Policing global hubs – A study of the Norwegian airport and maritime port security environments

Martin Nøkleberg

Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law

University of Oslo

January 2021

Summary

The topic of this dissertation is the policing of global hubs, and it is particularly concerned with the security governance arrangements found at Norwegian airports and maritime ports. Employing a mixed-method design, the dissertation draws on extensive empirically grounded research from case studies of Oslo airport, the port of Stavanger and the port of Kristiansand, which are three important hubs in the Norwegian infrastructure for facilitating flows of people and things. This dissertation sets out to explore collaborative and network structures among policing agencies as a way to approach complex matters relating to security, and the organizations' experience of security projects in their everyday life, with particular emphasis on their perceptions of different mentalities, logics and interests and efforts to reconcile them. By combining perspectives on collaboration, experiences of security practices and guiding mentalities, this study seeks to contribute by providing new empirical and conceptual insights into plural policing and security governance from the Nordic context. More importantly, the dissertation aims to develop and advance our thinking on the policing of global hubs – which are distinct and unique institutional environments that have yet to receive proper criminological attention. Thus, to make this possible, the overarching research question that this dissertation sets out to address is

> *How do agencies producing and delivering security and policing services in global hubs experience and perceive their collaborative relations and everyday practices when dealing with matters of security?*

The dissertation is made up of four articles, and although the articles can be read separately as independent contributions to the literature on plural policing and security governance, they also connect in certain ways and, taken together, shed light on the overall research objective of this dissertation, and contribute to expand and advance the current literature. Articles one and two are concerned with examining and mapping collaborative relations, and make clear that the notion of public-private is crucial to the way agencies view themselves in comparison with others, and to how they seek to position themselves in collaborative efforts by referring to this divide. The mapping of relations reveals a distinct social structure and highlights how power is connected to the relational position of agencies within security networks. The third and fourth articles take a broader approach to unpacking security governance by giving attention to agencies' experiences and understanding of policing and security practice in global hubs. The third article underlines how the dimension of "everyday practices" is important for making sense of the way in which agencies respond to exceptionality and develop strategies to cope

with it. The last article shows how policing and security agencies are affected by, and seek to adapt to, the demand for efficiency and speed that is intrinsic to the commercial system prevailing in global hubs.

Acknowledgments

Writing this dissertation has been an incredible journey with many highs and (some) lows, and along the way I have received support from a great number of people, to whom I would like to express my sincere gratitude.

First of all, I would like to thank my main supervisors, Katja Franko and Helene Oppen Ingebrigtsen Gundhus, for your thoughtful and valuable guidance, and the continuous belief you have shown in me and my project. I really appreciate all the discussions we have had about theoretical perspectives and concepts and the extensive data I gathered, these conversations were particularly helpful to tease out the way forward when I sometimes felt "lost". You have also offered a lot of encouragement, inspiration, and moral support over the years, for which I am forever grateful. All your insightful, constructive and critical comments and suggestions on draft papers and chapters have been invaluable and challenged me to push forward the established academic boundaries.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my co-supervisor Jan Froestad from the University of Bergen, for believing in me all those years ago, when I was a master's student with an interest in security, policing and governance. Your initial encouragement and support helped lead me to embark on this PhD project. I appreciate the fact you introduced me to a number of your colleagues and invited me to contribute to a book chapter. I am grateful that you have always had time to read and discuss my work, and share your extensive empirical and theoretical knowledge, which has shaped my thinking and the analytical lenses through which I have analyzed the empirical material in this dissertation.

Special thanks to all the interviewees and survey respondents who took the time to participate in this project for sharing their knowledge, expertise, experiences and reflections on different aspects of airport and maritime port policing and security. The research would not have been possible without your contributions.

Thanks to Adam Crawford who provided insightful and constructive feedback on the project at the midway assessment. I am also indebted to various research assistants for their help with transcribing a good part of the interviews. I would like to thank Daphne Day for her excellent language editing of the articles and this extended introduction.

Thanks to my PhD colleagues (and post-docs) at the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law – your company and all the conversations, discussions and laughter we have shared over

the years have been invaluable and made the rather lonesome life of a PhD student much more enjoyable. Thanks too, to the people who read and commented on draft papers. Dorina Damsa, you are truly a good friend and one of a kind, and I appreciate all the support you have given me. "Extracurricular activities" have helped keep me sane, especially all the squash matches I have played against Frode Lyshaugen, John Todd-Kvam and the other members of the IKRS squash group. Hopefully, there will be many more soon.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support while I was working on the dissertation.

Martin Nøkleberg,

January 2021, Oslo.

Table of Contents

List of tables

Abbreviations

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority Norway
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESA	EFTA Surveillance Authority
EU	European Union
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IR	International Relations
ISPS Code	International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
NCA	Norwegian Coastal Administration
NSD	Norwegian Center for Research Data
PFSA	Port Facility Security Assessment
PFSO	Port Facility Security Officer
PFSP	Port Facility Security Plan
PINCOM	Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration Model
POD	National Police Directorate
RSO	Recognized Security Organization
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

PART ONE

1. Introduction

The topic of this dissertation is the policing of global hubs, and it is particularly concerned with the security governance arrangements found at Norwegian airports and maritime ports. Employing a mixed-method design, the dissertation draws on extensive empirically grounded research from case studies of Oslo airport, the port of Stavanger and the port of Kristiansand, which are three important hubs in the Norwegian infrastructure for facilitating flows of people and things. This dissertation sets out to explore collaborative and network structures among policing agencies as a way to approach complex matters relating to security, and the organizations' experience of security projects in their everyday life, with particular emphasis on their perceptions of different mentalities, logics and interests and efforts to reconcile them. By combining perspectives on collaboration, experiences of security practices and guiding mentalities, this study seeks to contribute by providing new empirical and conceptual insights into plural policing and security governance from the Nordic context. More importantly, the dissertation aims to develop and advance our thinking on the policing of global hubs – which are distinct and unique institutional environments that have yet to receive proper criminological attention.

1.1 Setting the scene: Global hubs, economy and security risks

Over recent decades, airports and ports have become vital spaces for the international networked economy – an economy that is increasingly dependent on a "world in motion" (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002). That is, global economic opportunities are to a great extent related to the vast flow of people and things that intersect and make use of the different infrastructures and modes of the transport system (Rodrigue, 2020). Drawing inspiration from the notion of "global cities" (Sassen, 2001, 2005), the spaces of airports and maritime ports can be thought of as *global hubs* (Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez, 2017; Kesselring, 2009; Leese and Wittendorp, 2018). Thus, and in line with Sassen's emphasis on the flow of information and capital as a key characteristic of the global city, this study understands global hubs such as airports and ports as geographically bounded centers or crossroads where an immense flow of people, goods, and capital converges and is facilitated every day. The core components of global hubs are the networks of infrastructures that various modes of transportation and flows utilize to connect between locations, together with numerous public and private interests and stakeholders. Airports and ports are thus considered as prominent points of passage in the interconnected

global systems of flows and mobility, which value the notions of efficiency, speed and time in the chain of production, distribution, and consumption.

As representations of contemporary connectivity, global hubs help to establish links between local markets and global economic and trade networks, to the extent that, to function optimally, the networked economy has become dependent on and integrated into the infrastructure of airports and seaports. In fact, around 80 percent of global trade in goods, measured by volume, is carried by sea, and in 2018, world seaborne trade volumes reached a new all-time high of 11 billion tons (UNCTAD, 2019). Maritime ports are thus essential structures and the backbone supporting international trading system. Similarly, since the 1970s, when air travel ceased to be the preserve of elites and became available to the masses, aviation has seen tremendous growth. Air passenger numbers rose from 1.025 billion in 1990 to 4.233 billion in 2018 (ICAO, 2018), which indicates how aviation and airports now act globally as significant catalysts for socio-economic development.

With this in mind, airports and ports are instrumental in connecting local and national regions to international ones, and establishing links between local and international economic activities (Cwerner, Kesselring and Urry, 2009; Urry, 2007). The crucial role global hubs play in society more generally, in shaping and influencing manifold aspects of individuals' lives, also becomes ever more apparent. In Europe, for instance, the Single Market Strategy together with the Schengen Agreement are pivotal in supporting cross-border mobility, trade and commerce by promoting the free movement of people, goods and services. The EU's strategy to facilitate movement is the Single European Act, which seeks ways to remove various physical, fiscal and technological barriers to free movement, so as to provide new opportunities for citizens and businesses to pursue their activities within the internal borders of Europe (McCormick, 2008; Pelkmans, 2016). However, to reach its fullest potential with regard to the ideal of freedom of movement, the European system is dependent on open, frictionless and reliable transportation infrastructures which are capable of efficiently facilitating and handling vast flows of people and things. To support this, airports and seaports across Europe have key roles in increasing and strengthening interconnectivity and in maintaining smooth flows across borders. Numerous societal functions are therefore dependent on the infrastructure of global hubs for their continued existence, and have become an integral part of them, which leads to an important interdependency encompassing not only economic but also social and political aspects.

More importantly, due to their integrated role and centrality in society, global hubs such as airports and maritime ports are often seen as critical infrastructure by governmental institutions. In the Norwegian context of this dissertation, transportation is one of the sectors that are considered critical, which means that airports and ports (as well as road transport and railways) are essential components of the process of maintaining vital societal functions (DSB, 2017). However, the fact that they are considered critical infrastructures serving as symbolic locations of contemporary capitalism, commerce, and mobility, and have become important "glocal" spaces (Adey, 2004a, 2004b; Cowen, 2014; Cwerner, Kesselring and Urry, 2009), does not mean that they are preserved from risks and vulnerabilities, in the post 9/11 environment, in which the security discourse of terrorism is now omnipresent. Global hubs may attract illicit activities and criminal exploitation, and therefore be exposed to numerous security risks. It has frequently been shown that the smuggling of goods (such as drugs or firearms), illegal border crossings, terrorism, piracy, and theft, to name but a few issues, are common problems for airports and ports (Brewer, 2014; Cowen, 2014; Eski, 2011, 2016a; Eski and Buijt, 2017; George and Whatford, 2007; Salter, 2008d; Sergi, 2020a, 2020b). Given the numerous terror attacks there have been, most notably 9/11, the London bombings in 2005, and the 2016 Brussels bombings, which targeted various parts of global transportation hubs (such as airlines, railways, and metros), concern about terrorism is very much to the fore in the imaginaries of airport and maritime port security, so much so that the sectors' regulatory regimes have been characterized as "archetypal War on Terror" regulation (Eski, 2016b). Increased and emerging risks have subsequently been added to a broadened security agenda (Burgess, 2010; Buzan, 1991; Krause and Williams, 1996), and have opened the way to new thinking on the phenomena of security governance.

Any of the threats routinely faced by airports and ports may have significant implications, both local and global. Chief among these is the fact that any disruption of the flows through global hub, can cause immediate and serious effects. As a result of the interdependencies between vital functions in society and global hubs, many activities can be slowed down or even brought to a complete halt, seriously impacting the everyday life of businesses and individuals. It has therefore been suggested that the disruption of flows has itself become a security risk (Hoijtink, 2017: 315). The Covid-19 global pandemic shows how disrupting flows can affect the role of global hubs and how they operate, with travel restrictions and the reintroduction of temporary border controls have effectively shut down the aviation industry and much of maritime shipping, leading to severe losses for these industries. It is estimated that the economic impact

of Covid-19 on civil aviation in the operating year of 2020 was approximately a US$391bn loss of gross passenger operating revenues (ICAO, 2020). Similarly, the disruption of global trade involving maritime transportation has had far-reaching implications for the whole industry, with a reduction in the number of port of calls throughout 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020). These shutdowns, implemented for the sake of preserving public health, demonstrate how security concerns can become major impediments to the global economy.

In fact, as Salter (2008c: ix) argues, "few sites are more iconographic of both the opportunities and the vulnerabilities of contemporary globalization" than airports and ports. This points to a central dilemma for global hubs, where the aviation and maritime industries and their actors may be faced with potentially contradictory logics and strategies in their everyday efforts to produce secure environments. This can be seen, for instance, in the tension between, on the one hand, the increasing securitization of global hubs through the implementation of security and control measures, and on the other, the economic imperative of the free flow and movement of people and things, which could have enormously beneficial impacts on the economy. Global hubs are therefore viewed as extremely important, but at the same time vulnerable, spaces in need of security and protection, covering both the sites and actors themselves and the flows that converge in them. Besides being focal points for economic prosperity, global hubs are therefore also places "where the contemporary preoccupation with security and risk is highly concentrated" (Schouten, 2014: 24).

As a result of the perceived necessity to make global hubs safe, policing practices and the governing of airport and seaport security have now been placed high on the international community's agenda, as can be seen particularly in the extensive regulatory regime for aviation and maritime security that has been established post-9/11. As a consequence, airports and ports are now enmeshed in a complex web of international treaties, national and local regulation and legislation (Eski, 2011; Olsvik, 2015; Salter, 2008d), which has arisen from efforts to achieve the standardization and harmonization of security practices across countries. While global hubs are archetypical examples of the organizing principles of the "space of flows" (Castells, 1996) and have been described as non-places (Augé, 1995), airports and ports are still places in which flows become grounded, which make it possible to implement stringent security and control measures. As several observers have noted, the security infrastructure of these places often involves multiple organizations and interests, thus making pluralized and networked policing approaches commonplace (Berndtsson and Stern, 2011; Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016a; Van Sluis, Marks, Gilleir and Easton, 2012). Given these diverse elements, the policing practices of global

hubs, both in Norway and elsewhere, have created highly dynamic and flexible environments, with a plethora of public and private agencies operating with different mentalities, logics, and interests. Since security issues at global hubs often transcend organizational boundaries, the network responses to policing and security issues in them suggest that collaboration has become a very important means to effectively address risks and vulnerabilities deriving from the flows of people and goods.

This therefore makes airports and ports prime sites for exploring everyday experiences of plural security practices, collaborative structures, and the interactions between different mentalities and interests, and the potential implications this may have for agencies' practices.

1.2 Aviation and maritime security, plural policing and the Nordic context

There is now growing criminological interest in exploring the way in which flows of people and things have affected the nature of policing practices and the multitude of actors involved, and also in how policing practices influence and shape contemporary flows and their patterns (de Lint, O'Connor and Cotter, 2007; Hufnagel and Moiseienko, 2020; Sanders and Condon, 2017; Whelan and Molnar, 2017). Some have even argued that there is a need to recalibrate the conceptual, theoretical and methodological landscape of criminology in the face of flows (Amicelle et al., 2017). To capture and understand these new practices, various aspects of this connection between policing and flow have been explored and unpacked. Many recent studies examine the securitization of borders to deal with the "world in motion" (Aas, 2007, 2011; Aas and Gundhus, 2015; Côté-Boucher, 2020; Weber, 2013; Weber, Mohn, Vecchio and Fili, 2019). One important consequence of the fact that global flows cross national boundaries is that this creates "a constant flux between the inside and the outside, resulting in hybridity of what before appeared to be relatively stable entities" (Aas, 2013: 8). There has also been more exploration of the implications of the use of technology and surveillance to filter and govern flows of people (Adey, 2004a, 2009; Côté-Boucher, 2008; Leese and Koenigseder, 2015; Lyon, 2005). A central issue in the literature is that border control practices reveal mechanisms and logics for differentiating mobile bodies, in that border control activities become tools for determining belonging by means of inclusion and exclusion (Aas, 2011; Pickering and Weber, 2006).

These studies have been crucial for deepening our understanding and knowledge of control practices and their interaction with the flows of people, things, information, and capital. Notwithstanding the importance of this literature, it must be recognized that, in criminology and policing studies, far less attention has been paid to unpacking and understanding the unique

5

spaces global hubs represent. Due to the centrality of economic drivers such as efficiency, time and speed, global hubs are assumed to be distinct institutional environments quite unlike static, area-bound neighborhoods. Consequently, as airports and ports are regarded as crucial crossroads, movement through them is carefully planned, regulated and controlled (Knox, O'Doherty, Vurdubakis and Westrup, 2007) to ensure smooth and efficient throughput. It has therefore been suggested that airport and port spaces are involved in the government of time (Salter, 2008a), with a fixation on framing issues in terms of various temporal dimensions: measuring and reducing waiting times, improving dwell-time and consumption, and the implementation of preemptive and risk-based strategies (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Lloyd, 2003; Salter, 2007, 2008b). Global hubs can thus be considered to be immersed in various temporal imaginaries, which suggests that the temporalization of security is important (Valverde, 2011, 2014).

Hitherto, studies of policing flows have not fully recognized the unique character of the security infrastructure of global hubs and analyses of how policing practices and governance of security develop in the institutional environments of airports and maritime ports are particularly wanting in this respect. Although global hubs clearly play a critical role in the networked economy and are exposed to significant threats, significant aspects of their policing are often only considered in connection with other phenomena, generally being touched upon in the wider context of the impact of global flows and mobility, such as in studies of border control and surveillance practices. The security assemblages and practices needed to make sense of the special nature of global hubs, which are the topic of this dissertation, are thus mainly explored in isolation, or only at specific sites, with little attention to the practices, actors, interests and logics involved. This dissertation seeks to address this gap by providing empirical substantiation through examining Norwegian airport and maritime port security, and focusing on collaborative structures and agencies' experience of security projects in their everyday life.

Recent criminological scholarship has not however entirely ignored the topic of current security and plural policing responses in transportation nodes. Although rather few in number, there are studies which set out to explore various aspects of maritime and aviation security and how these are dealt with in the plural policing literature. For instance, Eski (2016a, 2016b, 2019) provides an ethnography of the port securityscape, by examining the everyday realities and occupational identities of street-level port security professionals. This work demonstrates the importance of recognizing bottom-up perspectives in analyses of security and policing, as they can reveal significant nuances of the interactions found in the port securityscape. It also offers important

insights into how industrial commercialization affects security issues and those tasked with addressing them. Eski also deals with multi-agency collaboration in his case study, while Brewer's (2014, 2017) analysis of waterfronts in Australia and the United States focuses explicitly on networks, partnerships and the co-production of policing and security governance, and reveals the social structure and relational properties that exist among public and private policing actors. In particular, it shows that norms of trust, reciprocity and building social capital in partnerships are key in enabling effective responses to policing and security issues that cut across organizational boundaries and areas of responsibility. Brewer's study makes use of social network analysis (SNA) to chart relationships – an approach that has much to offer in studies of security and policing and one that is also employed in this dissertation. As yet, there have been few empirical studies that employ the SNA toolbox to explore security issues (Whelan and Dupont, 2017), which suggests there is a need for further research to develop a better methodological approach to study and unpack plural policing and security practices.

Similar arrangements to those found on the waterfront are to be found in aviation and airport security, as pluralization is now commonplace. Previous studies have documented extensive outsourcing of security provision to private companies – an effect of neoliberal logics (Leese, 2016). The complex relationships between the public and private actors working in the airport environment can make it challenging to implement security measures, particularly when actors are seeking to meet the demands of different stakeholders (Lahav, 2008; Olsvik, 2015; Salter, 2008a). Both strands of literature of aviation and maritime security and policing seem to be influenced by the terrorism discourse, and as was pointed out above, it has been suggested that the regulatory regimes and current policing practice are "archetypal War on Terror" approaches (Eski, 2016b).

These studies clearly provide valuable empirical, conceptual and methodological insights into dimensions of the policing of global hubs that are addressed in this dissertation, such as plural and multi-agency responses and security networks, the influence of commercialization and neoliberal logics, everyday realities and practices, and the tools of SNA. More importantly, following the empirical scope of these studies, particularly those of Eski and Brewer, this dissertation seeks to engage with, build upon and advance beyond these findings by shedding light on the distinct nature and practices of policing that are found in global hubs such as airport and ports, and by so doing, also develop more finely tuned methodological and analytical tools for evaluating them.

The situation described above shows that studies of aviation and maritime security connect and engage with the burgeoning literature on plural policing, particularly in its emphasis on multi-agency partnerships and network perspectives. Plural policing has become established as an important field of research (O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; Terpstra and van Stokkom, 2015). The increasing privatization of crime control and security has been one of the most salient and intensely debated issues within criminological scholarship in the past decades (Bowling, Reiner and Sheptycki, 2019; Button, 2002; Christie, 2000; Garland, 2001; Jones and Newburn, 2006; Loader, 2000; Loader and Walker, 2007; Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983; Wood and Dupont, 2006; Zedner, 2009). It is, therefore, well-recognized that contemporary policing endeavors involve a diverse set of state and non-state actors, who operate alongside each other in the production and delivery of security and crime control (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Crawford, Lister, Blackburn and Burnett, 2005; Dupont, 2006a; Fleming and Wood, 2006; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Schuilenburg, 2015). In recent years, two of the most salient perspectives used to understand and conceptualize this plurality have been nodal governance (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005; Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and (state) anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007). While it should be recognized as very useful for shaping current debates on plural policing and how it is understood, this literature is often concerned with conceptual thinking and favors normative orientations and questions. Normative arguments have mainly been used to consider what the role of the state ought to be in today's policing landscape. What seems to be lacking is a more detailed account of what is involved in assessing and understanding the contribution and involvement of various agencies to plural policing, when addressing the matter at an empirical level (see Crawford, 2006; Kerr, 2015; Martin, 2013; Terpstra, 2017 for notable exceptions).

While acknowledging the importance of these contributions, this dissertation argues that, to move policing scholarship beyond its preoccupation with conceptual and normative claims it is necessary to better operationalize the theoretical frameworks and to elucidate grounded analytical perspectives for the study of policing arrangements and practices. In the dissertation, this requirement is met by combining the theoretical perspectives of nodal governance and anchored pluralism with concepts and analytical tools drawn from network theory. Emphasis is, for instance, laid on the notion of mentality developed in the nodal approach, and on the possibility of empirically capturing and understanding everyday security practices by examining various governing mentalities. It is assumed that such an approach can provide more empirically informed understandings of plural policing and security governance. The

dissertation contributes to this endeavor and shows how it can be achieved, by examining the empirical case of policing global hubs in Norway.

The plural nature of policing has received increasing scholarly attention, which has provided insight into how (national) policing systems are structured and organized, and in particular, how power structures are articulated by actors and their relationships with each other (Brewer, 2017; Dupont, 2006b; Quéro and Dupont, 2019; van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018). However, most of our knowledge about plural policing and security networks originates from the Anglosphere (e.g. the US, Britain, Australia), as do most studies exploring airport and port security. As pointed out by van Stokkom and Terpstra (2018), this may lead to an overemphasis on Anglocentric findings, which are often assumed to be universal, and there is a risk of overlooking local nuances and the importance of place-based specificity in the current landscape (Lum and Fyfe, 2015). Thus, to identify convergences and differences in contemporary policing, it has been suggested that attention should be directed to historical, cultural and political factors, and that new empirical contexts should be explored (O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018). It is obvious, then, that by addressing Norwegian plural policing in global hubs, this dissertation both engages with and seeks to extend the rather limited, but growing, literature on Nordic plural policing in general (Gundhus and Larsson, 2007; Hansen Löfstrand, 2019; Kammersgaard, 2019; Lomell, 2007; Nøkleberg, 2016; Saarikkomäki, 2018; Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori, 2016; Stenström, 2018, 2019; Søgaard, Houborg and Tutenges, 2016), and the literature on airport and port security in particular (Jore, 2012; Jore and Njå, 2012; Lindøe and Kringen, 2015; Olsvik, 2015; Oltedal, 2011; Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). Given the lack of Norwegian or Nordic scholarly attention to the subject, there is clearly a need for more detailed, empirically grounded studies of plural policing and the unique institutional environment that global hubs represent.

1.3 Research objective: Unpacking the policing of global hubs

Theoretically, this research connects the broader discussion of security governance, and of nodal governance and state anchored pluralism in particular, with the network theory and governance literature. To unpack the precise nature of the policing of global hubs, the emphasis is on the nature of governance, the capacities of individual security agencies and the linkages and network responses between them. By employing these ideas in empirical work on Norwegian airport and port security, the dissertation aims to add to the conceptual thinking on policing global hubs more broadly, which is currently absent from the criminological and plural

policing literature. Secondly, this research aims to provide deeper insight into the way in which policing and security agencies in global hubs experience their everyday practices in dealing with matters of security. In this dissertation, these everyday practices encompass perceptions of the collaborative structures, strategies and measures employed by agencies, and their different mentalities, logics and interests. Mapping and unpacking these perceptions and experiences can also provide novel empirical and conceptual insights that can help advance the field of plural policing, not least because this research draws on empirical work and findings from a context other than the Anglosphere. Moreover, this in-depth exploration of Norwegian airport and port security addresses the apparent lack of empirical investigation of the interaction between collaborative relations on the one hand, and agencies' experience of security projects on the other. The dissertation also aims to help advance the methodological and analytical perspectives that can be used in studies of security governance and plural policing.

Thus, to make this possible and achieve the above aims, the overarching research question that this dissertation sets out to address is:

> *How do agencies producing and delivering security and policing services in global hubs experience and perceive their collaborative relations and everyday practices when dealing with matters of security?*

The dissertation draws on extensive empirical research in Norway, and includes case studies of Oslo airport, the port of Stavanger and the port of Kristiansand. As will be evident in the next chapter, these are crucial hubs in the Norwegian infrastructure for facilitating flows, as can be seen from their operational capacity, economic importance, and role in connecting Norway to the wider world. To guide and focus the empirical exploration of the everyday policing practices and security in these important global hubs, four research questions have been formulated:

1. What, if any, are the collaborative relations between the agencies involved in the security governance at airports and maritime ports in Norway?
2. How are collaboration processes perceived by the different agencies, and what dilemmas or issues can occur in the meeting between agencies with different interests?
3. How do agencies experience and think about their security and policing practices in global hubs in Norway?

4.   What are the underlying mentalities or interests of the security and policing agencies, and how do they experience the balancing act that may be necessary when seemingly contradictory interests converge?

The dissertation is made up of four articles and the research questions are addressed from different angles in each of them. To explore the questions, the dissertation takes a mixed-method approach, drawing upon qualitative and quantitative methodological and analytical techniques. Thus, data used in the empirical articles are derived from 76 interviews with key representatives involved in policing and security in Norwegian airports and maritime ports, and from a survey which addresses individuals' perception of collaboration and maps policing agencies' collaborative relationships. The mixed-method approach made it possible to make a comprehensive assessment of experiences and perceptions of everyday policing and collaboration processes in the distinct institutional environment global hubs represent. Although the articles can be read separately as independent contributions to the literature on plural policing and security governance, they also connect in certain ways and, taken together, shed light on the overall research objective of this dissertation, and contribute to expand and advance the current literature. Articles **one** and **two** are concerned with examining and mapping collaborative relations, and make clear that the notion of public-private is crucial to the way agencies view themselves in comparison with others, and to how they seek to position themselves in collaborative efforts by referring to this divide. The mapping of relations reveals a distinct social structure and highlights how power is connected to the relational position of actors within security networks. The **third** and **fourth articles** take a broader approach to unpacking security governance by giving attention to agencies' experiences and understanding of policing and security practice in global hubs. The **third article** underlines how the dimension of "everyday practices" is important for making sense of the way in which agencies respond to exceptionality and develop strategies to cope with it. The **last article** shows how policing and security agencies are affected by, and seek to adapt to, the demand for efficiency and speed that is intrinsic to the commercial system prevailing in global hubs.

1.4 Outline

This dissertation is made up of two parts. The first consists of this extended introduction, which provides a detailed account of the conceptual, theoretical, analytical and methodological considerations involved in this research. The second consists of the four articles exploring and mapping different aspects of the policing of global hubs. This introductory chapter is followed

by five more. The second outlines the empirical context and institutional landscape of Norwegian airports and ports, focusing on their historical development, and social and economic importance. It also describes the international regulatory security framework of the aviation and maritime sectors, as it is assumed that regulation can influence the actions and behavior of agencies and their interactions with one another. Chapter three explicates the theoretical foundation of the research project. In order to understand how policing agencies at global hubs experience their everyday practices and collaborative relations, the dissertation combines conceptual perspectives on security governance, network theory, and collaboration. Two concepts dealt with in the security governance literature – nodal governance and state anchored pluralism – can yield important insights, especially to help unpack the potential influence of different mentalities, interests or logics within the empirical context of airports and maritime ports. Building upon conceptualizations of everyday security drawn from the fields of criminology and international relations helps to situate the analysis of security practices and actors' experience of security projects against a background of exceptionality. The complexity of plural policing and security practices makes organizations interdependent and increasingly integrated in network responses. To capture this, concepts derived from network theory and network governance have been deemed useful. The chapter therefore seeks to offer an analytical framework for studying policing at global hubs. The fourth chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this dissertation. To grasp collaborative processes of plural policing and everyday experiences and perceptions of security practices, a mixed-method approach was utilized. That is, data were collected through semi-structured interviews and a survey, which provided both qualitative and quantitative material. The chapter introduces the different analytical procedures used in the empirical studies. One of these was social network analysis. In addition, the chapter presents reflections and discussions on the issues involved in gaining access to closed security environments, considerations of research validity and ethical issues regarding the empirical exploration. Chapter five summarizes the four articles and highlights their main findings. The final chapter elaborates on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of this research and discusses its implications for future work in the field of plural policing and security governance.

The second part of this dissertation consists of four articles:

Article 1: Nøkleberg, Martin (2019). The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing. *Policing and Society*, 601–617.

Article 2: Nøkleberg, Martin (2020). Examining the how of Plural Policing: Moving from Normative Debate to Empirical Enquiry. *British Journal of Criminology*, 60 (3), 681–702.

Article 3: Nøkleberg, Martin (forthcoming). Expecting the Exceptional in the Everyday: Policing Global Transportation Hubs. *Security Dialogue.*

Article 4: Nøkleberg, Martin (ready for submission). Policing global hubs: Balancing the imperatives of security and trade.

2. Empirical context – Pluralized policing, regulations, and Norwegian global hubs

In recent decades, there have been significant developments in all spheres of governance (Burris, Kempa and Shearing, 2008; Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004), with traditional approaches being challenged and new arrangements emerging. In the area of policing and security, policing systems have also undergone profound changes (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Loader, 2000; Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983; Shearing, 1992). Indeed, Bayley and Shearing (1996: 585) proclaimed in the late 1990s that "modern democratic countries (…) have reached a watershed in the evolution of their systems of crime control and law enforcement. Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its place". One of the most striking features of these changes seems to be pluralization, which has, it is suggested, come to challenge the traditional view of security governance as being the prerogative and monopoly of the state (government) (Burris, 2004), and as revolving around the state-centered perspective of "governance through force" (Wood and Shearing, 2007). This change, according to Bayley and Shearing, is not a slow transition during which one system of policing replaces another, but rather a swift and clear break with the past.

Others, however, have suggested that the claim that the rise of non-state policing actors (mainly private) represents a truly epochal break with the past overstates the case (Reiner, 2010). This view gains support from a compelling, historically informed literature on private policing and security, which also explores the empirical context of port policing, and recognizes and rightly criticizes the narrative of the discontinuity thesis (Churchill, 2017, 2019; Jones and Newburn, 2002; Leloup, 2019). Some argue that describing the development of (plural) policing in terms of "a new paradigm of policing" seem to "misinterprets the past and produces misleading assessments of recent changes in security regimes" (Churchill, Janiewski and Leloup, 2020: 3), particularly as regards the supposed novelty of these changes.

Nonetheless, plural policing has undoubtedly emerged as an important field of research within criminology (Terpstra and van Stokkom, 2015). To capture and make sense of this plurality, reference has been made to, for instance, "policing beyond, below, above, and through the government", "the policing complex", "the policing web", and "the mixed economy of policing" (Brodeur, 2010; Crawford et al., 2005; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader, 2000). This literature has contributed crucial insights into various aspects and contexts of the plural and networked nature of policing, such as street-level policing in urban areas, town centers and

parks, and mega-events, the policing of nightlife, and plural responses to fraud (Kammersgaard, 2019; O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; Stenström, 2018; Søgaard, Houborg and Tutenges, 2016; Whelan and Molnar, 2017, 2019).

This chapter aims to describe the empirical context of the topic explored in this dissertation, that is the plural policing environment of global hubs in Norway, which now involves many public and private actors and interests. Given the apparent overemphasis on Anglocentric contexts (O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018) with regard to plural policing and security governance and the risk of omitting local nuances, which was mentioned in the introduction, it seems useful to outline how plural policing has evolved in a country that has a strong public sector, a well-functioning welfare state and an inclusive welfare policy (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). The chapter therefore begins with a general historical outline of the parts played by public and private policing agencies in Norway. The historical background is important for situating the practices and multi-agency policing endeavors present at airports and maritime ports and providing a basis for understanding them. As global hubs are integrated into complex regulatory security regimes, a description of the framework that regulates aviation and maritime security is offered. The chapter ends with an outline of the institutional landscape of Norwegian airports and ports; it covers their historical development, operational capacity and economic importance, and the actors and roles that make these spaces unique in terms of policing and security.

2.1 The historical development of (plural) policing in Norway

Histories of policing have long argued that the term "police" originally had a far broader meaning than it acquired during the 19th and 20th centuries when, as is now common knowledge, "the police" came to refer to a state institution responsible for law enforcement. According to this view, the historical antecedents of the Norwegian police date back to 14th century (Næshagen, 1999, 2000), and the use of the term "police" is commonly found in writings on the law from the beginning of the 1500s (Ellefsen, 2018). At this time and in following centuries, the notion was most often interpreted as the various governmental techniques or strategies "to govern people as individuals significantly useful for the world" (Foucault, 1988: 154). But more importantly, policing encompassed, in Norway as elsewhere, a broad range of governing practices connected with religion and morals, health, public safety and order, the poor, trade and supplies, and roads and town buildings (Ellefsen and Larsson, 2014; Næshagen, 2000; Valen-Sendstad, 1953). Although, from late 17th century and during

the 18th century, in the main cities there was, a gradual professionalization of the police, with the appointment of the first Norwegian police commissioners, the interpretation of policing tasks continued to be rather broad. The responsibility of these commissioners was to ensure that all citizens acted in accordance with the police's rules for social and economic interaction (Ellefsen, 2018). In this sense, it is possible to view these policing arrangements as pluralistic, with the scope and to some extent the agencies of the police extending beyond a monopolistic understanding of them as guardians of public order and law enforcement.

In the mid-19th century, however, significant changes occurred in the organization of the Norwegian police and more generally in the Scandinavian police model, and it has been argued that these developments represent the starting point of the modernization of Scandinavian police institutions (Christensen, 2014; Ellefsen and Larsson, 2014). Drawing inspiration from England, where the London Metropolitan Police was set up in 1829, the reform of the police in Christiania[1] in Norway started to pick up speed in late 1859, with the establishment of a constabulary that performed day and night patrols on set beats (Ellefsen, 2018). This formalization meant that previous communal policing arrangements – that is, local community involvement and private and vigilante efforts – were replaced by a (public) police force patrolling public spaces and urban centers. The emergence of the "new police" was frequently described as a response to concerns about the inadequacy of the previous system (Emsley, 1996). In 1866, the police in Christiania further developed by dividing into a patrol department and an investigative branch, following the principles of specialization that have been observed elsewhere.

Despite these reforms of the Norwegian police, which included the introduction of uniformed constables and significant changes in how the police were understood and legitimized, they did not necessarily constitute a definite break with the organization of the past (Ellefsen, 2018). Nonetheless, they marked a shift towards the conception of the police we have today: that of an institution that is characterized by professionalization, specialization and publicness (Bayley, 1985). In the case of Norway, responsibility for financing the police was for many years divided between the state and municipalities, and it was not until the passing of a new police law in 1936 that the state became solely responsible for financing and regulating the police (Ellefsen, 2018). The reason behind this was that the previous division of responsibility had led to uncertainty and confusion. The modern idea of policing, then, developed during the twentieth

---

[1] The city of Oslo in Norway was called Christiania from 1624 to 1925.

century, its understanding of the object of (public) policing being that defined by Bittner (1970), who suggests that policing in modern societies revolves around a Weberian state-centered perception. That is, the state claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force to impose social order within its boundaries.

The Nordic policing model has traditionally been characterized by a strong state apparatus (Høigård, 2011), where the public police are seen as the central institution responsible for providing security and policing services (Gundhus and Larsson, 2007). This has had consequences for how public police forces agencies are organized and how they are demarcated from other (private) policing bodies. The public police in Nordic countries are largely unitary (Ugelvik, 2016) and generally enjoy a high level of trust among citizens (Kääriäinen, 2007). In 1981, the Police Role Committee (Politirolleutvalget) of Norway issued ten basic principles for the police. While these were viewed as important guidelines for the structure and activities of the police, they can also be seen as an expression of the basic values that the police should seek to maintain within society. In particular, the principles suggest that the police should be unitary, of a civilian character, decentralized, and integrated into the local community, so that officers could interact closely with the public. The police must prioritize their tasks, but crime prevention is assumed to be the organization's primary focus as of today (Politidirektoratet, 2018). The ten principles have been crucial in setting the direction for the development of the Norwegian police since the 1980s, through various reforms and reorganizations.

Even so, it has been observed that the Nordic policing system is changing, following the trend towards pluralization and network organization that is found elsewhere (Gundhus and Larsson, 2007; Thomassen and Bjørgo, 2006). Collaboration between the police and external (private) agencies seems to have become even more prominent in today's policing environment (Nøkleberg, 2016; Wathne, Talberg and Gundhus, 2019). As already noted, pluralization means that state and non-state, commercial and non-commercial actors operate alongside each other in the production and delivery of security and policing. In Norway, private policing is not a new phenomenon as such, given that one can find descriptions of what can be regarded as private arrangements for delivering policing and security services that date back to the 17th and 18th centuries (Finstad, 2012; Spurkland, Myhrer and Bunæs, 2013; Valen-Sendstad, 1953). Although these arrangements were perceived as being private, they were still closely connected with the public and the state, as people sometimes received payment from the state for making arrests.

The first modern (for-profit) private security companies in Norway were set up in the early 1900s, with the establishment of the Christiania and district Night Watch Company (Christiania og Omegns Nattevagt Compagni) in 1905. This company quickly became the biggest one in Norway and changed its name to the Norwegian Security Company; it was eventually acquired by Securitas AB (NOU 1984: 24). The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the emergence of several other private security companies (Spurkland, Myhrer and Bunæs, 2013). After World War II, the range and number of services provided by private security companies increased significantly. The total revenue of private security companies in Norway increased from NOK 144 million in 1977 to NOK 270 million in 1981 (NOU 1984: 24), which indicates the speed of growth of the industry.

Despite these developments in the private security industry, it is still common, in the Norwegian context, to mark a distinction between private security before and after the 1980s. Before that time there was no governmental control or regulation of the industry, and the Ministry of Justice expressed no particular interest in doing so (NOU 1984: 24). The Ministry said that they had not observed any significant problems regarding the activities of the private security companies which made stricter regulation necessary. However, this may seem surprising as, before the 1980s, the unions and the industry itself were amongst the strongest proponents of stricter state regulation of their businesses. The lack of legislation made it possible for anyone to establish or work in a security company, and there were no requirements to be met regarding the companies' organization, management, activities or scope. This led to concern about the legitimacy and accountability of the private security industry as a whole. Union and company pressure would eventually elicit a governmental response.

The Police Role Committee report, published in 1981, was the first attempt to examine the industry. Although the mandate had been to define the role and tasks of the public police, the Committee had to draw a line and distinguish between tasks that should be performed by the police and tasks which could be performed by other actors, such as private security companies. Concern was raised, for example about the use of private security in public areas which were open to everyone, and it was decided that "private security companies should not assume responsibility for law and order in public places. The lack of police resources should not be used as an argument for employing private security guards" (NOU 1981: 35: 206). Following the Police Role Committee report and the demands from the security industry, it was decided

that – through the Security Company Committee[2] – the need to establish a regulatory framework should be explored. The Security Company Committee's report, published in 1984, can be seen as a precursor to the Security Guard Services Act of May 13, 1988. However, only seven years after the passing of the 1988 law, that was supposed to regulate private security activities, and the conditions under which the industry could operate, a new committee was commissioned to revise this legislation.

So then, a third committee – the Private Security Act Committee – presented their report in 1997 and suggested several changes. First, the committee acknowledged that it was indeed difficult to decide how police and private security companies' activities and responsibilities should be demarcated (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget, 1997: 151). According to the Committee, the deciding factor when drawing this line should be the nature of the task or activity that actors were performing when delivering security. The Committee said "the private security companies are undoubtedly here to stay, and in the view of the Committee they represent a mainly positive supplement to the public police" (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget, 1997: 134, my translation). Thus, the general perception of the use of private security companies now seemed to be that their activities played an important role in preventing crime and increasing security. However, a significant aspect of the Committee's revision of the legislation is the greater emphasis on the government's role, through the police, as a regulator controlling the activities of the industry (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget, 1997). The revisions suggested in the Committee's report resulted in a proposal for new legislation to govern private security companies (the Security Guard Services Act of January 1st, 2001), which still regulates how private security companies operate – though with some minor revisions.

Under this law, private security activity is understood as being the provision of security services for third parties and/or self-protection services (that is, in-house security). A decisive element is that the services are provided in return for remuneration. The law also requires that private security personnel should have proper training, both theoretical and practical. Before they can provide security services, private companies must be authorized by the Norwegian Police Directorate, and the police district in which the services are to be provided. The police directorate is not only responsible for the licensing processes of the industry, it also operates as the overseer of private security activities. As the above description indicates, as has been observed in other countries (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Johnston, 2000; Jones and Newburn,

---

[2] NOU 1984: 24. Vaktselskapenes virksomhet og tjenester m.v (Vaktselskapsutvalget). Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

1998), Norway has experienced considerable changes regarding the provision of security, and there has been a huge increase in the number of private security providers. By 2011, there were 243 approved private security companies, with a total turnover of NOK 8.9 billion (Spurkland, Myhrer and Bunæs, 2013). These figures indicate that private security companies in Norway are no longer peripheral providers, but key actors in the production and delivery of security.

Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, the pluralization of policing in Norway involves more than just the rise in the number of private security companies (Gundhus and Larsson, 2007). Along with the growth of private security, a wide variety of other public and private actors have sprung up as significant providers of security and policing. To ensure public security and crime control, there are now, for instance, various governmental authorities (such as the Tax Administration and the Labor and Welfare Administration) which are responsible for carrying out various policing tasks, and actively engage in multi-agency and collaborative structures with other policing actors (Bjelland and Vestby, 2017). In addition, the regulatory authorities are increasingly involved in policing practices through their emphasis on security-related measures. In certain areas, private companies (other than private security firms) have also developed expertise in securing and controlling critical infrastructure and in surveillance and crisis and risk management, which means they have become part of the pluralized policing environment. This is the case for the aviation and maritime sectors, in the post 9/11 security environment. In ports, for instance, recognized security organizations (RSO) carry out security assessments and provide assistance and advice on port security matters.

The proliferation of such agencies, in addition to private security, has thus influenced the way in which security and policing is structured and delivered in Norway. The existing scholarship on Nordic plural policing is still limited and seems mainly concerned with the empirical context of street-level policing in urban areas, town centers and parks, examining, for example the nightlife policing partnership (Søgaard, Houborg and Tutenges, 2016) collaborative structures and security networks (Nøkleberg, 2016), the practices of private security guards in public space (Kammersgaard, 2019) encounters between private security and young people (Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori, 2016), and differences in control logics and aims between public and private actors (Lomell, 2007). Studies of local crime prevention strategies[3] in Norway have demonstrated the importance of collaboration between various municipal institutions and the police (Egge and Gundhus, 2012; Gundhus, Egge, Strype and Myhrer, 2008). Some studies

---

[3] Samordning av lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak – SLT.

address the legal dimensions of plural and private policing, paying particular attention to discussions of the where to draw the boundaries of various actors' legal authority (Myhrer, 2011; Spurkland, Myhrer and Bunæs, 2013; Volquartzen, 2020). Although the literature is growing, more studies are clearly needed to develop a fuller understanding of Nordic plural policing practices and of how they have changed. The policing practices found in global hubs, and how these are experienced, have yet to receive any proper criminological attention. By building upon existing accounts of Nordic plural policing, this dissertation aims to move forward by providing an empirically grounded exploration of the distinct nature of policing practices in global hubs that focuses on actors' experiences and collaborative relations.

As will be discussed more fully below, the increase in pluralization has certainly affected the policing environment of Norwegian airports and ports, where there are now a plethora of public and private actors, many of whom have a stake in securing and policing these spaces. In recent decades, increasing awareness of the risks faced by aviation and maritime security, has caused governments and international organizations to establish comprehensive regulatory regimes and develop strategies to protect this vulnerability and improve overall security. Traditionally, the transport sector has been mainly a national concern, but with the increase in global interconnectivity and transboundary security issues, the regulation of the aviation and maritime industries has taken on a transnational character. In this sense, the regulatory responsibility for guarding against risk and insecurities in global hubs now has an international dimension, which has important implications for how policing actors operate, which the next sections will explore.

2.2 Airport and maritime port security studies

Although the processes of pluralization in policing have received increased criminological attention over the years, the same cannot be said of the field of port and airport security and policing (but see Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016a; Leese, 2016). Although there have been few criminological studies of the subject, if one moves towards the edges of criminology, and examines the interdisciplinary literature that includes perspectives from sociology, political science and international relations, it is possible to find the emergent subdisciplines of "airport studies" (Salter, 2008d) and "maritime security studies" (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). These have made significant contributions to the discussion of policing and security in the sectors of aviation and maritime transport.

Several observers have underlined the importance of exploring the historical development of the maritime and aviation industries. Historical accounts provide important insights into how

various security and policing issues have been framed in different periods. Wallis (1998) and Alexander and Sochor (1990) offer descriptions of the emergence of aerial piracy and hijacking since the late 1960s, and show how this affected the whole aviation industry. Wallis, for instance, connects these challenges with the efforts made by international organizations to regulate security in the aviation industry. In the literature, the development of security regulation is commonly divided into three phases (Mironenko Enerstvedt, 2017; Olsvik, 2015). Prior to the late 1960s, hijacking by individuals seeking to avoid prosecution generated the greatest security fears. In the next phase, in the late 1960s and the 1980s, there was the emergence of politically driven action, which made civil aviation a target for terrorism. The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (the Lockerbie bombing) in 1988 is an iconic example of the challenges experienced in this period. As a result, substantial changes were made in aviation security (Price and Forrest, 2016). In the third phase, the threat of terrorism was a permanent feature of civil aviation. What changed, and this was particularly the case from the late 1990s, was the way in which aircraft were used to cause harm; they were seen as weapons of destruction (Virilio, 2005). The events of 9/11 are a graphic illustration of this development, and they subsequently led to considerable changes in aviation security. Regulation can thus be seen as events-based and reactive (Olsvik, 2015), as (major) events and incidents have led to the development of new regulatory measures.

Others have examined the cultural and social history of airports and its implications for security practices. Studies have shown the way in which technological, economic, and political changes have affected both the design of airports and how they and aviation actors function (Gordon, 2004; Pascoe, 2001; Virilio, 2005). Since 9/11, investment in security technology has been substantial, with screening, surveillance, and risk management systems now widespread at airports around the world (Adey, 2004a, 2004b, 2009; Jones, 2009; Neyland, 2009; Salter, 2007, 2008b; Schouten, 2014). Airport spaces have also been examined in relation to border control regimes, which are used as tools to determine inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, airports have been characterized as "difference machine[s]" and sites for "the filtering of friends and foes" (Adey, 2008; Lyon, 2008).

Although coming from outside of the fields of criminology and plural policing studies – but still highly relevant to the Norwegian context of this dissertation, one recent article insisted that protection against terrorism was the primary concern among aviation actors (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). In the face of the risk of terrorism discourse, Norwegian aviation security went from being considered mainly a national concern to being a supranational issue (Jore and

Njå, 2012). It has been suggested that the introduction of new security measures in the wake of 9/11 impacted and, in fact, hindered the communication and information sharing processes of Norwegian civil aviation actors (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). Similarly, it has also come to light that both management and frontline workers in Norwegian airports experienced a significant degree of constraint after the implementation of the new precautions. Olsvik (2015), for instance, shows that the room for maneuver of aviation actors was limited by the rigorousness of EU regulations. Their standardization and the increased level of detail in descriptions of procedures that were to be followed were perceived to be inappropriate to local contexts. This was shown to lead to considerable frustration and feelings of meaninglessness, as regulations and prescribed practices were at times considered to be illogical and unreasonable (Jore and Njå, 2012; Olsvik, 2015).

The maritime industry has for centuries been associated with illicit activities that interrupt the smooth flows that intersect at ports. During the late 18th century, the port of London, for instance, was seen as the center of global commerce and was thus surrounded by major risks (Brewer, 2014; Critchley, 1979; Radzinowicz, 1956). Given its preeminent position, interruptions of these flows could have significant consequences for the global economy. Preeminence came at a cost, however, as the huge volume of ships and goods passing through the port acted as a magnet for deviance and disorder. It is estimated that one quarter of the annual losses resulting from crime in the city of London occurred in the port (Colquhoun, 1800a, 1800b). For that reason, as Radzinowicz (1956) points out, considerable efforts were made to secure London's waterfront. In fact, the establishment in 1798 of the (private) River Thames preventive force can be seen as the first example of a modern police force in London (Critchley, 1979; Palmer, 1988; Rawlings, 2002), and a crucial element in the lead-up to the creation of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829 (Brewer, 2014). Historically, ports have always been seen as "crime-ridden spaces" (Eski, 2016a) where insecurities are created and illicit activities thrive – places where thefts flourish, and that provide safe havens for the smuggling of goods, and opportunities for stowaways. As a result, measures have been introduced in order to safeguard the maritime industry, at both national and international levels. These measures are designed to govern or regulate the insecurities and risks deriving from the vast flows that intersect at ports which are global hubs.

In the realm of maritime security studies, increasing attention has been given to discussions of the various threats and risks that seem to prevail within the maritime domain, and the implications they may have on practice. In this respect, references have been made to issues

ranging from maritime terrorism and piracy, cross-border trafficking of drugs, people and illicit goods, to environmental crimes, such as illegal fishing and marine pollution (Aarstad, 2016; Bueger, 2015; Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Klein, 2011; Roach, 2004). For many of these challenges, ports play a crucial role as they provide a necessary infrastructure for them to flourish, but also as numerous of the transnational insecurities "concentrate themselves especially 'at the docks'" (Eski, 2011: 416). As a result, efforts have been made to unpack the particularities of port policing and crime control (Eski, 2016a), and the multi-agency responses (Brewer, 2014) that are required to meet contemporary challenges in the port environment.

2.3 Regulatory regimes of global hubs: International and national aviation and maritime

The heightened (in)security facing contemporary global hubs such as airports and maritime ports makes them places where there is intensified policing and regulation, and one feature of this regulation is its international dimension (Salter, 2008d). This, however, is not surprising as, by its very nature, aviation and maritime security demand international responses. Airports and ports are national spaces, with strong connections to international space, as aircraft and ships often travel from one national jurisdiction to another; this makes airports and ports into "glocal" spaces. In addition, many of the actors operating at global hubs are also large transnational corporations (Dinchel and Easton, 2020). Numerous national, transnational and international organizations and regulatory bodies have therefore sought to influence the way in which local authorities and aviation and maritime organizations work and how they perceive security. This situation suggests there has been a need for governments to adapt their domestic legislation on aviation and maritime security to developments at the international level. As a result, airports and ports are enmeshed in a complex web of international treaties, national legislation and local regulations (Eski, 2011; George and Whatford, 2007; Olsvik, 2015; Salter, 2008d). It is possible to detect some trends in the development of the regulatory regime of the aviation and maritime industries. In particular, the regulatory framework tends to be events-based and retrospective and the framework is designed to establish harmonization across countries. In the following, I will describe these developments, to shed light on how regulations affect the way in which security and policing agencies work within Norwegian port and airport environments, both alone and together.

Regulations in aviation – ICAO and the EU

The commercial aviation industry started to become important in the 1920s and developed rapidly, and it was not long before concern about unlawful interference emerged. However, it was not until the late 1960s, with the advent of mass air travel, that aviation security was thought of as a serious issue, following a series of hijacking events (Price and Forrest, 2016). Formerly the exclusive preserve of elites, air travel was now becoming available to the masses, which resulted in immense growth in the economy of the industry and passenger numbers, which was accompanied by significant risks that made it important to secure airports, as part of the interconnected infrastructure facilitating (global) flows.

At the international level, the most important organization with regard to the regulation of international civil aviation is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN). It was established in 1944 through the Convention on International Civil Aviation[4], which consisted of numerous annexes covering standards and recommended practices on various aspects of aviation. In 1974, the ICAO presented the first provisions for a harmonized security framework as Annex 17, and since its adoption, the Annex has been revised on many occasions in response to new and emerging risks and threats. The 11th edition of Annex 17 became applicable in 2020. The main aim of annex 17 is to provide guidance and procedures on how to secure civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, by assisting with the implementation of international security measures, the guiding document being the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 - restricted). The annex consists of recommendations and standards concerning the organizing structure of aviation security, including the division of roles and responsibilities between appropriate authorities, airport and aircraft operators. It includes numerous preventive security measures, relating to such matters as access control and the screening of passengers, hold and cabin baggage, and cargo. It is important to note that, legally, there is a distinction between standards and recommendations. The regulatory nature of standards means that Contracting States must conform to them in accordance with the Convention, and they are therefore mandatory. However, as the ICAO does not have enforcement powers over member states and their national legislation (Mironenko Enerstvedt, 2017), they are not in fact legally binding. Contracting States are therefore at liberty to opt out of regulations but are then obliged to report deviations from these standards. The recommendations, by contrast, are seen as desirable practices, to which Contracting States should endeavor to conform, in accordance with the Convention. The

---

[4] Most commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention.

ICAO carries out regular systematic audits to ensure that aviation security activities are in place in member states, and to offer guidance if needed.

Prior to 9/11, the European Union (EU) had no proper legislative competence in the field of aviation security, as it was essentially a national responsibility[5], with each Member State making its own provisions. In 2002, as a response to the attacks of 9/11 in the US, the EU developed and put in place its first common rules for aviation security, which covered all Member States and took precedence over national regulations. These common rules also apply to Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Like the ICAO's standards and recommendations, the European regulations aim to safeguard and protect persons and goods from acts of unlawful interference. However, there is an important difference between the two. Unlike the ICAO's recommended practices, which are not legally binding, the practices laid down by the EU must be adhered to by all member countries and must be adopted into national legislation. This aside, the common European rules on aviation security are based upon the regulatory framework of the ICAO.

As already noted, following 9/11, the EU's establishment of a common framework for the regulation of aviation security moved with remarkable speed, and Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 was soon implemented by all member states. By it, the Commission aimed to achieve harmonization and clarification and to improve aviation security throughout Europe by setting out common baseline standards. However, as aviation security environments are fast-changing and given the need for flexibility to address new risks and threats[6], the original regulation was overhauled and replaced by a new framework in 2008 – Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008. The new regulation aimed to simplify the existing aviation security system and strengthen harmonization processes. With the introduction of Regulation 300/2008, the notions of risk and risk management emerged as key aspects of the regulatory framework of aviation security (Poole, 2008; Salter, 2007, 2008a). Governments, regulatory authorities, airport operators and airlines are thus, in various ways, engaged in the management and regulation of risk. Following the introduction of Regulation 300/2008, the common basic standards include measures for screening passengers, cabin baggage and hold baggage, methods of access control and surveillance, staff recruitment and training, and lists of categories of prohibited articles. In 2016, previous implementing legislation was updated and replaced by the adoption of Regulation (EC) No. 2015/1998. This regulation includes detailed measures for the

---

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/security/aviation-security-policy_en, accessed 05.05.2019.
[6] Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security.

implementation of the common basic standards of aviation security, as set out in the Regulation 300/2008. In European aviation, the principle of "One-Stop Security" has been important to facilitate and secure the smooth flow of passengers, and it means that passengers and their baggage can be exempted from re-screening and repeat security checks at a transfer airport, since the Member States recognize and accept that security measures and standards in force elsewhere in Europe are equivalent to their own.

The Norwegian Aviation Act of 1993 sets out to regulate all aspects of Norwegian civil aviation. As mentioned above, the common European security regulations also apply to Norway, and the implementation of EU regulation is permitted by section 3 in the Norwegian Regulation relating to the prevention of unlawful interference with aviation security (with some minor adaptions). Changes made by the EU therefore have implications for practice in Norway and for those involved in aviation security.

The regulatory framework – derived from both the ICAO and the EU – not only outlines how national governments should address acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation but also influences the collaborative landscape of organizations involved in aviation security, since every member state must have a designated (appropriate) authority that takes responsibility for the development and implementation of national civil aviation security. There are also requirements for tasks and activities to be allocated to the many agencies and organizations, both public and private, involved in the implementation and delivery of security, and for their work to be coordinated. As a result, collaboration within and between organizations is a crucial part of delivering aviation security. In Norway, the Security Council for Aviation (SFL) has been set up, to assist governmental authorities and other relevant agencies by providing advice on matters of security and preventing attacks on civil aviation. Within this highly formalized national network, top management from the Civil Aviation Authority, the National Police Directorate, the Norwegian Police Security Service, Avinor, the Norwegian National Security Authority, and other ministries meet regularly to discuss, assess and coordinate their aviation security operations'.

Maritime regulations – ISPS and the EU

Despite the explosive growth witnessed in aviation during the twentieth century, the maritime industry remains the backbone supporting international trade and globalization and is therefore vital to the (global) economy, as is demonstrated by the fact that around 80 percent of global trade, by volume, is still carried by sea (UNCTAD, 2019). As noted above, the maritime

industry and ports have long been bedeviled by crime and other illicit activities which have interrupted the flow of goods, capital and passengers. Because ports were integral to the development of cities (Porfyriou and Sepe, 2017), and because the advent of industrialization made them magnets for global trade and its concomitant risks, regulatory measures have long been in place to safeguard and protect the maritime industry.

One early intervention to make life at sea safer and more secure was the adoption of the first version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1914. In 1974, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is the UN specialized agency concerned with safety and security in the shipping and maritime sector, ratified a new version of SOLAS, making it the most important treaty dealing with maritime security and safety (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). It is important to notice that these "early" interventions and regulations were mainly concerned with the safety and security of ships, and not ports per se. Piracy and armed robbery targeting ships were indeed considered the main threat of the time. Eventually, however, the increasing threat of terrorism radically changed ideas about maritime port security (Eski, 2016a). The events of 9/11 sparked regulatory changes in this field, as they did elsewhere. There were, of course, other events directly affecting shipping that also contributed to the heightened awareness about port security, including the attacks on the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole in 2000 and the oil tanker Limburg in 2002. In the wake of these events, there was substantial pressure to revise the international maritime regulatory framework, led by the US; the US Coast Guard was a strong advocate for change. Thus, in December 2002, the IMO adopted security amendments to the SOLAS Convention that aimed to enhance maritime security (chapter XI-2); they included the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).

The ISPS came into force on July 1, 2004 and has since been the basis for a comprehensive mandatory and standardized security regime for the international maritime industry. The Code is divided into two sections: Part A and Part B. Part A is mandatory and sets out detailed security obligations that contracting governments, port authorities and shipping companies must adhere to, in order to comply with the Code. Part B offers several recommendatory guidelines. The ISPS Code applies to passenger ships (including high-speed passenger craft), cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and over, offshore mobile drilling units which are engaged on international voyages, and the port facilities serving such ships (ISPS Code, 2004, Regulation 3.1). The Code sets out to establish an international standardized framework for evaluating risk and security threats, and to help contracting governments, government agencies, local administrations and

the shipping and port industries to improve their methods of detecting and assessing potential security threats to ships or port facilities. To this end, the ISPS Code sets out appropriate security measures to respond to risks and threats that are identified by ship and port security assessments. The Code also helps to define the roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved in safeguarding maritime security in ports and on-board ship. For instance, it states that contracting governments are responsible for setting the appropriate security level, and provides guidance on protection from security incidents. The Code also lays down the foundation for conducting port facility security assessments (PFSA) and port facility security plans (PFSP), which are considered essential to uphold appropriate security levels and help implement preventive measures against security incidents and unlawful interference. In this area, the main components of the PFSA are the identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure which are in need of protection; the identification of possible threats to the assets and infrastructure, and evaluation of the likelihood they will occur; and the identification, selection and prioritization of countermeasures (ISPS Code, 2004, Regulation 15.5). The PFSP is concerned with measures and procedures designed to prevent or respond to security threats or breaches of security, and with how to conduct security checks and access control. The security threats and risks a port facility can face may vary depending on the nature of the port and port facility The PFSA and PFSP are specific to the facility in question, but the underlying logic of assessment and identification of risk and threats to a critical infrastructure is similar across all port facilities. An important task for the port facility security officer (PFSO) implementing the Code's security measures is to enhance and maintain security awareness among port facility personnel. The regulation seeks to guide how individuals act in terms of security, and to make sure that they understand the important role they play in securing the infrastructure of port facilities (ISPS Code, 2004, Regulation 17.2).

However, it is not only international bodies that seek to regulate the policing and security governance of the ports. In 2004 the EU introduced regulations designed to harmonize the interpretation and implementation of the IMO's guidelines (the SOLAS and ISPS codes) in all EU member states (Eski and Carpenter, 2013). The EU legislation is a combination of the preventive measures contained in the Regulation on enhancing ship and port facility security (Regulation (EC) No 725/2004), and the Directive on port security (Directive 2005/65/EC). The Regulation No 752/2004 makes part A of the ISPS Code mandatory in all EU member states. The EU regulatory regime goes beyond the international obligations, as it also makes mandatory several of the recommendations made in Part B of the ISPS Code. In Norway, the ISPS Code

and the EU regulations on ship and port security were adopted into the national law by the Regulations on Securing Port Facilities and the Regulations on Securing Ports, which both came into force on July 1, 2013, replacing the previous Regulations on Securing Ports and Port Terminals against Terrorist Attacks from 2004. The implementation of the ISPS Code and the EU regulations make it clear that collaboration between different agencies is required. For instance, as the first objective of the ISPS it is stated that the framework seeks to establish cooperation between contracting governments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries, in order to identify threats and take measures against security incidents. The delivery of security and policing of the maritime port environment thus inevitably involve collaborative relations between agencies.

2.4 Norwegian global hubs – pluralized responses to security issues

Before embarking on theoretical considerations and discussions in the next chapter, it will be useful to contextualize the complex and specific empirical settings of the airports and maritime ports that figure in this dissertation. Although these are briefly touched upon in the four articles that make up the dissertation, the article format limits the space available for in-depth description. This section will therefore give a more detailed outline of the institutional landscape of Norwegian airports and ports, paying attention to their historical development, operational capacity and economic importance, and the actors and roles that make these spaces unique in terms of policing and security.

Oslo airport – The main Norwegian aviation hub

The area where Oslo airport is now situated (Gardermoen) was for many years the site of a military training facility dating back to the mid-18th century. In the early 1900s, an airfield was built for military flights, with the first flight taking place in 1912 (Bredal, 1998). It was during the Second World War, however, when the Luftwaffe seized Gardermoen, that the airport really began to take shape, with the building of two runways, in addition to hangar facilities and other infrastructure. In the post-war period, the Royal Norwegian Air Force acquired the facilities at Gardermoen and built an air force station, which is still there today; it houses the transport squadron. In the following years, civilian traffic was handled at Gardermoen, mainly that of intercontinental and charter routes. However, it was just a secondary and reserve airport, since Oslo Airport Fornebu was the main airport for civilian traffic in the region from the 1930s until the late 1990s (Bredal, 1998). Due to the vast increase in air traffic during the 1980s and because Fornebu was located on a peninsula with limited space for expansion to meet future demand,

together with renewed political pressure[7], in 1992 it was decided that work should begin on a new main airport at Gardermoen, and that Fornebu should be closed.

The new main hub for aviation in Norway opened on October 8, 1998, with the departure of a Boeing 737-300 from Color Air. The airport is located about 40 km north of Oslo city center and is connected to the city by a high-speed railway, which was built at the same time as the airport. The connectivity by railway has made Oslo Airport among the best in Europe in terms of the percentage of passengers using public transport to and from the airport, this being around 70 percent[8]. During its first couple of years in operation, the airport handled over 14 million passengers per year, including both domestic and international traffic (Avinor, 2002). Over the next ten years it operated as the main hub for Norwegian aviation and the number of passengers grew steadily, and breaking a total of 20 million in 2011, when the airport handled 21 million passengers (Avinor, 2012). To cater for the vast growth in air passenger numbers, as well as for the explosive increase in air cargo – since the airport is a critical infrastructure for the national distribution and logistics network – it was decided that a major expansion was necessary. Work on expanding the arrivals and departures hall and building a new pier to improve capacity and efficiency started in 2011 and was completed in 2017, with the official opening on April 27[9]. However, to meet future demand arising from traffic volume and passenger growth – it was estimated there would be about 40 million passengers by 2030-35, including many from destinations outside of Schengen – and to meet the ambition to become the main international hub in the Nordic region, at present the non-Schengen space at the airport is being expanded. The work is expected to be completed in 2022, and thereafter police passport control will be more efficient, and there will be increased capacity to handle intercontinental flights[10].

As of today, the terminal building covers 265,000 square meters and the airport has 22,000 square meters of floor space for shops, restaurants and other service functions; it has 73 gates, of which 44 are bridge-connected. It has an operational capacity of 32 million passengers a year, and can handle 12,000 arriving and departing passengers per hour[11]. In 2019, Oslo airport handled nearly 28.6 million passengers, which made it one of the busiest airports in the Nordic

---

[7] In the post-war years and during the 1960s, political discussion arose concerning the siting of the main airport to serve the region of Oslo, with numerous solutions suggested: Gardermoen Air Station, Hurum, Hobøl, Ås and a divided operation between Fornebu and Gardermoen.

[8] https://avinor.no/en/corporate/airport/oslo/about-us/about-oslo-airport/about-oslo-airport, accessed 07.11.2020.

[9] https://avinor.no/en/corporate/airport/oslo/development/this-is-new/this-is-new, accessed 07.11.2020.

[10] https://avinor.no/en/corporate/airport/oslo/development/expansion-of-the-non-schengen-travel-area/, accessed 07.11.2020.

[11] https://avinor.no/en/corporate/airport/oslo/about-us/about-oslo-airport/tall-og-fakta (accessed 14.10.2020)

region, and thus a significant infrastructure for the economy and trade regime. Like the whole global aviation industry, Oslo airport has been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has led to a significant drop in passenger numbers in 2020, with just over 9 million passengers in total. In 2019, the airport handled over 180,000 tonnes of freight and mail. Compared with those of other modes of transportation, the air freight volumes are rather low, but the goods transported are generally high value and in need of speedy delivery: for example, the export of farmed salmon is dependent on a reliable and efficient logistics chain. Although the Norwegian aviation sector has been affected by neoliberal ideas, most airports (including Oslo) are still owned and operated by the state-owned limited company Avinor, which was established in 2003, and Oslo airport is therefore managed by a public entity. In 2019, the Avinor group's operating income was NOK 11.8 billion, and the revenues from Oslo airport alone totaled almost NOK 6 billion. The profit generated by Oslo Airport is crucial for funding the network of airports across the rest of Norway because it covers their operating deficits. Oslo's revenues are mainly derived from airline business, including fees for the use of Avinor's services, and commercial activities at the airport – rents from commercial tenants and direct sales to passengers. This demonstrates the significant role Oslo airport plays in facilitating and connecting local and global trade networks and acting as an important transport hub in the Nordic region

Government responsibility for civil aviation security has now become the norm. Although Avinor acts as an airport operator, it is highly dependent upon a number of other actors that have key roles in making the airport function optimally and ensuring that it is properly secured. In this way, the configuration of the security infrastructure at airports is undoubtedly pluralized, consisting as it does of multiple organizations and stakeholders spanning the public-private divide. As already mentioned, Avinor's role as the owner is to operate and develop a national network of airports for the civilian sector, and is therefore responsible for the administration and implementation of all aviation and airport security-related measures at the local level. In addition, Avinor is central to the process of ensuring that all companies operating at Oslo airport comply with the security regulations, and it is Avinor that is held accountable if any of these companies are not compliant with the regulations.

As Avinor is a state-owned limited company, the Ministry of Transport manages the government's ownership of it. In Norway, the Ministry of Transport has overall responsibility for the civil aviation sector, and the ministry participates in international organizations (e.g., the ICAO) to protect Norwegian interests in matters of aviation. Another important actor in the

Norwegian aviation sector is the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is an independent administrative agency responsible for adopting national and international aviation legislation and regulations. In addition, the agency has regulatory oversight responsibilities for all aspects of civil aviation in Norway, including security, and carries out audits, inspections, and supervision to ensure compliance among the many actors found in the sector, including airport operators, airlines, handling companies, cargo and freight companies, and private security companies. It also grants licenses and operating permits and certificates to organizations and individuals involved in aviation. For instance, in the system of regulated agents and known consignors of air cargo and mail, which facilitates trade by making sure that the disruptions of flows are kept at a minimum, the CAA is responsible for approving businesses that have applied to become a regulated agent or known consignor, after thorough examination of their security program and an inspection of their site. The CAA is governed by and reports to the Ministry of Transport, and together with the ministry, it also takes part in international organizations to promote Norwegian interests. Under the EU aviation legislation (Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008) and national legislation (The Aviation Act of 1993 and the Regulation concerning the prevention of unlawful interference against aviation security), the CAA is designated as the appropriate authority responsible for implementing common basic standards on aviation security. As the appropriate authority, the Civil Aviation Authority is required to draw up, apply and maintain a national civil aviation security program which sets out the common basic standards, and to describe the measures operators and entities are required to implement and follow.

While Avinor is responsible for the overarching operation and administration of Oslo airport, there are many actors whose activities are mainly directed at passengers (and airport employees); such businesses include restaurants, convenience stores, and other shops. These actors generally enter into contracts with Avinor locally in order to do business at the airport. Although not directly involved in the management of security, these businesses may be affected by crime, particularly theft. They are, therefore, involved in the security governance system and crime control at the airport, and are required to take the necessary measures to prevent losses. It should also be noted that all in-flight supplies and airport supplies, which are defined as items intended to be sold, used or made available in security restricted areas of the airport, must, in accordance with the security regulations, be screened or subjected to other security controls before being allowed into security restricted areas.

Moreover, some actors are directly involved in the operation of the airport and cooperate with Avinor – this includes airlines, handling companies, regulated agents, known consignors, and fuel and catering services. The EU legislation relating to aviation security, and thus also the national regulatory framework, apply to these actors, who are subject to controls and audits by the Civil Aviation Authority. In this regard, the actors are responsible for implementing appropriate security measures and procedures, and for training personnel, and they need to comply both with the regulations and with the national civil aviation security program. Handling agents at Oslo airport are crucial to the smooth running of airport operations, as they are responsible for services such as ramp and baggage services (e.g., aircraft loading/unloading, aircraft marshaling and pushback, refueling, catering trucks, passenger stairs, and baggage sorting), passenger check-in, departure and gate services, and cargo services. Handling agents are concerned with minimizing turnaround times, and set a high value on the imperatives of efficiency and speed. Previous studies have shown that handling agent personnel are among the groups most subject to airport security screenings (Olsvik, 2015), since during their working day they constantly move between airside and landside, and between security restricted areas and the frequent screening can cause additional strain for the personnel. Closely associated with the handling agents are the airlines that have their operational base at Oslo airport (e.g., Norwegian Air Shuttle and Scandinavian Airlines) and those that have the airport as their destination. To maintain aviation and airport security, the airlines have dedicated personnel working on it, and they too are subject to controls and inspections by the CAA.

Although, as an airport operator, Avinor is responsible for carrying out security screenings, checks and other relevant security measures in accordance with the regulations, they are allowed to outsource the security screening and checking of passengers, baggage and cargo to private actors, following an open bidding process that complies with the public procurement rules. At the time when the data for this study were collected, the private security company Nokas held the contract at Oslo airport, which they secured in 2008[12]. Nokas thus performs all types of security checks and controls in the airport facilities, including airside and landside patrols, screening of passengers, crew, airport employees, baggage and cargo, and control of access to the security restricted areas. Like other private actors with security responsibilities that operate at the airport, Nokas is subject to audits and inspections by the CAA, and if breaches

---

[12] G4S was awarded the contract for security at Oslo Airport in 2008. In 2013, however, Nokas signed an agreement to take over G4S businesses in Norway, which was approved and finalized in 2014.

or quality issues are discovered, it is Avinor, as the operator with overarching responsibility, that is held accountable by the CAA

As an important transportation hub for the flow of people and goods, Oslo airport is inevitably a border-crossing point that connects the national with the global. Border policing tasks are deemed crucial, and are driven by the desire to halt flows that are considered unwanted and that, in many respects, are made illegal through the process of criminalization. The practice of stopping flows at the border is a stratified phenomenon, which exhibits what others have framed as the process of distinguishing between "crimmigrant" bodies and bona fide travelers (Aas, 2011). Since Oslo airport is the main gateway into Norway and a point on the Schengen border and therefore part of the critical infrastructure as regards national security, the police are present there, in Gardermoen police station. The station is responsible for operational policing work such as emergency response and preparedness and the investigation of criminal cases at Oslo Airport. When the data were being collected in 2016 and 2017, border control was also one of Gardermoen police station's responsibilities. However, after the "Community police reform" and the reorganization of the Eastern police district, which includes Oslo airport and Gardermoen police station, in 2017 responsibility for border control at the airport was transferred to Immigration, Passports and Permits Department in the police district. Border policing is still conducted at the airport, however, and in addition to the police officers who carry out border control tasks, civilian border guards (border controllers) are employed by the police to perform first-line border checks, such as passport control.

As well as handling a large number of passengers, Oslo airport is of great importance because it facilitates a considerable volume of goods and cargo every year, as noted above. In order to secure and protect the legitimate trade network, Norwegian Customs plays a critical role in cross-border flow protection by preventing illegal imports and exports, and facilitating legal imports and exports by handling them efficiently. The efforts made by the Customs is considered to represent a vital contribution to Norway's public security, particularly as they carry out controls (at the border) on behalf of more than 30 public agencies. Moreover, Customs has played a crucial role in the implementation of the project "Domestic Transfer" at Oslo airport, which means that arriving passengers (travelling with Norwegian, SAS or Widerøe) from an international origin and continuing on a domestic flight (with the same airline) are allowed to move directly to the domestic departure terminal, without the need for re-screening of passengers and hold baggage. In this way, it is assumed that "Domestic Transfer" will speed up the flow of transfer passengers and baggage by removing duplication of security controls

and this can help improve passengers' experience of quicker and hassle-free connections. To meet these demands, the Customs has implemented several measures in order to uphold the quality in their control of passengers and their baggage.

At Oslo airport, the police and customs clearly have a shared interest in securing the border, and this makes collaborative practices inevitable. Together, they have established joint operations and task forces to police illicit cross-border flows, which are often connected with organized crime. These arrangements can perhaps be characterized as less formal relationships as they are often created to curtail a particular criminal activity or security threat at the airport, or arise from informal ties existing across organizational boundaries (e.g., a shared interest in a specific crime). Such collaborations arrangements are usually of a temporary nature. The two agencies are concerned with intelligence and information gathering at the airport, and they have therefore set up a formalized intelligence unit, comprising members of the police and customs.

Collaboration at Oslo airport, however, is not limited to public-public arrangements such as these. There are numerous public-private partnerships working to improve the policing and governance of security, ranging from strategic meetings for top management from relevant organizations to the simple exchange of information on a matter deemed important at a specific moment. These and similar collaborative efforts to police and secure the airport have been explored in depth in this dissertation to show the complexity of the governance of security and make sense of it.

This description has shown that the configuration of the Norwegian civil aviation system found in Oslo airport is very complex and multi-nodal, particularly with regard to the implementation of security measures. To complicate matters further, airports should be considered critical infrastructures in society, which means that aviation security is also part of national and societal security as a whole. Although not directly present at the airport, even more organizations are thus involved in securing airports and preventing acts of unlawful interference from taking place. Among these are the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Defense, the National Police Directorate, and the Norwegian Police Security Service.

The port of Stavanger and port of Kristiansand – the maritime gateways to Norway
In Norway, the coastline has long played a key role in shaping the pattern of settlements and the development of cities and communities, with strong concentrations of people to be found along the coast from north to south. Moreover, Norway has one of the longest coastlines in the world and the sea has always linked different parts of the country, with ships being used for the

domestic transport of people and goods over the centuries. As has often been pointed out, in pre-industrial societies, water cities were the predominant urban form and ports were generally integral parts of city building (Porfyriou and Sepe, 2017). In Norway, with its long coastline, seaports offered a diversity of possibilities, in terms of trade, transport and resources (e.g., fisheries). With industrialization, during the 18th and 19th centuries, the two examples dealt with in this dissertation – the ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand – developed quickly into important trading centers, thanks to their strategic geographical locations. Kristiansand in the South has easy access to the Skagerrak and Baltic Sea, while Stavanger in the Southwest faces the North Sea. Activity in the two ports has long been considerable, and crucial to the economic development of their surrounding regions. The shipping industry and port facilities helped to connect local markets to the national and global trade and transport systems. In the mid to late 1800s, Stavanger became one of the main centers for shipbuilding in Norway, thus strengthening its position as an important port city. Similarly, the strategic location of the port of Kristiansand meant that the Danish-Norwegian fleet controlled the trade routes across Skagerrak. Kristiansand was important for the import and export of goods and established itself as a critical quarantine station for the international trade fleet (Skeie and Moseng, 2009).

In the twentieth century, the two ports underwent considerable modernization as a result of technological advances and changes in shipping, such as the introduction of new lines of larger ships, which had different requirements regarding loading and unloading and other port services. From around 1960 there was increasing specialization and scaling up in the trade, and to support this, new forms of logistics emerged (e.g., containerization, supply-chains, just-in-time production) (Mutlu, 2015), which in turn affected the Norwegian port environment. In order to adapt to these developments, significant investments were made to improve the infrastructure of the ports, and to build new facilities. The port of Stavanger was also greatly affected by the discovery in 1969 of oil in the Ekofisk field in the North Sea, which is regarded as the starting point of the Norwegian oil adventure and which made Stavanger into the "Oil Capital of Norway".

Today Stavanger and Kristiansand are modern ports with state-of-the-art facilities, which handle everything from cruise and ferry traffic to cargo, container and offshore traffic. The two ports are also considered to have a special place in the overall transport network of Norway, as can be seen from the fact that they have been given the status of designated ports by the Ministry of Transport, which means that they are particularly important for the development of safe and efficient transport of people and goods by sea. In Norway, public ownership of ports is the

norm, and most ports are organized as municipal enterprises. In 2000, the port of Stavanger was set up as an inter-municipal company, and is currently owned by the municipalities of Stavanger (81.88%), Sola (16.75%) and Randaberg (1.36%). From 1970 the port adapted to engaging in more offshore-related activities, while at the same time continuing to carry out traditional port business. In particular, the port started to develop the Risavika facilities, which were designed to be the center of many of the port's activities. These now include the international ferry terminal, the container terminal, and Northern Europe's largest oil and gas cluster, with its offshore terminal. While the offshore and cargo industries play a crucial role in the economy of the region, the port of Stavanger is also Norway's second-largest cruise destination; 234 ships called there in 2019, carrying 460,000 passengers. The cruise terminal is located in the heart of Stavanger city center. The port of Stavanger has numerous operating berths at different terminals and has more than 5,500 meters of quayside. In 2019, the total number of vessels calling at Stavanger (at just the public port facilities) was 9,164, with offshore vessels accounting for 33 percent of these.

In 2004, the port of Kristiansand too was established as a municipal enterprise. Its location in southern Norway and proximity to Europe, make it an important hub and a bridge to European markets for the import and export of goods. With 19 operating berths, the port provides all the facilities necessary to ensure the efficient flow of goods and people in the region. It includes a ferry terminal, container terminal, cruise terminal, wet/dry bulk terminal, general cargo terminal and offshore/supply terminal. In 2019, the total number of vessels calling at Kristiansand was 1,907. The ferry terminal is the second busiest in Norway, serving more than 1.2 million passengers annually, and there are several daily crossings between Hirtshals (Denmark) and Kristiansand. Like the port of Stavanger, Kristiansand has also been affected by the offshore industry, and some of the world's leading offshore supply companies are located there. To meet the demands of the offshore industry, port of Kristiansand has established a modern offshore supply terminal.

These public enterprises operate as landlord ports,[13] in the sense that they have overarching responsibility for the administration and maintenance of their port facilities and infrastructure. However, they lease port terminals and facilities to private operating companies, and are therefore seen as the port authority, with which private actors need to enter into a contract in

---

[13] One can differentiate between two classifications in the organization and administration of ports – operating ports and landlord ports. At a landlord port, the entity which owns the land of the port leases its facilities and space to private operators (Pate, Taylor and Kubu, 2007).

order to operate. Although they mainly lease their facilities and terminals to private customers and operators, in certain situations the two ports do operate in their own facilities. In the regions of both Stavanger and Kristiansand there are also some private ports, owned and operated by private companies. In Stavanger, for example, the company NorSea provides supply bases and integrated logistics solutions to the energy industry and operates its own port facilities at Dusavik and Tananger. Regardless of the type of ownership involved, any port facilities that want to serve vessels engaged in international voyages, including passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and over, and mobile offshore drilling units, are bound by the ISPS Code, and must comply with the security measures outlined in the regulations.

While the ports are owned and administered by the public port authority, other industry stakeholders also have key roles in their operation. As already noted, the ports examined in this dissertation lease their terminals to private companies, which then act as terminal operators. In Kristiansand, the two ferry companies Color Line and Fjord Line operate the ferry terminal, and this includes ensuring the efficient flow of passengers and cargo. The container terminal is operated by Greencarrier Freight Services and Seafront Port Services, which provide quayside storage, loading/unloading services, and other logistics solutions. Similarly, Fjord Line operates the Stavanger ferry terminal, while the container terminal is operated by Westport, which provides what is needed for the efficient handling of cargo and containers. Although these actors are mainly concerned with port activities and maintaining the efficiency in the flow of people and goods, they are also embedded, albeit indirectly, in the ports' security infrastructure. There are thus many private companies that, together with the port authority, have responsibilities for the application of maritime security regulatory regime measures that are designed to protect and secure the port facility and ships, persons and cargo.

The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) is considered the competent authority for maritime security, and is thus responsible for coordinating, implementing and monitoring the application of the security measures laid down in the European version of the ISPS code (through Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004). In order to ensure compliance with the Regulation, the NCA conducts regular audits and inspections of port operators and facilities, carries out the supervision of actors, and distributes information on security concerns. If a port or port facility is found to be non-compliant, they are not allowed to receive ships that require ISPS-approved facilities and must cease their activities. The NCA also approves the port facility security plan, which details the security measures that must be implemented in a particular port. They also have responsibility for deciding the security level for the maritime sector (on a scale of 1 to 3).

Like the aviation sector, the NCA, together with the Ministry of Transport, participates in international organizations and forums in order to exert influence and promote Norwegian maritime interests. The Coastal Administration is also concerned with the follow-up of inspections by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA).

As a consequence of the stringent maritime security regulations, new markets for security services are emerging. Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) have been established and act as intermediaries between the government (Coastal Administration) and port facilities. In order to become a RSO, approval by the NCA is required, after submitting an application and meeting the requirements laid out in the regulation. A RSO often carries out port facility security assessments and provides assistance and advice to its customers (usually port operators) on port security matters. In Stavanger and Kristiansand various RSOs operate. The main actor is Nordic Crisis Management and this company has a contract with the authorities in the two ports and with numerous terminal operators. In the two ports under investigation, various security-related activities are outsourced to private security companies, including gate and access control to port terminals and facilities. When this study was conducted, Securitas held the contract with the port of Stavanger to carry out various security activities in its facilities. This means that Securitas provides ISPS-approved security guards to conduct access control at the terminal gates, regularly checks that fences around the perimeters of the port are not breached or damaged, and patrols and monitors restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access to them. In the ferry terminal in Stavanger, the private security company is also responsible for passenger and vehicle control. Similar arrangements are found in the port of Kristiansand, where Nokas had the contract with the port authority at the time when the data collection was conducted.

Although the police are not directly involved in the implementation of security measures laid down by the ISPS code, they still have an important role in the governance of port security. Ports are viewed as critical infrastructure and as being crucial to the Norwegian transportation network; they therefore require protection against the risks associated with this type of infrastructure. This is made clear by the large-scale exercises that are carried out in the ports to test separate parts of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), in which the police – along with many other actors – may take part. As the maritime security regulation was put in place in response to the events of 9/11 and is often considered as "archetypal War on Terror legislation" (Eski, 2016b), the police are mainly concerned with exercises connected with anti-terror responses on ships and in port facilities. Stavanger and Kristiansand, being important gateways

to Norway, are therefore border-crossing points, which see the arrival of passenger, cruise and cargo ships, and this means that the police have border control tasks at the sea border to perform. The whole Norwegian coastline is defined as a Schengen external border (separated by the crossing of territorial waters). The police therefore seek to prevent illegal border crossings and cross-border crime, by means of entry and exit controls and through monitoring the Schengen external border. In the maritime setting and according to the Schengen Borders Code, however, regular internal ferry connections between the same two or more ports in Schengen Member States are exempt from regular control. Nonetheless, all vessels arriving from ports outside of Norway are required to submit information to the police regarding the vessel and all persons (crew and passengers) on board. Given that the two ports are important hubs for the import and export of goods, Norwegian Customs is also present in the port security environment. As in the aviation sector, the main aim is cross-border flow protection.

Transport companies are considered to play an important role in the smooth operation of ports (Brewer, 2014), as many of the companies operating in port facilities are dependent on the delivery and collection of goods by truck. In the ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand, the daily traffic of transport companies to and from the facilities is considerable. Because of the implementation of the ISPS code, however, port facilities have been fenced off and access has been restricted, which can impede the free flow of transport traffic. In Norwegian ports, to stop access or gate controls acting as bottlenecks, there is a system whereby businesses can enter into a security contract with the port authority. The transportation of goods involves many regular actors and suppliers, who enter and exit and move around the port. To simplify the operation, transport companies can get a security clearance or contract, which transfers responsibility for control to the transport companies and they secure the trucks, and goods before they enter the port.

As this description shows, the security environment of the two ports is complex and involves a large number of public and private actors, who directly or indirectly have a stake in the governance of maritime security. Within such complex environments, collaborative responses to security issues become inevitable. The collaborative efforts in Stavanger and Kristiansand share many similarities with what happens in the aviation sector. There are thus several local inter-agency and public-private partnerships and networks on the waterfronts, which are concerned with security and crime. In general, public-private collaboration is based on voluntary initiatives to share important information. Because of their informal character, they evolve rapidly, and their exact nature varies according to circumstances. At the national level,

there are informal forums where governmental and regulatory authorities and industry stakeholders (e.g., port authorities) can meet. The Norwegian Coastal Administration, for instance, hosts meetings for port facility security officers (PFSO), where various aspects of port security are discussed, analyzed, and evaluated.

2.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has provided a thorough description of the empirical context of the plural policing and security governance explored in this dissertation. The first part offered a historical outline of the parts played by public and private policing agencies in Norway, and pointed to a general trend towards pluralization. As the global hubs examined in this study are part of complex regulatory security regimes, the chapter also described the framework that regulates aviation and maritime security, providing information about regulations that may affect how security and policing agencies work within Norwegian port and airport environments. To situate the exploration of the way policing agencies experience and perceive their everyday practices and collaborative relations, the last section sought to contextualize the distinct institutional landscape of the airports and maritime ports that figure in this dissertation, with a particular focus on their historical development, operational capacity and economic importance, together with their personnel and their roles. In line with van Stokkom and Terpstra (2018) and Lum and Fyfe (2015), the outline of the empirical settings of Norwegian global hubs in this chapter recognizes the importance of being sensitive to contextual and institutional factors in analyses, by taking into account their local traditions and practices.

3. Theoretical perspectives – Security governance, network governance and collaboration

While the previous chapter laid out the empirical context of the dissertation, this chapter outlines the theoretical concepts and considerations relevant to the four articles that make up this study and their emphasis on exploring how policing agencies at global hubs such as airports and maritime ports experience and perceive their everyday practices and collaborative relations. While the perspectives of nodal governance and anchored pluralism drawn from plural policing and security governance studies serve as the primary inspiration for the empirical analysis of this dissertation, I also draw on the conceptualizations of everyday security, network theory and collaboration in order to describe and examine the way in which actors operating at global hubs experience and perceive their practices. These perspectives have been crucial in informing the theoretical understanding that has shaped my empirical exploration of policing at global hubs. By discussing and connecting the concepts of security governance, the everyday and networks and collaboration, the chapter seeks to offer a sound analytical framework for unpacking policing and security practices at global hubs. This will also help to underline how the four articles connect and overlap in their conceptualizations and empirical and theoretical contributions, and how they help shed light on the overall research objective presented in the introduction. As the binding concept of security plays a fundamental role in this dissertation, the first section will outline relevant conceptualizations of security, emphasizing particularly ones from the fields of criminology and international relations.

3.1 Conceptualizing security – criminology and International relations

Security is a peculiar phenomenon. It is perceived as both complex and ambiguous, since it conveys a wide diversity of meanings. Notwithstanding its apparent complexity, however, security is a key concept within political and academic debates throughout the world. Security is to be found everywhere (Bourbeau, 2015a), from the trivialities of locking one's front door or buying home security systems to state police forces or military defense. It also encompasses processes and projects that move beyond such defensive efforts, in the sense that some social problems have been drawn into its domain and are now framed as security issues (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011; Valverde, 2011). While such issues may be local or national context, because, in the era of "late modernity" or "liquid modernity" (Bauman, 2000), the world has become more interconnected, their consequences may also impact the international and global spheres. This is part of the multifaceted and fluid nature of security, and its capacity to cut across disciplinary boundaries (Bourbeau, 2015b). Given its many different meanings, it is

claimed that security is a contested and difficult term to pin down (Herington, 2015; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Zedner, 2009). The contestedness of security, it is argued, "arises naturally as the meaning of security is not an ontological given, but changes across time" (Floyd, 2007: 333). This contested nature thus invites empirical and conceptual exploration of the various meanings of security and processes related to its governance, and of the circumstances under which the polysemy of security comes into existence.

Contemporary understandings of security are the product of a long and complex development, whose early stages can be found in the writings of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Herington, 2015; Zedner, 2009; Åtland, 2008). From that period, through the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment until the twenty-first century, there have been remarkable changes in the content and understanding of security. Some argue that the term can used to describe more than one facet of our lives (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) – it may refer to our personal or physical security, or to our emotional, psychological or financial security. Of course, one's understanding of the concept depends in large part upon the discipline one is involved in. In this sense, views of it vary across academic fields, and security has been the subject of a variety of disciplines, including International Relations (IR), criminology, sociology, law, geography, anthropology, and economics (Bourbeau, 2015b).

Criminology and international relations have been concerned with the complex concept of security for some time, and have given it a wide diversity of meanings. It thus seems reasonable to suggest that the effort to study and conceptualize security requires interdisciplinarity (Loader and Percy, 2012). It has been argued that security is too big an idea to be constrained by the strictures of any single discipline (Zedner, 2009), and one should strive to avoid the academic silos of different epistemological, ontological and methodological interests. Within the criminological discourse of security, it has been suggested that criminology "needs to engage more explicitly than it has done thus far with existing genres of security scholarship" (Zedner, 2009: 48). The area of this dissertation's empirical focus – policing and security of global hubs – is characterized by threats and risks and security and control measures that are neither purely internal nor purely external, which means they often transcend the academic boundaries between criminology and international relations. Conceptualizations of security found in criminology and IR are of particular importance to make sense of and contextualize the security configurations observed at global hubs in this dissertation. In the following, I will briefly outline how the concept of security is understood in the fields of criminology and IR, and will point

out the commonalities that exists between the two and how they relate to the policing and security governance of global hubs.

Criminology – crime, risk and security

Criminologists are often considered as latecomers to the study of security, as it is only in the last two decades or so that security has really become a concern at the top of the criminological research agenda. This can be seen from a number of studies produced during the early 2000s, in which prominent scholars of criminology made important advances in the understanding of security (Loader and Walker, 2007; Schuilenburg, van Steden and Oude Breuil, 2014; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Zedner, 2009). Before then, criminology was concerned with the Hobbesian perspective of interpersonal safety (Froestad, Shearing and van der Merwe, 2015), with security mainly being examined in relation to crime and the criminal justice system designed to respond to criminal wrongs. Accordingly, it is suggested that this traditional "crime focus" has meant that it is *crime* rather than *security* that has been the main interest (Froestad, Shearing and van der Merwe, 2015). In this regard, the concept of security was not an object for criminological inquiry, and its main concern long remained the analysis and critique of dimensions of social control (Loader, 2014).

This way of making sense of security in the criminological field has changed, and one key factor in this development seems to be the concept of risk. Since the mid-1950s, societal changes have sparked an interest in the concepts of risk and fear, which gained further traction from the 1980s onwards, leading scholars to characterize the contemporary world as a risk society (Beck, 1992, 1999). Some even claim that risk is becoming the dominant concept of Western security (Vedby Rasmussen, 2001). This has also influenced the scholarship of criminology, where the increased emphasis on conceptualizing security reflects closer attention to the insecurity and uncertainty that shape the everyday and social life of the 21st century. This view can also be seen in relation to a new paradigm that has developed, described as a shift "from criminal justice state to security society" (Zedner, 2003: 176; see also Zedner, 2007; 2009). The change has led to increased emphasis being placed on the view that security should be about addressing and managing the conditions prior to crimes occur, to forestall security problems and issues – an approach which is bound by risk-oriented thinking. The implications of these developments for security and its governance have been explored in the criminological literature (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; O'Malley, 2004; Simon, 2007). In this way, the element of risk and pre-crime logics have been instrumental in shifting the focus away from the traditional crime paradigm towards security, and different ways of governing it (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; McCulloch

and Pickering, 2009; Valverde, 2001, 2011; Zedner, 2007). With regard to the global hubs examined in this dissertation, risk, preemption, and instrumental logics of security seem to be of particular importance, as previous studies have pointed out the proliferation of risk-based strategies in aviation and maritime security post 9/11 (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Salter, 2007, 2008b).

In the field of criminology, the distinction between objective and subjective security is considered to be of great importance (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Zedner, 2003, 2009). Security can refer either to the objective state of not being threatened and of having protection against threats, or to the subjective condition of being free from anxiety that originates from threats. An important point regarding the objective and subjective dimension of security is that, even if one achieves an absence of threats today, one always has to look out for new threats tomorrow – security is marked by a distinct temporal quality (Zedner, 2009). In the pursuit of security, one will have to engage in a constant struggle against future (unknown) threats in order to feel secure. The pursuit of security undoubtedly affects individuals and their perception of safety, but it also has implications for the wide range of actors who produce and deliver security, in that they have to be ready to identify and mitigate future threats and security risks.

International relations – national security and securitization

For several decades, the academic attention devoted to security, both theoretically and empirically, has primarily been in the field of classical political science disciplines (Buzan, 1991; Kolodziej, 2005; Zedner, 2009), and security has been a major concern for international relations (Bourbeau, Balzacq and Cavelty, 2015). In international relations literature, the notion of security has been influenced by what can be characterized as a national dimension, with *the state* being the main referent object (Kolodziej, 2005). The dominant conception of security was for many years that of national or military security, to which the major threat came from other nation-states. There was seen to be a close connection between the sovereign state and security initiatives, and security studies were frequently defined as "the study of the threat, use and control of military force" (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988; Walt, 1991: 212). This traditional framing of security is associated with the neorealist paradigm of international relations (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Waltz, 1979).

In the last three decades, however, security scholars have challenged this dominant understanding of security, whose referent object is the nation-state; the traditional view was considered inadequate to fully capture the new landscape of security issues. Following the

widening of the debate in IR (Bourbeau, Balzacq and Cavelty, 2015; Burgess, 2010; Krause and Williams, 1996; Tarry, 1999), new research themes were explored, such as the economy, the environment, and health and society, which meant that discussion moved beyond viewing security as the study of threat and the use of military force. These changes also meant the debate on security moved beyond state-centric perspectives (Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver, 1998).

A critical strand of literature has developed, which adopts a constructivist take on security. In broad terms, constructivists draw on social theories of security and take culture, norms, and identity as important theoretical lenses to analyze and explain security policies and issues (Katzenstein, 1996). The critical constructivist perspective often connects to the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization, which sees security as a process of speech acts, where security issues are constructed through and influenced by the power of language. In essence, this means that securitization involves the identification and formulation of threats and the placement of these on the political or public agenda. In this approach to security, an increasing number of issues are framed through the lens of "security" and thus offer legitimation for the use of extraordinary or exceptional measures (Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver, 1998; Wæver, 1995). Critical security studies have explored how various issues depart from "normal politics". This has enabled broader understandings of security issues and threats to flourish and seems to shape the current landscape of security debates.

Such exploration of exceptional measures that are justified in the name of security is similar to the work of Carl Schmitt (2005 [1922]) and more recently, that of Giorgio Agamben (2005) on states of exception, where the rule of law is suspended to make possible extraordinary means. There has been a lively discussion of the notion of exception in international studies (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Huysmans, 2008), and this has sparked conceptual exploration of the relationships between exceptionalism, sovereignty and security (Aradau and van Munster, 2009; Burles, 2016; Murphy, 2019a, 2019b). In the post 9/11 environment, the "war on terror" discourse has led to the implementation of widespread exceptional security practices, as has recently been seen in France, for example (de Massol de Rebetz and van der Woude, 2020), and as noted in the introduction, global hubs are clearly affected by the securitization that derives from this discourse, and the increasing pressure to adopt stringent security measures.

Commonalities across disciplines – the internal and external nature of security
Traditionally, the dividing line between internal and external security was clearly marked. Challenges to a state's internal, domestic security were to do with crime, protection, and law

and order inside the boundaries of the state, whilst the external security involved threats arising from other states, that is, on the possibility of war between states and defense and deterrence. The role played by security actors, mainly law enforcement agencies on the one hand, and the military on the other, served to distinguish the two domains. The distinction between internal and external security seems to have been further reinforced by the research interests of different disciplines, with international relations being mainly concerned with conflicts between states, while criminology has tended to focus on crimes within the state.

Recently, due to increased blurring of internal and external threats there have been important developments, particularly in the work of Loader and Percy (2012), Bourbeau (2014, 2015b), Crawford and Hutchinson (2016a), and Bigo (2016), which pave the way for academic discussion of security that bridges the disciplinary dividing line between international relations and criminology. It is suggested that the contemporary security environment has changed significantly such that security and threats are no longer categorized according to simple distinctions between "inside" and "outside", "war" and "crime", and "public" and "private" (Loader and Percy, 2012: 214). There is now a growing body of literature suggesting a blurring of the once sharp distinction between the internal and external domains of security (Avant and Haufler, 2012; Bigo, 2001; Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009; Lutterbeck, 2004; Schroeder, 2011; Weiss, 2011).

As regards security at global hubs, the challenges now faced by airports and maritime ports can in many ways be thought of as "transboundary security issues" (Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009), meaning that the security landscape is characterized by threats and concerns that are neither purely internal nor external, but rather transnational (Lutterbeck, 2005). Several observers have pointed out that criminality in global hubs ranges from the involvement of workers in illicit activities such as theft to organized and complex trafficking of drugs, weapons or human beings, as well as piracy and terrorist activities (Eski, 2016a; Eski and Buijt, 2017; Hoijtink, 2017; Leese, 2016; Leese and Koenigseder, 2015; Salter, 2008d; Schouten, 2014; Sergi, 2020a, 2020b). In a sense, then, global hubs are symbolic spaces where globalization meets the nation-state; they have been said to be "a specific kind of urban context where it's possible to observe local and global changes at the same time" (Sergi, 2020b: 2). One important aspect of these transboundary security issues is that they not only cross geographical and spatial boundaries, but also affect the way in which security actors operate. That is, the division of work between internal and external security actors has been challenged. Traditional military approaches have to some extent been expanded to include crime-fighting and humanitarian initiatives, while a

certain degree of militarization of policing tasks can also be observed (Burgess, 2009; Franko, 2020; Lutterbeck, 2005; Schroeder, 2011). The pluralization of security governance and policing, which was described in the previous chapter, has also contributed to the blurring of the internal and the external, which has made policing and security governance at global hubs increasingly complex.

3.2 The analytical perspectives of security governance and policing seen through the everyday

Notwithstanding the importance of the conceptual discussions of security outlined above, one major challenge seems to remain in the existing scholarship – that is, the need for perspectives and conditions that will make it possible to examine security from an empirical point of view. It has, for instance, been argued that "criminologists must insist on the importance of empirical enquiry that scrutinizes a priori assumptions" with regard to security (Shearing and Johnston, 2010: 496). That is, there is a need for empirical inquiry into how security is experienced and what security entails at the practical level for those involved. However, as noted by Valverde (2011), one should be careful to assume that security actually exists as a thing at all, ready to be observed and measured directly. Instead, to make sense of security, it is suggested that attention needs to be turned to what people or organizations are doing in the name of security, that is, that one should focus on the "practices of governance that in fact appeal to 'security'" (Valverde, 2011: 5; see also Valverde, 2014). To fully grasp the nature of security and policing processes in this context, which is the aim of this dissertation, it is suggested that they should be studied in practice (Côté-Boucher, 2018; Côté-Boucher, Infantino and Salter, 2014; Loftus, 2015), which also connects to the constructivist approaches to security found in the field of international relations (Balzacq et al., 2010).

This dissertation takes seriously Valverde's suggestion that governance should be studied as practices that appeal to security, because it provides a unique way to open empirical material to investigation, and therefore serves as an important analytical tool for unpacking the complexities of the experience of security governance and policing of actors in global hubs. The concept of practice was therefore important in the construction of the research questions set out in the introduction above, which guided the dissertation's empirical investigations. This approach was inspired by the belief that "much can be gained by exploring how practices of security governance are experienced by different people and groups 'on the ground'" (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016b: 1185). In this dissertation, giving analytical attention to practice is

considered valuable for capturing both collaborative structures and actors' guiding mentalities and their implications for the governance of security.

Along with the "practice turn", everyday security as an analytical lens has recently been embraced in criminology and international relations. Taking the everyday as a framework is useful when examining the policing of global hubs, as it is a way to situate empirical analysis of security practices and actors' lived experience and the quotidian actions involved in the construction of security (Bigo, 2002, 2006; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016b; Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; Huysmans, 2009). In the course of the above discussion of the conceptualization of security, it was noted that securitization has received considerable scholarly attention and has also affected how security processes at global hubs function in practice (especially those to do with risk management and instrumental thinking). Although these studies offer valuable insights into the exceptionality of security, it has been suggested that concentrating on securitization has a tendency to neglect the everyday micro-practices or micro-politics of (in)security (Aas, Gundhus and Lomell, 2009; Bigo, 2006; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016b). Arguments have therefore been put forward for moving attention from "spectacular" and "exceptional" events to the mundane, everyday nature of security practice. Such an approach breaks with traditional imageries of the international as the "realm of exceptional events" (Guillaume, 2011: 459), since it implies that security is not only about exceptional politics. Thus, the everyday is concerned with understanding the construction, experience and articulation of (in)security by particular (ordinary) individuals and groups (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016).

Responding to this, and given that the security discourse of exceptional threats is omnipresent in the aviation and maritime industries, the dissertation suggests that using the notion of the everyday is a helpful way to offer detailed empirical descriptions of security practices on the ground. Thinking in terms of everyday security has therefore informed my empirical investigation and been valuable for framing analysis of actors' experiences and perceptions of collaborative relations and practices. Thus, the dissertation argues, along with Crawford and Hutchinson (2016), that the everyday has great analytical value and enables rigorous analyses of security governance practices.

In criminology, when (everyday) security practices are addressed and explored, this is commonly done in relation to policing endeavors (Hoogenboom, 2010). However, the notion of policing is often associated with the institution of the police. This "conflation of policing

with the activities of state police" (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 10) may limit the ability to understand and capture the plurality of actors involved in contemporary practices. Several observers have therefore stressed the importance of uncoupling the institution of the police from policing as practices (Johnston and Shearing, 2003), so as to enable consideration of the plethora of actors now involved in producing, delivering, and governing security – which is also a factor affecting the environment of airports and ports, as was described in the previous chapter. Increasing attention has thus been paid to the governance of security (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Dupont, 2006). This may be conceived of as the intentional activities or "actions designed to shape events so as to create 'spaces' in which people can live, work and play" securely (Wood and Shearing, 2007: 7), and examining security governance therefore means focusing on these activities as a way of performing and practicing policing, instead of fixating on the actors conducting them.

This way of conceptualizing security governance clearly draws inspiration from the governance perspective found in the political science literature (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Ostrom, 2010; Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 2007), which points out the analytical potential of using the notion of governance to make sense of the changing boundaries between the public and private sectors, and to capture the decentered nature of governance processes. But it also connects to Valverde's approach (2011), which emphasizes the importance of paying attention to governance practices that appeal to security, in the sense that the governance of security is more concerned with describing policing endeavors as practices. While this dissertation engages with and seeks to add to the literature of plural policing, it still values the governance of security perspective as a way of thinking about the contribution made by the multiple actors involved in policing global hubs.

Consequently, the framing of security and policing as practices of governance has fostered the development of new analytical perspectives to unpack the way in which actors operate and relate to one another. As noted in the introduction, in the field of criminology, two of the most prominent theoretical approaches have been nodal governance and state anchored pluralism. These two have been highly influential for my own conceptual thinking and in informing the analytical perspectives of this dissertation. Although not all the individual articles in this dissertation make explicit reference to these perspectives, they have still been crucial in the analytical processes. The next sections will therefore outline the features of these perspectives and explicate how they have informed and guided the empirical exploration and analysis of policing global hubs that this dissertation addresses.

Nodal governance – nodes, networks and the internal characteristics of actors

In a series of works, Clifford Shearing and colleagues develop the "nodal governance" approach to capture the plurality of the contemporary security and policing environment (Burris, 2004; Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing, 2001a, 2006; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood, 2006; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Nodal governance scholars argue that it is crucial to move beyond top-down and state-centered conceptions of governance practices, which have long been understood as the dominant modes of governing, to capture the plurality of contemporary governance arrangements. Thus, within the nodal perspective, no set of actors is given conceptual priority, and a central requirement is that the exact composition of the actors and their contribution to governance practices should be considered as an empirical question (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003). Such empirical inquiry has the potential to capture the way in which governance practices and configurations evolve will vary across time and space, which also underscores the importance of exploring numerous contexts of security and policing. It is important to note, however, that although the exact composition and positioning of governing actors is assumed to be an "empirical open question", some argue that this perspective puts forward "claims that verge upon state-sceptic ideas and ideals" (Boutellier and Van Steden, 2011: 465), and thus makes certain normative assumptions. Nonetheless, nodal governance has emerged as a significant framework for considering heterogeneous and interconnected governing actors (Quéro and Dupont, 2019). Given the aims of this dissertation, the nodal perspective is seen as a particularly suitable analytical tool to make sense of the empirical context of security and policing at global hubs where there are numerous actors representing different interests.

The nodal governance approach draws inspiration from the network society theory developed by Manuel Castells (1996, 2000), and, in particular, from the way in which it defines networks: "A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point where the curve intersects itself" (Castells, 2000: 15). The nodal perspective accepts, and indeed insists on this, and nodal scholars thus take the notion of *nodes* as the focal point of reference in their analyses of governance processes and practices (Huey, 2008). The framework of "nodal governance is intended to enrich network theory by focusing attention on and bringing more clarity to the internal characteristics of nodes and thus to the analysis of how power is actually created and exercised within a social system" (Burris, 2004: 341). The main reason for holding such an ambition is that the conception of network, in Castells' accounts, seems to downplay the importance of how the internal characteristics may allow nodes to exert influence across

networks (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005: 37). In doing so, the nodal approach places the emphasis on the internal characteristics of nodes rather than on the networks themselves, which accords with the ambitions of this dissertation to unpack the nature of governance practices, the capacities of individual security actors and the linkages and network responses between them.

Another key element of nodal governance, which also distinguishes it from the network theory, is that the approach does not assume that nodes are integrated within a network. It rather regards this idea to be explored empirically, as nodes may decide not to come together to form network assemblages at all (Dupont and Wood, 2007; Fleming and Wood, 2006; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Developing a nodal perspective thus helps to "provide a conceptual architecture for analyzing trends in governance that is equally comfortable with the idea that governance can be contested and uncoordinated as it is with the idea that it can be cooperative and coordinated" (Wood and Shearing, 2007: 28). One assumption in the nodal perspective is that the characteristics of the nodes affect the development of network relations and collaborative ties. However, as Ayling, Grabosky and Shearing (2009) point out, these relations also seem to affect the internal characteristics of nodes. This means that there is a dynamic connection between the characteristics of nodes and the development of relational linkages. In the context of this dissertation, the dynamic connection is considered to be highly significant for the analysis as a whole, but it is of particular significance for the **first article**, where the notion of public-private, the interaction between differing interests and the possible impact this has on collaborative relations are examined in detail, and for the **second article**, which addresses empirically the relational structures of two security networks and examines how network power and resources are affected by actors' mentalities and the sector they belong to.

In the nodal perspective, governing nodes are understood as the organizational sites of governance practices where attempts are made to intentionally shape the flow of events so as to bring about secure environments and outcomes. Nodes are assumed to have four essential characteristics: mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional structures (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Setting about a "nodal mapping", then, requires that the empirical investigation of these four principal elements should be valued and taken seriously (Holley and Shearing, 2017; Wood, 2006). Regarding this attention paid to the internal characteristics of nodes, it is possible to recognize a connection with the strand of literature which is known as post-Foucauldian governmentality studies (Mckee, 2009; Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, O'Malley and Valverde, 2006; Valverde, 2011, 2014). In this respect, some would argue that the nodal governance framework locates itself nicely within and draws on the

conceptions of power and governance outlined by Foucault (Shearing, 2006; Wood and Shearing, 2007).

In this dissertation, thinking in terms of the internal characteristics of nodes has undoubtedly motivated the empirical investigation and also influenced the way in which experiences of everyday practices of policing and security in global hubs have been analyzed. In addition to motivating and structuring the analysis, the perspective of nodal governance has also important methodological implications for the study, since extensive empirical data on security actors' practices and their way of thinking about them are needed to fully capture the essence of security governance in global hubs. How this has been achieved will be further explained in the next chapter, which deals with the research design. As the four articles making up the dissertation are viewed as self-standing, with each making its own distinct contribution to the literature, not all aspects of the nodal approach and its internal characteristics are considered relevant to all of the articles. When the four internal characteristics are set against the context and aims of this dissertation, it is obvious that the notion of mentalities has had the greatest bearing on the research question addressed, as can be seen in the **third** and **fourth articles**. Mentalities are also of relevance to the collaborative activities examined in the **first two articles**. In what follows, I will therefore explicate how the four characteristics, with a particular emphasis on mentalities, are relevant and make clear how these concepts have been utilized in the empirical investigation of this dissertation.

The first of the four – mentality – is considered the most significant dimension of governance, and denotes the mental framework that shapes how we think about and see the world (Froestad, Grimwood, Herbstein and Shearing, 2015; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). In terms of the nodal approach, the governing mentality is the way the issues that the node has emerged to govern are thought about (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). It thus seeks to capture the culture of the node and "operates to bring coherence and thus enable longevity and collective action within the node" (Burris, 2004: 342). Its mentality, therefore, is the way a node conceives of its purpose and role within the broader environment (Martin, 2013). With this in mind, a mentality is assumed to be capable of influencing the everyday practices of nodes, which indicates how the nodal approach, as utilized in this dissertation, is a valuable analytical framework for studying governance as practices that appeal to security.

In the security governance literature, some observers have delved into the mentalities that seem to be operating in governing nodes of security, and two important ones are identified – a

punishment mentality and a risk mentality (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Zedner, 2009). The punishment mentality is characterized by reactive strategies based on punishment, reaction and retribution in response to wrongdoing (crime), and is generally a key feature of security governance conducted by the criminal justice system. The latter, as Johnston and Shearing (2003; see also Shearing, 2001b; Shearing and Johnston, 2005) argue, is concerned with future-oriented strategies based on a chain of risk, anticipation, and prevention, and its central aspects are instrumental calculations and techniques intended to reduce crime, danger and risk. The risk-based mentality is often found in (private) corporate security institutions. However, following the changes in the security governance environment outlined above, which include pluralization and a marked shift from a criminal justice state to a security society (Zedner, 2003), it has been recognized that mentalities increasingly "mix and meld" within governing nodes (Johnston, 2006; Wood, 2006; Wood and Shearing, 2007).

This blurring of mentalities has made the contemporary landscape of security governance complex, and underscores the importance of conducting empirically informed explorations in a variety of contexts. Taking this as the dissertation's point of departure, exploring actors' guiding mentalities has been considered a crucial part of describing policing and security governance in Norwegian global hubs. As previously mentioned, risk-based strategies are a prominent feature of security at contemporary airports and maritime ports. In the **third article**, this analytical framing is considered particularly helpful in making sense of how security actors experience and respond to the exceptional nature of security threats in their everyday practice, and in revealing how the language of risk and risk assessment has become a significant aspect of an instrumental way of thinking to deal with uncertainty and risk in aviation and maritime security.

The relevance of governmentality scholarship is particularly apparent in relation to the notion of mentalities. Although punitive and risk mentalities can be seen as important in understanding and describing security governance practices in global hubs, they are still just two examples of mentalities that can be discerned. Analyses of governmentality have identified "political rationalities" or "logics" of governance as key elements to be explored, in that they encompass the rationales, aims and assumptions of governing actors, while also indicating the ethical or moral justifications for particular ways of governing (Rose and Miller, 1992; Valverde, 2011, 2014). It has been acknowledged that "relations among different logics are complex, unpredictable and site-specific" (Valverde, 2011: 11), which yet again suggests the importance of exploring a variety of empirical and national contexts of policing. The connection between

mentalities and rationalities is made explicit when Garland (1997: 184) suggests that "government rationalities" are the ways of thinking and styles of reasoning that are embodied in practices.

In the context of security and policing, although not directly drawing upon the Foucauldian literature, White and Gill (2013) introduce the notion of rationalities as a way to conceptualize the practice of security agencies, which they describe as "ways of thinking and behaving which resonate with prevailing cultural interpretations of the public good and the market" (White, 2014: 1004). Thus the idea of rationalities overlaps with the concept of mentalities as presented by nodal scholars and has a similar analytical meaning, so the two will be used interchangeably throughout the dissertation. It has been shown that agencies can be guided by different rationalities, and a distinction is frequently made between organizations that work for the public good and those governed by market logic and the profit ethos (White and Gill, 2013).

Taking inspiration from White and Gill, this dissertation considers rationalities as an important analytical tool that can help move empirical attention beyond the punitive and risk mentalities that have so far dominated the literature, and add nuances to our understandings of security governance. The notion is used in different ways in the articles that make up this dissertation. In the **first article**, the notion of rationalities is deemed relevant to exploring how policing agencies view themselves in comparison with others, and how differences between public good and market rationalities may influence information sharing, trust and reciprocity in collaboration in global hubs. In the **second article**, public good and market rationalities are utilized to investigate how network power is distributed within the boundaries of security networks and to examine the way in which the two different rationalities determine or affect network formation. In the **fourth article**, the assumptions derived from rationalities come to the fore in the article's exploration of how commercial interests can play a crucial role in recasting security practices in global hubs, and of how policing and security agencies navigate, experience and respond to the imperatives of security and trade in their everyday.

The second of the essential characteristics of nodes mentioned above was technologies. Technologies of governance are the methods and strategies employed to exert influence over the course of events (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). It has been shown that methods and strategies often vary between different nodes, with the sector nodes are operating in being a deciding factor in what methods are available. In the realm of governance technologies, a distinction has been made between physical, legal, symbolic, and personal methods (Burris,

2004; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Mopasa and Stenning, 2001). In relation to security, then, technologies may include surveillance practices, street patrols, powers of arrest, and weapons (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Martin, 2013). In this dissertation, technologies are considered useful in revealing how seemingly mundane and quotidian activities become important tools in policing global hubs. In this regard, the **third article** illustrates the way in which bureaucratic processes develop as part of an instrumental mentality and why documentation becomes a strategy for coping with the uncertainty and vulnerability that agencies may face in global hubs.

Resources are the third of the internal characteristic of nodes mentioned above. The implementation of governing technologies depends in large part upon the resources available to a node – tend to be "broadly defined to include a wide range of forms of capital in the Bourdieuian sense" (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005: 39). Resources affect the ability of nodes to exert influence over the course of events, and subsequently affect their practices. Building on Bourdieu's notion of capital, Dupont (2006b, see also Dupont, 2004) presents five forms of capital that security nodes may employ in their governing practices and in their relations to other nodes: it may be economic, political, cultural, social or symbolic. Economic capital means the financial resources nodes have at their disposal. There is a difference between public and private actors in terms of the financial support they get from the government and the opportunities they have to find ways to increase their profits (Dupont, 2006b). This can to some extent be related to the public good and market rationalities outlined above. Political capital results from the node's capacity to exploit political processes in order to forward its own objectives or achieve its desired outcomes, and this type of capital therefore depends on whether the node is close to or distant from governmental power (Huey, 2008). In the Norwegian context addressed in this study, where there is a strong public sector and a well-functioning welfare state, consideration of political capital is relevant to the exploration of network power in the collaborative structures in which policing agencies are involved in global hubs. Cultural capital derives from the institutional knowledge that a node can accumulate and mobilize, at the individual and collective level. Social capital arises from "the whole set of social relations that allow the constitution, maintenance and expansion of social networks" (Dupont, 2004: 86). One can therefore say that the network connections possessed by nodes are important resources – it has been observed that nodes with many strong connections are more able to exert influence (Burris, 2004). As one of the main aims of this dissertation is to examine aspects of collaborative relations among policing and security actors, the notions of social capital and relations have played an important role in shaping the empirical investigation of the dissertation

as a whole, and in particular in the attempt made in the **first two articles** to map how power relations develop and affect actors' practice. Networks and collaborative relations will be explored further below. Symbolic capital results from the effective combination of the types of capital that have just been described and thus consists of "the mechanisms that confer legitimacy to an organization, and the power it holds to speak with authority to the other actors" (Dupont, 2004: 86). It is important to note that the identification of five forms of capital, as Dupont (2006b) points out, is not meant to be a rigid and final classification, but rather understood as a metaphorical lens that helps make sense of the complex landscape of governing nodes. This framing of the types of resources available has helped shape the analytical strategy of this dissertation.

The fourth of the internal characteristics of nodes listed above, are institutional structures that enable resources, mentalities and technologies to be targeted and mobilized over time (Burris, 2004; Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). Nodes may take almost any institutional structure as long as it has some temporal durability. For that reason, the nodes under investigation do not need to be formally constituted or legally recognized. Observers have also argued that the "adjustable scale of nodal identification explains much about the flexibility of this theoretical model and also highlights the extreme institutional variability characteristic of nodes associated with contemporary security provision" (Martin, 2013: 150).

The framing of nodes through the four essential characteristics that have just been described makes it clear that not all nodes are created equal. As a result, the nodes will vary in their accessibility and their efficacy (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). The configuration of mentalities, technologies, and resources that a node has may influence its status, its potential to exert influence over the course of events, and its practice. Previous studies have, for instance, examined the "nodal cartography" of migration policing (Weber, 2013) and mapped the configuration of actors involved in the policing of art theft (Kerr, 2015), which indicates the importance of empirical descriptions of the practices and internal characteristics of nodes. Inspired by the analytical perspective of nodal governance, this dissertation seeks to add to the literature by focusing on empirically grounded descriptions of the characteristics of governing actors in the global hubs under investigation. In doing so, this dissertation argues that taking account of the analytical assumptions outlined above can help operationalize the nodal approach and make it better able to bear empirical scrutiny. This is of particular importance, as it enables one to capture and investigate how a range of actors perceive and deliver security in their

everyday, and this can reveal crucial aspects of the practices of governance that appeal to security.

Within the nodal approach, it has also been argued that nodes tend to carry out governance "by mobilizing their resources and governing technologies to cajole, coerce or otherwise move those they wish to govern to comply with their directions" (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005: 39). In this mode of governing, the mobilization process also involves the more indirect mobilizing of the capacities and knowledge of other nodes. Thus, enrolment is seen as an important feature of nodal governance and is highly influenced by the work of Foucault (1990) and Latour (1986). Power, and thus also governance, is understood to be produced by processes of "action at a distance" (Latour, 1987) and is "the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting" (Latour, 1986: 273). What is required for efficient security governance, therefore, is the enrolment of actors who possess the capacities and knowledge that are necessary to achieve its objectives and aims (Wood and Shearing, 2007). The perspective of enrolment is useful, as **the first article** illustrates, for examining how collaboration between policing agencies is affected by power relations, and for examining the existence of sectoral allegiance in collaborative structures in the global hubs.

The capacity of a node to enroll others into its agenda is assumed to be dependent upon the four characteristics mentioned above (mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional structures), and this indicates why empirical explorations of nodes' internal characteristics, especially their mentalities, are of great importance for this dissertation's analytical framing. The efforts made to enroll others indicate how nodes can make use of networks to govern, interact, and communicate, and nodal scholars therefore argue that "networks are a prime means through which nodes exert influence" (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005: 33). The notions of (security) networks and collaborative relations will be explored in greater detail below. Before that, however, the next section turns to a different perspective which in recent decades has come to dominate the study of pluralized and networked security and policing provision.

State anchored pluralism – security as a public good
The second framework which has inspired the theoretical thinking in this dissertation is most often associated with the works of Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2001, 2004, 2006; 2007, but see also Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 2000; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003) and their concept of state anchored pluralism. To a great extent the conceptual model of anchored pluralism is presented in the literature as the main analytical alternative for capturing the increasingly complex nature

of the contemporary security landscape. Thus, while the nodal governance perspective seeks analytical openness such that no set of actors is given conceptual priority, the nodal approach still tends to be applauded for its normative merits as it "has frequently been framed (…) as an explicit critique of those state-centred 'Westphalian' analyses of domestic security provision which came to prominence during the monopoly era" (White, 2012: 90). In response to this, the perspective presented by Loader and Walker rigorously criticizes both the theoretical and normative assumptions of nodal governance (Boutellier and Van Steden, 2011), and in particular raises questions concerning the understanding of what the role of the state *ought* to be in practices of security governance. In the context of this dissertation, anchored pluralism is considered a useful analytical tool to understand the nature of security governance practices in global hubs, given the Norwegian context which consists of a strong public sector and a well-functioning welfare state. It is worth asking how this plays out in the plural reality of policing in global hubs and how it affects the collaborative relations that develop as means to deal with security issues – questions that are addressed in detail in the **second article** of the dissertation.

In contrast to the nodal governance perspective, within the framework of anchored pluralism, the state is not regarded as just one node among many governing actors, but rather as a necessary virtue in the provision of security as a collective or public good (Loader and Walker, 2007). Accordingly, the anchored pluralism approach makes an explicit connection to the conceptualization of security as a "thick" public good, which in many ways constitutes the very idea of publicness. In criminological scholarship, security has long been regarded as an essential public good, even to the extent that security may be a prerequisite for many governing projects. The ideal has been that there should be universal equity in the provision and distribution of the good of security, so that security is equally available to all. However, changes in the production and delivery of security in the direction of a world of both public and private provision may challenge this notion of security and the role of the state in delivering it. In regard to this, nodal governance theorists are often regarded as exhibiting an explicit state-skepticism, which adopts "no consistent normative position with regard to the ideal role of the state" (White, 2012: 93). Nonetheless, the position held by Loader and Walker favors an understanding of security as a public good, inherently dependent on state involvement. Their argument has three dimensions.

First, the instrumental dimension of security is concerned with "the sense in which security is seen as prerequisite to the effective liberty of individuals, which in turn is seen as prerequisite to the 'good life', however conceived" (Loader and Walker, 2006: 184). That is, security is understood as a foundational element in the realization of freedom for individuals. The liberal

state possesses the necessary capacity to balance security and other democratic values. The second dimension is social, and relates to the perception that the security of an individual depends in some way upon the security of others. As a consequence, Loader and Walker (2007: 161) suggest "that there is a tendency for the quality of security, (…), to be enhanced in the case of any particular individual when the security of those with whom that individual shares a social environment is also reasonably attended to". Even more importantly, a system of public provision to guarantee this is considered to be a good possible solution. The third dimension is that the constitutive perspective of security is, according to Loader and Walker (2007: 162), concerned with how security as a social good "is implicated in the very process of constituting the 'social' or the 'public'".

By appreciating these dimensions of security, one can understand how the state is involved in contemporary security provision. Loader and Walker argue that it is important to abandon a priori state-skepticism, and that the conception of security as a thick public good requires that security be publicly provided. While acknowledging the potential dangers and limitations of state provision (for example, fears that the state may be a meddler, partisan, a cultural monolith, or an idiot), they still argue that the state should be perceived as the main "anchor", as it represents the most suitable, effective and morally just solution. Given that this dissertation concerns Norway, with its seemingly strong welfare state, anchored pluralism seems an appropriate choice for the exploration of the empirical reality of security governance in global hubs.

Thus, the role of the state, it is argued, is anchored by the symbolic regulatory power, cultural authority, and distinctive capabilities that the state possesses (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2007), which are qualitatively different to those of other forms of policing and security processes (Crawford, 2006). However, this is not to say that the approach rejects the notion of plurality that shapes contemporary security governance. In fact, the model of anchored pluralism requires that "there should be as much pluralism as possible both, internally, (…), and externally" (Loader and Walker, 2007: 193). As regards external pluralism, one has to recognize the place of other sites of cultural and regulatory production above, below and otherwise beyond the state. In such circumstances, the role of the state, according to the model of anchored pluralism, should be that of a meta-regulator, which can ensure that security is governed democratically. Marks and Goldsmith (2006) follow a similar line of thought in maintaining that the state must strengthen and reaffirm its primacy in the provision of security governance. In their view, the state is best qualified, regarding capacity, legitimacy and

effectiveness, to provide equitable services for everyone, and should assert itself as the anchor of collective security, while at the same time remaining open to as much pluralism as possible.

The writings of Loader and Walker are mainly employed by scholars in a normative sense rather than to address empirical questions concerning the exploration of the governance of security. However, as this dissertation seeks to employ anchored pluralism analytically to investigate and make sense of an empirical context, it attempts to operationalize the theoretical approach. In conceptual terms, the model of anchored pluralism provides "analytical clues to identify and assess" the nature of the influence exerted by various governing actors, both public and private, in networked and plural security and policing arrangements (Boutellier and Van Steden, 2011: 467). In particular, attention can be directed to the institutional structure that leads to the preeminence of the state in the realization of security, where the anchored pluralism model identifies five conditions that are regarded as indispensable to security production: identification, resource mobilization and allocation, deliberation, regulation and commitment (Loader and Walker, 2007). This dissertation suggests that there is some overlap between these conditions and the essential characteristics of a node that were identified above.

Due to the lack of empirical specification and operationalization and given that the perspective accepts, and indeed encourages, pluralism in processes of security governance, it seems appropriate to raise questions about the anchoring role of the state within such networked arrangements. This dissertation therefore asks how one can empirically determine where the anchor is situated. Although the perspective of anchored pluralism strongly suggests that the state should be seen as the main anchor in the production of security, the pluralization of security provision suggests that the empirical situation is more complex, which is certainly the case as regards the global hubs addressed in this dissertation. In this respect, some observers argue that anchoring may come in many forms (Wood and Font, 2004) and several studies have demonstrated that, in security networks, the position of the state may be challenged by the fact that private policing actors can, and do, become key players by strategically positioning themselves (Brewer, 2017; Dupont, 2006a; O'Malley, 2015). This study therefore takes the view that it might be worthwhile considering the anchoring processes within the networked security governance in global hubs as an open question to be empirically explored. Applying the indicators from normative conceptualization to empirical material, the dissertation claims that one can move beyond focusing on underlying normative assumptions and find more rigorously analytical language to address research questions about security governance. In order to achieve this, as can be seen in the **second article** of the dissertation, the framework of

anchored pluralism will be connected to certain conceptual tools from network theory, as parallels may be drawn between the process of mobilizing resources by being positioned as an anchor and the notion of network power in collaborative structures.

It is important to point out that the perspective of anchored pluralism also has relevance to some of the theoretical debates this dissertation engage with. As outlined in the previous chapter, Nordic security governance seems to exhibit certain characteristics that set it apart from what is described in the Anglocentric studies that have long dominated the literature. Based on these, claims have been made that one can observe a significant paradigm shift in policing and crime control and that there has been a move "away from a literature that almost exclusively conceives brokerage through a state-centred lens" (Brewer, 2017: 713). However, the position taken in this dissertation is that one should frame anchoring as a matter of empirical inquiry, in the cases of Nordic security governance addressed, and that anchored pluralism is a useful theoretical and analytical lens, both to make sense of the involvement and positioning of the multiple actors involved in the security governance network in global hubs, and to add nuance to our knowledge about the governing of security.

In the light of the above descriptions of the theoretical perspectives, the notions of public and private seem relevant to the investigation undertaken in this study, even beyond the debate on security as a public good. It is thus assumed that differences in mentalities or rationalities, which in many circumstances arise from the public-private divide, can have implications for the way in which security actors work and collaborate. In the global hubs under investigation, it has been noted that multiple actors are present in the security infrastructure and they may adhere to very different mentalities, interests and objectives. In fact, they may be trapped between contradictory interests, so that frustration and conflicts arise. How these interactions unfold in the empirical reality of global hubs is one of the main concerns of the dissertation, and it will be examined in the four articles by applying different aspects of the analytical perspectives outlined above.

The plurality of security governance, and blurring of the internal and external dimensions of security have been related by several observers to the idea of hybrid security constellations and the middle ground (Button, 2002; Dupont, 2006a; Rogers, 2017; Schuilenburg, 2015); even to the extent that dichotomy of public and private has lost its utility (Kempa, Shearing and Burris, 2005). The assumed middle ground of hybridity is addressed in the **first article**, which asks how far this theoretical assumption stands up to empirical scrutiny and examines whether and

how this middle ground exists in the empirical context of policing in global hubs. Although the distinction has been called into question by the changing patterns of security governance, the dividing line between public and private still seems to have importance for public political imaginaries (Owens, 2008). In addition, the distinction is still employed in scholarly discussions of security provision (Diphoorn and Berg, 2014; Gimenez-salinas, 2004; Noaks, 2008; Wakefield, 2003). The next section will therefore briefly elucidate different views on how the public-private divide relates to security and policing, and to the empirical investigation of this dissertation.

3.3 The public–private divide: Differing interests

In the previous chapter, it was made clear that the global hubs examined in this study are characterized by pluralization, in which numerous public and private actors are engaged in the production and delivery of security and policing. The public-private divide has long been seen as crucial for understanding government involvement in many areas that have been subjected to social and political analysis (Owens, 2008; Weintraub, 1997). In the realm of criminological inquiry, the dividing line has also been important in attempts to capture and make sense of the involvement of diverse actors in crime control and security (Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Wakefield, 2003). In this dissertation, the public-private divide is of particular importance to the empirical exploration of the everyday security practices in global hubs, because it is assumed to have an influence on actors' mentalities, and whether their interests are public or private interests can have implications for collaborative relations. The public-private divide will therefore be explored in this dissertation in relation to how collaboration is perceived by different agencies, and it will be asked whether it can explain certain features of collaboration processes (such as power struggles and conflicts, trust, and network exchanges). The dividing line is also of importance for how the various security and policing actors experience and think about their governance practices.

As pointed out by Weintraub (1997), there is a wide range of conceptions of the public-private divide, which all have their own theoretical and ideological discursive assumptions. At first sight, what is public and what is private may seem clear-cut, as the distinction is framed as a sectoral matter. That is to say, if agencies are part of the state and are funded out of taxation, they are considered to belong to the category of public. If the services are provided by a for-profit organization via the market and involve contracts and competition, they are private. Weintraub (1997: 7) shows that this sectoral division is inspired by liberal economic thinking

and refers to the relation between the state and a market economy. However, this way of understanding the distinction, which is based on sectors, is too simplistic, given the pluralized nature of contemporary security practices. Jones and Newburn (1998) argue that the divide is a matter of degree of difference rather than a fundamental dichotomy. According to this view, the dividing line should be considered in terms of actors' level of "publicness" and "privateness", which means that the interests, mentalities, or strategies of the actors examined in this dissertation may be located along a continuum.

According to Jones and Newburn (1998), the degree of publicness and privateness is dependent on a number of factors, some of the most important ones being the source of funding and the way it is provided, the nature of the relationship between providers and users, and the employment status of employees. The first of these – the source and mode of provision of funding – corresponds nicely to the above distinction concerning state/market and taxation/contracts. Public actors, unlike private ones, do not depend for their survival on selling services for profit. This can in many ways be considered to coincide with the notion of resources derived from the nodal approach. In terms of the relationship between providers and users, private organizations are dependent upon contracts and competition, whereas the relationship between public services and users is generally characterized by universal and, to some extent, monopolistic provision. This raises the issue of what should be understood as public and private goods, a discussion which connects to the model of anchored pluralism. Finally, their employment status may mean that public officials have powers that differ from those of private employment. In terms of security and policing, as noted by Jones and Newburn (1998), such public powers are not only related to a Weberian notion of the state (which includes, for example, the monopoly of the legitimate use of force), but also to the inherent symbolic and cultural power possessed by public organizations (such as the police). For this reason, as was seen in the discussion of anchored pluralism, it is argued that the role of the state remains pivotal in the pluralized field of policing as regards both its symbolic and regulatory capacities (Crawford and Lister, 2004).

In their exploration of the growth of private security, Shearing and Stenning (1981) offer another way to identify the nature of the public-private divide. They argue that an important defining characteristics of private security, and hence a criterion for publicness/privateness, is that private (security) organizations serve the interests of their employers or corporate clients, rather than those of the public. Private organizations are thus not legally bound by any duty to carry out their responsibilities in the public interest (Shearing and Stenning, 1981). The criterion

is essentially the question of whose interests are being served. An organization that provides services that can benefit any or every member of a community is necessarily serving the public interest. By contrast, if an organization only benefits a particular individual or organization, then it is serving private interests. Such a distinction accords with the division made by Weintraub (1997) between matters pertaining to the collective and those pertaining to the individual. In developing their view of what the private interest includes, Shearing and Stenning show how a connection is also made to the role and nature of private security, and particularly to the different approaches to prevention taken by private security and the public police. Thus, Shearing and Stenning (1981) point out that the preventive approach of the public police is usually understood in terms of "crime prevention", while private security is generally involved in "loss prevention". This demarcation demonstrates that the preventive work undertaken by private security is concerned with the protection of assets and the maximization of their clients' profits, rather than the public interest (Shearing and Stenning, 1981). There is thus a distinct difference between the underlying philosophies and practices of private security and those of the public police (Shearing and Stenning, 1983), which is often defined in terms of the profit ethos of private security. In the nodal perspective outlined above, differences in publicness and privateness are further explored by using the notion of mentalities, with a special emphasis on the punishment and risk mentality. As regards policing global hubs, it is assumed that the question of whose interests are being served has implications for actors' practices. This dissertation therefore considers differences in interests and their potential impact on practices.

Given the complexity of policing provision, Johnston (1992) argues that the public-private dichotomy has lost its utility. By contrast, although recognizing its limitations (the divide does not, for example, help sort organizations into neat categories), Jones and Newburn (1998) argue that the divide still has value as a didactic tool which allows different actors and systems of security governance to be compared with each other. The public police and public policing and security agencies examined in this dissertation, for example, will have similarities and differences, but they are still clearly distinguishable from actors whose interests can be classed as private. Thus, following Jones and Newburn, it is suggested that public and private should not be viewed as a binary opposition, but as a continuum with public provision at one end and the market at the other. This dissertation is particularly concerned with examining how the interests, mentalities, or strategies of the actors delivering security and policing in global hubs may represent different points along this continuum of publicness-privateness. As was noted above, these differences may have important implications for how security actors view

themselves and their practices, and for how they connect and collaborate in security governance practices. The analytical perspectives relevant to understanding collaborative structures in global hubs will be discussed in the next section.

3.4 Network governance, security networks and collaboration

In the public administration literature, it is now widely recognized that governing processes (such as decision-making) are not confined to the formal structure and instrumental dimension of government (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Policy formulation is increasingly carried out by a vast number of formal and informal institutions and processes, which include various public and private organizations, which are commonly referred to as governance (Enroth, 2011; Pierre, 2000). In attempts to understand policy processes, there is generally an emphasis on examining the collaborative and informal relations that are established by means of networks. This has given rise to the notion of governance networks. In the realm of political science, a governance network is conceived of as being "a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; who interact through negotiations; which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and which contributes to the production of public purpose within or across particular policy areas" (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 203).

The insights developed here with regard to governance networks initially influenced how the research questions guiding this dissertation were constructed, and they also subsequently informed its empirical analyses of the experience of practices of security governance in global hubs. As the above discussion of theoretical perspectives made clear, the connections between different actors are central to the nodal perspective, and are also relevant to the anchored pluralism model. In relation to the dissertation's aim of unpacking collaborative networks in global hubs, the nodal governance approach to the connection between networks and nodes is deemed particularly useful, because of its assumption that using the network is one of the most effective ways an actor (node) can exert influence (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). For this reason, the **first two articles** of the dissertation set out to map the relationships that connect the actors and to examine how collaboration is understood, with particular attention paid to exchanges of resources and to how power is distributed within network boundaries.

Previous studies have suggested that relationships within networks can vary on a continuum that ranges from productive collaboration to competition and conflict. It has been noted that actors involved in security governance tend to "constantly jockey for position, securing helpful

alliances with one another or working to undermine rivals' positions in ways that help them achieve nodal objectives" (Martin, 2013: 151). This being so, it was considered of interest to explore if similar tendencies could be observed in the global hubs investigated in this dissertation. In this respect, it should be borne in mind here that it was assumed that the interests or mentality of an actor may influence collaboration and the formation of network responses to security issues. Dupont (2006a: 165) suggests that the notion of networks is a powerful one, in which the "appeal lies in its ability to account for the present multiplicity of institutional, organizational and social morphologies". Turning the analytical gaze on networks and collaborative relations is therefore particularly helpful in unpacking the security governance practices of the global hubs. Nonetheless, in this dissertation it is argued that one should consider as an empirical question whether security actors do indeed come together and form network structures, or decide to operate in isolation.

Drawing on the network governance tradition, a security network is defined in this dissertation as a set of institutional or individual actors or nodes that are directly or indirectly connected to authorize and/or provide security for internal or external actors (Dupont, 2004, 2006a; Shearing and Wood, 2000). Following Whelan and Dupont's (2017) typology, the security networks examined in this dissertation can be understood as information exchange networks. Thus, in the context of security governance in global hubs, these networks usually function as information exchanges on local or international crime and security issues or such issues in the informational/virtual domain. In this regard, the analysis is particularly concerned with understanding how resources which can be mobilized to solve crime and security issues circulate within the boundaries of the security networks in global hubs. One important motivation for security actors to engage in network practices is "the need to reduce exposure to uncertainty" (Dupont, 2006a: 168), and this is most often achieved by increasing their ability to pool resources from different sources and to establish collaborative relations with other actors. Capturing these collaborative connections, which are the building blocks of security networks, is part of an attempt to offer a thorough description of contemporary security practices in global hubs. The next section will therefore briefly flesh out some of the most important components of the notion of collaboration informing this dissertation.

Collaboration as a necessity – a conceptual model of collaboration
Collaboration is a complex phenomenon and previous studies have pointed out its multidimensional nature (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Thomson, Perry and Miller, 2007; Whelan, 2016b), suggesting that numerous processes and elements, both internal and external, affect

how collaboration develops (Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Rousseau et al., 2012). Several organizational studies have indicated that collaboration processes have five essential elements: governance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms and reciprocity (Thomson and Perry, 2006).

In the policing literature, it has been suggested that successful collaborations and partnerships result from the existence of trustworthy partners and an abundance of social capital in the organizations (Brewer, 2013, 2014; Dupont, 2006b). Despite some disagreement on how social capital should be defined (Bourdieu, 1986; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995), according to Brewer (2014), it is possible to find linkages between these conceptual discussions. Similar to how the concept is utilized in the nodal approach outlined above, social capital can be understood, rather broadly, as "a process by which social relations are used to facilitate individual and collective action, or outcomes for mutual benefit" (Brewer, 2014: 15), with the concept having two significant elements – networks of relationships (its structural dimension) and norms of trust and reciprocity. Drawing on the work of Valerie Braithwaite (1998), Brewer outlines how communal trust norms and exchange trust norms operate in plural policing arrangements, arguing "that social capital born of trusting interagency relations is key to enabling efficacious cooperative partnership between policing agencies" (Brewer, 2013: 375). When exploring the internal dynamics of collaborative processes, others have also emphasized the importance of norms of trust in developing sustainable collaborations which seek solutions to issues of security and policing (Cotter, 2015; Fleming and Rhodes, 2005; O'Neill and McCarthy, 2014; Whelan, 2016a). Informal ties and communication are important elements in the development of trusting relationships. Some studies have noted that such informal communication is essential if there is to be a flow of resources and information between units and organizations (Cotter, 2015; Whelan, 2012). Inspired by the ideas of networks of relationships and trust and reciprocity, the dissertation is particularly concerned with exploring how they can influence collaborative practices in the global hubs under investigation. The concepts are thus highly relevant to this dissertation and are used in different ways in the **first two articles** that deal with collaboration. Thus, attention has been given, in the empirical data, to elements such as building trust, the exchange of information, resources and expertise, power relations, and the degree of formalization of collaboration

Although norms of trust and reciprocity are deemed as crucial to understanding the collaboration found at global hubs, it has been demonstrated that, in the field of security, power struggles often develop and may influence the practices of security governance (Dupont,

2006b). In this respect, Giacomantonio (2014, 2015) shows clearly that power relations are still important, as collaborative structures and processes frequently involve negotiations, that are sometimes very demanding, on organizational boundaries regarding goals, resources, activities, prestige, and interests. In the context of this dissertation, investigating such power struggles and negotiations and the part they play in the everyday practices of security actors is of particular interest, as the security environment of global hubs consists of many public and private actors, with different mentalities, values, goals and interests. Previous studies have pointed out that such differences are potential sources of conflict and might obstruct the development of effective collaborative practice (Ayling, Shearing and Grabosky, 2009; Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Crawford et al., 2005; Jones and Newburn, 2006; van Steden, Wood, Shearing and Boutellier, 2013; Wakefield, 2003). Paying attention to processes of negotiation when analyzing security practices in global hubs can capture some of the structural conflicts or friction that may arise (Crawford, 1997). However, these differences between actors might also lead to improvements in the allocation of resources, responsibility, and information. Thus, it is important to clarify responsibilities and establish a mutual understanding of the aims and goals of collaborative practice. Fleming and Rhodes (2005: 195) argue that shared values and consensus are often the glue that holds a complex set of relationships together. This being the case, the **first article** in this dissertation examines how power struggles within collaborative relations develop in the empirical context of global hubs, since they can provide important insights into situations where conflict between actors' mentalities or interests becomes apparent.

Security actors who work together for some time may have a better understanding of the mentalities, values, and attitudes of their partners and thus "intentionally and unintentionally adapt their own ways of thinking and acting, resulting in something close to a 'merging' of organisational cultures" (Whelan, 2016b: 596). Security actors thus tend to take on board, either consciously or unconsciously, the mentalities, interests, or strategies of others – a process similar to that of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Accordingly, in this dissertation, the extent to which this happens in the global hubs under consideration will be investigated, since such changes have the potential to influence how collaborations take shape and evolve over time.

The above elements of what influences collaboration processes are considered to be of great interest for this dissertation. However, insights from organizational psychology and health and social care studies suggest that personal characteristics are as important as such organizational

and systemic factors for developing successful collaboration (D'Amour, Ferrada-Videla, San Martin Rodriguez and Beaulieu, 2005; Ødegård, 2006). In some cases, government or regulatory authorities implement standards, rules or procedures that make collaboration mandatory, as was seen in the regulatory regime described in the previous chapter. Normally, however, collaboration is a voluntary endeavor, in that organizations come together because they believe they will gain mutual benefit from working together. Several studies have indicated that individuals must be willing and motivated to enter into a collaboration process (Rousseau, Pontbriand, Nadeau and Johnson-Lafleur, 2017; San Martín-Rodríguez, Beaulieu, D'Amour and Ferrada-Videla, 2005; Ødegård and Strype, 2009). What motivates people to collaborate can, of course, vary considerably, and there may be internal or external factors at play. Professional expectations concerning the collaborative work and belief that it will be worthwhile seem to be among the most significant determinants (Sicotte, D'Amour and Moreault, 2002).

As already noted, collaborative practices may be challenging and involve frustration and a high level of conflict. Such problems can cause collaborative relationships to break down, particularly if they persist for a long time. Previous research suggests that individuals who adopt certain coping mechanisms when meeting with others in partner organizations can have positive effects on the collaboration (San Martín-Rodríguez et al., 2005). Giving individuals social support is shown to strengthen collaboration and be a key factor contributing to the quality of partnerships (Ødegård and Strype, 2009). Both coping mechanisms and social support require there to be well-functioning communication within and between organizations. This insight into the importance of making use of personal influence on collaboration is considered particularly helpful to make sense of how collaboration in global hubs is perceived by different agencies.

3.5 Concluding remarks on the theoretical framework

This chapter has outlined theoretical and analytical concepts relevant to the exploration of how policing agencies in Norwegian global hubs experience and perceive their everyday practices and collaborative relations. In doing so, it becomes apparent that nodal governance and anchored pluralism have informed my theoretical understanding, and are the main perspectives guiding the empirical analysis of this dissertation. As pointed out in the introductory chapter, there has been a tendency in the literature on these two approaches to favor conceptual and normative concerns. To move beyond this, this chapter has focused on various analytical assumptions that might operationalize the frameworks and make them better able to bear

empirical scrutiny in the study of plural policing arrangements and security practices. It should be noted that the dissertation also draws on conceptualizations of everyday security, network theory and collaboration in order to describe and examine the way in which actors operating in global hubs experience their practices and collaborative relations. The theoretical considerations set out above have helped to structure the empirical findings, which can be found the four articles that make up the dissertation. The following chapter will present the research design and methods used for analyzing how security and collaborative structures are experienced

4. Methods

This chapter offers a detailed account of the research design and methods employed in the dissertation. The complexity of collaboration and security processes in global hubs requires methodologies that allow for in-depth exploration, and as pointed out in the previous chapter, the analytical perspectives bring with them certain methodological implications. To make sense of this complexity, a mixed-method approach and case study design were chosen. This chapter begins by explaining the choice of this particular approach to the study of everyday practices and the experience of security governance and collaboration. This is followed by an account of the data collection and the challenges encountered with regard to access. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected, by means of semi-structured interviews and a survey. This combination necessitated the use of a variety of analytical procedures to make sense of the data, and this chapter describes the different steps of the analysis. Data were mainly analyzed using qualitative analytic procedures drawn from thematic analysis, and techniques deriving from social network analysis were used to unpack relational properties. The chapter describes these procedures. Finally, there is a discussion of data quality and the ethical considerations involved in the empirical exploration of policing in global hubs.

4.1 Research design – a case study approach

The case study approach is a popular (Andersen, 1997; George and Bennett, 2005) and suitable strategy for studying complex phenomena (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Case studies can be used in a variety of circumstances to increase our knowledge of individuals, groups, and organizational, social and political phenomena (Yin, 2009). Although associated with rich and detailed qualitative accounts of the phenomenon in question, the case approach does not in any way delimit the methods and sources one can use for collecting data, as case studies can be both qualitative and quantitative in nature (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009). In this regard, it is often suggested that a combination of different methods will enable a more thorough assessment of the subject, because one strategy should check the biases of another (Ragin, 1987). The case study approach is particularly appropriate when the aim is to provide a descriptive account of what happened in a certain situation or to answer explanatory questions about how and why a phenomenon occurs (Harder, 2010). The case study approach is therefore well-suited to exploring the complex phenomenon of the policing of global hubs, which as chapter two describes, involve numerous public and private actors. The approach is particularly suitable for this dissertation, as its overarching aim is to provide a detailed and thick account of how

different actors experience their everyday security practices and the collaborative responses they involve.

In this project, a multiple case approach was employed (Yin, 2009), and the cases can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of the policing of Oslo airport, the port of Stavanger and the port of Kristiansand, and their empirical and institutional context is presented in detail in chapter two. Extensive fieldwork was conducted in the three sites, to capture the everyday practices of policing, security, and collaboration. Interviews with key stakeholders were the primary source of data to explore the research questions. Interviews were carried out with 76 respondents across the three sites and covered the wide range of policing and security agencies present in them. In addition to the interviews, on several occasions I was invited to observe the port facilities and the airport. This provided me with a unique opportunity to talk with participants and gain an understanding of their experiences and practices of security and collaboration, outside the formal setting of the interviews, as well as to make some broader observations. Although these situations of observation brought important insights, for the most part the field notes were used as a secondary source of data. Moreover, documents were collected that provided information about the security practices of the global hubs and shed light on the research questions addressed in this dissertation. They included national and international regulations on airport and port security, government documents and reports, and annual reports from various other organizations. Like the field notes, documents were a source of background information. The exploration of the three cases relied on qualitative data sources. I will say more about the process of collecting data below.

The second part has a wider scope and the cases relate to the survey exploring perceptions of collaboration. The wider scope results from the fact that the empirical cases are five Norwegian cities (Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen and Tromsø), which have one airport and one port each, making a total of ten sites. These "embedded subcases" (Yin, 2009) were used to provide a general description of the phenomenon under investigation, thus increasing the potential to make generalizations about how collaboration is perceived among policing agencies. The rich qualitative accounts derived from the interviews produced important data about collaborative relations and perceptions. Although these accounts were drawn from a range of interviews in three different settings, the number was too small to offer generalizable descriptions of collaboration processes. To compensate for this, the cases included in the survey covered some of the busiest airports and ports, and had a geographical spread from the north to the south of Norway. To find answers to questions about how collaboration is perceived by policing and

security actors in global hubs, the questionnaire was distributed to a sample of nearly 900 participants who were involved in airport or maritime port security. These subcases generated an extensive data set on the perception of collaborative relations. This second part relied on quantitative research design.

This dissertation relies on mixed methods, in the belief that combining qualitative and quantitative research results in fuller insights into the research questions, and therefore has more potential to address issues than a single approach could have (Creswell, 2009). The main units of analysis in this study are the interactional and relational properties of the key policing agencies in the global hubs, on the one hand, and the actors' experience of security projects in their everyday life on the other, for which data were collected by a variety of means. By this mixture of research and data, the project was able to investigate single actors in-depth, examining the nature of their governance and capacities, as well as mapping and analyzing the overall patterns of relations and structures of collaboration processes.

The notion of "mixing", however, may be somewhat misleading, as the collected materials are not simply mixed – the qualitative and quantitative components are brought together and integrated in a particular manner (Bryman, 2006; Morse and Niehaus, 2009). The distinct data components in this dissertation are primarily being connected and integrated (Creswell, 2009). An example of this integration is found in **articles one and two**, which make use of different data sources, with the empirical findings consisting of a combination of quantitative material (for example, perceptions of collaboration) and rich qualitative description of the underlying process behind these relationships. The qualitative accounts, derived from interviews, were expected to reveal the nature the various agencies' operations, that is, how they think and act as regards collaboration, policing and security. While these qualitative accounts provide important insights, they can be criticized for failing to give details of actual relationships. That is, relational ties are often assumed rather than mapped. By contrast, the quantitative data enables rigorous mapping and an overview of structural relations in terms of how different agencies are connected and how they perceived these relationships. The analysis presented in **article two**, which relies on tools from social network analysis, is valuable in identifying the potential influence of the various actors and in determining the distribution of power within the networks. However, it does not necessarily capture whether the potential for influence is successfully exploited by the policing and security actors, which means that (qualitative) in-depth explorations are also needed.

The mixed method approach of a project can be laid out in advance, but in many instances, the design arises and develops as it goes along, which is a process known as "emergent design" (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; Given, 2008). The idea of an emergent research design is that the researcher often has flexibility to develop it in response to new information and insights. Parts of the initial plan may be discovered to be inadequate to collect the data needed to answer the research questions (Morse and Niehaus, 2009). This was certainly the case for this dissertation: the nature of this project, like that of many others, diverged in important ways from the original plan. What started as an idea for a comparison of Norwegian and Australian port policing soon developed into a project with a much narrower analytical and empirical focus – that of comparing aviation and maritime security and policing in Norway. Moreover, the initial plan for the case study approach was to limit empirical investigation to the Oslo area, that is, to the port of Oslo and Oslo airport. This case study would have had a comparative component examining two sites that are close to one another and both significant for facilitating the flow of people and goods. Negotiating access proved to be very challenging (see below for a detailed account), and ultimately access to the port of Oslo was not granted.

As a result of this failure to include the port of Oslo as one of the main cases, the project design was changed in important ways. During the process of recruiting participants for the survey, contacts were made in the ports of Kristiansand and Stavanger. With the help of these important gatekeepers, the two ports were adopted as the cases of maritime security and policing environment examined in this dissertation. Although the comparison of the policing of flows within the same region was absent, the new sites proved to be interesting cases. As mentioned in chapter two, they are both very important hubs connecting and facilitating flows from the South and West of Norway. In addition, there are particular challenges and risks associated with the flows at these sites. These changes to the project, made necessary by the turn of events, show how flexible qualitative research can be. However, the notion of emergent design applies not only to the qualitative aspects of this study, but also to the quantified data. Thus, the idea of including a quantitative component to explore the perception of collaboration arose during the process of reviewing literature on collaboration and when issues of access were slowing down the overall progress of the project. In this regard, an instrument to measure perceptions of collaboration (Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration Model (PINCOM)) (Ødegård, 2006) was found to be extremely useful; it will be further explained below. Emergent design, then encompasses both the process of data collection and that of analysis (Given, 2008; Hunter

and Brewer, 2015; Morse, 2003). In the following sections, I will describe in more detail and discuss the process of collecting data, access challenges, and analytical procedures.

4.2 Data collection, population and sample

Designing a data collection strategy that will capture the complexity of collaborative relations and the way the security practices of policing agencies are experienced is a challenging task. In some approaches, designing the instrument for data collection before embarking on the actual research is considered the best strategy. As has been seen, however, the emergent nature of this project and the importance of context, made it difficult to decide all the details of the collection process in advance. The empirical data for this dissertation are derived from two main sources: (1) in-depth interviews with key respondents from policing agencies, and (2) an electronic survey. In addition, I was sometimes able to undertake observations, so my field notes, together with relevant documents, are another source of data. The combination of multiple data sources and the accumulation of evidence from different cases were the main strategies for capturing the complexity of policing global hubs (Creswell, 2009, 2013; Yin, 2009). The description of the data collection process follows the division of the two types of cases. The processes of data collection are summarized in Table 4.1.

Instruments	Description	Relevance to the articles
Interviews (qualitative)	Semi-structured interviews with 76 key stakeholders involved in producing and delivering security at the port of Stavanger, the port of Kristiansand, and Oslo airport. Interviewees represent the full spectrum of policing agencies. Some had security as their primary concern, whereas others saw security as one concern among others. These interviews provided important insight into different agencies' perspectives and their experiences of collaboration, security and policing.	Used in **all four** articles, but this type of data is the primary source in articles **one**, **three**, and **four**.
Survey (quantitative)	Quantified data derived from an electronic survey. The questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 896 participants involved in authorizing and/or delivering security at five airports and five ports in Norway. 511 participants responded, giving a response rate of 57 %. Two data sets were constructed in order to prepare the data for various statistical analyses. These data sets make up the second foundation for this dissertation.	Used in articles **one** and **two.**
Documents (qualitative)	Various documents relating to security and policing at the airport and maritime ports were collected. They include Norwegian and international legislation and regulations on security, governmental reports and documents covering matters of police, security, risk, and preparedness, annual reports from public and private actors, and newsletter for security and policing actors.	Mainly used as background data, and relevant to all the articles.

Field notes (qualitative)	Written notes based on observation at maritime port facilities in Kristiansand and Stavanger, and at the airport. Observation provided additional information on various aspects of agencies' work and perceptions of collaboration. The observations opened new avenues to speak with participants not included in the interviews. 19 participants were thus added to the qualitative case group.	The field notes serve as supplementary and background data in this dissertation.

Table 4.1: Description of data

Data collection for the case studies of Oslo airport and ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand started in late 2015 and ended in 2017. As noted, the most important source of data were semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and during this period a total of 76 interviews were conducted. The interviewees ranged from (top) management to operational frontline workers. The methods literature suggests that interviews can provide insight into individuals' experiences and reflections or interpretations of events (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001; Silverman, 2004). The combination of management and frontline level thus made possible a thorough mapping and provided important insights into experiences of everyday practices, including those at the strategic level of management and frontline of policing in global hubs. In terms of collaboration processes and security practices, then, interviews provide insights into how a variety of policing agencies make sense of the collaborative processes that connect them, and shed light on the diverse interpretations of these relations, and their relevance to security and policing.

To obtain this foundation of rich and detailed data, the semi-structured interviews covered a range of topic, and, in accordance with the analytical assumptions derived from the nodal governance approach, the topics included participants' experience and understanding of their work and of the security and policing activities in the global hubs, to capture their various mentalities and interests. In the interviews, questions concerning collaboration, trust and reciprocity, the sharing of information, governance, the public-private divide, and the challenges and possible benefits of network exchanges were addressed. Once again, the relevance of the theoretical discussion presented in the previous chapter and its connection to the research design is clear. The interviews also included questions about perceptions of the activities performed in relation to security (such as exercises, risk assessments, patrols, and inspections) and the impact of the regulatory framework. Recognizing the value of asking both descriptive and evaluative questions, all interviews contained both these types of question. Questions about sharing resources across organizational boundaries, for instance, aimed to elicit clear accounts of what or who was involved – that is to obtain factual information about specific

events that had actually occurred. The evaluative questions, on the other hand, were designed to encourage participants to express their views on, for example, sharing resources, by beginning queries with words such as "how" and "why". Such open-ended questions gave participants an opportunity to go into detail about events and situations that they deemed significant. Interviews are a particularly effective way to generate data on individuals' experiences and their interpretations of how they think and act, and to provide insights into their perceptions of the social reality they are embedded in (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Zølner, Rasmussen and Hansen, 2007). Interviews were found to be particularly valuable for this study of security governance in global hubs, which has a particular interest in gaining an understanding of how the various mentalities present can affect actors' practices and collaboration. Interviews generally lasted between one and two hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and interviewees had the opportunity to read and approve the transcripts, to ensure the data was accurate and that no sensitive information was included.

The second core source for this dissertation was survey data. During the first part of 2017, a questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 896 participants involved in authorizing and/or delivering security at five airports and five ports in Norway (Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, and Tromsø). After four rounds of reminders, 511 participants responded, resulting in a response rate of 57 percent, and is considered as good and above average, particularly in light of the declining response rates one have witnessed over the past years (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). It is also important to consider the representativeness of the survey responses (Cook, Heath and Thompson, 2000). In order to assess the level of nonresponse bias, the current study compared individuals who responded early to late respondents, as this method assumes that late responders are very similar to non-respondents (Dalecki, Whitehead and Blomquist, 1993; Porter and Whitcomb, 2005). Following this, the representativeness of the final sample is considered acceptable and does not suffer from nonresponse bias. It was therefore not necessary to weight the sample to increase representativeness. Before the survey was distributed, a pilot study was carried out to refine the language, terminology, and description of procedures. In advance of general distribution, managers in the various policing agencies were informed about the survey and asked to pass on information about it to employees. This may help to explain the relatively high response rate.

The survey had two aims: to measure individuals' perceptions of collaboration and to map policing agencies' collaborative and relational ties. To achieve the first of these, the questionnaire was based on an adapted version of the Perception of Interprofessional

Collaboration Model questionnaire (PINCOM-Q) (Ødegård, 2006). The PINCOM will be further explained below. The approach taken to mapping collaborative ties drew inspiration from the methodologies of previous studies examining plural policing collaboration and networks (Dupont, 2006a; Nøkleberg, 2016). Respondents were given a "node generator" – a list consisting of all (identified) policing agencies on their particular site – from which they were asked to pick out organizations with which partnerships – either formal or informal – had been maintained over the past twelve months. In addition, a variety of attribute data was collected, including sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, field of work, frequency of collaboration, size of the organization, seniority/experience, and leadership.

The selection of participants and respondents is a crucial step in the research process and one that can influence the quality of the data (Creswell, 2013). The pluralized policing system may, as indicated in chapter two, involve a range of different agencies and institutions. Hence there were many possible units of analysis for this research. However, the impracticality of interviewing all individuals involved in the policing of the airports and ports led me to consider larger units of analysis. In this project, the research interest lies in the organizations or institutions to which individuals belong. To provide a rich understanding of experiences of security practices and collaborative relationships, it was thought fruitful to involve a rather wide range of actors. Accordingly, participants in this research represent the full spectrum of policing and security agencies, including the police, governmental bodies (e.g. Ministry of Transport Communications), regulatory authorities (e.g. The Norwegian Coastal Administration), publicly-owned companies, customs, private security companies (e.g. Securitas), and business and industry stakeholders (e.g. port facilities, airlines, and shipping companies) (see table 4.2 for an overview of the organizations respondents belonged to). These policing and security agencies are clearly located along a continuum of the public-private divide. Drawing on the notion of rationalities (White and Gill, 2013), the various agencies in this study were considered to adhere to some variant of the public good or the market logic to guide their actions. This may seem as a simplification of the empirical reality, particularly as there may be some blurring between the two. Nonetheless, to follow this distinction it was assumed, in this study, that it would provide greater analytical clarity.

All the organizations were directly or indirectly involved in the production and/or delivery of policing security services and procedures at the airports and ports selected for this study. Among these, some, such as the police, viewed security as their primary concern, while for others, such as customs and industry stakeholders, it was one concern among others. All

agencies, however, were considered to possess important knowledge relating to the research question.

Sector	Survey	Interviews
Police	66	14
Regulatory authority	44	8
Customs	53	7
Publicly owned company	39	8
Other public body	69	13
Private business	167	18
Private security company	73	8
Total	511	76

Table 4.2. Sector representation, survey N=511, interviews N=76

It should be noted that some agencies did not consider themselves responsible for (airport/port) security and policing. During interviews with some customs officers, for instance, I needed to reassure them that their contributions to this study were useful. The decision to include a broad set of policing agencies was justified because it made possible a richer and deeper understanding of the current collaborative landscape by including agencies that view themselves as peripheral security agents, and thus provides a better picture of the variety of experiences of security governance to be found in global hubs. To depict the everyday practices of policing the airport and port environments, the sample consisted of participants who carry out operational and frontline tasks, as well as individuals from the management level.

The strategies used to identify and select suitable participants for the survey and interviews, were snowball sampling, extensive online search, and searches on official databases or membership lists. The sampling process was therefore purposeful (Creswell, 2013; Palinkas et al., 2015), and the main criterion was that the participant should have knowledge and experience of working in airport or maritime port security and have been involved in collaboration with other members of policing agencies. Snowball sampling was key in recruiting interviewees. Thus, a couple of key individuals in an organization were contacted, interviewed, and asked to name other suitable participants, with whom the process was then repeated. Participants were also recruited by writing to managers of organizations, outlining the details of the study and what it aimed to achieve. This was followed by a request for a list of email addresses of people who would be suitable participants for the survey, and for permission to conduct in-depth interviews with individuals possessing knowledge of security and collaborative practices. The process of contacting and recruiting participants involved negotiating access, which will be elaborated on in the next section.

4.3 Getting "in" or being stopped on the doorstep – reflections on accessing the field[14]

Gaining access to carry out research is one of the most important concerns in social science (Burgess, 1984; Patton, 2002; Shenton and Hayter, 2004). The researcher's ability to negotiate access can affect the quality and quantity of information obtained and the possible questions that can be explored. In policing research, as in other fields, a great deal of time is therefore devoted to negotiating with authorities to get access to data. Interestingly, this task largely remains an untold story that is rarely critically analyzed, while research methods and results take precedent. One reason for this omission is that these stories are often difficult to tell, and may put the organizations from which the data were obtained in a bad light. Moreover, negotiation may continue throughout a research project and is a complex process that is not easily articulated. Although the stories about how one gains access are often unique to research studies and the context in which they take place, paying attention to them may provide important lessons for research implementation. My emphasis, in this section, is on issues to do with gaining organizational or institutional access rather than with the process of obtaining permission from individual informants.

Since this dissertation is concerned with what is known as "national security" or "critical infrastructure", negotiating access is a crucial task, and may involve certain dilemmas. Because the security infrastructure of the sites in question involved multi-agency policing, many layers of access needed to be negotiated simultaneously, for multiple settings, before the research project could begin. Among these, one can make a distinction between institutional access and individual access. Institutional access is often seen as the first gate that needs to be opened and is a pre-condition for moving on to the process of negotiating with individual informants (Feldman, Bell and Berger, 2003). Despite the crucial role played by institutional access, most of the literature on access is concerned with this second gate, that of negotiating with individual informants. Interestingly, institutional access is usually seen as a bureaucratic process that one has to overcome, although one can rarely have any influence on it.

In the case of my project, the organizations to which access had to be negotiated included those mentioned above, so the process was carried out in both public and private policing environments. For those that granted me access early on, the decisive factor seems to have been that my request was handled by organizations which not only had prior experience of dealing

---

[14] Part of these reflections have been published in Translational Criminology: Nøkleberg, Martin (2017) Research note: Gaining access to security environments in Norway. *Translational criminology* (Spring), 26–28.

with research and understood the purpose of this project but were also interested in what I would find. As mentioned above, I experienced difficulty in gaining access to the port of Oslo. Although they saw the value of the research, the organization was undergoing substantial structural reform, which made it difficult to find time to participate in the project. The port of Oslo was not the only organization that it was challenging to gain access to. Accessing the police proved to be the greatest hurdle I encountered, as will be described below.

Researchers have discussed tactics that can be used to gain access to research sites (Feldman, Bell and Berger, 2003; Shenton and Hayter, 2004; Wanat, 2008). But will these strategies be successful with police organizations, which are closed institutions which sometimes operate within secretive environments? Early studies in police research suggested that success in gaining access to police organizations depended on developing formal and informal relations with the gatekeeper of a particular police organization (Fox and Lundman, 1974). More recently, Demarée, Verwee, and Enhus (2013) have stressed the importance of formal meetings and verbal approval, as well as the necessity to build trust and engage in networking with key stakeholders to gain access. However, such strategies may not be successful when attempting to negotiate access to the organization responsible for airport or port policing and security. Building a relationship with a local gatekeeper may help, but ultimately the organization itself must decide whether to give researchers access. This means one needs to work through the organizational bureaucracy and gain permission from top levels of leadership. Such challenges are a particular problem in Norway, as formal access must be granted by the National Police Directorate (POD), which has overall responsibility for the police in both local and national security matters.

Greater challenges are present in the context of aviation and maritime security, which are more politicized than local policing. While "everyday" crime data might not be as restricted or inaccessible to researchers, the police may understandably consider information about global hubs and issues of national security more confidential and in need of being kept secret, and this increases the perceived risks of engaging in research into it. Those operating in the context of national security may, however, overestimate the security risks and, even if confidential data are not needed, gaining access to airports and ports to conduct research is still difficult. In the case of this project, the aim was to understand how various actors collaborate to create security at ports and airports, and this required access to agencies with information that may be subject to confidentiality rules (see also Lum et al., 2012). However, the focus was on how practices and collaboration with other agencies were perceived and experienced by those policing airports

and ports, topics which are arguably unrelated to confidential data on airport or port security measures. Despite this, an exemption from confidentiality was needed for police officers to be able to speak about these topics.

In Norway, the POD may grant exemptions from restricted access for purposes of research, to allow representatives to speak more freely when they are interviewed. However, applications to the POD are often forwarded to the Council for Confidentiality and Research for review. This process takes time: when this study was carried out, one had to expect to wait three months for an application to be processed. For those with limited time, such as PhD students, this can seriously affect the progress of a research project.

After a four months' wait, my application for a confidentiality exemption to study perceptions of practices and collaboration in airport and port security was rejected because the information I was interested in was deemed too sensitive; it was felt that divulging it might expose police security measures. In justifying their refusal, the POD invoked the Security Act, implying that the objects of the research (the airport and ports) and information about them are covered by the Security Act. Consequently, any information from airports and ports might be classified and protected, thus making it not accessible. Interestingly, other public agencies are subject to similar confidentiality constraints, and information obtained from these organizations could also be restricted by the Security Act. However, the Security Act was not invoked for research on those agencies in this study. Following this rejection, I had to develop a new project for which the application explicitly stated that the subject of my research was perceptions of practices and collaboration at airports and ports, rather than any more general discussion of security and crime. I was eventually granted the confidentiality exemption.

All this makes clear that gaining access for research on policing agencies is difficult, and in areas of national security, it is even more so. How researchers frame their projects when negotiating access can determine the outcome of their requests. For example, phrases such as "interdisciplinary and interagency cooperation" generally meet the approval of the National Police Directorate, while "security strategies" and "mentalities or rationalities" do not. Making use of neutral concepts can also be helpful. Security, on the other hand, is a contentious concept, with many connotations, as was shown above, and in the post 9/11 environment, where the "war on terror" discourse is prevalent, combining the word "security" with the word "airport" might create negative reactions to a research proposal. Building relationships during the negotiating

process with (local) gatekeepers who have experience of doing research and who understand research terminology can be helpful both in gaining access and in carrying out research projects.

Following the long and challenging process of gaining access to the organizations and to individuals, the process of collecting data commenced. As described above, a comprehensive data foundation was obtained for this dissertation, consisting of qualitative accounts of policing agencies' experiences of security practices and collaborative relations and their interpretations of them, and quantitative data capturing perceptions of collaboration and relational properties. In order to make sense of this vast data foundation, a variety of analytical procedures were utilized and I will now turn my attention describing that process.

4.4 Analytical procedures

Given the variety and richness of the data, many analytic procedures could be used. When selecting analytic methods, it is important to reflect upon the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and the research questions being asked, the type of data that has been gathered, and the advantages of applying any particular procedure to it. The process of analysis can take place at different stages during the research project (Creswell, 2013; Flick, 2014), and its purpose may differ according to how the project is progressing. In the case of my project, the process of analysis started with preliminary exploratory analyses while data collection was still ongoing. This was particularly the case for interview materials drawn from the studies of the ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand and Oslo airport; the second part of the analytical process began when data collection was complete, so that there could be more structured and in-depth analyses of the rich material available. Analysis thus went from an early exploratory phase to an explanatory stage later in the process (Swedberg, 2012). Because of the research questions addressed in this dissertation and the richness of the data, the analytical process relied on a variety of methods. The qualitative data demanded different strategies from those required for the quantitative foundation. In the following sections, I will describe the main analytical procedures and instruments used.

Qualitative analysis

As noted, the qualitative analytical process started with a preliminary analysis after the first sets of interviews were completed. These early analyses made it possible to identify interesting and important concepts and themes that could be followed up in subsequent data collections (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). This alternation between data collection and analysis enabled there to be greater sensitivity to the data and helped provide important input for collecting it. In general, to

gain a deeper understanding of the complex processes of collaboration amongst the policing agencies and their experiences of everyday security practices, the principles of grounded theory and thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Nowell, Norris, White and Moules, 2017), were generally followed, because of their flexibility and ability to provide rich and detailed accounts of data. The approach may be considered rather linear if the steps described by Braun and Clarke (2006), are strictly followed, but it is more correct to think of it as an iterative and reflective process, developing over time, in which one moves back and forth between the phases (Nowell et al., 2017).

With this in mind, I started the analysis by reading and re-reading all the interview transcripts, to increase my familiarity with their content. This is particularly important to get a sense of the entire body of data before breaking it into structured parts (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Creswell, 2013). In this first phase, I made short notes on early impressions of the data, and ideas about them which I thought could be useful in later stages of the analysis. Moving on from this reading of the interview transcripts, the next step was to raise the data to a conceptual level by developing initial codes. This meant describing, classifying and interpreting them in the process of coding and categorizing. Coding aims to enable simplification and attention to particular characteristics of the data (Nowell et al., 2017), which can be very useful for the next phase, which involves identifying and developing broader themes across the data set. The initial categorization of interesting features in this project produced several codes. For instance, phenomena relating to collaboration included codes such as consensus on objectives, information exchange, motivation, and degrees of formalization, whereas material about experiences of security practices produced codes such as risk, instrumental thinking, security awareness, efficiency and speed. This formed the basis for the sorting and collating of coded data extracts into different themes.

The aim of the qualitative analysis in this project – carried out by the initial coding, the process of asking questions about the data material, and making comparisons of data – was to identify overarching themes pertaining to collaboration processes and actors' experiences of security practices in global hubs, and to give a thick and rich description of these themes. In the literature, two main strategies for qualitative analysis and coding are presented. One involves codes that are developed on the basis of theoretical assumptions and is a rather "top down" process, while the other takes the data as its starting point and seeks to develop empirically inspired codes for them (Charmaz, 2014a, 2014b; Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Generally, however, qualitative research involves a combination of some sort of the theoretically driven

coding with the inductively oriented approach of interacting with the data. It is assumed that a theme captures something significant about the data, yet what counts as a theme is not necessarily something that can be measured quantitatively, but is rather to do with its prevalence both within a data item (such as an interview) and across the entire data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). What matters is whether it captures something important with regard to the research questions at hand.

In this research project, the coding process and the development of themes were inspired by the inductive approach, with codes and themes being identified inductively from the data. In **article one**, the main themes that emerged from analysis were "power struggles", "the public-private divide", "trust, norms and reciprocity", and "power relations and conflicts". In this article, these themes were crucial to making sense of collaborative processes among security actors in the global hubs, and of how the public-private dichotomy helped determine how agencies viewed themselves in comparison with others and positioned themselves within collaborative efforts. Although the **second article** mainly focuses on the relational and quantified data derived from the survey, it also includes qualitative accounts, to provide a richer description of emerging trends. In this regard, important themes that were identified included "brokerage powers", "network exchanges", and "lack of equality". **Article three** examined how actors construct, think about, and make sense of the security practices they engage in, when the exceptional is part of their everyday. Analysis of the material relating to these topics identified four overarching themes: "risk and instrumental logic", "militarization", "the human factor", and "the performance of security". The **fourth article** is also concerned with experiences of security practices in global hubs; analysis highlighted the nexus between trade and security and how it affects agencies' practices, identifying three themes that help make sense of the distinct spaces that airports and ports represent: "adapting to efficiency and speed", "responsibilization and privatization", and "security as service".

It should be noted, however, that the different themes were certainly influenced by my prior theoretical familiarity with the security and policing literature, and, most importantly, with the concept of mentalities drawn from the nodal approach and rationalities as developed by White and Gill (2013). Themes that were identified were therefore revised in the light of the conceptual framework set out in chapter 3, which underscores the flexibility of thematic analysis. How the different themes and categories related to each other was also considered during the process of analysis. To illustrate the particular nature of themes, pertinent quotations

are used extensively in the empirical articles of this dissertation. The analytical software NVivo 11 was used for the qualitative analysis in this dissertation.

Perception of collaboration – instrument and analysis

Based on the conceptualization of collaboration outlined in chapter 3, several factors seem to influence the way in which collaboration can be perceived; they can be found at the organizational, group and individual levels. Taking a multidisciplinary perspective and seeking a sound conceptual framework to analyze individual policing agents' perceptions of collaboration, I reviewed relevant literature in search of theoretical models and instruments relating to various aspects of collaboration. This review identified numerous quantitative research models and instruments, which explore different features of collaboration perceived by individual actors.

One such instrument is the Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration Model (PINCOM) (Strype, Gundhus, Egge and Ødegård, 2014; Ødegård, 2006; Ødegård, Hagtvet and Bjørkly, 2008; Ødegård and Strype, 2009). What is particularly interesting about this model is that it includes the idea that perception of collaboration may be influenced by factors at the individual, group, and organizational levels, and also covers the fundamental dimension of collaboration presented in the previous chapter. This instrument is composed of three dimensions and twelve constructs which attempt to give meaning to the phenomenon of collaboration. The first dimension includes motivation, role expectations, personality style, and professional power. The second consists of leadership, coping, communication and social support. The third dimension includes organizational aims, domain, culture and environment. Four indicators or items operationalize each of these constructs, making a total of 48 items. To take an example of the way operationalization works: the construct of motivation is represented by the two items: "I find working with other organizations as valuable" and "I get to use my creativity and imagination when I participate in collaboration with others".

The original PINCOM-Q, as reported by Strype, Gundhus, Egge, and Ødegård (2014), has achieved good reliability and validity scores, which suggests that it is suitable for measuring perceptions of collaboration (see also Rousseau et al., 2017). This was also the case in this dissertation, where the analysis shows the internal reliability coefficients Cronbach's alpha=.93 (whole questionnaire). As the original instrument was constructed to address interprofessional collaboration in youth mental health (Ødegård, 2006), some work was needed to adapt it for use in the field of policing and security.

The literature review (chapter 3), suggested that norms of trust and governance were important factors shaping individuals' perception of collaboration and four new constructs were thus developed to include them. Norms of trust were divided into two constructs, namely communal trust norms and exchange trust norms (Braithwaite, 1998; Brewer, 2014). Similarly, two constructs were added to cover different aspects of governance. The modified PINCOM used in this dissertation was composed of 16 constructs measured by 64 questions/items (48 derived from the original questionnaire), which were formulated as statements and rated on a 7-degree Likert scale (from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)). Some of the items were reverse-scored because the meaning of the statements was the opposite direction of the scale (that is, high-rated items were considered negative responses, and low-rated items were considered positive responses).

Data derived from the PINCOM were used in **article one** as a supplement to highlight differences in perceptions of collaboration processes, particularly differences between private and public policing agencies. Descriptive analyses were conducted to explore the main patterns of the quantified data on perception of collaboration. Index variables of the sixteen constructs of perception were computed on the basis of average scores. Analyses of Cronbach's alpha were conducted to check the reliability of the constructs derived from the PINCOM. Differences in average scores for each construct between groups (for example, differences between those of the public and private sectors) were tested using t-tests and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Social Network Analysis and measures
The second part of the data derived from the survey consists of quantified relational properties, which capture collaborative ties between policing agencies working in global hubs. In the policing literature of the last decade, interest in analyzing relational structures has increased and this has led to the exploration of various aspects of the networked plural policing system (Brewer, 2014; Dupont, 2006a; Whelan, 2016a, 2016b, 2017), and as the previous chapter illustrated, the notion of security networks has become prevalent (Dupont, 2004). However, while the relational and network perspective has received increasing scholarly attention, there is still a tendency to view networks only in terms of their metaphorical value (Whelan and Dupont, 2017). This can lead to methodological vagueness in the mapping of relationships and the way one understands the contribution to policing made by different agencies. To move beyond the use of (security) networks as mere metaphors, this dissertation argues that concepts and analytical tools drawn from network theory are useful and can yield important insights. The

application of social network analysis (SNA) can be particularly valuable in that it enables the empirical mapping and analysis of the relational constructs existing among the multitude of policing agencies. One of the ambitions of this dissertation is, therefore, to contribute to methodological advancement as regards the use of SNA in studies of plural policing and security governance.

The basic idea of SNA is to consider organizations or individuals as being embedded in a social or relational structure, which can be understood by applying various mathematical techniques to it (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013). SNA thus focuses on relations between actors, and has been defined as "the disciplined inquiry into the patterning of relations among social actors, as well as the patterning of relations among actors at different levels of analysis" (Breiger, 2004: 505). In this regard, network data are dependent on actors/nodes and relational ties/edges, with relational ties being the building blocks of networks. These ties can create direct paths between nodes, but equally importantly, they often interlink through common nodes, creating indirect paths of connection. The network approach, with the help of SNA, allows for the exploration of the patterns that constantly form in social interactions and can reveal how a network structure may provide (social) actors with opportunities for action or create constraints that limit action (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

The nodes can be a variety of actors, and in social contexts, the most common types of nodes are individuals, organizations, communities, countries and regions. Relations are generally divided into four types – similarities (such as location or membership), social relations (such as kinship), interactions (such as support), and flows (such as information or resources) (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca, 2009; Bø and Schiefloe, 2007; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In addition to the structural data capturing relations between actors, attribute variables can be included, that is, characteristics of the actors, such as age, gender and organizational affiliation (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). As described in the previous chapter, nodes in this dissertation represent the organizations that are directly or indirectly involved in the production and/or delivery of security and policing services in global hubs in Norway, which can either make connections to form security network structures or decide to operate in isolation.

Dupont (2006a) suggests that extensive data on relational ties must be collected to capture the essence of security networks. As noted above, the survey included a component designed to map structural relations that connect different policing and security agencies. In order to measure these ties, respondents were asked to name organizations with which partnerships –

either formal or informal – had been maintained over the previous twelve months. In this dissertation, the collaborative ties were operationalized as 1) physical interactions between actors on issues concerning security and policing, such as meetings or briefings, 2) the transfer of information, expertise, and knowledge, 3) the pooling of common resources, such as CCTV and communication equipment, and 4) the physical movement of actors, such as joint operations and task forces (Brewer, 2014). Collaborative connections thus encompass the types of relations characterized as interactions and flows. It has been pointed out that there can be considerable variations in the closeness of the relations between people or organizations (Boemcken, 2009), and to take this into account, the survey also sought to capture the degree of formalization and frequency of every relational tie that the respondents reported.

SNA provides several analytical techniques and concepts that help to identify and understand the patterns of relations that connect different policing agencies, and the positions occupied by central or peripheral actors. Network visualization can be a fruitful starting point for exploring relationships; it is a powerful tool that provides an overview of structural patterns and insights into them (Brandes, Freeman and Wagner, 2013). In the dissertation, (see **article two**) the visualizations of networks used layout algorithms, to make the graphs more interpretable, and included node attributes to provide more information about the nodes (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013). However, conducting analysis solely on the basis of visualization can be challenging, particularly if the network consists of many agencies and relational ties that make up a complex structure – which is the case for the security networks identified in this study. One way to overcome this was to employ mathematical measurement and analytical techniques, since these can be used regardless of the size and complexity of the network under investigation (Breiger, 2004; López and Scott, 2000; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The relational data in this dissertation were therefore organized using matrices which enabled mathematical tools to be used to explore patterns (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013; Bø and Schiefloe, 2007).

In network analysis, emphasis can be placed on different levels, that is, one can make macro-level measurements to characterize the network as a whole or use micro-level techniques focusing on individual actors. In this project, measurements at both these levels of analysis were important for exploring the collaborative relationships present in the global hubs. As regards the macro-level properties of the network, this study has employed measures such as density, average geodesic distance and centralization. Density measures the proportion of all possible ties that is present, and provides an insight into the level of connectedness of the network. To determine whether density should be considered high or low, one needs to look at the type and

number of actors involved. Density is generally measured in comparative terms (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013), which means that it is also possible to see how density is distributed between and within the different sectors or groups included in this dissertation. In addition to density, it is of interest to explore both the connectivity and distance between nodes. In this study, geodesic distance was analyzed – it refers to the shortest distance or path between two nodes in a network (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013). The average geodesic distance, however, is applied to the network as a whole. These measures help to show the potential for information and resource exchange within the boundaries of the networks under investigation in this study.

The exploration of the micro-properties of relations was based mainly on the concept of centrality, which is closely linked to the concept of power (Borgatti, 2005; Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013; Freeman, 1979). By applying SNA, previous studies of security networks have explored how power is structured in networks (Brewer, 2014; Dupont, 2006a; Nøkleberg, 2016); it has been demonstrated that well-positioned security actors have more ability to influence the course of events, because of the greater opportunities available to them and the fewer constraints they contend with (Dupont, 2006a). According to the network approach, power is therefore assumed to be essentially relational – it is a consequence of an actor's position in a network (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013).

Among the most important centrality measures used in this dissertation, are degree centrality, betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1979), and agencies' brokerage roles (Gould and Fernandez, 1989). Degree centrality is considered one of the simpler measures of centrality, as it captures the number of ties that a node has (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013). Wasserman and Faust (1994: 178) suggest that "the simplest definition of actor centrality is that central actors must be the most active in the sense that they have the most ties to other actors in the network or graph". Although one of the simpler measurement, it is often used in the study of security networks and can show the distribution of well-connected agencies. Betweenness centrality is among the most common indicators of brokerage (Long, Cunningham and Braithwaite, 2013), and captures the probability of a node being on the shortest path between any two nodes in the network (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Betweenness is often interpreted in terms of potential for controlling the flow of network resources: an actor with high betweenness is viewed as a broker. That is, someone or something that is the node that lies between other nodes and mediates their relationships, is assumed to possess considerable power to control flows through the entire network.

In this study, the notion of brokerage is of particular interest, because a connection is identified between network theory's understanding of brokerage and the idea of anchoring processes in Loader and Walker's conceptual framework, which was outlined in the previous chapter. The network view of brokerage suggests that broker agencies hold key structural positions in networks and therefore have more influence and power to control the diffusion of network resources (Marsden, 1982). In a similar way, the perspective of anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker, 2007) assumes that the actor who operates as an anchor has a powerful influence on the results of governance processes. To an extent, therefore, anchored pluralism is concerned with the notion of power.

In order to further explore the idea of brokerage, this dissertation utilizes the brokerage typology of Gould and Fernandez (1989). The brokerage structures they present suggest that a node may act as a broker through different sub-roles, depending on the direction of flow of information or resources within the network and between groups or clusters. To categorize these structural roles, five brokerage types are identified, and the connections within them are viewed as triads: node A is connected to node B, node B is connected to node C, but there is no tie connecting nodes A and C. It is assumed that node B plays the role of broker in these connections. The five brokerage roles are: (1) coordinator (all nodes belong to the same group), (2) gatekeeper (node A belongs to one group and nodes B and C to another), (3) representative (nodes A and B belong to one group and node C belongs to a different one), (4) consultant/itinerant (B is an external node who facilitates connections between the unconnected nodes A and C, which belong to the same group), and (5) liaison (nodes A, B and C each belongs to a different group). According to Gould and Fernandez, brokerage scores indicate the number of times an actor performs one of the brokerage roles. The metrics of this brokerage typology are employed to shed light on the distribution of network power.

The collected network data were analyzed using the SNA software UCINET and Gephi (Bastian, Heymann and Jacomy, 2009; Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002).

4.5 Research quality and ethical considerations

Clearly, the rich and varied data foundation for this dissertation can enable there to be in-depth analysis of the complexities of collaboration processes and experiences of security governance in global hubs; steps need to be taken to ensure that these analyses are considered credible and of a high quality. Research methods literature regards the quality of data analysis as of the utmost importance (Creswell, 2009), but as far as qualitative analysis is concerned, there seems

to be little consensus on how it should be evaluated (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). However, reliability and validity are undoubtedly necessary to attain rigor in both qualitative and quantitative research (Morse et al., 2002). A variety of requirements for this have been put forward, including methodological coherence, an appropriate sampling process, and concurrent collection and analysis of data (Morse et al., 2002), which are all criteria that could be applied to the quality of this study. The next sections present and discuss the importance of reliability and validity for rigor and quality in this dissertation. Following these, there are some reflections on the potential of generalization and a discussion of ethical considerations.

Reliability

Reliability is related to the consistency of research findings and to the transparency of the production and analysis of data (George and Bennett, 2005; Silverman, 2013). To achieve high reliability, it is important to document the steps of the research process. In this chapter, to make the different stages of this research as transparent as possible, I have made considerable efforts to describe how different methods for collecting data were used, how participants were selected, and the way in which data have been analyzed. Although qualitative projects are open-ended and often move back and forth between the different steps of the research process (for example, between data collection and analysis), efforts were made to systematize the various processes and procedures involved.

A distinction is often made between the strategies employed to achieve reliability in qualitative research and those used to achieve it in quantitative research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). Because of the mixed method nature of this dissertation, the reliability of the quantified data is indeed addressed differently. Reliability is concerned with consistency of measurements, and there are various ways to assess it. One of these relates to the internal consistency of a measurement, that is, the extent to which the items on a scale measure one particular construct (Heale and Twycross, 2015). In this dissertation, Cronbach's alpha is particularly appropriate for estimating the reliability of the perception of collaboration. It measures internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group and is considered to be a measure of scale reliability. As already mentioned above, analysis indicated a strong internal reliability of Cronbach's alpha= .93 (for the whole questionnaire). The usual cut off points for alpha is 0.6-0.7 (Trobia, 2008). Analyses of Cronbach's alpha were run for all the sixteen constructs measuring perception of collaboration, almost all of which showed high internal consistency and all were above the cut off points. This provides evidence for viewing the instruments as reliable.

Validity

While reliability is concerned with having research methods that generate reliable data, validity refers to the extent to which an instrument or method measures and captures what it is intended to investigate (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Silverman, 2013). To increase the validity of the research, various strategies recommended in the literature have been used. When selecting participants, for instance, I chose individuals who could be assumed to possess knowledge about the subject under investigation, taking them from a great variety of organizations. This sampling process enabled me to tap into the participants' varied perspectives and gave me the opportunity to search for convergence or divergence in findings across organizational boundaries. As with any research, there are methodological limitations, and the findings outlined in the empirical articles should be approached with some caution. There is a potential danger that what is said in interviews may not be what the interviewees actually think and do (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). If a trusting relationship with the interviewees is developed, which was the aim in this project, this is less likely to be the case, as has been found in similar research settings (Whelan, 2017).

Triangulation methods are thought to increase the validity of research (Creswell, 2013; Silverman, 2013). In the various stages of the data collection process, different types of data were collected, since this project set out to use multiple sources, methods, and analyses. One great advantage of combining methods and data is that experiences of security practice and collaboration can be viewed and understood from various positions and perspectives. This can help validate the findings presented in this study. I have also discussed parts of the research design, and the analysis and interpretation of data with colleagues, and these discussions can contribute to strengthening the validity (Creswell, 2013). In social network analysis of relational data, one major concern is the possibility that its quality can be affected by missing data (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013). Such missing data is frequently results from non-responses in surveys. As this research relied on a survey to collect relational data, this could have influenced the findings presented in this dissertation. During the design and data collection process, therefore, it was important to be aware of such potential pitfalls and consider what could be done to minimize threats to validity. One way to avoid the problem of non-responses was to include a large number of individuals from the different organizations, and make use of aggregated relational data in analyses. The survey also clearly specified the network boundaries, which made it easier for respondents to name all the collaborative relations that were considered to be active.

Generalization

Some of the criticism leveled against case study research concerns its potential for providing generalizations (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2009). In this project, 76 interviews were conducted as part of three case studies, and although this can be considered sufficient to provide in-depth descriptions of the subject under investigation and data saturation was considered to have been reached, the low number of units and non-randomized sampling meant statistical generalizations were not possible (Yin, 2009). However, the qualitative case study approach does not seek to provide generalizations of the type found in quantitative research. The aim should rather be considered that of offering analytical or theoretical generalizations (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Yin, 2009). As has been made clear in this chapter, this research is exploratory in nature and seeks to depict the ways in which agencies experience and make sense of security governance, through in-depth explorations of their everyday practices and collaborative relations. Analytical or theoretical generalizations can help develop principles or conceptual propositions that are applicable to other empirical situations in policing hubs. To allow for analytical generalization, it is essential to offer a detailed description of the research design and, more importantly, the context in which the research took place. Some of these broader implications of the research are outlined and discussed in chapter 6, and also addressed in the four empirical articles.

Ethical considerations

This research project was carried out in accordance with legally recognized Norwegian ethical standards with regard to data collection, confidentiality, and the storage of data. The research design and interview guides were approved by the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD). As the nature of the research design changed from the original plan (the methods and sample were expanded), I was required to notify the NSD, and these changes were subsequently approved.

The primary ethical concerns for this research were participants' confidentiality, integrity and their involvement in the research. Written consent was obtained from all interviewees. As part of the process of gaining informed consent, participants were given information about the project, thus, the consent form included a general outline of the purpose of the project, the sampling process and methods of data collection, together with reassurance that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time. Participants were told how confidentiality would be maintained in the project. Before an interview commenced, I again described the project to the interviewee and discussed the need to anonymize. Although

some participants did not mind being mentioned by name in print, the vast majority wanted to be anonymized. I therefore chose to anonymize when transcribing the interviews and all the interviewees' names were replaced with a number and organizational sector. Similar measures were taken with the survey participants, with some minor adjustments. As the survey was distributed via e-mail, participants received an invitation that included all the information necessary to make an informed decision about taking part in the project.

In addition to the ethical considerations relating to participants, the research topic involved other important challenges. As noted above, it was difficult to gain access to the field. This research investigates the experience of security practice and collaboration among organizations working in airport and port security, so it can be considered as being concerned with sensitive fields (such as national security and critical infrastructure). When the Police Directorate rejected my application to conduct the research, references were made to the Security Act. This made me aware that I had to be careful about the information I collected and I spent a considerable amount of time reflecting on how to avoid collecting sensitive and confidential material. One way to deal with this challenge was to send the interview guide to the interviewee beforehand.

The methodological descriptions offered in this chapter have made clear the mixed-method nature in order to capture and understand collaboration and experiences of everyday security practices in global hubs addressed in this study. The next chapter outlines the main findings from the four empirical articles that make up this dissertation.

5. Summary of articles

This chapter provides a summary of the four articles. The articles address slightly different aspects of experiences of security and the policing practices at airports and maritime ports. In the **first article**, I examine how policing agencies rely on the traditional dividing line between public and private to make sense of their collaborative processes, and challenge the notion of middle ground of hybridity in policing. In **article two**, using social network analysis, I map and analyze the distinct pattern of relationships that connects policing agencies, with the network perspective enabling methodological and conceptual advances on plural policing. The **third article** explores security practices in more detail by addressing how security and policing agencies perceive and experience the exceptional nature of security as part of their everyday practices. In the **fourth article**, I address the nexus between trade and security, and analyze how policing agencies understand the interaction between the imperatives of security and trade. Although the articles can be read separately as independent contributions to the field of plural policing and security governance, they also connect in certain ways. In the following, I will offer a brief description of how they interrelate, and clarify how they help shed light on this dissertation's research questions.

Article 1: Nøkleberg, Martin (2019). The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing. *Policing and Society*, 1–17.

The public-private divide revisited: Questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing.

The starting point of this article is the changing patterns of security provision as is recognized and described in the policing literature. A factor in the observed increase in pluralization in policing endeavors is the proliferation of hybrid policing actors, which has resulted in claims that the public-private dichotomy – long been deemed crucial for understanding policing agencies' involvement in security and crime control – has lost its utility. In particular, Marc Schuilenburg (2015) claims that the securitization of society causes the public and private to be so interwoven that there is little point in considering only one of them, and points out that the distinction is difficult to apply to real-life practices, which makes the conceptual pair of public-private obsolete. The dichotomy is increasingly fading, giving way to the *middle ground*, where everything and everyone is becoming hybrid. The idea of hybridity, then, denotes the growing similarity and even sameness between public and private actors, which will inevitably have consequences for the relationships and practices of policing agencies.

While not disputing the value of such predictions, this article responds to these claims by raising the question: to what extent does the theoretical assumptions of the middle ground of hybridity stand up to empirical scrutiny? Does the idea outlined by Schuilenburg, in fact obscure significant differences between agencies, particularly as regards their interests and mentalities? In order to address this question, the article revisits the public-private distinction by examining relational and collaborative practices in the Norwegian maritime port and airport security environments, focusing on power relations, information sharing and the exchange of resources and expertise. The article demonstrates that collaborative practices are prime sites for studying the impact of the notion of the middle ground on policing and security, as processes of collaboration between agencies create spaces in which different interests, mentalities or rationalities can meet. The agencies confront the potential blending of attributes that is associated with the notion of hybridity. As this article points out, whether such blending actually takes place must be seen as an empirical question rather than something that can be taken for granted. The first article contributes to the overall topic of unpacking collaborative and security practices by shedding light on the second research question about how security and policing actors perceive collaboration in their everyday practice. It also has relevance to the first question.

Supported by in-depth qualitative interviews with key policing and security agencies and survey data on perceptions of collaboration, the findings presented in this article are at odds with the conceptual and empirical assumptions about the middle ground of hybridity, that are made by Schuilenburg. One crucial point concerning the notion of the middle ground is that, as collaborations progress and proliferate, one might expect there to be fewer and fewer differences between policing agencies: hybridity should be a prominent feature of the empirical spaces of investigation. In fact, the article clearly demonstrates that the conceptual pair of public-private is a salient feature of the vocabulary of different policing agencies. The empirical findings reveal the importance of *interest* for understanding the distinction between public and private, and how it affects agencies' practice. This is borne out by the fact that reaching consensus on objectives and aims in collaborative processes was considered difficult because of differences in agencies' interests. The exploration also revealed that policing agencies that had a similar cultural outlook and shared interests seemed to experience greater reciprocity in their collaborative efforts, and considered establishing trust to be easier. The importance of sectoral allegiance is apparent here, in that public-public and private-private partnerships may experience fewer tensions than those that cross the public-private divide. The policing agencies

differ in terms of their mentalities and interests (for example economic ethos versus public interest), which makes collaboration challenging, and this difference seems largely to be determined by the degree of publicness-privateness. In this respect, the article shows that the public-private distinction is crucial to how agencies view themselves in comparison with others: they refer to the divide and the importance of difference when seeking to position themselves in collaborative efforts. This can be interpreted as an indication that the agencies under scrutiny frequently make use of the traditional dividing line between public and private to both navigate and make sense of their practices, relations, and identity in a complex policing environment. The article therefore questions the claim made by Schuilenburg (2015) that it is confusing and inaccurate to continue to rely on the public and private dichotomy in analyses of contemporary security governance, because the notion of the middle ground leads to an under-recognition of the importance of a widely-recognized difference.

Following from the findings outlined in this article, it is suggested that the dividing line between public and private still has significant analytical value in examinations of policing. The article contributes to the growing international literature on plural policing by offering insights into the perception of collaborative processes and the way collaboration is inevitably affected by the public-private distinction. Paying attention to differences, the article argues, is a fruitful approach to advancing our understanding of policing practices and the governance of security. In particular, by bringing together the dimensions of interest and mentality helps to show how agencies are situated along the continuum between "publicness" and "privateness".

Article 2: Nøkleberg, Martin (2020). Examining the how of Plural Policing: Moving from Normative Debate to Empirical Enquiry. *British Journal of Criminology*, 60 (3), 681–702.

Examining the how of Plural Policing: Moving from Normative Debate to Empirical Enquiry

While the first article addressed the issue of the middle ground of hybridity in policing studies, the second turns its attention toward the conceptual and analytical debates that have characterized the literature in recent years. Previous studies have demonstrated the importance of collaborative processes and recognized that policing practices generally involve an extensive exchange of information, expertise, resources and knowledge. In addition to pluralization, policing agencies are involved in a vast set of linkages, and security is therefore viewed as being produced and delivered through (security) networks. This article contributes to this strand of literature by mapping and examining the relational properties of security networks in Norwegian airport and port policing. It addresses more explicitly the first research question

guiding this dissertation, which relates to the mapping of organizations' collaborative relations, while also providing insights that help answer the second question.

Hitherto, two of the most salient perspectives seeking to conceptualize the complex nature of plural and networked policing have been nodal governance (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005; Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007). Both approaches aim to map today's policing environment, although they differ in how they interpret its plurality. Although deemed highly valuable for deepening our understanding of plural policing endeavors, current debates in the literature have been predominantly concerned with the *if*, *why* and *why not* of plural policing and have paid far less attention to questions of *how* and *how much*. This means that underlying normative assumptions and claims often take precedence over empirical inquiry when policing scholars explore the relationships that connect actors. The nodal governance and anchored pluralism perspectives are often presented as opposites as regards their understanding of what the role of the state *ought* to be in the plural landscape of policing and security (Boutellier and Van Steden, 2011), thus increasing the normative orientation of the field.

Against this backdrop, this article argues that there is a need for ways to operationalize the two theoretical frameworks and make them better able to bear empirical scrutiny. In order to achieve this, the article takes as its point of departure the collaborative processes found in Norwegian airport and maritime port policing. Using this empirical setting, the article explores how concepts and analytical tools drawn from the field of network theory can help close this gap and points out ways in which these tools can help operationalize the approaches of nodal governance and anchored pluralism. This moves the normative orientation of the debate towards empirically grounded inquiries, expanding the analytical toolbox and developing new ways of exploring and understanding plural policing environments. Looking at security governance through the lens of networks is not new as such (Dupont, 2006a), but there seems to be a growing interest in utilizing network concepts in policing studies. Nonetheless, there is still a tendency in the literature for networks to be viewed mainly in terms of their metaphorical value. Moving beyond this, the article shows how the concepts of brokerage and homophily – derived from social network analysis – can be connected with nodal governance and anchored pluralism, and thus provide a more rigorously analytical language with which to address research questions about plural policing. In this sense, the article has ambitions for methodological development, by showing the value of utilizing social network analysis.

Brokerage draws attention to the distribution of power in networks and, in particular, to how some actors possess key structural positions because they are intermediaries. In the anchored pluralism perspective, it is assumed that the actor who operates as an anchor crucially affects the results of governance processes, through being in a position to mobilize resources. Being an anchor in security and policing practices thus increases an actor's power and capacity to control the course of events, which is very similar to the position of brokers in network theory. This article argues that it is possible to draw parallels between the notion of brokerage and the idea of anchoring. Homophily, on the other hand, addresses the tendency of agencies to connect and interact more readily with ones that are similar to themselves; the notion enables a more in-depth analysis of what is framed in the first article as sectoral allegiance, which explains the tendency of policing agencies to share information and resources more readily with organizations within their own sector. The concept of homophily can thus be useful for showing how the social patterns within networks may be explained by differences and similarities of interests. The nodal perspective on policing has used the notion of mentalities to understand the dynamics of security governance, and frequently makes a distinction between organizations concerned with the public good and those governed by market logic and the profit ethos. Homophily is considered as particularly fruitful for the process of developing the empirical potential of nodal governance by enabling empirical inquiry into the extent to which policing agencies sharing similar mentalities or rationalities are more likely to form collaborative ties with each other than with those with different interests.

The empirical investigation reveals a distinct social structure, by mapping the pattern of relations of the security networks of the port of Stavanger and Oslo airport, and analysis of their network properties yields comparable results: the networks consist of multiple actors and many relational ties are reported to be active. In such dense networks, where policing agencies have many ways of reaching other actors, the potential for exchanging network resources is considerable and exchange can take place quickly within the boundaries of the network. The analysis also points to clustering effects, as divisions can be seen in both networks that correspond to the particular powers, responsibilities and core tasks of the policing agencies. Although it is assumed that clustering impacts the distribution of network power, as the analysis of brokerage shows, some agencies are strategically positioned and thus able to tap into the expertise, resources and knowledge of other agencies and to act as a bridge between clusters. In particular, the article reveals that public policing agencies, in the networks at port of Stavanger and Oslo airport, tend to occupy the most significant broker positions and thus to

possess great power to facilitate the exchange of information and resources. Their network power far exceeds the influence exerted by private policing agencies. This uneven distribution of network power means private policing agencies are reliant on accessing public nodes to reach otherwise unconnected agencies or clusters to participate in the exchange of valuable network resources.

As was shown in the first article, sectoral allegiance was as an important factor in reducing tensions and making collaboration easier. The tendency of policing agencies to rely upon relationships with organizations similar to themselves indicates the importance of homophily and the findings suggest that it plays a crucial role in network formation in the two cases examined. Policing agencies with similar mentalities or rationalities (for example, concern for the public good rather than market logic) are indeed more likely to form collaborative ties with one another. It was perceived by numerous agencies that collaborative efforts with similar organizations following the principle of homophily, involve less risk and lower costs, and can help establish trusting relations. However, this article shows that, despite its advantages, homogeneity in collaborative approaches to policing can also adversely affect exchanges in security networks, by causing some policing agencies to miss out on crucial information because exchange is restricted to private–private or public–public connections.

This article clearly demonstrates the value of utilizing the network perspective to make sense of plural and collaborative policing processes and of how, in particular, the analytical tool of social network analysis can capture and help explain crucial nuances in networked policing. Like previous studies that have demonstrated how collaboration can take various forms, the empirical investigation, with the help of social network analysis, shows how network structures and the distribution of network power can vary. Relational phenomena should not be understood only in the light of the normative debates that dominate the current literature. The findings demonstrate that, by linking the concepts of nodal governance and anchored pluralism with different elements from social network analysis, one can develop more sensitive analytical perspectives and methodologically sound tools that foster empirically informed understanding of networked policing.

Article 3: Nøkleberg, Martin (forthcoming). Expecting the Exceptional in the Everyday: Policing Global Transportation Hubs. *Security Dialogue.*

Expecting the Exceptional in the Everyday: Policing Global Transportation Hubs

This article moves away from the explicit focus on collaboration among security and policing agencies, which the first two articles have dealt with in detail, to take a broader view of the governance of security by paying attention to agencies' experiences and understandings of security practice. The article does this by addressing the dissertation's third research question, which concerns the way in which actors experience their practice of security; it thus makes an important contribution to knowledge about security governance. In the security and policing literature, previous studies have examined various aspects of security projects; a prime concern has been to assess how measures are implemented and justified in the name of security. In several fields, the notion of exceptionality has sparked considerable scholarly interest, as a way of understanding the circumstances in which ever more issues are framed through the lens of "security". This tendency towards securitization means some issues are deemed threatening and promoted from the ordinary to the exceptional realm of security. In the post 9/11 security environment, the "war on terror" discourse has led to the widespread implementation of exceptional security practices, which depart from "normal politics". The security of airports and ports is particularly affected by this trend, as it seems to be operating under constant threats of an exceptional nature, and have a minimal margin for error, because the potential consequences are so significant.

To add a new layer to our understanding of security projects, however, a case has been made for moving attention from "spectacular" and "exceptional" events to the mundane, everyday nature of security. The third article therefore engages with the debate on exceptionality and the everyday by drawing attention to organizations' experience of security projects. The "war on terror" discourse is perceived to have significantly influenced the everyday environment of the aviation and maritime sectors, in that they are affected by emotional responses, such as uncertainty, fear and anxiety, felt by passengers, customers, and employees. Against this backdrop, this article takes the case of Norwegian airport and port security to investigate how agencies involved in policing and security experience the exceptional in their everyday practice; the aim is to shed light on how they feel about it, interpret it and respond to it. To achieve this, empirical materials are drawn from qualitative in-depth interviews with key representatives of organizations involved in security governance and policing. By engaging with and building upon the literature at the intersection of the exceptional and the everyday, the article suggests that "everyday security consciousness" can help reveal how agencies construct strategies to cope with the consequences of exceptionality and reduce the level of uncertainty. Although an instrumental logic emphasizing risk management and the tangible has been deemed

indispensable to mitigating risk within aviation and maritime security (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Salter, 2007), the human aspect of security practices – where emotional dimensions of security consciousness and the performance of security are crucial parts of everyday life – signifies a shift in attention to the subjective and the embodied experiences of security agencies. This article argues that, as emotions play an important role in how we experience and respond to security measures, it is crucial to pay attention to everyday security consciousness, as this provides detailed empirical descriptions of the micro-practices or micro-politics of (in)security, which tend to receive little scholarly attention. This article's significance, therefore, lies in its development of our understanding of security governance and risk management at transportation hubs, by illuminating the embodied emotional experience of security and risk in the face of exceptionality that agencies respond to and develop strategies to cope with in their everyday practice.

In particular, the empirical assessment documents the impact of the exceptional through the embodied experiences of living with seemingly constant risk and uncertainty. As regards the sense of uneasiness that has become part of the everyday life of airport and port security, it is shown that individuals and agencies actively seek to compensate for it by relying on instrumental governing logics and techniques, with risk management and analysis used to render uncertainties manageable and tangible. In parallel with this, there is a tendency towards militarization, particularly in agencies' security exercises, which are influenced by the war on terror discourse prevalent in this field. However, emphasis on the tangible nature of everyday security is only one, albeit prominent aspect of the coping strategies developed by the security agencies. The evidence presented in this article shows the importance of what is characterized as the human dimension of security practices. This means that the value of human qualities is recognized when confronting the consequences of exceptionality in the security landscape of airports and ports. In particular, the empirical analysis demonstrates how the notion of everyday security consciousness figures in the life of security agencies. Closely associated with this is the emergence of mechanisms of active resistance that provide excitement and alleviate boredom, in response to what is sometimes seen as an overemphasis on the importance of the tangible nature of security practices. As part of their emotional response those delivering security find ways, in the way they perform security, to ridicule and challenge its instrumental governing logic.

Article 4: Nøkleberg, Martin (ready for submission). Policing global hubs: Balancing the imperatives of security and trade.

Policing global hubs: Balancing the imperatives of security and trade

This article focuses on the nexus between trade and security in the global hubs constituted by airports and maritime ports, whose security, as several observers have previously noted and the other articles of this dissertation have shown, involves pluralized and networked policing. One of the ambitions of this article is to make sense of the distinct space that airports and ports seem to represent. Taking inspiration from the notion of "global cities" (Sassen, 2001), one can think of airports and ports as global hubs which are critical geographical centers and crossroads where immense flows of people and things converge and are facilitated, to link local markets and global economic and trade networks. In this way, global hubs become, with their emphasis on efficiency, speed and high circulation rates, essential points of passage and representations of contemporary global connectivity. Due to the importance of time and speed, airports and ports are thought of as distinct institutional environments in terms of security, quite unlike static and area-bound neighborhoods, and this is assumed to have consequences for the way in which policing is organized and performed. In line with this, global hubs such as airports and ports are archetypical examples of the organizing principles of the "space of flows" (Castells, 1996), since they operate as passages and facilitators of vast movements of people and things. Policing actors seek ways to achieve secure and seamless systems to govern flows and meet the imperatives of trade. Movement through airports and ports must be systematically planned and policed. For all that, little is known about the interaction between security and trade in global hubs, and how this affects the practices of policing. Examining such environments, this article argues, can advance current scholarship on plural policing and also expand the analytical toolbox of criminology more generally, as it opens up for new perspectives on the temporalization of security to be included in analyses.

Drawing on empirically grounded research in Norway, this article examines how various agencies in ports and airports negotiate the imperatives of security and trade in everyday life. The article therefore pays particular attention to how they experience the balancing game involved and explores agencies' strategies for facing the tensions that arise when seemingly contradictory logics converge; in their efforts to secure smooth and speedy flows, security agencies may, in fact, act as barriers. The article therefore engages with both the third and fourth research questions guiding this dissertation, with the aim of unpacking the particularities of the experiences and mentalities of policing and security actors in global hubs.

The empirical findings show that global hubs can reveal how policing agencies are affected by, and seek to adapt to, commercial demands for the efficiency and speed necessary for trade. The notion of efficiency is clearly critical for understanding these processes, along with the demands of passengers, customers, and supply-chain and just-in-time production systems, where speed and time are paramount, which highlights the importance of the notion of the temporalization of security (Valverde, 2011, 2014) to address and unpack the complexities of contemporary security governance. Previous studies have established that time and speed inform understandings of security governance, and the temporal imaginaries that dominate the literature are generally concerned with risk and pre-crime, which are also issues for airport and port security. This article considers the here and now, directing attention to the interrelation of security and flows, speed and movement, and customer satisfaction. The article argues that the temporal dimension of airports and ports involves temporalization of a quite different kind than that which is concerned with the past, present and future of security measures and crime control. In the empirical context analyzed, security practices are highly sensitive to commercial imperatives, and efficiency and speed are an essential feature of the immense volume of flows needed for commercial success.

By examining the interaction between security and trade, this article presents a picture of how policing agencies are affected by the ambitions, actions and decisions of others, showing how border police, for instance, experience the ever greater passenger flows dictated by commercial logic and adapt their practice to meet the demands of those whose interests are based upon different temporal understandings; this leads to concern that the influence of others could challenge security and damage the quality of border control services. This article also shows that responsibilization is a prominent feature of the policing of global hubs: governmental agencies put increasing pressure on private actors to help control migratory flows, compelling them to develop skills that are not required for their core business. In these circumstances, private actors experience frustration both because of the conflict between such control responsibilities and their core business imperatives and because of the challenge to their temporal preoccupations, which revolve around the value of speedy flows and their ambition to increase their volume.

Since security and trade logics are not always compatible, the tension agencies experience when policing global hubs, arises from what has been described in policing studies as differences in guiding rationalities, which can have consequences for collaborative relations, as was shown in the first and second articles. Actors know it is important to be aware of the different interests

involved and to prevent them from colliding, and this article's findings demonstrate that recognizing these differences can make it easier to handle them and achieve a harmonious relationship between the imperatives of trade and security.

The empirical contextualization of policing global hubs also reveals how pivotal the logics of trade are in reconfiguring our understanding of contemporary security; it speaks to the debate on expanding conceptualizations of security. The findings show the salient position of *security as service* in policing practice in global hubs. The "customer is king" attitude (Eski, 2019), makes the service aspect of security particularly important for private actors, as can be seen in their contract and business strategy, and it is vital for guiding their practice. The connection between security and service is made apparent by policing agencies' recognition that it is important to satisfy customers' needs by making security part of the total experience of travel; they understand this can satisfy trade imperatives and companies' desires for increased flows and speed.

By examining the temporal imaginaries of global hubs, the article seeks to add empirical evidence to existing accounts, while also contributing new knowledge about how contemporary pluralized security governance both shapes, and is affected by, the imperatives of trade.

6. Concluding discussion and implications of findings

This dissertation has examined policing and security practices at global hubs, taking Norwegian airports and maritime ports as examples. More precisely, it has studied how the agencies producing and delivering security and policing services in global hubs experience and perceive their collaborative relations and everyday practices when dealing with matters of security.

Following this formulation of the overarching research objective and the four research questions presented in the introductory chapter, the dissertation aimed firstly to make sense of the practices of governance and the capacities of individual security agencies, with a particular emphasis on their experiences of everyday security and underlying mentalities, and the linkages and network responses observed between agencies. Secondly, by focusing on the interaction between collaborative relations on the one hand, and agencies' experiences of security practices on the other, an effort was made to unpack the distinct nature of policing global hubs, which this dissertation sees as qualitatively different from other forms of policing and security addressed in the literature. A third aim was to help advance the methodological and analytical perspectives utilized in studies of security governance and plural policing, by connecting the broader discussion on security governance with the network governance and network theory literature. As this in-depth exploration of security governance and policing addresses the Norwegian context, the dissertation also aims to contribute to and extend the rather limited, but growing, literature on Nordic plural policing. Consequently, the four empirical articles that make up this dissertation addressed different dimensions of experiences of security practices and collaborative structures. Although they dealt with a variety of topics and relied upon different analytical perspectives, it is possible to discern some overarching observations concerning the policing of global hubs.

In this concluding chapter, I will therefore elaborate on the key findings derived from the four articles and point out how they relate to the overall research objective and the four research questions. The first section summarizes the main findings and discusses how they engage with and advance the current literature on policing and security governance. Secondly, based on the findings, I raise a question about the empirical context from which these findings are drawn, asking if and how context matters. That is, does the fact that the dissertation is situated in the context of Norwegian and Nordic plural policing and security governance, have an influence on the empirical observations presented in it? This question is connected to the aim of identifying the distinct nature of policing global hubs. The following section will explore this further by discussing the findings in the light of the economic imperatives governing the

structure of global hubs, which involve notions of efficiency, speed and time and asks whether global hubs should be understood as generic or localized spaces. The final section points towards some avenues for future research.

6.1 The public–private divide: Implications of differing interests for the experience of security and policing

In the policing literature, it is recognized that contemporary practices of security and policing are shaped by pluralism, as reference is frequently made to the "extended policing family", "the mixed economy of policing" and "the policing complex" (Crawford and Lister, 2004; Crawford et al., 2005; Jones and Newburn, 1998). Previous studies of airport and maritime port security have highlighted the importance of pluralization, privatization and multi-agency responses and partnerships (Berndtsson and Stern, 2011; Brewer, 2013, 2014; Eski, 2016a, 2019; Leese, 2016; Salter, 2008d). The current study clearly belongs to the literature on plural policing, in that it investigates collaborative relations and how various actors experience their security and policing practices in global hubs. Thus, the findings add to the literature on plural policing and security governance, and make an important contribution to the literature on airport and maritime studies (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Salter, 2008d).

By examining the collaborative landscape of plural policing in Norwegian airports and ports, this dissertation has demonstrated that their security infrastructure involves multiple organizations, and has found extensive exchanges of information, expertise, resources and knowledge on security matters across organizational boundaries. This is not a novel observation, since Brewer's (2014) account of policing the waterfront demonstrated the prevalence of partnerships and network exchanges, but it still offers new empirical insights relevant to ongoing conceptual debates about network and multi-agency models in plural policing. In particular, the findings described in the **first article** show that the conceptual pair of public-private is a salient feature of the vocabulary of policing agencies in the airport and port sector. The notion of public-private interests or mentalities is important for how agencies view themselves in comparison with others, and the way they seek to position themselves in collaborative efforts by referring to the public-private divide and the importance of differences in actors' interests. The distinction between public and private is perpetuated by the various agencies involved in policing global hubs, which suggests that this is more than simply a reiteration of powerful traditional language inherited from the past.

The complexity of contemporary policing practices has led some observers to suggest that the changing patterns of security are calling into question the existence of a sharp dividing line between the public and the private, especially given the notion of hybrid policing actors (Button, 2002; Johnston, 1992; Kempa, Shearing and Burris, 2005; Rogers, 2017). It has thus been argued that one should perhaps not "worry too much about the classical public-private divide in policing" (van Steden, van der Wal and Lasthuizen, 2015: 240). Similar sentiments lie behind the theoretical assumptions of the middle ground of hybridity, which include the view that the dichotomy between public and private is obsolete, and has lost its utility as an analytical lens to frame empirical observations of everyday practices of policing and security (Schuilenburg, 2015). The main argument outlined in the **first article** takes issue with the conceptual assumptions of the middle ground. As already noted, in the empirical context analyzed, the policing agencies clearly relied on the traditional dividing line between public and private to navigate and make sense of their collaborative relations and exchanges, as is shown by the importance of sectoral allegiance and struggles over agreeing on objectives and aims when there are differences of interest (such as conflict between the economic ethos and the public interest). Similar structural conflicts and issues impacting collaboration have been observed elsewhere, both in the context of port security and in the broader plural policing literature (Crawford, 1997; Eski, 2016a; Gill, 2015), which suggests that the assessment presented in this dissertation provides empirical insight into how differences in interests are potential sources of conflict and may impede the development of effective collaborative practices.

By challenging the notion of the middle ground of hybridity, the dissertation argues for the continued relevance of the public and private as analytical concepts in examinations of the everyday reality of plural policing, particularly when the divide is regarded as degree of difference rather than a total division. It is therefore considered more appropriate to examine the "publicness" or "privateness" of policing actors (Jones and Newburn, 1998), as a way to chart the interests, mentalities, or strategies of organizations located along the continuum between the two. The perspectives of nodal governance and anchored pluralism (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2007; Wood and Shearing, 2007), make it clear that the dynamic aspect of actors' characteristics and relations is of particular importance for understanding how collaborative structures in plural policing evolve. This study, therefore, not only offers new empirical insights from plural policing in Norway, but also adds to the conceptual and theoretical debate on plural policing, by pointing to the implications for it of differences in interests and mentalities.

The analysis of the collaborative landscape of policing global hubs also revealed how network structures and the distribution of network power can vary considerably. In line with Eski's (2016a) observations, asymmetry and inequality are experienced in collaboration in ways that cut across the public-private divide in the global hubs investigated in this dissertation. Building on ideas drawn from network theory, and in particular, concepts from social network analysis, the **second article** mapped the pattern of relations in the security networks in order to reveal the social structures present and to examine how power was distributed within networked forms of security governance and policing. This approach resembles Eski's, but goes beyond it by offering a more in-depth analysis of the asymmetry of power within networked forms of governance. The empirical investigation of how network power was distributed within security networks also revealed the importance of taking into account the differences in actors' interests and mentalities.

The assessment showed that, in Norwegian global hubs, public policing agencies had considerable ability to control and facilitate the exchange of information and resources, and their network power far exceeded the influence exerted by private policing agencies. The public agencies were important "knowledge-brokers" (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), although many of them viewed their private counterparts' expertise, knowledge or perspectives as less valuable than theirs, as is shown in both **article one** and **article two**, suggesting that collaboration in global hubs is, at times, seriously constrained by a lack of equality and recognition of others' competence and expertise across the public-private divide. Similar trends have been described elsewhere in the context of airport security (Berndtsson and Stern, 2011; Leese, 2016). It should be noted that the observations made in this dissertation concerning the positioning of public agencies in networks is at odds with Brewer's (2014, 2017) descriptions of waterfront policing in the US and Australia, where private policing actors often acted as entrepreneurs by strategically positioning themselves within the networks. This raises the question of whether the Norwegian and Nordic context of the plural policing and security governance addressed in this dissertation may influence the empirical findings; this question will be discussed further below.

Conceptual assumptions from the nodal approach and anchored pluralism played a crucial role in the analysis, in that the **second article** sought to operationalize these theoretical frameworks and make them better able to bear empirical scrutiny. By contextualizing them, the dissertation significantly advances the methodology for the study of plural policing and security governance. That is, by connecting the concepts of brokerage and homophily – borrowed from

social network analysis (SNA) – with nodal governance and anchored pluralism respectively, the dissertation made a conscious attempt to move the plural policing literature beyond its normative orientation. This responds to the call made by Whelan and Dupont (2017), who suggest that the lack of empirical studies employing social network analysis tools can be explained by the methodological challenges associated with this approach. As the dissertation makes clear, one way to move beyond using networks as metaphors is to offer policing scholars better grounded analytical perspectives and methodological tools for the study of the contemporary plural policing environment. While network perspectives have been discussed in the criminological literature (Morselli, 2013), SNA – which enables collaborative and relational structures to be unpacked – is still seen as a rather new approach in the field of policing and has been little used (but see Brewer, 2014; Dupont, 2006a; Nøkleberg, 2016). Applying SNA in this dissertation helps demonstrate some of the many possibilities it has for inquiry into phenomena in criminology and policing.

This dissertation has also provided novel empirical insights into the way in which actors experience their everyday security practices, as can be seen in the **third** and **fourth articles**, which take a broader approach to unpacking the governance of security in global hubs and thus shed light on the third and fourth research questions. Thinking of governance as practices that appeal to security (Valverde, 2011) was deemed particularly useful, as it provided an excellent way to make sense of the empirical material. The dissertation examines how a variety of actors experienced the exceptional nature of security – which is a key feature of the contemporary landscape of global hubs – in their everyday practice, how they negotiated the imperatives of security and trade, and how the interaction of seemingly contradictory logics affects the practices of policing and security. By so doing, the dissertation adds to the limited, but growing, criminological scholarship on airport and maritime ports, as well as to security governance literature more generally.

Through the conceptual lens of governance as practice, one could, for instance, see how instrumental logic, such as risk assessment techniques and preventive strategies, were crucial in the process of making security risk and threats more tangible and less unpredictable in the global hubs. This study's observation of the fact that airport and maritime port security agencies actively relied on risk management and instrumental logics to mitigate risk is not unique – previous studies of aviation and maritime security, as well as others in the wider field of security studies, have noted the widespread use of risk-based strategies (Amoore, 2013; Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Gundhus and Jansen, 2019; Mythen and Walklate,

2008; Salter, 2007, 2008b). This dissertation shows, however, that the use of instrumental logic had various consequences for actors' practices. In line with what others have observed (Jore, 2019), one such consequence was that processes of bureaucratization emerged as a response to the uncertainty associated with the exceptionality found at global hubs. In particular, the study underscored how documentation played a central role in the governance of security, offering reassurance in situations of risk and vulnerability. This is similar to what has been described in the context of intelligence-led policing (Sanders, Weston and Schott, 2015), where crime analytics became important ways of demonstrating accountability and compliance in order to feel protected. This speaks to the influence of seemingly mundane and quotidian activities on security practices. The framework of the everyday has therefore been valuable for understanding the empirical reality of policing and security governance at global hubs. The dissertation argues, in agreement with Crawford and Hutchinson (2016b), that everyday security is of great interest because it enables rigorous analyses of experiences of security governance practice.

The findings presented in the **third article**, which addresses the research question concerning how actors experience security and policing practices, also point to the importance of what is referred to as the human dimension of security practices. In the face of the consequences of exceptionality, agencies developed strategies to cope with uncertainty, relying on the notion of everyday security consciousness. As a result, actions, such as asking simple questions to identify risks, which had been seen as rather mundane, were now perceived by agencies as decisive factors in the efficacy of governing security at global hubs. Reliance on "human capital" in the context of airport security has been observed elsewhere, together with the belief it could be made more valuable by using security-awareness programs (Schouten, 2014). By thinking in terms of everyday security consciousness, the dissertation shows, that novel insights can be gained into the embodied and emotional experience of security and risk in the face of the exceptionality that agencies tend to experience at global hubs. It therefore adds a layer of analysis which stands in contrast to the more traditional legal-theoretical considerations of Schmittian and Agambenian frameworks of exceptionality that predominate in the current literature.

As the introductory chapter and the empirical contextualization of this dissertation made clear, the global hubs under investigation are vital spaces for the networked economy and are key points of passage in the interconnected global systems of flows, in which many organizations value efficiency, speed and time. At the same time, airports and ports are vulnerable spaces in

need of security and protection. It has been noted above that multiple actors make up the security infrastructure of global hubs and may have very different mentalities and interests. Because they have to bear in mind that global hubs are focal points for economic prosperity and are faced with transboundary security risks (Eski, 2016a; Leese, 2016; Leese and Koenigseder, 2015; Salter, 2008d; Schouten, 2014; Sergi, 2020a, 2020b), actors may be trapped between contradictory interests and strategies in their everyday efforts to produce secure environments. How, then, do these interactions unfold in the empirical reality of global hubs? To answer this question, the **fourth article** analyzed how security and policing actors experienced the balancing act that becomes necessary when seemingly contradictory logics converge; in this regard, the use of the concepts of governance as practice and everyday security was also fruitful. In particular, it drew attention to how actors negotiate the imperatives of security and trade in everyday life. Examining the way this plays out in Norway, revealed that policing agencies are indeed affected by, and often seek to adapt to, commercial demands for the efficiency and speed that are necessary for trade to flourish. Agencies' practices were, for example, affected by the ambitions, actions and decisions of others, which in many ways reflect different temporal understandings.

Previous studies have illustrated how the spaces of airports and ports are connected and integrated to the government of time (Salter, 2008a). The global hubs examined in this dissertation can be viewed as being immersed in various temporal imaginaries, which suggests that the temporalization of security is of interest (Valverde, 2011, 2014). Although temporal aspects of security have been addressed previously, often with an emphasis on risk and pre-crime (Mythen and Walklate, 2008; Zedner, 2007), the current study of global hubs suggests that the temporal dimension observed also involves something quite different from perspectives concerned with the past, present and future of security measures and crime control. The empirical contextualization of policing global hubs indicated that efficiency and speed are concomitants of the immense volume of flows needed for commercial success. One example of how this affected practices of security was the way border police experienced the ever greater passenger flows caused by the commercial logic of other (private) actors. They did so by adapting their practice to meet the demands of others whose interests were based upon different temporal understandings. As security and trade logics are not always compatible, this can lead to experiences of frustration among the agencies, and bearing in mind the above findings on collaborative structures, this frustration can be connected to differences in guiding mentalities.

By unpacking how security and policing agencies experienced the interaction of the imperatives of security and trade, the study contributes to our understandings of security governance, and particularly to the debate on expanding conceptualizations of security (Bourbeau, 2015b). In broadening the discussion of security, the analysis of this project indicated that agencies are becoming part of a commercialized security order, obeying the imperatives of trade and adopting its distinctive temporal orientation towards vast volumes of flows, speed and efficiency. The findings concerning the fourth research question indicate that agencies responsible for governing and securing flows at global hubs adopt what has been called a "customer is king" attitude to security (Eski, 2016a, 2019). The practices observed at the global hubs in this study are connected to an understanding of *security as service*: agencies seek to satisfy their customers' demands. Public policing agencies are particularly affected by this. It should be emphasized that this differs from serving the interests of an employer, as the work on private security by Shearing and Stenning (1981) made clear. Policing and security agencies wanted to have satisfied customers, as this was good for business, and this aim was integral to organizations' business strategy.

Overall, the investigation of Norwegian airport and port security and policing undertaken in this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of plural policing and security governance, not least because it addresses an empirical context outside of the Anglosphere. Moreover, examining how policing and security agencies experience and perceive their collaborative relations and everyday practices, offers a criminologically informed understanding of what characterizes the unique institutional environment of policing global hubs, which consists of a plethora of actors, guided by different mentalities and interests that occupy various points on the continuum of publicness-privateness. As the security and policing actors of global hubs deal with transboundary security risks and threats, they are increasingly involved in collaborative practices, which cut across organizational boundaries, and take part in extensive exchanges of network resources. These collaborative relations are often affected, and even constrained, by differences in mentalities and interests, and this can lead to frustration and power struggles. The influence of such differences is also to be seen in actors' experiences of everyday practices of security. The demands for efficiency and speed associated with the imperatives of trade affect policing and security actors' governance practices and collaborative relations, which means that policing global hubs is deeply affected by various temporal imaginaries – this is part of the unique nature of the institutional environments of global hubs.

6.2 Policing global hubs as a matter of Nordic policing exceptionalism?

The dissertation's findings relate to Norwegian airport and maritime port security. The fact that the study examines Nordic plural policing and security governance, raises questions about how this might influence the empirical observations that are presented, since much of the literature on plural policing in general, and on security networks in particular, originates from the Anglosphere. The study is therefore a response to a recognized need for studies of plural policing in other empirical contexts outside the Anglosphere (O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018). In this regard, it has been suggested that attention should be paid to historical, cultural and political dimensions to help explain convergences and differences in contemporary policing practices. So then, is there anything connected to historical, cultural and political factors in the Nordic context of policing that has influenced the empirical findings in this dissertation?

In chapter two, historical developments in policing in Norway were outlined, and the crucial position played by the public police was pointed out, though the proliferation of private policing bodies was also acknowledged. It is therefore not surprising that the findings in this study reveal that pluralization in policing and security governance is also present in the environment of global hubs in Norway. The plural responses observed match what has previously been described in the context of airports and ports (Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016a; Olsvik, 2015; Salter, 2008d; Van Sluis et al., 2012) and in policing more generally (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Crawford et al., 2005; O'Neill and Fyfe, 2017; Terpstra and van Stokkom, 2015; Wood and Dupont, 2006), but the empirical assessment of this dissertation is that public policing agencies tend to occupy the most central positions and thus have far more power to influence the course of events than private policing agencies. This goes against the claim made by Brewer (2017) that there has been a significant "paradigm shift" in policing and crime control, whereby, because of "entrepreneurial" imperatives, private policing agencies take over the dominant positions in plural policing and security governance.

Historically, the ideals, discourses, and organization of the public police in the Nordic countries have been rooted in and affected by the ideology of the Scandinavian welfare model, which features an extensive role for the state, a wide scope for public policies, social cohesion, conformity and egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). This has led the Nordic policing model to be characterized by a strong state apparatus (Holmberg, 2014; Høigård, 2011; Wathne, 2018), and along with the strong position of the welfare state model, the public police is generally considered the main provider of policing services (Gundhus and

Larsson, 2007). In comparative policing research, it has therefore been argued that contemporary Nordic policing constitutes a distinctive system (Devroe, Edwards and Ponsaers, 2017; Houtsonen and Huotari, 2019; Virta and Taponen, 2017), which can have implications for the way in which security governance arrangements function. In particular, the public police are largely unitary, state-organized and centralized forces (Høigård, 2011; Ugelvik, 2016) and generally enjoy a high level of trust among citizens (Bradford and Jackson, 2016; Kääriäinen, 2007; Thomassen and Kääriäinen, 2016). In comparison to the Anglosphere, where scholars often situate plural policing in neoliberal discourses and where private sector mechanisms thrive (Loader, 1999; Loader and Walker, 2007; van Stokkom and Terpstra, 2018), the Nordic policing model has been more reluctant to accept neoliberal perspectives, as will be further explored in the next section.

Because of these distinctive historical and political features, and the notion of Scandinavian or Nordic penal exceptionalism (Pratt, 2008a, 2008b), some observers have framed the contemporary landscape of policing through the lens of Nordic policing exceptionalism (Ugelvik, 2016), which is assumed to have implications for how public policing agencies are organized and how they are demarcated from other (private) policing bodies. Although not making an explicit argument for Nordic policing exceptionalism, previous studies of Nordic collaborative structures and security networks have shown the dominant role of the state, with the governance of security being anchored and controlled by the public agencies (Nøkleberg, 2016). In the case of the plural policing of fraud in Sweden, it has been argued that "state sovereignty is continuously being reaffirmed in the set-up of power, and thus influences plural policing practices and professional identities" (Stenström, 2020: 36). Similarly, studies of local crime prevention strategies in Norway have highlighted how practices of crime prevention are developed by and integrated in municipal institutions and the police (Egge and Gundhus, 2012). The empirical evidence provided in this study concerning the pivotal role of public policing agencies in collaboration at global hubs, indicates the relevance of anchored pluralism to explaining the distinct social structure of the networked policing, which emphasizes the power, both symbolic and regulatory, cultural authority, and distinctive capabilities of the state (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2007).

Although framing the findings as an example of Nordic policing exceptionalism may offer valuable insights, the perspective does not fully capture the current empirical situation at global hubs. As with the Janus-faced nature of Nordic penal exceptionalism (Barker, 2012; Ugelvik and Dullum, 2012), nuances seem to exist in the realm of policing. As is shown in the current

study and by others, there is clear evidence of the pluralization of policing, as private-sector agencies (together with other public agencies) encroach on the preserve of the public police (Bjelland and Vestby, 2017; Kammersgaard, 2019; Stenström, 2018, 2019; Søgaard, Houborg and Tutenges, 2016). Although the "political, cultural and emotional norms and sentiments" of the Nordic countries "fostered a resistance to – and did for a long time hamper – the marketization of policing" (Hansen Löfstrand, 2019: 16), the traditionally state-centered model of Nordic policing has been put under pressure by the emergence of marketization and privatization – in the same way as policing in the Anglosphere. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the Norwegian police has been transformed by new public management reforms, with their strong emphasis on efficiency and quantifiable results, which has narrowed the police's core tasks (Wathne, 2018, 2020). While this might be true for some elements of local policing (e.g. street-level policing in public areas), greater challenges seem to be present in the context of global hubs, which are more politicized and considered essential to national security. As was made clear in the introductory chapter, in Norway, airports and ports are seen as sites of critical infrastructure, where the government and its institutions have a particular responsibility for maintaining security and policing which, along with the continuing importance of the Nordic welfare model, may explain the central position occupied by public actors observed in this study.

By demonstrating the salient role public policing actors play in policing global hubs in Norway, the dissertation questions whether the paradigm shift in policing and crime control observed by Brewer (2017) can be said to be universal. It also suggests that studies of plural policing should pay greater attention to the empirical context from which they draw their findings, to avoid neglecting significant local nuances (Lum and Fyfe, 2015). This is not to say that the contribution of private agencies to policing are irrelevant or that such agencies can never occupy prominent roles in plural policing and security networks – they certainly can, and do at times (Button, 2002; Wakefield, 2003, 2008; White, 2010, 2012). However, this dissertation understands the composition of plural policing and security governance to be a question for empirical inquiry rather than something to be assumed *a priori*.

6.3 Global hubs: Generic or localized spaces?

As chapter two made clear, there is a widespread desire to harmonize the regulatory regimes of aviation and maritime security across countries. Furthermore, as mentioned in the chapter, the principle of One-Stop Security in the aviation sector, which involves the recognition of the

equivalence of security measures in different countries, is one example of the effort to create this harmonization. Bearing in mind the standards set out by the international organizations and the European Union, it can be expected that the Norwegian policing and security agencies' efforts to govern security in airport and maritime port spaces will resemble those of agencies operating in other countries, particularly those within the EU. There will, of course, be some differences in terms of local threat and risk assessments, but the regulations place restrictions on how far local adjustments can go. The shared frameworks suggest that the security environment will be largely uniform. It has previously been illustrated that security and policing in maritime ports share some similarities concerning the operation, precisely because many ports are seeking to be in compliance with the ISPS-Code (Eski, 2016a), which points to tendencies for global hubs to be generic spaces.

The regulatory regimes, however, are not the only factors contributing to standardization. Neoliberal ideas have affected spaces in global hubs, as can be seen, for instance, in the increasing pluralization of stakeholders and the outsourcing of security provision at airports and ports to private companies (Leese, 2016). The influence of neoliberalism, mainly through marketization, deregulation and privatization has also led to the restructuring of the governance, ownership, control structures, and management of airports and maritime ports around the world, a major driver being the desire to increase efficiency and improve commercial performance. There seems to be a general trend in the aviation and maritime sectors to increasingly resort to privatization or deregulation in terms of ownership. In today's landscape one finds different structures such as publicly-listed companies or companies privately owned by large global investment funds (Baird, 2002; Cullinane and Song, 2002; Davis, 2007; Gillen, 2011; IATA, 2018). In aviation, fully privatized airports are to be found in both Australia and the UK. The UK was a front-runner in this regard: in 1987, the British Airports Authority (now Heathrow Airport Holdings Limited) was sold and listed on the London Stock Exchange. A large consortium, with international owners, later acquired it. Similarly, maritime ports have seen changes in their governance structures, with increasing outsourcing of services to private actors. It has been argued that the evolution of port reforms, which picked up speed in the 1980s, should be understood as being impacted by the reorganization of public power, a scarcity of government resources, and the rise of neo-liberalism (Debrie, Lavaud-Letilleul and Parola, 2013; Ferrari, Parola and Tei, 2015). In the maritime context, Australia and the UK are again among the countries that have adopted strategies of privatization, with the majority of ports being wholly owned and managed by private companies. Many other European ports have

chosen the landlord model, whereby port infrastructures are in the hands of some kind of public body and then leased to private operating companies.

The neoliberal discourse also exerts an influence on global hubs in another way. That is, the commercial imperatives that characterize contemporary airports and ports, which depend on the notions of speed, time, and efficiency, attach great importance to improving dwell-time to boost profits and consumption (Lloyd, 2003; Salter, 2008a). To take the example of aviation, airport revenue mainly derives from two sources: aeronautical operations (such as terminal space rentals and airline landing fees) and commercial operations (such as retail concessions, car parking, and advertising). Several observers have pointed out that commercial revenues have not only grown faster than aeronautical revenues, but have also become equal to or even more important than them in recent years (Bilotkach, Clougherty, Mueller and Zhang, 2012; Zhang, Fu and Yang, 2010). The increasing importance of passenger spending has consequences for the way in which airports organize and structure their businesses, as attention needs to be directed towards the commercialization and marketization of their retail space, in addition to taking care of the traditional operational efficiencies of airside activity (Gillen, 2011). This orientation towards commercial imperatives as drivers for development seems to be a factor in the generic nature of global hubs, where spaces in different countries share many similarities in how they are structured and the activities they prioritize.

It should be noted, however, that the influences of neoliberalism may be spatially disparate (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Dyson (1980) argues that, in most western political systems, the dominant state traditions are primarily shaped by the state's relation to civil society. In the Anglocentric contexts where full-fledged privatization strategies for airports and ports have mainly been implemented, the state normally has a less dominant role in society (Peters and Painter, 2010). In such countries, there is a clear distinction between the state and civil society, and the distinction causes more emphasis to be placed on private actors and their significance for innovation and development, particularly that organized and coordinated by means of a competitive market (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Neoliberal strategies and private sector mechanisms – including competition, entrepreneurship and the contracting out of services – tend to thrive and evolve in such environments. In contrast, Norway (and Nordics more generally) has been more reluctant to accept and implement neoliberal approaches and the state is perceived to have a much more prominent role in society. This must be seen in relation to the importance of the Nordic welfare state model. In this regard, Peters and Painter (2010: 6) suggest that this is "a more organic view, in which state and society are intertwined to the extent

that it is almost impossible to separate them". Although the public sector has increasingly been affected by new public management reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2004, 2007), strong state involvement means the government is reluctant to blur the lines between the state and the market (van Riemsdijk, 2010). This is a reminder of the importance of being sensitive to the contextual and institutional aspects of countries, by taking into account their local traditions and practices.

6.4 Future research

This final section will point to potential areas for future research that are suggested by the findings presented in the dissertation. This study provides a criminological understanding of policing global hubs, adding new empirical, methodological and conceptual insights to a growing literature concerned with governance practices in the realm of transportation security. Although criminologists have started to pay more attention to the spaces of airport and maritime ports and to seek to conceptualize agencies' practices, other spaces and modes of transportation have received significantly less attention. As this dissertation has made clear, the hubs of airports and ports are integral parts of the global networked economy and are inevitably exposed to numerous security risks, such as terrorism, illegal trafficking of goods and humans, and illicit activities such as theft. Similar phenomena could be examined in other transportation hubs, such as railways, metros, and buses. In this regard, it has been pointed out that such transit stations too are "risky facilities", as they are potential crime attractors and crime generators (La Vigne, 2015; Newton, Partridge and Gill, 2014; Smith and Clarke, 2000). Little is known, however, about how policing and security governance are performed in such public transport systems. Their apparent similarity to ports and airports, with regard to the actors involved, their significance to the economy, and the security risks present, suggest the need for more empirically grounded research to gain an understanding of them. Explorations of policing and security practices in other transit stations than those addressed in the current study would have the potential to offer new perspectives and nuances, and help provide a more holistic view of policing the unique spaces of global hubs.

The Nordic research on plural policing that this dissertation engages with and advances on is developing rapidly (Gundhus and Larsson, 2007; Hansen Löfstrand, 2019; Kammersgaard, 2019; Lomell, 2007; Nøkleberg, 2016; Saarikkomäki, 2018; Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori, 2016; Stenström, 2018, 2019; Søgaard, Houborg and Tutenges, 2016). However, our understanding of the Nordic context would nonetheless benefit from more studies addressing

different aspects of plural policing arrangements, with the trend for the privatization of public space and its policing practices being one possible area where the empirical scope could be expanded (but see Kammersgaard, 2019). In the debate on Nordic policing exceptionalism (Ugelvik, 2016), comparative perspectives are a central issue: there is a need to examine different empirical contexts and make comparisons across countries, both within the Nordics and internationally. Against this background, putting more emphasis on the Nordic context will inevitably contribute to a richer theorization of the nature plural policing in the area, by capturing convergences and differences in contemporary practices.

This dissertation has argued for the usefulness of applying techniques and analytical tools from social network analysis to unpack various aspects of network structures in plural policing and security governance, which are seen in relation to the perspectives of nodal governance and anchored pluralism. Following Whelan and Dupont (2017), it is suggested that social network analysis has much to offer in empirical studies of plural policing as a means to operationalize these theoretical frameworks, and to provide insights into the macrostructures of whole networks, as well as the micro-properties of relationships linking individual actors. As already noted, while there is growing interest in utilizing concepts from network theory in relation to policing, there remains a lack of empirical studies employing the perspectives of SNA to explore the complex nature of contemporary plural policing. One potentially fruitful avenue for research on plural policing seeking to address questions of *how* and *how much* would be to make use of concepts and analytical tools drawn from network theory.

References

Aarstad, Å. K. (2016). Maritime security and transformations in global governance. *Crime, Law and Social Change*: 1-19.

Aas, K. F. (2007). Analysing a world in motion: Global flows meet `criminology of the other'. *Theoretical Criminology,* 11/2: 283-303.

Aas, K. F. (2011). 'Crimmigrant' bodies and bona fide travelers: Surveillance, citizenship and global governance. *Theoretical Criminology,* 15/3: 331-346.

Aas, K. F. (2013). *Globalization & crime.* Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Aas, K. F., Gundhus, H. O. and Lomell, H. M. (2009) 'Technologies of InSecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life', Abingdon: Routledge.

Aas, K. F. and Gundhus, H. O. I. (2015). Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life. *British Journal of Criminology,* 55/1: 1-18.

Adey, P. (2004a). Secured and Sorted Mobilities: Examples from the Airport. *Surveillance and Society,* 1/4.

Adey, P. (2004b). Surveillance at the Airport: Surveilling Mobility/Mobilising Surveillance. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space,* 36/8: 1365-1380.

Adey, P. (2008). Mobilities and Modulations: The Airport as a Difference Machine. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Politics at the Airport*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Adey, P. (2009). Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, and the Preemptive Securitisation of the Mobile Body. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 27/2: 274-295.

Agamben, G. (2005). *State of exception.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alexander, Y. and Sochor, E. (1990). *Aerial piracy and aviation security.* Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Amicelle, A., Côté-Boucher, K., Dupont, B., Mulone, M., Shearing, C. and Tanner, S. (2017). Criminology in the face of flows: reflections on contemporary policing and security. *Global Crime,* 18/3: 165-175.

Amoore, L. (2013). *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Andersen, S. S. (1997). *Case-studier og generalisering: Forskningsstrategi og design.* Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

Aradau, C. and van Munster, R. (2007). Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future. *European Journal of International Relations,* 13/1: 89-115.

Aradau, C. and van Munster, R. (2009). Exceptionalism and the 'War on Terror': Criminology Meets International Relations. *British Journal of Criminology,* 49/5: 686-701.

Augé, M. (1995). *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity.* London: Verso.

Avant, D. and Haufler, V. (2012). Transnational organisations and security. *Global Crime,* 13/4: 254-275.

Avinor (2012). *Årsrapport 2011.* Gardermoen: Avinor.

Ayling, J., Shearing, C. and Grabosky, P. N. (2009). *Lengthening the arm of the law: enhancing police resources in the twenty-first century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baird, A. J. (2002). Privatization trends at the world's top-100 container ports. *Maritime Policy & Management,* 29/3: 271-284.

Balzacq, T., Basaran, T., Bigo, D., Guittet, E.-P. and Olsson, C. (2010) 'Security Practices', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*: Oxford University Press.

Barker, V. (2012). Nordic Exceptionalism revisited: Explaining the paradox of a Janus-faced penal regime. *Theoretical Criminology,* 17/1: 5-25.

Baruch, Y. and Holtom, B. C. (2008). Survey response rate levels and trends in organizational research. *Human Relations,* 61/8: 1139-1160.

Bastian, M., Heymann, S. and Jacomy, M. (2009) 'Gephi: An Open Source Software for Exploring and Manipulating Networks', *International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*.

Bauman, Z. (2000). *Liquid modernity.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Baxter, P. and Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The qualitative report,* 13/4: 544-559.

Bayley, D. H. (1985). *Patterns of policing. A comparative international analysis.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Bayley, D. H. and Shearing, C. (1996). The Future of Policing. *Law & Society Review,* 30/3: 585-606.

Bayley, D. H. and Shearing, C. (2001). *The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization and Research Agenda.* Washington: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Deptartment of Justice.

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity.* London: Sage.

Beck, U. (1999). *World risk society.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berndtsson, J. and Stern, M. (2011). Private Security and the Public–Private Divide: Contested Lines of Distinction and Modes of Governance in the Stockholm-Arlanda Security Assemblage. *International Political Sociology,* 5/4: 408-425.

Bigo, D. (2001). Internal and External Security(ies): The Möbius Ribbon. in M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid, eds., *Identities, Borders and Orders*, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives,* 27/1: 63-92.

Bigo, D. (2006). Security, exception, ban and surveillance. in D. Lyon, ed., *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, 46-68, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

Bigo, D. (2016). Rethinking Security at the Crossroad of International Relations and Criminology. *British Journal of Criminology,* 56/6: 1068-1086.

Bilotkach, V., Clougherty, J. A., Mueller, J. and Zhang, A. (2012). Regulation, privatization, and airport charges: panel data evidence from European airports. *Journal of Regulatory Economics,* 42/1: 73-94.

Bittner, E. (1970). *The functions of the police in modern society: a review of background factors, current practices, and possible role models.* Chevy Chase, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency.

Bjelland, H. F. and Vestby, A. (2017). 'It's about using the full sanction catalogue': on boundary negotiations in a multi-agency organised crime investigation. *Policing and Society,* 27/6: 655-670.

Boemcken, M. v. (2009) 'From Monopolies to Networks: A Framework for Analysing Security Practices in the 21st Century', *General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)* Potsdam.

Borgatti, S. P. (2005). Centrality and network flow. *Social Networks,* 27/1: 55-71.

Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G. and Freeman, L. C. (2002) 'Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis.', Harvard: MA: Analytic Technologies.

Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G. and Johnson, J. C. (2013). *Analyzing social networks.* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Borgatti, S. P., Mehra, A., Brass, D. J. and Labianca, G. (2009). Network Analysis in the Social Sciences. *Science,* 323/5916: 892-895.

Bourbeau, P. (2014). Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies,* 43/1: 187-206.

Bourbeau, P. (2015a). A multidisciplinary dialogue on security. in P. Bourbeau, ed., *Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Bourbeau, P. (2015b) 'Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourbeau, P., Balzacq, T. and Cavelty, M. D. (2015). International relations: Celebrating eclectic dynamism. in P. Bourbeau, ed., *Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. in J. Richardson, ed., *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, New York: Greenwood Press.

Boutellier, H. and Van Steden, R. (2011). Governing nodal governance: The 'anchoring' of local security networks. in A. Crawford, ed., *International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban Governance: Convergences and Divergences in Global, National and Local settings*, 461-482, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bowling, B., Reiner, R. and Sheptycki, J. (2019). *The Politics of the Police.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bradford, B. and Jackson, J. (2016). Cooperating with the Police as an Act of Social Control - Trust and Neighbourhood Concerns as Predictors of Public Assistance. *Nordisk politiforskning,* 3/2.

Braithwaite, V. (1998). Communal and exchange trust norms: Their value base and relevance to institutional trust. in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi, eds., *Trust and governance*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Brandes, U., Freeman, L. C. and Wagner, D. (2013). Social networks. in R. Tamassia, ed., *Handbook of graph drawing visualization*, 805-839, Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology,* 3/2: 77-101.

Bredal, D. (1998). *Oslo lufthavn Gardermoen: Porten til Norge.* Oslo: Schibsted.

Breiger, R. (2004). The Analysis of Social Networks. in M. Hardy and A. Bryman, eds., *Handbook of Data analysis*, London: Sage.

Brewer, R. (2013). Enhancing Crime Control Partnerships Across Government: Examining the Role of Trust and Social Capital on American and Australian Waterfronts. *Police Quarterly,* 16/4: 371-394.

Brewer, R. (2014). *Policing the waterfront: networks, partnerships and the governance of port security.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brewer, R. (2017). The malleable character of brokerage and crime control: a study of policing, security and network entrepreneurialism on Melbourne's waterfront. *Policing and Society,* 27/7: 712-731.

Brodeur, J.-P. (2010). *The Policing Web.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bryman, A. (2006). Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it done? *Qualitative Research,* 6/1: 97-113.

Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? *Marine Policy,* 53: 159-164.

Bueger, C. and Edmunds, T. (2017). Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies. *International Affairs,* 93/6: 1293-1311.

Burgess, J. P. (2009). There is No European Security, Only European Securities. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 44/3: 309-328.

Burgess, J. P. (2010) 'The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies', Abingdon: Routledge.

Burgess, R. G. (1984). *In the field: An introduction to field research.* London: Allen & Unwin.

Burles, R. (2016). Exception and governmentality in the critique of sovereignty. *Security Dialogue,* 47/3: 239-254.

Burris, S. (2004). Governance, Microgovernance and Health. *Temple Law Review* 77: 335-362.

Burris, S., Drahos, P. and Shearing, C. (2005). Nodal Governance. *Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy,* 30: 30-58.

Burris, S., Kempa, M. and Shearing, C. (2008). Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship. *Akron Law Review,* vol. 41.

Button, M. (2002). *Private policing.* Cullompton: Willan.

Buzan, B. (1991). *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era.* New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Buzan, B., de Wilde, J. and Wæver, O. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Bø, I. and Schiefloe, P. M. (2007). *Sosiale landskap og sosial kapital: innføring i nettverkstenkning.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Castells, M. (1996). *The information age: economy, society and culture, vol I: the rise of the network society.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2000). Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 51/1: 5-24.

Charmaz, K. (2014a). *Constructing grounded theory.* London: Sage.

Charmaz, K. (2014b). Grounded Theory in Global Perspective: Reviews by International Researchers. *Qualitative Inquiry,* 20/9: 1074-1084.

Christensen, M. J. (2014). Skabelsen af det moderne skandinaviske politi: Udkast til en komparativ historisk sociologi. in L. Finstad and H. M. Lomell, eds., *Motmæle : En antologi til Kjersti Ericsson, Cecilie Høigård og Guri Larsen*, Oslo: Novus forlag.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2004). Governmental autonomisation and control: the Norwegian way. *Public Administration and Development,* 24/2: 129-135.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2007). The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform. *Public Administration Review,* 67/6: 1059-1066.

Christie, N. (2000). *Crime control as industry: Towards Gulags, Western style.* London: Routledge.

Churchill, D. (2017). *Crime Control and Everyday Life in the Victorian City: The Police and the Public.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Churchill, D. (2019). History, periodization and the character of contemporary crime control. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 19/4: 475-492.

Churchill, D., Janiewski, D. and Leloup, P. (2020) 'Private Security and the Modern State: Historical and Comparative Perspectives', Londen: Routledge.

Colquhoun, P. (1800a). *A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames.* London: H. Baldwin and Son.

Colquhoun, P. (1800b). *A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis.* London: H. Baldwin and Son.

Cook, C., Heath, F. and Thompson, R. L. (2000). A Meta-Analysis of Response Rates in Web- or Internet-Based Surveys. *Educational and Psychological Measurement,* 60/6: 821-836.

Corbin, J. M. and Strauss, A. L. (2015). *Basics of qualitative research: techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory.* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Côté-Boucher, K. (2008). The Diffuse Border: Intelligence-Sharing, Control and Confinement along Canada's Smart Border. *Surveillance & Society,* 5/2.

Côté-Boucher, K. (2018). Of "old" and "new" ways: Generations, border control and the temporality of security. *Theoretical Criminology,* 22/2: 149-168.

Côté-Boucher, K. (2020). *Border Frictions: Gender, Generation and Technology on the Frontline.* London: Routledge.

Côté-Boucher, K., Infantino, F. and Salter, M. B. (2014). Border security as practice: An agenda for research. *Security Dialogue,* 45/3: 195-208.

Cotter, R. S. (2015). Police intelligence: connecting-the-dots in a network society. *Policing and Society,* 27/2: 173-187.

Cowen, D. (2014). *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Crawford, A. (1997). *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Crawford, A. (2006). Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security. *Theoretical Criminology,* 10/4: 449-479.

Crawford, A. and Hutchinson, S. (2016a). The Future(s) of Security Studies. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 56/6: 1049-1067.

Crawford, A. and Hutchinson, S. (2016b). Mapping the Contours of 'Everyday Security': Time, Space and Emotion. *British Journal of Criminology,* 56/6: 1184-1202.

Crawford, A. and Lister, S. (2004). *The Extended Policing Family: Visible Patrols in Residential Areas.* York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005). *Plural policing: The mixed economy of visible patrols in England and Wales.* Bristol: Policy Press.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches.* Los Angeles: SAGE.

Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Creswell, J. W. and Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Critchley, T. A. (1979). *A history of police in England and Wales 900-1966.* London: Constable and Company Ltd.

Croft, S. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (2017). Fit for purpose? Fitting ontological security studies 'into' the discipline of International Relations: Towards a vernacular turn. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 52/1: 12-30.

Cullinane, K. and Song, D.-W. (2002). Port privatization policy and practice. *Transport Reviews,* 22/1: 55-75.

Cwerner, S., Kesselring, S. and Urry, J. (2009) 'Aeromobilities', London: Routledge.

D'Amour, D., Ferrada-Videla, M., San Martin Rodriguez, L. and Beaulieu, M.-D. (2005). The conceptual basis for interprofessional collaboration: Core concepts and theoretical frameworks. *Journal of Interprofessional Care,* 19/sup1: 116-131.

Dalecki, M. G., Whitehead, J. C. and Blomquist, G. C. (1993). Sample Non-response Bias and Aggregate Benefits in Contingent Valuation: an Examination of Early, Late and Non-respondents. *Journal of Environmental Management,* 38/2: 133-143.

Davis, C. (2007). The Politics of Ports: Privatization and the World's Ports. *International Labor and Working-Class History,* /71: 154-161.

de Lint, W., O'Connor, D. and Cotter, R. (2007). Controlling the flow: Security, exclusivity, and criminal intelligence in Ontario. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law,* 35/1: 41-58.

de Massol de Rebetz, R. and van der Woude, M. (2020). Marianne's liberty in jeopardy? A French analysis on recent counterterrorism legal developments. *Critical Studies on Terrorism,* 13/1: 1-23.

Debrie, J., Lavaud-Letilleul, V. and Parola, F. (2013). Shaping port governance: The territorial trajectories of reform. *Journal of Transport Geography,* 27: 56-65.

Demarée, C., Verwee, I. and Enhus, E. (2013). Observing the Observers: Participant Observation in Police Settings. in K. Beyens, J. Christiaens, B. Claes, S. De Ridder, H. Tournel and H. Tubex, eds., *The pains of doing criminological research*, 105-123, Brussels: VUBPress.

Devroe, E., Edwards, A. and Ponsaers, P. (2017) 'Policing European Metropolises: The Politics of Security in City-Regions', London: Routledge.

DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review,* 48/2: 147-160.

Dinchel, E. and Easton, M. (2020). Going with the flow: Comparative research on transnational port security. in S. Hufnagel and A. Moiseienko, eds., *Policing Transnational Crime: Law Enforcement of Criminal Flows*, London: Routledge.

Diphoorn, T. and Berg, J. (2014). Typologies of partnership policing: case studies from urban South Africa. *Policing and Society,* 24/4: 425-442.

Directive 2005/65/EC 'Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security '.

DSB (2017). *Vital functions in society: What functional capabilities must society maintain at all times?* Tønsberg: Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection.

Dupont, B. (2004). Security in the age of networks. *Policing and Society,* 14/1: 76-91.

Dupont, B. (2006a). Delivering security through networks: Surveying the relational landscape of security managers in an urban setting. *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 45/3: 165-184.

Dupont, B. (2006b). Power struggles in the field of security: implications for democratic transformation. in J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, 86-110, Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Dupont, B. and Wood, J. (2007). Urban Security, from Nodes to Networks: On the Value of Connecting Disciplines. *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* 22/2.

Dyson, K. (1980). *The state tradition in Western Europe: A study of an idea and institution.* Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Egge, M. and Gundhus, H. O. I. (2012). Social crime prevention in Norway. in E. Baillergeau and P. Hebberech, eds., *Social crime prevention in late modern Europe: A comparative perspective*, Brussel: VUB University Press.

Ellefsen, B. (2018) 'Politiens politikk og politikkens politi: Norske politireformer i perioden 1682-1866', Bergen: University of Bergen.

Ellefsen, B. and Larsson, P. (2014). Skandinavisk politihistorie. in P. Larsson, H. O. I. Gundhus and R. Granér, eds., *Innføring i politivitenskap*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.

Emsley, C. (1996). *The English Police: A political and Social History.* London: Longman.

Enroth, H. (2011). Policy Network Theory. in M. Bevir, ed., *The Sage Handbook of Governance* London: Sage.

Ericson, R. V. and Haggerty, K. D. (1997). *Policing the risk society.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Eriksson, J. and Rhinard, M. (2009). The Internal—External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 44/3: 243-267.

Eski, Y. (2011). 'Port of call': Towards a criminology of port security. *Criminology and Criminal Justice,* 11/5: 415-431.

Eski, Y. (2016a). *Policing, Port Security and Crime Control: An Ethnography of the Port Securityscape.* London: Routledge.

Eski, Y. (2016b). The war on meaninglessness: A counter-terrorist self through an absent terrorist other. *Ethnography,* 17/4: 460-479.

Eski, Y. (2019). Customer is king: promoting port policing, supporting hypercommercialism. *Policing and Society,* 30/2: 153-168.

Eski, Y. and Buijt, R. (2017). Dockers in Drugs: Policing the Illegal Drug Trade and Port Employee Corruption in the Port of Rotterdam. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice,* 11/4: 371-386.

Eski, Y. and Carpenter, A. (2013). Policing in EU Seaports: Impact of the ISPS Code on Port Security Post 9/11. in M. O'neill, K. Swinton and A. Winter, eds., *New Challenges for the EU Internal Security Strategy*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Feldman, M. S., Bell, J. and Berger, M. T. (2003). *Gaining access: A practical and theoretical guide for qualitative researchers.* Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.

Ferrari, C., Parola, F. and Tei, A. (2015). Governance models and port concessions in Europe: Commonalities, critical issues and policy perspectives. *Transport Policy,* 41: 60-67.

Finstad, L. (2012). Byens voktere før og nå: Del 1: Byens voktere før. in K. Andenæs, T. Eikvam and P. J. Ystehede eds., *Kriminologiske byvandringer* 79-92, Oslo: Novus forl.

Fleming, J. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2005). Bureaucracy, Contracts and Networks: The Unholy Trinity and the Police. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology,* 38/2: 192-205.

Fleming, J. and Wood, J. (2006). *Fighting Crime Together: The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks.* Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Flick, U. (2014). *An introduction to qualitative research.* Los Angeles: SAGE.

Floyd, R. (2007). Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies. *Review of International Studies,* 33/2: 327-350.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. *Qualitative Inquiry,* 12/2: 219-245.

Foucault, M. (1988). The Political Technology of Individuals. in M. H. Luther, H. Gutman and P. H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the self: a seminar with Michel Foucault*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Foucault, M. (1990). *The history of sexuality, Volume 1: An introduction.* New York: Vintage Books.

Fox, J. C. and Lundman, R. J. (1974). Problems and Strategies in Gaining Research Access in Police Organization. *Criminology,* 12/1: 52-69.

Franko, K. (2020). *Globalization & Crime.* Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. *Social Networks,* 1/3: 215-239.

Froestad, J., Grimwood, S., Herbstein, T. and Shearing, C. (2015). Policy Design and Nodal Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Determinants of Environmental Policy Change in a South African City. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice,* 17/2: 174-191.

Froestad, J., Shearing, C. and van der Merwe, M. (2015). Criminology: Reimagining Security. in P. Bourbeau, ed., *Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Garland, D. (1997). 'Governmentality' and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology, Sociology. *Theoretical Criminology,* 1/2: 173-214.

Garland, D. (2001). *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

George, B. and Whatford, N. (2007). Regulation of Transport Security Post 9/11. *Security Journal,* 20/3: 158-170.

Giacomantonio, C. (2014). A typology of police organizational boundaries. *Policing and Society,* 24/5: 545-565.

Giacomantonio, C. (2015). *Policing Integration: The Sociology of Police Coordination Work.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gill, M. (2015). Senior police officers' perspectives on private security: sceptics, pragmatists and embracers. *Policing and Society,* 25/3: 276-293.

Gillen, D. (2011). The evolution of airport ownership and governance. *Journal of Air Transport Management,* 17/1: 3-13.

Gimenez-salinas, A. (2004). New approaches regarding private/public security. *Policing and Society,* 14/2: 158-174.

Given, L. M. (2008). Emergent Design, *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Gordon, A. (2004). *Naked airport: A cultural history of the world's most revolutionary structure.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Gould, R. V. and Fernandez, R. M. (1989). Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Brokerage in Transaction Networks. *Sociological Methodology,* 19: 89-126.

Gubrium, J. F. and Holstein, J. A. (2001). From the Individual Interview to the Interview Society in J. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein, eds., *Handbook of Interview Research*: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Guillaume, X. (2011). Resistance and the International: The Challenge of the Everyday. *International Political Sociology,* 5/4: 459-462.

Gundhus, H. I., Egge, M., Strype, J. and Myhrer, T.-G. (2008). *Modell for forebygging av kriminalitet? Evaluering av Samordning av Lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltak (SLT).* Oslo: Politihøgskolen.

Gundhus, H. I. and Larsson, P. (2007). Policing i et norsk perspektiv. in H. I. Gundhus, P. Larsson and T.-G. Myhrer, eds., *Polisiær virksomhet : hva er det - hvem gjør det? : Forskningskonferansen 2007*, 11-30, Oslo: Politihøgskolen.

Gundhus, H. O. I. and Jansen, P. T. (2019). Pre-crime and Policing of Migrants: Anticipatory Action Meets Management of Concerns. *Theoretical Criminology,* 24/1: 90-109.

Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. W. (2001). *Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hanrieder, T. and Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2014). WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health. *Security Dialogue,* 45/4: 331-348.

Hansen Löfstrand, C. (2019). Marketization in a state-centred policing context: The case of Sweden. *European Journal of Criminology*: 1477370819882905.

Harder, H. (2010). Explanatory Case Study. in A. J. Mills, G. Durepos and E. Wiebe, eds., *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*: SAGE Publications.

Heale, R. and Twycross, A. (2015). Validity and reliability in quantitative studies. *Evidence Based Nursing,* 18/3: 66.

Herington, J. (2015). Philosophy: The concepts of security, fear, liberty, and the state. in P. Bourbeau, ed., *Security: Dialogue Across Disciplines*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoijtink, M. (2017). Governing in the Space of the "Seam": Airport Security after the Liquid Bomb Plot. *International Political Sociology,* 11/3: 308-326.

Holley, C. and Shearing, C. (2017). A Nodal Perspective of Governance: Advances in Nodal Governance Thinking. in P. Drahos, ed., *Regulatory Theory: Foundations and applications*, Acton, ACT: ANU Press.

Holmberg, L. (2014). Scandinavian police reforms: can you have your cake and eat it, too? *Police Practice and Research,* 15/6: 447-460.

Hoogenboom, B. (2010). *The Governance of Policing and Security: Ironies, Myths and Paradoxes.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Houtsonen, J. and Huotari, V. (2019). A case for trans-local police governance. *European Journal of Criminology,* 16/5: 612-629.

Huey, L. (2008). 'When it comes to violence in my place, I am the police!' Exploring the policing functions of service providers in Edinburgh's Cowgate and Grassmarket. *Policing and Society,* 18/3: 207-224.

Hufnagel, S. and Moiseienko, A. (2020) 'Policing Transnational Crime: Law Enforcement of Criminal Flows', Abingdon: Routledge.

Hunter, A. and Brewer, J. D. (2015). Designing Multimethod Research. in S. N. Hesse-Biber and R. B. Johnson eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huxham, C. and Vangen, S. (2005). *Managing to collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative advantage.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Huysmans, J. (2008). The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society. *International Political Sociology,* 2/2: 165-183.

Huysmans, J. (2009). Conclusion: Insecurity and the everyday. in P. Noxolo and J. Huysmans, eds., *Community, Citizenship and the 'War on Terror': Security and Insecurity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Høigård, C. (2011). Policing the North. *Crime and Justice,* 40/1: 265-348.

Hönke, J. and Cuesta-Fernandez, I. (2017). A topolographical approach to infrastructure: Political topography, topology and the port of Dar es Salaam. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 35/6: 1076-1095.

IATA (2018). *Airport Ownership and Regulation.* The International Air Transport Association (IATA).

ICAO (2018). *Annual Report of the Council.* Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization.

ICAO (2020). *Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) on Civil Aviation: Economic Impact Analysis.* Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization.

Inda, J. X. and Rosaldo, R. (2002). Introduction: A World in Motion. in J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo, eds., *The Anthropology of Globalization : A reader* Oxford: Blackwell.

ISPS Code (2004). *International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.* International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Johnston, L. (1992). *The rebirth of private policing.* London: Routledge.

Johnston, L. (2000). *Policing Britain: risk, security and governance.* Harlow: Longman.

Johnston, L. (2006). Transnational security governance. in B. Dupont and J. Wood, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, 33- 51, Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, L. and Shearing, C. (2003). *Governing security: Explorations in policing and justice.* New York: Routledge.

Jones, R. (2009). Checkpoint security: Gateways, airports and the architecture of security. in K. F. Aas, H. O. Gundhus and H. M. Lomell, eds., *Technologies of InSecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (1998). *Private security and public policing.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2002). The Transformation of Policing? Understanding Current Trends in Policing Systems. *British Journal of Criminology,* 42/1: 129-146.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2006) 'Plural policing: a comparative perspective', London: Routledge.

Jore, S. H. (2012). *Counterterrorism as Risk Management Strategies.* Stavanger: University of Stavanger.

Jore, S. H. (2019). Standardization of terrorism risk analysis: A means or an obstacle to achieving security? in O. E. Olsen, K. V. Juhl, P. H. Lindøe and O. A. Engen, eds., *Standardization and Risk Governance: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*, London: Routledge.

Jore, S. H. and Njå, O. (2012) 'The Relation between Terrorism Risk Discourses and Aviation Security', *11th. International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference and the Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012, PSAM and ESREL*, pp. 4333-4343, Helsinki: Curran Associates.

Kammersgaard, T. (2019). Private security guards policing public space: using soft power in place of legal authority. *Policing and Society*: 1-14.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) 'The Culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics', *New directions in world politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Kempa, M., Shearing, C. and Burris, S. (2005) 'Changes in Governance: A Background Review', *The Salzburg Seminar on the Governance of Health*, Salzburg.

Kerr, J. (2015). *The securitization and policing of art theft : the case of London.* London: Ashgate.

Kersbergen, K. V. and Waarden, F. V. (2004). 'Governance' as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy. *European Journal of Political Research,* 43/2: 143-171.

Kesselring, S. (2009). Global transfer points: The making of airports in the mobile risk society. in S. Cwerner, S. Kesselring and J. Urry, eds., *Aeromobilities*, London: Routledge.

King, G., Keohane, R. O. and Verba, S. (1994). *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Klein, N. (2011). *Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea.* Oxford Oxford University Press.

Knox, H., O'Doherty, D., Vurdubakis, T. and Westrup, C. (2007). Rites of passage: Organization as an excess of flows. *Scandinavian Journal of Management,* 23/3: 265-284.

Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). *Security and international relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krause, K. and Williams, M. C. (1996). Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods *Mershon International Studies Review,* 40/2: 229-254.

Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2009). *Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Kääriäinen, J. T. (2007). Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries: A Multilevel Analysis. *European Journal of Criminology,* 4/4: 409-435.

La Vigne, N. (2015). Crime in and around Metro Transit Stations: Exploring the Utility of Opportunity Theories of Crime. in V. Ceccato and A. Newton, eds., *Safety and Security in Transit Environments: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, 251-269, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Lahav, G. (2008). Mobility and Border Security: The U.S. Aviation System, the State, and the Rise of Public-Private

Partnerships. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Politics at the Airport*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Latour, B. (1986). The Powers of Association. in J. Law, ed., *Power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge?*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Latour, B. (1987). *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Leese, M. (2016). Governing airport security between the market and the public good. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 16/2: 158-175.

Leese, M. and Koenigseder, A. (2015). Humor at the Airport? Visualization, Exposure, and Laughter in the "War on Terror". *International Political Sociology,* 9/1: 37-52.

Leese, M. and Wittendorp, S. (2018). The new mobilities paradigm and critical security studies: exploring common ground. *Mobilities,* 13/2: 171-184.

Legro, J. W. and Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is Anybody Still a Realist? *International Security,* 24/2: 5-55.

Leloup, P. (2019). A historical perspective on crime control and private security: a Belgian case study. *Policing and Society,* 29/5: 551-565.

Lindøe, P. H. and Kringen, J. (2015). Risk governance of hazardous industrial ports and areas: a case study of industrial areas and harbors in Norway. *Journal of Risk Research,* 18/7: 931-946.

Lloyd, J. (2003). Airport Technology, Travel, and Consumption. *Space and Culture,* 6/2: 93-109.

Loader, I. (1997a). Policing and the Social: Questions of Symbolic Power. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 48/1: 1-18.

Loader, I. (1997b). Thinking Normatively About Private Security. *Journal of Law and Society,* 24/3: 377-394.

Loader, I. (1999). Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security. *Sociology,* 33/2: 373-392.

Loader, I. (2000). Plural Policing and Democratic Governance. *Social & Legal Studies,* 9/3: 323-345.

Loader, I. (2014). Afterthoughts. Security, Anti-Security, Positive Security. in M. Schuilenburg, R. Van Steden and B. Oude Breuil, eds., *Positive Criminology: Reflections on Care, Belonging and Security*, Hauge: Eleven.

Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A. (2003). *Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loader, I. and Percy, S. (2012). Bringing the 'outside' in and the 'inside' out: crossing the criminology/IR divide. *Global Crime,* 13/4: 213-218.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. (2001). Policing as a Public Good:: Reconstituting the Connections between Policing and the State. *Theoretical Criminology, 5/1*: 9-35.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. (2004). State of Denial? Rethinking the Governance of Security. *Punishment & Society, 6/2*: 221-228.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. (2006). Necessary virtues: the legitimate place of the state in the production of security. in J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, 165- 195, Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Loader, I. and Walker, N. (2007). *Civilizing security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Loftus, B. (2015). Border regimes and the sociology of policing. *Policing and Society, 25/1*: 115-125.

Lomell, H. M. (2007). *Selektive overblikk. En studie av videoovervåkingspraksis.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Long, J. C., Cunningham, F. C. and Braithwaite, J. (2013). Bridges, brokers and boundary spanners in collaborative networks: a systematic review. *BMC Health Services Research, 13/1*: 158.

López, J. and Scott, J. (2000). *Social structure.* Buckingham: Open University Press.

Lum, C. and Fyfe, N. (2015). Space, Place, and Policing: Exploring Geographies of Research and Practice. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 9/3*: 219-222.

Lum, C., Gill, C., Cave, B., Hibdon, J. and Weisburd, D. (2012). Translational Criminology: Using Existing Evidence for Assessing TSA's Comprehensive Security Strategy at Airports. in C. Lum and L. W. Kennedy, eds., *Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy*, 209-251, New York: Springer.

Lutterbeck, D. (2004). Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries. *Cooperation and Conflict, 39/1*: 45-68.

Lutterbeck, D. (2005). Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western Europe. *European Security, 14/2*: 231-253.

Lyon, D. (2005). The border is everywhere: ID cards, surveillance and the other in E. Zureik and M. B. Salter, eds., *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity*, London: Willan.

Lyon, D. (2008). Filtering flows, friends, and foes: Global surveillance. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Politics at the Airport*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Marks, M. and Goldsmith, A. (2006). The state, the people and democratic policing: the case of South Africa. in B. Dupont and J. Wood, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marsden, P. V. (1982). Brokerage behavior in restricted exchange networks. in P. V. Marsden and N. Lin, eds., *Social structure and network analysis*, Beverly Hills: Sage.

Martin, J. (2013). Informal security nodes and force capital. *Policing and Society, 23/2*: 145-163.

McCormick, J. (2008). *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2009). Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the 'War on Terror'. *British Journal of Criminology, 49/5*: 628-645.

Mckee, K. (2009). Post-Foucauldian governmentality: What does it offer critical social policy analysis? *Critical Social Policy, 29/3*: 465-486.

Mironenko Enerstvedt, O. (2017). *Aviation Security, Privacy, Data Protection and Other Human Rights: Technologies and Legal Principles.* London: Springer.

Mopasa, M. S. and Stenning, P. C. (2001). Tools of the trade: The symbolic power of private security - an exploratory study. *Policing and Society, 11/1*: 67-97.

Morse, J. M. (2003). The Paradox of Qualitative Research Design. *Qualitative Health Research, 13/10*: 1335-1336.

Morse, J. M., Barrett, M., Mayan, M., Olson, K. and Spiers, J. (2002). Verification Strategies for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1/2*: 13-22.

Morse, J. M. and Niehaus, L. (2009). *Mixed method design: Principles and procedures.* Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.

Morselli, C. (2013) 'Crime and Networks', New York: Routledge.

Murphy, M. P. A. (2019a). 'The continuation of sovereign capture by other means': biopolitical tattooing and the shared logic of the exception and securitisation. *Critical Studies on Security, 7/1*: 34-50.

Murphy, M. P. A. (2019b). The Double Articulation of Sovereign Bordering: Spaces of Exception, Sovereign Vulnerability, and Agamben's Schmitt/Foucault Synthesis. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*: 1-17.

Mutlu, C. E. (2015). Containers. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Making Things International 1: Circuits and Motion*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Myhrer, T.-G. (2011). Sentervekternes polisiære fullmakter : grunnlag og grense. *Nordisk tidsskrift for kriminalvidenskab,* 98/2: 97- 160.

Mythen, G. and Walklate, S. (2008). Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking 'What If?'. *Security Dialogue,* 39/2-3: 221-242.

Neocleous, M. and Rigakos, G. S. (2011) 'Anti-Security', Ottawa: Red Quill Books.

Newton, A. D., Partridge, H. and Gill, A. (2014). Above and below: measuring crime risk in and around underground mass transit systems. *Crime Science,* 3/1: 1.

Neyland, D. (2009). Mundane Terror and the Threat of Everyday Objects. in K. F. Aas, H. O. Gundhus and H. M. Lomell, eds., *Technologies of InSecurity: The Surveillance of Everyday Life*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Noaks, L. (2008). Private and public policing in the UK: a citizen perspective on partnership. *Policing and Society,* 18/2: 156-168.

NOU 1981: 35 (1981). *Politiets rolle i samfunnet: Delutredning I.* Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

NOU 1984: 24 (1984). *Vaktselskapenes virksomhet og tjenester m.v.* Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

Nowell, L. S., Norris, J. M., White, D. E. and Moules, N. J. (2017). Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the Trustworthiness Criteria. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods,* 16/1: 1609406917733847.

Nye, J. S. and Lynn-Jones, S. M. (1988). International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field. *International Security,* 12/4: 5-27.

Næshagen, F. L. (1999). *Fra selvtekt til demokratisk politi: en komparativ studie av rettshåndhevelsens historie i Vesten.* Oslo: Politihøgskolen.

Næshagen, F. L. (2000). Norway's Democratic and Conservative Tradition in Policing. *Scandinavian Journal of History,* 25/3: 177-196.

Nøkleberg, M. (2016). Security Governance – An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Context. *Nordisk politiforskning,* 3/01.

Nøkleberg, M. (2017). Research note: Gaining access to security environments in Norway. *Translational criminology,* Spring: 26-28.

O'Malley, P. (2004). The Uncertain Promise of Risk. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology,* 37/3: 323-343.

O'Malley, P. (2015). Revisiting the Classics: 'Policing the Risk Society' in the Twenty-first Century. *Policing and Society,* 25/4: 426-431.

O'Neill, M. and Fyfe, N. R. (2017). Plural policing in Europe: relationships and governance in contemporary security systems. *Policing and Society,* 27/1: 1-5.

O'Neill, M. and McCarthy, D. J. (2014). (Re)negotiating police culture through partnership working: Trust, compromise and the 'new' pragmatism. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 14/2: 143-159.

Olsvik, E. A. (2015). *Challenges of Aviation Security regulation in Norway post 9/11.* Stavanger: University of Stavanger.

Oltedal, H. A. (2011). *Safety culture and safety management within the Norwegian-controlled shipping industry: State of art, interrelationships, and influencing factors.* Stavanger: University of Stavanger.

Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. *The American Economic Review,* 100/3: 641-672.

Owens, P. (2008). Distinctions, distinctions: 'public' and 'private' force? *International Affairs,* 84/5: 977-990.

Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N. and Hoagwood, K. (2015). Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research. *Administration and policy in mental health,* 42/5: 533-544.

Palmer, S. H. (1988). *Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pascoe, D. (2001). *Airspaces.* London: Reaktion.

Pate, A., Taylor, B. and Kubu, B. (2007). *Protecting America's Ports: Promising Practices.* Washington: National Institute of Justice.

Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2007). Variegated capitalism. *Progress in Human Geography,* 31/6: 731-772.

Pedersen, A. W. and Kuhnle, S. (2017). The Nordic welfare state model. in O. Knutsen, ed., *The Nordic models in political science. Challenged, but still viable?*, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

Pelkmans, J. (2016). Why the single market remains the EU's core business. *West European Politics,* 39/5: 1095-1113.

Peters, B. G. and Painter, M. (2010). *Tradition and public administration.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pettersen, K. A. and Bjørnskau, T. (2015). Organizational contradictions between safety and security – Perceived challenges and ways of integrating critical infrastructure protection in civil aviation. *Safety Science,* 71: 167-177.

Pickering, S. and Weber, L. (2006) 'Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control', Dordrecht: Springer.

Pierre, J. (2000). Introduction: Understanding Governance. in J. Pierre, ed., *Debating governance: : Authority, Steering, and Democracy*, 1-12, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Politidirektoratet (2018). *Kriminalitetsforebygging som politiets primærstrategi 2018-2020.* Oslo: Politidirektoratet.

Poole, R. W. (2008). Towards a Risk-based Aviation Security Policy. in Oecd/Itf, ed., *Terrorism and International Transport: Towards Risk-based Security Policy*, Paris: OECD Publishing.

Porfyriou, H. and Sepe, M. (2017). *Waterfronts Revisited: European ports in a historic and global perspective.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Porter, S. R. and Whitcomb, M. E. (2005). Non-response in student surveys: The Role of Demographics, Engagement and Personality. *Research in Higher Education,* 46/2: 127-152.

Pratt, J. (2008a). Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess Part I: The Nature and Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 48/2: 119-137.

Pratt, J. (2008b). Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess Part II: Does Scandinavian Exceptionalism Have a Future? *The British Journal of Criminology,* 48/3: 275-292.

Price, J. and Forrest, J. (2016). *Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats.* Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Provan, K. G. and Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 18/2: 229-252.

Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital *Journal of Democracy,* 6/1: 65-78.

Quéro, Y.-C. and Dupont, B. (2019). Nodal governance: toward a better understanding of node relationships in local security governance. *Policing and Society,* 29/3: 283-301.

Radzinowicz, L. (1956). *A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, Vol 2: The Enforcement of the Law.* London: Stevens and Sons.

Ragin, C. C. (1987). *The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rawlings, P. (2002). *Policing : a short history.* Cullompton: Willan.

Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 'Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002'.

Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 'Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security '.

Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 'Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998 of 5 November 2015 laying down detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security'.

Reiner, R. (2010). *The politics of the police.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The New Governance: Governing without Government. *Political Studies,* 44/4: 652-667.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2007). Understanding Governance: Ten Years On. *Organization Studies,* 28/8: 1243-1264.

Roach, J. A. (2004). Initiatives to enhance maritime security at sea. *Marine Policy,* 28/1: 41-66.

Rodrigue, J.-P. (2020). *The Geography of Transport Systems.* London: Routledge.

Rogers, C. (2017). *Plural policing: theory and practice.* Bristol: Policy Press.

Rose, N. and Miller, P. (1992). Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 43/2: 173-205.

Rose, N., O'Malley, P. and Valverde, M. (2006). Governmentality. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science,* 2/1: 83-104.

Rousseau, C., Laurin-Lamothe, A., Nadeau, L., Deshaies, S. and Measham, T. (2012). Measuring the quality of interprofessional collaboration in child mental health collaborative care. *International Journal of Integrated Care,* 12/1.

Rousseau, C., Pontbriand, A., Nadeau, L. and Johnson-Lafleur, J. (2017). Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration and Co-Location of Specialists and Primary Care Teams in Youth Mental Health. *J Can Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry,* 26/3: 198-204.

Saarikkomäki, E. (2018). Young people's conceptions of trust and confidence in the crime control system: Differences between public and private policing. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 18/2: 156-172.

Saarikkomäki, E. and Kivivuori, J. (2016). Encounters between security guards and young people: the extent and biases of formal social control. *Policing and Society,* 26/7: 824-840.

Salter, M. B. (2007). SeMS and sensibility: Security management systems and the management of risk in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. *Journal of Air Transport Management,* 13/6: 389-398.

Salter, M. B. (2008a). The Global Airport: Managing Space, Speed, and Security. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Politics at the Airport*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Salter, M. B. (2008b). Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security. *Security Dialogue,* 39/2-3: 243-266.

Salter, M. B. (2008c). Introduction: Airport assemblage. in M. B. Salter, ed., *Politics at the airport*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Salter, M. B. (2008d) 'Politics at the airport', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

San Martín-Rodríguez, L., Beaulieu, M.-D., D'Amour, D. and Ferrada-Videla, M. (2005). The determinants of successful collaboration: A review of theoretical and empirical studies. *Journal of Interprofessional Care,* 19/sup1: 132-147.

Sanders, C. and Condon, C. (2017). Crime analysis and cognitive effects: the practice of policing through flows of data. *Global Crime,* 18/3: 237-255.

Sanders, C. B., Weston, C. and Schott, N. (2015). Police Innovations, 'Secret Squirrels' and Accountability: Empirically Studying Intelligence-led Policing in Canada. *British Journal of Criminology,* 55/4: 711-729.

Sassen, S. (2001). *The global city: New York, London, Tokyo.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sassen, S. (2005). The Global City: Introducing a Concept. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs,* 11/2: 27-43.

Schmitt, C. (2005 [1922]). *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schouten, P. (2014). Security as controversy: Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport. *Security Dialogue,* 45/1: 23-42.

Schroeder, U. C. (2011). *The Organization of European Security Governance: Internal and External Security in Transition.* Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.

Schuilenburg, M. (2015). *The securitization of society: crime, risk, and social order.* New York: New York University Press.

Schuilenburg, M., van Steden, R. and Oude Breuil, B. (2014) 'Positive Criminology: Reflections on Care, Belonging and Security', Hague: Eleven.

Sergi, A. (2020a). Playing Pac-Man in Portville: Policing the dilution and fragmentation of drug importations through major seaports. *European Journal of Criminology*: 1-18.

Sergi, A. (2020b). Policing the port, watching the city. Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa. *Policing and Society*: 1-17.

Shearing, C. (2001a). A nodal conception of governance: Thoughts on a policing commission. *Policing and Society,* 11/3-4: 259-272.

Shearing, C. (2001b). Punishment and the Changing Face of the Governance. *Punishment & Society,* 3/2: 203-220.

Shearing, C. (2006). Reflections on the refusal to acknowledge private governments. in J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Shearing, C. and Johnston, L. (2005). Justice in the Risk Society. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology,* 38/1: 25-38.

Shearing, C. and Johnston, L. (2010). Nodal wars and network fallacies:A genealogical analysis of global insecurities. *Theoretical Criminology,* 14/4: 495-514.

Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications. *Crime and Justice,* 3: 193-245.

Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (1983). Private Security: Implications for Social Control. *Social Problems,* 30/5: 493-506.

Shearing, C. and Wood, J. (2000). Reflections on the Governance of Security: A Normative Enquiry *Police Practice,* 1/4: 457-476.

Shearing, C. and Wood, J. (2003). Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New 'Denizens'. *Journal of Law and Society,* 30/3: 400-419.

Shearing, C. D. (1992). The Relation between Public and Private Policing. *Crime and Justice,* 15: 399-434.

Shenton, A. K. and Hayter, S. (2004). Strategies for gaining access to organisations and informants in qualitative studies. *Education for Information,* 22: 223-231.

Sicotte, C., D'Amour, D. and Moreault, M.-P. (2002). Interdisciplinary collaboration within Quebec community health care centres. *Social Science & Medicine,* 55/6: 991-1003.

Silverman, D. (2004). *Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice.* London: Sage.

Silverman, D. (2013). *Doing qualitative research.* Los Angeles, Calif: Sage.

Simon, J. (2007). *Governing through crime: How the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skeie, J. and Moseng, O. G. (2009). *Kristiansand står og faller med sin havn: Kristiansand havns historie.* Kristiansand: Portal.

Smith, M. J. and Clarke, R. V. (2000). Crime and Public Transport. *Crime and Justice,* 27: 169-233.

Spurkland, K., Myhrer, T.-G. and Bunæs, R. (2013). *Juss for vektere.* Oslo: Universitetsforl.

Stenström, A. (2018). The Private Policing of Insurance Claims: Power, Profit and Private Justice. *The British Journal of Criminology,* 58/2: 478-496.

Stenström, A. (2019). The limits of the decentred state: the case of policing insurance claims fraud. *The British Journal of Sociology,* 70/1: 339-355.

Stenström, A. (2020) 'The Plural Policing of Fraud: Power and the investigation of insurance and welfare fraud in Sweden', *Department of Criminology*, Stockholm Stockholm University.

Stern, M. and Öjendal, J. (2010). Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence? *Security Dialogue,* 41/1: 5-29.

Strype, J., Gundhus, H. I., Egge, M. and Ødegård, A. (2014). Perceptions of Interprofessional Collaboration. *Profession and Professionalism,* 4/3.

Swedberg, R. (2012). Theorizing in sociology and social science: turning to the context of discovery. *Theory and Society,* 41/1: 1-40.

Søgaard, T. F., Houborg, E. and Tutenges, S. (2016). Nightlife Partnership Policing - (Dis)trust Building Between Bouncers and the Police in the War on Gangs. *Nordisk politiforskning,* 3/2: 132-153.

Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2005). Network Governance and Post-Liberal Democracy. *Administrative Theory & Praxis,* 27/2: 197-237.

Tarry, S. (1999). 'Deepening' and 'Widening': An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,* Vol 2/No 1.

Terpstra, J. (2017). 'Not just one node among many' – plural policing in a state-dominated context: the case of Austria. *Policing and Society,* 27/1: 68-81.

Terpstra, J. and van Stokkom, B. (2015). Plural Policing in Comparative Perspective. Four Models of Regulation. *European Journal of Policing Studies,* 2/3: 325-343.

Thomassen, G. and Bjørgo, T. (2006). A Letter from Norway: Contemporary Trends in Norwegian Policing. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety,* 8/1: 61-64.

Thomassen, G. and Kääriäinen, J. (2016). System satisfaction, contact satisfaction, and trust in the police: A study of Norway. *European Journal of Policing Studies,* 3/4.

Thomson, A. M. and Perry, J. L. (2006). Collaboration Processes: Inside the Black Box. *Public Administration Review,* 66/s1: 20-32.

Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L. and Miller, T. K. (2007). Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 19/1: 23-56.

Trobia, A. (2008). Cronbach's Alpha. in P. J. Lavrakas, ed., *Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods*, 169-171, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Ugelvik, S. (2016). Policing High-Trust Societies - Five Pieces to the Puzzle. *Nordisk politiforskning,* 3/02: 97-110.

Ugelvik, T. and Dullum, J. (2012). *Penal exceptionalism? Nordic prison policy and practice.* London: Routledge.

UNCTAD (2019). *Review of Maritime Transport 2019.* New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNCTAD (2020). *COVID-19 and maritime transport: Impact and responses.* Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Urry, J. (2007). *Mobilities.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget (1997). *Lov om vaktvirksomhet: reguleringen av de private vaktselskap* Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

Valen-Sendstad, F. (1953). *For lov og rett i 200 år: Oslo politis historie.* Oslo: Gyldendal.

Valverde, M. (2001). Governing Security, Governing Through Security. in R. J. Daniels, P. Macklem and K. Roach, eds., *The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Valverde, M. (2011). Questions of security: A framework for research. *Theoretical Criminology,* 15/1.

Valverde, M. (2014). Studying the governance of crime and security: Space, time and jurisdiction. *Criminology & Criminal Justice,* 14/4: 379-391.

van Riemsdijk, M. (2010). Neoliberal reforms in elder care in Norway: Roles of the state, Norwegian employers, and Polish nurses. *Geoforum,* 41/6: 930-939.

Van Sluis, A., Marks, P., Gilleir, F. and Easton, M. (2012). Nodal security in the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp. in M. Fenger and V. Bekkers, eds., *Beyond fragmentation and interconnectivity: Public governance and the search for connective capacity*, Amsterdam: IOC Press.

van Steden, R., van der Wal, Z. and Lasthuizen, K. (2015). Overlapping Values, Mutual Prejudices:Empirical Research into the Ethos of Police Officers and Private Security Guards. *Administration & Society,* 47/3: 220-243.

van Steden, R., Wood, J., Shearing, C. and Boutellier, H. (2013). The Many Faces of Nodal Policing: Team Play and Improvisation in Dutch Community Safety. *Security Journal*.

van Stokkom, B. and Terpstra, J. (2018). Plural policing, the public good, and the constitutional state: an international comparison of Austria and Canada – Ontario. *Policing and Society,* 28/4: 415-430.

Vaughan-Williams, N. and Stevens, D. (2016). Vernacular theories of everyday (in)security: The disruptive potential of non-elite knowledge. *Security Dialogue,* 47/1: 40-58.

Vedby Rasmussen, M. (2001). Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 30/2.

Virilio, P. (2005). *Negative horizon: An essay in dromoscopy.* London: Continuum.

Virta, S. and Taponen, J. (2017). Policing regime in transition in the Nordic countries: Some critical notes from the Nordic reality. in E. Devroe, A. Edwards and P. Ponsaers, eds., *Policing European Metropolises: The Politics of Security in City-Regions*, London: Routledge.

Volquartzen, M. (2020). *Politi og privat vagtvirksomhed.* København: Djøf Forlag.

Wakefield, A. (2003). *Selling security: The private policing of public space.* Cullompton: Willan.

Wakefield, A. (2008). Private policing: A view from the mall. *Public Administration,* 86/3: 659-678.

Wallis, R. (1998). The role of the international aviation organisations in enhancing security. in P. Wilkinson and B. M. Jenkins, eds., *Aviation terrorism and security*, London: Frank Cass.

Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly,* 35/2: 211-239.

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wanat, C. L. (2008). Getting Past the Gatekeepers: Differences Between Access and Cooperation in Public School Research. *Field Methods,* 20/2: 191-208.

Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994). *Social network analysis: methods and applications.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wathne, C. T. (2018). Welfare professionals in transformation: The case of police officers in Norway. in H. Hvid and E. Falkum, eds., *Work and Wellbeing in the Nordic Countries: Critical Perspectives on the World's Best Working Lives*, London: Routledge.

Wathne, C. T. (2020). New Public Management and the Police Profession at Play. *Criminal Justice Ethics,* 39/1: 1-22.

Wathne, C. T., Talberg, N. and Gundhus, H. I. (2019). *Nærpolitireformen og politiets relasjon til publikum.* Oslo: Arbeidsforskningsinstituttet

Weber, L. (2013). *Policing non-citizens.* London: Routledge.

Weber, L., Mohn, S. B., Vecchio, F. and Fili, A. (2019). Beyond deportation: researching the control of outward mobility using a space of flows logic. *Global Networks,* 20/1: 65-84.

Weintraub, J. (1997). The theory and politics of the public/private distinction. in J. Weintraub and K. Kumar, eds., *Public and private in thought and practice: perspectives on a grand dichotomy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weiss, T. (2011). The blurring border between the police and the military. *Cooperation and Conflict,* 46/3: 396-405.

Whelan, C. (2012). *Networks and national security: dynamics, effectiveness and organisation* Surrey: Ashgate.

Whelan, C. (2016a). Informal social networks within and between organisations: On the properties of interpersonal ties and trust. *Policing: An International Journal,* 39/1: 145-158.

Whelan, C. (2016b). Organisational culture and cultural change: A network perspective. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology,* 49/4: 583-599.

Whelan, C. (2017). Security networks and occupational culture: understanding culture within and between organisations. *Policing and Society,* 27/2: 113-135.

Whelan, C. and Dupont, B. (2017). Taking stock of networks across the security field: a review, typology and research agenda. *Policing and Society,* 27/6: 671-687.

Whelan, C. and Molnar, A. (2017). Managing flows during mega-events: taking account of internal and external flows in public order policing operations. *Global Crime,* 18/3: 176-197.

Whelan, C. and Molnar, A. (2019). Policing political mega-events through 'hard' and 'soft' tactics: reflections on local and organisational tensions in public order policing. *Policing and Society,* 29/1: 85-99.

White, A. (2010). *The politics of private security: regulation, reform and re-legitimation.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

White, A. (2012). The new political economy of private security. *Theoretical Criminology,* 16/1: 85-101.

White, A. (2014). Post-crisis Policing and Public–Private Partnerships: The Case of Lincolnshire Police and G4S. *British Journal of Criminology,* 54/6: 1002-1022.

White, A. and Gill, M. (2013). The Transformation of Policing From Ratios to Rationalities. *British Journal of Criminology,* 53/1: 74-93.

Wood, J. (2006). Research and innovation in the field of security: a nodal governance view. in J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds., *Democracy, society and the governance of security*, 217-240, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, J. and Dupont, B. (2006) 'Democracy, society and the governance of security', pp. 291, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, J. and Font, E. (2004) 'Is "community policing" a desirable export? On crafting a global constabulary ethic', *Constabulary Ethics and the Spirit of Transnational Policing*, Oñati, Spain.

Wood, J. and Shearing, C. (2007). *Imagining security.* Portland: Willan.

Wæver, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. in R. D. Lipschutz, ed., *On security*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods.* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Zedner, L. (2003). The concept of security: An agenda for comparative analysis. *Legal Studies,* 23/1: 153-175.

Zedner, L. (2007). Pre-crime and post-criminology? *Theoretical Criminology,* 11/2: 261-281.

Zedner, L. (2009). *Security.* London: Routledge.

Zhang, A., Fu, X. and Yang, H. (2010). Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological,* 44/8: 944-959.

Zølner, M., Rasmussen, I. Ø. and Hansen, A. D. (2007). Qualitative interviews: studying network narratives. in M. Zølner and P. Bogason, eds., *Methods in democratic network governance*, 125-147, Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan.

Ødegård, A. (2006). Exploring perceptions of interprofessional collaboration in child mental health care. *International Journal of Integrated Care,* 6/4.

Ødegård, A., Hagtvet, K. A. and Bjørkly, S. (2008). Applying aspects of generalizability theory in preliminary validation of the Multifacet Interprofessional Collaboration Model (PINCOM). *International Journal of Integrated Care,* 8.

Ødegård, A. and Strype, J. (2009). Perceptions of interprofessional collaboration within child mental health care in Norway. *Journal of Interprofessional Care,* 23/3: 286-296.

Åtland, K. (2008). Hva er sikkerhet? En drøfting av sikkerhetsbegrepets innhold og utvikling fra Antikken til det 21. århundre. *Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift,* Nr 01-02.

PART TWO

Article 1: Nøkleberg, Martin (2019). The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing. *Policing and Society*, 601–617.

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing

Martin Nøkleberg [ID]

Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT

The increasing pluralisation of policing and the changing patterns of security have in the past decades called into question the sharp dividing lines between the 'public' and the 'private'. For instance, Marc Schuilenburg ([2015. *The securitization of society: crime, risk, and social order*. New York University Press]) outlines the notion of the middle ground – where everything is becoming hybrid – which fundamentally changes the relationships and practices of policing agencies, making the conceptual pairs of public-private obsolete. However, by examining policing collaboration in the airport and maritime port environment in Norway, the empirical findings in this article reveal that the public-private divide is still salient to the various policing agencies. The findings are at odds with the conceptual and empirical assumptions about the middle ground of hybridity in policing. The article demonstrates that both public and private policing agencies strongly rely on the traditional dividing lines of public and private to navigate and make sense of their practices and relations, as well as their own sense of identity in a complex policing environment. The article discusses the implications of these findings.

Introduction

Historically and theoretically, the public-private divide has been crucial for understanding government involvement in many of the key issues of social and political analysis (Weintraub 1997, Owens 2008). Within criminological inquiry, the divide has been important to understand various policing actors' involvement in crime control. The increasing pluralisation of policing and changing patterns of security provision have called into question the sharp dividing lines between the 'public' and 'private'. Security, formerly perceived as the monopoly of the state, is now delivered by a wide range of actors operating alongside each other (Bayley and Shearing 1996, 2001, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Dupont 2006a, Schuilenburg 2015). This significant transformation in how policing is organised also seems to produce a demand for different policing agencies to seek partner organisations to collaborate with to govern security effectively. Thus, 'the pursuit of security' (Zedner 2009) requires communication, coordination, and exchange of information, knowledge, expertise, and resources across organisational boundaries. Consequently, the past decades have seen the emergence of a range of new governance, policing, and security configurations that clearly transcend the public and private divide.

Several academic observers have, since the 1990s, related this development to the proliferation of hybrid policing actors (Johnston 1992, Button 2002, Dupont 2006a, Rogers 2017). Given the complexity of policing provision, Johnston (1992) and Kempa *et al.* (2005) suggest that the public-private

CONTACT Martin Nøkleberg [✉] martin.nokleberg@jus.uio.no

dichotomy has lost its utility and has eroded. An even stronger claim is found in the writings of Schuilenburg (2015), who argues that the securitisation of society causes the public and private to be so interwoven that there is little use in considering only one of them. The public-private divide, according to Schuilenburg, is too narrow and lack nuances, making it challenging to apply in the exploration of everyday practices of policing. More importantly, Schuilenburg argues that the dichotomy is increasingly fading, giving way to the middle ground, where everything and everyone is becoming hybrid. Schuilenburg (2015, p. 15) claims that it is both 'confusing and inaccurate to continue to use such dichotomies when the facts cast doubt upon the characteristics of these terms'. According to the accounts of Schuilenburg, the idea of hybridity seems, then, to denote growing similarity and even sameness between public and private actors.

While not disputing the value of such predicaments, the article argues that the theoretical assumptions of the middle ground of hybridity, where the dichotomy of the public and private are claimed obsolete and lost utility, may create analytical vagueness, and thus be of limited use in understanding the empirical everyday practices of policing and security. As such, the article questions the claim that the move to the middle ground makes it inaccurate to continue to rely on the notion of public and private in empirical analyses. That is, the idea of the middle ground seems to lead to an under-recognition of difference, particularly when hybridity is assumed a priori, and defining elements of the public and private tend to be undervalued. The empirical findings of this article suggest that policing agencies continue to use the vocabulary of public and private to make sense of their practices and relations. More importantly, the distinction between public and private is being perpetuated by the agencies. This raises a crucial question: to what extent do the theoretical assumptions of the middle ground of hybridity stack up to empirical scrutiny? That is, does the idea of hybridity, in the sense outlined by Schuilenburg, obscure significant differences between agencies, particularly as regards their interests and mentalities? Given this, it is appropriate to highlight the importance of difference by revisiting the dividing line of public and private, and examine its continuous empirical and analytical value when considering policing and security.

In order to address the question, the article revisits the public-private distinction by examining the relational and collaborative properties of policing agencies within the maritime port and airport environment in Norway. Exploring collaboration to shed light on the importance of difference is a fruitful point of departure, as collaborative practices create spaces in which different interests, mentalities or rationalities can meet. Within such spaces, the policing agencies are often confronted with the potential 'blending of different elements or attributes into a new combined form' (Waring 2015, p. 346), that is of hybridity or sameness. However, whether such blending and mixing take place is an empirical question rather than something that can be assumed a priori. Drawing on qualitative interviews with key policing agencies and survey data on perceptions of collaboration, the article aims, first, to explore whether differences arising from the public-private divide make any difference to how these agencies perceive collaboration and partnership. Secondly, it aims to examine the impact of such differences on collaboration processes, by focusing in particular on power relations, information sharing and the exchange of resources and expertise.

The article is organised in five main sections. It begins with a review of the relevant literature on the middle ground of hybridity and the public-private divide. Following these theoretical considerations, the next section sets out to contextualise these discussions by describing and examining part of the collaborative landscape of airport and port policing in Norway. The next section outlines the research methods and design of this study. This is followed by a presentation of the empirical analysis of how collaboration is understood and negotiated across and within the public-private divide. The concluding section discusses the findings and identifies the implications for future research.

The middle ground of hybridity and the public-private divide

References to the notion of plural policing are now commonplace (Terpstra and van Stokkom 2015). To understand this plurality, reference has been made to 'policing beyond, below, above, and

through the government', 'the policing complex', and 'the mixed economy of policing' (Jones and Newburn 1998, Loader 2000, Crawford *et al.* 2005). These studies have a shared understanding of the notion of plurality, where actors can take many forms.

As noted, Johnston's (1992) efforts to conceptualise the field of policing provision introduced the notion of hybrid policing to cover all policing agencies (both public and private), other than the public police or private security. Without any clearer description, though, hybridity seems to denote those organisations whose status and practice cut across the public-private divide (Rogers 2017). According to this understanding, the category of hybrid policing agencies is potentially very broad, as is shown by Button (2002). Yet, such an understanding of hybrid policing seems to be somewhat limited, as it may merely indicate the existence of pluralism (which is well documented), in the sense that different policing agencies now operate alongside each other. Schuilenburg (2015) outlines the middle ground and suggests that within this space everything and everyone are increasingly hybrid. To fully grasp the idea of the middle ground of hybridity, one can draw on insights from the public administration literature, where hybrid solutions have received considerable attention. Within the frames of public administration, hybridity is described in terms of the 'mixing', 'combining', and 'blending' of different elements, tasks, values and organisational forms into new configurations (Christensen and Lægreid 2011, Gittell and Douglass 2012, Gulbrandsen *et al.* 2015). It is further argued that hybridisation can occur through the processes of acculturation (learning), adaptation (modification), and appropriation (borrowing) (Waring 2015). Similarly, several observers have suggested that, as organisations work together over time, they may become more similar, particularly in terms of their cultural outlook (Fossestøl *et al.* 2015, Whelan 2016, Whelan 2017). That is, agencies will tend to harmonise or incorporate, either consciously or unconsciously, the institutional logics, mentalities, interests, or strategies of others – a process similar to that of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In this sense, hybrid configurations are understood as a fusion of ideas and practices from different governing systems, which creates increasing similarity between agencies – and thus the idea of sameness emerges.

Bearing this in mind, then, the middle ground of hybridity of policing now becomes more explicit. When exploring the dynamic perspective of security governance, Schuilenburg (2015) suggests that the middle ground of hybridity is a way out of the static and fixed categories of public-private. According to Schuilenburg (2015, p. 129), 'the middle forms the basis from which relations develop and elements from various practices attach themselves to one another to form new combinations'. These new fluid configurations result in a hybrid security model understood as a security assemblage, and the emphasis is on the indeterminacy of the elements that make up the middle ground of hybridity (Schuilenburg 2015). The way policing agencies blend features, leading to an increasing similarity has been observed, for example by van Steden *et al.* (2015), who show that the occupational motivation and professional values of police officers and private security guards are more alike than different. Although some differences can be observed, the similarities are more pronounced and it is suggested that a 'shared security ethos' exists across sectors. White and Gill (2013) and White (2014) show, when exploring the public good and market rationalities of the police and private security, that 'what we are more likely to witness is a complex blurring of relations and rationalities across the traditional public–private divide'. That is, public police and private security 'draw upon a mix of rationalities to inform their actions: sometimes they draw upon public good rationalities, other times they draw upon market rationalities; often they draw upon both at the same time' (White and Gill 2013, p. 89). It is precisely this mixing and blending of elements that support the idea of the middle ground of hybridity. Thus, relying on the notion of public (good) and private (market logics) in analyses does not preclude the existence of hybridity in policing.

It is important to note that, although the distinction is frequently called into question, the public-private divide still seems to have importance for public political imaginaries (Owens 2008) and, within academic debate, the distinction is still frequently drawn (Wakefield 2003, Gimenez-salinas 2004, Diphoorn and Berg 2014). From a sectoral point of view, an agency is deemed public if it is part of

the state or government, funded out of taxation, and offers universal or monopolistic provision. If services are provided by a for-profit organisation via the market and involve contracts and competition, they are private. However, such a distinction, based on sectors, is too simplistic, given the pluralised nature of policing. Though recognising its limitations (e.g. the divide is not useful to sort organisations into neat categories), Jones and Newburn (1998) suggest that it still has value as a didactic tool and should be seen as a continuum, with public/state provision at one end and the market at the other. Thus, it indicates a degree of difference rather than a fundamental one. As such, the distinction must be considered in terms of agencies' 'publicness' and 'privateness', and the interests, mentalities, or strategies of organisations may be located along this continuum. In line with this reasoning, White and Gill (2013) and White (2014) expand our understanding of the rationalities of the public good and the market with regard to policing partnerships. Although their conclusions, as shown above, suggest hybridity in that the policing agencies under investigation frequently rely upon a mix of rationalities to guide their actions, their argument also shows how the exact composition of rationalities and distribution along the spectrum of publicness and privateness should be understood as an empirical question. That is, one cannot assume that private providers follow the market logic and public agencies are guided by public good rationalities, but it is equally true that one cannot take it for granted that there will be similarity and hybridity among policing agencies – sameness may occur, but the importance of focusing on difference is equally valid.

Numerous previous studies have sought to examine the public-private divide by empirically studying the relationships and collaboration between public and private agencies (Bayley and Shearing 1996, Wakefield 2003, Crawford *et al.* 2005, Jones and Newburn 2006, Ayling *et al.* 2009). This body of literature suggests that differences in organisations' degree of publicness-privateness may influence various aspects of such relationships. Previous studies show that collaboration processes may involve extensive exchange of information, resources and expertise (Crawford 1997, Bjelland and Vestby 2017). However, several barriers to exchange have been observed, including lack of openness and motivation, unwillingness to share, cultural differences, and structural or legal limitations (e.g. issues to do with confidentiality or lack of resources) (Ayling *et al.* 2009, Crawford and Cunningham 2015). Such barriers may cause considerable frustration and conflict, and lead to intense power struggles (Crawford 1997).

Based on this, we can see that hybridity of policing, following the accounts of the middle ground, is not a development that can be simply assumed, but one demanding a close empirical examination of everyday practices of collaborative efforts and relationships. This will be undertaken in the following sections.

Standardised regulation and the collaborative landscape of aviation and maritime policing in Norway

Ports and airports can be seen as prime sites for studying public-private collaboration, as well as meeting points between high and low policing (Brodeur 2010). Such areas are central nodes in the infrastructure of globalisation (Salter 2008, Brewer 2014, Eski 2016), where the constant flow of people, goods, and capital are policed and regulated. This highlights an important linkage between security and flow. Airports and ports are spaces that need to be secure – both the spaces themselves and the flows that pass through them.

In view of new risks and vulnerabilities, airports and ports are places of intensified regulation (Salter 2008), whose international dimension is a prominent feature. This, however, is not surprising as, by its very nature, aviation and maritime security seem to demand an international response. These places are understood as national spaces connected to international ones, since aircraft and ships traverse national jurisdictions. In the case of Norway, the national regulation of aviation and maritime security is influenced and closely bound by international conventions (e.g. ICAO's Annex 17, or the ISPS-code[1]) and EU-regulations. An important feature of these regulations is that they seek to establish common standards for different countries as regards aviation and maritime security.

146

Consequently, Norwegian policing and security agencies' efforts to govern security in these spaces can be expected to resemble those of agencies operating in other countries, particularly European countries. The regulatory framework suggests there is a standardised and harmonised security governance of these spaces.

The security infrastructure at airports and ports often involves multiple organisations operating with different mentalities and interests, which span the public-private divide. To meet challenges associated with the policing of flows, various agencies are increasingly involved in partnerships, either as a direct consequence of standardised regulation or through voluntary engagement. The situation is further complicated by the fact that airports and ports are seen as both national points of access (involving e.g. border control and national security) and sites where economic and business imperatives prevail (e.g. those of airlines and airport operators). Policing agencies may thus be trapped between contradictory logics and strategies (collective and individual, public and private interests), which can affect the interaction between agencies.

In the case of Norway, policing organisations at airports and ports devote considerable time and resources to collaboration. At Oslo Airport, the police and customs have a shared interest in securing the border, and this creates numerous opportunities for collaboration. These agencies have, for instance, established several temporary joint operations directed at policing illicit cross-border flows. The agencies have also established a formal interagency intelligence unit. The formalisation has enabled new and extensive sharing of information across organisational boundaries. In addition to these public-public arrangements, there are numerous public-private partnerships operating to police the flows, ranging from information exchange and joint operational activities to formalised and strategic contacts points, such as local security committees and a crime prevention forum.

The collaborative policing environment of ports in Norway has many similarities with what happens in airports. There are several active local inter-agency and public-private partnerships and networks on the waterfront, with varying degrees of formalisation. Following recommendations made in the ISPS-code, port security committees are thought to have led to an increased commitment, locally, to working on crime and security at the waterfront. In the ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand, for example, these informal forums seem to facilitate information-sharing across public-private organisations. Because of their informal character, they evolve rapidly and their exact nature varies according to circumstances.

An interesting feature of the policing environment is the possible influence of regulatory practices on collaborative relations. The Ministry of Transport and Communications has delegated responsibility for implementing aviation and maritime security to two regulatory entities. To ensure compliance, these authorities conduct regular audits. By definition, then, these regulators have the capacity to exercise control over others and some of the interaction with other (policing) agencies may be governed by hierarchical control. Nonetheless, the regulatory practice found in the airport and port environments share resemblances with the 'responsive regulation' model (Brewer 2014).

Methods

This article is based on a larger project analysing different aspects of security governance at ports and airports in Norway. Data for this article is derived from in-depth interviews and an electronic survey of key stakeholders involved in producing and delivering security. The mixed-method approach was important as it made possible a comprehensive assessment of the security governance of ports and airports.

Between (late) 2015 and 2017, a total of 76 interviews were conducted. Relevant organisations were identified through an extensive online search, official databases or membership lists, and snowball sampling. An exhaustive list of organisations involved in security governance at the selected ports and airports was produced, and access to these organisations was obtained. Accordingly,

147

participants belonged to the full spectrum of agencies dealing with security and crime. The agencies range from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, governmental bodies (Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Justice and Public Security), regulatory authorities (The Norwegian Coastal Administration, Civil Aviation Authority Norway), to customs, private security companies, and business or industry stakeholders (e.g. airport operators, port authorities, airlines, shipping companies). Interviewees were drawn from many organisations, some of these having security as their primary concern (e.g. the police, and private security companies) whereas others saw security as one concern among others (e.g. customs, regulatory authorities, industry/business stakeholders).

The semi-structured interviews covered a range of topics, among other the participant's experience and understanding of their work and activities in relation to security. Specific questions concerning collaboration and security networks (e.g. trust and reciprocity, sharing of information, governance, the public-private divide, challenges, and possibilities) were also addressed during the interviews. The interviews were recorded and lasted between one and two hours, on average. All interviews were transcribed, and interviewees had the opportunity to read and approve the transcripts, to ensure the data was accurate and that no sensitive information was mentioned.

The interview transcripts were coded and analysed following the principles of thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006). All transcripts were read and re-read, to increase my familiarity with their content. Coding involved the identification and comparison of key themes across interviews, as themes were identified inductively from the data. Analysis was facilitated by NVivo 11. The codes guiding the analysis were influenced by my prior theoretical familiarity with policing and collaboration literature. The aim of the analysis was to identify overarching themes pertaining to collaboration and the public-private divide, and to give a thick and rich description of these themes. The quotations used in this article have been selected for their informative value.

In addition to the interviews, a questionnaire was developed to explore how collaboration was perceived. During the first part of 2017, the questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 896 participants involved in authorising and/or delivering security at five airports and five ports in Norway. In total, 511 participants responded, giving a response rate of 57%. The questionnaire was based on an adapted version of the Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration Model questionnaire (PINCOM-Q) (Ødegård 2006). The questionnaire is composed of 64 items, formulated as statements, and responses to them were rated on a 7-degree Likert scale (from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)). Each construct is operationalised by four items. Among the constructs to measure perception of collaboration were motivation to collaborate, professional power, communication, governance, and trust (Table 1).

Descriptive analyses were conducted to explore the main patterns of the data. Index variables of the 16 constructs of perception were computed on the basis of average scores. Analyses of Cronbach's alpha were conducted to check the reliability of the constructs derived from the PINCOM. One-way analysis variance (ANOVA) was used to test for differences in average scores between groups. As the article relies mainly on interviews, I will not elaborate further on the sample size and characteristics, and the statistical analysis.

Table 1. Sector representation, $N = 511$.

Sector	N
Police	66
Regulatory authority	44
Customs	53
Publicly owned company	39
Other public body	69
Private business	167
Private security company	73
Total	511

Findings

The case for revisiting the public-private divide: differences in perception of collaboration

On the basis of the notion of the middle ground of hybridity in policing introduced above, one would expect there to be few differences between policing agencies as regards their mentalities, interests, collaboration, and alike. One way to explore the hypothesis is to have a closer look at this study's survey data on how collaboration is perceived by different policing agencies.

The survey findings suggest that there are differences in what aspects various agencies perceive as most prominent in collaboration processes. The greatest differences were found between private and public policing agencies. The various policing agencies were grouped together as a dummy variable[2] according to their publicness-privateness. Public agencies are the police, regulatory agencies, the customs authorities, publicly owned companies, or other public organisations (e.g. municipal institutions). Private agencies are private businesses and private security companies (Figure 1).

The above figure shows the mean-score distribution for the various constructs of perception of collaboration for the public and private actors. Overall, public policing actors had a higher mean score for all constructs, compared with the private actors. This is an indication that public policing agencies place a more positive valuation on collaboration than their private counterparts. Differences in average scores between groups (e.g. public vs private sector) were tested using *t*-tests and ANOVA. The ANOVA indicated significant effects on all constructs but one (governance 1). This indicates that the observed differences in means with respect to perception between public and private actors were statistically significant.

However, it is important to be aware of the difficulty of grouping agencies into neat binary categories. For instance, there might be considerable differences within the two groups as regards their perception of collaboration. To check for this, one-way ANOVA and post hoc tests were applied to explore differences in means within each group. Tukey's HSD post hoc test showed

PUBLIC VS PRIVATE ACTORS

Figure 1. Perception of collaboration, public versus private actors.

that the statistically significant differences observed between group means were found almost exclusively between public-private. The only significant differences within groups were found between the police and customs authorities on the professional power construct, and between the police and other public agencies on the governance 2 construct.

The analysis suggests that those agencies classed as public are clearly distinguishable from those bodies classed as private. Accordingly, there seem to be some clear differences between the agencies connected with the scale of publicness-privateness, particularly regarding how collaboration is understood. In view of this, the next sections will explore these differences in more detail by examining interviewees' narratives about collaboration and how these relate to the notion of publicness-privateness.

Reaching consensus – a matter of interests?

One dominant view of collaboration that was repeatedly expressed during interviews relating both to ports and to airports, was that establishing a shared understanding or consensus about various issues was crucial for a productive and effective relationship. As previously shown, such consensus can relate to such matters as common goals or aims, strategies and solutions, perspectives, or rules (Crawford 1997, Thomson and Perry 2006, Whelan 2017). In particular, interviewees emphasised the importance of making expectations, procedures, and guidelines explicit and clear to all involved in collaboration. Establishing consensus can help to create a stable and predictable collaborative environment. For this reason, many of the interviewees say that clarifying responsibilities and aims is the first step in establishing relationships with partner organisations. As Fleming and Rhodes (2005, p. 195) argue, shared values and norms are often the glue that holds a complex set of relationships together. However, the idea of consensus expressed by the interviewees does not seem to represent a merging or blending of values or logics along the lines of hybridity. Rather, differences seem to emerge with regard to how collaboration processes evolve.

Although consensus is viewed as crucial by many agencies, exactly how it can be achieved is problematic. Due to the plural nature of policing at ports and airports, most of the interviewees said that being able to rely on informal relationships with partner organisations was of great value. However, these informal ties are not necessarily as structured as those containing a contractual element. Reaching consensus may therefore give rise to organisational tensions. For instance, a port facility security officer (PFSO) said:

> Mutual understanding (…) would help reduce unnecessary interference in collaborative processes. However, it's precisely such interference that's almost always present, and that's because some people and agencies find it too difficult to agree. And this is extremely annoying really … it's damn frustrating and detrimental to the relationship. (Private business 34)

What this indicates is that the process of reaching a shared agreement may involve considerable frustration and tension, particularly as agencies may be pursuing their own agendas or interests. Accordingly, several of the interviewees from private organisations linked such frustration to a perceived scepticism on the part of their (public) collaborative partner(s). To explain such scepticism, the interference described by the PFSO above is very telling as the interviewee continued to maintain that the interference is connected with a public reluctance to collaborate and to adopt goals of market logic. These challenges are further elaborated below.

Power relations and conflicts

As pointed out by Crawford (1997), collaboration can take various forms and even range from cooperation to competition and conflict (see also Diphoorn and Berg 2014, Crawford and Cunningham 2015). Thus, differences in structural power relations can exist between agencies. A crucial question is whether the challenges described by the interviewees can be linked with the notion of publicness-privateness.

150

The different agencies are, of course, aware of the multitude of actors involved in policing and security, and that collaboration is inevitably becoming a natural part of everyday life. However, at the same time, interviewees emphasise that the challenges already mentioned – agreeing on goals and creating consensus for the direction of the collaboration – can be amplified by the underlying differences in interests of the various agencies. Reflecting on the differences between inter-agency and public-private collaboration, one police officer working with border control at a port noted that this is easier when only public agencies are involved. Collaboration with private actors, by contrast, was deemed much more demanding as the 'interests are often so different. (…). My experience is that you have this "us" against "them," public versus private' (Police 20). Similar experiences were described by another police officer:

> The different actors have different goals and are driven by different and sometimes contradictory interests. In some cases, when I have presented an idea or offered some suggestions for changes based on analyses, I have encountered opposition from private actors because the suggestions may result in increased costs or investments. The different interests can quickly develop into a situation of non-cooperation. (Police 19)

According to these police narratives, the publicness-privateness dimension seems to be of importance in discussions where agencies are trying to agree on their collaborative efforts. The 'us' and 'them' mentality suggests that the shared logic of publicness increases the categorisation of agencies into neat groups and it seems that this process makes it even more challenging for public agencies to accept the existence of other interests. This mentality is also concerned with the differing view on security as presented by the interviewees. While van Steden *et al.* (2015) highlight the possibility of a shared security ethos across sectors, in the case examined here, such an ethos is most evident within sectors than across them. Public agencies made it clear that the security they provide collectively is quite different from their private counterparts' exclusive and commodified provision, where profit is the motive. Such different manifestations of security may be interpreted in the light of the public good and market rationalities (White and Gill 2013). Public agencies may not always see, or want to acknowledge, market rationalities as valuable, even if such rationalities may contribute to the public good. That is, the frameworks of public agencies are clearly bound by their preference for the logic of publicness, and this may pose problems for the everyday practice of policing and security.

Therefore, despite having a shared understanding that collaborative approaches are beneficial, there seems to be a need for something of a 'balancing act' in reaching consensus between different and sometimes contradictory interests. Thus, some organisational interests or agendas are seen as more compatible with one's own interests than others. This balancing act, however, is not peculiar to the police – many interviewees from across all organisations gave similar accounts. A PFSO from one private company described some of these challenges and balancing acts in more detail:

> Everyone has their own agenda, that's how it is. (…) In terms of collaboration, even if it concerns security, terrorism, emergency planning, or crime, it's not always easy to reconcile our commercial, economic interests, with other agencies' understandings and wishes. This also has major consequences. For example, it's not particularly fun or motivating to do this type of work, when you meet resistance over and over again simply because you represent other interests and ideas. Just because we're concerned with profit, this does not mean that it should be difficult to collaborate with us regarding security. I find it strange that people often say 'No, we're not competitors in security, it's in everyone's interest that we work together.' But the reality is different when all these interests meet. (Private business 47)

This quote summarises the multiple dilemmas that policing agencies may face when trying to establish inter-organisational partnerships. It also underlines the apparent lack of understanding for different perspectives. Arguably, these different accounts capture a key element in the establishment of collaboration, namely the challenge of negotiating boundaries and consensus concerning goals and interests. Giacomantonio (2015) notes that power relations are still relevant as collaboration processes involve, sometimes very demanding, negotiations. The negotiation processes also capture

some of the structural conflicts or frictions that may be generated (Crawford 1997). As such, it seems that the fear of losing organisational autonomy, as boundaries of public and private agencies are crossed through collaboration, can increase tension and lead to confusion among the agencies (Gill 2015). This suggests that these relations are potential sources of conflict and may impede the development of effective collaborative practices. Moreover, as the policing agencies differ in terms of their mentalities (e.g. economic ethos versus public interest), which make collaboration challenging, this difference seems largely to be determined by the degree of publicness-privateness. Accordingly, the divide is of use not only in distinguishing between public and private policing bodies (Jones and Newburn 1998), but also in helping our understanding of the establishment of collaborative efforts across organisations and subsequent challenges that may arise. What follows from this, then, are questions about the consequences of these challenges.

Inter-organisational power struggles – information sharing, trust and reciprocity

Many different, and to some extent successful, policing and security partnerships do in fact exist at ports and airports, despite difficulties in establishing and maintaining them. One such example is the police-customs collaboration on intelligence-exchange that has been established at Oslo Airport. This example can be used to shed light on important processes behind perceptions of good working relations. Describing the beneficial outcomes of this relationship, a customs officer noted enthusiastically:

> You often have many common interests, and we've had cases in which both of us have an interest in an arriving object. By being familiar with the people who are doing the same type of work in the other agency, it's much easier to say, 'on this flight, for instance, we've noticed a person that isn't of interest to us, but who might be of interest to you based on this, and so on.' (Customs 21)

This customs officer went on to argue, in line with views expressed by police officers also involved, that one needs to be aware of what information one's own organisation needs and what the partner organisation needs and wants. The quote highlights the fact that information and particularly the exchange and sharing of information is crucial for carrying on effective collaboration. As we have seen, the belief in the pivotal position of information exchange in ensuring good and effective partnerships is shared among many of the policing agencies and across the public-private divide. Similar accounts are given by Crawford *et al.* (2005), who argue that information exchange is central to policing partnerships. Brewer (2013, 2014) elaborates on the importance of trust and reciprocity in partnerships, and notes that 'social capital born of trusting interagency relations is key to enabling efficacious cooperative partnership between policing agencies' (Brewer 2013, p. 375).

Although the exchange of information is deemed crucial and effective for some partnerships, this is not necessarily the case for all collaborative efforts. Many of the policing agencies find that the public police have a pre-eminent position as regards the exchange and collection of information and expertise. In interviews with the police, it is interesting to note that they also assign themselves such a central position. Nonetheless, a number of interviewees, particularly those belonging to private agencies, say that the police, despite their perceived central position, do not actively seek knowledge, information and expertise outside their sectoral domain. A good example is the importance of local knowledge for security work at the airport and ports, and how such knowledge may be shared between agencies.

In line with Dupont (2006b), such local knowledge could be viewed as a type of capital that is accumulated, mobilised, and shared among agencies. Thus, different agencies have the opportunity to become 'knowledge-brokers' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). However, interviewees called attention to a lack of interest on the part of the police in obtaining and making use of the necessary information about sites that are being policed and made secure. The public police thus seem to struggle to take the position of a successful knowledge-broker, particularly as they tend to have a hierarchical view of collaboration. That is, police organisations are generally guided by their strong hierarchical and legal-

bureaucratic role perception (Mawby and Wright 2008). For example, one PFSO argued that the police should take a more active role in searching for information, knowledge and expertise:

> If there is a major event at the port, the police get the responsibility for the site. I think, then, an important pre-requisite for being able to take this role seriously is to have obtained sufficient information. However, in those forums I am involved in, which are both formal and personal relationships, the police aren't particularly present or interested. So, from a collaboration perspective, I wish that they would take a more active role and seek more information. (Private business 44)

What is highlighted here seems to be the essence of the frustration felt by private agencies. Knowledge, information, and expertise found in different (private) policing agencies are seen as valuable resources, that are potentially critical for the governing of security. However, the potential of information exchange does not seem to be fully exploited in the collaborative efforts at the ports and airport.

Contrary to this view, police representatives argued that they do indeed seek information. The police narratives seem to express a feeling on the part of the interviewees that the police have some sort of an obligation or right to collect information, and in many instances this is, in fact, the case (e.g. information for crime investigation). More interestingly, many interviewees spoke about how to obtain information 'out there' from other policing agencies. As one police officer put it:

> It will give you a better and bigger picture when you start thinking in this way, who's actually around us. I think it can help you to identify partners faster, or I do not know if you should call it partners though, but they're sensors for us. (Police 19)

Such 'sensors' are understood as actors who can provide the police with relevant information. But to decide what should be deemed relevant, the police 'need to go out and talk to them and explain a couple of things' (police 19). Once again, these accounts demonstrate the hierarchical view of collaboration taken by the police. The notion of a sensor, in this context, clearly suggests that in encounters between the police and private agencies, the agencies are not deemed equal partners; in fact, they are not seen as partners at all. It is precisely this strongly hierarchical command mentality of the police – 'the need to explain' certain things – that indicates its publicness. Among these policing and security agencies one can sense not only different ideas about information and knowledge exchange between public and private, but also the tension that may arise from such differences. The tension becomes particularly evident when the policing agencies speak about reciprocity in collaboration processes.

As noted above, Brewer (2013, 2014) captures how inter-agency partnership is dependent on norms of trust. Other studies have also shown the importance of trust and reciprocity in collaborative policing (O'Neill and McCarthy 2014, Whelan 2017). When reflecting on the role of reciprocity, a number of interviewees emphasised that the way reciprocity is perceived may vary considerably between agencies. However, there appears to be a tendency for reciprocity with regard to information and knowledge to be dependent on sectoral allegiance: public agencies tend to share information more readily with other public agencies, and private organisations experience more reciprocity from other private organisations. Explaining how to seek and obtain information, one PFSO expressed:

> Our collaboration with the RSO [recognised security organisation] is very good. That's where we get all the information we really need. (…). It really helps me to do my job, and I'd rather call them [name of persons], than [name of person], the Coastal Administration or the police if I need to ask for something. I feel it's the professional interests we have in common. (…). We need to do what's best for us, you know, and they know our port facility, they know what they are talking about. (Private business 45)

From the public perspective, a similar picture is given:

> If you think about other governmental agencies, you naturally have trust in that relationship. We're both parts of the government. (…). In general, I think public agencies work well together. (…) And this is particularly evident in security incidents. Here, our collaboration is excellent. Yes, there are open lines between us. But of course, over

153

the years you get to know each other, that's very helpful, and we know those working in the Ministry on these issues. (Regulatory authority 12)

Speaking about these different perspectives on reciprocity, interviewees mentioned two sets of explanations. The first concerns who possesses relevant information and their willingness to share it. As we have seen, local knowledge and information exist, yet it seems that not all agencies have equal access to it. As one PFSO put it: 'Locally, the police and PST[3], but also the coastal administration are too closed in how they operate with regard to the information they possess, information that we often view as crucial for strategic choices in our company' (Private business 40). In a similar vein, a representative from one private company at the airport said 'Collaboration with certain public agencies is obstructed by our lack of authorisation to receive classified information' (Private business 29). Within partnerships, some agencies thus have the ability to set limits for certain types of information, particularly with regard to how it should be shared, and which agencies should get access. Following Foucault (1990) and Latour (1986), power can be seen as the process of enrolling and mobilising others' capacities and resources. At the same time, Wood and Shearing (2007, p. 15) note that some (state) actors in the process of enrolment 'are rather concerned with expanding their capacities and resources in furtherance of their mission'. These public policing agencies are thus involved in power relations when they seek to enlist others to share information with them, while at the same time operating as gatekeepers to other information. Such power relations may shed light on the existence of sectoral allegiance. As shown by Whelan and Dupont (2017), the nature of such allegiance has to some extent been overlooked in the literature. Given their closed environment, private agencies tend to develop alternative conduits for exchange, particularly by establishing ties with other private organisations. As noted by the interviewees, a 'common professional interest' plays a crucial role in their private-private relationships, in the sense that they already have a mutual framework to work within, and it seems that such a common interest can lead to 'natural' trust, similar to that described in the public-public collaboration. As a consequence, the tendency for there to be private-private sector relationships seems to be strengthened, both by the frustration experienced by these actors because of the difficulty of accessing local knowledge and information, and by their shared understanding.

The second explanation concerns different views on what type of information is being shared. That is, private policing agencies argue that they are interested in strategic information from the public agencies. One interviewee said:

The police and the coastal administration must share information about their observations, threat assessments and the like, as well as having a dialogue with the operators if they want to collect information from all actors about employees who might be a security threat. (Private business 35)

Among the interviewees, it is felt that such strategic information can contribute to improving security and policing at the ports and airport, particularly by making sure that decisions are based on intelligence and local knowledge. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the intelligence doctrine for the police declares that certain information can and should be made available to external agencies (Politidirektoratet 2014). Here, one interviewee, with extensive experience in the police, but now working in a private company, states that the information that could potentially be shared is very difficult to obtain: 'You need to know your way around to get the necessary information. The information is difficult to access, but it is available. So, you just need to accept the system' (Private business 76). Obtaining information thus requires a great amount of effort on the part of the (private) agencies to navigate within the difficult field of information exchange with the police and other (public) agencies. Again, this may help understand the nature of sectoral allegiance. The private agencies share not only the characteristics of their privateness (e.g. market rationalities) but also the constant difficulty of exchange and its attendant frustrations. In a sense, this seems to forge a stronger tie between private-private policing organisations, making exchange between them easier and more important. Moreover, the fact that one needs to know one's way around the system to obtain information shows the importance of establishing informal relations. Several

154

studies have demonstrated that interpersonal trust and informal relations are crucial to the smooth flow of resources and information between agencies (Crawford *et al.* 2005, Brewer 2014, Bjelland and Vestby 2017). In line with the idea of sectoral allegiance, private-private informal relations are viewed by the interviewees as strategies to overcome, or at least reduce, the barriers to exchange that private agencies encounter.

Public agencies, on the other hand, seem to have a somewhat different view about what information should be shared or obtained. While to some extent acknowledging the importance of strategic information, these agencies say that exchange is dependent on the sensitivity of the matter. Exchange, therefore, tends to be at a more general level. As one customs officer at the port explains:

> It's about information, you know. What we can and cannot share, and to what extent we can go into detail on the things [information] being shared. With regard to sharing between public agencies, it's pretty easy, I think. The formalities are established and known to all. With other actors, we tend to be vaguer, or not necessarily vague, but more general. Information we share is at a general level. (Customs 51)

This highlights one particular issue regarding information exchange within collaborative partnerships – an issue that can lead to considerable organisational tension. That is, if there is no common understanding or guiding principles about how to share information and what information should be shared, one runs the risk of creating barriers between agencies, particularly between those at different ends of the public-private divide. A representative from the Customs stresses the importance of such common understandings by noting that one may withhold information that should have been shared, as guidelines may not be sorted out and agreed upon, and exchange is sometimes hindered by confidentiality.

In the light of this, it is clear that negotiation over issues of confidentiality is crucial to avoid creating organisational barriers, since different policing agencies are bound by different legislation. Drafting a common understanding of information exchange, however, is not only concerned with fleshing out legal rules relating to sensitive and confidential data. In order to establish reciprocity within partnerships, one also needs to be aware of differences in agencies' interests and their potential contribution to exchange of information, resources and expertise. Consequently, one key aspect of reciprocity is that exchange is regarded as balanced amongst the policing agencies. However, it seems to be difficult for some agencies to adhere to the idea of balanced exchange, and there seems to be a power struggle that challenges collaboration and reciprocity. The power struggle is particularly evident in public agencies, which raises the issue of the publicness-privateness of agencies and their interests. This point was articulated powerfully by a police official who said: 'Although we work together closely on a daily basis, we must not forget that we're the police: we're the police and they're commercial actors' (Police 13). This quote reinforces the 'us' and 'them' mentality outlined above. What is indicated here is that public (police) agencies seem to be sceptical of those operating within the frames of a different logic – the market. This tendency illuminates the fact that meetings between different policing agencies do not necessarily involve the blending and mixing of the agencies interests or mentalities. Rather, it seems that these interests often seem incompatible and the perception of difference is reinforced. Thus, information exchange and trust within the airport and port environment is determined and contested according to the degree of agencies' publicness or privateness.

Discussion

The notion of the middle ground, where everything and everyone is increasingly hybrid, suggests, as collaborations progress and proliferate, that one could expect to experience fewer and fewer differences between policing agencies. From this perspective, it would follow that, in most situations, the hybridity should be prominent in empirical practice, particularly if the middle is all ground between what is seen as exclusively public or private. This is particularly the case if the security assemblages of the middle ground cannot be demarcated by assigning them hard boundaries (Schuilenburg 2015).

Also, as Schuilenburg (2015, p. 15) argues, the public-private distinction is often difficult to apply to real-life practice, and can thus be seriously questioned. The main argument of this article is, though, at odds with the conceptual assumptions of the middle ground as outlined by Schuilenburg. The empirical findings challenge the perception of the middle ground of hybridity, as the public-private divide is a salient feature of the language used by the various policing agencies. The article shows that the notion of public-private is crucial to how agencies view themselves in comparison with others, and to how they seek to position themselves within collaborative efforts by making reference to this divide. This is a strong indication that the policing agencies under investigation rely on the traditional dividing line of public and private to navigate and make sense of their practices and relations, as well as their own identity in a complex policing environment. It may, of course, be the case that different agencies rely on the language of public and private to inform their actions and relations simply because their frames of reference or conceptual language are still influenced by the historical power of these concepts. The findings of this article, however, suggest that this is more than simply a reiteration of a powerful traditional vocabulary inherited from the past. That is, the various policing agencies represent interests that are clearly empirically different, and these differences have a substantial influence on the collaborations explored in this study. Therefore, the article questions the claim made by Schuilenburg (2015) that it is confusing and inaccurate to continue to rely on the notion of public and private in analyses.

More specifically, the empirical findings reveal the importance of interest for understanding the public and private distinction. The issue of difference in interests was pointed out in several interviews. The question of whose interests are being served can be used to draw a dividing line between the public and private (Benn and Gaus 1983). In essence, an organisation that provides services designed to benefit any or every member of a community is one that serves the public interest. By contrast, if an organisation only benefits a particular individual or organisation, then it serves a private interest. I would like to suggest that the notion of interest deserves proper criminological attention in future research. Although acknowledged (Shearing and Stenning 1981), the diverging interests highlighted in this article represent a significant challenge to the middle ground of hybridity. For instance, the analysis put forward suggests that it can indeed be challenging for agencies to agree on objectives and aims because of differences in their interests. If examined in the light of the publicness-privateness continuum, diverging interests may add another layer to the analysis. The public police and other public policing agencies may have some similarities and differences, but they are all distinguishable from bodies that can be classed as private as regards their interests. This provides a novel insight into the way in which the notion of interest influences security governance.

The findings indicate that policing agencies which have a similar cultural outlook and shared interests seem to experience greater reciprocity in their collaborative efforts. Building rapport and trust over time is particularly important, but is a challenging task in the process of reciprocity. Within the partnerships investigated in this article, trust seems to be facilitated by stability in interpersonal relations between agencies. But as the above findings suggest, establishing trust is easier within the sector one belongs to. As such, the importance of sectoral allegiance comes to the fore. The narratives reveal a profound lack of trust across the boundaries of public and private agencies. Public-public and private-private partnerships may, therefore, experience less tension than those that cross the public-private divide. Thus, differing interests arising from the divide also seem to affect matters of reciprocity and trust.

In the empirical context analysed, local knowledge, information, and expertise are seen as important capital that can be mobilised and exchanged. However, the analysis suggests there is an unwillingness to share such capital among all policing agencies, this being particularly true of the public police. There are, of course, some confidentiality barriers to information exchange (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Bjelland and Vestby 2017). This unwillingness, therefore, is partly related to issues of confidentiality and the desire to ensure that sensitive information is not misused. However, the reluctance on the part of the public police to share and collect local knowledge and information is also linked to their mentality. The 'us' and 'them' perspective and the view that 'we are the police' impose limits on

exchange that cannot be justified by formal legal norms of confidentiality alone, but seem to arise from a state-centric mentality where the police seek to maintain their power and position in the plural policing environment. The position carries resemblance with what Shearing (2006) describes as the refusal to acknowledge private governments. Moreover, the criminal justice logic of public policing agencies is, in practice, often incompatible with the profitability logic of private agencies. This, together with the hierarchical view of collaboration that has been described, clearly creates tension, and the resultant power struggles clearly cut across the boundaries of the public-private divide. In this respect, the division between public and private is being constantly renewed and maintained by the agencies. This supports the view that the exact composition and distribution along the spectrum of publicness and privateness should be understood as an empirical question.

In order to understand differences in plural policing, van Stokkom and Terpstra (2018) highlight the importance of historical, cultural and political factors. Although the Norwegian policing context share similarities with regard to policing systems found elsewhere (e.g. pluralisation), the state apparatus is still strong and play a significant role in policing (Gundhus and Larsson 2007, Høigård 2011). This may influence the organisation of the plural policing system, in particular, the demarcation towards other (private) policing bodies. This raises the important question to what extent can the findings be geographically determined. As such, the empirical findings concerning the reinforcement of the public-private divide should be treated with some caution, particularly with regard to its generalisability. Nonetheless, the conceptual arguments seem to be useful in broader contexts.

Concluding remarks

In the light of these findings, I propose that one should be aware of the diverging interests and mentalities that exist, and of how these can influence collaboration between policing agencies. I do not dispute the idea that the divide between them is being contested and recast into different configurations. However, this study clearly suggests that the dividing line between public and private still has significant analytical value in examinations of the empirical context of policing, particularly by noting the importance of difference. This, therefore, demands a closer focus on such awareness. Drawing inspiration from the insight of Jones and Newburn (1998) that the public-private is a matter of degree, this study points to the importance of further research that brings together the two dimensions of interest and mentality in studies of pluralised policing and collaboration. Such a combination could provide a useful tool for classifying policing agencies that attach importance to the notions of 'publicness' and 'privateness', and for examining how agencies can be situated along this continuum. By expanding the one-dimensional scale of publicness and privateness, one may avoid fixating on the historical reference point of plural policing, which focuses almost exclusively on the public police and private security. That is, a vast array of other agencies (both public and private) also operates within the (plural) policing environment, and with such an expansion these agencies may be captured. Finally, the empirical contextualisation of the notion of the middle ground of hybridity demonstrated in this article raises a broader question of whether theoretical concepts developed within policing studies serve as productive conduits for further understanding or whether they may, in fact, become potential blocks against insight.

Acknowledgements

Disclosure statement

Notes

1. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN specialist agency, and Annex 17 concerns aviation security and sets security standards. The International Ship and Port Facility code (ISPS-code) is administered by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the equivalent body for maritime security.
2. 1 = Public ($N = 271$), 0 = Private ($N = 240$).
3. The Norwegian Police Security Service.

ORCID

Martin Nøkleberg 🆔 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4879-6100

References

Ayling, J., Shearing, C., and Grabosky, P.N., 2009. *Lengthening the arm of the law: enhancing police resources in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bayley, D.H. and Shearing, C., 1996. The future of policing. *Law & society review*, 30 (3), 585–606.

Bayley, D.H. and Shearing, C., 2001. *The new structure of policing: description, conceptualization and research agenda*. Washington: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Deptartment of Justice.

Benn, S. and Gaus, G., eds., 1983. *Public and private in social life*. London: Croom Helm.

Bjelland, H.F. and Vestby, A., 2017. 'It's about using the full sanction catalogue': on boundary negotiations in a multi-agency organised crime investigation. *Policing and society*, 27 (6), 655–670.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, 3 (2), 77–101.

Brewer, R., 2013. Enhancing crime control partnerships across government: examining the role of trust and social capital on American and Australian waterfronts. *Police quarterly*, 16 (4), 371–394.

Brewer, R., 2014. *Policing the waterfront: networks, partnerships and the governance of port security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brodeur, J.-P., 2010. *The policing web*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Button, M., 2002. *Private policing*. Cullompton: Willan.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P., 2011. Complexity and hybrid public administration—theoretical and empirical challenges. *Public organization review*, 11 (4), 407–423.

Crawford, A., 1997. *The local governance of crime: appeals to community and partnerships*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Crawford, A., et al., 2005. *Plural policing: the mixed economy of visible patrols in England and Wales*. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Crawford, A. and Cunningham, M., 2015. Working in partnership: the challenges of working across organizational boundaries, cultures, and practices. *In*: J. Fleming, ed. *Police leadership: rising to the top*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71–109.

DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American sociological review*, 48 (2), 147–160.

Diphoorn, T. and Berg, J., 2014. Typologies of partnership policing: case studies from urban South Africa. *Policing and society*, 24 (4), 425–442.

Dupont, B., 2006a. Delivering security through networks: surveying the relational landscape of security managers in an urban setting. *Crime, law and social change*, 45 (3), 165–184.

Dupont, B., 2006b. Power struggles in the field of security: implications for democratic transformation. *In*: J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds. *Democracy, society and the governance of security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 86–110.

Ericson, R.V. and Haggerty, K.D., 1997. *Policing the risk society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Eski, Y., 2016. *Policing, port security and crime control: an ethnography of the port securityscape*. London: Routledge.

Fleming, J. and Rhodes, R.A.W., 2005. Bureaucracy, contracts and networks: the unholy trinity and the police. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 38 (2), 192–215.

Fossestøl, K., et al., 2015. Managing institutional complexity in public sector reform: hybridization in front-line service organizations. *Public administration*, 93 (2), 290–306.

Foucault, M., 1990. *The history of sexuality, volume 1: an introduction*. New York: Vintage Books.

Giacomantonio, C., 2015. *Policing integration: the sociology of police coordination work*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gill, M., 2015. Senior police officers' perspectives on private security: sceptics, pragmatists and embracers. *Policing and society*, 25 (3), 276–293.

Gimenez-salinas, A., 2004. New approaches regarding private/public security. *Policing and society*, 14 (2), 158–174.

Gittell, J.H. and Douglass, A., 2012. Relational bureaucracy: structuring reciprocal relationships into roles. *Academy of management review*, 37 (4), 709–733.

Gulbrandsen, M., et al., 2015. Emerging hybrid practices in public-private research centres. *Public administration*, 93 (2), 363–379.

158

Gundhus, H.I. and Larsson, P., 2007. Policing i et norsk perspektiv. *In*: H.I. Gundhus, P. Larsson, and T.-G. Myhrer, eds. *Polisiær virksomhet: hva er det - hvem gjør det?: Forskningskonferansen 2007*. Oslo: Politihøgskolen, 11–30.

Høigård, C., 2011. Policing the North. *Crime and justice*, 40 (1), 265–348.

Johnston, L., 1992. *The rebirth of private policing*. London: Routledge.

Johnston, L. and Shearing, C., 2003. *Governing security: explorations in policing and justice*. New York: Routledge.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T., 1998. *Private security and public policing*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jones, T. and Newburn, T., eds., 2006. *Plural policing: a comparative perspective*. London: Routledge.

Kempa, M., Shearing, C., and Burris, S. 2005. Changes in governance: a background review. *The Salzburg seminar on the governance of health.* Salzburg.

Latour, B., 1986. The powers of association. *In*: J. Law, ed. *Power, action and belief: a new sociology of knowledge?* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 261–277.

Loader, I., 2000. Plural policing and democratic governance. *Social & legal studies*, 9 (3), 323–345.

Mawby, R.C. and Wright, A., 2008. The police organisation. *In*: T. Newburn, ed. *Handbook of policing*. 2nd ed. Cullompton: Willan, 224–252.

O'Neill, M. and McCarthy, D.J., 2014. (Re)negotiating police culture through partnership working: trust, compromise and the 'new' pragmatism. *Criminology & criminal justice*, 14 (2), 143–159.

Owens, P., 2008. Distinctions, distinctions: 'public' and 'private' force? *International affairs*, 84 (5), 977–990.

Politidirektoratet, 2014. *Etterretningsdoktrine for politiet*. Oslo: Politidirektoratet.

Rogers, C., 2017. *Plural policing: theory and practice*. Bristol: Policy Press.

Salter, M.B., ed., 2008. *Politics at the airport*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schuilenburg, M., 2015. *The securitization of society: crime, risk, and social order*. New York: New York University Press.

Shearing, C., 2006. Reflections on the refusal to acknowledge private governments. *In*: J. Wood and B. Dupont, eds. *Democracy, society and the governance of security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11–32.

Shearing, C. and Stenning, P., 1981. Modern private security: its growth and implications. *Crime and justice*, 3, 193–245.

Terpstra, J. and van Stokkom, B., 2015. Plural policing in comparative perspective. Four models of regulation. *European journal of policing studies*, 2 (3), 325–343.

Thomson, A.M. and Perry, J.L., 2006. Collaboration processes: inside the black box. *Public administration review*, 66 (s1), 20–32.

van Steden, R., van der Wal, Z., and Lasthuizen, K., 2015. Overlapping values, mutual prejudices: empirical research into the ethos of police officers and private security guards. *Administration & society*, 47 (3), 220–243.

van Stokkom, B. and Terpstra, J., 2018. Plural policing, the public good, and the constitutional state: an international comparison of Austria and Canada – Ontario. *Policing and society*, 28 (4), 415–430.

Wakefield, A., 2003. *Selling security: the private policing of public space*. Cullompton: Willan.

Waring, J., 2015. Mapping the public sector diaspora: towards a model of inter-sectoral cultural hybridity using evidence from the English healthcare reforms. *Public administration*, 93 (2), 345–362.

Weintraub, J., 1997. The theory and politics of the public/private distinction. *In*: J. Weintraub and K. Kumar, eds. *Public and private in thought and practice: perspectives on a grand dichotomy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1–42.

Whelan, C., 2016. Organisational culture and cultural change: a network perspective. *Australian & New Zealand journal of criminology*, 49 (4), 583–599.

Whelan, C., 2017. Security networks and occupational culture: understanding culture within and between organisations. *Policing and society*, 27 (2), 113–135.

Whelan, C. and Dupont, B., 2017. Taking stock of networks across the security field: a review, typology and research agenda. *Policing and society*, 27 (6), 671–687.

White, A., 2014. Post-crisis policing and public–private partnerships the case of Lincolnshire police and G4S. *British journal of criminology*, 54 (6), 1002–1022.

White, A. and Gill, M., 2013. The transformation of policing: from ratios to rationalities. *British journal of criminology*, 53 (1), 74–93.

Wood, J. and Shearing, C., 2007. *Imagining security*. Portland: Willan.

Zedner, L., 2009. *Security*. London: Routledge.

Ødegård, A., 2006. Exploring perceptions of interprofessional collaboration in child mental health care. *International journal of integrated care*, 6 (4), 1–13.

Article 2: Nøkleberg, Martin (2020). Examining the how of Plural Policing: Moving from Normative Debate to Empirical Enquiry. *British Journal of Criminology*, 60 (3), 681–702.

Article 3: Nøkleberg, Martin (forthcoming). Expecting the Exceptional in the Everyday: Policing Global Transportation Hubs. *Security Dialogue*.

Expecting the Exceptional in the Everyday: Policing Global Transportation Hubs

Martin Nøkleberg

Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Postboks 6706 St. Olavs plass 0130 OSLO, +4722850116, martin.nokleberg@jus.uio.no, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4879-6100

Abstract:

The notion of exceptionality has sparked considerable scholarly interest regarding how and under what conditions extraordinary powers and measures are justified in the name of security. The security discourse of exceptional threats is now omnipresent in the aviation and maritime industries, and has influenced the everyday working environment. Taking Norwegian airport and port security as its point of departure, this article analyzes how security and policing agencies perceive, experience and respond to the exceptional as part of their everyday practice. Drawing on extensive interview material with security agencies, it reveals how agencies construct strategies to cope with the consequences of exceptionality that arise from heightened (in)security and vulnerability. The article demonstrates that the instrumental logic in risk management is one crucial strategy, but that evidence also reveals the importance of the human dimension of security practices, as the emotional aspect of security consciousness is a part of the everyday life of security agencies. Closely associated with this is the emergence of mechanisms of active resistance that provide excitement and alleviate boredom.

Keywords: Everyday security, exceptional, risk, airports and ports, plural policing

Introduction

In recent decades, it has become fashionable in the security and policing literature to examine security projects, to assess how measures are implemented and justified in the name of security. There is now a voluminous literature addressing aspects of the processes of 'governing through security' (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009; Krahmann, 2003; Valverde, 2001; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Justification in the name of security often entails giving 'license to exceptional measures that might otherwise appear indefensible' (Zedner, 2003: 158) – measures which might conflict with democratic values. This resembles the works of Carl Schmitt (2005 [1922]) and more recently Agamben (2005) on states of exception, where the rule of law is suspended to make way for extraordinary measures. There has been lively discussion of the notion of exception in the field of international studies (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Huysmans, 2008). Critical security studies have explored how certain issues depart from 'normal politics'. Theorists of the Copenhagen School generally conceptualize this trend as a process of securitization, whereby ever more issues are framed as 'security', thus legitimizing the use of extraordinary or exceptional measures (Buzan et al., 1998).

However, arguments have developed for moving attention from 'spectacular' and 'exceptional' events to the mundane, *everyday nature* of security (Bigo, 2006b; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016), the everyday referring to individuals' and groups' lived experience of security projects, and the quotidian actions involved in the construction of security. As elaborated in the next section, the everyday and the vernacular have increasingly been embraced in the international field (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; Guillaume and Huysmans, 2019), to obtain a conceptual and analytical focus on constructions and experiences of international politics and (in)security beyond those of elites (Huysmans, 2009).

The present article seeks to engage with the debates on exceptionality and the everyday by drawing attention to organizations' (lived) experience of security projects within aviation and maritime security. Under the influence of 'war on terror' discourse, the contemporary security landscape of airports and ports seems to be operating under constant threats of an exceptional nature, with a minimal margin for error, because the potential consequences are so significant. The sectors are thus affected by emotional responses, such as uncertainty, fear and anxiety, felt by passengers, customers, and employees. It has been noted that the security discourse of exceptional threats post 9/11 continues to influence agencies' working environment. This is

particularly evident in their stringent regulations, risk management systems, enhanced security checks and controls, surveillance technologies, recruiting and training procedures, and international auditing systems to ensure compliance (Brewer, 2014; Eski, 2016a; Jore and Njå, 2012; Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015; Salter, 2007, 2008b). This line of inquiry also underlines how security agencies may sometimes feel security regimes to be meaningless (Eski, 2016b; Olsvik, 2015). There is now some understanding of how agencies respond to feelings of meaninglessness (e.g. with frustration or risk management), but how they cope with the consequences of exceptionality in their everyday is still under-developed, both empirically and conceptually.

This article, therefore, takes the case of Norwegian airport and port security to investigate how agencies experience the exceptional in their everyday security practice; the aim is to shed light on how they feel about it, interpret it and respond to it. Building upon the literature at the intersection of the exceptional and the everyday, the article suggests that 'everyday security consciousness' can help unpack how agencies construct strategies to cope with the consequences of exceptionality and reduce the level of uncertainty. While an instrumental logic emphasizing risk management and the tangible has been deemed indispensable to mitigating risk (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Salter, 2007), the human aspect of security practices – where emotional dimensions of security consciousness and the performance of security are crucial parts of everyday life – signify a shift in attention to '"the subjectivity of the state being" – the embodied experiences' (Schoch-Spana, 2004: 8) of security agencies. As emotions play an important role in how we experience and respond to security measures (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016), paying attention to everyday security consciousness is crucial, as this provides detailed empirical descriptions of the micro-practices or micro-politics of (in)security, which tend to receive little scholarly attention (Bigo, 2006b; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016). Thus, the article's salience lies in its development of our understanding of security governance and risk management at transportation hubs, providing particular insight into the embodied and emotional experience of security and risk in face of exceptionality that agencies respond to and develop strategies to cope with in their everyday practice.

Thinking of the Everyday in Exceptional Times

The connection between the everyday and the international has been attracting ever more scholarly interest in the field of international relations. As is argued by Guillaume and

Huysmans (2019), to claim a turn to the everyday would overstate the case, as antecedents can be traced back to feminist contributions in IR and security studies, which have long 'stressed the importance of the mundane, routine and quotidian aspects of daily life' (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2017: 22). Nonetheless, the everyday as a category of analysis has gained traction, alongside vernacular security studies. What defines the everyday, as Crane-Seeber (2011: 450) suggests, 'is the extent to which it is unremarkable, taken-for-granted, or ostensibly natural'. The everyday and vernacular dimension of security is seemingly connected with understanding the construction, experience and articulation of (in)security by particular (ordinary) individuals and groups (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016). The ontologies of security can thus be understood differently by different people and change across time and place (Bubandt, 2005; Floyd, 2007).

The analytical lens of the everyday has opened the way to exploring new areas of the international and made possible new interpretations of central ideas and phenomena. The everyday thus serves as 'an important tool to understand the international as a practice and a process' (Guillaume, 2011a: 446) and helps in 'navigating security from the bottom up' (Eschle, 2018: 290). Although focusing on everyday activities breaks with traditional imageries of the international as the 'realm of exceptional events' (Guillaume, 2011b: 459), it is possible to identify instances in which the exceptional becomes routine – an everyday occurrence (Crane-Seeber, 2011). Increasing numbers of studies highlight how the exceptional may become normalized and permanent (Salter, 2008c; van Munster, 2004), thus potentially influencing the everyday, as seems to be the case in aviation and maritime security. The normalization of exceptional measures affects ever more areas of society and the everyday practice of people and agencies, as regards, for example, the border (Amante, 2019; Salter, 2008c), technology and surveillance (Douglas, 2009), and counterterrorism (Bogain, 2017).

These studies have significantly deepened our understanding of the processes of exceptionality and the everyday, and have sparked conceptual discussion and exploration of the relationships between exceptionalism, sovereignty and security (see e.g. Aradau and van Munster, 2009; Burles, 2016; Murphy, 2019). In securitization theory, studies underscore 'the importance of the audience in the construction of shared security values and its active engagement in securitization processes' (Côté, 2016: 554). Similarly, focusing on individuals' or groups' construction and experience of (in)security in the everyday seems particularly productive when unpacking security practices. This article suggests that exploring the

mundane daily routines of security agencies, against a background of exceptionality, can result in conceptual advances, even though these organizations are made up of 'those in power or those who represent power' (Sausdal, 2017: 228).

Contextualizing and Researching Norwegian Aviation and Maritime Security

The heightened (in)security facing contemporary global transportation hubs makes airports and maritime ports ideal sites for investigating how security agencies experience and cope with exceptionality in their everyday. The exceptionality of airport and port security does not necessarily involve an Agambenian suspension of the law, but rather implies the constant presence of serious threats to such critical infrastructures, which have led to the implementation of comprehensive and stringent security measures. Airports and ports in Norway, as elsewhere, are subject to intensified policing and regulation, and are entangled in a complex web of international treaties and national and local regulation (Lindøe and Kringen, 2015; Olsvik, 2015; Salter, 2008b).

Although risk has long been associated with the aviation and maritime industries (Brewer, 2014), the events of 9/11 are generally considered the crucial turning point for security practice. In a sense, regulatory frameworks seem to foster exceptionality, in that regulation is considered 'archetypal War on Terror legislation' (Eski, 2016b) and protection against terrorism the primary concern (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). Terrorism risk discourse changed Norwegian aviation security from a national concern to a supranational issue (Jore and Njå, 2012). Moreover, responses to the attacks have had a major impact on the working environments of aviation and maritime actors and governmental agencies. Airports and ports are therefore often considered test beds for new security measures and technologies. It has been observed that security regulations introduced after 9/11 influenced and, in fact, hampered communication and information sharing between Norwegian civil aviation actors (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). It has also been shown that both management and frontline workers in Norwegian airports experienced a significant degree of constraint because of security regulations. In particular, as highlighted by Olsvik (2015), aviation actors' room for maneuver was greatly limited by the rigorousness of EU regulation, which increased standardization and the level of detail prescribed for procedures and was therefore perceived as inappropriate for local contexts. This meant the regulation and practices were considered by employees to be illogical and unreasonable, and sometimes made them feel their work was pointless (Jore and Njå, 2012; Olsvik, 2015; Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015). In Norwegian

maritime security governance too, there seems to be a similar level of standardization and rigor (Ørbeck, 2009), causing similar frustrations, as studies of Norwegian maritime safety culture suggest that the regulation may arouse opposition and resentment of the increased load of paperwork (Oltedal, 2011).

By engaging with this literature, whose empirical and conceptual approaches are very similar (in particular those of Olsvik), the present study seeks to move on from existing accounts to shed more light on how security agencies experience and respond to exceptionality in their everyday practice. Its empirical materials are drawn from qualitative in-depth interviews with key representatives of organizations involved in security at Oslo airport, the Port of Stavanger and the Port of Kristiansand. Interviewees represent the full spectrum of security agencies, including the police, governmental organizations (e.g. the Ministry of Transport and Communications), regulatory authorities (e.g. the Norwegian Coastal Administration), customs, publicly-owned companies, private security companies, and business or industry stakeholders (e.g. airlines, shipping companies). Some agencies, such as the police, regarded security as their primary responsibility, while for others (e.g. customs, industry stakeholders) it was one concern among others. All agencies, however, were considered to possess experience and knowledge relevant to the research question. Interviewees included management and frontline workers, which enabled there to be a thorough mapping of various agencies' experience and practice of everyday security in Norwegian ports and airports. Seventy-six interviews were carried out between 2015 and 2017.

In the semi-structured interviews, participants were asked to describe their experience of working with the production and delivery of security. They were asked about activities such as exercises, risk assessments, patrols and inspections, about the impact of the regulatory framework, and about their experience of collaboration and involvement in security networks. The open-ended nature of the interviews enable them to go into detail about events they considered as significant. Interviewees frequently made use of the language of security, risk, exceptional threat and mundane events to describe their work.

Interviews generally lasted between one and two hours, and were recorded and transcribed. To ensure accuracy and that no sensitive information was released, interviewees were given the opportunity to read and approve the transcripts. To facilitate analysis, the principles of thematic analysis were used (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Nowell et al., 2017). The first step was to get familiar with the data by reading and re-reading transcripts and developing initial

codes. Analytical categories and themes were then identified inductively from the data. However, the codes were undoubtedly influenced by my familiarity with security and policing literature. The themes identified were therefore revised in light of the conceptual framework set out above. The analysis aimed to identify overarching themes pertaining to agencies' experiences of security practices, and to provide rich descriptions of how they construct and make sense of security in their everyday work. The quotations used have been selected for their informative value, and the analysis was facilitated by NVivo 11.

Analysis of the empirical materials identified four overarching themes, which are addressed below: (1) risk and instrumental logic; (2) militarization; (3) the human factor and (4) the performance of security. By examining how actors construct, think about, and make sense of security practices, the aim is to gain a better understanding of how agencies construct strategies to cope with the consequences of exceptionality.

The Instrumental Logic and the Embodied Experience of Risk and Uncertainty

As noted, airports and ports can face threats with potentially devastating consequences and this is a cause of uncertainty, fear, and anxiety. However, it is not only passengers who suffer the feeling of uncertainty. Several interviewees describe how employees experience unease and anxiety when working in places where serious threats are part of everyday life. One airline security manager says that many frontline employees feel insecure and anxious, especially at times of heightened (in)security or changes in the risk landscape:

> What we want from the police, and this is something we mention if the security level has been raised and they've been here fully armed… I wish they could say something, not necessarily in advance, but when you have 50 employees in the terminal, frightened and wondering what's going on. I do, of course, understand that they can't tell me what 'object' they're looking for. But if they could just give us notice, then we could mitigate the situation, tell them it's safe and it's not dangerous. (Interview 8)

Airport customs officers express similar feelings, mentioning that uncertainty has resulted in a requirement for all uniformed personnel moving outside security restricted areas to wear bulletproof or stab vests. One official notes: 'When you are in uniform, it is visible to the whole world that you're a Norwegian public servant, and this can represent a risk' (Interview 1). The terrorist attacks that struck European cities and transportation hubs in 2015 and 2016

may be seen as catalysts for the heightened security measures described here and contributors to the feelings of uncertainty. However, aviation and maritime security procedures have always been reactive in that they respond to previous attacks (Olsvik, 2015), suggesting that these descriptions of the embodiment of uncertainties make clear that they are prominent aspects of their everyday security practice, and that they also inform the strong war on terror discourse of the regulatory framework.

Given that policing and security agencies at airports and ports face risks, uncertainties and (in)securities, they need to develop strategies to cope with them in their everyday lives. As one port facility security officer (PFSO) puts it:

> You have to be cynical in a way, it's impossible to have complete control and be absolutely certain in the current environment and definitely not sustainable in the long run. You can't do it! So, what you've got to do, then, is to just accept a certain level of uncertainty and figure out how to work around it. (Interview 9)

Previous studies have pointed to the proliferation of risk-based strategies in aviation and maritime security, particularly in the post 9/11 security regulatory environment (Eski and Carpenter, 2013; Salter, 2007, 2008a). One interviewee from the aviation regulatory authority says: 'Security legislation is risk management. It is not about eliminating risk but managing risk to an acceptable political standard' (Interview 24). Thus, one salient aspect of the agencies' approach to the consequences of exceptionality is closely bound up with the notion of risk – they seek to manage the embodied experience of uncertainty and risk by relying on what can be characterized as instrumental logic. Central to this is the view that risk and uncertainty should be met by 'formalized and objective' responses or attitudes, to make the situation more tangible and less unpredictable. The focus is on future-oriented strategies based on a sequence of risk, anticipation, and prevention – strategies that are generally reliant upon instrumental calculations and techniques intended to prevent or reduce crime, danger, and risk (McCulloch and Wilson, 2016).

In line with this, several interviewees describe the importance of utilizing risk assessment techniques to deal with security threats. The use of the notions of risk and risk management are portrayed as new ways of thinking of security, as one airport employee notes:

> This is a somewhat new regime that breaks with how we used to work in the past. Previously you could say 'We're doing this or that' but it was just based on our gut feeling. Now there are requirements to produce risk assessments to highlight what the actual risk is to us, to show what threat we are going to fight, and what the probabilities are that something will go wrong if we decide to do nothing. Instead of adding layer upon layer in the regulations, we can now focus our attention. So, to avoid spending time and money on obsolete issues, we actively use analysis to improve our work. (Interview 19)

The quote recognizes a break with the past through more standardized procedures and also indicates that risk analysis is thought to help give direction to agencies' everyday security practice and provide a more rational foundation for decision-making. It has been suggested that risk management 'renders the imaginary as real' (Salter, 2008a: 244), as future threats are generally unknown and difficult to calculate (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015), and exist in the imaginations of management and security experts. This process has been described as 'ghost hunting' in a post 9/11 security environment (Eski, 2016b). It can be difficult to cope with the unease caused by (imagined) threats, and agencies strive to reduce it. Agencies clearly believe in the effectiveness of the risk-based approach, as this interviewee makes clear: 'I have heard of risk-based audit (RBA) since I started working here. And everyone was like "when we get RBA in place, it will solve everything"' (Interview 25).

The extensive use of the language of risk and risk assessment by interviewees indicates another aspect of instrumental logic. That is, the uncertainties and risks of the exceptional nature of aviation and maritime security are transformed into something considered manageable and measurable by being made part of a balancing game in which the most objectively 'correct' measures can be implemented. The words of a PFSO vividly illustrate this:

> Yes, we conduct risk and cost-benefit security analyses. We are very committed to doing analyses of almost everything we do. And it is clear… well, when you do an analysis you have to clarify what you are going to secure against, you need to have a stated objective and know the risks you are facing. For instance, do you need a vehicle barrier or to implement some other measure? Then you need to analyze the situation and calculate and weigh the risk against the threat that you may be exposed to. (Interview 9)

The notion of balancing suggests that risk calculation may become an important tool in the management of security. In the security literature there are debates on the use of probability judgments in risk assessments (Amundrud et al., 2017; Askeland et al., 2017; Aven, 2013), particularly those expressed in quantitative terms.

Some agencies do indeed use language indicating a degree of quantification. Thus one customs manager says: 'We need to build a good knowledge-base, and to do this we rely on various risk analyses. We can then create a top ten list. There are, of course, more than ten items. But what you make is a system for ranking risk and objects' (Interview 1). Even so, these judgments of risk seem to rely upon qualitative approaches, which others have called knowledge-based probabilities (Aven, 2013). The Norwegian police increasingly rely on intelligence-led policing strategies, as can be seen in its implementation of the 2014 intelligence doctrine (National Police Directorate, 2014), in which preemptive and future-oriented strategies are considered vital for identifying and predicting changes in the crime challenges. As this police officer describes:

> One saw the need for increased intelligence, the ability to predict events based on information. (…) The tools provided by intelligence-led policing have given us an advantage, we can now observe changes in trends, or discover new developments. Let's say we observe a change in passenger flow, more flights from 'high risk' countries for drug smuggling or illegal migration, we can then capture and predict these trends much faster and change our routines and prevent crime. (Interview 2)

Inherent in this approach to predicting the future is the assumption that the use of intelligence will lead to better-targeted responses, which will enable the police to prevent or reduce crime and reduce uncertainty in decision-making. Both public and private agencies say they are interested in police intelligence, which interviewees think can improve risk analysis products and security responses. Such intelligence and strategic information, however, are known to be hard to obtain, because of sectoral allegiance in information exchanges (Nøkleberg, 2019).

So then, although not relying on the frequentist understanding of probability, agencies assess the likelihood of events in their risk analyses. As Askeland, Flage and Aven (2017) point out, subjective interpretation of probabilities can be useful: one is 'not searching for the "correct" or "true" probabilities but use[ing] probability to express uncertainties and degrees of belief' (Askeland et al., 2017: 202). The results of risk analysis cannot 'be considered a "truth

product", but rather the best assessment at the time' (Gundhus and Jansen, 2019: 95). Using likelihood and subjective probabilities is assumed to enable agencies to rank targets, threats, and security measures, in terms of seriousness, giving them a rational foundation for decision-making and resource allocation.

The instrumental logic has various consequences. Exceptionality, perhaps surprisingly, leads to bureaucratization. Jore (2019) notes that bureaucratization and standardization have become features of security, as is confirmed by interviewees who say that the demand for documentation – part of the stringent post 9/11 security regulations – has increased significantly in agencies' everyday work, particularly as regards the drafting of risk analyses. An interviewee working in airport security notes:

> There are now stricter requirements for documentation, and with that goes a
> need to consider and explain how certain risks influence us. One has to
> consider and explain why we do things the way we do. (Interview 21).

Growing bureaucratization may be seen in various sectors (Olsen, 2008), but is particularly apparent in aviation and shipping, which are preoccupied with security and risk. The instrumental logic increasingly demands that agencies document how they handle security (Jore, 2019), which means they spend more time on producing and preparing plans, procedures, and reports on security matters. Bureaucratization can also become a strategy for coping with the uncertainty associated with exceptionality, as formalization through documents provides guidance in emergencies. It also means uncertainty can be made into something more tangible and manageable. Some agencies, however, raise questions about the difference between theory and practice, as this interviewee makes clear:

> We often discuss the ISPS, the management level does too. And we write a lot
> of plans and stuff like that, but I would say that everyday life remains more or
> less the same. You don't see that many changes in our work. So, yes, it looks
> much better on paper than it really is. (Interview 4)

This is particularly apparent in the role of documentation in the interface between operators and the regulatory authorities. Faced with increasing demands, agencies may find themselves overwhelmed by a mass of paperwork, the same phenomenon was reported by Eski and Carpenter (2013). Bureaucratization becomes seen as a 'box-ticking exercise' (Interview 13). If a security incident occurs, an agency can provide documentation that everything was done

according to the regulations. Some interviewees point out that problems with the amount of paperwork can arise if an event takes place. One interviewee gives a good idea of the situation: 'So many documents have been written, and I must say, I think hardly anyone knows them by heart. You simply can't, there's too much' (Interview 4). Bureaucratization may therefore cause considerable frustration and tension within and between agencies – it has been shown that collaborative processes in plural policing may involve conflict (Crawford, 1997; Nøkleberg, 2019). The increasing demand for documentation of work behavior can be a major source of structural conflict.

Militarization and the Objectification of Security

The relation between risk and security creates a peculiar outcome, as is noted by Salter (2008a: 252), with the language of risk being used to justify the expansion of security rather than to resolve or reduce risk – considerable resources are devoted, not to circumventing risk, but to framing ever more practices or activities as matters of security. At Oslo airport, for instance, as numerous interviewees describe, significant investment has been made to build physical barriers to secure critical objects close to the terminal building and within the terminal itself. Similarly, following the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS) in 2004, ports are now closed environments with perimeter fencing. The focus on barriers indicates that, for many port and airport policing agencies, managing risk and uncertainty is all about physical security, as one interviewee makes clear: 'For us, security is about physical barriers, that is what talked about in the Security Act and Regulation' (Interview 17). Physical security measures are designed to protect people and assets, deny unauthorized access, and slow down adversaries. However, given the nature of exceptionality, the attention given to the physical has another a further explanation. When facing unknown, unpredictable threats, policing agencies direct their attention to visible, tangible and measurable phenomena, in an attempt to manage uncertainty.

Many interviewees describe the tangible nature of their everyday security practices. Focusing on physical security, they give detailed, highly technical descriptions of what are considered threats or vulnerabilities and of how they can be mitigated. There is a strong tendency to adopt militarized language. Thus in interview 19 quoted above there is the phrase: 'to show what threat we are going to fight'. Two other interviewees speak in similar terms: 'There are stricter requirements concerning timely detection and implementing countermeasures, so one must have adequate solid barriers; it is about target hardening' (Interview 20) and 'You need

proper assessments, and then to take action to eliminate or fight the risk' (Interview 10). As threats become increasingly transnational, a growing body of literature detects a blurring of the internal and external domains of security, whereby policing tasks are militarized (Bigo, 2006a; Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009; Loader and Percy, 2012; Schroeder, 2011; Weiss, 2011). The aviation and maritime industries have seen the proliferation of complex challenges, such as transnational organized crime, irregular migration, and global terrorism. In the 'war on terror', the practices and regulatory regime of aviation and maritime security are affected by transboundary threats. Technical and militarized language is employed to manage the uncertainty agencies may be experiencing, and to provide a 'cloak of objectivity' (Salter, 2008a: 254) in the discussion and implementation of security practices.

It is not only in language that tendencies to militarization can be seen. In the aviation and maritime industries, training and exercises are viewed as important security practices. They have been made mandatory by national and international regulation, and many interviewees describe them as necessary, and helpful for acquiring new skills, knowledge and experience. Exercises are designed to test measures and frameworks that have been implemented, including security plans and procedures, and to scrutinize organizational performance (e.g. communication and collaboration). Also, in the words of one waterfront PFSO: '[They are] about preparing us for reality' (Interview 11). However, although exercises are considered valuable, many still question their usefulness in their current form. This seems to be largely because of the constant call to prepare for exceptional threats and events, often in terms of a war on terror metaphor. Thus one interviewee says:

> When I think about the last large-scale exercise and its scope, then it is obvious it wasn't relevant to us, and maybe not that relevant to anyone really. The exercise was complete overkill, it wasn't realistic at all. Because events were happening all over the place, basically it became a military attack. What I mean is that… if we had been even close to something like that, then the port would have been shut down long before. So you can certainly question the point of it, like why make it so 'spectacular' and unrealistic. (Interview 12)

Others argue that, once the police and military are involved, one is already a long way into a scenario, and 'by that time, it is a bit too late, as a lot has already happened' (Interview 18). These respondents share reservations about the war on terror discourse now prevalent in airports and ports. Although learning and awareness are viewed as valuable outcomes, the

militarized focus on terrorism may reduce interest in participating in exercises and the general understanding of why security is important, because the focus is not on what the agencies perceive as the real problems, which others have framed as decontextualized and inappropriate threat scenarios (Olsvik, 2015). There is, of course, agreement that the threat of terrorism is real and should be given priority, but mundane problems (e.g. stowaways, theft, disorder) that face agencies in their everyday lives are displaced by the spectacular and the exceptional.

The Human Factor: Security Consciousness and Resources

Although the instrumental logic of (in)security is prominent in Norwegian airports and ports, agencies recognize that more is needed than risk analyses and the tangible and measurable to cope with embodied uncertainty. The views of two interviewees are telling: 'The ISPS fence is no Berlin wall' (Interview 3), and 'You can invest in the fanciest security measures there are, but unless you get your employees with you and they understand, you might as well leave the gates open' (Interview 14). There is consensus about the importance of the human factor, because the role individuals play in the delivery of security is critical. Certain human characteristics are crucial to coping with the consequences of exceptionality in the contemporary risk landscape of airports and ports. Analysis suggests that the most important of these are security consciousness and individuals' roles as resources. Although the two overlap and are interdependent, they can be distinguished and it makes sense to treat them separately.

When dealing with the exceptional character of everyday practice, a key strategy is to develop security consciousness – making organizations and their employees understand how to work in security and why the security practices adopted are important, as is pointed out in the above quote. The analysis also shows that good security practices are dependent on creating this consciousness, as without it there would be no point in adopting any of the tangible security measures. This accords with previous studies on the interaction between security technologies and human capacity (Schwaninger, 2006), which show that the technology is only as good as the individuals operating it. Security consciousness may mean individuals have more knowledge and competence, and will accept measures which help reduce feelings of uncertainty.

Given the perceived importance of security awareness, it is important to know how security agencies can stimulate interest in it. The regulators of aviation and maritime security set forth

influential guidelines in legislation, but strategies for developing awareness are also presented by experts at annual workshops and in newsletters and reports. It is clear that interviewees find these useful. However, agencies emphasize that security consciousness is not something one gains mainly through documents – it has to be learned through practical experience, as one interviewee articulates:

> It is basically that everyone must think about the security culture, that it is in their blood. This is not something you can accumulate or learn by reading. No, what you need is the right attitude, established and shaped through experience. (Interview 11)

The narrative offered by the interviewees also shows that developing security consciousness to help cope with the consequences of exceptionality is not solely the responsibility of agencies directly involved in security (e.g. security managers, police), but also encompasses more peripheral agencies and individuals (in airports it can include handling, catering, or fuel). Security consciousness thus seems to relate to the Foucauldian-inspired concept of responsibilization developed in the governmentality literature on risk and terrorism (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Garland, 2001; Mythen and Walklate, 2008), whereby individuals are made responsible for tasks formerly carried out by state institutions. This interviewee gives a clear description:

> You need to explain why we work in security, what all the fuss is about, what we are protecting, and most importantly, make clear how you can and must be part of it yourself. So, we strive to make our employees aware and observant, keeping their eyes and ears open, in a sense. As security is not solely the responsibility of the [private security company], we are all part of it, and we need to make sure we play our part. (Interview 15)

However, this way of doing and thinking security may also relate to the total defense approach that characterized the Scandinavian countries during the Cold War (Larsson, 2020; Morsut, 2020), so this may not be a new way of viewing security. The total defense had two pillars – military defense and civilian preparedness – to be mobilized in a crisis (Morsut, 2020). It seems, therefore, more appropriate to consider responsibilization in aviation and maritime security as building on this approach and as being a modern version of it.

Agencies need to play their part in establishing security consciousness, with the second key contribution being that of individuals understood as significant resources for dealing with the exceptional becoming part of everyday life. The phrase 'eyes and ears' suggests the potential for collaborative effort in plural policing and security settings (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Nøkleberg, 2016). The efficiency of the security governance system can be improved increasing the number of people thinking and acting in accordance with a proper security consciousness, as more information can be collected and more incidents reported.

Viewing individuals as resources involves more than just increasing the number of people in the field:

> This is related to culture, right. That is why the most important barrier one can have is one's own employees, because they are the first to notice if there is anything unusual. People working down at the dock are much quicker to spot someone or something than those sitting inside with cameras and such. And you know, this tangible security we are talking about… it's one thing to be met by signs saying 'restricted area', gates and fences with barbed wire, and guards. But I mean, when you're inside the port and you meet someone saying: 'hey, where is your ID, have I seen you before, where are you going?'. That's way more effective at preventing and securing. (Interview 14)

This clearly shows that security personnel are considered significant resources. The mundane activity of asking questions can have considerable security impact. Despite the instrumental focus on the tangible and measurable, contemporary security practices may obviously entail several things, and vary according to the situation (Bubandt, 2005). The view just quoted, echoed by several other interviewees, is that viewing individuals as a resource may be more effective than approaches based on the instrumental perspective. A private security guard working at the airport agrees: 'For me, it is not the equipment, it is the people. So we call it "security delivered by people". That's what it is about, clearly. So you need to develop your consciousness, to get a good security culture' (Interview 16).

There is a strong feeling that the human factor is, in many ways, more important than the instrumental logic. This is particularly evident in the way observing the unusual is spoken about – exemplified by this security airport operator, for example: 'For us this means that you're thinking while you're examining your surroundings. That you look for the abnormal' (Interview 22). Employees agree that it is individuals who possess the ability and knowledge

to identify it. Most importantly, as interviewees say, individuals need to be focused and alert, with an ability to assess what they see, and decide if something is out of the ordinary. One can see here the interdependence between perceiving individuals as resources and security consciousness, as developing the latter can foster individual skills.

The perceived importance of establishing everyday security consciousness for governance systems contrasts with the responses of security personnel to the meaninglessness described by Olsvik (2015), one of which was to stop thinking, reflecting or evaluating. Even so, a few interviewees report issues, which somewhat resemble attitudes found in Olsvik's study:

> Let us say that this scenario was not described in our security plan. What do you do? 'Well, if it is not described, then I do not need to report the incident.' Okay? This is, of course, not how we want it. I mean, this takes away their capacity to think for themselves, and you end up doing nothing. That is the downside if the regulation gets too detailed, you deprive people of the opportunity to think. I would not necessarily call it overkill, but maybe the regulation should not be so detailed in certain areas (Interview 9).

This quote identifies a crucial issue concerning the human aspect of coping with exceptionality – the ability of individuals to think and make judgments is considered a decisive factor in the efficiency and success of security governance. Bureaucratization resulting from the instrumental logic may, in fact, be an impediment to security agencies. Since many regard the human factor as more important than the instrumental perspective, it results in frustration and strain, as the instrumental approach is widespread in airport and maritime security.

It is not surprising that instrumental logic predominates, given how the regulatory regimes of aviation and maritime security are structured. These frameworks enable the logic to flourish as a response to exceptionality when the war on terror discourse is prevalent. Security expert panels (Salter, 2008a) seem to favor the visible and measurable, and direct attention to them. There is a perceptible difference of interest between the organizational level, where management and regulators emphasize tangible measures, and frontline (security) personnel, who value the potential of human beings. Excessive focus on the instrumental causes frustration (Pettersen and Bjørnskau, 2015), as is reported by the interviewees, and may result in what has been called 'the war on meaninglessness' (Eski, 2016b). In response to this,

security agencies have developed various strategies to counter the sense of meaninglessness and frustration, and these will be explored in the next section.

The Performance of Security: Ridicule and Lack of Interest

In the previous sections, the instrumental perspective was shown to be central to governing risk and uncertainty in the face of exceptionality in everyday practice. As there are differences between organizational levels, respondents stress that, to fulfill their role in the security governance system, frontline workers need to satisfy the desire of management and the regulator for the instrumental. It therefore seems that a performance of security is often put in place. This is how one interviewee perceives the situation:

> Since management both say this is so important and act as if it is, then it seems like we must believe it too. But we do not always see the point of all the fuss that is made. Of course, we know the threat of terrorism should be in our minds. But if there is too much focus on the visible, then we feel we lose sight of other important things. (Interview 23)

This quote shows that individuals may experience contradictory impulses regarding their interpretation and delivery of security, which can affect interaction both internally, between organizational levels, and with external agencies. Because of the perceived need to perform security and live up to expectations concerning the exceptional, war on terror discourse is often applied to events, irrespective of how serious they are. This may increase the importance of exceptionality, as one PFSO says:

> The reporting of incidents varies, what I mean is that it varies according to when the incident takes place. Let us say, and this has happened, we have an incident when there isn't that much going on, when we are not busy. Someone finds a hole in the fence, and then a big deal is made of it, the police are notified. In fact, it has happened that they have come here to help us see what may have caused it. (Interview 4)

This suggests that agencies seek to create excitement to alleviate their occupational boredom, and kill time in the absence of 'real' threats (Eski, 2016b). In the context of the exceptional nature of airport and maritime security, this approach to performing security seems to be connected to pressure to live up to the expectations of others.

Several interviewees also report that technical and militarized language, which is characteristic of the instrumental perspective, is not always considered appropriate. They feel the language used needs to be more 'balanced as part of an educational approach' as one interviewee puts it. This implies that site-specific issues (e.g. theft, stowaways, unruly passengers) should also be considered important. Although a balanced approach is considered crucial to stimulate interest and security consciousness, agencies' performance of security often seems to work against this. An interviewee's description of a security exercise is telling:

> Some of our employees were very keen, so they were allowed to pretend to be terrorists and were sent to one of the facilities. They caused utter mayhem with smoke bombs on one side and then they jumped the fence. We totally fooled them! Oh, it was so much fun, you should have seen it, all the chaos.
> (Interview 5)

Again, this suggests that agencies, when coping with the exceptional nature of their work, understand the need to meet the demand for the instrumental by utilizing a war on terror rhetoric. It points to the issue of how promoting meaningful work can be balanced with maintaining a level of realism in the governance of security. Lack of realism seems to have fostered the development of mechanisms of resistance in the performance of security. One interviewee describes the lack of interest of some agencies that do not take security work seriously:

> We placed five items and said this was a security incident and you need to find them. Although they were hidden, it was not that difficult to find them. But only two out of the five were retrieved, so one might ask why weren't they all found? It turned out that one of the agencies wasn't very committed. In fact, nobody from it was even out looking. (Interview 6)

This lack of interest relates to the roles and responsibilities agencies have – some are more driven by commercial and business imperatives than by security *per se*. This means active resistance develops, and instrumental measures are ridiculed, as described by one PFSO:

> Of course, having exercises is probably a pain in the ass for some actors, particularly to those focusing on effectiveness and with commercial interests. So, we had one experience where an organization fucked with us. Ha, ha, yes it was hell! So basically, it became an exercise within an exercise, since one guy

> wrote 'bomb' on a package and placed it somewhere in the facility. I was in a meeting with the regulatory authority and we had to cancel the whole exercise, since this wasn't part of the script. Oh fuck, what a circus it was. We got to test our emergency responses, and we drove down immediately and evacuated the area. That was just crazy. (Interview 7)

Such lack of interest and ridiculing of security practices strongly suggest that airport and port policing and security agencies often face serious frustrations in the performance of security. The theatrical elements in the interviewees' stories may be understood as responses to exasperation with an excessive focus on the instrumental logic adopted by many agencies.

Conclusion

Drawing attention to recent theoretical perspectives at the intersection of the exceptional and the everyday, this article offers empirical insights into how Norwegian aviation and maritime security agencies perceive and experience the exceptional as part of their everyday practice of security. It shows how, in the face of heightened (in)security, agencies seek to construct strategies to cope with the consequences of exceptionality. It is argued that, while the instrumental logic continues to play a crucial role, the analysis also points towards the recognition of the human dimension characterized by instinctive everyday security consciousness.

The empirical assessment documents the impact of the exceptional through the embodied experiences of living with seemingly constant risk and uncertainty. As regards the sense of uneasiness that has become part of the everyday life, it is shown that individuals and agencies actively seek to compensate for it by relying on instrumental governing logics and techniques. The findings demonstrate the use of risk management and analysis to render uncertainties manageable and tangible (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). By focusing on 'the *life* of apparatuses of security' (Adey and Anderson, 2012), the article provides insights into the impact of seemingly mundane and quotidian activities. It shows that documents can play a central role in security governance processes and that documentation can both offer reassurance and cause frustration in situations of risk and vulnerability. In parallel with this, there is a tendency towards militarization, particularly in agencies' security exercises. The exercises are influenced by the war on terror discourse prevalent in this field.

However, emphasis on the tangible nature of everyday security is only one aspect, albeit a crucial one, of the coping strategies developed by the security agencies. The evidence presented here shows the importance of what is characterized as the human dimension of security practices. This means that the value of human qualities is recognized when confronting the consequences of exceptionality in the contemporary security landscape. In particular, the study demonstrates how the notion of everyday security consciousness figures in the life of security agencies. Apparently mundane actions, such as asking simple questions to determine or identify risks, can be a decisive factor in the efficacy of governing security. The human factor in coping with exceptionality can therefore be related to governmentality and responsibilization (Mythen and Walklate, 2008), where individuals are viewed as self-governing subjects facing the embodied experiences of risk and uncertainty.

Although considered valuable, elements of the human dimension may be placed under strain and lead to conflict, because some agencies tend to overemphasize the tangible nature of security practices. In this respect, the findings point to the emergence of mechanisms of resistance to such over-emphasis. As part of their emotional response, those delivering security find ways to ridicule and challenge its instrumental governing logic in their performance of security. This article suggests that, although the performance of security serves to provide excitement and alleviate boredom, there is also pressure to go along with the vision of exceptional conditions intrinsic to war on terror discourse.

This study was conducted at a time of heightened (in)security when Europe experienced numerous terror attacks, some of which targeted transportation hubs. This may have contributed to an increased focus on security, risk, and preparedness by agencies and may therefore have affected the findings presented above and raise questions concerning their generalizability. However, the empirical context under scrutiny in this article is governed by comprehensive international regulatory regimes, which are designed to promote harmonized responses across countries (Eski, 2016a; Olsvik, 2015). More importantly, the regulations seek to respond to emerging risk and have over recent years become accustomed to the terrorism risk discourse (Eski, 2016b).

While not undermining the growing scholarly interest in everyday (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016), this article suggests that more critical engagement is needed to refine the theorization of everyday security practices in international spaces. By considering embodied experiences of living with risk, examined through the prism of everyday security

consciousness, one can provide another layer of analysis which stands in contrast to the more traditional legal-theoretical considerations of Schmittian and Agambenian frameworks of exceptionality. Thus, this article shows that exceptionality is not encountered only by elites or within 'the formal world of political discourses' (Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016: 1192). It can also be found by paying attention to everyday realities and 'those mundane relations that are constitutive of society at large' (Acuto, 2014: 347). The analytical lens of everyday (in)security could thus guide further empirically grounded research in other contexts, to enable new aspects of the experience of everyday security practices to be uncovered and to generate a more detailed understanding of the dynamics of governing logics that are practiced and negotiated. Given the desire to achieve international harmonization and standardization in the regulation of aviation and maritime security, similar dynamics of everyday security consciousness can be assumed to be present elsewhere, which suggests the value of comparative studies, but this is an empirical question that remains to be addressed.

References

Abrahamsen R and Williams MC (2009) Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics. *International Political Sociology* 3(1): 1-17.

Acuto M (2014) Everyday International Relations: Garbage, Grand Designs, and Mundane Matters. *International Political Sociology* 8(4): 345-362.

Adey P and Anderson B (2012) Anticipating emergencies: Technologies of preparedness and the matter of security. *Security Dialogue* 43(2): 99-117.

Agamben G (2005) *State of exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Amante MdF (2019) Performing Borders: Exceptions, Security and Symbolism in Portuguese Borders Control. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 34(1): 17-30.

Amundrud Ø, Aven T and Flage R (2017) How the definition of security risk can be made compatible with safety definitions. *Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability* 231(3): 286-294.

Aradau C and van Munster R (2007) Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future. *European Journal of International Relations* 13(1): 89-115.

Aradau C and van Munster R (2009) Exceptionalism and the 'War on Terror': Criminology Meets International Relations. *British Journal of Criminology* 49(5): 686-701.

Askeland T, Flage R and Aven T (2017) Moving beyond probabilities – Strength of knowledge characterisations applied to security. *Reliability Engineering & System Safety* 159: 196-205.

Aven T (2013) Probabilities and background knowledge as a tool to reflect uncertainties in relation to intentional acts. *Reliability Engineering & System Safety* 119: 229-234.

Bigo D (2006a) Internal and External Aspects of Security. *European Security* 15(4): 385-404.

Bigo D (2006b) Security, exception, ban and surveillance. In: Lyon D (ed.) *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 46-68.

Bogain A (2017) Security in the name of human rights: the discursive legitimation strategies of the war on terror in France. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10(3): 476-500.

Braun V and Clarke V (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3(2): 77-101.

Brewer R (2014) *Policing the waterfront: networks, partnerships and the governance of port security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bubandt N (2005) Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds. *Security Dialogue* 36(3): 275-296.

Burles R (2016) Exception and governmentality in the critique of sovereignty. *Security Dialogue* 47(3): 239-254.

Buzan B, de Wilde J and Wæver O (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Côté A (2016) Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory. *Security Dialogue* 47(6): 541-558.

Crane-Seeber J (2011) Everyday Counterinsurgency. *International Political Sociology* 5(4): 450-453.

Crawford A (1997) *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Crawford A and Hutchinson S (2016) Mapping the Contours of 'Everyday Security': Time, Space and Emotion. *British Journal of Criminology* 56(6): 1184-1202.

Croft S and Vaughan-Williams N (2017) Fit for purpose? Fitting ontological security studies 'into' the discipline of International Relations: Towards a vernacular turn. *Cooperation and Conflict* 52(1): 12-30.

Douglas J (2009) Disappearing Citizenship: Surveillance and the State of Exception. *Surveillance & Society* 6(1): 32-42.

Ericson RV and Haggerty KD (1997) *Policing the risk society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Eriksson J and Rhinard M (2009) The Internal—External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda. *Cooperation and Conflict* 44(3): 243-267.

Eschle C (2018) Nuclear (in)security in the everyday: Peace campers as everyday security practitioners. *Security Dialogue* 49(4): 289-305.

Eski Y (2016a) *Policing, Port Security and Crime Control: An Ethnography of the Port Securityscape*. London: Routledge.

Eski Y (2016b) The war on meaninglessness: A counter-terrorist self through an absent terrorist other. *Ethnography* 17(4): 460-479.

Eski Y and Carpenter A (2013) Policing in EU Seaports: Impact of the ISPS Code on Port Security Post 9/11. In: O'Neill M,Swinton K and Winter A (eds) *New Challenges for the EU Internal Security Strategy*. Cambridge Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Floyd R (2007) Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies. *Review of International Studies* 33(2): 327-350.

Garland D (2001) *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Guillaume X (2011a) The International as an Everyday Practice. *International Political Sociology* 5(4): 446-446.

Guillaume X (2011b) Resistance and the International: The Challenge of the Everyday. *International Political Sociology* 5(4): 459-462.

Guillaume X and Huysmans J (2019) The concept of 'the everyday': Ephemeral politics and the abundance of life. *Cooperation and Conflict* 54(2): 278-296.

Gundhus HOI and Jansen PT (2019) Pre-crime and Policing of Migrants: Anticipatory Action Meets Management of Concerns. *Theoretical Criminology* 24(1): 90-109.

Hanrieder T and Kreuder-Sonnen C (2014) WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health. *Security Dialogue* 45(4): 331-348.

Huysmans J (2008) The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society. *International Political Sociology* 2(2): 165-183.

Huysmans J (2009) Conclusion: Insecurity and the everyday. In: Noxolo P and Huysmans J (eds) *Community, Citizenship and the 'War on Terror': Security and Insecurity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Jore SH (2019) Standardization of terrorism risk analysis: A means or an obstacle to achieving security? In: Olsen OE,Juhl KV,Lindøe PH and Engen OA (eds) *Standardization and Risk Governance: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach*. London: Routledge.

Jore SH and Njå O (2012) *The Relation between Terrorism Risk Discourses and Aviation Security*. Paper presented at the 11th. International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference and the Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012, PSAM and ESREL, Helsinki: Curran Associates, 4333-4343.

Krahmann E (2003) Conceptualizing Security Governance. *Cooperation and Conflict* 38(1): 5-26.

Larsson S (2020) Swedish total defence and the emergence of societal security. In: Larsson S and Rhinard M (eds) *Nordic Societal Security: Convergence and Divergence*. London: Routledge.

Lindøe PH and Kringen J (2015) Risk governance of hazardous industrial ports and areas: a case study of industrial areas and harbors in Norway. *Journal of Risk Research* 18(7): 931-946.

Loader I and Percy S (2012) Bringing the 'outside' in and the 'inside' out: crossing the criminology/IR divide. *Global Crime* 13(4): 213-218.

McCulloch J and Wilson D (2016) *Pre-crime: Pre-emption, precaution and the future*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Morsut C (2020) The emergence and development of samfunnssikkerhet in Norway. In: Larsson S and Rhinard M (eds) *Nordic Societal Security: Convergence and Divergence*. London: Routledge.

Murphy MPA (2019) 'The continuation of sovereign capture by other means': biopolitical tattooing and the shared logic of the exception and securitisation. *Critical Studies on Security* 7(1): 34-50.

Mythen G and Walklate S (2008) Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking 'What If?'. *Security Dialogue* 39(2-3): 221-242.

National Police Directorate (2014) *Etteretningsdoktrinen [Intelligence doctrine]*. Oslo: Politidirektoratet.

Nowell LS, Norris JM, White DE and Moules NJ (2017) Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the Trustworthiness Criteria. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 16(1): 1609406917733847.

Nøkleberg M (2016) Security Governance – An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Context. *Nordisk politiforskning* 3(01).

Nøkleberg M (2019) The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing. *Policing and Society*: 1-17.

Olsen JP (2008) The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1): 13-37.

Olsvik EA (2015) *Challenges of Aviation Security regulation in Norway post 9/11*. PhD. Stavanger: University of Stavanger.

Oltedal HA (2011) *Safety culture and safety management within the Norwegian-controlled shipping industry: State of art, interrelationships, and influencing factors*. PhD. Stavanger: University of Stavanger.

Pettersen KA and Bjørnskau T (2015) Organizational contradictions between safety and security – Perceived challenges and ways of integrating critical infrastructure protection in civil aviation. *Safety Science* 71: 167-177.

Salter MB (2007) SeMS and sensibility: Security management systems and the management of risk in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. *Journal of Air Transport Management* 13(6): 389-398.

Salter MB (2008a) Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security. *Security Dialogue* 39(2-3): 243-266.

Salter MB (ed.) (2008b) *Politics at the airport*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Salter MB (2008c) When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship. *Citizenship Studies* 12(4): 365-380.

Sausdal D (2017) Pleasures of policing: An additional analysis of xenophobia. *Theoretical Criminology* 22(2): 226-242.

Schmitt C (2005 [1922]) *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schoch-Spana M (2004) Bioterrorism: US public health and a secular apocalypse. *Anthropology Today* 20(5): 8-13.

Schroeder UC (2011) *The Organization of European Security Governance: Internal and External Security in Transition*. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.

Schwaninger A (2006) *Airport security human factors: From the weakest to the strongest link in airport security screening*. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 4th International Aviation Security Technology Symposium.

Valverde M (2001) Governing Security, Governing Through Security. In: Daniels RJ, Macklem P and Roach K (eds) *The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

van Munster R (2004) The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule. *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 17(2): 141-153.

Vaughan-Williams N and Stevens D (2016) Vernacular theories of everyday (in)security: The disruptive potential of non-elite knowledge. *Security Dialogue* 47(1): 40-58.

Weiss T (2011) The blurring border between the police and the military. *Cooperation and Conflict* 46(3): 396-405.

Wood J and Shearing C (2007) *Imagining security*. Portland: Willan.

Zedner L (2003) The concept of security: an agenda for comparative analysis. *Legal Studies* 23(1): 153-175.

Ørbeck E (2009) Implementation of the ISPS Code in Norwegian Ports. In: Shahbazian E, Rogova G and DeWeert MJ (eds) *Harbour Protection Through Data Fusion Technologies*. Dordrecht: Springer, 7-12.

Interviews cited

1. Customs, 02.11.2016.
2. Police, 01.12.2016.
3. Police, 15.06.2017.
4. Port authority, 08.05.2017.
5. Port authority, 08.02.2017.
6. Port authority, 08.05.2017.
7. Port authority, 08.02.2017.
8. Private business, 25.09.2017.
9. Private business, 10.05.2017.
10. Private business, 11.05.2017.
11. Private business, 22.05.2017.
12. Private business, 23.05.2017.
13. Private business, 09.02.2017.
14. Private business, 08.05.2017.
15. Private business, 25.09.2017.
16. Private business, 25.09.2017.
17. Public agency, 09.05.2017.
18. Public agency, 14.06.2017.

19. Publicly owned company, 15.03.2017.

20. Publicly owned company, 20.03.2017.

21. Publicly owned company, 15.03.2017.

22. Publicly owned company, 09.10.2017.

23. Publicly owned company, 15.03.2017.

24. Regulatory authority, 09.12.2015.

25. Regulatory authority, 09.12.2015.

Article 4: Nøkleberg, Martin (ready for submission). Policing global hubs: Balancing the imperatives of security and trade.