Gender Perspectives in the Armed Forces and Military Operations: An uphill battle

Cultural, structural and functional factors that prevent or promote implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian Armed Forces and NATO

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Table of Contents

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List of Abbreviations

AO	Area of Operations
BiSC	Bi-Strategic Command
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COD	Chief of Defense
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
CWINF	Committee of Women in the NATO Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU	European Union
FET	Female Engagement Team
GBAD	Ground Based Air Defense
GENAD	Gender Advisor
GFA	Gender Field Advisor
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HR	Human Resources
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOD	Minister of Defense
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOT	Military Observation Team
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC	National Contingent Command
NCGM	Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations

NCGP	NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NORAFHRCC	Norwegian Armed Forces HR and Conscription Centre
NORDCSC	Norwegian Command and Staff College
NDUC	Norwegian Defense University College
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NJHQ	National Joint Head Quarters
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defense Cooperation
NORSOC	Norwegian Special Operations Commando
NORNAVSOC	Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PET	Supplementary Assignment for the Armed Forces
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP	Quick Impact Project
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
US	United States (of America)
USA	United States of America
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Abstract

In 2000, recognising that matters of security affect men and women differently, the United Nations (UN) adopted UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in an effort to achieve gender equality across UN operations and in Member States, by calling for the protection of women and girls from specific gender-based risks of conflict, the involvement of women in the prevention of conflict, and the greater participation of women in peacekeeping and peacemaking. The ambition of the Norwegian Government to be an international frontrunner in this area meant that numerous WPS-related tasks were assigned to the Norwegian Armed Forces, including the implementation of gender perspectives in all phases of military operations. However, progress has stalled and implementation of the WPS agenda remains a challenge.

Based on theories of gender, and of masculinity in particular, as well as the theories of transformation put forth by Schein (2004) and G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) on managing cultural change in organisations and the necessity of psychological safety to achieve it, this research focused on the experiences of the Gender Project of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the messaging of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD), and implementation of the WPS agenda within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to identify the structural, functional, and cultural factors that prevent or promote implementation of gender perspectives in the military. The role of the UN and the United States (US) in influencing the ambitions of the Norwegian Government to lead the field in implementing the WPS agenda was also analysed.

Factors that have prevented implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian Armed Forces are: a lack of structures, especially in the operative domain; a lack of conceptualisation, leadership command and control, new policies and processes, and proper monitoring, reward, and discipline systems; and an organisational culture that is resistant to change and tolerates an unproductive status-based hierarchy, misleading reporting, and the ridicule of both gender issues and promoters of the agenda. On the other hand, implementation has been promoted by expertise, education, and funding. But, any progress has depended on the resolve of individual enthusiasts; and with no accountability for the continued failure of the Armed Forces to implement tasks

extending from UNSCR 1325, the commitment of the Government to this agenda has been called into question. The speeches of Government officials seem to confirm their commitment and reveal a high degree of frustration with the culture of the Armed Forces – which is blamed for poor progress in implementing WPS initiatives – but the Government has neither provided enough capacity and support for transformational change, nor imposed any disciplinary consequences for a lack of implementation.

NATO gender experts indicated in interviews for this study that factors similar to those facing Norway have played a role in preventing and promoting implementation of the WPS agenda within the Alliance. Still, NATO appears to be structurally more progressive and have better leadership on this issue, despite scarcer funding. And while Norway is celebrated internationally for providing financial support and individual expertise to other militaries, and is perceived as being more advanced in gender perspectives in the Armed Forces due to a generally egalitarian society, several Norwegian military officers in the NATO structure were described by interviewees as extremely immature in their understanding of and attitude towards gender perspectives. These respondents expressed frustration at what they view as a lack of commitment from the Norwegian Armed Forces, which they believe should have been more successful in implementing the WPS agenda.

1 Introduction

"There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."

N. Machiavelli
The Prince (1513)

Recognising that matters of security can affect men and women in substantially different ways, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 (hereafter UNSCR 1325) on *Women, Peace and Security* (WPS) in October 2000. The Resolution emphasises the need for better *protection* for women from violence and abuse, the involvement of more women in the *prevention* of conflict and gender-based violence through improved intervention strategies, and more equal *participation* for women through their full inclusion in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security. UNSCR 1325 also calls for the incorporation of gender perspectives in all *relief and recovery* efforts, including in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.[1]

The adoption of UNSCR 1325 marked the first time in UN history that women's rights had been acknowledged as an important part of the international peace and security agenda (Tryggestad, 2014b, p. 97) and women as important actors in achieving sustainable peace. The UN subsequently adopted seven more WPS resolutions to further strengthen and commit to this approach, calling for more women peacekeepers, *gender mainstreaming in organisations*, and the *integration of gender perspectives in operations* (UN, 2000). This linked the Armed Forces firmly to the WPS agenda.

Indeed, the Norwegian Government has always regarded the Armed Forces as key to implementing the WPS agenda, especially given that two of the primary reforms specified in UNSCR 1325 are the increased recruitment and deployment of female military personnel and the implementation of gender perspectives[2] in all phases of military operations. The Government embraced the initiatives of UNSCR 1325 and the

[1] In addition to the original three pillars, of participation, prevention, and protection (the three Ps), also listed as important pillars of the Resolution are the mainstreaming of gender perspectives and peacebuilding and recovery.
[2] See definitions in Chapter 1.3.

related WPS resolutions and laid out a vision for implementing them in a 2006 National Action Plan (NAP) (Norwegian Government, 2006). In it, the Government declared that it was "intensifying Norway's efforts to promote a more just world" (ibid.) and repeatedly noted that it aspired to be an international leader in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see Chapter 2.1.2). The Government reaffirmed its commitment to the WPS agenda in 2011 by issuing a Strategic Plan for 2011–2013 (Norwegian Government, 2001c),[3] and again in 2015, with an Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security for 2015–2018 (Norwegian Government, 2015).[4]

The recruitment measure stipulated in UNSCR 1325 is an example of how *gender mainstreaming*[5] represents an *internal organisational* dimension of change in the Armed Forces, which must be addressed through policies that provide equal opportunities to ensure representation, and through integration efforts such as training, analysis, planning, reporting, evaluation, and policy development (Olsson et al, 2009). The *integration of a gender perspective* represents both an internal and *external operational* dimension of change, achieved by ensuring representation when conducting liaison, intelligence, and support, and when interpreting mandates and selecting and prioritising assignments (Olsson et al, 2009). Successful implementation of these initiatives internally and externally, in the organisation and in operations, demands different knowledge and approaches. Still, these two areas are profoundly connected, and NATO has even underscored that recognising the links between the external and internal integration of gender perspectives is a matter of credibility (NATO, 2017a).

The WPS agenda has emerged in the context of various geopolitical changes that have confronted militaries around the world in the past several decades. First, the end of the Cold War shifted how Norway and other NATO countries assessed risks and sought to maintain security (Heier, 2006; Sookermany, 2013). This was followed by increased threats and acts of terrorism, which led to new challenges and expectations in the way

[3] The Strategic Plan for 2011–2013 was an updated and enhanced version of the NAP from 2006. It provided a framework to ensure that Resolution 1325 was integrated into all peace and security efforts. The strategic plan was issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), but was a joint venture between the MoFA, the Minister of the Environment and International Development, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Justice and Police, and the Minister of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion (Norwegian Government, 2011c).

[4] The new Action Plan, released in February 2015, highlighted the Government's continued commitment and laid out tasks associated with different Departments.

[5] See Chapter 2.1.7.

military operations were conducted. The Norwegian Armed Forces, which transitioned from focusing primarily on territorial defence to an emphasis on contributing within NATO, required a total modernisation and, amid calls to reduce spending, a radical downsizing. This necessitated change throughout the organisation, impacting equipment, technology, structures, doctrines, competencies, capabilities, processes, personnel, and culture, to shape a force capable of adapting to and operating in a wide variety of situations, from combat to humanitarian efforts and peacekeeping (ibid.). And, as the nature of war continues to evolve – marked by an increasing use of special instead of conventional forces, airstrikes, and automated devices such as drones – Armed Forces organisations must continue to respond to new and emerging judicial and ethical challenges (Bentsen, Johansen, and Dyndal, 2016).

In recent years, the reduced ambitions of NATO in Afghanistan, the situation on the Crimean Peninsula, and political shifts in the US and the EU have refocused attention on national challenges. This is reflected in the 2016 Long Term Defence Plan of the Norwegian Government, which has placed additional pressure on the Armed Forces by assigning new capabilities, introducing new education and personnel systems, and announcing base closures, all while reiterating calls for greater economic efficiency. Of course, Armed Forces must be responsive, not only to the new and changing complexities of war but also to society. As international politics has begun to transform understandings of security, Norway – along with a growing number of states – has adopted a dual concept of security that is both human- and state-centric (Enloe, 2000.). While state security focuses on defending territory and the sovereignty of the state from outside military invasion, human security focuses on the individuals or communities at risk of political violence due to non-state conflicts or civil wars and supports military and non-military means to prevent conflict, protect the population, intervene, and rebuild (Kerr, 2013).[6] In the Norwegian Armed Forces, this duality is envisioned in the idea of: *"Security for Norway, safety for the population"* (Forsvaret, 2017).[7]

[6] The concept of human security came into popular use through its introduction in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). The report marked a milestone in the field of security studies and in security policy by explicitly contesting the dominant, realist approach to security (Gjørv, 2018). The Responsibility to Protect report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 further endorsed human security as a norm of the security concept.

[7] This duality will be discussed further in Chapter 2 as it relates to the duality of masculine and feminine culture in the Norwegian Armed Forces. NB: I have made all the translations from

Kronsell (2012) found that the integration of gender perspectives was among the effects of an overall shift from state to human security in post national defence around the globe after the Cold War. She concluded that the WPS resolutions, along with agreements on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) from the UN World Summit in 2005, as embodied in Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, are examples of how international peacekeeping activities have become more concerned with human rights. As conflicts have become more asymmetric, the violence suffered by civilians has increased, stimulating adoption of the human security approach as policymakers recognise that concepts of security must account not only for the sovereignty of the state but for the wellbeing of the individual (Enloe, 2000). And while the human security concept has been heavily debated and contested by some (Chandler, 2008, Krause, 2014; Tadjbakhsh, 2014; Gjørv, 2018), it has staying power within many global institutions, including the UN, the EU, and NATO, and is likely to be part of the broader security paradigm for the foreseeable future (Gjørv, 2018).

Still, scholars (Whitworth, 2004; Higate and Hopton, 2004) have questioned whether militaries – masculine, hierarchical organisations focused mostly on training for combat and instilling a warrior identity in troops – are capable of carrying out more civilian-oriented peacekeeping tasks such as policing, cooperating with locals, and communicating with and assisting civil society. In a democratic society, however, Armed Forces are expected to carry out the decisions of the elected government. Norwegian military leaders have emphasised this point, referring to the Armed Forces as a tool of the Government and noting that military action is rooted in the democratic will of the people, to protect the country, its population, its resources, and its values.[8] Yet, despite continuous demands from the Government to fulfil the obligations laid out in UNSCR 1325 since the issuance of the 2006 NAP, the Armed Forces have been slow to implement gender perspectives in both the organisation and in operations (See chapter 5.2 for statements by MODs Strøm-Erichsen, 2009 and Faremo, 2010). And, even though

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Norwegian documents, observations, conversations, meetings, and conferences myself. The responsibility for any misinterpretations consequently rests with me. Throughout this study, I have used *italic* to highlight expressions or underscore a point, and I have used italics and quotation marks to quote or to show that the expression is used orally or represents some form of military tribal language.

[8] Then Vice Admiral and Commander National Joint Headquarters Haakon Bruun-Hanssen at the MoFA Conference "10 years in Afghanistan – What now?" Oslo, 29 September 2011 (Bruun-Hanssen is now Admiral and Chief of Defence).

the values reflected in WPS resolutions are very much in concert with core Norwegian values and are based on human rights, democracy, equality, freedom, security, the rule of law, and care for all, military leadership has publicly questioned the role of the Armed Forces in their implementation.[9]

There are several interconnected causes for the slow *transformation*[10] of the Armed Forces in response to new expectations laid out in the WPS agenda and to the variety of challenges that emerge from gender policies. Implementing the WPS agenda requires considerable changes in the organisational structure, functions, and culture of the Armed Forces, to incorporate gender perspectives internally and also ensure they are employed externally to better understand the local culture and human terrain in areas where military operations are conducted. And importantly, implementation in either the internal or external dimensions can affect implementation in the other. Meaning, the capacity to implement gender perspectives internally and thereby recognise diversity as an asset in the military organisation, can enable the structures, functions, and cultural necessary to implement gender perspectives in operations (UN, 2002); and likewise, a highly gendered culture in the area of operations, i.e. a diverse culture externally, can strengthen awareness of the need for gender perspectives in the organisation (UN, 2001; NATO, 2017a). But it can also be true that what has been accepted in an organisation becomes embedded in routines and may be integrated into personal and group identities (Schein, 2004). Thus, any transformation towards the inclusion of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces has the potential to challenge the identity of the military organisation and the people who comprise it.

This research was grounded in the assumption that a change in any of three elements – structures, functions (comprising strategy and control), or culture – might force or encourage change in one of the others. In fact, G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) assert that transformational change in an organisation *always* involves change in the organisational culture. But because cultural change can be so difficult to achieve, special attention must be paid to its emotional aspects. According to Schein (2004), unlearning existing culture, at least to the degree that new perspectives can be embraced, requires proper motivation and psychological safety. This motivation may come in the form of disconfirming data about the status quo (i.e. information about

[9] Ibid.
[10] See Chapter 2.3.

gruesome assaults due to a lack of action), which may be particularly compelling if it links to an individual's goals and ideals or causes anxiety or guilt. Change also demands that individuals feel an adequate level of psychological safety in order to view problem solving and new learning as an opportunity, without fearing a loss of identity or integrity (ibid., p. 320). Hence, this analysis employs insights from theories on *transformational leadership* (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005) and the *need for psychological safety* (Schein, 2004) to identify, describe, and analyse the cultural, structural, and functional factors within the Armed Forces that prevent or promote implementation of UNSCR 1325 and broader gender perspectives.

Gender theories – especially theories of masculinity – are also used as a framework for analysis in this study because the Armed Forces have traditionally been male dominated and based on masculine values and ideals, whereas UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda originated from the experiences of women in conflict areas, feminist scholars, and advocates of peace and non-violence (Kronsell, 2012; Shepherd, 2008a; Sjoberg, 2006). There are tensions and challenges when these two gendered approaches meet, interact, and are actuated toward a common goal (ibid.). For example, Kronsell (2012) notes that men in the Armed Forces tend to regard themselves as the neutral norm, i.e. "soldiers," and women as gendered, or "*female* soldiers." This association of gender with women leads male soldiers to view the presence of women and of gender policies as a challenge to the Armed Forces, which have long promoted a strongly masculine identity as a requirement to carrying out the tasks of the military, especially when it comes to engaging in the use of force; an identity that is challenged to the core by the gender initiatives of the WPS agenda (Kronsell, 2012). This makes the integration of gender awareness and of UNSCR 1325 reforms likely one of the most difficult changes that can be implemented in an organisation such as the Armed Forces.

In institutions of hegemonic masculinity,[11] Kronsell asserts that understanding the role of gender requires questioning the silence of men (2012, p. 46). And so, it must be asked whether the Norwegian Armed Forces have been slow in implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives because of a fear of losing a masculine identity that values warrior culture. If not, what other factors are preventing the Armed Forces from fully adopting UNSCR 1325 and implementing gender perspectives in response to calls from

[11] The definition of hegemonic masculinity in the context of military organizational culture is further discussed in section 2.2.5.

consecutive governments that have championed the Resolution? And, which factors could finally promote the adoption and implementation of reforms? This research aims to explore why Armed Forces in general, and the Norwegian Armed Forces in particular, are resistant to change, especially as it relates to the cultural identities they embody. The goal is to identify the challenges and opportunities facing masculinised organisations like Armed Forces in implementing gender policies and perspectives, in order to analyse these factors and develop recommendations to better ensure successful implementation.

1.1 Research Question

What cultural, structural, and functional factors within the Armed Forces promote or prevent implementation of UNSCR 1325, gender perspectives, and gender policies in both the military organisation and military operations?

1.2 Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 1.3 will present some essential definitions and terminology, with more comprehensive definitions presented as they become relevant in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 offers the theoretical framework for this thesis. Section 2.1 presents background on UNSCR 1325, and how the foundation and development of the Norwegian Government's Action Plan has tasked the Armed Forces with several assignments in order to implement the Resolution. This section will illustrate the nature of political ambitions on this issue and how the Armed Forces play a vital role in efforts to reach those ambitions. In addition, the challenges and opportunities connected to different implementation measures, such as measures strengthening rights and equality, will be presented and discussed in the context of arguments about effectiveness. The differences and similarities between *gender balance* and *gender mainstreaming* will also be explained to further define the parameters of this study. Further, the functions of the Gender Advisor as the chosen tool of the Norwegian Armed Forces to support implementation of the WPS agenda and gender perspectives will be described. Finally, research on the degree to which implementation of the WPS agenda and gender perspectives has been achieved generally and in the Norwegian Armed Forces will be examined, including the current status of implementation of UNSCR 1325 in two of Norway's most valued security partners, the UN and NATO.

In section 2.2, the significance of culture is discussed, with an emphasis on military culture. The relevance of intercultural understanding in military operations, which is part of the external implementation of UNSCR 1325, is also explained, as a means of introducing the focus of this thesis – military organisational culture. How national culture forms the backdrop of organisational culture is outlined, and then the ways the specific military organisational culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces affects implementation of the WPS agenda is presented. In addition, how gender perspectives have influenced organisational theories is discussed, especially how gender perspectives and masculinities affect security and policies. Gender theories and cultures of masculinity are especially important with regard to change in military organisations, and provide the theoretical basis for this research.

Section 2.3 focuses further on theories of change and how to successfully transform an organisation to incorporate the WPS agenda and broader gender perspectives. The ability to guide an organisation from an existing to a desired state demands leadership, and in the context of organisational change, the theory of transformational leadership is presented as the preferred approach. According to organisational theorists, certain factors must be addressed in order to successfully implement change. Here, the focus is on the most significant reasons change fails, and which factors are necessary to create the psychological safety for cultural change. To further understand these dynamics, structural and functional factors will be linked to the cultural factors presented in section 2.2.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology that was used in this study to develop a deeper understanding of the culture, structures, and functions of the Norwegian Armed Forces and to reveal the current status of implementation, reasons for lack of progress, and the potential for further implementation of UNSCR 1325. Based on findings from the first part of the study, three research methodologies – which will be outlined as they are used in the three particular empirical phases of the study – were chosen: participative observation, document analysis, and semi-structured interviews. The research discussed here benefited from my position in leading the Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC). My dual role as Project Leader and researcher will be carefully considered in order to identify the ways this may have impacted the reliability and validity of the study.

In Chapter 4, the investigative portion of the research is laid out in a case study based on the work of the Gender Project at NDUC, with findings systematically presented under themed headings and analysed in the context of the theoretical model of this thesis. An analysis of the current state of UNSCR 1325 implementation is put forth, followed by a discussion of the factors that prevent or promote implementation of gender perspectives in the military organisation and in operations. This case study revealed that in fact numerous significant factors are preventing or promoting implementation, but it also brought into question the expectations of the Government. This informed further research, and exploring the ambition of the Government consequently became the second empirical phase of this study.

Chapter 5 presents results from this second phase of research, examining the Government's commitment to the WPS agenda and to gender perspectives and any challenges posed by uncertainty about this commitment. An analysis of official speeches and statements by Government officials is presented, which was undertaken to assess their communicated level of commitment and determine whether the expectations conveyed in these communications could explain or may have affected some of the structural, functional, and cultural factors identified in the first phase of this study. How the Norwegian Government perceives the military is particularly discussed, as well as how it views what yet needs to be done and how it motivates and "calls to arms" the Armed Forces in order to fully implement UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives.

In Chapter 6, the third and final empirical phase of this study is presented, in which the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by Norway's allies and organisational partners was analysed. In the last five years, NATO has emerged as a pioneer in relation to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, in several ways (Tryggestad, 2014a). Thus, evaluations by NATO personnel working with gender perspectives of the structural, functional, and cultural factors that have prevented or promoted implementation of the WPS agenda in NATO are highlighted, as are their assessments of efforts undertaken so far by the Norwegian Armed Forces and what they regard as essential for future progress. NATO, the UN, and the US are all important actors in the realm of Norwegian security and military matters; and the implementation of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces is evolving and operationalised within this context. Insight into what affects the implementation of the WPS agenda internationally is therefore important, because the same factors may have consequences for how Norway has, can, or should

implement gender perspectives. Ultimately, the Norwegian Government is and wants to remain a frontrunner when it comes to equality and thus in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Norwegian Government, 2006), and since this has proved challenging nonetheless, identifying the factors that prevent and promote implementation in Norway will be useful to allies and other militaries. And as a small nation with a strong and outspoken political commitment to UNSCR 1325, it is worth evaluating whether Norway's approach is a product of standards set by NATO, the UN, or the US, and if the challenges Norway faces are at all universal.

Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions drawn from all three empirical phases of this study, in the context of the theoretical framework of this research. Recommendations are put forth that can be applied by the Norwegian Armed Forces, or by any military organisation, to implement UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda more successfully.

1.3 Definitions and Terminology

This section presents some of the key definitions and terms used in this study. Further definitions and terminology will be introduced as they become relevant.

The first term that must be defined is *gender*. While the term *sex* is usually used to describe fixed biological differences in humans, *gender* is used to describe the flexible and changeable socially-constructed roles that people learn and perform based on societal expectations related to a person's biological sex (Eriksen, 1998; official UN definition in Chapter 2.1.4). Importantly, this conception of gender, which is applied throughout this study, frames gender as something that can be affected by, or can affect, culture and other aspects of society. Gender, which impacts access to security, justice, education, healthcare, the economy, etc., is a social construct and thus is not fixed or natural but an embodiment of norms; norms that may create conditions that are (un)equal or (un)fair.

Some have challenged the notion of gender as changeable and sex as fixed. Goldstein (2001, p. 2) claims, for instance, that biology provides diverse potentials that are limited, selected, and channelled by culture, and that culture directly influences the expression of genes and therefore the biology of our bodies. Through this lens, sex and gender are mutually interdependent and can influence and change each other (ibid.). Nevertheless, this study treats gender as a changeable social norm.

The terms "*a gender perspective*" and "*gender perspectives*" must also be clarified, since they are defined differently in various source documents used in this research. For example, *a gender perspective* can be used to describe a specific perspective, but NATO has used the term to describe a process whereby different gender perspectives are taken into consideration. In this study, the terms *a gender perspective* and *gender perspectives* will be used interchangeably to describe the same thing: a willingness and ability to evaluate how all genders affect or are affected differently by society, including in the Armed Forces and military operations. References to *a gender perspective in military operations* denote an overarching concept that encompasses the key measures required to achieve the aims of UNSCR 1325. In this respect, the term means to *do the right thing* to attain the goals of the WPS agenda, but given their potential to enhance any military operation, gender perspectives also support the ability of the Armed Forces to *do things right* (see Chapter 2.1.6).

The terms *Armed Forces* and *military* will also be used synonymously throughout this study. The term *military operations* will be used to describe all the activities of Armed Forces, including education, training, and the planning and execution of various national and international military operations. When referring specifically to the *Norwegian* Armed Forces or *Norwegian* military operations, this national qualifier will be used, while the use of the terms Armed Forces or military operations without that qualifier should be understood to describe these forces in general (except in cases where a reference to Norwegian forces is superfluous in the context of discussion).

The implementation of gender perspectives as part of *UNSCR 1325* is the main focus of this research, and the aims of UNSCR 1325 are referred to as *the WPS agenda* as it represents the mother Resolution of this agenda. This research identifies factors that contribute, directly or indirectly and positively or negatively, to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations, using the terms *preventing* and *promoting* to describe the impact of these factors. This research does not aim to investigate obstacles or enablers exhaustively, but focuses on the three factors (cultural, structural, and functional) that have the potential to significantly influence the ability of Armed Forces to change and adapt, especially in relation to gender perspectives.

Finally, as used in this thesis, the term *implementation* refers to the ability to identify and make use of relevant tools (such as gender mainstreaming; gender advisors; gender balance; and a gender perspective in analysis, planning procedures, and

reporting, etc.) to ensure that the aims of the WPS agenda are fulfilled. This manifests as equal representation and participation for women in decision-making processes and in efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, protection for women from violence and abuse, and the prevention of future incidents of maltreatment of women.

2 Concepts and Theory

2.1 UNSCR 1325 and Armed Forces

This chapter presents and discusses the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical framework for this study, beginning with an overview of the background and development of the WPS agenda, strategies for its implementation, and impacts on the Norwegian Armed Forces. A review of concepts follows, introducing gender perspectives in military operations, gender balance, gender mainstreaming, and gender advisors as relevant strategies and tools for implementation. Then, the status of implementation of the WPS agenda in the UN, NATO, and the Norwegian Armed Forces will be examined.

Also key to this analysis is military culture and how it affects implementation of the WPS agenda. Intercultural understanding will be discussed before the focus turns to national culture, organisational culture, gendered organisations, and masculinity in militaries and security studies, as a backdrop to discussion of military organisational culture. Research on Norwegian military organisational culture specifically will be presented as well.

Finally, theories on transformational leadership are introduced. This type of leadership of organisational structures, functions, and culture is vital to the successful implementation of the WPS agenda and gender perspectives in the military organisation and operations.

2.1.1 UNSCR 1325: Background and Development[12]

UNSCR 1325 resulted from intense and ongoing advocacy, research, activism, and field-based evidence gathering on the need to recognise the different ways in which gender affects and is affected by war and conflict. In an effort to build sustainable peace, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Resolution as a way to confront issues related to the role of women in peace and security processes, for the first time (Barnes, 2011). The Resolution calls for the participation of women at all levels of decision making, the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, and the

[12] Read UNSCR 1325 or any subsequent WPS resolutions at: http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions (accessed 24 July 2018).

prevention of violence against women through the promotion of women's rights, accountability mechanisms, and law enforcement. It also calls for more women and the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in peace operations.

The Security Council subsequently adopted seven additional resolutions related to the WPS agenda. While UNSCR 1325 addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and acknowledged that the contributions of women to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding had been both undervalued and underused, and therefore stressed the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security; UNSCR 1820 (2008) recognised sexual violence as a weapon and tactic of war, noting that rape and other forms of sexual violence could constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, and calling for the deployment of more women in peace operations and for more training among troops on preventing and responding to sexual violence. In this way, UNSCR 1820 served as an essential foundation for combatting conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (CRSGBV). Stamnes (2013) has emphasised that the passing of UNSCR 1820 established that sexual violence in conflict is a matter of international peace and security and, moreover, that women and girls are especially targeted.

The UN itself has had a zero-tolerance sexual misconduct policy since 2003, but researchers claim that the current approach taken by the organisation is insufficient, and that it ignores the complexity of sex economies and the highly gendered cultural and economic inequalities between peacekeepers and locals (Jennings, 2016; Enloe, 2000). Combatting sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) among peacekeepers is important because sexual misconduct undermines the trust of local populations, and thereby the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of a mission (Kronsell, 2012). It has been argued that the involvement of more women will bring legitimacy to peacekeeping missions, and thus increased female participation in international operations is an element of the WPS agenda.

In 2009, UNSCR 1888 reiterated that sexual violence exacerbates armed conflict and obstructs international peace and security, calling for leadership to address conflict-related sexual violence and deploy experts where cases of sexual violence occur. Then, UNSCR 1889 (2009) focused on post-conflict peacebuilding and on the participation of women in all stages of peace processes. UNSCR 1889 also put forth indicators to

measure the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as progress and accountability had clearly started to become a challenge. In 2010, UNSCR 1960 called yet again for an end to sexual violence in armed conflict and set out consequences for the behaviour, including citation in the annual Report of the Secretary General, referral to UN Sanctions Committees and the ICC, international condemnation, and reparations.

Instead of creating new obligations, UNSCR 2106 (2013) focused on operationalising prior resolutions. It discussed the participation of women in combating sexual violence and supported alternative ways of ensuring justice. Still, a persistent lack of progress by Member States in implementing the WPS agenda prompted the Security Council to reaffirm its commitment to this agenda by adopting Resolution 2122 (2013), which explicitly affirmed the need for an integrated approach to sustainable peace through concrete methods that reduce women's participative deficit as well as the need to address the root causes of both armed conflict and the security risks faced by women, and called for the provision of multi-sectoral services to women affected by conflict. Finally, acknowledging gender as a cross-cutting issue, UNSCR 2242 (2015) recognised the importance of integrating the WPS agenda across all others, including the violent extremism and counter terrorism agendas. This latest WPS Resolution highlights the importance of collaboration with civil society; calls for increased funding for gender-responsive training, analysis, and programs; and encourages the assessment of strategies and resources employed in implementing the WPS agenda.

Though it was the UN Security Council that took the first groundbreaking step of adopting Resolution 1325 and, with it, the WPS agenda, this achievement would not have been realized without the initial momentum created by civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at both the national and international levels. These actors continue to drive the agenda forward. However, the return of greater state-centrism in security theory has created some tension in its pursuit (Kirby and Shepherd, 2016),[13] and may slow implementation of human security initiatives in many areas.

Sheehan (2005) argues that security theory must evolve to acknowledge the different security experiences of men and women, so that questions of poverty, rape, and refugee status are treated with the same seriousness as military strategy and

[13] Kirby and Shepherd (2016) also regard the narrowing of the WPS agenda to the prevention of and protection from violence as an area of tension, since women as victims get more attention than women as a valuable resource to create sustainable peace.

nuclear weapons. Allowing for the experience of gender in security thinking would also open the way for more effective consideration of the unique security needs of other cultures. The R2P and WPS agendas are complementary and, with better alignment, could play an even more beneficial role in facilitating the protection of populations from atrocities and the maintenance of international peace and security (Lito, 2013, p. 193). Both these agendas represent a clear commitment to a new view of security that is in line with a feminist approach, to which both Norway and NATO are committed.

Combined, UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent related resolutions that make up the WPS agenda comprise a historic political framework for improving the situation of women in conflict-affected countries and incorporating a gender perspective into peace negotiations, peacekeeping operations planning, and the reconstruction of war-torn societies. These eight resolutions should be seen as a collective legal framework (Barnes, 2011). On this basis, 79 countries have also developed their own national action plans to ensure implementation of the WPS agenda, many of which refer to gender mainstreaming (Chapter 2.1.7).[14] In 2006, Norway was the second country to develop a NAP for implementation of UNSCR 1325.

2.1.2 The Norwegian Government's National Action Plan

On 8 March 2006, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Development, Justice and the Police, Children and Equality, and Defence issued an interdepartmental action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Norway. The plan, characterised as part of the Government's endeavour to promote global security, peace, and justice, aimed to intensify efforts to increase women's participation in civil-military peace operations, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and enhance the protection of women's human rights in conflict areas. Norway was set to pursue a policy that promoted gender equality both at home and globally (Norwegian Government, 2006). Additionally, the Government emphasised that implementation of UNSCR 1325 represented only part of a greater effort to change traditional gender roles and power structures to create a more just environment in conflict-affected societies (ibid.).

At an event held to announce the 2006 Norwegian NAP, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs made the point that UNSCR 1325 would not in itself bring about

[14] This figure is accurate as of December 2018. In 2017 and 2018, 17 countries adopted NAPs in support of UNSCR 1325. See updated data at: http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states (accessed 12 January 2019).

change. While the Resolution is binding for all UN Member States, good intentions must be backed by action, and UNSCR 1325 did not establish an internationally recognised supervisory or control mechanism. As a result, the responsibility to monitor and control implementation of the Resolution lies with each of those states, through governments and civil society together with international organisations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and the European Union (EU), along with certain agencies within the UN system itself (Støre, 2006).

The Norwegian Government already saw itself as a frontrunner for equal rights nationally and internationally, but the 2006 NAP was meant to promote a common and coordinated strategy that would implement gender perspectives in *all* relevant areas. By assigning tasks to five ministries, the Plan aimed to provide tools for the systematic implementation of the WPS agenda, related to strategy, resources, evaluation, dialogue, and process. In addition, it prioritised openness and transparency, so that the Government, as well as others, could measure and compare initiatives and progress (ibid.).

2.1.3 Consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces

A number of tasks and responsibilities were assigned to the Norwegian Armed Forces by the 2006 NAP. They reflect the extent of the Government's official commitment to UNSCR 1325, and the expectations conferred upon the military. The Armed Forces were further committed to implementation of the Resolution through three inter-departmental action plans, and then from 2007 to 2012, through additional long-term plans.

Following the issuance of the 2006 NAP, the primary policy document of relevance to the Armed Forces was the Government White Paper 36 (2007). It addressed the need for increased recruitment of women to the Armed Forces and called for gender balance throughout the military organization, reciting the aim of 15 % women overall and 25 % women in military education within 2008. UNSCR 1325 was referenced for the necessity, in addition to matters of legitimacy, diversity, rights and effectiveness. The following *Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces*, issued in 2007 (Stortinget, 2007) was similarly focused on the need to increase the participation of women in international operations, and on implementing gender perspectives in all parts of military operations, including in planning, education and training, execution, and evaluation. It instructed the Armed Forces to continue developing multinational

cooperation to strengthen competence in this area, with an emphasis on military operations and military education.

This commitment was renewed in the Government's 2008 annual budget proposal, (Stortinget, 2008), which included the instruction to establish a "Military Observation Team (MOT) 1325" in Afghanistan with significant female representation, responsible for following up on the aims of UNSCR 1325. This, together with the deployment of a Gender Advisor (GA), would increase protection of the local population, serve as an important recognition of women's achievements in the Armed Forces, and contribute valuably to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the framework of military operations. These increased measures demonstrated the Government's intention that the Armed Forces reach the aims of the WPS agenda; as did the added goal then tasked to the military, to increase protection of its own forces, reflecting the role of gender perspectives in effective military operations in general.

In the yearly Letter of Implementation (*Iverksettingsbrev*, or IVB) issued by the Norwegian Department of Defence, the Minister of Defence laid out yet another benchmark for the Armed Forces related to UNSCR 1325, for the period of 2009–2012. Citing Norwegian Ministry of Defence, White Paper 36 (2007) regarding the increased recruitment of women, the IVB called for follow up and prioritisation of this task. It also focused on the need for gender perspectives in both national and international efforts, in operational planning, mandates, training, and education, as well as in the implementation and evaluation of operations. Within the framework of multinational cooperation, the Armed Forces were again instructed to pilot a MOT with added competence in gender perspectives in order to gain new and relevant capabilities for participation in international operations and contribute to fulfilling Norway's WPS obligations. Still, despite these new assignments, the Government offered no status update or evaluation of efforts to date, nor any indication if or how the Government would hold the military accountable.

Still, the Government continued to reaffirm its official commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the annual budget plan for 2009 (Stortinget, 2009), which stated that the WPS agenda would remain a priority in 2010. The document called for the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) to further develop its competence on gender perspectives. Furthermore, along with their existing capacity to learn from experience to shape security sector reform, the NDUC was tasked with creating

synergies with education, and in the development of doctrines, research, and operations. The goal of implementing gender perspectives in all essential phases of an operation continued to be advanced, and in this way, the Government highlighted the NDUC as the competence hub on gender in the Armed Forces and directly tasked them with further developing this status.

The Government's budget for 2010 (Stortinget, 2010) increased the resources available to fulfil obligations related to UNSCR 1325, including the more systematic and comprehensive use of gender perspectives in all military operations. The need for gender competence in operational planning, in education at all levels, and in specific training was highlighted. Yet, a focus remained on recruiting and retaining more women in the Armed Forces organisation and in its operations as a means of strengthening the implementation of gender perspectives; and so it is worth noting that even if women can undoubtedly contribute to implementation, there is the danger that implementation is made the responsibility of women by focusing too much on the need for female representation as a prerequisite for progress.

In 2011, the Government issued a strategic plan for WPS for 2011–2013 (Norwegian Government, 2011b), the main objectives of which were to increase the participation of women in peace and security efforts and strengthen the following priority areas: peace processes and negotiations, international operations, post-conflict situations and peacebuilding, sexual violence in conflict, and reporting and accountability. This plan was a supplement to the original NAP, co-signed by the same ministries, and represented an effort to enhance follow up and evaluation of the implementation of UNSCR 1325. It was heralded as an important document for improving reporting and increasing accountability.

The Government referred explicitly to the new strategic plan and the tasks it stipulated for the Armed Forces in its 2011 budget (Stortinget, 2011). These tasks related to developing the competence of all military personnel on gender issues, on UNSCR 1325, and on gender perspectives in both military operations and education. In operations, the importance of strengthening local women's security and participation in political processes was highlighted. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued additional detailed tasks to the Armed Forces through Supplementary Assignment for the Armed Forces no. 23 (PET 23), which ordered the development of guidelines for responding to sexual and gender-based violence, a reward system for leadership performance related

to UNSCR 1325, a gender course for leaders, and a reporting system that incorporates gender perspectives, as well as the continued implementation of gender perspectives in operations and education.

In 2015, the Government launched yet another National Action Plan for WPS (Norwegian Government, 2015), with an even more comprehensive list of assignments for the Armed Forces. This study does not include an evaluation of this NAP, and Figure 2.1 (below) illustrates the variety of tasks assigned to the Norwegian Armed Forces for the purpose of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations *before* the 2015 NAP was issued. But, these new tasks emphasised a renewed commitment to the WPS agenda, and again assigned more obligations to the Armed Forces, including: ensuring gender balance in all official Norwegian delegations to meetings where negotiations about peace and security issues are discussed, strengthening national subject matter expertise on gender in military operations, continuing to strengthen combined Nordic professional competence in the implementation of the WPS agenda in international operations, strengthening dialogue with major troop-contributing countries to international operations for the protection of civilians (POC), and providing protection against sexual violence in conflict.

These policy documents, and the assignments presented in Figure 2.1, illustrate the breadth of the tasks demanded of the Armed Forces, both internally in the organisation and externally in military operations. Then again, these assignments are mostly presented in overarching terms, lacking specifics, leaving it up to the military to implement tasks in the manner it deems most appropriate and effective. Without an independent control mechanism to follow up on implementation, which the Government has not established, there is no stated consequence if WPS-related tasks are not carried out by the Armed Forces. What's more, the Government's development of new tasks or reaffirmations of old initiatives have not appeared thus far to be based on or explained by identified needs. And though policy documents have added detail to and pushed for further movement on tasks assigned previously, which has reinforced the notion that the Government is commitment to the WPS agenda, they also reveal the impatience of the Government with the progress made by the Armed Forces.

Figure 2.1. UNSCR 1325: Tasks Assigned to the Norwegian Armed Forces through 2014



2.1.4 Gender Perspectives in Military Operations

To appreciate exactly what a "gender perspective" means in the context of military operations, it is essential to understand the concept of gender more generally as well as how it is viewed as an important variable in global politics. Steans (1998) claims that gendered lenses expose the particular power relations that impact international processes. How and why this is true is laid out in the definition put forth by UN Women, which explains gender as:

> *"The social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those of men. These attributes and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age."*[15]

In and of itself, this understanding of gender is not controversial, but the fact that it has been developed by UN Women contributes to misconceptions that gender perspectives are related to women's perspectives only. This definition also reflects that of NATO (2009; 2017a), though, which asserts that gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialisation and determines a person's position and value in a given context. NATO, a male-dominated organisation, has additionally deemed it necessary to emphasise that gender is *not* only about women, but about men as well (ibid.).

In military operations specifically, the integration of a *gender perspective* implies the acknowledgement of gender and of the fact that conflict affects or is affected differently by men and women, boys and girls, as well as the assessment of gender-based differences reflected in social roles and interactions as power is distributed and resources are accessed. Militaries must take these different attributes and opportunities into consideration in all military activities by adapting action on the basis of a gender analysis (NATO, 2009). Such analysis requires the systematic collection and examination

[15] See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (accessed 25 June 2018).

of information related to gender differences and to the social relations between men and women in order to identify and understand gender-based inequalities in the context of a specific society or organisation (NATO, 2017a). By laying out challenges related to gender, the definitions of gender offered by the UN and NATO provide a solid foundation for deciding on courses of action (COA) to reach the aims of operations and the organisation, including those linked to the WPS agenda.

Still, operationalising gender perspectives in the military and ensuring that military personnel understand their different roles in implementation will require more specifics as to exactly *how* this will be achieved. In other words, how will gender perspectives be integrated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the military organisation and also into each activity – analysing, planning, executing, evaluating, and education and training – in every military operation?[16] NATO and its member states have endorsed UNSCR 1325, meaning that NATO Forces are supposed to have an initial plan and ambition for the operation that considers the WPS agenda as part of their obligations. However, the level of implementation in any given military operation will vary and will need to be flexible, while also inherently capable of addressing gender issues, as it is impacted by other actors including the enemy, the local population, and even allies. Fighting forces may, for instance, engage in gender-based violence (the way men and boys were targeted in Srebrenica in 1995) or use sexual violence as a weapon of war (as was true throughout the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s and again more recently by ISIS). These tactics clearly affect a military operation as it evolves.

2.1.5 Three Considerations in Ascertaining the Gender Ambitions for a Military Operation

The following *three essential tasks and responsibilities* have been synthesised from the WPS agenda, the comprehensive planning directive for military operations issued by NATO in 2010,[17] and the official NATO-accredited NDUC operational planning course, for the purpose of determining ambitions related to gender perspectives in military operations (Kvarving, 2014; Kvarving and Grimes, 2016):

[16] See explicit suggestions on *how* in Appendix 1.
[17] See: https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-COPD.pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

1. **Undertaking a gender-specific analysis of the area of operations**[18]
   This analysis encompasses social expectations, responsibilities, activities, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making processes, health, education, etc., to achieve situational awareness. It also includes gender-specific analyses of all forces – own, allied, and enemy.

2. **Meeting the obligations of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda**
   In other words, implementing *protective measures* to avoid women's suffering and abuse and safeguard their human rights, including protection from sexual- and gender-based violence. This includes *preventive measures* as well as *measures to ensure equal participation and representation* of women in activities and decision-making processes, at all levels of society, that shape the future and impact justice, gender equality, and sustainable solutions.

3. **Developing an operation-specific mandate**
   This requires an analysis of the overall goals of the specific military operation, the legal foundation of any UN mandate, the commander's intent, the rules of engagement, etc.

These analyses in the context of any military operation, and the ambitions determined by the commander, affect its aims, planning, staffing, education and training, equipment, execution, reporting, and evaluation (Kvarving, 2014), highlighting again that gender perspectives in military operations have an *internal organisational* dimension as well as an *external operational* dimension. Both must be addressed to successfully implement the WPS agenda. Thus, the structures, functions, and culture of the military organisation must perform in harmony with the specific mandates of operations, the obligations of the WPS agenda, and gender-specific analyses. Ultimately, the ability of a military to apply gender perspectives at all levels of the organisation and its operations (strategic, operational, and tactical) can contribute to effectively reaching the goals of operations, and is otherwise beneficial to the organisation.[19]

[18] This could be part of a broader socio-cultural assessment that also includes analysis of the situation as it relates to other vulnerable groups, such as people with different gender identities or gender expressions and sexual orientations (LGBT+), people from certain religious groups, and the elderly, or people who are vulnerable due to race, ethnicity, class, etc.

[19] NATO offers an extensive (though not exhaustive) overview of how gender perspectives can be integrated at different organisational levels of a military operation in NATO Bi-SCD 40-1 (NATO, 2017a), as does Appendix 1 (Kvarving & Grimes, 2016).

2.1.6 A Rights-based versus Effectiveness-based Approach to Implementation

The integration of gender perspectives into the Armed Forces involves multiple dimensions: *aims* (the WPS agenda stipulates equal consideration of all genders), *means* (a tool to reach those aims), a *rights perspective* (human rights), and a *gains perspective* (effectiveness). Given this variety of dimensions, there are a number of approaches to their implementation, which evolve as new experiences bring new lessons. Thus far, the two primary approaches to operationalising gender in the Armed Forces and implementing the WPS agenda have been rights-based and effectiveness-based (Olsson and Giszelis, 2015, p. 2).

The rights-based approach (or justice approach) focuses on the need for gender sensitivity and support for women's rights, for the sake of justice and equality (ibid.). In that respect, a gender perspective is a national and international obligation and an aim in itself. It is *the right thing to do* in order to obtain gender equality. As such, implementation is part of a strong normative agenda. As Juru (2002) noted, gender equality implies a society in which women and men enjoy the same opportunities, consequences, rights, and obligations in all spheres of life. Further, as UN Women puts it:

> *"Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women's issue but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centered development."*[20]

While it's true that matters of gender should concern and engage men, making a specific point of this implies that men neither fully understand the concept nor fully engage in the issue (an implication that is reflected in the NATO definition as well). Even if this is accurate in many cases, the perception that these definitions – and the policies that emerge from them – assume a general negligence on the part of men may be counterproductive to appeals for change.

Many military organisations have also implemented UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives by using an *effectiveness-based approach* (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014). One example of this was in the strategic choice by Sweden *not* to focus on UNSCR 1325

[20] See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm

per se in order to achieve implementation of gender perspectives (ibid.). There, a senior advisor on gender assessed that a tremendous cultural resistance to gender perspectives and the WPS agenda, at least as they were perceived, existed in the Swedish Armed Forces. The process of implementation thus had to be separated from women's issues more broadly, such as equality and human rights. This approach ran contrary to the advice of some women's groups at the time, but an effectiveness-based strategy was chosen anyway because talk of effectiveness, instead of talk of equality, offered better access to the military organisation and decision makers (ibid, p. 50-51).

In this way, gender perspectives were introduced as tools that help meet the objectives of any operation by enabling Swedish Armed Forces to better understand their own organisation, their allies, and the areas in which they operate. This can contribute to more precise situational awareness, enhance force protection and intelligence gathering, increase possibilities for information sharing, and improve calculations as to the effects of actions. What's more, it adds to the capacity of Armed Forces to communicate with representatives of the populations they encounter, to address gender issues if they occur, and to build trust. The effectiveness-based perspective can thus be described as a way of *doing things right*. Indeed, NATO's comprehensive planning directive for military operations (NATO, 2010) supports gender as a part of situational awareness and knowledge development that informs the planning and execution of NATO operations.

Both of these approaches are appropriate, but the potential for different perspectives on effectiveness and rights demands an educated awareness in order to make the best choices. For instance, a transportation route might be the most *effective* choice so that a military unit can reach a destination in the most timely manner, but heavy equipment and vehicles may ruin or disrupt the livelihoods of women and men by destroying cropland or disrupting a safe corridor to markets.[21] Because the effectiveness-based approach does not inherently incorporate gender perspectives and some operations do not have an obvious need for gender perspectives, they could be completely omitted from operations. Therefore, effectiveness should be argued in

[21] Ní Aoláin (2017) captured another example involving a case in the Israeli High Court, which demonstrated the balance between security and rights and how different needs and rights can collide by weighing the claims, on one hand, of the military hierarchy and occupier calling for security and, on the other, a woman fighting to keep her crop-producing trees.

relation to a specific goal (from the WPS agenda or others), not as a universal basis for decision-making.

2.1.7 Gender Balance and Gender Mainstreaming

The implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda hinge on two key instruments addressed specifically in the Resolution: gender balance and gender mainstreaming. *Gender balance*[22] refers to the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work. It is assumed that where there is gender balance, women and men participate in organisations, workforce, leadership, decision-making processes, etc. at rates that are proportional to their share of the population. Of course, in many organisations and decision-making processes, women are underrepresented, and this is definitely true in the Armed Forces.

The arguments for gender balance are that it is fair, effective, and profitable. It is fair because everybody should have the same right to participate in society; it is effective because it makes use of existing talents and increases the diversity and innovativeness of organisations; and it is profitable because it helps organisations attract competence. In fact, in a 2016 article in the *Harvard Business Review*, Michel Landel analysed The World Economic Forum's 2015 Global Gender Gap Report and data from the McKinsey Global Institute and found that gender balance is good for business, adding 12 trillion USD to global growth.[23] A country-by-country comparison established a correlation between gender parity and economic performance, and an analysis within individual companies determined a correlation between financial performance and female leadership. At the Sodexo company, for instance, units featuring greater gender balance and more gender-balanced management were 13% more likely to deliver consistent growth and 23% more likely to show an increase in gross profits and achieve operational, organisational, and performance benefits such as employee engagement, enhanced brand image, greater client and customer satisfaction, and increased profit generation. Nonetheless, there is still significant resistance to gender balance in many organisations and, at the current pace, it is expected to take another 118 years just to close the gender pay gap (ibid.). Even if militaries do not have the same demand for

[22] As defined by the UN, at: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/genderstatmanual/Glossary.ashx (accessed 24 July 2018).
[23] Available at: https://hbr.org/2016/03/why-gender-balance-cant-wait (accessed 24 July 2018).

economic profit as companies do, Armed Forces can certainly benefit from better organisational and operational performance and more efficient spending.

As of January 2017, the Norwegian Armed Forces were overwhelmingly comprised of men, accounting for 90% of officers, 87% of non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 79% of conscripts, and 67% of civilian employees. These numbers, though high, have declined slowly over the years. However, the introduction of universal conscription is expected to soon bring about a more substantial decline. The goal of the Armed Forces to achieve gender balance is often associated with increased recruitment and retention by human resources (HR). This is not the focus of this study, even though the increased participation of women can be crucial to organisational change, especially change that incorporates gender perspectives. The issue of gender balance in the programmes and projects of the military could be the subject of an extensive study on its own, but in this study, recruitment and retention will mainly be addressed insofar as these factors are linked to research findings on the structural, functional, and cultural factors that impact the integration of gender perspectives.

It is the concept of *gender mainstreaming* that is envisioned in UNSCR 1325 as the main instrument in implementing gender equality. While gender balance is more a question of numbers, gender mainstreaming is a methodology applied across an organisation and to all tasks. The UN defines gender mainstreaming as:

> *"The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality."*[24]

Gender mainstreaming thus brings the perceptions, experiences, knowledge, and interests of both women and men to bear in policymaking, planning, and decision-making by situating gender equality concerns at the centre of analyses, structures, and processes. In the Armed Forces, this requires that explicit and systematic attention be given to relevant gender perspectives in all areas of work, whether organisational or operational.

[24] See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/e65237.pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

In a 2017 directive on implementing the WPS agenda, NATO outlined gender mainstreaming in similar terms as the UN, as a strategy that can help achieve gender equality (see Figure 2.2) by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, in all areas and at all levels (NATO, 2017a). This pertains to legislation, policies, and programmes across sectors and means that the concerns and experiences of women and men must be taken into account in their design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. In NATO, gender mainstreaming is a process that recognises the role gender plays in relation to NATO activities, including operations, missions, and exercises (ibid.).

While gender mainstreaming is essential to securing human rights and social justice, it ensures that other social and economic goals can be achieved as well. Further, it can reveal a need to adapt or evolve those goals, or strategies and actions, in order to ensure that both women and men can influence, participate in, and benefit from organisational development processes. This may lead to changes in an organisation's structures, functions, and cultures, to create an organisational environment that is more conducive to the promotion of gender equality (UN, 2002). However, Shepherd (2008b) has argued that it is necessary to critically engage also the concepts of gender mainstreaming and gender balance in the UNSCR 1325 as these concepts alone cannot deliver the radical reforms that the UNSCR 1325 seeks.

Figure 2.2. NATO's vision of Peace and Security uses *gender perspectives* to achieve *gender balance* and *gender mainstreaming* as a way to attain *gender equality*.



Source: Presented to the 2016 Annual Discipline Conference for Gender in Military Operations at NATO HQ, Brussels, May 30, 2016.

2.1.8 Gender Advisors

To support implementation of the WPS agenda by militaries, some countries and organisations, including NATO (NATO, 2017a), have introduced Gender Advisors (GENAD) at the strategic and operational levels and Gender Field Advisors (GFA) at the tactical level. In addition, some countries and organisations have established a Gender Focal Point (GFP) role at different levels and in different departments, which, in combination with the GENADs and GFAs, represent a network of agents across the organisation supporting implementation of the WPS agenda. Gender Focal Points have additional professional specialties beyond gender but assist in the implementation of gender perspectives within their field of specialty. In this way, GFPs wear two hats, so to speak, facilitating gender mainstreaming into their daily work and also supporting and enabling a professional and functional network to implement the WPS agenda (NATO, 2017a).

The vision presented by NATO in Figure 2.2 shows the wide range of areas in which gender balance and gender mainstreaming must be achieved to meet NATO's goal

of equality. This sets the tasks of GENADs, who offers advice on how to implement gender perspectives throughout the internal and external dimensions of the military, from addressing questions of recruitment, working conditions, and harassment, to the integration of gender in education and exercises, analysis and planning, and the execution and evaluation of military operations. NATO recognises that the implementation of gender perspectives spans from internal matters to external activities, from human resources (HR) to education, training, and military operations. It was in 2009 that NATO first introduced a GENAD position, at ISAF Headquarters in Afghanistan, followed up by the establishment of a GENAD position at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 2011.

2.1.9 Implementation of UNSCR 1325: An Introduction

UNSCR 1325 has been at the centre of numerous studies, in countries around the world, from the standpoint of various disciplines. The Resolution was and still is regarded as an important victory in the effort to link women's rights, experiences, and security issues; but translating it into effective action plans and advocacy instruments remains challenging (Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings, 2004). Social science researchers have debated UNSCR 1325, and have studied and compared NAPs, their effectiveness, and their implementation in different countries (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, 2014). Some authors have focused on discourse analysis (Hudson, 2010), offering a theoretical framework on women, peace, and security, militarism, violence, and the conceptualisation of gender (Kaufmann and Williams, 2010; Kuehnast, de Jonge Oudraat, and Hernes, 2011); while others, like Anderlini (2007), have focused on experiences of implementation and the need for women's voices and perspectives to be heard. In addition, some scholars have highlighted the role of women's networks and of civil society, and their increased importance in the context of WPS (Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ilpe, 2011).

Shepherd (2014), who identified some critical implementation gaps, concluded that the UN Security Council needs to develop better cooperation with the UN Peacebuilding Commission and should create an additional Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). She calls on Member States to develop mechanisms that facilitate consistent meaningful interaction with civil society organisations (CSO) and for funds to be made available through bodies such as UN Women, to enhance information sharing. She also appeals for WPS academic collectives to be developed at the national

level to consolidate research on relevant issues and engage in advocacy with national governments (ibid.).

This study is concentrated mostly on research and reports specific to implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Armed Forces. Research on how gender perspectives in general are regarded and challenged in highly gendered organisations like militaries will also be reviewed in more detail. This existing research constitutes part of the knowledge base on which this study is built, but it is also serves as a point of reference for understanding the ways in which this study presents an innovative and essential perspective on the Armed Forces, gender perspectives, and the WPS agenda. Given that implementation is a work still in progress, this is a dynamic study of professional gender perspectives development in real time; and given that the WPS agenda is in constant development, this will be an increasingly interesting area for research.

2.1.10 The Status of Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the UN and NATO

In 2015, upon the 15-year commemoration of UNSCR 1325, UN Women was tasked with performing an independent global study of implementation of the Resolution. In the foreword to the resulting report, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared that:

> *"Women's leadership and the protection of women's rights should always be at the forefront – and never an afterthought – in promoting international peace and security. In an era when armed extremist groups place the subordination of women at the top of their agenda, our response should be unwavering support for empowering girls and women. The newly adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development reflects this priority with its emphasis on gender equality and respect for the human rights of all."*[25]

The report emphasised that, even if UNSCR 1325 is regarded as a crowning achievement of the global women's movement and among the most inspired decisions of the Security Council, there remains a crippling gap between the ambitions and intentions of international policymaking and the reality of actual political and financial support and national action. Yet, the conclusion of UN Women was that increasing challenges worldwide make implementation of UNSCR 1325 more urgent than ever (ibid., p. 5).

[25] See: UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace,* p. 4. Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-1325-2015%20(1).pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

The report did provide some useful examples of how gender perspectives had been integrated into different Armed Forces organisations and operations, such as in peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and provided evidence that when peace processes include women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators, the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years increases by 20%. The Australian Armed Forces were also cited as a good example for having adopted specific measures like flexible working hours, the introduction of a Gender Advisor for the Australian Chief of the Armed Forces, gender balance in all career development programmes, and the publication of detailed annual reports on the progress of women in the Armed Forces (ibid., p. 138).

The impact of this global study is hard to measure and will depend on whether the recommendations it made are adopted; but it provides an assessment in the meantime of the progress of the WPS agenda on a number of levels. And, despite some progress, the conclusion it draws is clear: the UN and its Member States have fallen short in meeting the aims set out in UNSCR 1325, reflecting a failure to achieve the equal participation of women in society and governance generally. This has led to missed opportunities, with men still dominating the management of peace processes, as well as a lack of concrete targets and quotas and overly weak language in WPS-related initiatives (Mazzuca, 2016).

Based on the assessments of UN Women, the prevention of conflict must be a priority, and the participation of women is a key to sustainable peace. Perpetrators of gender-based violence must also be held accountable and justice must be transformative. In addition, localised approaches, alongside processes that are inclusive and participatory, are crucial to the success of peace efforts. UN Women also looked inward, determining that a gender lens must be applied to all aspects of the work of the Security Council, that issues of funding must be addressed, and that a strong and supportive gender architecture at the UN is essential.

One of the most important takeaways from the UN Women report is its emphasis on the importance of appreciating that UNSCR 1325 is essentially a human rights mandate to promote the rights of women in conflict situations, and any attempt to "securitise" issues and use women as instruments in military strategy should be discouraged (ibid.). This is a criticism of the use of gender perspectives in military

operations purely based on arguments of efficiency. The militarisation or use of women to gain intelligence, increase force protection, etc. is underscored as a mistaken interpretation of the aims of UNSCR 1325 as intended by the UN. The report thereby promotes a rights perspective as most important for implementation of the WPS agenda.

In order to undertake a similar assessment, of how well the principles of UNSCR 1325 have been implemented within the Armed Forces of NATO allies, NATO cooperated with Women in International Security (WIIS) to develop an evaluation tool known as the 1325 Scorecard (De Jonge Oudratt, Stojonaović-Gajić, Washington and Stedman, 2015).[26] The Scorecard is also intended to help increase standardisation and interoperability among NATO allies and provide guidance on how to improve implementation. Preliminary findings confirm that much progress has been made since 2007 as far as the adoption of policy frameworks and working mechanisms, particularly within NATO, but that implementation at the national level has generally been approached in an ad hoc and unsystematic way, divorced from standard analysis or other norms. Further, WPS-related knowledge among military and civilian personnel within the Alliance is low. The results of the Scorecard evaluation led to four key recommendations for NATO members and partner states: (1) appoint GENADs at the commander level; (2) make gender training an element of basic training; (3) "institutionalize the incorporations of gender analyses and gender perspective in all aspects of military operations," including in national security strategies, directives, and guidance documents; and (4) publicise efforts to integrate UNSCR 1325 principles into national security policies and institutions (ibid., p. 2).

A 2017 progress report on implementation of NATO's own policy and action plan on WPS declares progress in many areas including planning, training, and exercises. NATO has established an institutional structure in which military commands and missions have a network of GENADs, supported by a network of GFPs at headquarters level. The report also indicates that gender perspectives have been successfully integrated into several policy areas, such as Arms Control, Building Integrity, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Counter-Terrorism. Additionally, NATO established a Civil Society Advisory Panel in 2016 to strengthen dialogue with CSOs on the WPS agenda.

[26] Available at: http://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/UNSCR-1325-Scorecard-Final-Report.pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

Gender perspectives are promoted as a key principle in various NATO initiatives as well, including its Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, and NATO partners are strongly encouraged to consider this principle in their cooperation with the Alliance. To this end, in May 2017, NATO revised Bi-strategic Command Directive 40-1 (NATO, 2009), which addresses the integration of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives into the NATO command structure and provides guidance to strategic commands on how to support and institutionalise gender perspectives in all activities. The revised Directive makes note of challenges that have slowed the advance of the WPS agenda in NATO's day-to-day operations, in particular at the strategic policy level, resulting in a gap between statements of intent and actual implementation. Indeed, women remain underrepresented in the Alliance, especially at senior levels. It also highlights how important a commitment by leadership is to the implementation and integration of gender perspectives across NATO and to efforts to strengthen the work of the WPS Task Force, and calls for a focus moving forward on ensuring institutionalisation and increasing awareness through reinforced dialogue and the regular exchange of information, to improve oversight, accountability, and legitimacy (ibid.).

While these are sensible and even necessary aims, directives such as this from NATO tend to say little about *how* to hold leaders accountable, much less what is to be legitimised and by whom, how information and dialogue are to be reinforced, and what better implementation means. And a recent study by Wright (2016) concluded that international security institutions like NATO play a pivotal role in realising the WPS agenda at the national level, through their own adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325, but that NATO has lacked a transformative approach, hindered largely by a gendered organisational structure that has contributed to shaping a particular understanding of the Resolution. This understanding frames the value of UNSCR 1325 as essentially twofold: first, increasing the representation of women in NATO forces ensures access to personnel, as most countries have abandoned conscription; and second, gender perspectives can increase operational effectiveness, as experiences from Afghanistan demonstrate (ibid.). Wright explains that this reframing of UNSCR 1325 has occurred in the midst of an emerging counter-discourse put forth by partner nations that are challenging the dominant understanding of the direction of policy dissemination within NATO, providing important lessons on opportunities for and obstacles to transformative change. Greater representation of women combined with a broad

programme on gender mainstreaming could have had transformative effects on NATO, but the selective approach to gender mainstreaming outlined in NATO's WPS-related action plans are a weakness that inhibits the pursuit of a truly transformative agenda (ibid.).[27]

2.1.11 Other Research on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Norway

In the Norwegian context, UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions have cross-cutting implications for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Justice; Children, Equality and Inclusion; and Defence (Norwegian Government, 2006, 2011c). A number of civilian research institutes[28] and NGOs[29] have taken a keen interest in the Resolution as well, and continue to promote its implementation (Eriksen, 2011; Lippe, 2011). The Norwegian Women's Voluntary Defence Association (*Kvinners Frivillige Beredskap,* or KFB) has especially contributed to keeping UNSCR 1325 on the agenda in Norway

Research on the implementation of WPS resolutions has examined the question through a securitised lens, focusing largely on security forces and on current international operations. The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) have been frontrunners in researching and discussing matters related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. PRIO has focused mainly on sexual violence in conflicts and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of UN operations,[30] but a 2010 PRIO study by Schjølset (2010) also explored the gender gap in NATO member militaries by comparing recruitment and retention initiatives.[31] Despite being among the top four countries as far as numbers of initiatives to recruit and retain women in the Armed Forces, Schjølset found that Norway is among the least

[27] See Chapter 6 for further discussion of implementation of the WPS agenda by the UN and NATO, as context for analysis of implementation by the Norwegian Armed Forces.
[28] These include the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and Fafo – a private social science research organisation.
[29] These include FOKUS, a forum for women and development that offers knowledge and resources on international women's issues; the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolutions (NOREF); the Red Cross; the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); and Grandmothers for Peace, a non-profit organisation working for peace and disarmament.
[30] PRIO researcher Inger Skjelsbæk has published numerous studies related to sexual violence in conflict (see: https://www.prio.org/People/Person/?x=3467); researcher Torunn L. Tryggestad has also published and participated actively in public debate related to the UN and UNSCR 1325 (see: https://www.prio.org/People/Person/?x=5162).
[31] Available at:
http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20(2010)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20(PRIO%20Paper).pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

successful countries in retaining female personnel recruited to the organisation (ibid.). NOREF has warned that linking an increase in women personnel with an increase in operational effectiveness can be counterproductive and divert attention from real equality issues (Jennings, 2011); but together, research by these organisations has added considerably to understanding the path of the Norwegian Armed Forces – including its successes and struggles – in its quest to implement the WPS agenda, and thus offers a baseline for some findings in this thesis.

The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) has also undertaken research on this subject, where Solhjell conducted a qualitative study in 2010 that mapped Norwegian capacities, potentialities, and challenges in dealing with sexual violence in conflict situations. She found a systematic institutional approach by Norwegian services lacking, only limited research on issues related to sexual violence, concerns regarding impunity for rape and sexual violence, and low levels of incident reporting, but also a tendency to alienate boys and men in the context of sexual and gender-based violence. This coincides with the message of military experts and academic researchers at the international conference on *Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations* in Oslo in 2011, who highlighted the link between how militaries deal with internal issues of sexual misconduct and their ability to deal with issues related to sexual- and gender-based violence in international operations (Kvarving, 2011). Parts of Solhjell's study and some of her conclusions, especially having to do with how Armed Forces approach gender perspectives, align with this study.

In 2011, the Norwegian MoD financed a one-year research scholarship at the War Academy in order to facilitate a study on implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian and Swedish militaries, to follow up on research conducted in 2009 (Olsson, et al.) in Afghanistan which found that the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) did *not* include gender perspectives in their analyses, planning, or execution of operations.[32] These findings were not regarded as surprising at the time, since 2009 was still seen as early in the implementation process, but the follow up study concluded that individual PRT commanders were still given too much discretion two years later – a practice that resulted in widely varying interpretations and degrees of implementation, and suggested a lack of strategy (A. Ellingsen, 2012). The Norwegian MoD also

[32] Available at: http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/operational_effectiveness_and_un_resolution_1325.pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

commissioned a cross-country study from NUPI on the operationalisation of UNSCR 1325 (Solhjell et al., 2012),[33] which concluded that the Norwegian Armed Forces lacked the documentation to support practical implementation and the indicators to measure success, and that the gap between political directives and actual implementation at the operational/tactical level made individual leaders crucial to progress. Researchers recommended focusing on the incorporation of gender perspectives into planning and analysis as a first key step, and called for greater consultation with women in areas of operation.

In 2014, the Norwegian military's use of Gender Field Advisors (GFAs) in Afghanistan was reviewed by the Gender Project at the NDUC (Fleming, 2014).[34] The review determined that this function is necessary in order to make progress in implementing UNSCR 1325, but that GFAs cannot on their own significantly impact this progress. Implementation, it was found, continued to depend largely on individual leaders and their knowledge of gender perspectives and the aims of UNSCR 1325. Personnel without professional gender competence, operative experience, or a military background were found at times to be explicitly counterproductive (ibid., p. 47). This research demonstrated the need for solid preparations and the evaluation of (new) structural initiatives, such as Gender Advisors (GENADs), to make use of experiences gained. As one of the most profiled structural initiatives related to implementing the WPS agenda in the Armed Forces, GENADs will also be discussed in Chapter 4 among the structural factors that affect implementation.

Another 2014 study, by Schjølset (2014a), traced gender perspectives in the Norwegian Armed Forces Lessons Learned Database (known as "*Ferdaball"*) and concluded that gender perspectives were mostly absent from periodic reports (D+180 and End of Tour) on international operations, and that when they were included, were segregated under a "miscellaneous" heading with no indication of their relevance to other functions. Indeed, Schjølset found that formal reporting structures and processes did not encourage or facilitate reporting on gender perspectives or implementation of UNSCR 1325. In addition, the formal and informal transfer of experience between PRT commanders was found to be inadequate for lessons learning, including with regard to

[33] Available at: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/276442/NUPI%2BReport-SIP-11-12-Solhjell%2Bet%2Bal.pdf?sequence=3 (accessed 24 July 2018).

[34] Available at: http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/id/14321/Militare_studier_2-14.pdf (accessed 24 July 2018).

gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325, and long-term commitment to the WPS agenda was deemed insufficient (ibid.).

The Norwegian Government (2016) Official Report (*Norges offentlige utredninger*, or NOU) on the country's efforts in Afghanistan (p. 8) was similarly critical of the military's lessons learning system. Yet, symptomatic of earlier Government reports and evaluations, this NOU provided only a basic overview of the WPS agenda and referenced the studies mentioned above in order to evaluate the implementation of that agenda by the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan, offering no new insights. The report did not even present an evaluation of the specific WPS-related assignments the Armed Forces had been previously tasked with. However, it did note that some military leadership had cited deficient staffing as a barrier to addressing the WPS agenda and that it was too early to gauge the potential impact of GENADs or Female Engagement Teams (FET), and further that gender perspectives needed yet to be embedded in planning process before deployment (ibid.). Skeie (2018) confirmed that tasks assigned to the Armed Forces in relation to UNSCR 1325 have not been systematically evaluated, in her master's thesis, in which she used existing reports from Norwegian military efforts in Afghanistan to argue a correlation between the Armed Forces' past and future performance, in the framework of path dependency theories.

Overall, research on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been limited, as verified by a global research bibliography related to gender and military issues made available by Fasting and Sand (2010)[35] and supplemented by a bibliography of gender and military issues in Scandinavian countries (Sand and Fasting, 2012). In the context of implementation by the Norwegian Armed Forces, these bibliographies indicate a lack of research related to numerous areas of military culture, but also related more generally to implementation and to gender perspectives in military operations (ibid.). Ultimately, the focus on gender perspectives in military operations is relatively new, and the fact that they have not yet been integrated into analysis, planning, or execution, means there is little research on *actual* implementation within the Norwegian Armed Forces.

The research cited here and discussed thus far has offered insights into *what* is lacking, but has not concentrated on *why* these shortcomings still exist. This study represents a pioneering opportunity to better understand the inner life of the Armed Forces, to answer this question of "why?" Thus, this research sought to determine the

[35] The Gender Project at NDUC funded this research bibliography.

factors that promote or prevent the integration of gender perspectives across the military, and where attention should be focused in order to create change.

2.2 Military Culture

Though limited, the research presented above on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian Armed Forces generally concludes that a lack of gender awareness within essential organisational elements like leadership, strategy, analysis, planning, execution, and reporting has hindered implementation. The fact that these elements are absent the gender awareness needed to facilitate implementation of the WPS agenda is not an accident, but results from a system that has prevented the prioritisation of this agenda. Therefore, it is necessary to study that system, and to understand the inner life of the Armed Forces, its military organisational culture, and the values on which that culture is based.

Culture is commonly viewed as dynamic and changeable; a learned, social phenomenon that often manifests through heroes, symbols, rituals, and values (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Nonetheless, culture is a complex concept with no universal definition, and includes unwritten social rules and mores, which can make it challenging to identify, understand, and change (ibid.). In the context of implementation of UNSCR 1325 by the Armed Forces, culture relates to two key but distinct areas that, although connected, require different understandings of organisational military culture: *internal organisational change* demands a different approach than *external operational change.*

In the external dimension, the Armed Forces must be attuned to the culture and human terrain in areas of operation, and must develop intercultural understanding both for military purposes and in order to implement the aims of the WPS agenda. As militaries have experienced internationalisation, they have faced much the same need to become better educated about other cultures as multinational companies. And the importance of intercultural understanding is further highlighted as Armed Forces increasingly engage in locations across the world in operations that are often carried out alongside allies – both military and civilian.[36] In addition, European forces have worked

[36] This was also argued by Sun Tzu: "*So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles without a single loss. If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you may win or may lose. If you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will always*

and still work together in bi-national or multinational arrangements (Soeters, Poponente, and Page, Jr., 2006). The structural internationalisation of the military workforce (i.e. multinational headquarters), the multinational character of military contingents in deployments, and the variety of local populations militaries must work with have thus become essential features of military activities that affect interoperability, efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy (ibid.).

As one might expect, this has been especially relevant for the Norwegian Armed Forces when they have taken part in international operations where the culture and understandings of gender are radically different than their own, such as in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Intercultural understanding is then crucial in order to appreciate the local context, as well as the approaches of both locals and allies to moral, ethical, cultural, and legal questions, which are central to the ability of troops to understand the operational environment, enhance force protection, and improve intelligence (Holo and Andreassen, 2010). On the other hand, failing to understanding the national culture of allies and of the nations in which troops operate may mean that chosen courses of action result in completely different outcomes than anticipated, potentially worsening already tense situations (Totland, 2014).

Cultural differences can seem fairly mild and subtle at first glance; but in reality, the consequences of cross-cultural relations can be extremely significant (Soeters, Poponente, and Page, Jr., 2006). It has been demonstrated for example that aircraft accidents can result from the combination of specific national cultural characteristics among pilots, controllers, and crews; and that different national cultures manifest in different styles of fighting, warring, and controlling foreign occupied territory (ibid; Hofstede, 2001). This clearly makes intercultural understanding important as a means of ensuring that Armed Forces achieve desired effects in operations focused on combat, but it is even more important when partaking in peacebuilding, peace support, or peacekeeping activities. And in these cases, intercultural understanding is an even more complex question, given the mandate of these operations to perform a wide range of non-kinetic[37] tasks such as liaising, negotiating, preventing conflict, contributing to the

endanger yourself" (Holo & Andreassen, 2010).

[37] This study uses the term kinetic in reference to military action involving lethal force; "non-kinetic" is thus military action that does *not* involve lethal force.

re-establishment of law and order, securing the withdrawal of unauthorised armed elements, setting up secure zones, protecting civil personnel, engaging in civil military cooperation, supporting elections, and contributing to equal and fair participation (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017).

These tasks also exemplify the diversity and difficulty of soldiering. Research has demonstrated that it is challenging for many soldiers to transition from the role of warrior to that of peacekeeper, especially because the traits that make the best warriors do not necessarily make the best peacekeepers; but these studies have also found that more detailed education and training, which includes non-kinetic tasks, can better enable soldiers in this regard (Kernic, 1999; Laberg, Johnsen, Eid, and Brun, 2002). The WPS agenda and gender comprehension should therefore be an integral part of military education in order to facilitate implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the integration of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces and in military operations (NATO, 2009; Fuglset, 2014).[38] However, it is the *internal organisational dimension* that will be the key focus of this study, and the internal organisational culture of the Armed Forces that will be explored in depth here.

Understanding this internal organisational culture is linked to and impacts our ability to understand other cultures (G. J. Hofstede, Pedersen, and Hofstede, 2002). Many feminist scholars have investigated militaries to explain the gendered nature of world politics, for instance, concluding that norms derived from masculinity and combat affect global politics through the valorisation of strength, athleticism, aggression, (hetero)sexual conquest, and brotherhood (Bulmer and Eicher, 2017). To appreciate what contributes to Norwegian military organisational culture, as well as how that culture affects military performance and implementation of UNSCR 1325, it is necessary to understand the context. So, the next sections address how national culture, organisational culture, and gendered organisations have created the foundation for Norwegian military organisational culture. This culture is highly gendered, and thus

[38] The importance of intercultural understanding in operations that take place abroad is well acknowledged. However, in the event of an attack on Norway, Norway would be the AO and our allies would meet similar challenges operating within the framework of Norwegian culture. As a host nation, when receiving allied support, Norway will need to brief allied forces about the AO in which military functions are taking place. This further emphasises the importance of applying *domestic* as well as allied and enemy cultural understanding and gender perspectives into planning and exercise scenarios on national territories to ensure operational effectiveness (means) and equality (rights).

theories on gendered organisations and different aspects of military masculinity will also be discussed. It is important to acknowledge that members of the Armed Forces are not monolithic, and that organisational culture is not universal, featuring sub-cultures within different geographical, professional, or task-specific units, but there are nonetheless general cultural characteristics that have consequences for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

2.2.1 A Framework for Understanding National Culture

Just as there is not *one* military culture, there is no *one* national culture. And, in the same way that large organisations such as the Armed Forces have sub-cultures (as mentioned above) – in which employees identify with a distinct sub-group based on shared profession, gender, race, etc. (Hatch, 2013, p. 159) – there are also many sub-cultures in a nation, resulting from different geographic, historic, demographic, and other factors. Yet, certain cultural characteristics are more prominent than others within nations, where people tend to share a similar value system.

The need to understand other (national) cultures has intensified with the growth of globalisation. The first large scale, systematic attempt to measure differences in national cultures was undertaken by Hofstede (2001), who managed to identify these differences by comparing respondents from dozens of countries on the basis of five specific dimensions:

- **Power distance**, which refers to differences in the way people deal with social (in)equality and hierarchy in organisations, and how they relate to authority.

- **Individualism**, which describes the degree to which ties between people are loose and there is an emphasis on self-reliance, as contrasted with **collectivism,** which features people integrated into strong, cohesive groups.

- **Masculinity**, which indicates a preference in society for individual achievement and a "winner takes all" reward system, as opposed to **femininity**, which is characterised by care for others and concern for quality of life.

- **Uncertainty avoidance**, which relates to the extent that members of society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty or ambiguity, and their ways of coping.

- **Long-term versus short-term orientation**, which describes the level of acceptance of gradual change in a society or community (Soeters, Poponente, and Page, Jr., 2006, p. 15).

Hofstede (1991) also found that different national cultures affect various governmental policies, how countries address conflict, and even the amount of money spent on defence as a percentage of GNP, which he discovered correlated to high masculinity scores. According to Hofstede (2001), Norway scores very low on power distance (i.e., people value equality) and fairly low on uncertainty avoidance (i.e. people are rather accepting of different ideas), with high scores on individualism and femininity (ibid., p. 500). This means that Norwegian culture values independence and devalues hierarchy. Norwegians have a strong preference for non-hierarchical organisations with a high level of co-determination, do not respond well to authoritative leaders, and do not accept when power is unequally distributed (ibid.).[39]

Norwegian society is thus highly individualistic, and the expression of personal opinions is valued. Similarly, privacy is important and respected, and clear lines are drawn between work and private life (ibid). Norway's high femininity score equates to a low masculinity score, which indicates that society is not driven by competition and status achievement but by values of cooperation and mutual care. Norwegians also highly value dialogue, sympathy with the underdog, solidarity, care for the environment, consensus building, and self-development (ibid.). Still, Norwegians tend to view social change with suspicion, exhibiting a great respect for traditions and only a limited propensity to plan for the future or take a long-term view. Cultures that score higher on the uncertainty avoidance dimension, on the other hand, encourage efforts that prepare for the future, for example through modern education initiatives (ibid.). Understanding the different dimensions of Norwegian national culture through the lens provided by Hofstede offers valuable context for understanding Norwegian military culture, and where these two cultures might be at odds. After all, individuals who serve in the Norwegian Armed Forces are mostly exposed to Norwegian national culture in childhood and are only later socialised into military culture.

[39] Information presented here from the Hofstede study is also available at: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/ (accessed 26 July 2018).

2.2.2 A Framework for Understanding Organisational Culture

To achieve the transformations needed within a military organisation in order to integrate gender perspectives in military operations, and thereby implement the WPS agenda, it is necessary to understand what constitutes *an organisation*. An organisation is a social system that is constructed to solve special tasks and realise specific goals, in which common tasks and goals connect members, and a set of procedures and guidelines coordinate their work towards those goals (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009, p. 19). These members develop unique collective values and strategies that are expressed as an organisational *culture*.

Hofstede and Hofstede have described organisational culture as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the member of one organization from another" (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 282). And Schein explains it as "the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems" (1985, p. 6). Organisational culture thus allows for agreement, but also accommodates disagreement within the confines of a collective identity (Hatch, 2013, p. 159).

Schein (2004) contends that culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual; and similarly, though culture is an abstraction, its consequences are not. Culture is identity forming and provides a sense of belonging. It is stable, in that it defines a group; has depth, in that it is often an unconscious part of a group; and has breadth, in that it influences all aspects of how an organisation operates (ibid.). Culture also makes communication possible, distributes power and resources, and thereby establishes and categorises social differences (Bourdieu and Stene-Johansen, 2000).

According to Strand (2010), to understand the culture within an organisation, the norms, values, and relations between people must be identified, as well as how their actions, structures, and procedures are interpreted. Describing the actions that take place within an organisation can be challenging, though, and it is even more difficult to analyse and understand *why* they happen the way they do and *how much they matter* (Bang, 2010). McShane and Von Glinow (2010, pp. 416-417) suggest that an iceberg metaphor can help to envision the intricacy of organisational culture: the visible part above the surface of the water represents the *artefacts of organisational culture*, or the

language, rituals and ceremonies, stories and legends that all can see; while the majority of the iceberg that lies below the surface represents an organisation's *shared values* (the conscious beliefs used to evaluate what is good or bad, right or wrong) and *shared assumptions* (the sub-conscious beliefs that are taken for granted). In the context of militaries, organisational culture helps explain why they do what they do, but also how militaries may be affected by other cultures.

The research of Hofstede has determined that the main difference between national culture and organisational culture comes down to *values* versus *practices* (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005), with the culture of countries residing mostly in values and that of organisations residing mostly in practices. Of course, values are learned at an early age, while organisational practices are learned through later socialisation (ibid.). Hofstede claims the most important cultural dimensions for organisations are *power distance* and *uncertainty avoidance*, and that by acknowledging these dimensions and their role in the effectiveness of an organisation, they become valuable tools by which leaders can successfully bring about change. This study will therefore analyse data through the lens of these two cultural dimensions, to identify how and why they affect the implementation of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces.

A checklist created by G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), which outlines the main steps required to change an organisational culture, demonstrates how this process is linked to corresponding changes in other aspects of the organisation, including its structures and functions. Such change demands *leadership that is both capable and willing to manage the organisational culture*; and moreover, this *management cannot be delegated*. Beyond that, changing organisational culture requires:

- *both power and expertise*
- *a cultural map of the organisation*
- *strategic choices*
- *the creation of a network of change agents in the organisation*
- *necessary structural changes*
- *necessary changes to process*
- *the revision of personnel policies*
- *the monitoring and development of organisational culture*

2.2.3 Gendered Organisations

Just as gender perspectives have added new dimensions to security studies, the same is true in organisational theory. For instance, the field has incorporated perspectives on

how deeply masculinity is embedded in bureaucracies through hierarchies, the impersonal application of rules, and the segregation of work and private life. And theorists recognise that the construction of gender within organisations and what is seen as gendered work is given meaning, and identities are created, through various discourses of gender that involve cultural icons and stories (Hatch, 2013, pp. 248-249).

Nonetheless, some scholars claim that gender has been significantly ignored in both older and contemporary research on organisations. According to Kvande (2007), organisational theorists having always enjoyed a close relationship with elites who lead and control society, whereas gender research grew out of a *critical* tradition within the social sciences that acknowledges the relevance of marginalised actors. In 1974, Van Houten challenged the dominant male paradigm within organisational theory research, for example, and in 1977, Kanter showed how organisational structures impact women's opportunities (Kvande, 2007, p. 13). On this latter question, Kvande asserts that women's opportunities for professional development depend on whether an organisation is dynamic and flexible, highly networked, and characterised by decentralisation and de-hierarchisation – in which women fare better – or whether it is marked by a static hierarchy with traditional opportunity structures (ibid., p. 12). The Norwegian Armed Forces generally represents this second category. Equally, hegemonic masculinity (chapter 2.2.4) in society and organizations can result in women hitting the "*glass ceiling*" reflecting unfair systems or attitudes, and stagnate career-wise in a male dominant organization, while men in a female dominant work place can be portrayed as being given the possibility to take the "*glass escalator*" which propels them more rapidly up the career ladder (Williams, 1992).

If all organisations are considered gendered, the important question to ask is *in which way* and what consequences this has. And also, what consequences does this *not* have or can we not assume? In other words, an organisation that is characterised as culturally masculinised does not necessarily have members who identify as masculine (ibid., pp. 100-101). While the personal identity of some individuals may be very closely connected to their professional identity and to the prevailing organisational culture of their employer, others may adapt to that organisational culture only at work and their identity may be more or almost entirely attuned to the national culture.

Military culture is a hegemonic masculine culture, and military organisations are male dominated in terms of numeric representation, especially in the core functions of

the institution that offer opportunities for prestige, rewards, and the possibility to access higher ranks (Carreiras, 2017). In this respect, the military is an extreme case of a gendered organisation. Carreiras describes several types of gendering that occur in organisations such as this. First, through recruitment and selection procedures, division of labour, allowed behaviours, use of power, and physical spaces; second, through an organisational culture and ideology that references cultural values in terms of masculinity and femininity, and constructs symbols and images to explain, express, reinforce, or oppose gender division; and lastly, through the patterns of interaction and identity formation that express, reinforce, or subvert structural and ideological constraints (ibid.).

The organisational structure of the military is clearly based on gender, as far as opportunity, power, and division of labour. Women have been excluded from certain military functions and there are distinct patterns of gender representation by rank and job description (ibid.). As Calás and Smircich note, gender is relevant for organisations today precisely because the material conditions of inequality continue to be produced by gender and other power relations. This demands an analysis of organisations that asks: What prevents change? Who keeps the gates closed? Whose knowledge is allowed? What kind of politics are the politics of knowledge in our field? (2006, p. 328).

In an attempt to understand the politics of knowledge and competence in the context of the Norwegian Armed Forces, Christensen (2017) discussed the development of the military organisation and the need for *new* competences. The implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the military can be understood in this context as well. According to Christensen, new technology demands new approaches, changing the balance between operative domains, which have traditionally been given more status, and non-kinetic domains. In addition, increased diversity results in the Armed Forces mirroring civil society to a larger degree on a cultural level. This can lead to increased fragmentation and friction that challenges a common professional culture (ibid.); yet, Christensen notes that the Armed Forces will have to challenge that culture to some extent, to compete in the job market as an innovative, modern, and progressive organisation, in order to attain the talent needed to achieve greater competence. Christensen's work highlights the obstacles to implementing gender perspectives and the WPS agenda in the Norwegian Armed Forces, but also the necessity that these changes are made in response to a dynamic environment.

Recent scholarship has focused on *doing gender* as a way to understand change in an organisation, since gender perspectives enable organisations to detect variations over time and in a number of contexts (Kvande, 2007. pp. 13-17). This and other research make clear that it is challenging, if not impossible, for the Armed Forces to implement gender perspectives in their (external) operations if the (internal) organisation itself is not actively *doing gender*. The approaches taken in both these dimensions demand leadership with the knowledge and the will to create change within the military organisation and within operations, as well as the ability to understand that these approaches must be different but are nonetheless connected.

2.2.4 Masculinity

In the context of gender issues in the Armed Forces, differences between *masculinity* and *femininity* are a recurring theme. Though related and interdependent concepts, masculinity and femininity are often represented as fixed concepts attached to different worth and status (Disler, 2010). Semantic links between women and femininity, and men and masculinity, can also create opposition stemming from incorrect assumptions and expectations that women and men cannot have both masculine and feminine characteristics and traits (Ibid.). This binary classification of traits and behaviours into the feminine versus the masculine often results in a parallel semantic dichotomy, with certain terms imbued with different values, status, and power in an organisation or in society: gentle versus strong, emotional versus rational, soft versus muscular, passive versus aggressive, cooperative versus competitive, etc. (Woodward, 1997; Kronsell, 2012). These semantics can lead to bias and presumption that make it even more challenging to address gender issues.

To understand power relations at the family, organisation, state, and interstate levels, the notion of *hegemonic masculinity* is also instructive (Marusca, 2010), and can be described as a structure that represents the currently accepted solution to the problem of patriarchal legitimacy by guaranteeing or appearing to guarantee the dominant position of men and the subordination of women (Connell, 1995, p. 77).[40] Hegemonic masculinity allows elites to participate in a lived system of meaningful practices that reproduce and confirm their own identities. Men and women alike are

[40] Hegemony refers to the dominance of one group over another, often with the support of legitimating norms and practices. In the term *hegemonic masculinity*, 'hegemonic' refers to the cultural dynamics that facilitate and sustain that dominance.

complicit in maintaining hegemonic masculinity every time they act in a way that reinforces the existing (hegemonic) culture (Hooper, 2001; Carreiras, 2006, p. 27). Hegemonic masculinity can be challenged and changed, but only through strategic, comprehensive, and bold efforts to overcome conscious and unconscious biases.

Given that the Armed Forces are a gendered organisation in which masculinity plays a significant cultural role, it is clear that research on the integration of gender policies in the Armed Forces must acknowledge it as a hierarchical, traditionally masculine organisation that, by design, stands in conflict with principles of gender equality embraced by modern democratic societies (Obradovic, 2014, p. 5). Historically, the link between masculinity and soldiering has been emphasised, which some argue has allowed for very little change and has prevented the military from evolving as an institution (Enloe, 2000; Higate 2003). In fact, it has been necessary for women (and men) to conceal their femininity in order to fit into the masculine environment of the military (Herbert, 1998).

According to MacKenzie (2015), who undertook a historical study of the exclusion of women in the US Armed Forces, this exclusion was at its core *not* about women, but about men and their military *identity*. MacKenzie demonstrated that exclusion is first and foremost enforced through the development of rules and ideals that envision a solely male fighter unit as elite, essential, and exceptional; and secondly, through the myth of "*the band of brothers.*" This exclusion of women has not been based on evidence but on fantasies, myths, and emotional rationales, and McKenzie warns that the recent lift on bans excluding women in the US Armed Forces should not necessarily be seen as a monumental step towards equality. She argues that this can be understood as an attempt to redefine and revive the adventure of "*the band of brothers*" by including a "few special ones" (women) to appease society, and at the same time shift focus away from events where American soldiers have been associated with human rights violations, sexual violence, and other scandals.

The ideal to which many soldiers conform has been referred to as a *hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity*, due to the caricaturised and often sexualised version of manliness that self-described "real men" may present (Connell, 1995; Nayak, 2006).[41] Yet, according to Belkin, any assumption that male soldiers must be socialised

[41] Feminist theorist Ann Tickner (1999) has argued that much military basic training involves overcoming (mostly male) soldiers' reluctance to kill by appealing to notions of manliness and

into a warrior ideal based on stereotypical hypermasculine traits is an oversimplification at best (2012, p. 112). He contends that the masculinity of the military is a constructed contradiction, wherein masculinity is represented in beliefs but femininity is represented in what is actually achieved. This can be seen in the traditional Norwegian military mantra to: "*complete the assignment and take care of your men.*"[42] The mission-oriented first half of this mantra is associated with masculinity and the caring expressed in the second half with femininity.

Indeed, the Norwegian Armed Forces perform a wide variety of tasks that demand both masculine and feminine traits, ranging from combat assignments, logistics and transportation, and medical services, to human resources, royal guard duty, policing, and intelligence gathering and analysis. All of these and many more tasks may be attached to their own sub-organisational cultures, which enable the military to meet the nine key objectives laid out by the Government in 2016:

1. *Ensure credible deterrence on the basis of NATO's collective defence.*
2. *Defend Norway and allies against serious threats, confrontations, and attacks within the NATO collective defence framework.*
3. *Prevent and successfully deal with security episodes and crises connected to national resources, including by facilitating allied engagement if necessary.*
4. *Ensure a solid foundation for quality decisions regarding national security through monitoring and intelligence.*
5. *Ensure Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights.*
6. *Exercise authority in regulated areas by securing borders with Russia, controlling resources, and acting offshore.*
7. *Participate in multinational crisis management, including in peacekeeping operations.*
8. *Contribute to international cooperation on areas of security and defence policy.*
9. *Contribute to ensuring civil protection for events such as accidents, serious crimes, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters.*

The completion of these tasks requires the personnel of the Norwegian Armed Forces to have both masculine and feminine traits. However, the Norwegian military is

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patriotic duty. She explains: "*…military trainers resort to manipulation of men's anxiety about their sexual identity in order to increase soldiers' willingness to fight. In basic training the term of outmost derision is to be called a girl or a lady. The association between men and violence… depends not on men's innate aggresiveness, but on the construction of a gendered identity that places heavy pressure on soldiers to prove themselves as men*."

[42] This has evolved in recent years to *"complete the assignment and take care of your men and women (or soldiers),"* reflecting the reality of gender in the Armed Forces. It is used in military education and training. Its origin is unknown to the author.

overwhelmingly comprised of men who value masculinity and make decisions about how these tasks are prioritised. And the organisational culture of the military reflects these prioritisations.

Still, Belkin's (2012) claim that there is more to military masculinity than is often portrayed is supported by Carreiras (2017), who argues that different masculinities exist and develop within the Armed Forces depending on context. These different variations of masculinity are multifaceted, and research that focuses on hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity has failed to address non-violent masculinities and the men who embody them (Myrttinen, Khattab, and Naujoks, 2017). While research of this nature has supported critical analysis of conflict-affected masculinities, a broader and more contextualised approach may be necessary to gain a more nuanced analysis and allow for more targeted initiatives in peacebuilding (ibid.). This is important because hegemony does not necessarily require violence, and being seen as manly does not necessarily require being a member of the military, even in conflict scenarios. In fact, the social value associated with being part of a military varies significantly among cultures (ibid).

Though there are clear links between male-dominated military institutions, for which the use of violence is a core function, and the kinds of masculinities promoted and constructed within them, these links are often complex and sometimes contradictory (ibid; Belkin, 2012; Haaland, 2008; Higate 2003). And Chisholm (2017) notes that military masculinities are being reshaped, for example in the market-driven military economies of the broader private security industry, where security needs are very much contextual and geographical and conditions on the ground can interact in various ways with factors like gender and race. For instance, white men are not always the best choice for security actors if the goal is that people feel safe; in some contexts, they can even be considered a source of *in*security (ibid.). The private security industry is a space where the military and civilian worlds intersect, and Bulmer and Eichler (2017) claim that studies too often concentrate on *military* masculinity, without acknowledging just how much the boundaries between the military and civilian worlds, and between masculinity and femininity, are always fluctuating. In this respect, military veterans are a valuable case in point, as their military identity has been privileged at the expense of a civilian identity they must (re)acquire. The post-military lives of veterans are thus shaped by an entangled, constitutive, and contradictory social process in which some struggle with

the experiences they had as warrior soldiers, leading to health, social, and financial issues that make them vulnerable citizens and recipients of benefits. In turn, this dependency can be viewed as a "feminised" social role that further undermines ideals of masculinity (ibid; Eichler, 2012; Eichler, 2015).

The militarised masculinity that veterans must transition away from eroticises and institutionalises masculine values and beliefs and may link masculinity to politics (Kronsell, 2012, p. 13; Sheehan, 2005, pp. 128-129). The system of norms that frames war-making as a legitimate way to resolve problems, known as *militarism*, depends on this strain of masculinity (Obradovic, 2014, pp. 24-25). As a contrast to militarism, many feminist scholars have associated themselves with antimilitarists and pacifists and have been highly critical of militaries in general (Kronsell, 2012, p. 13).[43] Early on, Tickner (1988) demonstrated that the field of international security lacked feminist insights. Since Tickner's groundbreaking work, feminist scholars have made several key theoretical and empirical contributions to the field of security studies and have broadened understandings of what constitutes a security issue. Security is now associated not only with war and international violence, but also with domestic violence, rape, poverty, gender subordination, and ecological destruction.

Feminist security studies explore the gendered nature of values within international security by using a distinct approach to thinking about how gender influences scholars and policymakers in framing and interpreting security issues (ibid.). Wilcox (2010) claims for instance that a form of gendered nationalism can inspire worship of the military offensive. By exaggerating the dangers a state faces, a government can use a "protection" rationale to fight offensive wars that celebrate the

[43] NB: Millar & Tidy (2017) assert that even some feminist and gender theorists privilege masculine concepts like combat in a way that contributes to their normalisation and amounts to a celebration of state violence. And, Zalewski (2016) argues that the concept of military masculinities has been too frequently criticised by feminist studies and raises the question of whether this may work against purpose, suggesting it would be more productive to focus on how to create change instead of highlighting what is wrong. It is worth noting that an intersectional lens may deepen understanding of the complexity of gendered masculinity. Henry (2017) puts forth that much of the existing work on militarised masculinity has failed to account for intersectional differences and argues that by paying attention to privileges, benefits, and power gains maintained and crystallised through the military or through patriarchy itself, scholars must adequately reflect intersectional priorities if they seek to challenge the hegemonic position of men. Military masculinity and security should therefore also be examined through lenses such as colonialism, race, and sexuality (ibid; Agathangelou & Ling, 2009; Richter-Montpetit, 2016).

heroism of male soldiers who save the lives of innocent women and children, reinforcing gendered identities that promote conflict-seeking behaviour in men and states, and replicating hegemonic notions of masculinity (ibid., pp. 61-78).[44] Hegemonic masculinity is thus regarded as a norm and as *normative* in security, defence, and military practices (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832-838). As such, men become the standard and women become associated with "gender" (Connell, 1995, p. 212).

Mills (1992) suggests that organisational culture can be understood through the underlying (gender) rules of an organisation and by examining to what extent masculine values permeate conceptions of the organisational environment (ibid., p. 99). In other words, if gender is not widely considered a useful line of inquiry in military operations, perhaps this is linked to the mind-set of hegemonic masculinity that has been normalised and made "neutral" in the Armed Forces. As Connell explains:

> *"Most of the time, defence of the patriarchal order does not require an explicit masculinity politics. Given that heterosexual men socially selected for hegemonic masculinity run the corporations and the state, the routine maintenance of these institutions will normally do the job. This is the core of the collective project of hegemonic masculinity, and the reason why this project most of the time is not visible as a project. Most of the time masculinity need not be thematized at all. What is brought to attention is national security, or corporate profit, or family values, or true religion, or individual freedom, or international competitiveness, or economic efficiency, or the advance of science. Through the everyday working of institutions defended in such terms, the dominance of a particular kind of masculinity is achieved"* (1995, pp. 212-213).

2.2.5 Military Organisational Culture

Across states, military structures, cultures, and histories are highly gendered and highly masculinised, and within military organisations, the qualities, practices, and symbols of masculinity are idealised (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017). These male-dominated but inherently hierarchical organisations thus feature systems of hierarchy *between* men that produce different and unequal masculinities, defined in relation to each other but also in relation to women (Cockburn, 2001). Through the construction and reproduction of specific norms, and rules and policies that govern individual activities and shape daily

[44] Through this lens, use of the R2P as a rationale for protective military intervention should be critically and thorough assessed whenever advocated, to clarify motives, means, and outcome. The UN-mandated military operations in Afghanistan and Libya, for instance, were both validated from a protection point of view and both have been questioned in retrospect with regard to the level of protection they achieved (Gade and Hilde, 2016).

lives, gendered military institutions shape the behaviours and lived experiences of their personnel as well as those working or living alongside a military presence (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017).

Based on Hofstede's measures of culture, it has been demonstrated that there is also a supra-national military culture that exists between NATO militaries, enabling cooperation even when substantial national cultural differences may seem to divide operational partners (ibid.). Rones and Fasting (2017) note that the "heroic soldier" archetype is a key symbol of masculinity for militaries in all countries, despite different national contexts. Norway is a useful case to examine, because this supra-national gender hierarchy in military culture challenges the larger national culture, which aligns strongly with an identity as a nation of peace. Yet, increased professionalisation (i.e. people entering the military as their chosen profession as opposed to through conscription) and internationalisation of the Norwegian military has led Norwegian soldiers to strive for the hegemonic masculinity that is a norm in the UK and the US – the militaries that sit atop the hierarchy of the Alliance and are thus in a position to pass judgment on the value of various forces in the coalition (ibid., p. 155).

The roles of soldiers, ranging from warrior to peacekeeper, are increasingly complex and multifaceted. However, Kernic (1999) found that soldiers give far more value and status to the role of warrior than to that of peacekeeper, which they view as "boring." This reflects an extreme hegemonic masculinity, a sort of blind militarism, in which combat, and a warrior identity, drive all priorities. On the ground, as Kernic's 1999 study of Austrian soldiers concluded, this can lead to a focus on military and weaponry skills and a lack of interest in the language and culture of an operational area. These findings are a strong argument for better and more realistic education and training before deployments, but also reflect the values that underpin the internal organisational military cultures in various Armed Forces, which have consequences for how military personnel perform different tasks. Indeed, if they lack training in non-kinetic tasks or do not understand principles such as limited use of force, soldiers can themselves create conflicts or insecurity for other security actors and for civil society (ibid.; Moskos, 1976; Solberg, 2007).

To what degree militaries should be viewed as instruments of security rather than of violence is debated among scholars, and often in the context of the deployment of forces by civilian leadership in democratic societies in the interest of human security,

including women's security (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017). Concern that militaries lack the ability to remain impartial and lack the education and training to engage through non-kinetic approaches in culturally sensitive environments has raised questions about the capacity of soldiers to act as peacekeepers (Gordenker and Weiss, 1991; Sion, 2006). And yet Armed Forces are *mainly* employed in non-combat operations, acting as a threshold defence [45] or engaging in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and the mentoring and training of local forces. Danielsen (2017) argues that Norwegian military personnel are thus assigned tasks they are typically *not* educated or trained to do, and notes that weapons drills and "axe throwing" may win a war but will not create peace. She questions the skillset and mindset of the Norwegian Armed Forces as well as the ability of the Norwegian military education system to sufficiently adapt (ibid.).

Research continues to demonstrate (Jennings, 2016; Enloe, 2000; Moon, 1997) that the sexualised masculinity of the Armed Forces is a particular challenge during military missions, as exemplified by recurring incidents of sexual misconduct and abuse. The focus in the military on group loyalty and homosociality[46] fosters a culture of impunity for sexual abuse by peacekeepers; and this sexual exploitation can play a role in the emergence of wartime sex economies, which in turn become an important element of peacekeeping economies. Locals offer sex to generate income or privileges and the resources necessary for everyday material survival, a practice some refer to as survival sex (ibid.). The extremely gendered nature of military institutions has therefore been a substantial focus of feminist scholars interested in gender equity, and particularly to those analysing how change might further gendered justice, not least because militaries are often regarded as the "hard case" (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017).

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[45] A threshold defence is a strategy that requires Norway to have at all times an appropriate means of power to counteract pressure, aggression, or appropriation. With modern capabilities and high responsiveness, the Armed Forces constitute a war-prevention threshold that entails a high risk and cost for anyone who may challenge Norwegian security and independence (Norwegian Government, 2011c). See: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop-73-s-20112012/
id676029/sec1 (accessed 28 July 2018).

[46] The concept of *homosociality* pertains to social bonds between people of the same sex. In studies on men and masculinities, it is often cited as a mechanism that helps maintain hegemonic masculinity. See:
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2158244013518057 (accessed 28 July 2018).

2.2.6 Research on Norwegian Military Organisational Culture

The Armed Forces are one of Norway's largest, most complex, and most multifaceted organisations, with longstanding traditions that guide how the internal organisation is structured and ordered as well as how external operations are conducted. It comprises a wide variety of professions, from medical staff and computer scientists, to pilots and sharp-shooters, to chauffeurs and cooks, among so many others (Forsvaret, 2007). This diversity of professions and units within the Armed Forces allows for valuable research on military culture and military personnel. However, security, political, and practical concerns all combine to restrict access to the Norwegian Armed Forces, resulting in a limited number of empirical, qualitative studies analysing the internal organisation and culture. Most existing studies have been undertaken by researchers with some relationship to or position in the Armed Forces (Totland, 2009) and have usually focused on a small part of the organisation. Though research by active duty officers can raise questions about bias, their relationships can also help them gain deeper access to the organisation.[47]

Still, in the last decade, there has been an increased openness, even to studies of Norwegian military culture carried out by independent researchers. In the last half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, discussion of the new objectives of the Armed Forces and the introduction of a regulation that made it mandatory for all Norwegian military personnel to serve in international operations raised the interest of researchers in soldiers, particularly regarding their motivation for serving. Alongside this, the failure of the Armed Forces to recruit and retain women further intensified the curiosity of researchers.

Studies have shown a tendency among younger officers in Norway to develop a more pragmatic and practical relationship to their work, as merely a source of income, compared to older officers (Syversen, 2001). In fact, Haaland discovered that even if Norwegian soldiers viewed themselves as warriors, and even if that identity had grown after the Cold War through involvement in international operations, most regarded themselves primarily as state employees (2008, pp. 244-257). Gustavsen (2011) corroborated these findings, demonstrating that the motivations for Norwegian Air

[47] The committee that evaluated this study also regarded the fact that I was (and still am) an active duty female officer as an asset in studying these issues, allowing me to see from within the organisation and better access the organisational culture.

Force soldiers to join the military were based more on career opportunities and self-realisations than on loyalty to the nation's honour and interests. These results reflect a 2007 Joint Operational Doctrine that sought to set new standards for ethics and identity in the Norwegian Armed Forces and claimed that a paradigm shift was occurring in the military, from ideological idealism to professionalism. Armed Forces once motivated by their embrace of national values, democracy, and human rights were described as increasingly driven by the comradeship and soldiering associated with being a professional warrior.

Numerous studies have confirmed the masculine values of the Norwegian Armed Forces, in which the ideal soldier is viewed as a physically strong man with the capacity to endure the burden of heavy equipment over time (Rones, 2008; Rones and Fasting, 2011; Totland, 2009). As such, the male body is regarded as a symbol of both masculinity and operative fellowship (Totland, 2009). This traditional masculine form of fellowship has fostered sexual language, sexist remarks, and the suppression of female symbols, which have become the social expectation for male and female personnel alike serving in some parts of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Harsvik, 2010; F. Steder, Hellum, and Skutlaberg, 2009; Totland, 2009).

According to Netland (2013), the presence of women in the Armed Forces challenges the hyper-masculine space in which "honour" can be obtained in an otherwise egalitarian society like Norway. Through this lens, discriminatory attitudes among men may be explained by their subconscious fear of losing this space, and thus the freedom to display and manifest their masculinity (ibid.). But when Danielsen (2012) examined the effect of women on a *sub*-culture within the military, in her study of the Norwegian Navy Special Operations Command (NORNAVSOC), she found they had a far more pragmatic attitude regarding gender and sex than conventional forces. Even if some respondents expressed scepticism about women as operatives, they acknowledged situations in which women had been essential to carrying out military tasks. Danielson concluded that soldiers in the NORNAVSOC were so confident in their own masculinity that they felt no threat from the integration of women, and were more concerned that the people they worked with had relevant knowledge or skills and could complete the task at hand (ibid.). However, in a more recent follow up study of the NORNAVSOC, Danielson contends that the military has been mostly unresponsive to changes in civil society, in large part because the goal of the Armed Forces is uniformity

(to masculine ideals), not diversity (Danielsen, 2015, pp. 84-87). These findings are especially relevant in evaluating whether the Armed Forces are capable of transforming in accordance with new assignments and a new role in society.

Some of the research that has examined the success of the military in moving into this new role is also quite instructive regarding the organisational culture of the Armed Forces. In 2006, the Norwegian military established the "Working Committee for a Higher Percentage of Women," to recommend ways to recruit and retain more women. The report eventually issued by the Committee determined that universal conscription would probably have positive effects in the long run, but that gender was under-communicated throughout the organisation and that actions already taken to recruit and retain women had not been sufficiently monitored. The Committee suggested 31 new initiatives, including: the introduction of a module on gender, gender roles, culture, and diversity at all military schools; the incorporation of gender perspectives into annual appraisals; more accountability from leadership; a designated Defence Staff ombuds unit; and more research on issues related to women in the Armed Forces (Brestrup et al., 2007).

Recognising the need for more research on military culture and on the reasons for the continued low representation of women, the Norwegian MoD looked to the Northern Research Institute Tromsø to undertake a pilot project in 2008, the results of which suggested that low female representation had numerous causes. Women did not choose the education and career paths necessary to succeed in the Armed Forces,[48] the Armed Forces did not provide a work environment favourable to women, and Norwegian society had a clearly gender-segregated labour market.[49] The study indicated that gender differences within the Armed Forces were obscured through lack of regard and respect, and researchers recommended four essential areas of further research on Norwegian military culture: the practical manifestation of values and attitudes; trust

[48] This issue is addressed in Chapter 6, where the interviews with female officers are presented. They noted that their career paths have been chosen for them, limiting future possibilities for promotions in the military system. These findings were supported by a study carried out by the Eastern Norway Research Institute (Østlandsforskning) titled *Recruitment, Socializing and Military Core Competence* (Eide, Lauritzen, Olsvik, & Stokke, 2014), the results of which were presented by Trude Hella Eide and Tonje Lauritzen at the Chief of Defence's Equal Opportunity Conference at Akershus Fortress, Oslo, 12 May 2015.

[49] At the time of this study there was no universal conscription in Norway; however, Parliament decided in 2013 to implement universal conscription by 2015. See: https://lovdata.no/dokument/LTI/lov/2014-11-07-66 (accessed 28 July 2018).

processes; recruiting, selection, and education; and daily conduct in different areas of the organisation (M.-B. Ellingsen, Karlsen, Kirkhaug, and Rørvik, 2008). After evaluating these results, the MoD directed funding towards research focused on military sociology, based on White Paper 36 on the recruitment of women into the Armed Forces; as well as on gender, leadership, and recruitment (Steder, Hellum and Skutlaberg, 2009), masculinity cultures, and military core competence (Lauritzen, Leirvik, Schanke, and Ellingsen, 2010).[50]

In 2014, the research of Lilleaas and Ellingsen confirmed the findings of earlier studies regarding the role of masculinity culture in preventing gender equality within the Armed Forces. They observed a negative masculine culture conveyed by men of all ages, who used humour as a weapon. Their research also highlighted the significance of leadership in implementing gender equality and the need for leaders to model this perspective from day one, in all interactions, and to deal with any negative incidents when they occur.[51] The impact that such incidents have on the recruitment of women was emphasised by researchers tasked with exploring this problem, which concluded that the Armed Forces have "a problem in finding measures to strengthen the situation of women" (Steder et al., 2009). These researchers put forth specific short- and long-term recommendations to improve efforts to recruit women. In the short term, these included better follow-up on suggestions made in previous studies, the enforcement of a zero-tolerance policy with regard to offensive behaviour, better focused recruitment campaigns, improved outreach regarding the conscript system, and an immediate end to hidden quota systems. Their long-term recommendations included enforcing a more systematic approach to initiatives to strengthen retention, decreasing the use of masculinised vocabulary in describing competences and duties, and replacing service reports with individual development plans (ibid.).

A number of these recommendations address attitudes and culture, which former Norwegian Minister of Defence Ine Marie E. Søreide has described as the factors that ensure inequality is sustained in the military. In her preface to the book *Military Women: The Armed Forces Achilles Heel?*, she notes that a lack of formal and legislative equality is seldom the reason for a lack of actual equality in the military, citing an absence of

[50] MoD Senior Advisor Hanna Syse, e-mail to the author, 7 February 2012.

[51] Available (in Norwegian) at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/maskulinitetsstudier.pdf (accessed 28 July 2018).

genuine desire and commitment from the Norwegian military and questioning whether measures already implemented had been adequately monitored and whether those measures truly had the support of military leadership (F. B. Steder, 2015, p. 10). Hovde (2010) analysed the attitudes of male military leaders towards women in the Armed Forces and found they had a limited understanding of the value of gender perspectives. Most viewed the recruitment of women in the context of improving the work environment, with few arguing that women may have actual military prowess or specifically applicable qualifications (ibid.).

Given the cultural transformation that is clearly required to implement equity initiatives and the WPS agenda, several researchers and politicians have called attention to how important it is that military leadership is unquestionably committed to cultivating a progressive culture that meets the current and future needs of a diverse force. Of course, this assumes that these leaders possess the knowledge, will, and power to change the organisational culture of the Armed Forces; an assumption that Brunborg (2015, p. 96) has questioned due to what he depicts as a cultural segregation within the organisation:

> *"The warrior culture is…for all practical purposes detached from the military culture at the top leadership levels. The only connection between them is the semantic packaging, through which the leadership of the Armed Forces dutifully attempts to motivate soldiers using the content of warrior culture, but the rhetoric of the culture of top military leaders. This resembles an acrobatic exercise in political correctness."*

Brunborg argues that the expressed military culture at the highest leadership levels is (still) strongly influenced by Norwegian society. It aligns somewhat with the national culture and thus comes across as more civilian than what he argues is "functional" in a military system. Yet, according to Brunborg, this culture of Norwegian military leadership has had little trickle-down effect on the warrior culture that exists strongly at the tactical level, where human rights, human dignity, and notions of ethics remain abstract postulates in the face of what he calls "the blind forces of nature that characterise war" (ibid.). Brunborg leaves open the question of whether leadership has failed to influence the warrior culture of lower ranks due to a lack of ability or a lack of will, but his study is incredibly relevant to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, for which the importance of leadership commitment has been repeatedly emphasised. In light of

Brunborg's study, we must ask: Is military leadership disconnected from the organisation it is supposed to lead? Or, do military leaders strategically portray the organisation in a way that downplays warrior culture and places it outside scrutiny?

The Norwegian military's own highest academic institution (NDUC) has addressed the paradox of warrior soldiers in a peace nation (Edström, Lunde, and Matlary, 2009), as well as the challenge of balancing the need for uniformity and the need for diversity (Edström, Lunde, and Matlary, 2010). Research by Edström, Lunde, and Matlary on both of these topics has concluded that gender perspectives should be incorporated across the Armed Forces, in the organisation and in operations. Further, they highlighted the need for broad consideration of the consequences of transforming the Armed Forces, including challenges and opportunities related to military identity that would result.

To examine the relationship between military identity and military performance, Johansen (2013) developed scales that allowed him to score various dimensions of identity.[52] He found identities in the Norwegian Armed Forces to be multi-dimensional and both role- and context-dependent. The dimension of professionalism emerged as a significant factor in explaining positive military performance, especially in the operational realm, and was also an indicator of organisational commitment. Interestingly, though, professionalism – which Johansen noted "emphasises combat skills" – was not predictive of *leadership* performance (ibid., p. 52). These findings bring nuance to discussions about a preferred cultural identity in the Armed Forces, at least in the context of performance. Further research on identity and organisational culture will contribute to a better understanding of how these results can be linked to changes that have a specific gender dimension.

A year after Johansen's research was published, the revised Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine, issued in 2014 (Forsvaret), downplayed a focus on warrior culture and identity and set out to reframe professionalism, defining it more in terms of knowledge (as opposed to combat skill) and the ability to use that knowledge in planning military operations. A section was included on joint operational culture and the importance of working together to achieve a common goal, as well as sections on the protection of civilians and gender perspectives (ibid.). The promotion of these feminine

[52] Johansen's dissertation is available at: https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/7833/dr-thesis-2013-Rino-Bandlitz-Johansen.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 28 July 2018).

values coincides with what appears to be a shift back, at least doctrinally, towards more idealism in military activities and in military identity. This idealism is also underscored by the Armed Forces as a reason for joining the organisation in their recruitment and branding campaign, which portrays a competent and modern force comprised of diverse personnel, willing and able to protect Norway's values and people under the slogan: "*For all that we have. For all that we are*" (Bruteig, 2010).[53]

According to Mathisen (2015), this marketing approach by the Armed Forces is rational and strategic, intended to communicate a universal organisational identity, to make up for an earlier fragmented approach, and to restore legitimacy and trust with the population. But he found that even if members of the military have a sense of loyalty to the organisational identity portrayed in communication efforts, they have another and often stronger sense of identity associated with their branch or unit (ibid.). These findings correspond with the discrepancy Brunborg (2015) discovered between the culture and identity of strategic leadership and that of other organisational levels. If military leaders are unaware or incapable of bridging this gap, it may prove incredibly difficult to change the existing military organisational culture.

A study by Rones (2015) on the debate over military identity in the candidate schools of the Norwegian Armed Forces confirmed the contradiction that officers are expected to embody – displaying both masculine and feminine traits, but within a framework of militarised masculinity. Rones also examined how physical ideals of the preferred military body impact men and women differently, noting that some women uphold masculinity by *opposing* affirmative actions or accommodations for women as a way of becoming accepted as "one of the guys." But women candidates who challenged the stereotype of who could be an officer thereby challenged the masculinity of the military profession itself and the belief system that legitimises personal claims to authority and a powerful masculine identity. In turn, some male candidates used their physical strength to bully and harass women in an attempt to "psyche them out" (ibid., pp. 300-303).

At Ørland Air Station, a pioneering project was implemented in a single unit to try to mitigate gender-related tension and the dominance of masculinity. The conscripts

[53] NB: This slogan ("*For alt vi har. Og alt vi er.*" in Norwegian) won the Norwegian Armed Forces a gold for best employer branding at the "*Årets gulljeger 2016*" and an Ipsos MMIs branding award in 2014.

serving there were divided evenly by gender, 50% women and 50% men, and lived in mixed-gender rooms; and the results were quite positive (Hellum, 2016). This dynamic created space for the acceptance of differences between women and men, and it was widely recognised by soldiers and officers in the unit that gender was not an indicator of performance. The gender balance in this unit also increased tolerance and understanding, minimised harassment and jokes based on women's sexuality, and reduced gender-based prejudice (ibid.).

In 2017, a report by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (*Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt*, or FFI) offered several key recommendations based on this and other empirical research undertaken since 2008 on the issue of gender balance in the Armed Forces. The report made clear that women constitute an important recruitment pool and should be taken seriously, first and foremost by ensuring an environment free from harassment and hostile attitudes. Gender perspectives must also be addressed more effectively in the education and training of officers and soldiers, and the specific needs of women must be accounted for in equipment, clothing, and construction. The report highlighted the importance of evaluating candidate selection processes and criteria, as well as ensuring access to education and further employment in the Armed Forces and improving personnel policies to accommodate evolving needs in family life. Finally, concerns were voiced regarding the establishment of a new Specialist Corps primarily consisting of men and driven largely by masculine values (ibid.).

A recurring theme of the recommendations that materialise from research in this area is the need for more and better education and knowledge related to gender perspectives. Many researchers have identified this as a crucial factor in shaping the attitudes, competences, and organisational culture necessary to transform the Armed Forces with respect to gender. If instead, the military does not focus on intercultural understanding, gender equality, and other non-kinetic subjects related to implementing gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325, progress will be slow or even non-existent. On the question of intercultural understanding specifically, Christensen and Dille (2017) argue that the Norwegian military currently struggles to both provide the field with concrete examples and identify accurate priorities, and that the concept of culture is often used in a vague way to explain why a task is hard or has failed (ibid.).

A similar representation is made in the official report on the efforts of the Norwegian Armed Forces in Afghanistan through 2014 (NOU 2016: 8), which notes that

engagement there was based less on knowledge about things like local conditions, culture, and lines of conflict than on the need to support NATO, and the US in particular. The report concluded that a lack of proper preparation regarding the religion and culture of the area contributed to a lack of success (ibid.). This case illustrates the effect that non-kinetic subjects can have on the success of an operation, and thus why it is important that a greater focus is put on these subjects as core elements of military education. But Torgersen (2017)[54] warns that the Norwegian Armed Forces are heading towards a form of organisational narcissism and are moving increasingly *out* of step with reality.[55] This results in military education and core competences that are based on an insular identity and culture, and in a disregard for the value of other expertise. Yet, the implementation of gender perspectives and the WPS agenda are fundamental and *must* be supported by outside experts so long as there is a continued lack of internal expertise in the Armed Forces.

One could reasonably conclude that the dominant masculine military culture is primarily responsible for alienating women and preventing the implementation of gender perspectives and the WPS agenda in the Norwegian Armed Forces; however, blaming masculinity or the organisational culture in general will not alone lead to change. The Armed Forces must identify and address the specific elements of organisational culture that are unproductive, and in some cases unpack how they are interwoven with masculinity. In other words, constructive criticism of the norms of masculinity that produce unwanted behaviour is necessary if the military is to engage in meaningful change, but masculinity must not be condemned wholesale. After all, a strong masculine culture is not necessarily synonymous with hostility in all contexts, and it is the ability of the organisation to learn lessons and be flexible that will ultimately lead to success in a fast-changing environment (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009).

The Norwegian Armed Forces have *not* been gender mainstreamed, though, nor have the required cultural, functional, and structural changes been made to achieve

[54] The study Torgersen refers to is not publicly available: Forsvarsdepartementet (2011), *Personell og kompetanse i Forsvarssektoren. Forstudie* [Personnel and competence in the Defence Sector. A preliminary study], Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet (Unntatt offentlighet).

[55] Schultz & Hatch (2002) introduced the expression "organizational narcissism" to explain what happens when organisations lose their sense of reality and become unsynchronised with their environment due to a strong focus on their identity and culture and a lack of interaction with other professionals.

equality and fulfil commitments related to UNSCR 1325. According to Schein (2004), transformational change in organisations almost always requires a change in the organisational culture; and if the organisational culture is a main obstacle to change, it is necessary to understand *what* within the culture has this effect, so that this factor can be addressed. If masculine military culture is an obstacle to the implementation of gender policies in the Norwegian Armed Forces, progress on the WPS agenda will remain fundamentally unchanged if this culture is not specifically targeted. And so, bearing this in mind, the following section presents a theoretical framework for transformational change.

2.3 Transformational Leadership to Create Organisational Change

Theories on organisations and change, such as those presented earlier by Schein and Hofstede, can inform processes of transformation for the Armed Forces. In this case, the change that must be implemented is the adoption of the WPS agenda. But in essence, organisational change always comes down to two key questions: What will compel an organisation to change? And, how can that change be managed? (Hatch, 2013, p. 4).

A *systems approach* to the change that is needed in the Norwegian military acknowledges that Norway, the US, NATO, and the UN all potentially affect each other, depending on resources, strengths, weaknesses, and political interests, and recognises that the Norwegian Armed Forces are dependent on external resources, which allows external actors to create insecurity and exert pressure (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009). This pressure can be normative, through media, public opinion, or politics (ibid.). The Government is also an external actor that affects the Norwegian military, through decisions about which operations to conduct and which policies to implement.

This study is based on an understanding that the Norwegian Armed Forces are part of a larger *system*, wherein the statements and priorities of the Norwegian Government regarding UNSCR 1325 impact the organisation. The following section discusses *how to manage organisational change*, including the differences between transactional and *transformational leadership* and the necessity that the WPS agenda be addressed in the transformational domain, as well as *psychological safety* in the context of change. Organisational structures and functions are then clarified before the final section of this chapter presents the analytical framework used for this research.

2.3.1 Transformational Leadership

The preferred leadership strategy of the Armed Forces, as described in the 2014 Joint Operational Doctrine, is a mission-based management that relies on flexibility and allows the task to determine the approach, rather than setting procedures or management styles to suit all situations (Forsvaret). Leadership is often broken down into two types – transactional and transformational – and this mission-based management aligns more closely with the transformational approach because it gives leaders the space to make changes to existing culture instead of depending on the people they lead to adapt to that culture in every instance. While *transactional leadership*, which consists of an exchange of rewards for services, can work well in the day-to-day interactions between leaders and subordinates, transactional leaders tend to give little attention to the role of larger cultural factors (ibid).

It is through *transformational leadership* that major changes in attitudes and behaviours can be inspired (Burns, 2010), and transformational leaders appreciate that almost any evolution into a more successful and effective organisation (Bass, 2006; Connor, 1998) involves some change to the organisational culture (Schein, 2004). Thus, the changes required in the Norwegian Armed Forces in order to implement the WPS agenda demand a transformational approach. Indeed, research conducted with the US military determined that transformational leadership led to increased efficiency in operations. Further, and quite relevantly in the context of UNSCR 1325, the same study found that women were more capable than men of exercising transformational leadership (Bass, 1999). This indicates that the Armed Forces need transformational leadership to achieve better gender balance and incorporate gender perspectives, and that better gender balance in leadership positions can further enable the transformational leadership that can create this change.

Some scholars warn of the danger of pseudo-transformational leaders, who pose as authentic transformational leaders and even use the same tools and display similar behaviours, but do so in order to exploit the achievements of their subordinates for personal gain instead of for the greater good of the organisation (Li, 2013). This could make pseudo-transformational leadership an obstacle to change, since the incorporation of gender perspectives in all military matters requires truly transformational leaders who prioritise the best interests of the organisation. Data on leadership behaviour is therefore especially interesting in the pursuit of transformational leadership. And, it is

important to determine whether necessary changes have been approached in a constructive transformative manner, even if motivated by personal interests (pseudo-transformation), in order to analyse the cultural, structural, and functional factors that affect the implementation of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces.

Schein (2004) explains that transformational change is motivated by a disequilibrium marked by three distinct processes: 1) seeing enough data on a situation to cause serious discomfort (for example, regarding rates of rape in an area of operations); 2) connecting that disconfirming data to important goals and ideals (such as the expectation that the Armed Forces are there to protect), causing anxiety or guilt; and 3) feeling enough psychological safety to imagine the possibility that solving the problem and learning something new will not risk a loss of identity or integrity. Schein is convinced that a sense of threat, crisis, or dissatisfaction must exist to generate enough motivation to begin *unlearning*, to relearn new ways to problem solve. But learning something new can create learning anxiety, linked to fears of temporary incompetence, punishment for incompetence, a loss of personal identity, and a loss of group membership. This anxiety can overcome the anxiety associated with disconfirming data, resulting in a denial of the validity of that disconfirming data or in scapegoating – in which an individual convinces themself that the data does not apply to them and that the cause of a problem lies elsewhere (ibid.).

One approach to incentivising change uses bargaining, offering special compensation for efforts to change (Coghlan, 1996). Yet, Schein's (2004) extensive research on organisational culture and leadership found that most transformational change programmes fail because *leaders do not develop the underlying conditions necessary to foster sufficient psychological safety for change*. It is important that leaders seeking to apply transformative leadership in the military realise that increasing the sense of psychological safety of members of the Armed Forces will reduce their learning anxiety, and decrease the likelihood that this anxiety manifests as defensiveness (Schein, 2004).

Schein contends that the following conditions are crucial if leaders are to generate enough of a sense of safety among employees to successfully facilitate transformational change (2004, p. 332-333):

- *Create a compelling positive vision so that the change is understood to benefit the organisation and its ability to achieve desired results.*

- *Ensure that learners are involved in the process to promote this understanding and motivate them to change.*
- *Create formal and informal training of relevant groups and teams in which learning problems can be aired and discussed.*
- *Have positive role models.*
- *Have a clear reward and discipline system to promote change.*
- *Ensure organisational structures that are consistent with the new way of thinking and working.*

The elements Schein identifies are incorporated into the theoretical structure that informs analysis in this research. However, transformational organisational and cultural change can be influenced by an overwhelming number of authorities and circumstances in organisations as large and complex as the Armed Forces. Therefore, to study the positive and negative influence of structural, functional, and cultural factors on progress related to the implementation of gender awareness, research had to be focused on specific parts of the organisation. A combination of theories of analysis was applied to the data to ensure that the research question could be answered nonetheless.

2.3.2 Structures

The job of managing organisational culture never ends; it requires constant monitoring to determine which if any changes best serve the larger goals of the organisation (ibid.). A lack of management of culture may thus explain the lack of progress in implementing UNSCR 1325. But culture does not exist in a silo, and two other organisational factors – structure and functions – also play a role in change, and are also accounted for in the theoretical basis for this study.

While the formal structure of an organisation is often presented as a flowchart that reflects activities and responsibilities, *structure is also a tool* for direction, coordination, and control within an organisation (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009). As McShane and Von Glinow (2010) explain, organisational structure is:

> *"The division of labor as well as the patterns of coordination, communication, workflow, and formal power that direct organizational activities"* (ibid., p. 386).

In this way, an organisational structure is far more dynamic than an organisational chart can possibly convey. The subdivision of work leads to specialisation, and as organisations grow, a horizontal division of labour is usually accompanied by vertical

divisions of labour and management, for efficiency. The coordinating function of the organisational structure ensures that everyone works in concert (ibid., p. 386-387).

There are four basic elements of organisational structure. The first is the *span of control*, which is defined by the number of people who report directly to the next level in the hierarchy when the organisation is most effective. This is interconnected with the *size and shape* (a tall or flat structure) of an organisation; the *degree of formal decision-making authority* held by a small group of people (centralisation or decentralisation); and the *degree of formalisation* through rules, procedures, formal training, and related mechanisms (ibid., p. 390-394). An organisational structure therefore configures power, communication patterns, and potentially the organisational culture, which makes change to an organisation's structure an important component of achieving broader organisational change (ibid., p. 386).

In the context of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the Armed Forces and in military operations, identifying and analysing new structural elements – structures themselves – that have been established to address new tasks, and evaluating the suitability and capability of those already established to reach new goals, is a key objective. These structures can promote stability and focus, which may support the aims of the organisation in some cases; but they can also suppress development, and stability and predictability can work against change, innovation, and flexibility (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009). This study will identify organisational structures and their formal and informal power within the Norwegian Armed Forces linked to gender-related tasks, and will present an analysis of whether these structures have prevented or promoted implementation of the WPS agenda.

2.3.3 Functions

Generally, the functions of an organisation are considered the *activities* performed to define or implement the goals of the organisation, such as socialising, recruiting, communicating, and developing, implementing, or evaluating policy (Hofstede, 1993). This reflects a collective understanding of functions, comprising all the activities carried out in an organisation. However, the focus in this research was on the ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to conceptualise the *new* tasks assigned to them by the Government in order to implement UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, and thus it is this *conceptualisation* that is defined as *function* in this study. In other words, what is the ability of the Armed Forces to transform political will into a comprehensive plan with

concrete goals, tasks, and responsibilities, including the establishment of new structures, functions, and culture or the new use of established structures and functions?

This requires that strategic command level leaders interpret the formal political tasks assigned through official channels and develop strategies to implement them (Forsvaret, 2014). Furthermore, it demands that various change measures are enacted in accordance with the theoretical basis for this study: strategic leadership choices (regarding structures, functions, and culture), the development and use of a cultural map of the organisation, the establishment of good role models, a positive vision, the development of expertise through education and training, learner involvement, the establishment of a network of change agents, a review and revision of personnel policies, and the introduction of a reward and discipline system. And last but not least, it requires continuous monitoring and evaluation of the changes and measures implemented, to assess whether they have the desired effect (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004). In this study, several WPS-related assignments tasked to the Armed Forces will be specifically analysed in this way, especially the development of guidelines for soldiers to address sexualised and gender-based violence in areas of operations (AO).

2.3.4 The Analytical Model for this Study

The theoretical framework for this research is captured in a simplified diagram below (Figure 2.3), consisting of theory and research on UNSCR 1325, military organisational culture, and transformational organisational change:

Figure 2.3. The multi-dimensional theoretical framework for analysis used in this research



The three empirical phases of this study – a case study of the Gender Project at the NDUC, a document analysis of Department of Defence communications, and interviews with NATO gender experts – will be discussed and analysed on the basis of the relevant existing research detailed above and the theoretical foundations presented in this chapter.

3 Research Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological approach to data collection for this study, the main source of which was the Gender Project at the NDUC. A single case study can be particularly suited to testing a theoretical framework, and a study of the Norwegian military's Gender Project was especially appropriate because it could be seen as one of the "most-likely" cases of success (George and Bennett, 2005). Here, I will present the background and context for selecting the Gender Project as a case study, followed by a thorough discussion of the challenges connected to the dual role I played as a scholarly researcher and leader of the Gender Project, and of the methods used to ensure validity and trustworthiness of the data. Finally, I discuss the research methods used to collect data throughout this study: participative observation, document analysis, and interviews.

3.1 Background and Context for the Research

The Norwegian Government tasked the Armed Forces with multiple assignments related to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (see Chapter 2.1), and it was at the NDUC that the first initiatives were taken within the military to embrace the Norwegian NAP. Following a request for funding, the MoD earmarked funds to the NDUC for two years (2010–2011)[56] in support of activities to build competence vis-à-vis UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations; and the decision was made to design a unique project for this purpose. The idea of such a project had already been evolving at the NDUC, so that some preliminary work had been done, but the task was formalised for the 2010 budget year.

In November 2009, the Commander of the NDUC contacted me – a female Air Force Officer with a traditional military education, combined with a civilian master's degree in Comparative Studies, for which I had focused on the work of the EU and the Council of Europe to promote equality – and asked that I lead the Gender Project for two

[56] Financial support for the Gender Project at the NDUC was later extended, until the Project was formally terminated in July 2013.

years while continuing to pursue my PhD scholarship on the same subject.[57] After consulting with leaders from all command levels at the NDUC, the vision for the Project broadened to incorporate three civilian advisors (male or female) as well as a preferably male Army officer, to reach the overwhelmingly majority male military organisation and ensure diversity and added perspectives in the Project. And, since the financial support provided by the MoD was not attached to a specific mandate, drafting one became a first step.[58]

The mandate of the NDUC's Gender Project was influenced by the mandate of a similar project at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also accounted for the role and functions of the NDUC within the Armed Forces and an initial analysis of needs. It thus focused on education, dissemination, and research. A core objective of the Project was also to identify factors that prevented and promoted the implementation of a gender perspective in military operations, encompassing the concept of this study. The identification of these factors was intended to enable efforts to address specific issues and target key change agents and institutions related to the fulfilment and implementation of the WPS agenda across the military (Forsvaret, 2011e).[59] To that end, Gender Project staff offered direct training to military personnel as well as train-the-trainers courses, provided information and assistance at meetings, participated at and arranged conferences, produced and disseminated learning materials, cooperated with civil society actors, addressed military leadership to promote implementation, participated in and evaluated exercises, developed a pioneering reporting system, and advocated gender perspectives in books, articles, and other media.

In its effort to implement the WPS agenda, the Gender Project was the Norwegian military's key additional structural element; but projects are temporary in nature. This means they have end-dates, and ideally, that they lead to a desired end-*state*. Studying

[57] I was awarded a PhD scholarship in early 2009 to study what factors prevent and promote the implementation of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces, but the start-up was postponed due to my deployment to Afghanistan.

[58] The fact that the NDUC received funding for a specific purpose before the project format had been chosen, before the Gender Project had a mandate, and even before the desired results had been set out, suggests challenges from the start to the success of the Project. In retrospect, this is an opportunity to learn lessons about project management; and the management of the Gender Project could serve as a valuable case study in how projects are directed in reality versus the ideals set out in project management theories.

[59] See: "MANDAT FOR PROSJEKT GENDER VED FHS," 6 February 2010 (reference number: 2010/022405-001/FORSVARET/009).

the Project was therefore a means of gathering valuable information about how the military, as an organisation, has responded and adapted to what have been regarded a new, or at least different, perspectives and whether it has made necessary changes in structures, functions, and culture. However, it is important to note that this research did *not seek to evaluate the Gender Project itself or its effectiveness.* Instead, the Project is used as a case study in which factors that emerged throughout the Project phase with implications for realising the WPS agenda are identified and discussed.[60]

The Gender Project made an effective case study due largely to the regular interaction of staff with multiple parts of the military organisation, offering exclusive insight regarding an ongoing transformational process that is not necessarily being experienced consistently throughout the Armed Forces. In my two years as leader of the Project, I knew of no single organisational unit that had progressed far enough in terms of gender or were otherwise in a position to serve as an alternative in-depth case for study. Focusing on a small part of the military, at the brigade or unit level, also risked leaving important information at the strategic or operational levels undiscovered.

Though the approach used here can at times frame the Armed Forces as something of a monolith, with little distinction between military units, branches, and functions, the factors that faced the Gender Project in implementing gender perspectives reveal those seen generally in the military to varying degrees; and analysis of those factors provided valid and valuable information on what has affected progress in actuating the WPS agenda across the organisation. Furthermore, the Project generally targeted the entire military organisation, but the involvement of distinctive parts of the organisation varied over time. Flexibility to respond to requests and identify challenges and opportunities was therefore important. Choosing from the start to take an open-minded approach and avoiding preconceptions regarding the levels of implementation in various military units allowed for capacity "bottlenecks" to be exposed without bias.

Still, singular case studies can always fall prey to selection bias or the over-generalisation of results (George and Bennett, 2005). Thus, it would be wrong to imply

[60] Evaluating the effectiveness of the Gender Project would in some ways amount to evaluating my own leadership and is thus better left to other researchers and my superiors. Still, feedback from the military regarding the Gender Project has been positive. The level of activity of the Project can also be confirmed by yearly reports (Forsvaret, 2011c, 2012, 2013). A lack of effectiveness of the Project should not be used as an explanation for the lack of implementation of UNSCR 1325 and thereby as a reason to neglect the findings in this study.

that the data obtained through the Gender Project case study is valid for the entire military organisation. Instead, it reflects the units and situations the Gender Project encountered as it progressed in efforts to fulfil its mandate. Schein has noted that it is impossible to describe an entire organisational culture, but possible to identify certain elements that make some sense of the significant phenomena in an organisation (2004, p. 39), and that is both the core aim of this study and what the case of the Gender Project provides.[61]

3.2 The Challenge of Dual Roles

When given the unique opportunity to combine my academic research with my leadership of the NDUC's Gender Project, I re-worked my original plan to undertake a purely theoretical study of military culture for my PhD. Leading the Project gave me the chance to study military structures, functions, *and* culture from within, and to experience and identify the factors that affected the implementation of gender perspectives first-hand. Mapping the factors I found most relevant served as a foundation for further analysis, offering me an opportunity to address these issues directly through a "*learning by doing*" approach. However, this dual role as researcher and project leader was also challenging. Carrying out research as an organisational insider brings both advantages and disadvantages, especially when it comes to issues of pre-understanding and access (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014).

Personal experience and knowledge of a system and a job are a distinctive pre-understanding for an insider-researcher, which can be beneficial in terms of valuable knowledge about the culture and informal structures in an organisation. As Nielsen and Repstad (1993) explain, this can enable a researcher to see beyond objectives that amount to little more than lip service, and by using organisational vernacular, to follow up on replies in a way that compels richer data. What's more, this familiarity allows a researcher to choose to participate freely in discussion or merely observe, without drawing attention or creating suspicion (ibid.). Yet, being so close to the data can also mean that a researcher assumes too much and, intentionally or not, does not allow their

[61] Different military units, branches, functions, etc. will have to evaluate for themselves which parts of this study apply or can apply to them, depending on their level of change or ability to change in order to implement the WPS agenda. Similarly, other countries or organisations will have to review the results of this study in the context of their own needs and capacities in order to compare results and benefit from the empirical and analytical material provided herein.

thinking to be influenced by an alternative reframing (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014). In an attempt to avoid this pitfall, I found it valuable to journal and to discuss findings with other members of the Gender Project – who provided both an inside perspective and an outside perspective, due to (some of) their lack of prior experience working with the military. Additionally, Ferguson and Ferguson (2001) highlight the importance that insider-researchers are honest about the perspectives from which they operate and open to disconfirming evidence. In both of the roles I played during the research period, as researcher and Project leader, I was always honest and open about my perspective on implementation of UNSCR 1325, that it is the right thing to do not only in light of our international commitments and the NAP but also as a matter of ethics. I have also embraced the added functional value that gender perspectives can bring to the effectiveness of military operations. And, based on the lack of progress that had been reported in relation to implementation of the WPS agenda before I entered the dual roles I played, it is important to note that I took on those roles already under the impression that Norwegian military leadership had not yet prioritised or embraced gender perspectives and the principles of UNSCR 1325.

Coghlan and Brannick (2015) have discussed the relationship between the status of an insider-researcher and their access to various networks within the organisation. Normally, the higher the status of a researcher, the more access they have to more networks; but this higher status position may also exclude them from informal and grapevine networks (ibid.). I found, interestingly and perhaps fittingly, that gender was also an exclusionary factor in accessing some informal streams of information. While my rank as Lieutenant Colonel and my position as leader of the Gender Project, as well as my academic status as a PhD scholar, provided me with access to many relevant actors, *being a woman restricted my access to "locker-room-talk" or other "male-only" spaces*. On the other hand, in official spaces, I mostly gained access when I requested it and felt I was taken seriously. I posed little threat given that I was focused on enabling the Armed Forces to fulfil assignments and obligations, and not on imposing sanctions for lack of implementation.

The behaviour of military personnel in interactions with me was nonetheless potentially affected by their perception of my dual insider roles. Yet, individuals were not the focus of the study, which sought to draw conclusions about structural, functional, and cultural dynamics, and thus, I did not ask for the permission of personnel within the

Norwegian military to incorporate their feedback. One could argue for this reason that the research involved a degree of covertness, and all covert actions in research must be given special ethical consideration (The Economic and Social Research Council, 2010).[62] In this case, individuals were treated with respect and the research placed no extra burden on them or placed them at any risk. Further, these individuals were in no way regarded as vulnerable (ibid.). Quite the opposite, they were powerful, well-selected, security-screened, educated personnel, and all were part of the military organisation at the centre of the research. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the level of covertness observed in this research is acceptable from an ethical perspective.

Insider research demands a difficult balancing of the needs of three audiences (Coghlan and Brannick, 2014). Researchers aim to do solid research that can contribute to personal career development, but on top of that, the organisation being researched wants results that benefit the organisation, and the researcher must also contribute towards general theory as part of the broader academic community. I did not expect that this research would serve as a career booster; in fact, on the contrary, I was convinced that gender perspectives were not a priority for the Norwegian Armed Forces and I had been warned by a military supervisor that I should *not* take an academic position on gender issues if I hoped to be promoted within the military system. As a result, I felt no limitations or obligations on my professional integrity as a researcher or my role as leader of the Gender Project related to ensuring personal or professional benefits.[63] My motivation arose from my commitment to the principle and value of equality, and my desire to understand *how* it can be realised.

Of course, dual roles can also be an asset in research. Each role can open the door to the other, with valuable synergistic effects. A relevant question in this study, then, is whether my active role created such synergy, or alternatively, compromised the results in some way. Whether any of the successes or shortcomings I had as Project leader have been over- or understated to better fit my personal ambitions should also be examined. I

[62] Available at: http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk/Practitioner-research-and-dual-roles-187 (accessed 30 July 2018).

[63] My initial evaluation that working with gender issues could be linked to a personal lack of career opportunities should not be viewed as an argument expressed to support my findings. On the contrary, it would be hard to find anyone more content to see this assessment disproven than me, since it would have enhanced my own opportunities for promotion.

have tried to be as transparent as possible by being open here about my own intellectual and emotional investment in the topic being researched (Chisholm, 2017).

Coghlan and Brannick (2014) contend that doing internal research is inherently political and sometimes even subversive in that it emphasises listening, comprehensive examination, and questioning, fosters courage, instigates action, encourages reflection, and supports democratic participation. Any or all of these can threaten existing organisational norms, especially in organisations with hierarchical control cultures (ibid.), such as the Armed Forces. However, my objective as an insider researcher was never to disrupt the organisation, but to facilitate and support the implementation of the WPS agenda within the Armed Forces by carrying out forthright and valuable research. Notably, this approach was challenged routinely by an external academic supervisor who advocated for greater professional distance and asserted that the *use of* the results should in no way be relevant to the researcher. Indeed, any mention of how the results *could* be useful was regarded by this supervisor as unprofessional from an academic standpoint, proving the claim of Coghlan and Brannick (2014) true, that balancing different audiences as an insider researcher with dual roles is incredibly difficult. Furthermore, I can relate to the "role detachment" that Adler and Adler (1987) described in relation to this challenge of dual roles, in which I ultimately came to feel like an outsider in *both* roles.

In parsing these roles, it is important to note that successful implementation was the main aim of the Gender Project, but it was not the main aim of the research, even if the results of the study can be used to further argue for implementation of the WPS agenda and even if that was one of the motivating factors for me as a researcher. In some ways, this study can be regarded as a form of critique that positions it in the realm of critical theory (Mjøset, 2009), as opposed to a more traditional attempt to describe and explain a phenomenon. As the leader of the Gender Project, I had a normative agenda within a broader effort to create change, and working for implementation of the WPS agenda meant that, in a way, I led a kind of process intervention. Mjøset (2009) asserts, however, that not all such process intervention is based in critical theory and that the line between critical and explanation-based theory is a question of both ethical judgment and the social position of the researcher. One of the factors (or in this case, non-factors) that contributes to making this study more explanation-based than critical is that I did not set out to promote a new world view or challenge an existing model or

regime of knowledge. The Norwegian Government had already committed the Armed Forces to implementing UNSCR 1325, and my objective was to determine what mechanisms related to structures, functions, and culture affected that implementation. Still, in the light of my dual roles as researcher and Project leader, I would characterise my approach by borrowing two terms Hacking (1999) used in the context of social constructionism – as *unmasking*, by seeking to reveal, and as *reformist*, by seeking change. As researcher, my approach focused more on unmasking, and as Project leader, more on reforming.

3.3 Methods

Within this study, the three empirical phases of data collection each favoured and enabled different research methods. Participative observation, document analysis, and interviews were all employed, as described and discussed below.

3.3.1 Participative Observation

I used participative observation over the two years I led the Gender Project at the NDUC, to study the structures, functions, and culture of the Armed Forces from within.[64] Notes were taken in journals, with a focus on what happened and any immediate response of the Project. After my leadership assignment ended, these observations were reviewed, discussed, and analysed through the lens of theories of transformational organisational change, as well as gender theories, particularly theories of masculinity.

The focus areas of this research – structures, functions, and culture – were considered in all analysis. Because concrete structures and functions were easier to observe and define, I decided on the following approach: First, formal and informal structures, positions, and personnel assigned to deal with issues related to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, and the challenges and opportunities they faced, were studied and observed. Second, functions like analysis, planning, implementation, leadership, reporting, and feedback were studied with the same focus on challenges and opportunities; and my participation in meetings, teaching, presentations, conversations, conferences, exercises, and studies related to implementation offered me important opportunities to observe and experience what succeeded and what failed in real time.

[64] This two-year period included a few weeks of sick leave and participation in a course module at the Command and Staff College (my observations and evaluations continued while attending and completing this course, offering valuable information for the research).

Third, to identify the elements of organisational culture in the military that could affect implementation, I made an effort to observe and take notes of what occurred, without prejudging the significance of events or experiences, so that they could be analysed at a later stage based on the theoretical foundation for this endeavour.

My direct involvement in the processes I was observing necessitated that I was able to take notes with some objectivity and regard difficult and challenging situations I faced as a leader as potentially beneficial in my role as a researcher. By recording observations in this way, I was able to push forward in my leadership role. What's more, the fact that any frustrations and obstacles I encountered in my role in the Gender Project could be constructively channelled and addressed in this study provided a certain freedom to continue with the tasks at hand, knowing these challenges would be the focus of later analysis.

Recording general observations and even my own conversations meant that listening and attention skills were vital to the quality of the research (Creswell, 2003). As an active duty officer in the Armed Forces and an academic, I am trained in and have diverse experience as an observer and interviewer, both academically and professionally. I considered my observation and communication skills assets in acquiring the information needed for this study. Nonetheless, to reduce the limitations associated with being a sole observer, I shared and discussed my observations, as well as those made by others, with fellow members of the Gender Project. These discussions, along with observations and conversations, focused on several key questions:

- *What do you/they know about gender, UNSCR 1325, or the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces in that respect?*
- *What is being done in your/their part of the Armed Forces or do you/they know of other parts of the organisation that have made progress in this area?*
- *Why do you/they think progress in this area is slow, and what can we as a Gender Project do to assist you/them and your/their part of the organisation to succeed?*

Field notes I made in my role as Gender Project leader (in this case, the field is the space in which I worked as Project leader, and these notes were made about events I faced in that capacity) also allowed me to return to contemporaneous observations, reflections, and questions, to compare them with those made on later occasions. This helped me to identify how situations evolved over time.

This research also relied on testimonies from respondents within the Gender Project, about their own observations and conversations. Using testimony raises

epistemological issues, two of which must particularly be addressed when testimonies are used as empirical indicators: 1) whether an informant can be trusted generally, and 2) whether their specific testimony can be trusted. This involves evaluating the knowledge an informant actually possesses about the subject(s) they are discussing, and if they are competent and sincere (Malnes, 2015). In this study, professionals operating as normal in their typical work environment provided testimony. They were encouraged to be open and honest and had no obvious or observed reasons to enhance or downplay information. In fact, the challenging mandate and work of the Gender Project helped generate a level of trust among staff that contributed to their increased openness regarding their impressions and experiences, as a way of sharing the burden. This information was often communicated in the course of everyday work, in response to actual efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the Armed Forces. The personnel of the Gender Project were exceptionally competent to reflect upon their experiences, as they all had relevant professional experience (including UN deployments and research experience) and academic credentials (master's degrees and PhDs in anthropology and political science). It was also part of their mandate to identify and address the factors that prevented, promoted, or enhanced implementation of the WPS agenda, and they were thus capable of observing relevant information and conveying it to me, both as Project leader and as researcher.

The choice to use qualitative methods like participative observation is especially salient in cultural studies that require researchers to observe natural settings and access deeper levels of information. Qualitative approaches treat social phenomena more comprehensively and can be more interpretive than quantitative methods. In this research, a qualitative approach enabled me to explore more complex reasoning and kept open the possibility of adapting the methodology as the work progressed. Despite this, I have made use of some quantifiable expressions, including "high level," "majority," "many," etc., when discussing results. These terms do not imply that a conclusion is based on quantifiable data, but are expressions of an observed or reported trend within the organisation, and are contextualised when relevant. Most of the conclusions presented here are the result of indirect normative evidence, seen through the lens of more than 20 years of service in the Armed Forces and my correlated background knowledge of the organisation.

As leader of the Gender Project, I always informed my contacts or audience about my research. Still, since none of the colleagues, partners, or associates I observed were explicitly asked for or gave written consent to be studied (because individuals were not the focus of the research, as discussed in section 3.2), any information and quotes they provided are presented anonymously. It is imperative to emphasise that all the information used in this study was analysed as part of an effort to explain a phenomenon and not to judge or evaluate individuals in the organisation. However, military personnel are closely connected to the structural elements in which they are positioned, the various functions they perform, and the organisational culture – and are thus integrated into this study.

While my decision to employ a research method like participative observation during a critical period in the implementation of a new perspective in the organisation makes this study impossible to recreate in the exactly same manner, it is difficult to replicate any study that observes real life, since so much data emerges from conversations, impressions, and other unrecorded participatory information. Therefore, a re-analysis of results using the same data is not often done (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). However, I believe that research of another similar project or implementation process in the Norwegian Armed Forces could provide interesting and comparable results.

It must be mentioned as well that something like culture is incredibly hard to measure in research, and case studies can be better at assessing whether and how variables matter to an outcome than how *much* those variables matter. But case studies also allow for conceptual refinements that provide a higher level of validity over a small number of cases (Bennett and George, 2005). This is the most challenging aspect regarding the conceptual validity of this study. As an insider-researcher who was collecting data related to a transformative change agenda, it was necessary to acknowledge that gathering valid data from a complex human system involves a variety of challenging choices and options and, if the research involves any contact with the organisation, that it is *always an intervention into the life of that organisation* (Schein, 2004). However, it can be necessary to work within an organisation to reach deeper levels of information, especially when the focus is a matter like culture, which cannot be assessed easily through surveys or questionnaires because the reliability and validity of responses cannot be judged (ibid.). These data collection methods can uncover attitudes

about cultural artefacts and provide reflections on the climate of an organisation but are less suitable as a means of accessing deeper values and shared assumptions (ibid., p. 362).

Revelations about those values and assumptions, and about the experiences of the Gender Project in the Norwegian Armed Forces, are not necessarily representative of militaries in other countries or of organisations such as NATO and the UN. Yet, they offer useful insight into a national context that can be used as a basis for further research. Other directly relevant cases may exist in other countries and organisations (i.e., military operations in the Congo, Liberia, or Afghanistan), but the time, capacity, finances, and availability for this research regulated its scope. I must also highlight that, even if this study was an attempt to learn about how the Armed Forces address change related to implementing UNSCR 1325, the results are an indication of how the organisation deals with change in general. The findings can thus teach us something broader about change-related mechanisms in organisations.

Results from the participative observation phase of the research were used as the basis for the interviewing phase that followed, allowing me to confirm or modify results according to new information about the ways structures, functions, and culture impacted the ability of the Armed Forces to change. The process is illustrated below:



Figure 3.1. The methodological process of the first phase of this study

3.3.2 Document Analysis

Official open source documents were used throughout this study to analyse plans, policies, orders, and directives of the Norwegian Government, the UN, and NATO related

to implementation of the WPS agenda. In some instances, classified documents were consulted to verify information, but no sensitive classified information is presented in this study. To confirm the commitment of Norwegian political leadership to the WPS agenda, the second empirical phase of this study also involved an in-depth discourse analysis of the content of official speeches and statements published on the MoD website.

Discourse analysis must include the three important elements of *limitation, representation,* and *different layers* (Neumann, 2001). Thus, I made the choice to limit the second phase of the study to political leadership within the MoD and to the official speeches, articles, and similar content published on the Ministry's official website.[65] I also focused my analysis on certain communications that the MoD itself selected to promote official views, which represented internal perceptions within the Ministry and how it sought to communicate them to the public and to the Norwegian Armed Forces. These communications were drawn from a larger search that gathered all documents mentioning UNSCR 1325, gender, and women published on the MoD website from January 2006 through June 2012. This approach was used in order to trace the development of discourse over time, and compensated for the probability that political leadership was unlikely to agree to confirm or renounce their commitment on the record.

With theories of transformational change in mind, an interesting aspect to explore in the context of political communication efforts is whether or how a communication was perceived by the audience it was intended to motivate to change (in this case, the military community), and whether the perception of that group differed from the perception of the general public. In this research, the main objectives of analysing this communication were to assess the commitment of political leadership to the assignments handed down to the Armed Forces and the view of the Norwegian Government on the military organisation and on the transformational change needed to implement the WPS agenda. Therefore, the approach of this study was not aimed at collecting data on the effects of those communications on military personnel. Findings and analysis presented here suggest areas for further research, though, as well as opportunities for better leadership and communication to implement change.

[65] See: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler.html?id=391 (accessed 30 July 2018).

A total of 22 speeches and articles addressing UNSCR 1325 were reviewed using the theoretical framework of this study. While every effort has been made to ensure that summaries of these communications are as true to the originals as possible, it is worth noting that any attempt to summarise is bound to contain an element of subjectivity, even if unintended (Yin, 2014). In addition, I translated content from Norwegian to English, and so the quality of translation rests on my language skills. Any misinterpretations or misunderstandings related to the results are thus my responsibility. Still, my use of publicly accessible records and documentation means that my interpretations can be reviewed (Yin, 2014).

The results of the document analysis conducted for this research are presented chronologically, from the earliest publication to the latest, beginning with the first reference made by the MoD to UNSCR 1325 in 2006 (the last document analysed was published in June 2012).[66] Summaries of these documents focus on what they communicate in regard to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the military, and on diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational arguments, and are followed by theoretical discussion and analysis linking them to structures, functions, and culture in the Armed Forces.[67] The methodological process employed in this second empirical phase of the study parallels that used in the first. However, as Figure 3.2 illustrates (below), in this phase, research on the Gender Project is substituted by analysis of communication efforts.



Figure 3.2. The methodological process of the second phase of this study

[66] The period of investigation in this phase of the study was aligned to the end of the first two-year period of the Gender Project, investigated in the first phase, to enable parallel and overlapping discussions and conclusions.

[67] See Appendix IV for full summaries of each speech and article.

3.3.3 Interviews

To gather solid data on how allies of Norway (NATO specifically) perceive the country and the capacity of the Norwegian Armed Forces to transform in relation to gender policies and perspectives, and their own experience transforming to implement the same policies, I interviewed NATO personnel who had worked directly with implementation of the WPS agenda and could provide specific insights into factors that have affected the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in NATO military operations. These interviews constitute the third and final empirical phase of the study. I targeted key personnel with relevant competences and conducted semi-structured interviews in which interviewees shared what *they* knew to impact implementation in their own experience. Additionally, evaluations of the role of Norway in NATO by key NATO personnel working on gender perspectives and policies provided valuable information regarding what priorities must be addressed if Norway is to remain or return to being a frontrunner in this area.

Ten interviews were conducted at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, at SHAPE in Mons (Belgium), and at NCGM in Stockholm with individuals from NATO entities involved with policy, planning, and education related to gender perspectives within the NATO organisation and in their military operations. Respondents were: current and former officers at the International Military Staff office of the Gender Advisor at NATO HQ in Brussels (OF-4 level);[68] the former NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security;[69] the former Chair of the NCGP (OF-4 level);[70] the Gender Advisor to SACEUR;[71] three Gender Focal Points at SHAPE; the Operations Officer at J3 SHAPE (OF-4 level);[72] the staff officer with the Chief of Staff office (COS) SHAPE (OF-4 level);[73] the Branch Head Civil Military Analyses (OF-5 level);[74] the Head of Education and Training Section NCGM (OF-4 level);[75] and the Commander of NCGM (OF-4 level).[76] These interviewees, comprised of military officers along with a couple high-ranking civilians,

[68] Interviews conducted at NATO HQ Brussels, 22–23 September 2014.
[69] Interview conducted in Oslo, 13 October 2014.
[70] Interview conducted in Oslo, 16 October 2014.
[71] Interview conducted at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, 25 September 2014.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Interview conducted in Mons, Belgium, 24 September 2014.
[75] Interview conducted in Stockholm, 16 December 2014.
[76] Interview conducted in Stockholm, 17 December 2014.

were chosen due to their expertise, function, and relevant experience, and their ability to offer insight into the contribution of Norway to the subject matter. Two of the three Gender Focal Points at SHAPE were identified through a referral by the SHAPE GENAD, and the rest of the respondents were already known to me, as they are respected professionals in a field featuring a limited number of experts. Five were women and five were men, representing six different nationalities, from both NATO and PfP countries.

Interviews were conducted at a place convenient to respondents, to ensure the environment met their needs and enabled as open and secure a dialogue as possible. These locations thus varied, and interviews took place in a car, a restaurant, offices, a military operations room, and vestibules to meeting or conference rooms. All interviewees had the opportunity to receive a preparatory interview guide prior to their interview, and most took advantage of this.[77] I used a semi-structured approach, beginning each interview by presenting the research question, the background to my study, and my research so far, before engaging with interviewees for anywhere from one to four hours as they opened up and spoke freely regarding their thoughts, experiences, and evaluations.

All ten interviewees consented with signed confirmation that they understood the study and released their responses for use in this research.[78] Still, so that interviews would be as unrestricted as possible, respondents were informed that they would be treated as anonymous sources. Nonetheless, even if anonymous quotes were used in the study, the source of the quote was contacted by me and given the opportunity to verify that it was being used correctly in context. This was especially important because these interviews were not tape-recorded. Several interviews were conducted on military locations with high levels of security, security clearance requirements, and bans on recording devices, so all interviews were recorded by the interviewer in shorthand notes and were then transcribed.

Interviewing is an effective method by which to focus directly on a research topic, but it can also be challenging with regard to biased questions or responses, or inaccuracies in the recall or reflections of a respondent (Yin, 2014). I tried to counteract these factors by remaining humble and open to new inputs, and being curious and grateful for the feedback of informants in an area in which *they* were the experts on

[77] See the interview guide in Appendix II.
[78] See the permission form in Appendix III.

their own experiences. The opportunity to communicate and share with others who had worked on the same issue was stimulating to all parties and resulted in interviews that lasted longer than anticipated.

On the basis of these interviews, the research of other scholars, my own participative observation as leader of the Gender Project at NDUC, and my involvement in numerous workshops and conferences on gender-related topics, I have also incorporated a discussion of the US and UN as promoters of gender perspectives and the WPS agenda in Armed Forces and military operations. This is supported by official documents and meetings or interviews with UN and US officials and provides further context for Norwegian implementation efforts.

The methodological process of this third and final phase of the research reflected that of the first two (see Figure 3.3 below), but focused on the structural, functional, and cultural challenges and opportunities related to transformational change in NATO. It also examined whether and how the ambition of the Norwegian Government to be a leader in implementing the WPS agenda can be perceived as credible or possible.



Figure 3.3. The methodological process of the third phase of this study

4 Factors that Affected Implementation of UNSCR 1325

CASE STUDY: THE GENDER PROJECT IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES

The structural, functional, and cultural factors that were found to affect implementation of the WPS agenda in the Norwegian Armed Forces are presented and discussed in this chapter, based on data acquired through the activities of the Gender Project at the NDUC. Structures relate to different positions in the organisation, while functions relate to the practical tasks people holding certain positions perform – including both general tasks such as leading, planning, reporting, communications, and evaluation, as well as specific tasks related to their specialisation – and culture refers to the values that explain how and why these positions were established or are maintained and these tasks are performed. Hence, structures, functions, and culture interact with and affect each other. Culture influences how tasks and positions are prioritised, for example, and positions and tasks can challenge existing culture.

These factors are analysed here through the lens of theories and research on masculine organisational culture in the military (i.e. Hatch, 2013; Kvande, 2007; Carreiras, 2006; Kronsell, 2012), transformational leadership and change in organisational culture (i.e. Schein, 2004; Hofstede, 2001, G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005), and gender (especially theories that explain resistance) (i.e. McKenzie, 2015; Kronsell, 2012; Calàs and Smirchic, 2006; Kernic, 1999). The data is presented thematically based on observations made of the military organisation and operations, starting with an analysis of the period when the Gender Project was launched. Observations related to the concept for implementation, ownership, knowledge, and expectations of the Project are then discussed.

Because the implementation of gender policies and perspectives demanded change in the organisation, the role of *the messenger* will also be specifically analysed in

the context of the culture in which change was to take place and decisions were to be made. Cultural expressions such as ridicule, unfolding values, and status connected to what were regarded as hard and soft security issues will be addressed as well. Norwegian efforts related to the WPS agenda in international settings, where Norway was an important financial contributor, will then be linked to national progress. Next, challenges related to creative reporting are examined, as well as how command and control from both military and political leadership has proved essential. And finally, the status of implementation is discussed, and conclusions are drawn from the data.

4.1 The Launch of the Gender Project

The Norwegian Government gave the Armed Forces substantial responsibility in implementing UNSCR 1325, which political leaders emphasised in numerous public speeches beginning in 2006.[79] The range of tasks assigned to the military concerned everything from human resources policy, to education and training standards, to the conduct of military operations. From the start, efforts of the Gender Project were focused on operations and education, taking the view that the integration of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces was *both* ethically necessary in order to reach the aim of UNSCR 1325 and strategically pragmatic in order to make the Norwegian military generally more effective in response to security issues.

When the Gender Project commenced in 2010, approximately four years after the first NAP and ten years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, NDUC leadership presented the status of implementation of the WPS agenda within the Armed Forces as follows:

1. The Norwegian Chief of Defence had referred to assignments laid out in the NAP in plans and policies for the Armed Forces since the introduction of his classified strategic plan for 2007.
2. Military schools and pre-deployment education institutions had been tasked with teaching the principles of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives (defined as a two-hour lecture), yet feedback indicated that this functional measure was generally lacking, infrequent, and inconsistent.[80]

[79] See Chapter 2.1 for explanations of official documents. See Chapter 5 or the official MoD website for publicly accessible speeches and articles used in this research; available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler.html?id=391 (accessed 30 July 2018).

[80] Conversation with senior staff officer at NDUC, February 2009; meeting with NDUC and NORDCSC leadership, 25 January 2010; meeting with War Academy representative, 27 January 2010; and meeting with group providing study plans at NDUC, 16 February 2010.

3. The NDUC had granted one of their PhD scholarships to a study related to UNSCR 1325.[81]
4. The NDUC had received time-limited funding from the MoD to establish gender competence.[82]
5. A part-time Gender Field Advisor (GFA) position had been established in the summer of 2009 in the Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan, and Norway had funded and staffed the GENAD position in ISAF HQ from the end of 2009.
6. A higher-level position (Colonel) had been newly established in 2009 as Coordinator for Equal Opportunities and Diversity in the Defence Staff and the job description included a reference to UNSCR 1325.[83]

Despite action plans committing the Armed Forces to gender initiatives, the approach to implementation was fragmented. The Armed Forces had included UNSCR 1325 in the Directive for Operations for 2009–2012 under the heading of *Culture*, with the ambition to make gender perspectives fully operational before the end of 2012, but no overall concept for implementation or set of actions related to structural, functional, and cultural measures existed. The Defence Staff reported to Gender Project personnel that UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives had periodically been mentioned in classified management documents, but often without any elaboration on means of implementation or evaluation, or even clearly defined outcomes. And apart from a handful of individuals who pushed for the Project,[84] few within the military organisation demonstrated an understanding of UNSCR 1325 and the measures it required, allowing many misconceptions to flourish.[85] Our initial analysis of official strategic documents indicated that several of the specific WPS-related tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by the

[81] The author was the recipient of this PhD scholarship, which was postponed for six months due to deployment to Afghanistan.
[82] As ordered in classified policy and activity plans, to be in place as of 1 January 2009. See: Chief of Defence decision note no. 11/2008.
[83] Conversation with Defence Staff representative, 25 May 2010. This position will be discussed further in Chapter 6.3.
[84] The former Head of Department of Military Power (a colonel) perceived UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives as pioneering work and recognised the need for new competence. There were also reports by a staff officer at NORDCSC on the lack of implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan by different PRTs. A Senior Staff Officer at the Defence Staff and a Senior Advisor at the DoD also pushed for progress. All of these individuals communicated with me prior to the start of the Project.
[85] This observation emerged from a number of interactions, including: meeting with respondent, 21 January 2010; meeting with Department of Military Power, 16 February 2010; teaching pre-deployment training, 16 April, 2010; meeting with Defence Staff, 3 June 2010; meeting with PRT COS, 28 June 2010; comments at lunch, 29 June 2010; meeting at Defence Staff, 20 August 2010; and meeting at NJHQ, 25 August 2010.

Government had also not been implemented, e.g. the establishment of a "*Military Observation Team 1325*" in the Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan.[86]

Analysis

Introducing a new perspective often generates the need for new expertise and additional or changed structures, processes, or culture within an organisation (Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004; Jacobsen and Torsvik, 2009). The lack of an all-encompassing implementation strategy for the WPS agenda within the Norwegian Armed Forces that accounted for structural, functional, and cultural aspects reflected an approach that considered implementation of this agenda a purely transactional matter (Schein, 2005). No analysis grounded in an actual review of the actions demanded by implementation was ever discovered by, reported on, or explained to anyone working within the Gender Project.[87]

In this case, the Gender Project was the primary additional structural element created to facilitate change in the organisation; but a project is a temporary arrangement with an end-date that can only contribute in limited ways to a larger transformational change (Schein, 2005). Similar challenges related to this impermanence, leading to a lack of continuity that in some ways reproduced the fragmentation of implementation efforts more broadly, emerged within the Project as well. The research position was temporary, terminated as soon as the research scholarship ended. The positions in international operations were also temporary and limited to 6-month deployments.[88] Additionally, the position created in the Defence Staff Personnel Section devoted only limited time to overseeing implementation of UNSCR 1325, along with working on general issues of equal rights and diversity. And since these different provisional positions were not connected through the chain of command in the military organisation, they had no direct command or control in relation to each other.

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[86] The lack of a concrete concept from the Defence Staff to the military organisation as a functional measure might be explained by several factors and will be analysed in more depth in section 4.3.

[87] This was a recurring topic in internal meetings within the Gender Project but was also requested by Project staff upon commencement of the Project (25 January 2010) and in meetings conducted throughout the first year of the Project with representatives from the Defence Staff and DoD (on 3 May 2010, 10 May 2010, 30 June 2010, 7 July 2010, 20 August 2010, 24 September 2010, and 15 November 2010).

[88] In some instances, this was prolonged to 12 months by application or new orders.

This organisational design did not enhance performance to meet new demands and made it especially difficult to take a comprehensive and unified approach (Hatch, 2013, p. 271).

This lack of cohesion and leadership was even seen in the process that led to the creation of the Gender Project itself. Though it was reasonable that a major structural investment was made in the NDUC to increase knowledge in the military organisation, the NDUC initiated this effort and applied for funding directly from the MoD. The Defence Staff gave no official orders for the NDUC to address gender until *after* the start of a 2008 internal NDUC initiative had already opened the topic up to select work by their staff.[89]

It was particularly significant that structures were lacking in the *permanent* operational organisational design of the Armed Forces because most assignments related to UNSCR 1325 would need to be resolved in the operative domain, by Defence Staff Operations, Armed Forces Operative Headquarters, the Intelligence Services, and the operative and educational units of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Cyber and Special Forces. The decision by the Defence Staff to designate their Personnel Section, instead of the operational domain, as the professional authority for gender perspectives and implementation of UNSCR 1325 demonstrated a failure to comprehend the actual demands associated with mainstreaming gender perspectives and the WPS agenda. Additionally, there had apparently been no analysis of the organisational culture. New functions and personnel policies had not been developed, and there were no solid operative leaders with the power, expertise, and positive vision for change, much less guidelines for appropriate future levels of implementation of UNSCR 1325, which Schein (2004) and G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) argue are necessary to succeed. The absence of a broad plan for organisational change and adequate efforts to initiate the implementation of gender perspectives in the Norwegian Armed Forces additionally epitomise the claim of Enloe (2000) and Higate (2003) that links between soldiering and masculinity can prevent the military from *allowing* change in gendered structures and thus evolving as an institution.

[89] A Defence Staff order appeared in classified policy and activity plans beginning 1 January 2009. See: Chief of Defence decision note no. 11/2008.

4.2 How New Gender Structures were Challenged

The NDUC received two years of funding for the Gender Project, but was given no specific mandate or detailed orders beyond the goal to establish competence in UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations, and it was several months before formal internal orders were sorted.[90] Throughout the duration of the Project, temporary positions created as part of the Project and intended to enhance implementation of UNSCR 1325 were systematically and persistently challenged. In one instance, the Norwegian Armed Forces HR and Conscription Centre (NORAFHRCC, shortened to HR) questioned these arrangements after having been approached by someone with a personal interest.[91] This required the NDUC to defend its chosen course of action in a process that took approximately one year.[92]

Staffing the Gender Project was thus time-consuming, and the process offered little flexibility due to the time-limited nature of the Project. What's more, it was possible for staff officers in different positions and departments to delay, disrupt, or even prevent progress, and they had various motivations for doing so – from personal agendas, to dissatisfaction that gender perspectives were being made a priority, to the desire to take a stand against the Commander of the NDUC ("*Someone needs to teach her a lesson!*").[93] No matter the motivation, there were no observable consequences for conduct that interfered with the Project.

The Project was already almost one-third into its initial two-year duration when the last three civilian advisors were finally put in place in September 2010.[94] The recruitment of a male Army officer was also considered important given the target audience of the Project (about 92 per cent men at the time) and in order to emphasise that gender perspectives were the responsibility of both men and women, but this

[90] These documents are not available in Doculive but were filed internally at the NDUC.

[91] Information received or confirmed in: meetings with superiors on 21 January 2010, 25 January 2010, and 28 June 2010; a phone call from a superior, 23 September 2010; and a phone call with the NDUC legal advisor, 8 February 2011.

[92] Compromises between the NDUC and HR had to be reached to secure progress. This included an NDUC promise not to apply for a higher rank on my behalf after my temporary two-year assignment as leader of the Gender Project. This represents an unorthodox and unofficial part of negotiations for positions in a public institution. (Phone conversation with legal advisor, 8 February 2011).

[93] Comments at NORAFHRCC and recited to me by a colleague at a meeting on 30 May 2011.

[94] Only one of these temporary advisors successfully competed at the professional level among new applicants and was able to continue in this position.

ambition was never fulfilled. Despite requests to both the Personnel Section in the Defence Staff and to HR for assistance in finding an appropriate male officer, no candidates were identified.[95] And though the Gender Project reached out to several candidates that were identified through other means, their final hiring process was never completed due to reluctance from the candidate's supervisor, slow or no follow-up by NORDCSC, or at one point, because funding earmarked for the position was re-allocated.

The use of earmarked funding on other expenses was defended in terms of the greater good, as necessary in the bigger picture for other groups of personnel. But Gender Project representatives argued that the MoD should have been informed that NORDCSC could choose to spend resources designated for the Project in other ways, and noted to military leadership that this issue would be discussed in this study in the context of factors that prevented implementation of gender perspectives in the Armed Forces and military operations.[96] The decision to re-allocate this funding was thus reversed and was not revisited. Still, this delayed the final approval to hire a male Army officer until the spring of 2011. Then, just a few weeks later, new leadership announced that two *female* Air Force officers would join the Project instead, beginning in August 2011.[97] One of these officers would replace the leader of the Project following the initial two-year period[98] and the other was a substitute for the male candidate who never materialised. This contradicted the initial decision made in January 2010 by the NDUC Commander and previous leadership at all command levels of the NDUC and resulted from the combination of central HR's need to find positions for surplus personnel,[99] a leadership disagreement between two command levels at the NDUC (as to who had authority over decisions concerning the Gender Project), and lobbying from other personnel within NORDCSC.[100]

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[95] E-mails exchanged with HR, March and April 2010; meeting with the Defence Staff, 3 June 2010.

[96] This was conveyed in a conversation with a superior at NORDCSC, 28 June 2010.

[97] Both were professionally qualified former Norwegian GENADs from ISAF.

[98] By that time, the Project had been extended for another year (one year beyond my two-year assignment).

[99] Meeting with Commander at NORDCSC, 31 March 2011.

[100] This last dynamic was observed and communicated by other officers to the Project and referred to at an internal meeting on 9 May 2011.

Beyond these challenges to shaping the Gender Project as envisioned, the larger aims of the Project were also hampered by the lack of structures dedicated to gender in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Armed Forces.[101] In the entire operative structure of the Norwegian military, only a single part-time structure at the tactical level, a GFA in the PRT Meymaneh – which depended on deployment to Afghanistan – had been assigned concrete responsibilities related to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives.[102] More accurately, in 2009, the added GFA function had been tacked on to the job description of a position that previously involved full-time analyst work. The job had thus been filled by someone selected for their analytical skills and not their knowledge of gender, who was sent to a two-week GFA course in Sweden prior to deployment.

It is hard to make gender a priority when it is assigned to only a part-time function in just one position within the operative structure, especially when the rest of the organisation has limited or no knowledge about how to make use of the GFA. In general, personnel in GFA positions have been poorly prepared and have lacked education and training, reflecting an absence of leadership commitment related to UNSCR 1325. One former GFA remarked:

> *"It felt like I was a scapegoat and that the task was too overwhelming for one person. It felt equivalent to being given the responsibility of defending Oslo all by myself…. I found it absurd that my added function as GFA was mentioned in public speeches by the MoD on several occasions as one of the main indicators of progress and success in this area."*[103]

A sole, part-time position dedicated to the subject of gender simply did not meet the needs required to implement UNSCR 1325 in military operations (Fleming, 2014). According to Fleming, the decision to establish the GFA position was rooted in *political* pressure to make headway on the WPS agenda, and was more of a token gesture than a step taken on the basis of operational analysis with the intention of advancing that agenda (ibid.). This meant the GFA function, which has the potential to be an effective role if staffed with competent personnel in an organisation that understands the value of

[101] The operational level transforms strategic goals into tasks to be performed at a tactical level (NATO, 2010).
[102] This was the first GFA deployed to Afghanistan in the summer of 2009.
[103] Address (in Norwegian), Gender Seminar at the War Academy at Linderud, Oslo, 30 April 2010.

this expertise and how to make use of it (Fleming, 2014), became a relatively useless add-on. Yet, the Government, pushing for progress on implementation, pointed to the GFA position as though it were evidence that their political ambitions had been achieved and were successful.

But a lack of conceptualisation, along with the lack of other structural or functional elements in the Armed Forces and a lack of knowledge, actually diminished the likelihood of success in implementing gender perspectives; a fact that was later confirmed by individuals who had filled the GFA role (Fleming, 2014) as well as by PRT leadership.[104] Nonetheless, in response to steady pressure from the Government, the Armed Forces alluded regularly to the establishment of the Gender Project and the installation of the GFA as proof of accomplishment.[105] And within the military, gender was discussed not as something relevant to the Armed Forces, but in the context of political ambitions and expectations. Indeed, scepticism about the topic was communicated indirectly and directly by military personnel, sometimes through open resistance in meetings and discussions with Gender Project staff.[106]

After a study on how to reach political ambitions related to gender policies in the Armed Forces recommended the measure (Brestrup et al., 2007), the Norwegian Defence Staff Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity established a new Colonel-ranked position, assigned a gender competence, at the end of 2009. Specifically, the study recommended that a designated unit be created in the Defence Staff and led by the Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity, to act as an ombudsman and follow up on equality measures, carry out research, and develop more comprehensive solutions over time (ibid.). But the Defence Staff found it difficult to recruit qualified personnel to the

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[104] From internal classified reports regarding lessons learned in military operations in Afghanistan. (General information related to the GFA is not regarded as classified.) See: Schjølset (2014a) for a comprehensive review of reports on gender in the operations of Norwegian Armed Forces.

[105] For example, at: meeting at the NDUC, 15 April 2010; Gender Seminar at the War Academy, 30 April 2010; Women's conference at Thon hotel, 19 May 2010; NCGP, 24–28 May 2010; conference at the Armed Forces Museum, 10 May 2011; NCGP, 23–27 May 2011; and conference on Sexual and Gender based violence, 17 June 2011.

[106] For example, at: Gender Conference, 13 January 2010; meeting with War Academy representative, 27 January 2010; teaching at Bardufoss, 16 April 2010; Gender Seminar at the War Academy, 30 April 2010; meeting with Defence Staff, 3 May 2010; Gender Workshop at NDUC, 31 August 2010; internal meeting, 19 November 2010; and meeting with superior at NDUC, 25 March 2011. Gender Project employees also communicated these impressions in weekly internal information and planning meetings.

position, which consequently remained vacant for months.[107] Some male officers with relevant backgrounds and trusted good ethics, who had been approached individually as preferred candidates, were upset or annoyed by the inquiry even if the position promised a promotion. This incentive appears to have been overwhelmed by a sense that the position would in fact be a career killer, and one that was associated with potential ridicule or disrespect from colleagues because gender issues carried little status.

As a result, a redundant officer staffed the position – which had a two-year time frame. Due to sick leave and preparation for another position, though, little work on equal rights and diversity was undertaken until a male Navy Captain applied for the position and received orders to begin in May 2010.[108] But long before his time in the role was complete, he was deployed on short notice to a newly established position in Afghanistan as Chief of Section for Gender Integration and Human Rights in NTM-A/CJ1, for six months.[109]

In 2010, NATO had tasked Norway with staffing this Chief of Section position for a full year, but it did not even advertise the opening until April 2011, just three months before deployment. When there were no applicants for the position, the order was given to the new Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity to fill the role, against his wishes. The Armed Forces failed to recruit another voluntary candidate to complete the final six months of the commitment and decided not to deploy another disinclined officer. This was a contributing factor in NATO's decision to end deployments for this position to Afghanistan altogether; and consequently, shortened the time the Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity served in the area of operations, to only five months.[110]

The position of Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity was made permanent by the Norwegian military after two years. But it was downgraded to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and the incumbent Commander was therefore asked to apply for

[107] Conversation with representative from the Defence Staff, 26 May 2010.
[108] Information provided by a representative from the Defence Staff, 27 May 2010.
[109] NTM-A/CJ1 refers to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Joint 1, a multinational military organisation tasked with providing higher-level training for the Afghan National Army, Afghan Air Force, and Afghan National Police, established in 2009.
[110] Information provided by a representative from the Defence Staff, 27 May 2010; and in e-mail from Navy Captain Tore Stubberud, 27 July 2013. Stubberud held the position of Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity from 2010.

another position. The position had been staffed at that point for less than 75 per cent of the initial two-year appointment, with no support personnel.

Notably, *all* parts of the Armed Forces had been encouraged to include UNSCR 1325 in the competences of at least one position in every division or unit, to ensure gender perspectives in their services and in order to establish more effective information sharing, reporting, command, and control.[111] Yet, to the knowledge of Gender Project staff, only the Commander of the Home Guard gave orders to this effect (though, the orders were not carried out). This Commander was Norway's first female Army General and a pioneer in the work of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, both nationally and internationally. Similarly, the Commander of the NDUC was the first female Rear Admiral in the Norwegian Armed Forces and a patron of the Gender Project; meaning that Norway's only two female officers ranked at OF-7 (at the time) stood alone at that leadership level in their willingness to be visible and proactive in implementing the WPS agenda.

Analysis

UNSCR 1325 is sometimes distilled to little more than an argument for increasing the number of women in the military, a metric that is easily visible and understandable, and a goal that is generally accepted. On the other hand, *gender perspectives* are often associated with femininity, and are therefore not prioritised (Carreiras, 2017). This has generated significant attention on the number of women in the Armed Forces, while reducing the focus on a wider spectrum of requirements set forth in UNSCR 1325, which also demand structural changes such as the establishment of positions to implement the WPS agenda.

To further analyse the willingness and ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to staff gender positions, a request was forwarded to personnel with HR and computer programming competence for a complete listing of structural elements in the organisation with some kind of function or process responsibility related to gender perspectives, established since the start of the Gender Project. They replied that there was no way to produce such a list through a database search and that a reliable overview could *only* be obtained manually, by reading through the job descriptions of

[111] Mentioned to the author by representatives of the Defence Staff and the Home Guard.

each and every position across the organisation.[112] The fact that a comprehensive design of the structural transformation needed for change was lacking, as was a plan to ensure decisions were actually carried out, reveals an absence of command and control and strategic competence management. These are important factors in the management of organisational culture and organisational change (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

The ways leaders recruit, select, promote, and communicate are also important in the context of organisational change (Schein, 2004), but this effect is reduced if leadership does not hold adequate power. The findings of this study indicate that leaders in the Norwegian Armed Forces are limited in their capacity to lead when it comes to staffing relevant positions within their units because too much power is granted to staff officers and central HR, and yet staff officers often have no competence related to gender-related subjects. Moreover, a time-limited Gender Project does not provide sufficient expertise for an organisation that features multiple key departments, such as HR and the operative part of the Defence Staff, where gender competence is necessary as a means to execute WPS-related tasks and initiatives.

The Gender Project faced a number of functional challenges related to existing hiring procedures as well, which were particularly salient given its short-term design. This raises reasonable questions regarding project management, since a mandate and readily available personnel were not identified prior to the start of the project period. But there were additional functional and cultural challenges related to which institution within the Armed Forces had the final say in personnel and competence management, leading to lengthy processes, multiple delays, differing interpretations, and inflexibility, but also creating space for individual agendas and intentional obstruction when funds were deemed better spent elsewhere. This lack of unified functions and culture represents a leadership challenge generally, but especially when the goal is transformational change (Schein, 2005).

However, the fact that the Armed Forces had granted a PhD scholarship for research on gender and had established funding for a Gender Project showed there was some willingness, particularly among the military's academic elite, to embrace this new agenda. There was a recognition of the need to increase understanding and competence related to gender and an ability among some leaders to convince the Department of Defence (DoD) and the Defence Staff to fund and include this work in official

[112] E-mail from subject specialist, 29 August 2013.

assignments, at least as long as this did not affect the total number of permanent positions. This reflects that (sub-)cultures were open to embracing initiatives put forth by enthusiasts within the organisation and is a positive example of a culture characterised by *low power distance*, in which less powerful members do not just obey unquestioningly and leadership is willing to give lower ranking personnel a voice (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 46).

Interactions between Gender Project staff and military leadership regarding funding and hiring for the Project position meant to be delegated to a male Army officer demonstrated this low power distance dynamic in another way, when the behaviour of leaders shifted after they were confronted with the prospect of being portrayed in this study as among the factors that prevented implementation. This suggests that the potential of this portrayal was perceived as a kind of threat, and that the idea of being portrayed in that way was undesirable. This incident supports theorists who argue that consequences must exist for actions that do not align with new ways of thinking and acting in organisations (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004). In this case, a perceived threat or penalty or the triggering of undesired consequences were necessary to ensure that funding remained earmarked for gender perspectives and the implementation of the WPS agenda could continue. This was especially true given comments made and resistance displayed by various military personnel in meetings with Gender Project staff, which routinely demonstrated a significant lack of cultural flexibility to embrace gender perspectives as a new focus and subject matter within existing structures and functions.[113]

Brunborg's (2015) analysis that the culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces is not in tune with political goals should be mentioned here, together with MacKenzie's (2015) findings that some positive changes in the US Armed Forces related to openings for women may be only skin deep, meant to mitigate negative attention. In the Norwegian military, implementation of UNSCR 1325 depended on dedicated personnel, who already worked with gender perspectives, continuously pushing for progress and

[113] For example, while serving in Afghanistan in late 2009 as a G1-Human Resources, I met with the first GFA, to discuss his work. Based on my knowledge and interest in the subject area, I encouraged him to start preparing a report on his experiences so that the Armed Forces could learn from his pioneering work and said I would ask my commander to talk to his commander in order to make a formal request. I was unsuccessful in my quest and was informed by my superior that there was no need or desire for such a report. Mostly, it was argued, no one wished to add to the already heavy burden of reports requested from that unit.

keeping gender-related tasks on the agenda. Despite the initial will to fund an initiative such as the Gender Project and a new position at the Defence Staff, and valuable knowledge and experience related to implementation gained over the course of several years by staffing the GFA in the Norwegian PRT and the GENAD position in ISAF Kabul, an organisational culture of hegemonic masculinity meant that consistent pressure had to be applied to leadership to insure that the issue of gender was addressed (Mills, 1992).

It is still too early to evaluate the full effect of the temporary gender-related structures established by the Norwegian Armed Forces. While the Armed Forces is a public institution with rules and regulations to be followed, these rules and regulations were not employed as professionally and flexibly as they could have been in order to staff relevant positions in a timely manner. On the contrary, an organisational culture resistant to change and to gender issues limited the use of structures and functions by allowing individual staff to obstruct implementation without consequences, including by redirecting funding to be spent elsewhere. This culture prevented the necessary conceptualisation of UNSCR 1325 and framed implementation efforts as undesirable, reflecting a lack of leadership or reward and discipline systems, and insufficient organisational structures to implement the WPS agenda (Schein, 2004). What's more, this speaks to an organisation that is *unaware* of the hegemonic masculinity permeating the institution, which allows a culture to prevail simply through upholding the status quo (Connell, 1995).

The prevalence of hegemonic masculinity in the military culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces was especially evident during the attempt to fill the Colonel-ranked position of Commander for Equal Rights and Diversity. The cultural cost of "*carrying the torch*" of gender equality and gender perspectives was a price too high to pay for military personnel, who did not want to be associated with equal rights, diversity, and gender. This reluctance is inconsistent with the official values of the Armed Forces, of courage and responsibility, and can be compared to the hesitancy observed by MacKenzie (2015) in the US military to open combat positions to women. In the Norwegian case, the reluctance displayed by personnel was not directly connected to women per se, but to matters and concepts correlated with women; and this exposes the lack of value afforded to "women's issues," which leads military personnel to underestimate the contribution of gender perspectives (Calàs and Smircich, 2006). This

also explains the more favourable response by leadership to female officers addressing gender, which is consistent with an internal status hierarchy and organisational cultural ideals of gender roles (Hooper, 2001; Carreiras, 2006).

It follows, then, that the only two *female* military leaders at OF-7 level were willing to champion gender perspectives.[114] They had a better understanding of the importance of gender perspectives in the military organisation and operations and, since gender issues were largely seen as the realm of women anyway, these officers had less fear of association with WPS-related initiatives. Were it not for the will of these women officers, it is hard to say whether even the temporary structural changes that were made would have been carried out, considering that male military leaders routinely recommended that their inferiors *not* work on gender issues. According to Kvande (2007), by *doing gender* in organisations, it is possible to identify how men and women contribute differently and how they understand variation and change differently. The fact that some leaders in the Armed Forces actively *resisted* the implementation of gender perspectives by straightforwardly advising people against working on related issues (see chapter 4.7), failing to reward or discipline personnel according to their results in this area, and demonstrating little or no commitment to establishing structures and processes in order to include gender perspectives are strong expressions of hegemonic masculine organisational culture.

Schein explains that there are mechanisms and forces which can initiate cultural change and notes that members of an organisation learn from their own experience with things like promotions, performance appraisals, and discussions with their superiors about what an organisation values, tolerates, and does not tolerate (2004, p.291). Leaders can change what they pay attention to, control, and reward; their role modelling and coaching; how they allocate resources; how they select, promote, and "deselect" staff; and structures and processes. This research found that a culture featuring a high level of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1993) contributed to preventing implementation, as seen in the fear of association with gender issues from officers at all leadership levels, the unwillingness to make qualified personnel available to work with the time-limited Gender Project, and the lack of staff provided to other positions relevant to the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

[114] They have both been awarded the Norwegian Chief of Defence's Equality Prize.

Indeed, a fear of association with gender issues and gender policies was found to be a particularly significant cultural factor preventing implementation, with some leaders counselling personnel who worked for implementation that they should stop promoting this agenda if they wanted a career. This indicates that the organisation values a more masculine culture than the society it serves (G. Hofstede, 1993). And based on the findings of previous research (Lilleaas and Ellingsen, 2014), this organisational culture does not even embrace gender perspectives and equality to the degree that most individuals in the organisation do. Therefore, it is crucial that high-ranking personnel within the Armed Forces display a willingness to openly champion implementation of the WPS agenda as a main condition for change in the organisational culture.

4.3 A Lack of Conceptualisation and Ownership

Numerous tasks are assigned to the Armed Forces by the MoD every year, but in meetings with the Defence Staff and MoD, Gender Project personnel observed considerable mutual frustration between representatives of these bodies. There were more personnel with qualifications related to UNSCR 1325 available to *give* orders within the MoD than similarly qualified personnel in the Defence Staff to *process* them.[115] Further, the MoD and the military organisation did not communicate constructively and failed to understand the role played by the other.

Recurring frustration about lack of implementation of the WPS agenda was occasionally tied to specific staff officers thought to be preventing progress. Even if tasks had been assigned by the MoD, they had to be continually reasserted to compel action.[116] Still, there were no observable monitoring or accountability measures or mechanisms, or consequences for a lack of progress, from either the MoD or the Defence Staff. In other words, there were neither recognisable rewards for success nor penalties for failure,[117] so that neglecting to implement tasks related to UNSCR 1325 came with no

[115] Expressed at meeting with MoD, 16 November 2010; and meetings with leadership from NDUC and Home Guard, 29 and 30 October 2010, in Copenhagen.

[116] Expressed at multiple meetings and one-to-one conversations at conferences and workshops, including at: seminar, 30 April 2010; meeting with Defence Staff, 3 May 2010; meeting with DoD Staff, 29 June and 7 July 2010; meeting with Defence Staff, 20 August 2010; meeting with DoD, 24 September 2010; conference, 17 June 2011; and meeting with Defence Staff, 31 August 2011.

[117] The Norwegian Armed Forces present an Equality Award on a yearly basis, but this award is not connected to the work related to implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in

apparent costs to the military organisation as a whole or individuals within it. And while the MoD *did* instruct the Armed Forces to develop a reward system for leaders that would incentivise them to perform in accordance with the WPS agenda, this was not realised.[118]

Importantly, it was observed that personnel in the Armed Forces were aware of the aim to implement UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, but were less aware of what this was actually meant *to achieve*. Additionally, these personnel expressed resentment stemming from their perception that the Government or the Gender Project had forced change upon them, as opposed to that change being driven from *within* the organisation based on the experiences and knowledge of influential leadership.[119] Some leaders saw implementation as imposing rules, regulations, and an inflexibility that they felt overrode their freedom to organise and operate in the way they found most effective. They described a number of decisions related to implementation as nonsensical, including the use of more expensive temporary positions or consultants to cope with or manoeuver around a fixed and artificial limit on permanent positions, the push for a GFA in the midst of an already challenging staffing situation, rigid staffing and reorganisation processes, and overly detailed instructions from the MoD. The view of military personnel that decision makers in the MoD had the power to make structural or functional changes without the support of local commanders was a challenge, and was occasionally *counter*productive.

Throughout two years of observation, the Defence Staff never fully conceptualised or controlled the parts played by various structures and functions within the organisation related to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives. Apart from the efforts of the Gender Project, progress on implementation relied largely on individual initiatives

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military operations directly, even if some candidates for the award have been known to take a keen interest in this subject. The Armed Forces do discipline personnel for sexual harassment and sexual violence, but there is no system by which to assess gender issues in yearly personal performance evaluations. Though the need for a performance evaluation element related to implementation of UNSCR 1325 was specifically mentioned in PET no. 23 (2010) from the MoD to the military organisation (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2010), it was not implemented.

[118] The instruction was to: *"Reward military leaders that demonstrate an ability to implement UNSCR 1325, by evaluating leaders of military operations on the theme in yearly and/or operations specific duty evaluations."* See: Forsvarsdepartementet (DoD) clarifications, changes and additions no. 23 (2010).

[119] From meetings on: 16 April 2010, 3 June 2010, 28 June 2010, 30 June 2010, 30 October 2010, 16 and 19 November 2010, 17 June 2011, 31 August 2011, and 11–12 October 2011.

and convictions. Two conferences were held on the topic at the Norwegian Military Academy,[120] several individuals contacted the Gender Project to learn more about how gender related to their area of expertise and role in deployment,[121] some relevant pieces appeared in internal media,[122] and a few studies were undertaken by self-motivated military students seeking to research gender or UNSCR 1325.[123] However, the majority of military commanders lacked knowledge and a clear and robust commitment to implementation, and progress stagnated.

At an international conference on *Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations* in Oslo on 17 June 2011, Major Tanner of the US Army fittingly expressed the importance of leadership commitment and ownership to addressing gender matters, saying: *"What my boss finds interesting, I find fascinating!"* (Kvarving, 2011, p. 91). He had recent and relevant experience working with Female Engagement Teams (FET) in international operations and insisted that neither he nor the FETs could have done their jobs without the support of US military leadership. Yet, the scattered initiatives introduced by the Norwegian Defence Staff hardly amount to consistent or dependable leadership commitment; and with no apparent ability to manage cultural change, no overall strategy for change in structures and functions, and no acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of structures, functions, and culture, implementation is an uphill battle.

Of course, some Defence Staff initiatives *have* promoted implementation, especially through functional activities such as the inclusion of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military education, which have targeted personnel from the operative structure of the organisation. In addition, seminars, briefings, meetings, and even informal discussions with personnel working in relevant positions have changed some

[120] I participated in one of them, on 30 April 2010.
[121] Meetings took place between staff of the Gender Project and these individuals on: 28 June 2010, 27 August 2010, 2 September 2010, 19 November 2010, and 19 September 2011.
[122] For example, see: *Offisersbladet* (the journal of Befalets Fellesorganisasjon), no. 1 and no. 3 (2011), and *Forum* (the Armed Forces journal), 27 September 2010 and 18 January 2011.
[123] See Chapter 2. Also see: the 2010 bachelor thesis of (then) Lieutenant and cadet A. G. Vedul for the War Academy, discussing to what degree the Norwegian Armed Forces has implemented a gender perspective and UNSCR 1325 and what it means to military leaders, which earned him a nomination for the 2011 Equality Prize. Available in Norwegian at: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/160769/Bachelor%20Oppgave%20Anders%20Vedul%20-%20Arnold.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed July 31, 2018).

attitudes and have encouraged understanding.[124] The Defence Staff also opened its doors in new ways to engagement with the rest of the organisation, for example in meetings between Defence Staff Operations and the National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ). And while some of these developments came as a result of encouragement or pressure from the Gender Project, broader dialogue was made possible by the willingness of leadership to understand the need and show interest in the subject.

A final thought under this theme relates to the interplay among structure, conceptualisation, and ownership, and how the Government's decision to give initial responsibility for the WPS agenda in the Armed Forces to the MoD Department of Personnel and General Services and their counterpart in the Defence Staff contributed to the impression that implementing UNSCR 1325 was merely a matter of recruitment and retention. This decision placed the issue of gender perspectives in the context of a *political* focus on increased numbers of women in the military and not in the context of operational concerns.[125] This was reinforced by the attention paid by the Government, the MoD, and thus the public to the failure of the Armed Forces to recruit and retain more women. The lack of gender diversity has been seen as an Achilles' heel of the Norwegian military and has been explored by several researchers (F. B. Steder, 2015), however the number of women has remained low (Schjølset, 2010) and politicians and military leaders continue to highlight this fact.

Analysis

The lack of consequences in the Norwegian military for neglecting to complete tasks assigned in relation to UNSCR 1325 clearly indicates the absence of functions associated with a reward and discipline system, or to the extent such functions exist, a culture unwilling to apply them. This is evidence of a slow, conformist system that has not adapted to new demands of the Armed Forces, for which a reward and discipline system is a *necessary* condition for change (Schein, 2004). Change has been obstructed further both by the failure of the Defence Staff to conceptualise implementation and the lack of

[124] For example, after leadership and analysts were educated on the topic, gender perspectives were considered to a greater degree in the analysis that precedes operations. Information shared by military leadership at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 16 September 2013.

[125] Communicated at meetings with Defence Staff, 3 May 2010; and the MoD, 16 November 2010. A superior also recommended a focus on *either* equality *or* operations because they were regarded as incompatible, 25 March 2011.

clear leadership commitment within the military organisation, especially because this change was initiated through a universally top-down approach (as opposed to the bottom-up approach of some units within the US Marine Corps, for instance, and their use of Female Engagement Teams in operations[126]).

According to Schein, a coherent concept and new standards by which to evaluate performance are important to creating an environment conducive to transformational change (2004, p. 332). But, even after implementation of UNSCR 1325 was officially underway in the Norwegian Armed Forces following the assignment of tasks by the Defence Staff, a basic understanding of the concept of gender perspectives was still absent at both the operational and tactical levels. This limited or prevented a sense of ownership and genuine motivation to meet the obligations and benefits of implementing the WPS agenda across the organisation, and reflected that the operational structures of the military had played an insufficient part in the important diagnostic and prognostic phases that preceded implementation (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 314).

The fact that the Defence Staff lacked a concept for implementation was a functional factor preventing implementation; but this functional deficiency was most likely rooted in a pervasively masculine organisational culture that places no value on implementing political agendas that challenge military ideals or identities (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017). Despite this, *it is the responsibility of the Defence Staff to convert the political ambitions of the Government into a military concept*. Yet, there is no automatic function within the organisation tasked with conceptualising all policies, even when orders have been given by the MoD, often leaving priorities regarding scope and ambitions to be set at the Senior Staff Officer level. This is problematic when implementation depends on capability, knowledge, and enthusiasm regarding an initiative within the Defence Staff itself.

It was a challenge to determine whether this lack of conceptualisation was deliberate or the result of insufficient knowledge, culture, structures, or functions within the Defence Staff. At the very least, it exposed a failure of imagination that omitted key elements, including positive role models to lead change and a reward and discipline

[126] Until quite recently, the US Marine Corps did not allow female operators in combat positions, but it developed a way to deploy female soldiers when it was considered an operational imperative in order to reach the local female population. To that end, Female Engagement Teams (FET) were established and attached to units, circumventing regulations so that and operational and tactical needs for female personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan could be met.

system consistent with a new way of thinking and working. Nevertheless, constant pressure and efforts by individuals who refused to give up on implementation did generate action. And even if military personnel displayed an obvious aversion to following instructions from the MoD, over time, the efforts of the Ministry promoted further implementation. Still, resistance to change (uncertainty avoidance) can emerge when members of an organisation feel restricted from making enough independent decisions regarding the organisation and its operations. In this case, military personnel particularly experienced frustration with initiatives put forth by the Government, like the use of GENADs, when they lacked insight as to their purpose. This again reflects the low power distance culture of the organisation, in which subordinates disapprove of or protest power inequities (Hofstede, 2005), which can be associated with a lack of trust in the ability of leadership to make comprehensively informed decisions.

4.4 Knowledge and Expectations

Gender Project staff focused on creating opportunities to inform and educate, to address the lack of knowledge regarding gender, gender perspectives, UNSCR 1325, and related assignments at all levels of the military organisation. In military schools, the majority of teachers did not possess the knowledge, competence, or time to take on new subjects. And generally, specific subjects related to the WPS agenda were not embraced as a part of the curricula by concrete functions within the organisation or by the organisational culture.[127]

Despite considerable scepticism about the Gender Project and about UNSCR 1325, Project staff found that when productive information-sharing and cooperation was established, some military personnel were willing to engage on the topic. A few said they had initially seen gender initiatives as *just another political project* driven by the fact that gender was the new "it word," and assumed the focus on these subjects would eventually pass. Others held the opinion that the WPS agenda brought no value to the Armed Forces and served no purpose in military operations, arguing for instance that:

> *"Gender perspectives in military operations are just another way for Norwegian politicians to push their Western equal-opportunity agenda in parts of the world*

[127] Reported in a conversation with staff and leadership at NDUC, February 2008; and in feedback from participants at the NDUC workshop on gender, 31 August 2010.

that cannot comprehend it, or onto a military organisation that does not want or need it."[128]

Similar views were expressed at all levels of the organisation. Yet, when individuals took the time to learn about the origins of UNSCR 1325, its logic, and the obligations and opportunities it represents, many were quickly convinced of its worth. Some of these "converts" admitted they had lacked the necessary knowledge to fully comprehend the elements and aims of the WPS agenda, and gave it two thumbs up once they did, along with support and access to resources in their part of the organisation.[129] There were also a handful of officers, from 1st Lieutenants to Colonels and Generals, who responded to invitations from the Gender Project to use Project staff as a learning resource, and sought advice or engaged in frank and open discussions on gender issues. The NJHQ was a frontrunner in that respect, inviting the Gender Project to seminars, meetings, and formal and informal talks.[130]

A significant challenge to closing the knowledge gap on gender issues in the Armed Forces was the need to reach the military masses that had not attended a military educational institution or received pre-deployment training. And after initial attention on UNSCR 1325 faded, it was difficult for the Gender Project to maintain momentum in this regard. Moreover, the success of the Project in delivering relevant knowledge appeared to be linked to several factors that could not be universalised as a practical matter, such as whether learners received face-to-face exposure to experts on WPS topics and in what setting. Information was disseminated by the Project across the organisation in various ways – at presentations and conferences, through capacity-building efforts aimed at teachers, via train-the-trainers sessions, and in articles and book chapters – but it proved far easiest to confront and overcome scepticism in smaller groups or in one-on-one discussions. Personnel were generally reluctant to accept tasks or concepts related to gender without developing a deeper understanding of the topic, but their reluctance was rarely knowledge based, and many found it harder to

[128] Attendee at a seminar at NJHQ, 12 October 2011. This view was also observed by gender advisors in the Gender Project throughout two years of meetings, teaching, seminars, and conferences.

[129] For example, at meetings with Defence Staff Operations, 30 June 2010; and with NJHQ, 12 May 2011 and 12 October 2011.

[130] For example, on: 25 August 2010, 12 May 2011, and 11 and 12 October 2011.

contradict the value of gender matters when face-to-face with well-informed individuals who displayed conviction about the subject.

But there were no mechanisms of support in which personnel could discuss gender perspectives or get field practice, coaching, or feedback, all of which are important in implementing change (Schein, 2004). When activities spearheaded by the Gender Project were absent, there were few indications that Norwegian military personnel had the will or ability to keep focused on implementing UNSCR 1325. In fact, the impression of the Gender Project was that whatever military personnel had acquired from their mostly minimal interaction with the Project was essentially all there was to learn on the subject.

The failure to develop a conceptual approach to implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the Norwegian Armed Forces meant that there was no clearly communicated strategy for the military organisation in terms of policies, education, training, personnel, equipment, operational planning, and execution aimed at filling the knowledge void and confronting biased attitudes. Nevertheless, after months of sustained pressure from the MoD, the Gender Project, and others, some parts of the military organisation slowly began opening to the idea of change, and feedback confirmed that the ball had started rolling on the WPS agenda. Yet, as then Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet reminded us in 2011, efforts to increase knowledge are very important, but *feelings* enable knowledge and thus implementation. Because feelings are among the hardest cultural areas to address, though, they may not be challenged strongly enough. Indeed, change in the Norwegian military often seemed to be compelled by constant inducements or the possibility of being evaluated, instead of by a genuine understanding of the issues and their importance. The WPS agenda was often presented as something that had been forced on the organisation by higher ups for no apparent reason. Illustrative of this point is the anecdote of a retired General who was hired to act as Commander at Exercise Joint Effort at NORDCSC and, having had no former interaction with GENADs, asked why there should be one on staff, and was simply told by senior staff: *"Because the Admiral said we had to."*[131]

[131] See: *Rapport on implementering av genderperspektiv i emnet fellesoperasjoner of øvelse 'Joint Effort' ved Forsvarets Stabsskole 2010-2011*, No. 2011/016677-001/FORSVARET/519, 3 May

In hindsight, NJHQ leadership admitted they had postponed work on the WPS agenda because they were unsure of how to go about it, and acknowledged they should have done more from the start. But their lack of action meant that, instead of implementing UNSCR 1325, gender perspectives, and gender mainstreaming at their own initiative, NJHQ leadership thought the Armed Forces had been "put under administration" by the MoD on the subject.[132] Prompted by poor progress, in 2010, the MoD did indeed issue tasks in far more extensive detail than was typical – in PET no. 23 regarding UNSCR 1325. Though the Defence Staff had been invited to comment on and influence the draft of this order, personnel in both the Defence Staff and the NJHQ saw the level of detail it included as provocative. Still, military leaders conceded to Project staff that they had contributed to the situation themselves by not doing the work in the first place, and that they would have been better off if they had possessed a greater understanding of the subject, the political will, and the needs of the Minister of Defence. By openly and willingly admitting to these inadequacies, NJHQ leadership facilitated an unbiased exchange of ideas and showed a willingness to learn.[133]

The degree to which the needs for more knowledge and for further efforts to overcome biased attitudes are *perpetual* surprised many military leaders, slowing progress and leading to missed opportunities. For example, absent a communication strategy meant to increase knowledge on gender across the military, a chance to reach much of the organisation was unfortunately squandered when the Armed Forces-funded magazine, *F*, dedicated an issue to the theme of gender. The Project regarded this as an ideal opportunity to disseminate essential fact-based information, but the editor of the magazine chose instead to feature various uneducated associations about gender and opinions on gender perspectives from a wide range of people, from the MOD to a newly conscripted soldier, that did little to contribute to increased competence. When challenged on this content before publishing by me as leader of the Gender Project, the

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2011. Also expressed in meetings on 17 October 2011, 28 November 2011, and 14 December 2011.

[132] Phone conversation with leadership at the NJHQ, December 2009; Gender Seminar at the NJHQ, 11–12 October 2011.

[133] Meeting at the NJHQ, 12 May 2011; meeting with representative from the Defence Staff, 31 August 2016.

editor argued that the aim of the magazine was not to educate military personnel per se, but to produce critical and thought-provoking journalism.[134]

Analysis

The relatively good relationship enjoyed between the Gender Project and the NJHQ was due to official cooperation between leaders at the NJHQ and the NDUC, through which mutual respect and expertise overcame issues of rank or position. This indicates a low power distance and a shared understanding that power is determined by more than formal hierarchies (Hofstede, 1993). Additionally, this reveals that the organisation is dependent on individual efforts, abilities, and convictions to make progress on implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives. So, it must be asked: Who keeps the gates closed to new knowledge in this field? (Calás and Smircich, 2006).

Limited knowledge and the reluctance of some leaders to execute orders without comprehending their validity or without being part of a diagnostic or prognostic phase of transformational change inhibited implementation and was linked to all three of the factors examined in this research – structures, functions, and culture.[135] New, formal structures were sometimes no match for opposition to change. And the formal and informal training that is important to facilitating change (Hofstede, 1993) was at first lacking or limited. This was due in part to the fact that gender perspectives were seen as a fundamentally political venture with limited relevance to the military, and meeting the requirements of the MoD was viewed largely in terms of appeasing the Ministry just enough to avoid being assigned additional tasks. A much-needed *conceptual approach* to implementing UNSCR 1325 was not put forth, despite the necessity of such a concept to achieving transformational change (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004).

The lack of an overarching conceptualisation for implementation was reflected in the failure to use a publication like *F* magazine to meet the needs of the military organisation as far as increasing knowledge and confronting biases. The magazine is a military funded structure, and it is therefore valid to question why it does what civilian media already does, when it could be used to convey valuable and clarifying information

[134] Meeting with representative from *F* magazine, 20 December 2010; e-mail to *F* magazine journalist and desk, 14 January 2011.

[135] One example of a reluctance to execute orders was evident in the lack of implementation of the guidelines for soldiers to address sexual and gender-based violence in military operations. See Chapter 6.10.

to a military audience. On its own, this structure could have played a considerable role in generating the compelling, positive shared vision necessary for a change agenda (Schein, 2004). But this potentially valuable mechanism to increasing knowledge was inadequately utilised.

The importance of such structures in transformational change is linked not just to knowledge but also to feelings. Feelings related to identity and safety, or fear of change, are connected to whether people are willing to take on the tasks they are assigned in order to enable change. It is vital that the forces within military culture that support psychological conditions for safety, which Schein (2004) claims is necessary for change, are identified. That would enable the Armed Forces to better succeed in educating personnel, and therefore in promoting and implementing gender perspectives. As MacKenzie (2015) has repeatedly highlighted in her studies of the US military, *feelings* have long played a part in the exclusion of women from combat positions based on arguments about their emotional capacity, and when instrumentalised in this way, feelings can prevent progress. Hence, an inability by both the Gender Project and the Defence Staff to focus sufficiently on feelings as they relate to change (i.e. psychological safety) and understand these feelings as a possible obstruction to implementation (Schein, 2004) prevented progress.

A general lack of knowledge and expertise among leaders and staff officers related to implementing organisational change, especially specific to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, clearly influenced outcomes as well. These powerful change agents and leaders are particularly essential to implementing *cultural* transformation in an organisation (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005); and it was this cultural factor that largely prevented implementation of the WPS agenda despite efforts to increase knowledge and decrease bias, despite teaching structures and functions, and despite efforts to promote understanding of gender perspectives across the military. A culture of suspicion regarding anything perceived as a "political project" meant that many military personnel dismissed UNSCR 1325 as having minimal or no relevance to the Armed Forces. And a low power distance between military and political leadership resulted in little acceptance within the Armed Forces of the demands of political actors, and a subsequent lack of conceptualisation and communication reflected the fact that limited implementation was implicitly supported by military leadership.

4.5 The Role of the Messenger

Given prevailing scepticism towards gender perspectives and policies within the Armed Forces, Gender Project personnel recognised that the role and tone of the messenger was critical. How information about UNSCR 1325 was mediated and how messengers were perceived would vitally impact whether people in the target audience were reached. Projecting a positive attitude and the desire to be part of a solution, rather than pointing out shortcomings and mistakes, therefore became an ethos of the Project.

The ability to access personnel seen as change agents depended on the ability to create and sustain good relationships. And sometimes, the introduction of gender issues by their superiors made military leaders *less* willing to engage or cooperate, with some communicating directly in several cases that the use of higher-ranking staff to push the WPS agenda was counterproductive. These higher-ranking officers preferred not being approached about implementation by colleagues holding formally more influential positions. In one example, an officer who turned down a transfer request submitted on behalf of the Gender Project told me:

> *"Lena, if you as Project leader had called, instead of your Commander, to ask my support for the transfer you wanted, the answer would have been different – we could have solved the issue over a cup of coffee."*[136]

Knowing when to make use of the sway held by superiors and when the Gender Project should take a stand without top-down support became a balancing act. However, there was a tacit understanding among members of the military, both those with less formal power and with more formal power, that *informal* relations and expertise took precedence over formal structures to some extent.[137]

The importance of the messenger was apparent in the classroom, too. Students and trainees sometimes displayed scepticism about and resistance to the subject of gender, in their comments, body language, and reluctance to acknowledge that gender perspectives are relevant to military operations.[138] Yet, when the Gender Project happened to match the "right" instructor with the "right" audience, responses were quite different. The Project thus made an effort to mix and match training teams to increase their ability to adapt to any situation.

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[136] Meeting at the Defence Staff Operations, Akershus Fortress, 3 June 2010.
[137] Meetings with leadership; seminar at NJHQ, 11 October 2011.
[138] Feedback after instruction by Gender Project staff at pre-deployment training, Bardufoss, 16 April 2010.

Some officers admitted after interacting with Project representatives that they had expected to be more aggressively confronted about gender, and said they felt a sense of relief when they realised the Project took a different approach. They had anticipated facing an "angry feminist" viewpoint concerned with "scolding" them for a lack of effort; but instead, the Project showed respect for the challenging work and sacrifices of the military and recognised the fact that 92 per cent of the personnel engaged in implementation were men. This had a positive effect, and the military audience became more open and willing to learning about how gender perspectives *are* in fact relevant to military operations. In this way, acceptance and recognition of the audience led to acceptance and recognition of the message.

There of course remained officers who expressed scepticism or implied that their superiors were merely paying lip-service to gender matters. The ability of messengers from the Gender Project to stomach negative attitudes and nevertheless maintain their professionalism and positivity, even in the face of bullying and uneducated or biased attitudes, was therefore paramount to getting and keeping the respect of military personnel. Defensive reactions from representatives of the Project risked confirming the worst expectations of the audience and shutting down any lines of communication.

In general, military personnel appeared to be exhausted by external demands for more women in the Armed Forces and resented the focus on this topic. They frequently shared the impression that some women had been promoted above their level of competence because of their gender. What's more, the fact that mostly women worked to implement gender perspectives reinforced the notion that UNSCR 1325 was related to "women's issues" and not to military activities or to men in the military organisation. On the other hand, feedback was quite positive regarding the male advisor in the Gender Project, who had both military experience and an academic degree and to whom male audience members could relate, making them more open to his agenda.[139]

Among female officers, several enthusiastically and openly embraced UNSCR 1325 and were unmistakable in their commitment to the WPS agenda and to women in conflict zones. They also regarded UNSCR 1325 as an important recognition of their own participation in and valuable contributions to achieving the goals of military

[139] Feedback after instruction by Gender Project staff, Army Weapons School, November 2010; feedback after instruction by the Project's male advisor, INI OPS at Jørstadmoen and The Army Weapons School, 2011.

operations.[140] That the UN recognised the efforts of women in the Armed Forces empowered these officers and showed them an appreciation that was absent in their own military organisation. Throughout the research period, female officers and their network maintained a dedication to implementation, but over time, the attitudes of these officers shifted in tone, from positive and encouraging…

> *"I am so proud. Finally, 1325 says it like it is. You don't know about 1325? (asking male colleagues). I'll tell you [about it]. Just remember 1325!!"*[141]

…to pessimistic and weary:

> *"I admire your courage to confront an issue like this. I don't know how you can stand it."* And, *"I couldn't do it. It must be extremely demanding and very tiresome."*[142]

The Government also prioritised the UN and its initiatives in foreign policymaking during this time. In October 2010, the Norwegian Minister of Defence spoke at the UN's 10-year commemoration of UNSCR 1325, where she promised to continue pushing for progress in implementation through increased national efforts, reporting, and financial support for UN efforts to fulfil the WPS agenda. She highlighted initiatives already undertaken or underway and reiterated the ambition of the Norwegian Government that it be a frontrunner in implementation.[143] Statements such as these from representatives of the Norwegian MoD, the UN, and NATO helped support the message that UNSCR 1325 has value and gave credibility within the Norwegian military to messengers from the Gender Project. Especially helpful were the appearances of UN and NATO experts at conferences and in publications, NATO documents such as BiSC-40 on gender perspectives,[144] and doctrines and orders from American commanders in on-going operations (such as ISAF).

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[140] Conversations with various senior female military leaders, 30 October 2010 and 15 November 2010; and with female officer contributor at seminar, Akershus Fortress, 10 May 2011.

[141] Female officer to male colleagues, observed at a social venue at Armed Forces central HR, Oslo, December 2008.

[142] Comments of two female officers at the annual meeting of the Armed Forces Female Association, Akershus Fortress, Oslo, 27 January 2011.

[143] Minister of Defence Grete Faremo to the UN, 26 October 2010.

[144] See: Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 and revisions at https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_132098.htm (accessed 10 August 2018).

Notably, although the Gender Project was regarded by other countries and organisations as a source of expertise on UNSCR 1325,[145] members of the Norwegian Armed Forces often responded better to international messengers than to those within their own military or their own national politics.[146] Military personnel also showed greater respect for NATO communications, which were associated with the ongoing armed military reality in Afghanistan, than for some of the initiatives put forth by the UN. When military audiences learned that gender perspectives were on the agenda at NATO headquarters in Brussels and Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, they often expressed increased interest. The words of then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, spoken in 2010 at the European Commission and emphasising that gender perspectives are not a "women's issue" but a security issue, added further credibility to the idea that the WPS agenda is important to security forces:

> *"The ongoing victimisation of women in conflict situations and the marginalisation of women in matters of peace-building have a profound impact on global security. Women and girls suffer disproportionately from conflicts and the lawlessness of post-conflict environments.*
>
> *At the same time, women are far too often excluded from playing a role in maintaining, restoring, and defending stability. The results can be seen in rising threats to regional stability, growing violence, and prolonged conflict. I am convinced that we need to confront these issues forcefully and – to the extent possible – jointly, if are to deal successfully with the security challenges of the 21st century.*

[145] Throughout 2010 and 2011, Gender Project representatives and advisors were asked to participate as gender experts in various international contexts, including as: a planner and moderator at a regional conference on women in the security sector in Belgrade and at the Human Rights dialogue in Jakarta; a speaker for a PfP event in Geneva, the NCGP in Brussels, OSCE Seoul, a NATO-funded initiative in five different Bosnian cities, and an international conference on UNSCR 1325 and Afghanistan in Oslo; a reviewer of the NATO Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes' Education Development Working Group's creation of a generic Professional Military Education curriculum for use in the 22 PfP countries; and support to the Polish Department of Defence, the Pentagon in developing the US NAP, and the Folke Bernadotte 1325 network in Sweden. It was not possible to accommodate all of these and similar requests.

[146] Foreign civilian and military experts were embraced at Norwegian events attended by Norwegian military personnel, including the "10 years in Afghanistan – what now?" conference at Hotel Bristol, Oslo, 29 September 2011, and a gender seminar at the War Academy, Linderud, 30 April 2010. Even when Norwegian officers or academics had relevant experiences or expertise, the Armed Forces invited foreign experts to speak at some events.

As we do so, we can build on a solid foundation. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 is a powerful appeal to protect those who are most vulnerable in conflicts and their aftermath, and to enhance the participation of women in building peace and security."[147]

Experts within NATO acknowledged the rights perspective embedded in UNSCR 1325 but argued that military personnel would not be strongly impacted by a message of rights and equality, and chose to frame gender perspectives as a force multiplier, in order to make the concept more palatable to soldiers.[148] NATO messaging consequently discussed gender perspectives in terms of operational effectiveness related to increased force protection, improved intelligence, etc. ISAF directives urging participating nations to establish and train Female Engagement Teams (FET)[149] and GENADs in PRTs also focused on female engagement as a force multiplier, not as a tool to promote equality.[150] While Norway was committed to a dual approach to implementation (both rights- and effectiveness-based), the messaging of NATO and other international actors gave weight to the justification for implementation of gender perspectives and contributed as an external structural factor to promoting implementation.

Analysis

It is a paradox, and a reflection of international power dynamics, that Norwegian Gender Project experts were routinely sought by NATO and PfP countries to help develop gender directives but were hard pressed to capture the same attention and respect from Norwegian military leadership or soldiers at home. International agents hold a higher status than domestic officers and experts and this hierarchy is reinforced by the organisational culture, which in this case prevented progress by failing to effectively utilise the most easily accessible expertise. A lack of enthusiasm within the Norwegian Armed Forces to be or become a leader in implementing UNSCR 1325 was somewhat countered by the urging of other NATO member states, underscoring the role of NATO

[147] Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_61040.htm (accessed 31 July 2018).

[148] Remarks made to NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, Brussels, May 2010 and May 2011.

[149] FETs were a tool of the US military whereby female personnel were engaged before women could officially serve, in order to reach the female population in Afghanistan. Similarly, the "Lionesses" had been deployed in Iraq earlier. See Chapter 12.11 for more on FETs.

[150] Based on analysis of classified ISAF documents.

as a model for the Norwegian military. Still, this general lack of interest in exhibiting leadership on gender perspectives was linked to the view that this is a "soft" security issue, and even international recognition of the WPS agenda did not appear to change that; indicating that the organisational culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces does not provide sufficient psychological safety to military personnel to facilitate change in their values, a shared positive vision, and the acceptance of internal role models (Schein, 2004).

Despite NATO's focus on efficiency as a rationale for implementation of the WPS agenda, efficiency is hard to measure. Indeed, it is especially difficult to prove a direct cause-and-effect relationship between attitudes and experiences of security. The risk of tying gender perspectives too tightly to the notion of effectiveness is that a failure to observe more efficient outcomes as a result of implementing the WPS agenda could result in the loss of any existing commitment to implementation, now detached from a rights-based framework. And this risk is magnified due to the masculine culture of the Norwegian military, which associates gender perspectives with femininity and thus assigns them less status, in some ways handicapping the implementation of UNSCR 1325 from the start (Woodward, 1997; Kronsell, 2012).

The importance of networking and of personality preferences in the male-dominated military organisation was another cultural factor that prevented the implementation of gender perspectives, which were perceived as part of a women's agenda. Access to change agents became more challenging when the messenger was female or was not part of an existing network.[151] However, even when leaders were accessible, there were doubts about their sincerity related to implementing gender perspectives. As Brunborg (2015) has described, military leaders may attempt to satisfy both the political culture at a strategic level as well as the military culture at a tactical level through ambiguous communications.

Interestingly, recent research has found that older male officers in the Norwegian Armed Forces are *more* equality minded than men in the rest of Norwegian society, while the opposite is true for younger male officers (Lilleaas & Ellingsen, 2014). Other research has suggested that younger officers often join the military because they are

[151] As a female officer in an academic position, I posed no threat to the official or unofficial hierarchy and was thus commonly granted access to these leaders; but other female messengers were not received as graciously.

motivated by adventure and the opportunity to test their limits and become "men" (Goldstein, 2001; Totland, 2009), and this may account to some degree for the attitudes they display towards issues they perceive as feminised. A masculine military culture that values traditional hard security issues and tends to exclude ideas it finds threatening to the organisation or to military identity is predictably associated with much foot-dragging when it comes to implementing gender perspectives. This kind of culture discourages feelings of vulnerability and leads to uncertainty avoidance; a trait that makes it difficult to open up to new ideas – no matter the messenger – undertake change, or innovate (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

Efforts to move the WPS agenda forward were, contrastingly, received very positively by female officers, demonstrating the extent to which they recognised or had personally experienced the need for UNSCR 1325 and also how much they felt their own contributions were underappreciated. However, early enthusiasm about implementation among female officers deteriorated over time as they faced ridicule and began to appreciate the considerable effort required to promote the idea that equality and gender perspectives are necessary in the Armed Forces. When female officers continued to feel insufficiently recognised, some questioned whether UNSCR 1325 was really relevant in their part of the organisation. This is an example of how universally the values of masculinity permeate understandings of what is important in military culture (Mills, 1992). Further, it indicates that these women, so positive at the start of implementation and so inspired by the message, lost confidence in the ability of the organisation to change, despite their respect for the messenger.

4.6 Gender as the Joke of the Day

From across the military organisation, Gender Project personnel were confronted by ridicule and jokes related to gender equality and women in the Armed Forces. Representatives of the Project with limited previous exposure to the military commented on the tendency for communication among military personnel to be sexualised; and while those of us with a military background could more effectively disarm or challenge such language, it was necessary to find the fine balance between tolerating a joke and taking a stand when a line was crossed. Inappropriate and sexual language was often shrugged off as "*just a joke,*" or was rationalised through a gendered lens, for example by remarking that a woman officer "*can take it, she is one of us.*" This

implies there is an "us" to which most women do not belong; but that *this* woman is an exception.

Even efforts by the Armed Forces to officially recognise personnel who had excelled in the field of equality with an Equality Prize, presented at an annual conference, were ridiculed. Despite being widely promoted within the military, the Prize was not widely respected and was joked about in terms that linked it with achievements viewed as feminine. Some military personnel were even observed using, "*aiming for the Equality Prize?*" as a jibe.[152] Or, officers sometimes tried to prove that their actions or attitudes were firmly rooted in another value base by remarking, *"Let's just say I'll never get an Equality Prize!"* Considering the ridicule associated with the Prize, it is understandable that individual military personnel expressed embarrassment after being nominated for it.[153]

Curious about how my male colleagues would react, I experimented with using gendered expressions typical in the Armed Forces when I was in one-on-one conversations – expressions such as "*man up,*" "*every man for himself,*" "*be a man,*" "*all men on board,*" "*wingman*" or even "*BF.*"[154] Most of the male colleagues I spoke this way with either commented on it or corrected me, eager to exhibit their awareness because they knew my subject matter.[155] But outside of one-on-one settings, gendered and sexual jokes were more commonly accepted, from smaller groups to larger groups, at official gatherings or on lunch breaks.

An important briefing at Exercise Joint Effort at NORDCSC even opened with a suggestive image of a female lower body wearing a mini skirt, which the presenting male Lieutenant Colonel joked was an analogy for his presentation:

"Just long enough to cover the essentials, but short enough to keep it interesting."

The briefing room was filled with military students at Staff School level, leaders from NORDCSC, and external experts from civil society, none of whom voiced the opinion that the image was inappropriate, and several of whom laughed out loud. Jokes were also

[152] Overheard among officer students at NORDCSC, 2010.
[153] This was expressed at the Annual Women's Conference, 19 May 2010, by one candidate, and by another candidate in 2011.
[154] A BF is a military winter hat. The abbreviation is short for the gendered term "*bjørnefitte*" (bear cunt).
[155] I experimented with this in one-on-one get-togethers and meetings on: 16 February 2010, 27 April 2010, 11 May 2010, 29 June 2010, 24 August 2010, 14 September 2010, and 1 June 2011.

told in the same briefing, by students and leadership alike, about the role of the GENAD in the exercise, gender as a subject, and equality in general.[156] To most of the military community, it was natural and unproblematic to make these topics the objects of ridicule.

The Gender Project, a cornerstone of the NDUC's new approach, was regarded by militaries in other countries, NGOs, NATO, and the UN as an important contributor to the WPS agenda. Yet, at NORDCSC, the Project was often regarded as a nuisance, especially because it accounted for new positions and required funding. Additionally, the concept of "gender" was regarded as diametrically opposed to the values and status of the most admired operatives in the Armed Forces. There is a difference in the status attached to various military positions, which means that operatives in elite forces and fighter pilots, for instance, are regarded as the most respected and bravest soldiers. They have been through a demanding selection process to take on duties that remain reserved for a special few, and command the most expensive and complicated weapons platforms, providing them a near-mythic aura. As far as most military personnel are concerned, nothing about the job of these most respected soldiers has anything to do with gender.[157] And the fact that gender was communicated by some military leadership as a political buzzword pushed by politicians with an equality agenda gave military personnel little indication they should take it seriously.[158]

There was a fear of association with gender observed in most of the Norwegian Armed Forces the Gender Project encountered. This was obvious in the attitudes military personnel expressed about attempts to reward them for work towards equality, such as with the Equality Prize. It was also reflected in the well-intentioned advice extended by male senior officers to those of us working with gender, that female and male officers alike may find that addressing these subjects in the Armed Forces would be our professional downfall.[159] I was personally advised to "*get out*" before it was too

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[156] Briefing during Exercise Joint Effort, 21 February–4 March 2011.

[157] During the timeframe of this study, as operations in Afghanistan progressed, a greater amount of status was connected to being a TIC (troop in contact with enemy fire). Even gender advisors who could swap war stories with other TICs found their status relatively soar and their ease of access increase (confirmed at meeting, 19 September 2011).

[158] In meetings and in comments at seminars and conferences, gender was often referred to as an extra burden with no relevance to the military.

[159] Meetings with Defence Staff, 3 June 2010, 20 August 2010, 9 May 2011; meeting with NDUC and DoD, 15 November 2010; and meeting with NJHQ, 12 May 2011.

late.[160] And, one GFA was warned by her commander that gender matters were a "dead end" and that her focus on them would hinder her future career.[161] Clearly, although the formal values of the organisation support equality and encourage soldiers to show respect, courage, and responsibility, a more dominant *informal* set of core values directly contradicts these impulses, and thus stands in the way of implementing UNSCR 1325.

Analysis

Sexualised language was not only an accepted part of communication within the military organisation, it was used to suppress efforts to implement gender perspectives. Combined with ridicule and jokes, this made it even more challenging for Gender Project personnel to convince a military audience that UNSCR 1325 is a vitally important security matter. This is particularly notable given the generally egalitarian nature of Norwegian society, which is categorized as feminine, with very low scores on the masculinity index, due to a high overlap in emotional gender roles; meaning that both men and women are expected to be modest, kind, and caring (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). In other words, most male military members are likely to possess values associated with equality in their roles as private Norwegian citizens, and yet their everyday communications and values in the military sphere are loaded with overt and covert contradictions to equality. The organisational culture in this case suppresses the widespread values of the broader society and creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to address serious issues like sexual violence in conflict, much less to implement gender perspectives.

Further evidence that men in the Armed Forces are split between two kinds of social awareness and two cultures was the tendency of male colleagues to correct my use of gendered semantics in one-on-one conversations while accepting or positively reinforcing gendered and sexual jokes in the company of other men. In fact, because of the military organisational culture, these men *expect* this behaviour from other men and see sexualised and condescending language as an expression of masculine culture and values (Totland, 2009, 2014). This is an example of hegemonic masculinity, wherein

[160] Expressed during conversations with superior officers, 27 October 2010 and 10 June 2011.
[161] Expressed during meeting at NDUC with Gender Advisor, 19 September 2011.

elites participate in a system of meaningful practices that reproduce and confirm their own identities (Connell, 1995).

Collectively, the behaviours and attitudes observed in military personnel reflect an insecurity and immaturity related to gender and sex in the Armed Forces. Sexual and gender-based jokes and ridicule are part of an everyday social code that demeans women, sex, and gender perspectives. Gender perspectives are thus regarded as vague and amusing, instead of as a concrete tool that can bring awareness to tragic and criminal human rights violations, or as a force multiplier to reach the goal of operations. When coupled with the fact that few Norwegian soldiers have operated in an area where gender-based oppression, sexual violence, molestation, rape, or assaults have been prevalent, a lack of knowledge to recognise these gendered crimes may leave soldiers incapable of responding appropriately.

Ultimately, even if gender perspectives challenge the social philosophy of Norwegian military culture, they reflect the *purported* core values of the Norwegian Armed Forces.[162] Ridicule of gender therefore stands in stark contrast to these values and serves as another cultural expression that undermines the psychological safety required for organisational change (Schein, 2004). What's more, this ridicule was observed at *all levels* of military leadership, indicating a lack of positive role models and of effective reward or discipline systems (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). The neglect of orders to establish necessary structures and functions related to gender perspectives is an obvious consequence of a military culture that regards gender as insignificant or even laughable. And when existing hierarchical structures and functions reinforce the lack of status related to gender perspectives, that cultural disregard is validated and becomes even more fixed (Mills, 1992).

4.7 Kinetics versus "Soft" Security Issues

When gender perspectives in military operations were discussed over lunch at a national seminar on gender, one Norwegian officer commented dismissively that, "*We*

[162] These core values, as defined by the MoD, are: openness, broadmindedness, respect, responsibility, and courage. The latter three are especially promoted under the acronym RAM (in Norwegian, these words are: *Respect*, *Ansvar*, and *Mot*). See (in English): Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Core values of Norway's defence sector* (2013). Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/forsvarssektorens-verdigrunnlag-desember-2013-engelsk-nettutgave.pdf (accessed 10 August 2018).

are warriors, not blue beret do-gooders!"[163] Determined in his belief that UNSCR 1325 was nothing more than an overhyped and perhaps even reactive political project, this officer argued that:

> *"The focus on gender will eventually pass, so that the Armed Forces can continue to focus on real military issues. The next war we fight could just as well be a full-scale war, not an intervention such as in Afghanistan where there are enormous cultural challenges and the situation facing women consequently plays a disproportionately large role."*[164]

These views, expressed in response to a question about this officer's thoughts on the seminar so far, appeared to reflect a deep frustration that he welcomed getting off his chest and speaking about freely. It is likely that the views of this officer were shared by some higher-ranking officers, who typically chose to voice their more "politically incorrect" and more honest opinions in one-on-one settings or under the premises that they were "playing devil's advocate,"[165] leaving it to younger officers to voice these opinions publicly.[166]

A similar frustration was observed among military personnel regarding a debate about morale in the Armed Forces that took place, and played out in the media, during the research period. A Danish documentary set in Afghanistan, which portrayed the attitudes and activities of Danish soldiers operating there,[167] brought the realities facing soldiers in international operations home. At the same time, magazine and newspaper stories about how Norwegian soldiers used Viking slogans and artefacts as a call to arms[168] were widely discussed, informing political rhetoric. The appropriate identity of

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[163] This, of course, is a reference to the blue berets worn by UN peacekeepers.
[164] Gender Seminar at NJHQ, 11–12 October 2011.
[165] Ibid. This observation supports earlier studies on Norwegian military culture. For example, see: Brunborg, 2015.
[166] As argued in *Offisersbladet*, no. 1, pp. 42–45; and *Offisersbladet*, no. 3, pp. 18–20.
[167] Janus Metz, dir., *Armadillo* (2010). The film followed a group of soldiers from a Danish cavalry unit on their mission in Helmand province in Afghanistan.
[168] For example, see (in Norwegian): Kamal Anwar, "Til Valhall!" *Aftenposten*, 1 October 2010, http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/Til-Valhall-6271635.html; Marius Arnesen, "Med ett runger det: 'Til Valhall!'" *NRK*, 9 May 2011, http://www.nrk.no/kultur/_til-valhall__-1.7622800; and Bente Johanne Moe and Jørund Hessevik, "Faremo: -Tar sterk avstand fra soldatholdninger," *NRK*, 27 September 2010, http://www.nrk.no/norge/faremo-tar-sterk-avstand-1.7310182 (all accessed 10 August 2018).

military personnel in a peace nation such as Norway was consequently debated in both academic and political circles.[169]

As these debates persisted, the fact that gender perspectives were not seen as a military matter resulted in several significant missed opportunities in the operational realm. In the first two years of the Gender Project, Norway's military contribution to ISAF shifted towards mentoring Afghan military forces, for example, but this mentoring was strongly focused on kinetics, with little concentration on human rights, ethics, gender perspectives, or other so-called soft security issues.[170] The emphasis was also clearly on hard security issues in two key national military exercises that the Gender Project evaluated in 2011, in which references to UNSCR 1325 and attempts to include gender perspectives were treated as awkward add-ons.[171] Participants and exercise planners appeared to regard human security issues as an introduction to the real point of the exercises – combat scenarios, as deterrence measures were anticipated to fail.[172]

There were many obvious weaknesses in the 2011 Exercise Joint Effort related to UNSCR 1325 – from a lack of education on gender perspectives, to advertising for the position of Gender Advisor without providing information about what a GENAD does, to a lack of any gender specific analysis in the "country handbooks" used in the scenario. The General running the Exercise did repeatedly encourage students to focus on the humanitarian situation, but they failed to prioritise this factor or see connections to gender perspectives; and meanwhile, the General addressed the entire group, including female officers, as "*gentlemen.*"[173] In 2013, Exercise Joint Effort was reportedly handled

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[169] See Chapter 2.2.6.

[170] Communicated at Gender seminar, 11 November 2011; at seminar, 29 September 2011; in meeting with Defence Staff, 9 May 2011; and in meeting with DoD, 16 November 2010. Human security is often described as consisting of "soft security issues," where the focus is not on the state but on a broader concept of security that includes gender issues, feminism, and peacemaking (Collins, 2013, pp. 118-119).

[171] These were: Faryab, a pre-deployment exercise for the PRT Meymaneh in Afghanistan (Forsvaret, 2011a), and Exercise Joint Effort at the NORDCSC (Forsvaret, 2011g). Hard security is generally associated with militarism and masculinity, and war or combat on behalf of the state (Collins, 2013, pp. 118-119).

[172] In 2014, for the first time in NORDCSC's history of Exercise Joint Effort, deterrence was successful. As a matter of academic curiosity, one might ask whether this was related to the fact that it was also the first time in NORDCSC's Joint Effort history that a female officer was the acting COS, or if it was all in the hands of the Exercise staff.

[173] See: *Rapport on implementering av genderperspektiv i emnet fellesoperasjoner of øvelse 'Joint Effort' ved Forsvarets Stabsskole 2010-2011*; and *Erfaringsrapport gender øvelse Faryab PRT 16*, No. 2011/015347-001/FORSVARET/522, 15 March 2011.

poorly with regard to gender perspectives yet again.[174] When the student acting as Military Advisor was absent due to illness, the student acting as GENAD was ordered to leave the GENAD position vacant for the entire Exercise in order to fill the Military Advisor position instead, marking the GENAD position as least important. Additionally, the Commander concluded the Exercise by joking in front of staff, students, and civilian experts that, since deterrence had failed on his watch, the student in charge would have to act as GENAD in the next exercise *as punishment*.[175]

Analysis

In an organisational culture where status and glory are connected to matters of "hard security," it can be difficult for a soldier to push against that culture to become a promoter of equal rights and gender perspectives. Many in the Armed Forces view the job of an officer as involving standard, practical work with little variation.[176] If that work includes soldiering, and being a solder thus remains a strong part of the work identity of military personnel, implementation of UNSCR 1325 will be successful only if its goals and tasks are *perceived* as a natural part of the work of soldiers. This brings us back to the views of Ms. Bachelet that *feelings* must be addressed in order to achieve implementation, and the premise of Schein (2004) that psychological safety is a prerequisite to organisational change. If the military organisation is to embrace the values of UNSCR 1325, leadership must acknowledge the role of feelings, which relate to values and status and affect decisions at all levels. In Sweden, an evaluation of WPS-related implementation found that the Swedish military organisation also took an emotional, rather than professional, approach to gender perspectives and that reactions to the WPS agenda often stemmed from negative feelings instead of from objective analysis (Egnell, Hojem and Berts, 2014, p. 71).

The narrow view within militaries of what are regarded as security issues highlights the necessity that the scope of security continues to be redefined by feminist

[174] Communicated to the author in two phone calls (one with a student and one with an instructor), 29 May 2013.

[175] In 2014, I was informed there were positive changes compared to 2013. However, it was not until 2016 that a GENAD was reportedly included from the start of the exercise, to incorporate gender perspectives throughout the planning and execution phases.

[176] The two last Chiefs of Defence, have mentioned this. The latest occasion was a remark by Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen at the annual Equality Conference of the Chief of Defense, Akershus Fortress, Oslo, 12 May 2015.

scholars. Of course, definitions do not alter realities on the ground if actual change is not implemented (Sjoberg, 2010). Still, even a nominally increased focus on human security has influenced military operations in many respects, compared to just decades ago. Today, there is less tolerance for the loss of human lives at the hands of states; politics, increased transparency, and media coverage have all contributed to shifting the responsibilities of and demands on Armed Forces; and there are new operational patterns, new uses of new weapons, new rules of engagement, even new military doctrines, morals, and culture (Gentry, 2013). In these ways, human security is concerned with how military means can be used legally, but also challenges how military operations are carried out.

The goals of implementing the political aims and policies of a peace nation and operating as a fighting force with combat capabilities can easily be seen as conflicting. But it is this opposition within the Norwegian Armed Forces that further emphasises the importance of a robust conceptual approach, a compelling positive vision, role models, and leadership commitment to creating the psychological safety needed to enable change (Schein, 2004). Early expectations that Norway would be an obvious leader in implementing UNSCR 1325 were linked to assumptions that Norwegian national culture was reflective of Norwegian military culture. Observations for this study indicate that this military culture deviates to a significant degree from that national culture, favouring hard security issues and masculinised activities like combat over soft security issues, which are viewed as feminised. This illustrates how masculinity, both eroticised and institutionalised, can enable militarism as a legitimate means to resolving problems and conflicts (Kronsell, 2012, p. 13; Sheehan, 2005, pp. 128-129), even within a larger culture that embraces feminine social concepts.

4.8 Reporting: How Transparent is Too Transparent?

The Gender Project evaluated two major exercises – Faryab, a pre-deployment exercise for the PRT Meymaneh in Afghanistan (Forsvaret, 2011a), and Exercise Joint Effort at the NORDCSC (Forsvaret, 2011d)– and gave feedback to the military organisation.[177] Several officers responded to the reports issued for each exercise with frustration and

[177] Available at Doculive in the Armed Forces: *Erfaringsrapport gender øvelse Faryab PRT 16*; and *Rapport on implementering av genderperspektiv i emnet fellesoperasjoner of øvelse 'Joint Effort' ved Forsvarets Stabsskole 2010-2011*.

anger, though they never questioned their validity.[178] Indeed, the reports were straightforward, well documented, and could not in all fairness be contradicted. It was the fact that the reports had been sent through the chain of command as normal procedure, and thus were available to the rest of the organisation, that was the cause of contention. One military leader claimed it was disloyal to make the reports accessible, because they made the responsible department look bad. Producing the reports was one thing; publicising them was another, and there had been an expectation that undesirable results would be addressed in-house.[179] And so, instead of the analytical evaluation presented in these reports, which identified subpar capacities at several levels, the question of accessibility became the focus upon their release.

Though the Gender Project had been given authorisation to be creative and flexible and its mandate had the commitment of leaders, some military colleagues were uncomfortable with the freedom entrusted to the Project and made sceptical comments about the independence it had been given.[180] This freedom and flexibility seemed to be associated with being out of, or hard to, control. The open and unrestricted approach to investigations that was taken by the Project was also perceived by some as a threat, causing the Project to be called upon to answer questions and inquiries from time to time after complaints reached leadership.[181] The Project was easily able to demonstrate results, however, and benefit to the NDUC; and as long as successes continued, leadership was content and the Project was allowed to work relatively autonomously. And, leadership expected transparency from the Project, only once instructing Project personnel to omit specific information from an annual report.

There were advantages to being autonomous, including a greater capacity to adapt to requests from the military organisation. For this reason, the Project and NDUC leadership felt it was important *not* to have a rigid agenda, so that the Project could monitor and act upon needs as they were expressed. However, most of the time, the Project had to be on the offence to get any access at all, and only a small proportion of military personnel or leaders initiated contact with the Project in order to increase their own knowledge. The general level of understanding of gender perspectives in the Armed

[178] Meetings with personnel involved in the exercises, 10 August 2011 and 14 December 2011.
[179] Comment made by colleague, June 2011.
[180] Meeting with colleagues with leadership responsibilities at NDUC, 19 November 2010 and 31 March 2011.
[181] Meetings with leadership at NDUC, 15 November 2010 and 10 June 2011.

Forces was modest at best, though; and many military colleagues held strong opinions about gender perspectives that were not based on a proper gender education but on the idea that "since I have a gender, I am a gender expert."

Opinions and criticisms shared in private were often more severe than those aired in public. Resentment was expressed about the attention media and leadership directed towards gender issues, about internal recognition, and about financing. For example, some military personnel believed that funds spent implementing gender perspectives should have been spent otherwise, preferably to support their own areas of expertise. By promoting gender perspectives, receiving funds that could have been allocated in another way, and highlighting flaws in the military organisation, the Gender Project was seen by some as unfit to be "part of the team." This meant that the Project could not singlehandedly inspire organisational change but could support open and forthright dialogue on opportunities and limitations, to create *possibilities* for change. This sparked individual efforts from officers who valued the work of the Project and wanted to improve the performance of their own departments or units in relation to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives; and this did promote implementation.

Analysis

Reporting and feedback are parts of any standard process model so that command and control can achieve desired effects (Stanton, Baber, and Harris, 2008, p. 232). Negative reactions from military officers to reports and feedback provided by the Gender Project revealed their expectation that colleagues should communicate only minimally and privately about anything that could be perceived as criticism. Personal loyalty to fellow soldiers was thus expected to eclipse professional loyalty to assigned tasks, the military leadership, or the Government. This reflects an organisational culture that fears the publication of poor planning and execution and any potential disciplinary action that ensues; and yet, there were no observable consequences for these failures.

A similar fear of being exposed as incompetent was described by Schein (2004, p. 330) as an element of learning anxiety. Combined with the fear of losing personal identity and group membership, this can lead to behaviours like denial, scapegoating, dodging, and bargaining. As Machiavelli said, those who want change will have enemies among those who fear the loss of power and position, and this is a fair assessment of the

dynamics within the Norwegian Armed Forces in relation to the WPS agenda in the timeframe of this study.

The culture of the Norwegian military is inflexible and has a low tolerance for different views, and the hierarchical structure of the organisation does not benefit learning. In fact, research has found that strong homogeneous cultures, as seen in the Armed Forces, often negatively impact learning, which is best supported by horizontal structures wherein groups have the freedom to think creatively and the ability to both try and fail (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009, p. 334). Still, the low power distance observed in the Norwegian Armed Forces may somewhat mitigate the effect of hierarchical structures, and in some parts of the military organisation, there are long traditions of transparency for the sake of learning from mistakes. The safety culture among Air Force crewmembers is a great example.

4.9 National versus International Efforts

The Norwegian Government exhibited a willingness to earmark funds to support military and civilian projects related to UNSCR 1325, both nationally and internationally. The Government declared Nordic cooperation a specific priority and contributed both monetary and human resources to establishing a Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Stockholm, Sweden. But when a feasibility study regarding Nordic cooperation on UNSCR 1325 had been sent to the NDUC for inputs, NDUC leadership had endorsed the study's second recommendation – suggesting close cooperation *instead* of the establishment of this permanent Stockholm-based Nordic Centre. Given the lack of progress within the Norwegian Armed Forces, the NDUC regarded Norway's implementation process as in its early stages, meaning that knowledge, structures, functions, and culture remained unclear. Further, to staff positions abroad required reducing already limited efforts in Norway, where the same officer could work to implement UNSCR 1325 within the Norwegian military for less than half the cost of transferring them elsewhere.[182] The advice of the NDUC was disregarded by the MoD, and the NCGM was established as part of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) at SWEDINT (Swedish Armed Forces International Centre).

[182] An estimate based on the additional costs of living, travel, moving allowance, etc. that are associated with filling positions abroad.

Along with several Norwegian officers working at the NCGM on a full-time basis, additional Norwegian personnel have taught courses and assisted with developing curricula at the Centre. When their schedules allowed, Gender Project personnel also made an effort to contribute knowledge and expertise in the international arena. The Project received more invitations from international actors than from the national military organisation, in fact, and it became obvious in international settings that Norway was regarded as a valuable partner not only due to the expertise of personnel but due to Norway's deep pockets when it came to UNSCR 1325 and related initiatives.[183]

At NDUC, on the other hand, it was a struggle to ensure that funds remained earmarked for the WPS agenda. Before the Gender Project had even started, there were expectations among some colleagues about how these funds would be spent, and as leader of the Project, it was vital to ensure that the NDUC disbursed this funding to implement gender perspectives. Predictably, this was unpopular. And yet, the need to play gatekeeper in this way was clear when military colleagues were openly willing to exploit the concept of gender in order to fund projects that would not actually support or promote implementation of the WPS agenda. One such proposal was for a publication that would only indirectly include gender, in order to justify the money spent, but the mandate approved by the Commander ruled out this suggestion. When they didn't receive funding, some of those who had proposed the project explicitly dismissed gender in remarks that revealed just how *un*important the topic had been to them all along:

> *"Since they won't embrace the spending, we've decided to drop the gender aspect altogether and write a book on real military matters instead."*[184]

Another point of contention among some Armed Forces personnel was the fact that new, temporary civilian employees largely staffed the Gender Project, while the rest of the military organisation struggled to fill positions due to international operations in Afghanistan and Libya, and UN missions. Military colleagues were frustrated to observe that the Project had three new advisors at a time when they were forced to operate with vacancies. The fact that the Project received earmarked funding was no consolation, and

[183] Based on interactions at international seminars on: 17–19 February 2010, 13–15 October 2010, and 19–22 October 2010.
[184] From conversation at NORDCSC, June 2010 (I failed to mark the exact date on my notes).

Project personnel had to make an effort to establish a good working relationship despite these perceived inequities.

Analysis

Even if the direction of financial resources towards gender structures created tensions, access to dedicated funding for these structures is one of the most obvious functional factors that promoted the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Without funding, both national and international progress would have been significantly more protracted or even lacking entirely. Yet, access to funding brings the need for structures and functions to manage it wisely, which can be especially difficult in an organisational culture that accepts stripping financial resources away from issues like gender to spend them in other ways. Indeed, the disloyalty displayed by some military personnel to the mandate attached to earmarked funds demonstrated an organisational culture tolerant of disobedience to instructions of the Government and exposed a degree of hubris within the Armed Forces that led some officers to believe they knew better than civilian political leaders and could thus feel free to ignore their directives. This again reflects the cultural dimension of *low power distance* described by Geert Hofstede (1993), wherein relatively less powerful members of the organisation reject the idea that power is distributed unequally.

The interplay between national and international ambitions related to UNSCR 1325 is itself a factor in national implementation efforts within the Norwegian Armed Forces. International initiatives, especially those of NATO, can bring valuable experience and knowledge back to the Norwegian military. At the same time, without concrete examples of how Norway's national commitment to implementing gender perspectives has created change, there is a fair chance that the country will *not* be seen as a credible international role model and frontrunner on this matter in the long run.

Lacking a conceptualisation of and defined goals for both the national and international arenas, an evaluation of what was beneficial or possible for the Norwegian Armed Forces was left to the Gender Project. The fact that an evaluation had not previously been undertaken was a failure of both function and culture, and was evident in the decision to join the NCGM. Undoubtedly, the NCGM as Gender Department Head in NATO has been valuable to the international community and to military operations in general. Nonetheless, the decision by the Norwegian MoD and Norwegian Defence Staff

to join NCGM showed a lack of ability or desire (function and culture) to assess needs within the *Norwegian* Armed Forces. Relatively few students from the Norwegian military participate in courses at the NCGM and, given the very high cost of staffing positions abroad to which the military became newly obliged, a simple cost-benefit analysis indicates that this may not be a reasonable cost for the benefit a mere handful of Norwegian students could receive.

It is important to note, too, that the NCGM does crucial work internationally and can be a key factor in Norway's comprehensive security policies, but that the Norwegian Armed Forces are currently unable to fully profit from it. This is due to a lack of structures to command and organise the necessary support for competence building, a lack of functions to include personnel working at NCGM in national contexts, and a lack of culture that regards this as an imperative. Any political gains or effect on Norway's standing in NATO that have resulted from cooperation in the NCGM is hard to evaluate. Sweden, as the host nation, carries the main economic burden and has openly taken a significant degree of ownership of the Centre. For instance, NCGM was at one point reorganised and incorporated as a structural element *within* the Swedish military and official briefing materials highlighted the logo of the Swedish Armed Forces, downplaying the Centre's broader "Nordic" character.[185]

One interesting feature of international efforts is that they are almost exclusively politically driven. Though there are several initiatives, including within NATO and the PfP, in which Norway and Norwegian officers play an important role, Norway's international participation is part of a comprehensive *political* agenda. When this international agenda is seen as taking precedence over the practical implementation of gender perspectives within the Norwegian Armed Forces and military operations, it adds to the impression of many Norwegian military personnel that UNSCR 1325 is merely a political project. And this fuels frustrations regarding what is perceived as the unfair allocation of funds, which some believe are being directed towards irrelevant aims in order to meet external demands.

This fight over funding reveals an organisational culture that encourages competition between different disciplines and tends to sub-optimise. When leadership had to be challenged regarding earmarked financing and staffing for the Gender Project,

[185] This proved to be in violation of the NORDEFCO technical agreement, and the NCGM Steering Committee demanded the NCGM make changes accordingly.

it demonstrated their limited loyalty to matters outside of those for which they themselves advocate. This organisational culture makes the resistance to gender perspectives that is displayed in the Norwegian Armed Forces almost inevitable, because the concept is so outside the pervasive norm of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005).

For this reason, funding for gender initiatives should have been thoroughly analysed as part of a comprehensive concept for implementation designed to foster the psychological safety needed to achieve cultural and organisational change (Schein, 2004; G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Without this kind of transformational change, and without the will, expertise, or management within the Norwegian Armed Forces to shape responsive new structures and functions, and to continuously monitor the military organisation from within, the full implementation of gender perspectives is unlikely. And while funding and participating in international efforts can contribute to this goal in many ways, such as through networking and the sharing of experiences, Norway will lose international credibility if national implementation efforts are not successful.

4.10 Military Leadership: Command and Control, or *Plus ça Change*?

The Norwegian Armed Forces have undergone considerable change in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War, developing conventional and compatible structures for command and control in accordance with new strategies and capabilities. The military has traditional bureaucratic processes for day-to-day management, but also more operational hands-on structures and processes where required by situations and operations. In principle, these already established structures and processes could, with some added knowledge and competence, be used to mainstream gender perspectives; but military culture would have to permit it and military leaders would have to exhibit a full commitment to implementation.

One concrete example of how a lack of leadership commitment generates missed opportunities occurred when the Gender Project was invited by NJHQ leadership to contribute to a gender seminar in the fall of 2011, as part of a mutual cooperation agreement between the NJHQ and the NDUC. The seminar, which was open to all units in the Armed Forces and advertised nationally, attracted only some thirty participants; and beyond a couple of male leaders from the NJHQ, most participants were mid- to lower-

level military women. When one of the tasks highlighted in UNSCR 1325 – the importance of talking to female leaders in areas of operation, i.e. Afghanistan – was discussed, one of the military leaders who was present responded sceptically, asking:

> *"Why should we talk to female leaders in Afghanistan? I'm not interested in expending resources on this until you can prove it has an effect. I won't try it until I know it works – so give me the proof first, and document it properly."*

Another participant challenged this framing, saying:

> *"Then I would like to see the proof you collected, all the documentation that was provided, and the documented effect it had, before you chose to talk to male leaders in Afghanistan!"*[186]

This dialogue demonstrates the tendency of Norwegian military leadership, frequently observed by Gender Project personnel, to see efficiency-related arguments as the only legitimate justifications for implementation of gender perspectives. Yet, efficiency in respect to *what* was rarely specified and demands for proof of efficiency were the burden of women, not men.[187]

A few military leaders did show an openness to giving access to the Gender Project and creating opportunities to share information with their part of the organisation. The Project found that subordinates sometimes questioned the commitment of these leaders, as well as whether they genuinely understood the value of gender perspectives in the analysis phase of operational planning. But the fact that they exhibited a willingness to incorporate new knowledge nonetheless had positive and concrete consequences.[188]

Another essential aspect of the control function of leadership is reporting, and official documents of the Norwegian Government explicitly mention the importance of reporting related to gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325.[189] In a speech to the UN, the Minister of Defence also declared that reporting was an area of particular priority for Norway and announced that a new reporting system specifically geared towards UNSCR

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[186] Gender seminar, NJHQ, 11–12 October 2011.

[187] Communicated to author at meeting, 25 May 2010; at meeting with leadership at NORDCSC, 31 March 2011; and at Gender Seminar, NJHQ, 11-12 October 2011.

[188] As reported by Colonel T. Byrløkken (then Chief of Staff/Brig N) at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee seminar, "UN Security Council Resolution – women, peace and security: 3 levels of Norwegian implementation," 16 September 2013.

[189] See the 2006 Norwegian NAP and Norway's Strategic Plan for WPS 2011–2013.

1325 would be introduced in Norwegian military operations.[190] Recognising that the task of creating such a reporting system would be new and unexplored territory for personnel within the military, the Gender Project designed a reporting tool and presented it to the NJHQ. The tool was based on knowledge about national challenges and needs, UN indicators, and NATO directives, and was aimed at enabling the Norwegian Armed Forces to compare results, undertake research, and track successes and failures in order to make progress in implementation. If successfully put into use, the Project anticipated that the tool could be used as a model by other NATO countries, and thus make comparisons possible.

This tool was presented to NJHQ leadership on several occasions,[191] but was never activated, and no reason was ever offered for why it had been ignored. Instead, orders were given to include gender perspectives in existing reporting procedures; a decision that again seemed to be based at least partly on concerns over efficiency. Although the Gender Project supported avoiding the creation of parallel structures and functions related to gender perspectives that were "just another add-on," when it came to reporting, the level of knowledge within the Armed Forces on the subject of gender was so minimal that special accommodations clearly needed to be made in the initial phase of implementation. Until a gender perspective was a natural reflex for military personnel, gender would need to be given focused attention in several areas, including in reporting, which was often unsuitable for transmitting lessons learned or contributing to the education system and pre-deployment trainings (Schjølset, 2014a).

Aware of the central role of the NJHQ in the planning and execution of military operations, the Gender Project also offered to fund one position that would work mostly within the NJHQ to enable implementation of gender perspectives in all aspects of military operations. The Project possessed the competence to train and educate candidates and the means to support the position, both professionally and financially,

[190] Minister Faremo's speech, commemorating 10 years since the adoption of Resolution 1325, was delivered on 26 October 2010.

[191] The tool was transmitted by e-mail several times and in person, in printed form, at a meeting on 12 May 2011. It was also sent to CoS PRT after a meeting on 28 June 2010, to prepare for deployment.

due to staff vacancies within the Project. But the cooperation of the NJHQ was necessary, and it never fully considered the offer.[192]

Yet another command and control issue that was routinely noted by Project personnel was the lack of consequences for a failure to do assigned tasks. In some cases, the Project was told that the responsibility for imposing sanctions was delegated by the Norwegian Defence Staff leadership to the appropriate level within its own organisation or to other parts of the military organisation, but little or nothing came of it. Overall, there was a lack of useful structures and functions, and a culture that did not prioritise holding individuals accountable for poor results or neglect of their tasks.

The reduced personnel capacity within the Gender Project meant it could only reach some parts of the military organisation and since barely a handful of other actors in the organisation had the competence to teach gender-related subjects, they could not close the gap. A lack of knowledge related to gender and UNSCR 1325 within different military units equated to a lot of time spent by Project staff travelling, in order to educate both military and civilian personnel.[193] Often, an introductory lecture from the Project was the only input related to UNSCR 1325 these audiences had received to that point. And it was rare for military leaders to attend these events, despite the fact that most did not seem to understand how to incorporate gender perspectives. The process of increasing competence and furthering implementation was therefore more time-consuming than desired.[194]

The disinterest of leadership in increasing their knowledge on the subject of gender reflected the limits of the organisational culture. Yet, to the extent that any management of the organisational culture was undertaken to encourage an embrace of UNSCR 1325, it was delegated to the Gender Project, a temporary structure, and to a Gender Field Advisor, a single structural function at the tactical level. The expertise required to manage cultural change was absent at the leadership level, which did not

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[192] The offer was presented by phone, then in a meeting on 24 August 2010, then again during VTC on 20 September 2010.

[193] The Gender Project organised a train-the-trainers seminar and produced teaching materials but were also asked to provide pre-deployment education and received requests from several different military units for expertise.

[194] This was again confirmed at the first meeting in the Norwegian Gender Network in the Armed Forces, 8 March 2016, where representatives explained that gender had not been taught in pre-deployment training before, partly because they did not have staff with the relevant competence and partly because finding such a person would be too time consuming.

make or communicate a cultural map and made no clearly defined strategic choices in response to UNSCR 1325.

Analysis

According to the checklist for managing organisational culture put forth by G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), the leadership of the Norwegian Armed Forces failed on multiple levels by neglecting to take any necessary steps related to culture management even long after implementation efforts had begun. Attempts to delegate the management of culture to the Gender Project or a Gender Field Advisor ignored that these structures could never facilitate broader organisational change. This cannot be achieved without a clear conceptual plan for implementation that extends from leadership, based on a thorough evaluation of the need for added or changed structures, functions, and culture.

In some ways, the resistance exhibited by senior officers to gender perspectives, when they had been recommended or ordered by the UN, NATO, international agreements, the Government, and the Chief of Defence is rather extraordinary. To demand concrete proof of their effectiveness before being willing to even play a part in implementation, for example, demonstrates a remarkable degree of defiance. In democratic societies, a military operation is not a goal in itself; it is a tool to achieve something, and that *something* gives any military operation legitimacy. In other words, without a legitimate political goal, the use of military force is just violence. In this case, the operational goals are set in UNSCR 1325, including the equal and fair participation of women in decision-making processes, and better protection for women from assault. The apparent assumption by some Norwegian military leaders that local women in the areas they operate have nothing to add, or must *prove* they have something to add, to the myriad functions involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping should be viewed as an operational concern.

Because many military personnel did not perceive new tasks related to the WPS agenda as necessary to operations, their possible benefits to efficiency (as a force multiplier) were often highlighted.[195] But even through this framing, cultural elements can only be learned if new behaviours lead to success and satisfaction (Schein, 2004, p.

[195] This was also the basis for the Swedish approach to implementation (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014).

334). It is therefore important to show *how* the implementation of gender perspectives, from the start to the end of an operation, facilitates success and contributes to reaching operational goals. This requires a commitment to implementation in all phases of an operation because, to acquire knowledge and experience success, there has to be something to learn and achieve.

Missed opportunities in the Norwegian Armed Forces related to implementation of UNSCR 1325 were the by-product of an organisational culture that accepts the dismissal of directives from the Government, and of an organisation with no functions in place to impose consequences for ignoring them. But political leaders in some ways exacerbated resistance to implementation by repeatedly stating that military culture would need to change in order to implement gender perspectives in the Armed Forces (See Chapter 5). They may have been correct, but according to Schein (2004, p. 334), it is important to focus on concrete change linked to solving a specific problem, and not just on cultural change for its own sake. Without clearly defining a problem or putting forth a plan to fix it through the development of new or transformed functions and structures, the Government created dynamics in which cultural change in the Armed Forces was particularly hard to manage. Indeed, the lack of a conceptual approach to implementation on the part of Norwegian political *and* military leadership contributed to a disproportionate amount of attention on culture rather than on the actual goals of change. Ironically, a focus on those goals could have led to the development of other dimensions in the organisation – such as structures and functions (Schein, 2004) – that would have made managing cultural change much easier.

The disregard military leaders showed for the need to develop these dimensions signalled that UNSCR 1325 was unclear or unimportant to them. One of the values of reporting, for instance, is that systems and procedures can formalise the practice of *paying attention*, and thus reinforce messaging about what leadership really cares about (Schein, 2004). This alone is a strong argument for making use of the pioneering reporting tool developed by the Gender Project, to demonstrate commitment to a new perspective and impress upon the organisation its importance. But this was another opportunity missed by the NJHQ. On top of that, the disinterest exhibited by the NJHQ regarding the position proposed (and potentially funded) by the Gender Project to ensure the implementation of gender perspectives in military operations, revealed a lack of clear and reasoned decision making.

Schein (2004) notes that if leaders within organisations are not consciously aware of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage *them*. It is essential for this reason that leaders possess a cultural understanding of the organisations they lead (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). But if they want to achieve transformational change (Schein, 2004), it is also essential that leaders have the capacity to manage that culture. Still, the Norwegian Armed Forces have known since a 2007 report about serious issues with limited leadership involvement in gender initiatives and with control and follow up capacities (Brestrup et al., 2007), but have not implemented several of its recommendations. The conclusions of the report, produced by a working group focused on increasing the participation of women in the Armed Forces, clearly reflect the findings of *this* study that a compelling positive vision was lacking from leadership, and positive role models were scarce. This meant that even when initiatives were undertaken, they were limited in scope and ambition. And, essential functions like a reward and discipline system, or updated structures consistent with new ways of thinking and working, were not established.

Change, at least change that challenges established structures, functions, and culture, was in this way resisted at all levels in the organisation. And what leaders do *not* pay attention to is as known throughout an organisation as their priorities (Schein, 2004). Indeed, the things leaders notice, comment on, measure, control, reward, and address systematically indicate what they view as important, and by omission, *un*important. Thus, in the context of implementing UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian military, a lack of reporting is not only evidence of poor reporting practices, it communicates to the organisation that leadership does not feel gender perspectives warrant attention.

4.11 Political Leadership: Demands without Consequences

The relationship between the MoD and the Defence Staff was complicated by issues with reporting and control mechanisms as well. The Government declared that transparency, reporting, and control were essential to implementation of UNSCR 1325 in its National Action Plans (2006 and 2015) and Strategic Plan (2011) but reporting related to gender perspectives was largely completed by the MoD in a silo, without the input of key actors working on the WPS agenda. In fact, when the Gender Project contacted the MoD in 2011 with feedback on progress, the Ministry replied that any challenges to

implementation identified by the Project would *not* be included in their reporting, because they wanted to highlight what was being done, and not what could have been done better. Despite being well aware that much could be improved, the MoD hoped that by highlighting successes they could further motivate those who already had made an effort. They argued that this would benefit both the Armed Forces and implementation of UNSCR 1325.[196]

This raised the question of whether challenges within the Armed Forces suggested a lack of control and an inability to implement change by the MoD, as well as if reporting on lack of progress was thus seen as reflecting poorly on the MoD itself. Could control mechanisms have a boomerang effect? Indeed, it appeared several times that it was more important to the MoD to present Norway as successful in implementing UNSCR 1325 than it was to actually implement it. The Gender Field Advisor in Afghanistan became a recurring but empty theme in speeches that reflected no comprehension of what had been achieved in the field, for example, and though the Minister of Defence discussed the importance of reporting and promised a new reporting tool in her speech to the UN Assembly, little effort was made to follow up.

The Gender Project continued to press for progress nonetheless and was willing to shine a spotlight on every part of the organisation to do so. Sometimes, it seemed as though the Project was turning out to be more than leadership had bargained for.[197] Still, a lack of progress had no actual consequences for leaders, staff officers, or departments. Even after the MoD issued PET 23 on gender perspectives in 2010 because progress had been so slow, a failure to complete the tasks it assigned was met by no observable consequences. PET 23 was coordinated with the Gender Project and the Defence Staff, and though the Defence Staff and the military organisation did perform some tasks, others were simply never delegated from the Defence Staff to the organisation. And, one of the tasks was the implementation of a reporting system for UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in operations, but the pioneering reporting tool that *was* produced by the Gender Project was never utilised.

The development of guidelines to deal with sexual and gender-based violence in conflict areas was another initiative that generated tension between the Armed Forces

[196] E-mail from MoD, 11 November 2011.

[197] Meetings with leadership at NDUC, 31 March 2011 and 26 September 2011; meeting with Defence Staff representative, 31 August 2011; meeting with Defence Staff and MoD, 17 October 2011; and meeting with the Department of Military Power, 15 November 2011.

and the political leadership in the MoD on the topic of reporting and control.[198] In early 2010, the military was given the task of developing guidelines for the prevention, response to, and adequate reporting on issues related to sexual and gender-based violence in operations.[199] The order emphasised the importance of involving the operative components of the Armed Forces in developing these systems. Shortly after the task was assigned, the Gender Project offered to assist the MoD and the Defence Staff and made an advisor available as a point of contact. Then, in the fall of 2010, the Project decided to organise an international conference on "Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations" that could be used to release the guidelines, create publicity, and enhance implementation. The conference was set for 17 June 2011, and several high-level officials agreed to participate, including the Norwegian MOD and the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflicts.

In the meantime, the Gender Project continued to inquire about progress on the development of guidelines and repeatedly renewed its offer to assist. On 23 December 2010, the MoD issued the aforementioned Supplemental Assignment, PET 23 (2010), to the Defence Staff, pushing for progress on UNSCR 1325 generally but mentioning the guidelines specifically. Yet, this document did not find its way to the Defence Staff until May 2011, when a representative from the Gender Project hand delivered a copy. This delay was attributed to a duplication of archive codes, but colleagues confirmed knowledge of the orders; they had simply not made it a priority to seek them out as long as the documents had not appeared on their computer (in Doculive). When the Operational Division of the Defence Staff learned of the delay, they sought clarification of

[198] The International Criminal Court describes sexual violence as "an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons," committed either "by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power…" Sexual violence can take many forms including sexual assault, rape, sexual torture, mutilation of genitals, sexual humiliation, sexual enslavement, forced rape, forced incest and sexual harassment. Sexual violence within or by members of security sector institutions falls largely into the following four categories: 1. Sexual violence committed by the security sector against other security personnel; 2. Sexual violence taking place between detainees; 3. Sexual violence committed by security sector personnel against members of the public; and 4. Sexual violence committed by security sector personnel against detainees (Watson, 2014).

[199] Referred to in a request for progress and explanation of the delay. Official document reference: "Angående utarbeidelse av retningslinjer for å møte seksualisert vold I krig og konflikt," No. 2008/03234-37/FD I 2/HAHS, 23 May 2012.

the scope of the assignment in a meeting attended by Gender Project personnel, to decide on how to move forward.[200]

At this point, the conference was just one month away and the fact that nothing had been done to develop guidelines was troubling. The Defence Staff expressed appreciation for the support offered by the Gender Project, but there was a common understanding that the guidelines had to be produced by the operational part of the organisation that would be using them in order to become an effective tool. In addition to the Defence Staff, this meant that main operational components such as the Northern Brigade and the National Joint Headquarters would also need to participate and feel ownership over the guidelines. Instead of development, the Project was thus asked to assist with professional inputs and writing.

The Gender Project chose to re-brand the conference. It would no longer be a release event but a kick-off. Media were interested, due to the high-level participants and the situation of women in conflict, but they were sceptical of the fact that guidelines were yet to be developed. With assistance from the Communications Department in the MoD, the Project was able to put a positive spin on this in a spot that aired on national television.[201] The contents of the conference were then published in the Defence Command and Staff College's Monograph Series (Kvarving, 2011) in an effort to reach a wider audience.

However, after the conference passed, no one in Defence Staff Operations followed up on what had been agreed at the meeting a month earlier, when clarifications were sought regarding how to make progress on the guidelines. The Gender Project kept up its inquiries, contacting the MoD and the Defence Staff on several occasions, but it seemed the Project was the *only* entity inquiring about the guidelines. After several months, the Project was asked to host a meeting with representatives from the MoD, Defence Staff Operations, and Defence Staff Personnel to get the matter sorted out.[202] Project personnel were among the few familiar with the process of developing the guidelines to that point, and they explained the history to individuals who were newly

[200] Meeting at NDUC, 9 May 2011.
[201] This assistance was vital to a successful outcome and was made possible by the insight of the officer on duty in the Communications Department on both the subject and the media. Again, personal relations proved important.
[202] The meeting took place at NORDCSC, 17 October 2011.

involved. In short, it was the fall of 2011 and nothing had been achieved on a task issued in the beginning of 2010.

As a part of the NDUC, the Gender Project had no authority to order the military organisation to act on the guidelines. Nonetheless, a representative from the Defence Staff remarked sharply that:

> *"If you do not stop pestering the Defence Staff about these guidelines, we will simply give the task back to you."*

A representative of the Gender Project responded:

> *"Back to us? It is not the Gender Project that has given the Armed Forces the task of developing guidelines, but the Norwegian Government!"*

As the meeting adjourned, there was an understanding that something had to be done and that the Defence Staff had the power to do so, due to its authority to command. Yet, no guidelines materialised by the end of 2011, despite reporting from the MoD in its annual feedback on the UNSCR 1325 NAP that they were in process and could be expected to be finalised in 2012.[203]

Although beyond the timeframe of this study, it is worth mentioning that an internal game of "hot potato" was played over who was responsible for making headway on the guidelines, even after that report was issued by the MoD. In May of 2012, the MoD sent a letter to the Defence Staff reminding them of the task of developing guidelines, referring to all the official documents that assigned the task, and stating that an investigation into the two-year delay was necessary in order to compel progress.[204] The MoD gave the Defence Staff a deadline (1 June 2012) by which to respond, noting that the Ministry had reported the guidelines would be finished within 2012. Without consulting the NDUC or its legal department, the Defence Staff then delegated the guidelines to the department, to be included in the "Military Manual Project" it was publishing. But the guidelines did not fit within the concept or scope of the Manual – a fact that was swiftly reported to the Defence Staff – and so the task of developing the guidelines was consequently assigned to the NDUC in general.[205] At this point, the

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[203] The progress report for 2011 has been the only official report since the NAP in 2006. The report is available in Norwegian at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/rapport_sr1325.pdf (accessed 30 August 2018).

[204] See: "Angående utarbeidelse av retningslinjer for å møte seksualisert vold I krig og konflikt."

[205] The Legal Department at NORDCSC explained this process to me in the fall of 2012.

Gender Project was in its finishing stages and the competence and personnel needed to develop the guidelines had either left the organisation or had been tasked with other duties. As of 2017, the guidelines had still not been produced.

Analysis

The impression that implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the Armed Forces were mere political ventures with no real consequence for the military was reinforced by the lack of reporting demands, control over, or consequences for the Armed Forces by the MoD. In order to remain (or uphold the impression of being) a frontrunner and international leader in implementing the WPS agenda, the Government focused more on reporting progress than on exercising *actual* control or fully assessing implementation. This suggests that the necessary situational awareness was lacking or that opponents of implementation within the Armed Forces were actually making a fair point. The mantra of "*sit tight; it will pass*" began to sound like it had a ring of truth to it.

The Norwegian Government, however, maintained a focus on UNSCR 1325, both nationally and internationally. Considerable economic resources were dedicated to programmes that incorporated gender perspectives, especially in the civil sphere, and this willingness to fund projects contributed to the sense that Norway was indeed a frontrunner in this area and had made more progress in implementation than other nations. But the lack of consequences within the Norwegian Armed Forces for failures to implement directives revealed the inability of the organisation to create necessary conditions for the psychological safety required for change (Schein, 2004). A reward and discipline system must be in place along with organisational structures that are consistent with the new way of thinking and working; and again, the findings of this study demonstrate that this was not achieved, even in the relationship between the MoD and the Armed Forces.

The lack of ability or will within the Armed Forces to convert political aims into military tasks, and to make the resources and personnel available to do so, had no consequences for the careers of military leaders or staff officers and were not mentioned in performance reports. The appropriate structure, the Defence Staff, was responsible for the task of developing the guidelines, but its failure to give the necessary orders was a functional breakdown. This failure reflects an organisational culture in which it is possible for military officers to delay or disrupt processes and face no

penalties. On the other hand, if the Government does not demand results, military personnel are actually right to conclude that anything not seen as a core task will "disappear" if disregarded long enough. The choice to focus on tasks for which they *do* face consequences for failure is then understandable. Indeed, this propensity to do only what one is measured on is why control mechanisms are among the conditions Schein identifies as necessary to create the psychological safety for change (Schein, 2004).

The inability of the Defence Staff to lead the organisation through the conscious management of structure, strategy, culture, and control (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005) raises the question of whether the strategic and operational levels of the Armed Forces even comprehended new assignments related to UNSCR 1325, or tried to change at all; and it completely absolves the lack of implementation at the tactical level. The lost cause of the guidelines is a useful example of how little priority was given to the WPS agenda. It is also an example of what Woodward (1997) and Kronsell (2012) explain as the binary opposition between what is viewed as masculine and feminine where values, status, and power affect the organisation and its priorities. In this case, loyalty to political ambitions regarding gender perspectives and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence is obviously lacking and represents a major cultural factor preventing implementation.

As noted above, the MoD indicated in the official 2011 Progress Report (Regjeringen, 2011a) that guidelines for the prevention, response to, and reporting on sexual and gender-based violence in operations were in process. To report that something is "in process" implies that it is actually in development. Yet, observations that nothing had been done at that time were indisputable, and the guidelines are still "in process" over six years later.

4.12 The Status of Implementation and the Aftermath of the Gender Project

The initial two-year duration of the Gender Project was extended a further year, until July 2013. The last year of the Project was focused on the production of relevant teaching material for officer candidate schools; the preparation of a report on Norwegian Gender Advisors in Afghanistan (Fleming, 2014); the writing and editing of the book *Gender in the Armed Forces: from Theory to Practice* (Schjølset, 2014b); and teaching in classrooms and at pre-deployment trainings, as well as assisting in exercises. Throughout its existence, the Project operated with vacancies due to a lack of staffing, or

sick, maternity, or paternity leaves. Upon completion of the Project, the editor of *Gender in the Armed Forces* was asked to stay on until the end of 2013 to finish the book, but the rest of the personnel who worked on the Project: were assigned (temporary engagement) to other positions not associated with UNSCR 1325 or gender (4); did not receive offers to stay and left the Armed Forces (2); or occupied the position of CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) officer at NORDCSC for a short time (1). The role of the CIMIC officer was expanded to include the task of gender perspectives in military operations in much the same way that this task had been added to the analyst position in the PRT, where gender perspectives were simply tacked on to an already existing role. This position remained vacant from early 2014, and when the NORDCSC was reorganised at the end of 2015, it was permanently terminated.

Despite the formal recommendations of the Gender Project, the decision was made at NORDCSC to minimise the task of establishing professional competence on UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations. The final report issued by the Gender Project in 2013 noted that instead of opting for additional structures on gender, the NORDCSC Commander intended to include a 10% gender responsibility in three existing positions in three different units,[206] one of which was the CIMIC position that was eventually terminated. Apart from this final report by the Project, no other status, plan, or concept for further implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Armed Forces had been issued by any other part of the organisation as of June 2016.

Nonetheless, the Project was brought to a close without ceremony.[207] Thanks and recognition were finally expressed by leadership at the release event for the book on *Gender in the Armed Forces,* six months later, where they declared "*Mission Accomplished*" by the Project and symbolically transferred efforts related to UNSCR 1325 back to the Defence Staff. It seemed the temporary commitment to these initiatives by the NDUC was over. Yet, the Defence Staff re-tasked the NDUC with implementation and, as of January 2015, reported progress on many levels due to the presence of

[206] See: Norwegian Defense University College, No. 2013/030791-001/FORSVARET/009, 31 July 2013.

[207] On their own initiative, members of the Gender Project organised a farewell dinner and were granted funding to do so by NORDCSC. But the temporary leader of the Gender Project, as well as other Project personnel who were leaving NORDCSC permanently, received no acknowledgement and left the organisation without ceremony or thanks by the chain of command. This further emphasised a lack of leadership at the end of the Project, and the lack of a conscious approach to the way ahead.

competent and willing staff officers in key positions, but also noted that there is still much to be done.[208]

Of course, assigning tasks and funding them are two different processes. The Defence Staff confirmed that the NDUC had received additional funding for the entire budget years of 2013 and 2014 with the understanding that work related to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations was to continue in some shape or form.[209] However, the authors of *Gender in the Armed Forces* (including former employees of the Gender Project) were expected to finish their chapters in 2013 and participate in the January 2014 book launch without compensation. Additionally, the editor of the book was offered another temporary six-month assignment at NORDCSC to study lessons learned, during which she was asked by the Norwegian Embassy in Reykjavik to contribute to the University of Iceland's international conference, "Resolution 1325: Addressing the Persistence of Gender Inequalities in Conflict Prevention and Peace Processes," in April 2014 to present academic inputs from a Norwegian perspective and promote the book. The conference organizers would pay all expenses, and as editor she made no financial gains through royalties from the book, but since she was no longer supposed to work on gender perspectives, she had to use vacation days if she wanted to attend.[210] In a struggle for funds, it seemed gender work had lost.

In the early summer of 2014, though, the NORDCSC acknowledged they were not staffed to fulfil WPS-related obligations or requests for support from the organisation and undertook a process to hire new personnel. This time, gender and culture were included in the job titles and job descriptions. But progress on hiring was slow and it was not until the end of 2014 that the decision was made, due to a lack of additional permanent positions in the NDUC, to again allow the NDUC to hire up to two *temporary project positions* for up to four years. There appeared to be no conceptual analysis of the need for these positions, apart from the fact that there was a shortage of personnel to perform gender duties. And while there were funds to spend, there was still an unwillingness to set priorities in *permanent* structures to satisfy the requirements of UNSCR 1325. What's more, the new temporary project positions were immediately used

[208] E-mail from Defence Staff, 9 December 2012.
[209] Confirmed by e-mail from Senior Staff officer Lt Col Hilde Solheim at Defence Staff Personnel, 9 December 2014.
[210] Expressed by Gender Project advisor in phone conversation, 2 April 2014.

as a rationale to redefine the single permanent position that included gender responsibilities – the CIMIC officer – to cover an entirely different area. And when NORDCSC was reorganised, this position was not carried over.[211] These decisions, alongside clearly insufficient hiring procedures, cost the Norwegian Armed Forces the WPS-specific experience and capabilities that had been built up over several years of implementation efforts. Indeed, even the new temporary positions were not filled until June 2015, creating further gaps.[212]

Still, there have been two noteworthy pilot projects promoting gender perspectives in the military since the end of the Gender Project. The first was an initiative that evolved from within the Special Forces (NORSOC) because the training of female police forces and hidden intelligence gathering in operations, such as in Afghanistan, had proved the need for female operatives in the field. A pilot all-female conscript special operations unit was consequently established to enable the Special Forces to solve diverse tasks and to provide access to gender-related competence in future operations.[213] The project began in 2014 and was set to last three years, but was expanded to five years in 2017. The second project was preparatory, implemented in September 2014, ahead of the start of universal conscript service in 2015. Seeking to be proactive, the Norwegian Air Force initiated the 50/50 Project in which they appointed an equal number of women and men to conscript military service in the Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) unit at Ørland Main Air Station. The project reported success using mixed dorms and equal demands, which increased cohesion and cultivated a good working environment. Notably, ownership of the 50/50 Project's success by its leader was also reported to be very important.[214] Both of these projects were deemed successful, including because almost all the women who took part were interested in pursuing some sort of further engagement with the Armed Forces; and they should be seen as models for other parts of the organisation as far as the willingness and ability of leadership to pursue pioneering work related to the Government's ambition to implement gender perspectives in all parts of the military. This of course includes

[211] Confirmed by e-mail from Senior Staff Officer Lt Col Thomas Stenberg, 6 September 2016.
[212] As of September 2015, one temporary position was filled and the second was due to be filled in October.
[213] As presented by Chief of NORSOC Colonel Frode Kristiansen at the annual Equality Conference of the Chief of Defense, 12 May 2015, Akershus Fortress, Oslo.
[214] As presented by Chief of the GBAD Unit at Ørland Main Air Station Major Per Steinar Trøite at the annual Equality Conference of the Chief of Defense, 12 May 2015, Akershus Fortress, Oslo.

increasing the recruitment and retention of women, which the full implementation of universal conscript service, since mid-2016, is expected to help facilitate.

In June 2016, based on feedback from the Defence Staff, from military colleagues, and from my own experience and the results of this research, the status of implementation of UNSCR 1325 was evaluated, task by task. A basic assessment of these tasks (as presented in Chapter 2) follows:

- Gender perspectives had not been implemented in all parts of military operations; only fragmented initiatives on analysis, competence, and reporting had been carried out, and with varied results.
- Some initiatives to include gender perspectives had been undertaken but were not institutionalised.
- Female participation in international operations had not increased noticeably, likely related to challenges connected to recruitment and retention of women more generally.
- Multinational cooperation was limited to one person (two, from August 2016) working on gender at NCGP in Stockholm and attending the NCGP annual meeting, along with random participation at seminars, courses, conferences, and in exercises.
- MOT 1325 was never implemented, and the opportunity was missed due to the termination of the PRT in Afghanistan.
- The preparation and international deployment of Gender Field Advisors had been carried out to some degree, but with limited success, especially in the PRT.
- The appointment of GENADs nationally had *not* been implemented (as of June 2016).
- The recruitment and retention of women was ongoing, and there was a slight increase in recruitment. The effect of universal conscript service is not yet realised.
- A gender perspective was lacking in national and international efforts despite the fact that the implementation of UNSCR 1325, gender perspectives, and even the unfinished guidelines on dealing with sexual violence are often referred to in official mandates and orders. Gender perspectives were also mentioned in the military's new joint doctrine, under point 4.3 "*Matters relating to multinational forces and operations*" (Forsvaret, 2014).
- The NDUC was tasked with further developing competence on gender perspectives, but since the termination of the Gender Project in 2013, had made minimal effort and had often relied on hired external help.[215] Though responsible

[215] Former Advisors in the Gender Project have been hired as civilian consultants on several occasions, but other external lecturers with no military experience have also been hired on an hourly basis to talk generally about UNSCR 1325 in other parts of the Armed Forces, since neither the NDUC nor another military institution could provide lecturers.

for the systematic competence building of gender perspectives of *all* military personnel, with no internal SMEs, this was neglected until the two new temporary civilian positions were filled in late 2015. The focus of the NDUC on gender perspectives was stronger after these positions were filled, but they are temporary and there are no concrete plans for permanent positions, making the work and any progress very vulnerable.

- A universal two-hour lecture on UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives had been given to some personnel before deployment, but a lack of operation-specific training was evident. And, recent feedback suggests this lecture has been increasingly ignored.[216]
- Gender perspectives in exercises were mainly absent; however, the NDUC has maintained the GENAD role in Exercise Joint Effort, and in 2016, made use of temporary positions to focus on implementing gender perspectives and culture in their own exercise.
- Concrete and relevant tasks in operations to strengthen local women's security and participation were only randomly and minimally carried out in PRT Meymaneh. Apart from a Special Forces programme to train Female Afghan Police, no other such tasks were observed.
- Development of a reporting system related to UNSCR 1325 *was* undertaken and presented to NJHQ but was never implemented.
- No reward system for leadership performance related to gender and UNSCR 1325 had been developed or implemented.
- Gender perspectives had not been officially integrated into the mentoring and education of all security forces, even if some efforts had been attempted.
- Last, but not least, the implementation of NATO directives had been fulfilled to only a limited degree, and national and international efforts advocating gender perspectives were declining in parallel to a lack of experts. And, additional tasks from the new National Action Plan had not yet been implemented.

4.13 Conclusions

This study was based on the assumption that the Norwegian Armed Forces are obligated to carry out assignments imposed by the Norwegian Government. The results have challenged this assumption and demand an alternative conclusion to this part of the research. This will be presented as part two of these conclusions.

4.13.1 Structural, Functional, and Cultural Factors

If the Armed Forces are in fact obligated to follow the instructions of the Government, the research observations and analysis demonstrate that there are numerous cultural,

[216] Expressed in the first meeting of the professional gender network in the Armed Forces, 8 March 2016.

functional, and structural factors that prevent, and some that promote, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives. For the most part, these factors have been presented and discussed separately, but in reality they interconnect and affect each other (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Nuciari, 2007).

The Norwegian military *culture* has long traditions and is likely to have served the Armed Forces well in many respects, including by contributing to the ability to solve previously assigned tasks. Yet, when it comes to the changes necessary to meet *new* demands and implement UNSCR 1325 in the Armed Forces organisation and in military operations, several cultural factors have prevented progress. Indeed, the high level of uncertainty avoidance that has been observed makes *any* kind of change challenging. Combined with values that favour hard security issues, personnel, and equipment associated with combat, and a low power distance that creates resistance to directives from the Government, implementation has been particularly difficult. There is also a status hierarchy in the Armed Forces that subjugates matters and personnel related to UNSCR 1325, which deters personnel from embracing the subject or staffing relevant positions. Ridicule and immature jokes towards topics related to women, femininity, equality, and sex further inhibit personnel from welcoming gender policies and perspectives.

Feedback that the Armed Forces received through reporting, analysis, or discussions on the lack of progress was often met with anger and resentfulness, and reflected a culture in which loyalty towards individuals eclipses loyalty towards leadership or the tasks they order. The status hierarchy of the Norwegian military and the low power distance prevalent in its culture affect the ability and will of leaders to command and control, enabling sub-optimisation and providing considerable power to staff officers, who follow their own agenda without consequences. Commonly, officers saw UNSCR 1325 as a political project that would disappear in due time if ignored.

But the low power distance in Norwegian military culture also *contributed* to implementation because it created opportunities to access higher-ranking officers through networks and personal relationships. The organisation was thus open to new inputs, as long as the messengers were professional, likeable, and able to face resistance with dignity. The culture accepted and was dependent on individual enthusiasts as a driving force for implementation; a factor that became increasingly evident due to the lack of vital functional and structural factors.

A major *functional* factor that prevented implementation was a lack of conceptualisation by the Defence Staff of instructions given by the Government related to UNSCR 1325. There was no clear communication of any analysis, goals, plan, evaluation, or consequences. And even if the Defence Staff formally assigned tasks related to the Gender Project to the NDUC, it was an initiative from the NDUC itself that triggered the MoD to earmark funding, which was not tied to a mandate or a demand for results. There was an imbalance between structure, functions, culture, and control; no cultural map of the organisation; and no new major *permanent* structural, functional, or process changes. There were no significant new policies, monitoring or report mechanisms, reward and discipline systems, or support groups, and no network of change agents to support a new way of thinking and working. Some temporary expertise was established nonetheless, and formal education and training commenced to increase knowledge and understanding, but all told, the approach to change was more transactional than transformational.

Still, even if bureaucratic hiring procedures and various agendas prevented an effective staffing of the Gender Project, the will to fund such efforts did promote implementation. Equally, the will and ability of the Norwegian Government to fund international projects and facilitate the contribution of expertise from Norway abroad was a factor in promoting implementation among allies, which reinforced perceptions that Norway was a leader in implementing UNSCR 1325. And as long as Norway was not asked to contribute with best practices for implementation, the egalitarian society of Norway and the pristine international reputation of Scandinavia as a model of equality ensured that this impression was maintained.

The Norwegian Armed Forces have a hierarchical *structure* that, in principle, could be used to mainstream gender perspectives and implement UNSCR 1325, assuming the supporting knowledge, culture, and functions were in place. The need for new structural elements to solve new tasks did result in the establishment of a few *temporary* structures or positions within the Norwegian military organisation: the Gender Project at the NDUC, to increase knowledge and understanding through education and training; a Colonel position tasked partly with taking on diversity, equality, and UNSCR 1325 at the strategic level; and a part-time GFA at the tactical level. But a lack of knowledge, functions (especially leadership), and culture to support these structures, which have all been terminated, strengthened resistance to change in the

organisation. The Armed Forces have been unable to develop any other job descriptions that include UNSCR 1325 or gender perspectives. Meanwhile, Norway has prioritised the filling and funding of positions at NCGM in Sweden.[217]

The conclusions of this study are related to change in the context of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, but they reflect strengths and weaknesses in the capacity of the military organisation to undergo change more generally. Few of the actions recommended by the theories that underpin this research, on how to manage organisational culture (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005) and how to create the psychological safety needed for transformational change (Schein, 2004), were taken. This inability or unwillingness by the Norwegian Armed Forces reflects a form of hegemonic masculine organisational culture that is reluctant to change, especially when that change is driven by gendered issues (Connell, 1995; Carreiras, 2006; Obradovic, 2014; Enloe, 2000; Higate, 2003).

In recent years, militaries around the world have been asked to transform. Once a "hammer," now they must be a "Swiss army knife," capable of focusing on human security, lowering the tolerance for loss of lives, and operating in changed conflict scenarios. However, the transformation of military organisations, and of the Norwegian Armed Forces specifically, has been challenging. And because it has not been truly successful, it has created a tendency within the military to return to what many consider their core task: combat (Gentry, 2013). This consistent lack of progress and repeated neglect of the WPS agenda should not be taken as an indication that gender perspectives will inevitably continue to be neglected going forward, though. Over time, repetition could make the organisation more and more likely to change (Malnes, 2012), especially if pressure from society is sustained.

4.13.2 Lack of Progress: An Expected Political Strategy?

Based on the results of this study presented above, this second part of the conclusion offers an alternative model for understanding the lack of progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the Norwegian Armed Forces and in military operations. The absence of political control over and a lack of consequences for the

[217] The Defence Staff confirmed in July 2014 that the MoD had decided to fund a second position at the Nordic Center, contrary to the recommendation of the Defence Staff. This decision was later reversed in December 2014 after substantial arguments were put forth by the Defence Staff regarding the need to focus nationally. A new meeting was held with representatives from Norway and Sweden in September 2015, and new positions at NCGM were again discussed.

failures of the Armed Forces can be seen as a sign of a lack of political will or ability to lead, and of a democracy marked by miscommunication and misunderstanding between the Government and the military. This raises democratic concerns.

It is possible that the Government assigned tasks, leaving it up to the Armed Forces to set priorities, only to gain political capital. This corresponds to the lack of consequences for failing to carry out assignments. It also supports the notion that implementation is merely a political project with no relevance to the Armed Forces, and that any focus on the subject will fade if military leaders just wait it out. In that case, the Armed Forces are doing an adequate job of keeping the focus on kinetics and making sure that any other agendas of the Government do not interfere too much with the military's core task of combat. On the other hand, it is possible that the idea of neutrality in public management, as Strand (2010) argues, has expanded from favouring certain issues to actually making strategic decisions. This raises other democratic concerns; and even more are raised still if the Government has taken an unofficially stealth approach that is not transparent or in tune with the public's expectations.

This alternative conclusion accounts for two of the major findings from this study about what has *prevented* implementation: the view that UNSCR 1325 is a political project with no significance to the military, and the sense of staff officers that their leaders consent to their prioritising tasks according to what they themselves find relevant. These essentially cultural factors led to failures to develop appropriate structures and functions within the military organisation. But this alternative conclusion brings the commitment of the Government into question, and so an analysis of that commitment is presented next, in the second part of this study.

5 Agents of Transformational Change

THE COMMITMENT OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO UNSCR 1325

5.1 Introduction

In both national and international political arenas, the Norwegian Government has officially touted itself as a frontrunner in implementing UNSCR 1325 and an advocate for its core principles. This is also reflected in the Norwegian interdepartmental NAPs that frame Norway as a nation of peace and express the desire to increase efforts aimed at global security. To that end, the Norwegian Government tasked the Norwegian Armed Forces with internal and external measures meant to achieve the implementation of gender perspectives across the organisation and its operations, including in planning, competence, and evaluation (St. prp. 48, 2007–2008); yet despite the demands of the Government and a demonstrated need for gender perspectives in operations such as ISAF (NATO, 2010), progress has been slow.

The first part of this study presented an analysis of the cultural, functional, and structural factors that have prevented and promoted implementation of the WPS agenda in the Norwegian military. The findings raised questions about various dynamics between the Government and the Armed Forces – including issues of communication – as well as about the democratic challenges that have arisen due to failures to implement UNSCR 1325. To examine conclusions based on the first phase of this research in more depth, it is important to determine the *actual* expectations of the Government regarding implementation of the WPS agenda by the Armed Forces, to shed light on apparent clashes between the MoD and military leaders over values, purposes, and priorities. Thus, official communications from the MoD that reference the WPS agenda and women in the Armed Forces are presented and discussed in this section, many of which highlighted the slow pace of implementation. This analysis of MoD communications can

help clarify whether the Government has been truly dedicated to the WPS agenda, as official rhetoric implies, or whether political leadership has in fact been content with the selective priorities identified by military leaders as long as enough is achieved for the MoD to claim triumph. Indeed, findings in the first part of this study led to the conclusion that, despite tasking the Armed Forces with implementation, the Government itself was absent the ability or will to hold military leaders accountable for their lack of progress.

Change in the Norwegian Armed Forces cannot and does not occur in isolation, of course, but is affected by other actors (both national and international), is dependent on resources, and can be motivated or pressured by external factors (Jacobsen and Thorsvik, 2009). Hence, *a systems approach* to examining the lack of implementation of the WPS agenda involves considering how outside actors influence the Armed Forces and vice versa. Given that the Government provides funding and assignments to the Armed Forces, over which it has command and control, the relationship between the military and the Government is central to any change in the military, and must therefore be analysed as it relates to poor progress in implementing UNSCR 1325. In this section, some of the dynamics of that relationship reveal themselves through the communications of Ministers of Defence.

This analysis focuses on whether diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational statements issued by the Government were consistent with theories of transformational change. How these communications impacted structural, functional, and cultural factors in the military organisation, and consequently prevented or promoted implementation, will also be examined, particularly through the lenses of Schein's (2004) necessary conditions to create psychological safety for change and Hofstede's (2005) theory on managing organisational culture. According to Schein (2004), three elements are linked to the motivation for change: 1) a situation that needs to change, 2) a connection to the goals and ideals of an organisation, and 3) a sense of psychological safety that makes it possible for members of an organisation to view change as a chance to learn and evolve and not as a threat to their identity or integrity. This last point emphasises the need to address both the practical and *emotional* aspects of change – which makes factors such as a positive vision, strong role models, a clear reward and discipline system, and new organisational structures even more important to creating the psychological safety that Schein claims is a prerequisite to transformation. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) also

underscore the need to culturally map an organisation in order to understand the cultural climate so that strategic choices can be made in relation to structures, processes, policies, change agents, and monitoring.

In broad terms, this framework confers three key tasks upon leaders managing processes of change. First, they must identify the problem and the change that is needed (a *diagnostic* task), then propose solutions and strategies to address practical and emotional concerns (a *prognostic* task), before ensuring lastly that the actions required to reach a goal are carried through (a *motivational* task) (Papas, 2012; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Schein; 2004). A motivational approach is effective because it speaks to the heart – for instance, by referencing injustices, which are at the core of most grievances (Papas, 2012) – and also reflects the need to incorporate feelings in order to nurture a sense of psychological safety (Schein, 2004). This is essentially the rights perspective described in Chapter 2, where the need for a dual approach to implementation of UNSCR 1325 is recommended, combining a rights perspective with an efficiency perspective (NATO, 2017).

5.2 Ministry of Defence Communications 2006–2012

A summary of each of the official communications issued by the Ministry of Defence from January 2006 through June 2012 (22 in total) that reference UNSCR 1325, gender, or women are analysed below.[218] This timeframe begins with the introduction of the first UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and closes at the end of the research period for this study. Presented in chronological order, each communication is outlined in bullet points that illustrate the substance of communications and their development over time.[219]

(#1) 10 January 2006: *Annual address of MOD Strøm-Erichsen to the Oslo Military Society on the status of the Norwegian Armed Forces*

- Defence in our time is about being flexible in a changing world
- It is important to have relevant education, training, and experience
- We must continually work to combine competence, experience, and equipment to provide our forces with security and the chance to master tasks

[218] These communications are all publicly available. See: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler.html?id=391

[219] Any mistakes in translation due to misinterpretations or misunderstandings of the original texts (in Norwegian) rests with the author, who translated all communications presented here.

- Women are victims in conflict, but are also an important resource in conflict resolution
- The government will develop a NAP to address the role of the Armed Forces
- Knowledge about the roles of women in the societies in which we operate should be an inherent part of preparations
- Increased representation of women in the Armed Forces itself contributes to better defence
- There will be a special focus on women in leadership positions in the Armed Forces
- It is essential that the Armed Forces have the confidence and trust of the population

(#2) 27 January 2006: ***Address of MOD Strøm-Erichsen to the annual meeting of the "Network of Female Officers"***

- More women will in itself provide a better defence, but a well-balanced and diverse organisation with complementary abilities and values will, according to research, stimulate creative learning and is a necessity for development and modernisation
- We need more women because we want a modern and flexible Armed Forces with the ability to operate in both Norway and abroad
- The Government will develop a plan to implement UNSCR 1325, and the Armed Forces will be a key contributor
- Learning about the roles and situations of women in the societies in which we operate should be a natural part of preparations for international operations, and another reason we want more women in the Armed Forces
- Women contribute to lower anxiety and aggression levels in operations by making contact with local women and discussing women-specific problems and everyday issues, offering them valuable information about the local society and allowing them to carry out body searches in a way that respects women and their culture
- The role of a soldier needs to include a broader set of capabilities than we traditionally imagine, including interpersonal skills
- Women who participate in international peace operations and experience the great value of their capabilities in achieving operational aims may have increased motivation and incentive to remain in the Armed Forces
- Women are a resource the Armed Forces cannot do without
- The culture of Norwegian society needs to be more strongly reflected in the military
- Diversity is a resource, and one that builds a powerful and credible Armed Forces

(#3) 1 February 2006: ***Address of MOD Strøm-Erichsen to the annual "Royal Norwegian Air Force Air Power Seminar"***

- An important goal in international operations is to increase respect for Human Rights and International Law
- Knowledge about the role of women in the societies in which our forces operate shall be incorporated as a natural part of preparations for international operations

- It is unacceptable that the Armed Forces, among the largest public organisations, has a mere 7 per cent women personnel
- A higher participation of women will in itself contribute to better defence
- This requires an organisational culture based on integrity and high ethical standards

(#4) 26 March 2007: ***Statement of MOD Strøm-Erichsen to VG newspaper***

- The Armed Forces is focused on attitudes; and the NAP for implementation of UNSCR 1325 represents a wish to strengthen, coordinate, and systemise Norwegian efforts toward international peace, security, and democracy

(#5) 10 June 2009: ***OpEd of State Secretaries Walaas and Eide to Dagbladet newspaper on 9 June 2009, in response to NATO research***

- Despite a strong focus on conditions for women in Afghanistan and an ambitious action plan, progress is not being achieved as hoped
- UNSCR 1325 is a high priority in Norway, and research on the Armed Forces is therefore important
- Making a difference for Afghan women is still important to us
- The Government wants knowledge and awareness about UNSCR 1325 at all levels, wherever Norway operates, including among Armed Forces in Afghanistan
- Gender perspectives have two purposes; first, they make an operation more comprehensive and effective, and second, an awareness of the needs and experiences of women (in Afghanistan) will contribute to a better society
- The MOD decided in 2008 to strengthen the competence of the Armed Forces and their education on UNSCR 1325 through advisors with special knowledge on gender perspectives as well as plans to establish an operative unit that specialises in putting gender perspective into practice in operations
- There are cautiously positive signs regarding the recruitment of more women to the Armed Forces, and UNSCR 1325 motivates the military even further
- We are disappointed by the results presented in the NATO study, which do not reflect our expectations

(#6) 19 June 2009: ***Address of MOD Strøm-Erichsen to a Norwegian Command and Staff College student group***

- The systematic use of sexualised violence is defined as a crime of war, and this influences our operations and our doctrines
- Incorporating a gender perspective means paying attention to the social roles played by the different sexes, the different ways conflict is experienced, and to hear all sides of the story
- A gender perspective means a focus on human rights; for, when we operate internationally, we do it not to win territory but to facilitate security and increased fairness and respect for human rights

- Sexual violence consists not only of attacks on women and girls, but also on boys
- We need to protect both women and men, and thus must earn acceptance from both women and men in order to access and gain information
- There are three reasons a gender perspective impacts operations: by winning acceptance (hearts and minds); by offering a better overview and information; and by asserting human rights for all people
- Dialogue with local women's groups is needed in order to challenge the police in Afghanistan and push for the increased protection of women in Afghan society
- We must realise that planning with gender in mind will affect operations as much as other factors
- Knowledge about local culture and a gender perspective should be included in doctrines and made practical for units training for specific international operations
- The Norwegian Government has not been asleep; it has given multiple tasks to the Armed Forces related to UNSCR 1325
- Implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the responsibility of leaders who must disseminate, understand, and implement those tasks, and there is considerable room for improvement in order to meet high ambitions
- Gender perspectives are still regarded as new and strange to many, and to some they are also seen as irrelevant, but you [students] should be agents of change and new thinking
- The time for grand speeches has passed; I now expect implementation of a gender perspective in practice

(#7) 19 May 2010: ***Address of MOD Faremo to the annual "Conference on Women in the Armed Forces"***

- We need a tougher debate on equality and the distribution of power in the Armed Forces
- Leading is about responsibility and the power to define, and I see a pattern in the Armed Forces that needs to be challenged systematically
- Though the legal framework has been in place, it has not proven enough; and so, we have introduced new initiatives to recruit more women, because only young men currently have to do conscript service (which is in itself discriminatory)
- We have not reached our goals, and need to examine different actions that can get us there, especially as it relates to cultural attitudes and removing practical and historical obstacles
- The effort for increased female participation in the Armed Forces needs to be a part of daily routines and should be monitored on all levels, so I will establish reporting routines in this area.
- We need to challenge attitudes, establish new selection criteria, and get away from the notion that women are to be let in and let up, for it is the Armed Forces that need the women

- I have decided to monitor these efforts more closely at the political level, through a more structured and step-by-step approach
- I am especially concerned that established and traditional attitudes may prevail within recruitment programmes for female leaders, as well as in our family policy and use of quotas
- Accessing an area that has been reserved for men demands a lot from women and they need encouragement
- Research suggests that men promote other men and that selection criteria are dated and likely biased towards masculinity, which means we need a *conscious* approach to recruitment, motivation, and quotas
- My worry that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 amounts to a lot of words and little action, despite the Government's NAP, makes monitoring the resolution a high priority for me
- We must strengthen our ability to incorporate a gender perspective in daily operations
- To say this is only about force protection is too limiting, and reduces local women to only their instrumental value in securing the Armed Forces
- It is time the Armed Forces seriously understand that having a knowledge-based organisation with operative capabilities requires women in the organisation and in leadership

(#8) 27 September 2010: *Remarks of MOD Faremo at an Armed Forces conference on attitudes, ethics, and leadership*

- We are facing great challenges when it comes to equality
- There are questions and dilemmas regarding whether women are respected and treated as equals by their male colleagues, whether they have the same career opportunities, and what is being done to confront sexual and other forms of harassment
- If the culture of the military provides a set of values and attitudes that removes it from the common attitudes of the population, we risk estrangement from society and from its expressed support
- Leaders have a responsibility as role models to ensure that soldiers identify with the values of the Armed Forces, and to prevent unproductive cultures from developing
- One of three main areas of focus is equality, where there have been ethical challenges and the work has been too slow
- Efforts for equality in the Armed Forces have revealed a military professional who sees her/himself, to a certain extent, as part of an organisation that is different than others in the public sector, and where issues of political equality from the civilian sector can be perceived as irrelevant
- The legal framework is in place, but that is not enough, because this is about attitudes and culture and on that, we have a long way to go

- This demands a new leadership focus and thus I will implement special routines for reporting in this area
- A system that has practiced radical quotas for men all these years requires that we dare challenge attitudes and selection criteria
- A lot of work remains to operationalise UNSCR 1325 and we must speed up the process in order to make it a part of operation-specific training
- This change will not happen just by recruiting more women and expecting them to solve the problem, but needs to be incorporated into everything we do
- I am worried that work on UNSCR 1325 will amount to too many words and too little action, despite the Government NAP

(#9) 20 October 2010: ***Internet article by the MOD reporting on a meeting between the MOD and UNSCR 1325 actors***

- The importance of UNSCR 1325 is clear; we have not come far enough in the process of strengthening women's security and empowerment within conflicts
- The MOD and the Government remain committed to women, but should have progressed further in this commitment
- There is an undeniable need for additional concrete actions in this area, and so the revised NAP will be even more specific regarding the work that is needed to take a next step in implementing UNSCR 1325

(#10) 26 October 2010: ***Internet article by the MOD on the visit of the MOD to the UN on the 10-year commemoration of UNSCR 1325***

- UNSCR 1325 must be further operationalised and strengthened, through concrete commitments
- Norway has given 6 million NOK to the 1325-project

(#11) 26 October 2010: ***Address of MOD Faremo to the UN, commemorating 10 years since the adoption of UNSCR 1325***

- We obviously have a job to do to make military men take this resolution seriously
- Resolution 1325 is not about political correctness; it improves the quality of service, making results more sustainable
- We simply cannot afford to ignore the talents and capacities of half of society
- We must ensure greater accountability
- I will ensure our military operations rest on a gender analysis and will adjust our operational demands accordingly
- I will strengthen gender education and introduce a new system of reporting on gender and on the role of women in field missions
- This is the only path to sustainable peace and to freeing millions of women and children from the appalling suffering we see in too many current conflicts, the

suffering and humiliation of whom is a blemish on the face of humanity that cannot be tolerated

(#12) 1 November 2010: ***Remarks of MOD Faremo to PRT 16 before deploying to Afghanistan***

- Harsh criticism of efforts in Afghanistan are linked to high expectations
- This is more than traditional peacekeeping; it is more like state building
- The NCC is an important contributor to measuring progress and has the extra responsibility of evaluating quality and quantity, and therefore effect[220]
- I expect that you will place renewed focus on the role and position of women in the area you operate, and that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is not just a theoretical exercise
- We must make sure that our operation does not make the situation for women worse, but better; yet, without security and participation for Afghan women, their situation will never be stable
- The country is throwing away half of its resources

(#13) 11 November 2010: ***Internet article by the MOD on the expanded Nordic–Baltic MOD meeting***

- Nordic countries discussed, among other things, how to implement UNSCR 1325, a possible common contribution to UN operations, and closer cooperation between the forces of Nordic countries in Afghanistan

(#14) 20 January 2011: ***Internet article by the MOD on the release of the strategic plan for WPS***

- UNSCR 1325 is important to the Armed Forces and means incorporating a gender perspective in all we do and ensuring that women are participating and protected
- A lot of work remains, even if some progress has been made
- The Chief of Defence has given clear orders that UNSCR 1325 is to be concretely integrated into all military planning
- We need not just new recruitment measures, but changes to how the Armed Forces operate

(#15) 1 March 2011: ***Address of MOD Faremo to the annual "People and Defence" Conference***

- The Armed Forces are more important than ever
- It is good to see increased numbers of women doing conscript service, even if we are far from where we should be regarding the number of women in the military

[220] National Contingent Command (NCC)

- Challenges as far as conscript service and changes in the Armed Forces risk weakening the relationship between the Norwegian people and the Armed Forces
- The military must reflect the whole population, and yet women and minorities are not represented to a satisfactory degree, which is both a democratic problem and a military problem
- We need to work especially hard to show women and minorities what the Armed Forces are about and to emphasise opportunities
- Resolution 1325 calls for a focus on the protection and participation of women and on their influence in peacebuilding
- For the Armed Forces, Resolution 1325 is about security, conflict management, and human rights
- We must plan and execute operations in a manner that provides different security needs for different populations, with activities and routines on the ground focused on women and competent personnel to carry them out
- In this way, the Armed Forces shall contribute to a more sustainable peace process that does not exclude half the population
- I have decided to set a quota for women in the conscript service and we must also critically examine the demands of different positions
- Equality, diversity, and tolerance are important challenges, both in the development of the military and when it comes to the relationship between the military and the general population

(#16) 25 May 2011: ***Address of MOD Faremo to the annual "Conference on Women in the Armed Forces"***

- The Armed Forces need women, yet two of the most important challenges in the Armed Forces remain recruiting and retaining more women
- After years, women still make up less than 10 per cent of the military
- It is not women that need to change to make this happen; it is the Armed Forces
- We cannot accept that women who choose the Armed Forces will be subjected to harassment and worse, and we cannot be comfortable with the fact that military culture pushes intelligent women out
- Numbers will make a difference, but men need to change their attitudes
- Diversity will strengthen our defence, and more women will offer new ways of thinking and working, which is important to improving operations
- The Armed Forces struggle with a specific culture moulded for men, to which a lot of women don't relate
- We need more research, reporting, and whistle blowing, but the job of changing attitudes and culture is first and foremost the responsibility of leadership
- I have heard stories about sexual harassment in which reported incidents have had no negative consequences for the aggressor; on the contrary, some have been promoted

- We need to better understand that the recruitment of women, paradoxically, is not about gender but about competence, and that to re-evaluate demands is not to lower them
- In time, we will have a military that reflects society to a much larger extent, which is essential to the legitimacy of the Armed Forces and thus to trust from society
- We need broader competence, and research shows that women are more dialogue-oriented and choose other assets than men in conflict situations, meaning that having more women means having more tools in the toolbox
- Soldiers need skills beyond being able to shoot; including cultural understanding, empathy, the ability to communicate, and knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution
- All leaders at all levels must accept the need to implement UNSCR 1325; their personal preferences have no place here
- Before an operation, we will develop routine descriptions of what soldiers are to do in the field and how to report on experiences, will create an environment of competence building, and will cooperate internationally to ensure quality
- We will discuss the need for leadership coaching and the recruitment of women to operative units specifically
- We want to develop the Norwegian Defence so that it is better suited to do the job, which means we need to be able to see the needs and perspectives of women, engage them in peace building and act according to information they provide
- Some say UNSCR 1325 is not a military or security issue, but that is incorrect; this is about human rights and the fact that women are especially targeted in war, and both war and human rights are issues for the military, for which an important goal in international operations is the protection of civilians
- Some women and men who work on these issues find themselves ridiculed and distrusted by their colleagues
- The issues of equal opportunity, the recruitment of women, and UNSCR 1325 are closely connected, and this is not a Norwegian phenomenon but is recognised by the world community as related to the uneven distribution of power between men and women, which demands change

(#17) 17 June 2011: ***Internet article reporting on, and Address of MOD Faremo at, the International Conference on "Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations," organised by the NDUC Gender Project***

- The Armed Forces are in the process of establishing guidelines for Norwegian soldiers that address sexualised violence in war and conflicts
- This is important as far as UNSCR 1325 because it means better fulfilment of the mandate, improved human rights, and increased operational effectiveness
- It is no secret that the Armed Forces have struggled with implementation, and we must hold leaders responsible

- Implementing a gender perspective in military operations is largely about changing attitudes and gaining a new perspective on how we perceive our military missions and operations, and this is demanding work
- Our job is to attract more women to the military, so if we fail women and their rights, we are making a conscious choice to suppress women

(#18) 14 October 2011: ***Internet article reporting on the visit of Michelle Bachelet, Director of UN Women, to Norway***

- International operations increasingly include a gender perspective, but the MOD recognises that it has taken too long
- Though work related to UNSCR 1325 has had a positive effect, we must maintain a focus on it and the Norwegian Armed Forces must still better incorporate women and gender perspectives – from planning and implementation, to recruiting

(#19) 21 December 2011: ***Internet article reporting on a meeting of MOD Barth-Eide with NCC 16, discussing UNSCR 1325***

- Data from year to year is necessary, in order to compare and measure progress
- The security sector has considerable ownership of international operations, mechanisms to improve competence, and the recruitment of women, and thus an obligation to produce guidelines on how to deal with sexualised violence in conflicts
- We need to focus on results in the field, and appreciate the importance of local women's participation in planning and executing military operations
- This is a job for the Armed Forces, not for women alone; and men's participation is essential
- To develop a new area of expertise can be challenging, may turn old ways of thinking and old habits inside out, and can take time, but it is important to keep the pressure on so that the military can improve and continue to develop in the way we envision

(#20) 9 March 2012: ***Address of MOD Barth-Eide to the annual "People and Defence" Conference***

- We have facilitated an important breakthrough for women in the military
- We should have a military organisation that recruits from the whole population, and must not let inherited imaginations of what women and men can and cannot do guide us
- As the only legal male bastion in the professional world, the Armed Forces are out of tune with the rest of the society, and yet military traditions run deep
- We must ask whether we benefit if the conscript service reproduces these inherited traditions in a radically changed environment
- Issues of diversity, competence, and a social contract with only half the population make a gender-neutral conscript service the natural thing to do

- The recruitment of women is more about competence and less about gender, as it improves cooperation, brings greater diversity in thoughts and ideas, and leads to better outcomes.
- The question of more women in the Armed Forces must be put in the broader context of a personnel and competence system that is out of tune with the operational environment

(#21) 11 May 2012: ***Remarks of MOD Barth-Eide on conscript service for women in the Armed Forces at the "Conference on Women in the Armed Forces"***

- We must develop the Armed Forces in the right way in order to have a current and relevant tool of power
- To have the best Armed Forces, we need the best people
- We cannot keep ignoring the facts that half of those "best people" are women and that, to ensure the military aligns with values and attitudes in society, this must be reflected
- Some seem to think that the demand for increased diversity comes at the cost of competence; this is a misunderstanding that must be corrected
- Success in a changing environment requires diverse competence in the organisation, and remaining relevant demands thinking differently
- Concerns that efforts for equality will jeopardise the security of the country assumes that everything is perfect as it is; there is a fear of change behind those arguments
- The same goes for those who say that discourse about equality is just "fuss" in an organisation based on brotherhood; this is myopic thinking
- Military culture and paradigms need to be challenged, as does the stereotype of a soldier, as well as systems, routines, attitudes, and behaviours
- Women should not have to change or adapt to the existing culture; the Armed Forces must change so that the military is attractive to women
- We have shifted our marketing approach to emphasise the need for intelligent people with good values, but to actually change values and attitudes within the military will require a critical mass, which is why it is important to move away from the radical quotas practiced on behalf of men and the power of men to define the image of a good soldier
- Political leaders have assigned numerous tasks to military leaders and the ball is in their court

(#22) 12 June 2012: ***Address of MOD Barth-Eide to an Armed Forces seminar on "The Military and Masculinity"***

- Diversity matters, and is a precondition for an effective and modern military
- Different perspectives improve the ability to understand and address complex issues, and gender is a part of this
- It does not make sense to recruit from only half of the population

- Women can be a remarkable asset in the field, engaging with and gaining access to local populations, as well as fighting
- Research tells us that women are not fully included or welcomed into existing military culture simply because they are women, which makes it essential to expose the underlying mechanisms of that military culture
- We need a culture that nurtures diversity
- Norms are defined by and for men, and any organisation tends to reproduce itself until it is changed or challenged
- We are impatient, but in it for the long haul, because a military organisation does not change overnight and neither does a culture
- We must transition from a "brotherhood" to a "team" so that the military is not a playground for masculinity but an organisation comprised of highly competent and professional team players
- Diversity is not just a matter of semantics; it is the dawning of a new and more sophisticated organisation that will ensure the legitimacy of the Armed Forces – a fundamental principle in a democratic society

5.3 Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Motivational Communications

Findings from the first phase of this study brought into question just how committed political leaders in Norway had been to UNSCR 1325, given the freedom afforded to military leaders to prioritise WPS-related tasks as they saw fit, with no consequences. Yet, the speeches and statements analysed in this second phase of research suggest a real commitment did exist among political leadership. Indeed, these communications not only emphasise the dedication of the Government to UNSCR 1325 but also reveal an increasing frustration over time with the lack of progress by the Armed Forces in implementing the WPS agenda. While the MoD at times commends progress made in recruitment, retention, and education, the topics of gender perspectives, UNSCR 1325, and women in the Armed Forces are typically discussed in terms of a lack of progress, a lack of transformation, and a lack of commitment by military leadership.

References to these communications (cited by number, e.g. "#1") are presented below, in the context of analysing: how the Government, represented by the MoD, conveyed a diagnosis of the situation in the Armed Forces; how they communicated a prognosis of necessary changes; and how they motivated the organisation to realise these changes in order to meet obligations related to the WPS agenda and to meet the challenges emerging from the changing nature of conflict and war.

5.3.1 Diagnosis

Diagnostic communications from the MoD largely pointed to the lack of ability and will within the Armed Forces to change as required by UNSCR 1325, with the Forces said to be outdated, slow to progress, and incapable of functioning optimally with current personnel. Ministers of Defence also increasingly questioned the trust of the Norwegian population in the military, as well as the culture and ethical standards of the organisation: *"If the culture of the military profession provides a set of values and attitudes that removes it from the common attitudes of the population, we risk estrangement from society and from its expressed support"* (#8); *"If we don't change, we risk losing the support of society"* (#21); and "*Diversity is not just a matter of semantics; it is the dawning of a new and more sophisticated organisation that will ensure the legitimacy of the Armed Forces – a fundamental principle in a democratic society"* (#22).

Military leaders were furthermore described as having neglected their responsibilities with respect to UNSCR 1325: "*I am worried that the implementation of UNSCR 1325 amounts to a lot of words and little action, despite the Government's action plan*" (#7). The MOD also claimed that outdated attitudes shape the selection criteria of the Armed Forces, and that deep-rooted barriers and radical quotas for men are oppressive to women: *"…to actually change values and attitudes will require a critical mass, which is why it is important to move away from the radical quotas that have been practiced on behalf of men*" (#21); and *"norms are defined by and for men; and any organisation tends to reproduce itself until it is changed or challenged from the outside"* (#22). The masculine culture of the Armed Forces – which promotes men as aggressors and tolerates inequality – was characterised as out of sync with the values promoted in wider society. This disconnect and/or this inequality were highlighted by MODs in a number of communications: "*The culture of Norwegian society needs to be more strongly reflected in the military*" (#2); "*There are questions and dilemmas regarding whether women are respected and treated as equals by their male colleagues, whether they have the same career opportunities, and what is being done to confront sexual and other forms of harassment*" (#8); *"I have heard stories about sexual harassment in which reported incidents have had no negative consequences for the aggressor; on the contrary, some of them have been promoted"* (#16); and *"…women are not fully included or welcomed into existing military culture, simply because they are women"* (#22).

As portrayed by the Ministry, the military has also misconstrued much about UNSCR 1325: "*Some seem to think that the demand for increased diversity comes at the cost of competence; this is a misunderstanding that must be corrected"* (#21). A number of communications also emphasised that the intention of the WPS agenda should not be reduced to a question of effectiveness: "*To say this is only about force protection is too limiting; and reduces local women to only their instrumental value as it relates to our own security*" (#7). Statements such as this refer to the engagement of women in areas of international operations in order to ensure the security of the military, but not to support women and work to effectively prevent and protect them from abuse, nor to ensure their fair participation in decision-making processes. The message of the MoD was clear that local women in areas of operations must be protected and must be able to participate, noting: "*we simply cannot afford to ignore the talents and capacities of half of society"* (#11).

The MOD discussed low numbers of women in the Armed Forces as a democratic problem: "*The Armed Forces must reflect the whole population, and yet women and minorities are not represented to a satisfactory degree, which is both a democratic problem and a problem for the Armed Forces"* (#15). The Ministry asserts that Norway needs an Armed Forces built on values of equality, diversity, and tolerance, but argues that military culture opposes this by allowing personal agendas to dominate and by resisting change. The MOD addressed leadership on this point repeatedly: "*All leaders at all levels must accept the need to implement UNSCR 1325; their personal preferences have no place here"* (#16); "*As the only legal male bastion in the professional world, the Armed Forces are out of touch with the rest of the society"* (#20); and *"Some seem to think that efforts for equality will jeopardise the security of the country, but that assumes that everything is perfect as it is, and there is a fear of change behind arguments like that*" (#21).

These are all significant and serious claims made by the MOD about the status of the Armed Forces, and not only as it relates to implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives. The Ministry has identified the Armed Forces as an organisation characterised by a hegemonic masculinity that upholds traditional masculine values, where men dominate and women are oppressed (Marusca, 2010). Yet, many communications from the Ministry lack nuance in their approach to masculinity, which is criticised and presented as wrong in itself, with little apparent understanding of how

to develop targeted initiatives to address specific aspects of masculinity in order to create change (Zalewski, 2016; Belkin, 2012; Carreiras, 2017; Myrttinen, Khatlab, and Naujoks, 2017).

Additionally, if the MOD seeks to promote transformational change in the Armed Forces, the Ministry must embrace its command and control responsibilities. The MOD could have contributed to creating the conditions necessary for psychological safety, to facilitate change, but this would have required the development of a compelling *positive vision*, of *positive role models*, and of a *reward and discipline system* (Schein, 2004). And, despite communications from the Ministry that leaders in the Armed Forces would be held accountable for their lack of progress, they never were, and a proper evaluation of the WPS-related assignments tasked to the Armed Forces has not been carried out to date (Skeie, 2018).

5.3.2 Prognosis

Prognostic communications from the Ministry, and their approach, developed over time. Initially, the goals of UNSCR 1325 were linked somewhat vaguely to more knowledge and more women. This evolved and became more explicit, involving increased education, operational training, and new GENAD positions. Then, as the broader importance of gender perspectives was recognised, the need for more detailed instruction became clear. Finally, the role of leadership was addressed, when progress on implementation still lagged. This triggered closer monitoring and reports, critical examinations of the implementation process, and accountability for leadership. By mid-2011, the MOD said, "*It is no secret that the Armed Forces have struggled with implementation, and we must hold leaders responsible*" (#17).

However, an analysis of the existing culture, in the form of a cultural map, should have been completed *prior* to any prognostic decision-making that led to action or assignments (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Without such a map as a guide, some measures had undesirable effects and even worsened the situation. For example, calls for more women in the military assumed that increased numbers of women would alone make conditions for women better, without considering *how* women contribute. And even if more women *is* the solution, a clear line was not drawn by leadership from the existing reality, through the appropriate prognostic measures, to the desired reality (ibid.). This is why a well-conceived positive vision that can bridge different elements of the process is so important.

Though the primary focus of the Ministry on building more WPS-related knowledge in the Armed Forces translated into efforts to strengthen education and training on all aspects of military operations, doctrines, and reporting, MODs also routinely expressed the need for gender perspectives to be further integrated, more quickly: *"A lot of work remains to operationalise UNSCR 1325 and we must speed up the process in order to make it a part of operation-specific training"* (#8); *"international operations increasingly include a gender perspective, but the MOD recognises that implementation has taken too long"* (#18); and *"the Norwegian Armed Forces must still better incorporate women and gender perspectives – from the planning and implementation of operations, to recruiting"* (#18). This was linked to calls for a more conscious approach to recruitment and quotas, more monitoring on progress, and consideration of gender-neutral conscription. Still, in parallel, the Ministry increasingly focused on the need for new competences and abilities in a military facing fast-changing organisational and operational environments, and on closing the knowledge gap: "*Before an operation, we will develop routine descriptions of what soldiers are to do in the area of operations and how to report on their experiences, and will create a good environment for competence building, including through international cooperation, to ensure quality"* (#16); and *"Success in a changing environment requires diverse competence in the organisation, and remaining relevant demands thinking differently"* (#21).

The Ministry sought an open and serious debate on equality and on the distribution of power in the Armed Forces, a thorough investigation of necessary competences, better implementation of UNSCR 1325 overall, and a change in the military culture as it related to gender issues. Communications from MODs demonstrated a desire to challenge the existing paradigm, values, and attitudes of the Armed Forces, and an impatience with corrosive mechanisms in the military culture: "*We obviously have a job to do to make military men take this [resolution] seriously"* (#11); *"We must ensure greater accountability"* (#11); and *"Let me be clear: it is not women that need to change to make this happen; it is the Armed Forces"* (#16).

5.3.3 Motivation

Motivational communications from the Ministry were rarer than might be expected. The approach of Ministers was mostly to promote human rights and the notion of "making a difference" for women and children in areas of operations. Any motivational aspects of their speeches and statements were very broad-spectrum: "*this is about human rights*

and the fact that women are especially targeted in war, and both war and human rights are issues for the military" (#16). This made it challenging for most military personnel to link the goals of UNSCR 1325 directly to their own duties; and indeed, Brunborg (2015) has found that political rhetoric which uses overly general terms such as "human rights" or "equality" has little motivational effect partly for this reason.

Communications from the Ministry argued that a modern military must be flexible in order to succeed in achieving sustainable peace, and placed this in the context of international obligations. But clear disappointment on the part of MODs that the Armed Forces had neglected the WPS agenda and had failed to implement gender perspective had no obvious consequences. Conversely, an analysis of the incentives put forth by the Ministry to *motivate* change finds that there were simply not very many of them. Moreover, the few motivational incentives that were offered were ineffective without the critically important positive vision that Schein (2004) claims must exist for change to occur. These incentives were thus easily overshadowed by a larger focus on problems with implementation. Had a reward system that was linked to necessary changes and the implementation of new policies been in place, it could have played a part in creating the psychological safety that supports transformational change (ibid.).

5.4 The Political Contribution to Transformational Change

The public speeches of MODs, and by proxy the Norwegian Government, addressed some structural, but mostly functional and cultural, aspects of the Armed Forces when discussing implementation of UNSCR 1325. The focus of the Ministry on recruiting and retaining more women in the military was often associated with increased competence and capability, for example, but had clear structural implications when political leadership responded by instituting universal conscript service. Some speeches also mentioned wider Nordic cooperation in the context of structural means to implementing the WPS agenda; a proposal that was also followed up by political action, to staff and finance the NCGM.

Though other structural elements were rarely a focus of communications from the Ministry, the Government did push strongly for the use of GENADs in international operations in Afghanistan (see Chapter 4) and tasked the Armed Forces with establishing both GENADs and Gender Focal Points in the military organisation. Yet, this has not been achieved, and with no assessment on the part of the MoD as to why

implementation of these initiatives has been unsuccessful, the control and accountability promised in official communications appears to be lacking. While the establishment of structures like the NCGM and a universal conscript service represented necessary steps in managing the organisational culture (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005), a failure to hold military leaders accountable or put a disciplinary system in place undermined these efforts (Schein, 2004).

Also important in managing organisational culture and facilitating change was clarity by the Government as to the need for that change, along with the articulation of concrete measures to achieve it (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). As such, a variety of functional aspects were addressed in Ministry communications, including: coordination and systemisation; education and training; gender analysis; guidelines for reporting and responding to sexual violence in conflict; the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in military operations, including in planning, execution, and reporting; and leadership accountability – all of which were reflected in tasks assigned to the Armed Forces in official documents (see Chapter 2). These assignments were identified as vital to implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in multiple communications by MODs, who emphasised the commitment of the Government to the WPS agenda and proclaimed that the Armed Forces would be held accountable for poor progress. Still, apart from formalising these assignments, the practical implementation of these tasks was left to the military. And again, absent a discipline and reward system, the potential for change has remained unrealised (Schein, 2004).

The question of military culture, and the need to change certain cultural aspects of the Armed Forces, was addressed in a different tone by MODs than structural and functional aspects. The Ministry openly challenged this culture, highlighted that it is based in norms created for and by men, and noted that such a culture discriminates against women and tolerates their harassment. What's more, the culture of the military was said to separate men not only from women, but also from the rest of Norwegian society. Communications of the Ministry reflected the position of the Government that a new military culture must be cultivated, and must be grounded in diversity and equality. This demands new attitudes, ethics, and organisational culture in the Armed Forces, and yet once again, control mechanisms have not been established to motivate and ensure progress in this area.

5.5 Conclusions

Analysis of communications issued by the MoD demonstrates that the Government had concrete expectations for the implementation of gender perspectives in the military organisation and in military operations. Among the earlier communications examined, the assumption that military leaders would inevitably carry out the democratic will, expressed through political directives, was evident; yet over time, lack of progress was met by frustration and even some surprise. This underscores several challenges in the relationship between the military and the Ministry.

First, the frustration expressed by representatives of the Government over the pace of implementation revealed *a lack of understanding by political actors about how military structures, functions, and culture were likely to interact with externally-mandated calls for change*. Second, *the MoD and military leadership do not share a diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational understanding of the changes that are necessary in the Armed Forces*. If the descriptions put forth in Ministry communications of military culture are accurate – as this study and other research presented in chapter 2.2.6 indicate that it is – this is a democratic concern that should attract the attention of the Government, especially if that culture is preventing the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Finally, *the MoD has not applied adequate command and control mechanisms, and has not established a suitable reward and discipline system,* even though this bridge between political and military leadership is vital to changing organisational culture (Schein, 2004). This means that when political expectations are met by a lack of implementation, there is no consequence, offering no incentive to leadership within the Armed Forces to become more committed to transformational change or hold their own personnel accountable for preventing it (see Chapter 4.10).

There are several explanations for why an effective reward and discipline system has not been developed by the MoD and the Armed Forces. But, one key factor in any system intended to respond to progress or failures in an implementation process is the capacity to objectively evaluate that process. Thus, given findings from the first phase of this study that the MoD has at times reported on initiatives in a way that implies more success or more progress than is realistic, dynamics within the Integrated Strategic Leadership (ISL) – where leaders of the MoD and the military come together – should be investigated to determine whether command and control is obstructed by a need to appear to meet certain political benchmarks. The Office of the Auditor General of

Norway or other independent control mechanisms could also play a more substantial role in evaluating both the lack of implementation of the WPS agenda and the lack of consequences for those who have not undertaken or completed assigned tasks.

Many communications of the Ministry conveyed a genuine commitment to the WPS agenda, which has sometimes been reflected in political decision-making, such as in the establishment of universal conscription. This has demonstrated a real desire to push gender initiatives forward at the political level; however, with no actions taken by political leadership to call military leaders to account for failing to do the same, any mentions of accountability in the speeches of MODs come across as increasingly hollow threats. Indeed, assertions in official Government communications of political will to hold military leaders accountable have not been borne out in practice and this *inaction* must be viewed as a factor that has played a role in *preventing* change in the structures, functions, and culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and thus in preventing the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

6 NATO and Norwegian Allies

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WPS AGENDA IN CONTEXT

6.1 Introduction

In the final empirical phase of this research, I sought to contextualise findings from the first two phases by analysing implementation of the WPS agenda within NATO; evaluating the efforts of both NATO and the Norwegian Armed Forces through the lens of gender expertise; and presenting cases of gender policy implementation across the globe, with a focus on UN entities and the US military. Norway's relationships with its allies and its roles in key security organisations affect its political aims, including the ambition to be an international leader in implementing the WPS agenda. By identifying similarities and differences between the experiences of Norway and other states or organisations, my goal was to gain further insight into factors that have supported or prevented progress. I also attempted to ascertain whether and how Norway is regarded as a frontrunner when it comes to implementation of UNSCR 1325, or what factors must be addressed to reach this aim, by examining perceptions of Norway within NATO and among Norwegian allies.

The results of interviews conducted with gender experts from NATO are presented in such a way as to reflect the structures, functions, and culture that they cited as affecting the implementation of the WPS agenda within the Alliance. These results are then discussed in the context of the theoretical foundation of this study, and the findings of the first and second phases of research. The evaluation by these interviewees of the contribution made by Norway to implementation will also be specifically addressed.

6.2 The History of NATO and Foundations for Implementing UNSCR 1325

Founded in 1949, NATO is an international alliance intended to safeguard the freedom and security of member states through both political and military means. It currently counts 29 countries as members and 41 as partners. Norway has been a member since

the inception of the Alliance, and this membership has become a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy (Tamnes and Eriksen, 1999). Politically, NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues to build trust and prevent conflict. Still, while NATO is committed to peaceful dispute resolution, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military capacity to undertake crisis-management operations – carried out under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,[221] the founding document of the Alliance, or under a UN mandate. As part of a comprehensive approach to crisis, NATO also cooperates with international organisations and actors that have experience and skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, the judiciary, and the police, including the UN, the EU, and OSCE, the African Union, and the World Bank. To be effective, such an approach requires that all actors contribute to a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, transparency, and determination, and an accounting for respective strengths, mandates, and decision-making autonomy.[222]

Since 1961, senior female officers in NATO have been organising ad hoc conferences to discuss the status, conditions of employment, and career opportunities

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[221] Article 5 reads: "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.*" Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 10 November 2018).

[222] On the NATO website, this comprehensive approach is explained: "*Lessons learned from NATO operations show that addressing crisis situations calls for a comprehensive approach combining political, civilian and military instruments. Building on its unique capabilities and operational experience, including expertise in civilian-military interaction, NATO can contribute to the efforts of the international community for maintaining peace, security and stability, in full coordination with other actors. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations requires nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to contribute in a concerted effort.*" In November 2010, Allied leaders agreed at the Lisbon Summit to enhance NATO's contribution to this comprehensive approach as part of an effort to improve NATO's ability to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction. In 2012, Allies agreed at the Chicago Summit to establish "an appropriate but modest" civilian crisis management capability at NATO Headquarters and within Allied Command Operations (SHAPE). See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (accessed 10 November 2018).

for women in the Armed Forces of the Alliance. In 1976, the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) was officially recognized by the NATO Military Committee. Then, in 1998, the permanent Office on Women in the NATO Forces was established as part of the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters to provide information on gender and diversity issues and support the work of CWINF.

In 2009, the mandate of CWINF was extended and the Committee was renamed the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) to reflect its role in supporting the implementation of the WPS agenda, including the integration of gender perspectives into NATO military operations. To that end, the NCGP encourages gender mainstreaming as a strategy that incorporates the concerns and experiences of both women and men as integral to the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of NATO policies, programmes, and military operations. In August 2012, NATO appointed Norwegian Diplomat Mari Skåre as its first Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, to reinforce and promote the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions within NATO. This political role complements that of the NCGP on the military side of the Alliance, and underscores the messaging of NATO leadership that these WPS resolutions are crucial given the disproportionate impact of war and conflict on women and children and their historical exclusion from peace processes and stabilisation efforts.

In addition to the Special Representative for WPS and the NCGP, NATO now has GENADs at Allied Command Operations at SHAPE in Mons, at Joint Force Command Brunssum, at Joint Force Command Naples, and at Allied Command Transformation Norfolk. SHAPE additionally has Gender Focal Points throughout its organisation, to ensure the mainstreaming of gender perspectives. GENADs at the strategic and operational levels are supplemented with GENADs at the tactical level in some operations. Headquarters and exercises are evaluated from a gender perspective; and, as part of the stronger commitment NATO has made to monitoring and reporting, the Alliance briefs member and partner states every six months on progress made on the WPS agenda. The NATO Secretary-General is also obliged to publish an annual report on implementation of the Women, Peace and Security policy (UN, 2015 p. 262).

In 2016, NATO established its first ever Civil Advisory Panel, dedicated to the WPS agenda. The aim was to institutionalise continuous dialogue between the Alliance and representatives of civil society working on conflict prevention and resolution,

security issues, and empowering women, to translate grassroots activism into national and international policy and improve implementation of the WPS agenda within NATO.[223] The NCGM in Stockholm (Sweden is a partner nation) was identified as Department Head for all curricula related to gender education and training for NATO and PfP countries.

It is clear that NATO leadership appreciates the degree to which today's military operations require diverse skills and resources in order to ensure that peace and security are achieved and maintained. Indeed, the Alliance recognises that the complementary skills of both male and female personnel are essential to NATO operations – especially as civil-military interactions, public relations, and information sharing become only more complex – and that the broad integration of gender perspectives has contributed to increased operational effectiveness.[224] Still, while it may go without saying that diverse competence is needed to solve diverse tasks, the assumption that women alone will bring necessary diversity can undermine the transformational change that must occur within an organisation in order to implement the WPS agenda (Wright, 2016).

The commitment of NATO to gender perspectives is built partly on the work of the first military women in the Alliance to connect, network, and advocate for change from within this highly gendered organisation (Wright, 2016). This, along with a focus on increasing the representation of women, the influence of member and partner nations, and use of the WPS agenda by those nations as a tool to achieve gender equity, has created and reinforced the unhelpful impression that UNSCR 1325 and its core initiatives are related only to "women's issues" and are thus disconnected from the security agenda and the aim of military operations (ibid.). And despite the claims of NATO that gender perspectives have contributed to increased effectiveness in military operations, leaders have not clearly communicated how this effectiveness is linked to the aims and transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 (ibid.).

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[223] See: NATO, "New Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security," press release, 18 October 2016.

[224] See: NATO, Topics, Women, Peace and Security, "Gender Perspectives in NATO Armed Forces," 15 October 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm (accessed 10 November 2018).

6.3 NATO Gender Professionals Evaluate the Structures Affecting Implementation

The gender experts interviewed for this research agreed that early efforts to introduce structural changes to NATO had resulted from the earnest desire to do *something*, but had not been part of a comprehensive plan. For instance, when the Gender Advisor position was created, there was no overall concept for the work and no coordination or clear chain of command. Thus, as GENADs were placed in ISAF Operations from the end of 2009, personnel had minimal academic qualifications or training specific to gender.

Even the GENAD at SHAPE was initially established in a department focused on civil and military cooperation; but in 2011, mostly as a result of the GENAD's own advocacy, transitioned to the team directly advising the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It was another year after that, however, before the Secretary General's Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security in NATO Brussels was appointed. These structural elements were established without a clear strategy from a command perspective, leading to confusion about how various structures, including the political and military sides of NATO, were to interact with each other. The fact that the military organisation had a GENAD before the governing body of NATO did, contributed to tension over established measures and disagreement as to the way ahead.

Creating the position of the NATO Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security had been a Norwegian initiative and was funded by the Norwegian Government for the first two years, in 2012 and 2013. The position was then made a permanent part of the NATO SG Advisory Team and was funded by the Alliance as of 2014. Interviewees regarded this position as very important, and expressed that the Special Representative could significantly and constructively contribute to improving dynamics between the political and military arms of NATO. The structure was created to enhance cooperation at the highest levels, in implementing the political peace and security agenda and in defence and national planning, with the aim of mobilising political leadership to affect the institutional culture.

Alongside the GENAD position at SHAPE, the Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security was regarded as a cornerstone achievement of pioneering efforts related to UNSCR 1325 on the military side. Still, despite positive views of both these structures, interviewees said they were part of an approach that had been drawn out far too long, and were created without support, staffing, or funding. This left the first people

who filled these roles to navigate the organisation with no guidance, and to cobble together whatever support they could in order to gain access to leadership. But somehow, they did; and at SHAPE, the GENAD advised the Commander to designate Gender Focal Points throughout the organisation – an initiative that interviewees described as successful in promoting implementation of the WPS agenda and contributing to awareness.

The work of GENADs requires further support from change agents within both the military and civil society, especially when it comes to efforts to transform culture, which is especially difficult to change. When asked about factors that made their work harder, some interviewees specifically noted that the termination of the Norwegian Gender Project meant there was no longer a professional structural element in Norway to respond or contribute to their work in NATO, expressing surprise and frustration that they had no professional counterparts in a member country they expected to lead on issues of gender. Moreover, they complained that some of the staff positioned in structural elements in operations, such as GENADs in ISAF, had been low-ranking and inexperienced and thus ill-equipped to hit the ground running. In fact, several GENAD positions in NATO operations remain vacant because member states consider it such a low priority to fill them at all.

Respondents agreed that the Armed Forces of member countries should create their own structures, rather than hiring temporary personnel from civilian society to fill needs in NATO, as Norway did for instance when asked to provide an evaluator for two NATO exercises in Naples. This was believed to have camouflaged actual structural needs within the Norwegian Armed Forces and to have undermined an opportunity for the organisation to apply knowledge obtained in the exercises. In other words, ad hoc solutions prevented the organisation from taking structural, functional, and cultural responsibility. Some respondents also said that a WPS task force – established as a cooperative forum for personnel with gender on their agenda within the NATO organisation, to increase cooperation and effectiveness – had been inconsequential due to a lack of participation by key personnel and a lack of organisation. As a solution, they suggested that GENADs and Gender Focal Points should participate in the task force as part of their job descriptions.

6.4 NATO Gender Professionals Evaluate the Functions Affecting Implementation

6.4.1 A Lack of Joint Political and Military Concept and Efforts

The factor most commonly emphasised by NATO experts as representing an obstacle to implementing UNSCR 1325 in NATO military operations was a *lack of conceptualisation*, manifesting in the absence of a clear strategic plan or well-defined objectives for the use of gender perspectives and Gender Advisors. Several interviewees cited the need for institutionalisation and a more comprehensive approach, and reported that gender was often *not* considered part of the standard functions of planning and execution, but was instead treated as an add-on. With no rewards or disciplinary measures connected to implementation and no evaluations of leaders on results related to gender, there had been no consequences for inaction, which respondents attributed not just to individual unwillingness but also to a lack of institutional and operational goals. One remarked that leadership seemed to have believed it would be enough to say, "*do it*," and implementation would simply trickle down across the organisation and everyone would understand their roles.

A lack of resources and funding were also regarded as problems that hindered implementation, and these were described as a natural consequence of the failure to develop a concept and plan. But without support, staff, or funds, the work was vulnerable and extremely dependent on individual will; and at both NATO Headquarters and at SHAPE, gender initiatives were viewed as part of a "*one-woman show.*" Fortunately, the position of Chair of NCGP is no longer tied to the financial cost it previously involved, opening it up to nations with less financial capacities and allowing them to take a leadership role.

Interviewees also pointed out that the first Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security had met only twice with the NATO Secretary General in her two years in office. More access to the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretary General, and executive leadership, along with better promotion of the subject of gender, were regarded by these experts as absolutely necessary in order to secure support from higher levels of the organisation and ensure that the organisation as a whole can deliver on concrete strategies that address legal issues, gender policies, Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), and action plans. One respondent noted that the operationalisation of policies typically occurs at the Lieutenant Colonel level – described as "*where the rubber*

meets the road" – but that this level of the organisation was the most challenging to transform.

Despite acknowledging these significant challenges, interviewees did report some progress. At SHAPE, for instance, they said that many NATO personnel seem to have a good grasp on the notion of protection that is encapsulated in UNSCR 1325; though, they claimed the concepts of prevention and participation appear to be less well understood. They noted that gender perspectives have also been included in NATO planning and exercises, but recommended, in order to more fully mainstream implementation, that a professional institute be established so that UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives cannot be easily marginalised within the organisation. Indeed, without an active effort to champion the WPS agenda and convert it into concrete goals, these experts felt that even significant policies such as the Bi-SC Directive 40-1 – developed by NATO at the strategic level – will remain little more than words on paper. This is also a challenge facing the NATO reporting system on gender perspectives, to which member states are urged to report yearly but face no penalty if they do not. Interviewees mentioned that Norway was among the countries that have failed to report every year.

To some degree, a lack of agreement between the political and military parts of NATO as to which has responsibility and authority for gender initiatives, whether NATO Headquarters or SHAPE, has already marginalised the subject. Several respondents expressed that gender was treated as a short-term priority that would be supplanted in due time. This was linked by interviewees to the lack of a long-term strategy, which they believed had resulted in progress being tied too tightly to the efforts of individual enthusiasts – the work of whom was described as a necessity, without which there would be no incorporation of gender perspectives at all. Nevertheless, respondents said NATO had shown leadership and responsibility as an organisation and, since the first GENADs were deployed in 2009, had made significant progress to institutionalise gender awareness at a structural level through the establishment of key positions.

6.4.2 The Role of Leadership

Every expert interviewed for this research highlighted the importance of leadership in the successful implementation of gender perspectives. They noted that leaders must be personally committed to the WPS agenda so that they can "sell" it internally, and must match that with engagement and concrete actions, rather than simply by giving lip service to the subject in a few statements or speeches. At present, respondents said,

there is a glitch in the NATO system whereby political communication and policies that set standards for the military are converted into tangible military aims, analysis, plans, actions, and education.

These concerns over leadership extend to both the political and military sides of NATO. On the political side, respondents noted interestingly that gender itself has played a role among key actors in their comfort with prioritising gender issues at NATO Headquarters, where mostly male ambassadors have seemed to require social "cover" for bringing *soft security issues* to the table. Doing so appears to be easier when they represent a nation, not themselves, allowing them to avoid losing personal credibility or having their manliness questioned, and thus many of these ambassadors simply do as their national political leadership instructs. Still, interviewees acknowledged that expertise is growing and support is gaining ground on the political side, but cited the high turnover of diplomats as a challenge and said the process of building support for gender initiatives is time consuming.

Generally, respondents felt that the military side of NATO has made more progress on implementing gender perspectives, thanks to the introduction of GENADs at the leadership level. This access created openings for GENADs to influence leaders and ensure that gender perspectives were included in policies and programming. Interviewees from the military side also reported efforts to engage military leadership from NATO partner states such as Sweden. There, a gender-focused mentoring program for military leaders was regarded as successful and is now something Swedish leaders would like to become a part of themselves. Several interviewees highlighted the important leadership of General (r) David Morrison as well. This former Chief of the Australian Army, regarded by respondents as a model for NATO military leaders, demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of gender and fearless leadership on gender policies. Australia has been progressive on equality issues; has implemented gender perspectives in the Armed Forces with close cooperation between civil and military leaders;[225] has instigated programmes to conquer discrimination and educate

[225] Australian Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick and General Morrison established an effective working relationship to address these issues, and they remain champions of equality.

military leaders;[226] and has appointed GENADs to the CoD, the different services (Army, Air Force, Navy), and operational Headquarters.

6.4.3 Legal Framework and Reporting

NATO experts described a legal framework as fundamental to the success of WPS initiatives. Yet, they said there were no real demands for or control over execution, leaving activities to be carried out by chance and with mixed results. Respondents also mentioned the need for the monitoring and evaluation of NATO implementation under the leadership of the Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security as a means to professionalise gender policies and ensure institutional learning. They called the lack of WPS-related reporting between the political and military sides of NATO a crucial problem and said it was most difficult to get reports from military field operations; but they also cited delays with reports from member states, the priority of which is set at the national level.

Interviewees claimed that different standards for reporting added to these difficulties, and they mentioned the need for clear indicators of implementation of the WPS agenda, especially metrics in numeric form, which tend to be most convincing to the most people. The process of review and reporting was also said to be lengthy and dysfunctional. As one interviewee said: "*the question is whether you want the truth or a report,*" implying that reports have been embellished to present initiatives as more successful than reality suggests.

6.4.4 Education and Training

NATO experts emphasised that more expertise is required to implement gender perspectives in education and training. SHAPE made gender perspectives a part of their introductory training for new personnel, but an overall deficiency in knowledge of the subject matter makes this difficult to achieve. And though courses have been held infrequently at NCGM in Sweden and have been offered by NCGM in several countries that have requested this, the Centre has a limited capacity. What's more, a lack of

[226] On 27 August 2015, GENAD to the Australian CoD Julie McKay informed a roundtable meeting with representatives from the Norwegian military and civil society about the process used by the Australian Armed Forces to address gender issues over the previous five years. One of their initiatives to educate and enlighten military leaders had involved meetings between these leaders and victims (often escorted by their mothers). Meeting and hearing concrete stories, including mothers saying, "*I gave my daughter to you, I trusted you, and you let this happen to her on your watch, and it ruined her*," has been eye-opening for many.

funding has prevented even the most senior officer who works on gender at NATO Headquarters from attending a GFA course, reflecting how little priority this education was assigned by leadership.

But the experts interviewed for this study insisted that education is a powerful opportunity for requisite "*aha moments*." They felt that the subject of gender must be divorced from any drama and de-mystified within the organisation so that it simply becomes part of the thinking; a new consciousness, if you will. To reach that point, they said, would represent having come a long way. While one interviewee warned that focusing so much on education and training may detract from the fact that gender perspectives apply so broadly and must be integrated into the whole process of military operations, education on gender – required for all "6ers"[227] and up – was viewed by every respondent as an important initiative and one that proved the commitment of NATO as an entire organisation to gender perspectives. Notably, one respondent expressed the opinion that education remains too focused on war, however, and not on the Armed Forces as peace brokers, which would be more accessible to and adaptable to gender perspectives. This echoed the impression of interviewees that military education is designed to shape "macho" men from day one.

It is apparent that a failure to fully conceptualise implementation impacts the ability of NATO to build expertise, but NATO experts also cited a lack of ability and knowledge as a *cause* of this fragmented approach to implementation, which in turn has prevented progress. The dependence of NATO on member states to implement gender policies plays a significant role in this dynamic, as these states, too, must fill positions with competent and knowledgeable staff who can bring this competence and expertise into NATO. This highlights how crucial it is for Norway and other NATO members to provide quality education internally so that they can contribute professional competence that helps the Alliance progress further in implementation.

Still, the development by NATO of an implementation plan, indicators, and guidelines to deal with sexual violence in conflict, and some advances in areas such as planning, education, and exercises were regarded as important signals that gender perspectives will also be incorporated into all documents, operational plans, and policies, pushing member and partner nations further toward implementation as well. Interviewees claimed that top NATO military leaders have made efforts on multiple

[227] Refers to OF 6, officers at the level of Brigadier General.

levels to facilitate implementation, and have been open to taking advice and carrying out political agendas. This is encouraging and essential, but cannot be very effective without an overall strategic plan; and the learning-by-doing approach has led to a protracted implementation process that has created resistance and frustration in the organisation. Respondents were hopeful that future civilian and military leaders would be more willing to think outside the box regarding gender perspectives and would view implementation as an opportunity for progress. Currently, the organisational culture of NATO and other militaries allows a lack of knowledge of gender to be an excuse for inaction when it comes to implementing gender perspectives.

6.5 Culture

6.5.1 Bullying and the Ridicule of Gender Policies

Interviewees attempted to explain the culture of NATO, but at the same time acknowledged the existence of different subcultures within the forces of the Alliance and the influence of the national cultures of member states. On the issue of gender, they described a culture of negativity and recalled situations in which personnel working on the topic had been subjected to bullying. In one case, for example, a female instructor conducting a briefing on gender perspectives in military operations was actively disrupted by two participants (Norwegian officers at the Lieutenant Colonel level) who were later overheard bragging that they had managed to sabotage the briefing, and that they had done so because they were bored.

The eye-rolling, ridicule, ignorance, and exclusion reported by these interviewees reflected attitudes sometimes encountered even when gender perspectives were presented to the NATO military committee. Respondents said that gender had never really been taken seriously, and one claimed that when the new Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security position was announced, jokes had been made that it was paid from someone's "*social expense account.*" However, respect for the position grew when it was filled and the title and rank of the position was designated as Special Representative to the Secretary General.

Some interviewees noted that a negative mindset about gender, and sabotage of implementation efforts, extended from both the military and political leadership of NATO; and to such a degree that some gender advocates felt pressured to quit. One respondent expressed incredulity that officials in such important and influential

organisations could hold such negative and outdated attitudes, and every interviewee emphasised that these attitudes had no place in a modern democratic organisation such as NATO. They admitted that NATO can occasionally come across as "*an unprofessional and sexist organisation with Neanderthal attitudes*" and is thus perceived as discriminating against women. Of course, this echoes the cultures of militaries around the world, which are regarded as "men's spaces," where men function and interact uniquely as men. Several respondents attributed the strong resistance to gender perspectives in NATO and in armed forces generally to a culture that seeks to protect these spaces for men.

According to interviewees, NATO personnel were usually "politically correct" about gender when their superiors were around, but in reality, tended to view gender perspectives as a feminisation of the force. Respondents had the impression that gender perspectives were largely regarded as a concern for women, feminists, or civilians, not as a core task for the military. Some officers openly expressed their contempt for the issue and anyone addressing it, such as when a male officer recognised a pin on the shirt of a female officer as related to work on gender perspectives and remarked, unprompted: "*I can't be bothered to talk to feminists from the second floor*."

6.5.2 Customising the Message of Gender Perspectives

Gender professionals at NATO had different opinions regarding the best way to communicate about gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325 within NATO. Some highlighted the need for a human rights focus, while others clearly favoured an effectiveness approach. Due to the masculinity culture of NATO and of military forces in member states, they all agreed that gender requires a special care not necessary in the messaging of other topics. Still, while some warned of an unambiguous focus on effectiveness, others endorsed this as the only way to access personnel.

Indeed, one interviewee said the rights approach could actually be *counter*productive, and told of overhearing a military colleague exclaim about gender perspectives: "*Thank God it's not about equality, just operational effectiveness!*" The lack of mutual understanding and communication between NATO Headquarters and SHAPE was said to have created its own counterproductive dynamic as well, reflected in a difference of opinion between the political and military sides of the organisation over which of these approaches is best. SHAPE has chosen to focus mainly on effectiveness,

and has treated contact with the political side of NATO as superfluous to implementing gender perspectives through the military chain of command.

Respondents noted that the culture of member countries influences the way their personnel interact with leadership and the internal hierarchy of NATO. Some follow orders without question, while others voice strong opinions about how the organisation should operate. In the case of gender perspectives, personnel from countries that enjoy high levels of gender equality nationally were said to have been outspoken about the need for NATO to adopt similar policies in order to succeed in implementing UNSCR 1325. Yet, several interviewees expressed that many soldiers continue to view gender perspectives as some kind of "*hype*," and that leadership has reinforced this assessment. As an example, one interviewee described a seminar held for a group of military cadets that featured actress and UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Envoy Angelina Jolie, addressing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, at which all the generals left the room as soon as her introduction ended, sending a signal to the cadets that *she* and not the topic were their focus. Given the different cultures and subcultures that coexist within NATO, leadership from the top down is even more vital to creating a culture open to change, regardless of the approach to implementation.

6.5.3 Male Dominance and Masculine Culture

Ultimately, interviewees felt the masculine culture of NATO had been the biggest obstacle to its implementation of gender policies. One respondent even said that the aims of the WPS agenda simply *cannot* be achieved until it is completely normal to see women in NATO uniforms; something they said is still uncommon enough that they think "*good for you!*" every time they see a female officer in the halls of NATO Headquarters. This is a challenge for armed forces across the globe, and many member nations have tasked their militaries with better reflecting society and making service more attractive, especially to women. But the dominant masculine culture of militaries everywhere makes the implementation of gender perspective a challenge that requires extra finesse so that they can be "*smoothed in*" unlike other initiatives.

One respondent noted that some men view the WPS agenda as a personal affront and believe gender policies pit men against women. Interviewees felt this kind of resistance may be overcome by highlighting the operational benefits or necessities of gender perspectives and of women themselves (again, by making an effectiveness

argument). Operations in Mali were cited as an example of this, where it was a problem to fulfil the mandate without more women.

Interviewees felt that special support must be provided to the women who do serve in armed forces, if the aim of better gender balance is ever going to be achieved. In this respect, they reported differences in the cultures of the political and the military sides of NATO, describing the military side as more entrenched in outdated views of gender and the political side as more forward-thinking. This is interesting given their assessment that, on a *structural* level, the military side of the organisation had been more successful in implementing the WPS agenda. But, on the question of culture, these respondents claimed the political side of NATO was more progressive than the military side. They described active efforts by political leadership to design policies that embrace diversity and will move the organisation toward 50/50 gender representation, and which recognise that families require support and assistance to help spouses (of any gender) find employment, given the increasing number of two-career families. Interviewees felt, conversely, that military leaders were less forward thinking and only considered policy changes if a policy itself was regarded as a problem.

Still, even if gender perspectives appear more obviously aligned with the culture on the political side of NATO, NATO gender experts have found it difficult to get some political leaders on board with the WPS agenda. In describing the difference between the cultures of the military and political sides of the organisation, one respondent remarked that the military side "*shoots from the hip*" while the political side "*stabs in the back.*" In other words, the military side might act without a proper strategy or plan, they explained, but political personnel were apt to throw ostensible support behind an initiative while actually favouring an alternate agenda.

Interviewees mentioned the need for more female role models in order to support women within military culture. The new Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security was viewed as a great step forward in that respect, but only a first step. After all, the stigma attached to working with gender issues remains, and it thus remains a career disadvantage; and women who speak out with passion on the topic continue to be dismissed in some cases as "merely" emotional. Respondents noted that they had observed older women daring to claim their space and take ownership of strong emotions with more assertiveness than younger women. One offered an example

of an older female officer who, with tears in her eyes, had confronted a male bully in a meeting; telling him: "*Do not patronize me. You yell when you're angry; I cry. Deal with it.*"

Previous arguments for greater gender balance in the military, including that more women would contribute to a shift in the culture, have mostly been supplanted by the recent emphasis on improved effectiveness. In the past, the physical demands of soldiering were often presented as a legitimate reason for the low representation of women in militaries, and one respondent noted that it had often been international military athletes who set universal physical standards, which are unnecessarily strict for the needs of many military tasks. Interviewees felt it was important that armed forces customise physical standards to meet the real demands of different jobs.

Respondents mentioned two different strategies for achieving better gender balance in NATO. A traditional approach – considered "*gentler*" – relies on recruitment and education over generations, to pave the way for more women and greater equality in the long run. Interviewees were frustrated by this approach; yet, several said it was simply the way things *had* to be done. But those fed up by the lack of progress said a new strategy was essential. And though they are controversial in many ways, some cited quotas as a crucial measure, arguing that the *correct* approach is the one that ensures gender balance is actually achieved.

These interviewees believed that a critical mass[228] of women is important, and there was a conviction among them that larger numbers of women in NATO would positively affect the organisation as well as the armed forces of member states. Yet, increased numbers of women in the military cannot alone be viewed as success; and if politicians do not follow up by giving women the right tools to thrive, measures to recruit women could be interpreted as another empty political gesture. This could lead to even stronger resistance among military personnel who construe efforts to implement the WPS agenda and thus *change* their behaviour as a personal indictment. In fact, respondents warned that any messaging which could be perceived as *blaming* men

[228] According to Childs and Krook (2008), critical mass was originally argued by Kanter in 1977 and Dahlerup in 1988 as essential for underrepresented groups (in this case, women) to be able to promote their agendas and politics, advocate for changes to legislation, avoid isolation, and affect culture as a group (as opposed to just adapting to the majority). Childs and Krook revisited the classic contributions and anticipated connections between numbers and outcomes in a research note and claimed that research on the relationship between expected and substantive representations of women demanded clarification of the origins of the critical mass concept. Available at: http://mlkrook.org/pdf/childs_krook_2008.pdf (accessed 10 November 2018).

would block progress and could trigger a sort of territorial warfare from any men who are scared of being *replaced* by women.

Interviewees noted that the masculinity culture of the military had long impacted women in ways that continue to have consequences. Decisions were made *for* women in the military for many years, often to steer them in the wrong direction career-wise, and to this day, career advancement is more difficult for women than for men in the armed forces.[229] Several female respondents expressed unambiguous frustration about the extra hurdles and hidden traps they had faced in their careers, and two of the five women who were interviewed offered examples from their own experiences of having been provided a different kind of training or a different work position than they applied for, because of their gender. One had been told by a male supervisor that she didn't receive training she was qualified for and had requested, because:

> *"The married male instructor has an obvious crush on you, and your colleagues would think you got the training because of this, and that would be unfortunate for everyone."*

6.5.4 The Messengers of the WPS Agenda

These interviewees, all messengers of the WPS agenda, described their work to implement UNSCR 1325 as difficult and demanding. Several said it had been an extremely challenging experience both professionally and personally, resulting at times in tears, high stress, and ill health. As noted above, some of these experts had themselves experienced sexist behaviour and discrimination in their careers, and now, they felt isolated in their work on gender, with little or no support from NATO or their home countries. The only way they knew to persevere was to demonstrate credibility, legitimacy, and authority over and over again. Still, the isolation in which these messengers worked made it challenging for them to pull in the same direction, and among such small numbers, this created tensions. The lack of clear leadership, command structure, and functions related to implementation only made this tension worse, and respondents reported that information had at times been deliberately withheld among

[229] The Eastern Norway Research Institute has studied the recruitment, socialisation, and military core competence in the Norwegian Armed Forces from 2011 to 2014 and have come to similar conclusions. Women report not being recommended or encouraged to apply for positions that are career enhancing. In addition, the Research Institute concludes that it is still *informal* processes that are crucial to accessing certain positions and promotions (Eide et al., 2014).

them. Nonetheless, the approach of these messengers was predominantly that gender perspectives were more important than any of them as individuals and they all reported that, despite the obstacles, the work could be very personally rewarding.

These respondents emphasised the importance of having the *right* messengers, with certain qualities, in order to best promote the WPS agenda. One explained that the gender equality aspect of the agenda had initially attracted women to the job who were viewed as strong feminists with an aggressive message, but their communication style proved counterproductive in the military domain. Several other respondents agreed that this had prevented progress. However, many others said that most of the messengers of the WPS agenda within NATO were in fact strong and able women; characteristics that played a critical role in their ability to promote an agenda regarded by many as controversial at best and thus requiring them to perform with authority, commitment, and competence. What's more, these messengers must exhibit the capacity to make meaningful connections, adapt to changing needs, and understand when to push, when to hold back, or when to use another strategy.

Given the culture and structure of the military, it is not surprising that the rank of messengers was said to be important, partly because it facilitates access to decision makers. But interviewees said that military culture also means that *men* with a higher rank are preferable as messengers, assuming they have other important personal traits. Indeed, without certain traits, committed male messengers have the potential to prevent progress just as significantly as women perceived as angry feminists. And, NATO gender experts of all types mentioned that the legitimacy of their expertise was frequently dismissed by their colleagues, who tended to imply that anybody could be a gender expert because everyone has a gender.

This dynamic was said to be further complicated by the absence of a concept for implementation and control by leadership, which made it possible for some messengers to promote themselves as experts through self-evaluation, without having the appropriate professional knowledge of history, policies, strategies, and political and military ambitions related to the WPS agenda. One male interviewee remarked that just being a woman seemed in some cases to qualify candidates for gender-related roles, noting that "*it appears the organisation has just employed women to take responsibility for the perspective of women.*" At the same time, male officers who work with gender perspectives face a stigma; rooted in the notion that "real men" can't be too concerned

with "women's issues." One female officer remarked, "*For a man to work with gender, it is like confessing you are gay.*"

Still, interviewees felt the gender of the messenger mattered mostly as it related to the needs of *audiences*, which were sometimes more receptive to a male messenger. Male champions of the WPS agenda were also regarded as important because they had a greater potential to break through certain obstacles in the military system. And, if WPS is kept on the agenda by leaders, the hope among NATO gender professionals is that more men will become interested in gender issues and the area will eventually be regarded as a career booster, or at least as less of a liability. Ultimately, in an organisation consisting overwhelmingly of men, interviewees regarded it as essential that senior male leaders lead from the front in implementing the WPS agenda; and the ability of messengers to gain access to and engage leadership was seen as paramount to this.

Interviewees had the impression, however, that it is often "*hardliners*" who reach the highest echelons of leadership, and that many of these officers regard the WPS agenda as a matter of soft security or "women's issues." Thus, they feel it is important to emphasise the "pro-men" nature of gender perspectives and the fact that they relate to both men and women. If not, one expert commented, there is a real risk of creating more resistance.

6.6 Discussion and Analysis of NATO Implementation of the WPS Agenda

Official documents, interviews with NATO gender professionals, and analysis of the implementation of gender policies within the Norwegian Armed Forces, indicate that NATO has advanced further in implementing the WPS agenda than member states. Still, even NATO implementation has been ad hoc, lacking vital structural, functional, and cultural elements. This has placed too much of a burden on individual efforts. Additionally, the progress and quality of implementation within the Alliance is affected by those of member states, often negatively.

De Dardel (2010) acknowledges this as a general and recurring challenge for NATO, because it depends on its members to move any process forward. He argues that NATO requires more than just procedural shifts, a simplification of the chain of command, new capabilities, and a NATO Reaction Force to meet new demands, but claims it must undergo a radical systemic and organic change in order to adopt decision-

making processes and structures that are more flexible and can adapt to the pace at which challenges and threats are evolving. De Dardel argues that a transformation is underway, but that true transformational change is necessary to enable a comprehensive approach involving knowledge management, lines of communication, and the fusing of military and political, military and civil, and NATO and partners.

According to the data in this study, De Dardel might be right, especially as far as gender policies. As to the structural, functional, and cultural factors that have affected NATO's implementation of the WPS agenda, NATO gender professionals offered several relevant observations in this regard. They claimed that all the new permanent structures with gender responsibilities within the organisation were important and that they had promoted implementation of WPS policies, but admitted that these structures were insufficient and had been unsystematically and ineffectively introduced. An overall lack of planning has been evident, including when it comes to structures and the coordination between them. Schein (2004) noted the need for conscious decisions regarding structural design in order to implement transformational change; and unsurprisingly, in its absence, gender professionals faced frustrating and difficult working conditions and gender policies were more challenging to implement.

However, it is not only conscious decision-making that was lacking in NATO, where gender professionals appealed for decisions to be manifested in a proper concept for implementation in order to ensure institutionalisation. In other words, leadership needed to commit to transformational change not only in speeches but also by providing appropriate structures and functions and by leading the organisation in *cultural* change. Interviewees used examples of leadership from Australia (which is not a NATO country), to demonstrate the relative lack of such genuine leadership within NATO (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Schein, 2004; Strand, 2010). Leadership with knowledge, commitment, and the ability to implement the WPS agenda is thus in dire need.

NATO leaders have so far failed to provide a cultural map of the organisation; an overall concept for structures, functions, and culture; sufficient funding; suitable reporting and evaluation mechanisms; or a reward and discipline system to support change – all of which are requisite elements to create the psychological safety necessary for transformational change (Schein, 2004; F. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). If NATO leadership had committed to instituting these tools and systems, it would probably not remain culturally acceptable to assert: "*I don't know anything about gender perspectives*

and I don't really care." Similarly, there would likely be less room for ridicule and suppression techniques. Therefore, it is imperative that leadership takes responsibility for the organisational culture and reprimands unwanted behaviour (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

The notion of "*gender fatigue*" was also a noteworthy theme in interviews with NATO gender professionals, and reflects the experiences of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This highlights the need to take a conscious approach to change, from the start; otherwise, even well-intentioned efforts can produce resistance that impedes progress in numerous ways. Moreover, if progress is slow or delayed, stakeholders may feel the need to blame a scapegoat, and if men in the organisation are accused, any progress may be obstructed further. The need for a positive vision from the outset of implementation is clear, and in the case of militaries, a vision that inspires and engages change in men – who make up the majority of these organisations (ibid.).

It is worth mentioning that interviewees reported finding culture the hardest factor to define, understand, and change. In an international environment such as NATO, with a rigid hierarchical structure in which people are expected to do as they are told, implementation is promoted as long as leaders make it a priority. This reflects an organisational culture featuring what G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) referred to as a higher power distance, where members accept the fact that power is divided unequally. However, interviewees also described NATO organisational culture as "macho" and focused on combat, and said efforts were made to avoid subjects perceived as "women's issues." NATO gender experts had experienced resistance from individual leaders who ridiculed the topic, employed suppression techniques, and reacted as if their male-dominated domain was being threatened; all signs of a lack of psychological safety (Schein, 2004).

Calás and Smircich (2006) claim that gendered organisations like the Armed Forces are likely to continue to resist new knowledge that challenges their gender and power relations. This has led much of the communication regarding gender perspectives and the WPS agenda to be tailored so that it is less linked to rights and equality, and has made the role of messengers akin to that of diplomats, constantly aware of not rubbing someone the wrong way. The aim of UNSCR 1325 has often been intentionally underemphasised, with gender perspectives framed through the lens of effectiveness, as merely useful tools related to military activities like force protection, intelligence, or

information gathering. That it has been more acceptable to argue for the WPS agenda in this way, ignoring key aims of UNSCR 1325, reflects the hegemonic masculine culture of the organisation (Carreiras, 2017).

Even if the effectiveness approach was used by the Swedish Armed Forces and was verified as partially successful in an evaluation of the Swedish model, the need to develop this approach further to include transformational organisational change and the concept of equality was regarded as a necessity for additional progress (Egnell, Hojem and Berts, 2014 p. 70-75). Yet, the need to change an organisational culture in order to embrace a new concept is difficult to argue for if this is pursued by customising the related messaging to the *existing* and inflexible hegemonic culture. Such is military culture, within military organisations that are male dominated, especially in the core functions that offer opportunities for prestige, rewards, and access to higher ranks (Carreiras, 2017). Indeed, the military is an extreme case of a gendered organisation; and Carreiras describes three strands of gendering that occur in such organisations: first, through recruitment and selection procedures, the division of labour, tolerance for behaviours, use of power, and physical spaces; second, through an organisational culture and ideology that references cultural values in terms of masculinity and femininity, and constructs symbols and images to explain, express, reinforce, or oppose gender division; and third, through the patterns of interaction and identity formation that express, reinforce, or subvert structural and ideological constraints (ibid.).

The fact that the success of messengers in NATO has been associated with certain personality traits also implies an organisational culture challenged not only by gender policies, but also by the professionals disseminating those policies. And, lacking sufficient structures, functions, and culture for change, these messengers are saddled with disproportionate significance in the work of implementation. When change is not properly managed and psychological safety is not present (Schein, 2004), extra pressure and demands are placed on just a few individuals to act as change agents. The vital importance of committed individual Gender Advisors and messengers was emphasised in the evaluation of Swedish implementation as well (Egnell, Hojem and Berts, 2014), which noted the unfair and stressful load they carried.

Importantly, several women gender professionals at NATO said that they had been guided by male leaders in ways that had negative professional consequences. One explained, "*we are trained to follow orders and encouraged to do what is best for the unit,*

not our individual careers." This tendency has been confirmed by current research in Norway (Eide et al., 2014),[230] and is a particularly intriguing insight given the insistence by Norwegian military leaders that women themselves are responsible for ensuring they "*tick off*" the perceived appropriate military positions or continuing education needed to compete for promotions (Nodeland, 2008; Stubberud, 2011). This indicates a knowledge void about existing opportunities and obstructions for women in the Armed Forces and reflects a static hierarchy that reinforces traditional opportunity structures (Kvande, 2007). Even the promotion of a female Admiral to command the Norwegian Defence University College (Høyesterett, 2014) was challenged by this traditional view, in a 2014 trial in the Norwegian Supreme Court.[231] And though the Norwegian MoD tasked the Armed Forces with creating a mechanism to integrate gender awareness as a criterion in the annual evaluations of employees that are used to assess promotions, (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2010), this was never effectuated.[232]

According to Schein (2004, p. 334), personnel must see and experience success using a new perspective in order to embrace it. The fact that NATO has recognised the need to do *something* is appreciated by NATO gender professionals, who were all adamant that genuine effort and progress had been made by the Alliance on structures and policies. Yet, MacKenzie (2015) claims that hegemonic masculine organisations like armed forces may implement small policy changes to appease society, while in reality continuing on as before. If the initial introduction of structures and policies in NATO is not followed up by leadership, conceptualisation, analysis, expertise development, planning, and a reward and discipline system, the characterisation put forth by MacKenzie may well be accurate. And if so, NATO personnel are unlikely to experience success in implementing a new perspective, and are thus likely to reject it (Schein, 2004). This corresponds with the findings in the Norwegian Armed Forces, where the need to do *something* took precedence over developing a proper conceptualisation based on in-depth analyses of the aim of implementation and of the organisation and

[230] These findings caused me to reflect on my own career; and I realized this had been the case several times for me as well.

[231] The Norwegian Supreme Court ruled in favor of the MoD's promotion of this female Admiral. To view official documents from the Supreme Court ruling, see: Høyesteretts dom, HR-2014-00831-A, (sak nr. 2013/1275) April 29, 2014.

[232] A possible reward for efforts related to the WPS agenda that could be implemented within the existing reward system of every military organisation would be a medal. Promotions, increased pay, or admittance to qualifying education are other options.

operations in which implementation was to take place. If NATO is to succeed with implementing the WPS agenda and changing its hegemonic masculine culture to integrate gender perspectives, it will require strategic, comprehensive, and courageous efforts to overcome both conscious and unconscious biases.

6.7 NATO and Norway

NATO gender professionals were asked specifically to reflect on the role of Norway in the Alliance when it comes to implementing the WPS agenda and gender perspectives. As a member of the Alliance, Norway contributes with a wide range of capabilities; and the WPS agenda is one of the areas in which Norway's contribution is expected, particularly because the Norwegian Government has expressed the ambition to lead internationally on this issue. The evaluation of these efforts by NATO gender experts provides useful perspectives on the implementation of gender policies in the NATO context as well as on the factors affecting Norway's ability to accomplish this same goal.

Interviewees described Norway as among the most high-profile countries on the topic of gender, citing much-regarded individual professionals, numerous international conferences, and significant political will and funding. Still, several respondents had the impression that interest in the subject was declining in Norway, noting an absence of any Norwegians in gender courses at NCGM in 2014 and the termination of the Gender Project. Their sense was that Norway no longer regarded gender as important, but that other nations continued to look to political leaders in Norway as a role model.

According to NATO gender professionals, change occurs at a more grassroots level in many other countries, with no expectation that the Government will step in, as has appeared to be the case in Norway – which interviewees understood as an odd country in that it lacks the extra political agenda many other nations have. Norway is thus regarded as neutral, with a balance of policy positions. But this has subjected Norway to accusations of naïveté in contrast to what has been called the "gender mafia," comprising other NATO and PfP countries. And to some extent, though Norway was still regarded by interviewees as a leader on equality issues, they felt the Norwegian military should take a much stronger lead on this work, remarking that they had wondered about a lack of interest and effort by the Norwegian Armed Forces when personnel from partner countries filled important positions in the Alliance instead.

Nonetheless, NATO still regards Scandinavian countries as beacons of possibility. Several interviewees commented that their colleagues had the notion you could simply show up there (in Scandinavia), look around, and absorb how it all worked, as if through a magical osmosis. Several more were surprised and unhappy to learn that even Norway had struggled with implementation of the WPS agenda and was no further along than NATO. They seemed to need an ideal for which to strive, a success to prove implementation was feasible, and the fact that gender perspectives had not been fully implemented in Norway challenged that. Countries in southern Europe, on the other hand, were regarded very differently; there, implementation was *expected* to take time.

Interviewees also reported disappointment that Norwegian leadership in the NATO Military Mission in Brussels had claimed to have no knowledge of the WPS agenda and had exhibited a bad attitude toward gender perspectives. The Norwegian Military Mission was additionally criticised for failing to provide any extra funds when Norway chaired the NCGP. In that case, the Norwegian Chair did not even receive any communication from Norway's MoD about the role, leaving the Chair burdened entirely and solely with the Norwegian commitment to this work in NATO.

This reflected the experiences of other Norwegian military personnel working abroad on gender policies, who lacked information, invitations, funds, and more, and felt alienated from the Norwegian Armed Forces and the MoD and detached from the Norwegian political agenda. One reported having waited 18 months to receive feedback on questions of additional staffing, and was still waiting. Another said their job made them feel like a Norwegian "*gender hostage.*" Others contended that Norway was simply not taking work on gender perspectives seriously, claiming Norwegian personnel without relevant knowledge had been sent to act as syndicate leaders at gender courses; and noting that, in Sweden, military leaders were interested in discussing gender, but Norwegian leaders showed no such interest.

This same indifference was observed by interviewees among the leadership at the Norwegian National Military Representative office at SHAPE, where personnel were seen to represent an inflexibility that manifested in their continued primary recruitment of men and the development of a culture out of tune with the rest of Norwegian society. Interviewees highlighted the emotional and irrational reactions of Norwegian officers to gender perspectives, as if they felt threatened, to illustrate this. One NATO interviewee had visited the Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan and said the personnel there were also

uninformed about gender perspectives, had not taken the political aims of the WPS agenda to heart, and behaved as if the value of gender perspectives was merely an *opinion* of the Norwegian Embassy. The interviewee was surprised at how little understanding Norwegians had of the issue, noting that the subtlety of the stigma related to gender appeared to prevent them from recognising it.

Several individual Norwegian officers or officials were highlighted by interviewees for having some knowledge of the subject; but were noted as exceptions. Mostly, these respondents now view Norway as an external funder of WPS initiatives that has lost its opportunity to lead domestically in this arena. Indeed, Norway was said to have forfeited its leadership role in implementing gender policies when the decision was made to end the Gender Project. One interviewee suggested further that the Nordic Centre had been a mistake for Norway, because it was viewed more as Swedish than Nordic, despite Norwegian staffing. But it was the lack of gender professionals in the Norwegian national structure that ultimately led interviewees to view Norway as unserious about the implementation of gender perspectives. While they acknowledged that some efforts had been made at the NDUC, they felt the rest of the Norwegian military organisation had not undertaken necessary change.

The impressions of interviewees regarding Norway as a promoter of gender perspectives and of its role in NATO implementation of the WPS agenda raise interesting questions. First, by their evaluation, Norway has failed in its ambition of leading on implementation of UNSCR 1325, and interviewees working in NATO called on the Norwegian military to take more responsibility. Further, because there are few individuals that represent Norway on this issue respectably and with a solid political and legal foundation for the work, Norway is regarded as having adopted a "*chequebook mentality*" whereby leaders believe they can pay their way into maintaining strategic significance within the WPS community. The result instead is that Norway is emerging as a nation with decreasing credibility. Indeed, Norway was characterised by several gender professionals in NATO as lacking any *real* ambitions to lead in implementing gender policies in the Alliance. In addition to the arrogance and poor behaviour displayed by many male Norwegian military personnel, these interviewees also cited lack of reporting and initiatives as evidence of Norway's deficient commitment.

These perceptions support findings of the first phase of this research, as well as the argument that the lack of Norwegian national implementation impacts both

international efforts and the opinion of Norway's allies. The attitudes reportedly conveyed by Norwegian military personnel to NATO gender professionals in NATO settings echo the organisational culture detailed in the first part of this study. It is this culture that is preventing the change required to embrace UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives, and thus preventing Norway from exporting the benefits of equality that should serve as a reflection of Norwegian society in NATO. Rather than taking advantage of what Norway is known for around the world to position itself progressively within the Alliance as far as human security and human rights, the data from this research shows that the Norwegian military culture differs so drastically from that of Norwegian society that gender policies and gender equality simply do not hold the same status. In fact, the WPS agenda and the equality it envisions seem to be at odds with a military identity many Norwegian military personnel strive to attain.

The data also suggests that Norwegian officers do not adapt well to the more hierarchal structures and higher power distance of NATO, at least when it comes to gender perspectives. This means that it is their Norwegian military organisational culture or identity that blocks them from becoming gender champions in an international context. However, there is still much room for progress in NATO's implementation; which means that, despite Norway's missed opportunities so far, it is possible for Norwegian military leadership to take a leading role in advancing the WPS agenda in NATO yet, if it should choose to inspire transformational change in the organisational culture by embracing gender policies and making the fight for human security and equality a part of a new military identity.

6.8 The UN and Norway

Norway has been a significant contributor to the UN since its establishment in 1945. Compared to nations that claim their rights by wielding economic or military power, it has been difficult for smaller nations such as Norway to claim their rights in international political spaces. A world governed by international laws and regulations is thus especially important for smaller nations, and Norwegian foreign policy has been characterised by the pursuit of a world order based on international laws, peaceful conflict resolution, and international cooperation through the UN. Norway's engagement with and support to the UN is also rooted in a desire to be seen as a nation of peace; which Norway has asserted through considerable financial contributions to a wide

range of policy areas, as well as more than 40,000 military personnel in 25 peace operations.[233]

6.8.1 The History of the UN and the Foundation for UNSCR 1325

UNSCR 1325 is intrinsically linked to core UN principles. Following the devastation of World War II, the UN was established with aspirational aims, to maintain international peace and security, promote sustainable development, protect human rights, uphold international law, and deliver humanitarian aid. In order to prevent conflict, help parties to conflict make peace, engage in peacekeeping, and facilitate and create conditions that allow peace to take hold and flourish, the UN carries out overlapping activities including: diplomacy and mediation; peacekeeping meant to facilitate political processes; the protection of civilians; assistance in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants; support for constitutional processes; and the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law. The UN also plays a coordinating role in counter-terrorism and works for the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.

The UN Security Council issues mandates for UN peacekeeping operations. Military troops and police for these operations are contributed by Member States but managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and supported by the Department of Field Support (DFS) at UN Headquarters in New York. Combined with the UN International Court of Justice, the UN main bodies, and support from Member States to fund and staff missions, the UN has become the major international actor for peace and security and a leader in establishing standards across the globe. Consequently, when the Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1325 (and related resolutions) on WPS, they initiated a process that is changing international norms. And as the UN is arguably well on the way to institutionalising this norm in its own organisation, this shift is affecting the foreign policies of its Member States (Tryggestad, 2014b)

6.8.2 Discussion

Norway is a member of both NATO and the UN; organisations that depend on the will and capability of members, and between which a sort of work and responsibility sharing has developed. For the last 15 years or so, NATO has taken responsibility for implementing more demanding and offensive military operations, while the UN has

[233] Available at: https://www.fn.no/Om-FN/Norge-og-FN (accessed 14 November 2018).

focused efforts on what the Norwegian Government calls a "concept for multidimensional and integrated peace operations," through a more comprehensive approach including political, military, humanitarian, and development elements (Stortinget, 2008).[234] Differences in the structures, functions, and cultures of these two international organisations not only assign them different responsibilities but affect their ability to implement gender perspectives in military operations.

In recent research, Tryggestad (2014b, p 58) found that Norway has played an active role as an entrepreneur for the WPS agenda within the UN. First of all, Norway promoted the norms and values of women's human rights; both when serving on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and also by seizing the opportunity while chairing the PBC Burundi configuration, to ensure that UNSCR 1325 was included in the strategic framework. In collaboration with the international advocacy network on WPS, Norway was also active in securing women a place at the table when national peacebuilding strategies and priorities were discussed. In fact, Norway has been applauded by other Member States, the UN Secretariat, and the NGO community as among the first countries to adopt a NAP related to UNSCR 1325, to include this normative framework in foreign policy, and to actively pursue its implementation nationally and internationally. Yet, while Norway's *visibility* in promoting UNSCR 1325 in many policy areas seems unquestionable – as evidenced by public speeches, the NAP and two additional follow-up plans, funding for a wide range of projects, and promises made by Norwegian Ministers of Defence to the UN to pursue implementation and finance more initiatives – the findings of this study indicate that aspirations have not always matched realities.

Still, the appearance of progress was a powerful tool in achieving international recognition, and was also reflected in a 2011 Progress Report issued by the Norwegian Government on its own efforts, which stated the country's progress on WPS initiatives proved it was a champion of the WPS resolutions vis-à-vis the UN, NATO, and individual countries.[235] It further emphasised the substantial support provided by Norway to the

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[234] See: https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/stprp-nr-1-20082009-/id530537/?docId=STP200820090001_FDDDDEPIS&ch=1&q=&ref=search&term= (accessed 14 November 2018).

[235] Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/rapport_sr1325.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018). NB: As leader of the Gender Project at the NDUC, I was asked to be a delegate in the Military and Police Group as part of the human rights dialogue that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) conducted with Indonesia. I was recruited to talk about UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations as part of Norway's commitment to the WPS agenda. I was the only woman in the group, which included

UN, NGOs, and other actors that work to implement these resolutions on the ground. The Progress Report also noted the continuing high priority to integrate gender perspectives into the planning, implementation, and evaluation of Norwegian international operations as well as those of UN and NATO, and indicated that there would be increased focus on reporting and accountability in the years to come. But the Government's Progress Report and the results of this research paint two different pictures of the realities of implementation, especially in the military domain, which highlights challenges related to self-evaluation and reporting that were discussed earlier in this study.

Moreover, an official abstract from a March 2015 meeting held between the cooperative body and civilian society, written by the Senior Advisor and Coordinator of WPS in the Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs at the Norwegian MoFA, is much less optimistic than the Progress Report. It states that:

- the DoD should focus on strengthening implementation, including by working more systematically to achieve already-existing tasks meant to integrate 1325 into the work of the Department;
- it is especially important to include WPS in the military's operative pillar – in military exercises, training, and operations – as well as to streamline WPS into national military education, at officer candidate schools and the War College; and
- leaders in the Armed Forces must have a strong academic community from which to draw support, and the NDUC should thus re-establish the research community on WPS.[236]

These points focus narrowly on what can easily be perceived as progress, but there is no mention of the fact that the inclusion of the WPS agenda in military operations has been

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military, police, and representatives from Norwegian human rights organisations. From the first meeting with the Norwegian MoFA, I consistently requested an outline of the goals they wanted me to achieve in the dialogue, but none of my requests were met with a response and the agenda was entrusted entirely to me. Since no aims, funding, or resources followed the dialogue, it seemed the ambition was limited to creating positive and encouraging discussion with the Indonesian delegation on the subject. Most of the leaders in the Norwegian Military and Police Group had no prior knowledge of UNSCR 1325, though the MoFA had made sure it was on the agenda. I expected my contribution to be part of a comprehensive strategy to reach the implementation goals of UNSCR 1325, but it was treated as an add-on, with no expectation of specific results or accountability. That it was on the agenda seemed to be enough to satisfy the political goal.

[236] Mail from Senior Advisor and Coordinator of WPS at the Norwegian MoFA Bjørg Skotnes, 23 April 2015; and abstract from meeting between the cooperative body and civilian society on UNSCR 1325, Oslo, 27 March 2015.

listed as a key task for over ten years. The MoD continues to note its importance, without ever holding the Armed Forces accountable for their lack of progress on the task so far. In addition, there is no indication of *how* the MoD will strengthen and work more systematically on existing tasks. Finally, the reestablishment of a research "community" at NDUC has amounted, in reality, to the designation of one part of one new *temporary* position, for which research is just a fraction of the job description.

The UN appears to have had similar challenges to implementation. UNSCR 1325 stressed the need for more women in peacekeeping operations, for example, but Dharmapuri (2013) found in her study that the inclusion of uniformed female personnel in national contributions to UN peace operations has fallen far short of expectations, comprising only about 3 per cent of military UN peacekeepers globally; a number that rose to just over 4 per cent by late 2018.[237] According to Dharmapuri , the UN is unlikely to reach its goals for gender equality in missions because it is not fully implementing its own two-pronged approach: (1) increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations, and (2) integrating gender perspectives within these missions. She says both goals have gone unmet as a result of three core issues:

- A lack of understanding among Member States about UNSCR 1325 and the UN policy on gender equality in peace operations;
- Gaps in the data and analysis about women's participation in national security institutions globally and in UN peacekeeping in particular; and
- The prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality in the security sector.

At the same time, Dharmapuri (2013) asserts that the UN and Member States alike have obscured the equally important goal of integrating a gender perspective into the work of peace operations, and calls for a comprehensive strategic plan, supported by strong leadership, to operationalise policy guidelines that have already been outlined by the DPKO and DFS.[238] Notably, like NATO, the UN needs its Member States to implement gender policies at home in order to implement them in missions and operations. Unlike NATO, however, UN members include far more major troop-contributing countries that

[237] In September 2018, female military personnel comprise 4.12 per cent of in UN missions. See: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender (accessed 17 October 2018)

[238] See the paper at: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/8074~v~Not_Just_A_Numbers_Game__Increasing_Womens_Participation_in_UN_Peacekeeping.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).

face significant challenges related to gender equality in their own countries and in their own armed forces.

The UN also struggles with the transition from policy and guidelines to operationalisation and implementation, as experienced in Norway and in NATO. Personnel working within the UN on gender perspectives have even said they feel the organisation is moving backwards in certain areas.[239] They claim too much funding is spent on high-profile events or new resolutions, instead of on projects that make a real difference for individuals. They also cited a lack of accountability for Member States, noting that the UN offers an important legal foundation through its resolutions, but without the ability to hold members accountable for implementation, lacks a vital tool (Schein, 2004) in facilitating change related to gender perspectives.

An analysis of the issues that have received increasing attention from the international community, including related to the UN and NATO, reveals that the Norwegian Armed Forces missed out on three key opportunities to lead WPS implementation internationally. First, in 2010, the Armed Forces were tasked with developing guidelines for soldiers related to sexual and gender-based violence in war and armed conflicts, but the work remains unfinished.[240] In 2011, when the Gender Project organised an international conference on "Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations" that featured Margot Wallström, the UN SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict at the time, as keynote speaker, she underscored Norway's important role to play as a frontrunner in this area and said the country could both lead the way and challenge other nations (Kvarving, 2011). But it is not the Norwegian Armed Forces and Government, but the international community beyond Norway – with the UK taking the lead – that has honed its focus on this issue since 2010. British Foreign Secretary William Hague and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, co-chaired the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in June 2014 in London, which constituted the largest gathering ever brought together on the subject, with 1,700 delegates and 123 country delegations including 79 Ministers. These participants agreed on practical steps to address impunity for the use of rape as a weapon of war, and to begin to change global attitudes to these crimes. The

[239] Paper presented by Clare Hutchinson and Tara Sarathy, UN Department of Peacekeeping, panel for "Practitioners' Collective Experiences from WPS and Gender Advisory Work: Challenges and Progress," ISA conference, Baltimore, 22 February 2017.
[240] Also discussed in Chapter 4.11.

Summit featured over 175 public events in London as well as an 84-hour global relay of events around the world.[241]

Norway missed a second strategic opportunity to lead the international community on the WPS agenda on the issue of reporting, despite the fact that monitoring through reporting goes to the heart of situational awareness, learning, and command and control (see Chapter 4.11). In fact, the Gender Project produced a pilot reporting system in 2010 based on UN indicators, NATO guidelines, and national needs[242] that the MoD told the UN Assembly would be tested in Afghanistan, starting with PRT 15 (2010–2011).[243] The use of this tool could have offered valuable pioneering experience and a basis for a more developed reporting system, and could have been made available to other nations to enable comparisons of experiences, possibilities, and limitations in both NATO and the UN. But, as discussed earlier in this study, the NJHQ chose *not* to make use of this reporting system while the MoD continued to identify reporting as a high priority, from the 2011 Progress Report to the 2015 NAP.

The third, and perhaps most significant, opportunity missed by Norway to lead on implementing gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325 was in the planning, execution, and evaluation of military operations. With positive and relevant examples from both exercises and operations on how to do so successfully, the Norwegian Armed Forces could have been pioneers in this area. The lack of implementation from Norway, a nation assumed to face few obstacles in implementing the WPS agenda, has contributed to a loss of confidence among some international actors.[244]

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[241] For more about the Summit and links to various resources, see: https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/sexual-violence-in-conflict (accessed 18 November 2018).

[242] See Chapter 4.12.

[243] A representative from the office of the Minister of Defence contacted me, as leader of the Gender Project, to make sure the reporting system would be ready in time for PRT 15 to use it, so that the Minister could make this assertion to the UN knowing the system was on track.

[244] Norway has influence in some policy areas in the UN, contributes financially, and has had some officers serve in the UN with pride – in New York or on missions. However, observation and interviews suggest that some Norwegian military personnel do not feel a part of the UN identity, even though Norwegian officers serve in UN missions every year. The views of sceptics within the Norwegian Armed Forces are that "*Norway has no import in the UN*" and moreover, that "*blue-beret do-gooders do not fit in with our military culture.*" This could be an interesting starting point for further research into the culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces and an examination of whether they relate more to, or give more credibility to, UN missions or NATO operations.

Norway does continue to lead through the examples of exceptional individual Norwegians who help promote the idea of it as a leading nation on gender equality, including within the Armed Forces. For instance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced on 12 May 2014 that Norwegian Major General Kristin Lund had become the first woman to serve as a Force Commander in a UN peacekeeping operation, when she was appointed to lead the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.[245] Even so, while positive role models are essential to transformational change (Schein, 2004), there is a danger of tokenism, wherein a single success story is given oversized credit and attention, masking the reality that an organisation actually remains unchanged (MacKenzie, 2015).

The appointment here and there of Norwegian military or civilian women as WPS experts[246] in the UN or NATO and the Norwegian Government's self-reported progress serve the perception that Norway is a leader in WPS implementation in *all* areas, including the Armed Forces. With growing credibility issues, it remains to be seen if Norway's approach will end up being regarded as too reliant on the "*chequebook mentality*" referred to by one NATO interviewee. Still, even if the Armed Forces of other nations implement more concrete efforts and see positive results from gender perspectives, the ability of Norway to fund initiatives is likely to provide it with a certain leading status internationally, no matter its own success (or failure) with implementation.

6.9 The US and Norway

For many years, Norway has acknowledged the United States (US) as its closest ally (Stortinget, 2008), regarding it as the country that most persistently and capably protects Norwegian values based on freedom and democracy. This is also a role the US has taken on internationally, notwithstanding constant criticism from certain parts of the world. Despite being allied Western countries, though, the Armed Forces of the US and Norway are organised and trained on different foundational cultures, histories, and

[245] "Norwegian General becomes first woman commander to head UN peacekeeping force," press release, 12 May 2014, https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/468092-norwegian-general-becomes-first-woman-commander-head-un-peacekeeping-force (accessed 18 November 2018).
[246] One example of a civilian appointee is PRIO researcher Torunn Tryggestad, who was appointed to the UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group for 2015–2016 and to NATO's Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security in 2016.

capabilities, and are significantly different sizes. The US also wields substantially more influence in NATO (Hallams, 2010; Nazemroaya, 2012).

Given the leading role of the US in NATO and the fact that it has one of the most powerful military forces in the world, one might expect progress within NATO on implementing gender perspectives in military operations to be partly due to the backing and support of the US for the WPS agenda. However, in several discussions, interviews, conferences, and workshops with NATO and US civilian and military officials who worked on gender-related issues in or alongside the US Armed Forces, various daunting internal challenges were reported. Thus, in the context of a brief summary of UNSCR 1325 in the US and in its Armed Forces, the next section presents an analysis of whether US military forces still have an important role to play as promoters of gender policies in NATO, and how this may affect the Norwegian context for implementation.

6.9.1 The History and Foundation for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the US

It was not until December 2011, 11 years after the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325, that the US issued a NAP on Women, Peace, and Security. A NAP to support a UN resolution was not standard procedure for the US, but the Government felt it necessary to lay out the course the country wanted to take in order to accelerate, institutionalise, and better coordinate efforts to enhance women's inclusion, protection, and equal access.[247] The NAP was guided by five principles: (1) the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability; (2) complementarity with existing initiatives to advance gender equality, women's empowerment, and human rights and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments; (3) inclusion; (4) the coordination of activities, to maximize impact; and (5) the responsibility of US Government agencies to implement the policies and initiatives endorsed in the Plan.

The NAP called for the US DoD to incorporate its objectives into appropriate strategic guidance and planning documents, designate personnel to coordinate implementation, ensure appropriate training, improve data collection, and identify lessons learned. Additionally, the Department was tasked with improving the recruitment and retention of women. However, a majority of the activities assigned to the DoD were related to support from the Armed Forces for *other* actors. This includes, for example, providing common guidelines and training to assist partner nations to

[247] Available at: https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/us_nationalactionplan_2011.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).

integrate women and their perspectives into their security sectors; assigning female US military personnel to encourage and model gender integration and reach out to both female and male populations in partner nations; increasing the participation of women in partner nations in US-funded training programs; assisting partner nations in building their Defence Ministry capacities to develop, implement, and enforce policies that promote and protect women's rights; incorporating modules on the rights and specific needs of women in conflict into training provided to partner militaries and security personnel; and supporting education and awareness initiatives for US Government civilian contractors and aid workers on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse in crisis and conflict-related environments. The US NAP also cites the importance of effective accountability and transitional justice mechanisms to address crimes committed against women and girls, and specifically stipulates a zero-tolerance policy for trafficking in persons.

The US DoD was given 150 days to designate one or more officers as responsible for coordination and implementation. A number of offices and documents also followed, all to support the aims of the NAP, including the Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, the Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012–2017, and the Strategic Plan for Combatting Trafficking in Persons 2014–2018. The NAP was updated in 2016, after a comprehensive review that reflected on its first three years of implementation.[248]

The fact that the US NAP directed only some tasks internally at the US military but focused primarily on outlining assistance or support to partner nations, contractors, or aid workers – ranging from training initiatives to gender-sensitive DDR programmes – reflects a nation that regards itself as a leader and is willing to export its values through military operations. Indeed, this US position was stated quite clearly by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who remarked:

> *"Appalling abuses are still being committed against women. And these include: domestic violence, dowry murders, coerced abortions, honor crimes, and the killing of infants simply because they are born female. Some say, all this is cultural and there's nothing you can do about it. I say it's criminal and we all have an obligation to stop it."*[249]

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[248] Available at: https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/women-national-action-plan.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).

[249] Madeleine Albright, White House Address Commemorating International Women's Day, 8 March 2010, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/

The US military has also received a lot of attention related to its Lioness program in Iraq and deployment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan.[250] Operatives on the ground in Afghanistan had highlighted the need for female personnel to engage on some of their tasks, and the initiative became a part of a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign from 2006, which focused on enabling and supporting the Afghan government (GIRoA) in efforts to defeat the insurgency and convince the people to accept its legitimacy and authority. However, the continued US prohibition on women in combat units meant that female personnel had to be "attached" to all-male US Army and Marine Corps combat units as a way to skirt regulations. The first ad hoc FET was thus officially established in 2009, with the aim of overcoming cultural barriers to accessing a previously unreachable part of the Afghan population – women. But unofficially, media has reported that Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008, has claimed that women served and died for the US in ground combat in Iraq and Afghanistan before that, during his tenure.[251]

The willingness of the US to develop and finance FETs in order to reach female populations in international military COIN operations in Afghanistan contrasts rather strikingly with a lack of convincing response to the alarming numbers of sexual and gender-based violence and assault reported *within* the US Armed Forces. A 2012 survey indicated that 6.1 per cent of women (an increase from 4.4 per cent in 2010) and 1.2 per cent of men in the US military had been sexually assaulted in the preceding 12 months.

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madeleinealbrightinternationalwomensdayspeech.htm (accessed 15 November 2018). Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also been a frontrunner and champion for women's rights as a security issue at the strategic level. She has made strong statements to prove her commitment in multiple public events and speeches, including at the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325: *"…It is not as though we are doing a favor for ourselves and them by including women in the work for peace. It is a necessary global security imperative. Including women in the work of peace advances our national security interests and promotes political stability, economic growth and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Just as in the economic sphere, we cannot exclude the talents of half the population, neither when it comes to matters of life and death can we afford to ignore, marginalize, and dismiss the very direct contributions that women can and have made."* See: Hillary R. Clinton, UN Security Council, New York, 26 October 2010.

[250] See: Maureen Callahan, "Inside the military program that put women in combat," *New York Post*, 19 April 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/04/19/inside-the-military-program-that-put-women-in-combat/ (accessed 22 November 2018).

[251] Ibid.

Notably, 67 per cent of female victims and 81 per cent of male victims did not report the incident to a military authority (Bastick, 2014, p. 37).

6.9.2 Discussion

The choice for the US to develop a NAP in order to implement a UN resolution can be a regarded as confirmation of a strong commitment to the WPS agenda. Yet, considerable national and international pressure to "walk the talk" certainly influenced the decision, and the development of UNSCR 1325 NAPs by other countries likely encouraged the US to develop one, too. It was not enough to have a prominent WPS champion in the political sphere, like former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to be regarded as a frontrunner internationally.

The US NAP mentions the need for the inclusion of gender in strategic documents, data collection, reporting, and training by the DoD, and the need to recruit and retain more women in the military, but there is no specific mention of the need to integrate gender perspectives into *all* parts of military operations, as stipulated in UNSCR 1325. This differs from the Norwegian NAP, where a gender perspective is a recurrent, if still underdeveloped, concept. While the Norwegian Armed Forces appear reluctant to export an equality agenda, though, the US appears to regard it as a duty. This is reflected in the number of tasks assigned to the US DoD directed at external support to partner nations. But this distinctively *external* focus of the US NAP represents something of an oxymoron when the US struggles *internally* with significant issues related to gender. These internal challenges may very well have constrained the focus of the US NAP on gender perspectives within the Armed Forces to merely achieving better gender balance and addressing unacceptable conditions for those who serve. Nonetheless, the US persistently portrays itself as a leader in teaching *other* nations about equality and democracy.

Gender professionals working in NATO and from Norway described the US and its influence as important, but said it is not leading in implementation on UNSCR 1325. Nevertheless, the will of the American military to carry out orders and the fact that US military and political leaders have supported new measures such as FETs in Afghanistan have been essential to NATO. But several interviewees from NATO regarded political champions for the WPS agenda, such as former Secretary of State Clinton, as the heroes who had driven US progress on the issue and described the Pentagon, conversely, as having done nothing at all to implement gender perspectives.

This was confirmed in introductory meetings at the Pentagon and in a phone interview with a US officer working on implementation of the WPS agenda,[252] which made it apparent that gender perspectives and the WPS agenda have indeed *not* been institutionalised by the US DoD. There has also been a lack of capacity and continuity in the work, and both American and international professionals have reported building liaison with personnel at the Pentagon only to find that the turnover rate for officials working on this issue is so high that they must restart the process over and over again. However, an increasing focus on diversity in the US Armed Forces has for example led to the abandonment of the "*don't ask, don't tell*" policy related to homosexuality, and has opened more and more positions to women that were previously accessible exclusively to male soldiers.[253]

Professionals from NATO and Norway found it notable, though, that the US – the leading nation in the Alliance – is still discussing whether parts of its military services should *remain* exclusive to men and has yet to better ensure safety for both servicemen and servicewomen from sexual assault. Remarkable progress has certainly been made in relation to equality in the US Armed Forces,[254] but an enduring crisis of crimes related to sexual harassment, assault, and abuse supersede progress in many areas. The US NAP is also a paradox of sorts, given that FETs were established *only* as part of the COIN doctrine and *not* to support the WPS agenda by implementing gender perspectives in military operations. This undoubtedly affected the approach to their deployment, and to reporting and evaluation. Further, a US officer interviewed for this research claimed that many US military personnel knew about FETs but had never heard of UNSCR 1325 and had no idea at all what was meant by "the WPS agenda."[255] Though the US has taken a bottom-up approach and the Norwegian Armed Forces a top-down approach, both approaches have clearly presented challenges as far as how the WPS agenda has been communicated and prioritised in each military organisation and its operations.

Beyond the matter of whether gender perspectives have been a priority in the US military, the actual effectiveness of FETs – much-promoted as proof of US commitment

[252] Meetings at the Pentagon, December 2011; and recorded phone interview with officer (r) working in the US Armed Forces J-structure, 20 June 2013.
[253] Meaning, they had a previous 100% quota for men.
[254] History was made, for example, when two women completed the US Army Rangers School for the first time in August 2015.
[255] Recorded phone interview, officer (r) in US Armed Forces J-structure, 20 June 2013.

to UNSCR 1325 – has been questioned as well. In fact, Coll (2012) has argued that assessment models for the FET program have been insufficient in many respects. For one, she says that US claims of success have been based on activity, not on systematic data connecting action to the mechanisms of COIN to determine whether it has stopped the enabling of insurgents and created support for GIRoA. Moreover, the military has based FET activities on several untested assumptions. Coll suggests cultural–psychological and bureaucratic–political explanations for poorly developed assessment models; one might assume, for example, that a model that has worked in other areas will work in relation to FET, or that measuring inputs is a way to secure funding and prestige.

Similar criticism was raised about FETs by Azarbaijani-Moghaddam (2014), who contends that false assumptions were made about the roles of Afghan women and about the roles FETs should play.[256] Women who worked as part of FETs were often strongly motivated to reach their Afghan sisters and demonstrate the value of the program; but they faced an uphill battle, sometimes having to leave camp to engage local women without interpreters and lacking adequate cultural and gender training to be burdened with unrealistic results-driven expectations. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam claims that these expectations affected reporting, so that it became a numbers game, which shaped an interpretation of events that gave the impression of success. She sums up her paper with the troubling statement (2014, p.2) that: "*the FET experiment was the sociological equivalent of sending troops out with malfunctioning weaponry*."

Ultimately, the necessity for the US Army and Marine Corps to establish additional teams of female personnel that were *attached* to their units, to meet a need that was *required* to fulfil their tasks, is hard to portray as very progressive when it is the lack of access for women to these positions that limited the ability of these units to reach the whole population in the first place. It is akin to treating the symptoms, not the disease. Equal access from the start would result in a mix of women and men that would preclude the need for FETs.

On this, it is worth quoting (as Azarbaijani-Moghaddam does) US Army General and former US Ambassador to Afghanistan (2009–2011) Karl Eikenberry (2013):

[256] Available at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5096-seeking-out-their-afghan-sisters.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018)

> *"US military leaders should not necessarily be criticized for devising plans to fill the gaping policy hole they stumbled on years into the Afghan war. But the public marketing of these plans by some of these generals in an effort to enlist support from members of Congress, sympathetic think tanks, and the media should serve as a warning against granting too much deference to military leadership."*[257]

Eikenberry highlights two factors related to the functions and cultures of military organisations that persistently prevent the implementation of gender perspectives. First, gender perspectives and the WPS agenda have not been part of a concept for implementation, for example as part of the operational planning in Afghanistan from the beginning. There, a solid gender-specific analysis of the area of operation was lacking, as was a relevant reporting system related to gender.

Planning and reporting are both functional factors, but the explanations for *why* these functions were not put in place or for *how* reporting was carried out are rooted in the organisational culture; the second factor Eikenberry emphasises. Reporting through self-evaluation has repeatedly been discussed in this study as a form of evaluation that can be unreliable and, as Eikenberry notes, can amount to "public marketing." Reports from personnel who need funding or who can enhance their own careers with a narrative of success should be subject to high levels of scrutiny. Indeed, this has been a factor preventing implementation in Norway, NATO, the UN, and the US.

Despite its own challenges with implementation, the US holds many leadership positions in NATO and has considerable influence on progress made within the Alliance. When US military leadership embraces the inclusion of gender in NATO, the high power distance that permeates the US Armed Forces – in which lower ranking soldiers accept the difference in power distribution and do what more powerful officers order (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005) – can advance those efforts. But interviewees still stressed that UNSCR 1325 is regarded as a collateral duty by US military officers; that it has not been institutionalised in intelligence, planning, and execution; and that even efforts to include gender perspectives in educational contexts have been met with resistance.

Still, the most difficult factor to affect in the US Armed Forces is not dissimilar to what faces the Norwegian Armed Forces: a military culture based on what one interviewee described as "*the macho fighting man that just wants to take care of business;*

[257] Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan (accessed 18 November 2018).

the good old boy syndrome," noting that "*there is a need for cultural change, but it will not be quick. The US needs good examples to follow from countries that have progressed further in this area, and they need more expertise and accountability*."[258]

Following the first evaluation of the US NAP in 2015, Commander Collins of the J5-Global Policy and Partnerships Office at the Joint Staff at the Pentagon addressed the NCGP in June 2016 and informed the Committee that the evaluation revealed four main challenges: the organisational culture of the US Armed Forces struggled to connect with the label "women, peace, and security," it was difficult to get senior leadership on board, funds and resources were lacking, and more backing from civil society and the policy side was needed in order to mainstream gender perspectives.[259] The evaluation revealed an organisation that lacks the psychological safety and transformational leadership needed to facilitate change in the organisational culture (Schein, 2004; G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). Additionally, it exposed the organisation as gendered; meaning that it idealises qualities, practices, and symbols seen as masculine (Woodward and Duncanson, 2017; Hatch; 2013; MacKenzie, 2015). There is an obvious need to keep investigating and identifying who keeps the gate closed to implementation of the WPS agenda (Calás & Smircich, 2006), as this study does.

6.10 Conclusions

NATO has become an important actor in the work of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in armed forces and in military operations. It has especially made progress in establishing its own permanent structures (Gender Advisors, Gender Focal Points, a 1325 Special Representative, the Gender Office, and the NCGP) with the organisational proximity, capacity, and power to influence leadership. Compared to Norway, NATO has emerged with a stronger and more persistent commitment due to the priorities of leaders who appear more willing to take advice and pursue political ambitions. However, NATO experts report a lack of funding, among other challenges to implementation that coincide with those in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Functions that have prevented implementation in both organisations include the lack of a joint political and military concept for implementation; a lack of accountability and skilled and reliable

[258] Recorded phone interview, officer (r) in US Armed Forces J-structure, 20 June 2013.
[259] A scorecard was developed and shows progress in several areas. Available at: http://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Scorecard-United-States-No-Scores1.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).

reporting; and a lack of expertise, education, and training. These functions are all vital to facilitating change in the organisational culture (G. H. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005).

Among the cultural factors that have challenged implementation in both organisations are a focus on hard security issues (i.e. combat) and a resistance to what some regard as soft issues (i.e. the WPS agenda). In addition, interviewees said that suppression techniques, ridicule, and sexist, degrading, and homophobic attitudes are commonly expressed in response to the subject of gender and toward personnel working on gender perspectives. These attitudes expose a gendered organisational culture (Kvande, 2007) and reveal the politics of knowledge in the military (Calás and Smircich, 2006). Further, their use demonstrates how suppression techniques define who is inside or outside the group (Schein, 2004). This organisational culture has put a considerable amount of pressure on messengers of the WPS agenda, forcing them to endure these behaviours from their colleagues and still convey the principles and values of gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325.

One cultural factor that has *promoted* implementation in NATO, in contrast to Norway, is related to what Geert Hofstede (1993) refers to as a high power distance; in other words, military personnel working in NATO are more inclined to accept the disproportionate power of leadership and thus to execute orders, even if they do not necessarily understand them or are not convinced of their importance. In the Norwegian Armed Forces, on the other hand, a low power distance has meant that just several employees have been able to impede the political agenda, because they disagree with political ambitions.

Therefore, though the Norwegian Government continues to support UN initiatives and the WPS agenda through policies and funding, it struggles to ensure implementation in military operations and in the Armed Forces organisation. But then, the UN has also struggled to implement gender perspectives in its own missions, while it continues to push for progress internally and internationally. In the wider international context, however, the UN continues to play a vital role and UN resolutions serve as the essential legal foundation for implementation of the WPS agenda. In contrast, the US, which has presented itself as a visionary for implementation of UNSCR 1325, faces credibility issues due to internal organisational obstacles such as a lack of knowledge, education, and training and the fact that some military services still exclude women and

must thus instigate initiatives such as FETs to circumvent regulations, as well as ethical concerns related to sexual harassment and abuse.

The results of this third empirical phase of this study indicate that Norway has missed out on several opportunities so far to lead internationally on implementing gender perspectives and UNSCR 1325 in the Armed Forces. But furthermore, Norway lacks relevant national examples (best practices) from which the international community can learn. And, in some cases, interviewees even portrayed male Norwegian military personnel in international contexts as representing some of the worst aspects of military organisational culture. Still, given that NATO, the UN, and the US face their own challenges with implementation, and Norway enjoys certain Scandinavian advantages – including a strong political will regarding gender policies, relevant strategic documents, a conscript service that includes women, and to some degree funding – Norway continues to be seen as a global leader of the WPS agenda. A lack of concrete implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Norwegian military organisation and operations, along with the attitudes of some male Norwegian military personnel, risk jeopardising the status currently enjoyed by the Norwegian Armed Forces, which are viewed with diminishing approval amongst NATO gender professionals.

7 A Final Analysis and Recommendations

The progress of the Norwegian Armed Forces in implementing the demands of the Norwegian Government for gender policies and perspectives in alignment with UNSCR 1325 has been insufficient. This study has shown that the Armed Forces failed at applying almost all the measures necessary to change organisational culture according to Hofstede (2005), and to create the psychological safety required for transformational change according to Schein (2004). Indeed, the research identified numerous structural, functional, and cultural factors within the organisation that have negatively affected implementation of the WPS agenda. Additionally, it revealed a lack of balance between these factors and command and control. There has been no cultural mapping of the organisation; no conceptualisation of assignments; a shortage of structural, functional, or process changes; a lack of monitoring; a lack of reward and discipline systems; a lack of support groups and networks of change agents; no compelling positive vision and few positive role models; limited formal and informal training possibilities; and insufficient power and expertise.

The organisational culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces has positioned gender policies low on the organisational hierarchy of status and value. This is exemplified by the fear of association, ridicule, and jokes on display by Norwegian military personnel in response to the subject and work of gender perspectives. And when the implementation of assigned WPS tasks has been ignored, leadership has imposed no consequences, offering an unspoken blessing for neglect of gender policies. In fact, the low power distance of the organisational culture has allowed for sub-optimising and outright sabotaging of the WPS agenda.

Though structure, function, and culture have been discussed independently as analytical mechanisms throughout this study and served as valuable tools in observing and classifying findings, some factors uncovered in the research did not fall easily into just one of those categories. For instance, *feelings* were mentioned as an important

factor to address in the process of implementation. Feelings could be addressed as a functional factor related to insufficient psychological safety necessary for change, or as a cultural factor related to identity. Factors such as these highlighted how structure, function, and culture affect and intersect with each other and must be analysed jointly to understand their combined impact on processes of transformational organisational change. It also became clear that psychological factors are linked to all three; a point worth examining further in order to enhance understandings of transformational change.

For this study, Hofstede (2005) and Schein (2004) provided the theoretical foundation to understanding *what* lacked in terms of essential decision-making and actual implementation of the WPS agenda, in the context of transformational change. However, it was gender theories, especially related to masculine organisational culture, that provided crucial added insights into the essential questions of *how* and *why* gender policies and perspectives have been rejected, and even *how much* this matters (Strand, 2010). This research found that gender policies are incompatible with a military identity shaped by hegemonic masculine culture, which has led a majority of Norwegian military leaders to ignore assignments associated with the WPS agenda, confirming the gendered nature of the organisation. Kvande (2007) asserts that *all* organisations are gendered, and it is thus important to determine *how,* and *in what way* this affects policy implementation. This study also supports the claim of MacKenzie (2015) that hegemonic masculine organisational culture enforces a type of exclusion that extends to gender policies and perspectives.

Organisational theorists commonly agree that leadership is crucial to implementing transformational change in organisations. Yet, when military leaders are the products of the very gendered organisational culture they lead, transformational change is even more challenging. This study substantiates that a lack of transformational leadership skills exist among Norwegian military leaders in general, but especially that they exhibit an inability to recognise (a competence blind spot) or acquire knowledge about the gendered organisation they lead, the obstacles it presents, what is required to implement gender policies within it, and their own biases (Cálas and Smircich, 2013). The failure of these leaders is illustrated in this study through examples of their lack of commitment and conceptualisation, including through the establishment of impermanent structures with gender competence, as well as the absence of Norwegian

military personnel educated at NCGM, the neglect of a reward and discipline system, and a lack of national gender courses or leadership programmes. These research results demonstrate that the Norwegian Armed Forces are *so* gendered that any progress at all in implementing the WPS agenda has been due only to the rare efforts of individual enthusiasts within the DoD and the Armed Forces organisation. In this way, the low power distance (Hofstede, 2005) of the Norwegian organisational culture, which has at times been an obstacle to implementation in military operations, in this case made access to leadership possible and benefitted implementation.

As Schein (2004) has explained, learning and change cannot be imposed on people, who must be involved in both the diagnostic and prognostic phases of change. But such cultural understanding and learning begins with self-insight, which is why Hofstede (2005) claims that an organisation's change process should start with a cultural map of that organisation. Such an exercise would have helped the Armed Forces when tasked by the Norwegian Government with implementation of UNSCR 1325; but it also would have been useful to the Government itself. After all, it is up to the Government to control the process of implementation, and though its official communications have indicated a significant commitment to the WPS agenda, the fact that political officials have been shocked by a lack of implementation within the military has exposed their lack of *insight* into the Armed Forces. The Government has expressed a willingness to be confrontational and demanding with military leadership, and has emphasised knowledge, routines, and practical guidelines as tools for change. However, the Government has failed to truly understand the structures, functions, and culture of the Armed Forces and has never really followed through on their word and had *control* over military leaders when it comes to implementation.

The hegemonic masculine organisational culture of the Armed Forces was well known, but political leaders evidently underestimated the extent and effects of it. Without the imposition of disciplinary actions by the Government, Norwegian military leadership has felt free to cast aside much of the political agenda and maintain male privileges and perspectives that devalue "soft security issues," gender perspectives, and any policies that could be interpreted as feminising (Connell, 1995; Enloe, 2000; Higate 2003; Kronsell, 2012). This *a la carte* approach taken by the Armed Forces to assignments from the Government is concerning not just in the context of implementation, but from the standpoint of democratic norms.

Even so, when change is equated to a loss of privilege, in this case male privilege, it is important to understand this privilege. In the Armed Forces, this requires an awareness of the complexity of the masculine self, male gender roles in society, and how men are socialised to disconnect from their own feelings (Kilmartin, 2010, p. 14). For generations, the military has been an arena reserved to men, and the prospect of losing that space along with the privileges that extend from belonging to this relatively closed society can create resistance to change. On top of this, the organisational culture of the military is based entirely on the preferences of men, making resistance to gender perspectives almost inevitable. According to Kilmartin (2015), privilege is a topic that must be addressed with great caution, proper timing, and in small doses, because of how much resistance it generates.[260] This supports the argument that the implementation of gender policies in the Armed Forces could have been advanced by the inclusion of in-depth psychological analysis.

Male privilege has impacted implementation across contexts; and given the ambition of the Norwegian Government to be an international frontrunner as far as the WPS agenda, it was important to this research to understand the role of Norway through the eyes of NATO gender professionals, as well as the processes of implementation in the UN and in US Armed Forces. NATO has progressed in implementing the WPS agenda in certain respects, having established important positions in NATO permanent structures and in operations. Some NATO leaders have also demonstrated a genuine willingness to take advice and to champion gender policies. Yet, NATO has struggled with many challenges as well; and the cultural factors that have prevented implementation in NATO are similar to those faced by the Norwegian military, including a masculine organisational culture that demeans gender policies, resulting in difficult working conditions for the messengers of gender perspectives. However, NATO features a higher power distance in its organisational culture, which means that personnel carry out orders with fewer objections than in Norway.

Functional factors that have prevented implementation in NATO were reported to include a lack of conceptualisation, expertise, education, training, reporting, and funding as well as the dependency of the Alliance on member states to implement UNSCR 1325 nationally. NATO, governed by its member states, has adopted the

[260] Insights provided at a workshop reviewing the *Handbook on Teaching Gender to the Military*, 1 July 2015.

resolution because its members have done so; but while NATO can promote implementation internally and encourage and support it in member countries, the Alliance is ultimately dependent on those members to develop their own capacity and willingness to implement the WPS agenda at the national level. In this way, NATO is functionally limited where Norway is not, because the Norwegian Armed Forces *have* the authority to exercise command and control over their own forces. Of course, for this to be an asset, it must be directed toward the aim of transformational change.

Even with this constraint, NATO has arguably made more progress related to gender perspectives and the WPS agenda than the Norwegian Armed Forces, but the difference is incremental and the rate of progress within NATO, the UN, and the US has been so protracted that Norway still has a chance to make up for prior lack of efforts and become a true international frontrunner in this area, as the Norwegian Government envisions. Indeed, by learning from previous successes and failures – described and analysed in this research – the Norwegian Armed Forces could very well be successful in fulfilling these ambitions of the Government. This will demand a wide range of cultural, functional, and structural efforts, though, which must be executed fully and expediently.

This research has focused on the ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to implement gender perspectives and the WPS agenda, primarily from the view of insider professionals advocating for change. Based on the analysis presented in this study, I recommend a (new) conceptualisation of the scope of implementation of the WPS agenda, as well as a plan for developing an organisational culture that is willing and able to embrace gender policies and other aspects of human security. I therefore call for:

- The clear definition of WPS and gender policy goals, measures, responsibilities, and timeframes, including an analysis of the organisational culture;
- The development and implementation of reporting systems to meet defined aims;
- A reward and discipline system that clearly supports new perspectives;
- The compulsory gender-specific analysis of any AO, for allies and own forces;
- An analysis of gender perspectives in the context of national threats and the assistance of the Armed Forces to civil society in national emergency efforts, and in the role of a host nation;
- The production of guidelines to address sexual and gender-based violence and harassment – internally, externally, as first responders, by allies, and by own forces – and the systematised teaching and training of these guidelines;
- The production of materials on gender perspectives in relation to the aims of the WPS agenda, and the systematised teaching and training of these materials;

- A gender mentor program for military leaders (involving coaching);[261]
- A leadership program on military culture and on changing organisational culture;
- A national course (open to allies) for military leaders focused on WPS-aware planning for military operations, including instruction on the legal framework and international obligations, operational effectiveness, gender, culture, gender perspectives, sexual and gender-based violence, and SEA;
- The development of a communication strategy to educate and affirm the commitment of the military to the WPS agenda;
- The establishment of structures designed to ensure the Armed Forces reach political aims, preferably based on the NATO model, including full time GENADs at the strategic level leading a gender office, full time GENADs at the operational level as part of the Commanders advisory team, and Gender Focal Points throughout the rest of the organisation, as well as GENADs in operations wherever advantageous and gender professionals at NDUC to ensure expertise and academic development;
- The prioritisation of staffing international GENAD positions to support implementation of UNSCR 1325 among Norwegian allies and partners, and to bring valuable experience back to national efforts; and
- The establishment of an independent evaluation and control component to ensure the Armed Forces remain an executive organisation by avoiding reporting based on unreliable self-evaluation, and to challenge the propensity of the Government to collect political capital when a decision is made and not when goals are actually met (The Office of the Auditor General of Norway or Internal Audit).

International politics are in constant flux, and the 45th President of the United States carries the mantle of a new form of government and leadership that harkens an increased isolationism and more of a focus on state security, over human security and global thinking. The vote of citizens in the UK to leave the European Union, and a continued lack of clarity about how or if the so-called "Brexit" will occur, also contributes to uncertainty regarding international organisations and cooperation as important providers of security. How these changes and new political conditions will affect attention on human security and implementation by armed forces of the WPS agenda will be vital subject areas for further investigation.

[261] *The Canadian Military Handbook for Mentoring and Coaching* (Lagacé-Roy & Knackstedt, 2007) could be used as a reference guide, and to determine whether mentoring, or coaching as a part of mentoring, is desirable in each case.

”First they ignore you,
then they laugh at you,
then they fight you,
then you win”[262]

[262] The origin of this quote has been debated (See: https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/03/donald-trump/donald-trump-falls-phony-gandhi-quote/), but in this context it is used as a motivational quote for all of those struggling while working for change in relation to the WPS agenda.

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Appendix I

A Guide on how to implement gender perspectives in military operations (non-exhaustive)[263]

GENDER AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Political–Military Level

Strategic political–military level objectives are created for the military to execute. To ensure that gender perspectives are achieved at the tactical level, these objectives should:

- Reinforce the UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security – noting the critical role that the inclusion and participation of women plays in achieving an enduring peace.
- Acknowledge that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those affected by conflict.
- Include specific direction to consider the protection of women and children as importantly as the neutralisation of armed groups.
- Include specific direction to consider the prevention of violations of women.
- Include specific direction to consider participation of women in all matters in which you would consider participation of men.
- Relate the mandate to specific gender matters (e.g., that any DDR programs include female combatants as well as male combatants and should not only be focused on people carrying weapons).
- Include wording in the mission that encourages the military carrying out the strategic direction to consider a gender perspective. For example, instead of stating that the "force is to create a safe and secure environment," the sentence could be expanded to: "The force is to create a safe and secure environment cognizant that the view of security varies between women and men/taking into consideration that women and men experience security in different ways."
- Include formal liaison with international and national groups that represent women's groups within the country where the deployment will take place.
- Capture gender-disaggregated data to better understand the area of operations and to include it in future operational planning purposes.
- Direct units to deploy GENADs, Gender Focal Points, and diverse service members.
- Budget for GENADs and Gender Focal Points.
- Make finances available for initiatives supporting women as well as men in the theatre.

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[263] Adapted from: Grimes, R. and Kvarving, L. (2016). Gender: What the Military Needs to Know. In Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes Security Sector Reform and Education Development Working Group (Eds.), *Teaching Gender in the Military*. Geneva and Garmisch-Partenkirchen: DCAF and PfPC.

Recruitment and Retention of Servicewomen

Whilst gender perspectives in military operations predominantly focus on external interaction with local communities in the AO, without enough servicewomen to engage with women in the AO it will be difficult to achieve a gender perspective. At the strategic level it is critical that:

- Recruitment campaigns are run to encourage women to join the military.
- Servicewomen have terms and conditions of service that inspire women to stay in the military as a long-term career choice.
- Promotion for women is at (proportionally) the same level as promotion for men
- Career paths to senior military appointments are reviewed to ensure servicewomen and men have the same opportunities.
- The Armed Forces' organisational structures, functions, and culture support the recruitment and retention of servicewomen.

GENDER AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The operational level acts as a bridge between the objectives set at the strategic level and the military action carried out at the tactical level. The direction and orders issued by the operational HQ should be gender mainstreamed and provide specific guidelines to units that will ensure a gender perspective is included at ground level.

Operational HQ staffing and procedures

In time, a gender perspective will be in the "veins" of the military HQ and not require additional staffing, but currently the military mindset is not intuitively attuned to a gender perspective and fails to mainstream gender. To that end, the operational HQ should:

- Establish a staff officer responsible for the implementation of UN Security Resolutions relating to Women, Peace and Security; this appointment could be based on the NATO GFA.
- Ensure the analysis of AO and allied and own forces is based on gender-specific data.
- Ensure the level of ambition related to implementation of the WPS agenda is analysed and clearly stated in the plan.
- Include in the main body of the Operational Order (OpOrd) and Operational Plan (OPlan) paragraphs that are gender mainstreamed.
- Include a gender-specific annex for Gender Focal Points in units and other staff branches that would benefit from a gender perspective.
- Check and assess reports from the tactical level to ensure gender perspectives are implemented.

Gender Mainstreaming in Military Functions at the Operational Level[264]

J1/Chief Personnel Officer:

- Does the deploying Force have a GFA?[265]
- Are there sufficient servicewomen to conduct search operations and engage with local women/women interpreters/trained women and men to respond to survivors of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)?
- Are soldiers aware of standards of behaviour towards the local population?
- Zero-tolerance policy towards prostitution.
- Zero-tolerance policy towards sexual harassment or violence between service members.

J2:

- Is information being collected from women as well as men?
- Is data disaggregated to show the experiences of women, men, and under-18s?
- Is data being analysed to provide commanders and staffs with relevant intelligence?
- Are procedures in place to push intelligence out to the field?

J3:

- Ensure orders direct units to conduct mixed patrolling/have servicewomen on cordon and search operations.
- Create templates for reporting that include headings which provide information relating to the gender dynamics of the area, e.g., formally report incidents of rape/incidents of alleged witchcraft.
- Train staff on and implement Gender Overlay in Collateral Damage Estimate for Air Dropped munitions.
- Ensure missions using gendered interface units (FETs, Civil Support Teams, Mixed Patrols, etc.) are tracked in the Joint Operations Centre.
- For Information Operations:
  - ✓ Are the products communicating with local populations inclusive?
  - ✓ Is the Force aware that the cultural mores of the society may be undermining the human rights of children and women?
    (Don't we want more? Such as to "ensure that the cultural mores of the society that may undermine the rights of women and children are not reinforced by InfoOps messaging"?)
- Does Key Leader Engagement include dialogue with women?

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[264] This list shows how different military functions can mainstream a gender perspective into their routine work. These functions are typically (but can change from nation to nation): J1 – personnel; J2 – operational intelligence; J3 – current operations; J4 – logistics/medical; J5 – deliberate planning; J6 – communication and information systems; J7 – training; J8 – finance and human resources; and J9 – policy, legal, and civil-military cooperation. J refers to Joint i.e. a Naval, Land, and Air operation. If the military deployment is a single service, then the military functions are G (Ground), A (Air), and N (Navy).

[265] The table that states who needs to deploy is traditionally drafted by the current operations branch (G3).

J4:

- Can contracts be given to companies that have a transparent record on treatment of women and children?
- Can contracts be given to businesses run by women/which support women in local society?
- With J1 and Military Police, ensure women and men employed on camp are not able to practice prostitution.
- Servicewomen and men trained by medics to respond to CRSV and have PEP[266] kits, etc.
- Camps to have ablutions for women and men that are safe and secure.
- Adequate supplies of urinary diversion tubes exist in theatre.
- Medics trained in the health needs of women servicemen operating in austere environments.
- Laundry facilities available for women service members who choose not to use camp laundry services.

J5:

- Operation Plans and Op-Orders to have a gender perspective throughout, plus a dedicated annex on gender.
- Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs to specifically include training and infrastructure for indigenous women and not only a focus on training local men
- DDR to consider women and girls as well as the men involved in armed groups
- Post-Conflict Negotiations/Key Leader Engagement to include women
- Should the Force be involved with Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) or refugee camps – which is rare as this is the role of UN agencies and humanitarian actors – consider the security of women, such as through locks on showers, lighting, separate areas for men and women, etc.
- Special Operating Forces concepts of operations must include gender-relevant considerations.

J6:

- Ensure communications structures are not placed near schools or areas usually occupied by local women.

J7:

- Ensure induction training for the Force includes a gender specific lesson.
- If involved in SSR, ensure women are included in training.
- Ensure specific staff section officers, e.g., targeteers and weaponeers in the dynamic targeting cell, have training in the incorporation of gender perspectives in their specific functional SOPs.

J8:

- Money should be allocated to units to fund women's projects.

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[266] A PEP Kit is provided after a *rape*, when survivors are given anti-retroviral (ARV) medication to prevent HIV infection. This treatment is called Post-exposure prophylaxis or *PEP*.

J9:

- Ensure there is liaison with women's as well as men's groups when scoping Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).
- Ensure the QIP processing cycle assesses the benefits of projects for men and women.
- Before deploying, liaise with/research NGOs and civil society groups in the area.
- Conduct mapping of civil society groups, NGOs, and international organisations working in the area and share with J5 and J2. This mapping will help if deliberate operations are likely to see the dispersal of civilians from their homes and therefore put them more at risk as they look for a "safe" area.
- The Legal Advisor Office is not generally part of J9 (in many militaries they are a separate office with direct access to the commander), but there are specific tasks that could be assigned to legal advisors with regard to incorporating gender perspectives. However, the ones noted in NATO Bi-SCD 40-1 are neither relevant nor realistic.

GENDER AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

The tactical level requires soldiers to be aware of a gender perspective, to think beyond the traditional norms of conflict, and understand that their job is not purely about neutralising armed groups or insurgents. They must be taught before they deploy how men and women experience conflict differently and how some groups are more at risk than others during deliberate operations.

J1:

- Units should have male and female Battle Casualty Replacements at the home unit.
- Discipline of soldiers must be monitored, and zero tolerance shown to soldiers who transgress the rules regarding prostitution and the exploitation of women and children.

J2:

- Units to use mixed engagement and female engagement teams to gather information from the entire spectrum of society.
- Are patterns and trends for CRSV being monitored and collated?

J3:

- Patrols to be mixed sex as often as possible.
- Post-patrol briefings to include assessment of threats to civilians and reports of CRSV or other human rights violations.
- Command and Company Commanders to engage with local women (where culturally acceptable) and use FETs when there are no female military staff, or when local women cannot meet with the men from the unit.

J4:

- With J1 and Military Police, ensure women employed on camp not able to practice prostitution.
- Servicewomen trained by medics in how to respond to CRSV and use PEP kits, etc.

J5:

- Units to have servicewomen prepared and trained to assist with SSR/DDR/IDP camps etc.

J6:

- Ensure communications structures are not placed near schools or areas usually occupied by local women.

J7:

- Training officer to ensure soldiers refreshed in gender training during tour.
- If involved in SSR, ensure women are included in training.

J8:

- Commanding Officer to allocate funding for women's projects.

J9:

- Ensure there is liaison with women's groups as well as men's groups when scoping QIPs.
- Ensure the QIP processing cycle assesses the benefits of projects for men and women.
- Before deploying, liaise with/research NGOs and civil society groups in the area.

Appendix II

INTERVIEW GUIDE, PhD STUDIES
LENA P. KVARVING

Major at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) and
PhD Scholar at the University of Oslo, Department of Political Science

Based on the results from the first and second part of my PhD studies related to the research question of **what factors (structural, functional, and cultural) prevent and promote the implementation of a gender perspective in military operations in the light of UNSCR 1325**, this guide is to enable me as a researcher to validate and understand results across nations and organisations. The first phase of research was a case study of The Gender Project at the NDCU and experiences related to the implementation of a gender perspective in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the second phase was an analysis of relevant official speeches of the MOD.

1. **Have there been special groups/projects/initiatives initiated and funded related to UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in military operations?**
   - Results
   - Mandate
   - Control/Reporting
   - Staffing/funding
   - Lessons learned

2. **What structures are related to UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective in military operations?**
   - Positions
   - Staffed by men or women/does it matter
   - Funding of structures
   - Mainstreamed
   - Part of how many job descriptions specifically related to gender, 1325, etc.

3. **What functions are related to UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective in military operations?**
   - Operational planning
   - Intelligence
   - Analysis
   - Education/training
   - Policies, part of everyday work

4. **How is culture related to UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective in military operations?**
   - Attitudes
   - Valued as good/bad

- Does it affect choices
- Masculine/feminine
- Uncertainty avoidance
- Power distance
- Long term orientation
- Individualism/collectivism
- Values/norms/symbols

5. **The role of the messenger**
   - Critical?
   - Men/women/authorities – is it important?
   - How to talk about it? Hard/soft
   - Availability/access to leaders, the organisation
   - Relations important or position?
   - Solves issues face to face or by official channels?
   - Attitude towards the messenger/feminists/professionals/not interested
   - What are the reactions of recipients? Positive, scepticism, unwanted, unsexy, opportunities, value related?
   - Controversial?
   - Do they feel appreciated themselves? Is this message threatening to them and their position?
   - Important qualities of the messenger?

6. **The Political Message – what does the Government communicate to and about the Armed Forces about this subject?**
   - Change how?
   - Do they have what it takes today? Or do they need to do things differently?
   - Status of personnel/praise?
   - How are they (military) portrayed?
   - Do politicians seem to understand the military system and culture?
   - Do politicians have a clear goal?
   - Do they follow up?
   - Do they place blame?
   - Do they look upon this change as transformative or transactional?
   - Do they lead accordingly?

7. **A clear concept and genuine leadership**
   - Have political ambitions been conceptualised to military tasks?
   - Has the Defence Staff given clear tasks, guidelines, reporting, and control?
   - Genuine military leadership commitment? Or lip service?
   - Consequences for military not doing what they are tasked with in this matter?
   - Individual efforts more important or is it a part of the organisation as a whole?
   - Top down or bottom up approach?
   - Progress, fast or slow, why?
   - Pressure, attention, media, etc.
   - Understanding of the political will?

8. **Lack of knowledge and biased expectations?**
   - How does the military make this subject and concept known?
   - Are there biased expectations, or openness to new perspectives?
   - More open to perspectives other than gender?
   - Focus on effectiveness or values? Why do it?
   - Difficult subject to teach? Mystical? Women's issue only?
   - What is being done to reach the masses – special concerns?
   - Do top leaders communicate well and understand the concept?

9. **Gender as joke of the day**
   - Do the military joke about gender issues in general?
   - Sexist, sexual language
   - Femininity made fun of?
   - Are they able to discuss the subject without jokes?
   - Attitudes towards equality, sexual abuse, etc. – funny?
   - Leaders show the way – are they serious about the issues, or do they joke?
   - Sexist briefs, jokes at any time?
   - Is the subject less popular with men than women?

10. **Reporting to and control by political leadership**
   - Just a political ambition, nothing to do with the Armed Forces?
   - Are there consequences if Armed Forces leaders do not act?
   - Do they want real feedback or the glossy version?
   - Look good instead of doing well?
   - Doing just to do, but not really accomplishing anything? Exercises, FET, gender advisors, etc.
   - What is most important for politicians in the way you report and the way you are controlled?

11. **Funding, international cooperation, and visibility**
   - Is funding an issue?
   - How important is it for the US to be visible internationally on this issue, and why?
   - Staffing with professionals an issue, men and women?
   - A priority?
   - How is this viewed by other subject matter experts?

12. **Kinetics versus soft security issue**
   - What is the priority?
   - The view of the military itself, others view on the military?
   - Peacekeeping versus fighting a war?
   - Values versus guns – what does the military communicate to the public? Changes?
   - Morale – do you have programs, prizes, etc. to focus on this subject and honour good work? And how is it viewed in the system?
   - Lessons from Afghanistan and other operations?
   - Clear message on why we need both women and men in the force?

13. The role of UN and NATO/the role of US and Norway

- Does it matter what the UN or NATO does in this matter, i.e. how they communicate – effect, values; the right thing to do or doing things right?
- Do you need that to argue within the US/Norway?
- Cooperation important? Funding?
- Wish to lead? Political or military ambitions?
- US versus Norway – different roles?
- Easier to work with these issues internationally or nationally – why?

14. Ability and will to staff positions related to gender and Resolution 1325

- Working structures?
- Possible for individuals to stop progress?
- Based on relations?
- Secure or insecure working relations and positions?
- Popular amongst men? Women? Competition?
- Women support each other or not?
- Regarded as important to prioritise to staff?
- A lot of applicants (women and men) to relevant positions working on these issues? Why?

15. Fear of association?

- How much do men seek to and are willing to work on these issues?
- Is it career friendly – would it help you get an attractive next position?
- Are men willing to front the issue and carry the torch?
- A subject for those especially interested, idealists?
- What does that suggest about the values in the organisation?
- Are they able to see the bigger picture – comprehensive approach?
- Do they think the focus on the subject will pass and not be important for their careers or future job success?

16. Leadership, reporting, and control

- Has the task been delegated throughout the organisation?
- Has it been done?
- Consequences, if not – are there possibilities and are they used?
- What reports have to be made/what consequences?
- Do they want to report well or realistically?
- A gender perspective and 1325 part of international/national operations: part of analysis, planning, exercises, pre-deployment education and training, etc.?
- Part of mentoring foreign forces? Hard versus soft issues?
- What do military leaders communicate?
- Regarded as relevant and a cause for the military, or others?
- Have leaders or others communicated that this is only a political project with no relevance for the Armed Forces?
- Just another buzzword?

17. Permission to criticise the military organisation

- Taken as system critique or personal?
- Room for feedback?
- Culture for internal and external criticism
- Consequences for the ones that criticise

18. Subject-matter expertise

- How important is it to have skilled subject matter experts in the area?
- Do you have established lessons to teach at different levels?
- Good coordination between education and operational life – lessons learned put back into the educational system
- Part of the permanent staff or on contract?

19. Matter of identity

- Does this subject shake the foundation of the military identity?
- Warrior versus peace keeper and soft security issues
- Are there changes in identity now, is there a need for them or should there be change?
- Room for diversity versus uniformity
- How is this regarded in civil society – is that changing?
- Are these issues regarded as easy and logical or in need of transformational change to deal with them in the Forces?
- Do the military understand the intention behind Resolution 1325+?
- Is the subject mysterious?

20. Other comments on what factors prevent and promote implementation of a gender perspective in military operations in your country/organisation

Appendix III

Permission to use the results from interviews and conversations related to the PhD study by Lena P. Kvarving, Norwegian Defence University College/University of Oslo.

I, Lena P. Kvarving, am a PhD Scholar at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo. As an active duty military officer, I also work at the Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo. This study aims to identify some major factors in the success or failure to implement gender perspectives in military operations.
Research question to be answered:

> **"What factors – structural, functional, and cultural – prevent and promote the implementation of gender perspectives in military operations in light of UNSCR 1325?"**

As someone that works with/or has worked with issues related to this subject, you are regarded as a relevant informant and I would like to interview you. What I would like to learn during the interview is your opinion, experience, and knowledge about these factors in your country/organisation and what role the following have played in implementation (Norway/US/NATO/UN). I have based the interview guide on the findings from a case study of the Gender Project at the NDUC and a study of Norwegian MOD speeches.

It is important for me as a researcher to assure you that all information gathered in interviews or conversations will be treated confidentially and only used in this study. Your participation is anonymous, and you are free to be excused and withdraw from the study at any time. Any quotes I would wish to use, anonymous or not, will always require your additional approval.

Best regards,
Lena P. Kvarving
Cell: +47 47 67 76 27
Mail: lkvarving@gmail.com

Permission

I hereby declare that I give my permission for Lena P. Kvarving to use interview data and conversations related to her PhD research as mentioned above. I am aware of my right to anonymity as mentioned above and my option to withdraw from the research at any time.

Place/date ……

Name …… Rank/title: ……..

Current position: ……

Former relevant position: ……