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

‘Agro sí, mina NO!’ the Tía Maria copper mine, state terrorism and social war by every means in the Tambo Valley, Peru

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ABSTRACT

The Tía Maria copper mine situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley, southwest Peru, has sparked nearly ten years of protracted conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet Southern Copper Peru or Southern, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, has faced ardent resistance. This article explores the ‘political reactions from above’, examining how Southern and the Peruvian government have negotiated the popular rejection of the mine. Residents have organized a popular consultation, large-scale demonstrations, road blockades and general strikes, which has been met with violent repression. Reviewing the political ecology of counterinsurgency, which studies the socio-ecological warfare techniques employed to control human and natural resources, and relating it to social war discourse, this section lays the theoretical foundations to discuss the coercion and ‘social war component’ present in natural resource extraction. This leads to an overview of the relationship between Peruvian security forces and extraction industries, followed by a brief chronology of the Tía Maria conflict. The subsequent two sections offer a political ecology analysis of various ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ counterinsurgency techniques employed by the Peruvian state and Southern in an attempt to pacify social unrest and socially engineer acceptance of the project. The concluding section discusses the ‘whole-of-government’ counterinsurgency approach employed, recognizing how the present institutional arrangements and business imperatives are designed to override popular socio-ecological concerns. Supporting social war discourse, the article contends that the state apparatus and politics itself serve as an instrument of social pacification and ecological exploitation regardless of widespread ecological and climatic concerns.

> ***Pacification****—the military, political, economic and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.*
>
> Colonel Erwin Brigham, June 1968

1. Introduction

On August 1st, 2014, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) approved the second environmental impact assessment (EIA), which allowed the Tía Maria Copper Mine to commence mineral exploitation. When dialogue failed between the Peruvian Government and civil society groups, the latter declared an indefinite strike on March 23, 2015. This is the second time hundreds of people began protesting to prevent the mine from entering the Tambo Valley in the Islay province, southwest Peru (Fig. 1). Demonstrations and road blockades would spread across the Valley. San Francisco Plaza, in the city of Cocachacra, was a central rallying point, complete with road blockades made of stones and sticks with people waving their neon green flags above their heads that read: ‘Agro sí, mina NO!’—Agriculture yes, mine NO! At two o'clock on March 28th, 2015, the police began firing teargas canisters into the crowd to disperse the protest and break the barricade—‘with the tear gas people could not breathe and you had to run,’ explains ‘Kali’ who continues:

> Everybody was running and jumped the irrigation ditch and I couldn't make it. When I wanted to jump, I fell into the water and I felt another person fall on top of me and it was a cop. The water carried us downstream thirty meters and the cop let go of me, because the two of us were struggling and the water was taking us away. The water current was strong and the irrigation ditch was

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Fig. 1. Peru, The Tambo Valley and the Tía Maria project. Source: La Republica.

2.5 m wide and the water was about this deep—here [over chest high]. We cannot stand either, so he let me go and he caught a branch …. The water carried me further, like eighty meters, until an irrigation pond and a cement bridge. There, a lot of police were waiting, and I did not have any other options—I had to pass them. Right before I passed under the bridge about six or seven police jumped in the water and it wasn't to get me out of the water—that would have been nice. Instead, they began to beat me—hard, hard, hard! They were trying to drown me and when I was in a very bad condition they brought me to edge of the canal. Then one of the police says: "That guy almost died." In that moment, think of my pants, where am I going to have some rocks and a Honda [long-rang sling shot]? We were in that place for about five minutes and they lifted me up and dragged me in the direction of the police station. And in that moment appears the cop who was in the water with me and the other police say, "Commander! We caught one!" [Commander:] "This motherfucker (*conchasumadre*) escaped from me." And then they took me to the police station and the Commander Raúl Genaro Acosta arrived fifteen minutes later and, with insults, told me: "Motherfucker hands on the wall" and I feel him putting his hands in my left pocket. So I look down and I see he is putting rocks and a Honda in my pocket. So I knock his hand away and I say: "What are you doing Commander? Why are you putting that on me when I never had that?" And he says to another officer, "put this on him, write this in the police report and I am going to sign!" And that is what he did—Raúl Genaro Acosta. I spent fourteen months in prison and left that place on November 4, 2016.[1]

This police practice of planting weapons on protestors once in custody was common during the Tía Maria conflict. This conflict began in 2009, yet Southern Copper Peru, a subsidiary of Grupo Mexico, already began assessing the mineral reserve situated above the agricultural Tambo Valley in 2000. It negotiated with government officials and civil servants in 2005 and later provided three consultations (*audencias*) to the Tambo Valley. The third consultation in August 2009, however, is when open conflict broke out. People began rioting, throwing rocks and plastic chairs at Southern Copper Peru representatives (hereafter Southern) after the company announced its preference to use the ground and river water, not sea water with a desalination plant at the mine (Jaskoski, 2014; Romero, 2017). What began here, would develop into a protracted conflict that, since 2011, has resulted in eight deaths— seven protesters and one police officer—hundreds of injuries and President Ollanta Humala declaring a sixty day State of Emergency on May 9, 2015.

Building upon the political ecology and critical agrarian studies literature (Ulloa, 2013/2005, 2017; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012; Borras et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2013; Aguilar-Støen, 2016; Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2017), this article seeks to explore 'political reactions from above' (Geenen & Verweijen, 2017: 2) through the lens of counterinsurgency. It will examine the strategies, tactics and approaches employed by and between Southern Copper and the Peruvian state to mitigate and repress the popular rejection of the Tía Maria project. In doing so, the article contributes to the study of ***'militarized mining' (***Gedicks, 2015: 146), ***the criminalization of land defense (***Middeldorp, Morales, & der Harr 2016***;*** Birss, 2017***;*** Rasch, 2017***; Dunlap, 2018/2017;*** Brock & Dunlap, 2018***;*** Middeldorp & Le Billon, 2019***) and militarization beyond the battlefield more generally***. Heeding the call by Marta Conde and Philippe Le Billon (2017: 693) for greater research into 'the criminalization of dissent by the state and the repression of resistance by mining companies', this article approaches environmental conflicts through counterinsurgency to critically dissect the relationships of force and social engineering efforts employed past and present (in various intensities) to open and maintain natural resource extraction sites. Highlighting the social war component within the Tía Maria project, the article argues that the Peruvian government and Southern Copper are employing a 'whole-of-government' counterinsurgency

[1] Interview 2, 12-01-2018. Note: This lengthy prison sentence was also related to violating probation by not appearing at the police station every Monday.

approach articulated through formal and informal private-public partnerships[2] to socially engineer subsoil extraction.

The article is based on field research in the Tambo Valley conducted between December 28, 2017 and February 22, 2018, which employed participant observation, semi-structured and informal interviews. Interviews were conducted in various towns in the Tambo Valley: Cocachacra, El Fiscal, Pampilla, Punta de Bombón, Nuevo Arenal, La Curva and Mejía (Fig. 1). Interviews were approached through a pre-established network of (trusted) intermediaries from the region, which facilitated making initial contacts through their familial and commercial networks in the Tambo Valley. This was followed by opportunistic sampling in public spaces (streets, taxis, markets, shops and restaurants) which, after explaining the research project and anonymization of names in the final text,[3] participants would identify preference for informal or semi-structured interviews. This included numerous interviews with company representatives, eager to explain their version of event, and municipal agents who I approached or was introduced to by intermediaries. In total sixty informal and forty-seven recorded semi-structured interviews were conducted together with a friend and interpreter, Carlo Eduardo Fernández Valencia, who has long-term roots in the Tambo Valley. There was over 1308 min[4] of recorded audio from semi-structured interviews. The majority of research participants were women, while also including a wide range of occupations: farmers, fishermen, merchants, grocers, civil servants, company representatives, current and/or ex-leaders of civil society groups, conservationists, a lawyer and a private security contractor. While the location of interviews is recorded, it is no indication for where research participants live, as for instance a Taxi driver informally interviewed in Punta would live in Mollendo. Questions focused on what research participants thought about the Tía Maria mine, their experience with the conflict and Southern's actions in the Valley to impose the mine. Research participants were disproportionally against the mine: semi-structured interviews articulated 35 'anti-mine', and 11 'pro-mine' views (and one exempt), while informal interviews had 41 anti-mine and 19 pro-mine. The interviews were complemented with secondary research—books, articles, newspapers, blogs and public relations material. Information was triangulated by drawing on secondary research material, verification discussions with intermediaries, repeated interview themes and follow up questions with various actors. Because of the level of conflict in this region, preserving research participant confidentiality is a priority in this contribution.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the political ecology of counterinsurgency, discussing its relationship to social war discourse and violence within extractive research. This leads to reviewing the relationship between Peruvian security forces and extraction industries, which is followed by a brief chronology of the Tía Maria conflict. The subsequent two sections delve into analyzing the various 'hard' (direct) and 'soft' (indirect) counterinsurgency techniques employed by Peruvian state and Southern in an attempt to pacify social unrest and socially engineering acceptance of the Tía Maria project. The concluding section discusses the 'whole-of-government' counterinsurgency ***as the social engineering of extraction***, recognizing how present institutional arrangements and business imperatives are designed to override popular socio-ecological concerns over the industrial extraction of minerals (see Orozco & Veiga, 2018). Supporting social war discourse, the article contends that the state apparatus and politics itself serve as an instrument of social pacification and ecological exploitation regardless of ecological and climatic concerns.

[2] On private-public partnerships see Hildyard (2016).

[3] Note: one interview is not dated purposely to prevent triangulation of location. Furthermore, select people interviewed insisted on using their real name regardless of advice to the contrary.

[4] The mean interview length was 28 min.

2. The political ecology of counterinsurgency

Military hardware, techniques and strategies remain foundational to land control and natural resource extraction. Coercive technologies are instrumental to what Tania Murray Li (2014: 592) calls, 'rendering land investible,' that are creating the conditions for investment and landscapes development. Rendering land investable, Le Billon and Sommerville (2017: 214) explain, requires three factors: creating a narrative exclaiming both the financial and social benefits of the development project; constructing and enforcing a legal framework suitable to transnational, national and elite interests (often at the expense of rural communities); and mobilizing labor, infrastructure and the resources necessary to accomplish natural resource extraction. Governmental and corporate efforts to control land and render it investible have led to increasing research examining the militarization of nature. Foregrounded by scholarly work on imperial/colonial relations (Galeano, 1997/1973; Rodney, 2009/1972), the geopolitics of resource wars (Le Billon, 2001, 2012), framings of national and environmental security discourses (Huff, 2017; Peluso & Watts, 2001), environmental conflicts (Gedicks, 2015; Martínez-Alier, 2002), social movement theory (Bebbington et al., 2008: 2888–2905; Middeldorp et al., 2016; Verweijen, 2017: 1–17) and policing (Williams, 2007/2004; Dunlap, 2014b) has slowly laid the foundation for counterinsurgency to emerge as a focus in environmental conflicts.

The emergence of counterinsurgency also overlaps with recent research into 'green militarization' (Lunstrum, 2014; Massé & Lunstrum, 2016), 'green violence' (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016), 'Green Wars' (Büscher & Fletcher, 2018) and the 'greening of the military' (Bigger & Neimark, 2017; Dunlap, 2017a). Political ecology research into counterinsurgency revealed that it is not only foundational to nation state formation, but also the creation of 'national forests,' present day cities and the production of space more generally (Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011). Counterinsurgency and economic growth retain a profound affinity in regards to ways that military-security efforts create the conditions for capital accumulation, whether relating to conservation parks (Verweijen & Marijnen, 2018; Ybarra, 2012); development schemes (Copeland, 2012; Devine, 2014; Grajales, 2013; Marijnen, 2017; Paley, 2014; Price, 2014); the green economy or 'climate change commodities' (Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014: 938; Dunlap, 2018/2017). Furthermore, counterinsurgency and natural resource extraction, as will be elaborated below, retain a relationship that is both an illustrious marriage and secretive affair.

Counterinsurgency is defined by Kilcullen (2006: 29, 31) as 'a competition with the insurgent for the right and ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population,' where 'hearts' are explained as 'persuading people their best interests are served by your success' and 'minds,' 'convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless'. Counterinsurgency is a type of war—'low-intensity' or 'asymmetrical' combat—and style of warfare that emphasizes intelligence networks, psychological operations, media manipulation, security provision and social development to maintain governmental and, in the case below, extractive legitimacy (FM3-24, 2014; Dunlap, 2018a). ***Pacification and establishing political control, as Colonel Erwin*** Brigham (1968***: 27) demonstrates above, is not solely centered on coercive force, but initiating 'economic and social activities' related to opening roads, waterways 'and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity***'. Counterinsurgency combines the brute force of 'hard' conventional warfare and 'soft' social warfare strategies that form a larger mutually reinforcing governmental-corporate strategy, disciplining, enchanting and engineering the 'hearts' and 'minds' of target populations. This frequently includes, as social war discourse suggests, the pre-emptive and systematic targeting of non-violent protesters (Dunlap, 2014b, 2016, 2018a; Brock & Dunlap, 2018) to enforce the present trajectory of political economy.

The insights from the emerging field of the political ecology of

counterinsurgency are important, yet its theoretical perspectives can still be further developed. The existing literature retains variegated insights and findings based on historical analysis, emphasis on 'hard' coercive military-police operations or 'soft' civil-military social technologies among others. While the literature on green militarization and war, to a degree, serve as exceptions, the scholarship on ecological conflicts rarely acknowledges the extent of violence or the importance of a 'social war component'. This component is defined as recognizing, in whole or in part, the various warfare strategies, techniques and technologies intertwined with shaping landscapes, land deals and protecting existing 'green' or conventional extractive operations. The term 'social war; ' originates from the Roman Social War (91-89 BC), where the Roman Republic learned the indispensability of political concessions and developing techniques for internal stability, as opposed to exclusionary conventional warfare techniques (Dunlap, 2014a; Trocci, 2011). Inclusionary techniques were developed, intervening into the socio-cultural relationships of people by deploying social amenities, rights and citizenship to pacify insurrection and internally stabilize a growing republic, which are foundational to territorialization processes (see Rasmussen & Lund, 2018: 388–399) and 'soft' counterinsurgency techniques. Social warfare, it could be said, was an early concessionary biopolitical strategy to consolidate and advance imperial power.

Performing the genealogical study of von Clausewitz's (2007/1827: 7) dictum: '*war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means*' (emphasis original), Michel Foucault (2003: 60) finds 'the great theme and theory of social war' as the central discourse substantiating von Clausewitz's assertions. The discourse is summarized best by its 17th century proponents, the Diggers:

> We have to defend ourselves against our enemies because the State apparatuses, the law, and the power structures not only do not defend us against our enemies; they are the instruments our enemies are using to pursue and subjugate us (Foucault, 2003: 62).

Social war discourse is an early recognition of biopolitics, articulating a radical distrust of state and institutional power, meanwhile offering an *anti-politics* that, different from Ferguson's (1994), views the Political system, its economy, divisions of labor and hierarchy as a system of subjugation (see Anonymous, 2012; Dunlap, 2014a; Shahin, 2016). Relevant to anarchist political ecology (Springer et al., 2019), social war discourse was historically dedicated to revealing 'the internal war or the social war' waged against populations (Foucault, 2003: 89), meanwhile counterinsurgency is the science of this war, or 'the war of progress', designed to affirm the state apparatus, political economy/primitive accumulation and cognitive submission to the ideology of (techno-industrial) progress (Dunlap, 2014b: 55). While some claim that 'there is no basis for this conception' of politics (Owens, 2017: 7), retired Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen (2012: 130) reminds us that 'counterinsurgency, then, or counter-insurrection, seems to be an enduring human social institution that has been part of the role of virtually every government in history and perhaps even partly defines what we mean by the word "state."' Moreover, Kilcullen (2012: 145), acknowledging the current state of media and technology, asserts that 'today's counterinsurgencies may be 100 percent political'.

Social warfare discourse is the recognition of counterinsurgency operations, while the political ecology of counterinsurgency dissects the socio-ecological warfare techniques employed—past and present—to control human and non-human resources. This is about unraveling the 'slow (structural) violence' necessary to construct (Gamu & Dauvergne, 2018; Nixon, 2011; Springer & Le Billon, 2016), what Foucault (1995: 168-9) calls, the 'military dream of society' working to prefect an 'internal peace and order' based on 'the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp'. This 'military dream of society' is industrial society, seeking to prefect the political economy of populations, economic growth and resource extraction. The political ecology of counterinsurgency interrogates these relationships of force—coercion—and social engineering necessary for industrial society, its development initiatives and resource extraction operations. Thus, the political ecology of counterinsurgency dissects institutional arrangements, as well as politics itself, as militarized environments are progressively normalized into the everyday lives of researchers, research participants and landscapes across the globe.

The political ecology of counterinsurgency emerges as a study of social warfare, 'broadening the notion of conflict' and deepening methodological approaches to coercion within extractive research (Huff, 2017: 168), offering four preliminary pillars. First, the political ecology of counterinsurgency interrogates the relationships of force or methods of scientific violence employed to dominate, control and pacify people to the imperatives of governments, companies or elite factions. A central component, related to governmentality (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017), is examining legitimacy construction and normalization, which is linked to targeting and intervening into sociality and socio-cultural relationships of people, hence social warfare (see Dunlap, 2014a). Second, these interventions into people, as Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) document, are often matched by interventions into landscapes, non-human natures and space generally. Thirdly, this perspective unravels the horizontality of communal or inter-ethnic conflict, charting the political economy of social divisions and how racial, caste and gendered discourses and fault lines are operationalized in the service of land control and natural resource extraction. And closely related to all three, the fourth perspective asks if and how political reactions from above are socially engineered in the service of state control, capital accumulation or other political and elite agendas.

'Invasion is a structure not an event,' Patrick Wolfe (2006: 388) reminds us, which is the contention of social warfare discourse and, in large part, the focus of the political ecology of counterinsurgency. Interrogating the socio-ecological warfare techniques employed to control natural and human resources, the political ecology of counterinsurgency offers affinity with post-development and decolonization theory by actively interrogating the past and present modality of this structure of invasion, that can be called the 'colonial matrix of power', 'the state', 'capitalism', 'industrialism' or the 'techno-industrial system' depending on one's perspective. The central focus is examining political and environmental control, and the (warfare) techniques and strategies used to secure it. Said differently, the political ecology of counterinsurgency asks, how can any (external) entity, often in lesser numbers, enters a region to capture resources, establish governance and maintain a relatively high-level of real or imagined legitimacy (see Foucault, 2003; Dunlap, 2014a, 2019)? This is the question being explored around the Tía Maria mine, which details how this popularly contested and controversial mine is invading and attempting to establish legitimacy to exploit the mineral resources in the hills of the Tambo Valley.

3. Peru: environmental conflicts and security services

The Peruvian state's *Defensoría del Pueblo*[5] registered 224 social conflicts in 2013, 149 (67 per cent) were socio-environmental conflicts and 108 were related to mining activities (Lust, 2014). By 2014, mining concessions occupied 20.42% of the country (Romero, 2017: 15), while mining investment in Peru increase 3.8%, totaling USD 2.833 billion in August 2017 (MEM, 2018). Organizing the country around an extractivist model of development, an economic growth strategy centered on market-based natural resource demand and extraction (Bebbington, 2012; Brundenius, 1972), Peru has been littered with various extraction projects and, consequently, a plethora of environmental conflicts with rural and Indigenous populations (Bebbington et al., 2008: 2888–2905; Bebbington, 2012; Bebbington & Bury, 2013; Jaskoski, 2014; Arce, 2014; Gustafson and Solano, 2016). This extractivist development model, and resulting conflicts, has made the Peruvian military and

[5] See https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/.

police, especially the Peruvian National Police (PNP), companions to extraction companies.

In the 1980s, the Maoist, Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) weapon of choice was dynamite stolen from mines, later used to target civil and extractive infrastructure (McClintock, 2005). The Shining Path engulfed Peru into revolutionary war in May 1980, which turned into a prolonged 'Dirty War' lasting until 2000 (see Stern, 1998). The deployment of terrorist tactics by Sendero forces served as a pretext for a series of laws, Defense System Law (1987), Organic Law of the Defense Ministry (1987) and series of decrees in 1991, 2002 and 2007, allowing the military not only to 'assume control of internal order' during States of Emergency (Jaskoski, 2013: 65), but also to contract with private companies. In *Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes*, Maiah Jaskoski (2013) reveals the military's aversion to engage in domestic counterinsurgency operations, which made the Peruvian National Police (PNP) the preferred practitioners. In the 1990s and early 2000s 'the national police increased its participation in counterinsurgency considerably' against Sendero forces, explains Jaskoski (2013: 75), to the point that 'the national police force has expanded it counterinsurgency activities, potentially encroaching on the army's domain and threatening its future budget share'. While the PNP became the leading specialist in counterinsurgency operations, the military's relationship with extractive companies grew. Moreover, the constitution encouraged, under 'resources directly collected' (RDR) contracts, the military to rent equipment (vehicles, helicopters and specialized gear, etc.), infrastructure and personnel to private oil and mineral companies. Contracts were drafted with local army commanders and between the years 2003–2005, RDR comprised approximately eight to eleven percent of the defense budget and could cover between 5 and 50 percent of military base operating expenses. This work proved highly lucrative for military commanders and offered benefits for soldiers, such as medicine, discounted airfare and access to more desirable food and lodging (Jaskoski, 2013). Extraction companies became increasingly influential in directing military patrols, hiring 'Peruvian army units to conduct counterinsurgency patrols' and, in some cases, the army 'conducted police work for companies' (Jaskoski, 2013: 168). Notable among these companies, according to 'a former private security official' was Southern Copper Peru (Jaskoski, 2013: 171), which 'received army protections, suggesting that private mining companies have proved exceptionally influential in terms of affecting army behavior'. The 'securitisation of strategic resources' then, as highlighted by Middeldorp et al. (2016: 934), becomes a reciprocal self-reinforcing process: 'the military is deployed to guard the extraction in progress, and resource extraction revenues are in turn invested in the military'. This self-reinforcing cycle is not limited to the extractives sector, and is more broadly implicated in the increasing militarization and marketization of nature mentioned above.

Under President Alan Garcia (2006–2011) private-public security partnerships would expand to include the Peruvian National Police (PNP). The construction of Indigenous land defenders as the 'internal enemy' (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017), once reserved for the Shining Path paved the way for The July 11, 2009 Decree that authorized 'the provision of extraordinary additional services by the Police' (Grufides, 2013: 9), in the form of two types of contracts: *institutional* and *individualized*. Institutional contracts require an agreement between the Director-General of PNP and the persons or entity requesting protection, which can classify as either *permanent* or *occasional* services. Permanent service would be for a specific time period and occasional would be for short requests between one-to-eight hours. The individualized 'extraordinary additional services' are performed by off-duty police officers, which only require an agreement with the individual officers (Grufides, 2013: 9)—the latter could be read as legalizing paramilitarism. The PNP are currently servicing over 22 mines in over 11 regions with more than 485 police officers working with mining companies 'to "prevent, detect and neutralise" threats by means of precautionary measures, surveillance and patrols' (Grufides, 2013: 10). Threats are understood as 'criminal actions, assaults, acts of sabotage, and terrorism,' which could also include 'acts of a threat-like nature' specified as 'civil war, invasion, insurgency, strikes, internal unrest, civil disturbances, rebellion, vandalism and other criminal and terrorist action' (Grufides, 2013: 10). Jaskoski (2013) demonstrates that the police—specifically the PNP—have out-performed the military and have taken the lead in counterinsurgency operations domestically. Notable among the PNP is the DINOES (National Division of Special Operations) trained for 'anti-subversive' activities and deployed to support extractive operations (Gustafson and Solano, 2016).

Expanding counterinsurgency by Peruvian security agencies dovetails with plans from the United States to send over 3000 US soldiers to PERU for narcotics interdiction and to combat insurgents, which School of the Americas (SOA) Watch (Bravo, 2015: 1) believes is 'a guise for military control and repression of social movements, especially those defending their natural resources' (see also Paley, 2014). This proliferation of private-public security agreements has transformed public security forces into private contractors. Furthermore, according to the January 2014 Law No. 30151 members of the armed forces and PNP are exempted from criminal responsibility if they cause injury or death on duty. Human rights groups have called Law No. 30151 a 'license to kill' (FLD, 2017: 2). These arrangements are also used by Southern Copper, which registered an agreement in 2010 with PNP XI Dirtepol of Arequipa to 'provide extraordinary services' under an 'individualized service'[6] contract (Palomino, 2015). Thus impunity is granted under Law No. 30151 to security personnel, which appears to have taken effect during the Tía Maria conflict.

4. The Tía Maria project & conflict

Southern began conducting extensive geological and geochemical studies in 2003, which was followed by The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) granting approval for an environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 2006 (Castillo Fernández et al., 2011). However, since 2012, the MEM is responsible for approving EIAs and not the Ministry of the Environment (Lust, 2014). The Tía Maria project sought to extract 120 thousand tons of copper cathodes per year for 18 years with a 1.4 billion dollar investment and three mining and processing sites. The first mining site is 'La Tapada' in the *Pampa Yamayo*, which is located closest to Cocachacra, El Fiscal and the Tambo River. Exemplifying, Stuart Kirsch's (2014) notion of 'corporate science', Southern measurements claim that La Tapada is 3 km[7] away, while independent investigators demonstrate it is 1.2 km[8] and locals assert that the distance from the Tambo River is between 500 and 700 m.[9] Second is the 'Tía Maria' site in *Cachuyo* area that according to the company is 7 km from the Tambo Valley and, third, the processing and leaching site in the *Pampa Cachendo* that is 11 km away from the Valley (see Fig. 1).

Southern entered the Tambo Valley in a similar way to wind energy projects in Mexico (Dunlap, 2018b, 2019), which was to approach national political bodies, local municipal leaders and, eventually, civil society groups. President of the Broad Front of Defense and Development Interests in the Islay Province,[10] at the time, Catalina Torocahua, explained that in '2006 the mine became known as a result of usurping city boundaries' and by '2007 the company entered formally to talk

[6] With 20% of the amount paid to commissioned and non-commissioned offers directly into the PNP National Bank account.

[7] Southern Copper, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pd1OL9EEj4k.

[8] See minutes 6:30–7:00 of RTVE (2016). *La Battalla del Cobre*, Available at: http://www.rtve.es/television/20160823/batalla-del-cobre/1296701.shtml.

[9] Interviews, 1, 30 & 37.

[10] Frente Amplio de defense y desarrollo de los intereses de la provincial de Islay.

with the authorities: Mayors and leaders'.[11] At the time Catalina was trying to start a portable water project for the Valley, called Plan Maestro. Eventually, once a representative from Southern approached Catalina, explaining that if she accepted the mine her portable water 'plan will be achieved, because the mine is going to give a big Canon minero, [12] and supposedly this cannon minero will make this project a reality'.[13] Catalina, aware of the ecological costs of mining, expressed serious hesitation based on her knowledge of mining in Moquegua, Tacna and La Oroya. The representative replied by assuring her that there was an 'abundance of water,' pollution and particulates from the mine would not spread and cover the crops. Catalina responded by asserting that 'what is logical is that no mayor or leader decides, it should be a popular consultation and nobody should oppose this,' to which, according to Catalina, Southern's representative replied: 'I already talked to the Mayors and leaders and they already agreed'.

Opposition to the Tía Maria project was rooted in past experiences with Southern's operations and mining in general. Catalina and other research participants referenced a series of mines: La Oroya, a distant copper smelter; Moquegua[14] and Toquepala[15] mineral mines operated by Southern in the neighboring province; Tacna operated by Minsur; Cerro Verde copper mine; and, most importantly, Southern's smelting facility in Ilo. People claim that Ilo produced acid rain in the Tambo Valley, killing all the olive trees in the 1970s, which is a common story linked to the belief that Southern authorized the assassination of agronomist and opponent of the Ilo smelter, Carlos Guillén Carrerra on October 2, 1998.[16]

Previous experiences with mining projects combined with the Tambo Valley's strong agrarian culture laid the foundations for ardent resistance. There are about 40,000 people, José Romero's (2017) contends in his new book—*Lo Que Los Ojos No Ven* (*What the Eyes Do Not See*)—that are anchored directly or indirectly into the agrarian economy. Cocachacra, according to Romero (2017), consist of 2000 plantation owners, 7000 small holders and renters along with 8000 day laborers (*Jornaleros*). The district of Cocachacra, based on 2007 census data, consists of 47.15% agricultural activity, 11.72% in retail trade, 5.63% in transportation, 4.36% in hotels, 4.16% in construction and 3.53% in mining and quarries (Romero, 2017: 21). While people engaged in agriculture also engage in small commercial operations, the Cocachacra demographic is similar in other districts, often with agriculture in the 60th percentile (see Romero, 2017: 21–30). The backbone and existence of the Tambo Valley is agriculture, which retains not only a strong agrarian economy, but also a culture that the mine is generally understood as threatening.

There are three principle reasons why the populace rejects the mine: (1) ground water usage; (2) contamination of the groundwater and (3) air pollution. Southern claims that the wind blows on shore, implying that the wind will not carry mining particulates into the Valley, yet as Catalina and others pointed out the winds current shifts daily between on-and-off shore, highlighting a popular misconception propagated by Southern that entrenches existing distrust. Regarding socio-ecological impact, it was common for residents to feel that 'the mine is only destruction,' 'it is slow death' and, referring to social development funds: 'What is the point of having schools, medical clinics, universities if they will be slowly killing us?'[17] The link between slow violence and mining is clear to the majority of residents (Nixon, 2011; Springer & Le Billon, 2016). Furthermore the job opportunities offered by Southern are not only limited compared to those offered by agriculture in the Valley, but they require technical expertise that will discriminate against the young, old and unskilled labors. Romero (2017: 46) contends that Tía Maria's 'operation phase would hardly employ 600 workers, while the agrarian economy offers jobs to more than 20,000 families'. Lastly, like other research participants, Catalina rejects the idea of authorities approving the Tía Maria mine without achieving the population's general consent or 'social license'.

There were three public consultations hosted by Southern in November 2007, July 2009 and August 2009. Despite popular skepticism and distrust rooted in experiences with Ilo, Moquegua, and disinformation about the wind currents, the consultations gained steam and the company offered three methods of mine water use, from the river, ground or sea water. During the August 2009 consultation, the EIA did not favor desalination of sea water and residents—based on finding identity cards they found[18]—claimed that Southern bused people into the consultation 'from the outside,' notably students from the National University of San Augustine in Arequipa to fabricate consent for the mine (Romero, 2017). Consultations as spaces for manufacturing consent is common (see Bebbington, 2012; Dunlap, 2017b: 1–21; Gamu & Dauvergne, 2018), yet this triggered a riot and assaults against representatives of Southern with rocks, sticks and plastic chairs[19] (Jaskoski, 2014). Now the Defense Front and Interests of the Tambo Valley inspired by previous struggles in Tambogrand and Minera Majaz (Arce, 2014), began to implement Catalina's idea to hold a popular consultation (*consulta popular*) against Tía Maria and its EIA. In October 2009 the Defense Front organized the popular consultation in Cocachaca, Punta de Bombón and Deán Valdivia, resulting in 93.4% rejection of the Tía Maria project by the voters (Sullivan, 2015). This led to continued organizing, widespread protest and strikes called against Southern in 2010 (Bedregal & Scott, 2013), while 4000 PNP were ready to enter the Valley the MEM opted to contract the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) to evaluate the Tía Maria EIA (Castillo Fernández et al., 2011; Jaskoski, 2014). Then in March, just before UNOPS would release the report, the contract was cancelled, due to budgetary constraints by MEM (Sullivan, 2015). The UNOPS report, however, was leaked, revealing 138 observations including missing a hydrological study and failure to recognize other minerals (e.g. molybdenum, silver, gold) in the concession (Castillo Fernández et al., 2011: 80-3; Sullivan, 2015). When it became clear that the government would ignore UNOPS' 138 observations an indefinite strike was organized for March 23, 2011.

The state responded with repression. The PNP flooded the area, police attacked and protests escalated, which gave rise to the now infamous *Espartambos* (Fig. 2).[20] Referencing the Spartans from the film *300* in the Tambo Valley, these individuals took a position of combative self-defense against the police, widely recognized for grabbing large sheets of tin and wood to use as shields to block the rubber bullets, bird shot and rocks of the police. The conflict escalated, with the police shooting and killing four: Adrés Taipe Chuquipuma on April 4th followed by Néstor Cerezo Patana, Aurelio Huarcapuma Clemente and Miguel Ángel Pino on April 7th, 2011 (Sullivan, 2015). This led the government to temporarily pull back from the Tía Maria project as the strike paralyzed the valley and the conflict sowed terror and resentment.

[11] Interview 1, 13-01-2018.

[12] The 1992 *canon minero* law, allows 20% of corporate mining tax be allocated to the territories where companies operate. In 2001 the *canon minero* was raised to 50% and extended this tax to other extractive activities (see Bebbington, 2012, p. 92).

[13] Interview 1, 13-01-2018.

[14] http://larepublica.pe/archivo/704641-tacna-fiscalia-investiga-a-southern-por-presunta-contaminacion.http://larepublica.pe/politica/978337-pasto-grande-pide-demolicion-de-cancha-de-relaves-de-southern.http://www.radiouno.pe/noticias/23662/viceministros-se-negaron-ingresar-embalse-relaves-quebrada-honda.

[15] See https://ejatlas.org/conflict/cuajone-toquepala-ilo-peru.

[16] http://elpueblo.com.pe/noticia/opinion/quien-mato-carlos-guillen-carrera & https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvC5PARFWGg.

[17] Interview 11, 13-01-18; Interview 20, 15-01-18; & Interview 34, 17-01-18.

[18] Interview, 42, 18-01-2018.

[19] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzAKk_snE-E.

[20] Interview 2, 12-01-2018.

Fig. 2. Espartambos on the frontlines battling police and their armored vehicles, 2015. Photo: Miguel Mejía Castro.

This victory, however, was short-lived. Southern launched an information campaign to re-enter the Valley, which then, according to Carlos Aranda, Southern's national head of 'community relations,' in late 2012 were 'summoned by the Ministry of Energy and Mines' and 'they told us that: "we are willing to give it another chance, so let's go ahead with Tia Maria."'[21] The government imposed three conditions on Southern: (1) a desalination plant; (2) redo the social impact study; and (3) comply with the UNOPS observations. Aranda, explains: 'We did all three of them'.[22] In January 2013, Southern began a full-spectrum public relations campaign, and it began a new EIA in November 2013. Meanwhile, people commenced hunger strikes against Tía Maria in Arequipa in December and October 2013 (Romero, 2017). Eventually, however, the new EIA was approved on August 2014, as MEM claimed that all the observations were resolved. Despite the deaths, investment risk and popular opposition, the government decided to permit the project.

The Mining Conflict Observatory (OCM), however, found the same issues as with the previous EIA regarding the hydrogeological and subsoil analysis, and the lack of information about the clearing tank and crushing plant. Other objections related to particulates from construction, and the risk of sulphuric acid evaporation that could cause acid rain. Moreover, the new study evaded assessments on the desalination plant's impacts on nearby wetland conservation,[23] and also neglected community participation in the study (Romero, 2017; Sullivan, 2015). These irregularities led the Defense Front to request UNOPS to review the new EIA, which was denied.

Once negotiations broke down an indefinite strike was called on March 23, 2015. Again, the Valley erupted in protests, road blockades and eventually combat with PNP. Then Southern's Tía Maria head of 'community relations,' Julio Morriberón, declared on March 27th once again, the retirement of the Tía Maria project, first due to, 'the onslaught of a new type of terrorism, anti-mining terrorism' and 'secondly, the paralysis of the state in its role of promoting investments and giving the necessary guarantees to get them started' (Daly, 2015, n.p.). ***Tapping into the socio-politico discourse of terruco, or terrorist, Southern employs a cultural device from the Dirty War that constructed (dark-skinned) rural and Indigenous people as subhuman, fanatical and violent terrorists (*****Aguirre, 2011*****), thus criminalizing and justifying scorched-earth counterinsurgency tactics against highland populations during the war*. *This trend has continued since (*Bebbington, 2012***;*** Andreucci & Kallis, 2017***),* and** recently after Primitivo Evanán's exhibition, at The Art Museum of Lima (MALI), was slandered as 'terrorism apologetics' (apología al terrorismo), Journalist Gabriela Wiener (2018), highlighting this socio-political device coined the verb '*terruquear*' to refer to a 'political strategy that uses the fear of terrorism for its benefit' (Trelles, 2018: n.p). Morriberón, and, later, Aranda (see La Republica, 2018: n.p), we can say are '*terruqueadores*', people who are operationalizing the discourse of terrorism from the Dirty War to encourage, and subsequently, justify, police and military intervention to enforce the operation of the Tía Maria mine.

In April, the conflict further escalated. Three residents were murdered by security forces: Victoriano Huayna Nina, Henery Checlla Chura and Ramón Colque, and one police officer, Alberto Vásquez, was killed. This eventually gave way to President Ollanta Humala declaring a State of Emergency on May 9, 2015, involving the presence of 3000 police and 2000 military personnel (Romero, 2017). The next section will explore the state terrorism and 'hard' counterinsurgency tactics deployed during the police invasions and State of Emergency to enforce mineral extraction.

5. Terrorizing the valley: the state, PNP & military

The contested approval of the EIA and the deployment of the PNP and, later, military against the strike only reinforced the existing belief that the politicians nationally and locally had been bought by Southern. 'The politicians just want to fill their pockets because they do not care about the consequences, the consequences that will affect everyone—they are not going to live here,' explains a disgruntled mother, 'they promise us [to terminate Tía Maria] every time they come here, but when they enter as presidents they begin to agree with the contracts and all of this—they are cheats.[24] President Humala came to the Tambo Valley before election in 2011 proclaiming that Tía Maria 'must be

[21] Interview 24, 16-01-18.
[22] Interview 24, 16-01-18.
[23] Interview 47, 18-02-18.
[24] Interview 10, 13-01-2018.

revoked' and that the people's 'voice has a binding character before any political decision,'[25] then four years later declared a State of Emergency against the Valley asking that the 'full weight of the law come down on these criminals, murderers and extortionists'.[26] Local politicians and administrators tend to have a more antagonistic dynamic with the mine, but, as Romero (2017: 54) reveals, there are 'mining candidates' sponsored by Southern 'with the aim of legitimizing and promoting their interests'. In December 2017, Yamila Osario, the current governor of Arequipa, accepted a 770,000 soles (approx. USD 235,503) donation a week before announcing Tía Maria will begin operations in March 2018.[27] The Odebrecht bribery scandal, which placed ex-president Humala and his wife in pre-trial detention and caused President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski to resign, serves as a high-profile reminder of the systemic political corruption residents' associate with the Tía Maria project.[28] Distrust and contempt for politicians would characterize the majority of interviews, but, in a neoliberal regime (see Springer, 2016), the line between bribery and contract negotiations, the public and transnational private sector is increasingly fine.

The Tambo Valley residents are convinced that the PNP and military work for Southern. 'In reality it is not the state that declared the State of Emergency, it's the project that induced the state through the power they have to declare a State of Emergency, for what? Why? … to minimize protests,' says a conservationist who continues: 'there are cities with crime, theft and a lot of bad things, but there are no police,' but 'there are police to defend a project, a hill, but there are no police to defend and take care of the population—that is strange, no?'[29] Southern's Carlos Aranda, however, describes the situation in 2011 this way:

> We had three people that were killed in this process. Not because they were on our property or in part of the project, they were killed because the mob decided to block the roads and in Peru that is illegal. When they went to block a major highway, like Pan American South, and they blocked it for days, the police came in and violence took over the Valley and three people died.[30]

Southern representatives stress that Southern adheres to 'environmental regulations' and the 'rule of law,' while the protesters do not. What 'happened is regrettable, your little deaths (*muertitos*), rest in peace, who died in these protests,' says Tía Maria's head of Community Relations continuing to assert that 'it's true that Southern, like every human being, also has the capacity to say, "stop."'[31] Aside from the poor choice of words, '*muertitos*,' this statement defends the transnational corporation's right to stop popular oppositions to their operations.

The 2015 indefinite strike unleashed the fury of the state (Fig. 4). It began with marches and road blockades (Fig. 3), with women, children and the elderly leading the demonstrations, when, according to most accounts, 'the police came and pushed, used their batons and then the people also used sugarcane sticks and the police began to use teargas bombs. Then the people responded with whatever they had'. In 2011 and 2015 police actions were brutal: beating people; shooting tear gas, slinging rocks from Hondas and even firing bullets at people. On the tactical front they deployed undercover police and informants; monitored the area with drones; and patrolled the air with helicopters that also fired tear gas and dropped rocks on the demonstrators. They further engaged in acts designed to create depredation and psychological stress burning rice fields; and even attacking funeral processions with teargas for people killed during the demonstrations; as well as the repeated accounts of police framing people once they were arrested. Remembering Kali's event described in the introduction, another instance is the case of Antonio 'Miguelito' Coasaca. On April 23, 2015 the PNP DINOES division beat and dragged Coasaca down the highway, then concussed, the police broke his hand and forced a caltrop into it. Subsequently, they called a nearby journalist over to take a photograph as evidence. This police action was documented on video[32] and later dropped in court.[33] The lawyer Héctor Herrera, who defended Coasaca and over 120 people from the Valley during this period, remembers: 'I also have people who were planted with bullets, dynamite and everyday somebody arrives to me with rocks, sticks and Hondas and the police saying: "I saw him with that."' Herrera continues, 'here is a delinquent state who ordered the police to plant evidence and prosecutors that collaborated with them'.[34] This legal action was prefaced with people claiming that police would cover up evidence by taking bodies from hospitals, which would additionally delay and prevent medical care. '[N]ot only did they kill us,' explains Kali, 'but when we wanted to take the body of our brother they threw tear gas canisters and they prevented us from taking our dead'.[35] Stating that Ramón Colque 'bled to death' and 'a lot of people wanted to help him, but 'the police did not allow us,' explains a woman continuing that the police 'stole the body from the clinic and I think they wanted to disappear him or something like that'.[36] Scuffles over corpses and the wounded in clinics and hospitals were frequent during the indefinite strikes.

The violent behavior of the police only escalated during the State of Emergency. Police cut off the lights in the Valley, threw rocks and teargas into houses and conducted night raids on houses of suspected organizers or Espartambos. Two women explain:

> W1: It was a terrible abuse, terrible abuse and they did whatever they wanted with us. They entered into the houses at four in the morning to take out all the young people, because snitches were whispering.
>
> W2: By pointing people out … they entered into Maria's house in the middle of the night to take out her husband.
>
> Q: With what reason?
>
> W2: They said that he was an Espartambo.

Later in the conversation this second woman recounts the police telling her to 'shut up you shitty terrorist,' when she was pleading with them not to throw tear gas into her house where her sick mother with bronchitis and 'a delicate heart' was living. The police did anyway and they had to get her to the hospital in Arequipa.[37] The trauma left by the police would surface with eyes of rage, fear and tears. During interviews older women would repeatedly break into tears remembering how the police chased, beat and dragged people down the street or when the police would raid houses at night dragging people out of bed, while children stood naked in the street

[25] See Mollendinostv (2016). Ollanta Humala ¿traicionó a su palabra? Consulta. Availible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFr2PEVToWY & Reuters (2018). *La Battalla del Cobre,* available at: http://www.rtve.es/television/20160823/batalla-del-cobre/1296701.shtml.

[26] See Tv Perú (2015). Mensaje a la Nación del Presidente Ollanta Humala. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bselvRy_cjY.

[27] See La República (2017). Available at: http://larepublica.pe/politica/1154229-gra-recibira-donacion-de-s770-mil-de-southern.

[28] See BBC (2017) Odebrecht case: Politicians worldwide suspected in bribery scandal. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41109132.

[29] Interview 26, 16-01-2018.

[30] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.

[31] Interview 43, 18-01-2018.

[32] La República (2015). Video muestra que policía "sembró" arma a manifestante contra Tía María | VIDEO. Available at: http://larepublica.pe/politica/872285-video-muestra-que-policia-sembro-arma-a-manifestante-contra-tia-maria-video.

[33] Redacción (2017). Absuelven a agricultor a quien 'sembraron' arma durante protestas contra Tía María. Availible at: http://rpp.pe/peru/arequipa/absuelven-a-agricultor-a-quien-sembraron-arma-durante-protestas-contra-tia-maria-noticia-1071324.

[34] Interview 42, 18-01-2018.

[35] Interview 2.2, 19-01-2018.

[36] Interview 12, 14-01-2018.

[37] Interview 17, 15-01-2018.

Fig. 3. Protestors stand behind a barricade in Cocachacra. Photo: Miguel Mejía Castro.

Fig. 4. The PNP and DINOES' with a South African style armored transport vehicles. Photo: Miguel Mejía Castro.

screaming in tears. Meanwhile, the military stood by holding assault rifles watching (Fig. 5), and by some accounts even criticized the behavior of the police. One person recounted that one military officer even said, 'sometimes I want to grab my weapon and shoot the police. Because I do not like how they treat the old women—they push and kick them'.[38] Not only does this resonate with earlier accounts by Jaskoski (2013), that the Peruvian military refrains from domestic operations, but also Hanna Arendt's (1962/1951: 289) early observations of the enhanced abilities of police to dispense terror.

Because of the brutal behavior and murders by the police, along with them having 'long hair, scars on their face, beards, [and] tattoos,'[39] people were convinced that these were not police, but rather mine security

[38] Interview 40, 18-01-2018.

[39] Interview 1, 2, 17, 19, 26, 40 & 41.

Fig. 5. Military helicopter hovers over the rice patties, while soldiers stand guard. Photo: Miguel Mejía Castro.

personnel—'they weren't police they were miners dressed like police, yes, contracted by Southern'.[40] An ex-military private security contractor, in the business for over fifteen years, 'Jim' explained that 'apart of the intelligence service here in Peru, exist the famous mercenaries' that are sent to the 'frontlines' of conflicts, 'because when the police commit excesses, they get in trouble'. According to Jim, the police contract mercenaries for purposes of plausible deniability, which complements accounts in 2015 that the PNP had unknown name tags that read 'FilosofeXXX' (Palomino, 2015). When asking Jim about this he replied: 'In some cases, they dress by themselves like police, because they also want to protect themselves'. This concern overlapped with the deployment of undercover police and informants in the demonstrations; many were caught and confessed that they were paid 100 soles to attend meetings and demonstrations.[41] Isabel explains: 'When people captured infiltrators, more than three or four people, also women, they would punish them because they were paid by the mine to infiltrate, but we already knew who they were. When we see people we do not know, we already know it's them'.[42] During the State of Emergency informants were also used to point out the homes of protest organizers and Espartambos—'So there were police infiltrators and they took notes where people live, and in the night the police would abduct people'.[43]

Herrera suggests the possible presence of *Grupo Terna*, a division of undercover police. Jim, however, explained that not only in 'the majority of the cases' mining companies 'work with DINOES,' but that 'every mining and oil company has their own [secret] service that we call, special services'. This security contractor continued to explain how every resource extraction company in Peru has something called 'Internal Affairs' (*asuntos internos*), which is the extraction companies 'intelligence service,' largely staffed by ex-military and security personnel, that specializes in 'counter-intelligence' and is responsible for neutralizing opposition against the mine and stifling attempts at corporate espionage and concession theft. Jim explained that the job of internal affairs was to pacify opposition, which included negotiating 'one million' soles with local opposition leaders to stop protests for a certain amount of time and continues: 'So they deceive them with a medical clinic, I do not know, with a donation of clothes for kids, or blankets, so something that looks great for the community, but in reality it is nothing. So they handle it this way. So what does an Internal Affairs do? They begin to check up on the leader' and if the leader begins asking for more or breaks his deal by protesting to negotiate for more money with the extraction company, then 'sometimes they are in charge of disappearing him from the map'. This resonates with the Pepe Julio Gutiérrez case, former Tambo Valley Defense Front leader, who in January 2018 was sentenced to thirty years-six months for negotiating 1.5 million 'lentils' to end the indefinite strike with a lawyer from Southern in 2015.[44] Romero (2017: 99) contends this was a strategy to fragment the social movement, which remains plausible as Southern's lawyer was not brought to court. This case resonates with General Kitson's (2010/1971:69–71) recommendations on how to use the law as method to neutralize activists and 'disposal of unwanted members of the public' (see also Churchill, 2002/1989: 44). Nevertheless, the dark side of environmental conflicts is revealed—cooptation, assassination and 'neutralization' by every means. Finally, referring to this research, Jim concluded: 'The things that you are doing are intelligence work and, so they have their team of counter-intelligence, I hope that this [research] does not become detected at any moment; otherwise you are going to have very serious troubles'.

When discussing the political violence in the Valley during 2011–2015, people at the demonstrations or families of the dead were convinced that snipers were present at the demonstrations. For example, Nestor 'got shot in the head, which is not a lost or accidental bullet. We are not that foolish—we recognized that a sniper was there'.[45] Raising this question to Jim elicited this response:

> That is what we call asymmetric warfare. So with this they [the company] tell you, "if you continue irritating me, the same is going to happen to you." This is another way to debilitate the group, if you are the principle head [protests leader] and you move twenty people, I am not going to kill him [another person], I want to kill you. Because when I neutralize you, I weaken all of them. And now, who is going to direct them? Nobody is going to direct them, so this group has to create another and I come back and I kill him again.
>
> Q: And for the asymmetric warfare, how involved are the mining

[40] Interview 19, 15-01-2018.

[41] FN, 14-01-2018; Interview 2.2, 12-01-2018.

[42] Interview 12, 14-01-2018.

[43] Interview 2, 12-01-2018.

[44] La Republica (2018) Tía María: Piden 30 años de prisión para Pepe Julio Gutiérrez. Available at: http://larepublica.pe/sociedad/1172269-piden-30-anos-de-prision-para-pepe-julio-gutierrez.

[45] Interview 36, 17-01-2018.

companies in strategies of asymmetric warfare?

> They always do it, they always use it. As I told you they use it to debilitate the group.
>
> Q: Asymmetric warfare is part of what they have to do?
>
> It's part of the process.
>
> Q: Its always part of the process?
>
> This case is more the last resort. When the situation gets very difficult … when a problem has been created that cannot be controlled. When they cannot control the situation with money, this is the last resort and especially when the leader, for example receives 1 million [soles], but in two or three months he goes and asks for more money.

This animates where and how the 'soft' and then 'hard' approaches to managing opposition meet, demonstrating the intricate relationship between counterinsurgency and resource extraction operations. While Jim did not work for Southern, he confirms that there are people 'still in the army … working intelligence … with them'.[46] It is clear, however, that 'without asymmetric warfare techniques the protesters can paralyze the mining operations, and in one day the company will lose millions' (see Franks et al., 2014). This intimately emphasizes the importance of counterinsurgency in extractive research, offering details into the techniques of political violence employed in an attempt to render the land investable and the minerals extractable.

6. Developing the valley: public relations, social development & valleunido

The intensity of police violence was matched by Southern's 'information campaigns,' 'community relations' teams and development programs that, one woman said, 'entered into everything!'[47] Catalina agrees, 'they are in everything, they are in education, they are in health care'.[48] Southern's operations have entered into just about every facet of Tambo Valley life, manifesting an extractive biopolitics, rooted in counterinsurgency tactics to secure access to subsoil resources. This socially integrative biopolitical approach is consistent with, and animated by, previous research on 'soft' counterinsurgency and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives (Brock & Dunlap, 2018; Dunlap, 2018a,b; Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Marijnen, 2017; Verweijen & Marijnen, 2018). Research has linked extraction company social interventions to *the Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies Field Manual* (FM3-24, 2014) chapter titled 'Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,' specifically the approach known as '*integrated monetary shaping operations*' (Dunlap, 2018a,b; Brock & Dunlap, 2018). 'Integrated monetary shaping operations are the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support' the goals of security forces (or mining companies), using 'developmental assistance, infrastructure, and governance support projects to win the support of an indigenous populace and erode support for the adversary' (FM3-24, 2014: 10–11). There is a strong relation between US and Peruvian counterinsurgency (Koven, 2016), which even extends to FM3-24 (2014: 8-1) explicitly referencing Peru as successfully employing integrated monetary shaping operations:

> Peru demonstrates that intelligence capabilities can be integrated with information operations and integrated monetary shaping operations to successfully undermine an insurgency. The Peruvian government was eventually successful in using economic development and an information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency.

Southern's approach in the Tambo Valley closely resembled the principles of integrated monetary shaping operations to 'win' the 'hearts' and 'minds' of the population to mitigate resistance and gain 'social license' for the Tía Maria project.

In January 2013, Southern Copper began a full-spectrum 'intervention'[49] into the social life of the Tambo Valley. This first began with 'Plan Reencuentro' that would invest 100 million soles (approximately USD 30.6 million) into disseminating Tía Maria information with 46 volunteers going door-to-door, offering to paint and giving new concrete floors to houses (Romero, 2017). Aranda, explains: '[W]e started doing things, like paint your house, because after the violence a lot of the houses were left in really bad shape with graffiti and you know that sort of thing'.[50] House painting, especially after 2015, served a dual purpose of community relations, but also to paint over the anti-Southern graffiti in the region. Social development, mining public relations and 'Broken Windows' theory—the theory that visible symbols of civil disorder, or political opposition, encourage further crime (see Williams, 2007: 211–212)—comes into confluence in counterinsurgency strategy.

People in the Valley, however, saw what was happening and, in Aranda's words, 'some of them [staff] had been kicked out of the Valley. They ran away, there were threats made to their lives, people tried to burn their houses and [vehicles,] so they left the Valley'. This terminated 'Plan Reencuentro,' which was later revived as 'Future Arrived' (*El Futuro Llegó*) in 2015 while the second EIA was under review. This initiative, however, ended with the indefinite strike and State of Emergency—shifting from social warfare to military occupation of the Valley. Southern 'pulled everyone out,' recounts Aranda, 'we did not do anything in the Valley, but what we decided to do was a very strong information campaign outside Arequipa, we did it in the rest of the country'. Aranda did interviews with newspapers, radio and television stations, in addition to buying advertisement space in the rest of the country, until 'finally, the current Governor said, "You should be doing this in Arequipa." The radios and the television said: "You should be doing this here." So then we came back, because one thing is for you to come back without anyone asking you and another is when someone asks you to return'.[51] The main justification to return in 2015 came from the Governor of Arequipa and the radio and television stations, the latter of which Southern is known to control. According to Romero (2017: 58), Southern retains 'control over more than thirteen local radios that exist in the Islay Province and Tambo Valley'. Reportedly, a brief case from a head journalist contained receipts for thousands of journalists that were paid by Southern on the quantity and quality of criticism lodged at mining opponents (Romero, 2017: 58). It seems that the media, national and regional governments were the ones in favor of Southern returning—and less so the residents of the Valley.

Then enters *Valleunido* in 2016, Southern's 'community relations' third wave (Fig. 6). Valleunido—'Valley United'—consisted of 27 people responsible for the 'information centers,' going door-to-door everyday with information brochures and implementing social development projects with the goal, in the words of 'Tía Maria's Social Relations Manager,' to have 'the Tía Maria project viewed as an opportunity and not as a threat'. Largely recruiting people indigenous to the Valley, Valleunido developed a corporate culture (see Dugger, 1989) that allows members to co-create the group name, brain storming sessions to better reach the population and a collective identity. 'So we gave them information, we trained them,' says Aranda, 'we actually had training days for them where we explained what mining is, what the project was, how we do mining in our operations, what environmental

[46] This quote is fragmented to prevent the identification of this research participant.
[47] Interview 36, 17-01-2018.
[48] Interview 1, 12-01-2018.
[49] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.
[50] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.
[51] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.

Fig. 6. Southern Copper's 'Project Tía Maria Building Trust' book cover. Source: Valleunido.

concerns we have and what we do for those concerns'.[52] This also includes pep rallies and measuring the impact of Valleunidos' efforts using census consultants, sociologists and anthropologists. Notably, Aranda makes the distinction between 'community relations' and 'public relations,' explaining that public relations 'is mainly for interactions between our higher authorities in the company with the mayors, the church, social things like festivities,' while community relations 'are much more hands on—working with the farmers, working with the cattle ranchers and the things that we do with the population'.

Valleunido's community interventions fall under the later program: *Construyamos Confianza Proyecto Tía Maria* (Project Tía Maria Building Trust), which approached the community on six socio-ecological fronts. First, *Tambo Agricola* that worked to improve soil quality, offering free fertilizers, pesticides, and 'high-quality' seeds, in addition to classes on 'improved' rice growing techniques. Additionally, Southern repaired irrigation canals and promoted mechanization of agriculture techniques. Second *Tambo Ganadero* was a program geared to improve cattle and livestock by offering educational workshops, free straw, staffing veterinarians and offering nitrogen tanks to allow the optimal condition for cattle insemination. According to Southern, this project has 'improved the quality of both the cows and pigs' with 'an increment of 13 or a bit more increase in milk production'.[53] Third, *Mejora tu Vividenda*, offered Rotoplas portable water tanks and concrete floors for homes, while also renovating water infrastructure in select towns. Fourth, *Apoyo a la Educacíon* provided school materials, computers, uniforms, after school programs and painted and repaired parts of the school. Fifth, *Apoyo a la Salud*, invested in medical clinics, 24 h medical professionals, dentists, educational classes and, even, 'has paid or is about to pay 25 million soles' (approximately USD 7.6 Million) for three studies for a hospital in Mollendo. Finally, community interventions also included three *Oficinas Informativas* (information centers) in Punta Bombón, Deán Valdivia and Cocachacra (Southern, 2016: 1–55), which were located on mains streets and, in Cocachacra, behind the PNP station. These information centers were akin to internet cafes, except they had a staff ready to discuss the benefits of the Tía Maria project, have you sit and watch Southern's promotional videos as well as handout promotional material and posters from Southern, the MEM, PNP and Jehovah's Witness. Asking a mother in Punta Bombón if they have ever heard of these internet cafes, they replied: 'Yes, I heard about this place, but I never go, but people told me you have to go with your identification card and sign and then you can leave'.[54] While this was not my experience, other accounts are similar.

There have been three Valleunidos impact reports that, according to Aranda, can be summarized as: (1) 'They do not like you; ' (2) 'we showed improvement …. [but] Yeah not so good; ' and (3) 'this last one is a bit better. We are actually … pinpointing areas where we have to improve'. Southern uses social scientists, anthropologists and, more frequently, sociologists in an attempt to guide development interventions and measure their impact at convincing the population to accept the Tía Maria project. While studies revealed Deán Valdivia as being irreconcilable, these operations are consistent with research findings studying controversial wind energy projects in Mexico (Dunlap, 2018a, 2019) and reminiscent of anthropologists and other social scientists measuring the impact of the resettlement and development programs in Vietnam and elsewhere (Owens, 2015; Price, 2014). 'The engineering of consent,' Edward Bernays (1947: 118) explains: 'learns what group leaders know and do not know, the extent to which they will cooperate

[52] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.
[53] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.
[54] Interview 11, 13-01-2018.

with him, the media that reach them, appeals that may be valid, and the prejudices, the legends, or the facts by which they live'. This demonstrates how (often banal types of) knowledge can be weaponized and how social scientists are instrumental to the social engineering extraction.

Social warfare is the process of social engineering. The operations of Valleunido, Internal Affairs and their integrated monetary shaping approach specialize in the social engineering of populations to convenience them to relinquish their natural resources. In this sense interventions into people become an intervention into the land. The social engineering of extraction then seeks to break opposition, which includes the people's connections with the land, water and their livelihoods. Meanwhile, progressively trying to isolate, criminalize and demoralize land defenders (see Birss, 2017; Gedicks, 2015; Middeldorp et al., 2016; Rasch, 2017; Verweijen, 2017: 1–17), so as to gain 'social license' through popular acceptance or, more likely after police and military interventions, exhaustion and fear-induced acquiescence. The calculus of the company, it must be remembered, measures acceptance based on the intensity of protest and disruption, or the lack thereof.[55]

A decisive political technology, according to Aranda, was the creation of 'community committees' which decide what is important to their communities and what needs to be solved. Aranda, summarizing their initial formation, explains: 'Listen, do not come and tell us that you need an airport that is out of the question, but if you see something that has to do with health, education, environment, culture or whatever, bring it here'.[56] Community committees allowed Southern to be strategic with their distribution of funds and create a participatory culture. Central to controlling local communities', Hochmuller and Muller (2017: 175) remind us, 'is "community input," which can be translated into civil-military intelligence. This rural development strategy deserves acknowledgement for addressing the Valley's social needs, but is unfortunately employed as a weapon of persuasion in the service of resource acquisition, 'economic gain' and to 'to have Tia Maria working,'[57] not for the sake of supporting the developmental aspirations of the community.

These counter-insurrectionary social interventions seeking the populations' approval were intelligent. Nevertheless, the damage was done. The local response to social development was largely negative: 'It's a scam,'[58] 'Blackmail,'[59] and its purpose 'is to change our mentality'.[60] Another woman says, 'the "help" are like small pills to calm people down'.[61] The portable water, concrete floors, fertilizer and so, required a signature that the people were convinced was being collected to show the MEM as proof of 'social license'. For example, one woman contends that Southern has 'a strategy, they say "I am going to give you a floor in your house, but you have to sign this piece of paper with your identification card." …. So they did not give you things because it is a gift, 'no,' they did it in order to collect signatures to bring it to Lima and present the documents that the people signed here to agree with the mine', but 'everybody knows that this is blackmail taking advantage of people's needs'.[62] While a Valleunido canvasser denies this,[63] people felt that Southern was taking advantage of people's needs, which is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi's (2001/1944: 118) observations of 'hunger,' as instrumental to forcing people into work, or Milford Batemans (2010: 74) critique of microfinance as 'poverty-pushed entrepreneurship'—where abject poverty pushes people into microfinance schemes. While organizing deprivation is a classic technique of colonial counterinsurgency,[64] so is the deployment of social amenities and gifts to get people to accept political control. It was widely recorded, however, that Tambo Valley residents would take the benefits, but remained in complete opposition to the mine.

Human terrain studies, public relations and engaging in social development praxis, as it combines with state repression, also exploit local prejudices. The first was popularly conceived racism, dividing owning farmers from day labors. The racist discourse was especially salient in La Punta, among older *Criollo's* and municipal administrators. One municipal agent states:

> The farmers, the real native farmers, they are not the people who made the strikes. The people who made the strikes are the workers of the farmers, they are the people who work every day in the field—the people who fill their pockets with agricultural money.[65]

The day labors are typically migrants from Cusco, Puno and elsewhere in the highlands (Romero, 2017), which are home to large Indigenous populations. This view was tied up with a conservative welfare narrative that disparaged the communal food system *Payapando* and claimed that the day labors receive welfare and do not bare the agricultural overhead of tractors, fertilizers and pesticides.[66] This narrative creates a division between migrant day labors and owners, and, additionally, combines with claims that the Espartambos are agent provocateurs from outside the Valley. This external provocateur narrative is a textbook disinformation tactic across the world (see Gelderloos, 2013), which according to many is completely untrue since 'the Espartambos are from here, they are sons of Tambeños'.[67] Research participants repeatedly claimed that 'everyone was united'[68] and 'everyone from here went to the protest, it was all the people who worked in agriculture'.[69] One teacher explains that 'there are a lot of racist people,' meanwhile another woman says Southern 'take[s] advantage of this … they manage all of this',[70] suggesting that they are exploiting a discourse that blames opposition and/or combative self-defense on darker skinned day labors and not the so-called 'real native farmers'.

7. Conclusion: business is warfare by other means

Providing a brief chronological narrative of the conflict and key events, this article has demonstrated the political reactions 'from above' from both the Peruvian state and Southern Copper that mirror a whole-of-government counterinsurgency approach designed to socially engineer a pathway for natural resource extraction. Not surprisingly, the company itself denies this. 'Let's be honest here,' I said to Tía Maria's head of Community Relations, 'isn't the job of Valleunido akin to conducting counterinsurgency to essentially pacify people who are against the mine—to buy their hearts and minds?' He replied, 'first there has never been an insurgency,' here 'was just a run-of-the-mill violence,' before continuing: 'We are not pacifiers; our know-how is to be developmentalists'.[65] Aside from the repeated attempts by Southern to call the opposition 'terrorists' or 'anti-mining terrorists,' engaging in 'white terrorism,'[66] which even extents to Carlos Aranda at a public event, 'Jueves Minero,' reminding people that the birthplace of Abimael Guzmán, leader of the Shining Path, is Deán Valdivia, conjuring up the stigma of *terruco* to imply that the Tambo Valley 'villagers have terrorist genes' (La Republica, 2018: n.p). A statement he later retracted. The

[55] Aranda offers this shortened example: 'We had a march against that [the health center] agreement the following day in front of Cocachacra [city hall] and only 50 people showed up in the last 15 min and never again, never again'. Interview 24.

[56] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.

[57] Interview 24, 16-01-2018.

[58] Interview 37, 17-01-2018.

[59] Interview 13, 14-01-2018.

[60] Interview 27, 16-01-2018.

[61] Interview 28, 16-01-2018.

[62] Interview 3, 12-01-2018.

[63] Interview 21, 15-01-2018.

[64] Huff's (2017: 157, 167) Sitzkrieg ('sitting war'/'slow war of attrition') is another exploration of constructing environmental deprivation.

[65] Interview 43, 18-01-2018.

[66] Interview, Huff's (2017) "White Terrorism,' according to Peruvian judge Duberlí Rodríguez, means 'generating anxiety and alarm in the population using media and social networks'.

Tambo Valley has not only experienced sustained social warfare efforts, or what the company calls 'developmentalism', but the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and DINOES repeatedly invading the region, which includes a sixty day military occupation under the State of Emergency. While protesters did engage in 'run-of-the-mill violence', this was provoked by an extractive intervention and met with a whole-of-government counterinsurgency approach orchestrated through formal and informal private-public agreements.

The line formulated between the 'excessive' violence dispensed by the PNP and Southern's efforts to 'help' overcome its environmental and developmental issues is thinner than the official public version from the private sector would suggest. The line is blurred formally with private-public security partnerships, but informally with Southern's 'public relations' with 'mayors, the church, [and] social things' that, many speculate, involves paying off national political leaders. This division between the private and public sectors, under neoliberalism, begins to dissolve when transnational companies negotiating contracts with the government, military and police officials to dispense repression against the popular desires of the Valley. The illegal vested interests of the past are becoming today's political norms under neoliberal political economy, cementing a self-reinforcing cycle of natural resource extraction and militarization. The root of this mining conflict lies with a national, regional and, at times, local government that for reasons of economic growth, social development and, likely, self-interest want the mine and disregard popular agricultural and environmental concerns. The social war discourse resonates, when the Peruvian political system serves as 'instruments [of] our enemies,' specifically politicians and mining companies, who are using this system 'to pursue and subjugate' the Tambo Valley to the imperatives of industrial development and economic growth.

This is not to say that problems do not exist in the Tambo Valley. 'Soft' counterinsurgency subsists on social issues and vulnerabilities, often using sociologists, anthropologists and census teams—as integral to integrated monetary shaping operations—to not only map the human terrain, but to find the cracks, fissures or existing communal conflicts to divide and conquer populations. Common in Peru is pinning urban against rural populations (see Andreucci & Kallis, 2017), or farm owners against day labors. Another divisive governmentality strategy is to seize upon the failures of industrial agriculture (marginalizing smallholder farming) to position mining as a solution. Information and civil operations or community development are employed to slowly build a social armor to deflect the opponent's attack. Grievance, need, desire or ambitions serve as points of intervention to begin a process of social engineering or winning the 'hearts' and 'minds'. This 'need' on the part of the people, the erasure of sustainable practices and governments and companies' ability to intervene with money are producing spaces of (low-intensity) 'militarizaton by consumption' (Marijnen & Verweijen, 2016: 276). This militarization, however, is the militarization of everyday life, described by Foucault and highlighted by social war discourse, which propels techno-industrial progress. In this case, it manifests in erecting enclosures, hiring mine security personnel, conducting drill tests and attempting to legally grab water resources to begin mineral exploration. The result is a space of social conflict and socio-political maneuvers to slowly and continuously socially engineer the political acceptance of the Tía Maria mine.

The political ecology of counterinsurgency dissects the militarization and marketization of nature. This field of study is ethically positioned to make legible the political reactions of state, corporate and elite actors by revealing both the 'hard' coercive techniques and 'soft' social technologies of political control. Counterinsurgency has historically intervened into 'natures' to deprive people of their lands and illegible territories as a means to develop human and natural resources into the colonial and, later, state project (see Dunlap & Fairhead, 2014; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011). Now, more than ever, people are the target of pacification to persuade them—by 'carrot', 'stick' or depravation—to relinquish their land and natural resources. Indigenous people, land defenders and people with attachments to the land, increasingly equated with the communist insurgents of the past, comprise the political terrain to be managed and shaped to gain access to land and subsoil resources. Southern persists in orchestrating their social war of attrition to start operations. Meanwhile, farmers continue to protest, earning them prison sentences and the physical and mental scars from the beatings and killings of friends, loved ones or acquaintances. There is a psychogeographical space being produced, not only through coercion and repression, but also through biopolitical investments into the Tambo Valley in which amenities, gifts and technologies are used as a method to approve extraction. The forests were once destroyed to control the people and now the people must be controlled to acquire the subsoil resources. The state is the framework and structure that facilitates the ongoing systematic conquest of natural resources, and while 'politics is the continuation of war by other means,' we can say business is a type of warfare by every means to captivate docile bodies and capture fertile lands to maximize shareholder value, maintain legitimacy and, consequently, affirming the path of rapid biodiversity loss, ecological and climate crises.

Conflicts of interest

None.

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

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