

Why Opt for a New START?

*The U.S. Senate's ratification process and the purposes of arms
control*

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Abstract

States sign arms control treaties. Such treaties are advantageous for the international community as they reduce the prospect of a nuclear war. However, even if arms control treaties improves world security, it is still a puzzle why nuclear states sign and ratify such treaties when these weapons are seen as central mean of national security: Why would a nuclear state willingly limit its arsenal and constrain its own nuclear policy options?

This puzzle motivates the research question of this thesis: What are the purposes of the New START Treaty for U.S. policymakers and experts? The New START Treaty expires next year and this thesis may improve our understanding of the implications of the treaty's expiration.

To answer the research question, I utilize a theoretical framework not previously applied to the case of New START. The framework directs attention to the multiple purposes for signing arms control: disarmament, strategic stability and strategic advantage. I demonstrate empirically the presence of five purposes among U.S. policymakers and experts in the Senate hearings before the New START Treaty was ratified.

A first purpose, was to enhance U.S. international disarmament credentials. A second purpose was to spur continuing bilateral disarmament efforts. Third, it was hoped that the treaty's transparency measures would increase predictability, which would maintain strategic stability. Fourth, one wanted to reduce and regulate weapons in order to maintain strategic stability at a lower cost. Fifth, policymakers and experts expressed underlying concerns with enhancing U.S. strategic advantage. If the New START Treaty expires next year, it might no longer serve the U.S. these purposes.

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List of Abbreviations

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

DOD – Department of Defense

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

INF Treaty – The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

MIRV – Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle

New START Treaty – Treaty between the United States of America and The Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

NPR – Nuclear Posture Review

NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SLBM – Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SORT Treaty – The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Moscow)

START I Treaty – Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

START II Treaty – Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. – The United States of America

1. Introduction

This thesis will examine the purposes of the New START Treaty for U.S. policymakers and experts.

Nuclear weapons are consequential. For states in possession of them, the weapons are primarily a safety guarantor. Still, the existence of the weapons represents a devastating potential for destruction for every member of the international community. Since the consequences and risks posed by nuclear weapons are so dire, management and regulation become a key challenge. Arms control is an important management and regulating tool. One fundamental purpose of arms control treaties is to reduce the probability of nuclear war. It is no wonder, therefore, that arms control is viewed as advantageous for the international community.

However, even if arms control treaties benefit the world at large, there is still a puzzle why nuclear states sign and ratify such treaties. If nuclear weapons are seen as central to national security, why would a state willingly put limits on its arsenal and constrain its own nuclear policy options? States rely on cooperation for their national security, and often do so with potential adversaries, instead of relying on a unilateral nuclear weapons policy. When nuclear states sign arms control agreements, they sign off the full autonomy to act on their security requirements. This implies that if the defense planners' assessments require larger nuclear arsenals to maintain a desired security level, the state's policymakers cannot act on this assessment if it exceeds a treaty's limits. Despite this constraint, the nuclear states still sign arms control agreements. This constitutes a paradox that begs the question of why states choose to sign arms control agreements and what policymakers see as the purpose with ratifying them.

This paradox motivates this thesis's aim to answer the question:

What are the purposes of New START for U.S. policymakers and experts?

The New START Treaty limits strategic arms between the U.S. and Russia and builds on former START Treaties. For the former START Treaties, the process of ratification in the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma did not always lead to the treaty entering in force.

Therefore, this thesis will study why the Senate successfully ratified the New START Treaty. It will do so through utilizing a theoretical framework previously not applied to study the case of the New START Treaty.

The New START Treaty might expire next year and leave the U.S. and Russia without bilateral nuclear arms control for the first time since 1972. The possible expiration follows a wave of bilateral arms control demises, most recently the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty last year. The New START Treaty was ratified in 2010 and expires February 2021, if not extended by five years. Russia has expressed willingness to extend it, while the U.S. authorities have seemed hesitant so far. The U.S. thus hold the destiny of the last bilateral arms control treaty in their hands.

I shall therefore scrutinize and make sense of the congressional hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations prior to the Senate's ratification in 2010. Studying the perceived purpose before ratifying the treaty in 2010, puts me in a better position to shed light on how failure to extend the treaty today will affect U.S.

1.1. The purpose of arms control

While it is commonly believed that arms control is the same as disarmament, which is defined as a state's reduction of its military arsenal, arms control has a broader definition. It includes all forms of military cooperation between states that has three main objectives: avoiding war, minimizing the economic cost and political risk of an arms race, and to reduce damage if war occurs (Schelling, Halperin, 1961, p. 2). Arms control can for example regulate the number of acceptable nuclear weapons, limit specific types of weapons or restrict the deployment of them. This thesis will examine the considerations and reasoning utilized by U.S. experts and politicians before ratifying one very significant nuclear arms control agreement in order to understand the underlying purposes behind these types of agreements.

Traditionally, most scholars explain arms control's purpose as contributing to strategic stability. Strategic stability consists of both crisis stability and arms race stability (Schelling, Halperin, 1961). Crisis stability involves reducing incentives for striking first. Arms control can contribute to crisis stability by securing all parties a secure second-strike capability. This makes states prone to abstain from using their nuclear weapons against one another because they know the nuclear opponent has the capability to respond in kind. Arms race stability involves imposing limits on states' arsenals to provide the same level of security as the states unilaterally would seek but at a lower level of economic and political cost. In the absence of a regulatory regime, it is assumed that states, unilaterally, would spend more resources on increasing their own nuclear arsenals. This provides one plausible explanation for why states sign arms control agreements, despite the paradox of relinquishing their right to decide and

act on their security requirements. However, more recent literature challenges scholars who are analyzing this paradox through this lens only (Maurer, 2018).

The American scholar Maurer identifies this as the first out of two gaps in the literature on arms control. Maurer presupposes or argues that most arms control agreements serve multiple purposes at the same time. This is in contrast to the conventional explanation for arms control, which only comprehends arms control in the light of the states' ability to maintain strategic stability. Furthermore, literature is scarce in examining how limiting concrete weapon systems contribute to generic terms such as peace, stability and security. This results in scholars, experts and policymakers talking past each other (Maurer, 2018). To contribute to fill the gaps Maurer described, this thesis will use Maurer's theoretical framework as a point of view to scrutinize the purposes that are on display in the discussions about whether to ratify a concrete control agreement: New START. The framework consists of three purposes for why nuclear states sign arms control agreements: disarmament, strategic stability and strategic advantage.

1.2. The case of The New START Treaty

The primary aim of this thesis is to make sense of the ratification process of the New START Treaty. I will analyze in detail U.S. politicians' and experts' perceived purposes in this process. A secondary aim is to explore the potential transfer value of the perceived purposes in the ratification process in 2010 to the debate about extension of the treaty today. The New START Treaty is the last remaining treaty between the U.S. and Russia and it will expire, unless both parties choose to extend it by five years.

The New START Treaty does not only represent the last decade of strategic arms control between the U.S. and Russia. It represents over 40 years of strategic arms control between great powers. After the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s, the U.S. and Soviet Union signed the first START Treaty in 1991. The New START Treaty's foundation builds on the former START Treaties.

The full name of the treaty is "Treaty between the United States of America and The Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms", commonly known as the New START Treaty. The treaty itself does not define the term "strategic offensive arms". However, it lists the specific types of systems the treaty limits. I will describe the concrete limits in the beginning of Chapter 4: U.S. Assessments of New START.

Unless familiar with the issues, the numbers are difficult to interpret. This makes it difficult at first glance to assess how the concrete limits as set by the treaty affects the national security of the U.S. This partly explains the process after former U.S. president Obama signed the treaty and before the Senate ratified the treaty. The Committee on Foreign Relations needed to hold hearings in order for the senators to interpret the concrete limits and their consequences for the U.S.

In order to analyze the lawmakers', and the experts', perceived purposes of the treaty's limitations, I will scrutinize congressional hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations. After President Obama signed the agreement in April 2010, the Senate had to ratify the treaty in order for it to enter in force. This process might prove challenging, as the history of former START Treaties shows. Even though signed, The START II Treaty never entered into force, despite years of negotiations and new addenda to the treaty between the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma put a halt to the process. This is why it is interesting to study perceived purposes of the New START Treaty present in congressional hearings. The Committee held ten public hearings after President Obama signed the agreement and prior to the Senate ratifying it. Present during the hearings were politicians, the negotiators and invited experts, which secures that the selection of arguments probably are more mixed than if only politicians took part of the debate.

1.3. Academic and policy relevance

This thesis is particularly designed to contribute to understand the perceived American value of the New START Treaty. As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov wrote together in The New York Times earlier this year, "Right now, the most important thing to do is extend New START. Russia has indicated, at the highest levels, its willingness to do so. All that President Trump needs to do is agree" (Albright & Ivanov, 2020). The transfer value of studying assessments of the purpose of the New START Treaty before ratification in 2010 is a more thorough understanding of exactly what Trump has to decide on now, what the perceived tradeoffs between ratification or not are and how a failure to extend the treaty will affect the U.S. However, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia have changed since ratification in 2010 and this might reduce the transfer value. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and last year, the U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty because Russia broke their obligations to the treaty – which Russia refused to admit. This might imply

that the U.S. perceives the risk of Russia cheating on other arms control treaties as higher than the U.S. perceived in 2010.

While the particularities of the New START Treaty are interesting due to its relevance in the current political debate, the thesis will strive to have some broader contributions. First, through the theoretical framework and methodology it seeks to add one contribution to the catalogue of case studies of arms control and nuclear policy previously not studied with this framework. Secondly, it aims to contribute to the growing literature on modern arms control, i.e. arms control in the second nuclear age¹. Most of the existing arms control literature builds on the theoretical foundation built before the first bilateral arms control treaty existed. Thirdly, it seeks to provide a contribution to our understanding of the nature of congressional hearings. This could be useful in order to understand how policy relevant knowledge is produced and perhaps even bridge the gap between scholars and policymakers in understanding theoretical concepts.

1.4. Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 will present the traditional theories explaining why states sign and ratify arms control. Then, I will present the theoretical framework applied in the main analysis. The framework enables a study of arms control agreements identifying multiple purposes present for ratifying arms control agreements. Chapter 3 contains a presentation of the methodological choices of the analysis. The aim is to be transparent about the opportunities and challenges the design provides in this analysis.

In Chapter 4, I conduct a case study of ratification process of the New START Treaty. It is an analysis of the perceived purposes the Treaty serves in the congressional hearings before ratifying the treaty. The chapter's structure derives from the chosen theoretical framework, which provides three purposes for signing arms control agreements: disarmament, stability and advantage. I examine the empirical data from the congressional hearings through these three lenses to determine what purposes dominate the discussion and arguments made. I demonstrate that all purposes were present to a various degree, and I discuss how they were evident and how the purposes interlinked. In Chapter 5, I conclude the analysis by discussing the key findings from the analysis.

¹ The term is often used to describe nuclear states and their policy after the Cold War ended. (Holmes, J. R. 2012, October 16, The Second Nuclear Age, *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2012/10/welcome-to-the-second-nuclear-age/>)

The five key findings of the perceived purposes of the New START Treaty for U.S. policymakers and experts are in broad terms: First, to maintain strategic stability through reducing and regulating nuclear weapons. Second, to maintain strategic stability through transparency measures. Third, to enhance U.S. international disarmament credentials. Fourth, to spur continuing U.S.-Russian disarmament efforts. Fifth, the policymakers and experts demonstrated concern over the treaty's ability to enhance U.S. strategic advantage.

After presenting the key findings, I shall discuss their implications for next year's possible expiration, and suggest topics for further studies. In the conclusion, I aim to elaborate and discuss this thesis' contributions.

2. Theory

In this chapter, I first present traditional theory for explaining why states sign arms control agreements in more detail than the brief presentation in Chapter 1. Second, I will present the critique of the traditional theory. Scholars have criticized the concept of strategic stability for being too technical and that it lacks a political approach. Third, I will lay out the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. The framework provides two additional motives for signing arms control agreements: disarmament and strategic advantage. Applying three motives instead of one will show how one agreement can serve multiple purposes and interests.

Arms control theory emerged from the 1960 *Daedalus* special issue arms control² (edited by Donald G. Brennan) as well as from Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin's 1961 book *Strategy and Arms Control*. These founding fathers were described by Nancy Gallagher as "the Cambridge Community", given their location in Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S. This thesis will utilize the same term to refer to this group of arms control academics and their influential work. *Daedalus* has later provided new special issues on arms control because of the influence the original issue had. More than sixty years later, scholars continue to make use of and build on Schelling and Halperin's work.

The Cambridge Community contributed to establishing and defining arms control as a distinct term. While disarmament is a state's reduction of its military arsenal, Schelling and Halperin define arms control as all forms of military cooperation between states that has three main objectives: First, avoid war. Second, minimize the economic cost and political risk of an arms race. Third, reduce damage if war occurs (Schelling, Halperin, 1961, p. 2). While Schelling and Halperin included all forms of military cooperation, I will focus on formal arms control treaties. Formal arms control treaties do not have to concern nuclear weapons, but I will in this thesis focus on nuclear weapons, not conventional weapons.

When Schelling and Halperin wrote *Strategy and Arms Control*, the classic arms control treaties such as the INF Treaty and the START Treaty were not yet established. They wrote *Strategy and Arms Control* in a time where both the U.S and Russia had possessed nuclear weapons for over a decade, and the competition intensified. During the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration announced that they would "protect themselves and their allies through the

² John F. Kennedy called this issue "The Bible" for arms control because it established the concept of strategic stability. (American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security. Retrieved from: <https://www.amacad.org/project/arms-control-disarmament-and-national-security>)

deterrent of massive retaliatory power” (History, 2009A) while Soviet leader Khrushchev stated in an interview that the “Soviet Union has missile superiority over the United States and challenges America to a missile shooting match to prove his assertion” (History, 2009B). The Cambridge Community therefore saw arms control as an alternative to disarmament because it took into account the “strategic, technological and geopolitical” realities of the on-going nuclear arms race (Atkinson, 2017).

Schelling and Halperin argued that states should strive to maintain “strategic stability”. They define strategic stability as crisis stability and arms race stability. Crisis stability involves reducing incentives for striking first. Arms control can contribute to crisis stability by securing all parties a second-strike capability. This makes states refrain from using their military forces against one another because they know the nuclear opponent is equally capable. Arms race stability involves imposing limits on states’ arsenals in order to provide the same level of security as the states unilaterally would seek but at a lower level of economic and political cost. Unilaterally, states would spend more resources on increasing their arsenals.

According to Schelling and Halperin, states can strengthen strategic stability by agreeing on arms control. A reciprocal adjustment in military postures can thus be of national security interest for both parties (Schelling, Halperin, 1961 p. 143). Strategic stability relies on states being aware of the reciprocal military threat their adversaries possess. This is what deterrence is: states being aware that certain outcomes are worse for both themselves and their adversaries (Schelling, Halperin, 1961, p. 142). Schelling and Halperin argue that this awareness of each other’s capabilities reduces the chances of war. They believe arms control provides rules, traditions and clearer expectations about each other’s reactions and modes of behavior that may reduce the likelihood of military action based on mistake or misunderstanding³ (Schelling, Halperin, 1961, p. 4).

Strategic stability-theory is not without critique. In this and the next paragraph, I present the critique. First, critics argue that it is too difficult to categorize weapons as ‘stabilizing’ and ‘destabilizing’ and for adversaries to judge the intention of the weapons (Maurer, 2018). Second, proponents of the nuclear revolution are skeptical of strategic stability because they do not believe states need arms control in order to prevent war. Proponents of the nuclear

³ Scholars argue today that the biggest challenge and risk nuclear weapons poses is miscommunication and misperception (Williams, H. (2017) “Dr. Heather Williams on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control” [Video clip]. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NfYqxEtunos>)

revolution believe the existence of nuclear weapons automatically renders the possibility of war. This is because nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from other weapons. As Brodie argued in 1946, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them" (Brodie (1946) in Brodie (1978). Policymakers and scholars viewed nuclear weapons so lethal that the main purpose of possessing them is to deter other nuclear states use of them. Third, critics question whether maintaining armed forces really are an effective means of preventing war and ask why states should not arrange their agreements as disarmament arms controllers argue, towards abolition instead of mutual deterrence (Maurer, 2018, p. 15).

Fourth, Trachtenberg questioned whether crisis stability and arms race stability really generates peace (Trachtenberg, 1991). If it does not, he questions whether arms control should function as a tool for maintaining strategic stability. Fifth, Carol Cohn argued that the theory lacks a human approach. She argues that the technical aspect fosters a technical language where there is little room to discuss the moral implication of using nuclear weapons (Cohn, 1987, p. 711). She highlights that those working with these issues scarcely mention peace, but refer instead to 'strategic stability' (Cohn, 1987, p. 708). Lastly, scholars have criticized the theory for its narrow and largely technical understanding of arms control, which lacks a political dimension (Gallagher, 2015, p. 472). A political approach would be helpful in achieving political goals on an international level, instead of technical ones on a bilateral level. Gallagher argues that a technical focus increases bipartisan support for treaties, which explains the heavy technical focus when evaluating treaties among politicians (Gallagher, 2015, p. 474). Instead, Gallagher referred to the work of another scholar from the same time as The Cambridge Community's work was established, Hedley Bull.

Bull managed to integrate both the political and technical dimensions of arms control. Like Schelling and Halperin, Bull provides three objectives for arms control. He writes, "to contribute to international security and stop the drift to war, to release economic resources otherwise spent on armaments, and lastly, to stop preparing for war because it is morally wrong" (Larsen, 2002, p. 2). Bull also argued that scholars and policymakers should evaluate arms control agreements in light of how they contribute politically to strengthen international diplomacy (Gallagher, 2015, p. 487). He believed the most important objective for arms control was to promote order and increase a sense of society among sovereign states. He also argued that policymakers and scholars should address substantive questions about arms control within the context of current political structures, institutions, and relationships, not

treated as technical problems that the policymakers and scholars can solve in the abstract. This argument, combined with his moral take on the objectives for arms control, leads Gallagher to argue that Bull treats political, philosophical, and moral considerations as seriously as technical and military ones (Gallagher, 2016).

However, neither the strategic stability-theory of arms control nor the critique of it, seem sufficient in explaining the purpose of the New START Treaty when reading the American on-going debate on whether to extend the Treaty or not. In an op-ed published before Christmas, the Chief U.S. negotiator to the New START Treaty, Rose Gottemoeller, identified the Trump administration's two concerns with extension: "The treaty does not limit new nuclear weapons systems that the Russians are threatening to use against us; and it does not include the Chinese, who are busily modernizing their nuclear arsenal" (Gottemoeller, 2019). Despite the concern, the modernization of the Chinese nuclear arsenal does not threaten American second-strike capability, as it is estimated that China possess 300 nuclear weapons and the U.S. over 6000 nuclear weapons (SIPRI, 2019). If the New START Treaty expires over U.S. concern with a Chinese arsenal that cannot threaten strategic stability, then it might imply that the New START Treaty served other purposes as well. Therefore, the analysis of the purposes of New START would benefit from a framework that enables the identification of multiple purposes.

The American scholar Maurer presents a theoretical framework for analyzing three purposes for arms control. Maurer's work came after a warning from Robert Jervis that "if the main objective of arms control is to make war less likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory of the causes of war" (Jervis, 1993). This was not the case in either the works of Bull, or Schelling and Halperin. This simple argument Jervis made leads Maurer to present a theoretical framework for analyzing arms control that consists of three arms control theories. This is because the uncertainty in causes of war theory should lead to uncertainty in arms control theory and nuances in analysis of agreements. In addition to strategic stability, he identifies "disarmament" and "strategic advantage" as two other potential purposes for signing arms control agreements. Maurer's three purposes thus help the analysis to move beyond the theory established by the Cambridge Community, while still acknowledging strategic stability as one of the purposes arms control serve.

2.1. Disarmament arms control

The first purpose Maurer provides for signing arms control agreements is disarmament. As the name suggests, the motive is to reduce arsenals and ultimately abolish nuclear weapons. Disarmament arms controllers seek to remove the rationales provided for justifying war and to create new, international arenas for justice. They also want to free up the resources spent on the military to use towards peaceful purposes (Maurer, 2018, p. 11). The disarmament-theory builds on the critique Cohn, Trachtenberg and Gallagher made of strategic stability and Bull's alternative objectives for arms control.

Disarmament arms controllers have a long-term view on arms control. They believe it takes time to reach their goals. This is why the proponents support partial measures, as opposed to stability arms controllers (Maurer, 2018, p. 12). Disarmament arms controllers view agreements that introduce new reductions, regardless of their size, as a step in the right direction. Previously, advocates of disarmament have praised the efforts made by former U.S. president Reagan and former Soviet leader Gorbachev to work towards the long-term goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. The proponents also praised the INF Treaty because it eliminated a whole class of weapons. Maurer argues that the disarmament arms controller's praise of the INF Treaty is an example on how they praise even small efforts because they view treaties as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of nuclear abolition. This is because the INF Treaty only limited *land-based* missiles with an intermediate-range, and only those of the Soviet Union and the U.S. Disarmament arms controllers also argue that it is safer to reduce the arsenals and work towards abolition than to rely on deterrence. They argue that there is no empirical evidence that deterrence works and that if it fails, the consequences would be fatal (Maurer, 2018, p. 13).

Critics of this approach question whether disarmament is the most important factor in preventing war. The critics argue that disarmament in the time between the First and Second World War failed to prevent the outbreak of the latter. They are also afraid that destroying the wrong weapons might harm deterrence and actually increase the risk of war (Maurer, 2018, p. 12).

2.2. Stability arms control

The second purpose states have for signing arms control agreements is to maintain strategic stability. This is the classic arms control theory as presented by Cambridge Community. The goal is to promote a defense-dominant agenda. A defense-dominant agenda means working

toward the military balance favoring defense instead of offense because it deters states from attacking each other. The opposite would favor a first strike to avoid the damage if the other state strikes first. This is what the Cambridge Community referred to as crisis instability. An offense-dominant situation also favors acquiring more weapons in order to protect and deter against the first striker. This undermines other states' security and triggers an arms race. States can use arms control agreements as a tool to shape this balance. States can limit or prevent defensive weapons, to make sure both parties have a secure second-strike capability and reduce the incentives of striking first. This strengthens deterrence and ensures mutual assured destruction and vulnerability. In this way, strategic stability ensures peace and enhances national security (Maurer, 2018, p. 13).

Whereas proponents of disarmament view arms control agreements as building blocks towards the long-term goal of peace, stability arms controllers seek immediate and permanent solutions. The proponents of the stability-theory of arms control view the problem as a military-technical one that requires adequate solutions. They study the relative vulnerability of weapon technology and pressure for solutions in order to achieve the necessary balance to avoid first strike capability. The proponents also want the solutions to control the entire problem, and not to have partial measures. This is why the proponents of the stability-theory view arms control agreements as permanent. Changes should occur when new (and destabilizing) technology requires it (Maurer, 2018, p. 15). Proponents of this school believe states should acknowledge their shared interests in order to gain mutual benefits by signing arms control agreements.

2.3. Advantage arms control

The third purpose Maurer presents for states to have for signing arms control agreements is to enhance their strategic advantage. Proponents of the advantage theory believe arms control can help promote military advantages of status quo powers over war-prone revisionist powers. States can structure arms control agreements to be beneficial to themselves, for example by limiting the kind of weapons that traditionally have been advantageous to their adversaries or including asymmetrical reductions. States can use arms control to shift or shape the competition to their advantage (Maurer, 2018, p. 16). According to Maurer, using some advantages and downplaying others is a forgotten intellectual alternative to traditional arms control theory, which emphasizes strategic stability (Maurer, 2018B).

For the proponents of this theory, states should use and discard arms control according to their needs. In other words, arms control agreements are temporary tools. The agreements are part of a long-term competition between the great powers to seek marginal advantages. When the competition no longer looks as it did at the time of ratification, the states may need new tools to assure their own military advantage. When states secure their own military advantages, they can hinder a more war prone state to start war. This is why Maurer argues that peace is a product of the competition. Proponents of advantage arms control, just like proponents of disarmament arms control, he argues, judge individual agreements as to how they contribute to a larger peace-promoting agenda (Maurer, 2018, p. 18).

Maurer argues that U.S. policymakers today should pay closer attention to how arms control can contribute to enhancing U.S. competitive advantage (Maurer, 2018B). He contends that the U.S. began seeking this advantage at the early stages of the Cold War in order to maintain a nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union (See also Green & Long, 2017). Seeking quantitative parity is the first offset, according to Maurer. Publicly, the U.S. argued in favor of reductions so the world would be safer from nuclear weapons. Privately, the leaders saw that reductions in the nuclear arsenals were beneficial to them vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The qualities of the American weapons were better, and through reductions, the U.S. could achieve superiority at a lesser cost (Maurer, 2018B).

The second offset came after the nuclear superiority ended, and Maurer calls it qualitative advantages. Maurer argues that the first START Treaty pursued this. He writes that START I required the Soviet Union to eliminate “half of their heavy ICBMs and reduce their missile throw weight by nearly 50 percent” (Maurer, 2018B). The treaty requires the same of the United States, even though the U.S. had no “heavy” ICBMs and their missile forces were below the limit. Still, the language of the treaty seems neutral. The U.S. prevented the Russians from matching U.S. qualitative force improvements with quantitative offsets of their own. This made the U.S. achieve superior nuclear capabilities (Maurer, 2018B). The INF Treaty provides another piece of evidence for the U.S. utilizing arms control agreements to enhance their own competitive advantages, according to Maurer. It was indeed unique, because it prohibited a whole class of missiles, including those with conventional warheads. This led many disarmament-arms controllers to argue in favor of the INF agreement. Still, Maurer argues, the agreement only prohibited land-based intermediate-range missiles, which was favorable for the U.S. The U.S. had stronger sea and air capabilities than the Soviet Union (Maurer, 2018B). However, enhancing one’s strengths and downplaying other states’

weaknesses do not necessarily signify one's preparedness to win a war. It might be to limit the prospect of war, if the state believe the other state is more war-prone. This is how Maurer argues this theory has a peace-promoting agenda.

One might question why adversaries might agree to treaties downplaying their strengths. First, the other state might trick them into it. Second, adversaries might conclude an arms control agreement that promotes different relative advantages for each side. Lastly, the states have different calculations about the long-term implications and each side is seeking to advance its own competitive advantage (Maurer, 2018, p. 18).

If scholars recognize that arms control might serve this purpose, they might not treat ratification of treaties as empirical evidence for cooperation between states but might instead view it as a sign of the competition shifting form. This provides a deeper understanding of how cooperation and competition works in the international environment. It also takes into consideration that the two concepts, cooperation and competition, are not mutually exclusive (Maurer, 2018, p. 26).

The critics of this approach question how much relative advantage a state needs to improve deterrence, especially when they compare it with other interests and communicating them with their adversaries. Lastly, the critics argue that arms control in general only ratifies the existing balance, and does not change it (Maurer, 2018, p. 19).

2.4. Expectations and concluding remarks

Maurer's main argument is that all three theories can function in a complementary way to explain the multiple purposes states perceive in signing arms control agreements. He argues that the theories are so different that they downplay or ignore the existence of other theories and that they are not mutually exclusive. The different explanations, he says, requires us not to reject the others as false (Maurer, 2018, p. 19). There are three reasons for this. First, by acknowledging proponents of advantage arms controller's idea of arms control not necessarily being a sign of cooperation, you also reduce the risk of misunderstanding the international political environment. Second, by better understanding the theoretical debate on arms control, one can also better understand whether an agreement was successful. Third, analyzing multiple purposes can also shed light on changes over time. It can show whether the purpose of a specific agreement changed. This helps understand what the different short and long-term benefits and consequences of a treaty will be. Fourth, Maurer argues that utilizing the lens of all three motives will help bring meaning to generic concepts often referred to such as

“stability” in arms control research (Maurer, 2018, p. 10). Lastly, scholars should study the practical world because the political necessity has different implications for arms control than theories. In this thesis, I will therefore apply his framework in order to analyze multiple purposes for the ratification of the New START Treaty.

This introduces several opportunities and challenges into this analysis. It will provide a fuller understanding of the purposes of the New START Treaty to apply these three theories.

Because the theories rely on different assumptions about what causes and what prevents war, studying the empirical material through all of them, might help broaden our understanding of the New START Treaty and its different implications. At the same time, applying these theories presents two challenges. First, the way Maurer presents the theories makes them resemble ideal types rather than full theories. In the analysis, it will be more difficult to show the nuances that exist in the data. The chosen theories might make me pay more attention to material supporting the chosen lenses, and hence, ideal types instead of nuances. Second, it might leave an impression that all three theories have the same level of academic support when utilizing all three theories the same way. In reality, that is not the case. More scholars explain the paradox of states signing arms control agreements by strategic stability than by disarmament. However, the intention behind choosing this theoretical framework is not to study competing theories in order to strengthen one of them. The intention behind choosing this theoretical framework is to acknowledge that theories can function in a complementary way and provide a map to understand what purposes U.S. policymakers and experts consider arms control agreements to serve.

3. Methodology

The political scientist Mayer presents three objectives for a research study, all of which influences methodological choices. First, the study needs to be academically relevant, yet practically relevant to practitioners. Second, the research must be theoretically structured, yet empirically focused. Third, the researcher should aim to be “methodologically sound in its approach, whereby the resulting analysis exhibits conceptual clarity, validity and reliability” (Mayer, 2013, p. 21). This requires transparency about the methodological choices and their consequences. This chapter aims to increase methodological transparency, not in order to “guard” this thesis against criticism, but rather to open up for discussions about the different implications and challenges of my methodological choices. One can imagine a map, where there are different routes to go from A (the research question) to B (this thesis’ answer). A research design shows what route the thesis follows. To do so, I will discuss the chosen case, operationalizing of the theory, data and sources and the coding scheme.

3.1. Selecting a case

This thesis will use a single case study to examine the purpose of the New START Treaty according to U.S. policymakers and experts. First, I will clarify why I chose to study American considerations. Then I will explain why I chose the New START Treaty as the case for American considerations.

There are a number of reasons for choosing to study American purposes in this thesis. The most interesting states to study when analyzing why states ratify arms control agreement are the U.S. and Russia. This is mainly because of two factors. First, they have signed the most arms control agreements. Second, together they possess over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons are key to their national security, as confirmed in the Nuclear Posture Review (2018) when Jim Mattis in his Secretary’s Preface writes: “This review rests on a bedrock truth: nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future” (Nuclear Posture Review, 2018). The same view is confirmed in the Russian Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine of this year, when it states “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons

when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020). When choosing between the U.S. and Russia, it came down to a practical question. The language barriers argued in favor of studying the U.S. The same did the availability of the material I seek to scrutinize. This thesis relies on public documents and debates, and the public material is more available in the U.S than in Russia.

Since I chose to study American assessments of arms control’s purpose, I have chosen to study the New START Treaty as a case. A case study enables a broad range of sources and a deeper understanding of contextual factors. Theoretical concepts are difficult to measure. However, case studies make it easier to study contextual factors, as George and Bennet identifies as one of the strengths with conducting a case study (George, Bennet, 2005, p. 19). This can contribute to a discussion and understanding of what Americans attribute to concepts such as strategic stability. American understanding of strategic stability might be different from, for example, a Russian understanding. As argued by Williams, the concept of strategic stability is in the eye of the beholder (Williams, 2019). A case study provides the opportunity to study the contextual factors for an increased understanding of strategic stability. This enables case studies to generate new hypotheses for future studies with greater ease, and it shows that observations do not have to be theory-determined (George, Bennet, 2005, p. 21).

The New START Treaty is an interesting case of American arms control purpose because of its expiration date. Unless the U.S. and Russia extend it by five years, the treaty will expire in February 2021, less than a year from now. Studying American considerations of the treaty’s impact prior to ratification in 2010 will shed light on how the demise of the treaty might affect the U.S. now. In addition, the New START Treaty was built on treaties that had ceased to exist. The U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the first START Treaty in 1991. In 2009, it expired. Then president Obama and President Medvedev signed a New START Treaty. After this, the Senate had to ratify the treaty. The discussions the Senate had before ratifying in 2010 takes place in a similar situation as the U.S. might face next year. It shows why Americans argued to bring back an arms control agreement limiting strategic arms. If the New START Treaty expires, the U.S. might again find themselves in the position wanting to bring back an arms control agreement limiting strategic arms.

It presents a challenge as well to choose the New START Treaty as the case. Because the treaty builds on other treaties, it is quite different from its predecessors and other bilateral arms control agreements between the U.S. and Russia. The New START Treaty did not introduce new, significant reductions. It mostly continued the agreements negotiated in the

former START treaties. For this analysis, this presents a challenge. Because the proposed new reductions are quite modest, there is less reason to believe the politicians and experts in the Senate argued in favor of ratification because of the disarmament-agenda. If the reductions were bigger, it is reasonable to believe the debate had focused more on the reductions itself and their impact. That might had shed light on different arms control agendas. However, without a treaty, there would be no limitations at all. Disarmament arms controllers view treaties as building blocks toward the ultimate goal of nuclear abolition. Even if the debates do not focus on the reductions, this view should be present.

In the process of choosing an agreement as the case for the analysis, I considered other agreements as well, mainly the INF Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). I considered studying the NPT in addition to either the INF Treaty or the New START Treaty, to compare bilateral and multilateral arms control. However, it proved to be more challenging than beneficial to the analysis. The NPT has a different purpose and is more complex. In addition to the original treaty, the U.S. also signed the additional IAEA Safeguards Agreement. This separated two important discussions, which both should have been included in the analysis in order to compare it with the New START Treaty. Due to time and space-constraints, I chose not to do this. In addition, because the NPT is very different from the New START Treaty, it might not have been fruitful to compare the results.

I also considered studying the INF Treaty both as a comparative case to the New START Treaty and separately instead of the New START Treaty. However, scholars have studied the Cold War treaties more than modern arms control considerations. Because of the gap in the literature, I chose to the New START Treaty over the INF Treaty. I could have chosen to study both and compare them, but due to time and space-constraints, I chose to focus on the New START Treaty. The available empirical material also guided this decision. For the INF Treaty, the available material consisted of more than congressional hearings because the U.S. has published documents of the negotiation process. This material is not (yet) public for the New START Treaty's negotiation process. The size of the material thus hamper a comparison of the two cases. While comparing American considerations of two different treaties might have contributed to a fuller understanding of how the politicians and experts discuss treaties, focusing the analysis on one case provides a deeper understanding of that one case. As Mayer acknowledges in his work, "a single case study research design can be quite useful in developing a deeper, richer analysis that pays attention to nuances and causal linkages" (Mayer, 2013, p. 36).

The case of the New START Treaty presents two opportunities for generalizable findings. First, the case can shed light on the logic behind contemporary American arms control considerations. This can provide an idea for future debates in the American context and what arms control purposes exist in the second nuclear age. Second, that the treaty builds on existing treaties might increase its scope for generalization, as the findings might be representative for the other START treaties as well. When it comes to bilateral nuclear arms control agreements, there has only been the START Treaties and the INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia the last two decades.

However, this does not mean that generalization is unproblematic. This thesis does not study other cases than the New START Treaty, and the causal variables this theoretical framework does not sufficiently explain, might be even more valuable in other cases (George & Bennet, 2005, p. 110).

To conclude, there are several opportunities and challenges when studying the case of the New START Treaty. In the analysis, the aim is to focus on the opportunities and be transparent about the challenges to shed light on the purposes of contemporary American arms control.

3.2. Operationalizing the theory

This thesis will take a deductive approach. A deductive approach tests the empirical implications and predictions of theory, as opposed to an inductive approach where the researcher draws predictions and conclusions from the data, not the theory. The deductive approach's pitfall is the increased emphasis on material supporting the chosen theory. Material fitting the theory's predictions increases confidence in the explanation provided by it (Rø, 2011, p. 75). At the same time, there is reason to be skeptical of it. Isolating factors, explanations and causal directions is a difficult task and therefore, this thesis aims to be transparent of this uncertainty.

3.2.1. Selecting data and coping with uncertain sources

In this thesis, I will study the congressional hearings held prior to the New START treaty ratification. This data material provides an opportunity to examine politicians and experts' public assessments of the purposes of the treaty before ratifying it. The hearings will show how the ones who voted over ratification discussed implications of it. The hearings' main objective is to discuss and consider ratification. Since this analysis seeks to answer the

question on what the purpose of New START Treaty was according to American policymakers and experts, analyzing the hearings provide a forum where politicians from both parties, negotiators and experts meet to discuss these issues. This secures that the selection of arguments probably are more mixed than if I only analyzed the negotiators' assessments alone.

President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev first signed the agreement in Prague on April 8, 2010. Then on May 13, the Senate received the agreement and referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations, along with the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence. The Committee on Foreign Relations was placed in charge of holding the hearings. I will focus on these hearings, as they form the most significant material. The committee held 12 hearings, including two closed hearings. The first closed hearing was on June 8 and concerned the negotiation on the treaty. The second was on July 14 and concerned monitoring and verification of treaty compliance. The publicly available material consists of 448 pages from the 10 public hearings. In the analysis, I will reference the quotes from the hearings with New START and the corresponding hearing number. The public hearings include the following:

1. April 29: "The Historical and Modern Context for U.S.-Russian Arms Control".
2. May 18: "The New START Treaty."
3. May 19: "The History and Lessons of START."
4. May 25: "The Role of Strategic Arms Control in a Post-Cold War World."
5. June 10: "Strategic Arms Control and National Security."
6. June 15: "The negotiation of the New START Treaty."
7. June 16: "The New START Treaty: Views from the Pentagon."
8. June 24: "The New START Treaty: Implementation – Inspections and Assistance."
9. June 24: "Benefits and risks related to the treaty."
10. July 15: "Maintaining a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Arsenal."

During those meetings, there were several witnesses invited to speak in addition to the committee members. The witnesses include intelligence community officials, experts in the field, negotiators, and others. They were outside experts on the field across the political spectrum, all with firsthand knowledge on arms control and nuclear weapons. In total, there were 18 politicians present at all hearings as members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and around two-three invited experts for each hearing. The Committee consisted of ten Democrats and eight Republicans. In addition, the main chair was a Democrat. Senator Kerry

(D), in addition to Senator Kaufman (D), Senator Shaheen (D) and Senator Casey (D), mainly chaired the meetings. This thesis will analyze statements from both politicians and the invited experts.

On 22 December 2010, the Senate ratified the treaty. Ratification required 67 out of 100 U.S. Senators to vote in favor. 71 voted in favor. Among those were all Democrats, Independents and 13 Republicans. Among the 26 who voted against, were only Republicans. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 voted in favor of ratification, while four opposed. Among those in favor were three Republicans: Richard Lugar, Bob Corker and Johnny Isakson.

In his article, Maurer focuses on how policymakers decide on a negotiation strategy. My analysis will be different since it will analyze the public discussions held in the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations. When these hearings took place, the administration had already concluded the negotiations with Russia. The hearings discuss whether to ratify the treaty, as the treaty is. It does not discuss changes to the treaty itself, and what the politicians and experts would like to change in order for the treaty to serve their motives for arms control better.

Still, it will be useful to apply Maurer's framework on this material. First, because the negotiators, such as Rose Gottemoeller, also participated in the hearings, arguing why they believe the U.S. should ratify the treaty. The negotiators' statements are interesting because they know what trade-offs the U.S. had to make to secure the treaty. Second, because this material includes both Democrat and Republican views of the treaty, while analyzing the administration's perceived purposes would only provide those of Democrats. In addition, if the New START Treaty gets an extension next year, there are two ways for that to happen. The first is a clean one, where the U.S. and Russia make no new adjustments and requires just a signature from the two heads of state. The second makes new adjustments to the treaty. That would require the Senate's ratification. This makes it interesting to go back to the last time the Senate debated and ratified the treaty.

It makes it easy to limit the analysis in time and scope when using congressional hearings as the empirical data. Congressional hearings thus help systematize the analysis and process the prevalent considerations as publicly expressed in these hearings. The material is easily available, and this increases the replicability by making it easier for others to find and utilize the exact same material.

The Committee's two closed hearings presents a challenge. The field of national security and nuclear weapons may be particularly prone to classification issues. Even though it might have been academically interesting to gain access to that material, it would also have been academically problematic to use it, preventing others from access to the same material and replication (Mayer, 2013, p. 42). Because of this, I want to specify that this thesis analyzes *public* American assessments. This might influence the results of the analysis. It is more difficult to argue publicly in favor of ratification because it will enhance U.S. strategic advantage because the policymakers and experts know that both Russia and the international community is paying attention to their hearings. This makes it easier to argue in favor of ratification because the treaty's purpose is either to maintain strategic stability or to strengthen disarmament efforts, which both are equally fruitful for Russia and the U.S.

It raises another challenge to rely on public assessments. According to Yin, "every document was written for some specific purpose and some specific audience other than those of the case study being done" (Yin, 2003, p. 86). This might be especially true regarding politicians' statements, because they have to reaffirm the parties' stand. Democrat's voices in the hearings will most likely not oppose the treaty because their administration negotiated it. In addition, politicians use words with less detailed attention to theory and causality than scholars do. Their intentions might not be theoretically founded, even if the politicians use theoretical concepts to argue in favor of ratification. Some of the most influential arms control scholars, such as Thomas Schelling, have had a big impact on the practical world as well as the theoretical. This impact might influence how politicians choose to express their thoughts on an arms control treaty. The negotiators, invited as witnesses, also have to argue in favor of ratification of the treaty they negotiated and already agreed on. The statements are prepared in advance, and some have described congressional hearings as a political theater (Troy, 2015). However, this does not make the analysis of the statements less interesting, because the statements include assessments of the purpose of the New START Treaty made by American policymakers and experts, which is what I seek to study in this analysis.

3.2.2. The use of a coding scheme

When analyzing the congressional hearings, I will focus on manifest content: concrete and observable content. It treats text as content where meanings can be observed and should be counted (Bratberg, 2017, p. 101). This approach enables me to analyze and systemize how close the policymakers and invited experts' statements are to the different theories'

explanations for the purposes of arms control. Since Maurer argues all three purposes are present in successful treaties, a coding scheme focusing on manifest content will help to analyze the weight of the different theories. It also enables me to study how policymakers and experts use words differently.

The three different arms control theories have three different arms control agendas. In order to capture the arguments close to the agendas, I operationalized the agendas through keywords. The first theory has a larger peace-promoting agenda obtained through disarmament. Disarmament is hence a tool for achieving the larger agenda. That is why I chose disarmament as the first keyword for identifying arguments of this theory. In addition, I chose to search for “elimination”, “reduction” and “peace”. I chose the first two because they function as the same tool as disarmament, and “peace” because that is the larger agenda for this theory.

The second theory has a defense-dominant promoting agenda. Arms control might achieve this through enhancing strategic stability through arms race stability and crisis stability. In order to find the arguments associated with this theory, I searched for “stability”. It includes all mentions of strategic stability, crisis stability and arms race stability. I did not search for multiple keywords to identify arguments in the hearings strengthening the stability-theory because the results of the search was more fruitful than the other searches in terms of support for the theory, and because synonyms to the word stability, like balance, is not a synonym to the concept of strategic stability. For the last theory, I chose to search for “advantage”, “superior” and “benefit/benefits/beneficial”. All of these keywords help identify arguments concerned with the treaty’s potential for advancing U.S. competitive advantages.

Table 1 shows an overview over the three theories and its corresponding keywords used to conduct the analysis.

Table 1

	Disarmament	Stability	Advantage
Keywords	“Disarmament”, “Elimination”, “Reduction”, “Peace”	“Stability”	“Advantage” “Superior” “Benefit/benefits/beneficial”

The keywords help by generating results relevant for the analysis. However, when analyzing the results, the keywords alone do not determine whether the result is relevant. The context the keywords appear in, what the whole sentence looks like, what questions have been asked, is what helps me analyze the results the keywords generate. The context helps sort the relevant information from the less relevant information. In addition, the context might show that the results are in fact relevant for more than one arms control motive. In this case, I will try to present the nuances and interpretation of the results.

4. U.S. Assessments of New START

In this chapter, I utilize the theoretical framework as outlined in the theory chapter to examine the case of the New START Treaty. In the hearings, I found that the politicians and experts' arguments in favor of ratification demonstrated the power of all three theories for arms control in explaining the purposes of the New START Treaty. However, they did so in various degrees.

First, I found that the politicians and experts' statements demonstrated the power of the disarmament-theory in explaining the purpose for the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty. However, there was a distinction between the politicians and experts who argued that the agreement would spur continuing U.S.-Russian disarmament efforts and the ones who argued that the agreement could be beneficial to the U.S. for enhancing their international disarmament credentials.

Second, I found that the politicians and experts' statements strongly demonstrated the power of the strategic stability-theory in explaining the purpose for the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty. The policymakers and experts argued that the treaty could do so through its transparency measures or regulating the number of nuclear weapons. The prevalence of the statements supporting the stability-theory can partly be explained by the politicians and experts' use of the concept as a rhetorical device. The policymakers and experts often used the term "strategic stability" carelessly and failed to explain how this treaty specifically could contribute to strategic stability, or how strategic stability would contribute to their security. This is problematic because it makes it more difficult to interpret their motives.

Third, I found that the politicians and experts' statements scarcely demonstrated the power of the disarmament-theory in explaining the purpose for the Senate to ratify the New START Treaty. The politicians and experts could use strategic stability as a rhetorical device during the public hearings because to maintain strategic stability is beneficial to both parties of the treaty, but enhancing U.S. strategic advantage is not and can explain the lack of arguments strengthening the advantage-theory. Publicly, the treaty had to look mutually beneficial for both the U.S. and Russia. However, there was evidence in the politicians' questions to the experts that enhancing U.S. strategic advantage was an underlying concern they had.

This chapter is organized as follows: I will present the history of the New START Treaty. Then I will utilize the outlined theoretical framework to present, structure and discuss the statements from the hearings in this order: disarmament, stability, advantage.

4.1. The history of New START

On December 22, 2010, the U.S. Senate ratified the New START Treaty. The treaty required the Parties to limit their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments (U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty). The concrete limits are, for each party to the Treaty:

- 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
- 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
- 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

Attention should be directed towards two remarks regarding the description of the limits. First, when an ICBM is deployed it means that the ICBM is contained or on a deployed launcher. Secondly, instead of listing ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the term ‘nuclear triad’ is often used to describe them.

The treaty built on the START I Treaty, which was signed in 1991 and expired in December 2009. Two years after the US and the Soviet Union signed the START I Treaty, the US and Russia agreed to the START II Treaty, a follow-on treaty that also limited the number of strategic arms. Both START I and START II reduced the numbers of strategic arms by 50 percent. However, Russia withdrew from START II in 2002 before the treaty even entered in force, commonly interpreted as a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the same year. The SORT Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, replaced START II in 2003. In 1997, there was also negotiations for a START III Treaty, but the U.S. and Russia never signed the treaty. In 2010, the New START Treaty replaced the Moscow Treaty and the newly expired START I Treaty. Almost all the other former START treaties reduced the number of nuclear warheads by fifty percent. The New START introduced the fewest reductions the U.S. and Russia ever agreed to.

The New START Treaty entered into force from February 5, 2011 and is set to expire on the same date in 2021, unless extended by five years.

4.2. New START strengthens disarmament efforts

In the hearings, politicians and experts argued that the treaty contributed to disarmament in two distinct ways. A first leitmotiv was the emphasis on how the Treaty would enhance the US international disarmament credentials. A second was that the signing of the Treaty would spur continuing disarmament efforts between the U.S. and Russia.

It is useful to distinguish these categories because they showed two distinct ways ratification of the New START Treaty could strengthen the disarmament-agenda. The first category consists of statements where the politicians and experts emphasized how the U.S. could use the treaty's reductions as a tool to signal to the world that they are committed to NPT's obligations. The second category shows arguments where the politicians and experts view bilateral disarmament efforts as good in themselves.

In the material from the hearings, I encountered the term "disarmament" 27 times, "elimination" 143 times, "reduction" 306 times and "peace" 28 times. On inspection, "peace" turned out to be a poor indicator of disarmament arguments because the results only showed statements regarding the already established purpose of the NPT, not the New START, and the results from this search is therefore not included in this analysis. The frequency does not alone imply support for the theory, but the data shows how policymakers and invited experts expressed that the New START Treaty could contribute to overall goal of 'disarmament' and its long-term peace promoting agenda.

4.2.1. Ratification enhances the international disarmament credentials of the US

In the hearings, I found that the politicians and experts argued that ratifying the New START Treaty would enhance the international disarmament credentials of the United States. The policymakers and experts argued it would do so by showing commitment to their obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Policymakers and experts emphasized how fulfilling these commitments would contribute to the disarmament agenda through further reductions in arsenals, strengthen international institutions with a disarmament-agenda and increase the chances for other states to fulfill their NPT-commitments and not acquire nuclear weapons.

As Secretary Hillary Clinton (D) said, reaching New START Treaty gives them "so much more credibility on the nonproliferation agenda" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 52). She

also argued, “it conveys to other nations that we are committed to real reductions, and to holding up our end of the bargain under the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 39). The three pillars in NPT include disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear power. When Clinton argued in favor of ratification because of the treaty’s “real” reductions and in order to strengthen the NPT, it shows how she argued that the New START Treaty works towards the goal of disarmament-theory.

There are two elaborations from the hearings included in this analysis on how ratification will strengthen disarmament efforts, first from Secretary Clinton and later by Dr. Henry Kissinger. Senator Wicker (R) submitted this question to Secretary Clinton: (...) In this respect, what benefits to the nonproliferation regime can we expect to come from the particular reductions embodied in this treaty that have not come from the previous 40 years of US nuclear reductions? (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 128). Secretary Clinton answered,

The cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which contains three pillars—disarmament, nonproliferation, and access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy—all of which are interlinked. The treaty obligates nuclear-weapon states to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to disarmament, and without measures for this purpose, the willingness of non-nuclear-weapon state Parties to support a strong nonproliferation regime would likely diminish. We can expect that the New START Treaty, combined with further nuclear reductions and nonproliferation efforts such as holding Iran accountable for Treaty violations, will strengthen the NPT regime and ensure that it remains the principal legal barrier to nuclear proliferation. The United States and Russia are the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Although both nations have made significant cuts to their stockpiles, both still possess significantly more warheads than any other nation. For this reason, the world looks to the United States and Russia to uphold the architecture of arms control and nonproliferation (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 128).

Secretary Clinton even turned the argument the other way around: If the U.S. did not ratify the treaty, it would contribute to weaken a disarmament institution. If the U.S. did ratify the treaty, it would enhance their disarmament credibility. This would help the U.S. in limiting states such as Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Lastly, she argued that the U.S. has a specific role for enabling future disarmament because of the size of their nuclear arsenal. Clinton’s argument falls squarely on the disarmament-agenda because of the focus on reductions as the ultimate tool for achieving this. Her reasons to continue efforts of nonproliferation seem unaffected by fluctuations in the security competition with Russia.

Later, Dr. Henry Kissinger provided a similar elaboration as Secretary Clinton. Senator John F. Kerry (D), asked Dr. Henry Kissinger the following: “And in your prepared testimony, you

said that a failure by the United States to ratify this treaty would profoundly affect global confidence in American purposes. I think that's an important warning, and I wonder if you would elaborate a little bit" (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 172). Dr. Kissinger answered, "Well, I would argue, on two levels. One, under the NPT, the United States obligated itself to negotiate about the reduction, and indeed eventual elimination, of its nuclear weapons" (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 172). Further, he elaborated on why he believed this was important:

Second, the expectation, globally, that a serious effort is being undertaken to limit the prospects of nuclear war, has become an almost permanent feature of the international negotiating scene and a major commitment, especially of this administration. This START Treaty is an evolution of treaties that have been negotiated in previous administrations, of both parties. And its principal provisions are an elaboration or continuation of existing agreements. Therefore, a rejection of them would indicate that a new period of American policy has started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons and would, therefore, create an element of uncertainty in the calculations of both adversaries and allies. And therefore, I think it would have an unsettling impact on the international environment (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 172/3).

The expectation globally to undertake efforts to limit nuclear war derives, to a large extent, from treaty obligations. If the U.S. ratified the treaty, it would enhance their international credibility because they meet the global expectations. Dr. Kissinger argued that ratifying the New START Treaty both helps to prevent nuclear war and shows that the U.S. want to do so. In line with Clinton, he turned it the other way around: What does it mean if the U.S. do not ratify the treaty? He argued that it would signal to the international community that the U.S. would no longer rely on bilateral and multilateral measures for their security, but unilaterally decide their security requirements. The uncertainty this creates among adversaries might lead to proliferation instead of disarmament. Dr. Kissinger's argument strengthens the disarmament-theory because the theory predicts that states will sign arms control treaties to strengthen cooperative measures to enhance global security.

The New START Treaty was not the first START Treaty to enhance U.S. international disarmament credentials. James A. Baker III (R), former Secretary of State, repeated a statement he made in 1992 in front of the same committee before the ratification of START I. He stated,

"As I also testified before this committee in 1992, the reductions under START I constituted a major step by the United States and Russia toward fulfilling their obligations under Article 6 of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nonnuclear states have long regarded these reductions as keys to the success of that treaty, and really to their cooperation with it” (New START, hearing 3, 2010, p. 140).

This argument shows how the New START Treaty is part of a long-term process, where each treaty introduces new reductions, slowly working towards the ultimate goal. The statement therefore shows how each (new) START Treaty builds on the predecessor to build further towards the goal. The statement also shows how the U.S. wants other states to comply with the NPT, and that their reductions contribute to this.

The statements presented so far suggest that increased disarmament credentials contribute to international disarmament goals and strengthens the NPT. This enhances American security because strengthening the NPT can limit the opportunities of states like Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. If the U.S. contribute to international disarmament goals, they also reduce uncertainty among adversaries who assess American actions in the worst-case scenario, which increases the chances of adversaries misinterpret their actions. Therefore, contributing to international disarmament goals can enhance their own security.

This view, however, was contested. Robert G. Joseph, senior scholar from the National Institute for Public Policy, commented on the administration’s disarmament goals in his statement. He argued that even though the administration believed the ratification of New START shows a commitment to U.S. disarmament and nonproliferation goals, and thus enhances their disarmament credentials, this does not necessarily strengthen the NPT. As evidence, he brought up the lack of pressure on Iran and recent outcomes of NPT review conferences (New START, hearing 9, 2010, p. 358). This way he questioned the usefulness of the treaty and its reductions as conducive to overall and general goal of disarmament.

A different critique of the disarmament-agenda came from Ambassador Linton F. Brooks. He argued in favor of ratification because reductions are stated U.S. policy, despite being sceptic of nuclear abolition. He stated that while he was in fact sceptic of the “desirability of nuclear abolition, it is a stated U.S. policy. The first step is obviously reductions in the arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. Because abolition cannot happen for decades (if ever), I do not believe that it is necessary to support abolition in order to favor New START” (New START, hearing 10, 2010, p. 394). Interpreting this through the lens of disarmament-theory, he thus argued that he did not have to agree with what the theory’s proponents in order for him to assess whether the treaty contributed to the theory’s peace-promoting agenda - and therefore

ratify it. This makes it an argument stating that the treaty contributes to the agenda through its reductions.

Because Ambassador Brooks believed the politicians should assess whether the treaty contributes to stated U.S. policy, he therefore argued that one out of four objectives for which to assess New START ratification is: whether a U.S. emphasis on arms control and disarmament increases international support for nuclear nonproliferation (New START, hearing 10, 2010, p. 394). According to him, the administration argued that New START ratification could hinder proliferation among non-nuclear states worried about U.S. disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. While he was unsure of this argument, he believed that by pursuing a disarmament agenda and signing treaties such as New START, one dispels an excuse for armament often used by Iran and North Korea (New START, hearing 10, 2010, p. 394). While Ambassador Brooks was criticizing the disarmament-agenda, he argued in favor of the treaty because it enhanced the very same agenda. It is interesting to include this argument because it shows another aspect of the theory and how important previously stated policies and obligations are.

Ambassador Brooks received support from Dr. James Schlesinger who argued the treaty's purpose was to generate diplomatic support, not to strengthen American deterrence. Senator Risch (R) questioned Dr. Schlesinger on whether the treaty would help or hinder America's ability to provide deterrence and guarantee the security of their allies. Dr. Schlesinger stated that it would not strengthen allies' confidence in U.S. deterrence. However, he did say, "The treaty is intended to generate diplomatic support and to indicate that the United States is fulfilling its obligation to reduce its nuclear forces under the NPT. It may be successful in terms of generating such diplomatic support" (New START, hearing 1, 2010, p. 32). If he had argued that the treaty is strengthening U.S. deterrence and allies' confidence in it, it would carry an advantage-agenda. When he argued in favor of ratification because of its ability to generate diplomatic support and fulfilling U.S. obligations under the NPT, it carried a disarmament-agenda. However, the different aspects shows that when utilizing the lens of one theory, the disarmament-theory in this case, one is presented with results that the theory not necessarily can explain sufficiently on its own. Since ratification provided the U.S. goodwill, it will carry an advantage-motive as well. The U.S. could more easily achieve this goodwill, which is beneficial to them, because the reductions in New START were modest.

During the hearings, there were statements that showed both a stability-motive for signing the treaty, and a disarmament-motive. James N. Miller, Jr., provided an argument in favor of

ratification because of how the treaty's reductions are serving multiple motives, "We believe that such reductions will be in the interests of both sides in order to further enhance stability, reduce costs, and meet obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" (New START, hearing 7, 2010, p. 306). This clearly shows how reductions contributes to a disarmament agenda: through supporting the NPT and its agenda. In addition, he also argued that reductions contribute to strategic stability. It is compatible with all agendas to argue that reductions reduce costs.

William J. Perry (D), former Secretary of Defense, presented a statement that recognized the reductions in New START as modest:

I've organized my comments in two areas: what the treaty will not do and what the treaty will do. First of all, what it will not do. It will not make major reductions in our nuclear forces. Indeed, after all reductions are made the United States will still have deployed nuclear forces with the destructive power of more than 10,000—much more than 10,000 Hiroshima bombs. (...) What will the treaty do, then? First of all, it gives a clear signal to the world that the United States is serious about carrying out its responsibilities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This will be welcomed as a positive step by all other members of the NPT (New START, hearing 1, 2010, p. 9)

The reductions in the New START were not new and significant. The reductions were modest, even though some of the policymakers have tried to portray them as bigger. The diplomatic signal effect of agreeing on reductions, even though they were not that big, can help the global process of disarmament. This is how the reductions of the New START Treaty contributed to a long disarmament-process.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this category is that the statements presented have referred to U.S. obligations to the NPT or previously stated U.S. policy. As the disarmament-theory would suggest, the New START agreement could function as a tool for enhancing disarmament efforts, which again functions as a mean for achieving the long-term goal of a larger peace-promoting agenda. When the policymakers and experts refer to obligations instead of arguing that the reductions in the New START Treaty in themselves contribute to this goal, it demonstrates how the disarmament-process is long and requires international institutions. The U.S. and Russia have special obligations under the NPT's three pillars as the two biggest nuclear states. The policymakers' and experts' argument was that ratifying the New START Treaty showed commitment to the treaty and its disarmament-agenda.

The statements also showed how most of the politicians and experts believed ratifying the treaty and showing commitment to the NPT could help strengthen global nonproliferation-

efforts and thus improve US security. While the disarmament-theory of arms control explains this data, the advantage-theory of arms control could also explain the American beneficial aspect of the argument. As discussed in Chapter 2, Theory, both theories have a similar peace-promoting agenda, which can challenge the distinction of the statements in the hearings. The disarmament-theory of arms control would explain strengthening the NPT as a means to strengthen international disarmament institutions. However, the advantage-theory of arms control could explain the U.S. commitment to the NPT as temporary. If the NPT cease to exist, the competition has changed and the New START Treaty might not serve its purpose anymore and the proponents of the advantage-theory would discard it. This analysis treats this argument, strengthening the NPT through ratifying the New START Treaty and its reductions, as a support for the disarmament-theory because the politicians and experts accept limited measures in the treaty and believe the NPT supports global disarmament goals. Because it is difficult to take unilateral disarmament measures, the theory also have to take into account the competition in international politics in the global world as well.

Even though not all politicians and experts were equally supportive of abolition being the ultimate goal of arms control, they saw other interests in fulfilling their disarmament-commitments through the New START Treaty. This way the policymakers and experts did provide an argument that strengthens the disarmament-theory. If the New START Treaty contributes to the disarmament-agenda, the U.S. fulfill their obligations under the NPT, which again increases diplomatic support – which will be beneficial whether the policymakers and experts agree or not that abolition is the ultimate goal. This way, the policymakers and experts should assess the New START Treaty on whether it contributes to the disarmament-agenda.

4.2.2. Ratification spurs continuing bilateral US-Russian disarmament efforts

U.S. policymakers and experts argued that the Senate should ratify the treaty because of its reductions and opportunities for further bilateral reductions. Unlike the last category, the policymakers and experts value the reductions on their own, not as a tool for enhancing their credentials. The statements included in this category will show how the policymakers and experts argued that the U.S. would curtail the disarmament process if the Senate did not ratify the treaty.

The first statement included in this category is from Secretary Clinton (D) who argued in favor of the New START Treaty because she valued the reductions as meaningful on their own. While she did also argue the reductions would strengthen U.S. international

disarmament efforts, it is interesting to see how she perceived multiple purposes of U.S. nuclear reductions. Again, she highlighted the special role and responsibility of the U.S., when she said,

U.S. and Russian arms control and reduction efforts play an important role in nonproliferation. We cannot achieve a world free of nuclear weapons without the United States and Russian Federation, which between them hold 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, taking significant and substantial disarmament steps (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 133).

Secretary Clinton (D) also acknowledged the long-term process of achieving the goal of nuclear abolition. Senator Lugar (R) questioned her on steps taken with regard to other countries, because the preamble implies that additional reductions requires multilateral action. Senator Clinton said, "When the New START Treaty is ratified and enters into force, we can begin to move to expand the process of further reducing and limiting nuclear arms" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 117). In this answer, Secretary Clinton suggested that the treaty may serve as a building block for further reductions and that the ultimate goal of disarmament will be difficult to achieve without this ratification. As in line with the theory, bilateral arms control agreements functions as building blocks towards the ultimate goal of abolition.

The two next statements included will show how the Senators valued reductions as a long, historic tradition between the U.S. and Russia in order to work toward nuclear disarmament. First, Senator Edward E. Kaufman (D) argued, "This is a good treaty. From the historical perspective, it is another step contributing to our decades-long process of responsible, safe, and secure nuclear arms reduction" (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 213).

Second, Senator John F. Kerry's (D) called the New START-ratification a responsible move towards disarmament because it lowered the number of deployed warheads. He argued that the last four decades have "decreased fears of nuclear aggression and helped the United States and Russia to work together. The New START Treaty continues and advances the tradition of reductions that was forged in the original START agreement and Moscow Treaty." (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 164) He continued in his statement to argue for the ratification by referencing earlier statements made by Secretary Kissinger (R) who said that bilateral nuclear reductions are key to our global effort to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons.

Senator Kerry (D) also said that he has heard others argue that the U.S. and Russia's number of nuclear weapons do not matter to other countries. This led him to say "But, in fact, we've already seen that New START can help us fight nuclear proliferation, and therefore, nuclear

terrorism (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 164). This argument stated that reductions and disarmament through arms control contribute to a safer world, which Senator Kerry (D) argued was through fighting nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Even though his argument supports the disarmament-theory, the argument could strengthen the disarmament-theory even further if Senator Kerry elaborated on how ratification of New START helps battle nuclear terrorism, because it is not obvious how the treaty specifically contributes to this.

Others argued without reference to the historic efforts, but that the reductions in themselves were meaningful. In Adm. Michael Mullen's (USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) statement, he said that the treaty "makes meaningful reductions in the United States and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening strategic stability and United States national security"(New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 48). Later, in a discussion with Senator Corker (R), he did again describe the reductions in New START as "significant" and "very clearly a benefit" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 57). The Admiral thus argued that the reductions in themselves are meaningful, and this reason alone would be sufficient to justify ratification. This is clearly an argument supporting the disarmament-theory. However, just because his argument strengthens the disarmament-agenda, it does not imply that there is not another interpretation of his statement. Even though he argued the reductions were significant, they were in fact modest. In addition, because he mentioned, "while strengthening strategic stability", it seems to imply that if the reductions would have been more significant, and might have threatened their second strike capability, it would not have been as easy for him to support the disarmament-agenda.

Some of the references to reductions, did not argue in favor of ratification of New START because of the treaty's "meaningful" reductions, but rather saw ratification as an enabler for further future bilateral reductions. This fits with the theory's expectations. Arms control agreements are part of a long-term plan, and as Maurer noted, proponents of the disarmament-theory of arms control will be positive to all steps in that direction.

In a letter addressed to the chairperson of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, George P. Shultz (R) and Sam Nunn (D) provided an argument in favor of ratification, and they also stated that they, "urge the two governments to begin planning now for even more substantial reductions in the future involving all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, deployed and non-deployed" (New START, hearing 10, 2010, 396). Senator Lugar (R) asked Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen whether additional reductions in the New START Treaty would be desirable. In their answer, they said:

The United States will continue to take concrete steps to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, in accordance with its long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. But this goal will not be reached quickly and its success will not be achieved by U.S. actions alone. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has directed a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider further reductions in nuclear weapons (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 85).

This argument also revealed Lugar's view that unilateral measures are not enough for a safer world free from nuclear threats. This is why the U.S. need arms control agreements like the New START Treaty. Ratification would facilitate further reductions and keep the long-term process going. When the policymakers and experts acknowledge that they will not reach the goal quickly, they acknowledge one important facet of the disarmament-theory.

The policymakers, who valued the reductions on their own, also acknowledged the long-term process of the disarmament-agenda. Senator Corker (R) asked former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft whether he has understood the treaty's contribution right. He asked if Mr. Scowcroft believes that concerning arms reduction, this is "not much of a treaty". That the argument for ratifying it, is just to keep the process going and hopefully to lead to other things. To this, Mr. Scowcroft said,

Yes, I think that this is very much the case, Senator. What it does is clear the way for whatever the two sides want to do now in proceeding with this overall plan to now reduce the numbers and reduce them in a way that improves the stability of balance between us. Without this treaty, you cannot move forward to that other step (New START, hearing 5, 2010, p. 204).

The argument is similar to Secretary Gates' and Admiral Mullen's response, but it also shows how reductions can support another theory: strategic stability. In this analysis, this argument is included to show how reductions can support two theories at the same time.

To sum up, this category has shown statements that have strengthened the disarmament-theory in two ways. First, the statements argued in favor of ratification because of the treaty's meaningful reductions. As opposed to the statements in the first category, these statements value the reductions on their own, not as a tool to show commitment to their obligations of the NPT. Second, the statements argued that ratification would enable a process for further reductions. If the U.S. do not ratify the treaty, they would curtail the disarmament process. As the theory suggests, disarmament is part of a long-term peace promoting agenda. The agreements serve as building blocks. When the politicians and experts argue that the treaty enables a process for further reductions, in addition to introducing modest new ones and

continues existing reductions from former treaties, they support the disarmament-theory and its long-term time perspective. As Shultz and Nunn write in their letter, ratification can provide “even more substantial reductions”.

Besides Admiral Mullen, there were only politicians arguing in favor of ratification because of its “meaningful” reductions. The politicians can have other motives besides the disarmament-agenda for portraying the reductions as meaningful. Since the reductions were modest, there is reason to believe some of the policymakers would like other states to believe the reductions were bigger than they actually were. This can for example be in order to enhance their international disarmament credibility. As discussed earlier, this can have an advantage-side to it.

4.2.3. Conclusion on the disarmament arguments

In the hearings, I found that the statements in the two categories acknowledged the long-term time perspective of the disarmament-agenda. The arguments presented viewed the New START Treaty as a building block for further reductions bilaterally and as a means for strengthening global efforts to achieve the same.

In both categories, some of the arguments in favor of ratification also turned it the other way around and argued what would happen if the U.S. did not ratify the treaty. If the U.S. did not ratify, the politicians and experts argued it would weaken an international disarmament institution and signal to other states that the U.S. would rely on unilateral reliance of nuclear weapons and create uncertainty. Therefore, a ratification continued efforts to achieve the long-term goal of nuclear abolition.

Those statements made during the hearings, which strengthened the disarmament-theory were presented by more Democrats than Republicans. The strongest proponent was Secretary Hillary Clinton (D). Because she was part of the administration who negotiated the treaty, it is not particularly surprising that she tried to convince the Senate to argue in favor of ratification. This does not necessarily signal Republican arms control policy as much as partisan implications of a Democratic administration having negotiated the treaty.

Statements in both categories strengthen the disarmament-theory, however, the policymakers’ and experts’ view of the treaty’s reductions function differently. The first category of statements viewed reductions as a tool for receiving increased diplomatic support. If the U.S. had not been a member of the NPT, most of the arguments in this category would not exist.

The category's statements strengthen the disarmament-theory of arms control's validity by arguing in favor of ratification in order to strengthen an international disarmament institution, as Maurer argues is one of the disarmament-theory's intentions with arms control. The second category viewed reductions as meaningful in themselves. If the policymakers and experts stated that the reductions were not meaningful, they still argued that ratification would spur meaningful reductions. The focus was bilateral, as opposed to the first category where the statements focused on the international community.

Because the politicians and experts in favor of ratification of the treaty had to convince the Senate, they could focus on enhancing U.S. international disarmament credentials in order to convince the more disarmament-sceptics members of the Committee of the benefits of agreeing to reductions.

4.3. New START preserves strategic stability

In the hearings, I identified three distinct ways the politicians and experts argued that the treaty strengthened strategic stability. First, they argued that the treaty's transparency measures in themselves contributes to strategic stability. Second, they argued that the concrete limits and regulations as set in the treaty language contributes to strategic stability. Lastly, the politicians often argued in favor of ratification because the treaty would contribute to strategic stability, but failed to explain how. This implies that the policymakers and experts use the concept as a rhetorical device.

In the material from the hearings, I encountered the term "stability" 172 times. The number of times mentioned does not alone imply support for the theory, but the testimonies clearly show how policymakers and invited experts believe the New START Treaty can strengthen the 'stability'-theory and its defense-dominant promoting agenda.

First, I will present how the politicians and experts argued that the treaty provided predictability and transparency measures, which contributes to strategic stability. Second, I will present how they argued that the treaty's limitations, regulations and reductions of weapons contributed to strategic stability. Lastly, I will present how the politicians and experts used strategic stability as a rhetorical device. This strengthens the theory by stating the same goal, but the reasoning does not explain in more detail how the treaty will produce stability.

4.3.1. Transparency measures contribute to strategic stability

In this category, the politicians and experts flesh out how the treaty will contribute to strategic stability. More precisely, in this category we find those testimonies that elaborated on the relationship between strategic stability and transparency and predictability. In the hearings, the policymakers and experts argued that there was a causal relationship between transparency measures and strategic stability. Transparency measures increase predictability and predictability contributes to strategic stability. The treaty's concrete limits seemed of secondary importance.

The policymakers and experts established a causal link between transparency and strategic stability. Former Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry (D), argued that the New START Treaty, "(...) does improve strategic stability between the United States and Russia by requiring both nations to provide transparency and accountability of their vast nuclear arsenals" (New START, hearing 1, 2010, p. 10). In this statement, he did not refer to the reductions or regulations of the arsenals as essential for strategic stability, but provided a value to transparency measures on their own.

Defense Secretary Gates provided the same causal link, but he also elaborated further on the specifics in the treaty. First, Gates said that the negotiations of New START started because of the START Treaty's expiration. START was important because of its limitations and verification regime, which "had been an important component of strategic stability for 15 years" before it expired (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 108). This established the link between the treaty language: the verification regime, and transparency and predictability. Then Secretary Gates said, "The New START Treaty strengthens strategic stability. It does so by imposing lower limits on strategic delivery vehicles and the strategic warheads they carry and by promoting predictability and transparency in our relationship with Russia, the world's other principal nuclear power" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 108). He argued again that arms control treaties contain measures as set in the treaty language, which promote predictability and transparency, which contribute to strategic stability. This is why he argued in favor of ratification.

Senator Kerry (D) pointed to another variable in the causal connection between transparency and stability: predictability. He quoted Secretary Baker and said, "The stability rested on the predictability that START mandates through its openness and transparency provisions" (New START, hearing 3, 2010, p. 135). It states that the transparency provisions of the treaty

increase predictability, which contribute to stability. The former arguments presented have not drawn a distinction between transparency and predictability. If valid, this argument shows how transparency provisions increase predictability. This shows how the treaty language can reduce uncertainties. States can contribute to strategic stability by reducing incentives for striking first and monitoring the arms production. In order to achieve these objectives, states have to understand their adversary's strategy and have insight in their arsenals.

Like the last statement, Dr. Henry Kissinger also valued predictability and its role for strategic stability, but he also emphasized its role for reducing war by miscalculation. He said,

A number of objectives have characterized these negotiations: to reduce or eliminate the danger of war by miscalculation, which requires transparency and verification; to bring about the maximum stability in the balance of forces to reduce incentives for nuclear war by design, especially by reducing incentives for surprise attack; and to overcome the danger of accidents fostered by the automaticity of the new technology. All of these measures, combined, might merge into an international system that would reduce or limit—and, in the end, hopefully, eliminate—the use of these weapons as a conscious choice (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 167).

This means that by ratifying the treaty and benefiting from its transparency measures, the U.S. and Russia increase the level of predictability in their relationship, which reduces the danger of war by miscalculation. In addition, he elaborated on how strategic stability enhances security: by reducing incentives for surprise attack (first strike capability and contemplation). This argument is strongly supporting of the stability-agenda.

“Transparency leads to predictability and predictability leads to stability” (New START, hearing 8, 2010, p. 313). This explicit causal direction is first provided by Ambassador Linton Brooks, and later quoted by Senator Robert P. Casey Jr. (D). Senator Casey Jr (D) supported Dr. Kissinger's argument and argued that transparency limits surprises, mistrust and miscalculation, and that this predictability reduces the danger of war. He continued, “the opportunity to examine Russian nuclear forces will help limit the surprises, mistrust, and miscalculation that could result from lack of information” (New START, hearing 8, 2010, p. 313). Kenneth A. Myers III, Director of the Defense for Policy, repeated the quote by Ambassador Brooks in the same hearing, urging to ratify the treaty (New START, hearing 8, 2010, p. 348). The argument in this quote shows what Senator Kerry (D) explained earlier: that verification and other confidence-building measures as set in the treaty language increases predictability between the parties, and this contributes to strategic stability.

Ambassador Brooks presented four objectives for which to assess ratification of the New START Treaty, where one was mentioned in the disarmament-arguments, while another one strengthens the stability-theory of arms control. The first objective was,

(...) Reduce suspicion and avoid misunderstanding through increased transparency and predictability. Transparency leads to predictability and predictability leads to stability. Here I believe New START breaks new ground. In cold-war treaties, we limited verification provisions to those necessary to verify formal treaty limits. New START provides some exchanges purely for transparency. (...) The treaty states that this exchange “is designed to help forge a new strategic relationship of the Parties” (New START, hearing 10, 2010, p. 393-394).

This point is interesting: that the treaty language describes confidence-building measures as designed to forge a new strategic relationship of the Parties. It seems to imply that not just the politicians and experts in the hearings argued that transparency enhances strategic stability, but also the negotiators on both sides had confidence in this causal direction.

While there has been consensus on the causal direction in the statements presented so far, this was not always the case in the hearings. Dr. Edward L. Warner III, Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-New START negotiations, argued the other way around. He said, “The United States sought to conclude a treaty that would significantly limit and reduce United States and Russian strategic offensive arms while preserving strategic stability in a manner that provides predictability and is supported by an effective, extensive verification system” (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 222). This implies that strategic stability provides predictability, not that predictability contributes to strategic stability, as others before him have argued. This point is interesting because it shows how the politicians and experts find it difficult to use these words with care. However, while it is possible to argue that strategic stability provides predictability because the adversary is less likely to strike first and to acquire more arms, it makes more sense to argue the other way. Because the treaty provided transparency measures, the parties acquire more knowledge on the other state’s arsenal and capabilities. This knowledge provides them with predictability on each other’s actions and strategies, which increases confidence in their assessments of each other. It makes the states less likely to break the treaty’s limits if the states reduce uncertainties, and therefore, it maintains strategic stability to have transparency measures between the states.

Despite Dr. Warner III’s former statement, he later turned on the causal direction, which is problematic for the analysis because it makes it challenging to interpret what his purposes for ratifying the treaty actually were. In the same hearing, Senator Barrasso (R) asked to mention

the most beneficial provisions of New START. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner III responded,

The New START Treaty as a whole provides predictability and transparency regarding the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia. (...) But the benefits are not all one way: Shared knowledge of U.S. and Russian strategic forces is crucial for maintaining strategic stability between the two major nuclear powers (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 261).

In this response, the causal direction is the other way around again. Even though Dr. Warner III argued that strategic stability provided predictability, he later on, together with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, argued that transparency and predictability is crucial for maintaining strategic stability. In one way, this provides stronger confidence in the causal direction all the former arguments mentioned also highlights as a reason for ratifying the treaty. But when Dr. Warner III argued without attention to causal directions, it makes it difficult to interpret his perceived purpose of ratifying the New START Treaty.

In this category of arguments, I have shown how the policymakers and experts in the hearings describe a causal direction between the treaty's language and strategic stability. This leads them to argue in favor of ratification, and therefore, strengthens the stability-theory. Even though there were some confusion around the direction of causality, most of the policymakers and experts seemed to agree on transparency measures increasing predictability between the parties and that this contributes to strategic stability.

The policymakers and experts elaborated on how they defined the concept of strategic stability. They defined it as reducing incentives for surprise attacks and reducing misunderstandings. It is not explicit in the literature on strategic stability to reduce misunderstandings through transparency measures. However, defense planners can have a tendency to work based on the worst case in order to prevent their state for falling behind an adversary. If the defense planners are uncertain about the adversary's capabilities, it will only be the planners' imagination and the state's economic situation that will limit the plans for new weapons and strategy. This way, states might end up building weapons based on scenarios that does not exist, and their adversaries will respond to this, creating an arms race on a misunderstanding (J, Cameron, email exchange, March, 2020). In reality, even without arms control, the planners base their assessments on intelligence gathering through national technical means of verification to avoid arms races based on misunderstandings. With arms control, the planners can base their assessments on the verification regimes, which provides greater assurance and accuracy. This way, the state's strategies and weapon programs can

have more realistic and conservative limits and the adversary's does not respond to new weapons (J, Cameron, email exchange, March 2020). This way, reducing the risk for misunderstandings contribute to arms race stability.

It also contributes to another aspect of strategic stability to reduce the risk for misunderstandings through transparency measures: crisis stability. Increased knowledge on the adversary's capabilities provides the states with higher confidence in their assessment of whether the other is preparing for a first strike capability for a crisis. If a state misunderstands the adversary's actions as preparing a first strike capability, they might strike first to limit damage (J, Cameron, email exchange, March 2020). This way, a nuclear war may come about by accident. The transparency measures in arms control agreements lead to predictability, which will reduce the uncertainties and increase the state's confidence in these assessments. This was also Dr. Henry Kissinger's argument in the hearing: reducing or eliminating the danger of war by miscalculation required transparency and verification, in order to enhance strategic stability.

While some of the politicians and experts mentioned the treaty's concrete limits and regulations for the state's nuclear arsenals together with the treaty's transparency measures, it seemed of secondary importance. The policymakers and experts valued the insight they gain into Russian forces on its own, and for strategic stability on its own. The concrete limits and regulations simply provide guidelines for the inspections, and guidelines for interpreting the adversary's intentions. This can have implications for future arms control agreements. Scholars and others point out that arms control might not look the same in the years to come (Kulesa, 2020). If scholars and policymakers receive an increased understanding of the value of transparency measures, and why insight is beneficial, the knowledge can help guide the direction for arms control's new shape.

4.3.2. Reducing and regulating nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability

The second category of arguments used by policymakers and experts is linked to how the regulation of nuclear weapons can produce strategic stability. This category of statements points to the reductions and regulations of weapons as set in the treaty language. The argument is as follows: Through reducing size of their arsenals and agreeing on the limit together, the states can either contribute to strategic stability or maintain it at lower cost. This stabilizes the arms race. However, it does so by way of a different mechanism than transparency measures. These arguments point to specific reductions or regulations in the

treaty, for example the type of weapon, and concern their impact on the offense-defense balance between Russia and the U.S. By reaching a balance that reduces incentives for striking first at a lower level, the U.S. save economic resources and counteract incentives for achieving more arms. Unilaterally, the states would have less confidence that the balance was in their favor, which increases incentives for acquiring arms.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided such an argument in favor of ratification, pointing to the reductions, not the transparency measures alone, as the contribution to strategic stability. He said, “This treaty reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the strategic stability of our relationship and protects the security of the American people and our allies” (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 43). Gates is of the view that the treaty’s reductions (in and of themselves) contribute to strategic stability and protect American and allied security. However, Gates’ statement also shows that the policymakers and experts can be of the view that more than one element of the treaty contributes to strategic stability – as he also provided a statement valuing the transparency measures’ role in contributing to strategic stability.

Further, Secretary Gates argued that the structure of the treaty contributes stability and exemplified it with the number of warheads and delivery vehicles being reduced:

(...) Putting just a single one of our warheads on an ICBM requires the Russians to use a one-for-one or two-for-one attack mode if they were to come after our ICBMs, so they would use up a significant portion of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles trying to take out our ICBMS. All of this contributes to strategic stability (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 50).

In this statement, Gates suggested that the regulations of warheads and delivery vehicles contribute to securing American second-strike capability and limiting Russian first strike capability.

Dr. Henry Kissinger was explicitly asked to compare two of the purposes of arms control: strategic stability and strategic advantage, and argued that preserving strategic stability is the only purpose the New START Treaty needs to serve. First, he argued in favor of ratification because “the treaty, if observed, would maintain strategic stability with Russia over the next decade at somewhat lower force levels than currently existing” (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 170). And when he is asked whether the treaty preserves the U.S.’ strategic advantage, he said,

The issue is not whether this new treaty preserves our own strategic advantage; it is whether this treaty preserves strategic stability. In my judgment, the numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles stipulated in the treaty and the verification and monitoring regimes provided for by it reduce to an acceptable level the risk that Russia could break out of this treaty and undermine strategic stability to our disadvantage (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 187).

It is interesting that Dr. Kissinger argued that arms control should not be about whether it enhances American strategic advantage but should be about whether it preserves strategic stability. This is an explicit comparison between the purposes. Strategic stability outweighs strategic advantage because it is beneficial for both parts, as long as one state does not undermine it.

The treaty itself defines and acknowledges the concept of strategic stability as the New START Treaty's purpose, which might be because strategic stability is beneficial for both parts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction (also representative to Post-New START Negotiations), Dr. Edward L. Warner III, argued that the "START Treaty's concept of strategic stability includes the idea of having a secure second strike, the ability for both sides to be able to retaliate substantially or devastatingly against one another. That has been characterized as mutual assured destruction" (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 236). This is interesting to include here because it shows how Dr. Warner III, as a representative to the negotiations, argued the concept of strategic stability is in the New START Treaty. Because the negotiators have defined strategic stability in the treaty, it implies that both parts of the treaty intended the treaty to contribute to strategic stability.

However, it does not imply that all members of the Committee present in the hearings was of the impression that all the aspects of the treaty assured them a secure second-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia just because that the negotiators defined strategic stability in the treaty. Multiple members of the Committee did throughout the hearings express concern regarding Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and their superiority. This thesis includes these concerns in this category in addition to the category studying the treaty's ability to enhance or harm strategic advantages because the questions the thesis will present in this paragraph ask directly how Russia's superiority in tactical nuclear weapons affect strategic stability. Senator Lugar (R) asked Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen how tactical nuclear weapons would affect strategic stability. To this, they answered, "(...) Because the United States will retain a robust strategic force structure under New START, Russia's tactical nuclear weapons have little or no impact on strategic stability" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 88).

The Commander of United States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, GEN Kevin P. Chilton, also argued that the asymmetry in the numbers of tactical weapons between the U.S. and Russia would not pose any threat to strategic stability. Senator Risch (R) questioned him on vulnerability to Russian first strike and technical aspects of strategic stability. GEN Chilton explained, as others before him also did, why he did not believe the asymmetry in numbers of tactical weapons between the U.S. and Russia poses any threat to strategic stability. Mainly, he explained this by the total capability and force levels structured by the New START (New START, hearing 7, 2010, p. 301). When Senator Risch (R) asked similar questions to Dr. James N. Miller, he also argued,

Tactical weapons do not directly influence the stability of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia because of their limited range and the different roles these weapons play. More broadly, the United States will be able to retain approximate overall parity in nuclear weapons if the New START Treaty is ratified and enters into force (New START, hearing 7, 2010, p. 306).

This shows how strategic stability is not all about parity in numbers. The assessments must study the asymmetrical sides of the arsenals and assess how they affect American and Russian second-strike capabilities. The arguments also show how nuclear weapons do not all have the same capabilities and roles. This also influences their strategic role in strategies. Still, for the politicians in the hearings, this was an important worry. Russia was superior in this area, and for the politicians, it was important to clarify why the treaty would not limit this superiority and how that would affect the strategic stability.

Another concern for members of the Committee were the unilateral reduction of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRVed) ICBM force. A MIRVed ICBM means that one single missile can carry and deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets. Secretary Gates argued that the de-MIRVed ICBM force is stabilizing. Senator Inhofe (R) then asked him whether this was necessary to achieve stability and why U.S. was alone in this step. The answer is quite long and technical, but the most important point was,

The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) decision to complete the deMIRVing of the silo-based Minuteman III ICBM force was made because deMIRVing enhances the strategic stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives of a would-be attacking side to strike first. (...) The U.S. de-MIRVing of ICBMs is being taken unilaterally because it enhances stability, irrespective of Russia's strategic force structure (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 110).

Dr. Warner III and Assistant Secretary Gottenmoeller shared Secretary Gates' view and argued that de-MIRVing silo-based ICBMs reduces the incentives of either side to strike first against

these targets, and hence, contribute to strategic stability (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 255). Dr. Warner III and Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller also said, “(...) these MIRVed missiles on mobile launchers assist the Parties in fielding sufficiently capable, survivable, second-strike capabilities which are critical for maintaining the mutual deterrence that is a critical component of strategic stability” (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 255). As with the worries of Russian tactical superiority, also this asymmetrical step creates questions on the Treaty’s impact on strategic stability. The politicians’ concern with asymmetrical capabilities and its impact on strategic stability shows how important it was for the politicians and experts to maintain strategic stability through arms control.

There is a clear benefit in maintaining strategic stability through arms control besides increased security: lower economic cost. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R) presented a goal for the treaty, “We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and reduce the costs of maintaining the weapons” (New START, hearing 3, 2010, p. 137). Deputy Under Secretary of Defense of Policy, Dr. James N. Miller presented the Department of Defense’s (DOD) perspective on the treaty, and said “DOD’s view of the treaty is that it will allow us to sustain effective deterrence and strengthen strategic stability with Russia at reduced force levels” (New START, hearing 3, 2010, p. 271). Later on, he went into detail on this point, and said that treaty’s limits of 1,550 accountable warheads will allow the U.S. to sustain an effective deterrence, and still maintain an assured second-strike capability. In addition, he said, “the treaty’s limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers will support strategic stability by allowing the United States to retain a robust triad” (New START, hearing 7, 2010, p. 271). These arguments demonstrate the theory’s validity because the arguments show why states want to reduce their arsenals. States save economic resources, while maintaining strategic stability. Arms control provides the states an opportunity to maintain their security requirements (secured second-strike capability) at a lower level of cost.

The last argument included in this category is mostly interesting because of its speaker. In hearing 9, Dr. Morton H. Halperin (co-author of *Strategy and Arms Control*) said, “In short, I believe that the limitations places on Russian and American forces will contribute to strategic stability and reduce the risk of unintended and/or accidental use of nuclear weapons by either nation” (New START, hearing 9, 2010, p. 369). Even though it is no surprise that Dr. Halperin believes the purpose of arms control is maintaining strategic stability, it is interesting that he believed this specific treaty does exactly that.

To sum up this category, I have shown how U.S. politicians and experts argue that the reductions in the New START Treaty contribute to or maintain strategic stability at a lower level. The statements showed that the policymakers and experts wanted to maintain strategic stability while reducing economic resources. The arguments also showed their worries regarding asymmetrical capabilities and their impact on strategic stability. While this was not an argument in favor of ratification, it showed how important it is for the politicians to maintain strategic stability in order for them to consider ratification. It also showed how the concept of strategic stability does not require parity in all areas. Not all nuclear weapons have the same capabilities since they for example differ in range, and therefore the different weapons play different roles in states' strategies.

4.3.3. The use of “Strategic Stability” as a rhetorical device

This category of arguments shows how policymakers and experts argued in favor of ratification because the treaty contributes to strategic stability without explaining how the treaty does so. This way, they provided arguments in favor of ratification strengthening stability. However, the policymakers and experts do not state how or what aspect of the treaty it is that contributes to this. This leads me to assess their use of strategic stability as a rhetorical device. I include this category because this shows the challenge with analyzing politicians. As discussed in the theory-chapter, the political necessity might have different implications for arms control than theories. Politicians might have other motives besides strategic stability, or disarmament and strategic advantage for that matter, for arguing in favor of ratification. Therefore, scholars should scrutinize how the politicians use generic concepts such as ‘strategic stability’ to argue in favor of a treaty’s ratification. It might not solely indicate support for the theory, and one should be careful to interpret it as evidence for it.

Senator John F. Kerry’s (D) statement is an example of the politicians’ interchangeable use of the words stability and transparency. He said,

This treaty improves our security because it increases certainty, stability, and transparency in the two countries that together hold 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, and it does so while retaining for America the flexibility to protect ourselves and our allies in Europe and around the world (New START, hearing 1, 2010, p. 1).

This is one example of how the politicians use words like “certainty”, “stability” and “transparency” without explaining how the treaty enhances these qualities, what the difference between them are or what about these qualities enhances American security. The

interchangeable use of these words throughout the hearings, provide evidence of the lack of attention to how policymakers use the concept of strategic stability. While John Kerry provided an argument included in the category of the treaty's transparency measures contributing to strategic stability, this was a quote and not his own words. This shows that he throughout the hearings has not himself described what aspect of the treaty that contributes to strategic stability.

The statements in this category strengthen the stability-theory of arms control, but the statements would strengthen the validity of the theory even further if the policymakers elaborated on how the treaty contributes to strategic stability, or how strategic stability enhances their security. This analysis includes four examples of this.

First, Secretary Clinton (D) who provided an almost identical argument as Senator Kerry (D). She says, "It is a treaty that, if ratified, will provide stability, transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 39). She repeated this later on in the hearing when the chair asks her what the implications of not ratifying the agreement would be:

(...) having gone this far to achieve the benefits that are in this treaty, to lose them would not only undermine our strategic stability, the predictability, the transparency, the other points that both the Secretary and the Admiral made, but it would severely impact our potential to lead on the important issue of nonproliferation (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 52).

The way Clinton presented her argument, she separates between the stability/transparency/predictability side of arms control and the nonproliferation side. Secretary Clinton abstained from explaining how or why a treaty should contribute to strategic stability. Even more interesting, she did not separate stability/transparency/predictability. This might imply that she used these words as a rhetorical device, but it might also imply that these aspects of arms control are closely linked.

Second, Dr. James Schlesinger stated what he believed the purpose of arms control always should be:

Arms control only can work when both sides recognize that by using constraints, on either the production or deployment of weapons, they can enhance strategic stability and their own security. Maintaining overall strategic stability is always required. Those who think that arms control should be focused primarily or solely on reducing the number of weapons can endanger strategic stability (New START, hearing 1, 2010, p. 32).

Dr. Schlesinger's argument explained how the stability-theory of arms control is different from the disarmament-theory. As the theory suggests, the control of weapons enhances strategic stability, not the reductions. On its own, the statement still strengthens the stability-theory, but it would have been stronger if accompanied by an explanation on why reductions can contribute to strategic stability.

Third, even the head U.S. negotiator for the New START Treaty, Gottemoeller, often failed to elaborate on how the specific treaty contributed to strategic stability. She said, "it advances the security of the entire world by giving added stability and transparency to the relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers" (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 219). To be clear, this does not necessarily signal that she lacks knowledge on the treaty specifics and the causal connections. But to comprehend what Gottemoeller's statement contains requires a good dose of intellectual extrapolation. This contributes to legitimize the use of strategic stability as a rhetorical device. It would have been more helpful if she accounted for in more detail how the treaty adds stability.

Lastly, the same goes for the 30 Democrats and Republicans who urged ratification in Politico during the process of holding the hearings. Senator Lugar (R) submitted the extract as additional material during one hearing. Among other arguments, the 30 politicians finish their letter with "We, the undersigned, Republican and Democrats, support the New START Treaty because we believe that it, first, enhances stability, transparency, and predictability between the world's two largest nuclear powers (New START, hearing 8, 2010, p. 349). Yet again, there is an interchangeable use of stability, transparency and predictability, and the lack of explanations as to why or how these concepts enhance American or international security. Given the high number of bipartisan signatories, it could strengthen the stability-theory for arms control's validity in explaining the purpose of arms control if the statement had included an explanation for how the concepts enhance the security.

There are several plausible explanations for the use of strategic stability as a rhetorical device. As discussed earlier, the theory of strategic stability has had more support in academia than disarmament. Some of the (American) researchers worked closely with the American policymakers throughout the Cold War. This influence might explain the level of support for theory and explain why American politicians and experts use it as a rhetorical device. Stability has become a buzzword or shorthand with positive connotations. The question remains: What do the policymakers and experts then mean when they argue in favor of ratification because it enhances strategic stability? First, the policymakers and experts might

mean exactly that but abstain from describing how. This might seem similar to how the politicians and experts argued in favor of ratification because of the treaty's reductions. However, there is a difference between them. Strategic stability is more complex: scholars define the concept as crisis stability and arms race stability. When the politicians and experts argued in favor of ratification because of the treaty's reductions, there is no need to explain how the treaty "enhances" the "theoretical concept" of reductions. The reductions are the proposed limits set in the treaty language. Strategic stability does not exist in the treaty language. That is why the politicians and experts when arguing in favor of ratification would benefit from explaining exactly what in the treaty language or provisions contribute to strategic stability. Second, the policymakers and experts might mean something else besides strategic stability. The politicians and experts also use strategic stability and other words, like transparency, predictability, interchangeably, and seemingly, to describe the same aspect of the treaty's contribution. This makes it difficult to interpret their real motive for arguing in favor of ratification.

4.3.4. Conclusion on the stability arguments

In the hearings, I have found countless statements suggesting a belief that support of the New START Treaty strengthens strategic stability, in support of the stability theory of arms control. The statements share the stability-theory's view of agreements as timeless, tools to achieve a defense-dominant agenda. The goal with arms control is mutual across the categories: to deter attacks.

The policymakers and experts' statements in "Transparency measures contribute to strategic stability" and "Reducing and regulating nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability" pointed to specifics of the New START Treaty's contribution to strategic stability. This means the treaty's measures, provisions and language. These specifics contribute to both crisis stability and arms race stability.

However, the first two categories also have interesting distinctions. First, the "Transparency measures contribute to strategic stability"-category does not require specific limits, points to a balance of forces, nor an economic motive. The transparency measures are important in themselves. The specific limits are guidelines to interpret the adversary's intentions and strategy, whereas in the "Reducing and regulating nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability"-category, the specific limits are in themselves the tool for contributing to strategic stability. This has implications for future arms control agreements as scholars have suggested

that future arms control might look different. Scholars and policymakers can therefore benefit from an increased understanding of the value of transparency measures in order to help guide the direction for arms control's new shape.

Second, the "Transparency measures contribute to strategic stability"-category seem to indicate that war is accidental, while the "Reducing and regulating nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability"-category seem to imply that war is intentional. For example, Senator Casey Jr. (D) and Dr. Henry Kissinger both argued in the "Transparency measures contribute to strategic stability"-category that transparency and verification reduces or eliminates the danger of war by miscalculation, mistrust and surprises. Secretary Gates argued in the "Reducing and regulating nuclear weapons contribute to strategic stability"-category that the treaty's reductions required the Russians to use a significant portion of their arsenal if they were to attack the U.S. The underlying assumptions on what causes war, or at least what type of war to prevent, Casey Jr, Kissinger and Gates have, thus seem different.

The last category, even though similar in its agenda and support of the stability-theory, is difficult to interpret. There is no clear distinction compared to the other categories. The category shows statements that include an interchangeable use with other words and concepts. The policymakers and experts also fail to accompany their argument with reference to the specifics of the treaty.

There were significantly more Democrats arguing in favor of the treaty because it contributed to strategic stability, regardless of the category their statements fit in. However, it was only Republicans who questioned Russian superiority in tactical weapons' impact on strategic stability. This was the same for the concern with the unilateral step the U.S. took to reduce their MIRVed ICBM force. Because it was not their administration who negotiated the treaty, it makes sense that it was members of the Republican Party who asked critical questions of the treaty's impact. This makes sense in the same way that Democrats supported the treaty because it was their administration who negotiated the treaty.

4.4. New START and concerns about U.S. strategic advantage

In the hearings, the policymakers and experts argued or questioned the New START Treaty's contribution to U.S. strategic advantage in two distinct ways. First, by asking questions where the underlying concern was the international competition and the U.S. advantage or disadvantage. Second, by arguing that the treaty's limitations enhanced American strategic advantage.

In the material in the hearings, I encountered the term “advantage” 71 times, “superior” 11 times and “benefit/benefits/beneficial” 110 times. After interpreting the results based on their context, I decided to divide them into subcategories. For this theory, interpreting results and the general context of the hearings was even more demanding. It would weaken other motives for ratification, such as enhancing international disarmament credentials, if the policymakers and experts explicitly argued that ratification of the treaty would enhance U.S. strategic advantage. This is why the first subcategory is not as explicit as other subcategories in how the statements strengthens the theory, but rather shows how advantage motives are an underlying concern the politicians have.

First, I will present how the politicians and experts were concerned about the treaty’s impact on strategic advantage through the questions they asked during the hearings. Then, I will present how the politicians and experts argued that the treaty’s formal limitations and regulations contributed to American strategic advantage or limited Russian strategic advantage.

4.4.1. Questions prodding the impact on US strategic advantage

The questions asked by many of the politicians share the same competitive focus on international politics as the advantage-theory would lead us to think. The empirical data thus suggests that the policymakers and experts were concerned with U.S. strategic advantage.

First, the policymakers and experts questioned whether the treaty contributed to American advantage. Senator Lugar (R) questioned Secretary Gates on whether the flexible rules regarding heavy bombers provided advantages to the United States. Secretary Gates answered,

Neither side will secure an advantage over the other under the New START Treaty. (...) Instead, the treaty will allow both sides to meet their legitimate security need within a set of limits while acknowledging a mutual desire to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons in the strategic postures of the Parties (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 100).

Even though Secretary Gate’s answer did not support the advantage-theory, Senator Lugar’s question has an advantage focus and view of the strategic competition.

Senator Inhofe (R) questioned Secretary Gates on whether the “U.S. hedge is something Russia is interested in limiting due to perceptions about an advantage it affords the U.S. to

upload its strategic missiles?” (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 110). To this, Secretary Gates said, “Whatever concerns the Russian Federation may have had, Russia agreed to the treaty, which permits the U.S. to maintain a significant upload capability that serves as a hedge against technical and geopolitical uncertainties” (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 111). This question is interesting because Secretary Gates in this answer, as oppose to the last, did not deny the question’s premise. This might imply that he at least acknowledged that states could use arms control to pursue strategic advantages.

Second, the policymakers and experts questioned whether the treaty put the U.S. at a disadvantage. Senator Cardin (D) said that some would argue that Russia wants this treaty to enhance its own strategic advantage and asked Dr. Kissinger on his thoughts as to why Russia welcomed the treaty. Dr. Kissinger declined this and said the only Russian benefit was a measure of parity with the U.S for its global role (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 180). This question is notable because it does show concern for U.S. competitive advantage, but rather focus on a possible Russian competitive advantage and concern with American disadvantage.

United States Institute of Peace expert, Stephen J. Hadley, referred to the same discussion this analysis have shown earlier, regarding Russian tactical nuclear superiority, and asked, “Are there any gaps and loopholes in the treaty that put the United States at a strategic disadvantage? (...)” (New START, hearing 5, 2010, p. 195). Hadley received the same lack of support for his worries. However, it shows how there might be different aspects and agendas behind the same discussions. Since the theory on strategic stability also rests on realist assumptions, the anarchic nature of the international system forces the proponents of the agenda to question how it might place them at a disadvantage. However, the concern with Russian advantage faced a lack of support. Dr. Morton Halperin said, “Let me simply say that I have no doubt that Russian efforts at evasion of this treaty have no chance of success at any level which would provide a meaningful advantage to them in the nuclear competition between the United States and Russia(...) (New START, hearing 9, 2010, p. 370). While it is not a politician’s question, it still accepts the same competitive view of international politics, and declines the notion that the Treaty would provide Russia with a strategic advantage.

To conclude this category of questions: The policymakers and experts asked questions during the hearings were the underlying concern was U.S. strategic advantage, but they did not argue in favor of ratification because the treaty enhanced such an advantage. The reason for

including questions of this sort is to show that the politicians and experts care about strategic advantage, even though they do not state it explicitly.

Although the answers from the experts to the politicians' and other experts' questions often implied strengthening strategic stability as the agenda for New START, the experts also reassured them that the treaty would not put the U.S. at any disadvantage. As the advantage-theory suggests, this implies that for the politicians and the experts posing the questions, the reality of international politics is a long-term competition. However, this acknowledgment is not entirely exclusive for the advantage-agenda. Strategic stability does also build on realist assumptions, which forces proponents of this view to consider how an arms control agreement will affect their position. However, in this category the underlying concern with strategic advantages, not solely benefits, was more prevalent than in the previous categories.

4.4.2. The treaty will preserve or enhance U.S. strategic advantage

Several politicians and experts did argue that the treaty would preserve or enhance U.S. strategic advantage through the treaty's limits and regulations. The politicians and experts highlighted four main aspects contributing to this.

First, Senator Lugar (R) believed the bomber rules of the treaty is to the U.S.' advantage given the quality of their bombers. He asked Secretary Gates whether "the bomber advantage now go to the Russians instead of the United States", referring to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's statement on the bomber rules of New START. According to him, "Russia can maintain 2,100 strategic weapons rather than the 1,550 specified in the Treaty". To this, Secretary Gates said that because of the quality of American bombers, "the U.S. bomber force will remain superior to that of the Russian Federation for the life of the New START Treaty. Counting one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-capable heavy bomber applies to both sides and does not provide Russia an advantage" (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 100).

Second, Secretary Gates argued that constraining Russia after Russia shifted focus from conventional to nuclear weapons enhanced U.S. strategic advantage. He argued that this treaty would constrain Russia in an area they are focusing on. He said that Russia lately had shifted focus from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons, so constraining them in that area would be beneficial to the United States (New START, hearing 2, 2010, p. 70). As the advantage-theory explains, constraining an adversary in an area where they are seeking superiority is one way to maintain or enhance your own strategic advantage. By constraining Russia's nuclear

weapons, after they have shifted focus from conventional to nuclear weapons, the U.S. limits the impact Russia has with its investment in nuclear weapons.

Third, Senator Feingold (D) argued that the treaty limited Russia's ability to seek parity in launchers, hence, it preserves U.S. advantage. He asked Dr. Henry Kissinger whether the treaty preserves their own strategic advantage. Senator Feingold argued that he believed it did given the new limitations from 880 to 800 launchers. Because the Congressional Research Service believes Russia has 620 launchers, this would limit their ability to produce a higher number. Moreover, "according to independent reports, we have the capacity to upload far more warheads onto our launchers than the Russians" (New START, hearing 4, 2010, p. 187). To this, Dr. Henry Kissinger said, "the issue is not whether this new treaty preserves our own strategic advantage; it is whether this treaty preserves strategic stability" (New START, 2010, p. 187). Senator Feingold (D) later asked the very same question to General Chilton. To this, General Chilton said, "Senator, I wouldn't go as far as to say that a strategic advantage existed before or after the treaty, but a strategic balance continues to exist between both sides. I don't think we would come to a resolution in the negotiations if both sides didn't feel that way" (New START, hearing 7, 2010, p. 287). As mentioned after presenting other statements as well, this too shows how the politicians and experts consider the treaty to serve multiple agendas. For Senator Feingold, this aspect of the treaty enhanced U.S. strategic advantage and he sought confirmation with Dr. Kissinger and General Chilton. For Dr. Henry Kissinger and General Chilton, the agenda for the treaty is the ability to contribute strategic stability between the two states.

Fourth, the negotiators and invited experts argued the treaty made it easier than the START I-treaty to develop U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, another area where the U.S. has a comparative advantage. Dr. Edward L. Warner III and Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller quotes Lieutenant General O'Reilly and said, "he also noted that the New START Treaty offers certain advantages for development of the U.S. ballistic missile defense systems" (New START, hearing 6, 2010, p. 259). Lieutenant General O'Reilly argued that the New START Treaty made it easier to develop the missile defense program than the START Treaty did. One reason for this is that the offensive missiles used as targets during tests of their missile defense interceptor would not be subject to constraints. This made it easier for the U.S. to use air-to-surface and waterborne launchers of targets, which saves them money. He also noted that the New START did not limit them to five space launch facilities for target launches (New START, 2010, p. 259).

The issue of missile defense was highly important for many of the members and invited experts. In the statement of Eric S. Edelman, a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, he said he hoped the Senate would use this process to express that the U.S. is not interested in putting further limitations on their missile defense or prompt global strike. He argued, “Any such constraints could potentially prove to be a major error in long-term strategy because they would trade away areas of United States comparative advantage for reductions in Russian strategic forces that would be likely to happen even in the absence of a treaty” (New START, hearing 9, 2010, p. 365). Missile defense systems is an area where the U.S. enjoys competitive advantage, and an area where Russia wants to constrain them. When the experts argued that the New START Treaty made it easier to develop the missile defense program, this is a way for the U.S. to enhance their strategic advantage.

In addition, John F. Kerry (D) provided an argument for the U.S. receiving some advantages because of how the counting of warheads will be. More specifically, he said, that because the inspection pieces and the counting of warheads are more rigorous, the U.S. will get some advantages (New START, hearing 5, 2010, p. 200). It is not a strong argument in favor of ratification, but it shows that the policymakers and experts consider advantages in their own favor a part of the agenda for the New START Treaty.

Several politicians and experts argued that the treaty’s limitations and regulations enhances or preserves U.S. competitive advantage. According to them, there are four ways the treaty contributes to this. First, the bomber rules of the treaty is to their advantage given the quality of their bombers. Second, by constraining Russia after Russia shifted focus from conventional to nuclear weapons. Third, Senator Feingold (D) argued the treaty limited Russia’s ability to seek parity in launchers, hence, it preserves U.S. advantage. Fourth, the negotiators and invited experts argued the treaty made it easier than the START I-treaty to develop U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, another area where the U.S. has a comparative advantage. All the speakers in this category have provided statements this thesis has included as support for previous theories’ validity in explaining the purpose of New START. This implies that if the New START Treaty enhanced U.S. strategic advantage, it did so in addition to other motives. This is in line with Maurer’s argument: that arms control should serve all three motives. But, it seems, that the advantage type of argument was far less prevalent in the hearings than the categories previously discussed.

4.4.3. Conclusion on the advantage arguments

During the hearings, the policymakers and experts presented few explicit arguments in favor of ratification of the New START Treaty because of the treaty's ability to enhance U.S. strategic advantage, and therefore in support of the advantage theory of arms control. This does not mean that the motive of producing strategic advantage was not present. In the analysis, I presented two ways in which this agenda was apparent in the empirical evidence: through questions acknowledging the competitive nature of international politics, and through arguments showing how the treaty's limitations and regulations enhanced the competitive advantage of the United States. Both the questions posed and the statements built on similar assumptions on the competitive nature in international politics and how it makes states either gain or lose advantages through arms control. The statements that argued in favor of ratification did so often with reference to the treaty's specifics. The questions did not have this explicit form of argumentation in favor of ratification. I chose to include the questions in the analysis in order to demonstrate how support of the advantage theory of arms control might be an underlying concern among U.S. policymakers and experts.

To argue in favor of ratification because the New START Treaty enhances U.S. competitive advantage is more prone to be an underlying concern because it only benefits the U.S. If the treaty serves the purpose of enhancing U.S.' strategic advantage, it will place Russia at a strategic disadvantage. The disarmament-agenda has an international focus, the stability-agenda has a bilateral focus, while this is exclusively unilateral focus. The information as to how the treaty can enhance U.S. strategic advantage might not be public because of this. It is better if Russia believes the U.S. signed and now ratifies the treaty because it contributes to strategic stability and reduces the number of weapons. The policymakers and experts might have discussed other benefits and advantages during the two closed hearings. As Secretary Gates said, "Whatever concerns the Russian Federation may have had, Russia agreed to the treaty". However, the U.S. politicians and experts do not need to provide new concerns to Russia. Russia also had to ratify the treaty in the Duma, which they did after the U.S. had ratified and after monitoring the discussions in the U.S. Senate.

The discussions in the Senate, while lacking explicit arguments in favor of ratification because of the treaty's ability to enhance U.S. strategic advantage, demonstrated a bipartisan concern with arms control's competitive component in their relationship with Russia. This is

in contrast to both the disarmament and stability-motives, where there was a clear domination of Democrats. However, that was mostly arguments in favor of ratification of their administration's treaty. In "Questions prodding the impact on U.S. strategic advantage" and "The treaty will preserve or enhance U.S. strategic advantage" most of the evidence found in the statements was not explicit about whether to ratify the New START Treaty or not. This can explain the bipartisan presence in the included statements and questions.

The lack of arguments in favor of ratification of the treaty because it enhances U.S. strategic advantage, might also be because the treaty did not enhance it. As Maurer has argued, enhancing U.S. strategic advantage is a forgotten side of U.S. arms control, and the U.S. negotiators might not have had this focus when working on the treaty with Russia. Indeed, this is one of the arguments currently being made by those who oppose an extension of The New Start Treaty. For example, the American Policy Analyst for nuclear deterrence and missile defense, Geller, has argued that the U.S. should not extend the treaty because it was flawed from the beginning due to how the treaty enhanced Russian strategic advantage, not the U.S. (Geller, 2020).

5. Conclusion

The thesis set out to identify what U.S. policymakers and experts' perceived to be the purposes of the New START Treaty. I sought to answer this question by studying multiple purposes for why states sign arms control agreements: disarmament, strategic stability and strategic advantage, based on a theoretical framework developed by Maurer. This framework was presented in the Chapter 2: Theory, operationalized in Chapter 3: Methodology and then utilized analytically in Chapter 4: U.S. Assessments of New START.

In this concluding chapter, I shall present the key findings from the analysis and highlight the most significant takeaways. To a large extent, the theoretical framework accounted for the empirical data. Finally, I discuss the implications of findings and suggest further studies based on them.

5.1. Key findings

In broad terms, I found that U.S. policymakers and experts argued that the New START Treaty served these five purposes and I present them in prioritized order.

First, the policymakers and experts argued in favor of ratification of the treaty to reduce and regulate weapons in order to maintain strategic stability at a lower cost. The politicians and experts argued that the reductions and limits of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in the New START Treaty secured both parties a secure second-strike capability. The treaty limits save money. This is because the United States unilaterally would invest in more arms in order to achieve the same level of security as the secured second-strike capability through New START provides them. The stability-theory of arms control predicted the presence and importance of this purpose. The data from this particular case falls squarely on that prediction, thus strengthening our confidence of theory's validity on this score.

Second, the policymakers and experts argued in favor of ratification because the treaty had transparency measures in place that would increase predictability, which maintains strategic stability. The stability-theory of arms control did not explicitly predict the role of transparency measures in maintaining strategic stability. However, the theory did explain how arms control could provide clearer expectations between states in order to reduce the likelihood of military action based on misunderstandings. Transparency measures reduce uncertainties because the measures increase confidence in assessments of each part's military strategies and capabilities. This increases confidence in U.S. second-strike capability and

hinders unnecessary acquisitions of arms. This way, the presence of this purpose strengthens the theory's validity.

Third, the policymakers and experts were preoccupied with enhancing U.S. international disarmament credentials. They argued that ratification of New Start would strengthen the NPT regime because it would signal to the other member states U.S. commitment to its obligations to the NPT. In accordance with the predictions of disarmament-theory of arms control, policymakers and experts view strong international institutions as important for achieving global disarmament goals. However, the policymakers and experts viewed this signal to the other member states of the NPT as beneficial to the U.S. because it would increase diplomatic support. This purpose of the New START should therefore not be judged as exclusively peace-promoting. Despite the benefits for the U.S. in agreeing to reductions, the signal effect of agreeing to reductions as obliged to by the NPT, can help the global process of disarmament through encouraging other states to do the same.

Fourth, the policymakers and experts argued that ratification of the New START Treaty would spur continuing bilateral disarmament efforts with Russia. As the disarmament-theory for arms control suggests, arms control agreements are building blocks towards the long-term goal of nuclear abolition. Proponents of this theory therefore supports partial measures, which is what the policymakers and experts argued the modest reductions of the New START Treaty was. The policymakers and experts argued that if the U.S. Senate would fail to ratify the treaty, it would halt, maybe even derail, the disarmament process. The policymakers and experts emphasize this argument when they argued that ratification of these modest reductions would also enable further reductions that would be more significant bilaterally.

Fifth, the policymakers and experts were concerned with the treaty's ability to preserve or enhance U.S. strategic advantage. This purpose had some implicit support among the policymakers and experts. However, there was also some evidence that this was an unspoken, yet underlying concern. The concern came to the fore when the politicians' questioned the experts, which often was concerned with whether the treaty enhanced U.S. strategic advantage or placed them at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis Russia. This clearly suggests that the policymakers and experts view their relationship with Russia as competitive and that arms control functions as a tool that can affect this relationship. The advantage-theory for arms control appears to account for the policymakers' perception of their relationship with Russia.

These findings reflect more Democrats' than Republicans' perceived purpose of ratification. There is a simple explanation for this. Their administration negotiated the deal. The outcome of the votes also reflected these partisan differences in the hearings: only Republicans voted against ratification.

As the theoretical framework suggests, the statements in the different categories had different time perspectives. Statements supporting the disarmament-agenda viewed the New START Treaty as a building block towards a bigger goal. The statements in the stability-agenda viewed ratification as maintaining strategic stability. Their view of the treaty was timeless. However, the statements in the advantage-agenda were interesting. The statements did not show a clear time perspective. Their concern with being at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Russia leads to the conclusion that the policymakers and experts viewed ratification as something temporary. If circumstances were to change, and the treaty would hurt their strategic relationship with Russia, the proponents of this theory would dismiss the New START Treaty.

The evidence in the U.S. Senate hearings supported all three theories, but to various degrees. This can have two explanations. First, that enhancing U.S. strategic advantage only benefits the U.S., while strengthening disarmament efforts can benefit all states. It is more challenging to argue publicly in favor of ratification of an arms control agreement if the treaty only benefits your state. If the treaty maintains strategic stability, it benefits both parties because strategic stability makes both states equally vulnerable to attacks – and equally capable of responding to them. However, if the treaty strengthens global disarmament efforts, the treaty does not only benefit the parties – it benefits all existing states because it lowers the threat nuclear weapons pose and reduces the likelihood of more states acquiring nuclear weapons. Because the three theories differ in how many states they benefit, it can explain why the U.S. policymakers and experts had few explicit arguments in the public hearings in favor of ratification because the treaty enhanced their strategic advantage.

Second, (strategic) stability is a buzzword. In addition to the five purposes, I found that the politicians and experts often stated that they should ratify the treaty because it would contribute to strategic stability without any attempt at accounting for how. While this is a support for the theory, it does not make sense alone. Their arguments could have been stronger if the policymakers and experts pointed to what part of the treaty language that contributed to strategic stability. Instead, they often used the concept loosely, together with other words like predictability and transparency. This points to two challenges, as mentioned

in Chapter 3. First, there is a problem with using politicians' statements as data. They often have to reaffirm their political party's stand and use rhetorical devices to do so. However, utilizing congressional hearings as the data material revealed this difference between scholars and politicians, which is useful for further research. Second, it is possible that material fitting the theory's predictions increases confidence in the explanation provided by it, even if isolating factors, explanations and causal directions is difficult. The politicians' use of strategic stability is an example of how difficult it can be to interpret the results.

5.2. Implications

These findings may have implication for our judgments regarding how the expiration of the New START Treaty will affect the U.S. next year. As of now, the U.S. administration has not signaled that they will extend the treaty (by five years), while Russia has. Based on the purposes the policymakers and experts argued the New START Treaty served in 2010, this will have four likely consequences in 2021.

First, the U.S. can potentially risk harming their international disarmament credentials and weakening the NPT. The policymakers and experts believed ratification would signal their commitment to their obligation to the NPT. If the U.S. now abstains from extending the treaty, the U.S. will potentially signal that they to a far lesser extent rely on cooperative measures for their security. On the contrary, the U.S. will possibly signal to the other member states of the NPT that they rely unilaterally on nuclear weapons for their security. This effect will be stronger if the world perceive the U.S. as the state who refused to move on with the treaty, whilst Russia still willingly precede with the reductions. As the politicians and experts argued throughout the hearings, the consequences of a weaker NPT might increase the risk of more states, such as Iran, to acquire nuclear weapons.

Second, failing to extend New START will bring a halt to a long history of bilateral disarmament efforts, which has been a historic effort since the Cold War. The evidence examined here displayed that this was perceived to be important because disarmament is a slow process, which requires partial measures through arms control over time in order to obtain the long-term goal of nuclear abolition. The policymakers and experts also argued that ratification of The New START Treaty could lead to reductions that would be even more substantial than the ones introduced by New START. Therefore, if the U.S. refrains from extending the treaty, they will make it more difficult to agree with Russia on reductions that are more substantial, which the policymakers and experts argued was the purpose of ratifying

the New START Treaty. As the disarmament-theory suggest and the policymakers and experts confirms in the hearings, they perceive fewer nuclear weapons as safer to the world because it would lower the risk of use.

Third, without the treaty's transparency measures, the U.S. and Russia will experience increased uncertainty and increased risk of misunderstanding and misinterpretations of each other's actions, which harms crisis stability. This will probably harm crisis stability because decreased confidence in the state's assessments of the adversary might lead the state to misunderstand the adversary's actions as preparing for a first-strike capability. This misunderstanding might lead the state to strike first to limit damage (J, Cameron, email exchange, March 2020).

Fourth, if the treaty's limitations and regulations of weapons contributed to strategic stability, as the politicians and experts in the hearings before ratification in 2010 argued, the U.S. and Russia will now forego arms race stability. When the U.S. and Russia are without limitations on strategic nuclear weapons it might trigger an arms race by increasing incentives to acquire arms in order to maintain the same level of security as they had bilaterally through the New START Treaty. In addition, if the U.S. and Russia do not have transparency measures in place, the decreased confidence in the assessments of the adversary's size of arsenal and capabilities might strengthen the possibility of an arms race because the leaders would rather spend more money acquiring extra arms than to risk the adversary having a first strike capability.

However, utilizing the advantage-theory for arms control to analyze the hearings before ratification in 2010, can also explain the purpose in not extending the New START Treaty for the U.S. As discussed, many of the politicians were concerned with how the treaty potentially affected U.S. strategic advantage or placed them at a strategic disadvantage. In other words, the politicians showed concern with the strategic competition with Russia. Since 2010, the international climate has changed. For one, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 changed the U.S.' perception of Russia to the more aggressive. The U.S. have also accused Russia of breaching its obligations of the INF Treaty – and withdrew from it. Russia refused to admit they cheated on the treaty, which for the U.S. might imply that Russia might have a higher risk of cheating again. Simultaneously, Russia has modernized its nuclear arsenal and deployed weapons that did not exist in 2010. In addition, China is more rapidly building its own nuclear arsenal. These are all signs of a shifting competition of great powers, and the advantage-theory of arms control suggests that states discard arms control when they no

longer benefit them. The Trump administration has expressed concern with both Russia's new weapon systems and China's development for the extension of the New START Treaty. If the U.S. allows the New START Treaty to expire, the changed competition might explain why.

Even though 10 years have passed since the hearings in Congress took place, the statements still provide insights into the strategic utility of strategic arms limitations treaties as expressed by US policymakers and experts. The New START Treaty still serves various purposes for U.S. politicians and experts. If the U.S. and Russia end up without any nuclear arms control treaty for the first time since 1972 next year, the treaty can no longer serve these purposes.

5.3. Suggestions for further studies

The findings in this thesis open up for multiple new studies. The first suggestion is to study the concept of strategic stability. These studies can seek to shed light on why there is a gap between scholars and policymakers in how they use the concept and if it even is possible to interpret what the politicians really mean by "strategic stability". Studies of the concept strategic stability can also study whether the Party the politicians represent matter for their use.

I would suggest applying the same framework and/or method as this analysis does to four other studies. First, to the debate in Russia before ratifying the New START Treaty. Second, to a comparative case study with the other START Treaties. Third, to a comparative case study with other arms control agreements, such as the INF Treaty. Lastly, to a possible New START Treaty debate in the Senate next year, or later.

Applying the same framework and method to these four suggestions could strengthen the generalizability of the findings in this analysis and possibly nuance the framework further. The purposes before ratifying the New START Treaty are in broad terms generalizable to other countries, i.e. Russia, and other bilateral arms control agreements between them. However, applying the same framework and method could also shed light on whether particularities of the treaty, such as the size of the reductions, or other particularities, such as political circumstances, matters for the politicians and experts' perceived purposes.

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