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Political Headwind

A qualitative study on how environmental policy projects influence political trust

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Abstract

This thesis explores how environmental policy projects affect political trust among policy opponents. It does this by conducting semi-structured interviews with policy opponents who live within proximity of such a project, more specifically, the completed, and planned, wind turbines on Haramsøya and Bjerkreim respectively. Participants' answers are then analyzed and discussed in relation to four different factors, namely procedural fairness, whereas just and fair processes are associated with high trust, whilst unfair processes are associated with low trust; institutional performance, which sees citizens as able to assess institutions' performance and that good and poor results affects trust accordingly; citizen participation where those who disagree with a policy seeks to oppose it, and that participation might effect trust positively, or poorly; and polarization, which related to increased hostility and distrust towards opposing groups . Various stages of policy implementation found in each of these two cases is also taken into consideration, whereas Haramsøya is in the output stage, while Bjerkreim is in the input phase.

The thesis identifies all the factors as influencing political trust, and that the first factor, procedural fairness, is a source for the other factors. Procedural fairness is the first among the factors that becomes relevant during policy implementation of wind power, and sees most participants unhappy with the secretive, abusive, and unfair process. Next is institutional performance which, to some degree, is dependent on procedural fairness. Here, the actions, or inactions, of certain institutions have weakened participants' trust in them. The next factor, citizen participation, shows that most participants found their efforts ignored by authorities and decision-makers; however, their participation managed to spread news of the unfairly perceived process to those outside these communities. This factor is also found to be dependent on procedural fairness. Finally, polarization sees the biggest difference between participants in each case, due to the stages of policy implementation, where those on Haramsøya have grown more skeptical and distrusting towards supporters of the wind power policy. All these factors have the potential to weaken Norwegian politicians' and decision-makers' reputation through the actions of policy opponents, and must therefore be taken into consideration by these actors.

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List of abbreviations

OED	Olje- og energidepartementet [Ministry of Petroleum and Energy]
NVE	Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat [Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate]
EPP	Environmental policy project

1. Introduction

In the western world, one of the most important values is democracy, something that most people who live in a democratic society would consider valuable, and perhaps even crucial for a system to work in the favor of the citizens. There are disagreements, and little to no consensus yet as to what a system requires to qualify as democratic; however, no matter if one follows a strict, or a loose, definition of democracy, it always involves representatives and institutions that are meant to govern the population. Yet, some feel that their voices go unheard, and may question the competence of their elected representatives and institutions as their trust, and confidence, in the political system wanes.

The local community on Haramsøya has the last couple of years fought a battle to prevent the construction of sixteen, later changed to eight, wind turbines; however, to no avail as, at the time of writing, these have finished construction. Similarly, the local community in Bjerkreim have seen some opponents fight a long battle to hinder development of wind power on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim; however, contrary to Haramsøya, this battle is not yet over. Consequently, both communities have voiced their concerns of lacking democratic processes in social media, and the former, Haramsøya, have seen much media attention since 2019. These cases may not only be harmful to those within proximity, but also for decision-makers and politicians as the critique that follows these cases might spread past those who are affected by these projects.

Literature has long examined the extent to which siting of environmental policy projects, henceforth EPPs, effects local communities, and the consequences this has on public trust (e.g., Lesbirel, 1998; Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018; Waldo, 2012; Wolsink, 2007). Findings generally find that the populous consider green energy sources a positive remedy for global climate change; however, these projects often lead to a dilemma of conflicting values (e.g., Hurley & Walker, 2004; Stokes, 2017; Warren, Lumsden, & Birnie, 2005). These dilemmas have shown to negatively impact political trust, in regard to how procedures surrounding wind power siting have been conducted (Clausen & Rudolph, 2019; Firestone, Hirt, Bidwell, Gardner, & Dwyer, 2020; Stokes, 2016; Wolsink, 2007), potentially leading to electoral backlash. Literature also found that it is important to pay attention to those who oppose such policies as they are the source of discontent and may disrupt political trust on

the grounds of environmental policy implementation (Cheon & Urpelainen, 2013; Jagers et al., 2020; Werners et al., 2010).

Therefore, this thesis argues that EPPs will have a negative effect on political trust of policy opponents, and aims to add knowledge on the topic of declining political trust as a consequence of EPPs, with a case study from Norway, in order to safely and democratically develop future EPPs. It does this by exploring *how environmental policy projects affect political trust among policy opponents*.

The thesis does this through a qualitative approach towards theory testing with the use of case studies. In order to gather data for the case studies, the thesis will utilize semi-structured interviews with policy opponents who either live, or own a home, close to a completed EPP, or policy opponents who live, or own a home, close to a planned EPP. The data will then be analyzed thematically to allow insight into what the locals themselves consider important topics when it comes to EPP siting.

These topics, theory argues, consists of the following four factors influence political trust: procedural fairness, where perceived unfairness of a process negatively impacts political trust; institutional performance, where citizens who assess institutional results and performance poorly have their trust reduced; citizen participation, where citizens participate on various levels of trust, and participation results will likely affect trust; and polarization, where citizens grow skeptical and distrusting towards those with opposite beliefs. These were utilized with interview answers to see what effects they have on policy opponents' political trust in the wake of an EPP.

Results from the interviews showed that each of the factors influence political trust; however, procedural fairness ranks as the most important due to the fact that the other factors stem from a process initially being deemed as unfair. If decision-makers fail to inform those who are affected by such a policy, as well as following-up during the entire process, they are left with opponents from the beginning of a policy cycle, which could snowball into poor assessment of institutional performance, which leads to participation, and polarization.

The thesis will first present the chapter on previous literature, which aims clarify what we know about the topic, and what we do not know. In the third chapter, a definition for political trust is given, before presenting a theoretical framework including the four

aforementioned factors procedural fairness, institutional performance, citizen participation, and polarization. Next is a short chapter explaining the research question. What data the thesis aims to utilize, how it gathers the data, and, finally, how it analyzes the data is then explained in the fifth chapter on methodology. Then a quick explanation on how EPPs, more specifically wind power, is developed in Norway, as well as a quick recap of the EPP cases on Haramsøya and Bjerkreim is then explained in the sixth chapter. Then comes a presentation of the results for each factor, as well as a discussion for each individual factor. Finally, the thesis presents the conclusion, as well as possibilities for future research on the topic.

2. Literature Review

Literature has long examined the extent to which siting of EPPs, such as solar-, hydro- and wind power, effects local communities, and the consequences this has on public support, engagement, and trust (e.g., Lesbirel, 1998; Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018; Waldo, 2012; Wolsink, 2007; Stokes 2017). Results from the field generally find that the populous consider green energy sources a positive remedy for global climate change; however, these projects, like other large-scale land usage projects, often lead to a dilemma involving conflicting values (e.g., Hurley & Walker, 2004; Stokes, 2017; Warren, Lumsden, & Birnie, 2005). These dilemmas have shown to negatively impact political trust, in regard to how procedures surrounding wind power siting have been conducted (Clausen & Rudolph, 2019; Firestone, Hirt, Bidwell, Gardner, & Dwyer, 2020; Stokes, 2016; Wolsink, 2007), potentially leading to electoral backlash. Literature also found that it is important to pay attention to those who oppose such policies as they are the source of discontent on a given policy in society and may disrupt political trust on the grounds of environmental policy implementation (Cheon & Urpelainen, 2013; Jagers et al., 2020; Werners et al., 2010; Stokes, 2016). Yet, we know little on how specific decision-making and implementation processes of EPP siting influence political trust, or which ones are most important in order for decision-makers and politicians to prevent this loss of trust. It is of major importance to understand and prevent erosion of trust in a democracy, as trust is a core value in this kind of government. Therefore, by looking at Norway, widely considered to live in a high-trust society, compared to other established democracies (Catterberg & Moreno, 2005), this thesis aims to add knowledge on the topic of declining political trust in policy opponents as a consequence of EPPs.

2.1 Public Response to Environmental Policies and EPPs

Development of green energy sources in the form of EPPs are an important step in combating climate change; however, these often take up much space and requires tact in order to sway opinions of those within proximity. Leah Stokes, an influential energy, climate, and environmental scholar, have made several seminal contributions on US climate policies and issues surrounding implementation of environmental governance necessary to reduce carbon emissions, whilst emphasizing the importance of public support (e.g., Stokes, 2016; Stokes, 2017; Stokes, 2020). Her main argument is that action on climate change remains

critical; however, she realizes that there have been pitfalls, which have affected public support and trust in the process.

One way in which she tested public support for renewable energy policies, was through its policy design and framing, and what effects it would carry (Stokes, 2017). Here, Stokes surveyed a large sample of the US population on their opinions of renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies, a set of laws requiring a portion of electricity generation to come from renewable sources. The survey presented a hypothetical renewable energy bill with random information on cost, potential jobs, air quality, and partisan effect, which was used to measure public support for the bill (Stokes, 2017, pp. 3-5). The main results from the survey, for each treatment was (1) that even the slightest increase cost increase for the average taxpayer would decrease public support for such a bill, and that a larger cost could potentially flip most states from support to opposition for RPS, suggesting that the public is sensitive to costs; (2) that the promise of new jobs would increase support substantially; (3) that better air quality as a result from RPS policies would increase support of such policies; (4) that emphasizing a link between renewable sources and climate change changed nothing; (5) and finally, that elite support for a bill had strong positive influence on support for the bill. Of these, the cost treatment had the largest effect, whereas it alone could undermine the positive effects of all other treatments if placed at US\$10/month in utility bills, decreasing public support for these policies way beyond how the others would increase it.

These high costs are therefore enough to have those affected by an EPP oppose the policy, which could lead to electoral backlash. Stokes (2016) identified this as another barrier for EPPs. Voters who consider facilities within proximity to their community as harmful are likely to punish the current government, whilst mobilizing an opposition to future developments as a result. This might lead to local governments repealing said policies, as supporters are less likely to mobilize on the same level as the opponents. Due to the assumption that energy and environmental policy issues are less important during campaigns, they are uncommon in the study of retrospective voting; however, the public have shown initiative on such issues for a long time through voting patterns (Stokes, 2016). To test this, she investigated, through a panel data set, whether proposed and operational wind turbines in Ontario led to a retrospective punishment of the incumbent government through voting (Stokes, 2016, pp. 959-960). Her results found that proposals for wind

turbines would lead to a 5% decline in votes, whilst operational wind turbines reduced it by 10% in the 2011 election. Moreover, this was not only the case for those precincts within an immediate proximity, but also those up to 3km away. Finally, small groups of citizens were proven to have the ability to incentivize politicians to abandon policies, although the vast majority was positive towards the change, which in turn leads to distorted signaling for the development of public policies (Stokes, 2016, pp. 966-971). The data came out significant, and provided evidence that citizens will mobilize when threatened by new EPPs, and their effects on the local community. This phenomenon is often referred to as NIMBYism, an acronym for “Not In My Back Yard,” which is what locals would say to new infrastructure within close proximity (Stokes, 2016, p. 959).

2.2 What is NIMBYism?

This phenomenon is almost synonymous with opposition to EPP siting, and has been widely observed by various scholars over the last three decades in different cases of infrastructure facility siting (such as, nuclear, conventional, and hazardous waste facilities; nuclear and conventional power plants, railroads, roads, offshore oil platforms, oil drilling, etc.), and social facility siting (such as, housing, nursing homes, mental health institutions, etc.). On the ground level, this might seem like the case for the citizens on Haramsøya and around Faurefjell; however, this opposition is largely reserved for local project siting, as those not affected will support the same projects elsewhere (Bosley & Bosley, 1988; Cotton & Devine-Wright, 2011; Lesbirel, 1998; Petrova, 2013; Schively, 2007).

Although NIMBY might seem like a simple phenomenon where citizens usually wish for EPP, just not in their own community, it carries far greater complexity through its characteristics. Schively (2007, pp. 256-257) has identified and presents these characteristics in her article. First (1), the variation in the two types of facilities. The first of these types are human, or public, service facilities aimed at quality-of-life improvements, such as affordable housing, or homeless shelters, while the second are facilities with environmental impact such as waste disposal, or industry. She notes the consequence of opposing the former of the two types, where citizens may experience a lack of services and excessive travel requirements in order to reach such services elsewhere. Second (2), those who participate in opposition of an EPP are either local, or external, based on proximity to the siting, and the level of response varies accordingly. Those who live near a proposed siting will have a

perceived cost, and thus have a motivation for opposition, as the benefits will feel less present. Those most active in oppositions are usually homeowners who fear devaluation of their community. On the other hand, those outside the community represent broader economic, social, and political issues, including organizations that provide financial resources for, for instance, environmental protection. Third (3), one may characterize NIMBY responses as both positive and negative. The negative characterizations usually claim that these responses are mainly motivated by citizens' self interest in protecting their "turf," which may lead policy makers viewing citizen participation as a nuisance, rather than something positive. Moreover, such participation does not necessarily represent the whole community, but rather the smaller, more vocal, minority. This minority usually consists of the older, educated, wealthier, who are likely to organize an opposition. On the other hand, the positive characterization points to the opponents as exemplars of a healthy democracy, and the value of citizen opposition in forcing changes to society they deem necessary. These responses also lead to democratic discourse on the siting process, involving the local communities on what will affect them.

2.3 Institutional Factors Matter

These characteristics have been used since wind power siting began, when developers faced local resistance, to appeal to the NIMBY argument. Yet, some literature (Wolsink, 1999; 2007), argue that there are barriers to wind power other than attitudes, which then questions the significance of NIMBY and its outcome of reduced public support. Instead, institutional factors arguably provide a better explanations for local opposition towards EEPs. NIMBY, as understood so far in the literature, involves a positive attitude towards wind power; however, this is not always the case. More often than not, as proven by Wolsink through survey data, those who oppose wind power in their own backyard also oppose wind power in general, which differs from the usual discussion surrounding the phenomenon (Wolsink, 1999, pp. 53-54; 2007). There are, in fact, several motivations, that can be used to explain opposition to EPPs:

- Type A: Possesses a positive attitude towards wind power, whilst opposing construction of EPPs in close proximity. This is NIMBY.
- Type B: Rejects local EPPs because of a general distrust towards the technology. This is sometimes referred to as "NIABY," or "Not In Any Backyard."

- Type C: Has a positive attitude towards the EPP in question, but it changes as public discourse on the project proceeds. This reflects NIABY resulting from changed risk perception during the siting- and construction process.
- Type D: Opposes an EPP, not because of skepticism towards the technology, but because of faulty project management. Here, the opposition is limited to individual projects, and would accept it if it was sited somewhere the community would consider suitable (Wolsink, 1999, p. 57).

All of these will be present with most EPPs, with type B and C being the most prevalent, especially on the siting of technologies that are perceived as more dangerous than the others, for instance nuclear power plants. However, when it comes to wind power, Wolsink (1999, p. 57) notes how type B is less prevalent because of the general acceptance and support for wind power, but it is prone to type C.

Although the attitudes above towards EPPs are personal, they are influenced by various decision-making processes. Therefore, to understand how opposition towards EPPs occur, Wolsink (1999; 2007), seeing fallacies in simply attributing various project failures to NIMBY, argues for the importance of institutional factors on implementation and public support of EPPs. One of the most important factors for improved development of EPPs, or more specifically wind power, is to build *institutional capital*. This has three dimensions, (1) knowledge resources, (2) relational resources, and (3) the capacity for mobilization. The purpose of institutional capital is to promote a collaborative style to the siting process of renewable energy infrastructure (Wolsink, 2007). This will reduce the inefficiencies of top-down bureaucracy and will provide openness, whilst reducing the amount of technocratic and elite decision-making, which might decide to ignore local attitudes. Finally, although participatory processes are crucial to the expansion of wind power, the siting process in some countries does not encourage this collaborative process (Wolsink, 2007), and instead is completed beforehand, followed by consultation after the planning has already begun. Rather than improving public opinion, this will likely trigger opposition instead. Therefore, it could be argued that it was not necessarily the technology that the people opposed, but rather, the process, because, as seen in Smøla, some have come to accept wind farms in their backyards (Andersen, 2020).

2.4 Cases of Wind Power Siting and Construction

Like Stokes' investigation of wind power in Ontario, there is a myriad of articles dealing with this form of EPP, public opinions on the policy, and its consequences. Therefore, while wind power has its benefits, and the population is usually positive towards such developments, land concessions often clash with local usage of those lands, including grazing, recreational use, such as hiking, tourism, as well as conservation claims, such as for flora and fauna (Wolsink, 2007). Some of the scholars who aims to test these claims, which often ends up aligning with Stokes' findings, include Ek and Matti (2014). They found through surveys that the construction of a large wind park in the northern Swedish area of Markbygden, Piteå, was indeed perceived as negative, as it would damage nature conservation, and negatively impact future reindeer herding in the area, giving rise to external costs for the local community. Waldo (2012) also studied the construction of wind parks in Sweden; however, while she took a qualitative approach, the results remained the same, the local community opposed the construction of these new wind farms, but, in alignment with Wolsink's work, there was no evidence of NIMBY here.

In addition to the loss of lands, exclusion and alienation of the local community where an EPP is planned is an issue that causes opposition towards the EPP. Large-scale deployment of wind energy in Denmark saw the need to generate social acceptance by reconciling the local communities with green technology (Clausen & Rudolph, 2019). However, this reconciliation oftentimes happens detached, both economically and politically, from the local host communities of said green technology as a result of the emphasis on "Green Capitalism." This has led to large-scale counter-discourse as a response to the Danish political discourse on reconciliation. Therefore, Clausen and Rudolph (2019) argue that this sort of reconciliation should happen within the local culture and economy as to consider local identity, equality, and democracy.

Inclusion of the local community is important. It is also important that they are informed of the process, and that decisions are in line with what the people wants, otherwise it will erode trust. As the German "Energiewende" expands, so too does the need for considerable expansion and restructuring of current energy infrastructure into one that is renewable (Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018). Linzenich & Ziefle's study on the impact of trust and perceived fairness on wind power plants in Germany is based on a survey where random

citizens were asked questions regarding wind power plants and electricity pylons. The result from their study underlines the importance for political actors to make decisions that are transparent and considers both environmental and citizen needs if they wish to be successful. Moreover, it was made clear from the results that the public felt left out from the siting processes of new wind parks, and as such felt a low degree of perceived procedural fairness, resulting in a lower level of trust. Firestone and colleagues (Firestone et al., 2020) also did research on the connection between procedural fairness and political trust. Here, an offshore wind park project named the Block Island Offshore Wind Project in the US was studied through surveys prior to and after the turbines was installed, in addition to semi-structured interviews with locals. Through their assessment of respondents' engagement in the planning process, they found that a negative view of state government did not affect their opinions on the project; however, trust in state government did affect respondents' perceptions of procedural fairness, which affected project support. Finally, the paper encourages future siting processes to create community engagement plans in order to ensure transparency of the planning process, whilst providing expectations for those affected.

Finally, in Norway attitude towards construction of wind power on land and in the sea has arguably changed over time from highly positive, to less positive due to increasing popularity of counter-movements, such as *MOTVIND* or "*NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!*" [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya]. Gregersen and Tinnereim (2019) utilized an internet-based survey often used to measure Norwegians' attitude towards important societal matters, called *Norsk Medborgerpanel*, to study whether Norwegians are receptive towards wind power, or not. They start by presenting a general opinion poll on the level of agreement to the statement "more wind turbines should be built on land in Norway," and one for ocean-based wind turbines. They then divide the polls into gender, age, and area of residency. The first poll found that the population is positive towards construction of ocean-based wind turbines; however, attitudes towards land-based wind turbines are more polarized, with 20% strongly disagreeing with the statement that more should be built on land. The poll that divides genders shows that men and women are relatively in agreement. When it comes to age, those born after 1990 are far more positive towards construction on land than those born before, while all age groups generally agree

on ocean-based wind turbines. Finally, the area of residence shows that those living in Oslo/Akershus and Østlandet are far more positive towards construction of land-based wind turbines compared to Sørlandet, Vestlandet and Trøndelag. On the other hand, they generally agree on construction of ocean-based wind turbines. In conclusion, this study shows that, those who have settled along the coast of Norway carry negative attitudes towards land-based wind turbines and choose to oppose them as they are more likely to have them built in proximity to their homes. However, this attitude could potentially spread to other parts of Norway, with the abovementioned counter-movements, increasing the number of policy opponents towards wind power development in Norway.

2.5 Who are the Policy Opponents?

There is also a conscious choice in this thesis to solely focus on policy opponents as these are easier to trace down for interviews, in addition to them being the source of discontent on certain policies and the source of disrupted political trust on the grounds of EPP implementation. These opponents, as seen in both Stokes (2016) and Wolsink (2007) are able to affect politicians and incumbents negatively by either reducing their election turnout, or by haltering policy implementation. Hence it is important to understand their motivations, and how to collaborate with them, in order to develop EPPs that benefits everyone without damaging the notion of democracy. But who are the policy opponents?

Previous literature shows that, oftentimes, those within proximity of such EPPs are, or becomes, opponents of these kinds of policies. Cheon and Urpelainen (2013) found that in the absence of opposition, support grows, but as support grows, so too does opposition, and this opposition will affect policy chance, and might even halt its progress completely. As for policy opponents' strategies to influence, or completely halt EPPs, Werners et al. (2010) presents these in five different points, and how these aid in altering policy change during a water policy change in Hungary and the Netherlands. These strategies often involve garnering sympathy from those outside the communities, and tactical voting in favor of politicians who agree with the policy opponents and could therefore change the tide of the development of certain EPPs. Finally, Jagers et al. (2020) explain how policy opponents' attitudes change over three different stages of policy implementation, namely the input-, throughput- and output phases, where the first phase would affect attitude and trust over the course of implementation. The stages of implementation will likely see differing opinions

from policy opponents from various communities that are within proximity of EPPs, and are therefore important to consider. This was a brief recap of these studies, and will be expanded upon in chapter 3.5.

Thus far, the literature on EPPs and the consequences from its siting and subsequent construction on locals has largely been constrained to large-scale surveys (Clausen & Rudolph, 2019; Ek & Matti, 2014; Gregersen & Tvinnereim, 2019; Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018; Stokes, 2017; Wolsink, 1999) as a means to gather a generalizable opinion from the masses, or by those affected, in order to present reliable statistics of declining trust. This paper instead addresses the need for qualitative studies on the topic of EPPs' effect on political trust and argues that previous literature can only be considered a first step towards a deeper understanding of the topic. By studying the perspective and opinions of those affected through means of interviews, such an understanding of the topic is achievable. Still, such in-depth investigations are utilized far less than large surveys that lack deeper insight (except for: Firestone et al., 2020; Waldo, 2012). While there are some qualitative studies done on EPPs and political trust, they do not necessarily provide a deep enough understanding of how specific decision-making and implementation processes of EPP siting influence political trust. Previous literature also tends to focus on institutions that decides whether an EPP is built; however, other state institutions, such as the courts or the police are often ignored. For this reason, the thesis seeks to gain insight into the relationship between newly built EPPs and eroding political trust by focusing on locals' opinions on the process and decisions made by various institutions during EPP siting and development. To do this, the thesis will explain its understanding and conceptualization of political trust, EPPs, and policy opponents, and present four factors, derived from theory, found to influence political trust among policy opponent during EPPs siting and construction.

3. Theoretical Approach

3.1 Definitions of Political Trust

During the early development on the field of political trust, scholars made several attempts to define the concept; however, a single definition with similar characteristics was not found, or is in need of an update to face modern issues of political trust (Citrin, 1974; Easton, 1975; Miller, 1974; Stokes, 1962). In *the Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust* (2018), Uslaner explains that the academic field on political trust flourished in the 60s with its political unrest and ensuing protests, and the 70s with the economic crisis. This led to sharp drops in political trust, paving the way for a research agenda to study the phenomena. During this time, on one hand, scholars, such as Arthur Miller (1974), argued that the declining trust in U.S. politics stemmed from political scandals, and the inability to implement proper policies, prompting mistrust in the whole political system. On the other hand, some scholars, such as Jack Citrin (1974), considered this interpretation too pessimistic, and that the mistrust was aimed toward specific politicians, and not the entire democratic system.

Citrin's (1974) focus on specific politicians being the issue for failing political trust could arguably be traced back to Donald Stokes' work, *Popular Evaluations of government: an empirical assessment* (1962), where he introduced what would later become known as the National Election Studies, or the NES, which included questions designed to test trust in government. For instance, to measure trust among the sample,

[...] the criteria of judgement implicit in [the] questions were partly ethical, that is honesty and other ethical qualities of public officials [...] but the criteria extended to other qualities as well, including the ability and efficiency of government officials and the correctness of their policy decisions. (Stokes, 1962, pp. 64).

This data was then used to place survey respondents in either of two categories based on whether they held favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the government. Yet, despite measuring evaluative orientations toward the national government, the actual concept of political trust did not figure into Stokes' analysis.

Researchers that utilized the NES responses to measure and study the dynamics of trust/distrust in politics, found that there are prevalent components relating to political

parties, or the current office holder. For instance, whether an American president is a Democrat, or a Republican, will have a positive or negative effect on trust based on whether the identifier is Democratic (e.g., Citrin, 1974). There have been similar studies in Western Europe, although these focus on governing coalitions and its dominant parties (e.g., Listhaug, 1995). Other important components that have been identified to affect political trust are evaluations of leaders' personal qualities; evaluations on performance of the sitting president or government; and whether policies that are implemented are dissatisfactory or not (Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 1998; Listhaug, 1995; Miller & Borrelli, 1991; Van der Meer, 2010).

However, studies have shown that trust judgements go deeper than simply reactions to current office holders, governments, or parties, and extends into political positions and policies taken by these parties. Miller (1974) developed an idea that those who held a left- or right extremist stance, would be dissatisfied by the policy choices developed by centrist American parties, while more recent studies have shown that political parties have become so polarized, that those who hold a centrist stance are dissatisfied with policy choices.

Another reason as to why political trust is not solely dependent on leaders' performance and ideology, is the fact that the decline in political trust in the 60s and 70s U.S. remained the same, even after changes in the administration, nor did it change in the decades after. Instead, it would keep declining over time, likely as a result of certain problems, for instance the fact that the U.S. would, simply face problems, such as crime, or American's dissatisfaction with Congress, without managing to solve them, naturally leading to distrust in politicians and government (Hetherington, 1998). This downwards trend in political trust is not limited to the U.S. as, over time, other established Western Democracies, such as Finland, Germany, or Canada, have also experienced a net loss in political trust (Catterberg & Morena, 2005).

This steady decline of political trust across various governments prompted many scholars to instead focus on institutions, similar to Miller (1974), as they found evidence of components associated with office-holders (e.g., Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Listhaug & Wiberg, 1995; McAllister, 1999; Miller & Listhaug, 1990; van der Meer, 2018). Two scholars, Miller and Listhaug, found the importance of performance

evaluation of institutions when they compared external efficacy and political trust, noting how:

[...] both focus on the performance of government and political leaders rather than on an assessment of one's own capabilities. [Moreover,] without acting in an honest and efficient manner government cannot hope to foster the belief that it will either be capable of responding to citizen needs in the future or that it will be willing to respond to those needs. (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, pp. 358-359).

Similarly, Hetherington defines political trust as “[...] the ratio of people’s evaluation of government performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to perform” (Hetherington & Husser, 2012, p. 313). This conceptual definition, they argue, works well in studies where the findings see changes in trust resulting from changes in perceived performance on important problems, such as the economy. Finally, Van der Meer agrees on the evaluative approach, arguing for “[...] the existence of a relationship between subject A (the truster) and object B (the trustee) [and that] trust is implicitly or explicitly conceptualized as an evaluation of this relationship by subject A” (Van der Meer, 2018, pp 600-601). He then notes that the object in this case, compared to fellow people, is made up by political institutions, making trust vertical rather than horizontal. Moreover, he mentions that for citizens to properly evaluate political institutions, they must have benchmarks based on what they think *will* happen or based on what they believe *should* happen (Van der Meer, 2018, p. 602).

Over time, as more evidence suggesting the importance of political trust has come to light, scholars have agreed on certain characteristics for the concept. However, while the above definitions and explanations provide insight into the concept of political trust, with some of its characteristics, none of them provide the full picture required to completely understand it, and instead presents two main arguments – that trust is affected by office-holders, or that it is affected by institutions.

The critically acclaimed Pippa Norris attempts to remedy this in her chapter *The conceptual framework of political support* (2018) where she draws on, and modernizes, the work done by the prominent political scientist, David Easton, in an attempt to make it more applicable to current issues. Moreover, compared to the other contributions presented in

this chapter, whose reason to define political trust was to explain how it would apply to their own research, Norris' aim was to synthesize a definitory guideline applicable to future research on political trust and as such provided more depth and arguments to the final definition.

According to Norris (2018), Easton established two distinct levels of political support, namely *specific* and *diffuse-*, or *generalized*, political support, or political trust. The former focuses on elected and appointed office-holders as well as other political elites, who are tasked with forming and implementing political decisions. Public attitudes towards the incumbent government, as well as political leadership in other sectors, such as judges, the military, or the police is the primary indicator of this type of political support. Specific support is vulnerable to short- and medium-term factors and is thus expected to fluctuate across various administrations based on their approach to, for instance, economic, social, and foreign policy issues. Deterioration of specific support is regarded as an issue for all governments; however, it does not affect the foundational authority of its agencies and actors. On the other hand, generalized support, is a notion, or a feeling towards one's nation built up during one's upbringing, which remains largely unaffected by incumbent office holders' actions or political outcomes (Norris, 2018). Therefore, compared to specific support, generalized support is expected to remain stable and more enduring as it is built on a person's sense of identity, as well as their agreement with a nation's core values and principles. These levels work in a continuum (Norris, 2018) and implies that while a political scandal could bring down the incumbent government, it would not have a large effect on an individual's support for the values on which a nation's political institutions are built; however, fragile states where the populations think less of the core values on which politics are built, could see destabilization.

In addition, Norris (2018) notes how Easton distinguished between three different components of a political system when identifying the concept, namely the nation, the state, and incumbent authorities. In this system, the nation represents the community where people belong; the state includes government institutions on the national, regional, and local levels; and, finally, the authorities represent the elected and appointed actors that hold office and makes policy decisions in the public sector. These levels are related to each other and moves down in levels from the nation on the top, down to the authorities. With this

distinction, one could not be dissatisfied with the incumbent authorities, without also feeling dissatisfaction with the nation; however, Norris argues that the Bush administration disproves this, whereas the deep dissatisfaction with the federal government did not affect people's national pride and patriotism, nor did it reduce faith in the judicial branch.

From these elements, the levels and components of a political system, as identified by Easton, Norris creates her own model made up of five components, ranging from the most diffuse, to the most specific levels. The first (1), and most diffuse, is the citizens' attitudes towards belonging to the nation-state, exemplified through pride and patriotism. The second (2) is the agreement with the core principles that the nation's regime is built upon and includes the approval of democratic values. The third (3) is an evaluation of the overall performance of the regime as seen through citizens' satisfaction with democratic governance and an assessment of democratic processes. The fourth (4) is the confidence in regime institutions, including the executive, legislative and judicial branches, security forces, such as the military and police, as well as central and local governments. Finally, the fifth (5), and most specific, is the approval of incumbent office-holders, and includes citizens' approval of specific party members, leaders, legislators, as well as authorities and leadership in the public sector (Norris, 2018, pp. 23-30).

Of these components, the two latter, trust in regime institutions and approval of incumbents, are those mostly associated with political trust, and is therefore the ones Norris utilize in order to define the concept as "[...] the general belief in the performance capacity of political institutions and/or belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of office-holders" (Norris, 2018, p. 24).

Compared to the definitions above, this definition makes a distinction between the primary focus of those above, political institutions, and individual political actors; however, admits that citizens rarely make this distinction themselves. Still, considering Norris' attempt to meld previously discussed definitions together into a comprehensive definition and conceptual framework, together with its wide usage in an oft-cited and critically acclaimed handbook for political trust, and its purpose as a guiding definition for all future research on political trust, it is the chosen definition and will be considered when moving ahead with the thesis.

3.2 What are EPPs and their complications?

Chapter 2.2 mentioned two different forms of facility siting, including those considered to be of a social nature or those of infrastructural nature (Bosley & Bosley, 1988; Cotton & Devine-Wright, 2011; Lesbirel, 1998; Petrova, 2013; Schively, 2007). The former of the two, social facility siting, would therefore, as the name suggest, be more social in nature as these aim to solve social issues such as affordable housing, homeless shelters, nursing homes, or public service offers in a community. On the other hand, infrastructure facility siting is more concerned with developing a strong infrastructure, often with facilities with a higher environmental impact than the social ones. These facilities include, for instance, waste collection, roads and railroads, large industries, and conventional power plants. Environmental policy projects would thus be considered infrastructure facility siting as these are projects that aim to provide infrastructural development that is also considered environmentally friendly, including, for instance, nuclear power plants, solar farms, or wind parks.

Oftentimes, locals will, as seen in the literature, oppose projects that has a large consequence on their local environment, but this depends on the form of siting (Schively, 2007). For instance, opposing social facility siting carries the consequence of citizens not having necessary services nearby, such as adequate housing, schools, or doctor's office, meaning that they would have to travel far to reach these services. Therefore, this type of siting project is not as often opposed as they provide the community with more services. By contrast, opposing infrastructure facilities would not restrict services in the area, as proximity to such facilities is less important; however, these facilities could have other benefits for a local community, for instance cheaper power. Still, it has been proven to have large enough consequences for homeowners' house values and their recreational areas that those who live within proximity tend to oppose it rather than accept it. And then, if a wind power facility is sited near a community, certain factors mentioned in the literature could influence political trust negatively through, for instance, poor procedural fairness (e.g., Clausen & Rudolph, 2019; Ek and Matti, 2014; Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018; Waldo, 2012; Wolsink, 2007).

In Norway, there are more proponents than opponents of EPPs as seen in surveys (Gregersen and Tvinnereim, 2019). Most of these opponents live close to the coast, and is

therefore those who are most likely to have a wind power facility built nearby because of the wind conditions along the Norwegian coast. However, in Norway, there have been a growing counter-movement with organizations such as MOTVIND, who provide opponents with financial resources and lectures, or Facebook-groups like “NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!” [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] with over 34.000 members, which is no small feat as Haramsøya is limited to just under 600 inhabitants. So, opponents towards this EPP are not only limited to those along the coasts, but to others further inland as well, reducing the significance of NIMBY in Norway whilst encouraging discourse on the topic of EPPs. On the other hand, opponents are the smaller, more vocal minority in most of these cases, and those who support development of EPPs would claim that opponents are motivated by their self interest in protecting their area, and are unwilling to sacrifice it for the greater good (Schively, 2007). Consequently, those who are faced with decision making are faced with a dilemma. What could be a solution to an environmental problem by most, can be seen by opponents living within proximity as a threat to their health and immediate environment. This must be explored further, and one way to do so is to figure out which factors negatively impacts political trust among policy opponents.

3.3 Theories on Procedural Fairness and Institutional Performance

Over time, during later developments on the field of political trust, two major groups of theoretical explanations, designed to understand sources of political trust, took shape – *procedural fairness theories* and *institutional performance theories*. The former, procedural fairness theory, explain how fair and democratic decision-making procedures positively affects political trust, and, conversely, how poor and undemocratic decision-making procedures negatively affects political trust (Grimes, 2017; Miller & Listhaug, 1999; Tyler, 2000). Proper procedures are arguably one of the cornerstones of a democracy as citizens who lose an election still abide by the law as they consider the election fair and free, and proper representation makes taxation tolerable. Conversely, if the same election was *perceived* as procedurally unfair, the citizens would likely act differently. This theory suggests a strong association between how citizens perceive procedural fairness and political trust and is therefore often utilized in studies aiming to explore the relationship between EPPs and political trust. For instance, Linzenich and Ziefle (2018) found that transparent and considerate decisions from political actors would lead to more successful EPPs. Moreover, opposition to EPPs are often aimed towards planning processes and the distribution of costs

and benefits, associated with the project, if it is perceived as unfair by the local community (Walker & Baxter, 2017). Finally, Ulbig (2002) found a strong relationship between political trust and the perception that the government is neutral, that it cares about what its citizens think, and that it pays attention to those who elects it, suggesting that it would be in the government's interest to take citizens' opinions into account when designing policies.

Similarly, institutional performance theories, is used to explain how satisfactory and poor performance from government institutions affects political trust (Chu, Collins, Lai & Xu, 2018; Espinal, Hartlyn, & Kelly, 2006; Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Miller, 1974). This theory suggests that if government institutions perform well, citizens are more likely to trust said government institutions, conversely, if the same institutions perform poorly, citizens are more likely to distrust them. Therefore, institutional performance theory suggests that citizens recognize whether or not government institutions are performing well, and are prepared to react correspondingly, leading to institutional pressure. This pressure will also likely spread to firms who will likely pursue green innovation in order to stay competitive, leading to further expansion of EPPs. In their research, Chu and colleagues (2018) analyzed this topic in China and found that customer- and competitive pressure does, in fact, effect green innovation, and that such innovation led to improved financial performance, which in turn alleviated institutional pressure, increasing trust in the process.

Both theories suggest a link between the government and the people whereas the former must maintain transparency and meet citizen expectations while developing EPPs to make future projects straightforward, and therefore constitutes *why* EPPs might affect political trust. Procedural fairness is an important factor for the political success of an EPP, and proximity to a project, for instance wind power, will see an increased necessity for perceived transparency compared to those who are less affected. On the other hand, contrary to previous research where the wider population was included, institutional performance is expected to be judged negatively by the local communities *due to* development of green innovation, despite any positive effects it generates for the wider population.

3.4 Theories on Citizen Participation and Polarization

As a result of poorly perceived fairness and performance, citizens could attempt to increase their *participation* in the matter, hoping to change the outcome, or at least the process, and

provide their insights and opinions on a given policy or project. If this fails, it may lead to a *polarization* of politics. If the incumbent government is unable to meet the expectations of the citizens in recent EPPs in terms of siting processes and the following completion of the project, increased support for niche parties with a noticeably different set of policies compared to mainstream parties might ensue.

When citizens disagree with a with a policy or a project, there are several methods they may employ to sway opinions. They may work/volunteer for a non-governmental organization, or engage in public issue advocacy; they may attend a rally, demonstration, or protest; they may contact any elected official in their district; or they may take a more passive approach and post views on political issues on social media. For this reason, energy systems have over the years faced not only an increasing number of challenges such as rapid fossil fuel depletion, greenhouse emissions, and nuclear risks, but also nontechnological issues like governance, *participation*, and the role of the people (van der Schoor & Scholtens, 2015; Santamouris et al., 2007). This development has led to rapid deployment of EPPs, which has been faced with various forms of participation be it positive participation through support for its environmental benefits, to negative participation in the form of resistance through, for instance protests (Huijts, Molin & Steg, 2012). One of the factors that lead to this kind of participation is political trust, although it has proven to be a complex link, for while it is proven that that high levels of trust is associated with higher levels of participation, low levels of trust is also related to higher levels of participation, although with less institutionalized political processes and more with protests (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). While varying levels of trust may initiate participation, participation itself may influence degrees of political trust itself either through fostering confidence in the government, or by causing disillusionment in the process (Finkel, Sabatini & Bevis, 2000; Putnam, 1993), likely based on whether the experience of participation is deemed positive or negative.

If an individual's political trust, in the aftermath of citizen participation, is lower than it previously was, there is a risk of *polarization*, a process in which opposition towards a cause increases. In two-party systems, this would manifest in the tension of its binary political ideologies and identities, or in multi-party system, it would usually manifest as a shift away from centre parties, towards the edges of the political scale. Over time, there has

been a growth of significant ideological differences, which has increasingly shaped competition among political parties as they seek to garner political support among the people, giving rise to historically minor political parties (Carter, 2013; Spoon, Hobolt & De Vries, 2013). In Germany, this has resulted in an electoral upswing for the Greens and the populist radical right on grounds of environmental concerns (Otteni & Weisskircher, 2021). Political trust is a major factor for this phenomena, and there are two major reasons for this according to Hetherington and his colleague, Rudolph (2018, pp. 583-584). First, partisans' increased hostility towards the opposing party has led to polarized political trust, as people are usually unwilling to trust people, or institutions, they do not favor politically (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018). On the other hand, those of the same opinion or social group is usually considered more trustworthy. This also applies to an individual's trust in the government, whereas they are more likely to display distrust towards an incumbent who do not share their identity or political preferences (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018). Second, is a decision-making phenomenon called motivated reasoning, where an individual is more likely to process information or evidence that is in line with their own bias, which enables them to reach the conclusion they themselves desire (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018). Thus, it is safe to assume that if an individual decides to partake in protests, or social media groups, designed to oppose a policy, or an EPP, it is likely that both the factors presented by Hetherington and Rudolph will be realized, thus leading to further polarization.

Similar to the two previous theories, participation and polarization suggests a link between the government and the people; however, while the other focused on *why* this link affects political trust, these constitutes *how* EPPs might affect political trust as it is likely to already be low when these take effect. Granted, participation could take place when political trust is high when people believe that their actions influence decision-making processes; however, while this is interesting, the level of political trust in the wake of participation will be more important. Polarization on the other hand is mostly a result of low levels of political trust as people are more likely to disapprove of **future** projects or policies when their trust has been weakened by the incumbent government.




Figure 1 Factors for decline of political trust

Taking into account these insights and expectations, we have the following factors: perceptions of the *procedural fairness* of EPP siting processes in terms of transparency and process; *institutional performance* in terms of how the local community assesses EPP siting, construction, completion, and outcomes, as well as possible involvement from other institutions; *citizen participation* in terms of how and why citizens chose to partake in the process; and *polarization* in terms of whether or not an EPP can alter voting behavior, political preferences, and trust in those who support development. These factors will aid the thesis in its important investigation and documentation of how EPPs disrupt political trust in locals policy opponents.

3.5 Policy Opponents and their Strategies

Chapter 2.5 briefly mentioned literature that discussed policy opponents, including who they are, what their strategies are, and that their attitudes change across stages of policy implementation. And because the thesis aims to explore how the four abovementioned factors for declining political trust influence policy opponents, it is important to first understand them, starting with who they are.

Wherever there are proponents, there are most likely opponents to face them. In their paper, Cheon and Urpelainen (2013), argues that support for policies is most influential

in the absence of opposition; however, as support grows, so does opposition. This increase in opposition will affect supporters' influence on policy change, and likely halt its progress. However, their article focused on industry and manufacturing opposing new environmental policies that would hamper their production; therefore, the motivation for opposition varies from the individuals who oppose such policies within proximity of their homes. Still, the paper identifies the proponents as renewable energy producers who profit economically from such policies. Moreover, an argument can be made that an increase in civil opposition groups could have a similar effect on proponents' influence on policy change when their efforts reach a wider audience who may sympathize with their cause.

Civil opposition has generated several strategies over the years that are often utilized in order to influence policy change. Werners et al. (2010) examined the strategies of the individual policy opponent, as well as supporter, against water policy change in Hungary and the Netherlands and found a fivefold distinction of strategies; however, this part will focus exclusively on the opponents' strategies. Their first (1) strategy was to create challenging ideas that highlighted the unwanted situation that such a policy change would have in the area. This strategy aims to undermine public technical experts' assessment of policy results with their own assessments, often built on scientific research journals. The second (2) strategy was for groups of actors to come together and form coalitions with the intent to pool their resources, develop common ideas, as well as opposing supporters' ideas. This was initiated by one, or several, figureheads who were informed of the situation, as it usually came as a shock to the average actor in the region. This then allowed these actors to formulate their critique and organize more effectively. Third (3), it was seen as important to recognize and exploit windows of opportunity to change the course of a policy. Here, local actors would vote in an election with the goal to disrupt the ongoing water policy change. This changed the course of the policy towards a more conventional, rather than a fundamental, solution. Next, the fourth (4) strategy was for opponents to utilize multiple venues. Here, they found that the opposition, in both cases, would use the media, including the internet, they would also issue public communications with politicians, as well as threatening, or going through, with legal action. Finally, the fifth (5) strategy was for opponents to orchestrate and manage large networks. In each opposing coalition, the leaders proved useful networkers as they managed to expand their networks, allowing them

to lobby business networks, and national and regional politicians; to challenge the technical basis for the policy through connections with specialists, such as engineers, ecologists, etc.; and to gain counter expertise on the rationality of flood retention through scientists. In sum, a policy opponent is someone who is actively against and, either publicly, or privately, voice their opposition towards policies.

So far, the paper has identified *how* policy opponents emerge, *who* they are, and *what* their strategies are, but there is yet another argument, which considers how the attitudes of policy opponents change across stages of a policy. To illustrate this argument, Jagers et al. (2020) examined legitimacy, pertaining to process and decision-making, across the three phases of the implementation of congestion taxes in Gothenburg, Sweden. These three phases are the input (policy formulation), throughput (policy implementation), and output (monitoring and evaluation). They found that whether legitimacy was high or low in the input phase would affect policy support in the remaining phases. However, legitimacy on the current phase was more significant than legitimacy on the previous phase as experiences would outweigh expectations. At this point, both the previous, and the present phase would influence legitimacy of the policy, which in turn would affect the support for the policy. It is therefore likely that participants in the interviews will have different answers based on whether they are from Haramsøya or Bjerkreim, considering that each case is in a different policy implementation stage.

4. Specified Aim and Research Question

The foundation of this thesis is discourse, understood as collective perceptions of reality, expressed through statements from opponents, whose perceptions of decisions and processes might influence elections and make EPP policies difficult to adopt in the future. The purpose is to uncover their opinions in the debate surrounding environmental policy projects, and explore how various decisions and processes affects their trust in decision-makers and politicians. Therefore, the research question for this thesis becomes:

How does environmental policy projects affect political trust among policy opponents?

The research question considers the theoretical expectations, whereas there are four factors which, according to previous studies, are known to have some effect on political trust. Despite this knowledge, Norwegian decision-makers, as seen in the news and on social media, continues to make decisions and processes that that anger those who live within proximity of an EPP, more specifically wind turbines. Although these EPPs are developed to hinder climate change, there are consequences for local communities, their economy, and their nature, which creates policy opponents and negatively affects their political trust. Norway is still developing green alternatives to power; however, policy opponents, through their various actions, might hurt trust in incumbents and political trust in general as they bring attention to the case, introducing the wider population to these issues. This could, according to Cheon and Urpelainen (2013), affect supporter's influence on the policy and might completely halter its progress. Therefore, it is relevant to take a discursive approach, and discuss the issues with policy opponents whose perceptions of decisions and processes might make such policies difficult to adopt in the future.

5. Methodology

This thesis takes a qualitative approach towards theory testing with the use of case studies. The method design was chosen to enable an analysis of how policy opponents' political trust changes in the wake of an EPP and which factors affects it. In order to gather data for the case studies, the thesis utilized semi-structured interviews with policy opponents who either live, or own a home, close to a completed EPP, or policy opponents who live, or own a home, close to a planned EPP. The data was then analyzed thematically to allow insight into what the locals themselves consider important topics when it comes to EPP siting.

5.1 Research Design

Originally, the thesis was thought to be a comparative study, whereas Haramsøya would be the primary case as a result of the finished wind turbines on Haramsfjellet, while Bjerkreim would act as a control case because of the failed concession on Faurefjell. This would allow the thesis to better understand how each factor affects political trust as there would likely be differing results. However, before the interviews happened, politics in Bjerkreim had changed, and the debate on whether to build wind turbines on Faurefjell is back, leaving the future uncertain, and thus making the results from each case more similar. This seemingly leaves the thesis with a research design more similar to a case study of two different communities. However, while it is true that the differences between cases have been reduced to the point of it being a simple case study, it was shown, through research done by Jegers et al. (2020), that policy opponents' opinions on a policy varies across stages of implementation. Wind turbines on Haramsfjellet have already been constructed and is currently in the output stage of implementation. Meanwhile, wind turbines on Faurefjell remains in the input stage with uncertainty on whether it will go on to the next stage of implementation. Therefore, this thesis argues that the analysis is more comparative in nature where the comparison is about two cases at different stages of the policy implementation process, which in this case is when a project is planned, and after the project is completed. The decision to limit the number of cases to two, rather than analyzing a larger number of areas affected by EPPs to various degrees, was primarily due to time restrictions, but also budgetary restrictions.

The population in the study was several representatives from communities on Haramsøya and in Bjerkreim recruited through word-of-mouth and the Facebook groups

“NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!” [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] and “Nei til vindkraftverk på Faurefjell i Bjerkreim” [No to wind turbines on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim]. The chosen research design seeks to gain insight into policy opponents’ opinions and attitudes (as opposed to the general public) and therefore utilized a purposive, nonrandom sample of potential representatives based on their proximity, participation, and knowledge on wind turbines and their negative effects on the local community. The decision to focus on policy opponents is intended to learn how people who actively oppose certain environmental policies think and behave and because they may, through the use of media, hurt trust in incumbents and political trust in general, and might halt policy changes as the wider population is informed on the case. Polls on the general Norwegian’s opinions on environmental policies, more specifically wind power, is readily available; however, these do not typically ask questions as to how and why some rate their support towards wind power poorly in their surveys. Therefore, this thesis will not represent the average Norwegian’s political trust in the wake on EPPs, but rather presents an example of a political opponent within proximity of such a project.

5.2 Choice of Data

Interview answers, gathered through semi-structured interviews, will be the primary source of data in this thesis. There are several reasons why the thesis chose interviews, for instance, (1) it is open to the participants interpretation of a situation, more so than a survey, and allows research to “see through the eyes of the people studied” (Bryman, 2016, pp. 393-394). The knowledge, and range of emotions the local communities on Haramsøya and Bjerkreim possess is difficult to comprehend through quantitative means; however, other qualitative means, such as behavioral experiments could have been considered. Also, by quantifying human emotions, the possibility for the interviewee’s freedom to share their own perspectives on a case is removed (Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 67). In other words, interview answers, compared to quantitative data gathering, highlights the participants’ ability to themselves raise the issues that matter most to them, in accordance with the overarching topics, which allows for more in-depth issues to be raised at the participants’ whim. Moreover, (2) interviews provide more context from a situation through minor details, such as social setting, events, the people, etc. than other data, such as surveys (Bryman, 2016, p. 394). The chosen data-gathering method for this thesis, semi-structured interviews, is

therefore flexible and allows for deviations, such as probing, whereas the researcher could ask the participant to clarify their answers, or to dig deeper, based on participant's answer (Bryman, 2016, p. 467; Lune & Berg, 2017, p. 67). The provided context allows the thesis to place emphasis on answers in the data, revealing which values, beliefs, and assumptions are most important to the participants. Another (3) benefit of interview data is that it provides an opportunity to consider processes and participants' opinions on a topic over years, depending on the questions asked, rather than recent opinions (Bryman, 2016, p. 396). These opinions on wind turbines and their effects on political trust is a process that the participants will find easier to explain in the interview format, compared to, for instance, a survey where they are limited to certain options, which will provide the thesis with a richer result.

Despite this, there are some critiques to be aware of, for example, (1) the research may be considered subjective whereas the researcher decides what is considered important or not in the data (Bryman, 2016, p. 398). However, participant answers in this thesis agreed across various topics, which reduced the risk of researcher bias. The risk of picking themes that benefits the argument were lowered, considering the importance of all themes for the research question. Further criticism is the fact that (2) qualitative research is difficult to replicate because of its unstructured nature and lack of procedures (Bryman, 2016, pp. 398-399). While this is true, all questions from the interviews are documented in the appendix, all procedures are followed, and the people in the same position as those who participated are easy to find for future research, or replication. Finally, (3) it is difficult to generalize a qualitative study, such as interviews, because of the small number of participants that are represented in the study. However, according to Bryman (2016, p. 399), a qualitative study could, in some cases, find "generalizable features" that can be applied to others in a similar situation, in this case policy opponents who live in proximity of an EPP. Therefore, this paper argues that, while the local communities on Haramsøya and Bjerkreim are not representative for the average Norwegian on the topic of EPPs, it can be seen as a good example of a certain group of people, namely policy opponents who live, or owns property, close to such projects.

5.3 Data Gathering

In order to gain better insight into how EPPs affect trust among policy opponents, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 representatives from Haramsøya and 8 from Bjerkreim, with one interview being done with a couple, for a total of 17 participants over 16 interviews. Policy opponents was, for this thesis' participants, defined as someone who is actively against and, either publicly, or privately, voiced their opposition towards wind turbines being built in proximity of their homes, more specifically, on Haramsfjellet and Faurefjell. Participants were selected from opposition groups on Facebook and through local networks, and came from a wide variety of professional backgrounds, including civil servants, private sector workers, as well as farmers. They were contacted through either Facebook Messenger, or phone calls, where a meeting was scheduled. Interviews were conducted mostly face-to-face, apart from 1 online meeting on Microsoft Teams, whereas 14 took place in participants' homes, and 2 took place at participant's work. Each interview lasted, on average, 60 minutes each and took place in Norwegian. Answers were recorded by note-taking and UiO's own dictaphone app "Nettskjema-diktafon" with consent.

To guide the participants through the topics of the thesis, an interview guide with questions modeled after the theoretical model was made, whereas participants were asked two overarching questions for each of the four topics - procedural fairness, institutional performance, citizen participation and polarization. These questions asked, for instance: "What do you know about the process surrounding the wind power development? Have you tried to learn more?", "What is your impression on the results from the wind power development? Economically? Socially? Etc.", "Have you, in any way shape or form participated in the opposition against this development? Why/why not? What did you think when it (did not) work out?", or "Who informed you on this case? (Why) has it been useful?" In addition to these main questions, the interview guide contains guiding questions in the case of the participants struggling to voice their opinions and thoughts on a given topic, for instance: "What is your opinion on the police's involvement in connection with the development on Haramsfjellet?", "Are you a member of "No to wind turbines on Haramsøya"/ "No to wind turbines on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim"? How did you hear about this group? Why did you join?" or "Have you paid attention to wind power supporters' arguments? What do you think about these?" Finally, the participant was asked if they had

anything they wished to add to the interview, before being asked to place their own political trust on a scale from 1 to 10, with reasoning, after being given the definition provided in this thesis. The reason for including a question of quantitative nature in the end was to measure each participants' own opinions of their trust, and which element had the largest effect.

More often than not, one of the two overarching questions from each topic was not asked during the interview when the participants themselves had already answered it earlier in the interview, or if they had a lot to share on the first overarching question. Meanwhile, some of the guiding questions were asked, regardless of the participants' activity. These questions were asked because of their relevance to the research questions, and if the topic was briefly mentioned by the participant, they were asked to elaborate further. Despite these brief modifications, the interviews remained largely similar overall, except for one of the 16 interviews as it was conducted with restricted time and had to compromise on the topic of citizen participation. While this interview lacks a topic, it does not influence the findings in any way, other than having less results on the topic.

5.4 Data Analysis

Finally, to analyze the gathered data, the thesis will utilize a thematic analysis of the content in the interviews. This process involves splitting each interview into themes as to see which topics the participants usually discuss when asked a question. According to Bryman (2016, p. 586), the framework for this kind of analysis is to look for certain characteristics of each theme, such as *repetitions, indigenous typologies, metaphors and analogies, and similarities and differences* whereas the first, repetition is the most common criteria. He then presents the six steps that are usually taken in a thematic analysis (pp. 587-588); (1) The researcher must first familiarize himself with the data material acquired. (2) He must then start coding the material, giving names to short pieces of text. (3) Next, he must find themes that are similar and combine them into higher-order themes, whilst writing summaries for these themes. (4) Then the researcher finds sub-themes for each of the higher-order themes, whilst working towards giving each theme enough data to provide meaningful insight. (5) Examining the links between each theme is the next step as this shows whether different answers or participant situations lead to different conclusions. (6) Finally, the researcher must create a compelling narrative built on the insights gathered from the previous stages,

and make sure to justify each of the themes. This framework will aid in the utilization of each interview as, while not all may be quoted, each will have an impact in the results.

6. Background

This chapter intends to quickly give a brief background on wind power development in Norway, and how it is done, in addition to both cases, the siting, and subsequent construction of the wind power facility on Haramsøy, and the siting process in Bjerkreim.

6.1 Wind power in Norway

In 2015, the “Grønne Skiftet” [The Green Shift] was named word of the year by the Norske Språkrådet [Language Council of Norway] as it saw much attention in the media and research and has since then been popular in Norwegian political rhetoric on the topic of environmental policies (Olerud & Halleraker, 2021). In Norway, the term sees a shift where society must grow and develop within the tolerance limit of Nature, as well as a shift to products and services that carries fewer negative consequences for climate and environment. Additionally, as a member of EU’s internal energy market, Norway had to comply with the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive, whereas Norway had to meet 67,5% of final energy consumption with energy from renewable sources by 2020 (Skjærseth & Rosendal, 2022).

To adhere to the shift towards more renewable energy, Norway joined Sweden’s market-based system of “El certificates,” otherwise known as “green certificates” until 2020 (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2022a). In Norway, this means, for every produced MWh a power plant is issued a green certificate from the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), which power suppliers, and certain electricity customers, including businesses and industries, are required to purchase. The reason for joining this system was to entice power producers to develop renewable energy, such as wind, water, and solar, as opposed to non-renewable energy, such as coal or oil, by making it more profitable. To be eligible to this system, the power plant had to be operational by the end of 2021. Norway joined this system January 1st, 2012, and remained until 2020, to which it had increased its overall production of renewable energy by 19TWh, for a grand total of 155TWh renewable energy (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2022a; 2022c). This period also saw the majority of Norway’s wind turbine development, and at the start of 2022 it had built about 4700MW of wind power, producing on average 15TWh, enough to supply around 773.000 Norwegian households (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2021). These wind turbines are primarily built along Norway’s coastline, with a few operating further inland.

The process of developing wind power in Norway consists of several steps whereas a private developer, if building a facility where the capacity will exceed 10MW, must take the initiative and obtain a permit from NVE. The first (1) step then is for a developer to report their case in accordance with regulations on impact assessment. Next (2), after consulting the report, NVE determines an impact assessment program which describes certain topics the developer must investigate in more detail. If the developer, after seeing this program, decides to move on with the project, they must (3) send an application together with a completed impact assessment to NVE for processing. After this (4), NVE assesses the case comprehensively and makes a decision based on the application, impact assessment, comments, and NVE's expertise on the topic of wind power. This decision can be appealed by anyone with a legal interest in the case; however, if NVE decides to uphold the decision after assessing these complaints, the case (5) is sent to OED for final processing. Finally, (6) before the developer can start construction, NVE, together with Miljøtilsynet [Norwegian Environmental Protection Agency], must approve the transport- and construction plan (MTA), and the details around the plan for the project (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2022b). This makes NVE and OED the de facto concession authorities of Norway.

Concession processing was halted in April 2019 due to community backlash in various areas for wind power development (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2020). It was later reintroduced in June 2021 where cases that had already started could resume at the request of the host municipality (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2021). One year later, in 2022, concession processes for new wind power development were opened, if the host municipality consents to development (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2022). These changes have altered concession processing over time to be more in line with local considerations due to feedback on previous projects. The step-by-step run-through above reflects the current concession processing.

6.2 Process on Haramsøy

The local community on Haramsøy, an island in western Norway consisting of just under 600 inhabitants, has the last couple of years fought a battle to prevent the construction of sixteen, later changed to eight, wind turbines with an expected production of 127.18 GWh; however, to no avail as, at the time of writing, these have finished construction. This process

dates back to 2005, when the then municipal council of Haram (Ålesund municipality as of 2019) advised NVE against the construction of wind power on Haramsøya (Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat, 2008, pp.13). Yet, in 2008, NVE gave Haram Kraft permission to construct Haram wind park, and OED affirmed NVE's decision in late 2009. That same year, the municipal council of Haram met to vote on whether to accept the wind park or not. Here, the majority voted in favor *given that the wind park on Haramsøya came second to the larger, ocean-based Havsul II wind park project*. The Havsul II project was later scrapped. Despite this, the wind park on Haramsfjellet was built, going against local democratic decision-making (Ofstad, 2020).

After this vote not much happened, not even construction; however, the concession deadline was continuously postponed, and the issue resurfaced in 2019. At this time, the local community made an effort to fight back as seen through the creation of the popular Facebook group "NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!" [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] garnering over 34.000 members, at the time of writing, from various parts of Norway. Moreover, there have been several demonstrations, including blocking roads to the mountain to delay construction, leading to a short arrest; blocking the docks, preventing construction vehicles from disembarking; hunger strikes; and artistic imagery of dead protected bird species (Bjørnset & Sagen, 2020; Bjørnset et al., 2020; Ofstad, 2020). There has also been made attempts at formal resistance in the form of the courts, where the group "NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!" [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] had hoped to expose whether the decision was lawfully made, but, in the end, they lost the case (Ofstad, 2021). There was seemingly little to no action done from the supporters' side in this case.

6.3 Process in Bjerkreim

Similar to Haramsøya, the local community in Bjerkreim, with its roughly 2.800 inhabitants, have seen some opponents fight a long battle to hinder development of wind power on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim; however, contrary to Haramsøya, this battle is not over. Rogaland county, which Bjerkreim is part of, is Norway's second largest wind power county with over 243 turbines divided among 16 facilities, but the number of concessions since 2000, specifically 18, gives Rogaland first place (Søndeland & Ellingsen, 2020). The planned wind turbines on Faurefjell are expected to produce around 228 GWh. Originally, Hybritech

applied for concession in 2013 for 20 wind turbines at 120m each, which was given by NVE in 2014, this decision was appealed and confirmed by OED, who added three conditions to the concession in 2017. Later that year, Norsk Vind AS took over the concession for Faurefjell (NVE, n.d.). In 2020, NVE accepted increasing production to the aforementioned 228 GWh, with 12 turbines at 200m each (Søndeland & Ellingsen, 2020). In late 2021, Norsk Vind failed to have the wind power facility on Faurefjell operational by December 31., the final deadline given by NVE, because the municipality never gave them a disposition, meaning they had to apply for a new concession. However, negotiations with the municipality resumed in March 2022 (Hovland, 2022; Motvind Norge, 2022).

These processes went by peacefully, until it surfaced in 2019, consequently creating the opposition (Søndeland & Ellingsen, 2020); however, compared to Haramsøy, there have been less sensational news from the opposition in Bjerkreim. Their opposition largely consists of editorials, including opinion pieces and letters to the editor, as well as some protests (Espeland, 2022; Tiller, 2022; Vassbø, 2022; Vaule, 2022). Another way the opposition attempted to stop development was in 2019, when they tactically voted for the incumbent mayor of Bjerkreim, who, according to the Valgomat [voting aid application] disagreed with the statement that there should be built more wind parks in Bjerkreim (Valgomat 2019, 2019). And yet, the mayor would, without mandate from the municipal council in Bjerkreim, negotiate with Norsk Vind on the topic of Faurefjell in March 2022 (Motvind Norge, 2022; Odland, 2022a). Moreover, despite the presence of opposition, there are still some, more specifically landowners, who, according to Norsk Vind, support development of wind power, and have been in contact with Norsk Vind to try and offer their lands for development of a new wind park (Odland, 2022b).

7. Results and Discussion

In this section, the findings from each conducted interview will be presented in five parts, wherein lies several themes, as well as participants' closing statements. After each part of findings, these findings will be analyzed and discussed in relation to the theoretical framework and research question. The aim is, according to the research question, to explore how EPPs affect political trust in policy opponents. After presenting the interviews, the first part will discuss perceived process transparency among the participants. Subsequently, assessment of construction, completion, and outcomes will be presented and discussed. Afterwards, how, and why, participants chose to partake in the opposition will be discussed. Finally, the chapter, in accordance with literature, will look at information flow and differing voting behavior as told by the participants.

7.1 Procedural Fairness

As seen in the theoretical framework, procedural fairness theory suggests that fair and democratic decision-making procedures positively affects political trust, whilst poor and undemocratic decision-making procedures negatively affects political trust. Because of the strong link between perceived procedural fairness and political trust, this theory is often utilized when discussing political trust and EPPs. It shows that transparent and considerate decisions would lead to a more successful EPP, and that it would be in the government's interest to take the citizens' opinions into account when designing policies.

This is what this subchapter seeks to investigate in these results, which dives into participants' perception of process transparency; poor information sharing in advance of development start; ease of democratic involvement in the case; as well as perceived fairness in politics and elected officials. The subchapter will then discuss these results according to the procedural fairness theory.

7.1.1 Non-transparent Siting Process

Across all interviews, there is an almost unison agreement on the fact that the siting process was, in fact, non-transparent and came as a surprise for the inhabitants in each community:

It was then [in 2017] that the snowball started rolling slightly without it having been sent to affected parties like us who live on Ulla [who] consider ourselves affected because it will have large consequences for us.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I know that the developer is obliged to inform those who are- those who are you could say affected by the development and here there was a demand for if there is a change they are obliged to inform, and this failed completely here on the development on Haramsøya.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It [concessions for development on Faurefjell] laid dead and you don't think any more about it, until it BANG suddenly comes back up again when it says in the local newspapers that now- now things are going on.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I don't think there has been a neighborhood warning even here, because you kind of don't have the right to any- you have to stay up-to date yourself because a lot of it is public information which is available from NVE, but you don't get it directly as a neighbor because you don't border the wind park.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Still, despite the initial shock, most respondents show a desire to learn more about the process and to stay informed; however, gaining insight is not always particularly easy with the large number of documents and data in such cases. Because of this, some respondents report that it was difficult to stay up-to-date on the information provided:

I have tried to get my hands on all documents that are available, but it is locked away.

[Haramsøya rep.]

This concession - every concession is available online, a good amount, but not everything, and about insight, we didn't figure it out before it was quite late [...] it felt like it was on purpose that we were not supposed to know much, at least that was the impression.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It is a little difficult to familiarize oneself with these things... there is so much information other than the development itself in the way it is set up, when it comes to production and that we get additional power or balanced power when the wind doesn't blow, it's hard to find information about such things, it isn't something they inform about, and you must figure it out yourself, and I think few people understand it.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

This has been going on for many years and I... have made an effort to try to learn but it is... in a hectic workday quite heavy material to go through.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Another reason why participants find it difficult to stay on top of the information is the language. One interview noted how some of the documents are written in English, even when those requesting the documents for review are Norwegian:

This one, consultant- no, MTA detail-plan it came- it was the last to arrive, which is sound – acoustics and sound – and it... is in English, and it should be possible to get it in Norwegian, rather than English.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

However, these were not all the complications. Most of those who participated, from both areas, mentioned how plans had changed over time, whereas various parts of the plan, such as wind turbine characteristics and roads, were completely different from the original:

We, those who are affected were not informed that these turbines were twice as large compared to the plan, among other things. They went up from 75 meters to 150 meters tall, and that is horrible that they don't inform us about it.

[Haramsøya rep.]

What I reacted to in the addendum message and such, was that it changed and there were different turbines, different heights, so it was not the project we started with.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The wind turbines jumped from 20 turbines of 120 meters to 12 turbines of 200 meters.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

They take a larger area than they said they would in the MTA-plan, and this has happened with every wind powerplants here in Bjerkreim that they take wider roads, and the footprint is much larger, but they just do it, and I don't know why, but it is easier to ask forgiveness than permission is what I get the impression of.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

They had only impact assessed 120 meter turbines and that is what the municipal council said yes to, then I called Skorpen and others in Norsk Vind and asked a bit what they actually had planned to set up, and then he said that it would be 190-200 meter turbines that would be built there.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Finally, one participant in Bjerkreim struggles to understand who owns the turbines as this is not as transparent as they would like it to be:

The owner structures... they hide them, sort of, in many... wrappings so it is difficult to track who owns the wind park. Because it isn't Norsk Vind in the aftermath, they start the whole thing and then they send it out either during or actually probably before they start the process up here.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.1.2 Selective Information Sharing and Consent Gathering

Exclusive to interviewees on Haramsøya, is the theme of secrecy and who is told about the process before it becomes public knowledge. Here, some note how developers pay certain

households within proximity if they consent to construction, despite failure to remain within the noise requirements, and that is how they themselves first learn about the process – from neighbors:

I didn't know anything when I out of pure coincidence learned about it in February 2019, and that was from a neighbor on Ullahammaren who had learned about it, that they were building and that they would receive 30.000 kroners to accept the noise requirements. That was the background. So everything was for me... for me that was perceived as secret.

[Haramsøya rep.]

You could say that, when it comes to the general knowledge of it- the process around it [wind turbine development], I had little knowledge about it before the developer actually took contact, written and orally to homeowners.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The neighbors here, they were actually given an offer for compensation because of too high noise levels, and it was fairly random which ones of the neighbors that got this, and they got this offer of compensation, if they accepted this, for several thousand kroners, and there was only one household that accepted this.

[Haramsøya rep.]

And some, mention secret dealings between landowners and developer, whereas landowners must remain silent and cannot share details of the deal with anyone in the community:

We didn't have the rights, because we are not landowners, but we are owners, because we own homes out here on Ullahammaren, but Ullahammaren wasn't part of what the landowners knew about, because they only knew about things they were paid to know in order to accept the project.

[Haramsøya rep.]

A developer, or an interested party in the state perhaps, go to landowners, picking out individuals, taking direct contact, and this happens in secrecy, and they are not allowed to inform those who are around, neighbors or such, and they lay down the basis there before it has come to public treatment or any sort of announcements.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Landowners, they were oriented to a larger degree than us normal settlers, and even if they too probably received these papers in the start and had little faith that this was to be realized, they had a chance to orient us about it, but that wasn't actually done. It was a very closed system.

[Haramsøya rep.]

They [the developers] have worked together with landowners and rights to lands in the shadows and those who have- the landowners were told that could not tell anyone because they were deathly scared that this would stop them

[Haramsøya rep.]

Finally, one interviewee claims that investors have easier access to information and decision-making, in regard to wind power development, compared to those who oppose it:

I also believe that... the investors, those who have the money, development interests, and the apparatus surrounding them, have a completely different access to those who make the decisions than us the others, including organizations or private persons, either Naturnvernforbundet or our little organization.

[Haramsøya rep.]

7.1.3 (Un)democratic Siting Process

When asked about whether the process is perceived as democratic or not, the majority of participants agreed that the processes are less democratic than they would anticipate in a democracy:

I think that we should have the opportunity to say no, and we did not get that.

[Haramsøya rep.]

There was a big misbalance in the opportunity to reach out with arguments, and a big reluctance to accept our arguments, and I found this very arrogant often. We often [...] send in a lot to NVE, before where we said- perhaps even more after and during the construction, that this and this is happening and other complaints we point out, and then what NVE does is sending the request along to Zephyr or Haram Kraft and then they answer and then that is the final answer when it comes to that matter. This is how we experience it.

[Haramsøya rep.]

No [it is not democratic], not unless you are politically engaged... and is part of a political party and go to group meetings or is part of the politics in any way, the only thing we others can do is to demonstrate, gather signatures and hand those in. I told the mayor that I wish there was a referendum in the municipality on whether the park should come or not, that would be something. Wouldn't that be fair?

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I have seen that everything we have sent in of complaints, including those with the "Nei til Faure"-group, none of it had an impact.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Some participants on Haramsøya, whose opposition to the wind turbines lost, argue that the process is already decided, thus making any attempts at democratic participation for naught:

The processes are weak, and the local democracy is not heard, and they do not care because they always find excuses... no matter what objection you may have, they find a way out because this is going to be built either way. So, the process is in reality decided.

[Haramsøya rep.]

This was basically a "rail process" because we had- every objection we came with then was, sort of, ignored and was not considered. This was apparently decided that this was going to be built.

[Haramsøya rep.]

And one mentions that knowing what actions to take to affect development is half the battle in this democratic process:

They don't stand there and show you where, who... do you have the right to form a complaint, can you be a part of the case? What rights do you have as an inhabitant that get this close to you? And that should have been on a different level, that we got better information.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Moreover, some participants on Haramsøya mentions how not only the individuals living on the island had little say on the matter, but also that the central government went ahead with the plan, despite the Haram municipality's decision:

They [then Haram municipality] were against... the ocean wind project, alternatively they could accept that BOTH, note BOTH, wind power on the mountain AND Havsul 2 could be built. And the word "both" is essential there because it means that the decision that was made in 2006 that Haram municipality said "no," Haram municipality council said "no" to singular development of... the one on the mountain, but the department- NVE complained about this to the department, and the department said then that Haram municipality had said "yes."

[Haramsøya rep.]

They would build Havsul first, and if they needed to build on the mountain in order to finish Havsul, then they [the municipality] could accept it, but they really weren't for it, and then the state went in with state area plan.

[Haramsøya rep.]

In 7.1.2, it is made clear that, on Haramsøy, developers approach landowners early to strike the initial concession deal; however, according to participants in Bjerkreim, not all landowners are positive towards these concessions. In this case, as one interviewee explain, developers can expropriate lands from their owners if they manage to gather enough signatures from other, surrounding, landowners, making the situation less democratic:

They [Hybritech] said that if they got a signature from the two last landowners, they could expropriate the rest, so we [landowners] are put in a bit of a check mate.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Another interviewee adds that, once a landowner signs, there is no option to change one's mind and opt out of the deal later:

And something that comes up with everyone I talk to, the landowners, who sign and later realize that this is not something I want to be a part of, there is no escape at all... no matter how many years into the future you think, they have your signature and... yeah.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Despite this, some of the participants, both those who utilized politics as well as otherwise, shows satisfaction with the democratic processes:

After we came into the system where we were oriented, we were to an extent informed by the authorities and Zephyr and on all those consultations that happened then, we could send in an objection. Then it was placement, for instance of the wind turbines, and those objections were taken partly into consideration as some of the wind turbines were placed further away... from the settlement on Ulla, at least the one on Ullahornet.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I must say that... it has been a good experience, and it has been interesting. There is a democracy, right? So I would like to say that we have been on municipal council meetings and have been welcome and- I mean there isn't anything that- right there I would say that we appreciate it. Absolutely.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

This shows that stopping the process of wind power development, despite having the ability to voice opinions in some matters, is difficult. Moreover, most noted how the impact assessment, whereas contractors determine the level of impact such development will have, was done poorly, sometimes on purpose, for the benefit of the developers, rather than the nearby communities.

There were deficiencies in the last analyses, I remember, especially regarding height and regarding noise, for instance, it said that it was likely that 34 households would get noise above the limits, but one had sort of not- that is, one did not have data for such large turbines at that time. One considered sizes that were unknown and then, when it says that it is likely that you would get noise above your limits and still give concession when those turbines are so large that they are not built yet, we think that there is a hole- that there is a hole in the factual basis there.

[Haramsøya rep.]

These impact analyses, to get started- because the time limit it- it would run out in New Years that year, so it had to- the wind turbines had to be operational before 1.1.2022, so they have little time, so then they had to- they took a couple of shortcuts to get to the finish line.

[Haramsøya rep.]

And then there is this about the reports they have had about predators and eagle-owls and mapping of... that. And this is done during the times of year and times when those characteristics- I mean, they are not optimal periods for the nature, these are more optimal periods for the developer because then you don't find as much.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

We have seen the noise measurements and such [...] and I think- they are used with calculations which are... sort of facilitated for wind turbines on plains and marshes in Denmark and in the Netherlands. They do not have data that corresponds to Norwegian [conditions].

[Bjerkreim rep.]

This is not something they can give feedback on either, even when they know the area better than those taking the measurements, often because they are not informed that an impact assessment is taking place.

No matter what we said, they just said that the report shows this, the report from, I believe it was Multiconsult, shows this, so they knew more about it [Fauna][sarcastic], those who had been there one to two days.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I did not receive any information that they were working on an impact assessment, and I lived here then. We weren't asked, we weren't informed about anything.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

These [...] papers and data for the project is a gloss image of how it will really be. We who work with agriculture know what its like to challenge nature in various ways and here they come trying to explain that "yeah, we're placing a road there where that mountain stands in that valley and there we just do so, and so, and so." [...] So, everything is explained in such a simplistic way [...] and I know that it is not how it works.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.1.4 Fairness in Politics

Results show that almost all participants made some comment on politics to various degrees. Interestingly, participants on Haramsøya and Bjerkreim seem to have a different focus whereas the former are more so concerned with central politics, and its perceived failure on the case:

And then [after Sylvi Listhaug left her post as OED Minister in early 2020] came in a totally useless Petroleum- and Energy minister whose name is Tina Bru... from Høyre. And she- the

first thing she did was to move our process along to get it started and started development on Haramsøya.

[Haramsøya rep.]

There was a Høyre-government that just went ahead here, so- so what I know is that there were some parties that tried to bring this case back up, while those sitting in government just went ahead to get this done. Erna even came to Ålesund when the verdict fell just to say that there was nothing to do here.

[Haramsøya rep.]

We had shifting governments and ministers who gladly promised that there would be none of this ugliness, but in reality they just held us busy with nice talk, is what we feel afterwards. This was decided with the green certificates many years ago that wind power was also to be built on land.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The government has kind of said that- handed the responsibility over to NVE- that “you know this, you can handle this,” so it is they who control these processes, so it is kind of-, but those who sat in the government, together with Petroleum and Energy- these ministers they were kind of sidelined... they just supported when it was brought up, and it was brought up on all possible points, but they testified to the importance getting this operational.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Whilst the latter almost exclusively focus on local and regional politics:

During the election I voted for Senterpartiet for the simple reason that the mayor, he said that he was- he is for wind turbines, and he always said that he is, but he also said that he would vote against the Faure Park, because he thought it was enough- and so on and so forth, and this he did, until now. He suddenly flipped.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

In advance of this being discussed in the municipal council, the mayor negotiated a sort of deal with the concession applicant for Faurefjell, and this I have wondered, if it affected whether they got a positive answer from the municipality and a positive attitude from the municipality.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

They [the developers] probably just expect the county to fix this [roads and infrastructure], as far as I know, and they just expect someone to fix it, it's not something- I have not seen any indication that they applied for any of this there, so it's weird.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

This is a very demanding case so it should be moved away from the municipality, and this is what they should conclude with. And then, I saw some of those Høyre people who sat there, especially one of them, and I really just felt sorry for them.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

While these citations critique politicians, and their role in the development, some participants across both communities, explicitly discuss perceived corruption, including bribery from developers to politicians to turn their opinions on whether to grant concessions or not:

So we went ahead and got a meeting with the then Petroleum- and Energy minister, who of course wouldn't promise anything, and then he left his post 14 days later, and that was probably a strategic choice by the Solberg government to get rid of a bothersome- who tried to get into the case, and then they enacted policies that made FRP leave the government and then you got [...] Tina Bru, and then- yeah, it reminds me very much of corruption.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It was very strategic from Norsk Vind when the mayor presents this deal three days before a decision is to be made in the municipal council, can you believe it? I was simply shocked. So right there and then I was paralyzed over the whole ordeal, and I couldn't say anything but my opinion of why I didn't want these wind turbines here because this deal sunk into my head, and I just thought that it was corrupt I would say. It just seemed crazy in my opinion.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

The mayor, in cooperation with the councilor, on their own negotiated power reduction for the inhabitants in Bjerkreim in exchange for construction on Faurefjell and this he sends out three days before send-off now on Monday to the municipal council. And he does not have any mandate from the municipal council to complete these negotiations... and so I think... is this democracy?

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.1.5 Closing Statements and Trust Changes

Close to the end of the interview, participants were asked if they had anything they wanted to add, and some closing statements had to do with procedural fairness:

One wakes up too late, that I have seen, we must find a way to pay better attention to what is happening around us before things are decided and a place one can go to pay attention to hearings [...] and we realize the things we take for granted, and how we have it, and how we should have these areas... we don't know how good things are before they are threatened.

[Haram rep.]

This really came in at the end, and the load on people who live in the area before there even is development is just colossal... you have adults calling me, crying and desperate and... you lose your entire joy of life... and the desperation and the feeling of powerlessness, that really needs to come to the forefront and what we do about the psychic health of people around, and that isn't even a topic... you should just get used to it sort of [...] it's just... tragic.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Finally, participants were asked to rate their own political trust, whereas 1 is low and 10 is high, using the definition provided in chapter 3.1, and some participants noted how it had been lowered due to procedural fairness issues:

The trust is on 0 and this has been continuously reinforced by a constant exploitation by the bureaucracy, technocracy, and directocracy, that means that the people have been disarmed, and does not know what is happening either, I think.

[Haram rep.]

Generally, I would like to have a high level of trust, but when it comes to energy politics it is between 2 and 3 [...] I am basically more skeptical towards what politicians say... in my view... there are a few strong personalities in all political organizations that controls them and when you then see a cohesion between interest groups and politicians, then we need to consider if it's proper.

[Haram rep.]

I think I'll go for a, based on everything I have said, a 3... so it is lost, we were disillusioned from this process [...] I think I put it low, because I still have a hope that the democracy in Norway is better than in many other places, but this wasn't very democratic.

[Haram rep.]

I think I'll put it in the middle of the tree [5] [...] It would be wrong to set anything else, it becomes... yes, I think I'll put it in the middle of the tree [...] I have faith in the political system, but I am very disappointed in this case... I'm starting to have a weakened trust, but I choose to give them a chance... but things are happening that happens in countries you don't want to be compared to and I bet others already said this.

[Haram rep.]

It is very low, and I am simply amazed by how little they need to know to have a political job [...] they should have to take a test, and if they can't answer a basic thing, then they shouldn't be allowed to be a politician... basically, because I feel- I mean you should know something, so... no, I have little faith to them, that I do [...] let's say 2 [...] with the scale I see, with chambers of politicians and how invisible the new government is after being elected... you haven't seen, nor heard them... with Erna Solberg in power there was at least dialogue and you felt like you got information, unlike now.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.1.6 Discussion – Procedural Fairness

Not unlike previous studies (Clausen & Rudolph, 2019; Firestone et al., 2020; Grimes, 2017; Linzenich & Ziefle, 2018; Miller & Listhaug, 1999; Tyler 2000), results in this part of the analysis suggest that poor and undemocratic decision-making procedures have had a negative impact on participants' support of the EPP and arguably on political trust in the wake of, and during, the processes EPP implementation on Haramsøya and in Bjerkreim.

First, all participants found the process secretive, and were surprised when the developers had failed to inform them, oftentimes because they were not considered an affected party because they do not directly border the current, or potential wind power facilities. On Haramsøy, participants mentioned in the results how only some were informed, including landowners whose lands the developers wished to build upon, those whose house was within the noise zone, as well as investors. Moreover, when participants finally knew about the process, they made an attempt to inform themselves; however, it proved difficult as they found the documentation untransparent, and in some instances they were provided English, rather than Norwegian documentation. Essentially, participants had a feeling that they were not supposed to know and were discouraged from learning more. This is similar to Firestone et al.'s findings (2020), whose paper encourages siting process to create community engagement plans in order to ensure transparency of the planning process. This could help each community and set expectations more in line with the developers', rather than leaving participants shocked, angry, and confused as a starting point for future opinions on the project. However, this failed, leaving the developers with locals whose opposition started with this mistake. This matches Wolsink's (2007) argument that siting processes in some countries avoid collaborative processes, and instead completes this beforehand, and then consults locals after planning has already begun.

Second participants found the process to be less democratic than they would expect from a democracy and most agreed that their input had little to no value, despite their best effort. On Haramsøy, where the opposition lost, some participants argue how the process was already decided, making any form of inputs useless. Moreover, according to participants, landowners are left with little choice themselves when approached by the developer, whereas the developer are potentially able to expropriate lands, and if a landowner signs away land for development, they are unable to change their mind later. The lack of a democratic process extended to the municipality as well, whereas Haram municipality, which voted against building the wind turbines on Haramsfjellet was overridden by the state. Finally, participants criticized the impact assessment of the wind turbines, and that those were done with the developers interests in mind, rather than nature or the community, and that, when participants tried to pitch in with their own local knowledge, they were ignored. These results make it clear that the participants felt, and feel,

left out of the siting process of these new wind parks, consequently leading to a low degree of perceived procedural fairness. Linzenich and Ziefle (2018) made a similar argument relating to wind power plants in Germany, where they stress the importance of political actors considering both environmental as well as citizen needs if the EPP is to be successful. If participants on Haramsøya and in Bjerkreim were given a chance to alter the development, and come to an agreement with the developer, instead of the elite and technocratic decision-making of NVE and the developer, it would likely have a lesser impact on their political trust and make the wind turbines more acceptable. Granted this would likely make it difficult for developers to make any sort of progress anywhere within proximity of a home.

These themes, the lack of information and democratic impact, culminate in participants from both communities criticizing politicians and decision-makers, voicing their opinions on their lack of support in the case, and the unfairness in which things were done. Participants showed disdain for the *Conservative Party* government led by Erna Solberg as well as the *Labor Party* government led by Jonas Gahr Støre, as both have been incumbents in the process period and positive towards wind power in the media when asked, instead of trying to do anything to the benefit of those living in proximity to these projects. Local politicians were also criticized for their involvement with the decisions to implement wind turbines into the municipality, including flipping opinions after having been elected on a platform based on no more wind turbines, as well as perceived shady dealings. Participants in both communities also discussed, explicitly, corruption among certain politicians. This seems to go against Ulbig's (2002) recommendations, who sees a strong link between political trust and the perception that the government and politicians are neutral, that it cares about what its citizens think, and that it pays attention to those who elects them. Therefore, it would be in elected officials' interest to take the citizens' opinions into account which is not the case here. It is made clear in chapter 7.4.4 that almost all participants on Haramsøya lost faith in the previous party they voted for in parliamentary elections because of their stance on wind power, therefore altering their voting behavior to a party that is against wind power on land, and in the sea for some. By changing their platform to exclude further investments into wind power, these parties would likely maintain a certain level of political trust among the participants. However, polls usually show Norwegians to be positive towards wind power, and if the major parties were to alienate the majority, they would

suffer in the next election, unless they offered a better alternative to green energy than wind power, which the next subchapter will discuss.

Perceptions and opinions on procedural fairness have, in both cases, been formed early in the development, in the input phase; however, participants on Haramsøya have had more time to consider their opinions throughout the later phases of implementation. This leads to some key differences in the focus for each community, including in 7.1.2 on selective information sharing and consent gathering whereas mostly participants on Haramsøya would mention developer's contact with some locals as well as landowners. Although not blaming them for anything, participants made it clear that some of these are to this day disliked and referred to as a "Judas" by some in the community, which could come as a result of the project moving past the input phase, hence giving these actors more perceived responsibility for the completion of the wind turbines. Another major difference is the issue of democratic impact in the first half of 7.1.3, whereas mostly participants on Haramsøya had much to say, again, likely because the project moved past the input phase, while participants in Bjerkreim still have a chance to see democratic impact if the project is stopped at the input phase. Finally, each community focused on differently when it came to the importance of either local or central politics. Participants on Haramsøya would focus more on central politics, while those in Bjerkreim would focus more on local politics. Compared to the other differences, this is not rooted in the phases of implementation, but rather what the municipality did to prevent development. Haram municipality voted "no" while Bjerkreim is still deciding whether to accept concession or not. These results support Jegers et al.'s argument that different phases matter, and that the current phase matters the most, which justifies the differences in focus among the communities on the issue of procedural fairness even when opinions on this topic is formed early.

7.2 Institutional Performance

According to institutional performance theories, citizens are able to recognize whether or not government institutions are performing well, and that satisfactory performance and results regularly leads to higher levels of trust, whilst poor performance and results leads to distrust. Within the energy sector this usually means that institutions are encouraged by the general public to push for green energy alternatives to reduce pollution, which in turn leads to high levels of trust, while leaving opponents with low levels of trust.

This is the topic for this subchapter, which aims to present relevant findings by exploring how participants assess the consequences of institutions allowing wind power within proximity and in general, and which energy sources they would consider as better solutions to renewable energy policies; hypocrisy when developers are exempt from rules and laws that regular citizens must abide by; assessment of police action on Haramsøy; and finally, how the courts failed to meet participants' expectations. Following this is a discussion of the topic in relations to the theory.

7.2.1 Results of Wind Power Policies

When asked about results from the wind turbines, either constructed or potential, in terms of economy, social life, or whatever the participant could come up with, the answers seem to agree that the wind turbines are an almost exclusively poor policy for green energy. The first point most of the participants mention is the noise, visual imprint, and the loss of nature:

I grew up on Haramsøya [...] and I would hike, and I used the nature everywhere and were used to birds and animals, fish and ocean and yeah, and this was part of growing up, it was a great upbringing that is now ruined by construction machinery, and lots of concrete that is injected into the mountain by each of the 8 turbines.

[Haramsøya rep.]

If we look at the results, then- outside of my house we can hear quite a lot of noise in certain wind directions. It is suspicious the way it was done because all measurements are close to the maximum value.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Placing such things [wind turbines] close to homes... and... the recreational areas of people, this is wrong.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

And then you have ice throws, for instance, which is a problem, because they fall down... here on the house on there is a 200 meter altitude, up there is 400 meters, and then, where the wind turbines stand, 600 meters on the top. [...] Last autumn when I sent the last sheep home, it was cold, and down here there was no frost, but on the mountain there was, so then imagine what would happen if the wind turbines stood there and you are supposed to send sheep up there... with the ice on the blades that let go [...] I can't use it for grazing anymore.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Next, many criticize the output of wind turbines, claiming that it is inefficient, and costs more than it provides for climate and nature:

Up here, there is no stable wind, the formation of the island makes it so there are wind throws in all directions so there is no stable wind, and this gives instability in production and instability in relation to shelf life and how they are going to stop the blades so they aren't ruined.

[Haramsøya rep.]

They say that it is the Grønne Skiftet that we are supposed to build wind turbines to- but when you see the amount of plastic that comes from the fact that one must replace these wind turbine blades every... 5 or 10 years because then the plastic is ruined and that goes into the nature, so I don't see any Grønt Skifte in [...] I only see pollution.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I have lost faith- long-term, I think the conclusion is - I don't know how long it will take – will be that this was an erroneous investment. [...] First and foremost, what I think about when it comes to wind power is, at least on land, is that there is a way too big encroachment on nature compared to what we get in return.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

What these turbines are made up of, both blades and body, they are very energy demanding to build, and when they then paint them white and tell us that it is green, then it does not ring clear in my ears.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

One participant makes a note on how it almost seems like climate and nature is unable to coexist when these things happen:

One needs to see climate and nature as one, so that they don't become so one-sided on the fact that one needs to save the climate and then sacrifice everything and sacrifice what we were supposed to save, [the nature].

[Haramsøya rep.]

Despite the drawbacks, some participants, notably in Bjerkreim, sees potential economic benefits for the municipality:

I assume that they don't do this if they don't think they can make money from it [...] and then again, the deal that they came with, then Bjerkreim municipality will earn a lot from this, I see that, I see that they get a lot of money.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

For the municipality it would mean some economic benefits from property tax... that comes there, and now there is also introduced a, what's it called? A production tax... I think it's 0.01,- per kilowatt/hour that is supposed to go to the municipality.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

However, other participants from Bjerkreim note how, while there might be a slight economic gain for the municipality, there are little economic benefits for the individual because the power is exported to other countries, leading to little reduction in power prices:

*This whole thing about energy, when you haven' started taking ENØK [energy saving] measures and you could get 30- 40- maybe 50 terawatts just by taking ENØK measures and when we don't do this but just exporting out all everything from the country- are we supposed to just lay here as some f***** rape victims for German energy production?*

[Bjerkreim rep.]

In the end we have enough power and cheap power until they in some ways send it out of the country [...] so this is when we truly start to feel it.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Moreover, there are less economic incentives for the locals as they see, and fear, a loss of value on their home in the wake of development:

What we fear, which are houses, is that the value will sink. Let's hope that the Nordøyveg negates some of the negative consequences... but that is uncertain, but there are definitely some of the houses nearby that have seen a loss of value because of the wind power facility.

[Haramsøya rep.]

People have built... built homes on Ulla without knowing about it [wind turbine development] and that is a huge democratic issue [...] and when someone who have built discovers that the neighbor knew, but said nothing, and it might affect the value of what you have built, then this causes conflict between the neighbors.

[Haramsøya rep.]

About real estate prices... it is not certain that it will be so attractive- I asked someone "would you buy my house... if you know that... right over there... about 1-1.4 kilometers away... there stands a 6MW turbine- two that are in clear sight with much of body and the whole rotor?" No thank you, then he would not.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Economically I fear that it will affect the value... the buildings around the whole mountain.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Some locals in Bjerkreim even threaten with moving somewhere else as they do not want to live close to the wind turbines:

We have decided that we will move, se we will put up the homestead for sale on Thursday if it doesn't go the right way [...] so we have decided that we will sell and there is no residency requirement on this homestead so... no matter what, we will move out of the municipality, we will not contribute with a single tax dollar to Bjerkreim municipality at all.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I have had thoughts like I don't want to stay here anymore, I just want to leave the husband and children and just leave if this is built, like there is no point in staying here.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Finally, the last recurring theme on the topic of results was how wind power development have managed to split the local communities between supporters and the opposition:

When it comes to the community, and the societal parts then you can't find a worse example of how to create a community that you can ruin [...] for instance, a landowner deal that was signed and returned 15-20 years [...] and what a landowner knew at that time compared to the public opinion that there is now, it wasn't even a topic. [...] In social media they now use them as a Judas.

[Haramsøya rep.]

As mentioned, the split it [wind turbines] create in the local community... and in a small community, like Ulla, it is harmful that there are such different opinions between people, and it will take some time for it to heal.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Here there is a very big split [...] neighbor number two [...] he signed... he is after money... I have been sitting on this, and then- because we grew up together, right, and then I sort of think "what does he think about me as a neighbor when he wants to hurt me so much?"

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.2.2 Alternatives to Wind Power

Participants, when asked about alternatives to wind power, presents several different renewable alternatives that they prefer, these are hydro-, nuclear-, solar-, and geo power:

Yes, the first thing is hydro power and the Norwegian hydro power it- it have been a part of renewing the falls we already have snow tops and such things we could double our hydro power, I am not a specialist, but these are things I have read... and then you have the thing where you have falls you could also- and they actually started doing this- there you can build several power plants, meaning you can reuse the water several times.

[Haramsøya rep.]

If you imagine this kind of development, but instead on solar cells... then houses would, after some time, I am fairly convinced, they could supply themselves, new housing that is built in 10-15 years all have solar cells that cover an annual consumption [...] then this power could go to other things, to companies, to power-hungry industry...

[Haramsøya rep.]

Nuclear power with thorium is good [...] and then we have a lot of hydro power in this country and that is more than enough, I mean, we export 20TWh... 20TW to other countries [...] and then there is earth geothermal heat.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I would say nuclear power is better than wind and if they would get started on research on thorium then that would be even better because in thorium you have a marble with enough energy for one person his entire life... so why not research these things that are stable that can provide stable power? And we are not exactly in the part of the world with the most earthquakes and that there are large... you could say, I mean... such things that would make nuclear power difficult... we would've managed with three [nuclear power plants] in Norway.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Others would like to see other initiatives involving energy saving, rather than production:

They must give incentives for people to save power, supporting arrangements that truly gives effect, for instance insulation in older buildings... heating controls... and, yeah, and so on and so forth.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The most obvious are the ENØK [energy saving] measures [...] here there are at least a potential for 17TWh with just post-insulation, and so forth and such things... and then you have production on buildings, for instance heating pumps, solar cells, integrated systems with waterborne heat and so forth.

[Haramsøya rep.]

7.2.3 Rules and Laws Hypocrisy

One thing that bothers many participants is the obvious hypocrisy whereas some developers and individuals must abide by established rules and laws, while developers whose goal is to construct wind turbines are exempt from the same rules:

There are bird sanctuaries here, there are bird sanctuaries out on the slope, the one on the slope was so close to the wind turbine that you see there that in order to place that wind turbine where it is now, they had to move the bird sanctuary further out, I don't think the birds see any sort of border, they will go there anyway, but that was just to get it constructed.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It was said in the impact assessment that that there are no conflicts with any protection plans, but it was revealed later that there was an active protection plan on- in regards to Haramsøya already back then, which was not mentioned in the impact assessment. And then it was revealed that "woah there are overlapping planned areas" and then there was a short dialogue between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Climate and Environment whereas the Minister of the Environment, Eirik Solheim, said that this was fine, and this is not how you change a protection plan, you have to- if you change a protection plan then you need to go into the process and do it correctly.

[Haramsøya rep.]

If I want to cultivate new lands then I can't do so in a marsh anymore because that has been made illegal, but to dig up an entire marsh to create roads to a wind turbine, that is completely fine!

[Bjerkreim rep.]

It's so weird, because us farmers are not allowed to cultivate marshlands, to grow food, but the fact that a wind power facility is being built, they can flip and turn the entire marsh and...- where the heck is the logic?! [...] It almost seems like you need to sit in a department to get that done.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.2.4 Police Action on Haramsøy

Participants were asked about their opinion on police activity on Haramsøy, no matter if they are connected to Haramsøya or Bjerkreim, and most are skeptical to- and agree that police involvement on Haramsøya was exaggerated, unnecessary, and unfair:

Many are skeptical to how the police handled the wind power construction... all the violations that... "Nei til Vindkraft" and others have reported was set aside, none of it was processed, as far as I know, but... the opposing side, meaning the developer, they got lots of resources in police force to finish this. So, it was one-sided in our view.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It was obvious that they were teamed up with the authorities that wanted this development, and we believe that we were overrun when they started this without the complaints, that we had sent in, were considered, or processed... and it seemed unnecessary and provocative for the police to be active at that time before a verdict was given.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Completely tragic, completely tragic, it was horrible to watch it, that... when you try to protect what you have, and then the police- no, it was just tragic... and look at all the resources that went into it, I don't know how many police that were there to... there were many! [...] You feel small and powerless, and you thought Norway was a good country to live in, but you could almost compare us to something we don't want to compare with, unfortunately. It shows that capital reigns.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

It was completely exaggerated, what was it? 6-7-8 cars that came over simultaneously and it's just crazy... they make a narrative of the opposition as if we were terrorists.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Consequently, some, notably on Haramsøy, lost trust and respect for the police in the wake of their involvement on Haramsøy:

[...] many have said that they lost respect for the police... because they run the capitalists errand without taking care of the people.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I used to have a general naïve trust before this and when it has keep feeling this in all areas... and then I'm like, ok it's on a- let's say on a low level in the police, they are ok, proper, and

do their best at their job, and then a little further up I am more skeptical... I think they [the police] had some bad moves in the media and announced suspicions based on what developers said, and with that created problems with our organization because that makes the politicians scared as they cannot support anyone who does such things.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The police do what they are told by the authorities, so... they need to do what they are told, and- but I think the respect for the police has been heavily reduced out here when... you have seen how they have protected these developers.

[Haramsøya rep.]

We lost some faith in the police throughout this process [...] and one must question whether the democratic process was neat and tidy in this case... so the police lost some respect in my eyes, they were obviously loyal to the authorities, and not the people.

[Haramsøya rep.]

However, some, involving those who lost respect for the police, comment that the police are doing what they are told and that this is, to various degrees, understandable, and should be respected:

But I do believe that this was heavily imposed on them from politicians actually... so no matter if they're against it themselves, they need to do their job, otherwise they need to leave their job.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I have demonstrated myself, I have been asked to move by the police, I am of the opinion that we must be allowed to demonstrate, but I move when the police tells me to move, I never go to the point where I must be carried away.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I think it's horrible... but they get their orders from the higher-ups and... as a police officer, you have a job to do.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.2.5 Court Battles

Participants exclusive to Haramsøya mention the use of the courts in an attempt to halt the development of the wind turbines; however, the process sowed doubt in the courts and the power of the judicial system:

The court of Appeal thought that- or said that it was ok when the time had gone, the landscape would be back to its original design, and that was the verdict in the Court of Appeal, which made it impossible for us to win that trial... so the Court of Appeal was on the same team as NVE, OED, minsters, FN, they run over the people anyways.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It might be a big leap with the Fosen case where they won in the Supreme Court [...] so that facility is void, and the concession there was deemed void [...] we lost the legal proceedings here, and they won in court, but the result is the exact same, there are two facilities that are operational, so you're like... what in the heavens, what do we do then? Because they won in the Supreme Court, and it has no effect.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It is terrifying that the incumbent government attempt to find... ways to bypass a Supreme Court judgement, where the Supreme Court have said that development is illegal and in conflict with the rights of the indigenous people.

[Haramsøya rep.]

And then it depends on the justice system, I mean we could say that it is also corrupt, that they are also paid, but I have not gone so far, I still believe in it, but I understand that there cannot be any links there, right, we must have distributions of power, and there we have the courts that is an institution that is supposed to judge this safely and completely... they cannot be, in any way, paid.

[Haramsøya rep.]

7.2.6 Closing Statements and Trust Changes

There were also mentions of institutional performance in the closing statements:

Today's politicians are a tragedy for the people. These five are the worst: Jens Stoltenberg, Jonas Gahr Støre, Espen Barth Eide, Erna Solberg and Jan Christian Vestre. This is a parliamentary fraud and betrayal towards the people. Fraud is betrayal. My opinion is that all development of wind power is abuse, fraud and betrayal, and the conclusion is: Haramsfjellet is lost; how can we save the ocean?

[Haram rep.]

My son was ready to build a home here, and then I have to tell him, don't do it, don't do something you will lose all your money doing when you can't even live here, he was about ready to do it, but then we got the message that they resumed the concession process so it was ruined... and it's kind of the way they do it, I mean a combination between the municipality and- they ruin so many years of a life where you live in your head and don't know what to...

[Bjerkreim rep.]

There needs to be work done on future solutions and better solutions etc. because I think we have, in more ways than one, very conservative and old-school power- there's always new solutions that pop up, for instance research on nuclear fusion... the time of the expensive magazines in the mountains and the wind turbines, that time has passed, and with these huge turbines with its blades, it needs to go, it's archaic.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

While rating their own political trust, some participants mentioned institutional performance as the reason for their score:

I don't have the level of trust that I used to have [...] from 1 to 10... I struggle with these kinds of definitions... it depends on the area of politics, but on this particular area, my trust is a little low to the department, the Petroleum- and Energy Department, and... the bureaucracy... I think it is- and my reasoning is that when you have- when you got a decision from the parliament to go through all these concessions to find mistakes you have the exact same people going through them... there is a lot of power in some of the departments... from 1 to 10, let's say 7, it is one of the better working democracies after all, but... often times the politics go too fast, and the amount of information is too big, and my biggest gripe is the fact that those who make professional reports and those who have economic interests have an economic interdependency and close relations.

[Haram rep.]

It's split, like, in NVE they are just so busy with these weird assessments and it just feels like they don't know anything themselves, and the same thing with the municipal council, although they have been supportive until- but no, it usually all just comes back to money... but then you have people like the country governor here in Rogaland and... some I have a lot of trust in, and others I don't [...] so it's sort of in the middle [5], there are some that do a lot of good.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

One participant notes how, despite what happened, their political trust had not been lowered much because politicians are unable to do much:

I don't think it changes so much, I don't think so, but politics is the people's opinion in this, so I am still, as a whole, on a 7 or 8, no matter how it went here, it's not on a 1 or 2, that's for sure [...] I completely disagree that they should've built on Haramsøya, but when a concession is given, what could a minister from the government do there? [...] What could they have done? They are bound at hands and feet, and that is based on the laws, then that must change.

[Haram rep.]

7.2.7 Discussion – Institutional Performance

The results above seem to agree with theories on institutional performance (Chu, Collins, Lai & Xu, 2018; Espinal, Hartlyn, & Kelly, 2006; Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Miller, 1974), whereas participants on Haramsøya have been able to assess the performance of various institutions and participants in Bjerkreim have been able to assess the *potential* performance of various institutions. Correspondingly, the poor assessment has left participants opposing the EPP, and with less trust in some institutions that were either responsible, or involved in some way.

First, the results show that the assessment of the wind turbines themselves are manifold, whereas participants critique several elements, including the physical presence of

a wind turbine. This critique of wind turbines links to institutional performance as participants claim that wind power is an archaic and inefficient policy solution to renewable energy, and mostly brings negative consequences for those living in proximity. As seen in chapter 6, government institutions, namely NVE and OED, are responsible for granting developers concessions, allowing them to build the turbines. First, participants' answers agree with Wolsink's (2007) statement that land concessions often clash with the recreational usage of said lands by the community and that the visual imprint is scarring. Second, the participants argue that impact assessments were rushed and not done right, whereas noise is way above danger levels, bird species are threatened, and during the winter, there is the constant danger of ice throws. Despite this, NVE chose to give concession, potentially harming people in the communities. This naturally leads participants to distrust NVE and, in some instances, suggest an economic partnership between them and developers.

Next, the economic factors of cost and benefits, in accordance with Walker and Baxter (2017), suggests that participants find wind power to be a wasteful policy, whereas the cost and maintenance of the wind turbines is higher than what they provide for the environment. Despite this, some of the participants see certain economic benefits for their municipality; however, some fail to see this as positive because the individual is left with few incentives considering the generated power is oftentimes exported. Moreover, many participants fear potential losses in property value, which does not help when some participants in Bjerkreim consider moving out if the concession is given. Finally, each community have seen a social net loss resulting from differences in opinion, and the aforementioned secret information sharing in 7.1.2. This assessment leaves each community with the impression that wind power is not an optimal policy investment for renewable energy, at least in Norway where the landscape is not built for this source, unlike Denmark and Germany, as mentioned by some participants.

Participants had the opportunity to present their preferred renewable energy source, and most agreed that hydro power was the most optimal, with other sources, such as nuclear and solar, close behind. These, the participants argued, had a better cost/benefit than wind power and were a better fit for the Norwegian landscape. Other participants would like to see power saving initiatives, rather than power generation, as this method

could potentially reduce the issue of power exports, which bothers many participants. As discussed in 7.1.5, major political parties might maintain that wind power is a positive policy to pursue because of polls; however, if they were to change to another renewable energy source, this could benefit both wind power policy opponents as well as the general population. It could also benefit trust in that policy opponents would have to spend less time promoting their counter-movement through arguments and ideas, as is a common strategy opponents utilize according to Werners and colleagues (2010). These ideas and arguments could influence political trust negatively when opponents are increasingly exposed to these ideas and arguments, which might target decision-makers and politicians.

These were the participants' answers to wind power turbines- and policy design; however, they had further grievances with institutional performance in this case, including perceived hypocrisy of rules and laws. Some participants chose to discuss how, while they must abide by the law, developers seem to be exempt from them, whereas, for instance, they can develop a wind power facility on a marsh, whilst farmers are not allowed to cultivate marshes. There could, of course be more behind it than what participants say; however, this perceived hypocrisy could, even if such a small sample of participants arguably is inconsequential, hurt trust in politicians and institutions if word spread that certain institutions are above the law.

Next topic is the police, and participants' reactions to their involvement on Haramsøy. Participants in both communities would comment on the issue, and while some are fine with the police involvement, arguing that they are doing their jobs, most are negative towards it and found it exaggerated, unnecessary, unfair, and in some instances, corrupt. This negative assessment consequently led many participants on Haramsøya to lose trust in the police, more specifically, the higher-ups who make decisions on where to allocate police resources.

Finally, and exclusive to Haramsøy, was the failure of the courts. In order to battle the concession, several members of the community on Haramsøya came together to pay for a trial, which they eventually lost. This loss was perceived as unfair where the courts would be biased and take the side of the developers and NVE to go through with the concession. Many of the participants therefore wonder, if taking a situation such as this one, to court, and it does not help, then what can they do? Even if there is a court case where the

community wins, as one participant told was the case with Fosen, and the wind power facility is still built, then it could be argued that it is objectively unfair, and a risk to take for these institutions as it will lead to a decrease in trust.

As for differences between the communities, the first question regarding the results of completed wind turbines, although adapted for each communities' situation and stage in policy implementation, is oddly similar, except for certain participants located in Bjerkreim who threatens to move out if the policy moves into implementation. Granted, the similarities in answers could be a result of the fact that Bjerkreim already has several wind turbines in the area. Moreover, both communities agree on various alternatives including hydro, solar, nuclear etc. to replace wind turbines, as well as legal hypocrisy in terms of where developers are allowed to build. Comparatively, the issue of police involvement on Haramsøya is split, for while both communities generally agree that it was unnecessary, only participants on Haramsøya mentioned a hit on their trust in the police. And, finally, only participants on Haramsøya discussed court battles, and a reason for this could be that being in the implementation phase of a policy urges opponents to take further action to stop development, compared to those who are yet unsure whether the concession will be given.

7.3 Citizen Participation

When citizens disagree with a certain policy or a project, there is a chance that they may choose to participate in an attempt to foster change. The reason for participating is complex and could be rooted in either high- or low trust, as both are associated with higher levels of participation. This can be seen with a participant choosing to either contact elected officials, if they believe in institutional processes, or to protest if they have less faith in institutional processes. However, participation itself, and its results, may affect levels of political trust by either fostering confidence in the system if it worked, or cause disillusionment if it failed.

This subchapter aims to present and investigate results on these topics by answering how people chose to participate, what their reason for participating was; what their thoughts are in the wake of a (potentially) lost opposition; as well as how each community chose to organize their opposition. Afterwards, these results will be analyzed in the context of the theoretical framework on citizen participation.

7.3.1 Participation

Every participant, apart from one who remained passive throughout the process, have participated in the opposition towards wind power development, to various degrees, in their respective areas:

I have participated in the opposition in a way where I gained insight about it and agreed that we don't want this there, and I have given this impression directly towards Zephyr, the developer on it, but I have never participated in the debate, nor physically.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Yes, I have participated in the opposition, but not as much as I should have, nor as much as many other... I am at work during daytime, and much of this goes on during daytime, but I must say that I was eager in the beginning and then I fell off when I noticed that this wasn't helping.

[Haramsøya rep.]

We participated in most of the actions out here, both when we blocked the road for Zephyr at the start of the process there on Haram, and where Thue was prominent, and otherwise we participated in several actions, we were a part of stopping... stopping the transport when they came over with the ferry, these were great actions in my eyes, lawful, and legal ways to show opposition against nature vandalism... and otherwise we participated in demonstrations in Ålesund, and demonstrations on the mountain here.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I have been gathering information and such for Marit and calculated the exploited area- or the area usage on Faurefjell [...] and more information on such things as ice throws, and such... so I and a friend, who have a vacation home up here, have sat in this kitchen for many hours and worked on that to help Marit in this battle.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

We have sent in complaints, and collected signatures, we have demonstrated outside the city hall, which isn't normal in this municipality, but we have managed to gather a lot of people, so it goes to show how much we care about this... we have read a lot [...] and writing complaints, and then see that whatever you write, there is no point in it.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Some participants find politics to be the most efficient way to reach out for change, communicating directly with authorities, or signing up for party memberships to stay informed:

I have worked politically against the authorities and with that tried to bring to light the mistakes and lacking information in the assessments the developers have presented to NVE, which are pretty obvious.

[Haramsøya rep.]

And I have now signed up in Senterpartiet in order to partake in party meetings and so on, and, as I said earlier, to gather information and to be a bit more engaged, and, not the least, to affect this

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I signed up for membership in Senterpartiet to try and be a part of... affecting those who were... unsure of their decision, you could say... and I actually got a taste for politics, so it started with only being about Faure, but now I've participated in all of their meetings because I find it interesting, it is the only way to truly understand what is happening in town.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Many participants, exclusive to Haramsøy, also took to the courts, as seen in 7.2.5, to try and stop the development; however, this was not successful.

While most chose to participate, it is possible that it would not be so without some members of each community who took it upon themselves to inform other locals to initialize the opposition at the start of the planning phase. These figureheads were praised by some of the participants:

We must mention SV and... Birgit in this context too, she was also a good spokesperson for the opposition, even if her party is a little vague when it comes to this... but we need figureheads in this battle, and there, both Thue and Birgit have been central.

[Haramsøya rep.]

We had Marit, and she spent... I was about to say her whole life, she has done an incredible amount, and we, the others, just went along, we didn't stand a chance if we're trying to run a farm whilst doing voluntary work.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

That's why [busy with work] I appreciate people like Marit, who have... managed to do as much as they have.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Participants have different reasons as to why they chose to participate in the opposition, but most seem to have done so because they either had or have faith that it will stop the process:

I thought we lived in a democracy and because of that I had to fight... those who wish to break down the democracy in the way that they are doing here... because you can't reach them with factual arguments, nor with lawsuits, or meetings with authorities.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I love my island, the whole place [...] I was convinced that when... they saw how we protested they would realize that this is not something that we want and that they would stop it [...] so we thought we could manage to turn this around.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I was so provoked by the whole ordeal, and because we are so close here... we get it so close, and I felt a sort of responsibility, and we had a hope that we would manage to stop it, a small naïve hope.

[Haramsøya rep.]

To show that we are unhappy and are tricked to believe that this was- and is something better than what we have in the end, and so we demonstrate because we want the politicians- in a democracy they must play with open cards with those who elected them, and I feel like they haven't done that here.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.3.2 (Potentially) Failed Opposition

The effects of a failed opposition vary for the people of Haramsøy; however, most are left with little faith in the process:

Before Christmas... 2020 I believe... then I realized that the whole system is corrupt, so it doesn't matter what arguments- factual arguments and evidence... in a trial, because the courts are corrupt, and the authorities are corrupt in their entirety [...] it is a lost cause... you cannot win over NVE, OED, ministers, the prime minister, EU, NATO, and FN, they decided that this was right. [...] "The Storting is the peoples' servants, not lords" and that is the essence of a democracy.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It... proved to not be democratic, this was decided and was going to happen, no matter the cost, the people aren't as important, so... I don't know what to compare it to other than a...dictatorship in Africa I think it looks like... and I think Erna looks like an African dictator.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It gives frustration, but I don't have a problem with accepting when a verdict is made, I still believe in the courts, and therefore I just need to accept it [...] there are many other out here who have it worse, who doesn't want to accept, but... that... I do.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It gives a feeling of powerlessness when, no matter what you prove, what you claim completely right... of wrongdoing and errors, it doesn't matter anyways, and that is the big bad wolf in this whole thing.

[Haramsøya rep.]

While some are left with a slight hope for the future, and that their efforts are not in vain:

I think that the effort was worth- even... if it took almost all of a person's time over two years [...], this effort that we put in led to- we created a fuss about the processes and lacking

processes that happen within wind power development, and the hope is that this gets consequences for future development, that it needs to be done properly, where there are proper assessments so that one can cooperate.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I think that the effort wasn't wasted, we had an effect that there needs to be some changes to the law on how they should move on with development, I hope there is none, but yeah. But at least we did wake up, at least a bit, those who are in control... and then of course it is a bit bitter to be the loser, I would much rather be on the winning side, but it was still worth it.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Participants from Bjerkreim was asked a variation of the same question, which focused on what they think *if* the opposition fails, and in addition to threatening with leaving Bjerkreim, as was covered in chapter 7.2.1, people seem to risk losing faith in politics:

I will, at the very least, have a clean consciousness because I said my piece... it sort of depends on-... the concession have been given, but- but, when it comes to Faurefjell and what has been going on... I have lost a bit of trust in the local politicians.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I would be sad, absolutely, [...] if it doesn't go the right way, because I know that there will be a lot of hearings in the wake of the vote, but I have no faith that they will matter, because the government have said that they want more wind power and if the municipality say yes, then I don't believe there's any hope.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I would be left with a lot of feelings, we will be angry, we will be pissed off, we'll feel trampled, every feeling you can imagine really... because there is one thing to talk about this now, but if they stand up there, we will feel a loss, and for our descendants, we want for them to have a good future.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.3.3 Facebook Groups and other Organizations

In order to spread information, and garner supporters for the opposition, Facebook groups, namely “NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!” [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] and “Nei til vindkraft på Faurefjell I Bjerkreim” [No to wind turbines on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim] were made. All participants, but three, for various reasons, are members of these groups and finds them useful for the cause:

We needed an organization that could gather the opposition, [...] this [wind power development] became bigger and bigger and engaged... the whole local community, and so we chose to build this organization.

[Haramsøya rep.]

We created the group because we were against both the ways this was done and was against wind power... the goal was to stop it [...] one important aspect, I think, was to garner sympathy... to highlight what is happening and garner sympathy.

[Haramsøya rep.]

It was created to create a unity for us who live around Faure, and so that we could communicate in between ourselves, and to meet up, like for instance tonight we'll meet outside the city hall and demonstrate.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

It was good for spreading information to most people possible and keep them updated for those who wanted to; however, there is a chance for them to be misused with crass comments, but yeah... otherwise a really useful tool.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Because these are digital groups made to gather the opposition, harsh comments are inevitable. One participant in Bjerkreim explains how these harsh comments are being used against them by certain members of the municipal council:

And then there are some completely rotten people in this municipal council who repeats themselves that if we write bad stuff on Facebook... then they consider voting for the development on Faure because one doesn't behave properly [...] so not only do they want to take away millions of kroners in property values as well as people's health and joy of life, but also our voice.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Some participants also make note of other organizations that oppose wind power on a larger, more national scale, such as MOTVIND:

So that we managed to put focus on this... and open a large portion of the Norwegian population's eyes- so this is why I am also a member in the organization MOTVIND Norge, which is a country-based organization.

[Haramsøya rep.]

MOTVIND Norge I am positive towards, that is clear, but Miljøvernforbundet... we tried, as stated, first, and we had visits from their leaders and... he told us loud and clear on one of these meetings that the only- I mean, this is something we cannot fight against with laws and things, you just have to show opposition throughout the process, and I guess he was right... but the organization MOTVIND Norge I'll be a member of for the rest of my life.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I have used to participate in demonstrations organized by MOTVIND, and that have primarily been in Bjerkreim, sometimes in Stavanger, but it is in Bjerkreim they have put in more manpower.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.3.4 Closing Statements and Trust Changes

The lesser mentioned theme of the four is citizen participation, which was not participants' main focus in closing statements as much as the others:

My opinion in this is that I have been an opponent towards development out there all the time and I have educated myself with what's available, and have been engaged on the level I could be engaged on, and in relation to what we can do to minimize the damages, and whether there was anything we could do to stop it, and then when that road closed, I looked the other way and asked what we, as a community, can do to move forward.

[Haram rep.]

The same goes for the rating of political trust. Participation was the main theme for only one interview, who also partly blamed themselves:

1: Usually I have a good portion of trust, but during this process I have seen that if Ola Nordmann sits still and doesn't participate then he suffers and so a democracy is a demanding system, it's a fantastic system, but it really demands awake citizens.

2: Yes, mine has taken a hit I would say.

1: Yes and you... it would be wrong to blame the mayor or systems, and administrations and so on if you haven't participated in any way [...] 6 I would think, like, slightly over... but the 4 that lacks to be a 10 I feel is my own fault.

2: I haven't completely lost the trust [...] but I can't blindly trust the politicians... 5 is too little, and 7 is too much, I'm landing on a 6 as well... I do still trust them...

[Bjerkreim reps.]

7.3.5 Discussion – Citizen Participation

Results from this subchapter agrees with the theoretical framework (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Huijts, Molin & Steg, 2012) where almost all participants in both communities, chose to participate in the opposition, despite the level of political trust before development. Moreover, participation arguably seems to have influenced some participants on Haramsøy's trust in a democratic process in the wake of the lost cause, although the evidence of lost political trust is less explicit compared to the other three factors.

First, many participants claimed to have joined the opposition because they had faith that they could stop development, and that they would be heard by decision-makers. The way they chose to participate in the opposition were varied, including through politics, direct contact with decision-makers, letters-to-the-editor, as well as demonstrations and protests. However, participants in both communities quickly felt that their voices went unheard, and thus lost trust in the process. Participants who were aware of development early on

Haramsøya often took the route of contacting politicians, as well as informing themselves through developers and such, likely because they had a high level of political trust at the time. However, in 2019, when development seemed somewhat inevitable, and many forms of institutionalized processes already failed, most participants on Haramsøya took to protesting. This was also the case in Bjerkreim, whereas some attempted, earlier in the process to contact decision-makers, but later mobilized demonstrations. This goes in accordance with theory that participants who possess low, as well as high, political trust will participate in the opposition in various ways. In the start, these participants likely tried to uproot this development through the decision-makers, but later, when contact did not yield the appropriate results, found it useful to apply pressure by protesting, or demonstrating, in addition to maintaining contact.

Next, participants on Haramsøya were asked what they felt after their opposition failed, and most reported that they had lost some faith in the process, while some reported that their opposition was not in vain. Meanwhile, in Bjerkreim, they were asked what they think they would feel should their opposition fail, to which they, naturally, would be disappointed, and it seems that some already have lost trust in politicians, and that stopping the concession would hardly remedy this. Considering that participants in Bjerkreim celebrated a victory over the concession in December of 2021, only to have to organize the opposition anew early 2022, to some, this felt like a loss. Still, despite participants' feeling on the topic, there is no doubt that they were able to create fuzz around the topic, especially on Haramsøya, which gained a lot of media attention, hence why some participants found the opposition useful despite the loss. Through this attention, the loss of political trust that participants feel, might extend to those who actively watched the news, potentially creating more policy opponents.

Finally, both communities had their own Facebook groups, namely "NEI TIL VINDKRAFTVERK PÅ HARAMSØYA!" [No to wind turbines on Haramsøya] and "Nei til vindkraft på Faurefjell i Bjerkreim" [No to wind turbines on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim]. These were, according to participants, started for various reasons depending on who you asked, including them being forums for locals to connect and share information, as well as to organize meetings, protests, etc. However, one of these groups would become more than just a means for locals to oppose development. The group belonging to Haramsøya grew

much larger than the population of Haramsøya would suggest, for while less than 400 people live on the island, the group currently has over 33.000 members, which gave the core opponents on Haramsøya the opportunity to reach a much larger audience. Much like the media attention, this was a big opportunity to spread distrust towards decision-makers and those supporting development of wind power in Norway. Granted, it is likely that many of the members were policy opponents beforehand, still, it had a much greater reach than originally intended.

The difference in policy implementation in both communities were not too different when it came to the way, or reason, for protesting as protests can happen all the way throughout implementation, from input to output. Reactions to a (potentially) failed opposition was also quite similar, despite participants being in different situations, again, likely because participants in Bjerkreim already felt a loss when the concession process resumed in 2022 after being stopped in late 2021. However, a major difference stemming from the stage of implementation is the attention, for while Bjerkreim has been in the media with interviews, their Facebook group's member numbers more closely reflect the population of opponents in the municipality. Meanwhile, on Haramsøy, the media attention, including protests, and the controversial removal of Hans Petter Thue from his property, would potentially garner more sympathy for their cause. On the other hand, this media attention could, as some participants feared, paint them in a bad light. In addition to the media coverage, the large number of followers on social media could also be helpful to garner sympathy, but moderators would have to be careful to remove any vicious discourse as these groups often become echo chambers where members hype each other up.

7.4 Polarization

Polarization, a process in which opposition towards a cause increases, was presented, in the words of Hetherington and Rudolph (2018), as having an important relationship with political trust. There are two major reasons for this: the first being that increased hostility and distrust towards opposing groups, institutions or incumbents lead to polarized political trust; and the second being that individuals are more likely to seek information that line up with their own biases in a phenomenon called motivated reasoning.

These are the main topics this subchapter seeks to investigate in the results by looking at what sources the participants used for information; differing arguments and

perceived differing opinions from city inhabitants; as well as whether this process has affected participants' voting behavior. After presenting these topics, a discussion on whether the answers fit into Hetherington and Rudolph's (2018) arguments will take place.

7.4.1 Sources of Information

The sources participants choose to use is varied, and most often more than one is used; however, there are some used more than others, and the two most used are Facebook and word of mouth:

That would be- I think Knut has been very good at understanding the case... so I think he is the one I've learned most from, and we've had lecturers [...] we've learned much throughout the process, and we've read a lot, we also have our own Facebook page in "Nei til Vindkraft" where a lot came up so [...] the information was useful, but I must say that it might've been a bit one-sided negatively towards wind power.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I believe that must have been from "Nei til Vindkraft på Haramsøy," both that- when we first started we were in doubt how we would gather people, I remember we had this meeting in here, with Knut, where we gathered, we from Ulla, and discussed how we would bring this forward, and a really good tool we ended on was the Facebook group "Nei til Vindkraft på Haramsøy" and it is REALLY good information channel.

[Haramsøya rep.]

From Marit... well yes from Marit and- yes and on the internet... I am part of the MOTVIND group on Facebook so there's a good amount of information coming from there.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

That must've been from Marit, from word of mouth and other voices... I don't like computers to begin with so to get information... neither do I have the time, nor am I fond of computers, but we who are against this talk together a lot so there is a lot of information from that.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

The second most used source for information gathering comes from other organizations and institutions, including MOTVIND, Miljøvernforbundet, OED, NVE, etc.:

In November/December, I, among others, including Oddny, were invited to Frøya for a meeting where they established the organization MOTVIND Norge, and so I could talk about that, MOTVIND Norge, incredibly skilled people, especially Salen who is the leader there, and they contribute with a lot of knowledge and information.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I joined Miljøvernforbundet and the Norwegian Ornithological Society, and... because then you get newsletters when you join them, and so I read those.

[Haramsøya rep.]

When it comes to the objective and formal, with OED, NVE and the planning, and that part there, I have been oriented directly through the Petroleum- and Energy Department and NVE, been in contact with the advisors there, received documents on it [...] so I had a direct dialogue there and read documents there, and not in relation to what's written on Facebook.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The internet... NVE's homepage on Faurefjell and the results of the hearings and so such, NVE's guide to neighbors to wind power and how it's supposed to be, how an impact assessment is supposed to be, and then its Lovdata [Law data], the regulations [...] and then there are people in MOTVIND who contribute a lot.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

The third most popular source is, especially in Bjerkreim, news media and debates. This source of information was usually briefly mentioned along with other sources:

I cannot say that I have read a lot about the case, but I have paid the most attention in- it's on TV where I've seen the conflicts that have been around in, for instance, Haramsøy... but otherwise it's much my own thoughts.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

And then came the newspapers after a while, and then Dalane Tidende became important for us, and Aftenbladet has also been involved and an important source of information [...] during the municipal meetings, the local newspapers would be present, but lately, NRK has attended as well.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

And finally, science journals and doctors, which was only mentioned by two, one in each community:

And... doctors who are skeptical that it hasn't been done research on infrasound, even if international studies say that infrasound can have harmful effects long term, long term effects for people's health.

[Haramsøya rep.]

A lot comes from case papers and NVE, I think, and to find more information I looked at forskning.no [science.no] and read a couple of articles from there, but I have seen that... scientific reports and to use that against the politicians where there is documented several things, that's hard, because they won't believe it.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.4.2 Trust in Supporters and their Arguments

Whether or not participants choose to engage with, or consider, the supporting sides' arguments are, interestingly, mostly found in Bjerkreim whereas all participants do this, while only some do on Haramsøy:

Sometimes I read NORWEA [...] to read about the supporters' side and to know what they are up to [...] because it can't be completely one-sided, not everything is black and white, so you need to get the nuances... and there is something about knowing your enemies.

[Haramsøya rep.]

One tries to know what they are up to, and... those arguments are so thin, so it's almost like I can't believe how they believe it themselves. For instance, some may say "oh, but think about all the millions that will come into the community" and to that I say "well, what about all the millions people around here lose on property values?"

[Bjerkreim rep.]

I usually do weigh them against each other, but I don't think it matters too much because much of what has come up regarding the Grønne Skiftet, and then to think about- recently, Skorpen brought up Ukraine as a thing in relation to Faure, and that... made me go a bit crazy, truly, that is taking it a bit far, I think.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

There is the fact that the municipality makes some money, but then they forgot to consider lost... income for those who needs sick leave, lost joy of life, lost tourism, lost property value... no, their calculations think that it's only a plus.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Others do not pay too much mind to these arguments, and some choose to ignore it:

I think that a lot of what is presented is fabricated arguments that doesn't hold up in a discussion and I know people who... doesn't quite reach in debates because... disagree with developers.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Not too much, if I'm being honest, because those- that which is positive is that its green energy and environmentally friendly, but it is there where we don't speak the same language... actually.

[Haramsøya rep.]

In addition to a general distrust and disagreement with supporters' arguments, participants in both communities note how the siting process and, in the case of Haramsøy, a completed wind power facility split the community, sowing distrust within the community:

When it comes to the community, and the societal parts then you can't find a worse example of how to create a community that you can ruin [...] for instance, a landowner deal that was signed and returned 15-20 years [...] and what a landowner knew at that time compared to the public opinion that there is now, it wasn't even a topic. [...] In social media they now use them as a Judas.

[Haramsøya rep.]

As mentioned, the split it [wind turbines] create in the local community... and in a small community, like Ulla, it is harmful that there are such different opinions between people, and it will take some time for it to heal.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Here there is a very big split [...] neighbor number two [...] he signed... he is after money... I have been sitting on this, and then- because we grew up together, right, and then I sort of think "what does he think about me as a neighbor when he wants to hurt me so much?"

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.4.3 Changed Voting Behavior

Compared to the two last ones, participants from Haramsøya held the majority when asked whether their voting behavior has changed over the course of these processes, whereas 9 out of 11 had changed, whilst only 2 out of 8 had changed in Bjerkreim. Participants were told that they could answer as much as they would like, so most answered with a simple yes or no:

Yes, I voted... Demokratene [the Democrats], I voted on the Democrats this time... I used to vote for SV, but we disagree on the negative impacts of, for instance ocean wind [...], but in this last election, I voted for the Democrats based on their view of energy politics and... yeah.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The party also had some other important political opinions, but the attitude towards wind power, especially on land was crucial, and in the ocean... they are less clear.

[Haramsøya rep.]

Yes... I voted SV [Socialist Left Party] in this election, but it was because we voted tactically, we wanted Birgit in the Storting and we did that [...] we were supposed to vote Rødt [Red Party], we voted in a good voice for "Nei til Vindkraft" and she is important.

[Haramsøya rep.]

I voted for the party that was against wind turbines... and I think that those who speak so nicely about the environment and think that it's acceptable to place wind power on every mountaintop, and every beautiful mountain in Norway, they don't think environment, because then they would work on hydro power.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

Those who did not have their voting behavior altered also had their reasons for this, including some who did not see their vote altering the development of wind power:

There is so much more to a parliamentary election, with what's here, if the local election covered some things and other things then maybe... then its more about what you can do locally, but centrally, for one single case like this one, I don't think so.

[Haramsøya rep.]

The thing is, the large parties think the same, so it doesn't matter- it's energy, and whatever happens with this- because political parties, they want this, so it would not mean enough, both Høyre [Conservative Party], Senterpartiet [Centre Party], Arbeiderpartiet [Labor Party], Venstre [Liberal Party], KRF [Christian Democratic Party], wants it, so...

[Haramsøya rep.]

No, it's more about which areas in the political spectrum we feel a connection to and believe in [...] there are also a lot of conflicting opinions within the parties themselves, but we thought it was important, no doubt, but there were other topics as well, so it was an overall assessment.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.4.4 Closing Statements and Trust Changes

Finally, similar to participation, polarization was not mentioned much in the closing statements, with one participant focusing on it:

What I think about is the fact that there are some out here, and I think, in a local community there are many who chose to remain neutral, and who feel pressured not to have an opinion by others, and that makes me think... on this island there is a gathering place for young people called school where students who engaged in demonstrations, and then the parents call the school and insinuate that it is the teachers who initiate this... and even as a teacher you need to be able to have your own opinions.

[Haram rep.]

However, it was prominently represented during the rating phase:

3... it changed drastically, I used to have a great level of political trust before this, and then I see what I consider to be done in the wrong way, and it's not honest, not in this area, and then I assume it's happening in other areas too... and the politicians are not to be trusted, neither are office holders.

[Haram rep.]

It was 10 before this, and now it's a 1, no... 0.5... I had very good trust, and I followed rules to the dot, and I had very good trust to the democracy and celebrated 17. May [Norwegian Constitution Day] every year with great joy, but not anymore.

[Haram rep.]

I experience it as a little sad, to have had such good faith, both in local, regional, and national too... and then to experience that there is behavior that I find... reprehensible and unethical and- so I have asked questions if I have been too naïve throughout my life [...] suddenly I ask questions of whether people in such positions are there because they are power hungry... are they so... concerned with the well-being of the people as they try to express, or is it all about the power? [...] per today I can't reach higher than maximum 4... and that is what I experience as sad.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

*Is 1 the worst? [...] It would land there then... it isn't Norwegian politics anymore either, it's just controlled by the EU [...] there is zero trust... and when politicians pull up Ukraine and say that we should develop wind turbines in solidarity with them I just think what the h***, if we need to be solidary then we can instead send gas to the EU.*

[Bjerkreim rep.]

There are a lot of individual differences and we have seen this within the same parties here in Bjerkreim... when some... feel the same pain as you, while others run with the politician style where they trample you and... but generally I have... very poor faith in the politicians, but I am not a politician myself so it's very simple for me to say so, it's not like its easy once you're in that position that they are in [...] 3 or 4.

[Bjerkreim rep.]

7.4.5 Discussion - Polarization

Similar to the previous subchapters, the theoretical expectations (Carter, 2013; Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018; Hobolt & De Vries, 2014; Otteni & Weisskircher, 2021) found support in the results; however, the results vary across stages of implementation more so than in other subchapters. Depending on the community, participants did have their voting behavior changed; sources were, at times, limited to what was said within the community; and opposing arguments were not always trusted or considered.

First, voting behavior was heavily affected by this process on Haramsøya whereas all but two participants had their voting behavior changed. Few of the participants disclosed what they voted, while some did disclose it. One participant had voted for the Democrats, considered a right-wing populist party, mostly based on the party's stance on wind power. Another participant, while voting for SV, considered the Red Party, considered a far-left socialist party. Both of these, the Democrats and the Red Party are fringe parties far from the centre parties of Norway, which mainly consist of the Labor Party, the Conservative Party, Centre Party and Progress Party, who all had over 10% of the election vote in 2021. Because most of the major parties are positive towards wind power to some extent, certain participants are willing to vote for the smaller fringe parties, whose policies might at times be considered extreme for Norwegian standards, based on their stance on wind power, leading to a polarization effect in politics. However, they do this as a consequence of the lack of trust in the larger parties and their policies. On the contrary, participants in Bjerkreim mostly maintained an unchanged voting behavior.

The second theme, the sources, shows that participants on Haramsøya were to a larger degree dependent on localized sources, including Facebook, word of mouth, and institutions that opposes wind power than participants in Bjerkreim who would mention the news media and debates more. As one participant on Haramsøya pointed out, it might be a bit one-sided to limit your sources to those you agree with, and not expand the pool; however, because the wind power facility is built and operational, the mentions being limited to those you agree with might be a sign of appreciation to those who stood along side each other, and a sign of a bigger distrust in supporters of the policy. Meanwhile, in Bjerkreim, concessions are yet to be finalized, and as such participants might yet have more trust in democratic processes and accepts sources outside of their opposition. While there are some participants in each community who differ, and who used sources different from the rest, this is the general trend observed in the interviews.

Openness to sources that might support wind power observed in Bjerkreim, also extended to arguments from supporters, which these participants were, to a larger degree, open to discuss and consider. The reason for this is likely similar to why they mentioned the news more often, in that they still have some trust in democratic processes because the concession is still being decided on. On Haramsøy, these arguments were rarely considered by participants, whereas one participant considers them fabricated. This could also be attributed to the reasoning for the sources, where participants on Haramsøya have suffered a larger loss of trust in the democratic processes and therefore might downplay the opposing side's arguments, or completely ignore them. The general distrust of supporters' arguments also extends to some within the community, whereas participants, especially from Haramsøy, mention how the process has sowed distrust within the community, and split it between those who allowed, or supports, the development, and the opponents.

As one can see, the differences in policy implementation between Haramsøya and Bjerkreim is quite large in this subchapter, and that these phases matter. Starting from voting behavior, most of the participants on Haramsøya changed their behavior, whilst only a few did so in Bjerkreim. Next are the sources, where participants on Haramsøya were mostly limited to sources within their opposition, while those in Bjerkreim paid more attention to the news and debates for information. Finally, supporters' arguments held more weight in Bjerkreim than it did on Haramsøy. These events are likely caused by the level of

policy implementation, where Haramsøya being in the output phase has, as argued above, likely taken a hit on their trust in democratic processes, and they might see these arguments as less relevant now that it is finished, and might wish to move on. Bjerkreim, on the other hand, is still in the input phase, and might have a long battle ahead of themselves, while also possibly having a higher level of trust in the process as they still might have a chance to hinder development of the EPP. In order to stop development, it is also important for participants to stay up to date on new information on the case, which the news provides. Contrary to the arguments however, being in the output phase, participants on Haramsøya who opposed the development might feel resentment or disappointment towards others within the community who initially, and later, supports the development because they might have aided in the completion of the facility. Meanwhile, in Bjerkreim, while there is some disappointment aimed towards some land-owners who sold their land, it was a less important topic, likely because the opponents can still halt the development.

8. Concluding Remarks

This thesis studied the effect of EPPs on political trust among policy opponents living on Haramsøya and in Bjerkreim. Based on the literature and findings analyzed above, these concluding remarks will firstly sum up the main results of the thesis and secondly give recommendations for future research.

8.1 Conclusions

This thesis considered how political trust was changed among policy opponents who lives within proximity to planned and completed EPPs in Bjerkreim and on Haramsøya respectively. To do this, the thesis first conceptualized political trust, EPPs, and policy opponents, before moving on to the analysis, which was guided by four factors, emphasized by theories as the most important ones. These were perceptions of procedural fairness of the EPP siting processes in terms of transparency and process; institutional performance in terms of how the local communities assessed the EPP, from siting to outcomes, as well as other institutions' involvement; participation in terms of how and why participants chose to partake in the process; and polarization in terms of whether the EPP has altered voting behavior, political preferences, and trust in those who support development. Coincidentally, this order was also reflected in the number of results for each topic from most to least discussed by participants. Additionally, the thesis considered various stages of policy implementation on the grounds of development variety in Bjerkreim and on Haramsøya, whereas the former is still in the input phase, while the latter is in the output stage of implementation. This variation in implementation stage contributed to certain differences in participant answers, and thus how factors mattered for political trust.

First, according to the results, participants in both communities perceived the procedures as unfair, without much insight into the siting process, or impact when they initially tried to affect the procedures. Consequently, this led all participants to oppose the EPP, and most showed a general distrust in politicians and decision-makers due to the secretive, abusive, and unfair process perceptions. While there is a general agreement that the procedures had a negative impact on participants, the results vary slightly in each community, and this might be caused by the different stages of policy implementation. The key differences lie in what participants in each community chose to discuss while on the topic of procedural fairness, including contact between locals and developers, the possibility

of democratic impact, and whether local or central politics were most important during the process. However, the conclusion that both communities showed distrust due to poor process perceptions remains the same. Therefore, by making the process transparent, rather than closed, developers could potentially see a higher level of acceptance among the community, and more importantly, politicians and decision-makers could see a higher level of political trust and acceptance towards their energy policies among policy opponents. However, if this fails, procedural fairness becomes a source for the other factors mentioned in the thesis.

Second, results from the interviews reveal that the performance of several institutions, including NVE, OED, the police, and the courts, have by their various actions, or in some cases inactions, weakened participants' trust in them. Furthermore, participants have grown cautious of wind turbine technologies, and wind power expansion policies as they see other alternatives as superior in terms of costs and benefits for the community, and for Norway as a whole. These findings are, despite the difference in levels of policy implementation in each community, surprisingly similar; however, the answers differed slightly on the topic of trust in police and the courts because of their impact on the Haramsøya community. As discussed in 7.1.6, communities might potentially accept these developments if they feel included in the process, and by doing so, faith in each of the above institutions would arguably suffer much less of a trust penalty as some of them, namely the police or the courts, would likely not be involved to begin with. If there was a general agreement between the community and developers, NVE and OED's decision could have been accepted, which would arguably lead to less opposition and resistance. This in turn would reduce the probability of the courts and the police being involved on Haramsøy, consequently reducing, or negating, the lowered trust in these institutions. Moreover, if acceptance towards the policy was higher, each community would have to spend less time forming ideas and arguments to oppose decision-makers and strengthen the counter-movement, which fosters doubt and distrust towards decision-makers and politicians. Finally, while developers are mentioned a lot in the interviews, it seems that participants, although unhappy with the developers too, generally agree that decision-makers, who allow the developers to construct the wind turbines to begin with, are at fault.

Third, the evidence corresponds well with the theoretical expectations on how citizen participation affects political trust. Participants in each community disagreed with the policy, and thus decided to act, participating in various ways, likely based on the level of political trust, whereas those who acted early most often did so through institutionalized processes, and later protests and demonstrations became a popular option. However, participants found their efforts ignored by authorities and decision-makers. This was the case for both communities, where answers on participation remained largely similar despite being at different stages of implementation. There is one core difference, and that is the amount of attention each opposition received in the media, which some participants from Haramsøya would mention. In sum, the outcome of participation has, in both communities, had a negative impact on participants, thus arguably reducing their political trust, although this is less explicit from the interview answers. Moreover, both communities' efforts in the media might help them in spreading low levels of political trust through garnering sympathy among those who does not live within proximity of the EPP and by potentially exposing poor institutional performance.

Finally, the results show that this process has influenced political trust through polarization, especially on Haramsøy, for the worse. However, for this factor, the stage of policy implementation proved to be quite important, and shows that participants on Haramsøya and in Bjerkreim varies vastly on answers on the various themes of polarization. In accordance with the theoretical framework, participants on Haramsøya did alter their voting behavior, and they did tend to trust their own more so than the supporters, as seen in their sources and acceptance of opposing arguments. Conversely, participants in Bjerkreim, did not alter their voting behavior much, and were more open towards sources and supporters' arguments. Therefore, polarization is a result of the previous factors and stems from an already weakened political trust, as it is mostly seen in the output stage of policy implementation, and consequently lead to further reduced political trust. To hinder polarization, decision-makers and authorities will have to intervene early in the EPP process, or risk alienating certain communities who oppose these policies.

Overall, the findings regarding how EPPs affects political trust among policy opponents suggest that all the above factors influence political trust, although in different stages of policy implementation. Moreover, findings show that, in addition to Norris' focus

on the 4th and 5th component, these are trust in regime institutions and incumbents, for her definition of political trust, her 3rd component, regarding satisfaction with democratic governance and democratic processes, was also prevalent in the interviews. Therefore, it seems recommendable for decision-makers to be aware of the perceived procedural fairness and inform those who will be affected by such a policy, and follow-up during the entire process. If this fails, decision-makers could have inconvincible opponents from the beginning of a policy cycle and the situation could snowball into a poor assessment of institutional performance, as well as participation, and polarization if the EPP passes the input stage of implementation. This might then lead to a decrease in trust in politicians and decision-makers and consequently affect the maneuverability of said decision-makers and politicians in the shift towards more renewable energy, in addition to lowering legitimacy of Norwegian democracy. However, if decision-makers succeed in addressing these issues at the early stages of implementation, it could prevent the loss of political trust and instead lead to safely and democratically developed EPPs in the future.

8.2 Further Research Possibilities

Due to the breadth and complexity of the field of political trust, as well as the exploratory character of this thesis, it could only provide a small insight, which was the intention. To truly understand how EPPs affects political trust among policy opponents in general, as well as to develop useful insights for how governments can to prevent this decline, the area would need to be studied further in depth, with different factors to find other prevalent ones, and from different angles. For this reason, this final section of the thesis will present three limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. First, the limited number of cases; second, the possibility of other potential factors; and third, the inclusion of policy opponents not within proximity of an EPP.

The thesis mentioned in chapter 5.1 that it was limited to two cases due to time and budgetary constraints. Therefore, it only chose Haramsøya and Bjerkreim, and the communities within each for data gathering. Hence, the second stage of policy implementation, throughput, and its effect on the factors was not studied. However, for future research, and to truly understand how the distinct stages of policy implementation affects various factors that influence political trust, including it and comparing such findings with this thesis seems highly recommendable. Conducting such research in a community

where a concession has been given, and construction is starting, or has started, might deliver different insights into the factors, and the underlying reasons for low levels of political trust due to EPPs. Granted this would require said research to utilize the same factors as this thesis. Alternatively, research that considers all three stages of policy implementations – input, throughput, and output – could utilize different factors to widen the scope.

The inclusion of procedural fairness, as done in this thesis, proved to be a useful measure to understand how EPPs affects political trust among policy opponents, as it led to the other factors. However, this does not diminish the importance of institutional performance, citizen participation and polarization as they all derived from theory and proved to influence political trust. For this reason, future quantitative research on EPPs and political trust could base questionnaire and survey questions on answers from this study. Still, there might be other factors, or reasons, with somewhat similar effects, which might also be important for decision-makers to be aware of. Hence, future research could attempt to find and include different factors from those used in this thesis to further expand knowledge on how EPPs influence political trust.

Regarding the variety in participants, it seems relevant to point out that, while they had different occupations, genders, and ages, they all lived within proximity of the completed or planned EPP in their community, more specifically wind turbines. With organizations, such as MOTVIND, which was mentioned by some participants, and over 34.000 members in Haramsøy's opposition group on Facebook, there are bound to be policy opponents further inland, distanced from such projects. Giving this group of policy opponents more weight might include different perspectives on the issue, and could potentially reduce the notion of NIMBY when policy opponents oppose wind power. Therefore, future research could include policy opponents who do not live in proximity to the EPP being studied.

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Appendix

Interview Guide

- *Interviews are planned to last between 40 minutes and 1 hour
- *Ask for permission to tape record the interview using University of Oslo's own dictaphone and explain Nettskjema
- *Reassure participants that their anonymity will be protected
- *There are no right or wrong answers! I am interested in your experiences, opinions, and feelings
- *Remember to explain the topic and focus of the study briefly

Primary questions are written in **bold** and guiding questions in *italic* in case noting comes to mind for the interviewees.

Procedural Fairness

1. **What do you know about the procedures surrounding the wind power development here? Have you tried to learn more? Why?**
2. **Do you think the processes were/are democratic? Why?**
3. *Explain what you think about the processes from concession to complete construction.*
 - a. *What do you think about NVE's data gathering for the concession?*
 - b. *Do you feel like you got to participate? If **NO** – how did you experience that?*
 - c. *How would you change the procedures?*

Institutional Performance

1. **What is your impression on the results from the wind power development? Economically? Socially? Etc.**
2. **Do you think there are better alternatives to renewable energy compared to wind power? Which? Why?**
3. *What is your opinion on the police's involvement in connection with the development on Haramsfjellet?*

Citizen Participation

1. **Explain your attitudes towards renewable energy, more specifically wind power, before and after construction/planned construction of the wind power facilities.**

2. **Have you, in any way shape or form participated in the opposition against this development? Why/why not? What did you think when it (did not) work out?**
3. *Did you participate because you thought the authorities would listen to what you had to say, or because they did not pay enough attention?*
4. *Are you a member of "No to wind turbines on Haramsøya"/ "No to wind turbines on Faurefjell in Bjerkreim"? How did you hear about this group? Why did you join?*

Polarization

1. **Who informed you on this case? (Why) has it been useful?**
2. **Do you believe that you have a different opinion on the development of wind power than someone from, for instance, Oslo? Why?**
3. **Have you paid attention to wind power supporters' arguments? What do you think about these?**
4. **Did you vote at the parliamentary election in 2021 (last year)?**
 - a. **If YES – Did your vote go to a party based on their environmental policies?**
 - b. **If NO – who not?**
 - c. **Do you believe this has split opinions here?**

Final Questions

1. **Do you have anything to add?**
2. **Where, on a scale from 1 to 10, where do you place your own political trust?**
 - a. Definition of political trust is "the general belief in the performance capacity of political institutions and/or belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of office-holders"

Interview Issues

One interview with a representative from Haramsøya was completely corrupted and unretrievable, leaving the researcher with only notes, rendering that conversation unquotable. Another interview had the second half of the interview (everything after 45 minutes) corrupted, and could thus only quote the first half of that conversation.