

## **International engagement in the 1960s:**

### *The establishment of the International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement*

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## **Preface**

I would like to thank my supervisor Hanne Hagtvedt Vik for her insightful comments and advice. Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have greatly benefitted from Hanne's knowledge and dedication to her students. Thanks also to my fellow students in Hanne's supervision group, particularly Anja, for valuable comments and support. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Helge Pharo for our talks on the topic and his comments on parts of this thesis. I am grateful to Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek for their help in the archives. I am also grateful for the grant I received through LO's scholarship for studies in labour history.

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has only to a certain degree put its mark on this thesis. Fortunately, I had already accessed the most essential sources in the archives and much literature has been made accessible online. Where I have not been able to locate relevant literature or sources, this is indicated in a footnote.

While the process of writing this thesis has been rewarding and inspiring, the abrupt shift from the reading hall at Blindern to home office was, nevertheless, a big readjustment. I would like to thank my family and friends who have kept my spirits up through the semester. Last, but not least, thank you, Harald, for making the prolonged home office and self-imposed quarantine more manageable and contributing to a better separation between work and leisure.

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## **Abstract**

This thesis addresses the scarcely covered topic of the Norwegian labour movement's international engagement in the 1960s. Specifically, it examines why the International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement was established. The thesis has found that the committee was established in 1969 as an ideological tool to support individuals, organisations and movements who were struggling for democracy and freedom. It was established by members of the leadership of the Norwegian Labour Party and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions. These leading figures and their political orientations were not new. However, in the 1960s, the international engagement of the labour movement acquired a more global ambition and critical character in response to internal pressure and international developments. The committee was established as a measure of this radicalised international engagement. The committee can, moreover, be understood as an organisational tool to respond to political and organisational issues. The thesis thus asserts that the establishment of the committee was part of the changing Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s, although it was marked by a certain degree of continuity. It also highlights the role of both the leadership and the base of the labour movement in this development. Moreover, concurrently with the radicalisation of the Norwegian labour movement and the establishment of the committee, there existed global trends of activism and solidarity efforts. The thesis argues that these trends provide important contexts to understand the pressures and challenges facing the labour movement and are thus essential contexts to understand the establishment of the committee. They also illustrate that the committee was part of a broader pattern of international engagement and solidarity efforts globally. This means that the thesis points to the significance of both domestic and international factors for the international engagement of the labour movement. In this way, the thesis provides insights on the international engagement of the labour movement for the historiographies of the Norwegian labour movement and Norwegian international engagement.

## List of abbreviations

AAB	<i>Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek</i>
AIS	<i>Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Støttekomité</i> , International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement
AUF	<i>Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking</i> , Workers' Youth League
DNA	<i>Det norske Arbeiderparti</i> , Norwegian Labour Party
FNL	<i>Front National de Libération</i> , National Liberation Front
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ILO	International Labour Organization
LO	<i>Landsorganisasjonen i Norge</i> , Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKP	<i>Norges Kommunistiske Parti</i> , Communist Party of Norway
SF	<i>Sosialistisk Folkeparti</i> , Socialist People's Party
SI	Socialist International

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## Introduction

In 1969, the Norwegian Labour Party (*Det norske Arbeiderparti*, DNA) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen i Norge*, LO) established the International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement (*Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Støttekomité*, AIS).<sup>1</sup> After its establishment, the committee supported liberation movements and people struggling for democracy and rights in other countries economically, politically and morally until it was dissolved in 1995. While the committee was established by DNA and LO, affiliated organisations of DNA and LO were included in its work. According to its statutes at the time of the establishment, the committee was to be led by a board consisting of representatives elected by DNA and LO, whereas the Cooperation Committee between LO and DNA (*Samarbeidskomitéen mellom LO og DNA*, henceforth the Cooperation Committee) would be included in decisions that implied large economic obligations.<sup>2</sup>

The decade in which AIS was established, the 1960s, has typically been depicted as a decade of activism and international engagement. On the international level, the focus has rested on the protest movements, the youth revolts and particularly 1968 as a phenomenon.<sup>3</sup> In addition to questioning domestic issues, many movements and revolters were increasingly attuned to international issues, including issues of the “Third World”. This term was at the time commonly used to describe what we today refer to as the “Global South” and will for that reason be used throughout this thesis. On the Norwegian national level, the increased international engagement of the Norwegian state in the 1960s is widely acknowledged. In this decade, there was increased attention to various international issues, including Third World issues like development aid, decolonisation and apartheid. The question remains how the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement, and specifically the establishment of AIS, fits within this broader picture. By international engagement, the thesis refers to the interest and involvement in international issues and international work.

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<sup>1</sup> Although *Arbeiderbevegelsens Internasjonale Støttekomité* directly translates to the Labour Movement’s International Support Committee, the translation I have observed in scholarly literature is the International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement.

<sup>2</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248-249; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 262-263.

<sup>3</sup> The phenomenon has been described in many ways, but generally refers to the protest movements that proliferated in the 1960s. It is epitomised by the year 1968 primarily due to the student revolts that year.

## Historiography

This thesis will take part in the discussion within several historiographic fields, including the literature on global international engagement in the 1960s and on Norwegian international engagement and politics. This includes literature on the international and Norwegian labour movements.

The 1960s as a decade of activism and radicalism globally has received much scholarly attention, especially in relation to the phenomenon of 1968. In addition to literature on 1968 globally, the special issue on 1968 in the *Scandinavian Journal of History* has proved particularly useful for this thesis.<sup>4</sup> Covering a wide range of issues of 1968 in Scandinavia, the journal issue provides an in-depth understanding of the Scandinavian experiences of 1968, also in contrast to the American and European experiences. Included in this issue is a comparative article by historian Thomas Ekman Jørgensen in which he argues that there existed similarities and differences among the Scandinavian countries and more essentially differences between Scandinavia and Europe that set the Scandinavian 1968 apart.<sup>5</sup> Interestingly, what, according to Jørgensen, sets the Scandinavian 1968 apart is its integration within established politics. This argument opens for a discussion of the role of 1968 in the international engagement of the established parties and the labour movement.

The thesis has, furthermore, been interested in the solidarity committees and other solidarity efforts that proliferated in the 1960s. Historian Kim Christiaens has been particularly relevant due to his attention to the European social democratic parties and trade unions as some of many actors involved in solidarity committees.<sup>6</sup> The international engagement of the international labour movement has also been covered by historians writing on international labour or trade union organisations. A significant contribution to the historiography of international trade unionism was the publication of an edited work on the history of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and its predecessors edited by Marcel van der Linden.<sup>7</sup> The contributions to this work by Anthony Carew and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick have provided valuable insights on the involvement of the ICFTU in various international issues in the periods 1949-1972 and 1972-1990s respectively and its changing international role

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<sup>4</sup> Fink, Gassert and Junker, *1968: The World Transformed*; Horn, *The Spirit of '68*; Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture"; *Scandinavian Journal of History* 33, no. 4 (2008).

<sup>5</sup> Jørgensen, "The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective".

<sup>6</sup> Christiaens, "Communists are no Beasts"; Christiaens, "Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds".

<sup>7</sup> van der Linden, *The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions*.



through these years.<sup>8</sup> What is more, two chapters in Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin's edited volume on *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* have furthered the understanding of Socialist Internationalism, which has only rarely been covered broadly by historians.<sup>9</sup> Particularly useful for this thesis has been Talbot Imlay's chapter on "Socialist Internationalism after 1914" because of his attention to the Socialist International (SI) as one practice of Socialist Internationalism. Historian Daniel Maul has, moreover, researched the International Labour Organization (ILO) and its connections to various international issues. His latest work explores the contributions of the ILO to global social policy.<sup>10</sup> The mentioned works have contributed to this thesis' understanding of international engagement in the 1960s and the involvement of the international labour movement and international labour organisations.

The Norwegian international engagement is another historiographical field of importance for this thesis. The field has been extensively covered by political and diplomatic historians. A topic of debate is the origins of this engagement. Writing on Norway's foreign relations since the Middle Ages, historian Olav Riste describes the Norwegian international engagement after the Second World War as a missionary impulse as he traces the engagement to the Norwegian missionary tradition.<sup>11</sup> Riste, however, dedicates most attention to the periods after 1970.<sup>12</sup>

In the fifth volume of *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie*, historians Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo present the main lines of the Norwegian foreign policy in the years 1949 to 1965. In this work, the Norwegian foreign policy in these years is characterised as being marked by the Cold War and internationalisation, in the sense of a broader geographical scope.<sup>13</sup> While acknowledging that Norway was a leading country in the work with development aid and decolonisation in the 1950s, Eriksen and Pharo point to a stronger engagement for the world outside of Europe in the years after the mid-1950s due to both international and domestic developments.<sup>14</sup> This view is further substantiated in the sixth volume in the same series, written by historian Rolf Tamnes. Focusing on the period from 1965 until 1995, Tamnes describes the many-folded international engagement that was expressed through the so-

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<sup>8</sup> Carew, "Towards a Free Trade Union Centre"; Gumbrell-McCormick, "Facing New Challenges".

<sup>9</sup> Dogliani, "The Fate of Socialist Internationalism"; Imlay, "Socialist Internationalism after 1914"; For the historiographical situation, see Imlay, "Socialist Internationalism after 1914", 216-219.

<sup>10</sup> Maul, *The International Labour Organization*.

<sup>11</sup> Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations*, 255-256.

<sup>12</sup> See chapter 12 "An Ethical Foreign Policy?" in Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations*.

<sup>13</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 15.

<sup>14</sup> See chapters "Vestlig foregangsland – bistand og avkolonisering 1949-55" and "Sterkere engasjement utenfor Europa 1955-65" in Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*.

called engagement policy of the Norwegian state. The engagement was, in Tamnes' view, strengthened around the mid-1960s and radicalised around 1970 due to both international and national developments.<sup>15</sup> The labour movement is briefly mentioned in relation to this radicalisation by virtue of its position as the foremost political force.<sup>16</sup>

Historian Jarle Simensen follows the same the line of thought in the first volume of *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie*. This volume centres around Norwegian development aid between 1952 and 1975 and describes the distinctive features of the different periods within this time frame. Simensen argues that Norwegian development aid was given renewed efforts in the 1960s before taking a radical turn in the 1970s.<sup>17</sup> Similar to Eriksen and Pharo, as well as Tamnes, Simensen locates the origins of these developments in both international and domestic factors. The volume provides, moreover, some attention to other actors than the state. The Norwegian labour movement, nonetheless, remains a small side player.

Another scholar who takes part in the discussion on the Norwegian international engagement is historian Terje Tvedt in his book *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*.<sup>18</sup> Tvedt argues that Norway became involved in development aid following what he sees as an American initiative in the 1950s. His focus is primarily how Norway's international role changed and was developed as a national project during Norway's international breakthrough from the early 1960s onwards.<sup>19</sup> From then on, development aid was developed and led as a national project, which the state mobilised the population's support to through the humanitarian-political complex. This complex was a structure of institutions involved in development aid and producing a new elite that educated the population and formed their world views and self-images.<sup>20</sup> Thus, even though emphasising that his story is driven by an interest in global history, his explanations is mainly focused on domestic factors. Also in his narrative, the labour movement remains largely out of sight of the analysis. Moreover, Tvedt's account contributes to raising a question of continuity versus change in Norwegian international engagement as the

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<sup>15</sup> See part IV "Mesen, Megler og Moralist" in Tamnes, *Oljealder*.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 344.

<sup>17</sup> See chapter 5 "Ny giv: Norsk utviklingshjelp grunnlegges" and chapter 10 "Den radikale bølgen i 1970-årene" in Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*.

<sup>18</sup> Tvedt's work received considerable criticism upon its release in 2017 and became a subject of public debate in Norway. This includes Norwegian scholars who have criticised his arguments and methods. See Gripsrud, *Norsk hamskifte?*, Bangstad and Abdi, "Tvedts metode", and Pharo, "Terje Tvedts historier". Still, Oddgeir Osland calls for a more critical-constructive, as opposed to an exposing, reading in scholarly debates with polarising potential. Osland, "Polemikkens pris", 42-43.

<sup>19</sup> See part I "Da Norge møtte verden" in Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*.

<sup>20</sup> See part III "Det humanitær-politiske kompleks" in *Ibid.*

description of an international breakthrough indicates a significant change. In contrast, Tammes, Simensen, and Eriksen and Pharo acknowledge a larger degree of continuity as they trace the international engagement further back.

The literature on the Norwegian international engagement in and before the 1960s remains, however, focused on the Norwegian state, which opens for a discussion of the international engagement of other actors. The labour movement and other organisations are mentioned but remain side players in the story of the state's engagement. DNA is at times given a larger role due to its position as a ruling government party for the most parts of the period from 1945 to 1965, but still the focus lies on the government or the foreign political leadership. Yet, this literature can contribute to highlight the international engagement of the labour movement to some extent because of the similarities between the Norwegian foreign policy and the official positions of DNA as the ruling party. In addition, it provides a national context. The literature on Norway's international engagement has thus been used to complement the literature on the labour movement in this thesis.

There exists much scholarly material on the Norwegian labour movement. Still, labour historians have not displayed much interest in the labour movement's international engagement. Some of the works mention the international engagement of the labour movement, but in general they provide short descriptions more than a detailed study. This seems to be the case regardless of which period of time one studies. In the second volume of *LOs historie*, which deals with period 1935-1969, historians Inger Bjørnhaug and Terje Halvorsen briefly touch upon the anti-fascist work of the Norwegian labour movement in the interwar period and the first years after the Second World War.<sup>21</sup> They also mention LO's role in the international and European trade union movements, but LO's involvement in broader international issues is largely unexplored.<sup>22</sup> The subject is to some extent, but not extensively, elaborated upon in the third volume of the same series in which historian Trond Bergh covers the period from 1969 to 2009. Bergh's primary focus is the 1970s onwards, although he dedicates significant attention to the restructuring of LO, which began already in the mid-1960s and included an increased focus on international solidarity work.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> See chapter 3 "Med regjeringen i førersetet" and chapter 11 "I den kalde krigens tid" in Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*.

<sup>22</sup> See chapter 15 "Mot nye problemstillinger" in *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> See part one "De radikale og ustabile 1970-årene" in Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*.

The labour movement's international engagement is, moreover, not a main topic in the series *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge*. In the fifth volume, Bergh covers the period from 1945 to 1965 with a focus on domestic issues, although he does provide some insight into DNA's foreign policy in the Cold War and the party's stance towards NATO.<sup>24</sup> In the sixth volume in the series, which covers the period from 1965 to 1990, the domestic focus is maintained. However, in this volume, author Jostein Nyhamar offers valuable insight on the strife related to the Vietnam issue within DNA, as well as a shorter description of the international work since the 1970s.<sup>25</sup>

In their book *De lange linjer*, historians Trond Gram and Ole Martin Rønning cover the main developments in the Norwegian labour movement, including a brief mention of the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement in the 1930s and the 1960s.<sup>26</sup> The main developments of the international solidarity work are described in historian Einar Terjesen's article "Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser". While not a detailed account of the different parts of the engagement, the article does provide a useful overview of the main developments since the 1880s. Kaare Sandegren, who held several leading positions in the Norwegian labour movement from the 1970s onwards, provides a more detailed account of the international engagement in *Fagbevegelsens internasjonale engasjement*. Sandegren, however, focuses on the period since the 1970s.

The international engagement of the labour movement has received some attention in scholarly work that focuses on specific causes. Historian James Godbolt, who has done extensive research on the Vietnam movement in Norway, has attended to the involvement of different parts of the labour movement in the Vietnam issue.<sup>27</sup> Vesla Vetlesen, who has been involved in the international work of both LO and DNA, has, for her part, written about the involvement of the Norwegian trade union movement in the anti-apartheid struggle. Vetlesen's focus is, nevertheless, the 1970s.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> See chapters "Brobygger og alliert" and "Atomdebatt og partisprengning" in Bergh, *Storhetstid*.

<sup>25</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 87-104, 564-565.

<sup>26</sup> Gram and Rønning, *De lange linjer*, 82-86, 103-104.

<sup>27</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War"; Godbolt, "AUF og protesten mot Vietnamkrigen"; Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*; Godbolt, "Vietnamkrigen i Norge"; Godbolt, "Vietnam-protesten i Norge".

<sup>28</sup> Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*; Vetlesen, "Trade Union Support to the Struggle Against Apartheid".

The period after the 1970s is, furthermore, the primary focus of several students in history who have written master's theses on the international work of the Norwegian labour movement, in particular LO. They tend to focus on specific projects or support to specific trade union movements in other countries in the period after the establishment of AIS. Rita Stensrud studies LO's engagement in El Salvador in the period from 1984 to 1994.<sup>29</sup> LO's relation to the conflict in Middle East in the period from 1947 to 2002 is the topic of Øystein Rovde's thesis.<sup>30</sup> In the later years, LO and the broader trade union movement's solidarity work in different countries in Southern Africa from the 1970 onwards has also been covered.<sup>31</sup> Several of the theses include the work of AIS on these issues. As far as I can tell, these theses are the most extensive coverage of the work of AIS.<sup>32</sup> These master's theses have thus broadened the understanding of what AIS actually did after its establishment. More important for this thesis, these theses demonstrate the lack of literature on AIS and in particular its establishment. This leaves a gap to be filled concerning the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement in the 1960s and its role in Norwegian international engagement.

### **Research question, focus and definitions**

The thesis aims to explain the establishment of AIS in order to shed light on the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement in the late 1960s. This will allow the thesis to place this engagement in a broader picture of global activism and Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s. The primary research question is therefore "*why was the International Solidarity Committee of the Norwegian Labour Movement established?*" In order to answer this question, the thesis will examine a set of sub-research questions. Who were involved in the establishment of AIS? What did they intend AIS to be? What considerations were made? How does this fit within the longer trends of the Norwegian labour movement's international engagement? Was the establishment of AIS part of global or regional trends? Examining these questions will enable the thesis to shed light on the basis and nature of the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement at the time and how it fits within the broader depiction of the 1960s as a decade of activism and international engagement. This also ties to

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<sup>29</sup> Stensrud, "Faglig samarbeid i skuddlinjen".

<sup>30</sup> Rovde, "I solidaritetens navn".

<sup>31</sup> Andersgaard, "Norsk fagbevegelses solidaritetsarbeid i Zimbabwe, 1976-98"; Apalset, "LOs støtte til den sørafrikanske fagorganisasjonen COSATU 1986-1997"; Lindebekk, "Fagbevegelsens solidaritetsarbeid i Zambia 1980-2006"; Ørstavik "LOs solidaritetsarbeid i Tanzania 1980-2009".

<sup>32</sup> AIS's work is also shortly described in Valstrand, *Alt om LO*, 202-203, Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 564-565, and Sandegren, *Fagbevegelsens internasjonale engasjement*. AIS' involvement in the solidarity work with Southern Africa is mentioned in Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika* and Eriksen, *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa*.

the overriding debate on the degree of continuity versus change in Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s.

The focus of the thesis will thus be the Norwegian labour movement. In a broad definition, the labour movement refers to the trade union movement and workers' parties and organisations. This thesis will, however, employ a narrower definition of the labour movement. In this thesis, the Norwegian labour movement refers to DNA and LO and their affiliated organisations and institutions because AIS, the main object of study, was restricted to these organisations.

DNA is a Norwegian social democratic party, established in 1887. Its affiliated organisations included at the time of AIS' establishment, the youth organisation the Workers' Youth League (*Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking*, AUF) and the newspaper *Arbeiderbladet*. The Party Congress is DNA's overarching body, which meets every two years to adopt policies and elect representatives for the Executive Board, including the leadership. The Executive Board leads DNA's work and carries out the adopted policies on a daily basis. In addition, the National Council meets occasionally to ensure that DNA's work is carried out according to its bylaws and resolutions. Although the party was an opposition party at the time of the establishment of AIS in 1969, the party had been Norway's ruling government party from 1945 to 1965, with the exception of a few weeks in 1963.

LO is Norway's largest confederation of trade unions, established in 1899 as the Workers' Confederations of Trade Unions (*Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon*). The confederation changed its name in 1957. For simplicity's sake, the thesis will refer to the confederation as the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). LO's affiliated trade unions and trade union federations are organised on the basis of craft or industry. The federations are the key actors within the confederation, through the elected LO bodies. The LO Congress is the overarching body, which meets every fourth year to discuss and agree on the large and fundamental decisions and elect members of the leadership. The Secretariat consists of LO's elected leadership and the most central federation leaders, who meet weekly to discuss running tasks.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> In addition to the LO Congress and the Secretariat, there is the Board of Representatives. However, due to the board's focus on tariff issues, it is not central in this thesis.

Although the different trade unions and federations affiliated to LO safeguard different interests and therefore might adhere to different political views, LO has traditionally been close to DNA. Their cooperation has been formalised in the Cooperation Committee since 1928. The Cooperation Committee, consisting of a number of representatives from LO and DNA, works on matters that concern the party and the trade union movement. At times it can be difficult to separate DNA and LO in the literature due to general references to the labour movement. As LO and DNA are two separate entities, I will attempt to keep LO and DNA separate. However, LO mainly followed the same official international line as the party. Thus, this thesis will sometimes focus on DNA or refer to Norwegian labour movement in general.

### **Theory and method**

The thesis draws on elements of political and transnational history. It is interested in the domestic and international developments that shaped the political action that is the establishment of AIS. One advantage of the transnational approach is that it allows the thesis to consider causes of a phenomenon or event on different geographical and temporal scales, including the national, transnational and global.<sup>34</sup> While the approach enables the thesis to transcend the national context, it also allows it to reflect on the national context as the nation is still viewed as essential to understand the transnational actors.<sup>35</sup> In fact, “[t]he individuals and organisations engaged in international relations cannot but reflect the culture of their nation-state, region or local community.”<sup>36</sup> In the words of historian Patricia Clavin, a transnational approach “underlines the ways in which local history can be understood in relation to world history.”<sup>37</sup> This means that the thesis will highlight the significance of international developments, but also look to the national context.

In regards to transnational history, Ian Tyrrell’s notion of framing contexts has helped the thesis’ analysis. Tyrrell identifies framing contexts as an approach in transnational history that involves “providing a wider context than the nation by acknowledging that similar events or experiences occurred elsewhere.”<sup>38</sup> In such an approach, one should aim to show material or intellectual connections, in addition to parallels or global contexts.<sup>39</sup> This allows the thesis “to

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<sup>34</sup> Tyrrell, “Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History”, 463.

<sup>35</sup> Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism”, 438.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 437.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 438.

<sup>38</sup> Tyrrell, “Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History”, 462.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 463.

balance inward-looking accounts with broader perspectives.”<sup>40</sup> Keeping this in mind, the thesis will examine global and regional trends in order to establish the global and regional context in which AIS was established and whether similar committees were established elsewhere. The thesis will also explore the dynamics and connections between these contexts and the labour movement to examine how the establishment of AIS fits within these broader trends and whether it was part of a broader pattern. This approach also means that the thesis will be able to shed light on the significance of global and regional contexts and certain transnational connections for the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement.

Drawing on political history, the thesis studies the establishment of AIS as a historical political event and explores the ideas, motivations and considerations that lay the foundation for it within the political institutions DNA and LO. As a political history, the thesis rests on the assumption that individuals matter. The thesis will therefore to some extent employ an actor approach, which draws on insights from prosopography. British historian Lawrence Stone defines prosopography as “the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives.”<sup>41</sup> He further explains that prosopography is a tool to uncover the roots of political actions and to analyse social structure and mobility.<sup>42</sup> The method is based on a premise that past experiences and upbringing influence values and behaviour patterns.<sup>43</sup> While this thesis will not be a prosopographical study, it accepts the premise that a group’s background and characteristics influence their actions and will therefore study the background and characteristics of the key individuals involved in the establishment of AIS. The thesis will additionally examine these main actors’ views, international engagement and transnational involvement. In this way, the thesis will be able to reflect on not only who was involved in establishing AIS, but also what experiences and ideas laid the foundation for their action. This will contribute to a greater understanding of the motivations and considerations that motivated the establishment of AIS. In this context, it is important to historicise. In order to analyse the motivations behind the solidarity committee, an understanding of what solidarity meant to the labour movement at the time is needed. The thesis will therefore examine the Norwegian labour movement’s international engagement over time.

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<sup>40</sup> Tyrrell, “Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History”, 462.

<sup>41</sup> Stone, “Prosopography”, 46.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.



## **Primary sources**

This thesis is based on secondary literature and primary sources from the institutional archives of the Norwegian labour movement (*Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek*), specifically from DNA and LO. The amount of material in the archives has been quite vast and at times difficult to navigate. DNA and LO have many organisational bodies, including ad-hoc task forces that at times lack a formal name which has made the task of locating them in the archives difficult. Cross-references in the material from the different bodies involved in the establishment of AIS have entailed that I have navigated between the different boxes and folders in order to find the original documents. The documents were scattered between many folders and boxes, which means that I cannot exclude that some relevant material was missed. However, I was able to trace the process thoroughly through the documents that I did access. I thus have a quite extensive picture of the process regardless of any omissions. I was also in contact with Hans Jørgen Raastad, who was chairman of AUF in 1969, through email in order to work out certain questions that emerged from the source material, which he allowed me to reference.

Among the material studied are protocols and documents from DNA's Executive Board and National Council and LO's Secretariat, as well as the Cooperation Committee. This material was studied to investigate the process, the key individuals and possible motivations behind the establishment of AIS. I have studied material from the years leading up to 1969, with a primary focus on the period 1967-1969 as soon as it became clear that the process to establish AIS was initiated in 1968. I was able to trace the process, as well as examine other statements and decisions in the years prior, through these various documents. In DNA's and LO's case records, I have also accessed documents and protocols from different task forces and committees, memorandums, and other documents, which have supplemented the mentioned protocols and documents.

One challenge with the mentioned material is that the protocols are not particularly detailed. The protocols primarily reference the decisions adopted at the meetings and reveal little information about the discussion on the matters that were discussed. This means that the protocols reveal little about the motivations for the establishment of AIS and who advocated it. Although the thesis would have benefitted from identifying the key advocates as this could have revealed more on the specific motivations behind the establishment, I have been able to identify the group that was involved in the decision. This still allows the thesis to consider the main actors involved and their broader international engagement. In addition, the protocols

reference statements that were adopted by the Secretariat and the Executive Board on different matters, which provides an insight into the official stance on different international issues at the time.

What is more, some specific reasoning on AIS is provided in the protocols from the LO Congress and DNA's Party Congress in 1969 where the establishment of AIS was adopted, as well as in certain memorandums. The motivations and reasoning concerning the broader international engagement are substantiated in LO's programme of action and DNA's work programme and programme of principle from 1969.<sup>44</sup> Together with literature on the labour movement institutions, these primary sources have contributed to shed light on the causes and considerations that motivated the establishment of AIS. Finally, I have searched the online archives of the National Library of Norway for references to AIS in 1969 and the years prior in historical newspapers and journals, as such material could have the potential of expanding the information on the motivations or key actors. However, there were no mention of AIS prior to its establishment in May 1969 and the few articles concerning its establishment were factual references.<sup>45</sup> The historical newspapers have therefore not informed this thesis in any significant way.

In the case records in DNAs and LOs archives, I was also able to access material on international correspondence, including circulars from the SI and the ICFTU of which DNA and LO were members respectively. This does not provide an extensive insight into the views of those that DNA and LO corresponded with as the documents are limited to what was received and archived by DNA and LO. Nonetheless, it does reveal the topics that were on the agenda and whether AIS was discussed. This has helped shed light on the connections of the Norwegian labour movement and AIS to other movements. My primary focus was the years 1967 to 1969, but I also looked through some boxes from the preceding years.

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<sup>44</sup> LO's programme of action was approved at the 1969 LO Congress as guidelines for LO's future work. The programme was the first of its kind. DNA's work programmes were documents that listed the primary tasks and objectives of the party for the coming parliamentary period. The programmes of principles, created at less regular intervals, listed the main policies and principles of the party.

<sup>45</sup> Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, I was not able to go to the library's archive to do a more extensive search. However, the lack of references in the online material suggests that it was not a big topic. It is therefore possible that such a search would not have yielded much additional results.

The archive has limited material from the years prior to 1969 on most of the individuals that I identified as the key actors in the establishment of AIS.<sup>46</sup> Whereas the archive has quite an amount of material from Trygve Bratteli and Haakon Lie, the material I worked with did not contain any substantial references to AIS. Although this material did contain information on the broader international engagement of these individuals, I chose to rather focus on biographies and secondary literature that have already covered this topic to some extent in order to examine the key actors.

One methodological issue concerning the use of primary sources that should be mentioned is the use of translations in this thesis. Much of the literature and sources that the thesis has employed is written in Norwegian. I have attempted to paraphrase as much as possible. However, in some instances, I have found a translated direct quote more suitable to illustrate the original phrasing. In these cases, there might be some differences in nuances, especially concerning ideological terminology. Still, I have done my utmost to conserve the original meaning.

## **Structure**

The thesis has four main chapters and a thematic structure. The first chapter studies global and regional trends in order to examine the global and regional contexts of the establishment of AIS. This chapter thus provides a basis for the thesis to examine whether the establishment of AIS was part of a broader pattern globally or regionally. The second chapter focuses on the main actors involved in the establishment of AIS and the ideas and experiences that lay the foundation for the establishment of AIS. This will more broadly shed light on who was involved in the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s. Seeking to explore what motivated the establishment of AIS and the degree of continuity or change, the third chapter examines the nature of the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement and its specific expression in the late 1960s with the establishment of AIS. This ties to the overriding debate on the factors that motivated Norwegian international engagement and the degree of continuity versus change. Based on an assertion that the establishment of AIS was based on more than immediate political motivations, the fourth chapter examines the organisational aspects behind the establishment of AIS. Finally, in the conclusion, the thesis will gather the different arguments and discuss their implications for the historiographical debate.

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<sup>46</sup> The key actors identified were Haakon Lie, Reilulf Steen, Trygve Bratteli and Reidar Hirsti from DNA and Parelius Mentsen, Tor Aspengren, Fritz W. Hannestad and Alf Andersen from LO.

## **Chapter 1: Global and regional trends – proliferation of activism and solidarity efforts**

The decade in which AIS was established, the 1960s, has been described as one of activism and solidarity efforts globally. Ian Tyrrell's notion of framing contexts is an approach in transnational history that involves examining whether a phenomenon was part of a broader pattern. This involves exploring material or intellectual connections, as well as parallels or global contexts.<sup>47</sup> The chapter will therefore examine certain global and regional trends of international engagement and the dynamics and connections between these trends and the Norwegian labour movement. This approach will provide a basis for the thesis to later examine whether the establishment of the AIS was part of a broader pattern.

Due to the limitations of this thesis, the chapter will not provide an in-depth study of all relevant contexts, but it will point to certain main trends. Firstly, the chapter will study the phenomenon of 1968 and its impact on the political establishment, particularly the social democratic parties. This can help illuminate the role of 1968 in the origins of the AIS. Next, the chapter will study the solidarity committees that proliferated in the 1960s. This allows the thesis to later examine whether AIS was similar to other solidarity committees that were established at approximately the same time. Finally, the chapter will look to labour movements internationally in order to examine whether there was a broader pattern of solidarity efforts, specifically in the SI and the ICFTU. Then, the chapter will look towards the efforts of the labour movements in Norway's Scandinavian neighbours, Sweden and Denmark. The reasoning behind this choice is the "like-mindedness" often assigned to the Scandinavian countries, as well as the close contact and connections between the Scandinavian labour movements. In this way, the chapter asserts that there was a proliferation of activism and solidarity efforts in the 1960s. The Norwegian labour movement had connection to these trends through various dynamics, which raises the question of whether these trends were reflected in the establishment of AIS.

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<sup>47</sup> Tyrrell, "Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History", 463; See the introduction of this thesis.

## The 1968 revolts

1968 has no clear-cut definition in scholarly literature. While some scholars have epitomised the phenomenon by the youth and student revolts of the year 1968, others include broader developments and movements throughout the decade or even decades 1950s-1970s.<sup>48</sup> Although scholars disagree when and what 1968 actually was, it is possible to discern certain characteristics. As there exists a debate about the universality of the protests and movements around the world, this chapter will focus on the main Western and Scandinavian features.

One feature of 1968 was the revolts against the establishment. In the 1960s, there emerged a counterculture characterised by anti-authoritarianism, particularly among youth, in the United States and Western Europe. The counterculture was expressed through for instance arts, music and lifestyles, but the specific 1960s counterculture was also explicitly politicised through demands for social and political reforms.<sup>49</sup> Protests and calls for reforms emerged against what the youth saw as repressive systems.<sup>50</sup> While counterculture was not new, the 1960s counterculture was specific for its time as it emerged from the dissatisfaction with the prevalent Cold War culture, in addition to its unique social and geographical breadth.<sup>51</sup> Thus, the revolts of the 1960s can be characterised as revolts against the establishment that were specific for their time.

The discontent was also expressed through the rise of the so-called New Left, a movement of activists who typically embraced counterculture and participated in the 1960s protests. The New Left had emerged from opposition to what then became strands of the Old Left, namely social democracy and communism.<sup>52</sup> This aversion had been fuelled by two crises of 1956 – the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the social democratic support for or lack of critical distance to the Suez Crisis.<sup>53</sup> These actions, or lack of actions, made activists take a critical distance to the official policies of the established political parties as they regarded these to have been compromised.<sup>54</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s, this was followed by expressions of broader discontent of the activists with the political establishment and its accommodation

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<sup>48</sup> For examples of both approaches, see the different chapters in Fink, Gassert and Junker, *1968: The World Transformed*; For the latter, see for instance Horn, *The Spirit of '68* or Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture".

<sup>49</sup> Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture", 47.

<sup>50</sup> Anderson, "1968: The American and Scandinavian Experiences", 491-492.

<sup>51</sup> Suri, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture", 46-47.

<sup>52</sup> Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, 131.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

to the foreign and domestic status quo, as well as with these parties' traditionalist culture and rejection of mass culture and new trends.<sup>55</sup> In this way, the rise of the New Left was part of the 1968 phenomenon.

Furthermore, while the nature and characteristics of the revolts and the demands differed between countries, it is possible to discern certain common European features. Jørgensen characterises the European 1968 by three common features. Firstly, the European 1968 was a democratic revolt for equality and participation, which in the Western European democracies was focused on the integration of new groups into the democratic structure and on establishing new means of participation.<sup>56</sup> This was expressed through an individualisation of politics, meaning the proliferation of grassroots, single-issue movements.<sup>57</sup> This was a typical feature of the New Left, which generally decentralised decision-making, empowered grassroots activists, acted through direct actions and focused on broad mass mobilisation.<sup>58</sup> Next, there were raised aesthetic demands.<sup>59</sup> This represented a shift from an emphasis on material growth to an emphasis on quality of life and self-realisation. Lastly, the activists were raising racial and post-colonial issues.<sup>60</sup> Particularly the Third World was gaining attention among the activists. Historian Arif Dirlik in fact argues that one factor in the origins of 1968 was an “[a]cute awareness of relations of oppression and exploitation between the Three Worlds”, meaning the First, Second and Third Worlds.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the Western activists looked to Third World national liberation movements and adopted their solutions as they discarded the American capitalist and Soviet communist solutions.<sup>62</sup> A key issue for the revolts was their opposition to the Vietnam War, in particular the American involvement in the war. The war served to discredit American solutions to the world's problems, as well as to discredit European social democracy due its lack of criticism.<sup>63</sup> Thus, the European 1968 activists had both a domestic and an international outlook.

The legacy of 1968 is still a topic of discussion. Historian Terry Anderson argues that 1968 was “the ignition” - the sparks of which “exploded into a pageant of young people marching,

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<sup>55</sup> Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, 131-139.

<sup>56</sup> Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective”, 326.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 333-334.

<sup>58</sup> Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, 152.

<sup>59</sup> Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective”, 326-327.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Dirlik, “The Third World in 1968”, 314.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*; Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, 135.

demanding liberation, and empowerment, and the subsequent changes resulted in a different United States and Scandinavian nations, and in the continuing debate about the social, cultural and political legacies of the 1960s.”<sup>64</sup> Carole Fink, Phillipp Gassert and Detlef Junker similarly argue that Western societies were transformed by the 1960s upheavals, at least culturally, although the political legacy is still contested.<sup>65</sup>

However, Tor Egil Førland claims that the revolts in Scandinavia had a more lasting and thorough effect on their societies.<sup>66</sup> Førland’s claim relates to the argument made by Thomas Ekman Jørgensen in his article on “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective” in the same issue of the *Scandinavian Journal of History*. In the article, Jørgensen argues that although the revolts in the Scandinavian countries differed from each other, they had certain characteristics that make it possible to discern a Scandinavian 1968, namely the low level of conflict and the high level of integration.<sup>67</sup> Summarised by Førland, “the Scandinavian region is distinguished by a much stronger integration of the protest movement into society at large.”<sup>68</sup> Indeed, Jørgensen argues that the grassroot and single-issue movements that emerged were more integrated and politically successful in the Scandinavian countries than elsewhere.<sup>69</sup> There, the leftist parties entered the parliaments and the challenge of the New Left to social democracy was met with openness, integration and to some extent reforms.<sup>70</sup> In addition, their language was adopted into the political mainstream.<sup>71</sup> This claim is to a great extent supported by Professor of Social Work and Social Policy Steinar Stjernø who argues that the youth revolt’s radical language and broad concept of solidarity compelled European social democratic parties to consider revitalisation and programmatic renewal as they realised the need for a more radical language in order to not be isolated from the radical students and the middle class.<sup>72</sup> This was a general European development, but it occurred earlier in the Scandinavian countries.<sup>73</sup> In this way, the integration of the 1968 revolts in the Scandinavian countries is evident.

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<sup>64</sup> Anderson, “1968: The American and Scandinavian Experiences”, 498.

<sup>65</sup> Fink, Gassert and Junker, “Introduction”, 24. These authors refer to Macedo, *Reassessing the Sixties*.

<sup>66</sup> Førland, “Introduction to the Special Issue on 1968”, 320.

<sup>67</sup> Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective”, 335-336.

<sup>68</sup> Førland, “Introduction to the Special Issue on 1968”, 320.

<sup>69</sup> Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective”, 333-334.

<sup>70</sup> Jørgensen, “Scandinavia”, 249.

<sup>71</sup> Jørgensen, “The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective”, 334.

<sup>72</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 191; Stjernø, “The Idea of Solidarity in Europe”, 160.

<sup>73</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 192-193.

This integration of the revolts in the Scandinavian countries was allowed by the specific political and societal features of those countries. The central feature of the Scandinavian countries, except Finland, in Jørgensen's analysis is the political context with strong, stable political structures and a social democratic hegemony that was embedded in a strong consensus culture.<sup>74</sup> The social democratic hegemony made it normal to be leftist or socialist in mainstream society, and the social democratic parties were inclusive and contained leftist elements and maintained an interest in events and developments further out on the left wing.<sup>75</sup> The political context, moreover, allowed the political establishment in the Scandinavian countries to integrate ideas and demands from the protest movements with a large popular consensus, which they showed willingness and ability to do.<sup>76</sup> Jørgensen mentions the rising critique of the Vietnam War by the social democrats as an example of this.<sup>77</sup> In this way, the phenomenon of 1968 had a particular impact on the political establishment in the Scandinavian countries. As put by Førland, "[t]he inclusion of the movement into the mainstream perhaps made it less radical, but it also gave radicals an opportunity to influence parts of society more thoroughly than in much of continental Europe or the United States, where they were met with confrontation rather than conciliation."<sup>78</sup> Drawing on these arguments, the integration of issues and language from the activists by the political establishment, in particular the social democrats, in the Scandinavian countries should be emphasised. This provides valuable insight into the dynamic between the 1968 activism and the labour movement.

### **Proliferation of solidarity committees**

Another global trend in the 1960s was the proliferation of solidarity committees. Christiaens characterises the period from the late 1960s to the 1980s as "the highpoint of dozens of solidarity committees identifying with liberation movements and revolutionary regimes in the Third World."<sup>79</sup> According to Christiaens, such committees were "emblematic for the evolution Third World solidarity activism experienced during this period."<sup>80</sup> These solidarity groups often consisted of "a tiersmondist generation of activists" who, in the changed climate after 1968, viewed the alleged underdevelopment of the Third World in Neo-Marxist terms linking it to Western capitalism and imperialism and who were both advocating change in the

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<sup>74</sup> Jørgensen, "The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective", 327.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 331-333.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

<sup>78</sup> Førland, "Introduction to the Special Issue on 1968", 320.

<sup>79</sup> Christiaens, "States Going Transnational", 1279.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*



Third World and drawing inspiration for domestic change.<sup>81</sup> In this way, the solidarity committees can be understood as one expression of the 1968 activists' solidarity with the Third World. However, they were also a separate phenomenon before, during and after 1968. There is therefore a need for a perspective on solidarity committees that goes beyond the 1968 framework.<sup>82</sup>

The solidarity committees mobilised a wide array of actors, not only radical leftists. Although the solidarity committees proliferated in the changed climate after 1968, the committees mobilised activists across ideology and party politics as more movements and organisations put Third World issues on their agenda towards the end of the 1960s, which in some instances resulted in the emergence of large-scale heterogeneous solidarity movements.<sup>83</sup> While the discourse of the radical leftist groups emphasised the Third World, these groups were domestically marginal political actors who were unable to create “large-scale, sustained and organized campaigns”.<sup>84</sup> It was rather Christian, social democratic and communist movements in Europe that organised the largest demonstrations.<sup>85</sup> In fact, in the Nordic countries, the labour movements played a role of particular importance in the promotion of Third World solidarity.<sup>86</sup> There, the social democratic parties and the broader labour movement played a significant role, “bridging public and official support”.<sup>87</sup> Thus, political parties, like the social democrats, were actors in the solidarity committees for the Third World.

In addition, it was such established political movements who were the primary targets of diplomacy by governments and organisations in the Third World. In fact, it was “above all influential sectors of society, which organized international solidarity campaigns on a national scale, and provided access to broader networks, such as political parties, trade-union movements or professionalized NGOs”, rather than local student committees, that were targeted by the Third World diplomats.<sup>88</sup> In the Scandinavian case, although the direct contact with Third World diplomats and organisations remained limited in the 1960s, the labour movements could communicate with them through international labour movement organisations like the

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<sup>81</sup> Christiaens, “States Going Transnational”, 1279-1280.

<sup>82</sup> Christiaens, “Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds”, 932-934; Christiaens, “From the East to the South, and Back?”, 216-217.

<sup>83</sup> Christiaens, “States Going Transnational”, 1280.

<sup>84</sup> Christiaens, “Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds”, 936.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Marklund, *Neutrality and Solidarity in Nordic Humanitarian Action*, 13.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Christiaens, “Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds”, 942.

SI.<sup>89</sup> These connections contribute to the understanding of the role of the labour movements, including the Scandinavian labour movements, in solidarity committees.

A common trait of the solidarity committees was that they often focused on one single issue. This must be viewed in context of the individualisation of politics during 1968 in Europe which brought with it grassroots, single-issue movements.<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, the different solidarity committees engaged in a wide array of issues. Among the key issues that engaged such solidarities committees were the Vietnam War, dictatorships in Latin America and apartheid in South Africa.<sup>91</sup> At the same time, there were also solidarity committees and campaigns for other issues than the Third World, although they have often received less attention. Christiaens has, for instance, emphasised the neglect of European campaigns for Southern Europe, especially Greece, in the historiography.<sup>92</sup> Although there had occurred several solidarity campaigns for political prisoners and persecuted communists in Greece already in the 1940s and 1950s, the first sustained campaigns with broader support occurred in the early 1960s, led by Western European communist parties.<sup>93</sup> The interest in Greece, moreover, expanded after the military coup d'état in 1967. Following the coup a variety of movements, including the social democratic trade unions and parties, youth movements and the New Left, joined the solidarity campaigns and formed solidarity committees together with the communist movements.<sup>94</sup> This was also the case in Norway where various political parties and organisations, including DNA and LO, had formed the Norwegian Committee for Democracy in Greece (*Den norske komité for demokrati i Hellas*). The solidarity campaigns for Greece illustrate both that there was a proliferation of solidarity committees for more issues than the Third World and that solidarity committees gathered members of different political orientations. In this way, it is evident that the different single-issue solidarity committees engaged in various issues.

### **Solidarity efforts within the international labour movement**

While the solidarity committees that proliferated in the 1960s had labour and social democratic participation, they often had broad political backing. It thus remains the questions of

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<sup>89</sup> Marklund, *Neutrality and Solidarity in Nordic Humanitarian Action*, 13; Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*, 34.

<sup>90</sup> See Jørgensen, "The Scandinavian 1968 in a European Perspective", 333-334.

<sup>91</sup> Christiaens, "Europe at the Crossroads of Three Worlds", 933.

<sup>92</sup> Christiaens, "Communists are no Beasts", 623.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 626-627.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 630-633.

what solidarity efforts were taken within the international labour movement and whether there were established any specific labour movement committees in the late 1960s.

On the international level, the SI and the ICFTU appear to have been arenas for their respective members, the primarily European socialist parties in the SI and the various trade union federations and trade unions in the more international ICFTU, to discuss and obtain information on different international matters. Both organisations organised meetings and conferences where international issues were discussed and distributed circulars with information and appeals to action. Through resolutions and circulars, the SI and the ICFTU also expressed the organisations' official stance on and solidarity with different causes. In the late 1960s, anti-colonialism and opposition to the military junta in Greece and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia were among the recurring topics on the agenda.<sup>95</sup> The ICFTU was, moreover, involved in several campaigns, including against the apartheid regime in South Africa and the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece.<sup>96</sup> Thus, international issues were a topic within the SI and the ICFTU in which DNA and LO were respective members.

Despite the international engagement and expressions of solidarity, the direct multilateral actions of both the SI and the ICFTU remained limited in the late 1960s. The SI did not possess much executive authority with its purpose being to facilitate consensus.<sup>97</sup> The SI resolutions were therefore declarations of solidarity and calls for action rather than a reflection of widespread direct action. In addition, although Socialist Internationalism was based on a collective purpose of cooperating to create a new and better world after the two world wars, this purpose eventually started to wane in the 1960s.<sup>98</sup> The socialist parties retained an interest in international issues, but rather dealt with them on their own, which narrowed the discussions at the SI.<sup>99</sup> Still, there were some direct actions. The SI established for instance a committee for Greece in 1969, which however faltered due to the apathy of its Western European members and disagreement on the most suitable Greek partners for support.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek (hereafter AAB). The archives of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions ARK-1579 (hereafter LO's archives). Dd-L0622, Dd-L0661, Dd-L0705, Dd-L0706; AAB. The archives of the Norwegian Labour Party ARK-1001 (hereafter DNA's archives). Da-L0373, Da-L0400, Da-L0429.

<sup>96</sup> Gumbrell-McCormick, "Facing New Challenges", 358, 397.

<sup>97</sup> Imlay, "Socialist Internationalism after 1914", 221.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Christiaens, "Communists are no Beasts", 642.

The ICFTU, for its part, established the International Solidarity Fund in 1957 to provide support to trade unions and trade union projects around the world and which also made some other allocations to for instance natural catastrophes and aid to refugees and exiles.<sup>101</sup> Yet, the significance of the International Solidarity Fund in the developing world decreased in the 1960s as national trade unions retrenched their financial support due to internal struggles.<sup>102</sup> There was also an increasing tendency for bilateral endeavours instead of multilateral efforts through the ICFTU due to both political, financial and administrative considerations.<sup>103</sup> Ultimately, the international work within the ICFTU was hindered by financial difficulties, internal problems, a tendency of bilateral programs, and restraining political and economic conditions in the world.<sup>104</sup> Instead, the ICFTU relied on others to commit to international work, stating in their progress report from 1969 that “Since we can do but little by direct action, we constantly have to appeal to the solidarity of our affiliates, to public opinion and to the governments of the world.”<sup>105</sup> Thus, while the international labour organisations were involved in several international issues, the direct actions of the SI and the ICFTU remained limited in the late 1960s.<sup>106</sup> Nevertheless, these international organisations remained arenas in which the national socialist parties and trade union federations could discuss and obtain information.

In the labour movements in Norway’s Scandinavian neighbours, there was, however, increasing international activity in the 1960s. The Swedish labour movement had been engaged in a campaign for liberation movements in Southern Africa, including the anti-apartheid movement, since the end of the 1950s.<sup>107</sup> In contrast to earlier, more sporadic, solidarity actions of the labour movement, the campaign for Southern Africa was long-lasting and comprehensive, involving both political and practical support to Southern African movements.<sup>108</sup> From around the mid-1960s, several events contributed to broaden the international solidarity agenda of the Swedish labour movement even further, with growing attention to the events like Vietnam, Greece and Czechoslovakia.<sup>109</sup> The Swedish social democratic government was in fact a

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<sup>101</sup> Windmuller, “Cohesion and Disunity in the ICFTU”, 357.

<sup>102</sup> Carew, “Towards a Free Trade Union Centre”, 305.

<sup>103</sup> Windmuller, “Internationalism in Eclipse”, 525.

<sup>104</sup> Carew, “Towards a Free Trade Union Centre”, 318.

<sup>105</sup> *Twenty Years: ICFTU 1949-69* cited in *Ibid.*, 319.

<sup>106</sup> Also the ILO engaged in various international issues. After pressure from the Afro-Asian countries, the ILO took several steps against the South African apartheid regime in the 1960s. The ILO was also involved in the struggle against the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek regimes, but was limited to efforts of moral support and serving as a reference to trade unionists. Maul, *The International Labour Organization*, 210, 228.

<sup>107</sup> Silén, *Uppdrag Solidaritet*, 10.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

leading critic of the role of the United States in the Vietnam War.<sup>110</sup> In the Scandinavian context, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*) was early in its criticism of the Vietnam War and in particular the American policy, with criticism in 1965. This was primarily due to Swedish neutrality in the Cold War, the strength and unity of the party and the earlier peak of the revolutionary left who were putting pressure on the party.<sup>111</sup> Although the Swedish Social Democratic Party genuinely opposed the war, its opposition also served domestic purposes.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, the government's Vietnam policy was to a great extent directed at the young radicals and urban intelligentsia who were the primary anti-war activists.<sup>113</sup> Thus, as new issues entered the agenda, the Swedish labour movement was increasingly turning its attention to international issues.

Similarly the Danish labour movement increased its international engagement. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Danish Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet*) increased its contact outside of Europe and its engagement in Latin America and Africa.<sup>114</sup> In 1969, the party adopted a programme of action that pledged and gave high priority to support a number of national liberation movements and their struggle for political, economic and social independence.<sup>115</sup> Christopher Munthe Morgenstjerne argues that the domestic political context is essential to understand this development. Pressurised by the youth and the New Left, the Social Democratic Party "was forced to strengthen its positions including issues like international relations and solidarity."<sup>116</sup> Additionally, as the party had lost government power in 1968, it was freer to pursue a more radical policy.<sup>117</sup> This is supported by James Godbolt, Chris Holmsted Larsen and Søren Hein Rasmussen who argue that the Danish social democrats gradually moved away from its support of the American warfare in Vietnam after losing government power and phrased their criticism in a way that would appease the party's left-wing critics.<sup>118</sup> This shift in policy was also tied to internal developments within the party, as well as to developments in and information about the war.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, it was not only the party that engaged in international issues. The trade union movement played a significant role in several

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<sup>110</sup> Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, 17.

<sup>111</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War", 396.

<sup>112</sup> Scott, *Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War*, 34.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>114</sup> Bille and Christoffersen, *De danske partiers internationale forbindelser*, 26.

<sup>115</sup> Morgenstjerne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, 55.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>118</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War", 398.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 399.

solidarity movements, including the Vietnam and the anti-apartheid movements.<sup>120</sup> In this way, it is evident that the Danish labour movement took an increasingly more active position on several issues.

The increased international engagement and solidarity efforts were eventually institutionalised. In 1969, the Danish Social Democratic Party established the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund (*Arbejderbevægelsens Solidaritetsfond*). The fund was established for the labour movement with the purpose of collecting funds to support parties, organisations and movements that worked on the basis of democratic socialism, primarily in developing countries.<sup>121</sup> This included socialist parties and national liberation movements. The establishment of this committee must be viewed in context of the increased focus on such efforts in the party's programme of action that same year.

In contrast, while organising large-scale, coordinated campaigns in the 1960s, it was not until 1970s that the Swedish labour movement formalised its efforts. In 1977, the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisationen i Sverige*) and the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (*Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation*) established a secretariat to institutionalise their cooperation which previously, since 1974, had been conducted by a joint international committee.<sup>122</sup> This secretariat worked primarily with trade union assistance in developing countries. Moreover, the International Centre of the Labour Movement (*Arbetarrörelsens Internationella Centrum*) was established in 1978 by the Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions, the Swedish Co-operative Union and Wholesale Society (*Kooperativa Förbundet*) and the Swedish Workers' Educational Assistance (*Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*). This initiative was a formalisation of the coordination efforts that labour movement organisations had attempted in order to make their work more effective, especially after the international activity increased.<sup>123</sup> According to Birgitta Silén, the centre was a result of high pressure and a realisation that the labour movement needed an organisation dedicated specifically to international issues, in particular development and political campaigns.<sup>124</sup> Thus, the centre had a wide objective going beyond just labour issues and trade union rights.

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<sup>120</sup> Bjerregaard, "Et undertrykt folk har altid ret", 61.

<sup>121</sup> Bille and Christoffersen, *De danske partiers internationale forbindelser*, 26.

<sup>122</sup> Sellström, *Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1994*, 289.

<sup>123</sup> Silén, *Uppdrag Solidaritet*, 92-93.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

In this way, there was increasing international engagement and solidarity efforts in the Swedish and Danish labour movements in the 1960s. In addition, these movements formalised their international work in committees. Whereas the Swedish labour movement eventually formed committees in the 1970s, the Danish labour movement established a Solidarity Fund in 1969, the same year that the Norwegian AIS was established. However, the accessed archival material has not revealed any communication between the Norwegian and the Swedish and Danish labour movements on the particular issue of the establishment of AIS or the Danish Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund.<sup>125</sup> Still, this does not necessarily mean that it was not a topic among the Scandinavian movements. The Scandinavian labour movements conferred with each other on several issues and met in several venues which allowed discussions to take place. One can assume that if not the particular issue of such committees was discussed, there were discussions on how to deal with international issues. In fact, the source material asserts that this happened on several occasions.<sup>126</sup> In addition, in the cases of the Vietnam War and support to national liberation movements, the already existing support or actions of the Swedish and Norwegian social democratic governments allowed the Danish social democrats to pursue similar actions in government.<sup>127</sup> There were, thus, clear intellectual connections between the Scandinavian labour movements, which imply that they might have looked to each other.

## **Chapter findings**

This chapter has sought to examine certain global and regional trends in order to explore the global and regional context in which AIS was established. By exploring this, the chapter has aimed to provide a basis to later examine whether AIS was part of a broader pattern. It has asserted that there was a proliferation of activism and solidarity efforts in the 1960s. Firstly, in the 1960s, a generation of youth were revolting and calling the established politics into question. They were raising both domestic and international issues. In the Scandinavian countries, the demands and issues raised by the revolts were to a great extent integrated by the political establishment, including the social democratic parties. Next, there was a proliferation of solidarity committees in the 1960s. These committees were primarily single-issue committees

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<sup>125</sup> The archival material has not indicated any correspondence directly related to AIS at all.

<sup>126</sup> See for instance AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0661. Sak nr. 54-4 1968 FFI. Letter from the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions concerning Greece, 29.05.1968 and AAB. DNA's archives. Da-L0373. Internasjonal korrespondanse – Europa. Letters from DNA to the Danish and Swedish social democratic parties concerning the Pan-African Congress, 22.06.1966.

<sup>127</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War", 399; Morgenstjerne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, 48.

with broad political backing, including the participation of labour movements. Finally, whereas the direct actions of the international labour movement organisations remained limited, the Swedish and Danish labour movements were increasing their international engagement and at different occasions formalising their efforts. While the Norwegian labour movement had connections to these trends and contexts through various dynamics, it remains to see whether these trends and dynamics were reflected in the establishment of AIS.



## **Chapter 2: The main actors and their experiences and ideas**

The final decision to establish AIS was adopted unanimously at the LO Congress and DNA's Party Congress in May 1969. This chapter addresses the issue of who were the key actors involved in the establishment of AIS in the process prior to this decision. It asks who were they and what were their main characteristics, international engagement and views? Taking this actor approach, the chapter aims to provide insight into who these individuals were specifically and the experiences and ideas that lay the foundation for the committee. While providing insight into the origins of AIS, the chapter will also take part in the scholarly debate on Norwegian international engagement. By studying the main actors involved in the establishment of AIS, the chapter will contribute to the debate on who was involved in Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s.

The chapter will start by examining the process in order to identify the main actors, as the origins of the committee have not yet been examined by scholars. Next, building primarily on biographies and literature on the labour and trade union movements, the chapter will study the characteristics, main views and international and transnational engagement of these key actors. While there exists less detailed information and material on some individuals, the chapter will give remarks on the group composition and provide some insights on the individuals and on certain common themes.

The chapter identifies the Cooperation Committee as the key developer of AIS. The individuals in this committee were men belonging to the older generations and to the leadership in LO and DNA with a long-lasting involvement in the labour movement. Their experiences of the rise of fascism and war in the 1930s and 1940s affected their world view, by illustrating the dangers of fascism and contributing to the conviction that peace is indivisible. Lastly, these men were part of a transnational labour movement and engaged with different international issues to varying extents, although they primarily were politicians and trade union officials with a Norwegian foothold.

### **The process of establishing AIS**

The process of establishing AIS involved several bodies within the Norwegian labour movement. The issue of creating a new committee for international work within the labour movement was first discussed at a meeting of a task force consisting of representatives from LO

and the trade union federations, put together by LO's Secretariat specifically to discuss the issue of establishing a labour movement committee for Greece. The contemplation of such a committee followed the disintegration of the Norwegian Committee for Democracy in Greece, which was a committee with broad political backing including support from both DNA and LO, in the spring of 1968.<sup>128</sup> In a meeting in June 1968, the task force discussed the establishment of a labour movement committee for Greece and a proposal for its statutes. The proposed statutes laid forward a committee consisting of members from DNA, LO, the affiliated trade unions federations and AUF which would work to promote the reestablishment of democracy in Greece. The committee was proposed to work in close contact with similar existing committees in which the trade union movement was involved in order to coordinate the international work of the trade union movement as much as possible.<sup>129</sup>

However, two of the task force's members, Øystein Larsen from the Norwegian Union of General Workers (*Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund*) and Per Andersen from the Norwegian Union of Iron and Metalworkers (*Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund*), objected to the establishment of such a committee. They argued that the existing Committee for Democracy in Greece received large support from the clubs and trade unions after its disintegration. In their view, difficulties could arise within the trade unions if a new, labour movement committee for Greece was established. They also pointed out that it would be better for the labour movement if they could coordinate the work that was performed by separate committees within the labour movement at the time. The question was raised whether the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund (*Arbeiderbevegelsens Solidaritetsfond*) or the Norwegian Committee for Spain (*Den norske Spaniakomite*), which were already established bodies within the labour movement, could take on the tasks intended for a potential labour movement committee for Greece.<sup>130</sup> The task force decided to send the proposed statutes and a record of the views expressed at the meeting to LO's Secretariat, which forwarded it to the Cooperation Committee.<sup>131</sup> The issue was processed and the issue of how to organise the international support efforts of the labour

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<sup>128</sup> The committee had been established to support the reestablishment of democracy in Greece following the coup in 1967. The disintegration of the committee will be further detailed in Chapter 4. Notably, disagreements led to a split in the committee. After this, the minority of the committee continued the committee's work.

<sup>129</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0635. Sak nr. 50-7 1968 Samarbeidskomiteen mellom LO og DNA. Memorandum on the labour movement's committee for Greece, 21.06.1968.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.; AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0024. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1968. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 24.06.1968.

movement was discussed in the Cooperation Committee in September with the decision being to contemplate the issue further in a later meeting.<sup>132</sup>

In October 1968, the Cooperation Committee agreed to create a new task force to discuss the issue of establishing a body to work with situations that might arise in other countries.<sup>133</sup> The task force, which was led by DNA politician and third secretary of LO Odd Højdahl, was given the mandate to work out the statutes of such a permanent body. These statutes were to define the size of the body and the representation of the trade union movement and DNA, as well as the objective and tasks of the body.<sup>134</sup> In the end of January 1969, the task force presented, to the Cooperation Committee, the draft statutes for the Labour Movement's Help Fund (*Arbeiderbevegelsens hjelpefond*) that would coordinate the labour movement's international support efforts.<sup>135</sup> These were the draft statutes of the body that later in the process was renamed the International Solidarity Committee. Thus, the statutes for AIS were initially developed in this task force.

Nonetheless, the proposal of establishing a permanent body came from the Cooperation Committee, which also provided guidelines and contextualised the objective and tasks of the body in the mandate that was given to the task force led by Højdahl. The mandate stated that the objective and tasks of the body ought to be determined with an aim of dealing with such tasks that various situational bodies had performed in the post-war years, for instance the committees for South Africa, Vietnam, Greece, Czechoslovakia and Spain.<sup>136</sup> This mandate was a repetition of the mandate as stated in a memorandum written by LO chairman Parelius Mentsen two weeks prior.<sup>137</sup> While not stated explicitly in the source material, one can assume that this memorandum was sent on behalf of the Cooperation Committee as Mentsen was a member and as they repeated the mandate in their next formal meeting. Thus, the guidelines and contextualisation originated from the Cooperation Committee, while the task force

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<sup>132</sup> AAB. DNA's archives. Af-L0001. Møtebok 1965-1971. Protocol from meeting of the Cooperation Committee, 04.09.1968.

<sup>133</sup> AAB. DNA's archives. Af-L0001. Møtebok 1965-1971. Protocol from meeting of the Cooperation Committee, 22.10.1968.

<sup>134</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0025. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1969. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 03.01.1969.

<sup>135</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0680. Sak nr. 50-11 1969 Komiteer og utvalg i LO. Proposal to the Cooperation Committee, 29.01.1969.

<sup>136</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0025. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1969. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 03.01.1969. The protocol refers to the meeting in the Cooperation Committee 18.12.1968.

<sup>137</sup> AAB. DNA's archives. Da-L0438. Samarbeidskomiteen. Memorandum attached to letter from P. Mentsen, 04.12.1968.

led by Højdahl appears to have had a more practical function in the process. In addition, the Cooperation Committee received the proposed statutes from the task force and further developed the proposal. The name the International Solidarity Committee, which replaced the suggested Labour Movement's Help Fund, also seems to stem from the Cooperation Committee.<sup>138</sup> In this way, while the task forces established by LO and the Cooperation Committee played a role in the development of AIS, the Cooperation Committee appears as the main body involved in the process before the establishment of AIS was finally adopted at the LO Congress and the Party Congress.

### **The Cooperation Committee**

The Cooperation Committee consisted of some of the main representatives from LO and DNA. In 1968 and until the LO Congress and the Party Congress in 1969, the members were Haakon Lie, Reiulf Steen and Trygve Bratteli, with Reidar Hirsti as substitute, from DNA, and Parelius Mentsen, Tor Aspengren and Fritz W. Hannestad, with Alf Andersen as substitute and secretary, from LO.

These members were representing the leadership of the labour movement. The members from DNA were those holding the top elected positions within the party, namely the chairman Bratteli, the vice-chairman Steen, the secretary Lie, and the editor-in-chief of *Arbeiderbladet* Hirsti. While Lie had held his position since 1945, the three others had been appointed to their positions in 1963 and 1965.<sup>139</sup> However, prior to their appointment they had held other high-ranking positions. In addition to having held several ministerial postings in the DNA governments, Bratteli served as vice-chairman of the party from 1945. Steen and Hirsti had both served as chairmen of AUF. Notably, these four men all originated from working class backgrounds, became involved in the labour movement from an early age and had risen through the party ranks.

Likewise, the members representing LO in the Cooperation Committee held top positions within the trade union movement. Mentsen and Aspengren were chairman and vice-chairman of LO since 1965. Hannestad served as the President of the Norwegian Union of Supervisors

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<sup>138</sup> It is in the documents from the Cooperation Committee where this name first appears in the archival material that I have studied.

<sup>139</sup> Hirsti was elected editor-in-chief at the Party Congress in 1963, while Bratteli and Steen was appointed in 1965.

and Technical Employees (*Norsk Forbund for Arbeidsledere og Tekniske Funksjonærer*) and member of the Secretariat, while Andersen was head treasurer in LO. Less detailed information exists on the background of these men. Still, while Mentsen had a long career as paid trade union official within LO and had served as vice-chairman between 1950 and 1965, Hanestad, Andersen and Aspengren had backgrounds as trade union officials in different federations. Similar to Mentsen, Andersen had a long career in LO's elected leadership, having held the position of secretary from 1950 to 1961 when he was elected head treasurer. It should also be noted that the members of the two task forces that had been involved in the process of establishing AIS were all members or substitute members of LO's Secretariat, except for one who belonged to the administration.

Next, there was a total predominance of men in the Cooperation Committee. Although several women were heavily involved in the international work of the labour movement, they were still a large minority in the leadership in DNA and LO and absent from the Cooperation Committee.<sup>140</sup> In fact, in all the bodies involved in the process of establishing AIS, there was only one woman involved, namely Liv Buck in the task force put together to contemplate a committee for Greece, who later, in 1971, became the first woman elected into the LO leadership. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to contemplate further the gender dimension, it is noteworthy that it was primarily men who then defined this part of the labour movement's international work.

Moreover, these men belonged to the older generations. Certainly, there was a generation gap within the Cooperation Committee with Steen being the youngest member with his 35 years in 1968, compared to the 66 and 63 years of the oldest members Mentsen and Lie respectively.<sup>141</sup> The age gap created obvious differences. In his autobiography *Der hjertet banker*, Steen describes a generation gap so large that it made the integration of the two generations into a joint leadership difficult due to differences in age, experiences, attitudes and perceptions. According to Steen, Hirsti, who also was relatively young, was of the same opinion.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> DNA's Aase Lionæs was for instance the chairman of the original Norwegian Committee for Democracy in Greece and served as substitute member of DNA's group in the Committee of Foreign and Constitutional Affairs in the parliament. Another example is Aase Bjerkholt who was involved in the work with development aid and later selected as member of AIS.

<sup>141</sup> Aspengren was also younger than most of LO's leadership. Despite his mature age of 48 when being elected vice-chairman in 1965, Aspengren is considered to be part of a generation shift in LO, in which younger representatives came to replace the LO leadership who were well into their 60s and had held top positions for most of the post-war years. Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 20-21.

<sup>142</sup> Steen, *Der hjertet banker*, 114.

The generational differences materialised in a clash between Lie and Steen.<sup>143</sup> However, the differences did not necessarily exclude good connections. Steen claims that he was able to connect with Bratteli despite the generation gap because of shared ideological views, shared interests and a shared social background.<sup>144</sup> In addition, although Steen and Hirsti belonged to younger generations, both had left AUF for the parent party. The youth generation was also not content with Steen who in their view did not represent the renewal of the party that they had been hoping for.<sup>145</sup> Thus, despite the spread in age within the committee, the members can be distinguished from the generation of youth in the 1960s.

*A world view marked by experiences of fascism and war*

The members of the Cooperation Committee belonged to generations that had experienced the rise of fascism in the 1930s or at least some of its consequences. These experiences marked their world view. Firstly, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 and the continued fight against fascism in Spain was an important issue for the Norwegian labour movement. Pharo has even argued that “for the generation coming of age in the interwar period, [who dominated Norwegian politics from 1945 to the early 1970s,] the civil war in Spain has been likened to the Vietnam War as a formative experience.”<sup>146</sup> The 1930s had seen the rise of fascism in Europe with for instance Hitler’s and Mussolini’s rise to power in Germany and Italy respectively. When the civil war broke out in Spain in 1936, it provoked strong reactions within the Norwegian labour movement as it followed a reactionary coup led by general Francisco Franco against a democratically elected government and represented yet another example of the rise of fascism in Europe.<sup>147</sup> The struggle against fascism, both domestically and abroad was among the main causes preoccupying the Norwegian labour movement in the 1930s.<sup>148</sup> The interest in Spain was first and foremost motivated by a class-based solidarity with a perceived political community and providing support to the left wing.<sup>149</sup> However, the support to Spain was by some also viewed as containment of the fascist threat in Europe.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 49.

<sup>144</sup> Steen, *Der hjertet banker*, 116.

<sup>145</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 51.

<sup>146</sup> Pharo, “Small State Anti-Fascism”, 10.

<sup>147</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 81-83.

<sup>148</sup> Lange, *Samling om felles mål*, 64.

<sup>149</sup> Fure, *Mellomkrigstid*, 292.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

Whereas the Norwegian DNA government was restrained by strong trade and shipping interests, the lead in the work for Spain was rather taken by LO in a humanitarian fund-raising campaign.<sup>151</sup> Their initiative led to the establishment of a broad cross-party committee, which was an unusual measure in the labour movement at the time and served to underline the strength of their engagement for Spain.<sup>152</sup> The efforts for Spain also included travels to Spain, both by people enlisting in the war effort and by people who were observing and bringing information back home. The latter included Haakon Lie, who in the winter of 1936-1937 travelled to Spain to observe the situation. For him, the memories from Spain became “a painful first-hand experience of the difficulties of raising an effective front against the threat of fascism, both internationally and nationally.”<sup>153</sup> The war illustrated to Lie both the threat of dictatorships against democracies and the consequences of dictatorship.<sup>154</sup> Thus, the Spanish Civil War had illustrated the dangers of fascism and evoked much engagement within the Norwegian labour movement. Certainly, the struggle against the Spanish Franco regime remained an important issue for the Norwegian labour movement after the civil war ended. In government, DNA worked against Spanish membership in the United Nations and NATO, but further actions were restrained by Norwegian trade and shipping interests, especially because of the rebuilding efforts needed after the world war.<sup>155</sup> Still, the labour movement continued its efforts in the Norwegian Committee for Spain. As the work continued, younger generations were included in the work related to Spain, with for instance Reiulf Steen representing AUF on the board of the committee.

Another event that came to mark the members of the Cooperation Committee was the Second World War. Members of the labour movement were active participants of resistance activities in Norway during the German occupation. This included for instance Lie, Bratteli, Andersen and Mentsen. Lie also worked in London and the United States to collect money for the humanitarian efforts in Norway after fleeing in 1941. In addition to their resistance and humanitarian efforts, their generation also had personal experiences that left them marked by the war. Described as perhaps the toughest moment in Lie’s personal life was the loss of his brother in a Nazi concentration camp few weeks before the liberation in 1945.<sup>156</sup> Bratteli, for his part,

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<sup>151</sup> Pryser, *Klassen og nasjonen*, 206-207; Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 82-83.

<sup>152</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 83.

<sup>153</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 111. My translation.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 308.

<sup>156</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 204-205.

had himself spent the last years of the war in Nazi labour camps. Thus, the members of the Cooperation Committee belonged to the generations who had felt the consequences of war and occupation. The war in fact also made an impact on the younger generations at the time. Steen, who was only seven years old when the Germans invaded Norway in 1940, remarked that “during the war, we were too young to participate, but old enough for it to leave lasting marks.”<sup>157</sup>

The rise of fascism and the world war affected the world view of the generations that experienced it. Already in the 1930s had parts of the labour movement, including Bratteli, sought a more active foreign political line, with support to antifascist forces and increased military spending as a defence against the fascist threat.<sup>158</sup> This was a response to the rise of fascism internationally, as well as the risk that Norway would be involved in a war.<sup>159</sup> Lie, who had been a convicted anti-militarist willing to risk imprisonment to demonstrate that view as late as in 1927 when he rejected military service, had by the late 1930s turned into an advocate of military armament to face the threat from dictatorships.<sup>160</sup> The active foreign political line advocated by several members of the labour movement contrasted the traditional line of the labour movement that saw the military apparatus as a bourgeois weapon against the working class. After the war broke out in 1939, the active foreign policy line became widely supported.<sup>161</sup>

In her master thesis on DNA, Anita Gismervik concludes that during the war, there was an outspread realisation that the world was indivisible and that Norway had to work for military and political guarantees to secure the peace. This was a transition from the idealistic ideas of the interwar period that if you worked hard enough for disarmament and willingness for peace, the peace would last.<sup>162</sup> Pharo similarly argues that the Second World War contributed to a change in attitude in so far that the war and occupation had illustrated for Norwegian statesmen that Norway could not avoid being involved in a war between the great powers.<sup>163</sup> This conviction of peace as indivisible built, moreover, on the experiences of the interwar period and the outbreak of war. These experiences had contributed to the perception that war

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<sup>157</sup> Steen cited in Lahlum, *Reiulf Steen*, 23. My translation.

<sup>158</sup> Lange, *Samling om felles mål*, 66.

<sup>159</sup> Pryser, *Klassen og nasjonen*, 214.

<sup>160</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 51, 127.

<sup>161</sup> Lange, *Samling om felles mål*, 66.

<sup>162</sup> Gismervik, “Arbeiderpartiet mellom idealisme og realisme”.

<sup>163</sup> Pharo, “Terje Tvedts historier”, 200.



was tied to poverty and need, which laid the foundation for political extremism and totalitarian movements, and that totalitarian states were inclined to pursue expansion and an aggressive foreign policy.<sup>164</sup> After the war, this perception, paired with the increasingly global Cold War, contributed to maintain the conviction that peace was indivisible and that the faith of the West, and Norway, was dependent on developments in remote areas of the world.<sup>165</sup> The members of the Cooperation Committee thus belonged to generations who came to perceive the peace as indivisible.

### *International and transnational engagement*

Several of the members of the Cooperation Committee participated considerably in the Norwegian labour movement's international work. Steen led DNA's internal international committee in a period after 1965, whereas Bratteli served on several occasions in the Committee of Foreign and Constitutional Affairs in the Norwegian parliament. Lie has, for his part, been described as the most international-orientated party secretary that DNA has ever had.<sup>166</sup> In addition, although DNA was more involved in international issues than LO, the international work of the confederation increased during Mentsen's and Aspengren's chairmanships as part of a broader reorganisation.<sup>167</sup> Aspengren has, indeed, been described as having a particularly strong interest in international issues and solidarity work.<sup>168</sup>

One issue that received much attention was the Cold War. The Western orientation was particularly evident in DNA. Bratteli supported Norway's Western orientation in the Cold War and the NATO membership.<sup>169</sup> Steen supported the NATO membership as security political necessity, although he had some critical remarks to the alliance.<sup>170</sup> Lie distinguished himself as a particularly staunch anti-communist and had since the Second World War looked to the United States as "a democracy and military superpower to which Norway and other small states in Western Europe were dependent on having good relations".<sup>171</sup> According to Nyhamar, Lie's anti-communism affected his entire world view.<sup>172</sup> Anti-communism was also widespread in LO, although some within the trade union movement sought to avoid the

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<sup>164</sup> Pharo, "Den norske fredstradisjonen", 248.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 442.

<sup>167</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 467-468; Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 38.

<sup>168</sup> Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 80.

<sup>169</sup> Ørvik, *Kampen om Arbeiderpartiet*, 188; Engstad, *Statsmann i storm og stille*, 49.

<sup>170</sup> Lahlum, *Reiulf Steen*, 47.

<sup>171</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 187. My translation.

<sup>172</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 111.

Western orientation.<sup>173</sup> Aspengren was among those who showed an increasing willingness for contact eastward in the 1960s.<sup>174</sup>

The anti-communism and westward orientation of the labour movement put its mark on their policies and reactions to different events. Historian Hilde Henriksen Waage has described the different reactions to the Israeli, French and British invasion of Egypt and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Waage contrasts the clear-cut denunciations of the Soviet Union with the mixed reactions within labour movement to the Suez Crisis and the more reluctant criticism of the NATO allies and Israel within the leadership, including Bratteli and Lie.<sup>175</sup> Their scepticism towards the Soviet Union can contribute to explain these differences in reactions, although the general support to Israel among several within the labour movement should also be noted.<sup>176</sup> A decade later, the anti-communism and westward orientation of the DNA leadership continued to put its mark on the official policies of the party, specifically on the Vietnam issue. Until the party finally adopted a more radical stance on the Vietnam War in 1967, the party had for years been unwilling to criticise the American involvement in the war.<sup>177</sup> Lie saw the war as a step in the communist expansion strategy and took a clear pro-United States stance.<sup>178</sup> Others in the DNA leadership were not in favour of the war, but remained reluctant to criticise Norway's most essential ally, the United States.<sup>179</sup> Indeed, Bratteli referred to the war as tragic and meaningless war, but did not denounce the American war efforts.<sup>180</sup> However, it should be noted that others in the leadership took a more critical stance. Steen participated in the *Landsinnsamlingen til Vietnam*, a movement that contributed to legitimise the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (*Front National de Libération*, FNL) as an independent part in the conflict.<sup>181</sup> In addition, *Arbeiderbladet*, edited by Hirsti, was not clearly pro-American in its reports on the war in 1965.<sup>182</sup> Thus, the east-west focus put its marks on the official stance, although there existed some more critical positions within the leadership.

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<sup>173</sup> Terjesen, "Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser", 34-35.

<sup>174</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 435.

<sup>175</sup> See Waage for a more detailed account. Waage, *Norge – Israels beste venn*, 329-336.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 329-332.

<sup>177</sup> The turn in their stance will be further detailed in Chapter 3.

<sup>178</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 104; Lie, *Slik jeg ser det*, 355.

<sup>179</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 104.

<sup>180</sup> Lorenz, *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie*, 171-172.

<sup>181</sup> Godbolt, "Vietnamkrigen i Norge", 129.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*

Another issue that received increasing attention by the members of the Cooperation Committee, as well as in the broader labour movement, was the Third World. In government, DNA became increasingly involved in development and decolonisation in the 1950s and even more so in the 1960s.<sup>183</sup> The more trade union and worker-orientated development work was performed through the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund, established in 1963. Haakon Lie was central in the establishment of this fund and has described it as "Pretty much my baby".<sup>184</sup> Lie was also involved in the process leading up to the first Norwegian development project in India in the early 1950s.<sup>185</sup> According to historian and biographer Hans Olav Lahlum, Lie was a glowing internationalist, who already before the world war had been involved in several international aid campaigns.<sup>186</sup> Although Lie was motivated by a genuine wish to support people in need, there also existed realist and tactical considerations behind his dedication to development aid.<sup>187</sup> The development aid was also supported by Bratteli who, affected by his experiences of war, came to see cooperation between the nations, also the developing countries, as an essential factor for peace together with traditional defence measures.<sup>188</sup> Moreover, Steen engaged with North-South issues and was particularly involved in the anti-apartheid cause and became leader of the international Anti-Apartheid movement in 1962.<sup>189</sup> Thus, several members of the Cooperation Committee displayed an interest in North-South issues.

The Norwegian labour movement that the members of the Cooperation Committee belonged to was one with international and transnational connections. Through meetings, conferences and study trips, they could discuss and learn from other labour movements. Bratteli was for instance, from early on in his career, involved in Nordic and international labour movement cooperation and participated in conferences.<sup>190</sup> Lie was, moreover, particularly involved in such activities due to his work in the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund.<sup>191</sup> Besides, LO was member of the ICFTU from 1949, and from 1951 DNA was member in the SI. Both provided an arena to discuss issues with their international counterparts. Steen met as representative of DNA in the SI on several occasions. In his autobiography *Maktkamp*, Steen describes

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<sup>183</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>184</sup> Lie cited in Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 440.

<sup>185</sup> Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 44.

<sup>186</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 325.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*; Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 42-44.

<sup>188</sup> Engstad, *Statsmann i storm og stille*, 117-118, 234-235.

<sup>189</sup> Lahlum, *Reiulf Steen*, 83.

<sup>190</sup> Engstad, *Statsmann i storm og stille*, 112.

<sup>191</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 440-441.

this arena as providing him with the opportunity to see how other socialists dealt with the same issues and share perspectives.<sup>192</sup> In addition, the archives of both LO and DNA witness frequent international correspondence from these organisations. DNA, as government party, and LO had also participated in the ILO. The labour movement thus had clear transnational connections and participated in transnational and international venues.

Finally, certain remarks on the international and transnational engagement are due. Firstly, it should be noted that international engagement was only part of the political portfolios of the Cooperation Committee's members. On the domestic level, these men were engaged in a range of issues, both political, organisational and trade union-related. Secondly, prior to the establishment of AIS, the members of the Cooperation Committee appear to have been involved in international and transnational cooperation primarily as representatives of the Norwegian labour movement rather than as statesmen. Indeed, it was only Bratteli who had held a ministerial posting. The members of the Cooperation Committee were therefore primarily Norwegian politicians and trade union officials with transnational connections and an interest for international issues.

### **Chapter findings**

This chapter has sought to examine the key actors involved in the establishment of AIS and shed light on the experiences and ideas that lay the foundation for the committee. The chapter has found that although two ad-hoc task forces were involved in the process of establishing AIS, the Cooperation Committee was the primary group. The members of the Cooperation Committee were men who belonged to the relatively older generations and the leadership in DNA and LO. Some members were quite new to the leadership, whereas others had been in the leadership for decades. Nevertheless, they all had a strong adherence to the labour movement, and even the newest members to the leadership had been involved in the party or trade union federations for a long time. Their world view was heavily affected by their experiences of fascism and war in the 1930s, which had illustrated the consequences of fascism and led to a view of peace as indivisible. Although these men were politicians and trade union officials with a national rooting, they were part of a transnational labour movement and engaged with international issues to varying extents. Generally, they were marked by anti-communism and

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<sup>192</sup> Steen, *Maktkamp*, 118.

a Western orientation, which made East-West issues a prominent concern. Still, they also displayed an interest for North-South issues.

These findings have implications for the debate on who was involved in Norwegian international engagement. The members of the Cooperation Committee fit within the description of what Tvedt describes as the elite of the one-party state that rose from the working class into the leading ranks of the labour movement and hence society.<sup>193</sup> This elite contrast the elite that is the focus of Tvedt's book, namely the political elite that emerged during Norway's international breakthrough from the 1960s onwards.<sup>194</sup> Tvedt argues that this new political elite, which was produced within an emerging humanitarian-political complex, defined Norway's internationalisation and led and formed the education of the population by spreading their own understandings of international development and Norway's role in it.<sup>195</sup> The elite that led this educational project were individuals who primarily always had been politicians or had background from international work in various institutions and organisations.<sup>196</sup> Tvedt distinguishes this elite from earlier elites in Norwegian history, for instance the elites of the one-party state, as the new elite was formed more by international political-ideological thoughts within aid and migration than discussions among workers or parliamentarians.<sup>197</sup> This description of the new political elite clearly does not cover the members of the Cooperation Committee.

AIS was thus an established by an old political elite rather than the new elite that Tvedt argues emerged from the 1960s onwards. This suggest that one needs to look beyond the new political elite described by Tvedt in order to understand the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s. This is supported by Simensen who argues that internal issues within DNA is essential to understand the radical turn in Norwegian foreign policy around 1970.<sup>198</sup>

Like the new elite that Tvedt describes, members of the old elite did engage in international arenas and with international issues, among them development aid. However, the question

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<sup>193</sup> Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*, 282. Tvedt refers to Jens Arup Seip who described the one-party state of the Labour Party after 1945 in a lecture in 1963. See Seip, *Fra embedsmannsstat til ettpartistat og andre essays*.

<sup>194</sup> Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*, 251.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 252, 274.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup> Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 251.

remains whether the old elite participated in the internationalisation that Tvedt describes from the 1960s onwards. For that purpose, one needs to look closer at AIS as an expression of the labour movement' international engagement, as well as its longer trends of international engagement. This topic will be further discussed in the next chapter.

### **Chapter 3: New directions in the support for democracy and freedom**

The Norwegian labour movement had decades of international engagement before the establishment of AIS in 1969. This chapter seeks to examine the nature of this international engagement and its specific expression in the late 1960s with the establishment of AIS. Examining this international engagement will allow the chapter to explore what motivated the establishment of AIS, as well as whether the establishment constituted a change or continuity. This ties to an overarching debate on the changing global Norwegian engagement in the late 1960s. I am particularly intrigued by Terje Tvedt's thesis on Norway's international breakthrough in the 1960s.<sup>199</sup> A reading of his work raises several questions on how we can assess the role of the Norwegian labour movement in this alleged breakthrough and the degree of change in this period. In order to understand the degree of change or continuity, it is assumed that one needs to look at longer trends.

The chapter will therefore first study some major trends and developments in the Norwegian labour movement's international engagement since the interwar period.<sup>200</sup> Next, the chapter will examine the nature and underpinnings of AIS as it was set out in documents and meetings prior to its establishment. Comparisons will be drawn between the nature of AIS and earlier trends in order to assert the degree of continuity or change. The chapter will finally place the chapter's findings in the broader debate on the changing Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s.

While the labour movement had long been involved in international issues and supported democracy and freedom, the engagement was radicalised and increased in the 1960s due to both domestic and international factors. The establishment of AIS was a part of a response by leading figures to the growing pressure from the base of the labour movement. Still, AIS was an effort to support struggles for freedom and democracy with an ideological and political, as well as idealist and self-interested, underpinning. In this way, the chapter argues that the establishment of AIS reflected the increased political activism at the time. Yet, the international engagement of the labour movement was hardly new. What was new, however, was the more global ambition and critical character of their engagement. The chapter thus points to the role of the labour movement in the changing global Norwegian engagement in the 1960s.

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<sup>199</sup> Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*.

<sup>200</sup> As the aim is to provide a basis to examine the degree of continuity or change, the chapter will not provide an extensive account of previous international engagement. It will rather provide an overview of certain trends.

## Trends in the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement

### *Emergence of international solidarity work*

In DNA's early programmes, international solidarity was phrased in a Marxist perspective, focusing on the working class' struggle, a joint international struggle, for equality and freedom from oppression.<sup>201</sup> However, it was not until the 1930s, in the face of fascism and war, that international solidarity work became a prominent part of the Norwegian labour movement's activities.<sup>202</sup>

In the 1930s, the international work was marked by a working-class focus. At the time, DNA and LO provided support to primarily German political dissidents and refugees through the Workers' Justice Fund (*Arbeidernes Justisfond*), the special committee for refugees (*den spesielle flyktningkomiteen*), and a permanent committee, also known by the name the Workers' Justice Fund, resulting from a merger of the former two bodies in 1938.<sup>203</sup> This support was based on class solidarity with fellow partisans.<sup>204</sup> The political refugees who were offered support were in fact typically young, single, working-class men.<sup>205</sup> The other main group of refugees coming from Germany at the time, the Jews, who often belonged to the bourgeoisie and did not politically adhere to the labour movement, did not receive the same support.<sup>206</sup> This working-class focus was also prevalent in the support to Spain during the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s, which is more detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Thus, in the 1930s, the international solidarity work of the Norwegian labour movement was centred on the support to the working class' struggle for freedom from oppression within dictatorships.<sup>207</sup>

### *Post-war and early Cold War engagement*

The working-class perspective became increasingly less emphasised. Stjernø argues that the experiences of the Second World War contributed to a change in the solidarity concept as there had emerged a stronger feeling of community between members of the labour

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<sup>201</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 110-111.

<sup>202</sup> Gram and Rønning, *De lange linjer*, 82.

<sup>203</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 85; Dørum, "De rødes kamp mot fascismen i Norge i 1930-årene", 100-101.

<sup>204</sup> Fure, *Mellomkrigstid*, 49.

<sup>205</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 85.

<sup>206</sup> Fure, *Mellomkrigstid*, 49-50.

<sup>207</sup> However, it was not limited to this towards the end of the decade. The Norwegian People's Aid (*Norsk folkehjelp*), established in 1939 as the humanitarian aid organisation of the Norwegian labour movement, had a somewhat broader focus. Its first large task was to provide humanitarian aid to the Finnish population during the Finnish Winter War, which was more based on Finland being a neighbouring country fighting the Soviet Union. Bull, *Norsk fagbevegelse*, 73.



movement and the bourgeois parties after joint hardship and collaboration during the war.<sup>208</sup> This is supported by historian Finn Olstad who argues that the experiences of war contributed to national unity, which made class differences less important to the Norwegian people.<sup>209</sup> With this development, the broadening of the labour movement's focus in the international realm was not unanticipated. In fact, Stjernø argues that "the step to include people living in misery in the Third World was natural" after the concept of solidarity had been broadened to include more than the working class and the basis of solidarity was reformulated to a general compassion rather than interests.<sup>210</sup> Although Stjernø's argument perhaps refers more to the solidarity with the poor and the so-called underdeveloped world, it is possible to make a similar argument for the support to those struggling for freedom and democracy. Indeed, the SI, of which DNA was a member, expressed its "solidarity with all peoples living under fascist or communist dictatorship" in a resolution at its first congress in 1951, which reflected its members' ideological mood.<sup>211</sup> However, it should be noted that the special attention to workers' and trade union rights was not entirely discarded in the Norwegian labour movement, although there was added a more general political focus on injustice and oppression. In this way, the general insight is that the Norwegian labour movement after the Second World War increasingly expanded their perspective.

Besides, the experiences from the outbreak of the last world war had contributed to a perception that totalitarian states represented a foreign political threat and that the emergence of political extremism and totalitarian movements could be rooted in poverty and need.<sup>212</sup> This perception was paired with a widespread conviction that the fate of the West and Norway was dependent on developments in remote areas.<sup>213</sup> This idea of the peace as indivisible marked the generations of labour movement politicians and officials who led the labour movement in the decades after the war.<sup>214</sup> Working against poverty, need, and certain dictatorships in the world thus became important in their international work.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 118.

<sup>209</sup> Olstad, *Den lange oppturen*, 98, 123.

<sup>210</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 181.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>212</sup> Pharo, "Den norske fredstradisjonen", 248.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> See Chapter 2.

<sup>215</sup> It should be noted that the Norwegian labour movement did not oppose all dictatorships and one-party states.

The international work of the Norwegian labour movement was initially after the Second World War concentrated on the Cold War. After the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the negotiations of a Finnish-Soviet defence pact, communism and the Soviet Union were increasingly seen as threats against peace.<sup>216</sup> As described by Terjesen, the internationalism of the Norwegian labour movement was in the 1950s marked by national foreign political goals and the orientation towards the United States on the one hand and the fear of war, dictatorship and Russian military expansion on the other.<sup>217</sup> The focus was therefore on threats to democracy, freedom and peace from especially the Soviet Union and communism. However, criticism of undemocratic developments also went beyond the Communist bloc to some extent, as illustrated by LO's criticism of the undemocratic methods used by the Greek government in 1948 during the civil war in Greece.<sup>218</sup> Still, the focus was Europe, with a primary focus on the threat of communism.

At the same time, there was an increasing involvement in non-European matters. The establishment of the United Nations and the spur in the process of decolonisation after the Second World War had brought new issues that had remained the topic for the colonial powers and great powers prior to the war to the foreign political agenda.<sup>219</sup> One issue was development aid. In the latter part of the 1940s, the DNA government became involved in development aid through multilateral projects in the United Nations. The first bilateral project, the India project, was moreover launched in the early 1950s.<sup>220</sup> The solidarity with the so-called underdeveloped world was eventually expressed explicitly in the 1953 DNA programme.<sup>221</sup> Another issue was the decolonisation. As the process of decolonising sped up in the 1950s, DNA expanded its focus on freedom and democracy to include national liberation.<sup>222</sup> Still, while supporting the gradual and peaceful dismantling of the colonies, DNA in government remained reluctant to criticise the colonial policies of NATO allies, especially France and Britain.<sup>223</sup> This reluctance was reduced towards the 1960s due to the growing fear that colonial policies would harm the position of the West and NATO and due to increased attention to

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<sup>216</sup> Bergh, *Storhetstid*, 259; Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 315.

<sup>217</sup> Terjesen, "Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser", 34.

<sup>218</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 318.

<sup>219</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 169; Pharo, "Norge og den tredje verden", 291.

<sup>220</sup> The India project is extensively covered by Pharo in his two volumes on *Hjelp til Selvhjelp*. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, I have not been able to access these volumes. However, some information has been provided through Pharo, "Norge og den tredje verden", 296-299.

<sup>221</sup> Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe*, 122.

<sup>222</sup> This development was reflected in the DNA programmes. See for instance DNA, "Arbeidsprogram 1953-1957".

<sup>223</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 177-178.

decolonisation in Southern Africa in the late 1950s.<sup>224</sup> Among the first expressions of this more critical position of the DNA government was the criticism of French policies and warfare in Algeria.<sup>225</sup> In this way, DNA became increasingly involved in both development aid and decolonisation issues.<sup>226</sup>

LO does not seem to have engaged with these issues on an official level to the same extent as DNA as international issues were primarily a party matter. Nonetheless, the then LO chairman Konrad Nordahl expressed his support of Norwegian development aid in his Labour Day speech in 1951.<sup>227</sup> In addition, LO was a central force of domestic pressure for increased support to liberation movements in the 1950s.<sup>228</sup> Through the ICFTU, LO was also involved with the trade union movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and issues of the developing countries were discussed within the international confederation. However, it was the leadership in LO, rather than the base of the trade union movement, that primarily were involved in these issues.<sup>229</sup>

### *Critical, global engagement in the radical sixties*

Although the Norwegian labour movement had been involved in international engagement and support to democracy and freedom for decades, there was a radicalisation and increased international engagement in Norway and the Norwegian labour movement in the 1960s.<sup>230</sup> One part of the radicalisation was an increasing engagement with anti-colonial and Third World issues, giving the international engagement an increasingly global ambition. This development occurred at the same time as the such issues were receiving attention globally, including within the broader international labour movement.<sup>231</sup>

Among the issues gaining attention was the racial discrimination and apartheid system that had been legally institutionalised in South Africa since 1948. The Norwegian DNA government had pursued a quite reserved policy towards South Africa due to their alliance during the

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<sup>224</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 396-397.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 396.

<sup>226</sup> For the realist, idealist and tactical motivations, see for instance Pharo, "Norge og den tredje verden", 293, Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 409, Bergh, *Storhetstid*, 290-292, and Terjesen, "Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser", 35.

<sup>227</sup> Pharo, "Norge og den tredje verden", 299-300.

<sup>228</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 178.

<sup>229</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 434.

<sup>230</sup> Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 344; Gram and Rønning, *De lange linjer*, 103.

<sup>231</sup> See Chapter 1.

Second World War and Norwegian shipping interests.<sup>232</sup> In addition, the foreign political focus had prioritised the Cold War and the relations between East and West.<sup>233</sup> Nevertheless, around 1960 the DNA government took a tougher stance. This was partly due to international factors, including the British willingness to pressure South Africa and the Sharpeville massacre when 69 protestors were killed by South African police in 1960.<sup>234</sup> The latter event contributed to awakening the international public opinion as it provided “a glimpse of the brutality of the white minority rule.”<sup>235</sup>

The tougher stance of the DNA government can also be explained by domestic activism.<sup>236</sup> The Norwegian activism against apartheid involved parts of the labour movement. In Norway, as well as in the other Scandinavian countries, it was in fact the political left and trade union movement that led the anti-apartheid protest.<sup>237</sup> For the trade union movement, the opposition to the oppressive apartheid system in South Africa followed a genuine belief in equal rights.<sup>238</sup> In addition, the Sharpeville massacre spurred attention to the issue. The first direct involvement of LO was a consumer boycott in 1960 following an appeal from the ICFTU in 1959. In the following years, LO expressed its condemnation of the apartheid system in resolutions and statements.<sup>239</sup> Also DNA spoke out against the apartheid regime and racial discrimination.<sup>240</sup> However, the systematic anti-apartheid work of the Norwegian labour movement did not begin until the mid-1970s.<sup>241</sup> Still, Third World issues, including the anti-apartheid cause, received increasing attention in the 1960s in the Norwegian labour movement.

Moreover, towards the latter part of the 1960s, DNA and LO became increasingly inclined to criticise the Norwegian NATO-allies. In April 1967, a military coup was undertaken in Greece. Within a month of the coup, both DNA and LO had denounced the events in Greece and demanded the restoration of democracy and the release of political prisoners.<sup>242</sup> Both the

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<sup>232</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 179.

<sup>233</sup> Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*, 11.

<sup>234</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 399.

<sup>235</sup> Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*, 12. My translation.

<sup>236</sup> Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 399.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, 400.

<sup>238</sup> Vetlesen, “Trade Union Support to the Struggle Against Apartheid”, 332.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>240</sup> See for instance DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1963, 93-97 and DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1967, 225-227.

<sup>241</sup> Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*, 12-13.

<sup>242</sup> AAB. DNA’s archives. Ac-L0009. Møtebok 10/4-67 til 23/2-70. Protocol from meeting of DNA’s Executive Board, 24.04.1967; AAB. LO’s archives. Ac-L0024. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1967. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 08.05.1967.

party and the confederation also supported the cross-party Norwegian Committee for Democracy in Greece, established in May 1967, which worked to promote the reestablishment of Greek democracy and supported Greek political prisoners, refugees and exiles. Moreover, the same year, the Scandinavian states brought complaints about Greek violations of the European Human Rights Convention before the Council of Europe. This action was supported actively by DNA.<sup>243</sup> Also LO supported the act of putting pressure on the Greek junta in international organisations.<sup>244</sup> In addition, in the so-called Nasty case, DNA, then an opposition party, unsuccessfully demanded the Norwegian government to stop the planned delivery of the last of six military ships to Greece that a Norwegian company had agreed to send to Greece before the coup.<sup>245</sup>

The reactions of DNA and LO illustrated a willingness to criticise and put active pressure on a NATO ally, although it should be pointed out that Greece was no vital ally.<sup>246</sup> The Norwegian experiences of war and of the rise of fascism can to some extent contribute to explain the opposition to the Greek junta and the willingness to criticise it. As argued in Chapter 2, the Norwegian politicians who had experienced these developments were formed by it. Knut Funderud asserts that after the coup in Greece, parallels were drawn between Greece and the 1930s Germany and that the neo-Nazi movements in Western Germany at the same time only enhanced the reactions.<sup>247</sup> While Funderud examines the Norwegian reactions in general, these reactions might also have been reflected in the leadership in LO and DNA as the leaders belonged to the generations that had experienced war and fascism.

At the same time, the timing of the coup perhaps induced the strong criticism from the Norwegian labour movement. Firstly, in government, DNA had since the Second World War balanced security-political considerations with opposition to violations of human rights and democracy by NATO allies.<sup>248</sup> As DNA was not a government party at the time of the Greek coup, the party could be more unrestrained. Next, DNA was in the process of deciding its stance on continued NATO membership before the issue was to be finally decided in the

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<sup>243</sup> Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 55.

<sup>244</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0680. Sak nr. 50-11 1969 Komiteer og utvalg i LO. Note on Greece by LO's Office for Press and Information, 26.03.1969.

<sup>245</sup> Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 22; For more information, see Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 358-359 and Gjerdåker, "Menneskerettar og utanrikspolitik", 64-66.

<sup>246</sup> At the same time, there was a domestic dimension in the Nasty case as DNA wanted to hamper the non-DNA government. Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 26-30.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>248</sup> Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 358

Norwegian parliament as the first contractual opening to leave the alliance was approaching in 1969. According to Funderud, with the reactions to the developments in Greece, NATO proponents wanted to prevent harm to the alliance and prove that they could take a clear and tough stance towards an ally. The NATO opposition, on the other hand, wanted to use the campaign to further their cause of leaving the alliance.<sup>249</sup> This interpretation is substantiated by Svein Gjerdåker who argues that DNA's active position on Greece can be explained by the leadership's wish to satisfy the left wing within the party as they experienced pressure from the many youth who were sceptical towards the NATO membership and the many reluctant NATO proponents who wanted the party to put pressure on the Greek regime.<sup>250</sup> While there existed genuine solidarity with the Greek people, the willingness to criticise and put pressure on the Greek junta was thus substantiated by the pressure from the internal foreign political opposition. However, also in the international labour movement, there existed opposition to the Greek junta. Both the SI and the ICFTU called for their members to work to put pressure on Greece.<sup>251</sup> In this way, while to some extent being a response to internal pressure, the actions of DNA and LO were also part of a broader campaign against Greece.

While Greece was no vital ally, the Norwegian labour movement eventually adopted a critical stance towards the policies of Norway's key ally and main protector, the United States. The United States had been involved in the Vietnam War since the 1950s, and the war became a topic of protest in several countries around the world in the late 1960s. In DNA, the debate on the Vietnam War increased in intensity in 1965 when the United States increased its efforts in the war.<sup>252</sup> Initially, it was primarily AUF and several trade unions, in addition to leftist party members, who opposed the war actively.<sup>253</sup> The DNA leadership increasingly criticised the means of the war, but still remained reluctant to criticise the American involvement. One important consideration was that United States was Norway's key ally.<sup>254</sup> In addition, there existed a widespread perception of the war as a part of a communist expansion strategy rather than as a struggle for national liberation.<sup>255</sup> This view was especially maintained by party secretary Haakon Lie, who later argued that the support to the United States' war effort built on

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<sup>249</sup> Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 20.

<sup>250</sup> Gjerdåker, "Menneskerettar og utanrikspolitik", 66.

<sup>251</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0705. Sak nr. 54-4 1969 Den frie faglige internasjonale. ICFTU Circular no.33 (1969), 24.04.1969; AAB. DNA's archives. Da-L0429. Internasjonalt utvalg. SI Circular No.47/68, 27.08.1968; AAB. DNA's archives. Da-L0429. Internasjonalt utvalg. SI Circular No.65/68, 18.12.1968.

<sup>252</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 89.

<sup>253</sup> Godbolt, "Vietnamkrigen i Norge", 129.

<sup>254</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War", 405.

<sup>255</sup> Steen, *Maktkamp*, 90.

“the conviction that it was the task of the strongest democracy in the world to defend a people being attacked from the inside and the outside.”<sup>256</sup> It is not clear whether this was the conviction of the entire leadership, but nevertheless, the leadership remained reluctant to criticise the role of the United States.

Yet, at the Party Congress in May 1967, DNA adopted a resolution that sided with the Vietnamese FNL as a national and social liberation movement and portrayed the United States as the perpetrator in the Vietnam War. The resolution represented a turnabout in DNA’s official policy, which now had taken a clear stance against the war and the involvement of the United States.<sup>257</sup> Also LO was initially unwilling to criticise the United States despite grassroots engagement, but later expressed its full support to FNL.<sup>258</sup> Thus, the Norwegian labour movement eventually criticised the United States. This was more astounding than the criticism of Greece, as the United States was Norway’s key ally and main protector.

The willingness to criticise the United States was to a large extent based on the sincere engagement against the war among leftists and the youth. These groups had voiced strong demands for a tough stance against the war and American policy.<sup>259</sup> In addition, the resolution represented a real change in attitude within DNA as there existed widespread opposition to the United States in labour circles.<sup>260</sup> The defeat in the elections in 1965 had, moreover, provided DNA with an opportunity to take this more critical stance as the party then went into opposition.<sup>261</sup> Yet, it should be noted that it was the leftist wing, primarily the youth, that pushed the war increasingly on the agenda and put pressure for a more critical stance.

The resolution also reflected pragmatism within the DNA leadership. In fact, several within the leadership was not content with the resolution, but they nonetheless remained passive.<sup>262</sup> Nyhamar offers three different explanations for this passivity. First of all, the leadership might have wanted to avoid a defeat and rather retain unity within the party prior to the municipal elections in the fall of 1967. Next, the passivity might have been a concession to the foreign

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<sup>256</sup> Lie, *Slik jeg ser det*, 335. My translation.

<sup>257</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 100.

<sup>258</sup> Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 132; The source material indicates that LO expressed support to FNL at the Congress in 1969 at latest.

<sup>259</sup> Godbolt, “Vietnamkrigen i Norge”, 130; Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 100-101.

<sup>260</sup> Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 135-136.

<sup>261</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, “The Vietnam War”, 409.

<sup>262</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 100.

political opposition within the party to avoid heated debate on two other issues that were considered more important, namely Norwegian membership in the European Economic Community and in NATO. Finally, it might have been a move to avoid large scale conflict over the elections of the party secretary at the Party Congress. Many were discontent with Haakon Lie as secretary, and the leadership might have hoped to appease the critics by allowing them a victory on the Vietnam issue.<sup>263</sup> The Vietnam resolution, thus, represented a concession to the leftist wing within the party, especially the youth. This is supported by the argument of leading DNA politicians who, after taking the initiative to a new anti-war organisation in 1967, argued that it “was better to ride the wave of protests rather than resist and risk being swept of the field”.<sup>264</sup>

Moreover, the engagement against the war in Vietnam had broader implications for the Norwegian labour movement. According to Nyhamar, the Vietnam issue contributed to the radicalisation within DNA towards the end of the 1960s.<sup>265</sup> The engagement for Vietnam also brought with it a reorientation of the support work within the Norwegian labour movement and was continued through support to other liberation movements.<sup>266</sup> At the same time, there was, as argued, an increasing attention to Third World issues. This radicalisation became increasingly pronounced through the 1960s. In fact, towards the end of the 1960s LO increased its efforts of international solidarity and trade union aid.<sup>267</sup> DNA and LO also expanded their contact with the communist Eastern Europe and radical movements in Southern Europe and the Third World.<sup>268</sup> In the 1970s, a period with primarily DNA governments in power, there was increasing Norwegian support to radical movements, although the majority of support was provided to governments and movements that could become good social democrats.<sup>269</sup> As we will see in the next section, AIS can be considered a part of the new efforts that followed the radicalisation.

### **The nature and underpinnings of AIS**

In May 1969, the proposal of establishing AIS was presented to the LO Congress by LO’s Secretariat and to DNA’s Party Congress by the Cooperation Committee. They declared that

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<sup>263</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 101.

<sup>264</sup> Godbolt, “Vietnam-protesten i Norge”, 66. My translation.

<sup>265</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 104.

<sup>266</sup> Terjesen, “Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser”, 36.

<sup>267</sup> Gram and Rønning, *De lange linjer*, 103.

<sup>268</sup> Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 344.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, 351.



the Cooperation Committee wanted to create a permanent committee to coordinate the support to national and social freedom movements and for democracy and freedom. This was reflected in the statutes that were presented and adopted, in which the objective of the committee was defined as “to take initiative to and coordinate the labour movement’s support to national and social freedom movements and support to organisations and individuals that work to establish freedom of association and other democratic rights in countries where such rights are violated”, as well as to provide support to “people who are facing difficulties due to such conditions in their country of origins.”<sup>270</sup> In addition, the Cooperation Committee stressed the need to support the struggle against dictatorships and racial oppression and to support people fighting for freedom or who were exposed to oppression.<sup>271</sup> There was, nevertheless, no reference to any specific situation.

In terms of specific measures of support, the statutes passed at the LO Congress and the Party Congress are not particularly illuminating. It was stated that support could “be given in economic form or through other means appropriate to implement the objective.”<sup>272</sup> However, the Cooperation Committee mentioned in its presentation to the Party Congress the need for economic, political and moral support.<sup>273</sup> Also the Secretariat referred to support, “economically as well as morally and of other sorts”.<sup>274</sup> In this way, the presentations and the statutes outlined the establishment of a committee that would coordinate economic, political and moral support to national and social freedom movements and to those struggling for democratic rights and against oppression.

Thus, it appears that the Norwegian labour movement had a somewhat open understanding of who and how they wanted to support through AIS. There is nonetheless a clear focus on national and social freedom and democratic rights in the presentations and statutes. The statutes, moreover, clarified that the support could be given to both movements, organisations and individuals who work for freedom and democratic rights. Yet, the references to these concepts were quite broad without specific details on what kind of freedom movements they wanted to support or what they defined as “freedom of association and other democratic rights”. It is not

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<sup>270</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 262. My translation.

<sup>271</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 263. My translation.

<sup>273</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248.

<sup>274</sup> LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 261. My translation.

unreasonable to assume that the statement was left intentionally vague to avoid being pinned down, as such unspecific statements were common. The unspecific nature of the statutes and the presentation might also reflect that the support to freedom and democracy was already an established part of their international work and embedded in labour movement ideology.

While no specific situation was mentioned as a candidate for support, the presentations by the Cooperation Committee and the Secretariat established that AIS was to be a coordination of efforts similar to the work performed in light of recent situations. The Cooperation Committee's presentation stated that

In recent years, there have regularly occurred situations where it has been natural for the labour movement to become involved in support of people who are fighting for freedom, or are exposed to oppression: the Vietnam War, the racial oppression in South Africa, the military coup in Greece, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Due to the situation in the world, we have to envisage similar need for support and solidarity in the future.<sup>275</sup>

It is noteworthy that the Cooperation Committee mentioned these situations as examples of previous situations in which it has been natural for the labour movement to become involved. Firstly, it may shed light on the understanding of who they were willing to support. As already noted, the Norwegian labour movement expressed its support of the Vietnamese FNL in their struggle for national liberation, the South African anti-apartheid movement in their struggle against racial oppression, and the Greek struggle for democracy. Likewise, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, DNA and LO expressed its sympathy with the Czechoslovakian people and country and supported their right to national freedom and self-determination.<sup>276</sup> These examples illustrate that the Cooperation Committee was referring to situations in which DNA and LO had offered support to groups that were not specifically worker-, trade unionist-, socialist- or social democratic-orientated. In these situations, they had rather supported various peoples, liberation movements and political dissidents and refugees. As they referred to there being similar needs in the future, it is possible to assume that they intended AIS to be equally inclusive.

What is more, the reference to these situations illustrates that AIS built on these recent global efforts. Another point is that the situations that the Cooperation Committee mentioned include situations in which both superpowers of the time were seen as the perpetrators and had been

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<sup>275</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248. My translation.

<sup>276</sup> AAB. DNA's archives. Ac-L0009. Møtebok 10/4-67 til 23/2-70. Protocol from meeting of DNA's Executive Board, 30.09.1968; AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0024. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1968. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 21.08.1968.

criticised by the Norwegian labour movement. Thus, despite of the Cold War, they were willing to support forces fighting either of the superpowers. This was explicitly stated in LO's programme of action and DNA's work programme from 1969. While LO stressed its right to become involved in issues occurring in both the East and the West and the North and the South, DNA identified a particular responsibility, through the NATO membership, "to oppose and fight situations in other member countries that conflict with NATO's fundamental principles of defence of democracy, individual freedom and the prevalence of law."<sup>277</sup> In this way, it appears that the support they were intending to provide through AIS was quite inclusive and global, in the sense that they were willing to support different movements and peoples across East-West and North-South divisions. On the one hand, this built on the long-standing scepticism towards communism and the established support to the Third World. On the other hand, the attention to the latter issue had increased in the last decade, giving the international engagement of the labour movement a more global outlook. The willingness to react against NATO members can, similarly, only be understood in light of the more recent developments in the 1960s when DNA and LO had adopted a more critical stance towards its allies. Thus, AIS appears as a measure in the more global and critical international engagement in the 1960s.

Moreover, the lack of a specific labour or trade union focus in the documents from the establishment of AIS is notable, but not astounding. Although the labour movement initially had a strong working-class focus, this had been less emphasised since the Second World War in favour of a broader focus on democracy and freedom. Nonetheless, it should be noted that LO did maintain a trade union dimension. The statement made by LO following the coup in Greece in 1967 is revealing in this sense.<sup>278</sup> LO expressed a worry about the fall of democracy in Greece, but made a specific reference to freedom of association, and in particular for trade unions, by stating that

the dissolution of trade unions and other people's movements is a violation of the Greek people's right to work through free organisations. [...] We in the free trade union organisations condemn these methods. Through international bodies, we will work for democratic rights to be reinstated in Greece. Those who are arrested must be released. The trade unions and other organisations must be allowed to work without interference. Democracy must be reinstated in Greece.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> LO, *LO's handlingsprogram 69*, 34; DNA, "Politikk for en ny tid". My translation.

<sup>278</sup> As the coup in Greece was one of the situations mentioned by DNA and LO as providing a backdrop to the establishment of AIS, this is particularly relevant.

<sup>279</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0024. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1967. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 08.05.1967. My translation.

In this way, LO implied that the right to trade union organisation was a part of freedom of association and democratic rights. LO's statement thus gives reason to assume that although the presentations and statutes of AIS did not include an explicit reference to trade union or labour rights, these rights were included in the understanding of democratic rights. This reflected an international understanding of such rights. Within the ILO, there existed an understanding that freedom of association, together with the right to collective bargaining, "enshrined, above all, the rights of trade unions."<sup>280</sup> Nonetheless, it appears that LO wanted to support more than only trade union and labour rights due to the lack of a more specific formulation. Moreover, the reference to the "free trade union organisations" is also interesting as it shows that LO looked to the broader trade union movement. This indicates that LO, more than DNA, used trade unionism as a framework and the international trade union movement as a point of reference. However, the reference to international bodies in this statement illustrates that LO worked both within and beyond the international trade union movement. In fact, DNA and LO advocated to put pressure on Greece in various international bodies in which Norway or their own organisations were represented, included the Council of Europe, NATO and the ILO.<sup>281</sup>

Finally, the ideological and political character of AIS should be underlined. This character becomes clearer when compared to other efforts of the Norwegian labour movement at the time. In the 1960s, the solidarity work towards the developing countries was performed by the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund and the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund, which both dealt primarily with development aid to trade unions and workers. Additionally, the Norwegian labour movement had established the Norwegian People's Aid in 1939 as its humanitarian organisation. In contrast to these efforts, AIS was established for the more political and ideological solidarity work. Nyhamar has asserted a similar division between the humanitarian trade union work and the ideological and political work of the trade union movement.<sup>282</sup> He characterises AIS' direct support to political and national liberation movements, to refugees in dictatorships and to the victims of human rights abuses as ideological support work aimed to promote democracy and human rights.<sup>283</sup> While Nyhamar's short description of AIS is focused on the period after the establishment of AIS, in particular the 1980s, the ideological description is also pertinent to describe AIS in its origins. Nyhamar's description of AIS'

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<sup>280</sup> Maul, *The International Labour Organization*, 188-189.

<sup>281</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0680. Sak nr. 50-11 1969 Komiteer og utvalg i LO. Note on Greece by LO's Office for Press and Information, 26.03.1969; Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 55, 77-78.

<sup>282</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 565.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

work is similar to what was set out in the statutes, although the statutes and the presentations of AIS focused on promoting freedom and democratic rights rather than human rights explicitly. The ideological dimension of AIS was thus already evident in the presentations and statutes as it was established.

The ideological character is further elucidated by LO's programme of action and DNA's work programme from 1969. In these documents, LO and DNA respectively framed their international engagement in an ideological framework. When listing the objectives for its international work, LO included a world based on justice and peace and the pursuit of the fundamental principles and goals of the trade union movement.<sup>284</sup> Moreover, LO declared that "[t]he trade union movement must nevertheless reserve the right to react, in words or actions, to acts that conflict with our convictions".<sup>285</sup> This illustrates that LO wanted to promote the principles to which they adhered themselves. Similarly, DNA declared that the party, in accordance with the principles of democratic socialism, would work towards a world based on cooperation, solidarity, justice, equality and freedom for all people.<sup>286</sup> In addition, DNA declared that through its international efforts it would work towards the implementation of democratic socialism.<sup>287</sup> The ideological underpinning is therefore evident as they wanted to promote ideological principles and implement democratic socialism. In light of this, AIS, which was established to promote democracy and freedom – two fundamental principles in labour movement ideology –, can be understood as an ideological tool.

However, it should be noted that within this ideological framework there were also elements of idealism and national self-interest. The idealism, on the one hand, was rooted in a genuine belief in these principles as contributing to a better and more just world. In its programme of principles from 1969, DNA declared that "[f]rom a socialist point of view, it is a matter of course to support the struggle *against* oppression, for social equality and political freedom."<sup>288</sup> The self-interest was, on the other hand, a global-orientated perception of national self-interest which saw Norway's future – and the future of the organised labour movement – as tied to the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world and a need to

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<sup>284</sup> LO, *LO's handlingsprogram 69*, 32.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 34. My translation.

<sup>286</sup> DNA, "Politikk for en ny tid".

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>288</sup> DNA, "Prinsipper og perspektiver". My translation.

adapt to and affect international development.<sup>289</sup> This interpretation of their reasoning is supported by the claims of Kaare Sandegren that the international engagement of the Norwegian trade union movement was an attempt to adapt to the increasing integration and interdependence in the world and to find new ways to retain its influence, as well as a pursuit of equality, democracy and human rights and the achievement of the main principles of the labour movement.<sup>290</sup> The establishment of AIS was therefore underpinned by an entanglement of ideology, idealism and self-interest.

### **Chapter findings**

This chapter has sought to examine the nature of the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement and its specific expression in the late 1960s with the establishment of AIS. By examining this, the chapter has aimed to explore what motivated the establishment of AIS, as well as whether the establishment constituted a change or continuity. It has been asserted that AIS was established to support individuals, organisations and movements who were struggling for democracy and freedom. AIS was thus an ideological and political effort, established to promote democracy and freedom. The establishment of AIS in 1969 built on the labour movement's tradition for international solidarity and emphasis on democracy and freedom, but it was also affected by international developments and recent radicalism, which had given the international engagement a more global ambition and critical character. The establishment of AIS was therefore part of new, more radical developments in the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement in the 1960s.

These findings have implications for Tvedt's thesis on Norway's international breakthrough, which he argues began in the 1960s, in his book *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*.<sup>291</sup> Tvedt's explanatory model relies on an analysis of a humanitarian-political complex as a growing web of institutions working with development-related topics with governmental funding, which is an intriguing interpretation of the growing field of development aid in Norway. Particularly interesting is the analysis of the emergence of an elite that circulated within these institutions and justified their work on moral grounds.<sup>292</sup> Indeed, Oddgeir Osland argues that Tvedt's analysis of the emergence of power structures that are supported by a discourse

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<sup>289</sup> LO, *LO's handlingsprogram 69*, 32; DNA, "Politikk for en ny tid".

<sup>290</sup> Sandegren, *Fagbevegelsens internasjonale engasjement*, 12, 18.

<sup>291</sup> Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*.

<sup>292</sup> See part III "Det humanitær-politiske kompleks" in *Ibid.*

of morality in the field of development aid opens for fruitful analyses of other political fields.<sup>293</sup>

Nevertheless, Tvedt's book does not explicitly include the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement. However, as the labour movement was so closely associated with the state from the Second World War until the mid-1960s, his analytical framework can also be expected to explain main developments of its international engagement. Notably, even though the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement can be traced back several decades before the 1960s, at least back to support efforts in the 1930s and especially the Spanish Civil War, it experienced an internationalisation in the 1960s. This was tied to a radicalisation, which brought increasing attention to more issues and a more critical stance. DNA and LO also increased their engagement and efforts. This is supported by Simensen and Tamnes, who both point to the increased international engagement of the labour movement and apply this in their explanation of the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s.<sup>294</sup> In this way, AIS and the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement can be regarded as a part of the changing global Norwegian engagement in the 1960s. Still, none of this can be understood within a framework of a humanitarian-political complex and a new elite emerging due to the growing governmental development aid.

Rather when explaining this development, it is crucial to note that this internationalisation was performed by the leaderships of LO and DNA who constituted an established political elite.<sup>295</sup> On the one hand, these leading figures and their political orientations were, as we saw in Chapter 2, hardly new. The Norwegian labour movement had, moreover, long been involved in international solidarity work, although the focus had changed over time. On the other hand, the international engagement in the 1960s was radicalised as the leadership reacted to pressure for change, which came from the base of the labour movement, from the leftist opposition and especially the youth. The chapter therefore contributes to nuance the narrative of the changing Norwegian international engagement by pointing to the role played by both the elite and the base within the labour movement.

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<sup>293</sup> Osland, "Polemikkens pris", 43.

<sup>294</sup> Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 344; Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 251.

<sup>295</sup> See Chapter 2.

What is more, the chapter has found that the internationalisation of the Norwegian labour movement cannot be read in a solely national context. In Tvedt's analysis of the international breakthrough the international element is confined primarily to the American influence with the argument that the United States made Norway a "development aid country".<sup>296</sup> However, this chapter argues that the international impulses were multiple and had other historical and contemporary sources. The internationalisation was tied to developments elsewhere in the world, which contributed to awakening interest and engagement. DNA and LO were responding to international events and giving attention to issues that were also gaining increased awareness internationally. As argued in Chapter 1, there was an increasing international engagement around the world, much related to the 1960s radicalism and youth revolts. The Norwegian labour movement was in this way affected by international developments and impulses. This corresponds with the claims of Simensen, Tamnes, and Eriksen and Pharo who respectively have pointed to the importance of international developments and impulses for the increased Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s. Among the different international factors mentioned by these historians are the Vietnam War, the student and youth revolts, and pressure from the Third World countries.<sup>297</sup> The findings of this chapter thus follow the line of these historians, by underlining various global and international aspects in order to understand the Norwegian international engagement, including that of the labour movement, in the 1960s. Still, these historians concentrate on the state and only to a limited extent examine the labour movement and other civil society actors. This thesis therefore adds an important insight from the labour movement.

Finally, it should be noted that Tvedt focuses primarily on development aid rather than the kind of support provided by AIS. Still, this does not diminish the significance of the findings of this chapter. Rather it serves to illustrate that the internationalisation in the 1960s touched on more aspects and contained more actors than just development aid and the new elite. The engagement of the Norwegian labour movement also serves to illustrate that the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s was perhaps not part of a breakthrough. The international engagement of the labour movement was, as we have seen, based on a long-standing

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<sup>296</sup> Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet*, 27-33. There is also a Cold War element as Tvedt sees the Western development aid as a weapon in the Cold War and the Norwegian development aid as part of Norway's relations to its American ally. This American and Cold War-centred analysis is, however, criticised by Pharo who argues that one needs to seek broader explanations. Pharo, "Terje Tvedts historier", 192-193.

<sup>297</sup> Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 99-104, 246-248; Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 345-346; Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 384-385.



interest and involvement in international issues, but was radicalised and increased in the 1960s. In this way, the chapter supports interpretations of a changing global Norwegian engagement in the 1960s that was marked by a certain degree of continuity.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> See Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, Tamnes, *Oljealder*, and Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*. These historians study the Norwegian foreign policy and international engagement in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and point to an increase or radicalisation in the 1960s and 1970s.

## **Chapter 4: From cross-party situational bodies to a coordinated, confined effort**

The previous chapters have documented that political motivations to further strengthen the international efforts of the labour movement were central in the process leading up to the establishment of AIS and that the committee in many respects built on prior engagement while encapsulating the radicalisation in Norwegian society and the labour movement itself. However, such motives were not the only factor. The statutes of AIS clarified that the committee was to take initiative to and coordinate the labour movement's support for freedom and democratic rights and take on the tasks that previously had been performed by situational bodies, meaning the bodies organised in response to specific situations that often had been organised on a cross-party basis.<sup>299</sup> This chapter will examine the organisational aspects of AIS in order to further explain why it was established and what effects this had for the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement. First, the chapter will examine the challenges that had arisen with certain cross-party situational bodies in the recent years and the considerations made by the leaderships in DNA and LO in regards to these issues. Next, the chapter will study how DNA and LO responded to different organisational challenges with the establishment of AIS.

The chapter argues that there were several organisational factors behind the shift and thus the establishment of AIS. For the Norwegian labour movement, the establishment of AIS represented a shift away from ad-hoc cross-party situational organisations and movements to a coordinated, confined effort. The leaderships in LO and DNA wanted to strengthen and unify the Norwegian labour movement by curbing or controlling its ad-hoc participation in cross-party organisations. The establishment of AIS grew out of this domestic context, but an international perspective is also needed in order to understand it. The organisational dimension was closely connected to political considerations but should also be assessed as a separate factor because AIS was an organisation tool that was a response to an organisational landscape that created political challenges for the leadership in the labour movement.

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<sup>299</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248-249; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 262-263.

## **The challenges posed by the cross-party situational bodies**

When presenting the proposal of establishing AIS to the LO Congress and the Party Congress in 1969, LO's Secretariat and the Cooperation Committee asserted the need for a permanent committee to take initiative to and coordinate the international support work of the Norwegian labour movement.<sup>300</sup> According to the section titled "Special remarks" in the statutes of AIS, the committee's objective was to take on the tasks that previously had been performed by situational bodies. The statutes further noted that these bodies often had been organised on a cross-party basis and that in some cases, there had existed two competing bodies for the same cause.<sup>301</sup> In the foregoing years, the Norwegian labour movement had experienced troubles with such organisations. The challenges posed by the cross-party situational bodies provides, as we will see, part of the motivation to coordinate the work and thereby to establish AIS.

### *The Vietnam movement*

One issue where the labour movement experienced problems with the situational bodies was the Vietnam issue. The war in Vietnam had become an increasing topic of political debate in Norway in 1965. In December 1965, the Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Vietnam (*Den norske solidaritetskomité for Vietnam*) was established in solidarity with FNL. The temporary board included members from the Socialist People's Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*, SF), the Communist Party of Norway (*Norges Kommunistiske Parti*, NKP) and DNA. The AUF group in Oslo also participated in its work. In addition, parts of the trade union movement supported the Solidarity Committee or participated in other parts of the broader Vietnam movement.<sup>302</sup>

However, both the DNA leadership and the central AUF leadership, as well as the leadership in LO, opposed the committee.<sup>303</sup> According to Nyhamar, the opposition from the party leadership was both politically and organisationally grounded. The DNA leadership was

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<sup>300</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 261.

<sup>301</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 249; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 263; The part of the statutes that mentioned the situational bodies was proposed removed by AUF chairman Hans Jørgen Raastad in a meeting in DNA's National Council on 9 May 1969. Even though the National Council then agreed to this proposal, these changes had not been made when AIS was presented to the Party Congress and the LO Congress later in May. AAB. DNA's archives. Ac-L0009. Møtebok 10/4-67 til 23/2-70. Protocol from meeting of DNA's National Council, 09.05.1969; The archival material does not indicate why this happened, but Raastad presumes that one reason the changes were left out was that the party did not want to change a joint proposal from DNA and LO. Personal e-mail correspondence with Hans Jørgen Raastad, 07.05.2020.

<sup>302</sup> Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 133.

<sup>303</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 90; Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 133.

discontent with the political content of the committee.<sup>304</sup> The committee's support to FNL came at a time when the official position of the party still supported the United States. In addition, the leadership was discontent with party members joining a committee with SF and NKP as such cross-party collaboration violated the organisational culture of the party.<sup>305</sup> DNA had a long tradition of organising campaigns on their own and was hesitant towards cooperation with both the right-wing and the leftist parties out of a fear that it could harm the party.<sup>306</sup> The party was particular cautious of cooperation with the organisations and parties that were further out on the left wing, as it could legitimise the internal strife within the labour movement and support the foreign political opposition rather than the official party position.<sup>307</sup> DNA chairman Trygve Bratteli argued, moreover, that it was not possible to cooperate with NKP and SF as there existed elements within these parties whose primary task was to destroy DNA.<sup>308</sup> In addition, DNA's Executive Board claimed that organisational cooperation with these parties could signal to young people that it was unimportant which of the left-wing parties they adhered to.<sup>309</sup>

This unwillingness to cooperate with SF and NKP can be understood in light of the domestic left-wing political conflict at the time. SF had been established in 1961 by a foreign political opposition that had left or been excluded from DNA. In the eyes of the DNA leadership, SF was not only creating a split in the labour movement, but it was also an electoral competitor whose influence should be limited.<sup>310</sup> DNA and NKP, moreover, had been in a struggle about politics and ideology since the late 1940s.<sup>311</sup> This provides an essential context to understand DNA's political and organisational considerations towards cross-party organisations.

Despite some internal disagreements, the Executive Board of DNA described the Solidarity Committee for Vietnam as a NKP initiative and warned its members to refrain from joining the committee in March 1966.<sup>312</sup> Similarly, LO worked against the participation of the trade union movement in the committee and the broader Vietnam movement, arguing that it was a

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<sup>304</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 90.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Godbolt, "AUF og protesten mot Vietnamkrigen", 58-59.

<sup>307</sup> Halvorsen, *Partiets salt*, 344.

<sup>308</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 63-64.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>310</sup> Lorenz, *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie*, 164.

<sup>311</sup> Bergh, *Storhetstid*, 558.

<sup>312</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 91-92.

cover for extreme political views.<sup>313</sup> The issue became a topic of disagreement within the labour movement, as there existed a foreign political opposition that increasingly opposed the war and participated in anti-war efforts. The DNA leadership continued to limit the support to the committee, but only cautiously as not to provoke further internal disagreements due to fear of a new internal split similar to one that resulted in the establishment of SF.<sup>314</sup> This silent acceptance of party members' participation in the committee implied a legitimization of cross-party campaigns, which made it increasingly difficult to impose sanctions on party members who participated in similar campaigns.<sup>315</sup> Thus, DNA and LO experienced their members joining a cross-party organisation that they did not endorse.

Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to explain LO's and DNA's position on cross-party bodies. In fact, in the beginning of 1967, AUF gave its support to the Solidarity Committee for Vietnam.<sup>316</sup> In addition, with the adoption of the radical resolution on the Vietnam issue at the Party Congress that spring, the DNA leadership also sanctioned the anti-war protest.<sup>317</sup> However, within some months, the internal unity of the committee was breaking apart. Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen explain that "[i]nner unity had started to unravel as revolutionary rhetoric replaced the traditional peace slogans, and the movement started to make the transition from a non-partisan, single-issue movement to a multi-issue, socialistic, anti-imperialistic movement."<sup>318</sup> The final blow to the unity of the committee was a coup staged by activists from the youth organisation of SF, the Socialist Youth Federation (*Sosialistisk Ungdomsforbund*), in November 1967. Following this coup, other groups who had previously endorsed the committee formed a new body in January 1968, namely the Vietnam Movement in Norway (*Vietnambevegelsen i Norge*). This reformist organisation attracted support from members of the labour movement, who opposed the war and increasingly the American policy but did not adhere to the more activist line and revolutionary rhetoric of the Solidarity Committee.<sup>319</sup> With reference to Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 of this thesis, this illustrates that while the youth and leftist elements pushed Vietnam on the agenda, the labour movement remained reluctant to adopt the radical discourse.

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<sup>313</sup> Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 133.

<sup>314</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 93.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

<sup>316</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, "The Vietnam War", 407.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 408.

Furthermore, after the increasing interest for the Vietnam issue within the labour movement, the broader Vietnam solidarity movement was characterised by internal disagreements as the revolutionary left “felt that Labor was encroaching on *their* political turf.”<sup>320</sup> In his book *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, Godbolt has described a rivalry between the Solidarity Committee and the Vietnam Movement. The rivalry was caused by the difference in political roots, but also by the lack of a clear organisational allocation of tasks within the movement.<sup>321</sup> In addition, they were competing for the support of the same groups and neither organisation was able to achieve hegemony.<sup>322</sup> According to Godbolt, “[t]he struggle for hegemony in the Vietnam movement became a part of the internal political power struggle in which the Vietnam issue had turned into a source of political capital.”<sup>323</sup> The rivalry and lack of unity between the organisations led to a stagnation in the broader Vietnam movement in the period from 1968 to 1971.<sup>324</sup> The rivalry had thus affected the efficiency of the movement. This might contribute to explain LO’s and DNA’s desire for a coordinated confined effort.

#### *The committees for Greece*

Another cross-party situational body that faced difficulties was the Norwegian Committee for Democracy in Greece. Established after the Greek coup in 1967 to promote the restoration of democracy and the release of political prisoners, the committee was endorsed by organisations across the political spectrum, including DNA and LO. However, in May 1968, the committee split apart after being struck by internal issues. Knut Funderud claims in his thesis on the Norwegian reactions to the coup that among the issues creating disagreement were a personnel issue and a proposal of reorganising the committee.<sup>325</sup> This proposal was put forward by the committee’s chairman, DNA MP Aase Lionæs, who suggested the establishment of a new committee including LO and all the major political parties, except SF and NKP. Despite opposition from a minority, the proposal was passed. The rationale offered by the majority for the reorganisation was that it feared that the committee would be used in “the political struggle”, referring to the mass enrolment of SF groups that spring.<sup>326</sup> The majority thus tied the disagreement to the domestic left-wing conflict. Funderud, nevertheless, argues that the real reason for the split was the disagreement that arose over which position to take towards the

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<sup>320</sup> Godbolt, Larsen and Rasmussen, “The Vietnam War”, 408-409.

<sup>321</sup> Godbolt, *Den norske vietnambevegelsen*, 299-303.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, 303, 316.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, 316. My translation

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>325</sup> Funderud, “Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas”, 118.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*

United States' and other NATO members' weapon supply and economic support to Greece. While the majority wanted to avoid political campaigns and preferred humanitarian approaches, the minority pushed for a tougher political stance.<sup>327</sup> The majority failed to establish a reorganised committee, and the minority continued the committee's work with a more activist line than before.<sup>328</sup>

These developments illustrate certain difficulties with this cross-party organisation. The Committee for Democracy in Greece was marked by disagreement. The majority opposed the enrolment of SF groups. In addition, the participation of different political elements made it more difficult to agree on the appropriate line and measures. This might be one of the reasons that the leadership in DNA and LO wanted to avoid cross-party organisation. In fact, LO started a process in which they contemplated whether to establish a labour movement committee for Greece in the aftermath of the split.<sup>329</sup> This might suggest that the labour movement did not want join the more political and activist line of the committee that continued after the split, although DNA had maintained a quite active position on Greece.<sup>330</sup>

Moreover, the split of the Committee for Democracy in Greece created internal problems for DNA. While DNA-affiliated youth organisations and some other groups belonging to the labour movement supported the minority of the committee, the DNA leadership criticised it.<sup>331</sup> The opposing views was materialised in accusations by the different wings within the party. Party secretary Haakon Lie was accused of being a DNA right wing activist and responsible for the split, while *Arbeiderbladet*, the main journal of DNA, accused the minority of performing a coup of the committee through mass enrolment of SF groups.<sup>332</sup> These disagreements becomes clearer when viewed in light of the already existing internal tension between the leadership and the foreign political opposition within the party and labour movement.<sup>333</sup> Thus, as the DNA leadership had feared, the cross-party cooperation had contributed to exacerbate existing internal tension. This can contribute to explain the step away from this type of organisations.

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<sup>327</sup> Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 118.

<sup>328</sup> Gjerdåker, "Menneskerettar og utanrikspolitikk", 71.

<sup>329</sup> See Chapter 2.

<sup>330</sup> For DNA's active position, see Gjerdåker, "Menneskerettar og utanrikspolitikk", 66.

<sup>331</sup> Funderud, "Norske reaksjoner på militærregimet i Hellas", 119.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>333</sup> The existing tension was revealed by the more open climate of debate that emerged after the party became an opposition party in 1965. Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 67-68.

Moreover, the process within LO to establish a new labour movement committee for Greece illustrates some of the considerations that were made. After the disagreements had surfaced in the original committee, LO's Secretariat discussed the situation. It was decided that a broad committee with all the major parties except SF and NKP, like the majority of the original committee had proposed, was unattainable. The Secretariat decided to rather contemplate a labour movement committee with the trade unions federations as the main members.<sup>334</sup> The statutes that was drafted for such a committee clarified that the members would originate from DNA, LO, the affiliated trade unions federations and AUF.<sup>335</sup> This supports the argument that LO, as well as DNA, wanted to avoid cross-party organisational cooperation. Another point that should be mentioned is that LO contemplated a *labour movement* committee without SF and NKP. This was also the case when AIS was established. It is reasonable to assume that LO and DNA wanted to define the labour movement narrowly, without the more leftist parties. Their position towards SF and NKP can, as in the Vietnam issue, be better understood in light of the left-wing political struggle and the organisational considerations against cross-party organisations.

The labour movement committee for Greece was eventually discarded. This happened after comments from two members of the task force of LO representatives that was selected to discuss the establishment of a labour movement committee for Greece. The two members pointed to the troubles that could arise if a labour movement committee was established because of the large support for the Committee for Democracy in Greece among the trade unions.<sup>336</sup> Although the documents that I have accessed in the archives do not show how the Secretariat or the Cooperation Committee responded to these comments directly, LO abandoned its plans of a labour movement committee for Greece in favour of AIS. It is therefore possible to assume that one consideration behind the abandonment of a committee for Greece was that it would be difficult to create a new situational body without causing more internal strife. In this way, rather than creating a competing committee to the already existing Committee for Democracy in Greece, they created a coordination effort in AIS.

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<sup>334</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Ac-L0024. Sekretariatsprotokoll 1968. Protocol from meeting of the Secretariat, 15.05.1968.

<sup>335</sup> AAB. LO's archives. Dd-L0635. Sak nr. 50-7 1968 Samarbeidskomiteen mellom LO og DNA. Memorandum on the labour movement's committee for Greece, 21.06.1968.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.; See Chapter 2 of this thesis.



### **AIS as an organisational tool**

After the challenges posed by the cross-party organisations for Vietnam and Greece, it appears that DNA and LO wanted to move away from such organisations to avoid cooperation with the leftist parties and hinder further internal strife. In addition, there were several problems with the cross-party organisations that hindered effective solidarity work. By creating their own initiative, they would be able to control the work and make it more effective. The need to make the support work more efficient was underlined in the presentation of AIS by the Secretariat to the LO Congress. The Secretariat claimed that there had constantly been requests for support to the work of the different committees, which had led to a lack of overview and coordination of the trade union movement's support.<sup>337</sup> Also the Cooperation Committee asserted that AIS was to be established in order for the labour movement to "be able to act more effectively in such situations" where there was need for quick reactions to international events.<sup>338</sup> In this way, AIS was not to replace all earlier efforts, but to take responsibility and coordinate the work in order to streamline it. This view was maintained by DNA representative Gunnar Alf Larsen at the Party Congress where he was the only representative to comment the proposal of establishing AIS. Larsen's comment, which remained undisputed, was that he supported the proposal with the assumption that the new committee would not render the groups, trade unions and clubs working with international issues passive, but rather conserve and coordinate this work.<sup>339</sup> The then AUF chairman Hans Jørgen Raastad has indicated that this comment safeguarded the position of the more activist members of the labour movement.<sup>340</sup>

What is more, as AIS was established as an alternative to situational bodies and cooperation with the leftist parties, a reference to the New Left and the proliferation of solidarity committees in the 1960s as described in Chapter 1 seems relevant at this point. Firstly, SF can be considered as a part of the New Left that proliferated internationally and that criticised both the communist and the social democratic parties.<sup>341</sup> This means that AIS was established as a counterforce to the New Left rather than as part of it. In addition, the cross-party bodies that DNA and LO shifted away from were similar to the cross-party single-issue solidarity committees that were proliferating globally. In this way, AIS was established as an alternative to

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<sup>337</sup> LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 261.

<sup>338</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248. My translation.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 249.

<sup>340</sup> Personal e-mail correspondence with Hans Jørgen Raastad, 12.05.2020.

<sup>341</sup> Lorenz, *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie*, 158.

such committees. The international context in which radicalism and solidarity committees proliferated is thus essential to understand the establishment of AIS, also beyond the integration of demands and pressure from youth and leftists.<sup>342</sup>

These organisational considerations behind the establishment of AIS can be further understood in light of an existing ambition to strengthen and unify the labour movement. Tamnes argues that after a crisis in the early 1970s, DNA accepted leftist demands of increased engagement in order to unite the party and regain strength.<sup>343</sup> While Tamnes describes the 1970s, it is possible to argue that it started already in the late 1960s. In fact, Pharo claims that “the leftist Labor Party foreign policy opposition [...] remained a thorn in the side of the leadership throughout the Cold War”.<sup>344</sup>

In the 1960s, the need to strengthen and unify the party arose due to internal disagreements and the party’s weakened position in some electoral groups. After losing government power in 1965, internal disagreements on issues like the Vietnam War and the NATO membership surfaced as the debate climate had improved and members felt freer and more unfettered.<sup>345</sup> Despite the internal disagreements and tension, the debate was more open than before and DNA in fact ended up with good electoral results in 1969.<sup>346</sup> Still, these disagreements might have contributed to a sense of need to unify the party. DNA had additionally problems with its appeal to the youth.<sup>347</sup> As we saw in Chapter 1, the lack of appeal of the established parties to the youth was in fact an international phenomenon. Although the municipal elections in 1967 gave DNA good results, there were tendencies that created worries, including the poor results among the younger electorate.<sup>348</sup>

This is supported by a draft discussion platform to prepare the party before the elections in 1969 by the organisational committee in DNA. The draft noted that there was a need for a reinforcement internally on both the political and the organisational levels before the elections

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<sup>342</sup> See Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.

<sup>343</sup> Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 344; Simensen similarly argues that the radical turn in Norwegian international engagement in the 1970s was a unifying measure by DNA in the aftermath of the poor election results in 1973. Simensen, *Norge møter den tredje verden*, 251.

<sup>344</sup> Pharo, “Small State Anti-Fascism”, 8-9.

<sup>345</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 66-67.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-68.

<sup>347</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 466.

<sup>348</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 57.

in 1969.<sup>349</sup> This suggest that DNA was conscious of the need to strengthen the party prior to the elections. They also directly addressed the need to increase its appeal to the youth, arguing that they needed to put extra efforts into strengthening the ties between young voters and the party.<sup>350</sup> With reference to both the poor election results and the situation within youth groups around Europe, the organisational committee stressed the need for conversations and discussions with youth groups, to plan internally and figure out the main issues for the youth.<sup>351</sup> As international issues were, as we have seen, of growing importance to the youth, it is reasonable to assume that they were among the issues that the party wanted to increase their appeal on. In fact, Godbolt argues that DNA used the Vietnam issue to make the party more attractive to the youth.<sup>352</sup> One could also note that the engagement for the anti-apartheid cause was particularly strong in the youth organisations.<sup>353</sup> This might contribute to explain the emphasis on racial discrimination and South Africa in relation to AIS, as it displayed a willingness to deal with the issue. However, the engagement of DNA in these issues also built on genuine solidarity and social democratic ideology, as we saw in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, the engagement was at the same time a measure to strengthen and unify the party. AIS, which was to address international situations including ones like the youth and the leftist opposition within the party had recently engaged with, can be considered part of this effort. Notably, AIS was established just prior to the elections in 1969 before which the leadership wanted to strengthen the party and increase its appeal and just prior to the parliament decision on whether to continue the NATO membership, which was an important issue to many among the leftist opposition.

Moreover, the establishment of AIS was part of a renewal process in LO that was initiated to strengthen the confederation. This renewal process started during Parelius Mentsen's chairmanship with Tor Aspengren as vice-chairman and a central figure in making new long-term plans for LO, although the process was intensified in 1969 when Aspengren was elected chairman.<sup>354</sup> Bergh has detailed the process in his volume of *LOs historie*.<sup>355</sup> The renewal process included both a reorganisation of LO's work and a renewal of the leadership. As put by

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<sup>349</sup> AAB. DNA's archives. Da-L0444. Organisasjonsutvalget. Second draft of discussion platform for party work prior to the elections 1969, undated.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

<sup>352</sup> Godbolt, "Vietnam-protesten i Norge", 65-66.

<sup>353</sup> Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika*, 12.

<sup>354</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 467-468.

<sup>355</sup> See part one "De radikale og ustabile 1970-årene" in Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*.

Bergh, “Aspengren and his new team in the LO leadership represented a big rejuvenation and a distinct renewal of LO both on the person level, in methods and not the least in ambitions.”<sup>356</sup> Existing departments were expanded, and new ones were created. New positions were created, and the administration was enlarged with more leaders, experts and executive officers. The people who were hired were often young academics with strong ties to DNA.<sup>357</sup> This new staff appear to be somewhat similar to Tvedt’s new elite as they were part of an effort to take the lead in the development of the Norwegian society and as they later circulated between positions as experts, DNA politicians and government ministers.<sup>358</sup> Among the areas affected by the process, was the trade union movement’s occupation with international issues as international solidarity and trade union aid were among the new topics of focus.<sup>359</sup> In 1970, LO hired its first international secretary, which was followed by the creation of an international department. The new staff, however, does not seem to have been involved in the establishment of AIS, but Thorvald Stoltenberg, who became LO’s first international secretary and later would have a long political career in DNA with an international orientation, was appointed member of AIS when the committee’s board was put together for the first time in 1969. He was succeeded as international secretary by Kaare Sandegren in 1974, who also became a member of AIS and involved in several parts of the labour movement’s international work. These experts with academic backgrounds appear therefore to be prominent in the labour movement’s international work in the time after the establishment of AIS. Nevertheless, the expansion of the international work began already in the late 1960s. In this way, AIS can also be considered a part of the increased engagement and the renewal process.

The renewal process was based on two ambitions. One was the ambition to pursue a more systematic policy on more areas than before.<sup>360</sup> The second ambition was that the top leadership in LO, especially the chairman and the vice-chairman, was to pursue a more overriding and strategic management with focus on large, long-term matters rather than details and single issues.<sup>361</sup> An important underlying motivation for the renewal was, moreover, to diminish the threats of the conservative features of LO, which existed due to the organisation’s structure that put much significance on its leaders, who often gained strong positions and kept the

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<sup>356</sup> Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 44. My translation.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-40.

<sup>358</sup> See *Ibid.*, 36-41.

<sup>359</sup> Gram and Rønning, *De lange linjer*, 103.

<sup>360</sup> Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 36.

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*

positions for a considerable time.<sup>362</sup> This structure threatened the vitality of the organisation as well as the contact with the grassroots level.<sup>363</sup> In addition, LO had, similarly to DNA and established parties around Europe, problems with its appeal to the youth.<sup>364</sup> The renewal process, which AIS can be considered part of, was thus an effort to strengthen LO, including its appeal to the grassroots and the youth. However, it should be noted that Aspengren was dedicated to foreign political issues, which indicates that the increased international engagement was not only a pragmatic measure.

The renewal process in LO marked, furthermore, closer connections and cooperation between LO and DNA.<sup>365</sup> Not only did the new officials, experts and advisors in LO often have a background from the party, but LO itself sought an increased political role.<sup>366</sup> In 1968, LO initiated a study program titled *Program 69*. This program was to gather the opinions of LO members through study circles and formed the basis of LO's first programme of action in 1969. The strategic motivation was to strengthen the ties between the trade union movement and the party "through a programmatic harmonisation that could give both parts a common political framework."<sup>367</sup> The programme of action aimed to remove, to some extent, the former division of tasks that had given the party the main responsibility for general political issues.<sup>368</sup> It is possible to see AIS as part of the efforts to strengthen the ties between DNA and LO. AIS was to be a committee for solely LO and DNA and their affiliated organisations. Rather than leaning on participation in broad cross-party organisations and movements, they were now to have their own coordinated effort confined to the labour movement, which as we have seen they defined narrowly. AIS can, in this way, be regarded as an effort to unify the labour movement, meaning LO and DNA and their affiliated organisations.

The need for more effective, coordinated and confined organisation of the support through AIS was, however, not only tied to the issues that existed with the domestic cross-party organisations and the organisational considerations of DNA and LO. There was also an element of pressure from the increasing number of situations that they aspired to support. The Cooperation Committee explained in its presentation of AIS to DNA's Party Congress that there had

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<sup>362</sup> Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 19-20.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>364</sup> Bjørnhaug and Halvorsen, *Medlemsmakt og samfunnsansvar*, 466.

<sup>365</sup> Bergh, *Kollektiv fornuft*, 45.

<sup>366</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>367</sup> Nyhamar, *Nye utfordringer*, 71. My translation.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*

been constantly situations to which the labour movement wanted to react in the later years and that there would be similar needs in the future.<sup>369</sup> Thus, underlying the need for an organisational change was the realisation that world peace and prosperity was dependent on international developments, and that this was a precondition for further progress in Norway.<sup>370</sup> Kaare Sandegren has reached similar conclusions when arguing that the trade union movement's occupation with foreign political issues was a natural consequence of international integration and interdependency.<sup>371</sup> The desire for more effective organisation can therefore also be tied to an understanding that there was an increasing number of situations to which they wanted to respond. To this it can be added that although DNA and LO participated in the SI and the ICFTU where international issues were to some extent discussed, the direct actions of these organisations to such situations remained limited.<sup>372</sup> The possibility of multilateral support efforts through these organisations was consequently restrained.

Finally, there have been some arguments made in the literature as to the relationship between the establishment of AIS and the solidarity funds. Terjesen claims that AIS was established after the merging of LO's engagement in the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund with the Norwegian Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund.<sup>373</sup> Also the then party vice-chairman Reiulf Steen writes that AIS replaced the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund.<sup>374</sup> Both of these funds had prior to the establishment of AIS faced problems. The International Solidarity Fund had faced troubles after several of its contributors had shifted their focus to bilateral programmes.<sup>375</sup> The Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund was, for its part, challenged by internal disagreements. Firstly, there existed ideological differences between Haakon Lie and Paul Engstad and the younger representatives on the board.<sup>376</sup> The disagreement centred to a large extent on their perceptions of the Vietnam issue and the international situation.<sup>377</sup> In addition, the environment within the board was characterised by feuds and allegations of covert operations, ties to intelligence organisations and the like.<sup>378</sup> However, despite these claims and the challenges facing the funds, I have found no information in the archival material to support an

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<sup>369</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 248.

<sup>370</sup> See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

<sup>371</sup> Sandegren, *Fagbevegelsens internasjonale engasjement*, 12, 15-18.

<sup>372</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>373</sup> Terjesen, "Begrenset solidaritet eller solidaritet uten grenser", 36.

<sup>374</sup> Steen, *Maktkamp*, 94.

<sup>375</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>376</sup> Borgen, *Diktatoren*, 208.

<sup>377</sup> Lahlum, *Haakon Lie*, 528.

<sup>378</sup> Steen, *Maktkamp*, 94.

argument that AIS was a replacement of either of the solidarity funds when it was established in 1969. Rather the Norwegian labour movement continued its support to the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund and even channelled some money to it through AIS. In addition, the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund continued its efforts. In fact, the statutes for AIS clarified that this fund was to remain unaffected by the establishment of AIS.<sup>379</sup> This gives basis to argue that AIS was not intended to replace it at the time of its establishment. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the fund was eventually merged with AIS in 1971 after a reorganisation.<sup>380</sup>

### **Chapter findings**

This chapter has sought to examine the organisational aspects of AIS in order to further explain why it was established and what effects this had for the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement. It has been asserted that there were several organisational factors behind the establishment of AIS. There had been several issues with the cross-party situational bodies that had been operating in the years prior to the establishment of AIS in 1969. Not only did these bodies imply organisational cooperation with the leftist parties, but they had also caused internal strife within DNA and created issues for the efficiency of the solidarity work. By curbing or controlling the ad-hoc participation in cross-party organisations and creating a coordinated and confined effort, the leadership in LO and DNA aimed to strengthen and unify the labour movement. Besides, the international situation contributed to pressure for increased support efforts. Even though these organisational factors were connected to political considerations, AIS can be considered to also have been an organisational tool to respond to these issues. AIS was established as an effort to take responsibility for and coordinate the labour movement's support work. It thereby represented a shift away from ad-hoc cross-party situational organisations and movements to a coordinated, confined effort for the Norwegian labour movement.

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<sup>379</sup> DNA, Protocol of the proceedings of the Party Congress 1969, 249; LO, Protocol of the proceedings of the Congress 1969, 263.

<sup>380</sup> Valstrand, *Alt om LO*, 202.

## **Conclusion**

In May 1969, DNA's Party Congress and the LO Congress approved unanimously the establishment of the AIS. This thesis has sought to examine why AIS was established. In order to answer this question, the thesis has investigated a set of sub-research questions. Who were involved in the establishment of AIS? What did they intend AIS to be? What considerations were made? How does this fit within the longer trends of the Norwegian labour movement's international engagement? Was the establishment of AIS part of global or regional trends? By examining these questions, the thesis has aimed to shed light on a scarcely covered topic of international engagement in the historiography of the Norwegian labour movement. This also ties to an overriding discussion on the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s.

The establishment of AIS was the result of a process within the leaderships of DNA and LO. While several ad-hoc task forces were involved in the process, the primary group involved was the Cooperation Committee. The members of this group were men who had long been involved in the labour movement and now belonged to the leadership in DNA and LO. These individuals, moreover, belonged to older generations, although there was also a generation gap within the committee. Even though these men were part of a transnational labour movement and engaged in different international issues to varying extents, they were first and foremost Norwegian politicians and trade union officials. The primary actors involved in the establishment of AIS thus belonged to a political elite with a basis in the Norwegian labour movement.

The thesis has moreover found that AIS was established as an effort to support individuals, organisations and movements who were struggling for democracy and freedom. Other than this, it appears that the definition of who were possible candidates for support were quite open and inclusive. Notably, there was no specific labour movement focus, although it is reasonable to assume that labour movements were included. What is more, the committee was established with a global ambition, which implied that it would provide support across the prevalent North-South and East-West divisions of the time. AIS was established with an ideological and political underpinning because of its aim to promote democratic rights and freedom. These were principles that were part of labour movement ideology and which the Norwegian labour movement had long supported in their international engagement. This ideological underpinning was, however, intertwined with idealism and self-interest. There existed a genuine



belief in these ideological principles, but also a conviction that it was in the interest of Norway and the labour movement to adapt to and affect international developments. This conviction rested on an idea of peace as indivisible that was prevalent after the Second World War and implied global interdependence. This idea was also part of the world view of the generations that the members of the Cooperation Committee belonged to, who had witnessed the consequences of war and dictatorship.

Still, the establishment of AIS was part of new, more radical developments in the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement in the 1960s. At that time, the Norwegian labour movement experienced a radicalisation and increased international engagement. One part of this was an increasingly global ambition as the Norwegian labour movement increasingly engaged with anti-colonial and Third World issues. This included for instance the anti-apartheid and Vietnam issues. Another part of the radicalised international engagement was the more critical character. In the 1960s, the Norwegian labour movement displayed an increased willingness to criticise and put pressure on NATO allies, including the United States. This development cannot be understood except for in light of the pressure from the internal foreign political opposition, which included youth and leftists, for an increased critical position. This radicalisation brought with it new efforts, including AIS. The establishment of AIS can in this way also be viewed as an attempt by the leading figures to respond to the growing pressure from the base of the labour movement and as a measure in the more global and critical international engagement in the 1960s.

However, these political motivations provide only parts of the explanation of AIS. There were also organisational aspects that contribute to the explanation. AIS represented a shift away from ad-hoc cross-party situational bodies to a coordinated effort confined to the Norwegian labour movement. In the recent years, there had been several issues with such bodies, which had contributed to internal strife within the labour movement and caused challenges for the efficiency of the work. By creating a coordinated and confined effort, the leadership in LO and DNA aimed to strengthen and unify the labour movement. There existed, moreover, a perception that the current international situation demanded increased support efforts. These organisational factors were tied to political considerations. Yet, AIS can be considered an organisational tool to respond to these issues. This contributes to explain why AIS was established in 1969 when the Norwegian labour movement had a long tradition of international engagement and had already increased its efforts in the recent years.

Finally, the establishment of AIS can be further understood in a global context. Concurrently with the radicalisation of the Norwegian labour movement and the establishment of AIS, there existed global trends of activism and solidarity efforts. The 1960s saw the proliferation of revolts that called established politics into question and raised attention to various international issues. These revolts are typically tied to the phenomenon of 1968 and the participation of youth and the New Left. Even though these revolts occurred on a global scale, the Scandinavian revolts can be distinguished by the integration of the protest and demands by the political establishment, including the labour movement. The findings of this thesis give reason to argue that this dynamic to some extent contributed to the establishment of AIS. As we have seen, LO and DNA integrated demands from youth and leftists for a more critical position. In this way, the revolts did have an impact on the international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement. However, AIS was also established to avoid direct organisational cooperation with leftist parties and was therefore established as a counterforce to the New Left. 1968 and the 1960s activism is thus an important context to the establishment of AIS, although the committee was established by representatives of the political establishment and was not directly a part of the 1968 phenomenon.

Moreover, another global trend in the 1960s was the proliferation of solidarity committees. These were part of the 1968 phenomenon, but also a distinctive phenomenon both prior to, during and after 1968. These committees were often organised for one single issue and with broad political backing. Although these solidarity committees included the participation of labour movements, AIS was rather established as an alternative to these committees. As we recall, the establishment of AIS represented a shift away from ad-hoc single-issue cross-party situational bodies. In this way, these bodies remain an essential context to understand the establishment of AIS.

Also within the international labour movement there was attention to international issues. Still, the direct actions of the international labour movement organisations remained limited. This meant that the international labour movement relied on actions of the individual labour movements. In Scandinavia, the labour movements were increasing their international engagement. In 1969, the same year as AIS was established, the Danish Social Democratic Party institutionalised its engagement in the Labour Movement's Solidarity Fund which shared several characteristics with AIS and was tied to pressure from the youth and the New Left. The Swedish labour movement appears to not have institutionalised their activity in a committee

similar to AIS until the 1970s. However, also they were increasing their efforts in the 1960s. The establishment of AIS can therefore be understood as part of a broader pattern of international engagement and solidarity efforts globally and regionally.

The international engagement of the Norwegian labour movement has also implications for the overriding debate of Norwegian international engagement and the questions of who were the actors involved, what factors motivated this engagement and the degree of continuity versus change. Whereas scholars like Simensen, Tamnes, and Eriksen and Pharo have focused on the international engagement of the Norwegian state, this thesis has stressed the role of the leadership and the base of the labour movement in the changing international engagement in the 1960s. Moreover, the thesis asserts the need to look beyond the new political elite described by Tvedt in order to understand the Norwegian international engagement in the 1960s, as it argues that the main actors in the establishment of AIS rather represented an old political elite. Whereas these leading figures and their political orientations were not new, the international engagement of the movement they led was increased and radicalised in the 1960s as they responded to internal pressure and to international developments. In addition, the establishment of AIS was a response to political and organisational challenges. The political and organisational considerations behind AIS can be further understood in light of multiple international contexts and impulses. This means that the labour movement's international engagement in the 1960s cannot be understood within the framework of a humanitarian-political complex that Tvedt professes. Like Simensen, Tamnes, and Eriksen and Pharo, the thesis rather points to the significance of various global impulses and developments and other domestic developments for the Norwegian international engagement. Additionally, the thesis supports these historians' interpretation of a changing Norwegian international engagement that was characterised by a degree of continuity. However, what this thesis adds to the historiography is its specific insights from the Norwegian labour movement.

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