

The policy emphasis of Norwegian political parties:

Catching as many votes as possible

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Abstract

What shapes the policy emphasis of political parties? As political competition in Western Europe has evolved, the role of issue competition has increased, and the content of parties' agendas has become just as important as their ideological position. This thesis will attempt to further the understanding of how parties strategically adopt issues. More precisely, what leads them to adopt a broad catch-all profile. Six Norwegian parties will serve as cases. A secondary purpose is therefore to examine the issue attention of these individual parties, which will grant important insight into further research on the Norwegian party system.

Inspiration is taken from Wolinetz' model which added party types to Strøm's theory of party behaviour. Several modifications are made to Wolinetz's model, primarily, the addition of post-electoral potential. Parties' policy-seeking, office-seeking and vote-seeking is measured by how they distribute attention to policy issues. To investigate the extent this can be explained by the interplay between a party's party type and its potential to impact public policy after the election.

Support for the revised model of behaviour is found. Party type seems to explain the breadth of policy profiles quite well. Catch-all parties emphasize a broad policy profile and a willingness to adapt their agenda frequently to shifting moods in the electorate, while niche parties are far more policy-seeking, stably emphasising their core policy issues. FrP, which was assumed to distribute their attention in line with niche parties, emerges as an exception. Post-electoral potential does however seem to explain this finding. An increased potential to impact public policy gradually increases parties' vote-seeking and in turn office-seeking behaviour, as shown by their issue emphasis. While the thesis has an exploratory design, the uncovered empirical patterns are consistent with several of the model's main aspects and should provide a useful starting point for future research.

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To the extent the thesis has spiralled, and every other mistake are my own.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research question

One of the core characteristics of a representative democracy is that the residents elect the decision makers of the state. This grants the voters the ability to signal their preferences to the legislative power. The instrument used to translate voters' preferences into governments and in turn policy in contemporary democracies, is commonly political parties. E.E.

Schattschneider went as far as to state that: «modern democracy is unthinkable save in term of parties» (1942, p. 1). Voting is thus a way for the voters to influence public policy, based on how they perceive parties' policy propositions and valence. It is therefore important to understand what influences the parties' policy priorities.

The party competition of the first half of the 20th century can be described, with some notable exceptions, as stable (Dalton, 2020, p. 140). Party choice could quite accurately be predicted by the socioeconomic affiliation of the voter (Inglehart, 1990, p. 430-431), while political parties could be placed on a left-right continuum, based on their stance on economic redistribution and state control (Dalton, 2020, p. 108-109). People acted primarily based on economic and materialistic motivations (Inglehart, 1990, p. 430).

As the materialistic needs for economic and physical security became less pressing, Ronald Inglehart argued that values shifted away from strictly materialistic, toward post-materialistic values, such as sense of community and the quality of life (1990, p. 56). Importantly, as argued by Inglehart, these new values did not supplant the old, they supplemented them, creating a more complex multidimensional system of party competition (1990, p. 257). While being an important factor in determining party choice, socioeconomic affiliation does not reflect as large a part of the picture as before.

As the voter volatility rose and the parties no longer could rely as heavily on specific segments of the population, parties started to adapt too. Election campaign strategies changed from the grassroots attempting to mobilize core electorates, to strategic attempts at persuading all types of voters on several different dimensions and single-issues (Farrell, 2006, p. 126; Schmitt-Beck, 2007, p. 745-746). There has been a “transformation from class to issue competition” (Green-Pedersen, 2006, p. 220). This has led to a situation where research has shifted towards explaining the imbalance of party systems, rather than the balance (Dalton, 2020, p. 141).

This shift towards studying the imbalance and volatility also changed the object of studies. While the party systems were, in large parts, frozen (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50), the party systems themselves were the most interesting objects of study. However, when party systems started to de-align and become dynamic, the actors making up the system, and in parts driving this change, became increasingly important to study (Farrell, 2006, p. 122). Not only which profile political parties have, but how profiles change, and political parties adapt. How political parties have adapted to this new system of political competition and which profile they present to the electorate, are thus important in order to understand modern political competition. This thesis will, more precisely, examine which strategic considerations lead parties to prioritize a more diverse set of policy areas. The research question that will be answered in this thesis consists of two parts:

Which policy issues do political parties prioritise and why, and secondly, what leads parties to broaden their policy agenda?

1.2. Disposition

The thesis will start by reviewing previous literature on policy. This serves to place the thesis in existing literature and highlight some of its contributions. The review will include a brief introduction of the Comparative Agendas Project, which provides a frame for the data and much theoretical support. Following this, the political party literature will be discussed in chapter 3. Based on a discussion of several of the prevalent contributions of this tradition, a model of party behaviour will be crafted. Several hypotheses that are assumed to aid in answering the research question are derived from this proposed model.

Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the case selection. This includes discussion of Norway as a relevant case and the choice of which Norwegian parties to include. Both the appropriateness and key limitations of the case selection are discussed. The appropriateness and limitations of the research design and objects of analysis will take centre stage in chapter 5, where the methods and research design are presented. Here, a more in-depth discussion of the Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme and the coding itself are also presented.

Chapter 6 follows up by presenting the issue emphasis of Norwegian political parties, before an analysis based on previous theoretical discussion and the model presented in chapter 3 is performed. The hypotheses guide the analysis and the parties' development based on both institutional and strategic factors, enable the answering the research question. The thesis concludes in chapter 7. While this chapter contains a summary of the findings, some

concluding thoughts on the appropriateness of the revised model and possibilities of its usage outside of the current case, are also provided.

2. Placing the thesis in between politics and policy

2.1. The study of policy

Much of the political party literature is primarily interested in the ideological position of parties. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), for example, studied how differing placement on certain dimensions or political cleavages framed political choices and competition. Especially, parties' and individuals' placement on the left-right scale, the economic dimension, has received massive attention (Budge and Klingemann, 2001; Medina, 2015), and rightly so. This portion of the literature fits the definition of politics made in Harold Lasswell's seminal book: "Politics: who gets what, when, how" (1936). Gøsta Esping-Andersen, for example, clearly relates the rise of social democracy in Scandinavia to demands of redistribution (2017). Illustrating that political development is determined by the prioritizations on who gets what.

The focus of this study on the other hand, is public policy. Relying on a definition by Guy Peters, "public policies are the means through which governments and their allies in the private sector determine who gets what" (2018, p. 88). So, diverging from a big portion of the party literature, this study attempts to shed a light on which tools political parties propose to use, not the end goal they propose.

The study of public policy is also a diverse field, including, but not exclusive to, the use of different policy instruments (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007), the study of the implementation of specific policy programmes (Carrell and Hauge, 2009; Grung et al., 2014), the comparison of policy programmes and implementation across countries (Falkner and Treib, 2008; Goyal and Howlett, 2021). Which instruments used in the implementation of policy programmes and the evaluation of implemented policy are important. Furthermore, Frank Baumgartner et al. write: "A common approach in comparative policy studies is to focus on one stage and to compare that stage cross-nationally" (2009, p. 604). While the thesis does not have a cross-national design, it follows the trend of studying one part of the policy-making process. One described by Baumgartner and co-authors, as the input stage (2009, p. 604).

The political agenda literature shows that both people and political elites are more likely to act on what they think about (Cohen, 1963, p. 255; Iyengar, 2017, p. 61-62), said differently, on what is on their agenda. Policy that are on the agenda of the government is more likely to implemented and, as stated above, modern governments consist almost exclusively of party representatives.

Examining parties' priorities improves the understanding of public policy, as it aids in the understanding of which policies parties will implement if they enter government. Ian Budge writes: "In writing programmes parties have the power to emphasize and de-emphasize issues for strategic advantage, among other things (...)" (2015, p. 765). Furthermore, while much attention is given to the policy promises not kept by the parties, research shows signs that parties' policy propositions, do impact public policy (Budge and Bara, 2001, p. 70-71; Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001, p. 22-25; Thomson et al., 2017, p. 540).

Party prioritizations are only one factor explaining the implementation of specific public policy programmes, but as argued by for example Sylvain Brouard et al. (2018, p. 915), an important one. Peter Van Aelst and co-authors write: "Political agenda-setting can be considered as an early stage of the larger policy process" (2014, p. 203). This illustrates that while policymaking is a long process, how the priorities at the input-stage are formed, is of great importance.

Party competition also has an impact on which policy issues gain salience, meaning that it impacts what issues the political competition is fought on (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 27), which in turn impacts public policy. Studying how parties' policy prioritizations develop is therefore both going to shed some light on the process of policy implementation, but also on the political competition between parties itself.

In his article *Comparative Politics and Comparative Policy Studies: Making the Linkage* Peters argues that the study of comparative politics and the study of comparative policy are too divided, and that both fields would benefit from more cooperation and interdisciplinary studies (2018). Heeding to Peters' call, this thesis will examine which policies get prioritization from the political parties, heavily leaning on theoretical assumptions from the comparative politics literature.

2.2. The Comparative Agendas Project, making the linkage

While Peters admits to being critical of the lack of linkage between the research traditions, he mentions some *best practices* (2018, p. 94-95). One of these *best practices* is the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) (Peters, 2018, p. 94). The CAP coding scheme will be used to investigate political parties and to answer the research question of this article. The coding scheme is presented in more detail below.

CAP can be traced back to *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* by Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993). The substantial purpose of Baumgartner and Jones' book (1993), as well

as much of the following CAP literature, was to examine the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Breunig, 2006; John and Jennings, 2010). CAP is however, not bound by a specific theoretical tradition, it is united by data (Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman, 2019a, p. 4).

Described briefly, CAP is a measurement and retrieval system to classify political documents by policy issue, and thus quantitatively examine which policy issues actually appear and at what rate (Jones, 2016). Discussing the purpose and rhetoric of party manifestos, Budge notes: “Selective emphasis on different policies (‘security’, ‘peace’) rather than directly advocating ‘more’ or ‘less’ of either, seemed to be the guiding principle (2015, p. 762). CAP aims to map this *selective emphasis*.”

The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge et al., 2001), has been the most used tool for quantitatively examining party manifestos. It has among other things been used to examine parties’ policy attention (Green-Pedersen, 2019b, p. 376). However, despite this, CMP was initially developed to determine parties’ position on the ideological spectrum. “The driving logic is not policy issues, but ideological ‘symbols’ like democracy, freedom, social justice, etc.” (Green-Pedersen, 2019b, p. 375). Christoffer Green-Pedersen elaborated this further: “The main focus of the coding is the ideological goals that parties express, not the policy means or instruments they suggest” (2019b, p. 375).

The main purpose of CAP, on the other hand, is precisely to examine the distribution of policy attention. CAP makes it possible to examine which policy issues get attention in far more detail. Both coding schemes are important tools that grant the opportunity to examine the profile and development over time. The choice between the two should thus be determined based on the research question. The interest of this article is to examine which policy issues parties prioritize and which circumstances that determine parties’ policy breadth. The CAP coding scheme is therefore more applicable.

Since the publication of Baumgartner and Jones’ book (1993) the use of the CAP coding scheme has gradually grown, especially since the early 2000s. The adoption of the coding scheme to Western Europe also increased its use to study party manifestos, see for example Froio, Bevan and Jennings (2017), Green-Pedersen (2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022).

A core motivation behind CAP is to enable cross-country comparisons. Despite this, most of the studies using CAP have been non-comparative until now (Walgrave and Boydston, 2019,

p. 41-42). This study falls into that trend, by only examining parties in one country, Norway. However, one of the primary contributions of this study is the addition of Norwegian party manifesto data to the CAP database. As Stefaan Walgrave and Amber Boydstun allude to, the growth of the database and launch of the integrated webpage in 2016, may potentially cause a boom in comparative research using the CAP coding scheme (2019, p. 47). A primary goal of this thesis and the data collection preceding it, is to enable the inclusion of Norway in such studies.

In addition, “(...) the CAP provides the opportunity to ask the same question in multiple contexts” (Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman, 2019b, p. 392). The inclusion of Norwegian CAP data also increases the opportunity to examine country specific context and to increase the understanding of how the public policy agenda evolves in Norway. Or, as is the purpose of a large portion of the CAP literature, to examine the political process, not only policy output (Walgrave and Boydstun, 2019, p. 38). Such as this study, which attempts to shed light on the development of the strategic behaviour of political parties.

2.2.1. Reviewing research by Christoffer Green-Pedersen

While no research has used the CAP coding scheme to examine the Norwegian case, much of the previous CAP literature is still of importance to the study. Of particular relevance is much of the research done by Green-Pedersen. Green-Pedersen initiated the Danish Policy Project with the goals of improving the knowledge on the Danish political system and to introduce a comparative aspect to the policy agenda-setting literature (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2019, p. 82). This parallels the aims of this thesis. The Danish political system and party system is also quite comparable to the Norwegian system (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2019, p. 82-83), making the findings using the Danish CAP data a useful reference point. Some of Green-Pedersen’s research will thus be briefly reviewed.

In his book: *The Reshaping of Western European Party Politics* (Green-Pedersen, 2019a) and several articles elaborating his findings (Green-Pedersen and Jensen, 2019; Otjes and Green-Pedersen, 2019; Otjes and Green-Pedersen, 2021), he and co-authors examine how prioritization of specific policy issues have evolved, and which circumstances determine whether those policy issues gain attention. He developed an issue incentive model of party system attention, to examine this (Green-Pedersen, 2019a). His interest of study is hence how party systems as a whole develop, not the development of the parties constituting the system. However, even though the primary purpose of Green-Pedersen’s studies and this one differs,

quite similar approaches are used. While studying systems, the research objects he examines are indeed parties, leading to important comparability. He primarily studies large, mainstream parties' policy priorities, as he expects these to be the primary drivers of the party system agenda (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 2).

The issue incentive model presents three factors that predict whether large, mainstream parties focus on specific policy issues (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 35). The first is issue characteristics, the second is issue ownership and lastly, while the third is coalition implications (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, 35). It is likely that these factors have some impact on other parties than large, mainstream parties as well. This makes them relevant to this thesis.

Issue characteristics are the interplay between the traits of the problem the policy is designed to solve and the information available to the actors (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 31). Several examples mentioned by Green-Pedersen may be relevant. The extent the problem can be solved (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 33). How many people the issue affects, so whether it is an obtrusive issue or not (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 33). Whether the issue is a valence problem, meaning that essentially everyone agrees on the importance of the problem, while merely disagreeing on how to solve it (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 33).

It is likely that all these characteristics determine the extent all types of parties emphasize them, not only large, mainstream parties. It is, on the other hand not unlikely that their impact varies depending on traits of the party. That, as Green-Pedersen expects, large, mainstream parties, consider different types of policy problems strategically beneficial than other types of parties (2019a, p. 31-32).

Issue ownership refers to how both the electorate and the party members view the party. It does, as noted by Budge, not refer to ownership in the traditional understanding of the word (2015, p. 771), but is more closely related to association and perceived competence (Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch, 2012, p. 772-773). This specification is important, as these perceptions hinder parties from selectively disowning certain issues (Budge, 2015, p. 770).

The issue ownership concept includes both a long-term and a short-term perspective. Certain expectations and preconceptions follow parties long-term, giving them incentives to prioritize issues they are associated with or are considered competent on (Petrocik, 1996, p. 827-829). This may raise the salience of the issue (Green-Pedersen, 2006, p. 221). They have short-term incentives to emphasize their own issues that are popular among the electorate, and de-emphasize the issues associated with them that will not give them electoral benefits (Budge,

2015, p. 767; Petrocik, 1996, p. 829). As parties operate in a situation of competition, it is however not a winning strategy to completely ignore issues they do not have ownership over. To borrow an analogy from Emiliano Grossman and Isabelle Guinaudeau: “Parties are like `snakes in a tunnel`: they have distinct priorities, but they need to respond to emerging problems and their competitors’ strategies, resulting in considerable cross-partisan overlap” (2022, p. 11).

Issue ownership is likely to impact non-large, mainstream parties as well. It is even likely that issue ownership influences niche parties more, as they often are defined by just a few policy issues (Meguid, 2005, p. 347-348). The long-term salience of the issue may also be more important to niche parties (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 30), which may make a heavy emphasis potentially more strategically beneficial long-term (Budge, 2015, p. 772). This aspect of the issue incentive model will be important in this study.

The third aspect of the issue incentive model, coalition implications, is the factor that might be most relevant specifically to large, mainstream parties. Party size is important to determine whether parties may enter government coalitions. Green-Pedersen expects large, mainstream parties to shape their issue emphasis based on which parties they depend on as coalition partners in order to gain office (2019a, p. 34-35). This is derived from the expectation that large, mainstream parties are more concerned with whether they gain office than the number of votes they achieve individually (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 29).

Coalition implications is likely mostly relevant for large, mainstream parties. It may however influence other parties aiming to enter coalitions too. Parties striving to join coalitions as the partner of the prime minister’s party are concerned with coalition implications as well. The instability that might occur due to conflict within the coalition (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 35), may hamper them too. On the other hand, it is essential for such parties to be able to distinguish themselves from their larger coalition partner (Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017, p. 345). Both the extent and how coalitions implications impact a party’s issue prioritization, will thus likely depend heavily on traits of the party and their potential role in coalitions.

While the issue incentives model was not designed to describe how different types of political parties develop over time, it is here shown that all of its three components likely affect the incentives of most relevant political parties’ issue emphasis. In addition to studies of Western European countries utilizing the model (Green-Pedersen, 2019a), Green-Pedersen has used CAP data to study other relevant questions.

One important contribution is the article *Long-Term Changes in Danish Party Politics: The Rise and Importance of Issue Competition* (Green-Pedersen, 2006). As an early contribution to the Danish CAP literature, it was motivated by many of the same aspirations as this thesis. Green-Pedersen's aim was to give an initial description of the Danish political system based on an issue competition perspective (2006, p. 220). In order to get a better understanding of the political competition and development of the system. He also saw the shift away from primarily class-based competition as an important reason to aim scientific inquiries toward the development of issue attention (2006, p. 220-223). Both theses have a somewhat exploratory design, attempting to broaden the insight on the respective party systems.

Green-Pedersen has additionally written a couple articles elaborating the issue ownership concept (Green-Pedersen, 2007, p. 618-623; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015). Green-Pedersen and Peter Mortensen show that parties also pay attention to which issues their competition and particularly their allies prioritize (2015, p. 755-757). Despite differing data and some country-specific developments, the findings are an important source of comparison, especially due to similarities between Denmark and Norway. Some comparable results are expected. This has not been a complete summary of Green-Pedersen's bibliography, not even of the contributions with relevance to the research question, but a brief insight of the issue attention of political parties and its development.

2.2.2. Further CAP research

While Green-Pedersen's focus on Western European parties makes his research particularly relevant, some insights from different parts of the CAP literature are also warranted. As mentioned briefly, the theoretical perspective of the punctuated equilibrium is strongly connected to CAP (Baumgartner, Breunig and Grossman, 2019a, p. 5). While the term punctuated equilibrium typically is used in the study of government behaviour, it shares important similarities with insight from the party literature, illustrating its applicability to this thesis. Especially, several of the expectations on party behaviour discussed by Angelo Panebianco (1988), resemble it in important aspects. The punctuated equilibrium and its use in CAP literature will thus be briefly described.

The core claim of the punctuated equilibrium theory is that institutional constraints limit political institutions capacity and interest to pay attention to all social processes simultaneously, leading to a delayed reaction to the problem (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 605-607). This delay then leads to a drastic catch-up reaction, when the change or social

demand have grown large enough that the political institutions must react (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 607; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 192). The argument is that policy can be described as an equilibrium with a great deal of stability, occasionally punctuated by major changes.

Baumgartner and co-authors show that the institutional friction gets stronger the further along the policy-making process, due to increased complexity, coordination and cost (2009, p. 610-613). The study of parties is as mentioned a study of the input stage, which would lead one to expect a somewhat more gradual pattern of change compared to processes at the output stage. Additionally, parties are more directly in existential risk than most other political institutions, by way of elections, forcing them to respond quicker to changing demands (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 193). In a rare example of a study utilizing the punctuated equilibrium to study parties, Walgrave and Michiel Nuytemans write: “(...) parties have very strong incentives for adapting swiftly to incoming signals” (2009, p. 193). This leads them to state: “Compared to other political institutions and actors, however, party program changes are expected to be only moderately punctuated (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 193).

Contrary to this expectation, Walgrave and Nuytemans find a strongly punctuated pattern of policy change when studying party manifestos in 25 countries using CMP data (2009, p. 201). This implies that parties rarely change their manifestos, only committing rare severe changes. This illustrates that while at the input stage, parties are complex political institutions restricted by cognitive and institutional limitations (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 192). As complex institutions most parties are dependent on agreement between several internal actors to implement change (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 193). Secondly, parties’ ideologies are reflections of their priorities and goals and lenses voters view them with, and it is thus likely that parties pay less attention to social processes that do not impact these (Wagner and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 192). These notions will be built more on and placed within the party literature in the theory chapter. As CMP, the dataset used by Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009, p. 195), was not specifically designed to measure attention, revisiting the punctuated equilibrium theory’s appropriateness in describing parties with a more fitting dataset can lend important support to their findings.

In addition to the heavy focus on the punctuated equilibrium, CAP has been used to examine a wide array of different research questions. In the book *Comparative Policy Agendas: Theory, Tools, Data*, edited by Baumgartner, Christian Breunig and Grossman (2019c), several of the national CAP projects presents their data, study interests and core findings.

Another portion of the CAP literature has used party manifestos as an independent variable in order to examine how party attention affects government attention or policy, see for example Böcskei and Molnar (2019), Borghetto and Belchior (2020) and Joly and Dandoy (2016).

Among relevant studies is an article by Caterina Froio, Shaun Bevan and Will Jennings (2017) where they studied what impact the attention distribution in party manifestos and other political documents impact the acts of the British parliament. Their findings supplement some of the previously mentioned literature, by showing that parties have to prioritize issues on the public agenda and that the degree party manifestos impact government behaviour depends on external pressures (Froio, Bevan and Jennings, 2017, p. 699-700).

The most directly relevant piece of CAP literature, other than the work by Green-Pedersen, is the recently published book: *Do Elections (Still) Matter?: Mandates, Institutions, and Policies in Western Europe* by Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022). They build further on the work of Green-Pedersen, while also expanding to the study of programme-to-policy linkages, meaning how manifestos impact government policy (2022, p. 25-36). With regards to party priorities, they argue that they are impacted by a systemic component, which create considerable overlap between parties, but that parties also attempt to be faithful to their own agenda (Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 102-106).

2.3. Previous research on policy shifts

As, Green-Pedersen notes, several studies have examined how the attention to specific policy issues has evolved, but research on the overall issue content of parties' attention, is scarce (2019a, p. 1-2). Other contributions focus on specific party types, such as niche parties (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 4). Much of the policy shift literature is also ideologically focused (Green-Pedersen, 2019b, p. 374), such as the attention to welfare issues (Abou-Chadi and Immergut, 2019). The study of the welfare state is also one of the *best practices* mentioned by Peters (2018, p. 95).

Some of the previous research alluded to above include work by Tarik Abou-Chadi (2016), Abou-Chadi and Ellen Immergut (2019), Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2020), Abou-Chadi and Matthias Orłowski (2016), James Adams et al. (2006), Adams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu (2009), Matthew Bergman and Henry Flatt (2020) and Gijs Schumacher et al. (2015). These examples are all helpful, by illustrating how parties' policy shifts evolve, but they fall into the patterns mentioned in the previous paragraph. Other

examples studying parties' policy priorities and policy shifts do of course exist, but this sample provides important insight to the upcoming analysis.

Bergman and Flatt attempt to investigate how the breadth, said differently, the issue diversity, of parties affect their electoral success (2020, p. 716). They too investigate the breadth of parties, meaning that their article arguably resembles the thesis the most. The dependent and independent variables are swapped compared to this thesis, but as this thesis assume that electoral results impact party manifestos, Bergman and Flatt's findings (2020), will likely have important implications. They find that nationalist parties with a niche profile might gain by broadening their agenda, while not finding similar results for green parties (Bergman and Flatt, 2020, p. 722-723). They point to differing levels of issue ownership and potential gains by competing with more mainstream parties on other issues as reasons for this divergence (Bergman and Flatt, 2020, p. 715).

Several of the other mentioned articles also investigate niche parties, predominantly green and radical right parties. Abou-Chadi studied the difference between green and radical right parties, showing that the success of green parties does not significantly incentivise mainstream parties to adopt a greener platform, while the success of radical right parties leads mainstream parties to become more immigration critical (2016, p. 427). As Bergman and Flatt, he also points to the difference extent of issue ownership (Abou-Chadi, 2016, p. 422). Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen also study the difference between immigration policy and environmental policy, while also including welfare policy (2020, p. 750). They show that how increased issue salience impacts parties' behaviour depends both on the type of issue and the type of party. Primarily that large parties are more likely to shift toward the majority position, the median voter, if the saliency of the issue increases, but that it is clearly issue dependent (Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2020, p. 762-763).

While being important contributions to the study of issue emphasis, they only investigate specific issues, that being the environment, immigration and the welfare state. Grossman and Guinaudeau point out that the majority of research on issue emphasis investigate the environment and immigration (2022, p. 31). They also argue that issue specific traits of these issues likely lead to findings that are not generalizable across issues (Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 105). In order to examine how parties adapt, the following analysis will therefore not be limited to these issues, but rather the distribution between issues, while highlighting some issues of theoretical importance.

Adams et al. finds that while mainstream parties adapt their profile in response to change in the public opinion, niche parties do not (2006, p. 525). This article will be discussed briefly below regarding the conceptualization of the niche party term. Abou-Chadi and Orłowski argue that increased issue competition lead parties toward issue maximization (2016, p. 868-869). However, as also discussed in the theoretical discussions on parties below, what this entails differs for mainstream parties and niche parties. Niche parties radicalize their position to create a niche, while mainstream parties moderate their position to approach the median voter (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski, 2016, p. 878).

Another glimpse at how parties shift their policy is provided by Adams and Somer-Topcu, who show that parties shift toward their competitors' position in the previous election (2009, p. 836). This shift is even more pronounced in response to parties of the same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009, p. 837). Schumacher et al. show, depending on strategic considerations, government parties change their platform to a larger extent than opposition parties (2015, p. 1049-1050). Lastly, Abou-Chadi and Immergut's article is a part of the *best practice*, welfare state studies (2019). They conclude that the degree of electoral competition and the presence of a radical right party impact the welfare policy position of governing parties (Abou-Chadi and Immergut, 2019, p. 708-711).

Of the mentioned articles, only Bergman and Flatt (2020) have a purely issue attention angle, with others at least to some extent studying directional shifts, such as shift from immigration friendly towards immigration critical. Secondly, a large portion only studies specific issues, that also being among the most commonly studied, the environment, immigration (Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 31) and the welfare state (Peters, 2018, p. 95). Another clear trend these examples illustrate is the predominant focus on certain party types, often niche parties. This thesis will also to some extent study the difference between niche and mainstream parties, but will attempt to differentiate within these concepts as well, in order to craft a more complete picture of parties' issue emphasis. This thesis is an attempt to incorporate policy shifts into a more general discussion on party development.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Some initial insight to the study of political parties

Over time, several different ways to classify parties have been developed, and several of them grant important insight to how parties strategize, develop and behave (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Krouwel, 2006). However, an underlying assumption of this thesis is shown by a statement by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond: “(...) that the existing models of political parties do not adequately capture the full range of variation in party types found in the world today (...)” (2003, p. 167-168).

Importantly, “(...) classificatory schemata derive from research and application. If they are to be useful, such schemata must not only distinguish among different types of political parties, but do so in ways which reflect questions we are interested in” (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 149). This notion is equally important as the reflections made by Gunther and Diamond. The interest of the study is: how parties decide and divide their attention to policy issues. The following discussion on party typologies will therefore primarily revolve around the aspects of parties assumed to impact this, rather than being a complete discussion of every aspect of party typologies.

In order to pick an appropriate typology, some existing ones are presented and discussed. Based on these reflections, a model of party behaviour will be presented. A set of hypotheses on parties' strategic issue emphasis will be presented based on this model.

One of the most influential theories on party behaviour is the spatial theory, popularized by Anthony Downs (1957). Spatial theory states that rational parties aiming to win elections place themselves close to the majority position on all issues (Downs, 1957, p. 54). The primary reason that prevents complete convergence at the median position is the fear of losing legitimacy from the more extreme parts of their electorate (Downs, 1957, p. 118). Especially, to move past another party on the ideological spectrum is assumed to be harshly punished at the polls (Downs, 1957, p. 122-123). In multiparty systems, the importance of distinguishing themselves limits this convergence somewhat (Downs, 1957, p. 127).

One of the contributions saliency theories, which is at the core of both CAP and CMP, is to nuance the position held by Downs (1957). Particularly the idea that the incumbent party must hold the majority position on every issue to ensure electoral victory (Downs, 1957, p. 54). The claim by for example David Robertson (1976, p. 4-8) and Budge (2001, p. 79), is that voters do not vote on each issue at the same time. They are only being influenced by a small portion

of issues at a time. Saliency theory thus implies that not only the spatial position of the parties matters, their issue emphasis is of great importance too. Downs did state: “(...) only benefits which voters become conscious of by election day can influence their voting decision (...)” (1957, p. 38), clearly acknowledging salience as an important determinant of political behaviour. Saliency theory is not an outright dismissal of spatial theory, rather a modification (Budge and Bara, 2001, p. 62-63).

Bonnie Meguid builds further on the notion of salience’s importance on spatial theory, by arguing that parties can manipulate how issue competence and salience are perceived, thus manipulating issue ownership (2005, p. 349). One of her main findings is that how mainstream parties react to or manipulate issues predominantly owned by emerging niche parties, not only influence the electoral success of the niche parties, but also other established parties (Meguid, 2005, p. 357).

3.2. Supplementing the study of political parties

Meguid’s (2005) findings illustrate, as also shown by much of the previously reviewed literature, the increasing importance of niche parties. This thus also illustrates the need of supplementing Downs’ spatial theory in order to understand what affects niche party success. The failure to accurately describe niche parties is not unique to Downs, but a common trend in many of the traditional party typologies. This is partially due to these parties gaining an increased role and influence in recent times (Abou-Chadi, 2016, p. 417). In order to give a complete description of modern parties’ strategies and to bridge the classic party literature with the policy attention literature, the niche party concept is an essential supplement.

Meguid points to three defining characteristics that distinguish niche parties from mainstream parties (2005, p. 347). Firstly, niche parties reject the materialistic base of traditional party competition, instead emphasizing post-materialist issues such as the environment or immigration (Meguid, 2005, p. 347-348). Secondly, and somewhat in line with the first characteristic, they emphasize issues outside of the existing party competition (Meguid, 2005, p. 348). Lastly, they have a narrow issue appeal, focusing on a small number of issues (Meguid, 2005, p. 348). Meguid’s definition illustrates why a summary of the niche party concept is important when studying parties’ issue emphasis. Niche parties do, by definition, distribute their issue attention differently.

While the concepts, niche and mainstream, have been discussed as dichotomies up until now, several scholars have argued that this is an inaccurate simplification (Bischof, 2017, p. 222;

Meyer and Miller, 2015, p. 261-262). Thomas Meyer and Bernhard Miller thus introduced a continuous measure for nicheness (2015). Recently, David Bischof (2017) reviewed existing conceptualizations of niche parties. Based on both the work of Meguid (2005) and Meyer and Miller (2015), as well as Adams et al. (2006) and Markus Wagner (2012a) he attempts to create a measurement that accurately encapsulates the most common theoretical assumptions of the concept.

Bischof defines niche parties as parties that predominantly compete on issues ignored by their competitors while only emphasizing a narrow selection of these issue segments (2017, p. 223). He thus diverges from both Meguid (2005) and Adams et al. (2006) who base their concepts on party family and origin, stating that parties that originated as a typical niche party, could evolve into a mainstream party (Bischof, 2017, p. 225). Meyer and Miller write: “(...) a measure based on party ideology does not allow for temporal variance within party families” (2015, p. 261). The development of parties is at the very core of this thesis, making a conceptualization that allows for such temporal variance essential. Furthermore, Bischof points out that Meyer and Miller predominantly measure the narrowness of attention, thus failing to account for whether parties emphasize traditional issues or not (Bischof, 2017, p. 222).

Inspired by these previous conceptualizations, Bischof creates a measure based on whether parties emphasize five issue segments he theoretically defines as niche (2017, p. 225). He then measures the extent parties differs from their competitors on the emphasis on these issue segments and how narrow the parties' focus on the segments are (Bischof, 2017, p. 226). Importantly, this measure is heavily grounded on theoretical assumptions. It is not surprising that he finds that communist parties are not niche, contrary to Adams et al. (2006), as he purposefully created his measurement based on the theoretical assumption that they are not (Bischof, 2017, p. 222-227). This illustrates the importance of choosing a measure as that determines which parties get counted as niche. Using Bischof's measurement is preconditioned on having similar theoretical assumptions.

While the specific measurement created by Bischof (2017), will not be used, his and Meguid's (2005) definitions will serve as the primary conceptualizations of the niche party term. As the definitions of niche parties centre around the divergences from mainstream parties, mainstream parties are defined as parties that are not niche. This, while still acknowledging that the concepts are ideal types on a continuous scale.

The distinction between niche and mainstream parties illustrates the feasibility of distinguishing parties based on their potential impact. The fact that niche parties are expected to behave differently is, in parts, due to their at least initial position at the outside of existing party competition. This illustrates that the party's own perception of its electoral potential impacts its strategic considerations and thus behaviour. Green-Pedersen's (2019a) focus on, not merely mainstream parties, but large, mainstream parties, supports this claim. Their potential to impact public policy is expected to lead to different behaviour than other parties (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 29).

An appropriate starting point when distinguishing parties based on their potential impact on public policy is the work of Giovanni Sartori (2005). With the purpose of counting parties in order to create a typology of party systems, Sartori distinguished between relevant and irrelevant parties (2005, p. 105-110). Based on this dichotomy and with some inspiration taken from David Hopmann et al. (2012), parties will be put in one of four categories based on their potential post-election influence. While Sartori developed his method for a widely different purpose, the classifications do provide a useful tool to create expectations about behaviour.

Sartori argued that his rules of counting, was strictly postdictive, as there is no point of using them predictively (2005, p. 108). As a means of describing party systems, this is accurate. Here, his counting rules are used as the basis for a completely different purpose. It is precisely the expected post-electoral impact that is expected to impact the individual parties' behaviour, meaning that the purpose is strictly predictive.

To start, the same understanding of irrelevant parties as created by Sartori (2005), is used. However, with regards to strategic behaviour, it is more fruitful to divide Sartori's relevant party definition further. Sartori considers parties to be relevant if they have either coalition potential or blackmailing potential (2005, p. 107-109). Parties that feasibly cannot enter government as part of a coalition or force other parties to change their position directionally, are considered irrelevant (2005, p. 107-109).

Following Hopmann and co-authors (2012, p. 177), it is argued that there are important differences between parties with blackmailing potential and parties with coalition potential as well. This does of course overlap, but it is considered likely that parties with a genuine potential of joining government may act differently than perpetual opposition parties. As government parties are judged by whether they actually enact the policy they promise

(Kreppel, 2014, p. 86), it is reasonable to assume that parties that might enter coalition take that into consideration when formulating their policy platform. Taking it a step further than Hopmann et al. (2012), this thesis also considers it likely that parties with governing potential, here defined as parties realistically vying for the prime minister position, have different strategic considerations than even their potential coalition partners. While not using his dichotomy, all four categories are derived from Sartori's work (2005, p. 108).

The classification of other typologies often includes some expectation about the party's post-electoral potential. Green-Pedersen's expectations about large, mainstream parties are mainly created on the assumption of their governing potential or at least desire to govern (2019a, p. 30). Secondly, even though some types of niche parties have obtained coalition potential, this is not the norm. As described above, some of their primary characteristics are a narrow focus on issues that up until recently have not been important in political competition. So, unless the party's niche gains substantive importance, niche parties are likely to be irrelevant.

However, the inclusion of the potential typology derived from Sartori (2005, p. 107-110), creates a more nuanced and intuitive description. This nuance is important, as parties with similar electoral support may have widely differing opportunities to influence policy. This is likely to affect their strategies, perhaps even more than their pure vote numbers. In order to craft a set of expectations of how different political parties develop their strategic behaviour, it is argued, that the potential position and power they might obtain through the following election, are of severe importance.

The supplement of the niche party typology is also considered to be necessary, as an important portion of political parties would be described inadequately by the following framework without it. While the niche party concept has much in common with previous typologies, the notions by Meguid (2005) and following authors (Adams et al., 2006; Bischof, 2017) are considered to be important contributions. Niche parties have up until now been discussed in the light of being deviations from mainstream parties. It is thus about time to thoroughly lay out a classification of mainstream parties. While, as pointed out earlier and by Gunther and Diamond, a vast number of different typologies exists (2003, p. 167), many of them describing what falls into the umbrella term mainstream. While several will be discussed, Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all party (1957; 1966) will serve a particularly prominent role in forming assumptions on how parties toward the mainstream end of the nicheness-scale divide their issue attention.

3.3. A massive detour and the catch-all party

Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties emerged when mass parties adapted to a changing situation (1966, p. 184), partly because of the rising complexity and variance of voter demands, as described by Inglehart (1990). A detour through the mass party is thus necessary to understand catch-all parties.

This thesis is based on the premiss that parties compete on a wide array of issues and across social groups. As stated by Inglehart (1990), this system of multidimensional competition grew out of a system where materialistic concerns to a large extent determined party choice. Party competition was frozen (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50). The mass party was one of the dominant actors of these frozen system, representing the demands of the disenfranchised (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 178; Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 184). While variants representing other disenfranchised groups exist (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 178), only the one representing the working-class will be discussed.

The mass party was tightly integrated into the demand for suffrage and rights in a period where party competition was tightly connected to socioeconomic affiliation (Krouwel, 2006, p. 254-262). They had extra-parliamentary origin, forming from these demands for suffrage, contrary to the elite parties of the time which originated from cooperation and coalitions within parliaments (Duverger, 1972, p. xxiv-xxx).

Maurice Duverger argued that the very structure of mass parties was what differentiated them from the elite parties prevalent prior to and during the introduction of universal suffrage (1972, p. 63). “The difference between cadre and mass parties corresponds to a social and political substructure” (Duverger, 1972, p. 65). “[T]he very party nature” (Duverger, 1972, p. 62) differentiated mass parties from the cadre parties. The party’s survival was completely dependent on its members, contrary to the elite-funded cadre parties (Duverger, 1972, p. 63). Creating an organizational dependence on their supporters (Panebianco, 1988, p. 211), the strategy of the mass party revolved around mobilizing the people of the class they represented (Krouwel, 2006, p. 254). Their policy profile was thus heavily based on a stable set of core issue demands (Krouwel, 2006, p. 254).

Catch-all parties emerged around the same time the class cleavages’ grip on political competition loosened and political competition moved farther and farther away from the economic determinism proposed by Marx at his boldest (Inglehart, 1990, p. 431; Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 184-186). The success of the mass parties decreased the very rational for their

existence by improving the position of the groups they represented (Krouwel, 2006, p. 256). This resulted in the variance of political demands discussed by Inglehart (1990). The change from class-based mass parties to more pragmatic catch-all parties led to different campaign strategies and strategies in general, as briefly mentioned in the introduction (Farrell, 2006, p. 126). As the parties no longer could simply rely on mobilizing their core segments of the electorate, they started to adopt a catch-all profile.

This essentially means that they started to compete in order to catch all voters, or at least as many of them as possible. The parties traded some of their specialized position for “a wider audience and more immediate election success” (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 184). Kirchheimer wrote of his contemporary party: “By and large, European parliamentary parties are reducing their special ideological and material offerings. Instead, they substitute a demand for a wide variety of ever expanding community services, open on a basis of equality to whole categories of citizens” (1957, p. 153). Parties transitioned away from clear advocates for a certain class and its core needs.

The strategy of catch-all parties is thus directly contrary to that of the niche party discussed above. In accordance with Downs’ expectations of rational parties (1957, p. 54), it is to converge toward the median voter in order to appeal to as large a portion of the electorate as possible. Kirchheimer himself notes this difference:

«As a rule, only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. [Small and niche parties’] *raison d’être* is the defence of a specific clientele or the lobbying for a limited reform clearly delineated to allow for a restricted appeal, perhaps intense, but excluding a wider impact (...)” (1966, p. 187-188).

He argues later that “Conversion to catch-all parties constitutes a competitive phenomenon” (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 188). Smaller parties are unlikely to be able to compete on the median position, so they will instead keep their niche profile, in order to at least appeal to their activists. It is clear from the quote, that the catch-all term was never supposed to describe all parties. It does, however, give an important description to many of the large parties that have had essential impact on party systems.

Much attention has been given to the de-emphasising of ideology and how the relevance of which parties win elections matter less for the government policy (Pierson, 1996, p. 174). This is in accordance with Kirchheimer’s statement that the transition to catch-all parties resulted in the de-emphasising of ideology (1957, p. 153). However, Kirchheimer clearly

acknowledges a broadening of the issue emphasis based on strategic considerations as an important characteristic of catch-all parties as well (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 186-187).

For one, he mentions how parties shift attention towards issues that appeal to both sides of the economic cleavage (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 186). Even more importantly, is the shift of attention to issues that likely will not gain much push-back (1966, p. 186). This coincides with the issues Green-Pedersen classify as valence problems (2019a, p. 33). A party will for example not get much grief for suggesting to improve the education system. Third, and referenced several times already, is the fact that the improved well-being of the voters made them shift their attention toward several needs, instead of a limited set of core needs (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 186-187). Parties thus had to offer policy on a several widely different types of issues in order to have answers to the demands of the electorate.

Catch-all parties thus adopt a significantly different issue profile than the mass parties they evolved from. Both with regards to the breadth of different issues they pay attention to, the characteristics of issues they prioritize and the spatial position they take on these issues. Parties want to catch all voters. To do so, they not only have to present policy answers that appeal to all voters, they also have to provide answers on all issues that matter to them.

3.3.1. Conceptually stretching the catch-all term

Despite the preceding presentation of the catch-all party and its usefulness to the thesis, the term is, as Gunther and Diamond point out, overused (2003, p. 190). They write: “Over the following decades, however, the catch-all label was being used to describe an excessively wide variety of parties whose electoral strategies and programmatic commitments differed substantially” (Gunther and Diamond. 2003, p. 190). This is one of the primary reasons for why several different party model typologies are being presented here. These serve to supplement the concept and cover some of the explanatory holes created by using such a broad term.

Building on several existing schemes, Gunther and Diamond presented 15 different species of political parties (2003, p. 172-175). Among their reasoning for creating such an extensive scheme is to ensure its applicability across time and space, even at the cost of parsimony (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 171-173).

While the warnings of ‘conceptual stretching’ are being heeded (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 168), the research question and design still result in the adoption of a far less extensive

scheme than the one they produced. It will include a quite broad understanding of the catch-all concept. This is based on notions as reflected on by Bischof (2017) and Meyer and Miller (2015), parties are assumed to fit on a continuous scale.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of a quite limited selection of parties. Gunther and Diamond on the other hand sought to create a classification scheme that covers all theoretically significant variations in the real world (2003, p. 170). So, while they certainly succeeded in creating an extensive and useful scheme, a less extensive scheme is more appropriate in this thesis. The purpose of this framework is not to differentiate between all “theoretically significant variations among real-world parties” (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 170). It is to differentiate between relevant theoretical variations of the selected cases, in order to understand the differences and similarities in their issue emphasis and development.

The emphasis on party development is also relevant in this regard. While the scheme of this thesis will consist of ideal types, the development of empirical parties and how parties transition from one ideal type toward another, are crucial. Using as many categories as Gunther and Diamond, is not fruitful, as the space on the dimension between ideal types is of severe importance in its own right. Transition is explicitly not within the purpose of Gunther and Diamond’s scheme, which is supposed to be a set of stable ideal types (2003, p. 186). The difference in purpose is thus critical for the scheme design.

An extensive review of all of Gunther and Diamond’s 15 species (2003), will not be performed. Some will, however, be briefly mentioned. Two of the species fit quite well with the catch-all party presented by Kirchheimer. Gunther and Diamond places both in a common genus they call electoralist parties and argue that the primary function of these parties is to perform election campaigns in order to win votes (2003, p. 185). What Gunther and Diamond call catch-all parties, is only one of these (2003, p. 185-188). The other is the programmatic party. The programmatic party is more ideologically coherent than catch-all parties, while both have similar organizational structure and are motivated by gaining votes and office (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 185-187).

Gunther and Diamond admit that their catch-all party is not completely similar to Kirchheimer’s (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 186). This is partially because Kirchheimer, in his ideal description of the term, allows for catch-all parties to keep important aspects of their ideological roots (1966, p. 185-186). He specifically views catch-all parties as an ongoing transition away from mass parties (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 185). Gunther and

Diamond's catch-all party on the other hand is a stable ideal type, where they explicitly disregard ideological baggage (2003, p. 186). The difference between these two illustrates the core difference between their scheme and the one in this thesis. One is designed to examine transition, the other is not.

The term catch-all party will thus be used for Gunther and Diamond's catch-all party and programmatic party (2003, p. 185-187). The term is not used as one stable and fixed term and parties are considered to potentially be more or less catch-all. As the topic is empirical parties, they will with all likelihood not fit any ideal classification and may still be considered catch-all if they have some ideological baggage.

The only others of Gunther and Diamond's party species that will be mentioned are the two in the movement party genus: left libertarian and post-industrial extreme right parties (2003, p. 188-189). Both fit the conceptualizations of niche parties shown above. Similar to niche parties they prioritize post-materialist issues (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 188). The two species match the most common types of niche parties, green parties and radical right parties. While the term left libertarian more clearly alludes to a spatial position on the traditional political dimension than the term green party, this often overlaps (Wang and Keith, 2020, p. 494-497).

While insights from Gunther and Diamond is used, the two species will most commonly be discussed using the common term niche party. The terms green party and radical right party will also be more prominently used than Gunther and Diamond's terminology. However, it is insightful that they have conceptualized them as two different species in the same genus. This illustrates that the two party types have essential similarities, but also important differences. As pointed out above, other types of parties may also be categorized as niche parties, if described appropriately by the conceptualizations of Bischof (2017) and Meguid (2005).

3.4. Three types of classification schemes

Gunther and Diamond argue that existing schemes can be divided into three types (2003, p. 169-170). Kirchheimer's scheme is once again a good starting point (1966), as they argue that he incorporates all three logics (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 170). Kirchheimer's classification scheme does to some extent take the parties' functionalist purpose, their organizational structure and their sociological orientation into account (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, 169-170). Other schemes more purely classify parties according to one of these criteria.

The framework of this thesis will most heavily lean on functionalistic logic, but the two others, particularly the organizational, provides important supplements. Explicitly sociological schemes, such as the one by Samuel Eldersveld, consider “(...) the party a structural system seeking to translate or convert (or be converted by) social and economic interest into political power directly” (1966, p. 6).

While the limits of using social group or class to determine voting behaviour have been argued repeatedly, it cannot be stressed enough, that this argument is not against the relevance of group affiliation in voting behaviour. It is one of several important factors. While not explicitly discussing sociological affiliation, Panebianco also points to how the loss of a party’s core electorate will always be more determinantal to the party, than losing other voters (1988, p. 211). While the core electorate does not always have to be from a certain sociological affiliation, Panebianco points to how the deep-seated roots that connect certain groups and contemporary parties are not completely broken, and that it would be disastrous for parties if they break (1988, p. 211).

3.4.1. Angelo Panebianco’s organizational scheme

While one of Panebianco’s points was used to argue for the potential applicability of sociological classifications, his work (1988), is arguably the clearest example of an organizational classification scheme. Panebianco presents his own terminology, the electoral-professional party and the party of mass integration (1988, p. 264), which are reformulations of Kirchheimer’s terms. These terms will not be presented, as Kirchheimer’s terminology is used, but the reflections made by Panebianco serve as insightful supplements to the concepts.

Leaning on the work of Roberto Michels (1927), Panebianco writes: “the true objective of an organization’s leaders often is not that of pursuing the manifest aims for which the organization was established, but rather that of ensuring the organization’s survival (and with it the survival of their own power positions)” (1988, p. 7). He thus adds to why parties turn catch-all, by pointing to internal motivations and arguing that the leaders’ power and position grows in importance relative to the party’s core goals.

However, Panebianco argues that such motivations do not completely supplant the policy goals of the parties (1988, p. 16). It is important to note that while both Downs and Kirchheimer argued that ideology or policy was not the primary goal, they would have agreed with their successor, as neither believed that parties would completely converge at a position

that granted the most voters. This being due to bounded rationality (Downs, 1957, p. 215-217), and the need to distinguish themselves from their competitors (Downs, 1957, p. 126-127; Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 185-186).

While basing his assumptions on an explicit organizational logic, Panebianco reaches very similar conclusions on the development of parties as Kirchheimer. He writes: “The party goes (...) from a phase in which organizational ideology is *manifest* (the objectives being explicit and coherent), to a phase in which organizational ideology is *latent* (the objects being vague, implicit, and contradictory) (...)” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 19). He follows this by mentioning several other forms of party transitions that, to quite a large extent, follows Kirchheimer’s expectations, while having a clearly organizational stance (Panebianco, 1988, p. 19).

Panebianco argues that parties do not substitute their ideological ends with their organizational ends (1988, p. 16).

“The relation between aims and behavior never completely disappears; it attenuates. The correspondence of a party’s behavior to its official aims is constantly reaffirmed by its leaders, but only these courses of action – amongst the many possible that the party may choose to achieve its official aims – which are compatible with the organization’s stability will be selected” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 16).

This illustrates that the party leadership’s freedom of choice becomes limited by organizational constraints and by how both party members and the electorate view them (Panebianco, 1988, p. 19). Ideology maintains the party’s identity, as it is the “primary source of collective incentives” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 11).

Panebianco’s writings thus illustrate several important aspects of parties’ behaviour. While the party leadership’s aspiration for power and organizational survival lead the party to shed some of its strict ideological position, the degree this is possible is limited by both internal and external expectations of what the party is. “Every organization bears the mark of its formulation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which “molded” the organization” (Panebianco, 1988, p. 50). Kirchheimer similarly wrote “Thus tradition and the pattern of social and professional stratification may set limits and offer potential audiences to the party’s appeal” (1966, p. 186). Both Panebianco and Kirchheimer clearly point to a limit to the possibility of de-emphasizing the party’s political goals.

These notions also add to why the catch-all and programmatic types of Gunther and Diamond (2003, p. 185-187), are combined. The degree parties possibly can remove their ideological

baggage is severely limited by organizational history. It is illustrating that Gunther and Diamond likened Panebianco's electoral-professional party with the electoralist genus, rather than just one specie (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 185).

While Panebianco writes about ideology, ideology is several times used vaguely, referring to parties' objectives, ends or goals (1988, p. 16 & 244). As he also points to the rise of new policy issues and dimensions (Panebianco, 1988, p. 270-272), it is unreasonable to argue that his theory strictly points to parties' spatial position. Panebianco's work is therefore applicable to this thesis.

Building further on organizational assumptions, Panebianco argues that all change poses risk to a party and particularly its leaders (1988, p. 240-241). This leads to behaviour that bears striking similarities to the punctuated equilibrium theory. This adds to the institutionalism rationale of the punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 607; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 193).

The leadership is part of the status quo and their legitimacy rests on their definition of current problems and their solutions to them, which makes any change a potential challenge to their individual position (Panebianco, 1988, p. 240-241). New leadership when it arrives, must therefore attempt to present the organization's failure to deal with change or crisis as a result of the former leadership, rather than an organizational flaw (Panebianco, 1988, p. 243-244). This leads them to change the organization's strategy or end goals (Panebianco, 1988, p. 244). While Panebianco's argument not necessarily would lead exactly to the punctuated equilibrium, the fact that both traditions expect organizational traits to lead to delayed change, followed by a drastic reaction, grants support to Walgrave and Nuytemans' argument of the theorem's application to political parties (2009).

Seen in sum, Panebianco's organizational thesis (1988) clearly crafts certain implications of parties' strategic behaviour that functions as important supplements to the catch-all thesis. It is most clearly showed by an example he provides: "Analogously, a workers party can more easily stand a loss in its bourgeois electorate than its worker electorate" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 211). This leads to a situation pointed out by the issue ownership literature (Budge, 2015, p. 770), where parties will not or cannot abandon its core policy goals, as that would pose serious threat to the very survival of the party. Furthermore, one would expect party crisis to lead to change. The most obvious party crisis is severe or continuous electoral loss (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 194).

3.4.2. Functionalistic schemes

The last of the three types of classification schemes mentioned by Gunther and Diamond is functionalistic schemes (2003, p. 169). This is several widely differing ways of categorizing parties based on what the primary aim or function of the parties are (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 169; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kitschelt, 1989; Strøm, 1990).

In their presentation of parties Richard Katz and Peter Mair presented the cartel party, that they argued would transition into the dominant party type of modern democracies (1995, p. 17). They argued that parties' increased reliance on state subsidies made ensuring this detrimental to their very survival (Katz and Mair, 1995, p. 15-16). Katz and Mair argued that the established parties would essentially form a cartel in order to ensure the control of the governing institutions of the state and limit the detrimental effects of electoral loss (1995, p. 19-20). In this system, while party competition exists, the actors of the system become more concerned with losing, which risks their survival, than with winning. Katz and Mair argues that inter-party collusion becomes the norm, precisely to secure the existing system (1995, p. 19). The conceptualization is thus clearly based on the assumption that the primary function of parties is to gain state control.

Clear policy differences would in many ways primarily serve to shake the balance of the cartel and system of collusion. Because of this, the policy positions of the parties in the cartel are likely to converge and simply serve as an instrument to secure power. Katz and Mair argued that the cartel party becomes an integrated part of the state rather than parties being delegates serving the voters in relations to the state (1995, p. 16). The cartel party is thus a far stretch from the sociological understandings of parties, where parties essentially is an institutionalized form of class demands. Ruud Koole argued that these traits, the integration of parties into the state and the colluding relationship between these parties, made the work of Katz and Mair a description of the party system, rather than of individual parties (Koole, 1996, p. 508).

Another functionalistic scheme, the one developed by Kaare Strøm (1990), will serve as the foundation of the theoretical framework in the upcoming analysis. He distinguishes parties based on whether they have a primarily vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking objective. The scheme was further expanded on by Strøm and Wolfgang Müller (1999) and Steven Wolinetz (2002).

The notions of vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking parties were not introduced by Strøm (1990). His contribution was to merge the three existing terms into a consistent theory of parties' strategic behaviour. There are several examples both prior to and after Strøm's article that primarily examine parties with the lens of only one of the three behavioural ideals, see for example Robertson (1976), Riker (1975) and Bischof (2017), respectively.

Strøm on the other hand argued that all three objectives mattered to parties, but that they regularly have to make trade-offs between them (1990, p. 570). The three terms are thus considered by Strøm to be ideal concepts, like several of the typologies reviewed above. He writes: "Pure vote seekers, office seekers, or policy seekers are unlikely to exist. We can empirically identify party objectives, or mixes of objectives, through manifest behavior" (Strøm, 1990, p. 570). This quote also illustrates that his model is behavioural, parties' motivation is studied through their behaviour.

What the three types of party behaviour entail, is somewhat given away by their intuitive labels. Policy-seeking fits the classical assumptions of activists, as it is the prioritization of enacting, impacting or changing policy. This can be both fully formed and coherent ideological positions or singular narrow single-issues (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 150). Importantly, policy-seeking entails having coherent policy goals and strictly sticking to them.

Office-seeking on the other hand, entails the pursuit of office, often measured by government portfolios (Strøm, 1990, p. 567). This typically includes parties without a strict ideological position and that are willing to adapt their strategies and policy propositions in order to secure governmental positions (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 152). In addition, the very functions of the state are likely to impact what potential policymakers are judged on. Office-seeking parties are likely to present themselves as credible officeholders and may likely prioritize what Jennings et al. call the core functions of the state (2011, p. 1007). Parties adopting the prioritizations of the state is also in line with Katz and Mair's description of the cartel party (1995, 17).

Similarly, Green-Pedersen presents certain issue characteristics that he assumes increase the incentives for parties vying for office to emphasize them, for example obtrusiveness (2019a, p. 33).

Vote-seeking is somewhat puzzling compared to the other two, as obtaining votes have a clearly instrumental value (Strøm and Muller, 1999, p. 9). This can for example be seen in the work of Downs, who even though assumed politicians are driven by the prospect of office and private benefits, formed his model around parties trying to maximize the number of votes

(1957, p. 28-31). Illustrated by: “Thus our reasoning has led us from the self-interest axiom to the vote-maximizing government (...)” (Downs, 1957, p. 31). Parties and government shape their behaviour in order to win the greatest number of votes possible. Vote-seeking typically entails having a broad policy profile and appeal to as large a part of the electorate as possible and to pay serious attention to the sentiment of the electorate.

The instrumental nature of vote-seeking led Grossman and Guinaudeau to argue that: “Most authors generally tend to agree on the primacy of vote seeking over other forms of partisan incentives, as this is a precondition for taking office and passing policy” (2022, p. 37). It is thus useful to show some examples that differentiate it from the other two. To illustrate that all three have their use.

Parties may increase their chance of obtaining office at the expense of their absolute vote gain. The differentiation between office- and vote-seeking is particularly relevant in multiparty systems where coalitions are the norm, as the party obtaining the most votes, not necessarily achieve office (Strøm and Müller, 1999, p. 5). Emphasizing issues where they disagree with their potential coalition partners may be beneficial from a vote-seeking perspective, but highlighting the disagreements in the potential coalition may seriously hinder the coalition-making process, thus being ill-advised from an office-seeking perspective (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 34-35). This illustrates that office-seeking parties may be willing to lose votes in order to put a certain issue on the public agenda. If that improves their prospect of forming a coalition or hinders the opposing coalition’s opportunities.

Policy-driven parties on the other hand may not be willing to abolish certain policy positions even if that could ensure them more votes, even if that is a precondition for implementing policy. Contrary to such strategic considerations, vote-seeking parties adopt the strategies that strictly increase their ability to obtain as many votes as possible, to grow in sheer electoral size. This does not discount the fact that achieving votes is an instrumental goal in order to achieve either policy, office or both.

These are merely a small sample of the considerations and trade-offs parties have to make between different objectives. Some further insight into why parties are unlikely to fit perfectly into one of the presented poles, are therefore needed. Panebianco’s organizational perspectives (1988) and the issue ownership literature (Petrocik, 1996), point to how voters are likely to punish all parties if they do not provide a coherent policy that they are assumed

to be competent on. Even parties that fit quite well with the vote-seeking or office-seeking terms, must therefore to some extent be conscious about how they present their policy.

On the other hand, even policy-seeking parties must seek votes and office, as that is the instruments available to them to impact policy. The exceptions are “non-strategic (and not surprisingly do not get many votes)” (Budge, 2015, p. 772). The quite harsh term derived from the work of Sartori is often descriptive of such parties, irrelevant (2005, p. 107-108).

“Nevertheless, once a party is well-established and its practices and modes of operation are institutionalized, differences in emphases and priorities should be visible” (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 153). Idealized understandings of the terms are therefore useful analytical concepts, as long as they are considered to be the extreme points of the model, where actual parties occupy the space between them.

3.5. A triangular base to the theoretical framework

As stated above, Kirchheimer points to the motivation of achieving as many votes as possible as the primary driving force of parties’ transition from mass parties to catch-all parties (1966, p. 184). This is an example of how Strøm’s behavioural model may be applied on other aspects of the party literature, in order to increase the understanding of how different types of parties are likely to behave. This was done by Wolinetz (2002, p. 149-164), and the following will take much inspiration from his work. Green-Pedersen (2019a) also points to the correlation between party type and behaviour. He assumes that large, mainstream parties are primarily office-seeking, small, mainstream parties primarily vote-seeking and niche parties primarily policy-seeking (2019a, p. 30-31).

One of the main justifications Wolinetz presents for applying the behavioural scheme on party development is that much of the previous theories assumed that all parties developed in the same direction (2002, p. 159). Kirchheimer for example points to the catch-all party as a transitional end that mass parties move toward, not paying much attention to the possibility of parties becoming less catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 185; Wolinetz, 2002, p. 159). While the rise of post-materialism, technological development and so on, indeed are likely to impact parties, a uni-directional expectation of party development is likely to be far more deterministic than what actually occurs. Parties may react differently to problems that arise. This will in turn impact the way they develop.

Based on these notions, Wolinetz places some previously conceptualized party types into the behavioural scheme, with each corner of the triangle representing the behavioural ideal types

(2002, p. 161). He has thus crafted a set of expectations on which characteristics of parties that lead them to adopt certain strategic considerations and behaviour (Wolinetz, 2002, 160-162). This can be seen in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1 Wolinetz' model of vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking political parties (2002)

As Kirchheimer assumes that the transition towards catch-all parties is motivated by electoral gain and the environment of the electorate shifting (1966, p. 184), Wolinetz fittingly places the catch-all party towards the vote-seeking corner of his model (2002, p. 160-161). He also places Panebianco's electoral-professional party (1988, p. 263-265) here, which as discussed is a reformulation of the catch-all concept (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 160-161).

He places the cartel party towards the office-seeking corner (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 160-161), reflecting that Katz and Mair argued that securing governing control was the primary function of these parties. Wolinetz also places patronage-oriented parties toward the office-seeking corner (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 161). The functionalist purpose of both party types is reliant on the continuous benefits achieved by holding office (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 152). The patronage-oriented party will not be discussed further, as it is not considered to be relevant to the thesis.

The mass party, referred to as the mass integration party, is placed towards the policy-seeking corner in Wolinetz' model (2002, p. 159-161). This is due to the promotion of a specific group's policy demands, being the priority of these parties, rather than chasing votes from a wide array of the electorate (Duverger, 1972, p. 63-64; Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 182-184).

Falling close to the mass parties in Wolinetz' framework is what he calls new politics parties (2002, p. 161). Alluding to the new dimension of political competition (Inglehart, 1999), this is the parties Gunther and Diamond place in the movement party genus (2003, p. 188-189). As discussed above, these will predominantly be referred to as niche parties. Following the discussion of Bischof, the priority of specific policy above other concerns, falls close the common conceptualizations of niche parties (2017, p. 221).

Lastly, Wolinetz includes programmatic parties (2002, p. 161). Based on Gunther and Diamond's conceptualization (2003, p. 187) it is argued that it is fitting to place the category between the vote-seeking and policy seeking corner of Wolinetz' figure (2002, p. 161). Gunther and Diamond places the specie in the electoralist genus, illustrating that it has serious electoral motivations (2003, p. 186-187). However, as they still are expected to be heavily influenced by its ideological baggage (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 187), they fit quite accurately between the two poles.

3.6. Constructing a revised model of party behaviour

Following this brief presentation of Wolinetz' idealised framework (2002), an alternative is presented. It must once again be stressed that the main argument for presenting an alternative rather than adopting the one he created, is applicability to the current research question. With this in mind, it is necessary to discuss the concepts included by Wolinetz in light of the purpose of the thesis. In order to then craft the model that will serve as the framework of the analysis. Secondly, while the new politics party included by Wolinetz' (2002, p. 161) resembles the niche party concept in many ways, the extensive attention the concept has received by Meguid (2005) and researchers following her (Adams et al., 2006; Bischof, 2017; Meyer and Miller, 2015; Wagner, 2012a), grants important conceptual and analytical tools that were not available at the time Wolinetz made his scheme.

Out of the party types included in Wolinetz' model (2002, p. 161), the catch-all party and the new politics party, here re-conceptualized as the niche party, are expected to be particularly prevalent in the analysis and are thus good starting points.

Catch-all parties are expected to present a broad set of issues in order to appeal to as large a portion of the electorate as possible. They are furthermore likely to have less loyalty to specific issues, instead forming their agenda based on the prospect of gaining votes. If, for example, a certain strategy led to electoral disappointment, catch-all parties likely de-

emphasize this issue. It is therefore placed at the same spot as in Wolinetz' model, towards the vote-seeking corner (2002, p. 161).

Niche parties on the other hand are expected to prioritize only a limited set of issues and to be far less willing to de-emphasize these core policy issues. Even when faced with electoral disappointment. Losing their niche puts them at a severe existential risk (Dennison, 2020, p. 139), as the niche usually is what grants them credibility. They are expected to keep a stable attention on their niche.

A quote by Bergman and Flatt, leaning on work by Wagner (2012a; 2012b), illustrates much of the previously stated assumptions of niche party behaviour: "These parties are more likely to emphasize highly specialized positions and issues ignored by their competitors to strengthen contrasts with their opponents, thereby allowing them to carve out an electoral "niche" that ensures party survival (...)" (Bergman and Flatt, 2020, p. 712). The niche party thus takes the spot of the new politics party from Wolinetz model at the policy-seeking corner (2002, p. 161).

The key contribution of Kirchheimer has been to describe how parties transitioned from mass parties to catch-all parties. One would then assume that the catch-all party have supplanted the mass party as the best description of these parties in the relevant time frame. However, one of the primary reasons for using a framework resembling Wolinetz', was the acknowledgment that parties do not evolve in a universal fashion (2002, p. 159) and the fact that parties underwent a gradual transition (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 185). Secondly, the electoral dominance social democratic mass parties had in Scandinavia during the first decades of the post-war era made these transition toward catch-all later than comparable parties.

Kirchheimer used precisely these parties as an example for how lack of political competition prevents the transition into catch-all parties (1966, p. 188).

With the increased electoral competition in the time after Kirchheimer made his work, the level of competition increased in Scandinavia, making it reasonable to assume that also these mass parties gradually transitioned toward the catch-all ideal. While almost 20 years separate Kirchheimer's work and the first manifesto examined, it is possible that the Norwegian Labour party still has more policy-seeking traits than one would expect from a comparable party during parts of the analysed period. The inclusion of the mass party concept thus lends theoretical basis in order to explain any potential transition in the Labour party's issue

emphasis in early parts of the studied period. Such a transition could give important insight to how mass parties transition towards the catch-all ideal.

The mass party will therefore be included in the revised model, with the ideal type expected to be policy-seeking. While their sheer size makes it likely that they emphasize a larger sample of issues than niche parties, the close sociological ties make the policy breadth narrow. A coherent and strict ideological position also leads the issue emphasis to be particularly stable. Increased frequency in the changing of manifesto content and a gradual broadening of the policy emphasis at the cost of their core issues would be indicators of a transition from mass party to catch-all party.

While it could be argued that such uncertainties concerning the theoretical placement of the Labour party is a critical flaw of the model, the argument is made for the opposite. The revised model is by design transitional. Parties are expected to move toward and away from the ideal types. The fact that a party at times fits in the middle of the model, between two or even three corners, merely speaks to the complexity of trade-offs parties must make. As stated above, one of the core assumptions is precisely that parties are drawn between these objectives. Changing circumstances are expected to gradually impact these prioritizations forcing parties to adapt.

While adding an intermediate category such as the programmatic party would create a more complete description of existing parties, the catch-all and mass party terms are argued to function as illustrative poles in the transition of parties. This enables important insight to how they adapt their strategies and behaviour to shifts. This helps to explain why the programmatic party is a useful category in Gunther and Diamond's work (2003, p. 187), while also highlighting the different purposes of the two papers.

It could feasibly be argued that the Labour party would best be described as a programmatic party during the entire timeframe included in this study. The party has adapted to a new campaign environment and is not solely relying on its class roots to gain voters, while still being affected by their ideological baggage (Vogt, 1994, p. 238-251). Examining the extent the party fits with the ideal concepts, is argued to be more appropriate in the study of transition. So, while also Wolinetz included the programmatic party in his scheme (2002, p. 161), it is removed based on this reasoning. This term will instead fall into a continuous scale and be classified as more or less catch-all.

It is further argued that the cartel party as presented by Katz and Mair (1995) is likely to formulate their issue attention quite similar to an idealized version of the catch-all party. This reflects the severe difficulties with differentiating between office-seeking and vote-seeking parties (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 154-155). Both are likely to have a broad issue attention and frequently switch the emphasis on issues in order to capitalize on voter sentiments (Katz and Mair, 1995, p. 18). It could be argued that the issue attention of cartel parties converges even more than that of catch-all parties and that their policy prioritizations are slightly more so shaped by their integration in the state rather than issue ownership.

While it was argued above that a broader conceptualization of the catch-all party is more appropriate than Gunther and Diamond's specie (2003, p. 185-187), this was not to discard their understanding of the concept, but to include it as a part of a broader conceptualization. Their catch-all specie can even be conceived as the most idealized version. This version of the catch-all party is expected to design its issue emphasis very similar to how one would expect the cartel party to behave. If one insists on including the cartel party in the following framework, it would therefore be expected to act as an exaggerated version of the catch-all party. However, as the framework utilizes ideal types, the inclusion of a category expected to behave as an exaggerated version of an already included category, is redundant.

Gunther and Diamond came to the same conclusion when formulating their scheme, choosing not to include the cartel party, while also noting that it would have been placed in the electoralist genus if incorporated (2003, p. 193). This supports the argument that these party types are likely to behave quite similar. Koole's argument concerning the terminology being a description of party systems, rather than parties (1996, p. 508), also contributes to its removal.

While several aspects of Wolinetz' model (2002, p. 161) have been removed so far, the model can be fruitfully supplemented as well. Especially in order to describe parties' behavioural transition. A good place to start is the potential-based categorizations derived from Sartori (2005). This is a helpful addition that nuances the expectations of how parties behave. The parties' post-electoral potential is assumed to pull them toward certain spots in the behavioural triangle. As stated above, parties' potential and party type are often connected, so the inclusion may at first glance seem redundant. The argument is, that this not always is the case and that post-electoral potential in those cases improves the model.

Irrelevant parties are expected to behave in line with the policy-seeking ideal, which makes sense as they often are niche parties. The fact that all parties are most dependent on their core

supporters lead parties, that either do not ever get relevant or parties that drastically lose their relevancy, to prioritize their core policy profile. This is necessary as the lack of electoral success raise questions on the very identity of the party, making it detrimental to its survival to keep the few activists and core voters that they do have (Panebianco, 1988, p. 211).

This illustrates that minor parties must adopt a policy-seeking strategy, even if they do not fit the common conceptualizations of the niche party (Bischof, 2017). This might be minor parties that focus on issues inside of traditional political competition or that are based on a broader set of issues than niche parties. This primarily entails that they will likely stick quite loyally to their policy profile. If parties of this size frequently switch their emphasis or attempt to follow the trends of the electorate as a whole, they will more than likely lose the small support they do have. The main expectancy of irrelevant parties is thus that they have a stable issue emphasis. While voters and activists prioritizing a broad set of mainstream issues, likely will chose the larger catch-all parties, irrelevant parties with a broad platform are not unthinkable. Party collapse illustrates the possibility of relevant catch-all parties becoming irrelevant (Laroze, 2019).

While parties with blackmailing potential are larger and potentially have more influence than irrelevant parties, they too are likely to be quite small and at the fringes of party competition. What differentiate them from parties with coalition potential is that other parties do not consider them viable governing partners. This may be due to governing norms, stable coalition patterns or party size. This makes the emphasis on certain core policy issues important, in order to distance themselves from the parties they seek to blackmail. If blackmailing the governing parties shall have any point, the party must have unique enough policy platform that they can profile themselves on this blackmail. Policy-seeking is therefore necessary for such parties to gain a role in the party system.

However, as these parties have a larger electoral support than irrelevant parties, their risk of collapse is smaller. This implies that they can take larger chances when formulating their policy positions, in order to further their electoral growth without risking their survival. Parties with blackmailing potential are therefore likely to prioritize both policy-seeking and vote-seeking, thus being placed somewhere between the two poles on the behavioural triangle. In sum, this imply that they emphasize a quite narrow set of issues and have a quite stable issue focus, while being more flexible than irrelevant parties.

As briefly stated above, parties with coalition potential are likely to be more integrated parts of the party system, as other parties consider them for cooperation. This implies that at least one other party consider their policy positions viable enough to formulate public policy with them. While also considering them to be sufficiently reliable. It also points to the party with coalition potential likely getting enough votes to contribute to coalition building. How many votes this is, is highly dependent on the party system.

Coalition building necessitates reaching policy compromises, which means that parties with coalition potential have to be prepared to frequently sacrifice policy-seeking in order to seek votes or office. However, as they still run the risk of being marginalized by their larger partner (Bolleyer, 2007, p. 126), their primary need is likely to maximize votes, rather than office. The larger these parties are, the greater impact they are likely to have in government, which in turn is likely to be further rewarded in the polls (Bolleyer, 2007, p. 123). A larger portion of the votes will additionally also increase their blackmailing capability if their coalition does not win the election.

Parties with coalition potential is therefore expected to be mainly drawn to the vote-seeking corner, while also aspiring office. These parties are thus likely to attempt to reach as many voters as possible, expanding the breadth of their policy position while also becoming more flexible and changing emphasis to respond to the demands of the electorate. They are, however, unlikely to be willing to sacrifice their core policy issues, due to the need to distinguish themselves.

Parties with governing potential are expected to prioritize the fulfilment of that potential, meaning seeking office. This implies that they are willing to sacrifice both policy and votes to achieve this. This coincides with a core aspect of the issue incentive model presented by Green-Pedersen (2019a, p. 35). He assumes that large, mainstream parties, which usually are the parties with governing potential, are willing to emphasize policy issues they do not have issue ownership of (2019a, p. 35). In order to benefit their potential coalition partners or sabotage their competition (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 35). This leads them to switch issue emphasis frequently, depending on what increases their chance of entering office. As argued above, certain core functions of the state and obtrusive issues are likely particularly important in this regard. They are also likely to have a very broad platform in order to increase their vote-getting which is a precondition of gaining office. Governing potential is thus assumed to pull parties toward the office-seeking corner.

The office-seeking corner of the revised model is inhabited by catch-all parties with governing potential. It is argued that these party traits are sufficient to incentivize parties to adopt office-seeking behaviour. The relation between parties, such as inter-party collusion is argued not to be necessary for such behaviour, which has motivated the omission of the cartel party from the model.

This results in the model illustrated by Figure 3.2. Parties are expected to fit in varying degree with the categories mass party, catch-all party and niche party. The ideal types will with all likelihood not describe any actual parties, but serve as broad categories. Bischof uses degree of nicheness (2017, p. 223), which is illustrative. Similarly, catch-allness is a useful term. A party that may be described as a niche party, is likely to have some catch-all traits and vice versa.

Where actual parties place in the triangle is however also conditioned by their post-electoral potential. This means that while, a niche party is expected to primarily seek policy, electoral success and increased potential gradually pulls it towards the vote-seeking corner. Prolonged and drastic shifts may in turn pull it towards office-seeking. As the party's motivation shifts, its strategy does too, and the niche party adopts traits resembling catch-all parties. With time and continued electoral success, the party may potentially be better described as a catch-all party than as the niche party it originated as. This is in line with Grossman and Guinaudeau findings, as they write: "in most cases, issue engagement is the result of deviant parties progressively aligning with the tunnel (rather than the tunnel moving closer to them)" (2022, p. 107). The tunnel is their metaphor for the party system agenda which also Green-Pedersen (2019a) studies. The revised model in Figure 3.2. is proposed, partially in order to explain the circumstances in which parties *align with the tunnel*.




Figure 3.2. *The revised model*

While electoral expectations impact campaign strategies even if the change of potential only lasts one election, parties likely have to experience a prolonged change of their electoral potential to drastically change as an organization. These expectations of party transition thus resemble a continuous scale and parties that once were niche parties, will not necessarily remain it. As with the mass parties, however, the notions stressed by Panebianco (1988, p. 211), are likely to function as a limit to the extent parties can undergo such a transition without losing its identity. This would in turn likely have severe consequences on their electoral success. From this, it is also possible to craft the assumption that parties will *return home*, so to speak, when faced with particularly severe or continuous electoral loss. This entails a shift towards policy-seeking, by narrowing their platform and reinforcing their core policies.

The underlying assumption is that parties will seek to maximize their votes and control of office, if they have the potential to. This may initially be strictly instrumental in order to get the power to impact policy, but these vote-seeking tendencies are likely to gradually institutionalize. However, when their identity is stretched thin enough, their legitimacy and perceived loyalty to their voters will decrease, resulting in electoral loss, making the party partially *return home* by emphasizing their traditional core policy areas. Figure 3.2. thus presents a dynamic model of party behaviour.

The major difference between the revised model presented in Figure 3.2. and the one formulated by Wolinetz (2002, p. 161) shown in Figure 3.1, is that the revised model does not

include mutually exclusive concepts. While the party types and potential are expected to correlate, this is not always the case. A catch-all party is for example expected to be pulled towards the office-seeking corner if it has governing potential, but towards the policy-seeking corner if it is irrelevant. A party's potential determines if it adopts office-seeking behaviour. So, no party type occupies the bottom right corner of the triangle. Only the potential of governing is assumed to lead parties to be strictly willing to sacrifice its potential vote growth.

While the ideal catch-all party is placed at the vote-seeking corner, it is here argued that it is not outside of reason to assume that catch-all parties would be willing to adopt more strictly office-seeking behaviour if the potential were there. Kirchheimer even states: "(...) bent on continuing in power or moving into governmental power, it performs this expressive function subject to manifold restrictions and changing tactical considerations" (1966, p. 189). He clearly assumed that office was a driving force of the transition to catch-all, making it plausible to argue that a catch-all party would be willing to sacrifice votes to achieve this. When in the position to do so. In sum, the triangle in Figure 3.2. presents a two-dimensional model of party behaviour.

3.7. Hypotheses

Several hypotheses can be drawn from the model:

1A: Catch-all parties have a broad issue emphasis, while frequently adapting the relative emphasis on issues

1B: Niche parties have a stable emphasis on a limited number of issues

2A: Increased post-electoral potential leads parties to broaden their agenda and adopt a less stable emphasis

2B: Decreased post-electoral potential leads parties to narrow their emphasis toward their core issues

3: Parties keep emphasis on their core issues, even when experiencing electoral growth

4. Case selection

As already hinted at above, the analysis of this thesis will be performed by studying Norwegian political parties. The choice of Norway is two-fold and both reasons have been alluded to above. First, the addition of Norwegian CAP data enables an extensive mapping of the political parties that have not been available to previous research. While much work has been done with regards to the ideological position of Norwegian parties (Joly et al., 2020; Volkens et al., 2021), the addition of CAP data enables describing the actual policy emphasis of the parties. With the increased role of issue competition in the overall political competition (Green-Pedersen, 2007), this supplement grants an essential improvement to the study of Norwegian parties and the Norwegian party system. Parts of the analysis thus have an exploratory purpose, as the descriptive findings enabled by the data may provide important insights. The findings of this thesis provide a valuable base for the future research on Norwegian political parties.

Secondly, the Norwegian CAP data also allows for new insight into the development of parties. Noting for example Kirchheimer's statement, that the lack of competition led Norwegian parties to develop in different ways than his expectations (1966, p. 188), makes it an important case. To further understand whether Norwegian parties converged more toward other Western European parties or continue on a different path. While the purpose of the thesis is to examine the development of Norwegian parties, a brief discussion on the compliance between the studied parties and the findings of Green-Pedersen (2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022), is performed concludingly, to better place the findings in context.

Norway has many similarities with other Western European countries. Analysis on the Norwegian case is therefore an important supplement to the CAP literature on parties, which tends to study Western European countries (Green-Pedersen, 2019a; Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022). Increased focus on the Norwegian case is thus important to test robustness and external validity. Additionally, any divergence, such as what discussed by Kirchheimer (1966, p. 188), would enable future research utilizing a most-similar design to better understand what leads to divergence of policy emphases.

While party competition in plurality electoral systems is an important field of study in its own right, the research question and formulation of the theoretical model are clearly aimed at a proportional electoral system. The motivation that drives political parties in two-party systems

are completely different (Dow, 2001, p.111). Such assumptions can for example be found in the work of Downs who assume that parties in two-party systems will converge more toward the median voter than parties in multiparty systems (1957, p. 126). Jay Dow writes about majoritarian party systems: “Because there exists little possibility of a coalition government, political parties must maximize vote share and win the election to implement desired policies” (2001, p. 111). Note that precisely this lack of coalitions has been argued above to make the difference between office-seeking and vote-seeking mostly redundant.

The differences between electoral systems are at least partially because of different thresholds to relevancy. With regards to the revised model, one would expect a far more distinct division between parties with governing potential and irrelevant parties in two-party systems. The two main parties would be expected to act quite distinctly as vote-seeking catch-all parties, while essentially all others would act as irrelevant parties. Some clear exceptions of parties with blackmailing potential exist, such as the Liberal Democrats in the UK (Cutts, 2012, p. 96-97).

Studying party development on a continuous scale is more appropriate if the party system allows for the growth of party power to happen gradually, rather than harsh thresholds keeping most parties out of relevancy. Future research should examine two-party systems based on the revised model in order to examine if the gap between relevant parties and all irrelevant parties are as prominent as proposed here. The expectation is that the vast majority of parties in such systems are policy-seeking, while the two competing for power adopt a far broader platform in order to vote-see. This could also bring forth important insight to the differences in development of parties in different electoral systems.

The Norwegian party system is also argued to be particularly fitting for this analysis. The party system includes parties that fit the party types and potential described in Figure 3.2., with the possible exception of mass parties, which has been discussed above. This allows for an investigation of whether these parties behave as expected in the hypotheses.

Based on this, six political parties have been chosen. While a more extensive case selection would be beneficial and remove some risks of party-specific factors shaping the results, the data collection process for this project is labour intensive, and the scope of the project has been limited by the time and resources available. While conclusions primarily can be made about the issue emphasis and development of these six parties, the case selection is argued to enable some cautious generalizations. While party-specific traits likely impact their policy breadth, they are assumed to fit quite similarly in the triangle of Figure 3.2. as parties of the

same party type. A conscious case selection to ensure this variation of party types were therefore important.

A strong encouragement is thus issued to test the findings with a more extensive number of parties. While limited, clear trends in support of the hypotheses, should be interpreted as a reason to validate the results. A cross-country comparative design is suggested. This is the most important step to test the robustness of the following findings. Similarities to the findings of Green-Pedersen (2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022), would however at least partially contribute to the robustness of the findings.

The parties studied are the Labour party (AP), the Conservative party (Høyre), the Progress party (FrP), the Green party (MDG), the Liberal party (Venstre) and the Coastal party (KP). This case selection covers a broad set of relevant Norwegian parties, as well as one consistently irrelevant. It ensures some ideological variance, as well as differences in party type and post-electoral potential. The timeframe, 1985-2021 is expected to enable the detection of trends and potential developments. In order to do this, both parties that have experienced clear change in electoral success and parties that have remained quite stable during the time period, are included. This makes it easier to study the difference between parties that have developed and those that have not.

The study includes 10 elections and a total of 51 party manifestos, which were collected from the party document archive of NSD¹ (Norsk senter for forskningsdata, n.d.). Each manifesto between 1985 and 2021 for AP, FrP and Venstre are included. All KP manifestos are also included, meaning between 2001 and 2021, while MDG's manifestos available from NSD were included, meaning 1993-2021. Seven of Høyre's manifestos are included. While the inclusion of manifestos between 1985 and 1993 would benefit the analysis, it was prioritized to code manifestos from as broad a spectrum of parties as possible. Høyre is in many ways expected to behave similarly to the other large, mainstream party with governing potential, AP. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, ensuring as large a sample of the remaining five parties was prioritised.

Based on the definitions provided by Meguid (2005) and Bsichof (2017), FrP, MDG and KP are considered to be niche parties. MDG can quite appropriately be considered as a left-

¹ MDG's manifesto from 2005 is not available in the archive, but were provided directly by NSD (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2005) and the most recent manifestos were collected from the parties web pages (Arbeiderpartiet, 2021; Fremskrittspartiet, 2021; Høyre, 2021; Kystpartiet 2021; Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2021; Venstre, 2021).

libertarian party, which as stated above are typically conceptualised closely to the definitions of niche parties utilized (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 188-189). MDG is appropriately described with the niche party term, rejecting traditional party competition in order to present a specialized environmental profile.

MDG is further considered to have been an irrelevant party during most of the period. They have however, grown during the last elections. While it could be argued that their failure to reach the electoral threshold in 2021, ensured them staying irrelevant, this is contested. First, the government being a minority government increases even small parties' blackmailing potential. A second important point is the difference in the use of the terminology, compared to how Sartori developed it (2005, p. 108). Despite Sartori counting parties based on postdictive potential (2005, p. 108), it is the predicted potential that is assumed to impact the policy emphasis of election manifestos, and MDG had serious potential of reaching the threshold ahead of the election (Poll of polls, n.d.). Even though pre-election promises should be taken with a grain of salt (Wüst, 2018, p. 90-92), the claims by AP that they would not enter government with MDG (Norges rikskringkasting, 2021), is considered proof of them having blackmailing potential, not coalition potential.

KP also has a narrow emphasis, prioritizing issues concerning the coast. One could however argue that coastal policies do not fit Meguid's first characteristic (2005, p. 347-348), as important economic considerations often motivate coastal policies. They share clear similarities with agrarian parties, by having a specialized rural profile, which, as shown by Bischof have previously had high degrees of nicheness (2017, p. 229). When explaining why niche parties fit the first characteristic Meguid writes: "(...) these parties similarly challenge the content of political debate" (2005, p. 348). As agrarian parties prior to their conversion into mainstreamness, KP does challenge the content of political debate, attempting to push rural and coastal values and needs onto the political agenda. They are expected to have a high degree of nicheness and are thus perceived as a niche party.

Contrary to MDG however, they are considered to have remained irrelevant during the entire period. They did enter parliament in 2001, but has never reached 2% of the overall votes and did not pose plausible potential of impacting public policy even in parliament.

FrP is considered to be a radical right party or, using Gunther and Diamond's terminology, a post-industrial extreme right party, which is the other movement party specie (2003, p. 189). This illustrates its theoretical placement as a niche party. This is admittedly a quite poor fit, as

the party is comparatively more moderate than other radical right parties. Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah de Lange and Matthijs Roodujin define it as a boarder case (2016a, p. 6). They point to the heavy socioeconomic emphasis of FrP, arguing that this makes their fit as a niche party more questionable than other radical right parties (Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin, 2016b, p. 48). This is likely reflecting the party's origin as a single-issue party dedicated to lowering taxes (Jupskås, 2016, p. 169).

This is an important insight and their lacking compliance with the first of Meguid's criteria, limits their expected nicheness. However, as Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin (2016a) conclude that the term is appropriate enough and end up including FrP in their study of radical right parties, the same will be done here. FrP is viewed as radical right, and thus a niche party. Similarly, to other parties included in their study FrP have a clear anti-immigration profile emphasizing the traditional values of the sociocultural dimension, not only the socioeconomic dimension (Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin, 2016b, p. 33). They additionally presented a clear protest to the established party competition when they emerged ensuring a relatively high degree of nicheness compared to traditional parties.

FrP is the party where the post-electoral potential has evolved most during the time frame. While FrP had blackmailing potential in the beginning of the period, they have recently proved their coalition potential by entering government after consecutive elections.

The three remaining parties are considered to be catch-all parties. While the appropriateness of the catch-all term in the Norwegian context has been contested (Kirchheimer, 1966, p. 188; Vogt, 1994, p. 249-251), the three parties are argued to be fit the provided conceptualizations to an appropriate extent. All operate within the traditional frames of party competition and are expected to provide broad platforms in order to reach wide portions of the electorate. The parties being influenced by ideological baggage is not contested, but as discussed above, this is within the expectations of the catch-all term.

Furthermore, AP and Høyre have both had governing potential during the time period, being the main competitors for the prime minister position. AP has been the most dominant Norwegian party during the post-war era. While Høyre has entered governments led by prime ministers from other parties, they have consistently been the largest or second largest party on the right, consistently having at least coalition potential, but most commonly a clear potential to govern.

Contrary to the previous two, Venstre has not been in serious contention for the prime minister position. While moving in and out of parliament, they have consistently had the potential to enter coalitions depending on election results. Again, the difference from Sartori’s original use of the terms is important, as Venstre typically had the potential not only to enter parliament, but also government, when viewed predictively.

Figure 4.1 shows the parties’ portion of the votes dating back to 1981 (Aardal, n.d.), as this is an important indicator of party potential.




Figure 4.1. Election results

While the shift in voter demands is likely to encourage all six parties to broaden their agenda over time, the six parties are expected to display different forms of issue emphases. Some brief insight into how the parties are expected to develop based on the hypotheses is thus helpful. FrP and MDG have experienced the greatest change in post-electoral potential during the time frame and are expected to have the most pronounced change of strategic behaviour. The increased potential is expected to incentivise them to broaden their emphases. AP, Høyre and Venstre are expected to keep broad and volatile issue emphases during the entire period. The shift from a more frozen system of party competition is still expected to lead to changes in the strategies of these parties. The size and governing aspirations of AP and Høyre will likely lead them to have a broader platform than Venstre. KP is expected to consistently prioritize most of their attention on issues directly related to their core policies. This selection of cases is thus expected to allow for the examination of the applicability of the proposed model.

5. Methods

5.1. The study of party manifestos

The dataset that will be used in the analysis, is manifesto data that has been coded as a part of the Norwegian Policy Agendas Project. As mentioned by both Green-Pedersen (2019a, p. 41-44) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022, p. 3-4), there has been several discussions on the use of party manifestos as an object of research. This chapter thus starts with a discussion of the study of party manifestos, before a presentation of the dataset and the codebook follows. There is an extensive history of using party manifestos as the object of study, especially due to the prominence of CMP (Budge et al., 2001). Despite this, conventional wisdom would lead one to expect that parties do not keep the promises made in manifestos (Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 4). The extent they keep their promises has been widely debated.

Several authors show that only a portion, and at times a small portion, of policy pledges made by parties actually become public policy (Mansergh and Thomson, 2007, p. 318; Prapotnik, 2017, p. 852). While it is clear that parties do not keep all their promises, the degree party position impacts policy is highly dependent on several conditions (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001). This has also been proven true in the study of party manifestos (Mansergh and Thomson, 2007) and the research field is one of the most disputed in social science (Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 4).

In an important large-scale analysis, Robert Thomson and several co-authors sought to examine what lead some election pledges to be fulfilled while others are not, concluding that their “findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers” (2017, p. 527). They argue that, while dependent on several conditions, parties fulfil a substantial percentage of their pledges and that parties make pledges with aspirations to fulfil them (Thomson et al., 2017, p. 540-541).

Importantly, much of the research studying the effectiveness of party manifestos examine policy pledges or promises (Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Prapotnik, 2017; Thomson et al., 2017). By having a theoretical base in saliency theory, this thesis is explicitly based on the assumption that parties express their intentions by means other than policy pledges (Budge, 2015, p. 762-767). The aims of parties are often manifested by their selective emphasis on issues, not necessarily pledges. The extensive study by Thomson et al. (2017), shows that manifestos may be a good object of analysis, even for pledges. Secondly, the very foundation of this thesis points to strategic priorities of the parties being the object of interest.

Party manifestos are exactly this, the parties' self-reported priorities, making them appropriate in order to examine how strategic considerations are balanced (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 44). Findings by Brouard et al., using the CAP coding scheme grant support to the assumption that the policy prioritizations of the prime minister's party impacted which policy issue they prioritized after the election (2018, p. 911-914). Like the findings of Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari (2001) and Thomson et al. (2017), Brouard et al. find that the impact is dependent of specific conditions (2018, p. 914). The CAP coding scheme provides a particularly fitting method to measure parties' self-reported policy priorities.

Other ways of studying the behaviour and strategies of political parties do exist (Helbling and Tresch, 2011, p. 176), so the choice should be made based on the purpose of the study. In addition to being a good way of studying parties' strategic concerns, manifestos are also a particularly suitable data source when studying medium- or long-term changes (Helbling and Tresch, 2011, p. 175-176). In their study Marc Helbling and Anke Tresch found that using manifesto data, media data, expert survey data and mass survey data, do, to a large extent, produce the same results (2011, p. 178-180). So, based on the considerations discussed above, manifestos are chosen as an appropriate data source to answer the hypotheses.

5.2. The Norwegian Policy Agendas Project

The CAP coding scheme is particularly useful considering the purpose of the thesis. The development of CAP has been based on the idea that issue emphasis is of great importance to the political process. While this thesis uses manifesto data, the coding scheme is applicable to most, if not all, types of political documents enabling the study of the political process as a whole. The CAP database covers a wide selection of different types of political documents across several countries, as well as the EU and two American states (Comparative Agendas Project, n.d.).

In order to combat the growing discrepancy between several different codebooks used during the early years of the project, a Master Codebook was designed (Bevan, 2019, p. 20). The Master Codebook is divided into 213 issues, which fit one of 21 major topics (Bevan, 2019, p. 24). While most country projects still have their own codebook, these have been adapted to ensure compliance with the Master Codebook. This enables the inclusion of country specific issues while ensuring comparability. Following this, and based heavily on the Danish Codebook (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2019, p. 83), a Norwegian Codebook was designed. The Norwegian Policy Agendas Codebook is in the Online Appendix.

The Norwegian Codebook includes 235 subtopics, divided into the same 21 major topics as the Master Codebook. While each category has been given a Norwegian code, the codebook also informs which code it equates to in the Master Codebook. This enables an easy translation. The Norwegian data was collected by the author and another student coder. The major topics is shown in Table 5.1.

Major Topic	Title
1	Macroeconomics
2	Civil rights, minority issues and civil liberties
3	Health
4	Agriculture and fishing industry
5	Labour
6	Education and culture
7	Environment
8	Energy
9	Immigration and refugee issues
10	Traffic
12	Legal affairs
13	Social policy
14	Urban and housing issues
15	Industrial and commercial policy
16	Defence
17	Research, technology and information
18	Foreign trade
19	Foreign policy and relations to other countries
20	Government operations and government issues
21	Public lands and water management
23	Cultural policy

Table 5.1. CAP Major Topics

In order to ensure the validity of the coding, extensive coder training was performed. This process illustrated some of the troubles of using a coding scheme designed for comparative studies, particularly one initially based on an American context. One particular code that was discussed in length was, family issues, which is included in major topic 12 legal affairs. In a

Norwegian context this seemed odd, as family often is discussed in the context of the welfare state (Vollset, 2011), thus major topic 13 social policy. The inclusion of family issues in major topic 12, reflects both the American context and that CAP originally studied government behaviour, as the US government purposefully avoided family issues, except when discussing legal issues such as child custody or domestic violence (Bevan, 2019, p. 33).

Such examples illustrate that a coding scheme deliberately designed to study Norwegian political parties would enable a more precise investigation. That would, however, severely limit comparative studies and the possible scope of the codebook. While such potential inaccuracies have some impact on the prospect of ensuring the validity of the study, the extensive work that went into the creation of the Master Codebook (Bevan, 2019, p. 27-32) and its application to the Norwegian context, add to the validity. The motivation for using the codebook is to cover relevant issues and enable future comparative research.

In addition to several discussions aiming to ensure the Norwegian data's usefulness in a broader CAP context, several rounds of inter coder reliability tests were performed to ensure reliability. Inter coder reliability testing is an essential part of the process of quantitative content analysis.

While one method of measuring the reliability is to examine the percentage agreement between coders, this has some serious flaws. Klaus Krippendorff quite harshly writes "(...) the convenience of calculating percent agreement, which is often cited as its advantage, cannot compensate for its meaninglessness" (2004, p. 413). As an alternative, Krippendorff developed his own method of measuring inter coder reliability (Krippendorff, 1970). The Krippendorff alfa.

The alfa has values between 0 and 1 and Krippendorff states that the acceptable value depends on the severity of achieving invalid results, but that scores above 0.67 are acceptable (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 429). Six rounds were performed, until a sufficient score was achieved consistently. The coding is thus assumed to be sufficiently reliable, which is argued to improve the validity of the analysis. See the Appendix for the reliability coefficient for each round.

Each natural sentence in the manifestos was coded, making the dataset include data on more than 95 500 sentences. Approximately 3500 of those were considered to not include policy. Only the approximately 92 000 sentences including policy were used in the analysis. The manifestos vary significantly in length, averaging 1877 sentences, with the shortest containing

a total of 183 and the longest 4265. Each major topic's relative proportion in each manifesto was calculated in order to investigate the change in emphasis, not only the change of manifesto length. The development of certain especially relevant subtopics will also be examined. This too using proportional values.

However, as it is likely that the absolute length of manifestos is related to the number of issues they cover, the number of sentences is presented in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1. also illustrates that there are some party differences. Some of it may be explained by organizational strength, but Høyre seems to be a clear exception. The manifesto length of Høyre, FrP, Venstre² and MDG has grown during the time frame.




Figure 5.1. The number of sentences in manifestos

Due to the conversion to proportional values, the units of analysis are the manifestos themselves, meaning that the complete dataset includes 51 units, severely limiting the possibilities of regression analysis. A comparative design including other parties coded with the CAP coding scheme, would improve the possibilities of finding significant results as well as adding validity to the research. Incorporating the new Norwegian data in a comparative study, enabling regression-based approaches, is a promising venue for future research.

5.3. Research design

The research design takes much inspiration from the design used by Green-Pedersen in one of his earliest works (2006). This is because both have at least a partially exploratory purpose, aiming to examine a new dataset. His approach was to demonstrate the development of the Danish political party agenda based on several theoretical assumptions (Green-Pedersen,

² Venstre's 2021 manifesto decreased drastically in length compared to previous manifestos. Time will tell if that was the beginning of a trend for the party or an anomaly due to the pandemic.

2006, p. 221). He has since built further on the findings from this article, illustrating the benefits of placing a new data source in a theoretical framework. As discussed by Ilana Shpaizman, CAP grants a relevant starting point for triangulation (2019, p. 359), which is the approach here. While a larger dataset increases the opportunity to test the hypotheses accurately with a regression-based approach, the clear behavioural assumptions of the hypotheses allow for an in-depth study of the theoretical model presented supplemented with quantitative measures (Annamalai, 2010).

Similarly, the Norwegian manifesto data will take centre stage. The more qualitative design limits some of the certainty of the conclusions, as such designs typically are characterized by lower validity. The thesis does however still rely on certain quantitative measures, which as discussed above, improves the validity due to the extensive coder training process.

Uncovering important trends is possible as these measures are heavily supplemented with theoretical assumptions. Future research should test the robustness of the findings. Secondly, some of Green-Pedersen (2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau's (2022) appropriate findings will be referenced, as similar trends using comparable data improves the study's robustness.

To begin, a brief summary of the issue profile of the six parties will be presented. This is also to test the face validity of the dataset. There are likely serious flaws with the coding if the results imply that MDG does not emphasize environmental policy. In addition to providing a description of the parties, this will serve as a first peak at the development of their issue emphasis. Some issues considered to be core issues of the parties will be reviewed. The extent parties emphasize their core issues will be important in evaluating policy-seeking behaviour, while heavy attention to core functions of the state and obtrusive issues may imply office-seeking. After these initial investigations of the parties, how the parties adapt their manifestos, and the breadth of their policy profile are examined in order to study their placement in the revised model.

The first aspect that will be presented is the distribution of parties' changes. The assumptions of the punctuated equilibrium theory will be tested. This is done because catch-all parties are expected to adapt their profile more gradually than niche parties, which have a stable emphasis on their core policies. While the distribution of both party types is expected to be shaped as a punctuated equilibrium, niche parties are expected to have an even more punctuated distribution.

Kurtosis is the best measure to detect whether the distribution follows this pattern (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005, p. 157-159). A normal distribution would imply gradual and proportional change (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 196). A leptokurtic distribution on the other hand is a strong indication of a punctuated equilibrium. Leptokurtic distribution means a high peak, while including more observations at the extremes than a normal distribution (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 607). The high peak of the distribution would signify that there usually are no or limited change, while large tails show the drastic changes, meaning the punctuations (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 607).

Following Breunig, L-kurtosis is used instead of standard kurtosis, due to kurtosis requiring a large number of observations (2006, p. 1083). L-kurtosis ranges from 0-1, where 0.123 signifies normal distributions and values closer to 1 signify a leptokurtic distribution (Breunig, 2006, p. 1076). Examining the distribution has the added benefit of contributing to the literature on the punctuated equilibrium theory.

Following this is an analysis of parties' breadth. Green-Pedersen used the term complexity when examining the breadth of party manifestos and the two measures of complexity he utilized are borrowed (2006, p. 222). High degree of complexity is a clear sign of vote-seeking behaviour. Studying several manifestos from each party also gives some answers to whether their breadth has evolved.

One measure of complexity is the number of subtopics the manifestos consist of. This is a clear indicator of why CAP is more suitable than CMP to study the research question and hypotheses. As the CMP coding scheme only consists of 56 separate issues, it does not enable the differentiation of the number of categories included in a manifesto to the same extent as the Norwegian Policy Agendas Codebook with 235 subtopics. How many issues each party cover speak to their priority and to which parts of the electorate they aspire to provide policy to.

The other measure of complexity is entropy. While the chosen measure of entropy originally was developed in the field of information theory, it is suitable to study the distribution of policy issues in political documents (Jennings et al., 2011, p. 1011; Green-Pedersen, 2006, p. 223). This measure of entropy is Shannon's H (1949, p. 48-53). It enables studying whether all issues are emphasized equally or if certain issues get all the attention. Shannon's H is given by:

$$H = -\left(\sum_{i=1}^n p(x_i) \ln(p(x_i))\right)$$

The distribution of each major topic is multiplied with its own natural logarithm and then summarized. The negative of this sum is the entropy score of the manifesto. Following the example of previous authors, the logarithm of zero is assumed to be zero, in order to make the formula applicable (Jennings et al., 2011, p. 1011; King and Wand, 2007, p. 57). The lowest possible entropy score is 0, which signifies that only one category is used, while the highest possible entropy score depends on the number of categories (King and Wand, 2007, p. 57). When measuring the entropy of the 21 major topics, the maximum score is approximately 3.045, creating a scale between 0 and 3.045. A high value thus signifies that a party divides their attention across most issues, implying vote-seeking, while a low score signifies that they prioritize most of their attention on a limited number of issues. Change in a party's entropy is also an indicator of a party adopting new behavioural strategies.

Based on these findings, an in-depth discussion of the impact party type and post-electoral potential have on the behaviour of parties is performed based on the assumptions of the hypotheses. Policy-seeking, office-seeking and vote-seeking will be discussed based on the theoretical assumptions crafted from the presented findings.

Quantitative measures enable a quite precise examination of parties' prioritization between policy-seeking and vote-seeking. To round of the analysis, an index consisting of the parties' L-kurtosis and the two measures of complexity will be constructed to place parties on the dimension between policy-seeking and vote-seeking. Each of the three measures were transformed to ensure comparability. The complexity measures were transformed so that the lowest observed score is valued 0 and the highest 1, while the opposite was done with L-kurtosis. The L-kurtosis scale was reversed in order to make it comparable with the complexity measures, as low L-kurtosis imply vote-seeking. The average score of these measures is then used to examine the extent parties vote-seek.

This thus provides a measure of complexity which also incorporates the willingness to frequently adapt the policy contents, thus adding another behavioural trait of vote-seeking. An important note regarding the index is that it measures parties' policy-seeking and vote-seeking relative to the remaining manifestos. The scale is thus not absolute, and idealized versions are expected to be even further toward the poles, but this approach enables a more insightful interpretation of the Norwegian party system.

The measure will be supplemented with the findings on core policies, as that provides clear indications of the extent parties prioritize policy-seeking. The lack of all parties with coalition potential in the case selection limits the possibility of measuring office-seeking quantitatively. While the measures enable a quite accurate study of parties' policy-seeking and vote-seeking, the theoretical model enables some fruitful supplements of traits indicating office-seeking. Especially the attention to certain issues provides indications. Future research should investigate this further.

These measures make it possible to examine the behaviour of parties and how election results affect this. Especially change in post-electoral potential is expected to lead to detectable trends. At the core of the analysis is to examine whether parties' behaviour starts to transition prior to election results changing their potential to impact public policies or after as presented in the hypotheses. The timing of shifts is therefore essential to the study.

6. Analysis

6.1. The policy emphases of Norwegian parties

6.1.1. The Labour party: A catch-all party shaped by ideological baggage

Figure 6.1. shows the issue distribution of the 21 major topics across AP’s election manifestos. While the figure admittedly is not particularly intuitive, some initial observations can be made. First of all, AP clearly divides its attention between the policy topics. All 21 major topics are included in each of the 10 manifestos, ranging from only 0.42% attention on immigration in 1993 to a high of 17.98% attention to foreign policy, also in 1993. See Appendix 9.2.1. for descriptive statistics of AP’s issue distribution. While the issue attention is divided, some issues are clearly emphasized while others do not get much space in the manifestos. Foreign policy makes up 9.87% of the policy of each manifesto and is the topic receiving the heaviest emphasis on average. On the other side of the spectrum is foreign trade which only takes up an average of 1.42% of the policy attention. Importantly, the coding scheme is not crafted with the assumption that all topics are equally important (Bevan, 2019, p. 27-28), so it is not surprising that some policy issues get little attention.




Figure 6.1. The issue emphasis of AP

Another observation that can be made from Figure 6.1. is that how AP emphasizes issues changes over time. Every single issue, except agriculture and fishing, have a range of variation at least equalling the minimum value, meaning that the emphasis of 20 of the issues has varied with at least 100% during the time frame. This implies a clear willingness to adapt the issue agenda.

While several issues typically obtain emphasis, prioritized issues can be detected, primarily foreign policy, health, social policy and labour. These all fit quite accurately with theoretical assumptions. It is for example likely that voters judge AP on their ability to handle international affairs as that will be a primary task if they achieve office, as discussed by Jennings et al. (2011, p. 1007).

Green-Pedersen points to healthcare being an obtrusive policy issue as a reason for the essential importance the policy topic has for large, mainstream parties (2019a, p. 155). He further argues that the rapid increase in new healthcare technology has raised both the expenditures and the demands, which in turn create importance in diverting blame (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 167-168). Figure 6.1. does indeed show that healthcare has gradually become a bigger part of AP manifestos. This is shown even more clear in the Appendix.

Social policy (Seeberg, 2017, p. 483) and labour policy (Otjes and Green-Pedersen, 2019, p. 620) are assumed to be core policy topics of social democratic parties. They are the topics that receive the second and third most attention on average respectively, in the analysed AP manifestos. The average manifesto includes slightly below 8% labour policy, which as shown in Figure 6.2., is a substantially greater emphasis than that of the other parties in the analysis. The portion of their manifestos dedicated to social policy is also typically larger than among other parties. The heavy attention to these issues, both compared to other policy issues and to the emphasis they achieve by other parties, strengthen the assumption that ideological baggage is an important explanatory variable in AP's policy agenda, as expected from hypothesis 3.




Figure 6.2. The proportion of labour policy in manifestos

While showing the emphasis compared to other parties, Figure 6.2. also illustrates how AP's emphasis on labour has evolved. The figure shows that the attention to labour was most pronounced in the three earliest elections. It is notable that the 1993 manifesto, which appears as a clear outlier where more than 13% of the manifesto consisted of labour policy, was the shortest AP manifesto studied, as shown in Figure 5.1. While this illustrates that the absolute number of sentences concerning labour policy did not change as much, it does show that they prioritized keeping a large portion of labour policy at the expense of other policy fields. Even if 1993 is disregarded, Figure 6.2. illustrates a decrease in the labour emphasis. However, it must be noted that AP has not separated itself from its labour core as it still clearly prioritizes the policy field more than its competitors included in the study.

Even more pronounced than the emphasis on labour policy, has been their prioritization of social policy. Figure 6.3. shows the high proportion of social policy sentences in AP's manifestos compared to other parties. It is notable that Høyre rivalled them in the extent they emphasised the issue during some elections. This is a surprising finding. One explanation explored by Christoph Arndt (2014), relates to Norway being a universal welfare state. He argues that the natural salience welfare issues have in such systems incentivize centre-right parties to compete on social policy (Arndt, 2014, p. 154). The assumption is that the issue will be of importance regardless, making it sensible for Høyre to provide social policy of their own in order to negate some of the advantage left-wing parties receive due to issue ownership (Arndt, 2014, p. 154). A high emphasis on social policy signals to the electorate that the welfare state is not at risk even during a right-wing government (Arndt, 2014, p. 154-155).




Figure 6.3. The proportion of social policies in manifestos

Despite this, Figure 6.3. shows that AP has a very heavy emphasis on social policy for most of the timeframe compared to the other parties. The last couple elections have however proven to be serious exceptions to this, both in terms of their relative emphasis and their emphasis compared to other parties. Social policy seems to have been seriously de-emphasized by AP.

While it is too early to provide any serious predictions concerning its cause or whether the trend will continue, it did coincide with a change of party leader (Arbeiderpartiet, 2014). Somer-Topcu did find that parties actively use leadership changes as an opportunity to shift their policy emphasis (2017, p. 70-71). The change provides a window of opportunity for a more credible shift in policy (Somer-Topcu, 2017, p. 70-71), limiting some of the organizational constraints discussed by Panebianco (1988). The motivation for such a shift is not within the frame of this thesis, but one potential reason may have been to decrease their reliance on social policy in an era of austerity. This would be in line with Abou-Chadi and Immergut finding that left-wing parties in government de-emphasized welfare state policies due to vote-seeking aspirations when the political competition were high (2019, p. 710). AP's severe decrease in attention to social policies during the two last elections is thus an interesting beginning point for future research.

AP has thus performed a somewhat gradual de-emphasising of their core issues, while still clearly not distancing themselves completely from their ideological roots. First labour policy, which reached a low in 2009, then a severe drop in the attention to social policy in 2017. Particularly health and immigration seem to have taken the place, but it has also varied substantially across elections, which do have vote-seeking implications.

6.1.2. The Conservative Party: A policy agenda shaped to govern

Høyre's distribution of policy attention, as illustrated in Figure 6.4., has many similarities with that of AP shown in Figure 6.1. Even though the actual distributions between issues differ. Both parties have a rather diverse agenda, while a notable emphasis on certain issues can be detected. The policy distribution of Høyre seems to be slightly more stable than that of AP at first glance. The range of variation is more than 100% of the minimum value for 15 of the major topics for Høyre, which still indicate that their attention to most issues varies substantially. The number of manifestos will of course likely impact the range of variations. Both parties have a quite large willingness to adopt or drop policy to gain electorally. See Appendix 9.2.2. for further descriptive statistics for Høyre.




Figure 6.4. The issue emphasis of Høyre

While Høyre also has certain issues they emphasize heavily, contrary to AP, they are not prioritizing specific topics to a notably larger extent than the other parties. They are not the main promoter of a topic, such as AP is with labour. This is however likely at least partially due to the case selection, as more right-wing parties are included in the study. Henrik Seeberg finds that macroeconomics and legal affairs typically are right-wing issues (2017, p. 483). The findings of this study imply the same. Neither are however particular to Høyre, as they also are heavily prioritized by especially FrP.

As Seeberg points out, previous research has not found conclusive results on macroeconomics (2017, p. 479). This gains support using Norwegian CAP data, as Høyre's emphasis on legal affairs is more distinct compared to non-right wing parties than the attention to macroeconomics, which varies more across blocs. Both are shown in the Appendix.

Høyre's emphasis on macroeconomics has dropped substantially since the beginning of the timeframe, while their attention to legal affairs have increased slightly, but with serious variation across elections. As the attention to macroeconomics has dropped for all relevant parties this is likely due to the increasing relevance of post-materialistic issues relative to economic concerns. Their attention to legal affairs on the other hand was particularly low in 1997 and has not been as low since. Importantly, Høyre's emphasis has consistently been higher than that of AP. The fact that FrP's emphasis also has been consistently high, illustrates that legal affairs indeed is a right-wing issue.

The issues consistently receiving the most attention by Høyre during the time span were health and education. These received more attention than the two presumed core issues quite consistently. The attention to health policy has developed quite similarly to that of AP's attention to the topic, growing substantially during the studied period. This lends support to it being a general trend for large, mainstream parties. Education is also an obtrusive issue, which may help to explain why a party with governing potential, such as Høyre prioritises it. This points to Høyre putting severe emphasis on obtrusive issues, which could be another reason for their heavy attention to social policy shown in Figure 6.3. The policy agenda of Høyre does in general seem to be shaped by them being a party with governing potential, as several of the issues gaining emphasis are either core issues of the state or obtrusive issues.

6.1.3. The Progress party: Changing their core

Figure 6.5. illustrates the proportions of issue attention in FrP's manifestos. Some clear similarities with the attention distribution of AP and Høyre can be detected. FrP pays attention to all major topics as well. Interestingly, while there were 11 occurrences where an issue achieved more than 10% of attention in AP manifestos and 9 such occurrences in Høyre manifestos, this only happened twice in FrP manifestos. Descriptive statistics for FrP are shown in Appendix 9.2.3. The topics that consistently achieved most attention were health, education, traffic, legal affairs and social policy. FrP clearly has much in common with Høyre.




Figure 6.5. The issue emphasis of FrP

Compared to the changes in the issue attention of AP shown in Figure 6.1., what seen in Figure 6.5. seems somewhat more gradual, making it resemble Høyre in this regard too. Following this, the range of variation of the emphases on the major topics were more than 100% for 11 of the major topics, which illustrates that their willingness to shift emphasis was even less than that of Høyre.

Education had the highest average frequency in the manifestos, which may initially seem puzzling. One important reason for this, is the CAP coding scheme. Many of the sentences coded as education would have been classified as privatization in other coding schemes. These findings should thus not be interpreted as arguing that FrP is an education party. However, while the results shown in Figure 6.5. is driven by underlying ideological baggage, the policy issues actually discussed are often education or healthcare. The emphasis on these issues has important implications on which fields of society the party seeks to influence.

Health, education and social policy are furthermore among the clearest examples of obtrusive issues that impact all parts of the electorate, creating voter demands for answers on these issues. As Green-Pedersen pointed out, rising demands are one of the primary reasons for the growth of healthcare on the issue agenda (2019a, p. 155). This may help to explain why a party such as FrP, which traditionally have had blackmailing potential, has emphasized such obtrusive issues. While such issues often turn into an exercise of blame avoidance for

governing parties, they may serve as perfect opportunities for those wishing to point blame as well. The notion of blackmailing potential is an interesting tool to incorporate in future research on party attention to obtrusive issues.

While legal affairs, which was one of their most emphasized policy topics, is one of the issues commonly associated with radical right parties, another is immigration (Mudde, 2007, p. 21), which only consists of 3.5% of FrP’s manifestos on average. Firstly, compared to other issue topics, immigration is not a category that has received extensive attention in general. So, while 3.5% seems like a low number, the second highest average attention immigration received is 3%, illustrating that FrP has a large emphasis on immigration compared to its competition. Secondly, as shown in Figure 6.6., their emphasis on both immigration and legal affairs have gradually risen, particularly in 2021.




Figure 6.6. FrP’s attention to immigration and legal affairs

While a quite clear upwards trend is evident for the attention to legal affairs, this is particularly obvious with regards to the emphasis on immigration. As shown in Appendix 9.3.7. The average attention to immigration in 1985 among the three included parties was slightly less than 1%, illustrating that immigration did not gain much attention in general. Secondly, FrP' originated with the sole explicit purpose of lowering taxes (Jupskås, 2016, p. 169), which also helps to explain the increased focus on both immigration and legal affairs. The party transitions towards the radical right ideal.

Figure 6.7. illustrates the party’s attention to tax policy which is a subtopic included in the macroeconomics major topic. The party dedicated almost 2% of its attention to tax policy in 2021, which is a large proportion. It is however very clear from Figure 6.7. that the party has gradually de-emphasized its initial core policy. While it may seem intuitive to draw the

conclusion that this has been a move away from the policy-seeking ideal, this is too early to conclude. It may rather signify a shift of core policy aims. While studying the mainstreaming of radical right parties, one of the reasons Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin included FrP, was to detect whether they had developed differently than the other parties of their study (2016a, p. 6). Figure 6.6. and Figure 6.7. seen together do indeed make it quite clear that the party has shifted its identity towards the radical right in its issue emphasis.




Figure 6.7. FrP's attention to tax policy

6.1.4. The Green party: Unsurprisingly green

While the three previously reviewed area plots may be somewhat hard to differentiate at first glance, the issue attention of MDG illustrated by Figure 6.8. has clearly distinct characteristics. This is primarily the heavy emphasis on environmental policy, which is not a surprising finding. The attention to the environment in their manifestos was never lower than 17.59%, which happened in 2013, while the average proportion is 20.63%. Their descriptive statistics is shown in Appendix 9.2.4.




Figure 6.8. The issue emphasis of MDG

Figure 6.8. illustrates a quite stable issue emphasis. Despite this initial observation, the range of variation on 17 of the major topics is more than 100% of the lowest value, which do imply severe shifts of emphasis. The number of major topics with large range of variation does also drop to 10 if the especially short 1993 and 2009 manifestos are omitted. Those manifestos are also the only ones in the analysis that do not cover all 21 major topics. It is noteworthy that similarly to how AP had a relatively heavy emphasis on labour policy when publishing a short manifesto, the environment was especially emphasized in the two shortest MDG manifestos. This can be interpreted as a clear sign of the parties' priorities. In instances where only a small sample of policy is presented, the parties' core positions are prioritized, rather than breadth. This may be an interesting insight for future research on issue ownership and issue emphasis.

Importantly, the emphasis on the environment has been stable, with the exception of the two short manifestos, showing that the party has barely shed any of its core. The parties' attention to the environment is illustrated in Figure 6.9., illustrating how dominant MDG's emphasis on the topic is. A slight decline in 2021 can be detected compared to 2017, which may be due to them de-emphasizing to broaden their agenda because of improved electoral prospects. As the proportion in 2021 was more in line with the party's typical attention to the issue, it is too

early to make such a conclusion. MDG appears at first glance to fit the assumptions of hypothesis 1B, resembling the theoretical behaviour of niche parties.




Figure 6.9. The proportion of environmental policy in manifestos

6.1.5. The Liberal party: Unsurprisingly less green

Figure 6.10. illustrating the issue emphasis of Venstre has much in common with AP's, Høyre's and FrP's distributions, as no single issue topic dominates as heavily as MDG's focus on the environment. Several policy topics get substantial attention. Just as the remaining parties, certain core issues can however, be detected. While the issue distributions of the beginning and the end of the studied timeframe look quite similar in Figure 6.10., some clear developments in the distributions can be detected throughout. 14 of the major topics have a range of variation higher than 100% of its minimum score, which is illustrated by the descriptive statistics shown in Appendix 9.2.5. While their attention has shifted similarly as Høyre, they appear to have performed less frequent, but more severe shifts.




Figure 6.10. The issue emphasis of Venstre

While the overall distribution of Venstre shares more similarities with those of the established parties, their primary core issue, the environment, is shared with MDG. Venstre's manifestos include on average 10.98% sentences regarding environmental policy, which while is a substantial emphasis, is far lower than the 20.63% average in MDG's manifestos. This can clearly be seen in Figure 6.9. While both MDG and Venstre emphasize the environment, this is far more pronounced in MDG's manifestos.

The difference between Figure 6.8. and Figure 6.10. thus, clearly illustrates that while the environment is a core issue for Venstre, this emphasis is balanced with other policy issues far more than what is the case for MDG. Similarly, while the difference between MDG's attention to the environment and its second most focused issue, agriculture and fishing, is 12.55 percentage points, the difference between Venstre's attention to the environment and education, is only 1.6 percentage points. This illustrates that the environment has a far more distinct role for MDG, while Venstre to a larger extent divides their attention, which is exactly in line with the expectations of hypotheses 1A and 1B.

The second most emphasized policy of Venstre is education, which seen together with the previous findings reveal that education in general is a heavily emphasized policy field by Norwegian political parties. Venstre's heavy attention to an obtrusive issue may also indicate some office-seeking motivations, which would be appropriate noting their coalition potential.

Interestingly, while the three right-wing parties have had a quite stable, high emphasis on education AP, gradually increased its attention. As shown in Appendix 9.3.6. This may mirror some of the reflections concerning the increased attention to health, meaning that AP has shifted more attention to obtrusive issues over time. This may imply growth in their office-seeking prioritization. Venstre on the other hand has had a rather stable emphasis on education.

6.1.6. The Coastal party: Keeping their niche

While none of the major topics are as clearly emphasized as MDG’s focus on the environment, KP’s issue distribution shown in Figure 6.11., is still clearly distinct compared to the four most established parties. This is especially due to the issue distribution being particularly stable. Only 6 of the major topics had an emphasis that varied with more than 100%, illustrating that the party more or less kept their attention fixed. KP’s descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix 9.2.6.




Figure 6.11. The issue emphasis of KP

Two of the major topics do seem like core issues, agriculture and fishing and traffic which obtain an average of 14.13% and 10.74% of the attention respectively. However, the major topics of the coding scheme do not perfectly describe the focus of the party. In order to measure KP’s core issue, several subtopics were combined into a new coastal category. This

illustrates some of the flexibility of the CAP coding scheme. These subtopics were: fisheries policy, aquaculture industry, marine environment, maritime issues, shipbuilding industry, and water and sea resources including harbours. Figure 6.12. illustrates KP's attention to the issues revolving around the coast and ocean or related activities, compared to the other parties.




Figure 6.12. The proportion of coastal policies in manifestos

Figure 6.12. makes it obvious that KP has a clear emphasis on issues relation to the coast relative to all other parties in the analysis. KP's average attention to coastal issues was 17.76%, illustrating a clear emphasis and prioritization of policy relating to it. Especially compared to the other parties. KP's emphasis on the coast and MDG's emphasis on the environment are the two examples where one party clearly pays far more attention to an issue area than any of the other parties. The proportion of these issues are approximately 10 percentage points higher than the party that emphasizes them second most. MDG has consistently had far more environmental agenda than other parties, while KP has consistently had a far more coastal agenda than other parties. Seen together with the party's stable issue emphasis, hypothesis 1B seems to describe the party particularly well.

6.2. Punctuated equilibrium

Initial examinations of the development of issue distribution in party manifestos have granted some support to the findings of Schumacher and co-authors, as the two parties with governing potential seem particularly willing to adapt the contents of their manifestos (2015, p. 1050). Examining the assumptions of the punctuated equilibrium theory may grant further support to this.

As also found by Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009, p. 197), the parties seem to behave in line with the punctuated equilibrium assumption. This is, as discussed above, in accordance with some of the party theory as well, mainly Panebianco's writings (1988, p. 240-244). However, while Walgrave and Nuytemans argued that the political parties from their study had a strongly punctuated distribution compared to other institutions (2009, p. 201), the findings here are more in line with the noted expectations concerning institutions at the input stage of the policymaking process. While all the included parties indeed have L-kurtosis scores above 0.123, implying leptokurtic distributions, every party except MDG has lower scores than what Breunig found in his study of national budgets, which are at the output stage (2006, p. 1078). The parties' L-kurtosis is shown in Appendix 9.4.

However, while the actual scores found are consistently lower than those in Walgrave and Nuytemans' study, quite similar trends can be found (2009, p. 198). For one, MDG has the most punctuated distribution having an L-kurtosis score of 0.486, which fits perfectly with ecological parties having the highest scores in their study (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009, p. 198). MDG having a particularly stable agenda, only rarely punctuated by severe changes is in perfect accordance with hypothesis 1B. KP having the second highest L-kurtosis score of 0.367, and the only other reaching the levels found by Breunig (2006, p. 1078), further lends support to hypothesis 1B, while being in accordance with Walgrave and Nuytemans' findings (2009, p. 198).

The others change the issue content of their manifestos more gradually than the two mainly irrelevant niche parties. They are, however, still clearly not normal distributed. All parties seem to resist change, which is in accordance with them being institutions shaped by their ideological baggage (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 608; Panebianco, 1988, p. 241). The more established parties having more, but more gradual change, are clearly in line with hypothesis 1A, as they are more likely to adapt to the changing notions of the electorate. It is, notable that FrP seems more in line with the catch-all parties than the two other niche parties. The two parties with governing potential, AP and H, have the lowest L-kurtosis scores, again strengthening Schumacher et al.'s findings (2015). The difference between especially AP and FrP and Venstre is however quite minimal.

While the findings using the more appropriate CAP coding scheme lend some support to Walgrave and Nuytemans' findings (2009), some differences in design should be kept in mind. It is possible that the less leptokurtic distributions illustrate party adaptations more

appropriately, but the limited number of cases make this uncertain. It does however lend to their overall findings that the trends between party types are similar.

6.3. Complexity

The average number of subtopics used in the party manifestos was approximately 152. As shown in Figure 6.13., this does vary, both over time and across parties. The average for AP, FrP and Venstre is all between 159 and 161, showing that they commonly prioritize a similar degree of breadth. 1993 is as mentioned an outlier for AP, but other than that, their and Venstre’s manifesto breadth seem to have developed similarly. The short Liberal manifesto of 2021 appears to be a similar outlier. The manifestos of FrP on the other hand grew gradually broader, at least until 2005 when they stabilized with slightly more subtopics than the two mentioned catch-all parties. See the Appendix for a more detailed view of the parties’ complexity.




Figure 6.13. The number of subtopics used in manifestos

The Conservative party was expected to emphasize a similar number of issues as the other catch-all parties, especially due to their governing potential. Contrary to this, their earliest election manifestos were a lot narrower than those of both the two other catch-all parties and FrP at the time. They average only 149 subtopics during the complete timeframe. The number of subtopics has however increased steadily since 2001 and has been quite similar to the other parliamentary parties during the last elections. Importantly, this increase has not been purely due to the length of their manifestos increasing, as the increase in the number of subtopics has been quite linear, while the manifesto length has not. As seen in Figure 5.1. This illustrates that while manifesto length is an important factor explaining agenda breadth, it is not the only one.

The manifestos of MDG have typically included less issues than the three first parties, with an average of 133 subtopics. The two short manifestos are the clear outliers, only including 64 and 89 of the subtopics. This seen with the high proportion of environmental policy in these manifestos support the claim that parties downgrade breadth when publishing short manifestos, not their core policy positions. Even when ignoring the two short manifestos, the average number of included subtopics are 152, so less than the three former parties and quite similar to Høyre. It is however unlikely a coincidence that MDG has published the two particularly short, non-complex manifestos, not Høyre. As Figure 6.13. illustrates, with the exception of 2009, the number of subtopics in MDG manifestos has increased gradually and the most recent manifestos include approximately the same number of policy issues as the other parliamentary parties.

KP on the other hand systematically create the manifestos with the least amount of policy issues. KP averages almost 139 issues in each manifesto and, while the number has risen slightly, the breadth of the party’s issue profile does not seem to move towards the remaining parties.

The other measure of manifesto complexity is entropy, which is shown in Figure 6.14. The overall entropy scores are rather high, showing that while there is some variety in the issue breadth, the parties do balance the 21 major topics rather than prioritizing only a few. The two clear outliers are once again MDG’s manifestos from 1993 and 2009. These too have entropy scores well above 2, meaning that they have quite balanced emphases, despite the focus on core policies. AP’s manifesto from 1993 does also have a notably lower entropy score than their remaining manifestos, enforcing the findings above.




Figure 6.14. The entropy scores of manifestos

While the 1993 and 2009 manifestos are the most obvious examples, the remaining MDG manifestos also have comparably less balanced manifestos than the remaining parties. It has risen slightly over time, but the entropy has kept quite stable. The order between MDG's and KP's complexity as measured by entropy is the inverse compared to when the number of subtopics is used as measurement. KP's manifestos are however still narrower than those of the remaining four when measured with entropy. The relative high entropy scores of KP are likely partially due to its niche not being fully reflected by the major topics. As shown in Figure 6.11, a lot of their attention is focused on the six issues related to the coast. These are included in four different major topics meaning that the entropy scores in Figure 6.14 partially measure them as diversity.

The four remaining parties have quite stable entropy scores around or slightly below 2.9. Interestingly, it is FrP that have had a high and stable entropy score the longest, with both AP and Venstre presenting some less complex manifestos. This is contrary to the other measure of complexity, as the earliest FrP manifestos included less subtopics. It is also contrary to the theoretical expectations as one would not expect their manifestos to reach the complexity of the three catch-all parties until the early 2000s when they adopted an explicit goal of entering government (Jupskås, 2016, p. 182-183). This assumption, based on hypothesis 2A, is more in line with the findings of Figure 6.13.

The high, stable entropy scores of Høyre show a different picture of complexity than when measured by the number of subtopics. The high entropy scores are more in line with the expectations concerning agenda breadth, based on Høyre's characteristics and post-electoral potential. This shows that even though the party did not provide policy on as many aspects of society as their competitors, they prioritized a balanced profile, which is in line with the vote-seeking assumption.

Based on the number of subtopics and entropy, MDG and KP seem distinct compared to the others. They have the least complex agendas out of the included parties. Supplemented by their issue distribution shown in Figure 6.8. and Figure 6.11., it becomes clear that these parties have had the expected niche party profile during the studied period. Their stable policy distribution also fit the expectations of these parties highly prioritizing policy-seeking.

While the high entropy scores do make the examination of FrP a bit murkier, the number of subtopics in the early years of the analysis are closer to that of MDG and KP, implying that FrP too had some clear policy-seeking traits. While not having any as clear core policies

among the major topics, their heavy attention to tax policy during this period also fits hypothesis 1A. Tax policy falls into the macroeconomics major topic, illustrating that it is an issue in the traditional party competition, reflecting the party's somewhat ill fit as a niche party. However, they do seem to lay closer to the policy-seeking corner than AP and Venstre during the first studied elections.

Being a large, mainstream party with governing potential one would assume that Høyre presented clear catch-all tendencies, balancing primarily vote-seeking and office-seeking. Analysing their manifestos reveals a far less clear picture. Especially their L-kurtosis speaks to a clear willingness to adapt, that is not expected by policy-seeking parties. The issue distribution also has clear similarities with the other catch-all parties, as some core issues can be detected, without them relying nearly as heavy on their core policy as the two distinctly niche parties. These core issues further reveal some aspirations of impacting public policy. Secondly, the entropy scores also lend clear support to the expectations of Høyre displaying a high degree of vote-seeking.

Some of the other measures would however lead one to conclude that Høyre displays traits more similar to the niche parties. Particularly the limited number of subtopics included in the three earliest elections are more in line with the complexity of a niche party. Comparing Figure 6.4. with Figure 6.8. and Figure 6.11., reveals that their agenda is far less stable than that of the niche parties as well. Høyre in general seems to be closer to the catch-all parties than the niche parties, with Venstre probably being the party they share most similarities with.

The consistently high complexity and relatively low degree of issue distribution stability do imply that AP and Venstre have more catch-all tendencies than the other parties during the start of the period. This is in clear accordance with hypothesis 1A. This is also supported by them not having an as consistent heavy emphasis on any issue the same way as MDG and KP.

6.4. The strategic aims of Norwegian parties

6.4.1. The Labour party: Returning home if necessary

In addition to having a broad agenda, the high range of variation in the emphases given to the issues, make it clear that AP has moved away from the policy-seeking tradition of its mass party past. A relatively low L-kurtosis score of 0.257, implies a distinctly more gradual trend of change than the two mostly irrelevant parties, which also supports this. The findings of Figure 6.2. and Figure 6.3., that their attention to core issues has gradually sunk, may however

imply that this is an ongoing transition. While this is particularly clear with regards to labour policy, the most recent elections may have initiated a further move away from its ideological roots, as social policy has been heavily de-emphasized.

However, the findings clearly illustrate that they have not performed a uni-directional transition. The emphasis to both of their core policy issues increased substantially in 2005, compared to both preceding and subsequent elections. Particularly the attention to social policy got a substantial spike. This is likely to be directly related to the catastrophic election result of 2001 shown in Figure 4.1. Both policy topics, especially labour, received less attention in 2001 than they had in recent elections. Following the work of Panebianco (1988) and the expectations created in the revised model of Figure 3.2, it is likely that the party interpreted the defeat as a signal that they had reached a ceiling to their catch-allness. Whin in turn resulted in a shift back towards the policy-seeking corner in an attempt to recapture lost voters.

Any clear policy shifts in order to support their two potential coalition partners after establishing coalition governments as a possible strategy cannot be detected in the data. A clear emphasis on especially foreign policy, but also health and some of the other issues expected to fit office-seeking motivations, show a likely inclination from AP to seek office. Future research should incorporate the assumptions of the issue incentives model, to fully understand the extent of AP's office-seeking.

Figure 6.15. partially illustrates AP's placement based on the revised model, with 0 representing the policy-seeking pole and 1 representing the vote-seeking pole. The Figure clearly grants support to previous discussions as AP is placed close to the vote-seeking end during most elections. Seen together with the issue distribution above, it is clear that AP has moved away from their past as a mass party, without completely dropping their ideological baggage.




Figure 6.15. AP's strategic behaviour based on the revised model

It does, however become increasingly clear that the short 1993 manifesto is an outlier compared to the others with especially the policy breadth contributing to the party resembling a mass party that year. This is further reinforced by the heavy focus on core issues. Several explanations likely contributed to the policy-seeking turn. As seen in Figure 4.1. however, the previous 1989 election was a clear disappointment compared to previous elections. A turn towards policy-seeking in 1993 is thus perfectly in line with hypothesis 2B and seems like an attempt to reconcile with lost voters.

While far less notable than in 1993, Figure 6.15. shows that AP shifted towards policy-seeking after their disastrous election in 2001 too. This is particularly clear by examining Figures 6.2. and 6.3., as the party in 2005 once again had a clearly more distinct focus on their core policies than other elections, apart from 1993, as already mentioned. This is also supported by Figure 6.15., as they showcased the second lowest vote-seeking traits in 2005. While not losing their governing potential due to either of these setbacks, it is a clear indication of the appropriateness of the hypotheses that they responded by increasing their policy-seeking tendencies after their most severe election losses. While it must be mentioned that their vote-seeking increased after another serious loss of voters in 2013, implying that further research is needed, these initial findings are promising. Furthermore, Figure 6.15. indicates that the severity of the vote loss is essential to whether the party turned towards policy-seeking.

A relatively heavy emphasis on especially labour policy points to a quite high policy-seeking tendency, during the early elections. Figure 6.15. does however, illustrate that the prioritizations of AP have been quite stable with the exceptions of the policy-seeking emphasis directly after serious election disappointments. A gradual turn to vote-seeking cannot be detected during the time period. Despite this, the slightly higher vote-seeking scores in Figure 6.15. seen together with the serious de-emphasis of social policy imply that the party lies somewhat closer to the vote-seeking ideal during the last couple of elections than previously.

6.4.2. The Conservative party: Reinforcing their governing potential

Høyre has typically been the main competitor of AP for the prime minister position, and they were thus expected to present clear catch-all traits. However, the initial analysis revealed that AP has consistently had a more complex agenda. Especially the earliest Høyre manifestos had traits resembling that of the niche parties.

However, while Høyre seems to be less catch-all than AP as a whole, they have some traits that reveal clear vote-seeking and office-seeking tendencies. Especially an L-kurtosis score of 0.210, which is low even compared to the other catch-all parties, is a sign of their willingness to adapt frequently. In addition to the consistently high entropy scores and far less stable distribution than the niche parties, the issues they prioritize hints to office aspirations. Both the attention to government policy and legal affairs may be in order to have clear policy positions on these core functions of the state, while the heavy attention to particularly health and education, but also social policy imply a need to present extensive answers to obtrusive problems.

While AP's attention to the typical left-wing issues labour and social policy has dropped during the studied time period, Høyre has increased their attention to the right-wing issue legal affairs. While their attention to legal affairs is likely at least partially due to ideological baggage and issue ownership, Appendix 9.3.9. shows that a system wide increase of attention to the issue has occurred. This is in line with Green-Pedersen's observations of other Western European party systems (2019a, p. 62-63). Their increased attention is likely more a result of a systemic trend than a policy-seeking turn. This would if so, be in accordance with Green-Pedersen (2019a, p. 62) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022, p. 108). The claim that a systemic trend impacts Høyre's issue emphasis more than ideological baggage is supported by

the observation that their attention to the other discussed right-wing issue, macroeconomics, has decreased drastically, just as it has for other parties.

All this, seen together point to their issue distribution being more shaped by aspirations to govern than ideological baggage, which speak to some clear office-seeking traits. While further research is needed, these initial findings do imply that the catch-all party with governing potential has relatively high emphases on office-seeking.

Notably, as their governing potential have been based on their position as a link between the centre parties and FrP, it is likely that they have balanced electoral growth with coalition concerns. Testing this is as stated difficult. It is however notable that Høyre's emphasis on immigration has not followed an as steep increase as their contemporaries. Immigration being a clear policy field of contention between the two centre parties and FrP makes attention to the issue a serious threat to the potential of coalition formation on the right. Green-Pedersen discussed precisely this challenge, noting that:

“(…) coalition considerations may make it attractive to the large, mainstream right parties to focus on immigration in order to gain government power based on support from the radical right. However, whether or not this is an attractive strategy for the large, mainstream parties depends on the structure of coalition politics, especially the extent to which a right-wing governing majority can be formed without centre parties can be formed” (2019a, p. 86).

Future research should investigate Høyre's relatively low attention to immigration in order to test if this truly is motivated by office-seeking. Their emphasis on other policy topics does not reveal a clear trend that backs up the office-seeking coalition concerns, but again, this may be due to limited data.

As some of the measures indicated a policy-seeking tendency during the earliest years, the index enabling viewing the measures as a whole, may serve as an important tool to clarify the findings and investigate the extent of the party's policy-seeking. Figure 6.16. does indeed show that Høyre had a tendency to prioritize policy-seeking to larger extent than AP during the first studied elections. Interestingly, Høyre has had a more uni-directional development, clearly transitioning towards vote-seeking.




Figure 6.16. Høyre's strategic behaviour based on the revised model

While it was argued above that Høyre has had governing potential during the whole studied time period, the results may imply that this was a too simplistic assumption. While their size and governing experience led them to have governing potential, this potential was most certainly decreased at the start of the timeframe compared to their prime during the early 1980s. The party was not the largest party on the right-wing in either 1993 or 1997, being on a serious downwards trend since 1985, as seen in Figure 4.1. The limited number of subtopics may have served to counteract a dilution of their profile in order to avoid further electoral loss.

An additional, and likely related factor, is the emergence of a party to their right, FrP. Their rise may have necessitated a reinforcement of Høyre's profile, which may further have created a need to postpone further developments towards catch-allness. While the election results of FrP were unstable during these years, they were the largest party on the right in 1997 and did present a new challenge to the identity of Høyre. It is plausible that Høyre shifted their emphasis in order to solidify their position in the party system after being challenged from the right.

As noted by Green-Pedersen, de-emphasizing core issues of the competition is a strategy used to hinder them (2019a, p. 18), and it is possible that this explains Høyre's low attention to legal affairs in 1997. They may potentially have de-emphasized the issue with the hope of hindering FrP facilitating their position in the party system. This would also add to why their attention to legal affairs rose thereafter, as FrP became a potential coalition partner.

The inclusion of previous election manifestos may shed a light on whether these assumptions are correct. If further research is performed, investigating whether Høyre had a more pronounced vote-seeking profile in the 80 when they were the clear governing alternative of the right, is highly recommended. The fact that their catch-allness increased from 2001 may imply that the relative governing potential impacts their issue profile and breadth. While Høyre's proportion of the votes did not increase steadily, their governing potential did. This fits well with the model of Figure 3.2 and hypothesis 2A.

The composition of the parliament during the 2000s have led Høyre to consistently be the only party with serious governing potential on the right, from 2005 and on. While FrP were the largest party on the right after several elections, their lack of support from other parties limited their governing potential, while the Christian party lost their governing potential due to the Agrarian party switching blocks and decreasing electoral success. Primarily by increasing the breadth of their policy agenda, Høyre shifted towards vote-seeking as their position as a governing alternative facilitated. As there has been an upwards trend in their vote-seeking from the beginning of the studied timeframe, it is difficult to accurately predict whether it indeed was the increased prospect of obtaining office that initiated this transition. The data is unable to state the causal direction with certainty. Increased vote-seeking despite disappointing election results in 2005 and 2009 lends some support to the hypothesis, but this cannot be concluded with certainty without a larger case selection.

While noting the relatively high policy-seeking scores during early elections, Figure 6.16. clearly shows that the party did not disregard breadth to the extent expected by niche parties. They still clearly had a vote-seeking strategy. Despite their initial emphasis on policy-seeking, it is further notable that they never reached the policy-seeking tendencies of AP in 1993. This adds to the significance of AP's drastic turn and may be an indication of Ap's heavy ideological baggage due to their mass party background.

6.4.3. The Progress Party: Radicalizing towards the mainstream

FrP does also have clear vote-seeking tendencies when studying the time period as a whole. The L-kurtosis score does for example clearly place them with the catch-all parties, rather than the niche parties as expected from hypothesis 1B. While the typical expectations of niche parties seem to fail explaining FrP's behaviour, Figure 3.2. contributes important insight, most precisely formulated in hypothesis 2A. Their transition towards a party with coalition potential have led them to adopt clear catch-all tendencies, such as a willingness to adapt

frequently to gain electorally and increasing the attention to policy topics theoretically associated with office-seeking.

While they too have shed some of the heavy emphasis on their initial core issue, tax policy, this seems to be more due to a transition towards becoming a radical right party, rather than strictly away from policy-seeking. However, the clear increase of included subtopics in their manifestos also adds to the notion of the party gradually adopting a more catch-all profile. It is a particularly good fit with the model of Figure 3.2., that they have stabilized their profile as broad and with a large extent of catch-allness since the early 2000s.

Figure 6.17. illustrates that FrP started as a more pronounced policy-seeking party than the two previously reviewed parties. This did however quickly change, as they transitioned towards the vote-seeking pole. Gradually, but especially from 1993, they started broadening their agenda, presenting policy answers on most issues, transitioning towards catch-allness. This peaked in the early 2000s when they adopted an explicit office-seeking strategy (Jupskås, 2016, p. 182-183). Their attention to obtrusive issues has remained mostly stable since the early 2000s, while the attention to core functions of the state has somewhat decreased. Seen together with Figure 6.17., their transition to catch-allness and office-seeking seem to have culminated around 2005, as their position remained quite stable between 2001 and 2017.




Figure 6.17. FrP's strategic behaviour based on the revised model

Significantly, while rising slightly, both the attention to legal affairs and immigration, were rather stable between 2001 and 2017. The high attention to legal affairs in 2005 is an exception. Studying the development of the issue distribution carefully, therefore points to the party having a somewhat stable catch-all profile between 2001 and 2017. At least relatively speaking.

The change of party leader to Sylvi Listhaug, who typically is considered to be from a more radical faction of the party than her predecessor (Bangstad, 2018, p. 39), may have resulted in the party transitioning towards a more typical post-modern extreme right party. One election is a small sample size, so more in-depth studies of the profile of Listhaug's FrP are necessary supplements, but the steep increase of the emphasis on these issues is eye-catching.

Particularly interesting in this regard is an article by Katrine Fangen and Mari Vaage (2018). They found that FrP politicians with ministerial positions during the coalition government with Høyre from 2013 moderated their anti-immigration rhetoric in order to secure the coalition (Fangen and Vaage, 2018, p. 471). This is clearly in line with the findings here pointing to them increasing their office-seeking during this period. The exception found by Fangen and Vaage was during the period Listhaug was Minister of Immigration and Integration (2018, p. 471), which in hindsight may be viewed as foreshadowing the party's development after she got appointed party leader. They also point to her appointment as Minister of Immigration and Integration and an increasingly immigration critical rhetoric, being due to the disappointing electoral results of the local elections in 2015 (Fangen and Vaage, 2018, p. 475). Such a policy-seeking turn due to electoral loss is in perfect accordance with the revised model. Their findings clearly add to the expectation that the increased emphasis on legal affairs and immigration represent an actual policy-seeking transition due to the change of party leader. Listhaug seems to have impacted the profile of the party, both as minister and as party leader.

This duality of the development of FrP, both becoming increasingly catch-all, but also radical right may lend support to an explanation mentioned by Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin, that "'niceness' is possibly not a distinctive feature of being not mainstream" (2016b, p. 48). Studying the possibility of becoming more niche as well as more catch-all or mainstream is therefore something that could bring important insight, not only to FrP, but to radical right parties in general.

6.4.4. The Green party: A green potential to blackmail

MDG had a far more pronounced policy-seeking profile during most of the studied period than the three reviewed parties, which is shown clearly in Figure 6.18. The punctuated distribution of change is one clear implication of policy-seeking, as they rarely seem to be willing to adapt, rather keeping a stable focus on their policy. This fits both with them being a niche party as well as being an irrelevant party. Figure 6.18. does however show a clear transition towards vote-seeking.




Figure 6.18. MDG’s strategic behaviour based on the revised model

While the reason for the lack of policy breadth in MDG’s 1993 manifesto is its short length, this is also likely a real indicator of the party’s prioritizations and organizational strength. This manifesto, followed closely by the 2009 manifesto, is by far the most policy-seeking included in the analysis and MDG presented themselves as far more vote-seeking already in 1997. With the clear exception being 2009, this increased gradually. While particularly clear when viewing the number of subtopics in Figure 6.13., but also when examining the strategic behaviour as a whole in Figure 6.18., 2013 may be seen as a turning point. This is of course particularly evident compared to 2009, but to some extent compared to the previous manifestos as well.

2013 was the first election MDG won a seat in parliament, following breakout results at the 2011 local elections (Jupskås and Garvik, 2022). The findings thus seem in line with the expectations, that MDG has adopted a broader, more vote-seeking profile after their electoral

potential evolved. The shift in emphasis was however not as severe as one would have expected, if the 2009 manifesto is ignored. The motivation behind releasing such a short policy-seeking manifesto is therefore important to test this assumption. One potential explanation is indeed that the 2009 manifesto represents a genuine policy-seeking turn, due to the lack of election success until then. This can also be seen in the manifestos of KP, which grew after they won a parliamentary seat, but then reverted in length after several disappointing results. See Figure 4.1. Viewed with this lens, MDG made a drastic turn towards vote-seeking in 2013. This must however be reinforced with additional research, preferably an in-depth study of the party ahead of their first breakout elections.

As the index includes a static measure, L-kurtosis, it is not perfectly appropriate to compare MDG's position to other parties in individual years. L-kurtosis was included despite this, due to the proposed impact the institutionalized patterns of change are expected to reflect strategy and goals. How parties change their issue emphasis over time is an indicator of strategic prioritizations.³ However, examining the two complexity measures do reveal that MDG's manifestos still are slightly less complex than the four established parties, even at the end of the period.

The dominance environmental policy still has in their agenda shown in Figure 6.9, makes it clear that they still have not reached the catch-all level of the other parliamentary parties in the analysis. They have a distinct policy emphasis. This fits the theoretical assumptions of Figure 3.2, as they still only have blackmailing potential. It is also in accordance with Bergman and Flatt's findings, that the role issue ownership has on the success of green parties, limits their willingness to broaden their attention at the cost of environmental policies (2020, p. 723). Their potential influence is tightly connected to their credibility and blackmailing potential on environmental policy. It can be argued that they have approached the programmatic party specie (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 187).

6.4.5. The Liberal party: Threshold-seeking

When examining the manifesto breadth and stability of Venstre, they seem most similar to Høyre. With some slight exceptions, the complexity of their manifestos remained high during the whole period, illustrating a high degree of vote-seeking. They did have a heavy emphasis on the environment, even before MDG broke through, providing somewhat of a niche for the

³ One possibility for future research could be to examine parties' L-kurtosis in for example 3 or 5 year intervals, in order to better track potential development of these adaptations.

party, but their attention to the issue seems more alike the attention the other catch-all parties provide to their core issues.

One difference between AP and Venstre is the degree the attention to issues varies. While the issue stability of Venstre is lower than MDG's and KP's, it is more stable than that of AP and Høyre when looking at the range of variation. Venstre and FrP having the highest L-kurtoses out of the four most established parties also supports this observation, as their agendas seem to change slightly less gradual than the two parties with governing potential. It does seem that Venstre has not adopted as clear office-seeking behaviour as AP or Høyre.

This is also reinforced by a rather low attention to core functions of the state and obtrusive issues, with the exception of education. The development and issue distribution of Venstre also provides strong support for certain aspects of the revised model. This can be viewed in Figure 6.19., as they are clearly more in line with the catch-all parties while mostly remaining more stable than the two parties with governing potential. The 2017 manifesto, which is by far the longest in the case selection, has a distinct vote-seeking emphasis. This is in line with findings above, that parties prioritize core policies in short manifestos and policy breadth when publishing longer manifestos. With the exception of 2017, the party has had a quite stable, but high emphasis on vote-seeking since 1989, growing steadily the first years.




Figure 6.19. Venstre's strategic behaviour based on the revised model

The extent of the party's vote-seeking has stabilized slightly below that of the two parties with governing potential, which is in line with the proposed model. It is however unexpected that

they were similar to FrP in this regard, even during the earliest elections when Frp was clearly outside of the mainstream, as a party with blackmailing potential. This might imply that Venstre’s struggle reaching the election threshold limited their potential to vote-seek, necessitating an emphasis on core voters. FrP’s low number of subtopics in these early elections should however not be completely forgotten and it seems appropriate to deem Venstre slightly more vote-seeking in these years. FrP developing in some aspects of policy breadth, while Venstre remained mostly stable, are in line with hypothesis 2A, that post-electoral potential has an impact. These uncertainties with placing FrP are as noted not new to this thesis (Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin, 2016, p. 6).

6.4.6. The Coastal party: At the periphery of relevance

KP is probably the easiest to place based on the revised model. Their manifestos are notably less balanced than those by established parties and they have a clear emphasis on policy relating to the coast. This becomes particularly clear by the continuous stability of the distribution of attention, which also is shown by the high L-kurtosis score. They prioritize approximately the same amount of attention to issues during the entire period. All this is in line with the niche party ideal. As expected, based on the revised model, their issue profile has not changed much as they have failed to obtain blackmailing potential. They have a clear policy-seeking profile.




Figure 6.20. KP’s strategic behaviour based on the revised model

This is reinforced by Figure 6.20., as they have a less vote-seeking profile than any of the catch-all parties, as well as FrP. Their vote-seeking score did increase after the first elections

before stabilizing at a still quite low level after 2009. This may likely have been an attempt to facilitate their position in the party system after winning a seat in parliament in 2001. Future research on the strategies of minor parties that break into parliament, would help explain the motivation of such parties. While still not obtaining serious blackmailing potential, it could be argued that even just being in parliament is a valuable opportunity to impact policy, incentivising parties to seek votes after entering. As their time in parliament became distant, their development towards vote-seeking receded.

Whether KP is a niche party depends on if their core policy is considered niche enough. Without a more extensive analysis of the party's nicheness, it is difficult to decide whether the party fits traditional conceptualizations of the niche party term. The findings of this analysis do, however, clearly imply that they behave as expected of a niche party. They may serve as another example nicheness not being distinct from not being mainstream (Akkerman, de Lange and Roodujin, 2016b, p. 48). This gains support as the most evident distinction detected is between relevant and irrelevant parties, rather than catch-all and niche parties.

7. Conclusion

This thesis has served as an initial exploration of the issue emphasis of Norwegian political parties. Many of the findings serve as confirmation of the coding scheme. The findings do seem to have face validity, as even though certain parties' emphasis on specific issues may have been surprising, they are within reasonable expectations. Especially, when accompanied by a theoretical framework and previous research.

The overall findings are furthermore in compliance with those of Green-Pedersen (2006; 2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau (2022), which even though they studied the overall party system agenda, lend support to the findings. It becomes clear that the Norwegian party system has developed in quite similar ways as other Western European systems while also having certain country-specific traits. These should be investigated more in future research. Grossman and Guinaudeau's analogy of *snakes in a tunnel* (2022), seems to be appropriate for the Norwegian case as well. While all parties emphasize certain issues, the issue overlap is possibly even more notable. The area plots of all mainstream parties were primarily characterized by their similarities, rather than unique aspects of the parties.

There has for example, as shown in the Appendix, been a clear increase in the attention to health, education and immigration at the expense of macroeconomics, commercial policy and defence across different parties. This has been a common trend in Western European party systems since the 1980s (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 62-65). The claims of a common systemic agenda seem fitting in Norway too (Green-Pedersen, 2019a, p. 69-70; Grossman and Guinaudeau, 2022, p. 99-100). The findings of this thesis clearly imply that also Norwegian parties impact each other in terms of which policy areas they give attention to. The chosen selection of parties also provided insight into the dynamic development of parties and the findings should be interpreted as clear support of the notion that parties do not develop unidirectionally.

It is furthermore especially notable that MDG and KP seem distinguished from the other four. While they too to some extent follow the trends of the party system, they are clearly more deviant in their issue attention. The findings based on the proposed model of Figure 3.2. provides important insight to these deviations, and it is argued here that the results of the analysis may supplement Green-Pedersen (2019a) and Grossman and Guinaudeau's (2022) discussions. A review of the appropriateness of the hypotheses thus follows.

As reflected by hypothesis 1A, certain clear vote-seeking traits can be detected by all of the included catch-all parties. AP, Høyre and Venstre have quite consistently emphasized a broad spectre of different policy issues, while also showing a greater willingness to adapt than most of the niche parties. In addition to illustrating the appropriateness of the hypothesis, the study has also lent support to the appropriateness of categorizing these three parties as catch-all. Differences between the mainstream parties and the niche parties can be detected.

Hypothesis 1B on the other hand is only partially supported. While MDG and KP indeed fit the assumptions of the hypothesis precisely, the fit is far poorer for FrP, which has striking similarities with the catch-all parties. The two former do indeed have a clear policy-seeking profile compared to the others, heavily emphasizing their core issues and only adapting on rare occasions.

Especially between 2001 and 2017, both the issue distribution and which issues obtained emphasis was quite comparable between FrP and the catch-all parties. They also showed a willingness to adapt the content of their manifestos at a rate which indicates vote-seeking. Two potential explanations for this have been discussed. Their electoral success during the entire period ensured their position as a relevant party even during the beginning of the study, making a clear distinction between relevant and irrelevant parties. It is possible that this is the main determinant of policy breadth and that party type's impact is marginal. Another likely explanation is FrP's low degree of nicheness. Their difference from the two other niche parties makes sense in this regard, but their similarities with the catch-all parties could also imply that FrP was a catch-all party by the beginning of the studied time period. This is in line with findings by Gunnar Vogt (1994, p. 249).

While the timeframe of the study, limits the possibility of clearing this further, hypothesis 2A may give an indication for the high catch-allness of FrP. This assumption gains support as the extent FrP prioritizes vote-seeking, especially as measured by the number of subtopics, rises until it reaches a peak after they formulated an explicit office-seeking strategy. While as noted, the findings reported on such a development for both Høyre and MDG is heavily impacted by manifesto length, their development is also in line with hypothesis 2A. Based on this analysis, the hypothesis receives at least initial support.

The example of FrP is however important as it illustrates the necessity of a more nuanced understanding of potential than the one used here. Internal factors also impact a party's potential. The internal processes that make parties adopt coalition aspirations are likely

heavily dependent on external factors such as election results, but should be incorporated in future research to add further nuances. The development of Venstre and KP do also imply that further nuances, incorporating the gain of parliamentary seat into the definition of blackmailing potential, probably is beneficial.

Several observations that are in line with hypothesis 2B are also clear. The most evident examples are those of AP in 1993 and 2005, where a heavy emphasis on core policies came directly after serious election losses. Secondly, this could, as discussed also help to explain the relatively low complexity of Høyre during the first studied years.

Fangen and Vaage pointed to disappointing election result as a motivation for the appointment of Listhaug as Minister of Immigration and Integration in 2015 (2018, p. 474). Several of their election results prior to her appointment as party leader and the subsequent policy-seeking turn, were also disappointing. Further strengthening the appropriateness of hypothesis 2B in explaining this turn, is FrP's withdrawal from government in 2020 (Krekling et al., 2020), illustrating a strain between them and their potential coalition partners, limiting their coalition potential. As noted by Anders Jupskås, the party has had one foot in the niche camp and one in the mainstream camp (2016, p. 184-185), and the appointment of Listhaug seems to be an indication of stepping towards the policy-seeking, niche traits of its radical right contemporaries. A decreased post-electoral potential is likely to have contributed to this.

Due to the design of the study, these findings should be studied further, but the development of AP especially, supplemented with other clear policy-seeking shifts after election disappointments, lend strong support to hypothesis 2B.

Clear support is also found for hypothesis 3. Despite some of the parties experiencing continuous governing potential, none have distanced themselves completely from policy-seeking strategies. The response of AP, adopting a platform emphasizing their core, after the 1989 and 2001 election disappointments, also serves as a clear illustration that the parties are limited in their vote-seeking potential, even if the parties are catch-all. The remaining parties also prioritize some core issues quite consistently, for example noting several findings that are in accordance with Seeberg's issue ownership findings (2017, p. 483).

The analysis thus clearly points to the appropriateness of incorporating post-electoral potential into Wolinetz' behavioural model (2002, p. 161). The revised model is for now considered partially appropriate. Some modifications have been recommended. While the exploratory design of this thesis only provides an initial description of how parties distribute their

attention, clear behavioural differences appear when the parties are studied with a lens combining party type and post-electoral potential. Future research is highly encouraged to add nuances to the proposed model.

Additionally, a larger selection of parties and election years allows for the testing of these findings and the implications of the proposed theoretical model. Especially, the extent parties emphasize office-seeking has been discussed based on theoretical assumptions, but a larger dataset will enable testing this in the light of Green-Pedersen's issue incentives model (2019a, p. 24-40). Some signs of heightened office-seeking could be detected from the parties with governing potential, such as the prevalence of the two largest parties to typically emphasize core functions of the state and obtrusive issues. A regression-based approach with a cross-country design, would be particularly relevant to investigate this further. Incorporating previous elections is especially important in order to examine the proposed development of Høyre and FrP, as that may shed more light on the causal direction between election results and policy breadth.

Another useful supplement would be to include more party types as that could provide for more cumulative theory building (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p. 167-168). In addition, some of the described trends are interesting starting points for future research. This was reflected on by Shpaizman who noted that CAP allows for the familiarization with the case of interest, which aids in the formulating of precise research questions (2019, p. 365).

A strong encouragement is made for future research on the development of FrP after the appointment of Listhaug as party leader. Previous studies have examined the party's transition to mainstreamness and the extent of the party's compliance with the radical right concept (Fangen and Vaage, 2018; Jupskås, 2016), but the clear increase of attention to typical radical right policy issues under Listhaug, should reinforce the incentives of studying this. Similarly, a more extensive examination of AP's evident policy-seeking shifts after election disappointments would also be an interesting starting point. Several more suggestions have been made throughout the thesis.

8. Literature

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9. Appendix

Online Appendix: <https://github.com/jonbvalg/The-policy-emphasis-of-political-parties>

9.1. Intercoder reliability test results

Round	Text	Holsti	Krippendorff	Holsti Major topic	Krippendorff Major topic
1	Manifesto	.57	.56		
	Trontale	.56	.55		
	Trontale	.54	.52		
	Trontale	.62	.61		
2	Manifesto	.66	.65		
	Trontale	.61	.59		
	Trontale	.67	.66		
	Trontale	.69	.69		
3	Coalition agreement	.73	.73		
	Trontale	.83	.83		
	Trontale	.65	.63		
	Manifesto	.70	.69		
4	Manifesto	.75	.74	.89	.88
	Trontale	.72	.72	.93	.93
	Trontale	.86	.86	.85	.85
	Trontale	.74	.74	.85	.84
5	Coalition agreement	.74	.73	.83	.83
	Trontale	.78	.78	.88	.88
	Manifesto	.70	.69	.83	.82

One additional round was performed on a party manifesto and a Krippendorff alfa above 0.7 on subtopics was achieved

9.2. The descriptive statistics of distribution in manifestos

9.2.1. The descriptive statistics of AP

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0253	0.0395	0.0442	0.0694
Civil rights	0.0414	0.0655	0.0672	0.0948
Health	0.0471	0.0758	0.0793	0.1221
Agriculture and fishing	0.0228	0.0332	0.0314	0.0395
Labour	0.0586	0.0764	0.0794	0.1315

Education	0.0359	0.0696	0.0669	0.1017
Environment	0.0215	0.0643	0.0592	0.0788
Energy	0.0178	0.0277	0.0275	0.0463
Immigration	0.0042	0.0254	0.0265	0.0585
Traffic	0.0149	0.0240	0.0268	0.0447
Legal affairs	0.0153	0.0419	0.0437	0.0622
Social policy	0.0528	0.0954	0.0926	0.1362
Housing	0.0179	0.0283	0.0302	0.0392
Commercial policy	0.0339	0.0441	0.0508	0.0864
Defence	0.0217	0.0277	0.314	0.632
Technology	0.0133	0.371	0.0373	0.0498
Foreign trade	0.0065	0.0108	0.0142	0.0356
Foreign policy	0.0588	0.0898	0.0987	0.1798
Government	0.0349	0.0520	0.0520	0.0775
Public lands	0.0075	0.0162	0.0167	0.0248
Culture	0.0143	0.0218	0.0239	0.0535

9.2.2. The descriptive statistics of Høyre

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0231	0.0345	0.0402	0.0823
Civil rights	0.0338	0.0431	0.0507	0.0863
Health	0.0466	0.1004	0.0937	0.1217
Agriculture and fishing	0.0318	0.0424	0.0414	0.0517
Labour	0.0308	0.0466	0.0463	0.0571
Education	0.0842	0.0938	0.1026	0.1396
Environment	0.0278	0.0502	0.0611	0.1158
Energy	0.0119	0.0287	0.0277	0.0447
Immigration	0.0129	0.0276	0.0252	0.0384
Traffic	0.0173	0.0502	0.0444	0.0686
Legal affairs	0.0437	0.0783	0.0740	0.0941
Social policy	0.0464	0.0746	0.0788	0.1093
Housing	0.0118	0.0238	0.0253	0.0368
Commercial policy	0.0377	0.0516	0.0497	0.0576
Defence	0.0173	0.0210	0.0232	0.0310
Technology	0.0256	0.0375	0.0354	0.0451
Foreign trade	0.0044	0.0107	0.0150	0.0258
Foreign policy	0.0320	0.0516	0.0588	0.0972
Government	0.0454	0.0651	0.0680	0.0965
Public lands	0.0060	0.0165	0.0160	0.0249
Culture	0.0160	0.0230	0.0229	0.0303

9.2.3. The descriptive statistics of FrP

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0361	0.0619	0.0655	0.0112
Civil rights	0.0250	0.0401	0.0388	0.0504
Health	0.0572	0.0895	0.0848	0.0979

Agriculture and fishing	0.0373	0.0424	0.0458	0.0629
Labour	0.0310	0.0442	0.0446	0.0590
Education	0.0700	0.0886	0.0860	0.1000
Environment	0.0122	0.0364	0.0386	0.0557
Energy	0.0168	0.0283	0.0281	0.0429
Immigration	0.0099	0.0348	0.0351	0.0816
Traffic	0.0599	0.0801	0.0787	0.0982
Legal affairs	0.0607	0.0717	0.0731	0.0975
Social policy	0.0614	0.0713	0.0715	0.0894
Housing	0.0092	0.0146	0.0151	0.0235
Commercial policy	0.0487	0.0596	0.0602	0.0789
Defence	0.0260	0.0469	0.0507	0.0667
Technology	0.0189	0.0274	0.0276	0.0349
Foreign trade	0.0123	0.0161	0.0170	0.0259
Foreign policy	0.0372	0.0451	0.0470	0.0681
Government	0.0358	0.0498	0.0551	0.0862
Public lands	0.0112	0.0189	0.0194	0.0283
Culture	0.0094	0.0204	0.0212	0.0368

9.2.4. The descriptive statistics of MDG

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0270	0.0551	0.0592	0.1000
Civil rights	0.0111	0.0630	0.0590	0.0907
Health	0.0551	0.0807	0.0808	0.1052
Agriculture and fishing	0.0570	0.0680	0.0808	0.1693
Labour	0.0056	0.0189	0.0202	0.0372
Education	0.0088	0.0547	0.0509	0.0722
Environment	0.1759	0.1917	0.2063	0.2778
Energy	0.0233	0.0356	0.0374	0.556
Immigration	0.0000	0.0227	0.0225	0.0360
Traffic	0.0324	0.0458	0.0482	0.0722
Legal affairs	0.0053	0.0362	0.0399	0.0712
Social policy	0.0389	0.0496	0.0533	0.0718
Housing	0.0035	0.0153	0.0158	0.0255
Commercial policy	0.0167	0.0462	0.0434	0.0527
Defence	0.0000	0.0223	0.0256	0.0722
Technology	0.0000	0.0180	0.0180	0.0337
Foreign trade	0.0000	0.0089	0.0087	0.0176
Foreign policy	0.0463	0.0552	0.0590	0.0889
Government	0.0000	0.0308	0.0334	0.0564
Public lands	0.0000	0.0195	0.0144	0.0223
Culture	0.0000	0.0251	0.0232	0.0352

9.2.5. The descriptive statistics of Venstre

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0252	0.0457	0.0436	0.0632

Civil rights	0.0638	0.0743	0.0798	0.1161
Health	0.0412	0.0639	0.0651	0.0967
Agriculture and fishing	0.0246	0.0461	0.0422	0.0571
Labour	0.0257	0.0400	0.0492	0.0560
Education	0.0619	0.0959	0.0937	0.0118
Environment	0.0772	0.0973	0.1098	0.2039
Energy	0.0218	0.0275	0.0275	0.0383
Immigration	0.0085	0.0304	0.0299	0.0497
Traffic	0.0160	0.0324	0.0308	0.0452
Legal affairs	0.0153	0.0557	0.0489	0.0700
Social policy	0.0487	0.0611	0.0625	0.0768
Housing	0.0084	0.0209	0.0217	0.0336
Commercial policy	0.0386	0.0487	0.0504	0.0689
Defence	0.0218	0.0267	0.0273	0.0367
Technology	0.0144	0.0275	0.0304	0.0529
Foreign trade	0.0058	0.0087	0.0101	0.0176
Foreign policy	0.0535	0.0657	0.0706	0.0986
Government	0.0380	0.0555	0.0647	0.0979
Public lands	0.0064	0.0133	0.0143	0.0423
Culture	0.0259	0.0379	0.0367	0.0539

9.2.6. The descriptive statistics of KP

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Maximum
Macroeconomics	0.0523	0.0533	0.0547	0.0626
Civil rights	0.0226	0.0347	0.0359	0.0508
Health	0.0584	0.0734	0.0766	0.0993
Agriculture and fishing	0.1243	0.1364	0.1413	0.1673
Labour	0.0227	0.0327	0.0325	0.0412
Education	0.0681	0.0733	0.0755	0.0916
Environment	0.0467	0.0551	0.0549	0.0624
Energy	0.0385	0.0513	0.0523	0.0682
Immigration	0.0027	0.0209	0.0206	0.0307
Traffic	0.0941	0.1060	0.1074	0.1275
Legal affairs	0.0252	0.0555	0.0508	0.0641
Social policy	0.0494	0.0625	0.0626	0.0743
Housing	0.0280	0.0394	0.0409	0.0704
Commercial policy	0.0339	0.0371	0.0383	0.0452
Defence	0.0159	0.0175	0.0202	0.0280
Technology	0.0149	0.0198	0.0205	0.0267
Foreign trade	0.0009	0.0039	0.0042	0.0080
Foreign policy	0.0122	0.0185	0.0208	0.0318
Government	0.0319	0.0454	0.0442	0.0514
Public lands	0.0284	0.0319	0.0327	0.0387
Culture	0.0102	0.0137	0.0131	0.0159

9.3. The distribution of the remaining major topics

Figure 9.3.1. The proportion of macroeconomics in manifestos




Figure 9.3.2. The proportion of civil rights in manifestos




Figure 9.3.3. The proportion of health in manifestos




Figure 9.3.4. The proportion of agriculture and fishing in manifestos




Figure 9.3.5. The proportion of education in manifestos




Figure 9.3.6. The proportion of energy in manifestos




Figure 9.3.7. The proportion of immigration in manifestos




Figure 9.3.8. The proportion of traffic in manifestos




Figure 9.3.9. The proportion of legal affairs in manifestos




Figure 9.3.10. The proportion of housing in manifestos




Figure 9.3.11. The proportion of commercial policy in manifestos




Figure 9.3.12. The proportion of defence in manifestos




Figure 9.3.13. The proportion of technology in manifestos




Figure 9.3.14. The proportion of foreign trade in manifestos




Figure 9.3.15. The proportion of foreign policy in manifestos




Figure 9.3.16. The proportion of government affairs in manifestos




Figure 9.3.17. The proportion of public lands in manifestos





Figure 9.3.18. The proportion of culture in manifestos



9.4. The L-kurtosis of the parties

	AP	Høyre	FrP	MDG	Venstre	KP
L-kurtosis	0.02568	0.02102	0.02703	0.04857	0.02759	0.03668
Kurtosis	6.5400	4.2907	6.1701	31.6170	8.9373	10.1441

N	210	147	210	168	210	126
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9.5. The complexity measures of the parties

	Number of subtopics	Entropy
AP 1985	172	2.8651
AP 1989	166	2.9083
AP 1993	126	2.7278
AP 1997	163	2.8940
AP 2001	157	2.8905
AP 2005	150	2.8464
AP 2009	156	2.8374
AP 2013	164	2.8868
AP 2017	169	2.9178
AP 2021	171	2.9018
Høyre 1997	135	2.8314
Høyre 2001	134	2.8585
Høyre 2005	140	2.8936
Høyre 2009	147	2.8978
Høyre 2013	155	2.8981
Høyre 2017	165	2.8695
Høyre 2021	164	2.8627
FrP 1985	131	2.8690
FrP 1989	135	2.8828
FrP 1993	148	2.9221
FrP 1997	161	2.8786
FrP 2001	172	2.9145
FrP 2005	175	2.9188
FrP 2009	165	2.9164
FrP 2013	171	2.9398
FrP 2017	173	2.9390
FrP 2021	176	2.8919
MDG 1993	64	2.3854
MDG 1997	135	2.7580
MDG 2001	143	2.7812
MDG 2005	146	2.7917

MDG 2009	89	2.4543
MDG 2013	158	2.8056
MDG 2017	161	2.8133
MDG 2021	169	2.8125
Venstre 1985	163	2.8820
Venstre 1989	158	2.7672
Venstre 1993	143	2.8555
Venstre 1997	148	2.8873
Venstre 2001	163	2.8679
Venstre 2005	165	2.8714
Venstre 2009	158	2.8988
Venstre 2013	165	2.8999
Venstre 2017	182	2.9050
Venstre 2021	155	2.8869
KP 2001	123	2.7385
KP 2005	134	2.8117
KP 2009	147	2.8406
KP 2013	148	2.8321
KP 2017	138	2.8466
KP 2021	142	2.8697