

UiO : **Faculty of Law**
University of Oslo

A Feminist Perspective on the Norwegian Intervention in Libya

Exploring Alternatives for Peace and Security

Candidate number: 8018

Submission deadline: 1 June 2020

Number of words: 19 999



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor Cecilia Bailliet for her helpful comments and guidance. I have greatly benefited from her extensive knowledge and inspirational words.

I am also particularly grateful to Berit von der Lippe, whose feedback has been invaluable.

I would also like to thank my friends and family for their encouragements and support.

Finally, I wish to thank Magnus for always believing in me.

Table of contents

- 1 INTRODUCTION1**
- 1.1 Background.....1
- 1.2 Scope2
- 1.3 Contents3
- 1.4 Conceptual clarifications5
- 1.5 Structure.....6
- 2 LITERATURE REVIEW7**
- 2.1 Theoretical underpinnings7
- 2.2 The Norwegian context9
- 3 METHODOLOGY11**
- 3.1 Research question11
- 3.2 Methodological approach12
- 3.3 Methods13
- 3.4 Data.....14
- 3.5 Some ethical reflections.....15
- 4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....17**
- 4.1 Hierarchies of gender and race17
- 4.2 The construction of social reality20
- 4.3 Making humanitarian intervention possible21
- 4.4 Remaking the world.....23
- 5 CONSTRUCTING THE INTERVENTION.....25**
- 5.1 Norway as a peace nation25
- 5.2 Military intervention in Libya27
 - 5.2.1 Continuing the peace tradition27
 - 5.2.2 Intervention as protection.....29
 - 5.2.3 The need for protection31
- 5.3 Concluding thoughts: Intervention made possible34
- 6 DECONSTRUCTING THE NARRATIVE36**
- 6.1 Lessons learnt?36
- 6.2 The naturalisation of violence38
- 6.3 Undoing the hierarchy42

6.4 Seeking alternatives43
6.4.1 A feminist peace.....43
6.4.2 Alternative visions, new futures.....46
6.5 Exploring established mechanisms.....47
6.5.1 The responsibility to protect: A move to prevention?.....47
6.5.2 Turning to the UN Charter50
6.6 Concluding thoughts: Thinking differently51
7 CONCLUSION53
BIBLIOGRAPHY55

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

In February 2011, uprisings were taking place in Libya as part of the wider movement of popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring.¹ The demonstrations were reported to take on a largely peaceful character, although with violent clashes in some parts of the country.² It was furthermore claimed that the Libyan authorities resorted to the use of force against their own population to put an end to the unrest.³ In fact, by mid-March allegations were made of a potential genocide at the hands of the country's ruler Gaddafi.⁴

As a response to the developments in Libya, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1973, which authorised, *inter alia*, Member States “to take all necessary measures (...) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi”.⁵ This decision built on the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, developed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document which established the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.⁶

On 19 March 2011, the Norwegian government decided to contribute to the international military operation in Libya. A few days later, Norwegian military aircrafts engaged in their first bombing mission in the country. The Norwegian military effort lasted until August 2011.⁷ During the months of the Norwegian contribution, Norway alone had dropped a total of 588 bombs.

The intervention in Libya should arguably be considered as part of a broader policy of military engagement. At the time of writing the Norwegian government is in the process of

¹ For a timeline of events with a focus on the Norwegian context, see Heier, Ottosen, Tvedt (eds.), *Libya*, 253-263.

² See *Ibid.*, 253.

³ See *Ibid.*, 253-256. See also Tunander, “Den “Humanitære Krigen””, 172.

⁴ Tunander, “Den “Humanitære Krigen””, 172. These claims have however been subject to much criticism. Tunander, for instance, claims that “Today we know that all of this was a lie”, *Ibid.* My translation.

⁵ UNSC, *Resolution 1973*, para 4.

⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome resolution*, para 138 and 139. See also UNSC, *Resolution 1973*, preamble.

⁷ This timeline is based on Heier, Ottosen, Tvedt (eds.), *Libya*, 253-263.

introducing several new military aircrafts.⁸ At the same time, Norwegian military presence continues in several international operations.⁹ Yet, Norway has a self-image as a peace nation. Indeed, Norway has played a central role in peace negotiations and peace processes and enjoys a favourable reputation in this field on the international level.¹⁰ This is a position that hardly can be reconciled with the participation in international military operations.¹¹

In this light, the thesis seeks to critically engage with how Norway can best contribute to securing a peaceful and stable world. The overall objective is to examine the logics that underpinned the Norwegian intervention in Libya and the meanings that were created, and excluded, as a result. This is based on a desire to challenge the way in which the use of force is conceptualised, and to develop alternatives in its place.

1.2 Scope

The intervention in Libya has largely been discussed in relation to the legality of the operation. A central argument has been that the intervention was conducted contrary to international law by going beyond the United Nations (UN) mandate of protecting civilians, aiming instead at regime change.¹² The issue of compliance with international law will, however, not be the topic of analysis in this thesis. The role played by various motives or interests in explaining why the intervention took place will also not be discussed.¹³

Instead, the focus is on the way in which the intervention was conceptualised in the discourse, and the consequences this had for alternative ways of thinking about peace and security. It is, at the same time, important to emphasise that this is by no means a full examination of the discourse surrounding Norwegian foreign policy debate or the intervention in Libya. That would have required a scope far beyond what is possible for a thesis of this length. The aim is

⁸ See for instance Henriksen, "Suksess uten Innflytelse?", 30, arguing that these will likely be "sought after in future conflicts". My translation.

⁹ See an overview at Regjeringen, "Militære Bidrag".

¹⁰ See for instance Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, "Tilslørt Fredspolitik", 381.

¹¹ See Lippe and Stuvøy, "Kvinnefrigjøring", 47.

¹² See for instance Ulfstein, "Norge Brøt Folkeretten", 91.

¹³ Dyvik, for instance, refers to Norway's relationship to the US and NATO in the context of the war in Afghanistan, which could have been explored in the context of Libya as well. See Dyvik, "Performing Gender", 87-89. This is also a point made by Matlary, see Matlary, "Fornektelse og Forpliktelse", 195.

rather to examine general trends and whether it is possible to trace gendered and racialised logics within the discourse, and consider the potential consequences this has had.

1.3 Contents

The thesis will examine the ways in which humanitarian intervention was made possible through a reliance on particular understandings of masculinity and femininity. The aim is to understand the role played by gendered and racialised logics in enabling the intervention in Libya to be seen as a legitimate foreign policy tool.¹⁴ This also entails discussing the alternatives that have been excluded as a result. The thesis therefore asks the questions:

How was the Norwegian intervention in Libya made possible? And how did this impact on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace?

These questions build on the idea that gender is central to the way in which we make sense of the world. Meaning, it is claimed, is in dominant discourses created through binary logics based on hierarchies of gender and race. This will also have an impact on how we understand social reality. In fact, gender is seen as central for how we understand and conduct ourselves in international politics.

In order to answer these questions, the analysis will engage with the wider discourse on Norwegian foreign policy. In particular, it will consider whether the intervention can be understood in light of the understanding of Norway as a peace nation. More specifically, it will analyse how humanitarian intervention in Libya came to be seen as a means for the pursuit of security and the protection of individuals, and as way of acting that is in keeping with the Norwegian peace tradition.

Next, it will consider the immediate discourse surrounding the intervention. Here it is argued that the actions taken by Norway are portrayed in a way that implicitly resonates with certain ideas of masculinity. The identities and actions attributed to the Libyan people and authorities are also argued to take on a gendered character, creating the image of a civilian population at risk of violence by its authorities. In this way, it is claimed, gendered and racialised logics assigned meaning to the actions and actors involved. This, in turn, served to make intervention possible. More exactly, the claim is that this enabled the understanding that

¹⁴ The Norwegian scholar Iver Neumann argued in 2004 that war was seemingly becoming a “normal foreign policy tool”. My translation. Neumann, “Det er Typisk Norsk å Krige”.

intervention was needed for the protection of civilians and for the sake of ensuring human rights and democracy.

The argument is moreover that through interrogating the role of these kinds of logics in enabling the intervention, alternative ways of understanding security and peace may open up. This is because it reveals how the gendered and racialised logics underlying the discourse may be claimed to naturalise the use of force. These logics are argued to privilege certain forms of masculinity at the expense of those actions, values and characteristics associated with femininity. By privileging forms of acting seen as masculine, alternatives linked to femininity are excluded. This also means that that outside these logics, other ways of thinking about how to ensure security and peace may be possible. In other words, it allows for exploring how the situation in Libya may have been responded to outside of these logics. Here, the thesis will also engage with a discussion on the Norwegian evaluation of the intervention in Libya, showing the continued belief in military power.

The way in which this has impacted on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace is furthermore illustrated by a discussion of the alternative realities that could have been possible had we dismantled these logics. The aim is explicitly to develop alternatives to the use of force. The thesis will in this regard consider the idea of a feminist peace, based on the notions of emancipation, social justice, human rights and inclusion. Here, the thesis also discusses whether it is possible to pursue these alternatives within existing mechanisms of international law, including the doctrine of responsibility to protect and the UN Charter.

Finally, the conclusion of the thesis is that the intervention in Libya was seemingly made possible through the operations of gendered and racialised logics. These logics may moreover be argued to have excluded other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace. This is because they privilege masculine characteristics, actions and values over those associated with femininity. Changing the way in which we understand gender, then, may change the way in which we think about these issues. This means that alternative realities may open up where the use of force is not employed for the sake of protecting or promoting human rights and democracy. Here, security and peace will be understood as being incompatible with the use of force, and as requiring non-violent measures to address conflict and crises based on the participation of the people affected by such measures. Only then, it is argued, will security

and peace truly encompass the protection of civilians and respect for human rights and democracy.

1.4 Conceptual clarifications

Before proceeding it may be useful to clarify some of the key concepts employed in this thesis.

The analysis engages with the dominant narrative of the intervention in Libya. This thesis takes the concept of narrative to mean stories that construct a specific version of the world, the actors that inhabit it, and the actions that take place.¹⁵ In other words, a narrative constitutes a particular version of reality. Narratives are thus subsumed within a larger discursive context, and, when dominant, may give support to an overall discourse.

Here, it is also necessary to explain what is meant by the term discourse in the context of this thesis. Hollway, for instance, has described discourse as a “system of statements which cohere around common meanings and values”.¹⁶ Accordingly, a discourse may be said to establish meaning within the specific context in which it operates.¹⁷ The knowledge produced within the discourse thus comes to be viewed as “objective reality”.¹⁸

The concept of gendered and racialised logics also deserves some clarification.¹⁹ These kinds of logics may be explained as ways of framing and understanding the world in which particular

“gendered [and racialised] meanings and images [help] organize the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them, and sometimes [provide] some rationale for action”.²⁰

Gendered and racialised logics may accordingly be explained as a way of making sense of the world through ideas of gender and race.²¹ In other words, it is a matter of constructing an

¹⁵ See Threadgold, “Introduction”, 3.

¹⁶ Hollway, “Heterosexual Sex: Power and Desire for the Other”, in Cartledge and Ryan (eds.), *Sex and Love: New Thoughts on Old Contradictions*, 124-140 (London: Women’s Press, 1983), 231 [sic] in Gavey, “Feminist Poststructuralism”, 463-464.

¹⁷ Jørgensen and Phillips, “Laclau and Mouffe”, 3. See also Gavey, “Feminist Poststructuralism”, 464.

¹⁸ Jørgensen and Phillips, “Laclau and Mouffe”, 9.

¹⁹ This term is also used by Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 90 and Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 37.

²⁰ Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection”, 2. My edit.

image of the world in which various actors and the actions they conduct are given meaning through their perceived resemblance with gendered and racialised identities, qualities and practices.

What is more, the thesis refers principally to the concept of humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions are seen as constituting a part of the third pillar of the responsibility to protect doctrine.²² These interventions are commonly understood as “humanitarian military interventions”, which entails “the use of force by external actors without host state consent aimed at preventing or ending genocide or mass atrocities”.²³ They may, as such, also be described as a form of war. On this basis, the thesis will use the terms humanitarian intervention, military intervention and war more broadly.

1.5 Structure

The thesis will firstly set out a literature review, with the aim of establishing the broader fields of debate in which the thesis can be situated. In chapter 3, it will present the methodological approach, the methods and some relevant ethical reflections. Also the reasoning behind the research questions will be elaborated upon in this section. The methodology will establish why feminism is an important approach for studying the issue of military intervention. In chapter 4, the thesis will outline the theoretical framework. Here, the concept of gender will be addressed, providing the framework from which to analyse how meaning is constructed within dominant discourses and consequently for understanding the practice of humanitarian intervention. Chapter 5 will analyse the discourse surrounding the intervention. It will examine the question of how the Norwegian intervention in Libya was made possible. This entails analysing the gendered and racialised logics that operated within the discourse. Chapter 6 will analyse the consequences of these logics, addressing how they have impacted on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace. This will also entail considering whether any alternatives may be found in existing legal mechanisms at the international level. Finally, the thesis will provide a concluding chapter, giving an overview of the findings and the arguments that have been made throughout the thesis.

²¹ See also Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 701 on “gendered and racialized metaphors”.

²² See United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome resolution*, para 139.

²³ Williams and Bellamy, “Principles, Politics, and Prudence”, 294. A similar definition is adopted by Heathcote, although emphasising human rights more broadly. Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 168-169.

2 Literature Review

The topic of this thesis relates to several academic fields and existing scholarly debates. First and foremost, the thesis engages with feminist discussions on war and peace. The literature review will therefore seek to give an account of some of the most relevant literature on this issue. In addition, the thesis should be seen in relation to a broader debate on the role of Norway as a peace nation. For this reason, the literature review will also consider literature in the Norwegian context which provides the basis for an interrogation into the Norwegian peace identity. All in all, this section will contribute to situate the topic of analysis within a wider field of scholarly debates.

2.1 Theoretical underpinnings

The thesis draws attention to gender and its impact on ways of thinking about the world. In this regard, the thesis will largely engage with feminist research on the role of gender within the field of international relations. The thesis has particularly been inspired by feminist scholars like J. Ann Tickner, Laura Sjoberg, Laura Shepherd, Jill Steans and Cynthia Enloe.²⁴ In this way, the thesis joins Enloe and other feminist scholars in an attempt to make feminist sense of international politics.²⁵ This should be understood as asking questions about “how we organize life, how we accord it value, how we compel the world”.²⁶ Increasingly, for example, the role of masculinities has been recognised and studied, giving important insight into how gender works to structure our understanding of different phenomena.²⁷ In particular, much focus has been on the impact of gender dynamics on practices of war and conflict.²⁸ Especially relevant is the work done by feminist scholars who have analysed the idea of

²⁴ This includes Shepherd (ed.), *Gender Matters*; Steans, *Gender and International Relations*; Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*; Tickner and Sjoberg (eds.), *Feminism and International Relations*; Sjoberg (ed.), *Gender and International Security*.

²⁵ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*. See also Zalewski, “Feminist International Relations”, 29.

²⁶ Butler, *Undoing Gender* (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 205 in Zalewski, “Feminist International Relations”, 29.

²⁷ See Zalewski and Parpart (eds.), *The ‘Man’ Question*; Connell, *Masculinities*; Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”; Hooper, *Manly States*.

²⁸ Sjoberg, “Seeing Sex, Gender, and Sexuality”, 434; Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”; Zalewski, “Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?”; Sjoberg, *Gender, Justice, and the Wars*; Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook*; Sjoberg and Via (eds.), *Gender, War, and Militarism*; Cohn (ed.), *Women and Wars*; Cohn, “Wars, Wimps, and Women”, see also the overall volume.

protection in the context of military practices.²⁹ This should more broadly be understood in the context of feminist analyses of political identities and representation.³⁰

It is within this scholarly setting that the thesis will engage with understandings of humanitarian intervention in particular. More specifically, this thesis seeks to interrogate the ways in which gender is at work in the discourses surrounding such interventions.³¹ Here, the work of Anne Orford is especially notable. She interrogates how legal texts on humanitarian intervention and the representations they rely on make use of gendered and racialised ideas of violence.³² The thesis will also draw on the work Gina Heathcote who has conducted a feminist analysis of humanitarian intervention, the doctrine of the responsibility to protect and the law on the use of force more widely.³³ These works provide an interesting starting point for analysing humanitarian intervention from a feminist perspective, recognising the gendered and racialised logics that make intervention appear intelligible. The thesis will seek to expand on these ideas and see them in light of the Norwegian intervention in Libya. Here, feminist ideas of peace and its requirements will also be important for the analysis, providing a framework for alternative understandings.³⁴

In this context it might be useful to include a mention of the work done within this field in Norway. Two Norwegian feminist scholars have been of particular importance for the development of the topic of this thesis, namely Synne Dyvik and Berit von der Lippe. Dyvik's doctoral thesis, for example, dealt with the role of gender in the invasion of Afghanistan.³⁵

²⁹ See notably Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection"; Wilcox, "Gendering the Cult of the Offensive"; Elshtain, *Women and War*; Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States", 50.

³⁰ See for instance Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*, 14. See also Mohanty, "Introduction", 16; Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security*. See also Doty, *Imperial Encounters*.

³¹ Three authors have been highlighted in the literature as especially prominent on this topic, namely Anne Orford (see below), Sherene Razack and Sandra Whitworth. Although Razack and Whitworth write in the context of peacekeeping missions, these missions arguably share many similarities with humanitarian intervention with regards to the underlying logic and narratives surrounding the operations. See Razack, *Dark Threats*; Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*.

³² Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 11; Orford, "Muscular Humanitarianism".

³³ Heathcote, "Justifying Force", especially chapter 5 and 6.3; Heathcote, *The Law on the Use of Force*, see in particular chapter 5; Heathcote, "Humanitarian Intervention". On these issues, see also Charlesworth, "Feminist Reflections", Engle, "Calling in the Troops".

³⁴ Heathcote, "Humanitarian Intervention"; Heathcote, "Justifying Force"; Confortini, "Galtung, Violence, and Gender"; Hudson, "Inhabitants of Interstices?"; Wibben *et al.*, "Collective Discussion"; Charlesworth, "International Law".

³⁵ Focusing on Norway and the US.

Here she directly addresses the gendered and racialised logics at play in legitimising the invasion and how they operated in the war that followed, with a particular focus on gendered bodies and performances.³⁶ Writing on the issue of political rhetoric, Lippe has also taken a critical perspective on the use of force for allegedly protective purposes, analysing in particular the co-optation of feminist ideas in the legitimisation of war.³⁷ The insights provided by these scholars have been important sources of reflection on the meaning that can be made of the use of force and humanitarian intervention.

2.2 The Norwegian context

In the field of Norwegian peace research, the work done by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) enjoys a prominent position. PRIO has implemented gender as a key research focus through its Centre on Gender, Peace and Security. Turning more specifically to the Norwegian context, PRIO researchers Inger Skjelsbæk and Torunn Tryggestad have noted a seeming unwillingness by Norwegian governments to describe Norwegian foreign policies as feminist.³⁸ Such an unwillingness may be, it is argued, the result of feminism being considered “as too provocative and undermining rather than advancing peacemaking”.³⁹ This thesis will, on the contrary, attempt to show how the pursuit of a feminist peace is crucial for establishing conditions in which peace and security can be enjoyed by all, and thus not something that should be rejected. Rather it should be embraced as integral for a lasting peace. In this way, the thesis is seeking to contribute to this debate and offer a new perspective on how Norway can pursue a feminist peace.

What is more, the thesis will draw on debates surrounding Norway’s peace identity, as well as the country’s contribution to the intervention in Libya. The book *Libya: The Unbearable Ease of the War*,⁴⁰ for example, offers a collection of analyses of the war in Libya and Norway’s role in it. Beyond a general interest in the study of gender, it was particularly this book that inspired the topic of this thesis. Lippe’s analysis of the concept of responsibility to protect, for instance, has been especially informative. For Lippe, political rhetoric has made explicit use

³⁶ Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 32.

³⁷ Lippe and Stuvøy, “Kvinnefrigjøring”; Lippe, “The White Woman”; Lippe, “Rhetoric of War”; Lippe, “Kjønnete Ikoner”; Lippe and Väyrynen, “Co-opting Feminist Voices”.

³⁸ Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, “Pro-gender Norms”, 181-182. Yet, Norway has a strong commitment to gender equality, see *Ibid.*, 184. This is explained by the strong emphasis on consensus and neutrality, see *Ibid.*, 196.

³⁹ Aggestam and True, “Gendering Foreign Policy”, 156.

⁴⁰ Heier, Ottosen, Tvedt (eds.), *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*. My translation.

of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect and implicit use of a rhetoric of protection underlying this doctrine to legitimise humanitarian interventions.⁴¹ Moreover, in the study of Norwegian state identity and practices more generally, the work of Terje Tvedt has been especially influential. He has pointed to the idea of the Norwegian Samaritan through a focus on Norwegian foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on aid and peace policies.⁴² Other authors have also analysed Norwegian self-images and foreign policy.⁴³ Kristian Harpviken and Inger Skjelsbæk, for example, have analysed the increasing blend of discourses of security and peace within Norwegian political debate, which they see as having potentially detrimental effects for the potential for Norwegian peace efforts.⁴⁴ These perspectives serve as an interesting background for situating the thesis in a larger debate on the use of military measures in the name of pursuing peace. These insights are moreover important for furthering our understanding of the wider representational practices that form the backdrop for the intervention in Libya.

Yet, what is lacking is a gender perspective on humanitarian intervention and the Norwegian effort in Libya. The goal is, as such, to understand how the intervention in Libya was made possible in the Norwegian context on the basis of feminist insights on the operations of gender.

⁴¹ Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 195.

⁴² Tvedt, *Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk og Makt*, 19 and 22.

⁴³ Skånland, “Norsk Utenrikspolitikk”; Østerud, “Lite Land”; Leira (ed.), *Norsk Selvbilder*; Leira, “Our Entire People”; Dobinson and Dale, “Den Norske Ryggsekk”; Matlary, “Kriger i Kamouflasje?”. On Libya in particular see Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”; Holm, “Liberale Verdifelleskap”. On the topic of Norwegian security policies see especially the work of Matlary. Explaining for instance Norwegian military operations in relation to Norway’s dependence on NATO, see Matlary, “Fornektelse og Forpliktelse”, 195.

⁴⁴ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, “Tilslørt Fredspolitikk”, 383. See however the criticism offered by Lippe and Stuvøy on co-optation, gender perspectives and “the problematic – impossible? – balancing act between Norway’s NATO membership and the preservation of the peace engagement”. Lippe and Stuvøy, “Kvinnefrigjøring”, 47. My translation.

3 Methodology

3.1 Research question

The research question of this thesis is:

How was the Norwegian intervention in Libya made possible?

What is more, the thesis also asks:

How did this impact on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace?

The way in which the first research question is framed is done deliberately. It is inspired by the work of Doty, who analyses “how the U.S. invasion of Panama was made possible”.⁴⁵ In essence, this type of question allows for an examination of how meaning may be said to be created through discourse, and the implications this has for the conduct of actors both at an individual and an international level. In asking how the intervention was made possible, the thesis is seeking to explore how certain realities are created through the use of language, which in turn is argued to enable particular actions to be taken.⁴⁶ More specifically, it will analyse the role played by gendered and racialised logics in making the intervention in Libya possible. This will also entail assessing the implications of this particular framing of reality and the potential for arriving at alternative possibilities, which is addressed by the second research question. In view of this, the aim is to explore the conditions that enable certain actions to take place but not others.⁴⁷ Crucially, this way of framing the analysis is motivated by a belief that the intervention “cannot be fully understood without taking seriously the gendered and racial discourse it relied on”.⁴⁸ Indeed, the claim is that “gendered and racialized identities constructed in foreign policy discourse” create certain possibilities for action.⁴⁹ The aim of asking these questions is furthermore to consider what can be learnt about the various possibilities for action if security and peace are conceptualised in a different way. The methodology and theoretical framework will provide further guidance on how some possibilities are socially constructed, while others are excluded.

⁴⁵ Doty, “Foreign Policy”, 299. Although this thesis takes a slightly different theoretical approach to this question than Doty. See also Skånland, “Norsk Utenrikspolitikk”, 322 for this question in the context of the Norwegian peace engagement.

⁴⁶ Doty, “Foreign Policy”, 298.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ See Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 66.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Dyvik also uses the notion of “gendered and racialized logics” to describe this, see *Ibid.*, 90.

3.2 Methodological approach

This thesis will base itself on a feminist methodology. Central to this methodological approach is that it considers gender as an analytical category.⁵⁰ Gender, it is argued, is currently structuring the ways in which people understand the world around them.⁵¹ This is related to the claim that all knowledge is socially constructed.⁵² Employing a feminist perspective thus entails that one asks questions about the ways in which we make sense of the world.⁵³ In particular, the claim is that “we know more about global politics when we ask questions about women and gender”.⁵⁴ In the context of the use of military force, which is the central concern of the thesis, feminist approaches have sought to “identify where and how gender matters in wars”.⁵⁵ This entails, for instance, studying how understandings of masculinities and femininities impact on how war is portrayed, on the choices made in the conduct of war, and on how war and conflict are generally understood.⁵⁶ Underlying this is the belief that gender may be understood as “a linchpin (...) of the very existence of the war system”.⁵⁷ Feminism may thus advance our understanding of the use of military force and military intervention.

Far from only seeking to understand the world in new ways, however, feminist analyses are conducted with the purpose of exploring “the potential for change” and improving the lives of individuals.⁵⁸ This relates specifically to the goal of emancipation which underlies most, if not all, of feminist research. The point of the analysis is not merely to engage in a critique of the existing order, but to develop alternatives.⁵⁹ The claim is that, through critique, one is able to destabilise what is perceived as natural, and open up opportunities for the transformation of

⁵⁰ Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, 27; Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 17 in Peterson, “Introduction”, 8; Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 22; Wilcox, “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive”, 218.

⁵¹ Peterson, “Introduction”, 8-9.

⁵² For more on this point in a feminist context, see for example Peterson, “Security and Sovereign States”, 57.

⁵³ Zalewski, “Feminist International Relations”, 29.

⁵⁴ Sjoberg and Via, “Introduction”, 9.

⁵⁵ Sjoberg, “Gender, Feminism, and War Theorizing”, 64.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁵⁷ Sjoberg and Via, “Introduction”, 10-11.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁹ Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 22.

social relations.⁶⁰ Theorising is for this reason considered a crucial tool for change and for establishing alternative realities.⁶¹

Yet, it should be emphasised that the point is not to develop one coherent account of what reality really is, or to develop a fixed account of what feminist emancipation entails. On the contrary, the argument is that research premised on the search for definite conclusions will be unable to attend to the diverse experiences women are facing and the diverse ways in which oppression operates.⁶² In this regard, feminist approaches also emphasise listening to and understanding the perspectives of those whose voices have all too often been excluded.⁶³ Conversations and dialogue are prioritised over the search for “a single triumphant truth”.⁶⁴

3.3 Methods

The thesis will primarily engage in a feminist discourse analysis. In this way, I see myself as being in “conversation” with the texts I am analysing.⁶⁵ The main objective is to “take meaning from a given text and write a convincing story about that meaning”.⁶⁶ Employing discourse analysis thus allows for a rather open engagement with the discourse and interpretations of it.⁶⁷ As such, the analysis entails a careful examination of texts, focusing on exposing how meaning is created.⁶⁸ More specifically, the focus is on particular expressions and how they function as articulations of a particular version of reality.⁶⁹ This has been explained by Doty as “examin[ing] how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others”.⁷⁰ Accordingly, the analysis functions by way of interrogating the meanings established within the discourse, seeking to explore how these impact on the possibilities for action.

⁶⁰ Peterson, “Introduction”, 15.

⁶¹ See Ackerly and True, “Studying the Struggles”, 243.

⁶² Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, “Feminist Approaches”, 613.

⁶³ Tickner, “You Just Don’t Understand”, 629.

⁶⁴ Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods”, 379.

⁶⁵ Reinharz, with Davidman, *Feminist Methods in Social Research* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 230 in Tickner, “Feminism Meets International Relations”, 21.

⁶⁶ Shepherd, *Gender, Violence and Security*, 32.

⁶⁷ Tilley, “Feminist Discourse Analysis”, 1.

⁶⁸ Gavey, “Feminist Poststructuralism”, 467.

⁶⁹ Jørgensen and Phillips, “Laclau and Mouffe”, 6.

⁷⁰ Doty, “Foreign Policy”, 298.

This will, moreover, be combined with the use of secondary sources and scholarly literature. The analysis will, for example, be supplemented by an engagement with the work of various scholars to assist the interpretation of the discourse and discuss the topics at hand.

3.4 Data

The first section of the analysis will predominantly be based on the analysis of secondary material. This is because the idea of Norway as a peace nation is already a quite heavily researched area.⁷¹ The thesis will therefore be able to draw on the insights provided by Norwegian scholars. This issue will, however, be analysed through the application of a feminist perspective.⁷² These materials will be analysed with a view to examining the general discourse and the way in which Norwegian foreign policy is presented. This will serve as an essential backdrop to making sense of the intervention in Libya.

Next, the thesis will engage more directly with the intervention, through Norwegian Parliamentary debates, as well as speeches and statements made before and during the intervention. These materials will allow the thesis to get a grasp of how the intervention was understood, presented and justified. For this purpose, the section will largely refer to the texts through quotations in order to best recount the essence of the meanings created therein.⁷³ This will include the statements of people representing the main political parties in Norway, members of parliament and government officials. In totality, this will give an indication of the arguments that constituted the very core of Norwegian political debate, as these people will be “presumed (...) to be authorised speakers/writers of a dominant discourse”.⁷⁴ The thesis will furthermore engage with relevant scholarly literature, both feminist and non-feminist, in this analysis.

⁷¹ See the sources listed in the literature review.

⁷² See also Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, especially pages 72 and 74; Lippe, “The White Woman”, 25-27; Lippe, “Rhetoric of War”, 159-162.

⁷³ All translations are my own.

⁷⁴ Milliken, “The Study of Discourse”, 233.

Finally, the evaluation of the Norwegian military efforts in Libya will also be of relevance. Here, the work of the Petersen committee,⁷⁵ who wrote the Libya report, will be particularly important, as it is the official evaluation made at the request of the Norwegian government.

As a result, it will enable insight into the dominant understanding of the intervention. This will likely be relevant for future responses to similar situations, and the way in which Norway intends to approach the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect in the future.

The remaining sections will predominantly be based on an engagement with secondary material, in combination with a reflection on the findings in the initial part of the analysis. Here the thesis will largely refer to the work of feminist scholars on the issues of war and peace.

3.5 Some ethical reflections

Although, I am not seeking to impose definite conclusions of what peace entails or what the future direction for Norwegian foreign policy should be, I will nonetheless offer a critique and some recommendations on what the world *should* look like. As an implication of this, “there are implicit or explicit judgements also about what kind of changes constitute a better or worse situation for women”.⁷⁶ For these reasons, it is particularly important to be attentive to the differences in people’s lives, and accordingly in their priorities. As a consequence, the alternatives presented should take into consideration these differences.⁷⁷ What is more, the fact that I am theorising about others entails that I am exercising power over them and their realities. Here, it should be noted that my theorising about humanitarian intervention is made possible “precisely because I am not a daily risk” of the harms caused by humanitarian intervention.⁷⁸ As a matter of fact, my academic practice has been made possible by certain socio-economic and political relations which benefit some at the expense of others.⁷⁹ Against this background, it has been suggested that in exercise of this power, there is a responsibility to “use such advantage to provide space and time for other women to speak”.⁸⁰ As a

⁷⁵ In Norwegian: Petersen-utvalget.

⁷⁶ Lugones and Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You!”, 578-579.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 579.

⁷⁸ Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods”, 380-381.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 380.

⁸⁰ Lugones and Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You”, 580.

consequence, I am not seeking to impose a particular solution as such, but rather broadening the perspective of what peace *may* entail, and facilitating the inclusion of new voices.

4 Theoretical framework

4.1 Hierarchies of gender and race

As has been made clear from the above, the thesis takes as its starting point the concept of gender. The notion of gender entails socially constructed ideas of masculinity and femininity. These may be explained as “stereotypes, behaviour norms, and rules assigned to men and women”,⁸¹ or “a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be”.⁸² Masculinity and femininity tend currently to be defined in oppositional terms, through a dichotomous pairing.⁸³ What is more, in their present understanding, they may be argued to exist in a hierarchical structure in which one takes precedence over the other. From this perspective, this binary pair is structured in a way that not only makes them appear oppositional, but in which one is privileged over the other with the result of “displacing the subordinate term beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable”.⁸⁴ The crucial point is how this dualistic framework ensures a hierarchy of gender, in which the masculine character takes up the position of authority.⁸⁵ In fact, his authority is secured through his difference to and perceived superiority over the feminine.⁸⁶

What is more, this dichotomy is connected to other binary pairings, and gender may in this way be seen as playing a central role in the process of generating meaning. The dichotomy of gender is, in this view, argued to inform the way in which other dichotomies are perceived and understood.⁸⁷ Indeed, the argument is that the entire structure of generating meaning is currently dependent on gender.⁸⁸ In this view, certain practices will come to resonate with particular gendered identities.⁸⁹ The way in which gender accords meaning becomes clearer when considering binaries such as powerful/weak, autonomous/dependent, active/passive, and

⁸¹ Sjoberg, *Gender, Justice, and the Wars*, 33.

⁸² Tickner and Sjoberg, “Feminism”, in Dunne, Kukri and Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 195-212 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), 206 in Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 39.

⁸³ Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 31.

⁸⁴ Gregory, “Foreword”, in *International/Intertextual Relations*, ed. Der Derian and Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), xvi in Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 19. These binaries and their hierarchical ordering have been subjected to a great amount of feminist criticism, see discussions below.

⁸⁵ Otto, “Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’”, 106.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 19.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”, 843.

rational/emotional.⁹⁰ Here the first comes to be associated with masculinity, while the second is associated with the feminine.⁹¹ More importantly, the first will likely be given a higher value than the second.⁹² Referring to the point made earlier, the claim is that “these dichotomies are not only hierarchical (privileging the first term over the second) but also *androcentric*”.⁹³ The privileged term, then, is “associated with masculinity or assumes a male-as-norm point of view”.⁹⁴ These hierarchies thus sustain female subordination,⁹⁵ and the subordination of those traits, qualities and behaviours associated with femininity. As a consequence, this means that those traits, qualities and behaviours associated with masculinity is accentuated, privileged and considered desirable.

Against this background, the analysis of masculinity becomes particularly pertinent. Here the work of R.W. Connell has been especially authoritative.⁹⁶ In her analysis, Connell uses the concept of hegemonic masculinities to “conceptualize how patriarchal relations are legitimated throughout society”⁹⁷ both with regards to femininities and subordinate masculinities.⁹⁸ Hegemonic masculinities may, in this view, be considered particular arrangements or patterns of practice, constituting a particular idea or version of masculinity that is dominant within a society at a given time and context and which serves to uphold certain gender relations.⁹⁹ In other words, it constitutes “the currently most honored way of being a man”.¹⁰⁰ From this perspective, there exist multiple versions of masculinity, where some have more authority than others depending on context.¹⁰¹ The dominance of hegemonic masculinities is dependent on the feminisation of both femininities and subordinate

⁹⁰ See Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives”, 336 and Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 31.

⁹¹ Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 31.

⁹² *Ibid.*; Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 20.

⁹³ Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 20.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives”, 336.

⁹⁶ Connell’s work is however not without criticism, see especially the comments on the hierarchy of gender in Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”.

⁹⁷ Messerschmidt, “Engendering Gendered Knowledge: Assessing Academic Appropriation of Hegemonic Masculinity, *Men and Masculinities*, 15 (2012), 56–76, 63 in Christensen and Jensen, “Combining Hegemonic Masculinity and Intersectionality”, 63.

⁹⁸ Christensen and Jensen, “Combining Hegemonic Masculinity and Intersectionality”, 63.

⁹⁹ See Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”, 853; Connell, *Masculinities*, 77. The hegemonic version is not constant, but changes according to context, see Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”, 847.

¹⁰⁰ Connell and Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity”, 832.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 846.

masculinities. This entails “a demeaning, or devalorization, on the basis of sex and gender association”.¹⁰² Consequently, gender becomes “a way of structuring social practice”¹⁰³ through the privileging of certain behaviours and actions.

This should also be considered in relation to how a “global gender order”, and the dominant position of hegemonic masculinities, has been established through colonial and imperialist practices.¹⁰⁴ Connell, for instance, argues that gender is only one aspect of the structuring of social practice, and that “it is unavoidably involved with other social structures”, pointing to for example race.¹⁰⁵ Gender and race, it is argued, operate both independently and concurrently in structuring the way the world is understood.¹⁰⁶ In fact, this intersectionality is considered as crucial to understand how power operates in social relations.¹⁰⁷ Crucially, this gender order has been preserved by “[a] global, racialized (and racist) hierarchy of masculinities” established through “the institutionalization of a complex set of race and gender identities”.¹⁰⁸ This hierarchy was consequently made possible by the feminisation of ‘other’ masculinities.¹⁰⁹ Gender thus operates alongside other hierarchies, which establish the dominance of some men over “feminized and ‘barbarian’ others”.¹¹⁰ These groups will often be considered to lack the qualities and values associated with hegemonic masculinities.¹¹¹ In other words, they fail to live up to the “idealized notions of “real manhood””.¹¹² In this process, there is a creation of an ‘other’, in terms of both gender and race, which enable the identity of the masculine white man through his difference and superiority to those cast as other.¹¹³

The thesis thus takes gender as its primary point of reference, while also including some reflections on racialised logics. In taking this approach, it follows Petersen’s reasoning in that

¹⁰² Sjoberg, “Seeing Sex, Gender, and Sexuality”, 441.

¹⁰³ Connell, *Masculinities*, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 36.

¹⁰⁵ Connell, *Masculinities*, 75. See also Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 34.

¹⁰⁶ Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 45.

¹⁰⁷ Blanchard, “Rethinking International Security”, 64.

¹⁰⁸ Hooper, “Masculinist Practices”, 36.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Alexander, “Gender, Structural Violence, and Peace”, 32.

¹¹¹ Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives”, 336.

¹¹² Blanchard, “Rethinking International Security”, 63.

¹¹³ See Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, 36-37.

it is “not arguing that gender hierarchy is the “primary” oppression overshadowing race or class or sexuality”.¹¹⁴ Instead, the belief is that “the dichotomy of gender underpins – as the denigration of the feminine naturalizes – hierarchies of gender, class, race, sexualities, and geopolitical “difference.””¹¹⁵ Feminisation, it is argued, occurs not only in the context of gender oppression, but functions to “normalize and depoliticize subjection” in the context of other hierarchies as well.¹¹⁶ On this basis, gender oppression is not taken as the *main* form of oppression, rather the process of feminisation is seen as a way in which oppressions come to be naturalised.¹¹⁷ In this way, the thesis seeks to explore the work gender is doing,¹¹⁸ while also paying attention to its intersection with race.

With this in mind, the thesis will examine how the hierarchy outlined above may contribute to shaping meaning in the context of political relations, and as a consequence create certain possibilities at the expense of others.

4.2 The construction of social reality

The central argument of the thesis is that political relations also take on a gendered character. The thesis will on this basis engage with how different constructions of masculinity and femininity are engineered to give meaning to international politics.¹¹⁹ More concretely, the argument is that many of the actions of states are implicitly understood and legitimised through their resonance with values and behaviours associated with masculinity.¹²⁰ The claim is in this regard that “[g]endered language shapes our view of the world in such a way that only certain worlds are made imaginable, where other visions are erased from the realm of possibilities”.¹²¹ The realities that are seen as possible, it is argued, are secured through hegemonic discourses which present them as mere reflections of social reality.¹²² The knowledge produced in this hegemony thereby become a matter of common sense.¹²³

¹¹⁴ Peterson, “Gendered Identities”, 20.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 20; see this wording in Zalewski, “Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?”, 341.

¹¹⁹ *Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, 197.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 200.

¹²¹ Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender”, 357.

¹²² Lippe, “Images of Victory”, 64.

¹²³ Blanchard, “Rethinking International Security”, 64.

Hegemonic masculinity plays a central role in these discourses. This is because it will be embedded within the discourse so as to privilege the values, actions and actors associated with it, which in turn will come to be considered as universal.¹²⁴ Linking back to the research questions, gendered logics may thus be seen as essential in creating certain possibilities, while excluding others.

The thesis will on this basis seek to explore the ways in which humanitarian intervention is made possible through a reliance on particular understandings of masculinity and femininity.

4.3 Making humanitarian intervention possible

Drawing on the arguments laid out above, the thesis makes the claim that certain gendered and racialised logics operate in the context of war and humanitarian interventions. Young, for example, describes the logic of masculinist protection.¹²⁵ Arguably, this logic relies on a very particular idea of masculinity in which the state takes up the position as a

“gallantly masculine man [who] is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in relation to women. He faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women¹²⁶ from harm (...). The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a protector.”¹²⁷

Young explains how this particular logic places the masculine character in the position of a protector, while feminised subjects are placed in a position of dependence and seen as being in need of protection.¹²⁸ Crucially, the image of the feminine subjects within discourses “produces and is dependent upon a binary male representation: the protected subject constitutes her ‘protector’”.¹²⁹ By portraying these particular subjects as victims, one simultaneously create a need for a masculine subject whose role is to ensure the protection of “‘good’ women from ‘bad’, often ‘native’, men”.¹³⁰ This logic is therefore dependent on not

¹²⁴ Lippe, “Images of Victory”, 64 and 65.

¹²⁵ Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection”. Similarly, Dyvik has analysed the notion of protective masculinity in the context of Norway’s participation in the invasion of Afghanistan, see Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 34.

¹²⁶ Or in the case of this thesis, feminised subjects more broadly.

¹²⁷ Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection”, 4.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹²⁹ Otto, “Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’”, 106.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

only feminised subjects in need of protection, but also on the construction of “bad” and “evil others” who are simultaneously feminised and racialised.¹³¹

The central point here is how this logic is considered to provide the conditions necessary for taking certain actions.¹³² The claim is, more specifically, that interventions are made “thinkable” through narratives based on gendered and racialised logics.¹³³ In other words, such stories are premised on and reinforce “conventional understandings” of gender, and what it means to be a man and woman.¹³⁴ More specifically, they embody particular “ideas about what it means to be a ‘good woman’ or a ‘good man’”.¹³⁵ The logic of a masculinist protection may on this basis be considered to be linked to a form of hegemonic masculinity that relies on wider gendered logics or ideas for its coherence.¹³⁶ In turn these ideas have an effect on public action through generating certain expectations and legitimising and valorising certain behaviour.¹³⁷ Masculinity, it is claimed, “provide[s] a framework through which war can be rendered both intelligible and acceptable as a social practice and institution”.¹³⁸

Yet, as has been established above, gender is not the only factor that figures as part of this logic. Wider racialised logics, it is argued, are also at play in the creation of a logic of masculinist protection and in justifying humanitarian intervention. Such engagements are arguably dependent on a particular idea of race, and the production of a “racially specific” subject.¹³⁹ Said, for example, draws attention to how western discourse have been permeated by ideas of “bringing civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples”.¹⁴⁰ Crucially, the argument is that this division is enabled by its association with gendered and racial traits, qualities and actions.¹⁴¹ As such, narratives of intervention depend on the division between ‘civilised’ and

¹³¹ Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection”, 13.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 16.

¹³³ Higate, “Men, Masculinity, and Global Insecurity”, 72. See also Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 66 and 90.

¹³⁴ Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, 52-53.

¹³⁵ Zalewski, “Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?”, 354.

¹³⁶ Wilcox, “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive”, 220.

¹³⁷ Zalewski, “Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?”, 354.

¹³⁸ Hutchings, “Making Sense”, 389.

¹³⁹ Razack, *Dark Threats*, 9.

¹⁴⁰ Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, xi.

¹⁴¹ Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 42.

‘uncivilised’ parts of the world.¹⁴² Insecurity is thought to be caused as a result of failed political and economic development.¹⁴³ International intervention thus becomes identified as a way in which this situation can be redeemed.¹⁴⁴ In particular, intervention on the grounds of security concerns is presented as a form of “benign imperialism” and the measures taken are to be viewed as “non-racist technical fixes to failures of governance”.¹⁴⁵

In this way “intervention stories” may be argued to tell a story in which brave and noble-minded men act to bring “progress, democratic values, peace and security”.¹⁴⁶ Importantly Orford points out that “[w]hile those heroes are not human, they are nevertheless imagined as having the characteristics attributed to white men”.¹⁴⁷ This particular story may, more specifically, be argued to be enabled through a reliance on logics of what it means to be a man based on the ideals, values and qualities associated with hegemonic masculinity. Masculinity is thus entrenched within stories of humanitarian intervention.¹⁴⁸ Understanding how humanitarian intervention is made possible, then, is about understanding “how liberators and oppressors, heroes and villains, protagonists and antagonists are constructed”.¹⁴⁹

4.4 Remaking the world

Building on the above, the argument is that exposing how gender is nothing but a “symbolic construct” enables us to undo the dichotomies that structure our understandings of the world and rather focus on the complexities of social reality.¹⁵⁰ More importantly, this also allows for new visions of what the future may hold.¹⁵¹ As Enloe has pointed out, “the world is something that has been made; therefore, it can be remade”.¹⁵² Framing military interventions in terms of a responsibility to protect, and a heroic narrative of protection, thus becomes merely one of

¹⁴² Razack, *Dark Threats*, 10.

¹⁴³ Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 45.

¹⁴⁴ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 697.

¹⁴⁵ Shilliam, “What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us About Development, Security, and the Politics of Race”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 3 (2008), 778-808, 778-779 in Khalid, “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity”, 42.

¹⁴⁶ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 166.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ Lippe, “Images of Victory”, 64.

¹⁵⁰ Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender”, 356-357.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 357.

¹⁵² Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, 17.

the “stories one could choose to tell about the war”.¹⁵³ This furthermore has the implication that other stories could have been possible.

¹⁵³ Zalewski, “Feminist International Relations”, 38.

5 Constructing the intervention

This chapter will answer the question of how the Norwegian intervention in Libya was made possible. The first section will interrogate the dominant way of understanding the identity of Norway within Norwegian discourse. Here, the focus will particularly be on the view that Norway is a peace nation. The second section will engage with the discourse surrounding the intervention more directly. The chapter will be concluded by some reflections on the implications of this kind of discourse. The argument will be that by representing Norway as an especially peaceful state that acts with authority and good intentions, one is able to construct intervention as a natural part of this identity and the practices that follow from it. What is more, the arguments presented by Norwegian politicians before and during the intervention cast Norway as acting in a controlled and rational manner to ensure the protection of civilians. The intervention in Libya thus comes to be seen as a type of humanitarian practice aimed at securing the protection of a population at risk of massive abuses, and as a way of promoting respect for human rights and democracy. The actions taken by Norwegian forces, Gaddafi and his supporters, and the Libyan populations are thereby given meaning through this discourse. More specifically it is argued that gendered and racialised logics operate to assign meaning to the various actors and actions taken in this context. On this basis the claim is that the discourse constructed an image of the world where humanitarian intervention was possible.¹⁵⁴

5.1 Norway as a peace nation

To understand how the intervention in Libya was made possible, it is necessary to situate it within the larger context of Norwegian foreign policy and practices. To be more specific, it should be seen in relation to the understanding of Norway as a peace nation. The view of Norway as a peace nation has its origins in the 1890s,¹⁵⁵ but gained more hold in the 1990s as a result of greater international involvement.¹⁵⁶ The narrative which presents Norway as a peace nation is particularly based on “the idea that Norway has a long-standing tradition of

¹⁵⁴ See Doty, “Foreign Policy”, 304-305.

¹⁵⁵ Leira (ed.) *et al.*, “Norske Selvbilder og Norsk Utenrikspolitikk”, (Oslo: NUPI, 2007) and Leira, “Folket og Freden. Utviklingstrekk i Norsk Fredsdiskurs 1890-2005”, *Internasjonal Politikk* 63, nr. 2-3 (2005), 135-160 in Holm, “Liberale Verdifelleskap”, 60.

¹⁵⁶ Holm, “Liberale Verdifelleskap”, 60.

participation in UN-led peace-keeping activities, conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation, and overseas development aid on a large scale”.¹⁵⁷

This has led to the belief in what some call the Norwegian exceptionalism. Here, Norway is considered as being a state that is well suited for dealing with global challenges, which is particularly linked to the country’s traditions, competence, and standing abroad.¹⁵⁸ A salient feature of Norwegian foreign policy has arguably been the strong focus on peace and reconciliation.¹⁵⁹ This focus is considered to be a result of Norway’s identity as a state based on compassion and solidarity.¹⁶⁰ The view is that Norway does not only have the opportunity to contribute to the creation of peace, but also the abilities and competence necessary to do so.¹⁶¹ Overall this is seen to “[make] Norway capable of offering a considerable contribution to a better world”.¹⁶² The Norwegian foreign policy is as such seen as a way of advancing the stabilisation of a complex world.¹⁶³ Norwegian foreign policy is accordingly aimed at the creation of “well-functioning states” in which both development and peace is secured.¹⁶⁴

Norway has on these grounds been argued to be “a unique and morally superior nation”.¹⁶⁵ What is more, there is a sense of responsibility to use this position to spread values and ideas considered as important.¹⁶⁶ Støre, who held the position as Foreign Minister during the intervention in Libya, for example, has maintained that

“In our times, Norway is a political and economic surplus nation. We have the strength to carry our part of the responsibility for creating a better world. [...] We must visibly show that we take at least our part of the responsibility; that we are going above and beyond what the rest of the world could normally expect. We have the resources to make a difference; we have a political and economic surplus that obligates.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁷ Lippe, “The White Woman”, 25.

¹⁵⁸ Skånland, “Norsk Utenrikspolitikk”, 325.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 321.

¹⁶⁰ Bondevik, Statsministerens nyttårstale årsskiftet 1999/2000 [The Prime Minister’s New Year’s Speech 1999/2000], 2000 in *Ibid.*, 330.

¹⁶¹ Skånland, “Norsk Utenrikspolitikk”, 331.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* My translation.

¹⁶³ Østerud, “Lite Land”, 304. See also Leira (ed.), *Norsk Selvbilder*, 12.

¹⁶⁴ Østerud, “Lite Land”, 312. My translation.

¹⁶⁵ Leira (ed.), *Norsk Selvbilder*, 10. My translation.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Støre, *Å gjøre en forskjell. Refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008), 13, 24 in Leira, “Our Entire People”; 349.

Quite explicitly, then, the Norwegian foreign policy discourse resonates with the broader “idea that the West has a duty/moral obligation to modernize, democratize and develop the global South”.¹⁶⁸

This portrayal is arguably dependent on the creation of an ‘other’ whose identity sets the boundaries and necessary contrast to the Norwegian identity.¹⁶⁹ This means that through the construction of Norway as a peace nation and as a state that acts to secure the rights of the individual, one simultaneously constructs the identity of ‘others’.¹⁷⁰ Norway thereby comes to be seen as “developed” or “advanced” in contrast to the “developing” countries in which it seeks to create stability and increased economic and political development.¹⁷¹ These states are often associated with the lack of democracy and democratic values, violence, conflict, and the denial of basic human rights.¹⁷² In the end, this leads to the claim that the idea of Norway as a peace nation both constructs and depends on a particular identity of both the self and the ‘other’.¹⁷³ These identities may be argued to be created through the differences established by “the notion that “we” know about democracy [and respect democratic values], and “they” do not”.¹⁷⁴ Norway thus seems to become associated with that which is competent, authoritative, but also compassionate and caring, while the states in which it acts is arguably seen as passive, unstable, disorderly and in need of external assistance. On these grounds it may be possible to link the idea of Norway as a peace nation to certain gendered and racialised logics, which serves to place Norway in a position of authority, with the power, skills and qualities necessary to help those in a less favourable position.

5.2 Military intervention in Libya

5.2.1 Continuing the peace tradition

With the above in mind, the focus now turns to the Norwegian intervention in Libya. In fact, the intervention in Libya has been labelled part of “Norwegian peace efforts”.¹⁷⁵ For Leira, the explanation for this apparent contradiction is to be found in the persistent and commonly

¹⁶⁸ O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 535.

¹⁶⁹ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*, 14.

¹⁷⁰ See *Ibid.*, 14-15 and 27.

¹⁷¹ See Mgbeoji, “The Civilised Self”, 857.

¹⁷² See Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*, 38-39.

¹⁷³ See Razack, *Dark Threats*, 9.

¹⁷⁴ See *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁷⁵ Leira, “Our Entire People”, 338.

held idea that Norway is a particularly liberal and peaceful nation.¹⁷⁶ This idea may be argued to have led Norwegian politicians to not question how the bombing in Libya could be reconciled with the image of Norway as a peace nation.¹⁷⁷ Instead, they were considered “two sides of the same coin”.¹⁷⁸ Drawing attention to the consensus among Norwegian political parties, Parliamentary Representative Solberg, for instance, expressed that the stance taken on the situation in Libya is a result of “a good, Norwegian tradition, where Norway has been concerned with the strengthening of human rights, the rights of the individual in the face of national sovereignty, internationally”.¹⁷⁹

Norwegian politicians can in this way refer to the history of a Norwegian state which has taken the position as peace nation as a way of giving support to the immediate discourse surrounding the intervention.¹⁸⁰ In this sense, it may be explained as “part of the background knowledge that is taken to be true”.¹⁸¹ Indeed Norway may be argued to be considered as having the authority, ability and will necessary to shield civilians from the violence exerted on them by Gaddafi’s forces and to bring human rights and democracy to Libya.¹⁸² The intervention can in this light be seen as a humanitarian act.¹⁸³ This line of thinking is clearly expressed in the discourse surrounding the intervention. The supposed motivations for the intervention was expressed clearly by Foreign Minister Støre when addressing the Parliament:

“For us it is a matter of promoting fundamental values we believe in – to ensure the protection of civilians, to aid people in distress, to strengthen the UN and the international legal system as well as supporting central principles of public international law that we, historically, have ourselves fought for”.¹⁸⁴

Arguably, then, the Norwegian efforts in Libya are to be seen as a continuation of the Norwegian peace tradition where the purpose of the use of force is to secure protection and promote human rights and democracy.

¹⁷⁶ Leira, “Our Entire People”, 338.

¹⁷⁷ Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”, 211.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* My translation. See this logic in the context of the war in Afghanistan in Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 74.

¹⁷⁹ Solberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

¹⁸⁰ See Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 700-701.

¹⁸¹ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*, 27.

¹⁸² See this logic in O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 540.

¹⁸³ Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”, 215.

¹⁸⁴ Støre in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

5.2.2 Intervention as protection

In light of the foregoing, it can be claimed that what we are seeing is a type of paternalistic portrayal of the reasons for taking action.¹⁸⁵ Intervention, it appears, is required on ethical grounds for the sake of ensuring protection of civilian lives and respect for human rights and democracy. This in turn serves to justify the use of military interventions.¹⁸⁶ The reliance on human rights and democracy is especially important in this process. This is because the call for respect for human rights and democratic values provides legitimacy for the actions taken by states allegedly seeking to protect them, while it erodes the legitimacy of those states failing to respect them.¹⁸⁷ Action, it is argued, is taken on the basis of ensuring progress and development.¹⁸⁸ It appears that what is needed of the intervening actors is the creation of “order, peace and security”.¹⁸⁹ Humanitarian intervention is presented as a means to this end. Støre held, for example, that “sometimes the use of military force is required as part of an overall effort to prevent assaults and lay the foundation for peace and stability”.¹⁹⁰ Based on this, the claim is that casting humanitarian intervention as an act of protection serves to portray the actions taken as “logical, rational and ethically sound”.¹⁹¹ Hence, intervention appears to be the moral response to the situation one is faced with. Norway, it seems, is acting merely out of a concern for the civilian population in Libya thus taking on the role of a masculine protector.

An “interventionist model of masculinity”¹⁹² is furthermore promoted through the emphasis on the importance to act. Military intervention, it is argued, is made to appear necessary for the sake of dealing with rogue states and cruel dictators.¹⁹³ More concretely, humanitarian intervention seems to be presented as the only available option to “halt the horrors of genocide or ethnic cleansing”.¹⁹⁴ One is consequently left with the question of whether one

¹⁸⁵ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 693.

¹⁸⁶ Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 206.

¹⁸⁷ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 187.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 171.

¹⁸⁹ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 693.

¹⁹⁰ Støre in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

¹⁹¹ Lippe, “Kjønnete Ikoner”, n.p. My translation.

¹⁹² See O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 537.

¹⁹³ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 691.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

should intervene or whether one should refrain from taking any action at all.¹⁹⁵ Taking action, it seems, is preferable to the alternative even if it may cause some damage.¹⁹⁶ Prime Minister Stoltenberg, for example, emphasised that the decision to use force had not been an easy one. He underlines that “there must be a high threshold for the use of military force in international relations”.¹⁹⁷ There are no “perfect possible courses of action”, yet “the clearly worst of all alternatives would be not to act”.¹⁹⁸ Støre also emphasised the options they were faced with, namely that of inaction and following catastrophe, or military action to protect Libyan civilians.¹⁹⁹ In this way, intervention is not merely considered legitimate, but also a moral necessity, as it is perceived to be the only way to ensure the protection of civilians.²⁰⁰

What is more, the appeal to the morality is combined with the rationality of the action.²⁰¹ This rationality is emphasised through the focus on the control and authority exercised by the Norwegian military forces. Stoltenberg held that “we have full control over the use of Norwegian military forces”.²⁰² It is also emphasised that the military command is to be “direct, resolute, clear and competent” in order to effectively carry out the mission.²⁰³ What should be noted here is how the identity of Norway is constructed “in masculinized terms” where the state is associated with qualities like agency, control, rationality.²⁰⁴ Gaddafi, however, was “bomb[ing] away the entire opposition in his own country”.²⁰⁵ This focus portrays Norway as non-aggressive which serves to maintain the idea that the use of force is actually employed to secure protection.²⁰⁶ Norway thus emerges as self-contained, controlled, and authoritative, especially when contrasted with Gaddafi’s brutal use of force.²⁰⁷ What is more, there is a tendency to not address the potential negative effects of our own

¹⁹⁵ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 15.

¹⁹⁶ Tesón, “Collective Humanitarian Intervention”, *Michigan Journal of International Law* 17 (1996), 323–371, 342 in *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Stoltenberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* My translation.

¹⁹⁹ Støre in the Storting, 9 May 2011.

²⁰⁰ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 34. Prime Minister Stoltenberg acknowledges, however, the complexities and dilemmas involved in this decision, see Stoltenberg in the Storting, 23 March 2011.

²⁰¹ Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 206.

²⁰² Stoltenberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation. See also Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 206.

²⁰³ Stoltenberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

²⁰⁴ O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 535.

²⁰⁵ Solberg in the Storting, 16 March 2011. My translation.

²⁰⁶ See Lippe, “Kjønnete Ikoner”, n.p.

²⁰⁷ This point will be further elaborated upon below.

contribution.²⁰⁸ In fact, it appears that the Norwegian contribution is exclusively considered in terms of its potential for saving civilians. Tvedt, for instance, remarks how Støre “did not speak a word of the bombs that killed”, instead the focus was on “the ethical bombs”.²⁰⁹ Støre held that “we are proud of Norwegian pilots who are contributing to preventing new assaults”.²¹⁰ The intervention thus appears “bloodless”.²¹¹ While Norwegian air forces were operating in Libya, through the dropping of bombs, Stoltenberg maintained that “we condemn the use of violence, and demand peaceful solutions through political dialogue and democratic reforms”.²¹² As a consequence, Norwegian violence is erased.²¹³ To the extent that Norwegian use of force is discussed, the focus on the cleanliness and precision of our violence and the brutality of their violence “reassures us of the civility of our society and the barbarity of those others upon whom we have inflicted violence”.²¹⁴ Intervention is in this way presented as being both a moral and rational act.²¹⁵

5.2.3 The need for protection

What is more, in order for Norway to be seen as a protector, there is a need for others to be seen as those who are to be protected.²¹⁶ More specifically, the argument is that while the intervening actors are cast as masculine, and hence male, “the second character, representing the ‘space for and the resistance to’ the actions of the hero, is coded as female”.²¹⁷ It is the states in which intervention takes place, in this case Libya, which take up this secondary role.²¹⁸ The agency of their populations is thereby reduced, with the consequence that they are seen as objects to be acted upon, rather than agents in their own right.²¹⁹ They become mere

²⁰⁸ When addressed, they appear somewhat concealed. Vedum, for example, asserts that “civilians are *affected* by hostilities and the use of weapons”. [My emphasis]. Vedum in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

²⁰⁹ Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”, 212. My translation.

²¹⁰ Støre, 1. mai-tale i Fredrikstad [May 1 Speech in Fredrikstad] (Speech, Fredrikstad, 1 May 2011) in *Ibid.*, 213. My translation.

²¹¹ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 192.

²¹² Stoltenberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

²¹³ See Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 190.

²¹⁴ See *Ibid.*, 191 and 197.

²¹⁵ Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 206.

²¹⁶ Lippe, “Rhetoric of War”, 163.

²¹⁷ Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (1989), 234 in Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 686.

²¹⁸ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 695.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 686. One exception is Svei Grande’s mention of the agreed policy of increased cooperation with peoples in the Middle East. See Svei Grande in the Storting, 29 March 2011. This is however not followed up by any other representatives.

“victims of abuses”.²²⁰ This is enabled by narratives in which these people are cast as helpless, suffering and in need of protection.²²¹ Such a feminisation also appears to have occurred in the context of the intervention in Libya. To the extent that the Libyan population were given agency, they were mainly considered as peaceful protestors.²²² These actors are thus considered to lack legal agency, as the focus is on the capacity of states to act.²²³ According to Skei Grande, “democratic forces are begging on their knees” for action to be taken.²²⁴ It appears as though the Libyan population wanted action to be taken in this particular form. They are not subordinated in the sense that forceful measures are imposed upon them against their will.²²⁵ Instead, their interests are seemingly secured through the actions of the intervenor. They are perceived to allow the intervenor to make the decisions as this ensures their protection and security.²²⁶

The intervenor may, in this way, be considered to have both agency and creativity, and will use these skills to bring about change for those unable to do this themselves.²²⁷ The argument made by Norwegian politicians was that if the democratic movement in Libya “is to have any hope of succeeding, they must at least experience an international community that loudly and clearly stands up for them”.²²⁸ It was furthermore asserted that if we do not come to their aid, we may “risk that these democratic processes stop out of fear for a lack of help from democratic countries”.²²⁹ The focus remains on the protection of the Libyan population which leaves them as feminised subjects in need of rescue.²³⁰ Although their agency is recognised in terms of the Arab Spring and the protests against the regime, these actors are not portrayed as decision-makers or as having any role or involvement in deciding what the measures to stop the potential violence should be.²³¹ The need for intervention is thus grounded in the

²²⁰ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 696.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 697.

²²² Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 197. Lippe also points out that this was a misleading portrayal considering the groups involved.

²²³ Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 171.

²²⁴ Skei Grande in the Storting, 16 March 2011. My translation.

²²⁵ Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection”, 5.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 686.

²²⁸ Jensen in the Storting, 16 March 2011. My translation.

²²⁹ *Ibid.* My translation.

²³⁰ See Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 201.

²³¹ See *Ibid.*

“suffering and passivity” of victims “and their dependence on external benefactors”.²³² The essence of the Norwegian position is fittingly summed up in the statement by Parliamentary Representative Eriksen: “It is not the West that is invading an Arab country, but an Arab civilian population that is receiving protection and support from an outside world acting in solidarity”.²³³

The intervention in Libya also relied on a particular representation of the Libyan government. Orford, for instance, has made the claim that the governments of states in which intervention takes place come to be seen as having only limited and deviant agency.²³⁴ These actors are subordinated through their association with inferior gendered and racialised traits.²³⁵ They become associated with that which is “irrational, disorderly, unpredictable, lacking self-control, and economically and politically incompetent”.²³⁶ This also resonates with the portrayal of Gaddafi and his supporters in Libya. It was asserted that “the authorities met the citizens’ peaceful demonstrations with ruthless, brutal violence”.²³⁷ Seen in this way, their violence is unreasonable and uncontrollable. Their identity is moreover established in opposition to that of the Norwegian forces. Where Gaddafi and his supporters are seen as violent and barbarian, Norway is considered controlled and rational.²³⁸ They thus come to be represented through a subordinate form of masculinity.²³⁹ The situation in Libya, and in the Arab world more generally, is furthermore considered a consequence of a “poor Arab ruling tradition”.²⁴⁰ It was argued that “the countries in the region are different, but they share problems related to authoritarian systems of government, widespread corruption, nepotism, large social differences and violations of human rights”.²⁴¹ On this basis, it may be argued that

²³² Cunliffe, “The Doctrine”, 479. Instead, the Norwegian politicians choose to focus their attention on the will of the Arab League and the African Union, as well as Libya’s neighbouring countries, who were as such allowed to speak for the Libyan population. See the arguments presented by Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 205.

²³³ Eriksen in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

²³⁴ Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 695.

²³⁵ See Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 177 for a similar logic.

²³⁶ Peterson, “Gendered Identities”, 21.

²³⁷ Støre in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

²³⁸ See this logic in O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 538.

²³⁹ Coleman, “The Gendered Violence of Development: Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9, no. 2 (2007): 204–229, 210 in *Ibid.*, 541.

²⁴⁰ Hjemdal in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

²⁴¹ Støre in the Storting, 9 May 2011. My translation.

they are seen as “deviant”, “threatening” and in need of “correction by the West”.²⁴² Stoltenberg, for example, asserted that

“the world was witnessing an authoritarian ruler that met peaceful protests with live ammunition and heavy artillery. (...) Colonel Gaddafi expressed clearly that his intention was to crush the opposition, and that there would be no mercy. (...) The Security Council resolution and the resolute use of force likely prevented massive assaults on civilians”.²⁴³

In this way, intervention could take place on the basis of the claim that it was necessary to control the violence exerted by Gaddafi on the country’s population and ensure their protection.

5.3 Concluding thoughts: Intervention made possible

Overall, the point to be made here is that the way in which the intervention was constructed in the Norwegian context may be argued to have depended on a logic similar to what Young describes as the logic of masculinist protection, in which Norway takes up the position of a masculine character coming to the aid of a feminised victim.²⁴⁴ In other words, the possibility of the Norwegian intervention arguably depended “on the unspoken construction of feminine vulnerability and a narrative of masculine rescue”.²⁴⁵ In this context the argument is that intervention stories function through “learned assumptions about value based on old stereotypes of gender, [and] race”.²⁴⁶ As such, they will resonate with how people commonly understand and engage with the world in which they live.²⁴⁷ Gendered and racialised logics may thus be argued to assign meaning to actors and actions, and thereby make some realities possible according to the meaning established within the discourse.

If the above analysis not fully explains, it may at least indicate how the intervention in Libya was made possible. The war was, arguably, reduced to a war “between democracy and dictatorship and where the bombing was to save lives and promote human rights”.²⁴⁸ Norway and its allies were presented as participating in the war on the basis of the promotion of

²⁴² O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 538.

²⁴³ Stoltenberg in the Storting, 29 March 2011. My translation.

²⁴⁴ For this point, see the theoretical framework.

²⁴⁵ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 201.

²⁴⁶ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 11.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”, 210. My translation. Note however that Tvedt does not consider these arguments to relate to racism or orientalism, see *Ibid.*, 215.

human rights and democracy.²⁴⁹ Gaddafi and his supporters, however, were presented as “those who wanted to slaughter the population and maintain the dictatorship”.²⁵⁰ In other words, Gaddafi appeared evil.²⁵¹ Turning back to the research question, this explains how the discourse surrounding the intervention created the image of a world in which such an intervention was made to appear desirable and a necessary course of action.²⁵² Ultimately, the argument goes, humanitarian intervention in Libya was made possible.

²⁴⁹ Tvedt, “Tausheten om Libya”, 210.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.* My translation.

²⁵¹ Holm, “Liberale Verdifelleskap”, 61.

²⁵² Doty, “Foreign Policy”, 316; Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 682 and 691.

6 Deconstructing the narrative

This chapter will deal with the implications of framing the world in this way. It will answer the question of how the gendered and racialised logics underlying the discourse of protection impacted on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace. Firstly, it will establish how the intervention in Libya was evaluated. This examination will reveal that rather than assessing the use of force in itself, the evaluation had the aim of improving future Norwegian military employments. The chapter will then address how the logics underlying the Norwegian discourse may be argued to naturalise the use of force. It will argue that to create a world in which the use of force is not possible as a means for ensuring peace and security, there is a need to undo the hierarchical ordering of the binary logics that have constrained our way of thinking and thus the possibilities we consider available to us. Against this background new ways of thinking about the world and how we engage with each other may emerge as possible. To illustrate it will consider the alternatives that might replace the use of force if we rework these logics and seriously commit to a world in which we are open to previously excluded perspectives. This includes an idea of feminist peace based on emancipation and the struggle for justice. It moreover includes feminist methods of listening so as to allow marginalised perspectives to speak for themselves. Lastly, it will conclude by examining whether an approach based on the idea of feminist peace can be reconciled with or promoted through any existing legal mechanisms within international relations.

6.1 Lessons learnt?

Not only the initial responses to and justifications for the intervention are important for understanding how the use of force is conceptualised within the Norwegian discourse. The evaluation of the Norwegian efforts also deserves some consideration.

Violence and insecurity is today, nine years after the intervention, still very much present within Libya.²⁵³ It has been established that the war resulted in “political and economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime weapons across the region and the growth of ISIL in North Africa”.²⁵⁴ The war furthermore had enormous human costs, causing

²⁵³ Higate, “Men, Masculinity, and Global Insecurity”, 72.

²⁵⁴ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Libya*, 3. See also Tvedt, “Libya-krigen”, 27.

destruction of life and infrastructure, as well as increased poverty and insecurity.²⁵⁵ Norwegian forces were responsible for 588 bombs, constituting 10 percent of the total amount of bombs dropped.²⁵⁶ Despite these devastating consequences, it appears that Norway still endorses the concept of humanitarian intervention. In the official evaluation report on the Norwegian contribution in Libya delivered by the Petersen committee in 2018, for instance, the focus remained solely on questions of law and the legality of the actions taken,²⁵⁷ rather than on a critical interrogation of the very idea of humanitarian intervention itself.²⁵⁸ Nowhere is the actual use of military force questioned, or the consequences of the Norwegian actions analysed.²⁵⁹ In fact, the committee explicitly asserts that “the development in Libya has clearly not gone in the right direction after the end of the military intervention in 2011”, but that “an evaluation of the extent to which this was caused by the military operations Norway contributed to, is outside the committee’s mandate”.²⁶⁰ Instead the aim of the official evaluation report was arguably to learn from the intervention in order to improve future contributions to international operations.²⁶¹ Tvedt has maintained that this is a severely narrow mandate, as it entails discussing “future military operations as a permanent part of Norwegian foreign policy with the war in Libya as a positive backdrop”.²⁶² This is significant because it signals Norway’s continued belief in the use of force.²⁶³ Indeed, in response to debates surrounding the conformity of participation in international operations with

²⁵⁵ Tunander, “Den “Humanitære Krigen””, 173-174.

²⁵⁶ Østerud, “Libya-krigen”, 158.

²⁵⁷ The focus areas of the report are the national decision-making process, the adherence to constitutional law, public international law and international humanitarian law, national control in the conduct of operations, and the political effort in Libya, see Petersen *et al.*, *Evaluering*, for example page 11 and 171. The conclusions largely found the Norwegian effort to be in accordance with the relevant law, see Østerud, “Libya-krigen”, 162-163. The result of this legal focus is arguably that the “political and moral responsibility for the war’s brutality and consequences” is removed, see Tvedt, “Det Politiske Lederskapet”. My translation. Indeed, the report seems to take for granted that the intervention was aimed at the protection of civilians. This a position that has been heavily criticised, see Tunander, “Den “Humanitære Krigen””, 171.

²⁵⁸ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 199. See also Tvedt, “Det Politiske Lederskapet”. See the mandate in Petersen *et al.*, *Evaluering*, 15. The report also evaluated the political/civilian efforts, although alongside the military component.

²⁵⁹ See Tunander, “Den “Humanitære Krigen””, 173.

²⁶⁰ Petersen *et al.*, *Evaluering*, 168.

²⁶¹ See *Ibid.*, for example page 11 and 171.

²⁶² Tvedt, “Det Politiske Lederskapet”. My translation.

²⁶³ Interestingly, this development does not seem to be in line with the increased focus on prevention and peaceful measures within the doctrine of responsibility to protect in the UN Secretary-General reports. See the discussion on prevention below.

Norwegian constitutional law, the Petersen committee suggests constitutional reform in order to “create a clearer and more predictable framework for the use of the Armed Forces outside the country’s borders”.²⁶⁴ The continued belief in military power is also evident in the debates in the Norwegian Parliament in response to the evaluations made by the committee.²⁶⁵ Overall then, it can be argued that the challenges and potential problematic aspects of using military force in a humanitarian context was largely disregarded in the Norwegian evaluation efforts.²⁶⁶ What is missing is a critical examination of “the usefulness of a military intervention in resolving complex emergency situations (...) or the gendered model that humanitarian interventions deploy”.²⁶⁷ In light of this, the remaining part of this chapter will discuss the implications of relying on gendered and racialised logics and explore some alternative possibilities that have been excluded as a result, but which may serve as alternative visions for new futures.

6.2 The naturalisation of violence

As can be seen from the above, Norway may be argued to take the use of force for granted in their foreign policy. This may be explained by the claim that the use of force is intrinsically linked to the privileging of certain forms of masculinity in the structuring of our understandings of the world. The argument is that the narratives employed to justify the use of force, like the Norwegian narrative of protection with regards to Libya, build on highly “gendered accounts of the value of military intervention in international affairs that limit the possible responses to atrocities”.²⁶⁸ The claim is, on this basis, that the portrayal of the reasons for taking action and the ways in which action is to be taken, “makes it appear a logical, strong and appropriate response to violence”.²⁶⁹ The result is, as the thesis has argued, that the actions taken by Norway, namely military operations in the name of humanitarian intervention, are cast as essential to bring about the protection of civilians and the conditions

²⁶⁴ Petersen *et al.*, *Evaluering*, 95. My translation.

²⁶⁵ See the statements in the Storting, 8 January 2019 and 2 April 2019. An exception here is Moxnes from the Red Party, who refers to the argument that the Norwegian actions in Libya were “particularly violent, destructive and deadly”. Moxnes in The Storting, 2 April 2019. My translation. But this can hardly be taken to be representative of the general discourse.

²⁶⁶ See the comments made by Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 199. See also Tvedt, “Det Politiske Lederskapet”.

²⁶⁷ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 199.

²⁶⁸ See Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 233 on the responsibility to protect.

²⁶⁹ See *Ibid.*, 248. Speaking on the responsibility to protect doctrine more broadly, but in the context of the use of military force.

necessary to ensure the flourishing of human rights and democracy.²⁷⁰ By framing the intervention in these terms, there is a failure to consider how the violence employed by the intervening actors themselves may be just as detrimental to the lives of civilians as the violence employed by those seen as ‘other’.²⁷¹ After all, humanitarian intervention is nothing more than “forceful military intervention primarily justified with humanitarian reasons”.²⁷² Intervention is, however, made to appear as a tool for defending the lives of civilians and important values.

An essential element in these logics is, as has been shown in the analysis, the protection of important values like human rights and democracy. Lippe,²⁷³ for instance, has pointed out how intricate ideas and concepts become co-opted to ensure the upholding of particular systems of power.²⁷⁴ Co-optation is in this context taken to mean a practice where certain concepts are used in conjunction with a particular agenda to the extent that their meaning becomes neutralised.²⁷⁵ In particular, the worry is that by using the language of human rights and democracy in the context of military intervention, these concepts “become enmeshed within frameworks that discipline them to specific causes; causes which have effects that are centred upon violence and exclusion”.²⁷⁶ This means that, through the employment of gendered and racialised logics, “human rights and democratic claims may operate to legitimise (...) military projects and actions that are less clearly humanitarian in effect”.²⁷⁷ The resulting view is that human rights and democracy are secured, even promoted through the use of force.

Building on the above, it is argued that the gendered and racialised logics that underlie these narratives enable the use of force to be seen as “the norm” for ensuring the protection of

²⁷⁰ See the arguments on the international community more broadly in Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 248 and Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 694.

²⁷¹ See Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 248 giving the example of the effect of military operations on women’s inequality and oppression.

²⁷² See Engle, ““Calling in the Troops””, 189.

²⁷³ Although Lippe is writing primarily with regards to feminist language and ideas, the thesis will use her insights to discuss co-optation in other contexts.

²⁷⁴ Lippe, “The White Woman”, 24.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ See Orford, “Locating the International”, 484.

human rights and democracy in situations of perceived emergency.²⁷⁸ What is more, this portrayal enables, as has been seen in the foregoing analysis, the view that the options one has is either action, in the form of military intervention, or inaction.²⁷⁹ This furthermore has the implication that actions taken without the use of military force come to be seen as a form of inaction.²⁸⁰ Importantly the argument is that when politicians present the options of doing something or doing nothing, there is “no room for interrogation of why the ‘something’ must be bombing from 20,000 feet, or indeed why the ‘something’ must inevitably involve the use of force”.²⁸¹ Overall, the worry seems to be that the logic underlying humanitarian intervention favours military means over other policy options.²⁸² By relying on these kinds of logics, “[a]lternative ‘tactile’ and ‘empathetic’ forms of interventionism (...) were marginalized”.²⁸³

The explanation for this marginalisation may be found in the association of such policies with features and values perceived as feminine.²⁸⁴ This in turn may be seen as excluding ways of engaging with the world that may be better fitted to serve the needs of individuals and the societies in which they live.²⁸⁵ This may be explained by the way in which gendered logics restrict our thinking. Because the discourse is premised on a dichotomous structuring of the world, in which the term associated with masculinity is privileged over that associated with femininity, those aspects of social reality seen as feminine, will be marginalised.²⁸⁶ Cohn, for example, has argued that “[c]ertain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and are devalued”.²⁸⁷ Alternatives to military intervention, will consequently be “both difficult to say and difficult

²⁷⁸ See Engle, “‘Calling in the Troops’”, 190.

²⁷⁹ See Orford, “Locating the International”, 444; Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 15; Charlesworth, “International Law”, 387. See also Tvedt’s analysis of the apparent choice between action and inaction in the context of the Norwegian evaluation efforts. Tvedt, “Libya-krigen”, 36.

²⁸⁰ Engle, “‘Calling in the Troops’”, 224.

²⁸¹ Charlesworth, “International Law”, 387. Referring to an argument made by Tony Blair in the context of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

²⁸² Amar, “Global South”, 3. Amar suggests for example “mechanisms of entitlement or redistribution”.

²⁸³ Sylvester, “The Art of War/the War Question in (Feminist) IR”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (2005), 855–87, in O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 543.

²⁸⁴ O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 543; Charlesworth, “International Law”, 390.

²⁸⁵ O’Reilly, “Muscular Interventionism”, 543.

²⁸⁶ Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods”, 382.

²⁸⁷ Cohn, “War, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War”, in *Gendering War Talk*, Cooke and Woollacott (eds.), (1993), 227, 231 in *Ibid.*

to hear”.²⁸⁸ The problem is that the “oppositional structure” upon which these gendered logics are built “constrains our thought and therefore action by presenting only two mutually exclusive choices, as if these exhausted the possibilities”.²⁸⁹ As a result, “we lose sight of alternative, nonoppositional constructions”.²⁹⁰ In the context of Libya, it appeared, through the discourse, that Norwegian politicians had to choose between military intervention or simply doing nothing.

This brings us to the consequences of constructing the intervention narrative according to these logics. The problem is, arguably, that the focus on military force as a form of humanitarianism has restricted the potential for social justice.²⁹¹ This is it because it moves the focus to the immediate circumstances of a crisis, portrayed in a very particular way, without a regard to the broader context in which it takes place.²⁹² Moving forward, the argument is that the focus on Gaddafi’s potential for violence “presented us with an oversimplified and decontextualized explanation” for the intervention.²⁹³ Building on the insights of Charlesworth, we see how the challenges faced by Libyan people “before, during, and after the crisis” have been widely neglected outside the immediate context of the potential genocidal violence on part of Gaddafi and his supporters.²⁹⁴ A consequence is that attention is steered away from what may have been the reasons for the political situation in Libya at the time.²⁹⁵ The “why and how” of Libya was neglected.²⁹⁶ This furthermore has the consequence of making us “blind to the actual causes of this violence, its systemic aspects”.²⁹⁷

Overall, then, it may be argued that the reliance on gendered logics within these discourses “degrades our ability to think well and fully about” about security issues because it “shapes

²⁸⁸ See the reasoning provided in Charlesworth, “Feminist Methods”, 382.

²⁸⁹ Peterson and True, ““New Times””, 19.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 247.

²⁹² See *Ibid.*; Orford, “Muscular Humanitarianism”, 692; Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 122; Razack, *Dark Threats*, 47.

²⁹³ Hudson, “Gendercidal Violence”, 113.

²⁹⁴ Charlesworth, “International Law”, 389. Writing in the context of the silencing of women in Kuwait.

²⁹⁵ See the argumentation in *Ibid.*, 384.

²⁹⁶ See *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Žižek cited in Oksala, “Violence and Neoliberal Governmentality”, *Constellations*, 18, no 3. (2011), 475 in Hudson, “Gendercidal Violence”, 112.

and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations”.²⁹⁸ This has the consequence of setting aside other conflict resolution mechanisms.²⁹⁹ In order to allow for alternatives, then, there is a need to deconstruct and overturn the operations of power involved in making certain actions possible.³⁰⁰

6.3 Undoing the hierarchy

As the analysis above has shown, the gendered logics operating within the discourse can be argued to have functioned to “frame interpretive possibilities, create meanings, and thereby naturalize a particular state of affairs”.³⁰¹ The consequence of portraying intervention in these terms is that it makes the use of force seem desirable, while pacific means for responding to crisis are seen as inadequate to respond to the situation one is faced with.³⁰² Moving beyond the use of force in the pursuit of security and peace will therefore require us to reconsider the way in which gender operates to accord value to actors and actions based on their resonance with various forms of femininities and masculinities and thus impacts on how we make sense of the world around us.

An approach to be adopted may be to recognise gender as a social construction, expose and unsettle the hierarchies of contemporary gender relations, and in this way understand gender as “open to infinite possibilities beyond the relentless dualisms that have been naturalised by so many laws and practices”.³⁰³ This means that rather than merely changing the value accorded to the terms of a binary opposition, we must nuance their relationship.³⁰⁴ We should strive towards “democratic gender relations” where emphasis is placed on “equality, nonviolence and mutual respect”.³⁰⁵ Hudson, for instance, argues for an approach that

²⁹⁸ Cohn, "Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War," in *Gendering War Talk*, Cooke and Woollacott (eds.), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 232 in Blanchard, "Rethinking International Security", 61, in the context of national security.

²⁹⁹ Heathcote, "Justifying Force", 17.

³⁰⁰ Peterson, "Gendered Identities", 20.

³⁰¹ Doty, "Foreign Policy", 314.

³⁰² Heathcote, "Humanitarian Intervention", 201.

³⁰³ Otto, "Disconcerting "Masculinities": Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law", in Buss and Manji, *International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches*, (Hart, 2005), 124 in Heathcote, "Justifying Force", 195.

³⁰⁴ Confortini, "Galtung, Violence, and Gender", 346.

³⁰⁵ Tickner, "Feminist Perspectives", 342.

“acknowledge[s] the terrains of mutuality rather than difference”.³⁰⁶ In order to ensure true security, *the hierarchies* associated with gender must, however, be deconstructed and discarded.³⁰⁷ Violence/peace, protector/protected, barbaric/civilised and other binaries will in that way no longer be seen as fixed or as absolute.³⁰⁸ Instead, the focus turns to “continuities, complexities, and contestations when looking at social phenomena and social relations”.³⁰⁹ One is thus able to create new ways of understanding the world and the possible actions to be taken within it.³¹⁰ This means that we must challenge the ways in which dominant assumptions about masculinities and femininities are currently affecting our understandings of events and actions, the identities assigned to various actors, and the ways in which we engage with the world.³¹¹ As such, it allows us to engage with how we understand security and peace. That is to say, it allows us to engage with how these issues could have been conceptualised outside a discourse structured by gendered and racialised logics that favour the use of force.

6.4 Seeking alternatives

6.4.1 A feminist peace

Moving forward there is a need for exploring the possibilities for security and peace outside the framework of humanitarian intervention. This thesis proposes instead their pursuit through an approach based on an idea of a feminist peace. Such an approach would understand violence as encompassing a broad range of practices.³¹² This includes not only physical violence, as that so clearly being employed in the intervention in Libya, but also structural violence and gender oppression more widely.³¹³ The claim is that the conditions for peace and security will never be truly fulfilled unless one engages with and challenges power relations more broadly. This is because militarisation is only a part of a broader system of domination, which influences the lives of women, and men, in multiple and intersecting ways.³¹⁴ In this

³⁰⁶ Hudson, “Gendericidal Violence”, 116.

³⁰⁷ Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 30 in Mehta and Wibben, “Feminist Narrative Approaches”, 48. This includes also hierarchies of race and class.

³⁰⁸ Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender”, 356-357.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 357.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Enloe, “Feminist Thinking”, 544.

³¹² Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives”, 346.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ Enloe, “Feminist Thinking”, 538 and 539.

sense, pursuing peace and security for all may be understood as entailing “a struggle for justice”.³¹⁵

This pursuit of social justice may take the form of emancipation.³¹⁶ Emancipation is understood as a process of removing the “structural barriers which create situations of insecurity for individuals”.³¹⁷ In this way, Norway should turn its attention to everyday violence, in the sense of “issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life”.³¹⁸ Here, security for individuals and the communities in which they live would entail eradicating violence and pursuing greater economic and social justice.³¹⁹ The objectives sought are “substantive democracy, social justice, empowerment of women, racial harmony, and the end of poverty” and “the protection and promotion of human rights”.³²⁰ In turn this focus would allow us to reconsider the use of military force as a response to humanitarian issues.³²¹ Surely, “[m]ilitary intervention is an inappropriate mechanism if the causes of insecurity are poverty, discrimination and violence protected by structures within the state”.³²² Rather, a feminist peace entails the creation of an environment of respect for human life and dignity across societies.³²³ In this understanding of peace, the use of force, even in the form of humanitarian intervention, appears unreasonable.³²⁴ If we are to arrive at these ends, the implication is that Norway should encourage an approach to international relations that relies less on the use of force,³²⁵ and more on the achievement of justice.

Building on this, it can be argued that it might not be the ideals that we proclaim to be protecting when engaging in humanitarian intervention that should be rejected.³²⁶ It is rather the way in which these concepts have been used within the discourse that is problematic. The

³¹⁵ Tickner, “Feminist Perspectives”, 347.

³¹⁶ Confortini, “Feminist Peace Research as Prefiguration”, 88. This is as mentioned in the theoretical framework a central feminist goal.

³¹⁷ Hudson, “Inhabitants of Interstices?”, 37.

³¹⁸ Charlesworth, “International Law”, 391.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Orford, “Locating the International”, 485.

³²¹ Charlesworth, “International Law”, 391.

³²² *Ibid.*, 391-392.

³²³ Otto, “Women, Peace, and Security”, 107.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

³²⁵ See Orford, “Locating the International”, 485.

³²⁶ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 219.

argument is that by placing the concepts of human rights and democracy in the context of humanitarian intervention, one removes “the radical potential of human rights to subvert the established order of things”.³²⁷ The fact that these concepts may have different meanings is disguised.³²⁸ The inclusion of human rights and democracy into a framework of humanitarian intervention may on these grounds be argued to have had profound implications for the way in which we understand these concepts and how to best protect them. We must therefore rethink what these ideals entail.³²⁹ In the end, this may contribute to opening up our imaginations to other ways of engaging with them that do not entail the use of force.³³⁰ Contrary to how human rights and democracy was understood in the Norwegian discourse, these concepts may actually be argued to be incompatible with the use of force. Turning to the idea of a feminist peace, for instance, reveals how these concepts may be seen to demand increased public participation and the promotion of social justice, of which the respect for and fulfilment of human rights are a large part. Here democracy could be conceived of as “the furtherance of broad popular empowerment with respect to the full range of social decisions that condition life in society”.³³¹ Clearly, this would give different results than military interventions.

What is more, rather than seeing peace as an end in itself, it has been suggested that peace should be understood “as dynamic” and as “constantly in the making, a process laying the foundations for relationships of mutuality within “multiple worlds””.³³² This process would moreover be respectful of and take into consideration the various insights offered by marginalised groups and individuals.³³³ The main objective of a feminist peace would therefore be to promote increased engagement with diverse ways of understanding and being

³²⁷ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 201.

³²⁸ Orford, "Locating the International", 462.

³²⁹ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 219.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ Roth, *Evaluating Democratic Progress: A Normative Theoretical Perspective*, *Ethics & Int'l Aff* 9 (1995), 55, at 56 in Orford, "Locating the International", 462. Being mindful of critiques of the overall concept of democracy, see *Ibid.*, 463.

³³² Vellacott, "Dynamic Peace and the Practicality of Pacifism", in *Patterns of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, Fisk and Schellenberg (eds.), 202–205 (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008) and Ling, *The Dao of World Politics: Toward a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2014) in Wibben *et al.*, "Collective Discussion", 87. What is more, the pursuit of peace does not mean that there will be no conflict, but that conflicts will be dealt with through non-violence, see Wibben, "Toward a Pedagogy", 102.

³³³ Otto, "Women, Peace, and Security", 115.

positioned in the world, and learning from this.³³⁴ As a whole, the idea of a feminist peace may thus be seen as requiring emancipation, in the sense of pursuing social justice and human rights, fighting violence and domination in all its forms, and ensuring respect for diverse perspectives and ways of life. Only then will conditions of peace and security truly be possible.

6.4.2 Alternative visions, new futures

It is clear from the above that increased engagement with alternative ways of understanding the world is crucial for the pursuit of peace and security. The problem is, however, that the way in which the events in Libya and the actors involved in the intervention was constructed did not only serve to make the intervention itself possible, but also excluded the possibility of listening to alternative voices. In fact, an implication of this way of framing the use of force is that it impacts on the scope of action available to the people targeted for protection.³³⁵ The feminisation of the Libyan population served to “[distance] the act of force from the group the force is proposed to protect”.³³⁶ The Norwegian politicians, as the “speaking subjects” came to “speak on behalf of and in place of” Libyans, with the consequence of “erasing more or less the[ir] subjectivity”.³³⁷ As a consequence, any real consideration of their lives based on their own perspectives was prohibited.³³⁸

The focus should thus be moved to “advocating strategies for working in concert” so as to create policies that are attentive to difference and the varying needs that people may have.³³⁹ This work should be built on the recognition that the people affected by humanitarian crises may have different understandings of the situation and consequently different priorities and needs arising from it.³⁴⁰ Decisions on security issues need to be built on a process in which various groups have been able to “articulate, theorize, and politicize their own interests”.³⁴¹

³³⁴ Hudson, “Inhabitants of Interstices?”, 29.

³³⁵ See also Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 211.

³³⁶ See Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 171.

³³⁷ See Lippe, “Rhetoric of War”, 155 in the context of women’s agency.

³³⁸ Lippe, “Beskyttelse”, 210-211.

³³⁹ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 200.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ Orford, “The Politics of Collective Security”, 391-392. This approach is more similar to the Document no. 8 proposal mentioned by Skei Grande in the debate on Libya. Skei Grande in the Storting, 29 March 2011. See also the Storting, 2 June 2006 and Document no. 8: 36 Proposal.

This entails treating them as agents, rather than merely as victims.³⁴² In this regard, Heathcote explains that changing the way in which we approach security issues “is by no means a simple task; this is a politics of “the everyday” that relies on a politics of seeing, hearing, listening, and asking women and peripheral subjects to be full participants in our reimaginings of global relationships, actions, and institutions”.³⁴³ Norway’s peace policies would thus benefit from an engagement with feminist techniques in which new subjects are given room to speak and be heard.³⁴⁴ This does, however, not entail that there exists one single answer as to what peace *really* entails.³⁴⁵ The point is not to “uncover universal truths”, but to make way for “openness, plurality, diversity and difference”.³⁴⁶

6.5 Exploring established mechanisms

6.5.1 The responsibility to protect: A move to prevention?

It is not completely clear from the above what this entails in terms of more specific policy measures. This leads to the question of whether any solutions may be found within already existing legal mechanisms. Especially relevant is the preventative aspect of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. Is it possible that the situation in Libya could have been better dealt with through an earlier engagement consisting of prevention and assistance to the state in providing protection?

The responsibility to protect concept may appear to offer a generous commitment to the principle of non-violence through its focus on prevention.³⁴⁷ In the 2019 report on the responsibility to protect by the Secretary-General, for example, preventative measures were underlined as a vital part of the effort to protect against mass atrocities.³⁴⁸ While placing the primary responsibility for protection on the state itself,³⁴⁹ the report also establishes key

³⁴² Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender”, 349.

³⁴³ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 208.

³⁴⁴ Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 235. Heathcote gives the examples of engaging peripheral subjects, multicultural conversations/world travelling, and seeing law as a narrative.

³⁴⁵ See Confortini, “Feminist Peace Research as Prefiguration”, 88.

³⁴⁶ Steans, *Gender and International Relations*, 17 on poststructuralist feminism. Although the thesis is not applying a poststructuralist perspective, it sympathises with many of its core tenets.

³⁴⁷ Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 240.

³⁴⁸ In the reports by the UN Secretary-General, prevention has increasingly been emphasised as key to the doctrine. See in particular United Nations Secretary-General, *Responsibility to Protect*.

³⁴⁹ See for instance *Ibid.*, para 6 and 15. Underlining especially the need to reduce inequalities and exclusion, and ensure respect for diversity and a flourishing civil society, see *Ibid.*, para 16.a-e.

measures to be taken by the international community. Part of these prevention efforts include an increased focus on early action, through negotiation and mediation and supporting civil society organisations and grassroots prevention initiatives in creating dialogue and establishing trust within communities.³⁵⁰ It is furthermore recognised that local communities “are the first line of prevention and are best placed to stop the seed of violence escalating”.³⁵¹ As such, it may be seen to resonate with feminist ideas of security.³⁵² Upon a closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that it falls short of providing the means for a more just pursuit of peaceful conditions.³⁵³ The report suggests, for instance, that if negotiation efforts fail, direct action may be required. Although such direct action also consists of non-forcible measures, peacekeeping is suggested as “among the most direct ways in which the Organization [the UN] prevents atrocity crimes”.³⁵⁴ This is problematic because, as Whitworth has asserted, “the introduction of peacekeeping forces” in some instances “*increase[s]* some local people’s insecurity rather than *alleviate[s]* it”.³⁵⁵ A further criticism is that by privileging “occasional outbreaks of particular forms of public violence”, the doctrine fails to take into account the range of harms that actually affect the lives of people.³⁵⁶ This is especially apparent if we think about the violence faced by many women. The concept places emphasis on state violence, yet the reality is that most women face great insecurity not only in relation to the state, but also within their families or communities.³⁵⁷ What is more, the doctrine emphasises the functioning of the institutions within the state itself which has the effect of removing the responsibility that might be best borne by international institutions and actors acting in the name of the international community.³⁵⁸ In this regard it has been claimed that the doctrine reduces great «social, economic and political problems to technical and administrative questions of institutional governance”.³⁵⁹ Through its focus on crisis, the doctrine can also be argued to steer the focus away from wider political issues, and in this

³⁵⁰ See United Nations Secretary-General, *Responsibility to Protect*, para 21-22 and 25.a-e.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para 24.

³⁵² Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 240.

³⁵³ See *Ibid.*

³⁵⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, *Responsibility to Protect*, para 23.a-d.

³⁵⁵ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping*, 12. See also the link between the protection of civilians and expanded justifications for the use of force in peacekeeping operations in Heathcote, “Women and Children”, especially page 3.

³⁵⁶ Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 243.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 242.

³⁵⁸ Chandler, “The Paradox”, 132 and 134.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

way further strengthen the hold of current power structures.³⁶⁰ As Cunliffe has established: “a recurrent demand for imminent action in response to emergencies helps obviate the need to justify existing political arrangements in the international order”.³⁶¹ The doctrine may for these reasons be argued to be unable to address the various causes of insecurity and crises that impact on the lives of individuals.

Another issue is that the responsibility to protect doctrine remains focused on the expertise of external actors, which often “involves top-down intervention, with little emphasis on empowering local people, particularly women”.³⁶² Again, gendered logics are present in this doctrine. Here, “[t]he international community is positioned as the ultimate guarantor of stability and peace”.³⁶³ The claim is that the doctrine favours a specific type of institutional response in which power is removed from civilian populations and placed in the hands of states acting on the international level.³⁶⁴ As such, the doctrine may be argued to take a top down approach to the issue of protection. In fact, while the doctrine is concerned with the protection of civilians, “it does not propose to vest the power to decide what protection requires with the people, or at least not immediately”.³⁶⁵ Instead, this power is given to the international community and the states acting in its name.³⁶⁶ Referring to the increased focus on local prevention initiatives mentioned above, the claim is that the main authority still remains with the international community.³⁶⁷ It is the international community that decides when actions are required and what this entails in a certain context.³⁶⁸ As a consequence, the doctrine seems to be much more about attempting “to legitimise authority through appeals to protection” rather than about “bring[ing] into being a global civil society to ensure that universal rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all of humanity”.³⁶⁹ There thus seems to be a need to move beyond this doctrine, so as to build new ways of engaging with these issues.

³⁶⁰ Cunliffe, “The Doctrine”, 477.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² Charlesworth, “Feminist Reflections”, 244.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 248.

³⁶⁴ See Orford, “From Promise to Practice”, 422.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 422-423.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 423.

³⁶⁷ United Nations Secretary-General, *Responsibility to Protect*, para 29 asserts for instance that international leadership is vital for the success of prevention efforts. Pointing also to the role of “the field presence of international actors”, *Ibid.*, para 23.b.

³⁶⁸ Orford, “From Promise to Practice”, 423. See also Mahdavi, “A Postcolonial Critique”, 25 on powerful states.

³⁶⁹ Orford, *International Authority*, 212.

The suggestion is therefore to pursue instead the strengthening of the process of peace and the principle of non-violence.³⁷⁰ This process must, moreover, be based on the perspectives of those who are affected by the policies to be employed. This may involve a turn to the idea of a feminist peace.³⁷¹

6.5.2 Turning to the UN Charter

One possibility for Norway to promote this kind of politics may be, as Orford has explained, through “remaking the law in the image of justice”.³⁷² One way of doing this would be, as suggested by Heathcote, to promote strategies that emphasise the significance of the prohibition on the use of force in international law and the aims it serves, rather than fuel expansive interpretations of the exceptions that can be made to it.³⁷³ In other words, there is a need to begin with peace, rather than the use of force. What we should be doing is “recalling the essence of the prohibition as a restraint on force rather than a space to argue for further force, justified, authorized, or legitimized”.³⁷⁴ This line of reasoning is further strengthened if we consider O’Connell’s claim of a responsibility to peace. From this perspective, “nothing is more destructive of human rights than war”.³⁷⁵ This means that if Norway is truly committed to the promotion of human rights and democracy, it should pursue peace and respect for the rule of law.³⁷⁶ Indeed the history of humanitarian interventions “should lead to the conclusion that we must rid the world of war, not advocate its acceptability”.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁰ Moix and Keck, *The Responsibility to Prevent. A Report to Congress from the Friends Committee on National Legislation*. (Quakers) (October, 2008) in O’Connell, “Responsibility to Peace”, 48.

³⁷¹ This brings us to the question of whether a feminist peace can be pursued through existing mechanisms for feminist engagement with international security. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda provides one such avenue. There is however good reason to remain sceptical of this. This framework may be criticised for its acceptance of the established order, including the use of military force. In turn, the focus is merely on the inclusion of women, without a critical engagement with power relations and the institutions on which they rely. The WPS agenda may on these grounds be criticised for “a fundamental failure to see feminist awareness requiring more than adding women to existing security strategies”, see Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 226. See also Otto, “Women, Peace, and Security”; Heathcote, “Feminist Politics”; Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 61-63; Hudson, “Inhabitants of Interstices?”, 44; Dyvik, “Performing Gender”, 208-209.

³⁷² Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, 70.

³⁷³ Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 52.

³⁷⁴ Heathcote, “Feminist Perspectives”, 123-124.

³⁷⁵ O’Connell, “Responsibility to Peace”, 39.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

The thesis thus joins Heathcote in advancing an approach founded on article 2.3 of the UN Charter.³⁷⁸ This article holds that states are to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”.³⁷⁹ By taking this as the starting point for how we should conduct our behaviour in international relations, one facilitates a stronger focus on the implications of using force in the specific contexts in which it argued to be needed.³⁸⁰ This reading of the prohibition on the use of force is also more in line with “the hope for a world in which its “peoples” commit to “liv[ing] together in peace with one another”.³⁸¹ The implication of this is “a return to the reduction and limiting of force that coalesces with feminist expectations of international security”.³⁸² It would entail enhancing strategies aimed at prevention and the creation of peace.³⁸³ However such a move would not be complete without an inclusion of marginalised perspectives, especially those of women.³⁸⁴ This would therefore also involve changing the methods for decision-making at the international level.³⁸⁵ The thesis remains, however, sceptical about the pursuit of a feminist peace through existing institutions of international law.³⁸⁶ This is because of the risk of co-optation and the use of normative frameworks to “enhance the authorisation of the use of force”.³⁸⁷ Based on this, it seems possible that some prospects of pursuing a feminist peace may be found within the international legal structure, requiring however a reconsideration of the very idea of the use of force and the requirements for peace and security.

6.6 Concluding thoughts: Thinking differently

In the end, this means that the intervention in Libya could have been approached in a different manner. This seems however, to have been prevented by the gendered and racialised logics that seemingly influenced the way in which the situation in Libya was understood. The

³⁷⁸ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 200.

³⁷⁹ United Nations, *Charter*, article 2.3. Also quoted in Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 200.

³⁸⁰ Heathcote, “Humanitarian Intervention”, 200.

³⁸¹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, preamble, para 2 in Otto, “Women, Peace, and Security”, 114.

³⁸² Heathcote, “Justifying Force”, 235.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 234.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Heathcote argues that women, due to current social and cultural structures, may have different perspectives than men, *Ibid.*, 31.

³⁸⁵ Orford, “The Politics of Collective Security”, 392.

³⁸⁶ Heathcote, “Women and Children”, 4, see also the conclusions on page 30.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

Norwegian evaluation report, for instance, failed to challenge the use of force and the continued participation in international operations. As has been discussed in this chapter, it can be claimed that the privileging of certain forms of masculinity has led to the naturalisation of violence.³⁸⁸ This has arguably precluded other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace and the behaviour necessary to ensure this. There is therefore a need to rethink how we conceptualise gender and use it to assign meaning to the world. This involves the deconstruction of the hierarchy of gender and the dismantling of the dominant position of hegemonic masculinities. The aim should thus be to set the stage for new worlds and new realities, guided by the idea of a feminist peace and the inclusion of new voices, where the pursuit of social justice and emancipation are within reach. This may be facilitated by reengaging with how we read the requirements for peace under the UN Charter.

³⁸⁸ See also Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender”, 357.

7 Conclusion

This thesis has examined how the Norwegian intervention in Libya was made possible. It has also considered how this impacted on other ways of thinking about the issues of security and peace. The conclusion is that the Norwegian intervention in Libya can be claimed to have been made possible through gendered and racialised logics that portrayed the intervention as an act of protection. This furthermore is argued to have had the consequence of excluding alternative ways of thinking about security and peace.

The claim is, more specifically, that gender impacts on dominant understandings of the world. Values, characteristics and actions will be accorded different priority depending on their association with either masculinities or femininities. This, it is argued, may be seen as a result of the way in which binary logics structure our way of understanding the world according to hierarchies of gender and race.

In the context of the intervention in Libya, gendered and racialised logics are argued to have operated to accord meaning to the various actors and actions involved. This in turn enabled the intervention to take place. The thesis found for example that Norway was portrayed as a heroic character, taking action for the sake of providing protection. What is more, they were seen as acting in a rational and logical manner. Libyan civilians, however, were portrayed as being in need of the protection offered by Norwegian and international forces. The Libyan authorities, on the other hand, came to be seen as an evil that needed to be stopped. The identities assigned to these actors and consequently the meaning to be made of their actions arguably resonated with gendered and racialised logics. The meaning made of the situation in Libya followed the idea of what it means to be a man, and what it means to be a woman according to dominant understandings of gender. This in turn privileged the actions associated with hegemonic masculinity, namely that of intervention. Humanitarian intervention was thus made possible.

What is more, these gendered and racialised logics are claimed to have had the consequence of excluding other ways of thinking about security and peace. More precisely, the argument is that these gendered and racialised logics served to naturalise the use of force, as opposed to non-violent means of dealing with conflict and crisis. This was furthermore illustrated by an engagement with the Norwegian evaluation of the Libya intervention, which seemed to take

the use of force for granted as a future foreign policy option. This is claimed to be a result of how gender constrains our thinking, where the use of force and resolute intervention can be considered as masculine forms of action. The thesis has argued that by privileging masculine actions and attributes over feminine ones, one restricts the potential for the actions that are seen as possible in the world. Actions associated with femininity are thus seen as inadequate to respond to the situation at hand.

The thesis argued in this context that there is a need to undo the hierarchy of gender. This is because it will allow for new ways of thinking about the possibilities for action. In this regard the thesis explored alternatives for actions if the way in which gender is commonly understood is transformed. Here, the thesis suggested a move towards the idea of a feminist peace. Peace, in a feminist sense, would entail emancipation where the emphasis is put on achieving social justice, respect for human rights, and greater inclusion. In fact, previously marginalised perspectives are to be the very foundation of the pursuit of peace and the understanding of its requirements.

The thesis also explored whether alternatives for security and peace could be pursued through existing mechanisms of international law. This includes the responsibility to protect doctrine, which in recent years have moved towards a focus on prevention. The thesis found, however, that the doctrine is still to be considered inadequate for truly responding to requirements of security and peace in a feminist sense. The thesis rather suggests turning to the UN Charter and its emphasis on peaceful means of conflict resolution.

All in all, it is argued that the intervention in Libya was made possible through gendered and racialised logics. By privileging actions and actors associated with masculine traits and values, one excludes other ways of engaging in the world. Pursuing peace and security through an idea of feminist peace, for instance, has not been seen as a viable alternative. However, the thesis has suggested that a move towards a feminist peace is essential for securing real security and peace for all. Overall this suggests that if Norway wants to pursue a foreign policy based on peace, it should turn its focus to working towards a feminist peace. This would entail efforts in striving for social justice, respect for human rights and ensuring inclusionary practices. Here, the use of force, for example in the form of humanitarian intervention, would not be possible as a means for ensuring the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy.

Bibliography

- Ackerly, Brooke A., and Jacqui True. "Studying the Struggles and Wishes of the Age: Feminist Theoretical Methodology and Feminist Theoretical Methods". In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True, 241-260. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Aggestam, Karin and Jacqui True. "Gendering Foreign Policy: A Comparative Framework for Analysis". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2020): 143-162. doi: 10.1093/fpa/orz026. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Alexander, Ronni. "Gender, Structural Violence, and Peace". In *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*, edited by Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, 27-36. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Amar, Paul. "Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries". *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 1-13. doi: 10.1080/14747731.2012.657408. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Blanchard, Eric M. "Rethinking International Security: Masculinity in World Politics". *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 21, no. 1 (2014): 61-80. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/brownjwa21&i=61>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Chandler, David. "The Paradox of the 'Responsibility to Protect'". *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 1 (2010): 128-134. doi: 10.1177/0010836709352802. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Charlesworth, Hilary. "Feminist Methods in International Law". *The American Journal of International Law* 93, no. 2 (1999): 379-394. doi: 10.2307/2997996. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Charlesworth, Hilary. "Feminist Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect". *Global Responsibility to Protect* 2, no. 3 (2010): 232-249. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/gloresp2&i=248>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Charlesworth, Hilary. "International Law: A Discipline of Crisis". *The Modern Law Review* 65, no. 3 (2002): 377-392. www.jstor.org/stable/1097579. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Charlesworth, Hilary, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright. "Feminist Approaches to

- International Law”. *The American Journal of International Law* 85, no. 4 (1991): 613-645. doi: 10.2307/2203269. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Christensen, Ann-Dorte and Sune Qvotrup Jensen. “Combining Hegemonic Masculinity and Intersectionality”. *NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies* 9, no. 1 (2014): 60-75. doi: 10.1080/18902138.2014.892289. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Cohn, Carol, ed. *Women and Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
- Cohn, Carol. “Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War”. In *Gendering War Talk*, edited by Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, 227-246. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. muse.jhu.edu/book/34144. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Confortini, Catia Cecilia. “Feminist Peace Research as Prefiguration”, 88-90 in Wibben, Annick T.R., Catia Cecilia Confortini, Sanam Roohi, Sarai B Aharoni, Leena Vastapuu and Tiina Vaittinen. “Collective Discussion: Piecing-Up Feminist Peace Research”. *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 1 (2019): 86-107. doi: 10.1093/ips/oly034. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Confortini, Catia Cecilia. “Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance”. *Peace and Change* 31, no. 3 (2006): 333-367. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0130.2006.00378.x. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Connell, R.W. and James W. Messerschmidt. “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept”. *Gender and Society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 829-859. www.jstor.org/stable/27640853. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Connell, R.W. *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
- Cunliffe, Philip. “The Doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a Practice of Political Exceptionalism”. *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2017): 466-486. doi: 10.1177/1354066116654956. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Dobinson, Kristin and Geir Dale. “Den Norske Ryggsekk - En Analyse av “Norsk” Fredsdiplomati”. In *Grenser for Alt: Kritiske Perspektiver på Norsk Utenrikspolitikk*, Dale, Geir, Kristin Dobinson, Tore Fougner, Karsten Friis, Øyvind Jæger, Torgeir Larsen, Inger Skjelsbæk, Gyrd Steen, Gisle R. Tangenes, Henrik Thune and Kjetil Visnes, 45-69. Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, 2000. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2013120508151. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn. “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of

- U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines”. *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 297-320. doi: 10.2307/2600810. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.nb.idm.oclc.org/lib/nasjonal/detail.action?docID=310361>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Dyvik, Synne Laastad. “Performing Gender in the ‘Theatre of War’: Embodying the Invasion, Counterinsurgency and Exit Strategy in Afghanistan”. PhD thesis: University of Sussex, 2013. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46848/1/Laastad_Dyvik%2C_Synne.pdf. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. *Women and War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Engle, Karen. ““Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention”. *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 20 (2007): 189-226. <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.uio.no/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hhrj20&i=191>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. London: Pandora Press, 1989.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. “Feminist Thinking about War, Militarism, and Peace”. In *Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of Social Science Research*, edited by Beth B. Hess and Myra Marx Ferree, 526-547. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1987.
- Gavey, Nicola. “Feminist Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis: Contributions to Feminist Psychology”. *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1989): 459-475. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-6402.1989.tb01014.x. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Gentry, Caron E., Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Inger Skjelsbæk. “Tilslørt Fredspolitik”. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 27, nr. 4 (2010): 379-388. <https://www-idunn-no.ezproxy.uio.no/nnt/2010/04/art02>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Heathcote, Gina. “Feminist Perspectives on the Law on the Use of Force”. In *The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law*, edited by Marc Weller, 114-128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. doi: 10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0006. Last accessed 22 May 2020.

- Heathcote, Gina. "Feminist Politics and the Use of Force: Theorising Feminist Action and Security Council Resolution 1325". *Socio-Legal Review* 7 (2011): 1-21. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13161/1/SLR_GH_103-344-1-PB.pdf. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Heathcote, Gina. "Humanitarian Intervention and Gender Dynamics". In *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict*, edited by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Naomi Cahn, Dina Francesca Haynes and Nahla Valji, 199-210. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199300983.001.0001. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Heathcote, Gina. "Justifying Force: A Feminist Analysis of the International Law on the Use of Force". PhD thesis: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009. <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2550/1/U615499.pdf>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Heathcote, Gina. *The Law on the Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.
- Heathcote, Gina. "Women and Children and Elephants as Justification for Force". *Journal on the Use of Force and International Law* 4, no. 1 (2017): 1-30. <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/1/WomenandChildren%20and%20Elephants%20author%20version.pdf>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Heier, Tormod, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, eds. *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.
- Henriksen, Dag. "Suksess uten Innflytelse? Norges Erfaringer fra Operasjonene over Libya". *Internasjonal Politikk* 71, no.1 (2013): 29-57. https://www-idunn-no.ezproxy.uio.no/ip/2013/01/suksess_uten_innflytelse_-_norges_erfaringer_fra_operasjon. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Higate, Paul. "Men, Maculinity, and Global Insecurity". In *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*, edited by Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, 70-82. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Holm, Minda. "Liberale Verdifelleskap og Selvbilder i Praksis: Hvordan Norge Gikk til Krig, og Hva Vi Kan Lære". In *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 47-70. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.
- Hooper, Charlotte. *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Hooper, Charlotte. "Masculinist Practices and Gender Politics: The Operation of Multiple

- Masculinities in International Relations”. In *The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations*, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, 28-53. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
- House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. *Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options*. Third Report of Session 2016-2017. 14 September 2016.
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/119.pdf>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Hudson, Heidi. “Gendercidal Violence and the Technologies of Othering in Libya and Rwanda”. *Africa Insight* 44, no. 1 (2014): 103-120.
https://files.prio.org/Publication_files/internal/prio/Hudson-Gendercidal-Violence-Africa-Insight-2014-44-1.pdf. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Hudson, Heidi. “Inhabitants of Interstices? Feminist Analysis at the Intersection of Peace Studies, Critical Security Studies and Human Security”. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 33, no. 2 (2011): 26-50. <https://search-proquest.com.ezproxy.uio.no/docview/1026585513?accountid=14699>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Hutchings, Kimberly. “Making Sense of Masculinity and War”. *Men and Masculinities* 10, no. 4 (2008): 389-404. doi: 10.1177/1097184X07306740. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Jørgensen, Marianne and Louise J. Phillips. “Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory”. In *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 1-29. London: Sage Publications, 2002. doi: 10.4135/9781849208871.n2 Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Khalid, Maryam. “Gender, Race, and the Insecurity of ‘Security’”. In *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*, edited by Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjøberg, 37-47. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Leira, Halvard, ed., Axel Borchgrevink, Nina Græger, Arne Melchior, Eli Stamnes and Indra Øverland. *Norsk Selvbilder og Norsk Utenrikspolitikk*. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), 2007.
- Leira, Halvard. “‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace”. *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (2013): 338-356. doi: 10.1111/spsr.12044. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Lippe, Berit von der and Kirsti Stuvøy. “Kvinnefrigjøring og Krig – en Selvmotsigelse? FNs Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon 1325 and Kvinners Rettigheter i Afghanistan”. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 30, nr. 1 (2013): 41-52. <https://www-idunn->

no.nb.idm.oclc.org/nnt/2013/01/kvinnefrigjoring_og_krig_en_selvmotsigelse_-_fns_sikker. Last accessed 18 May 2020.

- Lippe, Berit von der and Tarja Väyrynen. “Co-opting Feminist Voices for the War on Terror: Laura Bush Meets Nordic Feminism”. *European Journal of Women’s Studies* 18, no. 1 (2011): 19-33. doi: 10.1177/1350506810386082. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Lippe, Berit von der. “Beskyttelse av Hva og for Hvem – Hvordan og Når? Da en Retorisk Situasjon Ble en R2P-situasjon”. *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 193-214. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.
- Lippe, Berit von der. “Images of Victory - Images of Masculinity?”. *Nordicom Review* 27, no.1 (2006): 63-79. doi: 10.1515/nor-2017-0219. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Lippe, Berit von der. “Kjønnete Ikoner i Fortellinger om Krig”. *Gnist* 2 (2010): n.p. <https://marxisme.no/berit-von-der-lippe/>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Lippe, Berit von der. “Rhetoric of War, Rhetoric of Gender”. In *Rhetorical Citizenship and Public Deliberation*, edited by Christian Kock and Lisa S. Villadsen, 153-168. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012.
- Lippe, Berit von der. “The White Woman’s Burden: “Feminist” War Rhetoric and the Phenomenon of Co-optation”. *NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 20, no. 1 (2012): 19–36. doi: 10.1080/08038740.2011.618811. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Lugones, María C. and Elizabeth V. Spelman. “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for ‘the Woman’s Voice’”. *Women’s Studies International Forum* 6, no. 6 (1983): 573-581. doi: 10.1016/0277-5395(83)90019-5. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Mahdavi, Mojtaba. “A Postcolonial Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East”. *Perceptions* XX, no. 1 (2015): 7-36. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/02_Mahdavi.pdf. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Matlary, Janne Haaland. “Fornektelse og Forpliktelse i Afghanistan”. In *Exit Afghanistan: Tilbakeblikk – og Debatt om Utviklingen*, edited by Gjert Lage Dyndal and Torbjørn L. Knutsen, 194-202. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2012. https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2018110677044. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Matlary, Janne Haaland. “Kriger i Kamouflasje? Profesjonen og Politikken”. In *Krigerkultur i en Fredsnasjon: Norsk Militærprofesjon i Endring*, edited by Håkan Edström, Nils Terje Lunde and Janne Haaland Matlary, 92-130. Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2009.

- Mehta, Akanksha and Annick T.R. Wibben. "Feminist Narrative Approaches to Security". In *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*, edited by Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, 48-58. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Mgbeoji, Ikechi. "The Civilised Self and the Barbaric Other: Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Security". *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 5 (2006): 855-869. <https://www-jstor-org.nb.idm.oclc.org/stable/4017782>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Milliken, Jennifer. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods". *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225-254. doi: 10.1177/1354066199005002003. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism". In *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, edited by Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres, 1-47. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Neumann, Iver B. "Det er Typisk Norsk å Krige". *Dagbladet*. 14 October 2004. <https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/det-er-typisk-norsk-a-krige/66001512>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- O'Connell, Mary Ellen. "Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4, no. 1 (2010): 39-52. doi: 10.1080/17502970903541671. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- O'Reilly, Maria. "Muscular Interventionism: Gender, Power and Liberal Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina". *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14, no. 4 (2012): 529-548. doi: 10.1080/14616742.2012.726096. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. "From Promise to Practice - The Legal Significance of the Responsibility to Protect Concept". *Global Responsibility to Protect* 3, no. 4 (2011): 400-424. <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.uio.no/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/gloresp3&i=410>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511973574. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. "Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War". *Harvard International Law Journal* 38, no. 2 (1997): 443-486. <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.uio.no/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hilj38&i=449>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. "Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New

- Interventionism”. *European Journal of International Law* 10, no. 4 (1999): 679-711. doi: 10.1093/ejil/10.4.679. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511494277. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Orford, Anne. “The Politics of Collective Security”. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 17, no. 2 (1996): 373-409. <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.uio.no/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/mjil17&i=383>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Otto, Dianne. “Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law”. In *International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches*, edited by Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji, 105-129. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005.
- Otto, Dianne. “Women, Peace, and Security: A Critical Analysis of the Security Council’s Vision”. In *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict*, edited by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Naomi Cahn, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Nahla Valji, 105-118. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199300983.001.0001. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Petersen, Jan, Christoffer Conrad Eriksen, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Gjert Lage Dyndal. *Evaluering av Norsk Deltakelse I Libya-Operasjonene i 2011*. Rapport fra Libya-utvalget, nedsatt av Forsvarsdepartementet og Utenriksdepartementet. 2018. <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/rapporter-og-regelverk/libya-rapporten.pdf>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Peterson, V. Spike and Jacqui True. ““New Times” and New Conversations”. In *The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations*, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, 14-27. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
- Peterson, V. Spike. “Gendered Identities, Ideologies, and Practices in the Context of War and Militarism”. In *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, 17-29. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, ABC-CLIO, 2010.
- Peterson, V. Spike. “Introduction”. In *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, edited by V. Spike Peterson, 1-29. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Peterson, V. Spike. “Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism

- Seriously?”. In *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, edited by V. Spike Peterson, 31-64. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Razack, Sherene H. *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004.
- Regjeringen. “Militære Bidrag til Internasjonale Operasjoner i 2020”. *Regjeringen.no*. 13 February 2020.
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/intops2020/id2690291/>. Last accessed 18 May 2020.
- Said, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1993.
- Shepherd, Laura J., ed. *Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
- Shepherd, Laura J. *Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice*. London: Zed Books, 2008. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.nb.idm.oclc.org/lib/nasjonal/detail.action?docID=368675>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Sjoberg, Laura, ed. *Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.nb.idm.oclc.org/lib/nasjonal/detail.action?docID=460347>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Sjoberg, Laura and Sandra Via, eds. *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, ABC-CLIO, 2010.
- Sjoberg, Laura and Sandra Via. “Introduction”. In *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, 1-13. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, ABC-CLIO, 2010.
- Sjoberg, Laura. “Gender, Feminism, and War Theorizing”. In *The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*, edited by Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, 59-69. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019.
- Sjoberg, Laura. *Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq: A Feminist Reformulation of Just War Theory*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.
- Sjoberg, Laura. “Seeing Sex, Gender, and Sexuality in International Security”. *International Journal* 70, no. 3 (2015): 434-453. www.jstor.org/stable/24709442. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

Skjelsbæk, Inger and Torunn Lise Tryggestad. “Pro-gender Norms in Norwegian Peace Engagement: Balancing Experiences, Values, and Interests”. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2020): 181–198. doi: 10.1093/fpa/orz028. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

Skånland, Øystein Haga. “Norsk Utenrikspolitikk i Fredens Tegn: En Diskursanalyse”. *Internasjonal Politikk* 67, no. 3 (2009): 321-348. <https://www-idunn-no.ezproxy.uio.no/file/pdf/35079010/art19.pdf>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

Steans, Jill. *Gender and International Relations: Issues, Debates and Future Directions*. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

The Storting. Document no. 8: 36. Proposal by Parliamentary Representatives Trine Skei Grande and Anne Margrethe Larsen concerning an exchange and cooperation programme between Muslim countries and Norway. 2005-2006. <https://stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/representantforslag/2005-2006/dok8-200506-036.pdf>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 1. 16 March 2011. <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2010-2011/110316/muntligsporretime/>. Last accessed 19 May.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 1. 23 March 2011. <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2010-2011/110323/muntligsporretime/> Last accessed 19 May.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 1. 29 March 2011. <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2010-2011/110329/1>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 1. 8 January 2019. <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2018-2019/refs-201819-01-08?all=true>. Last accessed 19 May.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 1. 9 May 2011. <https://stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2010-2011/110509/1>. Last accessed 19 May.

The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 2. 2 April 2019. <https://stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2018-2019/refs-201819-04-02?m=2>. Last accessed 19 May.

- The Storting. Meeting in the Storting, case no. 7. 2 June 2006. <https://stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Stortinget/2005-2006/060602/7>. Last accessed 19 May.
- Threadgold, Terry. "Introduction". In *Feminine/Masculine and Representation*, edited by Terry Threadgold and Anne Cranny-Francis, 1-35. North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990.
- Tickner, J. Ann and Laura Sjoberg, eds. *Feminism and International Relations: Conversations about the Past, Present and Future*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues". In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True, 19-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "Feminist Perspectives on 9/11". *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 4 (2002): 333-350. doi: 10.1111/1528-3577.t01-1-00098. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Tickner, J. Ann. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
- Tickner, J. Ann. "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists". *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (1997): 611-632. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600855>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Tilley, Elspeth. "Feminist Discourse Analysis". In *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, edited by George Ritzer, 1-5. John Wiley & Sons, 2018. doi: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeos1098. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Tunander, Ola. "Den "Humanitære Krigen"". In *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 171-192. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.
- Tvedt, Terje. "Det Politiske Lederskapet Vil Krige i Verden, Men Ikke Lære om Den". *Aftenposten*. 30 September 2018. <https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/Kvm4a4/det-politiske-lederskapet-vil-krige-i-verden-men-ikke-laere-om-den-terje-tvedt>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Tvedt, Terje. "Libya-krigen og Fraværet av Etterpåklokskap". In *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 23-45. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.

- Tvedt, Terje. "Tausheten om Libya". *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 32, no.3 (2015): 205-218. https://www-idunn-no.ezproxy.uio.no/file/pdf/66798423/tausheten_om_libya.pdf. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Tvedt, Terje. *Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk og Makt: Den Norske Modellen*. Oslo: Gyldendal, 2003.
- Ulfstein, Geir. "Norge Brøt Folkeretten i Libya". In *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 91-102. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.
- United Nations General Assembly. *2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution adopted by the General Assembly*. 24 October 2005. A/RES/60/1.
- United Nations Secretary-General. *Responsibility to Protect: Lessons Learned for Prevention: Report of the Secretary-General*. 10 June 2019. A/73/898-S/2019/463.
- United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1973*. 17 March 2011. S/RES/1973 (2011).
- United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. 24 October 1945. 1 UNTS XVI.
- Whitworth, Sandra. *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Wibben, Annick T.R., Catia Cecilia Confortini, Sanam Roohi, Sarai B Aharoni, Leena Vastapuu and Tiina Vaittinen. "Collective Discussion: Piecing-Up Feminist Peace Research". *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 1 (2019): 86-107. doi: 10.1093/ips/oly034. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Wibben, Annick T.R. "Toward a Pedagogy of Utopian Thinking Grounded in the Everyday" 101-103, in Wibben, Annick T.R., Catia Cecilia Confortini, Sanam Roohi, Sarai B Aharoni, Leena Vastapuu and Tiina Vaittinen. "Collective Discussion: Piecing-Up Feminist Peace Research". *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 1 (2019): 86-107. doi: 10.1093/ips/oly034. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Wilcox, Lauren. "Gendering the Cult of the Offensive". *Security Studies* 18, no. 2 (2009): 214-240. doi: 10.1080/09636410902900152. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Williams, Paul D. and Alex J. Bellamy. "Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force". *Global Governance* 18, no. 3 (2012): 273-297. <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.uio.no/stable/23269958>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.
- Young, Iris Marion. "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current

Security State”. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29, no. 1 (2003): 1-25. doi: 10.1086/375708. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

Zalewski, Marysia and Jane Parpart, eds. *The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

Zalewski, Marysia. “Feminist International Relations: Making Sense...”. In *Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations*, edited by Laura J. Shepherd, 28-43. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.

Zalewski, Marysia. “Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?”. *International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1995): 339-356. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2623438>. Last accessed 19 May 2020.

Østerud, Øyvind. “Libya-krigen og Utredningene i Storbritannia og Norge”. In *Libya: Krigens Uutholdelige Letthet*, edited by Tormod Heier, Rune Ottosen and Terje Tvedt, 149-167. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2019.

Østerud, Øyvind. “Lite Land som Humanitær Stormakt?”. *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 23, no. 4 (2006): 303-316. https://www-idunn-no.ezproxy.uio.no/file/pdf/33209027/lite_land_som_humaniterstormakt.pdf. Last accessed 19 May 2020.