Exploring Territorial Peace

A case study of the search for Peace in Putumayo, Colombia

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Abstract

This thesis investigates how to understand the Colombian concept of *Territorial Peace.* The Colombian Peace Agreement is the tool from which this peace should be constructed. Still, I argue, it is not clear what Territorial peace *is* nor *can be*. This thesis seeks to find some answers through a qualitative study of the peace process in the southern Amazonian department of Putumayo.

Three complex issues are problematic for the territorial peacebuilding in Putumayo: 1) lack of social development, 2) coca farming and -production, and 3) weak local politics and democracy. I investigate peacebuilding attempts by looking at selected participation measures in the Colombian peace agreement and find that through the case study at hand, the *State led* peacebuilding in Putumayo is highly vulnerable. Nonetheless, *Putumayans* continue build territorial pece *outside* the realm of the state. Radical measures should be taken in order for the Colombian State to comply with what has been agreed upon.

Bienvenidas y bienvenidos al Putumayo – Welcome to Putumayo

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They say it takes a village: this thesis certainly did!
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saved this! Live, my life peeks when I'm living with you, thanks for making me move in, for always teaching me and helping me. Friends and family: I have missed you like crazy and I cannot wait to see you again!

This has been a hell of a ride! Any mistakes in this paper are entirely my own. Without further ado, I invite you to step into this magnificent, puzzling world:

This is the search for Peace in Putumayo.

With love,
Hanne Giskehaug
Oslo June 2020

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADA: Alianza democrática Afrocolombiana – Democratic Afrocolombian Alliance

AICO: Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia – Indigenous Authorities of Colombia

ASI: Alianza Social Independiente – Independent Social Alliance

CD: Centro Democrático – The Democratic Centre

CH: Colombia Humana – Humane Colombia

COCA: Casa Amazonia – Amazon house

CPA: The Colombian Peace Agreement

CS: Case Study

CSO: Civil Society Organization

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration

DS: Development Studies

ETCR: Espacios Territoriales de Capacitacion y Reintegracion - Territorial Reintegration Spaces

Farc: Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Comun - The Common Alternative Revolutionary Force

FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Ejercito del Pueblo - The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army

FN: Frente Nacional – The National Front

MOE: Misión de Observación Electoral – The Electoral Observation Mission

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

PCC: Partido Comunista Colombiana – The Colombian Communist Party

PDET: Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial - Development Programmes with a Territorial-Based Approach

PNIS: Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de uso Ilícito – National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes

PS: Problem Statement

SP: Somos Putumayo

UN: The United Nations

UP: Union Patriótica – The Patriotic Union

1. Introduction

"Sin maldad no hay Paraíso – Without evil there is no Paradise" (Anonymous)

When trying to illuminate my understanding of Colombia, my Colombian friends keep repeating something to the likes of the following; "When God created the earth, he made Colombia the garden of Eden, but to ensure others would not be too envious of our beauty, he also placed the worst people here". It is conspicuous that at this very moment, as I am writing about how evil Colombia often is portrayed, a notification pops up on my phone alerting me to the fact that yet another social leader in Putumayo has been violently murdered. This leader's name is Edison. I did not know him, but I wish to bear witness, on his, and so many other Putumayans' behalf:

Edison was killed, on the 8th of June after his State-provided bodyguards retired for the evening, around 4.30 pm. At this time, there is almost two more hours of daylight in Putumayo. Daylight usually means it is safe, even for the most threatened leaders. But when the sun disappears, darkness sets in, and apparently so does evil. Edison stepped out of his house later that evening and was ambushed by gunmen who assassinated him.

> *He is the eleventh social leader killed in Putumayo in 2020[1].*
>
> *By May 2020, one hundred Colombian leaders have been killed[2].*
>
> *Putumayo is not the most violent department in Colombia[3].*

How can we begin to speak of peace in such a context? How is it possible that the peace agreement negotiated between the Colombian government and the guerrilla group FARC[4] *(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaras de Colombia- Ejercito del Pueblo)* is so widely celebrated when the facts clearly state that activists and Human rights defenders are still murdered *because* of their desire for change? How can the people of Putumayo find peace when there are five

[1] INDEPAZ
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] I refer to the guerrilla group as FARC and the political party or ex-combatants as Farc in this thesis.

active insurgent groups fighting for control of their territories? How is it possible that the tragic developments post-agreement in Colombia and Putumayo continue to go unnoticed?

1.1 Aim of the study

In this master thesis, peace, considered in the Colombian context as *territorial*, is the meta-concept I seek to understand and make theoretical contributions to. The Colombian Peace Agreement of 2016 (from here on referred to as CPA) sets the overall framework for the development of peace in Colombia – but *what does Territorial Peace look like?*

In order to explore the concept *territorial peace,* I conducted an empirical case study based on two towns in Putumayo, Colombia, where collected data through qualitative methods. Below I will elaborate on how the *territorial* approach to peace is interpreted based on the CPA.

1.2 Method

I opted for a qualitative approach to investigate *territorial peace* in Putumayo. For ten weeks, between 10.09.2019-20.11.2019, I conducted fieldwork research in Putumayo and Bogotá. I interviewed, observed and participated in the daily life alongside my informants and people in Putumayo in order to collect the primary data that substantiates this thesis. I stayed for five days in the reintegration zone with Farc's local faction where I interviewed, observed and participated in meetings and courses. During the time of fieldwork, local elections were held leading me to participate in campaign events and observe the general evolvement of how the political campaigns were run in the two main areas of investigation: the towns of Mocoa and Puerto Asís. Furthermore, I spent considerable time looking for secondary data by tracking real-time- and past debates through a variety of media outlets. I make use of the CPA as the main textual document guiding the research; I also explored official government publications in order to include the current central State's views on the peace process in Putumayo.

1.2.1 Territorial peace

Territorial peace as applied in the Colombian agreement signifies peace in actual geographic areas called *territories*, literally translated to 'territories' in English. However, in Colombia territory is the term used to refer to rural and peripheral geographic areas distant from the major urban areas, power centers and the Colombian elites. In the peace agreement, the term Territorial Peace (*Paz territorial)* refers to peace in specific geographic areas, i.e. 16 subregions chosen as 'peace territories' (*territorios de paz*) based on a set list of criteria. This is where the most encompassing policies of the peace agreement would be implemented in a prioritized manner: these 16 territories have precedence compared to the rest of the country. What exactly does the agreement seek to accomplish through this undefined territorial form of peace? What *mechanisms* does a territorial approach to peace implement in the peace territories? As I am studying human geography, the concept of territory and territoriality also jumps to mind. How can I begin to explore what a territorial approach to peace is? This thesis seeks to address the theoretical assumptions regarding this concept through investigating the case; The search for peace in Putumayo. Below I present the research design that guided this thesis.

In order to study territorial peace from a local perspective, I first identify the measures of the agreement, most important to Putumayans[5] and assess how different factors affect the way they are implemented. Second, I must explore what individual and communal responses, strategies, and measures Putumayans themselves implement or prioritize, as an attempt at building territorial peace in accordance with their own preferences. Finally, I argue, that the abovementioned explorations can inform an understanding of *what territorial peace looks like.*

I seek to investigate how the search for peace, through a politically negotiated agreement, can be interpreted by exploring the following problem statement: *"How can the concept of territorial peace be understood by exploring the implementation process of the Colombian peace agreement in Putumayo?*

[5] Throughout the thesis, I refer to the people of Putumayo as *Putumayan* based on Ramirez (2011).

To address the problem statement, I have developed four research questions:

- *What measures are being implemented in Putumayo and how is this carried out?*
- *What factors affect the implementation-process? Who participates in the implementation and how?*
- *How do the stakeholders interpret current implementation and what strategies do they apply to overcome limitations?*
- *What does the implementation process and its limitations tell us about territorial peace?*

Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will introduce the research design, including methods, theoretical framework, the case, the context and the structure of the thesis.

1.2.2 The case

Below I will briefly present some of the structural factors that informs the case in this thesis and the context in which it is situated.

1.2.3 Colombian violence, insecurity and conflicts

As might be known, Colombia has throughout history struggled with a variety of conflicts. Hannah Arendt's (1964) term 'the banality of evil' is depressingly suitable for some aspects of Colombian society and social behavior, as violence, insecurity and conflicts restrain the country from progressively moving forward. Ultimately, 'the banality of evil' is a grave challenge to the overall peace process. Violence in Colombia takes different forms and Chambers has even proclaimed that Colombia is having a "widely recognized moral crisis" (2013, p.118) in relation to the many atrocities taking place in the country. Expectations of decreased violence as a direct result of the peace process has been maintained, still the results after three years are daunting.

Colombia is supposedly in a condition of 'post-conflict' given the signing of the Peace Agreement. MacGinty and Williams (2009) rightfully emphasize how speaking of 'ends to conflict' is problematic. Given what we know about the nature of conflict, violence, peace

negotiations, interventions, peacebuilding or transitions; expecting a country to come to an abrupt 'ending of conflict' is a blunt and naive claim. This logic entails it is naturally also highly problematic to even characterize Colombia as a 'post-conflict' society. Much of the government- and international discourses frame the situation as if the country is instead in a state of 'transition towards peace', but five active conflicts in addition to reports of increasing rates of violence, rumors of new extrajudicial killings, and the attacks on local social leaders are particularly worrisome and challenges this claim. Furthermore, an encompassing investigation published on May 1st exposing the army conducting illegal surveillance, striking in particular those opposed to the current government, have shaken the illusion of Colombia as a progressive country attempting to construct a more peaceful society (Semana, 01.05.2020). In sum, I argue it is a far-off claim to assert that Colombia has negotiated 'the end of the conflict' (CPA, 2016). Given this argument, I consequently make use of the plural nomination *conflicts* to substantiate the fact that regrettably, many Colombians are still living in a state of war.

1.2.4 Development in the Peace Agreement

Development is understood in this thesis as a western, colonial and neoliberally influenced construction. Although the measures studied here originate in a 'local', Colombian document (CPA, 2016), it is still shaped by western, colonial and neoliberal structures while attempting to create endogenous ownership.

Development, as discursively presented in the Colombian peace agreement, is framed as necessary steps aiming to ensure more and equal opportunities for all Colombians. The discourse in the agreement places particular emphasis on those regions and minorities historically lagging behind in terms of social, political and economic prosperity (CPA, 2016). The Colombian peace discourse presents social development according to the view of the negotiating team i.e. former President Santos' government (2010-2018) and Farc[6]. It is framed

[6] Farc in this thesis excludes dissidents and defectors. Post-agreement Colombia has been increasingly polarized as will be reflected upon throughout this thesis and claiming the peace-discourse is only pertinent to that of the negotiating teams does not imply I assume other actors and groupings does not support it. Instead, it substantiates the notion that many Colombians, including the sitting government, are not positive to the wording of the agreement nor the implementation of it (Carranza-Franco 2019).

as progressive and inclusive, innovative and differential and not least highly context sensitive (ref.the territorial focus) (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Throughout the course of the negotiation, participatory mechanisms were constantly promoted, a differential focus prioritizing 'subgroups' such as victims, women, indigenous, Afro-Colombians, *campesinos* (peasants) and LGBTQ[7] community representatives whom were invited to participate. Furthermore, public suggestions could be submitted through a web portal run by the government. These suggestions were only considered in a secondary and contributory matter and would not alter the negotiating agenda (Nasi 2018). The negotiating parties presumed that increased democratic participation, both during and after the negotiations, would facilitate locally adapted programs and increase local ownership of the CPA. The full implementation of the measures in the agreement is expected to expedite the breakdown of structural injustices (CPA, 2016). I take as point of departure that policies derived from a negotiated agreement, such as that in Colombia, can facilitate a societal transformation towards the predetermined outcome *territorial peace.*

The decrease in active conflict following the signing of the agreement between Colombia's two biggest opponents, lends itself to questioning what type of society Colombia now will turn towards. Can the agreement indeed bring renewed opportunities for a more substantial democracy and facilitate a transition towards a long-desired territorial peace?

1.3 Theoretical framework

The analytical framework chosen for this research is based on two main concepts *Participation* and *Peace*. Throughout this thesis I lean on main concepts from Human Geography (Place, Space, Territory, Scale). I am also inspired by political geography's understandings of democracy and state-building or -consolidation (Jordhus-Lier & Stokke, 2017).

The participation concept is inspired by democracy-debates in the Social Sciences. Within Human Geography, I look towards Political Geography and Planning theory, I also link the discussion to debates regarding participation as a tool for democracy as seen in Development

[7] LGBTQ is an acronym for Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning.

Studies (DS). I then explore more radical and holistic approaches to participation from Critical peace pedagogy. In the analyses in chapter five and six I link these approaches with the discursive conceptualization of participation as I interpret it from the peace agreement. This is because the CPA is the Colombian State's own framework and as such it is of value to investigate to what extent the State is following and making use of its own guiding principles to construct peace in Putumayo.

When the concept of peace is to be presented and discussed I look at debates on peace within human geography and also present a view from critical peace pedagogy. I look towards pedagogy because I interpret that the CPA has a pedagogic approach to peacebuilding. For the analysis in chapter seven I make use of the framework in order to explore the strategies people apply in order to advance in their own educational journeys towards peace.

Finally, at the end of chapter two I combine the approaches of participation and peace in an encompassing framework which is applied in chapter seven to explore *what we can learn about territorial peace*.

Human geography concepts such as *scale* and *network* further inform my interpretation as the *place* where this project is situated is seen *in relation* to the broad Colombian society (scale) and to *center-periphery* distance (network). In addition, the *geographical* area (Putumayo) is also seen as an abstraction of *space* where people experience their lives in relation to each other *within* the space which surrounds them. These spaces are seen as contested and thus resonates with a spatial understanding of *territory* and *territoriality* (Jordhus-Lier & Stokke, 2017).

1.4 Limitations of the research

As I am writing about a phenomenon outside my home-context this necessarily has some implications for the final result. In chapter three I will thoroughly discuss and critically reflect on ethically challenging issues regarding cross-cultural research, gender, security, language and power. Transforming someone's words into parts of a story to be critically analyzed carries with it a great deal of responsibility for the researcher. This is a responsibility I seek to uphold through applying conscious awareness and critical self-reflection

Critically reflecting on both the goal of this project and my own personal bias, has led me to accept that my project might be somewhat premature. Only three years have passed since the signing of the Colombian peace agreement, by all means it is not nearly enough time to conclude that Colombia is failing to implement their 578-point comprehensive agreement, nor is unable to build peace.

This thesis is thus limited in scope; I do not compare the Putumayan experience with other prioritized regions, neither have I chosen to focus on the most violent department in the country. I do not aim to generalize my findings, but to re-present viewpoints and experiences based on interactions with a selected group of people in the Putumayan local communities of Mocoa and Puerto Asís.

1.5 Structure

Chapter two presents and discusses the theoretical concepts of participation and peace guiding the analyses in this thesis. I also present an illustrative figure which aim to represent how the analytical framework will be used in the substantial chapters.

Chapter three is the Methodology and Methods chapter. This chapter is extensive in its form as a result of both changes in the field and subsequent altering of the research design, as well as the Corona-situation leading us to miss out the oral defense opportunity. Throughout the chapter, I account for and discuss the methodological implications in the study, before I reflect on the qualitative methods, the analytical approaches and ethical considerations applied in this thesis.

In **Chapter four** I describe the Colombian context in which this thesis is situated. I present a brief, historical overview of the development of the Colombian state, elaborate on the social conflicts and its actors, albeit with particular emphasis on FARC/Farc. The peace agreement is then described, before I end by introducing historical and current characteristics of Putumayo.

The first substantial chapter is **Chapter five,** where I answer the two first research questions in terms of the *development-measures* in the CPA. I conducted a thematic analysis of the measures implemented and investigated what factors affect their state of implementation. I

continued to process-trace these factors in order to uncover the current status of *development* in Putumayo as stipulated by the agreement.

In **Chapter six**, I focus on *formal, local politics* and *democratic practices* and present a second interpretation of the two first research questions. I particularly investigate the legal aspect of the political reforms that are presented in the agreement. I aim to exemplify this by looking at the Putumayan local elections during the fall of 2019.

Chapter seven takes as departure the third and fourth research questions. By applying a narrative analytical method, I seek to uncover the perspectives of particularly marginalized groups, coinciding with my research goal of 'giving voice' to the Putumayans I interacted with. I investigate what strategies are employed in the local communities, in order to progress the local search for peace. I end the chapter by exploring what the case of Putumayo can teach us about the concept *Territorial Peace.*

In **Chapter eight** I summarize and conclude my research. I present main findings and argue that the research presented is a valuable contribution to the field of Human Geography. In particular I have attempted to couple my research to the critical Peace debate in addition to the general research field considering peripheral areas of Colombia. I present my theoretical contributions and evaluate if there are any policy recommendations to be found as a result of this investigation. Finally, I conclude the thesis with presenting my suggestions on further research in the field.

2. Theory and Analytical Framework

To explore the dynamics at work in Putumayo's search for peace, I propose to apply an encompassing analytical framework based on two main theoretical concepts: Participation and Peace. By combining Human Geography with other Social Science debates, I attempt to develop a middle range analytical approach, which is clearly informed by the philosophical and methodological paradigms I adhere to. In sum, complex contexts lend themselves to complex interpretations, and I argue that the case of Putumayo qualifies for such an approach.

I begin this chapter by discussing the concept of *participation* and different understandings of it. One of the most celebrated aspects of the Colombian peace agreement is its focus on participation. I have created a figure to illustrate how the participation framework will be used in the substantial chapters five and six. I then discuss *peace*, which is the main theoretical focus of this project. I rely on interdisciplinary literature but focus on peace understandings from critical peace-geographies. I argue that a peace pedagogy approach is essential in the construction of peace in Putumayo. I conclude the chapter by linking the concepts of participation and peace and present an analytical framework used in the final substantial chapter (7).

2.1 Participation Research

Participation is one of the most debated- and applied concepts in social sciences, policymaking and development research and practice. In this section, I wish to shed light on the evolution of participation as both an emancipatory concept and a practical methodology, which I argue is uncritically framed as a tool to enable democratic- and peaceful social interactions between people.

In this thesis, Participation is understood in accordance to its *depth: deep* and *shallow* participation. The depth of participation varies depending on the *scope* and *form* of participation. The scope refers to whether it is an *inclusive* or *exclusive* participation; to uncover this one should ask *who is invited?* The form refers to whether there is a focus on *giving voice* or on *decision-making power*; to uncover this one should ask *who gets to make decisions?*

I consider the depth of participation from deep horizontal participation to shallow hierarchic participation and not least, various intermediate positions in-between. I make use of the

denomination *Deep* for public participation in the form of horizontal collaborative decision-making processes with a focus on dispersion of power, based on substantial democratic principles of intersectional but differential equality. In these participatory processes, co-determination of principles, policies and programs is ensured and guaranteed by law. The term *Shallow* applies to hierarchic participation in the form of clear leader-structures where 'the public' is invited to participate in processes without due process guaranteed. It is based on liberal democratic principles of representativity; thus, co-determination is not ensured. Instead, "inclusive participation" is promoted in the form of process observation where a participant group gets to *voice* their concerns and suggestions but is not holding any significant *decision-making power*. Below I elaborate on the theories that inspired this conceptualization, which is used in the substantial chapters five and six.

2.1.1 Participation and democracy

The State is the only widely recognized principle of organization for nations (MacGinty and Williams 2009:59-60). Today, most States take their form based on western, Eurocentric philosophy, which abide to a categorization of organizing structures ranging from for example anarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and autocracy (Galtung & Scott, 2008). Most common within those denominating themselves democracies, is a power sharing agreement where indirect, elected representatives make up the political class. The self-proclaimed democratic State is usually organized in a threefold division of executive, legislative and judicial powers, and entails a decentralized variegation of powers (Ibid). In Colombia, the State decentralize through sub-regions: regions, special districts, departments and municipalities, and apply their own indirect- but elected State representatives and appointed institutions (Colombia.co n.d). I argue that the State-organizations known as democracies today applies *representativity* as the guiding principle of participation and based on Galtung and Scott (2008) this thesis considers Colombia a *pseudo-democracy*, that is a democracy based on weak representation and elections.

The State's capacity is "crucial in facilitating, developing and constraining conflict" (MacGinty and Williams 2009:58) and the ideal State should be able to provide for its citizens, whatever that entails. States are thus of importance, as the different forms a State takes will affect how it exercises its obligations to the citizens. States often take a role of both 'solution and problem'

(Ibid:59), meaning that States' as institutions work *together with* and *alongside* its population towards a common democratic goal, and to the contrary: work *alone* and *against* the majority of its populations' needs and wishes. In Colombia, I argue the State ends up unsuccessfully doing both.

There is growing consensus regarding the importance of participatory measures as a way of enhancing and ensuring political legitimacy and sustainability, and in turn substantiate democracy. Buzzwords such as local participation, ownership and empowerment have become essential parts of political documents, although the way in which one can assure realization of these measures is more unclear. Galtung and Scott (2008) argue that the democratic states we are accustomed to are not democratic in the *Athenian* sense of the word and that structural changes in State organization are difficult to achieve. So how can one push for progressive democratization of the State within its existing limits? I suggest that participation as a democratizing measure is a tool that deserves critical consideration.

The concept of participation experienced a boom during the 1990s. The concept itself, in its truest form of being a direct, power-sharing model, has historical roots back to the Greek philosophy discussions of the 'demos' (here free, rich men) ruling equally through participation (Galtung & Scott, 2008). Still, it was not until coopted by institutions such as the World Bank that participatory measures were reframed as emancipatory for the marginalized and 'powerless' (Williams, 2004). Both during and after the participatory decade of the 1990s, critics were vocal in denouncing the measures as a Trojan horse: a means of pretend that did not enable much emancipation but instead served as another neoliberal tool for power and control (Ibid). To this day, the critique remains largely the same; individual reform triumphs political, common struggles, local power disparities are hidden by uncritically celebrating an illusion of 'one local community' and continuous 'participation as emancipation'-discourses are spread while the powerful incorporates marginalized populations within the continued dogma of the capitalist modernization of neoliberalism (Ibid, p. 558). Even so, through criticism comes perhaps change, and participation is continuously discussed as a possible tool for democratization.

From development debates, Cooke and Kothari (2002) ask if there exists a 'tyranny of participation' where donors require participation to be included in policies as a natural part of

western liberal institutions' policy recommendations (in Mac Ginty and Wiliams 2009:79). Glyn Williams (2004) claims that because the World Bank adopted participation as a guiding term, Southern governments are being forced into implementing participatory measures, at least on paper. Still, what seems clear is that "the official discourse of participation and empowerment through democracy often falls far short of reality" (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009:118). Is participation then, a case of 'coercive harmony' where participants are welcomed but pressured into reaching consensus, thus leaving intact underlying grievances and skewed power structures? How representative and participatory are these measures, and what are their consequences? Is it indeed yet another box to tick of, or can it stimulate a substantial deepening of democracy (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009:79)?

Mac Ginty and Williams state that we must accept that deep-rooted conflicts are extremely complex and not easy to resolve, at the same time we should not stop trying (Ibid). Good intentions set aside, if participation is to enable a more inclusive democracy, it necessarily must be more than just a box to tick off. To what extent then, are theories and practices, aimed at supporting transitions towards peace, adequate to solve problems caused by conflict? Scholars have spent considerable time plundering this issue, to be presented below.

2.1.2 Substantial democratic participation

Stokke & Törnquist have co-edited three books about the prospects for democratic transformation in the Global South. In the first volume, the authors criticize the illusory creation of a universal democratic model where the ideal state is (neo)liberal. The second book identifies the poor representation of people as a root cause of these pseudo-democracies. In their third book, 'Democratization in the Global South: The importance of Transformative Politics' (2013), upon which this section is based, they argue that transformative democratic politics can function as an engine for substantive democracy, especially in, but not limited to, the Global South. Based on Stokke & Törnquist, I argue that a substantiation of democracy closely relates to a deepening of democracy, which is more in line with my conceptualization of participation according to depth.

The authors base their analysis on three pillars: "how the significant actors relate to the institutional means of democracy" (Stokke & Törnquist, 2013, p. 9); how they "relate to the

determinants of their political capacity when trying to develop more or less democratic transformative strategies" (Ibid:10), and the third pillar; the need to conduct comparative analysis. The most relevant aspect of Stokke & Törnquist's approach for this thesis is what I interpret as a *relational approach*: the acknowledgement that democratic transformation happens through relational interaction between State and society. In the case of Putumayo, my analysis of political elections, peace negotiations and general State-society communication- and interaction is interpreted through a relational approach.

According to Stokke & Törnquist (2013), most scholars agree that the aims of democracy is "popular control of public affair on the basis of political equality" (p.9) while the means of democracy on the other hand, is "an extensive list of specific institutions" (Ibid). However, the ethos which drives the framing of such an understanding of democracy is a Eurocentric, (neo)liberal approach. According to the authors, democratic rules and regulations can in general terms be said to include at least the following measures; citizenship rights, rule of law (international and national), equal justice, human rights, basic needs, *democratic* representation and -*participation*, effective democratic central- and local governance, control of the means of coercion and freedom of; public discourse, culture, academia and civil society (Ibid). As Colombia claims to be a democracy, I argue that these measures should be expected as a given, throughout the whole country.

Combining a plurality of local, indigenous norms with general democratic norms derived from the liberal democratic measures mentioned above, may easily lead to collisions (MacGinty and Williams 2009). One strategy to avoid such cultural clashes could be to outlaw forms of discrimination and make differential identity-based quotas of representation in an attempt to minimize historical inequalities. I argue that this is what the Colombian Peace agreement seeks to achieve through its participatory focus (CPA, 2016).

Still, a bigger challenge is to enable a deep democratic transformation of socio political- and cultural norms both in specific societies, and globally. Converting rhetoric, discourse, laws, decrees; all documented content, into real, deep rooted change is indeed an eternal battle that requires what I interpret as *intersectional solidarity* (Stokke & Törnquist, 2013, p. 86). Intersectional solidarity takes as departure that we actively need to bridge the lives of different groups (Ellsworth, 1989). This is essential as history shows that any given group is likely to

work for the benefit of their individual community, and not the plurality of the wider, social public (Sokke & Törnquist, 2017). This is not to say that extreme power-differences, and hence the degree to which one group's struggle actually manages to make an impact, is not affected by the standard norms derived from a Eurocentric, liberal democracy. Still, local belief systems, and practices of social- and political organization, are often found in *combination* with variations of Eurocentric (neo)liberalism. However, it is often difficult to bring these different systems- and norms to the surface in an inclusive matter that manages to balance the plurality of what I see as *contradicting* systems- and norms into one. I argue that this indeed is the case in Putumayo (ref chapter 4). Conflicts regarding the extent a local community should liberalize, is thus inherent in a highly plural-community, such as Putumayo. I argue that the conflicting nature between Eurocentric, liberal democracy- and local, indigenous forms of democracy should continue to be critically examined, in order to minimize the incompatibilities within local community groups.

2.1.3 Radical democratic participation

Further criticism against democratic participation measures stem from the field of planning theory. Within these theories, all planning is policy driven, meaning that it is part of a political system that is governed based on political convictions. This leads the effectiveness of said planned policies to be judged by their measurable outcomes (Healey, 1997; Pløger, 2002). Critical planning theories suggest more radical and democratic participation as a possible tool in order to overcome the pitfalls of what I argue, following Galtung and Scott (2008), are pseudo-democratic planning norms and -associated implementation processes.

Patsy Healey (1997) suggests leaders should find inspiration in collaborative planning theory that builds on a communicative approach, but takes a radical- and critical look at the planning process. Following Healey, I argue that democratization can be enabled through deep participation that is applied continuously throughout *both* the planning phase *and* the implementation process.

This approach correlates with critical action research methodologies, where the people to be researched (objects) transform into becoming both researcher participants and co researchers (subjects), where they have the power to shape the focus of the research themselves (Charmaz,

2006). Pamina Firchow (2018) extends this argument within the same lines regarding peace processes, stating that local voices must reclaim their position as both *developers*, *recipients* and *drivers* of holistic peacebuilding processes. Regardless of all 'good intentions' from external peacebuilders[8], the people actually building their lives in communities', which are in a continued state of conflict-transition processes, are evidently the voices that should carry the most weight (Ibid). Even so, local communities are as different as the people that comprise them; indicating local power differences always will be present within the communities seeking to build peace. The recognition of power discrepancies, latent within all human relations, are of utter importance when seeking to substantiate democracy through participating collaboratively in planning- and policy processes.

Differential- and preferential treatment is in line with the radical propositions that Healey (1997) and Pløger (2002) suggest; those historically marginalized should have precedence in collaborative planning processes in order to attempt an undoing of historical wrongs. I have argued that differential- and preferential principles are found in the Colombian Peace agreement and further posit that it is a legally founded guarantee that, based on the CPA, should drive the planning- and implementation of the agreement forward.

Still, while the Colombian Peace agreement is celebrated as an innovative and bottom up-participatory process (Herbolzheimer, 2016) as is expected in radical collaborative policy planning (Healey, 1997), the issues the agreement sets out to tackle were pre-fixed by the negotiating teams before they stated that a negotiation was taking place (Nasi, 2018). This contradicts collaborative policy planning, and challenges the claim that the agreement is bottom-up participatory focused. I therefore argue that the claim that this agreement is based on participatory, bottom up planning for *the people* and especially *the victims of the conflict* is highly up for debate. The Colombian people and the conflict's victims were only included as a final part of the so-called 'democratization of planning and policies' in the agreement. Furthermore, their inputs were restricted to making comments on the agreement (Nasi 2018) The claim that the Colombian Peace process is considered an international 'best-practice' in participatory bottom-up peace processes while simultaneously denying radical democratic

[8] I make use of the general denomination 'peacebuilder' for all people proactively working towards 'some peace'.

participation in both the negotiations- and the implementation process, will be further criticized in the substantial chapters (5 and 6).

2.2 Pedagogy of participation

Critical peace pedagogy also sheds light on how participation can be interpreted as both an emancipatory concept and a practical methodology. The theoretical contributions presented in the 2011 book 'Critical Issues in Peace and Education' edited by Trifonas and Wright, is what guides this section. These are combined with specific inputs from Elizabeth Ellsworth's work on discriminatory pedagogy, which she argues requires intersectional- and differential methodologies to truly enable emancipatory- and peaceful social interaction (1989).

In accordance with a social constructivist epistemology, the foundation of all learning is enabled through participation. By way of participating in social interactions, people embark on an educational journey of personal and/or communal growth as we are presented with variations- and experiences of the many meanings found in our shared, but individually interpreted life experiences. Learning is thus about obtaining, challenging and reframing socially produced knowledge. According to Bickmore (2011), the frequency- and diversity of active participation opportunities one is offered is essential for learning how to resolve incompatibilities (i.e. conflicts) peacefully. Furthermore, it may also deepen democracy through the exploration of collaborative relationships (Healey, 1997; Ellsworth, 1989; Echevarria & Cremin, 2019). Essentially;

"Disagreements, problems, decisions, injustices, clashing perspectives or interests need negotiation and resolution for peace. Violence can be a symptom of underlying conflicts, and a way of handling conflicts, but it is not inevitable in all cases. The nonviolent confrontation of such conflicts is what sustains both democratic civil society and human relationships. […]. Unfortunately, typical… [Institutions]… today do not embrace such conflicts as opportunities for learning and collectively creating dynamic peace." (Bicksmore, 2011, p. 99).

Critical peace pedagogy applies a holistic, interdisciplinary approach when conceptualizing notions of peaceful coexistence through differential- and radically democratic relations

(Trifonas & Wright, 2011). Human interaction is critically interpreted as both conflictive and peaceful as reflected on by Bicksmore above; if participation is employed in a consciously democratic and radical manner, it can enable a bridging of oneself with 'Others'.[9] If used uncritically, participation can exacerbate the already latent distance between groups of Others (Ibid).

A differential approach to group participation entails that the voices of those considered Others (finally) can enter the stage. While 'on stage', Others can present their grievances, basic necessities and desires while being actively listened to. Moreover, and of most importance, these pedagogues argue that when differential principles are adhered to, the suggestions made by Others enable a transfer of real decision-making power. Planning, policies and programs can then better reflect *their* concerns based on *their* preferences and decisions (Trifonas & Wright, 2011). A radical differential approach rejects principles of equanimity between people by acknowledging the structural power discrepancies already existing in society (Pløger, 2002; Healey, 1997; Trifonas & Wright, 2011). In an attempt to minimize these power imbalances, and eventually challenge the overwhelming structures that reproduce them, principles of difference should be applied.

Ellsworth (1989) criticizes how, in social relations, the dominant, 'rational dialogue' always is in opposition to the 'irrational Other' which historically has been "women and other exotic Others" (p.308). Ellsworth bases her suggestions on experiences from teaching a college class on discrimination and highlights power structures always present within the classroom:

> *"Because not all voices within the classroom are not and cannot carry the equal legitimacy, safety and power in dialogue at this historical moment, there are times when the inequalities must be named and addressed by constructing alternative ground rules for communication"* (Ibid:317).

[9] The term 'Other' here refers to the assumed distance between subgroups based on cultural and normative assumptions of difference between humans. Ellsworth's (1989) interpretation could for instance coin women (and other traditionally marginalized groups) as 'Others'. I continue writhing Others with a capital O to emphasize that I am referring to this understanding of social groups.

Constructing 'alternative ground rules' for communication, interaction and participation within social organization spaces is thus essential if one truly wishes to respond to the voices of 'the Others' who are most struck by historical inequalities.

2.3 Deep and Shallow Participation

In an attempt to summarize, the way in which I conceptualize participation, I have developed a figure. The figure, '*Participation depth'* illustrates how I differentiate types of participatory measures- and activities from deep to shallow; these are seen as ideal types. [10] The ideal types are seen in connection with participation measures derived from the Colombian peace agreement, highlighting the types of participation, which I interpret as theoretically, normatively and practically possible to achieve in the case of Putumayo. I make no claims that this conceptualization is neither universally encompassing nor exhaustive; the figure is limited to the scope of this thesis.

		SCOPE	
		INCLUSIVE	***EXCLUSIVE***
FORMS	***VOICE***	*Intermediate Participation*	*Shallow Participation*
	DECISION-MAKING POWER	*Deep Participation*	*Intermediate Participation*

[10] This dichotomy is inspired by Weber's conceptualization of *Ideal Types* (Weber 2004 [1904])

2.3.1 Deep participation

Deep Participation is operationalized as a continuous process where people with different degrees of decision-making power enter into a collaborative dialogue with Others. The leading principle that drives the dialogue- and hence, the social interaction, is differential treatment based on each affinity group's historical experiences with discriminating- and exclusionary structures. Participants representing affinity groups are not assumed to be true or encompassing representatives for all 'exotic Others', neither is it assumed that group-characteristics are fixed; they are indeed dynamic. Representatives thus speak for themselves, ***but*** they also speak in 'layers': first individually, then as representatives of their family and/or community nucleuses, and finally they opinionate as a spokesperson for an affinity group. In the Colombian agreement, the preferential affinity groups are victims, indigenous, ethnic minorities, women, afrocolombians, LGBTQ and Farc. In spaces of interaction where the goal is to work towards peace, allotted speaking-duration is divided differentially. Those living their lives in the context of severe conflict incompatibilities have precedence, in the Colombian context that refers to the 16 prioritized regions. Furthermore, the marginalized affinity groups (as mentioned above) also have preference compared to groupings *not* identifying with the grouping's characteristics. Active listening is a guiding principle for all participants, but especially the dialogue leader (usually a comparably more powerful institutional representative – often not considered an 'Other') is to guarantee that this principle is followed. Furthermore, continuous check-ins with each affinity group is essential; this is in order to seek reassurance regarding discriminatory discourses and/or avoidance of misunderstandings regarding Others' grievances, desires and needs in accordance with *their own priorities*. Deep participation is a direct- and radical form of democratic 'problem solving'- and peacebuilding, enabled through safe spaces of dialogue- and social interaction.

Experiments with variations of similar attempts at a local scale, such as the People Planning's campaign in Kerala, India and Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Törnquist 2002), are known examples of small-scale collaborative policy processes where they make use of what interpret as *deep participation* measures.

A seemingly eternal list of pitfalls to avoid comes with any attempt at challenging the status quo of power in society. However, without consciously considering these traditional power

structures I argue that attempts at minimizing these structures will fail. Radical differential democratization requires a radical rethinking of human relations. Consciously applying power-sensitive approaches, such as creating 'alternative grounds' of communication, interaction and participation in social spaces, is thus necessary (Ellsworth 1989).

2.3.2 Shallow participation

Shallow Participation, on the other hand, is seen as an opposite to Deep Participation. *Shallow participation* I conceptualize as; uncritical, liberally informed participation mechanisms based on principles of equality and pseudo-democratic representativity notwithstanding the powerstructures omnipresent within human relationships, communities and societies. I delimitate *Shallow participation* close to how I interpret the hegemonic status quo of democracy at this historical time (Galtung and Scott 2008). Otherness, I argue, is not acknowledged, nor is power inequality. I argue that power sharing agreements of indirect representation in pseudo-democracies make the majority a-political and/or depoliticized agents while a minority political elite rules on behalf of this majority who is often seen as in a condition of powerlessness. The reasons behind both people's decisions and/or the structural restraints hindering participation in the sociopolitical life are complex and conflictual (Bregazzi & Jackson 2018). Still, not participating, be the decision consciously taken or unconsciously denied, does not entail people lack agency. I thus argue that despite peoples', communities' or societies' lack of deep participation, they are still active agents of their own lives (Giddens, 1984). In my third research question, I explore what strategies Putumayans employ in their search for peace. I aim to demonstrate that even though the majority of Putumayans are not deeply participating within the realm of the CPA, they still manage to create their own peaceful spaces. These spaces are mostly found *outside* the formal spaces of participation that originate from the peace agreement. Still, Putumayans also manage to participate, albeit in different depths, within the formal spaces. This is elaborated- and discussed in chapter seven.

2.3.3 Intermediate participation

Intermediate Participation invokes a *cherry picking* of the extreme positions deep and shallow. When facilitators' and participants' cherry-pick the participation measures they wish to adhere to, based on what measures that best suit *their* concerns, I argue that they do not challenge the status quo and instead maintain the distance between groups of Others. In order for the peace process in Putumayo to develop further, I argue that the historical distance between communal groupings must be radically challenged. Maintaining the relations as they historically have been is hampering the peace process. Moreover, it contradicts the agreement's own participatory focus, which I have argued is presented as deep.

As can be seen in figure 2.1, intermediate participation is either inclusive *or* exclusive in scope. The form it takes is either voice *or* decision-making power. On the one hand, the combination of inclusive scope *and* voice in form becomes intermediate. On the other, the combination of exclusive scope *and* decision-making power in form also becomes intermediate. I argue that an intermediate participation approach is more in line with *individual*- rather than *societal* preferences. The intermediate types of participation are more in line with a neoliberal approach to a Eurocentric democratic space of interaction. Such an approach, I argue, will fail to facilitate peaceful interactions among groups of Others. I have argued above that the participatory approaches in the Colombian peace agreement are presented as being *deep*, yet when assessed through the case of Putumayo, this notion is challenged as I place the main stakeholders focused on in this agreement within either intermediate or shallow types of participation.

2.4 Approaching Peace

Peace is one of the most debated concepts in social sciences (McConnell, Megoran and Williams 2014; Höglund & Kovacs, 2010; Galtung & Scott, 2008), even more than participation. Peace, with all it is and is not, touches all lives. We take it for granted when we experience it, and long for some version of it when we experience a lack of this abstract 'it'. Most researchers have now come to agree that peace is a *process*, furthermore it is widely recognized that peace is *context specific* (Ibid). Other than that, it is difficult to reach consensus regarding *what more it is*. However, there are different normative approaches highlighting what peace can, should and could be. Innovative research and practices is developed, both from policy- and from peace workers, to researchers, supranational institutions and NGOs. Be they

abstract or theoretical, paired with case studies to demonstrate the development of 'such' peace, I consider the contributions valuable and argue that it helps push peace-theory forward.

Peace in Development Studies, and particularly within its leading supranational organization the UN, has been a focus area believed to be in a direct, dynamic and cyclical relationship with the process of development itself (Atwood, 2002). It is assumed that development and peace-transitions/conflict-transformations go hand in hand, and reciprocally reinforce- or weaken the respective processes (Barakat 2005). Within both academic and practical peace-fields, conceptualization of peace has been interpreted in different forms throughout the years, from peace as a utopian endpoint, to peace as an eternal process, and differing positions in between. Critical viewpoints are continuously presented. Attempts at implementing these views in both the planning processes, the policy development and as updated practice in peace worker's 'tool kits' is happening. The manner in which the UN and other development agencies frame and reframe both peace and development, ultimately has a direct impact on millions of peoples' lives. Still, I argue, the hegemonic liberal interpretation of 'peace as processes and 'peace as avoidance of conflict' is more in line with a negative approach to peace (Galtung, 1985).

The next subchapter primarily leans on the following debates: the prevailing 'liberal peace doctrine' has been continuously criticized since the early 2000s (MacGinty & Williams, 2009). Alternative models have been developed but are routinely approaching peace by applying 'adjectives' or making use of 'inverted commas' in order to conceptualize peace (Bregazzi & Jackson, 2018). Recent critique has struck the understanding of 'peace as a condition' and 'peace as an end goal', On the other hand, conflict as solvable has also been criticized (Trifonas & Wright, 2011). For the rest of this chapter, I now turn towards peace.

2.4.1 Negative and Positive peace

Johan Galtung, considered the father of modern peace studies, coined the renowned dichotomous understanding of peace as either *negative* or *positive*. Negative peace is by Galtung defined as 'absence of violence' (1985). It is a negation, what peace is not. Therefore, according to Galtung, the focus of negative peace is on *peacekeeping:* preventing- and constraining violence (Ibid). Furthermore, Galtung's understandings of violence take as departure that *violence* is *structural* in form. Structural violence is in this thesis understood as;

intersectional power structures such as *neoliberalism, racism, misogynism* and other forms of discrimination. I argue structural violence create *incompatibilities* between people, which in turn can lead to conflicts.

Even so, for Galtung, peace must be more than the negative: the absence of violence. The idea of his antonym, *positive peace,* thus entails concepts such as *harmony, cooperation* and *integration* (1985). Galtung further states that positive peace employs a more holistic understanding of forms of peace. This, he argues, makes peace as a process more focused on *peacebuilding*. Taking as departure Galtung's concepts of negative- and positive peace, I seek to develop an understanding of the Colombian approach to peace as territorial. Below I present some modern approaches to help me develop *the concept of territorial peace as an alternative approach to peacebuilding.*

2.5 Liberal Peace

Even if research, especially that which is empirically based, challenges the hegemonic understandings of peace, the prevailing interpretation of peace is still that of liberal peace. Liberal peace models generally contain multi-party democracy and rapid 'post-conflict' elections, open market-, security- and justice reforms (Smith et al 2020). According to MacGinty and Williams "The liberal peace can be seen as a normatively neoliberal system of compliance that is variously recommended, induced and enforced by leading states, leading international organisations and international financial institutions" (2009, p.50). Liberal peace favours an individualistic approach which often clashes with local organizations where family, clan or community function as society's organising unit (Ibid). One of the most criticized aspects of liberal peace is its promotion of neoliberal policies and economy. The overarching principle in the liberal peace doctrine is promotion of the free and open market; when negotiating for peace within such frames, neoliberal economic policy is the one non-negotiable factor that lays the foundation from where to develop all other aspects. As MacGinty and Williams (2009) state; commitment to the free market is "the core of the liberal peace" (p.52). The belief that the liberal peace doctrine, with its imposition of democracy and capitalism, will somehow automatically facilitate a transition towards a more peaceful society, is at best naïve and at worst dogmatic (Ibid). Long lasting, or protracted social conflicts, as coined by Edward Azar, are said to require *problem solving*. When people struggle, as is the case in Colombia,

for the upholding of- or access to such ‘basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation’ (Azar 1990, in MacGinty and Williams, 2009, p.107) these are the problems that need to be solved. But is conflict really solvable? And on what premises do we proclaim such assumptions?

As the liberal peace doctrine has been met with much criticism, other understandings of peace have been suggested instead. I discuss some of them below..

2.6 Hybrid- and (il)liberal peace

One approach that has received attention is that of hybrid peace. In short, hybrid peace can be said to take as departure point the liberal peace model and combining it with a renewed sensitivity of ‘the local’ i.e. context sensitivity. In addition, it often has an explicit focus on the more social realms of conflict transition (Williams, 2004). Anam (2015) describes it as “a form of the local agencies’ expression, which partly functions to break the domination of the liberal peace paradigms” ([sic] p. 41). The acceptance of hybrid political orders, where liberal state-organization and principles can coexist with local, endogenous ideas, which also incorporate more psychosocial and spiritual realms of conflict transitions, are celebrated aspects of hybrid peace. In turn, this hybridity is assumed to lead to a more sustainable peace and can facilitate local peacebuilding (Ibid). These aspects of the hybrid peace approach manages to capture specific local contexts, and are thus in line with what the Colombian territorial approach aims to do (CPA, 2016).

Furthermore, when Anam (2015) evaluates the transition from liberal to hybrid peace he concludes that the hybrid approach has some strengths, albeit limited in reach. It fails to capture particularly three weaknesses of the liberal peace doctrine; first, from where do these hybrid forms (of state organization and conflict transition policies) come from? Are they endogenous and organic? Or exogenous and imposed? The latter is regarded as undermining for peacebuilding attempts. Second, there is a tendency to romanticize the local, leaving discriminatory practices and unequal power relations unattained, which may collide with universal standards of for instance human rights and gender equality. Third, the different shapes such ‘hybridity peaces’ may take, exacerbates distance between ideals and realities (Ibid). Conflicting norms and practices within liberal and hybrid approaches may thus

eventually lead to an illiberal[11] hybrid peace (Smith et al, 2020). Following these arguments then, there is a dire need to develop other, more holistic approaches to peace. The second criticism deserves particular investigation, as I am conducting a research project situated in 'the local'.

2.6.1 The local turn in peacebuilding

Roger Mac Ginty has been at the forefront of questioning the so-called 'local turn' in peacebuilding. He argues that the local turn has maintained an uncritical and "confused attitude towards the local in terms of peacebuilding" (2015:841). If in peacebuilding one wishes to highlight 'the local', according to Mac Ginty, one has to ask critically *where it is*. Further he argues, that 'local' as a concept has been developed in line with liberal, Eurocentric thinking and as such is constructed and maintained as a particular 'type' of locality that does not reflect endogenous understandings of the communities existing within these localities. When peacebuilders attempt to build peace in 'local' spaces, Mac Ginty argues that the conceptualization of local has important consequences for how peace is approached and thus how peace develops in the local space. The Eurocentric view of local has lost its relevance, and there is a dire need to re-conceptualize it (Ibid).

Pamina Firchow writes in her book *Reclaiming Everyday Peace* (2018), that locality should be examined based on everyday indicators that are defined and developed by local people, in order to capture endogenous understandings of 'the local' peace and peacebuilding process. She argues, "When we do so, a picture of community perceptions of peacebuilding success- or lack thereof- emerges, with significant implications for peacebuilding practice and intervention design" (p.127). Through her studies, Firchow concludes in terms that are similar to my findings, as will be discussed in the substantial chapter 5-7, and suggests that community-level peace has not particularly benefitted from external i.e. non-local, interventions. Moreover, she finds that *increased* intervention does not equal *increased* perceptions of peace for the communities (Ibid, p. 128). This finding can challenge my claim: if the CPA is to succeed, it

[11] The term illiberal peace/peacebuilding is a new theorization of 'hybrid-peace turning illiberal'. A special issue in the Routledge journal 'Conflict, Security and Development' of February 2020 was dedicated to the development of the concept and shows in a comparative matter how illiberal peace,, that is :"domestically driven peace-building that deviates from liberal norms" (Smith et al 2020:3) is the new standard in many countries in transition.

has to be implemented as it is written. This indicates that a *high* level of intervention, or by my terms *implementation*, is needed. In the end, we both agree, that more focus on *local participation* of communities is needed for peacebuilding to actually succeed in said local communities (Firchow, 2018).

2.7 Geographies of peace

Traditionally, Human Geographers have spent an unfair amount of energy contemplating and theorizing on conflict, invasions, expansion and 'hard' geopolitics (Koopman, 2016). Over the last decade, critical geographers have reiterated that geographers have a historical obligation to turn our focus towards peace (Megoran, McConnell & Williams 2016). The authors observe, that while engagements with peace are on the rise across all Social Sciences, including Human Geography, questions regarding the action taken in transforming theory into practice still remain mostly unanswered. Geographers are hence encouraged to not only 'talk the talk' but 'walk the walk' and aim for direct institutional change of peace-practices because of our engagement with peace (2016:124).

Over the last years, human geographers have responded in different ways, primarily based on empirically grounded research: Williams/McConnell (2011) argues that critical geographies of peace should connect scales and sites with situated knowledge. They posit that when geographer engage with peace we must apply concepts that are peace-full i.e *filled* with peace. This cause for action, I argue, resonates with Galtung's positive peace (1985). As mentioned above, positive and negative peace are foundational for our understanding of peace approaches. Williams/McConnell's views closely align with this thesis' understanding of peace. Koopman (2011) highlights through a feminist approach to Alter-Geopolitics that non-State groups create non-violent spaces that are secure with- and for *all bodies*. This corresponds with my own feminist approach and focus on embodied experiences both by myself and my informants. Furthermore, in chapter seven I discuss findings that are highly similar to those presented by Koopman, namely that non-State groups, or in this thesis; general population (and to some extent Farc), create spaces of peace *outside* the realm of State-led spaces.

Human geographer Cristopher Courtheyn, who lives and studies in and about Colombia has introduced the concept of 'radical trans-relational peace', highlighting the importance of

relational autonomy (2018). In addition, he argues there can be no peace if *ecological sensitivity* is not incorporated as a guiding principle for any peacebuilding attempt in the 21st century. According to Courtheyn, people are spatially distant from the relational aspects of our social world, which includes humans, nature and places. We build borders and increase separation, which in turn contributes to the continuation of hierarchical dualisms such as; man over woman, white over black and coloured, human over nature and capitalist class over workers. In an attempt to bypass these dualisms, he suggests drawing on inspiration from *solidarity networks,* which highlight *relational autonomy* rather than isolationism (Courtheyn 2018).

In sum, I argue that Human Geography's approach to peace have concluded that different forms of peace exist. Moreover, peace varies across time and space: a notion lending itself to produce highly empirically informed understandings of many forms of peace that enable capturing both cross-cultural macro generalities, local experiences and variations of peace (Megoran, McConnell & Williams, 2014). A tendency to draw on interdisciplinary knowledge, combined with spatial and scalar sensitivity, is said to make human geographers especially apt to analyze the different forms of peace (Koopman, 2011). Concepts stemming from humanist geography, and critical anti/alter action research, in addition to the cultural turn and post-structural trends in our discipline, make incorporation of complex analytical sensitivity, such as feminist, post-colonial and radical notions, a welcomed attribution to the modern and critical geographies of peace.

I argue that an interdisciplinary consensus calls for the need for holistic, diversified approaches to peace that are context specific. However, the manner in which these approaches inform actual peacebuilding attempts also depend on the viewpoint of those negotiating, deciding and not least; implementing the measures assumed to promote peaceful transitions. Moreover, theoretical approaches can only get us so far, and while there is much normative- and cultural change happening outside the realm of 'planned policies', I argue that radical analytical frames also should be developed within policy approaches to peacebuilding. Below I will explore one of the more radical approaches to peace: the peace-pedagogues and -practitioners Echevarria and Cremin's (2019) 'Education for Territorial peace', and discuss how their research, based on empirical evidence from Colombia, can contribute to a geographic understanding of territorial peace as an alternative peacebuilding approach.

2.7.1 A view from critical peace pedagogy

Echevarria and Cremin's article builds on empirical evidence from a pilot project in Colombia regarding peace education as a peacebuilding tool to create territorial peace. The authors take as departure point that education is among the most important tools for building peace (2019). This resonates with the critical pedagogy described in section 2.3, which informs my analytical framework on participation. I agree with the authors and posit that the participation of groups of Others in peaceful spaces involves a learning process.

In order to facilitate a peaceful change i.e. evolve the peace process, participants can benefit from *learning* how to abide to principles of deep participation through social interaction. I argue that peaceful transformations in historically conflictive spaces require conscious and radical changes in the way people approach each other, on all scales. This include relations between groups of Others, and between Others, Elites and the State.

Echevarria and Cremin state that peace pedagogy involves all people and employ "risk, humility, solidarity and transformation as its foundations" (2019:325). Peace pedagogy seeks to support people's agency and empower them as peacebuilders through rebalancing, reconnecting and deepening people's awareness of the relations they are part of in order to transform the social, political and environmental incompatibilities in the applied territories (Ibid). Moreover, a pedagogical approach to peace must remain transparent and be adaptable to local circumstances while maintaining "inclusive and justice-oriented goals" (Ibid: 325).

Echevarria and Cremin build on approximations to peace[12] that I argue are ideal types (Dietrich 2014), which rationally are difficult to integrate in modern State-organizations. Nevertheless, according to Echevarria and Cremin, ideal types can be a great contribution as *intentional principles*, as they provide guiding *normative* frameworks. The authors conclude that the current approaches to peacebuilding (such as the liberal approach) are far from enough. In an attempt to break out of the hegemonic grip that these peacebuilding practices still maintain, I

[12] They build on an approach they call 'The Innsbruck approach'. It is outside the scope of this research project to elaborate on the Innsbruck approach.

lean on Echevarria and Cremin's argument that all those seeking territorial peace should approach the peacebuilding process as an educational journey towards peace i.e. a journey made with the goal of personal and communal growth and development.

In this case, Putumayan communities and Putumayans themselves are seen as agents of peace. I argue that they build peace both *inside* and *outside* the realm of the Colombian State's peace agreement and through participating with Others in journeys towards peace, thus contributing to build peace on their own terms. I suggest that in order for the Putumayan society to evolve peacefully, knowledge produced by interacting in peaceful and critical educational spaces (enabled through radical democratic (deep) participation) is the main tool from which the goals in the Colombian peace agreement, and thus territorial peace, can be achieved. This is discussed in chapter seven.

2.7.2 Exploring territorial peace

When territorial peace, as presented in the Colombian Peace Agreement, is taken as point of departure, my conceptualization of peace as *territorial* can be described as follows: different forms of peace are continuous processes which entail human experiences, -understandings and -embodiments and thus transcend the rational human mind. When human interaction and pedagogically produced knowledge, based on a constructionist view, is social, this necessitates a *relational* approach be added. Moreover, challenging the status quo of any, and all repressing structures, requires *intersectional solidarity* between peoples, both those that are in- and out of *relations* with each other. Uneven power structures, similar to what Galtung calls *structural violence* within the negative peace understanding, constantly shape and reshape our common world across time, space and cultures. *Radical* transformation of the way in which we relate to each other is needed if we are to break out of the spirals we, as 'beings in the world', are embedded in. In addition, the global environmental crisis we are in, requires us to adapt an ecological sensitive approach, which highlights the relationships between *nature*, local *knowledge* and *-experiences* in order to not undermine our goal of living in peace in an already vulnerable environment. Finally, I argue that territorial peace in its ideal form is relational, in solidarity (intersectional solidarity), radical, critical, democratic, embodied, educational and in harmony with nature's limitations.

2.8 Creating an analytical framework for territorial peace

In order to understand 'what territorial peace looks like', the different concepts *deep* and *shallow participation* combined with the *territorial peace* approach as summarized in the section above, are brought together in an encompassing and complex framework. By applying this framework, I aim to investigate and explore notions of *territorial peace* through the case study situated in Putumayo. I have created a model in an attempt to illustrate how I understand the continuous interactions and contact points between conflict incompatibilities and the levels of participation measures (*deep* to *shallow*) in a pseudo-democracy affected by structural factors, such as Putumayo (and Colombia). In order to aid the search for territorial peace as interpreted through the case of Putumayo, the government attempts to transform conflict into a journey towards peace by implementing 'the people's agreement' (CPA, 2016). I argue that the measures found in the agreement must be applied in their most radical form, if the state wishes to fulfill the vision of the agreement, and its duties towards Putumayans, and the rest of Colombia's people.

In sum, my analytical framework is informed by all the above-mentioned debates but primarily leans on the territorial approach as I interpret it (based on this research project), combined with geographical understandings of peace. A pedagogical contribution (section 2.8.1) which posits *education* as a primary tool for peacebuilding is a critical and practical addition that also informs my framework and conceptualization of territorial peace. Moreover, I build on my own experiences from following the peace process in Colombia and the fieldwork conducted for this thesis, as well as for my bachelor degree in Development Studies. These inputs have evolved into a framework inspired by interdisciplinary peace debates within the social sciences, and not least my understanding of the *Colombian* territorial approach itself. Finally I wish to reiterate that the *Territorial peace approach*, as I denominate, understand and conceptualize it, is ecologically sensitive and does not entail a continuance of our destructive behavior towards nature, even if human-nature relations fall beyond the scope of this thesis (chapter 5-7).

The search for peace is continuous and cyclical; it spirals, repeats or renews itself depending on the *participation-depth* and structural sensitivity of all peacebuilders[13]. As incompatibilities are an unavoidable aspect of human life, humans will always encounter renewed issues that possibly can evolve into 'incompatible goals' (i.e. conflicts) between both groups of Others and State versus Others. The peaceful 'solution' – or following mode of action, is thus to ensure that we learn from these encounters by applying the right tools. The tools from which we as a society approach these incompatibilities must be substantially democratic in its truest 'Athenian' form and ***non***-violent. To achieve this, I argue that deep participatory measures are needed.

I use this framework along with the narrative analysis that informs chapter seven. I investigate how the primary stakeholders, general population and Farc, challenge the State's meta narrative by constructing their own alternative grounds for interaction. I explore what strategies they make use of in their struggle to maintain deep participation within informal spaces of participation and argue that territorial peace, as understood in this thesis, is mostly found *outside* the scope of the measures established by the agreement. This is seen in connection with the factors identified in chapter five and six. Even so, Putumayans also engage in the formal spaces for participation that are a direct result of the current implementation of the agreement. The territorial development plans and formal political spaces that the State has managed to create thus far, are being used for the purpose of pushing the search for peace forward. However, these CPA items and measures do not manage to neither capture nor absorb what is happening at the grassroots level, in the local communities. I argue that this is where territorial peace is found, and that the people of Putumayo continue their search for *territorial peace* by educating themselves on how to peacefully interact, applying deep participation as the guiding principle for interaction.

Still, reaching locally adapted compromises that are 'both/and' for the plurality of stakeholders and Others involved (and hence manages to preserve the cultural plurality found in said contexts), is a great challenge. Nonetheless, I argue it is a challenge worthy of our constant attention. Many pitfalls challenge the peacebuilding currently happening in Putumayo. This is discussed extensively in chapters five-seven.

[13] As mentioned previously, peacebuilders are here considered all agents working towards 'some form of peace'.

2.9 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented the main theoretical concepts guiding the forthcoming substantial chapters. I take inspiration from critical planning theory and -peace pedagogy when I conceptualize participation as ranging from deep to shallow. The criteria for categorizing the depth of participation measures is characterized based on scope and form as shown in figure 2.1. Conflict transformation and learning to resolve incompatibilities in a non-violent manner, requires complex and radical approaches to participation as a democratizing-, and peaceful tool. The peace theory discussed sketches the development of peace debates from the early 2000s. Galtung's (1985) Negative/Positive peace lays the foundation for my understanding of territorial peace. The evolvement and criticism of the liberal peace approach has been presented and I argue that intermediate and shallow participation enables liberal or hybrid approach to peace and thus fail to contribute to the building of territorial peace as understood in this thesis. Criticism of the local turn in peacebuilding was also presented, and I have stated that I agree with the criticism presented by Mac Ginty and look towards Firchow (2018) when I argue that peacebuilders must focus on local communities' participation in peacebuilding. Geographical approaches to peace directly guide my interpretation of peace, particularly through the contributions of Koopman, Williams/McConnell and Courtheyn. Furthermore, I have also discussed how education as a tool for peacebuilding is of vital importance in the Colombian and particularly Putumayan search for peace. Finally, the two concepts, participation and peace, were merged in the framework for Territorial peace. I presented a figure to better illustrate the logic behind the analytical framework used when seeking to answer the problem statement in this thesis. I summarized how the framework will be used in chapter seven, where I aim to demonstrate that territorial peace can be understood by applying this framework. I argue that this framework aims to describe, reveal and uncover some of the most pressing challenges Putumayans meet in their search for territorial peace.

3. Method and Methodology

In February 2019, I read a Colombian news article stating that the ex-combatants' political party Farc had entered into its first political alliance running in the local elections scheduled for late October 2019. I was surprised, as I had seen statement after statement from both alternative- and progressive parties declining any possible cooperation with the party. The local elections were Farc's first time measuring their strength as a political player in their old hegemonic territories. It did not happen and as a result the research project I had originally planned for changed abruptly when I arrived at Putumayo.

In this chapter I will elaborate and critically reflect on the methods and methodologies that guide this research. I consider myself a post-colonial feminist exploring peace as a scientific concept. I adhere to a social constructivist research paradigm, meaning that I see the world as continuously being (re)constructed, making knowledge about the social world open to a variety of interpretations (Winchester & Rofe, 2016). Social structures and norms can thus be interpreted and evaluated, praised or criticized; social constructivism posits that they can never be completely evaded. Following this acknowledgment, I thus reject any claims of objective, positivistic human knowledge. Knowledge, from a social constructivist view, is seen as produced and reproduced by, through and with people communicating with other people (Blaikie, 2007). Still, depending on the view of anyone seeking knowledge, the results one finds and thus concludes with, will vary accordingly. Throughout this chapter I aim to demonstrate that I have critically reflected on my approaches to this thesis, and thus ensure I am conducting rigorous ethical research.

In this thesis, I have been inspired by the strategies Putumayans make use of to create personal and communal peaceful spaces for interaction. I acknowledge that my views and interpretations are affected by personal experiences and values; as such, this research is biased. This is expected from a social constructivist paradigm, and I hope to demonstrate that I have critically reflected on my bias throughout this thesis. I adhere to epistemological approaches that are both interconnected and sometimes interpreted as opposite, still I consider that the primary contribution of human geography is promotion of multifaceted approaches. I argue that a

multifaceted approach allows for complex and critical analyses apt for investigating puzzling phenomena such as peace (Megoran, McConnell & Williams, 2014).

3.1 Research goals and qualitative research

A problem statement (PS) should reflect the overall research design and vice versa, it is a continuous circular process applied to constantly check for rigour (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016). The problem statement that drives this research project is *"How can the concept of territorial peace be understood by exploring the implementation process of the Colombian peace agreement in Putumayo?*

Over the course of this project, several readjustments of the research strategy have been made. Starting with an original project I could not execute, I had to cancel some methodical strategies (such as focus group interviews and participatory observation of a particular political coalition) and adhere to a tentative problem statement focusing on peace, politics and participation throughout the fieldwork in Colombia. The final PS places my study safely within the qualitative realm as it aims to investigate people's own experiences and interpretations of the social phenomena *peace* (Winchester & Rofe, 2016). Qualitative researchers do not claim to generalize their findings, instead they plunge into limited events and occurrences (Ibid). Some of the findings derived from applying qualitative research may be recognizable for other areas sharing some of the same characteristics, still each case is different and context sensitivity is necessary. Following, this project does not claim to produce generalizability nor be representative of Colombia as a whole, although certain characteristics highlighted in the case of Putumayo may surpass its departmental borders.

I place my research within the goals that have primacy in qualitative research. According to Ragin and Amoroso (2011), social research has two comprehensive, *societal* goals while *particular* goals depend on the interest of each researcher. Moreover, different goals require specific research strategies. Two of these goals explicitly guides this research project.

With this project, I aim to call attention to the lives of a vital, albeit delimited, sample of Putumayan inhabitants. Seeking to act as a transmitter and thus contribute to what Ragin and Amoroso calls 'giving voice' to a historically marginalized group is the first goal. I strive to present, represent and, by adding my own interpretations, re-present what my informants have introduced as significant through our interviews. I feel honored that people have allowed me to attempt to interpret their personal testimonies.

Drawing on a combination of action research and critical approaches within a social constructivist research paradigm, I am sensitive to the fact that I cannot claim any one true or unbiased interpretation of the experiences that make up the data used in this assignment. Seeking to overcome positivistic interpretations, I strive to apply the principle of critical reflexivity (Dowling, 2016, p. 34) along with regular check-ins (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016, p. 126). Furthermore, I look to Ragin and Amoroso's (2011, pp. 47-48) 'list of caution' which highlight faults commonly seen when researchers claim to advocate 'on behalf of Others'.

3.1.1 Case study

I opted for a case study approach (CS) in order to advance my research goals. A case study can be understood in different ways, this thesis bases its understanding on the works of George & Bennet (2005), Ragin & Amoroso (2011), and Schwandt & Gates (2017).

Development of case studies as a methodical approach can be traced to two main trends: the Chicago school's interpretive orientation and critical realistic orientation which Schwandt and Gates (2017) says sprung out of more political scientists such as the American Political science Association. The interpretive orientation of the Chicago school is what primarily guides my understanding of a case study for this project.

Conducting a case study implies several methodical choices in each of the three phases of the process: designing the case study, conducting the case study and drawing implications of case study-findings with theory (George & Bennet, 2005). An expectation from interpretive oriented CS is that one conducts a situated fieldwork in order to improve transmitted representation of the people making the case sample (Schwandt & Gates, 2017). Cyclical processing between the research idea and the analytical concepts is expected throughout the phases in order for the

researcher to continuously adjust her overall research design to provide rigorously developed knowledge (Ragin and Amoroso 2011).

In this project, the case is the search for peace in Putumayo, investigated in the towns of Mocoa and Puerto Asìs. The events comprising the case are all considered everyday events. Even so, they are related to the local communities' peacebuilding process and are affected by the local elections that took place last fall. This, I argue, make the events concerned institutional and communal spaces of participation in Putumayo; I participated in many of these spaces leading up to the Election Day. In addition, the events are seen in relation to the implementation of the Colombian peace agreement.

The peace agreement informs the case by being the political and legal framework guiding Colombia's search for peace. In the previous chapter I stated that the negotiators of the agreement claim that by implementing the 578 points of the CPA, Colombia, and Putumayo, will build their *territorial peace*. I argued, implementation of the CPA is (intended to be) the motor that drives the peace process forward.

3.2 Research design

I had originally planned to focus on the political realm of the peace agreement with special emphasis on participation of former combatants, now political party Farc. The new problem statement, *how can the concept of territorial peace be understood by exploring the implementation process of the Colombian peace agreement in Putumayo,* was derived from the changes in the field. I struggled for a long time to grasp the implications of the renewed focus, wondering about necessary changes and keeping with ethically sound research. I will reflect on this below.

3.2.1 Changes in research design

Even as Farc withdrew from the elections in Putumayo, I still wanted to get their points of view regarding the status quo of the peacebuilding process. FARC's reintegration process is one of the main pillars of the agreement and I wanted to hear first-hand their experiences.

I altered the focus of my interview guide to some extent, and changed the weighting of my sample-groups because of the changes in the field. My interview guide was since the beginning structured in a thematic way, I added some new prompting-points and paid less attention to the coalition and Farc's participation in local politics. Originally, I wanted to have a twofold focus on Farc, on the one side and 'general population' on the other side. With the change of events, I decided to include a threefold focus on Farc, general population and the State. The decision to include the State was based on how I came to interpret the State's role as peacebuilder as highly contradicting.

I wanted to go along on campaign trails with Somos Putumayo and observe reception of the coalition in different areas of Putumayo from within the coalition. This had to be changed to an outside observation of the coalition's candidate, as SP did no longer exist. In addition, I also reflected on my role as an assumed political supporter of one given candidate. This led me to expand the sample scope; hence, I took part in other parties' campaign events as well. In time I realized that I would not be able to travel by myself to – nor include in the analysis - the department as a whole; both security issues and the scope of the assignment simply proved not feasible and I eventually settled on Mocoa and Puerto Asís as field sites. I still refer to the findings and my informants as pertaining to Putumayans, as this nonetheless is what they call themselves. Even so, I do not claim that my findings or informants are representative of the whole department.

Further challenges arose when assessing the data and trying to make sense of the experience. I returned with an extensive amount of data, building on seventeen interviews totaling more than 20 hours in addition to countless casual conversations and both structured and unstructured observations (Dunn, 2016). I took part in multiple semi-participatory observations and both my suitcase and computer were filled with campaign effects, reports, newly acquired books and a myriad of bookmarked newspaper articles. I was completely overwhelmed for months, continuously reassessing the data set and reading new and old literature. It truly has been a hectic and scary process and imposter syndrome has been lurking at every turn of a page. Finally, with guidance from my supervisor prompting me to think in terms of policy and implementation, I was able to grasp the essence of what it feels like I had tried to do all along namely *explore territorial peace in Putumayo.*

Most academics are well aware of the turbulent practice a research process necessarily is, and I agree with Sæther (2006) that despite this 'common knowledge', it never seems to be transparently reflected upon in writing. This reflection is an attempt to criticize and counterweigh this praxis; I consider the hidden nature of researchers' fumbling throughout the research process to be a privileged characteristic of the scientific community.

3.3 Choice of location and events

Since my first visit, Colombia has become a great passion in life. Learning about her in situ and getting to explore the contrasting sides, which are so characteristic to both Colombia and the Latin American region has shaped the course of my life and generated an infinite thirst for knowledge. I have traveled throughout diverse parts of Colombia as a tourist and done fieldwork there twice. Needless to say, I am highly engaged in the general development of the country and thus declare myself utterly biased; more on this below.

As I embarked on my master studies, I knew I wanted to do something that had to do with the peace agreement in Colombia. I kept looking for a case, but did not manage to neither 'find'- nor 'make' one (Schwandt and Gates 2017). In 2018, I was part of a working group pertinent to the Socialist party (Sosialistisk Vensterparti – SV) in Norway applying for funds to conduct a joint democracy-project with Farc. The project-proposal was declined but it inspired me to investigate more about Farc's role in Colombian politics and pushed me towards academic debates about reintegration of ex-combatants. I continued my search for a project, and luckily I had subscribed to the critical Colombian newspaper 'La Silla Vacia', which sent the email that eventually led me to Putumayo.

3.4 Data and privacy

In order to comply with both ethical- and juridical privacy regulations when conducting empirical research, I had to submit an application to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (Norsk senter for Forskninsgdata – NSD). NSD were to assess my strategies for handling the data collected based on ethical and methodical knowledge and the juridical framework derived from the data protection legislation (NSD n.d).

The process was initiated over the summer and I received my first notice in the beginning of August 2019. As I intended to collect data primarily by use of interviews, my project was subject to regulations regarding privacy protection. Personal information is to be treated with caution and as a researcher; one of the guarantees I had to be able to make was that of anonymity (Dowling, 2016). In this case, most informants are described by their true name as the use of pseudonyms when wanting to give voice to a particular group may according to Ragin and Amoroso actually reduce the value of the research (2011, p. 103), as the group themselves become distanced from the context. Nonetheless, this decision is completely dependent on each informant's accepted and informed consent. Still it is worth considering the reasons for why some informants wished to remain anonymous; in this case, I understood it to be about personal security and structures of power as four women wanted to remain anonymous.

NSD qualified my data as confidential meaning I could not use any personal devices for collecting data. The solution we came up with the IT-department was to borrow a secured and encrypted computer from them along with a tape recorder that had a removable memory card. When I left the interviews, I dismantled the device and hid the memory card. Security measures to protect informants, and abiding to the principle 'do no harm', are essential in any research-interaction (Dowling, 2016). During my stay in Colombia, this final solution presented by the institute and the IT department was adequate.

3.5 Reaching out

With the approval of my NSD- application I started reaching out to enable contact with possible gate keepers, door openers and find informants in line with Dunn's (2016) recommendations. I had never been to Putumayo before and neither did I know anyone there personally. I contacted organizations I believed could provide me with some guidance. Additionally, I sent out a standard message to most of my previous contacts and to my Colombian friends, looking out for a range of people meeting my sampling criteria and who could be asked to participate as informants. I am grateful to the people who supported me with both insights, a home, friendship and contacts.

According to Dunn (2016) it can be decisive to gain trust and establish rapport with not only direct informants during interviews but also with gatekeepers and door openers as they can facilitate "the opportunities to interact with others at the chosen research site" (Kearns 2016, p.323). Even so, I have had to critically reflect on the use of middle-persons and acknowledge that they can affect the research project in multiple ways; i.e. suggesting change of location, limit who I talk to, i.e. interfere with participant selection, and also shape how we talk i.e. interviewer or gatekeeper bias which can make informants feel pressured towards participating or giving particular answers (Desai & Potter, 2006). The gatekeeper approach can be problematic as the gatekeeper usually is an agent with significant power (Ibid). Reflections are needed when one is to assess the impact a gatekeeper may have. Being conscious about this (Dowling, 2016, p. 37) has enabled me to maintain research integrity throughout the project.

3.6 Fieldwork in Putumayo

After two weeks of preparations in Bogotá, I finally flew above the Andes and landed in the Amazonian port of Puerto Asís. I had kept postponing my departure to Putumayo because I wanted to have at least one interview in place upon arrival. I met up with my contact Human Rights (HR) activist Yuri and together we took the bus to Mocoa, the administrative capital of the region. As we got to know each other on the bus, I finally asked her about the coalition Somos Putumayo, she shook her head and told me "It doesn't exist. Farc doesn't exist" (Interview Yuri, 24.09.2019). I was in awe. I saw my project falling apart and could not believe I had missed it over the summer. There had been no communications, no statements saying SP was over before it even began. Moments later, passengers started screaming and as I looked up, I saw a motorcycle coming straight towards us.

Merely 40 minutes after arriving in Putumayo, I felt my life come crashing down in every sense of the way. We were in a terrible accident. None of the people in my bus was hurt but the two young men on the motorcycle were severely injured. It was a chaotic hour, all of us were perplex and in shock. As we tried to maintain the man most injured conscious, he kept asking what had happened, was it his fault and not least, were the police going to take his motorcycle. He expressed grave concern about losing his vehicle as it would be an economic strain and he would not be able to move around for work.

3.6.1 Sampling and reaching informants

The sampling criteria for this project were found during the exploratory phase of the project and its goal was to classify "people in the light of the particular concerns" of my study (Mason 2004 in Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016, p. 123). I decided to opt for a six-fold criteria sample ranging from politically active, non-politically active, public officers, scientific community, organizations and/or activists and demobilized FARC members. The groupings were made believing that in depth interviews with the 'right' people would generate deep insight and illustrate the case from a variety of viewpoints as can be further explored by the informant list (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016).

In order to reach people, I used different approaches based on Dunn (2016) and Thaagard's (2013) suggestions. First, I did preliminary searches online in order to locate key individuals and possible informants from Putumayo. Second, I made use of middle persons to put me in contact with possible informants. Third, I located areas of interest such as institutions and campaign-seats and stopped by to introduce myself and thus establish some *rapport* before asking people to be interviewed. I strived to employ *purposive* participant selection and made use of a range of strategies besides criterion sampling, as mentioned above. I argue that I am inspired by nearly all of Patton's commonly employed strategies as mentioned by Stratford and Bradshaw (Patton 2002, in Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016, p. 124) and chose informants I believed would make valuable contributions to the project. Still I lean on what Tate (2015, p. 14) refers to as a 'deeply informed perspective' which "rather than reflecting the larger and more complete universe of local perspectives" is concentrated and inspired by carefully selected participants. Still my sample was also affected by some *convenience* (Winchester & Rofe, 2016, p. 124) given the perceived security situation. Even so, I qualify my sample to be somewhat *biased* as I will reflect on below.

3.7 Interviews

I based my approach on Dunn (2016) and Ragin & Amoroso's suggestions (2011). I introduced each session by a 'meet and greet' including my *bona fides* and *raison d'etre* before I listed the topics' I wished to talk about. I always carried copies of a consent form, a simplified consent form more apt to the setting, in addition to a statement of purpose. Furthermore, I was conscious regarding my choice of clothes and carried my student-identification, particularly when

conducting interviews in offices so that I could easily be identified. Throughout the thesis, I refer to my interviews in the following manner (interview name, date). I also investigate group narratives, therefore I refer to some of the interviews as (interviews group, year), i.e. (Interviews Farc, 2019).

Through initial contact and reaching out to individuals, I had usually established some prior rapport with the informants and in general, I experienced that the informants were highly conversational. I made use of a thematic interview guide, where I first introuduced the project and then they were asked to share some background information. All informants were asked to speak freely, with prompting on occasion, about *Putumayan history* including politics, the *local elections*, the *peace agreement*, *FARC/Farc*, and *peace* in Putumayo. The structure of the interviews became more of a *narrative* (Loseke, 2007) rather than a clear distinction between interviewer-interviewee.

3.7.1 Recording

I used a recording device borrowed from the Social Science faculty when conducting interviews. Some informants might be affected by the presence of a recorder, even to the extent that their statements or way of speaking becomes altered (Sumner & Tribe 2008). During my interviews only one informant, Carmen, stated she was not comfortable being recorded, most of the other informants were accustomed to giving statements and participating in debates or open meetings hence they expressed few concerns with regards to having the interviews taped. As such, I do not consider my informants' statements to be much affected by the presence of a recording device. Yet, when a researcher uses a recording device, she might let her concentration slip or unwillingly experience technical malfunction leading data to be lost (Ibid). During one interview, my recorder stopped working and I had to use the application from the University. In order to minimize risks associated with using a recorder, and ensure I was actively listening to and acknowledging the informants' testimonies', I always carried a notepad where I jotted keynotes throughout the interviews. In addition, I took note of additional information such as surroundings, date and time, body language or movements as recommended by Dunn (2016). In addition to the formally conducted interviews, many informal conversations informed my observations, these are referred to as field notes.

3.7.2 Language

I speak Spanish fluently and did not need to use an interpreter, yet ethical considerations arise when conducting research in a foreign language (Sumner & Tribe 2008). When trying to minimize these challenges I opted to prepare myself well for the specific interviews. I did online searches and conferred with Colombian friends to familiarize myself with concepts and words that might be particular or specific to the setting I was entering.

Still, I found that I sometimes did not understand, or was unfamiliar with words, names on programs in the peace agreement and so on. My tactic then was to always state that "*even if it might sound like I know Spanish I still struggle to understand because Colombia is so complex, it's like Gabo*[14] *says: a land of magic realism and a thousand different realities".* This would often ease up the atmosphere and we would laugh a bit about the complexity of Colombia and the informants would ask me where I had learnt Spanish and so forth. This introduction contributed to break down the distance between us and I felt that by sharing some of my past and personal details I could gain some legitimacy or trust. The informants were welcomed into my life as well, and it was not just me poking into theirs. The relationships became be more similar to the beginning of a friendship, which correlates with what Ellsworth (1989) suggest; when trying to enter into solidarity with people who experience discriminatory structures that I will never be able to grasp, friendship is the best way to go.

Some of the language barriers occurred when conducting interviews in places with much noise. Four interviews were carried out in particularly noisy settings, I then pleaded with the informants to bear over with me as I found it hard to catch what they were saying. Being humble and admitting my limitations was met with compassion and the informants were willing to adjust their volume or repeat themselves if necessary. Many of them also checked in regularly to ask if understood this or that word or slang, and thus helped me verify that I had understood what they were saying. Many of my interview-interactions were arranged in such a way that I presumed informants were bypassing structural power relations such as my obvious privilege. This contributed to me increasingly feeling like a learner and turning them into the experts, which is accordance with my research stance (Blaikie, 2007). During the last few days before

[14] By Gabo, I refer to the Colombian slang for Colombian author Gabriel Garcia Marquez.

submitting this thesis, I have been in contact with all my contacts, and am thankful that many of them have commented on my preliminary findings.

3.7.3 Transcribing, language and power

For transcribing, I made use of the f5transkript program as recommended by the University of Oslo. While transcribing I noticed that there were some words that I had trouble hearing or did not understand the meaning of. If the words were impossible to hear due to surrounding noises such as traffic, I opted to leave the word out of the transcript and inserted transcription symbols to indicate undecipherable words or sections (Dunn 2016, p.172). If I heard words I could not understand, I adjusted the tempo to get a better understanding of what the context was. Most times this worked fine, and I could decipher the missing word. At other instances, I asked a Colombian friend to listen to the sentence with me and make suggestions regarding the missing word or meaning. I evaluated my friends' help to comply with privacy and anonymity principles, as they never knew which informant was speaking in a given transcript, because I separated the list of informants' names from the data material.

Having the data 'in hand', and needing to translate from one language to another necessarily means the translator has the power. I conducted all but one interview in Spanish, and first transcribed all interviews in Spanish using Spanish codes for the initial coding. Furthermore, most of my field notes and observations are jotted down in Spanish, but I sometimes have found that I have written chaotically in both Norwegian, English and Spanish which made the analytical and coding process quite confusing at times. In addition to messages and campaign material, most secondary data is also in Spanish. When coding the data transcribed in Spanish a second and third time, I finally created English translations. I opted not to translate the data to English unless I would use a quote, as I felt I needed to be in my 'Spanish mindset' to be completely submerged in the data. Desai and Potter state that "Ideas and concepts from one language cannot always be translated into another" (2006, p. 176), I have made use of this principle both while transcribing, coding, analyzing and writing the thesis in an attempt to improve transparency. I originally wanted to include the Spanish transcript in parentheses behind each quote, but given the thesis' word limits, firsthand data will be presented in English.

Transcribing the interviews was a time-consuming process but also one that gave room for different themes to emerge from the data. Listening to both the informants and myself in a third language, was at times frustrating and I sometimes was ashamed to hear my own perceived inadequacy. Still, much doubt naturally arises when having power over someone else's words. There is power in translation and the time spent translating had to be thorough in order to avoid misinterpreting my informants' meanings while simultaneously exploring my own interpretations (Dunn, 2016). This is a great responsibility for any researcher and critical reflection and check-ins are thus essential. I have strived to respond to this challenge by checking in with my informants and discussing translation with Colombians.

3.8 Observation and field notes

Kearns states that observation as research practice historically has been devaluated by human geographers and suggests, "there is more to observation than simply seeing" (2016, p.313). He also argues, "With critical reflection, however, observation can be transformed into a self-conscious, effective and ethically sound practice" and that all observation entails a form of participatory approach (Ibid).

By adding observation to my research design, I have found data that contextualize, challenge and complement my interviews. As such, observations supplement the basis of the case at hand. In Putumayo, I saw and experienced things without approaching it as observation, yet these more unconscious registrations also contributed to the overall data as I made use of field notes and memos regarding everything from food I ate to people I saw and conversations I had. Since I am co-participating in the same social arena as Others I too create meaning and interpret, albeit on the basis of my own life experiences. In turn, this also affects my understanding of the case and the overall analysis (Ibid).

I imagined I was conducting some form of pure observation. After reflecting on the matter, I realized what Kearns (2016) does: that all observation entails some form of participation, even if I will not claim to have been a complete participant equal to that of the locals. In fact, I switched between different levels of participation (Gold 1958, in Kearns 2016,p.319). I participated in various events and attended meetings and sessions that were both of private and public character. Furthermore, I participated, together with locals, in direct campaign related

events, also varying between open and public, or private for invited persons only. Even so, the extent of my participation was restrained by my status as an outsider, my foreign looks and the temporality of my stay.

I participated in a 'walk-around' with the Independent Social Alliance Movement (*Allianza Social Independiente*-ASI) in Mocoa. Also, I participated in a meeting in a *vereda*, a rural area on the outskirts of Mocoa, with the Conservative campaign. I attended the public 'closing of the campaign'-celebration with the Liberals and in general spent much time with the five governorship-campaigns in their Mocoa headquarters.

The Afrocolombian Democratic Alliance (*Alianza Democratica Afrocolombiana*-ADA) campaign were those I had the least interactions with. I spoke with the campaign manager and we tried to arrange for an interview with the candidate or a campaign event observation but, as the fifth chapter will describe in more detail, their campaign was affected by controversy the whole time I was in Putumayo. This made it difficult to arrange anything more than just passing by the open headquarters. I participated in a departmental peace-agreement meeting with state representatives, Farc, NGOs, army representatives and international organizations, and a public debate with four of the five governor candidates in Putumayo. While staying with Farc, I observed some meetings and took part in the daily life such as cooking and watching a neighborhood soccer match. Furthermore, I observed a working table held by an NGO, which aimed to encourage and teach the ex-combatants to develop sustainable and productive projects and hence improve their income. On Election Day, I observed three different voting stations as a bystander. Initially, I had contacted MOE to join their observation team in Mocoa, but I decided to observe on my own without my international-observer credentials in Mocoa, as I did not feel safe neither traveling nor observing alone in my allocated voting station which ended up being in Puerto Asís.

3.9 Documents and secondary data

This thesis also builds on secondary data such as documents and texts. Thaagaard (2013) states that textual sources not derived directly by the researcher may benefit from being classified as documents and this thesis will make use of such a distinction.

The Colombian Peace Agreement is the textual foundation of this project while other documents contribute, contextualize or challenge both the agreement and my primary data. The Peace Agreement is described in some detail in the background chapter since it contributes to the overall context and background of the case at hand. Moreover, multiple reports by the Colombian state, NGOs and think tanks, in addition to internationally produced reports, further contributes to the dataset. Newspaper-articles, mostly Colombian and particularly Putumayan', create additional information, while some western media outlets complement when needed. In an attempt to verify the primary data collected throughout the fieldwork, I relied on secondary data from a variety of sources. Some research touching upon similar themes has been conducted in the Putumayo area (Tate, 2015; Idler, 2019; Ramirez, 2011; Cancimance, 2014), there is also national and local reports available from State authorities as well as UN-sources and NGOs. All the documents used can be found in the literature list.

Diving into the world of documents when elaborating the research strategy is essential. It requires the researcher to evaluate the scope of the assignment and can further help the researcher to delimitate what methodical measures should be taken in the research project (Thagaard, 2013).

3.10 Writing process and analysis

I left Colombia on the 20th of November 2019, the day before a nation-wide strike, which lasted well into the new year. Back in Oslo, initiating the writing process was the next step. Given the necessary changes in the project I had ambivalent feelings with regards to how the process could continue forward. In accordance with recommendations from Cope (2016) and Dowling (2016) I have applied a method of field memos throughout this process to capture insights, draw connections and trigger my memory. I wrote in my field diary to critically reflect on my experiences and help process the diverse-, and emotional impressions encountered throughout this project. The chaos of sorting through these documents when analyzing and writing up the thesis has been a daunting experience; I have information everywhere. Even so, re-reading my notes has indeed been helpful and has further inspired the codes used in the analysis as will be further elaborated below.

I have made use of a *within-case analysis method* for my case study and I apply a mixed analytical approach combining a thematic analysis, process tracing, as well as narrative analysis (George & Bennet, 2005; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Loseke, 2007). To a certain degree, I have been inspired by a *grounded theory approach* as my informants' own accounts have inspired the development- and focus of this project (Charmaz, 2006). I started out conducting a research project based on my own assumptions and hypotheses regarding a place I had no situated knowledge of. My obvious privileged point of departure, as an educated Norwegian woman conducting research in the peripheral, rural Colombia, departed from assumed presumptions that did not reflect the realities in the field. Throughout the fieldwork, it became apparent that even if formal political participation is of high importance, other issues are more pressing. This made me adjust the project and include the lack of social development and the issues surrounding coca farming and production, as this is what most of my informants raised as critical. This is elaborated on in the substantial chapters (5-7) and introduced in chapter four.

I decided to conduct a *thematic analysis* to answer my first research question because I am looking for commonalities within each sample group. In addition, I seek to uncover any particularities or diverging attitudes, experiences, and reflections within-, and across subgroups (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For my second research question, I opted for the *process tracing* method. Process tracing is particularly suitable when conducting case study research and is a common method when seeking to advance theory, which is one of my research goals (George & Bennet 2005). Process tracing means the researcher try to connect causal factors that can be argued to have a direct effect on the phenomena she studies (Ibid). The coding that drove this analysis is briefly presented below. For the third and fourth research questions, I decided to opt for a *narrative approach* as I am interested in hearing-, and finding both subgroup-, and meta narratives. This analytical method is particularly suitable when seeking to 'give voice', and highlight social injustices, which is a main goal in this research project (Loseke, 2007).

In sum, I argue that the best approach for my particular project is a combination of analytical methods. I believe a combined approach will shed light on the complexity that I argue this case deserves. Interpretations and suggestive explanations of how some of Putumayo's inhabitants operate in order to improve their local peace process deserve to be looked at through a complex lens; hence, this is what I aim to do.

3.10.1 Coding

I have coded my data according to stakeholders' views on different issues. The coding I applied to uncover what measures are being implemented was based on rate of occurrences: throughout the fieldwork the majority of my informants mentioned lack of social development and issues surrounding coca, in addition to politics (ref. election). I searched my data for mentions of the agreement's programs and policies and found that development and coca-farming was of most importance. I had already opted to include the peace agreement's second agenda item, which considers politics and democratic participation (CPA, 2016). As a consequence this was automatically coded as a measure.

For my process analysis, I looked for commonalties within each stakeholder group (Venneson, 2008). I took as departure that structural factors affect the peace process in Colombia. This is based on my research stance and personal biased opinions. However, it is outside the scope of this agreement to investigate how *all* meta structures affect implementation rate in Putumayo. Scalar sensitivity towards meta structures is restrained to the following scalar relations: first, how the local, Putumayan scale relates to and interacts with the national and central power in Colombia (the central government and elites) through center periphery (national-local) relations. Second, I look at a Putumayan case situated in a Colombian peace process and thus investigate micro scales: local communities and groups of Others' *relations* with: each other (local-local), the local Putumayan State and elites (local-subnational), and the central Colombian state and elites (local-national). Still, it should be stated that for instance the issue surrounding coca-production and the general economy of narcotics, is a global phenomenon, and thus touches upon relations with a more global scale.

The code 'security' is of such importance to the overall peace process so I opted to keep it as a code in both the process-tracing analyses (chapter 5 and 6), despite its structural form. Codes for the fifth chapter regarding development are for instance 'resources' and 'professionalism' and. Codes for the sixth chapter are 'center periphery and political exclusion and more.

For the narrative analysis, I decided to separate the data in two stakeholders that I call 'Elites' and 'Others'. I opted for this approach because I have found that the narratives presented closely align with those of a subgroup and that of a Meta narrative. In narrative analyses, it is

common to find that the less powerful challenge the Meta narratives, as I have found in the group Others. The narratives discovered are for instance Elite agreement and Reconciliation.

3.11 Ethical challenges in a cross-cultural setting

Being a young, foreign female researcher who clearly stands out in the townscape makes for interesting and challenging reflections. Relations of power comes into mind and according to Dowling (2016) a researcher usually needs to navigate between intersecting power structures when conducting qualitative research, relationships can thus be reciprocal, asymmetrical and even potentially exploitative. At times I felt like I was 'studying up'; conducting so called elite interviews where I felt somewhat submissive, or to the contrary; I was in settings where I clearly was seen as extremely privileged. The feelings of own inferiority were mostly prevalent when walking around town or in the reintegration zone with Farc. In addition, my visit to the Colombian congress in Bogotá was also a strange experience of suddenly being submerged in the absolute power center of the country: it was highly distant from my own Norwegian political context. During interviews with 'powerful' men I sensed and experienced the Colombian culture as highly male chauvinist (*machista*). In other situations, I was struck by a terrible feeling of uncertainty about whether I was 'studying down' or entering into potentially exploitative relations (Dowling, 2016). Below I reflect on these issues.

For the most part I feel that the relationships with my informants were reciprocal, but I somewhat struggled to maintain them that way. Since I was present during campaigns and very visible in the city I saw it as essential to not involve myself too much with one campaign compared to another in order to avoid accusations of political support; I abide to the principle 'do no harm' (Ragin and Amoroso 2011). I do not think my political stance would make any impact on the election results, I do not possess such power, even so I considered it ethically wrong to show outspoken preference towards one or more candidates to everyone I met along the way. Still I had many conversations regarding politics and clearly stated my personal opinions on both Norwegian, Colombian and international politics. To emphasize my positionality, I explicitly made it clear that I was not here to assess the political platforms presented by any of the local candidates in Putumayo. The Putumayans I met were aware of my philosophical, ideological and moral stance, and I can accept criticism regarding this transparency from those abiding to more deductive and positivistic paradigms as well as those

disagreeing with me ideologically/politically. I put great efforts in explaining to my informants about the reason for being there; this is considered the ethically correct course of action (Dunn 2016). As I adhere to a social constructivist, and critical feminist approach, I also wish to specify that I cannot avoid inserting my own embodied experiences into the research process. This includes the writing-up of my project as presented in this document.

While I was visiting Farc, a powerful ex-combatant I spoke with, leaned in to kiss me on the cheek as is custom in Colombia. This time though, the man became intimate whispering in my ear how beautiful I was while he caressed my arm (Field notes 30.09-03.10.2019). Experiencing this approximation in a research setting, while alone at his house in la Carmelita was highly disturbing and uncomfortable. I withdrew from him and found myself laughing it away and quickly introduced a topic I hoped he would verbally engage in before I stood up to leave. Given that I lived in a house by myself on-site while in la Carmelita I had no possibility for a rapid exit. I opted for a submissive response when met with misogyny. I assumed I had needed this man's blessing to enter the zone and be able to conduct research, and concluded that I still needed to keep our relationship on good terms. His role as one of Farc's leaders, both in combat and in their reintegration process, made me question the illusion of Farc as an ideological project. I expected more from someone who constantly proclaims to fight for 'social justice' and 'equality for all', as this man did throughout my entire time in la Carmelita. Still I argue that misogynist views and machismo is a debated subject both within Farc/FARC and progressive communities in Colombia. Intersectional gender disparity is a massive problem in Putumayo and Colombia, during the 68 days of quarantine (ref-COVID), 42 women have been murdered in Colombia (Arenas, 2020).

Essentially, these experiences serve to remind me of the research approaches I am inspired by which acknowledge that people are culturally different but that we all have the same human value (Howitt and Stevens 2016:53). These anecdotes and reflections are necessary to include in order to call attention to "the complexity of, the historically produced power geometries (of imperialistic, white supremacist, capitalist, heteronormative patriarchy) upon which geographical research is based [sic]" (Johnson/Madge, 2016, p. 91). Still, reflections such as those above can potentially reproduce stereotypical assumptions regarding those often considered 'subaltern' and I wish to clarify that I have consciously considered how I write

about my experiences throughout the thesis as recommended by Dunn (2016). These fundamental social challenges are not the primary analytical focus in the assignment. I take as departure that structural factors are omnipresent; they thus present a methodological challenge, which affects both the research process and its final product.

Some challenges arose when trying to set up interviews allowing the participant selection to become more biased than I opted for. In my experience, most Colombians I have met can be described as helpful and outgoing. I reached out to possible informants and contact persons mainly through WhatsApp messages, phone calls or in person by seeking them out in the townscape. Meetings were usually set up over the course of the initial conversations, but the process was also marked by that of loose agreements, leading some potentially interesting meetings to suffer from this as my contacts and I sometimes did not find the time to meet before I eventually left Putumayo.

I also perceive that I gravitate towards people who are similar to me. Even though I had prepared for a long time and sought to get in touch with a more representative and diverging sample, I ended up finding that the majority of my informants shared similar opinions. At the end of my stay in Putumayo I felt like I had reached a limit. If I had managed to stay longer and spoken with the people I tried to speak with, I expect my sample would be less biased. Still, I argue that I am aware that I hold these assumptions and thus consciously try to be as transparent as possible in my writing. In order to minimize bias challenges, I also make extensive use of State-issued plans, reports and programs and combine these with the primary data collected while conducting fieldwork. By being critical and constantly reflect on my own interpretations and assumptions I hope to demonstrate throughout the whole of this thesis that I strive to produce an ethically rigorous research project (Stratford & Bradshaw, 2016; Desai & Potter, 2006)

Feelings of distance, between myself- and the people surrounding me, were prevalent throughout my stay in Colombia. I am painstakingly aware of my privileges, as should be, but this repeatedly led me into a negative spiral where I became overpowered by guilt and doubt. I used to look at myself as a brave and independent woman, a curious and social person who was not easily afraid. I have travelled extensively throughout the last ten years and have never

really felt scared before. I have been to Colombia several times over the last decade and always felt welcome, at home, in fact; in-place. This time though, it was different.

Ten days before departure my friend Ramiro asked if I had watched the news and suggested this was not a good time to go to Putumayo. Former FARC negotiator and second in command, Ivan Marquez, appeared in a YouTube video alongside approximately 20 other guerrilleros stating the initiation of the 'Second Marquetalia' and the definite retaking of arms (Youtube 29.08.2019, UN Press release 29.08.2019). Their whereabouts were, and still are unknown. Later that day I spoke with other contacts and was advised to pay close attention to local- and national news and perhaps create a backup plan in case Putumayo was not safe. My supervisor suggested the same thing and agreed with me that it did not come as a surprise to most people familiar with Colombian political- and peace-related developments. Even so, it was and still is an alarming development.

In Putumayo, I often felt like I did not belong. I was scared to move around, and it felt as if all my perhaps imaginary, but real *sense of fear* hindered me from making the most of this fieldwork. I have spent countless hours regretting the turn of events throughout this project, but have accepted that I cannot know what would have happened if I actually went on those planned trips, if I observed in Puerto Asís, if I had stayed a little longer, or hung out more with my informants. When conducting research, particularly in settings where misery and inequality prevail, the principle 'do no harm' not only applies to those 'researched' but also to the researcher (Dowling, 2016). I needed to protect myself from my own racing mind regardless of the potential data-loss, and even if these measures failed to successfully preserve my emotional and mental state; at least I can say that I did not take any unnecessary risks. Both Idler (2019) Tate (2015) and Ramirez (2011), all respectively female researchers from Germany, the U.S. and Colombia, have in their research situated in Putumayo also reflected on security challenges in the field and I agree with their general conclusion that as a researcher, and specifically female researcher, risk assessments and subsequent measures are essential.

3.12 Summary

Throughout this chapter, I have presented, discussed and reflected on the methodological and methodical choices made in this research process. In addition, throughout the whole of the research process I have strived to adhere to the guidelines of critical reflexivity as suggested by Dowling (2016, p. 42). As this is a critical case study leaning on research paradigms that are more radical, I strive to constantly reflect on both choices made and the choices I have changed. This is in order to be transparent and allow the reader, the people involved in this project and the research community to better be able to investigate, draw their own conclusions and thus verify and triangulate my arguments and conclusions in a more critical manner. My hope is thus that this chapter contributes to facilitate critical reviews of my findings and hence enable the overall goal of social research: "generating knowledge with the potential to transform society" (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011, p. 34).

4. Background

> *The democratization of a society fractured by war involves incorporating, in a protagonist way, the anonymous and the forgotten; the struggles. Eventually, by the grace of politics, it creates memory (Own translation, CNMH, 2013, p.14).*

This chapter provides an introduction to the context in which this thesis is situated. Background information regarding both the conflict and the particularities of the department of Putumayo is essential in order to understand the forthcoming analysis. In Putumayo, the Colombian armed conflict the ongoing construction of peace is related to issues of political participation, development and not least, coca-production. The chapter starts with a historical overview of the Colombian conflict, before discussing the peace process, negotiation and the final peace agreement of 2016. The chapter ends with a brief overview of the department of Putumayo, including characteristic events considered as of *'collective interest'* for Putumayans (Ramirez, 2011).

4.1 Understanding Colombian History

Colombia has since its independence in 1810 been a pseudo-democratic state with extreme inequality (Kline, 2018). Attempts at transformation have violently been shut down and fueled the ongoing conflicts. Few democratically induced changes have come about as political process; democracy itself is closely linked to violence. Though some important exceptions exist, such as the 1991 constitution, Colombia is indeed violent (CNMH, 2013).

4.1.1 State formation and violent conflict

Colombia has since its independence in 1810 been a pseudo-democratic state with extreme inequality. Attempts at transformation have violently been shut down and fueled the ongoing conflicts. Few democratically induced changes have come about as politics and democracy itself is so closely linked to violence both in Putumayo, in Colombia and in our world. Though some important exceptions exist, such as the 1991 constitution and several peace agreements albeit with disappointing results, Colombia is indeed violent (CNMH, 2013).

Given the topic of this thesis, this account of the conflict emphasizes its more political aspects. I trace the onset of the conflict back to *El Bogotázo* (mass riots in Bogotá), when in 1948 the killing of progressive presidential candidate Jorge Eilecer Gaitan in the center of Bogotá sparked mass riots and induced the ten year long civil war known as *La Violencia* (The Violence) (Diaz-Pabón, 2018). *La Violencia* was a bloody war between primarily the Conservative- and the Liberal party, estimated to leave around 200.000 people dead (CNMH, 2013, p.115). In the midst of civil war, President Gomez' failed attempt to remove Lieutenant Rojas Pinilla culminated with the latter staging a coup in 1953 leading Colombia into a period of military dictatorship. After 5 years of dictatorship fearful political elites representing both conservatives and liberals, created the *Frente Nacional* (National Front) and pressured Rojas Pinilla to step down. Following the dictator's exit the National Front coalition agreed on a fifty-fifty power sharing agreement on political positions at all levels, in addition, they alternated the presidency every four years (Kline, 2018).

Historically, the Colombian state has struggled to maintain both authority and legitimacy across its territory. Highly focused on urban and agrarian elites, the more peripheral areas and its rural population have traditionally been excluded making the Colombian conflict a class-based issue. Since the outbreak of La Violencia (1948) an excluding government, in combination with financial and social grievances, gave rise to the ideological peasant movements that would eventually become The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia: FARC (Kline, 2018 & Phelan, 2018).

4.1.2 Becoming FARC

The evolvement of the guerrilla group FARC is often traced back to *La Violencia* and is closely linked to the *Partido Comunista Colombiano* (The Colombian communist Party, PCC), active since 1930 (CNMH, 2013). During both the civil war and the succeeding bipartisan governments of the National Front, opposition parties were either excluded or criminalized. In rural areas south of Bogotá, a small but effective Communist party gained influence with the *campesinos* while the state avoided involvement in land-struggles and -disputes. As violence intensified, self-defense groups and small rural militias were created. PCC supported the peasants in their armed struggle and through this created strong bonds with parts of the rural

population (Phelan, 2018). Furthermore, members of the communist party were themselves also persecuted and expelled from their lands (Ramirez, 2011).

Armed campesino groups settled on expropriated or uninhabited lands mostly located in the center of Colombia, organizing themselves into agrarian unions and creating self-defense zones. The state saw the development of an armed movement as a threat to its sovereignty; the close ties to communist ideology combined with the news of a Cuban revolution meant increased confrontations between what was framed as 'independent campesino republics' and the state. Power-struggles between conservatives and liberals, the state and the so-called communist threat, in addition to increasing class conflict and divides between rural and urban populations culminated during the U.S. supported *'Operation Marquetália'* referring to the town of Marquetália, in the Tolima department in 1964 (Kline, 2018; Phelan, 2018 & Ramirez, 2011).

While the rural areas surrounding Marquetália were seized by the military, the campesino movement summoned the Southern Front's First Guerrilla Conference (1965) and announced the establishment of a mobile guerrilla unit consisting of around one hundred men. The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo* (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – The People's Army) was established two years later during the second conference. Throughout the sixties, the guerrillas, led by Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas (*nomes du guerre*), institutionalized even further. The group evolved into a small mobile guerrilla structure, which was present throughout most of Colombia. FARC had officially been born and "a regional social movement with political goals had turned itself into a national armed revolutionary movement" (Ramirez, 2011, p.41).

Ramirez (2011) highlights a valid yet contested point; the guerrillas were, (and some argue, always have been) *campesinos not combatants*. This understanding of FARC has been criticized for years: the first turn of discourse or understanding of what FARC was (and is) is connected to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s (Ramirez, 2011; CNMH, 2013), while the second is connected to the US foreign policy turn against terrorism post-nine eleven (Tate, 2015).

However, FARC did indeed both gain and maintain some support in the areas they operated throughout the years. Still, their role in the rural areas of Colombia is disputed and depending

on who you talk to, FARC has been and still is, understood in highly contradicting ways (CNMH, 2013). It is important to take note of the contested interpretations of FARC and the guerrilla movements in general, as it is a factor that helps to understand how they could ever claim to exercise power and influence in areas under their control and command, such as Putumayo (Ramirez, 2011). Ultimately, it also affects the analyses when trying to understand the political project of what is now the political party Farc – *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionária del Común* (The Common Alternative Revolutionary Force) (CNMH, 2013, p. 123).

4.1.3 From 'campesinos' to 'narcoterroristas'

Over time, FARC evolved into something quite more than an armed campesino movement. From a hundred members in 1965 to merely a thousand, more than a decade later, the start of FARC was precarious in terms of both expansion, armament and funding (CNMH, 2013). According to Leongómez (2004) this can be linked to the close yet peripheral ties FARC had with the Communist party as the latter saw the guerrilla as a mere backup in case their political agenda failed or if they needed armed protection following the possible event of a military coup. Following this relationship, FARC was never offered any expansive support from the PCC and remained a small-scale movement during much of their initial struggle (p.87). During the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, perhaps motivated by the success of other Latin-American revolutions in the midst of the cold war, FARC started their expansion while simultaneously distancing themselves from the Colombian Communist party.

As the coca boom exploded throughout the 70s and 80s, the guerrillas steadily increased their involvement in the drug trafficking business (Ramirez, 2011, p.45). First through a so-called 'coca-tax', where they collected tax from coca-farmers and producers, and further on, through involvement and regulation of other aspects related to coca-production (CNMH, 2012; CNMH, 2013; Ramirez, 2011). Opponents insist that FARC were one of the main producers of cocaine in the country, if not in the world, and that they subsisted throughout the years, in great part, because of income derived from illicit drug production (CNMH, 2013; Herbolzheimer, 2016). Former president Uribe (2002-2010) has been in the front of framing FARC as 'narco-terrorists' (*narcoterroristas*), given their nexus with the cocaine-production in the country (Veleazques, 10.10.2019). Since the 1980s, FARC nevertheless became associated with the illegal economies surrounding the world of drugs, and parallel to a substantial increase in

violence on part of both the guerrilla and other actors, these factors undoubtedly affected the revolutionary movement's image (CNMH, 2012, p. 100).

4.1.4 Other actors

Throughout the 1960s and 70s other guerrilla groups such as ELN[15], EPL[16] and M-19[17] were also born. Paramilitary groups sprung out from private defense groups allowed by a decree dated back to the late 1960s, still, it was not until 1997 that a majority of paramilitary-groups organized under the leadership of the Castaño brothers and formed *the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia-AUC) (Pabón, 2018). In contrast to the guerrilla groups, paramilitaries are more ideologically inclined to the right, but in essence they were created to protect landowners and land resources, both legal and illegal, as well as fighting the guerrillas. Paramilitaries have long kept strong ties to the military as well as Colombian economic- and political elites culminating in the so-called *parapolítica* scandal (parallel-politics: informal political structure, similar to *mafias*), which revealed the connections between State officials and the paramilitary forces. Complicating matters even more is the parallel expansion and organization of drug cartels and organized crime (Kline, 2018).

It is important to take notice of the historical nexus between violence and politics in Colombia as this relationship has and continues to influence Colombian society at its core. Still, this thesis takes as departure the conflicts and subsequent Peace Agreement between two of the most notorious and long running actors in the conflict, namely FARC and the government(s).

4.2 The negotiations

Negotiating for peace is not a novel experience for Colombian society. Various attempts to end or minimize violence have been tried and retried, and since the 1980s, the Colombian government have signed nine peace agreements with different armed actors (Diáz-Pabón 2018,

[15] Ejército de Liberación Nacional – The National Liberation Army

[16] Ejército Popular de Liberación – Popular Liberation Army

[17] Movimiento 19 de Abril – The 19th of April Movement

p.15). Between 2003 and 2016 more than 60 000 combatants have demobilized (Acosta-Navas & Reyes, 2018, p. 119), making the peace agreement reached between FARC and President Santos' (2010-2018) government, which added 13 000 to this number (ARN, 2019), merely the latest in a long list of peace initiatives. However, the 2016 agreement is the most ambitious attempt to this day.

Various conditions influenced the decision to negotiate and the reaching of an agreement. Nasi (2018) describes the journey towards negotiation and posits that it inevitably was the most rational course of action "since the war was yielding diminishing returns… [it was] …prudent to seek a way out of the conflict through politics" (Nasi, 2018, p.36).

The previous dialogues[18] that FARC have participated in were marked by both negotiating parties employing a devious, dual approach with tactical bargaining at the table parallel to individual military strengthening behind the scenes (Nasi, 2018). Both the government and FARC had endured significant blows between the 80s and the 2000s. Juan Manuel Santos, in his role as Defense Minister for the right wing President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010), had first handedly experienced the difficult task of reaching a military victory in the fight against FARC, even as they were significantly weakened by the time he took office as president in 2010. The guerrillas, on the other hand, had seen its most significant leaders (Mono Jojoy, Reyes, Cano), killed in combat or dead of natural causes (Marulanda). Furthermore, disagreement about leadership is claimed to have led to internal turmoil (Nasi, 2018). By 2011, the time seemed ripe to instigate dialogue between two of Colombia's biggest sworn enemies.

In an effort to avoid the many pitfalls of past negotiations, the Santos government (2010-2018) opted for a somewhat alternative approach to initiate dialogue with FARC. Months of secret exploratory meetings led to the creation of a guiding framework (The General agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Long-Lasting Peace) which was to steer the following negotiations (OACP, 2012). Negotiating abroad in countries such as Cuba and Norway, limiting public input on the agenda, months/years of initial secret talks, all the while negotiating without ceasefire, were all parts of the renewed Colombian approach to peace negotiations. The principle: 'nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed' (Nasi, 2018,

[18] Between FARC and the governments of Presidents Barco (1986-1990), Gaviria (1990-1994) and Pastrana (1998-2002)

p.37-39) was further framed as a discourse I interpret as; there will be an agreement, no matter what. Ultimately, the negotiators settled on an agenda consisting of six items, a modest yet celebrated list consisting of measures to ensure *Una Paz Estable y Duradera* – A Stable and Long-lasting Peace.

4.2.1 To 'end conflict' and build 'long-lasting peace'

"The bullets wrote our past, peace will write our future"

(Canal Capital 26.09.2016, Own translation)

The final agreement between the Colombian government and FARC is a 300-pages long, legal document that stipulates how Colombian society should move forward as they commence their path towards *territorial peace*. While the agreement itself certainly won't end violence in Colombia, it none the less sets out to reduce violence considerably as it led FARC to lay down their weapons. The agreement can be read in various ways; this thesis takes as point of departure that the agreement is a long term social and political contract meant to steer Colombia towards a more socially just development. Without doubt, this viewpoint can be criticized, and it frequently is.

Supporters of the agreement, such as myself, see the paper in its most ideal form, as a long-term national development plan between all members of society. A legal framework and political plan that embraces differences and heterogeneity, while highlighting the historical injustice embedded in Colombia through positively discriminating the most affected regions and groups of people through the territorial and differential focus (CPA, 2016). It is highly important to remember that the CPA is a *legally binding document*. This is an important fact, because the items in the agreement is *not* only a normative or guiding framework, they are legally grounded (and thus guaranteed) policies (Ibid). I argue that the juridical nature of the CPA enables a more critical analysis of the peace process. Opponents state that the agreement is 'selling the country to *narco-terroristas*', 'turning *la patria* into a socialist-mess like Cuba and Venezuela' and 'disrespecting the victims by letting FARC be seated in congress'

(Velasquez, 10.10.2019). Still, it is worth emphasizing that the opponents explicitly state that they are not against peace per se; they just do not agree with *this particular agreement*.

In between these opposing stances you find the majority of Colombians. Nuanced attitudes where people appreciate the attempt, but are reluctant to believe the promised end results will come about, disagreeing on parts of it (particularly the sections considering how to address the atrocities produced by the different stakeholders[19]), but in general support that the country needs to evolve. The massive resources (3,1% of total budget) spent on fighting guerrillas and armed groups and Paramilitaries that never seems to cease to exist, should instead be invest in Colombia's children, in education, in a future other than the one they envision, based on their past (Aristizábal Bedoya 06.09.2019)

In general, Colombia is a quite polarized country. Regional networks and power holders are more prevalent than central government authority. Grave divisions penetrate society as well, and differing understandings- and experiences of the conflict has produced stale and violent oppositions. In addition, ethnic and geographic diversity makes Colombia the multi-cultural crucible that she is.

4.2.2 The final Colombian Peace Agreement

The CPA is organised along six chapters, each corresponding to one of the six agenda items or issues included in the agreement to guide Colombia towards territorial peace These are discussed below.

The first item is 'The comprehensive Rural Reform' (*Hacia un nuevo campo Colombiano: Reforma Rural Integral* - RRI). The RRI is an effort to transform the Colombian rural areas, which continuously have been neglected. It establishes an agrarian institution seeking to distribute land, offer credit and formalize land ownership. It creates territorially focused development plans (*Plan de Desarrollo con Enfoque territorial*-PDETs) as means to promote

[19] The Special jurisdiction for peace (JEP) is set out to process in their transitional justice system: FARC, State and military, and thirdparty actors. The whole transitional justice process is highly debated in the country (Diaz Pabon 2018).

the improvement of public infrastructure, access to health care, markets, education and coverage of basic services such as water, electricity and telecommunications.

The second item, 'Political Participation: democratic opening to build peace' (*Participación Política: Apertura democrática para construir la paz*) seeks to advance the Colombian democracy and increase political pluralism, citizen participation and not least, to "outlaw violence as a method of political action" (CPA Summary, 2016, p.10). The main measures established include political participation by the political party Farc, the strengthening of democratic and participatory mechanisms, a statute to guarantee the rights of political opposition (including media access), peaceful demonstrations as a constitutional right, a review of the electoral system and the creation of 16 'Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace' (*Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz* - CITREPS) meant to give, particularly victims, a channel for direct representation in congress.

The third ítem is 'End of the conflict' (Fin del Conflicto: Acuerdo sobre Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo y Dejación de las Armas entre el Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP). It deals with FARC's transition from guerrilla to civilian life and the reincorporation of ex-combatants. The chapter stipulates the logistics, rights and responsibilities surrounding this process. It also outlines transitional justice mechanisms, transitory reintegration zones and DDR measures highlighting political and socioeconomic reincorporation, along with the practical framework of how to lay down arms. FARC's surrendering of illegally accumulated resources is also explained in this chapter.

Agenda item four is the 'Solution to the problem of illicit drugs', (*Solución al Problema de las Drogas Illícitas*). It addresses the guerrillas' involvement in the illegal economy linked to drug-production and the role illicit drugs have played throughout the length of the conflict. It establishes alternative income revenues to coca-farmers through the PNIS-program (*Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito* - PNIS), and additionally, it reframes drug use as a public health challenge based on a human rights approach. Finally, it seeks to facilitate voluntary eradication of coca-crops and denies the use of glyphosate as a forced eradication method.

Agenda item five, 'Agreement regarding the victims of the conflict', is arguably the most important chapter of the CPA. The chapter deals with one of the most pressing challenges of the conflict; namely securing the rights of all its victims. On the basis of a "comprehensive system for truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition" (CPA Summary, 2016, p.28) both the State and FARC are obligated to ensure that the victims, in fact, remain at the center of this process. Special commissions are set up to secure and achieve justice, and that truth be told by all involved actors hoping to contribute to easier coexistence in a polarized country. It establishes peacebuilding measures to secure that atrocities will not be repeated, to guarantee human rights, as well as symbolic reparations, semi-judicial procedures to establish accountability, and the creation of a special unit to search for missed persons

The sixth and final item presents a framework regarding 'Implementation and verification mechanisms. To guarantee the stakeholders' compliance with the policies agreed upon, an implementation and monitoring commission consisting of representatives from both sides of the bargaining table is set in place. A ten-year plan meant to secure a continuous pace of implementation is to be approved by each sitting president and its government before it is included in the National Development Plans (*Plan Nacional de Desarollo*- PND). It also establishes financial reallocation necessary to comply with the agreement.

4.2.3 Colombian novelty?

The peace agreement between FARC-EP and the Colombian state is often, and uncritically I argue, presented to have set an innovative, new standard for what a comprehensive peace agreement should look like (Herbolzheimer, 2016; Kroc Institute, 2017). Critics point out though, that while the agreement looks impressive on paper, reality is often a far cry from its ideals. This will be discussed in more detail in the substantial chapters, for now the more innovative principles of the agreement will be outlined.

The centrality of the victims of the conflict in both the negotiations and in the final text of the agreement set up the foundation for the recognition of violations inflicted upon millions of Colombians. The Victims Law (*Ley de Victimas 2011*) and to a much lesser degree the Peace and justice Law (*Ley de justicia y paz 2005*) are taken as inspiration for the transitional justice mechanisms established by the CPA, seeking to address the victims' dire need for truth-telling and representation (CPA, 2016). The Special Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP), albeit a controversial

measure for some parts of Colombian society, is meant to be a reconciliation tool for the victims of the conflict (Diaz-Pabon, 2018). The participatory approach applied in the negotiations recognized victims as legitimate bearers of their own testimonies, and they were invited to the negotiation table to present them (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Furthermore, the historical lack of victim-representation is sought to be addressed through the creation of sixteen additional congressional seats in the House of Representatives for the 16 sub-regions most affected by the conflict (ref. CITREPS). The goal of this measure is to promote political representation of populations and areas particularly affected by the conflict, aimed at social and ethnic organizations, and in particular, victims and women residing in these areas (CPA, 2016).

Another important feature of the peace agreement is the principle of *differential treatment* and *territoriality*. The first principle states that the programs in the agreement are to positively discriminate groups who have suffered from historical, systematic exclusion and oppression. As a result, the agreement has both an ethnic perspective and a gender perspective towards people who identify themselves as members of groups defined as marginalized (CPA, 2016). Furthermore, the territorial principle gives priority to the 16 subregions most affected by the conflict in terms of policy implementation. The subregions include a total of 19 departments and 170 municipalities. The PDET regions, also denominated *peace zones* in this thesis, were selected based on a set of criteria including levels of poverty (particularly extreme poverty), lack of basic needs, the degree to which the conflict has affected the region, institutional weakness and state capacities, high presence of insurgent groups, illicit drugs and other illegal economies (Ibid). One of these (unfortunate) prioritized zones is the beautiful department of Putumayo.

4.3 Putumayo: Libertad y Valor[20]

The department of Putumayo is one of sixteen sub-regions identified as priority areas for the implementation of policies with a territorial focus (*enfoque territorial*). Following then, is a general characterization of Putumayo as a peripheral department with mostly rural demographics, severely affected by conflict, high levels of poverty, widespread illicit

[20] The Putumayan departmental slogan is *Libertad y Valor*, meaning Freedom and Courage.

economies and weak institutional presence (CPA, 2016). Putumayo is a geographically vast, but sparsely populated department in the south-west of Colombia and its strategic border location combined with tropical forests and inaccessible areas has undoubtedly set its mark on the development of the department (Ramirez, 2011).

Gaining status as a department only after the constitution of 1991, Putumayo is a fairly young departmental jurisdiction. For more than 300 years after the Spanish colonization, the region remained unsettled by colonizers and to this day, it is a highly multiethnic, indigenous region. Historically, there have been five immigration waves to the region ranging from Catholic missionaries, people fleeing political violence during the civil war *La violencia*, the oil findings during the 1960s and most importantly influxes of migrants because of two separate coca booms between 1978-1996 (Ramirez, 2011). Since the mid-1990s, violence and economic opportunities has led people both to- and from the region, and during the last couple of years a steady flow of Venezuelan refugees have also arrived as a consequence of the detrimental situation in their home country. As of July 2019, the United Nations High commissioner for Refugees in Putumayo, reports that officially 38% of Putumayans are registered victims of the conflict, but in reality, these numbers are closer to at least some fifty-five percent (RUV 13.06.2020). Out of all the departments in Colombia, Putumayo has the second highest rate of victim population, and in the two main areas where I conducted fieldwork, Mocoa and Puerto Asis, the rate is respectively 67% and 45%. In a population of merely 363.000 inhabitants, forced displacement, forced disappearance, and homicides affect more than 138.000 people (Ibid).

4.3.1 Conflict in Putumayo

Historically, the ruling conflict strategy in Colombia has been centered on small-scale guerrilla warfare. The active combat has mostly struck rural and remote areas in order to ensure local control. In Putumayo, more than 50 % of the department's population lives in rural areas and around 80 % of the department consist of Amazonian forests (SIAT-AC:n.d). The guerrilla tactic created further distance between the occurring atrocities in rural areas and the national agenda, contributing to a blurring of the conflict's status quo (CNMH, 2013). In Putumayo,

conflict intensified as drug traffickers, paramilitaries and the guerrilla all sought territorial control in especially the middle and lower region. The region gained status as a *Zona Roja* (a red zone), practically characterizing it a war zone from the 1990s (Ramirez, 2011, p.123).

Throughout the 1980s Putumayo became an increasingly peripheral region, lagging behind in development while the economic basis of the department became increasingly tied to coca-production, illegal revenues and exploitation of natural resources that did not create local jobs or revenues (Ramirez, 2011, p.158). Civic strikes were organized almost continuously throughout the 80s and 90s, where coca-farmers (*campesino-cocaleros*) -demanded support from the government in order to obtain alternative income opportunities (Ibid). The strikes eventually led to the creation of the Popular Civic Movement of Putumayo, a broad social movement that eventually gained political power and increased influence through their heavy involvement in the *cocalero*-marches. A massive and violent strike and occupation during the summer of 1996 led to direct negotiation with the central State regarding Putumayans' rights and guarantees as Colombian citizens (Ramirez, 2011; Tate, 2015). Since then, Putumayo has managed to hold its momentum on the national agenda, albeit for disturbing reasons; however, the attention has not led to much improvement.

Around the turn of the millennium, Putumayo experienced its most difficult period yet. FARC's hegemony in the department was challenged as paramilitaries re-entered the zone to dispute the guerrillas' territorial control (CNMH, 2012). Paramilitary massacres, increased confrontations between armed groups, kidnappings, rape and disappearances, forced guerrilla and paramilitary recruitment of schoolchildren, executions in town squares, beheading and mutilations terrorized the local communities for years. Bodies flooding the river of Putumayo turned life on the borders of the Amazon into a constantly lurking, bloody war (CNMH, 2013; CNMH, 2012). These violent events are what has kept Putumayo on the agenda, framed as a dangerous narco-terrorist area.

During the 2000s paramilitaries, narco-cartels and State officials executed coordinated fights against the guerrillas. As U.S. foreign policy intensified the war against both drugs and terror, a *narco-terrorista* guerrilla group in the 'American's backyard' seemed to be the perfect goal for massive U.S. involvement. *Plan Colombia,* a grand military aid package, was approved by U.S. congress in 2000 and its effects in Putumayo have been detrimental in terms of increasing

the conflicts' intensity for a long time. Lives have been lost, infrastructure ruined, vulnerable nature demolished, children missing education, women raped, and traumatized and local development effectively came to a halt because the region was now even more of a war zone than before (Tate, 2015). AUC paramilitary demobilization between 2003-2006 led to diminishing (official) paramilitary presence throughout the whole country and then President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) combined support from Plan Colombia with increased national expenditures on military action. His security policy, *Seguridad Democratica* (Democratic Security) was intense in the region and forced coca eradication. Failed development programs funded by USAID through plan Colombia, as well as national development initiatives, did not manage to address the complex situation Putumayans faced (Ibid).

In 2010, Uribe's successor and former, close ally, President Santos, steered national security policy towards a supposedly more humane line and eventually started negotiations with FARC. Yet Putumayo continued to be plagued by violence; intense fights never ceased and the 48th and 32nd front of FARC-EP were still a very active powerholder in the southern plain-lands. Regional government was infamously known for its inadequate governance and my informants maintained Putumayo has 'the worst leaders in the country' Tormented by corrupt politicians, illegal economic dependence, and a severe lack of public services, Putumayans found renewed hope with FARC's announcement of the indefinite unilateral ceasefire in July 2015 (FARC-EP, 2015) and eagerly awaited a change to the conflicts that have haunted them for decades.

4.3.2 Post-agreement Putumayo

When remembering the last year leading up to the signing of the agreement and the following time, the Putumayans I met were both hopeful and sad:

"It was like a new life; we were all so happy and felt like the luckiest people alive. Finally, we could travel, we could get to know our own stunning department and become friends with our neighbors. We could talk about Putumayo as something other than coca and guerrillas, and people might even believe us. Tourists started coming. It was fantastic. But we were always scared, always wary that this might be an illusion. That it would not last".
(Interview Rosalia and Julia, 30.09.2019)

In October 2016, one third of eligible voters in Putumayo participated in the plebiscite for the peace agreement, out of these, 66% answered *yes* (Registraduria, 02.10.2016). When the Colombian people in the end voted *no* to the peace agreement, the Santos' government and FARC sat down with opposition parties and fierce critics, led by ex-president - now *senator* Uribe, at the bargaining table. On November 24th, 2016, the new and final version of the agreement was ultimately signed and accepted (Nasi, 2018).

Of the thirteen municipalities in Putumayo, nine falls under the priority of the territorial development plans PDET (ART undated). The capital, Mocoa, was included as a result of a terrible landslide in 2017, which left more than 300 people dead and destroyed an already vulnerable city (Velez, 2017). A reincorporation zone for ex-guerrilleros, La Carmelita, is located in a remote area outside Puerto Asìs. A cooperative of demobilized FARC members is located in a communal farm close to the municipality of Puerto Guzman. PDET initiatives are now on their way to implementation as all nine municipalities have finished their participatory planning sessions (Documentos PDET, 25.06 2019). Per November 2019, a total of 20.331 families in the department had registered under the PNIS program (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas Contra la Droga y el Delito [UNODC], 2019). Since the signing of the agreement, both national (2018) and local (2019) elections have been held, voter turnout has increased, and the 2018 elections was Colombia's most peaceful elections in history (Justicia, El Tiempo 27.05.2018). Farc is now a political party, active in most of the country's departments, including Putumayo.

It should be specified that Farc's role as insurgent group will not be discussed in this thesis. Nonetheless, it is taken as given that as a group, they have committed terrible acts of violence against civilians, other armed groups and representatives of the State. This is not to say all combatants *killed, raped, kidnapped* and so on, but their role as guerrilla is outside the scope of this research project. The people in reintegration processes are considered in a process of reconciliation and forgiveness as part of their DDR process (CPA, 2016), they are attempting a transition back into the civilians they all where prior to joining the guerrilla. Despite this notion of Farc seeming naïve and utopian, it nonetheless was a notion I was repeatedly reminded of through my meetings with non-FARC/Farc Putumayans. I argue that this view of Farc/FARC resonates with that of a marginal and contested identity that challenges ex-combatants' citizenship status as presented by Ramirez (2011).

In February 2019, Putumayo became the first department to publicly announce that a coalition of broad political forces from the left were in alliance with Farc in the run for the governorship in the upcoming elections (Ortiz, 05.02.2019). Still, ghosts from the past constantly hover in the shades, and the local elections of 2019 did not become what progressive Putumayans expected.

4.3.3 Putumayo now

Merely three years after the signing of the agreement conflicts are again ripe in Putumayo. Five different armed groups, ranging from FARC dissidents and neo-paramilitary groups, to national and international cartels are currently active in the region (Justicia, El Tiempo 16.02.2020). One reincorporation zone with frustrated ex-combatants waiting for relocation with highly uncertain futures and 75 indigenous reserves fighting for their ancestral territorial rights further complicates matters (Field notes, 2019). Afro Colombians continue to be discriminated against and *feminicidios* (gendercide or femicide), the violent and structural killing of women, happen continuously. Environmental challenges as a result of oil production, extensive cattle raising and monocrops in the vulnerable Amazonian soil, in addition to halting infrastructure and remote access to legal markets make progress in Putumayo seem hard to achieve. Influx of vulnerable Venezuelan migrants competing with locals for the scarce resources provided are an easy target for angry and violent gangs in the area (Interview Vera, 10.10.2019). Social leaders in Putumayo and in Colombia in general, are constantly under threat. Within the first month of 2020, and the new governors' administration, eleven Putumayan leaders were killed (ref intro). This is Putumayo, *Freedom and Courage*; this is what the peace agreement is supposed to diminish. The distance between ideals and reality continue in Putumayo, the following chapters (5-7) will substantiate this claim.

4.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have sought to provide an overview of selected parts of Colombian history in this project. I have traced the origins of the conflict between FARC and the government and briefly identified some of the actors involved in Colombia's bloody wars. The notion that Colombia now is 'at peace' has further been challenged. The Colombian Peace Agreement, with special emphasis on the agenda items that are investigated in this project has been

summarized before the field site, Putumayo was introduced. Historical issues in the region, current and continuous challenges have been discussed. The following three chapters offer substantial analyses of my material, each tackling specific aspects of the research questions, in order to arrive at an interpretation of the problem statement *"How can the concept of territorial peace be understood by exploring the implementation process of the Colombian peace agreement in Putumayo?*

5. Deep and Shallow Participatory Development

The aim of this chapter is to answer the first two research questions:

- *What measures are being implemented in Putumayo and how is this carried out?*
- *What factors affect the implementation-process? Who participates in the implementation and how?*

I identify what CPA-measures are being implemented in Putumayo and asses the participatory depth of two initiatives from agenda items *one* and *four*. I investigate the implementation of two programs, namely the PDET and PNIS established by the CPA. The chapter argues that participation depth in PDET and PNIS in Putumayo is intermediate and shallow, this contradicts the central State's claim that the peacebuilding process is 'going well' (Archila 14.05.2020). I have found that 1) lack of social development, 2) coca-farming and –production, and 3) weak local politics and democracy are important issues, which the peace agreement seeks to minimize through its policies and programs.

I start with introducing the PDET and PNIS initiatives, followed by introducing the informant group's general population and Farc. I then place the groups in their respective participation depth before I discuss the factors, found by my process tracing analysis, to affect implementation rate of PDET and PNIS in Putumayo. The State's role as a stakeholder is not the focus of this project, but State-propaganda and opinions withdrawn from a range of secondary sources is discussed in relation to the findings I present. In this chapter, I continue discussing the common themes the stakeholders consider to be of importance within the scope of the first and fourth agenda item in the Colombian Peace Agreement considering territorial development through the PDET and the PNIS.

5.1 Policies for territorial peace in Putumayo

Putumayo is one of the 16 territories to be prioritized by the Colombian state for the implementation of policies established by the peace agreement. The Colombian agreement consists of 578 points to be implemented over the course of 10 years; some are more extensive and comprehensive than others and require more time and resources (CPA, 2016). Broad, local

participation at all scales is one of the most celebrated aspects of the Colombian agreement (Herbolzheimer, 2016). The participation mechanisms include local community boards- (JACs), municipal- and departmental open hearings. These participatory bodies are meant to facilitate the bottom-up development of policy plans and the implementation of the actual programs (Ibid).

5.1.1 Territorial Development Plans: PDET and PNIS

PDET and PNIS are connected to each other through the CPA because they constitute important elements of the attempt to conduct a comprehensive rural reform in Colombia (CPA, 2016). In a way, PDET and PNIS set the framework for Putumayo's search for peace through development.

5.1.2 PDET

The Integrated Rural Reform (RRI) presented in the CPA Agenda Item 1 consist of four major policies: land access and use, national (development) plans, food security, and territorially based development programs (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial- PDET).* The goal of the PDETs is to speed up execution and funding of the development plans in the areas most affected by conflict (CPA, 2016). The PDETs are what my most of my informants described as a most critical importance, in addition to formalization of land.[21] They are without doubt the policies with the most explicit focus on participatory and bottom up planning as a means of democratization and power balance. Moreover, this inspired my original assumption; the Colombian state's planners and the CPA-negotiators have created a peace agreement, which on paper is an ideal-policy plan that aims to include all marginalized people. The participatory planning which the territorial development processes aim to conduct thus sets out to employ a strategy of *deep* participation according to my conceptualization of the term.

In the CPA the Colombian state emphasizes that participation by social organizations will be promoted and that the agreement is *for* the people. In the English summary of the CPA it is stated that agenda item one's goal is: "the well-being of rural people, their communities and different ethnic groups" (CPA summary, 2016, p.5). In order to do this, the state shall "promote

[21] Analyzing the entire, rural reform is outside the scope of this thesis.

citizen participation in the creation of territorial regulations and create mechanism for dialogue between the government, communities and enterprises" (Ibid, p.6). Furthermore, it shall protect the environment, create alternative economic incomes according to "the corresponding vocations of the rural inhabitants" (Ibid, p.8). The PDET is meant to apply a territorial-based approach "in order to speed up the execution and funding of the national development plans" (Ibid, p.9). Moreover, the PDET begins with "an action plan for regional transformation [the Putumayan territorial development plan], which will strive to include ample participation from the relevant sectors of the community, in the plan's formulation, execution and follow-up" (Ibid). The PDETs aims to foster "solidarity economies" and "enhance the social security of rural communities" (Ibid, p.8). Based on the text citied from the CPA, I argue it is clear that the Colombian State must apply deep participation in order to comply with its guaranteed goals.

5.1.3 PNIS

The National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes [sic], from hereon called PNIS, is the policy in focus when I assess the Agenda item 4 (CPA, 2016). The reason for including PNIS is not its participatory focus, but because Putumayo has a long and violent history of coca-farming, both in relation to the use of coca-products for indigenous traditional practices, but also, as one of the main cocaine-producing areas in the country (UNODOC, 2018) Issues surrounding stigma, violence and alternative livelihood opportunities for the coca-farmers, and the Putumayan economy as a whole, are the main reasons why my informants emphasized the PNIS program as important. The goal for PNIS is to enable a transformation from coca-based incomes to other farming-activities that are economically and socially sustainable. It is specified in the peace agreement that PNIS is meant to be *an integrated chapter* of the Rural reform (Agenda Item 1), where the PDETs are the leading tools of action (CPA, 2016).

The CPA states that the PNIS is to be included as "a chapter of the Comprehensive Rural reform" (agenda item 1) (CPA summary, 2016, p.25). The PNIS is to put in place "substitution and non-replanting agreements" (Ibid). When rural people sign these agreements the State "will commit to undertaking a public consultation process and put in place an Immediate Response Plan" (Ibid). The immediate response is food assistance and the targets are growers, pickers (raspachines) and sharecroppers. In addition, a direct cash transfer of 2 million pesos (531 US

dollars) will be paid every other month for two years. Capacitation and technical assistance regarding new crops and products will be provided and the State guarantees "rapid implementation measures for the community in general" (Ibid). Furthermore, the PNIS guarantees that the State will be "Formulating, through a process of public consultation, Comprehensive Substitution and Alternative Development Plans". Finally, the CPA states that they will prioritize property registration (formalizing the landownership) of the families participating in the PNIS (Summary, 2016, p.25). I reiterate my argument that the CPA explicitly makes the State guarantee these most vulnerable inhabitants be participating in the development of their futures through these two plans. The claim to adhere to principles of deep participation, as conceptualized in this thesis, but as will be shown throughout the following chapter, their claims of working *for* the people of Putumayo contradicts the Putumayans informing this thesis' views.

In sum, the two policy-programs in this chapter are highly intertwined given the fact that a large number of Putumayans are farmers and coca is a staple produce in the region. Furthermore, issues regarding overall rural development in Putumayo, connect to both the coca economy and general illegal economies. Illegal revenues indisputably make up much of the department's income (CNHM, 2012). Therefore, I argue, that a large part of the foundation upon which Putumayans' build their journey to peace, links directly to the issues these programs aim to solve. As such I combine the goals from the programs (rural development and economic transformation) and denominate them *Territorial development plans* (TDPs).

5.2 Looking for peace through Development

In Putumayo, one departmental agreement or pact and nine municipal pacts make up the territorial development plans. As of 2019, the municipal pacts are legally binding documents (Document PDETs Putumayo, n.d). More than nine thousand Putumayans have participated, to a varying degree, in the planning sessions of these development plans. 955 *veredas*, small rural communities, were visited and 3442 initiatives have been proposed and assessed (Ibid). The initiatives range from small and 'easily' implementable actions to major infrastructure projects such as the reconstruction of all tertiary roads and introduction of electricity in all permanently habited areas guaranteed to finish within ten years (Field notes, 30.09.2019).

The peace process in Colombia is currently in its third year. In Putumayo, the institutions responsible for implementing the programs have been set up in the department. The offices are mainly placed in the capital Mocoa, where I conducted most of my fieldwork. Furthermore, the UN have a team in place consisting of local workers and international senior-experts. The Verification Mission is responsible for verifying that the Colombian state implements the peace agreement, and the Office of the High commissioner for Refugees (*Agencia de la ONU para los refugiados* -ACNUR) is responsible for aiding and securing both internal and international refugees in the Putumayan department, alongside the Colombian Victim's Unit *(Unidad para las Victimas).* International and Colombian NGOs are also active, and the ones I met- and know of, all have an outspoken focus on following up the implementation of the policies in the agreement.

For the implementation of territorial development plan there are two main stakeholders: the local population and Farc; these are presented below.

5.2.1 General population

Local civil society organizations (CSOs) have been highly political and ideologically oriented since at least the early 1980s (Ramirez, 2011). The local organizations support the peace process and in addition, they have specific areas of interest, which they promote. Examples of the latter are for instance women's rights (Tejedoras de Vida, Casa Amazonia), human rights (Casa Amazonia, Red de derechos humanos Putumayo, Accion contra el Hambre), Amazonas and the environment (all the above) children and education (all of them), indigenous and ethnic minority-rights, religious groups and labor unions, in addition to farmer-organizations and economic cooperatives (Tejedoras de vida). Civil society in Putumayo is plural, they are fiercely active but remain under constant attacks from a myriad of stakeholders' whose interests clash with the goals of these local actors.

5.2.2 Farc

Farc's reintegration zone, *Espacio Territorial de Capacitación y Reintegración* (ETCR) *Holmer Mosquera La Carmelita* is located in a remote corridor between Puerto Vega – Teteye. From Colombia, you can only access the area by boat crossing the Putumayo River. From Ecuador, you can drive. More than 500 Ex-combatants moved here in the beginning of 2017. They have built everything they have from scratch: houses, restaurants, a football field, bathrooms, a playground, a library. There are communal bathrooms with toilets and showers; each family has their own shabby house. I rented one of the vacant houses, and paid 10.000 pesos per night (2, 7 US dollars). There is limited water and electricity. A bus passes by from time to time, and you must walk around 10 minutes to get out of the ETCR and reach the bus. To get to the river, and nearest town, Puerto Asís, you have to ride at least 40 minutes by car, depending on weather and the dirt road's condition. There is a protection zone around the ETCR, which has a radius of one kilometer, as stipulated by the CPA. Military and police officers (also stipulated in the agreement), protect the area. NGOs, INGOs, the UN verification mission, the Ombudsman and other Colombian State representatives, stops by on occasion. Two *Agencia de Reintegracion Nacional* (ARN - the Agency for National Reintegration) officers, the institution responsible for Farc's reintegration process, live on site. Farc plays a special role in the creation of a more peaceful Colombian society since they are one of the negotiating parts in the agreement. When Farc laid down arms, the energy in the region is said to have changed immediately (Interviews general population, 2019). Many of the members of the *Bloque Sur* (Southern Block), the former guerrilla faction that most of the ex-combatants in Putumayo came from, returned to an area where they had deep connections either through heritage or their former guerrilla front (32 and 48, some from 13) (Interviews Farc and general population, 2019 & Ramirez, 2011).

The factors found to affect implementation of the measures surrounding development in Putumayo vary among stakeholders. *Professionalism in civil service*, *security*, *public funding* and *alternative income opportunities* are the most important factors that emerge from my material.

5.3 Participation in the TDPs - Ideas vs Reality.

Agencia de Renovacion del Territorio – the Agency for Territorial Renovation (ART), is the state institution responsible for following up the TDPs. During a meeting I attended with many of Putumayo's stakeholders called '*Cómo va la Paz en el Putumayo?'* (How is peacebuilding going in Putumayo?), ART Putumayo started their presentation proclaiming that the Putumayan development-plans were going well (Field notes, 30.09.2019). 11 grand scale infrastructure projects were on the way, but when seeking to verify these statements in the ART's management report of 2019 the repeating phrase is that "they [the projects] are being worked on." (ART Informe de Gestion, 2019).

ART is the institution responsible for the follow-up of the TDPs, but their leader specified during the abovementioned meeting that "The implementation of the plans are not our responsibility, our role is to initiate and follow up the plans, we are only the motor that should coordinate and start the processes" (Field notes, 30.09.2019). In the peace agreement, it is specified that ART is the coordinating agency and that central- and local governments are responsible for *implementing* the Territorial Development plans. In addition, all Colombian governments, on municipal, regional and central scales, must create four-year *general development plans* within the first period of a new government elect. Given the Peace Agreement, the idea is that each level of government creates a general development plan and incorporates the TDP initiatives in a comprehensive development plan (CPA, 2016 & ART n.d). On the other hand, the Putumayan government cannot implement if they do not have the sufficient capacity, secure enough work environments, nor the fiscal resources to conduct the actual work that the agreement requires. Furthermore, if the local government cannot facilitate alternative income opportunities other than coca-farming and production, I argue that the implementation phase will be extremely challenging to complete.

While at the *Como va la paz*-meeting, I noticed a man in the back, who eagerly was making comments and suggesting topics for discussion as the different panel members presented how peace in Putumayo, according to their respective areas of responsibility, was going. My friend Liliana confirmed that this man was Ruben Dario, an ex-combatant of 30 years within the ranks, and current leader of Farc Putumayo's reintegration process. He questioned why they did not talk more about Farc when talking about how the peace process was going. He pointed out Farc's needs and reiterated that they are committed to the process, but that 'no one can

build peace alone'. Therefore, he argued, Farc also had to be a focus in the ongoing conversation about peace (Field notes, 30.09.2019). I agree with Ruben, and wish to advance his argument stating that Farc does not only need to be included in the conversation at this particular meeting, but they need to be considered as equal members of the Colombian society despite the violent past they have. Relations between Farc and the local communities are ambivalent, some accept them, others not. Reconciliation in peace processes require time, yet I would argue that it starts with people being included in social interactions in their local communities, such as Putumayo. Below I discuss the factors concerning implementation rate identified by both stakeholders and attempt to challenge the central State's claim that implementation of the territorial development plans in Putumayo is 'going well' and in accordance with the participatory measures as claimed by the government. As Farc constantly reiterates: "Duque; don't be a complicit" (*Duque, no sea complice*) (Farc, 16.06.2020).

5.3.1 Professionalism in civil service

During my interview with local ACNUR-leader Vera, she expressed frustration and concern regarding the local institutional capacity:

> *"It's ridiculous! Just a few percent of so-called professionals working with these highly complex and juridical processes in Putumayo are actually professional. The rest are not educated or capacitated to properly do their job. And every time there's change, you know, then someone gets a new job, and of course they are corrupt and then they have to give jobs to a whole bunch of people who don't have a clue what they're doing. The problem just repeats itself. People are not educated here. There are no Universities; there are no possibilities to educate people properly here. They have to leave, and when they do, most of them don't come back. And why would they? This [Putumayo] is such a messy place, I don't blame them for not wanting to come back and try to what, 'create something' out of nothing?"* (Interview Vera, 10.10.2019).

Vera points to a very difficult challenge in the region, the lack of training and educational opportunities. During the local elections, all governor-candidates explicitly highlighted the need for improved education alterniatives in Putumayo. As of 2019, they have debated the creation of a University in Putumayo for more than 20 years but still nothing has happened (Field notes, 04.10.2019), In Mocoa I lived right next to the departmental college and shared the house with a 21-year-old student. He was dedicated but did not see himself becoming a professional if he did not move from Putumayo; still he doubted that he or his family could afford him moving to a university city. Mocoa was already expensive enough and he struggled to pay his rent from time to time. My neighbor as well, a 16-year-old high school student wanting to study social work at a university level, did not manage to get into any universities that were public. Private universities in Colombia cost up to 5700 US dollars per semester, while the average salary is just above 300 dollars per month (Acosta, 2020). The unequal education possibilities in the country, and lack of such locally, clearly hampers Putumayans' possibilities for reaching- and maintaining a sustainable degree of professionals working in the department.

Furthermore, Vera directly links this to nepotism and brain drain, dynamics that severely challenge long-term capacity building in the area. I argue that nepotistic dynamics macerate the long-term perspective needed to drive the peace process forward. Implementation processes are initiated with one team: in Putumayo, the territorial development plans were developed with and by the Sorrel administration (2016-2019) but needs to be approved and adjusted to the governmental development plans of the Buanerges administration (2020-2023). Moreover, the latter is responsible, alongside the municipal governors, for actually *implementing* the initiatives agreed upon in the department's territorial development plans (TDPs). According to several of my informants, the processes become stuck in continuous reassessment circles where already developed policies are re-verified, challenged, changed or altered (Interviews General Population, 2019). I have heard this claim many times: A common say in Colombian politics, is that laws and policies are not about parties nor based on democratically developed platforms. Instead, they are individualistic and person-centered. For instance, it is common to refer to the CPA as 'Santos' agreement' (Fieldnotes, 2019). The result in Putumayo is that the process comes to a halt and does not manage to make practical changes on the ground based on the

policies made (and remade) according to renewed nepotistic changes in government and administrations.

The issue of brain-drain, meaning that professionals and those with higher levels of education leave an area not to return, is a common issue in vulnerable communities (Dodani & LaPorte, 2005). The TD plans are a highly complex mix of policies, programs, rights and regulations (CPA, 2016). I agree with Vera and posit that the issue of brain-drain further hampers the implementation of the TDPs because implementing these policies require a high level of professionalism over long and stable periods of time. In order to 1) understand the plans as legally binding documents, 2) harmonize the TDP initiatives with the departmental government plans, 3) allocate adequate funding, 4) initiate public procurements and 5) follow up the construction process. The CPA posits that implementation of the agreement will enable both 'the end of conflict' and 'a long-lasting and stable peace'. In Putumayo, implementing the agreement is not so simple. The territorial peace they await, and that the CPA should bring about, requires the people responsible for implementing these plans are professionally capable of doing so. Nepotistic and clientelistic practices worsen the situation.

While the situation in the department is highly worrisome, I argue that it is *not* because the majority of Putumayans actually resemble the stereotypes mentioned in Vera's quote above. As will be further discussed in chapter seven, the majority of Putumayans express great interest in- and responsibility towards, the peaceful education of the department's population. Furthermore, they are incredibly resilient when facing danger: they have sadly become accustomed to living in an ambivalent state of no peace-no war (Cancimance, 2014). Even so, lack of education possibilities combined with extensive nepotism and brain drain is a dangerous combination that hampers the territorial development plans' implementation and thus obstruct the overall peacebuilding in Putumayo.

5.3.2 Security

This leads me to the next factor emphasized as important for the implementation of the TDPs in Putumayo, namely conflicts and violence. The majority of my informants in the sample group general population emphasized that there is a dire need for Putumayo to become more secure if they ever are to believe they will live in a more peaceful society. Since the signing of the agreement Putumayo have experienced both positive and negative developments. Rosalia, a public officer working with victims' rights in Mocoa expressed concern regarding the status of the local communities:

> *"In the beginning we were all so positive, everyone was happy, and we thought we finally would create the Putumayo it feels like we have longed for and deserve. But it doesn't work. And I mean, I guess we never really believed it would happen but at the same time we also did".* (Interview Rosalia and Julia, 30.09.2019).

During my interview with Maria (23.10.2019), another public officer working with human rights in Putumayo also highlighted the difficult situation and stated that

> *"at least, when we had FARC, we knew who each other were, they knew us and respected that we worked for the people, they never touched us, and I wasn't ever scared. Now, the situation is like complete anarchy and both me and other colleagues are afraid. There's even one guy who's worked with human rights for probably 30 years and even he says he's scared to go 'out there' [to verify what has happened], because these new guys [i.e. illegal armed groups] don't give a damn about anybody's lives".*

Both Rosalia and Maria's statements correlate with an article local journalist German Arenas Usme (2019) wrote for *Colprensa* (a Colombian journalist network) where he proclaimed the "Return of war in Putumayo". This contradicts the notion that prioritized peace zone Putumayo, is steadily building territorial peace. Joshi, Melander & Quinn (2015) specify that through their quantitative comparison of negotiated endings to conflicts, the most vulnerable period is between two to five years after signing an agreement. I argue that the current development in

Colombia substantiates Joshi et al (2017) claim. On June 18th, 2020, as I finalize this thesis, my informant Eduardo sent me a *comunicado* - a statement, from Farc Putumayo. I asked him if he wanted me to include it in the thesis and he agreed. This further challenge the claim that Colombia is steady progressing towards implementation, which is what the current Colombian central State repeatedly claims (ART Informe de gestion, 2019).

> *"The members of Farc Putumayo reject the killing of our friend, Angel Alberto Calderón, accredited by the OACP, who was in a process of reintegration and pertained to Heiler Mosquera la Carmelita population center. We condemn the systematic killing of our members, who supported the peace agreement and are transitioning to a civilian life according to the reincorporation process concerted with the National government"* (Conversation Eduardo, 18.06.2020).

Angel was murdered at 4 pm on June 16th in the outskirts of la Carmelita. He is a friend of my friends, he played soccer while I was there, he hung out outside Eduardo's kiosk, he talked with me and I talked with him, I lived alongside this man for five short days last year, and now he is dead.

The peace agreement set out to diminish the steady increase of victims in the Colombian conflict (which has reached more than nine million people), the victim registry excludes anyone considered a member of an illegal armed group (CPA, 2016). Arguably, critics will challenge the notion that Farc needs to be forgiven for their past merely three years post-agreement. Yet, how is one supposed to build peace if the people involved in the process do not have the possibility to interact with each other in peaceful spaces of participation?

Leonore and Leidy are social leaders, locally elected victim-representatives and members of the women's organization Tejedoras de vida and arguably aware of their own agency. Leidy stated:

> *"It is a constant fight; we always fight with the ART; we always fight with the municipality. Either there's no information, or there's no money. And when there's money, it just goes to the same woman in our community. She claims to be a representative for the vulnerable but just worries about filling her own pockets. They [the government] never reach the most vulnerable anyways"* (Interview, 12.10.2019)

Even while they are actively participating in both formal and informal spaces of participation, it just does not work. Leonore explained: "they just talk and talk about the PDETs and PNIS and they never hold their promise, so many people have destroyed their crops and wait for the money, but it never comes" (Interview, 12.10.2019). Public funding is a challenge for the implementation of the CPA in Putumayo, below I will discuss this.

5.3.3 Public funding

The ART Putumayo leader was, as Leidy, worried about finances. He explained that revenues for the PDET comes from mixing public funds, international aid and private investments (Field notes, 30.09.2019). The central government is the primary funder, and responsible for distributing funds downwards on the national scale. Departments and municipalities are responsible for incorporating the PDETs in their local development plans, yet they also depend on public funding to be able to implement what has been agreed upon. ART specified that in order for the PDETs to be of value, they need to be productive. ART clearly places the goal of the PDETs within a neoliberal framework, where the priority of the plans is not primarily focused on improving people's lives in holistic manners such as the CPA and the central government claim, but maintains that in the end the objective of these plans is income stability for the individual.

Furthermore, ART Putumayo claim they were the first department to finish the departmental PDET plan in 2018, but when verifying this through checking in with my informants, the new government of Buanerges just recently approved the development plans in late May 2020. I argue that merely *finishing* a plan does not equal its implementation is in place. As mentioned in chapter 2, both the way in which one plans and the way in which one implements, are highly important factors when seeking to build peace. I reiterate that the territorial development plans

in Putumayo have not adhered to a deep type of participation for either stakeholders during neither its planning phase or when implementing the agreed upon initiatives, leading the process to fail to include the exact people it claims to work on behalf of.

5.3.4 Alternative income opportunities

Another factor of importance is that Putumayo is repeatedly portrayed as backwards and wild. The stigmas surrounding Putumayan inhabitants as violent *narco-terroristas* (Ramirez, 2011) unfairly continue to portray them as members of FARC-dissident groups, Narco-cartels or other insurgent groups connected to the coca-economy (Interview, Fatima 25.10.2019). The region has been under constant scrutiny from the traditional media, government, and investors, expressing an overall lack of faith in the Putumayan people. What these power brokers have done, is reinforce stereotypes leading the region to suffer under the very real and deadly conflicts that still are taking place. In addition, they also suffer from being portrayed as 'violent', 'guerrillas' and 'drug addicts'; people *not deserving* the positive attention of media, State, nor investors. The negative spiral repeats itself, and the personal stories of Putumayans' own truths remain hidden behind a colonial narrative of 'local savages' (Cancimance, 2014; Ramirez, 2011).

The PNIS program, and Agenda Item 4, set out to help overcome prejudice against a group of people who in the majority of cases are poor, vulnerable farmers in need of a more stable income. In Putumayo, participation in the coca-economy is how to gain an income. Coca-farmers have increasingly been objecting to the representations mentioned above since the mid-1980s, when the State finally acknowledged that Putumayans were both living and dying as a direct consequence of the violent coca-economy (Ramirez, 2011).

Furthermore, social leaders Leidy and Leonore also specified that the coca-economy is a very complex women's issue; it is an extremely violent and dangerous job, women easily become targets of violence directly linked to the economy. But in lack of other possibilities, women also have to participate as *raspachines* (coca-pickers, often migrating from farm to farm) (Interviews, 12.10.2019).

I met many Putumayans, both men and women who either work as *raspachines*, have a small lot where they grow coca or have big lots where they grow coca. Furthermore, of all the cocaine produced in Colombia, more than 24 % comes from laboratories hidden in the Putumayan amazon (UNODOC, 2019). Working in the coca-industry has been illegal in Colombia until the peace agreement stated that farmers could avoid falling under the arm of the law, if they voluntarily eradicate their plots and join the PNIS program. Despite how open coca-farmers and *raspachines* are concerning admitting participating in the illegal production of coca, it still is considered illegal if you do not participate in the PNIS-program.

Creating alternative income opportunities is a complex issue that the PNIS was supposed to address. More than 20 000 families have voluntarily eradicated their coca-crops in Putumayo, and many received the initial economic payment of 2 million pesos (540 US dollars) (Field notes, 30.09.2019). People try to grow different products such as the fruits *chontaduro*, cacao and *acai*, while they eagerly wait for their alternative crops to bring revenues. There are major issue though; the amazon soil is very acidic leading the majority of products to not be able to root in the Amazonian soil, an exception is native Amazonian products such as the coca plant, tobacco and the fruits mentioned above. The connectivity in Putumayo is bad; leading many of the products to rot or degrade during transportation (Interview Samir, 08.10.2019). The PDETs should tackle this issue and they have a primary focus on tertiary roads and grand infrastructure projects. The details surrounding who, when and where this is to happen have been formulated in the already developed PDETs, but as mentioned, the PDETs have not been agreed upon nor initiated by the Putumayan government at the time of writing this thesis.

Leidy further spoke of how she was a spokesperson for the community and maintained contact on behalf of her organization with the ART. But again, “they just won’t listen” (Interview, 12.10.2019).

Because of a complex mix of factors, the PNIS is failing one of the arguably most vulnerable groups of people in Putumayo. A group that the CPA explicitly guarantees that it will target and help *through* the PNIS program. Families and whole communities are desperate, and a minimum of five different cartel-structures are seemingly the only force that can provide these people with the income they need (Interviews, 2019). While visiting a rural area outside

Mocoa, the community spoke with fear about how unknown actors on several occasions had come by, with their automatic weapons and their threatening behavior: an unknown-armed group attempted to force the communities back into coca-farming (Fieldnotes, 27.09.2019). Both Leonore and Leidy also mentioned that this had happened in their respective communities (Interviews, 12.10.2019). Furthermore, the Siona indigenous community on the outskirts of Puerto Asís. While staying with Farc in la Carmelita, many people spoke of how non-combatants living in and around the ETCR have to work as *raspachines.* The reintegration zone is located in the corridor Puerto Vega-Teteye where the majority of coca is grown. There are continuous confrontations between the army and the coca-farmers in the area who are protecting their crops and livelihood from forced eradication. As mentioned, the PNIS is voluntary yet those who do not cooperate are subject to "the full force of the law". Demobilised FARC ex-combatants receive a minimum salary (186 US dollars) as a special benefit provided by the CPA in exchange for maintaining their reintegration process.

Carmen stated "you know, in the other ETCRs there are projects and more things happening, there they have *collective* projects". Collective and communal projects would benefit the whole community, the Farc cooperative that lives in Puerto de Guzman have been able to buy land and are sustaining themselves as a collective in the municipality. In the ETCR though, the most vulnerable are left behind without much option. Carmens husband, he is not an ex—combatant, works as a *raspachin*. They are not able to move out of the ETCR because they cannot afford to, their families are just as poor as they are, in addition Carmen just had her second son. She was terrified when she found out she was pregnant in October, and when I asked her about abortion, she just could not do it, even though "the economic situation is very very bad" (Carmen, 01.10.2019). Carmen's testimony is another example of how vulnerable Putumayans struggle to find income outside the coca economy. The CPA clearly states that it *will* protect *and* include and prioritize the most vulnerable of the population; I argue that the State fails to uphold this guarantee by not implementing the agreed upon measures in full nor including or empowering (through shape and form of participation) the vulnerable, such as my friend Carmen. While staying with Farc in la Carmelita, many people spoke of how non-combatants living in and around the ETCR have to work as *raspachines.* The reintegration zone is located in the corridor Puerto Vega-Teteye where the majority of coca is grown. There are continuous confrontations between the army and the coca-farmers in the area who are protecting their crops and livelihood from forced eradication. As mentioned, the PNIS is voluntary yet those who do

not cooperate are subject to “the full force of the law”. Demobilized FARC ex-combatants receive a minimum salary (186 US dollars) as a special benefit provided by the CPA in exchange for maintaining their reintegration process. They are not allowed to apply for additional social services that would give them additional income; at the same time, they are extremely vulnerable if they leave the ETCR as the 201 killed ex-combatants‘ post-agreement demonstrate (Interview Farc, 16.06.2020). One small project for a restricted group of ex-combatants is on the way, an agricultural fish farm where they breed trout (Interview Carmen ,01.10.2019). Even so, Carmen stated “you know, in the other ETCRs there are projects and more things happening, there they have *collective* projects”. Collective and communal projects would benefit the whole community, the Farc cooperative that lives in Puerto de Guzman have been able to buy land and are sustaining themselves as a collective in the municipality. In the ETCR though, the most vulnerable are left behind without much option. Carmens husband, he is not an ex—combatant, works as a *raspachin*. They are not able to move out of the ETCR because they cannot afford to, their families are just as poor as they are, in addition Carmen just had her second son. She was terrified when she found out she was pregnant in October, and when I asked her about abortion, she ddid not want to do it, even though “the economic situation is very very bad” (Interview Carmen, 22.10.2019). Carmen’s testimony is another example of how vulnerable Putumayans struggle to find income outside the coca economy. The CPA clearly states that it *will* protect *and* include and prioritize the most vulnerable of the population; I argue that the State fails to uphold this guarantee by not implementing the agreed upon measures in full nor including or empowering (through shape and form of participation) the vulnerable, such as my friend Carmen. include and prioritize the most vulnerable of the population; I argue that the State fails to uphold this guarantee by not implementing the agreed upon measures in full nor including or empowering (through shape and form of participation) the vulnerable, such as my friend Carmen.

5.4 Participation depth in the TDPs

When discussing the level of participation in TDPs, I make use of the theoretical framework on participation presented in the second chapter. As discussed in chapter two, the Participation *depth* is conceptualized from deep to shallow based on the form and scope it takes. Most participation in the Peace Agreement and the process of implementation is practically *not* deep.

Democratic participatory sessions outside formal political spaces of participation (institutional spaces) usually shift between intermediate- and shallow depths of participation. The TDPs in the Colombian Peace Agreement include *participatory* bottom up planning and development as both explicit *focus*, and *goal*. Based on the data material collected for this thesis, I argue that this claim is up for debate.

Figure 5.4:

Participation depth in the *Territorial Development plans* according to stakeholders

		SCOPE	
		INCLUSIVE	***EXCLUSIVE***
FORMS	***VOICE***	**General population** *Intermediate Participation*	**Farc** *Shallow Participation*
	DECISION-MAKING POWER	*Deep Participation*	*Intermediate Participation*

As it can be seen in figure 5.4, the participatory measures designed for PDET and PNIS do not manage to reach the goal of deep participation in Putumayo. I qualify the *scope* of participation in the TDPs in Putumayo as *inclusive* towards the general population, but *exclusive* towards Farc. Nonetheless, when there is no transfer of decision-making power the participation does not qualify as *deep* in my framework. The participation *form* in Putumayo is found within the realm of voice. Following then, it does not entail a power shift where participants can decide *what- when* and *how* initiatives should be implemented. I argue that there is no *deep* transfer of power to any of the stakeholder groups and that their participation depth thus places them within intermediate- and shallow participation.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the identified measures considered to be of most importance to the development of a more peaceful Putumayo in this thesis; the Territorial development plans consisting of PDET and PNIS. Based on the thematic analysis, I identified four causal factors I argue restrain implementation of the TDP-policies according to different stakeholders based on a process tracing analysis. Furthermore, I have shown that a minority of Putumayans actually participates in the implementation of the process, and challenged the notion that the Colombian state, through the participatory focus in the CPA, manages creates empowering and including spaces for deep participation. I have argued that deep participation in the TDPs programs (PDET and PNIS) can enable a radical change concerning two of the three most pressing issues in Putumayo.

6. Deep and Shallow participation in Local politics

While progressive forces struggled to accept the devastating results of the 2018 national elections, hope was what characterized the beginning of the election year 2019. Calls for 'pro-peace' activism and -political campaigns where everywhere. As a direct result of the Peace Agreement, these elections were different; Farc could postulate their candidates at all levels of Colombian politics, as candidates in their own party Farc (in Putumayo they call it *Partido de la Rosa*- the Rose party). Farc could also run as candidates for other parties, many postualted as *Polo Democratico* (Democratic Pole-PD) and *Colombia Humana* (Humane Colombia- CH). Traditionally suppressed social forces and political parties were guaranteed participation rights in formal politics because of the agreement. Statutes of opposition' guarantees the runner-up candidate a seat as opposition member, at all levels of governments. Since 2018, the second runner up can accept or decline a role to take her/his role as opposition (CPA, 2016).

In this chapter, I continue my thematic analysis discussing the common themes (factors) the stakeholders consider to be of importance within the scope of the second agenda item in the Colombian Peace Agreement: Political Participation and Democracy. The process tracing analysis enables me to explore causal mechanisms connecting the identified factors and state of implementation. I connect my theoretical framework to the factors found and discuss how the dynamics within local institutional spaces affect Putumayans search for peace. The guaranteed *political rights* of the *institutional spaces* in Putumayo can enable local democratization in Putumayo, but in order to succeed I argue, the State must guarantee their deep participation in local elections and formal institutional spaces.

6.1 Policies for territorial peace in Putumayo

As the first post-agreement local elections scheduled for the fall of 2019 came closer, I was intrigued by the fact that Farc had entered into the broad coalition "Somos Putumayo" (SP) with local progressive forces in a peripheral region of the country. As explained previously, things did not go as planned with neither the coalition nor my project. Local elections were nonetheless happening, and campaigns just started intensifying when I arrived in Putumayo in September 2019. Since Farc did not participate, I could not focus on their role as a local political actor participating in formal politics. I had to change my entry point to this item of the agreement; I elaborate below on the aspects of item two that I chose to focus on.

6.1.1 Institutional Spaces and Political Rights

One of the main goals of the peace agreement is to address the root causes of the Colombian conflict; exclusionary politics is one of the root causes (CNMH, 2013). Therefore, one of the most encompassing chapters in the CPA tackles questions regarding this issue. For this thesis, I ended up focusing on the overall participation in *formal politics* in Putumayo. I take as departure that *formal* politics are *institutional spaces* led and developed by the State. Many of the *institutional spaces* have expanded as a direct result of the CPA (2016). Empirically, the institutional space investigated in this chapter is the local elections of 2019.

6.1.2 Local elections

The Colombian state is a nominal Democratic Republic led by a President, which is head of both Government and State. National and local elections are held every four years, the last national election was in 2018 and the local- in 2019. The executive power lies with the government; the legislative Congress is bicameral and divided in respectively the Senate and the House of Representatives. The latter chamber consists of representatives from the territories, based on departmental and special constituencies, in order to improve ethnic representation. The judicial power is independent but is sometimes under fire for corrupt exposures. The current constitution was approved in 1991; it includes decentralization attempts- and a transfer of power to the regions. Since 1991, the 32 Colombian departments directly elect 32 governors and their assembly representatives, 1123 mayors and their council members. At the community-level, representatives can postulate for *Juntas de Acción Comunal (JAC)* – Community Boards (Colombia.co, n.d).

Since 1991, Putumayo has been able to vote directly for their governors and assembly-deputies (Ramirez, 2011). When FARC was a power holder in the region, their political strategy was centered on voter abstention; they kidnapped, threatened and killed political candidates and rejected electoral participation in the communities under their control (Avila, 2019). The paramilitaries' strategy was absorbing and infiltrating Colombian politics: a complete opposite to FARC (Ibid).

The Colombian Peace agreement (2016) highlights upholding of constitutional *political rights* as decisive for a 'deepening of democracy' *(apertura democratica).* The final version of the

CPA was approved by the Colombian congress on the 1st of December 2016 after a referendum resulted in a negative vote two months earlier (Corte Suprema de Justicia, n.d.). The Peace Agreement is in accordance with the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and is also complying with the 2011 'Victims law' (*Ley 1448: Ley de Victimas*) which explicitly states that victims have differential rights compared to those not registered as victims in the national register for victims of the conflict. Per June 13th, 2020, the total number of victims registered in Colombia is a staggering 9.014.776 people. As a result, almost 7.3 million Colombians are entitled to special attention while 1.727.256 victims are not (RUV 13.06.2020). The latter is because they are dead, killed, missing or disappeared. The official discourse surrounding the peace agreement states that *the victims* are its central focus (CPA, 2016). The CPA thus set out to end conflict between the Colombian state and the FARC guerrilla and transform society while *giving precedence* to Colombia's millions of victims.

In accordance with the agreement, all registered political parties could participate in the 2019-elections. The *Registraduría* (National Civil Registry) held information campaigns, processed voter-registration, and encouraged especially victims and first-time voters to participate. The *Contraloría* (National Comptroller, highest organ of fiscal control of the State) and its National electoral council (CNE) required transparent accounting be published online, and imposed maximum financial limits for campaigns, in order to control spending and hence diminish what Colombians call *Politiquería* or *La Maquinaría* (Politicking or The Machinery). The CPA (2016) also guarantees the reform of the political system and of the control mechanisms mentioned above; this has been approved in Congress. As of fall 2019, only a minority of these *guaranteed changes* were in place and according to the Kroc Institute, the second agenda item is the least implemented of the CPA (Kroc Institute, 2019).

The peace agreement stipulates legally binding rights and guarantees, and via its complete implementation, I have posited that a renewed social contract can emerge. The agreement aims to enable peaceful coexistence between all Colombians through the development of *territorial peace*, in order to reach their goal, I argue that democratization through deep participation in formal politics is needed (CPA, 2016).

During my fieldwork, I became more and more intrigued by the distance between my experiences with Norwegian politics, Colombian central politics and the realm of local politics in Putumayo. It was like stepping into a different type of democracy, which ambivalently related to politics I thought I at least knew *something* about. I kept being surprised, and not least; confused. This is the search for peace in Putumayo through Politics.

6.2 Looking for peace through Politics

As mentioned in the fifth chapter, the two sample groups primarily focused on in this thesis are 1) the general Putumayan population and 2) Farc. As a result, this thematic analysis does not emphasize the *local* government's views as an individual stakeholder. Instead, opinions from public officials, be they politicians or professionals, are explored as part of the general population. I specify whether- and if, the people referred to are actively engaged in party-politics as can be verified in the informant list. The primary reason for structuring the chapter in this manner is because of the great political and ideological distance between the Putumayan local governments (Leftist Green party Governor Sorrell 2016-2019) and the central state in Bogotá (Extreme right President Duque 2018-2022) at the time of conducting the field work (10.09.2019-20.11.2019).

6.2.1 General population

The Putumayan population voted for their local representatives on the 27th of October 2019. In Putumayo, five candidates participated in the battle for the governorship. ASI-candidate, Buanerges, eventually won by 9090 votes over *Colombia Humana*'s Andrés Cancimance on the 27th of October 2019. 62,64% of potential Putumayan participants voted at their designated polling station. There were 699 polling-stations in the department, most of them were placed in urban areas. 9383 of the counted votes were deemed un-valid. The un-valid votes were discharged because they were considered either 'un-marked' (7664 votes) or 'nulled' (1719 votes), meaning the election-workers considered the vote unclear and nullified them (Registraduria, Elecciones Putumayo 2019).

Per January 2020, the new local government in Putumayo was assumed by governor elect Buanerges (2020-2024), who depicts himself as a progressive albeit conservatively religious

candidate. Buanerges ran his campaign for the political party *Alianza Social Independiente* – The Independent Social Alliance (ASI). ASI identifies, on a political scale from left to right, as centre-left (Field notes, 2019). It is assumed that both the former governor Sorrell, and now governor Buanerges, are in opposition to the sitting central government based on their party-affiliation. To demonstrate the local government's perspectives in this chapter I include them as members of 'general population'. It should be reminded that the central government's views are mostly derived from secondary sources (official statements, websites, reports and other state-produced documents).

6.2.2 Farc

Farc had, per November 2019, 7000 active members in their party throughout Colombia. For the local elections, they had candidates in 27 of 32 departments, but the majority were *co-avalado* – endorsed, by other progressive parties (Field notes, 23.09.2019). Farc did not present party-affiliated candidates in the majority of the regions, and in Putumayo, only one ex-combatant in active reintegration process postulated as AICO (*Autoridades indigenas de Colombia*- Indigenous authorities of Colombia) in the municipal elections in Puerto Asís. He was not elected. As mentioned, Farc entered a broad coalition, Somos Putumayo (SP). The coalition fell through officially, and originally had five parties coming together to elect one governor candidate as a representative for the progressive forces in the department. Farc withdrew their official support to the coalition due to a variety of factors, such as internal disagreements in the SP, security and funding.

6.3 Local democratic participation – Ideals vs Realities

The Colombian state guarantees in their second agenda item "the representation of the different visions and interests of society" (CPA summary, 2016, p.10). This will allow wider and deeper participation by all Colombians is supposed to "strengthen citizen participation" and "outlaw violence as a method of political action" (Ibid). When the differential and preferential guarantees in the agreement are applied, this shall enable the historically marginalized groups of Others deep participation *without* risking their lives. As has been repeated throughout this thesis, the realities on the ground in Putumayo, as presented by my informants, begs to differ.

Colombia is still a violent country, with many active conflicts. Political exclusion persists, and politics and ideology are still highly entangled with violence. I argue that there is a dire need to respect the deep participatory principles of the CPA, merely writing an agreement does not entail real change on the ground.

The factors found to affect the implementation of participatory mechanisms related to local politics are *resources, political exclusion* and *center-periphery distance.* I focus on the formal spaces of political participation, particularly political rights and guarantees presented in the CPA agenda item two (2016).

6.3.1 Resources

A different theme emerging from my informants was the vulnerable environment in Putumayo.

> *More than anything what we need is preserving the environment, or not just n environment, but a healthy environment. And when speaking of the environment we speak of one part [of the CPA]: we need a healthy environment, where we all go to work for the preservation of this environment, and to do this we need to control the exploitation of petroleum, energetic mining, everything that has to do with gold and silver, other things that require use of mercury that severely pollute ('empuercan') our waters. It causes so much damage to our vital flows of water, to our fishes. Basically,*

> *they intoxicate the lung through which we breathe; that is the water and the air* (Interview Eduardo, 02.10.2019).

Samir is the governor of the indigenous reservation Inga Kamentsa in Mocoa. He ran to be a municipal delegate for Mocoa in the 2019 elections but was not elected. Early October, he sent me a message with photos of the Inga Kamentsa community "demanding their rights in the territory" (Field notes, 13.10.2019). They were peacefully protesting the exploitation of natural resources in their ancestral territories. Per both the constitution and the CPA they are guaranteed prior consultation in everything happening within their territorial boundaries. This right is continuously breached (Interview Samir, 08.10.2019). Archila, the leader of the entity responsible for implementing the agreement in Colombia, announced in May 2020 that Gran Tierra, an energy company already producing oil in Putumayo, had reached a 3.000 million pesos agreement with the department (almost 800.000 US dollars) (Archila, 14.05.2020)

The indigenous communities in Putumayo (14 different indigenous ethnicities, 75 indigenous reserves in total), are actually fighting for their lives as pro-peace social authorities and as opponents of 'extractivism for development' (Interview Samir, 08.10.2019). The CPA was meant to ensure that their rights finally would be respected, but as Samir's demonstration photo clearly shows, extractivism is already happening against the wishes of territorial indigenous authorities and decisions. Even though Samir and his community participated and suggested sustainable projects during the TDP processes, they also organized politically in two indigenous parties in order to avoid resource exploitation in their territories. To this day, they have neither been heard nor respected. Exploitation continues to threaten their livelihood and survival as indigenous groups. By not transferring real decision-making power to those the CPA promised to protect and promote, such as the Inga Kamensta community, the peacebuilding process is hampered, and intermediate participation is all the state manages to produce.

Putumayo is the southern-Amazonian frontier in Colombia. The geography is intense; dense jungles, wild, brown rivers and the Andes mountain ridge where exotic and endangered animals migrate to mate. On the other hand, Putumayo is also rich in natural resources, and the department has gained much revenue by allowing grand exploitation of these (Ramirez, 2011). A few years back, the Amazonian department of Putumayo was characterized a 'mining-

department' (Field notes, 04.10.2019). Both multinational and Colombian petroleum companies have produced petroleum and minerals in Putumayo since the early 1960s (Ramirez, 2011). The mining-status gives precedence to massive extraction industries which all the Putumayans I have spoken with argue is devastating the land and not producing any local jobs, NGOs and investigators concerned about the fragile environment support Putumayans repeated calls for changing extraction policies (Crudo Transparente, 2016).

"They come here [the petroleum workers] and take our resources, destroy our lands, drink, and fight and mistreat our women" (Interview Eduardo, 02.10.2019). The oil companies claim to abide to principles of *social responsibility* and on their official websites there is plenty of outreach material regarding their supposed contributions to Putumayan communities (Ecopetrol undated). The greater Putumayan community rejects the oil-companies' destruction of their local environment. There is a common discontentment with regards to the many *mulas* (massive trailers) that constantly drive by and destroy the already patch worked dirt roads that the CPA is supposed to pave if the local government initiates the political agreements of the CPA (Interviews Eduardo; Samir & Valentina and Paula, 2019).

As mentioned in the former chapter, higher education is not available in Putumayo leading petroleum workers to be specialized professionals that temporarily reside in the area. Consideration of the natural environment in Putumayo is of great concern for sustainable rural development (ref. Mocoa landslide below). When most inhabitants are farmers living of their land (more than 50 % of the population work directly with agriculture) it is easy to see how devastating resource extraction is to an already fragile eco-system sustaining livelihoods in Putumayo (Interviews and Field notes, 2019). I argue that if Farc's participation in institutional spaces were guaranteed along with the general population, the overall Putumayan society would thus demonstrate that the majority are in solidarity with each other *and* the environment. According to my framework, they would stand stronger together *across* groups of Others, when fighting for the end of resource extractivism as a development strategy in Putumayo.

Mocoa landslide 2017

In the middle of the night, on April 1st, 2017, Mocoa was struck by a catastrophic landslide, the third deadliest in all of Colombian history (Field notes, 25.10.2019). The floods and following landslides left at least: 336 people dead, 400 people injured, it demolished whole neighborhoods and 200 people, the majority women and children, are still missing. Ninety percent of those who were in their houses when the catastrophe struck were women and children. "It was a Friday, early Saturday morning; the men were out partying and the women and children at home" (Interview Fatima, 25.10.2019). The crisis was a result of a combination of factors, but what stands out is generations that have neglected to protect the environment by deforesting the mountain and forests around Mocoa. Geological analyses repeatedly warned about the risks, and the local and central government were aware of the situation. The majority of informal housing areas in the town were located in these areas, leaving already vulnerable families even more exposed to environmental threats (Field notes, 25.10.2019). What continues to be a challenge in the reconstruction of Mocoa, which because of the landslide was included in the TDPs, is how to include the people who left their houses and lost everything. Fatima (Tejedoras de Vida) conviced geologists, the departmental government of Sorrel (2015-2019), military and firefighters that the way Mocoa can solve these issues is to "bring the local women to the table" (Ibid). The Tejedoras capacitate more than 3000 Putumayan women as peace-promoters and socio-political leaders. In the elections of 2019, 34 women participated in a seminar that sought to teach the participants more on how to work as a politician.

> *"It is a subject of compromises and promises. These women work together, they talk together for the good of their families, and it is undoubtedly more efficient to include the women, without even being a feminist, we need to make Mocoa a communitarian restauration project, capacitating and empowering the women is the efficient way to do this"*

(Fatima, 25.10.2019)

Deep participation by the women directly affected by the landslide is what I argue Fatima managed to convince (or at least consider) the rest of the Mocoa risk group in the meeting above. Even so, Sorrel is no longer the governor, and there is a high probability that the people

who agreed this was a good idea, no longer work there because of changes in government and subsequent nepotistic dynamics.

6.3.2 Political Exclusion

Farc repeatedly expressed that the peace process is exclusionary as some, including the current central government, argue that the TDPs do not include Farc and that Farc should not be allowed to participate in politics before they have served time in prison (El tiempo, 14.01.2018). This automatically places Farc on a shallow participatory depth. Nonetheless, most people undergoing reintegration in Putumayo live with- and alongside the Putumayan population. Per October 2019, only 130 ex-combatants remained in la Carmelita and the majority of people residing there are family members of ex-combatants (Interview Ruben 02.10.2019). Therefore, the arguments surrounding 'ex-combatants as something *Other* than the general population' do not hold. Furthermore, the inhabitants in la Carmelita demonstrated close ties with the majority of the non-Farc residents living right outside their military gated community. While I stayed with Farc, neighbors came by both to play soccer and participate in local community meetings with the JAC. Some of the surrounding neighbors are themselves members of the political party Farc, and both Farc and their neighbors, in addition to unknowns in Mocoa, said that the general majority are in solidarity with Farc's reintegration process in the local community. "They are tired of war, they are tired of injustices, so are we. We all want peace" (Interview Omar X.10.2019).

Many neighbors also sympathize with Farc's political project, but the majority of residents in the surrounding *veredas* are, as has been argued, mostly concerned with the programs developed in the peace agreement as a means for building a more peaceful Putumayo for all. Even so, Putumayans are also highly opposed to Farc's presumed benefits in the agreement as the majority of Putumayans are poor and vulnerable themselves. The conflicts are class based and as Eduardo and Ruben both stated: 'we have killed and been killed by our own brothers'.

> *Because it's like, what is it that we have seen here in this process? That it is very complicated, very difficult. We have had a confrontation for 53 years, we fought each other. It was a fratricide where we killed each other between brothers and sisters. Because they don't send to the war neither children of the big generals, nor the big*

> *business nor the rich of this country. In war you see the soldier, the police, the paramilitary or the guerrilla, and we are all children of the people.* (02.10.2019)

Farc further posits that their revolution always has been centered on the exclusionary politics of Colombia, i.e. that political parties to the left, always has been violently excluded from participating (Interviews Farc October 2019; CNMH, 2013). The CPA's participatory focus set out to mark a break with exclusionary politics; still it fails to comply with its own goals when it disregards the inclusion of all Colombian citizens: Farc are also Colombian citizens.

6.3.3 Center – periphery distances

I could observe a great *distance* between the Putumayan local governments (Leftist Green party Governor Sorrell 2016-2020) and the central state in Bogotá (Extreme right President Duque 2018-2022) at the time of conducting the fieldwork. This distance refers to perceived distance in opinions between Bogotá and Putumayo; center-periphery, and opposite views on what the CPA and the territorial peace is and can be.

A recurring theme that came up during conversations with both Farc and the general population was the impression that 'the State isn't really interested in peace' (Interviews, 2019). The central government is highly opposed to this agreement. President Duque and his Democratic centre-party (CD) campaigned in 2018 (national elections) and again in 2019 (local elections) on a platform openly criticizing the agreement (Razon publica 03.06.2019). Still the CD is the party of President Duque, and both he and his administrative leaders continuously proclaim, "Implementation is going well" (Fieldnotes, 30.09.2019, Archila, 14.05.2020).

The CD was the self-proclaimed leader of the 'no-campaign' that successfully managed to convince Colombians to vote no in the 2016 referendum on the agreement. (Nasi, 2018). The CD is a far-right conservative party continuously proclaiming that the peace agreement *as it has been developed per 2016*, will transform Colombian society into a communistic anarchy (Arcadia, 19.07.2019). Farc considers the CDs discourse to be elitist, misogynist and discriminatory. Moreover, the CD discourse is extremely militant and hence the central State,

at least in the eyes of Putumayans, does not contribute to implementing nor upholding the political rights for Putumayan citizens as stipulated by the CPA (2016).

Samir, an indigenous leader and political candidate for the municipal elections, also reiterated this claim and said they cannot expect *anything* from the central government, and *only a little* from the local government. Still, he felt that the local government was the way to go (Interview Samir, 08.10.2019). Leonore also criticized the central government's lack of interest in Putumayo and said that: "what we need is a government who governs, who does what it says it should do. Bogotá [central government] needs to come visit the territories and see what is happening outside their bubble" (Interview, 12.10.2019).

The distance between what the State claims is happening and what these Putumayans express themselves calls for concern. The State fails to grasp the *territorial realities* of *real people* while simultaneously publishing what I consider populist propaganda stating, 'all goes well' (Archila, 14.05.2020). By not expressing more than a discursive political interest regarding both scope and form of participation, Putumayans are excluded from the peacebuilding process, which was to be led by participation in local politics and the TDPs. The State fails to reach the very own differentially precedential Others that they claim to empower when it does not support Putumayans through its actions: Putumayo need resources, education, political and rural reforms, they need help from their democratically elected government representatives to overcome the issues identified as hampering their peacebuilding process. To this day, what they get more than anything is a speech from the government proclaiming everything is fine, I argue it is not; if the government cannot secure real participation depth in the institutional spaces of the peace process, the prospects of building a territorial peace in Putumayo will wither away.

To further illustrate my argument on the diverging viewpoints on part of central and local governments with regards to implementation in Putumayo, I again return to the meeting in Mocoa on the 30th of September 2019.

During the different presentations given by local state institutions, most institutions reiterated that *the central State* (i.e. the Government in Bogotá) is the entity responsible for the peace

process – not them. Furthermore, they specified that the State needs to take control and make amends to the inhabitants of Putumayo. 'The Unit for missing persons' for instance, stated that "None of this is our task, it is not in our decrees, neither do we have the money or jurisdiction to do anything, even if we want to or feel like we could contribute" (Field notes, 30.09.2019). In the end, it is the national government and the central state institutions that have both the money and the power. Institutions in Putumayo are constantly underfunded; much revenue is lost in bureaucracy and corruption. In sum, both the juridical-, fiscal- and political power lays with the central government. It is their responsibility to prioritize Putumayo as a peace-zone, and it is their responsibility to both enable- and put pressure on the local governments and -state institutions. In order for the decentralized parts of the state to comply with the peace agreement, they require help from the 'big State'. Unfortunately, for the people in Putumayo, the sitting government is outspokenly opposed to the content of the agreement.

It should be reiterated that the peace Agreement is a *legally binding* document. This is an important fact; the items in the agreement are *not* part of a guiding framework, but are judicially grounded policies, regardless of who has the power in the country. Any sitting government is legally obligated to implement the measures in the CPA, regardless of their party's political platform or personal opinions. Originally, the negotiating parties attempted to include the peace agreement in the constitution, but the opposition rejected this claim (Nasi, 2018). Even so, the 578 points in the CPA have been approved by congress as *law* and so these policies are legally binding by law. I posit that the vast majority living in democratic societies often forgets this factor. If remembered, citizens can argue for their guaranteed rights as stated by laws. I consider laws to be of use when presenting arguments in a democratic society, no matter how strong or weak the democratic principles are. By accepting the CPA as laws, all levels of government guarantee its citizens that the measures *will be* implemented *no matter what.*

The current government disagrees with what opponents of the CPA commonly refer to as the 'pro-peace discourse' that sees Farc as deserving the help they get in order to create peace (Field notes 2019). Many of my informants also said it is unfair that Farc gets so much attention, when they are one of the worst perpetrators of violence (Interviews Rosalia, Julia, Nancy, Fatima 2019). Farc and the most radical social organizations (such as *Marcha*

Patriotica – Patriotic march) challenge this, and they argue that Farc and other guerrilla groups only restored to violence as a means to reach their revolutionary goals (Interview Farc, 2019).

A final, and important argument that kept being repeated was the lack of trust between the inhabitants in Putumayo, and between Putumayans and the (local also) central State, as discussed below.

First, Farc Putumayo both have internal disagreements, and disagreements with the central faction of the party (Interview Pastor, 03.10.2019; Carmen, 01.10.2019 & Eduardo, 02.10.2019). Pastor and Carmen both stated that the politically active members of Farc Putumayo fail to include the rest of the group that are not as ideologically convinced and politically active as the 30-40 people in la Carmelita who actually participate in the political reunions and meetings.

Eduardo on the other hand, stated that "if people are not interested in working together as one big commune (*comuna*) they should find something else to do" (Interview, 02.10.2019). Carmen further criticized the development of Farc post-agreement and said that the leaders, who have imprinted in the guerrilleros for years, that they are family, sisters and brothers, turned into "the exact same people as they have accused all other politicians of being" (Interview, Carmen 01.10.2019). While Pastor (Farc security guard and chauffeur), reflecting on the internal relations in Farc Putumayo, posited that:

> *"I don't even know what the leader does in all his meetings, I just drive him and am supposed to protect him, but I never get to know what he does. I just have this job because it gives me a guaranteed stabile income; I don't even live here anymore"* (Interview Pastor, 03.10.2019).

Furthermore, accusations of abandonment by both the Colombian State and internally within Farc towards the Farc leadership in Bogotá is also repeated: The last time anyone from the national faction of Farc was in la Carmelita was more than a year before Matias, a political organizer and infamous ex-commander (2018) came to visit while I was present. Matias tries to organize the local factions of Farc and told me "it was very challenging". Still he suggested

that “if Farc as a party does not manage to root itself as a political alternative past the guarantees of the agreement, we will have to join another party” (Interview Matias, 18.10.2019). He refers to Farc being guaranteed ten seats in congress and senate until 2024 despite the miniscule number of votes obtained. Nationally, Farc manages to maintain an intermediate participation in politics. This is an effort to include the historically excluded left in Colombia and avoid a return to arms (CPA, 2016). In Putumayo, a supposed prioritized zone, Farc’s participation in institutional spaces is at best shallow and practically non-existent.

Farc violently suppressed Putumayans for years while in active combat. These historical traumas still affect the relationships between Farc in reincorporation (because of FARC victimizing the population) and the general Putumayan population to this day (Interviews Farc, 2019, Interviews General Population, 2019). I argue therefor that the different scales of relationships between Putumayans, herein both Farc and the general population, and both local- and central State, are highly fragile. Ambivalent relations between central- and local State also demonstrates great distance between the peripheral Putumayo and the power center of the Nation (Field notes, 2019; Interviews general population, 2019; Interviews Farc, 2019).

Since the majority of these groupings lack trust both within groups and across groups, the strategy of most of my informants has been to become less political, avoid relations with unknown groupings and instead of a community-based lifestyle, they abide to a more individual-based approach. The latter aspect clearly resonates with a neoliberal ideology rather than the progressive ideology assumed to abide to the ex-combatants and many of my informants. On the one hand, Farc Putumayo promotes a discourse of communal solidarity where all Others are happily interacting in equal power relations free of discrimination and invincible to any structural factors. During my conversations with the people in reintegration, it became clear to me that this is a utopian illusion: the majority of Farc do not abide to or live by principles of deep participation nor are they truly radical in their actions. The reason for doing so is unclear, but it nonetheless is an observation I was told about and experienced (Interviews Farc 2019 & Field notes, 30.09-03.10.2019).

Fatima and Nancy were highly vocal regarding the relations they have with groups of Others. Nancy kept repeating that she was so “fed up of people victimizing us” (Putumayans, and particularly women) and stated, “the only solution was to hunt down and kill the new armed

actors" (Interview, 25.10.2019). She reiterated that this of course was not really a realistic option, she is against violence and also, as history has shown, these violent armed groups survive even the most violent attacks; "it's like a cancer" (Interview Fatima and Nancy, 25.10.2019).

6.4 Participation depth in local politics

Democratic participation in formal political spaces of participation (institutional spaces) in Putumayo, is found between intermediate- and shallow depths of participation. The Colombian Peace Agreement include *participatory* bottom up democratization as both explicit *focus,* and goal as the agreement seeks to create a 'democratic opening' *(Apertura democratica*). Based on the data material collected for this thesis, I argue that the Colombian state does not manage to produce a democratic opening in Putumayo.

As illustrated by figure 6.4, the participatory measures designed to uphold the political rights of Putumayans do not manage to reach the goal of deep participation. I qualify the *scope* of participation in the local politics in Putumayo as *inclusive* towards the general population, but *exclusive* towards Farc. This is because there is no transfer of decision-making power, neither the general population nor Farc can safely vote for whomever they want, nor participate without risking their safety or social wellbeing (ref. money for voting, nepotism etc). The participation in local politics does not qualify as *deep* in my framework. The participation *form* in Putumayo is found within the realm of voice. Following then, it does not entail a power shift where participants can decide *what- when* and *how* their political guarantees should be uphold. I argue that there is no *deep* transfer of power to any of the stakeholder groups and that their participation depth thus places them within intermediate- and shallow participation.

Figure 6.3

Participation depth in *institutional spaces of local politics* according to stakeholders

		SCOPE	
		INCLUSIVE	***EXCLUSIVE***
FORMS	***VOICE***	**General Population** *Intermediate Participation*	**Farc** *Shallow Participation*
	DECISION-MAKING POWER	*Deep Participation*	*Intermediate Participation*

The challenges related to bridging the relations between the Putumayan people are meant to be addressed by the institutional spaces that the CPA has established to guarantee a 'democratic opening' *(Apertura democratica),* as is stipulated in the second agenda item regarding politics. Yet there is much anger in Putumayo, and I could feel the anger myself both when in Putumayo and even now while I am at home. Writing about such horrors is a surreal and exhausting experience, even if my life and destiny is extremely distant to the informants, my body still reacts to these experiences in the strangest ways. I can cry and scream, rage and go numb. I hated my project for months and became quite depressed as I constantly struggled to process these experiences. The physical and class related distance between us (my privilege) does not seem to physically and emotionally distance my experiences from the struggles happening to my friends in Putumayo. A Somali-saying has been repeated during these last weeks of protests for Black lives matter. The phrase brilliantly captures my own feelings towards the Colombian

peace process; when met with injustice the Somalis' ask, *"does your blood not move"?* When thinking about Putumayo, my blood boils.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the identified measures considered to be of importance to Putumayo's peace process through local, formal politics. Through a thematic analysis, I identified three causal factors that restrain implementation of political rights and guarantees as stipulated by the CPA chapter two, according to the different stakeholders. I have demonstrated that even if general population participate in the institutional spaces, they are not experiencing deep transfer of decision-making power. When the form of participation is not inclusive, the group participates intermediately instead of deeply. Farc on the other hand, is highly restrained from participating at all, despite all the promises of equal grounds for participation presented in agenda item two of the CPA. This stakeholder group participates in a shallow manner in local formal political spaces. The lack of deep participation for both groups of Others, which I have argued the CPA guarantees by law, is highly worrisome and hinders the overall journey towards a peaceful Putumayo.

The measures explored in chapters five and six took as point of departure that local social development will happen through implementing the TDPs, while local democratization will happen through guaranteeing all groups of Others participation in formal politics such as local elections and –politics. Both groups considered Others have been found in the same participation depth. General population was placed in the inclusive scope in figure five and six, but decision-making form makes the participation intermediate. Farc remained in the exclusive scope in both figures, and did not obtain deep voice and decision-making power. Both groups of Others thus remain outside deep participation realms in TDPs and local politics in Putumayo.

The two measures explored in chapter five and six took as point of departure that local social development will happen through implementing the TDPs, while local democratization will happen through guaranteeing all groups of Others participation in formal politics such as local elections and –politics. I have argued that participation depth in both the *TDPs* and *Local, formal politics* affect the ability to *learn* from incompatible goals and conflicts in order to facilitate the development of *Territorial peace* in Putumayo. I discuss this in the following, and final substantial chapter.

7. An educational journey towards territorial peace

> ***"We have watered the fields and cities of our territories with the blood of our compatriots.*** *And that it is not the best way to resolve differences. There are other civilized ways to resolve differences. Right? Like, how many [civilized ways] are there really? Like the ones that we defend, the rights of our people (nuestro pueblo). Right? The right to have alimentation, an education, a decent home. But to have a decent, quality education. Not the education they always give us in schools. That's like, it's only to be useful, right. To become what they say. Hmm, how can I explain this? It's, it's an education to make us become servants. Puppets. But an education that allows us to realize our own future, our own life, right, from our own point of view [is what we need]. Because it is from the point of view related to education we say that we need* ***an education for peace****."* (Interview Eduardo, 02.10.2019)

In this final substantial chapter, I aim to answer the third and fourth research question. Given the narrative analysis, the structure in this chapter differs from the previous substantial chapters. One of my research goals in this thesis is to 'give voice' to traditionally marginalized or suppressed 'Others'. In doing so I have opted for a narrative analysis when answering the final research questions:

- *How do the stakeholders interpret current implementation and what strategies do they apply to overcome limitations?*
- *What does the implementation process and its limitations tell us about territorial peace?*

I argue that investigating how Putumayans interpret the implementation of the CPA and explore the strategies they use in their own search for peace, enables an answer to the final,

meta-question regarding what *participatory* and *educational* peacebuilding tools can tell us about *territorial peace* in Putumayo. Narrative analysis posits that the less powerful commonly challenge hegemonic Meta narratives (Loseke 2007). For this reason, the informants are divided into general groups of narrators who are considered more- and less powerful, referred to as Elites and Others. I have opted for this structure because I interpret that the two groups' approaches to the agreement, as the guiding tool to build territorial peace, are close to opposites.

Below I will discuss how the narratives of Putumayo's groups of Others inform this thesis' understanding of *territorial peace.* I have found that Putumayans especially create territorial peace *outside* the realm of institutional spaces, while simultaneously demanding deep participation in the formal institutional spaces as the CPA guarantees. The spaces they create to build peace are in this chapter referred to as *communal spaces* of participation; they are informal and developed by and through strengthening their own local relations. I argue that the territorial peace in Putumayo primarily is built in the *communal spaces*. I aim to demonstrate this by assessing the strategies applied to overcome issues of 1) lack of social development, 2) coca-farming and –production, and 3) weak local politics and democracy. The factors are relational, in solidarity (intersectional solidarity), radical, critical, democratic, embodied, educational and in harmony with nature's limitations. Again, my findings challenge the State's claim that the peace process in Colombia is steadily moving forward, and that the State, according to President Ivan Duque is making 'great progress' during his first year as president (Duque 18.08.2019). This chapter aims to demonstrate that his claim is not valid in Putumayo.

7.1 Groups of Others and Elites

I have interpreted my informants' narratives as pertinent to one of two sample groups. The less powerful *'Others'* are the Putumayans who challenge the Meta narratives. Those of my informants I consider members of this group are the general population, victims, civil society, and political opposition including Farc. The more powerful, including the central State as the hegemonic power, are considered Elites. I interpret this group to maintain the Meta narratives and place the narratives of Political, Economic and Armed *Elites* in this group. I conducted the narrative analysis in this way because I consider the two last research questions to entail an

explicit focus on power and I argue that Other's in general express *pro-peace* attitudes while *Elites* in general express attitudes that *challenge* the peace process.

I chose these groupings based on my dataset, they considered a somewhat biased sample as their expressions closely relate to my own beliefs. Even so, I argue that by using a variety of secondary sources to expand my understanding, I nonetheless can support my claims both empirically and theoretically.

The structure of the chapter is as follows; I introduce the three narratives identified by conducting a narrative analysis of the informant group Others: *elite agreement, reconciliation* and *software updates required*. I argue that the narratives found in this group are mostly *pro-peace* and that these Putumayans strongly challenge the Meta narratives of the State. Further, I specify what strategies I have found them to apply in order to *educate* themselves and their nucleuses about peaceful social interaction. I discuss how the *peace framework* which combines the participatory approach of deep to shallow with this thesis approach to peace, can enable an understanding of how the strategies applied enable Putumayans' critical peace education both inside *and* outside the scope of the peace agreement.

In the theory chapter, I argued that I consider *deep participation* and *peaceful critical education* to facilitate the journey towards territorial peace in Putumayo. I end the chapter by connecting all my findings with the combined *territorial peace framework.* The framework takes as departure that *participation* depth affects the ability to *learn* from conflicts through *peaceful* and *differential* interactions between Others' *and* Elites. I argue that the main tool to facilitate a peaceful educational journey towards *territorial peace* in Putumayo is the combination of *deep participation* and *critical peace education*. Below I discuss the Putumayan Others' search for territorial peace in Putumayo.

7.1.1 Elite agreement

The first concept the narrative analysis challenged was the claim that the CPA, as implemented in Putumayo, is an agreement for the most vulnerable people. I have argued that the testimonies from my informants contradicts this claim and that they remain unsatisfied and very critical to the State's role as a peacebuilder in chapter five and six. The state continuously present their peacebuilding effort as inclusive and empowering, but none of those considered Others in Putumayo are able to deeply participate in neither of the formal institutional spaces that the TDPs and the political rights guarantees them per the CPA's items one, two and four (Rural reform, political participation, the coca issue). As such, I argue that the State elite' fails to honour the participation depth the CPA set out to guarantee and does not facilitate territorial peacebuilding in Putumayo.

7.1.2 Reconciliation

The CPA further depicts that the agreement will facilitate reconciliation, but the Others' narrative challenges that the State manages to do so. Instead, the elites frame a narrative of vengeance and punishment through the militarization and neoliberal approach to peacebuilding in Putumayo. Again, the CD far-right government of President Duque and his accomplice ex-president and senator Uribe frames the locals as being *narcoterroristas* and argues the solution is to approach the CPA in a more militarized and neoliberal manner through the *Centro Democratico*'s (President's political party) political platform of *Paz con legalidad* – Peace within legality. The doctrine is highly militant. Moreover, the scandals that surround the current government clearly demonstrates that the current government is only willing to 'build peace' on their own, violent terms. I have demonstrated the CD-government does not abide to the holistic and progressive measures embedded in the TDPs nor the political rights. As such, I argue that they fail to enable the deep participation needed and instead produce even more violence in an already violent context.

7.1.3 Software updates required

Putumayo is struggling to overcome the three issues, which were identified as hampering their search for territorial peace. A solution pointed to by those considered Others is that *their chip needs to be updated*. By chip, my informants speak of the *formation* that Colombians

uncritically have been coerced into accepting during more than fifty years of conflicts. Their traumas have affected the communal and central-periphery relations, but I argue that the relation it most successfully has tampered with in Putumayo is the relations between Others and elites. I have posited in the previous chapters that the Colombian conflicts are both class-based and spatially different. I argued in chapter two that his has created hierarchical dualisms that are latent with unequal power between center and *periphery*, white and *colored*, rich and *poor*, urban and *rural*, men and *women* among others. In order to minimize the historical inequality, the CPA presents a holistic framework to enable differential and preferential treatment of all those to *the right* in these unequal relations through what I have argued is deep participation. The elites view the Colombian realties differently and claim that the chip is as good as it gets and that the only ones needing a software update are the exact same Others that they pretend to rule *on behalf of*.

What strategies then, do the Others use in order to minimize the issues identified (Issues 1, 2, and 3 in Putumayo), which the CPA seeks to guarantee (CPA Agenda items 1, 2 and 4: TDPs and local politics), and how does this resonate with the territorial approach to peace?

The informants all agree: they need a tool that can facilitate the bridging between all relational scales. I argue that the tool that can facilitate this and educational approach to the CPA. I claim that the participatory, differential and preferential measures of the Colombian peace agreement have the *intention* to create peaceful spaces of participation where the stakeholders can educate each other and themselves. I have found that my informants are to a high degree already doing this by themselves through applying a diverse range of strategies in their own communal spaces. Still, they cannot build territorial peace alone. I argue that the institutional and communal spaces in Putumayo can merge into one *peaceful space* through deep participation, if the intentional participation principles of the CPA transform into real, prioritized action. I argue the State can learn how to create a more peaceful space for participation in Putumayo from my informants. Below I will discuss how my Putumayan informants' approach territorial peace in their local *communal* spaces. I highlight the third *feria communal* – a community fair arranged by the women's organization Tejedoras de Vida (from here on referred to as feria) and the first *foro ciudadania* – a public debate arranged by local NGOs COCA and Acción contra el Hambre (from here on forum) with an active public for the governor candidates in

Putumayo. The *institutional* alternative *mesas de victimas* (victims' roundtables, from here on mesas), a political organ for victim participation is seen in relation to the two abovementioned events. I argue that the *institutional space* fails to apply the CPA's own principles of deep participation, despite efforts to ensure the principles are upheld. I do this in order to demonstrate that Putumayans are building territorial peace with or without the support from their simulating government.

7.2 Educational journeys in local communal spaces

The primary strategy of my informants is to engage in peaceful educational journeys through creating communal spaces of participation. The communal spaces are developed on the basis of mostly already existing relations in the local communities. The nucleuses are based on *geographical factors* such as neighborhoods and territorial sense of belonging, *relational factors* such as family and friendship, *political or ideological* convictions such as human rights and feminism, *spiritual or moral* convictions such as indigenous heritage or religious faith, or *conflict experiences* such as victimizing and/or conflicting events. The majority of nucleuses have connections to local grassroots organizations which take a role as participation facilitators in the communal spaces.

7.2.1 Mesas

Mesas (tables) are the registered victims of the conflict's political organ. The mesas are institutional structures that guarantees uphold the victims' rights. Each scale of government has a mesa, meaning there are municipal- departmental and national mesas. There are 14 categories for victimization in Colombia including victims of displacement, homicide, disappearances, antipersonnel mines, kidnappings and forced recruitment. Furthermore, differential approaches (minority groups such as LGBTQ, women adolescents, indigenous) is supposed to guarantee representation from all of them. The RUV, unique victim's registry, demonstrates how many *registered* victims a municipality or department have. If a mesa does not have registered victims in all of the categories, victims who have suffered more than one victimizing event may represent two or more.

The Santos government, which negotiated the CPA, created the mesas as part of the victims' law, five years prior to the agreement (law 1448 2011). Each representative is elected for two years, starting with the municipal mesas, then departmental and finally the national mesa. The victim's unit and the Ombudsman are responsible for facilitating the mesas; furthermore, they have observational status and organize the elections. The Colombian State funds the mesas (Interview Maria, 23.10. 2019).

By participating in the mesas, the victims are entitled to apply for courses, capacitation, studies, projects, exchange programs and all mesa-related expenses are covered. On behalf of their respective victim-groups' the representatives can apply for projects aimed at improving victim participation throughout Colombian society (Interview Maria 23.10.2019).

I have argued that the CPA is an advancement of the victims' law; therefore, the mesas are an institutional space, which in Putumayo is the formal participation mechanism meant to represent more than 130.000 people (RUV, 13.06.2020). Furthermore, I consider the mesas to be an alternative institutional space for the group of Others that the CPA claim is at the centre of the agreement. The CPA meant to prioritize the victims through the CITREPs, the special jurisdiction for 16-victim representatives with guaranteed congressional participation for eight years (2016-2024). This is the same agreement Farc negotiated to guarantee their own participation in formal politics and institutional spaces (CPA, 2016). The congress has debated the CITREP several times, but to this day, it remains voted down (Interview Leonore 12.10.2019). The mesas in Putumayo held elections throughout the fall of 2019 and have been in place since late 2013. Last year they elected their fourth round of representatives (Interview Maria, 23.10.2019).

According to Leidy and Leonore, respectively victim representatives in the municipal mesa of Puerto Guzman and the departmental mesa of Putumayo stated that prominent social leaders presenting the mesas, especially men, refused to let other victims participate and frequently couped the mesas for their own benefit. Maria, who stated that the idea is good, but in reality, it does not really work, confirmed this accusation (Interview, 23.10.2019). Furthermore, the victim representatives in the mesas do not apply truly deep participatory measures; many victims in the mesas are mostly concerned with working on behalf of their own nucleus, making solidarity between the representatives difficult to achieve. In this institutional space, all

members are considered Others. They each represent a victimizing characteristic such as victim of mines, incapacitation, sexual minority, displaced or homicide. Bridging their needs through actively listening to supposed equal marginalized voices is not an easy task. Their needs diverge, according to both victimizing event and other factors. While Leonore posited that the municipal mesa she was formerly a member of did make some progress, Leidy disagreed and said that the most powerful victims (referring to a woman in their community) always won projects, courses and the capacitation offered through membership in the mesas.

They both expressed concern about the function of the institutional spaces but proclaimed that it was nevertheless important to participate in *all* types of forums for participation. Colombia's victims have singlehandedly fought for every right they are guaranteed, both the victim's law and the CPA. They managed to include the CITREPS in the agreement, but elitist politicians in Bogot keep denying them a seat at the most powerful mesa in the country: the Colombian lawmakers in the congress. The mesas attempt to capacitate and empower Putumayo's victims; I argue they fail to do so because they do not adhere to principles of deep participation.

7.2.2 Foro ciudadania

On the 4th of October, two local NGOs arranged an open forum with four of five governor candidates in Putumayo. Neutrality principles guided the forum and the public was not allowed to express any political or ideological support to any one candidate during the debate and the final round of questions. The forum was at the *coliseo*, an open sports arena belonging to the only Putumayan College, which was next to my house in Mocoa. The candidates were challenged on their views and political plans regarding five issues in Putumayo: Health, Education, Environment, Income and the Peace process. It was meant to be a neutral space for debate, but the principles were not easy to follow. The arrangers told me after the event that this was a new type of forum in Putumayo; arranging debates with guiding principles of neutrality had never been tried (Field notes, 04.10.2019). It was strange for the population to not be allowed to express any support, but as COCA and Accion workers told me; "we need to change the way we do politics" (Interview, 04.10.2019).

The arrangers threatened to cancel because two of the candidates' supporters did not respect the rules of not showing support. Many supporters, who I sat next to and spoke with, also sent text messages to their candidates. Coral, the perhaps most questioned candidate, was not there.

Many students came to listen, ask questions and participate; they all wanted to talk to Andres Cancimance, the second runner up. Two young students sat next to me, they were 18 years old and this was their first-time voting.

The audience could ask questions, but not about the accusations that had been made the week before regarding the questionable candidates in Putumayo, where four of the five candidates for governorship were considered among the worst candidates in the country. The girls I sat with both had questions, but was not sure which question to pick, nor how to ask them. They told me a bit about the different questions they had, and in the end, one of the girls submitted her question. So did I. Neither of our questions were answered, but eight different questions were directed to each candidate as the final section of the event.

The forum was transmitted live on radio and on the Facebook pages of the arrangers. The arrangers stated that the most appropriate form of communication in Putumayo is the rural radio. The radio is the only type of communication that is able to reach everyone, as there is a grave lack of electricity coverage in the department. One radio listener who was unable to participate, called inn to the radio station to ask questions and the arrangers decided to prioritize the caller who was not able to physically be there. Her question was about PNIS and how the candidates, if elected, would help farmers finally get titles to their lands and thus avoid forced eradication of their crops (Field notes, 04.10.2019).

The arrangers tried to facilitate a neutral and more inclusive space for participation, they are bordering on deep participation but I argue that by not including more questions, nor challenging the candidates more specifically on the ex-combatants in ETCR la Carmelita (whose future is unknown), excludes an important stakeholder and thus forces the forum to maintain in an intermediate depth. Even so, the public forum is a positive and required addition, which I argue contributes to a merging of institutional and communal spaces as I have stated would benefit Putumayans search for territorial peace.

7.2.3 Feria artesanal

The third communal feria arranged by the women CSO Tejedoras de Vida, is a different type of communal space, which I argue is largely applying principles of deep participation. By

adhering to these principles, I have argued that this communal space can contribute to bridge groups of Others, and perhaps minimize distance between Others and Elites. The *'Feria artesanal y empresarial de las Mujeres Constructoras de Paz - Por la Diversidad de las Mujeres'* was arranged in Mocoa on the 12th of October 2019. Women from all the thirteen municipalities of Putumayo were present. There were families, children, women, men, indigenous, youth groups, elderly, victims of the natural disaster in Mocoa, sexual minorities, vicitms of the conflict, an ex-combatant, members of the mesas, students, foreigners, professionals, police, politicians, civil servants and more. It was a peaceful space where all Putumayans were welcomed to join the peaceful party in solidarity with all (Field notes, 12.10.2019). There was a band, we had games, there was a fashion show where twenty people, in different shapes, sizes, backgrounds, and forms showed the clothes and jewelry the women were selling. Children ran around, they screamed and played, food was cooked and food was served, artisanal products by women from all over Putumayo were presenting their products and talking about their journeys; how they are learning to be in peace, to trust, to educate their children, to take care of their territory, and make their territory work to their benefit. We heard a band play, we danced, we drank, we sang, and we ate. The experience created a wonderful feeling of community, but it was also a challenging and emotional event where stories and destinies were shared.

This communal space was open, it was honest, it was friendly, and it was warm. It had explicit focus on the Others but welcomed the elites to partake and get to know those considered Others. Through facilitating an event, the Tejedoras enabled a briding of spaces and managed, through deep participation, to initiate the growth of a Putumayan peaceful space. As two of the leaders of Tejedoras, Fatima Muriel and Nancy Sanchez, told me:

> *Having been able to transfer women from the private to the public, who now have the security to speak, that has been noted as a big change*
>
> *Before you did not see this, they did not want anything, but now they speak, open up spaces, participate, they are critical and argumentative and purposeful.*
>
> *They are listened to, because there is respect for the organization.*

The peace agreement we felt was an answer, we did exercises on the points of agreement [to teach them the contents]. Those two years [2016-2018] felt great because we saw the changes.

Look, we could go out, there were no retentions; we could travel at night and on the roads. There was more freedom to participate, in meetings and to go out.

But right now, on this date, you start to see problems again, but it is because of the incidents [the armed groups], the dissidents, the dissent that again is taking the territory where the FARC was. They [armed groups] returned again for the coca, then they knock down trees and kick out peasants, that is the problem of drug trafficking, right? That there are problems because of coca (Interview Nancy and Fatima, 25.10.2019).

I asked Nancy and Fatima, "Where do you get the strength to go on"? It was easy for them to answer my question:

From the women, from their great resilience. Those who are worse and worse and still have the ability to continue. And they have that resilience and they say: look, let's do this thing today. And I say, 'my God, where do these women get that strength?', if what I have, is everything I need, not as millionaires but, if you have a place to sleep, you have a place to get to, and those poor people, well.. Everywhere around them: coca, coca, coca!

But to see them, with that inspirational emotion, that they invite us, they want us to come do our seminars. And after all, they have killed their husband, their daughter, or they are missing. And they still have the strength to go to meetings and workshops. I would never be able to come again. But hey, they are what encourage us to continue.

Resilience is very prominent here. In other places, if someone loses their job, they commit suicide or go crazy. Here there are not such problems; if there is no work - I invent another one, or I look for work somewhere else, I sell empanadas. Here they are

not going to die, here it is either that the people [armed groups] kill you or that they make you disappear. But, here you value life a lot, you value it too much, because life has cost us a lot. It has cost us a lot to survive in this Amazon, and then we have to fight to keep it (Interview Nancy and Fatima, 25.10.2019)

7.2.4 Peace for all?

Megoran (2014) states that peace for one group of people may not be good news for another. In this chapter, I argue that the elites can live in peace while the Others cannot. How can we accept peace for some with reinforcement of violence for others, as peace? I have argued in chapter two, that peace is more than merely coexisting, structural transformations are needed for peace to translate into realities on the ground because simulated peaceful coexistence can reflect a less than violent situation rather than sustainable peace (Courtheyn, 2018, p.746). The uneven power structures that affect the relations between people create incompatibilites and reneved conflicts. In order to spiral out of conflicts I posit that deep participation is needed. I argue that the Putumayans I met at the feria managed to engage in peaceful conversations, learn from each other and support their search for peace in solidarity across nucleuses of Others and in line with nature's limits.

Figure 7.1

Others' participation depth in Putumayan spaces of participation

		SCOPE	
		INCLUSIVE	***EXCLUSIVE***
FORMS	***VOICE***	***Foro Ciudadania*** *Intermediate Participation*	*Shallow Participation*
	DECISION-MAKING POWER	***Feria communal*** *Deep Participation*	***Mesas*** *Intermediate Participation*

In the communal spaces of Putumayo, I found localized forms of peace challenging the dominant 'liberal peace' doctrine that Duque's government keep promoting as successful. Territorial peace is supposed to be an alternative approach, that breaks with the duality of the elite over Others, the individual over community and human over nature. The Colombian government attempts to create formal institutional spaces of participation, in order for peace to be built in the territories and hence make amends to its war-struck peripheral regions. The current government challenges their own legal framework that it has promised to apply in order to support its historically marginalized people (CPA 2016).

The elitist attitude of the Centro Democratico leadership is shameless and violent; ex-president Alvaro Uribe, arguably the most powerful politician in Colombia and a leader of the current CD-government, repeatedly insist that *there never was an armed conflict in Colombia* (Velasquez, 10.10.2019). Even military commanders, considered elites themselves, criticize

the government's lack of territorial understanding and agrees with my informants that 'from their offices in Bogotá they can claim whatever they want, but here we are at war' (Interview Others, 2019, Field notes, 30.09.2019). Senator Uribe's latest war hissing was published mid-June 2020; he argues that the only solution to 'rescue Colombia' is to "bombard the terrorists, day and night, without stopping" (Uribe 17.06.2020). He continues suggesting that the most "effective method" to end the 'terrorism' is by fumigating areas such as Putumayo with illegal glyphosate aerial spraying of coca-farmers and indigenous communities crops, which he argues is "the principal funder of terrorism" in the country (Ibid).

The central government has placed the responsibility for executing and implementing their elite agreement on the local government. 'Peripheral' institutions' lack of professionals make the enormous and complex framework of the CPA impossible to complete. The government is obligated by its own constitution and political platform, to respect what I argue is an implicit educational journey guaranteed by the peace agreement. The CPA promotes positive, territorial peace, and admits the state does- and has made mistakes. However, until August 2022, Putumayans must accept war hissing State-elites who refuses to follow the pedagogy stipulated by the agreement. By refusing to adhere to their own intentional principles, I argue they are unable to 'educate' the peripheral region of Putumayo on how to build territorial peace.

Furthermore, the departmental government, responsible for ensuring the implementation of the CPA measures in Putumayan territories, is continuously portrayed as Putumayo's very own constitutionally protected political mafia. They are claimed to be corrupt and nepotistic leaders without any real interest besides ensuring their own elitist educational journey. Elite journeys that play by the historical suppressive rules of participation in Colombia, will eventually allow local elites a seat at the central government's powerful table. Any involvement in illegal economies and corrupt practices demonstrate the elites' complete disregard of the very own habitants that supposedly voted freely for them.

These accusations are not polemic in Putumayo, they are known assumptions, based on years of experience. I am not able to verify if this true. What I can argue, is that this is my informants' realities and testimonies. The government representatives are the people meant to help my informants in their search for territorial peace. How are they able to have faith in this system? How can the State claim to be able to 'educate and guide' their own inhabitants in the pedagogy embedded in the peace agreement, when they act like criminals themselves?

My informants create and develop peaceful spaces on a micro level in their own nucleuses. The nucleuses found are communal, familiar, friendly, political, ideological and gendered. Intersectional solidarity *across* nucleuses is still the greatest challenges in a traumatized but fierce peripheral region. When the central state does not want nor manages to help the inhabitants through abiding to its 'own' guiding principles of the CPA (2016) peace will continue to be created by progressive Putumayans *outside* the realm of the peace agreement. They solve their conflicts by communicating and

As of now, I consider each nucleus is pursuing their own educational journey for peace. Challenges arise when an un-trustworthy State seek to facilitate reconciliation across these nucleuses, without including or empowering the Putumayans to create and run these spaces themselves through what I argue is close to principles of deep participation. My informants are tired of being called both narcos, savages and victims, but they are forced into conflicts because too many people do not have any real options. They will always keep working towards- and searching for peace, but they cannot continue the search for peace *alone*.

7.3 Territorial peace

Given the nature of this assignment, it is imperative to reflect on 'what we talk about when we talk about peace'. The 'search for peace' is an essential component of this assignment; it is the background, the driver and the goal. Looking for and looking into peace as both a concept and a process is what I set out to do, in some way or another. Trying to find out *what* peace is and *how* to conceptualize it is highly challenging. I argued in chapter two that I conceptualize peace through geographical approaches and include a critical peace pedagogy view in order to explore what this form of peace can be.

I stated that I view my informants as active agents of peace, through demonstrating their main strategy, building communal spaces for participation, I argue that they are constructing territorial peace on their own terms. At the feria, Putumayan Others came together across their nucleuses and interacted in a peaceful and critical space. They could *voice* their concerns as

included members and were able to actively *decide* what part of their stories they wanted to share through their stands. They adhered to deep participation within said space and I argue that the Tejedoras facilitated this meeting in an apporpriate manner that can inspire territorial peacebuilding. Per my framework, it is essential that all members of society are included, but that the Others have precedence. During the feria, the elites, who I consider myself to be a member of, were observers in the Others space; we learned from them and got to know them through interacting alongside them, and were able to listen to what they had to say and resolve any misunderstandings through peacefully and critically being together in solidarity.

7.4 What does territorial peace look like in Putumayo?

I have argued that intermediate and shallow modes of participation do not meet the participatory guarantees of the CPA and hence does not manage to facilitate building territorial peace in formal institutional spaces. Intermediate and shallow participatory measures are restricted to liberal and hybrid forms of peace, in addition they are highly neoliberal and Eurocentric. Liberal and hybrid forms of peace are rejected by the Putumayans informing this thesis; they are not good enough and does not aid their search for peace in a peripheral, plural and neglected Colombian territory. The CPA's own approach, the *territorial* approach to peace, is a text stipulating a roadmap regarding how Putumayans are supposed to build their territorial peace *with* the necessary and guaranteed help the Colombian government simulates that they are providing.

Throughout this thesis, I have aimed to demonstrate that the State fails to help Putumayans in their search for peace; still the local communities create their own peaceful paths through attempting to *deeply participate* in their own communal spaces and *educate* and *learn* both with and from each other, within these spaces. They do this in order to learn how to solve conflicts and incompatibilities without resorting to violence. I argue that territorial peace in Putumayo is found through communal groups' interactions and suggest that this is where territorial peacebuilding should be focused.

In chapter two I stated that territorial peace in its ideal form is relational, in solidarity (intersectional solidarity), radical, critical, democratic, embodied, educational and in harmony with nature's limitations. In the end, I argue territorial peace in its essence, is also about freedom and liberation for the people and nature that live in the territories. As Fatima and Nancy stated: they have fought so hard to survive in the Amazon, and they will not give up until they are free.

> *"Colombians! My last wish is for the happiness of the patria. If my death contributes to the end of partisanship and the consolidation of the union, I shall be lowered in peace into my grave"* (Simon Bolivar, in Rourke, 1939, p.357)

Gran Colombia's liberator Simon Bolivar shouted these words to the Colombian people in his final speech to his compatriots on the 8th of December 1830.

Bolivar would not lay peacefully in his grave, if he knew how far from his ideals Putumayans are, nearly two hundred years after his death. Bolivar removed the violent and excluding colonial elite but paved the way for a continuance of another group of still violent elites. I know many of my Colombian friends will disagree with me regarding the role Bolivar played in facilitating elite groups' continued oppression, perhaps my stature is mistaken, and Bolivar is not to blame. Nonetheless, he freed Colombians from one oppressor but necessarily did not manage to ensure freedom for all. The Colombian liberation project is fractured. The majority is still not free. Despite the Colombian elites' continuous violent rejection of the CPA, I argue it nonetheless is a guide for a peaceful social revolution in one of the most unequal countries in the world (BBC, 02.08.2018). If Putumayo manages to continue their search for territorial peace *without* risking and losing so many lives doing so, their future, and that of Colombia looks bright and peaceful. At least I know my informants will never give up. This brings hope.

7.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have answered the third and fourth research question by use of a narrative analysis . I have shown that Putumayans build peace by actively engaging in institutional and communal spaces of participation. Still the Colombian government does not enable the peacebuilding process in Putumayo; the main peacebuilding is found in the informal communal spaces that Putumayans create themselves. The narratives demonstrated a need to deepen participation and radically abide to principles of intersectional solidarity across groups of Others. Still, Putumayans cannot build peace by themselves, therefore I argued that the Colombian state must honor the legally binding CPA (2016) in order to bridge the relations between elites and Others. I suggested that a tool that can facilitate this bridging is to create relations in peaceful spaces where the participatory, differential and preferential intentions of the agreement are respected and implemented. This I argued can facilitate critical educational exchanges between groups of Others, and between Others and elites.

La Paz territorial está en la relación del pueblo y la tierra del territorio Putumayense.
Territorial peace is found in the relation between people and the land, nature in the Putumayan territory.

8. Conclusions

In this paper I have sought to answer the problem statement *"How can the concept of territorial peace be understood by exploring the implementation process of the Colombian peace agreement in Putumayo?*

I approached the concept based on the geographies of peace and included a view from critical pedagogy in order to highlight the implicit pedagogy I have argued is latent in the agreement.

In its ideal form I presented territorial peace as relational, in solidarity (intersectional solidarity), radical, critical, democratic, embodied, educational and in harmony with nature's limitations. In the end, I argued territorial peace is about freedom and liberation for the people and nature that live in the territories. Through my case study I have found that the territorial approach to peace seeks to highlight and honor the relations between people and nature in the Putumayan territory. I stated that the text in the agreement can contribute to reaching such a utopian goal but have criticized the State for not abiding to their own legal principles as stipulated in the agreement. Nevertheless, I believe I aimed to demonstrate that territorial peace is both found and under construction in Putumayo, with or without any help from the central State.

Many of the measures in the agreement are advancing, but when the current government continues to impose their own neoliberal and militant interpretations of the agreement on the Putumayan people, it warrants great cause for concern.

The CPA measures I identified as important in the Putumayan context were the agenda items one, two and four. These items seek to aid the Putumayans attempt to overcome issues related to 1) lack of social development, 2) coca farming and -production, and 3) weak local democratic practices. I argued that particularly three policy-programs and initiatives, PDET, PNIS and political rights guaranteed, which are derived from their respective agenda items, were appropriate tools to help Putumayo move forward in their search for territorial peace., the first two in terms of development, the last one through local politics. Yet I found that, at its current level of implementation, the programs fail to succeed.

Furthermore, I identified seven factors that I claim directly hamper the programs ability to help. The first four factors, related to development (chapter five), were professionalism in civil service, security issues because of continued conflicts, public funding and alternative income opportunities. I stated that the PDET and PNIS, as combined in territorial development plans, seek to offer solutions related to the first and second issue in Putumayo, but that they do not manage to do so because they do not adhere to deep participation in the institutional spaces where planning-, development, and implementation occurs.

The second issue related to institutional spaces of participation within the realm of formal politics also fails to adhere deep principles of participation (chapter six). The political guarantees and reforms that the CPA (2016) suggested have not been implemented to such a degree that this second agenda-item can be said to contribute to deepen (or open) the democracy in Putumayo. The factors found to affect the implementation of item two, 'Political participation and democracy' were resources, political exclusion and center-periphery distance. I argued that the factors hamper Putumayans' abilities for participating peacefully and safely in local institutional spaces for politics.

In the seventh chapter I discussed what strategies my informants apply in order to contribute to build peace on their own terms. I found that the most important strategy they use is to build their own communal spaces for participation which are based on relational notions found in the territorial peace approach. The nucleuses I identified were based on *geographical factors* such as neighborhoods and territorial sense of belonging, *relational factors* such as family and friendship, *political or ideological* convictions such as human rights and feminism, *spiritual or moral* convictions such as indigenous heritage or religious faith, or *conflict experiences* such as victimizing and/or conflicting events.

My informants are considered part of the preferential Others and should have precedence in any spaces of participation deriving from the CPA. I found that the institutional space that best tries to include and empower my informants are the mesas. Even so they only manage to impose intermediate depths of participation, and I argue they should continue to implement measures in order to reach deeper participation. A communal space that contributes but does not reach deep enough was the forum during the electoral campaigns in Putumayo. The attempt was important and novel, seeking to inform and educate the population and not least include them

in the debate. Still, while anyone who wanted to and was able to could attend, the event was not allowing people to speak as much as they wanted to, nor did they manage to explicitly include an important stakeholder in the peace process, namely Farc. Their future remains uncertain and they would benefit from interacting across groups of Others in Putumayo.

The communal space that held the most promise was the feria artisanal. I argued that the facilitators and the participants came together both between groups of Others and also with some elites. This communal space applied deep participatory principles; I argue that territorial peace can be built through spaces such as the feria attempted and succeeded in doing.

Still several issues remain:

The CPA's stipulated timeframe of 10 years has been agreed upon by the negotiating parties. Both national and international committees representing a variety of stakeholders are closely monitoring the rate of implementation and general evolvement of Colombia (CPA, 2016). Still, research indicates that the medium-term timeframe of two to five years after the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement is a highly vulnerable time. It is suggested that *at this point in time*, most agreements are either consolidated or broken (Joshi et al, 2017).

Given the present situation in Colombia, and especially the status quo in the sub-regions historically most affected by the conflict, I claim that the government must adjust their attitude and subsequent actions in regards to the peace process, in addition to prioritize the implementation to a greater extent, if they wish to truly transition towards a territorial peace. The continuous conflict in these marginalized areas exacerbate the State's limitations, yet State presence requires the state apply both discursive and economic support, in order for Putumayans to continue their own search for territorial peace.

My informants have dedicated their lives to fight for social justice. They have lost countless along the way and will continue to lose more. My biggest hope is that their sacrifices and successes will not go unnoticed.

In their own ways, they have all contributed, in solidarity with Others, to build a more peaceful territory for their children. They have challenged the elites and fought for every single one of

their rights to be upheld. Nothing comes for free in Colombia, except friendship. These people have contributed to the development of the Victims' Law of 2011, the gender perspective and the victims' rights, the minority preferences, the spiritual component and the territorial perspective in the CPA (2016). They have posited that a peaceful society is made *by its people* with or without the help of anybody else.

There is war and peace in Putumayo, but my informants' state they will never give up. Why would they when the alternative nonetheless is so much worse? Rome was not built in a day, neither is Colombia. But the world outside Putumayo must wake up. They are fighting for their lives and the peace guarantor Norway, entering member of the security council, is proud to claim they have helped and continue to help. I urge my Norwegian government and all, global peaceful voices to stand in solidarity. The search for territorial peace in Putumayo will never end, but for it not to be a utopian illusion, they need all the support they can get.

I dedicate this thesis to the people of Putumayo, in solidarity with their search towards territorial peace. May you never die in vain.

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Appendix I

Field notes

Field notes 24.09.2019: Arriving Putumayo, hanging at the bus stop in Puerto Asis with a majority of Venezuelan refugees working informally as bus-promoters.

Field notes 27.09.2019: Campaign event, round table community session in a *Vereda* (Conservative party).

Field notes 30.09.2019: Como va la paz en el Putumayo – Foro institucional. A peace forum with representatives from Putumayo (Governor Sorrell)

Field notes 30.09-03.10.2019: Farc reintegration zone, ETCR Helmer Mosquera, la Carmelita.

Field notes 04.10.2019: Foro ciudadano Mocoa – Putumayo Participe, public forum (Casa Amazonia y Accion contra el Hambre).

Field notes 12.10.2019: Por la Diversidad de las Mujeres – Feria comunal (Allianza Tejedoras de Vida).

Field notes 25.10.2019: Risk analysis- session Mocoa with Fatima, risk analytics, government, health sector, fire-brigade, military and police.

Field notes 27.10.2019: Election Day in Colombia, observation from three voting areas in Mocoa.

Appendix II

Interview guide Putumayo

1. Background and presentation - introduction

2. History

a. Political History of Putumayo, any particular event

b. Political / personal experiences local politics

c. Political / personal experiences central politics

d. Experiences before/after the peace agreement

3. Local elections

a. Views on the elections

b. Democracy in Putumayo

c. Hopes/needs for the future of the democracy

4. Farc

a. Farc as political party

b. Positive/negative experiences

c. Hopes/needs for the future

5. Peace Agreement

a. Paticipation as part of the peace agreement

b. Need for participation

c. Farc as party

d. Risks

6. Peace in the local community

a. What mechanisms and processes contribute/limit peace?

b. What role does participation play in the experience/development of peace in Putumayo?

c. What are your hopes for the future of Putumayo/Colombia?

d. What is peace to you?

Appendix III

Informed Consent Master's project - simplified version

• Everyone involved in research projects have the right to know how their data and privacy is protected.

• *You have the right to:*
o Be anonymous
o Withdraw your consent and/or delete your data at any time
o Access and/or correct all personal information about you at any time

• *I ask you to participate in any of the following:*
o Individual interview - recorded and/or written
o Group interview - recorded and/or written
o Joint activities that I will observe – written

• If you want more details, please don’t hesitate to ask before giving your informed consent.

I consent to participate in the research project:

……

Sincerely,
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Appendix IV

Names		Description of informant	Place and date
1	'Rosalia'	Putumayan, Indigenous from the Inga community, professional administrator at state institution in Mocoa, primarily working with transitional justice, truth mechanisms and guarantees of no repetition for victims in Putumayo. Mother and wife.	(Interview Rosalia and Julia) Interviewed at their workplace on 30.09.2019.
2	'Julia'	From Bogota, recently moved to Mocoa, professional political scientist at state institution in Mocoa, primarily working with transitional justice, truth mechanisms and guarantees of no repetition for victims in Putumayo.	(Interview Rosalia and Julia) Interviewed at their workplace on 30.09.2019.
3	Fatima	Teacher and former departmental education minister from Mocoa, now president of the CSO women's organization Allianza Tejedoras de Vida. Partook in the peace negotiations in Cuba as gender advisor, is also, along with others in the CSO, gender advisor for Putumayo department. Mother.	(Interview Fatima) Interviewed at Fatima's house on 25.10.2019.
4	Nancy	Professional women- and human rights advocate, has co-published and partaken in many reports and research projects regarding women in Putumayo. Moved to Mocoa many years ago, leader of the CSO Tejedoras.	(Interview Fatima and Nancy) Interviewed at Fatimas house on 25.10.2019.
5	'Carmen'	From Caqueta, Ex-combatant. Not active member of Farc Putumayo but member of the ETCR community. Mother and homemaker, member of two female and communal cooperatives in the ETCR la Carmelita. Recently graduated from secondary school in the reintegration program.	(Interview Carmen) Interviewed in the bakery at the ETCR on 01.10.2019.
6	Valentina and Paula	Professionals working at Casa Amazonia, a local NGO primarily	(Interview Valentina and Paula)

		focused on women and children in addition to general vulnerable population. Co-organized the biggest public debate during the election with 4 of 5 governor candidates at the Putumayo university college	Interviewed at their workplace on 08.10.2019.
7	'Maria'	Psychologist, professional in a state institution in Mocoa, responsible for Victims representation and in general working with HR protective measures. Mother and wife.	(Interview Maria) Interviewed at her workplace on 23.10.2019.
8	Vera	Leader of the UNHCR Mocoa, UN-professional from Portugal, has lived in Mocoa for the last 2, 5 years. Responsible for refugees, both foreign and internal in Putumayo. Also involved in the general development of Putumayo department in accordance with the SDGs and the Peace agreement.	(Interview Vera) Interviewed at a cafe on 10.10.2019.
9	Leonore	Tejedoras activist, mother and self-employed in a local cooperative. Victims' representative, member of the departmental Mesa	(Interview Leonore) Interviewed at a cafe on the 12.10.2019.
10	Leidy	Tejedoras activist, mother and self-employed in a local cooperative. Victims' representative of the municipal Mesa	(Interview Leidy) Interviewed at a cafe on 12.10.2019.
11	Yuri	Human rights' activist and former local politician for the Green party. Former Farc militia, mother and wife, is member of the Farc party in Putumayo and the ETCR Carmelita Junta de accion communal (JAC) local political community organization. Lives right outside the ETCR..	(Interview Yuri) Interviewed on the bus on 24.10.2019.
11	Eduardo	Ex-combatant with 12 years in active combat for FARC. Has since he was 16 been a FARC-militant and focused on political work,	(Interview Eduardo)

		former member of the PCC and UP. Now highly active member of Farc, Putumayo. Lives in la Carmelita and runs a small bodega there. Father and husband.	Interviewed on the patio outside his bodega in the ETCR on 02.10.2010
12	Ruben	Ex-combatant, more than 30 years in active combat for FARC. A leader of the ETCR la Carmelita Member of Farc, Putumayo. Lives both inside and outside the ETCR. Father and husband.	(Interview Ruben) Interviewed in his house in the ETCR on 02.10.2019.
13	Pastor	Ex-combatant, Active in FARC since he was 16, was imprisoned during the negotiations and subsequently let out as a result of the agreement. Currently chauffeur and armed security officer. Not active in Farc, Putumayo but member of the community. Currently lives right outside the ETCR and owns a small shop with his wife. Father and husband.	(Interview Pastor) Interviewed in his car in the ETCR on 03.10.2019.
14	Matias	Ex-combatant active since 1984 and continued to become a high-ranking commander for the Bloque Suroccidental and the central leadership *Estado Mayor Central* of FARC. Responsible for the political reintegration and territorial parties of Farc. Focusing on strengthening the local parties and their participation in politics locally and nationally. Partook in the negotiations in Cuba. Father and husband.	(Interview Matias) Interviewed on a café in Bogota on 18.10.2019.
15	Andres Cancimance	PhD in Social Anthropology focused on Putumayo. Politician from Colombia Humana, returned to Putumayo the last year to postulate as governor candidate for Somos Putmayo and eventually came second and is now department assembly	(Interview Cancimance) Interviewed at his campaign office in Mocoa on 11.10.2019.

		representative of the opposition in Putumayo.	
16	Omar	From Bogota. Working for the ASI - Buanerges campaign as a campaign manager. Came to Putumayo to work on the electoral campaign and awaited further work in Buanerges' governor administration as he was elected Governor of Putumayo 2019-2023.	(Interview Omar) Interviewed at the ASI candidate Buanerges' campaign office in Mocoa on 08.10.2019.
17	Samir	Indigenous, second term as the *gobernador* or elected governor for an ethnic community of Kamtsaa and Ingas outside Mocoa. Postulated as candidate for the city council as a member of the party MAIS which was part of a broad Liberal coalition consisting of five Parties. Did not become elected. Father and husband.	(Interview Samir) Interviewed at the offices of the indigenous organization he pertains to in Mocoa on 08.10. 2019.