SOVIETOLOGISM

Orientalist Discourse and the "-Ologies"

Index:

<u>Sovietologism: Orientalist Discourse and the "-Ologies"</u>

The collapse of the Soviet Union proved to be a watershed moment in modern history. Not only did one of the "worlds" collapse, but so too did the field of Sovietology. Among the former Sovietologists, there was a widespread feeling that somewhere along the line something vital had been overlooked, as virtually none had managed to predict its collapse.[1] Of the few who did predict its collapse, Andrei Amalrik stands out with his insightful essay *Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?*. Despite Amalrik's insightful analysis of Soviet social and ethnic antagonisms, a disastrous war with China never materialized. In any case, with the Soviet Union gone and Sovietology left without an object of study, Sovietologists began to take academic stock. When reviewing the field's history, concepts and theories, former Sovietologists faced the difficult question: Where did the field go so wrong? Was it the internal division and heavy politization? Were they too influenced by Western misrepresentations in the media? Was it too little political thinking? These questions have vexed many former Sovietologists, as the epistemic air was filled with a feeling of failure. The economic crises and 'era of stagnation' was obvious to most informed viewers, but only a select few such as Amalrik predicted total collapse.

On exactly what went wrong and how, there are many viewpoints. Since the late 1960s divisions and politicization internal to the field was widespread, crystalizing around roughly two main positions: The 'revisionist school'[2] believed in what became known as the 'Convergence Theory'[3] that argued that the Soviet Union represented an alternative path to modernity with a pluralist society. The 'totalitarian school' on the other hand argued for the essentially totalitarian

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[1] Tucker 1992, Sovietology and Russian History, p. 175.

[2] These 'schools' and their respective nicknames were not schools in an academic sense, as it was often the scholars of opposing opinions designating such nicknames. I choose to use these nonetheless because it gives a certain clarity in positions.

[3] See Mishra's (1976) "Convergence Theory and Social Change" as an example of Convergence Theory

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nature of the Soviet Union, rejecting Convergence Theory and believing the country was essentially unreformable.[4] Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much headway was made in respect to the differing viewpoints. After the collapse and the dust had settled, more nuanced arguments emerged. Among the critiques that emerged, the view that the field had misapprehended fundamental aspects of the Soviet system became a rough consensus. However, whether it was too much-, or too little political bias; value laden language and state influence; lacking methodological rigor or distorted incentive structures is still up for debate.[5][6][7][8][9][10]

In the decade after the USSR's collapse, a novel point of view emerged in relation to the critiques of Sovietology in the context of Russian historiography in the journal 'Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'. The debate concerned the applicability of Edward Said's Orientalism model in the framework of Russian historiography between historians Nathaniel Knight, Adeeb Khalid and Maria Todorova. Knight argued for the inapplicability of the Orientalism model, something both Adeeb Khalid and Maria Todorova disagreed with. In the ensuing debate using examples of different Russian Imperial officials, Khalid mentioned in passing the similarity between Sovietology and Orientalism. While he did not elaborate much, he gave brief mention of each field's academic insularity, similar dichotomization and distanced vindication of their subject matter.[11] While continuing the debate, Knight elaborated Khalid's insight on Sovietology and argued that it was the corporate institution dealing with the East (read Communist world) and how Sovietology was the key to understand the "riddle wrapped in an enigma".[12] Todorova for her part sided with Khalid in the debate and offered her conceptual insight of Orientalism, but being somewhat more apprehensive in hypothesizing Sovietology's Orientalist features. However, she did make a vague reference to the function of the principle of "othering" in identity formation, which relates to both Orientalism and Sovietology.[13] In a telling question, Todorova asked "…are we ready to discuss

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[4] Strayer 1998, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?, p. 11-12*
[5] Cohen 1985, *Sovieticus*
[6] Motyl 1993, "The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory, in *Post-Communist Studies & Political Science*
[7] Malia 1992, "The Leninist Endgame"
[8] Malia 1992, "From Under the Rubble, What?"
[9] Meyer 1993, "Politics and Methodology in Soviet Studies"
[10] Rutland 1993, "Sovietology: Notes on a Post-Mortem"
[11] Khalid 2000, "Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism", p. 694
[12] Knight 2000, "On Russian Orientalism: A Response to Abeed Khalid", p.714
[13] Todorova 2000, "Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul?", p. 726

the implications of Sovietology as body of scholarship?"[14] While she said "Khalid's measured silence on this question is already telling...",[15] I believe that now is such a time as almost 30 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is from this position I will argue, as I believe the framework, or model, laid out by Said pertains to something bigger than just the European colonial and neo-colonial relation to the Middle East and other formerly colonial areas. Not a novel argument, as Todorova argued for Orientalism as a "othering" process, I argue that this process has different characteristics depending on the area in question. In relation to the Soviet Union and Russia, I believe there are certain important variants of different 'Orientalisms', based on historical- and ideational historical traditions.

In this thesis, I will argue that there was a hegemonic discourse that governed Western perceptions of the Soviet Union and the wider communist world, although due to brevity I will focus on the former. This discourse I believe pertains not so much the formation of a cultural identity of the West, but rather of political identity formation, both in terms of our economic-political and ideology. By this I mean that since the Cold War was primarily an ideological conflict[16] between two opposing socio-economic systems, Sovietology functioned in the manner described by Todorova, that it represented an "othering" process of identity formation. I believe this is part of a larger historical process of regionalization of identity, although due to the scope of this thesis I unfortunately cannot elaborate much on this latter point.

To do this, I will examine several of the greatest works of the early Sovietologists, including (but not limited to-) Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* (1953), Moore's *Terror and Progress* (1956) and Barghoorn's *Politics in the USSR* (1966). I choose these texts as they became quite influential in the first phase of Sovietology, as well as because of the influence these authors were very influential in their time.[17] Concerning Barghoorn's textbook, however, is that this work did not become as influential as the other two, but it gives a good contrast to see how the discourse changed from the 1950s to the 1960s. Furthermore, by focusing mainly of these renowned texts in this time period on the eve- and first years of the behavioralist approach within the field, the change in the discourse prior to the break in the late 1960s and early 1970s

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[14] Ibid, 721
[15] ibid
[16] A different 'realist' perspective is that it was simply a conflict of national interest, but this has given way to the 'internationalist' perspective. See Odd Arne Westad's (2000) *Reviewing the Cold War*
[17] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p. 68, 192

reveals important changes. Namely, how the creative approaches and morally evaluative analyses changed into a more "scienticized" and value free language, but still plagued by the same underlying structure. To establish a proper conceptual and theoretical framework, I will base my analysis on the tools laid out by Foucault and Gramsci, as well using Said's Orientalism framework and reference to the Orientalist discourse. In other words, I will analyze the discourse that governed Western perceptions of the Soviet Union and attempt to give further insights into the wider debate around the methodological-, epistemological-, and (perhaps even) ontological challenges that face area studies. As for the ideological basis of said perceptions, I will use Anders Stephanson's "Liberty or Death" (2000) as the conceptual framework for the specifics of the discourse. To contextualize the works mentioned, I will use Engermann's book *Know Your Enemy* (2009) and Cummings (1997) article as a reference to the wider developments within the field. In respect to the wider developments within Sovietology, and the relationship between academia, the state and private foundations.

In order to prove my point, I will structure this thesis into two chapters. Before the first chapter I will cover the state of the debate concerning the challenges that were present in Sovietology, and why so few managed to predict the collapse of the USSR. The collapse of Sovietology caused not only debate among the former Sovietologists themselves, but it also spurred a wider debate within the field of Area Studies (AS). These two debates will be covered in the same section, as they are closely related. In addition, I will clarify my conceptual and methodological approach and give some notes on periodization. In the first chapter will be divided into three sections. First, I will briefly detail Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' and Foucault's conception of discourses. In this section I will also briefly discuss how the two are related and -indeed complimentary, in addition to giving a short overview over Edward Said's model of Orientalism. In addition I will cover the theoretical framework of Hans Weiler regarding the relationship between academia and politics, as well as that of Dominique Pester's discussion of knowledge production. Included in this section, I will also seek to define how I will use the term, as part of my argument is essentially the need for a typology of "Orientalisms". Second, I will detail the development of the field, as this field had a particularly close relationship to both state power and the influence of private economic actors. Third, I will discuss some of the implications and problems regarding the roots of Sovietology. The second chapter will be divided into four sections. First, I will detail the American anti-communist

ideology (or 'political discourse') using Anders Stephanson's "Liberty or Death" (2000), as I believe this forms the ideational basis of the Sovietological 'Orientalism'. This I believe is essential, as with any political discourse, this is not a *de novo* construction, it builds on old (and new) traditions and values. Second, I will analyze the three works mentioned, and compare them to both features of the Orientalist discourse and the American Ideology. I will first cover Moore's *Terror and Progress*, before moving on to Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* and Barghoorn's *Politics USSR*. Lastly, I will summarize and conclude on my findings.

Method, Conceptual Approach and Periodization

Before moving on to the theoretical framework and historical context, there are a couple of things that needs clarifying. First, my methodological approach: Since I am arguing for the presence of a particular type of discourse within Sovietological research, my method falls under discourse analysis. I approach the texts I selected by using the framework of particularly Gramsci, as his insight into how political society hegemonically influences the different actors and institutions in civil society. Foucault provides more the theoretical background in addition to explaining the dynamics of how discursive power makes itself felt in textual production. Since no discourse exists in a vacuum, I will detail in Chapter Two the specific ideational content in this discourse.

Regarding my conceptual approach, I will of course use Said's Orientalism framework. However, as I argue for the need of a typology of 'orientalisms', this needs some clarifying. When mentioning 'Orientalism' or 'Orientalist discourse', I refer to Said's conceptualization of the term in relation to the academic discourse as how it pertains to the Middle East. I will use the term 'Orientalizing tendencies' in a straightforward sense to refer to the features of Orientalism as described by Said. 'The American Ideology' will be used to refer to the American anti-communist ideology during the Cold War period. This ideology is as mentioned the ideational content for the 'American political discourse', which in relation to American perceptions of the USSR I believe form a specific part of said discourse.

In mentioning 'ideology', a short discussion and definition of the term is necessary. To avoid falling into a metaphorical rabbit-hole of philosophical- and terminological debate and

confusion surrounding the term,[18] I will simply offer my own. I define 'ideology' as consisting of two related aspects: First, it is a system of values to a high level of consistency, but in no way completely so. Second, it denotes a worldview, analyzed through its value system. This definition is close to the intrinsically normative definition but differs in respect to my inclusion of the term 'worldview'.[19] Why I choose to include 'worldview' in this definition, is that I believe we cannot separate our values from our ontological assumptions about what is and what isn't.

Why I choose to focus on the American discourse instead of the European one, is that as I will show briefly in Chapter One in discussing the Cultural Approach root of Sovietology, there were close academic links between the early European 'Russian Studies' and the American 'Russian Studies'. American scholars travelled in the latter half of the 19th century to Europe to gain their education, which Manning (1957) details, who subsequently travelled back to America to form the basis of Russian Studies in America. Furthermore, as detailed in many other works, there were (and are) close cultural, political and economic links between America and Europe.[20] Lastly, in the context of the immediate post-war years and especially the early Cold War period, Europe laid devastated after five years of warfare and occupation, hardly in shape to confront the Soviet Union. In addition, US unquestioned economic power in the post-war years, made the US the 'natural' power to oppose those she perceived as a threat to its national security.

To refer to this political discourse, I will borrow from Said and name it 'Sovietologism', though later scholars will probably find a better term.

In regard to periodization, I choose to focus on this period of Sovietology because I believe in the contingency of events to historical development, of which I believe discourses are not different. This is of course not a novel view, as William H. Sewell Jr. (2005) has argued as such.[21] Sovietology as a field existed for a little over 40 years, beginning with the establishment of Columbia's Russian Institute in 1946, and lasted until the final collapse of the Soviet Union in

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[18] See John L. Martin's (2015) "What is Ideology?" and John Gerring's (1997) "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis" for further information on this debate.
[19] Martin 2015, "What is Ideology?", p. 12
[20] 'Culture' is in this context used to refer to both ideational history, values and more colloquial usage of the term such as popular literature. See Jon Gerde's (1997) *The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830-1917*, as an example of this historiographic trend.
[21] Sewell 2005, *Logics of History,* p.7

1992. During this period, the field had one major rupture, namely the 'Revolutions of 1968' that came to influence academic life forever after. Why the year 1968 is important for Sovietology, is that after this event, though with developments stemming from the 1950s, the so-called totalitarian-model came under heavy criticism, and became obscured during the last decades of the field.[22] [23] While much of the criticism of the concept was appropriate, I do subscribe to Malia's (1992) arguments concerning the totalitarian nature of the USSR, but more importantly, it formed the basis of future discussion. Put differently, the theories, concepts and broader academic work of the latter period became contingent on this first period. An argument for this contingency, can be the relative insularity (or distance-) of the field vis-à-vis the larger disciplinary trends.[24]

Challenges in Sovietology and Area Studies

As mentioned, the collapse of the Soviet Union spurred a wide debate surrounding what and how Sovietology "failed", in the sense that there were evidently much that Sovietology missed. Due to the heavy politization within the field and intense debate, it was evident to most Sovietologists that something was amiss. Among the perspectives and opinions that emerged, they coalesced into roughly two main positions. The first was represented by Stephen Cohen in his influential book *Soveticus (1985)*, where he explained that it was American political interests and Sovietophobia that caused both Western scientists and media to misunderstand the USSR. Either, it was portrayed as too strong, or too weak, depending on what fitted the contemporary American political interests. Especially within American media Cohen believed that their use of value-laden language and short term "amnesia" in their analyses was what caused the skewed view of what the Soviet Union actually was.[25] [26]

The second position is represented by Martin Malia (1992) who argued that the misrepresentations that had caused Sovietologists to misapprehend the Soviet Union, was the field's avoidance of its totalitarian nature. Only with such a total system could you see such a

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[22] See T. H. Rigby's (1972) "'Totalitarianism and Change in Communist Systems" as a contemporary example of this debate.
[23] Malia 1992, "Leninist Endgame", p. 59
[24] Fleron & Hoffman 1993, *Post-Communist Studies & Political Science,* p.3
[25] Cohen 1985, *Soveticus*
[26] Ibid, p.36

total collapse.[27] This was because mainly two factors: One, the de-Stalinization process did in fact not mean an abandonment of totalitarianism; and, that Soviet prices had been exaggerated in Western models for calculating Soviet GDP.[28] While implicit in Malia's argument was that it was the political left that had caused the abandonment of the totalitarian model, Peter Rutland (1993) argued in a similar vein, though he blamed both sides of the 'revisionist/totalitarian' divide. Rutland believed that Sovietologists had put too much effort into covering up their own political biases, thus blinding themselves to elemental features of this system. The 'revisionists' believed too strongly in the reform potential of the system, while focusing too much on Gorbachev, while the 'conservatives' believed too strongly in the power of the Soviet elites.[29] On the whole, group-think had hindered Sovietologists from making accurate descriptions.[30]

George Breslauer (1992) on the other hand wanted to defend Sovietologists in their 'failures', both from those whose views aligned with Malia and Cohen. While agreeing with Malia that the 1960s proved a watershed moment in Sovietology, instead of putting the blame on the abandonment of the totalitarian model, Breslauer argued that this decade caused a disconnect between "…empirical research and a focus on the essential."[31] According to Breslauer, the main fault with both approaches was that they excluded the assumptions of the other; that the 'revisionists' neglected the primacy of politics, while the 'totalitarians' neglected the consequences of social forces.[32]

The 'disconnect' and pervasive influence of political ideologies within the field was noted by other scholars as well. Fredrick C. Fleron Jr. noted in 1969 in his *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences* (1969) that there existed a certain academic distance between Sovietology and the wider disciplines such as political science. Fleron argued that this distance was because of the emotional attachment of the scholars to their object "…as a sui generis (…), and [] therefore, irrelevant to the methodology and empirical theory of the social sciences."[33] In trying to explain this academic distance, Alexander J. Motyl (1993) argued that this "lag" came because of the political interests, and the behavioralist turn in the 1960s adopted by Sovietology.

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[27] Malia 1992, "Leninist Endgame", p. 60
[28] Ibid, p. 59
[29] Rutland 1993, "Sovietology: Notes on a Post-Mortem", p. 118-119
[30] Ibid, p. 116
[31] Breslauer 1992, "In Defense of Sovietology", p. 231
[32] ibid
[33] Fleron & Hoffman 1993, *Post-Communist Studies & Political Science, p. 3*

Motyl argued that with the field's infatuation with the behavioralist approach, it essentially became ossified and preoccupied with "doing research" in contrast to theoretical development. Because of state needs for policy relevant material and conformist pressure to its political perspectives (usually anti-communist), media pressure for short and exotic material and the "publish or perish" situation in the 1960s and -70s gave Sovietology strong incentives to avoid systematic and historically contextualized theorization.[34] Alfred G. Meyer (1993) argued that the uneasy relationship between Sovietology and the disciplines came as a result of ideology. Meyer noted that within the field and his own respective discipline (political science), many esteemed scholars considered it "…insulting to our won society to treat the Soviet Union as if it were comparable to other societies."[35] As a result, Sovietologists believed that "…the categories, models, and methods developed by the disciplines did not apply to the study of the USSR."[36] (ibid) This Meyer concluded, put the blame for Sovietology's failure on "…the intrusion of political ideologies into our research[, and] (…) blindness of dominant social science methodologies to non-Western cultures."[37]

There are to be sure many different perspectives on this debate, such as the field being too ahistorical,[38] but it is the cultural, ideological-, or political aspects is what I will continue to focus on. With the collapse of Soviet Union and the wider structural changes that the international system underwent, the forces of globalization, and its border obfuscating this process entails, spurred a wider debate within AS. Particularly, the problems of categories and ideological influence was not peculiar to Sovietology, as these were also present in the wider field of AS.

Not only had one of the major categories of inquiry disappeared, but with the unquestioned hegemony of the United States in the economic and political realms and the rapid spread of the internet, the world looked as if it was increasingly converging into one globalized community.[39] In a response to these developments critical voices emerged that questioned the very foundations of AS; namely the areas themselves.

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[34] Motyl 1993, "The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory", p.82-83
[35] Meyer 1993, "Politics and Methodology in Soviet Studies", p.171
[36] ibid
[37] Ibid, p. 174
[38] See Robert C. Tucker's (1992) "Sovietology and Russian History"
[39] Basedau & Köllner (2007), "Area Studies, Comparative Area Studies, and the Study of Politics", p. 107

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In an influential article trying to explain- and examine what happened with Sovietology and AS up until the time of writing, Bruce Cummings (1997) examined the relationship between Sovietology, the state and the private foundations. This relationship, Cummings argued, influenced both the shape and research agendas of AS to a large degree.[40] Furthermore, since "…power and money had found their subject first, and shaped the fields of inquiry accordingly[,]…"[41] the field, and especially the boundaries that define the objects of study within AS were particularly problematic.[42]

In a similar vein, Khosrowjah argued that because of the close relationship explained by Cummings, AS had been created to "…create academic programs that would both guide and legitimize US foreign policy."[43] In this way, AS produces knowledge that is "…situated, contingent, and shot through an ideological prism…",[44] aimed at informing and guiding policy. Furthermore, Khosrowjah argued that there is a high degree of Orientalizing in contemporary AS of the Middle East and Islam. Specifically, Khosrowjah mentioned the emergence of new "Democracy Projects" for researching specific areas, who "applies" their social scientific knowledge to the Middle East while ignoring external factors in the development of this area. In such a way, "…any past, present and future interference by US in Iran's internal affairs is also rationalized and legitimized by the same analytical grid[,] (…) [and that] assigns blame for economic underdevelopment and cultural backwardness to the failures of non-Western countries having endure colonial rule and imperialist interventions.[45] In short, Khosrowjah views this kind of knowledge as particularly problematic as this research which is intended to guide policy "…are based on factual distortions and misrepresentations."[46]

In relation to the "ideological prism" present in AS, as Khosrowjah mentioned, there is the problem of boundaries and intersubjectivity with one's area of study. Houben (2013) notes that there are several challenges currently facing AS. Firstly, for AS "…their origins appear to lie within Orientalism, (…) [and] [t]he second problem is the area itself, since it is unclear how it

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[40] Cummings (1997), "Boundary discplacement", p. 19
[41] Ibid, p. 9
[42] Cummings (1997), "Boundary discplacement"
[43] Khosrowjah (2011), "A Brief History of Area Studies and International Studies, p.132
[44] ibid
[45] Ibid, p. 136, 140
[46] Ibid, p. 140

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can be demarcated properly as a unit of analysis…".[47] However, it is not only AS that faces a crisis, but the academic disciplines themselves. According to Houben, the postmodernist deconstructionist agenda has revealed that the disciplines are in themselves a form of area studies. "[They] basically describe the processes and structures of [the] Western world…".[48] This fact, Houben argues, because of "…[t]heir contextuality in the spatial and temporal sense makes the disciplines partially inappropriate to explain processes of intertwinement between globalization and localization beyond the West."[49] This brings out the issue of the subjective quality of knowledge, as knowledge is produced within social, cultural and political contexts. Furthermore, because true knowledge is only indirectly possible, the consequence is that knowledge will in turn be colored to some degree by the one obtaining said knowledge through epistemic, methodological and ontological viewpoints.[50] Houben argues that these challenges should not be viewed as problems, but rather opportunities that can help refine both AS and the disciplines, especially the focus of historians on change. Thus, because change is never absolute, but rather "…always relation in a spatial and temporal sense…",[51] it opens up the possibility of viewing phenomena in a wider, interconnected and comparable perspective. In this way, Houben argues that it is possible to escape the Western origin that characterizes much of disciplinary- and AS knowledge.[52]

 A related perspective on overcoming the challenges posed to AS by globalization, the post-modern cultural critique, and allegations of being atheoretical, are that of Basedau and Köllner (2007). An interesting note that the authors make concerning the subjectivity of knowledge in relation to AS, is that "…what counts as area studies in different countries tend to diverge…".[53] In other words, one does not usually count one's own area as an area worth studying, it is taken for granted. Unfortunately, the authors do not continue this line of thought further. However, to remedy the above-mentioned critiques and developments, the authors argue that by utilizing the different types of area- and comparative area studies (ACAS) with

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[47] Houben (2013), "The New Area Studies and Southeast Asian History", p.4
[48] ibid
[49] ibid
[50] ibid
[51] Ibid, p.9
[52] ibid
[53] Basedau & Köllner (2007), "Area Studies, Comparative Area Studies, and the Study of Politics", p.109

methodological rigor and proper usage of concepts and research strategies, they are possible to overcome.[54]

In connection to the intersubjective relationship between the AS scholar and his field, Said's Orientalism frameworks is particularly relevant. And, as Houben and Khosrowjah notes, there is an especially close relationship between the two.

Chapter One: Theory and Historical Context

Theoretical Framework

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) proved to be a hugely influential work, as it has inspired countless scholars in examining academic writing in a post-colonial perspective. In this book, Said argues that the literary and textual representations made in the West of the Orient has since ancient times been governed by a discourse, supporting of Western political objectives. However, it was not until the late 18th-, and throughout the 19th century that the academic tradition took hold and formed itself into a more coherent academic field, or tradition. While Said is quite clear that what he termed *orientalism* was more than just an academic tradition, as it extended to culture and politics, it is the academic tradition that I will focus on. In an academic sense, Orientalism was "…a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (…) "the Occident."[55] Related to this, Said argues that between the imaginative- and academic traditions starting in the late 18th century, "…Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it…".[56] This is where I feel the similarities between Sovietology and Orientalism was the greatest. As many Sovietologists viewed the USSR as 'sui generis' – that is historically unique and incomparable – they were the only ones with the appropriate knowledge,

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[54] Ibid, p.120
[55] Said 2003, *Orientalism,* p.2
[56] Ibid, p. 3

understanding and authority to describe how the Communist world functioned. Put differently, as Knight put it, the Soviet Union was an "…enigma wrapped in a riddle [where only the Sovietologist could make it] into a known quantity, manageable comprehensible and predictable for policymakers and the public alike."[57]

To establish the close link between politics and academia, Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' is particularly useful. Based on his distinction between 'political-', and 'civil' society, Gramsci argued that while the former was ruled by the ruling class through direct means of coercion, such as police force and laws, the latter was characterized by a cultural hegemony of the ruling class (in a stable society). As he believed that every class had its own intellectuals, the ruling class' intellectuals were responsible for creating their specific culture. And, when the ruling class was the historically progressive one, their cultural ideals, history, and values came to be regarded as the 'national' culture. Through this culture, Gramsci argued, was how the ruling class manufactured the spontaneous consent that was the essential feature of this hegemony.[58]

This view of a state consisting of overlapping and intersecting power structures was a feature Michel Foucault also noted. In his books *The Archeology of Knowledge (1969)* and *Discipline and Punish (1975)*, Foucault argued that there was a certain common framework shared in society that governed our relation and understanding of the different aspects of our existence. This is what Foucault termed *discourses*, as they "…constrains and *enables* writing, speaking [and] thinking." [59] Discursive practices were the internal dynamics to discourses, as they "…work in both inhibiting and productive ways (…) that designate both exclusions and choices." [60] Particular to discourses was how tended to reproduce themselves in support of structures of power and commonly held norms. This is part of why discourses can be hard to detect, as in our day to day lives we live in, or with such discourses; characterizing our language, our evaluation of concepts, our narratives through which we construct meaning. In other words, because of discourses close connection to structures of power (which again is closely related to the legitimizing function of morals and ethics to politics), they do in large part influence how we perceive and relate to our contemporary reality.

When combining Foucault's discourses and Gramsci's hegemony it is possible to begin

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[57] Knight 2000, "On Russian Orientalism: A Response to Abeed Khalid", p.714
[58] Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society", p.7, 22
[59] Hook (2001), "Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality History", p.523
[60] Foucault 1981a, [Hook 2001]

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to grasp the structure and dynamics of how our human understanding of our social reality functions, and the interplay between knowledge and power. As we know from Gramsci, the ruling class' social-, cultural- and political history influences in large part how the rest of society views the state and society, in what is right, wrong, preferences and tastes. These tastes, preferences and value systems then forms different discourses, thus making the political influence of the state quite pervasive throughout society at large. What this tells us, is that we must pay close attention to how our language-; our employment of narrative structures in creating texts-; even our judgement on what is considered 'politically correct' are in large part influenced by the imperatives of 'political society', or the state. In the case of Sovietology that was formed at the beginning of the Cold War, the interests of the state its constituent bases of power all viewed the Soviet Union with great hostility, as the political-economic model embodied by this country posed a large threat to those interests. Namely, private ownership of the means of production, individual freedom which enabled both free speech but also the ownership of capital.

Up until now I have been detailed to some degree how state power and culture and values interact, it is also necessary to provide a quick overview over how this relates to academia, and the dynamics internal to it.

In Hans Weiler's article "Whose Knowledge Matters?" (2009), Weiler argued that there is a reciprocal relationship between knowledge and politics of mutual legitimation, where money, politics and science each serve each other symbiotically. This relationship Weiler argues, is fundamental to "…our understanding of modern statehood[…]",[61] as in politics, scientifically based policy is the most legitimate. In turn, politics help define what is considered "good" science, through school curriculum, public funding, employment criteria for public offices, and so forth.[62] Central to this relationship, is the importance of hierarchies in both politics and academia, which Weiler believes signifies power in the raw. Therefore, it is important to understand the hierarchical position of the institutes and universities that does research, as the most prestigious ones does in large part legitimize and convey authority to politics. Conversely, the same is true for academia. By staying within the political discourse, the state lends its authority and legitimacy to the scholars themselves.

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[61] Weiler (2009), "Whose Knowledge Matters?", p.3
[62] Ibid, p.3-4

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To supplement Weiler's framework of the mutually legitimating processes between academia and politics, Dominique Pestre argued that the historical social, economic and political contexts influence what knowledge is produced, and that particular attention should be paid to these contexts. This is because that the production of knowledge over the past five centuries have been exceedingly important to states and economic elites. What is of special interest to this thesis, is his explanation of how these contexts influenced knowledge production through the course of the 20th century. In the last 150 years, "…science has become so central to national security, economic development, and identity that it has become part of the normal duties of any state."[63] Particularly, during this period, "…a process of *nationalization* has happened to science…" and that this process was "…at its height durin the Cold War (notably in the United States)."[64] However, this process began to change between 1965 to 1975, where the power distribution changed in favor of Capital (versus Labor).[65] Furthermore, Pestre argued that "[national] political representatives have been long-standing players in the business of science, and major interest groups rarely hesitate to ask them to intervene toprotect their interests whenever there is a perceived need."[66]

In relation to discourses, one of Weiler's insights that is of relevance here is how the prestige of the universities and institutes high up in the hierarchy endows more legitimacy and power to the academic production taking place there. This is of special relevance to my thesis, as the main institution of the sources I use are from Harvard, widely known to be one of the top ranking universities in the world. As I will detail in chapter one, Harvard and Columbia formed the core of early Sovietological research, with Harvard's Russian Research Institute which sponsored both Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* (1953) and Moore's *Terror and Progress* (1954).

If we combine these insights with Pestre's, it is not only a symbiotic relationship between political power and academia, but also between the two and major economic interests. In the context of the Cold War, it is impossible not to argue that a Soviet-style communist regime in any Western country would be a major threat to economic interest groups. Therefore, as economic actors both influence knowledge production and security policies, there is a particularly close relationship between these three (politics, economics and academia). This

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[63] Pestre 2003, "Regimes of Knowledge Production in Society", p.250
[64] ibid
[65] Ibid, p. 252
[66] Ibid, p. 250

relationship will be covered in this chapter, using Cummings' (1997) and Engermann's works as sources to detail this relationship, as both base their arguments on primary- and secondary sources of all three actors.

Historical Backgroun: Soveitology in Embryo and Bloom

To understand the beginning the field of Sovietology, there are two separate roots that came fuse and create the field of Sovietology and AS as we know it today. While these two approaches exist separately today in their respective domains, namely within the Cultural Studies approach (in our case Slavic Studies) and the other within modern intelligence services. Despite contemporary usage of the terms 'Soviet Studies' and 'Russian Studies' often were interchangeable, [67] I will refer to the Cultural Approach root of Sovietology as 'Russian Studies'. To name this second approach, I will borrow Engermann's book title that bears the same name – 'Know Your Enemy'. Furthermore, I will use this book in a lexicographical manner for the early phase of Sovietology.

This first root, the Cultural Studies approach, studies the culture of certain areas and social groups and is often characterized by its humanistic approach to studies of language, literature and history of the area in question. In the case of Sovietology, this root is Slavic Studies. The second root is the 'know you enemy' approach that originated in the Second World War, and in the case of the US, the Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) analytical divisions, such as the USSR Division. Where these two intersected for the first time, was at the universities hosting the military language programs that were established to train and equip military personnel for interaction with allied forces (such as the USSR) and occupation duties. What is important about the origins of Sovietology, was how closely it formed a triangle between the state, academia and the private foundations. It is in this triangle that I believe is what makes it particularly susceptible to Orientalizing tendencies, because it creates a virtual space where academia touches two important corner stones of American- and Western society. The first such 'stone' is of course the state, as in any modern society. Representative of the state in this connection are the intelligence services such as the CIA, the American foreign ministry, the State Department, or its military branches such as the US Air Force, -Army or -Navy. The second

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[67] Kelly 2013, "What Was Soviet Studies and What Came Next?", p. 113-114

cornerstone is the private institutions that were formed as a result of hugely successful free-market enterprises. In relation to Sovietology in the late 1940s and early 1950s, these institutions were the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundations and the Rockefeller Foundation. To put it in Gramscian terms, because the liberal 'bourgeoisie' was Western society's ruling class, their political discourse will have hegemonic influence on civil society's institutions (i.e. academia).

The first root of Sovietology, Russian Studies, finds its first traces in 18th century Europe (at least in the case of France), but only gained its proper form during the 1860s.[68] It began somewhat later in the US, namely the late 19th century. While the field began earlier in Europe, it is interesting to note that American scholars during this period travelled to Europe to gain advanced degrees. One of the pioneering figures in early Russian Studies, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who graduated from Harvard in 1887, before travelling to Germany where he received his doctorate at the University of Freiburg in 1892. Travelling back to the United States in 1893 Coolidge took up a position at Harvard's History Department, where he began the first course on Russian and Polish history in 1894. While certainly influential in many respects to American scholarly influence on policymaking, he was in many ways the pioneering figure of Russian Studies in America. According to Manning, Coolidge's role in appointing Leo Weiner as professor of Russian Literature marked the beginning of the field in America.[69] In respect to Sovietology, not much happened up until around the Second World War, in American Russian Studies, except for the slow process of proliferation and education of new students in the field, as well as a growing body of work being published. In the time around the Russian Revolution there was an influx of immigrants from the former Russian Empire, who came to study and later became important figures. Also in the inter-war years was the period where several important figures were educated, especially Phillip Mosely and Geroid T. Robinson who also travelled to study in the Soviet Union during the NEP (New Economic Policy) period.[70] The institutional structures of Sovietology did have its embryonic beginning during the 1930s, but the changes during the war and in the immediate aftermath were to have far greater significance.[71]

This beginning of Russian Studies as 'academic fertilization' from Europe points to several things, one of which being the close transatlantic ties that connected Europe and the

[68] Adamovsky 2005, "Euro-Orientalism…", p. 591
[69] Manning 1957, *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States*, p. 26
[70] Ibid, p.50, 52
[71] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p.15-17

United States. If I am to hypothesize, it is not unlikely that this is one of the reasons for the similarity in the Orientalist discourse between the two continents. Thus, the 'Euro-Orientalism' Adamovsky discussed could well have been transmitted in its early stages to America as he argued that this type of Orientalism crystalized some thirty years earlier in France than it did in the US. However, for this 'Euro-Orientalism' to become Sovietologism, it first had to blend with war-time interdisciplinary intelligence analysis.

Know Your Enemy

In respect to Sovietology, the importance of the war-time programs can hardly be overstated. It was with the intelligence work of the OSS (Office for Strategic Services) during WW2 that came to have the largest impact on Sovietology, especially the analysis divisions within the OSS. In addition to the OSS' USSR Division (nicknamed the 'chairborne division'), the US Army and - Navy also had their respective training programs were also quite influential. These programs' influence were in contrast to the OSS' policy-relevant research, more influential in an educational sense, but also the fact that the Army's Civilian Affairs Training Program were posted at Harvard, while the Navy's 'Naval School of Military Government and Administration' program were situated at Columbia. What made the OSS-model and military programs so important, were not necessarily in what they did, but rather how. [72]

In 1941 Geroid T. Robinson became the head of the OSS' USSR Division after Mosely had turned down this position, and his approach became in many ways the ideal for later Sovietological research. In preparing the chairborne division for research, Robinson began "…ransacking universities (…) for students and scholars with any Russia expertise (preferably firsthand) without regard to seniority or discipline." [73] However, this is not to say that Robinson pioneered the interdisciplinary approach alone, as OSS director William "Wild Bill" Donnovan established in the same year "…the rationale for employing the nation's best expertise to "collect and analyze all [relevant] information (…) which may bear upon national security[.]""[74] After a series of conflicts however in how to best serve national security, the 'social science in one country' approach won out in 1942.[75] Thus, in contrast to regular academic research that was

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[72] Ibid, p. 17-18
[73] Ibid, p. 26
[74] Cummings 1997, "Boundary discplacement", p. 7. See Katz (1989), *Foreign Intelligence* for more detailed information.
[75] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p. 26

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often done in a disciplinary manner, the OSS approach recruited academics from a wide variety of backgrounds, thus laying the basis for AS methodology.

One event that came to have a significant impact on the prestige and legitimacy of doing interdisciplinary area specialized research, was in the OSS' Foreign Morale Analysis Division (FMAD) role in shaping American policy towards the Japanese Emperor. At FMAD, Clyde Kluckhohn together with Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead studied how to design American propaganda against Japan. In the closing years of the war, Kluckhohn and his colleagues had concluded on the central importance of the Japanese emperor to their society, and thus lobbied for American propaganda to allude to the possibility of his survival given Japan surrendered. After the war, Kluckhohn and his colleagues believed that their analysis of the Japanese emperor's centrality to his country had a significant impact on Japan's eventual surrender. [76]While this may seem peripheral to Sovietology, I believe that this in fact gave great legitimacy to the interdisciplinary approach. Not only do I believe such events does bestow legitimacy on what is perceived to have led to said event, but also in a similar fashion that Said showed how philological approaches in Oriental studies bestowed legitimacy to Orientalism.[77] Thus, with the success of one such major interdisciplinary social science analysis, such an approach gained much legitimacy.

After the end of the war, the real business of starting Sovietology began, with the two major centers emerging as *the* central Sovietological institution being Harvard's Russian Research Center (RRC) and Columbia's Russian Institute (RI). With the inspiration of the military programs and the OSS, the private foundations and the university faculties did not hesitate in formulating their own plans for an expansion of the area programs. Rockefeller, for example, had plans in 1944 for expanding the West Coast universities area programs, but faltered for various reasons.[78] It was during the later part of the war that the concrete plans for creating the interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research field of Sovietology, where Robinson played an instrumental part.[79]

Robinson, the war-time chief of the USSR Division and a historian at Columbia for two

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[76] Ibid, p. 44
[77] See Said's analysis of Ernest Renan's Oreintalism, Said 2003: 150.
[78] See Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p.21-25 for information regarding how the West Coast never became a center for Soveitology comparable to those of the East Coast
[79] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p.18, 20, 28

decades became the first director of the Russian Institute, as he had a wide interest in both Russia and Communism. However, while the Rockefeller Foundation had given Columbia an initial grant of $250K for developing the RI and with funds earmarked for research, in its first decade the RI functioned mainly as a teaching institution.[80]

In the case of Harvard's Russian Research Center, Kluckhohn became the director of this new center, which he envisioned would serve both government and academia in equal part.[81] The RRC's main initial benefactor was the Carnegie Corporation, who gave Harvard a grant of a total of $740K for the center's foundation[82]. An interesting affiliation between the Carnegie Corporation and the state, was its officer Fredrick Osborne who had served as an American delegation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. In trying to understand his Soviet counterparts he enlisted another Carnegie officer, psychologist John Gardener. While this attempt failed, they both believed in the approach of mixing social science and policy, they helped the foundation select Harvard as a possible site for such a center[83].

Perhaps most illuminating of the relationship between the foundations and academia, was the Ford Foundation's support for area programs, as their contribution dwarfed both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. Between 1953 to 1966, Ford provided a total of $270 million to 34 universities across the US.[84] As for the relationship between the foundations and the state, the correspondence between Mosely and Paul Langer is quite illustrating: When the two discussed "…implementing a program of "Coordinated Country Studies" (…)[,] Paul Langer wrote to Mosely stating that the first item in regard to implementation would be consultation with CIA director Allen Dulles."[85] What these 'items' referred to was both how these projects were to be represented to the CIA, whether or not the Ford Foundation would be responsible for the "…political reliability of the team members? (…) e) Should the directors of the proposed study project be informed of the fact that the CIA has been notified?"[86] While this correspondence was documented by Cummings in using FBI reports as course material, this relationship has also been shown extensively by Sigmund Diamond

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[80] Ibid, p. 25-26
[81] Ibid, p. 47
[82] Cummings 1997, "Boundary discplacement", p. 10
[83] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy, p.45*
[84] Cummings 1997, "Boundary displacement"
[85] Ibid, p.13
[86] ibid

showed in his seminal work *Compromised Campus* (1992).

I will suffice it to say that both Cummings, Diamond and Engermann has shown the incredibly dense connections between these three actors, all representative of essential aspects of Western society. This is particularly representative of Weiler's- and Pestre's frameworks, as the we can see how private foundations fund academic enterprises, which in turn aim to serve the national interest, who in turn guide and protect the other two.

Know Your -Ology

As I have shown in the two preceding sections, Sovietology was the mix of both the Cultural Studies approach and the intelligence analysis work of the OSS during the War. However, at this moment I will need to pause to discuss why such a blend are perhaps not always the most 'happy marriage', so to speak.

There exists a certain 'tension' between the two approaches. First of all, in regard to Cultural Studies, it would be safe to say that this field concerns what some historians call *Verstehen*. In that the goal of historical research is to *understand* the historical period or process in question as it relates to the human experience. Hence, the focus on change and continuity in historical periods when examining developments and historical trends. Because if we as historians can understand why something changes, i.e. the causal relations behind a change, it will increase our understanding of why and how contemporary reality is what it is. In contrast to policy-related research, understanding the context and causal relations that link developments and events are only useful as far as it increases the predictive strength of the models and theories such research. This points to a philosophical problem in that it poses the question: "what is the purpose of science?" The Cultural Studies scholar would presumably argue that the purpose of science is to increase our understanding of reality, both past and present. The policy-research scholar would in all likeliness ask back: "What is the value of scientific research is it has no practical application?". This is not only a problem of power as predictive theories gives power when accurately predicting future events. Increased *Verstehen* on the other hand, allows us to understand our fellow human beings more empathically, and could help both policymakers and regular people avoid damaging policies or actions. Thus, there is power in both, but where on the one hand one gives political power, the other gives social power, in that this latter type of power

can increase what International Relations scholars call 'soft power' (power of attraction).[87] Put differently, policy-research can provide *exertive* power, while cultural research gives *attractive* power, if one is to adopt a realist point of view. In any case, while the two are opposites in certain respects they do fill each other out

  This 'problem of power' brings me to the second point; the influence of political power on research. As my main argument is that the close connection between academia and politics are problematic as it makes it easy to project one's own views on others. Not only does this lessen our *Verstehen*, but it also demotes the predictive power of theories and models. This hardly needs extrapolation, as how can a wrong theory predict the future? Another aspect that makes this science-politics relationship problematic, is that when doing research for the purpose of informing policy, it becomes too easy to avoid politically unpalpable subjects. Because politicians are responsible in some degree to its public, be it authoritarian or democratic, scientists working on policy-research will have a strong incentive to avoid certain questions and avoid certain conclusions if they run counter to the interests of the politicians paying their salary. Furthermore, politicians and policymakers often work from a goal-oriented strategy, as policy X should lead to increased welfare or military power, this also has a distorting effect on the research done to support policy X. As mentioned, since politicians in some way or another derive their power from the public, be it a large- or a small segment of it, policy X will most likely have a valuable and admirable goal. Then, when the politician turns to the scientist and explains that policy X has the goal of Y, the scientist will work on the assumption that goal Y must be attained. This is produces the problem of fact fitting and selectivity, as the scientist will look for evidence to support policy X, as his employer wants to achieve Y. Thus, the scientist will have an incentive to cherry-pick evidence to support this policy. There are certainly problems with this relationship when we look in the opposite causal direction, but this problem then gains a certain circularity of argumentation. As this problem then becomes a problem of science having a too strong influence on politics, which leaves us back to the problem of political influence on science. A case in point for this latter argument could be the ideological basis of the Soviet Union. There, the ideology was originally based on what was at the time perceived as being scientific which in turn became political, which in turn distorted scientific research (or at least social scientific research).

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[87] See Joseph Nye's (2004) *Soft Power*

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A third problem that relates to the tension between the Cultural Studies approach and policy-research concerns ontology. Because the goal of the Cultural Studies scholar is increased *Verstehen* of cultures, languages and history, this necessarily presupposes the ontological position of particularism. As why study a specific culture if there is nothing particular to it? The policy-oriented scholar on the other hand adopts the polar opposite ontological position, that is the universally comparability of events, objects and people. In relation to Sovietology, this tension become quite clear. On the one hand they argue the Soviet Union was *sui generis*, On the other hand their goal was to produce predictive models and theories. In other words, assumptions and goals were fundamentally contradictory, as they cannot both claim that something is totally unique and predictable at the same time.

A fourth problem for Sovietology that was argued by both Houben and Cummings, is the problem of boundaries nd epistemology. As where does one area stop, and another begin? How does cultures within one area interact with another? In addition, because of the movement of peoples from one area to another, cross-cultural exchange and influence further complicates things when studying cultures in the singular. And, ass Houben notes, since "…[various] scales of knowledge coexist, ranging from the local to the national to the academic global. What and how to explain things is governed by the cultural orders in which the relevant knowledge is produced."[88] This is one of the areas where AS runs into The problem intersubjectivity with one object of study.

A simple yet inadequate solution would be the 're-disciplinarization' of study, as this would solve many of the epistemological and ontological problems. However, this would preclude interdisciplinary study, as one of the great strengths of such study is to cover a subject more holistically. It would be wrong to believe that human existence can be neatly packaged and segmented parts where one only has to add the different parts together to make up an accurate picture reality. In other words, reality is more than the sum of its parts. As Basedau and Köllner argued, the first step would be too properly define concepts theories and models, but this is only the beginning. I would argue one solution would be to try to look for logic in a wider scientific perspective, as I believe they are a certain holistic logic to this world (though unfortunately I cannot substantiate). This might sound pseudo-religious, but we cannot ignore that physics influence chemistry, and chemistry influences biology, and biology in turn influences

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[88] Houben (2013), "The New Area Studies and Southeast Asian History", p. 4

psychology that again influence the social sciences. In other words, we as scholars should strive to understand the interconnections between the different aspects of the human experience and reality at large. This I believe was one of the great innovations or insights produced by interdisciplinary study. Particularly one such interconnection I feel is woefully under-explored, relation between group psychology political science and history. As this could not only help us increase the predictive value of social science but also increase *Verstehen*. Thus, the answer is not 're-disciplinarization', but rather to increase the interdisciplinarity of interdisciplinary study.

In any case, regardless on the questions and answers to the problems of AS, I believe I have given substantial evidence for the existence of such a triangle between the state, private foundations and academia. While this is in no way my own original research, my argument in showing these examples are that such a constellation of forces creates an important virtual space that is particularly susceptible to what Gramsci described as 'hegemonic' influence of political society. As I will show in the proceeding chapter, there is a discourse governing Sovietology that bore both close resemblance to the Orientalist discourse and the American Ideology. However, before I move on to the mentioned source material, we must know some of the basics of the different narratives and characteristics of the American political discourse.

Chapter Two: The Oriental Communist

As mentioned, political discourses do not arise from a vacuum, which is why it is necessary to detail some of the historical ideational traditions that came to influence and create political discourses. Anders Stephanson's (2003) "Liberty or Death" is in this respect very illuminating, both because of his thorough argumentation, but also his wide base of source material of American- and Western European ideational historiography. This I believe gives much strength and validity to his argument.

The American Stories

I will start with the banal assumption that in any conflict as long and as tense as the Cold War there must be a legitimating force sustaining it, as people need beliefs to initiate and guide action. As we know from Said, there was a substantial ideational historical content that

influenced and informed the Orientalist about what the Orient was.[89] Sovietology and the Cold War were no different.

In Anders Stephanson's "Liberty or Death", a chapter in Odd Arne Westad's *Reviewing the Cold War* (2000), Stephanson detailed and analyzed the ideational historical traditions that formed the American Cold War ideology. Using the National Security Council directive 68 as his principal primary source, which he argued was "…given foundational status by the Korean War…".[90] Stephanson argued that from the end of the 1930s up until 1947, there was a shift in American political discourse that enabled both American interventionism and anti-communist ideology. Therefore, to understand exactly how the anti-communist discourse influenced Sovietology, we need to know some details about the narrative structures, motifs and ideas that informed it.

The deepest roots of this discourse can be found in both age-old Christian values and ideas from the Bible, as well as the republican tradition beginning with Rome, that gained its full force during the Enlightenment period and the 19th century. Most defining of this discourse, is its polarization between 'good and 'evil', where of course the former is represented by freedom and independence, and the latter as 'slavery' and dependence.[91] However, as we concern ourselves with representations of the Soviet Union and the anti-communist discourse, I will focus on the representations, characteristics and narratives that characterize evil in the American Ideology.

Roughly speaking there are two main narratives: First, there is the cyclical narrative of 'the fall from grace', or of apostasy and regeneration. This narrative describes those who were formerly good ended up becoming evil, as they gave into temptation and excess, therefore degenerating into evil and corruption. While it is possible for those who are now evil to become good again, by following the path of temperance and adherence to the agreed upon rules, this story is one where those who wanted to do good but ended up doing evil. Similar to the story of Lucifer's fall from grace, we follow the story of a protagonist full of virtuous characteristics, such as strength, intelligence and cunning, but due to certain important vices such as lust or greed, these virtues become used in an excessive manner leading the main character to 'fall from grace'. The second narrative is that of the Impostor (or Anti-Christ), where the subject of the

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[89] Said 2003, *Orientalism*, p. 17, 21.
[90] Stephanson 2000, "Liberty or Death", p. 83
[91] A note concerning 'slavery', as Stephanson shows, is how 'totalitarianism' came to represent slavery in this discourse between the late 1930s and mid-1940s. See Stephanson's chapter in full for more information.

story is seemingly possessing all the right qualities, but in reality is full of vice and malice as to subvert the forces of good and bring in the reign of evil (or the Devil in religious discourse). Furthermore, the Impostor portrays himself as the savior (or the second coming of Christ in Christian discourse), and portrays all the right virtues, but through his cunning manages to slowly subvert his righteous, but simple followers into becoming evil. [92]

The structure of these narratives share many similar qualities as should be evident to the reader, as they follow the story of something seemingly good, but who in reality is evil, or is good and subsequently succumbs to evil.

What is important to keep in mind with these narratives are the characteristics of good and evil. The forces of 'good' (read: free) are characterized by the virtues of temperance, adherence to agreed-upon rules and the independence from outside forces. Furthermore, drawing on the medieval English tradition, freedom is always under siege, both internally and externally. However, as these are the characteristics of 'good', it is important to remember that as any good man, temptation always tries to lure good people into doing evil. [93]

'Evil' on the other hand, is in many ways the mirror image of 'good', only in reverse, and it is in this "structural position"[94] that we can find many similarities with the Orientalist depiction of 'Oriental' political systems. Characteristic of evil, is that it is always expansive in nature, fraught by excess, and ruled by a lawless, arbitrary and unpredictable force/leader. It is in many respects fragile, but because of its tempting nature, it is also strong. Those who represent evil are in this view always a minority party who rules over the many, with a large degree of centralization of power their hands. In contrast to evil, the forces of good has purpose in their actions, they are visible and open, while the forces of evil have no purpose, they have designs; always creeping in their effectuation; slowly and cunningly orchestrated by shadowy cabals. Evil will therefore typically send its agents to subvert the forces of good from within and increase their power step-by-step before finally springing their trap. Thus, to combat this evil, the forces of good must always remain vigilant, honest in their purpose, and be tempered in their choices as to not fall for temptation. These ideas come in large part from the Fall of Rome, the Radical Reformation (such as Calvin's 'persecuted remnant'), and that of Lucifer's fall from grace and

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[92] Stephanson 2000, "Liberty or Death", p. 85-86
[93] Ibid, p. 87
[94] ibid

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the antichrist posing as an impostor among humans.[95]

As I will show in the following section, we can find all of these narratives, characteristics and representations in the authors' depictions of the Soviet Union and its communist power.

The Dangerous Communists

Before analyzing the source material, it is important to remember what Orientalism is. As Todorova argued (and Said) that one of the most important functions of Orientalism is the construction of identity by contrasting oneself with "the other". Put differently, it is an "othering" process.[96] This insight forms an essential part of my argument, as I have mentioned, I argue that 'Sovietologism' is such a process, only in contrast to Orientalism that has a wider scope, Soveitologism is the process of identity formation of the both the Western economic-political system, but also of the Western "Capitalist" ideology. Otherwise known as 'Capitalism', or free-market liberal democracy. Therefore, there are two main aspects I will focus on: First, there is the political system, and systems of political control of a state over its people. This is because of during this first period of Sovietology was dominated by the 'totalitarian model', which stood in stark contrast to the free-market liberal democratic ideology dominant in the West. For this aspect I will analyze Barrington Moore's (1954) *Terror and Progress*. However, to properly contextualize Moore's argument, I will cover some of the most basic characteristics of the 'totalitarian model', where I will use Carl Friedrich's contribution to his own symposium where he details the main aspects of such political systems. While Hanna Arendt's (1951) *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was the most important work in respect to totalitarianism, it was Friedrich who adapted the framework to better account for the Soviet Union.[97] The second aspect that I will focus on, is the portrayal and analysis of Soviet ideology, namely Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. This is because I believe this is one area where it's particularly easy for political discourses to surface. I would argue that this is because I believe every human individual has grown up within an ideology, and therefore it is hard not to view other ideologies through the prism of one's own. In other words, I believe the problem of intersubjectivity mentioned by Köllner and Basedau seems here particularly acute. Therefore, because of this problem of

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[95] Ibid, p.88-91
[96] Todorova 2000, "Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul?", p. 725
[97] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy,* p. 207

intersubjectivity, I will devote more space to ideology compared to the portrayal of the Soviet political system and the dynamics of power vis-à-vis the population.

Moore's Bureaucratic Society

As with most Sovietologists of the 1950s Barrington Moore jr. studied the Soviet Union through the lens of the totalitarian model. Despite the fact that this model came under increasing criticism in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the large degree of control of Soviet authorities over their population could not be ignored by any serious scholar. As mentioned, it was Friedrich who adapted Arendt's totalitarian model originally based on Nazi Germany to fit the Soviet Union. While Friedrich is quite clear that he does not believe totalitarianism is "racially" contingent on either Germans or Russians, but rather that it is only possible in "…the kind of context created by Christianity, democracy, and modern technology."[98] This point gives us some insight into the peculiar shape of the Sovietologism, as in many ways, Russia and the Soviet Union was seen as the representing a perversion of Western ideals, something we can see this in current affairs in relation to the Ukraine Conflict. As Blachford (2020) argues, the portrayal of Russia's hybrid warfare as "…not just being a "sneaky" Easterner, but by not playing by "the rules".[99] A corresponding view can be found in the older roots of Russian "Orientalism-ness" in the case of 18th and 19th century France where Russia and Slavs being viewed as "…young "Oriental Europeans" and assigning them the task of regenerating the old and decadent Europe."[100]

As for the instruments of political control and how the American Orientalist discourse shows itself, Barrington Moore Jr.'s *Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship* (1954) was as mentioned widely influential work in the early Sovietological community. The idea and intention of this book as explained by Moore in the preface was to study "…the sources of stability and the potentialities for change in the Bolshevik regime."[101] Moore, in contrast to Fainsod and Barghoorn who studied the Soviet Union through the lens of political science, Moore was a trained sociologist. Novel to this study, was Moore's analytical framework of studying the country by "…showing the kinds of situations that

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[98] Friedrich 1953, "The Nature of Totalitarianism", p. 58
[99] Blachford 2020, "Western orientalism and the threat from Russia", p.358
[100] Adamovsky 2005, "Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 1810–1880", p. 605
[101] Moore 1954, *Terror and Progress*, p. ix

confronted different people in Soviet society…".[102] This is perhaps also one of the strengths of the study, as it does have a certain "down to earth" perspective, using examples and perspectives of regular Soviet citizens in explaining how the Soviet system works. Further contrast to the other reviewed works, Moore is not concerned with the history of the state and regime, but rather how the system works as it was at the time of writing. This is not however to say that he disregards the history of the different parts of the system, but rather that it is used in an informative way, rather than analytically.

The sources used by Moore consists chiefly of official printed Soviet sources, such as newspaper articles, Party pronouncements and laws. The second type of sources used by Moore, was interviews with refugees from the Soviet Union, where Harvard's RIP project interviews formed the basis of Moore's oral sources. It is worth to remember, that this project was done in cooperation with the US Air Force's Human Resources Research Institute.[103] Of the works reviewed so far, this is in the opinion of the author the best one, as it shows the Soviet system as consisting of millions of ordinary and extraordinary people's lives. While I will argue for this work being influenced by Orientalizing tendencies, I will contend that because of the narrative structure and framework of analysis makes it considerably less influenced by said tendencies. This I believe is because of how Foucault argued of discursive power being "enabling and constraining", in that the Orientalist-, or American ideological discourse functions in an *informative* manner, and not *constructive* manner.

In Moore's first chapter "The Instruments of Control", he tries to explain and analyze how the Soviet system of controls fit together, as well as detailing their operation and the dynamics of power. What Moore believes is important when it comes to the analysis of society, is how informal rules and norms influence behavior, and how any society's inhabitants' actions, small and large, create a society as a whole. Thus, he begins with the larger features of Soviet society and political system, before going into more detail about its operation.

What Moore believes to be perhaps one of the most defining aspects of the Soviet Union, was its bureaucratic nature. He asserts that because of totalitarian shape that the Soviet dictatorship had taken, it had "…[f]or about the past twenty years (…) been one enormous bureaucracy. The state has swallowed society (…) [and t]he behavior of nearly every adult male

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[102] ibid
[103] Ibid, p. xii

during his waking hours is determined by his place within this bureaucracy."[104] The most important part of this bureaucracy was its hierarchical nature, where every decision was made "…within the framework of other decisions, reached at a higher level in an ell-embracing administrative system."[105] At the top of this hierarchy, was of course the Presidium (Politburo), without which "…the entire fabric of Soviet society could be expected to disintegrate with astonishing rapidity."[106] In other words, the Soviet Union was in fact no society, it was a bureaucracy. And, the crux of this bureaucracy, was its highest organ, the Presidium. This assertion echoes how Orientalism often ignored society and individuality.[107] In contrast with Western society where the free market is dominant and civil society plays an important role, no such thing existed in Moore's USSR. Furthermore, in line with Stephanson's description of American ideology and Oriental despotism, the leader (or collective leadership in this case) is the essential actor in such a political system. Without which, it cannot function and would simply unravel itself with "astonishing rapidity."

Another section that matches closely with both the Orientalist discourse and a commonly held view at the time of the Second World, was the view of Communist China being controlled, or directed from Moscow. During the truce negotiations in the Korean War, Moore finds it very suspicious that the coinciding of China's announcement of concessions on the prisoner-of-war issue, and Molotov's immediate support. He argues in relation to the timing that "…Soviet approval was timed suggestively."[108] Though he goes not as far as arguing that the Chinese action was controlled by Moscow, it is implicit in his wording. Moore does argue similarly in respect to East Germany, although in this case he was more correct.

After detailing the rough administrative lines and functions within the Soviet Union, Moore continues with describing how politically positive functions operated. In using these politically positive functions, "…Soviet leaders seem to be (…) [relying] on enough spirited and intelligent support from the population so that at least minor officials, (…) can be counted upon to do the right thing at the right time…"[109] As time passed, Moore explained, this hope of "spirited" and "intelligent" population diminished and were replaced by "…a more cynical and

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[104] Ibid, p.2
[105] Ibid, p. 3
[106] ibid
[107] Said 2003, *Orientalism*, p. 287
[108] Moore 1954, *Terror and Progress,* p. 6
[109] Ibid, p. 10

manipulative attitude, also a strong tradition in Bolshevik thinking."[110] While this cannot be refuted, it is rather how Moore can suddenly represent "a Bolshevik's" thoughts. As if Moore knows the 'Bolshevik' better than the Bolshevik himself.

Another passage that portends to the role of power vs. ideological commitments, Moore uses the argument of Rostow (1953) that the maintenance of power being the Soviet leaderships overriding goal to argue that "…the leaders have been quite willing to sacrifice any literal adherence to Marxism."[111] However, Moore does go onto argue that power alone does not explain Soviet policy, as "…[p]ower cannot be pursued as the one and only goal of any ruling group..."[112] This balanced, yet biased view does reveal Moore's greater distance to the ideological discourse governing Sovietology. I would argue that any political leader or ruling group does seek to maintain its power, as a pure ideal-type idealism hardly exists anywhere. And, if said group are to remain in power for any extended period of time, the maintenance of power must be pursued, as why seek power only to give it up?

In a later section concerning Soviet control over an industrialized society, Moore argues that the "…regularity, precision, security, predictability and clarity in hierarchical relationships…"[113] are the very anti-thesis to Soviet rule. While he admits that such qualities to a certain extent are essential in any industrial society, "…even in a totalitarian dictatorship […]"[114] he contends as follows: "If the Communist rulers ever achieved the degree of regularity and precision in their society that they seek so constantly and vigorously, they would seriously alter and probably destroy the basis of their own rule."[115] This is perhaps one of the passages where the Orientalist tendencies comes the most clearly forth. As we know, "Oriental" rule-, and the forces of evil in the American ideology, are characterized by a erratic, arbitrary and unpredictable rule. Moore continues in the succeeding paragraph "…[t]he Party itself shows some signs of strain under the conflicting requirements of being both a rational bureaucracy and an instrument of arbitrary despotism with secular utopian pretensions."[116] Why this is so, he argues that this is because of a trait in the Russian populace. "There is good evidence, I believe,

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[110] ibid
[111] Ibid, p. 12
[112] ibid
[113] Ibid, p. 18
[114] Ibid
[115] Ibid, p. 19
[116] ibid

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for the view that a substantial number of Russians shy away from cold, impersonal relationships that involve only a small segment of the personality."[117] And, Moore characterizes such a relationship as "…that between a gruff father and a naughty child."[118] Reflective of typical Orientalist diminution of their subject matter,[119] Moore argues here implicit that because the Bolshevik was Russian, and because the Russian likes warm and close personal relationships, any hierarchical relationship must be similar to that between a "gruff father and a naughty child."

The last section of this chapter deals mainly with the dynamics of the bureaucratic system of the USSR, and Moore argues for how the totalitarian nature of this system functions. Moore argued there was three methods that the Soviet authorities employed to keep strict control, though to varying degrees of success. The first was Lenin's attempt to impose a Prussian style-civil service with clear lines of authority and communication. While Moore argues that this was a poor fit due to "…the Communist viewpoint, [because for] the Bolsheviks it was necessary to be able to leap into the situation at any point they chose…".[120] Third, because of the demands for "frenzied" economic growth, "…Moscow puts demands on its servant s that are objectively beyond the possibility of human achievement. Moscow also makes the situation more difficult by hedging every responsible individual's behavior with numerous administrative and legal restrictions in order to make sure this behavior flows in the proper channels."[121] Through such methods, Moore argues, not only gave Soviet authorities a great hold over its officials and policy, as they could "…[threaten] them with punishment when they [failed] to accomplish [the assigned task]." (ibid) However, this did not only produce desirable results for Moscow. Due to the fact that breaking the law was necessary, officials needed favors from each other. This resulted in "…spiderwebs of connections (…) from the raion up to the Kremlin (…) [that] extend both upwards and downward. (…) At their center is usually a powerful and ambitions individual (…) [who] must balance one web against the other, as well as endeavor to destroy any that inhibit the exercise of his power"[122]

To a Westerners point of view, such a system not only seems arbitrary and lawless, the

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[117] Ibid, p. 20
[118] ibid
[119] Said 2003, *Orientalism,* p. 204
[120] Moore 1954, *Terror and Progress*, p.20
[121] Ibid, p. 21
[122] Ibid, p. 21-22

image of a spiderweb of power with a ruthless predator at its center does give strong negative connotations, even horror. Evaluative language and imagery aside, it does give an important insight into the Soviet political system, as to characterize it as totalitarian, at least during Stalin's reign, is in my opinion not exactly wrong. What is troubling however, is the portrayal of such a system as lawless and arbitrary in almost every respect, ruled by ruthless and powerful individuals whose "spiderwebs" extend outwards. The metaphor of 'spiderwebs' with the spider at its center not only uses the imagery of a frightening predator, but it also implies that it tries to catch unsuspecting individuals due to such webs' sticky nature.

In detailing the relationship between the military and secret police, Moore argued that the Bolsheviks' employment of violence would inevitably increase the power of those administering said violence. This statement of course necessitates a discussion of the power of the army versus that of the secret police. While giving a well-reasoned discussion and analysis of the military's role, Moore flounders in one important respect, which most likely pertains to Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. "Though such a hypothetical asset [of not being associated with the regime's most unpopular aspects] could not become effective until popular sentiment itself became far more of a political force, it is a plausible guess that a military [dictatorship[123]] might be more acceptable to the population than the Communist one."[124] Why would such a dictatorship be more popular than the Communist one? Moore gives no further reason than the military not being "…closely identified with the most unpopular aspects of the regime…"[125] This to me seems quite far-fetched, as is it not preferable to be guided by at least seemingly idealistic people, rather than purely military leaders with no professed goal? Was not the idealistic aspect of Marxism one of its most attractive aspects? Moore's argument here seems to me very thin, as he seems to argue that Communism would necessarily be rejected, had the people only known what he had known. This bears a close resemblance to the Orientalist discourse, as 'Orientals' simply didn't know any better, and that their ideals were wrong. Whether or not this was because of any inherent pseudo-scientific racial quality Moore stays clear of, but it seems to point to certain biases held by the author.

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[123] In parenthesis because of a spelling mistake
[124] Moore 1954, *Terror and Progress*, p. 24
[125] ibid

The last part of this chapter goes on to analyze the power of the military and secret police, as well as the relationship between the two. Moore's analysis in this respect is stronger when he for example discusses the high percentage of Party members among the officer corps, does not necessarily mean that every officer is a Party member primarily. Despite that this would incline the reader to believe the Party to relatively unpopular, "…[for] the military to attempt a Bonapartist coup seams almost out of the question."[126] This Moore implies is because of the Party relative popularity, although he does not rule it out. Furthermore, in analyzing the NKVD's importance, he gives statistical evidence for their relative decline in importance as their funding decreased after the conclusion of the war. However, in concluding on the NKVD's power, he mentions that this "…remains one of the crucial unknowns in any attempt to analyze the position of the police."[127] Concludingly, Moore summarizes the points he made about the bureaucratic dynamics of dividing it against itself and argues that it is "…doubtful that the police could dominate Soviet society to the point of dispensing with the positive and technical lines of control embodied in the Party and the Soviet apparatus."[128]

As this section shows, through Moore's analytical framework of analyzing different aspect of Soviet society through that of different situations facing the populace, and his usage of primary Soviet sources and secondary sources, Moore manages to arrive at relatively well-reasoned conclusions. I would argue that this because of his analytical framework, as analyzing a political system and society through "situations" at the personal level, allows the scholar to use empathic understanding.

While Moore's depiction of the Soviet political system was not exactly rosy, he did manage to portray it in a relatively objective manner. Although, there are significant similarities between discourse as detailed by Stephanson and Moore's portrayal the USSR, Containing many of the same characteristics 'evil'. Furthermore, we can also similarities between the description of Oriental- and the Soviet political system, with a supreme despot at the top controlling society at every level through his administrative system. An interesting note however, is how there seemed to be an intersection between the orientalist discourse and that of Sovietologism in the

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[126] Ibid, p. 27
[127] Ibid, p. 29
[128] Ibid, p. 30

case China. As I have so far covered the control aspect of Sovietologism, I will continue on to analyze the other two works mentioned.

Fainsod's Saints and Sinners

The aim of Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* was to "…analyze the physiology, as well as the anatomy, of Soviet totalitarianism and (…) [give] a sense of the living political processes in which Soviet rulers and subjects are enmeshed."[129] In other words, to examine the Soviet Union as a political- and social system. In detailing the different aspects of the Soviet social- and political system, Fainsod uses mainly a chronological and personal narrative structure. Most visible is this in Part One of the book, as this details the path of the Communist (or 'Bolshevik') Party to power, from the late 19th century until after the Second World War. His language not exactly value free, but his prose is good, and it seems that he tried to portray the Soviet Union as objectively as possible. However, here the devil is in the details; while avoiding straight out moral condemnations, as Fainsod was clearly a skilled and competent scholar, it is the larger picture he paints that I argue is where the Orientalist discourse is situated. One important note is that I will not refute (or "blame") Fainsod for being factually wrong, as Western scholars had no way to verify their expositions due to the political situation both between the West and the Soviet Union. In addition, any factual misrepresentations are outside the scope of this thesis, as it is the *portrayal* of the USSR that is important in respect to Western political identity formation.

Lenin's Fall from Grace

In explaining the role of the CPSU (the Party), both in theory and praxis, Fainsod gives a historical account of how the Party dealt with opposition, ideology and how it evolved from the crucible of the October Revolution up until the death of Stalin.

At the beginning of the chapter, Fainsod gives a short explication of the problem faced by the Party in the immediate situation succeeding the October Revolution. While Marx and Engels "…envisaged the possibility of a peaceful, democratic road to socialism, Lenin seized on the

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[129] Fainsod 1953, *How Russia is Ruled,* p. ix

conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat as summing up the essence of Marxist doctrine…".[130] While not factually wrong, as one of the characteristics of Leninism is the "proletarian dictatorship", this portrayal of Leninism as a perversion of Marxism does correspond to the view of Russia and the Soviet Union as a perversion of "good" Western philosophy.

After the fact of the Bolshevik seizure of power, Fainsod explained that there were two different paths for the Party. One, constitutionalism and coalition government, and two, Party dictatorship. According to Fainsod, the first path risked the Party losing its control, while the other "…led irrevocably in the direction of civil war (…) and the invocation of terror."[131] The faction represented by Kamenev and Zinoviev believing in multi-party rule, argued strongly for their cause, despite heavy criticism and suppression from Lenin's faction. However, despite their best efforts, Lenin "…resorted increasingly to dialectical casuistry."[132] Through the use of clever speeches where Lenin portrayed himself the very embodiment of the will of the people, and the use of not-so-veiled threats against his opponents "ignoring the class struggle" and being 'unrevolutionary'. Thus, after dissolving the Constituent Assembly in early 1918, Fainsod argued that this represented the definitive Bolshevik break with constitutionalism. Furthermore, the eradication of opposition proceeded in slow stages, declaring opposition parties counterrevolutionary, and the use of terror through the Cheka (the precursor to the KGB). Through this use of terror, and counter-terror by the Left SR (Socialist Revolutionaries), "…the Red Terror assumed a mass character."[133] With the end of the Civil War in 1921 and the Kronstadt revolt all opposition had been crushed, with the arrest of Left SRs, Mensheviks and Kadets. Thus, Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat was complete, and with it "…the USSR has been accompanied by an increasing tendency (…) to rationalize [one-party dictatorship] as the highest form of democracy."[134] By using a speech from 1936 by Stalin, Fainsod argued that this was proof of "the Communist" belief in such a "strange rationale". According to Fainsod, "…[t]he unwillingness of Communists to submit to such [electoral] tests may suggest that the Party leadership has no great confidence that the masses would in fact validate their claims.

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[130] Ibid, p. 121
[131] Ibid, p. 122
[132] Ibid, p. 124
[133] Ibid, p. 126
[134] Ibid, p. 129

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Indeed, the Communists attitude toward opposition betrays a degree of insecurity bordering on the hypochondriac." (ibid) Concerning the story of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Fainsod asserts that despite their opposition to Lenin, by being threatened with expulsion from the Party, Zinoviev and Kamenev 'repented' their 'sins' and were subsequently welcomed back.[135]

In respect to Orientalism and the American ideological discourse, there are two main points of interest. First of all, there is the portrayal of Lenin who acts as the Impostor, allowing democratic tendencies by discussing and debating instead of merely using terror, using his intellect to subvert and using 'casuistry' to fool his opponents. Second, is Fainsod's deterministic analysis: If the Party had allowed opposition it would loose power; if it did not, it would result in terror. This is not a novel criticism, as the book was criticized for its deterministic view,[136] as using sources from Stalin in the 1930s to explain the events of the early 1920s does pose some questions. During this initial phase of the Bolshevik power, Stalin's assent was in no means certain, as there were many figures vying for power in this period.

Another interesting narrative that emerges in this chapter, is that of Lenin. Initially portrayed as being an impostor of Western philosophy (in perverting Marxism), in the following section we can see the narrative change from the Impostor to one where Lenin 'fell from grace'. Giving several mentions of Lenin's leniency to the opposition, even reasoning with them and acquiescing when opposed.

In one instance, Lenin criticizes the Left Communists for their utopianism, and despite their continued opposition, "…he took no disciplinary measures to prevent the Left from expressing its views." (ibid: 132) After being criticized by the Democratic Centralists who called the Central Committee under Lenin 'oligarchs', and criticized him for his silencing of critique. "Lenin's reply was evasive. (…) "Perhaps", he admitted, "mistakes have been made."[137] Following this story, Fainsod gives several instances where Lenin shows leniency, even democratic tendencies by accepting defeats in voting. One example is when the Worker's Opposition agitated against the Central Committee, "…[despite] the ban on factionalism, (…) [Lenin's] motion failed by one vote (…), and Shlyapknikov escaped with a stern warning."[138] (ibid: 136) However, at the end of the section, Fainsod mentions how Lenin's veiled threat of

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[135] Ibid, p. 121-131
[136] Engermann 2009, *Know Your Enemy*, p. 210
[137] Fainsod 1953, *How Russia is Ruled,* p. 133
[138] Ibid, p. 136

using 'machine guns' against the opposition in relation to party discipline in the NEP period. Thus, while "…his intolerance of opposition in principle was tempered by a practical realization that differences were (…) unavoidable[,] (…) the growing body of precedents which he created steered a course toward outlawing all opposition."[139] With Lenin's direction of outlawing opposition, and despite his 'ameliorating' practice, the "…Party was transformed into a rigid, hierarchical, military formation in which the duty of the lower ranks was to obey and the obligation of the leadership was to command. The Supreme Leader Stalin became vested with a godlike infallibility."[140]

While Fainsod's Lenin had previously been the anti-democratic punisher who sent the Cheka to deal with his enemies, Lenin in this section became the one who still harbored temperance for the freedom of criticism. However, with his tendency towards excess in combatting the opposition through debate and even threats of violence, his practical abilities hindered this. Despite Lenin's best attempts to keep the Party relatively open, his previous sins opened the path for Stalin to enter the scene.

Stalin the Impostor

In the two previous section covered so far, the presence of temperance and virtues hindered the fall of the new socialist country into the depths of totalitarianism, in large part by Lenin's practicality and tolerance. However, in the section covering Stalin's ascent the story follows the pattern of the Impostor narrative. Starting with the traces of Lenin's virtues, the story turns progressively into one where Stalin's designs creeps in its effectuation. At its climax, Stalin's terror is unleashed in full force. On a side note, this section is very gripping to read.

What is perhaps the most striking in this section, is how closely it follows the Impostor narrative. Beginning with describing the power struggle between the triumvirate consisting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin is at one point described as "…appearing as the apostle of moderation and restraint...",[141] despite his staunch opposition to Trotsky. In his battle with Trotsky, Fainsod follows Stalin's story of initial leniency, though with mounting tensions first with Trotsky. At one point, Lenin's wife Krupskaya intervenes on part of the opposition, but to little avail. In the very same congress, Kamenev attempted an attack on Stalin, but to which the

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[139] Ibid, p. 138
[140] Ibid
[141] Ibid, p. 139

crowd starts chanting Stalin's name. As this marked the start of the cult of personality around Stalin, Fainsod described him as "…too shrewd to associate himself publicly with its development."[142] While the story continues with the ensuing struggle between Stalin and his former triumvirs and Trotsky, we see how Stalin outmaneuvers his opponents one by one, and forced his opponents into submission as conflicts arose. Even as Stalin managed to defeat his enemies, he subsequently turned around and betrayed his enemies. While I certainly do not wish to be an apologist for Stalin, it is rather telling that nowhere in this section is there a mention of any specific Stalinist ideology. Indeed, where Stalin is quoted, it is juxtaposed with a paragraph or section where Stalin's actions are described in a deterministic manner leading to totalitarianism. In the narrative employed by Fainsod, we almost come to root for the opposition to Stalin, where they are described in terms of 'refusing to capitulate', or 'refusing to be intimidated'. However, despite their attempts at resisting Stalin's power, at each step Stalin either intimidates, outmaneuvers his opponents with the words of Lenin, are preempted by Stalin's attacks or simply betrayed by him. Descriptive of how Stalin and his strategy is portrayed: "As always with Stalin, the design is unfolded by stages."[143]

The culmination of the story of Stalin came when Fainsod describes the beginning of The Great Terror. It must be said, that while perhaps not fitting to modern standards of academic writing, the story as Fainsod described it, it is quite gripping. "The delegates at the Congress vied with each other in proclaiming their fealty to Stalin. Not a single note of jarring criticism disturbed the monolithic serenity of the Congress."[144] After the assassination of Kirov when the Terror began, it is described in terms of "…[t]he saturnalia of blood and violence within the Party over the next four years claimed victims in the hundreds of thousands."[145] Perhaps fitting of such a truly horrific period of history, it is interesting however that the allusions to Roman religious festivals often viewed by Christianity as gluttonous and lustful. In such a manner Stalin's final ascent is described. "As an accompaniment of the overtowering ascendancy of Stalin, the figure of the infallible Dictator emerged as the operative theory of Bolshevik leadership. His colleagues in the Politburo functioned as administrative henchmen and assistants on a high level; the Central Committee went into a shadowy eclipse; Party congresses became

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[142] Ibid, p. 141
[143] Ibid, p. 145
[144] Ibid, p. 148
[145] Ibid

rallies of the faithful; and the Party apparatus served as the institutionalized projection of his will."[146] (Fainsod 1953: 150)

As mentioned, the story described by Fainsod is not a fictional one, it is roughly how it happened. In relation to Orientalism and the ideology described by Stephanson, it is interesting how Fainsod employs so many of the religious metaphors and narratives, especially when it comes to Stalin. While the story of Lenin does share some characteristics with the narratives of 'falling from grace' and the Impostor, but often overlapping with each other, that of Stalin does not. Especially the usage of religious metaphors such as his description of Stalin in the early years as appearing as an "apostle of moderation and restraint". The use of Roman metaphors also points to the republican tradition in the American political discourse, as explained by Stephanson, plays an important role.

Barghoorn's Ideological Menace

While Fainsod was mainly concerned in analyzing the "anatomy" of Soviet totalitarianism, Barghoorn's *Politics in the USSR* (1966) is a functional- and comparative political analysis of the Soviet Union. In his introduction, he explains how rapid change and technological progress can lead to the establishment of revolutionary political situations that for some "…may represent an instrumentality of human betterment[,] (…) [but t]o others, it can be a device for converting mass discontent into personal power for themselves.[147] Barghoorn devotes considerable space to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, as he explains that the rise of Sino-Soviet rivalry "…forces us to recognize the importance of (…) not only the elements common to the different varieties of communism but of the deep and complex differences which divide the various communist regimes and parties."[148] The book is about much more than 'variations within communism', as Barghoorn discusses both the historical traditions that make up the (then) contemporary Soviet "experiment", both in political and social terms, I will focus on his analysis on Marxist-Leninism as a political culture. I do this as I explained earlier, that within the realm of ideology, it is very easy to view a foreign ideology through the lens of owns own.

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[146] Ibid, p. 150
[147] Barghoorn 1966, *Politics in the USSR,* p. 2
[148] Ibid, p. 5

In beginning the chapter "The Dominant Political Culture", not only does the revolutionary movement in the "Russia" (read USSR) possess "titanic ambitions" to transform Russia, but also the world. According to Barghorn, "[t]his is a political culture outwardly consistent but seething with hidden contradictions."[149] He explains, that while Soviet ideology is premised on the Marxist conception of freedom, "[it] is oppressively orthodox and conformist, but capable of great resourcefulness and adaptiveness."[150] Here we see how Soviet communism is not only titanic and messianic in that it aims for world domination, but also rife with "contradictions" and is "oppressively conformist". In addition, Barghoorn explains that it is both "parochial and isolationist" but aspires to "universality of application". Drawing this juxtaposition further, "…[its] fear of "alien" influences inspires an urge to control the world whence these disturbing forces spring."[151] Thus we can see how contradictory the Soviet political culture is, it is both xenophobic and internationalist; isolationist, but also with universal ambitions.

Despite these contradictions that would lead one to believe in such a system's weakness, "…[the] "apparatus" (…) possesses overall coherence and formidable capabilities."[152] Further cementing the inner contradiction of how the American ideology views its anti-thesis as both strong and fragile at the same time. Not only is this system simultaneously strong and weak, but in respect to its ideology "[t]he party elite uses the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism to rationalize its monopoly of leadership roles."[153] In other words, the Soviet elite uses its ideology instrumentally for the maintenance of its own power, and implicit in this statement, they do not believe in it themselves. In respect to the 'expansive' nature of evil in the American Ideology, Barghoorn explains that while its ideological "…pretensions reflect the enormous ambition and power drive of the CPSU leadership."[154] This drive towards expansion and world domination is a prominent feature in this chapter, and this expansionism is not a purpose, but a "Soviet design", and whose adherents are characterized as possessing a "frightening determination".[155] Here we can see the use of the word "design" signifies this dichotomy between America's "purpose" and

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[149] Ibid, p. 12
[150] Ibid
[151] Ibid
[152] Ibid
[153] Ibid
[154] Ibid, p. 13
[155] Ibid, p. 14

Soviet "designs". It should be noted however, as with Fainsod, it is not a factual distortion I argue for, as Marxism is internationalist in its doctrine, but rather *how* it is portrayed, and the words used to portray Soviet communism. While the internationalist feature of Marxism is well known, Soviet elites are portrayed as not actually believing in this conviction was a mere tool in achieving world domination. Ignoring the fact that the East-West tensions does create certain geopolitical incentives, as Western hostility towards the Soviet Union would necessitate certain policies that does not exactly conform to the ideological tenants of Marxist-Leninism.

To commend Barghoorn, despite this portrayal, he does mention that "…one cannot simply dismiss [the contradiction between the professed goals and the means employed in this pursuit as] hypocritical demagogy or meaningless ritual phraseology…".[156] This he argues is because through using the heroic Soviet victories does foster a communist sense of purpose. Here we can perhaps see that while political discourses do influence the shape and form of narratives and the usage of concepts, it is not impossible for an author to deviate from this discourse. To use a metaphor, it is possible for an author to occasionally surface from the discursive waters but is nonetheless situated within this water that shapes formulation and patterns of thought.

An interesting section of this chapter is the one named "Blueprint for the Future". In the first paragraph, Barghoorn explains how the party program of the 22nd CPSU Congress is significantly less ambitious than that of 1919. By drawing on Marx's "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work", this program devotes large space to how important of material welfare is to Soviet citizens in the course of building communism. What Barghoorn notes, is how the program "…expressed confidence that the "high road to socialism" (…) would be taken "sooner or later by all peoples.""[157] Why I choose to discuss this paragraph, is that I find it rather peculiar that we go from the importance of material welfare to world domination in almost one breath. Neither is wrong, as mentioned there are certainly significant internationalist trends within Soviet socialism, and in an egalitarian society material welfare is very important. It is just that I fail to see the logic in what the two has to do with each other, as how does material welfare lead to aspirations for world domination? Both should of course be covered in any book or article on the Soviet Union, but I would contend that it is the projection of Barghoorn's own

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[156] Ibid, p. 17-18
[157] Ibid, p. 19

political ideology that would make such an inclusion of both pertinent. The material egalitarianism was a very influential and attractive aspect of Soviet society, but as Barghoorn's previous section concerns the political control that the Soviet 'apparatus' exerted over its populace. Preceding "The Blueprint for the Future", Barghoorn's section "Style of Mobilization", of which I quoted and discussed in the paragraphs above on length discusses the contradiction between Soviet ideology and governance. In a passage on page 17 the word "pseudomystical" Soviet ideology is used to explain Stalinist repression and dogmatic and "hysterical" intensity that his rule elicited. Detailing the many crimes of Stalin's regime and the eventual admittance that this might not be mere demagogy is then preceded by the need for material welfare of Soviet citizens.[158] In other words, in this context it is the composition of Barghoorn's argument that I find problematic, as why not include each in their own section, and later discuss their relation? To me, it seems that the theme connecting the two are Soviet ideology itself, and its "messianic" and internationalist elements that connects the two. Furthermore, the word "pseudomystical" (disregarding his spelling mistake) does seem a bit out of place, as he also mentions the word "pseudoreligious", which seems appropriate,[159] but "pseudomystical" seems to me as a transposition.

The following section "The Demand for Obedience", Barghoorn goes into some detail and analysis of Lenin, Stalin and Khruschev's attitudes to oppositional activity within (and outside) the party. As I have previously covered this theme in Fainsod's chapter, I will not go into detail about how Barghoorn portrays Lenin's- or Stalin's attitudes. While it could be of interest to juxtapose such portrayals in detail, it follows roughly the same narrative structure for the respective individuals.[160] Difference is of course, as Barghoorn wrote from the vantage point of the 1960s, thus including Khrushchev. Khrushchev shares many of the same characteristics as Lenin, although there is a certain 'blending' of the Fall from Grace- and Impostor narratives.

Since Khrushchev's secret speech initiated a softening of the previous Stalinist methods of terror and silencing of critics, it would be hard to portray the two in a similar fashion (not that Barghoorn attempts it). However, in comparing Khrushchev and Lenin, the two's more 'democratic' tendencies come to light, but of course hidden behind the scene is their dictatorial

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[158] Ibid, p. 14-18
[159] As totalitarian ideology does bear some resemblance to religion. See Sørensen's (2011) chapter on "Totalitarianism as Concept and Phenomena" (author's translation).
[160] Barghoorn 1966, *Politics in the USSR,* p. 23, 25

tendencies (which in no way is wrong). What is interesting here, is the oft cited criticism of Sovietology: its obsession with high politics. Only at the highest echelons of the Soviet political structure are there room for agency. Similar to 'oriental court politics', it is the whims of the leaders that guide policy. The aggregation of interests and cajoling in the lower to the upper ranks about making the voices of different interest groups are almost completely ignored. While the 'democratic' Khrushchev did foster forms of participatory forms of politics through the mass organizations (such as the Komosol), the tying of these to the CPSU prohibits any bottom-up initiative. "They might even, under adverse circumstances, become agents of repression…".[161]

In the following section concerning Soviet patriotism, "Patriotism and Internationalism", we can see this disregard for the agency of individuals not belonging to the Party elite. Barghoorn does at some length discuss the importance of Soviet patriotism, defined as 'socialist patriotism'. This section contains many paragraphs devoted to how this national identification with the Soviet socio-economic system were engineered by both Stalin and Khrushchev. Using speeches and official Soviet literature, Barghoorn explains that this construction of the 'socialist patriotism' was a realization of the Soviet leaders "…that if they were to fulfill their worldwide mission they must inculcate in the population (…) sentiments of patriotic pride."[162] This identity created by Lenin, Stalin and the Party elite, Barghoorn argues, "…represents identification with a "way of life"."[163] Thus, in opposition to the American "way of lie", the Soviet way of life entailed a "[boundless] love of the Soviet people for the socialist motherland, the unity of all the fraternal peoples around the party of Lenin and Stalin and the Soviet government"[164] This love Barghoorn explains, is not a love for one's country, but love for one's system. With this usage of the term "way of life", it is hard not to see the connotation to the West, whereas an American would love his country, a communist loves his system.

In discussing the impact this construction of the Soviet national identity had on the people, there is one passage that does connote strongly to Orientalist imagery: "How successful has the CPSU leadership been in molding the participatory subject, or to use the expression coined by an American scholar, the "eager robot?". Because of Soviet secrecy however, Barghoorn argues the result of how eager these "robots" were, was inconclusive, but on the

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[161] Ibid, p. 26
[162] Ibid, p. 30
[163] Ibid, p. 31
[164] Ibid

background on Soviet achievements significant support and pride existed. [165]

Perhaps most telling of the Orientalist discourse, is of course the characterization of Soviet citizens as robots. As such a characterization is completely devoid of life, as a robot does merely what it's told. In addition, the narrative of Barghoorn's section does leave little room for agency, or indeed individuality, of the different peoples of the Soviet Union. Constantly the discussion revolves around how top-down initiatives shape the formation of such an identity. Only once is a non-Soviet leader mentioned (except for Nekrasov, who was a 19th century Russian poet), and perhaps characteristic of the time, no name is mentioned except as a footnote (his name was N. I. Matyushkin).

In this section, I have given several instances of both narrative structures found in the American Cold War ideology as characterized by Stephanson. Just as with Fainsod, we see the employment of the same narratives, although at a smaller scale (which is arguably because of Fainsod's overall narrative structure). Portrayal of Soviet ideology painted a picture in stark opposition to Western free-market and individualistic ideology. Often in following descriptions and analyses of Stalin's crimes and the anti-democratic nature of the Soviet political system, a mention, reference, or analysis of Marxist-Leninist internationalist ambitions are mentioned. While Barghoorn does mention especially Khrushchev's 'peaceful co-existence' policies, we are often left with the feeling of Khrushchev's demagogy and deception and subversion of his democratic tendencies and 'peaceful' policies. Furthermore, the focus on elite politics and their imposition of policies and ideas on the Soviet populace, gives the implicit impression of a static and lifeless society, devoid of life, vibrancy and agency. Perhaps most illustrative of this latter point, is his borrowing of Ralph T. Fisher Jr.'s "eager robots".

Another interesting feature of Barghoorn's book in contrast to Fainsod's, is the increasingly 'scienticized' language. Avoiding to a large extent the religious metaphors, analogies and terms, it does point to an increasing professionalization of the field, as well as the overall trends within academia of employing less evaluative language. Of course, using such metaphors does make for more interesting reading, although hardly better science.

Further still, we can also see a certain shift in attitude towards the Soviet Union. While in Fainsod's book, Barghoorn's Soviet Union seems much more menacing than it did for Fainsod.

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[165] Ibid, p. 33-34

While with Fainsod, the dangers of Stalin or Lenin are mostly in the connection of what they posed to their enemies or population. With Barghoorn, this phantom of Soviet world domination or -conquest seems ever present. Barghoorn even mentions as such in the introduction, that because of the "…destructive capabilities have increased to almost an incredible degree. In this context a detailed analysis of Soviet political structure and processes seems a useful undertaking."[166] This is of course no surprise, as only four years before the publishing of his book the world stood at the edge of nuclear annihilation in the Cuban Crisis. In any case, this shows to how large an extent Gramsci's *hegemony* does influence academia, although we hardly need a theoretical concept to explain that the threat of extinction influence both the scholar and politician alike.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have argued for the influence of a political discourse Sovietology, that bears close resemblance to the Orientalist discourse. I have chosen to name this discourse in respect to Sovietology - 'Sovietologism'. I have based my argument on both Gramsci and Foucault, and used Cummings' and Engermann's works as evidence for this field's particular susceptibility for political influence. By analyzing Moore's *Terror and Progress*, Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* and Barghoorn's *Politics in the USSR*, with Stephanson's "Liberty or Death" as the ideational basis for Sovietologism, I believe I have given sufficient evidence to at least indicate there is such a discourse. As for the function that Sovietologism served, I have argued that this discourse served to differentiate the Western liberal democratic and socio-economic system against that of the Soviet Union. For this, I have unfortunately fallen short, as to prove such a wide-ranging statement would most likely necessitate a doctoral dissertation, and not a master's thesis.

In regard to the current debate within AS that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union, I have positioned my argument alongside Houben, Basedau and Köllner and Cummings, in that there is both a problem in the definition of concepts and theories, but also that there is a problem of boundaries that plague this field. Perhaps more unique to my own argument, although it does resemble Houben's, that there is an ontological tension within the field that is cause for

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[166] Ibid, p.1

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many of the misgivings of Sovietology. My own position to solving said tension, is to broaden the scope of interdisciplinary study, especially between group psychology and the social sciences, such as political science and history. I believe there are many fruits unpicked in this regard. Epistemological challenges also face AS, Khosrowjah explained, area specific knowledge tends to be produced through a prism of ideology, and that its root problem appears to be within the colonial heritage of the West. However, I would caution against condemning AS completely due to this fact, as I believe there is something intrinsic to knowledge. It is the work of scholars such as Said to correct them, as this will (and have in the past) greatly increased our knowledge about not only the field-, object-, and subject of study.

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