Abstract
In the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new liberal constitution of the Russian Federation from 1993 laid down a strong foundation for a society potentially moving towards a free and open democracy. In the Putin era new legislation has been put in place in order to limit, control and deny the right to assembly. Throughout the years the possibility to protest without consequences of getting fined, detained, or imprisoned, have become narrower. For the political opposition opposing the authorities this right has become close to non-existent, for the LGBT-movement of Russia, it has been even more severe and become almost non-existent. The process of applying for carrying out a protest is often complicated, and local and regional authorities have proven to either not respond, deny, or set up impossible terms. NGOs receiving funding from abroad, and later other organizations and legal persons have been added to different lists of foreign agents within the Russian Ministry of Justice (Minyust). Different online tools have been used by the opposition to mobilize, as well as by authorities, to detect and prevent bigger protests. In simple words we have seen the game of cat and mouse between protestors finding loopholes in new legislation trying to contain any opposition or not complying with the legislation by carrying out unsanctioned rallies or protests and between authorities constantly trying to tighten loopholes. Legislation is progressively restrictive. Stricter punishments and stricter laws, especially in light of the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 have made it more dangerous and riskier to protest. Authorities have shown an ability to maintain order. It is likely that if the Putin regime continues to be in power, legislation limiting the freedom of assembly and expression will not be liberalized. A state which by many political scholars have been described as authoritarian, has gradually and more rapidly moved towards becoming totalitarian. Why is this done? President Putin announced that Russia will never allow colour revolutions to take place in Russia. This overarching narrative sums up speech-acts performed by Russian authorities in order to justify their actions to limit personal freedoms through the tool of implementing legislation “containing” any opposition. So far, the Russian regime has shown little or no willingness to deescalate the conflict level with opposition forces like Navalny, and the regime is efficient at implementing new laws, as well as blocking websites and applications that may pose a threat to the regime.