| dc.description.abstract | Private cyber security companies have predominantly described Chinese cyber operations as information gathering. The existing literature in political science on cyber operations, however, have largely ignored this aspect of the phenomenon. Instead, the focus has been on the potentially destructive effects of cyber operations on digital systems and what this might mean for international politics. This thesis takes a more holistic view, seeking to establish to what extent Chinese cyber operations in the context of the South China Sea region align with the Chinese government’s publicly stated policy objectives. To illuminate this research objective, I develop a theoretical framework to categorise cyber operations as either decision advantage, compellence, or brute force. I draw on numerous sources of information to create a data set of likely Chinese cyber operations between 2014 and 2023. I apply the framework to this data and find that most incidents classify as information extraction. My findings show that Chinese cyber operations align well with their foreign policy. I infer the extent of alignment between cyber operations and policy by connecting the target of the operations and the effect applied to digital systems to the context in which the operations occurred. The research design presents an embedded case study to capture this logic of inference. The overall conclusion is that China collects information through cyber operations to obtain decision advantage, understood as a means of reducing the uncertainty of other states' intentions in international politics. The implications of my findings are twofold. Firstly, it underscores the need to analyse the alignment between cyber operations and policy. Secondly, it stresses the necessity of studying cyber operations as an instrument to achieve decision advantages more broadly. My work highlights the importance of developing a more nuanced understanding of the utility of cyber operations in international relations. | eng |