

The Effects of Internal Armed Conflict on Women's Labour Rights

Natalie M. Dyvesether



Masters' Thesis in Political Science
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

Spring 2019

Word Count: 27544

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2019

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Print: Representeren, University of Oslo

Abstract

There is no consensus in the literature as to whether internal armed conflict enhances or impedes women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. Several case studies demonstrate how pervasive conflicts may induce social upheavals with beneficial ripple effects for women's employment opportunities in the aftermath of conflict. Other studies, however, report a post-conflict backlash in women's newfound rights and that post-conflict conditions are devastating for the advancement of women's labour rights. I specify and systematize theoretical mechanisms indicating that the impact of internal conflict on women's post-conflict labour rights is either positive or negative. Using panel data from 128 countries in the 1981-2011 period, this study provides the first large-n quantitative investigation of the effects of internal armed conflict on women's labour rights. Estimating ordered probit analyses, I find that ongoing conflict and a post-conflict period of up to five years are associated with a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. The results hold when controlling for country-specific factors and are also robust to alternative model specifications and operationalizations of the post-conflict period. However, the findings are somewhat sensitive to the countries included in the sample. Overall, internal armed conflict seems to induce a net negative change in women's post-conflict labour rights.

Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to thank. First, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my exceptional supervisor, Carl Henrik Knutsen, for prioritizing my supervision despite his perpetually busy schedule. He is without a doubt worthy of the prize as Norway's fastest academic to answer emails and commenting on drafts. With his expertise, analytical clarity, and invaluable advice, he has contributed greatly to this thesis. I would also like to extend a very special thanks to my co-supervisor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Marianne Dahl, who was willing to supervise me even though she was on maternity leave for more than half of the time. Thanks for always reassuring me that it would all work out fine in the end.

I am also grateful for the scholarship from Fritt Ord, and to PRIO for accepting me into their student programme. Furthermore, working as a research assistant at PRIO for over two years has been a great privilege and has probably meant more for my thesis and academic development than I know. PRIO is an immensely instructive place to work with inspiring colleagues and an incredible working environment. Thanks to Lynn P. Nygaard for organising workshops for the MA students at PRIO, not to mention the encouraging and productive writing retreats, and for commenting on a section of my thesis. In addition, I am thankful to PRIO's PhD Forum for organising 'shut up and write' sessions and for including the research assistants as well. I also appreciate the comments I got when presenting my thesis at a brownbag at PRIO.

Furthermore, I am indebted to Sirianne Dahlum and Louise Olsson at PRIO for always taking the time to answer my questions and letting me profit from their expertise in gender, peace and security research. Thanks to Sirianne and Kristin Solli (OsloMet) for reading and commenting on my thesis outline. I am also eternally grateful to Julie Marie Hansen (PRIO) for making the time to proofread both my thesis and application for PRIO's student programme, even though she had enough on her plate. Additionally, I would like to thank Helga Malmin Binningsbø, Halvard Buhaug, Wenche Hauge, Gudrun Østby, Håvard Strand, Håvard Mogleiv Nygård, Elisabeth Lio Rosvold, Tore Wig, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Inger Skjelsbæk, and Ragnhild Nordås (all at PRIO), as well as Indra de Soysa (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Krishna Vadlamannati (University College Dublin), Kathleen Jennings (OsloMet), and Magnus Rasmussen (University of Oslo).

Last but not least, I cannot thank my parents enough for the love and support they have given me. My achievements would not have been possible without them.

Contents

1	Introduction.....	1
1.1	Concepts, Literature, and Hypotheses.....	3
1.1.1.	Women’s Labour Rights	3
1.1.2.	Internal Armed Conflict.....	4
1.1.3.	Summary of Literature, and Hypotheses	5
1.2	Findings and Conclusions.....	7
1.3	Structure of Thesis.....	8
2	Theoretical Framework	9
2.1	The Knowledge Gap.....	10
2.2	Why Conflict May Induce Change in Women’s Labour Rights	11
2.3	Why Internal Conflict May Enhance the Labour Rights of Women.....	12
2.3.1.	Female Employment During Conflict	12
2.3.2.	Demographic Changes in the Aftermath of Conflict.....	14
2.3.3.	Internal Conflict as a Window of Opportunity for Women.....	15
2.4	Why Internal Conflict May Impede the Labour Rights of Women.....	16
2.4.1.	Post-Conflict Backlash in Rights Gained During Conflict	17
2.4.2.	Unfavourable Post-Conflict Conditions.....	18
2.5	Summary and Hypotheses.....	20
3	Methodological Framework	22
3.1	Operationalizations, Validity, and Reliability.....	22
3.1.1.	Dependent Variable: Women’s Labour Rights.....	22
3.1.2.	Independent Variables: Ongoing Conflict and Post-Conflict Period.....	25
3.1.3.	Control Variables.....	28
3.2	The Sample and External Validity.....	35
3.3	Regression Model: Ordered Probit.....	37
4	Findings and Analysis	40
4.1	Findings	40
4.1.1.	Robustness	49
4.1.2.	Summary of Findings	57

4.2	Discussion	57
4.2.1.	The Effects of Wars May be Outweighed by the Effects of Minor Conflicts	58
4.2.2.	Female Employment Might Increase During Conflict without Associated Improvements in Women’s Labour Rights.....	60
4.2.3.	Caveats and Limitations	61
5	Conclusion	64
5.1	Implications and Future Research.....	66
	Literature.....	69
	Appendices.....	77
A.1	Descriptive Statistics	77
A.2	Lists of Countries.....	80
A.3	Diagnostics.....	86
A.4	Robustness Tests.....	88

1 Introduction

[W]omen will never be what they should be, nor their social position what it should be, until women, as universally as men, have the power of gaining their own livelihood (Mill [1832] 1970: 74).

Women's labour force participation surged in the aftermath of conflict in the 1990s in Rwanda (Newbury and Baldwin 2001). The share of female-headed households increased, and land and property disputes, which may have contributed to the internal conflict and genocide, endangered the country's newfound peace (Mageza-Barthel 2015: 89-90). In 1999, a new inheritance law was adopted, followed by additional laws and institutional changes in the early 2000s that aimed at eliminating traditional gender bias against female land ownership and inheritance rights, among other things (Ali et al. 2015). Post-conflict Rwanda established "a legal framework that guaranteed economic rights for women, which was unprecedented on the continent" (Mageza-Barthel 2015: 135). Post-conflict Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, experienced a return to traditional gender roles despite the active roles that women assumed during conflict. Women lost their jobs to returning male combatants and were "forced back into the kitchen" when the internal conflict ended (Manchanda 2001: 100).

As the cases above illustrate, how internal armed conflict generally affects women's post-conflict labour rights is unsettled in the literature. On the one hand, internal conflict may lead to pervasive upheavals in society with beneficial ripple effects for women. For instance, female employment often increases during conflict, which has the potential to change gender norms and expand women's post-conflict opportunities in the labour market (Brück and Vothknecht 2011, Justino 2012a, Kumar 2001a). On the other hand, several cases demonstrate a post-conflict backlash in newfound rights gained during conflict (Kaufman and Williams 2017). Factors characterising a post-conflict society, such as high levels of insecurity and violence, seem to be devastating for the advancement of women's labour rights (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, Meintjes et al. 2001).

Thus, there is no scholarly consensus as to whether internal armed conflict enhances or impedes women's post-conflict labour rights. In this study, I elucidate these diverging expectations in the literature by analysing the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights. My research question is as follows: *How are women's post-conflict labour rights affected by internal armed conflict?*

My study is the first to investigate this question statistically. The extant literature on the economic consequences of conflict for women is qualitative in nature and mostly consists of case studies¹ (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97). The large-n quantitative studies that do exist, investigate the reverse causal relationship; that is, how women's empowerment or gender equality affects (the risk of) conflict.² An exception is Bakken (2017) who analyses the effects of internal conflict aftermath on the *political* empowerment of women. Hence, my aim is to fill a knowledge gap in the literature by examining how internal armed conflict affects women's labour rights.

This question is furthermore of major societal relevance. Enjoyment of basic labour rights is a precondition for women's participation in the labour market, which is essential for female economic empowerment (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 110, Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Disregarding these rights in post-conflict societies will result in women's continued subordination and marginalization both in the private and public spheres (Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 5). "If violent conflict reduces the chances of women to join the labour force, especially in the formal sector, then this loss of opportunity creates a significant barrier to gender equality" (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 109). Not only are economically empowered women safer and less vulnerable to domestic violence, strengthening women's economic empowerment also contributes to the advancement of their families' and communities' welfare (Hudock et al. 2016: 4). Women who participate in the economy tend to better provide for their families, their children's school attendance increases, their daughters are older when they marry, and their families' health improves. Furthermore, women's employment participation is conducive to economic growth, and inclusive growth is in turn essential for sustained peace (Klugman and Quek 2018: 1).

Thus, knowledge of how internal conflict affects women's labour rights is crucial when designing development and aid schemes at all levels from the local to the supranational (Beswick and Jackson 2015: 1, Ormhaug et al. 2009: 4). Post-conflict reconstruction efforts should be gender-sensitive and recognize the different needs of men and women. "Describing these gender differential effects is a first step toward developing evidence-based conflict prevention and postconflict policy" (Buvinic et al. 2013: 110). Hence, the broader aim of this study is to strengthen the knowledge base of public and private decision makers, as well as non-governmental and supranational organizations on how internal armed conflict affects female labour rights. The endeavour to improve women's economic position and rebuild resilient post-conflict economies should rest on informed, research-based advice (Buvinic et al. 2013: 110). The aftermath of conflict can possibly provide unique opportunities for transforming gender-discriminatory institutions

¹ See e.g. Buck et al. (2001), Kool (2015), Kumar et al. (2001), Manchanda (2001), Newbury and Baldwin (2001), and Walsh (2001).

² See e.g. Dahlum and Wig (2018), Caprioli (2005), Forsberg and Olsson (2016) and Melander (2005b).

(Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 110). If there are positive changes in women's labour rights during and after conflict, post-conflict reconstruction efforts should take advantage of and enhance them. If there are negative changes, on the other hand, efforts must be made to mitigate them.

In the remainder of this section, I conceptualize women's labour rights and internal armed conflict, followed by a summary of the literature on how internal conflict affects women's post-conflict labour rights. Here, I also list my hypotheses. Second, I present the findings from the statistical analyses, before I conclude. Finally, I outline the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Concepts, Literature, and Hypotheses

In this subsection, I define the concepts of the dependent and independent variables of this study, namely women's labour rights and internal armed conflict, respectively. This is followed by a summary of the literature on how internal conflict affects women's post-conflict labour rights, which is thoroughly presented in section 2. Only a brief literature review is given in this subsection to provide the basis for the hypotheses of the study.

1.1.1. Women's Labour Rights

The concept of labour rights is unsettled, which by many is viewed as part of a broader set of human rights (Dorman 2007: 363). To clarify the concept, I therefore draw upon both existing theoretical work and to some extent international law. Labour rights are either exercised individually or collectively and can be defined as entitlements that an individual has by virtue of being a worker (Mantouvalou 2012: 152). *Women's* labour rights are nothing other than such entitlements held by a female worker. Recognizing the gendered aspects of how labour rights are formulated and enforced, for instance the impact of gender norms and relations, this study focuses on women's enjoyment of labour rights (Sweeney 2007). According to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, there are four main dimensions of labour rights: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; freedom from forced labour; the abolition of child labour; and freedom from discrimination in employment and occupation (International Labour Organization 1998: 7).

First, freedom of association and, more specifically, the right of workers to organize in trade unions are widely recognized as a constituent part of labour rights (Alston 2004: 458, Dorman 2007: 363). This dimension of labour rights encompasses the right to strike and to collective bargaining (Mantouvalou

2012: 152). Langille (2005: 428-429) contends that the most fundamental way to secure labour rights and a fair bargaining process is by legally protecting freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Naturally, these rights are exercised collectively.

Second, labour rights entail freedom from forced labour, including forced prostitution and bonded labour, and third, the prohibition of child labour (Alston 2004: 458, Dorman 2007: 369). The gravest forms of child labour, according to the ILO Convention 182, are prostitution, trafficking, combat, and bonded labour (International Labour Organization 1999). The fourth dimension of women's labour rights – freedom from discrimination in employment and occupation – encompasses several rights. These include equal access to employment, equal pay for work of equal value, non-discrimination in the labour market, freedom to choose occupation, and protection from arbitrary dismissal (Alston 2004: 466, Dyvesether 2017: 210). It can also include the right to otherwise fair working conditions, such as protection of privacy and the right to a just salary (Mantouvalou 2012: 152).

Furthermore, labour rights may entail employment security and safe and healthy working conditions, including health and safety regulations and standards for vacations, maximum working hours, and minimum wages (Dorman 2007: 363, Langille 2005: 428-429). In subsection 3.1.1, I further elaborate on indicators of women's labour rights as they appear both in the operationalization of the dependent variable as well as in article 7 of the UN's Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

1.1.2. Internal Armed Conflict

Internal armed conflict has been the most frequent type of armed conflict since the end of World War II (Gleditsch et al. 2016: 15). I follow the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and define armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018). Incompatibility occurs when the parties state claims concerning government or territory that are fundamentally incompatible. While a governmental armed conflict can be about changing either the political system or (parts of) the central government, a territorial internal conflict concerns demands for autonomy or secession (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619). A conflict starts the first year during which at least 25 battle deaths are recorded and terminates the year it fails to reach this threshold. An armed conflict is defined as a war if the number of battle-related deaths reaches at least 1,000 in a given calendar year (Gleditsch et al. 2016: 15-16).

Internal armed conflicts, also referred to as intra-state or civil conflicts, involve the government of a state and a non-governmental party as the warring parties. The concept encompasses internal conflicts both without foreign intervention as well as internationalized internal conflicts where at least one of the warring parties receives military support from other actively involved governments. Consequently, the concept ‘internal conflict’ excludes inter-state, non-state, one-sided, and extra-systemic (mainly colonial) conflicts (Pettersson and Eck 2018, Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018). The definition of internal conflict, where one of the warring parties must be the government of an independent state, rests on Gleditsch and Ward’s (1999) classification of independent states. A country that “a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on, and c) has a population greater than 250,000” is included in their definition (Gleditsch and Ward 1999: 398).

This study considers internal armed conflict exclusively because it is useful to study (the consequences of) internal and inter-state conflicts separately (Sambanis 2004: 272). Different forms of conflict are partly brought about by distinct causes and their consequences are also likely to be different both during and after conflict (Strand and Dahl 2011: 4). For example, the activities of an inter-state conflict can take place in just one of the warring countries, limiting the impact of the conflict on women’s labour rights in the other country involved. Moreover, the concept of internal armed conflict may already be considered an aggregate category, as it combines, for instance, ethnic and revolutionary conflicts, territorial and governmental conflicts, and conflicts with and without international intervention (Sambanis 2001: 259).

An elaborate discussion of the operationalization of internal armed conflict as well as a post-conflict period is conducted in subsection 3.1.2.

1.1.3. Summary of Literature, and Hypotheses

The literature is divided as to whether internal conflict enhances or impedes women’s labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. On the one hand, conflict has the potential to induce social upheavals with positive ripple effects on women through several mechanisms. Pervasive conflicts with mass mobilisation of men to the military, and their subsequent exit from civilian occupations, at least temporarily, creates a surge in the demand of women in the labour market. Not only does female employment typically increase, the gendered division of labour is also altered. This is observed in several cases, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, East Timor, Georgia, Guatemala, Kosovo, Nepal, Rwanda, and Tajikistan (Buck et al. 2001, Garrard-Burnett 2001, Justino 2012a, Kumar et al. 2001, Newbury and Baldwin 2001). In the absence of men, women take on new roles and responsibilities and conduct tasks that were previously perceived as ‘male’. Women acquire new knowledge and skills, they become more

aware of their rights, and their self-esteem might be strengthened. Furthermore, conflicts with a high (male) death toll alter the demographic composition of a post-conflict society. A higher share of single and widowed women, and consequently female-headed households, leads to increased female employment and presence of women in the public spheres also after the conflict ends (Manchanda 2001). This has the potential to change social relations and gender norms in the aftermath of conflict. These factors explain why internal conflict can create a critical juncture for change in women's labour rights in the wake of conflict. Women's mobilization in society has proven to be a precondition for women's ability to capitalize on such a critical juncture to strengthen their labour rights (Caprioli et al. 2010, Tripp 2015).

On the other hand, several studies report that the advances made during conflict are short-lived and that we observe a backlash in women's newfound rights in the aftermath of conflict (Brück and Vothknecht 2011, Kaufman and Williams 2017, Meintjes et al. 2001). The transition from conflict to peace proves to be a critical moment. Efforts to rebuild the pre-conflict social order often result in the return to traditional gender norms. Women are pressured to resume their pre-conflict domestic roles as men reclaim positions they perceive as rightfully theirs. Women tend to lose jobs to returning male combatants as the government and employers tend to prioritize male employment. Furthermore, the high levels of violence and insecurity characterising a post-conflict society seem to exacerbate women's inferior pre-conflict status (Kaufman and Williams 2017). In the transition from conflict to peace, gender-based violence predominantly relocates from the public to the private sphere with increased levels of domestic violence against women. The high levels of insecurity and violence that persist in post-conflict societies can in part be attributed to ineffective police and state institutions, and weak rule of law. Ineffective or failed security sector reforms contribute to uphold insecure environments. Women's disproportionate exposure to violence inhibits women's participation in the economy. In addition, women are more vulnerable to sexual harassment at work due to the widespread job insecurity that often prevails in a post-conflict economy (Walsh 2001: 61).

The mechanisms indicating that internal conflict enhances women's labour rights versus those indicating that it impedes them are both plausible and might manifest themselves at the same time. The question is which of the mechanisms that has the strongest impact on the post-conflict labour rights of women. The hypotheses for this study are as follows:

H₁: Internal armed conflict positively affects women's post-conflict labour rights.

H₂: Internal armed conflict negatively affects women's post-conflict labour rights.

1.2 Findings and Conclusions

How are women's labour rights affected by internal armed conflict? To test the above-mentioned hypotheses, I conduct ordered probit analyses of 128 non-OECD countries in the 1981-2011 period. I estimate the effects of ongoing internal conflict and of being in a post-conflict period (up to five years after conflict termination) on women's labour rights, controlling for democracy and democracy squared, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and women's political rights. A lagged dependent variable (LDV), which is the level of women's labour rights five years prior, is also added as a control to analyse the effects on a *change* in women's labour rights during a five-year period. The main analysis includes time-fixed and regional-fixed effects, as the ordered probit model does not allow for country-fixed effects (Wooldridge 2002).

The findings indicate that internal armed conflict is associated with a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. This holds when controlling for country-specific factors in fixed-effects pooled ordinary least squares (OSL) models with either Newey West or Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The results are robust to alternative operationalizations of the aftermath of conflict, namely a dummy measuring a post-conflict period of up to ten years instead of five, as well as a conflict variable transformed with a decay function. They all render negative and significant results. This also holds when analysing the full sample including the OECD countries.

However, separate analyses of each geographic region suggest that the results are somewhat sensitive to the countries included in the sample. One reason may be that I cannot isolate the effects of the mechanisms indicating a positive change from those indicating a negative change in women's labour rights. Hence, it is the net effect that is uncovered. Overall, internal armed conflict seems to induce a net negative change in women's post-conflict labour rights compared to a situation with enduring peace. This supports the second hypothesis of the study, while the first hypothesis that internal armed conflict positively affects women's post-conflict labour rights is refuted.

Which causal mechanisms can contribute to explaining the post-conflict negative change in women's labour rights? The pre-conflict restriction of women's opportunities in the economic sphere may be exacerbated in the aftermath of conflict due to the insecure and violent environment characterising many post-conflict societies (Kuehnast et al. 2011b). Furthermore, several mechanisms indicating a positive post-conflict change in women's labour rights relate to the pervasiveness of internal armed conflict. The effects of internal wars on women's labour rights might be outweighed by the effects of minor conflicts. For instance, some minor conflicts with relatively few battle-related deaths do not induce demographic

changes that are pervasive enough to substantially increase female employment, thereby failing to strengthen women's post-conflict labour rights. If women take on active roles in the public sphere during conflict but return to the home in the aftermath, gender norms are less likely to change. Not to mention, they organize in societal networks to a much more limited extent, which is shown to be crucial for improvements in women's rights (Tripp 2015).

These factors can contribute to explaining why the general trend is a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of internal armed conflict. Importantly, these findings do not rule out mechanisms leading to positive changes. Rather, the mechanisms indicating that internal conflict enhances women's labour rights and those indicating that it impedes them are both plausible and might manifest themselves at the same time. The results of this study only suggest that the mechanisms leading to negative changes have a stronger impact.

1.3 Structure of Thesis

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical framework of the study. The knowledge gap is elucidated, before I briefly present theory on why internal conflict may induce change in women's labour rights. The bulk of the section theorises on why internal conflict may enhance or impede women's labour rights, which lays the foundation for the hypotheses of the study. Section 3 comprises the methodological framework. First, I present and discuss the operationalizations of the variables and the sample, before I explain the main regression model. Section 4 presents the results from the statistical analyses followed by robustness checks. Subsequently, I discuss the findings and limitations of the study. Section 5 concludes.

2 Theoretical Framework

There is no consensus in the peace and conflict literature as to whether internal armed conflict enhances or impedes women's post-conflict labour rights (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 94, Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 3). On the one hand, conflict takes a disproportionately heavy toll on women, while at the same time, conflict has the potential to break down traditional gender roles and relations, thereby opening post-conflict windows of opportunity for women. Brück and Vothknecht (2011: 86) summarize the unsettled and diverging expectations on the matter: "[V]iolent conflicts affect traditional, pre-war gender relations. Conflict and post-conflict developments could accelerate the empowerment of women, conserve the pre-war status quo, or reverse progress made toward gender equality." The occurrence of internal conflict is, in several cases, associated with altered division of labour and transformed gender norms, which might change women's post-conflict economic conditions (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 110). Women's post-conflict opportunities are, on the other hand, hampered by high levels of insecurity and violence in the post-conflict society as well as a post-conflict backlash in potential rights gained during conflict.

Thus, armed conflict might induce change that is beneficial for women's labour rights. This is not to say that internal conflict *per se* is positive for women, or men for that sake. Armed conflict will in most, if not all cases, be overall negative for women, with physical and psychological hardships, rising levels of violence and lethality, and the destruction of physical and societal infrastructure, among other things (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 110). Rather, it is the overall consequences of armed conflict on women's long-term economic conditions that are ambiguous (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 10). As discussed in the following subsections, the mechanisms indicating that internal conflict enhances women's labour rights and those indicating that it impedes them are both plausible. They are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they might take place at the same time, and the question is which of the mechanisms are the most critical to informing the post-conflict labour rights of women.

In this section, I discuss the extant literature on the effects of internal armed conflict on women's post-conflict labour rights. First, I demonstrate why it is important to investigate this relationship by explaining the evident knowledge gap in the literature. Second, I argue why internal armed conflict might induce change in women's labour rights with reference to theory on institutional change and critical junctures. Third, I present the literature implying that internal armed conflict can have positive ripple effects by enhancing women's labour rights during and after conflict. Fourth, I give an account of the literature highlighting how conflict impedes women's labour rights and the post-conflict backlash of potential

newfound rights gained during conflict. The discussion of the literature serves as a basis on which to formulate testable hypotheses. The hypotheses are presented continuously and at the end of the section.

2.1 The Knowledge Gap

Gendered aspects of armed conflict were largely neglected in the peace and conflict literature until the entry of the new millennium when the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was adopted (Ellerby 2015, Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 4-5, United Nations Security Council 2000, 2017). Since Caprioli (2000) published her ground-breaking article on the relationship between inter-state conflict and women's situation, there has been a growing body of quantitative women, peace and security (WPS) research asserting that countries where women's status is low are more likely to experience both internal and inter-state conflicts (Forsberg and Olsson 2016: 1, Melander 2016: 208). Despite the increased scholarly attention on the situation of women in peace and security since 2000, there still remain knowledge gaps in the literature, notably including the effects of internal armed conflict on women's political and economic rights, and how the three relate to each other (Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 2).

While women's participation in peace processes and conflict-related sexual violence against women have been subject to thorough scrutiny, "economic elements of women's security have been neglected in the WPS agenda" (Duncanson 2019: 14). Accordingly, previous work calls for more attention to the economic dimension of WPS (see e.g. Bergeron et al. 2017, Buvinic et al. 2013: 110, Duncanson 2016). The extant literature on the economic consequences of conflict for women is qualitative in nature and mostly consists of case studies³ (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97). To my knowledge, there is no statistical research on the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights. The large-n quantitative studies that do exist investigate the reverse causal relationship; that is, how women's situation or gender equality affects (the risk of) conflict. Among these are Caprioli (2005), Forsberg and Olsson (2016) and Melander (2005b) who find that the likelihood (and severity) of internal conflict is positively associated with a country's level of gender inequality. In line with this, Dahlum and Wig (2018) demonstrate a negative effect of female political empowerment on internal conflict onset. Bakken (2017), on the other hand, analyses the effects of internal conflict aftermath on the political empowerment of women. Her results indicate that the effect is positive and largely mediated through conflict termination by peace agreement. To my knowledge, my study is the first to statistically investigate the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights. Before

³ See e.g. the case studies of Buck et al. (2001) on Georgia, Kool (2015) on Burundi, Kumar et al. (2001) on Cambodia, Manchanda (2001) on Nepal, Newbury and Baldwin (2001) on Rwanda, and Walsh (2001) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I turn to the effects, as indicated in the extant literature, I discuss *why* conflict might induce change in women's labour rights with reference to institutional change theory on critical junctures.

2.2 Why Conflict May Induce Change in Women's Labour Rights

How does social change occur? It is often posited that it either takes place incrementally from within the institution that changes, or suddenly as a response to an external shock (Capoccia 2015, Mahoney 2000, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The theory of path dependency and critical junctures has been prominent in the study of institutional change since the publication of Collier and Collier's (1991, 2002) influential work (Capoccia 2015). Path dependence is characterized by self-reinforcing processes where historical sequences of contingent events create an almost deterministic pattern of institutional development (Mahoney 2000: 507, Pierson 2000: 265). These event chains are associated with increasing returns of following the same 'path', which explain the persistent nature of institutional practices. These trajectories of development are set in motion by a set of crucial events – a critical juncture – of which the outcome shapes the future path dependent pattern of change (Collier and Collier 2002: 27, Pierson 2000: 263).

A critical juncture is defined as a period of substantial change that is an immediate response to an abrupt exogenous shock, for instance an economic crisis, social protests and uprisings, or armed conflict (Collier and Collier 2002: 29-31). "During critical junctures, a major event or confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power in a nation," which produces distinct legacies of path dependence (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 106). A legacy is the outcome of a critical juncture, the first period of which is called the aftermath, followed by a period until the next critical juncture, called the heritage (Collier and Collier 2002: 33). Critical junctures have been compared to Kingdon's (2014) concept of policy windows, where for instance a crisis can lead to a window of opportunity for change. The outcome of an opportunity window depends on the existence and ability of actors to capitalize on it before the policy window closes. Parallel to this, the timing and context of a critical juncture is crucial (Collier and Collier 2002: 31-32). The differences in timing and context often account for the differences in legacies. Internal armed conflict, for instance, occurs in different ways in different countries, which shapes the legacy of a critical juncture produced by conflict. Justino (2012b) finds that change during and after internal conflict is mediated through institutional changes induced by the armed conflict itself. The level of trust and cooperation in the conflict-affected society and the level of political and social participation by its people are two institutional mechanisms that are influential in this regard.

Related to this is the distinction between constant and historical causes in the analysis of path dependency and critical junctures (Collier and Collier 2002: 35-37). A constant cause is present continuously or at regular intervals and is a characteristic of an institutional system that is not a part of the critical juncture, even though it may influence the legacy of it. This should not be confused with the critical juncture as a historical cause. Pre-conflict institutions are likely to persist and shape women's post-conflict opportunities, which is an example of a constant cause. Although difficult to distinguish, the consequences of internal armed conflict should not be confounded with the effects of the underlying structural and institutional features of the conflict-affected country (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97). Nonetheless, internal armed conflict may induce a critical juncture, or a window of opportunity, for structural transformation of social and economic power relations in the post-conflict period. It can be considered as a critical juncture if it produces significant change that persists and shapes the path dependent development of the society in the aftermath of conflict. An analysis of women's post-conflict labour rights should take account of the dynamics of institutional change that occur during and after conflict (Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 3). Yet, the relationship between armed conflict and institutional change is, according to Justino (2012a: 3), one of the most under-researched dimensions of the peace and conflict literature.

Hence, internal armed conflict may produce a critical juncture that opens a window of opportunity for change in women's labour rights. In the following subsections, I discuss how this may occur and whether it is likely to enhance or impede women's post-conflict labour rights.

2.3 Why Internal Conflict May Enhance the Labour Rights of Women

Despite the devastating nature of internal conflict, not all consequences on women have been negative (Kumar 2001b: 215). In this subsection, I review literature indicating that internal armed conflict enhances women's labour rights. First, I discuss how women's employment often increases during conflict, and how this trend might extend to the post-conflict period through different mechanisms, among them major conflict-induced demographic changes. I also discuss how conflict can create a window of opportunity, or critical juncture, for lasting advancements of women's labour rights.

2.3.1. Female Employment During Conflict

Among the arguments on how internal conflict might positively affect women's labour rights, the proposition that it creates new employment opportunities for women and stimulate their labour force participation is the most prominent. The so-called 'world war hypothesis' states that pervasive conflicts generate a labour demand surplus due to a mass mobilisation of men to the military sector, leading to a surge in the demand of women in the labour market, which was observed in the USA during and after World War II (Acemoglu et al. 2004: 497, 501, 519-520, Goldin 1991, Meintjes et al. 2001: 25, Shatnawi and Fishback 2018, Taylor 1989). Even though many women had left the labour force five years after the end of war, a substantial number remained employed, indicating a change in women's opportunities in the labour market (Acemoglu et al. 2004). Some of the same patterns have also been witnessed in more recent contexts. For instance, Brück and Vothknecht (2011: 90) investigate the unemployment rates of development countries by war status and find that the mean value of female unemployment rates during times of conflict is reduced by four percent, and by seven percent for post-conflict compared to pre-conflict rates. While total unemployment during and after conflict increases, female unemployment is in fact reduced.

The claim that internal conflict expands women's participation and opportunities in the labour market is supported by several case studies. In Cambodia, women had to undertake previously restricted economic activities because of mass killing, mobilisation of men into the military, and higher labour demand due to conflict-related work (Kumar et al. 2001: 44). In analyses of Nepal, Kosovo, Colombia, Tajikistan, East Timor, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Justino (2012a), among others, finds that women participate in labour markets to a greater extent both during and immediately after conflict, which is a strong and consistent trend across the six case studies. In Cambodia, Georgia, Guatemala, and Rwanda, women's participation in the agricultural sector increased and they performed what was conceived as 'male' tasks at farms because the men were absent (Buck et al. 2001, Garrard-Burnett 2001, Kumar et al. 2001, Newbury and Baldwin 2001). Further, Calderón et al. (2011) analyses how internal displacement due to conflict affects women's employment in Colombia. When migrating from rural to urban areas, women are often better suited to compete in urban labour markets because they have experience that is more relevant to urban low-skilled jobs than do their farmer husbands. Such jobs are often concentrated in the service sector, for instance food vending and beauty parlours, or in the garment industry. The displaced women work more and contribute to a higher share of household earnings than women who remain in the villages.

Hence, shortage of labour and an increasing share of female-headed households necessitate that women join the labour force. During conflict, new economic opportunities open to women who are able to perform

tasks, take on responsibilities and enter occupations that were previously reserved for men (Bouta et al. 2004: 89, Kumar 2001b: 215-216). These new tasks and responsibilities allow women to acquire work-relevant knowledge and skills. This is not exclusive for civilian women. Female combatants and women who otherwise participate directly in the conflict, may also build up competence that is useful in the post-conflict civil society, for instance via training in military support functions, such as logistics (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 95). Women might become more aware of their rights, their self-esteem might be strengthened, and they have proven themselves (and/or become more) capable of work previously reserved for men. This can help women during the critical post-conflict transition and therefore promote women's labour rights both during and after conflict (Kumar 2001a: 19). "The post-conflict era may provide new fields of employment for women: they may possess new skills acquired in jobs during conflict, which they may be able to retain in the post-conflict period" (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 102). Women might be reluctant to give up their newfound rights and responsibilities, and more prone to organize in networks and speak up for themselves (Justino 2012a: 1). At the same time, men might be more willing to accept the claims of women from the experience during conflict that women are able to take on gainful employment. In Cambodia, for instance, women have gained access to the textile and construction industries, among others, because they started working there during the conflict. In addition, case studies of Georgia, Guatemala, Rwanda, El Salvador, and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that internal conflict undermines previous gendered division of labour in all countries, thereby expanding women's employment opportunities: "Conflicts eroded the traditional social and political order, leading women to assume new economic roles and responsibilities" (Kumar 2001a: 19). Traditional views of gender roles are likely to change due to the variety of roles that women actively take on during conflict (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 94-95). This can promote women's labour rights and labour force participation long after the conflict ends (Justino et al. 2012: 16).

2.3.2. Demographic Changes in the Aftermath of Conflict

As discussed above, internal conflict may enhance women's labour rights through cultural changes and elevated levels of female employment during conflict. Another related source of enhancement of women's labour rights is the altered post-conflict demographic structure. Intense conflicts with a high (male) death rate have long-term effects on the proportion and age distribution of men and women in a society (Meintjes 2001: 70). Many men who left to fight during the conflict never come back, others flee in the aftermath to avoid repercussions. "As a result of the impact of conflict on the demographic composition of households, one of the major livelihood adaptation strategies adopted by households in conflict-affected countries is a

change in customary gender divisions of labour: women typically take on earning roles within the household” (Justino 2012a: 3). In this way, internal conflict not only has short-term effects on women’s employment during (and immediately after) conflict, as discussed above, but also potentially has lasting post-conflict effects mediated through the demographic consequences of conflict. For example, the Maoist insurgency led virtually all men and boys to flee the villages in the mid-western hills of Nepal in the late 1990s. In the absence of men, women had to plough the land, which they were previously not allowed to do in the traditional rural society (Manchanda 2001: 117). In post-conflict Georgia, Guatemala, Rwanda, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, women’s employment participation increased partly due to the skewed demographic composition brought about by conflict (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100).

The links between a country’s demography and women’s labour rights are as follows: The post-conflict demographic structure is characterised by a clear female majority because of disproportionate death rates between men and women during conflict. Not only have numerous women lost their husbands, there are also fewer men to marry in the post-conflict society, leading to an unusually large proportion of unmarried women. In countries where the share of unmarried women is higher, the female labour force participation rate is generally higher compared to other countries (International Labour Organization 2017: 8). A larger share of single and widowed women and consequently female-headed households seem to boost women’s participation in the labour force, because it implies a substantial increase in the number of women who are the main breadwinner of the family (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100, Justino 2012a: 3). As a livelihood coping strategy, women are forced to adopt new roles as heads of households and main breadwinners, consequently prioritizing productive income-generating activities rather than just reproductive tasks. “A more lasting transformative impact in gendered family and societal relations may come from the unintended structural social changes wrought by protracted conflict as a consequence of loss, of women having to cope without men” (Manchanda 2001: 121). In some instances, women’s participation in the labour market is further stimulated by a booming economy in the wake of conflict, or a need for human resources caused by the demographic changes (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 102).

2.3.3. Internal Conflict as a Window of Opportunity for Women

The above-mentioned findings demonstrate the opportunities for social change in the aftermath of internal conflict, when there is often a need to establish new formal and cultural institutions (Duncanson 2019: 14, Tripp 2015). Internal conflict creates a critical juncture that opens a window of opportunity to advance women’s labour rights “because the very fabric of social life is torn by violence against civilians and

massive displacements” (Kumar 2001a: 7). For example, Hughes and Tripp (2015) examine the growth in women’s parliamentary representation in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 1985-2010 period. When comparing countries affected by conflict with those that are not, they find a larger increase in women’s parliamentary representation post conflict. In accordance with Hughes (2009), they find a positive effect, but only for war-stricken countries. However, this critical post-conflict moment is short, and women need to be organized before the conflict ends to be able to capitalize on it (Caprioli et al. 2010: 97). Sharoni (1995) claims that women’s mass mobilization in Guatemala and the Palestinian ‘intifada’ was the direct cause of women’s involvement in the later peace processes, which demonstrates the importance of women already being organized when the critical juncture arises.

Why may such windows of opportunity arise in the aftermath of internal conflict? The literature points to explanations both at the macro and household or individual levels. At the macro level, internal conflict alters the societal order and transforms the power structures in the political and economic life (Berdal and Zaum 2013: 4-5). As discussed in subsection 2.3.1, a conflict economy emerges with new economic interactions and new actors controlling economic resources. “Importantly, such war economies persist into peacetime, and are likely to shape the character of the post-war political economy” (Berdal and Zaum 2013: 5). Moreover, women’s increased participation in the public spheres, including the military and labour markets, strengthens women’s empowerment, economic autonomy and self-confidence, which in turn seem to positively affect women’s bargaining power within the household (Manchanda 2001: 115). Justino (2011: 4) claims that these positive changes are likely to persist in the long run because of women’s enhanced experience and knowledge gained during conflict. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:

H₁: Internal armed conflict positively affects women’s post-conflict labour rights.

However, in the next subsection, I discuss studies reporting that women experience a post-conflict backlash in their newfound rights gained during conflict.

2.4 Why Internal Conflict May Impede the Labour Rights of Women

Even though women might gain labour rights during conflict, several studies report that they experience a post-conflict backlash in their rights (Bouta et al. 2004: 139, Jacobsen 2013: 237, Kaufman and Williams 2017: 207). Irrespective of a potential backlash, there are factors characterising (the transition to) the post-conflict society that impede women’s labour force participation. In this subsection, I review the literature

highlighting the mentioned backlash, before I discuss other post-conflict conditions impeding women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict.

2.4.1. Post-Conflict Backlash in Rights Gained During Conflict

During internal conflict, women's labour force participation might increase and their labour rights strengthen, as shown in subsection 2.3. Nevertheless, Handrahan (2004: 436) asserts that women's gains during conflict are short-lived and that we observe a relapse of advancement in women's rights in the aftermath of conflict. Meintjes (2001: 64) asserts that "although women do gain from the shifts in gender relations during war, they may lose their wartime gains in [...] the transition from war to peace [which] emerges as a critical moment." This is supported by case studies of, for instance, Bosnia, where the economic advancements that women made during conflict were reversed during the transition to peace when Bosnian women were expected to return to their traditional pre-war roles (Kaufman and Williams 2017: 206-207). A backlash can also occur *de jure*. For example, the reconstitution of the Afghan and Iraqi governments in the aftermath of conflict combined with Sharia practice negated some of the pre-conflict legal rights of women.

Why does a relapse in women's labour rights and participation occur? In the aftermath of conflict, mobilized men return to the civil sphere and the society strives to get back to normal. Efforts to rebuild the pre-conflict social order often result in the return to traditional roles and responsibilities. Women are pressured to resume their pre-conflict domestic roles as men reclaim positions they perceive as rightfully theirs (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97-99, Handrahan 2004: 436). Therefore, the potential economic gains of women resulting from altered gender relations during conflict are often at risk in the aftermath of conflict (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 109). Several case studies of South Asian countries and regions in the aftermath of postcolonial nationalist, ethnic, or revolutionary conflicts demonstrate how women's newly strengthened economic empowerment is put at risk and how "the societies force women back into the kitchen after the conflict ends" (Manchanda 2001: 100). Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and several conflict-affected regions in India experienced a return to traditional gender roles, irrespective of the active role that mobilised women assumed during conflict. During the transition to peace, women tend to lose land or jobs because priority is given to demobilised male combatants (Bop 2001: 29). Generally, women are also the first to lose their jobs when an initial post-conflict period of economic growth is followed by an economic downturn and the associated increase in unemployment (Justino et al. 2012: 16). This is true especially for women employed in the formal sector, who are forced to turn to the informal sector to earn a living. This is demonstrated in case studies of Rwanda, Cambodia, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala:

“Although women were a significant part of the informal sector before the conflicts, their numbers increased during the postconflict transition [...] in all the case-study countries. This increase reflected the addition of women who had lost their jobs in the formal sector, as well as the wives of men who had lost jobs” (Kumar 2001a: 20). High levels of insecurity and violence in a post-conflict society are another factor contributing to hinder women’s rights, which I turn to in the next subsection.

2.4.2. Unfavourable Post-Conflict Conditions

Internal armed conflict may impede women’s labour rights not only through a backlash of potential rights gained during conflict, but also by virtue of conditions prevailing in the aftermath that directly impede women’s equal participation in the labour market. Kaufman and Williams (2017: 206-207) claim that women’s inferior pre-conflict economic and social status are often exacerbated by certain post-conflict conditions. First and foremost, a post-conflict society characterized by insecurity and violence seems to be devastating for the advancement of women’s labour rights achieved during and immediately after conflict (Kuehnast et al. 2011b: 97). Considering women’s disproportionate exposure to violence in post-conflict situations, these periods may be as devastating as conflict itself, which is an important factor in the backlash of women’s newfound rights (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97, Ghobarah et al. 2003). In the transition from conflict to peace, gender-based violence tends to relocate from the public to the private sphere, and several studies report an increase in domestic violence against women (Abirafeh 2007, Couldrey and Morris 2007: 34, 48, La Mattina 2017: 168, Meintjes et al. 2001: 4, True 2012: 137). Violent behaviour may have been ‘normalized’ during conflict, and “the social barriers against rape and assault may be so lowered that while the war may have ended for men, it continues for women” (Caprioli et al. 2010: 93). For example, in East Timor, Liberia, and Afghanistan, the levels of domestic violence increased post conflict, and up to 80 percent of women in Afghanistan are physically abused by their husbands (True 2012: 137). Like Caprioli et al. (2010), Meintjes et al. (2001) argue that there is no actual aftermath for women, as women experience high levels of violence long after the conflict has officially terminated. These insecure and sometimes lethal environments make it difficult for women to participate in the economy: “[F]or women, the lawlessness of many post-conflict situations with their widespread violence is as dangerous and devastating as armed conflict itself. [...] It is obvious that the threat and fear of abuse in a post-conflict situation will keep women from leaving their homes, working, or otherwise participating in society” (Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 7). This is particularly limiting for women and young girls, as they are in most cases more vulnerable than men outside of the home.

Furthermore, widespread job insecurity that often prevails in a post-conflict economy, renders women more vulnerable to sexual harassment at work (Walsh 2001: 61). The high levels of insecurity and violence that persist in post-conflict societies can in part be attributed to ineffective or even violent police and state institutions, and weak rule of law (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97). Stability and security are necessary for a post-conflict society to flourish, which require civil security based on the rule of law. This comprises, among other things, law enforcement and prevention of crime both in the home and in the public arena (Murray 2007: 108). Ineffective or failed security sector reforms contribute to uphold insecure environments both in the public and private spheres, which further inhibit women's participation. Thus, high levels of insecurity and violence against women are evident post-conflict factors contributing to a backlash in women's rights and status: "[P]ersistent insecurity and high incidence of domestic violence seem to be decisive factors in the post-conflict rollback of women's wartime gains and the return to pre-war gender roles" (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 86).

Second, there are structural, cultural, and institutional conditions impeding women's economic participation and labour rights. These barriers are intensified for women in conflict-affected countries (Hudock et al. 2016: 4). In addition to violent criminality discussed in the previous paragraph, corruption is often widespread in a post-conflict society, making the working environments even more dangerous and disadvantageous for women (Kaufman and Williams 2017: 206-207). Economic institutions are largely owned and managed by men, and access to resources is far from equal between men and women, which limits women's opportunities to participate in the economy. Furthermore, the lack of child care services, which are not likely to be prioritized in a halting post-conflict economy, impairs women's prospects for participation in the labour market (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100). During conflict, the economic vulnerability of women, especially in female-headed households, often increases substantially (Justino 2012a: 1). This is exacerbated by the major demographic alterations that often result from long and intense conflicts. High male death tolls imply larger shares of single women and female-headed households, and decreased male to female ratios. Women as sole heads of household face gender-based economic constraints that are exacerbated by the harsh post-conflict economic conditions (Brück and Schindler 2009a, Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 98). Among these are restrictions to property and land rights, which are particularly severe for women in agriculture whose livelihoods naturally depend on access to land. It is shown that ownership of land reduces poverty, and that, in the wake of conflict, households headed by women are more vulnerable to poverty, for example in conflict-affected Burundi, Rwanda, and Colombia (Bundervoet 2006: 18, 26, Ibáñez and Moya 2006: 20, Justino and Verwimp 2013: 72, Verpoorten and Berlage 2007: 364-365). Women's vulnerability to poverty aggravates since they are often only considered for low-paid, low-skilled jobs, and even more so when male ex-combatants

return to the labour market when the conflict ends. Because of ‘male breadwinner bias’, employers and public authorities often prioritize male employment, and women tend to lose their jobs to demobilized men (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100-102). Hard access to formal employment may in part be due to women’s poorer educational qualifications relative to men’s, but it may just as well be attributed to discriminatory practices (Sørensen 1998: 5). Due to traditional gender norms and expectations, elevated levels of female educational attainment have failed to ensure access to well-paying, formal jobs for women: “Thus, while educational and economic opportunities in post-conflict periods have provided opportunities for some women, cultural assumptions about masculine leadership and feminine subordination continue to constrain most women’s opportunities” (Kaufman and Williams 2017: 207).

Hence, the second hypothesis of this study is:

H₂: Internal armed conflict negatively affects women’s post-conflict labour rights.

2.5 Summary and Hypotheses

The literature review and theoretical discussion in the previous subsections demonstrate that the effects of internal armed conflict on women’s labour right are far from clear-cut. On the one hand, empirical evidence shows that women’s employment opportunities and participation in the labour market are expanded during conflict. In conjunction with a larger share of female-headed households in the aftermath of conflict, among other things, this might create a window of opportunity for post-conflict advancements in women’s employment and labour rights. On the other hand, several case studies report that these changes are short-lived and that a post-conflict backlash in women’s economic gains might arise. A post-conflict society is often characterised by persistent insecurity and high levels of domestic violence against women, which inhibit women’s economic participation. Women tend to be the first to lose their jobs in the post-conflict period due to several unfavourable conditions, like the return to pre-conflict gender norms and expectations. Hence, the results from the qualitative studies discussed in this section differ as to whether internal armed conflict enhances or impedes women’s labour rights.

The mechanisms indicating that internal conflict enhances women’s labour rights versus those indicating that it impedes them are both plausible and far from mutually exclusive. Rather, they might manifest themselves at the same time, and the question is thus which of the mechanisms has the strongest effect on the post-conflict labour rights of women. To reiterate, the hypotheses for this study are as follows:

H₁: Internal armed conflict positively affects women’s post-conflict labour rights.

H₂: Internal armed conflict negatively affects women's post-conflict labour rights.

The nature of each individual country and conflict seems to be decisive for women's post-conflict economic opportunities (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100). The economic situation women face in the wake of conflict is a product of pre-conflict institutions and context-specific effects of armed conflict: "The postwar economic circumstances of women are largely shaped by pre-war societal norms on the one hand and causes, objectives, conduct, and legacies of war on the other" (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 108). Nevertheless, the differing results from the qualitative studies discussed in this section clearly demonstrate the need for quantitative large-n studies. A statistical analysis helps to uncover general trends; that is, whether internal conflict generally enhances or impedes women's labour rights over time and across cases.

3 Methodological Framework

To test the hypotheses presented in the theory section, I employ a statistical research design. I carry out a panel analysis which enables me to explore variations across time and space (Stock and Watson 2015). Panel data not only expand the number of data points, it also allows for country-fixed effects, which reduce the risk of omitted variable bias (OVB). A large-n panel analysis might enable generalization of the results, as cross-sectional studies accommodate external validity to a greater extent than internal validity (Gerring 2007: 37-38).

The unit of analysis of this study is ‘country-year’. I transform the ‘conflict-year’ unit in the UCDP dataset, which operationalizes conflict in several ways, into a ‘country-year’ unit by collapsing the observations of all conflicts (if there are several) within a country in a given year (Pettersson and Eck 2018). The ‘country-year’ unit allows me to investigate the effects of internal armed conflict on women’s labour rights over time at the country level. In this section, I present the operationalizations of the study’s variables and discuss their validity and reliability. I then discuss the sample and external validity, before I present the main regression model employed, the ordered probit model.

3.1 Operationalizations, Validity, and Reliability

Here, I present the operationalizations of my variables and discuss their validity and reliability. First in line is the measure of my dependent variable, women’s labour rights, from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Second, I discuss the operationalization of my main independent variable, a post-conflict period of up to five years, from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset. Finally, I present the control variables of this study, as follows: regime type, GDP per capita, and women’s political rights from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset, the World Bank, and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, respectively. Descriptive statistics and frequency distributions of all variables are attached in appendix A.1.

3.1.1. Dependent Variable: Women’s Labour Rights

To operationalize the dependent variable – women’s labour rights – I use an index called ‘women’s economic rights’ from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). The CIRI dataset is based on yearly data at the country level and comprises data for 195 countries over the 1981-2011 period. Although CIRI name their index ‘women’s economic rights’, ‘women’s labour rights’ would probably

have been a more appropriate name. All of the index's indicators measure rights related to the labour market, for instance the right to gainful employment, free choice of profession or employment, and equal pay for equal work (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 77). Further, it measures whether women have the right to equality in hiring and promotion practices, and to be free from sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace, as well as the right to work at night and in occupations perceived as dangerous, including the military and the police force. In addition, it measures whether women are guaranteed job security, such as unemployment benefits, maternity leave, no arbitrary firing or lay-offs, and so forth. Examples of economic rights that are not included in CIRI's index are land, property, and allodial rights,⁴ as well as the right to inheritance.


The coding of CIRI's index is based on the existence of laws that protect women's rights, and whether they are effectively enforced (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 77-78). This is important to point out, because even though "laws mandating gender equality are on the books, enforcement mechanisms are often insufficient, and traditional, gender-discriminating customs are likely to prevail" (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 94). The CIRI index measures both the *de jure* and the *de facto* rights of women, which is a considerable strength. However, the index only reflects the government's practices and enforcement of the relevant laws protecting women's labour rights, independent of the government's policies on the books because they may deviate from the enforcement in practice (Cingranelli et al. 2014: 4). This implies that the overall labour rights conditions of a country, which can also be affected by non-state actors such as foreign multinational companies, are not necessarily captured.

CIRI's measure of women's labour rights is an additive, ordinal index with four values (Cingranelli et al. 2014: 77-80). The lowest score indicates that there are no labour rights for women in law, and that systematic discrimination may be built into the law. In a country with an observed value equal to zero, the government allows for a high level of discrimination against women. With a score of one or two, women have some labour rights under law, but these are not effectively enforced in the former case, enabling a moderate level of discrimination. In the latter case, the government effectively enforces these rights under law, although allowing for a low level of discrimination against women. The highest score, four, is described as follows: "All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no

⁴ Allodial rights are a kind of inheritance law that grant family members the right to claim agricultural properties with reference to the allodial succession of the family. (This is not to be confused with the meaning of 'allodial' as non-feudal land, formerly used in Scotland.) Examples of countries with laws favouring family in cases of agricultural land transfer are Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland (Glass et al. 2018: 22, 35-36).

discrimination against women” (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 77). Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the frequency distribution and a table can be found in appendix A.1, table A.1.2.

Figure 1: Histogram with the Frequency Distribution of Women’s Labour Rights



To evaluate the internal validity of CIRI’s index, I start with the research question of this study, which stated that the objective is to investigate the effects of internal armed conflict on women’s labour rights. Does CIRI’s index substantially capture the essential parts constituting women’s labour rights? It corresponds well to the concept of women’s labour rights presented in subsection 1.1.1. However, the indicators of the CIRI index primarily measure individual labour rights, while collective labour rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, are left out. To further assess the validity of the measure, I evaluate whether it corresponds to relevant indicators in the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The extent of various (formal) labour rights is observable and presumably clearly formulated in legislations. Considering that this is a cross-country study, it seems sensible to evaluate the operationalization against the backdrop of international law. CEDAW took effect in 1981, which is also the first year with observations in CIRI’s dataset (United Nations General Assembly 1979). The convention’s article eleven states that women should have the right “to work [...] to the same employment opportunities [...] to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security [...] equal remuneration [and] social security...” (United Nations General Assembly 1979). Altogether, CIRI’s measure clearly captures labour rights that are embedded in international legislation,

viewed by some as the global standard for what these rights should entail. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly (1979) emphasized that real, substantial commitment from each country is needed alongside formal rights. By also including observed practice and implementation as part of the operationalization, CIRI have taken this into account. Based on the thorough examination of CIRI's index presented in this subsection, my belief that it is a valid measure for women's (individual) labour rights is strengthened, although it does not capture collective labour rights.

The CIRI dataset has been among the most prominent datasets on human rights (Hensel 2010: 11-12). The coders must comply with a detailed and strict coding scheme, and they do not have access to previous scores of the country they are coding (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 6). To ensure inter-rater reliability, each data point is coded by at least two experienced coders. CIRI have kept records of all disagreements between coders and one can therefore assess the level of reliability of their data. For the coding in the year 2004, for instance, the Krippendorff's r -bar statistic was 0.94 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010: 14). Krippendorff's r -bar is an inter-rater reliability statistic that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means no reliability and 1 means perfect reliability. Thus, 0.94 indicates a very high level of inter-rater reliability. Since the Krippendorff's r -bar takes into account both the number of coder disagreements as well as the extent of a disagreement, it is an appropriate statistic for ordinal data. However, Cingranelli and Richards (1999) indicate a possible under-reporting of human rights violations in autocracies compared to democracies. If this is a systematic bias, it weakens the reliability of the CIRI data. With this caveat, I nonetheless assess the CIRI indices as sufficiently reliable.

3.1.2. Independent Variables: Ongoing Conflict and Post-Conflict Period

This study's main explanatory variable is a post-conflict period of up to five years. It is dummy coded such that it takes the value of 1 during the first five years after conflict termination. I base this dummy on a conflict variable from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset,⁵ which is a conflict-year dataset covering the time period from 1946 to 2017 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Pettersson and Eck 2018, Themnér et al. 2018). I transform the unit into 'country-year' by collapsing the observations of all conflicts (if there are several) within a country in a given year. I exclude inter-state and extra-systemic conflicts from the data and end up with a conflict variable that includes only internal armed conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year. To exemplify: the unit of analysis implies that a conflict will not be recorded as such for the years 2015 and 2016 if it results in 30 battle-related deaths from November 2015 to February 2016 but fails to reach the threshold

⁵ I use version 18.1 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

of 25 in either calendar year (Themnér et al. 2018: 4). (See subsection 1.1.2 for a discussion of the concept of internal armed conflict.)

The ongoing conflict variable takes the value of 1 or 2, where the former indicates a minor conflict of at least 25 battle deaths and the latter indicates that the conflict has reached at least 1,000 battle deaths, which is classified as war (Themnér et al. 2018: 9). I dummy code the UCDP/PRIO variable into ongoing conflict and ongoing war dummies. The former dummy includes both minor conflicts and wars and takes the value of 1 where there was a minor conflict or war in a given country in a given year. Likewise, the war dummy takes the value of 1 if a country experienced war in a specific year. To test the effects of conflict aftermath on women's labour rights, regardless of the intensity level, I construct a post-conflict dummy that takes the value of 1 during the first five years after conflict termination. If the conflict is still ongoing, or there is more than five years since the last conflict, the post-conflict dummy is given the value of 0. To construct a post-war dummy, I use the cumulative war variable from the UCDP/PRIO dataset. The cumulative war dummy, unlike the regular war dummy, codes whether a conflict has exceeded 1,000 battle deaths since the onset (Themnér et al. 2018: 9). If a conflict does not reach the 1,000 battle deaths threshold over time, it is coded as 0. It is coded as 1 from the year it reaches the threshold onwards. Based on the cumulative war variable, I generate a post-war dummy that measures the aftermath of cumulative wars through a period of up to five years. Equivalent to the post-conflict dummy, the post-war dummy takes the value of 1 during the first five years after termination of a cumulative war. For frequency distributions of the variables mentioned in this paragraph, see tables A.1.4 and A.1.5 in appendix A.1.

I set the maximum duration of the post-conflict and post-war periods to five years, because the risk of conflict relapse is particularly high within the first five years after conflict termination (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 88). Chalmers (2007) finds a 44 percent chance of conflict recurrence within a period of five years after conflict termination. Moreover, five years should be long enough for a potential relapse in women's newfound rights to occur, in the case of such improvements during conflict.

Is the UCDP/PRIO indicator, on which I base my post-conflict variables, a valid measure for internal armed conflict? Measuring the existence and/or magnitude of conflict by battle deaths is considered more precise than by total deaths; that is, the total number of people that would be alive if there had not been a conflict (Strand and Dahl 2011: 4). Using total fatalities as the measure often leads to an over-estimation of the numbers (Johnson et al. 2008: 653, Pedersen 2009: 8). Moreover, Gleditsch et al. (2002) argue that the 25 battle deaths threshold for an event to be counted as an armed conflict makes more sense than, for instance, the Correlates of War (COW) dataset's threshold of 1,000 battle deaths. They illustrate their point with two examples. According to the most inclusive of COW's thresholds, which is 1,000 battle deaths

during the entire conflict, the Basque conflict does not qualify as such since its total number of battle deaths is 'only' 211 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019b). The Northern Ireland conflict, which had more than 25 battle deaths annually in the period 1971-1993 and in 1998, falls short of COW's stricter definition of 1,000 battle deaths per year (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 617). Both these cases, which reached 25 battle deaths during several years, are counted as internal armed conflict in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. A threshold of 25 is low enough to include such cases, and high enough to exclude less politically significant events of violence. Hence, the UCDP/PRIO measure intuitively seems like a more valid conflict measure.

One possible objection to the operationalization is that it requires that one of the warring parties is a government. This excludes numerous cases of organized violent groups fighting against each other within a country, but with no involvement from the government, for instance the Islamic State (IS) against Hezbollah in Syria (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019a). This type of political violence is classified as non-state conflicts and can be studied separately, which makes this point less problematic since I have chosen to limit my study to internal conflicts. The dataset's clear distinction between different forms of political violence is, on the other hand, singled out as an advantage (Scarcelli 2017, Strand and Dahl 2011). Scarcelli (2017) employs the case of Iraq to evaluate which dataset best solves the problem of coding multiple simultaneous forms of political violence in a country. Comparing datasets from the COW Project, the Centre for Systemic Peace, the Political Instability Task Force, and UCDP/PRIO, he concludes that the latter comes closest to resolving this disentanglement problem thanks to its category for internationalized internal conflicts (Scarcelli 2017: 98). All in all, the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict measure seems like the most valid measure available.

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University are leading research institutions regarding data collection and development within the field of peace and conflict. They have argued for the reliability of their data in a convincing way and the data collection procedures are well-documented. For the years preceding 1989, the data is backdated through a three-stage process (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 618). First, they gathered extensive information from various existing datasets, before they critically assessed which of the potential conflicts fulfilled the criteria mentioned earlier in this subsection and in subsection 1.1.2. Finally, they surveyed all countries to uncover additional conflicts left out of the existing datasets and conducted in-depth studies of the countries where they suspected that there had been an incidence of conflict. According to Gleditsch et al. (2002), the coding is rigorous and there should be few false positives. False negatives are slightly more likely, meaning that they might have overlooked a few conflicts. However, they compared their dataset to similar datasets and concluded that the discrepancies were due to different coding criteria rather than false negatives.

Considering the difficulties with coding historical data of this kind, I consider the reliability of the UCDP/PRIO conflict measure to be satisfying.

3.1.3. Control Variables

Country-specific characteristics are accounted for in fixed-effects models and partly by controlling for a lagged independent variable, which I elaborate on in subsection 3.3. That includes stable characteristics of a country that relate to the economic conditions for women, such as religion or culture. Cultural and religious factors have a substantial impact on the labour force participation of certain groups of the population (International Labour Organization 2017: 8). In many countries, traditional social and religious norms prevent women from taking an active role in the economic sphere. In addition to the dependent and independent variables discussed in the two previous subsections, I add variables that might correlate with my dependent and independent variables to control for possible spurious associations. Grounding my choice of confounders in extant literature on women's labour rights, internal armed conflict and the relationship between them, I control for regime type, income level, and women's political rights.

Most likely, there are many confounders that relate somewhat to the variables of interest through a complex web of mechanisms and connections – as it often is in the real, messy world (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 3). Although adding control variables reduces the chances of omitted variable bias (OVB), the risk of post-treatment bias (PTB), on the other hand, increases. PTB occurs if I, for instance, misunderstand an ambiguous causal ordering among the independent variables and control for a mediator – for example women's political rights – thereby controlling away consequences of internal armed conflict (Blackwell and Glynn 2018: 1067). One type of PTB called 'intermediate variable bias' occurs if the model renders results that indicate a false relationship between internal conflict and women's labour rights (Acharya et al. 2016: 512-514). This implies, in other words, a substantial risk of committing a type 1 error (Stock and Watson 2015: 124). Indeed, PTB can also go in the other direction of a type 2 error. If I find an insignificant correlation between internal conflict and women's labour rights, while there should have been a positive result, I might have controlled for a mediator through which the effects of X on Y work. Hence, numerous controls do not necessarily yield the best-fitted regression model, and taking parsimony into consideration, one should abstain from controlling for 'everything' (Lee Ray 2003). In the remainder of this subsection, I present the operationalizations of the control variables regime type, GDP per capita, and women's political rights, following a brief discussion of how they relate to internal conflict and women's labour rights.

Regime type: Democracy, Anocracy, or Autocracy

The relationship between regime type and conflict has been subject to thorough scrutiny. Numerous studies have argued that anocracies are more conflict-prone than are democracies and autocracies (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Gates et al. (2006), Hegre et al. (2001), among others). Democracies and autocracies are more institutionally consistent and are hence stable political systems, making the outbreak of internal conflict less likely. Anocracies and regimes in transition are more unstable and have a higher probability of conflict outbreak. The relationship between internal conflict and regime type, ranging from autocracy via anocracy to democracy, is hence a curvilinear one (Hegre et al. 2001: 42). Furthermore, strong democracies are negatively associated with human rights violations (Davenport and Armstrong 2004: 538). In democracies that respect human rights such as freedom of speech and assembly, I expect it to be easier to spark sudden bottom-up change, compared to in repressive autocracies. And democracies, by definition, indicate respect for basic human rights (de Soysa & Nordås 2007). Respect for women's labour rights could hence reflect the level of democracy, the effects of which become important to isolate.

To measure the regime type of a country, I use the electoral democracy index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018b). This index measures the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense is achieved, which embodies "the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive" (Coppedge et al. 2018a: 40). Among other things, it entails clean elections that affect the composition of the executive, and that organizations can operate freely. The electoral democracy index is an aggregate of indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage. It constitutes a combination of the additive and multiplicative polyarchy indices, thus reconciling the two most well-known aggregation techniques in the literature (Coppedge et al. 2018a: 40).

The electoral democracy index, which is originally at the ordinal level, is transformed into an interval variable by use of the V-Dem Measurement Model (Pemstein et al. 2019). The transformed measure at the interval level ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates low levels of democracy and 1 indicates high levels. (See appendix A.1, table A.1.1 for descriptive statistics.) Thus, it ranges from autocracy via anocracy to democracy. As discussed, strong democracies and autocracies are less likely to experience the outbreak of conflict, while anocracies are less stable and hence more likely to do so (Gates et al. 2006). The association between regime type and internal conflict is therefore expected to be curvilinear. To account for this, I control not only for the democracy index, but also democracy squared, which is common practice in the

peace and conflict literature. (See Dahlum and Wig (2018), Hegre et al. (2001), Hegre (2014), among others.)

The V-Dem Dataset contains five main democracy indices, and among these I choose the minimal or essential definition of democracy to minimise the risk of endogeneity problems related to the CIRI indices for women's labour rights and especially women's political rights. (The latter is presented as the last control in this subsection.) For instance, the liberal democracy index has a strong focus on rights and might tap into some of the same aspects as do the CIRI indices. The electoral democracy index does indeed include suffrage, which overlaps with CIRI's index of women's political rights that includes women's right to vote. This is not surprising, since female suffrage constitutes an essential aspect of both democracy and women's political rights. Nonetheless, when controlling for both these variables in the same analysis, female suffrage is measured twice. It is not possible to remove this indicator from one of the indices. Considering that the correlation between the two controls is as low as 0.37 (see appendix A.3, table A.3.1), I do not regard this as a major problem.

Gross Domestic Product per Capita

The next control is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is among the most established predictors for the occurrence of internal conflict (Collier et al. 2003, Gates et al. 2012, Hegre and Sambanis 2006). At the same time, internal conflict is devastating to the economy and leads to reduced economic growth. Hence, low GDP per capita (growth) and the occurrence of internal conflict can be mutually reinforcing in a vicious circle. Collier et al. (2003) named this 'the conflict trap'; poor countries are more likely to experience internal conflict, which exacerbates poverty, in turn rendering internal conflict more likely.

Furthermore, GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth are closely linked to the labour market via increased job opportunities, and hence to women's employment. Higher GDP per capita stimulates women's participation in the labour market (World Bank 2011b: 210). In an analysis of women's labour rights, Dyvesether (2017) finds that the effect of GDP per capita is positive and significant. At the same time, higher unemployment tends to strike women relatively harder because of the 'male breadwinner bias', as mentioned in subsection 2.4.2. Unemployment is generally higher when the economic growth is low or negative. Although, according to the International Labour Organization (2016), labour force participation rates tend to decline with economic growth for less developed countries, and this effect is stronger and more consistent for men than women. It seems clear that there is a relationship between GDP

per capita (growth) and women's labour force participation, but the direction of the correlation is ambiguous.

To operationalize this control, I use an indicator for GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US dollars) from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018). The indicator is based on World Bank National Accounts data and the OECD National Accounts data files. I use this measure because of the extensive data coverage. The World Bank data on GDP per capita cover 194 countries, compared to, for instance, the Maddison data that cover 169 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre 2019). More specifically, GDP is the sum of gross value added by all producers in the economy and is a common domestic income measure. A country's GDP divided by its midyear population equals that country's GDP per capita, taking the size of the economy's population into account. In the regression, I use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita to avoid that the results are driven by extreme values. The descriptive statistics can be found in table A.1.1 in appendix A.1.


Women's Political Rights

The last control variable is women's political rights. How women's political rights relate to internal conflict and women's labour rights, and especially how the three relate to each other, is not clear. An increasing amount of studies show a negative association between women's political rights and internal conflict (Bakken 2017, Dahlum and Wig 2018, Forsberg and Olsson 2016, Melander 2005b). For instance, Dahlum and Wig (2018) demonstrate that women's political empowerment, measured by indices for several political rights, affects the risk of internal conflict negatively. Bakken (2017) investigates the reverse causal relationship and finds that internal conflict aftermath is associated with improved political rights for women. When it comes to how women's political rights relate to women's labour rights, Dyvesether (2017) finds a positive and robust correlation. It seems fair to assume that women's political rights are associated with both women's labour rights and internal armed conflict.

However, the trilateral relationship between internal conflict and the political rights and labour rights of women is more complex, not to mention under-researched. The literature indicates that women's political rights are correlated with both internal conflict and women's labour rights, but *how* and *why* remains unsettled. Put differently, are women's political rights a confounder or a mediator of the relationship between internal conflict and women's labour rights? Or, are the two sets of women's rights affected by conflict through distinct and perhaps simultaneous mechanisms? These questions are highly relevant because they have implications for the use of women's political rights as a control in my models.

Even though the mechanisms connecting the three variables are unclear, I can envisage four stylistic scenarios, portrayed in figure 2, which are of course not mutually exclusive. First, the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights might be contingent on its effects on women's political rights (figure 2a). It might also be the case that changes in women's political rights are an effect of internal conflict mediated through women's labour rights (figure 2b), and therefore an outcome of the treatment. Controlling for women's political rights would then bias the results because of PTB. A third possibility is that women's political rights are a confounder, affecting both internal conflict and women's labour rights, while there is no direct relationship between the last-mentioned variables (figure 2c). If this is the case, not controlling for women's political rights will result in OVB (Stock and Watson 2015: 385-386). Yet another option is that internal conflict affects the two sets of rights through distinct and perhaps simultaneous mechanisms (figure 2d). Most likely, the mechanisms connecting the variables in question cannot be explained by one of the scenarios only, not to forget the numerous confounding variables (which I left out here for the sake of simplicity). Whether or not to control for women's political rights is hence a more complicated question than it first seems because the relative risk of OVB versus PTB is unclear.

Figure 2: Causal Model of Possible Relationships between Internal Conflict, Women’s Labour Rights, and Women’s Political Rights



Clearly, the trilateral relationship between internal conflict and the political rights and labour rights of women is complex. The direction of causality (if any) between the three variables is an important question, albeit difficult to answer. Naturally, disentangling these mechanisms requires a much more thorough theoretical and empirical investigation than I have room for in this thesis. However, I account for it by testing both presumptions about the causal role of women's political rights. I run the regression analyses without controlling for women's political rights, before I add the control in an extended model to uncover how it affects the correlation between internal conflict and women's labour rights.

To measure this control, I use the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) index of women's political rights from the same dataset containing the operationalization of my dependent variable (Cingranelli et al. 2014). The CIRI measure is an additive index consisting of five aspects of women's political rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 71-73). The indicators included are women's right to vote, to run for political office, to take on elected and appointed positions in the government, to petition government officials, and to membership in political parties. It is an ordinal index with four values. The lowest value, zero, indicates that none of the political rights of women are protected in the legislature, and that there are laws significantly curtailing women's political participation. A score of one or two means that political equality is guaranteed *de jure*, but with the former value, there are substantial *de facto* limitations and women hold less than five percent of the seats in the national legislature and superior government positions. A score of two means that women hold more than five but less than thirty percent of the seats in the national legislature and/or superior government positions. The highest score, three, indicates that "[p]olitical equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions" (Cingranelli and Richards 2014: 71). The frequency distribution is attached in table A.1.2 in appendix A.1.

I deliberately choose CIRI's index rather than other measures, for instance the Women's Political Empowerment Index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Database (Coppedge et al. 2018b). In this way, I not only control for the underlying concept of women's political rights, but also for possible systematic measurement errors in the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. If there are systematic errors due to coding procedures specific to the dataset, they will apply to both indices of women's labour rights and women's political rights. For example, in case the CIRI coders have assigned systematically lower values to conflict countries compared to non-conflict countries, or democracies compared to autocracies, this will be reflected in the index of women's labour rights as well as of women's political rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

As demonstrated above and in subsection 3.1.1, CIRI's indices of the political rights and labour rights of women are substantially distinct. Nonetheless, since the two measures are from the same dataset, it is necessary to examine whether they in fact are independent of each other. The graphs from Cingranelli et al. (2013) in figure A.1.1 in appendix A.1 illustrate how the average of the political rights and labour rights of women evolve over time. Women's labour rights have been relatively stable and at lower levels than women's political rights. The respect for the latter has increased somewhat over time. Consequently, the indices' average values have a diverging tendency since the early 1990s, which suggests that they do not measure the same concept. Furthermore, a bivariate correlation analysis of the two indices shows a low correlation coefficient of 0.19. (See appendix A.3, table A.3.1 for a bivariate correlation analysis of all variables.) In addition, a variance inflation factor (VIF) test indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem. The results from the VIF test are reported in subsection 3.3.

3.2 The Sample and External Validity

Generalizability of the results is an ambition for this study, as mentioned in the introduction to this section. If the external validity is compromised, for instance if the sample is not representative of the population, the ability to generalize the results is weakened (Stock and Watson 2015: 529). Thus, when estimating statistical models to uncover general relationships, there are requirements for the size and selection of the sample. In this subsection, I clarify the selection, size, and composition of the sample to shed light on the external validity.

I follow Gates et al. (2012) and the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* of the World Bank (2011a), and exclude OECD countries⁶ from the sample to obtain a group of non-conflict countries that is more comparable to the conflict countries. In another analysis of the effects of conflict on development issues, Brück and Vothknecht (2011) have a similar approach and include only low-income and lower-middle-income economies, classified by the World Bank. As a result, I end up with a sample consisting of non-OECD countries that either have or have not experienced conflict. I expect the OECD countries to differ from the other countries – also when it comes to other variables than income and regime type – to such an extent that it does not make sense to compare them with the rest of the sample. This is an attempt to avoid that other variables not included in the sample, especially unobservable

⁶ The OECD countries as of December 2018 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

variables such as the level of trust in society, will drive the results. If the results indicate that being in a post-conflict period has significant effects on women's labour rights, it is more likely that it is due to after-effects of internal conflict, rather than other omitted variables where developed OECD countries differ systematically from conflict countries. Also, the index for women's labour rights has a maximum value of 3. Many of the OECD countries will have reached the maximum level of women's labour rights, hence they cannot improve further according to this measure. Removing them from the sample will avoid the analysis being affected by these countries' non-improvements.

To investigate whether OECD countries do in fact differ from the rest of the sample, as I expect, I run the analysis of the full sample with an OECD dummy and an interaction between the OECD dummy and the ongoing conflict variable.⁷ The interaction term is highly significant,⁸ indicating that the relation between internal conflict and women's labour rights is significantly different for OECD countries than for the rest of the countries in the sample.⁹ This supports my expectations and decision to exclude the OECD countries from the sample. Furthermore, I run a separate analysis of OECD countries alone. The main analysis of the subset without OECD is reported in table 1 in subsection 4.1, while the analysis of the OECD-countries can be found in table A.4.1 in appendix A.4. These results show that both the sign and significance of the coefficients of the post-conflict and ongoing conflict variables are different in the two analyses. This can be interpreted as an indication that the mechanisms at play are different for OECD countries than for the rest of the sample. In addition to the reasons listed above, this might also be due to the fact that most of the internal conflicts in the OECD countries in recent years are territorial (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2018). The conflict over Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom and the Basque conflict in Spain are two examples. The fighting in territorial conflicts tend to be limited to the disputed territories in question (Buhaug and Gates 2002: 421, Gates et al. 2012: 1715). At the same time, several of these countries have witnessed an improvement in women's labour rights. These factors can contribute to explaining why the mechanisms are different for the OECD countries compared to the rest of the countries.

Lists of countries, conflict-countries and post-conflict countries in the analysis of women's labour rights can be found in tables A.2.1-A.2.3 in appendix A.2. The sample used in the analysis of women's labour rights includes 128 countries, of which 62 countries have experienced an internal conflict and/or a post-conflict period. I consider the sample size and the number of conflict and post-conflict countries to be

⁷ The OECD dummy takes the value of 1 if the country is an OECD country, and 0 if not. The interaction term is the product of the OECD dummy and the ongoing conflict dummy, presented in subsection 3.1.2.

⁸ The p-value is 0.000.

⁹ An equivalent analysis, but with an interaction between the OECD dummy and the post-conflict dummy instead, renders a non-significant interaction coefficient. Most likely, this is due to the very low number of observations equal to 1 on the interaction variable, more specifically 46 observations out of 10,134 in total.

sufficiently large. The number of observations for each of these countries is also listed. After scrutinizing these numbers as well as the pattern of missingness, I have no reason to believe that conflict and post-conflict countries are underrepresented in the sample. However, there is slightly more missingness among conflict and post-conflict countries compared to non-conflict countries, but there is not much difference and it does not seem like the missingness is systematic. I can see no indication of a selection bias, although there could be selection biases related to unobservable variables that are hard to identify. That said, I have no reason to believe that the external validity is compromised. The results can thus be generalized to the population of developing (non-OECD) countries.

3.3 Regression Model: Ordered Probit

Using the variables presented in subsection 3.1, I conduct panel analyses to investigate variations across countries over time (Stock and Watson 2015: 397). As previously mentioned, the unit of analysis is ‘country-year’. To test the relationship between internal conflict aftermath and women’s labour rights, I estimate an ordered probit model covering the 1981-2011 period. In this subsection, I present and discuss the main model of this study – the ordered probit model.

My main regression model is the ordered probit model, since the measure for women’s labour rights is a four-point index at the ordinal level (Long 1997: 114). I check the form of the error distribution, which tends towards normality. (See appendix A.3, figure A.3.1.) For ordinal outcomes, the ordered probit is preferred over the ordered logit model when the distribution of errors is normal rather than logistic (Long 1997: 119-120). The final point that makes the case for an ordered probit model, is that the parallel lines assumption is not violated. The ordered probit model assumes that the coefficients are equal across the dependent variable’s categories (Pfarr et al. 2010). If, for instance, the effects of the explanatory variables are different when a high versus a low level of women’s labour rights is observed, the parallel lines assumption is violated, and an ordered model would not fit the data. Based on a Wald test,¹⁰ I conclude that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across categories. Although ordered probit is my main model, I do robustness checks with additional regression models, which I turn to in subsection 4.1.1.

As previously mentioned, my intention is to analyse *change* in, and not the *level* of, women’s labour rights. This is because I would like to investigate the effects of transitioning from a conflict to post-conflict period, rather than the effects of being a peaceful contra a conflict-ridden country. Therefore, I control for a lagged

¹⁰ The Wald statistic is 0.49 and the p-value is 0.7829.

dependent variable (LDV) in the extended models. My main independent variable is a post-conflict period of up to five years. Hence, I control for the dependent variable (Y_t) lagged with five years (y_{t-5}) – in other words, the level of women’s labour rights five years prior. Apart from the variables already mentioned, I sequentially include ongoing conflict, democracy and democracy squared, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and women’s political rights in the model, as discussed in subsection 3.1. When estimating the model, I assume that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each other (Stock and Watson 2015: 251). To test if the variables are indeed independent of each other – that there is not a problem with multicollinearity – I conduct a variance inflation factor (VIF) test of the independent variables in the full model of the ordered probit analysis. The results, reported in table A.3.2 in appendix A.3, show that the variables’ VIF scores range from 1.07 to 1.20 with a mean of 1.16. All VIF scores are well below the critical value of 10, which indicate that the variables are independent of each other.

Autocorrelation means that observations at a given moment in time in a given country is dependent on earlier observations on the same variable (Stock and Watson 2015: 412). Since I conduct a panel analysis, I face the problem of autocorrelation, which is a consistent feature of time-series data. This is also indicated by a Wooldridge test of autocorrelation,¹¹ which rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. The level of women’s labour rights in a country in year t , conditional on the covariates included in the regression, is correlated with the level at time $(t-1)$, for instance because women’s labour rights might reflect cultural factors that persist over time (Cho 2010). Including an LDV takes partly account of autocorrelation, but it is oftentimes not an adequate solution to the problem. Another concern is the potential problem of heteroscedasticity, which means that the variance in the dependent variable varies across different values of the independent variables (Stock and Watson 2015: 203). Let us say that variations in women’s labour rights depend on the level of GDP per capita, for instance that the level of women’s labour rights tend to vary less for rich than poor countries. In that case, the assumption of homoscedastic errors is violated. I cluster the standard errors at the country level to account for the problem of autocorrelation and possible heteroscedasticity. Hence, I assume that the error terms are correlated within, and not across, countries, which means that a country’s level of women’s labour rights, conditional on the included covariates, might depend on the previous levels in that same country but not, for instance, the level in its neighbouring countries (Cho 2010).

To further reduce the problem of autocorrelation and trending variables, I control for time-fixed effects in the model. I follow Dahlum and Wig (2018: 13), among others, and include year-fixed effects to “capture global secular trends in female empowerment and civil conflict” that can affect my results if not accounted

¹¹ The Wooldridge test statistic is 91.133 and the p-value is 0.0000.

for. They also include country-fixed effects in their model because of sticky cultural and historical factors that are likely to affect women's empowerment. Country-fixed effects are time-invariant effects at the country level that correlate with the variables. A country's geography, culture and religion are examples of such country-specific factors that persist over time, and that can impact women's labour rights. However, controlling for country-fixed effects is not possible in an ordered probit model because of 'incidental parameters problem' (Wooldridge 2002). This entails that the ordered probit model has difficulties converging to consistent estimates when the number of observations is high, as it tends to be in panel analyses. The above-mentioned LDV will partly capture country-specific factors that persist over time. In addition, I include regional fixed-effects to control for region-specific factors. I have categorized the countries into geographic regions – Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas – according to the Interstate System Membership of Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Therefore, I assume that there are characteristics at the regional level that correlate with the variables in the model. However, it does not sufficiently take care of the problem with unobserved country-heterogeneity; that is, sticky characteristics of a country omitted from the model that affect the relationship of interest. To check the robustness of the results from the ordered probit model, I control for country-fixed effects in two different pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) models with Newey-West and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. I present these robustness models in subsection 4.1.1. First, however, I present the findings from the main analysis in the following section.

4 Findings and Analysis

How are women's labour rights affected by internal armed conflict? To reiterate, my hypotheses are as follows: H_1 : Internal armed conflict positively affects women's post-conflict labour rights; and H_2 : Internal armed conflict negatively affects women's post-conflict labour rights. In this section, I test these hypotheses by first estimating an ordered probit model with time-fixed and regional-fixed effects, as described in the previous section. In addition, I estimate predicted probabilities that women's labour rights are at given levels in different scenarios. Second, I test whether the results are robust to alternative model specifications and measures of the post-conflict period as well as different samples. Finally, I discuss the findings in light of the theoretical mechanisms explained in section 2.

4.1 Findings

The results from the ordered probit analysis of women's labour rights are presented in table 1. It consists of four models and is based on around 3000 observations in 128 countries over 26-31 years. The time coverage is 1981-2011, which is reduced by five years to 1986-2011 in models 3 and 4. A lagged dependent variable (LDV) of five years is added in the third model, truncating the time coverage with the same number of years. In the first two models, I estimate the effects of the independent variables on the *level* of women's labour rights. An LDV of five years is added in the last two models, thus controlling for the level of women's labour rights five years prior in a given country. Consequently, the last two models estimate the effects of the independent variables on the *change* in women's labour rights during a five-year period.

Table 1: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.383*** (0.123)	-0.397*** (0.125)	-0.328*** (0.124)	-0.343*** (0.125)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.483*** (0.124)	-0.490*** (0.119)	-0.488*** (0.095)	-0.496*** (0.093)
Democracy	-1.717 (1.142)	-2.144* (1.104)	-1.763* (0.924)	-2.048** (0.897)
Democracy^2	2.187* (1.271)	2.510** (1.227)	2.024** (0.972)	2.239** (0.943)
ln(GDP pc)	0.178*** (0.054)	0.193*** (0.054)	0.169*** (0.042)	0.176*** (0.043)
Women's political rights		0.390*** (0.088)		0.242*** (0.079)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.977*** (0.094)	0.957*** (0.092)
Constant cut1	-0.514 (0.511)	0.020 (0.542)	-0.241 (0.452)	0.091 (0.462)
Constant cut2	1.854*** (0.527)	2.438*** (0.556)	2.401*** (0.464)	2.756*** (0.475)
Constant cut3	3.566*** (0.574)	4.178*** (0.600)	4.375*** (0.514)	4.741*** (0.530)
Pseudo R^2	0.1253	0.1403	0.2265	0.2315
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The main independent variables are two dummies measuring ongoing conflict and a post-conflict period of up to five years. Hence, the reference category of the dummy set is enduring peace, which is a situation where a country has either not experienced internal armed conflict since 1981 or is in a post-conflict period of six years or more. The variables in the baseline model are included in all models. These are the post-conflict and ongoing conflict dummies, as well as democracy, democracy squared and the natural logarithm (ln) of GDP per capita as controls. The second model also controls for women's political rights. In addition to the variables in the baseline model, the third model controls for an LDV, while women's political rights are added in model 4. The reason I add women's political rights in a separate model is to uncover how this control affects the correlation between internal conflict and women's labour rights. Now, I can evaluate the regression results both with and without controlling for women's political rights.

Furthermore, it does not make sense to interpret quantitatively the coefficients in a regression model estimated with ordered probit (Long 1997: 127-128). Therefore, I do not comment on the size of the coefficients, but rather the direction of the correlation and the significance.

The first two models demonstrate that the effects of the ongoing conflict and post-conflict dummies on the level of women's labour rights are negative and significant at the one-percent level. This holds when controlling for democracy and democracy squared, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and women's political rights. The dependent variable's values range from 0 to 3, where high values indicate a higher level of women's labour rights. Thus, an ongoing internal conflict in a country predicts a lower level of women's labour rights compared to a situation with enduring peace. The same goes for a post-conflict period of up to five years, which is associated with weakened labour rights of women, controlled for regime type, income level and women's political rights. These results are consistent in models 3 and 4, estimating the effects on a change in the dependent variable. The coefficients are still negative and highly significant, indicating that ongoing conflict and a post-conflict period of up to five years predict a negative change in women's labour rights through a five-year period.

The coefficients in an ordered probit analysis should not be interpreted quantitatively, as already mentioned. Hence, to evaluate the quantitative effects, I estimate the predicted probability that women's labour rights are at given values in different scenarios. These predicted probabilities are reported in table 2 and illustrated in figures 3-6. In the first baseline scenario, all covariates are at mean values. In scenario 2, the ongoing conflict scenario, the ongoing conflict dummy is set to 1, the post-conflict dummy is set to 0, while the rest of the covariates are at mean values. The third scenario is the post-conflict scenario where the post-conflict dummy is set to 1, the ongoing conflict dummy is set to 0, while the other covariates are at means. In scenario 4, the enduring peace scenario, both dummies are set to 0, while the rest of the covariates are at means.

Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Women's Labour Rights. Ordered Probit

Categories of Women's Labour Rights	Scenario 1: All covariates at means	Scenario 2: Ongoing conflict	Scenario 3: Post-conflict period	Scenario 4: Enduring peace
0	0.086*** (0.012)	0.145*** (0.029)	0.129*** (0.029)	0.068*** (0.011)
1	0.727*** (0.019)	0.739*** (0.019)	0.740*** (0.018)	0.709*** (0.023)
2	0.181*** (0.019)	0.114*** (0.022)	0.128*** (0.024)	0.216*** (0.024)
3	0.005*** (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.008** (0.003)
Observations	3,268	3,268	3,268	3,268

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities When All Covariates Are at Means. Ordered Probit.




Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities in an Ongoing Conflict Scenario




Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities in a Post-Conflict Scenario





Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities in an Enduring Peace Scenario



To reiterate, the women's labour rights variable ranges from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates a high level of rights. In all scenarios, the predicted probability is approximately 70 percent that the women's labour rights variable will be equal to 1. The probability that women's labour rights are at the lowest level is 8.6 percent in the baseline scenario. It is 14.5 percent in the ongoing conflict scenario, 12.9 percent in the post-conflict scenario, and as low as 6.8 percent in the enduring peace scenario. Hence, it is most likely that women's labour rights are very weak in a country with ongoing conflict, but it is almost as likely to be weak in the aftermath of conflict. It is considerably less likely to be weak in a country experiencing enduring peace.

Furthermore, the predicted probability that the level of women's labour rights equals 2 is 18.1 percent in the baseline scenario with all covariates at mean values. The probability is reduced to 11.4 and 12.8 percent in an ongoing conflict and post-conflict scenario, respectively. Again, the probabilities in the two last-mentioned scenarios differ with approximately 1.5 percentage points only. In an enduring conflict scenario, the probability that women's labour rights are at quite high levels increases to 21.6 percent. Finally, the probability that women's labour rights are at the highest level is below 1 percent in all scenarios. The predicted probability is 0.5 percent in the baseline scenario, 0.2 in the ongoing conflict scenario, 0.3 in the post-conflict scenario, and 0.8 in the enduring peace scenario. In other words, the probability that women's labour rights are at high levels is overall very low, given these scenarios.

All in all, the quantitative effects of ongoing conflict and of being in a post-conflict period of up to five years are quite similar. The predicted probabilities in table 2 and the illustrative graphs in figures 4 and 5 make this clear. The difference in probability in the two scenarios is between 0.1 and 1.6 percentage points, with it being slightly less likely with higher levels of women's labour rights in a situation with ongoing conflict compared to a post-conflict period of up to five years. The real difference is between countries that experience enduring peace, and those that experience or have recently experienced internal armed conflict. This might indicate that the impact of internal conflict on women's labour rights are rather persistent, which I investigate further in subsection 4.1.1.

Turning to the control variables in the main analysis, I start with democracy. In table 1, the coefficient of the democracy index is negative, but not significant in any of the models except for the last one. The coefficient of the squared term is positive in all models and significant in all but the first. Hence, the association of democracy to both the level of and change in women's labour rights is convex curvilinear, i.e. U-shaped. The next control is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, which I control for in all models. The coefficient is consistently positive and highly significant. This means that a one-percent increase in GDP per capita is associated with strengthened labour rights of women. Lastly, women's political rights are controlled for in models 2 and 4. The effect is positive and significant at the one-percent level in both

models. Hence, higher levels of women's political rights predict both higher levels of, and a positive change in, women's labour rights.

Given previous research, e.g. Dyvesether (2017), it is not surprising that advancements in women's political rights go together with improved labour rights of women. How about the trilateral relationship between the two sets of rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years, as discussed in subsection 3.1.3? The coefficients of a post-conflict period remain practically unchanged when women's political rights are added to the models both with and without an LDV. This suggests that women's political rights are not a consequence of internal conflict that works through women's labour rights, as depicted in figure 2b in subsection 3.1.3. If I had 'controlled away' the consequences of the treatment by controlling for women's political rights, it would have substantially changed the coefficients of the post-conflict dummy. Hence, women's political rights are most likely not a mediator in the relationship between internal conflict and women's labour rights, but it could be a confounder. Controlling for women's political rights in the analyses seems sensible. The causal relationship between these three variables is complex and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to perfectly disentangle this relationship, as it requires a thorough empirical and theoretical investigation of its own. I leave it to future research to uncover the causal mechanisms between internal armed conflict, women's political rights, and women's labour rights.

Does Conflict Intensity Matter?

To reiterate, both ongoing internal conflict and a post-conflict period of up to five years are associated with a negative change in women's labour rights, controlled for regime type, income level and women's political rights. I also run an ordered probit model to test the effects of ongoing minor conflict and ongoing war separately. The results, which are reported in table A.4.2 in appendix A.4, show that the effects are negative and highly significant, irrespective of conflict intensity. Ongoing internal wars have a larger negative impact on both the level of, and change in, women's labour rights, than do minor internal conflicts. Thus, conflict intensity makes a difference for the effects of *ongoing* conflict on women's labour rights. Unsurprisingly, the effects of being in a post-conflict period of up to five years remain the same.

To check if conflict intensity matters in the aftermath of conflict, I run an analysis equivalent to the one in table 1 but with a post-war dummy instead. This dummy measures the aftermath of *cumulative* war, as explained in subsection 3.1.2. Based on existing research discussed in section 2, I expect that internal wars have an even stronger negative impact on the post-conflict labour rights of women than the estimated effects of minor conflicts and wars measured together. The results are presented in table 3. Parallel to the main analysis, the effect of an ongoing conflict is still consistently negative and significant, controlled for

the same variables as in table 1. Likewise, being in a post-(cumulative) war period of up to five years affects the level of women's labour rights negatively and significantly. However, the negative coefficient of the post-war dummy loses significance when an LDV is added to the model. Hence, there is no significant effect of being in a post-war period on a change in women's labour rights during a five-year period after conflict termination. Consequently, the effects of being in a post-war period of up to five years on the *level* of women's labour rights are negative – a relationship that cannot be established when analysing the *change* in women's labour rights during a five-year period. Thus, it seems that it is only whether there has been a conflict at all, and not the intensity of the conflict, that matters for how women's labour rights change in the post-conflict period.

Table 3: Women's Post-War Labour Rights, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-war dummy (5)	-0.362** (0.146)	-0.421*** (0.146)	-0.230 (0.159)	-0.283* (0.158)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.445*** (0.123)	-0.455*** (0.117)	-0.445*** (0.094)	-0.455*** (0.090)
Democracy	-1.768 (1.146)	-2.200** (1.109)	-1.809** (0.922)	-2.098** (0.896)
Democracy^2	2.248* (1.276)	2.572** (1.232)	2.088** (0.970)	2.303** (0.942)
ln(GDP pc)	0.185*** (0.053)	0.199*** (0.053)	0.179*** (0.042)	0.186*** (0.042)
Women's political rights		0.398*** (0.087)		0.249*** (0.078)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.979*** (0.095)	0.958*** (0.093)
Constant cut1	-0.441 (0.507)	0.093 (0.538)	-0.117 (0.447)	0.219 (0.457)
Constant cut2	1.915*** (0.521)	2.501*** (0.550)	2.511*** (0.457)	2.871*** (0.467)
Constant cut3	3.626*** (0.568)	4.242*** (0.594)	4.485*** (0.508)	4.856*** (0.523)
Pseudo R^2	0.1226	0.138	0.2238	0.229
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The findings from the ordered probit analyses presented in this subsection are controlled for time trends and regional heterogeneity. However, I must control for country heterogeneity to assess whether specific factors at the country level are driving the results. In the next subsection, I present the robustness analyses which include both time-fixed and country-fixed effects.

4.1.1. Robustness

In this subsection, I test the robustness of the results presented in table 1. First, I test alternative model specifications that allow for country-fixed effects. These are pooled OLS analyses with either Newey West or Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Second, I test alternative operationalizations of the aftermath of conflict, namely a dummy measuring a post-conflict period of up to ten years instead of five, as well as a conflict variable transformed with a decay function. Finally, I estimate the ordered probit model using different samples to check whether the results depend on the countries included in the analysis. I analyse the full sample including the OECD countries, following separate analyses of each geographic region.

Alternative Model Specifications

To test the robustness of the findings from the main analysis presented in table 1 in the previous subsection, I estimate pooled OLS models that allow for country-fixed effects. This will uncover whether the results are driven by country heterogeneity, and whether they are dependent on the model specification. Even though the dependent variable is not continuous, the error distribution tends towards normality. (See figure A.3.1 in appendix A.3.) Therefore, I estimate two pooled OLS models with Newey West and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, following de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2011) and Gaibullov and Sandler (2011), among others.

The Newey West standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle 2007: 285). In panel analyses, however, it is likely that the error terms are also cross-sectionally correlated (Gaibullov and Sandler 2011: 359). Cross-sectional dependence can arise from common factors across countries, for instance financial recession, that are omitted from the model. If not corrected for, it will result in biased standard errors, hence affecting the hypothesis testing. Therefore, I also estimate a pooled OLS model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors as a robustness check. Unlike the Newey West standard errors, the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to cross-sectional dependence, in addition to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle 2007: 285). The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, discussed in subsection 3.3, indicates that there is first-order autocorrelation in the error terms. Thus, the standard errors in both models

account for autocorrelation with one lag, assuming that autocorrelation with more than one lag can be ignored. Furthermore, both models include time-fixed and country-fixed effects. In the remainder of this subsection, I present the results from the two models, starting with the pooled OLS-Newey West model.

The findings from the first robustness analysis, the pooled OLS model with Newey West standard errors, are displayed in table 4. The control variables of the four models are the same as in the main ordered probit analysis. In addition to the post-conflict and ongoing conflict dummy, model 1 includes democracy, democracy squared and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita as controls. Women's political rights are added in the second model. An LDV is added in models 3 and 4. The third model includes all controls but women's political rights, which are added in model 4. Controlled for time trends and country heterogeneity, the results from table 1 are largely supported in this analysis. As shown in table 4, being in a post-conflict period of up to five years has a negative and significant effect on both the level of, and change in, women's labour rights. Women's labour rights in a post-conflict period of up to five years, compared to a situation with enduring peace, are reduced by almost 0.1 points on a scale from 0 to 3. Equivalently, the change in women's labour rights during a five-year post-conflict period is reduced by almost 0.09 points compared to the change during five years of enduring peace. Thus, the finding from the ordered probit analysis that internal armed conflict changes women's post-conflict labour rights for the worse still holds. The effect of ongoing conflict in a country is also negative and significant at the one-percent level in all models. Parallel to the results from the main analysis, the quantitative effects of an ongoing conflict are larger than the effects of being in a post-conflict period. Women's labour rights, or a five-year change in them, are reduced by approximately 0.11-0.12 points in a situation with ongoing conflict compared to enduring peace. Hence, table 4¹² shows that the results from the main analysis are supported when controlled for country heterogeneity in the pooled OLS analysis with Newey West standard errors.

¹² The coefficients of democracy and its squared terms have changed signs but are no longer significant. As in the main analysis without country-fixed effects, both the income level and women's political rights affect women's labour rights positively and highly significantly.

Table 4: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011. OLS with Newey West Standard Errors

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.092*** (0.031)	-0.095*** (0.030)	-0.085** (0.036)	-0.086** (0.035)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.116*** (0.033)	-0.114*** (0.033)	-0.111*** (0.038)	-0.113*** (0.037)
Democracy	-0.096 (0.351)	-0.362 (0.354)	0.371 (0.406)	0.130 (0.413)
Democracy^2	0.052 (0.381)	0.299 (0.382)	-0.503 (0.444)	-0.269 (0.449)
ln(GDP pc)	0.192*** (0.053)	0.203*** (0.052)	0.278*** (0.062)	0.290*** (0.061)
Women's political rights		0.125*** (0.024)		0.093*** (0.025)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.110*** (0.025)	0.106*** (0.025)
Constant	0.343 (0.453)	0.033 (0.452)	-0.143 (0.526)	-0.408 (0.519)
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and country-fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To test whether the results hold when cross-sectional dependence is accounted for, I run a pooled OLS analysis of women's labour rights with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Unlike the Newey West standard errors, they are also robust to cross-sectional dependence, in addition to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The findings from this second robustness analysis are reported in table 5 with models identical to the ordered probit and pooled OLS-Newey West analyses. The effects of ongoing conflict and of being in a post-conflict period of up to five years are negative and significant in all models, and the size of the coefficients are identical to the equivalent coefficients in the previous robustness analysis reported in table 4. That means an ongoing conflict has a somewhat larger negative impact on women's labour rights than a post-conflict period. Compared to a situation with enduring peace, an ongoing conflict as well as being in a post-conflict period of up to five years affect both the level of, and change in, women's labour

rights negatively. Thus, the findings¹³ from the previous analyses are robust when dependence across countries is accounted for.

All in all, the results in the main analysis are supported by the findings in the pooled OLS analyses. The effects of ongoing conflict and of being in a post-conflict period of up to five years on women's labour rights are negative and significant, controlled for democracy and democracy squared, income level and women's political rights. The results hold in analyses with country-fixed and time-fixed effects.

Table 5: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011. OLS with Driscoll-Kraay SE

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.092*** (0.028)	-0.095*** (0.027)	-0.085** (0.031)	-0.086** (0.031)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.116*** (0.029)	-0.114*** (0.028)	-0.111*** (0.031)	-0.113*** (0.030)
Democracy	-0.096 (0.318)	-0.362 (0.331)	0.371 (0.347)	0.130 (0.347)
Democracy^2	0.052 (0.340)	0.299 (0.349)	-0.503 (0.357)	-0.269 (0.358)
ln(GDP pc)	0.192*** (0.056)	0.203*** (0.059)	0.278*** (0.060)	0.290*** (0.059)
Women's political rights		0.125*** (0.024)		0.093*** (0.022)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.110** (0.047)	0.106** (0.047)
Constant	-0.238 (0.430)	-0.556 (0.447)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Within R^2	0.0521	0.064	0.0696	0.0759
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and country-fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

¹³ Parallel to the pooled OLS-Newey West analysis, the coefficients of democracy and democracy squared change signs compared to the main analysis, but they are no longer significant. Nonetheless, the convex relationship between democracy and women's labour rights in the main analysis does not hold in the pooled OLS analyses with country-fixed effects. On the other hand, the effects of the natural logarithm of GDP per capita and women's political rights are the same. Their coefficients are positive and highly significant, like in the main analyses. Thus, income level and women's political rights affect both the level of, and change in, women's labour rights positively.

Alternative Measures of the Post-Conflict Period

The analyses presented above demonstrates that both ongoing conflict and a post-conflict period of up to five years have a negative and significant impact on women's labour rights. Are the two dummies significantly different from each other? Even though the ongoing conflict dummy has a stronger negative effect on women's labour rights than does the post-conflict dummy, they seem quite similar. Therefore, I test whether the two dummies are significantly different by changing the reference category from enduring peace to a post-conflict period of up to five years in an ordered probit analysis. The analysis with the ongoing conflict and enduring peace dummies is reported in table A.4.3 in appendix A.4. The coefficient of the ongoing conflict dummy is still negative but no longer significant in any of the models. In other words, the ongoing conflict dummy is not significantly different from the post-conflict dummy, which is now the reference category. The impact of an internal armed conflict might be so similar during and several years after conflict because the effects of it are rather persistent. It is likely that internal conflicts affect women's labour rights in the long run beyond the first five years after conflict termination.

To investigate the persistency of the effects, I analyse how being in a post-conflict period of up to ten years affects women's labour rights. Consequently, I control for women's labour rights ten years prior by lagging the dependent variable with ten years instead of five. The results from this ordered probit analysis can be found in table A.4.4 in appendix A.4. Both ongoing conflict and being in a post-conflict period of up to ten years have a negative and significant impact on the level of, and change in, women's labour rights. The size of the coefficients of the post-conflict dummy is approximately the same as in the initial analysis, and it is significant at the one-percent level. Measuring the effects on a change in women's labour rights during such a long period increases the risk of omitted variable bias. To test the robustness of the effects of internal conflict on women's post-conflict labour rights during a ten-year period, I estimate a pooled OLS analysis with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and country-fixed effects. Controlling for country-specific factors reduces the risk of omitted variable bias. The results are reported in table A.4.5 in appendix A.4. The coefficients of ongoing conflict and a post-conflict period of up to ten years are still negative and highly significant. This demonstrates that the effects of an internal armed conflict are persistent during the first ten years after conflict termination, and that these findings are robust when controlling for country-specific factors.

Implicitly, I make a strong assumption when measuring the post-conflict period with a dummy. The five-year dummy employed in most analyses implies that the effect of conflict is the same during the five-year period in the wake of conflict, and that there is no effect in the sixth year onwards. This is probably not that realistic, as the effects of conflict might be stronger in the immediate aftermath and then decrease over

time. To take this into account, I transform the ongoing conflict dummy with a decay function, such that it allows for continuous and decaying effects in the aftermath of conflict. Decay functions are useful to capture long-run effects of a variable when they are assumed to be diminishing over time (Dahl 2016: 257). I employ the following decay function:

$$x = 2^{-\frac{t}{\alpha}},$$

where x is the transformed conflict variable, t is the time since conflict termination (in years), and α is the half-life parameter. The decay function assumes that the effect of conflict is peaking immediately after conflict termination and that it diminishes at a constant rate over time. The half-life parameter determines the attenuation rate; that is, the time it is expected to take for the effect to be halved. I set the half-life, α , to three years – a choice I defend below. Therefore, the decay function is equal to one when the conflict is ongoing and starts to diminish the first year after conflict termination. After three years, the effect of conflict is 50 percent of the initial effect, 25 percent after six years and so on. The effect approximates zero as the time approximates infinity.

I replace the ongoing conflict and post-conflict dummies in the initial ordered probit analysis with this decay variable. Following Dahl (2016), I estimate several models with half-life parameters from two to five years to decide which parameter fits best to the data. I also include a squared term of the decay functions in some of the models to see if I can test how the effects evolve over time. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) informs me of which parameter to choose, where a lower BIC value indicates a better model fit (Stock and Watson 2015: 594). The BIC values from the different test analyses are reported in table A.4.6 in appendix A.4. I set the half-life to three years, as the model with this parameter yields the lowest BIC. The reported BIC values also indicate that a model with one decay function has a better fit than a model with two; that is, with the squared decay function in addition.¹⁴

The results from the ordered probit model with one decay function and a half-life of three years are reported in table A.4.7 in appendix A.4. The coefficient of the conflict decay is negative and significant at the one-percent level. To test whether this holds when controlling for country-specific factors, I also estimate a pooled OLS model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. It includes the same decay function, as well as country-fixed effects. The results from the fixed-effects analysis, reported in table A.4.8 in appendix A.4, show that the conflict decay still has a negative and highly significant effect on both the level of, and change in, women's labour rights. Taking into account that the effect of internal conflict decays over time and beyond a five-year period, the negative effect of internal conflict from the previous analyses with post-

¹⁴ Furthermore, in the analyses with two decay functions, the coefficients of the decay functions are negative but non-significant. This is probably due to high collinearity, as a variable is necessarily highly correlated with its squared term.

conflict dummies still holds. Thus, the findings of this study are robust to alternative measures of the post-conflict period that also include long-run effects.

Alternative Samples

Thus far, the analyses presented are of a subset of the full sample where the OECD countries are excluded, as discussed in subsection 3.2. Does the uncovered relationship between women's labour rights and internal armed conflict hold in an analysis of the complete sample? I run an ordered probit analysis equivalent to the one presented in table 1 in subsection 4.1, but this time I use the full sample including the OECD countries. The results are presented in table A.4.9 in appendix A.4. The last two models with an LDV show that the effect of an ongoing conflict on a change in women's labour rights is still negative and significant controlled for regime type, income level and women's political rights. The coefficient of a post-conflict period of up to five years is negative in all models, but significant only in the first two. When an LDV is added in models 3 and 4, the negative coefficient is only significant at the ten-percent level. Although this does not measure up to the conventional significance level in the social sciences, I consider it robust enough, given the results from the other robustness analyses. This analysis includes time-fixed and regional fixed effects. To test the relationship on the full sample with country-fixed effects, I estimate a pooled OLS regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors since they are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence. (See appendix A.4, table A.4.10). Controlled for country heterogeneity, the analysis of the full sample produces the same results as the initial analysis of the subset. The coefficient of the post-conflict period is negative and significant in all models, as is the coefficient of ongoing conflict. Thus, being in a post-conflict period of up to five years still yields a negative change in women's labour rights controlled for democracy and democracy squared, income level, and women's political rights. This result holds in the analysis of the full sample including the OECD countries with time-fixed and country-fixed effects.

Finally, I estimate the ordered probit model on the geographic regions separately to investigate whether the results differ accordingly. The geographic regions are Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas. (See tables A.2.4 and A.2.5 in appendix A.2 for lists of countries in each of the regional analyses.) I use the subset without the OECD countries and include the same controls as in the main analysis. The results are reported in tables A.4.11-A.4.15 in appendix A.4. The analyses of Asia and the Middle East show that the relationship between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years is negative and significant in the two regions. This is in line with the findings from the main analysis presented in table 1. The coefficients of the post-conflict dummy in the analyses of Europe and

Africa are negative but non-significant. In the analysis of Europe (excluding the OECD countries), this might be due to the low number of observations, which is only 250. The effects of ongoing conflict, however, are negative and significant in both analyses.

In the last geographic analysis of women's labour rights in the Americas, the coefficient of the post-conflict dummy is positive and non-significant. The mechanisms in the Americas appear to deviate from the global picture. To investigate whether influential observations or countries are driving the results, I plot the linear prediction against the standard errors of the linear prediction. The numbers in the plot (attached in appendix A.4, figure A.4.1) indicate the Gleditsch and Ward (1999) country code of the country that any given observation belongs to. The figure shows a scattered pattern with a vaguely discernible positive relationship. There are some outliers, but they do not seem to be influential observations. Excluding them from the analysis does not change the positive sign of the coefficient of the post-conflict dummy. Although some countries have more outliers than others, most notably Cuba and Bolivia, they do not seem to be influential units as the results remain the same when excluding them. Even though there are no signs of influential observations or units, figure A.4.1 shows that there is no clear positive relationship between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years in the Americas. This is not surprising given that the positive correlation is non-significant.

Nevertheless, the relationship is clearly not negative either, and the analysis of the Americas therefore weakens the robustness of the results from the main analysis. It indicates that the negative association between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period is sensitive to which countries are included in the sample. The correlation between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years is negative for Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, but only significant for the two first-mentioned regions. In the Americas, the association is positive but non-significant. One explanation might be that the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights depend on the political or religious ideology of the conflict's winning party. Different ideologies are likely to have differing consequences for women's status in general, and women's labour rights specifically. The socialist ideology of South American groups and extremist Islamism in the Middle East, for instance, have quite different views of women's role in society (Dudouet et al. 2012, Hauge 2008, Sanín and Carranza Franco 2017). This might explain the negative association between a post-conflict period and a change in women's labour rights in the Middle East, and the possibly positive association in the Americas. It is important to note that the regional analyses are without country-fixed effects. Thus, it might be that the country-specific factors are driving the differences between the regions.

4.1.2. Summary of Findings

Overall, there is a rather robust negative relationship between internal armed conflict and women's labour rights. The negative and significant correlation between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years is controlled for democracy and democracy squared, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, women's political rights, and the level of women's labour rights five years prior. It also holds when controlling for country-specific factors in fixed-effects analyses. The findings of this study are robust to alternative model specifications and operationalizations of the post-conflict period. The alternative measures are a dummy measuring a post-conflict period of up to ten years, and a conflict variable that is transformed with a decay function. Finally, I test whether the results are dependent on the countries included by analysing different samples. The analysis of the full sample including the OECD countries still yields a negative and significant relationship between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years. Although, a separate analysis of the Americas indicates that the results from the main analysis are sensitive to which countries are included in the sample.

Nevertheless, internal armed conflict seems to induce a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict compared to a situation with enduring peace. The findings of this study support the second hypothesis of this thesis that internal armed conflict negatively affects women's post-conflict labour rights. The first hypothesis that the association is positive is refuted.

4.2 Discussion

The findings of this study suggest that internal armed conflict can give rise to a critical juncture that induces change in women's labour rights. What, then, characterises the legacy of such a critical juncture? This study mainly sheds light on the first period of the legacy that Collier and Collier (1991, 2002) labelled the aftermath, measured here as a post-conflict period of up to five years. However, the analyses with alternative measures of the aftermath of conflict are indicative for how women's labour rights develop in the period following the aftermath, called the heritage. The analyses suggest that the effects of internal armed conflict are rather persistent. As the previous subsections made clear, the period following internal conflict is characterised by weakened labour rights of women. How can this post-conflict negative change in women's labour rights be explained?

In this section, I discuss this question in the light of literature presented in section 2. First, I point to the insecure and often violent conditions characterising a post-conflict society. Second, I discuss why the effects of pervasive wars on society may be outweighed by the effects of minor conflicts, and what this

means for women's labour rights. Third, I link female employment during and after conflict to the negative change in women's post conflict labour rights by shedding light on possible causal mechanisms. Finally, I discuss caveats and limitations to this study, followed by a conclusion.

First, the results from the analyses suggest that the mechanisms indicating that internal armed conflict impedes women's labour rights have a stronger impact than those indicating that it enhances them. They are most likely not mutually exclusive; hence, my findings suggesting a net negative effect do not rule out the mechanisms leading to a positive change. In other words, there might be some positive effects on women's labour rights, but the negative effects are stronger.

The post-conflict negative change in women's labour rights might be due to the insecure and often violent environment characterising many post-conflict societies, which may exacerbate women's pre-conflict inferior status in the economic sphere (Kuehnast et al. 2011b: 97). In the aftermath of conflict, women and girls are disproportionately exposed to violence. Violent behaviour might be normalised during conflict, resulting in a dangerous post-conflict situation for women (Caprioli et al. 2010: 97). Gender-based violence shifts from the public to the private sphere, and domestic violence against women rises (Couldrey and Morris 2007, La Mattina 2017, Meintjes et al. 2001, True 2012). Naturally, the threat and fear of abuse keep women from leaving their homes and participating in the economy (Kuehnast et al. 2011a: 7). On top of this, the pervasive job insecurity in a shattered post-conflict economy renders women more vulnerable to sexual harassment at work (Walsh 2001: 61). These post-conflict conditions might contribute to explaining why women's labour rights weaken in the aftermath of conflict.

4.2.1. The Effects of Wars May be Outweighed by the Effects of Minor Conflicts

Interestingly, conflict intensity does not seem to be decisive for the post-conflict change in women's labour rights. The results discussed in section 4.1 show that the effects of both ongoing minor internal conflict and ongoing internal war are negative and significant. Now, a post-war period is for practical reasons measured as a five-year period after the end of a *cumulative* war, as explained in subsection 3.1.2. A cumulative war affects the *level* of women's post-war labour rights negatively and significantly. However, the effects on a *change* in women's labour rights during a five-year post-war period are negative but not significant. Hence, the intensity of a conflict – that is, whether it is a minor conflict or war – seems to affect only the level of, and not change in, women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. Whether or not

there has been a conflict (of any intensity above 25 battle deaths a year) at all seems to be what matters for a change in women's labour rights during a five-year period after conflict termination.

Although conflict intensity matters for changes in women's labour rights *during* conflict, it does not seem to be an important factor in explaining *post-conflict* changes. Consequently, the effects of internal wars on women's post-conflict labour rights might be outweighed by the effects of minor conflicts, thereby leading to a net negative effect. Many mechanisms indicating a positive post-conflict change in women's labour rights revolve around the pervasiveness of internal armed conflict. For instance, the mechanisms observed during and after World War II in the USA and in more recent conflicts might not be present in minor conflicts. For there to be a surge in the demand of women in the labour market, a substantial number of men must be reallocated from the civilian labour supply, which is more likely in large conflicts where numerous men are called up to the military (Acemoglu et al. 2004, Brück and Vothknecht 2011). If women's employment opportunities and participation does not increase during internal conflict, one cannot expect to observe associated developments that can lead to improved labour rights, such as increased knowledge and skills, improved self-esteem, raised awareness of their labour rights, and so forth.

Furthermore, it might be that the post-conflict demographic changes brought about by some minor internal conflicts are not pervasive enough to substantially increase female employment, thereby failing to strengthen women's post-conflict labour rights. An internal conflict with few battle-related deaths, which characterises several minor conflicts, does not increase the share of female-headed household. Therefore, women stay at home in the aftermath of conflict while the returning men continue to be the breadwinner of the family (International Labour Organization 2017). The lasting effects of an altered demographic structure fail to materialize, which might partially explain why we do not observe a positive post-conflict change in women's labour rights.

Consequently, traditional gender norms and gendered division of labour are less likely to change. Importantly, if women stay in the domestic sphere during conflict, they will organise in societal networks and organisations to a much more limited extent, which has proven to be important when critical junctures occur (Collier and Collier 1991, 2002, Kaufman and Williams 2017, Kingdon 2014). A key finding in previous work is that women's organisation and involvement in societal arenas during conflict, for instance in peace or mobilisation movements, are a precondition for their ability to fight for their rights in the aftermath of conflict (Caprioli et al. 2010, Sharoni 1995, Tripp 2015). Tripp (2015: xxiii) argues that there are three causal mechanisms explaining how internal armed conflict affects women's post-conflict rights, which are linked to disruptions in gender relations, women's mobilisation in the country, and changes in international gender norms. Altered gender relations and widespread mobilisation of women are much

less likely to occur if women do not enter public realms, such as the labour market, during conflict. This may very well explain why the mechanisms leading to a positive change in women's post-conflict labour rights are outweighed by the mechanisms indicating a negative change.

4.2.2. Female Employment Might Increase During Conflict without Associated Improvements in Women's Labour Rights

The negative association between women's labour rights and a post-conflict period of up to five years may also be due to a post-conflict backlash in rights they may have gained during conflict (Handrahan 2004: 436, Kaufman and Williams 2017: 206-207, Meintjes 2001: 64). A five-year aftermath period is probably long enough to capture such developments; at least a ten-year period is. However, the negative correlation between ongoing internal conflict and women's labour rights, which is found in the analyses of both post-conflict periods of up to five and ten years, does not speak in favour of this proposition.

However, female employment might have increased during conflict without associated improvements in the labour rights of women. Legislative amendments of women's rights and enforcements of them are hardly the priority during armed conflict. In the aftermath, (often) male legislators will probably give priority to other pressing matters, such as rebuilding infrastructure and a shattered economy (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 100). In addition, it takes time for shifts in the labour market to be interpreted into strengthened labour rights for women. For that to happen, women need to be organised before the transition to peace begins to be able to negotiate and champion for better terms when the time comes (Caprioli et al. 2010: 97). It would have been interesting to test the effects of an interaction between a post-conflict period and the extent to which functioning women's organisations exist in a post-conflict society. To the best of my knowledge, global data on the level of women's organisations in a country are unfortunately not available.¹⁵

Women who did take on paid employment during conflict might have been forced to return to their domestic roles or to shift to the informal sector once the conflict ended, as several case studies have demonstrated (Kumar 2001a: 20, Manchanda 2001: 100). They might have lost their jobs to returning male combatants, or simply because it is not seen as proper for women to work when it is no longer strictly necessary. The transition to peace often brings with it an urge to return to pre-conflict normality, characterised by traditional gender norms in many countries. Furthermore, male employment tends to be prioritized by employers and public authorities because of the 'male breadwinner bias' (Brück and

¹⁵ I have only come across subnational data. See e.g. Kumar (ed.) (2001a) and Mageza-Barthel (2015).

Vothknecht 2011: 101). In an economy devastated by the atrocities of armed conflict, the competition in the labour market is often harsh at the expense of women's rights and employment opportunities. Widows or women who lose their jobs in the formal sector are forced to the informal sector to earn a living (Kumar 2001a: 20). The number of women working in the informal sector surges in the aftermath of conflict.

Disruptions in gender relations and women's mobilization in society are two important causal factors explaining how internal conflict affects women's post-conflict rights, as discussed in the previous subsection (Tripp 2015). If female employment drops in the aftermath of conflict and women return to the domestic sphere, a change in women's post-conflict labour rights are less likely to occur. This is because altered gendered division of labour and changes in gender norms do not extend to the post-conflict period. Furthermore, in the absence of roles and responsibilities in the public arenas, women will organize in organizations and societal networks to a much more limited extent. This is an important argument, as women's mobilization at critical moments in time is a precondition for the ability to fight for improvements in their labour rights. These factors can contribute to explaining why we observe a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict.

4.2.3. Caveats and Limitations

The findings of this study are rather robust, as discussed in subsection 4.1.1. However, it is important to acknowledge the caveats and limitations of the study, which I elaborate on in this subsection.

First, I must underscore that I have only uncovered correlations, not causality. That is, my study demonstrates that internal armed conflict is negatively associated with women's labour rights, but I cannot claim that conflict is the cause and women's labour rights are the effect. Due to the theoretical expectations discussed in section 2, it seems likely that the primary causal direction is that internal armed conflict affects women's labour rights, and not the other way around. However, several studies have demonstrated that unequal gender relations in a society increases the risk of conflict outbreak (Dahlum and Wig 2018, Forsberg and Olsson 2016, Melander 2005b). Thus, if the labour rights of women are weak, especially compared to men's labour rights, it might be a contributing factor leading to internal conflict. Nevertheless, I am primarily analysing women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict, thus mitigating problems with reversed causality due to time sequencing.

Furthermore, I cannot rule out the possibility that the uncovered correlation is spurious. If there is a confounding variable affecting both internal armed conflict and women's labour rights that is not controlled for in the analysis, it might generate a false positive result. For example, the level of social

inequality in a country, e.g. between men and women or different ethnic groups, might have an impact on both the risk of internal armed conflict as well as the level of women's labour rights (Dahlum and Wig 2018, Østby 2008). Cultural norms, especially masculine ideals, are another example of an omitted variable that possibly confounds the relationship between internal conflict and women's labour rights. The caveat of omitted variable bias is almost impossible to avoid completely and must be considered.

Another limitation concerns the data coverage of the study. The time coverage is 1981-2011, which is truncated with five years when an LDV is added to the model. Consequently, this study only uncovers the relationship between internal armed conflict and women's labour rights during the mentioned time-span, while variations before 1981 and after 2011 are left out. For instance, if there are mechanisms that are only relevant to the developments after the Arab Spring, they are not captured here. Ideally, I would have analysed a period from 1946 up until last year, which is not possible because of data availability of the dependent variable.

When it comes to the spatial coverage, a total of 128 countries are included in most of the analyses. A list of the countries is attached in appendix A.2, table A.2.1. Importantly, the OECD countries are excluded from the sample, as discussed in subsection 3.2. Consequently, I mostly analyse the effects of internal conflict on women's labour rights in non-OECD – or developing – countries. The analyses of the full sample including the OECD countries are reported in tables A.4.9 and A.4.10 and discussed in subsection 4.1.1. The results from the main analysis are by and large confirmed, which renders this point less of a concern. Although, the robustness analysis of the Americas separately indicate that the results are somewhat sensitive to the countries included in the sample. This sensitivity might be due to causal heterogeneity, meaning that the effect may operate differently in various contexts. It might also be a by-product of the relatively short time-series and/or that there are relatively few observations with conflict.

Another concern is that the informal economy is not included in the analysis. Women's situation and the conditions in the informal sector are extremely difficult to measure as it is informal and not captured in official statistics (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 102). Many women, particularly in developing countries, rely on activities in the informal sector, such as petty trade and small-scale businesses, which have proven to be of great importance to women's livelihoods (Fapohunda 2012: 35, Sørensen 1998: v). In all developing countries except for North African countries, the proportion of women in informal employment is greater than the proportion of men (Chen et al. 2005: 6). Informal employment constitutes a large share of female employment which is not captured in my study. At this point, it is not possible to include it in a global statistical analysis due to the informal nature and the lack of statistical data.

Finally, I analyse women's labour rights relying on cross-national aggregated data at the level of the 'country-year'. While this is useful for assessing general patterns, as is the aim of this study, it entails limitations, notably: "Measuring the effect of conflict using country-level indicators will [...] in many cases underestimate the local effect of conflict, and overestimate the effect on the median citizen" (Gates et al. 2012: 1715). A conflict does not impact all individuals in a country comparably, and my study does not capture variations in women's labour rights or the prevalence of conflict-related activities within a country. On average, conflict countries are larger than non-conflict countries, and conflicts are often partly local (Gates et al. 2012, Raleigh et al. 2010). For instance, in an internal conflict concerning a specific territory, such as the conflict over Kurdistan in Turkey (among other countries), the effects of conflict might be limited to that specific region. Unfortunately, heterogeneity within a country is not accounted for in analyses at the country level, such as this one.

Concluding remarks are provided in the following section.

5 Conclusion

How does internal armed conflict affect women's post-conflict labour rights? In this thesis, I have discussed how the existing literature that responds to this question is divided as to whether internal conflict enhances or impedes women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict.

Let me provide a brief summary of the discussion: On the one hand, conflict has the potential to induce social upheavals with positive ripple effects for women. Pervasive conflicts with mass mobilisation of men to the military create a surge in the demand of women in the labour market. Not only does female employment typically increase in such situations, the gendered division of labour is also altered (Justino 2012a, Kumar 2001a). Women take on new roles and responsibilities, acquire new knowledge and skills and become more aware of their rights. Furthermore, conflicts with a high (male) death toll alter the demographic composition of a post-conflict society. A higher share of female-headed households leads to increased female employment and participation in the public sphere (International Labour Organization 2017, Manchanda 2001). This has the potential to change social relations and gender norms, thereby improving women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict.

On the other hand, several studies report a backlash in women's newfound rights in the aftermath of conflict (Brück and Vothknecht 2011, Kaufman and Williams 2017, Meintjes et al. 2001). Efforts to rebuild the pre-conflict social order often result in the return to traditional gender norms. Women are pressured to resume their pre-conflict domestic roles as men reclaim positions they perceive as rightfully theirs. Furthermore, the high levels of violence and insecurity characterising a post-conflict society seem to exacerbate women's inferior pre-conflict status (Kaufman and Williams 2017). In the transition from conflict to peace, gender-based violence predominantly relocates from the public to the private sphere with increased levels of domestic violence against women (La Mattina 2017, True 2012). Women's disproportionate exposure to violence inhibits female participation in the economy.

The mechanisms indicating that internal conflict enhances women's labour rights versus those indicating that it impedes them are both plausible and might manifest themselves at the same time. To investigate whether the net effect is positive or negative, I have conducted statistical analyses of 128 countries in the 1981-2011 period. To my knowledge, this is the first statistical investigation of how internal armed conflict affects women's post-conflict labour rights. The large-n quantitative studies that do exist investigate the reversed causal relationship – that is, how women's situation or gender equality affects (the risk of) conflict, or, alternatively, the effects of internal conflict on women's *political* empowerment (Bakken 2017, Caprioli 2005, Dahlum and Wig 2018, Forsberg and Olsson 2016).

The findings of this study indicate that internal armed conflict is associated with a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. This relationship holds when controlling for democracy and democracy squared, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, women's political rights, and the level of women's labour rights five years prior. It also holds when controlling for country-specific factors in fixed-effects analyses. The findings are robust to alternative model specifications and operationalizations of the post-conflict period. In addition to the dummy measuring a post-conflict period of up to five years, I employed a ten-year dummy and a conflict variable transformed with a decay function. They all render a negative and significant result. However, the findings are somewhat sensitive to the countries included in the sample. This sensitivity might be due to causal heterogeneity – that is, the effect may operate differently in various contexts – but it might also be a by-product of the relatively short time-series or that there are relatively few observations with conflict. Overall, however, internal armed conflict seems to induce a net negative change in women's post-conflict labour rights compared to a situation with enduring peace.

Several causal mechanisms can contribute to explaining the post-conflict negative change in women's labour rights. Due to the insecure and often violent environment characterising many post-conflict societies, women's already inferior status in the economic sphere may be exacerbated in the aftermath of conflict (Kuehnast et al. 2011b). Furthermore, several mechanisms that indicate a positive post-conflict change in women's labour rights revolve around the pervasiveness of internal armed conflict. The effects of internal wars on women's labour rights might be outweighed by the effects of minor conflicts, thereby leading to a net negative effect. For example, some minor internal conflicts with relatively few battle deaths do not considerably reduce the male to female ratio. The demographic changes are thus not pervasive enough to substantially increase female employment through a larger share of female-headed households, thereby failing to strengthen women's post-conflict labour rights. If women take on active roles in the public sphere during conflict but return to the home in the aftermath, gender norms are less likely to change, and they organize in societal networks to a more limited extent. Women's mobilization in society has proven to be a precondition for their ability to fight for improvements in their labour rights (Tripp 2015).

These are some factors that can contribute to explaining why we observe a negative change in women's labour rights in the aftermath of conflict. Importantly, these findings do not rule out mechanisms leading to a positive change, which might very well be present. They only suggest that the mechanisms indicating that internal armed conflict impedes women's labour rights have a stronger impact than those indicating that it enhances them.

5.1 Implications and Future Research

The findings of this study should be of interest to actors working with post-conflict reconstruction and women's economic empowerment. As section 2.3 made clear, several case studies find positive effects of internal armed conflict on women's post-conflict economic empowerment (Brück and Vothknecht 2011, Calderón et al. 2011, Justino 2012a, Kumar 2001a, Manchanda 2001, Meintjes 2001). However, this study demonstrates that the general trend is that internal conflict negatively affects women's post-conflict labour rights. The differing findings generate new questions, particularly: What are the significant differences between the cases with improvements in women's post-conflict labour rights and the more generic cases where there is a negative change? The international community needs this knowledge to be able to contribute to accommodating benign mechanisms through which women's labour rights improve. There are indications that women's mobilization in society is key (Caprioli et al. 2010, Tripp 2015). If this is confirmed, supporting local women's organisations during and after conflict can prove to be crucial to strengthen women's labour rights.

Thus, there is a need for comparative case studies to uncover the specific mechanisms through which internal conflict strengthens or weakens women's labour rights. More analysis is needed at the subnational level, but this often presupposes new data collection as gender-disaggregated data from conflict-affected countries are largely unavailable (Brück and Vothknecht 2011: 97). Qualitative case studies can dig deeper into these mechanisms than large-n statistical investigations, such as this one, allow. Although causal mechanisms uncovered in case studies do not make a statistical correlation more valid or prove that it is in fact causal, they could provide a possible explanation of *how* and *why* internal conflict relate to women's labour rights (Gallagher 2013: 182).

George and Bennett (2005: 214) hold that process tracing is a particularly suitable case study design with which to complement large-n statistical analyses. Process-tracing case studies would allow me to "examine empirically the alternative causal mechanisms associated with observed patterns of covariation" and can be "useful in the empirical analysis of various forms of complex causation," for example in an analysis of critical junctures (Levy 2008: 11-12). This is because the aim of process tracing is to uncover the chronological unfolding of events within their contexts, the interaction between causal factors, and the detailed aspects of the outcome of interest. Such a design requires a "full "storyline" with *density* and *depth* and an "authentic" and fine-grained "picture" of events within their contexts" (Blatter and Blume 2008: 319).

Ideally, I would have employed a multi-method research design, triangulating the statistical analysis with one or a few (process-tracing) case studies. A complementing small-N study at the sub-national or individual level, for instance with surveys or semi-structured interviews, would allow me to tap into how internal conflict affects women's situation 'on the ground'. Furthermore, it would provide me with 'thicker' information about each unit compared to a broad statistical study (Blatter and Blume 2008: 315, Gallagher 2013: 183, Gerring 2007: 37-38). Hence, I could possibly discover the causal mechanisms leading to negative or positive changes in women's post-conflict labour rights. Recognizing the resource-limitations of a master's thesis, I leave it to future studies of mine or others to conduct such supplementing case studies.

Furthermore, the trilateral relationship between internal conflict and the political rights and labour rights of women is complex and under-researched, as discussed in subsection 3.1.3. The direction of causality (if any) between the three variables is an important question that needs thorough theoretical and empirical investigation. The findings of this study suggest that women's political rights are not a mediator in the association between internal conflict and women's labour rights, but a more stringent analysis of this complex relationship can, and should, be done.

Finally, informal employment constitutes a significant share of female employment that is not captured in my study. At this point, it is not possible to include it in a statistical analysis due to lack of data. How internal conflict impacts the informal sector and, specifically, the prevalence and conditions of female employment therein should be explored in future work.

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Appendices

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Standard dev.	Min	Max
Democracy	3881	0,37	0,24	0,01	0,93
ln(GDP per capita)	3644	7,66	1,28	4,88	11,61

Table A.1.2: Frequency Distribution of Women's Labour Rights and Women's Political Rights

Categories	Women's Labour Rights	Women's Political Rights
0	398	236
1	2428	819
2	741	2458
3	51	149
Total	3618	3662

Table A.1.3: Frequency Distributions of Ongoing Conflict and Post-Conflict Period among the Categories of Women's Labour Rights

Women's Labour Rights Categories	Ongoing Conflict			Post-Conflict Period		
	0	1	Total	0	1	Total
0	260	138	398	333	65	398
1	1924	504	2428	2124	304	2428
2	675	66	741	693	48	741
3	51	0	51	48	3	51
Total	2910	708	3618	3198	420	3618

Table A.1.4: Frequency Distributions of Ongoing Conflict, Ongoing War, and Ongoing Cumulative War

Categories	Ongoing Conflict	Ongoing War	Cumulative War
0	3247	3776	3393
1	804	265	648
Total	4041	4041	4041

Table A.1.5: Frequency Distributions of Post-Conflict Period and Post-War Period

Categories	Post-Conflict Period	Post-War Period
0	3565	3799
1	476	242
Total	4041	4041

Figure A.1.1: Stability and Change in the Labour Rights and Political Rights of Women



Source: Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards and K. Chad Clay (2013) *Human Rights in 2011: The CIRI Report*. Available at: <http://www.humanrightsdata.com/2013/08/human-rights-in-2011-ciri-report.html> (Accessed: 13.03.2015).

Table A.1.6: Data Sources

Variable	Source
Women's labour rights	CIRI Human Rights Dataset: http://www.humanrightsdata.com
Conflict variables	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/#d4
Democracy	V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v8: https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-8/
GDP per capita	World Development Indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD
Women's political rights	CIRI Human Rights Dataset: http://www.humanrightsdata.com

A.2 Lists of Countries

Table A.2.1: List of Countries in the Analysis

Countries	Frequency	Countries	Frequency
Afghanistan	6	Laos	25
Albania	26	Lebanon	6
Algeria	22	Lesotho	23
Angola	14	Liberia	11
Argentina	24	Libya	12
Armenia	15	Macedonia (FYR)	14
Azerbaijan	15	Madagascar	26
Bahrain	26	Malawi	26
Bangladesh	26	Malaysia	25
Barbados	5	Maldives	5
Belarus (Byelorussia)	15	Mali	25
Benin	26	Mauritania	26
Bhutan	26	Mauritius	26
Bolivia	24	Moldova	15
Bosnia-Herzegovina	6	Mongolia	24
Botswana	25	Montenegro	1
Brazil	26	Morocco	26
Bulgaria	26	Mozambique	26
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	26	Myanmar (Burma)	24
Burundi	20	Namibia	11
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	17	Nepal	26
Cameroon	16	Nicaragua	24
Cape Verde	5	Niger	26
Central African Republic	26	Nigeria	26
Chad	19	Oman	26
China	26	Pakistan	26
Colombia	26	Panama	26
Comoros	5	Papua New Guinea	26
Congo	26	Paraguay	26
Congo, Democratic Republic of	12	Peru	26
Costa Rica	26	Philippines	24
Cote D'Ivoire	26	Qatar	5
Croatia	15	Rumania	22
Cuba	24	Russia (Soviet Union)	23
Cyprus	26	Rwanda	26
Djibouti	1	Saudi Arabia	26
Dominican Republic	26	Senegal	26
East Timor	4	Serbia	1
Ecuador	26	Sierra Leone	18

Egypt	26	Singapore	26
El Salvador	26	Solomon Islands	5
Equatorial Guinea	4	South Africa	24
Eritrea	14	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	26
Ethiopia	23	Sudan	25
Fiji	26	Surinam	5
Gabon	26	Swaziland	26
Gambia	26	Tajikistan	14
Georgia	15	Tanzania/Tanganyika	21
Ghana	24	Thailand	26
Guatemala	24	Togo	26
Guinea	26	Trinidad and Tobago	26
Guinea-Bissau	22	Tunisia	26
Guyana	26	Turkmenistan	15
Haiti	24	Uganda	14
Honduras	26	Ukraine	15
India	24	United Arab Emirates	26
Indonesia	26	Uruguay	26
Iran (Persia)	24	Uzbekistan	15
Iraq	22	Venezuela	26
Jamaica	26	Vietnam, Democratic Republic of	22
Jordan	26	Yemen (Arab Republic of)	22
Kazakhstan	15	Zambia	26
Kenya	26	Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	22
Kuwait	16		
Kyrgyz Republic	15	Total	2,640

Table A.2.2: List of Conflict Countries in the Analysis

Afghanistan	Guinea	Panama
Algeria	Guinea-Bissau	Papua New Guinea
Angola	Haiti	Paraguay
Azerbaijan	India	Peru
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Philippines
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Iran (Persia)	Russia (Soviet Union)
Burundi	Iraq	Rwanda
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Laos	Senegal
Central African Republic	Liberia	Sierra Leone
Chad	Libya	South Africa
China	Macedonia (FYR)	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Colombia	Mali	Sudan
Congo	Mauritania	Tajikistan
Congo, DR	Morocco	Thailand
Cote D'Ivoire	Mozambique	Togo
Egypt	Myanmar (Burma)	Trinidad and Tobago
El Salvador	Nepal	Uganda
Eritrea	Nicaragua	Uzbekistan
Ethiopia	Niger	Venezuela
Georgia	Nigeria	Yemen (Arab Republic of)
Guatemala	Pakistan	

Table A.2.3: List of Post-Conflict Countries in the Analysis

Angola	Guatemala	Pakistan
Azerbaijan	Guinea	Panama
Bangladesh	Guinea-Bissau	Papua New Guinea
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Haiti	Paraguay
Burundi	Indonesia	Peru
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Iran (Persia)	Rumania
Cameroon	Iraq	Russia (Soviet Union)
Central African Republic	Kenya	Rwanda
Chad	Laos	Senegal
China	Lesotho	Sierra Leone
Congo	Liberia	South Africa
Congo, DR	Macedonia (FYR)	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Cote D'Ivoire	Malaysia	Tajikistan
Croatia	Mali	Thailand
Egypt	Moldova	Togo
El Salvador	Morocco	Trinidad and Tobago
Eritrea	Mozambique	Uganda
Ethiopia	Nepal	Uzbekistan
Gambia	Nicaragua	Venezuela
Georgia	Niger	Yemen (Arab Republic of)
Ghana	Nigeria	

Table A.2.4: List of Countries in the Analyses of the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East

The Americas	Europe	The Middle East
Argentina	Albania	Bahrain
Barbados	Armenia	Egypt
Bolivia	Azerbaijan	Iran (Persia)
Brazil	Belarus (Byelorussia)	Iraq
Colombia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jordan
Costa Rica	Bulgaria	Kuwait
Cuba	Croatia	Lebanon
Dominican Republic	Cyprus	Oman
Ecuador	Georgia	Qatar
El Salvador	Macedonia (FYR)	Saudi Arabia
Guatemala	Moldova	United Arab Emirates
Guyana	Montenegro	Yemen (Arab Republic of)
Haiti	Rumania	
Honduras	Russia (Soviet Union)	
Jamaica	Serbia	
Nicaragua	Ukraine	
Panama		
Paraguay		
Peru		
Surinam		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Table A.2.5: List of Countries in the Analyses of Asia and Africa

Asia	Africa	Africa (cont.)
Afghanistan	Algeria	Senegal
Bangladesh	Angola	Sierra Leone
Bhutan	Benin	South Africa
Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Botswana	Sudan
China	Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Swaziland
East Timor	Burundi	Tanzania/Tanganyika
Fiji	Cameroon	Togo
India	Cape Verde	Tunisia
Indonesia	Central African Republic	Uganda
Kazakhstan	Chad	Zambia
Kyrgyz Republic	Comoros	Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
Laos	Congo	
Malaysia	Congo, DR	
Maldives	Cote D'Ivoire	
Mongolia	Djibouti	
Myanmar (Burma)	Equatorial Guinea	
Nepal	Eritrea	
Pakistan	Ethiopia	
Papua New Guinea	Gabon	
Philippines	Gambia	
Singapore	Ghana	
Solomon Islands	Guinea	
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	Guinea-Bissau	
Tajikistan	Kenya	
Thailand	Lesotho	
Turkmenistan	Liberia	
Uzbekistan	Libya	
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of	Madagascar	
	Malawi	
	Mali	
	Mauritania	
	Mauritius	
	Morocco	
	Mozambique	
	Namibia	
	Niger	
	Nigeria	
	Rwanda	

A.3 Diagnostics


Table A.3.1: Bivariate Correlation Analysis of All Variables

Variables	Women's labour rights	Post-conflict period	Ongoing conflict	Democracy	ln(GDP per capita)	Women's political rights
Women's labour rights	1,00					
Post-conflict period	-0,09	1,00				
Ongoing conflict	-0,17	-0,19	1,00			
Democracy	0,20	-0,03	-0,13	1,00		
ln(GDP per capita)	0,18	-0,12	-0,22	0,21	1,00	
Women's political rights	0,19	0,02	-0,04	0,37	-0,10	1,00

Table A.3.2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of the Independent Variables

Variable	VIF	VIF ²	Tolerance	R ²	Eigenvalue
Post-conflict period	1,07	1,03	0,9361	0,0639	4,0634
Ongoing conflict	1,12	1,06	0,8946	0,1054	1,0005
Democracy	1,25	1,12	0,8006	0,1994	0,6647
ln(GDP per capita)	1,16	1,08	0,8588	0,1412	0,1739
Women's political rights	1,20	1,10	0,8323	0,1677	0,0876
Mean VIF	1,16				

Figure A.3.1: The Density Distribution of the Standard Errors of the Prediction and the Normal Density Curve



A.4 Robustness Tests

Table A.4.1: Women's Labour Rights in OECD Countries, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.004 (0.344)	0.092 (0.316)	0.226 (0.342)	0.249 (0.323)
Ongoing conflict dummy	0.346 (0.382)	0.562 (0.385)	0.594 (0.380)	0.711* (0.403)
Democracy	-8.488*** (3.276)	-7.526** (3.085)	-3.781 (3.478)	-2.534 (3.506)
Democracy ²	7.832*** (2.855)	6.994*** (2.700)	3.387 (3.062)	2.364 (2.999)
ln(GDP pc)	0.930*** (0.226)	0.811*** (0.239)	0.798*** (0.195)	0.728*** (0.203)
Women's political rights		0.533*** (0.187)		0.376** (0.157)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.916*** (0.141)	0.873*** (0.141)
Constant cut1	4.370** (2.047)	4.242** (2.058)	5.134*** (1.901)	5.379*** (1.885)
Constant cut2	6.995*** (2.065)	6.955*** (2.058)	7.896*** (1.931)	8.178*** (1.924)
Constant cut3	9.524*** (2.117)	9.538*** (2.109)	10.606*** (2.002)	10.920*** (1.990)
Pseudo R ²	0.2349	0.2507	0.2917	0.2991
Countries	36	36	36	36
Observations	995	995	839	839

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.2: Women's Post-Conflict Labour Rights, Ongoing Minor Conflict, and Ongoing War, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.383*** (0.123)	-0.396*** (0.125)	-0.328*** (0.124)	-0.343*** (0.125)
Ongoing minor conflict dummy	-0.468*** (0.132)	-0.466*** (0.131)	-0.466*** (0.102)	-0.469*** (0.102)
Ongoing war dummy	-0.518*** (0.172)	-0.544*** (0.158)	-0.552*** (0.130)	-0.573*** (0.120)
Democracy	-1.725 (1.140)	-2.157* (1.101)	-1.771* (0.923)	-2.059** (0.895)
Democracy^2	2.194* (1.270)	2.522** (1.225)	2.032** (0.971)	2.249** (0.942)
ln(GDP pc)	0.178*** (0.054)	0.193*** (0.054)	0.170*** (0.042)	0.177*** (0.043)
Women's political rights		0.390*** (0.088)		0.243*** (0.079)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.976*** (0.094)	0.955*** (0.092)
Constant cut1	-0.516 (0.511)	0.018 (0.541)	-0.244 (0.452)	0.090 (0.462)
Constant cut2	1.852*** (0.527)	2.437*** (0.556)	2.399*** (0.464)	2.756*** (0.475)
Constant cut3	3.563*** (0.574)	4.176*** (0.599)	4.373*** (0.513)	4.740*** (0.529)
Pseudo R^2	0.1254	0.1404	0.2266	0.2316
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.3: Women’s Labour Rights, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit with Different Reference Category

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.100 (0.130)	-0.093 (0.128)	-0.160 (0.121)	-0.153 (0.119)
Enduring peace dummy	0.383*** (0.123)	0.397*** (0.125)	0.328*** (0.124)	0.343*** (0.125)
Democracy	-1.717 (1.142)	-2.144* (1.104)	-1.763* (0.924)	-2.048** (0.897)
Democracy^2	2.187* (1.271)	2.510** (1.227)	2.024** (0.972)	2.239** (0.943)
ln(GDP pc)	0.178*** (0.054)	0.193*** (0.054)	0.169*** (0.042)	0.176*** (0.043)
Women’s political rights		0.390*** (0.088)		0.242*** (0.079)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.977*** (0.094)	0.957*** (0.092)
Constant cut1	-0.131 (0.498)	0.417 (0.530)	0.087 (0.444)	0.434 (0.452)
Constant cut2	2.237*** (0.509)	2.835*** (0.540)	2.729*** (0.453)	3.099*** (0.462)
Constant cut3	3.948*** (0.553)	4.575*** (0.581)	4.703*** (0.502)	5.084*** (0.516)
Pseudo R^2	0.1253	0.1403	0.2265	0.2315
Countries	129	129	128	128
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,652	2,640

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.4: Women's Post-Conflict Labour Rights (10 Years), 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (10)	-0.371*** (0.112)	-0.374*** (0.113)	-0.385*** (0.136)	-0.399*** (0.137)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.525*** (0.127)	-0.530*** (0.123)	-0.545*** (0.128)	-0.554*** (0.126)
Democracy	-1.618 (1.137)	-2.039* (1.100)	-2.336* (1.237)	-2.673** (1.209)
Democracy^2	2.098* (1.266)	2.418** (1.223)	2.595** (1.278)	2.844** (1.245)
ln(GDP pc)	0.169*** (0.054)	0.184*** (0.055)	0.196*** (0.059)	0.197*** (0.058)
Women's political rights		0.385*** (0.087)		0.258** (0.108)
Lagged dependent variable (10)			0.588*** (0.109)	0.573*** (0.107)
Constant cut1	-0.608 (0.520)	-0.076 (0.552)	-0.166 (0.625)	0.066 (0.618)
Constant cut2	1.767*** (0.538)	2.349*** (0.569)	2.337*** (0.633)	2.592*** (0.629)
Constant cut3	3.481*** (0.584)	4.091*** (0.612)	4.058*** (0.697)	4.328*** (0.695)
Pseudo R^2	0,1274	0,142	0,1822	0,1879
Countries	129	129	124	124
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,071	2,062

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.5: Women's Post-Conflict Labour Rights (10 Years), 1981-2011. OLS with Driscoll-Kraay SE

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (10)	-0.118*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.023)	-0.151*** (0.031)	-0.154*** (0.029)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.148*** (0.025)	-0.145*** (0.023)	-0.129*** (0.037)	-0.133*** (0.036)
Democracy	-0.061 (0.315)	-0.326 (0.329)	0.985* (0.568)	0.724 (0.649)
Democracy^2	0.034 (0.329)	0.281 (0.338)	-1.071* (0.593)	-0.825 (0.663)
ln(GDP pc)	0.185*** (0.055)	0.197*** (0.058)	0.253*** (0.084)	0.272*** (0.081)
Women's political rights		0.125*** (0.024)		0.062 (0.037)
Lagged dependent variable (10)			-0.064** (0.025)	-0.066*** (0.023)
Constant	-0.184 (0.420)	-0.502 (0.438)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Within R^2	0,0553	0,067	0,0658	0,0675
Countries	129	129	124	124
Observations	3,280	3,268	2,071	2,062

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and country-fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.6: BIC Values of the Ordered Probit Model with Decay Functions

	$\alpha = 2$	$\alpha = 3$	$\alpha = 4$	$\alpha = 5$
Full model	2662.771	2661.79	2662.121	2662.88
Full model with decay ²	2669.181	2669.165	2669.444	2669.418

Table A.4.7: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit with Decay Function

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Conflict decay, $\alpha = 3$	-0.680** (0.276)	-0.700** (0.287)	-0.653*** (0.242)	-0.684*** (0.250)
Ongoing conflict dummy	0.231 (0.201)	0.238 (0.207)	0.157 (0.184)	0.175 (0.188)
Democracy	-1.880 (1.502)	-2.466* (1.438)	-1.564 (1.189)	-2.100* (1.123)
Democracy ²	2.226 (1.720)	2.597 (1.646)	1.672 (1.278)	2.029* (1.218)
ln(GDP pc)	0.137* (0.082)	0.136* (0.082)	0.120* (0.065)	0.116* (0.064)
Women's political rights		0.519*** (0.121)		0.396*** (0.095)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			1.008*** (0.107)	0.974*** (0.101)
Constant cut1	-1.144 (0.787)	-0.672 (0.848)	-0.756 (0.660)	-0.385 (0.680)
Constant cut2	1.179 (0.815)	1.735** (0.877)	1.877*** (0.687)	2.301*** (0.709)
Constant cut3	2.792*** (0.848)	3.407*** (0.903)	3.777*** (0.729)	4.241*** (0.752)
Pseudo R ²	0.1363	0.1628	0.2414	0.2547
BIC	3588.557	3489.147	2702.694	2661.79
Countries	88	88	88	88
Observations	2,101	2,095	1,774	1,768

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.8: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011. OLS with Driscoll-Kraay SE & Decay F.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Conflict decay, $\alpha = 3$	-0.206*** (0.062)	-0.214*** (0.063)	-0.195*** (0.060)	-0.197*** (0.061)
Ongoing conflict dummy	0.046 (0.050)	0.052 (0.052)	0.050 (0.049)	0.047 (0.050)
Democracy	-0.141 (0.391)	-0.536 (0.408)	0.196 (0.524)	-0.120 (0.527)
Democracy ²	0.070 (0.421)	0.375 (0.426)	-0.340 (0.556)	-0.070 (0.545)
ln(GDP pc)	0.099* (0.052)	0.116** (0.050)	0.109 (0.070)	0.120* (0.066)
Women's political rights		0.162*** (0.035)		0.112*** (0.034)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.108** (0.046)	0.102** (0.044)
Constant	0.419 (0.384)	0.000 (0.000)	0.069 (0.516)	-0.110 (0.498)
Within R ²	0.0588	0.0787	0.0679	0.0766
Countries	88	88	88	88
Observations	2,101	2,095	1,774	1,768

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and country-fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.9: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011, incl. OECD. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.282** (0.113)	-0.297*** (0.115)	-0.210* (0.117)	-0.229* (0.118)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.195 (0.141)	-0.221 (0.135)	-0.236** (0.111)	-0.258** (0.109)
Democracy	-2.409** (1.109)	-2.791*** (1.025)	-1.935** (0.930)	-2.233** (0.871)
Democracy ²	3.451*** (1.081)	3.561*** (1.032)	2.526*** (0.897)	2.667*** (0.853)
ln(GDP pc)	0.246*** (0.056)	0.246*** (0.056)	0.223*** (0.043)	0.222*** (0.044)
Women's political rights		0.481*** (0.081)		0.294*** (0.069)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			1.032*** (0.085)	0.993*** (0.081)
Constant cut1	-0.065 (0.563)	0.479 (0.596)	0.424 (0.470)	0.752 (0.482)
Constant cut2	2.223*** (0.567)	2.828*** (0.605)	2.994*** (0.477)	3.343*** (0.491)
Constant cut3	4.132*** (0.602)	4.804*** (0.642)	5.183*** (0.514)	5.565*** (0.531)
Pseudo R ²	0.2239	0.2433	0.3233	0.3293
Countries	165	165	164	164
Observations	4,275	4,263	3,491	3,479

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.10: Women's Labour Rights, 1981-2011, incl. OECD. OLS with Driscoll-Kraay SE

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.077*** (0.025)	-0.066** (0.028)	-0.067** (0.028)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.091*** (0.027)	-0.086*** (0.026)	-0.080*** (0.028)	-0.081*** (0.027)
Democracy	-0.735* (0.399)	-0.954** (0.416)	-0.331 (0.455)	-0.522 (0.458)
Democracy^2	0.608 (0.427)	0.813* (0.444)	0.178 (0.474)	0.359 (0.478)
ln(GDP pc)	0.154*** (0.046)	0.162*** (0.048)	0.211*** (0.049)	0.219*** (0.049)
Women's political rights		0.113*** (0.025)		0.075** (0.028)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.104** (0.043)	0.101** (0.043)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	-0.076 (0.366)	-0.543 (0.387)	-0.683* (0.399)
Within R^2	0,0373	0,0461	0,0474	0,0512
Countries	165	165	164	164
Observations	4,275	4,263	3,491	3,479

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.11: Women's Labour Rights in Asia, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.759*** (0.285)	-0.773*** (0.284)	-0.719*** (0.270)	-0.728*** (0.274)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.754*** (0.232)	-0.748*** (0.243)	-0.860*** (0.169)	-0.839*** (0.183)
Democracy	-3.203 (2.477)	-3.414 (2.553)	-2.457 (1.825)	-2.629 (1.855)
Democracy ²	4.418 (3.366)	4.565 (3.444)	3.619 (2.413)	3.682 (2.425)
ln(GDP pc)	0.239** (0.099)	0.238** (0.100)	0.138** (0.058)	0.135** (0.062)
Women's political rights		0.220 (0.145)		0.228* (0.130)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			1.084*** (0.195)	1.115*** (0.196)
Constant cut1	-0.776 (0.735)	-0.534 (0.848)	-0.632 (0.594)	-0.326 (0.697)
Constant cut2	1.639** (0.735)	1.908** (0.856)	2.237*** (0.622)	2.579*** (0.726)
Constant cut3	3.358*** (0.818)	3.628*** (0.951)	4.377*** (0.790)	4.724*** (0.906)
Pseudo R ²	0.1147	0.1205	0.2609	0.2662
Countries	28	28	28	28
Observations	699	699	565	565

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.12: Women's Labour Rights in the Middle East, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-1.443*** (0.409)	-1.734*** (0.365)	-1.572*** (0.347)	-1.803*** (0.328)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.629 (0.892)	-1.039* (0.623)	-0.424 (0.532)	-0.768* (0.463)
Democracy	4.412 (7.927)	1.180 (6.090)	4.353 (4.544)	2.663 (4.097)
Democracy^2	-11.935 (13.829)	-4.761 (10.782)	-13.001 (8.323)	-9.229 (7.741)
ln(GDP pc)	-0.008 (0.206)	0.311** (0.140)	0.101 (0.133)	0.250** (0.110)
Women's political rights		1.192*** (0.269)		0.666*** (0.256)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			1.732*** (0.299)	1.517*** (0.281)
Constant cut1	-0.050 (2.481)	3.147* (1.782)	0.051 (1.680)	1.421 (1.396)
Constant cut2	1.968 (2.431)	5.516*** (1.623)	3.061* (1.605)	4.557*** (1.302)
Pseudo R^2	0,1208	0,2461	0,3697	0,3987
Countries	12	12	12	12
Observations	305	305	251	251

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.13: Women's Labour Rights in Europe, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.275 (0.256)	-0.303 (0.266)	-0.254 (0.221)	-0.239 (0.238)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.808** (0.330)	-0.809** (0.326)	-0.649** (0.321)	-0.641** (0.317)
Democracy	0.857 (2.157)	-0.512 (2.461)	0.325 (2.210)	0.601 (2.525)
Democracy ²	0.639 (2.174)	1.931 (2.350)	2.187 (2.501)	1.943 (2.710)
ln(GDP pc)	0.020 (0.331)	-0.001 (0.318)	-0.137 (0.345)	-0.135 (0.346)
Women's political rights		-0.318 (0.216)		0.100 (0.283)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.637*** (0.239)	0.641*** (0.238)
Constant cut1	-1.109 (2.606)	-2.080 (2.421)	-4.095 (2.747)	-3.853 (2.771)
Constant cut2	2.261 (2.667)	1.311 (2.474)	-0.305 (2.709)	-0.065 (2.765)
Constant cut3	4.221 (2.851)	3.282 (2.655)	1.748 (2.879)	1.986 (2.921)
Pseudo R ²	0.1633	0.1679	0.2457	0.246
Countries	17	17	16	16
Observations	316	316	250	250

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.14: Women's Labour Rights in Africa, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	-0.226 (0.169)	-0.251 (0.174)	-0.162 (0.164)	-0.173 (0.165)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.396** (0.182)	-0.390** (0.178)	-0.416*** (0.153)	-0.413*** (0.154)
Democracy	-2.655 (1.634)	-2.871* (1.654)	-1.783 (1.519)	-1.874 (1.572)
Democracy^2	3.521* (1.810)	3.634** (1.813)	2.456 (1.707)	2.520 (1.758)
ln(GDP pc)	0.140* (0.074)	0.136* (0.071)	0.160** (0.065)	0.154** (0.065)
Women's political rights		0.305*** (0.113)		0.091 (0.120)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			0.729*** (0.102)	0.719*** (0.109)
Constant cut1	-0.647 (0.620)	-0.347 (0.555)	-0.195 (0.563)	-0.132 (0.529)
Constant cut2	1.713*** (0.654)	2.042*** (0.598)	2.298*** (0.589)	2.362*** (0.557)
Constant cut3	3.681*** (0.621)	4.027*** (0.565)	4.331*** (0.607)	4.390*** (0.575)
Pseudo R^2	0.0765	0.0852	0.1353	0.135
Countries	49	49	49	49
Observations	1,296	1,286	1,040	1,030

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4.15: Women's Labour Rights in the Americas, 1981-2011. Ordered Probit

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Post-conflict dummy (5)	0.025 (0.313)	0.121 (0.322)	0.006 (0.347)	0.060 (0.348)
Ongoing conflict dummy	-0.334* (0.185)	-0.276 (0.169)	-0.399* (0.211)	-0.353* (0.208)
Democracy	-2.908 (2.790)	-2.831 (2.523)	-5.551*** (1.925)	-5.292*** (1.764)
Democracy^2	2.352 (3.009)	2.366 (2.722)	4.110** (2.081)	3.950** (1.871)
ln(GDP pc)	0.679*** (0.201)	0.636*** (0.202)	0.630*** (0.131)	0.586*** (0.118)
Women's political rights		0.618** (0.272)		0.464** (0.220)
Lagged dependent variable (5)			1.062*** (0.194)	1.057*** (0.184)
Constant cut1	2.807 (1.754)	3.322** (1.619)	1.996* (1.171)	2.505** (1.014)
Constant cut2	5.746*** (1.804)	6.342*** (1.689)	5.298*** (1.166)	5.817*** (1.026)
Constant cut3	7.478*** (1.950)	8.137*** (1.824)	7.463*** (1.273)	8.032*** (1.149)
Pseudo R^2	0,1169	0,139	0,2659	0,2745
Countries	23	23	23	23
Observations	664	662	546	544

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time-fixed and regional fixed effects in all models.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A.4.1: The Linear Prediction Plotted Against the Standard Errors of the Linear Prediction, the Americas. Ordered Probit

