

Monuments and Memory in Peacebuilding Processes:

*The materialization of the imagined future in
Mozambique*

Hannah Strøm Werkland



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Department of Sociology and Human Geography
Faculty of Social Sciences

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Monuments and Memory in Peacebuilding Processes: The re-territorialization through the materialization of the imagined future in Mozambique

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Abstract

Examining the significance of statues as consisting of both material and immaterial components through the case of the Samora Machel monuments in Mozambique, this thesis explores the information embedded in the Samora Machel monuments and how this information can open for discussions on peace processes. Approaching this objective, the thesis is based on a theoretical framework combining the concepts of memory, memoryscapes, and spatial peace. Using a social constructivist approach to memories, peace, and the spaces they exist in, their characterization is understood as a result of continuous power relations between different actors, resulting in their outcomes being context-specific and differentiating across time and space. Examining the case in light of this theoretical framework, the thesis explores the information embedded in the Samora Machel monuments through the historic use of memory, including the memory selection that has occurred and who has had the ability to impact it, in regards to Mozambique's recent peace and conflict history. Continuingly, the memory selection of the past is examined in connection to the events leading up to the construction of the Samora Machel monuments, examining what memories the act of building them expresses. Being aware of how the significance of statues are context-specific and differentiating across time and space, in what ways the symbolic value of the monuments has changed after their building will be examined. Examining this will lead to a discussion on how the building of them was an act of changing the representation of space and how recognizing this act and investigating how people react to this change can open for discussing why the existing peace and the memories the building of the monuments where an expression of is unable to create a lasting peace.

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Figure 1: Photo of the Samora Machel statue in Maputo, Mozambique by Fedor Selivanov/Alamy Stock Foto – Year unknown

CHAPTER 1:

Introduction

The symbolic effect of statues and monuments is becoming increasingly apparent for anyone following global news on conflicts, protests, peace, or even just news in general. During the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, various statues and monuments became the subject of mass protests under the allegations that the raising of racist figures to the status of heroes promotes white supremacy, and several statues and monuments all over the world were defaced and torn down (Selvin & Solomon, 2020; Grovier, 2020). The discussion on the removal of statues and monuments of racists from public space is still ongoing showing a controversy about the history and how we relate to it. Even the statues and monuments in Norway were not safe from these debates, with thousands signing the call to remove the Winston Churchill and the Ludvig Holberg monuments in Oslo (Knutsen & Henschien, 2020). Equally, among the first news heard after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan just a few weeks ago was of them blowing up and decapitating the statue of Abdul Ali Mazari, former leader and representative of the Hazara ethnic group, one of the most discriminated minority groups in Afghanistan, just after declaring an “amnesty” across Afghanistan (Limaye, 2021). The demolition of the statue being carried out in the Bamiyan province, where the Taliban blew up two 1500-year-old Buddha monuments 20 years ago, shows that the reaction to and use of the symbolic meaning of statues and monuments in public spaces is not unheard-of (Storaas, 2021).

When contemplating the fact that statues and monuments provoke such powerful reactions brings up several questions on why statues exist, to begin with, and the nature of our connection to them. Why do we have them? Who builds them? Moreover, for whom and what are they built? These questions demonstrate that statues are as much about the conceptual as they are about the material. When the building of and reaction to a statue happens within a political context of war and peace, these questions become even more potent. Answering them can give information on more than just what is directly concerned with the statues in themselves. It can also say something about the situation and context in which they exist.

1.1 The case

For anyone who has ever been to Mozambique, it is nearly impossible not to have seen a statue of Samora Machel. There is one in every province, and it is one rising nine meters tall in the center of the capital (see figure 1). Samora Machel was the leader of the Mozambican liberation movement, the first president of Mozambique governing the country in its first formative years until he died in 1986, and he is celebrated as the one who brought independence to Mozambique in 1975.

The independence was the result of a 10-year war of independence against Portugal (Virtanen, 2016). Following this independence, only two years passed until a civil war broke out, lasting until 1992 (Vines, 2013). Following the 1992-peace agreement, Mozambique was for a long time viewed as a successful case for conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Muchemwa & Harris, 2019; Weinstein, 2002). Peace, stability, and economic growth seemed to prosper, and the continued democratic transformation and pro-market economic reforms shaped the narrative of a well-executed peace process. However, with the increase of violence and the lack of development and economic growth reaching the population, the narrative of the Mozambican success story is beginning to fade (Muchemwa & Harris, 2019). The country is still among the poorest and most aid-dependent countries globally (Renzi & Hanlon, 2007; Gregson, 2017). The lack of prosperity reaching the population raises questions on what the Mozambican peace includes and if the absence of violence is enough to declare a country as peaceful.

In addition to this, the recent return of violent conflict gives rise to doubt whether the country was free of violence. In 2013, the 1992-peace treaty was broken by the former rebel movement-turned-opposition party (Stuster, 2013). Additionally, in 2017 the news came of the rise of a new insurgency in the north of Mozambique (Pessoa, 2020). Poverty, inequality, and violence persisting in the country show that the transition might not be as transformative as previously assumed and that the peace experienced lacks substance and might not be equal for everyone. Consequently, Mozambique's recent history has largely been influenced by situations of peace and conflict.

In the midst of all this, two years before the 1992-peace treaty was broken, the government decided to build all these monuments of Samora Machel in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Machel's death (Gunter, 2011). During the inauguration of the Samora Machel statue in Nampula, then-president Armando Guebuza declared: *"The values and principles defended by Mozambique's first President, Samora Machel, went beyond politics, and extended*

to the ethical, moral and cultural spheres” (All Africa, 2011). Guebuza’s referral to Machel's values and principles' political, ethical, moral, and cultural spheres during the inauguration of a Samora Machel monument in one of the provinces, a province where the opposition base most of their support, shows that these monuments and their construction are not neutral. The monuments are thus an essential, if not contested, part of building national identity and peace in Mozambique.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze and reflect on how the use of memory affects the symbolism of Samora Machel, how this is materialized in the monuments of him, and how this makes the monuments a platform for discussions on different versions of peace and the situation for peace in Mozambique.

1.2 Theoretical lens

Recognizing the significance of statues and monuments in peacebuilding contexts, I have chosen a theoretical framework to see their interconnectedness with political and societal conditions and how these conditions are socially constructed. Examining the socially constructed nature of statues and monuments’ interconnectedness with political and social conditions includes seeing what actors generate the narratives and knowledge that form the political and societal conditions, the ability the actors have of impacting the narrative and knowledge, and how the statues and monuments, political and societal conditions, narratives, and knowledge emerge in relation to each other. Seeing statues and monuments as built in the past through a selection of what is to be remembered in the future, I will use memories as a tool to approach this selection process. I see memories as constructed in the present and, therefore, not an exact retelling of the past, where the shared memories are products of a society that again shapes the collective memory (Assmann, 2008; Dube, 2015; Erll, 2011).

The construction of memories in the present makes remembering an act that occurs in the interplay between different actors and an outcome based on power relations. To approach and make sense of these power relations, I have chosen to use a Foucauldian understanding of power and knowledge to see how they intersect to create and shape the present (Foucault, 1977; Medina, 2011). This approach enables the investigation of what is remembered, how it is remembered, who does the remembering, what is forgotten or silenced, and its consequences. Approaching memories through a Foucauldian understanding of power and knowledge is helpful when examining how peace and conflict engenders and the role memories play in this.

I have chosen a spatial approach to peace, answering the call for geographers to investigate peace based on geography being a valuable tool for recognizing agency, power, and spatial and scalar realities (Megoran, McConnell & Williams, 2016). A spatial approach to peace allows for seeing peace as a spectrum where peace and conflict can co-exist along with a multitude of peace(s) (Courtheyn, 2017; Koopman, 2011; Williams & McConnell, 2011). This awareness of how peace can mean different things to different people makes it possible to see how the use of statues and monuments in a peacebuilding process can have various outcomes according to who experiences them.

Viewing peace as spatial also requires an understanding of space. In this thesis, I have chosen an anti-essentialist approach to space based on the work of Massey (1991; 1994; 1995) and Lefebvre (1991), which sees space as socially constructed and thus a social product shaped by hybridity. This understanding of space lets me see the interrelations and power relations between actors, between actors and the space(s) they are surrounded by, and how actors might use the symbolic value of space to impact how others experience space.

1.3 Research Questions

Using a theoretical framework built on these concepts of statues and monuments and memory in relation to space and peace, I will explore the history behind the Samora Machel monuments, the agenda leading to the creation of them, and the impact this agenda has had and still has on the peace that exists in Mozambique. The aim of the thesis is to analyze and reflect on what information is embedded in the Samora Machel monuments and how it can be a platform to discuss the social dynamics in the Mozambican peacebuilding process.

To make this research problem researchable, I have translated it into three research questions (Blaikie, 2007:6).

1. What characterizes the peace achieved in Mozambique and what challenges it?
2. What memories embody the Samora Machel monuments, and how is this affecting and being affected by the collective memory of Mozambique?
3. Why is the nature of the existing peace and the memories represented by the monuments unable to build a lasting peace in Mozambique?

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The next chapter, *chapter two*, presents the theoretical framework. Here, the concepts of statues and monuments, memory and memoryscapes, space, and spatial peace will be discussed. It will argue how a theoretical framework based on these concepts will provide a beneficial lens for

approaching the Mozambican peacebuilding process. This argument is developed from how the concepts allow for reflections on the social constructions of space, memory, and peace, what actors are involved, and their power relations. *Chapter three* discusses the methodological and methodical choices, including the ontological and epistemological assumptions, the choice of case study, the data collection strategies, the writing and analysis process, and the ethical considerations of researcher positionality and power. *Chapter four* will function as an instrumental background chapter, elaborating on selected parts of the Mozambican history of war and peace and answering the question of what the situation for peace is today. Chapters five, six, and seven are chapters of analysis. In *chapter five*, I investigate the current situation for peace in Mozambique by examining the power relations when it comes to defining conflict and how the various peace understandings promoted by the different actors involved to see how it influences the outcome of the peace. *Chapter six* will look at the challenges to the peace identified by examining what has been continued from the previous wars and the challenges this brings with it today. In *chapter seven*, I discuss what the use of Samora Machel as a symbol contains historically, what led to the building of the Samora Machel monuments, and how their symbolism has changed since the building of them, explaining their role in the Mozambican peace process. Lastly, in *chapter eight*, I will reflect on the findings to examine the limits of the peace and the memories the monuments represent.

CHAPTER 2:

Theoretical Framework

When looking at what has been chosen to be of symbolic meaning in public spaces, one can get a picture of which memories are passed on, whom they include or exclude, and what influence this can have on the current peace process. While often ignored in human geography, the interconnection between memory, peace, and politics enables discussions on the past and present realities of intersectional violence and is integral in creating alternative forms of peace, justice, and social transformation (Courtheyn, 2016). A cornerstone to the theoretical approach in this thesis is to present how the dynamics of conflict and peace processes are intertwined with different spaces and agencies through material structures. These will be used to see how various agents navigate spatial features influenced by these interactions, which may again lead to material expressions, reshaping and changing space, and how individuals and groups move within them (Buckley-Zistel & Bjorkdahl, 2016). In this thesis, this framework opens for seeing how statues, monuments and peace are connected temporally and spatially. Theories on memoryscapes and spatial peace based on an understanding of space that considers the multitudes of peace(s) co-existing will be used to see this connection and see how statues and monuments are a part of portraying these connections, shape the connections, and, in return, how they shape statues and monuments. The framework also introduces concepts on power dynamics and scalar differences, allowing for critical discussion on agency and representation in the peace process.

To explain how I will use the concepts in this framework, I will begin by going through the meaning of statues and monuments as symbols in public spaces, the concept of memory, and how they materialize in memoryscapes. Examining the relationship between statues and monuments, memory, and memoryscapes will show the process behind the creation of statues and monuments, what they communicate to the spaces and societies they exist in, and how memories impact people's relation to past, present, and future. Continuingly, the understanding of space will be explained, followed by an introduction of spatial peace. Spatial peace is chosen as a theoretical approach based on its function to capture how peace is expressed differently simultaneously and in the same space and how people thus have conflicting experiences with peace. The theoretical conceptualization of statues and monuments, memories, space, and peace

is based on extensive concepts with conflicting perceptions and comprehensions. This chapter untangles this complexity by delimiting them according to the concepts' use in this thesis and explaining their relation.

2.1 Statues and monuments

Statues, the dialogue surrounding them, and their relation to peace are the foundation of this study and will be used to clarify the situation of the peacebuilding process in Mozambique. Therefore, the starting point of this theoretical discussion is to shed light on the meaning of statues and monuments and their connection to peace. Statues are often categorized as part of “material culture,” defined as physical entities that people resonate with (Gaskell & Carter, 2020). This can mean things that are found, selected, adapted, or fashioned for a specific use, either physically, cognitively, or both. Therefore, statues can be said to be something that has been made with a specific purpose by the physical transformation of materials. Statues as monuments often depict deceased human heroes, allowing them to recreate the past in the present (Osmond, Philips, & O’Neil, 2006). This reflects how neither material culture nor statues are exclusively physical. The role of “human purpose in their construction and their place in human thought and action” establishes immaterial components in all material culture items (Gaskell & Carter, 2020:2). A statue brings with it not just the survival of the physical past of that thing, but also the ideologies and choices that went into the design and creation of that statue. In addition to this, it also brings with it the relations that have been produced in relation to it across time and space. The building of statues and monuments becomes a way of trying to create identity. In his study on symbols of power in provincial France, Cohen (1989) shows how statues and monuments were historically used for communicating political values to a people primarily connected to a specific political sense of community and linking them with large and historically significant events for France to create an imagined community for people to envision a common membership in. This shows that statues and monuments have an immaterial component to them that can be used to communicate, reproduce, and transform political values and societal elements, such as peace.

Gaskell and Carter’s (2020) five thematic divisions of interacting with the material world provide analytical insights for this thesis and will be used to explain in which ways statues and monuments influence people’s interaction with the material world. These five thematic divisions are cognition, technology, symbolic, social distinction, and memory. Cognition addresses how humans make and use material things as part of human thought, emotions, and

skills. This includes the coevolution of objects and people and how they affect each other dynamically. The technology division examines the selection, development, and implementation of material things. This includes studying their function, design, stability, adaptability, and ability to remain in the human domain after they become obsolete. The symbolic aspect of material culture examines the selection, development, and implementation of material things in the immaterial realm—for example, the use of material artifacts in the distinction of the sacred or the sacrilegious. As a social distinction, material culture functions as means of marking social differentiation within and among groups. In this sense, material culture establishes boundaries and hierarchies, defines access and rights, and categorizes people through, for instance, notions of gender, ethnicity, and class. Memory addresses the selection, development, and implementation of material things to preserve and regulate past knowledge and shape the present. Through these thematic divisions, I will summarize the processes of remembering and forgetting that have occurred in relation to the monuments when examining the dialogue surrounding the Samora Machel monuments. This summarization will include what aspects of the past has been integrated or excluded from the physical monuments, the values, ideals, and ideologies associated with the monuments and how it has changed, and the social and cultural context important to its location, construction, and maintenance, according to which thematic divisions the monuments express the most influence.

2.2 Memory and memoryscapes

In this section, I will explain how I will use the concept of memories as a social construct constantly negotiated through power struggles to examine how statues and monuments can function as an entry point to understanding the political space surrounding them, and how they shape and transform this space.

Assmann (2008:109) claims that “memory is the faculty that enables us to form an awareness of selfhood (identity)” where identity is related to time. He builds on this by distinguishing time, identity, and memory across three inner, social, and cultural levels. At the inner level, time is subjective, identity is formed as the inner self, and memory is a matter of individual memory or our neuro-mental system. On a social level, memory is a matter of communication with social interaction built on social time with the person as a carrier of social roles. Here, memory is what enables us to live together in communities, while living in communities simultaneously lets us build memory. The third level, which I will use as a basis in this thesis, is the cultural level. At this level, cultural memory is formed across historical, mythical, and

cultural times, forming cultural identity. Cultural memory is objectified in symbolic forms that are stable and situation-transcendent. These objects do not have memories of their own but carry memories that have been invested in them and are used as reminders or triggers on the social level (Assmann, 2008:111). This is what Durkheim calls “collective memory,” arguing that memory is a product of our socialization, which again produces a shared narrative (Dube, 2015:1). Here, shared memories are considered to be positioned through nations’ or communities’ memory work or their process of engaging with the past where memory is not equal to history (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2019:387). Promoting a shared past naturally excludes or silences other historical or temporal interpretations and creates a differentiation between the official stories and the other stories. The official histories create a political body’s unity and continuity. Using the cultural level or the collective memory as my starting point, I can, therefore, examine who is excluded and included when using memory politically, which will also indicate how it might affect the social and inner level through alienation and lack of representation.

The creation of memories is not a neutral process. According to Erll (2011), there are two agreed-upon characteristics of conscious remembering. First, that memory is constructed, and second, that “individual and collective memories are never a mirror image of the past, but rather an expressive indication of the needs and interests of the person or group doing the remembering in the present” (Besley, 2016:316; Erll, 2011:8). Every event is not remembered, and creating memories and identities is thus not a neutral process. While memory first and foremost is regarded as something that exists in historical time, the concepts concerning how the past is interpreted, commemorated, and represented are just as much connected to the understanding of a society’s present and future (Young, 1992; Bodnar, 1992). This makes memory and the interpretation of the past a political phenomenon that is always evolving. Therefore, it is always subject to contestation. In this sense, the contestation and connected political conflicts on memorializing the past become a current struggle for power rather than a commemoration of said past (Jonathan, 2002). Understanding how the process of remembering is not neutral but rather an outcome of a power struggle happening in the present allows for examining the actors involved in this process and seeing their agency and influence in society as a whole.

Foucault (1977:220) said: “If you wish to understand and perceive events in the present, you can only do so through the past, through an understanding—carefully derived from the past—which was specifically developed to clarify the present.” He argues that the relationship

between knowledge and power shapes the present. Knowledge is produced via language that gives meaning to a situation that is represented, and this representation is then circulated in society. The balance of power and representation is not equally shared throughout society, causing some people and historical happenings to be more talked about than others. These voices would have the power to define and maintain certain arguments and institutions in certain situations while other voices are oppressed and silenced. Through the influence of the past, the understanding of the present is, therefore, as much about what is *not* said as what is said. It also concerns which silenced knowledge has the potential to challenge the current holders of power. The silencing becomes part of subjugated knowledge, meaning the parts of historical knowledge that were present but hidden within the body of functionalist and systematizing theory and thus viewed as unqualified or unworthy by hegemonic discourses. Through reflecting on the subjugated knowledge and what Foucault (1980:83) terms “popular knowledge” or knowledge that is not common sense but local knowledge, one can get a full understanding of history and the memory that lies behind hostile encounters or struggles. It is already evident that memory is an important factor in struggles. By controlling memory, one also controls their dynamism. By possessing the collective memory, one can control and administer it, define it, and form what it contains. Using a Foucauldian approach to practices of remembering puts it in a context of power relations, focusing on more than what is remembered or forgotten, but also how it is remembered, by whom, and the effects it can have (Medina, 2011).

Remembering is, therefore, filled with elements of power. However, using a Foucauldian approach, power is not viewed as a traditional, top-down concept but rather as diverse and heterogeneous, flowing in every direction and offering multiple points of resistance (Medina, 2011:10). Within this view, the oppressed are not merely considered powerless and ignorant by default, and questions regarding what counts as legitimate power and knowledge and that power and knowledge have been demeaned and obscured for the oppressed group are key. This leads to multiple battles between multiple knowledges. The subjugated knowledge and the social and political memory formation not heard or integrated in official memory or history, opposes the themes, tradition, and knowledge of official history. In this way, they become part of Foucault’s concept of counter-memory and counter-history (Foucault, 1977:160; Medina, 2011:12). When understanding power and knowledge as inseparable forces, the oppressed are not powerless, but their powers and knowledge have been demeaned and obscured (Medina, 2011:13). By going against the monopolization of knowledge-production through an insurrection of subjugated

knowledge, power struggles on the relation to the past from the present's perspective can happen. In this way, counter-memory functions as a "bottom-up" perspective. It represents how different groups influence existing knowledge and functions as a form of democratization and pluralization of remembering, opposing the official history's sense of unity and continuity (Radzobe, 2019). Approaching power as diverse and heterogeneous allows me to critically examine the struggles against the official and, in that sense, collective memory and be aware of how the monopolization of knowledge-production is challenged. Equally, it shows what voices and actors oppose the mainstream, which allows reflections on who the opposition is in peace and conflict situations.

Memory is also a spatial performance rooted in place and landscape (Courtheyn, 2016:935). In this sense, memory is not fixed to just one site, but moves across and beyond territorial and social borders (Erll, 2011). Memory politics are held in place by local sites, constituting the material heritage of the conflict. In post-conflict landscapes memorials exist in the present to comment on the past while also trying to affect the future (Björkdahl-Kappler, 2019). State-sponsored memory of a nation's past is said by Young (1992) to traditionally aim at certifying the integrity of a nation's birth. When talking about spaces or locales that hold a certain importance for people's relation or narration of the past, we often talk about memoryscapes, or landscapes that memory practice happens on (Butler, 2009; Phillips & Reyes, 2011). Memoryscapes is defined by Phillips and Reyes (2011:14) as a "complex and vibrant plane upon which memories emerge, are contested, transform, encounter other memories, mutate, and multiply". They are, therefore, relational in the sense that they are given meaning through social discourses and practices, both between people and between people and the sites themselves (Kappler, 2017). This can for instance be through circulation of digital media, the built environment surrounding it, or actual memorials such as statues (O'Connor, 2019). Through examining and reading a memoryscape I will, therefore, examine how memories are negotiated, opposed, transformed, and how this transform and shape the spaces surrounding them.

This framework of statues and monuments, memories, and memoryscapes allows for studying statues and monuments as more than just a material object, but also as a part of the immaterial that has the ability to impact and showcase the surrounding dialogues in the spaces they exist in. In this way, statues and monuments can give information about the spaces and societies they are placed in, but also be a part of shaping and transforming these spaces and societies. Combining this with a Foucauldian approach to power and knowledge allows me to examine this in relation to how the process is not neutral and see how knowledges from the past and the

associated powers makes it a contentious issue. The framework brings attention to forgotten voices and experiences by relating to the past using the perspective of the present. By understanding the different actors' positionality and relationality in power relations, we can begin to understand the diversity and the contrasting heterogeneity of resistance. A theoretical framework that approaches monuments and memory spatially while examining power and knowledge hierarchies, the ideological and symbolic relations between people and the material world, and takes the temporal aspects into account allows us to go into the discursive debates about peace and conflict through a different angle. Kappler (2017:131) says, in the context of Sarajevo, that by reading monuments and a city's memoryscape one can form an analysis of the interplay between different social groups. This includes who is considered "local" and "international" and gives a spatial reading of the extent to which the design of the peace process is driven by a multiplicity of actors. This includes a reflection of the underlying power dynamics. Using what is geographically visible as a way of getting access to the means used by society to both relate to the past and to build peace allows one to look at conflict, agency, and power as spatial discursive practices. The geographically visible does not necessarily represent the collective memory, but does provide a useful angle from which to view the subject. In this thesis, this understanding of statues, monuments, memories, and memoryscapes will function as the lens of which peace will be studied through.

2.3 Space

Before going into the discussion on peace, it is necessary to see how space is viewed in this thesis. This thesis follows the critiques that arose during the cultural turn in human geography which resulted in awareness and criticism of the social construction of knowledge by social groups and relates it to specific time-place contexts and cultures (Mirahmadi & Ahmadi, 2018). This means that the research is assessed on the basis of who generates this knowledge and the understanding of space that the spatial peace builds upon reflects this. As a central concept in human geography, space has various conceptualizations and theorizations. In the past, conceptualizations of space and its relationship with society was first focused on the mapping of social characteristics and spatial inequalities (Little, 2014). Critique of the belief that space was passive and the failure to take account of the power relations within society that developed the spatial inequalities formed the foundation of the next approach to space and society, a radical approach showing the relation between society, space, and power. Following the cultural turn in geography, an interest in the co-construction of society and space arose showing

sensitivity to difference and hybrid identities as well as the different, fluid and contested nature of social characteristics and space (Little, 2014:26). In this thesis, space will be discussed both in terms of power relations and the post-structural co-production of space, to get a recognition of structural patterns of disadvantages and a sensitivity to difference. The aim is not to define space, but to see how to approach it as more than absolute space and how it is anti-essentialist and socially constructed. The spatial aspect of spatial peace, which will be the approach to peace that I will be using, concerns how peace relates to space and how perceptions of relationships in space affect peace. Therefore, this explanation of where I position myself will bring clarity to the following theorizations on spatial peace. In addition to this, this explanation will show how space is important in relation to the construction, the use, and the impact of memories.

In his book *Spaces of Global Capitalism*, Harvey (2006:127) argues for a tripartite division of the way space could be understood, as absolute, relative, or relational. Space as absolute is fixed, usually represented as pre-existing and immovable and becomes a “thing in itself”. In a relative view of space, space is seen as something relative to the observer and the relationship between elements located in space only exists because the elements exist and relate to each other. This is taken further in relational space where space is regarded as contained in objects based on the theory that objects can only exist to the extent that they are containing and representing relationships to other objects within itself. Continuing, I will explore space not in absolute terms, but in more abstract terms that enables reflections on the relationship between objects of space.

To explain the more abstract terms of approaching space, I will use elements from Massey’s and Lefebvre’s theorizations on what space is. This delimitation is made based on their anti-essentialist approach to space and the awareness this approach gives to social construction when advancing space. In Massey’s work, this anti-essentialist approach can be seen in her argumentation against the idea that specific locations have to be understood as founded on a reactionary sense of identity (Massey, 1994:137). She asserts that one should view them as “constructions out of the intersections and interactions of concrete social relations and social processes in a situation of co-presence” (Massey, 1994:138). In this way, she argues that space is a product of interrelations between multiple processes of change that co-exist and is constantly constructed. Equally, Lefebvre (1991:26) saw space as social as it assigns locations to social relations and social relations are concretized through space. It is a result of interactions and can thus be described as a complex social construction consisting of social norms, values, and ascribed meanings. By claiming that spatial practice expresses a close connection between

daily reality and urban reality, Lefebvre argues that there is a relationship between the use of space and the material reality of the space used. Like Massey, Lefebvre views the act of creation of social space as a process. Space is produced and is a means of production but also a means of control, domination, and power. Social space is, thus, seen as the space of society and social life and it is here the “subjects” are situated in and where they form and reform their identity. An anti-essentialist approach to space allows for seeing how space is socially constructed and to examine the interrelations between actors, and between actors and their spatial, material, societal surroundings. This is useful when examining the mutual formation of space, memory, and peace.

Space as the product of interrelations between multiple co-existing processes results in spaces being products of hybridity and, resultingly, a product of power relations. When writing about places, Massey (1995:183) points out the hybridity of them through places being constructed out of articulations of social relations that are both internal and external; and places being temporal with a disruption between their past and their present and future. A place’s past is not viewed as only existing in the past, but as being actively built in the present. This results in the past shaping the present while the present also shapes the past, causing conflicting interpretations of the past that serve to legitimate particular understandings of the present and shape how the future will be. Massey notes how different actors strive to define place based on certain understandings of the past. She points out how the dominant identity is the result of social negotiation and conflict between the multiple meanings of places which is part of the struggle to define its present and future and should, therefore, be considered in the light of power relations (Massey, 1994:141; 1991:186,188). Similar to Foucault, Massey argues that claims and counter-claims about the present character of a place depend in almost all cases on particular, rival, interpretations of its past and how histories of the past are constructed to confirm the views of the present (Massey, 1995:185-186). Space as a product of hybridity and power relations through different actors working toward different understandings of the past in the present is, thus, important, both when looking at memories and when understanding the spatiality of peace, as it allows for investigation into the social dynamics between the actors and awareness of diversity in a peacebuilding process.

Lefebvre (1991) also points out the necessity to take power relations into account when studying space. Factors such as knowledge, signs, and ideological conceptualizations made by those in power, shapes the representations of space or how space is perceived. Through power struggles, the representations of space can appropriate the conceptualization of space as directly lived and

what is experienced passively through its images, symbols, and symbolic use of its objects, called the representational spaces, and exploit this symbolic value. In relevance to the study of statues, monuments, and memoryscapes, this approach to space allows investigation on how the social and physical comes together in a process of meaning giving. Bringing with us this understanding of space, one can see how people ascribe meaning to their lives while also seeing these practices and experiences in relation to broader processes and societal structures. Equally, when looking at identity and the competing memories of place or space, we need to consider the interrelations that take part in the process of defining space as well as the coexisting heterogeneity and think of them both temporally and spatially.

In this thesis, the understanding of space will assist in examining the relationship between society, spaces, and power with a sensitivity to difference. This approach to space sets the stage for thinking spatially about peace, memory, memoryscapes and monuments, and engaging with the existence of multiple processes of coexistence. In this way, space in itself becomes the ground of the political, and the investigation of it will give an insight into who generates the dominant knowledge, who challenges it, and how this struggle of defining it takes shape. Space is relational and produced through interactions at different scales making it dynamic, ever-becoming, and heterogenous, allowing one to draw connections between physical space, memoryscapes, and the politics of space and memory by examining these interactions. This is furthered when seeing how space is constantly negotiated across society, influenced by both external and internal processes, which also produces and affects what exists in space. This constant negotiation occurs when constructing memories and how they take part in defining space both temporally and spatially in relation to different pasts and processes of meaning giving, and it occurs when these memories are used as an active part of a peace process.

2.4 Spatial peace

Megoran, McConnell and Williams (2016) have argued that geographers have a historical obligation to focus more on peace and view geography as an appropriate tool for assessing peace because of its focus on politics, agency, and power along with its sensitivity to spatial and scalar realities. Peace and conflict become connected to the spatial by being located in place and, therefore, being about sociospatial relations that are constantly made and remade. They argue for a geography of peace, where geography is used to study not just war, but also peace and within this how peace varies and differs across time and space (Megoran, 2010; Megoran et al., 2016). Responding to this call for geography to assess peace, Williams and McConnell

(2011) have examined the use of existing and potential future geographical research to see what a geography of peace might look like. They argue for geography's role in deconstructing normative assumptions about peace in order to see peace as situated knowledges based in different settings. Through research at various sites and scales, one can see how peace is differentially constructed, materialized, and interpreted (Williams & McConnell, 2011:930). It is based on this argument on challenging these implicit ideas of what peace means and to see how variations of peace co-exist and materialize differently across time, space, and scale that I will use geography as a tool for assessing peace.

The geography of peace framework argues for a turn towards the plurality of peace, as opposed to the dichotomous definition of peace advanced by Galtung and other traditional peace theorists (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2016:83; Höglund & Kovacs, 2010). This is both in regards to how peace has different meanings across time, space, and scale (Megoran et al., 2016), but also in how it differs between groups in one place (Courtheyn, 2017; Koopman, 2020). This shows that war and peace are not binary opposites, but rather a spectrum opening up for the possibility of peace and war existing at the same time in the same space (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2016; William & McConnell, 2011:930; Koopman, 2011:193). When peace is shaped in its interaction with space and what is in space, then different understandings of peace are not only brought into space with the different relations but they will also materialize differently in the meeting with space. Moving away from dichotomous categorizations of war and peace is essential to truly understanding why many post-conflict societies do not reach a lasting peace and in seeing the complex reality and explaining the different outcomes of peacebuilding processes.

In addition to this, the focus is switched away from peace research only being an examination of war, towards a more expansive and critical theorization about what peace means and contains (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2016; Koopman, 2011; Williams, 2013). That means the theoretical focus shifts from peace being defined by what it is not to an understanding of what peace actually is. The concept of peace and what it contains is not neutral and can be used as a tool of war. Switching towards trying to see how peace is described, who constructs it, and why, is important when looking at how peace has been approached and to see what actors are promoting which understanding of peace. The ontological background when approaching peace has an effect on how peace is viewed and the different materializations and interpretations of peace. Categorizing peace into different theoretical approaches becomes a tool through which the implications of theorization, ontology, epistemology, and methodology for a concept of peace can be viewed (Richmond, 2002). As a foundation when approaching the different theorizations

on peace, I will use Richmond's (2020) conceptualization and evolution of peace in International Relations theory for all the ontological backgrounds, with the exception of the authoritarian or illiberal peace. The authoritarian or illiberal peace will be based on Lewis, Heathershaw & Megoran (2008), Linz (2000), Smith, Waldorf, Venungopal, & McCarthy (2020), and Hackenesch's (2015) work, since it is field that is not explored as much yet and these sources have a more extensive exploration of authoritarian and illiberal peace.

After World War I, the understanding of peace lies in idealism, depicting a peace where the world is in complete social, political, and economic harmony (Megoran, 2010:179; Richmond, 2020:18). While this sounds desirable, it is also effectively viewed as unobtainable. On the other hand, realism views peace as impossible, but that war can be held off through the maintenance of order by a powerful hegemon or an international system (Megoran, 2010:180). Peace is found in a state-centric balance of power and power sharing, thus also limiting peace to this, with research as a needed tool to understand how it operates (Richmond, 2020).

Liberal peace has for a long time been the dominant focus in peacebuilding practices and will, therefore, receive more focus here than the other categories. Liberal peace's ontological background builds on liberalism which became the main challenge to realism (Megoran, 2010). In liberalism, also including liberal internationalism, neoliberalism, liberal-imperialism, and liberal-realism, peace is seen as existing in the institutionalization of liberal norms, such as economic, political, and social institutionalization of cooperation, regulation, and governance (Richmond, 2020). Research here focuses on the condition and processes of such governance. In liberal peace, peace is thought to be universal and achievable through the representation of universal agreements and norms by international institutions and organizations. A strongly held belief within international liberal peacebuilding and at the scale of governments is the universality of how to plan, promote, build, and sustain peace (MacGinty & Richmond, 2013; Megoran et al., 2016). Liberal peacebuilding has mainly been driven forward by international actors, such as the US, UK, Germany, the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Paris, 2004).

The singular idea and understanding of peacebuilding that liberal peace promotes has shown to not only be ineffective, but has also been met with resistance when implemented. Critiques of liberal peacebuilding claim the peace it results in is of inferior quality and is a stalled and dysfunctional peace where structural violence continues to exist, lacking justice, equality, and development (Höglund & Kovacs, 2010; MacGinty, 2010a). The modern liberal peace model

is criticized by Courtheyn (2017:742), among others, for not leading to anything that can be considered “peace” at all. He points out how modern-liberal peace more often leads to a victors’ peace, repression of dissent against injustice, or institutionalized hierarchies of exploitation that he would not categorize as “peace”. In addition to this, the large-scale, top-down format of liberal peacebuilding has been said to cause conflicts between local and international understandings of peace and peacebuilding, resulting in a hybridized peace (MacGinty, 2010b:395). This interplay between multiple actors, promoting different understandings of peace is criticized for leading to none of the actors’ peace being fully implemented, causing liberal and illiberal norms to interact and clash and creating a “peace” not necessarily based on legitimate and accountable democratic institutions, often characterized by poverty and insecurity (MacGinty, 2010a). The targeted societies having histories of themselves, and the “liberal peace” agenda implemented on them does not meet a blank canvas but is met with different structures and thoughts causing hybridity and varieties of peace.

Along with the criticism of liberal peace and the contestation on the ideas of liberal peacebuilding in the international system have governments in peacebuilding processes increasingly replaced negotiations with authoritarian practices and state coercion when trying to suppress armed rebellions, especially after the 2010s, creating a form of illiberal peace (Lewis et al., 2008:486). This shift also reflects the changes in the global power hegemony with the rise in influence of authoritarian powers, such as China and Russia (Hackenesch, 2015). Authoritarian political systems are systems with limited political pluralism, without extensive political mobilization, where a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits (Linz, 2000:159). This authoritarian framework for building peace executes this through reducing opportunities and resources for any opposition or resistance to mobilize by maintaining hegemonic control of public discourse, space, and economic resources (Lewis et al., 2008:491). While there is little written about what illiberal peacebuilding is precisely, this authoritarian framework gives an inclination to possible identifiers. The actors involved in illiberal peacebuilding are usually domestic (Smith et al., 2020).

In structuralism and Marxism, peace is seen as dependent on social justice, solidarity, and international cooperation based on socialist thought, along with the absence of certain types of structural violence (Richmond, 2020). Marxism unfolded as an important challenge to both realism and liberalism (Megoran, 2010:180). An upheaval in traditional class structures, international economy, and systems based on imperialism is here seen as necessary for peace

to be achieved. Peace research here is aimed at uncovering power relations and their injustice to form a response.

In critical theory and post-structuralism, the interest lies in identifying structures of hegemony and domination (Richmond, 2020). Peace here is only achievable by understanding the relationship between power and discourse and seeing which behaviors are constrained or not, while also discouraging the formation of any prescriptive behavior. They promote an emancipatory peace that considers justice, identity, and representation in multiple forms. A difference between the two is how critical theory goes for a universal basis for peace through ethical communication forms, while post-structural approaches are more vary of universal ideas of peace and investigate the multiple and co-existing concepts of peace, which is also the focus in spatial peace and the ontological background for understanding peace in this thesis.

When seeing how the ontological background and the approaches to peace have changed from World War I until today, it is clear that the understanding of what peace is and should be changed. The changes in what peace is has implications for any political and structural transformations that are made based on these understandings. In this regard, Koopman (2020:1) argues that by understanding peace as an ongoing socio-spatial process and by looking at how it is or is not inclusive of difference can help to build more inclusive and stronger peace(s). This review of the ontological backgrounds of peace will be used to approach how peace can be a result of these different understandings of what peace is and should be and how memories and memoryscapes are used as a part of this process while also reflects these processes.

The argument is that it is not only differences, but also power hierarchies and social relationships that shape the connections and inform the construction and experience of peace (Williams, 2013:232). The structuring of who has this power is also a part of wider socio-spatial processes. As opposed to the liberal peace model, peace in a spatial peace approach is not located at the nation-state level, but rather as a continuous process of “mutually enabling transversal social relations” at the “distributed intersection of intersubjective and material relationships” (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2016:87; Williams, 2013:233). Thus, peace means different things at different scales (Koopman, 2011:194). The concept of scale is not socially or politically neutral, but manifests and expresses power relations (Swyngedouw, 1997). This process is characterized as deeply heterogenous, conflictual, and contested. Through scales mobilized by individuals, groups, or the state, problems and solutions are framed in a certain way and this shapes the path of action (Molle, 2007). As scales are produced and reproduced

through the interaction between inherent social structures and emergent social and political projects, scales are not a fixed hierarchy (Swyngedouw, 1997). When only focusing on the scale of states, governments, and international relations, these elements become lost and with it an important part of understanding peace. State-centric approaches are also inclined to reproduce racist and patriarchal power relations and concealing alternative notions of peace (Courtheyn, 2017:741). Focusing too much on national-level measures of war or peace, however, restricts the accounting of local variations (Campbell et al., 2017). Conflict and cooperation not only occur in different areas and substantially in the same area but also fluctuate in these areas. They can coexist, and the absence of one does not mean the presence of the other, and both must be examined jointly to understand differences and variations in peace (Campbell et al., 2017:93). Taking multiple levels of analysis into account enables different approaches to reflecting on power. Realizing that peacebuilding involves a multitude of strategies takes into account the various power dynamics between actors at different times and scales and allows for examining the implications of these power dynamics. When seeing how the ontological background and the approaches to peace have changed from World War I until today, it is clear that the understanding of what peace is and should be changed.

The focus in peace geographies is on peace as a process that is relational in its spatiality; that peace can be interpreted in many ways and should be seen as a spectrum opening up for peace and conflict existing at the same time; that peace shapes and is shaped by social, cultural, economic, and political dynamics and can thus be used as a political discourse for different means; and that studying this will have an impact on our understanding of peace and peacebuilding (Courtheyn, 2017; Megoran, McConnell, & Williams, 2016). Peace means different things to different people in different places and the meaning is relationally grounded in place, bodies, and national settings (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2016; Koopman, 2011:194; Williams, 2013:232). Peace is understood as a process that is not fixed but dynamically produced and reinvented, an understanding that most researchers now have agreed upon (Courtheyn, 2017; Richmond, 2020). In addition to this, peace is thought of as being relational, meaning peace is not a static thing but shaped in a mutual relationship with time and space and the actors involved, such as narratives, politics, and practices of power that are situated and shift across sites and scales (Williams, 2013). I argue that a spatial approach to peace shows that peace is context specific, that different forms of peace exist, and that these forms of peace vary across time and space, showing a plurality of peace(s). In addition to this, there is no set

difference between war and peace, but the two should rather be seen as a spectrum where both can coexist and be more or less present simultaneously.

2.5 Towards a theoretical framework

As I have argued above, the investigation of what has been chosen to be of symbolic meaning in public spaces through examining the memories they enhance and convey can enable discussions on the past, present, and future realities of intersectional violence and help to explain the different dynamics of peace processes. Symbols, memories, and knowledge can be used to shape how space is represented and understood, and who has the ability to utilize statues and monuments in this way and how they are able to do it gives an inclination on the power relations between the different actors involved, who they are, and their role in the peacebuilding process is.

The memories statues and monuments “contain” and the space they exist in are, as argued, not neutral. Space and memory being products of social construction through interactions between individuals and groups living in and relating to the spaces and memories makes it important to see who produces and transforms the knowledges they are built on. The Foucauldian approach to power allows for this through the understanding that contestations involving knowledge and power is what shapes the present. Viewing this power as diverse and heterogenous gives room for not only seeing the dominating knowledges, but also how subjugated or forgotten knowledges and memories challenge and creates hybridity.

The objectification of cultural memory in symbolic forms, brings with it the power struggles and non-neutrality of memory production in a matter that is situation transcendent. In so doing, a statue/monument holds in its immaterial meaning the image through which memories have emerged through contestations in the past and how they are actively transformed and encountered in the present. Investigating the impact statues and monuments have and the dialogue surrounding the statues and monuments can shed light on what lies behind the erection of them and see how these ideologies and choices have transformed and are a result of their continuous production and re-production in meeting with the relative and relational space they exist within across time, scale, and space.

Bringing the concepts of the objectification of cultural memory in space to the foreground when examining the Mozambican peace process allows for awareness of the spatiality of peace. A spatial approach to peace allows for seeing how the plurality of peace co-exist and co-evolve and, through this, to investigate what this war-to-peace spectrum contains. Examining what the

war-to-peace spectrum contains helps build an understanding of what the situation for peace in Mozambique is today, what it is a result of, and what challenges further peacebuilding. By emphasizing the immaterial aspect of statues and monuments on basis of them being made with a specific purpose though the physical transformation of material, it is possible to see how they can have impacts on more than just the absolute space they are placed in, but also the politics and via this the peace process they are a part of.

2.6 Summary

In this chapter, I have explained how the tensions and perceptions of the memoryscapes defined by the statues of Samora Machel and the different actors that established and challenged their significance through the narratives and debates around these spaces of commemoration will be examined in this thesis. The statues are of interest through their reflection of underlying power dynamics that are inherent in the peacebuilding process, showing the disputes about the who, whats, and whys of the peace, both locally and internationally. The fluctuating meanings of memoryscapes function as transformers of societal discourse, reinforcing dominant narratives while also embodying resistance when these narratives are challenged by being a manifestation of stories in space. This includes narratives of peace and peacebuilding and transformations of discourses on potential peace(s). Reading these memoryscapes allows for analysis of different social groups interactions across time, space, and scale, or how the peace process is shaped by an array of actors with different interests that can be read spatially. Memory is seen as an integral part of peacebuilding as the thoughts and visions of the past impact the nature and shape of the peace constructed. By combining the focus on politics of memory and the work on spatial peace, I am going to see how practices of commemoration embody conflicts about the origin of a conflict itself, the connected social roles and actors involved in the peacebuilding process, and what it can say about the peace process today.

CHAPTER 3:

Methods and Methodology

In this chapter, I will present and reflect on the methods and the methodological choices that have been made throughout the research process. These choices form the foundation of how this research has been conducted. I will first present the overall research design, the selection of the site and case, and my positionality going into the research. Subsequently, I will present my data collection strategies and the connected choices and reflections surrounding this, followed by a review of my writing and analysis process. In the concluding part, I will reflect critically on the ethical considerations and my position in knowledge production.

3.1 Ontological and epistemological assumptions

The point of departure of this thesis is, as noted in the introduction through the research problem, to analyze and reflect on what information is embedded in the Samora Machel monuments and what examining monuments and this information can say about the social dynamics of the Mozambican peacebuilding process. Based on this, one can say that the foundation of the research is to examine the material and socially constructed world of social reality (Blaikie, 2007:13). Examining the material and socially constructed world of social reality includes observing how it can have an impact on people's lives, seeing how it is connected with underlying structures and mechanisms while still being a product of the interpretations of social actors shaped by power relations, and understanding how statues and monuments are materializations of these processes (Blaikie, 2007:16). This ontological point of departure is reflected in how statues and monuments are seen as materializations of ideologies, histories, and memories that shape the collective narrative of Mozambique and how this is a product that is being shaped and reproduced through contestations between the involved actors.

In this sense, the research also builds on social constructionism, where knowledge is the outcome of social actors making sense of their encounters with the physical world and with other social actors (Blaikie, 2007:22). With its interconnected use of memory, materialized culture, and contested understanding of peace, the peace process is a structure of ideas. These ideas are human beings' and social actors' products of the intersubjective, meaning-giving activity in their everyday lives (Blaikie, 2007:23). Social actors may navigate and, in this way, drive the process intentionally and unintentionally, linking the changing and maintaining of the

symbolic value of the statues and monuments to power relations and the multitude of social characteristics and space (Cresswell, 2013:208). Since the different cultures have different constructions of social reality, these ideas become a product of social construction and are thus not seen as natural.

3.2 Research design

The methodological approach to this research project is through a qualitative theory-informed case study where existing theories and concepts are used to examine a specific phenomenon (Baxter, 2016). By studying statues and monuments to understand the Mozambican peace process, I will be interpreting a culturally and historically significant phenomena to see how they affect the way we understand a society or a nation, a goal that is central in qualitative research (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:103). The in-depth examination of a phenomenon that qualitative research allows me to do, opens up for giving voice to actors outside of society's mainstream, and to investigate people's own experiences and interpretations of peace, and via this to see how they also are part of shaping the social reality the statues and monuments are a part of (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:101; Winchester & Rofe, 2016).

To produce knowledge on social phenomena, a researcher has to choose a research strategy, or a logical approach, for how to answer a research question (Blaikie, 2007:56). While research strategies have been constructed to have incompatible logics of inquiry, it is possible to combine them, by for instance using them in sequence or incorporating one in parts of another. Aiming to shed light on how the understanding of peace and people's relation to it is an outcome of the politicizing of memory in memoryscapes and to see how social actors influence the peace process and, I have used both abductive and retroductive research strategies. Abductive research strategy takes aim at explaining and understanding the social life with the social actors as the starting point (Blaikie, 2007:89). The goal is to discover their language, meanings, and accounts of everyday activities to see how they construct and give meaning to reality. The findings will then be used to explain this reality and to develop theories. These theories are not necessarily grand metanarratives, but rather descriptions of why the particular is particular (Blaikie, 2007:10). Through retroductive research strategy, the aim is to locate the real underlying structure(s) or mechanism(s) responsible for producing an observed regularity (Blaikie, 2007:9). Its cyclical logic of inquiry and exploration of the world by systematic alternation between induction and deduction opens for reflection on the abstract and the concrete as means for theory building (Blaikie, 2007:82). In this thesis, the social structures will be looked at in relation to cognitive mechanisms and socially constructed rules for behavior. By combining

abductive and retroductive research strategies, I am able to see the agency of the social actors and to critically assess what they say in relation to their social worlds (Blaikie, 2007:104).

3.2.1 Selecting the site and case

The selection of the site of research was done prior to the selection of the case since, in a manner that is often common with development researchers, Mozambique has been my country of interest throughout my studies (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:105,175). The selection of the case, however, happened through extensive reading about topics related to Mozambique and was formed gradually based on both a combination of purpose and serendipity and by taking account of what was practical and appropriate (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016:121). This way of selecting a case facilitated for an interactive relationship between data collection and analysis, allowing me to stay open to new insights throughout the process, making it easier to observe the interplay between subjective experiences of the everyday and broader historical and structural relations (Bailey et al. 1999:174).

3.2.2 Positionality

Complete neutrality does not exist within qualitative methods, and it is important to be aware of the active role I as a researcher play in this way of research (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019). Even when studying a single case, there is potentially an infinite amount of knowledge, and a researcher must filter what is deemed relevant or redundant (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:102). Therefore, it is important to be clear about one's own position and personal engagement in the research and how this can influence the finished product.

Having previously lived and conducted fieldwork in Maputo shaped my positionality in the research and to the case. In one way, it granted me access, as I already had a network to reach out to, and that could introduce me and secure access to new informants. In this way, I became sort of an insider, being included in informal conversations among friends and family through online group chats (Dowling, 2016:39). However, for the most part, and increasingly when I would need help understanding language, local sociolect, or cultural codes, I would be seen as an outsider, with the consequences and vantage points this brings with it. Being an outsider made it possible to see and question what might be taken for granted and obvious, opening for detangling the field in new ways (Sæther, 2006). In addition to having an insider/outsider role, I would also bring my personal culture, ideas, and embodied experiences, which will have an effect on the research (Kearns, 2016). Balancing these roles and being aware of my background was, therefore, a constant process throughout the research, especially as most of the research

focus was on who shapes different realities and what they consist of, the balance of power within this, and how we again are influenced by the dominant knowledge and the mainstream.

3.2.3 Research design changes and writing a thesis during the Covid-19 pandemic

This thesis has been written during strange times filled with lockdowns and closed borders, and it has, without a doubt, had an impact on every aspect of this thesis. The closing of country borders in 2020 rendered the original fieldwork plans impossible and created a need to rethink the thesis topic and the data collection strategies. New strategies and the extensive reliance on technology for contact gave both new possibilities and new challenges. Losing access to every resource that could not be found in one's own home for long periods of time was challenging in every aspect, from structural issues and practical execution to mental challenges. In addition to this, conducting fieldwork from one's own bedroom in an era filled with discussions on postcolonial research opened up questions about one's own positionality and ability in the research.

The most significant change was that my original plan of conducting a fieldwork, with all the field interviews and observations this contained, in Mozambique was rendered impossible. While having already been to Mozambique on several occasions lessened the impact this had on the research project, it still prevented me from being present in the social reality I was studying, limiting the degree of how involved and the extent of my understanding of the field. Consequently, the research design was adapted to a digital fieldwork, however, this also brought with it other changes. Instead of having an interview and primary data driven research, the digitalization made this challenging, and I early decided it would be better to base the research on secondary data with supporting data from interviews.

3.3 Data Collection Strategies

Most of my sources were, as mentioned, based on documents. To ensure rigor and triangulation, as well as to collect data not as readily found in documents, I also conducted an interview, online focus group interviews, and online observations (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016). The data collection from document sources happened throughout most of the research process, while the interview, focus groups, and online observations were carried out between April 12th and July 28th, 2021. The data collection strategies were in large parts shaped by the digitalization of the fieldwork.

3.3.1 The digitalization of a fieldwork

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all of the research for this thesis had to be conducted digitally and online. In regards to interviews, Dunn (2016) mentions how the relationship established between interviewer and informant often is critical to conducting good interviews and how movements, expressions, and gestures of the informants are valuable parts of an interview; Cameron (2016:217), brings up the importance of non-verbal signs in communication when conducting focus group interviews; and the imputed characteristics of place and the feelings of social actors in observations are emphasized by Kearns (2016). These elements are in a sense lost, or at least severely diminished through the digitalization of fieldwork. In addition to this, the social and spatial differences when it comes to access to technology and internet in the field of research brought with it limitations on what participants I could reach out to and get to participate in the research (Winders, 2016).

On the other hand, the digitalization of fieldwork also opened up new possibilities when conducting research. Having to recruit participants for the online focus group interviews online opened up for reaching out to and easily combining participants from different parts of the country which made it possible to see the conversation in light of regional differences and the participants' reaction to these, often just through off-handed comments such as "haha, well yes, but you're from Inhambane". This made it possible to talk more about what the location-based opinions on Samora Machel were and how it differed from others. In addition to this, the increased digitalization of data material that has been typical of the last decades and the escalation of this during the COVID-19 pandemic has also helped this aspect of the research process to a degree where the amount of possible data could seem daunting and almost exhausting (Winders, 2016).

3.3.2 Document sources

A large part of the data used in this research has been based on secondary document sources, such as reports and academic work. Documents are here classified as textual sources not directly derived by the researcher (Thagaard, 2013). When reading secondary sources, I have focused on reading them selectively and critically (Meth & Williams, 2006). To do this, I have approached the documents with certain critical questions in mind and have evaluated and interpreted what I have read, rather than just accepting it as "the truth" and have then analyzed the sources in total, reflecting on their themes. What actors and how actors produce and reproduce their social reality is, as mentioned, a point of departure for this research. Who has written the different texts and what their agenda might be, has, therefore, been influential in the

document selection. Making sure to have a broad representation based on gender, nationality, and background has been prioritized.

I put extra weight on gathering a diverse selection of documents and texts when answering research question one, since the aim was to uncover an understanding of the events that have shaped the current situation in a way that is as nuanced as possible. In addition to this, several of the texts functioning as the background when answering research question two were references to quotes and speeches told by different members of the societal landscape in Mozambique. When reading these, I was especially aware of how they might have been interpreted differently by those quoting them, and if possible, tried to go back to the original texts/videos to see how.

In regards to the use and reliance on secondary sources, it is important to be clear about what sources have covered which areas of my research previously and how I have built on it. For studies of previous use of memory and forgetting in Mozambique I have built on the work by Igreja (2010; 2013), de Souto (2013), and Pitcher (2006).

Coming from the central Mozambican province, Manica, Victor Igreja did his PhD at the University of Leiden and is currently a senior lecturer at the University of Southern Queensland. Igreja has written several articles on the politics of memory and the use of memory as a weapon and has seen this in regards to state-building, giving important insight into the connection between politics, power, and memory that opens up for new thoughts on what this possibly means in regards to peacebuilding.

Amélia Neves de Souto a historian at the Centre for African Studies at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. De Souto brings in the historical perspective on the use of memory. Researching the transmission of history and memory in connection to Frelimo from 1975 until today, she gives insight into what has shaped today's collective memory.

Anne Pitcher is a research professor at the University of Michigan studying the comparative politics of developing countries with a focus on Africa. Compared to the other sources, Pitcher writes with a more outsider perspective which gives an entrance to the field that is different to the other two and enables insight into questions that might be taken for granted by an insider (Sæther, 2006). Pitcher also looks at memory in terms of scale in Mozambique, researching who is doing the forgetting and who is doing the remembering.

While I have found no sources writing about the connection between Samora Machel, his memory in society, and the monuments, Rantala (2016) writes about the use and symbolism of Machel in rap music. Janne Rantala is a postdoctoral fellow in anthropology at the University of the Western Cape with a background from the University of Eastern Finland. In this thesis, I use some of his connections between the use of Machel and his legacy as a form of representation in other everyday practices as inspiration for seeing the connection between Machel the person, his history and the formation of his memory, and the monuments.

To see the connection between memories, peace, and conflict I use Courtheyn (2016) and I use Kappler (2017) to see the connection between monuments, memories, and conflicts.

Chris Courtheyn is a political geographer and ethnographer researching and teaching at the Boise State University specializing in Latin America. He writes about the use of memory as resistance in Colombia, showing how memory has spatial practices and how place-based memories can be related to the construction of peace.

Stefanie Kappler is professor in conflict resolution and peacebuilding at Durham University. Her field of interest is in the contested and transformative nature of local imaginations of peace and in the sources used in this thesis she focuses on this in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using Sarajevo as a case, Kappler shows how memorials are platforms on which different versions of peace and social justice are narrated and discussed.

These different sources give insight into the use of memory in Mozambique, the symbolism of Samora Machel, and the relation between memories, monuments, peace, and conflict. Building on this, I reflect and analyze on how the use of memory affects the symbolism of Machel, how this is materialized in the monuments of him, and how this makes the monuments a platform for discussions on different versions of peace and situation for peace in Mozambique.

3.3.3 Interviews and focus groups

I have used interviews, both one-on-one and focus group interviews as supplementary data meant to give information on different viewpoints and perceptions of the Samora Machel monuments from the general population's interaction with them

When beginning this project, there were primarily two groups I had decided to focus on. The first group were people in positions thought to have considerable knowledge on the Mozambican post-conflict situation, the peace building process, and the use of memory in identity building and in material culture and thus may have valuable information for my research project. The

second group consisted of the everyday Mozambican citizen whose lives would be impacted by the memoryscapes the Samora Machel monuments were part of and who would also in their way be part of influencing the discussion surrounding it. I chose this with a plan to gather different types of knowledge, where the first group was chosen with the aim of investigating complex behaviors and to provide background knowledge, while the second group was primarily aimed at collecting a diversity of meaning, opinion, and experiences (Dunn, 2016:150). However, when it became impossible to meet with people in real life, I changed my strategy on this. Instead, I chose to base the information I would obtain from interviewing the first group on secondary sources and rather focused the time spent collecting data from primary sources on the second group. This was decided based on the accessibility of the different kinds of information, where the first groups' opinions were much more readily available as secondary sources than that of the everyday Mozambican.

Based on this evaluation on what information that was mostly needed from interview and focus groups sources as well as time constraints and the need to prioritize, I ended up doing one Zoom-interview with an informant categorized within the first group. For the second group of informants, I conducted online focus group interviews through five different WhatsApp chats. Two of these were group interviews, two were one-on-one interviews, and one was a smaller three-person group. The smaller three-person group and one of the one-on-one interviews were informants from the larger groups who wished to speak in a more private format and one was a stand-alone interview. In total, I interviewed 18 people through WhatsApp interviews.

Both the interview and the online focus groups followed a semi-structured interview format (see appendix 1) where the interviews followed certain themes with some questions laid out, but there was room for the interviewees to develop their responses and for me to build on these developments (George & Stratford, 2016; Willis, 2006:144). All interviews included some orientation questions, to establish the participant's background. These questions proved to be indispensable in the online focus group interviews, since only having access to people's phone number and possibly a profile picture made these questions your single source of background information. The remaining pre-planned questions followed the structure of a primary question to initiate discussion on a new theme and then some secondary questions to encourage the informants to follow up or expand on the issues discussed (Dunn, 2016:154). The ordering of the questions followed a hybrid of the funnel and pyramid structures, where the interviews began with simpler questions relating to personal experiences on Samora Machel before moving to more abstract and reflective and then sensitive questions on Machel's meaning for the

political situation in Mozambique and the current challenges for peace in the country (Dunn, 2016:157).

The online focus group interviews were synchronous group interviews happening in real-time (Cameron, 2016:217). The participants could answer at their own time, through text and voice message, where most participants chose to answer in text. Their being able to answer in their own time, meant that they could partake in the online interviews for as long as they wanted. I opted for not setting a specific time limit for the conversation, to make it as easy as possible for the participants to participate. However, this resulted in the interviews taking a long time to conduct. Since it is also advised to maintain a critical inner dialogue during these interviews and to constantly plan, analyze, and formulate the next step, this became a rather intense period, since people's own time was not always the same and the conversation was thus kept going constantly through several days.

Conducting interviews online in this way is advantageous as it expands the sample, reduces the interviewer effect, enhances convenience, and facilitates more reflective informant responses (Dunn, 2016:179). The fact that it allows a researcher to overcome spatial, temporal, and social barriers was extra noticeable when everything else was so closed down. However, these benefits bring with them certain weaknesses, such as there being a spatial and temporal displacement between the researcher and the informants (Dunn, 2016:181). The need for having access to the internet has an effect on who can participate and visual cues or paralinguistic clues do not translate to this format, making it difficult to judge the informants' feelings behind the answers. It also removes the possibility of experiencing places and people in their places. In an attempt to at least partially overcome the spatial challenge of having no visual aid, I asked the informants if they could send photos of the monuments they would pass in their daily lives, if they could and were comfortable with that. The photos I received helped put some visual context behind their answers, and were used as part of observation as research strategy and triangulation.

I did not record or transcribe the Zoom-interview. I did, however, take extensive notes, which, considering the digital format, was easily done on a computer without it interfering with the flow of the conversation as much as note taking might do in a physical interview setting (Dunn, 2016; Winders, 2016).

3.3.4 Sampling of informants

When sampling for research participants, I began by engaging my already existing network in Mozambique. Since the knowledge needed by the participants in the second group was simply the ability to reflect on one's own position in Mozambique and one's own feelings towards Mozambican history, Samora Machel, and the Samora Machel monuments, there was no high threshold for participation and everyone I got in contact with could have some opinions on the matter. I did, however, wish to get the opinion from as diverse a group as possible. Since I took my own network as a starting point and most of my network is made up of youth in Maputo, I ended up using a combination of snowball sampling and criterion sampling, where I asked to be referred to people of a certain gender, age, and geographic area to ensure a certain amount of representation (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016:124). However, as this was qualitative research, I did not aim for perfect representation, but rather on analyzing meanings in specific contexts.

Out of the 18 informants participating in the online focus group interview, there are six of them used directly in the thesis where the comments either summarized a conversation well or they offered valuable insight not mentioned by the others: Carlos (40) from Inhambane, Marla (26) from Maputo, Nelson (22) from Maputo, Hélder (26) unknown location, Deolinda (35) from Maputo, and Vasco (30) from Montepuez, Cabo Delgado. All the names are pseudonyms to ensure anonymity.

The Zoom-interview was with an academic expert in the field who was reached out to through email and will be referenced to as interview informant 1, 12.04.2021.

3.3.5 Trust

The relationship between the interviewer and informant often has an impact on the data collected (Dunn, 2016:162). This includes the ability to create an environment where the participants felt safe and to build trust with the informants (Cameron, 2016). The interviews happening online, and especially the WhatsApp interviews, made this challenging in new ways I had not been part of previously. To build trust and a safe environment, I began every group chat by sharing information and giving an impression of who I am, hoping it had a reassuring effect. Every informant I gained access to happened via someone I had met on previous visits to Mozambique. Being referred to by a common acquaintance meant that I already had someone's approval which could have a positive impact, making them feel safe. However, this also meant that any sense of anonymity an online focus group of this manner could give would never be complete anonymity, which could also have an effect on the conversation flow.

3.3.6 Language and translation

Mozambique is a multilingual country and while the only official language is Portuguese, this is for the most part spoken by people as a second language. After having lived in Mozambique and Portugal, I have picked up some of the language, but as it is not even my second language, the possible challenges language can impose should not be taken lightly (Bujra, 2006). However, the fact that all conversation was done over WhatsApp eased this language barrier. Since most of the conversation was done over text, I had the opportunity to read through what had been written multiple times and if I had any difficulties formulating myself clearly, I had the option of asking Portuguese speaking friends for assistance. Equally, when receiving voice messages, I could listen to them several times, making sure I understood everything. However, ideas and concepts cannot always be translated and translations are rarely free of the political and social views of the translator, although I have strived towards reducing any influence this might have on my findings (Bujra, 2006).

When organizing the different focus groups, I gave the option of both an English and a Portuguese focus group, where seven informants chose to participate in the English-speaking focus group. Conducting focus group interviews in both languages gave me the opportunity to compare the answers and possibly filter out any major language-based misunderstandings (Sumner & Tribe, 2008:119).

3.3.7 Data and privacy

Conducting interviews online opens up for new questions concerning the privacy of the participants since internet communications can be intercepted and traced (Dunn, 2016:182). Before commencing the data collection process, I made a plan for ensuring the safety of the participants would be upheld and got the Norwegian Data Protection Service' (NSD) approval of this strategy. All participants received information about the purpose of the research, what to expect, the intended data use, and their rights in the project with focus on anonymity and confidentiality. They could confirm them receiving this information by signing the document containing this information or by stating their agreement in text. When choosing the platform used to conduct interviews, I went for platforms with end-to-end encryption and any notes that were stored outside of the platforms were anonymized and coded.

3.3.8 Observations

While in person observation was rendered impossible, I tried to compensate for this by a form of online observation (Kearns, 2016; Winders, 2016). This included paying attention to political and cultural happening in Mozambique, through for instance music, which was especially

relevant because of the use of Samora Machel in music, as will be talked about in the analysis. In addition to this, I asked the informants to send photos of their monuments of Samora Machel in their surroundings. Although these sources of observation are not directly included in the analysis of this thesis, they have contributed with contextual understanding and helped bring ease and better flow of conversation in the online focus groups.

3.3.9 Assessing the quality of the data

To assess the quality and rigor of the data gathered I used the method of triangulation. Here, I have focused on ensuring trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, and confirmability (Sumner & Tribe, 2008:114). This was executed by using multiple sources, such as the combination of document sources, interviews, and observations, and theories and was considered at every step of the research process (Stratfor & Bradshaw, 2016:127). In addition to this, I would cross-check and verify stories through finding more than one source, like for instance by using newspapers and online news articles from the past to read about how the historical events were written about at the time of occurrence. The use of multiple methods also offered a cross-checking of results by approaching a case from different angles (Winchester & Rofe, 2016:20). Reflecting critically about both the information and data gathered, but also about the methodological choices made has also been important throughout to ensure validity of the study (Thagaard, 2013).

3.4 Writing process and analysis

An analysis is the mental process of seeing a phenomenon in its constituent parts and then viewing them as parts in a relationship to some whole (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:51). This involves both the process of breaking things down through analysis and then making sense of them by putting them back together through synthesis. Quoting Krueger (1998:46), Cameron (2016:218) writes “analysis begins during the first focus group”, however, I would say that the analysis for this thesis started already from that with searching for the case and the theoretical framework. The cyclical model of exploration, where researching theory and gathering data has been done in multiple loops, and in this way some form of analysis has been active throughout the whole research process.

3.4.1 Process tracing

Seeing as I seek to explain a situation or an outcome that can have several possible explanations and to identify the causal inference in a case, process tracing as a method helped with identifying the crucial factors and causal mechanisms in the case study (George & Bennett,

2005; Vennesson, 2008). Process tracing is a good tool for observing changes in discourses and meaning given, making it a good aid when seeing peace as a part of a broad set of processes from past, present, and future and making it useful when investigating how the image of Samora Machel has changed and been impacted over time.

Using process tracing, I started by looking into the literature on Samora Machel and his role in shaping national identity in Mozambique as well as the literature on peace and conflict in Mozambique, then by reviewing the literature on memory, peace, and peacebuilding strategies to find theoretical explanations for the empirical observations. This analysis happened through an iterative process making it a case of outcome-explaining process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This approach was especially important for answering research questions one and two, but were also helpful when answering research question three in particular and also four. Through process tracing, I was able to see how the role of Samora Machel has been important historically, how it has changed, and the politization and materialization of his symbolism.

3.4.2 Memoing

One way of evaluating, organizing, and making sense of my data, has been by using memoing as a tool from day one of the data collection process (Cope, 2016:373). This has been done by always keeping a notebook on hand in which I noted down insights, connections, and reminders both to have an informal means of active thinking and to function as an aid for interpretation. Writing down reflections from observations, document sources, conversations, made memoing a key transition between data gathering and analysis as it helped make analytical remarks through the data gathering process.

Memoing has also functioned as a way of ensuring rigor. Since memos are reflexive by offering a critical review and self-reflection, they open up for seeing the bigger picture during the process and to consider alternative interpretations (Cope, 2016:375). In this way, it makes it possible to go back and see how the research process has played out, and what has led to the different choices taken and crossroads passed.

3.4.3 Coding

Coding was used in the analysis process when writing this thesis for data reduction, organization, and data exploration (Cope, 2016:377). The approach to coding used was through descriptive and analytic codes (Cope, 2016:378). The descriptive codes were used to see surface level themes or patterns, while analytic codes used after identifying these themes and to further investigate them and to identify other similar instances. In executing this, I used the memos as

a primary source of themes forming the basis of the codes searched for and used color-codes on interview data or text sources. When working in this way, I continuously re-evaluated the themes and codes searched for, working in a cyclical process of synthesizing and analyzing, to ensure rigor and being open for alternative interpretations. Through this, I ended up with a color-coding system where different colors represented different thematic areas like memory, statues and monuments, peace, among others, and within this I had different degrees of colors marking the different opinions within this, such as positivity or negativity towards the Samora Machel monuments. I also numbered the different sub-topics under the thematic divisions, to see if there were any recurring topics. This coding system allowed me to structure the data according to patterns, to see the different opinions among the participants, and to connect it to my theoretical framework.

3.5 Ethical challenges

Seeing that this analysis is in large part based on texts already available online, this has decreased the immediate ethical burdens that research and, more specifically, research during a conflict might have. However, no research is without ethical considerations, and the fact that I have conducted some interviews as supplementary data does mean that mechanisms for protecting the participants have been needed (Dowling, 2016:32).

3.5.1 Ethics

Avoiding harm of any kind has been important throughout this research (Dowling, 2016:32). In ensuring this, I have taken privacy, confidentiality, and the use of informed consent seriously when conducting interviews and conversing with my participants. While the anonymity of the online focus group interviews was in some form ensured by the participants having full control over what information they wanted me to know about them, I also took care in not probing them on topics they did not wish to speak about and to make sure they knew of their rights during and after the interviews (Ragin & Amoroso, 2019:91). I also made sure that the identities that were given were properly anonymized in the process of data storage.

3.5.2 Power relations

When conducting qualitative research, a researcher often has to navigate between intersecting power structures where relationships can be reciprocal, asymmetrical, and even exploitative (Dowling, 2016). Navigating and being aware of this field and how it can have an effect on the data gathered is important. While the anonymity of online group interviews in some part minimizes this effect as was showed with the participants having full control of what the other

participants could know about them in the group chats, it does not disappear completely (Dunn, 2016:179). In addition to how my position as interviewer might have an effect for instance by me being an outsider, the sampling method of acquiring new informants through snowballing means that there might be power relations between the participants within the group as well. However, the fact that the only background information asked for was age, gender, and location, the power relations between those who did not know of each other from previously would mainly be based on this.

In addition to there being different power relations in the interviewer relationships, my role as a researcher and knowledge producer also puts me in a position to represent or misrepresent the case (Dowling, 2016). Organizing and keeping up with check-in procedures with the informants and persons relevant to the case studied have been strived for, however, distance and closures due to Covid-19 made this challenging (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016).

3.5.3 Power and knowledge production

Considering how the understanding of social reality as socially constructed and this connection with the underlying structures is a starting point for knowledge generation in this research project, then being aware of the power that knowledge generation has and my role in this as a researcher becomes increasingly important. Knowledge can be directly powerful through its inputs into policy, but it can also be indirectly powerful through what stories are told that have the possibility to shape the way people are thought about (Dowling, 2016:35). Taking this into consideration, I have made it a focus to constantly be focused on whose stories I was reading or hearing and how I was retelling them. By using my network to question things I found confusing or to confirm or disprove possible doubts or misunderstandings I might have, I performed check-ins with my research community (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016). However, as most of my data was based on document sources, this was easily done by cross-checking and re-examining written sources.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented, discussed, and reflected on how I have conducted the research behind this thesis throughout its entire process. This includes the methodological and methodical choices that were made and the reasoning behind them. Throughout the research process, I have strived to ensure rigor and trustworthiness by using critical reflexivity and triangulation from beginning of the research project. This became especially important as the ontological and epistemological assumptions in the research were concerned with social

constructivism and the interplay between social actors, power, and structures. The digitalization of my research opened up for new ways of conducting and thinking about research, but it also brought with it limitations. Studying a case from a distance does have an effect on the understanding of the complex context that is being studied. This distance, combined with time limitations, limitations on sources, and the enormous complexity of the peace and conflict situation in Mozambique, does have an impact on the research outcome. With this chapter, I hope to have provided transparency about these limitations and about the research process in general.

CHAPTER 4:

Mozambique's recent history of peace and conflict

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the background that the current peace situation has sprung out from and to see what actors are involved in shaping the Mozambican peace process. I will take the history of war and the different peace negotiations from the independence war against Portugal to the re-negotiations of the General Peace Agreement as a starting point for this background leading up to an outline of the current political situation. The recent resurgence of violence in the center of the country and the new insurgency in the north, along with people not seeing the development and economic growth promised by the government, has opened up for doubt on the substance of the peace and democracy in Mozambique and the process taken to achieve it. In order to understand the historical background that has caused this development, I will first provide a summary of some of the most critical elements from the Mozambican War of Independence (1964-1974) until the end of the Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992) with particular focus on the actions of the socialist regime. Subsequently, I will look at the current situation with the continuous breaches of the GPA and clashes between the government and the main opposition party and the new Islamic insurgency in the north of Mozambique. Examining this background will give insight into the basis of the post-conflict situation in Mozambique that will be used later for further discussion and analysis of the current context for peace.

4.1 The Mozambican War of Independence

Mozambique was colonized by Portugal from 1498 to 1975. While many countries in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, the situation was different for the Portuguese colonies (Virtanen, 2016:25). Portugal's dictator António Salazar insisted on the Portuguese colonies to be considered as "overseas provinces" and, in his determination to hold onto them, suppressed any political demands made by both Mozambique and Angola (Funada-Classen, 2013). The geopolitical importance of Salazar having an anti-communist stance for the USA and the UK removed any pressure of liberation and democratization of the Portuguese colonies and made it more difficult for all the neighboring countries in southern Africa to gain liberation. While Portugal worked to keep Mozambique isolated from the changes happening elsewhere

in Africa and the rest of the world, it was not uncommon for Mozambicans to work abroad, and it was abroad that Mozambican nationalism grew (Newitt, 1995:520-521).

It was in this context that the “Frente de Libertação de Moçambique” (Frelimo), the current largest political party, came about. While there were several independence movements formed in Mozambique during the 1950s-1960s, only three are now remembered, and those are the ones that together formed Frelimo in 1962, led by Eduardo Mondlane. Eduardo Mondlane led Frelimo for seven formative years until his murder in 1969 (Newitt, 1995:522). During these years, Frelimo turned towards the concepts of social revolution and a guerrilla campaign. After Eduardo Mondlane died, Samora Machel became party leader in 1970 (Newitt, 1995). Samora Machel, like his predecessor, identified as a Marxist-Leninist, and this ideology became central to Frelimo. In addition to the external elements of Salazar wanting to keep the colonies as overseas provinces and Portugal’s geopolitical importance enabling this, there was also an internal element challenging the liberation movement. The artificially created borders from the end of the nineteenth century meant that the liberation movement had to simultaneously fight for liberation and form a unity in a territory characterized by a multitude of ethnic and religious groups, making the liberation struggle a dual process of dealing with external and internal challenges (Funada-Classen, 2013).

The independence war broke out in September 1964 with a raid executed in the north of Mozambique (Newitt, 1995:517). However, even with the support from China, Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, Tanzania, and other African countries, the chances of Frelimo being victorious was considered low, and by mid-1965, the war had ebbed to a low-intensity war (Funada-Classen, 2013; Newitt, 1995:527). Several elements were challenging Frelimo’s success. For one, Frelimo had limited human resources and weapons, provisions, and few possible supply routes to fix this. The size of Mozambique also made it difficult to liberate it all at once, and there had ended up being more division than solidarity amongst the Mozambican people. With the neighboring countries, such as Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, supporting Portugal, and the Salazar government having no intention of agreeing to independence, the chances of success seemed grim.

Salazar’s death in 1970 brought changes in Portugal, and increasing distress amongst the Portuguese population led to the Carnation Revolution on April 25th, 1974, and the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) overthrowing the dictatorship (Igreja, 2013). The MFA was determined to end the wars in Africa in what they called political solutions, and the first

negotiations between the Portuguese and Frelimo took place in June 1974 (Newitt, 1995:538-539). A private meeting between MFA officers and Frelimo in Tanzania led to the signing of the Lusaka Accord on September 7th, 1974. During the negotiations, Frelimo insisted on being the only true representative of the Mozambican people and thus ended up being the only actor from Mozambique involved (Virtanen, 2016). The result was a rapid and unequivocal transfer of power to Frelimo with nine months of transitional government headed by Joaquim Chissano, later president of Mozambique.

At the time of the peace negotiations between Mozambique and Portugal, the Cold War had expanded to sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet Union took an active interest in the liberation movements and the newly independent countries (Virtanen, 2016:4). The Soviet Union's engagement with the liberation movement and the radical nationalist movement that grew forth under Portuguese colonialism, shaped Frelimo's liberation struggle (Virtanen, 2016:26). Additionally, Mozambique gaining its independence through an armed struggle formed through mass mobilization was looked at as a successful example of "national unity" that defeated a colonialism based on "divide and rule" principles (Funada-Classen, 2013). Frelimo naming the country the People's Republic of Mozambique on its independence in 1975 and with Samora Machel followingly declaring the nationalization of land by claiming how it is meaningless that land remains in the hands of the few and that land belongs to people, further showing Frelimo's immediate focus on creating a form of "unity," preferably through socialism.

The Mozambican War of Independence and how the subsequent peace negotiations took place firmly established Frelimo as the new power in the country. This without regarding the initial challenge of forming unity across a large and multitudinous territory. While the independence, in the end, was viewed as a result of mass mobilization and an example of national unity, it did not seem likely until the international geopolitical context changed and the new Portuguese government cut resources set to militarize their authorities in the colonies. This simple equating of victory and national unity thus shows a somewhat one-sided story of how the war ended, as will be looked at later. The geopolitical situation of the Cold War and Salazar's Portugal having an anti-communist stance securing them the support of the USA and the UK also had a formative effect on the aftermath of the Mozambican independence. A socialist movement fighting against these established powers would be more likely to receive support, which could also influence the direction of such movements. In the end, the independence movement resulted in a Mozambique led by a Frelimo and founded on socialism and national unity.

4.2 The Mozambican Civil War

The legacies of the autocratic colonial state, which was particularly repressive and authoritarian in the case of Portugal, were in some part continued after the independence (Newitt, 1995:470-481). Frelimo formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1977, securing them an agreement on war support from the Soviet Union (Batley, 2005). The primary focus was on building a strong state, funding education, creating a solid workforce, and large-scale agriculture. Power was localized centrally as a form of democratic centralism (Carbone, 2005; Igreja, 2013). The areas where Frelimo had been the least active during the independence struggle were in central Mozambique and in the rural population (Darch, 2016). These were also the areas where Frelimo performed the most invasive transformation such as removing local power structures. Frelimo stressed the existence of a single Mozambican nation at every stage (Newitt, 1995:547).

Mozambique's independence shook the region's tradition of white minority rule, and the neighboring countries' leadership felt threatened by the new regional balance and feared an independent Mozambique also could threaten them within their own countries (Levine, 2007). After Frelimo imposed sanctions against the white minority in Rhodesia and began supporting the Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization began working together with Frelimo dissidents to train a Mozambican opposition force to destabilize the new, independent leadership in Mozambique (Vines, 2013). Through this alliance, they created the resistance group first named the "Mozambique National Resistance" in English until they later the name to "Resistência Nacional Moçambicana" (Renamo) (Darch, 2018:14). Once established as Renamo, they quickly distanced themselves from the allegation of being an externally driven destabilization force. According to them, their cause was primarily in opposition to Frelimo leading a Marxist-Leninist regime and that they saw Frelimo's Marxism as political and ideological brutality (Igreja, 2013:320). The claim of Frelimo's brutality was based on how Frelimo regarded religious influence and local traditions as obscurantist practices, treating traditional leaders and healers as enemies of the people hindering the modern Mozambican future. Frelimo frequently used re-education camps and violent persecution at this time in their pursuit of establishing the new Mozambique (Igreja, 2013).

During the first years, Frelimo's politics had resulted in parts of the population feeling alienated, making it easier for Renamo to find local support, especially in the central provinces (Darch, 2016). In this way, Renamo established themselves as an opposition group, a promoter of public

interest, and a leader of the rural resistance (Carbone, 2005; Newitt, 1995:571). Renamo received funding and protection from Rhodesia until their collapse in 1980, then from apartheid South Africa, as well as some support from the right-wing in several Western states disagreeing with Frelimo's Marxist-Leninist government and them receiving war support from the USSR (Levine, 2007:368, Vines, 2013, Virtanen, 2016). André Matsangaissa first led Renamo from 1977 until he died in 1979. Afonso Dhlakama took over as Renamo's leader in 1980 and kept his position until he died in 2018, and Ossufo Momade became his successor (Morier-Genoud, 2018; Vines, 2013).

The civil war broke out between Renamo and Frelimo in 1977 and became one of the most brutal civil wars in Africa (Vines, 2013). This period showed the foundation and establishment of Frelimo, transforming the meaning of national unity and equating it with a centralized power structure. It also brings the questions on how national the unity from the independence truly is, especially when the violence and re-education were deemed necessary to use by Frelimo to maintain it. Seeing how Frelimo had to be the most active in the rural areas and the areas where the independence struggle had been the least noticeable brings more questions of the content of the national unity, what forms its foundation, and what actors it embraces. Renamo's establishment and their source of support stemming from these areas bring this bias further into question. That the use of violence, re-education camps, and the removal of local power structures is a greater need for Frelimo in these areas can give an inclination towards the unity only representing certain areas where Frelimo's history is the most present, while also showing spatial divisions in its outcome and manifestations of certain power structures.

4.3 A shift in actors

Several changes were made to the actors involved during this period. The educated population chose to leave the country due to the civil war resulting in a brain drain and an economic decline later intensified by the severe drought lasting from 1982-1983 (Virtanen, 2016:30). The Soviet Union rejected Mozambique's application to join the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1981, and Frelimo needed to change its tactic to attract new funding (Alden & Simpson, 1993:111). The need to change tactics resulted in a shift towards a market economy and liberal democracy. Mozambique joined the IMF in 1984, commencing its agreement on bilateral aid from the USA. Aid was given in exchange for implementing the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (Batley, 2005:416; Virtanen, 2016). These adjustments included restoring markets, increasing privatization, removing price control, and reducing state

subsidies. The implementation of the SAPs and the roll-back of government spending also led to other bilateral donors, as well as multilateral organizations and NGOs getting involved in the country, leading up to aid accounting for 87 % of the GNI by the signing of the GPA (Batley, 2005; Cliff, 1993; Virtanen, 2016). Democracy and peace negotiations were, along with the financial, some of the conditions for receiving aid. To what degree these changes were wanted by Frelimo is, however, debated (Batley, 2005; Hanlon, 1996; Hanlon, 2004:749). While the government has claimed ownership over the changes, they only fully committed to the shift after two donor strikes where food aid was withheld, and it is thought by many that the reforms happened more out of donor pressure than the will of the government, even with the donors' weak historical links to the country. The high level of aid gave the Western donors control through coordination mechanisms and by creating leverage to press for political transitions (Batley, 2005:417; Virtanen, 2016:30). In sum, the geopolitical changes led Mozambique to seek assistance from the West rather than the Soviet Union, resulting in political and structural changes that opened the political landscape up for conversations about the possibility of peace and democracy.

4.4 The General Peace Agreement

Conversations about a possible peace agreement commenced in 1988 (Vines, 2013). There are several factors said to explain this, including how the decline of the Soviet Union and apartheid led to the two parties lacking financing, the extreme drought period which enhanced the economic problems as well as access to food, and the fact that the rural protests were making entry into the city and becoming more perceptible.

The GPA was brought forth through a negotiated, pacted transition brokered between only two actors, Renamo and Frelimo, based on the nature the negotiations for independence from Portugal took. How the peace negotiations came to be is understood through two tracks: a formal track and an informal track (Manning, 2002; Virtanen, 2016). The formal track follows the official processes and institutions of liberal democracy and is the most commonly relayed of the two. The formal peace talks began in Italy in 1990, observed by Mozambique's leading donors, the USA, the UK, Portugal, and Germany. A factor majorly delaying the peace talks was Frelimo denying Renamo being a representation of internal conflict and the opposing party of the conflict for a long time, blaming external, destabilizing powers. With protests becoming more visible within the country, this denial was no longer possible, forcing Frelimo to recognize the internal struggle.

The GPA, signed in 1992, outlined several institutional reforms to create stability (Darch, 2015; Manning, 2002:71; Maschietto, 2016). The GPA and its surrounding negotiations were successful in terms of ending the outright conflict. Beyond that, it only worked as a beginning of a transition to peace and the general perception is that the terms of the GPA were not respected or have not been fulfilled (Macamo, 2017:203). The government did not achieve the goals of including Renamo in public policy and integrating Renamo soldiers in the Mozambican army, contributing to the shortcomings in Renamo's transition to a political party (Macamo, 2017; Vines, 2013). In addition to this, the GPA included several decentralization processes aiming to close the gap between population and state (Maschietto, 2016). These decentralization processes involved creating political space for Renamo, focusing on local support while also attempting to understand the local aspects that had led to the civil war and to get closer to the rural population. The importance of traditional authorities was also recognized, and they were included in a category of "community authorities" that performed the role of representatives of rural communities and assistants of the state. While the Frelimo reformers' side argued for decentralization based on its connection with democratization and increased state responsiveness at the local level, the conservative majority of the party were more skeptical. This skepticism only increased after the first multiparty elections when Renamo received what was seen as unexpected support in the center and north of the country, especially in the rural areas. In the end, the outcome on decentralization reflected a form of compromise between the majority of Frelimo on one side, and the Frelimo reformers, Renamo, and pressure from important donors on the other.

The second track follows the informal negotiations and agreements involved in the settling of the conflict. These agreements were made between the top leadership of the two parties, and it is, according to some, because of this informal elite bargaining, the situation was kept stable (Manning, 2002:63). The deals and compromises agreed upon in the GPA caused shared political and military vulnerabilities, making both parties susceptible to alternative means of attaining their objectives (Virtanen, 2016:35). The lack of credibility and impartiality of the formal institutions meant that informal negotiations accompanied each case of formal processes, causing a continuous need for conflict even today (Manning, 2002:64; Virtanen, 2016:35). The continuous need for conflict and informal negotiations can be seen in how there is a round of fraud accusations and mismanagement after each round of elections, followed by informal elite negotiations to dampen the political dissatisfaction resulting in what is essentially an anti-democratic pattern.

Consequently, both formal and informal forms of negotiation were instituted as part of the 1992 pact. Having grown out of compromises between Frelimo, Renamo, and international organizations involved in the process, these tracks have shaped the credibility of the institutions based on them. The non-existence of credible, impartial institutions has led to credibility having to be based on constant renegotiations, and the ending of the Civil War has, in a sense, resulted in a pact to make pacts.

4.5 Questionable democracy and the return of conflict to Mozambique

Two important principles of modern democracy grew out of the GPA. Firstly, that the legitimacy of the political party or coalition in power should be established through multi-party elections and that they should have respect for democratic institutions, and secondly, that democracy requires respect for different ideas, opinions, and cultures (Virtanen, 2016). However, that being said, the GPA also reflects its method of negotiation and the process led to the exclusion of any political forces other than Frelimo and Renamo. In the end, the GPA and the connected constitution resulted in the system of government being one of centralized presidentialism which has shown to be a significant challenge to democratic transition (Virtanen, 2016). The combination of a formal and informal track of negotiations has been blamed for creating an anti-democratic pattern where outcomes of democratic processes are subjected to extra-parliamentary elite bargaining (Manning, 2002:63; Virtanen, 2016). There have been performed what can be defined as free elections in Mozambique regularly since 1994 (Carbone, 2015). However, since Frelimo has always won these elections, there is no way to say what would happen should their power be challenged electorally. Repeated accusations of election fraud also question the substance of Mozambique's democracy (Machado, 2009).

The last decade has also been characterized by several outbreaks of violent conflicts between Frelimo and Renamo, and in 2013, after the national military attacked the Renamo base in the Gorongosa mountains, Renamo announced the GPA as broken (Stuster, 2013). It was not until August 6th, 2019, that a new peace treaty was signed, except for a few months of ceasefire during the 2014 election (Regjeringen, 2019). This new peace treaty named the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation resulted from the peace talks that had been going on since December 2016. In addition to being a ceasefire agreement, it deals with decentralization and electoral reform and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of Renamo soldiers (Jentzsch, 2019).

The last elections were held in Mozambique on October 16th, 2019, marking the sixth general elections held in the country (Pitcher, 2020). The elections resulted in a landslide victory for Frelimo. At the same time, the elections were characterized by out-of-the-ordinary high levels of election-related violence such as conflict, killings, threats, intimidation, and other irregularities. The outcome and the execution of the elections showed signs of pernicious polarization and rising authoritarianism in Mozambique. Clashes between the Mozambican police and opposition parties or Frelimo and Renamo supporters resulted in 44 people being killed during the campaign period (Pitcher, 2020:14).

The return to violence by Renamo has not been the only challenge to peace in Mozambique in the last decade. During the last four years, there has been an ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province in Mozambique (Pessoa, 2020). The ongoing conflict has mainly been fought between Islamist militants and the Mozambican security forces. While there is still limited information about the conflict, the reasoning behind the insurgency has been said to have many causes, from religious to a case concerning a lack of development, governance, and accountability (Krippahl, 2020). This situation is worsened further by Cabo Delgado being home to Africa's three most significant liquid gas projects (Rawoot, 2020).

4.6 Summary

The current context for peace in Mozambique draws on long and complex historical lines where questions of power-sharing, national unity, and decentralization have played a significant role. This chapter has addressed the cause for and consequences of the Mozambican War of Independence and connected peace negotiations, the cause for and consequences of the Mozambican Civil war and the connected peace negotiations and peace agreement, and some of the instabilities this history has resulted in at the present times. It shows that Samora Machel played a formative role in Frelimo's early years, leading the movement to victory after an independence war through the establishment phase of Mozambique as a new, free nation and into a civil war. Being significant factors in the country's history, the influence these years had on Frelimo and the nation, as well as the roots for some of the challenges facing today's conflict having grown out from times shaped by Samora Machel's leadership, is a necessary backdrop to have a grasp on in order to understand today's situation for peace.

When exploring the history of Mozambique in this way, some key actors shaping and influencing the current peace situation has been uncovered. The first and most obvious actor is Frelimo, both as a movement, a party, and state. In relation to Frelimo through the ongoing

conflicts, we can identify Renamo as the opposing party of the civil war and currently the main opposition party. However, the rise of new conflicts amongst the Mozambican population besides Renamo shows the Mozambican population as a significant actor when looking at the future for peace in Mozambique. This argument should not be understood as me equating the use of violence by those connected to Renamo or by the insurgency in Cabo Delgado to the general population. It is merely used here as symptoms that show signs of more extensive lines of discontent. Lastly, when going through the history of peace and conflict in Mozambique, it is possible to see the significance of global actors and international geopolitics for the Mozambican peace process, especially when examining the shift in actors that characterized the start of the 1980s and how it influenced Mozambican politics.

The purpose of this chapter was to give insight into the basis of the post-conflict situation in Mozambique and see how the different wars and peace negotiations have resulted in institutionalizations of certain power-sharing, national unity, and decentralization systems. In doing so, I have also uncovered the central actors involved in shaping the context for peace in Mozambique. This background, the institutions it has caused, and the actors involved will in the subsequent chapters be used to discuss and analyze the Samora Machel monuments, the monuments' role in the peacebuilding process, and what examining the monuments can say about peace in Mozambique.

CHAPTER 5:

Peace in Mozambique

The building of statues and monuments in a political context of war and peace makes the questions of why a monument is built and the nature of our connection to the statues and monuments more potent, and their effect becomes potentially more powerful. Therefore, it is essential to understand in what context the building of the Samora Machel monuments has occurred. By answering part one of research question one on *what characterizes the form of peace achieved in Mozambique*, I will examine what can currently be said of peace and its contested meanings in Mozambique.

In this thesis, peace and conflict are viewed as a spectrum, with the possibility of versions of both co-existing. Therefore, I will first examine the understanding of peace by looking at the dynamics of the conflict(s). The various actors define the enemy and the conflict(s) differently, and these different interpretations lead to different experiences of peace within the same conflict. Along with looking at the various definitions of the conflicts and what actors define them, I will examine the utilization of memories to promote these understandings of the conflict. Subsequently, I will be reflecting on what can be said of the peace, linking it to spatial peace. Here, I will consider the different actors' understanding of peace to clarify their impact on the outcome of peace. Lastly, I will reflect on what characterizes the peace achieved in Mozambique.

5.1 Defining a conflict

The contested nature of whether Mozambique's peace process should be defined as a success story or not brings up questions on the substance of Mozambican peace and if it is a peace experienced by everyone. By examining who has the power to define conflict, I will work towards an understanding of who experiences peace and who does not.

5.1.1 Past definitions of conflict

Different actors are included or excluded in peace and conflict contexts. To examine this inclusion or exclusion, one has to see it connected to the inclusion and exclusion of actors in the past. Investigating who has had the power and ability to define the shared narrative of conflicts earlier makes it possible to understand who has had the power to select what memories of the conflict have continued and, subsequently, how these shape today's context. Both Frelimo

and Renamo, as the two main parties in Mozambique, became political parties as a result of the peace negotiations resulting in the GPA, as seen in chapter 4. Consequently, power relations formed during these times shape the actors' ability to define a conflict's character and, via this, whether there is peace or not, both in the past and currently.

When discussing the armed conflict from 1976 to 1992, it is most common to refer to it as a “civil war” between Frelimo representing the Mozambican government and Renamo. During the conflict, however, it was not as straightforward, and there was controversy over the characterization of the conflict (Darch, 2018). A significant challenge to ending the Civil War and commencing peace negotiations was for Frelimo to acknowledge Renamo as the opposing party of the conflict (Manning, 2002; Virtanen, 2016). One of Frelimo’s central claims during the Civil War was that there was no civil war, but rather a war against external forces trying to destabilize the country and undermining Frelimo’s rule, or a “war of destabilization,” and that it should not be confused with a struggle between two parties (Igreja, 2010). This refusal to see Renamo as the opposing party was founded on how Renamo was a movement supported and funded by Rhodesia’s white minority and later by apartheid South Africa (Levine, 2017; Vines, 2013).

While this was true in the beginning, Renamo quickly found support in the Mozambican population as a movement of peasant dissatisfaction working against government policy, especially among members of religious and traditional communities that had been excluded from Frelimo’s definition of Mozambican identity and stripped of their previous positions (Virtanen, 2016:31). Even so, Frelimo did not acknowledge Renamo being a group with support in the population, continuing the narrative of an outside enemy. As seen in chapter four, it was not until Frelimo experienced financial decline and international pressure in combination with the increase in internal pressure that Frelimo’s acknowledgment of Renamo happened and peace negotiations could commence.

While the war between Frelimo and Renamo concluded with Renamo being accepted as an opposing party in the conflict, the narrative of Renamo initially being an external destabilization force remains, with the pressure put on the destabilization aspect differing. The continuation of this narrative can be seen in how it continues to be the one most commonly focused on when writing the history of Mozambique. Sources (e.g., Darch, 2018; Newitt, 1995) writing about the Civil War in this manner and emphasizing Renamo’s history of being a destabilization movement strengthens the narrative of resistance within Mozambique as created externally and

silences any opposing views that may have existed within the country. This functions as part of Frelimo's using active forgetting to handle disagreements with their governing and official history.

Seeing the ability Frelimo has had in defining Renamo as an external destabilization force shows the historical power Frelimo has had in defining peace, which can also be seen in relation to them being in a position of a victor's peace from the previous negotiations with Portugal and the definition power this brings. However, growing support for Renamo among the population, shows that the lack of conflict within Mozambique and the peace thus existing is not as agreed upon as claimed. In addition, Frelimo's having to accept Renamo as an internal force of dissatisfaction shows how it can challenge Frelimo's definition of power.

The Civil War ending with Frelimo and Renamo as the two main political parties in Mozambique also becomes part of a form of organized forgetting of any other possible grievances and opposition that might have existed. However, the continued framing of Renamo primarily being a destabilization force does show the limits of other actors' ability to do so and the presence of continuous renegotiations of definition power over what peace and conflict is and which memories are continued.

5.1.2 Current definitions of conflict

Similarly, there is no consensus on the definition of the recurring Renamo conflict or the attacks executed in the North of Mozambique. Renamo's return to violence in the last decade is primarily seen as precisely that, a return. It is not viewed as a new conflict or a new phase, but as the old conflict coming back or as the "second civil war" (Interview informant 1, 12.04.2021). In doing this, the dichotomous and straightforward division between Frelimo and Renamo as the two major parties to be considered in the country's politics is reproduced.

The reproduction of this narrative excludes any other possibly relevant factors. In addition to this, it is a narrative that strengthens Renamo and Frelimo's political power making it a narrative from which both benefit. In 2013 and 2014, there were various clashes between Renamo combatants and the national police and army in Sofala, resulting in numerous casualties (Wiegnik, 2015). In terms of the informal negotiation pact, this can be understood as a way of securing power. First, it challenges the Frelimo power hegemony and advances Renamo's political agenda, and second, it strengthens the dichotomous power-sharing between Frelimo and Renamo, leaving no room for other actors to enter the scene. New political parties, such as MDM, entering the political scene have caused a disturbance in the country's political

polarization, giving the incentive to work towards strengthening the existing power hegemony (Wiegnik, 2015). However, by characterizing Renamo's return to armed violence as an aggressive electoral strategy and securing their power, one also ignores other grievances found in the population the return to violence can be a means of expressing. The recent conflicts are part of larger patterns of political instability connected to the growing disparities between rich and poor and the unequal distribution of new sources of wealth (Wiegnik, 2015). These political instabilities, the increasing inequality, and the grievances it might cause become forgotten or subjugated by defining the recent instabilities as a return of the Frelimo-Renamo. In addition, it also strengthens the definition power of Frelimo and Renamo.

It is also not unknown for the situation in the north to be viewed as “the war coming back” (Interview informant 1, 12.04.2021). In Mozambique, the group behind the attacks in the north is regularly called Al-Shabaab, despite having no connection to the Somalian terrorist organization (Amnesty International, 2021; Isilow, 2021). When not, it is referred to as a jihadist insurgency, and their claims of being ISIS supporters are emphasized. In March 2021, the US went out and called “the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique (ISIS-Mozambique)” a Foreign Terrorist Organization (USA, 2021). The Mozambican authorities called it “criminal banditry” until June 2020, when they started referring to the violence as “terrorism” (Stepansky, 2021). This way of referring to the attacks is not neutral. The production of the narrative of the attacks being jihadist and the Mozambican officials stressing the external dimension of the conflict reproduces the historical narrative of external enemies. In this way, it separates the government from the conflict and any disaffection or mismanaging of security responses in the region (Stepansky, 2021). The stressing of the insurgency being an external enemy is similar to how Frelimo framed Renamo during the Civil War. It builds on the idea that any opposition against the government in Mozambique has to be externally produced. By claiming that any opposition is produced outside Mozambique's borders, the narrative also says that there are no grounds for opposition within Mozambique's borders, building a story of unity and harmony.

5.1.3 The power to define and select the memories of Mozambique's conflicts

By looking at who has defined the conflict historically, it is possible to see how Frelimo, for the most part, has had the most power in so doing. Through Frelimo continuously blaming external forces for any opposition experienced in the country, one can see how they utilize this power to create a narrative in the present that rids them of accountability and blame. However, this power was challenged with Renamo entering a position where their wishes had to be

considered in peace negotiations. Seeing this in correlation to the informal peace negotiation track concluding the Civil War, the recurrence of conflict between Renamo and Frelimo is understood as a renegotiation of this informal agreement on power-sharing and, through this, a strengthening of the dichotomous division of power between the two parties. How the government is handling the new insurgency in northern Mozambique, in a manner equal to how Renamo first was handled, shows the continuation of memory selection from the past and how memories are used as part of the conflict to keep power by dominating public discourse.

5.2 What peace are the different actors promoting

In order to reflect on the character of peace in Mozambique, I will look at the various peace(s) promoted, with a basis in Richmond's (2020) categorizations of peace. Based on the potentially never-ending number of possible peace(s), I will focus this categorization on the international and national actors, with some reflections on the possible local versions of peace.

5.2.1 Liberal peace

International donors were important actors during the GPA negotiations and the following peace process, and they are still present in the political landscape (Manning, 2002). Historically, Mozambique has been heavily dependent on aid, particularly from bilateral donors (Batley, 2005). In 1992, when the Peace Agreement was signed, aid stood for 87 % of the GNI. Later it has been at around 30 %, except in 2002 when it went up to 60 % of GNI. In 2003, donor support stood for more than half of total public expenditure in Mozambique, and for a long time, Mozambique was the largest single recipient of foreign assistance in Africa (Batley, 2005). While reducing donor dependency has been a focus area, which has in many ways been successful, donor dependency is still a struggle in the country, and this is without taking into account the 2016 hidden debt crisis resulting in the IMF and many foreign donors cutting off support and triggering a currency collapse resulting in the country's worst-ever financial crisis (Strohecker, 2016). Consequently, international donor's influence on Mozambican politics, and thus on peacebuilding, is noticeable, bringing an influence on the outcome of peace.

As a consequence of the shift in international actors' involvement in Mozambique in the 1980s, the Western donors influenced the peace negotiations leading to the GPA and the following peacebuilding process (Batley, 2005:416; Vitanen, 2016). Through their focus on a shift towards a market economy, liberal democracy, and the inclusion of Mozambique into the norms of international institutions, they were promoting liberal peace (Sabaratnam, 2011). The liberal

peace agenda and the liberal social transformations they included were advocated under the banner of conflict management and good governance through SAPs (Manning, 2002).

Seeing the strong influence of western liberal international actors and their promotion of liberal peace makes the understanding behind liberal peace and its effect on the current peace essential. Its effect can also be seen in how the GPA's formal track of peace negotiations did lead to some forms of institutions of liberal democracy (Virtanen, 2016). However, as with the liberal peace agenda in general, these institutions and international donors' role has been criticized in Mozambique. These critiques claim that the donor community is weakening the government of Mozambique and consequently doing more harm than good (Hanlon, 1991; Hanlon, 2004). In addition, the international community is criticized for allowing the coexistence of the formal and informal track to persist through their investments in the social, economic, and political transition and in operational capacities establishing them as an external constituency each side can appeal to (Manning, 2002). These critiques lead towards the liberal peace agenda being unsuccessful and that they, in consequence, have caused a form of illiberal peace.

5.2.2 Illiberal and authoritarian peace

Because of the country's aid dependency and the strong donor influence, changes in the donor landscape are relevant when assessing the peace situation and the current peace process. The past decades' shift in the global hegemonic order, which seems to reduce Western powers' economic and moral attraction, has also made its presence felt in Mozambique (Hackenesch, 2015; Öniş, 2017). In addition to this, there has been a rise in the influence and strength of authoritarian powers challenging the liberal democracy, and countries like China and Russia have demonstrated great financial prosperity. Regarding Mozambique, China went from being the 26th biggest investor in 1998 to the second-biggest in 2008 (Vines, 2015). While their investment in Mozambique is not as high as it is in other neighboring countries, it is actively encouraged with the intention of improving the China-Mozambique relationship. Unlike Europe and the USA, which have an agenda to promote "good governance" and express political and social influence, the authoritarian powers give unconditional loans and primarily invest in building infrastructure (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015; Hackenesch, 2015).

Authoritarian regimes entering the donor market challenges the power hegemony democratic liberal peace has had while also providing alternatives to the previously dominant donors (Chen & Kinzelbach, 2015; Hackenesch, 2015). Despite the formal conditions for democracy being laid out in the GPA and the historically strong presence of Western donors promoting liberal peace, Mozambique is better characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime, where formal

democratic institutions exist and are regarded as the primary means of gaining power (Levitsky and Way, 2002). However, some actors' abuse of state power gives them a significant advantage compared to others. The room for informal negotiations created during peace negotiations ending the Civil War undermines the democratization process, and Renamo has since the 1994 election worked towards ensuring that most decisions should be made through negotiations, mainly between the leaders, maintaining their grasp on power while also weakening institutional channels (Manning, 2002). Formally, Renamo also aims to minimizing the GPA's principles on the majoritarian rule, building up under their case in the decentralization process. Frelimo, on the other hand, aims to strengthen the majoritarian rule (Manning, 2002). By strengthening the majoritarian rule, they can strengthen their political power, the power they have been criticized for not loosening since the end of the independence war (Darch, 2016; Jentsch, 2019). In addition to both parties having undemocratic and centralized internal structures (Carbone, 2003), this situation results in an elite-driven, non-democratic state with the governing power centralized within a small minority, which is, as mentioned, reaffirmed and renegotiated through the regular use of conflict.

5.2.3 Local understandings of peace

The international community's different understandings of peace, from liberal to illiberal, are met with the charismatic authoritarian values of Samora Machel, based on the Marxist-Leninist and centralized method of governing that characterized Frelimo's early years. Comparing the Marxist-Leninist aspect of it to Richmond's (2020) classification of Marxist peace, where peace is dependent on social justice, solidarity, international cooperation, and the absence of certain types of structural violence, one can see some resemblance. However, one cannot claim that the peace promoted by Samora Machel was a Marxist peace. While Samora Machel focused on the upheaval of imperialist and colonialist systems, he did so at the expense of diversity by persecuting those not meeting the limited view of "Mozambican-ness." The authoritarian values of Samora Machel and what the view of "Mozambican-ness" contained will be examined further in chapter six.

In addition to this, there are also other understandings of peace in the country based on traditional and religious values or imperialist and colonialist inheritance (Sabaratnam, 2011). As mentioned in chapter 4, and as can be seen in how the conflicts become defined, Frelimo felt the need to oppress these traditional and religious values and work actively to transform and change the legacies of the imperialist and colonialist structures. Frelimo's need to oppress conflicting ideas shows that there was already a power struggle between different ideas of how

to organize a society, a multitude of understanding of what peace contains, and a plurality of opinions on how to achieve peace within Mozambique.

5.3 Towards a spatial peace

Following a spatial approach to peace and taking the characteristics of conflict and peace in Mozambique into consideration, I will now look at the peace in Mozambique, focusing on the politics, agency, power, and scale while being aware of the existence of more than one understanding of peace, their co-existence, and how they materialize differently. Since I am approaching power and scale with a Foucauldian approach, the peace that the interplay between the different peace(s) may result in becomes a product of the power relations between them, where all actors impact the outcome.

The liberal peace promoted by Western actors meets with the authoritarian peace promoted by Frelimo representing the government, a peace for which the increase in international authoritarian donors expands the political space. This changing of the political space shows a power struggle on the definition of peace between different international actors and international and national actors. Seeing how this power struggle over the definition of peace does not materialize on a blank canvas, but rather a contentious space already marked by a struggle over the definition of conflict, what memories of conflict that should prevail, and with this a definition of peace, it makes the space for peace in Mozambique a multitudinous space characterized by hybridity and conflicting understandings of peace.

Seeing how the different actors promote various understandings of peace and how none of them are fully implemented, one can say that the peace is neither liberal nor authoritarian and that different understandings of peace are entering the Mozambican peacebuilding process. The liberal peace promoted by the Western international donors does not meet a blank canvas. However, its implementation happens in a context shaped by the authoritarian values already existing in the country, which shapes its materialization, forming hybridity of the different understandings of peace. The opportunity provided by authoritarian actors giving unconditional loans opens up for authoritarian and illiberal practices of peacebuilding, receiving more space, increasing their impact on the outcome of peace, and, thus, pushing the spectrum of the existing peace(s) in a more authoritarian direction. The changing influence of liberal and authoritarian peace(s), from more authoritarian before the market liberalization in the 1980s, to more liberal, and then, once more, towards a more authoritarian peace, shows how peace in Mozambique varies across time.

The combination of the formal liberal, democratic track for peacekeeping and the informal, elite-driven, authoritarian track is also said to be what makes the situation somewhat stable. As with the building of The Maputo-Katembe bridge, a \$785 million project and now the longest suspension bridge in Africa, was opened in 2018. When studying the building process behind it, one can see that Frelimo and the Mozambican government combines the strength of the different international actors, making them less dependent on just one group of actors (Rangongo, 2018; Vines, 2015). The bridge was built and financed by China, but the Mozambican government decided to give the task of conducting the quality appraisal to an American firm through international support (Vines, 2015). While this challenges and can cause hybridity in the influence of peace promoted by international actors, it also gives more agency to the state, promoting their understanding of peace and opens up for more local variations. However, this also brings up questions on how sustainable is the stability and stable for whom.

Peace may not be experienced equally for every member of society, and one group might be experiencing peace while others are not (Megoran, 2010). Concerning Mozambique, one can say that there is a peace based on a national unity that emphasizes and primarily consists of memories and histories of some parts of the population without considering others. Acknowledging the peace as spatial can open up for further examining this and getting a better grasp of what it may contain.

5.4 Summary

Through the examination of contesting definitions of conflict in Mozambique, with certain actors having more power than others in defining who the opposing party in a conflict is and whether there is an opposing party in a conflict, it is possible to see that there are different experiences of conflict and peace within Mozambique. Frelimo's handling of the newer conflicts being similar to their historic handling of conflicts shows the continuity of memory selection from the past, where Frelimo holds the most power in defining what is remembered from the past. Renamo's ability to claim a role in the political space shows a continuous struggle for definition and memory selection power, opening for the possible existence of subjugated versions of peace and memories of conflict.

The conflicting understandings of peace and conflict within Mozambique are met with the conflicting understandings of peace being imposed outside Mozambique. The international community and foreign donors influence the peace promoted in Mozambique and, thus, the outcome of the peace. Since the 1980s, it has predominantly been Western donors promoting

liberal peace dominating the Mozambican donor landscape. Because of geopolitical changes in the global power hegemony, this dominance has been challenged, and what is viewed as more authoritarian donors are making their presence known. While the claim by most of these new donors is that they are not imposing structural changes or conditions with their assistance, they do open the possibilities for the Mozambican government to decide more for themselves how to balance their foreign assistance and in that way can reduce some of the influence the international community has on Mozambican politics.

Therefore, the liberal peace promoted by the Western donors is met with the Mozambican government's option of taking a more authoritarian route, which one can say has historically already been a latent direction in Mozambique. It is especially the exclusion of any stories of memories that show resistance to Frelimo as the victor and how it primarily is the narratives of the victors that may be heard and only the images of the victors that may be seen that shows the authoritarian and illiberal shape the peace in Mozambique has taken.

CHAPTER 6:

Challenges to the Peace in Mozambique

While there are multiple variations of peace entering the Mozambican peace process, the persistence of violence and the increase in inequality shows that there are still challenges to the achievement of a peace, at least in terms of the traditional positive peace. I will here answer the second part of research question one on *what challenges the peace in Mozambique*.

To answer this, I will build on the historical lines shaping the current context for peace and the actors involved in it, as seen in chapter four. To begin with, I will look at the selection of memories and legacies continued from the Mozambican War of Independence, focusing on centralism and unity. Subsequently, I will look at the selection of memories and legacies from the Civil War and the conflicts regarding Renamo and regional divisions concerning the unity outlined by using memory politically. Lastly, I will look at how these issues are further enhanced with the recent discovery of national resources and how it increases division.

6.1 Legacies of centralism from the War of Independence

The Mozambican War of Independence and the subsequent peace negotiations where Frelimo insisted on being the only true representative of the Mozambican people established Frelimo as the new power in the country, without regarding and thus also subjugating the memories of previous struggles of forming unity across the large and multitudinous territory. The result of this was centralism having a long legacy in Mozambique, from Frelimo being the first and only party to exist for a long time after the Liberation War to the current organization of the government with a strong, centralized state and most of the power located in the south, in the capital (Alexander, 1997; Maschietto, 2016).

During the Portuguese colonial rule, the implementation of local structures of administration was gradual, resulting in the colonial territory, for the most part, only being partially covered with municipal structures (Silva, 2016). It was only during the last two decades of Mozambique being colonized municipal structures covered the entire territory. During most of the colonial period, there was a system of two main tiers of local administration. These were the district containing the de-concentrated offices divided across geographic areas and the municipality centered around an urban area. They were headed by an appointed colonial Governor of the

District and a mayor, respectively. Both were forms of administrative de-concentration. Centralism was, thus, a fact in Mozambique from the starting point, and a centralist administrative tradition and a local government system that was almost powerless were inherited by the new Mozambican government. The socialist model of governing and the following civil war also worked against decentralization under the argument that it could cause and exacerbate internal political division and work against national unity (Silva, 2016).

In 1978, after independence, the new government replaced the colonial system with a new system (Silva, 2016). However, the new local government was only a form of administrative de-concentration, as centrality was thought to protect national unity. With the introduction of the multi-party system in the 1990 constitution, de-concentration from the state to the provinces and districts and implementing a local self-government system were brought up (Silva, 2016). It was, however, not until the revision of the constitution in 1996 that the law became active, and the process truly began. Thirty-three municipalities were created in 1997, and the first local government elections were executed in 1998. The elected became responsible for governing cities and towns in the respective territories. The number of municipalities has later expanded, and there are currently 53 (CLGF, 2020). Other administrative units in the country have much less autonomy, with administrators appointed by the central government (Silva, 2016). Maputo, however, has a special administrative status and has since 2009 had an elected assembly.

With this, it is possible to see how the new Frelimo government adopted the centralized institutions from colonial times after the end of the War of Independence. While Frelimo focused on the upheaval of imperialist and colonialist systems as a strategy in the formation of independent Mozambique, the top-down format of these changes and the short interval until a new war broke out resulted in the changes not reforming the centralist nature of the structures. Considering the existence of multiple peace(s) existing within Mozambique, the centralized nature of these institutions would in some way have to embrace this plurality of peace. The centralist nature of the governing of Mozambique, with Frelimo as the sole ruler, meant Frelimo had most of the formal power in the selection of official memories and shaping the official narrative, and thus the official power when it came to the inclusion of the various narratives in the official narrative.

6.2 Legacies from the Civil War

The continuing conflict between Frelimo and Renamo is still on the agenda with the breaking of the GPA in 2013 and the regular outbreaks of violence and conflict until the signing of the

new peace treaty in 2019. Here, the discussion on decentralization once again becomes a central point of departure. Since the civil war, devolution of power has been on Renamo's agenda, shown through their criticism of Frelimo's centralization. One explanation for this is how Renamo's support is mainly localized in central and northern Mozambique areas, while the centralized power is in the south (Darch, 2015; Carbone, 2003). Devolution of power has been thought to strengthen Renamo's overall power, especially if Renamo's idea of them having the majority in six of the ten provinces had shown to be true (All Africa, 2016)

Currently, decentralization happens through deconcentration and devolution (Armes et al., 2010). Deconcentration happens through local state agencies of the central state where the central government authorities implement programs in the country's districts and provinces that are run by a district administrator appointed by the central government. Devolution occurs in the urban municipalities that each elect a president and a Municipal Assembly. However, the municipalities are also partially subordinate to the provinces (Maschietto, 2016). This results in both a technical and a political level of subordination in which it was primarily urban areas reaping the benefits. Decentralization, in the sense of transferring power and resources to sub-national authorities, and independent and democratically elected local governance have been a central part of the agenda since the 1992 peace accords when it was first introduced, strongly promoted by Western donors, and the centralized power structure is one of the issues criticized in this debate (Maschietto, 2016). It became an issue based on several factors. The peace process was a response to the need for stabilization and political space for Renamo to end the civil war. It was also a part of the market economy transition and a response to the need for economic recovery. In addition, it was a means to getting closer to the rural population and the local aspects that had contributed to the civil war.

Mozambique's "winner takes all" system results in provinces, where the opposition has received the most votes from the population like Zambézia and Nampula, still has all positions of power occupied by Frelimo members (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016). These positions include private bank members and all local leaders recognized by the government, resulting in distress among the opposition and the population. Reports of massive fraud during elections did not help the matter. After further fraud reports during the 1999 general election, many Renamo-dominated territories decided not to vote in the 2004 election. Interestingly enough, while the number of votes decreased, the electoral percentage of Frelimo rose to 62 % (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016). The votes seeming not to affect the results has led to many having abstained from the voting process altogether (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016). When the then Renamo leader,

Dhlakama, rebranded himself as a prominent political figure before the 2013-election, votes increased once more. However, nothing changed in the outcome, not even in regional or local elections where the opposition had the majority.

It is within the country's three central provinces that Renamo has the most support (All Africa, 2016). Controlling these provinces could function as a separation between the north and the south, threatening Frelimo as most of their support is in the south. Renamo having most of their support in central Mozambique and the new insurgency in the north hints at this already being an issue. In addition to this, the city of Beira is located in one of the three provinces Renamo historically has had the most support, Sofala (Igreja, 2013). As an important city for shipping both for Mozambique and the neighboring countries Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, Beira's location makes it the second most important city in Mozambique, and controlling Beira would challenge the current power dynamics.

The parliament opened for local elections of provincial governors in May 2018 (Louw-Vaudran, 2019). These changes were viewed as beneficial to Renamo and a positive step towards decentralization and political stability. However, in the 2019 elections, Frelimo won every province, allowing them to select all the provincial governors (Freedom House, 2020). In general, when looking at the likeliness of the opposition winning power through elections, Mozambique received a score of one out of a maximum of 20 in the 2020 Freedom House review (Freedom House, 2020). This is a reduction by one point from previous reviews. Mozambique receiving such a low score, even after the parliament approved the constitutional reforms opening for indirect elections of provincial governors, district administrators, and mayors in 2018, is reasoned to be because of Frelimo's increase in the use of pressure tactics, the advantages provided by already being in office, and the apparent fraud in the 2019 elections.

When studying Renamo's lack of success as a political party, many bring up how it can also be a result of Renamo under the leadership of Dhlakama had been unable to change from a guerrilla mentality and into a political party and that this is a deciding part of Renamo's return to their headquarters in rural central Mozambique at the end of 2012 (Levine, 2007; Vines, 2013). However, it can also be said that Renamo as a military force is just a military expression of a political problem and not a significant cause in the conflict (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016).

Frelimo has for a long time opposed the suggestion passed in May 2018, claiming that local elections of provincial governors would be unconstitutional (Darch, 2015). This claim was based on the 2004 constitution, which defined Mozambique as a unitary state. Frelimo leaders'

claim that selective decentralization where Renamo would have control over the provinces they have the majority in would violate this constitutional claim. Gilles Cistac, professor in constitutional law at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, was in March 2015 shot and killed in a drive-by shooting in Maputo most likely for his arguments on how the creation of new administrative structures at the local level would not be unconstitutional, as Frelimo claimed they would be. Cistac's opinions on the matter received much attention right before his death, and the lack of protection before or limited investigation later has led to many suspecting Frelimo to be behind the assassination (Darch, 2016).

The government's partial adoption of a decentralization agenda is primarily because of pressure from international donors (Maschietto, 2016; Hanlon, 1991; Hanlon, 2004). Historically, the donors and the international community have criticized Frelimo's socialist orientation and accused them of not sharing their power with the opposition (Armes et al., 2010). They believed that through devolution of power to the local level, civil society and "traditional authorities" would be brought back on the political agenda, strengthening democracy. At the time, Frelimo was not outright against this, especially during the 1980s, and several party members stood behind the idea, at times opening up for changes towards devolution. However, they were later criticized and rejected by Frelimo for hindering economic development and modernity (Maschietto, 2016). The idea of a single dominant party was not questioned by Frelimo (Armes et al., 2010).

The struggle of decentralization that is continuously brought up by the opposition during the peace negotiations leading up to the GPA and after, shows that the centralist structures does not necessarily include the plurality of peace(s) existing within Mozambique and that there is a struggle for representation. An interesting aspect to consider when the implementation of any decentralization initiative is not leading to a substantial decentralization of state power in praxis is the corresponding increase in authoritarian states' involvement in Mozambique. While Western actors still influence liberal social transformations, authoritarian actors' rise might challenge this (Manning, 2002; Sabaratnam, 2011). This challenge to Western donors' previous hegemony, along with the history of the charismatic authoritarian values of Samora Machel, as mentioned as one of the local understandings of peace and which will be further investigated in chapter seven, could work against the decentralization agenda and strengthen the current centralism dominating the political power-sharing found.

6.3 Regional divisions and spatial unevenness in Mozambique

The argumentation made for or against decentralization by either Frelimo or Renamo shows Renamo's belief that it is a divided country or Frelimo's belief that weakening the unity focus they are leading with now would result in a divided country. The argument of this dividedness is strengthened when seeing how the country is shaped by a regional division of political support, where most people live in areas primarily concentrated by political support based around one party (Carbone, 2003). There is also a clear regional dimension when looking at power-sharing, where the south holds most of the power. In addition, there is, as mentioned above, a clear spatial aspect of memory, where most heroes and stories are shaped in and based on areas in the south. The speeches delivered during the "triumphal journey" have been heard and understood differently by different parts of the population. Some understood them as critique or colonial discourse, while others understood them as hostile and menacing (Darch, 2018).

The history of Samora Machel is a good example of regional divisions in Mozambique and their formation (Funada-Classen, 2013). At the time when he grew up, there were several factors making it possible to become farm owners and what could be categorized as somewhat wealthy in southern Mozambique, such as increased food demand following the development of the colonial capital, worldwide demand for primary products, systematized migrant work to the mines of South Africa, amongst other elements. In addition to this, while the colonial authority opposed the educating of Africans, the Protestant church encouraged providing primary education, providing the opportunity for youth to become educated. However, the Protestant churches were mainly located in the southern region, meaning the youth in these areas having the chance of receiving a better education. The story of Eduardo Mondlane and many other central Frelimo members are of similar character, enhancing the regional division and the roots of this regional division in the country. Based on this, and the fact that Tanzanian help during the Civil War, resulted in the areas in the extreme north of the country being of importance, the main areas for Frelimo's support base lies in the extreme north and the extreme south of the country (Freedom House, 2020). The greater opportunities for education in the south also brought greater opportunities for positions of power after independence, as will be discussed. Those in positions of power being from these areas resulted in more representation of memories from these areas.

However, when looking at Frelimo's unwavering hold of power in the south, it is interesting to see how in the 2014 municipal election, the new political party Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM), received 45 % of the votes in Maputo and Matola municipalities, and possibly more when considering that there was a two-hour power cut when the votes were counted (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016). This shows dissatisfaction with the Frelimo rule right in the middle of Frelimo's central region of support. Sumich's (2007) findings also show that there is a growing gap between the urban middle class and the dominant state-based elite within Maputo. After the independence, anyone with some form of education not viewed as an enemy of the state was given positions within the state, education, bureaucracy, and similar positions (Sumich, 2007). With Frelimo dominating the economy and the emerging civil society and the political scene, this results in those favored by or connected to Frelimo holding much of the power. The advantages of the social networks and positions given during these times are still dominating in Maputo, where political power also results in economic and social power. After the structural adjustment reforms during the 1980s, opportunities in the new business and international aid sectors opened up, and good social networks were advantageous in procuring such positions (Sumich, 2007:6). Good social networks being advantageous resulted in the state being the ultimate source and guarantor of class power with a close link between the government and economy. Consequently, many people's social positions are closely connected with Frelimo, which also guarantees Frelimo to maintain their support. While the working class also had a somewhat privileged position during Frelimo's Marxist-Leninist rule, the structural adjustment reforms resulted in many entering a more uncertain informal market (Sumich, 2007).

According to his findings, the transition from single-party system to a multi-party system has also not led to democracy as promised, but rather weakened the state's legitimacy. A reason for this is because the transition to democracy and liberalization was not begun due to pressures from the population or ideological conviction among the Frelimo elite, but rather as a mean of and the only real alternative for the elite to secure its power (Morier-Genoud, 2007; Sumich, 2007:8). Both Frelimo and Renamo were highly dependent on outside funding, and the aforementioned reduction in support made democratization a solution to a financialization problem. The introduction of democracy and the aim of democratization was, thus, not to subject the government to what the population wanted, but to obtain legitimization among foreign donors funding the process (Sumich, 2007).

Growing corruption and misuse of international support have also been linked to the transition to democracy, permitting the ruling elite to ignore other social groups (Hanlon, 1991; Hanlon, 2004; Sumich, 2007). Hanlon (2004) argues that Mozambique fits into the World Bank's research finding that foreign aid can induce corruption and that more corrupt governments receive even more aid. The shift to market capitalism happened when under the guidance of the World Bank and newly emerged businesspeople learned the ways of capitalism in the context of a society strongly influenced by the donor community. Within this guidance, capitalism was shown not to be about profit but rather a system of patronage where businesses are privatized, and the repayment of loans given are not necessarily needed, depending on connections. Privatization of small firms through friends and family of the leadership was tolerated under the excuse of efficiency, and loans were given without actual belief in repayment in exchange for policy implementation (Hanlon, 2004:750). This has resulted in a relationship between Mozambique's predatory elite and the donors to maintain a myth of Mozambique as a success story, where donors tolerate mismanagement in exchange for the elite implemented market-friendly policy changes. Furthermore, while the implementation of good policies is encouraged, what "good policies" actually consist of is only vaguely defined. Even though donors can report success in several areas, most Mozambicans report not seeing any fundamental changes in their daily lives (Hanlon, 2004:748). In addition to this, donor officials rarely work in the country for more than four years, and institutional memory is short.

Examining these regional divisions and the spatial unevenness shows that there both is a belief in or a fear of the country not being as united as claimed. The historical differences and the memories they are built on proves this belief or fear, and the increase in inequality, both within and between the divided areas, and any changes being implemented that could result in people acting on these differences being implemented as a result of external pressure, further reaffirms it.

6.4 The discovery of natural resources in Mozambique

The recent cases of violent outbreaks have been in the north of Mozambique, in Cabo Delgado, and in the central Mozambique. Based on the location of the natural resources in Mozambique in regards to where the conflicts are located, such as Cabo Delgado being home to Africa's three largest liquid gas projects, the discovery of and politics surrounding these natural resources are of importance to the Mozambican peace process (Rawoot, 2020). Large-scale investments in resource exploitation with the promise of fair distribution of wealth benefitting the Mozambican citizens has been a regular occurrence in Mozambique. In the 1990s, during

the Chissano administration, an investment in mineral resources began (Darch, 2016). This investment included the aluminum project MOZAL, SASOL's natural gas developments, and the reopening of the Moatize coal fields. With the discovery of offshore gas in 2010, the anticipation of gas and coal-fueled economic boom grew under the Guebuza administration (Club of Mozambique, 2021; Offshore Technology, 2017). The promises of inclusive, sustainable, and fair distribution of wealth dominated the political discourse. The current President Nyusi reaffirmed these promises earlier this year at the 2021 opening session in Maputo of the 7th Conference and Exhibition on Mining, Oil, Gas, and Energy (Club of Mozambique, 2021). The exploration of these reserves has triggered increased foreign investment, and there are high expectations of this continuing. However, while the poverty level of most Mozambicans is relatively unchanged, there is a noticeable minority becoming richer that can cause dissatisfaction at a local scale (Cahen & Guilengue, 2016). There have been low levels of contribution to GDP and poor linkages between the projects and other sectors of the economy (Macuane, Buur, & Monjane, 2018).

The national unity understanding promoted by Frelimo affects the use of natural resources, not just how the state apparatus is organized and how they gain consent but also how it is used as a legal argument for state control over territory. As state power is geographically uneven, practices of policing resources are also variable and uneven. This way, it alienates certain parts of the population, creating conflicts over land and resources (Huber, 2018:559). When investing in resource exploitation, the state and foreign investors have been constructing large facilities, and the local population living in these areas has had to move to make way for these facilities (Bull Jørgensen, 2021). While having to uproot their lives, the local population has not seen any of the wealth promised by the state, which has been regarded as one of the root causes of the current conflicts.

Renamo breaking the GPA in 2012 was immediately linked to the discovery of natural resources and the signing of lucrative liquefied natural gas contracts (Macuane et al., 2018). The provinces Renamo has demanded to appoint the provincial governors during the subsequent peace negotiations, and where Renamo claims to have the most support are the provinces most of the country's natural resources are located (Buchanan, 2016). These provinces are also where a low-intensity civil war has been escalating and where the government has systematically been destroying Renamo bases (Macuane et al., 2018).

The insurgency in Northern Mozambique received international attention after the attack on Palma's natural gas-rich port in March 2021 (Byaruhanga, 2021). The insurgency has been

targeting contractors associated with the liquefied natural gas projects and has been moving in on the areas where these companies are operating (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2021). Researchers have not reached a consensus on the reason behind the insurgency in Northern Mozambique, and the root causes are most likely multidimensional. It was once the insurgency started attacking the international investors operating in the oil and gas sector that the insurgency started making international headlines, and the region became engaged in the issue and securing natural gas and oil infrastructures have been said to be as important as keeping stable government institutions and a functional state system (Faria, 2021; Byaruhanga, 2020; Bull Jørgensen, 2021). However, it being a revolt on redistribution is not to be excluded. The Cabo Delgado province is ranked the fourth worst in terms of poverty in Mozambique and is often referred to as the forgotten Cabo (Faria, 2021). The illiteracy rates are the highest in the country at 67 %, there are high unemployment rates, and inequality and marginalization continue to affect the province (Faria, 2021; USAID, 2021). The expectation that investing in natural resources would lead to increased wealth for the population, in general, has not been met, demonstrated when seeing how the energy, extractive industry, construction, and manufacturing industry are by far the sectors that employ the least in the province, with a total of 25637 people out of the 2,4 million living there (Faria, 2021).

The depth of the 1992 peacebuilding process and the lack of political reconciliation has been brought to the table when examining the political implication of natural resources in Mozambique and the current violent conflicts (Gordon, 2015). The abandonment of justice and public reconciliation and the use of strategic forgetting through the decision that any conflict from the past should be forgotten mean that the underlying conflictual mentality is still present, and the expectations of wealth the discovery of natural resources gives and the failure to deliver can be triggering. The centralized, “winner takes all” system has also created institutions that are viewed as inept for structuring natural resource extraction in a societal benefiting way. While these factors can already be seen as a cause for conflict, discovering resources can function as an accelerating element.

Within this, the politics of memory is a potentially powerful topic. Frelimo’s active use of national unity and the strengthening of their chosen memories form the backdrop it functions as a means of reinforcing their hold over the areas and the natural resources. In this way, opposing these memories, creating counter-memories, and challenging Frelimo’s homogeneous definition of who belongs and holds the majority in these areas can also be a means for weakening Frelimo’s ties to these resources and strengthening their own.

6.5 Summary

In this chapter, certain challenges to the peace process as driven by Frelimo in Mozambique are recognized. Considering this thesis' focus on who can shape the present and future by selecting what is remembered of the past and what forms the collective memory, the centralist legacies from the independence war and its consequences on memory representation become the core of this chapter. The centralist nature of power and administration structures is shown to be built on the top-down format of the institutions from the colonial times, with Frelimo holding most of the power during the Civil War and, along with this, most of the memory selection power and memory works. Regarding this, the continuous outbreaks of violence and the political debate on decentralization occurs as a result of the lack of inclusion or recognition of opposition within Mozambique and a form of power struggle in shaping this collective memory, what is regarded as a conflict in the past, and the content of peace. Disregarding this opposition becomes a challenge to peace.

In addition, centralism being built on memories of unity from the independence war, disregarding the fact that this unity was conflicted even during the mobilization for the struggle for independence, becomes an act of subjugating and forgetting the existence of local differences, both around Mozambique and within Frelimo dominated areas. The lack of distribution of wealth and the growing inequality is causing these differences, both in absolute, relative and relational terms, to increase. The recent discovery of natural resources, the promise of wealth from the distribution of the profits, and the lack of fulfillment of these promises make these differences and the lack of participation/representation an even more potent subject.

CHAPTER 7:

Understanding the Samora Machel Monuments

The large Samora Machel statue in Maputo (see figure one) was inaugurated on October 19, 2011, by then-president Armando Guebuza, marking the 25th anniversary of Samora Machel's death (Gunter, 2011). The statue shows Samora Machel standing with his finger raised and the other hand holding his belt. He is dressed, wearing a military uniform. At 9 meters and 4.8 tons, placed on top of a 2.7 meters marble base, the bronze statue towers over Independence Square, marking the top of the Samora Machel Avenue and the place where Samora Machel took office as the President of Mozambique in 1975 (Sousa, 2018). The Portuguese built the square as the Mouzinho de Albuquerque Square, and it was from 1940 home to a statue of the former governor-general of Portuguese Mozambique, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, on horseback. The square was renamed following the independence in 1975 and, as has been common following the ending of colonial and authoritarian regimes in Africa, the statue was moved and replaced by a small statue of Samora Machel until 2011 when the current statue took its place (Levinson, 1998; Sousa, 2018). Just down the road, you can find another small statue by the entrance to Tunduru Botanical Gardens. When building the 2011 statue of Samora Machel in Maputo, it was also decided that equal but smaller statues should be built in every province, said by former president Guebuza to represent the true dimension of Samora Machel (Mozreal, 2010). In the following analysis, the large Samora Machel statue in Maputo will be referred to as the statue, while all the Samora Machel statues throughout the country will be referred to as monuments.

In this chapter, I will look at and discuss the ideologies and choices that went into the design and creation of the Samora Machel monuments by looking at the use of memory and its influence on the construction of the Mozambican identity. The aim is to answer the research question: *What memories embody the Samora Machel monuments, and how is this affecting and being affected by the collective memory of Mozambique?* Answering this research question will be done by first looking at who Samora Machel was and what he meant for Mozambique. Choosing Samora Machel as the image to remember, his history and person, along with what he meant for the country, becomes the memory selected to pass on. Seeing as the choice of Samora Machel as the image of the monument happened in 2011, years after he lived and died, the memories selected for the future then also contains the selections of memories of his person happening in the past. I will, therefore, begin by examining the

historical choices of what Samora Machel signified and stood for. As the story of Samora Machel and Frelimo are largely intertwined, it is impossible to mention one without mentioning the other. Parts of the history of Frelimo in its connection with Samora Machel, Samora Machel's influence, and the symbolism of Samora Machel will, therefore, be included in this chapter. Following this, I will look at the memory selection done at the time of building by examining the political context before and during their building and what actors were shaping this context to see what led to the building. On the ground of monuments also containing the relations that have been produced in relation to them across time and space, I will lastly examine what the role of Samora Machel has become after the erection of the monuments by studying his memory's role in society today.

7.1 A short history of Samora Machel

Before delving into Samora Machel's significance to the monuments, it is necessary to give a short recount of who Samora Machel was. Samora Machel was a Mozambican guerrilla leader and politician who participated in the country's independence movement and became Mozambique's first president from 1975 until he died in 1986. It is, however, necessary to dig deeper into his life to see the significance of the Samora Machel monuments. Born in 1933, Samora Machel grew up in the Chokwe district of Gaza Province to a farming family (Newitt, 1995:545). He trained to be a nurse at the Miguel Bombarda Hospital in Lourenço Marques/Maputo, one of the higher positions available to Mozambicans under the Portuguese colonial state (Munslow, 1985). His experience with colonialism and the wave of independence across Africa from the late-1950s to the early 1960s worked as an influence on Samora Machel's thinking. After meeting Eduardo Mondlane, one of the founders and the first president of Frelimo, he became involved with Frelimo's work, and he joined the movement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1963 (Munslow, 1985; Newitt, 1995). Once there, his main concern was the study of struggle and the organization of an armed rebellion, and soon he was sent to Algeria for training. He quickly worked his way to a position of power in Frelimo as commander of Frelimo forces in 1966, and he influenced and steered the party to the left and into becoming a revolutionary movement and an independence movement (Munslow, 1985; Newitt, 1995).

Samora Machel became president of Frelimo in 1970 after Mondlane's death in 1969 and a short period as an elected member of a three-person junta (Newitt, 1995:546). In the late 1960s, Frelimo had a divide between a right-wing and a left-wing (Munslow, 1985). Samora Machel becoming president marked the right-wing losing this struggle. During his leadership time, he focused on creating the Mozambican nation and a united Mozambican people through

development and socialist transformation. The fear was that the feudal structures remained after independence, and social reform was needed to replace these (Frelimo, 1978; Newitt, 1995). In creating a new society, the existence of a single Mozambican nation was stressed, with a focus on far-reaching education and transforming the old colonial structures based on divisions into communal formations partaking in a context of a wider community (Newitt, 1996:547). At Frelimo's Third Congress in 1977, the party committed openly to Marxist-Leninism, and Machel led with the belief that theory and ideology should come from practice and not dogma (Frelimo, 1978; Munslow, 1985). This combination of thoughts meant that a fusion between patriotism and Marxism characterized Samora Machel's leadership.

Samora Machel's death is still under scrutiny. On the night of October 19, 1986, the plane Samora Machel was traveling in from Zambia to Maputo, a Soviet-built and crewed Tupolev Tu-134 passenger aircraft, crashed into the hills of Mbuzini, South Africa, killing Machel and 33 others, leaving nine survivors (Douek, 2017). Suspicion of the actual cause of the plane crash was quick to emerge, with people saying it was no accident but rather a result of sabotage by the South African apartheid regime (Philips, 2001). Following the crash, the South African government set up The Margo Commission, led by Judge Cecil Margo, which attributed the crash to pilot error (Douek, 2017). Mozambican and Soviet governments rejected this report, and after convening their own inquiry, the Soviet government claimed the plane had been misdirected by a decoy beacon set to lead it off course (Akugizibwe, 2014). Since then, the reason behind the crash has been discussed regularly, blaming different actors or combinations of actors, from South Africa, the Soviet Union, Mozambique, the crew or mechanics, or several factors at once. The most common accusation seems to be against the South African apartheid regime, especially as some reports claim Samora Machel informed that he had received intelligence that the apartheid regime wanted him dead in a meeting before his departure to Zambia, corresponding with the apartheid regime's destabilization campaign that had steadily intensified since August 1985 (Douek, 2017).

This short recount of who Samora Machel was, shows how his upbringing and experience with colonialism had an influential impact on what kind of leader Samora Machel was. In addition to this, it shows that Samora Machel did not just play a formative role in the shaping of Frelimo, as seen in chapter four, but that the patriotic and Marxist nature of his leadership and his revolutionary position influenced the building of the new nation took shape.

7.2 Shaping Mozambican identity and the historical symbolism of Samora Machel

As a new nation, the shaping of the identity and history of the country became important. The recognition of Frelimo as the only legitimate representative of the Mozambican people as one of Frelimo's demands during the negotiations with the Portuguese leading up to the Lusaka Accords and independence resulted in Frelimo ruling the country through a one-party rule from 1975 to 1990 (Darch, 2018; de Souto, 2013). Frelimo being the sole representative and official political power in the country resulted in them being the only possible political organization, occupying all available political space and controlling the composition of the government, the definition of nationalism, and what it meant to be Mozambican. The past was, thus, determined, controlled, and represented through the history of Frelimo. Through this, "Mozambican-ness" was defined as someone supporting Frelimo.

Memories and the use and control of memories were an essential part of Frelimo's agenda in the period following the independence, and Samora Machel as a charismatic and popular figure was an important symbol in the execution of this (Igreja, 2010). The story of Frelimo and Samora Machel leading the struggle towards independence and securing Mozambique and its people's freedom formed the foundation that political memory was constructed on, a memory regulated by the government with the aim of transferring it to a collective memory (Coelho, 2015). The history of the national liberation struggle became the core and the substance in nation-building and shaped the political development during this time. When talking about the past, the present, and in the construction and legitimization of the future, the struggle became the marking point separating the "before" and the "after" (de Souto, 2013). Frelimo's use and control of memories show that their construction of Mozambique's collective memory is a process of engaging with the past through memory works. The constructed nature of this process shows how the official histories were based on the selection of memories related to the positive aspects of Frelimo's past, including their role in the liberation struggle, portrayed through the charismatic and popular figure of Samora Machel forming the political body's unity.

Frelimo's unification of all Mozambicans was intended to happen through mainstreaming a past based on a shared colonial experience (Farré, 2015). Any difference between Mozambicans was seen as created by the colonial power as a divide-and-conquer strategy, and the solution was to build a common identity and eradicate any assumed colonial division. The history of Frelimo, and with it the history of Samora Machel, was from 1975 to 1990 spread throughout the county from pamphlets published by Frelimo's Department of Ideological Work and personal

narratives of participants in the independence struggle (de Souto, 2013:283). De Souto (2013) has analyzed these sources, which shaped the movement's history and were studied, dissected, and reproduced both within the country and abroad, creating a story told by a single voice. These pamphlets are especially interesting, as they were primarily transcriptions of speeches and reflections made by Samora Machel during the liberation struggle and after. In these speeches, Machel talked about topics from education and the role of women in society to the importance of national unity, where the latter topic is central to many of the current disputes in the country (de Souto, 2013). Stories told by other members of the movement were carefully coordinated and presented as a single, uniform, and homogenous narrative, shaping both what the official history contained and what was and is left out.

Shifting the political discourse and the basic assumptions about society started in 1974, lasting until the early 1980s (Darch, 2018). The new kind of politics was politics of independence and socialist transformation, which replaced the colonial structures in a way that left no room for disagreement and appropriated all political space. When envisioning the future nation, Frelimo leaders under Machel's leadership ideated a united and modern nation without social or cultural differences (Alexander, 1997:2). In executing this vision, chiefs and practices deemed "traditional" were seen as feudal and were not included, religious groups and churches were closed and burned, and believers were sent for re-education. Any businesses that existed, which were primarily Portuguese or Indian, were shut down in exchange for state-run people's stores. In this way, Frelimo marked and strengthened their position and power throughout the country; a power used to construct the past in the present according to their needs.

In 1975, Samora Machel went on a "triumphal journey," traveling through every province to deliver speeches and introduce the new provincial governors (Darch, 2018:). While being a journey traveled to celebrate the victory of the independence struggle, it can also be seen as a symbolic spatial inscription of "Mozambican-ness," and the new provincial governors were introduced as representations of the new power. This reframing process spurred a discourse that defines what it means to be fully Mozambican, where any opposition was seen as sabotage or conspiracy by enemies of the people (Darch, 2018).

As one can see with this one-sided development of what was planned to be the collective history of Mozambique, not every memory was included in the construction of the "official national history" (de Souto, 2013). The history of liberation had to be portrayed as perfect, and anything working against this image was excluded and silenced by being left out of retellings and thus "forgotten." The conflicts that were retold were conflicts legitimizing the liberation

movement's choices, which correlated with the development of their ideology (de Souto, 2013:282). In addition, the stories of those viewed as traitors to the liberation movement, ordinary citizens and those who participated in the underground struggles were all excluded from the official narrative and "forgotten" until the 1990s, when they were once again brought out into the public space (de Souto, 2013).

The history and the archives of Frelimo, and through this the history of their heroes and Samora Machel, are closed off from the public (de Souto, 2013). Closing the history and archives off from the public keeps the control of the memory in the hands of Frelimo. Per Foucault's theory on knowledge and power, controlling the memory conditions the hierarchy of power in Frelimo's favor. The ownership and control of information give control over "official" history and contribute to forgetting alternative memories. Keeping the memory oral also gives more flexibility and adaptability towards contextual changes (Coelho, 2015; de Souto, 2013).

When dealing with transitional justice post-independence, the commission of inquiry was entirely one-sided without a formal investigation guide or rights of witnesses (Igreja, 2010). It only dealt with alleged collaborators with Portuguese colonial fascism called the compromised, and neither the Portuguese colonial officers nor crimes Frelimo might have committed was considered. Memories were a central point to the strategy of inquiry, and as the memories that the compromised told of conflicted with what Frelimo wanted to hear, threats, guilt, force, and punishment were used to mobilize the compromised in the wanted direction. Anyone thought to support the old system was considered to be working against independence and freedom and thus seen as the enemy. This gave way to a narrative and a story consisting of them and us where everyone working against Frelimo was seen as one singular enemy working against the nation's good. Everything not appropriate with this narrative was not included in the official narrative and strategically "forgotten."

The reconciliation process completed after the Civil War was also limited, similar to the reconciliation and transitional justice that followed the Independence Struggle. Unlike South Africa and Rwanda, where reconciliation was a large part of the peace processes, Mozambique exchanged this with organized forgetting where everything was to be left in the past. However, when Frelimo and Renamo met in the new parliament in 1995, the previous preference for a transition of silence was put aside for the possibility of using memories as weapons by accusing each other of war crimes and in this way bringing up what was meant to be "forgotten" (Igreja, 2012).

There is, in general, little being written about how the use of violence was an essential part of Frelimo's being able to sustain these policies (Igreja, 2010). Most authors writing this type of history write about violence as something happening to Frelimo, not something Frelimo did. However, Frelimo is not entirely blameless in this regard either. Frelimo used many tools to achieve the goal of integrating the population into a common thought and agenda and removing people seen as compromised or enemies. One of these tools was by changing people's consciousness and a form of mental decolonization through a "reintegration strategy" implemented from 1978 to 1982 (Igreja, 2010). In general, when Samora Machel talked about anyone opposing Frelimo and the post-independence ruling authorities in his speeches, the focus was on the enemy having corrupted their minds or a form of mental colonialization and that they needed to be reborn into the "New Man" mentality (Igreja, 2010:789; de Souto, 2013). The goal was to create a national consciousness, and the preconditioning phase for this was an inward-looking process, starting with challenging people's thoughts and ideas and shaping them in a manner suitable for Frelimo.

7.2.2 The historical choices that lie behind the memories

By examining the historical choices behind the memories that historically give the Samora Machel monuments meaning, it is possible to see how the selection of memories has happened since the end of the War of Independence and is greatly affected by Frelimo having been the sole holder of power since then. Frelimo has used and controlled memories to unify the new nation by actively spreading stories, information and creating a shared narrative. This shared narrative is based on the independence struggle and Frelimo's role in it as saviors, and Samora Machel has been the personification of this narrative and, thus, his image is part of bringing continuity to these memories.

This shared narrative was imposed at a national scale and the individual by promoting the "new man" identity. The act of memory selection and active forgetting of everything from pre-independence was, through the manifestation of this identity, supposed to happen within every individual, showing how memories were used to not only share national identity, but also personal identity.

Seeing how the use of force and power was necessary for silencing opposing narratives through the symbolic spatial inscription of "Mozambican-ness" by deconcentrating the power, leaving no room for disagreements, and the use of violence and silencing in the reconciliation processes shows the existence of other subjugated knowledge that have been oppressed through power

struggles. The necessity of force also shows that the shared narrative is not as shared and collective as claimed by Frelimo, which will be discussed further in chapters six and seven.

7.3 The political context leading to the building of the monuments

While promoting and spreading information about Samora Machel was an essential political strategy in the early years of the independence, this strategy later changed to become the complete opposite with the silencing of the memory of Machel. Following Samora Machel's death and during the Chissano administration, which governed from 1986 to 2005, market liberalization and the structural adjustment reforms took hold on the Mozambican agenda. Samora Machel had served as a maintainer and guard of African socialism, and his death opened up for a rightward shift for both Mozambique and the region (Douek, 2017). His death opening for this shift can be seen in regards to the continuation and completion of the turn towards neoliberal economic agenda in the country in the 1980s, criticized by Machel (Minter, 1994). The political and economic changes had a significant impact on the memory of Samora Machel and Frelimo. Since the practices from the socialist period now would directly contradict the new ideological and economic changes, the Frelimo leadership changed its tactics by downplaying and strategically erasing aspects of this history (Sumich, 2020). The changing of tactics included decreasing the emphasis and promotion of Samora Machel and transforming what people related to Samora Machel (de Souto, 2013:289). The active choice of erasing certain parts of Mozambican history led to an almost eradication of the memory of Samora Machel. In addition to this, Frelimo as a party had to make way for governance and economic recovery, stepping away from the party-driven role from before to a more administrative role (de Souto, 2013).

However, the silencing of these memories of the early independence was challenged by the prominence they had acquired outside of the ruling elite. Urban workers often used symbols and slogans of socialism to express discontent, and the legacies from the socialist times continued to be influential and formative of the presence for both workers and the urban middle class (Sumich, 2020; Pitcher, 2006). The economic and social change also opened the space for the re-emergence of memories not included in the official narrative, and people wrote down these memoirs to recover the previous "silences" (de Souto, 2013). In a sense, these changes in the control of the past and the memories included in it opened up for subjugated knowledge to take more space and, in that way, increase their position in the power struggle to shape the collective history.

Frelimo's transition from a united front to a political party in a multi-party system following the signing of the GPA and the ending of the civil war stripped them of their exclusive right to claim the liberation struggle and "impose" their version of the part and of what the Mozambican identity contains on the population (Coelho, 2015). Others began to tell their stories and challenging the official history (de Souto, 2013). Stories about Frelimo were shared by people who had been considered traitors, such as people taking part in the struggle but leaving after Mondlane died, or after they became Marxist-Leninists, or who just did not fit into the narrative and were left out. They are now telling their stories, forming counter-memories. Autobiographies and individual memoirs were published (de Souto, 2013:294). While some were accounts of what the authors found important in their lives, others were attempts to deconstruct the history or histories in opposition to the collective social memory and were taking a position regarding their self-identification with this history. Here the need to recover history was viewed as important to explain the present and the future. Identity being built on certain truths from the past makes forgetting these a challenge to legitimizing current positions and identity. As some of these stories could be seen to challenge and contradict Frelimo's version of the past, they can be seen as counter-memories, working against the power of the official memories. However, De Souto (2013) comments upon how the memoirs do not seem to challenge the "official history," and what is told is not necessarily anything new or unknown.

7.3.1 The return of Samora Machel on the political agenda

After a period of silence and little mentioning of Samora Machel after his death, he slowly, then quickly, came back as a popular figure. The Guebuza administration that ruled from 2004 to 2015 took on a vastly different role from the Chissano administration, putting a strong focus on fronting the party and its leaders, history, and memory of the liberation struggle (de Souto, 2013). It was also during this time that Frelimo's support was challenged. In the 2003 local elections, Renamo mayors were elected, for the first time, in five of 33 municipalities (Hanlon, 2010). In addition to this, the ruling government was involved in corruption scandals and multiple accusations of bad governance (Guissemo, 2018). Aiming to secure their position and their positive role in the country's history, Frelimo responded by bringing stories of unknown and forgotten heroes back into the public and brought these memories into physical spaces and daily life through monuments, and in this way mobilizing the past to adapt their narrative to challenges in the present (de Souto, 2013). Again, showing the way Frelimo actively uses public spaces to form the country's history and memory in the present and for the future.

The 2008 commemoration of the death of all the heroes of the liberation struggle who died in 1968 was organized by the state, and President Guebuza, aiming to celebrate the building of Mozambican identity and to strengthen national pride and information about the heroes' life stories and Frelimo history were shared (de Souto, 2013). With the revitalization of old Frelimo heroes, the stories of Samora Machel returned to popularity. With his return, he was re-appropriated by Frelimo (de Souto, 2013). The memories of him openly fighting against bad governance, corruption, and inequality functioned as an appropriate counterpoint to the accusations of corruption and bad governance (Guissemo, 2018). This time, however, it was not his meanings and ideas that were shared, but they were retold in new contexts, giving them new meaning, or as de Souto (2013) writes:

“Making his ideas banal by repeating them systematically in a completely different context, where it is hard to articulate them with the current discourse, and to convert this figure, who cannot be erased from the popular memory, into a myth which can be reduced to the bronze statues that are now proliferating all over the country.”

In one way, this can be said to have worked, as Guebuza was re-elected in the 2009 election in a landslide victory, winning the highest number of parliamentary seats in all multi-party elections (Hanlon, 2010). However, the 2009 election also received much criticism for being tainted by unfairness, secrecy, and misconduct.

With the memory of Samora Machel's return on the political agenda, his symbolism in the population was revealed to have changed. This time, he had also become a symbol representing the dissatisfaction towards poverty and inequality in the country, making him an especially popular figure among those unhappy with the current situation (Rantala, 2016). The use of Samora Machel for criticism will be discussed further below.

7.3.2 The building of the monuments

The building of the monuments was organized by the government in relation to 2011 being named the “year of Samora Machel” to mark the 25th anniversary of Samora Machel's death (de Souto, 2013). It was the North Korean construction company Mansudae Overseas Project that designed and built the Maputo statue in the style of socialist realism. Socialist realism as a style was developed in the Soviet Union, leaning heavily on the conventions of classical sculptures, trying to portray the ideal society devoid of any artistic interpretation. Mansudae Overseas Project is the international division of the Mansudae Art Studio that produces most of

the official public monuments and buildings in Pyongyang (Kirkwood, 2011). Providing the countries of Africa with giant statues is a big North Korean export that started in early the 1980s through diplomatic gifts to socialist or non-aligned countries (Pollard, 2016). North Korean art is said to be popular among African leaders both for their cheap price and for their bold, authoritarian style and size which appeals as part of a nation-building process and as a way to assert oneself in the world. Their buildings and designs abroad have shown to be a means to convey a sense of identity when forging legitimacy domestically and in international spheres and to assert the power and authority of post-colonial governments publicly (Kirkwood, 2011).

While the Maputo statue was built by North Korea, it has also been said that some refer to it as the “China statue” (Interview informant 1, 12.04.2021). Commonly when something is said to be from China, it is a comment on how things do not work or are easily broken (own observations). Referring to the Maputo statue of Samora Machel in this way can thus be seen as a critique of the regime and the concept of a hero (Interview informant 1, 12.04.2021).

Another common critique is that the statue is a bad resemblance to the real Samora Machel and some say that its differences are so great it could rather be seen as a different person (Oliveira, 2014). Carlos said that:

“The statues of Samora Machel honestly does not remind me too much of the figure of the very dynamic, energetic, and explosive president that he was, because they portray a very sad picture of a serious Samora with his finger raised... Nothing to do with the real Samora. The statues are, because of this, just a monument to me that eternalizes his name, and does not depict ANY of his image” (Focus group interview Carlos, 26.04-11.05.2021, own translation).

However, on the other hand, several other informants comment on the opposite, saying that “when comparing pictures most of them look like the real Samora” (Interview Marla, 28.08.2021). While others again do not see the importance of the statues representing him fully, but rather the significance of them showing that he lives in all provinces, and how he reminds them of a pillar of the Mozambican nation (Focus group interview Vasco and Nelson, 26.04-11.05-2021).

These conflicting opinions on the statue reflect the different understandings of his image in the return of his figure on the political agenda. On the one hand, you have the turning of the memory of Samora Machel into material culture with the focus on certain aspects of his past as a way of shaping him into a blank canvas that can be a representation of the Frelimo they want to show

in the present. On the other hand, however, it is also possible to see the criticism of the statue and how it is a bad resemblance of the Samora Machel they looked up to as a part of a use of the memory of Samora Machel to criticize and show dissatisfaction with the government.

7.3.3 What memories was Machel representing during the building of the monuments?

The silencing of Samora Machel in order to implement SAPs and market liberalization acted as a form of silencing memory and opened the political space for other actors to change and appropriate what memories of Samora Machel were to be remembered, as was seen by the workers' continued use of his image. The introduction of multiparty elections increased this political space, and subjugated knowledge re-emerged. However, the fact that the memories and subjugated knowledge that did emerge did not necessarily challenge the collective memories can signify that Frelimo still was a stronger party in the power struggle, albeit slightly weakened.

The weakening of Frelimo's hold of power can also explain Samora Machel's return on the political agenda, as it was in a context of challenging support and accusations of bad governance that they were built. The resumed use of the memories and narrative surrounding Samora Machel as a hero representing the good Frelimo has done and equating Frelimo with a strong and independent Mozambique shows the selection of memories the new use of Samora Machel is supposed to symbolize. However, using these memories in a new context and only selecting the memories of him fighting bad governance and not the ones concerning what Samora Machel would say this governance should contain shows how the use of his memory and what is meant by building these monuments has changed. The new Samora Machel becomes a continuation of Samora Machel as a symbol of patriotism and a strong and united Frelimo, as can be seen in the authoritarian style and size of the Maputo statue, but he is no longer a symbol of Samora Machel's Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary thoughts.

However, the previous opening of the space for remembering Samora Machel did not make this process of memory selection as straightforward as previously, and what is remembered and by whom it is remembered has become more contested.

7.2.1. The “new man” identity

“O homem novo,” or the “new man,” was an identity based on the forgetting of one's past and the idea of starting anew with a clean slate (de Souto, 2013). It was constructed during the Independence War and used with the aim of building a more free and fair society until it was gradually left behind during the 1980s (Farré, 2015). When reflecting on the role of memory in

the creation of the “new man,” de Souto (2013) mentions how the “new man” was set to build his future from the moment of his transformation, but that the present and the future were constructed from the memory and the sense of identity connected to the past. Frelimo shaped this past under the rule of Samora Machel, and thus for many, the “new man” had a past based on a collective memory constructed by someone else founded on a history that he had not participated in himself (de Souto, 2013).

The idea of what this “new man” identity symbolizes is part of shaping identity in both the past, the present, and the future. The “new man” overcomes his individualistic character and becomes a collective being shaping the people's collective memory, which together identifies with the struggle, the community, and interests that go beyond the individual (de Souto, 2013:284). He was said to be a citizen promoting self-sacrifice, collective labor, and rationality. When transitioning from colonial rule to Marxist-Leninism, the understanding of Marxism was not necessarily exploitation as a result of social relations created by a mode of production, but rather exploitation was seen as a manifestation of wickedness, and the aim was to remove themselves from this and create a “good” and pure society (Sumich, 2019:4; Hall and Young, 1997). This process included the abolition of what was viewed as feudal structures, of ethnic and regional identities, “superstitious” beliefs, and everything seen as “primitive” (Sumich, 2019). The change implemented also introduced a new moral vision to unite a fractured population involving the internalization of new values, social structures, and an understanding of the Mozambican people’s connectedness. The goal was to create a common identity throughout the country, and Maputo, already the center of wealth and power in the country, became the center of the changes to the identity and the post-independence formation of a nationalist identity (Sumich, 2019:5).

Frelimo’s promotion of the “new man” identity was quite urban-based since the small, educated minority promoting it were from an urban environment and its main effect was in the cities, especially Maputo (Farré, 2015; Sumich, 2019). However, even in Maputo, the project has had dual outcomes, with the population internalizing nationalist values, identity, and systems of meaning, but at the same time, they were more exposed to any shortcomings of the party and thus more open to criticizing based on these values.

Whether or not the creation of the “new man” identity was a success or not can be debated, but as a strong focus during Samora Machel’s period of leadership and one of the formative elements of the national unity idea that is still heatedly discussed, the idea of the “new man” and what it stands for is still relevant to the discussion of what Samora Machel symbolizes. An

interesting element is how it categorizes what or who the enemy is. Since colonialism and the interconnected exploitation through any form of division between the Mozambican population was seen as a hindrance to a fair and just society, the enemy was not just found outside, but also inside the country, and inside Mozambicans (Farré, 2015). Anyone opposing the unity and identity promoted was seen as enemies of the cause, a viewpoint that can persist even when the idea of what that identity consists of has changed. In addition to this, the execution of this aim at creating a common identity and how it was done in a top-down format through the use of force and re-education camps, antagonizing any opposition and ridiculing most of the population's attitudes, did have a negative impact on Frelimo's support later. However, further research is needed to comment on how and to what degree (Farré, 2015).

7.4 Samora Machel in the present

The re-emergence of Samora Machel has not just happened on the political agenda. He has also had re-emerging popularity in the general population. When talking about his role in society today in one of the focus groups Deolinda mentioned how Samora Machel is of high regard by all generations, and because of this, he is quoted in music, everyday conversations, social media post (Focus group interview Deolinda, 26.04-11.05.20219. It is especially among the younger generation that the recent memorialization phenomenon surrounding him has taken hold (Sabaratnam, 2011). There seems to be hero-like worship of Samora Machel. When asked about the possibility of people from other parts of Mozambique than themselves could have some negative thoughts on the monuments, as Marla, a Maputo-based informant said they *“had heard of people not liking any statues, not even of Jesus and Mary, so it was possible that they didn't. But other than that no. Maybe the opposition, but even their freedom is because of Machel's work, so it is not likely”*, show how farfetched the thought of the idea of him not being liked seemed to her (Interview Marla, 28.08.2021).

During his lifetime, Samora Machel was presented as a man of the people, as a symbol used to bring people into action to perform and support the government and their values and to create unity. In popular culture today, Samora Machel is still mentioned in combination with “the people,” but this is not necessarily linked to positive aspects of the government and the nation, but often more as a comment on inequality, corruption, and the effects of liberalization in Mozambique (Sabaratnam, 2011). One male informant from Inhambane (Focus group interview Carlos, 26.04-11.05.2021, own translation) mentions how while his ideas remain valid after his death, there are inconsistencies among those who say they follow him, and because of this, he thinks his city tends to change their vision on whom Samora was, making

him just a name in history and not preserving his principles. It can seem that the recovered figure of Samora Machel fills a need for a “perfect hero” that can be used for criticizing the current government while staying true to the sense of Mozambican-ness and national unity shaped in the post-independence era. The symbolism of Samora Machel is stripped down to mean equality, freedom, unity, and strength to continue both politically and in everyday life. With this symbolism, he can be used to criticize anything that challenges this narrative without necessarily putting much weight on the politics behind it.

In his article on the politics of memory in Mozambique, Igreja (2013) demonstrates how ordinary people interpret and recreate the political narrative and discourse on their terms. Within this, he shows how, albeit Frelimo has an influential role in the formation of commemoration, national identity, and what national unity contains, others are also part of its shaping and reconceptualizing (Igreja, 2013:334). The shaping and reconceptualization done by others could be from political convictions or rational thought and personal sentiments and enthusiasms. By naming sites and places after elements from Renamo history, for instance, this informal recognition gives way for the national unity and identity as a product of multiple imaginings that can be conflicting (Igreja, 2013:335). An example of this that Igreja (2013) brings up is how a bus stop near the former Renamo leader’s residence in Maputo is popularly called Maringué after the last military headquarters of Renamo, given further significance as it was also located close to President Guebuza’s residence. This shows how the use of memory and counter-memory amalgamate in the process of shaping national identity.

One event that shows the people as an actor shaping the past, present, and future of how the symbolism of Samora Machel is being used were the riots of September 2010, which broke out as a reaction to the government’s rise in fuel and bread prices. The riots were violent, leaving 13 people dead, but brought with it the retreat of the government and stopped the rise in prices (BBC News, 2010). The song “Povo no Poder” (People in Power) by Azagaia played a formative role during and after the riots, offering slogans used in demonstrations and being claimed to reflect the social dynamics and problems behind the event. Mozambican hip-hop music and local rappers have been said to function as spokespeople of the marginalized population through lyrics claiming citizenship (Guissemo, 2018). In his music, Azagaia defines himself as “one of the people” and often uses quotes and recordings of Samora Machel’s speeches talking about the power of the people and their responsibility and ability to stand against those working against them (Pöysä & Rantala, 2018). Samora Machel is used as a symbol, representing the people and the fight for a more equal Mozambique. In addition to this,

some of his music brings up the unsolved case of Samora Machel's death blaming those in power of both murdering and covering up the truth, something also done by other musicians (Rantala, 2016). In this way, the narrative of Samora Machel is brought away from the singular narrative imposed by the government, opening up for counter-narratives and changing the symbolic value of Samora Machel. The use of music and art, in general, has been looked at as a source of alternative narratives that function alongside politicians and scientists that are dominating public debates bringing up topics of corruption, poverty, and other social problems other actors seem less willing to mention (Pöysä & Rantala, 2018; Rantala, 2016). The act of taking to the streets was a way of demanding their inclusion in the national narrative and the remembering of parts of the history that are not as publicly remembered as the Independence War and the economic growth since the 1990s, such as the civil war and the extensive poverty that is still very much present (Pöysä & Rantala, 2018).

The use of Samora Machel as a symbol in music is not new, as Rantala (2016) has shown in his writings on the topic. Songs of praise have been made since the Independence War and throughout Samora Machel's presidency, albeit changing from songs aiming at strengthening fighting morale to building a new nation through constructing national unity and combating enemies by praising its leaders (Rantala, 2016). Although most of them were songs of praise, there were some that could be said to be mild criticism of Samora Machel's government.

In popular culture, like this, existing memories are recalled, but also maintained and renewed. However, this can also open up a debate about the new media and broadcasting laws approved by the government in December 2020 which could result in Mozambique becoming one of the most closed media markets in Africa, limiting foreign journalists, banning international media from broadcasting, and creating a new media regulator managed by the government (DW, 2021; Zitmar, 2021). In an interview with Pöysä & Rantana (2018), Azagaia mentions how his music no longer gets played on radio or TV (Pöysä & Rantana, 2018). This, along with the stories of Azagaia and other musicians being arrested in connection with their music or concerts they have held shows the limits of this narrative's outreach and the dependence it has on being shared through other means (Freemuse, 2010; Mutch, 2013).

7.4.1 His memory's role in society today

The re-emergence of Samora Machel's memory makes his memory have an almost hero-like status. His memory becoming a symbol of prosperity and justice, allows for the use of it for criticizing the government and expressing grievances. Simultaneously, by removing the political background connected to his memory, it becomes possible to stay true to the sense of

Mozambican-ness and national unity he portrays, while still being critical of the government. Seeing this, one can say that the narrative and memory of Samora Machel in society today is more multitudinous than before, opening up for counter-narratives and different symbolic values of the memory of Samora Machel. However, as shown with the arresting and censoring of artists and musicians, the changing of the memory of Samora Machel is not without its difficulties. The multiple imaginings of Samora Machel can result in multiple imaginings of national unity and identity, that challenges the very foundation of the collective narrative Frelimo is trying to control. Although it is not possible based on the research here to say to what degree this related to the monuments or whether it is further implications of the previous opening of the political space after the market liberalization and the introduction of multiparty elections, it does have an impact on how people relate to the monuments and the symbolic significance they relay to society. In one of the focus group discussions, this was expressed clearly by Deolinda who said: “*Samora was a Frelimo leader and I think that if you are in a historically Renamo district, you probably have been neglected by the government for a very long time, until today. Therefore, I think it does matter.*” (Focus group interview Deolinda, 26.04-11.05.2021).

7.5 Summary

When looking at the spatial and temporal aspects of the creation and use of Samora Machel and the monuments in relation to Gaskell’s (2020) five thematic divisions of interacting with the material world, it is specifically within the symbolic, social, and memory division that the monuments have the most influence. While the symbolic meaning of Samora Machel and the monuments are constantly produced and reproduced, the significance of this symbolism and the sacredness of it has only increased. The increased of importance of Samora Machel as a hero and a spirit has only greatened the symbolic meaning of people’s interactions with the monuments. Although it seems that Frelimo’s aim with the monuments is to create a common cultural memory to strengthen national unity, they also heighten and manifest social distinctions and mark social differentiations by pointing out and alienating those who do not relate or feel included in what the monuments portray. Identity and social memory are shaped in relation to this agenda imposed by Frelimo, resulting in alienation among those whose identity and social memory those not fit with the cultural memory conveyed This is done through the use of memory, as the choice behind making them is to preserve and regulate certain knowledges of the past that substantiates Frelimo’s needs in the present and for the future.

Circling back to the research question posed in the chapter introduction, some clear lines emerge. The rise and fall and the following return of Samora Machel in public discourse and everyday conversation show that Samora Machel is used politically. This has for instance been done to shape national identity by engaging memories of him defined by Frelimo. When studying and analyzing the history and memories of Samora Machel and ideological and political changes that have led up to and influenced the building of the Samora Machel monuments, there are several points to be made. For one, there has clearly been a change in the symbolism of Machel, from being a socialist leader with a certain political agenda to being a symbol of Frelimo in general and the “good” they have done. Frelimo’s narrative in this is clear: Mozambique started with them, they are the founders and leaders of the nation that have led Mozambique through wars against internal and external enemies. They ensure peace and progress, and are eternal, representing the past and the future at once. One can see how memories are actively used in Mozambican politics and how this greatly influences the power hegemony, the construction of Mozambican identity, and who is included or excluded from political spaces. In this way, Samora Machel is also used to define who the enemy is. Especially important is how his focus on creating national unity has been maintained and how it is actively used to shape politics and to define “Mozambican-ness”. Looking at the symbolism of Samora Machel in recent times, one can also see a second use of Machel. His status as a hero securing freedom for every Mozambican shapes him into a symbol of more hopeful times articulated through the criticism of bad governance, corruption, and inequality. The discussion on Samora Machel’s symbolism and memory and their importance for Mozambique in one of the focus groups was concluded well by one male participant in his late 20s: “*Samora Machel’s memory is very important for our future, since ideas are the foundation for everything to reach other levels.*” (Focus group interview Hélder, 26.04-11.05.2021, own translation).

CHAPTER 8:

Monuments as an Act of Peacebuilding

Being aware of the socially constructed nature of monuments and their role in material culture, how they are used in changing the representation of space, and how they can open for discussions on how these representations are perceived allows for increased insight into the dynamics and the plurality of peace and conflict, what actors are involved, and their ability to influence a peace and conflict context.

In this chapter, I will investigate research question three by discussing *why the nature of the existing peace and the memories represented by the monuments is unable to build a lasting peace in Mozambique?* This will first be examined by discussing how the Samora Machel monuments have been used to change representational space as a part of illiberal, authoritarian peacebuilding. Secondly, by discussing how people have reacted to and reformed the monuments and how this shows the existence of subjugated knowledge and counter-memories. And lastly, by opening the discussion on why the nature of the peace in Mozambique today is not stable and how a spatial approach can be used to enlighten this subject.

8.1 Building statues in an illiberal and authoritarian peace

Monuments, as ideological conceptualizations, can be used by those in power to change the representational spaces and exploit their symbolic value and thus transform the representation of space and how space is perceived (Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994). In Mozambique, this can be seen in how Frelimo has historically been the most influential party in shaping the collective memory and the official narrative that functions as the basis for the nationally implemented understanding of peace and how the monuments represent this. Their domination of the content of this peace and the memory forming its foundation resulted in a nationally imposed peace built on an understanding of national unity that equates to supporting the values Frelimo stands for. Defining peace as equal to this confined interpretation of national unity excludes people and groups who do not identify with the memories that form the basis of Frelimo's understanding of national unity.

The national unity promoted is based around memories of stories and heroes related to Frelimo as a granter of independence, specifically through Samora Machel as a symbol. This can be seen with the construction of identity and promotion of stories from the independence struggle

throughout the country in the late-1970s using Samora Machel's speeches and later with his return on the political agenda. The collective memory became the foundation of national unity, built on the mainstreaming of a shared colonial experience. Any differences or opposition towards this collective memory was regarded as externally produced, first by the colonial power, then by Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa, and now by externally induced terrorism by Al-Shabaab and ISIS. The creation of a single uniform, homogenous narrative also happened at a personal level, with the forgetting of one's past and starting anew as a "new man" through the construction and establishment of a national consciousness using what was regarded as "mental decolonization." Even here, the goal was to build one's future from the moment of the transformation, but the present and future were constructed from the collective memory as selected by Frelimo (de Souto, 2013). Samora Machel is and has been used to share this narrative and as the inspiration and symbol of the narrative. While his Marxist-Leninist politics was actively removed from what his figure symbolizes, following Frelimo's political changes and the subjugation of the memories of Samora Machel in the 1980s and 1990s, the return of Samora Machel on the political agenda as a memory to be preserved brings with it the principles of Samora Machel as a symbol of national unity and this unity is based on memories of Frelimo.

The consistent blaming of external sources being behind any conflicts occurring in the country and the refusal to recognize any dissatisfaction among the Mozambican population in the manner done by Frelimo and the government can thus be seen as a consequent political strategy performed by Frelimo. When examining this while regarding the strategic use of forgetting through the promotion of a one-sided and censored re-account of the Mozambican history and the silencing of any negativity linked to Frelimo, one can see how Frelimo uses memories strategically in the creation of an understanding of national unity defining who are seen as insiders and outsiders. Through this, anyone opposing Frelimo is viewed as an outsider. Building the monuments only shows how this has increased. The demonstrative act of placing a monument of Samora Machel, a person whose identity and history have been mined and constructed to symbolize not just Frelimo and their self-asserted greatness, but also the future of Mozambique, the definition of "Mozambican-ness," and the perfect Mozambican, in every province, with one rising 9-meters tall in the center of the capital, is an act not only showing their power in defining Mozambique's past, present, and future but also enhancing and strengthening this power.

As mentioned, in regards to authoritarian peacebuilding, this form of peacebuilding is implemented by reducing opportunities and resources for the opposition to mobilize by

maintaining hegemonic control of public discourse, space, and economic resources (Lewis et al., 2008:491). The building of the monuments and the memory selection behind them become an act of controlling public discourse and space to maintain power and reduce other actors' resistance capabilities. Defining the content of national unity and the Mozambican identity on someone who supports Frelimo and the acts of Samora Machel and the framing of any opposition as being externally produced are both components of accomplishing these agendas. In regards to memories, it is said that liberal peace is a peace that can embrace a plurality of memories and memorials, while in illiberal peace, it is only the narratives of the victor that may be heard and only the images of the victor that may be seen (Kappler, 2017). The limited range and the singularity of memorials permitted thus raises concerns on the quality and the character of the peace achieved in Mozambique.

In addition, the building of the monuments becomes an act of trying to build identity. By building them all over Mozambique, their construction is used for communicating political values to a specific political sense of community by linking them with large and historically significant events in Mozambique. This way, the monuments become significant in creating an imagined community for people to envision a common membership with, or as Vasco summed up nicely: *"The statues of Samora Machel are a good way to immortalize the legacy, thoughts and the great leader that Samora was, and having them spread all over the country is even better for not forgetting him and the importance he represents to the country"* (Focus group interview Vasco, 26.04-11.5.2021). In this manner, the symbolism of one large statue in Maputo and a smaller one in each province becomes a representation and a manifestation of how the governmental system is built up, with the centralized power located in the capital where the large statue is placed. The smaller ones, thus, become representations of this power and the ideologies and memories Frelimo have materialized in them in every province.

Frelimo's dominance on defining history, memory, and national unity is comparable with their dominance on power and the centralism of the political system. Hence, the creation of the Samora Machel monuments in 2011 becomes an attempt to strengthen this dominance. Frelimo seems to equate centralism with unity and unity with peace, thus affecting the monuments' significance and the peacebuilding process.

8.2 Reforming the monuments through counter-memories

Returning to the notion of memories, memoryscapes, and monuments as socially constructed and an outcome of the power and knowledge struggles between actors, this also concerns the

silenced knowledge, which has the potential to challenge the current holders of power (Courtheyn, 2016; Erll, 2011; Foucault, 1977). The people's reaction to the monuments, either through them representing their view of Samora Machel as a hero symbolizing a better future or through their criticism of the government presenting Samora Machel wrongly, show the existence of subjugated knowledge and counter-memories in Mozambique. In this way, the Mozambican population is transforming the value and significance of the monuments through their relations to them, making them symbols of their own. Through these relations and the following transformation, the space and the memoryscape surrounding the monuments become open to different interpretations and values, showing the ambiguity of the monuments.

The ambiguous nature of the monuments is also shown in how Samora Machel has become a tool for criticism. The opening for different interpretations when the memory of Samora Machel was subjugated by the Chissano administration and the removal of Samora Machel's politics from his memory during his memory's return on the political agenda paved the way for Samora Machel to become a symbol to represent the dissatisfaction towards poverty and inequality in the country without distancing oneself from the national unity and the established understanding of "Mozambican-ness". These developments happened in a dynamic political space with varying degrees of openness from democratization in the late-1980s and the early 1990s and the introduction of the multi-party system, the failed decentralization through devolution of power, the new media laws, and the recent arrestations. These changing degrees of openness correspond with the influence of different understandings of peace and their power from Western donors dominating and a financially weak Frelimo in the 1980s and 1990s to authoritarian donors entering the scene and the prospects of natural resource revenue in the future 2010s. However, with the increase of authoritarian understandings of peace entering the political scene and the connected control of public discourse, the future prospects for variations in interpretations of Samora Machel in public spaces might be limited. Considering that physical arrests of some members of society publicly speaking out against the government and killings assumed to be on behalf of Frelimo are happening, the line of the spectrum between war and peace can seem to lean even further away from peace in some areas (Freemuse, 2010; Mutch, 2013).

Through this uncovering of subjugated knowledge and counter-memories in relation to the monuments, it is possible to see that the unity presented through the monuments, or the unity that Frelimo has meant to present through the monuments, might not necessarily be a unity that everyone feels included in and that this is a unity there is growing opposition against. This

opposition needs to be considered when searching for ways to reduce violent conflict and build a stable peace throughout the country.

8.3 The need for spatial awareness

Peace as a process that is relational in its spatiality and includes a plurality of peace interpretations coexisting which shapes and is shaped by the involved actors, means that an awareness of these different understandings of peace is necessary to build a sustainable peace (Courtheyn, 2017; Megoran et al., 2016). When arguing for how Frelimo uses Samora Machel as a symbol of a national unity that strongly alienates certain members of the society and rules the country with an “us and them” mentality, one can see how the members thought to be a part of the “us” in the equation might have a different experience of peace than others. The peace experienced by those identifying as “us” could be a peace containing more security, opportunities, and hope than those defined as the “them” might experience. The earlier mentioned new media laws and the prosecution experienced by those criticizing the state, and the lack of actual impact or possibilities for winning for the opposition parties during elections clearly show restrictions imposed on a large part of the population. While they may not be experiencing outright violence, the evident lack of possibility to participate freely or to have their voices heard can be seen as a lack of peace, especially in terms of positive peace.

The regional divisions reflected on in chapter six also shows how the different experiences of peace and conflict vary in relation to actual geographic areas in the country and thus takes on a spatial dimension of peace. This can be said both about who defines the official definition of peace and by how this definition is received differently based on where you live. Since the power is centralized in the south and around Maputo and this is also where the understanding of national unity is created both in the past and the present, this is also where the definition of the “us” is localized. How much of a “them” one becomes or can feel like will, therefore, depend on how far away from the “us” a person or a group is, both in absolute, relative, and relational terms. The differences between urban municipalities and rural districts, in addition to the actual physical distance, will shape the possible removal from the centrally defined memories that national unity is built on and through this the official understanding of “us”.

Examining the regional division, one can also see the foundation for there being different experiences of peace within Frelimo’s main area of support as well, which can also be seen in Sumich’s (2007) argument on the growing gap between the urban middle class and the dominant state-based elite in Maputo. The state being the ultimate source and guarantor of class

power means that being in good connection with Frelimo is advantageous in terms of everything from civil society to the economic and political scene, has caused a division of “us and them” among Maputo’s urban middle class as well, resulting in the opportunities of some being less than of others.

In Mozambique’s, albeit short, history with natural resource extraction in combination with their socio-economic conditions and the unequal distribution of wealth, one can see a trend in which these spatial divisions are greatening. As long as the wealth is primarily located in the south of the country, contained in small minorities often connected with international actors, the distance to the average Mozambican can feel even further. Since the natural resources are found in the central and northern parts of the country, the prospects of wealth become physically closer, making the relative and relational distance to wealth also appear closer. The following lack of fulfilling promises made by the government on redistribution and the apparent wealth by Frelimo and their supporters are also enhancing the experienced gap between the central and the peripheral Mozambique.

An important aspect here is that it is not necessarily the idea of national unity that imposes a challenge to the peacebuilding process in Mozambique, but rather the understanding of it. With the national unity and definition of Mozambican-ness being built on certain memories and a history understood in a certain way and this being used actively as a foundation for peace, conflicts on diversity have developed, such as a growing divide between the urban and rural parts of the country. Recently, one can also see trends towards these divides growing within the urban areas as well. Here, one can argue for Frelimo opening up for national unity not meaning the same as national homogeneity and that the embracing of diversity in the country can be beneficial for peace and development and not a hindrance to peace.

8.4 Summary

When regarding peace as spatially and recognizing its plurality while being aware of the socially constructed nature of monuments and their role in material culture, it has opened for a discussion on why the peace and the memories represented by the monuments are unable to build a lasting peace in Mozambique. Examining Frelimo’s agenda by constructing the monuments shows how it was an act of transforming the representation of space in an authoritarian peacebuilding agenda. Through this, the monuments represent Frelimo’s national unity, power, and centralism in an agenda to control public discourse. However, the monuments’ symbolism and representation are not perceived equally, as shown through the

investigation of how the monuments are perceived and transformed in relation to the space they are located in. The differentiation in perception uncovers the existence of subjugated knowledge and counter-memories. Memories being, as shown, an essential element in the understanding of peace makes this uncovering of variations in memories from the official narrative more prominent. These variations show that the peacebuilding these monuments symbol might not include everyone and that there is a need for spatial awareness when investigating peace in order to apprehend these differences.

CHAPTER 9:

Conclusion

The objective of this thesis has been to analyze and reflect on how the use of memory affects the symbolism of Samora Machel, how this is materialized in the monuments of him, and how this makes the monuments a platform for discussions on different versions of peace and situations for peace in Mozambique. I explore this by using a framework combining the concepts of statues and memories and seeing them in relation to concepts of space through memoryscapes and spatial peace. This has given insight into the socially constructed nature of statues, space, and peace, bringing awareness to how power relations between the actors involved shape the collective memory's outcome in the present. By examining how these power relations shape the outcome of the collective memory, it becomes clear how it is a temporal and spatial process, where memory selection in the past is inherited, reproduced, and transformed across time, and take shape differently in different contexts in relation to preexisting memories and identities.

To investigate how the use of memory affects the symbolism of Samora Machel and to see what information is embedded in the Samora Machel monuments, I have investigated the historical use of memory. The historical use of memory includes the memory selection that has occurred and who has had the ability to impact it. Since the purpose of this thesis is to see this in regards to peacebuilding processes, I have approached this field by looking at the history of peace and conflict in Mozambique to see how the use of memory has been an active and conscious part of both peace and conflict. Recognizing the temporal importance of memory in Mozambique's peace and conflict history, I have seen how the outcome of this use of memory in relation to the spaces it exists in has been a part of both shaping what characterizes the peace achieved in Mozambique and the challenges for making this peace sustainable. I argue that this memory selection both has an impact on the political institutions and the degree of decentralization that has been possible in Mozambique, through the legacies of centralism and the memories this centralism is built on through a constraint understanding of national unity of which Frelimo hold most of the definition power.

Investigating the precursory events resulting in the construction of the Samora Machel monuments, by answering the research question on what memories embody the Samora Machel monuments and how this is affecting and being affected by the collective memory of Mozambique, I argue that the building of them is an act of reaffirming the memory selection done by Frelimo in the past and until their inaugurations. The monuments are thus built to symbolize national unity with the elements Frelimo has made it out to be, and through this, reaffirm their political power, both informally and through the formal and centralized political institutions. However, as argued with how statues both affect and are affected by the spaces and relations they exist within, what a statue symbolizes can change over time, through what they are portraying being changes, and in relation to who is interacting with them and the memories they identify with. The investigation of the Samora Machel monuments as material culture and the values they portray can, thus, make the different memories and identities challenging the official memory in Mozambique clearer and more obvious. The changing hold of power by Frelimo over public discourse has led to different degrees of freedom to transform the symbolic value of Machel by the population. I argue that the combination of Frelimo subjugating the political opinions of Samora Machel from his memory along with the previous opening for change in public discourse with the introduction of the multiparty system has opened a political space for using Samora Machel as a symbol of the people and their grievances without having to criticize Frelimo and the national unity those in power construct the Mozambican identity around. Having a symbol to use in this way becomes important in a society where those in power oppress resistance and opposition. However, as seen with the recent arrests of people using Samora Machel as a symbol in this manner, the new and restrictive media laws, and Mozambique receiving one out of 20 on the likeliness of the opposition to win in Freedom House's 2020 assessment, the use of Samora Machel and the openness for personal interpretations of his symbolism in public might be becoming less practicable.

Recognizing the changing nature of openness for different interpretations of Samora Machel's symbolism, I argue that one can see this in relation to the changing nature of Frelimo's governance, how these changes are affected by who has the ability to influence the understanding of peace that becomes the foundation for peacebuilding, and how the interrelation between these understandings of peace shapes the outcome of Mozambican peacebuilding. Hanlon (1991) has long argued that it has been the Western donors who had the most influence on Mozambican governing and that it was because of donor dependence and the need for financial support that Frelimo accepted the restructuring leading to market

liberalization and multiparty elections. The increase in more authoritarian peacebuilding strategies of late, following the Western donors' reduction in impact ability and the subsequent rise of alternative authoritarian actors, makes this claim more plausible. The rise of authoritarian means of governance can be seen with stricter control of public discourse, decentralization through devolution not resulting in power-sharing, and no actual possibility for the opposition to win power through elections. The building of the Samora Machel monuments thus becomes an act expressing and reaffirming this change, and how people react to them reveals the subjugated knowledge and counter-memories conflicting with the official narrative and its related peacebuilding strategy.

The monuments revealing and clarifying these subjugated knowledges and counter-memories enable a discussion of the social dynamics in the Mozambican peacebuilding process and answer research question three on the nature of the existing peace and why the memories the monuments represent is unable to build a lasting peace in Mozambique. I argue, as mentioned that the monuments express the authoritarian manner of peacebuilding executed by Frelimo. The revealing and confirming of subjugated knowledges and counter-memories' existence shown through people's reaction to the monuments and their interpretation of the symbolism of Samora Machel that the monuments represent, show that the authoritarian peacebuilding excludes and alienates parts of the population, both regionally throughout Mozambique, and within Maputo and previously Frelimo dominated areas. Recognizing peace as spatial, where a spectrum of various understandings of peace coexists, and the possibility of war and peace existing in the same space, the subjugated knowledges and the counter-memories that the monuments expose reveals that the peace implemented and the claimed existence of it in Mozambique, with any resistance being defined as produced externally, might not embrace all Mozambicans and thus not be experienced as peace for everyone, everywhere. Further and more in-depth research on what these counter-memories and subjugated knowledges are could, thus, reveal what actions are needed to be taken to include those who do not have the same experience of peace in the peacebuilding process, how to broaden the peace process to be more inclusive, and, ultimately, how to create a more lasting peace in Mozambique.

With the symbolic effect of statues becoming increasingly evident with the powerful reactions they can provoke and the removal of them globally either formally, after discussions on their relevance for society today, and forcefully, as an act of protest or war, the discussions on who should be chosen as represented in public spaces and the investigation of the meaning of what has been chosen is shown to be an important area of research. I propose that the investigation

of the socially constructed nature of memories as something happening in the present to shape the past and the relationship between power and knowledge that lies behind the memory selection is an appropriate tool for understanding the information embedded in statues and that the examination of this information opens for examining how peace is spatial and that the recognition of this spatiality is a necessity for building lasting peace.

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Appendix 1

Interview guide:

English:

- How do you view Samora Machel?
- What are your thoughts on the statues of Samora Machel? Do you ever think about them?
- Do you think the view of Samora Machel has changed since before his death? In the last few years? If yes, how? And who causes this change?
- Do you think where you live in the country shapes people's view of Samora Machel? If yes, how?
- What are your thoughts on the future of Mozambique? In regards to peace?
- What role do you think the memory of Samora Machel will play on this future?

Portuguese:

- Como você vê Samora Machel?
- O que você acha das estátuas de Samora Machel? Você alguma vez pensa nelas?
- Acha que a opinião de Samora Machel mudou desde antes da sua morte? Nos últimos anos? Se sim, como? E quem causa essa mudança?
- Você acha que o lugar onde você mora no país molda a visão das pessoas sobre Samora Machel? Se sim, como?
- O que pensa sobre o futuro de Moçambique? Em relação à paz?
- Que papel pensa que a memória de Samora Machel terá neste futuro?