

When Foreign Policy Interests Collide

Motivation, policy instruments, costs and dilemmas related to Norway's foreign policy objective on the promotion and protection of human rights

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Writing a thesis is always challenging. However, a certain pandemic made this work even more demanding. The pandemic has marked the whole writing process with lockdown, confinement and closed libraries.

Days before submitting the final product, I contracted the virus myself. However, as I am finally handing in the thesis from isolation in February 2022, I am sure brighter days will come, both for society and my spare time.

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Abstract

Let us suppose there have been severe human rights violations in a country. How does the MFA assess whether to act? If Norway shall act, how does the MFA deliberate what actions to take? Should Norway condemn the violations publicly – or raise concerns privately? Should Norway work bilaterally – or take joint action with other countries? What if the country in question is a close partner of Norway's development programmes? What if vital Norwegian business interests are present in the country? And what if public criticism will worsen the bilateral relationship with a country Norway is dependent on to achieve other foreign policy goals?

The promotion of human rights has been defined as an independent objective in Norway's foreign policy since the 1970s. This thesis explores MFA's work on this policy goal and discusses the following research questions: What is Norway's motivation by making human rights promotion an independent foreign policy goal? How does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider if and how to react to human rights violations in other states – and which policy instruments does it favour? And: Does the MFA perceive dilemmas between the promotion of human rights and other national interests in Norway's foreign policy?

The research questions are addressed through an extensive document analysis of literature and policy documents - and through semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats and former members of MFA's Political leadership during the Stoltenberg and Solberg governments (2005-2013, 2013-2021).

Abbreviations

CoE – Council of Europe

CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Renamed OSCE in 1995)

CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility

ECHR – European Court of Human Rights

EEA – European Economic Area

EU – European Union

EFTA – European Free Trade Association

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

IGO – Intergovernmental Organisation

ILO – International Labour Organisation

IR – International Relations

MERCOSUR – Mercado Común Del Sur (English: Southern Common Market)

MFA – Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MRDEM – Seksjon for menneskerettigheter, demokrati og likestilling i UD. (English: Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality of the MFA)

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisations

NORAD - The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

NOU – Norsk offentlig utredning (English: Official Norwegian Report)

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

UNCHR – United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Replaced by the UNHRC in 2006)

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

UNHRC – United Nations Human Rights Council

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UPR – Universal Periodic Review

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1 Introduction

For decades, the promotion and protection of human rights have been a cornerstone in Norway's foreign policy. In the late 1970s, Norway was one of the first countries to officially include human rights as one of its foreign policy objectives. After the enforcement of the two international covenants on human rights in 1976 and the US inclusion of human rights objectives in its foreign policy by President Jimmy Carter, the Norwegian government submitted the first white paper on foreign policy and human rights to the Parliament. Through the white paper *Norway and the international protection of human rights*, the government declared that human rights would have a significant role in Norway's foreign policy, stressing that spreading human rights to the world's less privileged societies was a moral obligation.¹

In 1999 and 2015, the government presented additional white papers on foreign policy and human rights. Through the 2015 white paper *Opportunities for All: Human rights as a goal and a means in the foreign and development policy*, the government announced ambitious policies on human rights. It declared that it would conduct a comprehensive, proactive and coherent human rights policy. According to the government, the promotion and protection of human rights were to be integrated into all aspects of the foreign and development policy.² Numerous Norwegian Ministers of Foreign Affairs have emphasised Norway's role as a clear and constructive defender of human rights internationally. The former foreign minister Ine Eriksen Søreide stressed that respect for democracy and human rights is a *value* in Norway's foreign policy, "defining who we are and what we stand for internationally".³

However, daily dilemmas and difficult decisions characterise the foreign policy on human rights. In the 1977 white paper on human rights, the government stated that official comments or criticism of the internal affairs of another country might have a negative impact on Norway's relations with that country, "harming other important Norwegian interests". Additionally, it stressed that official criticism could be fruitless or even counter-productive in some cases. "Because of the potential problems raised, that are both complicated and many-sided, a nuanced and cautious approach is necessary," the government concluded.⁴

¹ St.meld.nr.93(1976-77), p.30-31

² Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.9-10

³ Søreide(2018), *Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse*

⁴ St.meld.nr.93(1976-77), p.31

In the 2015 white paper, the government emphasised that there will be dilemmas related to the human rights policy, and it must weigh those dilemmas.⁵ Potential costs if a country perceives Norway's human rights policies as unwanted interference in internal affairs may be freezing of political dialogue, that the country is putting obstacles in the way of trade and investments – or that it will oppose Norwegian positions in international organisations. However, the government stressed that “short-term burdens may be necessary to achieve long-term objectives” in the field.⁶

1.1 Research Questions, Thesis Plan, Scope and Limitations

In this thesis, the following research questions will be discussed:

- 1. What is Norway's motivation by making human rights promotion an independent foreign policy goal?*
- 2. How does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider if and how to react to human rights violations in other states – and which policy instruments does it favour?*
- 3. Does the MFA perceive dilemmas between the promotion of human rights and other national interests in Norway's foreign policy?*

This thesis intends to examine different sides of Norway's human rights policy, formulated as the research questions above. However, the research questions are interlinked as they directly or indirectly concern Norway's foreign policy interests – and the role of human rights promotion among the different foreign policy goals. To put the analysis of the two research questions in context, the thesis will also briefly account for the historical development of human rights as a Norwegian foreign policy goal.

The thesis will draw on different theories from the study of international relations, including classical theories and literature on the behaviour of small states. Moreover, the thesis will discuss a theory on the human rights policies of Norway and the US, put forth by Egeland (1988). The thesis will deduce hypotheses based on the theoretical framework that will

⁵ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.10

⁶ Ibid, p.96

function as a guideline for the empirical analysis and the discussion. The different theories invoked will be presented and discussed in the theory chapter.

The methodology used to conduct the analysis is an extensive document analysis of relevant policy documents, reports, news articles and literature on human rights and foreign policy. The document analysis is combined with in-depth interviews with key actors of Norwegian foreign policy on human rights. The interviewees include former ministers and state secretaries of the MFA, as well as Norwegian diplomats who have worked on human rights issues. I will account for the data collection, research considerations and limitations in the methodology chapter.

When conducting a foreign policy on human rights, several ministries and state agencies may be involved in decision-making and implementation processes. This may involve the MFA, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. As the research questions suggest, this thesis will exclusively address the human rights work conducted by the MFA. This is both due to the limited scope of a master's thesis and the fact that the MFA is the leading policy actor within the field of human rights in Norway's foreign policy.

This thesis will not address matters that are administered by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. That include the government's management as a majority or minority shareholder in several Norwegian companies that operate in countries with human rights challenges, such as Telenor, Yara, Hydro and Equinor. That also include Norway's trade negotiations with other States and the human rights dilemmas faced in such situations, such as the ongoing negotiations between Norway and the Mercosur countries – and with China.

The Norwegian development cooperation is an important part the policy portfolio of the MFA. The development agencies Norad and Norfund are also "child agencies" of the MFA. This thesis will address the overall strategies on human rights and development, but it will not go in-depth on this topic.

2 Methodology

This chapter will present the research design of the thesis and the data collection methodology. As a beginning, I will account for the research design the chosen case. I will elaborate on how I will conduct the case study of the MFA and the subsidiary units within the organisation that are of special interest. Subsequently, I will give an account for congruence analysis as a methodology to measure causal explanation between theories and the findings of a case study. Furthermore, I will discuss the data collection methodology, namely document analysis and semi-structural elite interviews. In this part, I will account for how the study's informants were selected and how the interviews were conducted.

2.1 Research Design, Validity and Reliability

A research design refers to a framework for collecting and analysing data. The establishment of a specific research design reflects the priorities of the research process and what its objectives are. According to Bryman (2012) such objectives can be to express causal connections between variables, generalise to larger groups than those forming part of the investigation, or understand behaviour and the meaning of that behaviour in a specific social context.⁷ Reliability and validity are two essential concerns when establishing a research design and methodology.

Reliability is concerned with whether the study results are repeatable and is mainly an issue in connection with quantitative research. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research.⁸ We can distinguish between internal and external validity. Internal validity relates to causality and whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables is trustworthy. In other words, we can test internal validity by asking ourselves whether we can be confident that the independent variable is, at least in part, responsible for the variation identified in the dependant variable.⁹ On the other hand, external validity is concerned with whether the results of a study can be generalised beyond the specific research context. For instance, it can relate to the extent to which the results of a study of a group of people can be generalised to the

⁷ Bryman(2012), *Social Research Methods*, p.46

⁸ Ibid, p.46-47

⁹ Ibid, p.47

population. I will discuss the reliability and validity of the thesis throughout the further discussion of the research design and methodology.

2.1.1 A Case Study of the MFA

To answer the research questions, I will conduct a case study of the MFA. According to Grønmo (2016), case studies may have different objectives. One can conduct a case study to develop a general understanding of the studied unit. Such studies perceive the unit as unique and scientifically interesting by itself. In other studies, the aim is to develop concepts, hypotheses or theories based on a case study. Such studies choose a unit to represent a typical unit within a universe, and the study results can thus be generalised.¹⁰ As both research questions suggest, this study concentrates on the former concept, namely how a specific organisation, the MFA, conducts Norway's human rights policy. Moreover, it concentrates on how the MFA perceives and manages dilemmas in its work. The study is thus a single case study analysis.

Case studies are characterised as intensified studies that include a great deal of information about the studied unit. According to Grønmo, the researcher usually bases case studies on qualitative data. However, the qualitative data may be combined with quantitative data.¹¹ The most common units in case studies, like organisations or communities, are complex but clear. One may identify actors, subsidiary units, actions, incidents and opinions within a complex unit.¹²

The MFA is a complex organisation that includes a massive number of subsidiary units. The Ministry consists of 13 departments that divide into several sections.¹³ For instance, the Department of Multilateral Affairs divides into six sections, with the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality being one of them. Additionally, the Ministry consists of 82 embassies, nine delegations to international organisations, and nine consulate generals.¹⁴

¹⁰ Grønmo(2016), p.105

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ MFA(2021a), *Departments*

¹⁴ Lundbo & Bech(2021), *Utenrikstjenesten*

2.1.1.1 Subsidiary Study Units within the MFA

To answer the research questions, it is essential to study the decision-making process of Norway's human rights policy within the MFA. Here, dilemmas and interest are considered. Therefore, the subsidiary unit of specific interest for this study is the Political leadership of the MFA. The political leadership of the ministries consists of ministers, state secretaries and political advisors that are politically appointed. When a government changes, a new political leadership takes office.¹⁵ The political leadership of the MFA is responsible for policy decisions on human rights.

Additionally, I have identified the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality (MRDEM) of the MFA as a unit of interest. This unit is central in preparatory proceedings for policy decisions on human rights, and the daily execution of Norway's human rights policy. That includes the follow-up and execution of white papers on human rights and the human rights allocations in the National budget.

Besides the centralised decision-making process in Oslo on essential issues and strategies of the human rights policy, the Foreign Service missions have a great deal of autonomy to consider and make decisions on country-specific human rights matters. When the Political leadership makes decisions on country-specific matters, the relevant geographical section of the MFA is generally involved. The region-specific sections are in close contact with Norway's Foreign Missions in their areas, and they prepare decision-making processes and give recommendations to the Political leadership.

To get a broader understanding of policy instruments and human rights dilemmas the embassies may face, I have also made the Norwegian Embassy in Brasilia a study unit. Brazil is an interesting case as Norway has multiple interests in the country. The two major interests are promotion of business interests – and Norway's Climate and Forest Initiative. The latter includes human rights promotion. Making the Embassy a Brasilia a study unit, I want to develop an understanding on how an embassy works on human rights issues – and if there are dilemmas concerning human rights and business promotion.

¹⁵ Tjernshaugen(2021), *Politisk ledelse*

2.1.2 Congruence Analysis.

According to Andersen (2007), case studies are not suitable to measure causal effects. Their strength is on the other side that they may establish causal explanations.¹⁶ Within social sciences, causality has been related to quantitative methods. However, according to Andersen, several qualitative methods can be applied to *trace* causal effects within case studies. Andersen emphasises process tracing and congruence analysis as two different but complementary case study methods.¹⁷

Process tracing is a method that can be used to both develop and test theories. On the other hand, congruence analysis may be applied to find matches or mismatches between empirical findings and concrete expectations deduced from core elements of theories. According to Blatter & Blume (2008), preconditions for process tracing are clear observations and a complete storyline of events within their contexts. On the other hand, preconditions for congruence analysis are a “plurality of full-fledge and coherent theories from which concrete expectations can be deduced”, as well as a plurality and diversity of available observations.¹⁸ To carry out a congruence analysis, the researcher generates predictions of what will appear according to these theories. The primary control mechanism in this approach is the rivalry between various theories.¹⁹

This thesis will use a congruence analysis as a methodological tool. This methodological approach allows me to consider the explanatory power of various theoretical lenses.²⁰ The theory chapter presents a set of theories of international relations to explain foreign policy behaviour in general and a set of theories to explain the conduction of Norway’s foreign policy on human rights in specific. From these theories, I have deduced several hypotheses that will function as a basis for discussing the case. If my empirical findings correspond with

¹⁶ Andersen(2007), *Kausalforklaringer i case-studier*, p.591

¹⁷ Ibid, p.592

¹⁸ Blatter&Blume(2008), *In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies*, p.319

¹⁹ Ibid, p.325

²⁰ Annamalai(2010), *Congruence Analysis In: Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, p.5

the empirical expectations and not with other competing theories, it will strengthen a causal explanation.²¹

2.2 Data Collection

The data is collected through the combination of document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews. This makes the foundation for a *methods triangulation*. According to Grønmo (2016), methods triangulation refers to applying several research methods and data in the study of the same phenomenon.²² A methods triangulation may increase the reliability and the validity of a study.

2.2.1 Document Analysis

Document analysis is a qualitative content analysis where the researcher systematically evaluates the content to find relevant information for a study's research questions. The relevant elements of the content are systemised, thematised and registered to use as a data source.²³

The document analysis of this thesis draws on an extensive literature search in the archives of the government, the Parliament and the MFA. Additionally, I have searched for relevant literature through the Library of the University of Oslo, the National Library and different internet search engines. I have also requested access to specific documents of the MFA that were not published, such as biannual reports from specific embassies of the political and economic situation in the country. The MFA exempted some of the information in the political reports from public disclosure. Additionally, the MFA did not grant access to activity plans and allocation letters from the Embassy in Brasilia and the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro. These documents set out the strategies of the Foreign Service stations.²⁴ In these documents, I intended to investigate MFA's strategic priorities of human rights objectives in Brazil; however, this was not possible.

²¹ Andersen(2007), p.599-600

²² Grønmo(2016) *Samfunnsvitenskapelige metoder*, p.67-68

²³ Ibid, p.175

²⁴ Deloitte(2020), *Områdegjennomgang av utenrikstjenesten. Delleveranse 1: Kartlegging*, p.39

The most central documents for the analysis have been the main national policy steering documents that are public, such as the 2015 white paper on Norway's human rights policy and other white papers that are central to MFA's work. The government submits white papers to the Parliament, in which it discusses and presents the government's future policies on a field or reports on the work that has been done in a specific area. White papers do not include specific law propositions to the Parliament but may notify the Parliament about its planned propositions.²⁵ The Parliament considers the white papers – first in the relevant Parliamentary standing committee, and then by a discussion in plenary session. The Parliament may add formal comments to the white paper – and then vote to add it to the protocol.

In addition to the white papers, I have analysed several political strategies of the MFA, the annual budget propositions and the annual foreign policy statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament. Other written sources such as opinion pieces and news articles are also included in the document analysis.

When conducting a document analysis, it is crucial to evaluate the credibility of the documents and conduct a contextual assessment. In addition, the researcher must evaluate whether the document's content may be biased. In my analysis, I have considered that government documents may be biased to portray the government's work and policies in a good light. Another challenge when conducting a document analysis is that the researcher's perspective can influence the selection and the interpretation of the documents. A researcher's limited understanding of the document content may affect the analysis.²⁶ To prevent this, I have analysed a broad selection of texts. Additionally, the semi-structured interviews complement the document analysis. The document analysis was central for the design of the interview guide that was used to conduct the interviews.

2.2.2 Semi-Structured Elite Interviews

This thesis uses qualitative interviews to collect essential data that complement and add to the data collected through document analysis. As emphasised above, to answer the research questions, it is essential to study MFA's decision-making process on Norway's human rights policy. The government generally exempts internal documents from decision-making

²⁵ Stortinget(2019), *Om regjeringens publikasjoner*

²⁶ Grønmo(2016), p.181

processes from public disclosure. Consequently, qualitative interviews with central actors of these processes are an essential method to be able to answer the research questions substantially. This thesis utilises semi-structured interviews with elite informants.

Prior to a semi-structured interview, the researcher selects topics that will be part of all the interviews. However, the interviews are flexible and will develop based on the information obtained from the informants and the communication with the researcher.²⁷ Due to the flexible nature of the interviews, it is necessary to develop an interview guide.²⁸ A specific structure may help the researcher compare the information obtained from different informants, and thus strengthen the reliability and validity of the study.

The interview guide of this study is based on the information obtained from the document analysis. It consisted of several topics that were relevant to answer the research questions. However, the current or former positions of the MFA informants varied. Some had been part of the political leadership, some were bureaucrats, and some were former diplomats of Foreign Service missions. Although I developed a general interview guide, I adjusted it before each interview to obtain valuable information from each informant's experience. In all the interviews, I generally asked open questions to avoid influencing the answers through my questioning.

2.2.2.1 Selection of Informants

The informants of this study represent so-called "elites". According to Beamer (2002), elite interviews directly target people involved in the political process. The individuals may have unique insight into the processes of politics. According to Beamer, the information elite informants provide offers both a richer description of political processes and more reliable and valid data.²⁹

This study's informants are chosen strategically based on their current or former positions in the decision-making process of Norway's human rights policy. Before recruiting the informants, I had background talks about the research topic with several people who work or

²⁷ Grønmo(2016), p.167

²⁸ See Annex 3

²⁹ Beamer(2002), *Elite Interviews and State Politics Research*, p.87

have worked for the MFA. These people helped me identify relevant informants. Additionally, by the end of almost every interview, I asked the informants if they knew about other people who could shed light on the topic. This made me to a certain extent make use of the “snowball sampling method” when recruiting informants.³⁰

The political leadership of the MFA is the most central study unit of this thesis. The exact size and organisation of the political leadership have varied under past governments. The current organisation of the Ministry under the Labour/Centre Party government, which took over in October 2021, is similar to what it was during the last years of the government led by the Conservative party. Two state secretaries and one political advisor accompany the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, one state secretary and one political advisor accompany the Minister of Development.³¹ The state secretaries divide a thematic portfolio between them. Human rights policies are included in the portfolio of one of the state secretaries under the foreign minister.

I have reached out to several state secretaries who have had human rights as part of their portfolio and several former ministers of the MFA. I decided to reach out to former members of the political leadership during the two past governments, namely the Labour-led coalition government (2005-2013) and the Conservative-led coalition government (2013-2021). To strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings, it has been essential to recruit a broad group of informants who represented different political parties during different governments. In addition to the informants from the political leadership, I recruited several bureaucrats who have participated in decision-making processes on human rights.

Most of the informants were contacted by e-mail. I presented the project and outlined the topics of a potential interview. In addition, I informed them about the formalities of the interview, according to the guidelines from the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.³² The guidelines included information about voluntary participation, the possibility to withdraw from the project, the possibility of anonymous participation, and recording and transcription of the interview.

³⁰ Frey(2018), *Snowball Sampling*

³¹ Regjeringen(2021a), *Øvrig politisk ledelse*

³² See Annex 2

2.2.2.2 Conduction of Interviews and Considerations about the Group of Informants

I conducted in total seven interviews for the study. The Norwegian Centre for Research Data granted approval to the project prior to the interviews.³³ All of the interviews were conducted in person, as I preferred. The interviews were recorded and transcribed shortly after. After the transcription of each interview, I deleted the recording. Before completing the study, I allowed all informants to read their direct quotes in the text and suggest modifications. In this way, the informants were ensured that their quotes and points of view were portrayed correctly. One informant chose to be quoted anonymously.

I am satisfied with the group of informants who took part in this study. Several of them have been key actors in the decision-making process of Norway's human rights policy. Together, they provide vital data essential to answer the study's research questions. However, several politicians who have been part of MFA's political leadership still hold important positions in Norway and abroad. It has thus been challenging to get in touch with some potential informants. Additionally, I have been in touch with informant candidates who were positive about participation, but we could not make an appointment within the research period. Ideally, I would like to have conducted interviews with all the former foreign ministers, and all of the state secretaries with a human rights portfolio between 2005 and 2021.

³³ See Annex 4

3 Theoretical Framework

This chapter establishes the theoretical framework of the thesis. As a beginning, I will account for the main theories within the study of international relations and discuss their understanding of human rights goals in foreign policy. Furthermore, I will discuss literature on the behaviour of small states like Norway in international relations and how human rights objectives may be understood within this context. I will also account for a theory put forward by Egeland (1988) about the motives, interests and dilemmas of Norway's human rights policy. Lastly, I will discuss and summarise the theoretical implications of the different theories and put forward a set of hypotheses that will work as a guideline for discussing the empirical findings.

3.1 A Realist, Liberalist and Constructivist Approach to Human Rights in Foreign Policy

Political realism has been the dominant theory in the study of international relations. "Realism" consists of several branches which emphasise different features of international relations. What realists have in common is a pessimistic view of human progress and cooperation beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.³⁴ Their core assumption is that world politics consist of an international anarchy of sovereign states and that international relations are conflictual. Realists view foreign policy behaviour as an instrumental activity based on the intelligent calculation of a state's power and interests against the power and interests of rivals and competitors. They highly emphasise national security, state survival, international order, and stability. Moreover, realists usually believe there are no international obligations in the moral sense between independent states.³⁵

From a realist point of view, international relations are a hostile place to human rights. According to Dunne and Hanson (2016), today's realists believe that human rights in diplomacy mainly is talk.³⁶ Although realists accept human rights as part of the vocabulary of international politics, they claim it is very low on the priority list of national goals. This is further seen as an explanation of "double standards" in international diplomacy where

³⁴ Jackson & Sørensen(2013), *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, p.96

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Dunne&Hanson(2009), *Human rights in international relations*

pursuing other national interests undermines human rights principles.³⁷ Unless the promotion of human rights is part of a country's national interests, it will not be rational for states to pursue such goals. Realists claim that if a state obeys the universal moral law, such as human rights, it is a technique to hide the pursuit of narrow self-interest.³⁸

Contrary to realists, liberals have a basic optimistic view on human nature and believe that they can reach mutually beneficial cooperation when they employ their reason.³⁹ The liberal analysis of international relations puts individuals and collectives of individuals at the forefront, such as states, corporations and organisations. Liberals claim that moral universalism has influenced the practice of international relations. States have made significant advances in meeting universal principles, liberals assert.⁴⁰

Liberals view human rights as having an increasingly important role for states in international relations, and they claim the spread of democracies and the establishment of a global human rights regime is evidence of this.⁴¹ Human rights regimes and institutions are seen as vital for monitoring compliance. Additionally, liberals link the promotion of human rights to good governance and democracy. They stress that unless human rights norms are embedded in state-based institutions, they will not be durable.⁴²

Constructivists offer a different theoretical point of view than both realists and liberals. They argue that there is no necessary tension between national interests and the moral principles associated with promoting and protecting human rights.⁴³ The basis of constructivism is to understand the relationship between norms and interests. This refers to how states create – and are created by – shared norms and values. Like in social life, international relations consist of expectations and rules on how actors should behave. Constructivists reject the realist notion that morals of domestic politics do not exist in foreign politics. According to constructivists,

³⁷ Dunne&Hanson(2009), p.63

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Jackson & Sørensen(2013), p.130

⁴⁰ Dunne&Hanson(2009), p.63

⁴¹ Ibid, p.64

⁴² Ibid, p.65

⁴³ Ibid, p.62

values shape a state's international behaviour. Therefore, constructivists assert that one should expect rights-protecting states at home to promote human rights abroad.⁴⁴

3.2 Literature on the Small States and Norway's Quest for Status

Much of the traditional literature on international relations refers to sovereign states as the main actors. Above all, its material resources decide a state's power, and the states with the most power, especially military power, may shape the rules of international relations. Small states must operate and survive within a world order regulated by superpowers. Løvold (2004) claims that in traditional IR theory, the behaviour of the big states has been seen as representative for all states.⁴⁵ He discusses several weaknesses of these assumptions, such as what defines a state's relative power in international relations and what decides small state behaviour.

According to Løvold, soft power has been relatively more important in international relations. Additionally, due to the globalisation process, the distinction between small and big states is less important than before.⁴⁶ Løvold argues that creative capabilities may in some cases be more important than material ones, such as being network builders in international diplomacy or by possessing "niche knowledge". Such qualities both increase the latitude of action in the foreign policy of a small state and help create an identity.⁴⁷

Baehr & Castermanns-Holland (2004) emphasise that big and small states may play different roles and possess different advantages influencing international politics and the human rights situation of another state. As superpowers may be more successful in restraining other countries from human rights violations, they suggest small states may be "more influential than expected as a result of their diverse activities, their prestige or the capacity of its diplomats". Small states might be especially influential on specific issue areas, for instance due to their expertise or traditions within this area, they claim.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Dunne&Hanson(2009), p.62-63

⁴⁵ Løvold(2004), *Småstatsproblematikken i internasjonal politikk*. P.8

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.23

⁴⁸ Baehr&Castermanns-Holleman(2004), p.21

Carvalho & Lie (2014) build on small state literature and investigate the role of Norway's policy of engagement as part of a quest for international status.⁴⁹ A state's reputation and its policies towards specific policy areas compared with other states are elements that shape its status in the international system, they suggest. They claim there exists a status hierarchy of the "great powers" of the world, defined by economic and military capabilities. However, they suggest there are other status hierarchies in international affairs and that small states can seek status along other dimensions. The hierarchy of "good powers" is one of them.⁵⁰ They state "Norway's quest for status as a *good state* rests on its international involvement in humanitarian action and international peace and security – dressing up as a great power". They argue that taking responsibility beyond what is expected based on size and military resources is a way of gaining recognition as good power.⁵¹

The 2003 Official Norwegian Report on Power and Democracy came to same conclusion, stating that portraying itself as a *morally and humanitarian great power* has become a national symbol, forming Norwegian identity.⁵² The policy of engagement makes up the core of being a humanitarian great power, including Norway's peace and reconciliation effort, promotion of human rights and development cooperation. At the same time, the policy of engagement has led to international recognition and given Norwegian diplomats and politicians access to "central fora and high political actors", it stated.⁵³

3.3 Egeland: Norway is a "Potent Small State" in Human Rights Policies

Egeland (1988) builds on small state theory and investigated the differences of human rights promotion in the foreign policies of Norway and the US. As both countries, emphasised human right in foreign policy, the outcome and the coherency of the policies seemed different. Egeland questioned the assumption of a positive correlation between economic, military and diplomatic resources and the ability to influence external human rights situations. He claimed that the conflict of interests experienced by a major economic and military power

⁴⁹ Carvalho&Lie(2014), *A great power performance: Norway, status and the policy of involvement*, p.58

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Ibid, p.59

⁵² NOU(2003:19), *Sluttrapport fra makt og demokratiutredningen*, p.51

⁵³ Ibid, p.52

when pursuing human rights policies might be greater than in the case of a small state.⁵⁴ Egeland stated that the human rights profile of foreign policy is largely determined by the perceived tension between a nation's egoistic self-interest and altruistic moral imperatives.⁵⁵

Key to the theory put forward by Egeland is that "if the foreign policies of a small state seem to be in harmony with international human rights norms, it does not necessarily reflect a political leadership of high moral standing".⁵⁶ According to Egeland, a small nation's human rights initiatives are less likely to clash with other external political, strategic or economic interests due to less internal tension between self-interest and ideals. However, he claimed, "if self-interest does appear to clash with generally recognised norms and principles, the small state is normally not any more willing than the big state to sacrifice interests for ideals".⁵⁷

Moreover, Egeland suggested "when economic and human rights interests seem to clash, the cost-benefit considerations have been relatively similar in the US and Norway", concluding that neither state is willing to make a significant unilateral sacrifice.⁵⁸ For instance, Egeland claimed there were double standards in Norway's advocacy for international sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa and simultaneously refusal until 1987 to enforce a shipping boycott that would hurt Norwegian shipping owners.⁵⁹

Egeland claims there is a major difference in how human rights measures are taken in the foreign policy of the US and Norway. Whereas the US encourages unilateral and actionist policies on human rights, the Norwegians have relied predominantly on a multilateral approach in external matters of a moral nature.⁶⁰ If Norway engages in bilateral human rights pressure, it is normally integrated with activity in multilateral fora, combined with consultation and coordination with the Nordic countries, Egeland claimed.⁶¹ Small states lack

⁵⁴ Egeland(1988) p.4

⁵⁵ Ibid, p.14

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.13

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.180

⁵⁹ Ibid, p.14-15

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.48

⁶¹ Ibid, p.51

economic, military and other resources to exert a meaningful influence on other countries, Egeland stated.⁶²

3.4 Summary and Hypotheses

As accounted for in the methodology chapter, the hypotheses of this study are deduced from the theories and represent a set of empirical expectations. The hypotheses are statements used to predict what the study results will show. They will function as a guideline and structure the discussion of the empirical findings, as is the basis of a congruence analysis. The three hypotheses correspond to the thematic division of the next three chapters and will be discussed in every chapter's concluding remarks.

Hypotheses 1: Norway's foreign policy goal on human rights promotion is motivated by international status-seeking, in addition to idealism.

With basis in small states literature, we assume that Norway's foreign policy goal on human rights promotion not solely is motivated by idealism. As Carvalho & Lie claim, Norway's policy of engagement may be viewed as an effort to increase Norway's status as a "good state". Consequently, such efforts may contribute to increasing Norway's influence in world politics as it gives connections and access to new arenas. It may thus help Norway in achieving other foreign policy goals. Although Carvalho & Lie mainly refer to the parts of the policy engagement that concern peace and reconciliation efforts, we assume the theory also is valid for Norway's human rights efforts.

Hypothesis 2: Norway will favour multilateral approaches over bilateral approaches to address human rights violations in other states.

With basis in Egeland's theory, we assume that Norway will favour multilateral approaches over bilateral ones when addressing human rights violations in other states. A small state like Norway will have limited resources to exert a meaningful influence with unilateral actions. Additionally, we assume it is in Norway's interest as a small state to uphold the multilateral system by using it to address international challenges.

⁶² Egeland(1988) p.55

Hypothesis 3: Norway is less likely to address human rights violations in another state when it may cause a considerable cost to economic interests.

With basis in realist assumptions and in Egeland's theory, we assume that the MFA will perceive conflicts of interest between human rights promotion and other national interests – and that conflicting considerations will make it less likely that Norway addresses human rights violations. We will specifically test if costs to economic and business interests make it less likely for Norway to address human rights violations, as this is in the core of the realist assumption that a states' national interests always will prevail in foreign policy considerations.

4 Human Rights as a Norwegian Foreign Policy Goal

This chapter will account for and discuss Norway's foreign policy interests and the role of human rights in Norway's foreign policy. I will begin by discussing Norway's foreign policy and its main features and interests, as stated in official policy documents. Subsequently, I will discuss the promotion of human rights as an objective in Norway's foreign policy and Norway's motivation by making it an independent foreign policy goal. This will be done by discussing sources such as the three white papers on human rights and foreign policy from 1977, 1999 and 2015, and by discussing data provided by the informants. Lastly, I will discuss the hypotheses on whether Norway's foreign policy goal on human rights promotion is motivated by international status-seeking, in addition to idealism.

4.1 Norway's Foreign Policy Interests

The main objective of Norway's foreign policy is to “work for Norway's interests internationally”, the MFA states.⁶³ The term “Norwegian interests” is often referred to in debates on foreign policy. The MFA emphasises that Norwegian interests are, among other things, defined by “our geographical position in a strategic area, our open economy, our positions as a coastal state and a manager of major marine resources, as well as our extensive oil and gas export”.⁶⁴

The 2009 white paper *Interests, Responsibilities and Possibilities*, submitted by the then Labour-led coalition government, is the latest white paper on the main features of Norway's foreign policy interests. Through the white paper, the government discussed the globalisation and geopolitical changes since 1990 and their consequences for Norway's national interests and the implementation of foreign policy.⁶⁵ The government stated “the primary objective of Norwegian foreign policy is to safeguard Norway's interests”. This was defined as a foreign policy designed to “systematically advance the welfare of Norwegian society and promote our fundamental political values”.⁶⁶ In the white paper, the government highlighted five main

⁶³ Utenriksdepartementet(2020), *Ansvarsområder og oppgaver i UD*

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ St.meld.nr.15(2008-09), p.7

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.10

groups of Norwegian interests: Security, engagement, economy, energy, climate and the environment - and international order.

Among what the government defined as Norway's core interests, we can recognise elements of what realists would include in a country's national interest, such as security and the promotion of Norwegian economic interests. However, the government also defined Norway's *policy of engagement* as a core interest. This policy refers to "the fight against poverty, efforts to promote human rights, peace and reconciliation efforts, the humanitarian policy and assistance". The government argued that this policy is motivated by Norway's values and "based on an altruistic desire to promote the common interests of mankind".⁶⁷

In the white paper, the government emphasised the importance of *values* in Norway's foreign policy. It introduced the concept of Norway's "extended self-interests", arguing that due to globalisation, "Norway's national interests and our political values are closely intertwined". A concrete example it put forward to illustrate this intertwinement was that the security policy is intended to "ensure the physical integrity of the individual citizen and protect against threats and attacks by foreign powers". However, the security policies also must be "designed to safeguard the principles of a liberal society, such as the rule of law and human rights, which play an essential role in maintaining peace between countries and preventing radicalism and conflicts in many parts of the world".⁶⁸

By launching the concept of "extended self-interests", the government seemed to reject the traditional realist notion of "narrow self-interest". Contrary to traditional realism, the extended self-interest concept links idealism and realism in foreign policy, and domestic and foreign policies. "We must abandon a narrow interpretation of Norwegian interests and *realpolitik*", it concluded, referring to the traditional distinction between soft 'idealpolitik' and hard 'realpolitik' as less meaningful than before.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ St.meld.nr.15(2008-09), p.12

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ St.meld.nr.15(2008-09), p.94

4.2 Human Rights as a Norwegian Foreign Policy Goal

As accounted for above, we can identify elements of more traditional national interests – and idealistic and value-based interests in Norway’s foreign policy steering documents. The promotion of human rights is defined as a core interest of Norwegian foreign policy by being part of the so-called “policy of engagement”. However, human rights promotion has a long history as an independent foreign policy goal. In this section, I will account for the historical development, formulation and official reasoning for the promotion of human rights as a Norwegian foreign policy goal.

4.2.1 White Papers on Human Rights

4.2.1.1 Norway and the International Protection of Human Rights (1977)

Although human rights had a role in Norway’s foreign policy before 1977, this year it was launched as an independent foreign policy goal through the white paper *Norway and the international protection of human rights*, submitted by the Labour government. Then foreign minister Knut Frydenlund said it was the world’s first white paper on human rights and foreign policy.⁷⁰

The white paper stressed that human rights had an increasing role in international politics and in international cooperation. As briefly discussed in the introductory remarks, the 1977 white paper was presented in the light of the election of Jimmy Carter as US President, who made the promotion of human rights a central objective of US foreign policy. Additionally, the white paper was presented shortly after the enactment of the two UN Covenants on human rights. These factors led to increasing human rights focus internationally and in Norway.

The white paper stated that this development imposed difficult decisions upon the government, considering international law, humanitarian aspects and foreign policy interests. The government said it intended to establish a public debate and a framework on Norway’s possibilities and limitations to address human rights violations in other countries through the white paper.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Frydenlund(1982), *Lille land – Hva nå? Refleksjoner om Norges utenrikspolitiske situasjon*, p.194

⁷¹ St.meld.nr.93(1976-77), p.3

The 1977 white paper does not include a thorough discussion of the international policy instruments to promote human rights, other than briefly mentioning a set of multilateral and bilateral means. It emphasises that a multilateral approach may be utilised if the government considers it expedient to address a human rights violation, including a Norwegian initiative to bring an issue to relevant IGOs. Furthermore, it proposed a restrictive policy concerning unilateral economic boycotts, stressing the damage it may cause for Norwegian business.⁷²

4.2.1.2 Human Dignity at the Centre: Action Plan for Human Rights (1999)

In 1999, the Christian Democratic Party-led coalition government submitted Norway's second-ever white paper on human rights and foreign policy to the Parliament. The white paper *Human Dignity at the Centre – Action Plan for Human Rights* was more comprehensive than the 1977 white paper. Whereas the 1977 paper consisted of 33 pages, the 1999 paper consisted of 230 pages. In the white paper, the government stated that promoting human rights would be prioritised, arguing it is a “moral duty” to help people who live in worse conditions than we do.⁷³ In addition to a discussion on the role of human rights in Norway's foreign policy, it included several chapters on means to improve the state of human rights in Norway.

The 1990s were characterised by a flourishing multilateralism and belief in international liberalism. The positive attitude towards the spread of liberal ideas such as democracy and human rights is recognisable in the white paper. The government emphasised *positive* means and *multilateral* approaches to promote human rights. Among the positive policy instruments, the government said it would offer technical assistance to develop new human rights provisions, and economic support to multilateral mechanisms to realise and supervise human rights. It argued that Norway's contributions could be most effective towards countries that were in a transition to democracy. Additionally, it affirmed that development cooperation might be an arena to channel economic or technical support for human rights. The government promised to strengthen the role of human rights within the development programs.⁷⁴

⁷² Ibid, p.29-30

⁷³ St.meld.nr.21(1999-2000), p.106

⁷⁴ St.meld.nr.21(1999-2000), p.107

4.2.1.3 Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway's Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation (2015)

The white paper *Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway's Foreign Policy* was submitted to the Parliament by the Conservative-led coalition government in 2015. It is, as of 2022, still one of the main policy steering documents for the human rights work of the MFA. The document's tone was strikingly different from the positivist 1999 white paper. Although the government underlined that there had been some positive developments in the field over the past 15 years, it emphasised the threats to human rights.⁷⁵ It argued that there was growing pressure and intense debates surrounding the definition and content of human rights in international forums. It promised "to intensify its efforts to promote respect for human rights, not least in the light of the ever more complex challenges the world is facing".⁷⁶

A significant contextual change in the 2015 white paper from the 1999 white paper was the state of human rights worldwide and the increasing pressure on liberal values. The government argued it had to conduct a policy to counter the human rights pushback worldwide to uphold human rights standards. The government stated it would "seek to ensure policy coherence for human rights so that Norway's efforts to promote and protect human rights are integrated into all aspects of its foreign and development policy". Further, it underlined it is essential that "all Norway's efforts pull in the same direction and are mutually reinforcing".⁷⁷

The government stated it is "in Norway's interest, both politically and economically, that human rights are respected throughout the world". In addition to being a foreign policy goal itself, respect for human rights is also a means of achieving lasting development and security, it stated. Consequently, "short-term costs are sometimes necessary to accept in order to promote long-term goals", it argued.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.7

⁷⁶ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.7

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.9

⁷⁸ Ibid, p.99

4.2.2 Norwegian Interests by Promoting Human Rights in Foreign Policy

As discussed above, human rights promotion has been defined as an independent foreign policy goal since the 1970s. However, by analysing the three white papers on human rights, it seems like its grounding and framework have changed throughout the years. Additionally, it seems like Norway's human rights policies are largely influenced by the tendencies of international relations. This section will discuss the motivation behind making human rights promotion an independent foreign policy goal: Is human rights promotion solely grounded in idealism – or does it benefit Norway in other ways?

In the 1977 white paper, the government referred to pragmatic arguments when giving reason for submitting the paper. As there was an increasing awareness about human rights both in Norway and abroad, the government was faced with a growing number of dilemmas. Therefore, it intended to initiate a public debate on human rights in foreign policy and establish a framework for its human rights work. It stated that the “human rights idea” was fundamental of the Norwegian society and the development of democracy. “As we are in a privileged position, we have a responsibility towards people who are in a less privileged position than we are”, the government said.⁷⁹ Consequently, it linked human rights promotion to idealism. However, it did not link it to the realisation of other Norwegian foreign policy objectives, other than briefly stating the importance of human rights in the decolonisation process, which Norway supported.⁸⁰

The 1999 white paper gave a similar reason for human rights promotion as a foreign policy objective, as it referred to Norway's moral duty to help people in worse conditions. However, it did also state that “increased respect for human rights” may have positive effect on development and peace.⁸¹

The 2015 white paper stands out from the previous ones as it to a lesser extent focused on the moral duty to promote human rights. It did to a greater extent argue that human rights promotion is pragmatic to achieve other foreign policy objectives. “Countries that respect human rights are more stable and predictable than those that do not”, and human rights will

⁷⁹ St.meld.nr.93(1976-77), p.30-31

⁸⁰ Ibid, p.3

⁸¹ Ibid, p.106

contribute to “creating a safer and more open world, which is also in Norway’s interests”, the government stated.⁸² The arguments were similar to those put forward in the 2009 white paper, launching the concept of Norway’s extended self-interests. Based on the 2009 and 2015 white paper, the government seemed to increasingly intertwine the promotion of human rights with the realisation of other foreign policy interests.

The informants of this thesis were also asked to give reason for the making of human rights promotion as an independent foreign policy goal. Former foreign minister Ine Eriksen Søreide from the Conservative party says “it is because it is fundamental for humans, development and foreign policy in general”.

“The past years have shown that States that safeguard human rights rarely fall into development crises and conflict. In contrast, human rights violations are often a preliminary warning of a possible conflict. It is more difficult to find a way out of conflict and poverty if human rights are not safeguarded.”⁸³

Eriksen Søreide argues that human rights promotion is pragmatic to reduce poverty and conflict. A former senior government official argues similarly:

“Human rights are both a value and a way to reduce poverty and increase stability in a country or a region. Promotion of human rights in foreign policy is motivated by both political idealism and pragmatism”.⁸⁴

Other than benefiting from a more peaceful and stable world, are there other advantages for Norway by promoting human rights internationally? Eriksen Søreide says she does not think it has major benefits for Norway “aside from our general interest in upholding basic human rights”.

⁸² Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.12

⁸³ Ine Eriksen Søreide was interviewed in November 2021.

⁸⁴ The former senior government official was interviewed during the fall of 2021. It was of the former official’s own wish to be cited anonymously.

“I would rather say that it often has a cost because it entails criticising states and taking actions against them. However, it is a cost we are willing to take. I am not thinking of an economical cost but a political cost we are willing to take.”

The former senior government official says there are few upsides in terms of ‘realpolitik’, “other than bonding with like-minded countries”:

“However, the pragmatic upside of talking about human rights internationally is that it strengthens norm compliance. The UN builds on human rights through the Charter. By protecting human rights, we also protect the fundament of multilateralism, which is essential for a small country like Norway. Additionally, promoting human rights is an effective strategy for development policies”.

Moreover, the former official underlines that “The downside is that we use political capital in the relationship with another country by pushing human rights when they disapprove. It might come at the expense of other bilateral issues”.

Additionally, Eriksen Søreide emphasises that a benefit human rights promotion may have is by contributing to building “good alliances”, like alliances that also include Non-Western countries. “Such an alliance-building does also benefit Norway in other areas”, Eriksen Søreide says.

Moreover, Eriksen Søreide compares the political capital Norway accumulates through its peace and reconciliation efforts and the benefits from Norway’s human rights policies. “Bigger countries can often not have a dialogue with certain actors and be involved in the way we are”, she says. The former foreign minister points at Norway’s dialogue with the Taliban for the past 12-13 years, which has included human rights. “It has been politically important for Norway to be able to offer something other actors cannot, and by that try to move an issue forward and find solutions”, she says.

Like Eriksen Søreide, several informants highlight that the human rights policies may contribute to building networks and create connections. Erik Solheim, a former Development minister from the Socialist Left Party (2005-2012), emphasises that the human rights work is a factor in Norway’s inclusion in a bloc of Western countries:

“When Norway promotes human rights in foreign policy, it does to a little extent concern our self-interests. However, it contributes to our inclusion in a broader Western bloc, led by the US, which is fundamentally motivated by self-interest”.⁸⁵

Moreover, when asked about the benefits for Norway from the human rights work, Gry Larsen, a former political advisor and state secretary of the MFA from the Labour party (2005-2013), highlights the connections and influence it may give:

“We benefit from a rule-based world. Safeguarding rights that are important both for others and for us is a Norwegian value by itself. Additionally, it gives us an international platform, connections, and opportunities for influence.”⁸⁶

4.3 Concluding Remarks and Discussion of Hypotheses 1

Whereas human rights promotion has been essential to Norway’s foreign policy since the 1970s, it seems like Norway’s motivation by promoting it has changed during the past decades. As the government in the 1977 and 1999 white papers mainly grounded human rights promotion in an idealistic ‘moral duty’, the government has since invoked several other arguments.

In the 2009 white paper on Norwegian interests, the government argued that traditional national interests, such as security, and values, such as human rights, are closely intertwined. Human rights promotion may thus contribute to realising other policy objectives, such as security, peace and stability, it argued. Furthermore, it rejected a realist duality in foreign policy that divides national interests from idealistic foreign policy. In the 2015 white paper, the government invoked similar arguments. It claimed it is in Norway’s interest both economically and politically that human rights are respected, as it is essential for lasting security and development.

The informants echoed the arguments linking human rights promotion to stability and development. Moreover, several informants argued that it further contributes in upholding

⁸⁵ Erik Solheim was interviewed in November 2021.

⁸⁶ Gry Larsen was interviewed in October 2021.

basic human rights and to protecting the fundamentals of the multilateral system, which is essential to Norway.

Hypotheses 1: Norway's foreign policy goal on human rights promotion is motivated by international status-seeking, in addition to idealism.

With basis in small states literature and the theory of Carvalho & Lie, we assumed that Norway's human rights promotion partly is motivated by a quest for status as a "good state". Such status will increase Norway's influence in world politics as it gives connection and access to areas of influence. That may help Norway achieve other foreign policy objective than human right promotion.

Several of the informants confirm that there are advantages for Norway by promoting human rights: Through human rights promotion, Norway "bonds" with like-minded countries. Additionally, it may contribute to building alliances, international platforms and connections that may benefit Norway in other areas. However, several informants also argue that Norway's human rights policies also may have considerable costs.

Based on the data, we cannot conclude that Norway's human rights is directly motivated by international status-seeking. However, the data indicate that an effect of the human rights policy is increased international influence through the creation of alliances, connections and networks.

5 Policy Instruments in Norway's Foreign Policy on Human Rights

There exists a broad range of policy instruments a state can utilise to influence the human rights policies of another state. There are many ways we can categorise the different instruments and tools. As Forsythe (2012) and Baehr & Castermans-Holleman (2004) suggest, we can divide them into diplomatic, economic and military means. We can further categorise them into bilateral or multilateral approaches, positive or negative tools, and short-term or long-term instruments. According to Forsythe, states take different approaches in different situations, as they “usually calculate the instruments available, the expected effect of the action taken and anticipated reactions.”⁸⁷

This chapter will discuss Norway's foreign policy instruments to address human rights violations in other states. The discussion will combine literature on foreign policy instruments on human rights, Norway's foreign policy steering documents, Norway's management of specific cases and data provided by the informants. I will begin by discussing how the MFA assesses if and how to react to human rights violations. Furthermore, I will discuss different approaches when addressing human rights violations: Public or confidential, bilateral or multilateral – and economic approaches. The discussion will include advantages and disadvantages, considerations and dilemmas with the different groups of policy instruments. Lastly, I will summarise the findings and discuss the thesis' second hypotheses, that claims Norway will favour multilateral over bilateral approaches.

5.1 Assessing a Situation

Let us suppose there have been severe human rights violations in a country. How does the MFA consider whether to take action? If Norway shall act, how does the MFA deliberate what actions to take? Should Norway condemn the violations publicly – or raise concerns privately? Should Norway work bilaterally – or take joint action with other countries? What if the country in question is a close partner in Norway's development programmes? What if vital Norwegian business interests are present in the country? And what if public criticism will

⁸⁷ Forsythe(2012), *Human Rights in International Relations*, p.198

worsen the bilateral relationship with a country Norway is dependent on to achieve other foreign policy goals?

These questions may be on the table in the daily assessment process of Norway's human rights policy. Different factors, relationships, situations and, not the least, the individuals who make the decisions influence the outcomes. In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government stated clear ambitions for Norway's human rights policy. It indicated which foreign policy tools can be utilised and clarifies how an assessment process should occur.

First, the government stated it would adopt a "comprehensive and integrated approach that combines short- and long-term and positive and negative instruments and tools". Further, it underlined that "each situation must be assessed separately, and the government will seek to adopt measures and responses and make use of those considered to be most appropriate in each case".⁸⁸

Second, the government provided a set of operational criteria for the assessment process on human rights – and discussed how Norway's resources might contribute most effectively to influence the human rights situation in another country. Norway's latitude to promote human rights in a specific country will be decided by "the human rights challenges in a country and the situation in the country otherwise". It added, "An equally important factor may be an understanding of Norway's relations with that country – the authorities, the opposition and the civil society – and of whether special circumstances are indicating that Norway should adjust how it works".

A factor it emphasised is whether Norway has a "long-standing presence or particularly good bilateral or personal relations with the country". In the assessment process, the government should consider which instruments and tools it can use, the choice of cooperation partners (like the civil society, local authorities and multilateral organisations), and whether it should choose a multilateral or bilateral approach, it stated.⁸⁹

5.1.1 The Internal Assessment Process of the MFA

Whereas the white paper indicates several factors the government should take into account when assessing a situation, it did not explain how the internal assessment process at the MFA

⁸⁸ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.90

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.88

functions. However, several informants shed light on this process. Claire Annette Hubert, Assistant Director General of the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality, explains how Norway generally considers if and how to react if there has been a human rights violation in another country.

“It is essential that the Embassy initiates the consideration. They have the best knowledge of the situation in the country, the precedence, and our latitude of action. They may consider whether we can act locally, summon the Embassy in Oslo, take joint action with other countries, bring it to the UNHRC or the UNSC - or if a public statement, such as a tweet, is appropriate. Both the Embassy and “the desk” are central. There may be different considerations within the MFA, and ultimately those are presented for the Political leadership that makes a decision. How you work with a matter is largely decided by the signals and ambitions of the politicians on the top.”⁹⁰

The informants highlight several actors that are central to the assessment process. First, the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality is fundamental, as it is the unit of expertise on the field. The Section is responsible for the follow-up of the 2015 white paper on human rights.⁹¹ Additionally, it manages human rights and gender equality funding to 50-60 partners. A large part of the Section’s work is to lead the work on resolution preparation and consideration, for instance, in the UNHRC and the UNGA Third Committee. Moreover, the Section prepares political messages both for national and international fora.⁹²

“The desk” refers to those in the MFA who are responsible for the particular matter, such as the geographical section responsible for the country in question. The geographical sections are organised under the Department for Regional Affairs (six sections), the Department for European Affairs and International Trade (three sections), and the Department for Security Policy and the High North (two sections). These sections are responsible for the bilateral relations in their region, the relations with relevant regional organisations, and other regional matters.⁹³ For instance, if Norway considers a reaction to human rights violations in Cuba, the Section for Latin America and the Caribbean will typically be involved, together with the

⁹⁰ Claire Annette Hubert was interviewed in November 2021. She has been Assistant Director General of the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality since 2019.

⁹¹ Utenriksdepartementet(2022), *Seksjon for menneskerettigheter, demokrati og likestilling*

⁹² Interview with Hubert

⁹³ Utenriksdepartementet(2022B), *Regionavdelingen*

Embassy in Havana. The leadership of the relevant Department may also be involved, for instance, in sensitive matters.

Whereas the civil service of the MFA often provides the Political leadership with a clear advice on how Norway should act, it may at times put forth alternatives. The former senior government official says there may be different considerations within the MFA:

“Normally, there is an agreement within the civil service on what we ought to do. There may be different considerations between the Section for Human Rights and Democracy and those responsible for the bilateral relations with the country. There are many choices related to human rights criticism and the calibration of the criticism. You must consider the specific case and the precedence in such cases. The most favourable and effective tool is to cooperate with other countries. Ultimately, the political leadership at the MFA decides on the matter”.

5.1.2 Maximising Results and Minimising Costs

The operational criteria set out in the 2015 white paper make it clear that *efficiency* and predicted *results* should be essential in the assessment process. The informants echo this approach. Additionally, several informants emphasise the importance of choosing policy instruments that do not harm human rights defenders. Former foreign minister Eriksen Søreide is among them:

“The choice between different policy instruments is situational. It is based on what gives results and effects - and does not harm. Choosing instruments that do not harm human rights defenders or the ethnic group in question has unfortunately become a more important factor in the human rights policy over the past years”.

Eriksen Søreide emphasises that human rights defenders in a country influence Norway’s approach, as they in many places may be in danger if they are associated with Western countries. If they want a low profile and do not want a country to do public ‘naming and shaming’, Norway must respect that, she says. When asked about potential arguments against taking action in specific cases, Hubert argues similarly.

“If it harms the cause or worsens the security situation for those involved. The public opinion in a country may also influence the considerations if the action makes those

involved more vulnerable to reprisals. Moreover, our scope of action and whether an action is likely to give results”.

The former senior government official describes the assessment process in the following way: “The most important consideration is: Do we achieve what we want? If so; is it worth the cost? That is quite a clear calculation”. The former official further underlines that the threshold to react is low when gross human rights violations happen.

Several informants emphasise the importance of choosing policy instruments that minimise the risk for those involved. Additionally, several informants emphasise that the human rights policy may have direct costs for Norway as it may worsen the bilateral relationship with the country. However, they seem to disagree on how much weight potential bilateral costs are emphasised in the assessment process. Chapter 6 will thoroughly discuss the question of costs to the bilateral relationship.

5.2 A Public or Confidential Approach

When choosing a policy strategy on human rights, an essential question is whether the government should take a public or confidential approach. Both approaches have their advantages and challenges. According to Forsythe, so-called “quiet diplomacy” is a traditional and classical method. He defines quiet diplomacy as “confidential discussions behind closed doors and away from public view”. Through quiet diplomacy meetings, state representatives can discuss a country’s human rights situation or request a halt to specific actions without risk of controversy or publicity about the talks.

Forsythe emphasises that some target governments will be flexible if they avoid publicity of them giving off to foreign pressure.⁹⁴ According to Forsythe, if a dialogue moves to the public arena, states pushing human rights frequently meet backlashes or negative reactions. State leaders who are subject to public criticism may become “defensive and inflexible in the name of national pride, state sovereignty, or because they have domestic elements who are hard-liners about resisting foreign pressure”.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Forsythe(2012), p.199

⁹⁵ Ibid

According to Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, publicity – or the threat of - may persuade a government into action.⁹⁶ However, if confidential activities are of no or insufficient effect, a government may give a public statement on the matter. States can give public statements through government channels, the media, in Parliament or international organisations like the UN. Through so-called ‘naming and shaming’, target governments are put in the spotlight for human rights abuses.⁹⁷ Moreover, public opinion in the sender country may also influence the consideration of confidentiality versus publicity. Governments may publish statements to show the public that it is concerned with a particular state’s human rights situation.⁹⁸

In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government argued that ‘quiet diplomacy’ may be necessary in some cases. It stated it has some good experiences from individual cases by working “behind the scenes rather than openly condemning the actors that have a key role in finding solutions”. The choice of working quietly may have to do with the bilateral relations to the country in question or with relations to the actors Norway is supporting, such as human rights defenders, the white paper stated.⁹⁹

The government stated that criticism will be expressed openly “when appropriate”.¹⁰⁰ However, what is appropriate? The government argued that “in critical situations, protesting loudly against human rights violations can save lives, and may be perceived by civil society and the population groups that are oppressed as vital support for their work”. Additionally, it may send “an important signal to other regimes and oppressors”, it stated.¹⁰¹

Former state secretary Larsen says that the “considerations on whether such reactions should be made public or not are often based on whether it is advantageous for those we want to help”:

“The most important tool in the human rights area is when you can speak with countries directly. I can understand the desire for publicity on all efforts you do. However, sometimes it is necessary with quiet diplomacy. Public or non-public: I believe you can achieve change through direct contact with countries”.

⁹⁶ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p.70

⁹⁷ Hafner-Burton(2008), *Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem*

⁹⁸ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p.70

⁹⁹ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.90

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.14

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.99-100

Eriksen Søreide says that quiet diplomacy may work to achieve change over time in some cases. “In other cases, it is necessary to be direct and do ‘naming and shaming’.”, she says. The former foreign minister refers to the conflict in Tigray - and Ethiopia’s decision to expel UN workers. She argues that it was necessary to be firm and direct because dialogue did not work with the Ethiopian side. On October 1st, 2021, Eriksen Søreide called Ethiopia’s decision “unacceptable” in a public statement.¹⁰²

However, if Norway chooses quiet diplomacy, it may take many forms. Eriksen Søreide says it often involves “a great deal of planning and working together with civil society and human rights defenders in the country and Norway”. In some cases, the Norwegian Embassy may have a dialogue with the country, based on instructions from home, she says.

“Additionally, there may be bilateral meetings between the countries that are unknown to the public. In cases about individuals, who for instance are imprisoned, quiet diplomacy may not only be the right approach but the only approach”.

5.3 A Bilateral or Multilateral Approach

5.3.1 A Theoretical Starting Point

The choice between a bilateral or multilateral approach is key to the assessment process of Norway’s human rights policy. In general, both approaches have their advantages. According to Egeland (1988), a bilateral approach is an independent and flexible choice of action. He argues that national political institutions may act with more speed and precision than multilateral institutions.¹⁰³ Further, Egeland states that bilateral action may benefit from potentially influential relationships between countries. A regime that violates human rights may be politically, financially or militarily dependant on another country. There may also be immaterial ties of political identification with a target country that make bilateral action more effective.¹⁰⁴

However, there are also several weaknesses of a bilateral approach. For small states, the main limitation is its modest economic, military and other resources to exert a meaningful influence

¹⁰² MFA(2021b), *Etiopia: Uttalelse fra utenriksministeren*

¹⁰³ Egeland(1988) p.53

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.54-55

on other countries, Egeland suggests.¹⁰⁵ Forsythe stresses that for economic sanctions to influence the human rights situation of another country, multilateral rather than bilateral means are to be preferred.¹⁰⁶ A general challenge for big and small states, especially when the sender-country is rich and Western, is that they may be perceived as moralistic and arrogant, Egeland states.¹⁰⁷ However, as opposed to action taken from a big state, action taken by a small state may be viewed as less threatening and have fewer concerns related to other national interests, Egeland argues.¹⁰⁸

Multilateral action may be undertaken through international organisations (IGOs) or as a separate initiative between countries or alliances. Several global and regional IGOs can wield exercise over national human rights policies. This may be done through the formulation of international human rights standards, regular human rights contact between countries, and procedures and mechanisms for the review and implementation of human rights standards.¹⁰⁹

Egeland underlines that a strong argument in favour of multilateral approaches through IGOs is that they are perceived as legitimate because of the universal nature of an IGO. Moreover, the internationally recognised standards derive a specific moral authority. Therefore, Egeland argues, human rights action through IGOs helps separate the human rights element and the national interests of a country's foreign policy. In addition, there is less chance it will be attacked as an interference in internal affairs or as Western moralism, he argues.¹¹⁰

5.3.2 Choosing an Approach

What decides whether the Norwegian government seeks a bilateral, multilateral – or combined – approach in the assessment process? As already mentioned, in the operational criteria, the government emphasised whether Norway has a “long long-standing presence or particularly good bilateral or personal relations with the country”. Further, the government stated that a Norwegian bilateral engagement would mainly be in countries that are “large aid recipients, in countries where there are serious violations of human rights, in countries with a

¹⁰⁵ Egeland(1988) p.55

¹⁰⁶ Forsythe(2012), p.203

¹⁰⁷ Egeland(1988), p.56

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.137

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.138

significant Norwegian business activity, and in fragile states”.¹¹¹ Moreover, it emphasised that bilateral dialogue on human rights would be “an integral part of our broader bilateral relations at both senior official and political level”.¹¹²

However, the government emphasised that in cases where “dialogue on human rights issues is not possible at the bilateral level, it is natural to follow up the human rights situation in multilateral forums”. That was the case with China, which froze the political and diplomatic relationship with Norway between 2011 and 2017. Consequently, the main channel for Norway’s human rights engagement was through the Universal Periodic Review in the UNHRC, the government said.¹¹³

As the white paper suggests, the informants underline that the choice between a bilateral or multilateral approach is situational. Several factors influence the decision. Former state secretary Larsen emphasises the importance of multilateral approaches to respond to gross human rights violations in other countries: “If we really want to change the situation, several countries should take action, for instance through statements or other joint actions”. Larsen says that she sometimes found it difficult to choose which diplomatic channel they should go through.

The former government official stresses that multilateral approaches often are more efficient and will reduce the costs for Norway:

“Unilateral criticism that comes ‘out of the blue,’ without a framework, foundation or explanation, will often not have the desired effect, whereas the cost is high.

Consequently, such criticism rarely happens. If we can base criticism on international agreements or rules, as well as cooperating with other countries, it will reduce the costs and is more probable to achieve results.”

The former government official says that there generally are more costs related to raising human rights concerns bilaterally than multilaterally. However, as the counterparts usually expect Norway to raise human rights concerns, the costs are known and often small, the former official asserts.

Former foreign minister Eriksen Søreide says that different factors may speak for a multilateral or bilateral approach, like the different relations with a country.

¹¹¹ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.86

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Ibid, p.90

“Although Norway has a fundamental belief in multilateralism, it is sometimes right to act alone. However, there is no contrast between both working through multilateral and bilateral channels on an issue”.

5.3.3 A Multilateral Strategy

Multilateral approaches are emphasised by several of the informants as effective and cost-reducing. Eriksen Søreide says “Often, multilateral approaches are most advantageous as it will have greater impact when several countries go together”. However, she emphasises that a multilateral approach “must unify the right group of countries”:

“If the situation is acute, it is important to act together with countries that are in a position to exert influence over the situation in the target country. In some cases, that is the USA. In other cases, countries in the region may be most influential.”

The former foreign minister says that if Norway is concerned about human rights in Iran, it will pose a small cost for Iran if only Western countries call attention to it. However, if other countries in the region are interested and engaged in the issue, it will suddenly pose a greater cost for Iran, she says.

“The value of alliance-building between regions, cultures, religions, and forms of government has become increasingly important. Human rights have unfortunately become a very polarised area. Several countries argue it is a Western value that does not fit their way of life. To breach that circle, it is decisive to build alliances with other countries than only the like-minded Western ones”.

Former state secretary Larsen claims that Norway has a comparative advantage when choosing a multilateral approach:

“One of Norway’s strengths is our large circle of partners that made it possible for us to gather support from all regions for human rights initiatives. Additionally, our broad contact with civil society, both in Norway and through the embassies abroad, gives us valuable information about what happens ‘on the ground’.”

There are several multilateral arenas where human rights violations can be addressed, such as in regional and international organisations. The 2015 white paper highlighted the importance of the UN bodies UNSC, UNGA and the OHCHR to enhance Norway’s role in the normative

work of the UN to protect and strengthen human rights.¹¹⁴ However, almost every informant emphasises the importance of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, which is part of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Every fourth year, all UN member states are subject to a human rights review.¹¹⁵ The review is based on a national report prepared by the state itself, a compilation of UN information on the state under review, and a summary of information submitted by other stakeholders, like the civil society.¹¹⁶

In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government stated that the UPR was “one of the most important innovations introduced” when the UNHRC was established in 2006. It argued that the process is predictable, lays the foundation for a constructive debate and has enabled the UNHRC to raise awareness of the human rights situation in countries that have previously been able to avoid this.¹¹⁷ The government affirmed it would “make systematic use of the UPR process to raise questions about difficult human rights issues in individual countries” and that it would “make use of relevant recommendations in the bilateral dialogue and cooperation with states”.¹¹⁸

The former senior government official points at the UPR as one of the essential areas for Norway’s human rights work:

“You can express harsh criticism at a known cost, often a low one, because all countries expect criticism. Additionally, Norway wishes to utilise multilateral arenas to raise human rights issues”.

5.3.4 A Bilateral Strategy

Although most informants highlight multilateral approaches to address human rights violations, “it is sometimes right to act alone”, as Eriksen Søreide put it. As stated in the 2015 white paper, different factors decide whether it is right to act bilaterally, such as a particular Norwegian engagement in a country. Additionally, Norway may combine multilateral and bilateral approaches.

¹¹⁴ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.70

¹¹⁵ OHCHR(2022), *Universal Periodic Review*

¹¹⁶ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.68

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.70

A bilateral strategy may take many different forms. Bilateral dialogue at a diplomatic or political level is a common strategy. However, the 2015 white paper on human rights emphasised some alternative bilateral approaches that might be effective in some cases. That includes “limiting or suspending political, cultural and economic relations” or cancelling high-level visits, recalling diplomatic personnel or refusing to issue visas.¹¹⁹

The informants emphasise the importance of human rights in the bilateral dialogue with other countries. Human rights are “always on the agenda” in bilateral meetings with countries with a problematic human rights situation, Eriksen Søreide says. She emphasises that her strategy in such meetings was to try and establish a constructive dialogue with the counterpart rather than just deliver criticism. She says that she used to refer to UPR recommendations as a starting point for a discussion in such meetings.

“I thanked them for their recommendations and explained how we followed them up. Then I repeated our recommendations to them and said that we are still concerned about the situation, for instance, the use of the death penalty or women’s rights. That worked because we got a real dialogue, which is the point if you want to change the human rights situation.”

The former foreign minister underlines that such bilateral discussion did not exclude public criticism or multilateral initiatives when necessary. Hubert has similar arguments:

“If a relationship is built on trust and mutual respect, you can raise most issues. But it is important how you do it. It is always strategic to draw parallels between your message and the country’s international commitments or national legislation, as well as messages or speeches of politicians from the country. That will contribute to initiating a real dialogue in a bilateral meeting rather than just delivering written statements.”

Moreover, Hubert emphasises the importance of the embassies when raising human rights bilaterally:

“At the country level, the embassies have an important role and autonomy in exploring their latitude of action and identifying the stakeholders who may push the boundaries in society. The embassies may help them not only with funding but with establishing safe meeting places and putting them in contact with others with knowledge and

¹¹⁹ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.91

experience. Embassies can also engage in dialogue with government representatives, including in cases concerning individuals or marginalised groups.”.

However, does a bilateral human rights dialogue have an effect? Former development minister Erik Solheim is critical to a part of Norway’s bilateral human rights approach. He questions the effects of Norway’s modus operandi in the bilateral dialogue:

“In Norway, there is an enormous belief in ‘speak up diplomacy.’ If you meet the prime minister of Malawi and speak up about human rights abuses, there is a belief that it will make a great impression on him. When politicians meet the press after such meetings, the press always asks if they remembered to ‘speak up’, whereas nobody asks if it has an effect. Maybe speaking up concerns our good conscience?”

Solheim says that the “most effective strategy is to go in and initiate a dialogue about human rights and specific measures that may ease the situation. Over time, such measures may create a different political situation.” He says he had some good experiences from such human rights dialogue “without any threats” when he was a minister. Moreover, Solheim points at a specific challenge of the bilateral strategy: Human factors.

“If there is a great atmosphere in the meeting, it may be more demanding to bring up human rights as you can spoil the mood. Additionally, in almost every case, the counterpart knows more about his own country. Consequently, it may be demanding and uncomfortable for a Norwegian minister to go into a discussion about the human rights situation in the country”

5.4 Economic Means

As there exist many types of diplomatic means, there is also a broad range of economic means to influence the human rights policies of other states. Roughly speaking, we can divide them into positive and negative economic means. Among the negative means, there are sanctions, discouragement of business cooperation and withdrawal of different types of aid. Among the positive ones, there are funding and technical assistance, and means to encourage trade and cooperation. This section will discuss sanctions and development aid as policy instruments in Norway’s human rights policy.

5.4.1 Sanctions

Economic sanctions are a traditional tool used in human rights policies. Sanctions may refer to economic boycotts and embargoes. The UNSC is the only organ that can impose mandatory economic sanctions. Both Forsythe (2012) and Baehr & Castermans-Holleman (2004) argue that States are generally reluctant to undertake economic sanctions. Sanctions may hurt their economy, and the effects of sanctions are often questioned.¹²⁰ However, States may impose sanctions for symbolic and demonstrative purposes, they claim.¹²¹

Sanctions are controversial as their effect, legitimacy and legality are questioned.¹²² Moreover, sanctions may have negative effects on the target country's population, such as a shortage of food, medicines, or other essential goods. So-called "smart sanctions" are increasingly utilised as they supposedly will hit the target government directly while avoiding hurting the civilian population.¹²³ Smart sanctions target individuals within the elites of repressing regimes, for instance, by freezing their economic assets.¹²⁴

In addition to potential negative consequences for civilians of the target country, sanctions imposed by Norway may have disadvantages for Norwegian business. In January 2022, partially state-owned Yara reported it would stop trading potassium with Belarus due to the sanctions imposed by the EU and Norway.¹²⁵

Norway does not have a tradition of imposing unilateral sanctions. However, Norway must enact the mandatory sanctions adopted by the UNSC. Additionally, Norway has enacted most sanctions adopted by the EU.¹²⁶ In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government stated that Norway will generally "align itself with restrictive measures adopted by the EU Council, except in cases when political considerations indicate that this is not appropriate".¹²⁷

According to the MFA, Norway has, as of January 2022, imposed sanctions against 26 countries, regions or groups. Belarus, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are among them. It further includes arms embargoes against 19 of those

¹²⁰ Forsythe(2012), p.201-202

¹²¹ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p.74

¹²² Riisnæs(2021), *Straffen er en favoritt i EUs arsenal. Men fungerer den?*

¹²³ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p.75

¹²⁴ Aftenposten(2021), *EU innfører sanksjoner mot Kina for første gang på over 30 år*

¹²⁵ Nilsen(2022), *Yara-sjefen om innkjøpsstans i Hviterussland: - Kommer nok ikke som en total overraskelse*

¹²⁶ Prop.69 L(2020-2021). p.7

¹²⁷ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.91

countries.¹²⁸ Several of the sanctions are grounded in human rights violations. For instance, in March 2021, Norway followed EU sanctions targeted against companies and individuals who allegedly participated in human rights violations against the Uyghur minority in China.¹²⁹

In 2021, the Norwegian parliament adopted a new sanctions law. The law will reportedly make it easier for the government to impose EU sanctions and “smart sanctions” targeted against individuals and entities. However, the law does not allow the government to impose unilateral sanctions, which was met with criticism from human rights organisations.¹³⁰ Then-foreign minister Eriksen Søreide responded to the criticism by saying “For a small country like Norway, there will be less power by imposing sanctions if we stand alone behind them. If a sufficient number of countries support them, it may often lead to substantial change”.

5.4.2 Development Aid and Financial Support

Another dimension of the economic means is different types of development aid. The nature of development cooperation is to improve people’s social and economic rights in the target country. Additionally, development programs may be targeted to improve the status of civil and political rights. That may involve technical assistance, funding to sponsor and supervise free and fair elections, state-building, construction of institutions and civil society funding.¹³¹

In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government stated that promoting and realising human rights were an overall objective of the development cooperation. It promised to “make more active use of its development policy to promote human rights” and to pursue a so-called human rights-based approach to development.¹³² About 1 per cent of Norway’s gross national income is allocated to development aid through the annual National budget. In 2020, Norwegian aid amounted to almost 40 billion NOK, according to Norad.¹³³

In addition to the general development aid, the government directs targeted financial support to the promotion and protection of human rights. In the 2015 white paper, it said this aid would include “financial support to and cooperation with civil society, media and freedom of

¹²⁸ Regjeringen(2021b), *Sanksjoner og tiltak*

¹²⁹ Kristiansen(2021), *Norge går Kina på klingen*

¹³⁰ Rønneberg(2020), *Hongkongs øverste leder har huset fullt av kontanter. Nå blir Norge med på ordningen som tvinger henne til det*

¹³¹ Forsythe(2012), p.203


¹³² Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.53-55

¹³³ Norad(2022), *Statistics and results*

expression organisations, support for the establishment of national human rights institutions, organising art exhibitions and taking part in conferences or research projects”.¹³⁴

In the National budget for 2022, almost 900 million NOK were allocated directly to human rights measures. About 200 million were allocated to the OHCHR, whereas 700 million will be allocated to human rights projects, decided by the MFA.¹³⁵ The MFA granted access to a summary of all human rights allocations for 2020. It shows that 659 million NOK were granted to 182 different partners or projects, mainly in 29 specific countries and 7 regions. However, the biggest allocations went to global organisations or projects, channelled through UNESCO, ILO, International Media Support, the University of Oslo, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance among others.¹³⁶

The MFA further granted access to a summary that shows that Norway’s donations to the OHCHR have steadily increased since 2009. According to the OHCHR’s annual reports, Norway was the largest donor country to the organisation in 2014 and 2018. Additionally, Norway has been among the top four donor countries every year between 2013 and 2021.¹³⁷



¹³⁴ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.90-91

¹³⁵ Prop.1S(2021-2022), Utenriksdepartementet, p.118-124

¹³⁶ See Annex 5

¹³⁷ OHCHR(2013-2021), *Annual reports*

When asked about what she views as the most fundamental instrument in Norway's foreign policy on human rights, Hubert says "by being clear and consistent, both in our dialogue with other states and in the way we use funds to support human rights work": She emphasises that Norway's human rights funding is results-oriented, with a thematic focus on human rights as laid out in the national budget:

"Whereas it sometimes may be difficult to measure the results of political dialogue, we can measure clear results from our funding. By providing funds at the country-level or channelling it through UN organisations, we save lives, influence legislation that provides rights for a population, and strengthen courts and access to free legal assistance that secure the realisation of the rights. If you do not have the funds, it may easily be just talk".

5.4.2.1 Suspension of Aid

In the 2015 white paper, the government stated that the 'starting point' is cooperation with authorities in countries that receive financial support from Norway, such as development aid or EEA Grants. However, in some cases it must take a more confrontational approach, it said.¹³⁸ The government may "reduce the amount of aid to a country or advise the business sector against investing or trading with specific countries".¹³⁹

Additionally, it said "the progress, or lack of it, in a country's human rights situation will have a 'substantial effect' on how the government organises development cooperation with the country and the amount of economic support is to be given".¹⁴⁰ If a country's human rights situation worsens over time, the government may reduce its support or channel it through different sources, like the civil society or the UN system. However, it stated it must assess the individual cases thoroughly and include local partners in the assessment, as reduced development cooperation may worsen the situation for the most vulnerable.¹⁴¹

Suspension of development aid and financial support is not a common policy instrument in Norway's human rights policies. However, it has happened in some occasions. In 2014,

¹³⁸ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.90

¹³⁹ Ibid, p.91

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.55

¹⁴¹ Ibid

President Museveni of Uganda ratified a law imposing severe penalties against “homosexual behaviour”. Norway’s then-foreign minister Brende reacted strongly and halted parts of Norwegian aid to Uganda. Additionally, Norway reorganised its aid by channelling more of it through civil society.¹⁴² Moreover, Norway has over the past years held back EEA Grants for Hungary as the parties did not agree on the appointment of an independent fund operator for civil society funding.¹⁴³

The informants who discussed aid suspension disagree on whether it is an effective tool.

Former development minister Solheim is very critical to negative economic means:

“Boycotts and sanctions rarely work. Threats about withdrawing aid are, in almost all cases, effectless. Then you presuppose that a brutal leader will care if his country receives some millions less in economic aid“

However, the former senior government official asserts that utilising Norway’s EEA grants is an essential mechanism to promote human rights. According to the former official, the halt of EEA grants has effectively pushed several Polish municipalities to abolish so-called “LGBT free zones.”

5.5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion of Hypotheses 2

As discussed above, Norway’s human rights policies include a broad range of policy instruments. Several factors influence whether the MFA decides to react to human rights violations, and which instruments it uses. However, based on the data, we can outline some main features:

First and foremost, a consideration is situational and may be influenced by factors such as Norway’s relations with the country, the precedence and the severeness of the human rights violations. Several informants confirm that there may be disagreements within the MFA, for instance, between those responsible for the bilateral relations with the country and the Section for Human Rights. Almost all informants underline that potential harm to human rights defenders, ethnic groups and minorities in the target country is an essential factor to the

¹⁴² Bakken&Soot-Ryen(2014), *Stanser deler av bistanden i homoprotest*

¹⁴³ EEA Grants(2021), *No agreement reached on funding for Hungary*

consideration. Additionally, predicted results and effects of a Norwegian reaction are central, not at least for the consideration between a public or confidential approach.

Human rights funding and development aid are essential instruments of Norway's policy. Norway's funding is directed to improve the human rights in several countries. Additionally, Norway's substantial development programme is organised to promote human rights. However, the data indicates that Norway rarely applies negative economic means as a policy instrument, especially unilateral means. Norway generally aligns itself with EU sanctions against countries and individuals that violate human rights. Unilateral economic sanctions are not common. However, Norway has on some occasions unilaterally, or with a couple of other countries, withdrawn development aid or EEA grants due to human rights.

Hypothesis 2: Norway will favour multilateral approaches over bilateral approaches to address human rights violations in other states.

With basis in Egeland's theory, we assumed that Norway would favour multilateral approaches to address human rights violations. The data indicate that this assumption mainly is correct. Policy documents and several informants highlight the importance of multilateral approaches as more effective than bilateral approaches. Additionally, multilateral approaches are associated with less costs to the bilateral relations. The UPR process stands out as an essential multilateral arena for the conduction of Norway's human rights policy.

Although the data mainly strengthen the hypothesis, it does not mean bilateral approaches are rare in Norway's human rights policies. The combination of bilateral and multilateral strategies is also highlighted. The informants underline that human rights often are on the agenda in bilateral meetings. Being able to have a constructive discussion about human rights issues is seen as an effective strategy. Quiet diplomacy is highlighted as an important tool when it is possible to initiate a constructive dialogue.

6 Dilemmas and Considerations in Norway's Human Rights Policy

6.1 Introductory remarks

Foreign policy practice is characterised by dilemmas in which different foreign policy objectives turn out to be incompatible. Decision-makers must choose between different alternatives that all have negative consequences. According to Baehr and Castermans-Holleman (2004), the human rights area is even more characterised by such dilemmas than foreign policymaking in general.¹⁴⁴ They point at two factors that cause the high number of dilemmas within the human rights policy.

First, “a human rights policy may conflict with the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign governments”, they state. If a foreign government is responsible for gross human rights violations, “that will call for a response by those governments that emphasise human rights in their foreign policy”. However, criticism, and especially public criticism, may harm the bilateral relationship with the country.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the nature of promoting human rights in foreign policy is to deal with issues that some foreign governments view as part of their domestic affairs. This leads to a tension between the traditional views of non-interference in another sovereign state's internal affairs, which is still the main view of several states.¹⁴⁶

Second, a foreign policy on human rights implies a choice among priorities. “A government has to decide whether and when it will give higher priority to human rights over other foreign policy considerations”, they state.¹⁴⁷ These considerations may involve foreign policy areas such as security, economy, and development cooperation – and those considerations may conflict with each other.

This chapter will discuss dilemmas in Norway's foreign policy on human rights. There are many specific dilemmas that could have been discussed. However, I have chosen to

¹⁴⁴ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p.45

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.45-46

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.46

thoroughly address three specific dilemmas: Human rights promotion versus 1) the maintenance of friendly bilateral relations, 2) Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts and 3) economic interests and business promotion.

The first dilemma is chosen as it is given major emphasis in the literature, in Norway's policy documents and by the informants. Furthermore, a worsened bilateral relationship with a country may have implications for several different Norwegian interests. The second dilemma is chosen as it also was given emphasis by the informants and in the literature. Moreover, I find it interesting to discuss potential dilemmas between different objectives within Norway's policy of engagement. Lastly, the third dilemma is chosen as it directly addresses a so-called idealistic foreign policy objective (human rights promotion) versus a "realist" national interest (economic interests and business promotion). Both Egeland (1988) and a realist approach to international relations would predict a potential conflict of interest between those considerations.

6.2 Dilemma 1: Human Rights Promotion vs. the Maintenance of Friendly Bilateral Relations

The potential negative impact on the bilateral relationship with a country that is subject to human rights criticism are highlighted in literature, policy documents and by the informants. In the 1977 white paper, this dilemma was given major emphasis. The government stated it had to consider which impact a direct human rights reaction would have due to the "different nature of the governments around the world and their sensitiveness confronted with criticism".¹⁴⁸ It said that such considerations must include which impact a Norwegian reaction to human rights violations may have on the bilateral relationship with the target country and the potential damage to other Norwegian interests. Such considerations are challenging, it stressed. Additionally, it emphasised Norway's privileged positions and that criticism towards other countries, especially developing countries, might be viewed as an act of self-righteousness.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ St.meld.nr.93(1976-77), p.4

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.5

Whereas the 1977 white paper was remarkably transparent on the human rights dilemmas and potential costs for Norwegian interests when addressing human rights violations in other countries, such discussions were almost absent in the 1999 white paper. However, the government briefly stated it must weigh and prioritise different alternatives in its human rights policies, “including on the economic side”.¹⁵⁰ Negative means must be utilised with caution, and after individual considerations of the case, the government concluded.¹⁵¹

In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government thoroughly discussed foreign policy dilemmas. It stated that the reaction of some countries to what they will consider interference in internal affairs may be "breaking off political dialogue, introducing barriers to trade and investments, or actively opposing Norway's positions in international organisations".¹⁵² It further stressed that loud criticism may "provoke some states and result in the authorities breaking off the dialogue with Norway, thereby limiting the opportunities for exerting influence".¹⁵³

The consequences of human rights policies can thus be harmful for Norway’s international influence and for Norwegian trade and business, the government suggested. However, it stated “short-term costs are sometimes necessary to accept in order to promote long-term goals”. Furthermore, it said “in a long-term perspective there should not be any contradiction between human rights on the one hand and political and economic considerations on the other”.¹⁵⁴

Several informants underline that “Norway’s human rights policies indeed may result in a worsened bilateral relationship with other countries. Former foreign minister Eriksen Søreide explains potential consequences:

“It may have a very direct cost as the bilateral relations with a country become more demanding. Sometimes it may not be a change that happens overnight but takes the

¹⁵⁰ St.meld.nr.21(1999-2000), p.110

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.107-108

¹⁵² Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.99

¹⁵³ Ibid, p.99-100

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p.99

form of less cooperation over time. However, it is a calculated risk we are willing to take with our major human rights focus in Norway's foreign policy.”

In other cases, Norway may experience direct costs related to human rights policies. According to Eriksen Søreide, that happened in the relations with Hungary after Norway's decision to hold back EEA Grants. Although Hungary had proclaimed they would support Norway's candidature for a seat in the UNSC for 2021-2022, they did not keep their promise in the UNGA vote in June 2020. Eriksen Søreide says that the Hungarian side told her this was due to the disagreement on EEA grants.

As Baehr & Castermans-Holleman suggested, the former senior government official confirms that different considerations can pull in different directions in decision-making processes on human rights policies:

“The major consideration is to what extent you are willing to worsen the bilateral relationship. Norwegian interests in a bilateral relation may consist of several different elements. You do not necessarily consider the consequences for specific interests but for the overall burden to the bilateral relationship. It is always difficult for Norway to have outright bad relations with several countries. To achieve Norwegian foreign policy goals, we need good relations with many countries.”

Former development minister Solheim also confirms that the human rights policies may have costs for Norway as the bilateral relationship with a country may weaken. “That may lead to worse conditions for Norwegian industry or businesses that want to invest and for Norwegian civil society to operate”, he says.

However, to what extent does a potential negative cost to the bilateral relations with a country influence Norway's policies and will to criticise? When asked if the MFA considers which approaches will have the least costs for Norwegian interests in decision-making processes, Eriksen Søreide says “In the cases that have been on my table, the focus has been on the issue and results”. She adds that she does not at all experience “a major cost-analysis to Norwegian interests” in such processes.

Former development minister Solheim is of another belief. When asked about significant Norwegian interests in a country affect Norway's will to push a human rights agenda, he says:

“It is indeed easier to push human rights towards a small African country that nobody has any knowledge about. Norway has been remarkably unwilling to push a human

rights agenda towards the Gulf States, to which we sell loads of weapons. If you based the relations between Saudi Arabia and Norway on human rights, it would have been challenging to sell them weapons”.

6.2.1 Preconditions: Expected Criticism and a Consistent Human Rights Policy

Several informants emphasise that there are some preconditions that can help reduce the costs to the bilateral relations: Consistent policies and expected criticism. The question of consistency refers to whether a state reacts equally to similar situations. Baehr and Castermans-Holleman state that it is commonly assumed that the most persuasive human rights policy is the consistent one.¹⁵⁵ However, they claim that there always will be some manner of inconsistency.¹⁵⁶ The former senior government official emphasises that a consistent policy is essential:’

“In order to have a human rights policy that delivers results, and reduces the bilateral cost, it is essential to conduct a consistent policy. You cannot treat countries differently. If you do that, it may be risky and lead to a higher political cost”.

The former official claims that the Norwegian human rights policy indeed is consistent. Moreover, the former official says that human rights criticism may be expressed at an expected low cost for Norway if the criticism is expected. However, if the criticism is raised unexpectedly, the official says that may lead to a strong backlash. As mentioned in chapter 5, the former official emphasises the importance of the UPR hearings as Norway “can express harsh criticism at a known cost, often a low one, because all countries expect criticism”.

Former foreign minister Eriksen Søreide also underlines the importance of consistency and expected criticism. She claims that Norway’s human rights policy is consistent:

“We criticise the USA for using the death penalty, and we criticise Iran for using the death penalty. Additionally, Norway’s positions should not come as a surprise to anyone. The Chinese know perfectly well our view on Xinjiang and Hong Kong. If we publish a statement or participate in a joint initiative, it will not surprise them.”

¹⁵⁵ Baehr&Castermans-Holleman(2004), p. 65

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 68

Again, former development minister Solheim is the odd one out among the informants. He says that Norway's human rights policy "absolutely" is inconsistent. "If the degree of human rights violations in a country should be the deciding factor for Norway's reactions, it is indeed inconsistent", he says.

6.3 Dilemma 2: Human Rights Promotion vs. Peace and Reconciliation Efforts

Human rights promotion and peace and reconciliation efforts are two elements of Norway's policy of engagement. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the government argues that the policy of engagement is based on "an altruistic desire to promote the common interests of mankind". However, as Carvalho & Lie (2014) suggest, this policy also gives Norwegian politicians and diplomats access to important international areas of influence.

Norway has been engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts with a number of countries. Over the past years, these include Colombia, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Sudan, among others.¹⁵⁷ The MFA emphasises that Norway is an *impartial* facilitator in such processes.¹⁵⁸ However, literature suggests that combining a role as a human right promoter and an impartial peace facilitator may be demanding: Prior to the 2009 white paper on Norwegian interests, the background report *National interests – Foreign policy for a globalised world* was published.¹⁵⁹ The report discussed several Norwegian foreign policy dilemmas. One of them concerned Norway's role as a peace nation versus its human rights activism.

The report claimed that a challenge of the "policy of engagement" might be conflicting values and principles. "More often than we are willing to admit, the policy of engagement is concerned with tensions and competition between different interests", it suggested.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, it stated that maybe the most deciding tension is between the interests of Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts and Norway's role and self-understanding as a "robust guardian and champion for the promotion of human rights". Whereas Norway's role

¹⁵⁷ MFA(2019a), *Norway's engagement in peace processes since 1993*

¹⁵⁸ MFA(2019b), *Hallmarks of Norway's peace and reconciliation work*

¹⁵⁹ Lunde et.al.(2008), *Norske interesser. Utenrikspolitik for en globalisert verden*

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p.205-206

within peace diplomacy presupposes pragmatism and caution towards the parties, the report stated that human rights policies often imply activism - and loudly and direct criticism.¹⁶¹

According to the report, this raises particularly three dilemmas: How can Norway sustain its role and reputation as an impartial mediator and third party, and at the same time react clearly towards actors and states that violate fundamental human rights? How should Norway balance public human rights work and quiet diplomacy? Moreover, how should Norway emphasise the desire for a quick solution to peace and reconciliation on the one side and the desire for just peace processes in which the parties respect ethical principles on the other side?¹⁶²

In the 2015 white paper on human rights, the government addressed this dilemma. It stated that building trust between parties to a conflict is critical in peace and reconciliation processes. Consequently, “Norwegian authorities are usually required to keep a long-term perspective, and must sometimes show restraint in terms of publicly calling for perpetrators to be brought to justice, or condemning one of the parties to the conflict, on account of Norway’s role as facilitator”, it concluded.¹⁶³ On the other hand, it stated that in peace and reconciliation efforts, “Norway is always a driving force for ensuring that human rights are included in the negotiations”.

Norway’s engagement as a facilitator in the talks between Venezuelan government and opposition highlights this dilemma. In her speech to the UNGA General Debate in September 2021, then Norwegian Prime minister Solberg said “(...)We are seeing grave human rights violations in many parts of the world. In Venezuela. The atrocities and conflict in Tigray (...)”.¹⁶⁴ The comments led to a temporarily crisis in the talks. According to a report from Norwegian broadcaster NRK, Venezuelan officials were furious and temporarily halted the talks.¹⁶⁵ Norway’s chief negotiator Dag Nylander expressed that the speech could weaken Norway’s role as an impartial facilitator.¹⁶⁶ Through a tweet, the MFA emphasised that “the recent statement in the UN” should not be interpreted as inconsistent with Norway’s

¹⁶¹ Lunde(2008), p.206

¹⁶² Ibid, p.206

¹⁶³ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.99

¹⁶⁴ Solberg(2021), *UNGA: General Debate – National Statement of Norway*

¹⁶⁵ Tvegård(2021), *Dette er krisene Norge møter i Venezuela-forhandlingene*

¹⁶⁶ NRK(2021), *Reaksjoner mot Solbergs tale i FN*

commitment to the talks and role as an impartial facilitator.¹⁶⁷ “It was an intense work for 48 hours. Luckily, we managed to bring them back”, Nylander told NRK.¹⁶⁸

When asked if Norway’s role in peace processes limit the possibility to being critical about human rights violations from parties to the process, former state secretary Larsen says that “it did maybe limit us concerning the publicity around it, but I did not find it limiting in general.”. She emphasises that Norway takes an important role in raising human rights issues and including those in the agreements. However, she underlines:

“With Norway’s role in such processes, it is maybe not Norway that should be the one taking a public role in pushing these issues internationally. There could be better and more effective channels and role for Norway.”

6.4 Dilemma 3: Human Rights Promotion vs. Economic Interests and the Promotion of Business Interests

The promotion of Norway’s business interests abroad has always been a key task of the MFA. The Ministry states the Foreign Service Missions are the most important resource in helping the Norwegian business sector. The MFA states that the missions can provide “access to networks and information about local conditions, as well as advice about matters such as security and corporate social responsibility”.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the missions can open doors and provide access to useful networks and potential partners, coordinating events, providing information about markets and local conditions, and putting companies in touch with the right authorities in matters that require approval. Additionally, the MFA can assist companies with problems related to their operations “where it is appropriate for the Norwegian authorities to do so”.¹⁷⁰

In the 2009 white paper on Norway’s foreign policy interests, the government discussed human rights dilemmas concerning Norwegian businesses abroad. “Norwegian investments in petroleum operations and other areas in countries with authoritarian regimes can entail

¹⁶⁷ Tvegård(2021)

¹⁶⁸ ibid

¹⁶⁹ MFA(2015a), *Promoting Norwegian business interests abroad*

¹⁷⁰ ibid

challenges for Norway in its effort to promote democracy, human rights and development”, the government stated.¹⁷¹ It suggested that partially state-owned companies' activities may give rise to dilemmas. "In such cases, we may be faced with conflicting interests, both of which are important for Norway". The government predicted that the number of such dilemmas and conflicts of interests would rise in the coming years, as the Norwegian petroleum industry was increasing its international activity. The government observed a particular increase "in parts of the world without democratic governance, and where there are significant violations of human rights".¹⁷²

The 2015 white paper on human rights also addressed the human rights and business dilemma. The government stated that Norway's relationship with developing countries to a lesser extent concerned development cooperation, and to a greater extent, concerned a reciprocal economic and political relationship. It stated that some of the fastest-growing economies of the world, which are those Norwegian companies were increasingly focusing on and establishing themselves in, had bad governance and poorly developed legislation for human rights.¹⁷³

In the white paper, the government called on the companies to integrate CSR into their business strategies. Moreover, it said it expected Norwegian companies to follow the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.¹⁷⁴ The government acknowledged it had a responsibility towards Norwegian companies operating abroad. It would take its responsibility, for instance, by promoting the UN principles and providing information and guidance to Norwegian companies.¹⁷⁵ In 2015, the government launched a national action plan on business and human rights. The action plan put forth a set of expectations to Norwegian companies regarding human rights, CSR and environmental considerations. Moreover, the government stated its intentions to follow up several measures to integrate human rights in the business sector.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ St.meld.nr.15(2008-09), p.119

¹⁷² Ibid, p.118

¹⁷³ Meld.St.10(2014-15), p.57

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p.59

¹⁷⁵ Ibid

¹⁷⁶ MFA(2015b), *National action plan on business and human rights*

Regardless of position and party affiliation, the informants have a positive attitude towards Norwegian business operating abroad. Former development minister Solheim says:

“I am possibly naïve. However, my clear perception is that Norwegian businesses almost exclusively are a good factor in such countries. They have higher standards for the environment, human rights, and child labour than normal. When they are present in Brazil, they will not lower the standard but increase it”.

Former foreign minister Eriksen Søreide is asked about the same topic: How does Norway organise its policies towards countries where Norway has multiple interests? Such as countries with major human rights challenges where major Norwegian companies are present? Eriksen Søreide says she thinks there is a growing awareness among Norwegian companies in general about their responsibility:

“In several cases, we also see companies making decisions to pull out of a country. We have clear expectations for Norwegian businesses, either they are partially state-owned or if they are fully private. That includes which guidelines they ought to follow, how they ought to work against human rights violations, and how they can be a positive factor to strengthen human rights. Zero tolerance towards corruption has become fundamental among Norwegian companies.”

Eriksen Søreide says there is a growing trend that big Norwegian companies abroad use their positions to push for a positive change for human rights in the country they operate. She refers to partially state-owned Yara’s work in Belarus to improve workers’ rights, although it has led to conflicts with the Belarusian government.

However, what if Norway’s effort to promote human rights in a country and Norwegian business interests do not pull in the same direction? What if human rights criticism towards a country may worsen the conditions for Norwegian business? Does that make it less likely that Norway will address human rights violations? The former government official clearly states that it does not:

“When we establish our human rights policies, business interests are not on the table. I have not experienced that our human rights criticism has been weakened because we

have major economic interests in a country. In general, I think there are few conflicts between business interests and human rights. Balancing them is quite straightforward”.

The former official refers to the incident when the Belarusian government forced down a commercial flight in May 2021 and arrested the political activist Roman Protasevich. Then foreign minister Eriksen Søreide said the incident was “shocking” and “unacceptable” and called for the immediate release of the activist.¹⁷⁷ According to the former official, Norway reacted strongly although potential costs by condemning the Belarusian government could be a more difficult situation for Norwegian business interests, and less cooperation with Belarus in international forums. Partially state-owned Yara is among the Norwegian companies that have major interests in Belarus.

Former state secretary Larsen says that she does not view decision-making processes on human rights that include business interests as a “scale- pan”:

“Norway’s values and interests in relations with a country may have several dimensions. However, it is not like having business interests on the one side and human rights on the other and deciding on what we will prioritise. It is about how we can safeguard both interests”.

6.4.1 The Case of Brazil: Business Promotion and Rainforest Protection

As mentioned in chapter 2, the Norwegian Embassy in Brasilia is a subsidiary study unit as it is an interesting case in the context of business promotion and human rights. Brazil is a country in which Norway has multiple interests. On the one hand, Brazil is the most important country in Latin America for Norway’s business interests. Over a hundred Norwegian companies operate in the country.¹⁷⁸ These include partially state-owned companies such as Hydro, Equinor and Yara. On the other hand, Brazil has over the past decade been one of the most important partners in Norway’s development programme. Through the Climate and Rainforest Initiative, Norway has allocated billions of NOK to rainforest protection and civil society and indigenous groups, including to human rights promotion.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Hagfors et.al(2021), *Fly med opposisjonell aktivist tvunget til å lande i Hviterussland. –Sjokkerende, sier Søreide*

¹⁷⁸ Innovasjon Norge(2022), *Internasjonal satsing og eksport til Brasil*

¹⁷⁹ Gjerstad&Oterholm(2019), *Norge stanser regnskogspenger til Brasil*

However, the past years have been challenging for Norway's cooperation with Brazil. The Bolsonaro government, which has been in power since January 2019, is fundamentally critical of Norway's rainforest engagement. In August 2019, Norway suspended its financial support to the Amazon Fund after the Bolsonaro government unilaterally closed its steering committee.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, in 2018, the Embassy was involved in the management of an environmental crisis involving the aluminium refinery of partially state-owned Hydro in Barcarena in the Amazon.

How does a Norwegian embassy work to promote human rights under such circumstances? How does it combine the safeguarding of Norwegian business interests and human rights promotion? Have any dilemmas arisen in the work?

Former ambassador Gunneng (2017-2021) says the Embassy worked on human rights issues by raising it in political conversations "when possible and relevant" and funding civil society organisations that work on human rights. He does not believe Norway's human rights efforts had any direct consequences for Norway. However, he emphasises:

"We received negative feedback from state representatives, but they never requested us to discontinue any programmes. In Brazil in general, there is significant scepticism towards any foreign interference and foreign support to civil society, including Norway's support. That is something we have to consider."

Gunneng points at the freeze of the Amazon fund when asked about how the Bolsonaro government affected the Embassy's work. Other than that, he says it did not have any other direct consequences for the ongoing work. "However, the political result is that this government is fundamentally skeptical about the Climate and Forest Initiative. This means there was much less room for new bilateral initiatives", he says.

Gunneng says that many would think there are inherent dilemmas when Norway simultaneously promotes business interests and is engaged in climate and forest matters. He asserts it is a positive thing that a trade and oil-based economy also make significant environmental efforts. "However, it has consequences as opponents of Norway's Climate and

¹⁸⁰ Gjerstad&Oterholm(2019)

Forest Initiative have questioned the genuineness of our efforts”, he says.¹⁸¹ Bolsonaro himself responded to Norway’s freeze of the Amazon Fund by claiming that Norway “extracts oil on the North pole”.¹⁸²

Former Norwegian special envoy for Climate and Forest Santos-Nedrelid (2016-2019) says "I believe Norwegian businesses in Brazil generally are a positive factor. They are concerned with sustainable development, fighting corruption and local job creation". None of the two informants points at any factors that would indicate that Norway gives less priority to human rights promotion because of business interests.¹⁸³

However, Santos-Nedrelid comes up with an interesting observation that happened after the Hydro environmental crisis in 2018: “The Brazilian public viewed Norway and Hydro as "one unit. It was difficult to explain Hydro's independence as a private enterprise when the Norwegian government partially owned it. It was framed as an act by Norway in the press and social media”, she says. Moreover, Santos-Nedrelid says that the Climate and Forest Initiative was involved from day one. Norway’s engagement in Brazil was portrayed as hypocritical.

According to Santos-Nedrelid, the Hydro crisis had far-reaching consequences for the Norwegian engagement, including the human rights efforts: "It was demanding for several of our partners as they had to defend their partnership with Norway. That included NGOs and indigenous groups". Santos-Nedrelid adds: “The Hydro crisis damaged Norway's reputation in Brazil. At least in the short term. That included the Norwegian forest cooperation and the Norwegian businesses in general”.

6.5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion of Hypotheses 3

The data indicate that the MFA indeed perceive dilemmas between human rights promotion and other foreign policy considerations in the decision-making processes. Several informants emphasise the potential consequences for the bilateral relations with a country that is subject for human rights criticism. A bilateral relationship consists of several dimension. A worsened

¹⁸¹ Nils Gunneng was interviewed in November 2021. He was Norway’s ambassador to Brazil (2017-2021).

¹⁸² Kolberg&Grut(2019), *Brasils president anklager Norge for blodige hvaldrap*

¹⁸³ Gunhils Santos-Nedrelid was interviewed in November 2021.

relationship may have consequences for Norway's influence and possibility to achieve other foreign policy objectives. However, the informants disagree on the extent to how costs to the bilateral relationship and other foreign policy interests are emphasised in decision-making processes. Moreover, several informants stress the importance of conducting a consistent human rights policy in to reduce the bilateral costs. If Norwegian criticism is expected, that will likely have small costs, several informants assert.

Moreover, the data indicate there is a dilemma between Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts and human rights promotion. Publicly criticising one of the parties to peace process can be in a direct conflict with Norway's role as an impartial facilitator. However, I do not have strong enough data to come up with a general conclusion.

Hypothesis 3: Norway is less likely to address human rights violations in another state when it may cause a considerable cost to economic interests.

With basis in realist assumptions and Egeland's theory, we assumed that Norway was less likely to address human rights violations when it may cause considerable costs to economic interests. However, the data do not support this claim. Regardless of position and party affiliation, the informants have a positive attitude towards Norwegian business operating abroad. Moreover, several informants assert that business interests are not on the table in decision-making processes on human rights policies. Additionally, the informants do not believe there are major dilemmas between human rights and economic and business interests.

The data collected from the case of Norway's engagement in Brazil, where strong business interests are present, do neither support the hypotheses. However, the findings from Brazil indicate that business interests and human rights do not exist in two separate worlds. Opponents of Norwegian engagement may utilise Norway's trade and oil interests as arguments to discredit environmental and human rights efforts. Additionally, the bad reputation of Norwegian business may have costs for other Norwegian interests, such as the human rights work.

7 Conclusion

This thesis has discussed different dimensions of Norway's foreign policy objective on human rights promotion. Through an extensive document analysis and semi-structured interviews with diplomats and politicians, I have addressed several research questions and hypotheses. Whereas the data are strong enough to indicate clear answers to some research questions and hypotheses, there is need of more research to address other questions.

The first research question addresses Norway's motivation by making human rights promotion an independent foreign policy goal. The data suggest that the government's reasoning for this policy goal has changed over the past decades. From being grounded in idealism and moral duty until the 1990s, the government has since claimed that human rights promotion is essential to achieve other foreign policy objectives. Those include peace, stability, poverty reduction and development. Several informants stress that promoting human rights is important to uphold a rights-based world order and the fundamentals of multilateralism, which is an essential Norwegian interest. Several informants also state that Norway's human rights work may contribute to building alliances, connections and give access to areas of influence. Consequently, human rights promotion may contribute to achieving other foreign policy objectives.

The second research question addresses how the MFA considers if and how to react to human rights violations in other states – and which policy instruments it favours. The data suggest that MFA's assessment is situational. There may be different considerations within the Ministry on if and how Norway should react, for instance, between the Section for Human Rights and those responsible for the bilateral relations with the country. Factors that are considered are Norway's relations with the target country, the precedence and the severeness of the human rights violations. Potential harm for individuals or groups by a Norwegian reaction is highlighted as an important consideration. Moreover, predicted results and effects are central in the assessment process.

I have found data that indicate that Norway favours multilateral rather than bilateral approaches to address human rights violations in other countries. Multilateral approaches are highlighted as more effective. Additionally, there may be fewer costs for Norway when acting

with other countries. Norway rarely applies unilateral negative economic means, such as sanctions and withdrawal of aid and economic support. However, the informants underline that human rights often are on the agenda in bilateral meetings. Being able to initiate a constructive human rights dialogue with a country is seen as an effective approach when possible. A multilateral strategy does not exclude a bilateral one – and vice versa.

The third research question addresses whether the MFA perceives dilemmas between the promotion of human rights and other foreign policy interests. The data indicate that the MFA does perceive dilemmas between human rights promotion and other foreign policy considerations. The further data indicate that the most important consideration is negative consequences for the overall bilateral relationship with a country. A bilateral relationship may consist of several elements and dimension. A worsened relationship may have far-reaching consequences for several Norwegian interests and Norway's possibility to achieve other foreign policy goal.

Moreover, the data indicate that there is a dilemma between Norway's human rights work and peace and reconciliation efforts. Publicly criticising one of the parties to peace process can be in a direct conflict with Norway's role as an impartial facilitator. Additionally, the data indicate that economic interests are not important to Norway's human rights considerations. Moreover, several informants assert that business interests are not on the table in decision-making processes on human rights policies. Additionally, the informants do not believe there are major dilemmas between human rights and economic and business interests in general.

However, the data indicate that business interests and human rights considerations do not exist in two separate worlds. Data from Brazil show that opponents of Norwegian engagement may utilise Norway's trade and oil interests as arguments to discredit environmental and human rights efforts. Additionally, the bad reputation of Norwegian business may have costs for other Norwegian interests, such as the human rights work.

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Annex 1 – List of Informants

Name	Position
Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide (Conservative Party)	Minister of Foreign Affairs (2017-2021), Minister of Defence (2013-2017), Chair of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (2009-2013, 2021-)
Former Senior Government Official	Anonymous.
Gry Larsen (Labour Party)	State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009-2013), Political Advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005-2009)
Erik Solheim (Socialist Left Party)	Minister of Development (2005-2007), Minister of Development and Environment (2007-2012)
Claire Annette Hubert	Assistant Director General of the Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender Equality (2019-)
Nils Martin Gunneng	Ambassador of Norway in Brazil (2017-2021)
Gunhild Santos-Nedrelid	Special Envoy for Climate and Forest, Embassy of Norway in Brazil (2016-2019)

Annex 2 – Information Letter to Informants

Informasjonsbrev om forskningsprosjektet:

Når utenrikspolitiske interesser møtes: Norges mål om å fremme menneskerettigheter i møte med andre norske interesser

Bakgrunn og formål

Prosjektet er en masteroppgave ved Norsk senter for menneskerettigheter, som ligger under Juridisk fakultet ved Universitetet i Oslo. Oppgaven er todelt.

Den første delen tar sikte på å beskrive og diskutere fremme av menneskerettigheter som et selvstendig mål og -interesse i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Denne delen vil ta for seg den historiske utviklingen av dette utenrikspolitiske målet, blant annet gjennom tre ulike stortingsmeldinger om menneskerettigheter i utenrikspolitikken (1977, 1999 og 2015), andre policy-dokumenter og i stortingsdebatter. Denne delen vil også ta for seg hvilke arenaer som benyttes for fremme av MR. I tillegg vil målet om fremme av menneskerettigheter diskuteres opp mot andre norske interesser, samt potensielle dilemmaer som kan oppstå mellom de ulike interessene.

Den andre delen vil utforske hvordan det i utenrikstjenesten arbeides med fremme av menneskerettigheter *i praksis*. Her søker jeg å undersøke hvordan det arbeides med fremme av MR i det daglige, hvilke utfordringer man møter i arbeidet og hvordan fremme av MR vektet dersom det oppstår dilemmaer. Her vil det særlig undersøkes hvordan utenrikspolitikken innrettes overfor land der Norge både har store handels- og næringsinteresser – og hvor det også er MR-utfordringer. Tidsrommet som studeres er perioden 2005-2021, under Stoltenberg II-regjeringen og Solberg-regjeringen.

Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet?

Universitetet i Oslo er ansvarlig for prosjektet. Andreas Lindquist Haakonsen utfører forskningsprosjektet, mens professor Bård Anders Andreassen fungerer som veileder.

Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta?

Intervjuene vil gjøres med en rekke personer (informanter) som har vært en del av politisk ledelse i Utenriksdepartementet under Stoltenberg- og Solberg-regjeringene fra 2005 til 2021. I tillegg vil det gjøres intervjuer av nøkkelpersoner i utenrikstjenesten med innsikt i det daglige arbeidet rundt fremme av menneskerettigheter og/eller som innehar/har innehatt en posisjon i utenrikstjenesten som gjør at personen sitter på relevant erfaring for oppgavens tematikk.

Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?

Deltakelse innebærer å stille opp på intervju. Som informant står du fritt til å avstå fra å svare på enkelte spørsmål – og du kan også trekke frem relevante momenter på eget initiativ. Jeg vil også be om samtykke for å gjøre opptak av intervjuet, både med tanke på å lette etterarbeidet og ha fullstendig tilstedeværelse i intervjusituasjonen.

Ved bruk av sitater, vil du få tilsendt sitatet som ønskes brukt på forhånd, slik at dette kan godkjennes eller avslås. Du kan selv velge om ditt navn kan brukes i oppgaven ved publisering. Dersom du takker ja til et intervju, men ikke ønsker at navnet ditt fremkommer, vil eventuelle sitater bli brukt på en måte som gjør at det ikke er mulig å identifisere deg.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Det vil kun være jeg som har tilgang på opptaket. Opptaket vil transkriberes, og deretter slettes, kort tid etter intervjuet. Transkripsjon vil lagres i et eget dokument, adskilt fra navneliste.

Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes i januar 2022. Transkripsjonen arkiveres frem til oppgaven er godkjent. Deretter vil transkripsjon og personopplysninger slettes.

Det er frivillig å delta

Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykket tilbake uten å oppgi årsak. Alle dine personopplysninger vil da bli slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger

Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene om deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?

Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke.

På oppdrag fra Universitetet i Oslo har NSD (Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS) vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Dine rettigheter

Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- innsyn i hvilke opplysninger vi behandler om deg, og å få utlevert en kopi av opplysningene
- å få rettet opplysninger om deg som er feil eller misvisende
- å få slettet personopplysninger om deg
- å sende klage til Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger

Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer?

Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å vite mer om eller benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:

- Universitetet i Oslo, ved professor Bård Anders Andreassen:
b.a.andreassen@nchr.uio.no
- Personvernombud ved Universitet i Oslo, Roger Markgraf-Bye:
personvernombud@uio.no

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til NSD sin vurdering av prosjektet, kan du ta kontakt med:

- NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller på telefon: 55 58 21 17.

Med vennlig hilsen

Andreas Lindquist Haakonsen

Mastergradsstudent ved The Theory and Practice of Human Rights, Universitetet i Oslo

Telefon: 90865822. E-post: andreashaa@gmail.com

Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet *Når utenrikspolitiske interesser møtes: Norges mål om å fremme menneskerettigheter i møte med andre norske interesse*, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- Å delta i intervju
- Opptak av intervjuet
- At mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Ved digitalt intervju eller ved telefonintervju, gis muntlig samtykke, og du trenger ikke huke av og signere fysisk på samtykkeerklæring.

Annex 3 – Interview Guide

(The following interview guide is an example of one of the guides that was used during the interviews)

Tema: Innledning

- Hvor lenge har du vært i din stilling?
- Hva er ansvarsområdene til seksjonen?
- Hvilke beslutninger er det seksjonen tar selv – og hva tas av politisk ledelse?

Tema: Menneskerettigheter som en utenrikspolitisk interesse (overordnet)

1. Fremme av menneskerettigheter er definert som et selvstendig utenrikspolitisk mål. Hvorfor er det sånn?

- Hva er det Norge tjener ved å fremme MR?
- Er det i Norges egeninteresse at MR kommer på dagsorden internasjonalt?

Tema: Verktøy for å fremme MR – og det daglige arbeidet

2. Hva tenker du er de viktigste arenaene og verktøyene Norge har i utenrikspolitikken for å fremme menneskerettigheter?

- Multilaterale arenaer?
- Bilaterale arenaer?
- Økonomiske bidrag/sanksjoner?

Tema: utfordringer og dilemmaer knyttet til MR

3. Hva er de største utfordringene Norge møter på i MR-arbeidet?

4. Hva kan være kostnadene for Norge ved å fremme MR i utenrikspolitikken?

- Skadelidende for andre norske interesser?
- Skadelidende for det bilaterale forholdet?

5. Hvis det har skjedd MR-brudd i et land som Norge vurderer å reagere på. Hvordan vurderer man om man skal fremme kritikk, i hvilket fora kritikken fremmes og hvilken form kritikken skal ta?

- Hva gjør det med en slik vurdering dersom det er snakk om et land med andre utenrikspolitiske interesser til stede, som sikkerhet eller handel, som kan bli skadelidende?

6. Tenderer Norge til å ville fremme MR-kritikk i multilaterale fora – og sammen med andre fremfor bilateralt? Hvorfor er det i så fall sånn?

7. Er Norge konsistente i sin MR-kritikk? (Reagerer man på samme måte overfor samme type MR-brudd, uavhengig av norske interesser i det landet og om det er en alliert eller ikke?)

Tema: Næringsfremme og MR

8. Det er en rekke land hvor det både er store norske handels- og næringsinteresser – og hvor det også er store MR-utfordringer. Hvordan innretter utenriktjenesten politikken overfor slike land? (Eksempler Angola, Brasil og Myanmar)

9. Er det noen utfordringer knyttet til både å skulle ivareta nærings- og handelsinteresser i et land – samtidig som man jobber med MR?

- Kan det også gi noen muligheter for Norges MR-arbeid at man er tungt inne med norsk næringsliv i et land?

10. En konkret situasjon som skjedde nylig er kuppet i Myanmar i februar 2021, og presset Telenor fikk på seg til å utlevere brukerdata til militærregimet. Hvordan jobbes det med en sånn sak fra norsk side?

11. Hvordan har det blitt jobbet med Brasil, der Bolsonaros politikk og retorikk kan gi en utfordring for MR – samtidig som Norge har vært tungt inne med regnskogssamarbeid, og hvor store norske selskaper opererer?

Tema: Diverse

12. I Erna Solbergs tale til FNs generalforsamling snakket hun om grove MR-brudd i Venezuela, noe som skapte utfordringer for Norges meklerrolle mellom partene i Venezuela. Hva tenker du det sier om norsk MR-politikk?

13. Et annet eksempel er da Norge, sammen med en rekke andre land, for en uke siden ba om løslatelsen av den tyrkiske aktivisten Osman Kavala – noe som førte til at Erdogan truet med å kaste ut den norske ambassadøren. Hva sier det om norsk MR-politikk?

14. En av få som har prøvd å lage en teori om utenriktjenestens MR-politikk er Jan Egeland. I boka «Impotent superpower – potent small state» fra 1989, der han sammenliknet Norge og USA, hevdet at små stater som Norge er i en bedre posisjon til å føre en konsistent og aktiv MR-politikk. Men han hevdet at det handlet om at Norge har færre interessekonflikter i utenrikspolitikken enn USA – og at dersom Norge først sto i en posisjon der egeninteresse og MR sto opp mot hverandre, ville også Norge prioritere egeninteresse. Hva tenker du om den analysen?

Innspill til videre arbeid

- Har du noe annet å legge til?

- Har du innspill til folk jeg bør snakke med?

Annex 4 – The Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s Assessment of the Project

NSD sin vurdering

Prosjekttittel

Masteroppgave

Referansenummer

643432

Registrert

05.10.2021 av Andreas Lindquist Haakonsen - andrhaak@uio.no

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon

Universitetet i Oslo / Det juridiske fakultet / Norsk senter for menneskerettigheter

Prosjektansvarlig (vitenskapelig ansatt/veileder eller stipendiat)

Bård Anders Andreassen, b.a.andreassen@nchr.uio.no, tlf: 97486486

Type prosjekt

Studentprosjekt, masterstudium

Kontaktinformasjon, student

Andreas Lindquist Haakonsen, andreashaa@gmail.com, tlf: 90865822

Prosjektperiode

18.10.2021 - 31.01.2022

Status

13.10.2021 - Vurdert

Vurdering (1)

13.10.2021 - Vurdert

Det er vår vurdering at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet vil være i samsvar med personvernlovgivningen såfremt den gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet med vedlegg den 13.10.2021, samt i meldingsdialogen mellom innmelder og NSD. Behandlingen kan starte.

DEL PROSJEKTET MED PROSJEKTANSVARLIG

For studenter er det obligatorisk å dele prosjektet med prosjektansvarlig (veileder). Del ved å trykke på knappen «Del prosjekt» i menylinjen øverst i meldeskjemaet. Prosjektansvarlig bes akseptere invitasjonen innen en uke. Om invitasjonen utløper, må han/hun inviteres på nytt.

TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET

Prosjektet vil behandle alminnelige kategorier av personopplysninger frem til 31.01.2022.

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG

Prosjektet vil innhente samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Vår vurdering er at prosjektet legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 og 7, ved at det er en frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utvetydig bekreftelse som kan dokumenteres, og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake.

Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER

NSD vurderer at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om:

- lovlighet, rettferdighet og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykker til behandlingen
- formålsbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samles inn for spesifikke, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke behandles til nye, uforenlige formål
- dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet
- lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet

DE REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER

Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet vil de ha følgende rettigheter: innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), og dataportabilitet (art. 20).

NSD vurderer at informasjonen om behandlingen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13.

Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER

NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1. f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og/eller rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

Ved bruk av databehandler (spørreskjemaleverandør, skylagring eller videosamtale) må behandlingen oppfylle kravene til bruk av databehandler, jf. art 28 og 29. Bruk leverandører som din institusjon har avtale med.

MELD VESENTLIGE ENDRINGER

Dersom det skjer vesentlige endringer i behandlingen av personopplysninger, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. Før du melder inn en endring, oppfordrer vi deg til å lese om hvilke type endringer det er nødvendig å melde: <https://www.nsd.no/personverntjenester/fylle-ut-meldeskjema-for-personopplysninger/melde-enderinger-i-meldeskjema>

Du må vente på svar fra NSD før endringen gjennomføres.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET

NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!

Annex 5 – Norway’s Human Right Funding in 2020

Granted by the MFA upon request in January 2022.

Tittel	Avtalepartner	Land	Hovedsektor	Undersektor	2020 (NOK)
Human Rights Training Project 2017 - 21	The Governance Group AS	Angola	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 301 358
Ensuring capacity for human rights defenders to promote accountability	EHAHRDP - East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project	Burundi	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	5 000 000
Strengthening civil society in Brazil through implementation of UPR/SDG	IDDH - Instituto de Desenvolvimento e Direitos Humanos	Brasil	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	200 000
Educating in Human Rights, Promoting their Enforcement Phase 2	IIDH - Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos	Nord- og Sentral- Amerika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 500 000
Support to the Institutional Strategic Plan of CEJIL Mesoamerica 2019-22	CEJIL - Centre for Justice and International Law	Nord- og Sentral- Amerika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 300 000
Monitoring Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights in C.A	OAS - Organization of American States	Nord- og Sentral- Amerika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 700 000
Strengthening the jurisdictional and communicational capacities of the IACtHR	CIIDH - Inter-American Court of Human Rights	Nord- og Sentral- Amerika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	30 - Legal and judicial development	2 500 000
Dui Hua core support 2020-2021	The Dui Hua Foundation	Kina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 375 000

Justice for Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia	CCJ - Comision Colombiana de Juristas	Colombia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 000 000
Women leaders and defenders prevention and protection programme	UN Women	Colombia	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	7 446 013
Programa Somos Defensores (We are Defenders Programme)	La Asociación Minga	Colombia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	657 019
Transitioning to a rainbow peace: LGBTI people building peace in Colombia	Caribe Afirmativo	Colombia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 000 000
Sexual and reproductive rights and prevention of sexual abuse, Matanzas	Centro Cristiano de Reflexión y Dialogo	Cuba	151 - Government and civil society, general	80 - Ending violence against women and girls	41 693
Strengthening core activities of Cuban independent information platform	Fundacja Wspolnota wielu Glosow	Cuba	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	304 644
Caritas Norway's Cuba project 2020	Caritas Norge	Cuba	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	2 200 000
Culture and Film Project Support Cuba 2020	Undefined	Cuba	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 184 975
First Film Forum	Seen Films	Egypt	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	540 000

Makan - folk music as cultural heritage	ECCA - Egyptian Center for Culture and Arts	Egypt	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	360 000
"Towards a community consensus against FGM and Early Marriage"	Bless - Bishopric for Public, Ecumenical & Social Services	Egypt	151 - Government and civil society, general	80 - Ending violence against women and girls	1 461 044
Support to the Government of Eritrea on Mainstreaming Human Rights/UPR	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Eritrea	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 000 000
Human Rights Teaching, Research and Community Service Activities	Addis Ababa University	Etiopia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 591 204
Human Rights Protection, Promotion of Good Governance & Peace Building	PFE - Prison Fellowship Ethiopia	Etiopia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	9 000 000
STRENGTHENING MAYA ART "CHOWEN PATAN SAMAJ"	Centro Cultural Sotz'il Jay	Guatemala	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	800 000
Enhancement of Human Rights Training and Policy in the Judicial Process	LeIP - Indonesian Institute for Independent Judiciary	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	435 000
Human Rights Small Scale Grants 2020	Undefined	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 729 118
Improving Capacity on Freedom of Religion or Belief within Media	SEJUK - Journalists Association for Diversity	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	435 113
Indonesia: where we are heading? Approaching a	UNAIR - Airlangga University	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil	60 - Human rights	67 746

decade of the UNGPs			society, general		
Strengthening Capacity and Knowledge of Young Human Rights Defenders on Transitional Justice in Indonesia	AJAR - Asian initiative on Justice and Rights	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	450 893
Rainbow Leadership Training Indonesia Batch 2	Arus Pelangi	Indonesia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	420 148
Peaceful Families and Communities	Iraqi Al-Amal Association	Irak	151 - Government and civil society, general	80 - Ending violence against women and girls	1 000 000
Creating new public spaces for women and youth engagement	Al-Quds Center for Political Studies	Jordan	151 - Government and civil society, general	80 - Ending violence against women and girls	2 000 000
Implementation of Jordan's National Plan for UN Resolution 1325	UN Women	Jordan	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 000 000
Strengthening the Right to Pay Equity and Childcare in Jordan	ILO - International Labour Organisation	Jordan	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	2 000 000
Battling Misinformation and Promoting Rights and Freedoms in Jordan Through Media Literacy	Jordan Media Institute	Jordan	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	1 000 000
InformAction - Building people power for	InformAction	Kenya	151 - Government and civil	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	1 750 000

Accountable Governance			society, general		
MUHURI - Social accountability and Civic Education Project	MUHURI - Muslims for Human Rights	Kenya	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	4 800 000
IMLU Support to Human Rights 2019-2021	Independent Medico-Legal Unit	Kenya	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 512 100
Strengthening the Work and protection of Human Rights Defenders	KI - Katiba Institute	Kenya	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 100 000
Strengthening Citizen Participation in Ward Governance	Friends of Lake Turkana	Kenya	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	888 709
Ni Mama Project - Support for Women Human Rights Defenders in Kenya	National coalition of human rights defenders - Kenya	Kenya	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 603 882
Arab Image Foundation	AIF - Arab Image Foundation	Libanon	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	650 000
Supporting the Lebanese Internal Security Forces in combating torture	DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance	Libanon	151 - Government and civil society, general	30 - Legal and judicial development	2 500 000
Mashreq Gender Facility	World Bank	Midtøsten regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	8 500 000
Cinematheque Beirut	Metropolis Cinema	Libanon	160 - Other social infrastructure	61 - Culture and recreation	650 000

			and services		
B&B International Music Festival and Development Program	Beirut and Beyond - international music festival	Libanon	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	500 000
Jouhouzia: safeguarding cultural heritage in crisis situation	Biladi	Libanon	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	700 000
Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Lebanon through Building Pathways for Dialogue and Inclusive Governance	UN Women	Libanon	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	2 000 000
UNDP Sri Lanka's Flagship Portfolio on SDG 16	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Sri Lanka	151 - Government and civil society, general	10 - Public sector policy and administrative management	5 000 000
KKV Freedom of Expression in Arts and Culture	KKV - Kirkelig Kulturverksted	Midtøsten regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 755 000
Beirut & Beyond International Music Festival 2017-2019	Oslo World Music Festival	Midtøsten regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	252 322
Artist mobility and freedom of expression in the Arab region 2018	AFAC - The Arab Fund for Arts and Culture	Midtøsten regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	3 500 000
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies - Human Rights Activities	CIHRS - Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies	Midtøsten regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 000 000
IMS MENA Media Cooperation	IMS - International Media Support	Midtøsten regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	4 925 000

Access to Land Project	Yesh Din - Volunteers for Human Rights	Midtøst en regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 100 000
Israeli Settlement Policy Report	B'Tselem - Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in Occupied Territory	Midtøst en regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 100 000
Freedom of Movement	Gisha - Legal center for freedom of movement	Midtøst en regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 200 000
Defending Human Rights and Promoting an Agreed Solution to Jerusalem	Ir Amim	Midtøst en regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 600 000
Mophradat	Mophradat	Midtøst en regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 350 000
RfP- Support to Myanmar Office and Advisory Forum	WCRP - World Conference on Religion and Peace	Myanm ar	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 050 000
ANFREL- Elections Support 2018-2020	ANFREL - Asian Network for Free Election	Myanm ar	151 - Government and civil society, general	51 - Elections	4 400 000
MNHRC-Myanmar National Human Rights Commission	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Myanm ar	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 000 000
MCRB - Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business	IHRB - Institute for Human Rights and Business	Myanm ar	250 - Business and other services	40 - Responsible Business Conduct	1 000 000

Support to media organisation Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB)	Democratic Voice of Burma	Myanmar	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	4 450 000
IMS - Paving the way for good journalism in Myanmar	IMS - International Media Support	Myanmar	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	2 000 000
Support Kulungwana 2013-2015	Associação Cultural Kulungwana	Mozambique	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 500 000
Mozambique Media Strengthening Program (MSP) Community Radios	IREX - International Research and Exchanges Board	Mozambique	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	6 000 000
UPR Follow-up	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Mozambique	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 000 000
Restoration and requalification Old Quelimane Cathedral	Associação dos Bons Sinais	Mozambique	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	950 000
Production Radio Thetare Plays on Covid-19	Teatro Avenida, Mozambique	Mozambique	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	370 000
Promotion arts and culture education	ISDB - Instituto Superior Dom Bosco	Mozambique	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	200 000
CHRR/CEDEP Promotion of LGBT Rights ph. II	CHRR - Center for human rights & rehab	Malawi	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 388 000
UNODC Prison Reform Program	UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	Malawi	151 - Government and civil society, general	30 - Legal and judicial development	3 500 000

MC International: Strengthening Music Education in Southern Africa	Music Crossroads International	Eastern Africa, regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	3 000 000
UNESCO Strengthening Institutional capacities in implementing Malawi Culture Policy in Line with UNESCO 2005 Convention on Culture Diversity in Malawi	UNESCO - UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	Malawi	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 000 000
CoE. Neighbourhood partnership with Tunisia and Morocco	Council of Europe	Afrika nord for Sahara regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	7 550 700
Supporting human rights defenders and organisations in North Africa	EMHRN - Euro- Mediterranean Human Rights Network	Afrika nord for Sahara regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 715 068
Sustainable Model for Initiatives through Local Empowerment (SMILE)	SAHIL	Pakistan	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 150 000
Human Rights in Pakistan	HRCPP - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan	Pakistan	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 200 600
Palestine Cultural Fund - phase II	Palestinian Ministry of Culture	Palestin a	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	7 103 048
UNESCO: Supporting the Institutional sustainability of AlAqsa Mosque Center for the Restoration of Islamic Manuscripts	UNESCO - UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	Palestin a	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	3 000 000

in Jerusalem: Phase IV: Consolid					
Gaza Sings: Young Palestine Raises Its Voice	ESNCM - Edward Said National Conservatory of Music	Palestina	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	2 200 000
UN Women - Implementation of WPS agenda in Palestine	UN Women	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	5 244 000
Monitoring, documentation, and reporting of HR violations in the oPt	Al Haq	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 000 000
WCLAC Service Unit 2019	WLAC - Women Legal Aid Center	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	3 600 000
Al Qaw, 2019 Media and Cultrual Programing	Al-Qaws for sexual and gender diversity in the Palestinian society	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	500 000
HRC Legal Unit 2019	Hebron Rehabilitation Committee	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 500 000
Building Accountablility and Bridging the Gender Policy Gap	Palestinian Ministry of Women's Affairs	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	1 000 000

Miftah, Advance Women Peace and Security Agenda in Palestine	MIFTAH - Palestinian Initiative for Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	2 500 000
Press House Palestine Project - 2019	Press House Palestine	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	1 800 000
Protecting Women's Rights in the Gaza Strip	Palestinian Centre for Human Rights	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 603 000
ICHR 2020-2022	ICHR - The Independent Commission for Human Rights	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	4 000 000
Palestinian Data Protection	7amleh-The Arab Center for Social Media Advancement	Palestina	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	500 000
Roots of Health - Supporting Women and Young People's Access to Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights	Roots of Health	Filippine	130 - Population policies/programmes and reproductive health	30 - Family planning	500 000
Strengthening Human Rights-Driven Policy Advocacy	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Filippine	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 500 000
Support for Cultural Heritage projects in Central Asia	AKTC - Aga Khan Trust for Culture	Sentral-Asia regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 887 000
Students at Risk	SIU - Senter for internasionalising av	Global uspesifis	151 - Government and civil	60 - Human rights	5 471 000

	utdanning		society, general		
Norsk PEN and International PEN. International work 2016 – 2019.	Norske PEN - Poets, Playwrights, Essayists and Novelists	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	4 834 538
NJ Norsk Journalistlag	Norsk journalistlag	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	5 800 000
WAN-IFRA Media Freedom and Democracy Programme 2016-2019	WAN-IFRA - World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	1 980 322
UN Partnership to promote the Rights of Persons with Disabilities MDTF	MPTF Office - Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	10 000 000
FN-sambandet	FN-sambandet	Global uspesifisert	998 - Unallocated/unspecified	20 - Promotion of development awareness	357 585
Development of the cultural sector and strengthening of cultural rights	Mimeta - Senter for kultur og Utvikling AS	Global uspesifisert	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	4 170 000
ECPM Abolition of the death penalty 2017-2019	ECPM - Ensemble Contre la Peine de Mort	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 053 069
NORDEM - Support from Section for Human Rights, Democracy and Gender	Flyktningshjelpen	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	52 - Legislatures and political parties	7 172 411
Core support to Community of Democracies	CoD - Community of Democracies	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	472 000

HiOA Strengthening institutions for freedom of expression and democracy	OsloMet - Storbyuniversitet (tidl. HiOA)	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	4 500 000
UN Global Compact - core funding	Global Compact	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 200 000
Support to International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 2017-2019	FIDH - International Federation of Human Rights	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 000 000
Support to human right defenders - emergency assistance	US Department of State	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	14 000 000
Minority Rights Group Core Funding 2019-2021	MRG - Minority Rights Group International	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 500 000
International Service for Human Rights	ISHR - International Service for Human Rights	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	5 000 000
Civil Society Support	Undefined	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	4 200 000
IFEX	IFEX - International Freedom of Expression Exchange	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	5 000 000
Empowering agents of change for freedom of religion or belief	Stefanusalliansen	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	11 000 000

IJ/EJN Free Media and Ethical Journalism	Institutt for Journalistikk	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	1 221 500
Universal Rights Group's Core Programme on Human Rights and Democracy	Universal Rights Group	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	111 574
International Panel of Parliamentarians for freedom of religion (ODA)	Den norske helseforskomiteen	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 887 764
Nexus	IPPF - International Planned Parenthood Federation	Global uspesifisert	130 - Population policies/programmes and reproductive health	20 - Reproductive health care	1 000 000
Annual Voluntary Contribution UNODC	UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	30 - Legal and judicial development	700 000
Women, Peace and Humanitarian Fund	MPTF Office - Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	8 000 000
ARTICLE 19 Freedom of Expression 2018-2021	Article 19	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	9 681 942
Frame Agreement Raftostiftelsen 2019-21	Raftostiftelsen	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	8 500 000
Support to Human Rights House Foundation 2019-21	HRH - Human Rights House Foundation	Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society,	60 - Human rights	14 700 000

			general		
Valuing Respect, How to evaluate business respect for HR	SHIFT project	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 500 000
ICORN. International Cities of Refuge Network	ICORN - International Cities of Refuge Network	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 700 000
Follow Up Fund	Undefined	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	2 600 000
Development of the digital management of copyrights in developing countr	Norcode - The Norwegian Copyright Development Association	Global uspesifis ert	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 420 000
Support to Norwegian Human Rights Fund 2019-2021	Det norske Menneskerettighetsfond	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	11 436 370
Framework Agreement with The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies on religious and ethnic minorities in conflict-affected areas	Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynsminoriteter	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 759 510
Core support to Front Line Defenders 2019-2022	Front Line Defenders	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	5 000 000
ICJ - International Commission of Jurists Core Support 2019 -	ICJ - International Commission of Jurists	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society,	30 - Legal and judicial development	5 000 000

2021			general		
IMS International Media Support 2020-2023	IMS International Media Support	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	20 000 000
Sørfond - Norwegian South Film Fund 2020 - 2022	Norsk Filminstitutt	- Global uspesifisert	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	3 430 500
Int. IDEA. Core contribution	IDEA - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	Multilateral	910 - Administration costs/multilateral	10 - Multilateral	20 000 000
Int. IDEA. Program support	IDEA - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	15 000 000
SafeMUSE - Safe Music Havens Initiative	SafeMUSE - Safe Music Havens Initiative	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 850 000
Equal rights and equal opportunities LGBTI people	FRI - Foreningen for kjønns- og seksualitetsmangfold (tidl. LLH)	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	11 534 600
Education and training in Human Rights 2020-2021	UiO - Norsk Senter for Menneskerettigheter (SMR)	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	30 000 000
UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism	MPTF Office - Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office	- Global uspesifisert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	10 000 000

Prevention of torture	Undefined	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	978 143
Defending Artistic Freedom	Freemuse	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	7 500 000
UPR INFO 2020-2022	UPR Info	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 530 319
Program cooperation agreement with UNESCO, cultural rights and freedom of speech	UNESCO - UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	52 000 000
Universal Rights Group	Universal Rights Group	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 000 000
ILO - Programme Cooperation Agreement (Support to RBSA) 2020-2021	ILO - International Labour Organisation	Global uspesifis ert	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	70 - Labour Rights	30 000 000
Small scale grant - 15270112 & 15971213 & 15971217 & 16371122 (2020)	Undefined	Global uspesifis ert	430 - Other multisector	10 - Multisector aid	329 904
Support to the activities of the European Endowment for Democracy	EED - European Endowment for Democracy	Global uspesifis ert	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	7 000 000
IDEA - AU Joint Activity Plan (JAP) 2016-2020	IDEA - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	Afrika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	4 075 637

CHR - Capacity - Building to Advance HR & Democracy in Africa (CAHRDA)	University of Pretoria	Afrika regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 999 647
Improved implementation of the World Heritage Convention in Africa	African World Heritage Fund	Afrika regional	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	5 000 000
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) 2019-2021	APHR - ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights	Asia regional	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	1 500 000
Field Band Foundation PLUS	Field Band Foundation	Sør-Afrika	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	925 000
ANFASA (Academic Non-Fiction Authors' Association of SA) 2019-2022	ANFASA	Sør-Afrika	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	285 000
Concerts South Africa 2019-2022	SAMRO - Southern African Music Rights Organisation	Sør-Afrika	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 000 000
Advocating for non-discrimination and substantial equality in Vietnam 2020-2021	CEPEW - The Center for Education, Promotion, and Empowerment of Women	Vietnam	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 000 000
Strengthening implementation of international human rights recommendations to Vietnam 2020 - 2021	UNDP - UN Development Programme	Vietnam	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	500 000
UNW - Syrian Women in the Lead for peace and	UN Women	Syria	151 - Government and civil	70 - Women's rights organisations	5 000 000

Reconciliation			society, general	and movements, and government institutions	
Nafasi Art Space - Core support to Strategic Plan 2016-2020	Nafasi Art Space	Tanzani a	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	569 923
MUDA Africa - Core support to Strategic Plan 2017-2020	MUDA Africa	Tanzani a	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 000 000
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Core support	Legal and Human Rights Centre, Tanzania	Tanzani a	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	6 000 000
Busara Promotions Core support to Strategic Plan 2019-2024	Busara Promotion	Tanzani a	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	61 - Culture and recreation	1 000 000
Timor-Leste Civil Society Support	HIVOS	Øst- Timor	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	2 000 000
Medyascope.tv: Sustaining Human Resources and Improvement	Medyascope	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	396 728
Hrant Dink Foundation: 1st Multicultural Mobile Application for Istanbul	Hrant Dink Foundation	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	335 000
Amnesty-Human Rights Education For All	Amnesty International - local office	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 090 600
Equal Opportunities Association: Women's	Equal Opportunities Association	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society,	70 - Women's rights organisations and	4 835 000

Employment and Training			general	movements, and government institutions	
HRFT: Strengthening Prevention of Torture	HRFT - Human Rights Foundation of Turkey	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	1 100 000
OSCAIR: Church Affairs, Syriac Promotion, Syriac/Christian Advocacy	OSCAIR - The Office for Syriac Culture and Inter-Cultural Relations	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	3 600 000
Istanbul Art-Support and Training for LGBTI Groups	Istanbul Sanat Dernegi (Art association)	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 400 000
P24 Institutional Re-enforcement and Editorial Resources	Punto24	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	759 310
DramaQueer-impact,interaction, assurance of art for women & LGBTI rights	DramaQueer	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	2 500 000
EDAM: Public Opinion on Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy	EDAM - Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	281 223
IFWE- From membership to leadership	IFWE - Initiative for Workers Empowerment	Tyrkia	160 - Other social infrastructure and services	70 - Labour Rights	2 500 000
Duvar-Exclusive reporting on human rights violations in Turkey	Duvar English	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	400 000
NHC: Right to freedom of religion or belief	Den norske helsingforskomiteen	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society,	60 - Human rights	841 995

			general		
PAR: Improving visibility of women in media	PAR – Arastirma ve Danismanlik	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	900 000
YOUNG LGBTI+: Legal and Psychosocial Counselling	GENC LGBTI+	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	412 149
Serbestiyet - Strengthening capacity for independent, liberal news and opinion website	Serbestiyet	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	53 - Media and free flow of information	247 995
KADER Monitoring and Capacity Building of Municipalities in terms of Gender Equality	KA.DER - Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates	Tyrkia	151 - Government and civil society, general	70 - Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions	400 000
ZLHR - Protecting Human Rights Defenders in Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	Zimbabwe	151 - Government and civil society, general	50 - Democratic participation and civil society	1 600 000
Enhancing Access to Justice, Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable Groups	LRF - Legal Resource Foundation	Zimbabwe	151 - Government and civil society, general	30 - Legal and judicial development	2 825 000
SALO Zimbabwe-South Africa Solidarity Dialogue on Human rights	SALO - Southern African Liaison Office	Zimbabwe	151 - Government and civil society, general	60 - Human rights	750 000