Do they fit in? Sector switchers in the Norwegian public administration

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Abstract

In a time where career trajectories are more fluid than ever, switching sectors is assumed to be increasingly common. However, how experience from the private sector may influence public officials is an area which has not been widely researched in the literature on the Norwegian public administration. Drawing on the demographical approach to organizational theory and the theories of person-organization- and publicness fit, I argue that "sector switchers" – people who transfer from the private to the public sector or *vice versa* – are likely to experience great value differences when entering the bureaucracy, as well as having a set of competences that are less applicable in their bureaucratic role than their non-switching colleagues. This is assumed to influence both their decision-making behaviour and their overall performance.

Using the Survey of State Administration, a comprehensive survey on officials in the Norwegian public administration, I employ a multilevel approach in examining how the values and modes of operating of sector switchers in the public administration differ from officials without experience from the private sector. The findings suggest that the sector switchers are equally likely to subscribe to public sector values as their non-switching colleagues and are just as likely to draw on their own former work experience as other public officials. However, it is found that sector switching bureaucrats are more likely to subscribe to values more commonly attributed to the private sector than others. The implication of this assumed to be that managers in the public sector looking to add some new influxes into their organization may utilize recruitment procedures to alter the focus of the organizations, without undermining the values the organization subscribe to.

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1. Introduction

The fundamental role of the public administration is to assist the political leadership in the planning, facilitation and implementation of public policy (Christensen, Egeberg, Lægreid & Trondal, 2018). As a consequence, the people who work in the public administration wields some degree of influence over the actions the government takes (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). When an individual assumes a position in the bureaucracy therefore, that person becomes a political actor (Christensen et.al, 2018). This means that anything that may influence the decision-making of bureaucrats is a question of political, and therefore public, interest.

In Norway, it has been shown that work experience and professional accomplishments are the most important consideration when public officials are recruited (Christensen et. al, 2018, p. 77). Therefore, the question arises as to what types of work experience that matters, and how different kinds of work experience influence the behaviour and performance of public officials. In the Weberian tradition, the bureaucratic career has been conceived as a lifelong duty, where a person devotes his or her professional career to serve the public (Weber, 2000; Sager & Rosser, 2009). Even today, there are those who hold that the bureaucratic profession should be seen as a distinct form of career and highlights the importance of keeping the bureaucracy as a career hierarchy separate from the rest of the economy (Sager & Rosser, 2009). Others, however, argue that bringing in members of staff from other kinds of organizations can bring in new values, modes of operating and skills into the bureaucracy that can be beneficial in order to liven up stagnant organizations (Lapuente, Suzuki & Van der Walle, 2020).

This debate is more relevant than ever, as career dynamics have changed in societies surrounding the bureaucracies, and more fluid career trajectories have become increasingly common (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Frederiksen & Hansen, 2014). Researchers of *sector switching*, defined as individuals' job mobility between sectors, seek to discover people's reasons for switching sectors, and the consequences of said switch (Frederiksen & Hansen 2014; Lapuente, et. al, 2020). In this area of study, one examines whether that there are residual effects, so-called sector imprints, that the individual bring with them upon entering an organization in a different sector (Boardman, et. al 2010, Chen, 2011). Therefore, one assumes that there are differences between the public and private sectors, and that these differences will have an impact on an individual when (s)he goes from one sector to the other (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2014; Boardman, Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2010). Within the context of political science, sector switching is of interest if it has an effect on public policy. So, what can the effects of bringing professionals from the private sector experience to organizations in the public sector might be? Are public officials with experience from organizations in the private sector experience different from the public officials who do not have such experience? And if so, can sector experience affect the decision-making of public officials?

Hence, discovering any possible effects of private sector experience on public officials is an area of interest. This thesis seeks to address this issue by examining the value subscription of public officials. Values are important as they represent principles or standards that guide behaviour (van der Wal, Huberts, van den Heuvel, & Kolthoff, 2006; Rokeach 1973). That the values of individuals matter for organizations is linked to the theories of person-organization- and publicness fit. These strands of theory are based on the idea that the convergence of the values of the members of the organization and the values of the organization itself is expected to make the organization perform better (Kristof-Browne, Zimmermann & Johnson, 2006, Vandenabeele, 2008). For this reason, the values of the public officials are of importance for the bureaucracy, as public officials who subscribe to public values are expected to perform their roles better than officials who do not, and the organizations in the public administration with a large number of public value-subscribers are expected to perform better than organizations where few subscribe to these values. Consequently, this thesis is made with the fundamental expectation that the values of individual bureaucrats matter not only in the execution of specific political actions, the formulation of goals, targets or objectives and to what degree these objectives are met; they matter for how well organizations in the public administration perform overall.

The principal assumption is therefore that sector switchers bring new values and modes of operating that are unique for the private sector into their roles as public officials. That former experiences matter for the conduct and performance of the individual bureaucrat, rests on a demographic perspective. The main idea behind this branch of organizational research is that when the members of organizations assume their roles, they are already pre-socialized into former modes of operation (Pfeffer, 1982; Egeberg & Trondal, 2020). Amongst the insights organizational demography offers, is that organizations can utilize recruitment processes as a tool for achieving specific outcomes (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). Therefore, if the value congruence between sector switchers and the organizations in the public organization is found to be poor, recruiting sector switchers is unadvisable.

On the other hand, the potential effects of former work experience may be mitigated by the socializing effect of the bureaucratic organization (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). The structural approach to organization theory holds the formal position of the individual, rather than demographic factors, matter for the decision-making of the public officials (Christensen, et.al 2018, Egeberg & Trondal, 2020). The organizations in the state administration are thought to be capable exercise control over its members through a system of rewards and punishments (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). By highlighting structural rather than demographic aspects, one assumes that bureaucrats are socialized into the values and modes of operating of the bureaucracy. As a consequence, the background of the sector switchers is deemed to have little significance for their behaviour in the organization.

In studying sector switchers therefore, this thesis finds itself in the middle of this theoretical debate. If sector background is found to matter for the values of bureaucrats, then the former experience of bureaucrats matters for the overall performance of the organizations in the public administration. Such a finding would support the demographic approach. Contrarily, if it is found that the effects of private sector experience are shown to be of little consequence, the socializing effects of the organizations in the public administration is found to be the most important feature for value subscription of public officials. Such a finding would support the arguments attributed to the structural approach. Hence, studying sector switchers in the state administration is considered to both be of practical and theoretical interest. The research question for this thesis is as follows:

"Does experience from the private sector matter for the values of "sector switchers" in the public administration?"

I will answer the research question by examining the Norwegian state administration. The state administration constitutes the higher levels of the executive powers of Norway, and consists of three hierarchically organized levels: Government, ministries and directorates (agencies) (Christensen, et al, 2018). As bureaucrats are the focus of this thesis, only the latter two are examined here. The ministries are the highest public administration authority after the

King in council (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation /KMD, 2021). They provide professional input for the formulation of public policy and ensure that adopted policies are implemented. However, they have gradually been adapted to serve as secretariates for the political leadership, and their main focus is the general development of policy and to have supervise their affiliated agencies (Christensen, et.al 2018). A vast assortment of directorates operates under the ministries, both centrally and regionally. They are generally more professionalized entities than the ministries and are chiefly focused on more concrete aspects of policy implementation (ibid.).

There are several reasons why studying sector switchers in the Norwegian public administration is of interest. Firstly, as I already have touched upon, public officials have the capacity to exercise influence over public policy. Therefore, understanding to what degree sector background affect the decision-making behaviour and performance of bureaucrats is of importance.

Secondly, the organizations in the public organizations are an ideal case for studying sector switchers. As parts of the nation's executive powers, they can be said to be the most public of public organizations (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997), and is therefore assumed to display the differences between organizations in the public and private sectors in the most fundamental ways. If no severe challenges with going from private organizations to organizations in the higher levels of the bureaucracy is found, it is unlikely that there will be any particular complications attributed with going from the private sector to any public organization.

Thirdly, while many studies have either studied demographic characteristics specifically, or otherwise included demographic characteristics in broader studies (for example, Lægreid & Olsen, 1974; Christensen & Mandelkern, 2021 or Egeberg & Stigen, 2018) few researchers have specifically studied sector switchers in Norway. Therefore, the accumulated knowledge regarding Norwegian sector switchers; their characteristics, values, motivation, attitudes or performance, is somewhat limited. Therefore, this thesis seeks to explore a hitherto unexplored gap in the scholarly literature regarding sector switchers in Norway, while simultaneously examining the possible effects of sector switching in public organizations generally.

The thesis consists of five main parts: a theory chapter, a data and methods chapter, an analysis chapter, a discussion chapter and a conclusion chapter. In the theory chapter, I will provide a thorough examination of the theories that the thesis rests on. Here the theoretical basis for the link between sector background, values and fit will be examined. Moreover, the basis for distinguishing public and private values is addressed, and based on this, the hypotheses of the thesis will be formulated. Subsequently, the data and methods chapter outline the empirical foundation of the thesis. Here I present the Survey of State Administration which provides the source of data for the thesis, as well as the operationalizations of the variables of interest. Afterwards, the choice of constructing multilevel logistic regression models in order to answer the hypotheses is presented and discussed. Thereafter, in the analysis chapter, the results of the multilevel logistic regression models are explained and further scrutinized. In the discussion chapter, I summarize the findings and discuss if and why sector experience is expected to matter for the performance of bureaucrats based on the empirical findings. Finally, a conclusion chapter provides an overall view of the thesis and present the main conclusions. However, before the theoretical framework is presented, an overview of the relevant literature that may help elucidate the subject matter is needed.

1.2. Literature

In this part, I will firstly give a brief overview of the research on organizational demographic factors in bureaucracies. Then I proceed to give an overview of the debate regarding the differences between the public and private sector. This is of importance, as it highlights the key reasons that sector experience is thought to matter. Thereafter, I proceed to examine the literature on sector switchers.

1.2.1. Demographic factors

Demographic factors in this context refers to features public officials carry along with them when entering the public administration, features that originates from the social background or former experiences of the individual officials (Christensen, Egeberg, Lægreid, Roness & Røvik, 2015; Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). Such features can be the officials' gender, education, length of tenure, socioeconomic status, work experience and other factors which can have had an effect on the official's values and ideals other than their formal organizational position (Christensen, et.al, 2018, Egeberg & Trondal, 2020).

Lægreid & Olsen (1978) examines demographic aspects of Norwegian civil servants in a broad study. They are particularly interested in examining the theory of representative bureaucracy – the notion that the composition of the staff of the bureaucracy will be reflected on policy output (p. 12). They find limited evidence supporting that the "social biography" of the bureaucrats impacts the behavioral patterns of the bureaucrats (p.130). Rather, they find convincing evidence suggesting that the conduct and performance of the bureaucrats is more strongly attributed to structural factors, such as the bureaucratic career and their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy (ibid, p. 284). However, they do concede that there may be some degree of interplay between demographic and structural factors and infers that the demographic explanations may be more significant in organizations with low potential for discipline or when the official has to deal with issues that are closely related to his or her background (p.287). Moreover, they find that the socializing effect the organizations in the Norwegian state administration has not seem to differ between each other (ibid.). For sector switchers, therefore, the findings of Lægreid & Olsen (1978) would suggest that the assumed value differences between the public and private sector is of limited importance.

Educational background, gender, age, length of tenure and geographical background has traditionally been cited as amongst the key demographical variables other than work experience (Christensen, et.al 2015). Additionally, factors such as ethnicity, parents' jobs or the socioeconomic status of the family in the childhood could also potentially influence an organization members behaviour, attitudes and values later in his or her career. However, the empirical foundations for claiming that the conventional demographic variables substantially impact governance processes in Norway are somewhat scarce (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). Education has often been cited as the most significant demographic characteristic (Christensen et. al 2018, p. p.55). Egeberg & Stigen (2018) finds that civil servants educated within the natural sciences report that their own education matters more than others. Christensen & Mandelkern (2021) finds evidence suggesting that educated economists in the bureaucracy have more technocratic role perceptions than the average bureaucrat, but only if they work in the Ministry of Finance or in higher administrative grades (p.21). Egeberg & Trondal (2020) concedes that work experience has also been shown to matter, as the lessons people learn tend to stick with them in later careers. As we know that work experience has been shown to be the predominant factor in employing people to the Norwegian public administration (Christensen et. al 2018, p. 77), the impact of former work experience on the current employment is therefore highlighted as an area of interest.

The general picture, however, is that behaviour in organizations in the public administration tend to be associated with organizational position rather than demographical characteristics. However, demographic factors have been shown to have some explanatory power. There are suggestions that educational background and work experience are of importance, however, the actual evidence for this remains limited. Nevertheless, what the effects of different kinds of work experience might be, are still somewhat unclear. Researching how experience from the private sector influence bureaucrats is therefore thought to add to the understanding of the effects of work experience on the behaviour performance of public officials.

1.2.2. Public and private organizations

The idea that sector switching may impact the behaviour, values and performance of the individual, rests on the assumption that differences exist between the public and private sectors. If there is no reason to believe that the sectors differ, there is no reason to expect that experience from the private sector will have any significant effect on the bureaucrat. Understanding the arguments of why there is, or should be, differences between the sectors, contributes to give some impressions as to how the sector switchers are expected to differ from other bureaucrats.

The debate regarding the differences between public and private organizations stretches back through history all the way to thinkers such as Plato, Locke and Rousseau, whom all discussed what should be public responsibilities, and what should be kept to the private sphere (Jacobsen, 2019). Essentially, the modern debate concerns itself with whether differences between the sectors exist, and if so, what the differences are (ibid.). Opinions regarding the public/private distinction stretches from those who hold that the differences are so small they are hardly worthy of notice, to those who claim that the distinction is so fundamental that organizations belonging to different sectors are almost incomparable (Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1994; Jacobsen 2019).

Those who argue that sector differences are of trivial concern, base their arguments on the assumption that members of an organization will act in the same way regardless of which organization to which they belong (Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011; Jacobsen, 2019). As a consequence, sector differences are expected to be minor, if at all present. This is known as the generic approach to sector differences (Jacobsen, 2019). Additionally, some has pointed out that the sectors have gradually become more alike as a consequence of a change in career dynamics (Boyne, 2002; Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011). Amidst the perceived changes in the career dynamic, lies the introduction of New Public Management (NPM)-related reforms in the public sector, whereby public organizations import practices from private firms (Jakobsen, 2019; Rainey & Chun, 2007) The emergence of NPM-related reforms has sometimes been argued to be a reason for convergence between public and private sector, however, the empirical support of sector convergence is mixed (Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011). A common explanation for dismissing these claims is that they fail to take the national context into account, as different countries have implemented such reforms in varying degree and in different extents (ibid.). Norway has conventionally been considered to be a "careful reformist" (Christensen et al, 2018, p. 150). However, by 2015, reform activity in the Norwegian central administration amongst the highest in Europe, especially in terms of management-related reforms (ibid.). Therefore, there is no reason to expect that the differences between the sectors are neither more nor less prominent in Norway than in other European countries.

However, there are many who argue that there are central differences between the sectors (Jacobsen 2019, Boardman, et.al, 2010). The fundamental argument lies in that the roles and societal position of the organizations are different, which in various ways affect how the organizations themselves operate (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011) The explanations can be categorized into four separate approaches: an economic approach, a political governance approach, a normative approach and a dimensional approach (Jacobsen, 2019, p. 19).

The economic approach highlights the importance of financing (Rainey & Chun, 2007, p. 74). Public organizations are to some extent shielded from competition and market logic, and objects like profitability and customer-orientations are therefore considered to be of less importance to these organizations (Jacobsen, 2019; Boyne 2002). However, they are funded by taxpayers, and should therefore shoulder more public responsibility than their private counterparts. As a consequence, one expects public organizations to have both more complex and more transparent decision-making processes (Boyne 2002, p.100).

The political governance approach focuses on the ownership of the organization. As public organizations are state-owned, they are answerable to elected officials. Such ownership always implies conflict, as the political body supervising the organization are made up of a constellation of politically representable officials. (Jacobsen, 2019, p. 19). Furthermore, public organizations are also essentially owned by the public, and therefore, various pressure groups in the larger society have different, and often conflicting, views on how the organization should act (Boyne, 2002). Private organizations are not assumed to be accountable towards their customers in the same way (Jacobsen, 2019).

The normative approach states that organizations in the different sectors *should* be different, as the public sector serves the interest of the people, whilst private firms serve only their customers and/or owners (Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011). The ideal is tied to the legitimacy of public organizations, which stresses the importance that public or that public organizations should more strictly adhere to rules, facilitate the representation of various minorities and sub-groups, as well as being more open and transparent (Jacobsen, 2019, p. 16).

The dimensional approach combines the economic- and political-governance approaches (ibid.). The central principle in this approach is that organizations could be categorized as more or less private than others (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994, p.202). The reasoning is that all organizations are affected by both economic factors and political decisions, but the extent of how these factors affect the organization is expected to matter. Hence, one can determine the "publicness" of an organization, by to what degree the organization is exposed to the markets, and by what degree the organization is subject to public authority (ibid.). Private companies are generally assumed to be lower on the public-private continuum than public organizations, but organizations within the private sector will vary with regards to publicness as well.

The idea of "publicness" is relatively new and is therefore still subject to continuing methodological and theoretical critique (Jacobsen, 2019, p. 28). Rather than looking at external influences, however, one can understand publicness as the extent the organization subscribe to public values (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997, p. 338). Antonsen & Jørgensen (1997) uses such a classification to assess whether organizations in the Danish public sector are High or Low Publicness organizations, where High Publicness organizations are considered to place greater emphasis on public sector values than Low Publicness organizations (p. 341).

All in all, there seems to be many reasons why public organizations can be assumed to be different from private. While this thesis will approach the subject matter with the assumption that public and private organizations differ, bearing in mind that the assumption is disputed is important. If no effects of switching from a private firm to a public organization is found, it could suggest that the claim of differences is exaggerated. Therefore, studying sector switchers may add to the literature concerning private and public sector differences. Antonsen & Jørgensen's (1997) finding that the value subscription of the organizations is a sign of their publicness potentially informative factor, as it provides an additional measurable indicator of the publicness of an organization. The relationship between organizational values and the value of the individual will be examined in the theory chapter of this thesis. Firstly however, empirical evidence for the value differences of public and private sector values will be examined.

1.2.3. Public and private sector values

Since former work experience of the individual is expected to have effects on the behaviour in the current organization, and that the values of the former organization are expected to be socialized onto the individual, the idea of organizational culture is should be considered to be of some importance. The concept refers to that informal norms and values gradually emerge in an organization, which in the long run entails an institutionalization of certain values and modes of attitude and behaviour (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). With the emergence of organizational culture, an identity or personality is established for the organization, and institutionalized organizations can create a shared sense of purpose and meaning among the employees, which in turn can increase efficiency, since communication is simplified and the need for coordination is reduced (Christensen et al., 2018, p. 22). As the values of organizations in public and private organizations are deemed to be different, there is need to review what these differences consists of.

There is no overall consensus on how values on whether organizational values and values of individuals diverge (van der Wal et. al, 2006). Studies often measure the values of the organization based on data generated members of the organizations (Lyons, Duxbury & Higgins, 2005, van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuizen, 2008) which emphasizes the general uncertainty regarding this distinction. On the whole, it is generally assumed that the values of the organization will reflect in the individual (van der Wal, et.al, 2008). Therefore, the empirical information generated from survey analyses are assumed to be useful to identify the organizational values. Using survey data to measure organizational values may, however, also include some biases attributed to the demographic composition of the staff.

As we have established, the reasons for the presumed value divergence of the sectors are that organizations have different tasks to perform and different sources of financing. These factors are seen to be influencing the value subscription of organizations in both sectors. Therefore, financial aspects seem to be emphasized more in the private sector – studies have uncovered that the values of organizations in the private sector generally is more associated with innovation, cost-efficiency and customer orientation (van der Wal, et.al 2008). Some studies have, however, somewhat negated the view that customer-orientation is a distinctive private sector trait (Vandenabeele, 2018). Private sector employees also seem to more strongly emphasize personal economic factors in general, as monetary incentives have been shown to be more highly appreciated in this sector (Rainey & Chun, 2007, p. 94). Managers in private companies have also been shown to more strongly emphasize financial aspects than other members of staff (ibid.).

Public sector values, on the other hand, is seemingly less connected to values related to economics, and to a greater extent concerned with the tasks the organizations are set to do. Studies that do find differences between the sectors, hold that values connected to factors like openness, social responsibility, altruism and professional ethics are characteristics of organizations in the public sector (Vrangbæk, 2009; van der Wal, et. al 2006). Both public sector employees and managers have also found to display higher levels of altruism and to value meaningful work to a greater extent than private sector employees (Rainey and Chun, 2007, p.94). Thus, they have been shown to be more inspired by the opportunity to make a difference in society.

There are also studies which finds some explanations for demographical studies in general, but which do not find support the idea that sector association is a strong predictor of value subscription. In a study of Canadian employees in the public and private sectors, Lyons, et. al (2006) demonstrates that demographical variables such as gender, education and age are stronger predictors for values than sector association (p. 615). In this study, the claim that public sector employees are more altruistic than their private sector counterparts is largely rejected, and the only sector specific difference is that private sector employees are more emotionally attached to their place of work than those employed in the public sector. Jacobsen (2019) who compares public and private sector managers in Norway, also mostly attribute value differences to other demographical characteristics than sector association.

Others reject the notion of sharply dichotomizing private and public sector values. Van der Wal et al. (2006) seeks to avoid the problem of attributing values solely to one sector or the other by "ranking" values on a continuum from public to private, where middle categories are constructed that contains values attributed to both sectors. Here, central distinctly public values are considered to encompass values such as obedience, social justice, impartibility and transparency, while central private values include entrepreneurship and customer-orientation (van der Wal et al., 2006).

On the whole, there seems to be ample empirical evidence highlighting the different public and private sector values. A common theme seems to be that private sector values are more concerned with financial aspects, which is natural, as we know financial aspects are cited as one of the key reasons why one would expect differences between the sectors. There seems to be a general theme that public sector values are more concerned with the actual tasks they are set to do, as well as the procedures in which these tasks are performed and the potential societal impact of their jobs.

1.2.4. Sector switchers

Having examined the literature on differences between the sectors, I now turn to inspect the literature on sector switchers. As previously mentioned, the literature regarding sector switchers in Norway is quite scant, and therefore, I mostly rely on empirical research done from other countries. Firstly, I will examine the more general literature on sector switchers before moving on to the literature that researches literature on sector switchers and values.

The modern labour market is characterized by performance-based employment, career flexibility, and career trajectories which involves both different organizations and different types of organizations (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2008). This change in career dynamic is usually explained by technological advancement, global markets and increased competition, which facilitates the need for more flexible forms of organization. Hence, it is argued that these forces have generated a change in the "social contract" between employers and employees (Frederiksen & Hansen, 2014, p.1021). The relative job security of employers in both sectors is deemed to be weakened. In return, the employee can expect a reduction in the degree of loyalty shown towards the employer, or his or her employer organization (ibid.).

Because of the change in the labour market, it has been hypothesized that the number of sector switchers will increase (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). Research that examines the prevalence of sector switching has been a long-standing gap in the literature regarding sector switching worldwide (ibid.). However, in a study that attempts to fill this gap, Frederiksen & Hansen (2014), discovers that close to 20% of all job movement in Denmark cross sector borders (p. 1018).

Analyses of sector switchers are often tied to psychological and sociological explanations regarding value- or attitude formation, and how they affect later behaviour (Boardman, et.al, 2010, p. 51). The main idea is that there are residual effects, so-called «sector imprints» of the former work experience which will, to varying degrees and in various forms, manifest themselves in how the individual perceives the organization, and what values, prioritisation, and general modes of conduct individuals will rely on in their jobs (Chen, 2011, p. 322). For this reason, the people that switch into organizations in the public administration will be assumed to carry some of the distinctive mannerisms of the private sector into their role in the bureaucracy.

1.2.5. Who are the sector switchers?

If sector association is a predictor of the value subscription of individuals, finding out whether sector switchers have distinct characteristics is of interest, as potential confounding variables may be identified. If the switch of sectors is closely associated with some distinct feature, that feature rather than the private experience may influence value subscription. Therefore, it will be important to control for any such factors in the empirical analysis.

In a study on American sector switchers, Su & Bozeman (2009) finds that few demographic features are reliable predictors of people making the switch from private to public (or non-profit) sector (p. 1110). However, there are certain indications that occupational position is a meaningful indicator of sector switching, much more so than common demographical variables like gender or age. Managers and professional employees are deemed to have a higher probability of switching sectors, as well as "others" - a group mostly contains sales- and clerical workers (ibid.). They also find that managers have a higher probability of switching to the non-profit sector, rendering this the group most likely to switch sectors overall (ibid.). However, Frederiksen and Hansen (2014) nuances this view by finding evidence supporting that top managers are more unlikely than the average person to swich from private to public sectors, while middle managers are more likely than average (p. 1026). The job mobility of professional employees is also been demonstrated to be lower between private and public sectors than between private and non-profit sectors (Su & Bozeman, 2009, s. 1111).

Why individuals switch sectors is also of interest, as motivation is distinctly related to values (Rokeach, 1973, p. 14). Research regarding the motivation of sector switching is often based in Public Sector Motivation (PSM)-theory, a branch of research which relies on the assumption that some individuals are strongly motivated to work for the common good, and as a consequence, people with high levels of PSM will be more likely to seek employment, perform better in, and be more satisfied with jobs in public sector organizations (Vandenabeele, 2008, p.1090). Usually, PSM-related explanations assume that public sector employees possess higher degrees of pro-social motivation than their private counterparts (Boardman et al, 2010, p. 50). Research focusing on sector switchers has, however, provided little support to PSM-related explanations (Hansen, 2011, p. 595). Such explanations have, in fact, shown themselves to have more explanatory power regarding the type of job or company-specific characteristics, rather than explaining the motivation from a shift to private to public sector, or *vice versa* (ibid.). An illustrating example is provided by Apfel (2012), who finds through qualitative interviews that while sector switchers from private to public sector in the United States usually display some level of pro-social motivation, they are also highly critical towards governmental institutions (p. 297). As a consequence, the sector switchers in this study focus on egocentric motives, such as self-actualization and the desire to test themselves in new societal and organizational roles, rather than altruistic motives for switching sector (ibid.). Nevertheless, Hansen (2011) does find some support for PSM-related explanations in Denmark, such as that the aspiration of serving society is related to shifts to public sector, while the wish to deal more directly with customer is related to shifts to the private sector (p. 603).

Empirical research on egocentric motives for switching sectors have provided varying results. The opportunity for career advancement has often been cited as one of the key explanations for job mobility. Bozeman & Ponomariov's (2009) findings indicate that switching sector in the United States has a strong effect on promotions and the number of employees supervised, an effect that is seemingly strongest on private sector mangers switching to the public sector (p.89). Hence, they assume that switching sectors is directly related to the desire to shoulder greater responsibilities. That switching from private to public sector is related to career advancement is, however, a notion that is contested elsewhere – Su & Bozeman (2009) finds that career related effects on the switch from private to the non-profit sector are stronger than the switch from private to the public sector (p. 1111). Wage is seemingly a common motive from switching from public to private sector, as wage levels are expected to be equal to or higher in private sector than public (Fredriksen & Hansen 2014; Su & Bozeman, 2009; Hansen, 2011). Job security in public sector is presumed to be better and is for this reason often cited as a cause of switching sector (Hansen, 2011, p. 594). However, this explanation seems to be most relevant in countries with weaker job-protection laws such as in the United States (Su & Bozeman, 2009). Additionally, Su & Bozeman highlights that public organizations have focused on the recruitment of ethnical minorities and women to a greater degree than their private counterparts, which indicates that these demographical characteristics may affect switching patterns (p.1109).

The literature on sector switchers have not revealed any significant characteristics which explain who becomes a sector switcher, apart from the indication that the opportunity for promotions seems to be of consequence (Su & Bozeman, 2009; Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). It is still up for debate whether prosocial or egocentric motives are the better predictor for the switch from private to public employment. Therefore, I have no expectation of any singular demographic characteristic that affect which people become sector switchers. This is important, as I can expect that the main independent variable of interest in this thesis will not be affected by other variables, which reduces the likelihood of uncovering spurious relationships.

1.2.6. Sector switchers and values

Generally, sector switchers report that they face differences in organizational values when going from one sector to another (de Graaf & van de Wal 2008; Lapuente, et.al, 2020). Most pronouncedly, values concerning profitability, competition and customer-orientation are typically reported as noticeable differences between the sectors by sector switchers in the private sector, while a stronger focus on values such as legitimacy, lawfulness and impartiality are detected amongst sector switchers in the public sector (de Graaf & van de Wal 2008, p.97). At the same, the values experienced by sector switchers do vary by job-specific characteristics, which is in line with the expectations of the structural approach (Hansen, 2011, p. 595). Very little effort has gone into examine the effects of switching sectors on job satisfaction, however one noticeable exception in the United States finds that sector switchers from private to public sector overall experience low job satisfaction compared to “non-sector switchers” in public organizations (Boardman, et. al, 2010, p. 56).

Lapuente et. al. (2020) finds that despite the value differences between sectors, the individuals are able to adapt to the changes in their circumstances finds in a study on public sector managers in Europe, including Norway. Focusing solely on managers going from positions private to public sector, they find that these sector switchers retain their skills and emphasize managerial values to a greater degree than public managers without private sector experience (p. 614). However, they also find that the managers subscribe just as much to public values whether they are sector switchers or not, which suggests that the imprint of private sector values does not cause less subscription to public sector values (p. 615).

The literature regarding the value subscription of sector switchers seem to mostly agree with the general literature on public and private sector values. The main findings indicate that the sector switchers report sector specific values, and that these include a more general focus on the customers and market in the private sector, whilst the public sector values are more focused around the legitimacy and lawfulness of the tasks that are performed. However, Lapuente et al. (2020) finds some support that the socializing effects of public organizations are fairly strong when they find that sector switching managers subscribe equally as highly to public sector values as any other managers.

1.2.7. Summary

Demographic factors in general have been shown to have some effect on the conduct of public officials, however the extent of the effects is usually found to be determined by the capacity the organization has to socialize their members. However, the effects of different types of work experience are somewhat under-researched in the literature on the Norwegian public sector. Since work experience is reported as the most important factor when recruiting new members to the organizations in the state administration (Christensen et al., 2018), this constitutes an important gap in the accumulated knowledge on the Norwegian bureaucracy.

This thesis seeks to address this gap by examining the effect of sector switching. Previous studies on sector switchers have generally been more focused on understanding the differences between organizations in the public and private sectors, as well as discovering why people switch sectors than understanding how the experience from former work experience translates to roles in the other sector. It has not been shown that any specific demographic characteristic affects who becomes a sector switcher, so I have no clear expectation that any particular feature will have a marked effect on the analysis. On the other hand, as little effort has gone into studying sector switchers in Norway, little is known about the Norwegian sector switchers specifically.

2. Theoretical framework: Linking sector background, values and fit

In this chapter, the theoretical basis for the thesis is outlined. I start by outlining the theories of organizational demography and organizational structure, which are well-known theories for bureaucratic behaviour. That former work experience is the main independent variable of interest is an inherently demographical view. Thereafter, I explain the concept of values, and outline how values are expected to influence the performance of an individual in an organization. I argue that civil servants who has experience from the private sector will be less likely to subscribe to the same values as their non-sector switching colleagues, and that as a consequence, they will be less likely to fit into their respective organizations. This is deemed to be of consequence to the recruitment procedures of bureaucratic organizations, as recruiting bureaucrats from another sector could potentially lead to a lower performing staff. On the other hand, recruiting from the private sector could bring some new values and modes of operating into an organization. Finally, I discuss the theoretical basis for distinguishing core public sector values from private sector values.

2.1. Contending theories on the behaviour of bureaucrats

In this thesis, the values the individual bureaucrats are considered the predominant feature affecting their behaviour. However, the assumptions of how values are procured and the significance of different values in relation to the job the bureaucrats are asked to do differs with one's theoretical outlook. The following sections will therefore give an overview of the theories associated with organizational demography and organizational structure, and how these approaches relate the concept of values.

The role the organization plays in shaping their members is the subject of considerable and long-standing theoretical debate. Largely competing explanations of organizational behaviour are derived from three historical theoretical perspectives: organizations as open systems, organizations as natural systems, organizations as rational systems (Egeberg & Trondal, 2020,

p. 3). While all of these approaches have undergone comprehensive transformations over the years, they still retain their identifiable characteristics, as well as continuing to exhibit explanatory power (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018, p. 5). The open systems perspective is characterized by the postulation that organizational structures and processes are heavily influenced by forces external to the organization, and consequently has organizational demography as its dominant independent variable (Egeberg & Trondal, 2020; Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). The natural system perspective highlights the importance of organizational culture, while the rational systems approach regards the decision-maker's (formal) organizational position as the most important explanation of his or her actual decision-making behaviour. As this thesis is chiefly interested in how values are influenced by sector experience, organizational demography should be considered the main theoretical viewpoint.

2.1.1. Organizational demography

Organizational demography refers to the composition of an organizational unit in terms of its staff – where factors like age, gender, social and geographical background, education, previous work experience and length of service in the current organization is assumed to be reflected in the decision-making of the organization members (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 175; Christensen et. al, 2015, p.66). The main idea is that the members enter the organization with various predefined experiences that are transferred to their conduct in the organization. Hence, one expects that previous experiences, rather than social or hierarchical structures, provide guidelines for decision-making, prioritization and value subscription (Christensen et al., 2018).

An organizational demographic view lends itself to the idea of a representative bureaucracy. Since the organization is seen to reflect the demographic composition of the workforce, proponents of representative bureaucracy argue that the composition of the staff of public organizations should mirror the demographic composition of the public (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). Representativeness is considered important, as civil servants are representatives of the social group to which they belong, and therefore, the composition of the staff will have an effect on the citizens trust in the bureaucracy (ibid.). This thesis does not make any normative assumptions about the representativeness of public organizations. However, the theoretical argument that changes in the demographical composition of the workforce is expected to have an effect on the output is of interest, as it highlights that public managers can use recruitment as a tool to affect the policy output. This can be seen in relation to the concept of meta-governance, which highlights that processes may be organized to achieve specific goals (Egeberg & Trondal, 2020). The implication is that if one believes that demographic characteristics will affect policies in a particular way, one can use recruitment processes as an instrument to achieve this result.

Because of the perceived differences between sectors, it is assumed that sector switchers will emphasize different values than non-sector switchers in the performance of their duties. This will, view through the lens of organizational demography, make them behave differently than their colleagues. Therefore, managers should be aware of these differences when hiring new members of staff and must decide whether the influx of new values, skills, and prioritizations the sector switchers bring to the organizations are desirable or not.

2.1.2 Socialization

The idea that experiences matter for subsequent work values, is connected to the concept of socialization. Socialization is a lifelong and changing process whereby individuals grow into a community with others, and are integrated into this community (Bø, 2005, p. 63). The main point is that socialization happens because people imitate behaviour or attitude from their surroundings, which eventually contributes to people identifying with the values that are perceived to be significant for the environment to which the individual belongs. In due course, this will lead to internalization of values, attitudes and behaviour, to the extent that it becomes part of a personality (Bø, 2005, p.65).

While the individual is marked by earlier experience and influence, individuals can also undergo transitions into other value, behaviour or attitude patterns as a consequence of changes in roles, expectations, social codes, or situations (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). The fact that individuals can be re-socialized into other roles may be important for sector switchers, as bureaucrats who go from public to private sector can eventually adopt public values, which may mitigate any effects of sector change (ibid.). As a consequence, one can conjecture that the effects of the imprinting the bureaucrat has been subjected to in the private sector will likely decrease with the amount of time spent in public sector employment.

2.1.3. Organizational structure

Organizational structure can be understood as the formal structure of an organization, which contributes with a set of role expectations and provides employees with limited goals and considerations that should be emphasized, and specific interests that should be safeguarded (Christensen et al, 2015, p. 17). Therefore, the individuals position in the organization determines what kind of information this person will look for and be exposed to. This is in contrast to a demographical view, as one assumes that an organization member draws a line between their personal lives and their roles in the organization. Consequently, two different people in the same role in an organization is expected to respond in the same way to an order regardless of what their own personal attitudes to that order is (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). This perception of the bureaucratic role is in line with the expectations Weber (2000) has to the conduct of bureaucrats.

In order for the organizational position of the individual to have an effect on their decision-making, the organization has to moderate any potential effects of the personal background of its members. Lægreid & Olsen (1978) identifies three ways in which an organization does this Firstly, an organization or organizational unit may have a (re)socializing effect on the member. Secondly, an organization may have a disciplinary effect, where the behaviour of the individual is separated from their personal values, attitudes or identifications (p.74). Discipline is associated with the potential of promotions or other forms of rewards the organization can provide. Thirdly, the organization can control its members by selecting which proposals and decisions of the individual members are rejected or altered (p.75).

A key concept related to organizational structure is the notion of bounded rationality. The concept is a critical addition to the notion of rational actors and implies that both organizations themselves and the individuals in an organization have limited cognitive and cognitive capacity and will act on the basis of simplified models of reality (Simon, 1997; Jones, 2003). Factors such as time pressure and the limited capacity humans have for analysis and attention make it impossible for organization members to keep control of the multitude of conceivable alternatives, outcomes, strategies and goals. Thus, there will always be an element of selection present in decision-making processes, and organization members will have limited capacity to search for and digest, information from a wide array of sources (Simon, 1997; Christensen et. al, 2015, p. 17). The structure of the organizations contributes to a systematic and planned simplification of reality, which schematizes the bounded rationality of the individual in the organization by the formation of guidelines for the individual's behaviour and way of thinking (Christensen et. al, 2015).

Structural approaches lend themselves to a meritocratic recruitment perspective (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978; Christensen et. al, 2018). The theory regarding meritocratic recruitment highlights that skills and competences, rather than the demographical characteristics should be the guiding principle in recruiting public officials (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). Hence, apart from the skills and abilities, individual factors regarding the civil servants are considered to be of limited interest. Because of the (re)socializing effect through discipline and control the public organizations is deemed to have, it is expected that civil servants will be socialized into subscribing to the values and behaving according to their role (ibid.). The principle of meritocratic recruitment is considered to have a strong position in the Norwegian public administration today (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978; Christensen et. al, 2018).

Interestingly, the two perspectives highlighted here both emphasize the importance of socialization, but with widely different interpretations of its consequences. Whilst the demographic approach claim that socialization affects the bureaucrats' behaviour, the structural approach highlights the organization's capacity to re-socialize its members. Therefore, the research question of this thesis finds itself in the middle of this debate. Since various studies has found that sector specific values exist (van der Wal, et al. 2006; van der Wal, et.al, 2008; Vrangbæk, 2009), the sector switchers are assumed to have been socialized into subscribing to the values of the sector in which the person worked. Therefore, if any effects of earlier socialization are found, the thesis strengthens the claim that demographic approaches do wield explanatory power. However, if no differences in value subscription are found, the claim that the organizations in the public administration have a strong re-socializing effect on its members is strengthened, which would support the structural approach.

On the other hand, there may be some degree of interplay between the explanations emphasized by the two approaches. Structural features may have an influence on how much the demographical characteristics matters without discounting them completely. The recruitment structures itself may have an effect, as they filter access to civil servant roles (Peters, 2001). By shaping job descriptions and through conducting interviews, managers narrow the field of potential candidates, excluding prospective applicants on the basis of skills, education, seniority or work experience (as well as, in some cases, ethnicity, religion or gender) early on in the recruitment process (ibid.). Also, like the findings of Lapuente et al. (2020) suggest, sector switchers may be socialized into subscribing to private sector values, without abandoning the values they have already learnt. Such a finding would indicate that it is possible to use recruitment to bring new values and modes of into the organization, as well as rely on the re-socializing effect of the organization to make the sector switchers subscribe to public values as well.

2.2. The importance of values

2.2.1. What is a value?

The literature concerning values rest upon a broad and varied range of concepts and instruments, and as a consequence, the meaning and application of the term *value* is often confusing. Thus, a clarification of the term is needed in order to further progress this thesis. A value is, usually, understood to be the expression of something preferred, which in turn guides action (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5; Schwartz, 2007, p. 67). Hence, they can be understood as "principles or standards that play a certain role in the choice of action" (van der Wal et al, 2006, p. 318). Rokeach (1973) explains that a two-dimensional distinction between terminal and instrumental values exists, where values is either understood to refer to an end state of existence, or a means to achieve the desired outcome (p. 5). These distinctions are not mutually exclusive, as a value can be both terminal and instrumental. Each individual has an unspecified number of values that are constantly compared, and their importance are weighed in relation to one another (Schwartz, 2007, p. 67; Rokeach, 1973, p. 6) The outcome of these comparisons manifests themselves in the decisions and actions of the individual (Rokeach,

1973. p.13). However, values do not operate alone, it is the relative importance of several values at once that leads to attitudes and prioritizations, and as a consequence, actions (Shwartz, 2007, p. 67).

There is no consensus on whether organizational and individual values are analytically separate concepts (van der Wal et. al, 2006, p. 317). However, the conventional assumption is that an organization also has a set of values that affect the organizations' choice in action, prioritization and the formulation of goals (ibid.). Consequentially, organizational values will be henceforth be understood to be «principles that matters for organizational decision-making and behaviour» (van der Wal et. al, 2006, p. 317).

2.2.2. Person – environment and Person – organization fit

That the values of individuals matter for organizations is connected to the theories regarding *person-environment fit*. This branch of theory stems from interactional psychology, and at its core lies the assumption that people prefer to operate in environments that fits their own principles, values or preferences (Kristof-Browne, et al, 2006, p. 284; Vandenabeele, 2008, p. 1091). Hence, people fit into the environment in which they find themselves in varying degrees, and the level of fit can be observed if the value of the individual and the values of the environment is known (ibid.). As an extension of this idea, several forms of «environments» can be assumed to exist. Kristof-Browne et. al. (2006) provides an overview of these, which include person- vocation fit, person-organization fit, person-group fit, and person supervisor fit (p. 284).

As this thesis is primarily concerned with organizations, *person-organization fit* is the most relevant amongst these concepts and describes to what degree the individual fits the organization. Fit is in this context seen as both the overlap between the capabilities of the individual and the needs of the organization, and the value congruence between the person and organization (Petrovsky, James & Boyne, 2014, p. 220; Kristof-Browne et. al., 2006). The most important facet of this relationship is that people who greatly identify with the values of the organization, perform better in their organizational tasks. Hence, the values of the individual matter for the organization as they are expected to have higher levels of job satisfaction, stronger organizational commitment and more optimistic outlook on the future of the organization (Kristof-Browne et. al., 2006; Vandenabeele, 2008).

2.2.3. Publicness fit

As well as measuring a person's organizational fit, one can also argue that the person's fit with publicness can be observed. This is because publicness could be considered to be a distinct "environment", and hence the key assumption is that some individuals will perform better in organizations belonging to a certain sector. Drawing from Antonsen & Jørgensen's (1997) understanding of publicness, in which publicness is understood to refer to the organization's adherence to public values, one can also make the argument that a person's publicness fit can be measured by the degree to which the individual's values correspond to public values. Therefore, in accordance with the assumptions regarding person-environment fit, it can be assumed that public officials that have a high degree of value convergence with public values will perform better in their work than employees in public organizations with low such convergence.

Two main drawbacks with the concept of publicness must be observed. Firstly, the problem of identifying what separates public from private values is still up for debate, a question that will be handled in the subsequent section. Secondly, when one downplays the roles of ownership and financial aspects as the defining characteristics between organizations in the public and private sectors, the distinction between sectors becomes even further blurred, as the organizations in even the higher echelons of the bureaucratic hierarchy is expected to have varying degrees of publicness. (Antonsen & Jørgensen 1997, p.339, Vandenabeele, 2008, p. 1092). While government-owned organizations are considered public from a legal perspective, they are inherently different organizations that operates within different policy areas, on different hierarchical levels, under different supervisors and in (mostly) different locations. Antonsen & Jørgensen (1997) separates different Danish public organizations into "High Publicness" and "Low Publicness"- organizations based on the organizations' environmental properties, the nature of relations between organization and environment, and intra-organizational properties, where High Publicness-organizations by definition subscribe more strongly, and to a greater degree to several public sector values (p. 339). Low publicness organizations, on the other hand, subscribe to a lesser degree to public sector values, and therefore, one may assume that the sector switchers going to a High Publicness Organization will encounter more substantial differences than sector switchers moving to a Low Publicness Organization.

However, Antonsen & Jørgensen's (1997) classifications of public sector organizations are not in itself transferrable to the Norwegian central administration. Their analysis consists of a broader scope of public organizations, while core governmental departments are omitted (p.339). Indeed, the degree to which the organization is influenced by its parent ministry is one of the variables separating high and low publicness organizations (p.343). The organizations in the central administration should be considered different from other public other public organizations, because as they work closely with the government, they are components of the nations' executive powers (Christensen et al. 2018). Therefore, the organizations in the central administrations are not only dictated by public authority, they also have the capacity and position to influence it. As their position within the public hierarchy is high, one can expect the degree of publicness of these organizations to be correspondingly so.

While the organizations in the central administration represent the uppermost levels of the public hierarchy, they also represent different hierarchical levels, and has different roles to play when it comes to policy formulation and implementation(Christensen et.al, 2018). Thus, the level of publicness in the organization is expected to vary with its position in the bureaucratic hierarchical level. This has implications for sector switchers, as environment the sector switcher transitions to is expected to vary with the publicness of the organization.

The notion of publicness fit in relation to recruitment is an interesting one. Because the performance of the civil servant is expected to be conditional upon their value subscription, one can surmise bringing in sector switchers is would be disadvantageous for the organizations in the public administration, if viewed through a demographical lens. Therefore, a recruitment strategy based on demographical principles could potentially discourage hiring sector switchers. If viewed through a structural lens, however, the effects of the former work experience of the bureaucrat are expected to be mitigated by the socializing power of the organization.

2.2.4. Hypothesized relationship

Thus far, we have established why the fit of the individual matter for organizational performance, and that the fit of the individual may be viewed as the value congruence between the individual and the organizational values. Sector experience is expected to matter, as the sector switchers are subjected to socialization in their previous jobs. The experiences they are imprinted with are hence transferred to other jobs in later careers. However, the effects of these experiences are expected to vary with the publicness of the bureaucratic organization to which individual switches. Figure 1 shows this theoretical framework.

Figure 1: Hypothesized relationship between sector experience, values and fit



2.3. Public sector values

While there exists a sizable literature of what private sector and public sector values are, few has ventured to create a wholesome framework encapsulating it. As a consequence, large portions of the literature regarding value differences consists of conventional assumptions, normative statements and suppositions founded in varying degrees of empirical or theoretical basis.

Max Webers' ideas of bureaucratic ethics is largely considered to be relevant today. Weber considered bureaucracy to be of the utmost importance (and indeed, an inevitability), as he claimed it was efficient and calculable, and therefore a rational mean of exercising authority (Weber, 2000; Sager & Rosser, 2009). The ideal type he outlines serves as a checklist for the archetypical bureaucracy. Rational public administration should be based on written rules, an impersonal order, and a clear hierarchical structure and division of labour. Appointments to the bureaucracy should be based on merit, rather than heritage, which underlines a focus on professional expertise. Mainly therefore, the values of Weber's ideal bureaucracy could be said to encompass meritocracy, discipline, obedience, impersonality, expertise, and, by default, efficiency (Sager & Rosser, 2009, p. 1137).

Weber's ideal type have been described as general, meaning that he did not explicitly set out the values he thought was most needed (Höpfl, 2006). However, the values associated with the Weber's ideal bureaucracy are largely influential in the Norwegian bureaucracy today. In 2019, the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (KMD) released a leaflet on the relationship between political leadership and the civil service, highlighting seven key "duties" for the civil service (KMD, 2019). These duties, which were formulated by the aid of both political and civil service managers as well as public administration scholars, are meant to serve as general principles intended to guide public officials' decision-making. Remembering that van der Wal et al. (2016) defined values as "principles or standards that play a certain role in the choice of action" (p. 318), one can infer that the seven duties are the key values that the Norwegian central administration. The seven duties were listed thus: 1) legality, 2) truth, 3) loyalty, 4) professionalism and professional independence, 5) party-political neutrality and objectivity, 6) transparency, 7) good public governance and management (KMD, 2019). Additionally, democracy, the rule of law, professional integrity, and efficiency are all cited as core public values by the KMD (ibid.).

However, while the seven duties are assumed to be the primary sources guiding the decision making of public officials, they may not always work in harmony. The guiding principles are habitually in conflict with one another, and therefore, subscribing to one may mean failing another (Jacobsen, 1960). Therefore, the duties frequently create dilemmas for bureaucrats.

Most notably, loyalty (understood as loyalty to the political leadership) is considered to be frequently in conflict with both professional independence and (party-) political neutrality, particularly in the ministries which serves as secretariats for the political leadership (ibid.). As a consequence of these conflicts, bureaucrats are regularly required to balance the relative importance of different duties. Remembering that values are characterized by how each value is weighed in relation to others (Schwartz, 2007, p. 67; Rokeach, 1973, p. 6), the argument that the seven duties should be seen as bureaucratic values is strengthened.

While the seven duties should be considered to be the public values that are the most important for bureaucrats, they are not necessarily exclusive for the bureaucracy. Indeed, as van der Wal et. al (2006) suggest, individuals employed in the private and public sectors may therefore have a set of values they adhere to in equal measures. In order to assess the value subscription of each sector, one must isolate which of the organizational values are shared, and which ones are exclusive to each sector. Otherwise, the empirical findings may suffer from biases, as I may attempt to measure differences in value subscriptions that theoretically should not be present.

Legality is understood as a key public value as public officials acting within the limits of the law is a necessity for the legitimacy of a state governed by law (KMD, 2019). Legality is also generally considered to be an important public sector ideal by politicians, however the literature in general has not provided a lot of insight into this (van der Wal, et. al, 2006, p.346). Principles of legality and lawfulness are frequently cited as important for public officials in the literature (de Graaf & van de Wal 2017, p.97). Van der Wal, et. al (2006) do not find any particular evidence that legality (or lawfulness) is strongly attributed to the private sector. Therefore, legality is recognised as a distinctive public sector value.

Loyalty is often cited as a key bureaucratic value however, it is also commonly understood as a key private value (van der Wal, et.al, 2006) Therefore, loyalty in itself should not be considered to belong to one sector specifically. However, while loyalty for private companies usually denotes allegiance to the manager or the firm, loyalty in the public sector usually refers to the sitting government and the political leadership (Jacobsen, 1960). Employees in private companies do not need to pay much attention to signals from publicly elected leaders into account. Therefore, loyalty, understood as loyalty to the elected political leaders, is considered an inherently public value.

The duty of truth refers to the notion that public organizations should not spread incorrect information (KMD, 2019). Elsewhere in the literature, this is often referred to as honesty or truthfulness (de Graaf & van de Wal 2017; van der Wal et. al, 2008). While Lyons et al (2005) links ethical values like honesty to the public sector, and de Graaf & van de Wal, 2017) suggests that the focus on profit in private businesses can be at odds with the value of honesty, the empirical basis for claiming that truth is a distinct public value is scant (ibid.) This leads van der Wal et. al (2008) to characterize truth as a distinct private value, rather than a public one. Therefore, truth is not considered to be a value specific to the public sector.

Professionalism and professional independence mean that civil servants must rely on professional standards or criteria, and do not take (party)-political considerations into account when it collects facts (KMD, 2019). Therefore, this can be seen as being somewhat similar to the value labelled party-political neutrality and objectivity. Mainly, the difference between the two is that professionalism is more general, whereas the latter is a more explicit nod to the Weberian bureaucratic ideal of neutrality. These values can be seen as equivalents of the “expertise”, “integrity” and “impartiality” components van der Wal et. al. (2006) attribute to public values, and professional ethics as outlined by Lyons, et al (2005). Since bureaucracy is expected to be different with regards to the tasks which are performed, it is therefore assumed that the professional standards are different in organizations in the bureaucracy and in private organizations. Moreover, professional ethics is often cited as a distinct public value in the literature (Vrangbæk, 2009). Therefore, professionalism and professional independence is considered a public value.

The value of transparency can refer to internal or external transparency. By external transparency, it is usually meant that the public policy processes should be available and easy to see through for the public. However, transparency in the bureaucratic sense refers to the internal transparency between the government and the ministries and their affiliated directorates. This conception of transparency is important as forms the basis of trust between the bureaucracy and the government (KMD, 2019). Therefore, the value addresses the relationship between government and bureaucracy, and is hence a solely public value.

The final public value highlighted by the Norwegian government is good public governance and management. This is a very general value which definitive meaning is somewhat unclear, but it should be seen as comparable to efficiency. How one understands efficiency, however, is neither obvious nor definite. The KMD summarizes it as being comparable to various effectiveness criteria, but to not extrapolate on how these should be considered in comparison to one another. Efficiency and the use of management tools to achieve efficiency is also an aspect that is usually tied to the private sector (van der Wal, et.al 2008). Hence, good governance and management is not considered an inherently public value.

There are striking resemblances between the items highlighted as resembling Weber's ideal bureaucracy and the Norwegian central administrations' seven duties. However, as these values are meant to guide civil servants in the ministries and its affiliated directorates, it may be unrealistic to expect that others employed in the public sector should subscribe to this set of values. As the focus of this thesis is the bureaucrats in the central administration, this should not matter much for the outcomes of my forthcoming analysis, but such a narrow conceptualization of public sector values could have implications for generalizations to public organizations outside the formal bureaucracy.

Therefore, I reiterate that I understand public values in this thesis to mean bureaucratic values. In order to assess the differences between private and public sector values I exclude the values that are expected to be shared between the public and the private, as there is no reason to expect that the subscription to these will be reliant upon sector experience. With these confines in mind, the purely public sector values in this thesis are understood to be legality, loyalty to the elected government, (bureaucratic) professionalism and professional independence (including party-political neutrality), and transparency. As sector switchers are assumed not to be socialized into adhering to these values in the same degree as non-sector switchers, it is expected that they do not subscribe to these values. Hence, hypothesis H1 is formulated thus:

H1) Sector switchers in the public administration are less likely to subscribe to public sector values than non-sector switchers.

2.4. Private sector values

Amongst of the main reasons for the presumed value divergence of the sectors is that organizations have different tasks to perform, different sources of financing, and that private organizations have private owners rather than being owned by the public (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Jacobsen 2019). While such classifications include oversimplifications, and only to a limited degree embrace the complexities of separating what characterizes organizations in the different sectors and their implications, this serves as a starting point for understanding the key mechanisms suggested to create value differences (Rainey & Chun, 2007). As the organizations in the public administration are core governmental institutions, the differences between the sectors are expected to be more pronounced than they would be between private organizations and public organizations with service delivery functions that are closer to the citizens.

Following the arguments of the economical approach to sector differences, there are reasons to believe that the financing will influence sector values. That private sector organizations are forced to operate on the open market, and therefore must follow to market logic, means that these organizations are reliant on being financially self-sufficient (Boyne, 2002). Additionally, owners of private companies often pursue financial profit, whereas the state gains its revenue from taxation (van der Wal et. al, 2006). Thus, private sector employees are expected socialized into adhering to profitability to a much greater extent than public sector employees, and consequently, sector switchers are assumed subscribe to this value to a greater extent than public sector employees. Hence, profitability is considered to be a distinct private sector value.

Organizations in the private sector is also usually considered to emphasize innovativeness and entrepreneurship to a greater extent than organizations in the public sector (Lapuente, et. al, 2020). This is because the private firms are operating in competitive markets, and therefore the need for continuous invention and reinvention of strategies, products, and staff is higher. Public sector organizations, on the other hand, are secluded from the market and as a consequence do not have any direct competition from similar businesses (Boyne, 2002). Additionally, the frequent turnover of top officials in public organizations is sometimes said to hamper the scope for innovativeness and change (Rainey & Chun, 2007). This is expected to lead to higher focus on innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour.

The competitiveness of the market is also expected to lead to private sector organizations having a greater emphasis on customer orientation than their public counterparts. Because the primary source of revenue for private firms comes from the market, they are reliant on getting profitable contracts and/or marketing and selling their products (van der Wal, et. al, 2006). Thus, they are required to continuously pay attention to the needs and wishes of their customers. While elected public officials also needs to focus on their constituents, bureaucrats are not usually thought to emphasize the wishes of the public to the same degree, as their loyalties are supposed to be directed towards their leaders (ibid.). Therefore, sector switchers are assumed to be emphasize customer-orientation to a greater extent than their non-sector switcher colleagues.

However, the private sector values hitherto outlined are not expected to be the only values subscribed to by private organizations. Critics of bureaucracy, such as advocates of New Public Management-related reforms and/or post-bureaucratic ideals, have often criticised the bureaucracy for being inefficient (Höpfl, 2006). However, as Weber construed his ideal bureaucracy as an efficient and rational way of managing public sector, efficiency should not be seen as explicitly a private or public value. Hence, while efficiency is certainly important for organizations in both sectors, it should not be considered a core value singular to one sector or the other.

Based on the arguments above, I understand values that are distinctly private to include profitability, innovativeness, entrepreneurship and customer-orientation. As sector switchers are presumed to be imprinted with these values during their tenure in a private sector organization, these values are not assumed to be shared by non-sector switchers. Thus, hypothesis H2 is formulated as follows:

H2) Sector switchers in the public administration are more likely to subscribe to private sector values than non-sector switchers.

2.5. Former work experience

It is traditional in human capital theory to conceptualize professional skills as being two-dimensional, where an individual has a set of occupational skills and a set of skills specific to the firm in which the person works (Shaw, 1984). Occupational skills and abilities are transferrable to across employers, whereas firm-specific skills need to be learnt upon entry to an organization (ibid.). It is assumed that new members of staff in the organizations in the public administration must acquire some new skills and competences when assuming their new role (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Petrovsky et.al, 2014). The change of careers is therefore assumed to reduce the applicability of their occupational skills, because switching to a position in the higher levels of civil service is considered to limit the way in which sector switchers can utilize the competences gained through their former professions.

The competences that are required in the bureaucracy differ from the ones in the private sector, as the bureaucratic profession contains elements of role conflicts. Public officials are subjected to signals from both elected officials and administrative managers, while simultaneously have a professional role (Jacobsen, 2019; Jacobsen, 1960). As the duties of the bureaucracy is considered analogous to public values, the ranking of which values that matters in a given context is considered an occupational skill of the bureaucracy. Entangling the role conflict that the bureaucratic career entails is therefore assumed an ability that may be difficult to learn without experience from the public sector. The relevance of former professional skills of the sector switchers therefore decreases, and as a consequence, sector switchers are assumed to be capable to draw on their former work experience that non-sector switchers. This is important, as the former work experience is considered the most important factor in recruitment to the bureaucracy (Christensen et al, 2018). If the former work experience of sector switchers cannot be utilized to the same extent, hiring sector switchers to organizations in the bureaucracy may be disadvantageous. Investigating whether the former work experience of sector switchers is of relevance to them in their bureaucratic role is therefore of relevance. Hypothesis H3 is therefore formulated as follows.

H3) Sector switchers in the central administration are less likely to draw on their former work experience than non-sector switchers.

2.6. Summary

The core assumption of this thesis is that sector switchers bring new skills and modes of operating, as well as a distinct set of values that are unique for the private sector into their roles as civil servants. As value convergence between the individual and the organization is expected to impact the performance of the individual in the organization, this is assumed to influence the overall performance of the organizations in the public administration, and therefore, the quality of the public governance. If sector switchers are found to rely less on their former work experience and subscribe less strongly to public sector values, the argument can be made that it is unadvisable to recruit staff from private organizations to positions in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, if some of the values attributed to the private sector is required in the bureaucratic organization, so long as the bureaucrat is subscribing to the set of values that characterizes the public sector as well. On the basis of this, three hypotheses were formulated.

H1) Sector switchers in the public administration are less likely to subscribe to public sector values than non-sector switchers.

H2) Sector switchers in the state administration are more likely to subscribe to core private values than non-sector switchers

H3) Sector switchers in the state administration are less likely to draw on their former work experience than non-sector switchers.

3. Methods and data

3.1. Data – The Survey of State Administration

In order to answer the research question, this thesis relies upon the Survey of State Administration 2016. This survey is a continuation of four former studies concerning the Norwegian state administration, which has been conducted since 1976 (NSD, Lægreid, Christensen, Egeberg, & Trondal, 2016). The purpose of the study is to increase knowledge about the state administration, both for the affiliated organizations themselves and the broader society. A key goal is that increasing knowledge will help maintaining and fashioning the quality of public governance. The 2016-version was financed and executed by the University of Oslo, with the collaboration of the University of Bergen and the University of Agder. The technical execution was handled by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). The survey consists of two related, yet separate parts; The Ministry survey and the Agency survey where the respondents are bureaucrats in the ministries and the agencies, respectively.

As individuals are the research object of this thesis, it is natural to rely on survey data as surveys are in essence, large-N interviews (Blair, Czaja & Blair, 2014). In conducting a survey, a (ordinarily) random sample is drawn from a defined population, providing the researcher with a representative sample. The data generated from the sample can be used to generalize to the larger population (ibid., p. 2).

The population of the Ministry survey is defined as all employees in the Norwegian ministries in advisor (*rådgiver*) positions and above who have at least spent one year of service in the ministry. All the members in the population were invited to participate in the study. The population of the Agency Study is defined to be all employees in an agency or other organizations in the state administration apart from the ministries, on a caseworker (*saksbehandler*) or managerial level with at least one year of tenure in the organization. Every third member in the organization were invited to participate. The study was implemented as a self-administered web-based questionnaire, where the invited participants were encouraged to join through notices on the organization's intranet with recommendations from the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation (NSD, 2016).

The utility of statistical methods relies on the data available (Moses & Knutsen, 2013, p. 93). As this thesis relies on one of the most comprehensible surveys regarding public officials in a single country there is (Christensen et al. 2018), the minor shortcomings with regards to representativity is largely outweighed by the advantages. One potential pitfall, however, is that the number of responses decline the further one progresses into the survey, meaning that many respondents have abandoned the survey before completion (Christensen, et. al 2018). This could pose problems, as most of the background variables, which includes question regarding work experience, age, gender and education, were located in the latter parts on the questionnaire. However, Christensen et al (2018) finds no systematic tendencies in the absences, which means that the representativity of the study is not considered to be compromised (p.24).

The two surveys overall generated a total amount of 7162 answers. For both studies, the percentage of responses were close to 60 % for the revised population, which gave a total percentage of 59.8 %. Table 1 provides an overview of responses and withdrawals for each of the surveys, as well as the overall study. As related studies from other countries studies are usually considered to have response rates ranging from 20% to 40%, one can assume that this study is more representative than what is usual in studies on public officials (Christensen et. al, 2018, p. 24) The representativity is thus assumed to be acceptable. Having assessed the sampling and response rates, I now proceed to the operationalization of the variables I use in order to address my hypotheses.

Table 1: Response rates for the Survey of State Administration

Survey	Forms sent	Excluded from population	Revised population	Total responses	Percentage of responses
Ministry	3945	83	3862	2322	60,1
Directorate	3415	115	3300	1963	59,5
Total	7360	198	7162	4285	59,8

(*Source: NSD, 2016, https://www.nsd.no/polsys/forvaltning/sentraladm2016.html*).

3.2. Operationalizations

In order to test the hypotheses of the thesis, it is required that the central concepts of the thesis are operationalized. Operationalization can be explained as a way of connecting theoretical concepts to practically measurable data (Adcock & Collier, 2001. s. 529). By operationalizing a term, one moves it from the systematic concept to measurable indicators. The precision of the operationalization is of vital importance for the validity of the thesis (ibid.).

3.2.1. Public sector values

As explained in the previous chapter, core public values have in this context been understood to mean the core values of the state administration that deviates from private sector values. In order to measure this concept, I rely on survey items under the heading of "How much do you emphasize each of the following considerations in performing your duties?[1]". As I have defined values as "principles or standard that guides action, the question in this survey item is seen to approach the concept of values most closely. In the theory chapter, I identified the values of legality, transparency, loyalty and professionalism and professional neutrality as the core public values which are distinctive from private sector values. Four survey items can be used to measure these three aspects: "Professional considerations" and "appropriate case management" is used to measure professionalism and professional neutrality. As I understood loyalty as being loyal to the current political management, the variable "signals from the political leadership" is used to measure loyalty. The variable "attention to openness and access" is used to measure the value of transparency. If bureaucrats subscribe to these values, they are likely to achieve good publicness fit, and therefore, perform better in the organization. There are no variables measuring the focus on legal proceedings included in the survey, so this value is omitted from the study. However, it can be argued that the variable "appropriate case management" also include legality, as appropriate handling of cases should include adhering to formal laws. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, legality should not be considered to be measured in this thesis.

[1] The questions and answer categories are here translated from Norwegian, meaning that there may be some nuances in the phrasing that are lost. The link to the survey questionnaire itself can be found in the appendix.

The survey items in this section are made up of unipolar scales ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Very important” and 5 denotes “Not at all important”. A “don’t know”/ “no opinion” category is not included, which usually gives a higher number of relevant responses than survey items where such a category is included (Blair et al. 2012, p. 201). However, researchers are divided on whether forcing the respondent to choose an answer category yields more valid answers (ibid., p.202). The survey items are identical in the Directorate survey and the Ministry survey.

Because a combination of values makes up this variable, I combine the survey items into a single variable. Cronbach’s alpha, which measure of inter-rate reliability, is 0.46 and is therefore below the commonly accepted value (Hair et. al, 2014, p. 90). However, as Cronbach’s alpha increases with the number of items, there are discussions on whether this measure should be used when the number of items is small, so that the mean inter-item correlation should be used instead. The mean inter-item correlation is 0.202, which places it within the optimal range of 0.2 to 0.5 (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). The overall measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) is 0.63, well above the accepted limit of 0.5 (Hair et. al, 2014, p.103), with all of the items exceeding this limit as well. Therefore, I am somewhat satisfied that the items which make up the index are empirically connected as well as theoretically.

Constructing indexes is common when analysing complex terms, such as values or attitudes (Converse & Presser, 2003, p. 45). It is customary to assume that scales overcome defects of single questions, as the compilation of multiple variables makes influences unique to single questions have less impact on the overall measure. While effects of question wording or form can still influence the overall result, especially in dense survey categories such as the items selected here, the creation of a scale will mitigate some of the challenges with measuring values (ibid.). As the scales of the survey items are equal and the scores therefore standardized, I create a linear additive index. The advantage of using such an index is that each survey item weighted equally (Christophersen, 2013, p. 105). Thus, I get an approximation of a metric scale ranging from 0 to 20, which measures subscription to core public values as the concept understood in this thesis. The scale is reversed, so that 20 denotes the maximum score, and 0 the minimum.

Figure 2: Public value subscription amongst Norwegian public officials (n=3432)



An overview of the descriptive statistics for this variable can be found in Table 4. As one can see, the distribution is highly skewed to the left (-1.96), indicating that bureaucrats in general subscribe highly to public sector values. This impression is strengthened by high mean and median values of 13.9 and 14 respectively. In order to assess the differences between the scores of sector switchers and non-sector switchers on this variable, I dichotomize the variable so that scores over the mean equals 1, and mean scores or lower are coded as 0. The fairly similar mean and median values means that the choice on which measure to dichotomize the variable over is thought to be of little consequence. With a dichotomized variable, I can calculate the likelihood that a sector switcher will subscribe more than average on public sector values. If the likelihood that a sector switcher subscribe above averagely to public sector values is lower than for non-sector switchers, I would find that private sector experience leads to a lower chance of subscribing to public values than other bureaucrats, and therefore, they have lower chances of achieving good publicness fit. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of bureaucrats subscribing above and below averagely to public sector values

Figure 3: Frequency of public officials who subscribe above averagely to public sector values



3.2.2. Private sector values

Core private values, as distinguished from core public values, are here understood to be productivity, customer-orientation and innovativeness. These are measured using three survey items in the category “how much do you emphasize each of the following considerations in performing your duties?”. The survey items suffer, therefore, from the same shortcomings as the variables used in operationalizing public sector values. Productivity is measured using the survey item “cost-efficiency/productivity”, whereas innovativeness is measured using the item “Renewal and change”. Customer orientation is measured using the survey item “signals from users, clients, and particularly affected groups in society”, as the “customers” of organizations in the bureaucracy is considered to be the people affected by specific policies.

Similar to the core public values variable, I use these survey items to create a linear additive index. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.58, and therefore not satisfactory (Hair et.al, 2014). However, the mean inter-item correlation is 0.3, well within the optimal range of 0.2 to 0.5. The overall MSA is 0.6, and the MSA for each item exceeds the limit of 0.5 as well (ibid.), meaning that I am fairly satisfied that the items are empirically connected.

The private sector values-index ranges from 0 – 15, where 0 represent no subscription to core private values, and 15 represents the maximum amount of subscription to core private values. Figure 4 represents the distribution of the answers. Descriptive statistics for this variable can be found in Table 2. The distribution of this variable is somwhat left skewed (-54), implying that bureaucrats, in general, subscribe somewhat highly to private sector values.

Figure 4: Private value subscription amongst Norwegian public officials (n=3438)



I choose to dichotomize this variable as well, so that I calculate the likelihood of subscribing above averagely to private sector values. As mean and median values hardly differ (8.67 and 9, respectively), it is unlikely that the choice between the two will have a significant impact on the distribution (see Table 2). The distribution of bureaucrats subscribing above and below averagely is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Frequency of public officials who subscribe below and above averagely to private sector values



3.2.3. The importance of former work experience

The Survey of State Administration 2016 contains a variety of survey items asking the bureaucrats what experiences they draw on, formulated thus: "How important are the following factors in order to understand your priorities, actions etc. in the job situation?". The question is followed by a range of demographic explanations, including "former work experience", where the respondents are asked to answer the question on a five-point unipolar rating scale, with the labels "Very important", "Somewhat important" "Both [important] and [unimportant]", "Somewhat unimportant", "Most unimportant".

Some hold that it is problematic to draw substantial inferences from scales containing only five possible answer categories (Schaffer & Presser, 2003, p.77) The distinctions between mutually exclusive categories can be confusing for the respondents, and as a consequence, answers may vary with the individual's perception of what a specific category cover. That the respondents are forced to define the distinctions themselves is assumed to impact the reliability and validity of the findings (Converse & Presser, 2003, p. 38). The accuracy of the answers is expected to increase with the amount of response categories options, and reliability of individual rating scales is said to increase as the number of categories grows, up to seven or nine categories (Schaffer & Presser, 2003, p.77). Therefore, five answer categories are deemed to be somewhat less than what is optimal. Bearing these shortcomings of the survey item in mind, I proceed to examine the variable itself.

With regards to my hypotheses, the variable “former work experience” is considered to be the most important, as it aids in answering hypothesis H1. The variable is dichotomized so that the score of 1 includes the respondents who answered that former work experience was “somewhat important” or “very important”, and the other answers are coded as 0. This is done because the threshold between those who report that work experience does matter for their priorities and actions is important, and those who report that it is less important is the most substantially interesting. Additionally, because the variable is ordinal with few levels, treating it as metric is potentially problematic, as linear regression models assumes interval- or ratio level variables (Christophersen, 2013, p.36).

Figure 6 shows the distribution of those who report former work experience to be somewhat or very important in the performance of their duties. A large majority (over 70%) of the public officials report that they find former work experience to be somewhat or very important, which further emphasize the importance of work experience for a career in the bureaucracy.

Figure 6: Frequency of public officials reporting they find work experience less than somewhat and at least somewhat important.



3.2.4. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for continous dependent variables (prior to dichotomizing)

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD	Skewness	Kurtiosis	NA
Public sector values	3432	13.9	14	0	16	1.94	-1.47	3.97	853
Private sector values	3438	8.67	9	0	12	2.02	-0.54	0.54	847

Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Public sector values (dichotomized)

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Below average	1171	209	24.9%	
Above average	2261	365	21.6%	
Total	3438	574	22.7%	1592

**) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n = 2522)*

Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Private sector values (dichotomized)

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Below average	1500	212	19.2%	
Above average	1938	359	24.6%	
Total	3432	574	22.6%	847

**) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n total = 2525)*

Table 5: Descriptive statistics: Former work experience

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Less than somewhat important	1009	146	20.5%	

Somewhat or very important	2367	430	23.4%	
Total	3376	574	22.6%	909

**) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n total = 2577)*

3.2.5. Independent variable: Private sector experience

As I endeavour to examine the possible effects of sector switching, private sector experience is predictably the independent variable of most interest in this thesis. The Survey of State Administration contains two variables that could be used to shed some light on the effects of sector switching. The first one covers recent sector switchers, where the respondents are asked what sort of organization, they worked in before their current organization in the state administration. These survey items are formulated differently in the Ministry and the Directorate surveys. The formulation for the ministry survey is: “Did you come to this ministry (including the ministry as it was prior to any separation or merging) from:...”, followed by a list of selectable alternatives. The survey item for the directorate survey is formulated as: “Did you come from the current (central administrative) unit from:…”, followed by the list of alternatives. The second survey item asks the respondents what type of organization they have been employed in the longest, formulated thus: “If you have former work experience, in which of these types have you worked the longest?”.

The answer categories differ slightly to suit the hierarchical level of the organization the respondent works in[2]. In this context the variation is deemed to be of no consequence as the alternatives representing private sector experience are the same for both surveys. The answer categories for the two different survey items are also identical for the two variables. The categories which measure private sector experience are formulated thus: “Business organizations” and “Private/semi-public companies”. That the latter alternative includes semi-public organizations is potentially problematic, as what is considered to be semi-public may be confusing or unclear in the eyes of the respondent. However, as the Norwegian government owns shares in a number of large Norwegian companies, and as the other

[2] The list of selectable answer categories is not included here, as it is fairly long. However, links to the questionnaire and variable descriptions are provided in the appendix.

categories include a variety of other public organizations, the chances of misinterpretations altering the results in a meaningful way is considered to be rather small.

Both of the variables could potentially provide valuable insights, however, the emphasis on socialization as an important factor in generating value subscription makes the former less applicable. Because I do not know the length of the respondent's tenure in the former job. As a consequence, there is no way of knowing how long the bureaucrats have been subjected to socialization processes in their former workplace. The latter survey item partly mitigates this complication. While there is no way of ascertaining how long the respondent was in their former position, it is at least established where they have been the longest, and as a consequence, where they are expected to have been subjected to socialization processes for the most amount time.

The arguments above suggest that the survey item measuring long tenure in the private sector is a better indicator than the survey item which measures recent private sector experience. However, the potential pitfalls with choosing one above the other is partly mitigated by the fact that the two items are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.67, which indicates a somewhat strong correlation, and is significant at $p<0.01$. This suggests that choosing one over the other is unlikely to yield significantly different results.

Hence, I choose to operationalize bureaucrats with private sector experience as the bureaucrats who reports that they have been employed in business organizations or in private and/or semi-public organizations for the most amount of time in their careers. These respondents are coded as 1 and the remaining respondents are coded as 0. Figure 7 shows the distribution of sector switchers versus non-sector switchers in the Norwegian state administration, as the term is operationalized here. As one can see, 581 of the 2587 (22.5%) of the respondents are sector switchers, meaning that a little over one in five of the civil servants in the Norwegian state administration have private sector experience the way it is operationalized here.

Figure 7: Frequency of sector switchers and non-sector switchers



3.2.6. Contextual variable: Organization

In the theory section of this thesis, I explained that various features of the organization are expected to influence its members. It is necessary to control for the organizational context in which the bureaucrats work as the organizations may be more or less public, and therefore, sector swichers are expected to fit more easily into one organization than another. At the time this survey was administered, there were 16 ministries and 47 agencies in the state administration, giving a total number of 63 distinctive organizations.

Since the organizations are different in terms of their hierarchical position, location, organizational culture, and the tasks they perform, they are not only expected to influence their members differently but may also be recruiting new members from different societal groups. Therefore, it is to be expected that the number of sector switchers fluctuates between the organizations.

Table 6 is a frequency table of sector switchers in the various organizations in the state administration. The names of the organizations are in Norwegian[3]. The frequency table is

[3] A list of ministries and their affiliated bodies' names in English may be found at: https://www.nsd.no/polsys/data/en/forvaltning/departement

ranked from highest to lowest by percentage of sector switchers, for the Ministry survey and the Directorate survey respectively.

Table 6: Frequency table of sector switchers in the organizations in the Survey of State Administration 2016

Organization	Sector switchers	Respondents total	Percentage of sector switchers
Ministries			
Arbeids - og velferdsdirektoratet	19	71	26,8 %
Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet	28	110	25,5 %
Utenriksdepartementet	65	297	21,9 %
Kulturdepartementet	11	54	20,4 %
Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet	14	72	19,4 %
Landbruks- og matdepartementet	7	39	17,9 %
Olje- og energidepartementet	9	51	17,6 %
Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet	27	183	14,8 %
Kunnskapsdepartementet	19	135	14,1 %
Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet	13	93	14,0 %
Samferdselsdepartementet	9	73	12,3 %
Forsvarsdepartementet	14	115	12,2 %
Finansdepartementet	10	89	11,2 %
Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet	8	72	11,1 %
Klima- og miljødepartementet	8	72	11,1 %
Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet	5	55	9,1 %
Statsministerens kontor	0	4	0,0 %
Ministries total:	266	1585	16,8 %
Directorates:			
Konkurransetilsynet	4	4	100,0 %
Oljedirektoratet	12	15	80,0 %
Lotteri - og stiftelsestilsynet	3	4	75,0 %
Sjøfartsdirektoratet	11	15	73,3 %
Direktoratet for nødkommunikasjon	9	13	69,2 %
Petroleumstilsynet	11	16	68,8 %
Finanstilsynet	13	20	65,0 %
Fiskeridirektoratet	10	17	58,8 %
Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet - nkom	7	12	58,3 %
Patentstyret	8	16	50,0 %
Direktoratet for byggkvalitet	3	6	50,0 %
Justervesenet	2	4	50,0 %
Statens legemiddelverk	10	22	45,5 %
Riksantikvaren	7	16	43,8 %

Landbruksdirektoratet	8	19	42,1 %
Nve - norges vassdrags - og energidirektorat	14	35	40,0 %
Vegdirektoratet + vegvesen sentralt	21	57	36,8 %
Jernbaneverket	8	23	34,8 %
Dfø - direktoratet for økonomistyring	9	26	34,6 %
Medietilsynet	1	3	33,3 %
Luftfartstilsynet	7	22	31,8 %
Mattilsynet	10	32	31,2 %
Norad - direktorat for utviklingssamarbeid	11	36	30,6 %
Dsb - direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap	9	31	29,0 %
Miljødirektoratet	21	74	28,4 %
Skattedirektoratet	9	36	25,0 %
Statens jernbanetilsyn	2	8	25,0 %
Datatilsynet	1	4	25,0 %
Statistisk sentralbyrå - SSB	11	47	23,4 %
Difi - direktoratet for forvaltning og ikt	8	35	22,9 %
Tolldirektoratet	5	22	22,7 %
Udi - utlendingsdirektoratet	11	49	22,4 %
Kystverket	4	18	22,2 %
Nokut - nasjonalt organ for kvalitet i utdanningen	1	5	20,0 %
Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet nsm	6	31	19,4 %
Udir - utdanningsdirektoratet	5	26	19,2 %
Helsedirektoratet	12	66	18,2 %
Bufdir - barne -ungdoms og familiedirektoratet	4	25	16,0 %
Norsk kulturråd	1	7	14,3 %
Pod - politidirektoratet	3	26	11,5 %
Imdi - integrerings - og mangfoldsdirektoratet	1	9	11,1 %
Kriminalomsorgsdirektoratet	1	9	11,1 %
Arbeidstilsynet	1	14	7,1 %
Landinfo	0	0	0,0 %
Statens helsetilsyn	0	19	0,0 %
Dmf - direktoratet for mineralforvaltning	0	1	0,0 %
Directorates total:	315	995	31,66 %
Total:	581	2580	22,52 %

As one can see, the number of sector switchers fluctuates quite a lot. The total amount of sector switchers partaking in the Ministry survey at the time the survey was conducted is 16.8 %. Amongst the ministries there is only *Statsministerens Kontor* (Office of the Prime Minister) which has no sector switchers. *Utenriksdepartementet* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has the most, which is unsurprising given its size. The ministry with the highest percentage of sector switchers is *Arbeids- og Sosialdepartementet* (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), where 26.8% of the staff were sector switchers. The relatively low amount of sector switchers indicates that jobs in the ministries either are not attractive for people working in the private sector, or that those who work in the private sector are less sought after by the organizations themselves, or both. This may indicate that the fit of the sector switchers is expected to be higher in the directorates than in the ministries.

The total amount of sector switchers is higher in the Directorate survey than in the Ministry survey. Overall, 31.66% of the respondents in the directories have private sector experience, meaning that one can expect almost one in three civil servants in the directories are sector switchers. In the survey, three organizations do not have sector switchers at all, whereas in some organizations the majority of the respondents are sector switchers. In one particular organization, *Konkurransetilsynet* (The Norwegian Competition Authority), there are exclusively sector switchers in the survey.

Apart from the fact that sector switchers seem to be more prevalent in the directorates than the ministries, there are no obviously evident pattern that emerges regarding the distribution of sector switchers in organizations. However, some possible suggestions can be drawn. It seems as though organizations working in policy areas that are intimately associated with the public sector attract sector switchers somewhat less than organizations working more closely towards the private sector. As former work experience is assumed to matter greatly, this is hardly surprising. For instance, public organizations working in the energy sector seems to attract sector switchers to a far greater degree than organizations which works with public health, education and national security. However, as many of the organizations work in policy areas that crosses the sector lines, this pattern is not necessarily generalizable.

3.2.7. Individual level control variables

While the contextual variable is considered to cover central factors that impact bureaucrats at the organizational level, it is equally important to control for factors at the individual level. It is conceivable that certain individual characteristics may influence value subscription and failing to control for these variables may lead to imprecise or erroneous results. As behaviour and attitudes in demographic studies often is seen as a consequence of the individuals' gender, age and/or education (Egeberg & Lægreid, 2020; Lægreid & Olsen; 1978), I choose to control for these aspects. For instance, like Egeberg & Mandelkern (2021) argue, one can imagine that a person with a degree in economics may be more concerned with cost efficiency than a person who has undergone an education within social sciences or law, which in turn will give this person higher scores on private values. Thus, one can see that failing to control for relevant variables may result in the discovery of spurious effects.

I add a variable measuring the number of years the individual has spent in the organization. In the organization. As explained in the theory section, it is a clear expectation of the thesis that the amount of time spent in an organization will mitigate the potential effects of influence from former jobs. However, a potentially quite important drawback with measuring the amount of time the individual has spent in the organization, is that it is unknown whether the individual has been employed in another public organization. Therefore, the individual could have been subjected to socialization processes in the organization for a longer than time than the variable captures. A survey item in the Directorate survey explicitly asks about the amount of time the individual has spent in the state administration, however, the corresponding variable in the Ministry survey only asked for the amount of time the respondent had been in employed in a ministry. As the respondent could have been employed in the directorates before this, and therefore these variables effectively measured two different things. Hence the variable measuring years of time in the organization was preferred.

Both the respondents age, gender and type of education is explicitly asked for in the survey. Gender is a dichotomous variable, where male is coded as 1 and female as 0. Age is a coded as a dichotomous variable so that public officials under the age of 45 is coded as 0, and those who are 45 or older is coded as 1. The survey item regarding education originally contained eight categories, however, as they were a mix of educational levels and educational disciplines, I chose to restrict the number to five: "“Law – Master”, “Economical – Higher degree/Master”, “Political Science, higher degree/Master”, “Other social science, higher degree, Master”, “Mathematics/natural science, higher degree/Master”, and “Other”. The latter category contains humanities, as well as educational levels lower than master’s degree, in addition to the original “other” category.

In addition to the aforementioned demographical explanatory variables, I introduce controls for whether the civil servant is a manager or not. The position of managers in the hierarchy may have an impact on their value subscription. As a vast amount of the previous literature regarding sector switchers has been done on managers, controlling for managerial experience will enable to more definitely relate this study to earlier studies on sector switchers. This variable is measured using a single survey item asking: "What is your current position", where managers is coded as 1 and non- managers is coded as 0. Managers are understood as being Heads of Section or Assistant Directors (*seksjonssjef/underdirektør*) or higher in the Directorate survey, and Head of Department (*avdelingsdirektør*) or higher for the Ministry survey. Descriptive statistics for each of the explanatory variables may be found in the appendix.

3.3. General methodological principles

In using survey data and regression analyses in order to answer hypotheses, I employ a quantitative approach. Quantitative approaches rely on information from large amounts of units, which are typically analysed through statistical methods. In statistically driven studies with few variables and a large number of units, the goal is usually to generalize the findings (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). Generalization means drawing conclusion from a sample, the units of the analysis, to the general population one wishes to research. As statistical methods do not rely on the physical manipulation of data, they lend themselves to researching social phenomena (ibid.).

There are, however, potential drawbacks with choosing statistical methods in answering a research question. Firstly, quantitative scholars have been criticized for failing to distinguish people and social institutions from the "world of nature" (Bryman, 2016, p. 166). Essentially, this critique is based in the idea that individuals interpret the world around them. Secondly, critics of quantitative research argues that the measurement process gives an artificial sense of precision (ibid). Thirdly, some argue that in employing tools for quantitative research, one controls the environment in an unnatural way, which influence the results (ibid.) Fourthly, some claim that quantitative methods generate an unnatural "static view" of social lives (ibid.).

The epistemological and ontological criticisms of quantitative approaches are usually associated with the naturalist-constructivist divide (Moses & Knutsen, p. 31). Essentially, this divide is characterized by opposing views on whether social scientists can find patterns or regularities that exist in nature or not, and to what extent these can be objectively observed and described by researchers. In choosing a research design, the researcher implicitly chooses between these fundamental, and often contradictory philosophical positions. Therefore, when choosing a quantitative, behaviourist design, I assume that there are observable patterns in the real world that can be observed through data and statistical methods, nevertheless I keep in mind that there are contradictory methodological positions which favour other ways of gathering knowledge.

3.4. Validity and reliability

By validity, one means to what degree one can draw valid inferences of the concept one examines. Threats to validity comes in the form of systematic sources of errors and inaccuracies. It is usual to distinguish between four types of validity: measurement validity, statistical validity, internal validity and external validity (Lund, 2002, p. 105).

Threats against statistical conclusion validity are chiefly related to the strength and significance of the statistical findings. Typically, statistical conclusion validity is considered to be a prerequisite for the other types of validity. However, statistical construction validity may be realised, without the other three dimensions being present. (ibid, p.106). In the analysis chapter in this thesis, the estimated correlations and significance tests will be presented.

Measurement validity encompasses to what degree the operationalization of the theoretical concepts reflects the concept the researcher seeks to investigate (Adcock & Collier, 2001, s. 529). In the previous section, I explained the basis for the operationalization of the variables. One of the disadvantages in using a survey which is not crafted with the research question in mind, is that the survey questions do not adequately cover the questions that are relevant. However, as the Survey of State Administration covered a multitude of aspects that could be used to measure professional considerations, and this was deemed to be compatible with the definition of values. With the formation of scales for the value-variables I to some extent counteract sources of error to single questions. Thus, the operationalization of the two variables measuring values is considered to be valid. However, for the other dependent variable I did not apply an index, as the survey item encapsulated the relevant concept in itself. While single questions can sometimes be problematic, as they are more prone to measurement error than scales (Converse & Presser, 2003), the operationalization of this variable is also considered to be valid.

The main independent variable of interest, public sector experience, was operationalized as bureaucrats who report that they have been employed in business organizations or in private and/or semi-public organizations for the most amount of time in their careers. This does not, however, take into account how many years had passed since the respondent entered his position in the bureaucracy, meaning that some explanatory power is assumed to be lost. I include a variable in the analysis measuring time in the organization as a means to combat this particular difficulty, which somewhat alleviates the problems.

Internal validity is related to whether or not one can draw an inference about the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Lund, 2002, p.105). It is often said that a limitation of statistical methods is that they are mostly unable to capture causal relationships (Moses & Knutsen, 2012, p. 93). As I rely on cross-sectional data from a single source, this disadvantage is further accentuated. Using the same independent and dependent variable from the same source is often cited as a source of systemic bias (Jakobsen & Jensen, 2015). However, as the independent variable is factual rather than perceptual, this is not thought to matter a great deal in this particular context. While causal explanations may be a problem for most research using cross-sectional data, this problem is to some extent dealt with in this thesis. Because work experience has taken place prior to the current employment, it follows naturally that any effects of private sector experience would be explained by what happened in the past. While this does not prove causality, the argument of causality is strengthened, which in turn improves the internal validity of the thesis.

External validity is closely linked with generalization, and a study has a high degree of external validity if the findings are beyond the specific research context (Bryman, 2016, p. 42). As this thesis essentially is a single case study of sector switchers in the state administration in Norway, the main goal is to generalize the findings to all sector switcher in the state administration, in the present and the future. As the sample is deemed to be adequately representative of the population, generalization is considered to be realistic.

However, as the nature of sector differences are not expected to be constant across time, it may be improbable that the findings will be relevant a long time into the future. It is also possible that the findings of this thesis could be applicable also to sector switchers in bureaucracies in different states. However, as the operationalization of public sector values was to a great extent based on the values the Norwegian government itself highlighted as key duties, it is doubtful whether one can relate the findings (at least directly) to organizations in the bureaucracy in other countries. On the other hand, as the organizations in the public administration is considered more public than others (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997) it is likely that examining sector switchers in these organizations will display the differences between private and public sector values in the most fundamental way. Therefore, if no effects are found, one can make the argument that sector switchers probably will not face differences when going to any public organization.

The reliability of a study is related to the accuracy of the measurements and could be understood as the absence of random errors (Bryman, 2016, p. 41). Sources of random error in survey research are usually concerned with random sampling errors and random measurement error. Sampling error refers to random differences between the sample and the population, while sampling bias refers to a systematic distortion of representativeness of the samples (ibid.). Non-sampling error refers to errors in the survey that do not stem from the sampling-process, such as false or inaccurate answers, or errors in the processing of the data from the survey (Blair et al, 2014, p. 16). The sample is deemed to be sufficiently large relative to the defined population, so that sampling error should not be relevant in this context. However, all of the relevant dependent variables are structured on five-point unipolar rating scales, and five answer categories are deemed to be less than optimal for the reliability of surveys (Schaffer & Presser, 2003, p. 79). This reduces the reliability of the thesis. The risk of errors in coding, transformations of variables, and in misinterpretations can possibly be present. However, as descriptive statistics for the most relevant variables and regression models are included, and as the R-script used for the handling of the data that forms the foundation of the thesis is available for review[4], the reliability of the thesis is considered to be acceptable.

[4] For further information regarding the R-script, please see appendix 8.3

There are some advantages and disadvantages with using web-based surveys compared to using structured interviews that are worthy of notice. Web-based surveys are generally considered to be less costly and quicker to administer, one evades potential interviewer effects, and are convenient for the respondents (Blair et al, 2012, p. 52). However, without an interviewer, one forfeits the chance of prompting and probing, and can therefore not collect additional data (Bryman, 2016, p. 224). Even more importantly, self-administered questionnaires usually suffer from lower response rates and larger amounts of missing data. Web-based surveys are generally seen as more efficient than other types of questionnaires, such as postal surveys, but the response rates tend to be lower and they demand some basic technical capacity (Bryman, 2016, p. 235). The latter point is not deemed to be relevant in this particular case, as Norwegian bureaucrats are highly educated and as they regularly use computers and other technical tools in their jobs (Christensen et. al, 2018, p. 148).

3.5. Multilevel approach

Researchers on social phenomena frequently encounters hierarchically structured data (Hox, 2010). By hierarchical data it is meant that the data contains individuals *nested* within groups. As the Survey of State Administration contains data on bureaucrats that are nested within various organizations, a hierarchical structure is present and will be accounted for. Figure 8 shows the structure of the data, with organizations as the level 2 units and individuals as the level 1 units.

Figure 8: The hierarchical data structure



3.5.1. Why multilevel analysis?

When data are hierarchically structured, several issues may arise. The first issue has to do with how one addresses the hierarchical structure. Variables may be measured at any level of the hierarchy, as they can be moved from one level through aggregation or disaggregation. Both aggregating and disaggregating data may lead to drawing imprecise or erroneous inferences (Hox, 2010, p. 2).

Aggregation means that variables from a lower level are moved to a higher level, for instance by taking the mean of the scores for each individual in the group, whereas disaggregation means moving a higher-level variable to a lower level (ibid.). Disaggregation in this context would mean including organization as a regular independent variable at the individual level. Aggregation and disaggregation are both potentially problematic, as the researcher runs the risk of interpreting the results on the wrong level. Drawing conclusions on the individual level by analysing a group is known as the *ecological fallacy*. Conversely, making inferences at a higher level based on data on the individual level is known as the *atomistic fallacy* (ibid, p.3)

There are also statistical reasons as to why one should be careful when data is aggregated. If the data is aggregated, data values from many sub-units are combined into fewer values for fewer higher-level units. Therefore, much data is lost, and the power of the analysis is reduced. Disaggregated data on the other hand, will increase the standard errors of the estimates as there are usually a larger number of individual level variables. Therefore, a few higher-level data values may be blown up into many more values on the lower level (ibid.). As ordinary statistical methods treat these data values as independent information, this may lead to higher risks of rejecting of the null hypothesis.

Another problem, most often found in connection with disaggregated data, is related to dependencies in the data (ibid.) Not all variables on the individual level can be considered to be independent. When individual data is nested into groups, certain individual level variables are expected to be influenced by to which group the individual belongs. Therefore, individuals belonging to one group are expected to share some distinctive quality which manifests itself in how the individual operate, meaning that they are in some respect homogenous (Christophersen, 2013, p. 107). For the bureaucrats in the state administration, they are all working in different organizations, and some of their experiences are expected to be dependent on some distinctive facets of their parent organization, such as organizational culture, the quality of the manager, the tasks that are performed etc. As the bureaucrats are (to some extent) expected to be influenced by the organization in which they work, bureaucrats in the same organisation are expected to have a larger degree of value congruence than bureaucrats in different organizations.

Multilevel models are designed to deal with the shortcomings of aggregating or disaggregating data (Hoffmann, 1997, p. 726). They acknowledge that individuals within a particular group could potentially be more equal than two individuals of separate groups. By utilizing multi-level approaches, researchers may estimate both effects and standard errors on each level. Thus, the individual level variables are estimated by the number of individuals and the organizational level variables on the number of organizations. This is considered a more secure way to analyse the effects sector switching has on bureaucrats than it is to somehow ignore or try to circumvent the inherent hierarchy of the data. For instance, one may assume that switching into an organization with a higher share of switchers is less consequential than switching to a context with few other switchers, or that the public value subscription in an organization which is in frequent contact with the private sector is lower than others. Multilevel models also allow for examining both lower-level unit and higher-level unit variance on the dependent variable, while maintaining the appropriate level of analysis for the independent variables. This permits for uncovering both individual and group level variance in specific outcomes (ibid.).

Generally, the effect of dependencies in the data is not considered to be negligible (Hox, 2010, p. 5). In order to proceed with a multi-level analysis, it is sensible to assess the extent of the dependencies. A convenient way to assess this, is by calculating the intraclass correlation (ICC). The ICC is calculated by dividing the between-group variance (the variance between level 2 units) with the total variance of the total variance (Christophersen, 2013, p.111). It is customary to understand the ICC-scores as measure of how much of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the contextual variable (ibid.). In this case, the ICC can be seen as a measure of to what degree the bureaucrats’ value adherence can be explained by the organization to which they are affiliated. ICC-scores can be used as a direct measure of dependence, where an ICC-score of 0.1 indicates that 10% of the variance can be attributed to the bureaucrats' organizational membership, whereas 90 % is explained by individual aspects (ibid.). A common rule of thumb is that scores of ICC > 0.05 are appropriately high that the dependencies in the data ought to be addressed (ibid., p. 111).

3.5.2. Building a multilevel model

In the previous section, I explained why estimating multilevel models are the best suited method. I will therefore proceed with examining how such models are built in more detail. A multi-level model can be seen as a hierarchical structure of regression equations (Hox, 2010, p.11). Consequently, multilevel models can be seen as extensions of the basic OLS model, where the level 1 regression models are estimated separately for each group (Hoffmann, 1997, p. 724). In order to estimate these level 1 regression models, one uses a model which closely resembles the common OLS model. This model is as follows:

$$(1)\ Yij = B0j + B1X1ij + eij$$

In this equation Yij is the dependent variable, and B0j is the mean score of the independent variable in organization j. B1 is the effect of the individual variable X1 on the dependent variable. X1ij is the value of the independent variable X1 of the individual i in organization j, and eij is the normal residual error term. To clarify even further, the subscripts j designates values that varies between organizations and i represents the variation between individuals. As this particular model only estimate individual level variables in a single organization, j is equal to the intercept B0j. Multilevel models allow the intercept to vary across groups, and therefore, assuming variation, the coefficient of the intercept will vary with what group one examines. With this knowledge, one can specify regression equations at the class level which enables one to explain the variance of the intercept.

$$(2)\ B0j = B0 + u0j$$

This second equation measures how the intercept is expected to vary across groups. B0 is a constant intercept, and u0j is a residual error term at the class level. This error term effectively denotes how much each group varies from the overall intercept. In my case, u0j signifies how much the independent variables are expected to vary across different organizations. This class level equation will also include any class level explanatory variables, if they are present (Hox, 2010, p. 13). As I have not included any such variables, I will not elaborate further on this. Hence, in this thesis the mean score of the dependent variables in organization j, can be understood as the mean scores of all the organizations included in the survey, added with the deviation organization j has from the mean scores of all the organizations. Adding these equations together gives us a multilevel model with a single dependent variable.

$$(3)\ Yij = B0 + B1X1ij + (u0j + eij)$$

With this equation as a baseline, one can further expand the model by adding more explanatory variables on both levels if one chooses. The model above is a random intercept model, where the effects of the independent variable is assumed to be the same across groups (ibid.). As I have no expectations that any effects will vary across groups, this is the type of model I will be estimating.

3.6 Logistic regression

Because the dependent variables in this thesis are dichotomized, I estimate multilevel binomial logistic regression models. With a dichotomous dependent variable, one cannot expect the relationship between the variables to be in a straight line (Skog, 1998, p. 380). Therefore, coefficients are estimated on a logit-scale, as this means the coefficients can be interpreted more or less like linear regression coefficients. However, the drawback is that the interpretations of the models are somewhat less intuitive, as one must convert the coefficients to odds-ratios or probabilities in order to gain a substantially meaningful interpretation of the relationship between the variables (ibid.). The multilevel logistic regression model for a random intercept/fixed effects model with a single level-1 predictor can be described thus:

$$(4)\ Logit(PR(Yij = 1) = B0 + B1X1ij + (u0j + eij)$$

When using logistic regression, there is no need to make restrictive assumptions about the distribution of residuals, as one does when employing linear regression (Christopersen, 2013, p. 144). The reason for constructing logistic models, is that the residual distribution of the continuous variable for private sector and public sector values were unsatisfactory distributed, meaning that they did not satisfy the assumptions for linear regression models. However, in measuring the likelihood of subscribing above averagely to these variables, I get a suitable indication of how sector background will affect value subscription. Logistic regression models, however, does assume the absence of autocorrelation, an assumption that is expected to be satisfied in this particular case, as the analysis is based on cross-sectional data (ibid.). Furthermore, the logistic regression models assume the absence of multicollinearity and an S-shaped relationship between the variables (Skog, 1998, p. 380), as well as absence of any significant outliers and omitted variable bias (Christophersen, 2013, p. 144).

4. Empirical analysis

Having formulated the hypotheses and explained the operationalization of the key variables and the methods I will use in order to evaluate whether or not the hypotheses should be rejected, I now turn to the actual empirical analysis. In this chapter, I will first present the result of the four different multilevel models, first the intercept only models and then the full models where the dependent variable and the covariates are added. Secondly, I will address the conditions of the models and assess to what extent these conditions are met. I will thereafter evaluate the robustness of the result and the appropriateness of the method I applied by fitting other kinds of models. Finally, I will assess whether the three hypotheses are strengthened or rejected.

4.1. Intercept-only models

Intercept-only models, or empty models, are models without explanatory variables. The main idea behind constructing empty models is that they form a basic model which can be compared with models that are later fitted with other explanatory variables. It is customary to construct such basic models in the initial phases of an investigation, as one can add additional parameters step by step (Hox, 2010, p. 56). The intercept of the empty models represents the expected average value on the dependent variables across all organizations (Christophersen, 2013, p.113). The empty models provide some information regarding the variance of the random effects. As these models are multilevel logistic regression models, the level 1 variance is calculated not by the residual variance, but rather the assumed variance component ($\pi^2/3$), the standard logistic distribution. Table 7 contain the constructed empty models.

Table 7: Intercept-only models

	Dependent variable:		
	Public sector values	Private sector values	Former work experience
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	0.691***	0.339***	1.048***
	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Level 1 variance	3.2897	3.2897	3.2897
Level 2 variance	0.1449	0.2363	0.1921
ICC	0.042	0.067	0.055
Organizations	62	62	62
Observations	2,129	2,127	2,145
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,679.889	2,882.564	2,515.826
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
			Estimated with Laplace Approximation

Reading from 7, one can see that the ICC is found to be 0.042 for the public sector value model. Hence, the organization the bureaucrat works in is assumed to account for roughly 4.2% of the probability that the bureaucrat subscribes above average to public sector values. For the private sector values model, the ICC is 0.067, suggesting that 6.7 % of the likelihood of a civil servant subscribing above average to private sector values is attributed to the organization in which the bureaucrat work. The ICC for model 3 is 0.55, which implies that 5.5 % of the chance that the civil servant strongly or somewhat finds it important to draw on former work experience in his or her job is attributed to what organization (s)he works in. Therefore, only two of the three models pass the threshold of ICC > 0.05 (Christophersen, 2013, p. 111). Therefore, one could argue that the dependencies in the data are not so large that it is necessary to take them into account. I still choose to estimate multilevel models to account for the possible organizational effects but bear in mind that they seem to be quite small, especially for the public sector values-model.

Figure 9, 10, and 11 graphically display the random effect variance with confidence intervals of the three constructed empty models. A score of zero tells that the intercept (the influence of the organizational context) is equal to the average intercept of the attributed model: 0.691 for the public sector values-model, 0.339 for the private sector values-model and 1.048 for the former work experience-model. If an organization have a score that is higher than zero, then the intercept of that organization is higher than the average intercept and vice versa.

Figure 9: Random effects of the public sector values-model



The random effects for the public sector values-model shows that the vast majority of the intercepts for each lies within ± 0.5, which suggests that for most groups, the deviance from the average intercept is relatively small. Moreover, almost all of the confidence bands cross cross the line which signifies the average intercept, meaning that one cannot be sure that the deviance from the average intercept is distinguishable from zero. There are five points which do not cross this line, meaning that one can only be confident that five organizations have an intercept which deviates from the average. On the whole however, it seems that the organizational context does matter to some extent, and that therefore I am justified in choosing a multilevel approach.

Figure 10: Random effects of the private sector values-model



The variation between the random effects for the private sector values-model is seemingly greater than for the public sector-model, as more organizations are closer to ±1. There are, however, only six organizations that have confidence bands which does not cross the average intercept line, meaning that there are only six organizations which have an intercept that is distinguishable from zero.

Figure 11: Random effects for the former work experience-model



The variation between the random effects for the former work experience model is seemingly greater than for the public sector-model, as the majority of the point estimates are around ±0.5, and that there are five points that significantly deviates from the average. However, in this model, all of the estimates that significantly deviates are negative.

The overall impression of the empty models is that the random effects are somewhat small, but still notable. The variation seems to be greatest for the private sector values model, which suggests that amongst the three dependent variables, the subscription to private sector values seems to be most conditional upon the organizational context. That public sector values seem to be largely unconditional on organization, is consistent with Lægreid & Olsen's (1976) finding that the socializing effect of the public organizations seems to be fairly similar. However, some divergences were discovered, which justifies keeping organization as a contextual variable.

4.2. Expanded models

Having drawn some inferences about the variation between the organizations, I now proceed to expand the empty models to include the relevant predictors. In the following three sections I will present the results of the estimated models - first the public sector values-model, then the private sector values-model and finally the former work experience-model.

4.2.1. Public sector values models

Table 8 contains the models constructed to address hypothesis H1 and are multilevel logistic regression models. In the bivariate model, the coefficient for private sector experience is negative, as expected. It is, however, not significant. The coefficient increases when explanatory variables are added, but it remains non-significant. This means I am unable to establish that private sector experience has any effect on the probability of subscribing above averagely to public sector values.

Table 8: Multilevel logistic regression models: Public sector values

	Public sector values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.691***	0.716***	0.140	0.137
	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Private sector experience		-0.097	-0.007	0.003
		(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.122)
Years employed			0.005	0.004
			(0.006)	(0.007)
Female			0.508***	0.507***
			(0.098)	(0.098)
45 years and older			0.380***	0.382***
			(0.113)	(0.113)
Law education			0.503***	0.503***
			(0.157)	(0.157)
Economics education			-0.153	-0.149
			(0.151)	(0.151)
Natural sciences education			-0.162	-0.161
			(0.163)	(0.163)
Other education			-0.177	-0.176
			(0.138)	(0.138)
Manager			0.538***	0.538***
			(0.139)	(0.139)
Private sector experience * Years employed				0.006
				(0.015)
Level 2 variance	0.1449	0.1400	0.1520	0.1519
ICC	0.046	0.041	0.044	0.044
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,129	2,129	2,129	2,129
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,679.889	2,681.177	2,613.667	2,615.473

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Estimated with Laplace Approximation
Education reference category: Social sciences
Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered

Despite the fact that the main variable of interest is deemed to be of no significance, some interesting results from the other explanatory variables deserves comment. The number of years spent in the public administration seems, somewhat surprisingly, to be of no importance. In model 4) I added an interaction term between the variable measuring private sector experience and the one measuring number of years in the organization, as the effect of public sector experience is assumed to be connected to the amount of time the civil servant has been employed in the organization. This is also non-significant, and thus the effect of time is deemed to be negligible. The effect of the interaction on the predicted probabilities of subscribing above averagely can be seen graphically in Figure 15 in the appendix. Judging by the *Akaike's Information Criterion* (AIC), which is based on log-likelihood values, the full model without the interaction term is the best suited to the data, and therefore, this is the model I will scrutinize further.

Figure 12 shows the odds ratios (OR) of the fixed effects of calculated from model 3) in Table 8. The OR for the private sector experience variable is 0.99, meaning that sector switchers have 1% lower odds of subscribing above averagely to private sector values. One can, however, see that this relationship is not significant as the confidence interval crosses 1 (the highlighted line in Figure 12). When all other predictor variables are set to their reference category, the probability of a public official in an average organization having served an average amount of time in the organization to subscribe more than averagely to public sector values is calculated to be 53.0% if he is a sector switcher and 53.2% if he is a non-sector switcher.

The coefficient for female bureaucrats is positive and significant, implying a positive relationship between being a woman and subscribing above averagely to public sector values than their male colleagues. Likewise, bureaucrats aged 45 years and older is shown to be more likely to subscribing to public sector values than bureaucrats under the age of 45. Educational background seems to be largely irrelevant, with only law-educated bureaucrats being significantly more likely to subscribe to public sector values than those educated within social sciences. The largest effect is found for managers, which have a significantly higher likelihood of subscribing above averagely to public sector values than non-managers, all else being equal. In interpreting the result, all the other explanatory variables are seemingly better predictors of the probability of subscribing above averagely to public sector values than private sector experience. The intercept coefficient of the full model is non-significant, which further suggests that the variance between organizations is of little importance.

Figure 12: Odds ratios of the fixed effects of the public sector values model



4.2.2. Private sector values models

The models in Table 9 are constructed in order to assess hypothesis H2, and contain an empty model, a bivariate model, a multivariate model and a multivariate model with a modelled interaction between private sector experience and the number of years spent in the organization. In contrast to the former model, the main dependent variable of interest - private sector experience - is significant at the $p < 0.01$ level for all of the models that include this variable. Therefore, bureaucrats with private sector experience are found to have a higher chance of subscribing to private sector values than non-sector switchers in an average organization.

Table 9: Multilevel logistic regression models: Private sector values

	Private sector values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.339***	0.253***	-0.442***	-0.432***
	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Private sector experience		0.332***	0.364***	0.321***
		(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.119)
Years employed			-0.011*	-0.004
			(0.006)	(0.007)
Female			0.411***	0.416***
			(0.095)	(0.095)
45 years and older			0.569***	0.560***
			(0.109)	(0.109)
Law education			-0.097	-0.097
			(0.142)	(0.142)
Economics education			-0.089	-0.114
			(0.147)	(0.148)
Natural sciences education			-0.070	-0.079
			(0.162)	(0.162)
Other education			0.097	0.090
			(0.134)	(0.134)
Manager			0.787***	0.786***
			(0.130)	(0.130)
Private sector experience * Years employed				-0.041***
				(0.014)
Level 2 variance	0.2363	0.2285	0.2430	0.2370
ICC	0.067	0.065	0.065	0.063
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,127	2,127	2,127	2,127
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,882.564	2,875.892	2,802.678	2,795.900

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Estimated with Laplace Approximation
Education reference category: Social sciences
Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered

As for the controls, the time coefficient is negative and non-significant when seen on its own. However, the interaction term in the fourth model is negative and significant, which means that the effect of private sector values declines with the number of years spent in the organization. Furthermore, the AIC shows that the model containing the interaction term fits the data better than the model without this term. Therefore, I will further inspect the model with the interaction, which is graphically displayed in Figure 13. The consequence of the interaction itself can be seen graphically in Figure 16 in the appendix.

Figure 13 shows that sector switchers have 38% higher odds of subscribing above averagely to private sector values, all else being equal. However, as the interaction term is significant, and negative, this effect is expected to be stronger if (s)he has spent less time than average in the organization, and weaker if the tenure has been longer than average. When all other predictor variables are set to their reference category, the probability of a public official in an average organization having served an average amount of time in the organization to subscribe more than averagely to private sector values is calculated to be 49.9% if he is a sector switcher and 39.5% if he is a non-sector switcher, a difference of 10.4 percentage points.

The coefficient for female bureaucrat is positive and significant, meaning that female bureaucrats are more likely to subscribe above averagely both to private and public sector values. The same is also true for bureaucrats aged 45 years and older. Education does not seem to matter at all for the probability of subscribing above averagely to private sector experience, as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Hence, no education is found to be more strongly associated with private sector values than social sciences and *vice versa*. Being employed in a managerial role, however, is strongly correlated with the probability of subscribing above averagely to private sector experience.

Figure 13: Odds ratios of the fixed effects of the public sector values model



4.2.3. Former work experience models

Table 10 contains the logistic regression models constructed to address hypothesis H3). The coefficient of private sector experience for the models which includes this variable is positive but insignificant, meaning that there is no statistical basis for concluding that sector switchers in an average organization are more or less likely to report that they draw on former work experience than non-sector switchers in average organizations.

Table 10: Multilevel logistic regression models: Former work experience

	Dependent variable:			
	Former work experience			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.048***	1.019***	0.247*	0.251*
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Private sector experience		0.107	0.018	0.002
		(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Years employed			-0.038***	-0.034***
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Female			0.176*	0.179*
			(0.103)	(0.103)
45 years and older			0.987***	0.982***
			(0.119)	(0.119)
Law education			-0.109	-0.110
			(0.151)	(0.151)
Economics education			-0.178	-0.191
			(0.156)	(0.157)
Natural sciences education			0.279	0.279
			(0.182)	(0.182)
Other education			-0.044	-0.048
			(0.147)	(0.147)
Manager			0.209	0.206
			(0.139)	(0.139)
Private sector experience * Years employed				-0.025*
				(0.015)
Level 2 variance	0.1921	0.1877	0.1124	0.1112
ICC	0.055	0.054	0.033	0.033
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,145	2,145	2,145	2,145
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,515.826	2,517.081	2,443.342	2,442.508
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			
	Estimated with Laplace Approximation			
	Education reference category: Social sciences			
	Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered			

The number of years employed in the organization is significant and negative, meaning that the number of years spent in the organization is negatively associated with civil servants reporting that former work experience is of relevance. The coefficient for the interaction is significant however, implying that there is a connection between years of service in the organization and experience from the private sector. However, it is not significant at the desired level of $p < 0.05$, which means that one cannot outright claim this find to be valid. The effect of this interaction is showed graphically in Figure 17 in the appendix. Therefore, I choose to inspect the model without the interaction term more closely. The fixed effects of this model are graphically displayed in Figure 14.

One can see clearly from the confidence bars in Figure 14 hat the coefficient for private sector experience is insignificant, and that the effect itself is negligible. A calculation of the probability when all other predictor variables are set to their reference category, shows that the probabilities of a public official in an average organization having served an average amount of time in the organization to subscribe more than averagely to public sector values is 56.6% if he is a sector switcher and 56.1% if he is a non-sector switcher. This serves to illustrate that private sector experience has little impact on the likelihood of reporting that former work experience is important for the jobs of the bureaucrats.

The coefficient for gender hints that females are more prone to report that they utilize their former work experience. However, the coefficient is only significant at $p < 0.01$. Age seems to be of consequence, where older bureaucrats (over 45) are significantly more likely to draw on former work experience than younger ones. Educational background seems to be largely unimportant, as the coefficients are above the preferred threshold of $p < 0.05$ for all types of educations, compared to social sciences. The coefficient for managers positive, albeit insignificant as well.

Figure 14: Odds ratios of the former work experience model



4.3. Evaluating the models

In order to evaluate the models, I first examine the assumptions of the models in order to determine whether these have been met. In the methods chapter, I explained the different assumptions of the logistical regression models. There is no reason to assume autocorrelation, as the assumption of independent residuals are automatically satisfied in studies relying on cross-sectional data. There are no apparent concerns regarding multicollinearity as an inspection of the Variance Inflation Factor shows no values above the commonly used threshold of VIF > 5 (Christophersen, 2013, p. 76). The models may still benefit from bias generated from omitted or neglected variables, which is a statistical worry as well as a substantial concern, as failure to include one or several relevant variables may lead to spurious correlations.

Goodness-of-fit statistics gives an impression of how well the constructed models fit the data. AIC is a particularly informative indicator of model fit, as it balances goodness of fit statistics while penalizing model complexity (Hox, 2010, p. 50). Moreover, AIC can be used to compare non-nested models, unlike other goodness-of-fit statistics, like the *-2LogLikelihood*(-2LL) which does not provide the opportunity to do this. For these reasons, AIC is the preferred choice of fit statistic (ibid., p.51). Based on the AIC, one can say that the multivariate models all fit the data better than the bivariate and empty models, which justifies the addition of the explanatory variables. The only added parameter that does not improve the fit of the model is the inclusion of the private sector experience-variable in the model measuring public sector experiences which actually decreases it according to the AIC. This is not surprising given that we know AIC punishes overparameterization, and the included independent variable is non-significant. The fact that adding the private sector experience-variable to the regression model does not improve the fit of the model, underlines that private sector experience has little to no effect on the probability of a bureaucrat subscribing above averagely to public sector values.

In addition to looking at the AIC-scores to assess the fit, I performed on the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. This test is a modified measure of the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test which assesses whether the regression curves for the models are indeed logistic (Skog, 1998, p. 381). In multivariate models however, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test gives a more general idea of model fit (ibid.). The results of the test for all three of the selected models are non-significant ($p > 0.05$) which suggests that all the models fit the data well.

4.3.1. Robustness

In order to assess whether the findings of the constructed models are robust to other model specifications, I constructed logistic regression models without organization as a contextual variable. The reason for constructing the basic logistic regression models is twofold. Firstly, the inclusion of a different kind of model contributes to the evaluation of to the robustness of the results. If the results are somewhat similar using different estimation techniques, the validity of the findings are improved. Conversely, large differences between different estimation techniques weakens the validity, as the findings are likely to be dependent upon the applied method. Secondly, I can apply goodness-of-fit statistics to assess whether the logistic multilevel approach is more suitable to the data than by estimating logistic regression coefficients which ignore the assumed dependencies in the data. This is particularly relevant for the public sector values-model as this had an ICC-score of ICC < 0.05. This means that belonging to an organization may not influence the results to a sufficiently large extent that it is necessary to perform a multilevel analysis. By utilizing fit-statistics, I get a numerical measurement of model choice, which can be used alongside the substantial arguments to determine whether the multilevel model is preferred.

As one can see from Table 11, the coefficients and significance levels from the logistic regression models do not differ greatly from the multilevel logistic regression models. The dissimilarities that are displayed are due to the dependencies in the data, but as changing the method do not drastically alter the results, logistic regression models could have been used. However, by comparing the AIC, where lower scores indicate better fit, one may see that all three multilevel models have a superior fit than the basic logistic regression models. Therefore, I am justified in choosing the former based on statistical considerations. Moreover, as there are still valid theoretical reasons for assuming that the organizational context should matter, the multilevel models are deemed to give a more substantially relevant depiction of what affects the civil servants.

Table 11: Logistic regression models

	Dependent variable:		
	Public sector values	Private sector values	Former work experience
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	-0.064	-1.051***	-0.045
	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.141)
Private sector experience	0.071	0.331***	-0.036
	(0.122)	(0.085)	(0.180)
Years employed	0.004	-0.002	-0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Female	0.506***	0.423***	0.208*
	(0.116)	(0.089)	(0.114)
45 years and older	0.406***	0.572***	0.946***
	(0.139)	(0.103)	(0.123)
Law education	0.549***	-0.094	-0.080
	(0.186)	(0.148)	(0.178)
Economics education	-0.143	-0.079	-0.131
	(0.145)	(0.169)	(0.162)
Natural sciences education	-0.147	-0.123	0.254
	(0.172)	(0.161)	(0.212)
Other education	-0.184	0.083	-0.048
	(0.176)	(0.107)	(0.163)
Manager	0.546***	0.810***	0.207
	(0.161)	(0.171)	(0.182)
Private sector experience * Years employed	0.006	-0.039***	-0.023*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Organization fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,129	2,127	2,145
Log Likelihood	-1,244.435	-1,329.442	-1,163.218
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,630.870	2,800.884	2,468.435
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
			Education reference category: Social sciences
			Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered
			Standard errors are clustered on organization

The operationalization of private sector experience was subject to a trade-off between recent experience and long experience in the private sector. As previously explained, these variables were highly correlated, however, I constructed regression models with private sector experience operationalized as recent private sector experience to check whether they produced different results. As expected, the results were mostly similar. Regression tables for these models can be found in the appendix. I also estimated models where I operationalized the dependent variables both as continuous rather than dichotomous variables. The continuous variables were as previously mentioned skewed, and the linear regression models constructed with the continuous dependent variables did not satisfy the assumptions of homoscedasticity and normally distributed standard errors (Christophersen, 2013, p. 74). This justifies the dichotomization of the dependent variables; however, the actual outcomes did not differ greatly between the models with continuous and categorical dependent variables. These models can be found in the appendix as well.

4.4. The empirical findings summarized

Hypothesis H1 was formulated thus: *H1) Sector switchers in the public administration are less likely to subscribe to public sector values than non-sector switchers.* The claim was not supported. The constructed models showed no significant relationship exist between private sector experience and subscribing above averagely to public sector values, and therefore, private sector experience is an insignificant predictor of public sector values. As these findings were robust to multiple other model specifications, I conclude that hypothesis H1 is rejected.

Hypothesis H2 was formulated thus: *H2) Sector switchers in the public administration are more likely to subscribe to core private values than non-sector switchers.* Since I was unable to uncover any statistically significant relationship between sector switchers and public sector values, a failure to uncover a relationship between sector switchers and private sector values would have indicated that sector imprinting either does not exist, or if it does, its effect on values is negligible. However, I did find that sector switchers in the bureaucracy have a higher probability of subscribing above averagely to private sector values. This is in line with conventional expectations of organizational demography and implies that lessons that are learnt in the former occupations are transferred to roles in future organizations. Hence, hypothesis H2 is strengthened.

Hypothesis H3 was formulated thus: *H3) Sector switchers in the public administration are less likely to draw on their former work experience than non-sector switchers.* The models created for this purpose showed no significant relationship between claiming one's own former work experience to be somewhat or very important and experience from the private sector. Therefore, there are no empirical evidence pointing to that private sector experience has an impact on how much bureaucrats utilize their own work experience in performing their jobs, and hypothesis H3 is rejected.

5. Discussion

The overall goal of this thesis was to discover any effects of bringing in bureaucrats from the private sector. Therefore, I chose to examine sector switchers. Based on the existing theory, I hypothesized that sector switchers in the public administration would subscribe less to public sector values and more to private sector values than their non-switching colleagues. Furthermore, I argued that the sector switchers would have a set of abilities which were less applicable in the bureaucracy, and that therefore, they would draw less on their former work experience than non-switching bureaucrats.

Firstly, I have uncovered that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of subscribing above averagely to public sector values between public officials who has predominantly spent his career in the private sector than public officials who has not. Public sector values are in this context understood to be transparency, loyalty and professionalism and professional independence, which was identified as the values that are distinctive to the public sector. Additionally, legality was considered a public value, but was omitted from the empirical analysis as no relevant survey category could validly be claimed to capture this value. Since no effects of public values were found, sector switchers are deemed equally likely to subscribe above averagely to public sector values, and there is no reason to assume that sector switchers will experience value differences in their organizations in any greater degree than their colleagues. Following the theories of person-organization and publicness fit, sector switchers should therefore be likely to fit just as well in their respective organizations than other bureaucrats.

I also assumed that the socialization processes the civil servants are subjected to would manifest themselves through that sector switchers would subscribe more to the public sector values the longer they had been employed in the public administration. The findings, however, did not at all suggest this. The number of years spent in the organization is an insignificant predictor of public sector values. This means that there is little reason to assume that bureaucrats coming from the private sector will subscribe any less to public sector values than bureaucrats who come from the public sector, regardless of how long ago the switch of sectors took place.

It has been uncovered, however, that some of the values the bureaucrats subscribe to are conditional upon their work experience. Sector switchers are significantly more likely to subscribe above averagely to private sector values than non-sector switchers. Private sector values were in this thesis understood to be productivity, customer-orientation and innovativeness. Since sector switchers were found to be more likely to subscribe more than averagely to these values, one can infer that public officials who have experience from roles in the private sector brings some distinctive features with them into their roles, features that bureaucrats without this experience are less likely to possess. Since there were uncovered no statistically significant differences in subscription to public sector values, the values that are distinctive to sector switchers comes as an added set of guiding principles rather than being a replacement. Thus, one can infer that private and public sector values are not opposites and that both can coexist as guiding principles for the same person.

Furthermore, I found that sector switchers are no less likely than non-sector switchers to draw on former work experience in performing their duties. Since the set of competences an individual has are expected to be (in part) specific for their occupation, and that a position in the bureaucracy is assumed to be different than other professions, this finding implies that the type of competences the sector switchers bring to the organizations in the public administration can be used also in their positions in the bureaucracy.

5.1. What the findings tell about sector switchers

The findings show that despite being equally likely to subscribe to the core public sector values, and therefore expected to be equally likely to achieve good publicness fit, bureaucrats coming from positions in private sector organizations brings some new values along with them with them into their new organizations. Sector switchers could therefore in many circumstances be assets for the organizations in the state administration; they bring new values and priorities with them, as well as subscribing to the values of the bureaucracy. Seen through the meta-governance perspective, recruiting sector switchers can be way to bring some new influxes to the organization, without upsetting the organizational culture or sacrificing the performance of the organization.

Furthermore, I did not find any indications that the sector switchers draw on their former work experience to a lesser extent than other public officials. That sector switchers seem to use their work-related experiences in their roles in the bureaucracy, indicate that experience from the private sector is either connected with having a set of skills that are transferable also to jobs in the public administration, or that sector switchers have high levels of human capital that compensate for the drawback of switching to an organization that is thought to be very different. Hence, the assumed disadvantages with going from a private to a public organization are either of little consequence or compensated for by the abilities the sector switchers bring into the organization.

The findings I discovered closely mirror those of Lapuente et al (2020), who discovered that sector switching managers in public administrations throughout Europe subscribe equally highly to public sector values than other managers, while still retaining their focus on managerial skills. That this study includes managers in the Norwegian bureaucracy, based on data from a different survey suggests that the findings are relevant. Furthermore, that they arrive at similar conclusions in a broader study, suggests that the findings of this thesis may be generalizable to public administrations in other countries. In the methods chapter, I argued that as a single case study, the scope for generalizations of the findings of the thesis should predominantly be considered to be limited to the Norwegian public administration. However, as my findings seems to agree with broader European studies on the same subject, the external validity of the thesis is strengthened.

As well as discovering the impact sector switchers has had on their organizations, some have attempted to study sector switchers in an attempt to reveal if there are differences between the sectors, and what these may be (Boardman, et. al, 2010; Chen, 2011). The findings of this thesis show that people who have worked in the private sector are more likely to subscribe to values that are usually attributed to the private sector, which suggests that there are noticeable differences between the sectors. Since sector switchers was seen to emphasize cost-efficiency, customer-orientation, and innovativeness to a greater degree than non-sector switchers, one may surmise that these are values more strongly linked to the private sector. On the other hand, sector background was not found to be a predictor of differences in public value subscription, meaning that there may be some limitations attributed to examining sector switchers to identify sector differences.

5.2. The findings in an organizational perspective

In order to find support for the demographic approach to the study of organizations, I would have had to discover that sector switchers will retain their values and competences, as well as utilize them in their jobs. Value subscription was found to be theoretically linked to performance (Kristof-Browne, et al, 2006), and values were therefore seen as measurable indicators for this. Because of the way values were operationalized, using a survey item where respondents were asked to what degree different considerations were important in performing their duties, I am satisfied that the values are relevant factors in the decision-making processes of the public officials. As subscription private sector values were found to be associated with private sector experience and that sector switchers seemingly use their experience from the private sector as much as non-sector switchers, show some support for the demographic approach. On the other hand, subscription to public sector values was not found to be connected with sector background, which is differs from the expectations of the demographic approach.

The findings show limited support for other demographic explanations. Education seems to be a poor predictor of value subscription, where the only significant result was that lawyers tend to subscribe more strongly to public sector values than others. This result differs from both the expectations of the demographic approach and earlier empirical results (Egeberg & Stigen, 2018). Age and gender seem to be better predictor of value subscription than education, whereas age is the only reliable predictor of those who deem their own work experience to be important.

While length of tenure is customarily deemed to be a demographic characteristic, I had a clear expectation that the effects of socialization would influence the results. Therefore, in line with the expectations of the structural approach, I suggested in the theory chapter that the effects of private sector experience would be contingent upon the time spent in the organization. That time spent in the organization seems to have little impact on the public value subscription of public officials insinuates that the impact of the socialization by the organizations in the state administration are not particularly relevant. However, the private sector values seem to erode as the years go by, which shows that the organizations have some socializing effect on the sector switchers.

In addition to the limited support for the effect of socialization in this thesis, I discovered that it is unlikely to matter what organization one switches into, as only a small number of organizations had intercepts that significantly deviated from the average. As suggested by Antonsen & Jørgensen (1997) the publicness of the different organizations is likely to be varying, and I worked under the assumption that this was likely to affect the sector switchers. However, that organizational context itself is deemed to have so little effect on public sector values, is somewhat consistent with the findings of Lægreid & Olsen (1984), who are unable to discover any differences in the socializing effect of the ministries in the state administration (p.284).

On the other hand, that public officials seem to be equally likely to subscribe to public sector values regardless of sector background can be seen as evidence supporting the structural approach, as it highlights that public officials will act in accordance with the expectations of their role (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). Moreover, that socializing effects of the organizations in the public administration were not showed in the empirical analysis does not mean that they do not exist. Since the Survey of State Administration was administered only to bureaucrats with at least one year of tenure, the socializing effect the sector switchers are submitted to may be strong from the moment they enter the organization, and its observable effect decreases within the scope of a year. As a consequence, the resocialization may have run its course over the span of a year or so, and therefore, one would not find that the number of years spent in the organizations to be of much consequence. While this latter point is largely conjectural, it is a probable that it may have had an impact on the findings.

The position the bureaucrat has also seems to be of importance for value subscription. Public managers are found to be significantly more likely to subscribe to public sector values than other bureaucrats. Managers were also found to be significantly more likely to subscribe highly to private sector values than other bureaucrats, and as a consequence, the position of the public official is considered to be a reliable predictor on value subscription. Seen together with the finding that public sector values were found not to be associated with sector background, this thesis also finds some support for the structural approach of studying organizations.

5.3 Why no effect on public sector values?

The claim that sector switchers in the bureaucracy would be less likely to subscribe to core public sector values than non-sector switchers was rejected, despite the theoretical expectations. Therefore, I will now venture to shed some light on why this was so. In the theory chapter of this thesis, I outlined that the theories regarding organizational demography rests on the assumption that the organization is reflected by its demographical composition, and that external forces therefore heavily influences the actions of the organization. Hence, one would assume that new members largely retain their characteristics and largely act according to their attributed values. Because of the way private values are operationalized, where the public and private sector values which overlap are omitted, it is unlikely that the values of the organizations the sector switchers have worked in and their current organizations also are overlapping. That sector switchers seem not to deviate from non-sector switchers seems to greatly oppose the conventional assumption of demographic view. So, what are the possible alternative explanations to this effect?

As I have already touched upon, the socializing effect of the organization could be the answer to this. The organization controls and disciplines the individual, as the organization chooses which of its members are rewarded, and which are not (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978). On these grounds, one could make the argument that structural, rather than demographic factors should be considered the dominant source of influence on bureaucrats' actions and priorities. In the theory chapter, I hinted that an interplay between demographic and structural explanations for bureaucratic behaviour. That public officials with private sector experience are just as likely to subscribe above averagely to public sector values as well as being more likely to subscribe above averagely to private sector values, suggests that the organizations in the state administration are able to socialize its members into subscribing to their preferred values whilst allowing the bureaucrats to retain values they have endorsed. Hence, the arguments attributed the structural perspective could generate insights as to why private sector experience does not seem matter for public values, while the demographic perspective is still showed to have some explanatory power. On the other hand, the empirical findings do not provide any actual evidence that socialization does have an effect on public value subscription, since I was unable to establish that time has any marked effect on the value subscription of the civil servants. However, if, as I previously argued, the capacity the organizations have for socialization is strong and swift, their effect would not have been captured by the empirical analysis in this thesis.

Another possible explanation for the absence of effects of private sector experience on public value-subscription can be related to the fact that the motivation of the sector switchers for entering the public administration is unknown. That private sector experience is seemingly of no consequence to public sector values lends itself to Public Sector Motivation-related explanations, for if the sector switchers already subscribed to public sector values at the time of entry, no differences in value subscription over time would be found. Since the reason for the switch of sectors is unknown, it cannot be ruled out as a possible explanation. Moreover, the switch itself may potentially have had an impact – if one knows that one enters a different type of organization, one may adjust one's own prioritizations and actions accordingly.

There are also methodological aspects that can have resulted in the lack of observable effect of private sector experience on public sector values. As I explained in the methods chapter, one of the survey items used in the operationalization of private sector experience could be misinterpreted, as it alluded to both private and semi-public companies. If this has been misinterpreted by the respondent, and/or that semi-public organizations share values with organizations that are strictly public, then this will moderate the potential effects. As the survey item contains a wide variety of public sector organizations and the government owns shares in a range of companies, this may be trivial concern, but it is possible that it may have had played a part in the outcome of the regression analysis.

Another methodological issue could be related to the operationalization of both public and private sector values. Firstly, categorizing values will always entail a strong degree of oversimplification (de Graaf & van der Wal, 2008). The wording of the questions in the survey items used in operationalizing public and private sector values quite closely match the definition of values. However, using these in measuring the sector-specific values do not encapsulate all possible aspects of the many-faceted concept. Moreover, I chose to assess only the values that distinguished the private and public sector values. Therefore, I discounted many possible variables that somewhat or wholly overlap with the concept of public or private sector values. While this was done in order to highlight the difference between the variables, a more complete operationalization of public sector values sector values would perhaps have discovered no correlations. However, it is a strength to the conclusion of equal subscription to public sector values that no overlapping values moderated the result.

5.4. Causality

There are some issues regarding causality in this thesis. As I previously argued, the main causal claim of this thesis is deemed to be valid, as the former work experience of the bureaucrats have taken place before their conduct in their current positions. Therefore, I made the assumption that values were attributed to the sector background the bureaucrat has had. While this claim makes logical sense, there are alternative causal explanations that must be addressed. The most prominent of these is have already been identified and found to be related to motivation. Why the switch of sector happened in the first place may be relevant, and based on the data at hand, there are no ways of ascertaining the reasoning behind it. It is possible that the switch of sector happened because the person in question had a preference for public sector values. If this has occurred, then the dependent variable has had an effect on the main independent variable, and thus the causality is the inverse of what I hypothesized.

Another study with a different research design could perhaps have addressed this issue. However, as I alluded to previously, researchers have only found limited support that explanations related to Public Sector Motivation-theory has been relevant for sector switchers (Hansen, 2011, p. 595). In an alternative research strategy, one could have made several attempts at definitely establishing causality. Ideally, one would have interviewed the respondents before and after they made the switch, however, it is unrealistic that one is able to identify sector swithers before they themselves have decided to change their job. A more practical solution would be to add a question to the survey which asked the respondent explicitly what their motivations were for seeking employment in the bureaucracy. Alternatively, one could conduct interviews, such as semi-structured interviews, where a smaller number of sector switching bureaucrats were invited to partake. With such a design, one could have dissected more closely the motivations of the sector switcher, and thereby also the claim of causality.

6. Conclusion

In this thesis, I set out to discover the effects of private sector experience on public officials. Based in the theories of organizational demography, I expected that sector switchers would have been imprinted with a set of values that were vastly different from public sector values. This was, in turn, expected to impact their overall performance, as well as making their own former work experience less relevant than the experiences of their non-switching colleagues. The research question of this thesis was formulated as follows:

"Does experience from the private sector matter for the values of sector switchers in the public administration?"

Sector switchers were found to be equally likely to subscribe more than averagely to public values, which indicate that there is no difference to public value subscription. Therefore, it is suggested that they will likely take same considerations as public officials without experience from the private sector when making decisions. As a consequence, they are likely to perform as well as their non-switching colleagues.

However, sector switchers were found to be significantly more likely to subscribe more than averagely to private sector values. This was taken to indicate that sector switchers bring some new values and modes of operating into the organization. Since no difference in public sector value subscription was found, this is not shown compromise their subscription to public sector values.

Sector switchers were not found to be less likely to report their own work experience as important than other public officials. This finding indicates that the abilities the sector switchers acquired in the private sector either are directly transferable to their positions in public administration as the skills of non-sector switchers, or that the potential disadvantages with switching sectors are outweighed by the benefits.

Therefore, the answer to the research question seems to be somewhat ambiguous. Experience from the private sector has been found to be associated with subscribing to private sector values. On the other hand, sector background has not been found to matter for subscribing to public sector values, and it does not seem like the difference in value subscription lead to the former work experience of sector switchers being less applicable in the public administration. Therefore, I conclude that experience from the private sector matters somewhat for the values of public officials, but that the differences in values are unlikely to affect the sector switcher negatively, and therefore it is unlikely that the sector background of public officials will play an influential role in the overall performance of the official.

6.1. Implications

Based on the findings on this thesis, there is reason to expect that sector switchers be equally likely to perform their roles well as their non-switching colleagues, according to the theory of person-organization and publicness fit. As sector switchers rely on their on their work experience just as much as non-sector switchers and are more likely to subscribe to private sector values than other sector switchers, they are expected bring some other values, prioritizations, and modes of operating into an organization, which can be beneficial to the organization. That what they bring to the organizations do not undermine the public values, could have implications for recruitment into the bureaucracy. It is believed, therefore, that recruitment can indeed be used as a tool in (re)designing the organization. Should a public organization find that they wish to import some of the skills and practices that characterize the private sector, while still retaining the characteristics of the public organization, recruiting new members from private sector can be a way to achieve this.

In examining sector switching in the Norwegian public administration, this thesis has endeavoured to shed some light on a phenomenon that has received little attention in the scholarly literature on the Norwegian public sector. Research in the future will, perhaps, endeavour to shed further light on the effects of sector switching in Norway, as well as the general literature on public organizations. As recruiting sector switchers have been found to be a way to adjust the focus of the organization without undermining its general values, further understanding what the sector switchers bring to the bureaucracy in terms of values, competences and skills would be helpful for managers looking to recruit new members of staff to the organizations in the public administration.

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8. Appendix

8.1 Data material

The data material this thesis is based on is provided by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) and is subjected to regulation due to privacy concerns. Therefore, I cannot provide the data this thesis is based on. However, the website of the survey contains the essential information regarding the survey, including how one might get access to the data:

http://nsddata.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?node=0&submode=ddi&study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.161%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FNSD2670-1&language=no&mode=documentation

8.2 Survey questionnaires

The questionnaires for the Survey of State Administration are fairly substantial. I do not include them here, for length concerns. However, the variable descriptions and questionnaires – in Norwegian - can be found at the websites of the NSD using the links provided below, under the headings "Spørreskjema departement 2016" for the Ministry survey and "Spørreskjema direktorat 2016" for the directorate survey, respectively.

The Ministry survey 2016:
http://nsddata.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?node=0&submode=ddi&study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.161%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FNSD2670-2&mode=documentation

The Directorate survey 2016:

http://nsddata.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?node=1&submode=ddi&study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.161%3A80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2FNSD2670-3&language=en&mode=documentation

8.3 R-script

The R-script for this thesis can be provided upon request.

Email: martin.rygg@gmail.com

8.4 Descriptive statistics

Table 12: Descriptive statistics: Gender

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Male	1334	300	23.5%	
Female	1359	274	21.6%	
Total	2673	574	22.6%	1592

*) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n = 2542)

Table 13: Descriptive statistics: Age

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Under 45	944	189	22.0%	
Over 45	1779	389	22.7%	
Total	2723	578	22.4%	853

*) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n = 2572)

Table 14: Desctriptive statistics: Education

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Social sciences	703	99	14.7%	
Law	483	69	15.2%	
Economics	437	104	25.8%	
Natural sciences	409	140	37.7%	
Other	554	123	22.9%	

Total	2586	543	21.9%	1699

*) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n = 2438)

Table 15: Descriptive statistics: Managers

	N	Number of sector switchers	Percentage of sector switchers*	Missing
Non-manager	3584	508	23.6%	
Manager	660	69	16.7%	
Total	4244	577	21.6%	41

*) Calculated by valid responses on both variables (n = 2569)

Table 16: Descriptive statistics: Years in organization

	N	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD	Skew.	Kur.	Missing
Years in organization	2491	11.38	9	0	44	1.94	1.05	0.49	1794
Years in organization (centered)	2491	0.00	-2.38	-11.38	32.62	2.02	1.05	0.49	1794

8.5 Alternative model specifications

Table 17: Alternative model specifications: Public sector values model

	Public sector values			
	linear mixed-effects		*generalized linear mixed-effects*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	13.273***	13.273***	0.149	0.151
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.140)	(0.140)
(Long) Private sector experience	0.052	0.052		
	(0.100)	(0.102)		
(Recent) Private sector experience			0.036	-0.001
			(0.125)	(0.128)
Years employed	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Female	0.610***	0.610***	0.541***	0.543***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.096)
45 years and older	0.428***	0.428***	0.358***	0.354***
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Law education	0.464***	0.464***	0.453***	0.454***
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Economics education	-0.219*	-0.219*	-0.183	-0.185
	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Natural sciences education	-0.066	-0.066	-0.156	-0.156
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Other education	-0.212*	-0.212*	-0.210	-0.209
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Manager	0.431***	0.431***	0.556***	0.554***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.136)	(0.136)
(Long) Private sector experience * Years employed		0.0003		
		(0.012)		
(Recent) Private sector experience * Years employed				-0.017
				(0.016)
Level 2 variance	0.1166	0.1166	0.1497	0.1516
Level 1 variance	3.3354	3.3370	3.2899	3.2899
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,128	2,128	2,252	2,252
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,689.922	8,698.914	2,762.280	2,763.081

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Estimated with REML (continous outcomes) and Laplace Approximation (categorical outcomes)
Education reference category: Social sciences
Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered

Table 18: Alternative model specifications: Private sector values model

	Private sector values			
	linear mixed-effects		*generalized linear mixed-effects*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	7.986***	7.992***	-0.425***	-0.423***
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.148)
(Long) Private sector experience	0.345***	0.322***		
	(0.107)	(0.108)		
(Recent) Private sector experience			0.315**	0.270**
			(0.124)	(0.128)
Years employed	-0.005	-0.002	-0.011*	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Female	0.423***	0.425***	0.408***	0.411***
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.095)
45 years and older	0.463***	0.459***	0.570***	0.566***
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Law education	-0.156	-0.156	-0.101	-0.101
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.142)
Economics education	-0.056	-0.066	-0.087	-0.091
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Natural sciences education	0.114	0.109	-0.042	-0.043
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Other education	0.267**	0.264**	0.094	0.095
	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Manager	0.707***	0.706***	0.782***	0.779***
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.130)	(0.130)
(Long) Private sector experience * Years employed		-0.018		
		(0.013)		
(Recent) Private sector experience * Years employed				-0.024
				(0.016)
Level 2 variance	0.1799	0.1769	0.2393	0.2366
Level 1 variance	3.7587	3.7578	3.2899	3.2899
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,126	2,126	2,126	2,126
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,942.983	8,949.891	2,805.379	2,805.053

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Estimated with REML (continous outcomes) and Laplace Approximation (categorical outcomes)
Education reference category: Social sciences
Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered

Table 19: Alternative model specifications: Former work experience

	Former work experience			
	linear mixed-effects		*generalized linear mixed-effects*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	2.487***	2.491***	0.237*	0.237
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.144)	(0.144)
(Long) Private sector experience	0.060	0.039		
	(0.055)	(0.056)		
(Recent) Private sector experience			0.097	0.064
			(0.137)	(0.139)
Years employed	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.038***	-0.035***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Female	0.121***	0.122***	0.175*	0.178*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.103)	(0.103)
45 years and older	0.524***	0.520***	0.983***	0.980***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Law education	-0.085	-0.085	-0.111	-0.111
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Economics education	-0.158**	-0.166**	-0.187	-0.189
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Natural sciences education	0.125	0.123	0.270	0.272
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.181)	(0.181)
Other education	-0.011	-0.014	-0.050	-0.050
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Manager	0.022	0.020	0.213	0.210
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.139)	(0.139)
(Long) Private sector experience * Years employed		-0.016**		
		(0.007)		
(Recent) Private sector experience * Years employed				-0.022
				(0.017)
Level 2 variance	0.0298	0.0289	0.1108	0.1099
Level 1 variance	1.0239	1.0220	3.2899	3.2899
Organizations	62	62	62	62
Observations	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,230.080	6,234.701	2,442.466	2,442.738

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Estimated with REML (continous outcomes) and Laplace Approximation (categorical outcomes)
Education reference category: Social sciences
Continuous variable (Years employed) is mean centered

8.6 Interaction plots

Figure 15: Interaction plot (public sector values model)



Figure 16: Interaction plot (private sector values model)



Figure 17: Interaction plot (former work experience model)