



The Welfare State and the Media System: The role of media and communication in the evolution and transformation of Scandinavian welfare state

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This article aims to bridge the gap between media studies and welfare state studies. While media and communications systems are key elements in society, these systems are strikingly missing from studies of the welfare state. Through a discussion of five historical phases in the evolvement of Scandinavian societies and media systems, from the early democratization in the late 18th century, via the 'golden era' for the welfare state and until the present challenges of globalization, digitalization, and fragmentation of social trust, the article discusses the nature of the relationships between the two spheres. The article points out how the developments in the two spheres have been parallel, yet also how progress in one sphere are indications of more general changes underway, or explanations that can help to make sense of changes in other sectors. The article concludes that it is difficult to understand the evolvement and challenges to the welfare state without an understanding of vital communications; simultaneously it is difficult to understand the media system without paying attention to broader political frameworks and trends.

Introduction

The interest in Scandinavia and the 'Nordic Model' has increased in recent decades, and the welfare models and societal organization of Denmark, Sweden and Norway have been widely debated.¹ This interest in Scandinavian societies is not new; already in the 1930s the 'Swedish model' and the 'middle way' was scrutinized as an ideal society, recognized by moderation, and social cohesion.² Yet, the specific topics drawing interest vary over time. Today's key debates are concerned with sustainability of the comprehensive welfare state and how to deal with new

challenges, such as how to ‘fully and successfully integrate immigrants into their generally very egalitarian provision of employment and other important life opportunities’.³

As media and communication scholars, we understand the media system as a crucial element in every society. This article is an attempt to bridge the gap between media studies and welfare state studies, and improve a situation where media and communication systems are noticeably absent from studies of the welfare state. While studies of democratization and modernization in the 18th and early 19th century placed strong emphasis on freedom of speech and the evolvment of press and the public sphere, studies of the emerging welfare state from the late 1800s pay little attention to media and communications. Through a discussion of five historical phases in the evolvment of Scandinavian societies and media systems, from the early democratisation in the late 18th century, via the ‘golden era’ for the welfare state and until the present challenges of globalization, digitalization, and fragmentation of social trust, the article discusses parallels and linkages between the two spheres. The challenges of periodization are a much-debated topic in history studies. Although each study has specific needs according to its thematic and theoretical focus and needs to define its own criteria, effective periodization is based on consistency, either by systematically focusing on given factors in each phase, or by identifying key events which form a natural break in history.⁴ The main argument is that it is difficult to understand the evolvment and challenges to the welfare state without an understanding of vital communications; simultaneously it is difficult to understand the media system without paying attention to broader political frameworks and trends.

The Welfare State and the Media System

Often referred to as the ‘Nordic model’ or the ‘Scandinavian Model’, the welfare states in the northernmost part of Europe are defined by a strong state, universalism and tax-funding of the welfare services and benefits.⁵ In social policy, the cornerstone of the model is universalism, as the entire population is included in welfare state arrangements. Universal programs are preferred to selective ones, and public services should hold a sufficiently high standard to discourage for example the demand for private schooling. The large and ambitious welfare state is intended to secure universalism and equality not only in social policies, but also in public participation in various areas of economic and social life, the purpose of which is to promote economic

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3 efficiency, to improve the ability of society to master its problems, and to enrich and equalize the
4 living conditions of individuals and families.⁶ The Scandinavian countries represent ‘a peculiar
5 fusion of liberalism and socialism’, often described as ‘social democratic’.⁷
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9 The academic interest in welfare state models, and research into the characteristics of the
10 welfare state emerged and increased rapidly from the 1960s. Studies and reports examining the
11 welfare state and developing concepts like ‘social indicators’ and ‘quality of life’, were
12 concerned with conceptualizing ‘the good and bad conditions of man’s life’ and aims at ‘a
13 comprehensive conception of his situation by including all crucial aspects of life’.⁸ However,
14 welfare state research tends to focus mainly on education, employment, health care, and old age
15 pensions.⁹ Despite exceptions, such as Drewnowski and Scott who identifies daily newspaper
16 circulation and radio and TV sets as part of the basic cultural need ‘leisure and recreation’¹⁰,
17 media and communication hold no place in conceptions of the welfare state; this is also the case
18 in concise and authoritative definitions in encyclopedia entries.¹¹
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27 In the last decades, there has been an upsurge in the interest among communication
28 scholars for comparing different types of media-state relations and models¹², and for studying the
29 role of the state in facilitating and restricting communication.¹³ Also in comparative studies of
30 media systems, there are distinct Scandinavian and Nordic features. The state has intervened to
31 enhance the media and communication systems in the same way as it has intervened in other
32 aspects of human life; the sector has also been characterized by ‘stateness’ in the sense that the
33 relationship between the state and the people is ‘a close and positive one’ and the state perceived
34 as ‘as an agency through which society can be reformed’.¹⁴ Historically, the comparatively high
35 legitimacy for state intervention in the media sector in the liberal Scandinavian democracies has
36 been remarkable, in particular in contrast to the situation in states such as the US. Yet, in studies
37 of state involvement and media policy, media-state relations are rarely compared to or seen as
38 intertwined with state interventions in other sectors. The advantage of a greater focus on
39 interdisciplinary in Nordic studies is that it opens up for discussions of broader trends and
40 interrelated developments; an interesting question being to what degree explanations for social
41 developments in one sphere can be found in spheres other than the one studied by a particular
42 discipline.
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In an attempt to discuss the analogy between media and welfare state studies, Syvertsen et al launched the tentative concept of ‘the media welfare state’, based on four key pillars that have characterized Nordic media systems: a strong emphasis on universal services, a strong tradition of personal liberties and press freedom, a cultural policy that extends to the media, and a tradition of consensus and cooperation between main stakeholders.¹⁵ The framework of a ‘Media Welfare State’ is neither meant to contradict existing typologies, nor present a new ideal type, but to identify and discuss principles that have characterized media and communications. This article extends the analysis by examining historical preconditions: specifically, how development of Scandinavian welfare states and the media systems coincide, as well as how developments in one sphere may help to explain developments in other spheres. The five phases are defined by key debates, conflicts and compromises about political and media solutions, which are crucial for evolvement of media as well as social systems.

Fig 1: Key developments in the evolvement of the welfare state as well as the media system

	1770s-1850	1850-1900	1900-1945	1945-1980	1980-2000s
Key social and political debates	End of authoritarianism, citizens’ rights, political democracy	Parliamentarism and political parties, early social policy, universal education	Consensus and compromises, Welfare solutions established	Comprehensive welfare state, Universality and state support	Regulated privatization, renewing the welfare state
Key developments in media and communication	Press freedom, public sphere, national press	Universal telegraph and telephone, Party press	Public service broadcasting, national radio	Press support, Public service television, Comprehensive cultural policy	Globalisation, Digitalisation, User participation, Public broadcasting gets new tasks

1. Political Democracy and Press Freedom 1770s to 1850s

The twin processes of modernization and democratization characterized the late 1700s and early 1800s. In Scandinavia, like most West European countries, this was a period of social and political change, informed by emerging ideals of popular sovereignty, criticism of absolutism

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3 and the rise of a new constitutionalism. The absolute monarchies were challenged by the joined
4 forces of international trends and local popular resistance; there was an emerging agitation for
5 citizens' rights: the right to influence on decision-making, the right to speak and assemble, press
6 freedom, and the protection of the citizens under the rule of law.¹⁶
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11 While institutionalization of citizen's rights was a precondition for the later evolvement
12 of the welfare state, freedom of the press was crucial for the dissemination of liberal ideas, the
13 mobilization of interest groups, as well as the later evolvement of media systems. Thus, this is a
14 period where political history and media history are strongly interlinked and often discussed
15 together, as a prerequisite for the development of modern Scandinavian democracies.
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20 *Politically and socially*, the late 1700s was characterized by bourgeois revolutions in
21 Europe, with the French revolution (1789-1799) as the most far-reaching. In Scandinavia, there
22 were no open revolutions; rather, the political and social changes were imposed gradually and
23 within the established order. Absolutism was relatively flexible, and rather than confronting
24 opposition, the rulers legitimized their power by absorbing changes and governed partly in
25 accordance with public opinion.¹⁷ This is related to the Scandinavian political culture with
26 origins in the Reformation tradition of teaching literacy, an early modern tradition of engaging
27 the lower classes in decision-making via local self-government, and a preference for consensus
28 above oppression. The outcome of absolutism was thus complex, as it not solely implied a
29 concentration of power, but also, although unintentionally, actually 'paved the way for
30 meritocracy and greater social equality'.¹⁸
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40 The transition to modernity was in Scandinavia a process of both continuity and change,
41 and the King was often seen as a collaborator in the struggles against the society of orders rather
42 than the opponent. This was a consequence of loyalty to the rulers and a trust in their ability to
43 rule, but also of a tradition of accessibility to the government and the size of the countries, as
44 geographical distances between the capitals and the rural areas were relatively small.¹⁹ The break
45 with absolutism represented a more profound change in Norway and Denmark, where the new
46 political order replaced an absolute monarchy dating from 1660, while the break was less
47 dramatic and more influenced by continuity in Sweden. During Sweden's 'Era of Liberty' (1718-
48 1772) political power was concentrated in the various estates of the realm; after the death of king
49 Karl XII in 1718 and Sweden's defeat in the Great Northern War, the Swedish parliament
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(Riksdag) and council were strong enough to introduce a new constitution that abolished royal absolutism and put power in the hands of parliament.

The Swedish Stature of Government of 1809 is the oldest written European constitution still in force. The Norwegian constitution dates from 1814, whereas Denmark did not replace the Royal Law of 1665 until 1849. The Norwegian constitution became possible because of the dissolution of the union with Denmark in 1814, although a union with Sweden followed lasting until 1905. Sweden was nevertheless a far less controlling senior union partner than Denmark, and there was a steady growth in the political consciousness in town and county, which prepared the way for parliamentarianism.²⁰ At this point, there were no political parties; the ministers were not politicians, but civil servants appointed by the King.²¹

The struggle for citizen rights was strongly intertwined with the struggle for *press freedom* and the emergence of a *national public sphere*. In Scandinavia, as elsewhere, widespread censorship was the rule, even during Sweden's so-called Era of Liberty, all non-orthodox movements were ruthlessly suppressed. Yet, despite its severe limitations, the Swedish press freedom law from 1766 is celebrated as the oldest in the world, at that time 'no other country had gone as far in guaranteeing the freedom of the press'.²² The Swedish constitutional provision came prior to the French 'Declaration of Rights' (1789) and the US Constitution securing press freedom from 1791.²³ One explanation for Sweden's pioneering role was that Sweden's wartime losses produced a need to 'catch up' with the European ideas and inventions of the Enlightenment, and 'talented Swedes also began to further develop the impulses that had been imported. Among these advances, it is possible to include the codification of freedom of the press that evolved during the 1760s'.²⁴

In the autocratic Denmark-Norway, press freedom was slower to be institutionalized. Censorship had been introduced in 1537, the press was not allowed to write anything that could harm the state, and was warned against reproducing rumors, undocumented claims, and speculations.²⁵ In 1770, press freedom was introduced by Johann Friedrich Struensee, who was inspired by the enlightenment ideals and enforced several reforms during his 18 months in power in Denmark-Norway, however, censorship was reintroduced in 1773 with severe restrictions, including the death penalty. In spite of these restrictions, the number and types of printed publications grew, and only extreme violations were prosecuted.²⁶

The struggle over press freedom as well as citizens' rights was both a result of and a precondition for the evolvment of the national public spheres, primarily manifested in the launch of newspapers. Following the 1766 freedom of the press legislation, newspapers emerged in Sweden and later in Denmark.²⁷ In the first half of the 18th century, Swedish liberal newspapers appeared, contributing to societal change as new newspaper owners introduced new journalistic genres and new technology.²⁸ The 1789 French revolution was mainly a forbidden topic in European journalism, and only briefly mentioned in the Norwegian press at the time, with the notable exceptions of a few protesting newspapers.²⁹ In 1789 -99, Peterson published the first explicit political journal in Norway, agitating against the aristocracy, and for freedom of speech.³⁰ In 1814, when the Danish-Norwegian union ended, the principle of freedom for all printed texts was included in the Norwegian constitution and new newspapers were launched³¹ – a strong reaction to the suppression of press freedom between the late 1700s and 1814.³²

The conflicts in the period from late 1700s to the mid-1800s that had the most crucial implications for later societal and media developments, were the struggles against a society of orders and authoritarianism, for citizens' rights, and press freedom. The controversy around press freedom illuminates the political and religious leaders' desire to control the citizens, but also that censorship became more difficult to maintain. Political and media developments in this period were fundamentally interlinked, as the emerging public spheres and growth of newspapers were preconditions for the political mobilization that led to later establishment of political parties. As Andenæs argued more than a century later: 'The Scandinavian countries regard freedom of the press as the mainspring of free popular government and any interference by the state – however well intended – will always evoke violent protest'.³³

2. Parties, parliamentarism and universal services 1850s – 1900

The period from 1850 to 1900 in Scandinavia was crucial for the rise of parties, political mobilization and the emergence of the party press. New groups entered the political realm, and growing literacy created a demand for printed material for enlightenment and entertainment. The period saw key struggles over parliamentarism, debates over social security schemes, as well as early debates over universal services. State regulation of vital communication infrastructure such as telegraph and telephone, would later serve as models for broadcasting and telecom policies.

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Politically and socially, the 1800s saw increased mobilization of groups seeking political influence. Political mass parties first emerged in Denmark; farmers united in a party in the early 1870s, and the conservative, urban-based party developed shortly afterwards, a social democratic party was established in 1884, 12 years earlier than in Sweden and 19 years earlier than in Norway.³⁴ The first party organizations in Norway emerged in 1882-84, a liberal Venstre representing farmers and urban intellectuals, and a conservative Høyre supported by the new industrial and commercial classes and higher civil servants. The labour party was founded in 1887.³⁵ The Scandinavian system of Proportional Representation implies that the political parties, rather than individuals, are important.³⁶ In a parliamentary system of democratic governance, the executive branch derives its legitimacy from the legislative parliament, and the opposition parties are essential in holding the government accountable through parliament and electorate.³⁷ The political breakthrough for parliamentarism dates to 1848 in Denmark, 1884 in Sweden and Norway.³⁸

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Industrialization and capitalism brought new problems as well as the question over whether the state should take more responsibility for people's lives. The 1800s saw struggles over the introduction of social insurance laws, old-age pensions, and subsidies to voluntary sickness funds.³⁹ In this period, the state was active in several areas – including areas that were controversial in other countries such as employment protection legislation and unemployment issues.⁴⁰ The period around 1870 is not described as a fully-fledged welfare state, but rather as a 'social service state'.⁴¹ Conservatives, aristocrats, and a liberal middle class dominated politics, and the working-class movement did not rise until the last two decades of the nineteenth century.⁴² Both liberal and conservative parties supported social insurance, but the socialists fought for a rights-based approach based on solidarity and universalism, rather than forms of aid that was seen to stigmatize individual recipients.⁴³

Pertaining to media and culture, the period from 1850 is described as 'the great technical revolution'.⁴⁴ Innovations in production and distribution technologies made printed material widely available; major innovations characterized the fields of photography, telegraphy, phonograph, telephony, as well as the development of components for cinema and broadcasting. The extension of literacy was crucial to political mobilization as well as the growth of media, and comprehensive schooling debated in all three countries.⁴⁵ Support grew for the idea that the

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3 state should provide equal educational opportunities for all children, regardless of social
4 background, geography, abilities, and gender, under the umbrella of a *School for All*.⁴⁶
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6 Throughout the 1800's important reforms in all three countries extended the comprehensive
7 school system to include children from all social classes. Gradually, also, the typical
8 Scandinavian phenomenon of 'popular education', in which the aim was empower the people to
9 raise oneself culturally and educationally, became a decisive factor for the formation of a more
10 egalitarian society.⁴⁷
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16 This focus on education in combination with the formation of political parties stimulated
17 the emergence of the Scandinavian party press. In contrast to the British and American press,
18 which were distanced from the political parties, in Scandinavia the voluntary collaboration and
19 links between the press and political parties influenced and formed the region's press structure.
20 The party press came to play a key role as 'agents of modernization' contributing to
21 democratization throughout the 1800s and 1900s.⁴⁸ However, other consequences of universal
22 literacy were more contested, especially the reading of popular fiction drawing on themes from
23 folk tales and folk culture.⁴⁹ Popular media were seen as amoral as well as distracting people
24 away from the issues at hand, there was strong emphasis on proving uplifting and enlightening
25 alternatives, as well as extending collections of good books in public libraries.⁵⁰
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34 A vital ingredient for the growth of the press was the development of telegraphy, which
35 enabled information to be transmitted over large distances, and this increase national integration.
36 The telegraph is the model for all electrical signaling systems that followed, and its organization
37 was subject of controversy in the same way as the state's role in other vital infrastructure: roads,
38 railways, canals, lighthouses and steamboat routes.⁵¹ The organization of telegraph, and
39 eventually telephone, as state-run services, provided a model for state-owned communication
40 infrastructures crucial to achieving political and moral changes associated with Scandinavian
41 welfare states. In Europe, most states chose a state telegraph, whereas the United Kingdom and
42 the United States had private systems. In Scandinavia, the state took control over the telegraph
43 systems around 1850.⁵² Even if the statist solutions differed across Scandinavia, the arguments
44 overlapped; quality, effectiveness, and references to the common good legitimated state
45 intervention.⁵³ As a rights-based ideal gained ground, unequal access to essential communication
46 infrastructure became a political problem.⁵⁴ Also with the later development of the telephone,
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3 equal access became a reason for state intervention.⁵⁵ The political norm was the compensatory
4 state; the state should compensate when private solutions were insufficient to grant universality
5 and access to remote parts.⁵⁶
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9 Although there was no uniform Scandinavian path, the struggles over parliamentarism
10 and communication infrastructure between 1850 and 1900 were important for the evolvement of
11 the welfare state as well as the ‘media welfare state’. Support for the idea that the state should
12 intervene to secure universal services – in social security, education, as well as
13 telecommunications – grew, providing arguments and toolboxes for later phases of social
14 engineering in the fields of social policy as well as policies for media and culture.
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23 **3. From conflict to consensus and public service broadcasting 1900-1945**

24 Decisions and compromises in the first half of the 20th century are vital for the evolvement of a
25 welfare state as well as a ‘media welfare state’. The phase is characterized by progression from
26 conflict to compromise and important agreements within social as well as media policy. While
27 studies have pinpointed the vital role of the press for political mobilization in the first and second
28 phase, the establishment of public broadcasting in this third phase has not been seen as equally
29 vital. Yet, the changes in political and media spheres were strongly intertwined: as new groups
30 were included in the political sphere, broadcasting drew diverging cultures into a common
31 national space.
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39 *Politically and societally*, the main political conflicts in this phase concerned
40 enfranchisement of new groups and disagreements over state intervention and universal
41 solutions. Gradually universal suffrage was achieved; Norway was the first of the Scandinavian
42 countries to implement suffrage for women in 1913, then came Denmark in 1915, and Sweden
43 1919. The 1920s and 1930s were decades of unrest and turmoil; controversies erupted over how
44 to solve the social problems of industrialization and urbanization, such as unemployment, safety
45 for workers and citizens’ protection. Denmark was the social policy force in Scandinavia, mainly
46 due to its early economic modernization, and K.K. Steincke’s social reform in the 1930s.⁵⁷
47 Danish initiatives led to cross-Scandinavian meetings on topics such as workers’ accident
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3 insurance (1907), social policy (1919), protection of children (1919) and sickness insurance
4 (1923).⁵⁸
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8 While reforms in the late 1800s had created a powerful Norwegian legislature and
9 considerable domestic autonomy, Norway did not gain full independence until 1905 – amidst
10 strong national sentiments emphasizing Norwegian identity, culture and heritage. Yet, emerging
11 class and political divisions produced polarization and social unrest, with confrontations between
12 workers and bourgeoisie, employers and employees. One set of conflicts pertained to the choice
13 between insurance-based and tax-based social security; in the case of old-age pensions, a
14 compromise was reached between labour and conservatives to introduce a dual system.⁵⁹ Even
15 though Labour held on to universalism as the ultimate goal, and redistribution of wealth as a key
16 political instrument, such compromises were vital.⁶⁰ Through the formation of political
17 coalitions, cooperation in the labour market, and expanding welfare provisions⁶¹, consensual
18 policy formation has since the interwar period been a key Scandinavian feature. As the Great
19 Depression and military threats from outside promoted cooperation, party coalitions appeared
20 across the region to tackle the economic crisis, and extreme political groups were marginalized.⁶²
21 These developments help to explain why the Scandinavian democracies lie close to a model of
22 ‘consensus democracy’⁶³, a type of democracy seeking ‘inclusiveness, negotiations and
23 compromises’.⁶⁴
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36 Paralleling the political debates, debate over *media and cultural policies* evolved from
37 conflict to compromise. Political parties and interest groups in Scandinavia held polarized views
38 on culture, and confrontations ensued over high and low culture, as well as over urban versus
39 rural cultures.⁶⁵ Cinema, which emerged around 1900 was seen as bad low culture, inspiring
40 crime and distraction, and moral and educational protests led to censorship.⁶⁶ While the early
41 1900s saw class-based mobilization for leisure, particularly among farmers and workers, the
42 emerging social consensus fostered a parallel cultural consensus in the inter-war period. As
43 Labour gave up the revolutionary path, the workers’ movement began to see national cultural
44 heritage as a valuable supplement to working class culture, and schools and libraries became
45 neutral arenas where different cultural traditions could meet.⁶⁷
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54 The establishment of public broadcasting became a further indication of this policy and
55 the idea that it was a state task to guarantee citizen access to art, culture and enlightenment.
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3 Radio was embraced by enthusiastic amateurs organized in radio clubs or groups from early on
4 throughout all the Scandinavian countries.⁶⁸ With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, amateur
5 activity was suspended; after the war, state authorities were reluctant to give up control, seeing
6 wireless telegraphy as vital infrastructure like other forms of telegraphy. In Norway, a state radio
7 monopoly was decided in 1933, after a crisis in private radio, and fierce debate over ideological
8 principles. The Labour party and their allies distrusted private companies and argued that only a
9 public institution would guarantee a universal service and compensate for geographical and
10 social inequalities.⁶⁹ Against this, the conservative party and their allies saw public broadcasting
11 as a form of socialist intervention.⁷⁰ In Sweden, there was a broader consensus behind the
12 monopoly; the 'policy was generally accepted across the party political groups from left to
13 right'.⁷¹ There was strong skepticism of the commercial radio model that was evolving in the US,
14 and a state monopoly was seen as better equipped to safeguard programming principles such as
15 political neutrality.⁷² However, the Swedish public broadcaster established in 1924 (Radiotjänst),
16 was not a state company, but in part owned by the press and radio industry.⁷³
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28 The radio organizations evolving in Scandinavia were comparable to church, school
29 and other institutions of national culture.⁷⁴ Radio was considered an excellent instrument to unify
30 diverse cultures and held more authority than even the largest newspaper, while the press was
31 divisive, radio provided a common ground.⁷⁵ Despite rising authority, however, content and
32 structure remained controversial. In Sweden, the public broadcaster was criticized for highbrow
33 content and not reflecting the taste of people in the countryside.⁷⁶ In Norway, almost everything
34 the NRK did was contested in the 1930s.⁷⁷ Yet, the NRK had from the start taken steps to include
35 more diverse voices, and was one of the first European radio broadcasters to develop the
36 reportage genre, where people in local communities were given access to the microphone.⁷⁸ The
37 broadcasters also began to reflect political controversy; political talks were included in Danish
38 radio from 1924, in Sweden in 1932 and in Norway as part of the election campaign in 1933.⁷⁹
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48 Even though the term 'cultural policy' was not regularly used in the 1930s, culture and
49 enlightenment were increasingly understood as a political field.⁸⁰ The compromises over cultural
50 policy in the interwar and early post-war era reflected the general societal consensus; and state-
51 owned radio broadcasting became an agent of national-building and cultural enlightenment with
52 broad responsibilities for creating more qualified and informed citizens.
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4. The Welfare State and Cultural Policy for the Media 1945-1980s

The period between 1945 and 1980 is often seen as the ‘golden age’ of the Nordic welfare state, and from the 1960s the term ‘welfare state’ was in use with overwhelmingly positive connotations.⁸¹ The universalistic welfare state in the period encompassed a host of social policy provisions, but also extended to media and cultural policy. While the welfare state included all in a social sphere, and the state was seen as an instrument to combat class differences, the state-supported press, cultural institutions and public service media were seen as instruments to sustain diversity, combat cultural inequalities, and bring citizens together in a common sphere.

Politically and socially, the post-war years saw an unprecedented consensus among parties and social engineers Scandinavia to choose the ‘third road’ between communism and ultra-capitalism.⁸² The political debates in this period were cooperative and pragmatic; whereas Scandinavia had previously hardly differed from international trends, this period saw the rise of a uniquely Scandinavian model. Typically, Sweden spearheaded the great wave of post-war reforms and Denmark and Norway followed suit some years later.⁸³ The two basic principles of the emerging welfare states were solidarity, expressed through universal coverage and equal treatment of all citizens, and the ideal of social rights as a basic modicum of security and welfare.⁸⁴

In Norway, there were a strong sentiment of post-war cooperation illustrated by the fact that all parties committed to a common platform in 1945. A universal child allowance was instituted in 1946 without debate⁸⁵ followed by comprehensive reforms in the areas of pensions, health, accident, and unemployment insurance.⁸⁶ However, the Norwegian middle class opposition was considerably weaker than elsewhere.⁸⁷ In Denmark and Sweden, the Liberals and Conservatives tried to block the Social Democrats’ commitment to comprehensive welfare reforms, favouring a more selective approach. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Social Democratic parties obtained an absolute majority in Norway and Sweden, and in Denmark they were part of parliamentary constellations. In the 1960s, the position of the social democrats grew stronger, but all systems have become more fluctuating since the 1970s.⁸⁸

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Scandinavian social policy was set up to be comprehensive, in the sense that social provisions covered virtually all areas where the state provide services in advanced democracies, and statist, in the sense that the services were provided by the state rather than non-profit institutions.⁸⁹ The Scandinavian model also implies that the financial burden is disseminated in solidarity across society instead of being tied to individual contributions.⁹⁰ These characteristics also apply to *cultural policy*, which from the 1960s and 1970s was defined as a coherent policy area in all Scandinavian countries.⁹¹ A key concern across Scandinavia was that cultural and media institutions could prevent Americanization of the culture, enlighten the citizens, and reduce social inequality.⁹²

The politicization of culture and the media is in part explained by increased leisure time after the war; concerns were expressed that citizens should engage in meaningful activities and corporatist stakeholders took part in engineering cultural policy.⁹³ During the 1960s, the view that culture should be democratized and included in the welfare state project legitimated public support for books, film, broadcasting, newspapers as well as a host of cultural activities.

Some elements were controversial, such as the implementation of press subsidies. The Norwegian party-press system implied that a majority of the newspapers sympathized with a political party, but the low level of political conflict in the 1950s led to convergence of opinion among newspapers and the press became increasingly professionalized.⁹⁴ Simultaneously, the growth in advertising funding led to consolidation of the market and so-called ‘newspaper death’.⁹⁵ In Sweden, circulation increased, especially for the new tabloid papers, whereas many small papers had to close.⁹⁶ The idea that the press should receive state subsidy originated in talks between Norwegian and Swedish labour press, and was eventually endorsed by press organizations and government.⁹⁷ The Norwegian conservatives warned that subsidy would undermine editorial independence, all support was forthcoming from other parties.⁹⁸ Norway in 1969 became the first Nordic country to subsidize the press, but Sweden and Denmark followed during the late 1960s and early 1970s. While Norway and Sweden directly support selected newspapers, representatives of the press and the political majority rejected similar proposals in Denmark.⁹⁹

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The role of radio in the 1950s is unique; for the first time, singular institutions reached the entire population on a daily basis in each Scandinavian country; gaining trust, legitimacy and

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3 authority.¹⁰⁰ Radio functioned as an equalizing force in the same way as other welfare state
4 measures; in proportion to the total population, the Scandinavian countries had the largest
5 numbers of radio owners in Europe in 1965, in spite of difficult topography, especially in
6 Norway. In part because radio was considered so important, television was met with little
7 enthusiasm among policy-makers.¹⁰¹ Both in Sweden and Norway, it was argued that television
8 was a large investment, and that more important societal challenges should be prioritized.¹⁰² The
9 fear of 'American' commercial and superficial influence was also a key argument against
10 television.¹⁰³ In Norway, a strong premise in the debate was that Norwegian television would
11 diverge completely from the brash commercialism in the USA and instead become a prominent
12 tool for Norwegian language, culture and enlightenment. In the end, the decision to implement
13 television was supported across party lines and not subject to the same level of debate as radio
14 had been.¹⁰⁴

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17 In Sweden, private actors responded to the slow process by promoting private television,
18 using the momentum provided by Danish television, which from 1954 were received in southern
19 Sweden.¹⁰⁵ A lobby against advertising gained strength and convinced the coalition government of
20 Social Democrats and the Farmer's party to support a non-advertising model where television,
21 like radio should serve 'society, culture, public education and homes'.¹⁰⁶ Liberals and
22 conservatives criticized the proposal, but a substantial majority voted for a public monopoly for
23 both radio and TV. Radiotjänst changed its name to Sveriges Radio, as a signal of the more
24 official status it had gained throughout the Second World War.¹⁰⁷

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27 All the Scandinavian broadcasting systems were funded directly by the listeners by
28 means of an annual fee fixed by Parliament, and commercial advertisement were barred after the
29 war. License fees were collected in slightly different ways (Denmark per radio set, Sweden per
30 household, Norway per license-holder), yet the funding and organization of broadcasting
31 strongly paralleled other welfare state measures. Welfare state values constituted an explicit
32 basis for the construction of cultural policy, with notions of citizenship, equality and solidarity as
33 crucial elements.¹⁰⁸ While the welfare state model implied a distance to market capitalism of the
34 US kind, a central aim of cultural policy and media policy was to prevent Americanization of the
35 mind.¹⁰⁹ Media and cultural activities became a regular post on the state budget and from 1977,
36 and the term 'media policy' was derived to describe the many public measures.¹¹⁰

5 Renewed Welfare State and regulated privatization 1980s -2000s

From the 1980s, the Scandinavian welfare states have been restructured and adapted to changing circumstances. The renewal of the welfare state paralleled important transformations of the media system and a dismantling of the established media order. Both in the welfare state area and media area there has been a strong emphasis on choice, as well as citizen participation.

In spite of broad political consensus, aspects of the welfare state were contested: ‘No sooner were the reforms in place than they began to produce new problems’.¹¹¹ Politically and societally, there were minor changes in the 1980s, but there were growing interest among all political parties in non-state agents, the ‘third-sector’, providing social welfare.¹¹² From the latter part of the 1980s, suggestions were made to privatize core elements of the welfare state, as well as identifying alternatives to public sector provisions. This form of privatization implies competition between various private and public service providers, whereas the state retain control by making decisions on the basis of quality and price. In this model, the authorities still guarantee the people their rights, as public funding and responsibilities are included.¹¹³

Throughout the 1990s, the expenses of the public health service grew at a higher rate than the capacity, and phenomena such as queueing for health care fueled arguments for increased privatization. From the mid -1990s, market-based and customer oriented solutions became more prominent; in particular, the conservative parties argued that the state should withdraw and encourage a private market where individuals have the right to choose.¹¹⁴ In the 2000s, a key political goal in the Scandinavian countries is to reform the public sector, improve the services, and make them less expensive, in other words, more customer-oriented, for example by putting services out on tender. This policy, however, is loudly criticized, for example by a new movement created to defend the welfare state, and to protest against privatization and competition.¹¹⁵ The welfare state also expects the citizens to be more active and responsible for their own happiness, and to participate in the development the welfare state solutions. Generally, self-help and self-empowerment has become an integrated element of welfare state policy; the public framework remains in place but people are encouraging to take more control over their lives.

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In the *media system*, the phase between 1980 to the 2000s represents a tremendous shift as the established media order was profoundly transformed. Following intensified critique against the monopolies, they were gradually dismantled in all Scandinavian countries as other operators were given license to broadcast. While the model for advertising funded broadcasting introduced in the 1980s and 1990s varied; Danish TV2, launched in 1988, was state-owned, and Norwegian TV2 and Swedish TV4, both launched in 1992, were private, all were regulated and offered financial and distributional privileges in return for cultural, informational and minority content.¹¹⁶ Commercial broadcasters were allowed in Scandinavia with the explicit aim of building a broader national cultural defense line against Americanization, and to extend the output of informational and cultural domestic programs. As such, also private operators were, in principle, enrolled in the welfare state mission to secure a good life and cultural uplift.

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A key reason for the introduction of competition was dissatisfaction with the public broadcasting monopolies: they were criticized for being arrogant, paternalistic, statist, and leaning towards a social-democratic world-view. Nevertheless, as the competition grew, the established institutions strengthened their legitimacy and were given leeway to develop new services and new channels.¹¹⁷ There was also a strong shift towards more customer-orientation in the public companies, as they struggled to retain their positions as key cultural arenas, they have been innovative and have developed format with strong emphasis on national identity as well as participation and interactivity.¹¹⁸ Norwegian NRK developed a range of new formats to combine the two missions, including text-in entertainment shows seeking to include various social segments and slow-TV formats seeking to engage the entire population through representations of local communities around the country.

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The 2000s has so far seen momentous technological shifts in society as well as communications. Digitization brought a proliferation of new media, platforms, and devices, enabling consumers to be constantly online. The Scandinavian countries have eagerly embraced new technology; placing them on top of global surveys in terms of broadband, Internet, and technological competence and the use.¹¹⁹ The implementation of digital technology has reflected traditional cooperative policy-making, but the state has changed to become less of a proprietor and more of a regulator, yet with continuing adherence to goals of high quality universal services, setting high minimum standards.¹²⁰ In a comparative survey, Ursula Maier-Rabler

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3 refers to the region's broader social democratic 'information culture' where 'access to
4 information is a basic right and is seen as a condition for the public control of government'.¹²¹
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7 Online media however represent enormous challenges for traditional media;
8 Scandinavian consumers have become ardent users of services like Facebook, Google and
9 Netflix bypassing traditional media. Despite changes, however, comprehensive and
10 interventionist approaches grounded in cultural policy goals remain. In Norway in 2004, article
11 100 in the constitution was amended to oblige the state to 'create conditions that facilitate open
12 and enlightened public conversation'. Public broadcasters are given leeway, particularly in
13 Norway, but also in Sweden and Denmark to expand to new platforms, both mobile and online.
14 Although the systems for collecting public fees change, the level of public funding remain high.
15 Press subsidy schemes have been extended and adapted to include also online news (2016 in
16 Norway).
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25 The intertwining of welfare state policy and media policy is becoming increasingly clear
26 in the 2000s. As policies change towards making people more responsible for their lives, similar
27 forces impact upon the media system as well as the welfare state system, imbuing both with new
28 tasks. In an era of increasing social fragmentation, political polarization, and loss of trust in
29 media and public institutions, there is a continuing engagement of policy-makers to sustain and
30 evolve a media system that is not just commercial but also act in the public interest.
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39 **Conclusion: Parallels, indications and explanations for welfare state and media** 40 **policy** 41

42 This article has discussed the connections between the welfare state and the media system,
43 exploring the historical roots of the concept of the 'Media Welfare State'. The article advocates a
44 closer look at the role of media and communication in studies of the welfare state, as well as
45 investigations into how the welfare state framework has provided arguments and policy solutions
46 in the field of media. Through a discussion of key historical decisions in five phases, we have
47 shown how developments of the welfare state has coincided with developments in the media. In
48 conclusion, we discuss the nature of the relationship more specifically.
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3 One way to discuss at the evolvement of welfare states and media system is to talk about
4 *parallel developments*. In each historical phase, there are clear parallels between solutions
5 chosen in the social and political fields and solutions chosen in the field of media and cultural
6 policy. The first phase, which we have called *Political Democracy and Press Freedom 1770s to*
7 *1850s*, is characterized by bourgeoisie revolutions and the struggle for citizens' rights, both
8 preconditions for the later rise of the welfare state. Press freedom was a crucial ideal, and the
9 evolvement of a free press and autonomous citizens has been seen as vital to democratization and
10 modernization. In the second phase, *Parties, parliamentarism and universal services 1850s –*
11 *1900*, parallel innovations in the social, political and communication fields brought new groups
12 onto the national arena, as well as new readers into the public sphere. Demands for policies to
13 combat the downsides of industrial capitalism was met by early social security schemes, and
14 demand for entertainment and enlightenment was met by educational and cultural initiatives to
15 combat bad and promote good culture.
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26 In the third phase, which we have called *From conflict to consensus and public service*
27 *broadcasting 1900-1945*, we discuss decisions and compromises vital for the evolvement of a
28 welfare state as well as a 'media welfare state'. The phase is characterized by progression from
29 conflict to consensus and important agreements within social as well as media policy, among the
30 most important were the establishment of public broadcasting. State-owned radio broadcasting
31 became an agent of national-building and cultural enlightenment. The fourth phase, *The Welfare*
32 *State and Cultural Policy for the Media 1945-1980s*, was the 'golden years' of the welfare state,
33 as well as the high point for extensive state support for media and culture. While the welfare
34 state included all in a social sphere, and the state was seen as an instrument to combat class
35 differences, the state-supported press, cultural institutions and public service media were
36 allocated the task of sustaining diversity, combat cultural inequalities, and bring citizens together
37 in a common sphere. In the fifth phase and last phase, *Renewed Welfare State and regulated*
38 *privatization 1980s -2000s*, the welfare state as well as the established media order was
39 profoundly transformed. Yet, core elements of system are retained, the state remain a guarantor
40 for social security, cooperative solutions are still predominant, and public support remain for
41 cornerstone institutions such as public broadcasting.
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The parallels are not surprising given that media policy is part of general policy, but they are still worthwhile to acknowledge, as the field of communications and welfare state are not often discussed together. However, we might go further than parallels and discuss to what degree developments in one sphere are *indications* of more general changes underway, or *explanations* that can help to make sense of changes in other sectors. The idea that changes in the media sector serve as indicators is relevant in many instances: the expansion of printed material was an indication of early social and political mobilization, criticisms of the public service broadcasting monopolies indicated mounting criticism of welfare state policies more generally, and erosion of trust in journalism may signal a more general decline in trust in public institutions. Yet, we may also see the construction of the media system as part of the *explanation* for the evolvment and legitimation of the welfare state. The Scandinavian media systems have been subject to substantial public intervention and social engineering to secure that they contain strong elements of enlightening and uplift, they have been part of a cultural policy aiming to combat what has been seen as bad culture, in particular commercialized Americanization. The media systems have not been predominantly elitist, rather publicly supported media have been popular and inclusive in their approach to the public. Strong public broadcasters, press subsidies, a highly competent public in terms of education and access to communication, and high demand for news and public information, may help to explain the legitimation of Scandinavian welfare states, and also why these states, despite challenges, remain more highly trusted than in many comparable liberal democracies.

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27 ¹ See, for example, Booth, *Almost Nearly Perfect People*; Scott, *Northern Lights*.

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29 ² Childs, *Sweden: the middle way*.

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31 ³ Scott, *Northern Lights*, 190.

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33 ⁴ In our study, periodization is complicated also because we deal with political and welfare state
34 developments in three countries, as well as media-historical developments in the same three
35 countries. In most cases, we have used periodization that are consistent with other literature and
36 major events, but this sometimes varies, and particularly the breaking point between the 2nd and
37 3rd phase can be discussed. In spite of a degree of uncertainty, we have found it most efficient to
38 divide the study into five phases, structured from historical breaks of importance for the study of
39 the relationship between the media and the welfare state:
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- 44 • 1st period starts from 1770 - Bourgeois revolutions in Europe, social and political changes
45 in Scandinavia, first codification of press freedom in Scandinavia.
- 46 • 2nd period starts from 1850 – Parliamentarism in Scandinavia, intensification of
47 industrialism, and the great technical revolution” in media history. Bastiansen and Dahl,
48 *Norsk mediehistorie*, ch. 3.
- 49 • 3rd period starts from 1900 – Audiovisual mass media; radio technology and cinema,
50 mass democracy with increased suffrage (women 1913).
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- 4th period starts from 1945 – The WWI is a common historical break, and indicates the beginning of enormous expansion of welfare state, as well as state involvement in media and culture.
- 5th period starts with 1980 –The end of the broadcast monopolies in the Scandinavia and also renewal of key welfare state policies (tendencies were emerging from the 1970s).

⁵ Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

⁶ Erikson et al., *Scandinavian Model*, vii-viii.

⁷ Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*; Christiansen et al., *Nordic Model of Welfare*.

⁸ Erikson and Uusitalo, 'The Scandinavian Approach', 178.

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¹¹ Christensen and Berg, *Velferdsstat*.

¹² See, for example, Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*.

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¹⁴ Alestalo, Hort, and Kuhnle 'The Nordic Model', 3; see also Korpi *Working Class in Welfare Capitalism*, 48.

¹⁵ Syvertsen et al., *Media Welfare State*.

¹⁶ Skirbekk, *Multiple Modernities*, 26-32; Kanaenen, *Nordic Welfare State in Three Eras*, 54-55; Ihalainen et al., *Scandinavia in the Age of Revolution*; Dørum, 'Oppgjør med eneveldet og standssamfunnet'; Barton, *Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era*.

¹⁷ Seip, 'Teorien om det opinionstyrte eneveldet'. Swedish absolutism has been characterized as based on "the consent of the many, by conviction of the few, and by acquiescence of almost all". Roberts 1965; 160; cited in Upton, 'Riksdag of 1680'.

¹⁸ Ihalainen et al., *Scandinavia in the Age of Revolution*.

¹⁹ Munch, 'Absolute Monarchy in Eighteenth-century Denmark'; Ihalainen et al., *Scandinavia in the Age of Revolution*.

²⁰ Dørum, 'Oppgjør med eneveldet og standssamfunnet'.

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- ²¹ Andenæs, 'Development of Political Democracy in Scandinavia', 97.
- ²² Gustafsson and Rydén, *History of the Press in Sweden*, 41.
- ²³ Chapman, *Comparative Media History*, 13.
- ²⁴ Gustafsson and Rydén, *History of the Press in Sweden*, 41.
- ²⁵ Høyer, *Pressen mellom teknologi og samfunn*, 126.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 128.
- ²⁷ See, for example, Gustafsson and Rydén, *History of the Press in Sweden*; Picard, *Ravens of Odin*.
- ²⁸ Gustafsson and Rydén, *History of the Press in Sweden*, 82.
- ²⁹ Høyer, *Pressen mellom teknologi og samfunn*, 130-133.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 131.
- ³¹ Eide, 'Pressen – institusjoner og historie', 163.
- ³² Storsveen, 'En frihet til besvær', 205.
- ³³ Andenæs, 'Development of Political Democracy in Scandinavia', 106.
- ³⁴ Alestalo and Kuhnle, 'Scandinavian Route', 30.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Nilson, 'Political Parties', 107.
- ³⁷ Juul Christiansen and Damgaard, 'Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism'.
- ³⁸ Nerbøvik, *Norsk historie 1870-1905*; Kent, *Concise History of Sweden*; Jespersen, *History of Denmark*.
- ³⁹ Alestalo, Hort, and Kuhnle, 'The Nordic Model', 10.
- ⁴⁰ Bjørnson, 'Social Democrats and the Norwegian Welfare State', 204.
- ⁴¹ Briggs, 'The welfare state in historical perspective'; Seip, *Utsikt over Norges historie*.
- ⁴² Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 'From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States', 34.
- ⁴³ Korpi, *Working Class in Welfare Capitalism*, 43.
- ⁴⁴ Bastiansen and Dahl, *Norsk mediehistorie*.
- ⁴⁵ Rasmussen and Moos, 'School for Less than All in Denmark'; Blossing, Imsen, and Moos, 'Nordic Schools in a Time of Change'; Imsen and Volckmar, 'Norwegian School for All'.
- ⁴⁶ Blossing and Söderström, 'School for Every Child in Sweden', 17.
- ⁴⁷ Skirbekk, *Multiple Modernities*, 32.

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4⁴⁸ Eide, 'Den norske vei', 373; Gustafsson and Rydén, *History of the Press in Sweden*;
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6 Lehrmann, 'Avisernes offentlige mening'.
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8⁴⁹ Öhman, *Populärlitteratur*.
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10⁵⁰ Hertel, *Verdens litteraturhistorie*.
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12⁵¹ Rinde, *Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie*, 23.
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14⁵² Rinde, *Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie*, 22, 41-42, 45.
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16⁵³ Kent, *Concise History of Sweden*, 178, 238; Wistoft, *Tyrannisk, men uundværlig*, 7, 109;
17 Rinde, *Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie*, 48-49, 51.
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19⁵⁴ Rinde, *Norsk telekommunikasjonshistorie*, 59-60.
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21⁵⁵ Ibid., 163.
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23⁵⁶ Ibid., 246-247.
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25⁵⁷ Christiansen et al., *Nordic Model of Welfare*, 71; Ramsøy, 'From necessity to choice', 76.
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27⁵⁸ Christiansen et al., *Nordic Model of Welfare*, 74-75.
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29⁵⁹ Seip, *Utsikt over Norges historie*, 46.
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31⁶⁰ Ibid., 49.
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33⁶¹ Alestalo, Hort, and Kuhnle, 'The Nordic Model', 7; Sträth, 'Nordic Modernity'; Jónsson,
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36⁶² Sträth, 'Nordic Modernity'.
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38⁶³ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* quoted in Jónsson, Jónsson, 'Iceland and the Nordic Model',
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41⁶⁴ Jónsson, 'Iceland and the Nordic Model', 513.
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43⁶⁵ Dahl and Helseth, *To knurrende løver*, 133.
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45⁶⁶ Nymo, 'Slibrige scener og listige knep'; Drotner, 'Dangerous Media?'.
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50 Dahl, *NRK i fred og krig*.
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52⁶⁹ Dahl, *NRK i fred og krig*, 91-93.
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56⁷¹ Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content', 36.
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58⁷² Hadenius, *Kampen om monopolet*.
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- ⁸⁰ Dahl and Helseth, *To knurrende løver*, 162.
- ⁸¹ Christiansen and Markkola, 'Introduction', 9.
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- ⁸³ Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 'From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States', 47.
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- ⁸⁵ Seip, *Utsikt over Norges historie*, 52.
- ⁸⁶ Kuhnle and Solheim, 'Party Programs and the Welfare State'; Ramsøy, 'From necessity to choice', 93.
- ⁸⁷ Lund and Langholm, *Folketrygden*; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 'From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States', 51.
- ⁸⁸ Alestalo and Kuhnle, 'Scandinavian Route', 30.
- ⁸⁹ Stephens, *Scandinavian Welfare States*, 5.
- ⁹⁰ Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 'From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States', 54.
- ⁹¹ Duelund, 'Cultural Policy in Denmark', 32; Bakke, 'Cultural Policy in Norway', 147; Frenander, *Kulturen som kulturpolitikens stora problem*, 75.
- ⁹² Bruhn Jensen, *Dansk Mediehistorie*; Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content'; Dahl, *NRK i fred og krig*.
- ⁹³ Dahl and Helseth, *To knurrende løver*, 266-267.
- ⁹⁴ Bastiansen and Dahl, *Norsk mediehistorie*, 2nd ed, 295-296.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid., 298.
- ⁹⁶ Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content', 39, 42.
- ⁹⁷ Bastiansen and Dahl, *Norsk mediehistorie*, 2nd ed, 426.

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10 101 Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content', 42; Enli et al., *From fear of*
11 *television to fear for television*, 214.
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14 Technology and Content', 42.
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16 103 Hadenius, *Kampen om monopolet*; Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content'.
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18 104 Bastiansen and Dahl, *Norsk mediehistorie, 2nd ed*; Enli et al., *From fear of television to fear*
19 *for television*.
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21 105 Weibull, 'New Media Between Technology and Content', 44.
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25 107 Enli et al., *From fear of television to fear for television*; Weibull, 'New Media Between
26 Technology and Content'.
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28 108 Bakke, 'Cultural Policy in Norway', 150.
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52 119 Robinson, *Media Welfare State*.
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Fig 1: Key developments in the evolvement of the welfare state as well as the media system

	<i>1770s-1850</i>	<i>1850-1900</i>	<i>1900-1945</i>	<i>1945-1980</i>	<i>1980-2000s</i>
Key social and political debates	End of authoritarianism, citizens' rights, political democracy	Parliamentarism and political parties, early social policy, universal education	Consensus and compromises, Welfare solutions established	Comprehensive welfare state, Universality and state support	Regulated privatization, renewing the welfare state
Key developments in media and communication	Press freedom, public sphere, national press	Universal telegraph and telephone, Party press, Struggle to promote good culture	Public service broadcasting, national radio, Compromise over cultural policy	Press support, Public service television, Comprehensive cultural policy	Globalisation, Digitalisation, User participation, Public broadcasting gets new tasks