Constructing and Contesting the 'Truth':

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party's Discursive Struggle to Define the 'Elite' in the Norwegian Context

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Abstract

This text covers how the Norwegian right-wing Progress Party and the left-wing Socialist Left struggle to determine which whom to label as the 'elite' dominating Norway – and whom to include in the subordinated 'people' dominated by this 'elite'. These parties struggle to determine the (il)legitimacy of powerholders – and this discursive struggle is my object of analysis. I utilize a discursive framework combining the Foucauldian focus on discursive regularities within Norman Fairclough's theoretical-methodological framework of critical discourse analysis. I further employ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's terminology and analytical strategies – which I then utilize within the sociological framework of Pierre Bourdieu. The text's task is threefold. Firstly, I investigate the discursive conflict of the parties. This conflict has equivalents globally as 'elites' are problematized by various popular, or populist, parties – with the content of the term tending to be an object of struggle which political actors are unable to fully fixate. Secondly, I map how the constitution of 'elites' can be understood based on the objective positions of the speaking subjects within social space and the objective hierarchies of contemporary Norway – seeking to contextualize the discursive practices vis-à-vis the Norwegian field of power as found by scholars working within the sociology of elites. Thirdly, I aim to offer theoretical innovation through combining various theoretical approaches in order to finish this discursive map and contextualize it vis-à-vis the nondiscursive basis of these articulations. For these ends, I split my focus between analysing discursive regularities and contextualizing these regularities based upon the nondiscursive basis which the discourses revolve around. This text takes a theoretically heterodox approach – being heavily theoretical due to a) the complexity of the discursive/nondiscursive relationship and b) scepticism towards individual consciousness and the possibility of unmediated perceptions. The discursive analysis, which takes up approximately 75% of the analysis/discussion, focuses upon how the parties' constitute the division between the 'people' and the 'elite' utilizing a Laclauian 'populist reason' – as well as how the parties' different perceptions lead to antagonism between them. I focus upon four aspects of the parties' discourses: a) the regularities of the discourses, b) internal ruptures, c) external resemblances and cleavages and d) the ways the parties' struggles lead to antagonistic meaning-production on several fronts, particularly as both parties find themselves to be 'protectors' of the 'people' while they simultaneously label their rivals as the 'enemies' of the very same 'people'. Thereafter, I contextualize these discursive practices through analysing how these relate to the parties' positions in social space as well as how their articulations and silences seem to influence the Norwegian field of power. The purpose of this is both to analyse the principles

behind the constitution of the 'elite' – as I seek the logic behind this constitution in these discourses, as well as to problematize how one's own position relates to how one appears to perceive power and domination. I utilize Foucauldian notions of critique as the open resistance to dominant 'truths' through denaturalizing social conditions' influence upon these discourses while interpreting the textual data as I seek to handle the parties' criticism of 'elites' with a diverse theoretical arsenal. Through these measures, I find the Progress Party's criticism of various symbolic 'elites' and the Socialist Left Party's criticism of economic 'elites' to follow similar principles of meaning-production while radically clashing, too. The parties' antagonism appears to be caused by the parties seemingly constructing social space in ways which correspond to their followers' own positions within the Norwegian social space and their qualities and quantities of capital.

Keywords: Symbolic Power, Elites, Populism, Field of Power, Foucault, Bourdieu, Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse Theory

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1. Introduction

Critique of 'elites' is a key feature of contemporary political debates, something the so-called 'populist' surges and the anti-elite sentiments these bring illustrate (see Laclau 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017; Mouffe 2018). A central question, however, is who this 'elite' is. This question haunts both academic and political, international and Norwegian debates. For instance, left-wing politician Audun Lysbakken, head of Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV, henceforward the Socialist Left Party), laments how the 'economic elite demands more and more' at the expense of an increasing number of 'poor families' (Gullestad 2017). Right-wing politician Sylvi Listhaug (2016), second-in-command at Fremskrittspartiet (FrP, henceforward the Progress Party), on the other hand, is 'tired of the elite telling the people what is right and what is wrong'. Both parties lament the Norwegian 'elite' and their domination of the common 'people', yet they are in overt disagreement regarding who these 'elites' are and how domination is exercised: Are the 'elites' the economic powerholders accumulating wealth at our expense or the symbolic powerholders seeking to govern the cultural and moral parts of our lives? Throughout this text we shall see how the Progress Party's discourse is fixated by the way it problematizes powerholders as the holders of symbolic resources, whereas the Socialist Left Party's discourse is fixated by how it criticizes the 'elite' as economic powerholders.

The different critiques of 'elites' – as dominating either our minds or our pockets – are not arbitrary. Utilizing Pierre Bourdieu's sociology as well as Thomas Piketty's (2018) findings on the so-called 'multiple elite system', the particular ways the parties constitute the 'elite' can be problematized and contextualized. Piketty investigates 'elites' and their attachment to political parties on the right-left axis within USA, Great Britain and France. He finds political parties to largely position themselves in the service of powerholders (ibid: 3), i.e. the dominant cultural/intellectual and economic actors. It appears that this 'multiple-elite system' could be responsible for populist movements gaining momentum and the growing discontent with present-day liberal democracies (ibid: 5). Briefly summarized, his findings find the left to largely represent 'highly educated voters', whereas the right represents 'the rich' (ibid: 16). This trend implies a) a schism between politicians which mirror that between the holders of different forms of power, i.e., of immaterial and material forms of power, cultural and economic capital in Bourdieu's terms, but also b) that the common 'people' is largely abandoned by its self-proclaimed representatives within the political system. Therefore, it appears that we are faced with a dialectical trend where the legitimacy of 'elites' are faltering

while the same 'elites' increase their dominance over the political system, while the system too faces legitimation challenges. Furthermore, point a) relates to Bourdieu's thesis that struggles between social actors tend to be, explicitly or implicitly, struggles between powerholders where the 'masses' serve as weapons (Wacquant 2013: 278). Bourdieu (1996a: 16) finds there to be a strong antagonism between the intellectual/cultural and economic powerholders. Following Bourdieu (1998a: 34), these powerholders are expected to battle each other around the respective 'exchange rate' of their particular forms of power, or in other words, to struggle over the worth of the (form of) power they hold vis-à-vis the power of their rivals. This struggle primarily relates to the worth of material, economic capital vis-a-vis immaterial power related to education, culture and morals.

Thus, if both the right and left struggle for popular support while actually representing the 'elites', then it is probable that they problematize power based upon their own positions within social space. However, as Piketty (2018: 7) asserts, the 'multiple-elite system thesis' claims that right and left-wing parties support the 'elites' closest to them must be investigated in a multiple ways, including discursively. We must in this regard note that problematization does more than to 'reveal' issues. Issues do not pre-exist their problematization (Foucault 1985: 172), and phenomena such as 'elites', while existing objectively as individuals within society, have no existence *as 'elites'* before they are discursively articulated as such. This prompts me to relativize the term 'elite' – not because Norway is not stratified following various social inequalities, which it is (see Flemmen 2014a; Flemmen 2014b; Hansen 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Jarness 2014; Ljunggren 2017; Flemmen & Haakestad 2018; Jarness et al 2019), but due the lack of clarity regarding whom we ought to label 'elite' as the term remains ambiguous (Hansen et al. 2014: 34) – being constructed through problematization (see chapter 4).

I will investigate this struggle utilizing a discourse analysis synthesising three discursive approaches. I primarily utilize the critical discourse analysis (CDA) of Norman Fairclough in combination with the discursive insights from Michel Foucault as well as the theoretical and analytical insights from the Discourse Theory (DT) of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. This discursive framework is then 'inserted' within a Bourdieusean sociological framework as I seek to contextualize the discourses within the parties' positions within the Norwegian social space. In order to accomplish this, I contextualize my findings vis-à-vis findings utilizing Bourdieusean theories within the Norwegian context, such as Magne Flemmen and Hedda Haakestad (2018) and Vegard Jarness et al. (2019).

I thus embrace Bourdieu's (1988a) notions of theoretical heterodoxy as I seek to utilize useful theories and concepts from multiple traditions whose ontology and epistemology break – utilizing theory as Foucault recommends, as 'tactical needs' for actual research (Gutting 2006: 4). Such theoretical heterodoxy enables analysts to better handle the complexity of research-objects (Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 154). Within this heterodox framework I utilize an intertextual approach as I seek to analyse and compare selected texts from leading actors within the two parties in order to investigate continuations and discontinuations within and between the parties' modes of perception. My analyses will centre on the following task, my research question:

> *I will investigate the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party's discursive struggle to define the 'elite' within the Norwegian context.*

This is of importance as the question of 'elites' within so-called 'populist studies' are oftentimes neglected as 'elites' tend to be taken for granted as a social category (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 11). The struggle between left/right in order to define the 'elite' is likewise largely taken for granted among scholars. Several scholars note how left-wing 'populists' lament economic powerholders (e.g. Otje & Louwerse 2015; Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 2016; March 2017) whereas others emphasise how the right-wing 'populists' tend to criticize intellectuals and political rivals as the 'elite' (Frank 2004; Sawer & Laycock 2009; Hochschild 2016). These disagreements do not happen in a void, but in a political context as democratic parties struggle to win support from the masses (Bourdieu 1991: 181; Wacquant 2013: 276). The discursive construction of 'elites' must thus be investigated in its context of struggle as the meaning produced by discourses cannot be grasped outside of their social context (Bourdieu 1991: 39; Fairclough 1995: 210). That phenomena such as 'elites' are constructed discursively, and that all struggles have discursive aspects (Fairclough 1989: 22, 1992: 36, 2013: 19), relate to the fact that the reality analysts deal with is '[a] construction of social reality and thus [of] the struggle of classification…' (Bourdieu 1991: 105). In other words, the 'truth' of our social reality is produced and sustained through power (Foucault 1980: 133), something we will discuss further throughout the text.

I operationalize this task as three research questions. Question a), which demands the largest section of my text and is analysed in chapter 5 and 6, is:

> a) *How is the 'elite' constituted within the discursive practices of the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party?*

This entails utilizing an intertextual analytical strategy in order to investigate how the discourses of the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party face internal and external continuations and discontinuations: Where do the parties agree and disagree, and where do the parties face internal conflicts? This entails investigating how the 'elites' and 'peoples' of the discourses are constituted – by mapping how the meaning-production of the parties is regulated. While I focus upon discursive regularities, I also touch upon internal ruptures and contradictions. Furthermore, I enter into a discussion on the (dis)continuities between the two parties. These steps will allow me to trace both homogeneity and heterogeneity and thus address the question of regulated meaning-production without simplifying the discourses' complexity. Question b), which is a follow-up question to question a), is:

b) *How do the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party constitute each other within the struggle between the 'people' and the 'elite' which they participate in producing?*

This question touches upon the context of struggle and the answer shows how the discursive logics of the parties enable classifications not just of groups outside of the political field, but also of the parties within it. This section centres around the parties' antagonism – as we will investigate multiple fronts where the parties struggle discursively based on their different perceptions of domination and inequalities in Norway. We will see how the parties seek to construct divisions between their rivals and the 'people' while perceiving themselves as the protectors of the 'people' - and how the ways these classifications happen relate to how the parties perceive the 'elite'. I follow up these issues with research question c), which contextualizes the former two as:

c) *How do the discursive practices of the parties relate the Norwegian social space?*

This entails contextualizing the discourses in two ways. First, how do the discourses appear to affect the hierarchies of Norway through critique? This entails discussing how critique of powerholders is directed with a focus upon which hierarchies they problematize and which they leave unproblematized. In other words, I analyse how the parties delegitimize certain forms of power and importantly, which forms of hierarchies the parties leave untouched, or in other words, legitimized. Second, I discuss how the parties' critique relate to their positions in social space. I utilize Bourdieu's theories and concepts and draw on Bourdieusean findings from the Norwegian context in order to accomplish this task. However, I do not conduct a

Bourdieusean multiple correspondence analysis myself. My data are purely qualitative. Instead, I seek to investigate how the discourses correspond to the larger societal context where the discourses and the speaking subjects are positioned. As I discuss below (see section 2.2.1), this accords with Bourdieu's (1987; 1989; 1992; 1998a) idea of a form of synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism which aims to surpass both of these approaches, a logic CDA also advocates (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 30).

These research questions are of importance for several reasons. First, the discursive construction of 'elites' is more than a classification of social categories. As Laclau (2005: 18) asserts, the construction of an 'elite' entails problematizing hierarchies – and thus to tacitly unite a (heterogeneous) 'people' against the powerholders dominating these hierarchies. Thus, it entails the active construction of the struggle which actors construct through articulations. Investigating the political constitution of struggle is of importance as struggles develop through discourses (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018). Furthermore, mapping how these struggles are constituted is imperative as we can investigate how the parties constitute struggles based on the parties' positions in social space – and thus based on their relations to various powerholders.

Second, as far as I know, the discursive struggle for the right to define the 'elite' has not been investigated. This is the case within Norway, but it also appears that this discursive struggle has received little attention internationally (e.g. Piketty 2018: 7). It is important to investigate the critique of 'elites' in an era where the 'elites' are claimed to be simultaneously evermore dominant and void of legitimacy (see chapter 4) while political, cultural and economic polarization and inequalities increase (Prior 2013; Westfall et al. 2015; Piketty 2018; Rollwage et al. 2019) –and discourses are imperative parts of such processes.

Third, as already mentioned, while the meaning of the term 'elite' is rarely touched upon in populist studies, our understanding of power remains lacklustre (Foucault 1977: 213). As 'elites' are relatively synonymous with 'powerholders', our understanding of these phenomena interweaves. I offer an investigation into how the two parties perceive (il)legitimate power, how these perceptions are rooted in different understandings of power as such, and how these understandings, in turn, relate to the parties' different positions within social space. This is important as it opens for a deeper investigation into how power is perceived, in relation to what forms of power the perceiving subject controls. A heterodox approach to CDA and Bourdieusean sociology enables me to investigate these topics as it lets us investigate how the

parties perceive power based on their positions within objectively existing structures. This opens for a deeper understanding of how objective structures and modes of perception correspond and how power is affected by the quantity and quality of resources held by the interpreting subject. I will now briefly cover the outline of this text.

1.1. Outline

I structure this thesis into nine chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter 2 is a *theoretical clarification* and discussion of my approach to discourse analysis – including insights from CDA, DT and Foucault – as well as Bourdieusean sociology. I focus upon discourses and the social structures in which they are embedded as well as the notion of power as a discursive and nondiscursive phenomenon. In chapter 3, I offer *methodological reflections*. The chapter elaborates on my empirical data, its selection and the analytical steps I undertake in order to analyse them as well as general reflections. In chapter 4, I *contextualize my analysis* by discussing findings on populism and 'elites', focusing upon the latter, including academic discussions on power and 'elites' in contemporary Norway. Chapter 5 handles the *constitution of the 'people/elite' dichotomy* and the regularities of the discourses. This entails reviewing the discursive principles of (di)vision and how the discourses are fixated around different centres. While 'discursive centres' will be discussed in section 2.1.2.1., it revolves around discourses being fixated (loosely and temporarily) around objects, such as 'elite-domination', which are interpreted in various ways through different discourses. (Di)vision signifies how all visions of the social world are simultaneously divisions (Bourdieu 1998a: 8). Chapter 6 breaks with chapter 5 by focusing upon the *internal heterogeneity as well as the breaks and resemblances between the two parties.* Chapter 7 focuses upon how the parties' different modes of interpretation leads to *antagonism between the two parties*. In chapter 8, I *contextualize the discursive findings vis-à-vis the nondiscursive social structures they are embedded* within by utilizing Bourdieu-inspired findings from Norway to discuss how the discourses relate to the Norwegian field of power as well as the social positions of the parties and their supporters - as well as a discussion on Piketty's 'multiple-elite system' thesis. In chapter 9 I discuss the critical agenda of the parties vis-à-vis critical science before I offer concluding remarks.

2. Between the Discursive and the Nondiscursive

I will in this chapter clarify the theoretical foundations of my text. First, we will focus upon the theory of discourse. I will a) cover the concept of discourse, b) the intertextual nature of texts as they belong to formations and c) discuss the Foucauldian and Faircloughian approaches and my own theoretical position. Second, I focus upon Bourdieu's sociology. I will a) cover the subjectivist/objectivist break of Bourdieu (and CDA), b) his theories of fields, c) his theory of capital and d) offer a discussion on symbolic power.

2.1. A Theory of Discourse

2.1.1. Discourses

Before I clarify critical discourse analysis as a discipline, I will define the concept of discourse and the importance of language. Language is imperative the construction of our social world (Fairclough 1992; Dean 1999: 64) – including the development of human perception and consciousness (Vygotsky 1962: 153; Eco 1986: 203; Hasan 2005: 4), and thus of both individual and collective identities (Jager & Maier 2009: 36). While all practices which produce meaning can be labelled 'discourse' (Laclau 1980: 87), language holds primacy as a semiotic producer (see Hasan 2005: 120; Dunn & Neumann 2016: 46)

Discourses both 'represent, signify, constitute and construct a world of meaning' (Fairclough 1992: 64). They offer ways of understanding the world while also 'form[ing] the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 1972: 49). Language is 'an indispensable element' in the formation of societies and vice-versa (Hasan 2005: 10) as the (re)production of society is largely facilitated discursively (Fairclough 2000a: 165). Discourses are central both to the actual (re)production of society as our ways of understanding the social world changes our behaviour as well as our relations to objects, ourselves and each other (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 4). Therefore, discourses always relate to power and struggles as all power relations and all struggles are at least partly discursive (Fairclough 1989: 163; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 42; see also Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018).

While discourses exist – as semiotic structures somewhat regulated after heterogenous principles found in texts (Fairclough 2013: 460), the discourses of the parties, which I discuss, are analytical concepts – produced through an analytical operation in order to trace and map meaning-production by creating ideal-type classifications (see Hansen 2006: 52). While the map is not reality, but rather an ideal-type (see Smith 1999: 123; Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips

1999: 149), such an operation enables me to map the discursive patterns of the parties – opening for me to contextualize the parties' practices vis-à-vis their positions in social space.

2.1.2. Discursive Formations: Myths and Centres

Discourses never exist by themselves since every articulation 'belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text' (Foucault 1972: 116) in the same way as all texts exist in a relationship with other texts as well as nondiscursive phenomena. Words and expressions have no meaning of their own as meaning is constituted within the discursive formations which such semiotic practices belong to (Pêcheux 1982: 112). Discursive formations '[are] made up by a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions can be defined' (Foucault 1972: 117), making it possible to speak of, for instance, a 'socialist' or 'liberal' discourse. However, it is important to note that while discursive formations cover a specific object of discourse and constitutes it in a particular and relatively regulated way, it is filled with contradictions (Foucault 1972: 155), which means that there is no 'true' socialist or liberal discourses. Rather, discursive formations serve 'as rules for constituting areas of knowledge' (Fairclough 1992: 39). Therefore, one can find a number of texts within, for instance, socialist or liberalist discursive formations which are more or less similar to other texts within the same formation as they follow similar 'rules', or principles of meaning-production – thus offering common modes of perceiving the world.

This implies that discursive formations are fixated around a common reference. Some, such as Kevin Dunn and Iver Neumann (2016: 3) find discourses to lack fixity, centre and permanence. However, I find discursive formations to be built around a 'centre', and furthermore, around a 'myth'. We will now enter a debate on how discursive formations have a relative fixity through being fixated around centres. Centres are understood as what the discourse is fixated around, and they are general in nature – such as 'madness' or 'elite-domination'. Myths, on the other hand, are more complicated to identify – being objects of analysis of meaning-production. A myth is 'the representation of the phenomenon' and all objectivity 'is merely a crystallized myth' (Laclau 1990: 61). Laclau follows Georges Sorel's (1925) use of the term as the 'general strike' as the myth which crystallizes proletarian identity – as an idea serving as 'the foundations for collective will-formation' (Gramsci 1999: 329). However, I use the term somewhat differently. I propose to understand the myth as the *content of the centre* which the discourse constitutes as 'truth' (see Gjerde 2019: 6). In other words, it is what the discourse constitutes and is fixated around. Its 'truthfulness' is a question of *power*

rather than sincerity, which is why the term 'myth' is fitting (see Laclau 1996: 51; Foucault 1980: 133).

Foucault (1999: 21) notes that when Gregor Mendel, an Austrian scientist famous for having 'discovered' genetics, spoke about medicine and biology, he spoke 'the truth', yet this 'truth' was not 'within the true' of the discourses of his time. Biological and medical objects were not yet 'formed' after the principles of contemporary discourses and the 'truths' we take for granted. Indeed, the 'truth' of one time or place can be the 'falsehood' of another. 'Truths' are thus crystallized through myths being naturalized as 'common sense' through symbolic power, which we will discuss further in section 2.2.4. and 3.3.2. All discourses will be fixated around some centre in specific discourses, even if it is clear that a discourse such as liberalism or socialism as a whole necessarily will be fixated around several centres and myths due to the complexity of ideologies which attempt to explain the social world in total. My conceptualization of myths and centres relates to Foucault's findings on madness, which offer the importance of distinguishing between centres and its contents. As Foucault (1972: 32) states:

> Statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the same object. Thus, statements belonging to psychopathology all seem to refer to an object that emerges in various ways in individual or social experience and which may be called madness. But … the unity of the object madness does not enable one to individualize a group of statements, and to establish between them a relation that is both constant and describable … Moreover, this group of statements is far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all… It is not the same illness that are at issue in these cases; we are not dealing with the same madmen.

Foucault's findings indicate that 'madness' is the centre which the traditions of psychopathology are fixated. However, it is not one, but several discursive formations which cover the topic of 'madness' (Deleuze 1988: 11). The content of 'madness' varies as the myths of madness are heterogenous and antagonistic – centres such as 'madness' can be represented in almost infinite ways. The particular ways traditions of psychopathology are fixated around their common centre of 'madness' is filled with various content through the different myths different traditions embrace. Thus, texts which may even at first glance appear to belong to a common discursive formation may in reality be antagonistic due to the radically different ways

centres can be constituted. These similar discursive formations which all orient around the centre of 'madness' are often antagonistic as the 'sane' of one formation may be the 'mad' of another. They thus belong to the same order of discourse, which entails a group of discursive formations operating within the same terrain – as antagonistic or collaborating (Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 70). This holds true for 'elites' too in the sense that we are not dealing with the same 'elites' across the various discursive formations which refer to the 'illegitimate' powerholders. Myths are established as real if the articulators have the power to establish their (di)vision of the social world in our consciousnesses and practices. The centre is fixated in a particular, and temporal, way (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 97; Fairclough 1992: 66). Thus, discursive formations are fixated, *around myths,* which are 'true' to the degree they are established as such through power. And this fixation will now be discussed.

2.1.2.1. Fixating the Unfixable

While there exist no pre-constituted centres of fixation, discursive practices, through the signifiers called 'nodal points', temporarily fixate the meaning-production of discourses (Mouffe 1993: 76) – around centres and myths. However, Laclau and Mouffe's term 'nodal point' is ambiguous as it somehow covers both the fixation and the fixated, which I break with by utilizing the term 'myth' for the fixated. For instance, 'communism' is labelled a nodal point (Howarth and Stavrakis 2008: 8). However, communism is a political rationality, an ideology and a discursive formation. The term 'communism' fixates nothing but is fixated by several signs such as historical materialism, class struggle, revolution and exploitation. While we have neither time nor space to discuss the signs fixating the various traditions of communism, which like those of psychopathology, are fragmented and heterogenous, communism is fixated rather than the fixator. Furthermore. Dunn and Neumann (2016: 116) call nodal points 'the dominating representation of reality' – and we must therefore discuss how I conceptualize this fixating signifier in order to avoid ambiguous usage.

Nodal points are universal as is *always* possible to 'establish a relative fixation through nodal points' (Laclau 1990: 91), even if such fixating is temporary and open for contestation. The fixating signs, nodal points, are privileged signifiers within the discourse which partially fixates the discourse *without* becoming the centre of it (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 98-99). A nodal point fixates the discourse around a centre, and it does so in particular ways through the way it fixates a number of signs and subordinates them to a regime of meaning-production. Nodal points fixate signs into 'chains of equivalence'. These chains consist of signs linked together through the discursive constitution of these signs as compatible, meaning that the logic of

metonymy is utilized within such chains (Laclau 2014: 18). Metonymy corresponds to combination (ibid: 59) such as when anti-racism and feminism are combined with class struggle as 'left-wing politics'. This is a logic of simplification as objects not naturally connected are discursively connected and their content modified in order to ensure that they logically 'match' (ibid: 21). Thus, concepts, ideas, phenomena and practices are combined into signifying chains even though they are not 'naturally' connected. Meaning thus tend to be fixated within the various discursive formations which struggle to establish the 'truth' of the various objects they refer to (Žižek 1989: 96). All signs can be drawn into these struggles for 'truth' since the potential diversity of 'truth' available to each sign varies considerably (ibid: 113). Concepts such as 'the elite' or 'the people', which are 'floating signifiers', are objects of a struggle insofar as the 'elite' of one discourse can be the 'people' of another. The content of the centre, the myth, is determined by how the nodal point fixates the various signs within the chain of equivalence and thus makes up a myth which, potentially, turns 'true' if the *power* of the speaking subject suffices.

Analysing the discourse through mapping the nodal point thus allows one to find how the discourse is fixated around a centre, and how this centre is constituted by how the nodal point holds signs together in a circular process of meaning-production where the various signs play constitutive roles for each other. I will now clarify my approach to CDA.

2.1.3. A Foucauldian-Faircloughian Approach to CDA

We will now cover my approach to discourse analysis, focusing upon CDA with Foucauldian insights. CDA is as Lillie Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 16) assert both a theory and a method: It is a method for analysing social practices focusing on their discursive moments, and a theory about how the discursive and the nondiscursive are connected in a dialectical fashion (Fairclough 1992; 65; 2005: 918; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 6). Thus, the analyst moves 'constantly 'back and forth between theory and data' (Meyer 2001: 27). CDA is an interdisciplinary tradition which brings a focus towards discourses and their relations to other social elements to various disciplines such as sociology (see Choukalari & Fairclough, 1999: 99; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2010: 1217).

While CDA is heterogenous and diverse (Breeze 2011: 494), the tradition is characterized by being constantly concerned with power and struggles (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 83; Weiss & Wodak 2002:12; van Dijk 2008: 63). CDA remains 'true' to Foucault's notions that nondiscursive conditions are essential to understanding the formation

of discourses and discursive practices (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 126; Fairclough 2013: 3; see also Foucault 1972: 41-42; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 77; Deleuze 1988: 50) – even if the Foucauldian approach is accused of conflating discourses and material practices and thus of 'discourse imperialism' (Fairclough 2013: 207). Foucault did admit that he tended to grant discourses too much autonomy during his earlier 'archaeological' phase (Hoy, 1986: 4) – even if the critique of 'discourse imperialism' may be excessive. Nonetheless, I embrace the clearer division between these social elements as advocated by Bourdieu and CDA.

While this understanding does not break with the social constructivist understanding of objects being meaningless outside of discourses (e.g. Barthes 1977: 10; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 93), it breaks with ideas such as that of Laclau and Mouffe (ibid; see also Dunn & Neumann 2016) that the discursive/nondiscursive distinction is pointless due to discourses producing all meaning. Rather, CDA recognizes the social importance of discourses without a reductive logic which turns all of social life discursive, i.e. 'discourse imperialism' (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 28; Fairclough 2013: 163; see also Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 72-73) CDA compares discourses to social structures, and just like the latter enable through constraining and limiting (Giddens 1982: 534-535; Bourdieu 1996a: 29), so discourses enable particular modes of thought and conduct through limiting the space of possibilities (Fairclough 1989: 28)

CDA is furthermore a critical discipline - seeking to denaturalize 'common sense' and its ideological effects (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 3; Fairclough 1995: 36) As Fairclough (1992: 9) writes, '[being] critical implies showing connections and causes which are hidden'. Naturalization gives representations the status of common sense (Fairclough 1995: 42), whereas denaturalization unveils how common-sensical 'doxa' is actually socially constructed (Bourdieu 2001: 35) – and how doxa affects and is affected by power struggles and power relations (Fairclough 1995: 28). The focus upon ideological effects entails a focus upon how dominant modes of perception may conceal their social arbitrariness and thus function in the service of powerholders (Fairclough 1995. 94; Wodak & Meyer 2009: 8). – CDA's ideology critique aims to unveil how power relations underlie the naturalized practices and ideas, thus sustaining power relations (Fairclough 1995: 94; 1996: 54).

However, CDA's critique also relates to the 'correction' of social wrongs (van Dijk 1993a: 131; Fairclough 2009: 162). This is potentially more problematic as there are no 'extra-ideological' perspective from where one can make such assertions (Laclau 2014: 13). Thus, social scientists risk naturalizing their (potentially) 'self-interested vision of the social world'

as if it was universal (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1989: 4). An alternative revolves around Foucauldian ideas of dismissing normativity in order to utilize 'the right to question truth on its effect of power and question power on its discourse of truth' (Foucault 2007a: 47), which thus revolves around a radical form of denaturalizing which challenges 'our dearest biases' and enables us to rethink our consciousness and practices without proclaiming alternatives, leaving alternatives to the reader (Flynn 2006: 33).

I embrace this 'right to question truth' combined with CDA's, but also Bourdieu's, aims' of denaturalization. Foucault's lack of a normative basis, which I also embrace in this text, is however heavily criticized (e.g. Fraser 1981: 283; Walzer 1986: 67; Dew 1987: 207; Habermas 1990: 269), and we will touch upon this in section 9.2 as I illustrate the strengths, but also limitations, of critique free of normative foundations.

The most interesting break between Foucauldian analysis and CDA relates to how CDA 'claims that close analysis of texts should be a significant part of social scientific analysis of a wide range of social and cultural practices and processes' (Fairclough 1995: 185), whereas Foucauldian discourse analysis is textually abstract as it 'focuses upon "conditions of possibility", rules of formations [etc]' (Fairclough 1992: 37-38). This relates to Foucault's (1980: 115) notion that discourses 'need no interpretation, no one to assign them a meaning' (see also Foucault 1977; Gutting 2006: 1). Foucault therefore 'seeks to identify the rules of such formation and transformation' (Lemke 2019: 41), attempting to analyse 'the regular patterns observed in discourse formations as the conditions of their existence' (ibid: 43). However, 'words typically have various meanings [and] the meanings of words… are socially contested' (Fairclough 1992: 185). Therefore, only through interpretation can the contestation to define the 'elite' be analysed. CDA utilizes linguistic, semiotic and literary methods for analysing texts before contextualizing them in their nondiscursive conditions (Luke 2002: 100). This opens for me to analyse the meaning-production of the discourses and interpret how the parties constitute the 'elite'. I utilize the semiotic strategies of Laclau and Mouffe (see section 3.2.2) in order to offer an interpretative analysis of the regulations of the discourses – as I embrace both the semiotic understanding of discourses as necessarily objects of interpretation while I seek to map the rules which regulate formations in a Foucauldian manner – as my approach remains theoretically heterodox (see more on practical methodology below). While I do embrace Foucauldian critique as well as the archaeological focus upon discursive regulation and rules I do consider this approach as part of the greater tradition of CDA as I nonetheless keep the interpretive focus utilizing semiotic strategies while embracing the

discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy as a tool for overcoming the subjectivist/objectivist debates we shall now cover as I enter a discussion on Bourdieu's sociology.

2.2. Bourdieusean Sociology

2.2.1. Subjectivism and Objectivism

The dialectical conception of discourses enables us to combine the analyses of discourse with other nondiscursive findings, opening for close collaboration with Bourdieu's sociology. CDA follows Bourdieu's (1989: 14) project of transcending the 'objectivist/subjectivist' schism through combining the 'objectivist' understanding of 'objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents' with the 'constructivism' understanding of 'schemes of perception' which may or may not relate to the former (see also Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 30). Bourdieu (1991: 135) finds discourses to have stronger effects when they are synchronized with the objective social conditions which they are based upon. After all, discursive and nondiscursive practices are not in a relation of causality, but of mutual presupposition (Deleuze 1988: 31; Lazzarato 2009: 113). These 'relativizations' of discourse let us 'place ourselves between the discursive and the nondiscursive' and thus enrichen the analysis (Lazzarato 2014: 108).

I reduce the nondiscursive to the abstract positionings of space and fields because I do not seek to investigate the nondiscursive phenomena *besides the objectively existing positions of the actors.* The nondiscursive includes phenomena such as modes of production (e.g. Marx 1887; Althusser 2008), technologies utilized in the governance of human actors, such as architecture (e.g. Foucault 1995; Rose 1998), as well as actor-networks consisting of living and non-living entities such as dogs, cars or God acting upon human conduct (e.g. Latour 2005). I neglect these aspects as I focus upon the link between discourses and objective positions. Bourdieu's theory is ideal for this as it enables investigations of both the objective position persons occupy and their subjective modes of perception (Wacquant 2013: 275).

2.2.2. Social Fields and Social Space

Social space is a metaphor for the social world and a multi-dimensional space which is the ground for struggles for power (Bourdieu 1987: 3-4). It is an objective space which positions individuals vis-à-vis other individuals, in contrast to the subjective aspects of social life such as consciousness or discourses (Bourdieu 1987:15). In the words of Bourdieu (1984: 131) it is structured based upon the volume and type of capital. Capital is defined as 'forms of power that are active in one or another of the fields' (Bourdieu 1996a: 265).

Social space is further divided into social fields or institutions which offer different forms of capital, such as economic or academic variants (Wacquant 2013: 275), which offer subject positions based on the level of capital, such as 'student' or 'professor' (Bourdieu 1991: 230). All social fields are characterized by groups facing each other in a struggle 'over classifications, the boundaries between fields, their hierarchization and battles over the power at stake from increasing one's position within the field offers' (Choukalari & Fairclough 1999: 104).

We must note that the 'notions of social space… are put to work and to the test in an investigation that is inseparably empirical and theoretical' (Bourdieu 1998a: 16) – notions the concept of fields also serve (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1989: 6). Thus, Bourdieu's framework serves practical purposes, and we will utilize findings from the Norwegian social space in the actual analysis in order to contextualize them in the nondiscursive positions of the actors. Furthermore, the theory of fields opens for a heterogenous understanding of powerholders as the actors inhabiting the top positions of different fields make up what Bourdieu (1996a: 264) calls 'the field of power', a field of struggles where the agents possessing high quantities of capital struggle to preserve or transform the positions of their fields within the overall hierarchy of society.

The field of power is relevant as both the 'elites' and politicians lamenting these 'elites' inhabit positions within it. The political field is somewhat different from the other fields as the powerholders must, because of democratic institutions, 'appeal to groups outside the fields of politics to win' (Bourdieu 1991: 28). Therefore, power within the political field is constituted by those *represented* (ibid: 194): The representing depends upon the represented. Political actors are the most significant actors in this struggle between professional agents (ibid: 180-181) where the stakes are 'the power to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the social world, and thereby, to make and unmake groups' (ibid: 221). The political field is characterized by a 'permanent rivalry for the truth of the social world', just like the scientific fields (Bourdieu 1988b: xiii). The political field must be understood as 'both as a field of forces and as a field of struggles aimed at transforming the relation of forces' (Bourdieu 1991: 171). It is a key site in the struggles to (re)produce the social world as it is the primarily site for the struggle to construct groups (Bourdieu 1987: 7). Struggles within the political field tend to be perceived as the crystallization of other struggles from within the field of power as it is structured homologously vis-à-vis social space as a whole (Bourdieu 1991: 182; Wacquant 2013: 278), even if the political field too is relatively autonomous and thus we cannot know

whether a struggle relates to the field of power and the struggles between powerholders or not a priori.

2.2.3. Power and Capital

Capital is power granted by and within institutions which enables subjects to exercise control over the institution and the individuals within it (Bourdieu 1983: 241). Bourdieu (19832: 242) writes that

> capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ("connections"), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility.

Economic and cultural capital are important to the 'elite' debates we will touch upon. Economic capital is money or objects which can be immediately and directly converted into money, such as property (ibid.), and it is considered the dominant form of capital (Bourdieu 1993: 38)

Cultural capital is a more complex form of power which is also more controversial, especially within the Norwegian context, as we shall discuss in section 4.3. Bourdieu (1983: 243) writes that cultural capital exists in both an embodied state in the sense of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body and in an objectified state in the form of cultural goods such as books, and, finally, an institutionalized in terms of educational qualifications. While some scholars (e.g. Di Maggio & Mohr, 1985) interpret it as the control over 'legitimate culture', cultural capital also entails the cultural ease of mastering practical culture as well as legitimized knowledge (Lareau & Weininger 2003: 580)

However, power is a complex phenomenon which 'we have yet to fully comprehend' (Foucault 1977: 213). Foucault's critique targets theories which fail to see that power is heterogenous and both restricts and enables, represses and produces (Foucault 1990: 73, 2007a: 155; Dyrberg 1997: 2; Veyne 1997: 151) – something Bourdieu is accused of (Bonikowski 2015: 387) – even if this may be somewhat dubious as he understands power as productive, too (see below). Furthermore, power is a dynamic phenomenon which changes: From revolving around the sovereign's coercive power to seize things – life included (Foucault 1995), it

changed to disciplinary powers which have now been largely replaced by regulating powers (Deleuze 1992; Foucault 2003). Therefore, critique of 'outdated' forms can lead to scholars to 'kick in open doors', and thus legitimize new forms of domination (see Dirlik 1997: 77; Hardt & Negri 2000: 138). Such critique is important as we must note that critique of power may serve to reinforce unarticulated hierarchies - as we shall see in chapter 8. However, I embrace Bourdieu's terminology as this enables me to contextualize the discourses in social space – especially as the Progress Party singles out 'symbolic power' while the Socialist Left Party criticizes 'economic capital', meaning that the parties' discourses relate to the understanding Bourdieu offers us and thus we can map the discourses within Bourdieu's theoretical schematics in order to break with the subjectivism of the discourses. I will now discuss the phenomenon of symbolic power – which is of the utmost importance as a) the Progress Party singles it out and b) both parties utilize it.

2.2.4. Symbolic Power

While Bourdieu gives primacy to economic, cultural and social capital, we must question whether these forms are more important or not. As Bourdieu (1989: 22) himself notes, the stakes of the social struggles are not just resources and positions, but the very 'truth of the social world'. The discursive power to shape our social world, i.e., symbolic power, is of paramount importance (see Fairclough 1989; Bernstein 1996; Gramsci 1999; Lukes 2004; van Dijk 2008). Bourdieu (1991: 170) defines it as

> the power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself.

This power enables powerholders to 'claim monopoly of legitimacy' (Bourdieu & Passeron 1990: 18) through 'organiz[ing] all perceptions of the social world' (Bourdieu 2001: 46). This power is, among other things, the power to make groups and to consecrate or institute them' (Bourdieu 1987: 14). Symbolic power has links to the Marxian understandings of ideology as distortions of reality (see Marx 1887; Žižek 1994; Althusser 2008) as Bourdieu (1992: 126) finds it to be enabled by dominated groups misrecognizing their positions due to powerholders' control over perceptions – even if Bourdieu himself would lament such comparisons (see Eagleton & Bourdieu 1992). However, as Laclau (2014: 13) puts it:

Notions such as "distortion" and "false representation" lose all meaning as any extra-ideological' viewpoint becomes unreachable, insofar as discourses organize all social practices and viewpoints…

Thus, rather than merely being 'misrecognition', symbolic/ideological power constitutes our consciousnesses (see Laclau 2014: 144). It is a key technique of power enabling powerholders' interests to be secured and potentially internalized by the lower sections of social space. Thus, ideological critique may problematize ideas which serves power-interests rather than to speak about 'distortions' (Fairclough 1995: 18).

However, Bourdieu appears to underestimate symbolic power's autonomy and productivity (Choukalari and Fairclough 1999: 104; Hasan, 2005: 331; Kögler, 2013: 305) as he finds the power over discourses to primarily relate to the authority of the speaking subject (Bourdieu 1991: 109). This authority is found to relate to symbolic power being dismissed as 'legitimate' and 'recognized' forms of cultural, economic and social capital (Bourdieu 1989 21, 1998a: 47) and as constituted primarily through the State (Bourdieu 2014: 167).

However, symbolic domination, such as the religious power Foucault (2007b: 311-312) labels 'pastoral', which characterizes the priest's relations as intermediary between God and the believers and the priest's capacity to influence the preferences and beliefs of these believers, are first and foremost symbolic. Such power functions in all cases where social actors fill the intermediary position between masses and the 'greater good', including in secular contexts (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 214). Bourdieu (1998a: 124) finds the church and thus pastoral power to conceal its 'real economic basis'. However, while priests may exercise power through economic or military resources, such possibilities are enabled by the church's *symbolic* position as intermediary between God and the pastorate. These symbolic foundations can be generalized to other pastoral powerholders – of both religious and secular forms – as the ability to define ethico-symbolic questions is relatively autonomous of the state and fields.

While being relatively autonomous, it is also productive. To increase its productivity, I will discuss hegemony as a specific form of symbolic power. This concept is imperative to this text as the parties both hold hegemonic aspirations (see chapter 7). Hegemony signifies a practice where a dominant actor manages to make its particular interests appear as the universal interest of all (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiii). Laclau and Mouffe's understanding relates to Antonio Gramsci's (1999: 526) theory that hegemony educates and moulds individuals 'to the interests of the ruling class'. Rather than dominance through coercion, it revolves around

constituting consensus through ideology. Bourdieu (1991: 221) too notes that the symbolic power to impose legitimate (di)visions revolve around the power 'to make and unmake groups'. Some find Gramsci's consent and Bourdieu's misrecognition to create a schism between hegemony and symbolic domination (see Burawoy 2012: 187). However, such divisions appear unclear as there are rarely any extra-ideological viewpoints for distinguishing consensus from misrecognition in practice. Thus, the division between hegemony/symbolic domination withers as hegemony can be defined as the most potent manifestation of symbolic power.

Hegemony entails concealing tensions through defining a mutual enemy (Mouffe 2018: 36), allowing fragments to be unified (Mouffe 2018: 45). Such antagonisms are complicated as they can start at any point where there are conflicts of interests (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 117), even if no relationship is inherently antagonistic (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 138). Antagonism emerges when power relations are constituted as blocking social actors from realizing themselves (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 111). Relations must thus be articulated as problematic for conflicts to emerge (Mouffe 2018: 42). The constitution of antagonism and thus of struggle allows political actors to impose their (di)visions on individuals through a) 'interpellat[ing] individuals as subjects' (Althusser 2008: 45) and b) positioning individuals and groups through classification vis-à-vis each other (Bernstein 1990: 15-24). In other words, it entails a) putting individuals in place as subjects and b) organizing the relations between these subjects. Individuals are thus placed in different subject positions, which are general discursive positions constituted by discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 115).

The constitution of subjects and relations, of interests and preferences, are all constituted through symbolic power. This power can be utilized for veiling or unveiling particularities and relations of domination as it enables individuals to impose their (di)visions. We will in the analysis focus upon how the parties both seek to assert their symbolic power through their hegemonic aspirations, and how the Progress Party problematizes those perceived as the holders of symbolic power. I will now discuss my methodology.

3. Methodology

I will in this chapter discuss my methods and data. This chapter has a close correspondence with the previous chapter as

the relationship between object of research, theory, and method is conceived of as a dynamic relationship, not a matter of pre-existing theory and method being 'applied' to a new object, but of theory and method evolving in the encounter with the object of research, whose construction is in turn ongoingly developed… (Fairclough & Graham 2002: 190).

Thus, theory and method 'cooperate' in the construction of the object of research: 'The most "empirical" choices cannot be disentangled from the most "theoretical" choices in the construction of the [research] object' (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 225), something we return to in section 3.3.

I structure this chapter as follows: First, I discuss my data and reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of it. Thereafter, I discuss my analytical strategies: The intertextual approach of Fairclough and the analytical tools of Laclau and Mouffe. Last, I reflect upon my choices regarding the parties as well as my heavily theoretical approach.

3.1. Empirical Material

3.1.1. Searching for Data

Accessing data is always challenging for discourse analysts when the data analysed are already existing and not gathered through interviews as the analyst must find and demarcate relevant texts (Dunn & Neumann 2016: 12). I utilized 'Retriever' for researching data, excluding data published earlier than 01.01.2009 as I seek to investigate the struggle for 'truth' in the present rather than a genealogical analysis of how debates have evolved. Furthermore, I exclude all papers not considered 'national papers', i.e.' rikspresse', from my literature research. This is done in order to review the discourses which influence the broadest, i.e. national, audience.

I started searching with 'common-sensical' terms: 'The Progress Party elite' and 'The Socialist Left Party elite[1]'. This gave me 486 and 404 texts respectively. However, the majority of these texts did not include articulations from central party members. Rather, most were commentaries written by journalists describing the political climate and the parties and thus unsuitable for my analysis. I do not investigate the particular ways journalists seek to impose their (di)visions of the social world, but how the political actors do so. Furthermore, several of the newspaper articles included the same texts as interviews were oftentimes reproduced in several newspapers. Therefore, I do not quantify the potential data as it will necessarily be

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[1] All keywords utilized in the research were originally written in Norwegian and are translated directly.

somewhat flawed. Furthermore, the purpose of the text is not generalizations as the meaning-production of the texts cannot be statistically generalized.

This first step in my research was combined with an early analysis of the data. This analysis illustrated, like Laclau (2005: 18) that the term 'elite' is a term for excluding powerholders from the 'people' and that it can take several forms. Oftentimes, the political actors take the term 'elite' for granted in their critique of powerholders. For the Progress Party, I noted a trend towards the 'elite' being utilized in a diverse number of ways. It is utilized for the 'bearers of opinion', 'tyrants of goodness', 'the left', 'mass media', 'academics' and 'bishops' well as 'environmentalists' and the singular case of 'feminist elites'. The connection between these concepts cannot be touched upon before the analysis. However, this illustrates the complexity of the construction of 'elites' as the category is not always explicitly articulated. I utilized all of the terms in my second round of literature research. Regarding the Socialist Left Party, terms such as 'fishing barons', 'the rich', 'welfare profiteers', 'oil companies' or 'billionaires', i.e., various terms for social actors inhabiting the higher sections of the economic fields, were used synonymously with the 'elite'. All of these keywords have been utilized in the literature research.

Furthermore, I include texts from outside of the national press, such as books, blog(s), and information from the parties' official webpages. While information from the parties' webpages could have been prioritized, the parties' webpages offered few texts on the topic. Therefore, they serve supplementary purposes. The data will be discussed more closely in section 3.1.3 – after a discussion on my selections.

3.1.2. Selecting Data

I will now discuss how I selected my data. Leading members of the parties are prioritized. This is so as leaders shape the interests of the ones below them (Dahl 1961: 164). This is however not a linear top-down relationship as this dialectical relationship entails the leader being both represented and representing (Bourdieu 1991: 106; Laclau 2005: 157). The leader is a creator of the group created by the group it creates. We can generally assume that leaders and their followers have a dialectical effect on each other's ideas and preferences. This implies neither that we can generalize the particular views of the leadership to that of the party as a whole, nor that we can generalize these views to the supporters of the parties, as the dialectical relationship remains complex and non-linear. We must note that a political party is not a homogenous entity as individuals within the party also compete for power *within* the party. The political party, too,

is a field of struggles where various factions of the party struggle for dominance, just like Bourdieu (2005: 69) notes regarding firms. Furthermore, political parties will be split into 'right' and 'left' wings, too. Bourdieu (1991: 187) points out how communists in the Soviet Union during the 20s and 30s could be split into Joseph Stalin's 'right' pole versus Leo Trotsky's 'left' pole, and similar tendencies can be generalized to political parties in other contexts, too.

This does not imply that some left-wing politicians lean to the 'right' within the political field as a whole, but that the relational status of the field as a whole is homologous within parties. Left-wing or right-wing politicians will lean right or left to their comrades independently of their positions within the field as a whole. However, that the party functions as a field of struggles indicates that we cannot generalize the articulations of the party's leadership to the entire party and the grassroot. I therefore include relevant texts from actors within the parties insofar as these actors represent or have represented the parties at parliament. However, the very leadership is prioritized as leading representatives illustrate parties' official agenda.

This understanding enables me to handle the complexity of the parties by seeking out these contradictions and thus avoid the issue of anedoctalism, i.e., the problem of appealing to 'telling examples' in the analysis as this breaks the validity of the research (Silverman 2001: 34) – a potential issue for discourse analysts due to discursive formations being heterogenous and contradictory. CDA is accused of having issues with anedoctalism (Stubbs 1997: 7). Seeking out and analysing contradictions within the discourses are essential to avoid this.

It is common for analysts within the tradition of CDA to focus upon so-called 'typical texts' (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 23). However, 'typical texts' is a floating term. What is a 'typical text' within a given discourse? As Ruth Breeze (2011: 505) notes while criticizing CDA, 'there is a danger that fragments can be presented as representative, without any explanation to how this representativeness has been established'. We have noted how I partly avoid this by dismissing the potential of generalizing between various levels of the party-as-a-field as the leadership of the party's (di)visions of the world may well differ from the viewpoints of the lower sections of it. However, the generalizing potential of my texts to the leadership of the parties must be discussed. Jennifer Milliksen (1999: 233) points out that 'a single source cannot be claimed to support empirical arguments…' as a series of examples are needed in order to display regularities (Barthelson 1995: 8). However, some texts, such as what Dunn and

Neumann (2016: 93) calls 'canonical texts', synonymous with 'typical texts', are important as they are (re)produced at a larger scale (see also Gjerde 2019: 7-8 for discussions on 'canonical texts') – the individual text can have a massive influence upon later texts if it is frequently reproduced.

This relates to the quantity/quality debate. Analysts may analyse fewer text in detail, but a smaller corpus makes it difficult to justify the significance of the analysis (Phillips & Hardy 2002: 72) as 'it is not individual texts that produce social reality, but structures of texts of various kinds', i.e., discursive formations, 'that constitute social phenomena' (ibid: 82). Thus, the goal must be to combine a broad number of texts with a focus upon privileged texts, such as the Bible for Christianity. It is however difficult to single out privileged texts within political discourses which have a longer history than the 10 years span I offer it – especially as specific political parties may follow complex narratives which only archaeological investigations can reveal. Therefore, I follow Milliksen's (1999: 234) advice on conducting research until new data stops altering my arguments. This also helps me find somewhat 'typical texts' as it opens for finding texts which others draw upon – even if I will not make claims of any of these texts being 'canonical' as the 'canonical' texts to the parties' discourses are likely to be older texts, potentially texts written in other national contexts by thinkers such as Marx, Keynes or Hayek. Nonetheless, some texts will cover the phenomenon at hand more deeply and thus allow us to see the logic behind 'common sensical' accounts.

Now that the rationale of my selection of data has been discussed, the actual selection of data can be discussed. While I will touch upon the properties of the data in the next section, I will here discuss the primarily actors whose texts I base myself upon. Regarding the Progress Party, I base primarily myself upon texts from party-leader Siv Jensen, second-in-command Sylvi Listhaug and Christian Tybring-Gjedde. While Tybring-Gjedde does not hold any of the highest leading positions within the party, he is nonetheless a veteran in parliament, an outspoken critic of the 'elite' and an important public figure within the party, and all the more interesting as he is sometimes considered a controversial character within the party, also from fellow party-members (e.g Løset et al. 2019) – thus inhabiting a somewhat complex position which makes it interesting to contextualize his contributions vis-à-vis the 'official' story of the party – which as we shall see he largely adheres to.

I further supplement with one example from Ketil Solvik-Olsen, former second-in-command, Carl I. Hagen, former commander of the party, which like Tybring-Gjedde may be

somewhat at odds with the current leadership and thus offer us interesting insights, as well as Ulf Erik Knudsen, former veteran at parliament, which is included as he co-authored an interesting piece with party-leader Jensen.

Regarding the Socialist Left Party, I primarily focus upon party-leader Audun Lysbakken, present second-in-command Torgeir Knag Fylkesnes and former second-in-command Snorre Valen. I further supplement these texts with texts from former rival of Fylkesnes for the second-in-command position, Elisabeth Kaski, veteran at parliament Karin Andersen as well as Freddy Andre Øvstegård, one of the party's rising stars. All quotes from the Norwegian-political context are translated by the author.

Furthermore, I focus upon texts which elaborate on the 'elites' rather than texts which merely mentions the term. I do so because the discourses' presuppositions are only touched upon in cases where the actors discuss their understanding in detail. I have also prioritized self-produced texts, even if I do include several interviews where the texts are mediated. This is important as meaning production can be altered through mediation. As Fairclough (2003: 30) notes, mediation, i.e. 'the movement of meaning, from one practice another…', such as when interviews are written down in order to fit into a short newspaper-article, can transform the meaning originally produced by the speaking subject. However, I do include a rich number of newspaper articles where journalists have completed the practice of mediation. Excluding these mediated texts would narrow the range of the discourses and exclude important data, especially as I failed to find any semiotic differences between mediated and non-mediated texts.

3.1.3. On the Data

While we cannot touch upon every selected text in detail due to limitations to space, I will now discuss the key texts of my analysis. There are a few texts whose meaning-production is especially important as they elaborate on and reveal the presuppositions of the discourses.

One of the key texts in my analysis is a mediated piece of journalism. In this text, a representative from the newspaper Klassekampen interviews Lysbakken on 'elites' in contemporary Norway. This is a privileged text within the discourse of the Socialist Left Party as Lysbakken both elaborates on the Socialist Left Party's understanding and (implicitly) dismisses the Progress Party's understanding. Lysbakken is challenged by the interviewer on rival points of view and he elaborates clearly on the 'elite' and the party's problematization of it. Another prioritized text of the party, a self-produced text from former second-in-command Valen, discusses the same topics and produces the same meaning six years prior to this

interview. These two texts are privileged because a) they touch upon both the Socialist Left Party's and The Progress Party's understandings of 'elites' while elaborating on the presuppositions and b) other texts within the party's discursive formation largely (re)produce similar meaning – even if they rarely touch upon the presuppositions and elaborations which Lysbakken and Valen express here.

Two texts from members of the Progress Party appear largely homologous to Lysbakken and Valen's texts. First, and this is the primarily text of the Progress Party in this regard, we have Sylvi Listhaug's book *Der andre tier*. Here, over a course of several pages, she elaborates on whom she considers to be the 'elite' and why this is so. Equally important, Listhaug also dismisses the understanding of her political rivals. This text is reproduced on several other occasions. Furthermore, this text is almost directly mirrored in another privileged text, Christian Tybring-Gjedde's book *Mens orkeseret spiller videre* [While the orchestra keeps on playing] from 2014 which shares the former's polemical style and content. I prioritize Listhaug's account because a) she holds a more important position within the party, b) her text is newer and c), as we shall see in the analysis, she elaborates more on the concept of 'elites' than Tybring-Gjedde. These texts, from both the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party, are highly 'typical' as their accounts are reproduced on numerous occasions in shorter, less elaborating texts.

I prioritize books from the Progress Party and articles from the Socialist Left as the former party offers fewer elaborating texts on this topic. This forced me to look deeper in the search for the principles of meaning-production. However, I do include other relevant texts not found in the literature review, some of which must be covered here. First, I include Audun Lysbakken's book *Frihet sammen* [Freedom together] from 2015. The book handles Lysbakken's reflections on contemporary Norway and offers a window into the worldview of the party's leadership. While this text does not elaborate on the 'elites' as the books of Listhaug or Tybring-Gjedde, nor as the mentioned texts from Lysbakken himself and Valen, it holds significance as it elaborates on the relationship between the 'elites' and the Progress Party. This is importance for research question b). Second, I include Sylvi Listhaug's blog post on 'the feminist elite'. This is included for similar reasons as Lysbakken's book. The text was heavily discussed in the Norwegian public, being important as it discusses how the Progress Party perceives the relationship between the 'elite' and the political left-wing. These links between the parties' rivals and the 'elites' are of paramount importance to the analysis of the struggle at hand. Third, I include an essay from Øvstegård, the youngest member of Socialist Left Party's

group at parliament. This text was written in the journal *Manifest* together with Albert Andersen Øydvin shortly before the former's election to parliament. It is included as it breaks with the orthodoxy of the centre of the party, opening for analyses of the complexity and heterogeneity of the party's discourse on 'elites' – avoiding anedoctialism. An interview with Tybring-Gjedde is homologous to this text, offering a rupture with his party's official demarcation of the 'people/elite' dichotomy. However, the majority of texts, on the other hand, are less privileged than the texts mentioned here, and they are all found through the literature review.

It is clear in this regard that several other steps could have been taken. I could have interviewed members of the party or focused on potential schisms between the parties' supporters rather than the political leadership. However, the purpose of my project is to map the political struggle between the parties and how this a) relates to the Norwegian field of power and b) appears to correspond to the parties' positions within social space. Leading representatives hold a privileged position as they determine the official agenda of the parties in order to contextualize the politico-discursive struggle for the 'truth' of the Norwegian 'elites'. Therefore, analysing texts articulated in the public serves my purposes better than interviews with lower members of the parties or their supporters as my main concern is the antagonism between, not within, the parties. While this allows me to classify the discourses as 'the discourse of the Progress Party' and 'the discourse of the Socialist Left' – which are two analytical operations in order to map the discursive practices of the representatives without being fully generalizable to the parties insofar as the parties may well consist of orders of discourse on the topic rather than singular discursive formations – such conclusions cannot be made without an investigation into potential dissidents which my data may be insufficient for revealing, even if we will touch upon internal discursive ruptures in chapter 6.

3.2. Analytical Strategies

I will in this section discuss the strategies I utilize for analysing the data at hand. I utilize the intertextual approach, which I supplement with Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory and various concepts from this tradition.

3.2.1. Intertextual Mapping

I will analyse the discourses' regulations as well as their meaning-production in order to review where the discourses break and where they overlap. Several analytical steps are taken in order to enable this analysis. I utilize Dorothy Smith's (1999: 123-126) metaphor of the map– as 'maps are built from locally recognizable differentiations to produce a standardized iconic representation'. While maps are not the terrain, they offer a way of reading the terrain from afar in order to gain an overview – of both stabilities and instabilities (Dunn & Neumann 2016: 118).

This cartography demands an actual strategy. I utilize Fairclough's intertextual approach for the actual mapping. This entails investigating the link between texts as texts always carries with them other texts (Fairclough 1992: 102). The term 'intertextuality' originated in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, which as Julia Kristeva (1980: 64-65) asserts 'was one of the first to replace the static hewing out of texts with a model where the literary structure does not simply exist but is generated in relation to another structure'. This is so as texts are linked 'in a very complex organized chain of utterances' (Bakhtin 1986: 69; see also Foucault 1972; Fairclough 1992). As Kristeva (1986: 94) notes in her development of the concept based on Bakhtin's theories, 'utterances are linked to chains which cannot be broken off from the preceding links that determine it'. This gives priority to the relationship between texts rather than singular texts.

Intertextuality is important to illustrate the contestations of meaning-production. Words in general have various meanings, and these meanings are contested (Fairclough 1992: 185). This especially hold true for terms such as the 'elite' – as I will discuss further in section 3.3.2. I utilize this approach in order to map the continuations and discontinuations both within and between the parties. While intertextuality entails an explicit focus upon similarities (Fairclough 1992: 84), breaks between discourses are necessarily implicitly touched upon in order to make the case for similarities. I will discuss such breaks more actively as I find intertextuality to primarily revolve around the relationality of texts rather than similarities between them as my understanding somewhat breaks with Fairclough and Kristeva's original conceptualization. This allows me to analyse antagonisms within the discourses and thus largely overcome the issue of anedoctalism. Understanding wholes as heterogenous elements regulated in a particular way rather than as being homogenous (see Foucault 1972: 125; Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 104; Deleuze 1988: 5), I trace both regularities and ruptures within the discourses. This increases the reliability of the findings as the sample is tested in practice as fragmentations are

also sought out. Intertextuality also increases the transparency of the analysis as the links between texts are made explicit. This allows me to investigate how the various politicians within the Progress Party's and the Socialist Left Party's discourses channel and rearticulate similar meaning-production, effectively assisting in the analysis of the discursive formation as we can see the continuations and breaks within the various discursive formations. In other words, I implement the intertextual approach to analyse the relationships between texts within the same discourse as well as between the two discourses.

Intertextuality assists me to in the struggle of determining how one can analytically combine heterogenous elements which form a whole without homogenizing and simplifying – I will analyse a) the regularities of the discursive formations, b) the internal breaks relating to their heterogeneity and c) the (dis)continuities between the parties. However, this approach will also be supplemented – with Laclau and Mouffe's DT, which we shall now discuss more closely.

3.2.2. Laclau and Mouffe's Analytical Concepts

I supplement CDA with of Laclau and Mouffe's DT and their conceptual framework. This will be utilized within the methodological framework of CDA. The motivation for this is manifold.

First, research question a) revolves around the Laclauian problem of understanding how discourses are 'established in never-concluded battles' through the 'fixing [of] floating elements' (Andersen 2003: 32). Despite the epistemological differences between DT and the Bourdieuese-Foucauldian-Faircloughian approach to CDA, the former's theoretical framework becomes relevant. I am particularly interested in a link which the approach offers us as an analytical strategy for through my modification of the concept of 'myth': The link between discursive centre(s), the myths which constitute content for the centre(s), and the nodal point(s) which fixate the meaning of the myth around the centre, which it does through the chain(s) of equivalence which corresponds to the particular way the nodal point fixates signs and orders them in relation to each other.

This link is important as it allows me to a) review similarities and breaks between and within the discourses and b) analyse how the discursive formations are fixated as systems of meaning and how their meaning is temporarily fixated by privileged signs within the discourse. In order to find the myth, we must first grasp the nodal point and how the nodal point fixates various signs into a chain of equivalence around the former – and the focus of DT is to investigate how the nodal point fixates 'the decentralised elements in the discourse' (Andersen

2003: xv). The chief weakness of this approach is the lack of guidelines regarding when and how such fixation happens (ibid: 109). I try to counter this weakness by 'installing' these terms into the intertextual approach – thus letting me investigate the (in)stability of the Progress Party's and the Socialist Left Party's chains of equivalence.

Second, DT is useful as it revolves around the constitution of groups and their adversaries within the political field (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1990, 2005; Mouffe 2018), and we saw in chapter 2 how Bourdieu's theory of the political field can be supplemented by DT's notions of hegemony and group-making through antagonism. Furthermore, both Fairclough (Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 102) and Foucault (Lemke 2019: 121) have little to say on group-making. Therefore, supplementing my approach to CDA with a discursive theory primarily focusing upon group-making becomes useful.

Third, DT serves to increase the level of abstraction. While Faircloughian CDA is abstract compared to others CDA theorists due to his strong macro-focus (Meyer 2009), as a sociolinguistic he nonetheless spends more time at the linguistic levels than I wish to do with my sociological approach – it focuses too much upon styles, genres, grammar, etc (see Fairclough 2013: 75). I want to keep an abstract focus while utilizing analyses of concrete texts in their actual context, thus combining the abstract approach of DT and Foucault with Fairclough's semi-abstract approach (see Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 30). I am interested in the meaning-production of the discourses at an abstract and semiotic level comparable to the abstract approach of Laclau and Mouffe. As the sociolinguist Ruqayia Hasan (2005: 347) notes in this regard, sociolinguistic interests do not always overlap with sociological interests. DT allows me to escape the sociolinguistic focus in order to increase the level of abstraction as I seek to map the discourses' and their meaning-production through my intertextual approach – enabling me to analyse the rules and regulations of the discursive formation a la Foucault's approach while keeping the semiotic focus upon interpretation which I seek to contextualize in their nondiscursive conditions as in CDA – thus enabling me to analyse the rules while interpreting and keeping a close relationship with the texts.

Fourth, the relational nature of signs which Fairclough and Foucault assert as central is key to DT. The concepts of DT revolve around the notions of relational meaning-production – the very purpose of concepts such as nodal points, chains of equivalence and metonymy is to illustrate how discourses are relationally constituted and how their partial fixation happens relationally. These analytical concepts thus fit well into the intertextual approach. All in all,

this makes DT a strong supplementary theory to CDA in general and to my approach in particular.

3.3. Further Reflections

We have to head through a few theoretical-methodological reflections before the analysis can be conducted. This entails offering reflections on a) why I offer a heavily theoretical approach, b) how and why I seek to avoid classifying the parties' in order to classify the parties' classifications, and c) why I have chosen these parties.

3.3.1. Theory and Data

A potential problem in my analysis is the heavy dependence upon theory. As Bourdieu (1992: 36) notes 'we must avoid putting the theories of the paper into "reality"'. Thus, theories must serve the purpose of cartography without analysts perceiving the map as reality. However. the link between the discursive and the nondiscursive is a complex terrain to analyse as it involves an attempt to understand the link between our understanding and the objects of understanding. CDA is a theory and a method to understand and analyse this link (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 16; Fairclough 2009: 167). Furthermore, there is no simple opposition between practice and theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 225; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 26; Fairclough & Graham 2002: 190). While I seek to let the 'data speak' rather than to 'verify' theories, the process of interpretation nonetheless bases itself strongly upon the theories utilized due to a) the complexity of the topic, b) the research-object being theoretically constructed in the first place and c) our consciousness being largely determined by exterior discourses, theory included.

I do therefore, like structuralists and poststructuralists, reject the 'autonomous subject' (see Best & Kellner 1992: 20). Perceptions cannot occur unmediated (Dunn & Neumann 2016: 45; see also Habermas 1987: 126). Therefore, I do not understand discourses as 'the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking… subject [but as] a totality, in which… the subject himself may be determined' (Foucault 1972: 55). We are all subjugated to the discourses channelled through us, even if we too have the potential to subjugate discourses (Foucault 1999: 25). We must note that the subject is actually 'produced by what he is studying' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 124). Foucault (1970: xiv) exemplifies this well as in the preface to *The Order of Things,* dismissing claims of himself being a structuralist, while also stating that:

It would hardly behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely unaware, and which determine other work that is being done today.

Likewise, my consciousness is affected by 'conditions and rules' which determine how I interpret the world around me and the data available for analysis, all of which I am 'very largely unaware'. This leads to an issue facing all social constructivist perspectives: How can my representations be better than alternative representations? (see Winther-Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 32; Fairclough 2013: 8)

Without claiming supremacy, my solution becomes a heavily theoretical approach. While such sentiments often lead scholar to conclude differently – proclaiming theory to be problematic and prone to offering false universality (e.g. Lyotard 1984; Seidman 1994; Smith 1999) – I dismiss this. As my very consciousness is socially and potentially arbitrary constructed, and as universality appears unreachable, letting an explicit theoretical arsenal guide my hand rather than my own ideological predispositions appears fruitful as a) findings and arguments related to an explicit theory can more easily be investigated by the reader than my hidden predispositions which neither I nor the reader can access, b) it lowers the risk that my personal predispositions will turn the analysis into a piece in the war I aim to analyse rather than participate in and c) it may well improve the quality of the arguments as a greater theoretical tradition is utilized rather than my own, partial consciousness, which remains incapable of accessing the data unmediated.

3.3.2. My Analytical Approach and the Struggle for 'Truth'

Before I can discuss the choice of parties, we must make some theoretical-methodological reflections on the parties and my approach. The 'truth' of our social world is established through symbolic power and struggle – something which has implications for how I handle the analysis. As Bourdieu (1988b: xiii) writes, the academic field, like the political and journalistic field, 'is a site of permanent rivalry for the truth of the social world…' as the 'truth' is first and foremost (re)produced through power (Foucault 1980: 133). Thus, academic accounts are not merely descriptions, but prescriptions, imposing (di)visions. Bourdieu (1988b: 14) offers a solution to social scientists attempting to avoid participating in this struggle as

social science cannot… disentangle itself from the struggles of which they are both ends and means, unless it takes them [the struggles] explicitly as its objects instead of letting them slyly infiltrate scientific discourse…'

Similarly, Dunn and Neumann (2016: 40) proclaim that methodologically, discourse analysts seek not to uncover 'truths' but to 'critically examin[e] interpretations in the struggle for determining meanings'. I embrace this approach – seeking not to uncover 'truths but to investigate and contextualize the parties' meaning-production and how their struggle to impose (di)visions relate to their positions in social space.

I will better illustrate my analytical-strategic choice by offering short reflections on the parties. The Progress Party constitutes itself as a 'liberalist' party (Garvik 2019a) which claims to fight for individual 'choices' - which entails less state governance in favour of market solutions – as well as wishing to establish more restrictive migration and juridical politics (Frp n.da). The Socialist Left, on the other hand, constitutes itself as a 'socialist' party (Garvik 2019b) championing causes such as feminism, multiculturalism and the reduction of economic inequalities, wanting the state rather than the market control of important sectors of Norway, such as healthcare or education (SV 2017a).

However, the content of terms such as 'liberal' or 'socialist' is ambiguous and a stake in the struggle. For instance, David Harvey (2005), an important contemporary Marxist scholar, claims that neoliberalism, the dominant mode of liberal thought in contemporary societies, has a main purpose: 'to restore the power of economic elites' to the levels of the years prior to the world wars (p. 19). Milton Friedman (1962), an important ideologist within the neoliberal tradition, claims on the other hand that non-capitalist societies, such as the communist and socialist ones embracing ideas Harvey stands for, 'would destroy all of our freedoms' (p. 20). It exists a multitude of perceptions which offer contradictory answers to the same questions, and especially the 'question of justice' – as 'justice is at stake in a struggle… [and] an instrument of power' (Foucault 1974: 180), meaning that it, like 'truth', serves as both means and ends. The 'truth' of terms such as 'elites' or 'populism', 'liberalism' and 'socialism', and the 'justice' of their content are questions of struggle as the power to define the world and its moralities enable the speaking subject to reap legitimacy at the expense of opponents. It is dubious if I can avoid participating in this struggle if I actively classify the parties' and their ideologies – which lead me to neglecting these questions. The question of critique and morality will be revisited in chapter 9.

This leads my analysis to resolve around classifying rather than participating in the struggle at hand. As I do not enter the war of classification, but seek to classify the parties' classifications and their nondiscursive basis, so discussing the parties' political practices and

ideologies beyond their discursive practices and objective positions is outside of my text's scope. This brief information will serve to let the reader interpret the parties, even if the potential for contextualizing them is weakened by my refusal to touch upon the question of political ideology. I will however utilize terms such as 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' in order to contextualize the parties vis-à-vis each other – as some classifications must be made in order for the struggle at hand to make sense. I will, however, primarily contextualize the parties and their discourses vis-à-vis their objective positions in the social space as this lets me largely avoid participating in the struggle for 'truth'.

3.3.3. On the Choice of Parties

While I seek to avoid classifying the parties', we must discuss my choice of parties as this is a key empirical-theoretical choice. The parties are analysed together as context is imperative (Fairclough 1995: 210). Thus, as the discourses in question exist in a relationship of struggle where they compete to impose their (di)vision of the social world, analysing one of their discourses outside of this context of struggle would limit the potential of the findings. However, the struggle to define the 'elites' and the 'people' of Norway is more diverse than these two parties. Therefore, we must discuss why the two parties have been chosen. It must be noted beforehand that I could not touch upon the totality of 'elite-critics' as more than two parties would likely have limited my findings.

Two other parties appear very relevant to the 'elite debates' of Norway. The Centre Party (SP/Senterpartiet) or the Red Party (R/Rødt) are relevant actors which bear resemblance to the parties I have chosen as they are strong critics of the 'elite'. Foucault (1970: x) advocates 'redrawing frontiers to pull what appears to be distant together'. This is so because a) tensions and distances may not be as clear as 'common sense' indicates and b) tensions and contradictions are interesting topics for discussion as conflicts of meaning force reflections which can reveal contradictions within the discourses as well as to open for new modes of thinking about the phenomena. I thus seek to analyse the parties whose discourses are expected to be the most antagonistic. The Centre Party appear to criticize similar tendencies as the Progress Party as it primarily criticizes urban 'elites' through representing the rural parts of Norway (Slottemo 2018) – which is somewhat related to the Progress Party's criticism of 'symbolic elites' as the critique is somewhat immaterially oriented, too. However, due to the Centre Party's alliance with left-wing parties, the antagonism is likely to be toned down – especially as the Centre Party too problematizes economic 'elites' (Skårderud 2020)– which makes the Progress Party the preferred object of analysis.

The Red Party and the Socialist Left Party are also somewhat similar – both primarily criticizing economic 'elites'. Bourdieu (1991: 200) claims that communist parties such as the Red Party tend to have a popular basis with lower cultural capital than socialist parties such as the Socialist Left Party. However, Flemmen and Haakestad (2018), which investigates the Norwegian political space, find the Red Party's supporters to have more cultural capital than the Socialist Left Party's (p. 413). While this challenges both Bourdieu's claims as well as my decision, the Socialist Left Party nonetheless has the popular support with the highest level of education (Rønning 2017). This implies that the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party may be the most antagonistic on this particular topic – as its supporters somewhat appear to be the most antagonistic based on their positions in social space. Furthermore, the Socialist Left Party represents 7.1% of the informants in this investigation,, versus the Red Party's 0.8%, something which gives priority to the former (Flemmen & Haakestad 2018) – even if we cannot conclude on whether their supporters hold the highest quantities of cultural capital or not

The Progress Party is positioned as a right-wing party with supporters primarily belonging to the mid-lower economic fields, whereas the Socialist Left Party is positioned as a left-wing party with supporters primarily belonging to the upper-mid cultural fields (see Flemmen & Haakestad 2018; Jarness et al. 2019). These parties appear to be opposites – both regarding their popular supporters' positions as well as the political ideologies which we do not touch upon in this analysis – which prompts me to choose their conflict. We will now review debates on 'elites' and 'populism'.

4. On 'Populism' and 'Elites': Delegitimized Categories of the Present

I will in this chapter offer a discursive reading of 'populism' and 'elites' in order to contextualize the concepts and the struggle at hand. I will first offer a discursive reading on the phenomena and their relationship. Second, I will discuss findings from the Norwegian context and discussions on 'elites' in this regard – focusing upon both material-economic and immaterial-symbolic 'elites' and power inequalities.

4.1. Populism: Political 'Anti-Elitism'

Populism as a term is ambiguous and elusive (Germani 1978: 88; Laclau 1979: 143; Stanley 2008: 96; Jensen 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 6). However, there is a general consensus around the 'people/elite-dichotomy' being central to populism (see Canovan 1981; Laclau 2005; Mudde 2007; De Cleen 2017). The famous populist theorist Margaret Canovan (1981: 9) defines populism as a 'particular kind of political phenomenon where the tensions between the elite and the grass roots loom large'. So-called populists 'appeal to the people and to anti-elitism' (ibid: 294), desiring to give power back to the 'people' (Canovan 2005: 5), a trait characterizing 'populists' regardless of whether they are considered left or right-wing (e.g. Otje & Louwerse 2015; Ivaldi et al. 2017; Roodujin & Akkerman 2017).

Populism is oftentimes understood as a 'thin ideology', i.e. as 'supplementary' to 'thick' ideologies such as socialism or liberalism (see Mudde 2004, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). The notion of 'thinness' relates to the idea that populism lacks a coherent programme besides the focus upon the 'people/elite' dichotomy – and thus, it is installed within other ideological programmes. I cannot utilize such notions as I seek to avoid classifying the parties' worldviews. A more beneficial theory for my approach is offered by Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2018). They understand populism as a deliberate discursive strategy which constructs a political frontier between two camps, the 'underdog' versus 'powerholders', i.e., the 'people' versus the 'elite' (Mouffe 2018: 11). This entails understanding 'populism' as a strategy for unifying the 'people' through the construction of *struggle* (Laclau 2005: 73; Mouffe 2018: 11). This political reasoning enables a social actor to claim that it is the legitimate representation of the whole (Laclau 2005: 81) through the simplification of organizing the political space after the dichotomy of 'people-oligarchy' (Laclau 2005: 18). Populism entails an attempted hegemonic operation through constructing a dominant alliance around the signifier 'people' versus the 'elites'.

However, the term 'populism' is problematic as it is primarily utilized to label opponents due to the term's negative connotation (Bjørklund 2004; Laclau 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017; Jensen 2017; Østerud 2017; Mouffe 2018). While the term was once utilized to signal an inherently democratic opposition to 'elites' (Laclau 2005), it is now primarily interpreted as a threat to democracy (e.g. Rupnik, 2007; de la Torre & Ortiz Lemos 2016; Algan et al 2017). Thus, I avoid utilizing the term as I seek to avoid classifying the parties into pre-existing categories which will serve their rivals in the perpetual struggle for power which the 'truth' remains both means and ends within. I will thus bring the findings on this 'anti-elitism' with me into the analysis without utilizing the terminology of populist studies – i.e., the terminology of (il)legitimacy – by renaming this Laclauian political strategy 'popular reason' (c.f. Laclau 2005).

4.2. The (il)legitimacy of 'Elites'

We have discussed how the contemporary 'popular movements' single out the perceived illegitimacy of the 'elite' – while themselves being considered largely illegitimate. As previously noted, however, the term 'elite' is rarely touched upon in populist studies (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 11) – yet it has its own field of study, the sociology of elites, which we shall utilize to supplement the 'populist' understanding of 'elites'.

The 'elite' is understood in ways similar to how the 'fathers of the sociology of elites', i.e. Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels and Gaetono Mosca (Higley & Pakulski 2007), conceptualized this social category as dominant groups/classes. Pareto's (1935: 1421) definition of the 'elite as 'a class of people who have the highest indices [achievements] in their branch of activity' is especially relevant – being reproduced by more recent sociological work as a key understanding of the term (see Mills 1999: 18; Higley & Burton 2006: 6; Khan 2012: 361; Gulbrandsen 2019: vi). However, the term 'elite', just like 'populism', is vague as there is no consensus regarding whom we ought to classify as such (Hansen et al. 2014: 34) – as there are no objective standards for such classifications.

Furthermore, just like how the debates on 'populism' largely revolves around its perceived illegitimacy, so the 'elites' are usually problematized. Such efforts are also criticized as some find 'elite researchers… to overstate the power and cohesion of elites' (Scott 2008: 25; see also Dahl 1958: 464; Giddens 1972; Gulbrandsen 2019: 32). Despite such criticism, there is a clear tendency that the 'elite' is problematized – oftentimes as a homogenous actor standing opposed to the 'rest. For instance, C. Wright Mills (1999: 9) problematizes the 'elites'

as they share an environment while moulding each other's psychological and cultural realities and thus develop shared traits regardless of the differences between the institutions they inhabit, enabling the 'elites' to dominate the 'masses' (see also Hunter 1953; Domhoff 1967). More complex theories, such as that of Bourdieu's (1996a, 1996b) field of power, contextualize the various powerholders of several social fields as individuals holding power over cultural, economic, academic and professional institutions as heterogenous 'elites'. However, Bourdieu's (1984: 128) theory revolves around classifying the 'elites' as the 'dominant class', whereas the lower sections of social space are classified as 'dominated' (Bourdieu 1996a: 1): The choice of wording entails problematizing the 'elite'. Furthermore, the 'elites' are being problematized directly, for instance through being 'engines of inequality' (Khan 2012: 362) or for falsely declaring that they support the universal interests of the 'people' (Delican 2000: 326). Furthermore, the very concept of 'elites' are problematized as they tend to reproduce their original position, thus being relevant producers of inequalities (e.g. Bourdieu & Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1996a; Savage & Williams 2008; Khan 2011, 2012; Hansen 2014a, 2014b).

It must be noted that outside of its scientific field of study, the very concept of 'elites' '[is] scandalous… [and] the very notion can imply a shortage of legitimacy or transparency' (Davies 2017: 231). As Alan Shipman, June Edmunds and Bryan Turner (2018: 1) note regarding the current political climate: 'We know whom to blame for our bad position', and the answer is the 'elite', which is accused of having 'lost touch with the people' (Lasch 1996: 3). Talking positively about elites or elitism 'seems unacceptable in polite company' (Du Gay 2008: 80) due to the social category's current lack of legitimacy.

Anti-elitists parties go further, tending to classify the 'elite' as morally degenerated (Ivaldi et al. 2017: 376). Especially the 'political establishment' is a popular target of such critique (Du Gay 2008: 86). However, the left and right clash regarding whom to classify besides this 'establishment'. For instance, right-wing anti-elitists in USA, Canada and Australia label individuals 'elite' based on social, cultural and moral questions, especially where this threatens the unity of the 'people', such as in questions of migration (e.g. Frank 2004; Sawer & Laycock 2009; Otje & Louwerse 2015: 62). This primarily relates to values as right-wing anti-elitists criticize the 'liberal values' emerging as dominant at the expense of conservative values rather than economics (Hochschild 2016: 54). Left-wing anti-elitists, on the other hand tend to criticize economic powerholders (Otje & Louwerse 2015: 61; Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 2016: 1083; March 2017: 82), which their right-wing rivals are accused of serving (March 2017: 67). It is interesting that the economic powerholders singled out by the left tend to vote

to the right, whereas the cultural/intellectual powerholders singled out by the right tend to vote left (Bourdieu 1996a: Piketty 2018). These voting patterns which Piketty finds in France, Great Britain and USA are also found in Norway (Gulbrandsen 2019: 120).

4.3. 'Elites' in Norway

Norway is a comparatively egalitarian society (Skarpnes & Sakslind 2010: 234; Ljunggren 2014: 560; Flemmen, et al 2017: 186; Saklind, Skarpnes & Hestholm, 2018: 159; Krogstad 2019b: 7; Guldbrandsen, 2019: 3). However, the nation has nonetheless traditionally been characterized by two 'elite' struggles. First, we have the old division between the 'popular/rural' and the 'elitist/urban' (Skarpnes 2018: 361). Second, we have the division between capital and labour (ibid: 366). The former primarily relates to the Centre Party's critique and is thus outside of this text's scope, even if the symbolic problematizations of the Progress Party have some similarities with it. The latter corresponds to the Socialist Left's critique of economic powerholders. We will start by discussing socioeconomic inequalities in Norway before we head into a discussion on symbolic hierarchies.

4.3.1. Socioeconomic inequalities

Despite being considered economically egalitarian compared to nations such as France, USA and UK, economic inequalities, which are rising globally (Atkinson et al 2011; Savage & Williams 2008), are likewise rising in Norway (Alderson & Nielsen 2002; Mastekaasa 2011a, 2011b, Hansen 2014a, 2014b). Social inequalities in Norway decreased and mobility increased from the 1930s (Salvanes 2014: 69). However, this trend has been reversed throughout the last decades, something especially affecting the lower sections of social space (ibid: 70).

Simultaneously as the lower sections of social space face harder times, the top wealth groups of Norway appear to strengthen their positions within the economic field of power (Hansen 2014a: 457). It is found that those from wealthy backgrounds increase their presence at the top of the wealth groups over time, whereas the quantity of individuals from the lower 95th percentile decreases (ibid: 464). Furthermore, it appears that the effect of social background has a clear effect on earnings, even when one controls for education and various variables for skills (Mastekaasa 2011a, 2011b). Educational mobility furthermore appears to be decreasing in Norway (Wiborg & Hansen 2009). Simultaneously, the lower sections of social space are faced with an increment in so-called 'bad jobs', i.e., jobs with low security,

part-time jobs, as well as unemployment in general (Wessel & Brattbakk 2017). This relates to the 'situation of permanent insecurity and precarity' characterizing the contemporary labour market, especially for the lower sections of society (Lazzarato 2009: 111) – a global trend characterizing Norway as well.

Thus, several trends within the Norwegian context indicates that economic powerholders strengthen their position at the expense of the lower sections of social space. Socioeconomic inequalities are rising while the importance of social background increases. These findings appear to be relatively uniform. Therefore, the most relevant questions regarding these socioeconomic inequalities is the political question of (il)legitimacy, which we shall discuss in the analysis. How these inequalities are to be interpreted is a key schism between the two parties in question. Immaterial power is however a more complex question which we must discuss further.

4.3.2 Immaterial hierarchies

Cultural 'elites' are a popular target in the Norwegian mass media (Haarr & Krogstad 2011; Krogstad 2019a, 2019b). However, the Norwegian tradition of egalitarianism has caused scholars to question the importance of Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital in Norway (e.g. Danielsen 1998; Skarpenes 2007; Sakslind et al. 2018; Gulbrandsen 2019). Such arguments are however heavily debated and problematized (e.g. Skogen et al. 2008; Jarness 2014; Ljunggren 2017). While the former scholars emphasise how cultural egalitarianism characterizes Norway, the latter ones find both the moral and cultural worldviews of the lower sections of social space to be stigmatized as both moral and cultural lines appear to be drawn. This is especially so regarding members of the 'wrong' party, i.e., the Progress Party, as these individuals are classified into derogatory categories such as 'racist' and 'homophobic' (Jarness 2014: 236). Gulbrandsen (2019) and Sakslind et al. (2018) – while being sceptical to cultural capital's importance in Norway - also find morality to appear more important than culture. The higher sections of social space tend to have more liberal views regarding moral questions such as migration and gender equality (Flemmen 2014a; 2014b; Midtbøen & Teigen 2019), something which opens for symbolic boundaries to be drawn along moral rather than cultural lines. Furthermore, the symbolic/cultural 'elites' appear to dominate public discourse, being the dominant actors within the mass media (Figenscou & Beyer 2014: 45) as immaterial hierarchies are relevant also in the Norwegian context.

Michele Lamont (1992) offers an interesting and potentially homologous example in this regard. She finds morality to enable symbolic boundaries similar to the cultural distinctions emphasised by Bourdieu (1984). She claims that Bourdieu overstates the importance of cultural capital and underestimates the role of morality as Americans prioritize moral standards above cultural ones (Lamont 1992: 5) – which appears to relate to Jarness' (2014) findings. Terje Tvedt (2009;2017) also finds Norway to be characterized by 'normative power' enabling individuals to impose social (di)visions (see Jarness & Flemmen 2017 for a discussion on symbolic boundary drawing from below). Tvedt's critique relates to the 'pastoral' power discussed in section 2.2.4 as it revolves around actors morally guiding the daily lives of subordinated individuals to 'salvation' in heaven or alternatively and more accurately in the present Norwegian context, in secular contexts on Earth. While the degree such boundaries are drawn by symbolic powerholders cannot be analysed in my text, these findings, as well as the Progress Party's critique, imply that moral boundaries are highly relevant to the Norwegian context. We will now leave these debates and head into the topic at hand: The discursive struggle between the parties.

5. Tracing 1. Discursive Regularities

I will now analyse the regularities of the parties' discourses. This entails mapping the parties' discourses where presuppositions are spelled out as well as how the principles of (di)vision function where the presuppositions remain unarticulated. The term 'principles of (di)vision' serves to express how (di)vision happens after discursive principles which are the object of analysis. However, as discourses tend to lean heavily on presuppositions, so these principles tend to be unarticulated (see Fairclough 1989: 92; van Dijk 2008: 163). While Foucault finds such regulations to remain unarticulated *and* unavailable to the speaking subject (Davidson 1986: 222), I find the principles regulating the discourses to be articulated in cases where the speaking subject elaborate on its points. Thus, rather than being unavailable, regulations are oftentimes concealed and presupposed. Therefore, I start by intertextually investigating and mapping these regularities in 'privileged' texts which elaborate on the parties' logic. Thereafter, I investigate the principles of (di)vision where the presuppositions as well as the very term 'elite is left unarticulated. I investigate the two parties separately, starting with the Progress Party. Lastly, I analyse the myths of the parties in section 5.3 – in order to clarify how the parties' common perception of Norway as divided between dominating 'elites' and a dominated 'people' change based on how the parties' discourses are fixated.

5.1 The 'People' versus Symbolic Powerholders

I start by clarifying the discursive principles of the Progress Party. The party does, as we shall see throughout this text, lament symbolic power – and symbolic powerholders. The 'elites' are problematized, as by Tybring-Gjedde, because '[they] have removed themselves from the people they are meant to serve. And they bring the mass media, the civil society and academia with them on the team of elites' (Suvatne 2016). However, we must go deeper into how and why these 'elites' are problematized: Exactly how do the 'elites' remove themselves from the 'people'? What does this entail? It entails the party being, as Listhaug (2016) is, 'tired of the elite telling the people what is right and wrong'. Why is the mass media, civil society and academia singled out? Listhaug (2018: 35-37) offers an elaboration on this in her polemical book *Der andre tier:*

> I refer to the bearers of opinions [meningsbærere][2] when I refer to the elite. Many
> individuals in this group actually look down upon the common people… this elite is

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[2] 'Bearers of opinions' classifies individuals which are important for the constitution of legitimate opinions and morals. The term is synonymous with Teo van Dijk's (2008) 'symbolic elites', which entails academics,

not necessarily the richest or those with the most formal power… [but rather, it is the] self-appointed group of judges and opinion police determining good from bad morals. Those I speak about are newspaper editors, politicians, PR specialists, authors, actors, musicians and theatre-workers, people placing themselves on a pedestal and feeling better than everybody else.

In other words, Listhaug does not consider economic or formal power constitutive of 'elite' status. In her own words, 'doing well is no reason to be ashamed' (Listhaug 2018: 35). Rather, this 'shame' relates to the capacity to influence opinions, or in the terminology of Bourdieu, symbolic power – utilized for drawing symbolic boundaries. The party's critique of the 'elite' revolves around problematizing a social category allegedly imposing (di)visions and demanding obedience – and this is how it removes itself from the 'people'. Rather than serving, it dominates – as the 'elite' has a different set of morals which it seeks to impose upon the 'people'. Such critique of a moralizing 'elite' tyrannizing the 'people' is also a core argument for poor American whites to vote Donald Trump and the Conservatives in general (see Hochschild 2016: 54). This critique of symbolic powerholders has an intertextual link with other articulations from other party-members. For instance, it has an intertextual link to party-leader Jensen and former representative at parliament Knudsen (2009), and one of the party's rare polemics towards the cultural 'elites', where they wrote:

It is wrong that a small group of insiders may allocate the community's resources to what they consider good culture and art. This system is built on a top-down-attitude towards the taste and preferences of the common people

Furthermore, Listhaug's text has a clear intertextual link to Tybring-Gjedde's (2014: 226) polemical book, which presented a similar critique of powerholders in contemporary Norway 4 years prior to Listhaug's own book:

It is my hope that the [mass] media and other bearers of opinions in [the Norwegian] society will realize that the contemporary monopoly of opinions limits the free exchange of viewpoints.

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journalists, cultural workers, etc. I utilize the direct translation due the lack of an adequate alternative insofar as 'symbolic elites' would appear to strengthen my arguments as if the party explicitly mentions how the power they problematize is 'symbolic' – which would be inaccurate.

These texts conceptualize power alongside the conceptual lines of Bourdieu (1991) as the power to govern morality through imposing (di)visions in moral and cultural questions – in Foucault's (2007b) pastoral sense as the totalitarian power to morally 'guide' souls through determining right from wrong. 'Illegitimate symbolic power' functions as the discursive nodal point as it fixates the party's critique around these symbolic powerholders – which monopolize the power to determine right from wrong in moral and cultural questions.

These notions of a 'monopoly of opinions' relates to the party finding 'freedom of speech' to be faltering in contemporary Norway (Tybring-Gjedde 2014: 200), and to 'political correctness'. Tybring-Gjedde (2014: 225) writes that 'politically incorrect statements' lead to 'labelling' which 'silences alternative voices', concerns also voiced by Listhaug (Sandvik & Sølhusvik 2016) as she claims one receives 'massive attacks' if utterances are 'not politically correct'. Tybring-Gjedde (2014: 41) elaborates on this 'political correctness', stating that 'the truth is subordinated in the multicultural project', which the party finds to be a project of the 'elite' (see also Jensen & Sandberg n.d). Tybring-Gjedde (2014: 41) continues:

> Alternative voices are strangled at birth… The intensity of this critique increases every time I get closer to topics where I mirror the people['s opinions]… The people puts sticks into the wheels of the ones on the inside… [but] the power and the power of definition lie with the societal elite.

'Political correctness' is thus interpreted by the party as symbolic power in its negative/repressive variant – utilized to keep moral dogmas unquestioned – even if the 'people' too try to sabotage the projects of the 'elites'. However, the term is also utilized by right-wing politicians to delegitimize left-wing politics in general and especially 'left-wing cultural politics' (Lakoff 2000: 91; Fairclough 2013: 441). Political correctness can thus be understood as a discursive technology for silencing left-wing opinions, as a term which problematizes symbolic power over moral and cultural questions, and as a concept and practice which restrict debates in favour of such 'left-wing' opinions problematized by right-wing actors. Thus, the phenomenon is utilized by actors all across the political spectrum for purposes of (de)legitimizing – serving an important role for the Progress Party as it relates to the nodal point of illegitimate symbolic power fixating the discourse based on a popular reason where the 'people' is dominated by the morally inferior yet symbolically dominating 'elite'. We will now touch upon how these discursive principles are utilized in practice in case where the term 'elite' remains unarticulated.

5.1.1. Environmentalism and Symbolic 'Elites'

We will now analyse how these principles of (di)vision are utilized in practice when the presuppositions remain unarticulated. I will focus upon environmentalists and green politics as the Progress Party problematizes them following the principles analysed above. To first quote Jensen regarding these politics of climate change[3] and discussions in the Norwegian public about the Swedish term 'flygskam', or 'flight shame', i.e., that increased awareness of omissions related to the flight-industry ought to turn flights or at least excessive flights problematic and thus limit emissions:

> The latest is that we ought to feel shame. We ought to be ashamed about using our cars. We ought to be ashamed about eating meat… We ought to be ashamed of our everyday lives. This is socialism in new clothing. A collective emotional coercion meant to govern our choices (Krekling & Sølhusvik 2019)

Listhaug channels the same discourse on the same topic, stating that:

> The problem is the Green Party's paternalistic policies. These paternalistic policies seek to force us make the same choices they made through making people feel shame. (ibid)

While the term 'elite' remains unused by both Jensen and Listhaug in these examples, the environmentalist Green Party's leading members are classified after the principles of popular reason – as an illegitimate group of (symbolic) powerholders imposing (di)visions through producing shame. They are criticized for utilizing their symbolic power through 'a collective emotional coercion meant to govern our choices' just like the 'elite' problematized above. There exists an intertextual chain between both Jensen and Listhaug's statements on this particular form of imposing (di)visions relates to the text analysed above. These environmentalists are taken for granted as an 'elite' imposing values and choices upon the 'people' as the party's nodal point fixates the party's critique around a problematization of the power to influence or impose social (di)visions. We will discuss more closely in chapter 7 how this relates to the Progress Party establishing a chain of equivalence between the 'left-wing' and the 'elite'. Furthermore, this illustrates how the 'people' is constituted within the discourse, as the 'non-elite', whereas the party is constituted as part of this 'people': 'we' are coerced and 'our lives' are governed.

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[3] It's worth noting that while the Green Party and other environmentalists are frequently criticized by the Progress Party, its official programme explicitly acknowledges the climate crisis' seriousness (FrP n.d.b).

Similarly, Tybring-Gjedde criticizes the politics of limiting car-usage through increasing the usage of bicycles within Oslo as:

> Most people do not use their bicycle [to get to their workplace], this is for the elite. This is an elitist policy, and it is a policy which the people do not feel attached to. It is a policy we [Oslo Progress Party] seek to stop (Jensen 2019)

These environmentalist measures are thus dismissed as elitist – based on Laclauian popular reason and 'elite' critique. Hagen, former leader of the party and, unlike the current leadership, a devoted denier of human-made climate change and of all environmentalist measures, says that

> it is alarming how political correctness and [the] elite seek to brainwash children into believing among other things that the life-giving gas of CO2 is dangerous for humanity and the environment (Halvorsen 2019),

also noting that dissidents are 'bullied into silence by the elites' (Vosgraff 2016). Thus, the politics of climate change and the activists behind it are constituted are an 'elite' forcing the 'people' into submission through symbolic domination. While the 'elite' is constituted as somewhat privileged, such as in the example of Tybring-Gjedde – as it is presumed that having access to bicycles as a means of transportation entails a privilege which only the 'elite' holds - the critique mostly relates to symbolic domination. Furthermore, a chain is established between the party and the 'people' as it is 'our lives' which are governed through this symbolic coercion. The 'elite' is problematized without the term being articulated as a) the terms 'elite' and 'people' are merely the most common terms for the main categories of popular reason and b) the nodal point (illegitimate symbolic power) takes primacy over these concepts within the discourse and c) we see clearly in the latter examples how the 'elite' is singled out when environmentalism is discussed – as symbolic powerholders imposing symbolic boundaries.

This understanding is opposed by the Progress Party's rival on the left. Lysbakken laments this mode of thought in the interview with Klassekampen as:

> We must not accept the premises many attempt to establish right now, that there is something elitist about the climate struggle. This is fatal as it stops us from solving the climate crisis. (Tollersrud 2019).

Furthermore, the principles of (di)vision which the Progress Party adheres to is dismissed on several occasions. The clearest dismissal is found in a commentary written by Lysbakken (2016) where he states that '[e]veryone disagreeing with Sylvi Listhaug is the "elite" according to her. Everyone agreeing with her are victims chained and oppressed by this elite'. We will touch further upon this in chapter 6 and 7 - now, we will analyse the Socialist Left Party's discourse.

5.2. The 'People' versus Economic Powerholders

The Socialist Left Party's critique relates to Lysbakken's recommendation that if we want to find power, we must 'follow the money' (Tollersrud 2019). He continues in the same interview where this recommendation is proclaimed, lamenting how 'this [the economic elite] is an elite pretending not to exist!'. This is important as the party finds the debates about economic inequalities and 'elites' to be at least partly silenced/distorted within contemporary society, and we will see in chapter 7 how the Socialist Left Party blames the Progress Party for this. Lysbakken and Valen both offer elaborating accounts which illustrate the party's perceptions – and we will now touch upon these. To first quote Lysbakken, which continues in the same interview:

> [The debates about the elite] revolve so much around culture and so little around class. The manager at the library does not hold the same quantity of power as the manager at the bank… Bureaucrats, journalists and academics have their power to define, [which] is also relevant. But we must not equal the power a bureaucrat, priest or general possess to the enormous power those sitting upon the money have. Then we get lost.

Similarly, Valen (2013) dismisses notions that cultural differences have any relevance to 'elite' status, stating that:

> When we discuss inequalities in Norway we are obsessed with culture, but not with money… The Socialist Left Party's job is not to define lifestyles… but to ensure that economic common interests are something which count, so that differences between classes can be equalized and goods can be redistributed.

The close relationship between these two texts makes it preferable that they are analysed together. Both Lysbakken and Valen criticize the lacking focus upon 'class' and 'money' within the 'elite' debates of Norway – finding contemporary debates to be at least somewhat distorted. Economic powerholders are interpellated as the 'elite', similar to left-wing anti-elitist

parties in other national contexts (Otje & Louwerse 2015; Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 2016; March 2017). Non-economic power is dismissed by Valen as 'life-styles', whereas Lysbakken acknowledges its relevance while dismissing it as inferior to the economic power which the party focuses upon. Power and economic capital appears to be synonymous concepts – as specially seen in Kaski's critique of the members of parliament's salaries increasing to the million-kroner range, as 'it is dramatic that we fill the role as an elite when [we are] elected to parliament' (Kristiansen 2018), not so much due to the position per se, but due to the salaries and their constant increase. This materialist understanding of class relates to the individuals' positions in the economic fields, and it is problematized as these economic powerholders are perceived as creating inequalities. These articulations illustrate how the Socialist Left divides society – after economic rather than moral lines. These inequalities are problematized due to the effects it has on society. As Lysbakken states:

> The numbers illustrate that the people is uneasy with the developments where at the one side there is an economic elite demanding more and more – and on the other side there is an increasing number of poor families and greater economic inequalities. (Gullestad 2017)

> When money is being accumulated between fewer hands than before, then so is power. The very fabric of society is weakened when an economic establishes itself and leaves the rest behind (Lysbakken 2020; see also SV n.d)

This problematization is based on the 'people' suffering due to economic 'elites' accumulating capital and increasing their power at its expense. This negates the 'people' – weakening the very 'fabric of society'. While the Progress Party's discourse is fixated by symbolic power, the Socialist Left Party's discourse is fixated by the nodal point of illegitimate economic power – which fixates the popular reason around economic hierarchies. The discourse is coherent as the texts problematize economic powerholders and how their practices causes trouble for the lower sections of social space as well as society more generally. Similarly, the party appears to discard alternative conceptions of power, and especially its right-wing rival's notions of immaterial power – even if the strength of such dismissals varies. However, due to the 'elite' being constituted as a group of illegitimate powerholders – and as power and economic capital is perceived as so closely related – so the 'elite' and the 'rich' appear as synonymous. The Socialist Left Party thus offers a popular reason based on economic hierarchies – and we will now analyse how this forms the discourse in cases where the term 'elite' remains unarticulated.

5.2.1. Coastal Politics and Economic 'Elites'

We will now review how the Socialist Left Party's principles of (di)vision are utilized while the principles analysed above remains unarticulated. The 'people/elite' division in costal areas will be the focus - as the Socialist Left Party went campaigning in these areas during the national elections of 2017 with the following slogan: 'A small elite has conquered the ocean. Now the coast prepares for battle'. This illustrates how the party views both itself as the protectors of the 'people' and the relationship between the 'people' and the coastal 'elites' as one of struggle. Fylkesnes, an important figure regarding the party's coastal politics, problematized these developments during the elections, saying that:

> The last decades have been characterized by private fishing barons and oil companies receiving ownership over the resources which for thousands of years have been the foundations of life in [Northern-Norway]. We are going to war against these developments… The Socialist Left Party will work further with coastal-based fishing policies… without a few accumulating the [community's] resources (Klassekampen 2017a).

In other words, economic actors are problematized as dominating and negating the 'people'. Similarly, Lysbakken told seafarers threatened by being replaced with cheaper labour-force from countries where workers have fewer rights vis-à-vis their employers– before the right-wing government backed off this proposal – that:

> If the shipowners manage to break the system [by outsourcing their labour force and thus weakening the rights of employees], more will follow. This could be the end for the Norwegian seafarers… [but] it is possible to win, and we promise to fight for you. (Nicolajsen 2018)

Lysbakken thus problematizes how the 'people', here the seafarers, are exploited by the implicit 'elite' which seeks to replace them with cheaper and more exploitable labour after a hegemonic logic. Similarly, Fylkesnes (2014) lamented how the privatization of the seas, or as he notes, 'of the resources of the community', leads to 'a few quotation barons becoming the winners while the Norwegian coast loses'. Fylkesnes (2019) continues in a similar manner regarding a (now withdrawn) policy suggestion from the Progress Party and the current situation at the coast, stating that: 'This creates few jobs. Simultaneously, a few becomes rich by reaping the values of the community', adding that the current situation is a 'robbery of the

coast' – as economic powerholders are constituted as maliciously exploiting the 'people' with the help of the right-wing politicians, something we will discuss further in chapter 7.

The 'economic-elites-at-sea', such as shipowners, oil companies and bigger fishing companies, are constituted as conquering the very seas from the 'people'. While the term 'elite' remains unarticulated, we can see that this critique remains guided by the principles of (di)vision from above through the party's slogan from the 2017 campaign, but also by the fact that the shipowners/fishing barons/oil companies are interpellated into the subject position of 'elite' following the popular reason which guides the party's critique – as economic powerholders exploiting the 'people' through accumulating at their expense. They push the 'people' downwards while appropriating their resources. Such critique relates to the left-wing critique of capital colonization of new spheres of life – as evermore parts of the social world is put under the domination of capital (see Habermas 1987; Hardt & Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2014). This problematizes both these processes and the existence of 'elites' – which are excluded from the 'people' due to the way they are constituted as dominating and negating it through the accumulation of wealth. The members of the Socialist Left Party are constituted as the protectors which go to 'war' against this and promise to 'fight' for the 'people' against the 'elite'.

The popular reason from the section above is thus utilized – while the term 'elite' remains unarticulated as the term itself remains secondary to the function it serves as an exclusionary mechanism. The secondary importance of the word itself vis-à-vis its functions is perhaps best exemplified by Lysbakken (2020) as he criticizes the increasing numbers of billionaires, which, while not related to coastal politics per se as it relates to the entirety of the economic fields, illustrates this point:

> An increased number of billionaires appear, and they accumulate evermore riches. The filthy rich's increasing power is a societal issue…. [as their] riches have direct and harmful effects on our society.

These billionaires are thus excluded through the *implicit* interpellation as the 'elite' – due to their harmful effects – and there can be no doubt that billionaires and 'elites' are synonymous within a discourse criticizing economic powerholders based on the nodal point of illegitimate economic power. The text mirrors articulations from the previous section – while the 'elite-status' of the problematized subjects is presupposed.

This understanding is dismissed by the Progress Party in a similar fashion to the Socialist Left Party's critique of the right-wing understanding of 'elites'. Listhaug (2018: 37) dismisses critique of economic 'elites' as '[w]hen one talks with managers and entrepreneurs from the private sector, at least privately, their attitudes are radically different [than the 'bearers of opinions']. This relates to her claim that one ought not to feel shame for 'doing well': Economic powerholders belong the 'people', and the critique of the left is dismissed, with Listhaug (Haugan & Holmes 2019) going as far as to assert that 'the Socialist Left Party almost presents those creating workplaces, and through this tax income, like criminals.' We will now cover the parties' common centre and antagonistic myths.

5.3. The Discursive Centre of 'Elite-Domination'

We will now investigate how the discourses' centre around notions of 'elite-domination', and the particular ways the two parties fill this centre with meaning. This entails investigating how the two parties constitute Norway by investigating two myths. I will first analyse the Progress Party's myth of the 'Tyranny of Goodness'. Thereafter, I analyse the Socialist Left Party's myth of 'Inequality-Norway'. We must note, again, the myth does not indicate falseness, but merely that it is the content of the discursive centre whose 'truth-value' is a question of power.

5.3.1. The Tyranny of Goodness: The Progress Party's Perception

We have touched upon how the Progress Party constitutes the relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' as one of domination. This relates to the party's centre of 'elite-domination' – which is filled with content as a myth – the 'Tyranny of Goodness'. Norway is thus constituted as being morally stratified. The examples above illustrate how the Progress Party constitutes the 'people' as symbolically dominated by the symbolic 'elite'. As Tybring-Gjedde (2014: 225) and Listhaug (2016) note, 'the politically incorrect', understood as the party and the 'people' more generally, are symbolically dominated: They cannot express themselves without the risk of symbolic punishment, such as shaming. The 'elite' negates the 'people's' ability to be itself as the 'elite' control, coerce and dominate the 'people', forcing it to accept choices the 'elite' takes on its behalf. Thus, the powerholders, which are supposed to serve the 'people', are excluded on the basis that they practically exclude themselves through neglecting their duties in favour of asserting their (symbolic) dominance. The 'elite' is thus the group of individuals which has been granted power to lead and abuses it against the 'people' rather than using it for the people – which constituted the 'people' as the 'anti-elite' following Laclauian popular reason. This actively constructs the powerholders in question as 'traitors' leaving their

responsibilities behind in order to serve their self-interests and morally dominate the 'people'. For instance, Listhaug criticizes leading members of the Norwegian church after a debate on the number of arriving refugees, offering us a privileged view into how the party perceives Norway:

> Bondevik and the leader of the bishops in Norway label those worrying about the current developments as non-solidary and bad people… This tyranny of goodness, which rides the Norwegian society like a mare, makes me react (Sandvik 2016).

Thus, society is organized along the lines of a being a moralistic 'tyranny' where 'elites' are policing opinions through shaming– especially on moral questions. Listhaug justifies the usage of the term as:

> Everyone [at a private dinner-party Listhaug attended] was worried about the increasing stream of refugees coming to Norway. But nobody dared to say this in public as nobody wanted to be labelled as racists or bad people. And then the concept tyranny of goodness came to me (Mauno 2016).

Listhaug claims that one cannot utter concerns about the current situation if these concerns oppose the worldview of Norwegian 'elites' – especially regarding questions such as migration, similarly to Tybring-Gjedde's criticism and Hagen's claims of the 'people' being 'bullied into silence'. Failure to conform leads to symbolic domination and the interpellation of the deviant as immoral. The parties thus problematize what they perceive as a discursive closure, understood as a discursive technique for thwarting discussions (see Deetz 1992: 177-188) – of which 'political correctness' is the term the party utilizes to criticize this technique. Tybring-Gjedde (2014: 199), four years prior, elaborate on this:

> It is no longer possible to lead open and honest debates on the consequences of the Norwegian migration policies. Every person questioning these migration policies will be represented by political opponents and the mass media as if [s/he is] sceptical to migrants… and from there, one is close to being labelled racist.

Thus, the myth of the 'Tyranny of Goodness' revolves around a notion that open debates on moral topics are impossible in contemporary Norway. This 'Tyranny of Goodness' relates to Norway being perceived as a realm of symbolic domination where the 'free exchange of viewpoints' is restricted. To review an example where Jensen and Listhaug (2019) wrote a

piece regarding from Sturla Stålsett, a Norwegian theolog and priest, which had written about the Norwegian migration debates:

> I am good, you are evil. This is the underlying assertion in the moralizing commentary written by Sturla Stålsett about the Norwegian migration debates on Friday. Everyone who read this chronicle understand that it primarily revolves around labelling the Progress Party as an evil and extreme party.

The Progress Party thus finds the 'people', the party included, to be restricted as failures to submit to the dominant morals carry serious (symbolic) consequences as moral judgement is cast upon dissidents through shaming. Society is constituted as a 'Tyranny of Goodness' where the 'tyrants/elites' enforce their will through symbolic power. This, as already discussed, includes discursively establishing an antagonistic relationship as the identity of the 'people' is negated by the 'elite'. The 'people' is dominated by the symbolic dominators. This critique, which primarily relates to questions of migration, singles out the pastoral power to guide souls to their 'moral' salvation (see Foucault 2007b) as a form of symbolic domination. Furthermore, the party constitutes a link between the church, which is one of the political actors the party regularly problematizes, and which has been the centre of attention to the examples above, and the political left. Listhaug criticizes the church for being 'a political actor for the left-wing' (Weden & Braaten 2016), while Ketil Solvik-Olsen, former second-in-command, finds it 'unreasonable if the church becomes an advertiser for left-radical groups', warning the church against embracing 'left-wing' values (Sommerfeldt 2013)– something we will touch more upon in chapter 7.

We can thus make several notes from this section. First, the party constitutes Norway as characterized by relations of symbolic domination limiting the freedom to act, speak and think for the lower sections of social space. Second, and related to this discursive centre of 'elite-domination' the party attempts to divide society after moral boundaries – which leads to the constitution of the myth of the 'Tyranny of Goodness'. Third, this relates to the party problematizing what appears as a pastoral form of power which excludes individuals appearing to stray from the 'good morals' which the elite/tyrants' – entailing various groups considered 'left-wing' - are criticized for imposing. The party largely neglects economic power and inequalities, which it finds to be unproblematic. Fourth, we must note that the notion of a 'Tyranny of Goodness' is not an universally accepted idea within the party. Rather, it can be generalized as the party's myth as the 'elite' critique primarily revolves around the definition

Listhaug offers this term – as the party's elite critique constitutes Norway as tyrannical. The party's discourses on 'elites' appear to first and foremost revolve around the interpretation that Norway is a realm of moral-symbolic domination.

5.3.2. Inequality-Norway: The Socialist Left Party's Perception

The Socialist Left Party's discourse is regulated around the notion that Norway is stratified based on economic inequalities. These inequalities are seen as causing power inequalities which as we covered above damage the social order of Norway. The 'elites' are constituted as 'engines of inequality' (see Khan 2012: 362) in a way which can be generalized as the myth of 'Inequality-Norway'. This myth constitutes Norway as structured around economic inequalities and hierarchies. The 'people', which worry about the recent developments, is not deprived of its moral and cultural existence, but of its livelihoods and socioeconomic existence. These 'elites' are criticized for utilizing the market to, as Fylkesnes (2014) bemoans regarding the coastal areas of Norway, rob local communities, and problematized, as by Lysbakken (2020) for causing negative effects due to their accumulation of wealth. The term 'Inequality-Norway' entails understanding the relations between the 'elite' and the 'people' as one of domination based on how capital accumulation is perceived to affect the 'people' and their lives. Lysbakken (2019) utilizes the term ahead of the local elections of 2019 as:

> It becomes clearer and clearer that the people feel unrest with Inequality-Norway. The richest get more and more while shamefully many are struggling to make their ends meet.

The nodal point of illegitimate economic power thus makes economic inequalities key to hierarchies – and rising economic inequalities therefore justify the label of 'Inequality-Norway'. Kaski adds to this debate, lamenting the current developments as:

> The present situation is characterized by an economic elite thinking it deserves a larger piece of the cake while inequalities are increasing. We must call a spade a spade and note that some actually are too rich. (Klassekampen 2017b)

This is problematized due to the relational understanding of riches/poverty which Kaski expresses as:

It is an illusion that it's possible to combine inequalities in wealth with equality of chance. Societies with high economic inequalities, such as USA, also have very little social mobility. (ibid)

Thus, the issue at hand is that the 'elite' blocks the identity of the 'people' by conquering its economic means of existence. This relational understanding of poverty and riches, of power and powerlessness, means that the 'elites' dominate passively as well as actively. They dominate through appropriating resources at the expense of the 'people'. Thus, they push the lower sections of social space downwards regardless of their intentions.

These inequalities are further problematized as the 'elites' exploit their power to avoid taking responsibility for the social problems they are perceived as creating. As Andersen (2011) writes in a text discussing the financial crisis and the classed consequences of this:

Huge class divisions with a super-rich elite was a central cause behind the financial crisis which started in USA… Now the crisis is threatening again… And again, the bill is sent to the poorest, to those which did not create the crisis… Normal people must get as much influence as the rich.

Similarly, Lysbakken (2020) in his critique of billionaires laments:

Countries with huge economic inequalities… have more poverty and lower economic growth. Furthermore, increased inequalities weaken our democracy… The increase in power and riches are crucial causes of our era's polarization and political unrest… Power ought to belong to the many, not the few.

The economic powerholders are thus constituted as exploiting the 'people' – something we have seen throughout this chapter. The 'people' is forced to take responsibility for this 'elite's' endeavours – as the 'elite' reaps all benefits while imposing the risks upon the 'people'. The party opposes this – seeking to flatten economic hierarchies to reduce power inequalities. Thus, the Socialist Left Party constitutes antagonism through problematizing the economic powerholders' practices following Laclauian popular reason – which divides society into the 'people' and the 'elite' - and it all revolves around the myth of 'Inequality-Norway'. This myth is crystallized by the party's discursive practices as it relates to the general critique of contemporary economic inequalities. The right-wing government is blamed for facilitating these developments (SV n.d.), something we will touch upon further in chapter 7.

Several points can be made here. First, like in the discourse of the Progress Party, the relationship between the 'people' and 'elite' is constituted as one of antagonism due to the latter's domination of the former. This relationship is somewhat differently constituted as the Progress Party's critique of the 'elite' as 'traitors' entails active attempts to dominate, whereas the Socialist Left Party's relational understanding of power means that the 'elites' dominates passively through increasing their power at the 'people's' expense regardless of intentions. Nonetheless, despite being somewhat independent of intentions, the critique tends to problematize practices such as accumulation or how the 'elite' avoids responsibility for the issues it causes. Second, however, as touched upon, rather than the Progress Party's moral critique, the Socialist Left's discourse revolves purely around economic classes being problematized as economic rather than symbolic currency enables groups to assert their dominance. Third, we see that this critique relates to left-wing critique of economic inequalities which largely neglects power in for instance as heterogenous and complex (e.g. Foucault 1980; Bourdieu 1991) – which we shall touch upon throughout the text as both parties are guilty of this simplification. Fourth, the myth of 'Inequality-Norway' can, like the 'Tyranny of Goodness' for the Progress Party, be understood as a generalized way which the party constitutes its version of Norway as dominated by an economic 'elite'. Lysbakken himself proclaims that the best part of Norway is the comparatively minor economic inequalities (Krekling 2019) – as the party is under no illusion that Norway is in a state of inequality compared to other contemporary nations. Rather, the myth shows how Norway is perceived as being characterized by illegitimate inequalities regardless of whether other nations are 'worse'. Rather, the term illustrates how inequalities are rising while Norway is perceived as dominated by the economic powerholders which are the 'engines' of these processes. This 'elite' is problematized based on its power due to the relational understanding of riches and poverty making the party perceive such inequalities in power as domination per se. We will now head into the terrain of discursive heterogeneity.

6. Tracing 2. Discursive Heterogeneity

We will in this chapter handle discursive heterodoxy. The focus will be upon continuities and discontinuities between the two discursive formations. Still, we must touch upon internal ruptures. As already covered, discursive formations are not defined by constants and homogeneity, but by being regulated after principles which make it possible to speak of formations despite heterogeneity (see Foucault 1972: 125; Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 104; Deleuze 1988: 5-22; Fairclough 1995: 211). Neglecting fragmentations would entail simplifying this complexity. Furthermore, touching upon the internal fragmentation will allow us to better see how the discourses are regulated – and thus also potential (implicit) collaborations between the two modes of thought. Mapping internal ruptures will enable us to investigate the various cleavages and collaborations between these two discourses.

6.1. Internal Heterogeneity

I will start by discussing the discourses' internal fragmentations, and how these fragments remain regulated after certain principles justifying the claims of two separate discursive formations. While both parties' discourses are regulated by their nodal points of symbolic and economic illegitimate power, they nonetheless face breaks. First, we will cover the Progress Party's discontinuities.

For instance, Tybring-Gjedde's (Suvatnae 2016) represents a rare rupture with his party as he criticizes economic powerholders as 'the elites find the economic growth of the EU to be more important than national culture, but I doubt that the common people agree…'. This constitutes capitalists and economically-oriented politicians, implicitly *right-wing politicians*, as an 'elite' in direct conflict with the 'people'. Such criticism appears synchronized with that of the Socialist Left Party, but the logic behind the critique is radically different as economic power is not problematic per se. Rather, this 'elite' is problematized because it is perceived to care more about economic gains than culture. Some, such as Benjamin De Cleen (2017: 12) claims that economic powerholders are rarely considered part of the 'elite' within right-wing critiques of 'elites', except when they 'speak out against them'. Yet in this example these 'elites' appear not to speak out against the party as it appears motivated by a schism in priority between economic and cultural aspects of life – even if this schism appears largely avoided by the Progress Party's leading members.

Furthermore, Tybring-Gjedde appears to interpret symbolic power as logically connected to formal and administrative power – such as when he criticizes the mass media,

politicians and academia for betraying their responsibilities to the people (ibid). Similarly, Tybring-Gjedde's critique of green politics appears to target individuals perceived as privileged, i.e., of having the 'privilege' of utilizing bicycles as a means of transportation. Tybring-Gjedde appears to presuppose some nondiscursive foundations for the 'elite' and its potential to impose symbolic boundaries - as his criticism appears to follow Bourdieu's (1991: 109) understanding that symbolic power 'manifests' other forms of power. This seemingly dialectical understanding of symbolic power's relationship to other forms of power is not intrinsic within this discourse. For instance, Listhaug (2018: 36) criticizes power while dismissing the need for a nondiscursive basis – as the 'elite' she criticizes is independent of economic and formal power. Rather, the 'elite' is perceived as holding a different form of power – symbolic power – which appears as an autonomous force. This ambiguity may relate to the complexity of symbolic hierarchies which by no means can be calculated empirically in the same way as economic inequalities (Bourdieu 1993: 48). Such ambiguity, which characterizes right-wing critique of 'elites' in other national contexts, too (see Du Gay 2008; Sawer & Laycock 2009), enables critics, such as Lysbakken (2016), to dismiss it, for instance through claiming that 'anyone' is labelled 'elite' if they disagree with the criticizing (right-wing) subject.

The Socialist Left Party likewise faces discursive ruptures. We must first note that this discourse appears to be more coherent. This is to be expected as economic hierarchies are less ambiguous than symbolic ones. We have seen that the party's discourse revolves around groups of economic powerholders, even if we will soon see how they criticize the right-wing parties as well. This does not imply that the Socialist Left Party's discourse is not somewhat fragmented, too. For instance, to which degree the party dismisses noneconomic forms of power varies – from Lysbakken's acknowledgement of these forms as somewhat relevant to Valen's dismissal of such forms of power as 'lifestyles' outside the scope of criticism. Nonetheless, immaterial forms of power remain largely untouched regardless of whether it is somewhat acknowledged or not.

Øvstegård, who as mentioned wrote an essay in the journal 'Manifest' together with Øydvin shortly before the former's election to parliament, offers a more radical rupture. Their essay is an anti-capitalist text attacking the 'establishment', advocating for class struggle to be rearticulated in order to create a common basis for 'everyone' against 'the rich'. They write:

Our left-populism is not one which blindly accepts the picture of the 'common people' which the Progress Party and the Civita[4]-influenced mass media offer us. Our left-wing populism is one where we retell the story about the common people … [to unify] the entire [people] against the established, middle-aged, male, white, rich… elite down in Oslo…(Øvstegård & Øyvdin 2016)

The authors, like Valen and Lysbakken, challenge the idea of the 'people' which the Progress Party presents as the party constitutes its own version of the 'people'. While this text does not question the foundations of the party's popular reason, i.e., the critique of economic power, it nonetheless represents an internal break a) through its polemical rhetoric, such as the problematizing of the 'elite' which is constituted as 'middle-aged, male, white' – as the 'elite' is problematized based on gender, age and ethnicity (and not merely economics), and b) because they openly embrace Mouffe's (2018) understanding that left-wing parties should reorganize after populist principles – something other members of the party avoids proclaiming explicitly as the popular reason of the party remains implicit, and c) as the critique is expanded to the mass media as

journalists live within the same bubble as the power elites. Therefore, their writings correspond better to the beliefs of the power elite about what the common people think than to what the common people actually think (Øvesegård & Øyvdin 2016)

The popular reason, and hegemonic aspirations, are made explicit in practice as what the 'common people actually think' is being addressed as something they, but not the 'power elite' or journalists, know. That the mass media is included in this critique represents a break with the party's discourse, especially as such critique is commonly associated with 'right-wing populists' (e.g. Burack & Snyder-Hall 2012; De Cleen 2015; Krämer 2018; Haller & Holt 2019). The mass media is constituted by Øvstegård and Øyvdin after the logic of being an 'ideological state apparatus', i.e., as an institution reproducing ideology for the 'ruling classes' (Althusser 2008: 30) – which is rearticulated after popular rather than Marxist principles. Thus, this text channels more 'radical' left-wing discourses than the leadership of the party.

Furthermore, on rare occasions, both parties reproduce similar sentiments as the Centre Party – problematizing Oslo and the cosmopolitan 'elites'. Just like how Øvstegård and Øyvdin's criticize the 'elite down in Oslo', so Listhaug (2018: 200-201) laments political

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[4] Civita is a Norwegian right-wing think tank.

correctness as an 'Oslo phenomenon'. It must be noted that such critique appears to be rare in both parties – and in the case of the Socialist Left Party, this entails a radical break as such sentiments are oftentimes problematized, such as when Kaski (Prestegård 2017) dismisses the critique of the cities as poverty is especially a problem in Oslo, noting that Oslo is 'highly divided by class' (Klassekampen 2017c) as she dismisses claims of regional divisions.

The parties are thus also fields of struggle. For the Socialist Left Party, it revolves around how 'radical' the critique ought to be – including whether criteria besides economics are relevant for 'elite' status, such as ethnicity or gender. For the Progress Party, it revolves around whether economic powerholders are problematic or not, yet there are also questions of demarcation, such as to whether symbolic powerholders have a nondiscursive foundation or not. An issue on this topic is how the 'left-wing' of the Progress Party and the 'right-wing' of the Socialist Left Party – as discussed in chapter 2 and 3 - may remain silent on such topics if they disagree with the 'elite critique' we have analysed. Despite not having access to this potential side of the parties, we nonetheless see that the parties are heterogenous – yet this heterogeneity does not break with the logic of the discursive formations – and the parties' myths and principles of (di)vision. Rather, they challenge the scope of demarcation as they seek to push the principles' boundaries. This strengthens the reliability of the findings as these heterogenous texts are regulated after principles justifying the label of two discursive formations. Attempts are made to change the 'elite/people' demarcation and exclude groups usually included as the 'people' by their own parties, such as journalists in the example of Øvstegård or economic powerholders in the example of Tybring-Gjedde, and this is of interest as these actors exclude groups which their rivals tend to exclude. However, both formations are coherent in their construction of the 'people' as the negated and dominated part based on the discourses' regulatory principles.

6.2. External Continuities

The discursive formations are characterized by internal breaks. The discourses boundaries are not fully fixated. Furthermore, these antagonistic parties' discourses have several similarities – which increases the complexity of their antagonistic relationship. We will cover these resemblances before we analyse the external cleavages.

Both parties problematize the 'elite' in order to unify the 'people'. For the Progress Party, the 'elite' is constituted as if it imposes social (di)visions. For the Socialist Left Party, the 'elite' is problematized as an economically exploiting group which accumulates economic

capital at the expense of the 'people'. Both parties constitute the 'elite' as a powerful and problematic 'other' through popular reason. Furthermore, both parties constitute themselves as the defenders of the 'people' – something we shall discuss throughout chapter 7. They thus belong to the same order of discourse – but their relationship is antagonistic as they block each other's attempts of crystallizing their discourses into 'truth'.

This problematization of the 'elite' entails the negative construction of the 'people' as the 'anti-elite'. The former's 'abuse' of its powers leads to the constitution of the latter as a social category. In other words, the parties' problematizations of their respective 'elites' lead to the construction of the 'people' after the same popular reason. The 'people' is united as the common enemy constitutes a link which the parties utilize for trying to construct a hegemonic identity (Laclau 2005: 180).

Furthermore, both parties offer a simplified dichotomy between the 'elites' and the 'non-elites' based on how they exclude the 'elite'. Utilizing a hegemonic logic, the parties try to present themselves as the representatives of the 'people' versus its perceived enemy. The 'elite/people' dichotomy is further simplified by the nodal points of the parties. The Progress Party's nodal point of 'illegitimate symbolic power' and the Socialist Left Party's nodal point of 'illegitimate economic power' fixate the discourses around a radical simplification of Norwegian hierarchies – alongside symbolic and economic hierarchies respectively - because the nodal points restrict access to 'elite status' based on symbolic or economic power respectively. We will see how the restrictions put upon the Socialist Left Party's discourses of exclusion regarding political rivals, and how it bypasses this.

This illustrates how we ought to understand nodal points. For instance, De Cleen (2017: 5) claims that 'anti-elitist' discourses are fixated by the nodal points of the 'people' and the 'elite'. Such claims, which are likely to relate to the ambiguity of the term 'nodal point' discussed in section 2.1.2.2., appear dubious as the two categories, as well as the relationships between them, appear to be constituted discursively through the fixation of social space through the nodal point of illegitimate power. These social actors are not premade. Rather, they are constituted through the nodal points of illegitimate power fixating the discourses through the constitution of chains of equivalence. This nodal point – and thus the chains - will be constituted radically different from discourse to discourse as power can be interpreted in radical various and oftentimes mutually exclusive ways. As the 'elite' within anti-elitist discourses are constituted as the holders and/or utilizers of *illegitimate power,* the concept of illegitimate

power gains primacy in the analysis of 'anti-elitist' meaning-production – it is this concept which enables the simplified (di)vision between 'elites' and 'people'. This illustrates how the 'people' and the 'elite' are floating as other signs determine which actors these categories are filled with, even if there are certain nondiscursive criteria such as power-inequalities which determine whom *can* be classified as 'elites'. Everyone can be classified as 'people', yet one must inhabit a higher position within a problematized hierarchy to be interpellated as 'elite'.

The key to the similarities between the two parties is how they are fixated by the same nodal point, i.e. illegitimate power – even if both parties offer different versions of it. This leads to different perceptions of social space even if these perceptions are based on similar popular principles. However, the different contents offered to this nodal point is also the root of the discourses' cleavages which we shall touch upon below. This nodal point determines which groups can be interpellated as 'elite' and thus as 'people'. This illustrates a) the relational nature of the signs within discursive formations as changes in singular concepts, such as 'power', affect the entire discourse's meaning-production and b) the contingency of such social categories as whether individuals are constituted as 'elite or 'people' is determined by how signs are combined – even if such combinations naturally depend upon the nondiscursive relations between the objects of signification, too. The discourses break radically with each other's meaning-production despite their common fixation by power due to the various way power is interpreted. This fixation by the parties' different conceptions of *illegitimate power* lead to the same centre as both parties problematize powerholders' and hierarchies. Thus, both parties belong to the same order of discourse as political discourses problematizing hierarchies. Power understood as legitimate would break radically with the principles of these discourses: It would no longer be a shared centre of 'elite-domination', but a struggle between two radically different understandings of the social realm. The shared principles of (di)vision, however, means that it turns into a struggle between two myths which revolve around the same centre in different ways.

Both parties thus operate after the popular principles – attempting to unify the 'people' which both parties constitute negatively through their problematization of 'elites'. We will discuss this further by continuing this topic with a focus upon the two myths and the common centre of the two parties.

6.3. External Cleavages

We have now seen that both the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party constitute the 'people' as negated by the 'elites' which are constituted as the dominators of society, a society both parties constitute as vertically stratified with a minority dominating the majority. Both parties' discursive formations centre around 'elite-domination', i.e., around the ideas that the 'common people' is oppressed by the 'elite'. However, while both parties' discourses are fixated around the centre of 'elite-domination', the content of this centre, the myths of the parties, are radically different. We will now touch upon these cleavages.

While both parties perceive Norway as dominated by an 'elite', they constitute social space radically differently as they differ in which groups they interpellate as 'elite'. The symbolic 'elites' of the Progress Party are included as the 'people' of the Socialist Left Party's discourse, and vice versa, the economic 'elites' of the Socialist Left Party tend to be included as the Progress Party's 'people'. The parties' problematizations differ based on whether class or status is problematized – which is the central topic of the struggle for 'truth' between the two parties. Max Weber (1978: 938) asserts that 'whereas the genuine place of classes is within the economic order, the place of status groups is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the distribution of honour'. The Progress Party's critique is based on 'status' – which the nodal point of illegitimate symbolic power fixates its discourse around. The 'elite' is perceived as the symbolic dominators imposing (di)visions based on shame and honour. The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, criticizes economics as power is perceived along economically classed lines – as the 'elite' is synonymous with the inhabitants of the economic fields of power. Thus, attempts such as Bourdieu's (1984) to combine these categories within a common frame of interpretation are ignored as the parties offer simplified (di)visions – based on of status groups for the Progress Party and economic class for the Socialist Left Party.

This has consequences for the 'peoples' of the parties. The Progress Party constitutes the 'people' as a cultural and moral entity which is threatened by moral domination by the 'elite'. This relates to communitarian ideals (see Anderson 1983; Tönnies 2002) as well as to right-wing 'elite' criticism in other national contexts – which entails attacking phenomena and entities perceived as threatening the unity of the 'people' (see Frank 2004; Sawer & Laycock 2009; Otje & Louwerse 2015: 62). The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, constitutes the 'people' as an economic actor exploited by the economic accumulation of the 'elite' at its expense. This relates to the division between Proletariat/Capitalist (see Marx 1887; Marx & Engels 1888; Althusser 2008) – and it relates to left-wing critique of economic powerholders

after such principles (see Otje & Louwerse 2015; Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 2016; March 2017). These conceptions of the 'people' are constituted by the particular ways the parties' discourses are fixated by their respective nodal points – and which 'elites' they exclude from the people on this basis.

The nodal points of the discourses are thus key in order to understand how the myths of Norway as a 'Tyranny of Goodness' and 'Inequality-Norway' are established. These perceptions of social space are constituted through how the nodal point holds together the signs which make up these myths. We see that in the discourse of the Progress Party, the nodal point of symbolic power as illegitimate power constitutes a chain of equivalence where other ideas and concepts, such as paternalism, political correctness, moralism, and emotional coercion, are combined in order to constitute a signifying chain where the 'elite' is constituted as the 'bearers of opinion'. This 'elite' is thus characterized such as 'politically correct', 'paternalistic', 'moralistic', etc. This logic of metonymy further combines such notions in ways which turns the notions 'left-wing', which we will discuss further in chapter 7. Thus, the myth of the 'Tyranny of Goodness' is given meaning through the way the Progress Party's discourse fixates these signs into a chain, constituting the relationship between the 'people' and the 'elite' as one of antagonistic difference based on moral qualities.

Similar tendencies are clear within the discourse of the Socialist Left Party – yet they lead to radically different answers to the same question. We see that the nodal point of economic power as illegitimate constitutes a chain of equivalence around the centre of 'elite-domination' through the myth of 'Inequality-Norway'. The nodal point combines notions such as materialism, 'egoism' related to the economic powerholders' wish to accumulate evermore wealth, a relational understanding of poverty and riches, which are combined with militant signifiers such as 'conquest' and 'battle' in order to constitute the market as a battlefield and a producer of struggles and inequalities which benefit the economic powerholders, i.e., the 'elite', at the expense of the 'people'. The Socialist Left Party thus constitutes a chain where 'Inequality-Norway' is constituted based on the 'elite' as a conquering group whose self-interests lead it to expand its dominance over the 'people'. Thus, the hierarchy is based upon the single criteria of material wealth. The interactions within the economic fields are seen as zero-sum games whereas the lower sections of social space lose out due to these capitalists' conquests.

Both parties thus simplify social space by dismissing forms of power besides their own nodal points. Their disagreements are constituted by their different understandings of power and (il)legitimacy. The Socialist Left Party excludes a group based on its power as the riches of the economic 'elite' is constituted as problematic per se. This is so as the poor are constituted as being poor due to the rich being rich. Thus, these powerholders are the 'elite', an illegitimate group which dominates the 'people' regardless of intentions. The 'people' and the 'elite' are dialectically connected as the spoils of war accumulated by the latter becomes the loss of the former regardless of whether the latter actively seeks to dominate or not. The Progress Party, on the other hand, does not constitute the 'elite' as *essentially* antagonistic. The 'elite' is excluded as an antagonistic other vis-à-vis the 'people' not so much due to its positions and power, but due to how it is accused of abusing its positions and power as it a) holds different morals than the 'people' and b) imposes these through asserting its symbolic power, even if there are breaks within the party to which degree formal positions are constitutive of 'elite' status. The 'elites' are the ones attempting to spread certain values and ideas, especially through the spreading shame and discomfort among 'dissidents'. In other words, the 'elites' are both imposing its worldview and limiting the possibility of alternative viewpoints emerging. Therefore, the 'elite' is excluded due to its active behaviour rather than its social positions per se.

We see that the nodal points of the discourses lead to radically different understandings of not just powerful and powerless, but on how the powerful dominate the powerless and the criteria of exclusion. Powerholders are in both cases excluded as they are positioned as a counter-pole to the 'people': The 'people' is created through the obstacle which the parties label 'elite'. And while the parties' nodal points lead to radically different understandings of social space, the principles of (di)vision are similar in both parties. And as touched upon above, the discursive complexity does not entail a break with the logic of the discursive formations – which remain dispersed and fragmented while simultaneously regulated by the nodal points – and the demarcation rather than the rules of this regulation is openly contested.

We will conclude this chapter by offering an answer to research question a). The Progress Party constitutes the 'elite' as the symbolic powerholders or the 'bearers of opinions'. These are problematized as they 'dominate' the 'people' through imposing their particular (di)visions through restricting the 'free exchange' of ideas. The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, constitutes the 'elite' as the economic powerholders. They are problematized as they exploit and dominate, not so much based on active behaviour, but primarily due to their

accumulation of wealth negatively affecting the 'people'. We will now touch upon the parties' struggle to define the 'truth' of their rivals.

7. The Antagonism of the Parties

We have now seen both how the two parties conduct a discursive war for the right to represent the 'people' through defining it through excluding the 'elite'. The parties struggle at three fronts where the different meaning-production is but one. They also block each other's identities and potential hegemonic projects. This chapter will first and foremost focus upon how the parties interpellate their rivals and position them within their discursive universes based on how the nodal point of illegitimate power regulates the meaning-production. After analysing how both parties constitute themselves and each other, we will head into a discussion on the three-front war of the two parties and the similar and different discursive strategies they utilize.

7.1. The Right: Protectors of the 'People' or the Agents of the 'Elite'?

The Progress Party has always labelled itself as the 'party of the common people' [partiet for folk flest] – their official slogan (Garvik 2019a). I will now analyse how the party attempts to constitute an identity as the protectors of the 'people' – and how the Socialist Left Party blocks this identity. To start with the former, we can first review Jensen's statement on the Progress Party strengthening its position among the lower sections of social space:

> We have been aware of this a long time, and it is great that science illustrates this as well. The reason is that the Progress Party for many years have taken people seriously. We talk with rather than to them (Fransson 2009)

Listhaug (2018: 204) reproduces this understanding, writing that

> I find the common people to be ignored [by Norwegian politicians]. For me it is important that the common people is taken seriously. That is the core of the Progress Party's politics and the way we treat people. This is the way it always has to be, otherwise we will lose parts of our soul and identity.

The Progress Party thus cares about and listens to the 'people', which it protects against the 'moralistic elites' which ignores it at best, dominates it at worst. The party finds its project to primarily revolve around moving power from the 'elite' to the common people. However, this discourse is actively denied by the party's left-wing rivals. As Lysbakken says about the party:

> I think their [the Progress Party's members] attacks turn more desperate because their old label as a party for the common people is gone. People have discovered that the Progress Party, with its unbalanced tax cuts, is a party for the upper-economic elite.

This critique illustrates how the Progress Party is classified radically different than in the party's own discourse. The right-wing government, which included the Progress Party at the time, is labelled 'the government of the rich' (Andersen 2019). Such criticism entails interpellating the right-wing politicians as 'opponents of the people'. The nodal point of the Socialist Left Party restricts access to the 'elite' to economic criteria. However, the party creatively bypasses this restriction by interpellating right-wing politicians into a new subject position – as servants of the 'elite'. Thus, they are still positioned in opposition to the 'people'. As Lysbakken notes on the tax policies of the right-wing government:

> Our numbers reveal how strongly the government works to strengthen the rich. Erna Solberg (the Conservatives) and Siv Jensen (the Progress Party) are waging an overclass struggle in order to give tax cuts to those which already have the most, whereas the common people do not get any noteworthy cuts.' (Haugan, 2018; see also SV 2017b)

We thus see clearly that the right-wing parties are interpellated as the servants of the 'elites'. They are not merely indirectly serving these 'elites', but actively waging a war in their favour versus the 'many', i.e., the 'people'. Similarly, Fylkesnes (2019) says

> The Progress Party has for the last years governed the important fishing industry, and the people of the coast's access to the ocean has been limited. [The Progress Party] attempts to distribute the riches among a small elite, mostly investors.

The Progress Party allegedly *limits* the access of the 'people' in favour of 'a small elite' which directly positions them as the *opponents* of the 'people'. Lysbakken (2015: 68) goes as far as to label the increased inequalities a natural consequence of right-wing parties winning national elections, saying that 'it goes as it always goes when the right-wing receives power: Increased inequalities and a feast for those having the most'. Such criticism shows how the party's rivals at the right is labelled as opponents of the people and thus interpellated as such. As Lysbakken (Suvatne 2018) is cited saying '[notions] that the Progress Party is a party for the elderly is just a bluff. We see now how their politics actually affect the countries pensioners. The Progress Party is a party for 'elites'. The Progress Party and the right-wing in general are therefore interpellated into a new subject position. However, the Progress Party is labelled harsher than its right-wing allies – its 'popular' discourse is constituted as a false-flag operation. To quote Valen (2013):

In short, [if I was the leader of the Progress Party] I would do everything I could to ensure that the debate revolves around anything but power, money and distribution… It is brilliantly implemented, but it does not have a thing to do with the 'common people'. This is politics by and for the elite, in a very popular disguise.

The Progress Party's critique of symbolic powerholders is thus dismissed as an ideological distortion which conceals the real hierarchies of Norway. This ideology critique relates to the Progress Party serving as *double-agents* rather than merely servants, something Valen (2014) clarifies as he criticizes its tax politics as follows:

Per Sandberg [and the Progress Party] has falsely been marketing for the common people, and he now spends his time defending billion-kroner gifts to the country's richest…. while the rest are left on their own.

The Progress Party is in other words constituted as directly responsible for rising inequalities. The party is perceived as if it takes money from the lower sections of society in order to finance gifts to the 'elite' through tax cuts. This positions the party's members as active servants of the 'elite'. While right-wing politicians are constituted as the 'agents' of the 'elite' in this discourse, the Progress Party is interpellated as 'double agents' which are 'falsely marketing… for the common people…' while simultaneously 'waging an overclass struggle' to improve the lives of the 'elite' *at the expense* of the 'people'.

We can in this critique see a clear link between the party's critique and the Marxian critique of ideology. As Althusser (2008: 21) claims, 'class struggle is expressed and exercised in ideological forms', with ideological forms relating to distortions (ibid: 36). The critique of the Progress Party as engaged in an 'overclass struggle' and as serving the 'rich' relate to this understanding as the party is constituted as if it distorts the real interests of the 'people' with discussions of symbolic powerholders, as well as topics such as migration, even if the latter is outside the scope of this text. Thus, the Socialist Left Party's critique of the Progress Party is a form of *ideology critique* as the critique has an explicit goal: To unveil the ideological functions of the Progress Party as the party of the 'elite'. Therefore, critique of non-economic 'elites' is perceived as an attempt to derail debates and conceal the actual 'elite' while the Progress Party's attempts of being a popular party is criticized as a false-flag operation. Rather, the popular aspects of its politics are constituted as a veil as if the Progress Party's 'politics of the people' are actually 'politics of and for the elite'. Such ideology critique of the Progress Party based on its liberal-economic ideology is mirrored in Marx's (1903: 96) critique of John

Locke for having been 'an advocate for the new bourgeoise in all forms' due to his discursive practices as liberal positions in economic questions are interpreted as primarily serving the capitalist classes (for similar ideology critique, see Engels 1896: 17; Lenin 1903: 73). I will now analyse how the Progress Party mirrors this understanding as the Socialist Left Party is constituted as the 'elite'.

7.2. The Left: The People's Vanguard or the 'Elite'?

Similarly to the Progress Party, the Socialist Left Party constitutes itself as the party of the 'people'. And similarly to the Progress Party, its members are constituted by its rival as opponents of the 'people. Before I analyse how the Progress Party constitutes its left-wing rivals, we must briefly review how the Socialist Left Party subjectifies itself as the party of the 'people'. As Valen (2014) says in the same text where he accuses the Progress Party of being double agents:

> We [the Socialist Left Party] care more about the toilers working hard throughout their lives without receiving enough for their hard work than the billionaires which financed Sandberg's campaign. That's why we prioritize that common people receive more money and better welfare.

Similarly, regarding the right-wing government allowing shipowners to cut ties with Norwegian employees in order to hire cheaper workers, a permission later revoked, Lysbakken proclaimed that 'we promise to fight for you [against the shipowners and the right-wing government]' (Nicolajsen 2018). Thus, while the Progress Party is constituted as being double agents, the Socialist Left Party cares and fights *for* the 'people'.

However, the Progress Party blocks this discursive identity through its problematization of its left-wing rivals. This critique from the Progress Party generally entails a critique of the unspecified 'left-wing', which stands in contrast to the Socialist Left Party's tendency to single out the Progress Party. However, the Progress Party nonetheless attempts to block the Socialist Left Party's identity. For instance, as Listhaug (2016) notes in her blog as she discusses pregnancy and parental leaves:

> [T]here are so many 'experts' telling us expectant parents what is right and wrong. And when it comes to parental leave, how it ought to be distributed. Especially the left-wing with the feminist-elite believe that they have the power to define what is morally right

and wrong, and they are terribly fond of deciding on our behalf… I am tired of this elite telling the common people what is right and wrong.

In an interview where this text was discussed, she elaborated on these points and the chain of equivalence between the 'elite' and left-wing. As she said: 'They are the bearers of opinion, primarily the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party'. She further adds that she received 'massive attacks from the left-wing' due to her statements not being 'politically correct' (Sandvik & Sølhusvik, 2016). That the left-wing 'elite' is attacking individuals uttering themselves against the 'politically correct' is also claimed by Tybring-Gjedde (2014). Thus, the logic of metonymy is utilized in order to relate the various 'elites' criticized by the party, such as the leading members of the Church, environmentalists, the mass media, to the left-wing.

The left-wing is thus interpellated as the 'elite' which symbolically dominates the 'people'. And as analysed earlier, Jensen criticized the climate change activism of the Green Party for being 'socialism in new clothing… collective emotional coercion meant to govern our choices', as the left-wing is constituted as the symbolic dominators *par excellence.* The Progress Party thus breaks the Socialist Left Party's subjectification by interpellating them as the 'elite'. Jensen adds to this regarding the perceived connection between green and red politics, saying that:

> Even if socialism was discarded [after the fall of the Soviet Union], the paternalists did not disappear…. This shame [flight-shame] is the left-wing's attempt to enforce a new Law of Jante into people's normal lives and ways of living (Gilbrant 2019)

Jensen utilizes the logic of metonymy to connect 'paternalism' to 'left-wing' and left-wing to environmentalism. Hence, the left-wing is constituted as if it enforces its ways of living – through being the 'bearers of opinions – seeking to dominate the 'common people'. As Jensen expresses, the left-wing wants 'to enforce a new Law of Jante'[5] as these politicians seek to dominate and crush potential opposition – these 'bearers of opinion' are 'intolerant' to oppositional opinions. Similarly, Listhaug criticizes the City Government of Oslo consisting of the Green Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Labour Party, stating that:

> For the socialist City Council of Oslo… it is obviously more important to decide what the elderly should [and should not] eat and govern from above to limit the meat

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[5] The Law of Jante is a Scandinavian term for rules of conduct which demand egalitarian conformity.

consumption of elderly and sick people [than to take care of their needs]… This smells a lot like paternalism and an override of elderly people. (Kristiansen et al. 2019)

The left-wing is thus criticized for wanting to 'rule' the 'people' rather than to lead/serve it. Furthermore, it is of interest that both parties criticize each other's handling of the elderly. The Socialist Left Party criticizes the Progress party for 'bluffing' about being a party for the elderly, whereas the Progress Party constitutes the left as 'overriding' their wishes and neglecting their needs. Listhaug (2019) adds to this in a commentary criticizing the 'moralism' of the City Government of Oslo, writing that:

The moral appears to be that choices are great, as long as you choose what the City Council finds reasonable. If you dare to choose other solutions…the City Council meets you with moralism… This is classical socialism as we know it from other times and other places in the world. A few people in high positions enforce upon everybody else their own personal choices.

Thus, 'socialism', which is synonymous with 'left-wing' in this discourse, is constituted as undemocratic, but equally important, as 'elitist' as 'a few people in high positions' enforce 'everybody else' their personal preferences as a dominant status group. In Jensen's example above socialism is also constituted as essentially undemocratic and as something 'discarded'. Rather than being a vanguard for the 'people', the left-wing is constituted as the rulers of the 'Tyranny of Goodness'. We must note again that the Progress Party rarely singles out the Socialist Left Party. Rather, the Socialist Left Party is included into a social category labelled 'left-wing' – and this category is filled with various actors considered 'left-wing' by the Progress Party.

This critique breaks with the ideology critique of the Socialist Left Party, which as we have seen revolves around 'unveiling' how the Progress Party's critique appears to serve economic 'elites'. The Progress Party's critique, on the other hand, relates to what Mitchell Dean (1999: 27) calls 'a problematizing of government' as it questions how conduct is shaped. Liberalism, which the party embraces, at least in some political questions, relates to the idea of 'let[ting] the people be "free" to let all sort itself out naturally' (Foucault 2007b: 67). 'Left-wing' measures, such as welfarism or environmentalism, are problematized after such a logic. Besides the critique of the left-wing imposing values and constructing symbolic boundaries, the party accuses the left-wing actors of utilizing pastoral power – which they are accused of

utilizing through demanding obedience as they seek to govern the morality of the 'people' (see Foucault 2007b).

We can see in all of these examples that left-wing actors are criticized for being 'paternalists' whose major flaw is their excessive, and importantly, 'illegitimate' governance. Institutions such as the Church and agendas such as environmentalism are chained together into a chain of equivalence as 'left-wing' and 'elite'. This way, the 'Tyranny of Goodness' is primarily understood as a tyranny facilitated by the political left-wing. We see clearly that the logic of metonymy is utilized to make the concepts of 'elites' and 'left-wing' synonymous – the 'elite' and its values are considered 'left-wing' per se. I will now analyse how the parties' blockages of their rivals' identities relate to but one of three fronts in the discursive struggle of the parties.

7.3. A Three-Front War

We have already discussed how the parties constitute social space as a realm of struggles, and we have seen that the parties exist in a relationship of antagonism as their discourses block each other's meaning-production as well as their identities. I will now discuss the antagonism between the parties more closely as the conflict is crystallized on three fronts: On the front of identity, which we have seen in the two previous sections, on the front of meaning-production, which we have seen throughout the entire analysis, and on the front of achieving political power, the latter being relevant as both parties attempt to establish hegemonic blocs versus the 'elite'.

First, as was the focus of section 7.1. and section 7.2., the discourses of the parties block the identities of their rivals. When Listhaug claims that the 'elite' primarily consists of the Socialist Left Party and the Labour Party, then the identity of these parties are cast into question. While the Socialist Left Party articulates itself as standing with the 'common people', this identity as the protectors of the 'people' is blocked when the party is constituted as the very dominators of the 'people'. Similarly, the Progress Party's claim of being the 'party for common people' is blocked when it is constituted as double agents 'falsely marketing for the common people' while in reality serving the 'upper economic elite'. Thus, both parties seek the identity as the 'people's' guardians – and both parties block their rivals' attempts of establishing such an identity. The parties are fully antagonistic as they prevent their rivals from fully realizing themselves as 'themselves' (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985).

Second, the parties' meaning-production clash as their worldviews block each other's discourses. Both parties seek to establish the discursive centre of 'elite-domination' as 'truth'. While the parties take it for granted that Norway is somewhat characterized by domination, the nation remains 'egalitarian' as these myths are not naturalized. The potential for such myths to naturalize is reduced as the parties block each other's potential ascension to naturalization through actively delegitimizing their rival's discourses. The parties' antagonism is increased as the parties actively renounce their rival's meaning-production. For instance, Lysbakken finds symbolic hierarchies to be less relevant – while Valen finds them to merely be questions of 'life-style'. Listhaug (2018) on the other hand tries to dismiss the importance of economic hierarchies, finding the lower sections of social space and the rich to belong to the same social category as their morals are 'shared', and furthermore, she asserts that the Socialist Left presents the economic powerholders, which she perceives as 'creating workplaces' as if they were 'criminals' (Haugan & Holmes 2019). Similarly, Valen (2013) proclaims, that the 'elite' discussions which the Progress Party produces are 'cultural questions few people care about', which, while marketing as if it was for the 'common people', is constituted as actually being 'politics by and for the elite, in a very popular disguise'. This way, rather than being supplementary, the discourses' meaning-production become mutually exclusive and inherently antagonistic. And this point of meaning-production is likely to relate somewhat to the third antagonism: That of hegemony.

Third, the parties both attempt to constitute a hegemonic bloc. All social order is hegemonic as society always revolves around power relations enabled by a dominant group within the larger society (Mouffe 2013: xi) – which remains unproblematic by itself before critical voices antagonize such power relations as relations of domination. Both parties try to constitute themselves as the representatives of the 'people' and thus as the leading members of a new hegemonic bloc. As Tybring-Gjedde says, the 'elite has removed themselves from the people they are meant to serve'. The powerholders attempt 'to govern our lives' through 'emotional coercion', as Jensen notes, thus illustrating how both the party and the 'people' stand united against the 'elite'. The Progress Party thus positions itself as an option for the 'people' in its struggle against the 'elite'. The party does more than to represent the 'people' in the struggle as it actively constitutes both the 'people' and the struggle this 'people' is born into. Similarly, the Socialist Left Party has a hegemonic agenda as it constitutes social space after the lines of powerholders and powerless, and it positions itself as the means for the 'people' to get its power back. As Valen (2013) notes: 'Rich people have more power than the

rest of us… The job of the socialists is to ensure that… power and money is equally distributed' as the party stands for the 'people' against the 'elite', and it attempts to mobilize the 'people' by, like the Progress Party, turning these relations of (economic) subordination into relations of domination and thus of struggle. However, both parties follow similar principles of (di)vision and have the same political aim of winning support from the lower sections of social space versus the different powerholders they constitute as 'illegitimate'.

The chances of universalizing decrease as the two parties oppose radically different aspects of contemporary relations of power while as we shall touch upon in the coming chapter remains silent on alternative relations. While the 'politics of group-making often functions as a self-fulling prophecy' (Bourdieu 1991: 191), the parties complicate each other's projects as they both actively seek to represent the lower sections of social space. They both attempt to constitute a shared identity between themselves and the heterogenous masses not excluded, but the symbolic power of the parties are utilized in ways which hinders the simplification of social space demanded for an actor to accomplish hegemony - which may potentially ensure that the current order prevails, an interesting possibility which sadly cannot be elaborated as it stands somewhat outside this text's scope.

Furthermore, all hegemonic projects depend on the 'erosion' of identity as the dominant part of the bloc must wipe out or at least reduce or conceal the differences between the groups united (Laclau 2014: 90), something both parties attempt to accomplish. For instance, the Socialist Left Party attempts to wipe away the differences between 'academics and workers' as immaterial capital and the differences in this is dismissed. In other words, the party attempts, like socialist and communist parties of the past century, to be 'a vanguard… that could bring together the working class with intellectuals and activists outside of the working class' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 250; see also Lenin 1902: 74-77). Likewise, the Progress Party follows a similar strategy as it dismisses economic inequalities in order to establish a hegemonic bloc which includes both economic powerholders and the lower sections of social space. However, when the rich and the poor are included into the same subject position, then the differences between them are likewise concealed. Thus, both parties attempt to turn some powerholders equivalent with the lower sections of social space, and the ideological consequences of this will be discussed in the next section.

We will conclude this chapter by answering research question b): The parties constitute each other as the 'enemies of the people' while they perceive themselves as belonging to the

'people'. The Progress Party constitutes its rivals as the very 'elite' through the logic of metonymy – as the nodal point of illegitimate symbolic power enables the party to classify political rivals as the 'elite'. The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, cannot label political rivals in such terms as its nodal point limits the potential of politicians being 'elites': Therefore, the members of the Progress Party are excluded due to the practices as 'double agents' pretending to serve the 'people' while actually serving the 'elite' instead. We will now head into an analysis of the nondiscursive side of this discursive struggle.

8. Into Social Space: Contextualizing the Discourses

I have until now focused strongly on the discursive practices without committing to the nondiscursive side of this struggle. However, the purpose of committing to CDA is to contextualize the discourses in a larger nondiscursive reality (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, Choularaki & Fairclough 1999). This chapter will revolve around breaking with the subjectivism of the parties and offer an elaborate understanding of how and why the discourses are fixated as they are through contextualizing the discourses in their nondiscursive social conditions, i.e., the objective positions of the actors and their supporters in social space. But before we discuss the connection between perception and position, I will discuss the emancipatory potential and limitations of the discourses – through discussing the articulations and silences of the parties vis-à-vis power inequalities in Norway. We must note that silences are not merely the limits of the discourse; they are parts of the discourses which function alongside articulations (Foucault 1990: 27). Thereafter, we will contextualize both these agendas and the silences based on the parties' positions in social space. Lastly, we will discuss the findings from these sections while contextualizing them vis-à-vis Piketty's 'multiple-elite thesis'.

8.1. Political Project of Emancipation

Both parties have an explicit agenda of weakening the 'elite'. Therefore, the parties' political projects entail agendas of 'emancipation'. As universality appears unreachable, so emancipation entails the (partial) removal of oppression (Laclau 1996: 17, 2000: 47). We must recall that conflicts are discursively constituted. Therefore, emancipatory actors participate in constructing the oppression they seek to end through problematizing the practices constituted as 'oppression' – and such practices are understood as unproblematic before such problematization.

For instance, critical consciousness about symbolic hierarchies is strengthened by the representatives of the Progress Party. When these symbolic powerholders are constituted not as bearers of cultural and moral enlightenment, but as dominators imposing their (di)visions, then their power to influence morals and culture is weakened as their legitimacy falters: Critical gazes are moved towards the power to influence opinions and to classify the social world of meaning. As the process of affecting minds is most effective when the power relations are concealed through naturalization (Fairclough 1992: 87; see also Gramsci 1999; van Dijk 2008), such critique cannot but weaken the powerholders potential to assert social (di)visions. This is

especially so as symbolic power can only be utilized if the dominated subject 'misrecognizes' (Bourdieu 1991) and/or 'consents' to (Gramsci 1999) the domination. We see that the Norwegian context is stratified after moral boundaries – even if the 'justice' and 'truth' of such hierarchies are political questions of struggle which this text cannot evaluate. However, the Progress Party breaks the 'spell' of symbolic power through their critique of these symbolic hierarchies – classified by the Progress Party as a 'Tyranny of Goodness'.

The Socialist Left Party's criticism functions in a similar way. The party's discourse unveils the potentially veiled rise in inequalities which may be obscured as the reproduction of the status quo rather than the production of new inequalities. Through criticizing the rising inequalities, the party unveils how the current system enables some to accumulate economic capital while others fall into poverty – a tendency interrelated in complex ways which entails the economic powerholders, directly or indirectly, increasing the number of poor (see Khan 2012). So, when fishing barons, oil companies or other economic actors are not 'building workplaces', as Listhaug proclaims, but 'conquering' the livelihood of the 'people', as Lysbakken, Kaski and Fylkesnes assert, then the legitimacy of these actors' increased economic power is scrutinized. This is so as the critique necessarily throws the legitimacy of the power hierarchies it criticises into question, constituting resistance to it in the process – which is an essential move as classes must be discursively constituted regardless of how similar or dissimilar they are (see Laclau 1979: 161; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 22; Bourdieu 1987: 7).

Both parties thus constitute social categories through the exclusion of powerholders – powerholders which are weakened, at least in principle, through their exclusion. However, the question of whom to exclude and whom to include remains a complex question as these emancipatory agendas remain partial. We will now discuss the silences and the contradictory effects of the discourses.

8.2. Ideological Side-Effects

As discussed throughout chapter 7, both parties refuse to acknowledge their rivals' understanding of power as they actively dismiss its importance. This illustrates the hegemonic aspirations as both parties present their solution to the hierarchical situation of Norway in a simplified manner which as we shall see in the next section relates to the parties and their electoral bases' positions in social space. Both parties' discourses turn contradictory as their attacks on hierarchies appear to serve *other* hierarchies – which are then left unarticulated.

For instance, the Progress Party largely refuses to touch upon economic hierarchies: First, economic powerholders 'create workplaces' and secondly, there is 'no shame' in succeeding (see Listhaug in section 5.1. and 5.2.1.). When economic powerholders are touched upon directly, as in the singular case of Tybring-Gjedde, then it relates to the economic powerholders and (right-wing) politicians' economism. In other words, it is framed as a lack of understanding the importance of (national) culture rather than a critique of economic inequalities. Besides, such problematizations are rare amongst the Progress Party's members. This silence on economic power conceals these hierarchies and thus legitimizes economic inequalities – strengthening the economic powerholders through veiling their practices of accumulation and how this increases their power vis-à-vis the lower sections of social space. – an issue right-wing politicians tend to turn an blind eye to (see Bourdieu 1991; Frank 2004; Lukes 2004). Economic inequalities are rising globally, something the Progress Party leaves unarticulated as its critique of powerholders remains partial. It must also be noted that the power of the Progress Party, its symbolic power included, is concealed when the party constitutes itself as part of the 'people' through its chains of equivalence and the 'elites' is identified with 'left-wing'. However, this is not necessarily contradictory, and it may not be dialectical, insofar as the party's power is perceived as the power of the 'people' and thus left unproblematic.

The Socialist Left Party's discourse follows similar patterns. The Socialist Left Party problematizes the growing inequalities in economic power. We see clearly that inequalities in economic capital are growing steadily – and the Socialist Left Party attacks the legitimacy of this through problematizing it, as well as by problematizing the political aspects of these inequalities as the privatization and market colonization which strengthens these inequalities are enabled by political actors (Deleuze & Guattari 1984: 252; see also Bourdieu 1998b; 2003). However, the party fails to offer a broad critique of power inequalities since it reduces problematic power to economic power. Left-wing parties and scholars are prone to such economism as they oftentimes neglect non-economic forms of power (see Foucault 2003: 14; Lemke 2019: 99). This causes symbolic power to be trivialized, further strengthening symbolic hierarchies. While Lysbakken acknowledges the relevance of symbolic power as the power to define, no concerns are raised about it. Rather, as Valen (2013) notes, the party finds academics and workers to share common interests versus the 'elite', i.e., the economically powerful. This claim relates to the notions of new forms of exploitation of 'immaterial labour'. Several critiques of post-Fordist production, especially from the Marxist Autonomist traditions, finds

the difference between material production and the 'immaterial production' of knowledge, ideas and relations to be of no consequence (see Lazzarato 1996: 136; Marazzi 2011: 11). However, this conceals how the potential power of academics, as well as other actors in various cultural and public positions, are far from reciprocal vis-à-vis the lower sections of social space. The 'intellectual elites' singled out by Piketty (2018) do have the potential to dominate, too. As Jarness (2014) shows, the immaterially powerful in Norway constructs boundaries which symbolically discriminate the lower sections of social space. After all, Norway is not merely stratified following the lines of the economy, but also those of morality and symbolic power. So, while there may be several overlaps between, for instance, intellectuals and low-wage workers, there are also potential schisms.

These silences are thus not merely 'innocent', but as Foucault (1990) notes they function alongside the things uttered. Both parties attempt to neutralize the struggles constituted by their rivals based on real hierarchies which they refuse to acknowledge, as their silences show us. After all, the primarily neutralization of struggles lies in transforming antagonism into 'simple difference' (Laclau 1979: 173). Both parties thus veil the existence of hierarchies and potential antagonisms, something which turns their power-critique *ideological*, implicitly installing ideas serving power-interests through reproducing power relations (see Fairclough 1995: 18).

However, the articulations and silences have thus far been discussed abstracted from the parties' own positions in social space. I will now discuss the homology between the parties' critique of power and the positions of the parties' supporters.

8.3. The Homology of Perception and Position

We see clearly that both parties weaken hierarchies while simultaneously strengthening the hierarchies left unarticulated. Both parties participate in a dialectical game of strengthening and weakening inequalities as some powerholders are threatened while others have their positions reinforced. I will now contextualize the parties' silences and articulations based on their positions in social space, utilizing a figure from Jarness et al. (2019: 16). This figure shows the political field of Norway and Norwegian parties' positions within the larger Norwegian social space (For similar results, see Flemmen & Haakestad 2018: 416).

Figure 1.

This figure positions the parties by calculating the class basis of the parties' support, class here serving as analytical constructs founded in reality '[which] is nothing other than the set of occupants of the same position in [social] space' (Bourdieu 1987: 6). These figures of Jarnes et. al (2019) and Flemmen and Haakestad (2018) tell the same narrative. The General/New right, meaning the Progress Party's and the Liberal/New left, meaning the Socialist Left Party as well as the Red Party, are positioned on opposite ends as the popular support of the parties differ: The 'cultural' elites in Bourdieu's terminology and the 'intellectual elites' in Piketty's terminology tend to vote for parties positioned at the upper-left side of social space. The Progress Party, on the other hand, bases its support on individuals primarily positioned at the mid-lower sections on the economic side, and these individuals have low immaterial capital. This mirrors the findings of Gulbrandsen (2019) as the Progress Party has low 'elite' support, whereas the Socialist Left Party has moderate support from the intellectual fractions of the field of power.

This is where the discourses must be contextualized. The parties criticize the powerholders which hold powers their own supporters are (relatively) deprived of. For instance, while the Progress Party's supporters somewhat lack economic capital as they by no means inhabit the upper regions of the economic fields, they primarily lack cultural capital, even if it is symbolic rather than cultural capital which the party opposes – indicating that the cultural/economic schism in Norway may be or at least appears to be perceived as a symbolic-

moral/economic schism. The party has the lowest' percentage of highly educated (Rønning 2017; Gulbrandsen 2019) and the immaterial capital of its supporters remain low, indicating that they are the most prone to symbolic domination. This appears to support conclusions that the 'cultural elites' of Norway appear to be a popular target for mass media criticism rather than an actual political force as it appears to be in other countries, such as France (see Haarr & Krogstad 2011; Krogstad 2019a), as also discussed in section 4.3.2 – even if it is likely that there is considerable overlap between the 'cultural elites' and symbolic powerholders.

In this regard, one may ask why the Progress Party, with supporters holding lower positions in social space, does not offer a 'broad' critique of 'elites', unless the purpose of this critique is to distort the 'real interests' of the 'people' in favour of the 'elites'? Similar critique has been made by critical scholars (see Frank 2004; Lukes 2004). However, rather than this being, as Thomas Frank (2004: 160) asserts, caused by an ideological 'delusion' and a 'pseudo-populist war' (ibid: 196), critique towards non-economic 'elites' may also serve emancipatory agendas as symbolic domination is also of importance – perhaps most of all for the ones lacking symbolic resources. Bourdieu (1991: 245) discusses the 'complicated alliance' between industrial workers and academics – related to their homologous position vis-à-vis economic powerholders – yet may not industrial workers and others positioned at the mid-lower to lower economic fields while lacking immaterial resources stand in a homologous position with economic powerholders vis-à-vis intellectuals and other symbolic/cultural powerholders, too – as the Progress Party and its supporters indicate? Economic capital does not *necessarily* take primacy over immaterial forms of power. As we are far away from fully understanding the nature of power (Foucault 1977: 213) – and as contemporary societies are characterized by 'soft' power, which is harder to measure than economic and material resources (Bourdieu 1993) – so how power functions in practice becomes an unanswered question. Thus, the limitations of the Progress Party's discourse appear to lie in the homology between its supporters and the holders of economic power, insofar as its supporters by no means are as 'lowly positioned' as it appears. Rather, the Progress Party's supporters lack cultural capital, and they rarely hold 'elite' status. Nonetheless, one out of four of its supporters have annual salaries ranging from 1 000 000 to 1 500 000 kroner (Rønning 2017) – illustrating that the party's supporters are not 'downtrodden'.

Somewhat paradoxically, the Socialist Left's supporters are more likely to make such salaries as 3/10 of its supporters earn between 1 000 000 and 1 500 000 kroner (ibid). This appears to contradict the argument of perception and position being homologous. If the

members of the Socialist Left Party are highly represented among economic powerholders, is not the homology of position and perception broken? This is inaccurate, as the positionings in social space illustrated above illustrate. The Socialist Left Party's supporters, regardless of its higher percentage of electors with salaries in the million kroner-range than the Progress Party, tends to base its power on immaterial rather than economic power. The party's supporters primarily stand opposed to the economic fractions of the field of power as they usually hold higher amounts of immaterial capital than the 'mean' of contemporary Norway. However, while the Socialist Left Party's base by no means belong to the lower sections of social space – a fact which some may claim justifies party situating as part of the 'elite' – the party nonetheless has an explicit agenda of assisting social categories oftentimes perceived as oppressed or marginalized – such as migrants, unemployed, the working classes, etc. While the party's voters tend to have significant cultural resources, its 'elite-support' appear similar to the weighted average of its 'non-elite support' (Gulbrandsen 2019). Thus, the close alliance with cultural/immaterial powerholders benefitting from the party's critique of economic powerholders also benefit the social categories which lack economic capital – as these lower sections of social space may tend to also be relatively homologous with the immaterial powerholders'.

We must note that the Socialist Left Party's supporters appear to benefit more from the party's dialectical project than the Progress Party's supporters – if we understand actors as benefitting from their forms of capital increasing in worth. This is so as their supporters, holding considerable immaterial power, are not weakened by cultural and moral forms of power gaining importance at the expense of economic capital. The supporters of the Progress Party, while appearing to benefit from the weakening of symbolic hierarchies, are also prone to face losses from the veiling of economic hierarchies as their positions in the economic fields are by no means high. However, the dominance (potentially) experienced by the parties' supporters vary considerably due to the forms of capital held, and this appears to largely shape the conception of social space and of the antagonism and domination of contemporary Norway.

Thus, the parties' principles of (di)vision have a clear basis in social space insofar as the parties criticize the 'elites' positioned far away from themselves. The parties attempt to 'manifest' the opinions of those standing closest to them through turning them into 'political forces capable of imposing their own visions of divisions' (Bourdieu 1987: 13), seeking to discursively organize the hierarchies and struggles of social space in ways benefitting their supporters. Their organization of struggles relate to their partial agendas of emancipation – but

the 'truth' and 'justice' of these agendas are contested. If we accept Bourdieu's notions that economic capital is more important than immaterial forms of power in contemporary societies (Bourdieu 1993), then the Socialist Left Party holds a stronger agenda of emancipation than the Progress Party – as this entails economic powerholders being the primarily dominators and economic hierarchies having primacy. However, we must ask ourselves if the basis for this assertion is empirical or based on Bourdieu's position as a leading intellectual with immense immaterial capital – which like the actors analysed in this text may underestimate his own resources and overestimate rival ones. Nothing proves beyond doubt that economic hierarchies are of higher importance than symbolic ones, even if recent market colonization of new social spheres implies that economic power may hold primacy (see Habermas 1987; Bourdieu 1998b, 2003; Hardt & Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2014).

To conclude this section, it appears as if there is, as Bourdieu (1989: 15) imagines, 'a dialectical relationship' between perception and position. The (di)visions the parties constitute may seem 'obvious', as it always appears to be when the 'embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement' (Bourdieu 1998a: 81). As Bourdieu (1992: 145) claims, '[the] discourse about the object says less about the object than about the author's relation to the object', and it appears that the discourses on power and domination likewise tell us more about the position the critical individual inhabits within these real hierarchies than how the hierarchies 'objectively' are. The parties' perceptions and classifications of inequalities seem to tell us more about the parties' supporters' relations to Norwegian hierarchies than about the hierarchies per se. Thus, whether hierarchies are domination or simply difference appears largely determined by the position individuals inhabit in the hierarchy, and most of all to which degree they are dominated or not within the hierarchies they single out. The Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party's discourses appear to signify just this homology between worldviews and position – even if we would have to compare the parties' discourses to their supporters in order to make a final conclusion on this topic. We will now continue this discussion by contextualizing the findings of this text vis-à-vis Piketty's 'multiple elite thesis'.

8.4. A Multiple Elite-System in Norway?

We must discuss an important question before we can conclude this text: Do the parties' partial emancipatory projects support Piketty's (2018) 'multiple-elite system' thesis' as well as Bourdieu's critique of social struggles for emancipation tend to actually be manifestations of struggles within the field of power (Wacquant 2013: 278)? Does this promise a new dawn for

powerholders and a new dark age for the 'people'? Or is the picture more complex than this? While we cannot fully grasp such questions as my text does not offer definitive answers to the question of 'elites' – finding it to be a politico-discursive question– we must nonetheless discuss the thesis and how my findings thus far correspond and break with it.

As already mentioned, Piketty (2018: 22) finds clear tendencies towards the emergence of the so-called 'multiple-elite system' in USA, France and U.K., even if the ideologies and supporters of the parties are heterogenous (ibid: 29). However, we cannot conclude that contemporary liberal democracies are turning into 'multiple-elite systems' based on voting patterns alone – we must also investigate discourses, manifestos and other non-voting expressions of opinion (ibid: 7). I have investigated the discursive aspects of this thesis, and we will now discuss how the discourses correspond to the expected findings following Piketty's own conclusions as well as Bourdieu's theories on the field of power and social struggles.

Both the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party fail to problematize the 'elites' which Piketty and Bourdieu position near such parties. This positioning is matched by Norwegian findings (Flemmen & Haakestad 2018; Jarness et al. 2019; Gulbrandsen 2019), thus having some empirical validity. However, the Progress Party's electorate is primarily made up of individuals outside of the fields of power as the 'elite' support of the party remains amongst the lowest in the Norwegian political context. The party is even unpopular amongst the economic powerholders. This does not prove that the party does not, as the members of the Socialist Left Party claim, embrace the role of 'double agents' as politicians may well serve actors they do not explicitly or openly represent (Bourdieu 1991: 59). Bourdieu (1991: 60) gives the example of religiously conservative politicians, claiming that they serve capitalists only as a *side-effect* of conserving the world as it is, which enables a more or less explicit alliance between these politicians and the capitalists seeking to reproduce the status quo. Both parties can be viewed in such as light as they at least partly support the 'elites' closest to them – even if the Progress Party's low level of 'elite support' makes such claims somewhat dubious as it is questionable if the party would benefit from an alliance which grants it no electorate support.

It is interesting in this regard that the Socialist Left Party has a close alliance with intellectuals – which they, as seen in the previous sections, serve indirectly, and which they represent to a relatively high degree. Nonetheless, the party has an explicit agenda of serving the lower sections of social space. That it combines this with so-called 'new left' ideas such as

multiculturalism and environmentalism – which may be the chief arguments for those seeking to classify the party as 'elitist' - does not imply that the party does not primarily seek to improve the lives of the lower sections of social space. Such notions can too be interpreted as primarily defending the lower sections of social space. However, this link may be different in other national contexts. For instance, Hochschild (2016: 139) finds that poor, rural whites in USA perceive themselves as largely left behind by the 'liberal elites', which they claim prioritize questions such as environmentalism and multiculturalism over their suffering. Regardless of whether this critique of American 'liberal elites' is fair or not, the Socialist Left Party combines these questions with a strong and explicit defence of all lower sections of social space regardless of these actors' cultural backgrounds – as there is nothing 'elitist' with notions such as multiculturalism or environmentalism unless actors utilize metonymic logic to combine these agendas with 'elitism'. Metonymy can however be utilized for labelling these politics 'popular' too as it lacks any 'elitist' essence - even if such values appear to be more important to powerholders than to the lower sections of social space per today (see Flemmen 2014b; Figenschou & Beyer 2014; Gulbrandsen 2019). Thus, it becomes dubious to claim that the Socialist Left Party primarily represents the 'elite'. Rather, power-plays are not 'zero-sum games' – an idea which seems to be implied by both Bourdieu and Piketty – and thus, powerholders and lower sections may actually tend to be somewhat homologous insofar as they belong to the same fields and hold the same forms of capital – even if it is possible that such alliances primarily benefit those in power (For such arguments on alliances, see Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Gramsci 1999).

Thus, the myths of 'Inequality-Norway' and the 'Tyranny of Goodness' offer no conclusive evidence for or against Piketty's thesis. The struggle between the parties appears as a hegemonic struggle to reshape contemporary discursive practices and restructure the contemporary relations of power. Both parties attempt to restructure the division of social space after their simplified accounts of social space and the 'people/elite' dichotomy. Does this imply that we, through the Faircloughian (1995, 1996) notions of ideology, should consider the parties to be waging a war for the 'elites' whose positions are strengthened by the parties overlooking their positions? While the parties may well function as servants for powerholders within the greater struggles of the field of power – this is but part of the parties' discursive practices as they do not merely 'serve' the 'elite'. Rather, they seek to 'serve' the 'people' – even if this category is not predetermined and must be discursively created. As the strengthening of unarticulated powerholders appear to also serve the parties' popular support,

so branding them as parties for 'elites' seems excessive – and must be strengthened by other findings which support such claims. The parties thus both serve their popular support and, willingly or not, embrace ideological functions in favour of the 'elites' they leave unarticulated.

We see that the Progress Party, made up of individuals primarily residing within the lower regions of social space, supports its base insofar as they attack the form of power which its base is the most deprived of. Even if this may be claimed to primarily serve the economic powerholders which are in a direct conflict with the immaterial holders of power for the control over society at large following the Bourdieusean interpretation, the homologous positions of the economically-oriented lower sections of social space and the so-called 'dominant dominants', i.e., the economic powerholders, ensure that they share interests in the weakening of cultural forms of power. By the same token, the electorate of the Socialist Left Party, regardless of whether they are positioned at the upper or lower fields, tend to primarily be positioned in the cultural fields. Thus, they tend to benefit from the weakening of economic capital while benefitting from immaterial power being strengthened. While this may entail a 'multiple-elite system' in some sense, as the left and right both appear to serve some 'elite' interests, may this not be due to the homologous positioning of immaterial powerholders and the lower sections of these fields vis-à-vis material powerholders and the lower sections of these fields?

We will conclude this chapter by answering research question c). We see that the parties' criticism relates to their objective positions in social space and the forms of power available to the parties' supporters as there is a logical connection between the parties' perceptions and positions. The symbolic hierarchies problematized by the Progress Party appears to objectively exist within Norway – while the economic inequalities problematized by the Socialist Left Party appears undisputable. The parties, however, both remain silent on the 'elites' residing the closest to them in social space – serving ideological functions strengthening the unarticulated hierarchies. Whether this indicates that the Norwegian democracy has morphed into a 'multiple-elite system' or not is a difficult question – answered through empirical research combined with the political struggle for 'truth' and 'justice'. Nonetheless, it clearly illustrates a logical connection between the parties' positions and their discourses. I will now conclude my findings.

9. Discussions and conclusion

9.1 On Critique

We have now seen a) that the parties' critique relates to the parties' positions within social space and b) how the critique turns dialectical as it has contradictory effects by veiling/unveiling and legitimizing/delegitimizing. I will now discuss what these lessons imply for critical sociology. Critical science, CDA included, oftentimes revolve around the idea of 'correcting social wrongs' (see Habermas 1987: 314; van Dijk 1994: 436; Fairclough 2009: 162) – a goal shared by the parties, too.

However, the critical subject has no privileged access to evaluations of the social world (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 73). The worldviews of the parties appear biased due to the different positions the parties inhabit – prompting the parties to perceive different 'social wrongs'. However, all forms of power inequalities are potentially 'wrong'. Inequalities' (il)legitimacy is constituted discursively rather than essentially. There is furthermore unlikely that power will ever cease to be immanent to social relations (see Foucault 1982: 222-223) – while we remain far away from fully understanding the nature of how power functions (Foucault 1977). Therefore, critique of power holds potential risk of dialectical side-effects – through serving the interests of unarticulated and unproblematized powerholders. Basically, you will always tend to naturalize what you do not criticize. Furthermore, singling out 'social wrongs' cannot but be part of the struggle for power as the critic of power too asserts its dominance (Bourdieu 1988b: 17). The social scientist risks participating in struggles to increase its own power regardless of intentions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1989: 18). In order for the analyst to remain critical, also of *its own position* and *its own access to means of domination,* it needs to remain vary of its own ideological presuppositions and the potentially dialectical effects any emancipatory project may have – and Bourdieu as well as Foucault offers critical insights for such reflectivity.

The political parties fail this test as their projects both weaken and strengthen power in a single blow. And like the parties, we, as academics in general and critical scholars in particular, also inhabit specific positions in social space. Based on our positions, we may evidently be prone to certain worldviews – worldviews which may block out alternative perceptions. Therefore, our emancipatory projects may too hold contradictory potential. This can potentially be avoided through classifying the struggle for 'truth' rather than participating (Bourdieu 1988b) – and questioning these 'truths' (Foucault 2007a). For this particular text, I

have sought to conduct such a study through remaining impartial and 'beyond' the struggle between the parties. This follows the logic of the writer 'cancel[ling] out his particular individuality' (Foucault 1984: 102), which, while perhaps impossible in practice, appears as an important goal for critical scholars - as this may enable us to bypass the prejudices imposed upon us by our positions within social space. If we try to focus upon, for instance, 'dominance relations by elite groups' (van Dijk 1993b: 249), then we risk naturalizing hierarchies and inequalities based on our own positions within these – as do the parties.

Such reservations limit the potential of scholars conducting partial projects of emancipation with dialectical side effects. However, it may also potentially turn critique toothless and useless –as the refusal to classify which I have embraced in this text can potentially lead to a lack of normative foundations – enabling moral nihilism and apathy and thus serving the power-interests of the present (e.g. Fraser 1981; Habermas 1990). Foucauldian scholars' approach to critique can in this way inflict 'environmental damage' which they can be held accountable for (Kelly 1994: 1). Thus, no 'perfect' solution exists for the question of critique of power – to paraphrase Foucault (1982b: 231), while all solutions may not be 'bad', they are all at least potentially 'dangerous' as we do not fully understand how power and domination functions – and our understandings may well tend to be largely determined by whether we dominate or are dominated – and the particular ways we dominate or are dominated.

9.2. Concluding remarks

This text has utilized the principles of theoretical heterodoxy – in order to map the discursive regulations and how these discourses relate to the struggle between the parties, which further relates to the parties' positions within social space. This approach has not been 'loyal' to the four traditions I have utilized; in Bourdieu's terms, it may potentially even be 'heretical'. For instance, Bourdieu may have lamented this approach as subjectivism overemphasising the discursive aspects. Fairclough would likely have criticized the high level of abstraction in the textual analysis – for a lack of linguistic precision as I focus upon Foucauldian regulations by utilizing DT's semiotics rather than the linguistic tools Fairclough advocates as well as for the lack of a normative critique. Foucault would have dismissed the interpretative analytical tools as idealistic and as subjectively interpreting objective texts whose meaning cannot be 'found' through interpretation, as well as my synthesizing, which he adamantly opposes (see Foucault

1994: 112). Laclau and Mouffe would have problematized the clear division between discursive and nondiscursive phenomena, and thus the entire rationale of my project.

However, the text has been loyal to Bourdieu and Foucault's notions of theory serving tactical needs – even if only the former would support how heavily theory supports my arguments. The approach offers interesting insights. We have seen throughout this text how the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party, despite their differences, construct social space based on similar discursive principles. The Progress Party's critique of symbolic powerholders and the Socialist Left Party's critique of economic powerholders illustrate that the parties' embrace popular reason and their emancipatory agendas. The myths of the 'Tyranny of Goodness' and 'Inequality-Norway' are constituted relationally vis-à-vis each other – as two radically opposed understandings of Norway which share the centre of 'elite-domination' as the two political actors' dreams of hegemony is made manifest in their attempts to represent the 'people' – which like the 'elite' is a discursive construction varying considerably between the two parties.

However, whether the 'elite' dominates our immaterial souls or our material wallets remain a discursive questions which appears to be answered through the parties' positions in social space. Similar analyses of other 'anti-elitists', in Norway and abroad, are needed to better investigate the potency of nodal points for understanding 'anti-elitists' discourses and the particular way they divide society into 'elite' and 'people' – and how they relate to the political actors' objective positions in social space. We must note in this regard that the research-objects constructed by Flemmen and Haakestad (2018), Jarness et al. (2019) and Gulbrandsen (2019) could potentially have been constructed differently, and that the homology found within this text revolves around a certain theoretical tradition which offers a way of seeing the social world. Within this and similar theoretical traditions, future endeavours may gain interesting insights into the homology between position and perception through seeking out parties which avoid dialectical side-effects through testing various forms of parties embracing the 'popular reason' in various national contexts.

The focus upon the parties' classification also comes with a cost, however. This step enabled me to sidestep the ideological struggle for 'truth', but only at the cost of removing the possibility of fully contextualizing the parties within the politico-ideological context – and perhaps most of all within the greater populist literature, which I have been forced to somewhat neglect due to the significant normative content of 'populism' as a term. This further makes it

impossible to fully emerge my findings vis-à-vis Piketty's story of a 'multiple-elite system'. My approach cannot tell us anything about a) the shades of grey which may emerge from such hegemonic alliances as power-games are not zero-sum games and b) whether this is 'positive' or 'negative', normative notions outside the scope of my approach. These dimensions are both empirical and political, and the latter aspect of the dimensions make it impossible for my approach to handle them in practice. Likewise, my focus upon discursive regularities has led to rhetorical and linguistic aspects of the discourses being somewhat neglected as I have prioritized these the 'rules' in a Foucauldian sense – which are analysed through semiotic intertextuality rather than rhetorical and linguistic tools – as I focus upon the privileged signs, the nodal points, and how they have fixated the parties' discourse around the centre of 'elite-domination' based on the perception of symbolic or economic power as illegitimate. Lastly, the primacy I have offered the discursive realm also makes it impossible to discuss the politico-empirical question which the parties address – which social actors are the 'elites of Norway – and which of these 'elites' are the most important – a question which I, for reasons covered thoroughly in the previous sections, ignored. Likewise, whether symbolic or economic powers hold different potential for domination within our world remains an unasked and thus unanswered question within my approach.

Wordcount: 35 888

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Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (2009) Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology. in (eds) Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*. 2nd edition. 1-33

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All texts referenced in this paper have been provided.

Appendix: Original Texts

Original texts from the original Norwegian sources without translations or other potential modifications. I have included the analysed texts – without the necessary modifications needed in order to make the texts presentable for analysis. I thus include some sentences which have been cut out of the analysis – but for the sake of space and at the reader's convenience I do not include the articles and pages in toto.

The Progress Party: Texts
Tybring-Gjedde, C. (2014) *Mens orkesteret fortsetter å spille.* Oslo. Cappelen Damm

41 – Alternative røster skal knebles i fødselen. Intensiviteten i kritikken øker hver gang jeg nærmer meg et tema med gjenklang i folket. Folket er noe skumle greier. Brysomt. Folket stikker kjepper i hjulene for de som er innenfor. Makten og definisjonsmakten ligger hos samfunnseliten. Den tviholder de på.

Sannheten er underordnet i det flerkulturelle prosjektet

199 – 'I Norge er det ikke lenger mulig å føre en åpen og ærlig diskusjon om konsekvensene av innvandringspolitikken. Enhver som stiller seg kritisk til innvandringspolitikken vil av politiske motstandere og mediene raskt bli fremstilt som innvandrerkritisk… og derfra er veien kort til å bli stemplet som rasist' [godhetstyranni]

225 Mitt håp er at de som i dag mener å forvalte sannheten, er villig til å tilegne seg ny kunnskap. Utfordringen er ikke at jeg bruker ytringsfriheten på politisk ukorrekt vis, men stemplingen som kommer i kjølvannet og som gjør at alternative røster forstummer

Suvatne, S. S. 2016. Snøkulemannen. Dagbladet 06.08.2016.

- Politikerne har fjernet seg fra det folket de er satt til å tjene. Og med på elitelaget har de med seg mediene, sivilsamfunnet og akademia.

Fransson, L. (2009) «Folk vil ikke bli behandlet som idioter». Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/folk-vil-ikke-bli-behandlet-som-idioter/65334066 (accessed 12.11.2019)

- Vi har vært klar over dette lenge, og det er flott at forskningen viser det samme. Årsaken er at Fremskrittspartiet gjennom mange år har tatt folk på alvor. Vi snakker med dem og ikke til dem (Jensen)

Gilbrant, J. (2019) - Siv Jensen flørter med konspirasjonsteorier på det mørkeste nettet. Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/siv-jensen-florter-med-konspirasjonsteorier-pa-det-morkeste-nettet/71487740 (accessed 20.11.2019)

Det siste nå er at vi skal føle skam. Vi skal skamme oss for å bruke bilen. Vi skal skamme oss for å spise kjøtt. Vi skal skamme oss for å ta fly på ferietur. Vi skal skamme oss for oljeeventyret. Vi skal skamme oss i hverdagen vår.

Det er sosialisme i nye klær. En kollektiv følelsestvang ment til å styre våre valg. Denne skammen er venstresidens forsøk på å påtvinge oss en ny jantelov på folks vanlige liv og levemåte (Jensen)

Kristansen, A. A., Gilbrant, J. & Rønning, M. (2019) Byrådserklæringen angripes- Skadelig for Oslo. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/skadelig-for-oslo/71735938 (accessed 24.11.2019)

- For det sosialistiske byrådet i Oslo, med Lan Marie Berg og MDG i spissen, er det tydeligvis viktigst å bestemme hva de eldre ikke skal spise og sentralstyre at kjøttforbruket til eldre og syke mennesker skal kuttes

- Jeg synes det er en uspiselig politikk, som lukter formynderi og overstyring av eldre mennesker lang vei (Listhaug)

Listhaug, S. (2016) Vi bestemmer – ikke feministeliten. Available at https://www.nettavisen.no/meninger/friskemeninger/sylvi-listhaug-vi-bestemmer---ikke-feministeliten/3423480090.html (accessed 10.09.2019)

Jeg er lei av at eliten skal fortelle folk flest hva som er riktig og galt. Det som er riktig for meg trenger ikke være riktig for deg

Men først: det er så mange «eksperter» som skal fortelle oss vordende foreldre hva som er rett og galt. Også når det kommer til foreldrepermisjon, og hvordan den skal fordeles. Spesielt venstresiden med feministeliten tror de har definisjonsmakt på hva som er moralsk riktig og galt, og er fryktelig glad i å bestemme over oss.

Listhaug, S. (2018) *Der andre tier*. Oslo: Kagge Forlag

35-37 – Samtidig har det etablert seg et meningspoliti som stempler alle som tar til orde for å justere kursen

Når jeg bruker begrepet elite, er det den meningsbærende eliten jeg snakker om. I denne gruppen er det mange som rett og slett ser ned på vanlige mennesker, eller som nærmest føler en slags avsky når de får høre hva ordinære mennesker i det norske samfunnet har på hjertet. Denne eliten er ikke nødvendigvis de rikeste eller demo har mest formell makt. Jeg snakker snarere om den gruppen i samfunnet som har skjenket seg selv retten til å definere hvilke standpunkt som er riktige eller gale, moralske eller umoralske og innenfor eller utenfor. Denne selvoppnevnte gruppen av dommere og meningspoliti av god og dårlig moral. Dem jeg snakker om, er avisredaktører, politikere, pr-folk, forfattere, skuespillere, musikere og teaterfolk, mennesker som plasserer dem selv på en pidestall og føler seg bedre enn alle andre.'

De samme folkene harselerer gjerne når noen våger å snakke om at det finnes en slik elite som har en stor definisjonsmakt over den offentlige samtale. De peker gjerne ut at de so sier dette, selv tjener godt og har gode posisjoner. Det de glemmer , er at jeg og andre snakker om, ikke er en økonomisk elite. Snakker man med ledere og entreprenører i det private næringsliv, iallfall privat, så er jo holdningene blant mange helt annerledes enn i Akersgata. Det er et typisk og skremmende trekk ved samfunnsutviklingen at denne samme eliten i stadig større grad distanserer seg fra folk flest, og stempler holdningene deres som skremmende. Vi husker alle hvordan Hillary Clinton tabbet seg ut i det som burde vært en lett match mot Donald Trump i den amerikanske valgkampen, da hun kalte velgerne hans 'avskyelige'. På valgdagen viste det seg at disse forferdelige velgerne egentlig var helt alminnelige mennesker som utgjorde nok stemmer til at Trump ble valgt.

200-201

Jeg for min del er stolt av å være medlem av et parti hvor man ikke trenger å skamme seg fordi man har fagbrev eller er ufaglært, eller at man har hobbyer som ikke er politisk korrekte. Dette er et Oslo- og storbyfenomen…

204 – Vanlige folk blir etter min mening ikke lyttet til. for meg er det viktig å ta vanlige folk på alvor. Dette er noe av kjernen i FrPs politikk og måte å behandle folk må. Slik må det alltid være, ellers mister vi noe av sjela og identiteten vår

Listhaug, S. (2019) Sylvi Listhaug ut mot de rødgrønne: – Slutt å tre valgene deres ned over hodene på andre! VG. Available at https://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/LAqGM4/sylvi-

listhaug-ut-mot-de-roedgroenne-slutt-aa-tre-valgene-deres-ned-over-hodene-paa-andre (accessed 31.08.2019)

Moralen synes å være at valg er fint, så lenge du velger det byrådet selv mener er fornuftig. Skulle du driste deg til å velge andre løsninger i ditt liv møter byrådet deg med moralisme, skambeskyldninger, reguleringer, eiendomsskatt og skyhøye bompenger.

Dette er klassisk sosialisme som vi kjenner fra tidligere tider og andre steder i verden. Et fåtall mennesker i høye posisjoner påtvinger alle andre sine personlige valg. Jeg og Frp mener at folk skal få bestemme mer i eget liv og over egen økonomi

Jensen, I. (2019) Frp går til kamp mot sykkelsatsningen i Oslo. TV2. Available at https://www.tv2.no/a/10753672/ (accessed 20.08.2019)

Folk flest er ikke de som sykler, dette her er eliten. Det er en elitistisk politikk, og det er en politikk som føres som folk ikke kjenner seg igjen i. Det er en politikk som vi ønsker å stoppe i Oslo Frp (Tybring-Gjedde)

Halvorsen, T. (2019) Klimastreikende ungdom får kjedebrev fra voksne: - Jeg blir forbanna. Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/klimastreikende-ungdom-far-kjedebrev-fra-voksne---jeg-blir-forbanna/70887189 (accessed 20.08.2019)

Det er tankevekkende hvordan den politiske korrekthet og elite virkelig har gått inn for å hjernevaske barn til å blant annet tro at den livsgivende gassen CO_2 er farlig for menneskeheten og klimaet. (Hagen)

Knudsen, U. E. & Jensen, S. (2009) Frp brenner ingen. Aftenposten. Available at https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/i/6zx1W/frp-brenner-ingen (accessed 1.10.2019)

Det er nemlig feil at en liten gruppe innsidere på såkalt skjønnsmessig grunnlag tildeler fellesskapets midler til det de mener er god kultur og kunst. Dette systemet bygger på en ovenfra-og-ned-holdning til den smak og de preferanser folk flest har.

Krekling, D. V. & Sølhusvik, L. (2019) Frp om klimapolitikere: – Sosialistiske formyndere. NrK. Available at https://www.nrk.no/norge/frp-om-klimapolitikere_-_-sosialistiske-formyndere-1.14661449 (accessed 20.08.2019)

– Det siste nå er at vi skal føle skam. Vi skal skamme oss for å bruke bilen. Vi skal skamme oss for å spise kjøtt. Vi skal skamme oss for å ta fly på ferietur. Vi skal skamme oss for

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oljeeventyret. Vi skal skamme oss i hverdagen vår. Dette er sosialisme i nye klær. En kollektiv følelsestvang ment til å styre våre valg. (Jensen)

– Problemet er denne formynderpolitikken som miljøpartiet fører. Det er en formynderpolitikk som skal påtvinge oss andre de valgene de har gjort selv ved å påføre folk skam. Men er det en ting vi i Norge ikke skal gjøre, så er det å skamme oss over hvor fantastisk godt vi har det. Det er bygget opp gjennom generasjoner. Alt det ønsker MDG å rive ned (Listhaug)

Sandvik, S. & Sølhusvik, L. (2016) Tajik om Listhaug: – Noe særlig nærmere elite er det ikke mulig å komme. NRK. Available at https://www.nrk.no/norge/tajik-om-listhaug_-_-noe-saerlig-naermere-elite-er-det-ikke-mulig-a-komme-1.13231627 (accessed 30.09.2019)

— Det er de som er meningsbærende, i stor grad Arbeiderpartiet og SV.

 Du ser hva som skjer når jeg legger ut denne bloggen, da er det et ramaskrik uten like. Da har jeg truffet noen ømme tær, og det forteller meg at det overhodet ikke er det som er politisk korrekt, når du får så massive angrep fra venstreside (Listhaug)

Sandvik, S. (2016) Frp-Listhaug: – Godhetstyranniet rir Norge som en mare. NRK. Available at https://www.nrk.no/norge/frp-listhaug_-_-godhetstyranniet-rir-norge-som-en-mare-1.12633044 (accessed 10.10.2019)

– Jeg reagerer på dette godhetstyranniet som rir det norske samfunnet som en mare, (Listhaug)

Mauno, H. (2016) Sylvi Listhaug: Portvokteren. Dagsavisen. Available at https://www.dagsavisen.no/portrett/sylvi-listhaug-portvokteren-1.677802 (accessed 10.09.2019)

– Men jeg satt altså i et familieselskap i høst. Der var det folk som stemte ulike partier, men som alle var bekymret for den økende flyktningstrømmen til Norge. Men ingen turte å si dette høyt i offentligheten, for ingen av dem hadde lyst til å bli stemplet som rasister og fæle mennesker. Da slo det ned i meg, dette ordet «godhetstyranni» (Listhaug)

Jensen, S. & Listhaug (2019) DEBATT: Offentlig ordskifte. Frp stemples som et ondt parti. Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/frp-stemples-som-et-ondt-parti/71573726. (accessed 18.10.2019)

Jeg er god, du er ond. Det er den underliggende påstanden i Sturla Stålsetts moraliserende kronikk om norsk innvandringsdebatt fredag. Alle som leser kronikken forstår likevel at den mest av alt handler om å stemple FrP som et ondt og ekstremt parti.

Weden, A. S. & Braaten, M. (2016) Listhaug til frontalangrep på kirken: – Kan ødelegge velferdssamfunnet. VG. Available at https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/KVOOM/listhaug-til-frontalangrep-paa-kirken-kan-oedelegge-velferdssamfunnet (accessed 10.10.2019)

Kirken bør være for alle, men det er den ikke. Den er ikke lenger en Folkekirke der personer med ulik politisk bakgrunn kan møtes med utgangspunkt i sin tro. Det er en politisk aktør for venstresiden, hevder Listhaug, og legger til:

– Dette føyer seg inn i et mønster som har pågått i årevis, der kirken kaster seg inn i diskusjoner om oljeborring, forhandlinger om statsbudsjett og flyktningpolitikk.

Sommerfeldt, P. A. (2013) – Solvik-Olsen vil kneble kirken. Vårt Land. Available at https://www.vl.no/samfunn/solvik-olsen-vil-kneble-kirken-1.67015?paywall=true (accessed 10.09.2019)

Mitt utspill er ikke et forsøk på knebling, men en bekymring for at kirka skyver folk fra seg. For velgere på borgerlig side tror jeg ikke det er fornuftig dersom kirken blir et reklametårn for venstreradikale grupper. Det er ikke klokt når kirka indikerer at alle som driver med oljevirksomhet, ødelegger skaperverket. (Solvik-Olsen)

Vosgraff, S. K. (2016) Hagen: - De mobbes til taushet av eliten. Finansavisen. Available at https://finansavisen.no/nyheter/politikk/2016/12/hagen-de-mobbes-til-taushet-av-eliten (accessed 20.08.2019)

Det er ingen andre land i verden som ville hatt en regjeringskrise eller budsjettkrise på klimasaken. Men det er mange som er feige og ikke tør si hva de mener for da mister de jobben. Klimaskeptikere, de som snakker sunn fornuft, mobbes til taushet av eliten (Hagen)

Haugan, B. & Holmes, M. C. S. (2019) Frp-Listhaug: – Du blir fattigere med SV. VG. Available at https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/RRjlQO/frp-listhaug-du-blir-fattigere-med-sv. (accessed 11.11.2019)

– SV fremstiller personer som skaper arbeidsplasser og gjennom dette skatteinntekter, nærmest som kriminelle. SV sin politikk ville bidratt til at det lønner seg mye mindre å putte pengene sine inn i verdiskapning, sier hun:

The Socialist Left Party: Texts

Nicolajsen, S. (2018) Jo, vi er sjøfolk, Erna. Klassekampen. Available at https://dagens.klassekampen.no/2018-10-13/jo-vi-er-sjofolk-erna (accessed 21.04.2020)

– Dere slåss for flere enn dere sjøl, sier SV-leder Audun Lysbakken til sjøfolkene.

– Dette handler om mer enn to skip. Dersom rederne nå klarer å slå hull i systemet vil flere følge etter. Det kan være begynnelsen på slutten for norske sjøfolk, sier han.

Ap, Sp og Rødt står samme linje som SV og Lysbakken. Dermed mangler bare KrF på å stanse regjeringen.

– Det er mulig å vinne, og vi lover å slåss for dere. Kun et parti gjenstår å overbevise,

Valen, S. (2013) Venstresiden er ikke på Blindern. VG. 15.03.2013.

Når vi snakker om forskjeller i Norge er vi opphengt i kultur, og ikke penger.

Hvis jeg var Frp-leder

Hvis jeg var leder i Frp, ville jeg sannsynligvis gjort akkurat som dem: Jeg ville mobilisert på håpløse byråkratiske regler (de fins det mange av!), på skepsis til «bedreviterne» som tar høyere utdanning og jobber i kommunen, jeg ville lagt skylden for det som er galt i landet på noen «andre», på innvandrerne eller de der multikulti-vennene deres med skjerf og rare matvaner, og jeg ville sagt at landets kultur er truet. Jeg ville ikke sagt rett ut hva som truet landet, men sagt sånn mellom linjene at det så klart er innvandrerne.

Jeg ville sagt at den rødgrønne regjeringen er livsfjerne elitister bestående av de ovennevnte bedreviterne, mens jeg trykket «like» på Facebook-statuser på veggen min der det står «forbanna drittregjering!» etterfulgt av hets av Somalia (ja, en Frp-er på Stortinget presterte det denne uken).

Kort sagt ville jeg gjort alt jeg kunne for å få debattene til å handle om alt annet enn makt og penger og fordeling.

Slik jobber et parti som ble brakt til de store høyder av en sukkerdirektør fra Oslo vest, og som vil flytte utrolige summer fra vanlige folks lommebok til de samme rikfolka som gir milliongaver til Frp.

Det er glitrende gjennomført, men det har ikke en pøkk å gjøre med «folk flest». Det er en politikk av og for eliten, i svært så folkelig forkledning.

Hva slags mat folk spiser, hva de ser på TV, og hvor mye de leser kan aldri være grunnlag for politikk.

Det kan være et tegn på hvor i samfunnet du befinner deg, men ikke noe mer. Da bærer det lett galt av sted.

SVs jobb er ikke å definere livsstil, hva man ser på TV eller hva slags identiteter man har, men å sørge for at økonomisk felles interesse er en noe som teller, slik at klasseforskjeller kan utjevnes og goder kan fordeles.

Valen, S. (2014) Siste Skanse. Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/siste-skanse/60195384 (accessed 20.11.2019)

Vi i SV bryr oss mer om alle sliterne som jobber hardt hele livet og ikke får nok igjen for det, enn milliardærene som finansierte Sandbergs valgkamp. Derfor prioriterer vi at vanlige folk både skal sitte igjen med mer penger, og bedre velferd. Og det synes vi godt Sandbergs rike venner kan bidra til.

Det er ikke å «fjerne alles økonomiske frihet», det er å sørge for at folk flest får større frihet til å bestemme over sine egne liv. Per Sandberg har drevet falsk markedsføring «for folk flest», og bruker nå tiden på å forsvare milliardgaver til landets rikeste. Så får resten klare seg selv.

Suvatne, S. S. (2018) For fjerde år på rad får pensjonistene mindre penger. Nå har Audun Lysbakken fått nok. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/for-fjerde-ar-pa-rad-far-pensjonistene-mindre-penger-na-har-audun-lysbakken-fatt-nok/69838654 (accessed 20.11.2019)

- At Frp er et eldreparti, det er bare en bløff. Vi ser nå hvordan Frp's politikk faktisk påvirker landets pensjonister. Frp er et eliteparti.

Fylkesnes, T. K. (2014) Dette er et fiskeriran. Available at https://www.sv.no/blog/2014/12/16/dette-er-et-fiskeriran/ (accessed 11.11.2019).

Utvalgets forslag peker retning for en privatisering av fellesskapets ressurser, hvor vinnerne blir noen får kvotebaroner og taperne er den norske kysten

Fylkesnes, T. K. (2019) Ta havet tilbake til folket. NRK. Available at https://www.nrk.no/ytring/ta-havet-tilbake-til-folket-1.14449280 (accessed 02.10.2019)

Andersen, K. (2011) Fellesskap og opprør. Klassekampen 17.08.2011

https://www.sv.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Forskjellsrapport_2019_Endelig_PDF3.pdf

Prestegård, S. (2017) Ut mot Vedums elite-stempling. Dagsavisen. Available at https://www.dagsavisen.no/oslo/ut-mot-vedums-elite-stempling-1.1004946 (accessed 11.11.2019)

Klassekampen (2017) Sloss for havet. Available at https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20170913/PLUSS/170919800

– Vi tok en kjempesjanse og satset alt på å få dette valget til å handle om eierskapet til havet. De siste tiårene har det vært en utvikling hvor private fiskebaroner og oljeselskap har tatt eierskap over ressursene som i tusenvis av år har vært grunnlaget for livet i nord. Vi gikk til krig mot utviklingen,

Havet og verdiene de norske havområdene inneholder, er en sentral del av SVs politikk. Oljealderen er i den store sammenhengen et lite blaff, og om få år skal Norge igjen lene seg til fisken i havet for å sikre velferd, arbeid og inntekter.

– Fremskrittspartiet har styrt den viktige fiskerinæringen de siste årene, og kystfolkets tilgang til havet er svekket. Verdiene blir forsøkt fordelt til en liten elite, for det meste investorer, sier Fylkesnes.

– For Nord-Norge er tilgangen til havet eksistensielt. Havet gir grunnlag for en rik kystkultur, og når tilgangen svekkes blir noe fundamentalt tatt bort,

Utvalgets forslag peker retning for en privatisering av fellesskapets ressurser, hvor vinnerne blir noen får kvotebaroner og taperne er den norske kysten

Klassekampen (2017b) Vil avsløre høyresida. https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20170720/PLUSS/170729832

– Altså, jeg sier jo ikke at alle bør tjene det samme. Jobber du mer eller har mer ansvar enn andre på din arbeidsplass, skal du også tjene mer enn dem. Men dagens situasjon preges av en økonomisk elite som selv mener at de fortjener en større del av kaka samtidig som ulikheten øker. Da må vi kunne kalle en spade for en spade, og si at noen faktisk er for rik

– Det er en illusjon å tro at man kan ha ulikhet i rikdom og samtidig ha mulighetslikhet. I samfunn der det er stor økonomisk ulikhet, som for eksempel USA, er det også svært lite sosial mobilitet.

Gullestad, F. H. (2017) Folk Frykter økte forskjeller. Klassekampen. Available at https://www.klassekampen.no/article/20170807/ARTICLE/170809968 (accessed 30.09.2019)

-Tallene viser at det er en folkelig uro over en utvikling hvor du på den ene siden har en økonomisk elite som krever mer og mer – og på den andre siden flere fattige familier og større økonomisk ulikhet, sier Audun Lysbakken.

Kristiansen, B. S. (2018) Snart har alle politikerne i denne salen millionlønn. Dagsavisen. Available at https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/snart-har-alle-politikerne-i-denne-salen-millionlonn-1.1105505 (accessed 29.08.2019)

Det er dramatisk at vi trer inn i en elite når vi blir valgt inn på Stortinget.

Lysbakken, A. (2015) *Frihet sammen*. Oslo: Gyldendal

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Økende ulikhet er ingen naturlov. Den urettferdige utviklingen skyldes politikk, og kan endres med politikk. Under den rødgrønne regjeringen gikk ulikheten i Norge ned. Den vanligste måten å beregne ulikhet på er å benytte den såkalte ginikoeffisienten. Dette målet viser nedgang i inntektsforskjellene i Norge under forrige regjering, særlig i de årene SV styrte Finansdepartementet. Årsaken var fordelingspolitikk. De rike måtte betale mer i skatt, mens lavtlønte fikk skattelette. Ifølge Statistisk sentralbyrå [34] betalte nordmenn med en årsinntekt på mer enn to millioner kroner i snitt cirka 270 000 kroner mer til fellesskapet i 2013 enn i 2005. I den andre enden fikk de med lave inntekter på mellom 150 000 og 300 000 kroner skattelette, med et gjennomsnitt på rundt 4600 kroner.

Det har ikke tatt den blå regjeringen lang tid å reversere denne utviklingen. Da «partiet for folk flest» inntok Finansdepartementet, viste det seg at dette slagordet må innebære grove brudd på

markedsføringsloven. Det var slett ikke folk flest som tjente på Siv Jensens to første statsbudsjett. En hjemmehjelp med en inntekt på 350 000 kroner i året fikk hundre kroner av Jensen i hennes første budsjett. Ikke om dagen, men i året. I budsjettet for 2015 ble det 400 kroner i redusert skatt for hjemmehjelpen. Det er nok til én plastposeavgift om dagen, minus lørdag og søndag. [35] Kontrasten til dem på toppen er stor. Det går som det alltid går når høyresiden får makten: økende forskjeller og fest for dem som har mest.

Lysbakken, A. (2016) Elitens regjering. Dagbladet. Available at https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/elitens-regjering/65369112 (accessed 21.08.2019)

Alle som er uenig med Sylvi Listhaug, er «eliten», hevder hun. Alle som er enig med henne, er ofre for knebling og meningsundertrykking fra eliten. Slik er verdensbildet som statsråden hamrer inn på sosiale medier og i avis etter avis.

Lysbakken, A. (2019) Audun Lysbakkens valg-appell: Miljø og rettferdighet. VG. Available at https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/QoqnJq/audun-lysbakkens-valg-appell-miljoe-og-rettferdighet (accessed 1.04.2020)

Den folkelige uroen over forskjells-Norge blir også tydeligere og tydeligere. De rikeste får mer og mer, og skammelig mange sliter med å få endene til å møtes. Barnehager, barnevern og eldreomsorg har plutselig blitt markeder, hvor noen få kan tjene seg rike på fellesskapets regning

Lysbakken, A. (2020) Vi trenger ikke milliardærer. Aftenposten. Available at https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/2GlJz4/vi-trenger-ikke-milliardaerer-audun-lysbakken (accessed 28.01.2020)

Land med stor økonomisk ulikhet gjør det gjennomgående dårligere på målinger av hva som er et godt samfunn å leve i. Land med store forskjeller har blant annet lavere gjennomsnittlig levealder, høyere kriminalitet og høyere spedbarnsdødelighet.

De har mer fattigdom, og lavere økonomisk vekst. Og stor ulikhet svekker demokratiet vårt.

For når pengene samles på færre hender enn før, gjør også makten det. Når det bygger seg opp en økonomisk elite som stikker fra resten, vil selve limet i samfunnet svekkes.

Vi vil ikke leve i milliardærenes tidsalder. Makten skal tilhøre de mange, ikke de få

Øvstegård, F. A. & Øydvin, A. A. (2016) Anti-establishment på norsk. *Manifest tidsskrift.*

Bernie Sanders sin politiske revolusjon vitnar om at det går an å flytta det politiske landskapet til venstre på ganske kort tid. Journalistar prøver å skildra det politiske landskapet sånn dei trur det er. Sidan journalistar lev i same boble som maktelita, stemmer det dei skriv om folk flest sine meiningar ofte meir overens med det maktelita trur folk flest meinar enn det folk flest faktisk meinar. Me kan stikka hol på desse «politiske sanningane» som ikkje stemmer overnes med verkelegheita folk flest lev i.

Dette er kjerna i den venstrepopulismen me ynskjer oss. Vår venstrepopulisme er ikkje ein der me blindt aksepterar bildet av «folk flest» som FrP og det Civita-påverka media serverar oss. Vår venstrepopulisme er den der me fortel fortellinga om folk flest på nytt. Ikkje nordmenn mot innvandrarar, oljearbeidarar mot miljøvernarar, middelklasse mot arbeidarklasse og bygd mot by, men heile hopen mot den etablerte, middelaldrande, mannlege, kvite, rike, dresskledde, oljedryppande, maktspelspelande, tåkepratande, frihandelselskande, marknadsfundamentalistiske, Brüssel-orienterte, krigshissande, blankpolerte og verklegheitsfjerne elita nedi Oslo.