

# Czech politics at a crossroads?

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## **Abstract**

Since 2010, Czech voters have turned their backs on the four long-standing parties that used to constitute the core of the party system, and have flocked to new, often populist alternatives. The most successful of these is ANO ('yes'), the party of the Andrej Babiš, who won the 2017 election convincingly and went on to form a minority government – the first in thirty years to rely on Communist support. However, the self-proclaimed democratic opposition united against Babiš and secured a comfortable majority in the 2021 election. This chapter investigates how the rise of new parties has changed the Czech party system; and how these parties differ from the longstanding parties in terms of organization as well as parliamentary elites.

# Czech politics at a crossroads?

*Elisabeth Bakke*

*For the last five years or so, it is as if Czech society has found itself at a dead end and has no idea how to get out of it. The political scene is dominated by the duo Andrej Babiš and Miloš Zeman. A president who extends his powers at will ... A prime minister whose oligarchic conflict of interest is unparalleled ... Is Czechia at a crossroads that in the last instance may reverse the post-November democratic development?<sup>1</sup>*

## **Introduction**

In 2019, the Czech Republic saw the largest demonstrations since the Velvet Revolution, as some 250,000 people rallied under the banner of A Million Moments for Democracy at Letná park in Prague, calling for Prime Minister Andrej Babiš to resign. His government was the first in thirty years to rely on Communist support, and Babiš himself was under investigation for EU subsidy fraud in the Stork's nest case (a subsidiary of his company Agrofert).

Two years later, it was starting to look more like business as usual. By the spring of 2021, the popularity of Andrej Babiš and his ANO party was on the wane, his junior partner the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) polled below the electoral threshold, and the opposition's two electoral alliances were set to win the October 2021 election. The alliance of the Pirate Party and Mayors and Independents (STAN) was initially the more popular of these, but in the end Spolu (Together), the alliance of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), and the conservative TOP 09, prevailed. Between them the two alliances secured a comfortable majority of 108 seats. Within a week of losing the election, Babiš threw in the towel and announced that he was prepared to hand over the premiership to Petr Fiala, the leader of Spolu.<sup>2</sup>

Since 2010, Czech voters have turned their backs on the four long-standing parties that used to constitute the core of the party system in the 1990s and 2000s, and have flocked to new, often populist alternatives. In this chapter, I will investigate 1) how the rise of new parties has changed the Czech party system, 2) how the newcomers differ from the long-standing parties in terms of organization, and 3) how this has affected the composition of the parliamentary elite. The analysis is in part based on a unique dataset covering all MPs that have served in Czech parliaments since the end of communism, and party interviews.<sup>3</sup>

### **Theoretical approach: Parties and parliamentary elites**

The rise of political parties in long-established West European democracies was part and parcel of a gradual democratization process, during which suffrage was extended from the few to the many. The first parties emerged in parliament as socially constricted and loosely organized elite caucuses, but soon gave way to the mass party, featuring large membership, a dense network of local branches, and strong ties to particular groups, classes, and interest organizations.<sup>4</sup> Party systems evolved gradually and ‘froze’ along the cleavages that had prevailed when the electoral system was adopted.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, the rise of new parties and movements in post-communist Europe took place in a situation of ‘instant democracy’, where universal suffrage was long established, but civic society was weak and the party as an institution discredited after more than 40 years of communist rule.<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime, parties in Western Europe had adopted a catch-all strategy in response to challenges such as the decline of class voting and the rise of the middle class. Compared to the mass party, the catch-all party (and to an even larger extent the cartel party and the business party) was ideologically more diffuse, more leadership-dominated, and less dependent on a large membership. West and East of the old iron curtain, politics has become a profession, communication experts have taken over the campaign, and the state and/or private sponsors have replaced members as the main source of revenue.<sup>7</sup> The rise of social media has reinforced this trend by making it easier to reach a large number of people without spending a lot of money on advertising or relying on conventional media. Even core party functions such as candidate selection and the formulation of policy platforms have been outsourced. Seen from the party leadership’s point of view, members are a nuisance more than an asset, and admission control has become a necessity.

Parties are the gatekeepers of modern democracies; they choose candidates for election among the eligible and willing. In flexible list proportional representation (PR) systems such as the Czech, voters have limited influence on the ranking. While lack of time, political interest, and ambition to some extent explain why certain groups are underrepresented in the political elite, it clearly matters how nomination is organized, who the gatekeepers are, and what qualities they are looking for.<sup>8</sup> In the mass party, candidate selection was formalized, under tight party organizational control, and aimed at representing the party’s core constituency. The catch-all party emphasized electoral appeal over organizational loyalty. The cartel party brought the

individual member back in, but in a way that made coordination difficult (like party primaries) and thus arguably strengthened the power of the leadership.<sup>9</sup> Finally, candidate selection in business parties is centralized and often confined to the inner circle of the 'party owner'.<sup>10</sup>

An under-researched question is how the rise of new parties with few members and little or no presence 'on the ground' affects the social bias of the parliamentary elite. We should expect these parties to differ from more established parties. First, when nomination processes are less formalized, the preferences of the (often narrow) selectorate matter more. Second, in the absence of a large pool of qualified candidates in their own ranks, new parties may be more open to candidates from outside the party. Third, selection criteria like long-lasting membership, party loyalty, political experience, and incumbency – which tend to privilege middle-aged, well-educated, male politicians – will be less relevant.<sup>11</sup> Finally, new (and especially populist) parties tend to present themselves as alternatives to established elites, and may thus actively select candidates who differ from incumbents. We should thus expect new parties to nominate more 'new faces', young people and women, but because expertise is important, not necessarily less well-educated candidates.<sup>12</sup>

### **Institutions: The rules of the game**

The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature and a directly elected (since 2013) president as formal head of state. The president's main prerogatives are the suspensive veto and the right to file complaints with the Constitutional Court. The government is the 'supreme executive power'. It is formally appointed by the president and must win an investiture vote in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>13</sup> The Chamber of Deputies or lower house is the more powerful of the two chambers. It can easily override any objections the Senate or the president may raise to ordinary legislation by adopting the same law for the second time with an absolute majority of all deputies. It has overruled the Senate in two thirds of the cases and the presidential veto in more than 80% of the cases.<sup>14</sup> President Václav Havel filed complaints with the Constitutional Court with more success.<sup>15</sup>

The Constitution was adopted on 16 December 1992 and was a compromise between the center-right government of Václav Klaus and part of the opposition. Seen in retrospect, the opposition's most important contribution was to insist that future constitutional amendments be adopted by a 3/5 supermajority in both

chambers, rather than the absolute majority Klaus and his party wanted.<sup>16</sup> Any change in the institutional set-up requires broad parliamentary agreement, as the principal electoral system of both chambers is enshrined in the Constitution, and even minor changes in the electoral law require a majority in both chambers.<sup>17</sup> Proportional elections to the Chamber of Deputies make it difficult for a single party to win a majority, let alone a constitutional majority, and staggered majoritarian elections to the Senate make it virtually impossible to win control of the Senate at the same time. Since 1996, only four governments have enjoyed a supermajority in the Senate at inauguration, and none had such a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>18</sup> In the case of a vote of no confidence against the government the president may dissolve the Chamber and call snap elections. Since 2009 the Chamber may also dissolve itself by a 3/5 majority.<sup>19</sup> The Senate cannot be dissolved.

The original electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies was adopted in 1990: it combined eight large constituencies with the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula, a five-percent threshold for parties, and (from 1992), a 7–11% threshold for alliances. In 2000, a ‘silent grand coalition’ of the two largest parties (the ČSSD and the ODS) had agreed to introduce a majoritarian system; however, having lost their narrow constitutional majority, they instead adopted a nominally proportional electoral code that would have yielded less proportional results than the British First-Past-The-Post system.<sup>20</sup> President Havel returned the law and subsequently filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which left only the controversial new threshold for alliances (five percent per party) in place. The electoral law adopted in 2002 increased the number of constituencies to 14 (the new regions) and used an ordinary d’Hondt formula. However, almost two decades later, the Constitutional Court ruled against the electoral threshold for alliances, as well as the combination of unequal sized constituencies and the d’Hondt formula. The parliament adopted the current electoral code in April 2021, lowering the threshold for alliances to 8–11% and introducing the Imperiali formula instead of d’Hondt.<sup>21</sup> This new, slightly more proportional electoral code has not made it easier for a big party to win a majority.

The electoral system for the Senate has been the same since it became operative in 1996: majoritarian run-off elections (two rounds) in 81 constituencies, with a third up for elections every other year. Independents can also run. If a senator dies or resigns, supplementary elections are held in that constituency.

## **The Czech party system 1992–2010 and beyond**

Until 2010, the Czech party system was among the most stable in post-communist Europe in terms of parties as well as bloc competition. By the 1992 election, the regime cleavage had given way to a national-cum-economic dimension at the federal level, and the national question lost relevance once Czechoslovakia was history. Party competition then stabilized along a socio-economic left–right dimension in the run-up to the 1996 election, with the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as the main contestants on either side. Thanks to its centrist position, the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) participated in all Czech coalition governments until 2010, along with a series of small center-right parties.<sup>22</sup> Because of its past, the other parties have been reluctant to govern with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), which also explains why it has been difficult to form stable majority governments in the Czech Republic. In the 1998, 2002, and 2006 elections, these four parties together won more than 90% of the seats.

The KSČM is the unreformed Czech successor party of the former Communist ruling party of Czechoslovakia (founded in 1921), which divided into a Czech and a Slovak party after the 1990 election. Unlike its Slovak, Polish, and Hungarian sister parties, it did not adopt a social democratic platform; nor did it make the members reregister. The old nomenklatura form the core of the party’s membership but as the only long-standing party that did not take part in government, it has in the past also drawn protest votes. By 2017, nearly 80% of its voters were over 60.<sup>23</sup>

The ČSSD was (re-)established two days into the Velvet Revolution, on 19 November 1989, but had its electoral breakthrough only in 1996, when the then chairman Miloš Zeman succeeded in presenting the party as the only relevant leftist alternative to the incumbent center–right government of Václav Klaus. It formed its first (minority) government after the snap election in 1998 and held the prime ministership for a total of 12 years, between 1998 and 2006, and again between 2013 and 2017 (appendix 2). Although it officially traces its roots to the original social democratic party (founded in 1878) that was forcibly merged with the Communist Party in 1948, the ČSSD was for all practical purposes a new party. There was no organizational continuity, and little elite continuity, apart from a few individuals who had been active in the party-in-exile and/or during the Prague Spring in 1968.<sup>24</sup>

The ODS emerged as the dominant party on the center-right already in the 1992 election and is the only surviving successor party of the Czech umbrella movement Civic Forum. It was founded in April 1991 by the circle around Václav Klaus, who set out to form a 'normal' liberal-conservative party with a strong party organization. As of 2021, the party had held the prime ministership for a total of 11.5 years, but ODS governments had never completed their terms, either because of scandals or because the government coalition had lost its majority due to defections, or both. Consequently, expert or caretaker governments served the rest of the terms, and in 1998 and 2013 coalition crises led to snap elections, while the Constitutional Court stopped an attempt to call snap elections in 2009.

The Christian Democratic Union (KDU) was originally an electoral alliance (in 1990) in which the Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL) constituted the core. It adopted its current name KDU-ČSL in 1992. The ČSL had been founded in 1919 through the merger of two even older Catholic parties and survived Communism as a part of the National Front. The party has since 1919 been strongest in Moravia, particularly in areas with many Catholics.<sup>25</sup> It dropped temporarily below the electoral threshold when its right wing left to found TOP 09 in the summer of 2009.

The 2010, 2013, and 2017 elections transformed the Czech party system completely. Electoral volatility peaked at 39% in 2010, and fell to more normal levels only in 2021. During this 'hurricane season' of Czech politics, the four long-standing parties lost to a series of newcomers, two of which are already defunct.<sup>26</sup>

Of the seven new parties that have entered the Chamber of Deputies since 2010, one could arguably be described as 'old wine in a new bottle' in terms of ideology as well as party elites: The conservative Tradition – Responsibility – Prosperity (TOP 09), which initially ran 'with the support of' Mayors and Independents (STAN). Under the charismatic leadership of Count Karel von Schwarzenberg, TOP 09 brought together disgruntled elites from several center-right parties, including the ODS, but many of its most seasoned politicians, including his successor Miroslav Kalousek, came from the KDU-ČSL. The political profile of TOP 09 was nevertheless closer to that of the ODS, and the largest share of its 2010 voters came from the ODS, followed by first-time voters and non-voters (appendix 3).

Mayors and Independents (STAN) originated in 2009 through the merger of four associations of independents operating at regional level. The party is centrist and stands out mainly in terms of its strong emphasis on municipal and regional self-

government.<sup>27</sup> As the name suggests, it was primarily a vehicle for mayors of the many small municipalities of the Czech Republic to run for office at regional, national, and European levels.<sup>28</sup> In the 2010 and 2013 elections, STAN had some of its candidates elected on the lists of TOP 09. Before the 2017 election it decided to end this cooperation and negotiated an alliance with the KDU-ČSL which then fell apart because of bad polls. STAN thus ran on its own, drawing voters mainly from other center-right parties. In 2021, it ran as a part of an electoral alliance with the Pirates, and thanks to preference votes, it got 33 of 37 seats won by the alliance.

The Pirate Party (Piráti) was registered in June 2009, and won a seat in the Senate in 2012 as part of an electoral alliance. Its national breakthrough came in 2017, when it ran on an anti-corruption platform, emphasizing transparency and accountability, e-government, and support of small businesses. It appealed especially to first-time voters and 2013 abstainers. Initially a single-issue party inspired by its Swedish sister party, it has broadened its platform and currently combines a centrist position on the left-right dimension with a liberal stance on the cultural dimension. Its level of populism was found to be negligible in 2017.<sup>29</sup>

By contrast, the remaining four parties were more or less populist, albeit in different ways. Three of them were loosely connected through their emphasis on direct democracy as well as through some overlap of political elites: Public Affairs, Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit), and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). All three presented direct democracy as a remedy against corrupt and unaccountable parties and elites. In this context, direct democracy meant national referenda; direct (i.e., majoritarian) elections of public figures such as the president, (regional) governors, mayors, or even MPs, and the recall of politicians.<sup>30</sup> Okamura also advocated a presidential system.

The oldest of the three was Public Affairs (VV), a centrist populist party that had started as a local protest party in Prague in 2002. Having run on an anti-corruption platform challenging 'political dinosaurs' in all the old parties, VV won representation in the Chamber of Deputies in 2010 and subsequently joined the government coalition of ODS and TOP 09 as a junior partner. Apart from the emphasis on direct democracy, its program was mainstream center-right. By then the circle around the businessman Vít Bárta had taken control of the party (according to Czech scholars a 'hostile takeover').<sup>31</sup> Officially Bárta was just the election manager and sponsor of the party through his security firm ABL. In reality, he pulled



the strings. Early in 2011 his plan to use the party to serve his business interests became public knowledge and then he was indicted for trying to bribe two of its MPs. The party never recovered from this blow and split over coalition strategy in 2012.

Before the 2013 election, some of the remaining VV elites, including Bárta, made a deal with the Japanese-Czech businessman Tomio Okamura to run on the lists of Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit). Okamura founded Úsvit in May 2013 after failing to collect enough valid signatures to run for president. It was essentially a one-man-show: it had only nine registered members, and the campaign focused on one man (Okamura) and one issue: direct democracy.<sup>32</sup> When a conflict over party finance and the admission of new members caused Okamura to lose control in the spring of 2015, he went on to found Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). The new party retained the old party's populism and emphasis on direct democracy, and was explicitly hard Eurosceptic, nationalist, anti-immigration, and anti-Islam. SPD thus has a broader political platform and clearly belongs to the populist radical right.<sup>33</sup>

The most successful of the new parties is ANO ('Yes'), the party of billionaire Andrej Babiš, founded in May 2012. Having run on a platform of anti-corruption and appeals for the replacement of incompetent political elites, it did surprisingly well in the 2013 snap election, and reluctantly joined the government with the ČSSD and KDU-ČSL. Babiš financed the campaign practically out of his own (and Agrofert's) pockets, using hired help for most party functions. An amendment to party financing regulations in 2016 capped individual and company donations as well as campaign spending, reducing this advantage. Moreover, in January 2017 the Czech parliament adopted an amendment to the conflict-of-interest law (dubbed *lex Babiš*) designed to prevent collusion between political parties and business interests.<sup>34</sup>





While ANO won the 2017 election convincingly, it struggled to find coalition partners. The parties of the self-proclaimed democratic opposition (ODS, KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, and STAN) as well as the Pirates refused to participate in a government where the prime minister was under investigation for EU subsidy fraud, and Babiš did not want to govern with the Communists or SPD. In the end the Social Democrats came on board as a junior coalition partner, and the Communist Party agreed to support the minority government in parliament. Both parties fell below the electoral threshold in 2021. Scholars describe ANO as techno-populist and ideologically flexible.<sup>35</sup> It drew voters primarily from the center-right in 2013 and from the ČSSD in 2017 (appendix 3 and 4), while its current voters are mainly centrist.<sup>36</sup>

### **Organization: Three generations of Czech parties**

The question in this section is how the newcomers differ from the long-standing parties in terms of organization. Two of the long-standing parties are first generation parties with roots in mass parties from the First Republic. As the successor of the former communist regime party, the KSČM was in a separate league. Having lost three quarters of its 1.25 million membership since 1989, it still had 317,000 members and 8,530 local branches in 1993 – 2.5 times as many as the other parties put together. However, these branches were already then virtual senior centers.<sup>37</sup> The KDU-ČSL (or rather its predecessor) more than doubled its membership during the first year after the Velvet Revolution, but then it started to decline, albeit at a slower pace than the KSČM (figure 1 and 2). In both cases, members are literally dying out.

The other two long-standing parties are second generation parties founded after the Velvet Revolution, and thus had to build a party organization from scratch. Of these, the ČSSD had the weakest organization and never surpassed 25,000 members. Because the majority of the rank-and-file followed Václav Klaus when the Civic Forum broke up, the ODS was more successful from the outset; membership dropped temporarily in the wake of the party finance scandal that brought down the second government of Václav Klaus, and peaked at 34,000 in January 2010. In both cases there have been reports of local ODS and ČSSD party bosses inflating party membership to boost their influence ahead of important decisions. These ‘godfathers’ reportedly used their influence to further their economic interests.<sup>38</sup> The drop in membership since 2010 (figure 3) is part and parcel of a general loss of popularity.

By contrast, third generation parties founded since 2009 have few members and little or no presence ‘on the ground’.<sup>39</sup> Most of the newcomers had less than 1,000 members when they won representation, including the second-generation Greens (800 members): ANO had 732, Úsvit 9, STAN 129, and the Pirates 504 members. The exceptions are TOP 09 and VV (3,319 and 1,950 members, respectively).<sup>40</sup> Moreover, with the caveat that precise membership for STAN and the SPD is missing (table 1), the total membership of third-generation parties has increased only marginally since 2010, (figure 4), and has not compensated for the long-standing parties’ drop in membership.



Sources: party headquarters. STAN numbers include registered supporters. Pirates: data for 2015 were not available. Omitted are SPD (unreliable data), Úsvit and VV (defunct).

The organizational structure of Czech parties corresponds roughly to the administrative levels of the state. All parties have branches in each of the 14 regions (*kraje*) and most have branches in the 76 districts (*okresy*), whereas the total number of district branches varies depending on their organizational set-up in Prague. The smallest parties in practice have only two levels below the national level, and not even the largest long-standing parties have branches in all 6,254 municipalities – which is hardly surprising, considering that three quarters of these have less than 1,000 inhabitants.<sup>41</sup> The overall number of local branches reflects the size of party membership, with a ratio of one local branch per 10–17 members (again with the caveat that precise membership for the SPD and STAN is missing). Of the newcomers, only TOP 09 and ANO have more than a handful local branches.

**Table 1. Organization and membership of major parties as per 1 January 2021**

Branches:	KSČM	KDU-ČSL	ODS	ČSSD	SPD	ANO	TOP 09	STAN	Pirates	Greens
– regional	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
– district	86	89	92	91	46	97	87	56	80	95
– local	2352	1449	928	905	20	237	149	2		
members	28715	21121	12199	11531	8136	2860	2527	1932	1143	920

Source: Party headquarters; ANO membership reported by E15.cz 20 July 2020.<sup>42</sup> SPD membership is as per 20 May 2021 and include candidate members (*čekatelé*) and applicants. STAN membership includes registered supporters. Pirate membership is as per April 2021; SZ as per May 2021.

While the number of branches is primarily a function of membership, the parties differ more in terms of party hierarchy and lines of command. All the four long-standing parties have a hierarchical structure modelled on the mass party and are organized bottom-up according to a delegation system.<sup>43</sup> Lower membership notwithstanding, TOP 09 is the newcomer that resembles this model the most. By contrast, ANO, the SPD, Úsvit, and in practice also Public Affairs can be characterized as leadership-dominated business parties. In the case of Okamura's SPD, the all-male presidium of five makes practically all important decisions, and all presidium decisions require the explicit consent of the chairman.<sup>44</sup> In the case of ANO, Andrej Babiš is clearly the party owner (cf. his infamous statement 'I'm paying, so I decide'), and has the right to act independently in all matters.<sup>45</sup> In both cases, the bylaws give the party presidium the right to approve or appoint regional chairmen and, in the case of the SPD, even district chairmen and vice chairmen.

The remaining newcomers (including the Greens) differ from the long-standing parties (and TOP 09) mainly by having fewer branches and a flatter structure, which reflect their past as small, informal groupings. The Pirates use delegation only for the central committee and otherwise work on the all-member principle. All members can vote at *forums* at each organizational level, in person or on the internet.<sup>46</sup> STAN is a special case because of its origin as a platform for independent mayors with limited membership. It is weakly organized beyond the regional level, and regional branches therefore as a rule work on the all-member principle. The exception is the stronghold Central Bohemia (which accounts for 20 of the 56 district branches).

In the four long-standing parties, TOP 09, the Greens, and the Pirates, membership is granted at the subregional level, and normally by the local (or lowest) branch. In VV, this power was vested in the regional branch. In ANO, the SPD, and STAN the party presidium must approve all members, but in practice they rarely go against the regional branch. This is thus mainly a safeguard. Most of the newcomers have more elaborated application procedures for membership. To become a member, you need to fill out a form and meet certain requirements, such as a clean lustration record (TOP 09, STAN, VV), no Communist Party membership (VV), no criminal record (VV, ANO, SPD, Pirates, Greens), and no debts (ANO). Four of the parties also require a waiting period, ranging from six months (VV, ANO) to two years (SPD, STAN), during which you have to 'prove that you have something to contribute'.<sup>47</sup> Parties have been reluctant to admit too many members too fast, reportedly for fear of attracting careerists, infiltrators from other parties, or ODS-style godfathers.<sup>48</sup>

While membership is quite exclusive, parties have allowed registered supporters and/or candidate members to take part in party activities. Public Affairs was the first party to adopt this innovation and called their registered supporters 'věčkaři'; currently, the Pirates, STAN and the Greens have them. For people who are reluctant to become party members, status as a registered supporter may be a less demanding and thus attractive way of engaging in politics. In the case of STAN, 'most candidates are [independent] mayors and do not even want to be members', according to my informant.<sup>49</sup> For the party elites, registered supporters are a convenient way of getting input, manpower, and/or economic support without jeopardizing control. Status as registered supporter (STAN) or candidate member (ANO, SPD, VV) is also a part of the vetting process for membership.<sup>50</sup>

Nomination processes are similar across parties in that the regional branches adopt candidate lists for parliamentary elections and have them approved by the Central Committee; in most cases, this is a formality. The first time new parties ran for election, the process was typically more informal, and the often small circle that put together the list mattered more. In ANO and SPD the party leader and his inner circle have real power over candidate selection.<sup>51</sup>

### **The elites: from political dinosaurs to Tordenskiold's soldiers?**


With fewer members and limited presence 'on the ground', Czech parties are obviously less rooted than they were around the turn of the Millennium. The question here is whether this has consequences for the composition of the political elite beyond the change of personnel. How do the parliamentary elites of the newcomers differ from the elites of the long-standing parties, and are they more or less representative of the voters? The short answer is that the social bias of the elite has changed only marginally since 2006. The Czech parliamentary elite is still predominantly male and middle aged, well-educated, and middle class. The gender balance of the Chamber of Deputies has improved since the 1990s, but, at 25% aggregate female representation, is still below the European average. The average age is 50 years, MPs still have predominantly middle-class professional backgrounds, and some 80% of the MPs elected since 2010 hold an academic degree. The share is even higher among ministers (more than 90%). By contrast, less than 25% of the adult population had higher education in 2019.<sup>52</sup>





Moreover, while the re-election rate was lower in 2010, 2013, and 2017 because of higher electoral volatility, the share of professional politicians among new MPs (figure 5) has remained higher than in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many of these were incumbent mayors or vice mayors. (The same applies to a full third of all senators elected since 1996). With lower re-election rates, the number of political dinosaurs in the Czech parliament is perhaps lower than in 2006, but considering the low membership of several parliamentary parties, the number of Tordenskiold's soldiers<sup>53</sup> may well be higher: dual or even triple mandates are not unusual, and there is considerable overlap between elected and party positions. A large majority of the regional party chairmen, for instance, are also MPs, senators, governors, mayors, and/or members of regional or municipal assemblies.<sup>54</sup> Power is thus probably even more concentrated than before.

There are nevertheless some interesting differences between new parties and long-standing parties. First, new parties tend to have a larger share of female MPs than more established parties (figure 6). For MPs elected since 2010, there is an almost 10 percentage-point difference. Exceptions are Úsvit in 2013 and the Pirates in 2017. Only the two smallest parliamentary clubs (the Greens in 2006 and the Pirates in 2021) were gender-balanced, but Public Affairs and STAN also scored well at 33 per cent. Interestingly, ten of the eleven female MPs of STAN in 2021 were elected due to preference votes. Among the long-standing parties, the KSČM scored well above average in all elections but 2017, while ODS consistently lagged behind.

Second, new parties do *on average* have younger legislators than the long-standing parties (figure 7); however, since 2010, this applies only to the Pirates (the youngest MPs ever at 34), VV (age 40), and STAN (age 41 in 2010). These parties thus to some extent brought a new generation into politics. ANO and Okamura’s two parties had older MPs than the long-standing parties, and the same goes for TOP 09, which is not surprising, considering that this party was founded by old elites. Of the long-standing parties, the two parties on the left (KSČM and ČSSD) had the oldest and ODS the youngest MPs. This reflects a left-right generation gap among voters.

Third, and perhaps more surprisingly, the MPs of new parties since 2010 are on average 10 percentage points less likely to hold an academic title than the MPs of long-standing parties (figure 8). The outliers are KDU-ČSL (all MPs held titles) and Okamura’s two parties (half of the MPs or less held titles). ANO scored (slightly) above average on education, and had the highest share of professors besides TOP 09. All ANO ministers held titles. This emphasis on expertise is perhaps not surprising, considering Babiš’s criticism of the (allegedly) incompetent incumbents.





Source: own data, mainly based on information from volby.cz and the Czech parliament. The figures include MPs as well as substitutes in the Chamber of Deputies.



Finally, there is a striking difference between new parties and long-standing parties in terms of professional background: in new parties, a third of the MPs came from business and management (figure 9), and the share was even higher in the SPD (53%), Úsvit, and ANO (43%). MPs of long-standing parties were more likely to be professional politicians at the time of election, but this applies to the ČSSD and the ODS more than to the two other parties. STAN had the highest share of politicians at two thirds. There are also other party specific recruitment patterns. The Pirates had many computer engineers/technicians, and the KSČM many educators. As expected, new parties (e.g. TOP 09 in 2010 and ANO in 2013) compensated for the lack of expertise within their own ranks by allowing independents to run.<sup>55</sup>

### **Czech politics at a crossroads?**

Since 2010, voters have left the longstanding parties for ever newer parties: center-right parties lost to other center-right parties; new parties lost to even newer parties; leftist voters abstained or voted for other leftist or populist parties; and all newcomers mobilized non-voters and first-time voters – most strikingly in the case of the Pirates and VV (appendix 3). These newcomers have fewer members and little presence ‘on the ground’, and they are (with the exception of TOP 09) either organized top-down (the business party model) or have a flatter, more informal structure. While the elites of all these new parties differ from longstanding parties in terms of age, gender, education and/or professional background, they have not reduced the social bias of the political elite much. On the contrary, the political elite is more professionalized, and power is probably even more concentrated than before.

Since 2017, the dominant position of ANO has changed the logic of party competition from traditional left–right contestation to a Babiš-versus-the-rest pattern reminiscent of Slovak politics in the 1990s. In the 2021 election, ČSSD and KSČM, the two longstanding parties on the left, paid the price for their support of Babiš and fell below the electoral threshold. As a result, the center-right won a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. As the book went to press, Babiš had resigned, and president Zeman had sworn in the five-party government of ODS chairman Petr Fiala, including the minister he at first wanted to block. The immediate danger of a democratic backlash may thus be over, but with both leftist parties out in the cold, a return to the traditional pattern of left–right competition is unlikely in the near future – unless Babiš decides to take ANO in a social democratic direction.

## Party acronyms

ANO – originally Action of Dissatisfied Citizens  
 ČSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party  
 Úsvit – Dawn of Direct Democracy  
 HSD-SMS – Moravian Autonomy Movement  
 KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party  
 KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia  
 LSU – Liberal Social Union  
 ODA – Civic Democratic Alliance  
 ODS – Civic Democratic Party  
 Pirates – Czech Pirate Party  
 SPD – Freedom and Direct Democracy  
 SPR-RSČ – Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia  
 STAN – Mayors and Independents  
 SZ – Greens  
 TOP 09 – Tradition – Responsibility – Prosperity  
 US-DEU – Freedom Union  
 Úsvit – Dawn of Direct Democracy  
 VV – Public Affairs

### Appendix 1. Elections to the Czech National Council/the Chamber of Deputies, %

	1990	1992	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013	2017	2021
ODS	–	29.7	29.6	27.7	24.5	35.4	20.2	7.7	11.3	27.8
KDU-ČSL <sup>a</sup>	8.4	6.3	8.1	9.0	14.3	7.2	(4.4)	6.8	5.8	<sup>a</sup>
TOP 09 <sup>b</sup>							16.7	12.0	5.3	<sup>a</sup>
STAN							<sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	5.2	15.6
Pirates <sup>c</sup>									10.8	<sup>c</sup>
ANO								18.7	29.6	27.1
SPD									10.6	9.6
ČSSD	(4.1)	6.5	26.4	32.3	30.2	32.3	22.1	20.5	7.3	(4.7)
KSČM <sup>d</sup>	13.2	14.1	10.3	11.0	18.5	12.8	11.3	14.9	7.8	(3.6)
Úsvit								6.9		
VV							10.9			
SZ	(4.1)	<sup>e</sup>				6.3				
US-DEU				8.6	<sup>a</sup>					
ODA		5.9	6.4							
SPR-RSČ		6.0	8.0							
LSU <sup>e</sup>		6.5								
HSD-SMS	10.0	5.9								
Civic Forum	49.5									
Wasted votes	18.8	19.1	11.2	11.3	12.6	6.0	18.9	12.6	6.3	19.9

Parties that won seats in at least one election (results in parentheses: the party did not cross the five-percent electoral threshold in that election). Source: Czech Statistical Office’s Election Server at [www.volby.cz](http://www.volby.cz).

<sup>a</sup> Alliance of Czechoslovak People's Party, Christian Democratic Party (KDS), and small groupings in 1990. Coalition of KDU-ČSL and US-DEU in 2002, Spolu (with ODS and TOP 09) in 2021.

<sup>b</sup> STAN candidates ran on TOP 09's list in 2010 and 2013.

<sup>c</sup> Alliance of Pirates and STAN in 2021.

<sup>d</sup> Communist party of Czechoslovakia in 1990; in the Left Bloc alliance with a small leftist party in 1992.

<sup>e</sup> Part of the loose electoral alliance Liberal Social Union in 1992 (with an agrarian party and the Czech National Social Party, a former satellite party).

## Appendix 2. Czech governments 1992–2021

	Prime minister	Party	Type of government
1992–1996	Václav Klaus I	ODS	Majority coalition (ODS, ODA, KDU-ČSL)
1996–1998	Václav Klaus II	ODS	Minority coalition (ODS, ODA, KDU-ČSL)
1998	Josef Tošovský	–	<i>Caretaker government</i>
1998–2002	Miloš Zeman	ČSSD	Minority one-party government (ČSSD)
2002–2004	Vladimír Špidla	ČSSD	Majority coalition (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US)
2004–2005	Stanislav Gross	ČSSD	Majority coalition (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US)
2005–2006	Jiří Paroubek	ČSSD	Majority coalition (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US)
2006–2007	Mirek Topolánek I	ODS	Minority one-party government* (ODS)
2007–2009	Mirek Topolánek II	ODS	Majority coalition (ODS, KDU-ČSL, SZ)
2009–2010	Jan Fischer	–	<i>Caretaker government</i>
2010–2013	Petr Nečas	ODS	Majority coalition (ODS, TOP 09, VV)
2013	Jiří Rusnok	–	<i>Caretaker government*</i>
2013–2017	Bohuslav Sobotka	ČSSD	Majority coalition (ČSSD, ANO, KDU-ČSL)
2017–2018	Andrej Babiš I	ANO	Minority one-party government* (ANO)
2018–2021	Andrej Babiš II	ANO	Minority coalition (ČSSD, ANO)
2021–	Petr Fiala	ODS	Majority coalition (Spolu, Pirates+STAN)


\* Did not win the investiture vote. Source: own compilation, based on [www.vlada.cz/](http://www.vlada.cz/).

## Appendix 3: Voters of new parties by party in previous election (% in rows)

	Year	KSČM	ČSSD	Úsvit	ANO	VV	SZ	KDU-ČSL	TOP 09	ODS	first-time voter	non-voter
TOP 09	2010	2	7				2	5		41	22	15
STAN	2017	7	10				3	10	17	10	3	24
VV	2010	1	7				8	2		30	30	13
ANO	2013	1	21			17	4	0	14	11	5	22
Úsvit	2013	5	15			24	2	2	7	2	10	24
SPD	2017	5	12	14	16			4		8	9	29
Pirates	2017	1	8	1	11		2	3	5	4	22	33

Sources: Survey data. Naše společnost 2010 – červen (CVVM), Povolební studie 2013, Povolební studie 2017, available at ČSDA, <http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/>. There were no new parties in 2021.

#### Appendix 4. Where did ANO's voters come from?



Source: Survey data. Povolební studie 2013, Povolební studie 2017, available at ČSDA, <http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/>, STEM TRENDY 10/2021.

<sup>1</sup> *Česko na křižovatce*, (Prague: Nakladatelství Zed', 2019), blurb. On the debate on the quality of Czech democracy, see e.g. Andrew Roberts (ed.), *Czech Democracy in the New Millennium* (London: Routledge, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Babiš by nepřijal pověření od prezidenta jednat o sestavení kabinetu, je připraven být v opozici, *ČT24* (15 October 2021), at <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/>.

<sup>3</sup> I would like to thank Czech party headquarters for generous assistance and provision of information, and Ondrej Gažovič, Tina Gažovičová and Radan Furiel for research assistance. The dataset is based on printed sources as well as biographical information supplied by the parliament's information service and website (<https://public.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw>). Candidate information is also available at the Czech statistical office website at <https://www.volby.cz/>.

<sup>4</sup> André Krouwel, "Party Models", in Richard S. Katz & William Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction", in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

<sup>6</sup> Elisabeth Bakke, "Central and East European party systems since 1989", in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 67.

<sup>7</sup> Jonathan Hopkin & Caterina Paolucci, "The business firm model of party organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 35 (1999), pp. 307–339; Richard Katz & Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party", in *Party Politics*, Vol. 1 (1995), pp. 5–28; and Krouwel, "Party Models".

<sup>8</sup> Pippa Norris & Joni Lovenduski, "If Only More Candidates Came Forward!: Supply-Side Explanations of Candidate Selection in Britain", in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23 (1993), No. 3, p. 381.

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<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Hopkin, “Bringing the members back in? Democratizing Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain”, in *Party Politics*, Vol. 7(2001), No. 3, p. 344.

<sup>10</sup> Hopkin & Paolucci, “The business firm model of party organisation”; and Vít Hloušek, Lubomír Kopeček & Petra Vodová, *The Rise of Entrepreneurial Parties in European Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Heinrich Best & Maurizio Cotta (eds.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>12</sup> Elisabeth Bakke, “It’s my generation, baby! How different are (new) parties in Slovakia in terms of descriptive representation?”, in *Czech Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, (2020), pp. 353–371.

<sup>13</sup> *Ústava České republiky*, §67 at <https://www.psp.cz/docs/laws/constitution.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Václav Havel: 20 of 24 cases, Václav Klaus: 46 of 57 cases, Miloš Zeman: six of seven cases. Lubomír Kopeček & Josef Mlejnek, Different confessions, same sins? Václav Havel and Václav Klaus as Czech presidents, in Vít Hloušek (ed.) *Presidents above parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, their formal competences and informal power* (Brno: MUNI Press, 2013), p. 45; Nela Krawiecová, Jan Boček, Tomáš Titěra, & Veronika Špalková, “Pojistka demokracie, nebo nástroj dábla? Senát opravil v průměru každý čtvrtý návrh zákona”, in *iRozhlas* (28.1.2020), at [https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/senat-parlamentu-cr-senat-data-datova-zurnalistika-hlasovani-v-senatu\\_2001280702\\_nkr](https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/senat-parlamentu-cr-senat-data-datova-zurnalistika-hlasovani-v-senatu_2001280702_nkr) [accessed 1 March, 2021].

<sup>15</sup> Kopeček & Mlejnek, “Different confessions, same sins?”, p. 45; *Roční statistické analýzy 2019*, pp. 18–19; and *Statistická data za 4 čtvrtleté 2020*, p. 5, Ústavní soud ČR, at <https://www.usoud.cz/statistika>.

<sup>16</sup> Lubomír Kopeček, “Czech political institutions and the problems of parliamentary democracy”, in Stanislav Balík (ed.), *Czech Politics: From West to East and Back Again* (Opladen: Barbara Budrich), p. 116.

<sup>17</sup> *Ústava České republiky*, §18, §40.

<sup>18</sup> Klaus II, Topolánek II, Sobotka, and now Fiala. The former two did not even hold a simple majority in the Chamber and depended on renegades from opposition parties. Zeman’s government (1998–2002) is a special case. Technically a minority government, it relied on the support of the largest opposition party ODS (through the so-called opposition agreement). This ‘silent grand coalition’ did hold a constitutional majority in both chambers – until an ODS senator died in June 1999.

<sup>19</sup> *Ústava České republiky*, §35.

<sup>20</sup> Michal Klíma, “Electoral Reform in the Czech Republic”, in *Central European Political Science Review*, Vol. 10 (2002), No. 3, pp. 126–147.

<sup>21</sup> Poslanci odhlasovali nový volební zákon, mírně výhodňuje úspěšnější strany, Česká televize, 7.4.2021, at <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/3294165-zive-poslanci-vyrknou-konecny-verdikt-nad-novym-volebnim-zakonom-shoda-mezi-stranami>.

<sup>22</sup> The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the Freedom Union (US-DEU), and the Greens (SZ). Of these, only the Greens still exist. In addition, the Moravian Autonomy Movement (HSD-SMS) and the Liberal Social Union (LSU) were represented in the Chamber of Deputies until 1996 and the Republicans (SPR-RSČ) until 1998.

<sup>23</sup> Povolební studie 2017, available at ČSDA, <http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/>.

<sup>24</sup> For more on the rise and fall of ČSSD, see Elisabeth Bakke & Nick Sitter, “Each unhappy in its own way? The rise and fall of Social Democracy in the Visegrád countries since 1989”, in Nik Brandal, Øivind Bratberg & Dag Einar Thorsen (eds.), *Social Democracy in the 21st Century* (Comparative Social Research vol. 35, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2021), pp. 37–68.

<sup>25</sup> Petr Fiala et al, *Český politický katolicismus 1848–2005* (Brno: CDK, 2008), pp. 183 ff, p. 449, 461; see also Elisabeth Bakke, The Czech Party System 20 Years after the Velvet Revolution, in Elisabeth Bakke & Ingo Peters (eds.), *20 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2011), p. 233.

<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the term, see Tim Haughton & Kevin Deegan-Krause, “Hurricane Season: Systems of Instability in Central and East European Party Politics”, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 29 (2015), No. 1, pp. 61–80.

<sup>27</sup> Hodnotové desatero hnutí Starostové a Nezávislí, at <https://www.starostove-nezavisli.cz/onas/volebni-program-a-ideova-vychodiska> [accessed on 14 May 2021].

<sup>28</sup> Pavel Maškarinec, Analýza prostorové podpory a stranického nahrazení na příkladu hnutí Starostové a nezávislí (STAN): Vstup nového subjektu do stranického systému České republiky, *Politické vedy* Vol. 23 (1/2020): pp. 8–31. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2020.23.1.8-31>.

<sup>29</sup> Vladimír Naxera, ‘Let us blow them down!’: Corruption as the subject of (non-)populist communication of the Czech Pirate Party, *Politics*, May 2021. doi:10.1177/02633957211010984.

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- <sup>30</sup> Vlastimil Havlík, The Czech Republic, in Vlastimil Havlík, Aneta Pinková et al, *Populist political parties in East-Central Europe* (Brno: MUNI Press, 2012), p. 117.
- <sup>31</sup> Vít Hloušek, Příliš soukromé Věci veřejné, in Lubomír Kopeček, Vít Hloušek, Roman Chytilík & Petra Svačinová, *Já platím, já rozhoduji! Političtí podnikatelé a jejich strany* (Brno: MUNI Press, 2018), p. 61.
- <sup>32</sup> Petra Svačinová, Úsvit: Potěmkinova vesnice přímé demokracie, in Kopeček et al, *Já platím, já rozhoduji!*, p. 171.
- <sup>33</sup> Petra Svačinová, Poučení z chyb Úsvitu: Svoboda a přímá demokracie, in Kopeček et al, *Já platím, já rozhoduji!*, p. 185.
- <sup>34</sup> On the Stork's nest case and Babiš' conflicts of interest, see "Lex Babiš. What is the Czech prime minister's interest in EU subsidies", VSQUARE 16.04.2020, at <https://vsquare.org/lex-babis-what-is-the-czech-prime-ministers-interest-in-eu-subsidies/>.
- <sup>35</sup> Lubomír Kopeček, ANO: Vytvoření efektivního a loajálního politického stroje, in Kopeček et al, *Já platím, já rozhoduji!*.
- <sup>36</sup> Naše společnost Speciál 2021 únor, CVVM, available at ČSDA, <http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/>. A post-election survey by STEM confirms this (STEM TRENDY 10/2021).
- <sup>37</sup> Anna M. Grzymała-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past. The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 86–87.
- <sup>38</sup> Lubomír Kopeček & Petra Svačinová, Kdo rozhoduje v českých politických stranách? Vzestup nových politických podnikatelů ve srovnávací perspektivě, *Středoevropské politické studie*, 17,(2015):2, pp. 186–187.
- <sup>39</sup> Kopeček & Svačinová, Kdo rozhoduje v českých politických stranách?.
- <sup>40</sup> (Party headquarters). SPD is reluctant to give up precise membership figures, but reportedly had 263 members in December 2015 and 1200 in early 2018, according to Svačinová, Poučení z chyb Úsvitu, p. 195.
- <sup>41</sup> *Population of municipalities of the Czech republic, 1 January 2021*, available at the website of the Czech Statistical Office, at <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/population-of-municipalities-1-january-2021> [accessed on 20 May 2021].
- <sup>42</sup> Pavel Otto, V počtu nových členů vyniká SPD, základna Babišova hnutí se propadá [based on data from party headquarters], *E15.cz* 20.7.2020, at <https://www.e15.cz/domaci/v-poctu-novych-clenu-vynika-spd-zakladna-babisova-hnuti-se-propada-1371553>.
- <sup>43</sup> Even other second-generation parties, such as the now defunct ODA and US-DEU, were organized bottom-up, but their membership was much lower.
- <sup>44</sup> Stanovy politického hnutí SPD, 2020, article VI, 5 at <https://www.spd.cz/volby2021/ke-stazeni/>, Svačinová, Poučení z chyb Úsvitu.
- <sup>45</sup> Stanovy politického hnutí ANO, 2021, article 9; Lubomír Kopeček, "I'm Paying, So I Decide": Czech ANO as an Extreme Form of a Business-Firm Party. *East European Politics and Societies*, 30(2016):4, 725-749.
- <sup>46</sup> Party interview, Pirates, 24 November 2017.
- <sup>47</sup> Party interview, ANO, 6 May 2015.
- <sup>48</sup> Party interview, VV, 17 June 2010; Party interview TOP 09, 20 October 2009; Party interview Úsvit, 12 May 2014; Kopeček & Svačinová, Kdo rozhoduje v českých politických stranách? p. 187.
- <sup>49</sup> Party interview, STAN, 22 November, 2017.
- <sup>50</sup> Party bylaws can be downloaded from party webpages. For a list of Czech party webpages, see <https://elisabeth-bakke.no/links>.
- <sup>51</sup> Party interview, TOP 09, 20 October 2009; Party interview, SPD, 23 November 2018; Party interview, ANO, 19 November 2014; Kopeček, "I'm Paying, So I Decide".
- <sup>52</sup> OECD (2020), Educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds (2019): Percentage of adults with a given level of education as the highest level attained, in *The output of educational institutions and the impact of learning*, OECD Publishing, Paris, doi.org/10.1787/75230926-en.
- <sup>53</sup> According to legend, the Dano-Norwegian flag officer Peter Wessel Tordenskiold in 1719 marched the same few soldiers around the block to create the illusion of massive numbers, and thus made the Swedish commandant at Carlsten fortress (in Marstrand) capitulate.
- <sup>54</sup> Party webpages.
- <sup>55</sup> 10% of the MPs elected in 2010 and 2017, and 18% in 2013 were non-party members. In 2021, 7.5% were non-party members. See [volby.cz](http://volby.cz) for details.