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NATO as a Value Institution: Do Democracy and Human Rights Matter?

The Spanish, Greek and Turkish Cases

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Preface:

I wrote this thesis in order to shed some light on a subject that came to fascinate me through my time in college. Are the rules regarding democracy and human rights in NATO just words on a page or do they carry any weight in real life too? As each alliance member have had different political trajectories and histories, I thought that the importance they put into these values should also differ. By focusing on a broader range of cases than other writers have done before me, this topic also enabled me to fill a knowledge-gap, something I put great value in doing.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help, love and support of my fellow students, friends and family. A special acknowledgment should also be given to Janne Haaland Matlary, whose guidance and scholarship have been invaluable in writing this thesis. Lastly I would be remiss to not acknowledge my own effort and hard work. I thank you all from the bottom of my heart.

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Abstract:

This thesis details whether NATO members are bound by rules regarding human rights and democracy. In the Washington Treaty, the document that all NATO states have to sign, there are rules promoting free institutions, respect for human rights and democratic governance that all signatory states are bound to follow. Yet in practice these have been violated. I explore whether these rules carry any real weight. My research question is: How do NATO's values affect membership status. This covers whether states have to be democratic and respect human rights in order to be able to join and retain membership in NATO.

To test whether NATO's democratic and human rights rules matter for the acquisition and retention of membership, I examine four cases who all underwent coups. In three of the cases the coups resulted in the overthrow of democratically elected governments, while in the fourth the coup was unsuccessful. The four cases are Turkey in 1960 and 2016, Spain and Greece. For all cases except Turkey in 2016 I examine responses by member governments relating to their breaches of democratic governance and suppression of human rights, as expressed through respondent government's press releases, discussions within NATO institutions and state departments. For the Turkish case I cannot examine state department correspondence as this is still classified to the public. Instead I rely on academic articles and press releases from NATO.

I use an exploratory multiple case study as my methodology. I decided on this approach as it gives me opportunity to examine a complex issue where the separation between context and phenomenon is unclear and hard to distinguish. Furthermore, as my research question deals with a 'how' question, a case study is well adapted as it deals with operational links being traced over time, rather than their frequency or occurrence.

I use realism and liberalism as my theories, and also use these for interpreting and analyzing the data. I will use these theories to highlight and analyze how 'values' on one hand and 'realist concerns' on the other formed the priorities taken by the respondent states. I analyze these in separate sections and attempt to conclude whether one has taken precedence over the other for given respondent states.

1.1: Introduction:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth NATO) was created in 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which initially bound together Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. It has since expanded to include 29 states in Europe and North America. NATO was initially created with the purpose of deterring possible Soviet aggression, following the widespread destruction of the Second World War. The US considered the threat of Soviet incursions into Western Europe, and Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a program of economic stimulus and aid for the rebuilding of Europe. The Soviet Union refused its satellite states to receive aid from the Marshall Plan, which heightened the emerging division between East and West¹.

The Brussels Treaty was the first collective security arrangement put in place for the defense of Western Europe, and was signed by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The principle of what is now Article 5 in NATO was also present in the Brussels Treaty: Any attack on one state would be counted as an attack on the alliance as a whole. In May 1948, the Vandenberg Resolution, which sought to create a collective defense agreement with a larger segment of Western Europe passed in the US Senate, and paved way for NATO.

NATO came to represent not only the fear over an expansionist Soviet Union, but an emerging ideological division between East and West. The West was represented by liberal democracy and capitalism, and the Soviet Union by communism and single-party rule. The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, which was the political integration of several Eastern European states into the collective matrix of the Soviet Union, constituted a threat to the United States and the Western European states politically aligned to it. The subsequent freezing of East/West relations resulted in the Cold War.

From the document at the heart of its founding, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, members have agreed to a set of rules. Article 5 represents the primary defensive objective of NATO and commits all members to collective defense, and specifies that in the event of an attack on one member, it is to be counted as an attack on all members². This means in theory that all NATO states are committed to

1 Office of the Historian

2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949).

defend fellow members in the event of an attack. Article 10 stipulates that NATO states may also invite other European countries to become members of the alliance, and their acceptance will be decided “by unanimous agreement³”.

The Treaty also contains normative and value-based rules. The Treaty opens with a paragraph that commits members to be “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law⁴”. In addition, Article 2 binds members to develop a peaceful conduct between states by “strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded⁵”. Both the preamble and Article 2 express that the ideals and working practices of democracy and human rights are to be upheld by its signatories. This means that NATO is not only supposed to be an alliance founded on collective defense, but also a value-based institution.

1.2: NATO and cooperation:

While it is hard to see the founding of NATO without considering the threat of the Soviet Union, NATO was according to the Treaty document meant to protect not only the countries of the alliance, but democracy within the alliance. NATO during the Cold War was by some thought to be “a one-dimensional military alliance, aimed principally at deterring a Soviet attack on Western Europe⁶”. Realist authors such as John Mearsheimer (1990) believed the end of the Cold War meant that NATO was obsolete as its main adversary was no longer a threat. Moreover he claimed that the threat of Soviet aggression was what kept NATO unified⁷. However a rival explanation de-emphasizes the explanation that alliance cohesion was and is just a result of common threats. Instead it focuses on “NATO’s role in integrating Western Europe and the common values shared by its members. (...) the Alliance has sought to ameliorate the effects of anarchy among its members, ultimately producing unprecedented stability during the Cold War years and beyond⁸”. Moore (2007) distinguishes between the Alliance’s defense against outside threats and its role in alleviating the security dilemma within the Alliance. She argues convincingly that the Alliance has made military action between members

3 Ibid.

4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

5 Ibid.

6 Moore (2007) pg 9.

7 Mearsheimer (1990)

8 Moore (2007) pg 10.

unthinkable, because NATO has created strong institutions that has set up ‘rules to the game’: peaceful conduct and cooperation between the alliance members, which in turn made the alliance a source of stability both during and after the Cold War. After the Cold War prospective members had to agree to the ‘democratizing’ wishes of NATO in order to join, through frameworks such as the Membership Action Plans (MAP). Members also have a long history of sharing intelligence, negotiating frameworks and policies and managing NATO troops and materiel. As such, members have chosen to follow given rules of conduct and thus signal a willingness for further cooperation. This has ultimately been facilitated by the liberal democratic character of NATO, which emphasizes cooperation.

1.3: Post-Cold War NATO.

In 1989 marking the 40th anniversary of NATO, former US president George H. W. Bush had declared that NATO’s new mission was to construct a Europe “whole and free⁹”. The Cold War had seen a Europe divided, and was now to be unified. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Europe was to undergo a transformation with NATO spearheading its evolutionary trajectory. “Its principal new political mission was the construction of a new security order in Europe – an order grounded on the liberal democratic values embodied in the preamble to the 1949 Washington Treaty¹⁰”. Additionally, the area of collective security was to be expanded as the fall of the Soviet Union had left a vacuum of power in Eastern Europe. In the absence of a strong adversary, NATO re-branded its efforts in more political terms rather than militarily. Democratic values became highly prioritized. In addition, a new out-of-area focus was adopted by NATO, as threats to the Alliance was more likely to emerge from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. This necessitated force projection outside of alliance territory. Former Warsaw Pact states who now aspired to join NATO had to undergo considerable scrutiny in assessment of their political processes and trajectories. New sub-organizations of NATO were created to further NATO’s goal of a commonality of democratic values, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and several aspirants subscribed to Membership Action Plans (MAP’s) in order to demonstrate their commitment to NATO’s ideals.

Yet in the history of the alliance there have been periods of time where member states’ regimes have been anything but democratic and have even played an active role in violating its citizens’ human

9 Moore (2007) pg 1.

10 Moore (2007) pg 1.

rights. Despite violations of the North Atlantic Treaty no state have ever been removed from the alliance. This apparent paradox forms the primary subject of this thesis. At its most general, this thesis seeks to explain if the values present in the Treaty really matter for membership in NATO. Related, how much of democracy and human rights concerns are the allied willing to ‘sacrifice’ for the benefit of security? While it is difficult to reason whether security concerns or the defense of democracy and human rights is the most important facet of the alliance, one can question whether the alliance was and is willing to suspend the importance and precedence of its values for a more pragmatic, security-oriented military alliance.

1.4: Research question:

My research question is:

- How do NATO’s values affect membership status?

The intention of the research question is to establish whether the NATO values have had any bearing on the conduct of its members. The research question covers whether states have to be democratic and respect human rights to be able to join and retain membership in NATO. I will answer this by presenting four country cases which all involve coups by the armed forces of the state. In three of the cases the coups resulted in the overthrow of a democratically elected government, while the fourth saw an attempt and failure of the armed forces to remove the elected government. In order to see how these values affect membership status, NATO itself and other NATO governments’ responses to the coups will be presented as any calls for sanction or removal would have to come from within NATO.

Likewise, the recruitment of new members require a unanimous vote by all members to be included. As an initial study proposition I argue that the Cold War period provided less impetus for discussions on a country’s democratic status and more on its contributions to military security for the alliance, because the looming Soviet threat made power as a means for security rank higher than the moral ideals of human rights and democracy.

1.5: Describing the cases:

1.5.1: Spain:

The first case is Spain, who as early as the 1950’s sought membership in NATO and did so with the support of the US. The concept of the ‘southern flank’ where the Mediterranean countries in the south of Europe (which also includes Greece and Turkey) could potentially be a point of invasion by the

Soviet was for many alliance members (and especially the US) a threat that could be alleviated by the inclusion of Spain. Yet Spain would not gain entry into NATO until 1982. While perspectives on Spain's inclusion and usefulness to the alliance changed from member to member, Norway remained firm in keeping Franco out of the alliance based on reasons of democracy and human rights. While Spain was not a NATO member during the period of investigation, its membership discussion was heavily value-laden as discussions in Norway exemplifies. As will be presented, the Spanish question was a source of public mobilization and parliamentary discussion in Norway. While most attention is devoted to the Norwegian and US perspectives to the inclusion of Spain, other NATO members' responses are added.

1.5.2: Greece:

In 1967 a junta of military officers had established themselves as the rulers of Greece by process of a coup, citing the threat and possibility of a communist takeover. The junta propagated a strongly anti-communist stance and subverted the state into facilitating the capture of communists. Furthermore the junta had suspended the constitution, arrested members of cabinet and also imprisoned and tortured suspected communists. Despite its sharp departure from democracy and its human rights abuses, the junta quickly asserted that Greece would still be a NATO member. Britain underwent a change in government in this period, and the differences in how they approached the military junta will form part of the analysis. In addition, the discussion by alliance members on the junta will highlight the concerns and perspectives that NATO members had for Greece in this period.

1.5.3: Turkey:

The third case is Turkey, which in 1960 underwent a coup where the democratically elected government led by president Adnan Menderes was overthrown by a military junta. Turkey had been admitted to NATO in 1952, and had long been plagued by an unstable economy. President Menderes' economic policies had aggravated the issue and the Turkish lira had seen increased inflation during his rule. Menderes had also restricted the rights of the free press and sought to suppress the opposition. The Turkish public had in the period leading up to the coup protested against Menderes and his faulty economic policies, complaining that the cost of living had gone up, without a comparative rise in incomes. A group of junior and high-ranking military officers had decided to overthrow Menderes by arresting him and most of his officers. Shortly after the coup, the junta had declared that they intended

to restore Turkey to a democracy and that they intervened and deposed Menderes in order to protect Turkey's democracy. As with Spain, the Norwegian and US are given most attention in this case, but other members' responses to the coup and junta are interspersed throughout the chapter.

The second part of the Turkish case deals with the 2016 coup attempt which saw an aftermath of mass arrestations and restrictions on the media at the hands of Erdogan and the AKP party. I will start by briefly presenting the rise of Erdogan and the AKP party as a political force. Later I will present the democratic and human rights detractions following the 2016 coup attempt. The case also involves an exploration of Turkey's regime trajectory towards autocracy. Lastly I will present the responses by NATO following the coup, and the debate following the Turkish decision to acquire the Russian S-400 ballistic missile system. As I do not have access to foreign office documents which I use in my other cases, I will instead focus on Turkey's contemporary detractions from NATO's democratic ideals.

Chapter 2: Method and theory:

2.1: Realism

Realism is a theoretical position that eschew idealist arguments in favor of what it holds to be 'realistic' in international affairs. That states look out for themselves and can do so at the expense of other states is logical within a realist interpretation. States need to use power in order to enforce its sovereignty within its boundaries, and pursue national interest outside its borders. Realism is less a grand theory of international affairs and is more of an umbrella term, where different writers hold different perspectives to what the theory covers. Here I will cover a few aspects of realism.

2.1.1: Commonalities in realist theories:

There are some commonly held assumptions that are shared by most political realists. One such is that the theory "refer to arguments that give priority to states' national interests and their military and economic power¹¹". Realists portray states in terms of their basic motives, one of which is security, as it is logical that a state is concerned with its self-preservation. Realists mean that the relative power distribution of states set general parameters for what they can accomplish in the international arena.

11 Glaser (2016) pg 14

Power is then the most important asset of a state, and is usually operationalized as the resources a state can mobilize, which includes its population, wealth, technology and so on. This type of power is often called ‘hard power’ as opposed to ‘soft power’ which instead deals primarily with co-optation rather than force. The power a state wields is translated into security, as hard power is used to perpetuate self-preservation. Realist writers have a conception of the world where international politics take the shape of a perpetual struggle between states who are faced with a need for security, and compete over finite resources. This struggle takes place in an international anarchy - as there is no state or entity that can hold other states accountable for their actions, or enforce internationally binding rules – which realists mean is the key cause for both uncertainty between states and interstate war. Because of anarchy, states need to enforce their own security and thus rely on their own capabilities to achieve their policy goals. Within this setting, states are interested in increasing their security and are likewise hesitant to pursue policies that could reduce security. Another shared assumption is that of the security dilemma, which holds that a state may arm itself for purely defensive reasons, but such a move will be deemed threatening by another. The other state then takes similar steps to arm itself for defense¹². An increase in one state's security thus leads to a similar reduction in another state.

Realists see states as the main actors in analysis, and international institutions play a smaller role in international relations. States enter into international organizations as a means for achieving its national interests. Within realism, international organizations wield little influence by themselves and are mostly unable to pressure a state into changing its policies. As such, international organizations only hold as much power as states have delegated to them¹³.

Realist theories see states as unitary actors, and de-emphasize rivalry and disagreement within the state. This is a useful abstraction as states become easier to analyze, rather than attempting to account for the myriad of political parties, interest groups and other actors competing for power within the state. Related, states assess each other in terms of their relative power, rather than regime type and ideology. Additionally, states are strategic and rational: they attempt to factor in how other states react to their policies and actions. “States make decisions that are well matched to the achievement of their interest, given the constraints imposed by their capabilities and the uncertainties they face about other states’

12 Jones (2018)

13 Muedini, “Realism and International Organizations”

capabilities and motives¹⁴”.

2.1.2: Structural realism:

Structural realism or neorealism “emphasizes the impact of the international system¹⁵”. As the international system is anarchic, states are forced to interact in an arena without rules. This type of realism argues that the constraints and opportunities that arise in international affairs is key to understanding a state’s behavior. Another aspect that influences state activity is the relative balance of power. States analyze each other in terms of relative power, and this forms the background for the constraints and opportunities states face with one another. There are also divides within structural realism, and one of these are known as Waltzian realism. It claims that the international structure “generates a general tendency towards competition between security-seeking states¹⁶”. The international system generates constraints and opportunities and these will affect states’ incentives to cooperate. Thus while states may only be interested in maintaining sovereignty over their own territory, they may find themselves in conflict with another due to the anarchic nature of the international system. Waltz also argues that states see the reason in limiting their own pursuit of more power, as it can lead other states to ally against it. Power is mainly seen as a pursuit of security, and by acquiring too much and to subsequently lead other states to ally against the state would undermine the intention of seeking security. This leads Waltz’s conception of structural realism to be limited in terms of competitiveness.

Structural realism also offers an explanation on alliances. When states are faced with anarchy, they can resort to balancing. The first is known as external balancing and happens when states form alliances with other states. By forming alliances, it allows one state to siphon some of the other state’s resources. The second, internal balancing, is the process of increasing the state’s own economic capability. A bipolar balance of power can result in balancing, as it did between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. The balancing undertaken by the states were both internal and external in scope. Through the Warsaw Pact and NATO, both succeeded in gaining an alliance of states, yet “internal balancing and the arms race that resulted were the key by which two superpowers (...) pursued security¹⁷”.

14 Glaser (2016) pg 15

15 Ibid. pg 15

16 Ibid. pg 16

17 Glaser (2016) pg 19

2.1.3: Classical realism:

“To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them, rather than moralizing¹⁸”. Classical realists interpret human nature as inherently selfish and argue that people will always act in their own self interest. Classical realists extend this to include states. Thus in an anarchic system wars are next to impossible to avoid, and can be started as a consequence of incompatible interests. Hans Morgenthau (1978) sees “interest defined as power¹⁹”. With this, he decouples a state’s policy from the morals, intentions and preference of statesmen or policy actors, which in turn enables political analysts to view policy as something rational. Rational policies follow a logic of maximizing utility and cost efficiency. Thus he describes a system in which rational state actors pursue national interest. National interest is then the pursuit of rational policies that intends to benefit the state and its survival. And since states are inherently self-interested, national interest often take the form of competition with other states.

2.1.4: Realist terms for analysis:

The theoretical terms I will use to analyze my cases are security, national interest and power. Power refers to ‘hard power’ as defined above, which is the physical resources a state has at its disposal, mainly focusing on a state’s population, economy and military. National interest refer to the policies states pursue, both within and outside its own territory. Thus, national interest is deeply embedded in foreign and domestic policy. In its basic form, national interest refers to a state’s interest in securing its own territorial integrity and political autonomy. After these are secured, states pursue other interests, which are manifold and vary greatly from state to state. Yet within this thesis, national interest will refer to the primary interest of security and self-defense. As mentioned above the structure of the international system can either constrain or enable the pursuit of national interests, and the relative balance of power of states is the key determining factor states have to account for when pursuing foreign policy. In order for a state to survive it needs to be secure, and security is thus a basic goal of all states. States achieve security through power, for example by investing into its military or arms (internal balancing) or by entering into alliances (external balancing). As is apparent these three factors

18 Korab-Karpowicz (2017)

19 Hans J. Morgenthau (1978), *Politics Among Nations*

are closely related to one another: security is a primary national interest all states pursue, and power is often used as a means to achieve security.

2.2: Liberalism:

Liberalism is a term that comprises many elements and is often associated with:

“strong support for democracy which is considered vital for the legitimacy of a government; strong support for private property and free enterprise – a market economy – at home and abroad; a belief in open relationships among societies – not only in trade and investment but in flows of information, and ideas, people, and culture; strong support for international cooperation such as in international organizations; and a strong commitment to human rights based on the importance of the individual”²⁰

From this we can identify four main topics within liberalist theory: Human rights, democracy, economic and international organizations. Three of these will be discussed below, after explaining the differences between realism and liberalism.

2.2.1: Differences between liberalism and realism:

The liberalist position agree with realists in seeing states as the most important actors, yet gives considerable weight to international institutions, such as NGO's, IGO's and various domestic interest groups. Liberalists see international organizations as important actors in the international system, often tasked with the dissemination of ideas and norms. Thus within a liberalist position NATO could be analyzed not just as a provider of security, but a community where conduct between states and adherence to values are pursued. Where realists are mostly pessimistic about the ability to foster lasting peace in the international political system, the liberal camp is largely marked by optimism. One example of this is that liberalists claim there exists no security dilemma²¹. With the right sort of mindset of state leaders, another state's investment into security is not inherently threatening to the first. From this we can derive that if state leaders can cultivate a relationship of working together, they can overcome many of the realist 'pitfalls' in international politics.

While realists argue that the international system affects the behavior of states, liberalists give more

20 Morgan (2016) pg 32.

21 Ibid. pg 31

precedence to the differences within states. Domestic actors' relative power and political preference and the type of regime is given more weight in analysis, and liberalists mostly agree that these are the primary variables that affect state behavior, and to a lesser degree the international system. The debate of policy within the state between the bureaucracy, interest groups, political parties, the government and so on is the most important variable to explain the political preference and policy a state pursues. Liberalists believe democracies are better adapted for international cooperation, as it is based on compromise and free debate. "With the 'right' sorts of (liberal) political systems and domestic (liberalist-oriented) groups running them, states can arrange to have international cooperation flourish²²". As many (especially Western) democracies often exhibit such liberalist oriented policies it is natural that they pursue international trade and a larger degree of interdependency through international institutions.

2.2.2: International organizations

International cooperation is facilitated by IGO's and NGO's who set up liberalist rules and norms of conduct between states, facilitating trade, exchange of information and so on. When states willingly follow these rules and norms they show commitment to the liberalist system and this becomes a source of stability and trust between states, which in turn heightens security. Thus, a competitive international order as theorized by realists can be replaced by one that in a larger degree fosters cooperation between states. Rather than states being affected by the international system, liberalists claim that state action and preference can shape other state's behavior by joining and adhering to international institutions and their rules. While liberalists agree that the international system and conduct between states can be 'realist' in a given setting, it disagrees that it is bound to be. Through cooperation and adherence to norms and rules, states can overcome this. As liberalists give weight to the rival forces within the state, it thus rejects the realist abstraction of states as unitary actors.

2.2.3: Democracy:

Liberalists reject the realist notion of an inherently competitive and conflict-prone international system, and points to how pairs of democracies act with one another. The democratic peace thesis points to the "notable statistical pattern in relations among modern liberal democracies²³", the fact that they very

22 Morgan (2016) pg. 31.

23 Ibid. pg 36.

rarely go to war with one another. Liberalists owe this to an absence of the security dilemma present in their relationships, as they are able to “coexist peacefully even when they have serious disagreements²⁴”. Democratic regimes are thought to constitute a 'pluralistic security community': because of the nature of their regime type, international anarchy is not inherently a source of mistrust for democracies, and they have no fear of being attacked by each other²⁵. Because of these elements, liberalists argue that security is furthered through the spread of democracy.

Morgan (2016) notes the rise of an international civil society where a political system exerts “respect for the private sector, not just in economic activities but in intellectual, cultural, social, and political spheres²⁶”. He notes that a well-functioning civil society gives voice to discussion and differences in opinion, which is a key facet of a good modern liberal democracy and has positive implications for security. In sum modern political liberalism and democracy can provide mechanisms for cooperation and peaceful conduct between states, if these states choose to adhere to liberal rules and institutions. Moreover, liberalists provide compelling arguments for states to do. As states adhere to the liberal ‘rulebook’, they become more predictable and thus there exists less uncertainty about their future actions, which in turn heightens security for its allies.

2.2.4: Liberalist terms for analysis:

The first analytical term I will focus on is domestic actors’ relative power. Liberalists focus on the debate that goes on within a state, where different opinions and preferences are expressed, and how that can shape a state’s overall policy on a given subject. The trajectory of future policy is shaped by the relative power of the rival segments within society. Thus not only the parts of the state apparatus wield power to define policy, but also interest groups, religious actors and other groups. The last term is related to the importance given to democracy and human rights. The liberalist position puts great importance on the adherence to democratic governance and respect for human rights as a means to foster peace and stability. Within my analysis I will identify if and how NATO and its members give democracy and human rights any weight or priority within the cases.

2.3: Method:

24 Ibid. pg 36.

25 Morgan (2016) pg 36.

26 Ibid. pg 37.

2.3.1: Case study:

For my method I have chosen a multiple case study which involves an in-depth analysis of four cases. The case study is described as “a versatile form of qualitative inquiry most suitable for a comprehensive, holistic and in-depth investigation of a complex issue²⁷”. Yin (2014) presents 3 criteria for the use of a case study: “the main research questions are “how” or “why” questions; (2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioral events; and (3) the focus of study is a contemporary (as opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon²⁸”. As my research question asks how NATO values affect membership status, the first criterion is met. My research question is exploratory, because “such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence²⁹”. Starting with the context and throughout the phenomenon I study, I trace over time the occurrence of ‘illiberal’ policies, and the responses by other NATO members. This is necessary to account for whether values had any impact on NATO membership. For the second point, I have no control over that which I intend to study and cannot manipulate any values on relevant variables (membership status or responses by other NATO members). Regarding the last criterion, my research is not exclusively historical nor exclusively contemporary. While most of my cases can be called historical, as they occurred during the Cold War, I do address the contemporary situation in Turkey with regards to Erdogan and the AKP’s detractions from democratic values. The theories are included to serve as separate lenses to analyze the data within and together with the case study approach, become a part of the method I employ to solve the research question.

There are several approaches within case studies. The one I will use see case studies as interpretative. “An interpretative position views reality as multiple and subjective, based on meanings and understanding. Knowledge generated from the research process is relative to the time and context of the study and the researcher is interactive and participates in the study³⁰”. Likewise my method involves a constructivist and subjective activity where analysis becomes a process of projecting meaning onto the data. I argue that this interpretative philosophical position makes more sense in this study than Yin’s (2014) post-positivist approach, which “embraces the ideals of objectivity³¹”.

27 Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills (2017)

28 Yin (2014) pg. 28

29 Ibid. pg 38.

30 Harrison et.al. (2017)

31 Ibid.

2.3.2: Operationalization:

National interest, power and security are key terms that will form the basis for the realist portion of analysis. The aspects within liberalism I will focus on in analysis are emphasis on human rights and democracy, and the impact of domestic political actors. National interest, security and power will be measured by identifying how they are expressed in the data. Likewise the liberalist portion of analysis will be operationalized by interpreting how the data furthers arguments and information that are related to how the domestic debate may shape policy, as well as arguments that give priority to democratic and human rights values. I analyze the theoretical terms in separate sections, for reasons of clarity. By grouping and analyzing the data in 'realist' and 'liberalist' parts, I can compare which concerns were prioritized by respondent states.

To find out whether the values mattered or not for the selected cases, I will use the theories presented above as different vantage points to view the data within. As previously explained, 'values' refer to the democratic and human rights dimension of the Atlantic Treaty. The measurement of what constitutes values in the data is: (a) where arguments or statements meant to further democratic governance or human rights concerns are explicitly mentioned and given precedence and (b) actions undertaken by respondent states or NATO, with the intention of either promoting democracy and human rights or putting pressure on a state as a result of violation of these. Values are thus distinguished from realist arguments that include security, power and national interest. These are measured likewise by statements or arguments:

- That give priority to the case-country's or respondent state's own security
- That give priority to the case-country's or the respondent states' ability to participate in the common defense of alliance territory.
- That give priority to the economic wellbeing of either the case-country or respondent state. (economic power) which at the same time downplays democratic or human rights concerns.

2.3.3: Data:

I will answer my research question by using correspondence from foreign offices, newspaper articles and academic articles as my main sources of data. The case of Turkey in the 60's and the Spain case I will use mostly US and Norwegian foreign office correspondence as my sources. The Norwegian

foreign office data on Spain stems mainly from academic literature that has already done a terrific job in collecting data on the Norwegian stance on Francoist Spain. Thus for my purpose it is sufficient to cite these sources. The Norwegian foreign office data on Turkey regarding the 1960 coup needed to be accessed through Riksarkivet in Sognsvann, Oslo and had no visible redactions, which led me to believe that most of the data was without censorship. The US foreign office documents are open for public access online and can be accessed outside the US, making it both practical and accessible. Furthermore it has few redactions in text of sensitive information which makes this an overall good source database to work with.

The Greek case is different from the others in that it includes data from the British foreign office, albeit from an academic article. The British foreign office data is not accessible from Norway, and similar to Riksarkivet, need to be accessed from a physical archive in Britain. For practical reasons, any foreign office correspondence from Britain is cited or referenced based on academic articles. While other foreign offices in Europe might have been accessible and given my analysis more breadth, they were not included due to language constraints. The contemporary Turkish case differs from the others in that foreign office data is classified and inaccessible, and as such I will only be able to use academic and newspaper articles, as well as official NATO statements, to investigate it.

2.3.4: Context and phenomenon

The case study approach is well suited where the boundary between phenomenon and context is not always clear and the number of variables exceed the observations, both being applicable here. Separating context from the cases in my study is challenging, as the historical context of a country can have a bearing on the phenomena I wish to study. Context is there to provide a background to the relevant information. The specific phenomenon of study will be both the violations of the North Atlantic Treaty within the case-country, as well as responses from NATO and its member countries.

Chapter 3: Spain

3.1: Context:

Francisco Franco had since the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, been the leader of Spain and would stay so until his death in November 1975³². His political station included being *generalissimo* of

32 Meditz & Solsten (1990) Chapter: Spanish Civil War

the armed forces, chief of state and head of the government. His authoritarian rule coupled with his government's immediate recognition of the Axis powers Italy and Germany, along with his open support of them during the Second World War had made his standing in Western politics decidedly unpopular, and his government had in the immediate postwar period been denied access to the UN³³. Moreover the UN, through a resolution in 1946 would see Spain "banned from the UN and would not be allowed to participate in any of its specialized agencies, as long as Franco remained in power³⁴". Despite ostracism from the UN and his relative unpopularity in Western opinion, Franco's firm anticommunist stance became a significant point for the US revision towards Spain after the Cold War started. "As the United States became increasingly concerned with the Soviet threat following the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade in 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, United States policy makers also began to realize the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula³⁵". Spain was initially an attractive NATO candidate already during the founding of the alliance in 1949, especially in US military circles. They viewed Spain as a valuable future ally due to its strategic perks, yet faced push-back from other NATO members, including France and Britain. Thus the US started taking steps towards a normalization of relations with Francoist Spain. President Truman signed a bill in 1950 that granted Spain 62.5 million US Dollars in aid, and in the same year supported a resolution in the UN of lifting the boycott on Franco³⁶. Later the US would also petition its NATO-allies to allow Spain entry into NATO. Aside from being a repressive dictatorship, Spain was a natural ally to the Western forces during the Cold War as Franco's regime was decidedly anti-communist. Yet it was hard to argue its inclusion into NATO based on the transgressions of human rights and free institutions that took place within Spain. These transgressions would form the basis for resistance to Spain's inclusion for many European NATO states.

Many Western European countries did not follow the US efforts to normalize Spanish relations. The inclusion of Spain into NATO was fronted by the US and Spain throughout the 1950s and 60s but was "opposed by Norway, Denmark, Holland and Luxembourg on the basis of antipathy towards the Franco regime³⁷". France and Britain was similarly apprehensive, yet later changed their stance.

Similarly, Spain's wishes to enter the EC were also rejected, largely on grounds of Franco's

33 Meditz & Solsten (1990) Chapter: Foreign Policy under Franco

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Carothers (1981) pg 2.

authoritarian regime: “Spanish membership in the Community, considered by Spanish economists and businessmen as crucial for Spain’s economic development, had to await the democratization of the regime³⁸”.

From 1953 the Spanish state had in essence been admitted into the umbrella of Western defense through the Pact of Madrid, which contained “mutual defense, for military aid to Spain, and for the construction of bases there³⁹”. The Pact was a bilateral agreement between the US and Spain and gave Spain much needed funding for its state. It also gave both parties significant strategic advantages: For the US it helped secure the Iberian Peninsula and part of the southern flank, for Spain the US acted as a guarantor for its safety.

3.2: Norway:

From the start of the discussion, Norway was firmly in favor of keeping Spain out of NATO. The fact that Franco had been an open supporter of the Axis forces, yet still had power in Spain was for most Norwegians unheard of⁴⁰. Within Norway large parts of the newspapers, the working class movement and organizations as well as prominent politicians came to have an important role in hindering Spain’s NATO process.

Where other authors have claimed that Norway’s relation to Spain stabilized after 1947, Haraldstad (1995) argues against it, and points to the fact that Norway did not open diplomatic or formal trade relations to Spain before 1951. Norway also supported Resolution 39 in the UN, where the Franco regime was condemned, denied membership in the UN and sub-organizations, and encouraged states to withdraw diplomats from Spain⁴¹. And again in 1949, Norway was the only Western country and also the only member of NATO that voted against the repeal of Resolution 39 against Francoist Spain⁴². This happened despite the calls for universal inclusion into the UN regardless of regime type.

Norway’s stance in 1949 was clearly against Spanish inclusion. Norway’s foreign minister at the time, Halvard Lange, said that Spain will never be admitted while Franco was in power. Lange, in an

38 Meditz & Solsten (1990) Chapter: Foreign Policy under Franco

39 Ibid.

40 Haraldstad (1995) pg 4.

41 UN General Assembly (1946)

42 Haraldstad (1995) pg 9.

interview to the Associated Press argued that an inclusion of Spain into NATO would weaken the alliance as Spain would undermine the intention of the alliance, namely the safeguarding of democracies. Despite other alliance members' (most notably the US) stances on Spanish inclusion, Lange was prepared for the possibility that Norway would be the only country not in favor of inclusion. The general stance against inclusion was maintained within Norway until the death of Franco, despite periods of domestic debate⁴³.

The Norwegian ambassador Wilhelm Morgenstjerne had stated in a report that the US political leadership had initially been apprehensive of accepting Spain into its security-political fold because of the negative atmosphere within NATO regarding Franco. The US furthermore chose to disregard the dissenting voices of France and Britain as the US regarded the security political environment to be more important than Spain's political status. The political leadership in the US argued that Spain would have a decisive strategic impact in a potential war⁴⁴.

While the Norwegian political leadership was firmly opposed to the inclusion of Spain, the Norwegian Foreign Office was less apprehensive, and did not openly oppose the thawing of US-Spanish relations⁴⁵. However, Foreign Minister Lange, Prime Minister Gerhardsen and later Prime Minister Torp from 1951 were openly opposed to Spanish inclusion.

After the US had started negotiations with Spain in 1951, which would eventually lead to the Pact of Madrid, several Norwegian newspapers had discussed Spain's inclusion in NATO. It was not obvious for the Norwegian press that bilateral talks between the US and Spain would not extend to a discussion on Spanish membership in the Alliance. The parliamentary representative for the Norwegian Left Party, Helge Seip, said that the Madrid Pact had made Spain a "half official" addendum to the alliance. Haraldstad (1995) argues that the majority of the Norwegian newspapers argued against the US policy on Spain in this period.

3.2.1: Norwegian support of Franco:

43 Haraldstad (1995) pg 11.

44 UD 33.6/3, I, amb. Washington (quote Truman) til UD, 20.07-1951, in Haraldstad (1995) pg 13-14

45 Haraldstad (1995) pg 15.

However not everyone shared the view of keeping Spain out of NATO. There were conservative news outlets that did not share this opinion, instead arguing in favor of a united Western front against the threat of the Soviet Union. Especially the Norwegian news outlet Morgenbladet lauded Franco's fight against the 'red threat' and his willingness to cooperate with the US⁴⁶.

Within the Norwegian Foreign Office, not everyone shared the apprehension of normalizing relations with Spain. Rolf Andersen, the Norwegian ambassador in Madrid complained to the Foreign Office that the Norwegian news portrayed the negotiations between the US and Spain without nuance, which also extended to the media's portrayal of Franco's Spain. In his view the newspaper's stance was wholly unfair and incorrect⁴⁷. Andersen himself was a vocal supporter of Franco Spain as well as the US-Spanish military negotiations. Parts of the Norwegian shipping sector was also against the Norwegian political leadership's policy perspective, as the director of the Norwegian Shipowner's Association, John Egeland argued that the Norwegian government had complicated the job of Norwegian shipping as Norway's stance had adversely affected trade relations between the two⁴⁸.

3.2.2: The Spain Committee:

On the other side of the issue, there were forces at play in Norway that wanted the government to not only maintain a critical outlook on Franco, but openly criticize the US-Spanish negotiations. The Spain Committee was established in Norway to attempt to influence the Norwegian government's policies towards Spain, its inclusion in the UN and the US-Spanish negotiations. At the outset of the negotiations, the Spain Committee sent a letter of protest to the Norwegian Labor Party as well as the largest worker's union, LO, and wanted members to protest and lobby the Norwegian government. After pressure, LO officially changed its stance to be against the US-Spanish military agreement⁴⁹.

The Spain Committee also acted when the Madrid Pact was implemented in 1953. It again attempted to lobby LO, the Worker's Party and now the Worker's Party's youth organization. In a strongly worded letter to the government the Spain Committee's board members said the agreement was a betrayal of the Spanish people and that the Norwegian government should promptly and publicly protest the

46 Morgenbladet (1951) in Haraldstad (1995) pg 18.

47 Haraldstad (1995) pg 15.

48 Haraldstad (1995) pg 19.

49 Haraldstad (1995) pg 19.

Madrid Pact⁵⁰. Yet only the Worker's Party's youth organization supported the Spain Committee in protesting the Madrid Pact.

The Norwegian government's reticence in pursuing an aggressive policy towards Franco and the Madrid Pact was due to the Korean War. In this period it was important for Alliance members to 'rally around the flag' and show no signs of internal division. Yet the French and British governments did not follow this rationale, and were openly in protest of the US Spain-policy⁵¹. Besides, the relative strength of Norway versus France and Britain was highly skewed. So skewed that an official condemnation of the Norwegian government on the Madrid Pact would probably not lead to a change in US policy. Thus it is likely that Norway chose to keep a low profile as not to strain the Alliance cohesion any further.

Domestically, the government also faced diverging interests with the Spain Committee and parts of the worker's movement on the one hand and the moderates and shipping industry members on the other. The split in public opinion may have prompted the government to follow a reserved policy, neither condemning nor supporting Franco or the Madrid Pact. If the government was to choose a side, constituent pressure may weaken government support and policy goals.

Regarding the question of the possibility of Spain joining NATO, Dean Acheson had given assurances that the Madrid Pact did not present a precursor to Alliance membership. This might also explain the Norwegian government's uninvolved stance. This way, the government could fulfill its promise of keeping Spain out of NATO while keeping its relationship to the US unproblematic by not protesting or condemning the Madrid Pact⁵².

3.2.3: A harder Norwegian stance:

In 1955, Spain was included in the UN. Where previous attempts to gain access to the UN had failed, the principle of universality in the UN now made access possible for Spain. In the same year West Germany was included in NATO, and the US Congress unanimously voted for a resolution pledging support for Franco's entry into the Alliance⁵³. These three events again spurred the debate about Spain's

50 Haraldstad (1995) pg 17.

51 Haraldstad (1995) pg 17.

52 Haraldstad (1995) pg 18.

53 Whitaker (1961) pg 317.

potential entry into NATO within Norway. This prompted both Lange and Gerhardsen to reiterate their stances. In Lange's words: "We need to oppose this tooth and claw as long as possible. NATO is something different from the UN and the universality principle does not apply⁵⁴". Here we see that Lange reiterates NATO's democratic character, and that acceptance of a dictatorship would in his mind be counter-intuitive for the alliance.

While Spain had the backing of a powerful ally and a positive momentum in international relations following its acceptance into the UN, Spain did not formally apply for NATO membership in 1955. As NATO requires a unanimous vote of yes to include a new member and the Spanish state was reticent about exposing itself to defeat as Norway's stance was clear, no formal application was entered. In June 1955, the Spanish Foreign Minister had probed the Norwegian ambassador to Madrid about Norwegian-Spanish relation, probably in an attempt to get information on Norway's stance⁵⁵.

Gerhardsen had been strongly opposed to Spanish inclusion and had continued this stance in 1955 when elected PM again. In an interview to the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet*, Gerhardsen said that even if Norway was the only country to do so, it would lay down veto against Spanish NATO membership⁵⁶. His reasons for doing so follows the same line of argument that had been presented before which is that NATO would be weakened, not strengthened by Franco's inclusion due to undermining NATO's democratic character⁵⁷. This apparently did not please the Spanish as Foreign Minister Lange was shortly after contacted by a Spanish minister that hoped such demonstrative statements would be avoided in the future. Lange answered that Norway's stance was already well known to the Spanish leadership and that Norway saw NATO as an amalgamation of democratic countries⁵⁸.

France and Britain had in this period of time taken a more reserved role when it came to critique of Franco, where Norway had seen fit to take a harder stance than in its previous political administrations. The relationship between Spain and Norway was put under further strain after Gerhardsen's clear-cut statement. General Franco shortly thereafter wrote to the US Foreign Minister that "it seemed a

54 Haraldstad (1996) in Pharo (2017)

55 Haraldstad (1995) pg 21.

56 *Dagbladet* (1955) in Haraldstad (1995) pg 27.

57 Haraldstad (1995) pg 22.

58 UD 33.6/3 II, UD-notat av Lange etter samtale med den spanske ministeren 17.08-1955 in Haraldstad (1995) pg 27

paradox to the Spaniards that the one nation in NATO which most violently oppose the admission of Spain to NATO was also the nation which denied the US access to bases on its national territory⁵⁹”

In December 1955 in a meeting between country representatives of NATO, the Portuguese representative had argued that Spain’s accession to the UN should make it eligible for NATO membership too. Lange argued against it by referring to article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which binds members to aid the spread of peaceful international relations by strengthening their free institutions. Lange argued that it would be counterintuitive to allow Spain into NATO as its state institutions were hardly free⁶⁰.

In the period 1958-1960, Norway’s stance remained unchanged. Where other Alliance members pushed for accession talks in the NATO meeting throughout this period, Norway is again the probable cause it did not, as there was procedure in NATO not to address this kind of question if it was clear that any country would vote against⁶¹. In an alternative approach, it was suggested that there was to be established a committee within NATO to study and evaluate Spanish accession, yet this suggestion was also quickly denied by Norway.

3.3: USA:

The US Senate in 1950 voted in favor of a loan to Spain for 100 million USD, based on the fact that the Spanish government was firmly anticommunist, and strategically it was argued that the country was of utmost importance in the event of a Soviet attack⁶². The loan could contribute to Spain’s security through modernization of its military. Not long after, Congressional representatives also debated that Spain could receive arms in trade for that the US be given rights to build and maintain military bases on Spanish soil⁶³. President Truman and Foreign Minister Acheson both distanced themselves from the Senate vote, as well as the Congressional suggestion and argued the US had not sufficiently tried to persuade Franco of the necessity of a more democratic rule. Yet this stance was short lived and soon after there was strong American support for military cooperation with Spain⁶⁴. Acheson writing to

59 FRUS (1955) document 195.

60 Haraldstad (1995) pg 28.

61 Haraldstad pg 28.

62 UD, 33.6/3, I, amb. Washington til UD 04.08-1950 in Haraldstad pg 12.

63 Haraldstad pg 12.

64 Haraldstad pg 12.

Senator Connally in 1950 states that the UN action of banning Spain's entry has entrenched the Franco regime, serving to strengthen rather than weaken it⁶⁵. George Kennan and the US Foreign Office had as early as 1947 suggested that Spain's strategic importance to the US should be prioritized. Yet it came to be that the US policy for Spain did not change until the start of the Korean War⁶⁶.

Whitaker (1961) argues that the US bilateral agreement with Spain in 1950 was an alternative to NATO, as it was clear the NATO Council would deny entry. "The rejection was so decisive, we are told, that the question has not been formally raised again, though it has been much discussed both in NATO circles and public forums, especially since 1957⁶⁷". He goes on to note that the State Department and House of Representatives favored Spanish inclusion in NATO from 1955, and later the Senate in 1957. With such broad support in US politics, the US came to vouch for Spanish NATO membership as a matter of national policy.

The US stance was initially to persuade larger European members to shift their stance on Spain, and Britain and France were targeted. In 1951 in a State Department memorandum the tactic was to gain the support of Britain and France first, then move on to the other NATO members⁶⁸. Diplomatic correspondence was the primary instrument of the US, and Dunham of the State Department urged the US to "not press (...) for Spanish participation in the NAT, until the other members are prepared to support such action⁶⁹". 5 years later the State Department reaffirmed its tactics and said that the alliance is built on cooperation and that a strong US push for Spanish membership would not be wise⁷⁰. Again the State Department advised a cautious approach as it suggested that "Any action to weaken Norwegian support for NATO, such as pressure for Spanish membership (...) would have adverse repercussions going beyond Norway⁷¹". Yet while the State Department advised caution, this view was not shared by everyone. The US ambassador to Madrid, Cabot Lodge did not favor the US balancing act: "There is a strong support within NATO for Spain's entry (...) opposed principally by Norway and

65 FRUS (1950) pg 1550.

66 Lafeber (1985) pg 65 in Haraldstad (1995) pg 13.

67 Whitaker (1961) pg 317.

68 FRUS (1951) "Report of the Western European Ambassadors Conference at Frankfurt"

69 FRUS (1950) "Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Thompson) to the Secretary of State".

70 FRUS (1955) Document 187.

71 FRUS (1957) in Haraldstad (1995) pg 39.

other small powers that hardly make a sizable manpower contribution to the ground forces necessary and now missing, for the defense of Western Europe⁷²”. He goes on to suggest a tougher US policy and urges a “new, fresh, hard look⁷³” on the question of accession.

In April 1957 the US undertook an analysis of NATO countries in terms of their stance on Spanish accession. The results showed that while Britain, France, the Netherlands and Canada were not fond of Franco or his policies, they would not vote against accession if the question was raised officially. Belgium and Luxembourg were critical of Spain, yet the analysis stated that when Paul-Henri Spaak would take over as Secretary General of NATO, they would change opinion on accession. Norway, Denmark and Iceland were then the last bastion of resistance as all other NATO countries were in favor of Spanish membership. Yet the report claims that if Norway was to change its opinion, then Iceland and Denmark would follow its lead, thus Norway’s role in keeping Spain out of NATO was pivotal. In a meeting of US ambassadors in northern Europe, it was argued that “Norway has a key position in relation to Iceland and Denmark, and latter are influenced by Norwegian advice or example⁷⁴”.

Despite its revision of tactics in 1957 the US tried to persuade the Canadian foreign ministry to influence Norway’s stance, building upon the positive relations between the two. The effort had backfired for the US when Mr. Davies of the Canadian foreign office had contacted Norway, fully disclosing the US State Department’s plot. Davies had argued that Canada would not be used against its close Norwegian ally⁷⁵. Haraldstad (1995) argues that the US wanted to use indirect approaches like the third party influence of Canada rather than attempt to influence Norway itself, as it could have a the opposite effect such as the further entrenchment of the Norwegian stance⁷⁶.

In 1955 the US Senate passed a resolution of seeking to admit Spain into NATO and in 1957 it was reaffirmed in a unanimous vote that the admittance should be discussed in the NATO meeting in Bonn in 1957. It was considered that since Britain had reduced its economic contributions to NATO, that the French had transferred a substantial amount of its army to Algeria, and that the West-German rearmament took longer than expected, that the Spanish were needed to compensate for the relative loss

72 FRUS (1957) Document 204.

73 Ibid.

74 FRUS (1957) in Haraldstad (1995) pg 30.

75 UD 33.6/3 IV UD notat 21.05.1959 in Haraldstad (1995) pg 40.

76 Haraldstad pg 33

of strength within the Alliance⁷⁷. Yet no such discussion occurred in the Bonn meeting⁷⁸.

3.4: Liberalist analysis:

Norway and Denmark had a decidedly negative stance against Spanish accession and the role of democratic values and human rights played a significant part. Haraldstad (1995) argues that the Nordic moralism, global conscience and missionary spirit have been used as a label on Norwegian politics in many questions on foreign politics, and can contribute to explaining the Norwegian policy towards Franco Spain in several contexts⁷⁹. The political leadership in Norway prioritized the ideals of democracy within NATO, and thus made it unthinkable for a broad spectrum of Norwegian citizens and politicians to include decidedly undemocratic countries such as Spain. This view is shared by several Norwegian researchers: “Olav Riste, Geir Lundestad and Rolf Tamnes in a number of works have all pointed to a missionary impulse and a strong moralistic strain in Norwegian foreign policy⁸⁰”. Such moralism is not typically combined with a realist policy stance, instead they are typically seen as divergent or contrary to one another. Yet Norway differs:

“(…) not just Labor in power but also Norwegian foreign policy makers more generally have tended to see realism and idealism not as opposites but rather as complementary. In order to maintain a functioning and liberal world order democratic ideals should be observed even if in some cases and in the short run they might appear to undermine the position of the West⁸¹”.

Pharo’s (2017) analysis is interesting as it clearly departs from the US strategic thinking within the Cold War setting. He claims that the Norwegian conception of security is one that prioritizes a unity of democracies within NATO. This ensures that the normative integrity of NATO is guaranteed as it adheres to the rules of the North Atlantic Treaty. By only containing democracies, NATO can more legitimately argue that it is an institution meant to protect the democratic way of life, namely human rights, freedoms and related values. The more ‘realist’ view of a strong presence in the Mediterranean is thus sacrificed to fulfill this. This view also adheres to the theoretical foundation of liberalism, that sees the promotion and spread of democracy as a factor that increases security.

77 FRUS (1957) Document 56.

78 North Atlantic Council (1957)

79 Haraldstad pg 37.

80 Pharo (2004, 2005, 2014) in Pharo (2017) pg 10.

81 Pharo (2017) pg 10.

The North Atlantic Treaty's article 10 stipulates that all members must vote affirmatively to allow a new member into NATO, such that any one member effectively has a veto. This is probably the main reason why Norway could keep such pressure on Spain in regards to accession. While Norway, according to Cabot Lodge, was small in terms of its relative NATO contributions, article 10 nonetheless grants considerable power to 'lesser states' in questions of accession. Norway's decisive role was due to the fact that Spain was an outsider wanting in, and the membership rules worked in favor of Norway's policy.

The discussion within Norway also highlights the role of how interest groups, workers' unions media attention and public debate played a role in shaping Norwegian foreign policy. These actors mobilized against Spanish membership from early parts of the accession discussion. While the Spain Committee was not active after 1955, it was a 'latent' resistance which represented a significant segment of the Norwegian population. Within the Labor party and worker's movement, the Spain question was of substantial importance, and the Spanish civil war was still in the minds of the Norwegian public⁸²⁸³. The resistance towards Spanish membership within the worker's movement and Labor party made it hard for the Labor government to accept its entrance. Lange had also made promises to the Labor constituents as early as 1949 that Norway would be the only NATO country to veto Spain's accession if necessary. Thus the incumbent Labor party had pressure on them to make good on its promise towards its constituent base. Gerhardsen and Lange were personally against Spanish accession and frequently stated in clear terms their stance against its membership. Thus a broad segment of Norwegian society coincided with their views and facilitated a negative stance towards the Spanish accession. Since the dominance of the Labor party in this period and the resistance towards Spain was so marked, the explanation that the domestic political setting led to Norway's strong stance seems strong. Pharo (2017) argues in the same general vein as Haraldstad (1995) that Norway was adamantly opposed to Spanish NATO membership at the outset of NATO's creation in 1949. The promise that Norway would deny Spain access was instrumental to "create an overwhelming Labor majority in favor of taking Norway into NATO⁸⁴". Thus Norway actively worked towards the democratic character of NATO, even seeing it as a criterion for its own membership in the alliance.

82 Pharo 2017, pg 10.

83 Haraldstad pg 38.

84 Pharo (2017) pg 10.

The US stance towards Spain was almost singularly based on security at the expense of values. While some divisions within the US political scene existed as Truman and Acheson had distanced themselves from the Senate vote regarding a considerable loan to Spain, as well as the Congressional argument of arms assistance, the resistance was short lived. The initial argument was that the US should have played a larger role in persuading Franco towards a more democratic mode of government. Yet shortly thereafter Acheson and Truman's position had changed and there was broad support for cooperation with Franco. Since then the US pursued Spanish inclusion fervently, opting to influence members' perspective on the necessity to include Spain, and brokering a bilateral agreement with Franco on security measures. The US had to balance its wish for Spanish membership against the pressure it could exert on disagreeing members, as the repercussions of too much pressure in the affairs of other members could have had negative effects on Alliance solidarity and unity.

3.5: Realist arguments:

In strategic terms within the Cold War setting, Spanish inclusion into NATO could have had benefits to the security of the Alliance members. Geographically, Spain could offer a large Mediterranean coastline, which especially the US found to be a very important asset to security, as the ability to secure NATO's southern flank was highly prioritized by the US in this period. Moreover "Spanish proponents of NATO membership argued that these same geopolitical considerations made such membership equally advantageous to Spain, because the country's strategic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict unless it had allied support⁸⁵". The Alliance could also provide Spain with much needed support through arms sales and aid for the modernization of its military. The US was the main supporter for Spain and vouched for Spanish inclusion based on a perceived security-based need for doing so as NATO's southern flank and Mediterranean presence was perceived as a strategic weak-point in its defences. A wholly realist stance was present in the US discussion of Spanish membership to NATO, as the relative power of the Western alliance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was prioritized over the need to embody democratic values and human rights.

The Madrid Pact can be argued to be a 'replacement deal' where Spain was integrated, by the US, into the security political umbrella of Western Europe. With Spain as a US ally, the security benefits in the

85 Meditz & Solsten (1990) Chapter: Spain and NATO

Mediterranean was reaped not only by the US but all of NATO. The US military presence in Spain in sum heightened the security of the Mediterranean region.

There were also potential security gains for Norway as it, arguably, would not gain any direct security advantage by allowing Spain into NATO. Instead the US priority of Southern Europe and the ‘southern flank’ was detrimental to Norwegian security in the high north and towards the Russian border north in Norway. According to Haraldstad (1995) Spanish membership could potentially have led to more investments in the south and Mediterranean and subsequently less investment for Norway⁸⁶. While questions of values undoubtedly were the main reason Norway denied its entry, this point could potentially have some merit.

Chapter 4: The Greek military junta of 1967 to 1974.

4.1: Context:

After its liberation from Axis occupation in 1944, Greece experienced a political environment characterized by a large degree of polarization between the political right and left. So large in fact that by 1946, Greece was experiencing a civil war “pitting monarchists against communists⁸⁷”. The political right first received support from the British, but due to fiscal challenges support was taken over by the US in 1947. The Greek right became empowered by its US benefactors and the launch of the Truman Doctrine would see many of the right-wing processes aided by the US, including “(...) the marginalization of the Greek left from the political system⁸⁸”, as well as the right’s victory over the communists in the civil war. From this early juncture of the Cold War the US thought of Greece as an important strategic asset in the fight against the Soviet threat. Greece joined NATO in 1952 with the aid of the US.

Yet by 1954 the US position in Greece would start to weaken, due in part to its heavy-handed pursuit of its interests. Another point of contention was during the Cyprus issue, when many states within the UN favored Greece’s claim to the island, yet not the US and several NATO allies. This marked the start of a Greek anti-American sentiment, leading James Penfield of the American Embassy in Greece in 1957 to conclude that “We can no longer be certain as we have been in the past that we shall have Greece’s

86 Haraldstad pg 41.

87 Klarevas (2004) pg 3.

88 Ibid pg 3.

support in foreign policy matters that are critical to us⁸⁹” George Papandreou who had claimed to fight an ““Unyielding Struggle” against a corrupt political establishment that had manipulated the elections of 1961 (...), in February 1964, was elected Prime Minister⁹⁰”. Papandreou would release documents with information about the alleged plot to influence the elections. When King Constantine asked to dismiss the officers who conducted the investigation into the plot, Papandreou refused. “In response to Papandreou’s unwillingness to appease the King, information was leaked to the press about an alleged plot to eliminate the Monarchy and establish a left-wing government⁹¹”. Papandreou tried to reshuffle and retire some military officers as a response to the plot allegations, yet was denied by his own minister of defense, Petros Garoufalias. Papandreou then tried to have Garoufalias dismissed and lead the Ministry of Defense himself. Yet this attempt was denied by the King, who argued that Papandreou, “by making himself Defense Minister, was putting himself in charge of the investigation of the ASPIDA group and his son’s relationship with that group⁹²”. The ASPIDA refer to a group within the armed forces who were central in the alleged plot. This caused Papandreou to resign on July 15 1965, and elections were scheduled for May 28, 1967.

4.2: Coup:

The May election never took place as, on April 27 1967, a junta of colonels “took upon itself the task of saving Greece from an imaginary communist coup by establishing a dictatorship⁹³”. Shortly thereafter, the constitution was suspended and members of the parliament were put under house arrest or imprisoned. The new political leaders promoted a staunchly anti-communist stance and enforced this through torturing political dissidents and suspected communists⁹⁴. The junta was quick to affirm its allegiance and loyalty to NATO, which came to play in the junta’s favor.

4.3: NATO DPC:

Despite the suffering of the civil population in the hands of the junta, the official NATO stance revolved around non-intervention and did not address the human rights abuses and the imposition of dictatorship. Instead NATO’s responses were framed by “the need to maintain the strength and

89 USDSR (1957) in Klarevas (2004) pg 5.

90 Ibid pg 5.

91 Ibid. pg 5.

92 Rouseas (1967) in Klarevas (2004) pg 6.

93 Pedaliu (2011) pg 101.

94 Amnesty International (1977) pg 10

cohesion of alliance, ensuring that Greece remained a loyal ally, able to discharge its NATO duties effectively⁹⁵”. At the 9th of May 1967, the NATO Defense Planning Committee convened and “provided a preview of how NATO would handle the Greek dictators over the next seven years and how the junta, in turn, would present itself to its NATO allies⁹⁶”. A review of the meeting minutes reveal no mention of the political situation in Greece⁹⁷. Furthermore, the NATO Secretary General Brosio had worked with the US NATO representative Harlan Cleveland “to ensure that the coup was not raised formally at the meeting⁹⁸”. Rather, ministers and Greek representatives express that Greece’s military capability is not adequate to defend Greek territory and thus call for a revised force plan to address this issue.

In the same meeting, representatives note the Soviet policy of extending its military power outside Europe and they “actively exploit every opportunity to built up positions from which to threaten NATO in the event of hostilities; this is especially true in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East⁹⁹” The Soviets had in this period built relations with Middle Eastern countries bordering the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. The document further notes that the military weakness of NATO’s flanks made potential attacks there especially threatening to the Alliance.

4.4: President Johnson

President Lyndon Johnson’s initial policy was to ban weapons exports to the regime. As the US was concerned over the NATO presence in the Mediterranean, its intention was not to weaken Greece’s military capability and ability to perform its NATO duties, but attempted to appease Congress through the weapons ban and send its Sixth Fleet to both provide military security in the Mediterranean, and put pressure on the Colonels¹⁰⁰. This policy was largely unsuccessful as the junta did not respond to the pressure of the Sixth Fleet, and the US wish for a speedy return to constitutional rule was not fulfilled¹⁰¹.

Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defence addressed US concerns over the junta in bilateral talks

95 Pedaliu (2011) pg 102.

96 Pedaliu (2011) pg 103.

97 Defence Planning Committee (1967)

98 Pedaliu (2011) pg 103.

99 Defence Planning Committee (1967) pg 339.

100FRUS (1967) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 103

101FRUS (1967) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 103

and discouraged other states raising such worries in official NATO settings¹⁰². In a meeting with the junta's Minister of Defence, McNamara had explained his concerns over human rights violations and the suspension of the constitution. The Greek defence minister had replied that the junta had acted to prevent a communist coup and "prevent (...) 'another Vietnam' in Greece¹⁰³" and that Greece's relation to NATO had improved after the coup. McNamara had in response brought up Greece's dependence on US economic and military aid and threatened to cut it if constitutional rule was not re-established. However, McNamara's threats did not force any change in Greek internal policy, and "despite their reservations, neither NATO nor the Americans were in a hurry to take punitive action¹⁰⁴".

4.5: Public opinion:

Several governments of the alliance faced pressure from public opinion regarding Greece's human rights violations and authoritarian rule, and protest groups called for ceasing diplomatic contact and trade with the regime, and in some instances calls for removing Greece from the alliance¹⁰⁵. Within Greece, an anti-junta movement was created quickly after the coup. The movement attempted to internationalize their efforts and garner support from like-minded people especially within Europe. The junta unwittingly aided the internationalization of the struggle, as the Greek colonels made enemies with a large segment of the elite who subsequently fled the country. The elites were well-connected enough to have "ready access to American congressmen, European parliamentarians, Hollywood, the principal international media, universities, and other influential bodies¹⁰⁶". Greek expatriates and students abroad were also mobilized against the regime.

The protest movement led a number of European states to suggest a discussion of the regime within the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 1967. The states include Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Italy and West Germany. Yet an effort by the US NATO representative Cleveland, NATO Secretary General Brosio and the British NATO representative Bernard Burrows, strongly advised the European states in question to deal with the Greek issue bilaterally. The bilateral call seemed to have been heeded because no mention of the Greek junta was forthcoming on the following

102FRUS (1967) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 103-104

103FRUS (1967) Document 286.

104Pedaliu (2011) pg 103

105FCO (1971) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 109

106Pedaliu (2011) pg 104

NAC meeting¹⁰⁷.

This call for bilateral action was followed in large part until the regime's collapse in 1974, mostly because of the explicit sensitivity of the nature, other times out of happenstance as on 13th of June 1967, when the NAC meeting was overshadowed by the Six Day War and the Greek issue was wholly ignored as a result. "The Arab-Israeli conflict threatened the military and energy security of NATO at a time when NATO's southern flank was already vulnerable to Soviet attempts to gain increased access to the airfields and ports of Mediterranean Muslim countries¹⁰⁸"

Secretary General Brosio was worried over the tensions within the Alliance and took it upon himself to be a voice of unity, attempting to downplay the conflicts over the Greek leadership. The junta themselves had threatened to leave the Alliance if formal censure was passed on them within the NATO framework¹⁰⁹. "Until his retirement, Brosio used a series of elaborate tactics to prevent a common stance against Greece, while ensuring that good relations were maintained between the other member states¹¹⁰".

4.6: The regime's bravado

After the Six Day War, despite the widespread critique and condemnation of the colonels' rule by international media and interest groups, the regime was still adamant that the Alliance would have to accept them. They listed a largely inflated sense of their security contributions to the Alliance as the reason they were still members. George Papadopolous, the chief instigator of the coup, bragged that the Alliance members had to accept Greece's new political trajectory, and if they did not the regime would still survive without their support¹¹¹.

After the lobbying attempts by Brosio and key members of the US political leadership, the regime became confident they were tolerated within NATO, and Papadopolous declared himself Prime Minister in late 1967. In January 1968, he wrote a number of letters to US President Johnson promising future elections in Greece. Yet he warned that the US-Greek relationship might suffer if the US

107North Atlantic Council (1967)

108FRUS (1967) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 105

109FCO (1968) and FCO (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 105

110Pedaliu (2011) pg 105

111Pedaliu (2011) pg 105

continued its distanced and cautious relationship with the regime¹¹². Johnson's government in response considered lifting its weapons export ban against the regime. Walt Rostow of the US National Security Advisory warned Johnson that to maintain the weapons ban was to further deteriorate US standing in Greece¹¹³. Johnson however maintained the ban, one factor being that he did not wish to aggravate Congress further, "when he had so much trouble with Vietnam¹¹⁴".

The North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), a sub-organization of NATO, became a vehicle for pressure against the regime. The Assembly had no impact on NATO decision-making or policy, but was created "to exchange ideas between legislators from NATO member-states¹¹⁵". In October 1969 the NAA adopted a resolution urging all members of NATO work towards appropriate means to return Greece to constitutional rule and prompt democratic elections¹¹⁶. This also heralded the end of bilateral action against Greece.

4.7: The Nixon years:

With the election of Richard Nixon as US president in 1969, the junta found a valuable ally within NATO, as he decided to resume arms sales to Greece in November in the same year as his election. After visiting the country in 1947 at the height of the civil war, Nixon argued that "only weapons could keep Greece safe, a view that he never revised. He did not like the Colonels much, but he believed he would "like [their] successors less"¹¹⁷". Nixon was also convinced that Greece was an important ally in the standoff against the Soviet Union and their efforts in the Middle East¹¹⁸

Nixon's foreign policy in relation to Greece was "influenced by the imperatives of *detente*¹¹⁹", or the easing of hostilities between East and West. Kissinger thought of the Mediterranean region as instrumental for US foreign policy, and maintaining a strong presence in the region was thought to be necessary to achieve *detente*. The Nixon-Kissinger paradigm regarded a unified Mediterranean region with Spain, Greece and Turkey as necessary both to NATO and the US for securing the Alliance against

112FRUS (1968) Document 352.

113Pedaliu (2011) pg 106

114Pedaliu (2011) pg 106

115Pedaliu (2011) pg 107

116FCO (1969) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 107

117Pedaliu (2011) pg 107

118NSC (1970) "NSC meeting" in Pedaliu (2011) pg 108

119Pedaliu (2011) pg 108

potential attacks. The threat of another Arab-Israeli conflict, combined with the Soviet's attempts of allegiance to Mediterranean Arab states made the region unstable and hotly contested. Nixon's tactic towards Greece would be to put pressure on the junta to return to constitutional rule, because if the US continued to be in the spotlight of the international media it could hinder US military support to Greece, which in turn would be detrimental to Greece's contribution to security in NATO.

4.8: Scandinavia on the offensive:

Norway and Denmark had since the junta's rise to power assumed a "posture of unequivocal opposition to the Colonel's regime¹²⁰". Both states had a foreign policy stance that gave high priority to humanitarian concerns, thus Greece's junta was decidedly unpopular. Besides, both states had opposed Turkish and Greek membership in 1952, based on "their non-Atlantic geographical position, but also through acute concern at the two countries' dubious democratic credentials¹²¹".

Nixon and Kissinger's pragmatic approach did not sit well with Norway and Denmark who "continued to be the most vociferous champions of Greek democracy¹²²". Pedaliu (2011) argues that Norway and Denmark underwent a political fragmentation, where the past dominance of large parties had been offset by the rise of others. Thus cross-party consensus on a range of issues were needed to create stable coalition governments. "This process was coupled with a decline in the traditional formulation and execution of foreign policy by the political elites. Activists were now bent on making their concerns part of the foreign policy-making process¹²³". The Vietnam war, the presence of nuclear weapons and fears that NATO were not prioritizing the northern flank became issues for concern. These were coupled with the general unease of the dictatorships in Portugal, Greece and Turkey. Especially in Denmark this translated into a debate on whether the country should continue to be a NATO member¹²⁴, yet a discontentment over NATO was also present in Norway. In Norway where the dominance of the Labor party and its ability to form majority governments had receded, consensus in foreign policy issues was needed to form stable coalitions. Prime Minister Per Borten of the liberal party was clearly against the Greek junta and adopted a policy of seeking to expunge it from NATO¹²⁵

120Pedaliu, (2011) pg 102

121Pedaliu, (2011) pg 102

122Pedaliu, (2011) pg 108

123Pedaliu, (2011) pg 109

124Petersen (1987) in Pedaliu pg 109.

125FCO (1971) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 109

The Norwegian and Danish campaigners meant that NATO could not tolerate the Greek regime if it would not return to democratic constitutional rule. Yet the primary event that spurred a Danish and Norwegian offensive was:

“the inopportune timing of a NATO report recommending the immediate supply of arms to Greece and Turkey to improve military deficiencies (...) The need to approve this report, allied to rumors that the Nixon Administration could resume heavy weapons sales to Greece, created concerns in the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada as well¹²⁶”.

Norway and Denmark decided to encourage all NATO states to oppose arms sales to Greece as an opportunity to pressure the regime. They went against Brosio’s policy of not bilateral action rather than addressing the issue through NATO institutions, and made requests to all European NATO members not to trade arms with Portugal, Greece and Turkey¹²⁷. The event “triggered a crisis in transatlantic relations and the whole machinery of the Alliance was put into motion to convince the two Northern European countries to tow the line¹²⁸”. The US, Britain and West Germany urged the two Scandinavian countries to not oppose arms sales, and Brosio argued that their opposition would harm the Alliance. The Greek colonels threatened to leave NATO if the supply of arms sales was not granted them. Brosio’s task became to mediate a solution between the two parties, and suggested a solution where the states opposing arms sales would be formally recognized, but the sale of arms would still go through. However the debate was so polarized that neither the Scandinavians nor the Greek junta agreed, and the issue was to be postponed until the NAC ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1970. Despite Brosio’s attempts to make Norway and Denmark moderate their critique against the junta, both countries’ foreign ministers condemned the Greeks for not fulfilling the membership criteria for NATO, “and for being a hindrance rather than an asset to the Alliance¹²⁹”. No Greek exit resulted from the meeting and Pipinellis countered by saying the internal politics of member states was of no concern to other Alliance members and that Greece was insulted by any such comments¹³⁰.

126Pedaliu, (2011) pg 110

127FCO (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 110

128Pedaliu, (2011) pg 110

129Pedaliu, (2011) pg 111

130Athens News Agency (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg

Because of the inability to resolve the issue it was again postponed to the next DPC meeting in September of the same year. The junta now attempted to seek assurances from Brosio that the issue should be resolved in the upcoming meeting or else the Greeks would not attend¹³¹. Nixon's stance was that the US would support the regime once more¹³². Brosio again approached Norway and Denmark and attempted to sway them to prioritize alliance cohesion over their moral standpoint¹³³. Hartling of the Danish foreign ministry eventually changed his stance and did not want to "set off a bomb¹³⁴" in NATO. The September meeting did not result in the prohibition of arms sales to Greece. Yet true to their policy Norway and Denmark urged member states not to sell arms to the Greek regime, and in the official report the Scandinavian stance was included as a footnote¹³⁵. The Jordanian civil war in September 1970 saw renewed worries in NATO about its security in the southern flank and Near East. Nixon used this as an opportunity to resume heavy weapons sales to Greece with the argument that the Mediterranean region needed strengthening¹³⁶.

In 1971, it was decided that the upcoming NAC meeting was to be held in Lisbon, and Norway and Denmark both disagreed with the choice of venue as Portugal was a country "languishing under a dictatorship¹³⁷", and it would be bad for the Alliance's image if a dictatorship should host a meeting of an organization intended to be for democracies. Moreover Denmark and Norway both indicated that they would raise issues of Greek governance in the meeting. Brosio again tried to pressure the two countries' representatives in NAC to moderate their critique against Greece, but only succeeded with the Danish representative, Hartling. The Norwegian representative Cappelen however, was adamant that he would level critique against Greece, and was not dissuaded by arguments of Alliance unity. A reason for this was that "the new Norwegian government had strong socialist beliefs¹³⁸" and in the Norwegian parliament there had been passed resolutions that had as a goal to put pressure on the Greek regime within NATO¹³⁹. Brosio argued he would censor any discussions in the NAC that could endanger Alliance unity, including discussions about the Greek regime. Nonetheless, Greek and

131FCO (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 111

132FRUS (1970) Document 283.

133FCO (1971) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 111

134FCO (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 111

135FCO (1970) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 111

136Blog.nixonfoundation.org (2010) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 111.

137Pedaliu, (2011) pg 112

138Pedaliu, (2011) pg 112

139FCO (1971) in Pedaliu (2011) pg 112

Portuguese governance was not spared critical discussion, yet none faced any sanction as most NATO members distanced themselves from the critical Norwegian stance. In October 1971, Brosio was replaced by the “pragmatic and deeply conservative Luns¹⁴⁰” who favored Brosio’s tactic of ‘stability over critique’. Luns, like Brosio, believed that allies should focus on Greece’s military contributions to the Alliance, not its system of governance nor its human rights record.

Despite his efforts the campaign against Greece did not cease. In fact it was given new impetus as the Dutch parliamentarian van der Stoep made a speech where he “called for concerted action against Greece and Portugal until democratic conditions were achieved¹⁴¹”. Otto Krag, the newly re-elected Danish Prime Minister had “committed himself publically to raising the suspension of Greece from NATO¹⁴²”. Again the NAC meeting became an arena where opponents of the Greek regime could express their critique. Yet again the meeting did not prompt any sanction, but drew a strong reaction from Luns and the Greek regime¹⁴³.

4.9: Anglo-Greek relations:

“The first serious consideration of London’s policy towards Greece following the coup came as an immediate response to a change of the political situation in a country considered for many years a traditional ally¹⁴⁴”. Prime Minister Wilson of the Labor Party, in discussions with Foreign Secretary George Brown, wanted to put pressure on the newly emerged regime and side with the deposed king. The wish was for a swift return of constitutional rule, yet without a Communist presence in a new government. Brown disagreed and said that “overt assistance to the king and, indeed, any political meddling would be inexpedient, as it would lead the colonels into further isolation and harden their stance¹⁴⁵”. Brown’s alternative was a cautious cooperation with the junta, with the intention of returning Greece to constitutional rule. As to the Greek king, he was to be supported “fully but unobtrusively¹⁴⁶”. This ‘balanced’ stance between supporting the king and cooperating to a degree with the junta became the general policy of the British government for the next three years.

140Pedaliu, Effie (2011) pg 113

141Pedaliu, (2011) pg 113.

142Pedaliu, (2011) pg 113.

143FCO (1971) in Pedaliu, (2011) pg 113.

144Nafpliotis, (2014) pg 72

145Nafpliotis, (2014) pg 72

146Nafpliotis (2014) pg 72

The British ambassador in Athens, Sir Ralph Murray was tasked with assessing and evaluating the Greek political situation, and recommended steps to be taken by Brown. His first such suggestion called for what became the major part of British bilateral relations with Greece: a ‘normal working relationship’. Yet it was to be combined with expressions of negative feelings towards the coup to attempt to pressure the colonels. In the same thread, Brown suggested “a certain aloofness, for example in having no British Ministers visit Greece (...) until the regime had evolved into something more respectable¹⁴⁷”.

Noel-Baker of the Labor government had however broken with the British diplomatic prerogative above. In a letter to the Greek foreign minister, he had expressed distress over the negative image the British press had given the junta, and had even suggested a visit with PM Kollias and colonel Papadopolous to make “certain specific suggestions about publicity and public relations, and also about possible visits to Greece by political and other British personalities¹⁴⁸”. This however conflicted with the Foreign Office’s stance and ambassador Murray meant it was “not the time for private diplomacy which might mess things up¹⁴⁹”.

King Constantine’s failed counter-coup made the British support to him a difficult position to maintain as the king was no longer seen as a force of stability. Sir Michael Stewart had warned the British against supporting the king after the botched coup as Britain could, as a result, find itself “in the middle of a Greek political storm¹⁵⁰”. The botched coup represented a period where the junta had consolidated its grip on state power, making attempts at promoting a return to constitutional rule difficult. Moreover, the Six Day War, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the loss of US bases in Libya made a stable southern flank highly sought after¹⁵¹.

In 1970, the Labor government was replaced by a Conservative one, with a more pragmatic outlook on the Greek regime, with a positive view on arms sales. The permanent under-secretary of state for

147PREM 13/2140 (1967) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 73

148MFA (1967) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 74

149FO (1966) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 74

150FCO (1967) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 77

151Nafpliotis (2014) pg 78

Foreign Affairs, Sir Denis Greenhill, said Britain wanted “as much business as possible with Greece¹⁵²” and that this would include the sale of arms and equipment that would aid Greece’s role as a NATO member. The FCO (formerly FO) adapted its stance to encompass the new Conservative government’s position in 1971. The FCO speaking notes of this period express “a more positive effort to sell arms to Greece¹⁵³”. In addition, Roy Jenkins, Chancellor of the Exchequer had earlier supported the arms sales and argued that Britain “should not suffer economically purely in order to take a resolute, moral stand¹⁵⁴”.

As to why the arms sales were an important policy for the Conservative government was economic in nature: “The problematic state of the British economy and the urgent need for trade contacts to boost revenue was exerting its influence on the diplomatic field, which is traditionally vulnerable to this kind of pressure¹⁵⁵”. While the arms sales were limited compared to what the Conservative leadership had hoped, an increase in trade did occur.

The new Conservative government had as shown downplayed its role as a promoter of democracy in Greece and its return to constitutional rule, in favor of good trade relations. Yet Britain also worked towards limiting the Danish and Norwegian efforts to level pressure against the junta¹⁵⁶. Any interference by the Scandinavian members could impact Britain’s arms exports to Greece negatively, as earlier campaigns had put pressure on such sales.

4.10: Liberalist analysis:

President Johnson’s decision to ban weapons exports to the junta was decided based on pressure from Congress, which signifies the split within US politics on the Greek issue. The continued ban of arms sales to Greece were given as a concession to Congress, and acted to appease them on Johnson’s unpopular stance regarding continued military presence in Vietnam. The decision to send the Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean was both to address the regional security issue, as well as put pressure on the junta’s breaches of the democratic constitution and human rights. McNamara brought up human rights violations in Greece and did attempt to put pressure on the junta in discussions with its defence

152Nafpliotis (2014) pg 89

153FCO (1971) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 92

154FCO (1969) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 82

155Nafpliotis (2014) pg 93

156FCO (1972) in Nafpliotis (2014) pg 94

minister, as he cited that the US funding and support to Greece could be cut if constitutional rule was not resumed. Yet at the same time the US did not enforce any punitive action following the coup, and no cut in funding happened.

The junta's breaches of values were clearly unpopular amongst several allies which the NAC and NAA actions point to. Several Western European members attempted to put pressure on the junta within the NAC, yet were either heavily discouraged to do so or by happenstance. As the NAA managed to put into action the resolution to encourage Greece to return to constitutional rule, it represented open resistance to the regime within a NATO setting.

Norway and Denmark were highly critical of the junta throughout its time in power, and were so because of its breaches of the Treaty's human rights and democratic aspects. As described, both countries worked towards a ban on arms sales to Greece by NATO states, in order to put in place more democratic measures within Greece. While they did not succeed, they clearly stated their dissatisfaction with the regime and its violations of the values NATO were supposed to embody.

Britain mirrored the US in pursuing a more cautious critique. While they did not suspend diplomatic contact with the junta, they put pressure on the regime by having no British ministers visit Greece. They also attempted to play both sides by supporting King Constantine, but only doing so to an extent that would not be 'obtrusive' to the junta. The fear was that by explicitly favoring the king, the junta would distance themselves from the British or become further entrenched, lessening the possibility of a democratic transition. The British Labor position seems more akin to an observer than a participant, hoping that the situation would sort itself out rather than risking any sort of intervention or strong stance.

4.11: Realist analysis:

The NATO DPC in 1967 clearly prioritized the power of the alliance over its values. As mentioned, the US NATO representative and Brosio worked to quash any discussion within the DPC pertaining the coup, of which they were successful. At the same time the meeting instead stresses the Soviet positions in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, and how these are threatening to the alliance. In response it was decided that NATO needed to refocus its attention to the adequate defense of its southern flank,

which included Greece. Brosio played an active role in suppressing intra-alliance issues and clearly prioritized NATO's unity, security and relative power over democratic and human rights values. Luns as Secretary General came to have the same stance as Brosio, firmly against any joint action against Greece.

The US considered Greece first and foremost as a vital asset in the defense of Western Europe, and second as a morally untenable regime. In the Johnson years there was an attempt of a balancing act, attempting cautious pressure yet not to an extent as to weaken Greece's ability to defend against possible Soviet aggression. With the election of Nixon the pressure to return to constitutional rule still remained, but Greek combat readiness would not be sacrificed as a result, as exemplified through the resuming of arms sales. The junta as a result faced even less pressure to reinstate the constitution and hold democratic elections because of Nixon's support.

The British cautious approach changed when the Conservative party took over from Labor, and resulted in a considerable shift in its Greek policy. The government, in an attempt to alleviate its struggling economy, saw no issue with selling arms and military equipment to the regime. The difficult economic situation Britain experienced in this time gives an explanation to this phenomenon and an increase in exports to Greece, which had a demand for military products, represented a market with significant potential profits. The shift in policy following the Conservative rise to power makes sense in a realist interpretation, as a state's primary concern is its own survival. Allowing and encouraging arms sales to Greece can thus be interpreted as economic self-preservation. Yet the arms sales to Greece also represents improving the British economy at the expense of furthering the values NATO members are committed to. This 'sacrifice' is exemplified by Roy Jenkins' statement that Britain shouldn't suffer financially to take a moral stand.

Chapter 5: Turkey's coup in 1960

5.1: Discontent within the Turkish military:

Since the start of the modern Turkish state, "the Turkish military (the army in particular) enjoyed an extremely high level of status and prestige, gaining an almost mythical position in Turkish society¹⁵⁷". During the Menderes government a division within the military was beginning to form, in part due to

157Gunn (2015) pg 109

perceptions within the military that Menderes and the Democratic party were actively undermining the armed forces' status in Turkish society. In addition the younger officer's opportunities for promotion were blocked by more senior military staff due to their political connections¹⁵⁸. Moreover due to inflation following Menderes' public works projects, the young officers found themselves poorly paid amidst rising costs of living. As early as 1954, discontent over the socioeconomic conditions in Turkey had led military officers to harbor grievances towards the Menderes regime, to the extent of fostering conspiratorial activities¹⁵⁹. By 1958 two secret military organizations (located in Ankara and Istanbul) had joined forces and worked towards removing Menderes from office¹⁶⁰. With the help of General Cemal Gürsel, commander of the Turkish ground forces, officers close to the conspirators were put in key leadership positions within the military¹⁶¹. At the 27th of May 1960, the elected government of Adnan Menderes and the leading Democratic Party (DP) was toppled as members of the Turkish armed forces carried out a coup. Shortly thereafter, the National Unity Committee (NUC) was established as the rulers of Turkey. They consisted of the 38 officers, with General Cemal Gürsel at the head, who instigated the coup and "announced plans to draft a new constitution and to restore civilian control as soon as possible¹⁶²". Since the NUC had set itself up as the transitional rulers of Turkey with the intention to return the country to constitutional rule as fast as possible, the NUC had wished countries to resume a normal working relationship with Turkey which did not include a formal recognition of the new regime. The NUC, stating that it was to be a temporary power structure saw formal recognition as an implication that the junta wished to go beyond its temporary position in Turkish politics¹⁶³.

5.2: Debate within the US:

In 1956 Fletcher Warren, the US ambassador to Turkey, warned president Hoover of Turkey's economic issues. At the time, Turkey was in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for receiving aid, with the condition that it accept a set of austerity measures. Warren noted the possibility that the Turkish government might not accept the policies set out, and warned that the US "cannot turn the cold shoulder if Turkey fails to accept the IMF proposals¹⁶⁴". He argues that Turkey is of prime

158Gunn (2015) pg 109

159Özbudun (1966) in Gunn (2015) pg 110

160Karpas (1970) pg 1665.

161Hale (1994) in Gunn (2015) pg 10.

162Gunn (2015) pg 2.

163Ibid.

164FRUS (1956) Document 345

importance to the US and the West and if it rejects the IMF proposals it would translate into a loss of security for its allies. Hoover replied that he was committed to 'foot the bill' if the proposals were not agreed upon and mentioned that Congress has appropriated substantial amounts of aid "and can be expected to dull the edge of Turkish economic difficulties¹⁶⁵". He does however see the possibility that by granting Turkey aid it becomes unwilling to "take corrective measures¹⁶⁶" in regards to its own ailing economy.

The National Security Council (NSC) report in the following year regards Turkey as the most stable Middle Eastern country in political regards, and that it has made substantial progress towards a liberal democratic political system and that "Western cultural concepts are being developed¹⁶⁷". Yet despite its progress, the presence of "strong limitations of freedom of the press and restrictions on the right of political assembly reflect authoritarian leanings within the government¹⁶⁸". In regards to the Turkish economy the report notes that while the Menderes government had restricted its spending somewhat after being denied a loan by the US in 1955 and due to IMF recommendations, public spending had overall increased since 1956¹⁶⁹. State Department documents reveal that the US was conflicted over the trajectory of their relationship with Menderes. When Secretary of State Christian Herter visited Istanbul the 1st of May 1960 he questioned Menderes' stability as a leader. Herter also feared that Menderes would take unlawful action against the opposition party, which Menderes had previously put under investigation. He also worries that the ongoing situation in Turkey might obfuscate the United States' access to bases in Turkey and future operations in the country¹⁷⁰.

Large sums of American aid had been given to Turkey to aid its faltering economy and "the most recent scholarship indicates that U.S. military assistance to Turkey from 1947 to 1964 equaled \$2.27 billion¹⁷¹". Despite the monetary contributions, Menderes' inability to reform the military had greatly frustrated the US, and "had caused the Turkish armed forces to become increasingly expensive, inefficient, and incompatible with U.S. security needs¹⁷²". This was not the end of US frustrations

165Ibid.

166Ibid.

167FRUS (1957) Document 359

168Ibid.

169Ibid.

170FRUS (1960) in Gunn (2015) pg 117

171Gunn (2015) pg 107

172Gunn (2015) pg 106

toward Menderes, as he had tried to use his unclear relationship with the Soviet Union as a bargaining tool in his dealings with the US, as “Relations between the Menderes government and the Soviet Union seemed to warm whenever Ankara’s pleas for financial aid were ignored by the West¹⁷³”.

In 1960, the Menderes government was growing increasingly repressive and the creation of a Turkish committee tasked with investigating the leading opposition party for alleged subversive activity was not lost on the US foreign office. On April 28th the director of the CIA, Allen Dulles commented in the NSC that suppression of the opposition had occurred and that “this problem required careful consideration by the U.S. Government in the future. The Turkish Army was probably behind the government; however, there was a strong popular feeling in favor of Inonu¹⁷⁴”. Mustafa Ismet Inonu had been leader of the Republican People’s Party since World War 2, and was the main opposition party to Menderes’ own Democratic Party. The Turkish Army’s discontent became clearer to Dulles and the Eisenhower administration closer to the coup when Dulles could report that on May 21st a number of officers and cadets from the War College had participated in an anti-government demonstration. However in ambassador Fletcher Warren’s correspondence with the Chief of Turkish Army Staff at the 23rd of May, he had “insisted that the army was non-political and would continue to support the Government of Turkey¹⁷⁵”. Yet a day later Dulles could report that “The Turkish Army is divided, with senior officers inclined to remain loyal to the government and lower level officers divided between the government and the opposition. Premier Menderes apparently does not realize the extent of discontent¹⁷⁶”. He concluded that the rioting and protests could lead the Turkish army to take over.

5.3: After the coup:

In an NSC briefing the 30th of May, 3 days after the coup, it was presented as likely that Inonu and the Republican Party had foreknowledge of the coup, yet “apparently did not participate actively in either the planning or action phases¹⁷⁷” Inonu had repeatedly stated that he wished to assume power through elections and not by process of a coup. While the NUC was friendly to Inonu as he was a respected figure within the military, he did not seem complicit in the coup according to the briefing.

173Gunn, Christopher (2015) pg 5.

174FRUS (1960) Document 357.

175FRUS (1960) Document 364

176Ibid.

177Central Intelligence Agency (1960) “NSC Briefing: Turkey”

The NUC were quick to confirm that they were committed to continue working with NATO and CENTO¹⁷⁸, and in part this might be due to “rumors (...) that the United States might intervene to restore Menderes to power¹⁷⁹”. The cause for worry was probably based on the defense agreement signed by Menderes and President Eisenhower a few months prior to the coup which pledged US intervention in Turkey in order to combat direct or indirect aggression. Yet no such intervention happened and by the 30th of May, most of the NATO allies had granted formal recognition to the new regime and resumed normal diplomatic contacts with Turkey¹⁸⁰. The news that the NUC would reinstate democracy was lauded by Eisenhower, who wrote a letter the 11th June to the new president of Turkey, colonel Cemal Gürsel. Gürsel and the NUC’s statements of continued NATO and CENTO support “was also a source of great satisfaction to me (...) My government looks forward to continuing cordial relations with Turkey¹⁸¹”.

5.4: Norwegian ambassadorial correspondence:

The 12th of January 1960, the Norwegian charge d’affaires to Ankara, Harald Midttun, reports to the Norwegian Foreign Office on a law targeting the press where any journalistic piece that has the intention to critique or reduce the standing of persons in a public position is punishable by law. As a consequence of this law, an editor of a Turkish newspaper was given a 16 month jail sentence for reprinting an article by a foreign journalist that had written a piece which was deeply critical of the Menderes regime. 3 other newspapers had also published the same article and all four newspapers had been temporarily been banned from publishing any news. The same report mentions how Midttun has received information of substantial discontent in the armed forces and he does not rule out the possibility of a military coup¹⁸². At the 11th of March Midttun reports that an unnamed figure in the government press apparatus had said to the Norwegian ambassador that the sentencing of the Turkish journalist would entail a loss of prestige in world opinion and would have severe consequences for the Turkish government¹⁸³. In the later parts of April, the embassy in Ankara report their impression of an evolving divide between the opposition and government, and concludes that a ‘dangerous situation’ can arise. The embassy also notes the possibility that the army could intervene if the situation is not

178FRUS (1960) Document 364

179Gunn (2015) pg 11.

180Gunn (2015) pg 11.

181FRUS (1960) Document 367

182Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) “Tyrkia ved årsskiftet”

183Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) “Redaktør Yalman fengsles”

resolved¹⁸⁴.

At the 10th of May the Norwegian ambassador to Ankara, Ivar Lunde, reports that the government had enacted a curfew that closed off the city center for the general public in the evenings, in an attempt to curb protests. Furthermore, he describes that Inonu from the Republican People's Party had been barred from meetings in parliament. The public has responded by organizing protests and riots which was in violation of both the curfew and martial law, where large organized groups were considered illegal. Despite the worrying events, Lunde argues that discussions between the government and the opposition could defuse the situation¹⁸⁵.

Nine days later, the embassy reports riots occurring in Ankara at the 14th the same month. In addition the curfew had been extended and movie theaters and other public meeting places had been closed to prevent the public from gathering en masse. The Menderes government had previously created a commission, tasked with investigating the Republican Party and Inonu, and had stated at the 19th that there would be no election before the commission had presented its report. The ambassador had previously attended a political meeting where several of the senior military officers present had greeted Inonu with great respect. Inonu had been an important political figure during and after the rule of Kemal Atatürk, father of the modern Turkish state, and Inonu had since become a figure that was deeply respected in the Turkish military¹⁸⁶. This period was marked by considerable protests across Turkey, seeing the participation of a broad segment of the Turkish population.

At the 27th of May, on the day of the coup d'état, the Norwegian embassy in London received word from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office that the coup was the result of a blister that sooner or later had to burst because the Menderes government had ended up in a totally untenable situation¹⁸⁷. While a report from the embassy in Ankara at the 29th of May had concluded that no formal recognition of the NUC would be forthcoming, this quickly changed the day after when word had come to the Norwegian foreign office that Britain wanted to formally recognize the new leadership under Gürsel¹⁸⁸. The note from the Norwegian foreign office suggests that the Norwegian delegation to Ankara be given

184Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Den innenrikspolitiske situasjonen i Tyrkia"

185Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Tyrkisk indrepolitikk" (10. May)

186Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Tyrkisk indrepolitikk" (19. May).

187Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Statskuppet i Tyrkia"

188Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Situasjonen i Tyrkia"

formal rights to recognize the new leadership, but only after Britain has given its own recognition. A hand-written comment at the bottom of the note expresses a wish that the new Turkish leadership would follow constitutional rule¹⁸⁹. Yet this comment was deemed void after the NUC had given a statement to the public via radio, where they pledged to hold elections in a year. The statement stipulated that the NUC's intention was not to become a dictatorship. Its intention was to restore law and order and democracy through holding free and fair elections as fast as possible. Yet the NUC did not want to rush towards elections considered it necessary to resolve underlying issues¹⁹⁰.

The NUC at the 28th of May, 2 days after the coup, expresses its continued loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. It further states that the military took power because the situation had pushed Turkey to the brink of civil war. The NUC had taken over to create a "strong and free democracy¹⁹¹". The same day, Ivar Lunde presents his reflections on the NUC's takeover. He reports first on the fact that the rioting has subsided, being replaced by people in celebration of the toppling of Menderes. In the last part of the report he reflects somewhat poetically on the new regime: The new regime have been so fortunate that today there is rain in Ankara and nearby regions at an unusual time. In a desert-dry country with a primitive population of farmers such as Turkey, this can't be interpreted as anything else than a sign of Allah's mercy and a signal of good years both for the rulers and those ruled¹⁹²! In correspondence from the Norwegian embassies in the US, Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, all states express the same intention of resuming a normal diplomatic relationship with the new regime¹⁹³. Only the Danes mention that power was seized using violent means, yet this did not dissuade them from pursuing a normal diplomatic relationship with Turkey.¹⁹⁴ In addition the Norwegian ambassador to London, Erik Braadland, states in relation to the British press' opinion of the coup that "something had to happen and this might not be the worst alternative"¹⁹⁵.

5.5: Liberalist analysis:

The NSC's report from 1957 first argues that Turkey was making progress in developing Western

189Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Notat 30. mai fra UD, fjerde kontor"

190Göktepe (1975) pg 161-162

191Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Telegram fra Ankara"

192Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Militærstyret i Tyrkia"

193Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Ankara, telegram fra den norske ambassade"

194Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Anerkjennelse av den Tyrkiske regjering"

195Norwegian Foreign Office (1960) "Norges ambassade i London"

cultural concepts, which it holds to be something positive. Whether this refers to democratic and human rights issues is not clear. But shortly thereafter the report discusses how there are limits on the freedom of the press and rights for political assembly. These elements are presented as factors that diminished Turkey's stability. The implicit argument is that by putting limits on its press and free political assembly, the Menderes government had diminished Turkey's stability. Thus democratic institutions are interpreted as a source of stability for the US when considering Turkish politics. Menderes' actions against the opposition was also noted as something negative by Secretary of State Herter and Alan Dulles, director of the CIA. The move to investigate Inonu and the Republican Party prompted Herter to question Menderes' stability as leader, and Dulles to suggest careful consideration in the future. In sum Menderes was a worrisome figure for the US based on his suppression of democratic institutions.

In reference to the NSC report from 30th May, there is indication that the US considered that the opposition would be put up as the ruling party by the NUC. The fact that it did not (because Inonu wished to rule only if elected through a democratic process), and that the NUC was committed to hold elections as fast as possible made the military junta, considering the circumstances, a promising candidate for US cooperation. Not only did they present a more 'stable' alternative relative to Menderes, as the coup proved they had public support, as opposed to Menderes. The junta also promised to reinstate a more substantive democratic regime than their predecessor had allowed. Ironically the military, through process of a violent overthrow of a democratically elected government, had become the custodians of Turkish democracy.

The Norwegian embassy's correspondence had put considerable weight on the free press issue, much like the US had. The fact that the reports detail these elements show us that the Norwegian ambassadorial staff at least found it to be relevant to the stability of Turkey. Yet where the data from the US explicitly saw the press issue as something that required caution in the future, the Norwegian embassy's staff were wholly descriptive. Neither Midttun nor Lunde offered any suggestions to how Norway was to deal with the Menderes regime or the suppression of democratic rights. In response to mounting protests and riots, Lunde suggested that discussions between the opposition and government could solve the issues at hand. This signals that initially there was hope the situation would solve itself.

In reference to Lunde's almost poetic description of the military takeover immediately following the coup is interesting as it expresses hope, a sentiment that has not been forthcoming in the correspondence until now. The shift from descriptive to hopeful I interpret to signify relief over the situation. The NUC had announced steps to reinforce democracy, hold elections and solve underlying issues caused by Menderes. All these factors would facilitate for regional stability and more harmonious relations with Norway and NATO as a whole if the NUC were to succeed. It shows us that Lunde at least hoped the military junta would be a more stable political actor and more in tune with the values of the Treaty than Menderes had been.

It is interesting that Norway initially considered withholding a formal recognition of the junta, until Britain expressed it would recognize it. Norway instead chose to follow the rest of the alliance in accepting the new regime. Compared to the Spanish case where Norway was assertive in condemning Franco and denying its entry into NATO, in this case it rather chooses to follow the path of least resistance. While it wishes that the NUC should quickly return to constitutional rule, it does not offer critique against the toppling of a democratically elected government. Moreover, Lunde seems pleased after the NUC declares its intentions to be a transitional power and work towards reinstating democracy. Norway's stance towards the NUC is marked by cautious pragmatism, with the hope that the NUC can eventually facilitate a more substantial democracy with more respect for human rights (such as the freedom of the press and rights of the opposition) than Menderes did. It seems like Norway did not wish to 'make waves' in the alliance to the same extent as it had done during the Spanish accession question, and would come to do with the Greek junta.

5.6: Realist analysis:

Gunn (2015) mentions the strategic significance of Turkey linked to its geographic placement. First, it links Europe to the Middle East, it has waterway proximity both to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and has "one of the world's most historically significant waterways (the Turkish Straits)¹⁹⁶". Turkey also formed the front-line of NATO towards the Soviet Union, as well as representing the middle-point between Middle Eastern energy resources traveling towards Europe and Eurasia. With the exception of a small corridor in the north of Norway, Turkey was also the only country that bordered directly to the Soviet Union. Turkey also had the second largest standing army in

¹⁹⁶Gunn, Christopher (2015) pg 5.

NATO after the US. All these reasons made Turkey “bound to play a major role in the superpowers’ Cold War calculations¹⁹⁷”.

The US had a national interest in keeping Turkey allied. Having diverted significant amounts of development funding since the 1950’s, the US sought to support a Turkish military able to hold its own in the possibility of Soviet aggression. Ambassador Warren’s worry over Turkey not being able to service its commitments to the IMF is indicative of the importance the US put on Turkey’s economy. A weak Turkish economy would in turn represent a weak military capability. The US also had military bases in Turkey and were meant to have a deterring effect on possible Soviet aggression. As Menderes frequently displayed his willingness to broker deals with the Soviet Union when US support was denied, it made his relationship with the US strained. Combined with Herter’s worries over Turkey’s political situation, Menderes could potentially limit US access to these bases, which in turn could reduce the security of the alliance.

The deal signed by Eisenhower that pledged US support to Turkey in the event of direct or indirect aggression is further sign of the US national interest in keeping Turkey stable and loyal to the West. As Turkey was regarded as a substantially important ally in the Mediterranean, Eisenhower was undoubtedly positive towards the NUC’s continued allegiance. That they also intended to be a temporary state power had the added advantage that open US support would be less problematic, despite the fact that they gained power through a coup.

The tacit approving relationship between the new Turkish regime and the alliance members must be understood in comparison with the Menderes regime. While Menderes rose to power as a result of democratic elections, the Democratic Party’s government was unpopular in the eyes of Norway and the US. The US had put a substantial amount of aid into Turkey to help its ailing economy and modernize its army. Yet in terms of its returns, the US were not impressed by Menderes. Many of his policies failed to produce the needed changes, and his tendency to try to use the Soviet Union as a bargaining tool had made his relationship with the US strained.

The fact that a military coup toppled a democratically elected government was not enough to prompt a

197Gunn, Christopher (2015) pg 5.

discussion on ousting Turkey from the alliance, despite the fact that the NUC was in violation of the Atlantic Treaty because of the coup. Both the Norwegian and US representatives argued that human rights and democracy mattered, but did so most for Turkey's internal stability which in turn affected its participation in NATO and force projection towards the Soviet Union. As a result the coup did not matter for Turkey's retention of NATO membership.

Chapter 6: Turkey under Erdogan

6.1: Background:

Erdogan emerged on the political scene as mayor of Istanbul, having won the local election on March 27th 1994. He quickly rose to prominence and esteem due to his successful handling of many of Istanbul's infrastructural problems, such as the problem of water shortage, air pollution and waste management, as well as issues with corruption and the proper distribution of municipal funding¹⁹⁸. In 1997 Erdogan was arrested and held in prison for 4 months as well as being removed from his mayoral position at the charge of inciting religious hatred. This was because he, in a public speech, recited part of an old nationalist poem that stated that "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers"¹⁹⁹". The recital was interpreted as a violation of Kemalist tradition²⁰⁰. After spending four months in prison, Erdogan "responded to the insistent demands of the public in an environment of improved democratic conditions, and established the Justice and Development party (AKP) with a group of friends on August 14, 2001²⁰¹". The party quickly established itself as a leading political force and in the 2002 general elections, the party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament and formed a single-party government. On March 15 2003, Erdogan was appointed to Prime Minister²⁰².

Through the successful implementation of various policies, Erdogan and the AKP gained a large degree of public esteem. His successful handling of municipal issues during his mayoral tenure, as well as contributing to a civil rights movement (also known as the Silent Revolution), led the party to gain "successive victories in eleven national electoral contests, including local, national, and presidential elections and referenda, indicating a level of popularity which is unprecedented in Turkish political

198Columbia University World Leaders Forum (2008)

199Al Jazeera (2018)

200Ibid.

201Columbia University World Leaders Forum (2008)

202Ibid.

history²⁰³”.

The civil rights movement led to the acceptance of “public expression of religious observance and ethno-linguistic distinctiveness, thus elevating the status of previously denigrated religious conservatives and ethno-linguistic minorities to the level of equal citizenship²⁰⁴”. While the allowance of religious expression such as the removal of the headscarf ban could be interpreted as a detraction from Turkey’s Kemalist traditions, it was a move lauded both by many European observers as well as ethnic minorities and religious conservatives. The reversal of Kemalist tradition gained many followers from the religious conservatives in Turkey, making them an important contribution to the AKP voter base.

6.2: The 2016 coup attempt:

On July 15th 2016, parts of the military once more intervened in Turkish politics, this time attempting to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his cabinet. According to Azeri (2016), the coup was “planned and supported by the members and sympathisers of the self-exiled Fetullah Gülen’s Islamic sect²⁰⁵”. That parts of the military who had sworn loyalty to Gülen attempted to overthrow Erdogan and his cabinet has become the dominant narrative of the coup attempt. This ‘sect’ operated by attempting to co-opt or subvert state practices to be in accordance with Gülenist policies. Those who were loyal to Gülen would allegedly take orders from senior members assigned to them “instead of following the orders of his/her superior in the legal hierarchy²⁰⁶”. The Gülenists are now implicated in a number of criminal activities, such as persecuting their opposition through mock trials within the judiciary²⁰⁷, mass cheating in university exams through distributing the answers²⁰⁸, and wiretapping and videotaping private conversations in order to blackmail citizens²⁰⁹.

The coup departed from the military’s “‘tradition’ of seizing power in the name of restoring ‘order’ and ‘national unity’²¹⁰”, but instead has basis in the rivalry between Gülen’s Service Movement and the

203Aktürk (2016) pg 142.

204Aktürk (2016) pg 141.

205Azeri (2016) pg. 465

206Aktürk (2016) pg. 157.

207Filkins (2016) and Rodrik (2014) in Aktürk (2016) pg. 157.

208Oğur (2014) in Aktürk (2016) pg. 157.

209Oğur (2014) in Aktürk (2016) pg. 157

210Azeri (2016) pg. 465

Erdogan-AKP government. Previously, the two factions were partners and Gülen's allies were secured places within AKP governments since 2002. Gülenist members "were brought into key positions within the jurisdiction, the education system and academia, the police forces, the military and the state bureaucracy and were part of the war against the Kemalist-secularist 'elites' within these institutions²¹¹".

Azeri (2016) continues by saying that the coup attempt failed because of internal divisions within the military. This is also backed up by Aktürk (2016) who says officers who were loyal to the Kemalist vision of a secular Turkey were in opposition to the coup attempt and "actively resisted it²¹²". Following the failed coup, the Erdogan administration put in action a sweeping purge of individuals suspected of being involved in the coup or with the Gülen Service Movement "not only within the army, but also in academia, and various ministries²¹³". The number of jailed or fired is according to Azeri (2016) 3158 military personnel including officers, generals and admirals, as well as more than 70,000 public employees. A number of these were also put under investigation for their alleged participation and planning of the coup. Moreover, economic holdings and assets "allegedly related to Gülen are under attack; several holdings and their assets have been confiscated and business-leaders and CEO's have been arrested²¹⁴".

6.3: Democratic backsliding:

Compared to the regime type that has emerged, the past regime has been described as a tutelary democracy which is defined as "a democracy that succeeded in achieving an acceptable level of separation of powers, press freedom, and regular elections, but the civilian regime had to share its power with the military on matters of structural importance, such as military promotions and the defense budget²¹⁵". Yet while the power of the military has receded, this has not produced democratization. Instead it has been replaced with an authoritarian regime with a concentration of powers in the hands of the President. Caliskan (2018) argues that Turkey can no longer be described as a democracy, but rather a type of authoritarian system "where the opposition's ability to compete for

211Ibid pg 466

212Azeri (2016) pg. 465

213Azeri (2016) pg. 466

214Azeri (2016) pg. 466

215Caliskan (2018) pg 13

power is restricted in real terms to the extent that elections become structurally non-competitive²¹⁶”.

The coup attempt ushered in widespread changes to Turkey’s political order and rule. Four days after the coup attempt, Erdogan granted himself “executive presidential rule, due to the declaration of a state of emergency²¹⁷”. While under the state of emergency, a referendum in 2017 regarding amendments to the constitution was voted in with a vote of 51% in favor, a slim margin for victory. This referendum “transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential one with executive powers in the hands of the president²¹⁸”. The June 24 elections in 2018 - where Erdogan declared himself the winner before the YSK (Supreme Electoral Council) had declared its results – saw the President as head of a political order with “little or no oversight²¹⁹” on his broad ranging powers.

The military was also affected and underwent a change in leadership structure as they were put under civilian control: “the chief of staff of the Turkish armed forces was placed under the political responsibility of the Minister of Defense, and then, following the 2017 referendum, under the president²²⁰”. The military, having been a historically major wielder of force and influence in Turkish politics had now seen its authority eroded, instead being reliant upon the state for funding and loyalty to the state being prioritized in the selection of officers.

The OSCE has reported that Erdogan enjoyed a significant advantage in the 2014 election, when they acted as observers on the voting process. “This bias was based on the existence of (...) impediments of preventing the opposition from campaigning on an equal footing and providing only uneven access to resources and media²²¹”. On the other hand, Erdogan and the AKP enjoyed higher levels of visibility in the media, in newspapers and TV channels than their opponents. This bias in favor of the AKP continued and increased in the June and November elections in 2015, when TV broadcasters were said to strongly favor the incumbent party, which in turn prevented oppositional parties from competing on equal ground²²².

216Ibid pg 9

217Yurtbilir (2018)

218Ibid.

219Ahval (2018)

220Caliskan (2018) pg 7

221Caliskan (2018) pg 13

222OSCE (2014) in Caliskan (2018) pg 13

Moreover the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), the judicial body that controls elections in Turkey, had after the 2015 elections refused to allow access to information pertaining the elective process. After the November 2015 election, a constitutional court ruling had made it so that reviewing YSK decisions were deemed illegal even in cases related to fundamental human rights. The YSK, being a branch of the judicial powers, is funded by the Ministry of Justice, “(...) thus making it financially dependent on a ministry under the control of the incumbent²²³”. In addition, the judicial reforms of 2011 and 2014 had “increased government control over the judiciary, thus decreasing the YSK’s autonomy²²⁴”. As the Ministry of Justice now holds the power to discipline and dismiss judges, it can exert significant control over the election administrators of the YSK. As a result, the elective process in Turkey has now become less transparent and harder to monitor and report on by the media. In addition, laws regarding the conduct and content of the media is restrictive to the degree that journalists have been jailed for being critical to the AKP and Erdogan. This in turn also reduces insight and transparency the elective process²²⁵.

Erdogan and the AKP have also employed underhanded tactics against the media. One case in 2009, where a newspaper had criticized Erdogan’s political allies on the basis of corruption, was a week after the article fined USD 2.5 billion for alleged unpaid taxes²²⁶. The newspaper conglomerate saw its stock plummet and was forced to sell large parts of its assets to stay afloat.

“Though openly criticized for these actions by the European Union, the European Commission, the International Press Institute, and the OSCE, Erdogan’s government dismissed these criticisms and refused to revise the tax fine until the group decided to sell two of its three newspapers (...) to a partnership led by Yildirim Demirören, a businessman who was very close to Erdogan. Following this sale, the second-largest media group, Sabah-ATV, was sold to the Calik Group, whose CEO, Berat Albayrak, is now Erdogan’s son-in-law and the minister of energy²²⁷”.

223Caliskan (2018) pg 14

224Ibid.

225Ibid.

226Caliskan (2018) pg 16

227Caliskan (2018) pg 17

Journalists have also been targeted by police and courts, particularly after the failed coup in 2016. The CPJ reports that in both 2016 and 2017 Turkey ranked first in the world on number of detained journalists, with 81 detained in 2016 and 73 in 2017. All these journalists were detained on the basis of crimes against the state, and most were associated with the Gülenist movement²²⁸. In some cases, Turkish prosecutors have alleged that the presence of a mobile phone application called Bylock is proof enough of the defendant's membership in the Gülenist movement²²⁹. Similarly, a Council of Europe report from 2015 report that Turkish journalists faced “threats to their safety and professional independence from overly restrictive laws, hundreds of questionable criminal investigations, (...)improper government interference with the work of the media, and intolerance of criticism on the part of the government²³⁰”.

6.4: NATO's response to the 2016 coup attempt

On the day of the attempted coup, July 16, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published a statement where he expressed concern over the political situation in Turkey. He “calls for calm and restraint, and full respect for Turkey's democratic institutions and its constitution²³¹”.

Two days later, Stoltenberg again publishes a statement where he “welcomed the strong support shown by the people and all political parties to democracy and to the democratically elected government²³²”.

Once again he stressed the democratic character of NATO as he “reiterated my full support of Turkey's democratic institutions²³³”. In addition: “Being part of a unique community of values, it is essential for Turkey, like all other Allies, to ensure full respect for democracy and its institutions, the constitutional order, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms²³⁴”.

At the 10th of August 2016, NATO published a press release on its website, stating that due to speculative press reports, NATO felt the need to clarify its stance regarding the coup attempt. The first part of the press release states that Turkey is a valued ally to NATO, with substantial contributions to the alliance. In addition the document states that Turkey's membership in NATO is not in question.

228Beiser (2017)

229Committee to Protect Journalists (2017)

230Flego (2015) point 117.

231NATO (2016) “NATO Secretary General statement on events in Turkey”

232NATO (2016) “NATO Secretary General statement following attempted coup in Turkey”

233Ibid.

234NATO (2016) “NATO Secretary General statement following attempted coup in Turkey”

“Our Alliance is committed to collective defence and founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law. NATO counts on the continued contributions of Turkey and Turkey can count on the solidarity and support of NATO²³⁵”

In talks between Stoltenberg and President Erdogan, Stoltenberg had been “strongly condemning the attempted coup and reiterating full support for Turkey’s democratic institutions²³⁶”.

A year later on the first anniversary of the coup attempt, Stoltenberg again issued a statement repeating his respect for those who died defending Turkey’s democracy, condemnation of the coup attempt, as well as “my strong message that any attempt to undermine democracy in any of our Allied countries is unacceptable²³⁷”.

6.5: S-400

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO leaders announced the goal of producing a ballistic missile defense system capable of covering the entirety of NATO’s European territory²³⁸. Most NATO members have acquired national ballistic defense systems which in turn have been connected to a Ballistic Missile Defence Operations Centre, located in Germany. An important component of the functioning of this system is interoperability, which is the ability of nationally owned sensors, systems and other components to be able to act together in order to rapidly detect threats and deploy defensive measures throughout NATO's territory. However Turkey’s decision to buy the S-400 ballistic defense system from Russia has been a source of worry for NATO leaders as “the S-400 will likely not be allowed to integrate into the NATO missile defence structure. This raises concern over the implication of NATO members procuring platforms that will not be permitted to plug into NATINAMDS and has led to unease among some NATO members²³⁹”

The US in particular has expressed concern. Turkey had plans to buy the American F-35 combat aircraft yet when Turkey also wanted to buy the S-400, the US withdrew the F-35 contract. The possibility that by connecting the S-400 to the F-35 combat aircraft, vulnerabilities of the jet could be revealed, “as any data collected by the air defense system and obtained by Russia could help expose the

235NATO (2016) “NATO Spokesperson's statement on Turkey”

236Ibid.

237NATO (2016) “Statement by the NATO Secretary General on first anniversary of coup attempt in Turkey”

238NATO (2010) “Lisbon Summit Declaration”

239King (2019) pg 53

joint strike fighter's vulnerabilities. For a platform like the F-35, whose major strengths are its stealth and data fusion capabilities, that would be a disaster²⁴⁰". US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had in 2018 informed Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu on his concerns over the S-400 acquisition, stressing the need for NATO allies to ensure interoperability in missile defense. After the meeting, Casuvoglu had nonetheless not changed stance: "We have completed the S-400 process. That is a done deal²⁴¹".

Ellen M. Lord of the US Department of Defense stated on June 7, 2019 that "As we have clearly communicated at all levels, Turkey will not receive the F-35 if Turkey takes delivery of the S-400 system. Thus, we need to begin unwinding Turkey's participation in the F-35 program²⁴²". The unwinding procedure involves halting training of Turkish pilots for the F-35. In addition she commented on the strong possibility that Turkey would face economic sanctions through CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) as a direct result of their decision to acquire the S-400²⁴³. Casuvoglu had previously responded that Turkey would not be deterred from buying the missile system despite the possibility of sanction²⁴⁴.

Stoltenberg speaking at the Aspen Institute's security forum expressed concern over Turkey's expulsion from the F-35 program. While Turkey would be excluded from the NATO air and missile defensive system, he underlined that Turkey's radar and aircraft would still remain part of the ballistic defense system²⁴⁵. He dismissed the question of whether the fracture over ballistic defense implies Turkey shifting away from the West and towards Russia²⁴⁶, arguing that Turkey "is a key ally in the fight against Daesh/ISIS²⁴⁷" and that "the role of Turkey is much broader than the F-35 or S-400²⁴⁸".

Stoltenberg further stated that no ally had asked for Turkey to be removed from the alliance, arguing that the alliance members are all interdependent on each other²⁴⁹.

240Insinna (2017)

241Wroughton (2018)

242U.S. Department of Defense (2019)

243Ibid.

244Wroughton (2018)

245Euractiv (2019)

246Williams (2019)

247BIAnet (2019)

248Ibid.

249Williams (2019)

6.6: Liberalist analysis:

Despite a lasting process of democratic backsliding in Turkey, I was unable to uncover any data pertaining NATO states' negative responses to this. While journalists, analysts and interest groups have been outspoken about breaches on human rights and the democratic process, no such have been forthcoming from NATO states. The closest approximation were the responses issued by NATO following the coup attempt. In his statements, the Secretary General makes frequent reference to the importance of respect for Turkey's democracy, yet do not point any fingers when speaking about the coup. In his closing statements on the press release two days after the attempt, he states that Turkey is bound to respect fundamental rights, the rule of law and other aspects that are related to the North Atlantic Treaty. This can be interpreted as a critique against Turkey, albeit a very cautious one. Stoltenberg was probably not ignorant on Turkey's violations of the freedoms of the press and free and fair elections, as this comment seems to indicate. The August 10 statement sees Stoltenberg approach the coup issue more cautiously as he expresses Turkey's importance, value and contributions to NATO, and the fact that Turkey can count on NATO's continuing support. Here it seems that Stoltenberg, as Brosio before him, is prioritizing the stability and unity of the alliance over issues regarding breaches of the democratic and human rights aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty.

6.7: Realist analysis:

The reduction of interoperability following the acquisition of the S-400 has been a source of worry for the US. The loss of interoperability translates into a loss of security for the Alliance as a whole, yet the US have been the most vocal opponents of the S-400, and now consider employing sanctions to put further pressure on Turkey. The reason is likely the resulting loss of presence the US faces vis-a-vis Russia, who have been expanding their influence in the Middle East.

The relative silence of the NATO members on Turkey's increasing authoritarianism is a finding in itself as it demonstrates the importance NATO members place on the participation of Turkey. Turkey has again shown tendencies to play both sides with Russia and the West, not only due to the S-400 acquisition but also militarily through the Idlib armistice in Syria²⁵⁰. Turkey also represents a bastion against the spillover of recent unrest and conflict in the region. Historically Turkey has long played the same role, being a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. In addition, Turkey has access to the

250Zandee (2019)

Black Sea, which the Russian Navy has been increasingly active in following the annexation of Crimea. As a NATO member, Turkey serves as a counterweight to Russian presence in the Black Sea²⁵¹. Alliance military infrastructure in Turkey is substantial, with several bases having served use by both NATO and the US, which also contributes to NATO's presence and force projection in the region. Turkey has moreover been a significant contributor to NATO since it joined, having a large standing army and military budget²⁵². All these factors make Turkey a sought-after partner and the loss of its presence in NATO could be cause for crisis for the alliance.

7: Conclusion:

When comparing these cases, it is important to remember they are fundamentally different. As Spain wanted membership whereas Greece and Turkey were already in the alliance has an impact on my analysis. As the North Atlantic Treaty has revealed, it is easier to keep a potential member out of NATO than it is to remove an existing member. A reason for this is that the North Atlantic Treaty's article 10 necessitates full agreement by all members on questions of accession. On the other hand, the Treaty lacks any formal procedures for the removal of a member, and no member has ever been removed from the alliance. With this in mind, I argue that Spain faced a greater scrutiny on its democratic status as article 10 effectively gives any member veto powers. Norway and Denmark especially prioritized the democratic and human rights shortcomings of Spain to deny it access to the alliance. In the cases of Cold War Greece and Turkey, any member who objected to their further inclusion risked damaging the alliance cohesion and unity, without certainty of seeing the country removed. Thus the objecting members faced a low possibility of realizing its policy and a high probability of a loss of security, through loss of alliance solidarity. Yet as I argued in my initial study proposition, the Spanish case has shown that given members were interested in maintaining and furthering NATO values in Spain, at the cost of security. Yet this loss was offset by the bilateral defense agreement between Spain and the US. Regarding Greece, Denmark and Norway greatly contested its membership in the alliance but it did not result in its removal. It did however cause a crisis in the alliance and lowered alliance solidarity. Thus in reference to Moore's (2007) comments on NATO's role in creating a unified institution based on liberal values, my research instead paints a different picture. Where she argues that the alliance created high levels of stability, my analysis points to deep-seated moral issues within the alliance during the

251Zandee (2019)

252Ibid.

Cold War years.

As explained previously, many states held the belief that there was a strong possibility of Soviet aggression stemming from the Mediterranean based on Middle Eastern states allying with the Soviet Union. In regards to the southern flank argument most if not all members had an interest in keeping it secure. This can explain why many states (especially the US) approached the membership question during the Cold War with a large degree of pragmatism, and a willingness to ‘sacrifice’ values for security.

The loss of the Soviet Union as the main adversary of NATO has not seen Europe completely secure and the alliance still faces common enemies in organized crime and terrorist organizations. In addition, aggressive Russian posturing in recent years have also proved a challenge to the alliance. In regards to the contemporary Turkish case, it is thus still an important asset in addressing these threats, and members have a clear interest in keeping Turkey a part of NATO. In the same vein as the Cold War cases, I argue that NATO members still have an incentive to be pragmatic and concerned with a realist conception of security. Even though Turkish politics are increasingly authoritarian, NATO and its members have been silent and not forthcoming with critique. Nor has there been any discussion of disciplinary measures or removal. This signals that NATO prioritizes notions of security and alliance stability rather than being an embodiment of human rights and democracy across its territory. In sum, to answer my research question I can conclude that NATO’s values affected membership status in Spain, but did not do so on my other cases.

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List of Abbreviations:

AKP – Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CENTO – Central Treaty Organization
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CPJ – Committee to Protect Journalists
DP – Democratic Party (of Turkey)
DPC – NATO Defense Planning Committee
EC – European Community
FCO – Foreign Commonwealth Office (of the UK)
FO – Foreign Office (of the UK)
HFAC – House Armed Services Committee
IGO – Intergovernmental organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
LO – Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge)
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAA – North Atlantic Assembly
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
NSC – National Security Council
NUC – National Unity Committee
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PM – Prime Minister
UN – United Nations
YSK – Supreme Electoral Council