Monitoring Great Power Security and Diplomatic Assistance in Africa 1994-2020

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Abstract

The UN's system of trusteeship over colonial and non-self-governing states officially concluded in 1994, which coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the decade. Amidst this shifting balance of power, the United States rose as the world's sole superpower. The state-building system that emerged from this transition came in the form of what Fearon and Laitin (2004) call *neotrusteeship.* It is a system where IGOs, governments, and NGOs collaborate to assist failing states experiencing armed conflict. This paper proposes a unique indicator of neotrusteeship and measures it against the occurrence of peace agreements on the African continent. Peace agreements are split into two separate dependent variables to account for varying diplomatic strategies outlined in the literature on Tracks of Diplomacy theory. The findings of the primary model show that the United Kingdom was the only great power to have provided official T1 diplomatic assistance to its security partners as a policy approach to statebuilding in Africa from 1994-2020. The United States and the United Kingdom were the only two great powers to have provided unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomatic assistance to its security partners as a policy approach to statebuilding in Africa from 1994-2020.

Introduction

The United Nations has five permanent members of the Security Council, recognized as the world's five great powers. Those states are France, The United States, The United Kingdom, China, and Russia. These powers often provide sophisticated weaponry and tactical support to states abroad, but they also develop infrastructure through commerce and humanitarian assistance. For states experiencing civil war, interstate war, or terrorism, the great powers can support existing state security structures to help quell the violence and ensure global security. Diplomacy and conflict resolution too can be used as tools by great powers to help bring stability to foreign regions. This begs the question: *Have the great powers offered non-violent conflict resolution assistance to their security partners?*

There are limited statistical analyses that study modern contributions to theories on diplomacy in the large body of existing political science and conflict resolution literature. There are also a limited set of publicly available tools and datasets for tracking great power involvement in foreign states' security development. The Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt's Humanitarian Military Interventions Dataset, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's External Support Dataset, and The University of Edinburgh's Peace Agreements Database have provided invaluable data to help answer this research question and are significant contributions to academia. However, the research question required more nuance in the data to extend the range of study to the present and adequately include and test theories on *neotrusteeship* and the *Tracks of Diplomacy*.

Neotrusteeship is a essential framework of modern state-building to analyze because Fearon and Laitin (2004) argue, "collapsed states pose an international collective action problem whose solution will involve multilateral interventions that share the initial burden across a wide variety of states." These interventions provide support to failing states in the form of security, humanitarian, economic, and diplomatic assistance. Stabilizing failing states provides reciprocal economic and security benefits to neighboring states, states who provide aid, and other trade partners in the international community. Furthermore, the United Nations, the world's largest Intergovernmental Organization, was created to maintain international peace and security because of the

universal benefit of global peace. The UN has written 17 common goals of nations, known as the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and they are greatly hindered by the consequences of violence. Neotrusteeship offers participating states the opportunity to average out the costs of interventions, spearheaded by great powers willing to make tangible contributions to global security.

This statistical analysis concentrates on the correlation between great power involvement in African security apparatuses and the prevalence of peace agreements on the African continent to investigate the individual efforts of great powers in their African stating-building policy. This framing is based on the idea that neotrusteeship is built around great power involvement. Theory on the Tracks of Diplomacy allows researchers to dissect diplomacy into its subcomponents and assess the effectiveness of outcomes. This study examined all states on the African continent because the continent has seen a steady rise in battle deaths, state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence from 2010-2017 (Bakken and Rustad, 2018). It also has the highest number of people living in conditions of extreme poverty (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2013). The continent provides a diverse sample of observations to statistically unveil great powers' efforts in stabilizing states while also limiting any potential effects of the differences in foreign policy on separate continents.

The findings of the primary model, tested without controls, showed the United Kingdom as the only great power with a correlation between its assistance to African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of official T1 peace agreements over the 1994-2020 period. Furthermore, the United States and the United Kingdom were the only two great powers with a correlation between their assistance to African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of unofficial T2-T1.5 peace agreements. This sample also allowed for the introduction of spatial and temporal controls to test the internal validity of the primary model and account for mainstream arguments regarding statebuilding. The controls in this study are:

1. French and British post-colonial states.
2. The G5S Joint Force and The Geographic Sahel.
3. US executive branch administration changes.
4. French executive branch administration changes.

The introduction of the control variables show that France and the UK were not more likely to deploy diplomatic resources to failing states that were its past colonies. The application of the primary model to the G5S region and the Geographic Sahel showed strikingly similar results to the entire continent, demonstrating that the actions of the great powers in this smaller sample are an accurate reflection of the larger sample of all states on the African continent. The findings also showed that US and French executive branch administration changes in some instances resulted in changes to neotrusteeship policy. This statistical model allows policymakers, NGOs, and the general public to monitor great powers' involvement in external state security apparatuses and contributions to diplomatic efforts.

Sahel Case Study

Because involvement in foreign conflicts is a highly contested issue in modern western academia, the crises in the Sahel demonstrates a justification for multilateral intervention in conflict abroad. To fully achieve the goals outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, violent conflicts will require diplomatic and military interventions and external developmental support to mitigate increasing flows of war-affected persons towards extreme poverty. This example serves as a small-n case study and complement to the large-n study of the entire continent.

Figure 1: The Ten Countries Within the Sahel Geographic Region



The Sahel is a war-torn, poverty-stricken, and environmentally challenged region in Northern Africa, located south of the Sahara desert and north of the Sudanian Savanna. As seen in Figure 1 above, the Sahel extends from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, crossing over Eritrea, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Senegal. The region is inundated by cycles of severe droughts and floods, which are argued to be caused and worsened by climate change (Sissoko, 2010). These environmental strains have threatened sustainable agriculture production and created wide-scale famine for many agro-pastoral communities already living in extreme poverty. When writing of the Sahel, Sissoko (2010) stated that:

> "Human coping strategies in response to increasing uncertainty in food supply as a result of climate change and the associated negative effects on the environment put additional and disturbing pressure on the natural resources, leading to accelerated land degradation and desertification and thus create a 'vicious circle of underdevelopment' (Lu¨deke et al. 2004; Brooks 2004; Petschel-Held et al. 1999)."

The region is also marked by high population growth, further increasing the scarcity of essential resources and increasing the propensity for violent conflict to emerge (Bächler, 1998).

According to the United Nations Africa Renewal Program, "Agriculture in the Sahel employs a majority of the region's workforce and contributes heavily to its gross domestic product...and millions are in a permanent state of food insecurity" even in years without floods and droughts (Essoungou, 2013). These fragile economies and environmental factors intensify security and humanitarian challenges by providing attractive benefits to potential recruits in armed conflict because "material and nonmaterial incentives play an important role in recruitment and retention in any organization" (Andvig and Gates, 2010). Amongst this backdrop of intensifying poverty, growing numbers of jihadi insurgencies, led by groups such as ISIL, Boko Haram, JNIM, and AQIM, have resulted in an increasing trend of verified battle-deaths.



Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program shows that battle-related deaths have steadily been on the rise in the G5 Sahel region in the past decade, at a rate of increase of 25 additional battle deaths per year, as seen in Figure 2. Wars such as the Maghreb insurgency, a spillover of the Algerian Civil War, are fought across multiple states because of the porous borders and lack of sophisticated and widespread security apparatuses (Essoungou, 2013). In this case, the Maghreb insurgency has spanned across Algeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya (Laub and Masters, 2015). While the harsh, oscillating environmental conditions and food insecurity are certainly not the sole causal factors of violence in the region, the compounding effects of poverty and violence allow for conflict spillover and enable similar jihadi groups elsewhere (Maiangwa, 2014; Fox, 2001).

Figure 3: The G5 Sahel Joint Force Member Countries



To adequately address the compounding effects of these correlated issues, NGOs, IGOs, and individual states work together to intervene in conflict, build peace, and develop sustainable infrastructure. Bakken and Rustad (2018) of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo emphasize that “if [African] states succeed in solving some of the most severe state-based conflicts that cut across borders...the total number of conflicts may decrease substantially.” In February 2014, in response to the worsening conflict conditions in the Sahel, heads of state from the region formed a cooperative group called the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger created the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat security and development issues across the region seen in Figure 3. The ongoing spread of insurgencies across a wide swath of geographic zones and nation-states poses a threat not only to the economic stability of the states directly involved but also to their trading partners and all the perceived enemies of jihadist groups who intend to export their terrorism abroad (Devlin-Foltz, 2010).

In 2017, France, Germany, and the European Union formed a partnership called The Sahel Alliance to coordinate development assistance and partner with the G5 Sahel

Joint Force. United Nations agencies like the Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office for West Africa and the Sahel are also present in the region providing support to these organizations. Official UN peacekeepers have been deployed in the area to assist these missions. These widespread and interconnected international efforts are further supported by NGOs, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which is active in mediating conflict, sometimes entirely outside the scope of official government-coordinated conflict mediations.

To fully understand the issues that these international collaborations attempt to address, the concepts of conflict and poverty traps offer essential insight. After World War II, the world saw a decrease in interstate conflicts and a steady accumulation in intrastate conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Paul Collier (2003) refers to intrastate conflicts, i.e., civil wars, as “development in reverse” because of the substantial loss in income, economic growth, and critical physical infrastructures, as well as increases in mortality, morbidity, infectious disease, and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, in an earlier study, Collier (1999) found that the average civil war brought an approximate “30 percent increase in the incidence of absolute poverty.” Because of the devastating effects of violence, poverty lingers long after a civil war. The prevalence of post-war poverty is partly due to sustained military expenditures post-conflict, spillover effects of conflict to neighboring countries, and the dispersion of capital and assets to stable foreign markets and banks abroad (Collier, 2003).

The cycle of poverty that civil war induces is interlinked with another factor detrimental to a state's continued development—the likelihood of conflict recurrence in post-war states. Not only are low-income countries at a significantly higher risk of civil war, but post-civil war societies are also at a higher risk of conflict recurrence. Collier (2003) states that:

> “a country that first falls into the [conflict] trap may have a risk of new war that is 10 times higher just after that war has ended than before the war started. If the country succeeds in maintaining post-conflict peace for 10 years or so, the risk is considerably reduced, but remains at a higher level than before the conflict.”

This risk for conflict recurrence is worsened by the 2% annual chance that the typical low-income country faces for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The poverty and conflict traps are inextricably connected, working in concert to prevent developing countries from emerging out of their state of disarray.

The consequences of civil war can also have adverse economic spillover effects on neighboring countries and impose security and economic costs to other distant states. Collier (2003) finds that civil wars decrease incomes of neighboring countries, increase military expenditures, and increase the spread of infectious disease via an influx of refugees. Furthermore, Collier finds that war can sometimes "directly increase the risk of war in neighboring countries." Therefore, it is in the international community's best interest to identify and prevent civil war or to assist in ending it quickly once it begins before it can further expand (Hegre, Nygård, and Ræder, 2017).

In the example of the West African Sahel region, many of these states lack a sufficient security apparatus necessary to prevent and quell armed groups before they cause extensive damage to their societies and neighboring states (Francis, 2009). While military intervention by intergovernmental organizations and great powers is sometimes necessary, it should be a part of a more comprehensive strategy that attempts to address the roots of conflict. Finney (2009) reaffirms this point when stating that "an integrated effort of all the actors involved in defense, diplomacy, and development" is required when "stabilizing a country or region." Devlin-Foltz (2010) supports this conclusion, stating that "external military intervention...provide[s] only short-lived results. Counterterrorism operations alone do not address the opening that state weakness offers violent extremists to expand their influence." The international community is incentivized to offer defense, diplomatic, and development assistance to states experiencing armed conflict because of the longitudinal and latitudinal spread of war and poverty.

Theoretical Frameworks

The Tracks of Diplomacy

The theoretical study of diplomacy and its history is a rich, well-researched field in modern academia. Its practice as a conflict resolution tool has been substantially documented since the Ancient Egyptian period. The oldest, partially-intact Peace Agreement in possession of historians is the Kadesh Peace Treaty, which dates back to c.1259 BC, and provides evidence for a flourishing international legal system (Bell, 2008). A separate, even earlier reference to an international peace agreement dates back to the 25th century BCE, between Rome and Mytilene (Ziegler, 1995). Due to their prevalence throughout history, peace agreements have likely been formed for as long as there have been civilizations living in close proximity to one another.

Despite long-existing diplomatic traditions, the definition of diplomacy is continually expanding and being redefined by scholars. In a 2015 paper, Pouliot and Cornut boiled down the concept of diplomacy as “a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world.” While this definition may appear to be vague and oversimplified on its facade, it considers recent developments in the classification of peacemaking activities. In 1981, Joseph V. Montville coined the term Track One (T1) and Track Two (T2) diplomacy in "Foreign Policy According to Freud," where he describes official and unofficial diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict. These terms have been readily adopted and expanded upon by scholars as a means for differentiating between peace processes negotiated by actors of various backgrounds and qualifications.

Montville outlines T1 diplomacy as peace processes that have been conducted through official channels by high-ranking government officials. Jeffrey Mapendere (2005), from The Carter Center, efficiently describes this type of diplomacy as “the primary peacemaking tool of a state’s foreign policy” (Mapendere, 2005). A notable example of a peace agreement brokered through T1 diplomacy is the Treaty of Versailles, a formal diplomatic treaty that outlined the terms to bring about the end of the first World War. Official government representatives of 32 nations met in France in 1919 and negotiated provisions covering war reparations, territorial disputes, military restrictions, and guarantees to the resolution. This peace process and the

consequential treaty it produced qualify as T1 diplomacy because the official state diplomats directly reached the agreement's terms. While all parties to this particular peace process were state officials, T1 diplomacy can also occur between official state representatives and representatives of an armed group in the case of intrastate conflict.

Because T1 diplomacy is the primary method for governments to resolve conflicts without using military force, it is the most commonly known by laypeople and the most effective. Representatives of T1 diplomacy are backed by the state's power, bringing to the negotiation table the threat of military force, significant material and financial resources, high-level knowledge of each party's interests, and knowledge of each party's foreign policy positions (Mapendere, 2005). In testing the effectiveness of T1 diplomacy, Tobias Böhmelt **(**2010) found that T1 diplomacy is more likely "to come to stable and effective outcomes" than efforts by unofficial actors. Nevertheless, that is not to say that unofficial diplomacy is without its merits. Montville (1991) defines T2 diplomacy as:

> "unofficial, non-structured interaction...between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, [and] organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict."

In other words, the T2 conflict resolution participants are not the official representatives of the actors in the conflict. Members of the T2 conflict resolution processes stem from various professional and non-professional backgrounds. They are everyday citizens and local community leaders, and on the extreme, they can be the guerilla fighters in a conflict or employees of a private diplomatic NGO. Montville emphasizes that these two different tracks are not mutually exclusive but complementary in the peacebuilding process.

For example, when conflicts are resolved between two states, conflict may still occur between communities and groups at the local level. In this case, T2 diplomacy would allow members of the respective communities to air their grievances and resolve the conflict. Similarly, a state may continue a military campaign against armed groups even if unofficial actors have influenced armed groups' leaders to stop fighting. Therefore, these two tracks are like parallel railroad tracks deploying essential resources and personnel to an eventual sustained resolution. Examples of T2 actors in

diplomatic efforts include, but are not limited to, members of academia, non-governmental organizations, religious institutions, business, and the general public.

While inherently political, this second track of diplomacy can sometimes be apolitical on the surface, such as the cultural exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian youth and adults at the Palestinian-Jewish Family Peacemakers Camp, operated from 2003-2007. This camp sought to bridge cultural divides and allow opposing members of a seemingly irresolvable conflict to understand one another without directly having these groups discuss the conflict at hand. This form of T2 diplomacy is advantageous when a state's citizens constrain state officials' actions and lock them into undesirable policy positions, such as continued armed conflict or mutually hurting stalemates (Mapendere, 2005). For Example, when citizens of two democracies resolve their differences on the grassroots level, they can vote for elected officials who support their views during the following election cycle. This track of diplomacy may also apply to citizens of autocracies, but non-government sanctioned programs may result in retaliation by autocratic leadership. T2 diplomacy has the power to gradually change constituents' perceptions and the public call on government officials for peace. Likewise, T2 diplomacy between scholars can result in proposals shared with government officials that contain previously undiscussed resolutions.

A community creating a peace treaty with a local tribe is also classified as a T2 process because these local authorities do not necessarily qualify as official state representatives. T2 is not designed to undermine or supersede the T1 approach but rather complement and support T1 in its areas of weakness, like reinforcing peace at the local level. As demonstrated, the types of diplomacy classified as T2 are widespread. When testing the effectiveness of the Tracks of Diplomacy, Böhmelt (2010) found that T2 diplomacy is effective at reaching peaceful settlements and that T1 diplomacy is made "more effective when it is facilitated by unofficial tracks." For instance, the peace process that led to the Oslo Accords' adoption in 1993 and 1995 began as a T2 diplomatic outreach between a Norwegian scholar named Terje Rød-Larsen and Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli scholar and peacemaker (Pruitt, 1997). Eventually, these two individuals bridged the peace process from an unofficial

collaboration between scholars to an officially sanctioned peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Israeli Government.

While it is possible that Montville envisioned T2 diplomacy to include instances where unofficial actors served as third-party mediators to the official parties of a conflict, he did not explicitly reference this example. For that reason, a third term arose to colloquial use by conflict resolution specialists to describe it: Track-One-and-a-Half Diplomacy (T1.5). Mapendere (2000) describes this track of diplomacy as such:

> "…Public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization or institution. Such interaction aims to influence attitudinal changes between the parties with the objective of changing the political power structures that caused the conflict."

One of the more prominent organizations providing T2 and T1.5 mediation services in failing states is the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. This type of diplomacy is typically referred to as private diplomacy. In one of their recently published mediations, they organized a dialogue between youth organizations and state institutions in the Sahel region of Africa to help shape their region's future social and economic policies (HD Centre, 2017). In more formal instances of T1.5 conflict resolution, they provided direct mediation services in the Central African Republic from 2014-2020 between the state's government and armed actors. Despite T1.5 diplomacy including official actors as part of the peace process, Böhmelt (2010) groups T1.5 with T2 diplomacy in his analysis due to their shared inclusion of unofficial actors. Because Böhmelt's research is the primary document that has delved into a statistical analysis of the Tracks of Diplomacy, this study follows his operationalization so the results can be interpreted as complements to one another and add to the total body of knowledge regarding this topic. The potential effects and limitations of this choice is discussed in the 'data' portion of this paper's 'Research Design' section.

Table 1: The Primary Tracks of Diplomacy		
Track One **(T1)**	***Track-One-and-a-Half*** **(T1.5)**	***Track Two*** **(T2)**
Official diplomacy	Official diplomacy assisted or mediated by unofficial diplomats	Unofficial diplomacy

In cases where both parties to a conflict find themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate, they may not seize the ripe opportunity to begin negotiations, sometimes leaving the opportunity for a resolution to be "seized...through the persuasion of a mediator" (Zartman, 2000). A non-partisan third-party mediator (T1.5) can overcome the party's psychological barriers surrounding the negotiation process because they do not bring partisan interest to the table. They can propose mutually beneficial concessions outside the scope of the initial bargaining range and lobby for each party's fundamental interests. For those reasons, a non-partisan third-party mediator has a higher chance of reaching a formal resolution than non-mediated negotiations (Beardsley, 2008). They are also better positioned to maintain political leaders' reputations during negotiations than if the parties were to concede directly with their adversaries (Hopmann, 1996). Parties to a conflict can save face with their constituents and avoid the potential audience costs attributed by direct negotiations with an enemy when working with a third-party mediator.

A significant distinction to the Tracks of Diplomacy's theoretical framework was introduced into the academic classification of diplomacy types in 1996 by Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald. Their book entitled *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace* expanded the view of the two primary tracks of diplomacy into a larger theoretical framework of Multi-Track Diplomacy. They stipulate that T2 diplomacy "no longer covered the variety, scope, and depth of citizen involvement" and thereby refined its definition to mean "professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by

non-state actors" (Diamond and McDonald, 1996). They then created seven additional tracks, which they summarize below in Table 2.

Table 2	Multi-Track Diplomacy Framework
Track Three	Business, or Peacemaking through Commerce
Track Four	Private Citizen, or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement
Track Five	Research, Training, and Education, or Peacemaking through Learning
Track Six	Activism, or Peacemaking through Advocacy
Track Seven	Religion, or Peacemaking through Faith in Action
Track Eight	Funding, or Peacemaking through Providing Resources
Track Nine	Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information

Their writing outlines the role of each track within the context of the whole diplomatic system and makes recommendations as to which instances of conflict they are best suited to resolve. They also explain how each track complements the others and demonstrates how each track is not intended to substitute the work of the others. Their work contributed significantly to the Tracks of Diplomacy literature by expanding the theory of diplomacy originally proposed in Montville's classification, allowing for each track to be dissected for the individual peacebuilding activities it promotes. Nonetheless, scholars such as Tobias Böhmelt revert to Montville's original classification, with the addition of T1.5, due to their simplicity in codifying datasets.

In many cases, conflict resolution through diplomacy in various conflicts is a naturally occurring social phenomenon between parties to a dispute at a ripe moment in time (Zartman, 2000). However, the diplomatic process can be accelerated or facilitated by actors external to a conflict, as observed during the Oslo Accords. Despite the profound history of these diplomatic tools for non-violent conflict resolution, little reference is made in diplomatic literature regarding whether or not the great powers are accelerating or facilitating the conflict resolution process in failing states through the use

of official and unofficial diplomacy as part of an official foreign policy strategy. The following section covers the evolution of the modern approach to state-building as seen through the lens of the United Nations.

UN Trusteeship

To understand the approach to state-building adopted in the post-Cold War era, the historical approach to state-building that followed World War II must first be understood. According to Jari Eloranta, The League of Nations failed to prevent World War II because of its inability to "provide adequate security guarantees for its members" and to "achieve the disarmament goals it set out in the 1920s and 1930s" (Eloranta, 2010). At the end of the Second World War, the League of Nations was officially disbanded, but not before handing over its agencies' work to the rebranded and reformed intergovernmental organization intended to ensure global peace and security—the United Nations. The United Nations was formed to prevent future generations from experiencing "the scourge of war" that had been suffered by many member nations in the previous decade and to address the critical security issues faced by the League of Nations (UN Charter, Preamble).

Territories that posed a significant risk to United Nations member's security and the new balance of power that emerged from the end of WWII were those that were held under League of Nations mandate, those that were detached from Axis powers, and those for which *colonial powers* were administratively responsible but from which they desired to step away (Article 77, Chapter XII). The latter group posed a particular threat to the stability of European powers because of the historical European exploitation of lesser developed civilizations. In the second half of the 19th century, European powers set out to Africa on economic and religious missions in search of raw materials to export back to their home states and, in the process, convert indigenous peoples to Christianity. Europeans viewed Africa as "without government and claimed by nobody, wide open to the first Western persons who might arrive" (Palmer, Colton, Kramer, 2004). When they arrived, they established colonies by coercing traditional African tribal leaders to exploit their people for forced labor. Many European states

participated in colonizing Africa, of which the principal actors were Portugal, Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. Rivalries between these actors in Africa, in part, contributed to the hostilities leading to WWI.

The appalling social structures of imperial masters, westernized Africans, and forced laborers that the European powers created had begun to break down. Former colonies such as Egypt and India openly resisted colonial authorities and gained their self-determination by imposing high costs to their occupiers through non-violent means (Palmer et al., 2004). In the wake of WWII, colonial powers faced devastating post-war economic hardship and were inundated further by the maintenance of their empires abroad. The international order was at a turning point, and the United Nations—recognizing this—sought to establish a program for handling these growing western security concerns regarding European colonies in Africa and elsewhere.

As a result, Chapter XI through XIII was included in the official UN Charter of 1945, which highlighted the issue of non-self-governing territories and provided a solution for developing their independence and self-governance. The United Nations General Assembly identified 72 of these non-self-governing territories, of which 11 were selected and assigned to members of the United Nations as administering authorities. These administering authorities were tasked to “accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote...within the system of international peace and security...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories” (Chapter XI, UN Charter). These UN Charter Chapters established The International Trusteeship System and The Trusteeship Council, which defined trustees, or administering authorities, as “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories.” Trustees consisted of “one or more [UN member] states or the Organization itself” (Article 81) and the territories under the custodianship of trustees were known as trust territories. Chapter XII of the UN Charter outlines the objectives of the International Trusteeship System as such:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards

self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

In 1960, these goals were further expanded when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514, which wholly backed a global decolonization policy. This resolution effectively granted independence to all countries under colonial rule, though decolonization was not immediate. The United Nations Trusteeship Council officially concluded its operations in 1994 when the last trust territory, Palau, gained its independence. Nonetheless, as of 2021, 17 non-self-governing territories remain under the control of administering authorities, although the UN Trusteeship's program has officially concluded.

Neotrusteeship

The United Nations Trusteeship Council's conclusion coincided with the end of the Cold War three years earlier, and the United States emerged as the sole superpower on the global stage. As stated in the 1992 report by the UN Secretary-General entitled "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping," the rivalry between East and West constrained the United Nation's ability to create regional arrangements and "made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfill." The end of the Cold War resulted in a reduction of Security Council vetoes over the east-west rivalry and increased the security arm's usefulness to address conflict. From the context of these sweeping political changes

emerged what Fearon and Latin refer to as a system of *neotrusteeship*, which they criticise as post-colonial imperialism.

As previously mentioned, after the end of the Second World War, the nation-states of the world saw a decline in the number of interstate conflicts and an accumulation of intrastate conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Both the United States and the USSR armed opposing sides of conflicts worldwide to spread their influence via their political and economic systems. Depending on their regional influences, the USSR and the US armed official state militaries or rebel groups, causing and worsening a series of wars that are today viewed as “proxy wars" for Cold War animosities (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). The collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989-91 and removal of one of the two superpowers from the global stage shifted the political consciousness of the international community away from fears of a clash between powerful states and towards the fear of threats of “diverse security, economic, and even health consequences emerging from political conflict, state collapse, and misrule in the third world” (Fearon and Latin, 2004). Fearon and Latin argue that the costs of state failure to the international community pose an international collective action problem in modern international politics, which creates an incentive for potentially affected external states to pool their resources and disperse the financial burden of intervention across all affected states.

Fearon and Latin’s conceptualization of neotrusteeship differs from the form of trusteeship outlined in the UN Charter in that trustees now oversee *failing states* as opposed to non-self-governing states that were in the process of being released from colonial rule. They argue that various combinations of domestic structures, foreign powers, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations govern modern trust states (Fearon and Latin, 2004). They maintain that neotrusteeship allows for “a remarkable degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries” to stabilize the failed state and mitigate the threat of an armed rogue state. As noted by Chauvet and Collier (2008), “states can ‘fail’ in various dimensions” such as in socio-economic development and security, and these dimensions are inextricably tied. These concepts are tied because a state needs to have sufficient resources to build an effective security apparatus, which can then defend

its institutions and infrastructure from external and internal threats and help bring stability to a developing economic system. Chauvet and Collier point out how the concept of state failure implies that specific dimensions have dropped below a threshold that external actors judge as unsatisfactory or unacceptable and require intervention.

Neotrusteeship as an approach to state-building should not be mistaken as an overarching intergovernmental policy as was created in the United Nations charter, but rather an evolution of trusteeship and the continuation of the old patronage by powerful states. The collapse of the Soviet Union served as an exogenous shock that brought about a change to the United Nations' state-building capabilities when the UN Trusteeship Council's official mission was concluding. Therefore, this new term provides value to academia by 1) addressing the transition in the scope of trusteeship from decolonization to assisting failing states, 2) calling attention to the conclusion of the official UN Trusteeship Council, and 3) highlighting the collaborative approach of various governments, IGOS, and NGOs to serve as trustees.

In Table 3, the systems of Trusteeship and Neotrusteeship are compared. Although they differ in three primary characteristics, the unchanging phenomenon between the system of trusteeship and neotrusteeship is that foreign powers exert influence, whether directly or through IGOs and NGOs, over lesser developed states and contributing to the practice of state-building. Bonacker, Distler, and Ketzmerick (2017) describe the goals of international state-building as "a means to bring stability and security to societies undergoing troubled domestic state-building processes." This description is significant as it applies to both systems. However, a primary difference is that trusteeship was assigned by UN mandate, whereas neotrusteeship can arise by direct interventions from governments, IGOs, and other humanitarian actors. Because of the interconnected nature of domestic structures, foreign powers, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, it may be the case that the practice of neotrusteeship is propelling forward the vehicle of both public and private diplomacy in failing states.

Table

3

Trusteeship vs. Neotrusteeship		
	UN Trusteeship	**Neotrusteeship**
Trust State	Non-self-governing territories and colonies	Failing states
Trustees	*United States* *United Kingdom* *France* *New Zealand* *Belgium* *Australia* *Italy*	NGOs, IGOs, Governments
Goals	Decolonization, international peace and security, political, economic, social, and educational development, human rights protections	Reduce threats arising from state collapse, reduce the threat of rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction, evolving goals

Although not highlighted in the language of the Tracks of Diplomacy, Bonacker et al. (2017) bring to light the relationship between state-building and diplomatic negotiations. They maintain that “internationally mandated statebuilding actors often find themselves obliged to compromise with violent actors so as to obviate possible active resistance or risk the reoccurrence of violence.” In other words, modern state builders are often working together with armed actors to resolve conflicts and reach the intended goal of stabilizing failing states and reducing potential threats arising from international collective action problems. This method goes against the George W. Bush administration’s post 9/11 position against negotiating with terrorists. In some instances, NGOs and individual peacemakers are better positioned to pursue negotiation processes, whereas, in other conflicts, it is the IGOs and external states that are better positioned. Recognizing that state-building actors are serving as mediators in some instances, it may be the case that the presence of neotrusteeship is producing public and private peace agreements where failing states may otherwise have not. For this reason, this paper’s position is based on the premise that when great powers are involved in stabilizing conflict through support for states’ security apparatuses, the number of diplomatic peace agreements may serve as an additional indicator of neotrusteeship.

From the theoretical frameworks of neotrusteeship and the Tracks of Diplomacy, the following hypotheses have been deduced:

H1: Great power involvement increases the number of T1 and T2-T1.5 peace agreements in 'failing states.'

H2: Great powers' involvement increases diplomatic efforts in failing states that were its colonies.

H3: US executive branch administration changes result in changes to great power's neotrusteeship strategies. French executive branch administration changes result in changes to great power's neotrusteeship strategies.

Research Design

To pursue the question of whether or not great powers are propelling forward the vehicle of diplomacy in states that are its security partners, this quantitative analysis compares the number of peace agreements that are reached both with and without the presence of great powers serving as support to African states security apparatuses. The continent of Africa serves as a compelling multiple case study because—according to researchers at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo—Africa is experiencing nuanced conflict scenarios (Bakken and Rustad, 2018). It also has the highest number of people living in extreme poverty conditions (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2013), multiple cases of international interventions, and a deep colonial history where the lingering effects of racial division and poverty are still seen today. This sample provides a diverse and ample size of observations from which to analyze. Descriptive statistics and qualitative arguments are also provided to explain visible trends in the data.

Data

As of January 2021, there are extreme limitations to the datasets available that sort between the Tracks of Diplomacy employed in peace negotiations. The only peace agreement dataset pre-sorted by T1, T1.5, and T2 diplomatic strategies is Tobias Böhmelt's 2010 study, which covers 295 disputes over the 1945–95 period. While this dataset provides a dispute number and a codebook to interpret variables provided in the dataset, it does not include descriptions of the peace processes or text that would serve as evidence for selecting particular processes as belonging to either category. Because Böhmelt's selection process is less than fully transparent, it may be the case that his selection criteria do not match this study and consequently cannot be used as a base dataset to expand outside of the initial 1945-1995 period. Additionally, Böhmelt's dataset does not include country-year as its primary unit of analysis. Therefore, transforming his dataset would require considerable attention to answer the research question posed in this study.

Fortunately, The University of Edinburgh provides an extensive up-to-date dataset named the "PA-X: Peace Agreements Database," which includes variables like "Third Party" that provide excerpts of text directly from peace agreements and, when

appropriate, documents third party unofficial mediators and peacemakers as having negotiated or assisted in the peace processes. These variables provided the information necessary to coding agreements as belonging to either T1 and T2-T1.5 diplomatic strategies while also allowing for country-year to be the primary unit of analysis. To confirm that The University of Edinburgh adequately captured private diplomatic organizations' work, this dataset was compared against public web pages for organizations such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Carter Center. As a result, this new dataset covers peace agreement counts over the 1994-2020 period in Africa, which contains two additional count variables manually coded to differentiate between peace agreements negotiated through private and public diplomacy.

In some instances, peace processes result in no tangible peace agreements, and the University of Edinburgh does not report these instances. Therefore, this study only analyzes peace processes that resulted in a tangible peace agreement instead of analyzing peace processes as a whole. While it may be valuable to analyze a dataset of unsuccessful negotiations, this dataset does not currently exist, and the lack of reporting would severely limit the creation of one. Unsuccessful peace processes often remain confidential because diplomatic organizations are incentivized to publish only successful mediations. Publishing unsuccessful mediations may have adverse impacts on their organization’s ability to raise funds and secure future opportunities. A successful public image plays a crucial role in the continuation of any for-profit or nonprofit organization to advertise the effectiveness of their organization's work.

To expand this original dataset further, five new variables were created to reflect each of the great powers' patronage (or *‘involvement’*) for African states' security apparatuses in a given country-year. For these variables, the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt's Humanitarian Military Interventions Dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's External Support Dataset have been combined. Because the years of observation are limited in these two primary datasets, additional research was required to account for more recent interventions and external support. An additional parameter was included in these new ‘involvement’ variables, accounting for the presence of great power military installations in each African state. While military installations do not signal the presence of a conflict, they do represent support for the security apparatus of a

state. Definitions for interventions and support are further explained in this paper's operationalization section.

Before proceeding, it is vital to acknowledge that in the social sciences, accurate data serves, at best, as an imperfect reflection of reality. Widely employed datasets and indicators frequently have missing data points for specific periods or countries, which can both be randomly or systematically missing due to reasons such as NGOs maintaining the confidentiality of actors in a peace negotiation or the non-disclosure of outside support in a given conflict because of the potential for domestic and international political repercussions. Datasets also rarely explain why specific data points have been omitted. Consequently, even a robust analysis of these indicators provides statistical results that skew analysis away from the missing or inaccurate data and towards the available data.

Therefore, social scientists are left with imperfect measurements and results that lack full measurement validity. This problem differs from research in the hard sciences, where precise measurements are found in a laboratory environment. King, Keohane, and Verba (1995) acknowledge this challenge by concluding that "social scientists often find themselves with problematic data and little chance to acquire anything better; thus, they have to make the best of what they have." Bearing this caveat in mind, it is advised to proceed with the best information available and attempt to mitigate the effect of missing data points.

Advantages of CSTS Data

The advantages of having a dataset with country-year as the primary unit of analysis are twofold. First, this dataset can be more easily merged with other datasets. Second, researchers can produce analyses that account for the variation of spatial and temporal trends both within and across observations. This type of dataset is known as a cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) because a cross-section dataset (a cross-section of observations within Africa) and a time series dataset (a 27-year set of observations per country) are combined into a single conglomerate dataset. CSTS data are interchangeably referred to as panel data, with each country and its 27-year set of observations for a set of variables serving as an individual panel.

In *Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide (7th Edition),* A. H. Studenmund explains the usefulness of panel data for not only increasing sample size and accounting for any potential omitted variable bias but also for providing "insight into analytical questions that can't be answered by using time-series or cross-sectional data alone" (2016). For instance, a simple time series of peace processes in Mali may not provide enough information to explain peace processes in its larger Sahel geographic region. Similarly, a cross-section of peace processes in the Sahel region for a single year may not reveal the trend of peace processes for periods outside this single year of observation. By including temporal and spatial elements, researchers can expand the scope of addressable questions possible to study.

Furthermore, expanding an analysis with both spatial and temporal dimensions also increases the generalizability of a study's results. Lipjphart's 1971 essay entitled *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method* highlights the importance of "increas[ing] the number of cases [or samples] as much as possible" to address one of the fundamental problems of comparative cross-national research—"many variables, small number of cases." King, Keohane, and Verba (1995) support the method of expanding cross-sections and temporal dimensions due to the necessity of providing controls in small-n research to increase the statistical leverage of causal inferences. Therefore, instead of pursuing a more narrow group of observations such as the geographic Sahel region alone, this study has been expanded to all 54 countries of the African continent during the post-Cold War period. Narrowing the sample of observations to the African continent mitigates the influence of differences in policy by great powers outside of the African continent and before the conclusion of the UN's system of trusteeship, while also allowing for the introduction of controls such as colonial history and policy for specific geographic regions on the continent such as the Sahel.

The data in this study is primarily composed of discrete values. Discrete data consists of numeric values that are typically whole numbers or simple counts that do not take infinite fractional values. It is essential to note the data type that is input into the regression because it affects how the results are interpreted. While whole numbers are input into the regressions, the generated coefficients are not always whole numbers and

may be less intuitive to laypeople. Nonetheless, the coefficients still provide meaning by revealing trends and the slope of relationships between variables.

Operationalization

Like Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba outline in *Designing Social Inquiry* (1995), a successful empirical investigation must rely on a bedrock foundation of theory to select research questions and data that reflects the concepts being studied. Because few datasets *perfectly* reflect theoretical concepts in the social sciences, researchers must perform their due diligence in operationalizing concepts to select accurate indicators. The following section provides strict guidelines around the variables of interest.

Dependent Variables

In the PA-X dataset, The University of Edinburgh defines a Peace Agreement as a "formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it" (PA-X Codebook, V4). This definition includes all peace agreements, regardless of whether official or unofficial actors negotiated them. They go on to clarify their definition of conflict as a case of "armed violence, causing more than 25 conflict-related deaths in one year," which aligns with The Uppsala Conflict Data Program's definition of armed conflict, with superficial changes in its language. There are two interrelated dependent variables to compare in this study, disaggregated from the total amount of peace agreements negotiated on the African continent in the post-Cold War, post-UN trusteeship era, from 1994-2020.

The total peace agreements count is separated into two variables to differentiate between peace agreements negotiated by official T1 and unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomats. Although the theory of Multi-Track Diplomacy separates T2 diplomacy into seven additional tracks, text from peace agreements included in the PA-X dataset is limited in explaining the background and role of unofficial third-party individuals. While this information is sometimes included, it is not detailed enough to effectively categorize the agreements into the seven additional tracks described in Multi-Track Diplomacy theory.

Even if a researcher were to manually perform this work, the counts that each track would receive would likely be too few to derive statistically significant results. For that reason, Montville's original classification of diplomacy is employed in this study, with one minor exception: the grouping of T2 and T1.5.

T1 peace agreements are operationalized here to refer to agreements that were negotiated solely by government officials and conflict protagonists, which do not refer to unofficial diplomats or mediators having taken part in the peace process in the language of the agreement. T2-T1.5 peace agreements, on the other hand, are operationalized here to refer to agreements that were negotiated either solely between unofficial diplomats, between official diplomats with the assistance of unofficial diplomats, and between official diplomats with unofficial diplomats serving as mediators. In other words, any involvement by unofficial actors in the negotiation process resulted in the peace agreement being coded as T2-T1.5.

To some scholars of diplomacy, this operationalization may be considered inaccurate because of the grouping together of the unofficial tracks, T2 and T1.5. The coding process is essentially labeling an agreement as T2 even if it were primarily negotiated through the work of T1 actors when T2 actors were supporting the peace process in lesser support roles. This operationalization has been consciously selected to contribute to the existing literature on the Tracks of Diplomacy. Future researchers can reconsider this path and justify their choice to deviate if they wish to do so. Böhmelt, in his 2010 study of the effectiveness of the Tracks of Diplomacy, groups T2 and T1.5 together in a category of unofficial diplomacy due to the presence of unofficial actors.

To further complicate this issue, the PA-X dataset does not always specify third parties' role in the negotiation process, requiring intensive exploration into each peace agreement to unearth the actual level of participation of unofficial diplomats within the negotiation process. Even then, the participation of unofficial actors would likely need to be scored on a sliding scale, and it is not clear how this would benefit the scope of this research question. Future researchers should self-select their operationalizations depending on the level of nuance they are trying to capture in their studies of diplomacy.

Independent Variables

To measure the presence of neotrusteeship and compare its relationship with the Tracks of Diplomacy described above, five original variables have been created to serve as the key causal variables, recorded in binary scores. These new indicators monitor the five permanent UN Security Council member's involvement in Africa states' security apparatuses. The five permanent UNSC members are: France, The United States, The United Kingdom, China, and Russia and are considered great powers due to their dominant military, economic, and diplomatic influence (Fox, 1944). This paper argues that the modern system of neotrusteeship is built around great power involvement, so these involvement variables track not just the direct military interventions by external governments and IGOs but it also documents the external financial and material support for benefactor states experiencing conflict. This unique measure of involvement combines information from two primary sources: The International Military Intervention 1989-2005 dataset and The Uppsala Conflict Data Program's External Support dataset 1975-2010.

The IMI dataset codes military interventions as the "movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute" (Pearson and Baumann, 1993). To fit this study's needs, the data was extracted when the intervention's target was one of the 54 African states, and the intervener was one of the five permanent members of the UNSC or an IGO that included any of the five Security Council members. The UCDP codebook (Version 1.0-2011) codes external support as "state government, a diaspora, a non-state rebel group...NGO or IGO, a political party, a company or a lobby group, or even an individual" providing "troops to assist in an ongoing conflict" or "sanctuary, financial assistance, logistics and military support short of troops."

Please note that in this study, IGOs are disaggregated into their respective member states, so an instance of UN intervention is coded as an intervention by all five of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. When the UN initiates an intervention, none of the Security Council members used their veto power to prevent it, showing all permanent members' implicit support. If a permanent member of the UN

Security Council scored a 1 in this new dataset, they were observed to have been involved in a foreign state's security apparatus. If they were not, they scored a 0. Although binary variables are ineffective at capturing the *degree of suppor*t, they serve the research question by documenting trends over time and the strength of correlations.

Additionally, states scored a 1 if they maintained an active military installation in that given country-year. Because decolonization had officially been completed at the beginning of this period of study, military installations reveal an ongoing security relationship between the host state and a great power. A military installation shows an explicit agreement between the external actor and the host state, for which the external actor has a principal interest in maintaining the status quo of regional security. Furthermore, military installations were only added to this dataset if their existence was known to the public. Because of the strategic nature of secret military bases and outposts, the full extent of great power involvement in Africa is likely higher than the counts in this dataset represent.

Unlike trusteeship, neotrusteeship involves a combination of independently motivated IGOs, individual governments, and NGOs. Why then is neotrusteeship being measured in this study on an individual basis? The great powers are essential to the modern system of neotrusteeship because they provide systematic guidance, funding, and direct support to the host state's security apparatus. Great powers provide this assistance due to the security dimension's fundamental importance in propping up a failing state. For that reason, the involvement of the great powers in external states' security apparatuses is tracked across all African countries from 1994-2020 as a baseline indicator of neotrusteeship. Differing combinations of nations will join in supporting states labeled as failing, in addition to contracted companies and humanitarian organizations. The combination of security actors can fluctuate year to year in any given neotrust state, yet this indicator will capture great power involvement as a base level to account for fluctuating foreign policy approaches.

A Clarification on "Failing States"

Because Fearon and Laitin (2004) defined the modern system of neo-trusteeship as a collaboration between IGOs, governments, and NGOs in assisting failing states,

the concept of failing and failed states must also be defined. Degrees of state failure, like any concept, exist on a spectrum when a binary qualification is not provided. For instance, states can fail to provide adequate security for a particular region of the state and, meanwhile, be successful in the economic development of another portion of the state. On the other hand, a state may be failing to develop its economy and raise its citizens out of poverty while maintaining security controls over its territory. Are both of these instances examples of failing states? When are states officially declared as failed?

It is imperative to operationalize the concept of a failing state if neotrusteeship is to be employed as a theoretical framework in this statistical analysis. In *Short of the Goal,* Carol Lancaster (2006) delineates between the concepts of failing and failed states:

> "A failing state...is one whose government is losing the ability to provide security and essential services for its population and to protect its borders. A failed state is one in which the government has lost this ability entirely (in some cases, the state has collapsed and civil conflict has erupted, with warring groups competing for power and control of resources)."

While Lancaster's definition of a failing state does provide insight into the declining ability of state security apparatuses, it misses the mark by lacking a strict process for labeling a state as failing, as she had done with her definition of a failed state. To borrow this definition and refine it, a "failing state" is operationalized here to reflect *the security apparatus's ability to prevent and address armed conflict without foreign countries' direct assistance.* Therefore, observations of this paper's 'involvement' indicator represent a minimum threshold of identifying a failing state.

Bøås and Jennings (2007) criticize the labeling of a state as failing and argue that "States called 'failed' are...primarily those in which...crises are perceived to threaten Western interests." However, Fearon and Laitin's (2004) position explains that failing states create international collective action problems, not just for great powers from the west but also for global security and other nearby and distant nation-states' economic development. Interventions, external support, and great powers' involvement in states' security apparatus can positively affect human beings' lives both within and outside

failing states. These strategic security partnerships are mutually beneficial by allowing for sustained development, increasing the flow of imports and exports, raising the GDP and living standards of both the trust state and its partners, and avoiding the cross-border consequences of the conflict and poverty traps.

All great powers are incentivized to address international collective action problems before they further develop, not just those from the west. This point is not to justify the use of the term 'failing state' so the international community and great powers can involve themselves in conflict and infringe on the sovereign rights of states labeled as 'failing.' Unless gross human rights violations or war crimes are perpetrated, great powers' involvement should be up to the discretion of the neo-trust state to avoid criticisms of colonialism or exploitation of the region. The purpose of operationalizing the concept of state failure for this article is to provide a measure for monitoring great powers' neotrusteeship activities after actions by great powers have already taken place.

Spatial and Temporal Controls

Since Fearon and Laitin (2004) refer to neotrusteeship as post-colonial imperialism, the groups of states previously under colonial rule by imperial great powers will serve as this study's first control variables. Great powers may have remained materially vested in states that were previous colonies, therefore being more or less involved in resolving their conflicts through diplomatic means. This parameter serves as a spatial control. Because the United States, China, and the USSR lacked colonies on the African continent, only previous *French* and *British* colonies will serve as the colonial control variables. All great powers are included in analyzing these controls since international trade may rely heavily on the infrastructure built during colonization. Neotrustees may serve to protect that infrastructure and maintain stability in states that are perceived as high-value economic partners. Because the Sahel region was provided in the introduction as a primary example and justification for neotrusteeship, two additional spatial controls will be applied to the original model: countries within the G5 Sahel Joint Alliance and the geographic boundaries of the Sahel. These two additional

spatial variables will further limit the influence of potential extraneous or confounding variables that may be affecting the results.

United States and French executive branch administration changes will also be introduced as separate temporal controls. When the United States emerged on the global stage as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union, their influence and sway in intergovernmental organizations grew significantly. So, US executive branch changes may result in changes of other great powers' neotrust policies. French executive branch administration changes are also tested because France is the great power that is most involved in African states' security apparatuses, as seen in Figure 6 in the descriptive statistics shared in the following section. One would expect that western great powers' democratic elections would produce elected leaders with varying policy objectives. A change in political administration may increase or decrease the use of official and unofficial diplomacy as a means for conflict resolution depending on the goals and philosophy of the administrations. With each change of administration, there may also be a change in a government approach to assisting failing states' security apparatuses. These two temporal controls are applied to all great powers because it may be the case that the UK, Russia, or China may pivot their own policy approaches depending on the approaches of the US and France.

Descriptive Statistics

Statistical software such as Stata allows researchers to input data and produce graphs and charts to help provide better interpretations of the more complex coefficients that are produced later in the study. The following graphs represent frequency counts for the dependent and independent variables, expressed through bar charts and pie charts. This visual information allows for a more nuanced understanding and interpretation of the coefficients provided in the final statistical analysis. The bar chart in Figure 4 represents the total peace agreement counts on the African continent from 1994-2020, showing a steady increase in peace agreements which peaked in 2006 then declined at a similar rate afterward. The low rate of peace agreements observed in 2020 is potentially due to the global covid-19 pandemic intervening with diplomatic processes.



The bar chart in Figure 5 divides the total peace agreement counts into official T1 and unofficial T2-T1.5 peace agreements. From 1994-2010, official T1 diplomacy was the primary method for reaching peace agreements. However, in 2011, there was a notable increase in T2-1.5 peace agreements and again in 2012. This change may reflect a major policy shift in great powers utilizing unofficial diplomacy's effectiveness in resolving conflict abroad. There was a significant decline in T2-1.5 peace agreements in the years following, but they held a steady rate, consolidating around ten peace agreements per year. 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2019 appear to be the only years in which unofficial diplomacy accounted for more agreements than official diplomacy.



The following two pie charts in Table 4 compare the nature of T1 and T2-T1.5 peace agreements and conflicts they attempted to resolve in Africa from 1994-2020. The pie graph key explains the different agreement types in which the peace agreements are categorized by the PA-X researchers: interstate, intrastate, interintra, and intralocal. *Interstate* agreement types refer to agreements that attempted to resolve armed conflict between two states. *Intrastate* agreements attempted to resolve armed conflict within a state's borders, otherwise known as civil wars. *Interintra* agreements attempted to resolve conflicts that are a blend of interstate and intrastate. Intralocal agreements attempted to resolve local issues, rather than issues that tied to a larger intrastate conflict.

Table 4: Peace Agreement Types in Africa 1994-2020



Interstate	*Conflicts between two states.*
Intrastate	*Conflicts within a state's borders.*
Interintra	*A blend of interstate and intrastate conflict.*
Intralocal	*Local conflict within a state's borders, not relating to larger intrastate conflict.*

As seen in the blue portions of Table 4, peace agreements that attempted to resolve *interstate* conflict occurred far less than the other types of conflict. When combining all T1, T2, and T1.5 peace agreements, less than 3% of the agreements are observed to be resolving interstate conflict. Furthermore, the type of conflict that most peace agreements attempted to resolve was *intrastate* conflict, or conflict occurring

within the confines of a state's borders, otherwise referred to as civil war, seen in the green section of the pie charts. This finding coincides with Fearon and Laitin's (2003) study that shows a steady accumulation of intrastate conflict after 1950 and the decline of interstate conflict (Kalyvas, 2001).

40% of T2-1.5 peace agreements during this period in Africa addressed intralocal conflicts, or conflicts focused on local issues and not conflict-wide issues. This finding suggests that unofficial diplomacy may be better suited for addressing intralocal conflict, complementing official diplomacy's larger-scale work at the intrastate level. The emergence of the propensity to use T2-T1.5 conflict resolution processes was likely initially aimed at resolving more intralocal conflicts. The combination of the intralocal and the intra indicators account for 85% of T2-T1.5 peace agreements working to resolve civil war, while 86% of T1 peace agreements worked to settle civil wars. Similarly, when combining the interstate indicator with the interintra to account for all instances of interstate conflict, less than 15% of peace agreements in either category worked to resolve interstate conflict.

As seen in Figure 6, *France is the great power with the most observed involvement in African state security apparatus from 1994-2020*, with 214 total observations of involvement. Each count represents one country-year observed in which a great power supports an African state's security apparatus. The United States follows France with 158 total observations of involvement, with the UK tailing the US with 132 observations of involvement. China is the second to least involved with 94 observations, and finally Russia with 87 observations. *The western great powers—France, the US, and the UK, which are intertwined in their strategic military alliance via NATO, and France and the UK via the EU—have been the most involved in African state security apparatuses, while the Eastern Powers, China and Russia, have been the least involved.*



Figure 7 reveals a fluctuating degree of French involvement in African states' security apparatus. During the duration of the total period, France was involved in a minimum of four African states' security apparatus during any given year, with a max involvement count of ten. France's high involvement count on the continent in 1994 reflects its interventions and external support in Rwanda, Chad, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Algeria. Of this list, all but Sudan are French-speaking, Francophone states. According to Schmidt (2018), France has primarily intervened in conflicts and assisted the security apparatuses of states that were its former colonies, justified by a new post-Cold War Africa policy that "linked French development aid to human rights and democratic practices."



This foreign policy approach has been criticized after France trained and supported the Rwandan government forces that assisted in perpetrating the Rwandan genocide. France's lagged reaction to intervening at the height of the Rwandan genocide led to an increase in support by western populations for the responsibility of intervening in foreign conflicts, where grave human rights abuses were being perpetrated. This change in western humanitarian consciousness, in part, resulted in the 2005 framework called Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P is a political commitment approved by all UN members to address genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The document outlines the role of UN members in preventing crises of these natures and provides measures for a timely response once they do. Charbonneau (2014) warns against presenting the issue of military intervention as:

> "between an external imperialist against a country united, or, in its liberal variant, as between humanitarian saviours and victims in need to be saved, [because] it

> imposes a worldview that excludes the critique of 'local' transnationalised actors that can benefit or aggravate the relationship between an international militarised peace agenda and capitalism."

Therefore, any criticisms of the motivations of great powers' involvement in African states' security apparatuses should also consider the influence and active participation of local agencies in African states and what they have to gain from the interventions. Opponents of French intervention and support for African states argue that French involvement is based primarily on its national economic and security interests on the continent, which have led to less stability and perpetuated conflict (Schmidt, 2018; Charbonneau, 2016).

When focusing on the 1994-2006 period, France had the highest involvement count until the US matched it in 2007. France's high involvement in Africa is likely due to its post-Colonial policy of rewrapping African state leaders "who assumed power after political independence, [and] signing partnership agreements that protected French economic, strategic, and security interests" (Schmidt, 2018). France's involvement peaked in 2008 due to its interventions and external support for Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Niger, DR Congo, and Sudan and the maintenance of its military bases in Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal. Between 2007-2019, the only countries that met the level of involvement or outperformed France's involvement were the UK and the US. After 2016, France's involvement was halved and remains steady at four observations of involvement from 2017-2020. During the final four-year period, Russia was the only great power whose involvement count exceeded France's.

When focused on US and UK involvement in African states in Figure 8, there is a steady increase in involvement, which more or less plateaus from 2007 to 2016. The increase in US involvement is particularly noticeable in the post-9/11 period. In 2017, there was a drop-off in UK and US involvement on the African continent. From 2000-2013, the United States appeared to be equally involved or more involved in providing security in African states than the United Kingdom. From 2013 to 2017, the UK was more involved, or in some cases as involved, in African states' security apparatuses than the US. However, from 2018-2020 the US again took the lead. During

the entire span of the 1994-2020 period, both of these great powers were involved in at least one security apparatus of African states at any given year and were involved in nine African states at the most.



Schmidt (2018) claims that the UK also primarily intervened in conflicts and assisted the security apparatuses of states that were former colonies, as was the case with the British intervention in Sierra Leone. At the height of their involvement in 2013-2016, the UK provided support in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan, DR Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte d'Ivoire. At its lower limit, the UK was involved with only a single African state's security apparatus from 1996-1997 in Kenya. The increase in UK involvement seen after 1997 is likely due to the Saint-Malo declaration of 1998, which the UK and France signed to "enhance defense cooperation and 'harmonise their policies towards Africa'" (Chafer & Cumming, 2013). According to Chafer and Cumming, France and Britain began to leverage their combined power to swing votes on the UNSC and intervene bi-laterally to

gain more autonomy and increase the effectiveness of their involvement in the securitization of African states. This agreement was further strengthened in the post-9/11 period due to the western emphasis on curtailing the growth of terrorism and likely accounts for the continued growth of UK involvement on the African continent.

As for the United States, the world's sole superpower was involved with a minimum of one African states' security apparatus at any given time. At its peak, the US was involved with nine African states' security apparatus. Schmidt (2018) asserts that the US assisted "its former Cold War allies and [focused] on countries deemed strategic in the war on terror" during the post-9/11 period. Although the US's involvement score is the second-highest of all the great powers in Africa, US interests were primarily focused on the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. However, where the US was involved, Schmidt (2018) argues that the US "privileged military security over broader forms of human security that focused on poverty, disease, climate change, and governance." Failing states were seen by the US as high-risk due to their potential to shelter and facilitate the growth of political extremism. Consequently, the war on terror replaced the war against the spread of communism, which further intertwined with US economic interests on the continent.

As seen in Figure 9, Russia and China's involvement counts appear to mirror each other from 1994 to 2016, likely due to their shared participation in multilateral UN interventions, despite their tendency to avoid military interventions. Like the other great powers, Russia and China's involvement drops-off in 2017. While this downward trend in involvement continued for China, Russia had an incredible jump from zero observations to six from 2019-2020. During the entire period of study, Russia had four years in which it was not involved in any African states' security apparatus and others where it was involved in six. Russia's recent spike in involvement is primarily due to reports that they have been building new military installations across the African continent, suggesting a change of focus and strategy for the region (Röpcke, 2020).



In post–Cold War Africa, Russia and China typically avoided unilateral military interventions and multilateral interventions they considered to favor western interests. However, Russia has continued its Cold War policy of arming African governments with military equipment and arms to increase its influence on the continent (Schmidt, 2018). Russia has also focused its attention on the mining and energy sectors and infrastructure development, so the uptick in military installations in 2020 may reflect their interest in protecting their investments in African trading partners. An explanation for Russia's low involvement score relative to western great powers is its tactic in supplying mercenaries to foreign conflicts rather than involving official government forces and suffering potential backlash (Sokolovskaya, 2019). The employment of mercenaries via private military companies brings to light a notable issue in capturing the full-scale of great power involvement due to the confidential nature of their funding.

At its lowest limit, China was involved in at least one African state's security apparatus annually, with a max of seven. As of 2016, China's minimum level of involvement in African states' security apparatus has been due to their military support

base in Djibouti. Because Djibouti sits strategically at the mouth of the red sea, China's base in Djibouti provides military support for Chinese trade vessels seeking safe passage into the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. This military installation is part of China's "Belt and Road Initiative," which is a plan launched by China in 2013 to "promote economic cooperation among countries in Asia, Europe and Africa that are found along the belt (the 'Silk Road Economic Belt'), and the road (the '21st Century Maritime Silk Road')" (Chan & Gunasekaran, 2020).

This trade initiative is designed to increase China's global economic influence, so it may result in further Chinese involvement in external state security apparatuses via additional military installations if African states allow. However, China has historically pursued its economic interests for resources on the continent by investing "heavily in African industries and infrastructure and [has] turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, political repression, and corruption" (Schmidt, 2018). The decline in the Chinese involvement indicator from 2016-2020 may reflect a doubling down on that foreign policy strategy, with plans to develop key military installations along the Belt and Road. Furthermore, China views African states as a critical voting bloc in the United Nations in their plight to legitimize their sovereignty over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Any investment in African states is potentially viewed by Chinese government officials as paying future dividends in multilateral forums (Yoon & Gebrekiros, 2020).

Because data gathered from the IMI dataset (1946-2005) and UCDP External Support dataset (1975-2009) overlap only for the years 1994-2005, one could argue that 1994-2005 is the most accurate data available. The years of 2006-2020 were manually coded to expand the relevant variable in the IMI dataset, and the years 2010-2020 for the relevant variable in the UCDPs External Support dataset. It is fair to criticize that the overlapping range is the most reliable range of years because it relies on data primarily composed by third-party researchers. Nonetheless, the steady trends from great power involvement from 2007 onward suggest there was no radical change in the data collection process, increasing the internal reliability of this analysis's accuracy.

Model

Because the primary dependent variable—peace agreements—is disaggregated into two additional dependent variables, official T1 and unofficial diplomacy T2-T1.5, this study qualifies as a Multivariate Multiple Regression. Beck and Katz (1995) recommend using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) to account for the cross-sectional time-series data as is employed in this study. Without using PCSE, a regular OLS regression "produces standard errors that lead to extreme overconfidence" (Beck and Katz, 1995). This method also addresses the potential for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, or cross-sectional correlation. In the end, a coefficient is produced that accurately describes the correlation between peace agreements and great power involvement. To test the boundaries of this potential causal connection, the first model is applied without controls. Temporal and spatial controls are then included in this original model separately.

Classical Assumptions

When testing the classical assumptions of The Gauss-Markov theorem, the model in this study produces an estimator of the coefficient that appears to be the best linear unbiased estimation (BLUE) that fits the data. The following questions reflect the seven classical assumptions of The Gauss-Markov theorem and are answered accordingly.

1. Is regression model linear, correctly specified, and have an additive error term?

Yes, the model is linear. When producing a line of best fit across any two dependent and independent variables in this study, a linear angle is produced that can be measured on an x and y-axis. The model is also correctly specified because, according to Beck and Katz (1995), panel-corrected standard errors should be used for panel data. When running Ramsey tests to check for omitted variables on each of the models, the tests reported no omitted variables. Furthermore, a stochastic error term is included in the linear equation. To assure the robustness of this study, I tested my original model, both with and without spatial controls, as a negative binomial regression to account for the

count dependent variables and potential overdispersion. As seen in Tables 12-14 in Appendix A, the statistical significance of the results show a similar outcome to that of Beck and Katz' recommendations for panel data using Panel Corrected Standard Errors, with minor degrees of change in statistical significance. This robustness check confirms our model specification. Therefore, this model satisfies the first classical assumption.

2. *Does the error term have a zero population mean?*
When producing a histogram of the residuals, the error term is distributed around a mean of zero. Furthermore, a scatterplot of the predicted residuals produces linear and quadratic fits that meet near the zero line. This model satisfies the second classical assumption.

3. *Are all explanatory variables uncorrelated with the error term?*
According to Studenmund (2016), “Classical Assumption III is violated most frequently when a researcher omits an important independent variable from an equation.” Because the Ramsey test demonstrated that this model has no omitted variables, the independent variables are exogenous. Therefore, this model satisfies the third classical assumption.

4. Are observations of the error term uncorrelated with each other?
When running the regression with panel corrected standard errors, no autocorrelation was reported in any of the models. This model satisfies the fourth classical assumption.

5. Does the error term have a constant variance?
When producing a residual-versus-fitted plot, no evidence for heteroskedasticity is observed. Even if heteroskedasticity were present, the use of panel corrected standard errors assumes the presence of heteroskedasticity and corrects for the issue. This model satisfies the fifth classical assumption.

6. *Is any explanatory variable a perfect linear function of any other explanatory variable?*

When testing the variance inflation factor (vif) of multicollinearity, no independent variables received a score greater than 10, with a mean VIF of 3.52. This score was expected to be slightly increased due to the cooperative nature of great powers in foreign policy via IGOs such as the UN, EU, and NATO. These results suggest that there is no perfect multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. This model satisfies the sixth classical assumption.

7. *Is the error term normally distributed?*

When creating a kernel density graph and histogram of the error term, both charts appear to be normally distributed. This model satisfies the seventh classical assumption.

Results

In Table 5, the United Kingdom is the only great power in the *1994-2020 period* to show a positive correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of peace agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .66 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. On the other hand, both the United States and the United Kingdom show a strong positive correlation between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and peace agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .39 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .67 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only great powers to show a statistically significant correlation between involvement and T2-T1.5 peace agreements in the *1994-2020 period.*

Table 5	*Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, All 54 African Countries*	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.03 (.12)	-.07 (.06)
US Involvement	.14 (.14)	.39 (.09) ***
UK Involvement	.66 (.28) **	.67 (.12) ***
Chinese Involvement	.05 (.42)	.32 (.27)
Russian Involvement	.35 (.47)	-.44 (.28)
Constant	.24 (.03) ***	.02 (.02)
# of Observations	1,457	1,457
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.		

In Table 6, the original model is tested with spatial controls for past French and past British colonies. When testing only past French colonies, the United Kingdom is the only great power to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement in past French colonies is associated with a .67 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables

are held constant. Similarly, when testing only past French colonies, the United States and the United Kingdom show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .38 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .67 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

Table 6

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, Controlled for Colonial history

	Past French Colonies		Past British Colonies	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.007 (.11)	-.06 (.05)	.03 (.12)	-.06 (.06)
US Involvement	.15 (.14)	.38 (.09) ***	.15 (.15)	.41 (.09) ***
UK Involvement	.67 (.28) **	.67 (.12)***	.61 (.26) **	.62 (.11)***
Chinese Involvement	.07 (.41)	.33 (.27)	.11 (.49)	.30 (.32)
Russian Involvement	.35 (.47)	-.44 (.28)	.42 (.49)	-.409 (.29)
Constant	.23	.019	.24	.018

(Y-Intercept)	(.03) ***	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)
# Observations	1,529	1,529	1,517	1,517
Panel Corrected standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.				

When testing only past British colonies, the United Kingdom again is the only great power to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement in past British colonies is associated with a .61 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. On the other hand, both the United States and the United Kingdom show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy when controlling for past British colonies. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement in past British colonies is associated with a .41 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement in past British colonies is associated with a .62 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

In Table 7, the original model is tested with two additional spatial controls for countries within the (1) G5 Sahel Joint Alliance and the (2) geographic boundaries of the Sahel. The United Kingdom again is the only great power to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement in past British colonies is associated with a .66 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Both the United States and the United Kingdom show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement in the G5 Sahel is associated with a .39 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all

other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .67 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. When focusing on countries within the geographic boundaries of the Sahel, the results are nearly identical.

Table 7

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, Spatial Controls for the Sahel Region

	G5 Sahel Joint Force Countries		Geographic Sahel	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.02 (.11)	-.06 (.06)	.01 (.11)	-.07 (.06)
US Involvement	.15 (.14)	.39 (.09)***	.13 (.14)	.39 (.09)***
UK Involvement	.66 (.28)***	.67 (.12)***	.66 (.28)***	.67 (.12)***
Chinese Involvement	.06 (.42)	.32 (.27)	.09 (.48)	.29 (.31)
Russian Involvement	.35 (.47)	-.44 (.28)	.33 (.49)	-.42 (.29)
Constant (Y-Intercept)	.24 (.03)	.02 (.02)	.24 (.03)	.01 (.02)

# Observations	1485	1485	1485	1485
Panel Corrected standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.				

In Table 8, the original model is tested with temporal controls for two separate US Executive Branch administration changes. Observations for the year 1993 are left out of this model because UN trusteeship had not concluded officially until 1994. During the years of the Clinton Administration, China was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in Chinese involvement is associated with a 1.27 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Furthermore, France, the US, the UK, and China show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French, US, and UK involvement is associated with a .01 unit decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in Chinese involvement is associated with a .48 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

When controlling for the Bush Administration, the United States and China show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .59 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in Chinese involvement is associated with a .46 unit decrease in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. France was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French involvement is associated with a .07 unit decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

Table 8

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement
US Executive Branch Administration Changes: Part 1

	Clinton Administration 1994-2000		George W. Bush Administration 2001-2008	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.0007 (.10)	-.01 (.008) **	.17 (.26)	-.07 (.01) ***
US Involvement	-.13 (.09)	-.01 (.006) *	.59 (.28) **	.17 (.11)
UK Involvement	-.07 (.07)	-.01 (.007) ***	1.4 (1.17)	-.02 (.01)
Chinese Involvement	1.27 (.72) *	.48 (.13) ***	-.46 (.21) **	.008 (.03)
Russian Involvement	-.51 (.89)	-.45 (.133)	-.18 (1.5)	-.03 (.14)
Constant	.22 (.24) ***	.01 (.007) ***	.37 (.08) ***	.02 (.01) ***
# of Observations	378	378	432	432

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In Table 9, the original model is tested with temporal controls for two additional US executive branch administration changes. When controlling for the years of the Obama Administration, the UK was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .86 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Furthermore, France, the US, and the UK show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French involvement is associated with a .33 unit decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .82 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a 1.05 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

When controlling for the years of the Trump Administration, France and the UK show a statistically significant correlation between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French involvement is associated with a .40 unit decrease in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .65 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. The UK also shows a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .62 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

Table 9

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement
US Executive Branch Administration Changes: Part 2

	Obama Administration 2009-2016		Trump Administration 2017-2020	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreement	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.001 (.08)	-.33 (.20) **	-.40 (.12) ***	.37 (.24)
US Involvement	-.38 (.26)	.82 (.35) ***	.12 (.22)	.47 (.42)
UK Involvement	.86 (.27) ***	1.05 (.19) ***	.65 (.18) ***	.62 (.35) *
Chinese Involvement	.25 (.39)	-.50 (.45)	-.14 (.27)	.19 (.62)
Russian Involvement	.62 (.52)	.45 (.56)	-.28 (1.07)	0.28 (.22)
Constant	.13 (.03) ***	.012 .022	.25 (.08) ***	.04 (.01) ***
# of Observations	432	432	215	215

Panel Corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In Table 10, the original model is tested with temporal controls for two separate French executive branch administration changes. During the years of the Chirac Administration, the US was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .32 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. On the other hand, the UK was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .02 unit decrease in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

During the years of the Sarkozy Administration, the UK was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a 1.55 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Both the US and UK, however, show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .76 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .99 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

Table 10

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement
French Executive Branch Administration Changes: Part 1

	Chirac Administration 1995-2007		Sarkozy Administration 2007-2012	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.11 (.14)	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.24)	-.27 (.22)
US Involvement	.32 (.18)*	-.01 (.01)	.37 (.39)	.76 (.32)***
UK Involvement	.02 (.23)	-.02 (.006)***	1.55 (.86)*	.99 (.44)**
Chinese Involvement	.69 (1.9)	.30 (.20)	-.20 (.15)	.13 (.12)
Russian Involvement	.18 (2.01)	-.20 (.20)	-.48 (.65)	.002 (.59)
Constant	.30 (.06)***	.02 (.007)***	.20 (.05)***	.003 (.04)
# of Observations	702	702	324	324

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In Table 11, the original model is tested with temporal controls for two additional French executive branch administration changes. During the years of the Hollande

Administration, both the US and the UK show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a .55 unit decrease in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .84 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. On the other hand, every great power except Russia shows statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French involvement is associated with a .44 unit decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in US involvement is associated with a 1.27 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .89 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in Chinese involvement is associated with a 1.07 unit decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

During the years of the Macron Administration, both France and the UK show statistically significant correlations between their involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T1 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in French involvement is associated with a .40 unit decrease in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .65 unit increase in T1 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant. Furthermore, The UK was the only superpower to show a statistically significant correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and the prevalence of agreements negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. Every 1 unit increase in UK involvement is associated with a .62 unit increase in T2-T1.5 peace agreements when all other variables are held constant.

Table

11

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement
French Executive Branch Administration Changes: Part 2

	Hollande Administration 2012-2017		Macron Administration 2017-2020	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.05 (.08)	-.44 (.21)**	-.40 (.12)***	.37 (.24)
US Involvement	-.55 (.17)***	1.27 (.53)***	.12 (.22)	.47 (.42)
UK Involvement	.84 (.25)***	.89 (.21)***	.65 (.18)***	.62 (.35)*
Chinese Involvement	.15 (.58)	-1.07 (.61)*	-.14 (.27)	.19 (.62)
Russian Involvement	.91 (.79)	.95 (.77)	-.28 (1.07)	-.28 (.22)
Constant	.13 (.03)	.02 (.04)	.25 (.08)***	.04 (.01)***
# of Observations	324	324	215	215

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Interpretation

France

Under the parameters of our primary model, France does not appear to show a statistically significant correlation between involvement in African states' security apparatuses and peace agreements by either track. The same is true for France when spatial control variables for past colonies and the Sahel region are introduced. Although it may not be expected that US administration changes would affect French foreign policy, temporal controls for US administration changes provide deeper insight into these particular periods. Once the temporal controls for US administration changes were introduced, France received negative correlations between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and peace agreements by T2-T1.5 diplomacy during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations.

France also received a negative correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and peace agreements by T1 diplomacy during the Trump administration, which overlapped with the Macron Administration during the same period. When testing exclusively for French administration changes, France also received a negative correlation between its involvement in African states' security apparatuses and peace agreements by T2-T1.5 diplomacy during the Hollande administration. Although France is the great power that is most involved in African states' security apparatuses, these findings suggest that French neotrusteeship policy likely intentionally gravitated towards support for external states' security apparatuses and purposely avoided the practice of funding T2-T1.5 diplomatic efforts.

The United States

As seen in Table 5, United States involvement in Africa from 1994-2020 correlates to an increase in peace agreements in African states negotiated through T2-T1.5 diplomacy. This finding suggests that the United States is accelerating or assisting peace processes through support for unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomats. It may also be the case that US involvement builds around it a system of neotrusteeship, from which unofficial diplomats are supported and funded to help stabilize conflict. This

correlation coincides with a positive correlation between UK involvement and unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomacy. This point is interesting because the United States and the United Kingdom share a "Special Relationship" in their bilateral defence and intelligence cooperation (Dumbrell, 2009). It may be that these positive coefficients are due to the coordination of approach to foreign policy and state-building.

This idea is supported by the United States and the United Kingdom's strong positive correlation between involvement and unofficial T2-T1.5 peace agreements in past British colonies. Furthermore, they both show positive correlations between involvement and unofficial T2-T1.5 peace agreements in past French colonies. Because these results match closely with the results of the primary model, it is not clear that the US and British are favoring past colonial states. When two separate spatial controls for the Sahel region were introduced, the US again received positive coefficients between involvement and peace agreements via T2-T1.5 diplomacy. This finding provides further evidence to support the original model and that US neotrusteeship policy is generally centered around deploying T2-T1.5 diplomatic efforts.

When testing US administrative changes, the US received a negative coefficient for T2-T1.5 peace agreements under Clinton, which identically aligned with France and the UK. The Clinton administration is the only period where diplomatic and involvement policy aligns between the three Western powers. The underutilization of diplomatic support during this period changed under the Bush administration, which also saw a statistically significant positive coefficient for US involvement and T1 Peace agreements. This finding suggests that the post-9/11 period resulted in a shift of neotrusteeship policy towards the use of official diplomacy. This favoring of diplomacy continued into the Obama administration with another shift towards unofficial diplomacy. This view is supported by the exceptional growth of peace agreements negotiated through unofficial diplomacy in the second decade of the 21st century. After 2016, the findings show no correlation between US involvement and either approach to diplomacy, which aligns with the Trump administration's promise to end the US's involvement in "endless wars" by withdrawing from foreign conflicts (Holland, 2020).

When testing French administrative changes, the US received a positive coefficient for T1 peace agreements under the period of the Chirac administration,

1995-2007, with a statistical significance of less than 10%. That statistical significance improved to 5% when isolated to 2001-2008 to represent the Bush administration, which signals that the 2001-2008 period is likely responsible for the improvement. This result is expected in a correctly specified model because it would not be expected that French administration changes would affect US foreign policy more than US administration changes. During the Sarkozy and Hollande administrations, the US received positive coefficients for T2-T.15 peace agreements, which primarily overlaps and confirms the results found for the Obama administration.

The United Kingdom

Table 5 shows that the United Kingdom's involvement in Africa from 1994-2020 correlates to an increase in peace agreements negotiated through official and unofficial diplomacy. This point suggests that the United Kingdom government supports peace processes directly through official T1 means or proxy by using unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomats. As with the US, it may be that UK involvement builds around it a system of neotrusteeship, from which both official and unofficial diplomats are being supported and funded to help stabilize conflict. Table 6 shows a correlation between UK involvement and peace agreements negotiated through both methods of diplomacy when tested strictly for past British colonies. When isolated alone, this finding supports the idea that the UK government seeks to reinforce its political interests in post British colonial African states with support for states' security apparatuses and diplomatic institutions in tandem. However, when taken together with the general approach to state-building seen in the other models, it appears that the UK government is supporting states' security apparatuses and diplomacy throughout the continent and is not focusing its efforts exclusively on past British colonies.

When tested for US executive branch administration changes, no correlations appear significant until the Obama and Trump administrations. The strength of the correlations in Table 9 suggests that, during these two periods, the UK shifted towards a foreign policy that supported African states' security apparatuses and intentionally funded and drove conflict resolution through the use of official T1 and unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomacy. It also appears that the US and UK acted in concert during the Obama

administration to provide support to African security partners by offering unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomatic services. That policy continued for the UK through the Trump Administration, though it weakened significantly. The US drastically reduced its support for T2-T1.5 diplomacy during the Trump administration, which further signals the union of US and UK foreign policy.

China

There appear to be no statistically significant correlations between Chinese involvement in Africa and peace agreements when measuring the entire period 1994-2020. Colonial French and British heritage also do not affect Chinese involvement and diplomacy. Table 8 shows positive correlations between Chinese involvement and official T1 and unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomacy during the Clinton Administration. During this period, China's foreign policy position may have been in response to the vacuum of influence left by the collapse of the USSR. However, during the period of the Bush administration, there appears to be a negative correlation between Chinese involvement and official T1 diplomacy. This policy outcome represents a significant shift in the Chinese foreign policy approach towards the African continent, further validated by Table 9, showing no statistically significant correlations between Chinese involvement and diplomacy during the Obama and Trump Administrations. Because China has the second-lowest involvement count of all great powers and considering their economic interests on the continent due to the Belt and Road Initiative, these findings suggest that China is focusing its security and diplomatic contributions to Africa primarily via IGOs.

Russia

There appear to be no statistically significant correlations between Russian involvement in Africa and peace agreements in any of the models tested in this study. These findings support the idea that Russia avoided diverting its diplomatic and security resources to Africa after the USSR collapsed. When it did divert diplomatic and security resources to external states in Africa, the data shows that it focused those resources on IGO coordinated efforts, perhaps to build goodwill in the international community and exercise its influence on the UN Security Council. Because Russia was the great power

that was least involved in African states' security apparatuses on the continent, it may be that Russia focused its support on failing states closer to its geographic boundaries. A follow-up study applying these models to areas like the Middle East and the Caucasus likely provides varying great power policy approaches because regional interests of the great powers change more dramatically. It is also important to note that China and Russia's influence on the continent is far less than Western powers. Their low involvement counts are due to the collapse of the USSR and African states' post-colonial trade and security relations with western nations. These relations and security agreements may limit the access of rival great powers to African markets and colonial infrastructure via higher tariffs or rejection of eastern unilateral security support.

Conclusion

To investigate the individual efforts of great powers in their stating-building policies, this statistical analysis concentrated on the correlation between great power involvement in foreign security apparatuses and the prevalence of peace agreements on the African continent. This study examined all states on the African continent in the post-cold war and post-colonial period, from 1994-2020. The continent provided a diverse sample of observations to statistically unveil great powers' efforts in stabilizing states while also limiting any potential effects of the differences in foreign policy on separate continents. This sample also allowed for the introduction of spatial and temporal controls to test the internal validity of the primary model. The controls in this study were:

1. French and British post-colonial states.
2. The G5S Joint Force and The Geographic Sahel.
3. US executive branch administration changes.
4. French executive branch administration changes.

The results of this statistical analysis provided insight into a more nuanced situation of neotrusteeship than initially hypothesized. The first hypothesis stated that great power involvement increases the number of T1 and T2-T1.5 peace agreements in failing states. Under the conditions of the primary model, *the US and the UK were the only great powers to show positive correlations between their involvement in foreign*

security apparatuses and the prevalence of T1 peace agreements. The US and UK were the only great powers to show positive correlations between their involvement in foreign security apparatuses and the prevalence of T2-T1.5 peace agreements. Under the different control variables, great power involvement in some cases decreased the number of T1 and T2-T1.5 peace agreements in failing states or reversed the foreign policy strategy of great powers in previous periods. These findings demonstrate that the various tracks of diplomacy are simply tools in the toolkit of state-building, the use of which fluctuates due to various factors such as changing administrations or shifts in a great power's approach to foreign policy.

In regards to Fearon and Laitin's (2004) claim equating neotrusteeship as a form of post-colonial imperialism, this study's second hypothesis stated that a great power's involvement would increase diplomatic efforts in failing states that were its colonies. The results of this study validate this hypothesis only in the case of the United Kingdom, which shows a positive correlation between its involvement in post British colonial states and increases in the prevalence of peace agreements through both tracks of diplomacy. Regardless of this positive finding, the UK's coefficients mirrored the results when tested amongst all African states. This fact suggests that the UK does not uniquely deploy diplomacy in its postcolonial neotrust states but rather to all of its African neotrust states. Therefore, this evidence is not strong enough to validate the claim of H2.

This study's third and final hypothesis stated that US and French executive branch administration changes would result in shifts to great power's neotrusteeship strategies. As for US executive branch administration changes, the findings suggest that the Bush Administration began a post-9/11 policy of guiding failing African states towards peace processes through official T1 diplomatic assistance. This policy likely continued into the Obama administration with a shift towards unofficial T2-T1.5 diplomacy. This view is supported by the exceptional growth of peace agreements negotiated through unofficial diplomacy in the second decade of the 21st century. After 2016, the findings show no correlation between US involvement and either approach to diplomacy, which aligns with the Trump administration's promise to end the US's involvement in "endless wars" (Holland, 2020). Overall, it appears that controlling for US

executive branch administration changes is effective at capturing the changing policy positions of the US government in foreign affairs and state-building.

The only French executive branch administration changes that resulted in a shift to the French foreign policy approach were in the Hollande and Macron administrations. The Hollande administration resulted in a decrease in T2-T1.5 peace agreements in states where France was involved in the security apparatuses of African states, while the Macron administration resulted in a decrease in T1 peace agreements in states where France was involved in the security apparatuses of African states. *The result of introducing these temporal control variables shows that administration changes can affect great power's neotrusteeship strategies for failing states.*

Overall, the results of this study prove that great powers' approach to state-building is fluid. Great powers can increase or decrease their support for external states' security apparatuses, and they can assist in accelerating or decelerating peace processes in states experiencing conflict. While it may be tempting to categorize great powers' approach to foreign policy into a single mode of thinking, it is crucial to recognize that priorities continually evolve. Once this is recognized, outputs and outcomes can be tracked by researchers, policymakers, and members of the general public to direct change. Despite widespread criticisms that western great powers act as a single coordinated force abroad, the varying results for French, US, and UK involvement and peace agreements tell a story of policy that is typically unique to each country. The 1994-2000 period is the only instance where western policy fully aligned between these three great powers. The same appears to be true for the eastern great powers, China and Russia, because Russia never demonstrated a correlation between the study's variables, while China's results demonstrated a fluctuating policy approach depending on the temporal controls introduced.

Implications

The implications of this statistical analysis vary widely in its application. The explicit benefit is that researchers now have a statistical indicator that can help monitor the level of involvement of great powers in providing security to external states. Furthermore, a statistical model has been created that analyzes the relationship

between great power involvement and diplomacy. This model can be expanded further to monitor all nation-states' involvement in external states' security apparatuses and use of diplomacy. This model should not be viewed as a final product but instead as an addition to a more extensive hypothetical or existing tool that monitors external states' response to conflict.

Presently, Palantir Technologies, a private software company that focuses on analyzing big data, maintains products that provide counter-terrorism analytics and other predictive tools like fraud detection, predictive policing, community and national health monitoring, and artificial intelligence for the US military. There are likely other existing conflict monitoring programs owned by government agencies and private corporations, who input statistical findings, clandestine intelligence gathering, and other real-world data to machine learning and artificial intelligence programs that can recommend courses of actions regarding direct military intervention, humanitarian response, and detecting ripe moments and methods for deploying state and non-state diplomats for conflict resolution. Executives in respective governments or private organizations can review computer-generated conflict warnings and response recommendations to weigh the costs and benefits of potential action. By employing such software, leaders can use real-world data to fine-tune policy and respond to conflict to optimize resources and improve success rates of foreign intervention. This software could assist in preventing failing states from falling further into the conflict and poverty traps.

Furthermore, suppose the statistical model in this paper was made available to the public as open-source software. This software could inform citizens of different countries about their government's foreign policy approaches and increase the audience cost of unpopular foreign policies. In tandem with statistical models produced by academia, publicly available datasets could help inform the public about their respective governments' response towards states in humanitarian crises and wars abroad. Informed citizens can then hold government officials liable for action or inaction, through voting and protest, to provide checks and balances for their actions in domestic and foreign policy.

For example, citizens may find their governments inactive in their diplomatic response to crises. In response, they can lobby their respective governments to increase federal funding for official T1 diplomatic missions to resolve foreign conflicts and increase funding and assistance to T2-1.5 diplomatic efforts. An increase of funding for T2-1.5 diplomatic organizations incentivizes professional mediators from great power states and other developed nations to provide peacebuilding services in international settings. Increased funding for T2-1.5 diplomacy could spark the forming of additional private mediation organizations like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue or increase previously existing organizations' capacities to implement peacebuilding processes. Because diplomacy would be funded by states and private donors external to the conflicts, official and unofficial diplomats can increase their partnerships with states in need of conflict resolution without putting additional financial strain on states who are already failing in their security dimensions. When paired with external support for states' security apparatus, the separate tracks of diplomacy could improve the effectiveness of the current model of neotrusteeship.

Limitations

While researchers can be confident in the robustness of this study, the generalizability of these findings should be limited to the 54 African states from 1994-2020. As a caveat, the general approach to state-building of great powers in Africa does not necessarily apply to states outside of Africa. In future studies, the theoretical model outlined in this paper should be applied to additional observations not only within the African context but also on a global sample size. That way, different continents and regions can be analyzed to further evaluate the approach of great powers in their support for neotrust states. A follow-up study on a larger sample size, preferably a global sample size, will increase the generalizability of these results and offer researchers the ability to control for separate continents or further narrow regions of interest.

It would also be useful if the University of Edinburgh will include two additional variables to their dataset to account for peace agreements negotiated by official and unofficial means. This improvement will further expand the dataset’s usefulness for

future researchers to dive deeper into this understudied topic. It should also be mentioned that the measurement of neotrusteeship employed in this study is limited in its scope. There are likely many other measurable outcomes of neotrusteeship, which may better serve the scope of a study not centered around security and diplomacy. Furthermore, the temporal control variables for executive branch administration changes only cover US and French administrations because of the US's dominance as a superpower and France's high involvement count on the continent. It may be of value to account for all great power administration changes, although China and Russia's administration changes are less frequent.

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Appendix A

Negative Binomial Regressions - Robustness Check

Table 12

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, All 54 African Countries

	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.23 (.31)	-1.01 (.75)
US Involvement	.57 (.36)	2.27 (.62)***
UK Involvement	1.26 (.41)***	2.18 (.57)***
Chinese Involvement	.15 (.90)	1.23 (1.15)
Russian Involvement	-.43 (1.002)	-1.22 (1.19)
Constant	-1.41 (.09)	-3.0 (.19)***
# of Observations	1,472	1,457

Standard Errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 13

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, Controlled for Colonial history

	Past French Colonies		Past British Colonies	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.15 (.29)	-1.10 .74	.22 (.30)	-.99 (.75)
US Involvement	.59 (.36)*	2.32 (.63)***	.56 (.36)	2.31 (.63)***
UK Involvement	1.30 (.42)***	2.22 (.58)***	1.20 (.40)***	2.14 (.57)***
Chinese Involvement	.20 (.91)	1.28 (1.16)	.27 (.82)	1.18 (1.13)
Russian Involvement	-.42 (1.009)	-1.23 (1.19)	-.41 (.94)	-1.17 (1.16)
Constant (Y-Intercept)	-1.45 (.09)***	-3.65 (.19)***	-1.41 (.09)***	-3.65 (.19)***
# Observations	1,529	1,529	1,517	1,517

Panel Corrected standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 14

Peace Agreements and Great Power Involvement 1994-2020, Era of Neotrusteeship, Spatial Controls for the Sahel Region

	G5 Sahel Joint Force Countries		Geographic Sahel	
	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements	T1 Peace Agreements	T2-T1.5 Peace Agreements
French Involvement	.20 (.30)	-1.03 (.75)	.18 (.30)	-1.06 (.75)
US Involvement	.58 (.36)*	2.29 (.62)***	.55 (.35)	2.29 (.63)***
UK Involvement	1.27 (.41)***	2.19 (.57)***	1.27 (.82)***	2.21 (.58)***
Chinese Involvement	.16 (.90)	1.24 (1.15)	.27 (.82)	1.18 (1.11)
Russian Involvement	-.41 (.99)	-1.22 (1.19)	-.48 (.94)	-1.14 (1.15)
Constant (Y-Intercept)	-1.41 (.09)***	-3.61 (.19)***	-1.42 (.09)***	-3.62 (.19)***
# Observations	1,472	1,472	1,487	1,487

Panel Corrected standard errors in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Appendix B

Commands in order of appearance in thesis

2nd Dataset

Figure 2

twoway scatter battledeaths year, mlabel(country) || lfit battledeaths year

Descriptive Statistics

Figure 4 & 5

1st dataset

graph bar (sum) t1 t2 if inrange(year,1994,2020), over(year)

graph bar (sum) agreements if inrange(year,1994,2020), over(year)

Table 4 Peace Agreements

3rd Dataset

graph pie [fweight = t1] if t1, over(contp) plabel(_all percent)

graph pie [fweight = t2] if t2, over(contp) plabel(_all percent)

1st Dataset

Figure 6-9 Involvement Bar Charts

graph bar (sum) franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved, bar(1, color(brown)) bar(2, color(black)) bar(3, color(emerald)) bar(4, color(navy)) bar(5, color(maroon)) blabel(bar)

graph bar (sum) usinvolved ukinvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020), over(year) bar(1, color(black)) bar(2, color(emerald))

graph bar (sum) franceinvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020), over(year) bar(1, color(brown))

graph bar (sum) chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020), over(year) bar(1, color(navy)) bar(2, color(maroon))

Table 5
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

Colonies
Table 6
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if fcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if fcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if ukcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if ukcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

Sahel Table: Table 7
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if g5sahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if g5sahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if geosahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if geosahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020), pairwise

US Presidential
Table 8
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2000), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2000), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2001,2008), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2001,2008), pairwise

Table 9
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2009,2016), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2009,2016), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2017,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2017,2020), pairwise

French Presidential
Table 10
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1995,2007), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1995,2007), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2007,2012), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2007,2012), pairwise

Table 11
1st Dataset
xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2012,2017), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2012,2017), pairwise

xtpcse t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2017,2020), pairwise

xtpcse t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,2017,2020), pairwise

Appendix A: Negative Binomial
1st Dataset
nbreg t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if inrange(year,1994,2020)

Negative Binomial: Colonies
1st Dataset
nbreg t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if fcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if fcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if ukcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if ukcolony==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

Negative Binomial: Sahel
1st Dataset

nbreg t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if g5sahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if g5sahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t1 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if geosahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)

nbreg t2 franceinvolved usinvolved ukinvolved chinainvolved russiainvolved if geosahel==1 | inrange(year,1994,2020)