UiO : University of Oslo

Please mind the gender gap

A study of gender's effect on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in Norway

Ingvild Leren Stensrud

(30,114 words)

A thesis presented for the degree of
Master of Political Science

Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
Autumn 2020

Abstract

Is there a gender gap in political views? In this master thesis, I will investigate whether or not women and men have different placements on the political dimension, often referred to as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Does gender affect views on so-called "cultural issues"?

Based on the Generation Gap theory by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, I expect women to be more libertarian than men. Inglehart and Norris' argument is that the various modernization process, predominantly happening in post-industrial societies, are creating a value cleavage between women and men. One consequence of this divide is that women and men's political views are drifting apart. This have made women more concerned with what can be considered libertarian political issues.

To test my hypothesis, I have looked to Norway and I find that Norwegian women, in general, have a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian men. The findings indicate that gender affect what we think about as a cluster of political issues related to this dimension. These political issues associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension can roughly be grouped into four issue categories, namely, 1) authority, order and punishment; 2) moral, religion, tradition and human rights; 3) immigration; and 4) climate and environmental issues. When looking at the issue categories separately, I find that women hold more libertarian positions then men on all issues, but that the size of the gender gap varies. The issue that women and men disagree the most about is climate and environmental issues, second comes immigration, third is moral, religion, tradition and human rights and forth comes the issue category authority, order and punishment. This findings indicated that while women are consistently holding a more libertarian political view then men, the strength of the gender effect varies between the issues related to the dimension.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my wonderful supervisors, Carl Henrik Knutsen and Peter Egge Langsæther. Peter, to me, you have been the older brother that knows everything. The one you look up to and want to become someday. You have always put me back on track when I got lost in the literature. Carl Henrik, I see you as the parent that made sure everything ran smoothly. You have solved disagreements between Peter and me and made sure that I got where I needed to be. To the both of you; thank you so much for your constructive and honest feedbacks. Thank you for all the words of encouragement and understanding and thank you for being so invested in my thesis from day one. You are the best.

I also want to thank Erlend and Alban for being my partners in crime when struggling through advanced statistics. Thank you to everyone in "Female political scientists who likes books and wine" and thank you Eva and Kristine for including me in your cohort during lockdown.

Writing my thesis was far from what I thought it would be. I imagined long days and complaining about our lives over a beer at U1. I did not imagine packing down my books, saying goodbye to my desk, before returning home to my little apartment and realizing; this is where I am finishing my thesis. In this tiny place, by myself. But, in the middle of everything, while the world was shutting down and everyone was struggling to find hand sanitizers, I fell deeply, deeply in love. Without you, I don't know what would have become of this thesis. To my amazing girlfriend, Ninni, thank you so much for keeping me sane through these unsane times.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

Why do women and men vote differently, and how does gender affect our voting behaviour? This question has received significant attention over the years, but do women and men differ in their underlying political orientation? In this master's thesis, I will take a step back from voting and ask the question: Do women and men hold different political views? Does a gender conflict run alongside our political divides?

To better explain why I ask these questions in the first place, I offer a brief review of the literature exploring the relationship between gender and political behaviour and beliefs, and I assess the status of the field today. In 1937, Herbert Tingsten (1937) conducted what was, to the best of my knowledge, the first study of women and men's voting behaviour. When women first obtained the right to vote, many believed they would simply vote the same as their husbands (Campbell 2016, 161). However, Tingsten (1937) found that women voted more conservatively than men, while the majority of those supporting socialist or communist parties were men. Women also tended to vote for religious parties more often than men. The same results were later found by Duverger (1955) in his study of voting behaviour in France, West Germany, Norway and Yugoslavia. This difference is often referred to as the gender gap, and the common notion of the time was that women were more conservative and right-leaning than men (Campbell 2016, 161).

But these trends did not last, and a new gender gap in voting emerged. It was first detected in the United States, where, since achieving full suffrage, the majority of women cast their ballots for Republican Party candidates. It was not until the 1980 presidential election that more women than men voted for the Democratic candidate. This new trend continued, and today, American women are more likely to vote for Democratic Party candidates while men more frequently vote Republican (Campbell 2016, 164 - 165). The same shift in voting behaviour

has slowly been appearing in other Western democracies, with researchers reporting that women were beginning to vote for left-leaning candidates and that the gender gap was changing direction. This new trend in voting is often referred to as the modern gender gap, and today it can be observed in most Western democracies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Bergh 2008; Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014).

Why are women today more likely than men to vote for left-leaning parties? Scholars theorize that there are three main reasons. The first is the difference between women and men's socioeconomic status and their experience in the work force. Multiple studies suggest that socioeconomic variables have a significant effect on gender and voting (see, for example, Knutsen 2001). However, there is a risk that the correlation between this structural variable and voting is created by variables further back in the causal model, for example, what are believed to be a good way to live and work.

The second explanation is that women and men have differing political attitudes, with research from the United States suggesting that the genders diverge on social welfare and economic issues. Women are more concerned with the redistribution of wealth and welfare services than men are (Bergh 2008 428). The same pattern has also been detected in the United Kingdom, where Campbell (2006, 62 – 63) found that the youngest cohorts of British women place themselves to the left of men on the right-left scale. She also discovered that women were more likely than men to consider education standards and the National Health Service (NHS) as important issues. Conversely, men placed more value on the state of the economy (Campbell 2006, 57 – 58). It seems plausible that a difference in women and men's political attitudes can contribute towards the voting gap. When we learn that men are more economically conservative than women, it is not surprising that we also find that men more likely to vote for right-leaning parties. However, this leads to another question: Why do women and men hold different political attitudes?

The last explanation for the modern gender gap is that women and men have different personal values. It has been suggested that the rise of new political parties and issues, beginning in the 1970s, was a result of changes in people's personal values. For example, Knudsen (2018) argues that values are a more important predictor of voting behaviour today than, for example, class and other socioeconomic background variables. Can values explain the modern gender gap? Inglehart and Norris (2000; 2003) believe so and argue that the modern gender gap in

voting is a result of a widening value divide between women and men. New political ideas, modernization and changing gender roles have made women, according to Inglehart and Norris, more post-materialistic than men, while men continue to hold more materialistic values. The consequence of this value divide is that women are more likely to vote for parties that emphasize political issues associated with post-materialistic values, and these parties are typically left-leaning. The difference between political attitudes and personal values might seem unclear. Simply put, the personal values we hold affect our attitudes towards political issues, and a difference in values can therefore explain a difference in attitudes. In the discussion of my theoretical framework in Chapter 2, I provide more in-depth clarification of these theoretical concepts.

In his literature review, Bergh (2008, 429) concludes there is evidence for claiming that values correlate with both gender and voting behaviour. However, he also argues that there remains much uncertainty regarding whether a difference in values can explain the modern gender gap in voting, suggesting that more research is needed to investigate which value dimensions might explain the voting gap and which are less important. In this master's thesis, I take Bergh up on his challenge and investigate whether I can identify gender differences relating to libertarian and authoritarian values. These values are seen as incompatible with each other, and their conflicting worldviews spill into the political realm by creating political divisions over core issues such as immigration, environment protection and LGBT+ rights (Kitschelt 1994; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Stubager 2008). Therefore, my research question is:

> Do women and men, in general, have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension?

1.1 Relevance of the research question

In this thesis, I do not explore the typical question of what creates the modern gender gap in most Western democracies. Instead, I choose to study the relationship between only two variables: gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. There are several reasons why, the most central of which is that this subject has been studied very little, and the few studies that have been done are inconclusive. As mentioned earlier, some studies have examined whether women and men have different political attitudes. However, only two studies have investigated the relationship between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) found that women in the Netherlands had become more libertarian than men over time, while Campbell (2006) did not find a significant gap between British women and men's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. The results from these studies contradict each other, and this creates a hole in the literature. Additionally, the data used in both studies were collected in the 1990s, and I am unaware of research being conducted with new data. This is problematic, because people's beliefs and attitudes are not static. Therefore, my master's thesis provides insight into a field that is little studied and in need of an update.

Another reason why my research question is relevant is because the results from my study might provide a small piece of the puzzle and contribute towards guiding further research questions. If I do not find a gender gap, it might seem less fruitful to continue studying whether personal values can explain the modern gender gap in voting and political attitudes. However, if I do identify a gender gap, this opens up a range of research questions that could be studied in the future (see Chapter 6).

A third reason why I have chosen this particular research question is because it is highly specific and considers only two variables: gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. It is necessary to dedicate my full attention to what might seem like a small question because it is quite important, and a robust answer can be difficult to obtain. Most populations are divided nearly evenly between women and men, but small differences between these two groups can have significant societal consequences. For example, a handful of votes can be the deciding factors in a close election. Therefore, it is relevant to investigate whether a gender gap exists, even though it might be small and difficult to detect. To provide a useful answer about whether women have a different placement than men on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, I must use robust and comprehensive measures that tap into various aspects of the dimension. However, this is easier said than done. Many scholars have understood the theory differently, and that has created some uncertainty in the literature. How are libertarian and authoritarian values expressed in the political realm? Which political issues are linked to the dimension, and how should they be measured and conceptualized? These are questions I must address before I can construct the measure I use in my analysis.

This focus on creating a robust and comprehensive measure of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has another consequence, which further strengthens the relevance of the research

question. Because it is necessary to conduct a thorough review of the literature, I am contributing to the ongoing debate about the very nature of this political dimension. My master's thesis is shedding light on some of the disagreements found in the literature and bringing them to the surface so they can be examined. I am especially giving attention to the question of which political issues are linked to the dimension, and therefore I am contributing further insights into how the theory might be understood and used (see Chapter 2).

The results from my study might also contribute towards changing what I believe is an unfortunate practice among researchers. In many studies of political behaviour and beliefs, gender is included as a control variable to ensure that the effect does not interfere with what is being studied, but few researchers provide a theoretical framework for how the gender effect works and why they should control for it in the first place. Many simply assume that there is some form of a gender effect and then control for it without explaining why (Campbell 2016, 159). My study might be used to explain why some researchers control for a gender effect in a study about political beliefs and behaviour.

Thus far, I have discussed why my research question is important for the field of election studies and how the results might guide further research. However, my research question also has other relevant aspects that I wish to mention. Understanding and mapping people's values and attitudes is also relevant because the views we holds shape many of our choices in life. In addition to affecting how we vote, our attitudes and beliefs might also influence other choices in life like work, friends and hobbies. For example, someone who holds libertarian views is more likely to value independent thinking and seek new knowledge (Flanagan and Lee 2003). This might make a libertarian more likely to pursue higher education than someone who holds authoritarian views. If more women hold libertarian values than men, this could explain the education gap one sees in, for example, Norway (SSB 2019a), where women are more likely to have earned a bachelor's degree than men. Our views create a readiness for action, and our political attitudes do more than guide how we vote. Therefore, my research might be relevant for others outside my specific field.

The last argument for the relevance of my research question concerns equal representation. Phillips (1995) argues that the political system has been male-dominated, and a consequence of this is that the specific interests of women have not received the same attention as the interests of men. Building on this argument, Campbell (2006) believes clear differences in

political interests between women and men should be proved, because this will be a strong argument for fair representation and affirmative action. In this master's thesis, I do just that, testing whether women and men have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. If a gender gap is discovered, the results can be used to argue that women and men have distinctly different political interests. Therefore, society should ensure that both genders are represented equally and enjoy the same access to all aspects of political life.

1.2 Findings

To answer my research question, I use data from Norway. This is because I view Norway as a likely case for gender differences on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. If a gap cannot be identified in Norway, I believe it is unlikely that it will be found in other political contexts (see Chapter 2). Additionally, the data from the Norwegian context to which I have access is of high quality, rich and context-specific. These are all features that are important to create a robust analysis (see Chapter 3).

Based on the generation gap theory by Inglehart and Norris (2000; 2003) and other empirical works (see Chapter 2), I expect Norwegian women to have a more libertarian position in general on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian men. The results from the analysis indicate support for my hypothesis (see Chapters 4 and 5). In chapter 2, I describes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature and concludes that the dimension consists of political issues from four categories of issues (see Chapter 2, Section 2). Those are: 1) authority, order and punishment; 2) moral, religion, tradition and human rights; 3) immigration; and 4) climate and environmental issues.

To secure robustness and validity, I have created a measure that includes items from all four categories. Additionally, I look at the correlation between gender and the four issue categories separately (see Chapter 3). In my model, I assign the libertarian position on the dimension a high value and the authoritarian position a low value. Women were also given the value of 2 and men the value of 1 (see Chapter 3). In my analysis, I found that women had a higher mean value than men on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and all of the issue categories (see Table 4.1). Additionally, there is a positive correlation between gender and libertarian views (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The findings suggest that Norwegian women have a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension regardless of which aspect of the dimension

is being considered. However, my findings also indicate that the strength of correlation differed among the issue categories. The first two categories – authority, order and punishment and moral, religion, tradition and human rights – had the smallest gender disparity, while immigration and the last category, climate and environmental issues, had a greater disparity (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).

1.3 Thesis structure

Lastly, I will provide a brief overview of the structure of this master's thesis. In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical framework for my study and defines the theoretical concept. Additionally, I explore various conceptualizations of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension which will create a robust base for my own use and operationalization of the concept. The data and methodology comprise Chapter 3, while results from the analysis are found in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I discuss the implications of my results before the thesis is summarized in Chapter 6, where I also present some research questions that I believe should be explored further.

Chapter 2

Theory

2.1 What is the libertarian–authoritarian dimension?

Political space is often considered to be two-dimensional, consisting of a traditional economic left-right dimension and a cultural dimension. This second dimension consist of political issues that are not economic but address other questions, such as LGBT+ rights, immigration and the women's movement (Kitschelt 1994; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kriesi et al. 2008). The cultural dimension can be described in various ways but is often referred to as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, a term with which many are familiar. There is no consensus on the nature of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and how it should be measured, but the term is widely used by both academics and people outside of academia. For example, the term is used when commentators compare political candidates (Se for example Shendruk 2019). The wide use of the terminology and the adoption of the term by the public make studying and understanding the cultural dimension more complicated, but also more important.

In this master's thesis, I ask the following question: Is there a difference in the placement of Norwegian women and men on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension? Before this question can be answered, an in-depth understanding of the theoretical concept and how to measure it is necessary. In the next section of this chapter, I review the most central literary contributions to the theory and demonstrate how our understanding of the cultural political dimension has evolved. The goal is to better understand the dimension and to provide a clear and specific definition that can be conceptualized and measured. In the third section of this chapter, I formulate a hypothesis about the relationship between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Basted on the theoretical and empirical results from other Western democratic countries, I expect Norwegian women to be more libertarian than Norwegian men.

2.1.1 Personal values and political attitudes

First, to understand the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, one must explore the relationship between personal values and political attitudes and discover why values are important when seeking understanding of attitudes and behaviour. Rokeach (1973, 5) define values as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conducted or end state of existence". With this definition, Rokeach draws a distinction between two sets of values which he calls "instrumental" and "terminal" values. The first set of values, the instrumental values, relate to modes of conduct and beliefs about how one should act. For example, "hard work pays off" and "stealing is wrong" are instrumental values, according to Rokeach. The second group of values, the terminal values, relate to how one wants a situation to be. For example, the desire to be respected or a wish for a comfortable life would be terminal values (Rokeach 1973, 7). Rokeach also argues that values can be about your own life (self-centred), which he calls intrapersonal values, or about other people (society-centred), which he calls interpersonal values. Desiring inner peace of mind, for example, is an intrapersonal value, while wanting world peace would be an interpersonal value (Rokeach 1973, 8). Values are also believed to be deep-rooted and enduring because they are formed early in life and change little over a lifetime (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 35). Additionally, values are general in nature and can guide us in many different decisions in life (Rokeach 1973, 18). Attitudes, on the other hand, are directed towards a specific issue, such as, for example, whether Norway should become a member of the European Union. A person's attitudes are also likely to shift more frequently than their values. For example, our opinion might change if we receives new information about a specific attitude object (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, 15 - 16).

One important reason why political scientists have been interested in personal values is that many argues that there is a link between values and political attitudes and behaviour. Because values are enduring and are often formed earlier in life, they can work as a framework or guide when we develop political attitudes about specific issues. When we are asked to evaluate a specific policy, we do this in line with our core personal values (Feldman 1988, 418). For example, if a person's most important value is that everyone should be free to do as they wish, all the time, that person might oppose a suggestion to close all strip clubs in their city because the policy is not in accordance with their values. Political attitudes can affect our political behaviour by guiding who we vote for or whether one is engaged in political activism. For

example, someone who opposes the closure of strip clubs might participate in a protest or vote for a candidate who promises to reopen them.

Researchers who have studied personal values have also discovered that some values are similar to each other while others are contradictory. This creates what is known as value dimensions, where some values are grouped together on one side of the dimension and some are grouped on the other side (Schwartz 2007, 174 - 175). In his theory about personal values, Schwartz (1992) identified 10 core values that he summed up into two value dimensions: the self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimension and the openness to change vs. conservative dimension (Schwartz 2007, 176). The existence of value dimensions might be the very thing that enables the existence of political dimensions.

If our personal values are not compatible and stand in opposition to each other – and these opposing values affect one's political views – this creates political dimensions where people are positioned towards one end or the other based on their values.

2.1.2 New political issues

Until the 1970s, the political space was often considered one-dimensional. The notion of the left versus the right originates from the French Revolution, but it was later used to describe the conflict between conservative parties and labour parties and the fights over issues such as redistribution of wealth, workers' rights and welfare goods. However, it is important note that this notion of a one-dimensional political space is a simplification that do not account for other political conflicts of the time, such as the suffrage movement, for example. In the 1970s, a new types of political issue began dominating the political agenda. These issues were not economic but addressed other aspects of how one lived one's life; they included abortion rights, recognition of LGBT+ people, racial equality and a greater interest in environmental protection. These new political issues quickly gained momentum and have since become quite important to both politicians and voters (Kitschelt 1994; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kriesi et al. 2008). The introduction of these new issues coincided with an observed decline in class voting, new political preferences and the establishment of new political parties in many European countries (Knutsen 2006).

The same changes have also been observed in the Norwegian political landscape, despite Stein Rokkan describing the Scandinavian party system as "frozen" only a decade earlier (Lipset and

Rokkan 1967, 50) Furthermore, new political parties and new issues changed the political reality in the Scandinavian countries. Together with its neighbouring countries, Norway has experienced a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary parties fronting various political issues (Sundberg 2002, 182). What created this change and facilitated the emergence of new political issues? One explanation is found in voters' personal values; because they are thought to be closely linked to political ideology and attitudes. A shift in values would, therefore affect what we consider to be important political issues and good solutions to this issues (Inglehart 1977, 12 - 13). In the next section, I discuss this theoretical debate further.

2.1.3. From post-materialism to libertarian and authoritarian values

Inglehart (1971, 1977) was one of the first to point out a value shift in the mass public. He claimed that people were becoming less likely to place an emphasis on what he called materialist values and were more focused on post-materialist values and the rise of new political issues. Inglehart argued that those holding materialistic values were more concerned with economic politics such wealth redistribution and economic stability, while post-materialists were less interested in "traditional" political issues and cared more about their quality of life, protection of the environment and the role of women in society (Inglehart 1977, 13). This value shift happened because members of the middle class improved their standard of living and were not exposed to the same economic hardships as previous generations. In developing this theory of how the changing economic situation affected societal values, Inglehart used the logic of Maslow's hierarchy of needs: As more of our basic needs are met, the more energy we can use to achieve higher needs (Maslow 1943). According to Inglehart, the same is true for political values. If our basic material needs are secured, we can focus on higher political values in the prioritization hierarchy such as democratic participation, quality-of-life issues and the opportunity for self-fulfilment.

Inglehart sees personal values as constant, stable and shaped early in life. He reasons that, growing up in a households with a stable economy, having basic needs were met at all times and not having to worry about an outbreak of war changes how we what we value. Younger generations, that have grown up under more stable and secure conditions, have, therefore, become more post-materialistic than their parents and grandparents. The result is that as new generations grow up, society is slowly becoming more post-materialistic (Inglehart 1977, 9 - 10). Later in his career, Inglehart (1987) expanded on his theory and argued that the fight for voters is also one of the driving forces that have heightened the importance of new political

issues. He argued that, as more and more people experience wealth and economic security, the fight for economic redistribution becomes less important to voters and they become more interested in politics centred on quality-of-life issues. Therefore, politicians will pursue a more post-materialistic political program (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1292). The rise of post-materialistic values and political issues has been observed in most Western democracies (Inglehart 2008), and it is clear that the political space is no longer one-dimensional, if it ever was. There is strong evidence for Inglehart's theory of changing values. However, he has been criticized for overlooking another development in today's modern democracies.

Flanagan (1982) argues that post-materialistic values have gained a rival – a set of other values standing on the opposite end of the political spectrum. These values are not new, but their importance has grown as an answer to the rise of post-materialism. Building on Inglehart's theories, Flanagan (1982) developed a theory about a libertarian–authoritarian value dimension, and his ideas are what make up the theoretical base and framework for my analysis. He believes that Inglehart wrongly grouped materialistic and authoritarian values, arguing that the other side of post- materialistic values are not questions about economic security and development, but cultural questions about how we think of social hierarchy and tradition. Flanagan believes that Inglehart observed one of the value changes taking place in the postmodern society but overlooked another important development (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1303-1304). First, Flanagan argues that what Inglehart calls post-materialism and labels as libertarian values is the same concept, just with different names. Both concepts include an emphasis on political and personal freedom, self-realization, tolerance, openness to new ideas and lifestyles, environmental protection and quality-of-life issues. Liberal people also place a greater emphasis on democratic participation and believe that people should have a greater say in their community and workplace (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1304).

Where Inglehart and Flanagan differ is in their understanding of materialistic values. They both agree that libertarian values are not materialistic, but Flanagan argues that there is a set of other non-materialistic values that he call authoritarian values. People with an authoritarian value orientation are more concerned with security and order, and they place a greater emphasis on respect for authorities and social hierarchy, discipline, patriotism and doing one's duty. Authoritarians are also more intolerant towards minorities, new ideas and new ways of living. They want conformity and support traditional religious and moral values (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1305). According to Flanagan, we must draw a distinction between

materialistic and not-materialistic values (see Figure 2.1). He argues that materialists are those who prioritize a stable economy, economic growth, higher-paying jobs and a comfortable life (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1305). Materialists are, therefore, more concerned with old political issues, while non-materialists place a greater emphasis on new issues, both on the libertarian and authoritarian ends of the value scale. For the remainder of this thesis, I use Flanagan's labels of this value concept, which are libertarian and authoritarian values.

Figure 2.1: Two-dimensional political space



2.1.4 The cultural conflict

There is no clear consensus on the existence of a new political division based on values; however, many scholars have put forth theoretical and empirical arguments for its existence. In this section, I describe the most prominent and popular theories regarding what I refer to as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Some use different names and labels or emphasize various values and concepts but are essentially describing the same phenomenon (Kriesi 2010, 681). By comparing theories and focusing on similarities and differences, I can better understand what the value dimension contains and its consequences for today's political context.

A classic in the study of the libertarian–authoritarian dimensions is the theoretical work of Kitschelt (1994; 1995). Kitschelt argues that how we thinks about and values fraternity is what creates this independent political dimension that cross-cuts the right-left dimension (Kitschelt

1994, 9). According to Kitschelt, various political ideologies have quite different visions of fraternity and this creates a value conflict affecting the political system. At one end of the spectrum, libertarians believe membership in a community must be based on voluntary and equal participation, while at the other end, authoritarians believe membership is compulsory and is based on a hierarchical order (Kitschelt 1994, 10). The consequence of these different views on fraternity is that libertarians and authoritarians develop different values, which again affect political attitudes and behaviour. According to Kitschelt, libertarians value creative self-fulfilment, self-determination and participation in decision-making or social processes that are, in themselves, rewarding. Additionally, libertarians view social integration as a process where preferences, identities and actions are developed in an open dialogue. In contrast, authoritarians favour social compliance, clear standards for behaviour and rewards outside the social process. Social interaction is considered to be a monologue, where social norms and standards are adopted upon the command of a higher authority (Kitschelt 1994, 17).

Another well-known theory of the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension comes from Flanagan and Lee (2003), who argue that the dimension consists of three subdimensions – social, cognitive and relational – and within each of these dimensions there is an ongoing struggle over who has authority. Is authority external and transcendent based on absolute principles decided by others, such as a God? Or is authority internal and individual with moral principles based on personal preferences (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 237 - 238)? The key concept for the social dimension is hierarchy and the question of how strict it should be. On the authoritarian end of this dimension, one finds values such as respect for authority, loyalty, social control and patriotism. For authoritarians, being dutiful and keeping to one's inherited station in life are also seen as important. On the libertarian end of the scale, one finds value in directed opposition. Libertarians value independence, equality among people, personal freedom and freedom from social rule and legal authority. For libertarians, it is also important that everyone have the opportunity to challenge the elite (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 238). The second dimension, labelled the cognitive dimension, revolves around people's ideas about the world and their openness to new ideas. Authoritarians are conformists and have stronger internal belief systems relying on absolute truths. They are also less open to new ideas, especially the ones challenging their own world view. Conversely, libertarians are more tolerant of new ideas; they also believe truth is subjective, and their perceptions of themselves and reality often shift (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 238). Last is the relational dimension, which is about emotions and relationships with other people. Authoritarians value self-control, the

service of others and the placement of group interests above one's own. They also believe people should find fulfilment in their work and follow moral codes and norms. Libertarians, in contrast, emphasize personal happiness and self-indulgence; they see work as a means to an end and seek personal development and self-realization. Additionally, libertarians have weak group loyalty and place their own interests ahead of others (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 238). Flanagan and Lee argue that new political issues, such as women's rights and environmental protection, are deeply rooted in libertarian values. In their study, they test this assumption and find a correlation between libertarian values and a positive stance on these issues (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 252).

Stubager (2008, 2013) builds on the definition of Flanagan and Lee (2003) and Kitschelt (1994) and has devised what appears to be a simpler and more straightforward understanding of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. He argues that the term taps into the dual concepts of hierarchy and tolerance that formed the underlying logic of the value dimension. Authoritarians favour social hierarchy while libertarians value free and equal interaction regardless of social position. It is the same with tolerance, where authoritarians seek conformation with social norms while libertarians value variety among people and tolerance for those who are non-conforming (Stubager 2008, 328 - 329). Additionally, Stubager believes the manifestation of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension varies from country to country. This is because the underlying values have a different relationship to specific issues depending on the socio-political and historical context in the country being studied. In American politics, for example, the conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values has, according to Stubager, been reflected in so-called "culture wars" over moral and religious issues such as abortion rights. In northern European countries, Stubager argues that the conflict is reflected in issues such as immigration and criminal justice (Stubager 2008, 329).

The notion that a cultural conflict affects political space is not exclusive to the theory of a libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Therefore, I expand my literature review to also include some of these contributions because they are relevant in understanding the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and its effect on the political space.

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) see the cultural dimension as a new dimension crossing the left-right dimension, creating a two-dimensional political space. The dimension includes non-economic political issues concerned with lifestyle, ecology, cultural diversity, nationalism and

immigration. The authors also argue that that the dimension is oriented towards different political issues in different countries. In some countries, it focuses on environmental protection; in others, it can be the secular-religious divide or the question of immigration and defence of the national community. In the authors' view, the cultural dimension is a summary category of different contextual expressions of a "new" underlying political conflict (Marks et al. 2006, 157). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) call their understanding of the cultural conflict the GAL-TAN dimension. One end includes political issues under the label of ecology (or "greenness"), alternative politics (including participatory democracy) and libertarianism. They call this the green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) pole. The opposite end of the dimension features issues that support traditional values, opposition to immigration and defence of the national community. They call this pole the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (TAN) pole (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002, 976). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) agree with Stubager's (2008, 2013) argument that the manifestation of this cultural conflict differs from country to country. They add that the conflict is expressed in the issues that are highest on the political agenda and that create the most division among groups (Marks et al. 2006, 157).

One of the last contributions I present comes from Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), who argue that there has always been a cultural dimension in political space. However, they believe the dimension has undergone a transformation, resulting in new political issues and parties (Kriesi et al. 2006, 921). They report that, until the 1960s, the cultural dimension was mainly defined by the conflict between religious and secular views. However, the new social-cultural professional class began mobilizing around political issues that were based on universalist values, human rights, the women's libertarian movement, solidarity with the poor and protection of the environment. These new issues blended with the religious-secular conflict and reformed the cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008, 12 - 13). On one side of the cultural dimension are cultural liberals who hold universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan positions. On the other side are traditionalists who favour protecting the national culture and institutions such as the Christian religion, the traditional family structure and a strong army.

Bornschier (2010) agrees with Kriesi et al. that the cultural conflict has blended with the religious-secular conflict and now consists of cultural liberal and cultural protectionist issues (Bornschier 2010, 422 - 423). Additionally, he points out that the cultural conflict has undergone another transformation and has been redefined by the appearance of a new, divisive political issue: immigration. Bornschier argues that immigration is directly linked to the

cultural conflict, because immigration threatens the cultural homogeneity that traditionalists seek to preserve. Conversely, cultural liberals are supportive of multiculturalism and are therefore more positive towards immigrants (Bornschier 2010, 423). This new issue stands in full opposition to cultural liberal issues that were introduced in the 1970s, and its appearance has created a polarization between cultural liberals and traditionalists, according to Bornschier (2010, 437).

2.1.5 Defining the theoretical concept

It can be difficult to grasp what this second political dimension is really about when many terms are introduced and authors are rapidly shifting from discussing personal values and attitudes to new political issues. It is easy to lose focus, but when all contributions to the literature are examined, some agreements, disagreements and common terms are observed. To begin, consider a point that is somewhat unclear. Should one consider the libertarian–authoritarian dimension as consisting of personal values, political values or specific political issues? Different interpretations of the theory abound. Flanagan and Lee see libertarian and authoritarian values as conflicting personal values, and this conflict creates a polarized worldview that spills over into the political space, affecting political beliefs and attitudes (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 236). When Flanagan and Lee use the term "libertarian–authoritarian dimension", they are referring to this conflict in personal values. When they refer to the various political attitudes affected by values, they use the term "new political issues". Other writers, such as Stubager (2008), lack clarity when discussing the libertarian–authoritarian dimension; it is unclear whether he is referring to political issues, personal values or both. Other scholars simply refer to what they call a cultural conflict in the political space while sometimes using complicated labels.

I believe a constructive way to create clarity about these confusing labels is to divide the theoretical term: On the one hand is the concept of libertarian and authoritarian values as underlying, personal, general and lasting values, while on the other hand is the libertarian–authoritarian dimension that refers to the second political dimension cutting true the left -right divide. The libertarian–authoritarian dimension is rooted in and affected by libertarian and authoritarian values (Flanagan and Lee 2003, 253). Libertarian values correlate with libertarian positions on political issues belonging to the libertarian–authoritarian dimension while authoritarian values correlate with the opposite position on the same issues. In this way, the

value dimension creates a divide in the political space, and it is this creating this second political dimension that I am studying in this master's thesis.

The second disagreement in the literature is how old or new the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is. The theoretical contributions discussed earlier, except Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) and Bornschier (2010), address some form of a new political conflict or dimension. These outliers argue that the cultural dimension is a restructuring of the secular-religious dimension. In this view the cultural conflict is not new, but new political issues have changed its content. If the cultural conflict or the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension is, in some part, a reshaping of the secular-religious dimension, it might be that the political dimension has always existed and that libertarian and authoritarian values have always existed to affect it. Only in later years have researchers begun to measure it, with Inglehart being the first. Since many believe this political dimension to be new, it could be a mistake to ascribe all new and current political issues to it so that it becomes a catch-all category for everything strictly not economic. Is it possible to find a conceptualization that all can agree upon? I explore this question in the next section.

2.2 How to conceptualize and measure the libertarian–authoritarian dimension

In the section above, I point out that many definitions have been ascribed to the theoretical term "libertarian–authoritarian dimension". This is also true of the many conceptualizations of the concept. The libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been measured broadly in two ways. The first is by using an index based on questions that are meant to measure underlying personal values. The questions are not directed towards specific political issues or situations, but are general. With this "value index", the authors seek to directly measure the personal values of individuals. An example can be found in Flanagan and Lee's (2003) study in which they found a correlation between libertarian and authoritarian values and what they called new political issues. A more current example comes from Norris and Inglehart (2019), who use selected questions from Schwartz's (2007) well-known battery of survey questions to measure libertarian and authoritarian values.

The second way in which the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been measured is by using survey questions that measures attitudes towards specific political issues. The focus of

this master's thesis is to determine whether Norwegian women and men place themselves differently on the cultural political dimension that is rooted in personal values. Therefore, I do not focus on the first measurement of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension but on the second, in which the dimension is measured by an index of questions exploring an individual's position on specific political issues. Unfortunately, the indexes sometimes include issues that might not fit neatly into either of these categories, making it difficult to be 100% sure what constitutes a personal value question and what is a political attitude question. Few of the authors express any awareness of this distinction, and there might be some issues from different categories in the same measure. I have identified some examples where this seems to be the case; I call this a hybrid measurement. However, there might be other instances of which I am not aware.

2.2.1 Ways to measure the libertarian–authoritarian dimension

In this section I review some important examples of how the second political dimension has been conceptualized and measured before discussing how to conceptualize the theoretical concepts to obtain a robust measurements in the Norwegian context. An overview of all indexes and measurements mentioned in this section can be found in Table 2.1. As I have mentioned, Flanagan and Lee (2003) do not refer to the second political dimension as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension but as new political issues. They have the most comprehensive conceptualization of what they consider to be the political attitudes affected by libertarian and authoritarian values (see Table 2.1), but they overlook some important elements. Flanagan and Lee fail to include political issues that, in recent years, have become especially important for people holding authoritarian values, such as the issue of immigration (Bornschier 2010, 434).

Heath, Evans and Martin (1994) sought to design a method of efficiently measuring the libertarian–authoritarian dimension with only a few questions (Heath, Evans, and Martin 1994, 115). They theorized that some political issues are linked to the underlying culture dimension and that it was possible to design a battery of questions that would specify a person's value position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996, 94). After exploring various combinations, they landed on a set of questions that have been used in different rounds of British Election Surveys but are not asked regularly. This was a problem for Tilley (2005), and he created his own scale, also using data from British Election Surveys. Tilley used questions that were asked more frequently and argues that his scale captures concepts similar to the one created by Heath, Evans and Martin (Tilley 2005, 444).

In addition to the examples mentioned above, I include three newer examples of how the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been represented and measured. All three indexes consist of four or five survey questions designed to measure a respondent's attitude towards a specific political issue. Stubager (2008, 2013) uses his measurement to study the relationship between a person's education and their placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in the Danish context. The second study is also a Scandinavian one, conducted by Oskarson and Demker (2015), who examined support of a Swedish new right party. The last study, by Hillen and Steiner (2019), conceptualizes the libertarian–authoritarian dimension to study what they call the left-authoritarian supply gap in 14 Western European nations. Each of the three studies is conducted in similar contexts, close in time and uses the same theoretical framework. However, there remain some differences in which political issues are included in the index.

Lastly, I include two studies that I categorize as hybrid operationalizations because they combine value measurements, specific issue questions and support for political movements. I include this measurement to present the variety of conceptualizations that have been used and to demonstrate how different interpretations of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension can vary. In his first study, Kitschelt (1994) uses a set of five indicators to measure the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. However, in a study conducted the following year, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) use another set of questions, and the only element that is the same is the item measuring post-materialistic values.

Table 2.1: Conceptualizations of the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension

Literature	Data	Index
Flanagan and Lee (2003)	World values survey 2000	**Moral issues** Abortion rights Suicide/euthanasia Drug use (marijuana) Prostitution Homosexuality Alternative family values **Human rights issues** Women's rights Minority rights Non-traditional women's roles **Quality-of-life issues** Environmental protection Autonomous jobs **Elite-challenging issues** Disarmament Political change Political violence
Heath, Evans and Martin (1994)	British Election Surveys	Respect for traditional British values Censorship necessary to uphold moral standards Tolerance of those who lead unconventional lives Belief that homosexuality is always wrong Allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government Parties that wish to overthrow democracy not to be banned
Tilley (2005)	British Election Surveys	Equal opportunities for women Equal opportunities for ethnic minorities Availability of abortion Right to depict nudity and sex in films and magazines Stiffer sentences for lawbreakers
Stubager (2008, 2009, 2010, 2013)	Danish voters [1]	Immigration serious threat to national culture Violent crimes punished far more strictly Sensible to let a strong man seize power in a situation of economic crisis Islam constitutes a serious threat to Danish culture

[1] Data come from a postal survey of 2,000 Danish voters (between the ages of 18 and 75) conducted by the author in spring 2004. The response rate was 60% (1,192 persons).

Oskarson and Demker (2015)	SOM survey from 2008 [2]	Right to free abortion Same-sex marriage Introduction of the death penalty Safeguarding of Swedish traditions and values Fewer refugees should be received in Sweden
Hillen and Steiner (2019)	European social survey	Country's culture undermined or enriched by immigrants European unification go further or gone too far Much harsher sentences for people who break the law Gays and lesbians free to live their lives as they wish
Kitschelt (1994)	Eurobarometer 25	Religiosity Post-materialism **Readiness to join social movement** - Anti-nuclear movement - Peace movement - Ecology movement
Kitschelt (1995)	World values Survey year	Post-materialism Respect for authority Participation in lawful demonstrations Women's right to abortion Role of housewife

Note: See appendix for exact wording.

2.2.2 What are the right issues to measure the libertarian–authoritarian dimension?

To gain a complete overview of how the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been and can be conceptualized, I identify which categories of issues were used in the empirical works mentioned above. This is because questions measuring the same or similar concepts can be worded differently or focused on various aspects of the political issue. Moreover, some questions that are unique for the political context do not make sense in any other country. However, that does not mean they fail to fit into an issue category that is relevant in additional countries. An example is the question of how many wolfs should be shot every year an issue that is central to the centre-periphery conflict in Norway. This question would not make sense in a Danish context, because Denmark has not been home to any wolf until recently. However, this does not mean Denmark lacks a centre-periphery conflict, it simply features different specifics.

[2] The SOM surveys are mail questionnaires delivered by the academic SOM Institute at the University of Gothenburg.

Some of the items used in the measurements are easier to categorize than others. For example, questions about immigration are simple to identify and group because immigration is included in almost every index and many similar questions are asked. The same is true for question about climate environmental issues. This group of issues is less frequently included in the conceptualization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, but questions about environmental protection are limited in scope and are easy recognize as revolving around the climate or the environment. However, when it comes to questions about equal opportunities for women and men, for example, should they be placed in a separate category for gender issues or do they overlap with other questions about equal rights for marginalized groups? There are no clear dividing lines, but I have done my best to construct a thematic grouping of the issues.

The first and perhaps most central category of questions are those dealing with authority, order and punishment. In all six studies referred to above, one or more questions from this category is included in the measurement. Typical questions placed in this category are those exploring political power, strong leaders, protests against authorities and the use of armed forces. Additionally, I have placed questions addressing punishment and treatment of criminals and other social outcasts in this group. These issues could comprise their own category because they are thematically somewhat different, but they are closely linked to those relating to authority and order. How society treats and punishes criminals go together with how authority is implemented and punishment of unacceptable behaviour is also a tool to maintain social order. The result is that if you want authority to be respected and social order to be maintained, you are also concerned with the punishment of criminals (Stubager 2008, 237). Issues relating to authority and punishment are closely linked to authoritarian values, which is recognized by other researchers because this category is almost always included in an index meant to measure a person's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Therefore, it is important to include one or more questions from this category when measuring this theoretical concept.

The second category is also the most comprehensive one and includes morality, religion, tradition and human rights. Every empirical contribution except Stubager (2008, 2013) includes a question that can be classified in this category. Because this is a large category potentially covering many political issues, I review the central thematic issues belonging to the

category.[3] First are issues concerning women's rights and abortion; these questions are present in almost all of the measurements in Table 2.1. Second are questions about LGBT+ rights, which are included in four of the studies I have highlighted. All four questions are about homosexuality; attitudes towards other forms of queerness are not measured. Two studies include a question that measures attitudes towards ethnic minority rights. Last are a group of survey questions measuring how concerned people are with protecting the morals and traditions of the country. The counterparts to these questions address the acceptance of unconventional lifestyles such as prostitution, drug use and so on. Religiosity is included only in Kitschelt's conceptualization from 1994.

The third category of questions are those concerning immigration, which has become a central issue over time something that is reflected in the fact that new studies often include issues about immigration (see Table 2.1). Those holding authoritarian values are most engaged in the question of immigration, because the rise in immigration have triggered anti-immigration sympathies among many authoritarians while libertarians are less concerned with this social change and welcome multiculturalism (Bornschier 2010, 423). Immigration is a highly divisive issue between libertarians and authoritarians and is closely linked to the value dimensions. For example, Bornschier (2010, 434) argues that the emergence of the immigration issue has polarized and intensified the cultural conflict. It is therefore essential to include the issue of immigration in a measurement of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in the Norwegian context.

The last category involves climate change and environmental issues, which have become among the most important for Norwegian voters (Bergh and Karlsen 2019, 30). However, it is unclear whether questions about climate change and environmental protection belong in a

[3] Flanagan and Lee (2003) distinguish between moral issues and human rights issues in their classification of new political issues (see Table 2.1). I choose not to do this because the same issue can have different meanings for libertarians and authoritarians, making it difficult to know if we are measuring a human rights issue or a morality issue. Take the example of abortion rights. People holding authoritarian values see it as a moral issue, and it is classified as such by Flanagan and Lee (see Table 2). Authoritarians believe in absolute truths, and if one believes that a child comes into the world by the will of God, then it is always wrong to end a pregnancy. However, one does not have to be religious to oppose abortion if one simply believes abortion is wrong because it takes a life. It is an absolute principle and it is always wrong in all situations, no matter the wishes of the woman and the consequences for her life. Libertarians, on the other hand, do not see abortion as a moral issue but as an issue of a woman's right to make decisions about her own body and life. Abortion is not a moral right or God's action in itself, but libertarians do not believe there is a moral right or wrong. It is all about the choice for the individual, and that it is why abortion has become a human rights issue for libertarians.

conceptualization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Only two empirical contributions include a question about the environment in their measurement – those of Flanagan and Lee (2003) and Kitschelt (1994). While reviewing the literature, I note that some researchers mention environmental issues as examples of cultural conflict while others do not (see Section 1 in this chapter). For example, Inglehart (1977), in his theory of post-modernism, argues that issues such as environmental protection are post-modern concerns. This is because it is a quality-of-life issue and is something people become concerned about only when they have obtained a certain level of materialistic security. Conversely, other authors do not mention climate and environmental issues as a component of the cultural conflict or the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. I am therefore unsure about whether questions addressing climate change and the environment should be included when measuring libertarian and authoritarian political views.

In the majority of the empirical works, I have reviewed thus far, the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension is measured by compiling four to six questions about the respondent's attitudes about a specific issue. For most people who are familiar with the theory, the often-used attitudes questions make intuitive sense. Should immigration be allowed from non-European countries? That question definitely taps into the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and where one stands on this issue reveals something about how libertarian or authoritarian one's values are. However, few of the literature contributions presented earlier provide any explanations for why they believe the questions they used are the best measurements of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

It is not possible to identify the absolute perfect measurement. If this was the standard, research would not be possible. However, I want to limit uncertainty to a minimum in this master's thesis. As I discussed earlier in my introduction (see Chapter 1), small differences between women and men can have great consequences, and if researchers are unable to reveal these possible small differences, this field of research can be taken no further. To overcome this challenge, I intend to use a robust measurement.

First, I ensure inclusion of questions from all categories of issues associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Additionally, I engage in an in-depth discussion of why each item is chosen and how it is linked to libertarian or authoritarian values. This is done to ensure transparency and the possibility that others may critically consider my conceptualization

(see Chapter 3). Second, I divide the items into thematic groups and test them as separate dimensions (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). This is to ensure that the results I receive are constant throughout the measurement and are not related to only a few specific issue categories. Because political attitudes are affected by many variables, I expect there to be some variations in the results. However, if there is a cultural dimension and if women's and men's differences in personal values affect their placement on it, we should be able to see consistency in all issues related to the cultural conflict.

2.3 Please mind the gender gap. What to expect?

There is a long tradition of studying the relationship between gender and politics. Previous researchers have found that women and men *do* have distinctly different political attitudes and behaviour (Campbell 2016). A gender gap can be seen among voters in many countries (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014) and women and man have different priorities about the political issues that are most important to them (Campbell 2006). Additionally, studies have demonstrated that women and men have different patterns of political participation, knowledge of and level of interest in politics (Dassonneville and Kostelka 2019).

The differences between women and men in political life are often referred to as the gender gap. This term was first introduced in the 1980s when scholars began observing a change in the voting behaviour of women and men. This shift was first observed in the United States; later, researchers began noticing changing voting behaviour in other Western democracies. Originally, women voted for conservative and religious, more often than men and this was known as the traditional gender gap. But since 1980, women have been moving towards the left end of the political spectrum and are today more likely to vote for left-leaning parties. This shift in party preferences is referred to as the modern gender gap (Campbell 2016, 161). The term gender gap was first used in reference to the differences in voting behaviour between women and men. However, it has also been used to refer to other aspects of political life including the level of political interest, the issues that are prioritised by voters and the choices women and men make when they participate in politics. In this thesis, I use this broader definition of the term, meaning all of the differences referred to here, because the gender gap exists in much more than voting behaviour, as previous studies have demonstrated. In the next section, I formulate my hypothesis based on the theories developed by Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003) before discussing whether there is empirical support for the hypothesis. Then, I

argue why I believe Norway to be a likely case in which to detect a gender gap in placement on the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension.

2.3.1 The silent gender revolution

One of the most well-known contributions to the literature on the gender gap in values and voting comes from Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003). They argue that the gender differences in ideology, voting and public opinion are a result of societal modernizations that have taken place in post-industrial societies. Modernization has reshaped women and men's political values, resulting in a modern gender gap where women lean more to the left and hold different political attitudes than men (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 76).

Inglehart and Norris identify two ways in which modernization is affecting the political preferences of women and men. First is the argument that structural change has produced different socioeconomic positions for women and men, and that gender has become a basic social cleavage. Women's new roles in society and their growing access to education may lead to political preferences that differ from those of men. The new gender roles have also given women autonomy from men and freedom to follow their own political interests. In this view, the gender gap should be possible to explain with standard social and demographic background variables (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 89 - 90). Inglehart and Norris state that the second factor in the creation of the modern gender gap in voting is a difference in cultural values. As central examples of cultural values, Inglehart and Norris highlight orientation towards post-materialist values, the role of government and gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 161). They argue that women hold more post-materialist values than men and that the cultural shift has increased the important of issues such as reproductive choice, equal opportunities and protection from sexual harassment. In their study, Inglehart and Norris find that the size of the gender gap in voting diminishes substantially when controlling for cultural values, and they conclude that the modern gender gap in voting is influenced more by cultural values than by social structure (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 95). It is possible that Inglehart and Norris have identified a value cleavage between women and men and that this cleavage has reshaped the political preferences of the two genders, making women more left-leaning because parties on the left are more concerned with post-matristic issues and women's rights (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 458 - 459). However, I believe that the left-right dimension might not be the only political value dimension that has been reshaped by the modernization process.

As I demonstrate in the first part of this chapter, there are many different understandings of the cultural dimensions affecting Western political systems. However, I also argue that these concepts and how they are measured can be linked. According to Flanagan, Inglehart wrongly grouped materialistic and authoritarian values. Ha also argues that post-materialistic and libertarian values is the same or similar concepts (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1304). If women possess more post-materialistic values, as Inglehart and Norris (2000; 2003) argue, I believe this suggests that they will also have more libertarian values. The consequence of women having more libertarian values than men might be that women also take a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. This is because a gender gap in values might cause women and men to organize their political views differently, resulting in varying political attitudes (Bergh 2008, 429).

Another aspect of the work of Inglehart and Norris suggests that women today are more libertarian than their male counterparts. These researchers (2000, 454) observed that the modern gender gap is greater among younger people. Based on their research, Inglehart and Norris argue that a modern gender gap in voting has been growing with every new generation and that this trend will continue as the modernization process develop and spreads to even more countries (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 459). If their assumption is correct, the gap in libertarian values between women and men should be even greater today than it was 20 years ago when their study was conducted.

2.3.2 Norway, a likely case

To test whether women have more libertarian views than men I have chosen to use a likely case. This is because the goal of my master's thesis is to investigate a possible direction for further research on political gender gaps (see Chapter 1). By examining a likely case I can gain a better indication about whether it will be fruitful to conduct further research in this field. Therefore, I have chosen to test my assumption in the Norwegian political context, because I consider Norway to be a likely case. If I cannot identify a gender gap on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in Norway, I believe it is unlikely that it would be found in another political context.

There are three main reasons why I believe Norwegian women have a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than men. The first is that Norway has one of the largest modern gender gaps among voters in Europe (Abendschön and Steinmetz

2014, 331). Inglehart and Norris (2000; 2003) believe that a modern gender gap in voting is a result of a gender gap in values. Because of this gender gap, I believe women are more concerned with libertarian or post-materialistic issues than men; therefore, women will vote for parties that reflect their political views, and those parties are often on the left. A modern gender gap in voting will therefore indicate a value gap, according to the theory.

The last reason is that Norway is a post-industrial society. In their study, Inglehart and Norris (2003) found that most post-industrial societies have a modern gender gap in voting, while industrial societies have a traditional gender gap or none at all (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 87). This led them to conclude that modernization processes and, more specifically, new gender roles and greater gender equality, are making women more libertarian than men. Norway is a highly modernized society. That fact, coupled with a high degree of gender equality, should combine to predict a gap in women and men's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, according to Inglehart and Norris' theory.

There is one last reason as to why I consider Norway to be a likely case. According to Inglehart and Norris' (2003) generation gap theory, women and men's political values are slowly drifting apart with every new generation. The longer the modernization process has been underway, the greater the generational turnover that has taken place. Norway was one of the first countries to become post-industrial, and therefore I expect Norway to be among the countries where women and men's values have drifted apart most significantly. I am also using data that is no more than three years old (see Chapter 3, Section 1) and therefore I suspect that the effect of generational turnover will have made the Norwegian gender gap even larger today than what it was 10 or 20 years ago. Based on the theoretical contributions and the choice of case, I have formulated a hypothesis that is tested in this master's thesis:

> **H1:** Norwegian women have, in general, a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian man.

2.3.3 Empirical support for my hypothesis. An issue of measurement?

Only a few studies have investigated whether a gender gap exists in people's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and the results are inconclusive. In her study of the British political context, Campbell (2004, 2006) found what she calls an ideological generation gap on the left-right value dimension where younger women were more left-leaning than younger

men. She argues that her findings support Inglehart and Norris' generation gap theory and that modernization is slowly creating a gender gap between women and men (Campbell 2004, 41). However, in addition to measuring the left-right dimension, Campbell also looks at the relationship between gender and placement on the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension; she does not find significant results or evidence of a gender gap on this dimension (Campbell 2006, 68). Even though Campbell cannot find any such significant differences, other studies have done so. An older study, conducted by Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) in the Netherlands, found that women have become more libertarian than men over time (Vollebergh, Iedema, and Meuss 1999, 291). Their data, collected from 1970 to 1992, reveal that both women and men are becoming more libertarian, but the change is greater in women. While women were more authoritarian than men in the 1970s, they are now more libertarian than men (Vollebergh, Iedema, and Meuss 1999, 310).

Considering the generation gap theory of Inglehart and Norris, it makes little sense that a study using older data would identify a gender gap on the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension but one based on data collected almost 10 years later would not. Even more puzzling is that both studies rely on the same understanding and conceptualization of the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension developed by Evans, Heath and Lalljee (1996). One possible explanation might be that Evans, Heath and Lalljee's measurement was developed for the British Election Survey. Campbell uses data from the same survey in her study and was able to replicate their measurement perfectly. On the other hand, Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) lack access to the same set of questions and use Middendorp's (1991) measure of conservatism in cultural issues. However, they argue that Middendorp's understanding of cultural issues is quite similar and therefore measures the same theoretical concept as Evans, Heath and Lalljee (1996) (Vollebergh, Iedema, and Meuss 1999, 292 - 293). Perhaps it is not easy to measure the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension?

There is also one later study where the results might indicate that women are more libertarian than men. Using data from nine Western European countries, Lloren and Rosset (2017) found that female political candidates are more libertarian than their party colleagues on what they call the cultural political dimension (Lloren and Rosset 2017, 944). If women are more libertarian in their values than men, this should, to some extent, also be reflected in differences between female and male political candidates. Lastly, a gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian values is also evident in Norris and Inglehart's (2019) newest study. In their latest

book, Norris and Inglehart no longer use the concept of post-materialism vs. materialism and now refer to libertarian vs. authoritarian values when studying this cultural dimension. The gender gap in personal values is not the main focus of their study; however, gender is included as a control variable in the model, and they find that men have more authoritarian values than women. Norris and Inglehart (2019, 113) suggest that one reason for their findings is that men feel a sense of cultural grievances from the impact of feminism. Changing attitudes towards gender equality may be perceived as a violation of traditional social norms, and women's new roles in society are threatening men's status and power (see Chapter 5 for a further discussion of their argument). The results from these two studies provide some empirical support for my hypothesis.

As I discuss in Section 2 of this chapter (see also Table 2.1), there is significant variation in how the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been measured. This is not unusual, since scholars are always restricted by the data to which they have access, and that will result in some differences. However, I also demonstrate in the previous section that there is little consensus on which issues are part of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Additionally, researchers seldom provide reasons for their choice of indicators in their operationalization (one exception is Stubager 2018; 2013). This factor might explain why the empirical results referred to here are contradictory. Another possible reason for these divergent results is that the value gender gap between women and men might be small and not easily observable. This is not to say that a small gap is inconsequential; a small value gap between women and men can have significant consequences, because each group comprises about 50% of the population. For example, if only a few more women than men vote for left-leaning parties, that can decide who is elected to the government and which new policies are introduced. To detect a significant but possibly small value gap, a valid and robust measure is needed, which is why I chose a measure that incorporates all aspects of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (see Section 2 of this chapter).

Lastly, I look at empirical results from the Norwegian context. I have been unable to find any studies that explicitly examine the relationship between gender and libertarian and authoritarian values or the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension. However, there is one Norwegian study that explains the emergence of a modern gender gap in voting with a difference in personal values. Listhaug, Miller and Valen 1985 observed that Norwegian women were becoming more left-leaning, and it was especially younger and better educated

women who were more likely to vote for parties on the left (Listhaug, Miller, and Valen 1985, 187). They conclude that a difference in personal values explained some of the gender gap in voting, but they were criticized later for their methodological approach to the measurement of the correlation among gender, values and voting (Bergh 2008, 429). However, they did find significant gender differences in many of the value dimensions they were studying. Men hold more matristic values than women, while women prioritize human connections and care more about equality and peace. They also found a gap in religiosity, where women were more religious than men (Listhaug, Miller, and Valen 1985, 199). This study is 35 years old, and it might not be applicable to the situation in Norway today. However, the findings suggests that a form of a values gap exists in Norway, but does it translate into the libertarian–authoritarian dimension?

Chapter 3

Data and methodology

The main objective of this master's thesis is to provide a descriptive analysis of the relationship between gender and placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Operationalization and providing a robust measurement of the dependent variable are therefore one of the main focuses of this thesis. As I point out in the Chapter 2, Section 3, I expect Norwegian woman to have a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian man. The goal of this thesis is to investigate whether gender correlates with political views as indicated by my main hypothesis.

However, a correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension will also indicate that there is causal relationship between the variables. According to Hellevik (1988, 25 - 26) gender must always come first in a causal model, and there is no other variable that can affect or change the value of the variable gender. This is because gender is assigned at birth before any other variables and does not change over time such as, for example, education or marital status.[4] Even though the gender variable cannot be affected by other variables, this does not prevent gender from having an effect on other aspects of our experiences in life. Hellevik (1988, 26) argues that gender probably affects other variables through social processes that result in different values on the dependent variable being studied; for example, gender can have a causal effect on our political views through some unknown social process. Taking Hellevik's reflections about the variable gender into account, this thesis does more than attempt to establish a correlation between the independent and dependent variables if I do find that

[4] Gender does change for some individuals, and one could also argue that some variables, such as your family's opinions of gender queer people, affect how likely it is that someone no longer identifies with the gender they had at birth. In this way, there are variables that might affect which gender we identify with. However, I am relying on large-n representative samples, and the majority of the population is cisgendered and will not change gender identity. The possibility of personal values or political attitude affecting our gender will almost certainly not substantially affect results. I am therefore holding to my assessment of where gender should be placed in a causal model.

Norwegian women have a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian men. I have also found a causal relationship between the variables and that gender causes our placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension through some unknown mechanism or process. This is because gender comes before our placement on the dimension, and our political views do not affect our gender.

In the first part of this chapter, I present the data used in this analysis and discuss their strengths and weaknesses as they relate to answering my research question. Secondly, I discuss the operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and how it can be separated into four issue categories. In the last section of this chapter, I present the research design for this study. The methodology approaches used in this analysis include comparisons of mean and the correlation measure of a Pearson's r and Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The analysis is conducted in five rounds in which the methodology remained the same but the dependent variable is switched out. In the first round I use the operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension as the dependent variable and in the next four I separate the issue categories that are associated with this dimension and examine them separately (see Table 3.2).

3.1 Data

To test my hypothesis, I use data from the Norwegian Election Survey. This is a renowned data series that includes data about Norwegian's political behaviour, attitudes towards specific issues and different background variables. In Chapter 2, Section 3, I present the theoretical argument for choosing Norway as a case for studying my research question. However, there are also methodological reasons why Norway is a useful case, and these are related to access to data. According to multiple theoretical contributions, the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is expressed differently in different political contexts. Some specific political issues can be central in some countries while they are not relevant at all in other nations (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks et al. 2006; Stubager 2008). Therefore, I have chosen to investigate one political context and to use a data set that is tailored to that specific context to obtain a robust measurement. The Norwegian Election Survey is a comprehensive data set and includes several survey questions from the four issue categories I have identified (see Chapter 2.2). Additionally, the Norwegian Election Survey contains questions that measure attitudes towards issues that are specific to the Norwegian political context. I view Norway as a likely case, but my choice has also been driven by the access to rich and context-specific data of high quality.

One challenge with the data set is that some of the questions in the survey have, over time, lost their relevance and are no longer central to the political debate in Norway. Therefore, some of the items used in my operationalization are less relevant in today's political context. This is discussed in Section 2 of this chapter. The most recent round of the Norwegian Election Survey is therefore the most relevant data set to use in constructing a robust operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in today's Norwegian context. The data for the last round of the Norwegian Election Survey were collected in 2017 in conjunction with the national elections. Some of the survey questions are specific to the Norwegian context while others are more general and are similar to the questions found in other countries' election surveys.

3.1.1 Sampling and data collation

To select the sample for the Norwegian Election Survey, simple random sampling was used (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 7). This is the most basic form of probability sampling, and everyone in the population has the same probability of being included in the sample. Using simple random sampling reduces the risk of sample bias and ensures that the sample is as representative as possible (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 91). One aspect of the sampling might introduce a bias, but that is not necessarily the case. The sample for the Norwegian Election Survey of 2017 comprised 3,200 individuals, 1,600 of whom were randomly sampled from the population while the remaining 1,600 were randomly sampled from the sample used in the 2013 election survey (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 7). Consequently, if there were biases in the 2013 sample, this could have created bias in 2017. However, the 2013 sample was created in the same way as the 2017 sample, and the use of simple random sampling should have reduced the risk of biases. One possible bias that might affect my research is that even though the 2013 sample was truly random, it does not erase the fact that Norwegian women live longer than Norwegian men (SSB 2020). Therefore, fewer men than women may remain in the 2013 sample, especially in the oldest cohorts.

Of the 3,200 people in the sample, 1,966 responded to the survey, resulting in a response rate of 62% (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 9). One bias that might be problematic for my study is that the response rate was lower among women (59%) than men (64%), resulting in a representation in the survey of 48% women and 52% men. Administrators of the Norwegian Election Survey identify two issues that might have hindered equal gender representation in

the survey: It was more difficult to come in contact with women, and women were more likely than men to decline to participate (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 12).

During the data-collection process, half of the sample was asked to answer by telephone interview and the other half was asked to complete an online survey. If the respondents did not answer directly, they were offered the opposite alternative than what they were first presented with. Additionally, in-person home interviews were offered to those who had not responded by midway through the data-collection period. At the conclusion of data collection, 61% of the respondents had answered by telephone interview, 38% had used the online survey form and 1% engaged in face-to-face interviews (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 9). All three collection methods had advantages and disadvantages, which I discuss in the next section.

The two greatest advantages of online surveys are the low cost and the speed of data collection (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 57). However, the technique also has other relevant advantages that might increase the quality of data collected in the survey. When answering the survey, the respondents do not talk to anyone, and they might be more comfortable answering questions about sensitive topics online (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 53). Some respondents might find it difficult to truthfully declare their political views to others, especially if they hold views that they believe are not socially acceptable. However, there are also disadvantages with online surveys, such as the fact that not all respondents are capable of completing an online survey because they lack the equipment or digital skills (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 59). Another disadvantage is that researchers have much less control when respondents complete an online survey: It can be hard to verified that the correct person is providing the answers, prevent respondent from receiving any help from others or make sure that the respondent truly understands the question being asked. Researchers also face the risk of respondents more often answering "don't know" because no one is available to help them or probe for an answer (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 60 - 61).

By contrast, telephone interviews provide researchers more control than online surveys. A well-trained interviewer can handle a variety of situations and can use probing questions when the respondents find it difficult to answer. Moreover, the interviewer can control the order of the questions, ensure that the correct person is answering and establish rapport with the respondent and motivate them to complete the survey (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 65). The same advantages are true of face-to-face interviews, where researchers enjoy an even greater

degree of control over the interview situation. The interviewer can use visual aids, read the body language of the respondents and offer probes and help when necessary. If the interviewer has received useful training in asking the questions and recording the answers, the recorded responses in face-to-face surveys are often of high quality (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 60). However, there are some disadvantages with both telephone and face-to-face interviews. The ones that are relevant for my analysis are that the respondent can be hesitant to answer a highly personal question or be more likely to report a socially desirable response (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 71-72). Those two disadvantages might make it difficult for some respondents to provide truthful answers to questions about personal and political values, especially if the respondents hold views that deviate from what they believe to be the norm. Another disadvantage of face-to-face interviews especially and telephone interviews to some degree is the interviewer effect. This is when the interviewer's appearance, manners and facial expressions are visible and can potentially affect respondents' answers (Blair, Blair, and Czaja 2014, 71).

As I have mentioned, these three data-collection methods have both advantages and disadvantages, and by combining them, researchers can balance the advantages and disadvantages when collecting the data. Another advantage of using three methods of data collection is that a researcher increases the likelihood of a higher response rate. For example, if a respondent is not comfortable with a telephone interview, an online survey opportunity can be offered, thereby making it more likely to achieve responses. If a respondent is especially reluctant to participate – or needs some visual props, translation or extra guidance – a face-to-face interview might secure their responses.

3.2 Operationalization

3.2.1 The independent variable

In all three data sets, gender is measured by self-identification; in other words, the respondent states whether they are a women or a man. Asking the respondent to self-identify reduces the risk that a researcher or interviewer might misgender the respondent, making this a more robust way of measuring gender. One challenge with how the independent variable is measured is that operating with a two-category measurement of gender can alienate gender queer persons. Based on the share of gender queer individuals in the population, it is to be expected that few respondents are likely to identify as something other than cisgendered. It is therefore highly

unlikely that the results will be affected in any way. However, the challenge of operating with only two genders could have been met by acknowledging it in the introduction of the survey question or giving respondents instructions about how to respond, for example, by asking the respondents to state the gender they most identify with.

3.2.2 Missing

To operationalize the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, I create indexes consisting of 20 items from the survey (see Table 3.1). These items are survey questions asking the respondents' attitude towards issues such as abortion rights, exploration of new oil fields in the Barents Sea or punishment meted out to criminals. Of the 1,966 respondents in the data set, 346 have a missing value on one or more of the 20 items included in my analysis.

One reason for this might be because "no opinion" was available as a response category for all survey questions is included in the index. However, interviewers collecting the data were instructed two wait and not offer the "no opinion" category unless it was necessary (Falnes-Dalheim and Bye 2019, 22). I am therefore unsure as to why there are so many missing values. It might have to do with how the interviewers were trained or the fact that many respondents might find it's hard to offer their opinions on questions about political issues. Furthermore, it is unclear to me whether the online respondents were offered a "no opinion" category or just the premotion to not choose any of the response categories. The design of the web form also could have affected the level of missing values, but unfortunately, I have no access to it.

In addition to offering a "no opinion" category, the respondents were also offered a "neutral" response category. Blair, Blair and Czaja (2014, 202) argue that "no opinion" and "neutral" responses should not be grouped together because stating that one is neutral about a question is not the same as stating that one in lacks an opinion. Consequently, I choose to exclude the missing values instead of assigning them the middle value, and this leaves 1,620 complete responses in the data set.

Reducing the size of the sample does not significantly affect its representativeness. This is because the absolute size of the sample is more important than its relative size to the population (Bryman 2016, 183). A larger sample does not guarantee precision, and there is always uncertainty when a sample of the population is surveyed (Bryman 2016, 184). However, what is risky by excluding missing values is that it might result in systematic exclusion of some

respondents with similar traits; for example, if men are less likely than women to answer all questions or if the respondent's education level affects how likely they are to choose the "don't know" response category. I have no reason to suspect that systematic exclusion affects my results in any way, but I cannot rule out the possibility in my research design. However, a robustness test was conducted where the missing value was assigned the middle alternative, and the results are almost identical (see appendix). In addition to using the full index with all 20 items, I also divide it into four issue categories: 1) authority, order and punishment; 2) morality, religion, tradition and human rights; 3) immigration; and 4) climate and environmental issues. Each category index contains five survey questions, and the number of missing values therefore will differ depending on which of the items is included in the specific index. However, it will not be greater than 364 (see appendix).

3.2.2 The dependent variable

I argue in Chapter 2.1 that the theoretical concept can be split into two. On one side is the concept of libertarian and authoritarian values that refer to underlying, personal, general and lasting values. On the other side is the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension, which refers to the political issues that are rooted in libertarian and authoritarian values. It is this last theoretical concept I examine in my thesis. Consequently, I use survey questions exploring the respondent's attitude towards specific political issues in my operationalization of the theoretical concept. In Chapter 2.2 I investigate how the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension has been measured and note that the survey questions used to measure this dimension can be roughly divided into four categories. Those issue categories are:

1. Authority, order and punishment.
2. Morality, religion, tradition and human rights.
3. Immigration.
4. Climate and environmental issues.

Now, which issues should be included in an operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in the Norwegian political context of today? One conclusion is certain: The survey items must measure attitudes towards issues from the four categories, but are all of them similarly relevant? Stubager (2008, 329) argues that, in the Scandinavian countries, the libertarian–authoritarian dimension has been reflected in issues such as immigration and criminal justice. Therefore, in his view, the most important issues to include in an

operationalization intended to measure Norway's libertarian–authoritarian dimension are found in Category 1 (authority, order and punishment) and Category 3 (immigration). Oskarson and Demker (2015) have also studied the libertarian–authoritarian dimension in Scandinavia. In their study of the Swedish context, they used survey questions from Categories 1 and 3 and also included items in Category 2 (moral, religion, tradition and human rights).

Various issues from the first three categories are all present in Norwegian debate today. Immigration has been high on the political agenda in recent national elections (Jenssen and Ivarsflaten 2019, 135) and is one of the issues Norwegian voters believe is most important (Bergh and Karlsen 2019, 30). Issues from the second category – morality, religion, tradition and human rights – has always been and are still important in the Norwegian context; these include questions about whether abortion laws should be stricter or more liberal. The same is true with the first category – authority, order and punishment; for example, decriminalization of drug use has been proposed and debated by many of the more liberal Norwegian political parties. None of the empirical studies conducted in Sweden and Denmark have included a survey question from the last issue category – climate and environmental issues. However, many scholars propose that these issues should be seen as an aspect of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Flanagan and Lee 2003). At the same time, climate and environmental issues have gained momentum in the political debate and are now among the most important matters in the Norwegian context (Bergh and Karlsen 2019, 30). Additionally, the Green Party in Norway gained a seat in Parliament for the first time in the 2013 national election and retained it in the 2017 election.

Therefore, in my operationalization, I choose to include items from all four issues categories associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. By ensuring that all aspects of the dimension are included in the index, I provide a robust measurement with strong validity. It is important to consider that gender differences might be quite small but still have real-world consequences. In addition to measuring women and men's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, I also measure each dimension separately to investigate the consistency in the overall findings. This is to ensure that no gender gaps are overlooked. The index used to measure the theoretical concepts is constructed with 20 survey questions measuring Norwegians' attitudes about specific political issues. Five questions in each of the four categories are included, and some of the scales have been reversed so all of the items have the same direction (see Table 3.1). Having a libertarian stance on an issue is assigned a high

value on the scale, and having an authoritarian stance is assigned low value. To construct the indexes, I summarized the values, divided them by the number of indicators and created a scale from 0 to 20 (see R script). The descriptive statistic for the five indexes and the 20 survey items is available in the appendix.

Table 3.1: Operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension. Data from the Norwegian Election Survey

1 Authority, order and punishment
1.1 There should be introduced a ban on begging in Norway
1.2 The most important thing children should learn is obedience and respect for their parents
1.3 What we need most in this country, more than laws and programs, are a few selfless and strong leaders whom the people can safely follow
1.4 We should not accept more control and surveillance, although this may provide better protection against terrorism (reversed)
1.5 Crime is better prevented with rehabilitation and guidance than with harsh punishments (reversed)
2 Morality, religion, tradition and human rights
2.1 It should be allowed to use a surrogate in Norway (reversed)
2.2 Homosexuals should have the same opportunity to adopt as heterosexuals (reversed)
2.3 Euthanasia should be allowed in Norway (reversed)
2.4 We should create a society where Christian values play a greater role
2.5 Under which circumstances should abortion be allowed?***
3 Immigration
3.1 Refugees and immigrants should have the same right to welfare as Norwegians, even if they are not Norwegian citizens (reversed)
3.2 Western European and Muslim ways of life are incompatible
3.3 How positive or negative are you towards immigration?*
3.4 Immigrants are mainly good for the Norwegian economy (reversed)
3.5 Immigration poses a serious threat to our national identity
4 Climate and environmental
4.1 We should allow oil and gas extraction outside Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja
4.2 Far too little emphasis is placed on environmental protection in today's Norway (reversed)
4.3 Climate change is mainly due to human activities (reversed)
4.4 How important is environmental protection for you?**
4.5 How important is climate change for you?**

Note 1: The response categories for the majority of the questions were 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree and 5 = strongly disagree.
* The response categories were a 10-point scale ranging from 0 = very negative to 10 = very positive.
** The response categories were a 10-point scale ranging from 0 = not important to 10 = very important.
*** The respondents were asked to pick one of four response categories: 1 = Abortion should never be allowed, 2 = Abortion should only be allowed if the woman's life or health is in danger, 3 = Abortion should be allowed

if it is very difficult for the woman to care for a child due to personal circumstances, and 4 = Pro-choice: The individual woman must decide for herself whether she wants to give birth to the child.

The Cronbach's alpha for all 20 items together is 0.83, which is acceptable. However, the intra correlation differs greatly and is between 0.64 and -0.15, and there are many negative or no correlations between the items in the index (see appendix). This is unexpected because I have reversed some of the scales so that all are going in the same direction, with libertarian positions assigned a high value and authoritarian positions assigned a low value. Based on the theory and other empirical studies, there should only be positive correlations. How did I achieve an acceptable alpha if some of the items have a negative or no correlation? This might be explained by the fact that when there are many items in the index, it is possible to achieve a high alpha value because of the number of items and not because of the high correlation among the items (Field 2013, 709).

To test whether 20 items in my index measure the same factor, I use a one-factor confirmatory factor analysis to determine whether the index is a suitable operationalization of the theoretical concept. The results from the factor analysis indicate that the model does not fit the data and that the items might be measuring multiple factors. When conducting a confirmatory factor analysis, the null hypothesis is that the model does fit the data and we do not want to reject our null hypothesis (Christophersen 2013, 184). The chi-square significance test yields a p-value below 0.05, which means that the null hypothesis is rejected. Other statistical tests that assess the model fit provide the same results. The confirmative fit index (CFI) is 0.70, which is, according to one general guideline, too low, (Christophersen 2013, 185). The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.101. Ideally, the RMSEA should be less than 0.05, and values over 0.10 are unacceptable (Christophersen 2013, 185). From this factor analysis, these results might indicate that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension cannot be conceptualized and measured as one dimension. Another result that also suggests the dimension might need to be divided is that a multi-factor confirmatory factor analysis provides a better model fit. If the items belonging to the four categories in the dimension are placed into four separate factors (as in Table 3.1), we build a model that is acceptable. The chi-square significance test still provides a p-value below 0.05 and the CFI is 0.91, which is below the acceptable level of 0.96. However, the RMSEA is 0.058, which is acceptable. In Chapter 5, I discuss the theoretical implication of these results.

The discussion of the items used in the index is done by category for the sake of structure. The first category of issues is the one I have called authority, order and punishment. The category is situated in the core of the theoretical concept and contains some of the political issues that are most linked to libertarian and authoritarian values. Unfortunately, when constructing this measurement, I was restricted by the available survey questions, and it is the weakest operationalization of my study. The Cronbach's alpha is the lowest of all my indexes at 0.50, and the intercorrelation varies from 0.01 to 0.25. I also conducted a one-factor confirmatory factor analysis that indicates a poor model fit (see appendix). The Norwegian Election Survey includes three questions concerning punishment of criminals, surveillance and the criminalization of begging; they are the only questions that fall into this first category, and they are all included in my measurement. However, the three questions cover one aspect of the category, which is order and punishment and not authority. Therefore, I also included two items that are not quite political issues but relate to our views about society and authority. The first asks whether children should learn to be obedient towards their parents. I included this question because it measures how important one believes it is to follow orders issued by authorities. The next question measures whether one wants a strong leader whom the people can safely follow. I included this question because it relates to one's views on who should have authority in a society. For example, if one believes the people should have a greater voice and be more critical of politicians, that person would oppose this statement.

The second category is also the most comprehensive one and consists of issues relating to morality, religion, tradition and human rights. My operationalization of this dimension comes from Aardal, Bergh and Haugsgjerd (2019, 55 -56) and consists of the five items with the highest factor loading on the dimension they call secularity vs. religiosity. Using an already tested and recognized measure increases the robustness of the measure. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.66, and the intercorrelation varies from 0.20 to 0.41. In addition to the Cronbach's alpha being rather low, a one-factor confirmatory factor analysis indicates a poor model fit, with the CFI being .91, less than the acceptable level of 0.96, and the RMSEA being too high, with a value of 0.112 (Christophersen 2013, 185). The items in the measure are linked to attitudes about alternative lifestyles that break with religious beliefs, tradition and the word of God. There is also one item measuring whether Christian values should play a greater role in Norwegian society. Aardal, Bergh and Haugsgjerd (2019) believe these items measure the secular vs. religious dimension in the Norwegian context. However, I believe these questions measure more than where one places oneself on the secular vs. religious divide but also address

our views on human rights and the freedom of individuals to live as they please. For example, the question of whether same-sex couples should have the opportunity to adopt might measure religiosity, but it also tests attitudes towards LHBT+ people in general. Furthermore, there is a question about abortion, which can reveal respondents' opinions about gender equality.[5] Flanagan and Lee (2003) also classify similar issues in their study, under the category of morality and human rights.

The third issue category is immigration, and it consists of five items that are highly correlated. In Aardal, Bergh and Haugsgjerd's (2019, 51 - 52) operationalization of the issue dimension, they use seven items from the Norwegian Election Survey. My goal is to create an operationalization of that libertarian–authoritarian political dimension that is balanced among the four categories. Therefore, I reduced the immigration category to five items, choosing those that have the highest factor load in the immigration dimension in Aardal, Bergh and Haugsgjerd's (2019) study. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.8, and the intercorrelation among the five items varies from 0.33 to 0.65, making this a highly correlated index and a robust measure of attitudes towards immigration. A one-factor confirmatory factor analysis also indicated that the index has a good model fit (see appendix). The measure includes one question examining how positive or negative the respondent is towards immigration. This is followed by two positive statements about immigrants and two negative statements, balancing the scale and reducing the risk of acquiescence bias. I believe this scale is perhaps the most robust attitude measure in this study as a result of well-crafted questions regarding immigration in the Norwegian Election Survey. Additionally, because the issue dimension is not highly comprehensive, it is easier to create a measurement that includes all aspects of the political debate in the Norwegian context.

I also pulled the fourth category, climate and environmental issues, from Aardal, Bergh and Haugsgjerd's (2019, 53 - 54) study of the Norwegian electorate; they call this dimension economic growth versus environmental protection. These questions had the highest factor loading on the environment dimension. This index also had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.8 and the intercorrelation varies from 0.34 to 0.58, making this a highly correlated index and a robust

[5] One problem with this item is that is somewhat outdated; most respondents answered that abortion should be accessible to all women (1,457 of 1,900). The issue is no longer controversial and it is a poor measure of attitudes towards gender equality today. However, it is what we have. While I understand the need for longtime series and continuity in the items included, it would be useful if the Norwegian Election Survey included updated questions on gender equality issues in the current political debate.

measure of attitudes towards climate and environment. However, a one-factor confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the index had a weak but acceptable model fit with a CFI of 0.96, which is an acceptable level, and an RMSEA of 0.112, which is too high (Christophersen 2013, 185). As with immigration, the scale is balanced between statements that are positive and negative about environmental protection. There are also two questions asking the respondent to state how much should be done to stop climate change and protect the environment. One of the items is quite specific to the Norwegian context and addresses oil drilling in what are considered vulnerable areas. This issue has been the most prominent in the environmental movement in Norway and was still highly relevant when the data were collected. Inclusion of issues that are high on the political agenda make it more likely that respondents have an opinion, which increases the chance that people's actual political attitudes are being measured.

3.3 Research design

The goal of this thesis is descriptive and to reveal any gender gaps in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. I conducted five rounds of analysis in this thesis where the independent variable remains the same and the dependent variable changes. The same set of research methods is used in all rounds of the analysis. In the first round, I used the 20-item index, and in the last four rounds I divided the index into the four issue categories (see Table 3.2)

Table 3.2: The five rounds of analysis

Round	**The dependent variable**
Round 1	The full index for the libertarian–authoritarian dimension
Round 2	Issue category - Authority, order and punishment
Round 3	Issue category - Morality, religion, tradition and human rights
Round 4	Issue category - Immigration
Round 5	Issue category - Climate and environmental issues

The independent variable is categorical while the dependent variables are continuous. Therefore, I used differences in means as the first method to test the hypothesis. To investigate the significance level of the results, I applied a t-test to the difference in means. My hypothesis is that women have more libertarian political views than men. However, it is possible that women are less libertarian than men, and, consequently, I used a two-sided t-test to determine whether the results are significant. I also graphically illustrated the relationship between the

independent and independent variables using a histogram, density plot and box plots. However, I was also able to use other methodological approaches that demand a metric measurement level. When a categorical variable has two values, we receive what is called equal unit difference. This is because a one-unit increase in the value of the variable always yields the same result; in this case, a one-unit increase means women and a decrease means men. When there is equal unit difference we can consider the variable as continuous (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 129). I therefore applied more statistical methods that required both the independent and dependent variables to be continuous. The additional measurements I used are the correlation measures of Pearson's r and OLS regression.

My data met the precondition for OLS regression in all five rounds of analysis except in Rounds 3 and 5, where the models did not meet the preconditions when it comes to the distribution of error (see appendix). In Round 3 – where the dependent variable is the morality, religion, tradition and human rights issue category – the errors were moderately skewed and the kurtosis was outside the acceptable range of -3 and +3 (Christophersen 2013, 18). This means the errors are not normally distributed. Additionally, I had problems with heteroscedasticity in Round 3. I used the Breusch–Pagan test to investigate whether the error distribution is homoscedastic and the test was significant, which means that heteroscedasticity is assumed. In Round 5, where the dependent variable is climate and environmental issues, I also found evidence of heteroscedasticity in the error distribution, but the error was normally distributed. The reason for problems with the error distribution in Rounds 3 and 5 might be because the dependent variable does not have a normal distribution and is, in both cases, negatively skewed (see the appendix). Because there was heteroscedasticity in my analyses, I am reporting the results using robust standard errors. This is to obtain unbiased standard errors despite the presence of heteroscedasticity. More specifically, I use the HC0 standard errors, also known as White's estimator (White 1980). Because gender is the only independent variable in my OLS model, there is little risk of omitted variable bias. The only underlying variable that might affect both gender and the dependent variable is age, because Norwegian women live longer than Norwegian men (SSB 2020), and age can affect our political views. Therefore, when conducting the OLS regressions, I control for the effect of age.

Thus far I have described my analysis as descriptive. The goal of this master's thesis is to reveal a gender gap in the libertarian–authoritarian political dimension. The goal is not, for now, to explain the gender gap or examine the correlation among variables. However, the results from

my analysis can be viewed as the total causal effect between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. This is because gender comes first in the causal model and I control for probably the only underlying variable which is age.

Chapter 4

Analysis

The main research question of this thesis is whether Norwegian women and men have a different placement on the second political dimension that cuts through the left-right divide in the political landscape. I refer to the second dimension as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and my results suggest that there is a gender gap in the Norwegian political context.

The analysis was conducted in five rounds where the dependent variable was switched out but the methodology remained the same (see Chapter 3, Section 3). In the first round, I included the full 20-item index, and in the next rounds I separately examined the four issue categories that are associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. In Chapter 3 I discuss which research methods are the most appropriate to answer my hypothesis, ultimately choosing three methods: comparisons of mean, correlation analysis using Pearson's r and OLS regression. For the sake of structure, I present the results from the five rounds of analysis by viewing the three research methods together (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).

In summary, the results reveal support for my hypothesis, which is that Norwegian women have, in general, a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian men. However, the strength of the correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension differs depending on which aspect of the dimension is examined. More specifically, I find the strongest and clearest relationships between someone's gender and their positions on climate and environmental issues. The correlation is also stronger between gender and immigration compared to other categories. There is a less clear relationship between gender and the first two categories: authority, order and punishment and morality, religion, tradition and human rights.

4.1 Comparisons of mean

The first research method I use is to compare the means between women and men. As can be seen in Table 1, women's mean value on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is 1.19 points higher than that of men. The difference in mean is also significant on a 0.01 significance level. My results indicate that Norwegian women have more libertarian political views than men, because the scale is coded so that libertarian views are assigned a higher value while authoritarian views are assigned a lower value. However, the results indicate a moderate gender gap, and the difference in mean is smaller compared to the standard deviation of the libertarian–authoritarian index, which is 3.1 (see appendix for all standard deviations). The difference in means between women and men is also smaller than the standard deviation for each of the two groups (2.9 for women and 3.2 for men). This means that, while men and women may be systematically different, on average, the variation within each gender is quite large when compared to the general difference between the genders. The same is also evident in Figure 4.1 where I have visualized the distribution, and there are large overlaps between the groups. My findings indicate that gender is far from the only factor predicting placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Considering that women and men are two highly heterogeneous groups consisting of members with very different life experiences, I believe the findings are in line with what could be expected. There is a significant and moderate gender gap, which means there is some form of systematic difference between women and men. Consequently, gender plays a role in the formation of attitudes among Norwegian voters.

Table 4.1: Difference in means of the dependent variables

The Libertarian–authoritarian Dimension			
	Mean	Confidence interval lower	Confidence interval upper
Women	12.20	11.99	12.41
Men	11.01	10.81	11.23
Differences	**1.19***	0.89	1.48
Authority, Order and Punishment			
Women	11.07	10.82	11.32
Men	10.45	10.20	10.69
Differences	**0.62***	0.27	0.97
Morality, Religion, Tradition and Human Rights			
Women	13.32	13.03	13.61
Men	12.57	12.27	12.87
Differences	**0.75***	0.33	1.17
Immigration			
Women	11.01	10.69	11.33
Men	9.68	9.36	10.00
Differences	**1.33***	0.88	1.78
Climate and Environment			
Women	13.38	13.10	13.66
Men	11.53	11.23	11.82
Differences	**1.85***	1.45	2.26

Note: Data are from the Norwegian Election Survey 2017. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0)

* The mean difference between women and men was significant at a 0.01 level (two-tailed t-test)

I find the same result for all four issue categories when they are considered separately. The difference in mean is smaller than the standard deviation for each index (see appendix), and the variation within each gender is larger, relative to the general difference between the genders. The visualizations of the distribution (see Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) also reveal large overlaps between the groups. However, I do find a significant gender gap indicating that women have a more libertarian position on all political issues associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (see Table 4.1). The reason I divided the libertarian–authoritarian index is to obtain a robust measure and to investigate whether the gender gap is detectable only when examining some of the issues. This is not the case, but the size of the gender gap does

vary between the issue categories. Both climate and environmental issues and immigration have a larger gender gap than the full index. Women have a 1.85-point higher mean value than men when looking only at climate and environmental issues and a 1.33-point higher mean value than men on the immigration index. The results are still moderate but they indicate that these are two issue categories where women and men stand further apart, which is also visible in the figures (see Section 3 of this chapter).

I am surprised to find that climate and environmental issues are where women and men have the most differing views. This is because the literature is somewhat unclear on whether climate and environmental issues should be considered a part of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (see Chapter 2). Additionally, I have not found any studies considering the relationship between gender and attitudes towards climate and environmental issues or green ideology. Nothing in the literature made me anticipate these results.

The first category – authority, order and punishment –and the second category – morality, religion, tradition and human rights – both have a lower difference of mean than the full index. Women have a 0.62-point higher mean than men when it comes to the authority, order and punishment index and a 0.75-point higher mean than men on the morality, religion, tradition and human rights index. Both categories have a difference in mean that is an entire point lower than the climate and environmental issues index, which is 1.85. The findings indicate that women and men share less different views when it comes to these categories. The results are surprising because I consider the issues included in the first and second categories as being central to the theoretical concept (see Chapter 2). However, as I discussed in Chapter 3, authority, order and punishment and morality, religion, tradition and human rights are the weakest operationalizations of the dimension, and the two indexes reveal the lowest internal consistence. This might have contributed to the results. The possible implications of the low internal consistence are discussed in Chapter 5.

4.2 Correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension

The second methodological approach used in this study tests the correlation between gender and the person's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. For this I use the correlation measurement of Pearson's r, and the results are presented in Table 2.

Table 4.2: Correlation between gender and the dependent variable

	Correlation coefficient	Confidence interval lower	Confidence interval upper
The libertarian–authoritarian dimension	0.19*	0.14	0.24
Authority, order and punishment	0.08*	0.04	0.13
Morality, religion, tradition and human rights	0.08*	0.04	0.13
Immigration	0.14*	0.09	0.18
Climate and environment	0.20*	0.16	0.25

Note: Data are from the Norwegian Election Survey 2017. Women = 2 and men = 1. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0). Pearson's r * The correlation was significant at a 0.01 level.

The correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is 0.19 and is significant at a 0.01 level. A Pearson's r of 0.19 is considered a moderate correlation between the two variables, and the results support my interpretations of the findings presented above, which included identification of a moderate gender gap. Gender comes before political views in my causal model and it is unlikely that attitudes have a reverse causation effect on gender.[6] Therefore, the results indicate that gender has a moderate but significant effect on a person's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

As with the results in Table 1, the effects vary when the issue categories are considered separately. The strongest correlation is between gender and the climate and environmental category, with a correlation coefficient of 0.20, which is a moderate correlation. Authority, order and punishment and morality, religion, tradition and human rights have the lowest correlation, with a coefficient of 0.08, and the correlation between gender and immigration has a Pearson's r of 0.14. I am surprised to find that the strength and effect of gender varies between the issue categories. These results indicate that the correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension would have been notably weaker if climate and environmental issues were not included in the full index. In Chapter 2, I highlight the possibility that the choice to include or exclude some types of issues might have affected the

[6] It is possible that people holding libertarian views are somewhat more likely to change their gender. However, this possibility has little to say for the results in large sample analyses, because the majority of the population is cisgendered.

results in previous studies regarding gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. These findings indicate that this indeed might be the case. As I discuss in the previous section, the findings are in line with what we could expect from comparing two such heterogeneous groups. However, there are systematic differences between women and men, and gender has a moderating effect on our political views.

The last research methodology that I applied to my data is an OLS regression in which I control for age (see Table 4.3). The reason is that age is the only variable that can be considered an underlying variable for both gender and political attitudes. Norwegian women live longer than men (SSB 2020), and, as a result, there are fewer men in the oldest cohorts (see Chapter 3, Section 3). The object of this thesis is to provide a descriptive analysis of the relationship between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. However, the results from the OLS regression can also be viewed as total causal effect between gender and the dependent variable controlled for all underlying variables (see Chapter 3, Section 3).

Table 4.3: OLS Regression

	The libertarian-authoritarian dimension	**Authority, order and punishment**	**Morality, religion, tradition and human rights**	**Immigration**	**Climate and environment**
Gender	1.10*	0.58*	0.59*	1.27*	1.82*
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Age	-0.05*	-0.03*	-0.10*	-0.04*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	13.38*	11.95*	17.29*	11.63*	12.93*
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.32)
Observations	1,620	1,785	1,719	1,801	1,837
R^2	0.101	0.025	0.136	0.037	0.052

Note: Data are from the Norwegian Election Survey 2017. Women = 2 and men = 1. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0). Unstandardized B coefficients and the standard errors in parentheses. * The correlation was significant at a 0.01 level.

The results from the first regression model are significant at 0.01 on a significance level and indicate that gender has a positive effect on one's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. The same is true for the other models measuring gender's effect on the four issue

categories. Similar to the other results presented in this chapter, this also supports my hypothesis. The results in Table 4.3 indicate that gender has an effect on attitudes towards political issues associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and that women have more libertarian views than men. Another similar finding is that the total causal effect of gender differs between issue categories, and the pattern resembles the one I found when comparing the mean and calculating Pearson's r (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The gender coefficient is again strongest when looking at climate and environment issues (1.82); followed by immigration (1.27); then morality, religion, tradition and human rights (0.59); and lastly, authority, order and punishment (0.58).

4.3 Visualizing the gender gap

Lastly, I plotted the respondents' distribution by gender on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and the issue categories. In summary, the figures provide the same result as the analysis presented in this chapter. Figure 4.1 indicates that both women and men have a close to normal distribution on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, but that women's distribution is more negatively skewed. Women have a mean score of 12.20 on the 20-point index while men have lower score of 11.01 (see Table 4.1). The figure also illustrates that both women and men have almost the same variances, which is confirmed by looking at the standard deviation, which is 2.9 for women and 3.2 for men (see appendix).

Figure 4.2 does not reveal the same clear gender difference as seen in Figure 1, but women's distribution on authority, order and punishment issues is somewhat more clustered around the middle value and a bit more negatively skewed. This gives women a mean value of 11.07. Conversely, men's distribution is more positively skewed, and their mean value is 10.45. The variance in the distribution is greater compared to Figure 4.1 but is almost similar for women and men. Women's distribution on authority, order and punishment has a standard deviation of 3.7, and men's distribution has a standard deviation of 3.8.

Figure 4.1: The respondents' distribution on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension by gender



Figure 4.2: The respondents' distribution on authority, order and punishment by gender



Figure 4.3: The respondents' distribution on morality, religion, tradition and human rights by gender



In Figure 4.3, both distributions are heavily skewed towards the left, but women's distribution is even more skewed than that of men. This gives women a higher mean value than men on morality, religion, tradition and human issues. Women's mean value is 13.32 while men's mean value is 12.57. The distribution of women is also more clustered around the highest values, which gives women a lower variance than that of men. The standard deviations are 4.2 for women and 4.6 for men.

Some of the same pattern is evident in Figure 4.4. Women's distributions are clustered more than men's, and the standard deviation is 4.7 for women and 5.0 for men. Additionally, Figure 4.4 is the only one where the two distributions are not skewed in the same direction. Women are negatively skewed, giving them a higher mean value than men, while men's distribution is positively skewed, giving men a mean below the middle value on the scale. The mean values are 11.01 for women and 9.68 for men.

Figure 4.4: The respondents' distribution on immigration by gender



Figure 4.5: The respondents' distribution on climate and environmental issues by gender



The last figure indicates the distribution for both women and men on climate and environmental issues is skewed towards the left. However, women's values are clustered around the highest values, giving women a greater mean value (13.38) than men (11.53). Figure 4.5 also illustrates that the category of climate and environmental issues sees the least overlap between women and men; this conforms to my finding that women and men disagree the most on climate and environmental issues. When it comes to variances, the pattern is similar to the other figures, where men have greater variances than women. The standard deviation is 4.2 for women and 4.7 for men.

Chapter 5

Discussion

5.1 What do the results tell us?

In this master's thesis I have set out to answer the following question: Does gender affect our placement on the second political dimension cutting through the left-right divide, here referred to as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension? Based on the generation gap theory by Norris and Inglehart (2003), I expected Norwegian women, in general, to have a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian men. The results from the analysis indicate that Norwegian woman have more libertarian positions than men on all four issue categories that comprise the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (see Chapter 4). Even do all correlations trend in the same direction, they differ in strength, and the strength of the gender effect on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension depends on which issues are considered. The results from the analysis reveal that Norwegian woman have more libertarian political views than Norwegian men and my support my hypothesis. I trace my arguments step by step before I relate them to the empirical results and their interpretation.

Norris and Inglehart (2003) theorize that societal modernization processes are exerting a greater impact on women's political values than the values of men. This creates a gender gap where women, over time, are slowly becoming more post-materialistic. As discussed in Chapter 2, Flanagan (1982) argues that post-materialistic values and libertarian values are different terms used to describe the same phenomenon and that having post-materialistic values is the same as having libertarian values. Therefore, based on Norris and Inglehart's (2003) theory, I expect women to be more libertarian than men. Furthermore, Flanagan and Lee (2003) believe that libertarian values stand in opposition to what they call authoritarian values, and this creates a value dimension. This value conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values has intensified, according to Flanagan and Lee, and is spilling into the political realm. The result of this conflict is the creation of new political issues. Many contributors to the literature,

together with Flanagan and Lee, argue that personal values and shifting worldviews have created a second political or cultural dimension that cuts through the traditional left-right divide (Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006; Stubager 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Because a values-based political dimension is created by a value conflict, one of the factors that will decide our placement on the second political dimension is our values. If one has libertarian personal values, we will embrace libertarian views, and if we has authoritarian values, we will embrace authoritarian views (Flanagan and Lee 2003). It is this second political dimension, which I call the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, that interests me in this thesis. This is because our values affect our placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and because women have more libertarian values than men, I expect women to also have more libertarian political views than men.

I used Norway as a case to test my hypothesis for two reasons: I view Norway is a likely case (see Chapter 2) and I have access to high-quality and context-specific data from Norway (see Chapter 3). Before I could investigate whether a gap exists between women and men's attitudes on issues associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, I had to determine which issues should be explored. While assessing the most prominent contributions to the literature, I discovered that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is composed of four categories of political issues (see Chapter 2). They are:

1. Authority, order and punishment.
2. Morality, religion, tradition and human rights.
3. Immigration.
4. Climate and environmental issues.

Furthermore, I created a robust operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension that includes all four categories associated with the dimension and that are relevant to today's Norwegian political context. The operationalization consists of an index constructed by 20 survey items measuring the respondents' attitudes towards political issues that are rooted in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. In my model I assign libertarian positions on the dimension a high value and authoritarian positions a low value. Women were given the value of 2 and men the value of 1 (see Chapter 3).

I found that women had a higher mean value than men on this index and that there is a positive correlation between the variable of gender and my operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. These results support my hypothesis, which is that Norwegian women have, in general, a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than Norwegian man. I also found the same results when I divided the index into the four issue categories, revealing a significant gender gap regardless of which aspect of the dimension is being studied. This finding provides further support to my hypothesis because it dismiss the notion that the gender gap is linked only to a few issues. Women have more libertarian views on all of the political issues that are associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. However, I also found that the size of the gender gap and the strength of the correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension differ depending on the issue category. The two first categories – authority, order and punishment and morality, religion, tradition and human rights – have the smallest gender gap. They are followed by immigration, and the largest gap was found in the last issue category, climate and environment. These results also support my hypothesis but they additionally indicate that the strength of the correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension depends on which aspect of dimension is being studied.

In the first part of the analysis, I looked at the difference in means between women and men on the variable of libertarian–authoritarian political views. The results indicated the presence of a significant gender gap. In the second part of the analysis, I used Pearson's r and an OLS regression and found a correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (see Chapter 4). These results supported my hypothesis. However, my results also indicate a causal relationship between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension because there is little change in reversed causality (see Chapter 3). Additionally, in the OLS regression, I control for, what seems to be, the only possible underlying variable, which is age (see Chapter 3). The results from the regression analysis can therefore be interpreted as the total causal effect of gender on political views.

This study has revealed a causal relationship between gender and libertarian and authoritarian views. However, the results do not provide an answer as to why gender affects one's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. It is not known which mechanism and mediating variables might cause the gender effect. In the next section of this chapter, I return to this question and explore possible explanations as well as suggest further research to be conducted

to answer the question (see Chapter 6). Another question that this master's thesis has not addressed is whether the size of the gender gap has been changing over time. Norris and Inglehart (2003) argue that younger women are becoming more post-materialistic than younger men and that the gap is slowly increasing with every new generation. Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) also find in their study that women in the Netherlands are more authoritarian than men but have slowly become more libertarian over time. Because my study looks only at data from 2017, my results do not contribute towards proving or disproving whether the gender gap has changed over time.

5.2 So what?

Many have studied the gender gap in voting, and a great deal of effort has been devoted to finding an explanation for it. One of the suggested reasons for the modern gender gap in voting is that woman and men hold different personal values, and this creates a gap between political attitudes (Bergh 2008). In this master's thesis, I have taken one step back from voting and more closely examined the belief that women and men hold different values. Specifically, I have focused on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. In the literature review (see Chapter 2), I found only two studies that examined the question I posed, and the results of these studies were contradictory. Campbell (2006) did not find a gender gap when studying British voters, while Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) did conclude that women in the Netherlands were more libertarian than men. Both studies used the same theoretical conceptualization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension but relied on different operationalizations of the dimension. The inconclusive findings have left us with a knowledge gap that this thesis aims to fill. By conducting a study with a comprehensive and robust operationalization, and by choosing a likely case, I have created a condition where the gender gap is likely to be detected if it exists at all. If I did not find a gender gap in this study, I would consider it unlikely that it could be found anywhere. However, I did identify a gender gap, and the results from my study correspond with the findings of Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) and support their claim that women have a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than men.

One of the most important ways my in which my thesis contributes to the literature is by suggesting where the focus should be placed if the knowledge gap is to be filled. Researchers cannot eliminate the possibility that women and men have different placements on the

libertarian–authoritarian dimension and that a gender disparity in political views might create a modern gender gap in voting. The academic community must continue to explore this questions if we are to gain a greater understanding of the effect gender has on political attitudes and behaviour.

Many have studied the Norwegian gender gap in voting. The first studies, conducted in the 1950s and '60s, identified a traditional gender gap, while later studies found the emergence of a modern gender gap (Bergh 2008, 430 - 431). Political attitudes are included in several of these studies, but only as a control or explanatory variable. The goal of Norwegian researchers thus far has been to explain why a modern gender gap in voting exists (Bergh 2008, 431). I am not aware of any studies that have specifically focused on the gender gap in political attitudes associated with the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and where attitudes are the dependent variable. Therefore, the results of my study are a contribution to the collective knowledge about Norwegian voters' political attitudes and beliefs.

5.2.1 Generalization

I looked only at the Norwegian political context in my study, but the results might also be generalized to other Western democracies, especially Sweden and Denmark. The societal and political contexts in these two Scandinavian countries share some of the same characteristics found in Norway, such as a plural party system, a high standard of living, a strong welfare state and a high rate of both gender equality and female participation in the workforce. Additionally, I consider the same to be true for Iceland and Finland, which share some of the same social contexts as the Scandinavian countries. What about other Western democracies? It is difficult to say whether these results could be replicated in these countries. However, some studies have identified gender gaps in political attitudes in other political contexts; for example, researchers in the United States discovered that women are more likely than men to vote for Democratic Party candidates (Campbell 2016, 164 - 165), and women and men do not share the same views on a range of political issues (Bergh 2008, 428 - 429). It seems likely that some form of gender gap in political attitudes and behaviour is present in most Western democracies, but whether it resembles the one I have found in the Norwegian political context is less certain.

What is universal among all Western democracies is that the role of women has been changing. These shifts may not be the same in every country, but women have earned more freedom and power, and the genders are more equal today than they were 50 years ago. The empowerment

of women might have prompted women to realize that their own political interests are different than those of men, thereby contributing to a gender gap in political attitudes among women and men who share the same socioeconomic background. These changing gender roles and the empowerment of women are among the reasons why I have found that Norwegian women have more libertarian views than Norwegian men, and I expect the same to be true in other Western democracies. However, more research is needed to support this expectation (see Chapter 6).

5.2.2 Theoretical implications

The results from my study provide some support to Norris and Inglehart's (2003) generation gap theory. I found the gender gap their theory predicted, and my results support the notion that women have more post-materialistic values or libertarian views than men. However, I did not investigate whether this gap is greater among young people or whether the disparity has widened over time. Therefore, these results do not address these questions. Based on Norris and Inglehart's theory and the findings of Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999), one might suspect that women and men's different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension are trends that have developed over time, but more research is needed (see Chapter 6).

Whether these different placements can explain the modern gender gap in voting is not directly investigated in this thesis. However, the findings suggest a potential mechanism that might explain the modern gender gap in voting. More women than men vote for left-leaning parties, and these parties are typically more libertarian in their political stances. At the same time, men are more likely than women to vote for right-leaning parties, which are typically more authoritarian. It can be seen that men are overrepresented among those voting for radical right parties (Gidengil et al. 2005; Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe 2015; Givens 2016), which are often the most authoritarian parties in any political context. In his study, Bergh (2007) found that "feminist consciousness" has a significant effect on the modern voting gaps found in the United States and Norway. To measure feminist consciousness, Bergh constructed a "feminism index" that included questions about attitudes and behaviour. He found two ways in which feminist consciousness mediates the effect that gender has on voting. The first is that women are more likely to be feminists than men, and feminists are more likely to support left-wing policies and vote for left-leaning parties. However, he also found that being a feminist had a direct effect on voting, and that the effect was not fully mediated by the variable support for leftist policies (Bergh 2007, 246 - 247). According to Bergh, these findings indicated that left-leaning parties are perceived to support feminist goals and policies, and having a feminist

consciousness leads someone to support these parties regardless of their position on the left–right scale (Bergh 2007, 250). Bergh did not study the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, but I believe his findings indicate that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension might be mediating the effect between gender and voting. This is because feminism is one of the political issues that are included in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension; it belongs to the second issue category I identified – morality, religion, tradition and human rights. However, this is something that must be studied further (see Chapter 6).

The last theoretical implication that I want to discuss is how my findings contributed to the literature regarding political dimensions. Two findings in my study lead me to question the validity of the theory behind a second political dimension. The first is that my operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension had a poor internal consistency, and the one-factor confirmative factor analysis revealed a poor and unacceptable model fit. I was guided by theory and a range of empirical studies when constructing my operationalization. Additionally, I took the issue of measurement very seriously (see Chapters 2 and 3). Therefore, I am surprised to find that the items in the index do not seem to measure the same underlying factor. This suggests that the 20-item index I constructed may actually measure more than one dimension. When I divided the index into the four issue categories, the internal consistency of each category improved, and if I placed the items into multiple factors, the results indicated an acceptable model fit. The second finding that leads me to question the theory is that the size of the gender gap varies when examining each of the issue categories separately. I found the largest disparity in climate and environment, with a difference in mean of 1.85 scale points (on a scale from 0 to 20). The second largest gap was found in the immigration category, with a 1.33 difference in mean. These were followed by morality, religion, tradition and human rights, which had a difference in mean of 0.75, and authority, order and punishment, which had a difference in mean of 0.62. The results indicate that the gender effect is stronger or weaker depending on which aspect of the dimension is being examined. One possible interpretation is that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is not one political dimension but instead a broad category for multiple dimensions.

A last implication from my findings is that the items chosen for inclusion in the operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension are important. I found significant differences when looking at the issue categories separately. This might indicate that research results can vary depending on which aspects of the dimension were included in the measure.

For example, in Chapter 2, I discovered that none of the empirical studies that have measured the libertarian–authoritarian dimension include items from all four issue categories and that items from the climate and environment category are less frequently used than items from other categories. I found a stronger gender effect relating to the issue of climate and environment; therefore, failure to include items from this category might have left previous researchers unable to register a gender gap when one did indeed exist.

5.2.3 Other democratic implications

There are wider implications for my findings than purely academic ones. On an aggregated level, Norwegian women have more libertarian political views than Norwegian men. The implications of these results is that there will be real-world consequences if women and men lack the same access to political power. A society in which men have a louder voice and stronger political power will look different than one where both women and men enjoy the same opportunity to be heard. This is because women and men do not share the same attitudes on core political issues, and the gender that has the greatest power might affect the outcome of the political process. Consider, for example, the issue of climate change and environmental protection, which is where I found the greatest gender differences. Norwegian women are much more concerned about climate change and more willing to prioritize carbon reduction and environmental protection over further economic development. Additionally, Bergh and Karlsen (Bergh and Karlsen 2019, 30) found that Norwegian women are more likely than Norwegian men to rank climate and environmental issues as the most important issue. Why women have a more libertarian view of this matter is still unknown, but my results suggest that Norway might have a different climate and environmental policy if men were the only ones making the dissections. The same is true with the issue of immigration, where women are more positive towards immigration than men are. If women possessed greater political power, the Norwegian immigration policy might be more liberal.

The results from my study can be used to advocate for affirmative action and other measures that secure equal representation in all aspects of political life. Ensuring that women and men have the same access to political life is not only fair, but it might have real consequences for political outcomes. Another argument for equal representation is that women and men are two social groups with distinct political interests that need to be represented when political decisions are been made. For example, Norwegian women are more likely to vote than

Norwegian men (SSB 2019c), and a consequence of this might be that men's political interests are underrepresented or that politicians are unable to appeal to the political interests of men.

5.3 Why?

The last, and perhaps most important, question I discussing is why? Why do Norwegian women and men, in general, have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension? In reviewing the literature, I identify two explanations for this situation. The first is work logic.

In his classical work, Kitschelt (1994) argues that our placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is determined by our occupational experiences, how our work is organized and the nature of the work tasks (Kitschelt 1994, 15 - 18). This is because the work one does affects one's views of the community and contributes to one's political views (see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth presentation of Kitschelt's argument). The first factor that affects our placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is how much autonomy one has in one's work situation. Those who have control over their own workday and do work where they participate in a communicative social process will develop more libertarian views than those who have little autonomy or control over their workday. This is because work that offers autonomy and that requires communication skills creates opportunity for social reciprocity, self-realization and creativity. Greater autonomy and control also create a sense of competence, so the work will demand more participation in collective affairs (Kitschelt 1994, 16 - 17). The second factor that affects our sense of community and placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is the type of tasks we met at work every day. If we works primarily with other people and enjoys face-to-face human interaction, we will develop more libertarian views. This is also true for people who work with cultural symbols that invoke the development of human individuality. Those who work and communicate with many people tend to have a more uncertain and non-routine workday. Non-routine and client-interactive labour creates a more individualized occupational experience, and workers in these types of jobs are more likely to reject an authoritarian vision of work and are more concerned with equal interaction and the well-being of others. Conversely, those who work with objects, documents or clients who are treated as standardized cases do not have this individualized experience and are more comfortable with hierarchical and authoritarian interactions at work. Therefore, they tend to have more authoritarian views (Kitschelt 1994, 17 - 18).

Women and men tend to have different occupational experiences, and this might explain some of the gender disparity in their political views. Men are more often to hold leadership positions than women and should therefore have greater autonomy over their workdays. Conversely, women often hold jobs in which they are not the boss but still enjoy autonomy over their work; for example, as teachers, child-care workers and middle-management administrators. Another factor that distinguishes women and men's work experiences is that women are more likely to enjoy face-to-face interactions with clients and work with cultural symbols. Women with higher education tend to seek employment where the primary task is work with people, as pupils, patients or clients. On the contrary, men with higher education are more likely to work with a process, objects and standardized tasks. The same is true for those with lower or no education: Women are more likely to work with people, such as caring for the sick and the elderly, while men complete tasks involving objects and processes, for example, in manufacturing (SSB 2019b).

Education might be the second variable that mitigates the effect between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Stubager (2008; 2013) finds in his studies of the Danish political context that people with higher education correlate with a more libertarian placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, while those with lower education have more authoritarian views. According to Stubager, the reason for this correlation is that education affects one's political views through the socializations process that takes place in educational institutions (Stubager 2008, 343 - 344). Students are often socialized into accepting the values held by the institution, not necessarily through the curriculum but rather through informal interactions with teachers and peers. Stubager argues that libertarian values are more predominant in educational institutions across the Western world and that people spending more time in these institutions are, therefore, more likely to hold libertarian views. The result is that those with higher education hold more libertarian values, while those with less education are often more authoritarian. Based on this theoretical argument and his previous research, Stubager argues that education is the main predictor when it comes to a person's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension (Stubager 2013, 376 - 377). In Western democracies since the 1980s, women have enrolled at universities at the same rate as men. However, in many countries, the number of women with higher education has slowly surpassed that of men (van Hek, Kraaykamp, and Wolbers 2016). In Norway, about 29% of women hold a bachelor's degree while only 19% of men do. However, 10% of both women and men hold a master's degree (SSB 2019a). Education and workplace experiences are variables that can explain why

women and men, in general, have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. These are factors that should be studied, and it is especially important to investigate whether the variables have a mediating effect between gender and someone's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

5.3.1 Is the gender gap due to more than a socioeconomic background?

The two explanations I have looked at so far are structural, where the gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian views is explained by women and men's different socioeconomic backgrounds. Can women and men's different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension be purely explained by structural differences between the genders? Indeed, there are differences in women and men's socioeconomic backgrounds, but the two genders also have different experiences unrelated to where they are placed in the social hierarchy. For example, a woman and a man can hold the same job, but she is more likely to experience sexual harassment in the workplace than he is. If two heterosexual couples take a road trip, one of the two men will probably drive. When shopping for a toy for a girl, it is natural to buy her a doll she can play with and care for, but the same gift is often not bought for a boy. There are many examples of how women and men are treated differently and meet different expectations. These differences are sometimes small but they are many, and in total, they make women and men's experience of the world quite different. These social and experiential differences might affect women and men's views and beliefs about the world. To understand the gender differences in libertarian and authoritarian views, researchers might have to look beyond only the structural differences between women and men.

In his theory of what affects one's placement on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, Kitschelt (1994) briefly mentions how gender might affect one's values and political views. He argues that women's socialization experiences and "involvement in reproductive activities" make women care more about communication with other people. Again, this makes women more libertarian, because greater mutual connection with others makes for a more individual experience (Kitschelt 1994, 18). However, he does not explore this notion any further or explain what he mean by "socialization experiences" and "involvement in reproductive activities". One potential interpretation of Kitschelt is that he believes women are more libertarian than men because they are taught to be nice to others and are more caring because they give birth and take care of babies. I believe Kitschelt might have overlooked a crucial factor in understanding the gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian views: New political

issues that are underpinned by libertarian values are more appealing to women and are important to their development of personal freedom. Libertarian views supported the shift in gender roles that gave women more freedom, new opportunities and autonomy over their own lives. But why are libertarian values, new political issues and women's liberation linked?

One point that is found in all theoretical contributions presented in Chapter 2 is that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is a conflict rooted in the notion of social hierarchy. Authoritarians believe in hierarchy and that maintaining one's place in society ensures a thriving community. In contrast, liberals care more about the individuals than the group and want a more egalitarian society where everyone has the personal freedom to live as they please. Traditionally, women, regardless of class and position in society, have been placed below men in the social hierarchy. The fight for equality between women and men is therefore not in line with the authoritarian ideas of how society should be organized. The women's liberation movement, in some sense, weakened the social hierarchy that authoritarians seek to maintain or even strengthen. Women are the ones suffering the most under society's traditional structure, and it is likely that women are more motivated than men to change the norms of society and the gender hierarchy. Of course, there are women who desire a society with more defined gender roles and less autonomy for women. If one looks at the traditional gender gap in voting, women did not seek change but wanted to preserve their role as holders of social capital and protectors of morale. However, the past 50 years have seen an awakening among women, many of whom are adopting libertarian values and notions about equal rights, eliminating the hierarchy between women and men and giving women more personal freedom. This adoption of libertarian values has made the women's movement possible, and the mobilization of women has also given them an awareness of other social issues, making women more libertarian than men in other political views as well. Social movements tend to spill over into each other, and this might be because they are rooted in the same libertarian values. For example, if one participates in a demonstration against climate change one will see someone dressed as a polar bear while also seeing a pride flag or a peace symbol. Additionally, one can find rainbow flags bearing the "Black Lives Matter" symbol or rainbow flags with a brown stripe indicating the fight for racial equality in the LGBT+ movement. The women's liberation movement might have altered women's views on political issues that reach beyond gender equality. The modern gender gap in voting was first noticed in the early 1980s, soon after women's rights and other new political issues began emerging on the political agenda.

5.3.2 A gender backlash

According to the theory I am using in thesis, women have become more libertarian over time (Inglehart and Norris 2003). But what if men, at the same time, have becoming more authoritarian? The growth of libertarian values in Western democracies is believed to have created what is referred to as a cultural backlash. As some people have adopted more libertarian values, those who hold authoritarian values feel threatened by liberal ideas and therefore place greater emphasis on authoritarian issues such as immigration and reject libertarian stances on new political issues. The growth of right-wing populist parties in Europe has often been explained by this cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The existence of a gender cultural backlash has been suggested previously, but it has not yet been studied. In his classical work, Kitschelt (1994, 23) wrote that:

> The growing salience of libertarian orientation among professionals, personal service employees and women also is likely to promote an authoritarian response from less-educated, typical male workers in the manufacturing sector, clerks or small business owners. (Kitschelt 1994, 23)

However, he uses little time explaining why he believes women are more libertarian and why men are more authoritarian. The liberalization of women and the fight for equal social status might have triggered a backlash among men who wish to maintain the current social hierarchy. Women's growing personal freedom and their roles in the workforce can promote men's fears about their own positions. In their new book, Norris and Inglehart (2019, 113) briefly explore this notion. They argue that men might generally feel a strong sense of cultural grievance from the impact of feminism. Changing attitudes about gender equality in the home, workplace and the public space means that men have lost their status as the breadwinner and head of the family. These grievances about changing gender roles and men's loss of status might create more backlash potential, which again push men even further toward authoritarian views.

Another point to consider when discussing whether men have a greater potential to experience a cultural backlash is that the backlash might differ based on social class. Kitschelt argues that an authoritarian response to libertarian values is more common among people who are less educated and work in the manufacturing sector, are clerks or are small business owners. It might be that men in this group have a stronger tendency to have cultural grievances about feminism than professional men who are better-educated and have more influence over their

work. The first group of men, traditional blue-collar workers, might have more to lose from women surpassing them in the social hierarchy because they would now be at the bottom. However, traditional white-collar workers find women now on equal footing with them and are therefore not threatened by changing gender roles. If this is the case, one should be able to observe a greater variance in libertarian and authoritarian views among men than among women. This is because some groups of men still follow the value development of women and are becoming more libertarian, while others, who have more to lose, are heading in the opposite direction and are rejecting libertarian stances on new political issues. In my analyses I saw some indications that there is more variations in men's placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. The reason for this might be that some group of men feels the cultural grievance stronger than other groups. however, this is something that needs to be studied further (see Chapter 6).

Perhaps the reason there is a gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian views is not only because women have become more libertarian. Perhaps it is also because more women than men have experienced a cultural backlash, and the backlash potential is especially great among some groups of men. I believe that if one seeks to understand the different placements of women and men on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, one must determine whether the cultural backlash is gendered. Is there a gender backlash affecting our political system?

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The goal of this master's thesis is to take a step back from the discussion of a gender gap in voting and examine what happens before votes are cast. I have asked the question, do women and men hold different political views? More specifically, I have been looking at the second political dimension cutting through the right–left divide and creating a two-dimensional political space. This second dimension is often referred to as the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and is thought to be rooted in a value conflict created by the incommutability of libertarian and authoritarian personal values. My research question is: Do women and men, in general, have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension?

There are several reasons why this research question is relevant (see Chapter 1), but a primary one is the knowledge gap created by previous studies that have provided inconclusive results. My results might guide further research on how gender affects political beliefs and behaviour in Western democracies, and they might also offer insights into what should be studied to understand a non-Western political context as well. In this last section of this thesis, I discuss some of the questions the academic community should explore in future studies.

Based on Inglehart and Norris' (2003) generation gap theory, I expect women to have a more libertarian position on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. They argue that modernization and changing gender roles are slowly creating a value gap between women and men, because women's values are changing faster than men's values. Another factor that indicates that women hold more libertarian views is the modern gender gap in voting. Parties on the left side of the political spectrum often hold more libertarian positions than parties on the right, which typically reflect more authoritarian positions.

To test my hypothesis, I use Norway as a case, and by studying one country I can take into account and control for context-specific factors. I chose Norway because I view the country as a likely case. Norway is a highly modernized society, with a high degree of gender equality a modern gender gap in voting. These are the three factors that predict a gender gap in political views, according to Inglehart and Norris' (2003) theory. Additionally, Inglehart and Norris argue that the gender gap in values and political attitudes is becoming larger with every new generation. The use of newer data would increase the likelihood of identifying such a gap (see Chapter 2). Additionally, Norway was chosen as the test case because the available data – which are rich, context-specific and of high quality – were collected in 2017 (see Chapter 3).

In reviewing the literature, I found that the libertarian–authoritarian dimension is predominantly thought to consist of political issues from four categories: 1) authority, order and punishment; 2) morality, religion, tradition and human rights; 3) immigration; and 4) climate and environmental issues. To investigate whether women and men hold different values, I created a 20-item index with five survey questions from each category. Then, I looked at both women and men's differences in the mean as well as the correlation between gender and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. My results supported my hypothesis, that women have a more libertarian position on all issue categories included in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. This is a strong indicator that women have more libertarian values and that women and men's different worldviews are shaping their political attitudes, possibly contribution toward the modern gender gap in voting. Additionally, the results indicate that women and men have distinctly different political interests. This means that whether women and men are equally represented in political life might have real-world consequences for the outcome of political processes.

6.1 What is next?

One of the most important contributions of my thesis is that it gives rise to new research questions that should be studied further. Why is there a gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian political views, what are the consequences of the gap that I have uncovered and is it present in other political contexts? In this last part of my thesis, I suggest some research questions that should be investigated further and describe how these questions could be studied. Furthermore, I present some possible explanations for why women and men have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

The first research question that I believe is important to investigate is: Can we find the same results in other Western democratic countries? Is the gender gap in libertarian and authoritarian political views specific to the Norwegian political context, or is it also present in other countries? In Chapter 5, I discuss whether my findings can be generalized to other political contexts. Based on Norris and Inglehart's (2003) theory that the modernization process is making women more post-materialistic than men, I expect women to be more libertarian in all post-industrial Western democracies. However, this is a notion that must be investigated empirically. Whether the same results will be found in other countries can be researched by examining data from cross-national surveys such as the European Social Survey and the World Value Survey. One challenge with this approach is that there might be relatively few items available to create the operationalization of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. For example, the Norwegian Election Survey has many more questions measuring attitudes towards issues in the four categories on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension than for example, the European Social Survey. Another approach that could be fruitful is to use data from various national election surveys and collaborate with researchers to create country-specific operationalizations of the libertarian–authoritarian dimension that is similar to the robust and comprehensive measure used in my study. Furthermore, collaboration with researchers from the specific political contexts would increase the quality of the measure, as they would be familiar with the local political landscape.

In this thesis, I looked only at data from 2017, and the question I suggest should be investigated is: Has the gender gap been stable from year to year or has it changed over time? Vollebergh, Iedema and Meuss (1999) found in their study of the Dutch political context that both women and men had become more libertarian over time. Women, however, experienced a greater change, which resulted in a widening gender gap. More than 20 years have passed since the publication of this study, and I wonder, has this trend continued? The answer is important because an understanding of how the gender gap has developed might provide some clues to explain it. One way of studying this question is by again reviewing data from the Norwegian Election Survey and using Norway as a case. These survey data are useful because they date back to the 1957 election, and many of the survey questions have been asked repeatedly.

What has created the modern gender gap in voting has been one of the central questions of this field of research. Therefore, the next step is to investigate whether women and men's different

placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension are contributing to the modern gender gap in voting. In his study, Bergh (2007) found that feminist consciousness had a significant effect on the modern voting gap in United States and Norway. To measure feminist consciousness, he constructed a feminism index that included questions about attitudes and behaviour. Bergh found two ways in which feminist consciousness mediates the effect that gender has on voting. The first is that women are more likely to be feminists than men, and feminists are more likely to support left-wing policies and vote for left-leaning parties. However, he also found that being a feminist had an direct effect on voting, and that effect was not fully mediated by support for leftist policies (Bergh 2007, 246 - 247). These findings indicated, according to Bergh, that left-leaning parties are perceived to support feminist goals and policies, and having a feminist consciousness leads someone to support these parties regardless of their position on the left–right political scale (Bergh 2007, 250). Bergh did not study the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, but I believe his findings indicate that the dimension might be mediating the effect between gender and voting. This is because feminism is one of the political issues included in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension and it belongs to the second issue category I identified – morality, religion, tradition and human rights. However, this must be studied further. To investigate this question, I suggest using mediation analysis with logistic regression. Again, I also believe it is wise to use the Norwegian political context as a case, because Norway has one of the largest gender gaps in voting (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014) and because Bergh (2007) found that feminist consciousness had an effect on voting in Norway. However, it could also be relevant to conduct the same study in other countries.

The last and perhaps the most important question we must ask ourselves is why? Why do women and men, in general, have different placements on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension? In Chapter 5, I discuss possible explanations for the gender gap, suggesting both structural and social explanations for why women and men hold different political views. Based on my discussion in Chapter 5, it appears that the explanation of my results might be complex and difficult to investigate. Therefore, I do not suggest any particular research strategies to investigate the possible explanations but I strongly encourage the academic community to study this further.

Lastly, I have one more suggestion for further research, which is to give extra attention to the relationship between gender and climate and environmental issues. In my analysis, I found that gender had the strongest effect on views concerning climate change and the environment (see

Chapter 4). These findings are surprising because nothing in the literature suggested this result. Why would women be more concerned about climate and environmental issues than men? This issue deserves further attention to help fill the knowledge gap in the literature.

Reference

Aardal, Bernt, Johannes Bergh, and Atle Haugsgjerd. 2019. "Politiske stridsspørsmål, ideologiske dimensjoner og stemmegivning." In *Velgere og valgkamp : en studie av stortingsvalget 2017*, edited by Johannes Bergh and Bernt Aardal, 44 - 80. Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk.

Abendschön, Simone, and Stephanie Steinmetz. 2014. "The gender gap in voting revisited: Women's party preferences in a European context." *Social Politics* 21 (2): 315-344.

Bergh, Johannes. 2007. "Explaining the gender gap: a cross-national analysis of gender differences in voting." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 17 (3): 235-261.

---. 2008. "Årsaker til kjønnsforskjeller i stemmegivning." *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* 49 (03): 421-432.

Bergh, Johannes, and Rune Karlsen. 2019. "Politisk dagsorden og sakseierskap ved stortingsvalget i 2017." In *Velgere og valgkamp : en studie av stortingsvalget 2017*, edited by Johannes Bergh and Bernt Aardal, 27 - 43. Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk.

Blair, Johnny, Edward A. Blair, and Ronald Czaja. 2014. *Designing surveys : a guide to decisions and procedures*. 3rd edition. ed. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Bornschier, Simon. 2010. "The new cultural divide and the two-dimensional political space in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 33 (3): 419-444.

Bryman, Alan. 2016. *Social research methods*. Oxford university press.

Campbell, Rosie. 2004. "Gender, ideology and issue preference: Is there such a thing as a political women's interest in Britain?" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6 (1): 20-44.

---. 2006. *Gender and the vote in Britain: Beyond the gender gap?* Essex: ECPR Press.

---. 2016. "Gender and Voting." In *The Sage handbook of electoral behaviour*, edited by Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans and Michael S Lewis-Beck, 159 - 176. Sage.

Christophersen, Knut-Andreas. 2013. *Introduksjon til statistisk analyse : regresjonsbaserte metoder og anvendelser*. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk.

Dassonneville, Ruth, and Filip Kostelka. 2019. "The Cultural Sources of the Gender Gap in Voter Turnout." *British Journal of Political Science*: 1-22.

Evans, Geoffrey, Anthony Heath, and Mansur Lalljee. 1996. "Measuring Left-Right and Libertarian-Authoritarian Values in the British Electorate."

Falnes-Dalheim, Elisabeth, and Lise Snellingen Bye. 2019. "Stortingsvalgundersøkelsen 2017 Dokumentasjonsnotat."

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (2): 416-440.

Field, Andy. 2013. *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*. sage.

Fishbein, Martin, and Leek Ajzen. 1975. "Belief, attitude, intention and behavior : an introduction to theory and research." *Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*: 181-202.

Flanagan, Scott. 1982. "Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies:Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings." *Comparative Political Studies* 14 (4): 403-444.

Flanagan, Scott, and Aie Rie Lee. 2003. "The new politics, culture wars, and the authoritarian-libertarian value change in advanced industrial democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (3): 235-270.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, Matthew Hennigar, AndrÉ Blais, and Neil Nevitte. 2005. "Explaining The Gender Gap in Support for the New Right:The Case of Canada." *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (10): 1171-1195.

Givens, Terri E. 2016. "The Radical Right Gender Gap." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (1): 30-54.

Heath, Anthony, Geoffrey Evans, and Jean Martin. 1994. "The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales." *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (1): 115-132.

Hellevik, Ottar. 1988. *Introduction to causal analysis: Exploring survey data by cross-tabulation*. Vol. 9. Oxford University Press.

Hillen, Sven, and Nils D. Steiner. 2019. "The consequences of supply gaps in two-dimensional policy spaces for voter turnout and political support: The case of economically left-wing and culturally right-wing citizens in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research*.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (8): 965-989.

Immerzeel, Tim, Hilde Coffé, and Tanja van der Lippe. 2015. "Explaining the gender gap in radical right voting: A cross-national investigation in 12 Western European countries." *Comparative European Politics* 13 (2): 263-286.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. "The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies." *American political science review* 65 (4): 991-1017.

---. 1977. *The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

---. 2008. "Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006." *West European Politics* 31 (1-2): 130-146.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Scott C Flanagan. 1987. "Value change in industrial societies." *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1289-1319.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2000. "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective." *International Political Science Review* 21 (4): 441 – 463.

---. 2003. *Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge University Press.

Jenssen, Anders Todal, and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. 2019. "Innvandringsvalget 2017." In *Velgere og valgkamp : en studie av stortingsvalget 2017*, edited by Johannes Bergh and Bernt Aardal, 131 - 155. Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk.

Kellstedt, Paul M., and Guy D. Whitten. 2018. *The fundamentals of political science research*. Third edition. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The transformation of European social democracy*. cambridge university press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The radical right in Western Europe : a comparative analysis*. Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 2006. *Class voting in Western Europe: A comparative longitudinal study*. Lexington Books.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2010. "Restructuration of partisan politics and the emergence of a new cleavage based on values." *West European Politics* 33 (3): 673-685.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2006. "Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (6): 921-956.

---. 2008. *West European politics in the age of globalization*.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*. Vol. 7. Free press.

Listhaug, Ola, Arthur. H Miller, and Henry Valen. 1985. "The gender gap in Norwegian voting behaviour." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 8 (3): 187-206.

Lloren, Anouk, and Jan Rosset. 2017. "Gendered policy preferences? Candidates' views on political issues in a comparative perspective." *Comparative European Politics* 15 (6): 944-968.

Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards. 2006. "Party competition and European integration in the East and West: Different structure, same causality." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (2): 155-175.

Maslow, Abraham Harold. 1943. "A theory of human motivation." *Psychological review* 50 (4): 370.

Middendorp, Cees P. 1991. *Ideology in Dutch politics: The democratic system reconsidered, 1970-1985*. van Gorcum.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*. Cambridge University Press.

Oskarson, Maria, and Marie Demker. 2015. "Room for Realignment: The Working-Class Sympathy for Sweden Democrats." *Government and Opposition* 50 (4): 629-651.

Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The nature of human values*. Free press.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. "Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries." In *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 1-65. Elsevier.

---. 2007. "Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations." *Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: Lessons from the European Social Survey*: 161-193.

Shendruk, Amanda. 2019. "How the 2020 US Democratic candidates compare to politicians around the world." Accessed 25.05.2020. https://qz.com/1748903/how-2020-us-democratic-candidates-compare-to-global-politicians/.

SSB. 2019a. "Befolkningens utdanningsnivå." Last Modified 20 of June 2019. Accessed 19 of February https://www.ssb.no/utniv/.

---. 2019b. "Kjønnsforskjeller i utdanning og arbeid." Last Modified 26 of February 2019. Accessed 31 of October. https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/likestilling#Arbeidsmarkedet.

---. 2019c. "Valgdeltakelse." Last Modified 6 of November 2019. Accessed 14 of October. https://www.ssb.no/valgdeltakelse.

---. 2020. "Slik ser befolkningen i Norge ut." Last Modified 26 of May 2020. Accessed 6 of October. https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/slik-ser-befolkningen-i-norge-ut.

Stubager, Rune. 2008. "Education effects on authoritarian-libertarian values: a question of socialization." *Br J Sociol* 59 (2): 327-50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00196.x. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18498598.

---. 2013. "The Changing Basis of Party Competition: Education, Authoritarian–Libertarian Values and Voting." *Government and Opposition* 48 (3): 372-397. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.13.

Sundberg, Jan. 2002. "The Scandinavian party model at the crossroads." *Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*: 181-216.

Tilley, James R. 2005. "Research Note: Libertarian-Authoritarian Value Change in Britain, 1974–2001." *Political Studies* 53 (2): 442-453.

van Hek, Margriet, Gerbert Kraaykamp, and Maarten HJ Wolbers. 2016. "Comparing the gender gap in educational attainment: The impact of emancipatory contexts in 33 cohorts across 33 countries." *Educational Research and Evaluation* 22 (5-6): 260-282.

Vollebergh, WAM, J Iedema, and W Meuss. 1999. "The emerging gender gap: Cultural and economic conservatism in the Netherlands 1970–1992." *Political Psychology* 20 (2): 291-321.

White, Halbert. 1980. "A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity." *Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society*: 817-838.

Appendix A

The exact wording of survey questions

In this appendix, I am presenting the exact wording for the survey questions used in the example of different operationalizations in table 2.1. Unfortunately, not all the authors include a table with the exact wording of their index and is therefore not included in table A.1. I am also including a table with the exact wording, in Norwegian, of the survey questions included in the index's used in the analyses.

Table A.1. Exact wording for the questions in table 2.1

Literature Heath, Evans, and Martin (1994)
Data The British Election Surveys
Variables Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values. Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives. Homosexual relations are always wrong. People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government. Even political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned.
Literature Stubager (2008, 2009, 2010, 2013)
Data Data comes from a postal survey of 2000 Danish voters (between the ages of 18 and 75) conducted by the author in spring 2004. The response rate was 60 per cent (1192 persons)
Immigration constitutes a serious threat to our national culture Violent crimes should be punished far stricter than they are today It would be very sensible to let a strong man seize power in a situation of economic crisis Islam constitutes a serious threat to Danish culture

Table A.2. Exact wording of questions in table 3.1 (Norwegian)

1 Authority, order and punishment
1.1 Det bør innføres et forbud mot tigging i Norge
1.2 Det viktigste barn bør lære er lydighet og respekt for sine foresatte
1.3 Det vi trenger mest her i landet, mer enn lover og programmer, er noen få, uselviske og myndige ledere som folket trygt kan følge
1.4 . Vi bør ikke akseptere mer kontroll og overvåkning, selv om dette kan gi bedre beskyttelse mot terror
1.5 Kriminalitet forhindres bedre med forebygging og veiledning enn med harde straffer
2 Moral, religion, tradition and human rights.
2.1 Det bør bli tillatt å bruke surrogatmor for å bære frem et barn i Norge
2.2 Det bør være samme mulighet til adopsjon for homofile som for heterofile
2.3 Vi bør tillate aktiv dødshjelp
2.4 Vi bør satse på et samfunn der kristne verdier spiller en større rolle
2.5 Så over til noen påstander. Hvilken av disse standpunktene om adgang til abort stemmer best med din egen mening?
1) Abort bør aldri tillates.
2) Abort bør tillates bare hvis kvinnens liv eller helse er i fare.
3) Abort bør tillates hvis kvinnen på grunn av personlige forhold har meget vanskelig for å ta seg av et barn.
4) Selvbestemt abort. Den enkelte kvinne må selv få bestemme om hun vil føde sitt barn.
8) VET IKKE
3 Immigration
3.1 Flyktninger og innvandrere bør ha samme rett til sosialhjelp som nordmenn, selv om de ikke er norske statsborgere
3.2 Vesteuropeiske og muslimske måter å leve på er uforenlige
3.3 Hvor vil du plassere deg på en skala fra 0 til 10, der 0 betyr at vi bør gjøre det lettere for innvandrere å få adgang til Norge, mens 10 betyr at antall innvandrere til Norge bør begrenses enda sterkere enn i dag?
3.4 Innvandrere er i hovedsak bra for norsk økonomi
3.5 Innvandring utgjør en alvorlig trussel mot vår nasjonale egenart
4 Climate and environmental
4.1 Vi bør tillate olje- og gassutvinning utenfor Lofoten, Vesterålen og Senja
4.2 Det legges altfor liten vekt på miljøvern i dagens Norge
4.3 Klimaendringene er i hovedsak menneskeskapt
4.4 Hvor vil du plassere deg på en skala fra 0 til 10, der 0 betyr at miljøvern ikke bør føres så langt at det går utover vår levestandard, mens 10 betyr at vi bør satse mye mer på miljøvern, selv om det medfører betydelige lavere levestandard for alle, inkludert deg selv?
4.5 Hvor vil du plassere deg selv på en skala fra 0 til 10, der 0 betyr at klimaendringer ikke er noe problem, mens 10 betyr at klimaendringer er et svært stort problem.

Appendix B

Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable

In appendix B, I present the descriptive statistics of the five indexes and the variance and standard deviation for women and men on these indexes.

Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of indexes

	Mean	Median	Standard derivation	Missing
The libertarian–authoritarian dimension	11.57	11.39	3.15	346
Authority, order and punishment	10.75	11.00	3.76	181
Morality, religion, tradition and human rights	12.96	13.68	4.42	249
Immigration	10.25	11.00	4.89	165
Climate and environment	12.39	12.00	55.59	129

Table B.2: Variance and standard deviation for women and men on the indexes

	Variance		Standard deviation	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
The libertarian–authoritarian dimension	8.73	9.91	2.95	3.15
Authority, order and punishment	13.65	14.49	3.70	3.8
Morality, religion, tradition and human rights	17.69	20.86	4.21	4.57

Immigration	22.27	24.38	4.72	4.94
Climate and environment	17.54	22.37	4.19	4.73

Figure B.1: Distribution of index: The libertarian–authoritarian dimension



Figure B.2: Distribution of index: Authority, order and punishment



Figure B.3: Distribution of index: Morality, religion, tradition and human rights



Figure B.4: Distribution of index: Immigration



Figure B.5: Distribution of index: Climate and environment



Appendix C

Robustness of the dependent variables

In this appendix, I present the results from the five one factor confirmative factor analysis I have conducted, and the results from the multi factor confirmative factor analysis. This appendix also contain a correlation matrix of alle the 20 items used in construction the indexes used in the analysis (see table C.3). The number of the different indicators corresponds with the number given in table 3.1. For example, the variable 1.1 is the variable 1.1 in table 3.1 which is " There should be introduced a ban on begging in Norway"

Table C.1: One factor confirmatory factor analysis

	P-value (Chi-square)	Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)
The libertarian–authoritarian dimension	0.00	0.691	0.102
Authority, order and punishment	0.00	0.853	0.097
Morality, religion, tradition and human rights	0.00	0.906	0.112
Immigration	0.00	0.989	0.062
Climate and environment	0.00	0.962	0.112

Table C.2: Four factor confirmatory factor analysis

P-value (Chi-square)	Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)
0.00	0.907	0.057

Table C.3: Correlation matrix

	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4
1.2	**0.34**																		
1.3	**0.28**	**0.13**																	
1.4	**0.16**	**0.08**	**0.25**																
1.5	**0.08**	**0.03**	**0.15**	**0.15**															
2.1	0.04	- 0.01	- 0.01	- 0.01	0.04														
2.2	0.25	0.12	0.18	0.15	0.09	**0.41**													
2.3	- 0.03	- 0.09	- 0.13	- 0.04	0.00	**0.31**	**0.17**												
2.4	0.22	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.12	**0.26**	**0.36**	**0.23**											
2.5	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.05	**0.20**	**0.31**	**0.24**	**0.35**										
3.1	0.24	0.08	0.41	0.23	0.13	0.00	0.18	- 0.15	0.14	0.04									
3.2	0.22	0.18	0.33	0.28	0.13	- 0.01	0.19	- 0.14	0.15	0.08	**0.40**								
3.3	0.32	0.20	0.40	0.26	0.12	0.02	0.25	- 0.08	0.19	0.10	**0.36**	**0.41**							
3.4	0.36	0.23	0.48	0.32	0.15	0.04	0.30	- 0.13	0.27	0.143	**0.51**	**0.56**	**0.59**						
3.5	0.30	0.19	0.52	0.26	0.16	0.02	0.23	- 0.15	0.18	0.07	**0.50**	**0.49**	**0.48**	**0.64**					
4.1	0.18	0.05	0.26	0.19	0.09	- 0.07	0.16	- 0.08	0.12	0.04	0.27	0.22	0.23	0.27	0.29				
4.2	0.26	0.15	0.29	0.20	0.13	0.00	0.25	- 0.06	0.18	0.07	0.32	0.27	0.30	0.35	0.34	**0.44**			
4.3	0.21	0.09	0.29	0.17	0.10	- 0.06	0.16	- 0.10	0.10	0.05	0.25	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.29	**0.43**	**0.34**		
4.4	0.25	0.11	0.33	0.26	0.13	-0.07	0.18	- 0.07	0.13	0.06	0.33	0.29	0.29	0.34	0.33	**0.50**	**0.45**	**0.44**	
4.5	0.28	0.14	0.32	0.20	0.11	0.00	0.22	- 0.06	0.18	0.09	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.38	0.34	**0.52**	**0.63**	**0.43**	**0.60**

Appendix D

Regression diagnostics

In this appendix, I present the regression diagnostics for all the OLS regressions presented in chapter 4 table 4.3. The preconditions for OLS regression is met in round 1, 2 and 4. However, I do have challenges with heteroscedasticity in round 3 and 5 and there is not a normal distribution of errors in round 3. I have solved this by using robust standard errors, more specifical HC0 (see chapter 3).

Round 1: Libertarian – autorotation dimension

1.1 Linearity

Figure C.1.1: Residuals vs. fitted values



Figure C.1.2: Partial-residual plot



1.2 Normal distribution of error

The skewness in round 1 was 0.02 and the kurtosis was 2.46

Figure C.1.3 The distribution of error



Figure C.1.4 The distribution of error



1.3 Homoscedasticity

The results from the Non-constant Variance Score Test had a p value of 0.06 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not redacted, and homoscedasticity is assumed.

Figure C.1.5: Standardized Residuals vs. fitted values



1.4 Independent error

The results from the Durbin Watson Test had a p value of 0.74 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not regrated and no autocorrelation is assumed.

1.5. Multi-collinearity

The variance inflation factor for gender is 1.00 and 1.00 for age. Multi-collinearity is not assumed.

1.6. Outliers

Figure C.1.6 Residuals vs. Leverage



1.6 Influential Observations

There where 65 observations that had a Cook's distance exceeded 4/(n - p - 1) and was considered as high influence. The significates of the results do not change when this observations are excluded.

Figure C.1.7 Cook´s distance



Round 2: Authority, Order and Punishment

2.1 Linearity

Figure C.2.1: Residuals vs. fitted values



Figure C.2.2: Partial-residual plot



2.2 Normal distribution of error

The skewness in round 1 was 0.12 and the kurtosis was 2.56

Figure C.2.3 The distribution of error



Figure C.2.4 The distribution of errors



2.3 Homoscedasticity

The results from the Non-constant Variance Score Test had a p value of 0.13 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. the null hypothesis is not regrated and l homoscedasticity is assumed.

Figure C.2.5: Standardized Residuals vs. fitted values



2.4 Independent error

The results from the Durbin Watson Test had a p value of 0.42 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not regrated and no autocorrelation is assumed.

2.5. Multi-collinearity

The variance inflation factor for gender is 1.00 and 1.00 for age. Multi-collinearity is not assumed.

2.6. Outliers

Figure C.2.6 Residuals vs. Leverage



2.6 Influential observations

There where 64 observations that had a Cook's distance exceeded 4/(n - p - 1) and was considered as high influence. The significates of the results do not change when this observations are excluded.

Figure C.2.7 Cook´s distance



Round 3: Moral, religion, tradition and human rights

3.1 Linearity

Figure C.3.1: Residuals vs. fitted values



Figure C.3.2: Partial-residual plot



3.2 Normal distribution of error

The skewness in round 3 was -0.60 and the kurtosis was 3.17.

Figure C.3.3 The distribution of error



Figure C.3.4 The distribution of error



3.3 Homoscedasticity

The results from the Non-constant Variance Score Test had a p value of 0.0001 and was significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is, therefore, regrated and heteroscedasticity is assumed.

Figure C.3.5: Standardized Residuals vs. fitted values



3.4 Independent error

The results from the Durbin Watson Test had a p value of 0.056 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not regrated and no autocorrelation is assumed.

2.5. Multi-collinearity

The variance inflation factor for gender is 1.00 and 1.00 for age. Multi-collinearity is not assumed.

3.6. Outliers

Figure C.3.6 Residuals vs. Leverage



3.6 Influential observations

There where 82 observations that had a Cook's distance exceeded 4/(n - p - 1) and was considered as high influence. The significates of the results do not change when this observations are excluded.

Figure C.3.7 Cook´s distance



Round 4: Immigration

4.1 Linearity

Figure C.4.1: Residuals vs. fitted values



Figure C.4.2: Partial-residual plot



4.2 Normal distribution of error

The skewness in round 1 was -0.16 and the kurtosis was 2.29

Figure C.4.3 The distribution of error



Figure C.4.4 The distribution of errors



4.3 Homoscedasticity

The results from the Non-constant Variance Score Test had a p value of 0.09 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. the null hypothesis is not regrated and l homoscedasticity is assumed.

Figure C.4.5: Standardized Residuals vs. fitted values



4.4 Independent error

The results from the Durbin Watson Test had a p value of 0.62 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not regrated and no autocorrelation is assumed.

4.5. Multi-collinearity

The variance inflation factor for gender is 1.00 and 1.00 for age. Multi-collinearity is not assumed.

4.6. Outliers

Figure C.4.6 Residuals vs. Leverage



4.6 Influential observations

There where 44 observations that had a Cook's distance exceeded 4/(n - p - 1) and was considered as high influence. The significates of the results do not change when this observations are excluded.

Figure C.4.7 Cook´s distance



Round 5: Moral, religion, tradition and human rights

5.1 Linearity

Figure C.5.1: Residuals vs. fitted values



Figure C.5.2: Partial-residual plot



5.2 Normal distribution of error

The skewness in round 3 was -0.27 and the kurtosis was 2.55.

Figure C.5.3 The distribution of error



Figure C.5.4 The distribution of error



5.3 Homoscedasticity

The results from the Non-constant Variance Score Test had a p value of 0.02 and was significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is, therefore, regrated and heteroscedasticity is assumed.

Figure C.5.5: Standardized Residuals vs. fitted values



5.4 Independent error

The results from the Durbin Watson Test had a p value of 0.81 and was not significant on a 95 % significands level. The null hypothesis is not regrated and no autocorrelation is assumed.

5.5. Multi-collinearity

The variance inflation factor for gender is 1.00 and 1.00 for age. Multi-collinearity is not assumed.

5.6. Outliers

Figure C.5.6 Residuals vs. Leverage



5.6 Influential observations

There where 45 observations that had a Cook's distance exceeded 4/(n - p - 1) and was considered as high influence. The significates of the results do not change when this observations are excluded.

Figure C.5.7 Cook´s distance



Appendix E

Robustness test: missing imputed

In this appendix, I am presenting the results with imputed missing. Instead of excluding missing, which I do in the analyses see chapter 3 and 4, I have given missing the value 3 which is the middle value for all of the variables used to construct the different indexes. The only exception is variable 2.5 in table 3.1; "Under which circumstances should abortion be allowed?". This variable have 4 values and the value 3 is the second most liberaltarian stand on the issue. The tables below presents the results from the same analyses as in table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 in chapter 4, but with imputed missing. The results from this robustness test show that imputing missing give somewhat weaker results, but they are still significant and going in the same direction.

Table E.1: Difference in mean on the dependent variables

The Libertarian – Authoritarian Dimension			
	Mean	Confidence interval lower	Confidence interval upper
Women	11.99	11.81	12.17
Men	10.89	10.78	11.16
Differences	**1.10***	0.76	1.29
Authority, Order and Punishment			
Women	10.87	10.64	11.10
Men	10.35	10.11	10.58
Differences	**0.48***	0.18	0.85
Moral, Religion, Tradition and Human rights			
Women	13.15	12.88	13.40
Men	12.48	12.20	12.75
Differences	**0.67***	0.28	1.05

Immigration			
Women	10.85	10.56	11.14
Men	9.67	9.37	9.97
Differences	**0.83***	0.76	1.59
Climate and Environment			
Women	13.16	12.90	13.44
Men	11.45	11.17	11.74
Differences	**1.71***	1.34	2.11

Note: Data from the Norwegian election survey 2017. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0)

* The mean difference between women and men was significant at a 0.01 level (Two tailed t test)

Table D.2: Correlation between gender and the dependent variable

	Correlation coefficient	Confidence interval lower	Confidence interval upper
The Libertarian – Authoritarian Dimension	0.16*	0.13	0.21
Authority, order and punishment	0.07*	0.03	0.11
Moral, religion, tradition and human rights	0.08*	0.03	0.12
Immigration	0.12*	0.08	0.17
Climate and environment	0.19*	0.15	0.23

Note: Data from the Norwegian election survey 2017. Women = 2 and men = 1. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0). Persons R. * The correlation was significant at a 0.01 level

Table D.3: OLS Regression

	The Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension	**Authority, order and punishment**	**Moral, religion, tradition and human rights**	**Immigration**	**Climate and environment**
Gender	0.96*	0.48*	0.54*	1.12*	1.68*
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Age	-0.05*	-0.03*	-0.09*	-0.04*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	13.11*	11.70*	16.85*	11.39*	12.68*
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Observations	1,966	1,966	1,966	1,966	1,966
R^2	0.09	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.05

Note: Data from the Norwegian election survey 2017. Women = 2 and men = 1. Scale goes from libertarian (20) to authoritarian (0). Unstandardized B coefficients and the standard errors in parentheses. * The correlation was significant at a 0.01 level