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# An investigation of education as subjectification

*Biesta's use of example*

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## SUMMARY

### MASTER THESIS IN EDUCATION (PEDAGOGIKK)

<b>Title</b>	An investigation of education as subjectification: Biesta's use of example
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In this thesis, I explore the question of what Biesta's idea of education as subjectification consist in when it is seen in light of its examples. I first present my theoretical approach as belonging to philosophy of education and as related to philosophical hermeneutics. And, because I understand my methodological approach and my theoretical framework as being interrelated, I explore Lyons' and Korsgaard's theoretical insights in how examples were used and how they are still used today in relation to education. Drawing from Lyons, I explore the ideas of examples used as instantiations of particular claims and as being in excess in relation to what they exemplify. And drawing from Korsgaard, I examine three different ways in which examples can be used in relation to education: First, examples can be used to gain understanding of a particular phenomenon in studying instantiations of some of its features. Second, examples can be used as "entryways" arousing the student's curiosity for understanding complex subject matters. And third, examples can work as prompting emulation through the admiration of exemplary persons as well as being used in the formation of educational judgment. From this exploration, I outline three hypotheses about Biesta's use of examples: (1) examples are instantiations of particular features of education as subjectification, (2) examples do not instantiate particular features of education as subjectification. On the contrary, they are always betraying what they exemplify, they show the reader how education as subjectification happened in a particular and unique way in the past. And (3), examples are rhetorical tools that guide the reader towards a particular axiomatic interpretation, which could foreclose different ways of thinking about ambivalent phenomena.

In the second part, I present Biesta's idea of education as subjectification as it appears in his work with an emphasis on how it is presented in his latest book: *World-Centred Education*. Then, I examine some of the criticisms that Biesta's idea of education as subjectification has been exposed to. These criticisms are oriented toward the normativity and elusiveness of Biesta's idea, the oversimplifications that Biesta's framework seems to imply, and the imbalance in the importance of the world and the self in the idea of education as subjectification.

In the third part, I propose to analyze the seven examples of education as subjectification as they occur in Biesta's latest book. I thoroughly describe the context in which those examples occurred and, when it is possible, I gather information on the original context the examples have been taken from. I supplement this description with insights from Lyons' seven characteristics of examples which allowed me to go more in depth about the different aspects of the examples used.

Finally, I discuss the three research questions that this thesis is concerned with in light of the analysis of the examples: (1) What roles do examples have in Biesta's latest book? (2) What are the relationships between the examples and what is exemplified? (3) What are the implications of the examples used for education as subjectification? This discussion leads to intricate interrogations about what education as subjectification consists in. I suggest that seeking to understand education as subjectification through an analysis of the examples that are used brought a layer of complexity to Biesta's own account of education as subjectification. I suggest that the examples used have a rhetorical power which could conceal disputable premises and partial descriptions of reality, which could lead the reader to take the examples as commonsensical and simplify complex realities. I also explore the idea of examples as inviting reflections from the reader, an idea that I moderate by the fact that the contradictory elements of the examples are left out. Yet, I also suggest that some other examples worked as openings due to their lack of expressive references to something tangible and unequivocal.

Then, drawing from Lyons' and Korsgaard's theoretical insights, I propose to describe the relationship between the examples and what they exemplify as a relationship between instantiation and excess. Indeed, I point out that some characteristics of the examples used are in tension, even sometimes in contradiction with what they were supposed to exemplify. Here, I argue that the analysis of examples could raise deep questions about what Biesta's idea implies. On the one hand, I explore the idea of the internal tensions between the different examples and claims as potentially constitutive of education as subjectification. If education as subjectification is approached as something unreproducible and unforeseeable, as something that is given here and now, then some examples could be seen as representing education as subjectification in the only way they can, with all their excess and contradictions. On the other hand, I suggest that other examples lead to deep interrogations about the clarity of some of Biesta's general claims about education. Examining those claims through the prism of exemplification allows me to explore the tensions between what we say, how we say it, and how we show it. In Biesta's text, I underline that the meaning and implications of ideas such as "reality check" and "external control" become unclear, and that it raises questions about Biesta's understanding of freedom.

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# Introduction

Since my very first year as an undergraduate student of “Pedagogikk” at the University of Oslo, there has not been one semester where I did not read Gert Biesta. His books and articles were part of the literature in several subjects. As students, we have been reading Biesta in relation to the history of education, Curriculum studies, assessment, democracy and citizenship education. Biesta has indeed a long career in academia, has published many articles and has been cited many times (From 2,449 times according to Web of Science<sup>1</sup> to 7,544 times according to Scopus<sup>2</sup>). According to Web of Science and Scopus, his most cited works are on evidence-based practice and teacher agency. More recently, he has focused especially on what teaching is and why it is important to think about teaching in relation to education. His main recurring primary sources are philosophers and educationalists such as Dewey, Lévinas, Derrida, Foucault, Rancière, Arendt, Lingis, Bauman with the more recent addition of Klaus Prange, Philippe Meirieu, Dietrich Benner and Jean-Luc Marion.

During all those years, I enjoyed reading Biesta’s work a lot. I felt that his thinking was exactly capturing everything wrong with our consumerist society. More importantly, he warned us about the dangers of neoliberalism when it came to education. I thought that his work was recentering the debate around the questions that really mattered: how to exist as subjects in the world, not at the center of the world. I also enjoyed the challenges of thinking philosophically (or educationally as Biesta would certainly say) about education. I am very grateful that Biesta made me discover the ideas and concepts of authors such as Arendt, Lévinas, Mouffe and Rancière. With the work of Biesta in mind, I felt that I could finally see what education was *really* about. I

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<sup>1</sup> Web of Science, accessed 11.02.2022

<https://www-webofscience-com.ezproxy.uio.no/wos/woscc/citation-report/00eff802-5ffb-4c2d-bb64-ddfc5858a895-22d4e6fd>

<sup>2</sup> Scopus, accessed 11.02.2022 <https://www-scopus-com.ezproxy.uio.no/authid/detail.uri?authorId=16030478100>

began to enjoy using “his” expressions: “being at home in the world”, “existing as the subject of your own life”, “meeting your freedom”, etc. I too found that those phrases put words on a *reality* too often neglected. Originally, my plan was to use Biesta’s idea of education as subjectification to think about democracy and freedom in relation to the urgency of the climate crisis.

However, when I began to prepare the work for this thesis and after having read Biesta’s latest book *World-Centred Education: A view for the present*, I could see that I became more critical to Biesta’s work than I thought I would be. I could no longer answer with ease the questions about what the content and the implications of the above-mentioned expressions were. I began to question whether the appeal I had for Biesta’s theoretical framework found its justification grounded in good reasons or in good writing. Thus, my focus shifted from a question about the applicability of Biesta’s framework (making the assumption that his theory was sound and valid) to a focus on the internal logic of Biesta’s framework. In this sense, the theme of my thesis has gone from using the work of Biesta to answer an external question to examining Biesta’s work as and for itself.

In reading the literature on Biesta’s work, I noticed that Biesta was cited many times but was rarely the object of a close and/or critical reading. Thus, I decided to do such a close and critical reading of his latest book. As an entry point, I chose to focus on the examples that Biesta uses throughout his book. To narrow it down further, I chose to focus only on the examples that were related to his philosophy of education centered around the idea of education as subjectification. Education as subjectification is an idea present in several of Biesta’s books and articles. In this thesis, I am interested in the way it is presented in his latest book. I chose to focus mainly on this book because of the way that Biesta presents it, as “the culmination of [his] writing, speaking and teaching [he] ha[s] been involved in the past 35 years or so” (Biesta, 2021, p. vi).

In this thesis, the overall question that leads my investigation is: **what does Biesta’s idea of education as subjectification consist in?** In order to examine this question further, the idea is to look at the different examples that Biesta gives of education as subjectification and to explore



the relationships and implications of these examples in relation to Biesta's idea of education as subjectification. To this end, my research questions are:

- (1) What roles do examples have in Biesta's latest book?**
- (2) What are the relationships between the examples and what is exemplified?**
- (3) What are the implications of the examples used for education as subjectification?**

The research questions will be examined according to the following plan. I will first propose methodological reflections and theoretical insights on the use of examples. My approach in this thesis is philosophical, it can be seen as inspired by philosophical hermeneutics in the sense that my goal is to seek to understand an idea - education as subjectification - through a close reading of Biesta's latest book. Then, I give some theoretical insights in the literature on the past and present use of examples in order to explore the complexity of textual exemplification. Second, I present Biesta's idea of education as subjectification through a reading of selected books, then I go through relevant critical readings concerning Biesta's idea. Third, I give an account of Biesta's examples of education as subjectification and analyze their contexts, sources, and roles in Biesta's text. Fourth, I discuss the implications of my analysis for the research questions, and I will finally conclude this thesis by a summary of my main arguments.

## **1. Reflections on method and theoretical insights**

When it comes to the methodology of this thesis, as far as I can, I will make explicit and detailed the steps that I took and the influences that I have. However, it is important to keep in mind that the research questions of this thesis belong to the field of philosophy of education. On that matter, Ruitenberg (2009) notes that the question of method in philosophy of education is not something that is often reflected upon explicitly and taught as such in philosophy departments, "it is assumed that students learn to read and write philosophy by, well, reading and writing philosophy" (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 316). However, when philosophers of education work in

educational departments, the question of method can become a concern for two reasons. The first one is that the method used in philosophical papers is not something that precedes writing the paper, it is often something that can only be described in retrospect. The second reason is that philosophers of education might be concerned by the fact that “research methods in philosophy of education cannot be divorced from content” (p. 318). This implies that both the theoretical framework used and the text under scrutiny shape the methodological approach.

In this thesis, the question of method is also something that came to me afterwards despite being presented at the start. My methodological approach is also closely connected both to the theoretical framework - the literature on the use of examples - and with the text examined - Biesta’s latest book. This implied a focus on the examples in relation to their role in the text - illustrative, argumentative, etc. - on their relationship with what they exemplify - illustration, evidence, etc. - and on their implications for education as subjectification.

## **1.1. Philosophical hermeneutics**

My approach in this thesis can be viewed as related to Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutic” (Gadamer, 2004) first of all because this thesis is occupied with the interpretation of a text: Biesta’s latest book. Furthermore, one could recognize the idea of the hermeneutic circle through my examination of examples (parts of the text) in relation to the idea of education as subjectification (whole). It is important to specify that I understand the relation between part and whole as textual and not necessarily conceptual. As I will develop throughout this thesis, examples are not necessarily the manifestations of particular parts of a general concept.

Another way in which I can relate to Gadamerian hermeneutics is that I am neither seeking to recover the author’s intentions nor seeking to transpose the methods of natural sciences. Rather, I seek to understand Biesta’s idea of education as subjectification through a formulation of my situated understanding of the subject matter while always keeping Biesta’s text in the foreground. I privilege this hermeneutic approach with a questioning attitude insofar that “questions always bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing” (Gadamer, 2004, p.

383). Thus, the idea is not to apply a preconceived understanding of how things are (for this thesis: Biesta's ideas and exemplification), but rather taking into account my preconceptions and being open to the undetermined possibilities that exemplification and education as subjectification have.

However, an important difference between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and my approach has to do with the importance of time and history for Gadamer. Indeed, the main text that I examine here is from 2021 and can thus hardly be defined as historical. One could argue that the difference in generations and country of origin between Biesta and myself could function as a form of distancing between us, as belonging to two different horizons in Gadamer's words. Moreover, one could argue that I do not solely examine Biesta's latest book in order to understand his idea of education as subjectification. I also read both his earlier work on the subject and the critical readings that have been made on this work. Fay also argues for the importance of the community of interpreters in the construction of meaning in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics (Fay, 1996, p. 147). In that sense, I don't stand alone with Biesta's latest book. My reading is enlarged by the earlier criticisms that other interpreters have made before me.

However, I believe that the fact that I have no time distance with Biesta's latest text is a major element that makes the methodological approach of this thesis different from Gadamer's. This is why this thesis can only be described as related to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It does not follow Gadamer's line of thought in all respects.

It is also important to specify here that my interpretation will not rest on one text but on several: Biesta's texts, the texts that Biesta's examples come from, the texts commenting on Biesta and the literature on the use of examples. In that sense, the subject matter that I seek to understand will go beyond the primary text this thesis focuses on. In the following section, I explain in greater details what those texts are about and how they relate to each other.

## 1.2. The use of examples

At first glance, examples and their uses seem quite straightforward: They are helpful to make something abstract more concrete, to create a link between a general statement and its particular instances. They establish a common reference between the listener/reader and the speaker/writer. It often points to something that is already familiar, that everyone can relate to (Rønning, et al., 2012, p. 9). Hereafter, I will suggest enriching this definition in order to explore Biesta's use of examples with a broad perspective about their roles and the relationship they have with what they exemplify.

It is important to note that I do not attempt to define what an example is. I do not seek to find a single and universal meaning that could be attached to the use of examples. As mentioned earlier, I will rather look at exemplification as something that happens in discourse that has had many applications and manifestations. In order to account for the complexity of the use of examples, I propose hereafter to follow Lyons in a historical retrospective on the lexical use of the word "example" and of the words it has been related to: "*paradeigma*" and "*exemplum*". Then, I turn to Korsgaard's work to get an overview of the contemporary use of exemplification in the field of educational research.

### Historical retrospective on the use of examples

In his work on rhetoric, Aristotle categorizes examples (*paradeigma*) as part of "Common topics" (Aristotle, 2004, 1392a), which concerns the fact that, in order to convince an audience, "proofs and arguments must be contrived from the commonplaces" (1355a26-27). Aristotle claims that the "proofs common to all" are "*example* and *enthymeme*" (1393a24-26). Examples, according to Aristotle, are themselves of two kinds, "one species of example is the *narration* of preceding events, the other *inventing* them oneself. Of the latter one is comparison, the other fables" (1393a29-31). Aristotle adds that it is "easier to invent stories" than "to find similar events that have happened" (1394a2-3). Examples are parts of the inductive logic, which is usually not suited for rhetoric. For Aristotle, examples should come as persuasive "supplements" when used rhetorically (1394a14).

Lyons reminds us that, in ancient rhetoric, for both Aristotle and Cicero, the example (*paradeigma*) had the above-mentioned tripartite categorization: (1) Narration, (2) Fictional comparison and (3) Fable (Lyons, 2014, pp. 7-8). With his historical search on the lexicography of the word, Lyons shows how the approach to examples changes from ancient rhetoric to medieval and modern rhetoric. In the Roman languages, the word used to refer to examples was not *paradeigma* but *exemplum*. Interestingly, Lyons points out that the semantic distinction between *paradeigma* and *exemplum* reflects the tensions inherent to the meaning of the word “example” nowadays. On the one hand, Lyons writes that “*Exemplum* is, first of all, etymologically akin to the verb *eximere*, ‘to take out, to remove, to take away, to free, to make an exception of’” (p. 9). The word *exemplum* concerns therefore “a distinction made between a prior whole and a resultant fragment” (p. 9). Thereby, the word *exemplum* makes explicit the procedure involved in the act of exemplification, something that the Greek word did not. On the other hand, Lyons writes that:

*paradeigma* remains associated with a rhetorical function [...] for *paradeigma* is related to *paradeiknumi* (‘to exhibit side by side, to make comparisons, to indicate or point out’) and to *deiknumi* (‘to bring to light, to show forth’). The Greek term is therefore always associated with light, showing, seeing, and pointing; the Latin term concerns selection, excision, textual combination, and discontinuity. (Lyons, 2014, p. 10)

Thus, the two words refer to two different aspects of examples: the highlight with *paradeigma* and the selection with *exemplum*. Moreover, Lyons points out that the Latin word *exemplum* “came to be associated as much with the Greek *eikon* as with *paradeigma*” (Lyons, 2014, p. 10). Thereby relating to examples as having “the quality of seeming rather than of being, they are associated with *species* and *imago*, and are therefore within the realm of all that is specious and imaginary” (p. 10). Further, Lyons indicates that *exemplum* is sometimes equated with narration, which retains the characteristic of examples as being “a departure from the direct discourse of the orator” (p. 11) but no longer systematically possesses the characteristic of exemplifying a general claim. Finally, Lyons indicates that “the term *exemplum* reveals the importance of reproducibility in example, for *exemplum* denotes both the model to be copied and the copy or

representation of that model” (p. 11). *Exemplum* can point to an event of which a historical model can be found and understood as being the same.

When it comes to the Renaissance period, Lyons states that examples were used very often, he writes that “Humanist thought thrived on example” (Lyons, 2014, p. 12). The desire to “recover the wisdom of antiquity”, coupled with “the humanist emphasis on philology” (p. 12) was fertile to the use of examples. Lyons writes that “the compilation of collections of passages from ancient authors and thus of examples and quotations was not only a pedagogical practice [...] but became a staple of publishing” (p. 12). The 15th to 17th centuries have even been called “the age of exemplarity” (p. 12). Stories were used to prompt emulation and behavioral change to the public (p. 13). In that sense, examples had to be worthy of being imitated in order to induce emulation or rejection from the audience.

According to Lyons, an exception to this approach can be found in the work of Desiderius Erasmus, which returns to the Aristotelian notion of *paradeigma* and relates *exemplum* to rhetoric. Lyons reports that, for Erasmus, *exemplum* is not a type of discourse, “*example* is the term used for the function of a unit of discourse within a whole” (Lyons, 2014, p. 17). The role of examples, according to Erasmus, is “to expand the quantity of things one has to say while avoiding a fall into meaninglessness. Example gives some form to a mass that would otherwise lose its direction and structure” (p. 17). In that sense and contrary to Aristotle, Erasmus does not make persuasion a dominant role of examples. According to Lyons, the difference between Erasmus and other theorists of that period is that, for Erasmus, examples are selected with an “aesthetic-rhetorical criterion” (p. 18) and not a moral or religious one. In this context, what Erasmus brings to light is the diversity present in the use and purposes of examples, which goes beyond their use as either narration or exemplary.

From this historical retrospective, Lyons advocates for understanding examples in their complexity and not as mere rhetorical tools. He reproves the contemporary view that focuses almost exclusively on the manipulative character of examples, he writes that “making the example an absolute rhetorical tool [...] ignores the fact that example is only part of a discursive situation” (Lyons, 2014, p. 22). Examples always appear in a certain context. Moreover, there are

other discursive genres that are doctrinal and manipulative without resorting to the use of examples. From this critique, Lyons draws two implications for the study of examples. The first is that examples have to be analyzed within their context. Second, examples are more than their pragmatic use. In the present thesis, these two implications will be kept in mind.

Following from this historical retrospective, Lyons suggests seven characteristics of example that will be useful within the framework of this thesis. The first characteristic is double, it concerns “iterativity and multiplicity” (p. 26). On the one hand, the iterative character of example describes “the way a condensed textual statement stands for an extensive historical repetition of similar events” (p. 26). It has to do with the fact that a single example can stand for something that has happened several times. On the other hand, multiplicity is “the term that stresses the redundancy of example within a single moment (that is, the way speakers or writers give several at once as if to support a point)” (p. 27). Multiplicity describes the recurring character of examples that refer to the same moment. Thus, this double characteristic concerns the mutual relationship from one to many between the example and what it exemplifies.

The second characteristic is “exteriority” (p. 28). Lyons claims that “Example is a way of gesturing outside the pure discourse of the speaker/writer toward support in a commonly accepted textual or referential world” (p. 28). The example is about what can be seen and what you can “see for yourself” (p. 28). In that sense, it is exterior to knowledge and discourse, it belongs to the domain of appearances and perception. Moreover, exemplifying is taking something that is outside of the text and bringing it in. Exemplification is an interruption of speech by something that is exterior. In that way, Lyons argues that it works similarly as quotation, with the difference that quoting requires a shift in enunciation while exemplifying does not. In other words, when I quote, it is no longer me who speaks, whereas it is still me who speaks when I give an example. In that regard, Lyons argues that “quotation allows the speaker/writer to distance what he is saying whereas example requires the speaker/writer to adopt or bring closer that may come from far away” (p. 31). The characteristic of exteriority concerns this gesture of bringing something exterior into discourse.

The third characteristic is “discontinuity” (p. 31). It “concerns the status of example as fragment of another whole” (p. 31). The example is something that has been taken from one context to be put into another. Lyons emphasizes that “All examples are chosen, isolated from a context and placed into a new context within which they are visible precisely because this discontinuity fits into the rhetorical/discursive exteriority” (p. 31). Thus, examples are fundamentally discontinuous to the discursive context in which they are, and it is precisely this characteristic that makes them stand out of the discourse.

The fourth characteristic is “rarity” (p. 32). It describes “a complex system of values and expectations based on both extratextual and textual ideas about frequency of occurrence or normal behavior” (p. 32). On the one hand, the idea with rarity is that examples are often exemplifying something that is rarely occurring, something exceptional in character that justify why one would take this particular example rather than another similar to this one. On the other hand, rarity can be understood as occurring rarely in texts.

The fifth characteristic is “artificiality” (p. 33). Lyons writes that “The artificiality of example is its quality as a semiotic act” and adds that “To say that examples are artificial means simply to recognize that no example exists independently of the formulation of generalities and specific instances”, “an example is made by ‘inventing’ significance out of the continuum of experience or of prior statement” (p. 33). Lyons reformulates with the very enlightening formula: “Examples, in short, do not happen; they are made” (p. 33). What is interesting with this characteristic is the emphasis on the transformation that happens in the act of exemplification. Examples are not out there, waiting to be used. They are made by those who use them.

The sixth characteristic is “undecidability” (p. 33). This characteristic concerns the paradox inherent to exemplification insofar that it is part of the logic of induction while at the same time being about showing exceptional cases, as noted earlier with the characteristic of rarity. On the one hand, examples are based on the assumption that it is probable that something that has happened will happen again. While on the other hand, examples are often events exceptional in character, which imply that they would not be likely to happen again. In Lyons’



words: “example finds itself in the paradoxical position of arguing in favor of a norm while displaying the fascinating exception to the norm” (p. 34).

Last but not least, the seventh characteristic is “excess” (p. 34). Lyons argues that, because examples are taken from another context, their characteristics will always exceed the general claim that they exemplify. Lyons writes that “Example is excessive because any element of historical reality and even any fiction adduced to support a generalization will have characteristics that exceed what can be covered by the generalization” (p. 34). In other words, in using an example, one often highlights one aspect of the example that is common both to the original context of the example and to the new one. Thus, it leaves out all the other aspects that are not relevant while still being inherent aspects of the example.

To sum up, I have proposed so far to follow Lyons in his historical retrospective on the use of examples, from the Greek *paradeigma*, the Latin *exemplum* to the very recent work on examples and their alleged manipulative character. From this retrospective Lyons suggested seven interrelated characteristics of examples, which will be very interesting to keep in mind for the present analysis.

## **Contemporary use of example in relation to education**

As noted earlier with Lyons’ historical retrospective, the educational potential of exemplification has been present from a very early period (Lyons, 2014). In the following, I explore some ways in which exemplification can be discussed in relation to education. I focus mostly on the work of one author, Korsgaard (2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). For him, the connection between examples and education appears to be at least threefold.

First, Korsgaard claims that examples can be used in order to acquire knowledge about a particular phenomenon in studying particular instantiations of parts of this phenomenon. Korsgaard draws from the work of Elgin on the use of examples in science and art, where she defines exemplification as “the relation of a sample, example, or other exemplar to the features or properties it is a sample of” (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 273). According to her definition, an example “makes something manifest by possessing some feature and by referring to this feature”

(p. 273). In that sense, one could say that both the characteristic of the Latin *exemplum*, as taking something out (here a feature), and of the Greek *paradeigma*, as highlighting (here making something manifest) are represented.

Second, there is literature using examples as arousing curiosity (Korsgaard, 2019, 2020b). Inspired by the work of Wagenschein in science didactics, Korsgaard proposes to look at a second way in which examples can be used, which he calls “didactical exemplarity” (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 278). Didactical exemplarity consists in selecting exemplary content that will work as an “entryway” (p. 279) into the subject matter. Korsgaard underlines that this proposition goes against the idea of learning as going from simple to complex or following chronologically the discoveries made in a field. The idea is rather to give a direct insight into the current level of complexity of a subject through the use of a concrete example. In that way, the example would work as an “entryway” into the subject matter, which would raise the student’s curiosity and desire to understand the studied phenomenon.

And third, there is literature on exemplarity as encouraging emulation (Korsgaard, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, see also Croce, 2020). That is to say, on how moral education can happen through the emulation of moral exemplars. Here, what is interesting in the work of Zagzebski as presented by Korsgaard, is the relationship between exemplarity and direct reference. The idea is that virtue or moral character does not need to be explicitly defined but can be directly referred to through the emotional admiration that we feel for someone exemplary. In other words, I don’t need to be able to formulate why I admire someone in order to admire this person. As presented by Korsgaard, Zagzebski calls “into question instantiation as a necessary condition” for exemplification (p. 273). In other words, examples do not need to be preceded by a description of what they manifest. With our emotions, we could recognize them and refer to them directly. As noted earlier, this use of examples in order to prompt emulation can be traced back to “the age of exemplarity” (Lyons, 2014, p. 12). This form of exemplarism in education is referred to by Korsgaard as “pedagogical exemplarity” (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 277), which he defines as “moments when someone exemplifies - instantiates and makes explicit reference to - an ability or a character trait worthy of emulation” (p. 278). It is important to note here that the teacher himself can be an exemplary person worthy of emulation.

Moreover, Korsgaard (2020b) reflects on how examples can be used in the formation of educational judgments. For Korsgaard, exemplarity can be seen as an alternative to evidence-based practice in teacher formation (p. 1358). He claims that education cannot be fully understood through the prism of causality. Rather, Korsgaard agrees with Biesta that teaching is fundamentally about judgments and interpretations. In this domain, he argues that examples can guide the practitioner's actions by encouraging reflections on educational practices without giving a final answer to how things should be done. Contrary to evidence-based practices, Korsgaard claims that examples require taking another's perspective when reflecting on a particular complex educational situation. In his words: "The point being that examples can be more sensitive to the messy details of pedagogical practice than large-scale studies are. The link between the messy details here of course is educational judgment and pedagogical tact" (p. 1363). This has two interrelated implications, Korsgaard claims. The first is that the example "always betrays that which is supposed to exemplify" (p. 1362) because the example is always a particular instantiation of a general claim. Resulting from this, the second implication is that emulation is not about emulating particular actions but rather emulating educational judgment and pedagogical tact.

To sum up, the contemporary use of examples in education as presented through the work of Korsgaard can be seen as threefold. First, examples can be used to gain understanding of a particular phenomenon in studying instantiations of some of its features. Second, examples can be used as "entryways" arousing the student's curiosity for understanding complex subject matters. And third, examples can work as prompting emulation through the admiration of exemplary persons as well as being used in the formation of educational judgment.

### **Biesta's use of example: hypotheses**

When it comes to Biesta's use of example, one hypothesis could be that examples of education as subjectification could be seen as particular instantiations of some features of education as

subjectification. In that way, the exploration of Biesta's use of example could shed light on what the idea of education as subjectification consists in as the sum of its parts.

A second hypothesis could be that, if we take examples as being in excess, as "something which always betrays that which is supposed to exemplify" (Korsgaard, 2020b, p. 1362), then the correspondence between examples and general claims would no longer be straightforward. And, one could argue that this is precisely what Biesta wants to do with his examples of education as subjectification: to give examples that will not exhaust all possibilities of how to make education as subjectification happen. One could even argue that Biesta uses examples in a similar manner than Zagezbski's writings in moral education. Biesta's use of examples could be understood as a sort of direct reference to education as subjectification and thus be coherent with his idea of removing the explanations or descriptions of what those examples are about. In that sense, instead of representing features of education as subjectification, examples could be themselves the whole of education as subjectification. Examples could be narratives of events where education as subjectification happened.

Taking a more critical approach, one could also argue that the use of examples can work as a rhetorical tool that makes natural something which is not (Rønning et al. 2012). Rather than giving food for thought to educators, examples could guide the educators' actions and reflections in a particular direction and close themselves to alternative interpretations. If it is the case, there would be a contradiction in Biesta's text if the examples were to lead every reader to make the very same interpretation of a yet ambivalent phenomenon. Thus, analyzing Biesta's use of examples opens a possibility for revealing at the same time the strengths and weaknesses of Biesta's idea of education as subjectification.

## **2. Education as subjectification**

Hereafter give a chronological overview of Biesta's idea of education as subjectification as it appears in five different books, in addition to the book this thesis will focus on. The idea with the following part is to give an idea of how education as subjectification is conceptualized

throughout Biesta's texts before I go over to the analysis of examples. My intention is to give an idea to the reader about the wider context Biesta's claims and examples are a part of.

## **2.1. Before *World-Centred Education***

In the preface of the book *World-Centred Education* (2021), Biesta states that this book can be seen as the fifth of a series, in which the four first were: *Beyond Learning* (2006), *Good Education in an Age of Measurement* (2010), *The Beautiful Risk of Education* (2014), and *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (2017a). Thus, in order to present the work that led to his latest book in the series, *World-centred Education*, I give a brief summary of the four books that came before it in relation to the idea of education as subjectification. Moreover, I briefly mention another book that I saw relevant to read, *Letting Art Teach* (2017b), in which Biesta gives an example of what teaching is in the context of art education.

In *Beyond Learning* (2006), the idea of student as subject is already present even if the word "subjectification" does not appear. In this book, Biesta searches for a way to "overcome the humanist foundations of modern education" (Biesta, 2006, p. 4). According to him, the language of learning is a symptom of the will for control in education, which stems from humanism insofar that it essentializes human beings. Here, subjectivity is suggested as an alternative to essentialism, inspired by Arendt's theory of action.

The word "subjectification" appears first in *Good Education in an Age of Measurement* (2010), a book that explores the democratic question of what constitutes good education: what education should be good for and for whom? In order to put words on what constitutes good education, Biesta comes with the distinction between three domains of purposes of education: qualification, socialization and subjectification. Biesta claims that subjectification, i.e. encouraging students to be unique, irreplaceable subjects, is a core value that should be promoted both for education and democracy because we live in a world that is fundamentally plural. In that sense, Biesta claims that promoting freedom is a more desirable end than promoting learning, which he describes as an empty term. In this book, subjectification is described as a central

purpose of education even if the formulation “education as subjectification” does not appear as such.

In *The Beautiful Risk of Education* (2013), Biesta claims that risk is not something that should be eliminated from education. On the contrary, Biesta argues that risk is what makes education educational. In this book, Biesta explores the themes of creation, communication, teaching, learning, emancipation, democracy and virtuosity, in relation to what he calls the “weakness of education”, the fact that “educational processes and practices do not work in a machine-like way” (Biesta, 2013, p. x). Followingly, Biesta presents how the above-mentioned themes can be approached and what implications they have for education. First, he argues that the creation of human subjectivity in education should be approached in its weak existential understanding and not in a strong metaphysical sense. It should be understood as “a confirmation of what is already there” (p. 17). Second, in his exploration of communication (pp. 25-42), Biesta shows the limits of a conception of communication as the transfer of information from one individual to another, which runs the risk of closing the possibility for something new to happen. On the contrary, with insights from Derrida, Biesta takes a deconstructive approach to pragmatism and claims that communication is at the same time defined by its presence and its absence. Third, when it comes to teaching (pp. 43-58), Biesta sets a constructivist perspective on teaching against the idea of teaching as a gift, as bringing something fundamentally new to the student. Fourth, in his exploration of learning (pp. 59-76), Biesta advocates for a resistance to and refusal of the politics of learning and the learner identity. Fifth, on emancipation (pp. 77-99), Biesta draws his reflections from the work of Rancière against the idea that emancipation rests on inequality and dependency. Sixth, from Arendt, Biesta reflects on democracy and political existence (pp. 101-118). Contrary to Arendt, Biesta claims that schools should not be an apolitical space but rather a space where political existence is exercised. Last, the theme of virtuosity (pp. 119-137) stems from Aristotle's distinction between *poiesis* and *phronesis*. Here Biesta claims that it is fundamental that the teacher makes educational judgments about the purpose and content of education, and that this virtuosity can be mastered by making, practicing and observing other virtuous teachers. Summing up, Biesta argues that the notion of risk is a necessary condition for an education for freedom.

In *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (2017a), Biesta's reflections on education are close to the idea of education as subjectification as presented in his latest book. In *The Rediscovery of Teaching*, Biesta wants to make a case for "how teaching matters and what it matters for" (p. 11). He approaches the educational task as the act of encouraging students to "exist in and with the world in a grown-up way" (p. 13). Biesta advocates for "freeing teaching from learning" (p. 22), arguing that the questions of relationships, content and purpose are not covered by the term learning and are yet essential in education. Moreover, Biesta provides a reflection of the relationship between the world and human beings, arguing against a relationship of control where the world becomes an object for humanity to make sense of. On the other hand, Biesta draws from Lévinas another approach to signification which presupposes the possibility of revelation. The idea is that of signification happening in the encounter with what is fundamentally other, exterior and different from ourselves, instead of signification as something constructed or possessed by individuals. From this reflection, Biesta argues that teaching should provide openings to the possibility for someone to be interrupted in its being, to encounter something that is not already his or herself. Furthermore, in a discussion around Rancière's work, Biesta proposes to look at the idea of the teacher as acting under the assumption of equality in order to make emancipation possible. The last chapter of the book is dedicated to a reflection on the linear conception of time present in many educational discourses. On the contrary, Biesta suggests a non-temporal vision of education where the students' freedom does not run the risk of being indefinitely deferred and where the teachers "have faith" (p. 92) in what their students could do in spite of the lack of evidence for it. Biesta sums this book up by claiming that there is a third alternative to the authoritarian and the absent teacher. This option, according to Biesta, has to do with reconnecting teaching with freedom.

In *Letting Art Teach* (2017b), Biesta addresses what he sees as a double crisis in contemporary art education where both art and education disappear because of their instrumentalization. In his latest book, Biesta (2021, p. 59) writes that *Letting Art Teach* exemplifies the claims made in his precedent book, *The Rediscovery of Teaching*. The example given is Beuys's performance "How to explain pictures to a dead hare", which is first shown in the book through 30 different pictures of the performance accompanied with time codes of when



the pictures have been taken. Biesta claims that this performance shows something about teaching because it pictures the act of showing, which is “an archetypical form of teaching”: “someone showing *something to someone*” (Biesta, 2017b, p. 44). It pictures “an archetypical modality of teaching” (p. 45), explanation, which is about “bringing *someone* into reason” (p. 45). “An archetypical object” (p. 45), which is what the explanation is about, in this case, the pictures of Beuys’ performance. And figures “a message for the teacher” (p. 47) in the presence of the dead hare which, according to Biesta, “is not only a reminder to the teacher that education should never end up in control; it is at the same time [...] an image of the radical freedom of the student as subject.” (p. 48).

Hitherto, education as subjectification has been presented by Biesta as an important domain of purpose of education. Education as subjectification appeared as associated with human uniqueness and freedom, and it has been opposed to essentialism, objectification and control. An emphasis on teaching as central for education could also be noted, something that is also be essential in Biesta’s latest book. Very interestingly, the importance of exemplification in Biesta’s writing appears explicitly with *Letting Art Teach* (2017b), which is an entire book that exemplifies the claims of another book: *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (2017a). However, it is also interesting to note that this book is not mentioned as constitutive of the series of four books preceding *World-Centred Education*. It appears as a specification of the general claims made in another book, which could hint at the ambivalent status of exemplification: having enough importance to constitute one book but being presented by Biesta as a non-essential contribution to his theory.

## **2.2. Subjectification in *World-Centred Education***

In his latest book, Biesta focuses on what he claims is often marginalized or even missing in contemporary educational discourse and practice: “the event of subjectification” (Biesta, 2021, p. vii). This event, Biesta claims, always presupposes two subjects: an educator arousing the desire in a student to be a self, and a student being a self. In Biesta’s words: it is “when this dimension is absent, when either it is forgotten or actively being obliterated, that education ceases to be educational” (p. vii). When this dimension is missing, education turns into objectification.



Having said that, Biesta warns his readers that they will be disappointed if they look for concrete advice on how this could be put into practice. He claims that teaching is a practical art and as such, he argues that “the point of educational scholarship is not to tell educators what they should do, but to provide them with resources that may inform their educational artistry” (p. vii).

In the first chapter, Biesta explains the aim of this book. He begins by claiming that there are too many models and approaches that have the ambition to fix education, and that it is not the ambition of this book. Biesta claims that “the whole point of education can never be that of subjecting students to ongoing external control, but that education should always be aimed at enhancing the ability of pupils and students to ‘enact’ their own ‘subject-ness’.” (Biesta, 2021, p. 2). For Biesta, what is important is what students will do with what they learned in situations where their actions matter. In that sense, Biesta argues that the “existential question” is “the central, fundamental and, if one wishes, ultimate educational concern.” (p. 3) By that he means that

to exist as subject ‘in’ and ‘with’ the world is about acknowledging that the world, natural and social, puts limits and limitations on what we can desire from it and do with it - which is both the question of democracy and the question of ecology. (Biesta, 2021, p. 3).

Nevertheless, Biesta suggests that subjectification is not the only thing that shall be done with the children. Only, it has to be prioritized over the two other domains of purpose of education: socialization and qualification. Otherwise, Biesta claims that education ceases to be educational.

Biesta outlines that the chapters in this book are centered on two key ideas. The first idea is that “educational questions are fundamentally *existential* questions” (Biesta, 2021, p. 9). In other words, it is about how human beings exist in a world that is external to them and resistant to their desires. The second idea is that “the educational ‘work’ related to this existential challenge comes *to* the student”, which implies that “the basic educational ‘gesture’ is that of *teaching*” (p. 9). Finally, Biesta claims that educational questions are not future-oriented, “education has to take place *in the here and now*” (p. 11). Education is about what we do today, not about what society we want in the future.

To sum up, in the preface and the first chapter, Biesta outlines the main goal of the present book. Education as subjectification, or “the event of subjectification” is presented as something “marginalized” or “missing” (Biesta, 2021, p. vii). In opposition to control and measurement, Biesta proposes an existential approach to education where teaching is essential in opening possibilities for the student to “exist as a subject” (p. 7).

## **Revisiting old ideas: subjectification**

In *World-Centred Education*, Biesta revisits the purposes of education that he developed earlier: qualification, socialization and subjectification. Biesta wishes to come back with a particular attention to subjectification which he claims has often been misunderstood. Biesta begins by highlighting that it is freedom that is at stake with the domain of subjectification. Biesta defines his use of the concept of freedom in the following way:

what is at stake in the idea of subjectivity [...] is our freedom as human beings: our freedom to act or to refrain from action [...]. This is not freedom as a theoretical construct or a complicated philosophical issue, but concerns the much more mundane experience that in many, and perhaps all situations we encounter in our lives we always have a possibility to say yes or no, to stay or to walk away, to go with the flow or to resist - and encountering this possibility in one's own life, particularly encountering it for the first time, is a very significant experience. (Biesta, 2021, p. 45)

Biesta makes clear that it is not any type of freedom that is at stake with subjectification. He opposes “freedom of shopping” (p. 47) with “qualified freedom” (p. 48). The former is a definition of freedom centered around an individual's wants and needs disconnected from anything else. The latter, qualified freedom, is a freedom that decenters the individual from itself, a freedom that takes one's existence as integrated to one's environment, “an existence in and with the world”, as Biesta puts it (pp. 47, 48). Going further into the dichotomy, Biesta (pp. 48-49) draws from Arendt's theory of action to claim that a self-centered understanding of freedom implies (more or less) living in a phantasy, not coming to terms with reality.

When it comes to responding to the idea that the concept of subjectification is too vague, Biesta claims that subjectification is concrete and has to do with reality. He argues that

education [...] allows for a “reality check” of our initiatives, ambitions, and desires. This requires, among other things, that education does not remain conceptual but that there is something real at stake; that the world, in its materiality and sociality, can be encountered. (Biesta, 2021, p. 50).

An education for freedom is therefore an education in which the real interrupts one’s egocentrism. And, according to Biesta, the role of school should not only be to interrupt one’s self-centeredness, but also give the time to students to be interrupted, which is the principle of suspension.

Biesta claims that education is fundamentally about freedom because to relate to another as free individuals entails taking the other as a subject and not an object. Biesta claims that there is a risk inherent to education, because taking other human beings as subjects imply that you will no longer be sure whether your intentions as a teacher will have the effect you want them to have. Thinking of education in terms of subject-ness imply exposing oneself as a teacher to unpredictability and even frustration: children might not always “get it right” (pp. 55-56).

## **Exploring new ideas**

### ***(1) Givenness***

The new element that is presented in *World-Centred Education* is the addition of a new source: Jean-Luc Marion and his philosophy of givenness, which Biesta relates to teaching. This idea can remind the attentive reader of Biesta’s earlier discussion about teaching as a gift (Biesta, 2013) and about the possibility of revelation, i.e. the Levinasian idea of signification happening in the encounter with the Other (Biesta, 2017a). However, in his latest book, Biesta does not make an explicit connection between the two ideas.

Biesta claims that the central question of the work of Marion has been “whether and, if

so, how we can make sense of givenness, bearing in mind, as mentioned, that the whole point of ‘givenness’ is that it doesn’t emanate from and not even depends upon our acts of sense making, precisely because it is *given* and not taken” (Biesta, 2021, p. 63). According to Biesta, the nature of Marion's concept of givenness cannot be defined: it “needs a phenomenology” (p. 65). Givenness can only be understood by *how* it is. “What Marion is challenging here, in other words, is the idea of God as the first cause of everything, just as he is challenging the idea of the teacher as the one who is ‘in control’ and, more specifically, the teacher as the cause of ‘learning’.” (p. 65). The idea is to see the phenomenon of givenness in and of itself, without utter references.

Biesta explains that, for Marion, there are two attitudes towards things. The most common is that of objectifying the things and people that one encounters. This first attitude consists in “reducing the chances that those around us will surprise us; consequently we continually learn how to better control them” (Marion, 2017, p. 83, quoted in Biesta, 2021, p. 66). This attitude puts the individual in the center. On the other hand, the second attitude towards things takes into account the phenomenon of givenness as resisting objectification on our part. Rather, givenness implies a retrieval of the ego. The “I” becomes the receiver of the given, “the subject is no longer *before* the world, *before* the phenomenon - in space and in time - but rather ‘receives itself from what it receives’” (Marion, 2017, p. 86)” (Biesta, 2021, p. 68). In that sense, givenness is an existential matter. From an educational point of view, it has to do with “being taught”, according to Biesta (p. 68).

From Marion’s approach, Biesta proposes “three ways in which givenness manifests itself *in* teaching and *as* teaching” (Biesta, 2021, p. 68). The first gift of teaching is concerned with curriculum. Education, according to Biesta, should be about giving students “what they *didn’t* ask for, first and foremost because *they didn’t even know they could ask for it.*” (p. 70). Education should be about giving students what they need, not what they want. In that sense, the school could be seen as “a place of revelation” (p. 71). When it comes to the second gift of teaching is concerned with didactics, it has to do with Kierkegaard’s notion of “double truth giving”, which according to Biesta is about “the idea is that teaching is not just about giving students the truth [...] but also and at the very same time about giving them the conditions ‘of recognising it as a

truth” (Biesta, 2021, p. 71). In that sense, teaching is a double gesture of giving “the truth” (p. 71) and the conditions in which one is able to receive the truth. Biesta claims that we encounter this gift “where we are not just given what lies within the scope of our current understanding, but are given what lies *beyond* that scope” (p. 72). The third gift of teaching is concerned with the existential work of education. It is about the fact that our freedom can never be taken for granted. In line with Rousseau, Biesta claims that our freedom is under constant threat from the inside (with our passions) and from the outside (with societal demands). Teaching is thus faced with the challenge of giving the student his or her freedom (p. 72).

To sum up, Biesta claims that it is teaching and not learning that is the essential characteristic of education. With the three gifts of teaching, Biesta claims that he has shown that there is more to education than learning, and that the language of learning is ill equipped to capture the complexities of education. He argues that this discussion around givenness “opens up” thinking about education as “being taught by” (Biesta, 2021, p. 73).

### ***(2) Education as pointing***

In the sixth chapter, Biesta (2021, p. 75) expands on the ideas developed in *The Rediscovery of Teaching* (2017a) and *Letting Art Teach* (2017b). He focuses on the form of teaching and, because he claims that teaching is the essential gesture of education, on the form of education. Biesta claims that education entails a specific gesture, that of pointing, which he formulates as “the basic gesture of teaching is that of trying to (re)direct the attention of the student to something” (p. 77). In this regard, Biesta agrees with Prange that educational pointing is not about control. On the contrary, it involves the student’s freedom.

### ***(3) Education as World-Centred***

In the seventh chapter, Biesta (2021, pp. 90-92) explores the idea of world-centered education, which he claims is central to this book. Biesta focuses on the question of how human beings encounter the world and why it matters for education. He suggests that two gestures going in opposite directions are important for education. On the one hand, the most common one is that of understanding, making sense of the world. On the other hand, Biesta claims that we can also be

called by the world, letting ourselves be surprised by it, listening to “what the world is asking from me” (p. 91). In order to explore this second gesture, Biesta explores the works of three authors: Roth, Mayer-Drawe and Marion.

Biesta presents Roth critique of the limitations of the “constructivist metaphor” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 92-95). Roth makes first the observation that “in educational settings students are asked to learn something they do not yet know” (p. 93). This observation leads to a contradiction according to Roth. How could the student construct something they do not know they are constructing? Roth concludes that the constructivist metaphor is unable to explain a wide range of human experience, within which lies the phenomenon that Roth calls “passibility”, which he defines as “our capacity to be affected” (Roth 2011, p. 17, quoted in Biesta, 2021, p. 93). To illustrate what he means by that, he takes the example of tasting a new food. From this example, he claims that we “cannot intentionally construct the smell and taste”, but rather “have to open up and allow ourselves to be affected” (Roth 2011, p. 18, quoted in Biesta, 2021, p. 93). There, Roth concludes that our capacity to be affected precedes our capacity to think, our cognition. We cannot think about what smelling is before we let ourselves be affected by an odor.

Thus, Biesta argues that not only people, but also things from the world, call us. In that sense, he emphasizes that “in a world-centered education it is the world that provides the demand, and not the teacher” (Biesta, 2021, p. 99). The teacher’s role is to redirect the student’s attention to the world’s demands. And this act of pointing is never an order but always a call that “reminds the student of his or her own freedom” (p. 99). Education is not about causality according to Biesta, the educator will never be sure that his or her call will reach out, will be answered.

To sum up, Biesta’s latest book could indeed be seen as the continuation of a series since the themes covered could appear as an elaboration of what he has already written about. Three aspects seem relevant to keep in mind. First, the fact that freedom is a central notion in education as subjectification. The second is that education is fundamentally about teaching, which is approached as a gift. And the third is the special attention to the form of teaching - pointing -

which consists in a double gesture: pointing at *something* to *someone*, which implies an attitude of letting oneself be affected by the world.

So far, I have presented Biesta's idea of education as subjectification through the reading of his five main books. In doing so, I hope to have given the reader a fair and nuanced account of what Biesta stands for. In the following, I look at different criticisms that Biesta has been exposed to regarding his idea of education as subjectification.

### **2.3. Critical readings of Biesta**

In this part, I selected the main critiques that I found relevant when it comes to Biesta's idea of education as subjectification. These criticisms have been made in relation to Biesta's earlier work. I will judge their potential applicability and relevance for Biesta's latest book in my analysis of examples and in the discussion.

#### **Normativity and Elusiveness**

The first difficulty that can be found with the idea of education as subjectification concerns the prescriptive nature of Biesta's framework. For MacAllister (2016), the overly prescriptive nature of Biesta's framework becomes an issue when Biesta makes an unjustified equivalence between thinking the purposes of education with thinking good education. Another difficulty with this normativity is that, according to MacAllister, it prevents Biesta from seeing outside of his own framework. It seems that for Biesta, the only way of thinking what good education should be is finding the right balance between qualification, socialization and qualification. On the other hand, MacAllister (2016, p. 379) shows with the example of Peters, that there are other ways to think about the purposes of education.

In addition to the criticism regarding the prescriptive nature of Biesta's framework, MacAllister (2016) finds Biesta's concept of subjectification "rather elusive" (p. 381). He writes

that “the particular ways in which curriculum knowledge may enable subjectification are far from clear” (p. 381). MacAllister recognizes the importance of meeting individuals as unique beings. He agrees with Biesta that education should encourage individuals to “think for themselves” (p. 384). However, what MacAllister disagrees on is the idea that “Biesta seems to here suggest that there is an unhelpful surplus of reason in education that constrains possibilities for subjectification. Rational communities stifle the emergence of human uniqueness and inhibit persons from challenging accepted social orders.” (p. 383). On the contrary, MacAllister rather agrees with McIntyre in that “the reduction in opportunity for public debate about the common good is due to a *lack of reason* in public institutions rather than a surplus of it” (p. 383). According to MacAllister, MacIntyre suggests at least two ways in which one can think for oneself while he notes that Biesta does not make explicit how students could be encouraged to speak in their own voices. The first would be that “persons can learn to think for themselves via rational debate with others about matters concerning the common public good” (p. 384). The idea would consist in questioning unjust social orders that are maintained by the rhetoric of the powerful by thinking together about common goods. The second way suggested by MacIntyre would be that “persons can learn to think for themselves by reading and then debating canonical texts” (p. 384).

To sum up, while agreeing with the fact that education should not only seek to qualify and socialize, MacAllister disagrees with the *what* and the *how* of subjectification. Contrary to Biesta, he understands subjectification as “thinking for oneself” and not “speaking in one’s own voice”, which he sees as quite abstract. Moreover, MacAllister suggests ways in which “thinking for oneself” can be brought about, something that Biesta does not do, according to MacAllister.

### **Oversimplified relationship between the domains of purposes**

When it comes to the relationship between the three domains of purposes of education, Papastephanou’s (2020, pp. 277-278) criticism concerns the three domains of purposes and their relationship to emancipation. She points out that Biesta makes a very clear distinction between subjectification, which is linked to emancipation, and qualification and socialization, which are



not linked to emancipation. On the other hand, Papastephanou gives the counterexample of studying at university. There, one can be socialized and qualified into spaces where an interruption of pre-existing social order is encouraged. In that sense, Papastephanou argues that “the relationship of these three domains with one another and with emancipation may be far more complex than Biesta’s neat account enables us to think” (p. 278).

Thus, Papastephanou argues that Biesta’s framework does not account for the complexity of the world. Qualification, socialization and subjectification are conceptualized as distinct entities and emancipation is only thought of in relation to the domain of subjectification. However, with the example of studying at the university, Papastephanou shows that it is not as simple as Biesta presents it to be and that emancipation could also be seen in relation to qualification and socialization.

### **Imbalance between world and self**

Similarly to Papastephanou, Rømer notes the imbalance between the three domains of purpose that Biesta presents. Rømer (2021, p. 39-40) claims that different contradictory interpretations of Biesta’s three domains of purposes of education are possible due to Biesta’s post-structuralist influences. On the one hand, there is a possible interpretation of the three domains of purposes of education as equally standing when represented in a Venn diagram. On the other hand, Rømer argues that another interpretation seems to be possible as well. This second interpretation stems from the fundamental nature that Biesta attributes to subjectification. In Biesta’s writings, the domain of subjectification seems to become a defining characteristic of education that gives substance to qualification and socialization. In that sense, the three domains of purposes are no longer equally standing and the self is put to the forefront. With this second interpretation, Rømer identifies the tension between post-structuralist influences and the German *Bildung* tradition. It is the uniqueness of each individual that seems to matter the most with subjectification as a defining feature of education. The relationship of the individual to his or her surroundings, to the world, which is essential in the *Bildung* tradition, is left in the background.

In this end, the overall critique that Rømer has toward Biesta's work is his undermining of the world in order to bring the self forward. Said differently, in undermining both the concept of Bildung and the importance of socialization and qualification, Biesta leaves the "world" out of the picture to focus almost exclusively on the subject (Rømer, 2021, p. 42). The ontological nature of the world is reduced to a superficial understanding of it. Rømer argues that this is due to Biesta's post-structuralist critique of the concept of culture, which makes him neglect the world and its historical nature.

Another critique that goes in the same direction comes from Straume. In an article from 2015, Straume argues that Biesta's conception of democracy is turned toward the self as well and looks away from the worldly manifestations of democracy, institutions. Straume (2015) claims that Dewey's and Gutmann's conception of democracy encourages social integration; they focus on shared values and experiences. Biesta however, acknowledges the agonal nature of democracy but, in the same way as Dewey and Gutmann, he fails to see the importance of what Straume calls the "what" of politics (p. 32). In that sense, he focuses exclusively on the "how" and the "who" of politics (p. 32) while the "what", institutions, are never discussed. The point that Straume makes in this article is that: "To become engaged in politics, we must be able to focus our attention on the world, not only on ourselves, and the things, ideas and institutions that are *between* and *around* us." (Straume, 2015, p. 43).

In a sense, one could argue that, even if Rømer's and Straume's critiques are centred on different parts of Biesta's work, they both note the same imbalance. Biesta's focus is inward, toward the self, and the world is at least partially overlooked.

### **The different critiques and their implications**

The first two critiques addressed by MacAllister concerned the prescriptive nature of Biesta's framework and the elusiveness of the idea of education as subjectification. In this thesis, it will be very interesting to see whether the examples given by Biesta in his latest book would counter those two criticisms. Indeed, examples could give a more concrete nature to an abstract idea. They could also bring a more descriptive and plural account of Biesta's framework if the

examples are varied. The third critique addressed by Papastephanou concerning oversimplification of the relationship between the three domains of purpose of education could be addressed by examples as well, if limits or counterexamples are discussed. Finally, the fourth critique addressed by Rømer and Straume concerned Biesta's emphasis on the individual subject and his minimization of the World at the ontological level. Similarly to Papastephanou's criticism, Rømer and Straume suggest that Biesta's reflections could lead to a reductive account of reality. Here, examples could also bring about the complexity of the world that appears to be undermined.

### 3. Analysis of examples

In this part, I analyze the seven examples that are examples of education as subjectification<sup>3</sup>. The first example - the Parks-Eichmann's paradox - exemplifies what education as subjectification is through the prism of what the educational reality is. The second example - Homer Lane and Jason - is an example of education as subjectification understood as direct education. The third example - "Hey, you there! Where are you?" - exemplifies education as subjectification as being summoned. The fourth example - "You, look there!" - is an example of the double gesture of teaching in education as subjectification. The fifth example - mathematics teaching - is an example of teaching as double truth giving in education as subjectification. The sixth example - walking as a first-person matter - exemplifies Biesta's idea of freedom in relation to education as subjectification. The seventh example - Marion's example of a painting - exemplifies the idea of the given in relation to education as subjectification. Each example is examined thoroughly within its context of occurrence, its original context and its role in argumentation.

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<sup>3</sup> When it comes to the selection of the examples that I analyze in this thesis, I first made a temporary selection of the examples I found relevant in my second reading of Biesta's latest book. Then, I made a table (Appendix 1) classifying all the occurrences of the words "example" (62 times), "case" with the meaning of "being a case of" (13 times), "instance" (3 times) and "e.g." (6 times), using a digital version of Biesta's book. Then, I retrieved the context of those occurrences, often one paragraph before and/or after the word, and examined what those passages were the example of or for. From this table, I extracted the examples that were related to education as subjectification. This implies that I have been interested in so-called "explicit examples" (Lyons, 2014, p. 26), examples that are referred to explicitly as examples.

### **3.1. Parks-Eichmann paradox and educational reality**

As noted, the first example exemplifies what education as subjectification is through the prism of what the "educational reality" is (Biesta, 2021, p. 26). This first example is of particular importance in Biesta's latest book. It is a complex example for two reasons, the first one is because it is used several times in Biesta's latest book. The second one is because it is an example that is grounded in two historical situations, that of Rosa Parks and that of Adolf Eichmann, which have been taken up and commented upon many times before by historians, philosophers, etc (e.g. Arendt, 1963, Lipstadt, 2011, p. 147). Hereafter, I examine first how this example is presented. Second, the role it has in the argumentation. Third, how the example is used beyond chapter three, in which it is central.

#### **Parks and Eichmann: Presentation**

In Biesta's latest book, the example of Parks and Eichmann appears first of all in the very title of the third chapter: "The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education" (Biesta, 2021, p. 25). The example is presented at the start of the chapter. Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann are presented as "cases" twice (pp. 28, 37) and as a paradox several times (pp. 26, 27, 28, 29, 36, 37, 75).

The Parks-Eichmann paradox is presented by Biesta as a point of departure for his reflections on the incompleteness of what he describes as the prevailing description of educational reality, education seen as a process of cultivation. In his words:

The question that I address in this chapter is [...] to what extent the prevailing description of educational *reality* that can be found in contemporary research, policy, and practice can be considered complete. The motivation for asking this question stems from an educational paradox to which I will refer to as the "Parks-Eichmann paradox" (Biesta, 2021, p. 26)

This paradox, which he qualifies as “educational” (Biesta, 2021, p. 26), shows that something is missing from the description of educational reality when it is understood as cultivation. According to Biesta, the examples of Parks and Eichmann represent situations which cannot be explained in a satisfying way by the prevailing description of the educational reality. Moreover, Biesta asserts that the question of the incompleteness of “the prevailing description of educational reality” is similar to the question that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen asked about the incompleteness of physical reality (p. 26). The comparison is even drawn indirectly further by using Einstein’s phrase to describe the educational reality, which itself is used in describing the Parks-Eichmann paradox. Biesta presents the original version of the paradox in the field of physics as follows:

In the paper the authors argued that the prevailing interpretation of quantum mechanics - the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation” - contained a paradox and could therefore not be seen as a *complete* description of physical reality. The paradox [...] has to do with the fact that particles can interact in such a way that it is possible to measure both their position and their momentum more accurately than Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle would allow for, unless measuring one particle would *instantaneously* affect the other. The latter, however, would require that information travels faster than light, and such “spooky action at a distance”, as Einstein called it, was considered to be impossible. (Biesta, 2021, p. 26)

To describe what he considers to be missing in the prevailing description of education, Biesta (2021, p. 34) uses Einstein’s phrase in the following:

If, from the paradigm of cultivation, such direction<sup>4</sup> education is the kind of action at a distance that is considered impossible and hence can only appear as “spooky”, in the existential paradigm of education such direct education, **such spooky action at a distance**, actually goes to the heart of the matter, perhaps first of all literally, because the “Hey, you there, where are you?” speaks to the heart. (The highlight in bold is added by me) (Biesta, 2021, p. 34)

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<sup>4</sup> It seems that there is a typographical error here. It seems probable that it should be written “direct”, not “direction”.

And, the injunction that Biesta writes about, “Hey, you there, where are you?” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 33), is itself a question that is said to be equivalent to the Parks-Eichmann paradox. This question will be examined as an example of its own in part 3.3. According to Biesta:

In very simple terms that go to the heart of the matter, this summoning happens when we say “Hey, you there, where are you?” - and I have shown that when Eichmann encountered this question he almost literally said “I wasn’t here,” “It wasn’t me,” “I was only following orders”. (Biesta, 2021, pp. 33-34)

Here, Biesta is asserting that this summoning is what happened to Eichmann when he writes that “Eichmann encountered this question”. Thus, what Biesta seems to be doing here is to make equivalences between a historical situation and a fictional question: “Hey, you there, where are you?” (I discuss this equivalence further in 3.3.). Another equivalence is further made between the aforementioned fictional question and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Said differently, it seems that Biesta is implying that the uncertainty and entanglement that are characteristics of the physical reality are also characteristics of the educational reality. Thereby, the Parks-Eichmann paradox functions as evidence taken from reality in the same way that Einstein and his colleagues found measures that were paradoxical when understood in light of the Copenhagen interpretation. The characteristic of being evidence taken from reality can prompt reflection relative to Lyons’s characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33). On the one hand, the example of Parks and Eichmann could be understood as being part of an inductive logic, as evidence for how educational reality is. Parks and Eichmann could be seen as reflecting their time, being an example among many others. On the other hand, the example of Parks and Eichmann can be seen as extraordinary, as precisely not representative of how things usually are. Indeed, one could argue that it is because Parks and Eichmann did something different that they have gained an exemplary status. Among others, Croce (2020) states that “Rosa Parks is a paradigmatic case of an epistemic hero, namely one who left an unforgettable mark in the history of the civil right movement by refusing to give up her seat” (Croce, 2020, p. 195). Similarly, Arendt’s famous book on Eichmann’s trial focused only on Eichmann’s deeds and regarded witnesses’ stories as irrelevant (Lipstadt, 2011, pp. 151-152), which made Eichmann stand out as

a person and thereby became exemplary. In that sense, the characteristic of rarity (Lyons, 2014, p. 32) is also manifest in the fact that Parks and Eichmann are not anybody. They are historical figures that historically stand out. They have been and continue to be written about.

### **Parks and Eichmann: the argumentation**

When it comes to the place of this example in Biesta's argumentation. The "Parks-Eichmann's paradox" presented by Biesta (2021, p. 28) could be rendered with the following argumentative steps:

- (1) Parks's "I" was present because she acted by herself against the current societal order. She stood for her action despite its possible consequences.
- (2) Eichmann's "I" was absent because he said he was only following orders, he did not want to face the consequences of his actions.
- (3) **If** education is only understood as bringing about certain predetermined outcomes,
- (4) **Then** (4.1) Eichmann's actions can count as successful learning because he did what was expected of him, whereas (4.2) Parks's actions can count as learning failure because she did not do what was expected of her.
- (5) **Because (4) cannot be accepted as true, then it follows that (3) is not true either**

The paradox is then taken up several times in the chapter to illustrate and justify why his description of the educational reality can be considered as incomplete when described through, for example, the perspective of Dewey's education as cultivation, or through the perspective of Benner: which acknowledges the existential question but leaves a central position to learning.

Here, the line of arguments relies on the idea that the example given is indeed an evidence taken from reality. However, one could argue that the correspondence between Biesta's depiction of the example and the example as historically anchored is arguable. Biesta is claiming that this paradox can help to choose which theory has a better explanatory power in the same

way that Einstein and colleagues did in the field of physics. I question this argumentation and turn to philosophy of science to explain why. Ladyman (2002) explains under the Duhem problem that, in order to rule out a theory over another through the empirical evidence that a theory entails, one needs not only to have a theory but also auxiliary assumptions. And, when a theory does not entail the predicted empirical consequences, one cannot infer whether it is the theory that is false or if it is the auxiliary assumptions, or both.

Ladyman presents it as follows:

$(T \& A) \vdash e$  This says that  $T$  together with some sets of auxiliary assumptions *entails*  $e$

$\neg e$  This says that  $e$  is false

$\neg (T \& A)$  This says that the conjunction of  $T$  and the auxiliary assumptions is false

Now  $\neg (P \& Q)$  is logically equivalent to  $\neg P$  or  $\neg Q$ . (Ladyman, 2002, p. 79)

In that sense, it seems to me that Biesta cannot rule out the theory of education as cultivation with this line of argument alone. What is missing is a determining criterion for why his auxiliary assumptions (1) and (2) cannot be ruled out. For that matter, I believe that there is room for criticism concerning Biesta's initial assumptions. Indeed, Biesta relies on Arendt's interpretation of Eichmann's motives, that he was only following orders. The problem is that this interpretation has been contested by historians, "following orders" being now interpreted by many as Eichmann's line of defense rather than something sincere he would have said. From his memoirs and other interviews he had, it appears that Eichmann was very involved in Nazi ideology at the time and was anti-Semite. In the words of Lipstadt:

In the newly released memoir, Eichmann expressed himself as an inveterate Nazi and anti-Semite. In contrast to claims that would be made by Hannah Arendt that he did not really understand the enterprise in which he was involved, the memoir reveals a man who considered his Nazi leaders to be his "idols" and was fully committed to their goals (Lipstadt, 2011, p. xix).



When it comes to the agency of Parks, it seems to me that this claim (1) needs to be justified since she claims to be following the rules of bus seats allocation, as it is described in the source Biesta enjoins us to check to get details on Rosa Parks (Taylor, 2015). There it is written that “[s]he didn’t think it was fair that she had to stand for someone else to sit who arrived after her and that she was not violating the city ordinance”. In that sense, she did not violate the societal order she found herself in but rather refused an order that she did not judge as justified in regard to the rules. Rosa Parks followed the rules but did not follow orders that went against the rules. Here, I do not see on what grounds Biesta is able to say that “Parks did step forward as an ‘I’ – an ‘I’ who asserted that she no longer wanted to be part of the particular societal order she found herself in” (p. 29). Said differently, I do not see how Biesta concludes that Eichmann acted because of external forces whereas Parks acted on her own accord. It seems to me that this conclusion ought to rest on a fine description of the conditions in which Eichmann and Parks acted, something that Biesta does not provide here. The description of the societal order in which Parks and Eichmann are in seems to be oversimplified and unidimensional. Moreover, Parks’ and Eichmann’s states of mind are taken as a matter of course by Biesta. The details and nuances are left out of the picture and Biesta’s interpretation of the two situations appears to be equated with the two situations in their historicity. Here, one could see a confirmation of MacAllister’s criticism concerning the prescriptive nature of Biesta’s framework which does not seem to allow him to see beyond it (MacAllister, 2016). Indeed, the situations of Parks and Eichmann are only interpreted in the light of Biesta’s framework and the fact that other interpretations might be possible is not even mentioned.

The other reason for which the argumentation can be seen as problematic is that (3) is a claim about the goal of education that would imply that the proponents of education as cultivation would be in favor of indoctrination. On the other hand, I find it difficult to believe that anyone in democratic regimes would claim that education is about controlling how people would choose to live their lives outside of the scope of schooling. Biesta is making a disputable equivalence between “bringing about certain predetermined outcomes” (Biesta, 2021, p. 28) and “ha[ving] learned to listen well” (p. 28), following orders. A justification would be needed to claim that wanting students to get the right answers to the test resembles following orders from

an illegitimate or amoral authority. In other words, it seems that Biesta is making a strawman out of its opponent (education as cultivation) and that it does not seem to be a fair representation of what anyone stands for in democratic societies. And, if it is, more information and sources would be needed in order to understand how such a strong claim can be justified. In that sense, the logic of the argument should go the other way around. It is because (3) cannot be accepted as true that (4) is unlikely. It is because nobody stands for the thesis that education is only about bringing certain predetermined outcomes that the alleged success of Eichmann and the alleged failure of Parks cannot be accepted as true. And this begs the question, who does interpret Eichmann to be a success and Parks a failure? Would a proponent of education as cultivation analyze the two situations as such without being inconsistent? In other words, is there a Parks-Eichmann paradox at all?

To sum up, the example used by Biesta is central to his argumentation. What he calls “the Parks-Eichmann paradox” is taken as evidence that the prevailing description of educational reality is incomplete. It is therefore important that Parks and Eichmann are historical examples since Biesta claims to be doing the same demonstration that the one done by Einstein and colleagues in the field of physics. The paradox is what motivated him to ask this question and what justifies the addition of a new dimension to the description of educational reality, the existential dimension. However, contrary to what Einstein and colleagues did in physics, Biesta’s argumentation does not rest on a detailed description of the historical examples used but rather on a partial interpretation of the meaning of these two historical events seen from the educational angle. Therefore, there seems to be a difference between what Biesta claims that these examples say and what they are actually in capacity to tell us about the “educational reality” as seen from outside Biesta’s normative framework.

### **Parks and Eichmann: use beyond chapter three**

Moreover, the example of Parks and Eichmann is not only mentioned in chapter three, but appears as well in the rest of the book (Biesta, 2021, pp. 53, 61, 75). It occurs first in relation to what subjectification is not, more precisely, that subjectification is not individuation:

It is perhaps not too difficult to see now, that subjectification should also be distinguished from individuation. [...] After all, both Parks and Eichmann were individuals, had learned and developed, but they ended up doing something quite differently with all that. This also means, and this is important too, that subjectification should not be understood as a process of becoming, as a development towards being a subject. Subjectification is what always interrupts our becoming, so we might say. It is an event that always occurs in the here and now, not in some distant future. (Biesta, 2021, p. 53)

This use of Parks and Eichmann's example could be understood as an appeal to common sense with the phrase "After all" introducing the example (Biesta, 2021, p. 53). This could hint to the fact that the merits and soundness of this example as evidence of the nature of "educational reality" is already established as a matter of fact. The historical anchor of the example is indicated by the predicate that "both Parks and Eichmann were individuals" (p. 53). Indeed, Parks and Eichmann are not presented as narratives or prototypical figures but as individuals that "had learned and developed" but that "ended up doing something quite differently with all that" (p. 53). In doing so, the status of this example as evidence from reality is reinforced, which makes the scale tip over toward the example belonging to the inductive logic when seen in light of Lyons's characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33).

In the fifth chapter "Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching" (pp. 58-74), the example of Parks and Eichmann occurs in a very similar way in the discussion about the limits of thinking education in terms of learning. The example occurs as such:

After all, as I have shown in Chapter 3, Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann both learned, but where they differed was in what they did with their learning. Where they differed, in other words, was in how they brought their "I" into play in relation to everything they had learned. (Biesta, 2021, p. 61)

Here, the ideas that "Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann both learned" and that "they differed with what they did with their learning" (Biesta, 2021, p. 61) are very similar to the precedent time this example occurred (p. 53). The example is introduced by the phrase "After all" as well (p. 61).

What is added here is an internal reference to the third chapter of this book with the phrase “as I have shown in Chapter 3” (p. 61), which can add a form of authority to the example, confirming that the example has already been established as valid. This can be seen in relation with Lyons’ characteristics of exteriority and discontinuity (Lyons, 2014, pp. 28-31). The example points outside of Biesta’s current enunciation and draws in something that has already been said. In that way, one could argue that the original example appears as something known to the reader, as something that can be seen as a common ground on which reader and writer have agreed upon.

At the very beginning of the sixth chapter “Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 75-89), the Parks and Eichmann’s example occurs one more time as follows:

The Parks–Eichmann paradox introduced in Chapter 3 is perhaps the most concise way to show why learning and development are not enough. After all, there is always the further question what each of us will do with what we have learned and with how we have developed and, more specifically, what we will do when it matters. (Biesta, 2021, p. 75)

In this passage, the same example accompanied with the same claim is reiterated in a different way, with “development” added to the fact that “learning” is not enough and that “there is always the further question what each of us will do”. The phrase “After all” is used once more, which makes the sentence that it introduces appear commonsensical, a matter of fact. Something that is reinforced by the several repetition of this example. Moreover, an intratextual reference is used once again: “The Parks–Eichmann paradox introduced in Chapter 3 is perhaps the most concise way to show why learning and development are not enough” (p. 75). This intratextual reference also adds an attribute to the example, it is now “perhaps the most concise way to show why learning and development are not enough” (p. 75). Thereby, Biesta points to the efficacy of the use of this example in addition to the fact that the repetition of the example makes it appear as becoming more and more familiar to the reader.

To sum up, the example of Parks and Eichmann has a great importance in Biesta's latest book. It is key to the argumentation of the third chapter. The Parks-Eichmann's paradox is presented as evidence taken from reality "to explore to what extent the prevailing description of educational reality that can be found in contemporary research, policy, and practice can be considered complete." (Biesta, 2021, p. 26). Even if the examples are presented as evidence supporting one description of "educational reality", the examples can be perceived as artificial (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) by the reader because there are many different interpretations and descriptions of Parks refusing to leave her seat and of Eichmann's trial. Indeed, if the examples were only taken from reality as such, one could suppose that there would be a consensus about their description.

Finally, the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) seems well suited to examine this example since the example of Parks and Eichmann is extraordinarily complex. As noted earlier, the complexity of this example stems not only from its historical origin, but also from the fact that it is a renowned example. In that sense, it would not have been possible nor effective for Biesta to take every detail of this example into account. Only some aspects of these two historical situations have been highlighted in Biesta's text. The question that I asked earlier however, is how to deal with the fact that some potentially essential characteristics of the original situation have been left out? Here, is it alright to leave out the fact that Eichmann was a known anti-Semite? Is it alright to leave out the context in which Parks evolved?

### **3.2. The example of Lane and Jason**

The second example - Homer Lane and Jason - is an example of education as subjectification understood as direct education. Hereafter, I examine how this example is presented by Biesta in chapter four. Then, I look at how the example is used beyond this chapter.

#### **Lane and Jason: Presentation**

The example of Lane and Jason is a story written by Homer Lane about an exchange between a teacher (himself), and one of his students, Jason. It is a complex example that Biesta described on two pages. The story goes as follows: during an altercation, Jason smashes up a tea set and Lane doesn't punish him for it but rather offers him the possibility to smash even more stuff. Biesta emphasizes the importance of this example on several occasions when he writes that this example is “a vivid and rather precise example of education as subjectification” and that he will explain why “Lane’s story is such a telling “case” of [education as subjectification]” (Biesta, 2021, p. 42). This example is also referred to several times as “a ‘complicated and unusual incident’” (pp. 41, 42, 47, 73, 75, 92). Biesta specifies that those are the words of Homer Lane himself, “I recount Homer Lane’s story – which he himself refers to as a ‘complicated and unusual incident’ (Lane 1928, p. 169)” (Biesta, 2021, p. 42) but does not comment on why precisely those attributes are interesting to mention in this context. One hypothesis could be to show the unplanned nature of this event, since it is also a characteristic of the story that Biesta emphasizes. In Biesta’s words:

What I particularly value about Homer Lane’s “complicated and unusual incident” – which was not pre-planned but was an educational opportunity Lane was able to spot and seize – is that it provides such a clear example of both the dynamics and the orientation of education as subjectification. (Biesta, 2021, p. 47)

Here, it is interesting to note that the example is qualified as “such a clear example of both the dynamics and the orientation of education as subjectification” (Biesta, 2021, p.47), but it is neither specified what the difference is between the dynamic and the orientation of education as subjectification, nor it is specified explicitly what they are.

### **Lane and Jason: The use of the example beyond chapter four**

As noted earlier, the story of Lane and Jason is referred to beyond the fourth chapter of Biesta’s latest book. The example of Lane and Jason is referred to in chapter five, six and seven (Biesta, 2021, pp. 73, 75, 76, 92).

First, it appears in the end of the fifth chapter “Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 58-74), just before the concluding remarks in the subpart about “The Third Gift of Teaching: Being Given Yourself” (pp. 72-73). In this part, the claim is that the third gift of teaching is about subjectification, which “can be captured as the summoning to be a self” (p. 72). In the last paragraph of this subpart, Biesta writes:

Homer Lane’s “complicated and unusual incident” remains a powerful example of this third gift of teaching, precisely because Lane, in putting the watch before Jason, put Jason’s freedom in his own hands and thus we might say that Jason “received himself from what he received” (Marion 2017, p. 86). (Biesta, 2021, p. 73)

Here, the claim of this paragraph is that, when it comes to education as subjectification and the third gift of teaching, “this all depends on the student” (Biesta, 2021, p. 73). The example of Lane and Jason is referred to as “Homer Lane’s ‘complicated and unusual incident’” (p. 73). And it is qualified as a “powerful example of this third gift of teaching” (p. 73). A claim that is justified “because Lane, in putting the watch before Jason, put Jason’s freedom in his own hands and thus we might say that Jason ‘received himself from what he received’” (p. 73). Here, it is interesting to note the shift in enunciation between Biesta writing that “Lane, in putting the watch before Jason, put Jason’s freedom in his own hands” (p. 73) and Biesta concluding that this interpretation of the example could lead to Marion’s formulation of givenness “receiv[ing] himself from what he received”<sup>5</sup> (p. 73). In that sense, it seems that the example of Lane and Jason could exemplify givenness as well as the third gift of teaching. From this comparison between Biesta’s and Marion’s claim, it could be though that “put[ting] Jason’s freedom in his own hands” (p. 73) is about encouraging Jason to act insofar that the quote taken from Marion comes at the end of a passage where Marion claims that givenness is not about passivity.

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<sup>5</sup> This sentence appears as a direct quote from Marion (2017, p. 86), however, some grammatical changes have been made by Biesta. The original passage from Marion is written as follows: “When the reduction goes beyond objectivity and beingness, all the way to the given, it is necessary that subjectivity itself changes stature, that **it would receive itself from what it receives**. This is what I propose calling the *adonné*.” (my highlight)

At the very beginning of chapter six: “Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 75-89), the example of Lane and Jason occurs in the following manner:

It is one thing to point out where teaching takes place, but still another to articulate how teaching takes place – which is both the question of the gesture of teaching itself and the question of the work of teachers in relation to this. In the preceding chapters I have already shown glimpses of this gesture and of the work of the teacher, for example in my discussion of Homer Lane’s “complicated and unusual incident” and in my discussion of givenness and the gifts of teaching. (Biesta, 2021, p. 75)

Here, the example is referred to as one example of “glimpses of [the gesture of teaching] and of the work of the teacher” (p. 75). In that sense, this occurrence appears as an intratextual reference. Biesta refers to the example as a “discussion” that happened in “the preceding chapters” of this book. Biesta continues this intratextual reference in the following paragraph, this time as an example of “intentional non-action” (p. 76). Biesta writes:

In Chapter 1 I have characterised education as a form of intentional action, that is, as something that educators do and that they do deliberately, with the proviso that this also contains intentional non-action, that is, the deliberate decision to refrain from action for educational reasons (think, for example, of all the things Homer Lane did not do in his interactions with Jason). (Biesta, 2021, p. 76)

In this paragraph, the example of Lane and Jason is referred to in a parenthesis. It is introduced by an injunction to the reader, marked by the use of the imperative “think” (Biesta, 2021, p. 76). In this parenthesis, the reader is encouraged to “think, for example, of all the things Homer Lane did not do in his interactions with Jason” (p. 76). What is interesting to note here, is that the reader is asked to picture, not something that has been manifest but something that was absent.

The example of Lane and Jason occurs one last time in the beginning of the seventh chapter: “World-Centred Education” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 90-102) in the following paragraph



presenting the idea that encountering the question of what the world is asking from me is a subjectifying moment because it singles me out and,

confronts me with my own freedom. This is not the freedom to do what I want to do, but the freedom to respond to the question I encounter, which of course includes the possibility to walk away from it. The whole point of freedom, after all, is that it never forces us to act in a particular way. Homer Lane's "complicated and unusual incident" remains an excellent example of this whole dynamic. (Biesta, 2021, p. 92)

In this paragraph, the example of Lane and Jason is referred once more as "Homer Lane's 'complicated and unusual incident'" (Biesta, 2021, p. 92). It is presented as "remain[ing] an excellent example of this whole dynamic", and the "whole dynamic" appears to be referring to "the whole point of freedom", which is "that it never forces us to act in a particular way" (p. 92). The qualification of this example as "excellent" can denote Lyons's characteristic of rarity (Lyons, 2014, p. 32). It is not any example that has been chosen here, it is an "excellent example" that is "complicated and unusual".

### **Lane and Jason: intertextuality and interpretation**

Hereafter, I discuss the relationship between the example and what is exemplified. On the one hand, the relationship between the example and what is exemplified can appear as straightforward: this example can appear as a faithful example of what education as subjectification is. Or, in the words of Elgin, as an expressive instantiation of education as subjectification (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 273). One could argue that the student, Jason, has been given the choice to act as he desires. Jason has been interrupted by his educator in that Lane did something that Jason did not expect and that forced him to react in a different way. Jason has been given time to take the measure of his actions, he has been offered several teacups to break without any judgment from the educator. And one could probably imagine that Jason has been given sustenance in that he is in an institution, The Little Commonwealth, that gives him time to try out different ways of being. For example, it gave Jason the possibility to work in the carpenter shop. In that sense, one could say that this example is an example of "being given

yourself” (Biesta, 2021, p. 72) where Lane put “Jason’s freedom in Jason’s own hands” (pp. 47, 73).

On the other hand, the relationship between the example and what is exemplified can appear as more complicated if one examines further what “being given yourself” (p. 72) and putting someone’s freedom into someone’s hand refers to in this example by looking at the original text where Biesta draws this example from. In the original text written by Homer Lane (1928), another interpretation of Homer Lane’s intentions can be considered. I agree with Biesta that Lane admits that one cannot entirely control another’s mind. However, something that Biesta does not mention but that seems essential to understand Homer Lane’s actions is that he appears to claim that knowledge in psychology is helpful to change children’s “undesirable activities” (Lane, 1928, p. 150). Indeed, Homer Lane claims that he has a method to change the children and teenagers he educated. In that sense, one could question the fact that this educational opportunity was “not pre-planned” as Biesta (2021, p. 47) claims.

I do agree with Biesta’s claim that Lane seized the opportunity of Jason spontaneously telling him that he would like to run the place. However, I think that it is important to remember that, in his confrontation with this situation, Lane already had an educational principle that he applied many times before. His educational principle is based on the assumption that impulsive desires in children come from repressed curiosity. Thus, instead of punishing the children whose actions are undesirable, the parent or the educator should let the child fulfill his or her desire for action in conditions made safe by the educator (Lane, 1928, pp. 149-158). For instance, Lane wrote about a little girl who was obsessed with fire and had an irrepressible desire to play with it. Lane’s solution in this case was to make a non-inflammable dress to the girl, and give to her disposition matches as well as other toys. After having played with the matches for a little while, Lane tells, the girl played with other toys and did not have this obsession with fire anymore (Lane, 1928, p. 155). When it comes to Jason, Lane analyzed his case as follows. His assumption was that “crime is fixed energy left over from an earlier period of childhood” and that “almost all delinquent children will resolve their own difficulties in an atmosphere of freedom and encouragement” (Lane, 1928, p. 162). In the case of Jason, Lane describes him as such:

The boy was frankly in conflict with authority. The rough exterior was a shell, which he wore to cover the gentle nature of which he was ashamed, and which had been imposed on him by the harsh treatment he had experienced as a child. (Lane, 1928, pp. 163-164)

After the incident with the teacups, when Jason finally hesitates to smash what is presented to him by his educator, Lane writes that “[t]he moment’s hesitation brought the real Jason to the surface” (Lane, 1928, p. 168).

When reading the original text, Biesta’s interpretation of the situation appears as less unequivocal. It is less clear that Lane gives Jason *himself*, that he encourages him to be *a self*. On the contrary, the extracts quoted above show that what interests Lane is to go from one Jason to another, if one could express it this way. Lane assumed that Jason as he appeared through his actions was not the “real Jason” (Lane, 1928, p. 168). With this reading of Lane, it is not very clear that Lane is opening existential potentialities for his student, Jason. What appears to be the case is that Lane opens only *one* existential potentiality for Jason to be who he *really* is. The same reasoning goes for the freedom given to Jason. It seems that Jason had only two possibilities in that situation, continuing to smash the teacups or stopping. All that bearing in mind that the situation created by the educator was intentionally orienting Jason’s reaction, Lane writes: “Jason was in evident distress, having unconsciously learned a great truth, that there is no fun in destroying things if you are allowed to do it” (Lane, 1928, p. 166). As a matter of fact, it appears difficult to state that Lane put “Jason’s freedom in Jason’s own hands” (Biesta, 2021, p. 47) if Jason did not consciously learn. Indeed, one could ask whether one is capable of making a choice freely while not being conscious of making this choice.

From these two different narratives of the same event, the example of Lane and Jason could be interpreted in the light of Lyons’ characteristic of multiplicity (Lyons, 2014, p. 26). On the one hand, as it is presented in Biesta’s text, the story of Lane and Jason appears as unique, exceptional and unusual. On the other hand, in Lane’s text, the story of him and Jason appears as one story among many others of children and young adults that Lane has educated. The characteristic of exteriority (Lyons, 2014, p. 28) is quite manifest in the way Biesta refers to this example as Homer Lane’s. In that sense, the example refers to a discourse that is outside of

Biesta's own text. It creates discontinuity (Lyons, 2014, p. 31), a discontinuity that appears as in between exemplification and quotation inasmuch as the example is taken out of another's text and is referred to as Homer Lane's story.

The characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) can be manifest as well, on the one hand in the exceptional character that Biesta attributes to this story. On the other hand, this example is also referred to many times as a factual example of education as subjectification. In that sense, it seems to set up a precedent that makes education as subjectification possible. In other words, the fact that there are examples of education as subjectification shows that it already exists and can happen again. Finally, the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) can be found in that only some aspects of the original situation seemed to suit Biesta's general claim. As noted earlier, the fact that Homer Lane wanted to change Jason into something that he knew was the *real* Jason has been left out. However, one could ask what implications this choice has for education as subjectification. Is the knowledge of the teacher about who her students *really* are a characteristic of education as subjectification? Is Homer Lane an example of a virtuous teacher? If so, is a virtuous teacher someone that has a preconceived idea of who their students are? If this is the case, it would point to the normativity inherent to Biesta's framework, to the fact that subjectivity has an already established particular direction, even if Biesta claims the contrary.

### **3.3. "Hey, you there! Where are you?"**

The third example - "Hey, you there! Where are you?" - exemplifies education as subjectification as being summoned. This example of being summoned or called is of another nature than the examples of Parks and Eichmann or Lane and Jason. Here, the phrase "Hey, you there! Where are you?" is not claimed to corroborate a particular description of educational reality. Contrary to the example of Parks and Eichmann which had the property of being anchored historically, this example is more abstract because it is a sentence that could represent several possible situations. In that sense, it could possess Lyons' characteristic of iterativity insofar that one question refers to a potentially recurring event (Lyons, 2014, p. 26).

In the third chapter, “The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education” (Biesta, 2021, p. 25), this example appears first in the presentation of the paradigm of “existential education” (p. 33). This first occurrence is one that we saw earlier in relation to Eichmann. It goes as follows:

In very simple terms that go to the heart of the matter, this summoning happens when we say “Hey, you there! Where are you?” - and I have shown that when Eichmann encountered this question he almost literally said “I wasn’t here,” “It wasn’t me,” “I was only following orders”. (Biesta, 2021, pp. 33-34)

In this short passage, “Hey, you there! Where are you?” is presented as prompting “this summoning”, which refers to “a summoning to self action” earlier in the paragraph (Biesta, 2021, p. 33). “Hey, you there! Where are you?” is referred to as “this question” that Eichmann “encountered” supposedly at his trial (p. 34). It is interesting to note that it is the indicative grammatical mood and not the subjunctive that is used in the presentation of this example in the following phrases: “this summoning happens when we say” and “when Eichmann encountered this question”. In writing in this way, it makes it appear as if it was natural to ask this question and that it was plausible that this question had been asked to Eichmann, even metaphorically. Moreover, one can notice a repetition of the grammatical construction “*when* + personal pronoun + *say/said*” expressed in the following sentences: “**when we say** ‘Hey, you there! Where are you?’” and “**when** Eichmann encountered this question **he almost literally said** ‘I wasn’t here,’ ‘It wasn’t me,’ I was only following orders” (pp. 33-34). With this repetition, one could make a parallel between the two phrases so that they could be seen in relation to each other. In that sense, when Biesta writes that “Eichmann [...] almost literally said ‘I wasn’t here’”, it could imply that “we” do *literally* “say ‘Hey, you there! Where are you?’”.

However, to me, it is not a matter of fact that we say “Hey, you there! Where are you?” (Biesta, 2021, p. 33). And it is not clear either how Eichmann “encountered this question”, even metaphorically (p. 33). Indeed, if we accept that “Hey, you there! Where are you?” is what prompts “a summoning to self action” which appears in educational settings, is Eichmann’s trial an example of such a summoning? And if it is, what is it then that is not an example of a

summoning to self action? What could “Hey, you there! Where are you?” represent in the context of a trial? One could argue that the trial is a summoning to self-action in the sense that Eichmann is asked to take responsibility for what he has done. However, due to the highly reprehensible nature of Eichmann’s deeds, one could ask: Did Eichmann really have a choice? Could he really choose to improve himself and live a free life? And if he did not have a choice, could this situation still be understood as educational?

In the following paragraph, Biesta comments further on the phrase “Hey, you there, where are you?”. The phrase changes slightly in form, from “Hey, you there! Where are you?” to “Hey, you there, where are you?”, in which the exclamation mark has been replaced by a comma. Here, “Hey, you there, where are you?” is presented not only as a “summoning”, but also as an “injunction to be *a self*” (Biesta, 2021, p. 33) and “a very *direct* question”, “an example, and perhaps even a prime example of *direct education*” (p. 34). It is presented as a “simple but crucial gesture”, it is “a spooky action at a distance” (p. 34). In addition to these properties, the phrase “Hey, you there, where are you?” “goes from ‘soul’ to ‘soul’”, “goes to the heart of the matter, perhaps first of all literally, because the ‘Hey, you there, where are you?’ speaks to the heart” (p. 34). It is interesting to note that the phrase “Hey, you there, where are you?” is referred to by Biesta as “an example, and perhaps even a prime example of *direct education*” (p. 34). Here, this would imply not only that Eichmann encountered the question “Hey, you there! Where are you?”, but that, in fact, he encountered direct education. However, one could ask once again, how can Eichmann’s trial be an example of such direct education?

Toward the end of the third chapter, the example appears once more in a summary about what has been said earlier in the chapter. The phrase appears in the form “Hey, you there! Where are you?”. In this paragraph, what had earlier been described as a “question” (Biesta, 2021, p. 34) is now described as a “gesture”, a “simple but crucial gesture” (p. 36). It “manifests itself as spooky action at a distance” (p. 36) and is opposed to education as cultivation. It is not only a “summoning” but also an “*Aufforderung*”, a “calling” (p. 36). Moreover, this summoning “subjectivises, puts the subject-ness of the one being called ‘at stake’” (p. 36).

The next time this example occurs is in chapter four “Subjectification Revisited” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 40-57) in a passage about the question of freedom in education. In this paragraph, the form of the example is reduced to “Hey, you there”. It comes to illustrate the claim that “‘Aufforderung’ – summoning, encouraging – is, after all, not an intervention upon an object, but speaks to the one being educated *as subject*. Put simply: to say ‘Hey, you there,’ rests on the assumption that there is a ‘you’ ‘there.’” (Biesta, 2021, p. 46). The fact that the example comes as an illustration of this claim is indicated by the phrase “Put simply”, which introduces a reformulation or an illustration of the preceding claim. Here, it is interesting to note that the fact that the example is truncated and that it is commented upon could make the example appear as already well established. As if it was a matter of fact that this example was indeed “a prime example of *direct education*” (p. 34).

In the fifth chapter “Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 58-74), the example appears in a similar form, this time as “Hey, you there...” in a part about the third gift of teaching, which is about “being given yourself” (p. 72). In this part of the chapter, Biesta argues that education is about the student’s freedom and about the student bringing his or her ‘I’ to the forefront. Biesta writes that:

All this can be captured as the summoning to be a self, either positively – the “Hey, you there...” – or negatively – Rancière’s suggestion that the emancipatory teacher should deny students the satisfaction of not having to be a subject (see Rancière 2010). This, as I have explained, is precisely not a matter of production or cultivation, but is the existential work of education. (Biesta, 2021, p. 72)

Here, the phrase is presented as a “summoning to be a self” (Biesta, 2021, p. 72), which is the positive equivalent to “Rancière’s suggestion that the emancipatory teacher should deny students the satisfaction of not having to be a subject”.

In the very beginning of the sixth chapter “Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education” (Biesta, 2021, pp. 75-89), the question “Hey, you there, where are you?” appears once more:

The Parks–Eichmann paradox introduced in Chapter 3 is perhaps the most concise way to show why learning and development are not enough. After all, there is always the further question what each of us will do with what we have learned and with how we have developed and, more specifically, what we will do when it matters. [...] In short: it matters when we encounter the question “Hey, you there, where are you?” – a question which, as mentioned, can come to us in many different guises, but always arrives as an interruption. (Biesta, 2021, p. 75)

In this passage, the question “Hey, you there, where are you?” (Biesta, 2021, p. 75) occurs as a reformulation of the preceding claim, as marked by the phrase “In short”, that introduces the example. Biesta writes here that this question “can come to us in many different guises, but always arrives as an interruption” (p. 75). This formulation seems to indicate that this question is a general abstraction which can be manifested in different ways but conserves the attribute of “always arriv[ing] as an interruption”.

This example is mentioned one more time at the very end of the book, in the last paragraph before the conclusion. It occurs in a passage about educational causality that goes as follows:

Educational causality, therefore, is *evocative* causality, so to speak. It works as an address and seeks to address the “I” of the student. “Hey, you there, where are you?” Whether the student responds with an “I am here” or with an “It has nothing to do with me, I was just following orders,” is, as mentioned, up to the student. (Biesta, 2021, p. 100)

Here, this occurrence of the example is quite similar to the one mentioned in page 34 with the addition of an emphasis on educational causality.

To sum up, “Hey, you there, where are you?” is a question that occurs many times throughout Biesta’s latest book. It comes often as a reformulation or an illustration of the claim that education is about a call, a summoning to self-action. It appears as a general example that can manifest itself in different ways which are not exemplified here. Thereby, this example can



appear as an appeal to the reader's imagination. At the same time, several formulations hint at a more concrete nature for this example with the use of the indicative present and the relation of this example to Eichmann's trial.

Seen in light of Lyons' characteristics, the exteriority of this example (Lyons, 2014, p. 28) is manifest when Biesta writes that we do say and encounter this phrase in our daily lives. In that sense, the example becomes exterior to discourse in that it points to the referential world, to what we can experience. This example creates a discontinuity in discourse (Lyons, 2014, p. 31), which is even visually emphasized by the fact that it appears between quotation marks. In this way, it could even imply that there is a shift in enunciation, that it is no longer Biesta who speaks but someone else. However, discontinuity as illustrating the fact that the example is taken from another context is more difficult to describe here due to the high level of abstraction of "Hey, you there! Where are you?". It is not unequivocal in what context this sentence would be pronounced or encountered.

In the same way, it is not easy to evaluate whether the characteristic of rarity is relevant here (Lyons, 2014, p. 32). When it comes to extratextual occurrences, it seems from the reading of Biesta's text that "Hey, you there! Where are you?" is a sentence that occurs very often. It is said to represent many educational situations. When it comes to extratextual occurrences, one hypothesis could be that this formulation resembles that of an author that Biesta quotes often, Hannah Arendt. In a passage about the capacity of human beings to begin something new and unpredictable, Arendt writes: "Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: 'Who are you?'" (Arendt, 1958, p. 178). Here, similarly to Biesta's question, Arendt's question "who are you?" is enclosed in quotation marks and is said to be a recurring phenomenon that we encounter. Moreover, Arendt refers to Augustine when it comes to the origins of this anthropological question, in Augustine's words: "I directed myself at myself and said to me: You, who are you? And I answered: A man"—*tu, quis es?* [Confessiones x. 6]" (Arendt, 1958, p. 10). Here, the formulation of the question resembles Biesta's formulation "Hey, you there! Where are you?" with first an address: "you" or "Hey, you there!" and a question "Who are you?" or "Where are you?". Thus, while the content of the question is different, with

an emphasis on situatedness in Biesta's text, the way it is formulated is quite similar. Thereby, one could argue that the formulation is not rare in texts even if Biesta does not make explicit this intertextuality.

In that sense, the artificiality of the example (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) is quite manifest insofar as Biesta wrote the example with a particular formulation to reflect a supposedly wide spectrum of actions and events that one could encounter. Following from these observations, the characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) is manifest in the ambivalent status of the example. On one hand, the example could belong to the logic of induction in that the sentence could be seen as something that we do say. On the other hand, the peculiar character of the formulation of this sentence renders it indeterminate regarding which events this sentence actually refers to. Thus, the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) can be found in the indeterminacy of the precise worldly events that "Hey, you there! Where are you?" refers to. The manifestation of the excess is thereby present with the thought that an infinite number of events could be understood as instantiations of the phrase.

### **3.4. "You, look there!"**

The fourth example - "You, look there!" - is an example of the double gesture of teaching in education as subjectification. It is about teaching as the act of pointing, as redirecting someone's attention. The example "Look there!" occurs 11 times in the book, each time to exemplify the act of pointing in education. In the sixth chapter "Form matters: on the point(ing) of education" (Biesta, 2021, pp. 75-89), "Look there!" occurs 10 times (pp. 78, 81, 84, 87, 88). Then, it appears once in the very end of the seventh chapter, which is also the end of the book (p. 100). This example appears first in the first part of the sixth chapter about the form of teaching. It occurs three times in this paragraph:

Yet, my point here is not to explain how the (re)direction of someone else's attention is possible – it is, one might say, the assumption upon which all education rests – but to point at the gesture of teaching in its "purest" and most basic form. And while this gesture can be enacted in all kind of

ways – for example by saying “Look there!” or “Pay attention” to our students, or by giving our students a particular task or challenge [...] What is important here is that pointing has a double orientation, in that it is always directed at something – Look there! – and at the same time orientated to someone – “You, look there!” (see also Prange 2012a, p. 68). There is, after all, little point in pointing [out] something to oneself. Pointing is, in this sense, always a communicative act. (Biesta, 2021, p. 78)

Here, “Look there!” is placed at the same level as “Pay attention” and “giving our students a particular task or challenge” as marked by the presence of the conjunction of coordination “or” which indicates that “Look there!” is only one of the possible alternative ways of doing this “gesture of teaching” (Biesta, 2021, p. 78). Thereby, the example appears as possessing the characteristic of multiplicity and iterativity (Lyons, 2014, p. 26). On the one hand, the characteristic of multiplicity is manifest when the example occurs for the first time among other examples that all refer to teaching as pointing (“for example by saying ‘Look there!’ or ‘Pay attention’ to our students, or by giving our students a particular task or challenge” (Biesta, 2021, p. 78)). On the other hand, the characteristic of iterativity is manifest in the fact that “You, look there!” could refer to many different actions that could be made in teaching situations.

Then, the gesture of teaching is specified at the same time that an address, “You”, is added to the example “Look there!”. Biesta specifies that the gesture of pointing is not only “directed at something”, which he exemplifies with “Look there!”, but it is also “oriented to someone”, which is exemplified as “You, look there!” (Biesta, 2021, p. 78). In the above-mentioned quote, it is also important to pay attention to how Biesta presents this example. By writing “my point here is not to explain [...] but to point at the gesture of teaching in its ‘purest’ and most basic form” (p. 78), one could see a *mise en abyme*. Biesta points to the gesture of pointing. In doing so, one could argue that he places himself in the position of the teacher and that every reader thereby takes the position of the student. Moreover, there are two underlying assumptions behind this claim: (1) that pointing is “the gesture of teaching in its ‘purest’ and most basic form” (p. 78) and (2) that pointing at this gesture of teaching without explanation is what Biesta does. One hypothesis could be that Biesta points at the gesture of teaching through his use of examples. But if it is the case, Biesta does not make it explicit.

This specification of the gesture of teaching as a double gesture accompanied by this example occurs one more time in the part where Biesta summarizes Prange’s “operational theory of education” (Biesta, 2021, p. 79). “The “Look there!” always means “*You* look there!” so to speak” (p. 79). A few pages later, the example appears again as “You, look there!” in a passage about Prange’s perspective on “education, teaching, and the invisibility of learning” (p. 82), and particularly on “how learning becomes manifest as a result of education and, more specifically, as a result of or response to pointing” (p. 84). Biesta writes:

Seen in this way, Prange writes, “educating as pointing is a form through which learning is provoked” (see Prange 2012b, p. 169; my translation). The evocation entailed in the act of pointing – the “You, look there!” – calls upon the student not just to look, not just to (re)direct his or her attention, but to do something with what is “found” there. (Biesta, 2021, p. 84)

Here, the example, while conserving the same form, is supplemented with a new layer of meaning. “You, look there!” does not only exemplify the gesture of teaching as a double gesture, it also “calls upon the student [...] to do something with what is ‘found’ there” (p. 84). Thus, pointing is not only pointing something to someone, but it is also calling someone to do something with what has been pointed to, it is a call to action.

In the conclusion of the sixth chapter, Biesta reiterates twice both the claim about teaching as a double gesture and the example accompanying this claim<sup>6</sup>. He emphasizes even this repetition of the example in the formulae closing the paragraph “Again. *You*, look there!” (Biesta,

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<sup>6</sup> In Biesta’s text: “What is perhaps the most important and most interesting quality of the gesture of pointing, is that it is a double gesture, because in pointing we are always pointing at something – with the ‘Look there!’ we are directing someone’s attention onto something – yet at the very same time we are referring to someone – with the ‘*You*, look there!’ we are, after all, trying to direct someone’s attention. With the double gesture of pointing we are therefore calling someone to attend to the world. It is not just that we make the world into an object for someone’s attention; at the very same time and in one and the same gesture we are inviting someone to attend to the world. While we could say, therefore, that in pointing we focus the student’s attention on the world, seen as everything ‘outside’ of the student, the act of pointing actually also points at the student and in this way also brings the self of the student to the student’s attention. This is not just beginning to reveal the way in which the gesture of pointing is truly world-centred – a theme to which I will return in the next chapter. It also begins to reveal that world centred education does not preclude the event of subjectification – it doesn’t turn students away from themselves – but rather calls for them to attend to the world. Again: ‘*You*, look there!’” (Biesta, 2021, p. 87)

2021, p. 87). In the end of the conclusion, the example reoccurs but is presented in a slightly different manner:

This then brings me to the question of the why of pointing, that is, the question what the point of educational pointing actually is. What is very clear is that pointing is not about control. One could say that this is the beauty of the gesture of pointing. It says “Look there!,” and even says “*You, look there!*” (Biesta, 2021, p. 88)

This time, the example is presented as being “said”, or expressed by the very gesture of pointing. An emphasis on the fact that the gesture of pointing is non-coercive is added to the example when Biesta writes that “it doesn’t force the student to look there and doesn’t determine what the student should do” (Biesta, 2021, p. 88).

One last time at the very end of the book, in the last paragraph before the concluding comments, the example “*You, look there!*” is mentioned in relation to educational causality in the following manner:

Prange (2012a, pp. 155–163) discusses this with reference to an interesting idea from Herbart, namely that of “educational causality” (“pädagogische Kausalverhältnis”). This is not of the order of “a causes b” – “teaching intervention causes learning outcome” – but rather of the order “a calls for b” – which, in its shortest formulation, can be read as the world calls for the “I” of the student. Or, in a slightly more precise formulation: the teacher calls for the student to attend to the world – “*You, look there!*” – which is, indeed, an “*Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit,*” as it is ultimately for the student to respond to what the world may be asking. (Biesta, 2021, pp. 99-100)

In this passage, the example “*You, look there!*” is apposed to the phrase “the teacher calls for the student to attend to the world”, which is itself “a slightly more precise formulation” of the phrase “the world calls for the ‘I’ of the student” (Biesta, 2021, p. 100). In that sense, the supplement of meaning found earlier seems to be confirmed with this new occurrence. The double gesture of teaching, exemplified by “*You, look there!*”, is not only about pointing something to someone, it is also about calling “for the student to attend the world” (p. 100), calling the student to do something” (p. 84).

To sum up, the example “Look there!” and “You, look there!” exemplifies the form of teaching, that of a double gesture of pointing. This example occurs many times in the sixth chapter of the book and one time in the seventh chapter. The example begins as “Look there!” which exemplifies pointing as pointing something. Then the example changes to “You, look there!” to exemplify pointing something to someone. It is interesting to note here that the first form of the example, “Look there!” is not abandoned. On the contrary, the transition from one form to the other is repeated several times throughout the chapter. The latter form, “You, look there!” appears on its own only in the very last occurrence of the example. Furthermore, a slight semantic shift could be noted when the example is no longer an *example of* the form of teaching, but becomes what *emanates from* the gesture of teaching.

When it comes to Lyons’ characteristics, in the same way as for the example “Hey, you there! Where are you?”, the characteristic of discontinuity (Lyons, 2014, p. 31) can literally be seen with the presence of the quotation marks around “You, look there!” despite the absence of any clear enunciator. Contrary to “Hey, you there! Where are you?” though, the phrase “You, look there!” does seem more common, even trivial. Thus, the characteristic of rarity (Lyons, 2014, p. 32) does not seem to apply. One could argue that it is not necessarily usual to find a trivial sentence in such a textual context. However, one could also argue that the reader becomes familiar with this sentence by the fact that it is repeated several times in Biesta’s text. The artificiality of this example (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) can be found, once again, in the formulation that has been chosen over others. In this text, it is the phrase “You, look there!” that has been chosen to exemplify teaching as pointing. The phrase can be seen as possessing the characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33) in that it could be seen both as a representative gesture and as a very specific and meaningful act. As a representative gesture, it could work as inductive evidence for the existence of teaching as pointing. However, one could argue that this phrase could only account for one particular way of pointing in teaching, which would make this example exemplary. The characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) can come from the fact that this phrase can refer to an infinity of different situations for which this phrase cannot cover exhaustively every aspect.

Finally, after having analyzed this example, it is interesting to go back to the criticism expressed by Straume (2015) and Rømer (2021). Indeed, the fact that teaching is an example of the double gesture of teaching is repeated many times. However, there is no example of what teaching could point to (apart from Marion's example of the painting, but I will come back to that in 3.7.). Thus, one could note an imbalance in favor of the phenomenological experience of the self whose attention is redirected, but little written about what the person's attention is redirected to.

### **3.5. Mathematics teaching**

The fifth example - mathematics teaching - is an example of teaching as double truth giving in education as subjectification. It is about Biesta as a mathematics student. This example is written about only once in the book. This example occurs at the end of the fifth chapter "Learnification, givenness, and the gifts of teaching" (Biesta, 2021, pp. 58-74). More precisely, it occurs in the short part about "The Second Gift of Teaching: Double Truth giving" (pp. 71-72), which is about Kierkegaard's critique of teaching as only being about "giving students knowledge" (p. 71) whereas knowledge has also to be recognized as such in order to be understood. To this end, one has to "be on the inside of the 'frame' within which something makes sense, can be appreciated as knowledge, and so on" (p. 71). In order to exemplify Kierkegaard's criticism, Biesta writes:

The concrete example I have encountered many times as a student was of my mathematics teachers who were able to do spectacular things on the blackboard and, when they met my puzzled gaze, could say no more than "But can't you see it?" And the whole problem, of course, was that I was unable to see, not because I couldn't see but because I didn't know what I should be seeing. I was, in other words, outside of the "frame" within which this seeing was possible, whereas my mathematics teacher was inside of that "frame."

And this example is claimed to be an example of "encounter[ing] something new, something radically 'beyond' their own horizon of understanding" (p. 71). It represents what Biesta calls "the second gift of teaching" which happens when something "breaks through" this

understanding, so we might say, just as a sudden insight breaks through; something, therefore, that is literally given” (p. 71)

This example is presented as “concrete” (Biesta, 2021, p. 71) and as having happened many times to Biesta as a student with different mathematics teachers. The example is about Biesta as a mathematics student who could not see what the teacher was showing him. He claims that, from his position at that time, seeing was not possible because he was “outside of the ‘frame’ within which this seeing was possible, whereas [his] mathematics teacher was inside of that ‘frame.’” (p. 71). In that sense, it appears that the situation which is exemplified is a recurring situation where teaching did *not* occur, where the act of double truth giving was not happening. At the same time, the example seems to illustrate the great distance between what the student does not know and what s/he is taught insofar that what is being taught is radically new, outside of the scope of what was previously known. Biesta describes it as such: “Here, then, do we encounter the second gift of teaching, where we are not just given what lies within the scope of our current understanding, but are given what lies beyond that scope” (p. 72). Therefore, it seems that this example is ambivalent in that it illustrates at the same time a recurring situation where teaching did *not* occur and the very possibility for teaching to occur.

When it comes to Lyons’ seven characteristics, this example can be seen as exterior to discourse in that it refers to an experience that Biesta has made. It is iterative insofar that it is referred to as having been experienced many times (Lyons, 2014, p. 26). One could argue that, while not being rare in real life, this example bears the characteristic of textual rarity (Lyons, 2014, p. 32) since it is the only time that Biesta takes an example from his own experience as a student, which makes the example stand out of Biesta’s text by its singularity. When it comes to the characteristic of undecidability (Lyons, 2014, p. 33), on the one hand, the example can be seen as very “concrete” in Biesta’s words. It could point to a real, tangible experience that could account for the teaching as bringing something entirely new to the student. On the other hand, the example seems to refer to both being taught and not being taught. Indeed, this example could work as an example of teaching something that is completely new. At the same time, it is also an example of *not* being taught, of Biesta being outside the frame in which understanding is possible. In that sense, the status of the example as norm or exception appears as undecidable.



Finally, the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) can come from the combination of a trivial experience, of not seeing something, with the metaphorical depiction of the situation, as finding oneself outside the frame. Moreover, the ambivalence between what this example represents, being taught or not being taught, opens for a multiplicity of possible interpretations.

### **3.6. Walking as a first-person matter**

The sixth example - walking as a first-person matter - exemplifies Biesta's idea of freedom in relation to education as subjectification. It appears only once in Biesta's latest book. The example goes as follows:

Freedom viewed in this way, as I have already mentioned earlier in this book, is fundamentally an existential matter; it is about how we exist, how we lead our own life – and there is no one else who can do that for us. Put differently, freedom is a first-person matter, just as, for example, walking, which is also something I have to do and no one else can do for me (see also Mollenhauer 2013). It is about how I exist as subject of my own life, not as object of what other people want from me. (Biesta, 2021, p. 46)

Here, Biesta compares freedom with walking and claims that they share the same property of “something I have to do and no one else can do it for me” (Biesta, 2021, p. 46). This example seems to be an appeal to common sense and is presented as an uncontroversial claim, a claim that does not require a justification.

The example of walking as a first-person matter that no one else can do for you can be seen in light of Lyons' characteristic of iterativity (Lyons, 2014, p. 26) in that it refers to an action that is quite trivial and happens many times: walking. This example has the characteristic of being exterior to the text in the sense that it is a commonly shared activity. In that sense, it creates a discontinuity in the discourse because it refers to an action belonging to the field of experience. The example can be seen as quite textually rare in the sense that the comparison between freedom and walking is not a straightforward comparison. Finally, when it comes to the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34), there are indeed many implications that could be

drawn from this example. Because this example refers to a widespread activity but not to an activity that every human being can experience individually, this poses the question of whether what is exemplified, freedom, is also an activity that is not accessible to every human being. In other words, does leaving out the fact that not everyone can walk alone imply that those who cannot access freedom individually are to be left out as well?

One could argue that this example implies a very atomistic perspective of reality where people and the environment exist independently from each other. This conception had been noted earlier by Murriss (2017) in her posthumanist criticism of Biesta's core assumptions. Drawing from the quantum physicist and feminist thinker Barad, Murriss (2017) makes explicit the assumptions entailed by Biesta's conception of a "non-egological education". She shows that Biesta's thinking presupposes a binary conception of the relationship between humans and non-humans. Even if Biesta disagrees with the postulate that the self is before the world and takes the world as an object and rather thinks of the subject as being called by the world, this line of thinking still implies that the world is external to the humans and that there exist clear boundaries between humans and non-humans.

This atomistic perspective appears to be a quite radical position to hold since it would imply excluding many people from subjectness in the same way it excludes many people from walking. Moreover, what is the fundamental difference between walking with a stick and while holding a hand? When is someone walking by himself and when is someone walking for someone else? In the same way, am I not a subject if I need someone else to answer for me to the question "Hey, you there! Where are you"? Where is the line between existing "as subject of my own life" and existing "as object of what other people want for me" (Biesta, 2021, p. 46)?

### **3.7. Marion's example of a painting**

The seventh example - Marion's example of a painting - exemplifies the idea of the given in relation to education as subjectification. It is about givenness, about being called by the world

through the experience of having to take a particular position in space in order to see a painting that represents an anamorphosis. The example appears twice in Biesta's latest book.

### **Marion's example: first occurrence**

The example appears for the first time in the fifth chapter "Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching" (Biesta, 2021, pp. 58-74), in the part about Marion's two attitudes to things. The example is presented in the following manner:

It is not we who command the world. Rather, "in the case of the given, we find ourselves commanded by the thing, summoned to come experience it" (Marion 2017, p. 85). We could also say that we are surprised, in the literal sense of "being seized." Marion gives the example of a painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount which has a secret point where one must be situated to see the painting. This point, Marion explains, "is determined by the painting and not by the spectator" so that "the spectator must obey the painting in order to see it" (Marion 2017, pp. 84–85). (Biesta, 2021, p. 67)

Here, the example is about "being seized", being "surprised by the world" (p. 67). Thereby, the anamorphosis in the painting is an example of having to change our perspective, our position, in order to "encounter the world" (p. 67). The idea being that we are no longer in control of how the world could "make sense" to us. Rather, we would let ourselves be surprised by the world. However, if I go back to the criticism of Straume (2015) and Rømer (2021) concerning the unbalance between the importance given to the world and to the self, it is interesting to note the nature of the example Biesta takes from the "world". In this case, the example of an object of the world calling us is an example of an object that is human made, a painting. Thereby, one could beg the question whether Biesta's understanding of the world is a world consisting of human beings and of objects of their making.

Going back to Marion's example and its original context, the painting is first an example of anamorphosis which "defines the distinctiveness of a painting that, if one puts oneself in the head-on position of the normal observer (that is, of the transcendental subject), does not offer

anything to see except complete confusion” (Marion, 2017, p. 84). On the one hand, Biesta suggests that this example, or rather, the principle that this example illustrates,

reflects the difference between “learning from,” where the “I” approaches the world as object, and “being taught by,” where the “I” not just subjects itself but, in a rather precise formulation, is “subjectified,” that is, is confronted with its own subject-ness. (Biesta, 2021, p. 67)

However, there is nothing about the distinction between “learning from” and “being taught by” in Marion’s original text (Biesta, 2021, p. 67). This difference is introduced by Biesta by the impersonal pronoun “one” in the phrase “one could say that this principle...”, which does not indicate clear *who* “could say that this principle reflects the difference between ‘learning from,’ [...] and ‘being taught by,’” (p. 67). In that sense, Marion’s example is taken from its original context, as illustrating givenness, and put in another, as illustrating Biesta’s claim about teaching.

### **Marion’s example: second occurrence**

The example appears one more time in the last chapter of the book, in a subpart titled: “Anamorphosis: Finding the Place Where One Can Be Found” (Biesta, 2021, p. 96). In this part, Biesta discusses Marion’s second attitude to things in which one lets oneself be surprised by things and let go of the control one wants to exert. Biesta asserts that “Marion thus provides further arguments for the idea [...] that it is not about intentionally focusing on something we already know, but that attention is a matter of opening oneself up [...] without being in control of what may or may not arrive” (p. 97). Further, Biesta claims that “what is interesting and helpful about Marion’s discussion of anamorphosis, is that there is some work to do, so we might say, in order to find the place from where one might be found” (p. 97). With Marion, Biesta wants to bring forward that “it is not a “pure” passivity that is at stake here, precisely because in the encounter with the world, the world calls upon *me*” (p. 98). To illustrate that claim, Biesta states that the example of the painting is “very helpful [...] because it gives an example of a situation where the spectator must find the point from which the painting can be seen” (Biesta, 2021, p. 98). In that sense, the painting illustrates “that there is some work to do, so we might say, in order to find the place from where one might be found” (p. 97). Contrary to the previous

occurrence of Marion's example, this time the example is taken together with that which is illustrated, givenness, and more precisely, Marion's second attitude to things. What is similar to the previous occurrence of Marion's example is that Biesta presents the "example of the painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount" (p. 98) as if there was something particular and important with this specific painting while for Marion, this painting seems to be just an instance of an anamorphosis. In the original text, Marion talks about "paintings", and gives the example of one painting in particular (Marion, 2017, p. 84)<sup>7</sup>.

Summing up, the example of the painting is an example that Biesta overtly takes from Marion. The example occurs twice in Biesta's latest book, both times in relation with the presentation of Marion's perspective. In the first occurrence, an implicit equivalence is made between Marion's theory and Biesta's ideas about teaching. The second time the example occurs in a discussion of Marion's work in order to illustrate the claim that one does not passively attend the world but is rather called by it.

Seen in light of Lyons' seven characteristics, the example of the painting can be characterized as almost in between being an example and being a quotation insofar that it is presented as Marion's example. Thereby, there is a shift in enunciation from Biesta's voice to Marion's. However, because the example is also taken as an example of the difference between "learning" and "being taught by", its status as an example can also be argued for. From these observations, the characteristics of exteriority and discontinuity can be seen (Lyons, 2014, pp. 28-31). The example has an extratextual quality, it comes from Marion's text, which implies that it has been taken out from one context and placed in a new one. The characteristic of rarity (Lyons, 2014, p. 32) as rarely occurring outside of texts is arguable here, in the same way that it was in the example of Lane and Jason. On the one hand, it seems that, for Biesta, there is only

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<sup>7</sup> The example is presented by Marion as follows: "There are paintings where one must place oneself entirely to the left, or completely below, or entirely on the right in order for the thing suddenly to appear. There is an example in Rome in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount. The painting has a secret point where one must be situated, one that is determined by the painting and not by the spectator. The spectator must obey the painting in order to see it." (Marion, 2017, pp. 84-85)

one example of an anamorphosis, which would grant this painting an exceptional character. On the other hand, for Marion, the anamorphosis is something that seems to be represented in many paintings, among which the painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount is just a particular instance. Something which does not make the example of the painting rare or exceptional. When it comes to the characteristic of artificiality (Lyons, 2014, p. 33), it can be found at two levels here. First in Marion's text, in how Marion made this example an example of givenness. Second, how Biesta made Marion's example an example of being taught by. Followingly, the characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34) can be seen as manifest in these different layers of artificiality. Indeed, one could ask which aspects of the painting Marion left out and which ones he considered essential. Further, when it comes to Biesta's use of the example, one could ask: could an example at the same time exemplify givenness and being taught by? Can givenness be equated in all respects with being taught by?

## 4. Discussion

So far, I have suggested with a close reading of the use of examples that examples are not accessory to Biesta's claims but that they are constitutive of them. Examples are used in the argumentation and accompany the reader throughout Biesta's whole text. In this part, I discuss the implications of the present analysis of examples for Biesta's idea of education as subjectification. The discussion will revolve around the research questions that this thesis is occupied with.

- (1) What roles do examples have in Biesta's latest book?
- (2) What are the relationships between the examples and what is exemplified?
- (3) What are the implications of the examples used for education as subjectification?

## 4.1. What roles do examples have in Biesta's latest book?

With the analysis of Biesta's use of examples, I could take the measure of Lyons' and Korsgaard's insights: Examples do not have one role, they have many. In Biesta's latest book, examples can be seen as having a rhetorical power while at the same time not being reducible to it. Examples can also be seen as reflecting education as subjectification insofar that they could call the reader to self-action.

### Rhetorical power

Hereafter, I analyze the use of examples in Biesta's text through the prism of their rhetorical power. First, examples can corroborate one's claim and acquire the status of proof when they are presented as taken from reality. Second, because examples appear as familiar to the reader, they can legitimate the claim they exemplify with an appeal to common sense. And third, the leeway that the author has in the presentation of the examples used can hide a partial or even axiomatic interpretation of those.

#### *(1) Examples as taken from reality*

With the analysis of Biesta's use of examples, I have noted that examples are often presented as corroborating claims and even as evidence taken from reality. The example of Parks and Eichmann is presented as evidence that something is missing from educational discourse and practice. The example of Lane and Jason is presented as non-fictional, as evidence for the fact that there are examples of education as subjectification in the past. The example of Biesta as a student and his mathematics teachers is also presented as having happened. And the anamorphosis in Marion's example is an example of a painting that exists in order to show an example of givenness.

However, I have argued that the role of examples as evidence taken from reality in Biesta's argumentation was questionable. Their presentations make the examples appear as proof corroborating Biesta's claims even when they rest on disputable assumptions - as I have examined especially with the example of Parks and Eichmann - or when they rely on a partial

interpretation of their original context - as I have examined with the example of Lane and Jason and the example of Marion.

Moreover, the fact that examples have been used as evidence taken from reality could imply a correspondence between the examples in discourse and the ontological level of reality. The clearest case of this phenomenon is the Parks' and Eichmann's example when it is compared to the Einstein-Polosky-Rosen paradox. With this comparison, it seems that Biesta implies that the description of the situations of Parks and Eichmann are evidence at the same level that Einstein's, Polosky's and Rosen's measurement of the movements of particles. In that sense, the description of Parks' and Eichmann's situations appear to be a description of what is at the ontological level. However, I suggested that Biesta's description of the situations of Parks and Eichmann was insufficient to render the complexity of the historical events. Therefore, I argued that this example was not sufficient to rule out one description of educational reality over another.

To sum up, the rhetorical power emanating from examples presented as taken from reality lies in the impression that examples are natural, already there. Nonetheless, I suggested by looking at Biesta's sources that there were differences between the ways in which they are presented in the different texts. Accordingly, one can conclude that the way in which Biesta presents examples is not neutral or natural, examples are not facts. Some examples are chosen over others, and some aspects of those examples are emphasized while others are left out.

## ***(2) Familiarity and appeal to common sense***

The second way in which examples bear a certain rhetorical power comes with their familiarity to the reader. The familiarity of the examples appears in two different ways in Biesta's text. The first way concerns examples that were already familiar, known to the readers. Indeed, the example of Parks and Eichmann concerns two stories that are widely known and that have had an impact on our contemporary understanding of history. The example of mathematics teaching is something that Biesta tells he has encountered many times. When it comes to the rest of the examples, they describe phenomena that have supposedly been experienced by everyone. The



claim that walking is a first-person matter is presented as a matter of fact. The two fictional sentences “Hey, you there! Where are you?” and “You, look there!” are presented as trivial phenomena that often happen. In that way, all those examples could appear as “proof common to all” (Aristotle, 2004, 1355a26-27). Examples can also appear as familiar in that they are taken from other authors: both Parks and Eichmann have been used several times before, the example of Lane and Jason is Lane’s example, and the example of the painting is from Marion. This can bring legitimacy to the example in that they are examples that have been used by others already.

The second way concerns the examples becoming more and more familiar due to their several occurrences throughout Biesta’s text. As a matter of fact, a characteristic that is shared by four of the seven examples is their numerous occurrences throughout Biesta’s last book. The example of Parks and Eichmann occurs three times outside of the chapter in which it is originally presented. The example of Lane and Jason appears five times. The phrase “Hey, you there” occurs eight times, and “You, look there!” appears six times. Moreover, not only these four examples are taken up several times throughout the text, I noticed in the analysis that the ways in which they are presented each time were strikingly similar. This can leave the reader with an impression of familiarity and lead to a passive habituation for the way the examples are formulated. Take “Hey, you there! Where are you?”: Biesta never mentions why and in which ways “where” in the question “Where are you?” is relevant as a summoning to be a self. The reader has to take for granted that it is.

Moreover, when the examples reoccur in Biesta’s text, they are presented as simple and commonsensical. They are often introduced by the phrases “after all”, “put simply”, “in short”, and qualified as “excellent examples”, “such a clear example” which reinforce their matter-of-factness. On the one hand, this could substantiate the idea that examples could function as entryways into difficult subject matter as Korsgaard (2019) proposes with Wagenschein. On the other hand, I have suggested with the analysis that examples are not presented as such. They are presented as corroborating claims and have a functional role in the argumentation. Moreover, even complex examples such as Parks and Eichmann and Lane and Jason are presented as simple and commonsensical. This could point to the criticism put forward by Papastephanou (2020) about Biesta’s oversimplification of complex realities. Biesta does not present counter examples

that could destabilize the consistency of his ideas. Neither does he point to what could be problematic in the examples he takes. On the contrary, all the examples are “simple” representations of his claims.

### ***(3) Partial and axiomatic interpretations***

As a result of the two aforementioned ways in which Biesta presents examples, one could argue that this can lead to partial or even axiomatic interpretations of the examples. As I have noted, presenting examples as evidence taken from reality and as something familiar to the readers makes the examples and what they exemplify appear as commonsensical, evident, unquestionable. However, I have suggested that different interpretations of the examples that Biesta takes are possible even if not mentioned by Biesta. I have suggested that the description of the situations of Parks and Eichmann made by Biesta was at best incomplete, and at worst erroneous. Similarly, Biesta’s description of Lane’s story can be seen as at least incomplete in light of Lane’s own writings. The same goes for the unaddressed implications of the example of freedom as walking and the vagueness of the fictional questions “You, look there!” and “Hey, you there! Where are you?”. The interpretations that Biesta makes of the examples he uses can hint at an axiomatic reading of the examples. The examples are always seen through the prism of Biesta’s theoretical framework even if another theoretical framework could have explained the examples in another way or if empirical evidence could go against Biesta’s interpretation. This could indicate a problematic use of examples: they could make the interpretations of ambiguous situations appear as straightforward while they are not.

## **Examples as calls to self-action**

### ***(4) Educational examples?***

However, one could also argue that rhetoric is not the only role that examples have in Biesta’s latest book. Drawing from the argument of Korsgaard (2020b) in which examples can help to form educational judgment and granted that education as subjectification is about arousing the desire in another human being to be a self, one could think of the examples as showing different

ways in which education as subjectification can happen without implying a strong causality between the teacher's actions and the effects it has on the students. This could work especially with the example of Lane and Jason and the example of mathematics teaching, which the reader can identify the most directly as educational situations.

However, the way in which Biesta uses examples does not really correspond to how Korsgaard suggests they should be used in order to prompt reflections from the reader. As I mentioned above, Biesta often disregards alternative interpretations of the examples he uses, which does not shed light on the potential complexity of educational judgment on particular situations. Furthermore, I suggested in the analysis that the excess of meaning stemming from the presentation of the examples came more often from a lack of details than from an overload of them. The description of the examples does not focus on the environment in which the exchanges take place. This could, once more, reinforce the criticism proposed by Rømer and Straume. Where are the classrooms, the schools, the institutions, the budgets in Biesta's examples? This begs the question: is it possible to think about the "educational reality" without those environmental surroundings? In that sense, it appears difficult to support the hypothesis that Biesta's use of example could help the formation of educational judgment in Korsgaard's sense. The "messy details of educational practice" (Korsgaard, 2020b, p.1363) are left out of focus in the examples used about education as subjectification.

### ***(5) Appeal to imagination***

Alternatively, one could argue that the use of metaphorical examples such as the two fictional sentences "Hey, you there! Where are you?" and "You, look there!" could appeal to the reader's imagination. Indeed, those examples are neither to be found directly in earlier literature nor do they refer to a tangible and unequivocal event. In that sense, those examples could open many possibilities for the reader to imagine what those sentences could mean for them, which could encourage the reader to be active. In other words, "Hey, you there! Where are you?" and "You, look there!" could first leave a freedom for the reader in what the content of those phrases are for them, and second, encourage the reader to actively imagine what these sentences could refer to for them in particular. From this, one could argue that the two fictional sentences appear as

implicit manifestations of education as subjectification in which Biesta is the teacher and we the students.

To sum up, examples have many different roles in Biesta's text. Their functions could be described as oscillating between encouraging the reader to more or less activity. On the one hand, some examples such as "Hey, you there" and "You, look there!" could appeal to the reader's imagination and be seen as educational. On the other hand, the partial presentation of some other examples - most notably Parks and Eichmann and Lane and Jason - could orient the reader in interpreting examples in one particular way, disregarding anything that would go against this very interpretation.

## **4.2. What is the relationship between the examples and what they exemplify?**

### **Between instantiation and excess**

With the analysis, I have suggested that the relationship between the examples and what they exemplify could be described as in tension between instantiation and excess. On the one hand, the examples explored can be seen as instantiations of particular aspects of the idea of education as subjectification, which is how Biesta presents them. First, the example of Parks and Eichmann could be seen as exemplifying that learning is not enough insofar that Eichmann "had learned to listen well" (Biesta, 2021, p. 28) but did not do something good with what he learned when it mattered. Second, the example of Lane and Jason could be seen as an example of education as subjectification and particularly of "put[ting] [one's] freedom in [one's] own hand" (p. 73). Third, "Hey, you there! Where are you?" as an example of a summoning to be a self. Fourth, "You, look there!" as an example of teaching as a double gesture. Fifth, walking as an example of a first-person matter, which is compared to the type of freedom that is at stake in education as subjectification. Sixth, mathematics teaching as an example of teaching as an act of double truth

giving. Seventh, Marion's example of the anamorphosis as an example of givenness, which is an aspect of teaching. All this could hint at the examples being instantiations of particular features of education as subjectification.

On the other hand, examples do not exemplify one thing in Biesta's text but several. Equivalences are made between Eichmann's trial and being asked the question "Hey, you there! Where are you?", which itself exemplifies direct education and summoning to self-action. Another example of direct education and summoning to self-action is the example of Lane and Jason, which is also an example of givenness, of being given oneself one's freedom, and of education as subjectification. Thereby, education as subjectification is exemplified by many different examples, and those examples are themselves exemplifying other ideas as well. As I suggested in the analysis with Lyons' characteristic of excess (Lyons, 2014, p. 34), one could argue that the examples chosen always possess more characteristics than the general claim that they are meant to exemplify and thus always betray it. Even if the examples used are often presented by Biesta as "good", "perfect" or "excellent", their ability to instantiate, represent or illustrate what education as subjectification consists in has not been clear through my reading of Biesta's text. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, some aspects of the examples could even be seen as, if not in contradiction, at least in tension with what they are supposed to exemplify. Of course, this remark does not apply equally for every example that Biesta uses. Most of the examples do not have a well-defined original context. In that sense, the characteristics that they possess are not fixed. However, when it comes to examples that are either historical or taken from another text, it has been possible to access other versions of the examples and see the aspects that have been left out of Biesta's description. Followingly, one could question the particular choice of examples in relation with what is exemplified and ask: is it possible to have an example with aspects that contradict the very idea it is supposed to exemplify?

Very concretely, is it possible to leave out that Eichmann was an active anti-Semite while arguing for his passivity? Is it possible to leave out the educational procedure that Lane had developed to exemplify an educational opportunity that was not pre-planned? Is it possible to refer to walking as something everybody can experience alone? Is it possible to present an example of givenness as an example of being taught?

### **4.3. What are the implications of the examples used for education as subjectification?**

So far, I explored the roles of the examples of education as subjectification and the relationship these examples have with what they exemplify. Now I turn to a question that I have touched on throughout the analysis and the discussion: what are the implications of the examples used for Biesta's idea of education as subjectification?

One interpretation of the excess perceived in the use of examples could be that the tensions and even contradictions between the different examples and within the examples themselves could reflect the complexity of the idea of education as subjectification itself. In that sense, education as subjectification could be seen as exemplified by the very excess of its examples, as happening in a different way each time. And this interpretation works quite well with the examples "Hey, you there! Where are you?" and "You, look there!" because those two examples could refer to a multiplicity of different situations. Those examples could be seen as encouraging the reader to recognize similar situations in his or her own life. Nonetheless, this hypothesis could be seen as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the elusiveness created by the use of some examples could be seen as positive. It could indeed manifest the openness of an idea that is meant to be filled by the readers. It would reflect an idea that is given to the reader and that the reader has to respond to in its unique way.

On the other hand, another hypothesis could be that the openness of the examples used could be only superficial. In my analysis I problematized the oversimplifications and confusions that Biesta's use of examples could imply, and I even explored the idea that the use of examples could foreclose other imaginaries about what education could or should be about.

First, when it comes to the oversimplifications and potential confusions, the analysis of examples made me question Biesta's claim that education "allows for a 'reality check' of our initiatives, ambitions, and desires", which requires that "education does not remain conceptual but that there is something real at stake; that the world, in its materiality and sociality, can be encountered. (Biesta, 2021, p. 50). From my close reading of Biesta's examples, it has not been

clear what “something real” and “the world” consist in. There is only one example of something from the world calling us and it is a human-made object: a painting. Is “the world” only constituted of fellow humans and their creations or are there other elements in Nature that lie beyond human reach? And, is a “reality check” possible when counterexamples and alternative interpretations are left out?

Second, I suggested that the rhetorical power of Biesta’s use of examples could foreclose imaginaries about what education is or should be. Instead of opening up, examples could narrow down thinking about education. Even if I read from Biesta's latest book that “the point of educational scholarship is not to tell educators what they should do” (Biesta, 2021, p. vii), I have suggested that the partial presentation of some of the examples could lead to interpreting the examples axiomatically, only through the prism of Biesta’s ideas. Something that could foreclose the potential interpretations that the reader could make of a particular situation. On the contrary, I have suggested with Papastephanou, MacAllister, Rømer and Straume that it was possible to think education ethically and existentially outside of Biesta’s framework.

Moreover, if “the whole point of education can never be that of subjecting students to ongoing external control” and that “education should always be aimed at enhancing the ability of pupils and students to ‘enact’ their own ‘subject-ness’” (Biesta, 2021, p. 2), then the control that Biesta potentially has on his readership becomes problematic, but is yet left unquestioned. Even in the examples, the aspect of control is often left out of focus. I have noted that the example closest to an educational situation - Lane’s - framed a teacher that exercised a specific method in order to change the undesired behaviors of his student, Jason. In another example, I saw that the difference between external control and autonomy was blurry when it came to walking as a first-person matter. Thus, Biesta’s presentation of Lane’s example seems to imply that behavioral change is not about external control while helping someone to walk is. Then, my questions are: What is external control about? Is it possible to avoid it? And is it even a constitutive aspect of teaching? If it is so, could thinking of teaching as givenness prevent reflections on this aspect?

Thus, after having analyzed the examples that Biesta is using in his latest book, the claim that what “is at stake in the idea of subjectivity, [...] is our freedom as human beings: our

freedom to act or to refrain from action” (Biesta, 2021, p. 45) is not that clear anymore. Does freedom mean to act alone? And if so, is it even possible or desirable?

## **Summary and concluding remarks**

In this thesis, I have explored the question of what education as subjectification consists in when it is seen in light of its examples. In the first part, I presented my approach as belonging to philosophy of education and as related to philosophical hermeneutics. I expressed as much as I could my situatedness and I worked to keep an open questioning attitude throughout the whole process of this thesis. And, because I understood my methodological approach and my theoretical framework as being interrelated, I explored Lyons’ and Korsgaard’s theoretical insights in how examples were used and how they are still used today in relation to education. I explored the ideas of examples used as instantiations of particular claims and as always being in excess in relation to what they exemplify. Drawing from Lyons, I explored the ideas of examples used as instantiations of particular claims and as always being in excess in relation to what they exemplify. And drawing from Korsgaard, I examined three different ways in which examples can be used in relation to education: First, examples can be used to gain understanding of a particular phenomenon in studying instantiations of some of its features. Second, examples can be used as “entryways” arousing the student’s curiosity for understanding complex subject matters. And third, examples can work as prompting emulation through the admiration of exemplary persons as well as being used in the formation of educational judgment. From this exploration, I outlined three hypotheses about Biesta’s use of examples: (1) examples are instantiations of particular features of education as subjectification, (2) examples do not instantiate particular features of education as subjectification. On the contrary, they are always betraying what they exemplify, they show the reader how education as subjectification happened in a particular and unique way in the past. And (3), examples are rhetorical tools that guide the reader towards a particular axiomatic interpretation, which could foreclose different ways of thinking about ambivalent phenomena.



In the second part, I presented Biesta's idea of education as subjectification as it appears in his work with an emphasis on how it is presented in his latest book: *World-Centred Education*. Then, I examined some of the criticisms that Biesta's idea of education as subjectification has been exposed to. These criticisms were oriented toward the normativity and elusiveness of Biesta's idea, the oversimplifications that Biesta's framework seemed to imply, and the imbalance in the importance of the world and the self in the idea of education as subjectification.

In the third part, I proposed to analyze the seven examples of education as subjectification as they occur in Biesta's latest book. I thoroughly described the context in which those examples occurred and, when it was possible, I gathered information on the original context the examples have been taken from. I supplemented this description with insights from Lyons' seven characteristics of examples which allowed me to go more in depth about the nature and function of the examples used.

Finally, I discussed the three research questions that this thesis has been concerned with in light of the analysis of the examples. This discussion led to intricate interrogations about what education as subjectification consists in. I have suggested that seeking to understand education as subjectification through an analysis of the examples that are used brought a layer of complexity to Biesta's own account of education as subjectification. I suggested that the examples used had rhetorical power. Their use could conceal disputable premises and partial descriptions of reality, which could lead the reader to take the examples as commonsensical and simplify complex realities. I have also explored the idea of examples as inviting reflections from the reader, an idea that I moderated by the fact that the contradictory elements of the examples were left out. Yet, I also suggested that some other examples worked as openings due to their lack of expressive references to something tangible and unequivocal.

Then, drawing from Lyons' and Korsgaard's theoretical insights, I proposed to describe the relationship between the examples and what they exemplify as a relationship between instantiation and excess. Indeed, I pointed out that some characteristics of the examples used were in tension, even sometimes in contradiction with what they were supposed to exemplify. This exploration led me to examine further the implications of the use of examples for the

content of the idea that they exemplified: education as subjectification. Here, I argued that the analysis of examples could raise deep questions about what Biesta's idea implies. On the one hand, I explored the idea of the internal tensions between the different examples and claims as potentially constitutive of education as subjectification. If education as subjectification is approached as something unreproducible and unforeseeable, as something that is given here and now, then some examples could be seen as representing education as subjectification in the only way they can, with all their excess and contradictions. On the other hand, I suggested that other examples led to deep interrogations about the clarity of some of Biesta's general claims about education. Examining those claims through the prism of exemplification allowed me to explore the tensions between what we say, how we say it, and how we show it. In Biesta's text, I underlined that the meaning and implications of ideas such as "reality check" and "external control" became unclear, and that it raised questions about Biesta's understanding of freedom.

In conclusion, I could not find a clear answer to the question that led my investigation - what does education as subjectification consist in. However, I believe that I found something much better than a clear answer. I found even more interesting questions: How to think about what is internal or external to me? How to think about control and freedom? And how does freedom manifest itself?

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## Appendix 1

Example		
Pages/Chapters	Occurrences	Comments
p.2 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	Not only are there huge sums of money being invested in research that seeks to find out which educational “interventions” are most effective in generating particular “outcomes.” Also, students themselves are increasingly being made complicit in this ambition, <b>for example</b> when they are called to become “self-regulated learners” who should take “ownership” of their own learning – a strategy that may sound liberating but actually is a demand for what I tend to see as forms of self-objectification (see also Vassallo 2013; Ball & Olmedo 2013).	This use of "for example" seems to imply that there are many ways in which "students themselves are increasingly being made complicit in this ambition", not only through the terms used to describe them, or not only through the terms listed here.
p.4 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	This immediately raises a number of further questions, such as why such action actually exists, what such action seeks to achieve, and how such action can be justified (on the latter question see, <b>for example</b> , Flitner 1989[1979]; Prange 2010).	Example of sources, gives the impression that there are more sources than the ones listed here without naming which.
p.5 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	When we look at the history of Western education, we can discern a number of different answers to the question what “we” should do with “the children,” that is, to the question what the point of education might be. Interestingly, many of these answers still play a role in contemporary thought and practice. In ancient Greece, <b>for example</b> , a main “agenda” for education, under the name of paideia (παιδεία), was to give free men – not women, slaves, or artisans – the time and resources to cultivate themselves towards civic excellence (in Greek: ἀρετή).	This use of "for example" seems to reflect an ideal example, an example taken for its singularity rather than a representative one.
p.6 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	Towards the end of the 19th century education became increasingly interested in providing educational opportunities for everyone, and doing so in equal measure. And again, this is still an important theme today, <b>for example</b> in the UN's sustainable development goals and in the ambition many countries have to provide equal educational opportunities for everyone.	This example could work as both a representative example and an exemplary example.
p.10 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	In dialogue with ideas from Jean-Luc Marion I try to show what it means to take “givenness” seriously – which, as I try to explain, is precisely not a matter of “taking.” I also provide <b>examples</b> of where givenness shows up in education by highlighting three “gifts” of teaching.	Here examples are provided to show the relevance of givenness for teaching.

p.11 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	For many people there is still the challenge of finding enough to eat, having clean water and proper sanitation, and the luxury of a roof above one's head, and this also happens in the "West." In this regard the idea of a world that is just changing rapidly is a <b>typical example</b> of an ideology: by expressing a truth it is "conveniently" hiding another.	typical example
p.13 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	Of course, there are ongoing concerns about the degree to which the modern school is able to deliver on these ambitions (see, <b>for example</b> , Hopmann 2008; Ravitch 2011)	Example of sources.
p.15 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	While this may sound attractive and also has entered the domain of education in the idea that educational institutions should first of all satisfy the needs of students, that is, give them what they want, problems arise when customers want something immoral or when students want something uneducational (such as the right answers to exam questions or written guarantee that they will succeed; on these problems see, <b>for example</b> , Eagle & Brennan 2007; Nixon, Scullion & Hearn 2018).	Example of sources.
p.20 (What Kind of Society Does the School Need?)	A central distinction in Roberts's analysis is that between "needs" and "wants." Roberts shows that about 70% of the US economy focuses on "discretionary consumption," that is on the things we don't really need but nonetheless want. And this creates problems, not just because of the fact that "an economy reoriented to give us what we want ... isn't the best for delivering what we need" (Roberts 2014, p. 8; emph. in original), but also because it may be quite difficult to "cope with an economic system that is almost too good at giving us what we want" (ibid., p. 2) – think, <b>for example</b> , of obesity as one of the "outcomes" of such a set-up, but also all the environmental problems created by "fast fashion." This does raise the question where our wants actually come from, which has something to do with the dynamics of contemporary capitalism.	examples of obesity and environmental problems as induced by the consumer society.
p.21 (What Kind of Society Does the School Need?)	There was, however, one "register" left, and this has become the defining focus of contemporary capitalism. <b>The best example</b> of what has emerged here is probably Apple, once we see that Apple doesn't so much sell mobile phones as that it sells the desire for a new mobile phone. It sells this desire for free, but once it has arrived "inside" us, we often find ourselves more than willing to exchange our hard-earned cash for the latest model. Contemporary capitalism, so we might say, is in the business of selling desires	the best example of want takes precedence over need.
p.22 (What Kind of Society Does the School Need?)	We should be mindful, however, that this is not simply a matter of age. It is not that young people are unable to be in a relationship with their desires where older people are. On the contrary, we can see many <b>examples</b> of older people who are entirely consumed by their desires, just as we can see many <b>examples</b> of younger people who are in a relationship with their desires and are able to achieve a degree of	many examples. Interesting to note that, despite many examples of children being grown ups, the term is kept anyway. It seems that direct correspondence with reality is



	sovereignty vis-à-vis their desires.	not what matters.
p.23 (What Kind of Society Does the School Need?)	It is here that democracy enters the discussion, because one could argue that the whole point of democracy – unlike populism – is precisely to ponder all the desires of individuals and groups in order then to find out which of those desires can be “carried” by society as a whole and which of those desires cannot be carried, <b>for example</b> because they put pressure on or run the risk of undermining the key democratic values of liberty and equality. Unlike populism, the very point of democracy is that you cannot always get what you want (see Biesta 2014b), which is not just the reason why democracy is difficult, but why it is becoming increasingly unpopular in an age in which we are being told again and again that there are no limits.	for example: is it one in many reasons or is it the primary reason?
p.28 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	This seems to be an important question for educators, because if it turns out that our genetic make-up (nature) would account for, say, 75%, and the influence from the environment (nurture) for, say, 20%, then there is very little scope left for education to make a difference. This issue is particularly important in our time, partly because there are studies that suggest that the contribution of our genetic-make-up is even higher than 75% (see, e.g., Harris 2009), and partly because many parents and teachers really struggle to limit the influences from the outside world on their children and students, <b>for example</b> in relation to what enters the home and the school through social media.	example of the external influence of social media.
p.30 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	The paradigm of cultivation partly provides an explanation of how individuals become who they are as a result of these processes – it, explains, <b>for example</b> how individuals become speakers of a particular language or adopters of particular attitudes and values.	Is it an example representative of the paradigm of education in the tradition of Dewey.
p.30 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	There are <b>many contemporary examples</b> of the paradigm of cultivation – <b>for example</b> educational practices that seek to provide children and young people with cultural and social capital; educational practices that seek to make room for the many languages of children, their natural curiosity, the development of their innate capacities, or educational practices that focus strongly on providing opportunities for children and young people to flourish in the widest sense possible. I wish to suggest that a “paradigm case” of this way of understanding and “doing” education can be found in the work of John Dewey. Dewey does see education basically as a process of cultivation as can be seen, <b>for example</b> , in his contention that “(t)he ultimate problem of all education is to co-ordinate the psychological and the social factors” (Dewey 1895, p. 224), that is, how individual development can “connect” with social and cultural resources.	Here we have at first an enumeration of all the different educational practices that could illustrate the paradigm of cultivation. Then, Dewey is presented as a “paradigm case”, that is to say an exemplary example of the theory examined. Finally, an example is given to show why Dewey can be understood as a paradigm case for education as cultivation.



p.31 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	This is a process of constant “doing and undergoing” – Dewey compares it with breathing, <b>for example</b> – in which the organism seeks to maintain an interactive equilibrium with its environment. In this process both the organism and the environment change over time; the environment changes as a result of the actions of the organism, but the organism also changes in order to adapt to the (changing) environment. Dewey refers to these changes as “habits,” which are not actions in themselves but “predispositions to act.”	Here it is an example given by Dewey that Biesta reports.
p.34 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	This injunction, this “Hey, you there, where are you?” is a very direct question. It is, in other words, an <b>example</b> , and perhaps even <b>the prime example</b> , of direct education, because it goes from “soul” to “soul,” so to speak (on this terminology see Biesta 2017b) rather than that it is a matter of organisms trying to adjust their actions to each other to secure ongoing successful transaction. If, from the paradigm of cultivation, such direction education is the kind of action at a distance that is considered impossible and hence can only appear as “spooky,” in the existential paradigm of education such direct education, such spooky action at a distance, actually goes to the heart of the matter, perhaps first of all literally, because the “Hey, you there, where are you?” speaks to the heart.	example, prime example of direct education. It is interesting to note that this example is not likely to have occurred in actual teaching situation but is more likely to be a metaphor.
p.34 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	Whereas in recent years the idea of Bildung has become more visible in the English-speaking world (see, <b>for example</b> , Løvlie & Standish 2002; Biesta 2002; Pinar 2011; Horlacher 2017), the word Erziehung has remained remarkably invisible (for a recent exception see Guilherme 2019). It can be argued, however, that together they are the foundational concepts of German educational thought (see, <b>for example</b> , Benner 2015), and of Continental educational thought more generally (see Biesta 2011).	Examples of sources.
p.34 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	Some, such as <b>for example</b> Peter Petersen, see Erziehung as a rather restrictive term that refers to ways in which educators try to tell children what to do and how to think	Example of sources.
p.36 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	It is the simple but crucial gesture of the “Hey, you there! Where are you?” which manifests itself as spooky action at a distance rather than an intervention in the acculturation of the organism, <b>for example</b> through structuring the organism’s “learning environment.” And the whole point of the summoning here is that no one can respond to this call but me. This means that it is this call that subjectivises, puts the subject-ness of the one being called “at stake” (although the “I” may still decide to walk away or keep silent, of course).	Is it an example that is given here, or is that the only possible example?

p.39 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	Endnote 2: I have discussed Dewey’s work extensively in a number of publications (see, <b>for example</b> , Biesta 1995, 2006b, 2014c; Biesta & Burbules 2003). My point in discussing Dewey here is not to engage in a discussion about his work as such, but to present him as <b>a powerful and rather “precise” example</b> of the idea of education as a process of cultivation. As mentioned earlier, the idea of education as cultivation concerns the dynamics of education – but those dynamics can “work” for a wide range of educational purposes and ambitions.	1. Example of sources in his own work. 2. Interesting to note that Biesta doesn't want to discuss Dewey but present him as an example of a theoretical line of thinking.
p.41 (Subjectification revisited)	From a more conventional view of education, Lane took quite a lot of risks with his approach – just as A.S. Neill would do later at Summerhill – and there are numerous stories of young people running away from the school and getting into trouble in the nearby village. But there are also <b>examples</b> of the opposite.	Just before introducing the story of Lane and Jason. Here, the story of Lane and Jason appears to be one in many, just an example of something.
p.42 (Subjectification revisited)	I recount Homer Lane’s story – which he himself refers to as a “complicated and unusual incident” (Lane 1928, p. 169) – not because of its apparent success in “turning around” a difficult youngster, but because Lane’s actions provide a vivid and <b>rather precise example of</b> education as subjectification. Let me take one step back in order then to explain why Lane’s story is such a telling “case” of this.	rather precise example of education as subjectification: is it the counterpart of Dewey? But then why not take an example of a situation to illustrate Dewey's theory as well?
p.43 (Subjectification revisited)	In addition to these concerns, I have also argued that the idea of the teacher as a “facilitator of learning,” misconstrues the complexities of educational relationships and the work of the teacher in such relationships (see, <b>for example</b> , Biesta 2012).	Example of his own work.
p.44 (Subjectification revisited)	The suggestion that education has an orientation towards more than one purpose is, of course, not unique. Kieran Egan, <b>for example</b> , has suggested that education should focus on socialisation, the acquisition of (academic) knowledge, and the promotion of individual development, and has argued that it should be possible to give all three a place in education (see Egan 2008, particularly Chapter 2).	Precise example of sources.
pp.44-45 (Subjectification revisited)	All three authors do acknowledge that education is not just about getting something into students, <b>for example</b> for the sake of cultural reproduction and continuity, but that it also does something “with” the student and should be of benefit to the student. In addition to qualification and socialisation there is, therefore, support for the idea of a third domain that has something to do with the student as individual, and this is also what I have seen in the uptake of my own ideas about the three domains of educational purpose.	Example of something really general.
p.46 (Subjectification revisited)	Freedom viewed in this way, as I have already mentioned earlier in this book, is fundamentally an existential matter; it is about how we exist, how we lead our own life – and there is no one else who can do that for us. Put differently, freedom is a first-person matter, just as, <b>for example</b> , walking, which is also something I have to do and no one	An example that adds a lot more meaning than intended? Because then it means that you have to think autonomously in order to think, as you have to walk alone

	else can do for me (see also Mollenhauer 2013). It is about how I exist as subject of my own life, not as object of what other people want from me.	to walk.
p.47 (Subjectification revisited)	What I particularly value about Homer Lane’s “complicated and unusual incident” – which was not pre-planned but was an educational opportunity Lane was able to spot and seize – is that it provides <b>such a clear example</b> of both the dynamics and the orientation of education as subjectification. What Lane does, almost literally, is putting Jason’s freedom in Jason’s own hands. Lane doesn’t condemn Jason; he doesn’t say, <b>for example</b> , that Jason is irresponsible and should act more responsibly. He is not saying that Jason has the wrong traits and should work on his character or receive some character education. Nor is he saying that Jason lacks something and is in need of learning.	such a clear example, because it is spontaneous? The second one is interesting because it is an example of what Lane didn’t say, which could be anything, or could be the typical things that teachers usually say?
p.52 (Subjectification revisited)	One suggestion that is frequently made, is that subjectification and, more specifically, the notion of subject-ness, is the same as the notion of identity. Although identity is a complex and multi-faceted notion and discussions about its meaning and status are ongoing (see, <b>for example</b> Schwartz, Luyckx & Vignoles 2013), it seems safe to say that identity concerns the question of who I am, both in terms of what I identify with and how I can be identified by others and by myself	Examples of sources.
p.52 (Subjectification revisited)	It is also to ensure that the existential domain of subjectification is not colonised by personality tests and personality measurement – such as, <b>for example</b> , the currently rather popular “Big Five Inventory” that seems to be making its way into education or the way in which the OECD seeks to expand its measurements into the domain of student personality (on these and similar developments see also Williamson 2017; Sellar & Hogan 2019). Subjectification is, in other words, not another category for student performance they should be tested on.	Examples of personality tests and measurement: popular examples.
p.61 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	I found helpful suggestions for exploring this dimension of the learnification thesis in work from American philosophers of education working in the analytic tradition. Interestingly, this work largely predated the rise of the new language of learning (see, <b>for example</b> , Fenstermacher 1986; see also Biesta & Stengel 2016).	Examples of sources and of his own work.
p.67 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	Thus, we encounter a reversal of our objective relation to the world. It is not we who command the world. Rather, “in the case of the given, we find ourselves commanded by the thing, summoned to come experience it” (Marion 2017, p. 85). We could also say that we are surprised, in the literal sense of “being seized.” Marion gives the <b>example</b> of a painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount which has a secret point where one must be situated to see the painting. This point, Marion explains, “is determined by the painting and not by the spectator” so that “the spectator must obey the painting in order to see it” (Marion 2017, pp. 84–85). Marion calls the principle at stake here “anamorphosis,” and one could say	Marion's example.

	that this principle reflects the difference between “learning from,” where the “I” approaches the world as object, and “being taught by,” where the “I” not just subjects itself but, in a rather precise formulation, is “subjectified,” that is, is confronted with its own subject-ness.	
p.69 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	All this has moved “the learner” to the centre of the educational endeavour and has manoeuvred the teacher to the side-line – coach, facilitator, fellow-learner, friend, critical or otherwise, but hardly ever teacher. On the one hand this has given the impression that teaching is outdated, undesirable and, according to constructivist “dogma,” even impossible and that, therefore, we should do away with teaching. On the other hand, however, it has also led to calls for a return of the teacher. Either this is a call for the teacher as the one who is able to exert control over the whole educational endeavour, which can be found, <b>for example</b> , in the rhetoric of the teacher as the most important “in-school factor” in the effective production of learning outcomes (for a more detailed discussion see Biesta 2017a). Or it is a call for the teacher as the one who ought to be able to exert control over the whole educational endeavour, that is, the call – and the desire – for the return of the authoritarian teacher.	Example of rhetoric for the return of the authoritarian teacher.
p.70 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	We also increasingly hear that learners should take responsibility for their own learning, should self-regulate their learning, and should take ownership of their own learning, as all this will supposedly make the learning better. Such arguments are not just given in relation to the process of learning – if such a thing exists – but also with regard to its content. When it is suggested, <b>for example</b> , that students should set their own learning goals, it often also means that students should decide about the content of their learning, that is, about what they should be learning, <b>for example</b> because they have come to the conclusions that this is their specific “learning need.”	Here the passive voice makes unclear who the bearer of this type of discourse is.
p.71 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	There is a complex philosophical discussion in the background (which is actually first of all a theological discussion about the possibility of revelation; see Westphal 2008), but the point Kierkegaard is making here is actually remarkable practical and “down to earth” as well, and is a very effective critique of the idea that teaching would simply be about giving students knowledge. The whole point, after all, is that in order to recognize something as knowledge – or more widely to recognise something as meaningful or true – one not just needs the “content” itself, but also needs to have, and be on the inside of, the “frame” within which something makes sense, can be appreciated as knowledge, and so on. The <b>concrete example I have encountered many times</b> as a student was of my mathematics teachers who were able to do spectacular things on the blackboard and, when they met my puzzled gaze, could say no more than “But can’t you see it?” And the whole problem, of	concrete example: the example fits exactly to what it is supposed to exemplify.

	course, was that I was unable to see, not because I couldn't see but because I didn't know what I should be seeing. I was, in other words, outside of the "frame" within which this seeing was possible, whereas my mathematics teacher was inside of that "frame."	
p.72 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	While our freedom is not of our own making, it is, however, also not entirely accurate to see it as a gift we receive, as this would suggest that there is an "I" who, in a sense, is waiting for his or her freedom to arrive. It seems more accurate to suggest that the "I" and its freedom "arrive" at the very same time, <b>for example</b> in the moment when we realise that we can say "no."	Is it an example, can freedom arrive at other moments than when we go against our environment?
p.73 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	Homer Lane's "complicated and unusual incident" remains a <b>powerful example</b> of this third gift of teaching, precisely because Lane, in putting the watch before Jason, put Jason's freedom in his own hands and thus we might say that Jason "received himself from what he received" (Marion 2017, p. 86).	powerful example, why powerful?
p.75 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	It is one thing to point out where teaching takes place, but still another to articulate how teaching takes place – which is both the question of the gesture of teaching itself and the question of the work of teachers in relation to this. In the preceding chapters I have already shown glimpses of this gesture and of the work of the teacher, <b>for example</b> in my discussion of Homer Lane's "complicated and unusual incident" and in my discussion of givenness and the gifts of teaching. In this chapter I will continue this exploration by focusing on the form of teaching and thus the form of education more generally	Referring to himself
p.76 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	In Chapter 1 I have characterised education as a form of intentional action, that is, as something that educators do and that they do deliberately, with the proviso that this also contains intentional non-action, that is, the deliberate decision to refrain from action for educational reasons (think, <b>for example</b> , of all the things Homer Lane did not do in his interactions with Jason).	Again, referring to what Lane didn't say
p.78 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	Yet, my point here is not to explain how the (re)direction of someone else's attention is possible – it is, one might say, the assumption upon which all education rests – but to point at the gesture of teaching in its "purest" and most basic form. And while this gesture can be enacted in all kind of ways – <b>for example</b> by saying "Look there!" or "Pay attention" to our students, or by giving our students a particular task or challenge – I agree with Prange (2012a, see also Prange & Strobel-Eisele 2006, pp. 40–48) that the basic "structure" of the gesture of teaching is that of pointing. What is important here is that pointing has a double orientation, in that it is always directed at something – Look there! – and at the same time orientated to someone – "You, look there!" (see also Prange 2012a, p. 68). There is, after all, little point in	Examples of redirecting someone's attention



	pointing [out] something to oneself. Pointing is, in this sense, always a communicative act.	
p.78 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	Before I discuss Prange’s ideas, I do wish to mention that, despite all the critique of “traditional” and “didactic” teaching, and despite the hype of the “flipped classroom” – there is actually nothing new about asking students to do preparatory and follow-up work – it is remarkable how persistent and also how resistant the form of teaching actually is. Perhaps YouTube is the <b>best example</b> here, because it is remarkable to find thousands and thousands of instructional videoclips that all use this basic form of someone talking to an audience and demonstrating a particular way of doing something (showing how to assemble a piece of IKEA furniture, <b>for example</b> , or plumbing, repairing a car, hanging curtains, and so on). <sup>3</sup> More generally, the form of sitting together in rows or a half-circle to listen to someone speaking remains a remarkable popular and useful form, in education and beyond.	Youtube as best example
p.80 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	The theme is that which is “at stake” in what the teacher seeks to teach to the student; it is that which is “at stake” in what the teacher hopes that the student will “acquire.” We can refer to this as “content” but “theme” allows for a wider and in a sense looser description of what is at stake in education. Prange gives several <b>examples</b> of possible themes, such as being able to walk, to speak, to read, to write and to do arithmetic (see <i>ibid.</i> , p. 42), thus suggesting that themes are relatively complex	Prange's examples
p.82 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	Prange’s point here is that “learning” doesn’t show itself as some kind of isolated and self-sufficient thing or object we can simply study, like a tree, <b>for example</b> , but rather is entangled in all kind of situations and constellations through which we may have some kind of experience that learning has occurred (see Prange 2012a, p. 83).	example of a tree for an object
p.85 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	Although education should live up to general ethical standards, just as any other field of human practice, the question is whether there are any particular, education-specific standards that educators need to take into consideration, similar to the particular ethics of medicine, <b>for example</b> .	education-specific standards as there are in ethics or medicine
p.87 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	From my own perspective I find it rather unhelpful that Prange focuses the answer to this question so strongly on learning. As I have argued in several places, learning is only one existential possibility amongst many others (see, <b>for example</b> , Biesta 2015b), so to claim, as Prange does, that the educational significance of pointing lies in learning, i.e., that learning gives pointing its educational significance, sounds too narrow to me, as it seeks to exclude many other ways in which human beings can exist in and with the world (I return to this in the next chapter as well).	Example in his own work

p.92 (World-Centred Education)	The whole point of freedom, after all, is that it never forces us to act in a particular way. Homer Lane's "complicated and unusual incident" remains <b>an excellent example</b> of this whole dynamic	Lane as an excellent example
p.93 (World-Centred Education)	To support his claims, Roth discusses the <b>example</b> of encountering "a new form of food, a wine or olive oil you have never tasted/smelled before" (ibid., p. 18).	Roth's example
p.94 (World-Centred Education)	Roth discusses the <b>example</b> of sensing the nature of a mouse pad surface, noticing that it doesn't suffice to just place one's fingers on it, but that one actually has to slide one's fingers across the surface.	Roth's example
p.95 (World-Centred Education)	In discussing this <b>example</b> Roth emphasises once more that construction has little to do here. "I cannot construct the surface because the sensation is an entirely pathic experience. (...) I cannot in a strong sense construct the knowledge about the surface as I can only open up and let it (the surface) affect me" (ibid., p. 54).	Roth's example
p.98 (World-Centred Education)	Yet Marion's <b>example</b> of the painting in the cloister of the convent of Trinity-on-the-Mount is very helpful as well, precisely because it gives an <b>example</b> of a situation where the spectator must find the point from which the painting can be seen, a point "determined by the painting and not by the spectator" so that "the spectator must obey the painting in order to see it" (Marion 2017, pp. 84–85). The spectator must, in other words, engage with the question what the painting is asking from them, not the other way around.	Marion's example.
p.99 (World-Centred Education)	Whereas one can put a toy or object away if it doesn't suit or if boredom sets in, animals pose an ongoing demand – they need to be fed, they need to be groomed, they need to be protected, and so on, and these challenges do not go away, so one could say that animals pull the "I" in a very different way into the world than inanimate objects do. Elsewhere ( <b>for example</b> Biesta 2019c) I have made a similar observation about the educational significance of plants, suggesting that what is special about the encounter with plants is that one can think as hard and long about the plant as one wishes, but that this will have no impact on whether the plant will flourish or not.	Example in his own work
pp. 100-101 (World-Centred Education)	Any answer we may give to what we shall do with the children, thus needs to be given in light of how we encounter and perceive our present "condition," so to speak. With regard to this, I do believe that we still live in the shadow of "Auschwitz," that is, that we still need to come to terms with the fact that the total objectification of (other) human beings is a real possibility, and that, as Primo Levi reminds us, we carry this possibility with us and within us, rather than that it is the evil we need to keep at bay. In light of this, we should not just be concerned about the ways in which objectification continues to emerge "elsewhere," <b>for example</b> through the way in which authoritarian	authoritarian regimes as an example of objectification occurring

	regimes suppress the possibility for people to exist as subjects of their own lives. We should also be concerned about the ways in which objectification shows up within education itself, particularly through the well-intended but ill-conceived attempts at improving educational systems that turn the education of subjects into the “management of objects,” as I have put it. (The demand for self-objectification, as mentioned, is one symptom of this.)	
<b>Instance</b>		
<b>Page/Chapter</b>	<b>Occurrences</b>	<b>Comments</b>
p.45 (Subjectification revisited)	As I have already mentioned in Chapter 1, education has not always had an interest in freedom or, to be more precise, it has not always had an interest in the promotion of freedom (and we could even say that in <b>many instances</b> education still hasn't got an interest in freedom).	Examples of education disinterested in freedom without naming what types of situations, just that they exist
p. 47 (Subjectification Revisited)	This shows that the educational gesture here is fundamentally non-affirmative – another helpful phrase from Benner (see Benner 1995) – because the educator is not telling the child or young person how they should become, what they should do with their freedom, which “template” or “image” they should adopt and aspire to, which all would be <b>instances</b> of affirmative education or, with the terms I have introduced, of “strong” socialisation.	Giving three examples of affirmative education
p.69 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	I have already referred to the redefinition of teaching as facilitating learning; a redefinition that is part of a more general shift from teaching to learning and one <b>instance</b> of the ongoing learnification of education.	Redefinition of teaching as facilitating learning as one example of a general shift.
<b>Case</b>		
<b>Page/Chapter</b>	<b>Occurrences</b>	<b>Comments</b>
p.10 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	Rather than thinking of this in terms of the gesture of learning and comprehension – which is a gesture that puts the student in the centre and makes the world into his or her object – I explore the <b>case</b> for the opposite direction, where the world speaks to me, addresses me, and in this sense tries to teach me.	
p.27 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	What made Eichmann's <b>case</b> famous (see, e.g., Arendt 1963) is the fact that he did admit arranging the mass deportation of Jews and others but denied responsibility for the consequences – their extermination – on the account that he was only following orders.	Does this mean that this case is an exception? If so, how could it illustrate a paradigm?



p.28 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	When looked at from an educational angle, the <b>cases</b> of Rosa Parks and Adolf Eichmann present us with a paradox.	
p.30 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	I wish to suggest that a “paradigm <b>case</b> ” of this way of understanding and “doing” education can be found in the work of John Dewey.	
p.31 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	While much of this goes on naturally, so we might say – <b>in most cases</b> we manage to adjust quickly and easily – Dewey particularly focuses on those situations in which the organism encounters a situation that calls out conflicting habits.	
p.32 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	Dewey’s theory – which I have presented as a “paradigm <b>case</b> ” of the paradigm of cultivation – is a theory of intelligent adjustment to always evolving environing conditions. It is, in other words, a theory of intelligent survival.	
p.37 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	I do think that stating the paradox in this way helped to bring the missing dimension in the paradigm of education as cultivation into view, as it highlighted that what counts as success in terms of that paradigm, actually flies in the face of what we would generally see as successful or as problematic when looking at the <b>cases</b> of Parks and Eichmann.	
p.42 (Subjectification Revisited)	Let me take one step back in order then to explain why Lane’s story is such a telling “ <b>case</b> ” of this.	
p.66 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	Reduction, as Marion explains, “consists in not taking everything I perceive for granted and in not receiving everything that happens to me with the same degree of evidence and thus of certainty but in each <b>case</b> to question what is actually given in order to distinguish it from what is only pieced together, inferred, or, so to say, acquired in a roundabout way, indirectly” (Marion 2017, pp. 72–73).	
p.66 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	Marion thus argues that Husserl “stopped” at the object, just as Heidegger “stopped” at the being of the object. For Marion, however, “objectness (Husserl) and beingness (Heidegger) only offer specific and possible <b>cases</b> , but surely not the most legitimate ones, of the naming of givenness” (Marion 2017, p. 78). Hence the need for “a	

	third, more original reduction ... namely the reduction to givenness” (Marion 2017, p. 79).	
p.67 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	Thus, we encounter a reversal of our objective relation to the world. It is not we who command the world. Rather, “in the <b>case</b> of the given, we find ourselves commanded by the thing, summoned to come experience it” (Marion 2017, p. 85)	
p.85 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	And Prange also reminds us that there are <b>cases</b> where parents and teachers obviously didn’t do the right things, and nonetheless their children and students turn out well.	
p.93 (World-Centred Education)	This is an experience of “not-knowing” that comes with uncertainty “and therefore, also with risk” (ibid.). Because of this risk, the “standard recommendation” in the <b>case</b> of smelling is that we “wave the hand such that the smelling can begin with whiffs of odor rather than with the full, potentially dangerous experience of smell” (ibid.).	
<b>e.g.</b>		
<b>Page/Chapter</b>	<b>Occurrences</b>	<b>Comments</b>
p.2 (What Shall we Do with the Children?)	This is particularly problematic when their jobs are being made dependent upon producing an ongoing increase in student test-scores or securing constant student progress along predefined trajectories (see, <b>e.g.</b> , Baker et al. 2010; Ravitch 2011).	Examples of sources.
p.27 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	What made Eichmann’s case famous (see, <b>e.g.</b> , Arendt 1963) is the fact that he did admit arranging the mass deportation of Jews and others but denied responsibility for the consequences – their extermination – on the account that he was only following orders.	Example of source?
p.28 (The Parks-Eichmann Paradox and the Two Paradigms of Education)	This issue is particularly important in our time, partly because there are studies that suggest that the contribution of our genetic-make-up is even higher than 75% (see, <b>e.g.</b> , Harris 2009), and partly because many parents and teachers really struggle to limit the influences from the outside world on their children and students, for example in relation to what enters the home and the school through social media.	Example of source.
p.61 (Learnification, Givenness, and the Gifts of Teaching)	While there is evidence of a growing interest in the question of the purpose(s) of education (see, <b>e.g.</b> , Hattie & Nepper Larsen 2020), much of what can be found in policy, research, and practice continues to have a rather one-dimensional focus on learning, also due to the dominance of the frameworks promoted by the global education measurement industry.	Examples of sources.

p.82 (Form Matters: On the Point(ing) of Education)	This has something to do with a fascinating claim he puts forward, namely that learning is basically invisible ( <b>e.g.</b> , Prange 2012a, p. 88) – sometimes he also refers to this as the intransparency of learning ( <b>e.g.</b> , Prange 2012b, chapter 11).	Examples of sources.
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