Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages

(IKOS)

UiO: University of Oslo

Independent Migrant Workers' Organizations in the South Korean Public Sphere and Society: Focusing on Their Discursive and Performative Activities

Polina Dunai

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ABSTRACT

The independent migrant workers' movement in South Korea, represented by the Migrant Trade Union, is an example of a unique formation in South Korea. Thus, it is of interest to us as a subject of academic research. The MTU is the first legalized migrant-based umbrella organization for all the migrant workers in South Korea struggling to protect their rights and improve their working conditions. After the MTU separated from the South Korean NGOs and established their own union, they have had to maneuver between the South Korean public sphere, the South Korean government, and society at large to achieve their goals. To gain a better understanding of the MTU and its interaction with the surrounding environment, their means of manifestation of demands, requests, discontent, and opinion were chosen to be analyzed. In the scope of this study, protest placards used by migrant workers and their performative activities were examined to identify their strategies, central purposes, and tactics, since they best reflect the essence of any type of organization. The results of the research revealed principal audiences the MTU is addressing and for what purposes, the major obstacles they are facing while defending their liberties, and the nature of the cooperation with the South Korean public sphere. Moreover, the results demonstrated challenges to engage the South Korean society to support their movement and aspirations to create a unified migrant worker identity.

Key words: migrant workers, migrant workers' trade unionism, protest signs, semiotics, performative activities, social movement, South Korea
Number of words: 18,624

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

International labor migration plays an active role in today's capitalist economy, where free circulation of capital, goods, and services has created a high demand for labor across industries and occupations. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the number of migrant workers employed worldwide has reached 164 million people, which certainly is a large portion of the overall 258 million international migrants.[1] The well-managed labor migration is a mutually beneficial process, since it allows countries of destination to resolve issues with labor shortages and is conducive to the economic growth of sending countries via remittance flows. Furthermore, labor migration enables workers to improve their standard of living and qualifications as well as to support financially their families through better employment opportunities and salaries offered by more developed countries.

Migrant labor has become an indispensable component of the development of the private sector due to the greater willingness of foreign workers to accept poor working conditions and low-paid manual jobs compared to local workers. While bringing substantial value to productivity and performance of nearly every business, migrant workers continue to remain a heavily exploited and discriminated workforce. In order to protect migrant workers as well as optimize the benefits for countries involved, it is necessary to formulate labor migration policies, legislation, and strategies both on the international and national levels. ILO's International Legal Framework on Labour Migration was introduced to address a wide range of challenges encountered by migrant workers and their families in a foreign country.[2] Nonetheless, owing to differences in legal systems of each country and inadequate experience on the part of the implementation of international laws within a national legal order, some states are struggling to provide sufficient support and protection to migrant workers and South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) is a clear example of this.

Since the late 1980s, the Korean government started to welcome a large number of migrant workers,[3] mostly from less-developed Asian countries, gradually turning Korea from a

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[1] International Labour Organization, "ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers" (Report), December 5, 2018, https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_652001/lang--en/index.htm.

[2] ILO's International Legal Framework on Labour Migration, https://www.ilo.org/africa/areas-of-work/labour-migration/relevant-standards/lang--en/index.htm.

[3] In this thesis, a phrase "migrant/foreign worker" refers to "unskilled worker".

labor-sending country into a labor-importing one.[4] As of 2019, Korea has already accepted 863,000 foreign workers.[5] Labor migration policies designed by the state, however, still fail to eliminate discrimination, rights violations, and mistreatment of foreign laborers. When the government of the destination country and its legal system are unable to facilitate the labor migration process without putting migrant workers into a vulnerable position, civil society along with migrant workers themselves are forced to take action.

The role of the social movement organized by migrant workers against violations of their rights cannot be underestimated. Using various types of social actions, slogans, banners, etc., they deftly maneuver between the Korean government, the Korean public sphere, and the society in an attempt to defend themselves in a foreign country. It is important to note that while being unwelcomed, but at the same time needed in such a supposedly homogeneous society as Korea, migrant workers still managed to achieve substantial results in improving their conditions. One of the biggest accomplishments was the establishment of the independent Migrant Trade Union in 2005 followed by a protracted and grueling struggle for its legalization. Whilst fighting for their rights and place in the Korean society, they not only influence political, economic, and social arena but also reform boundaries of the public sphere and their own by generating mutual interactions.

It is migrant workers' tools of social movement—protest signs (protests, rallies, leaflets, placards, etc.) and performative activities—that are of great interest to this study, since they best reflect the aforementioned intercommunication through meanings and ideas they carry as well as increase our knowledge about strategies and goals of a first migrant-based union in Korea.

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[4] Jin-kyung Lee, *Service economies: Militarism, sex work, and migrant labor in South Korea* (University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 186.

[5] Statistics Korea, "Survey on Immigrants' Living Conditions and Labour Force", December 19, 2019, http://kostat.go.kr/assist/synap/preview/skin/doc.html?fn=synapview381619_1&rs=/assist/synap/preview.

Theory and Literature Review

The present research attempts to conduct an interdisciplinary inquiry into Korea's contemporary social movements. The focus of this thesis is to examine the activity of independent migrant workers' organizations, namely the MTU, in a bid to enrich our understanding of the organization itself and its interconnections with the Korean public sphere and society as a whole. In order to reach our goals, a number of studies about migrant workers in Korea, semiotics, discourses, landscape linguistics, social movements, and performative acts were reviewed. With the objective to ease the comprehension of the theoretical material included in the literature review, three central study areas will be discussed serving as an umbrella for the following use of the theory in chapters. Since semiotic analysis was used as a research methodology for the purposes of the study, it will be pertinent to discuss semiotic literature first.

Ju. K. Lekomcev (1929–1984) defines semiotics as "the science of signs transmitting information inside some social group; it is the science of communicative sign systems".[6] That is to say, semiotics is a science of systems of meaning, where discourse is a medium. Semiotics is a very broad branch of studies that is not restricted within studying signs only in literature; however, it embraces the non-literary realm including customs, clothing, rituals, and the whole magnitude of human activities, which entail at least an iota of meaning. Nevertheless, language is considered as a primary sign system, hence constitutes the essence of the studies of semiotics—a position shared by many semiologists and linguists. The father of European semiotics and linguistics, F. De Saussure (1857–1913), was the first one to underscore the fundamental role of the language within the semiotic system. His argument was further supported by a number of leading linguists, such as Barthes (1915–1980), Greimas (1917–1992), Eco (1932–2016), and Jakobson (1896–1982).

The focal concept of discourse was introduced to semiotics by A. J. Greimas, who defined it "as the manifestation of language".[7] Discourse as a frequently used term in academic literature and as a field of study is quite vague.[8] It embraces several approaches that are interconnected by a wide range of disciplines. Similarly, when it comes to organizations, academics struggle to define the function that discourse performs there.[9] Although approaches

[6] Ju K. Lekomcev, "Foundations of general semiotics," *Soviet Semiotics* (1977): 41.
[7] Sémir Badir, "Semiotics and Discourse Studies," *Gragoatá* 22.44 (2017): 1060.
[8] Van Dijk, Teun A., ed. *Discourse as structure and process*. Vol. 1. Sage, 1997.
[9] David Grant, Tom Keenoy, and Cliff Oswick, "Organizational discourse: Key contributions and challenges," *International Studies of Management & Organization* 31.3 (2001): 5–24.

used in discourse research are often to a degree contradictory, the study is affiliated with the examination of texts and their usage in and by certain organizational facilities. Therefore, discursive analysis entails an assessment of text production, acts of communication, exercised languages, and interrelations between the participants within and outside of the particular institution.[10]

This approach is based upon discourse being a social reality constructor. In other words, discourse is capable of not only depicting reality per se but also has enough power to create it.[11] In a social context, it means that it can generate social identities and relationships between people and objects of knowledge. An alternative role of discourse, which is interesting to our study, is its political influence in situations when people or organizations exploit it for spreading their ideas and achieving aims. Researchers argue whether separate individuals can use the capability of discourse to exert a strong effect on society and make a difference (D. Grant) or not (C. Antaki, S. Condor). In our work, we are more inclined to support the idea that people and institutions can deploy discourse for their means to produce desirable results.[12]

One of the central objectives of this thesis is discursive activities of independent migrant workers' movement, where protest banners and slogans are analyzed as a form of discourse. They are a comprehensive instrument for broadcasting demands and feelings of the protesters together with assisting in their goal-attaining journey. Through the language of these protest signs, people often establish their social identity, create a feeling of unity and belonging as well as separation from those, who refuse to support the movement. Thus, using semiotico-textual analysis the code choice used by migrant workers in their placards, leaflets, banners, etc., will be examined to deepen understanding of the movement and its actors.

The concept of performativity from its discursive perspective enhances our understanding of the realm of political participation encompassing countless amounts of activities, locales, and agents taking the political action.[13] Thus, this theory is valuable to our study, as one of the agents participating in the communication with the Korean government

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[10] Cliff Oswick, Tom W. Keenoy, and David Grant, "Discourse, organizations and organizing: Concepts, objects and subjects," *Human Relations* 53.9 (2000): 1115–1123.

[11] Van Dijk, Teun A., "Social cognition and discourse," *Handbook of language and social psychology* (1990): 163–183.

[12] Cynthia Hardy, Thomas Lawrence, and Nelson Phillips, "Talking action: Conversations, narrative and action in inter-organizational collaboration," *Discourse and organization* 65 (1998): 83.

[13] Jessica J. Kulynych, "Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation," *Polity* 30.2 (1997): 315–346.

through various performative activities is the MTU.[14] When it comes to social movements, a term suggested by J. Butler, a prominent scientist in the theory of performative acts, will be used. Her definition perfectly describes the essence of the political performativity: "Showing up, standing, breathing, moving, standing still, speech, and silence are all aspects of a sudden assembly, an unforeseen form of *political performativity* that puts livable life at the forefront of politics".[15]

In the theory of speech act and performance art, there is a shared idea that "symbolic actions—performative actions in everyday life as well as artistic performances—have the potential to create or undermine social reality".[16] Researchers, such as R. Rowley, T.V. Reed, and J. Friedberg have long been discussing the explicit connection of art to activism and, how creativity and artistry are exhibited in the act of protest. Likewise, different manifestations of art performed during the protest play an influential role in revealing the origins of the protest, engaging masses, and overall success of the movement.[17]Another noteworthy trajectory of the research represented by J. Jasper[18] and J. Goodwin[19] looks into the impact of emotions and culture on the process of protest execution and communication with the audience.

Data and Methodology

Due to the multifaceted nature of the social movement, studies of protest require various types of approaches and methods of analysis to be used, occasionally in combination. In the majority of investigations, qualitative methods prevail over the quantitative. However, in some cases, a quantitative method provides additional evidence for the qualitatively analyzed data. The most preferred among researchers and, thus, the most frequently utilized are interviews, participant and non-participant observations, interpretations of the researcher and analyst, and iterative reflection on the researcher's interpretation.

In order to conduct this research, a qualitative method of data analysis will be used. To be more precise, qualitative content analysis was chosen as an appropriate method to serve the

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[14] The nature of its participation (political/non-political) will be further discussed in the paper.

[15] Judith Butler, *Notes toward a performative theory of assembly*. Harvard University Press, 2015.

[16] Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, "Utopia in Practise: The Discovery of Performativity in Sixties' Protest, Arts and Sciences," *Historein* 9 (2009): 46–56.

[17] Larry Isaac, "Movement of movements: Culture moves in the long civil rights struggle," *Social Forces* 87.1 (2008): 33–63.

[18] James M. Jasper and Lynn Owens, "Social movements and emotions," *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions: Volume II*. Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. 529-548.

[19] Jeffrey Goodwin and James M. Jasper, *Rethinking social movements: Structure, culture, and emotion*, (2004).

purposes of the study.[20] This method is considered to be the most suitable for analyzing not only text data in its classical representation but also discover and decode meanings behind various artifacts.[21]

In our research, the methodology of analysis is built on the pre-existing work of the theorists who contributed to the development of qualitative study methodologies. Together with a number of visual sociologists, R. Scollon and S. W. Scollon are believed to have achieved outstanding results in the discipline called geosemiotics, while G. Kress and T. van Leeuwen proved to be leading experts in visual grammar. Frame analysis, which is usually associated with the concepts of E. Goffman, and mediated discourse analysis (MDA) coined by R. Scollon are two analytical approaches that are highly relevant for examining social movements, particularly in the connection to artifacts.

The material existence of certain action is possible due to persons and objects. Thus, within MDA action is selected as an item of analysis and not the text.[22] Nevertheless, taking protest as an action, one can argue that text, bearing representative function, plays the role of a mediator assisting to interpret the meaning and essence behind the action from various perspectives. In order to somehow identify and structure the information obtained from the text analyses, addressing frame analysis would be a necessary thing to do.

In the current study, a total number of 76 pictures of protest placards used by migrant workers during various performative activities were drawn from the electronic resources and analyzed. In order to achieve the goals of the research, the collected data was applied to the context in which social actions took place and code preferences used by migrant workers.[23] Moreover, to fully capture the aspect of migrant workers' communication via protest placards, an attempt was made to compare their slogans and language codes to those used by the Korean workers and activists.

For the analysis of the performative activities of migrant workers, Korean newspaper articles were retrieved from electronic sources and examined. Within the field of social movement studies, newspapers are the most utilized data source for protests assessment, even though a number of scholars emphasized the weaknesses of this data source, unsure to what

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[20] Bernard H. Russell and Gery Ryan, "Text analysis," *Handbook of methods in cultural anthropology* 613 (1998).

[21] Daniel Chandler. *The Act of writing* (University of Wales., 1995)

[22] Suzie Wong Scollon and Ingrid de Saint-Georges, "Mediated discourse analysis," *The Routledge handbook of discourse analysis*. Routledge, 2013. 92–104.

[23] A number of online Korean newspaper articles were analyzed to establish actors, places, and types of performative actions.

extent the report's description of the protest can be objective.[24] If we take into account that researches of social movements identified two types of facts the newspapers usually entail—"hard facts" (an actual act of protest) and "soft facts" (interpretation of the reporter based on views),[25] the latter are less trustworthy and, therefore, will not be taken into consideration in our study. Following the analysis of the newspapers, performative activities of migrant workers, which can be the most useful for our study and illustrate our arguments as well as challenge our assumptions, were selected as examples and discussed during the course of the work. In addition, a participant observation method of data collection was applied, since I personally joined several demonstrations and communicated with the leader of the MTU and a number of migrant workers (protestors).

1. State policy towards migrant workers in South Korea

The reasons behind the massive influx of transnational workers to Korea are hardly novel or restricted to Korea. One of the primary causes was the need for foreign labor in certain industries as a response to rapid industrialization and substantial expansion of the economy. The demand for additional workforce arose in the «3-D» sectors such as fishing, construction, agriculture, manufacture, etc., where Korean nationals given a great improvement in educational levels were unwilling to work. As soon as the Korean government realized that it is no longer possible to attract domestic workers to eliminate the labor shortage in these sectors, new strategies to deal with imported labor were developed.

In 1993, the Korean government enforced the Industrial Technical Trainee System (ITTS) to deal with the deficit of labor and a large number of undocumented workers caused by the previously implemented Industrial Venture Training Program (IVTP).[26] By the time Korea started to face immigration issues related to unskilled laborers, Japan had already accumulated relevant experience in this area. Therefore, the Korean ITTS was largely based on the Japanese Industrial and Technical Training Program for Foreigners (1993).[27] The fundamental distinction between the ITTS and the formerly enacted IVTP was the elimination

[24] Christian Davenport, Sarah A. Soule, and David A. Armstrong, "Protesting while black? The differential policing of American activism, 1960 to 1990," *American Sociological Review* 76.1 (2011): 152–178.

[25] Thomas N. Ratliff and Lori L. Hall, "Practicing the art of dissent: Toward a typology of protest activity in the United States," *Humanity & Society* 38.3 (2014): 268–294.

[26] DEMIG (June 2015) DEMIG POLICY, version 1.3, Online Edition. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. www.migrationdeterminants.eu.

[27] Yong Wook Lee and Hyemee Park, "The politics of foreign labor policy in Korea and Japan," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 35.2 (2005): 143–165.

of the restriction for the Korean companies to hire migrant workers in case they did not possess foreign investments. That is to say, the IVTP excluded participation of the middle and small-sized businesses in the cheap labor importation, depriving companies of cutting expenses on the labor force, thus, preventing their stable economic development. Under the ITTS, the Korean government ensured that the entire Korean private sector would have the opportunity to experience benefits of the low-cost foreign labor. Nonetheless, no measures were adopted to improve a vulnerable position of migrant workers.

According to the ITTS, foreign laborers were permitted to reside in Korea and work for the Korean employers during the period of one year after which they were forced to return to their country of origin. The title of this program directly reflects the major downside of the system that was undermining the position of workers. The word "trainee" itself implied that foreign workers were not legally recognized as "workers". Subsequently, the Labor Standard Law or any other labor-related laws in Korea were unable to provide them sufficient protection. This has created an atmosphere of impunity, which led to the Korean employers often taking advantage of migrant workers and turning them into a subject of constant abuse. Those workers, who were no longer able to bear the burden of exploitation, would choose to become "illegal workers" (i.e. undocumented workers) and run away from the employers they were assigned to by the program. The problem is that in case they decided to flee, their identification documents would have to remain with their initial employers making these "runaways" even more vulnerable at their new working place. On the one hand, it gave them a possibility for a new start and a hope to obtain better employment opportunities. On the other hand, however, together with their passports, migrants were also losing their identity and chances to receive legal protection in a foreign country. Nevertheless, frequent human rights violations were not the main reason why migrants would change their trainee status to the "undocumented worker". The decisive factor behind the dislocation of the industrial trainees was the relatively low wages they received in comparison to undocumented workers.[28] Under the ITTS, trainees were paid "trainee allowance", which was considerably lower than a standard wage received for the same job by a Korean worker or even a foreign worker. During 1995–1996, a monthly wage difference between trainees and undocumented migrant workers was estimated to be

[28] Chin Hee Hahn and Yong Seok Choi, "The Effects of Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Korea: Overview and Empirical Assessment," *Korea and the World Economy Conference, Seoul, Korea*. 2006.

approximately 300,000 won.[29] Consequently, the number of runaways grew up to 78% of the total number of foreign workers in Korea as of the year 2003.[30]

Through decisions and actions taken by the Korean government, while managing the inflow of migrant laborers, we can observe that the primary focus of the immigration policies were the interests of the business sector and economic growth of the country. Despite the fact that this tendency towards achieving economic prosperity by means of infringing human rights was prevailing in the late 1980s and early 1990s as indicated,[31] it can be often traced in the current policy of the Korean state towards not only migrant workers but domestic workers as well.

Due to the ongoing inability of the ITTS to tackle a growing number of undocumented workers and lack of manpower, the Korean government decided in 2004 to introduce the Employment Permit System (EPS).[32] This new system granted migrant workers a right to work and reside in Korea for no more than six years in total and only under the condition that they spend one year in their home country after their first three-year contract expires. In 2008, this program underwent changes that enabled foreign workers to be employed for three years with a possibility to extend their stay up to four years and ten months (since five years would lead to the acquisition of permanent residence status) without the obligation to leave Korea for the period of one year.[33] Although migrant workers have become an integral part of the state's long-term strategy to ease labor shortages, the Korean government is determined to prevent manual foreign laborers (mainly male) from settling permanently in Korea by focusing on a rotation principle. This decision is based on the following concerns: the high population density of Korea; the negative impact it may have on the domestic labor market, including an increase in the unemployment rate; difficulties in assimilability and governability of non-ethnic Koreans and cultural conflicts that may arise; ungovernable foreign ghettos, etc.[34] Furthermore, in

[29] Timothy C. Lim, "The fight for equal rights: The power of foreign workers in South Korea," *Alternatives* 24.3 (1999): 329–359.

[30] Sarah Hasan, "Labour Migration to South Korea: Policies and Problems Related to Illegal Workers," *In World Congress of Korean Studies. Imin International Conference Center, University of Hawai'i at Moanoa,* USA, pp. 1–11. 2011.

[31] Lee, *Service economies*, 195.

[32] DEMIG POLICY (June 2015)

[33] Tan Soo Kee, "Foreign workers' policies and issues in South Korea: Focus on the workers from the South East Asian Region," *In Proceedings of the 6th Biennial Conference of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia*, pp. 9–10. Sydney, Australia: University of Sydney, 2009.

[34] Dong-Hoon Seol, "Which multiculturalism? Discourse of the incorporation of immigrants into Korean society," *Korea observer* 41.4 (2010): 593–614.

accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, only state and public institutions of exporting countries are to regulate the entire process of unskilled labor migration as one of the ways to minimize exploitation. In addition, migrant workers could seek employment in six major industries: offshore fishing, service industry, construction, livestock farming, agriculture, manufacture, and in companies that failed to hire local workers.[35]

One of the key accomplishments of the EPS, which directly influenced the development of migrant workers' rights situation in Korea, was the legal recognition of migrant workers as "workers". After their status had been elevated from a trainee to worker, they automatically obtained protection under the Labor Standard Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and the Industrial Safety and Health Insurance Act. Among other significant advantages, after being amended several times, the EPS eventually authorized migrant workers to exercise three basic labor rights (right to unionize, collective bargaining, and collective action) and included foreign workers into the National Health Insurance, providing them with the same health benefits as Koreans.[36]

In stark contrast to the previous systems, the EPS undoubtedly brought immense advancements in areas such as administration of migrant labor and the protection of workers' rights in Korea. Nevertheless, certain important nuances were not taken into consideration during the creation of this system, which in turn led to several weighty shortcomings. For instance, one of the most severely criticized provisions was a ban on foreign workers' families' reunions in Korea. Relatively identical regulation was introduced in Singapore for the Work Permit (WP) holders, who are forbidden to bring their family together with them. They, however, are nonetheless allowed to send their children to Singapore national schools under the condition of passing qualifying tests. [37] While these regulations were extremely disadvantageous for migrant laborers and their families, they contributed to the primary goal of both governments to prevent migrant workers from pursuing permanent residence. Another distinct setback of this system was that foreign workers, who became victims of abuse or rights violations, could not change their working place without the written consent of their current employer. Moreover, the number of times they could apply for the relocation was limited to three. Even supposing they presented a valid reason for changing a place of work and managed to receive permission from their original employer, they were forced to find a new job within two months and failure to do so would lead to their visa being canceled. These requirements

[35] DEMIG POLICY (June 2015)
[36] DEMIG POLICY (June 2015)
[37] YAPMUI TENG, "Singapore's system for managing foreign manpower," *Managing international migration for development in East Asia* (2014): 220.

consolidated employers' power over migrant workers and resulted in the continued growth of illegal workers in Korea, whose position was even more vulnerable in terms of rights breaching.[38]

It is noteworthy that migrant workers are deprived of the right to seek employment by themselves and have to rely entirely on the employment migrant center in questions related to finding a new employer. This system discourages foreign workers from searching for a new job, since there is a potential risk to be assigned to an employer, who will abuse them even more than the previous one. Therefore, instead of dealing with the primary cause of the employee's desire to change his/her workplace, the Korean government has created a system, which does not prevent migrant worker's maltreatment. However, at most, it allows employees to change one abuser for another. In addition, the frequent reluctance of migrant workers to switch their workplace is closely connected to the fact that continuity of employment strongly influences contract extensions. In case migrant workers would like to apply for the extension of their initial contracts, they are required to be supported by their current employers who often perceive negatively workers with the history of employment changes. Kim Yi-chan, the head of the *지구인의 정류장* (Eng. Earthians' Station),[39] says,

> Whenever migrants ask to change jobs, the reaction of employers is "how dare such a worker who can't even work well think he can change jobs!" They view migrants who want to change jobs as lazy, incompetent in their work and lacking in perseverance.[40]

In general, the EPS took into consideration the interests of the Korean government and the Korean private sector at the expense of the needs of migrant workers.

1.1. The concept of the Public Sphere

In contemporary political systems, studies about the public sphere are an important component for building understanding between the state and society.

In the theory of the public sphere, there are two major distinctions that rest upon two interconnected areas of academic studies. The term "public sphere" will imply slightly different meanings depending on the field of knowledge it is used in. Thus, in such disciplines as

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[38] DEMIG POLICY(June 2015)

[39] Korean NGO that provides help and shelter to migrant workers in the area of Ansan in Gyeonggi Province. Kim Yi-chan is famous for making movies about migrant workers' life in South Korea. *한겨레*, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/664373.html.

[40] Amnesty International, "Bitter harvest. Exploitation and forced labour of migrant agricultural workers in South Korea", 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/asa250042014en.pdf.

architecture and urban planning, it will relate to the actual physical space, where people interact in public. These disciplines are also more inclined to operate with terms "public space" and "public sphere" interchangeably. However, in this research, we are more interested in the definition of the "public sphere" from the sociological perspective.

The most central figure in the discussion of the public sphere is sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the author of *"The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere".* His work, while serving as an up-to-date fundamental theoretical framework for those studying the concept of the public sphere, did not avoid criticism and challenges due to the changing nature of this concept. Nevertheless, the definition of the public sphere was originally coined by him and denotes "virtual or imaginary community, which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space. In its ideal form, the public sphere is made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state".[41] This definition and characterization experienced a number of alterations, but nonetheless continues to carry the same meaning in the works of various researchers, including Calhoun (1992), Somers (1993), Fraser (1992), Dawson (1994, 1999), Keane (1996), Hanchard (1999), and Zaret (2000).

According to Habermas's theory, the classical model of the public sphere emerged in the 17–18th century Western Europe under the influence of the development of capitalism and modern nation-states. The public sphere was initially comprised of "bourgeoisie", male members of which would often meet at the public sphere institutions, such as saloons and coffeehouses. They would enter rational-critical discussions about matters concerning taxation and laws, and point out the weaknesses and disadvantages of the ruling state creating prerequisites for modern democracy. The irony is that the social force that once was a point of departure for the bourgeois public sphere eventually turned into the cause of its decline and disintegration. Habermas pointed out that monopoly capitalism went hand in hand with the commercialization of the press leading to the imposition of political and ideological viewpoints rather than sustaining public discussion and debate. [42] The reason-based public sphere disintegrates under the pressure of mass cultural production and propaganda causing democracy to face a crisis.[43] Since 1972, the Korean state has kept Korean mass media under tight control

[41] Jürgen Habermas. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (MIT press, 1991)

[42] Nick Stevenson, "Habermas, mass culture and the future of the public sphere," *Berkeley journal of sociology* 38 (1993): 221–245.

[43] Peter Uwe Hohendahl and Marc Silberman, "Critical theory, public sphere and culture. Jürgen Habermas and his critics," *New German Critique* (1979): 89–118.

gradually loosening its grip, however maintaining its profound influence until now. The signs of state interference in the mass media can be easily traced through the major broadcasting companies (KBS and MBC) and newspapers (Chosun, Joongang, and Donga Daily), which continue to dominate the Korean media market with the direct support of the political and business power.[44] Owing to close relations with political authorities and being dependent on large business interests, the Korean mainstream media have been constantly accused of delivering biased information, conservative and manipulative news reporting. Keeping in mind Habermas's statement, we can suggest that the commercial media-dominated public sphere in modern Korea, to a large extent, undermines further development of democracy.

Habermas's concept of the public sphere received most of its criticism for being not as inclusive and equal as he suggested. In her work, N. Fraser emphasizes the fundamental importance of Habermas's liberal public sphere in democratic and critical social theory, at the same time she describes it as highly idealized.[45] Fraser claims that the official public sphere was comprised of exclusions as opposed to Habermas's idea that it was guided by a principle of universal access. Indeed, subordinated groups represented by people of color, working-class men, women, and gay struggled to find a safe place under the single public sphere to debate needs and issues that were of high importance to them. Therefore, these marginalized groups established what Fraser refers to as "subaltern counter-publics", "parallel discursive arenas where they could invent and circulate counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs".[46] In Korea, an alternative type of journalism introduced in 2011—citizen podcasts—functions as an example of a counter-public sphere, providing a discrete space free of governmental censorship, where ordinary citizens can proliferate information and share their views concerning current political affairs.[47] Citizen podcasts, unlike mass-media which is strongly influenced by the Korean dominant corporations, serve as a tool to communicate the needs of the public to the authorities and contribute to the deepening of democracy via the social consensus built around the movements from below.

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[44] Chang Sup Park, "Citizen news podcasts and engaging journalism: The formation of a counter-public sphere in South Korea," *Pacific Journalism Review: Te Koakoa* 23.1 (2017): 245–262.

[45] Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and Guy-Uriel E. Charles, "Habermas, The Public Sphere, and the Creation of a Racial Counterpublic," *21 Michigan Journal of Rae & Law 1*(2015).

[46] Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy," *Social text* 25/26 (1990): 56–80.

[47] Chang Sup Park, "Citizen news podcasts and engaging journalism", 250.

Later in his works, Habermas would refer to public spheres as *"civil society"* or *"voluntary associations"*.[48] What is of interest to this study is his grounding idea that the necessary foundation of democracy in modern society is a public sphere. He and Schumpeter are committed to the notion, which narrates that democracy is a method. In democratic systems, people are able to freely express their will and opinion within the public sphere and further transmit their viewpoints to the administrative power either by formal or informal means of political participation, thus creating democracy itself. This leads us to "the public sphere" being a "fundamental concept of a theory of democracy".[49]

1.2. The rise and transformation of civic activism in South Korea

The value various international, national, and local non-governmental organizations, voluntary associations and clubs bring to the contemporary society cannot be underestimated. Civil society has gradually become an indispensable component for the accurate functioning and interaction within the political, economic, and social realms of modern societies. In the course of its development, civil society has repeatedly undergone changes acquiring new forms, meanings, and roles to ensure successful adaptation to the realities of a particular time and place. Nowadays, the scope of modern civil society activities includes monitoring policies and procedures, communicating concerns of the public to the government, fostering political participation via the proliferation of information and humanitarian action. These activities are performed with an aim to address diverse issues related to health and sustainability, human rights, environment, etc.

Prior to diving into the process of creation of civil society, spheres, and degree of its influence in Korea, it is necessary to agree upon the definition that will reflect our objectives. The notion of civil society was originated in the eighteenth-century Western Europe and is largely associated with the intellectual and philosophical ideas of Enlightenment, secularization, the emergence of the "public sphere", and increasing aspirations for liberation from oppressive authorities. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, civil society is "a set of intermediate associations, which are neither the state nor the (extended) family; civil society, therefore, includes voluntary associations and firms and other corporate

[48] Simone Chambers, "A critical theory of civil society," *Alternative conceptions of civil society* (2002): 90–110.

[49] Jürgen Habermas, "Further reflections on the public sphere" *Habermas and the public sphere* 428 (1992).

bodies".[50] As for participation, these voluntary associations consist of ordinary citizens who are willing to work for the public good, "serving underserved or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide services".[51] Civil society is widely thought to be in charge of "maintaining a balance between rights granted to individuals in free societies and the responsibilities required of citizens to maintain those rights".[52] In fact, it is assumed that civil society should act as a "third sector" that "mediates and balances the power of state and market, provides a moral check on the market and, likewise maintains the democratic integrity of the state".[53]

With regard to the early formation of civil society in Korea, Korean scholars tend to believe it took place in the second half of the nineteenth century when first civic associations stemmed from the need to modernize obsolete foundations of the Choson society and defend national integrity from Chinese and Japanese interventions.[54] However, a number of scholars claim that the early roots of Korean civil society can be found in the Choson dynasty, long before the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1910.[55] When arguing about the historical origins of civil society in the Korean context, these scholars usually refer to Confucian literati and emergence of the private academies, particularly, underlying their part in producing and circulating petitions before forwarding them to the monarch.[56] Notwithstanding, there are some scholars, who are inclined to think that the nascent Korean civil society emerged during the pro-democracy movements in the 1970–1980s, and started to acquire the form of institutions and organizations in 1987, after the transition to democracy.[57]

The lack of consensus in the Korean scholarly debate creates difficulties in outlining the exact period of history when Korean civil society was established. Despite the fact that the above-mentioned scientific opinions may contradict, it does not necessarily mean that one

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[50] Garrett W. Brown, Iain McLean, and Alistair McMillan. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2018)

[51] Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia Ann Hodgkinson, and Russy D. Sumariwalla. *The nonprofit sector in the global community: Voices from many nations* (No. 658.74 MAC. CIMMYT. 1992)

[52] Brian O'Connell, "Civil society: Definitions and descriptions," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (2000): 471–478.

[53] Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, "Civil society: technical instrument or social force for change?" (2000): 75–88.

[54] Hagen Koo, "Civil society and democracy in South Korea," *The good society* 11.2 (2002): 40–45.

[55] Shin Jong-Hwa, "The limits of civil society: Observations on the Korean debate," *European Journal of Social Theory* 3.2 (2000): 249–259.

[56] Jeong-Woo Koo, "The origins of the public sphere and civil society: private academies and petitions in Korea, 1506-1800," *Social Science History* 31.3 (2007): 381–409.

[57] Hagen Koo, "Civil society and democracy in South Korea", 42.

should prevail over the other. On the contrary, they all have a right to exist; however, one may suggest an appropriate terminology to distinguish several types of civil society in Korean history. A. F. Gramsci (1891–1937), an Italian philosopher and politician, who is well-known for his theory of cultural hegemony, offers the following two models of civil society: hegemonic civil society and counter-hegemonic civil society. The hegemonic civil society serves the needs of the government and ruling classes in imposing certain political views to dominate the ruled, and counter-hegemonic civil society is based on the subversive movements from below that intend to influence the established political order.[58] If to take into account that various social and religious groups, which existed since the liberation of Korea from Imperial Japanese colonial rule were "very politicized, from far-right to far-left" with members co-opted by state,[59] one can assume that these groups can be defined as a hegemonic civil society. Thus, it would be logical to suppose that what started to evolve first around people's movement (*minjung undong*, kor. *민중 운동*) and later during citizens' movement (*simin undong*, kor. *시민 운동*) in the second half of the 1980s can be regarded as a counter-hegemonic civil society.[60] The term "citizens' movement" (*市民運動*) can be found in both Korean and Japanese vocabularies, since word "citizen" (*simin*) and the phrase "civil society" (*simin sahoe*) were originally borrowed from Western languages and translated into East Asian languages accordingly.[61] Simin undong encompassed a new ideological orientation, different from the radical political movements and revolutionary activism that previously took place in Korean society. This movement resonated predominantly with the urban middle class—as well as, in some cases, organized labor—which became its major driving force and ran counter to minjung undong in its principal objectives, ways of their accomplishment, and interactions with the government. While minjung undong had a strong element of anti-capitalism in its ideology and aimed to achieve democratization and liberation from the authoritarian rule, simin undong was engaged in addressing a range of social issues, such as economic justice, gender equality, environmental protection, human rights, peacekeeping, etc. Furthermore, simin undong sought

[58] Hagai Katz, "Gramsci, hegemony, and global civil society networks," *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 17.4 (2006): 332–347.

[59] Inchoon Kim and Changsoon Hwang. *Defining the nonprofit sector: South Korea* (Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society, 2002)

[60] Shin Kwang-Yeong, "The citizens' movement in Korea," *Korea Journal* 46, no. 2 (2006): 5–34.

[61] Han Young-Hae, "An Analysis of the Discourse on the Citizens' Movement in Korea: A Comparison to the Japanese Case," *Korea Journal* 46, no. 2 (2006): 35–67.

to boost macro-structural changes in Korean society and establish a dynamic two-way relationship with the Korean government via peaceful and non-violent demonstrations and public campaigns. In contrast, an essential element of the minjung undong were militant street demonstrations, which would often involve violent confrontations with the police. Although this radical movement is usually illustrated by memorable scenes of clashes between its members and the police, minjung undong was not limited only to the utilization of physical force and brutal struggles. In fact, it also included three areas—"the university student movement, a reinvented traditional folk theatre, and the intellectuals' alliance with workers"—presented by Namhee Lee as counter-public spheres, where its participants "articulated their identities, interests, and needs not only in opposition to the state but also an emancipatory program for the whole society".[62]

Regardless of quite visible disparities between minjung undong and simin undong, one may notice that they mutually reinforce each other; "the former group continues to emphasize substantive democracy whereas the latter focuses on the procedural dimension of democracy".[63]

1.3. South Korean NGOs and foreign workers in the Migrant Workers' Support Movement

Immigration to a foreign country searching for better employment opportunities, by definition, not an easy process, which often requires compassion and assistance from the accepting state. In the majority of European countries, this assistance was provided by the members of socialist parties, who pushed for better protection of migrant workers' rights.[64] Situation was quite the opposite in the case of Korea, where political parties seemed to express little interest in migration issues and nearly no concern in problems encountered by migrant workers. However, it is worth mentioning that a social-democratic party, the Korean Democratic Labour Party, indeed existed in Korea from 2000 (split in 2008), but neither KDLP nor its successor parties demonstrated much interest in foreign workers until one of the successor parties, the Justice Party, accepted an immigrant female politician, Jasmine Lee, into its ranks last year.[65] That is why, the Korean civil society took initiative and launched into

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[62] Namhee Lee. *The making of minjung: democracy and the politics of representation in South Korea* (Cornell University Press, 2007), 10.

[63] Joon Kim, "Insurgency and advocacy: Unauthorized foreign workers and civil society in South Korea," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 12, no. 3 (2003): 237–269.

[64] Amyn B. Sajoo, "A Review of David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship," *McGill LJ* 43 (1998): 213–969.

[65] 이지혜 정치팀, "이자스민 전 의원이 정의당으로 간 까닭은", *한겨레*, December 8, 2019, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/916375.html.

attracting attention to a myriad of challenges foreign workers faced due to the lack of legal protection from the government.

In 1992, the images of migrant workers exposed to constant abuse from their Korean employers started to receive wider coverage in media gradually seizing the attention of the public. These images evoked sympathy from the Korean public, as they triggered memories of not-so-distant past, where local workers were subjected to similar mistreatment and were forced to fight for their rights.[66] While discontent and hostile attitudes among migrant workers towards the state continued to grow rapidly, they were unable to organize themselves into a union and proceed with the real actions. The scarcity of resources and necessary social connections, the illegal status of the majority of migrants, and the language barrier contributed to the passivity of migrant workers. Despite extremely adverse circumstances, with the support from Korean religious and social groups, foreign workers conducted several considerable protests in 1994 and 1995.[67] The 1994 sit-in protest performed by 15 trainees from Asia (mainly Filipinos and Nepalese) was particularly important for further development of migrant workers' solidarity. Participants continued to protest for one month in the hall of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) putting forward demands related to the inclusion of undocumented workers into the Industrial Accident Insurance. Driven by the ambition and desire to obtain legal protection under the Korean law, migrant workers had to rely on religious leaders and civic activists (박천응 목사, 서경석 목사, 최의팔 목사, 김해성 목사, 이철승 목사…etc.), who facilitated consolidation and institutionalization of the Migrant Workers' Support Movement (MWSM).

The migrant workers' centers and NGOs began to appear throughout the country assisting both documented and undocumented laborers by organizing shelters, providing medical, educational, and religious services, holding consultations, producing reports for international NGOs, and sustaining migrant workers' associations.[68] Undoubtedly, all the services offered by NGOs were constructive and efficient in helping migrants, yet counseling proved to be in the highest demand compared to others. The main reason is that a large number of migrant workers upon facing legal matters and violent treatment at the workplace (e.g.

[66] EuyRyung Jun, "Migrant Workers Amidst the Waves of Volunteers: Participation and Empowerment in South Korean Migrant Advocacy," *Anthropological Quarterly* 89, no. 3 (2016): 753–779.
[67] Hye-Kyung Lee, "Gender, migration and civil activism in South Korea". *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 12, no. 1-2 (2003): 127–153.
[68] Dong-Hoon Seol, "Korean citizens' responses to the inflow of foreign workers: Their impacts on the government's foreign labor policy," *USA*, vol. 2. 2005.

humiliation, exploitation, physical and sexual abuse, illegal overstay, unpaid salaries) required information on how to act in these situations. The importance of the established centers and NGOs went beyond giving advice and instructions that would answer migrant employees' common problems; they provided guidance along with moral comfort and compassion crucial for people working abroad.

It is noteworthy that NGOs not only dealt with the consequences of the discriminatory state's policy towards migrant workers but also made efforts to prevent them. For instance, the Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK, kor. *외국인이주노동자대책협의회*) was one of the main organizations campaigning for the extension of the domestic labor law protections to foreign employees, which after nearly ten years of negotiations, persuaded the Korean government to adopt the EPS. The foundation of the JCMK (January 1995) occurred in connection with the protest of Nepalese industrial technical trainees, calling for changes in ITTP at the Myong-dong Catholic Church.[69]

In the view of the JCMK, the newly introduced EPS, as in contrast to ITTP, was a huge achievement in expanding the Korean labor migration system in favor of foreign workers' legal protection. Whilst the leadership of the JCMK might have concluded that, no further enhancements of the system should be anticipated from the government, migrants had a different perspective on the overall situation. They claimed that the EPS did not entirely serve the needs of foreign workers; in particular, the process of regularization of undocumented laborers placed the majority at risk of deportation. In conformity with the enacted policy, "those who had been in Korea for less than three years were able to stay on for two more years at most. Those who had been in Korea between three and four years had to leave Korea but with a re-entry advance approval certificate".[70] In this way, the state intended to solve two objectives with one single action, namely to reduce the number of unauthorized migrant workers and to prevent them from settling in Korea permanently since the long-term stay was likely to end in de facto permanent settlement. Considering that the lion's share of foreign workers had already stayed in Korea for more than permitted four years, this regulating policy was perceived extremely negatively by migrants. In addition, it was obvious that the state targeted for deportation those who lived in Korea long enough to widen the network of contacts, learn the Korean language, and understand how Korean society functions, that is to say, potential leaders

[69] Joon K. Kim, "State, civil society and international norms: Expanding the political and labor rights of foreigners in South Korea," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 14, no. 4 (2005): 383–418.
[70] DEMIG POLICY(June 2015)

of the migrant workers' movement. Consequently, by officially acknowledging and agreeing to the terms of the EPS, the JCMK fueled a conflict within the MWSM triggering its division.

The Korean government realized that the identification of unauthorized migrant workers might alone be challenging and time-consuming; therefore, they devised a strategy to prompt illegal workers to arrive to the immigration offices by themselves. This strategy involved a self-reporting procedure according to which migrant workers were given a certain period of time to register themselves in exchange for permission to stay in Korea legally until March 2003.[71] With support from the JCMK, which persuaded migrant workers in its counseling centers to report themselves, the state managed to deport a substantial number of illegal workers. Seeing the direct cooperation of the JCMK with the government and its agitation of undocumented laborers to self-register, migrant activists concluded that Korean NGOs would always act in cahoots with the Korean state to benefit itself. That is why, in 2001, foreign workers mainly from Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Philippines together with some Korean activists formed their organization—Migrants Branch of the regional Equality Trade Union (ETUMB) that was transformed into the Migrant Workers' Trade Union (MTU) in 2005.[72]

The MTU viewed their mission in bringing an end to crackdowns and deportations, improving workers' rights and working conditions, abolishing restrictions on change of the workplace, and reforming the EPS into the Work Permit System (WPS) that would entitle workers to reside in Korea for ten years instead of three. It is worth mentioning that the MTU was struggling to receive its official status up until 2015, although, as per EPS migrant workers had three basic labor rights, including the right to unionize.[73]

There was more than one reason why some foreign workers were determined to create their union, and the following cause deserves particular attention. Around 86 percent of volunteer groups and associations, which were conducive to the evolvement of the MWSM, had affiliation ties with the Protestant churches or were headed by the minister.[74] For example, minister Kyu-ho Shim (심규호) at Sarang Migrant Workers Center and minister Yun-tae Lee (이윤태) at Heemang Migrant Workers Center were principal leaders of the well-known

[71] Mely Caballero-Anthony and Toshihiro Menju, eds. *Asia on the Move: Regional Migration and the Role of Civil Society* (Brookings Institution Press, 2015)

[72] Kevin Gray, "Migrant labor and civil society relations in South Korea," *Asian and Pacific migration journal* 15, no. 3 (2006): 381–390.

[73] 윤민식, "Korea authorizes first migrant workers' union", *The Korea Herald*, August 20, 2015, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150820001130.

[74] Kevin Gray, "Migrant labor and civil society relations in South Korea", 386.

JCMK.[75] Moreover, a great number of ministers, who actively took part in the minjung movement, were seeking ways of maintaining social activity and found an outlet in expanding minjung by including foreign workers.[76] Ministers were able to subsidize the social movement through religious networks, which are often considered a valuable financial source, and could provide a secure place for migrant workers' gatherings. Indeed, churches were a safe environment where the police, in most cases, would not enter without the consent of the minister.

The vast majority of these Protestant Church-based NGOs had a vested interest in lending a helping hand to foreign workers. Assisting migrant workers seemed as a perfect opportunity to simultaneously influence their religious views and eventually convert them into the new faith. Needless to say, foreign employees, who due to their origins were practicing mainly Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Catholicism (in case of workers from the Philippines), felt certain pressure to accept aid from these NGOs in exchange for reconsideration of their beliefs. Moreover, since workers who were coming to Korea were by far and large from Asia, where Protestantism is the least popular form of religion, it was a chance for ministers to expand the network of Protestant believers not only in Korea but also in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, etc. Therefore, the Foreign Worker Counseling Center in Ansan, where two-thirds of the population is non-Korean workers,[77] was established by the Korean Presbyterian Church with an agenda to "proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery of sight for the blind, [and] to release the oppressed".[78]

Final remarks

The historical process of formulation and implementation of labor migration policies in Korea is quite complex and illustrates major reasons why migrant workers are still subject to constant physical, mental, and sexual abuse. Although a considerable amount of time has passed since the late 1980s, when Korea has experienced its first influx of foreign workers, the situation with the violations of migrant workers' rights continues to be urgent and requires the Korean government to apply more efforts to improve it. Dependence of the Korean state on the large businesses in terms of economic development and its unwillingness to view migrant workers

[75] Woo-Seon Kim, "Church and civil society in Korea after democratization: the NGOs' activism for migrant workers" (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2007), 128.

[76] Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang, eds. *South Korean social movements: From democracy to civil society*. (Vol. 24. Routledge, 2011)

[77] Park Si-soo, Rachel Lee, "Ansan ― ghetto or multicultural enclave?", *The Korea Times*, April 2013, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/culture/2013/04/386_134111.html.

[78] Woo-Seon Kim, "Church and civil society in Korea after democratization", 103.

as potential citizens creates serious obstacles for further enhancement of the working and living conditions of the foreign employees in Korea.

Despite all the challenges, migrant workers with the support of the Korean counter-hegemonic civil society managed to achieve significant results in the expansion and protection of their rights.[79] Various Korean NGOs and religious groups actively participated in solving day-to-day issues of foreign workers by providing counseling on legal matters, delivering medical and educational services, establishing shelters, etc. Moreover, at its early stages, the MWSM heavily relied on the assistance of the Korean NGOs in the organization of the public campaigns, sit-ins, strikes, and attraction of the attention to migrant workers' miserable situation. Nevertheless, the relations between the Korean counter-hegemonic civil society and migrant workers were rather paternalistic, resulting in the former frequently neglecting the needs of the later. This ignorance is represented by the JCMK's acceptance of the EPS, even though this system was discriminating towards migrant workers and its direct contribution to the government's plan of deporting long-term undocumented workers.

Furthermore, since the larger part of the Korean NGOs had affiliation ties with Protestant churches, which did not promote any radical or aggressive behavior, the nature of the MWSM was somewhat tranquil and lacked robust actions. In addition, cooperation with the religious organizations often entailed that migrant workers were supposed to eventually change their faith and help to spread Protestantism not only in Korea but also in their home countries.

The aforementioned inconsistencies between migrant workers and the Korean counter-hegemonic civil society led to the division within the MWSM and prompted foreign workers to establish their union (MTU). In addition, the MWSM benefited not only migrant laborers in their struggle for rights, however, added to the dynamic development of the Korean counter-hegemonic civil society.

[79] In the case of the JCMK, we cannot fully consider it as a Korean counter-hegemonic civil society due to its cooperation with the government at the later stages of the MWSM.

CHAPTER II

2. Interaction between independent migrant workers' organizations, the South Korean public sphere and society through performative activities and protest placards

In the previous chapter, we have observed the historical background of migrant workers issues in Korea originated from the unsuccessful implementation of the foreign labor policies by the government. We have also discussed the Korean public sphere represented by the civil society organizations and their role in the protection of migrant workers' rights and the emergence of the MTU. The nature of the interaction between the Korean public sphere and migrant workers has always been rather complex. With the establishment of the MTU, these relationships experienced shifts in the distribution of power as migrant workers achieved relative independence and gained the opportunity to act in accordance with their needs.

The MTU being the first legalized union founded solely by foreign workers in Korea as a subject of research is quite fascinating. One of the approaches to study this organization and its unfolding dialogue with the surrounding environment is to examine the means by which it communicates. Therefore, in this Chapter, an attempt will be made to analyze social actions taken by the MTU and protest placards they have used to gain more perspective and understanding of this unit in relation to the Korean public sphere and society. This Chapter seeks answers to the following questions:

What can performative actions, banners, placards, and signs tell us about the position MTU occupies or anticipates to occupy within the Korean public space and the Korean society? What message do they carry and to whom do they aim to appeal? Are they distancing or uniting migrants vis-à-vis the Korean public space? Are they fragmenting or uniting migrants themselves?

2.1. The language of the protest placards

In contentious politics, where the main role is assigned to social and political acts and their actors, protest placards are starting to become an interesting topic of an academic discussion. Protest slogans, being at the same time a visual and textual material of this communication system, can be often encountered during the street protests. M. Beќar in her works frequently refers to any type of visual or textual material (incl. placards, T-shirts, banners, etc.) utilized by protesters as protest street art claiming that while expressing discontent, they simultaneously captivate the audience. According to Chaffee "because street art is universal in

its reach, it should be viewed as a mass communication medium in a general sense".[80] Therefore, we can consider protest street art as a separate form of communication as it enables those, who have no other means of articulating their opinion freely to demonstrate it visually. This brings us further to the concept of democracy and links protest street art to one of the ways of communicating democratic liberties.

Used in every demonstration, protest placards and banners are an extensive source of information that illustrates demands and declares sentiments of the participants. However, in the scholarly literature, protest placards as a subject of semiotic analysis have not yet received enough attention. A. Kasanga (2014) suggests that the shortage of studies that focus on protest slogans from the perspective of a semiotic resource may be ascribed to the lack of consideration of portable placards as a unit of linguistic landscape (LL). Due to their transient nature, placards and banners used during the protests are often disregarded in favor of those fixed ones.

Although the transiency of protest placards raises a question of the necessity of their research, it does not imply the absence of the impact they can make and information they can possess for academic research. That is to say, placards, banners, leaflets, etc. include certain textual content sufficient enough for carrying out discourse analysis to discover and interpret the meaning of the actions and goals of the movement they were used in. Furthermore, the matter of transiency is rather relative, since those placards can be gathered and documented not to mention the boundless Internet space, where they can be not only collected but also stored for the indefinite amount of time.

2.2. Code preference used by migrant workers

In this thesis, the term "code" is used in its general meaning presented by the sociolinguistic literature as a language or language variety.[81] I will refer to the "code preference" as to a selection of the language or language variety made by protesters for their placards, assuming they are their direct creators. Due to the existing mutual interdependency between the protest and discourse, defining the code preference takes an important role. In the first place, it is the audience and not the author makes the decision of what language will be eventually displayed on the protest placard. Therefore, the participants of the demonstration may carry placards written in the language they do not understand or read somewhat, but do not speak. That is to say, often protesters are not the initial designers of the messages portrayed, however,

[80] Lyman G. Chaffee, *Political protest and street art: Popular tools for democratization in Hispanic countries* (Vol. 40. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1993)

[81] Ronald Wardhaugh, *An introduction to sociolinguistics* (Vol. 28. John Wiley & Sons, 2011)

simply carriers of the portable placards.[82] A. Kasanga (2014) mentions that there are three major tendencies of the code preferences: English aims to reach international audiences; national languages intend to put extra stress to the message and to influence local and regional audiences, and multilingualism is strategically prevailing when it comes to addressing multiple audiences.

English by definition is considered a global language used by protesters when they hold their placards to spread the desired message worldwide and address international society.[83] Thus, portable placards that contain texts in English can be an exhaustive source of information that can demonstrate us demands and requests that are no longer of local concern. For instance, on the left side of Figure 1, we can observe signs that attempt to deliver messages in English:

1. *"Stop crackdown!"*
2. *"No to the EPS! Yes to Work Permit System!"*
3. *"Welcome Refugees! Stop Racism!"*

If the first two demands are made by migrant workers on a regular basis during their rallies and concern precisely themselves, the third one seems to stand out. This picture was taken during the MTU protest in December 2018 in front of the Sejong Center in Gwanghwamun. During this period, a wave of vituperative rejection towards the Yemeni refugee case swept across the country and reached the national level. The arrival of around 500 refugees fleeing from the conflict in Yemen to Jeju Island has sparked an anti-migrant sentiment among Koreans leading to the government granting only two Yemenis a refugee status.[84]

The fact that the MTU members together with calling for the rights of migrant workers articulated their attitudes towards the treatment of Yemeni asylum seekers is rather peculiar. The MTU is forced to balance between the Korean authorities, the KCTU (with which, at some point, the MTU was affiliated),[85] Korean NGOs, and the Korean society, consequently, they have to carefully choose to whom they can provide their support. Since the Korean government

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[82] Erving Goffman, *Forms of talk* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981)

[83] Satoko Kobayashi, "Selma K. Sonntag. The Local Politics of Global English: Case Studies in Linguistic Globalization. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. 2003. Pb (0739105981)," *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 9.2 (2005): 298–300.

[84] "난민: 제주 예멘인 중 난민 인정자 1 호 나와... 어떤 혜택 받나?", *BBC 코리아*, December 14, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-46562585.

[85] Darcie Draudt, "South Korea's Migrant Policies and Democratic Challenges after the Candlelight Movement," *Korea Economic Institute of America* (2019), 6.

and the Korean society were fairly hostile towards Yemeni asylum seekers,[86] the MTU's public manifestation of solidarity may put them into an unfavorable position. The MTU may have seen an opportunity for cooperation with Korean NGOs that support the refugees (such as The South Korean refugee rights NGO). It is noteworthy that it will not be the only case when the MTU with the purpose of establishing useful connections and collaboration would assist the Korean public sphere in matters, not of high importance for migrant workers. The active participation of the ETUMB members in the anti-war peaceful demonstration, in 2003, dedicated to the condemnation of the US war in Iraq can substantiate this claim. More than 50 foreign workers were fully engaged in the social movement arranged by Korean NGOs through printing out and giving away the leaflets and carrying placards even during their working hours. In return for the genuine support of their demonstration, the KCTU decided to hold a "Migrant Worker Action Day" to attract the attention of the Korean society to the vulnerable situation migrant workers were finding themselves in. Moreover, numbers of Korean student groups initiated and organized a "Struggle Cultural Festival" with an aim to manifest their solidarity and evoke compassion among the public towards foreign workers.[87]

While this could be a valid assumption, a placard carried during the National Migrant Workers' Day of Struggle in 2012 may allow us to make another suggestion. In Figure 2, we can see text in English almost identical to the one used to support Yemeni asylum seekers:

"Welcome Migrant Workers! No Racism!"

This powerful message was already utilized by the MTU, however with one major difference—to express a demand to accept migrant workers without making judgments based on their race. This slogan bears a rather symbolic meaning, which conveys that migrant workers and Yemeni refugees having completely divergent socio-economic backgrounds found themselves in Korea in a similar situation.[88] Identifying themselves with newly arrived refugees, who seek safer and

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[86] *53.4 %* of South Koreans were against granting asylum to the Yemeni refugees, *37.4 %* were in favor of giving them refuge, according to the second public opinion poll, http://www.realmeter.net/%ec%a0%9c%ec%a3%bc-%ec%98%88%eb%a9%98%eb%82%9c%eb%af%bc-%ec%88%98%ec%9a%a9-%eb%b0%98%eb%8c%80-49%e2%86%9253-vs-%ec%b0%ac%ec%84%b1-39%e2%86%9237/.

[87] Karl Christian, "South Korea: migrant workers and the anti-war movement", *Peace News*, June-August, 2003, https://peacenews.info/node/3633/south-korea-migrant-workers-and-anti-war-movement.

[88] Compared to migrant workers who came via the EPS, Yemeni refugees mainly belonged to an upper-middle class, thus, they could afford to travel to Korea through a number of other countries. For example, a Yemeni asylum seeker Mohammad Salem claimed he had a good life working at the airport and running a small business in the capital Sanaa, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/yemeni-refugee-escaping-war-life-south-korea-jeju-180816071438268.html.

better living conditions, the MTU members once again brought up the problem of racism in Korea to the international level. Not to mention that such preoccupation of non-citizens with the issues related not only to migrant workers but also to the global public may signal the creation of the new political identity.

For the authors of the protest placards, it is important to consider their audience while preparing slogans before the action. Rallies and protests are actions that usually contain a set of demands addressed towards the governmental authorities. Therefore, according to A. Kasanga (2014), participants of the protests will most likely use the language they share with the authorities rather than English (except countries where English is an official language). Nonetheless, the situation is different for migrant workers in Korea, as they do not share the same language with the representatives of the government. A great number of placards expressing foreign workers' demands are written in Korean and additionally translated into English. Taking into account that on the official MTU Facebook page all the information is posted in English (gradually diminishing), Korean and Nepali, the former and the latter can be considered as a language that unites migrant workers within the MTU.[89] The reason for the frequent usage of the English language by the MTU can be explained by the origins of its leadership. The MTU has a long history of being headed by foreign workers coming from Nepal and Bangladesh, countries that share a history of the British (quasi-) colonialism. While during colonial times, the English language functioned as lingua franca for the British to communicate with the elite of the region, nowadays it performs the role of lingua franca for the educated classes.[90] Incidentally, during the past years, the official MTU Facebook page became a major social platform for connecting migrant workers across Korea, exchanging information, and updating news concerning labor politics and future events. Over the recent year, the amount of Facebook posts in Nepali has grown dramatically nearly displacing English manifesting that the larger part of MTU members is migrant workers from Nepal. Considering an interview of the current MTU leader Udaya Rai for the "Left Voice" where he says: "the MTU's membership includes *a diverse range of nationalities*… In terms of national origins, the majority of our members come from Southeast Asia and South Asia" one can notice a

[89] Official Facebook page of Migrant Trade Union in South Korea, https://www.facebook.com/MTU-Migrants-Trade-Union-128082763877133/.

[90] Mohammad Mosiur Rahman, et al, "English language teaching in Bangladesh today: Issues, outcomes and implications," *Language Testing in Asia* 9.1 (2019): 9.

contradiction.[91] Having analyzed Facebook posts made by the MTU during the previous three years, one can assume that MTU is slowly turning into the Nepalese Workers Union, from where representatives of other nationalities intentionally or unintentionally were excluded on a basis of the language (Figure 3).

In the case of migrant workers in Korea, the language of protest is by far Korean, which reveals that communication of demands and opinions merely occurs between workers and Korean authorities. One of the goals of the MTU is to achieve a working permit system, which entails that migrant workers will be able to work and reside in Korea for more than four years as provided by the current EPS. In order to live and be employed in a foreign country, especially in Korea, it is crucial to have Korean language proficiency. Hence, if migrant workers choose to socially integrate and be considered as a part of the Korean society, one of the ways to demonstrate it is to strategically use the Korean language during their protests. For example, throughout a three-week protest against the government's refusal to legalize the MTU (Figure 4) even after the Supreme Court has recognized it, banners and placards were written solely in the Korean language.

1. *"10 년을 기다렸다 이주노조 인정하라!"*

   "We've waited for 10 years, recognize the MTU!"

2. *"정부는 이주노조 즉각 인정하라"*

   "Government, immediately recognize the MTU"

By using the Korean language and addressing the government directly, the MTU creates a feeling of belongingness of migrant workers to the Korean society and, thus, their entitlement to the same rights as Koreans. Moreover, attitudes of Koreans towards migrant workers are generally either unfriendly or indifferent and language—an integral component of any culture—may change the situation for better.[92] In other words, the MTU giving preference to the Korean language over English is an effective strategy to narrow an existing gap between Koreans and foreign workers.

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[91] Okhee Kwon, "We are Workers: South Korea's Migrant 'Machines'", *Left Voice*, August 17, 2015, https://www.leftvoice.org/We-are-Workers-South-Korea-s-Migrant-Machines.

[92] According to the Gallup Report 2015 "Public opinion about foreign workers migration to their country—A Comparative Survey of 69 countries", 54% of Koreans viewed foreign workers' migration to Korea negatively. In 1994, the same research has demonstrated that 49% of Koreans were "against" foreign workers working in Korea, https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=729.

Over and above that, we should not neglect a huge segment of multilingual protest placards as a "default mode of expression in the discourse of protest".[93] While monolingual placards and banners are deliberately chosen to address separate audiences, multilingual once are able to address both audiences simultaneously. The international trend of using two or more language codes during the demonstrations did not pass by migrant workers in Korea. However, after analyzing a large number of protest placards from various MTU's demonstrations, one can single out two types of techniques of using multiple languages in combination: *message translation* and *code-mixing*.

The first technique, which in this work would be referred to as message translation, is widely utilized by the MTU throughout the history of their protests, especially, when Korean authorities continue to ignore their basic demands. That is why; we can follow a sequence of certain demands that have not been fulfilled by the Korean Ministry of Labor from the earliest protests until nowadays. Those demands were and still articulated both in Korean and in English with the purpose of receiving international attention and assistance. For instance, at the National Migrant Workers' Congress held in 2019 in front of the Seoul Finance Center in Jung-gu (Figure 5), we can observe in the shape of protest placards the three central goals stated at MTU's official website.[94]

"사업장 이동의 자유보장!"	*"Free Job Change!"*
"고용허가제 폐지!"	*"Change the EPS into the*
"노동허가제 쟁취!"	*Work Permit System!"*

From the left, we can see the original message directed towards the Korean officials, and from the right is a translated version that was created, either to target the international society or migrant workers, who do not speak Korean. This statement raises a question of how we know that the initial text was Korean and not English leading to the global public being the primary audience. This conclusion is based upon the concept of place semiotics and code preferences coined by R. and S. Scollon. As indicated in their studies of multiple signs in various geographical locations, authors of the signs usually organize their preferred codes according to the following preference system: top-bottom, right-left. In other words, the favored code is on

[93] Luanga A. Kasanga, "The linguistic landscape: Mobile signs, code choice, symbolic meaning and territoriality in the discourse of protest," *International journal of the sociology of language* 2014.230 (2014): 19–44.

[94] 이주노동자 노동조합, http://migrant.nodong.net/index.php?mid=home.

the top, on the left, and in the center while the less important ones are situated on the bottom, on the right, and on the margins.[95] In Figure 5 producers of the placards placed the Korean text above the English locating it on the top of the placard and, thus, underscoring its relative predominance in this situation.

The second technique of using several languages simultaneously would be referred to as code-mixing. In comparison to message translation, this technique implies one text (demand) to be written partially in two languages. A placard in Figure 6 serves as a useful example of such code-mixing containing sentences that start with Korean and end in English.

1. *"인종차별 OUT"*

   "Racism OUT"

2. *"자유한국당 OUT"*

   "Liberty Korea Party OUT"

3. *"이완영의원 OUT"*

   "Rep. Yi Wan-young OUT"

It is highly unlikely that those massages although written in both Korean and English intended to reach out to the global and local audiences at the same time. The reason is that the text conveys the essential information for understanding the message in Korean, thus, creates a hindrance for comprehending the meaning if you are not acquainted with the Korean language. However, for our study, this protest placards can be a semiotic source of additional information about MTU's activities. This picture was taken during the press conference in front of the lawmaker's office in Chilgok County, North Gyeongsang Province, in 2019, after the Rep. Yi Wan-young from the ultra-conservative Liberty Korea Party submitted a bill that aimed to reduce the minimum wage for migrant workers during the two-year probationary period. It is noteworthy that although the idea of this protest was to denounce the government's suggestion to lower the minimum wage for foreign workers, neither of these placards included words "salary" or "wage". Instead, they managed to transmit their sentiment and discontent by naming the person responsible and by using the word "racism".

Furthermore, the word "racism" might have been used on purpose as a powerful trigger to involve more NGOs to join the MTU's action. One of the organizations that assisted the MTU in holding this conference was Gimhae Migrant Human Rights Center the leader of which

[95] Ron Scollon and Suzie Wong Scollon. *Discourses in place: Language in the material world*. (Routledge, 2003), 120.

clearly stated that if the Korean society and the Korean public sphere will allow such changes it will lead to further discrimination based on gender, physical disability, and age.[96] As a problem of racism in Korea is quite acute and directly related to migrant workers, it became an interconnecting issue between the MTU and other Korean NGOs.[97] It is noteworthy that the victims of discrimination also include ethnic Koreans from China (and, to a lesser degree, the former USSR). While being racially Korean, they are often excluded and stigmatized due to a combination of "poor country" citizenship and lower socio-economic status. That is to say, racial discrimination in Korea is mostly motivated economically rather than racially and directed towards people coming from developing nations that are less wealthy compared to Korea.[98] Therefore, in 2018, the MTU joined a collective action dedicated to the World Racism Day that was organized by the JCMK and the Korea Refugee Rights Network. In Figure 7 we can see members of the MTU holding placards related not only to racial discrimination "*인종차별과 혐오* OUT" (Eng. "Racial discrimination and hatred OUT") but also placards saying, "Stop the EPS! Yes to Work Permit". By doing this, the MTU grabbed a chance to draw the attention of the publicity to migrant workers' problems as well.

Another interesting feature of this sign is the symbolic use of the word "OUT", which also can be a powerful trigger to earn support from the Korean NGOs and society. Written entirely in capital letters, this word was used in a massive number of demonstrations in Korea. For example, during the #MeeToo movement, some of the placards said, "Sexual violence in performing arts sector OUT", the famous "Moon Jae-in OUT" placards carried during the rally for the resignation of allegedly corrupt Minister of Justice Cho Kuk, and the "Sexual violence in the workplace OUT" used during the rally dedicated to the protection of women rights.

Notwithstanding, Korean and English are not the only languages chosen by the MTU to demonstrate their discontent. During a May Day rally in front of the Bosingak Bell in 2016 (Figure 5), the MTU called for the improvement of the working conditions, especially in the agricultural sector. In the picture, we can clearly identify a few slogans written in Thai amid

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[96] Ock Hyun-ju, "Calls grow for lower minimum wage for foreign workers", *The Korea Herald,* March 13, 2019, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190313000653.

[97] According to the recent report from the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 68.4% of migrants residing in South Korea said that there is racial discrimination in the Korean society, https://www.humanrights.go.kr/site/program/board/basicboard/view?menuid=001004002001&pagesize=10&boardtypeid=24&boardid=7605192.

[98] Emma Campbell, "The end of ethnic nationalism? Changing conceptions of national identity and belonging among young South Koreans," *Nations and Nationalism* 21.3 (2015): 483-502.

protesters holding placards in Korean. The illustrated slogan speaks to the audience in both Thai and Korean:

"근로기준법 63 조를 폐자하여 농축산업 부분 이주노동자들에게도 노동시간, 휴게, 휴일에 대한 규정이 적용되고, 초과근로수당이 지급되어야 합니다".

"By abolishing Article 63 of the Labor Standards Act, working hours, recess, holidays as well as paid allowance will apply to migrant workers in the agricultural industry".

Apart from the fact that this message was duplicated into Thai, its grammatical structure is also somewhat divergent from the one protesters usually operate with. In every language, methods of expressing requests or demands can vary from different grammatical structures to particular vocabulary. In the Korean language, the most common way to place a demand would be to add an imperative grammatical ending "*-라*" to the verb as we have seen in the example with the word "*인정하라*" (Figure 3). However, the above placard contains a sentence, which ends with the formal grammar pattern *"(스)ㅂ니다"* creating a message that has a declarative meaning. As a result, it seems like this protest placard carries rather an explanation of how the rights of migrant workers in the agricultural sector can be improved. If it is not a demand or request translated from Thai (as usual, the "preferred code is on the left"),[99] we can suggest that the primary audience this message was directed to were not representatives of the Korean authorities, but rather Thai migrants employed by Korean farmers. The idea behind this is to attempt to educate Thai migrant workers about the basic labor rights they are entitled to via protest placard.

The majority of migrant workers, who arrive in Korea via the EPS, have a basic knowledge of Korean language and Korean Labor Law.[100] Consequently, if you are not aware of the rights you are eligible to, you will not make an effort to fight for them. In order to approach seriously this problem, in 2017, the MTU started to cooperate with the Cheongju Nepal Shelter, Immigrants' Advocacy Center Gamdong, Migrant Dandelion, Good Education Research Institute, and with a startup Limefriends. The main objective of this collaboration is

[99] Scollon, Scollon. *Discourses in place: Language in the material world*, 120.

[100] Min Ji. Kim, "The Republic of Korea's employment permit system (EPS): Background and rapid assessment," *International Migration Papers No. 119* (2015): 5.

to translate the Act on Foreign Workers' Employment first into Nepali and Bengali and then into 13 languages commonly spoken by migrant workers in Korea.[101]

The situation in the agriculture sector is even worse than in other industries due to farms being located outside of the city, practically isolating migrant workers from the outside world. That is to say, they are trapped in an everyday routine surrounded by employers, who would not care to respect their rights and co-workers, who are as well uninformed of their rights being violated on a daily basis. The MTU seeks to change the situation and constantly tries to involve more agricultural workers into the migrant workers' independent movement by explaining to them their basic human rights by all the means possible, including protest placards. Indeed, if previous studies we have referred to in this thesis pointed out that there are undoubtedly two audiences the protesters are usually communicating to (global and local), this research proves that there is a third audience—migrant workers themselves.

2.3. Migrant workers' performative activities

In the post-modern era, political participation went beyond campaigning on the regional or local levels, voting, joining political parties, boycotting, etc.[102]Its focus switched to actions, which no longer can be regarded as ordinary ones owing to their power to evoke strong emotions of the observers and feeling of unification among participants. World-renowned examples of such political participation are ranging from controversial naked performances of Femen, the self-immolation of monks in Tibet to crowds of protesters in Hong Kong, Lebanon, Chile, and Iraq wearing Guy Fawkes and Joker masks. Since such ways of articulating personal opinions and sentiments were always attention-seizing, symbolic, and complex, the right approach to grasp their meanings is to study them in terms of their performativity.

Discursively, these performances can explicate the nature of the movement and the essence of the social interaction between participants, organizations, and the audience. Moreover, they can deepen our understanding of people, who are directly involved in this performative activities, which in our case will be migrant workers in Korea.

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[101]고한솔, "외국인 노동자 죽음 내몬, 영어로만 번역된 고용허가제», *한겨레*, October 23, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/815633.html.

[102] D. Harvey, a well-known economic geographer, identifies postmodernity with "time and space compression" and characterizes postmodern societies as those with "more flexible labour processes and markets, geographically mobile and [with] rapid shifts in consumption practices",
David Harvey. *The condition of postmodernity*. (Vol. 14. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989)

a. The 'three-steps-and-one-bow' Buddhist monks' protest

In November 2018, Buddhist monks and other members of one of the biggest Buddhist organizations Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism jointly performed a protest against Korean authorities, who refused to investigate further the death of the 25-year old migrant worker from Myanmar. During a routine crackdown on illegal migrant workers regularly conducted by the Incheon Immigration office, Than Zaw Htay fell of eight meters from the construction site in Gimpo and died 13 days later in the hospital. The police officers decided to close the case calling it an incident even though there were a number of witnesses, who could testify that inspectors grabbed his legs while he was trying to escape through the window. This is not the only death that occurred on the account of the Korean immigration office raids in a "*토끼몰이 단속*" style (Eng. "Rabbit-herding"). According to the leader of the MTU Udaya Rai, in the last 10 years, the number of migrant workers who died during crackdowns reached 10 people.[103]

The protest itself was carried out in a form of a rare Buddhist practice of prostration, where participants (monks) after making three steps forward stretched their entire body out with toes, knees, palms, and forehead touching the ground. Monks together with other activists marched from the Jogye Order headquarters to the Cheong Wa Dae presidential residence demanding to reopen the case and stating by their body gestures denunciation of the deadly crackdowns. This performative action has deep roots in the Tibetan Buddhist practice of *yan lag lnglng'ai phyag,* when pilgrims take a sacred walk to the mountain Kailash in order to cleanse their karma. During their ascent, pilgrims take one-step forward and make a single bow; however, at times, they produce three steps symbolizing Three Poisons (greed, anger, and foolishness). The 'three-steps-and-one-bow' (Kor. *삼보일배*) was first brought to Korea in 1992 during the monastic training sessions at Tongdosa Temple and subsequently adopted by the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism as a part of a curriculum aiming to test a sincere desire of the person to become a monk.[104] It was Rev. Su-kyung who appropriated this traditional practice into Korean Buddhism and transformed it into a new form of a non-violent religious protest tactic during the Anti-Donggang Dam Campaign in 2001 (Yoon, Young-Hae 2015).

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[103] 선명수, '"토끼몰이 단속'에 추락사한 이주노동자 죽음 진상 밝혀야", *경향신문*, November, 2018, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201811191617001&code=940100.

[104] Young-Hae Yoon and Sherwin Jones, "Ecology, Dharma and Direct Action: A Brief Survey of Contemporary Eco-Buddhist Activism in Korea," *Buddhist Studies Review* 31.2 (2015): 293–311.

This performative action gained popularity among Koreans and became widely used during various demonstrations. The reason is that the act itself is peaceful and religious and cannot be regarded as unlawful by the authorities. Although this practice might seem calm and easy, in fact, it is quite painful and requires a great amount of strength, self-control, and fortitude to continue marching for more than two hours. That is why; it typically evokes sympathy and compassion of the audience and serves as a signal, which manifests that if protesters decided to endure this exhausting practice, the cause they are supporting is of great importance to them. Scholars have emphasized the importance of emotions unleashed by the protest and their powerful effect on the collective identity once they are shared. Rituals, in turn, usually have a common historical and cultural background for those who perform them, thereby are prone to amplify solidarity and emotional engagement among participants.[105] According to David Snow's and Robert Benford's research (1992), rituals occupy important roles in the theory of social movements as they frame the narratives of the shared past experiences and creating anticipation for the success of the movement and hope for a better future—"frame alignment".[106]

It is worth mentioning that the protest was organized not by migrant workers themselves, however by the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism's social and labor committee. Despite the fact that this practice was extensively exercised by Korean monks as well as ordinary Koreans since 2001, it had never been used to support someone who is still not considered as a full-fledged part of the Korean society—foreign workers. Nevertheless, what should be also taken into consideration is that the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism includes a substantial number of traveling monks or monks, who moved to Korea for religious purposes.[107] Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the reason why they decided to manifest their support was a shared understanding of the difficulty of being a foreigner in Korea.

Drawing on the aforementioned arguments about rituals' ability to create great solidarity, it can be suggested that monks utilized this performative practice to awake in the Korean public sympathy and desire to assist migrant workers. Demonstration by the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism of such strong solidarity towards migrant workers is a big step towards further cooperation between the MTU and Korean NGOs within the Korean public sphere domain.

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[105] Emile Durkheim and Joseph Ward Swain. *The elementary forms of the religious life*. (Courier Corporation, 2008), 50.

[106] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master frames and cycles of protest," *Frontiers in social movement theory* 133 (1992): 155.

[107] 대한불교조계종, http://www.buddhism.or.kr/index.php.

b. A one-person protest

In December 2017, the head of the MTU Udaya Rai started two-week picketing next to the Seoul Labor and Employment Office condemning and calling the Korean government to abolish board and lodging deduction guidelines for migrant workers. Taking its beginning in Seoul, the single-person protest as preliminary planned continued in other places throughout Korea: Busan, North Chungcheong Province, Daegu, and Gyeonggi Province. The MTU decided to hold the demonstration after the Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor enacted guidelines in which stated how to provide migrant workers with food and lodging aiming to improve their living conditions. Although this innovation seemed to have good intentions behind it, migrant workers found themselves in the situation worse than prior to these guidelines. According to these guidelines, workers are to be deducted up to 20 percent from their wages in advance for food and housing guaranteed by the employer.[108] However, the problem is that it can be another way of controlling migrant workers' salaries since employers usually take advantage of their unawareness and pay less than they supposed to.

A one-person protest is not a new phenomenon; on the contrary, it has been successfully exercised since the second half of the twentieth-century supplying world history with outstanding personalities. To name few: Rosa Parks, who refused to vacant a seat in the bus due to color of her skin, a mysterious Tank Man, who stood in front of the tanks sent by the Chinese government to suppress demonstrations in 1989, Thich Quang Duc's public self-immolation against discrimination of Buddhist in Vietnam, not to mention recent Greta Thunberg's Climate Change protest. In spite of the history of a single-person protest being filled with breathtaking and memorable examples, as a performative act in the field of studies of social movements, it remains without sufficient theoretical background and conceptualizing. In the context of Korean society, picketing is a quite widespread form of political performance for manifesting demands and discontent. The reason can be grounded in the fact that a single-person protest is a simple act of expression of a person's opinion, thus, is not subject to the Act on Assembly and Demonstration.[109] Therefore, by performing a solo protest an individual technically does not break any laws; however, he/she still may receive media coverage, delivers a message to the authorities or other targeted audience, and in the best-case scenario finds the support of like-

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[108] 조일준, «이주노동자 두번 울리는 고용부 '숙식비 공제 지침", *한겨레*, December 4, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/labor/821990.html.

[109] Statutes of the Republic of Korea, "Assembly and Demonstration Act", May 11, 2007, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=17771&type=part&key=11.

minded people. Consequently, even though the MTU was officially legalized, taking into account a history of clashes between the Korean government and migrant workers, it can be suggested that picketing was chosen as one of the safest types of performative actions to articulate their demands.

Although a peaceful demonstration carried out by Udaya Rai has little in common with the ones mentioned above, it did make an impact by attracting public attention and uniting migrant workers centers (Gyeongju Migrant Labor Center, Busan Foreign Workers Support Center, Daegu Support Center for Foreign Workers), representatives of which, joined the action across Korea. In addition, returning to the preceding sub-chapter dealing with the semiotic resource of protest slogans, it is worth mentioning that this one-person protest did not receive any international media coverage.[110]There could be several possible reasons why this action failed to attract media attention internationally, including low awareness about the gravity of the migrant workers' situation in Korea and news concerning the launch of the ballistic missile by North Korea along with the Yemeni refugee crisis in Korea crowding out news coverage of this picket.[111]Moreover, placards held by participants were solely in the Korean language (Figure 9), which proved that in order to attract the global public, English, as lingua franca is a necessary component of any protest slogan. However, what made it accessible for a quick meaning grasping and more comprehensible for the ordinary Korean public, was the usage of the image and words simultaneously.[112] Next to the slogan *"숙식비 강제징수 지침 폐기하라!"* (Eng. "Abolish the board and lodging deduction guidelines") authors of the placard located an image of the vinyl greenhouse and Korean banknotes (₩—won) in a red crossed-out circle, where greenhouse symbolizes poor living conditions and Korean won—money deducted from migrant workers for this housing. Right under it, we can observe the slogan "*고용허가제 폐지하라!"* (Eng. "Abolish Employment Permit System!"), placed next to the image of the EPS abbreviation and shackles in a red crossed-out circle symbolically calling the EPS modern-day slavery. An image can be considered as visual rhetoric, thus, a valid semiotic source in case

[110] Using various internationally utilized search engines no articles, posts, or reports in English dedicated to this demonstration discovered.

[111] "The biggest international stories of 2017: From North Korea and Yemen to ISIS and terrorism", *ABC News*, December 27, 2017, https://abcnews.go.com/International/biggest-international-stories-2017-north-korea-yemen-isis/story?id=51998164.

[112] Mira Beńkar, "Space, language and power: The rhetoric of street protests," *Sociološki pregled* 49.3 (2015): 337–348.

an individual in the process of creation employed "a conscious decision to communicate as well as conscious choices about the strategies".[113]

c. "투투버스" (Eng. "Tu Tu bus") campaign

In 2018, the MTU jointly with *수원이주민센터* (Eng. Suwon Migrants Center) and *지구인의 정류장* (Eng. Earthians' Station) launched an interesting in terms of performativity campaign the "Tu Tu bus". For the duration of one month, members of the MTU together with their leader Udaya Rai were traveling by bus to visit farms outside of Seoul city. The primary goal behind this project was threefold. Firstly, the MTU wanted to reach out to migrant workers employed in the agricultural industry. Due to the entire farming sector being located in the countryside, migrant workers often lack the possibility to address someone, including the MTU, for proper assistance in matters connected to terrible living conditions, non-payment of salaries, verbal, physical, and sexual abuse by employers, non-paid extended working hours, accidents at the workplace, and receiving financial reimbursement. Moreover, as was previously mentioned, the majority of agricultural workers are not aware of their basic rights and the Korean Labor Law which hinders them from fighting for the rights they already have and for the ones, they can receive if they join a struggle together with other members of the MTU. This campaign enabled members of the MTU to help those migrant workers whom they became acquainted with while visiting farms and educate them about their opportunities. Secondly, they managed to organize several meetings with some of the owners of the farms and communicated issues that workers are enduring alongside with possible ways of solving urgent problems; however, these conversations did not get any substantial results. Thirdly, they carried out a number of sit-in protests in front of the farms, which are well-known for the extensive workers' rights violations and exploitation.

From the perspective of its organization and implementation, the Tu Tu bus is an interesting campaign as it entails a combination of various means of performative action, which complicates its attribution to any type of protest. That is to say, it included sit-in protests, articulation of demands through visual rhetoric and shouting, speeches, and most importantly movement provided by the engagement of the vehicle. Although the movement in space did occur, we cannot properly ascribe it to the category of marches and parades as the motion took

[113] Kenneth L. Smith, et al., eds. *Handbook of visual communication: Theory, methods, and media*. (Routledge, 2004), 144.

place with the help of the bus.[114] The role of the bus was therefore threefold. Firstly, it assisted the MTU in taking a group of protesters to fairly distant locations. Secondly, being on the bus trip (even short one) often contributes to the feeling of belonging within the group. In addition, it enhanced wider participation among migrant workers due to the flexible schedule of the rides.

Moreover, according to the MTU's director of Education and Publicity Lee Yul-do, the biggest achievement of the Tu Tu bus were changes that happened in the minds of migrant workers. The MTU did not expect that more than 100 foreign workers would participate in this action given that it was carried out during weekdays. Lee Yul-do is convinced that this rather unusual event aided migrant workers in recognizing that they have rights and the desire to fight for them as well as realize that they are not alone in this struggle.[115]

For that matter, it is not the first time in the history of Korean protests that a bus was involved in a social movement. The innovation was introduced in 2010-2011 during the *한진중공업 사태* (Eng. Hanjin Heavy Industries strike) when massive demonstrations erupted after 400 workers of the Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction (HHIC) were laid off. In order to attract the attention of the national media and convince the HHIC to suspend the dismissals, a trade union official Kim Jin-Suk climbed on a 35 meters-high top of the crane and protested there. Some of the labor activists and cultural leaders were afraid that she would repeat the fate of the previous union leader Kim Ju-ik, who after protesting on the same crane for 129 days, failed to negotiate an agreement with the HHIC concerning the dismissals and committed suicide. Therefore, inspired by poet Song Kyung-dong they organized and launched a *희망버스* (Eng. Hope bus) campaign to provide support to Kim Jin-Suk before the 129th day comes.

During the first Hope bus, the participation reached approximately 700 people on board of 17 buses driving from different parts of the country to support the movement and struggle of Kim Jin Sook. After arriving at the HHIC complex, the protest began with dancing, singing, and praying under the crane. Following the first campaign, over 10000 people joined the second Hope bus resulting in 175 buses, 50 vans, and even some of the participants driving to the place of the demonstration by bicycles. The Hope bus rides continued for almost a year until the HHIC agreed to withdraw the dismissal plan and Kim Jin-Suk safely returned to the ground.

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[114] Thomas N. Ratliff and Lori L. Hall, "Practicing the art of dissent: Toward a typology of protest activity in the United States," *Humanity & Society* 38.3 (2014): 268–294.

[115] 이율도, "이주노동자 노동권의 덫 – 고용허가제", *전국불안정노동철폐연대*, August 8, 2018, http://workright.jinbo.net/xe/issue/60208.

Nevertheless, this method of protest turned out to be so successful that a number of activists in the wake of the victory carried on with Hope bus campaigns visiting workers in other major industrial cities of Korea.

The Hope bus campaign received its name not for the reason of the bus presence, however, because tens of thousands of ordinary people decided to stand by fighting workers expressing incredible solidarity. It is truly impressive and precedent-setting that what has firstly been a matter of laborers turned into a battle shared by the nation. This movement was not institutionalized or planned ahead; however, its humanitarian nature made it a powerful unifying force to withstand the fight against the neoliberal economy and vulnerable position of workers.

One can draw a line between the Tu Tu bus and Hope bus campaigns in both the idea and methods of implication. In comparison to the Hope bus, Tu tu bus campaign was definitely smaller in scale and participation rate, less militant, and well thought out. Furthermore, the participants of the action were migrant workers and activists. Nevertheless, what remained the same is the Korean employers' attitude and lack of efficient support from the Korean authorities and, certainly, the main objective behind—to demonstrate that regardless of distance and location, people can unite and enforce changes together. It can be suggested that the MTU members did not accidentally come up with the Tu Tu bus action, but, on the contrary, they decided to re-introduce forgotten tactics with the intention to evoke solidarity among not only migrant workers but also ordinary people and Korean NGOs.

There can be two reasons why the MTU re-introduce the old protesting strategy. First of all, to use the bus out of practicality, to provide assistance to isolated migrant workers on the outskirts, who feel alienated from the Korean society and migrant workers' organizations and counseling centers.[116] Secondly, the aspect of shared culture, history, and traditions in the theory of performative acts occupies an important role, as it serves as an amplifier of the emotion and feelings that embrace observers and transform them into participants.[117] Thus, the MTU might have expected that by using a protesting method with the Korean pedigree to it and past experiences, they could evoke compassion and involve more activists from the Korean civil society and the Korean society itself.

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[116] 이재호, 투투버스 나가신다 '나쁜 한국사장님' 비켜라, *한겨레*, May 14, 2018, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/45347.html.

[117] Xabier Itcaina, "Conclusion: Popular Culture, Folk Traditions and Protest—A Research Agenda," *Protest, Popular Culture and Tradition in Modern and Contemporary Western Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017. 229–248.

Final remarks

After analyzing the code preferences used by migrant workers for protest slogans during various demonstrations, one can confidently acknowledge that they are an extensive source of information. Based on the data they revealed, we can establish that the default language utilized by authors of protest placards is the Korean language. It is clear, therefore, that the main audience they were created for is the Korean government and the public. Nevertheless, taking into account the precarious position of migrant workers in the Korean society and their intention to stay in Korea for more than the legitimate spell of four years, the prevailing use of the Korean language can serve as a manifestation of their aspiration to occupy a certain niche within the Korean society.

Furthermore, the nature of the migrant workers' protest placards is quite symbolic and disguises partially its real content and real purposes. This is edifyingly illustrated in the example with the Yemeni refugees, where migrant workers recreated a slogan—, which they once used with an agenda to tackle hostility of the Korean society towards themselves—to demand the acceptance of the refugees. It can be also suggested that migrant workers demonstrated their solidarity not only because they subconsciously identified themselves with refugees but also with an aim to obtain a chance to cooperate with Korean NGOs, which defend the rights of asylum seekers. Another example of the use of symbolism is one of the multilingual placards articulating "Racism and Rep. Yi Wan-young OUT", where these two nominatives stand for the migrant workers' discontent concerning the suggestion to decrease the minimum wage for migrant workers during the two-year probationary period. Moreover, the word "OUT" has recently become a trendy expression to use during various demonstrations in Korea and associates with Koreans demanding justice and rights. Its symbolical meaning can, thus, greatly assist migrant workers in engaging the Korean public.

While producing multilingual artifacts, migrant workers used two methods, and each of them entailed particular information and meaning valuable for our research. That is to say, migrant workers used a message translation method in the issues on which the Korean government refused to acquiesce to their demands—the introduction of the WPS and freedom to change the workplace—since the creation of the MTU, prompting migrant workers to appeal to the international public for the support. The languages of the translation were by far Korean and English; however, other languages that are widely spoken by migrant workers were used as well. An example with a protest placard, which included a message in Thai and its translated version in Korean, illustrates for us the two substantial obstacles that are preventing migrant workers from fighting for their rights: lack of the Korean language proficiency and low level

of awareness of main provisions of the Korean Labor Laws. Moreover, based upon the language used in the text and grammatical construction, we can assume that this placard was created to deliver the message to both Thai migrant workers and to Korean authorities, leading us to an interesting finding that there is a third type of audience, which protest placards may communicate to—protesters themselves. To the same degree as the English language, languages shared by migrant workers and incorporated into their slogans serve as a tool creating a feeling of unification within migrant workers' independent movement. Another technique of inclusion of two languages simultaneously is a code-mixing, which based upon the example provided in the chapter, can address only the local audience, as the principal message is written in Korean.

In addition, within the series of migrant workers' protest placards, an issue of racism can be traced and defined as an interconnecting tool between the Korean public sphere and migrant workers. This problem enables the MTU to demand rights for migrant workers and at the same time participate in various Korean NGOs-organized events dedicated to the condemnation of racism. During the anti-racism protests, the MTU got an opportunity to establish useful connections for further cooperation with other Korean NGOs. What is more, taking into account the involvement of the MTU in a series of activities organized by Korean NGOs to express discontent with the current political governance, we can consider the MTU as one of the agents of political participation in the Korean public sphere.

On the part of performative activities carried out by migrant workers, they are also an extensive informational source, which contributes to our understanding of the essence of this movement. The 'three-steps-and-one-bow' Buddhist monks' protest, which was organized by the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism's social and labor committee, is an example of genuine support the Korean public sphere is providing migrant workers with. It is worth mentioning an interesting convergence of the official and counter-hegemonic public spheres, as they both seem to be assisting migrant workers. The Jogye Buddhist order is a part of Korea's religious mainstream, an organization recognized by the government as its partner. Hence, it belongs to the official public sphere. By contrast, many NGOs supporting migrants have roots in minjung movement (especially, religious-based ones) and can, therefore, be attributed to the counter-hegemonic public sphere. However, when it comes to the issue of racial discrimination, both counter-hegemonic and official public spheres have a reason to cooperate. This could be another reason why the MTU strategically positioned itself as anti-racist. In addition, after discovering the origins of the practice and its previous implementations in Korea, one can assume that Buddhist monks are assisting migrant workers not only in communication with the government

but also in evoking sympathy and engaging Koreans into this dialogue. The ‘three-steps-and-one-bow’ protest and a one-person demonstration portray the intention of the MTU to stay on the safe side and conduct activities that are non-violent and do not provoke negative emotions from neither the Korean government nor Korean society.

The one-person picketing, although it received a relatively small amount of attention, enhanced the relationships between the Korean public sphere (Gyeongju Migrant Labor Center, Busan Foreign Workers Support Center, Daegu Support Center for Foreign Workers) and the MTU, thereby attesting to their indirect cooperation. The Tu Tu bus campaign is an example of the creativity and resourcefulness of the MTU members. By recreating a protesting tactic identical to the one Korean laborers employed during their confrontations with the Korean business sector and adjusting it to the reality of the migrant workers struggle, they illustrated to which extent the situations are similar. The Tu Tu bus was a successful campaign in terms of educating migrant workers about their rights and opportunities as well as generating the feeling of co-belonging by showing that they are not alone. However, this campaign was not entirely successful, especially, in terms of reaching out to the larger Korean community.

CONCLUSION

Migrant workers in Korea are one of the most vulnerable social groups due to the dominant influence of the profit-minded business community and economy that is highly dependent on all-powerful conglomerates, resulting in the government's willingness to side with the private sector and society. Numerous cases of labor and human rights violations prompted foreign workers to take serious action and fight for their basic liberties and better working experience.

At the early stages of the movement, migrant workers received significant assistance from the Korean public sphere, which aided them not only in everyday problems at the workplace—legal counseling, provision of the shelters, education, etc.—but also in transforming their movement into an organized one. This cooperation was mutual, even though migrant workers lacked certain independence in their actions and goals they sought to achieve. After the establishment of the MTU, albeit still financially dependent on the KCTU, migrant workers were able to pursue their aims through the means they considered the most appropriate and effective. Those means included various demonstrations, protests, campaigns, rallies, and protest placards that they used to communicate with the audience during their acts of protest.

Everything that people say or do has a certain meaning behind it, although this meaning is not necessarily obvious to the world that surrounds us. Nevertheless, the way we decide to act, the words we choose to convey our thoughts are vital for understanding, since they are not only a certain method of expression but also a tool for creating reality.[118] From this point of view, collective public actions and linguistic repertoire used while conducting them are even more important to understand, as they carry an idea shared by more than one individual and have more power to cause an effect and bring changes.

A detailed analysis of the migrant workers' protest placards showed us three audiences the MTU seeks to communicate with: global, national, and migrant workers themselves. At the international scene, the MTU attempts to convey the demands which are within the domain of the basic labor rights and which the Korean government continuously refuses to fulfill for a long period of time. The national audience is represented by the Korean government and, as we may assume, the Korean society as a whole, since the MTU utilizes the Korean language in order to impart a statement that migrant workers are entitled to the same rights as Koreans and want to be included in the Korean society. The use of the languages that are shared by migrant

[118] Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth. "Utopia in Practise: The Discovery of Performativity in Sixties' Protest, Arts and Sciences," *Historein* 9 (2009): 46–56.

workers, revealed us the reasons why a large number of workers remain passive, do not reach out for the support and refrain from fighting for their rights. Moreover, slogans written in migrant workers' native languages made explicit the MTU's cooperation vis-à-vis NGOs with a goal to translate Korean Labor Law into other languages, so that more migrant workers would have access to necessary information. In addition, their protest placards bring up matters important not only to migrant workers but also to the international society and can, therefore, signal the emergence of a new political identity within the migrant community.

A comprehensive analysis of various performative activities conducted by migrant workers revealed us goals and aspirations behind these acts of protest. Performative acts that are presented in this thesis serve as an alternative source to reveal MTU's objectives and ways of their achievement. Among these are the following: to attract public attention and media to migrant workers' problems, to create a unified identity among migrant workers, to articulate demands and discontent to the Korean authorities, and to engage the Korean society into fighting side by side with migrant workers by utilizing Korean traditions, rituals, and references from the Korean history of the labor movement. Moreover, we can notice that during each of the demonstrations the MTU did not act entirely on their own. Quite the contrary, the Korean counter-hegemonic public sphere was always assisting them. It is noteworthy that at the early stages when their movement was weak and needed all the assistance it could get, migrant workers were forced to cooperate with mainly Protestant Church-based NGOs. Nonetheless, after gaining independence and strengthening its position, they now can choose with whom to collaborate. By giving noticeable preferences to the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism over NGOs headed by former ministers, affiliation with the official civil society rather than the counter-hegemonic one appears to be more beneficial for the MTU.

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APPENDIXES

Figure 1 (16.12.2018) Photo credentials: Polina Dunai

Figure 2 (23.09.2012) Source: https://rootlessmetropolitan.wordpress.com/2012/09/24/race-and-class-in-south-korea/



Figure 3 Source: 이주노동자 노동조합, <http://migrant.nodong.net/index.php?mid=home>

Figure 4 (27.07/2015) Source: http://www.laborplus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=10090

Figure 5 (21.10.2019) Source: http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/labor/913923.html

Figure 6 (13.03.2019) Source: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190313000653

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Figure 8 (04.05.2016) Source: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160504001012

Figure 9 (12.04.2017) Source: http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/labor/821990.html