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dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T08:16:38Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T08:16:38Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.date.submitted2009-11-12en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/10484
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a constrained stochastic control problem connected to a financial contract representing a virtual factory. Commonly known as tolling agreements, these contracts are traded in free energy markets and include exercise flexibility in volume as well as in timing. Allowing for very general models for jump-diffusion processes with possibly time-dependant jump intensity, we study the control problem under the dynamic programming framework. After rigorously proving the dynamic programming principle, we define viscosity solutions of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation, and show the value is the unique solution of the equation. In fact, we give an original proof of a strong comparison principle using the maximum principle for semicontinuous functions that avoids some of the problems connected with unbounded Lévy measures that have been investigated in recent research of several authors.eng
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMatematisk Institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
dc.relation.ispartofPreprint series. Pure mathematics http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-8076en_US
dc.relation.urihttp://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-8076
dc.rights© The Author(s) (2008). This material is protected by copyright law. Without explicit authorisation, reproduction is only allowed in so far as it is permitted by law or by agreement with a collecting society.
dc.titleVISCOSITY SOLUTIONS THEORY FOR TOLLING AGREEMENTS AND SWING OPTIONSen_US
dc.typeResearch reporten_US
dc.date.updated2009-11-12en_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2008 The Author(s)
dc.creator.authorWallin, Ollien_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::410en_US
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-23443en_US
dc.type.documentForskningsrapporten_US
dc.identifier.duo96755en_US
dc.identifier.fulltextFulltext https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/10484/1/pm04-08.pdf


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