

The Effect of Mass Protest on Attitudes toward Democracy:

New Data and Evidence from Colombia

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Abstract

Sociology and political science scholars have long debated the impacts of protest. Contributing to scholarship in the attitudinal consequences of protest, I examine how mass protest affects attitudes toward democracy in Colombia from 2010 to 2013. I develop and introduce the PEC dataset and match it with the latinobarómetro survey georeferenced at sub-national levels (departments). My results show that the size and diversity (number of identities) of protests, have a significant effect in support for democracy. Using statistical analyses, I find that larger and more diverse protests increase the likelihood of people supporting democracy. Descriptive statistics and qualitative work illustrate protests' dynamics in Colombia. These findings show how prodemocratic protests in a non-mature democracy can increase the support for democracy by affecting peoples beliefs.

Key words: Contentious Politics, Protest, Democracy, Attitudes to democracy.

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"The nobodies: Who are not, but could be. Who don't speak languages, but dialects. Who don't have religions, but superstitions. Who don't create art, but handicrafts. Who don't have culture, but folklore. Who are not human beings, but human resources. Who do not have faces, but arms. Who do not have names, but numbers. Who do not appear in the history of the world, but in the police blotter of the local paper. The nobodies, who are not worth the bullet that kills them" (Eduardo Galeano, The Book of Embraces)

In my first MA course in statistics at UiO the professor asked about our knowledge in stats, I told him "last time I saw an equation was 13 years ago when finished high-school" and here I am, trying to make sense of P-values. When I decided to write about protests I remembered people telling me that to protest was useless. Well, I think this research shows quite the opposite, protests are a powerful tool for the nobodies.

First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Tore Wig. Without his excellent guidance, dedication and permanent encouragement, this thesis would not be what it is. To the invaluable contributions of the academic community at PRIO. Particularly to Ida Rødninger, Júlia Palik, Anna Obermeier, Jonas Vestby, and Amalia Nielsen. To UiO for the field trip grant. Many thanks to my PECOS community. In particular to: Amandine, Birthe, Chandler, and Simone. You helped me to navigate thru long-dark winters with your friendship, support and generously sharing your knowledge with me. To Kaja, without her help (and friendship) I would still be lost in a cosmos of numbers.

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All flaws in this thesis are my own,

The PEC dataset file and the R-scripts can be provided upon request. Contact: davidfg@uio.no

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1

Introduction

In 1905, thousands of Russians peacefully marched to the winter palace in St. Petersburg to present petitions to the Tsar. They rejected the use of violence and -unknowingly- they brought a fresh understanding of power: real power derives from the consent of those it would control, not from the threat of violence against them. The emergence of this understanding in the great struggles against dictatorships, invasions, and the defence of human rights, has shaped mass protests around the world. This march not only brought a fresh understanding of power, but also inaugurated (unknowingly by the protesters) a century full of protests that were directly influenced by them. Just a couple of years later, Mahatma Gandhi would take them as inspiration to lead one of the most important and successful nonviolent campaigns of all time in India, showing the strength of nonviolent campaigns (Ackerman & Duvall, 2000, p. 8) and positioning contentious politics as a day to day reality in democracies and autocracies.

The relationship between protest and attitudes toward democracy is a contested one. Numerous scholars find evidence that prodemocratic sustained protest campaigns in autocracies can erode the support to autocratic systems and bring long-lasting democracies (Chenoweth, E, 2021; Chenoweth, E & Stephan, M, 2011; Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017; Kadivar, 2018). By comparison, there is a nascent literature on attitudinal consequences of protests seeking to expand democratic attitudes in democracies (Biggs et al., 2020; Branton et al., 2015; Ketchley & El-Rayyes, 2021; Mazumder, 2018, 2019; Wallace et al., 2014). With the notable exception of studies carried out by Tertychnaya and Lankina (2020) and Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021), this research agenda remains overwhelmingly focused on protests in the United States, and so it remains unclear how these insights travel to contexts of non mature democracies (Ketchley & El-Rayyes, 2021, p. 282).

Drawing on evidence from Colombia, this thesis seeks to understand how prodemocratic protest

events have influenced individual's attitudes toward democracy in a democratic context. According to V-DEM, Colombia scored in the top 30-40% in the Liberal Democracy Index during 2010-2014 (V-DEM, 2022). My study expands research on attitudinal consequences of protests to include the case of a non-mature democracy and contributes to scholarship on the attitudinal consequences of mass mobilization.

Colombia has had one of the longest-lasting armed conflicts, and possibly the most violent, in the American continent (Ríos, 2021). The research dedicated to it is proliferous. Despite important protests events and non-violent campaigns during the last decade, there is little research on the topic. By using empirical evidence collected in the Protest Events in Colombia Dataset (PEC Dataset) I seek to answer the following research question:

How does mass protest affect attitudes toward democracy?

I examined my research question within the context of Colombia from 2010 to 2013, at the sub-national level (department level). To answer this question, I conducted an independent data collection of protest events, qualitative fieldwork, and statistical analysis. The protest data is a data contribution since I designed a codebook and collected original data in the PEC Dataset. It includes three thousand seven hundred eighty-four (3784) observations at municipal level (grouped into departments to match the Latinobarómetro survey level).

I use two theoretical approaches in this research: rational and the social psychological approach. Using these theoretical approaches, I draw on three mechanisms to explain how protest events affect attitudes toward democracy: peer pressure, agenda setting and persuasion. As previously stated, the data sources are two: First, the Political Culture Survey conducted by Latinobarómetro to measure attitudes towards democracy (dependent variable); Second, the PEC dataset (originally collected for this thesis) to measure three independent variables: size of the event (number of participants), composition (number of identities reported), and intensity of the protest (count of the protest events).

Using descriptive statistics I present an overview of the dynamics of protests in Colombia, introduce unique repertoires to the Colombian case, and provide findings regarding who, how and where people protested, as well as the rationality behind it.

1.1 Research design and data

The research question is answered using a quantitative research design with large-N data. The objective of the thesis is to study the effect of protest events in attitudes toward democracy in the entire country for a four year period (2010-2013) and Large-N studies provide tools to measure and analyze variation in large groups of observations (Halperin & Heath, 2020). The study of protest events phenomena at aggregated levels has the advantage of presenting more generalized findings regarding variation in attitudes toward democracy. By comparison, a qualitative study would provide an explanation for particular elements of the protesters' preferences at the individual level, such as their feelings (individual perceptions), life history (why they did -or did not- join the protest event or what changed in their life after they joined or witnessed a protest), or to describe the characteristics of a singular protest event or campaign. Since my research question aims to capture the variance generated at the aggregated level in Colombia, a quantitative approach is preferable. Nevertheless, I conducted fieldwork in Colombia for three weeks in order to have a better understanding of the patterns and quantitative results. During my time in the South American country, I conducted semi structured interviews, collected data and did observational work.

The two quantitative data sources are the Latinobarómetro survey and the PEC dataset. The political culture survey conducted by Latinobarómetro is an annual public opinion survey that involves around 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries. In Colombia, during the period of study they conducted 1200 surveys per year. The Latinobarómetro survey presents two challenges. First, it didn't conduct the survey in 2012, thus, I use an average of values from the 2011 - 2013 surveys for the 2012 data; Second, the survey is not representative at the local level (municipalities) but at 20 out of the 32 departments of Colombia. Based on this, I use the department as the unit of analysis of my research. To measure the protest events, I created and used the PEC Dataset. I compared more than 190 datasets available in Harvard Dataverse and other dataset repositories (PRIO Replication datasets and open sources, see table A.1). To the best of my knowledge, currently there are no available datasets studying protest events in Colombia between 2010 -2013 with the precision of my dataset. I developed and aim to introduce the Protest Events in Colombia Dataset (PEC Dataset) in this research as a data contribution. The unit of analysis of the PEC dataset is the protest event, and the data is collected at the municipal level. To match the information in this dataset with the Latinobarómetro survey, the data is grouped at department level for the statistical analysis. The PEC dataset contains detailed information about dates, location, identities, number of participants, repression, and grievances from 1st January 2010 to 31st December 2013.

The analysis is performed using a design of a quasi-experimental identification strategy for estimating causal effects (S. Cunningham, 2021). To estimate the effect of the treatment (prodemocratic protest events) on attitudes toward democracy (dependent variable), I use a logit oneway fixed effects (on departments) estimation technique. This design helps to conduct the analysis for the effect of three independent variables: the size, the diversity and intensity of protest events over the dependent variable: support for democracy.

1.2 Why Colombia?

Most of the literature researching protest has been focused on authoritarian regimes (resistance to autocratization and the struggle to bring democracy), the United States, the Arab Spring (as case studies) during the last decade, and Hong Kong (Nilsen, 2021) in recent years. Protests, and particularly prodemocratic protests, have proved to bring political changes (Wasow, 2020) and attitudinal changes (Wallace et al., 2014) in advanced democracies like in the United States. However, we know little about attitudinal change as a result of protest events in non-advanced democratic countries.

Colombia is a country marked by one of the most long-lasting armed conflicts in the modern era (Faieta & Urdal, 2020). However, there is little work on protest and civil resistance (Barrera & Hoyos, 2020), lacking an empirical and theoretical framework to present the conditions and particular characteristics of the protests (Bautista Bautista, 2012). Colombia has a rich trajectory of protest events as the historian Archila Neira (2003, p. 133) highlights with a mean of 420 protest events per year from 1975 to 2007, and a mean of 173 protest events per year in the period of 1958 to 1974.

Colombia stood out to me as an interesting study case for the period 2010-2013 due to four elements:

1. it is a long-established democracy, however it scored in the fourth quintile of the top 50 % of countries in the Liberal Democracy Index (V-DEM, 2022), hence there are still multiple elements in the democratic system that don't properly work and people could try to improve it.
2. Between 2012 and 2016 a peace dialogue with FARC took place, leading to a peace agreement. Peace agreements are generally elite-led process (Marsh & Palik, 2021), in particular the Colombian peace agreement was restricted to FARC and the government with minor participation by the civil society (Gómez Triana, 2021). However, the peace agreement incorporated a sub-commission on gender in 2014 due to the pressure of women organizations (Bramsen, 2022) that took to the street, indicating some

effect from protests from previous years. 3. To the best of my knowledge, there are no academic studies regarding the effects of protest in attitudinal change in Colombia or in any country in the Latin American region. 4. It is a case without protest data with the magnitude and precision that I aim to introduce in this thesis. Then, to develop a dataset entails the possibility to open the door to future quantitative studies to better understand the patterns and effects of protest in Colombia, in similar countries and the region of Latin America, from the political science perspective.

Finally, other works have shown how changes in people's attitudes towards democracy has influenced long-term policy-developments (Mazumder, 2019) or even regime changes (Ketchley, 2017). Yet in Colombia, after the Peace Agreement signed with FARC in 2016 a new set of institutions and contextual conditions have opened the possibility for non-violent expressions to speak-up their agendas without the pressure of the internal armed conflict. To study how non-violent means, like protest, can change society could have real life implications, outside academia, for people to choose peaceful means rather than violent means in the resolution of their conflicts.

1.3 Summary of the results

The results of my findings can be summarized into two groups: First, I present new and unique data, introducing a unique perspective of the contentious politics phenomena in Colombia; Second, using statistical analysis for hypothesis testing, I find that prodemocratic protest events indeed have a positive effect on attitudes toward democracy.

I collected new data and introduce the PEC data set to be used in future quantitative research about protest events in Colombia as pioneer work. Using the data collected in the PEC dataset, I use descriptive statistics to present patterns about protests in Colombia. I present some qualitative findings based on the PEC dataset and my field work. The qualitative data includes three cases of unique repertoires to the Colombian case and describe what identities protested the most, what grievances they had and the characteristics of the different waves of protests across the entire period.

Using a Logit oneway fixed effects model, two of my three hypothesis have statistical significance and a positive relation to support for democracy. The size of the protests is statistically significant, with a positive relation. The number of identities, how diverse protests are, is also statistically significant to explain the increase in support for democracy.

In the end, this thesis is a contribution to the study of attitudinal consequences of protests, by

providing a causal relationship in a non-mature democracy that can be used to expand this nascent body of academic research, and to the study of protest dynamics themselves. To measure the size of protests is important, as well as the diversity in composition of protesters.

1.4 Clarifications and limitations

Protest events and non-violent resistance campaigns are one of the most fascinating phenomena in the last two centuries. In 1577, when Étienne de La Boétie wrote the *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude*, he was probably not aware of how the basic principle of noncooperation, as a technique to erode regime support, seeking a change, would take shape in the future. Prodemocratic protests in Colombia have managed to influence political agendas between 2010 and 2013. The results show an increase in the support for democracy in those departments that had prodemocratic protests events.

However, deep or significant democratic transformations in Colombia have not taken place after that. Three years after the last year of this study, the government signed a peace agreement with FARC that sought to expand democratic rights, but it was rejected by citizens on a plebiscite. Right after that, a right-wing candidate (Ivan Duque) won the presidential elections (2018) promising not to implement the peace agreement and to maintain a conservative agenda.

In 2019 and 2021, Colombia witnessed massive protest events all across the country. Still, significant changes in the democratic system are not on the horizon. Yet, important democratic gains like legal abortion rights (implemented in 2022) and 16 special seats for victims of the armed conflict in the congress were approved in 2021 by the constitutional court, following important protests by women and supporters of the peace agreement.

Attitudinal change in support for democracy is one of the many pieces of the puzzle to build a democratic society. The contribution of protest events is valuable and significant but should not be seen as a determinant factor of the equation. Chenoweth, E (2021) has shown the efficacy of prodemocratic protest campaigns. To organize and sustain a campaign has a different scope to a series of protest events, like what is presented in the period of study. The aim of this thesis is not to prove democratic changes in the political system as a result of protests events, but how people see democracy, how prodemocratic protest events bring attitudinal support for democracy.

1.5 Thesis outline

This thesis is structured as follows: in chapter 2 the core concepts of the thesis are defined and some of the most relevant literature about protests and attitudes toward democracy is presented. Chapter 3 aims to present a comprehensive background of the phenomena in Colombia. Using mainly descriptive statistics, chapter 3 seeks to characterize the main components of the protests as well as the key characteristics of the democracy in Colombia. Two main approaches are used and discussed in detail in chapter 4, social psychological and rational arguments. Drawing upon these approaches, I present the mechanisms I expect have an influence in individual's attitudes toward democracy and the hypotheses that guide my research. In chapter 5, I present a detailed discussion about the data sources, the variables and general research design of the thesis. In chapter 6, the theory, data, hypotheses and model are subjected to empirical tests, introducing the preliminary results of the research. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the research and presents the main findings, contributions, and weaknesses, as well as suggestions for further development of the topics covered in the thesis.

2

What we know and don't know about Protest and Attitudes toward Democracy

The first part of this chapter aims to present and define the core concepts used in this thesis work: *contentious politics, protest, identities, repertoires, attitudes towards democracy*. The second part of this chapter presents a literature review of some of the most influential academic works and debates in the field. Finally, I outline the knowledge gap that I seek to fill with this research: the effect of protest events in attitudes towards democracy.

2.1 Concepts

In this section I present and define the core concepts used in this thesis: *contentious politics, protest, identities, repertoires, attitudes toward democracy*. The definitions provided in this chapter are important to present a common ground to read and interpret the theory, research design, the evidence from the case study, and the results of this research.

2.1.1 Contentious politics

Using the definition of Tilly et al. (2001, p. 5) contentious politics are "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants"

2.1.2 Protest

Protest is defined as nonroutinized ways of affecting political, social and cultural processes (Della Porta, 2013). It is a public collective action that seeks to communicate a message expressing one or more grievances. A protest event can be performed by one or more people using one or more disruptive techniques - repertoires (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009). They also are "sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations" (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 268).

2.1.3 Identities

The concept of *collective identities* is described as *Identities* in this thesis and entails the following definition provided by Hunt and Benford (2007) "*collective identity is conceptualized as individuals' identifications of, identification with, and attachments to some collectivity in cognitive, emotional, and moral terms. Rooted in and shaped by particular sociocultural contexts, collective identities are produced and reproduced in ongoing interactions between allies, oppositional forces, and audiences who can be real or imagined. While providing a sense of we-ness and collective agency, collective identities also create a sense of other via boundary identification, construction, and maintenance. Collective identities, as shared meanings, provide cultural contexts for planning, enabling, carrying out and evaluating individual participation and collective actions. Collective identity is closely related to but yet distinct from other concepts such as ideology, personal identity, participation, solidarity, and commitment*" (2007, p. 450). The discussion and particular elements to the Colombia case of this concept are presented in chapters 4 and 5.

2.1.4 Repertoires

Repertoires are defined for this thesis as the technology used by citizens when they want to resist or promote changes, constrained to time and space (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004). In the words of Tilly (1986, p. 390): "these varieties of action constitute a repertoire in something like the theatrical or musical sense of the word; but the repertoire in question resembles that of the *commedia dell'arte* or jazz more than that of a strictly classical ensemble: people know the general rules of performance more or less well and vary the performance to meet the purpose at hand".

2.1.5 Attitudes toward democracy

Attitudes towards democracy consists of the linked stock of attitudes that define a set of commonsense beliefs about what is right, what is natural, and what works for the democracy. First, there is a normative belief about the worth of democracy as an ideal. Second, descriptive beliefs about how democratic the present country is. These commonsense beliefs are not universal, but are instead typically bound by time as well as by space (Rochon, 1998). Attitudes toward democracy is then defined as the preference and support for democracy, autocracy or being indifferent to the political system.

2.2 Literature

The question 'do protests work?' has presented a rich debate across political science, sociology, and economics about the efficacy of protest (Andrews, 1997; Andrews & Biggs, 2006; Biggs, 2015; Chenoweth, E, 2021; Chenoweth, E & Stephan, M, 2011; Gillion, 2012; Mazumder, 2019; Sharp, 1973; Wasow, 2020). In political science the relationship between protests and electoral changes has been somewhat explored. However, the link between protests and attitudinal change is a growing literature as Mazumder (2019) highlights. Particularly, the study of the changes that protests can produce in democracies.

2.2.1 Protest efficacy for policy

The study of political culture is one of the foundational elements of Political Science itself (Almond & Verba, 1963; Dalton, R, 2004; Diamond, Larry, 2008; Easton, 1975; Huntington, 1991; Larry, 1999). However, to study political culture and attitudes toward democracy has been a challenge, because there is a problem with comparison and generalization that lies within the specific measures used (Larry, 1999, p. 212) (see also; Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017).

Political power whether in a democracy or an autocracy comes from the ability to get other people to cooperate and obey authority voluntarily based on three fundamental assumptions: power is based on legitimacy rather than coercion; power is never permanent; and no system is monolithic (Chenoweth, E, 2021, p. 30). However, power can also be based on coercion. Hence, if contentious collective action achieves shifts in "loyalty", it can succeed in its objectives, proving its efficacy.

Some authors like Burstein and Sausner (2005, p. 413) note that collective action, including protests,

is rare and therefore has no impact on policy because there is so little of it. Giugni (2007, p. 54) takes a different path to the same conclusion, arguing that because movements are minority actors that have little power, the source of policy change would lie elsewhere. While Amenta (2014, p. 17) argues that mass disruption is frequently counterproductive to winning policy concessions.

Academics studying environmental protest and policymaking (Olzak & Soule, 2009) argue that institutional tactics, rather than disruptive ones, assist movements in gaining an audience in Congress. Or how anti-war demonstrations and congress attention encouraged congress attention but with opposite grievances to the protesters claims on Vietnam war (McAdam & Su, 2002). Santoro (2002, 2008) argue that black protest encouraged the adoption of more comprehensive fair employment voting rights policies, like Mazumder (2019) does in a similar study. Studying the riots in the city of Los Angeles in the US in 1992, using georeferenced data Enos et al. (2019) finds that the riot caused a marked liberal shift in policy support at the polls, and that it was likely the result of increased mobilization of both black and white voters. Showing effects over a decade later. This particular work, provides evidence of how rioting, analyzed as a protest - political activity, may contribute to policy change.

Most of the works consulted state a link protest-policy, arguing a marginal, negative or positive effect to protests in democracies. However, there is an intermediary, protest-attitudes-policy, that has not been studied enough.

2.2.2 Protest efficacy on attitudinal change

Almost five decades ago Sharp (1973, p. 32) theorized that changes in the attitudes of workers in factories or of citizens in politics, for example, which result in withdrawal of obedience and cooperation can create extreme difficulties for the system. It can be disrupted or paralyzed. At times this can happen even when the ruler's own agents continue their loyal obedience. Despite important theorization and the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of protests and non-violent campaigns in bringing democratic conquers the mechanisms that operate in the process are in construction.

Huntington (1991, p. 50) states that in democracies the legitimacy of rulers usually depends on the extent to which they meet the performance expectations of key voters. Legitimacy constitutes a key factor in explaining democracy. Generally, contentions politics are by themselves a public statement that undermines a counterpart legitimacy, and it is strongly linked with public opinion (attitudes).

Protest events, understood as public discourses from a specific subculture in which meanings are contested, and from which cultural changes may arise (d'Anjou & Van Male, 1998, p. 209), have the capacity to challenge established cultural beliefs. The work of d'Anjou and Van Male (1998) suggest a set of elements that became relevant to the study of Social Movements and protests to understand the cultural changes brought by them. They argue that social movements must accomplish a contradictory task: they must frame their challenges in interpretative packages that are contrary to the dominant culture while, at the same time, struggle to make these contrary views part of the dominant culture. They point out to two strategies to overcome this challenge, (1) linking controversial topics with generally accepted and valued notions like basic rights, and (2) associating their interpretative package with an existing theme, as an alternative culture context that may legitimate their package. Interpretative packages are made up of three elements: framing, reasoning and consequences. I explore and expand these elements in the theory section. The importance of this study is a general framework by which social movements can shift attitudes.

Studying protest and attitudes in relation to racial prejudice Mazumder (2019) concludes that the Black Lives Matter movement was successful in reducing white's racial prejudice following an age gradient where young whites are liberalized by protest while older whites are not. On a similar work, studying the effect of the civil rights movements protests in the United States during the 60's, using 150,000 survey respondents, Mazumder (2018) develops a theory in which protests can shift attitudes and these changed attitudes can persist. He argues that whites from counties that witnessed civil rights protests are more likely to identify as Democrats, support affirmative action, and are associated with grater Democratic Party vote even in 2018. However, Biggs et al. (2020) argue that Mazumder's (2018) analysis omits a crucial predictor of protest and of racial attitudes: college education. The inclusion of this variable cuts the effect of protest by about half, hence protest is no longer statistically significant; emphasizing the importance of education as a contextual variable.

Analysing the relationship between protest and democracy Arce et al. (2019) state that political change is the result of continuous interaction between different actors in the political system, particularly between social movements and the state. In their study, the protest movements tend to influence political and institutional change when the following conditions are met: a) when they occur during phases of heightened conflict; b) when their moral and material claims evoke strong reactions from the public, and c) when their respective political system is open to negotiations with protesters (p. 200).

In the 2014 work Wallace et al. (2014) study the relationship between efficacy of protest on political

attitudes change based on spatial and temporal proximity. They study the effect of the immigrant rights marches in 2006 on Latino attitudes toward trust in government and self-efficacy. Using data from the Latino National Survey (2006) they conclude that local proximity to small marches had a positive impact on feelings of efficacy, whereas large-scale protests led to lower feelings of efficacy. Their results provide support for a positive effect of localized protests events shaping feelings towards government. They argue that a relevant factor is the frequency of exposure to protest that helps create a feeling of political empowerment (attitudes) and finally the ability to bring about political change.

Prodemocratic protest events don't always bring attitudinal sympathy for Democracy. Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021) study how in a nascent democracy, protest shaped popular perceptions of democracy during the post-Mubarak transition in Egypt, showing that Egyptians came to hold less favorable attitudes toward democracy after sustained protest in their district, particularly the collective actions that targeted public space. Using protest events geolocated data and wave 2 of the Arab Barometer survey they find evidence that the imposed cost created by the disruption of the economy by protests on local economies can erode support for democracy affecting how individuals perceive it.

Studying the individual-level public opinion shift against former president of the US, Donald Trump, after the "Muslim Ban" Collingwood et al. (2018) present strong evidence of the potential broad political effects of mass movements and protests, on how demonstrations can play a meaningful role in bringing about new considerations in the information environment and potentially generating opinion change among mass publics.

2.2.3 Attitudes toward democracy

Some studies reflecting the importance of studying the effect of protest on political agendas and public opinion have been presented. Tarrow (1989) argues that nonviolent political action is good for democracy: it forces governments to comply with citizen's demands and forces citizens to participate in the political process. The active participation of large numbers of citizens in the process of democratic change from autocracies, through their involvement in campaigns of nonviolent resistance, enhances the prospect that the citizenry will remain politically engaged after the transition (Chenoweth, E & Stephan, M, 2011, p. 207). The engagement and support for democratic elements could also play a role in democracies.

Regarding democracy and self-expression values on political regime type, Dahlum and Knutsen (2017)

challenge the long well-established knowledge that democracy is the result of the citizens values as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue, by presenting a new methodological and data approach concluding that the absence of actual data should not lead to the conclusion that there is a positive relationship between citizens values and democracy; it is inappropriate to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between values and democracy based on studies that use limited data and do not account for important sources of bias (Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017, p. 459).

Kadivar (2018) argue that sustained unarmed uprising have generated long-lasting new democracies -largely because they are forced to develop an organizational structure, which provides a leadership cadre for the new regime, forges links between the government and society, and strengthens checks on the power of the post-transition government studying 112 new electoral democracies from 1960 to 2010. What is relevant of this work for this research is that in concordance with the findings of Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011), the inherent dynamics of sustained protest campaigns indeed have an effect on the values of the people. In her study she analyzes pro-democracy campaigns obtaining robust results on the long-term survival of democracy, meaning that there is change in the society values, and there is a change in the political culture that allows democracy to hold. However, this relationship has not been studied in depth resulting in a knowledge gap.

2.2.4 Protest efficacy on opportunities

The study of mechanisms to explain the efficiency of protest are wide and varied. Luders (2006) and Luders, J (2010) have developed an economic opportunity argument in which success depends on the vulnerability of targets to the costs movements impose, in which a protest event can secure gains by imposing costs on targets. By disrupting normal operations, protesters may damage a target's economic viability (Biggs, 2015, p. 5). Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011, p. 220) present evidence and conclude that diverse participation tends to result in higher levels of civic disruption through mass noncooperation, which causes erstwhile regime supporters, including security forces, to reevaluate their interests and preferences and become more willing to shift loyalties to the resistance.

Sharp's conceptualization of power defined as the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which action impinges on other group of people. And political power being a kind of social power which is wielded for political objectives, especially by government institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions (Sharp, 1973). At the end, protests are a constellation of individual sums aiming to produce a change, aiming to wield power of often far more powerful opponents in the political arena based on the disruptiveness

of their actions.

Biggs (2015, p. 7) states that protest is likely to generate change through disruption by threatening established actors and by enlisting the support of bystanders and it could also spread beyond the direct targets. A protest means disruption on the political scenario that according to the context, sympathy and effectiveness can achieve or not its goals. Political opportunity theorists argue that the conditions that facilitate movement emergence may account for their apparent influence (Kitschelt, 1986). Wasow (2020) argue that the disruption to seed mainstreams news agendas and tactics influence the types of frames adopted by media, recognizing elite dominance of political communication but focusing on the ability of activists to overcome asymmetries in power through tactics like disrupt that appeal to news organizations and shape media coverage using the sociological concept of frame construction through agenda seeding.

2.2.5 Study of protest

To study protest many different datasets are used. However, at the time of writing of this article, and to the best of my knowledge, there are no existing datasets of protest events in Colombia for the period of study. This thesis seeks to fill that gap in available data. The dataset and codebook presented in the next chapters of this thesis were developed based on the literature reviewed below.

Since protests events are seriously underestimated (Myers & Caniglia, 2004; Ortiz et al., 2005) to measure on frequency can be misleading. Actions should be quantified. The most basic measure is the number of protest actions, in other words the number of participants in protest (Biggs, 2018, p. 353), specially since large campaigns are much more likely to succeed than small campaigns, a single unit increase of active participants make a campaign over 10 percent more likely to achieve its ultimate outcome (Chenoweth, E & Stephan, M, 2011, p. 39). A protest event is a contentious collective action (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009), and it requires to be large in principle because in a nonviolent struggle, the only weapon that you're going to have is numbers (Popovic & Miller, 2015). Generally, protest events, despite using violent means like setting up fire on police stations or throwing Molotov bombs, are not in principle violent campaigns. Protesters do not carry lethal weapons or seek to. They, in principle, do not organize violent strategies to reach goals. Large protests events are more likely to be reported by newspapers (Biggs, 2018). As DeNardo, James (1985, pp. 36–37) argue, the disruptiveness of protests, demonstrations, and uprising to be first and foremost a question of numbers.

According to Biggs (2013, p. 409) a contentious gathering involves repetition for some and adoption for others. Adoption has many gradations, from joining a performance organized by experienced activists, to borrowing a tactic already used by acquaintances, to adapting a tactic used by dissimilar people under different conditions. This constitutes a limited repertoire of tactics within any given social space. Nonetheless, new performances arise chiefly through innovation within existing performances (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009, p. 68). Innovation is sensitive to three conditions: feasibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness (Biggs, 2013, p. 409). Where feasibility refers to structural preconditions and the cost of a tactic.

To study the composition of the protest events is relevant given that the social groups preferences can shape the outcome. For instance, Dahlum et al. (2019) find that movements dominated by industrial workers or the urban middle classes more often result in democracy compared to other movements and to situations without organized mass opposition, especially for industrial workers. Their study is based on two arguments. First, protesters must be motivated to confront the incumbent regime and push for democracy, and second, they must have access to resources that provide strategic leverage over the regime and that enable sustained large-scale collective action; social groups may prefer democratization if they anticipate more favorable policies under a new democracy (Dahlum et al., 2019, p. 1495).

On studying social groups and protest Dahlum and Wig (2019, p. 5) argue that education increases the frequency of mass protest, by alleviating collective-action problems and motivating mass opposition, particularly in autocracies. They study the African continent and develop a georeferenced study concluding that areas with more educated populations have higher levels of protest activity, having a strong effect in more authoritarian settings, suggesting that education spurs protest through anti-authoritarian grievances enhancing preferences for democracy and more accountable governance.

Social groups are also relatively connected to places, students to universities, farmers to farms, industrial workers to factories, and so on. In researching the relationship of the occurrence of protest and the location of universities in 62 countries in Africa and Central America, Dahlum and Wig (2021, p. 3) conclude that university establishments increase protest, showing that university-centered protests are more likely to emerge in dictatorships and are more likely to concern democracy and human rights, giving importance to the location (georeferenced) of the protests events.

Those wanting to mobilize a mass protest must overcome two hurdles, an information problem,

and a motivation problem. The information problem refers to preference falsification, which occurs when individuals have incentives to falsify their motives, including preferences for political change, and refrain from dissent, or when the coordinator of a protest is constrained because people lack access to people's intention regarding where and when to protest. And the motivation problem refers to the potential costs of joining the protest, such as being jailed or subject to violence, while the benefit realized by protesters is invariably a public good (such as regime-change), with no possibility of excluding non-protestors (Dahlum & Wig, 2021, p. 8) see also (Dahlum, 2019; Dahlum et al., 2019).

The specialized literature on contentious politics has placed an important focus on repression. Repression not only imposes or increases costs to protesters, but it can also be driver to bring more people to the street. Repression is one of the most important obstacles that protesters must overcome or achieve to deal with, in order to be successful. According to Davenport et al. (2011, p. 54) police are more likely to act (and to act in an aggressive manner) when protesters are violent, numerous, directly challenging political authorities, organized, and using multiple or innovative tactics.

Repression indeed increases the costs of protesting and seek to disincentivize it, however it can also have the opposite effect. When the repression is too severe it can bring a backlash, according to Francisco (2004) after a massacre, product of a brutal repression, there usually is sufficient communication of the massacre to enable subsequent backlash mobilization, as well as sufficient continuity in leadership after the massacre to coordinate it; and remarks that dissident leaders use adaptive tactics to elude subsequent repression in most cases. Dissidents enlisting leaders, easy urban information transmission reducing ignorance, leaders shifting public goods to ominous public bads, reducing the risks of action, and invoking preexisting organizations to order adaptive and "safe" tactics (Francisco, 2004, p. 121).

Studying the Iranian revolution, Rasler (1996) obtains similar results since repression had a short-term negative effect and a long-term positive effect on overall levels of protest via repression's influence in spatial diffusion. Repression is quite particular to contexts, some studies like Davenport et al. (2011) explore the idea that police viewed black protesters as especially threatening and that this threat leads to a greater probability of policing in comparison to white protest events in the USA from 1960 to 1990, concluding that the willingness and severity of the repression has a racial bias towards black people.

Repression is the first option -generally- of regimes to control protest events, concessions and nego-

tiation are used once the campaigns have gained too much legitimacy. Nonetheless, repression and especially severe repression is a synonym of regime weakness. It is a resource used when political power and legitimacy is at stake.

The study of repertoires is one of the foundational elements of the field by Tarrow and Tilly (2009) and it constitutes an essential elements to study when analyzing contentious politics. According to K. G. Cunningham et al. (2017) repertoires are subjected to innovation, diffusion and diversification. Innovation is quite rare in comparison to diffusion (Tilly, 1995). Resources, needs and constraints intersect with the proximate goals of organizations than a simple drive to do what incentives for organizations than a simple drivers to do what others do; organizations can achieve some of their proximate goals more efficiently by diversifying tactics rather than copying (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2017, p. 594).

The K. G. Cunningham et al. (2017) work highlights the logic behind the diversification by choosing to engage in tactics with low-resource needs and keep attention focused on the organization and its goals. By employing a non-resource-intensive tactic, organizations can use a tactic that complements what other organizations are doing while bringing attention to the organization's effort. Organizations can also attempt to differentiate themselves by using tactics that others are not employing, and it can also increase the resilience of the movement withstanding repression. This study entails a conception of interdependence among movements, in which movements are constantly learning and teaching from each other at a micro and macro level.

2.3 What we don't know

Understanding how protests affect attitudes toward democracy is of most importance. Chenoweth, E (2021) findings about the success of non-violent campaigns over violent campaigns and their result on long-term survival of democracy is explained for the capacity to overcome barriers to participation, eroding a regime's support. Despite her work being focused on autocratic systems, it does not mean that within democracies, protests might have an effect in bringing changes and advancing the level of democracy. This approach has been statistically supported, however the study of the specific dynamic that takes place in changing the beliefs of individuals has not yet being explored in-depth. If protest works to bring democratic changes it can also help to shape and improve the quality of democracy.

Rational and social psychological processes need to take place at the individual level to find democracy

legitimate or not. The long-term survival of a democracy needs to have a support at the individual level. The influence of protests in changing voters behaviour has been somewhat studied, nonetheless I argue that protest also affects beliefs. Wasow (2020) shows important statistical evidence of how protest affect attitudes. To affect attitudes implies that protests have short and long-term effects in the system of beliefs. Some studies argue that non-violent protests can lead to democracy. A potential mechanism for this is that non-violent protests can change beliefs. That is what I seek to investigate in this work.

After a thorough review of the literature, available data, and to the best of my knowledge, there is no existing dataset that includes information about protest in Colombia to conduct a quantitative analysis. Hence, as part of this research I developed a codebook A.2 and a dataset capturing information about protest events.

We know for fact that non-violent struggle brings long-lasting democratic transformations (over violent struggles), what we don't know is how it happens, what changes at the attitudes level for people to prefer democratic policies and institutions over autocratic or to be indifferent. As Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021) point out there is a growing body of literature seeking to understand protest not simply as an outcome to be explained but as a phenomenon that is itself generative of political attitudes referring to the work of Branton et al. (2015), Mazumder (2018, 2019), Wallace et al. (2014), and Amenta (2014).

What we know little about is the attitudinal consequences of protests seeking to expand democratic attitudes in democracies. Particularly, this gender of research remains overwhelmingly focused on protests in the United States, with the exception of Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021) work on Egypt. To expand the knowledge about the attitudinal consequences of protests seeking to expand democratic attitudes in democracies and how this has traveled to other contexts like the Latin American ones, in this case Colombia, is of major relevance and importance.

3

Background: Colombia 2010 - 2013

3.1 General patterns

In this chapter, I will briefly present some of the characteristics of Colombia as a case study and the protest dynamics in the country. Most of the information presented here is based on the PEC dataset. Using descriptive statistics my aim is to provide an overview of the context and highlight elements of interest for the analysis section. I include unique repertoires of the protest period: blockupations, the public display of corpses, and the sexual abstinence strike, as well as, the description of potential bias of the data.

3.2 A non-mature democracy

Colombia has a particular mix of democratic traditions and armed conflict. According to Freedom House Colombia is a partially free country with a 65/100 score, and a score of 7 in Polity IV. The State, paramilitary groups, guerrillas and cartels, covering a wide spectrum of political ideologies from left to right, have taken part in an armed confrontation since the 1950's. Since the mid 2000's a growing tendency on social mobilization has taken place (Archila Neira, 2008).

Since the late 70's the context of the country has been characterized by the paramilitary takeover of some of its geography and the consolidation of State Terrorism, the escalation and expansion of the insurgent conflict and the rise of the transnational economy of illicit drugs (De Zubiría, 2015, p. 36). The paramilitary phenomena, widespread across Colombia with social control dynamics using extreme violence such as massacres, selective murdering and even political control (in 2006 one third of the parliament in Colombia was imprisoned due to direct links with paramilitarism). Throughout 2006,

paramilitary groups (AUC) surrendered their weapons, however multiple neo-paramilitary groups have maintained similar territorial dynamics after in subsequent years (Gómez Triana, 2022).

Multiple guerrilla groups have operated in Colombia for the past 80 years. The FARC and ELN are the most representative given their military capacity and intensity of the violence. Multiple peace processes have taken place between these guerrilla groups and the establishment, however the armed confrontation has endured. The result of this armed confrontation after 1980 is more than 220.000 violent deaths related to the armed conflict, 8 million victims of forced displacement, and thousands of forced disappearances (de Memoria Histórica, 2013).

Rural areas in Colombia are marked by social and economic disparity. This is a result of a pending rural reform that has never been carried out. Since the times of the Spanish colony the tenancy of land structure has not been deeply changed (Fajardo, 2014). During the XIX and until the second part of the XX century Colombia was mainly a rural country with 70% of its population living in the countryside (Berry, 1978, p. 355). Between 1953 and 1975 an urbanization process took place and around 70% of the population moved to cities, mainly by two processes, an industrialization process and a phenomenon known as "La Violencia" where more than 200.000 people were assassinated by the government (Franz, 2016, p. 566). It's a configuration of protracted peasant revolution (Beissinger, 2013) with liberal claims like right to land access, subsidies, infrastructure and connectivity.

Peasant's movement and their repertoires can be tracked from 1874 to 1920 with emerging land claiming processes to the Colombian Estate (Legrand, 1988). During the decade of 1940's and 1950's several peasants unions and leagues were created (Fals Borda, 1975, p. 118). During the 1950's protests and governmental dispositions had the fundamental objective of transforming a quasi-feudal production system into a capitalist agrarian model diminishing latifundium and pushing through medium and small land ownership. However, it failed.

The decade of the 1960's gave birth to a completely new peasant struggle with two key elements, 1. the armed agrarian movements that turned into guerrilla organizations and 2. The creation of elite-led organization with the ANUC (National Association of Peasants), and with its elite-led contentious politics (Ketchley, 2017). The ANUC was popularly adopted by peasants to present their claims and petitions to the state.

However, during 1980's the ANUC escalated their claims and radicalized against the government. The importance of the ANUC is that it created a new social and political subject to the Colombian judicial

administration: the peasant. Given that peasants and their organizations were legally recognized as social and political actors a new scope of action opened. From 1960 to 1990 protest events were land invasion and occupation 20,2%, strikes 49%, marches 16,2%, blockades 8% and riots 6,5% (Archila Neira, 2008). By 1996 the coca peasants' producers protested against glyphosate fumigation claiming basic public service coverage and a crop substitution policy without forced eradication (Archila Neira, 2006, p. 23). This coca producers protest is the first record of a *blockupation repertoire*.

In 2013, according to Felipe Fonseca, director of the Rural Agricultural Planning Unit of Colombia (UPRA, in Spanish) 82% of the country's productive land is owned by only 10% of the total owners, while 68% of the owners have less than 5 hectares. This distribution of the landownership placed Colombia as one of the most unequal countries of Latin America and in the world with a rural Gini index of 0,875 (PNUD, 2011, p. 197). The economy is deeply dependent on hydrocarbon exports and foreign direct investment. According to the UNOCD (2020) it is estimated that 17% of Colombia's municipalities have coca crops.

Drug trafficking is a complex issue for Colombia, and at its base are the producers-peasants. The revenues product of drug trafficking are collected by drug cartels and intermediaries, but producers are regular peasants that get paid for the coca leaf as if it were any other agricultural product. Generally, coca crops are located on isolated areas. Isolated from government control but also protection, with poor infrastructure and almost no state presence. For example, drinking water has a 34.95% coverage in the rural area, and according to the World Economic Forum, by 2012 Colombia scored place 126 out of 144 countries evaluated in terms of road infrastructure making it highly expensive to transport any product. Nonetheless, in the case of Coca leaf, the drug cartels are basically in the front door buying it. That's why one of the grievances of the second and third wave of protests during 2013 was about a concerted crops substitution plan for the Coca producers against the militaristic approach that Colombia has had since the decade of the 1970's.

The armed conflict and violence on the countryside had an impact on the accelerated growing rates in cities. After the urbanization process in the 70's contentious politics were determinant in urban areas. Unions, students' organizations, neighborhoods associations and other organized expressions became relevant in cities. The armed conflict context has affected rural areas as well as urban areas. However, social resistance to violence and the armed conflict has also been important to the construction of Colombian society. Entire communities have declared themselves against the presence of any armed actor in their territory (Henriques, 2016). Peoples' initiatives have shaped important participatory dynamics such as the movement *7ma Papeleta* that supported the new Political Constitution of

Colombia in 1991, or the movement for *Humanitarian Exchange* between 2005 and 2008 calling for the liberation of war prisoners of FARC in Colombian jails in exchange for war prisoners of the state under FARC custody.

Figure 3.1 shows a more or less stable support for democracy. It is also interesting to see how from the year 2000 the preference for an autocratic government decreased and the indifference for the type of government increased. However, from 2017 to 2020 the indifference has gained more supporters while the support for democracy has decreased. Unfortunately, this thesis focuses in the 2010-2013 period and the 2000 and 2017 changes in preference are not covered. Nevertheless, the results of this thesis can provide elements for future research.




Figure 3.1: Support of Democracy. Data source: Latinobarómetro

3.3 Protests in Colombia

Cruz Rodríguez (2016) conducts a study about the protest cycle 2010-2016 in Colombia concluding that the political context is characterized by the proximity to institutional politics and the persistence of repression of social movements. However, this period of time was the most relevant in terms of protest events per year, according to the database of the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP, 2004), with 1027 protest events in 2013, the highest number of the record dating back to 1975. Cruz Rodríguez (2016) argues that the intensity of protest in this period has two explanations: First, there is an organizational infrastructure of the social movements with discourses capable of articulating multiple agendas. Second, the peace negotiations motivated an expansion of the public agenda toward systematically blocked social issues; hence potential benefits for the social movements are greater than the costs associated with repression.

According to my work, during the 2010 - 2013 the country observed a total of 3784 protest events with a mean of 946 protest events per year (figure 3.2). I will describe the data collection in-depth in chapter five. The peak-year was 2011 when 1346 protest events were reported. When comparing my dataset with the CINEP database, the results are somehow similar: in 2013 PEC reports 1293 and CINEP reports 1027 protest events (79,4 % consistency). Unfortunately, the frequency is the single element that can be compared given the different ways the data is organized and presented by CINEP and in my dataset. However, the patterns and numbers are similar, giving some support to my findings.




Figure 3.2: Protest News reported in PEC

The five most common grievances in terms of intensity were education rights (1015), subsidies (565), labor rights (553), infrastructure (375), and salaries raise (228). As the numbers show, the struggle for more and better education dominated the contentious politics landscape. Students, teachers, organized, and unorganized citizens massively took to the streets during 2011 against the reform of the Law 30 (a law that regulates professional and technical education). Despite the struggle for education being at the the main grievance in this period, in 2013 the rural-centered protest was the main character.

The PEC dataset includes many different identities for a single protest event, based on the news media reports. The most reported identities are students (1200), rural workers (847), non union workers (759), union workers (725), and nonorganized citizens (369). Some identities are under-reported, which is discussed in detail in section 3.2. By looking at the grievances and varying numbers of identities, it is possible to state that some identities mobilized around multiple grievances, indicating a higher likelihood of messages being spread throughout society.

3.4 Repertoires




Figure 3.3: Picture taken on field trip in Bogota 31.03.2022

The five most common repertoires were strikes (1398 events), blockades (553), occupations (477), *blockupations* (371), and demonstrations (327). However, 19 different repertoires were displayed and reported. Some of the most efficient and interesting repertoires were participating in a hunger strike, chaining oneself to the entrance of a building or to being crucified (using ropes to tie oneself to a cross). I argue that these were efficient repertoires given that they had less than ten participants and were reported (101 protest events). These three repertoires overcame the challenge of too small numbers and being reported. Of course, these are extremely disruptive repertoires since the life and well-being of the participants is at stake. For instance, hunger strikes were generally reported several days after starting and when the health conditions of the participants were compromised.

In the four years of the study period 5'898.821 individual observations of people joining protests were reported. The repertoires with more participants were: a. marches with more than 2'250.000 participants (peaked in 2011) and this could be explained by the ecology of students being centered in urban areas, where marching is an effective means to voice grievances considering that universities create opportunities for potential protesters to coordinate and overcome collective action problems, as Dahlum and Wig (2021) argue. b. *blockupations*, with more than 1'300.000 participants with a peak in use in 2013. This is explained given that rural workers adapted and used this repertoire effectively in rural contexts. And c. strikes, with more than 1'200.000 participants with a stable distribution along the entire period.

3.4.1 Repertoires unique to the Colombian case

In sections 3.2.1.1, 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 I present and introduce repertoires that are unique to the Colombian case. *Blockupations* is an example of such repertoires, and to the best of my knowledge, they have not been yet described as an adaption of two repertoires into a new repertoire but as occupations. I argue below that this is an innovation and include distinctive features that differentiate them from occupations. The other two repertoires described here presented have context-sensitive characteristics. Despite being used in other contexts, I consider it important to describe them to expand the information for future researches looking at how these repertoires spread or adapt.

3.4.1.1 Introducing: Blockupations

Studying the repertoires used during the rural workers protests wave in 2013, the main finding is the merging of two classical repertoires, the blockade and the occupation, into a new repertoire. For the purpose of this thesis, this concept will be called a blockupation. It is characterized by a large group of people (more than 2,000) building camps next to roads, in rural areas. They build tents, set up community kitchens, bathrooms, and meeting places. Once they have set up the camp, they block the road. One important aspect is that the blocked roads are secondary roads that connect small towns or rural settlements.

Most contentious politics repertoires tend to take place in capital cities or central places in order to generate attention. In contrast, blockupations are located on isolated places. *Blockupations* puts pressure on the government days after being established, imposing costs on local economies, and relying on large numbers of participants. According to the news reports analyzed, the first official source referring to it is mostly local police, then local mayors and governors and after that the national government. Local police report, the disruption on traffic conditions along the road to newspapers, days later local governments generally make a statement. Finally, if the blockupation has lasted long enough (more than 15 days) the national government responds with opening up negotiations with protesters and sending humanitarian aid to the affected towns.

A repertoire has to be disruptive enough in order to be reported. Disruption is generally associated with repression given that it means imposing costs on the economy or in symbolic aspects (like a hunger strike) that governments want to control as soon as possible. The explanation that I propose to the rationality of the emergence of *Blockupations*, is that it is feasible (Biggs, 2015) in rural contexts and safer than the occupations (the closest repertoire in terms of disruption).

In the figure 3.4 it is possible to see that the blockupations were almost a third less repressed than blockades and almost a half of the level of riots. Considering that blockupations can be equally or even more disruptive than blockades, yet less repressed, it is rational to choose a repertoire that has the same disruptive outcome but is associated with much lower repression.




Figure 3.4: Repression - repertoire

3.4.1.2 Display of corpses

According to the information covered in the period of study in 2011 the corps display repertoire was used two times in two different locations to protest against armed actors' violence. However, there are also records of this repertoire being used in multiple other locations and years in Colombia (Abad Colorado, 2018).

The display of dead body(ies) of victims is used as means of protesting violence. In one of the cases (20.2.2011) the father of the victim carried the body of his son to the main square of Bogota -Bolívar Square. He opened the coffin, and using a megaphone, describing that his son had been murdered by the military forces of Colombia while being an active soldier because he had disagreed with the program that would later become known as- the *6400 extrajudicial killings* between 2002 and 2008.

In the extrajudicial killings case, soldiers received benefits for the amount of guerrilla members killed. Due to the pressure of presenting results in the fight against the guerrillas, the army began a program where they would pick up young boys, promising them job opportunities in nearby towns, after which

the young boys were executed and dressed up as guerrilla members. More than 6400 young boys from poor neighborhoods and rural towns were victims of this program. The protester's son, as an active soldier did not agree with the program, threatened to denounce the case to the public opinion and was murdered right after. The efficiency of the repertoire chosen was due to the protest event being recorded, and it became one of the symbols of the struggle for truth in the context of the armed conflict. Almost ten years later (2021), the Special Jurisdiction for Peace began the public hearings with military personal about the extrajudicial killings, not exclusively due to this protest event, but it was one of the symbols of it.

The second case (9.8.2011) was performed by more than 100 people. In Tierralta (Córdoba) six inhabitants were murdered by paramilitary forces. The first four bodies to be found were taken out of the funeral home to the main square of the town to protest against the presence of paramilitary forces in the municipality and to petition to the national government for security. People were waving white tissues and carrying signs.

In the context of the presence armed actors (legal or illegal), to protest against them is an act that entails a high cost to the protesters, since the asymmetry in forces is disproportionate, and human rights are not respected. The two cases aforementioned portray a strong symbolic aspect as well as the efficiency of the repertoire.

3.4.1.3 Sexual abstinence strike

On 22 June 2011 a group of 350 women decided to launch a *crossed legs strike*, meaning that they would not have sex with their permanent or occasional partners in Barbacoas, a municipality in the department of Nariño, in the southeast of the country. The grievance of the women was the bad road that connects Barbacoas with Junín. The distance is 57 kilometers, however due to the poor conditions of the road the journey could take five to seven hours by car. The protest started because a pregnant woman passed away during childbirth while trying to get to the hospital in Junín.

The sexual abstinence strike lasted for 115 days until the national government decided on a budget for the improvement of the road. This repertoire has two interesting characteristics: the way in which it was adapted and its effectiveness. After day 20, several reports in the national section of the newspaper began a full coverage of the event interviewing men and women in the municipality. When they interviewed one of the organizers of the event, a judge, she reported that the idea came from reading *The Iliad* by Homer, where the author writes about Lysistrata organizing a sexual abstinence

strike against men for them to stop the Peloponnesian War.

It is important to highlight that Barbacoas was a town without internet connectivity in 2011, and it is interesting to think that a repertoire that was described around 750 B.C.E, in Greece was adopted more than 2750 years and 10.992 km later. It was disruptive at a symbolic level given that it was widely reported (sometimes more than one report in the same day in the same newspaper) including detailed information about life in town, and what the grievances of the women were. It is a repertoire that can be performed without much effort in general terms, women did not have to go to anywhere, devote time of the day to it or to risk being repressed by police forces.

3.5 The forgotten within the excluded

Protest events are generally a tool of the people excluded from traditional political arenas. Those that have to rely on contentious politics to voice their agendas. However, within the excluded group there are some identities that are even more excluded and (un)consciously not reported in newspapers. This is one of the challenges of building a dataset (see a further discussion of this in chapter 5). However, in terms of clarity I intend to acknowledge the bias of my data and describe it here.

3.5.1 Identities

It is important to discuss those identities that were not reported in the PEC dataset. The news media reports, as well as datasets, tend to be biased (Ortiz et al., 2005). Out of the 3785 protests reported, only 33 include mention or reference to black people -or communities. According to UNHCR (2012) in 2012 between 10% and 25% of Colombians were black. Black people and communities have disproportionately suffered the effects of the armed conflict in terms of forced displacement, violence and victimization (de Memoria Histórica, 2013), as well as poverty and systematic exclusion.

One of the main causes for the under-reporting of black people could be found in the bias introduced by working exclusively with one newspaper, *El Tiempo*. Since protests are more likely to be reported based on the proximity to the capital of the country and to the intensity of it (Biggs, 2018), this systematic exclusion could be due to the locations where protest events were taking place and/or structural racism. For instance, Chocó is the most black populated department with a total of 85% of its population (Llerena, 2012). According to the information in the PEC dataset, only 39 protests events took place in this department during four years (and six events were reported without mentioning black people as the protesters). Black communities have important social movements

and organizations across the country, such as the PCN (Black Communities Process), CONAFRO, CONPO (Cassiani, 2021), that actively participated in politics, even in the Havana Peace Dialogue. The numbers regarding their participation in protests events are potentially biased, and further research needs to be done to determine if the numbers match the reality or not. Hence, black identities and communities might be under-reported and underrepresented in this work.

Two other identities have a similar condition: LGTBQ+ and women. In the news reports reviewed, LGTBQ+ identities were mentioned 15 times for the entire period. Women were mentioned 145 times, however 115 of those refer to the sexual abstinence strike, meaning that women as individuals or a group of people were only mentioned 30 times in 3669 protest events (excluding the 115 already mentioned). Once again, women and LGTBQ+ individuals and organizations actively participated in contentious politics, expressed grievances, were repressed and placed important topics in the public agenda through protests events. However, they were not reported in *El Tiempo* newspaper, hence not included in PEC, which makes for a promising research data gap to be filled in future works.

3.5.2 Geographies

In multiple works Biggs (2013, 2015, 2018) has described that the likelihood of a protest event being reported increases the closer it is to the political center where news is produced, and how it decreases as it is further away from it. In the process of reading the news to create the dataset a pattern began to appear: even small events were reported in detail if there were in capital cities, especially in Bogota, for instance a protest of 80 unorganized citizens blocking public transportation. Meanwhile, large events, were only reported a long time after they had taken place if they were in isolated places, far from capital cities, such as an occupation of more than 100 organized citizens that lasted for more than two or three weeks. The news reports would write sentences like "for the past two weeks ago a group of ..." to begin reporting on the protest event. This meant that people in isolated municipalities had to sustain and devote extra efforts to be noticed and reported. Even if the protest event was reported, the level of detail would not be the same as if it were in capital cities, most of the time the description of the grievances, identities or number of participants was vague.

Isolated geographies not only have less access to economic resources, suffer more from the violence of the armed conflict and have more restricted access to public services, but are also less likely to be noticed on their protests. Repertoires need to be more disruptive, numbers of participants higher and the protest needs to have higher intensity (last for longer) to achieve even being just reported in the first place. This center-periphery dynamic presents bias in the robustness of the information about

the occurrence of protests in isolated places. It is possible that multiple protests events that took place in these geographies were not reported on the news. To complement and study how protest events in distant places of the urban centers are under-reported is also relevant. Overcoming this challenge is of major interest in order to have more reliable data to analyze, particularly considering that contentious politics could take place where social conflicts are more severe.

4

Theoretical Framework

In what instances do protests work and for whom? For this work I argue that protests work to change attitudes to democracy for participants and bystanders. Using data from the PEC Dataset of protest events in Colombia and the Latinobarómetro political culture survey I test a series of hypotheses to identify the effect of protests on attitudes toward democracy. Based on the argument that individuals in departments that witnessed prodemocratic protests events positively changed their attitudes to democracy. My dependent variable is a measure of support attitudes toward democracy using questions from the 2010-2013 Latinobarómetro survey. There are three independent variables related to the protests events: 1. size of the protests, 2. number of identities, and 3. number of protests events. The unit of analysis is survey respondents individuals located in departments; the sample size is 4488 individuals surveyed three times (2010, 2011, and 2013). To account for 2012 data I created an average out of the 2011 and 2013 data for each individual in each department.

The theoretical framework for this work draws upon two main approaches: rational choice and social psychology. Attitudes to democracy are created and shaped in two instances, individually and collectively. The individual might be persuaded to change their opinion once they have participated or witnessed a protest event with a message that they consider legitimate or important to support. The mechanism for this phenomenon is called persuasion. The individual also changes their preferences based on their experience as part of a collectivity. For the social psychological approach, two mechanisms play a role: peer pressure and agenda-setting. The two approaches and three mechanisms are presented below.

Some academic works differentiate between participants and bystanders of a protest event. However, as my research interest is the effect of protest events in attitudes, protesters and bystanders in departments are affected equally for the occurrence of the event.

4.1 Rational arguments

The rational approach follows the logic of rationalist perspectives which assume that human beings generally behave in ways that benefit their own interest. Rationality, then, is a process by which individuals or groups with set objectives consider available alternatives for achieving their objectives. Rational actors select the alternative that will maximize their expected utility with regard to those objectives (Chenoweth & Moore, 2018, p. 42).

This framework is based on the early work of Olson (1965) *Logic of Collective Action*, where he theorizes about the cost-benefit calculation that individuals carry out before deciding whether to participate or not from collective activities. After Olson's work the decision to take part of collective actions have been of great study interest. For this work I don't ask the question why people join or not collective actions, but if collective action can persuade individuals to change beliefs. However, the underlying argument is the same, there is an individual rationality that is subject to changes in a cost – benefit calculation.

According to Finkel and Muller (1998, p. 38) individuals who have participated in protests may change their attitudes as a result of their past participation, either by absorbing new information about a given situation and their own capabilities, or by rationalizing that their actions "must have" been due to their high levels of alienation, their strong belief that the protest group could be successful, and the like. Also, as Opp and Kittel (2010) state in their theoretical propositions and empirical findings studying the rationality of joining a protest, political discontent, perceived personal political influence, acceptance of a protest norm (moral incentives) and integration in protests encouraging networks (social incentives) can explain protest activity rather well.

The underlining argument is that people perform rational calculations about the personal or collective benefit of the agendas they witnessed in protests and are persuaded by the arguments portrayed, which results in a change in attitudes to democracy. For instance, an Indigenous person has a self-interest in representation. When they witness - or take part- in an indigenous protest for more representation they learn that they are underrepresented and that it is rational for them to want more and better representation increasing the support for democracy.

People are persuaded when they are able to perceive and understand the message (grievance) of a protest event as legitimate and valuable to improve the conditions of their own lives. The individual rationally accesses and interprets the information that is being presented by the protesters, and then

by doing an individual cost-benefit evaluation, decides to change their opinion. It is expected that prodemocratic events persuade a large portion of society, since democracy is a system based on seeking equal and fair conditions to larger portions of society. Hence, its expansion and improvement would entail benefits at the individual level.

4.2 Social psychological approach arguments

Scholars of the new social movement's (D'Anjou, 1996; d'Anjou & Van Male, 1998; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Rochon, 1998) have identified the new social movements' consequences on cultural outcomes. Particularly, the social psychological approach offers evidence and mechanisms for changes in values, beliefs, and opinions (Earl, 2007, p. 512) based on a casual explanation: framing (Snow et al., 1986).

Frames are key to understanding how culture is changed by protests as mechanisms that provide comprehension and meaning for a set of beliefs and values (Della Porta, D & Diani Mario, 2007). Frames provide meaning to acts and to reality. Frames determine the decision to act – and, specifically, to act collectively – depending not only on basic internalized principles and/or attitudes, but on a complex evaluation of the opportunities and constraints for action. This evaluation is mediated by values that are articulated through specific goals and are associated with strategies of appropriate conduct (Della Porta, D & Diani Mario, 2007, p. 72).

Della Porta, D and Diani Mario (2007) tackle the issue of ideology and culture when coining frames as mechanisms to understand the decision-making process of collective action. Culture provides the cognitive apparatus which people need to orient themselves in the world. This apparatus consists of a multiplicity of cultural and ideational elements which include beliefs, ceremonies, artistic forms, and informal practices such as language, conversation, stories, daily rituals (Sellers, 2019, p. 273). The content of cultural models, of which values are a key component, are of secondary importance here in relation to the vision of culture as a set of instruments that social actors use to make sense of their own life experience (Della Porta, D & Diani Mario, 2007, p. 74) reflecting on opinions and perceptions.

The basic idea of the symbolic aspects of collective action, the schema of interpretation, or frame, is based on Goffman (1974)'s work. According to Snow et al. (1986), frame alignment is a necessary condition for participation, whatever its nature or intensity, and that it is typically an interactional and ongoing accomplishment. Snow et al. use frames to denote schemata of interpretation that enable

individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experiences and guide action. In their analysis, frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464).

Hence, Frame analysis allows us to capture the process of the attribution of meaning which lies behind the explosion of any conflict. In fact, symbolic production enables us to attribute to events and behaviors of individuals or groups, a meaning which facilitates the activation of mobilization (Della Porta, D & Diani Mario, 2007, p. 86). Frames not only work within the protesters group, but for the audience that witness the protests. Protests can increase or decrease the relevance of certain issues on social agendas (Goffman, 1974), as well as change meanings to values in collectivities. Protests claiming for democratic elements such as education rights, gay marriage or against corruption could impact the interpretation of what is a democracy and raise the support for it.

4.3 General theoretical model

People as individuals and collectives construct a set of values, beliefs and opinions that shape the attitudes toward democracy. Attitudes toward democracy change over time (Opp & Kittel, 2010), with sets of opinions and preferences being affected by multiple factors. This means that people change beliefs, which makes democracy an arena in dispute where old and new preferences are in constant tension.

I argue that attitudinal change is affected by three mechanisms: peer pressure, agenda setting and persuasion (4.1). Based on the work of Biggs et al. (2020), Branton et al. (2015), Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021), Mazumder (2018), and Wallace et al. (2014) public opinion is the arena where attitudinal change is measured, and the instrument to measure it is data from surveys.

Previous research on peer pressure has shown how people are affected by relational pressure from their peers, which alters their perception of costs and benefits (Hadden & Jasny, 2019). Hence, it is expected that this also affects preferences for democratic attitudes. Public opinion is the result of and gives meaning to attitudes, then if contentious politics takes place and captures the agenda of the public opinion it should have a role in shaping attitudes. People change their minds due to peer pressure by recognizing themselves in the protesters, providing "a sense of we-ness and collective agency" (Hunt & Benford, 2007, p. 450). When people who witness protests events can identify themselves in the protesters identities they are more likely to be persuaded to support the message

and agenda of the protesters.

Agendas and social leaderships can be supported or refused by contentious politics, pressuring the inclusion of agendas and ideas on the political arena (agenda-setting) and affecting the set of attitudes. Persuasion takes place due to the rationality of considering something as legitimate. It is important to highlight that people don't need to directly take part in protest events to be persuaded, they can also be bystanders and be affected. Framing can be performed by protest events in a wider range than just social movements. In the framing process performed by protest events two mechanisms play a key role: peer pressure and political agendas.

Democracy is legitimate when it is viewed as the most appropriate regime for the country and, in particular, when it is preferred to some non-democratic alternative (Claassen, 2020, p. 37). According to Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011, p. 30) a critical source of the success of nonviolent resistance is mass participation, which can erode or remove a regime's main source of power when the participants represent diverse sectors of society. Following this reasoning I argue that mass participation entails a duality: on one hand it has the capacity to change attitudes; and on the other hand, it has its own gravity, if it is large and comprehensive (more identities) enough there is going to be more likely to attract bystanders to support the grievances of the protest since the more diverse the participation in the resistance – in terms of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status – the more difficult it is for the adversary to isolate the participants and adopt a repressive strategy short of maximal and indiscriminate repression (Chenoweth, E & Stephan, M, 2011). Several academic works have explored the rationality behind joining protest events. However, people joining is not the central point of this research, but how people change beliefs as protesters or bystanders of protests.




Figure 4.1: Theoretical Model

4.3.1 Mechanisms

The three mechanisms presented below operate in close relation to the rational and the social psychological approach. All three mechanisms are affected by both approaches, at higher or lower level, but they are affected. According to Zadeh (1978), addressing the study of social phenomena, like protest, implies that as the complexity of a system increases, the ability to make precise and exact formulations on its behavior declines. Hence, it might be problematic to draw a line to divide the

mechanisms and the approaches from the theories as if they don't operate in close relation to each other, but it is possible to establish a stronger rationality of persuasion to rational approaches, and agenda setting to the social psychological approach, while peer-pressure can be placed somewhere in the middle.

4.3.1.1 Peer pressure

According to Hadden and Jasny (2019), there is evidence on how individuals are affected by relational pressure from their peers, which alters their perception of costs and benefits when assessing the influence in the decision to adopt protest tactics. Since society is highly connected by networks, more people participating in protest events can translate into more people joining protest events or more people considering a protest event legitimate, increasing the strength of the frames to modify the democratic sphere. Hence, it is expected that those municipalities with bigger protest (number of participants) events campaigning for democratic agendas will experience a change in their support for democracy.

4.3.1.2 Agenda setting

Based on Wasow (2020, p. 656) there is evidence of how subordinate group activists, not just elites, can seed local and national agendas and construct frames in ways that grow or shrink egalitarian coalitions through strategic disruption and choice of tactics. Hence, protest events as one of the most important tools of subordinate groups used to overcome power asymmetries could also reflect on political agendas.

Since numbers and diversity of participation can determine peer pressure, public opinion and political culture, I capture this information in my dataset. It is also important to highlight that movements affect other movements through the changes they make in political and cultural contexts. As activists produce change in policy or political alignments, they alter the political opportunities that are available to other social movements, both present and future. As they change frames and discourses in mainstream culture, they alter the cultural context with which other social movements engage (Whittier, 2007, p. 546).

The attitudes towards democracy is measured using a question which asks respondents to evaluate their support for democracy, compare democracy to some undemocratic alternative, or evaluate one of these undemocratic forms of government (Claassen, 2020, p. 40). To capture the frames that constitute the desirability and perception of democracy data from Latinobarómetro is used.

4.3.1.3 Persuasion

When an individual is uncertain about how to act, that person can observe others and mimic their behavior. Hence, descriptive information of others' attitudes and behavior will exert informational social influence. That is, information about others' position informs the individual of whether others can be counted on to take action (Bäck et al., 2018, p. 50). Democracy has proven to bring high life quality standards, such as economic development, peace and security. Then, witnessing protests events that campaign for democratic grievances, should persuade people to change their beliefs and become more prone to support democracy.

Contentious politics advocating for democratic grievances can also entail a change in satisfaction levels. When people gain access to information related to prodemocratic agendas and ideas, they can be persuaded to include those elements in their democracy, which can lead them to support it more.

4.4 Public opinion and deriving hypothesis

Protest events are expected to affect public opinion and it can be captured using surveys. Numbers, disruption, and legitimacy are some of the aspects that might influence the positioning of a protest even in the public opinion, however knowing about a protest tactic from news media also means knowing that it can be effective in gaining media coverage (Biggs, 2013, p. 410). Not all the protests events are reported, large protest events are more likely to be reported by newspapers (Biggs, 2018). However, location and composition also determine the likelihood of a protest event being reported by newspapers, as discussed in section 5.1.

Protests may affect attitudes towards democracy through rational and social psychological mechanisms. The number of participants determine the possibility of protesters to spread the message on a wider public. This can persuade people to support the democracy. This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with more people joining the protest events campaigning for prodemocratic grievances

Numbers are important not only for the size but also to the identities of the protesters. To have more identities participating means that even more people can identify with the protesters and generate peer-pressure to join or support the democracy if the grievances expressed by the protesters is aiming

to that:

Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with more diverse composition of the protests events campaigning for democratic grievances

To be reported and generate an impact on decision makers, protests events have to be able to capture the attention of the media. Protests events can generate an impact and introduce topics on local and national agendas when they are able to frame meanings and grievances through strategic disruption. Strategic disruption not only happens when a lot of people are out on the street, but also when there is a commitment (Tilly, 1995) to the cause they are protesting about. This leads to the final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with a higher count of protest events campaigning for prodemocratic grievances

4.5 Reverse causality

Reverse causality refers to when the causality goes from output to input (Feng & Wu, 2018). In other words, when the dependent variable causes the independent variable, presenting an heterogeneity issue. In my research, reverse causality would be the case if places with higher turnout for democracy protests have a higher turnout because more people are supporting democracy.

Following the findings of Dahlum and Knutsen (2017), when researching liberal attitudes and democracy in a large-N study, when deeper political-historical or geographical factors determine both a country's level of self-expression and democracy, the reverse causality becomes an issue. It is likely that this is the case in my research and this is a potential flaw.

I acknowledge that to control for reverse causality in this research is a challenge. Due to the little time periods (four years) it is not possible to lagged the independent variables to make sure that the treatment effect (protest) occurs before the outcome (attitudes to democracy), DV: attitudes to democracy in year t , independent variables in year $1-t$. More data would be the statistical remedy for this.

However, I believe there is a good argument that supports the idea that reverse causality is not the case for this research. Using the data from Latinobarómetro and the CINEP database, figure 4.2

shows the patterns of protest intensity and data of support for democracy. The grey columns show the intensity of protests (the scale is on the right side of the figure) and the red line shows the support for democracy (the scale is on the left side of the figure).




Figure 4.2: Intensity of protests and support for democracy. Datasource: DINEP and Latino-barómetro

By looking at figure 4.2 there are some interesting observations. There is no direct correlation, however, for some periods like 1996 to 1999 when the protest intensity increased while the support for democracy dramatically decreased. From 2002 to 2007 there is an increase on the intensity of protest events while support for democracy is more or less stable. From 2008 to 2015 the protest intensity was high and the support for democracy fluctuated. Finally, from 2015 to 2019 the intensity of protest events decreased but the support for democracy was more or less stable in 2015 and 2016 but from 2017 to 2019 it experimented a decrease.

To argue that the support for democracy followed the trends from intensity protest events (or vice versa) would be a bold statement. However, the intensity almost doubled in the period 2008 to 2019 in comparison with the period 1996 to 2007. While the support for democracy was higher with low intensity of protests events in the first period (1996-2007) and more stable in the period 2008-2019, suggesting that the intensity is a little more independent to the fluctuations in the support for democracy.

In the results section of this thesis one of the findings is that between 2010 - 2013 the intensity of protest events is statistically significant to explain the support for democracy. Hence, to use this measure could be misleading. Also, the Latinobarometro and CINEP data are aggregated for the entire country in one year, contrary to the geographical unit of this thesis: departments. However, in country-years the intensity of protest events seems more independent to the support for democracy than the support for democracy to the intensity.

In summary, there is some insight in table 4.2 that intensity of protest events are slightly more independent to the support for democracy. This means that, reverse causality is a challenge to the analysis of this thesis. More data and studies are needed to conclude the specific direction of the causality between the support for democracy and mass protests.

Data and Research Design

In this chapter I present the data and research design used to write this thesis. In the first part I present and discuss the data used from the PEC dataset and the Latinobarómetro survey. Later I introduce the variables of the study, their operationalization, and the controls. In the second part the reliability and validity of the Latinobarómetro survey is presented. Finally, I present and discuss the model used for the analysis.

5.1 Data sources: PEC dataset and Latinobarómetro survey

To test the hypothesis outlined in section 4.4 of the thesis I use two data sources. The Latinobarómetro survey to measure the dependent variable, attitudes towards democracy and the PEC dataset to measure the independent variables, number of participants, identities of the protesters, and intensity of the protests events (number of protests events).

5.1.1 Introducing a new dataset: Protests Events in Colombia (2010 - 2013)

When I decided to write about protests events in Colombia with a quantitative approach one of the first findings was the nonexistence of a dataset suitable for conducting the analysis. Hence, I decided to create the Protests Events in Colombia Dataset. Considering the early work of Tilly (1995, p. 535) contentious collective action seeks to maximize four factors: numbers, commitment, worthiness and unity. Measuring worthiness, unity, and commitment is hard without having the right research design for the case study. However, numbers are more accessible to determine how collective actions position

grievances on the public sphere.

The initial step was to design a suitable codebook and to decide on the sources to collect the data. The aim of the dataset is to capture as many relevant variables as possible; not only to my research in this thesis, but also for future research projects regarding protest events. The variables captured in the dataset include the following elements about the protest event: when, where, who, how many, what repertoire was used, if the protest event was repressed, what was the grievance, a coder comment, and the source(s) as shown on figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1: PEC Dataset variables

I collected a novel dataset of 3784 individual observations of protest events in Colombia at municipal level (1110 Municipalities in total in Colombia) from January 1st 2010 to December 31st 2013, using newsreports mainly from the newspaper *El Tiempo*. The unit of observation of the dataset is protest event at municipal level. However, it is important to bear in mind that the unit of analysis of this thesis is individuals.

To the best of my knowledge, the PEC dataset represents the first systematic collection of protest events in Colombia. The most similar initiative is the Digital Newspaper Archive collected by CINEP (National Popular Center for Research and Education) with more than 650.000 news articles collected from 10 newspaper sources in 163 categories, however it is an Archive not a dataset. As already mentioned there is only one comparable element between the archive and the dataset which is the amount of protests events. I also conducted a comparison of the PEC dataset with other available datasets on Harvard Dataverse (more than 160 including Colombia), PRIO Replication dataset and other online sources. There is no other dataset reporting all the variables and protests events for the period 2010-2013 as shown on the annex A.1.

The process of reading, analysing and coding the news was an extensive part of this research. This process began in February 2021 as a term paper project for the course "STV4323 Protest, Mobilization and Revolution" at UiO and finished in April 2022. It provides an unique insight into the phenomena of

Protests in Colombia. The dataset and the codebook (see annex A.2) aim to provide a comprehensive overview of location (georeferenced at municipal level), identities, number of participants, repertoires, repression, and grievances of the protests events. I acknowledge that this dataset has a lot of room for improvement in the future, such as including other sources, reviewing coding rules and typing errors.

5.1.1.1 Variables of the PEC dataset

For the PEC dataset I use a similar definition of a protest as in the concepts section (2.1) of this thesis. However, for the PEC dataset a protest event is a public collective action that seeks to communicate a message expressing one or more grievances. A protest event can be performed by one or more people using one or more disruptive techniques - repertoires (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009). The event takes place in one specific place and day. It lasts for a day. If a protest event lasts two days I code it as two independent observations of protests events in two days in the same location. The unit of observation of the PEC dataset is day-municipality.

The variables included in the PEC dataset are grouped onto seven sets of variables. The first group of variables determine the *date* of the occurrence of the protest event. Most of the news reports analyzed would be published a day or multiple days after the occurrence of the protest. To decide on the date I used the information explicitly contained in the news, ie. "yesterday, a group of students marched to get more funding for their university" hence, I would code the day before the news was published. In case the news reports that the event "have lasted for two weeks", I would include individual observations for 14 days before the protest was reported. In other words, the protest is coded 14 times, as 14 individual protests events. And, in the case that no date was reported, I would use the day the news was published.

The second set of variables correspond to the *place* where the protest event took place. The news article would, most of the time, state the name of the department and the municipality of the event on a clear and precise way. The exception is when there were national protests. The news would just write that in multiple places of the country a protest event was taking place. Then I would code "multiple" for the department. A second part of the set of variables related to the location contains characteristics of the place where the protest event was. The characteristics regards to the rural or urban area of the municipality.

To have precise information about the rural or urban contexts is relevant to see how different reper-

toires are used in different locations and by different groups of protesters. From the literature review on protests and social movements in Colombia (Abad Colorado, 2018; Archila Neira, 2003, 2008; Bautista Bautista, 2012; Cruz Rodríguez, 2016) it is possible to conclude that rural workers (*campesinos*) are a relevant actor in protests dynamics in the country. This information provides a basis for analyzes on protest's ecologies (Zhao, 1998).

A third set of variables correspond to the *identities* of the protesters. Identities are the social group described in the news: Union Workers, Non Union Workers, Students, Organized Citizens, Non Organized Citizens, Ethnic, Rural Workers, Women, LGTBQ+, Blacks People, Inmates. Multiple works (Asal et al., 2013; Biggs et al., 2020; Branton et al., 2015; Dahlum et al., 2019; Dahlum & Wig, 2021; Enos et al., 2019; Kawalerowicz & Biggs, 2015; Mazumder, 2019; Wasow, 2020) rely on the identities of the protesters to conduct their analyzes. My aim is to present the most comprehensive data in relation to who protested. Identities are case-sensitive. Datasets covering countries or regions where religious beliefs are central debates would include that information, or where ethnicity is a major conflict driver, would desegregate this variable. However, this is not the case in Colombia.

For the PEC dataset my objective is to include identities that are case-relevant but also general to make the information comparable with other contexts. Identities are coded with a dummy variable. This allows the dataset to include more than one identity for each protest event, according to the news report. Some of the identities captured are part of the *standard dataset* rules, such as union workers, students, rural workers, and so on. However, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of protest phenomena in Colombia, based on Chenoweth, E (2019), the PEC captures women and LGTBQ+ identities when "women (or LGTBQ+ members) reported/observed advocating for the campaign in the news or social media" (p. 5) , and as particular identities it captures for ethnic groups (indigenous) and inmates.

According to the government of Colombia, the indigenous population by 2012 was around 4,4% of the total population. Several works (Barrera & Hoyos, 2020; Cruz Rodríguez, 2016; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Ibarra, 2019) have described them from a qualitative approach. To present quantitative data about indigenous people and communities helps to a better understand their participation in contentious politics. In the period of study, 162 protests events with indigenous were recorded.

I decided to include inmates as an independent identity given that their citizenship rights are restricted while being in jail. They are not entitled to the same mobility or political rights rights, ie. they can't

vote. Despite that, they organized 64 protest events: hunger strikes, riots and declared themselves in civil disobedience.

The fourth variable is the number of participants. The number of participants is one of the most contested measures used in political science and sociology to study protests events (Ortiz et al., 2005). Newspaper reports are not written to be scientific sources, however are one of the most suitable available tools to produce quantitative data about protests events. Journalist's reports tend to be vague using words like "hundreds", "thousands" or "millions" to describe the number of participants.

To code the number of participants I use three strategies. First, when the news report state the exact number of participants I use that number. Second, when the description about the number of participants was vague I used the Francisco's technique of making conservative interval estimates (Francisco, 2004). Hence, if the news reports "dozens" would be coded as 21, " hundreds of people" would be coded "201", "several thousands" would be "2001" and so on. Numbers ending in 1 indicate estimates. And if the news didn't report any specific or any vague approximate I would use (Biggs, 2018) estimate by coding 101 considering that the average number of people going into a protest event that would be reported is more than 100 (100+1).

The fifth set of variables correspond to the repertoire reported. As presented on the background chapter 20 repertoires were reported. The sixth set of variables collect information about repression. Repression for this work is understood as "*any realized or threatened limit or coercive action taken by state authorities to control or prevent challenges that could alter the status quo policy or distribution of power*" (Ritter & Conrad, 2016). The news reports have to state that State forces would have repressed the protest. If so, and if the protest report include the information about how did it I would have coded as: police, riot police or army. It also includes information about how many were killed, injured and arrested.

According to the PEC dataset 8,13% of protests events were repressed, 24 people were killed, 694 injured, and 1168 arrested. However, these numbers have to be analyzed with special care. Considering the limitation of working with only one data source (as discussed in the following section 5.1.1.2) the reports about repression seems to not reflect the reality. There are multiple cases like ID 3509, on 23.08.2013 where there was a blockade that was repressed by the riot police; *El Tiempo* reported eight cops injured but 0 protesters killed, injured or arrested. In principle repressive forces have weapons, infrastructure and technology far more powerful to confront protesters than what protesters

have to confront repressive forces. Hence, it would be expected that more protesters would be injured than the number of officers of the repressiven forces. Unfortunately, to account for the accuracy of the repression and what is reported escapes the scope of this research project but it is important to mention a potential bias in this matter for future works using the PEC dataset.

Finally, the PEC dataset captures for the grievances of the protesters. I identified more than 35 grievances expressed on the reports. In order to conduct the statistical analyzes in this work I grouped the grievances into six groups of grievances: antidemocratic, economic, social, prodemocratic minimalis, prodemocratic maximalist, other, and unreported. Some grievances such as "territory", "Truth", and "Disappeared" can be coded in more than one group of grievances to account for the presence of more than one category aim.




Figure 5.2: Recurrence of the Grouped Grievances

Figure 5.2 shows the recurrence of grievances for the entire period of study. Antidemocratic grievances (1 observation, 0.02%) refer to protests aimed to segregate a group of people. This grievance would seek to reduce the access to democratic rights. Into the group of Other grievances (11 observations, 0.29%) I include the protests events that seek to pressure international governments, given that they were not seeking to target domestic actors as the rest of grievances collected, ie. demonstrations in front of embassies to protest a matter in a foreign country.

2.03% of the protests (76 observations) didn't include the grievances of the protesters. I code 1 for unknown grievances when the news didn't include information about what were the protesters seeking to change or voice. There seems not to be a clear relationship under what conditions would the grievance not be reported. I run correlation tests between different identities, number of participants

or repertoires; but all of them were not significant. Hence, it is not possible to state a logic behind when grievances were not reported but it seems to be more random.

Social grievances correspond to the 8.5% of the protests events (311). This group of grievances seek to modify or change social behaviors without reducing the access or restriction of democratic rights. It includes demands related to coexistence, reject the military presence of armed actors (guerrillas, paramilitaries, criminal groups or the army), development plans, truth about victims of the armed conflict, land use and symbolic disputes (like statues: removal or installation).

Economic grievances were reported a 37.44% of the total of observations. Economic grievances seek an economic gain and correspond to those demands related to public infrastructure (improvement or change), income, employment, housing, public services, taxes, and private services. This was the second most recurrent grievance expressed during the period of study.

To study the effect of prodemocratic protest events I created two subcategories: the prodemocratic maximalist and the prodemocratic minimalist. Prodemicratic minimalist are the protest events that seek to maintain or guarantee the defense of and existing democratic right, and prodemocratic maximalist protest events aims to expand or increase democratic rights.

Prodemicratic minimalists protest events were the most reported grievance with a 46,16% (1721 observations). Minimalist prodemicratic events include the following elements: the defense of Human Rights, against police brutality, to protest against corruption in elections, against the government, to defend education, labor, animal and health rights, and disputes for the rights of use of the territory.

Maximalist prodemicratic events were registered 5.52% of the times (206 observations). This group includes protest events seeking to expand rights that guarantee the nondiscrimination, expansion of gender-based rights access, the expansion of indigenous, political and civil rights.

5.1.1.2 PEC dataset challenges

To build from scratch and introduce a data contribution entails a dichotomous relationship. On one hand, I have an insightful perspective of the variables used to conduct the analysis as well as of the case of study. On the other hand, there is an important challenge in assuring the reliability of the data.

The dataset was constructed from newspaper reports. The main source is the newspaper *El Tiempo*. I chose this newspaper due to it being the only daily newspaper in Colombia with the following characteristics: national coverage, online archive and search engine. Initially, I conducted my search using Factiva, however some limitations appeared, such as incomplete articles, broken links, and spelling mistakes. Hence, I use Factiva as a second option when information reported in *El Tiempo* was unclear or contradictory.

The collection -and coding- of data sourced from newspapers has raised a methodological debate among scholars. Some of them have completely ignored any selection issues and have assumed newspaper data as a random sample. Others have concluded that data from newspaper is not critically flawed and with minimal care, the data can be used without biasing the analysis. On the contrary, others consider that the data has serious distortion and have proposed strategies to correct it (Ortiz et al., 2005).




Figure 5.3: Levels of Selection bias Source: Ortiz et al. (2005, p. 402)

Three main problems may arise: "1. *media bias in the selection of but a few of the many possible events to observe and report (selection bias)*, 2. *media bias in the description of the events they do select to report (description bias)*, and 3. *the reliability and validity of media trace recovery by researchers*" McCarthy et al. (1996). In particular, since I am working with a single data source it is important to acknowledge the introduced bias in terms of selection. However, according to McCarthy et al. (1996) findings, selection bias is similarly stable across time, in spite of the high level of volatility in the characteristics of populations of demonstrations and in the patterns of media coverage.

It is important to acknowledge potential bias from the power dynamic where I did the data collection. The data feminism point out two major challenges with datasets: first, how is counting. Second, how is counting. The first challenge refers to the asymmetries directly reflected in the power dynamics between who is doing the counting and who is being counted. Second, counting and classification are powerful parts of the process of creating knowledge. The hierarchies and binary classifications systems offer a reflect of how they are constructed by cultures and societies and reflect both their values and

their biases (D'Ignazio & Klein, 2020, p. 123). Several of my variables are binary variables. Multiple expressions, identities, genders and elements are potentially excluded given the power position from where I sat while doing the coding, as well as the knowledge and values that I have restrict my capacity to design a more inclusive classification of the protesters.

Lastly, it is difficult to measure inter-coder reliability given that I was the only coder of the dataset. However, I mitigated this by going through it several times choosing random news to code them again, and comparing my two codings to guarantee its quality.

In order to contribute with the transparency and reliability of my work -and data- I acknowledge that the data collected in the PEC dataset, to be used in the analysis section of this thesis, faces potential bias in terms of what (and how) was reported, as well as how I coded it. The main source of information *El Tiempo* is a well-known established newspaper in Colombia. However, it has been criticized for aligning with government policies and supporting them. Considering that protesters are, in general, opposing government or seeking to change something in it, it is possible that *El Tiempo* might have excluded some political agendas of the government, some municipalities and some identities. To mitigate this I implemented strategies seeking to reduce these potential bias as already presented in sections 3.4.1, 3.5, and 5.1.1.1.

5.1.2 Latinobarómetro

To measure attitudes to democracy I use the public opinion data of the Latinobarómetro survey in multiple years. The Latinobarómetro Corporation is a non-profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile, and is solely responsible for the production and publication of an annual public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 600 million people. The Latinobarómetro Corporation researches the development of democracy and economies as well as societies, using indicators of opinion, attitudes, behaviour and values. Its results are used by social and political actors, international organizations, governments and the media. In Colombia they conducted 1200 representative surveys in 20 departments in 2010, 2011, and 2013.

The survey asks respondents about six set of variables: living conditions preferences, democracy, perception about other countries, public security, the economy and socio-demographics of the respondents. Two set of variables are relevant to this work: socio-demographics for the control variables and democracy to measure the dependent variable.

In the period of study the Latinobarómetro survey was conducted in 2010, 2011, 2013. A 2012 survey was not conducted. To solve this problem I create a value using an average between the data from 2011 and 2013. There is also data about 2009 and 2015, hence I use the data from both years to have a before and after the period of study to illustrate patterns in the dependent variable.

5.1.2.1 Latinobarómetro survey challenges

Surveys are a valuable tool to provide an accurate and reliable insight into what ordinary people think about politics and how they do politics (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 173). The Latinobarómetro foundation claims that its survey is statistically significant for departments, countries and countries. The internal validity of the survey is assured by the research design and development of the survey by Latinobarómetro. Hence, it is not necessary to deal with it in this work.

Reliability refers how accurately the measurement of the indicators is designed (Halperin & Heath, 2020). After thoroughly reviewing the questionnaire and methods used by Latinobarómetro, it appears to be a reliable source to use. The survey is based on closed and open-ended questions. Yet the questions of interest for my work are all closed guaranteeing that it can be replicated. The surveys are conducted by interviewers in person. The interviews can take between 30 and 60 minutes. Some of the questions are problematic, for instance question *S7. sex of the interviewee (Just write don't ask) Male= 1 or Female =2*. However, the questions that I use for the analysis seems not to be problematic.

5.1.3 Field work

The approach of this thesis is quantitative. However, to study protests events and contentious politics in Colombia from Norway is challenging given that multiple contextual elements play a key role and are not easily accessible. Hence, to have a better understanding of the phenomena I conducted a three weeks field trip (29.03.2022 - 15.04.2022) to Bogotá thanks to the support of the grant of the Institutt for Statsvitenskap for field work in the spring of 2022.

During those three weeks I visited CINEP (Bogotá) to access the Base de datos de luchas sociales (Social Struggles Database). Their methodologies and collection process was inspiring and decisive in choosing the design of the PEC Dataset and Codebook. An important body of the literature studying protests events in Colombia has been published in Spanish and is not accessible online. Then, I consulted specialized literature in two libraries: Luis Angel Arango and the library of the Universidad Nacional of Colombia.

Finally, I conducted semi structured interviewees with academics and protesters. One of the most relevant interviews was with Jose Isidro Gómez, researcher at the Museo de Bogotá (Museum of the City of Bogotá). The Museum has two ongoing projects about protests events: how they have shaped urban planning of the city and a project of memory of protesters. The Museum has been collecting testimonies, objects and audiovisual material of protesters in the city. Image 5.4 shows one of the permanent exhibitions of the Museum devoted to protests, where people write messages about how they feel about them, what have they supported, and what is the overall meaning of protests for them. The Museum collects the messages routinely for their archive.

The field work helped me define of relevant elements in the research design, as well as with the comprehension of the background of Colombia in terms of protest events. I use the information gathered to deepen the understanding of the quantitative patterns of my research.

5.2 Research design

My unit of analysis is the individual. Individuals are defined as the people who were surveyed by the Latinóbarometro as a representative sample of the population of their department. The research design seeks to answer the question *How does mass protest affect attitudes towards democracy?*

Table 5.1 below provides an overview of the hypotheses, selected independent variables, and indicators of the variables.

Variable	Hypothesis	Indicator
Protest size	Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with more people joining the protest events campaigning for pro-democratic grievances	The total number of participants reported in protest event
Identities	Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with more diverse composition of the protest events campaigning for democratic grievances	The total number of identities reported in protests events

Intensity	Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with a higher count of protest events campaigning for prodemocratic grievances	Measurement of the total number of protest events occurred in the department
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Table 5.1: Operationalization

5.2.1 Dependent variable: attitudes toward democracy

My dependent variable captures changes in individual's perception of democracy. It is measured using the following question: "*With which of the following statements do you agree most? 1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. 3. For people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime*". Question Q10ST in the Latinobarómetro questionnaire. I chose this question because it captures three preferences: for a democratic government, for an authoritarian government or indifference about the form of government. In addition, this question was maintained the same for the entire period of study, giving reliability to multiple periods.

By looking at the maps below (5.5) it is possible to see the variation in multiple departments. The darker it gets towards brown the more supportive it is of democracy. The lighter it gets towards the blue less supportive it is of democracy. Departments like Huila, Meta, Cauca, Tolima, and Risaralda get gradually lighter with time. While departments like Norte de Santander and Córdoba get gradually darker. Other departments like Cundinamarca, Bolívar, and Madgalena fluctuate. Valle del Cauca, Bogotá, Amazonas, Nariño, and Boyacá are more or less stable departments

5.2.2 Independent variables

I include three variables to measure the relationship between the results of attitudes toward democracy in 20 departments in Colombia and the hypothesized predictors of attitudes change. The data for all the independent variables has been filtered from 33 departments to 20 departments, based on the departments with available data from Latinobarómetro. The first measure is the total number of protesters reported in each department per year that reported prodemocratic grievances. It is measured as a count of the number of participants. This variable is included to test the Hypothesis 1.




Figure 5.4: Memories of the Protesters. Museum of Bogotá: 31.03.2022

For Hypothesis 2 the variable is the diversity of composition of the protests events. The measurement is the count of identities that were reported as participants of the protest events. Finally, for Hypothesis 3 I use a count of the total number of events reported in each department per year.

5.2.2.1 Number of participants

To test Hypothesis 1, the measurement of the number of participants in each department each year is pertinent. The independent variable called "number of participants" captures the total number of participants in each of the 20 departments to be studied between 2010 and 2013 (figure 5.6). The variable "number of participants" is operationalized by adding all participants that took part in protest events expressing grievances for prodemocratic rights for each year. In 2010 a total




Figure 5.5: Attitudes to Democracy data provided by Latinobarómetro

of 459.465 individuals participated in prodemocratic protests with a strong geographical center in Bogotá (department: 4). Individual observations refer to how many people was reported in the news.

During 2011 a total of 1.972.777 individuals participated in prodemocratic protests and the epicenter of the mobilization was Bogotá, as in 2010. However, 2012 shows a more dispersed picture. With a total of 224.511 individual observations the protests events took place in different regions of the country: Antioquia (1), Valle del Cauca (31), Bogotá (4), Córdoba (13), Cauca (10), and Huila (16). Finally, 2013 was the most active year in terms of number of participants with a total of 2.257.804. The geographical centers for 2013 were: Norte de Santander (23), Valle del Cauca (31), Caldas (7), Huila (16), and Santander (28).




Figure 5.6: Number of Participants

During 2010 - 2013 a total of 4.914.557 individual observations were reported. Interestingly, the number of people participating in Bogotá decreased dramatically during 2013. However, this corresponds to one of the aspects mentioned in the background chapter: protests events in 2013 were dominated by rural workers (*campesinos*) with the Paro Agrario y Popular (Popular and Agrarian Strike).

5.2.2.2 Identities of the protesters

To test Hypothesis 2 I use the measurement of the total count of identities in each department per year. The variable is called "number of participants" and is operationalized by aggregating the number of identities registered in each protest, grouped into departments by year 5.7. 2013 was the year with more diverse participation of multiple identities. The departments with more diverse participation of protesters for the entire period were Valle del Cauca (31), Bogotá (4), Antioquia (1), Risaralda (26), and Meta (19).




Figure 5.7: Identities

Interestingly, the intensity and the identities show similar trends for the entire period. Those departments with more count of protest events were also the departments where protest events were more diverse.

5.2.2.3 Intensity of the protest events

To test Hypothesis 3 the measurement is the aggregate of the count of prodemocratic protest events in each department. This is one of the traditional measures to quantify protest events. The intensity determines not only commitment but also increases the disruption of the event. In comparison to figure 5.6, figure 5.8 shows a more even distribution of the protest events. Disruption in terms of count of the protests shows a different level of participation to the number of participants and number of identities.

2013 and 2011 are not only the years with higher number of participants but also with higher distribution of events across the departments. In this variable Bogotá is no longer the most active city in 2010 and 2011, as in figure 5.6. According to this variable departments like Antioquia (1), Valle del Cauca (31), Nariño (22), Bogotá (4), Risaralda (26), and Meta (19) were particularly active.




Figure 5.8: Intensity Protests Events

It is interesting to highlight how just by looking at figures 5.8, 5.6, 5.6, the protests landscape is completely different in every single measure. Working with multiple independent variables that capture different information about the phenomena should increase the robustness of the analysis.

5.2.3 Control variables

To determine relevant control variables and isolate the effect of the independent variables over the dependent variable I use the a directed acyclic graphical (DAG) notation. In figure 5.9 "PE" stands for protests Events, "AD" for Attitudes to Democracy, "a" for age, "e" for education level, "o" for occupation, "i" for income, and "u" for unobserved elements. Arrows represent a causal effect between two random variables moving in the intuitive direction of the arrow, and the direction captures the direction of the causality (S. Cunningham, 2021, p. 97). Straight arrows imply observable relations and dotted arrows unobserved relations.




Figure 5.9: DAG

In the DAG, it is possible to see the relation $PE \leftarrow a \rightarrow AD$ implying that "a" can determine the outcome and the treatment. To avoid omitted variable bias, or backdoor paths, using the DAG I argue that Attitudes to Democracy are affected by education level, income, occupation, the age of the participants, and unobserved elements (error term). Education influences attitudes to democracy and income thru occupation. The occupation and income of the individuals by themselves also influence attitudes toward democracy.

5.2.3.1 Age

Controlling for the age of the survey respondents is relevant considering Mazumder (2019) findings that the Black Live Matters movement had an impact on attitudinal change following an age gradient where young whites are liberalized by protests while older whites are not. This is based on the socialization literature that argues that individuals are more likely to change their attitudes when younger (Sears & Valentino, 1997). Hence, it is plausible to consider that the age has an effect on the change of attitudes toward democracy. Age is also an important determinant of the rationality in deciding to join (or not) protests events. Younger people could expect less costs associated to joining protests (Kawalerowicz & Biggs, 2015) as well as a higher willingness to protests considering the work of Della Porta, D and Diani Mario (2007)

The ages recorded in the Latinobarometro data are from 18 to 90 years old. Using Mazumder (2019) work I created a dummy variable for respondents under 50 years to be considered as young.

5.2.3.2 Education

As shown in the DAG, the level of education is a confounder because it affects the occurrence of the protests and the dependent variable. Studying attitudinal consequences of protests Biggs et al. (2020) finds that college education has a large impact on individual attitudes when criticizing Mazumder (2019) for not taking into account college education in his study about the changes in racial attitudes after the civil rights movement in the United States in the 60's. Education not only affects attitudes toward democracy but it also affects the occurrence of protests. Dahlum and Wig (2019) demonstrate that education is linked to a higher likelihood of actual protest events and that this effect is particularly strong in more authoritarian settings, suggesting that education spurs protest through anti-authoritarian grievances. They too suggest that education could effect protest through enhancing preferences for democracy and more accountable governance. Hence, to avoid omitted variable bias I include level of education as a control variable. This information is captured in the survey with question "*S14. What level of education do you have? (What was the last year you completed?)*"

The data of the survey shows that those respondents who went to college scored more than 14 in this answer (the variable is measured from 1 to 17). To operationalize this variable I coded a dummy variable if the answer was more than 14.

5.2.3.3 Occupation

Occupation is a confounder because it jointly determines attitudes toward democracy and the occurrence of protests. It also affects income and based on Dahlum et al. (2019) it affects the attitudes toward democracy. According to their work, groups that expect to be electorally important in the future, like middle classes or industrial workers may prefer democracy, even if weak now, if they have sufficiently long time horizon (Dahlum et al., 2019, p. 1495). Despite their work being focused on democratization from autocracies, I believe the composition play a determinant role in prestablished preferences for certain attitudes to democracy. In support of this Dahlum and Wig (2019) find that university locations are more likely to concern democracy and human rights. Hence, I control for occupation using question "*S16A What is your current employment situation?*" with 7 possible answers "*a. self employed. b. salaried employee in a State company. c. Salaried employee in a private company. d. Temporarily out of work. e. Retired. f. Don't work/responsible for shopping and*

housework. g. Student"

Similar to the other variables, if the respondent had answered a. b. or c. (4, 5, and 6 in the data) I coded a dummy variable meaning that the respondent was employed.

5.2.3.4 Income

The work of (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) presents strong evidence that populist attitudes are strongly linked with economic conditions, there is evidence that socio-economic development leads to value changes, proposing that individuals mired in scarcity aspire to satisfy basic economic needs, while individuals whose economic needs are satisfied strive for self-realization and autonomy (Dahlum & Knutsen, 2017, p. 440). To measure this control I use the question "S4. Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes your situation?" with five possible answers "a. It's sufficient and we can save. b. it's just sufficient and we don't have major problems. c. It's not sufficient and we have major problems. d. It's not sufficient and we have major problems. or e. don't know".

From question S4, I use answers a. and b. as indicators that the person had enough resources to live with. I created a dummy variable indicating that her/his financial situation was stable. I decided to use the perceived economic level because it measures the perception of the interviewee, and this is coherent with the level of satisfaction that individuals have in relation to economic needs.

5.3 Statistical model

In order to examine the effect of protest events on attitudes toward democracy I first used a simple linear regression (annex A.2). The basic principles that I want to test can be expressed as:

- $Support\ for\ democracy = support\ for\ democracy\ t-1 + mean\ number\ of\ participants\ t-1$
- $Support\ for\ democracy = support\ for\ democracy\ t-1 + mean\ number\ of\ identities\ t-1$
- $Support\ for\ democracy = support\ for\ democracy\ t-1 + count\ of\ protests\ events\ t-1$

To decide what is the best model for my analysis I ran some preliminary specifications including each control variable each time as well as each independent variable. After running multiple Ordinary Least Square specifications of the dependent variable with the independent variables and the control variables the statistically significant variables are shown on table 5.2. According to table 5.2 the

independent variable *count of protests* is not statically significant. The control variable *employment* appears not to have statistically significance in any of the models. The variables that maintain statistical significance are the number of participants (the strongest association), the average of identities reported, college education, sufficient income, and to be young (negatively associated).

Table 5.2: Base Model

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Support for Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ave_participants	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)
ave_identities	0.001*** (0.0005)	0.001** (0.0005)	
count_pevents	-0.0002 (0.0002)		-0.0002 (0.0002)
young	-0.087*** (0.018)	-0.086*** (0.018)	-0.087*** (0.018)
college	0.073*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.073*** (0.016)
employment	0.015 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)
sufincome	0.039** (0.015)	0.037** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)
Constant	0.520*** (0.019)	0.514*** (0.018)	0.524*** (0.019)
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488
R ²	0.014	0.014	0.013
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.013	0.011
Residual Std. Error	0.496 (df = 4480)	0.496 (df = 4481)	0.496 (df = 4481)
F Statistic	9.248*** (df = 7; 4480)	10.555*** (df = 6; 4481)	9.620*** (df = 6; 4481)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Based on the linear regression model 5.2 I decided to try with other models. By looking at figure 5.6, it is clear how some departments like Bogotá (4 in the graph) and Norte de Santander (23) are outliers. To control for these outliers, I decided to use a logarithm for the value of the number of

participants to produce a more normal distribution of the observations across all models, then every time this variable is presented it is in Log form. By using the Log function I am transforming the data to attenuate the effect of the outliers. This means that the values follow a curve that attenuates the weight of the values in relation to the number of observations.

Assuming that the strongest explanatory variable is the number of participants in protest events I then used the log function in the simplest possible model (A.6) and obtained a higher statistical significance of the variable at 95%. Considering that the dependent variable is a dummy variable I use a Logit model. The independent variables are aggregated at department level, then, to account for this I use oneway fixed effects for the right side of the equation at the department level (units). A more in depth discussion and implications about the decisions to choose this model is in chapter 6.

As for the research design the model is Logit with Oneway Fixed Effects, and looks like this:

$$\gamma_i = \chi_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where γ_i is the dependent variable with a dummy form of the support for democracy. χ_{it} is the time-variant $1 \times \kappa$ (the number of independent variables) regressor vector. β is the $\kappa \times 1$ matrix of parameters. α_i is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect. And ε_{it} is the error term. $t = 1, \dots, N$ and $i = 1, \dots, N$

6

Results

In this chapter I will present the empirical analysis. The chapter is divided into three different sections. In the first part I run and discuss multiple statistical models and specifications to see the robustness of my analysis. In the second part I provide an interpretation of the results from the Logit oneway fixed effects model. Finally, in the third section I discuss the causality and validity of my analysis.

To find the best model to estimate the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable I conduct estimations with multiple linear probability models. First, it is important to take into account that the dependent variable is binary (support for democracy = 1, no support for democracy = 0).

Using a base model with a linear regression, as shown on table 5.2 and on scatter plot 6.1, an increase in the number of participants is associated with an increase in the the support for democracy. The model indicates a positive relation, however the dependent variable has an unbounded form. Hence is necessary to use a model that fits the dependent variable observations by 0 and 1.

The coefficients shown on table 5.2, on the number of identities and the number of participants is positive and significantly different from zero at the 0,1% level and 0,01%, respectively. The interpretation of these results is not easy and can be misleading. The results might be distorted by omitted variable bias, so to conclude a positive effect of the protests on support for democracy could be premature.

Scatterplot number of participants and support for Demo




Figure 6.1: Scatterplot lm

6.1 Models: logit, fixed effects: twoway - oneway

6.1.1 Logit regressions

Based on Hanck et al. (2020), the linear probability model (like the estimations on models A.3, ??, and ??) has a major flaw: it assumes the conditional probability function to be linear. This does not restrict the dependent variable to lie between 0 and 1. Then, it the most appropriate to use an approach that uses a nonlinear function to model the conditional probability function for a binary dependent variable. In effect, I decided to use a logit regression model.

The binomial logit model is an estimation technique for equations with dummy dependent variables that avoids the unboundedness problem of of the linear probability model by using a variant of a cumulative normal distribution (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 405). When using the logit model the estimation regression change to an "s" shape because it is constrained to values between 0 and 1.

To interpret the result, it is important to remember that "the binomial logit is best estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) technique and a large sample. A slope coefficient from a logit mea-

sures the impact of a one-unit increase of the independent variable in question (holding the other explanatory variables constant) on the log of the odds of a given choice" (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 407).

Table 6.1: Logit Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Support for democracy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Size (log)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.013)	0.031** (0.014)	0.038*** (0.013)
Identities	0.005** (0.002)			0.004** (0.002)
Identities (log)		0.009 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.045)	
Intensity	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Intensity (log)			0.032 (0.023)	
young	-0.353*** (0.072)	-0.352*** (0.072)	-0.343*** (0.072)	-0.344*** (0.072)
college	0.295*** (0.064)	0.294*** (0.064)	0.283*** (0.064)	0.292*** (0.064)
employment	0.059 (0.061)	0.058 (0.061)	0.064 (0.061)	
sufincome	0.153** (0.062)	0.150** (0.062)	0.136** (0.062)	0.147** (0.062)
Constant	-0.099 (0.102)	-0.089 (0.103)	-0.133 (0.105)	-0.083 (0.096)
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
Log Likelihood	-3,071.336	-3,074.234	-3,073.752	-3,072.712
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,158.672	6,164.468	6,163.504	6,157.424

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.1 shows the results from the Logit regressions. In Model 1 the number of participants (size)

is logged, has a positive relation and is statistically significant. The number of identities statistically significant like the control variables: younger than 50 years, to have college education, and to have sufficient income to live. However, the intensity of the protests and to be employed are not statistically significant.

Model 2 in table 6.1 present a positive and statistical significance for the logged size of the protests. However, when transforming the number of participants into a logged variable its statistical significance disappears; probably because the number of identities don't present extreme values to skew the distribution. The control variables have similar behaviours as in model 1.

By looking at the values on model 3 the logged size remains statistically significant but appears to have a smaller effect. Like in model 2, the log identities values are not significant, as well as the logged value of intensity. Control variables, as in models 1 and 2, maintain their signs and significance.

Finally, model 4 of the Logit models present a positive and statistical significance for the logged size of the protests, the number of identities reported, college education and to have sufficient income. To be younger than 50 years old is also significant and negatively related as in models 1, 2, 3, and 4.

In comparison, model 1 and model 4 are the models with better statistical significance for the size and identities of the protests. The logit model provides interesting insights about the data. It shows the same variables to be statistically significant as the model base ??, but with a higher effect on the support for democracy.

The Logit model appears to be the right model, considering the dependent variable is a dummy variable. However, it presents a limitation in relation to the right side of the equation: the independent variables. The observations from the Latinobarómetro survey and the PEC Dataset have times-series cross sectional characteristics. The data repeats observations for each department for each year. That means that it is necessary to cluster the standard errors at department level and use time fixed effects to control for the years. Then, I proceed to present and work with a twoway fixed effects model to account for better suited model to account for differential timing in the observations.

6.1.2 Twoway fixed effects

The fixed effects model estimates panel data equations by including enough dummy variables to allow each cross-sectional entity (departments in my thesis) and each period (2010 to 2013) to have a different intercept (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 475). To work with a fixed effects model seems to be the most appropriate, since I am working with 20 departments for four time periods.

Each department might have a different culture, history and institutions, in sum, elements that can influence the results from within the department. Also, it is plausible to think that history, infrastructure, institutions or culture is somewhat constant from year to year. It is challenging to account for all those factors, however what we know is that they are stable, and mark differences from each department.

For example, in the data analyzed from Colombia there are completely different departments in terms of cultural heritage, history and practices. The department of Bolívar is located in the Caribbean region of the country, with a culture deeply influenced by African and Caribbean practices since it was the main slavery port for the Spaniard colony (Cartagena) into the Nueva Granada for almost three centuries. And on the other side of the country there is the department of Cauca, mostly characterized for being in the middle of the Cordillera of Andes, where a big portion of the population is indigenous, and whose ancestors resisted the colonisation and genocide of the Spaniards. The productive dynamics in both departments are different given different production schemes based on thermal floors and cultural heritage.

Of course, the characteristics and brief description of the departments of Cauca and Bolívar is not representative or seeks to be. It is just an example to make sense of how different two departments can be and at the same time, how it is expected that most of conditions within them remain constant over time.

It is likely to think that those particular characteristics at department level might be correlated with the outcome variable, attitudes toward democracy. Since I cannot control for all variables that might influence the attitudes toward democracy, there might be an issue of omitted variable bias. Some other things might also change within the departments across time, like developments of the armed conflict, or any other variation across time that I am not capturing here but might have an effect on the attitudes toward democracy.

However, the solution to the omitted variable bias is to include dummy variables for every department. This solves the problem of unobserved but unchanging effects at department level. This solution can also be applied to every time period, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 to control for time fixed effects. By this I am controlling for the omitted variables since they are represented by the dummy variables.

As Studenmund and Johnson (2017) argue what fixed effects does in essence is allowing each entity's intercept and each time period's intercept to vary around the omitted condition baseline. Model 6.2 shows the results for the model with twoway fixed effects.

Models 1 to 5 in table 6.2 show that when controlling with fixed effects for departments and years the independent variables are not significant to explain the support for democracy. Despite this model being one of the most promising ones to explain the level of variation according to the literature it don't show significance.

However, these results don't imply that the effect of protests is insignificant. Twoway fixed effects might be the best model, but it is also the most demanding model in terms of data. The significance of the independent variables might disappear due to the few year-observations in my data. To control for four years might explain the problem of why the model is not showing results. The best option then, is to use oneway fixed effects strategy, with dummy variables at the department level, since it might have enough data and variation to show significant results. For a future research to expand the period of study (more years) is a promising topic to use twoway fixed effects and investigate if the results are or not significant with more year-observations.

6.1.3 Oneway fixed effects

Oneway fixed effects shares the same characteristics as the twoway fixed effects, but differs in the principle that it only has fixed effects on the geographical unit (departments). Clearly, when comparing the results of the twoway fixed effects models with the oneway fixed effects, it might seem like the robustness and findings of the research are not significant anymore. However, as Richard McElreath (2020) point out, it is important to remember that estimation techniques use the data they are feed with. Considering that my data only includes three periods (plus one created out of averages) twoway fixed effects is very demanding to the amount of data. This makes the twoway fixed effects model not suitable for the data availability.

Using the same specifications as in the logit models 6.1, and the twoway fixed effects 6.2, but

Table 6.2: Twoway Fixed Effects

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
		Support for Democracy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Size (log)	−0.012 (0.020)	−0.009 (0.020)	−0.008 (0.020)			
Identities	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	
Intensity	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)			−0.001 (0.001)	
young		−0.308*** (0.076)	−0.302*** (0.076)	−0.302*** (0.076)	−0.303*** (0.076)	
sufincome		0.345*** (0.067)	0.347*** (0.067)	0.348*** (0.067)	0.349*** (0.067)	
employment		0.089 (0.064)				
college		0.252*** (0.069)	0.258*** (0.069)	0.258*** (0.069)	0.258*** (0.069)	
Constant	0.503*** (0.177)	0.493*** (0.190)	0.552*** (0.186)	0.547*** (0.185)	0.533*** (0.187)	
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488	
Log Likelihood	−2,893.592	−2,864.887	−2,866.039	−2,866.126	−2,865.961	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,839.185	5,789.774	5,788.078	5,786.252	5,787.923	

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

only using geographical entities as fixed effects, table 6.3 present the results. Using a oneway fixed effects includes estimations for five models. The intensity of the protests is included in models 1, 2, and 5, however, in none of them it is statistical significant. Model 1, presents only the independent variables. In this model the size of the protests is logged and present a positive relation and statistical significance at 0.01, the number of identities also has a positive relation and is also significant at 0.01.

Models 2 and 3 in table 6.3 show a positive and significant relationship for the variables: size (log), number of identities, being young, having sufficient income, and college education with the support for democracy. Models 4 and 5 show a positive relationship between the number of identities and the support for democracy, this variable is significant at 0.05 in model 4 and significant at 0.01 in model 5. All the control variables show the same pattern as in models 2 and 3. Like in previous models (twoway fixed effects and the logit model), the intensity of the protest events is not relevant, neither is the employment variable.

The fixed effects regression, as any statistical model, has a series of assumptions that need to hold in order to produce unbiased estimates. The first assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with all observations of the independent variable for the entity (departments) over time. If this assumption is violated, we face omitted variables bias. The second assumption ensures that variables are independent across entities (departments). This does not require the observations to be uncorrelated within an entity. The observations are allowed to be autocorrelated within entities. This is a common property of time series data. Third, large outliers have nonzero finite fourth moment. Fourth, there is no perfect multicollinearity (Hanck et al., 2020, p. 294).

6.1.3.1 Standard errors for fixed effects regressions

I have introduced and presented the results of multiple models: base model (lm), logit model (logit), twoway fixed effects (glm), and oneway fixed effects (glm). Considering the data characteristics and the model characteristics, the better suited model is the oneway fixed effects. I will present a more in-depth discussion about the oneway fixed effects model.

According to (Hanck et al., 2020) similar as for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation invalidates the usual standard error formulas as well as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors since these are derived under the assumption that there is no autocorrelation, which is not the case with fixed effects. When there is both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation so-called heteroskedasticity and

Table 6.3: Oneway Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Support for Democracy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Size (log)	0.087*** (0.018)	0.088*** (0.018)	0.089*** (0.018)		
Identities	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Intensity	-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.001)
young		-0.380*** (0.074)	-0.377*** (0.073)	-0.384*** (0.073)	-0.386*** (0.073)
sufincome		0.178*** (0.064)	0.179*** (0.064)	0.153** (0.064)	0.155** (0.064)
employment		0.037 (0.062)			
college		0.329*** (0.067)	0.332*** (0.067)	0.344*** (0.066)	0.343*** (0.066)
Constant	0.026 (0.160)	0.095 (0.174)	0.113 (0.171)	0.122 (0.171)	0.123 (0.171)
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
Log Likelihood	-3,019.041	-2,993.307	-2,993.689	-3,005.625	-3,004.869
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,084.083	6,040.615	6,037.379	6,059.250	6,059.739

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors need to be used. Clustered standard errors belong to these type of standard errors. They allow for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelated errors within an entity but not correlation across entities.

The I used the "coeftest" specification in R with the HAC specification to produce table 6.4. It shows the same results as table 6.3. This same result is explained by the fact that fixed effects models don't need to cluster (Abadie et al., 2017, p. 17). The major advantage with fixed effects, is that it avoids bias due to omitted variables by assuming that the departments don't change over time or that change over time equally for all departments. It is expected that individuals in the same department are equally affected. In essence it allows to each entity's intercept to vary around the omitted condition baseline (when all fixed effect dummies equal zero) (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 477). The fixed effects model helps to mitigate the omitted variable bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity by looking at each department and comparing the department to itself over time.

Table 6.4: HAC Standard errors oneway fixed effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Support for democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Size (log)	0.089*** (0.019)	0.087*** (0.018)	0.088*** (0.019)
Identities	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
young	-0.377*** (0.073)		-0.380*** (0.073)
sufincome	0.179*** (0.065)		0.178*** (0.065)
employment			0.037 (0.062)
college	0.332*** (0.067)		0.329*** (0.067)
Intensity		-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	0.113 (0.171)	0.026 (0.161)	0.095 (0.174)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.2 Protests and changes in support for democracy

Having presented the specifications and performances of multiple models there are some general elements to highlight. The size as well as the diversity (identities) of the protest events have a positive relation and are statistically significant to explain the support for democracy. To be older than 50 years old, to have sufficient income to live, and to have college education are positively related and statistically significant to support democracy. In none of the models' specifications the intensity of the protests or to be employed appear to have statistical significance.

However, for the analysis I will use the models that use the the oneway fixed effects estimation 6.3 due to the advantages of this estimation technique in relation to the specifications of the dependent variable and the characteristics of the data. In the following section I will briefly present the performance of the control variables and, after, I present an interpretation of the results. Figure 6.2 shows the coefficients plot for the model 3 in table 6.3.




Figure 6.2: Coefficients (glm) oneway fixed effects

6.2.1 Performance of the control variables

6.2.1.1 Age

According to models 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the oneway fixed effects model (6.3) to be young is negatively related to support democracy. For my research I use the Mazumder (2019) classification of young

people under 50 years old. However, I also run the analysis with multiple age groups as shown in the annexes (A.8). According to my analysis, people older than 50 years old tend to be more positively supportive of democracy, especially those older than 70 years old. While, people younger than 20 appear to be the least supportive group for democracy.

The explanation that I suggest for this is phenomena, is that young people could have a tendency to be more indifferent to the preference for democracy because they have to care more about materialistic values based on the opportunity argument (Dahlum et al., 2019). Materialistic needs like getting a job, being able to pay their studies and so on. People older than 50 years old who are willing to answer a survey that could take between 35 and 65 minutes should have some material guarantees, and can be interested in supporting more post-materialistic agendas, such as democracy.

Across the multiple age groups that I use (annex A.8) the number of participants and the number of identities remain statistically significant. Between 2010 and 2015 the youth unemployment rate was around 19,9% and 15,3%. In the same period, 62,5% of young people who finished highschool didn't go to college. Young people are also exposed to multiple violences from the armed conflict, such as being recruited by armed groups, or being involved in illegal economies.

Interestingly, the cohort suggested by Mazumder (2019) to define a young person when studying racial attitudes in the United States also works in the case of Colombia. To turn 50 is a breaking point. However, in the case of the United States the effect on people younger than 50 years old is to liberalize their racial attitudes, while in Colombia it is to be less supportive of democracy.

6.2.1.2 Income

To have sufficient income, using the self-perception assessment presented in the survey is a statistically significant predictor to have support for democracy. However, its effect, based on table 6.3 and annex A.8, is about half of those that have college education. The relevance and effect of having sufficient income is align with the theory. When people have resolved material issues, they are more likely to support post materialistic issues.

Some people might suggest to use a different indicator to measure income, like the amount of minimum wage income per month or gross income. However, the scope of this thesis is to measure attitudes, and as presented on the theory section there are social psychological and rational arguments that determine to support democracy. Hence, to measure sufficient or not sufficient income perception is coherent with the self-representation of the individual in the world. Most of gross measurements,

like gross income, or GDP percapita, are fitting for some estimations, but they leave aside important experiences and perceptions of the individuals.

People with high income in period t might have been unemployed in period $t-1$, hence their income would not be devoted to savings or to support the idea that is living in comfortable economic conditions. On the contrary, their perception might better capture how they see and identify themselves with their society and in turn how they would like that society to be shaped, democratically, autocratically, indifferent.

6.2.1.3 College education

College education presents the strongest relationship (see 6.3 and A.8) of all control variables to support democracy. It is statistically significant in all models. This result is expected since higher education has a relationship with more liberal attitudes according to Biggs et al. (2020) when studying attitudinal change as a result of protest events.

This result is somewhat similar to the effect of college education in attitudes to democracy in other contexts like the African continent (Dahlum & Wig, 2019), Egypt (Ketchley & El-Rayyes, 2021), and the United States (Biggs et al., 2020; Enos et al., 2019; Mazumder, 2019). It remains as an important context variable to measure attitudes to democracy with a tendency towards liberal values.

6.2.1.4 Employment

To be employed shows no relevance or significance in any of the models used. This is contrary to most of the theory that states working class and urban middle class people to be more supportive for democracy. However, this condition might be the result of my measurement design. The question and instrument that I used to measure the occupation only captures if the individual is employed or not.

It does not capture the type of occupation that the person has. This might have flawed the result. A plain dummy variable is not the most accurate for this variable considering how multiple studies have explored how specific occupations have an impact on the support for liberal attitudes. For example, in autocratic states public sector employees have a preference to falsify their democratic preference to avoid being fired or repressed at their workplace (Koesel & Bunce, 2013). In this case, to be employed includes rural workers, public sector employees, private sector employees, and self-employed. Unfortunately, the latinobarómetro survey does not include more detailed information.

6.3 Understanding the Results

As previously stated, the best fitted model to estimate the statistical models is the oneway fixed effect model. Before presenting the interpretation of the model it is important to emphasize the characteristics of the model. There are three characteristics to use this estimation technique with the specifications that I do in this thesis.

First, the dependent variable (support for democracy) is limited by 0 and 1. Then, the logit is the best fitted given that it uses a variant of cumulative logistic function to avoid the unboundedness problem the linear probability model (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 397). In other words, it constrains the dependent variable into an "s" shape curve between 0 and 1.

Second, the fixed effects model allows model estimates panel data equation by including dummy variables to allow each cross-sectional department and each period to have a different intercept. This is the best model to estimate panel data. In other words, data that has multiple observations of the same unit multiple times and in multiple times with other units. A linear model would suffer from heteroskedasticity and omitted variable bias since it violates the principle that observations are not autocorrelated. In a panel data observations within departments are going to be autocorrelated given that the observations are repeated in the same unit. The inclusion of dummy variables for each unit and time solves this issue to have different intercept. However, the survey data only has observations for four periods (including one -2012- that I generated out of average observations using data from 2011 and 2013). The twoway fixed effects would be the best model if the data had more observations across time.

Third, given the number of periods in the data the best model is the oneway fixed effects given that it has the same characteristics as the twoway fixed effects but is better fitted for the amount of years-observations in my data.

Then, the oneway fixed effects is the best and most demanding model to use with the data characteristics and the dependent variable that I want to explain. To estimate the oneway fixed model I use a Generalized Linear Model (glm) in *R version 4.2.0*. I use *glm* because it doesn't need to use of Gaussian likelihoods and replaces a parameter of a likelihood function with a linear model, and linear models can be attached to any or all of the parameters that describe its shape (Studenmund & Johnson, 2017, p. 300). In this case the function is "s" shape given the logit function used for the dependent variable.

6.3.1 More people, increased likelihood of success

Hypothesis 1 states that *The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with more people joining the protest events campaigning for prodemocratic grievances.* In table 6.3 models 1, 2 and 3 describe a positive and significant relation between the size of the protests and the support for democracy. Model 3 is the most complete model given that it includes all the variables that are statistically significant. Hence, I will proceed to base my analysis on this model. Based on model 3, the size of a protest has a positive relationship and is statistically significance at 0,01.

By interpreting model 3 in table 6.3 it is possible to state that all else conditions are equal the size of protests is positive and significant to support democracy. This has several implications. First *hypothesis 1* is supported. Second, the model is congruent with the presented theory of the thesis. Third, this finding is aligned with Biggs (2018) work regarding the relevance to include the number of participants in the study of protests and contentious politics.

My explanation for the result behind *H1* is that the number of participants affects the three mechanisms that I presented in the theory to influence individual's attitudes toward democracy. The size of a protest event determines how many people join. First of all, it affects the likelihood of the protest being reported by the media. If a lot of people join a protest event, then a lot of people could identify themselves with the protesters and see them as peers.

Once the protesters have convinced a lot of people to join, it is then more likely that they will persuade bystanders about the importance of the grievance. The size of the protest then increases the chances that people see the protesters as peers, that a broader public becomes persuaded to support claims that are prodemocratic, and also that a change in policy, or political alignment with the protesters message, is produced. For example, in the period of study, the two largest protests campaigns were centered around two main topics. In 2011, against the reform of the general law of education, and in 2013 to pressure the government to negotiate with rural workers about rural conditions. These two protests were successful in stopping the education reform and in establishing a negotiation agenda between the government and rural workers (*campesinos*), respectively.

It might seem like a positive relationship is not that significant at first sight. However, it shows that protest indeed have an effect on peoples' beliefs. And peoples' beliefs are able to change by electoral or non-violent means governments in the long run. No political system is monolithic, it is in permanent change. So, to find a social phenomena that affects the outcome in the system of beliefs

is a powerful element, no matter how small it might seem. This is particularly relevant because it adds elements to the study of Chenoweth and Moore (2018), Chenoweth, E (2021), and Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011) in the explanation of why (and how) civil resistance succeed at a greater rate than violent campaigns and longer in bringing, and maintaining, democracy over time.

If more people are joining, then the grievance can be widely spread, as well as the rationale behind it. For bystanders, a larger protest implies a higher possibility to produce a frame alignment with the values and agendas of the protesters. The size of the protest affects the rational and social psychological processes in individual's preferences. By producing a frame alignment it introduces legitimacy to the message (grievance) among bystanders (protesters already consider it legitimate).

For *H1* to be supported means that, as a result of this thesis, there is indeed a contribution to the gender of academic research that seeks to explain attitudinal changes as result of protests events. This contribution expands on the work of Biggs et al. (2020), Branton et al. (2015), Mazumder (2018, 2019), and Wallace et al. (2014), Tertychnaya and Lankina (2020) and Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2021), with the particular element that this research study is a case in Latin America and in a non-mature democracy. Then, to include the number of participants (size) is an interesting and significant tool to study the effects of protest.

6.3.2 More diversity is always good

Hypothesis 2 states that *the likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with a more diverse composition of the protest events campaigning for democratic grievances*. In light of the results presented in model 3, table 6.3, it is possible to establish that average number of identities present in protests positively affects the support for democracy.

Model 3 shows for the average number of identities participant in a department-year, that all else conditions equal is positively related to explain the support for democracy. Again, this might not that significant at first sight, but has profound implications for the study of protests and their consequences on attitudinal change.

The rationale behind this explanation is that more identities participating in a protest implies that there is an increase in the likelihood of bystanders to be persuaded and feel peer pressured when they see identities or groups of identities that they can identify with. This variable was significant in all models specifications, linear, logit, and oneway fixed effects. In figure 6.3 I present the correlation

matrix of the data. I introduce this matrix to show that the size and number of identities are not perfectly correlated and that each variable has its own explanatory power when doing the testing of hypothesis.




Figure 6.3: Correlation Matrix

These results are congruent with Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011, p. 40) findings about how the more diverse the participation is in the resistance -in terms of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status- the more difficult it is for the adversary to isolate the participants and adopt a repressive strategy short of maximal and indiscriminate repression. However, it is not only congruent with it but it also provides evidence about the efficacy of the diversity of identities in protests events -not only within campaigns- in changing people's attitudes.

Identities have been the subject of study in multiple works. How different identities affect different outcomes has been somewhat studied, how students and rural workers relate to democratic changes, how black people relate to liberal attitudes, and so on. However, the methodological approach and results for *H2* are quite unique and promising. None of the protest studies regarding attitudinal change include the number of identities as a study variable. To expand Chenoweth, E (2021) argument about diversity in the success of pro democracy campaigns in autocracies appears, in light of these results, to be a promising argument to include in analysis about attitudinal change and protests in general.

As previously acknowledged, the data and the analysis has a certain level of bias in terms of the number of identities reported. One of the most interesting elements of the analysis is that despite multiple

identities being under reported (hence, underestimated in my models) this variable is significant at the 0,01 level. It is possible, with better quality data the significance and explanatory power of this variable might be higher.

6.3.3 Intensity can be misleading

H3 states that *The likelihood of supporting democracy will increase in Departments with a higher count of protest events campaigning for prodemocratic grievances*. However, in none of the models used in my research, the intensity of protest events appear to have any statistical significance.

The rationale behind this result, according to my theory, is that small protests take place almost every day in cities, towns and rural areas but contain small numbers of participants and small numbers of identities. There is a logical argument, when a protest is small it is expected that the number of people and identities be reduced too. The message or grievance that the protesters aim to transmit does not persuade bystanders and makes it hard for people watching to identify and support the message of the protest. In other words, the protest is not able to make a change in frame alignment.

Despite the intensity of protest events being one of the most used measurements to study protests, it appears to not have an effect on attitudinal consequences. Grievances and agendas have to be persuasive enough to protesters before they can appeal to bystanders. By definition, if a protest is small it is not able to appeal to sympathizers to join it.

As Chenoweth, E and Stephan, M (2011) argue, scholars have found that individuals are more likely to engage in protest activity when they expect large numbers of people to participate. The opposite effect can be seen here. Individuals are less likely to join (even less to support) protests when they expect small numbers of people to participate. Several protest events, but small protests could be misleading when analysing the effects of protests.

6.4 Validity and causality

Based on the results and analysis presented so far in this chapter, I argue that the size and the diversity of the protest events are relevant and significant to explain the support for democracies following a positive relationship. In general, these results are robust across multiple model specifications and estimation techniques. However, these results are not evidence for causality between mass protests and support for democracy.

One of the assumptions of statistical models is that omitted variable bias is not present. In the logit oneway fixed effects model that I use for this analysis, the model includes dummy variables to avoid omitted variable bias within the variations within the department level. However, this approach helps to remedy a representative part of this issue but there it does not perfectly control for omitted variable. Society, public opinion and support for democracy are, in essence, complex phenomena. It is not possible to have an estimation technique and data to guarantee no omitted variable bias. Some of the challenges of this thesis are:

First, having collected the data by myself for this research gave me a unique knowledge of the data content, structure and limitations. As discussed in chapters 3 and 5, there are multiple limitations with the data: to work with only one newspaper, the lack of intercoder reliability, the power position from the developed dataset, the hierarchies and classification system used (D'Ignazio & Klein, 2020), and not having any similar data source to compare it with. However, the PEC dataset and codebook are a data contributions that aim to capture and present, in the most rigorous and ethical way the protest events. To work on some of those data challenges and to expand the data availability is crucial to attain better and more reliable results.

Second, to be able to work with a more demanding model like logit twoway fixed effects is desirable. However, the data limitation affected this. Other control variables such as gender and race of the survey respondents would be desirable. However, assessing with a more demanding statistical model and including the characteristics of survey respondents is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Reverse causality poses a remarkable challenge to this thesis. For mass protests events to affect attitudes toward democracy, the causality has to be clear and precise. My analysis and results are based on the idea that mass protests (particularly large and diverse protests) positively affect support for democracy at the department level. However, it is important to keep in mind that the opposite relationship is also plausible. Those departments with higher support for democracy are those departments where more people joined the protest events. By increasing the sample size this challenge could be solved.

Despite multiple limitations and challenges throughout the thesis, the data and estimation techniques show a positive relationship of mass protests and support for democracy. These results are promising for further research to build upon them in order to include other variables, estimations techniques or expand the time.

Conclusion

The research question that my theses aimed to answer is: How does mass protest affect attitudes toward democracy? Drawing on rational and social and psychological theories, I presented three mechanisms by which mass protests affect attitudes toward democracy: peer pressure, agenda setting, and persuasion. I created a dataset to analyze protest events in Colombia from 2010 to 2013 and matched it with the Latinobarómetro survey. Through testimonial, observational, and statistical analysis I found evidence of an increase in likelihood of support for democracy in those departments that witnessed larger and more diverse protest events.

The findings in my thesis are divided into two groups, the protest data and the statistical analyses. The PEC dataset and codebook is a pioneer work that collects and presents a dataset about protest events in Colombia. It includes multiple variables and is geolocated at the municipal level (the smallest administrative entity in Colombia). The coding decisions and procedures make it a robust dataset for the study of protest events. The dataset has important challenges to address in the future. However, it is an important data contribution for academics around the world who may be interested in studying contentious politics in Colombia. The codebook and the dataset are a base to build upon. They are, with this thesis, now available for researchers who might want to work with it in the future. Statistical analyses and descriptive statistics for one of the most interesting periods of the Colombian protest history are now possible thanks to the PEC dataset.

Using descriptive statistics and qualitative work, I illustrated protests' dynamics in Colombia. I described (and explained the rationale behind) unique repertoires to the Colombian case: blockupations, display of corpses, and sexual abstinence strike. Some trends and patterns of who protested the most, what grievances people campaigned the most, and the intensity of protests were presented.

My statistical analyses results show that *H1* is supported, meaning that the size of the protests affects support for democracy. This has several implications. It is important to measure the size of protests as it proves to be statistically significant. It also means that the mechanisms presented in the theory section have an impact on the way they were presented. My preliminary results also show support for *H2*. This implies that to account for the number of identities joining protest events is important for the study of contentious politics. The more diverse a protest is, the more likely it is to succeed in its aims.

Preliminary results also show that *H3* is not supported. The intensity of protest events is not statistically significant in any of the models as a predictor of decreasing or increasing support for democracy. Nevertheless, preliminary results regarding *H1*, and *H2* lead me to conclude that, indeed, mass protest events have an effect on democracy.

Large mass protest events with more diversity of protesters campaigning for prodemocratic grievances affect attitudes toward democracy in a positive way, increasing the support for it. These preliminary findings expand on the growing research agenda about attitudinal changes as a result of protests events with promising and significant results.

The pursuit and struggle of protesters for democracy is not exclusively centered in autocracies. People in mature democracies protest to improve the quality of their democracy (Biggs et al., 2020; Branton et al., 2015; Enos et al., 2019; Mazumder, 2019; Wasow, 2020). This thesis expands the scope to a non-mature democratic country where people protested for prodemocratic grievances and this had a positive impact on the support for democracy.

However, this thesis has some limitations. The dataset is an early work that requires complementation with other sources and more coders to guarantee intercoder reliability. The preliminary results, despite being from a representative sample of more than 4000 observations across 20 departments for four years, need to be expanded to more periods of time to assure robustness. Reverse causality is also a flaw of this thesis as it was not possible to exclude the possibility that the support for democracy is the driver to increase the size of protests. I tried to use the best-fitted estimation technique but omitted variable bias is an outstanding challenge that needs to be considered when reading and interpreting the results of this thesis.

The effect of protests on attitudinal consequences toward democracy is a promising field of study to expand the knowledge about contentious politics. Based on this thesis, future research projects in-

clude reevaluating and expanding the PEC dataset, performing alternative estimation techniques, and expanding the study of attitudinal consequences of protests to other non-mature democracies.

Between 2014 and 2021, Colombia witnessed the end of the armed conflict with FARC in 2016, saw intense protests in 2019 and 2021, and was affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. To study the impact that a peace agreement has on trends and dynamics of protest events appears to be a promising research in the future. The Havana peace agreement was meant as an expansion of rights to improve the quality of democracy. Studying if and how protests changes before and after the end of a severe armed conflict might give insights to the puzzle of how society and contentious politics reacts to peace agreements.

Studies focusing on protest events after the Covid-19 pandemic are also interesting. Analyzing how the intensity, size and grievances changed after the pandemic could provide an important insight into how it affected contentious politics. One element that was mentioned, but escaped the scope of the thesis, is the role of repression in shaping protests' dynamics and its effects on attitudinal consequences.

Contentious politics are an intense and wide arena where a multiplicity of actors play a role all the time. The study of it is something that barely grasps on the sides of multiple mechanisms, realities, and dynamics in the definition of the political dynamics of societies that range between non-violent and violent means to address social conflicts. To protest and the use of non-violent means in efforts to seek a better quality of democracy, according to this thesis, seem to have a positive effect on peoples' beliefs.

8

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A

Annex

A.1 Annex 1

Name	Author	Year	Relevant	Comparable	Events	Comment
Women in Resistance	Chenoweth, Erica	2019	1	0		
NACVO 3.0	Erica Chenoweth, Orion A. Lewis, and Jonathan Pinckney	2019	1	0		
NAVCO 2.1	Chenoweth, Erica; Christopher Shay	2019	1	0		
NAVCO 1.2	Chenoweth, Erica; Christopher Shay,	2019	1	0		
NAVCO 1.3	Chenoweth, Erica; Christopher Shay,	2020	1	0		
Social Conflict Dataset	Robert Strauss Center	2018	0			

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project	ACLED	2022	1	0			
Data set on political events in Latin America (1979-2019)	Martínez, Christo- pher	2020	1	1	10	Doesn't include identities, reper- toires or number of participants	
Urban Social Disorder	Urdal, Henrik & Kristian Hoelscher	2017	1	0			
Women Peace and Security Index	Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security	2022	0				
Social Strug- gles Database (Base de datos de luchas sociales)	CINEP	2022	1	1	5609	Paid access. The information is cat- alogued but not organizad in a manner that can be used to conduct statistical analysis (news reports are organized under categories: type of grievance, location, etc. and uploaded as image) It is not a dataset.	
How Revolts?	Dahlum, Sirianne; Knutsen, Carl Hen- rik; Wig, Tore	2018	1	0			

Neoliberal Reform and Protest in Latin American Democracies	Solt, Frederick; Kim, Dongkyu; Lee, Kyu Young; Willardson, Spencer; Kim, Seokdong,	2014	1	1	0	yearly aggregated
Mass Mobilization Data Protest	Clark, David; Reagan, Patrick	2016	1	1	16	Yearly aggregate / vague identities
Latin America Student Protest	Disi Pavlic, Rodolfo	2021	1	1	122	Collects exclusively students related protest events
Dynamics for Political Protests	Klein, Graig R.; Reagan, Patrick M	2021	1	1	16	
International Monetary Fund, party system institutionalization, and protest in Latin America	Bejar, Sergio; Moraes, Juan Andrés	2016	1	0		
Mobilization and Armed Conflict	Díaz Pabón, Fabio Andrés	2020	1	1	4523	Reports 4523 protest events for almost 50 years. Yearly aggregated.
Protest Events in Colombia	Gómez, David	2022	1	1	3784	

Table A.1: Dataset comparison

A.2 Annex 2

Codebook

Protest Events in Colombia (PEC)

Dataset 1.0

2010-2013

Version 1.0

May 2022

David Felipe Gómez Triana (UiO)

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1 About the PEC dataset

1.1 Introducing the PEC dataset

This document describes the Protest Events in Colombia Dataset 1.0, a MA Thesis research project developed in 2021 – 2022 to fill-in the gap of the lack of data about protest events in Colombia. It has been developed by David Felipe Gómez-Triana, under the supervision and contribution of Prof. Tore Wig at the University of Oslo (UiO). The Data collection and coding was completed by David Felipe Gómez-Triana.

The dataset covers the protest events reported in the newspapers in Colombia from 1st January 2010 to 31st December 2013. This dataset is an original contribution to the literature, aiming to capture contentious politics from people in Colombia.

“Remember, in a nonviolent struggle, the only weapon that you’re going to have is numbers” (Popovic & Miller, 2015)

1.2 What is new?

The PEC dataset includes three sets of novel contributions: original data about Colombian protests events, inclusion of a wide range of identities, and unique repertoires.

Some of the identities captured are part of the *standard dataset* rules, such as union workers, students, rural workers, and so on. However, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of protest phenomena in Colombia, based on Chenoweth, E (2019), the PEC captures women and LGTBQ+ constituencies, and as novel identities captures it for ethnic groups (indigenous and Romany people), black people, and inmates.

Repertoires entail mostly repetition and rarely innovation (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009), however, opportunities and contexts might bring innovation and adaptation. One adaptation captured in the PEC dataset is the so-called “blockupation”, a repertoire mostly used by ethnic and rural workers protestors where they mix occupations and blockades. Additionally, given the armed confrontation of paramilitaries, guerrillas, Narco-cartels and the official Armed Forces in Colombia, several massacres and human rights violations were perpetrated. This triggered to the best of my knowledge, the innovation of a repertoire: the public display of dead bodies

of the victims -generally in the main square of cities and towns- to reject violent acts.

1.3 Unit of observation

The unit of observation of the PEC Dataset is the municipality. The municipalities of Colombia are the smallest decentralized subdivision of the government structure of the country. According to the database Divipola of the National Department of Statistics in Colombia (DANE, in Spanish) there are 1102 municipalities in Colombia. Municipalities are grouped to form departments (32 in total).

1.4 Data Collection and Methodology

The data sources for this codebook are two. First and mainly, it relies in the Colombian newspaper “El Tiempo”. “El Tiempo” newspaper is used because during the period of study covered in this dataset, is the only one with national coverage, daily publication, online archive, and online search engine. The second data source is Factiva (Dow Jones). Based on Boolean searches the relevant news reports are identified, analyzed, and coded.

1.5 Representativeness

Any protests events analysis method captures only a segment of the events that take place in a given place and time. This means that it can never fully reflect the flux of protest events in real life (Lorenzini et al., 2021). Protest events are subjected to multiple challenges to be noticed and reported, including the number of participants (Biggs, 2018), which is crucial for a protest event to be reported. Media proximity also plays a part. This means that the closer an event is to a media outlet, the more likely that the event will feature in the press. The geographical proximity challenge can be overcome depending on mobilization intensity. On the other hand, the biases of the news media tend to be stable over time and when protest events are reported on the news there are very few factual mistakes, only missing information about the goals of the movement (Lorenzini et al., 2021).

The author acknowledges the bias of using mass media news reports, such as under-reporting: the number of participants, the identities of the protesters, the consequences of police repression (protesters injured or killed), and small protest events. However, the contribution of

future research and researchers studying protest events in the world, as well as in Colombia, will help to reduce and overcome the bias presented in this dataset

2 Key Definitions

2.1 Protest event

A *Protest* is an event defined as nonroutinized ways of affecting political, social and cultural processes (Della Porta, 2013). It is a public collective action that seeks to communicate a message expressing one or more grievances. A protest event can be performed by one or more people using one or more disruptive techniques - repertoires (Tarrow & Tilly, 2009). They also are "sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations" (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004, p. 268). To be coded in this dataset the protest event must be reported by mass media.

3 Variables in the PEC Dataset

Variable name	variable title	Description	Coding Rule
Event ID	<code>event_id</code>	Number assigned to the event	
Year	<code>year</code>	Year of the protest event	
Month	<code>month</code>	Month of the protest event	
Day	<code>day</code>	Day of the protest event	
Name of the department	<code>department_name</code>	Name of the department	According to the National Planning Department and their "terridata" information system there are 32 administrative departments in Colombia

Code of the department	<code>co_department</code>	Code of the department	According to the National Planning Department and their “terridata” information system there are 1,122 administrative departments in Colombia
Name of the municipality	<code>municipality_name</code>	Name of the municipality	According to the National Planning Department and their “terridata” information system there are 1,122 administrative departments in Colombia
Code of the municipality	<code>co_municipality</code>	Code of the municipality	Code assigned by the National Planning Department of Colombia to the administrative municipalities
Capital City	<code>c_city</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	Capital of the department
Town	<code>town</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	Non-capital urban population
Rural	<code>rural</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	When the protest event takes place outside of the urban perimeter
Union Worker	<code>union_worker</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of union workers
Students	<code>students</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of students
Organized citizens	<code>organizedciti</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of citizens with a particular affiliation, such as an NGO, a social movement, or to a political party
Non organized citizens	<code>nonorganized_citi</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of citizens with no affiliation
Ethnic	<code>ethnic</code>	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of ethnic groups like indigenous or Romany people

Rural workers	ruralw	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of peasants
Women	women	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the mainly identity of the protestors as women
LQTBQ+	ltbg	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the mainly identity of the protestors as part of the LGTBQ+ community
African Colombians	afro_colombian	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of black people or black communities
Inmates	inmates	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should specify the presence of inmates
Number of participants	n_participants	Continuous variable	The number reported by the source. If the number is not reported, based on Biggs (2018) the value 101 is assigned by default as a rule to the minimum number of participants to be reported by news media. If the source uses the word “hundreds” the coding is 201, if the word “thousands” is used the coding is 2001, and if the word “millions” is used the coding is 2000001.

Repertoire	repertoire	Categorical	The source should specify the type of repertoire. The source can use the specific word, such as “strike”, “march” or “blockade”, however it can also describe the action i.e., “rural workers settled a camp next to the road and blockade the road”. Sometimes more than one repertoire can be reported, however the repertoire that is coded is the repertoire with the higher number of participants . The values are: blockade, blockupation, cacerolazo, chained, civic resistance, civil disobedience, crucified, death body show, demonstration, hunger strike, intermittent blockade, public kissing, letter, march, naked people, occupation, online, parade, riot, sexual abstinence, strike, vigil.
Repression	repression	Dummy variable 1=yes / 0=no	The source should report repression. Repression is understood as the use of physical violence against protestors.
Type of repression	type_repression	Categorical	The source should state what type of repression forces were used (Police, Riot Police, Army)
Number of people killed	killed	Continuos variable	The source should state the number of killed people
Number of people injured	injured	Continuos variable	The source should state the number of injured people

Number of people arrested	arrested	Continuous variable	The source should state the number of arrested people
Grievances	grievances	Categorical	The source should state the grievances of the protest event, within the following categories: Pro-segregation, Employment, Housing, Infrastructure, Private Service, Public Service, salaries, subsidies, Taxes, Co-existence, Development Plan, Child Abuse Environment, Forced Eradication, Land legalization, Security, statue Removal, Police Brutality, Education Rights, Electoral Results, Human Rights, illegality, Labor Rights, Health Rights, Civil Liberties, Civil Rights, Corruption, Discrimination, Gender Violence, Government, Indigenous Rights, Political Rights, International, Solidarity, Armed Actor Presence, against police control, Truth, Disappeared
Antidemocratic Grievances	antidemo_gr	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: pro-segregation.
Economic Grievances	econo_gr	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: employment, housing, infrastructure, private service, public service, salaries, subsidies, taxes, economic

Social Grievances	<code>social_gr</code>	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: coexistence, development plan, child abuse, environment, forced eradication, land legalization, security, statue removal, territory, armed actor presence, against police control, truth, disappeared
Prodemocratic Minimalist Grievances	<code>prodemil_gr</code>	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: police brutality, education rights, electoral rights, human rights, illegality, labor rights, health rights, territory, truth, disappeared.
Prodemocratic Maximalist Grievances	<code>prodemax_gr</code>	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: civil liberties, civil rights, corruption, discrimination, gender violence, government, indigenous rights, political rights
Other Grievances	<code>other_gr</code>	Dummy variable 1= yes / 0=no	If the variable “grievance” was coded as: international, solidarity
Additional comments	<code>comment</code>		To include comments or keep track of interesting patterns that are not captured in existing variables
Source 1	<code>source1</code>		Source weblink from FACTIVA to capture other sources to El Tiempo
Source 2	<code>source2</code>		Source weblink from El Tiempo
Source 3	<code>source3</code>		Source weblink from other sources
Appendix	<code>appendix</code>		

Table 1: Variables PEC Dataset

3.1 Grievances Spectrum

As one of the objectives of the PEC dataset is to identify the grievances of the protest events in Colombia a Grievance Spectrum is used to group the grievances expressed into six groups. To create the variables: “antidemo_gr”, “econo_gr”, “social_gr”, “prodemin_gr”, “prodemax_gr”, and “other_gr”, the type of grievances coded in the variable “grievances” is used as shown on table 1. Some grievances such as “territory”, “Truth”, and “Disappeared” can be coded in more than one group of grievances to account for the presence of more than one category aim.

Grievances Spectrum					
Antidemocratic	Economic	Social	Prodemocratic Minimalist	Prodemocratic Maximalis	Other
Pro-segregation	Employment	Coexistence	Police Brutality	Civil Liberties	International
	Housing	Development Plan	Education Rights	Civil Rights	Solidarity
	Infrastructure	Child Abuse	Electoral Results	Corruption	
	Private Service	Environment	Human Rights	Discrimination	
	Public Service salaries	Forced Eradication	Illegality	Gender Violence	
		Land legalization	Labor Rights	Government	
	Taxes	statue Removal		Political Rights	
		Armed actor Presence			
		Police Control			
		Territory	Territory	Territory	
		Truth	Truth		
		Disappeared	Disappeared		

Grievances that seek to reduce the access to democratic rights	Grievances that seek an economic gain	Grievances that seek to modify or change social behaviors without reducing the access or restriction of rights	Grievances that seek to modify the set of rights with minimalist aims in relation to the Democracy	Grievances that seek to expand or modify the set of rights with maximalist aims in relation to the Democracy	Grievances that seek to impact international government (i.e. demonstrations in front an embassy to protest an event in a foreign country)
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Table 2: Grievances Spectrum

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- Taylor, V., & Van Dyke, N. (2004). 'get up, stand up': Tactical repertoires of social movements. *The blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 262–293). Blackwell Publishing.

A.3 Annex 3

Table A.2: Im independent variables

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	demopref		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ave_participants	0.00000*** (0.00000)		
ave_identities		0.001** (0.0005)	
count_pevents			0.00005 (0.0002)
Constant	0.518*** (0.008)	0.524*** (0.008)	0.527*** (0.009)
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488
R ²	0.002	0.001	0.00001
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.001	-0.0002
Residual Std. Error (df = 4486)	0.499	0.499	0.499
F Statistic (df = 1; 4486)	11.065***	5.481**	0.058

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.4 Annex 4

Table A.3: Participants and young

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	demopref
ave_participants	0.00000*** (0.00000)
young	-0.058*** (0.017)
Constant	0.560*** (0.015)
Observations	4,488
R ²	0.005
Adjusted R ²	0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.498 (df = 4485)
F Statistic	11.437*** (df = 2; 4485)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.4: Im participants and college

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	demopref
ave_participants	0.00000*** (0.00000)
college	0.059*** (0.015)
Constant	0.489*** (0.011)
Observations	4,488
R ²	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.006
Residual Std. Error	0.498 (df = 4485)
F Statistic	13.514*** (df = 2; 4485)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.5: Im identities and employment

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
demopref	
ave_identities	0.001** (0.0005)
employment	0.015 (0.015)
Constant	0.516*** (0.011)
Observations	4,488
R ²	0.001
Adjusted R ²	0.001
Residual Std. Error	0.499 (df = 4485)
F Statistic	3.257** (df = 2; 4485)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.6: Size (log)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
demopref	
log(ave_participants + 1)	0.011*** (0.003)
Constant	0.464*** (0.019)
Observations	4,488
R ²	0.003
Adjusted R ²	0.003
Residual Std. Error	0.499 (df = 4486)
F Statistic	13.598*** (df = 1; 4486)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: glm factors(department)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	demopref
log(ave_participants + 1)	0.083*** (0.018)
factor(ciudad)1	-0.559** (0.227)
factor(ciudad)3	-0.682*** (0.225)
factor(ciudad)4	-0.456** (0.227)
factor(ciudad)5	-0.002 (0.313)
factor(ciudad)6	-0.762*** (0.274)
factor(ciudad)7	-0.344 (0.229)
factor(ciudad)10	-0.123 (0.212)
factor(ciudad)11	0.601** (0.287)
factor(ciudad)13	-0.509** (0.230)
factor(ciudad)14	-0.521** (0.250)
factor(ciudad)16	-1.419*** (0.246)
factor(ciudad)18	-0.185 (0.239)
factor(ciudad)19	-0.376* (0.225)
factor(ciudad)22	-0.537** (0.239)
factor(ciudad)23	-0.041 (0.275)

Table A.8: glm different age specifications

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	demopref					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
particip	0.089*** (0.018)	0.092*** (0.018)	0.094*** (0.018)	0.092*** (0.018)	0.089*** (0.018)	0.087*** (0.018)
identities	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
young	-0.377*** (0.073)					
sufincome	0.179*** (0.064)	0.177*** (0.064)	0.176*** (0.064)	0.163** (0.064)	0.176*** (0.064)	0.164** (0.064)
college	0.332*** (0.067)	0.324*** (0.067)	0.279*** (0.065)	0.243*** (0.064)	0.336*** (0.067)	0.303*** (0.066)
young40		-0.315*** (0.065)				
young30			-0.231*** (0.069)			
young20				-0.305** (0.145)		
old50					0.395*** (0.076)	
old60						0.449*** (0.104)
old70						
Constant	0.113 (0.171)	0.006 (0.166)	-0.074 (0.165)	-0.126 (0.164)	-0.257 (0.166)	-0.203 (0.165)
Observations	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
Log Likelihood	-2,993.689	-2,995.050	-3,001.426	-3,004.760	-2,993.170	-2,997.429
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,037.379	6,040.100	6,052.851	6,059.519	6,036.340	6,044.858

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0