Power-Sharing and State Repression

Explaining variation in repression globally and in post-conflict states

Maria Gilen Røysamb

Master Thesis in Political Science

University of Oslo

Spring 2019

II

Power-Sharing and State Repression

Explaining variation in repression globally and in post-conflict states

2019

Power-Sharing and State Repression
Explaining variation in repression globally and in post-conflict states

Maria Gilen Røysamb

Word count: 26 901

IV

Abstract

This thesis is guided by the question of whether power-sharing institutions constitute a liability or a valuable tool to mitigate state repression, in a global context and in post-conflict states. Excluded-based grievances fuelled by state repression are increasingly seen as a key driver for civil conflict onset and recurrence. Commonly, power-sharing institutions are implemented as a resolution tool in wake of civil conflict and as a preventive tool in societies at risk. Scholars and policy-makers applaud such arrangements for having a pacifying effect, as they are prescribed to give oppositional parties incentives to cooperate. Yet, power-sharing institutions are chiefly directed at fostering elite cooperation and may not include mechanisms that mitigate state repression.

Gates et al. (2016) find that among three conceptual and empirical forms of power-sharing institutions, named inclusive, dispersive and constraining arrangements, only the latter is associated with civil peace. They theorize that the effectiveness of constraining power-sharing institutions hinges on their ability to mitigate state repression. I empirically examine this suggested association, by considering the effect of the three forms of power-sharing institutions on state repression between 1976 and 2010. I offer a theoretical argument of how certain power-sharing institutions can provide expectations of mutual security among ordinary citizens and the government, which in turn reduces the risk of state repression.

Findings from multiple regression analyses suggest that while power-sharing in general is not a panacea for repression, constraining power-sharing is a viable institutional design. Contrary to inclusive and dispersive arrangements, which are intended to secure oppositional elites in central decision making or empower sub-regional units of government, constraining institutions divide power among the government, the judiciary and ordinary citizens. Addressing how human rights abuses can be prevented or reduced is important by itself. Yet, identifying which institutions safeguard against repression, is also important to hinder civil conflict. The findings suggest that scholars and policy-makers should focus less on the virtues of conventional elite-based power-sharing institutions and rather promote institutions that provide security for ordinary citizens.

Acknowledgements

I owe a special thanks to many persons who have helped me throughout the process of writing this thesis. First of all, I want to thank my supervisor Scott Gates for great conversations and valuable insights and comments. Your scholarly work on power-sharing institutions was a great motivation for this study. Next, I want to thank the Research Group on Peace, Conflict and Development at The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), where I have spent the past five months writing my thesis. Writing my thesis at NUPI was a great pleasure. A special thanks to Francesca Jensenius, Tine Gade and Ole Jacob Sending, who gave vital comments on my thesis in the weeks leading up to the deadline and to Kari Osland for great guidance. A great thanks also to my group of friends at the Department of Political Science who made the two past years so much fun. I could not have been luckier with the people I met there. I also want to thank my family, mom, dad and Ola. This project would not have been possible without your endless support and valuable advice. Finally, thank you Anders, for daily reminding me that life is wonderful outside the master thesis bubble.

All flaws or mistakes remain my own.

Contents

X

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

"Countries where governments violate human rights are at higher risk of violent conflict. In these contexts, repression creates incentives for violence by reinforcing the perception that there is no viable alternative for expressing grievances and frustration" (The United Nations and World Bank 2018).

In 2018 the United Nations and the World Bank issued a joint report addressing the acute challenge of preventing conflict and sustaining peace. As the report emphasises, state repression is shown to be a key driver for internal armed conflict onset and recurrence (Davenport 2007). Across the globe, grievances among marginalised groups have translated into violent action, often as a reaction to state repression (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). In contexts of grave human rights violations, such as torture and political imprisonment, marginalised groups might see no other alternative than to turn to violent means of opposition (Goodwin 1997). State repression is also regarded as a factor contributing to cyclical patterns of violence, or conflict traps (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier 2003). The political conflict trap holds that illegitimate governmental institutions and high levels of repression foster conflict, while conflict erodes the quality of state institutions further (Hegre, Strand, Gates and Nygård 2011; Walter 2015). The joint United Nations and World Bank report (2018) stipulates that the only viable pathway to sustainable peace is by promoting justice adhering to human rights practices.

Given that state repression fuels civil conflict (Davenport 2007), it is crucial to map out which institutions most successfully safeguard against its occurrence. Power-sharing institutions are often recommended as a tool to prevent civil conflict and provide durable peace in post-

conflict states (Binningsbø 2013). A rich body of literature has addressed the effectiveness of power-sharing institutions in this regard, with civil conflict onset and recurrence as the main variables of interest (e.g. Hartzell and Hoodie 2007; Jarstad and Nilson 2008; Gates, Graham, Lupu, Strand and Strøm 2016). The literature on power-sharing has nonetheless not sufficiently addressed how such arrangements affect factors driving conflict, such as state repression. To fill this gap, the aim of this thesis is to analyse the somewhat unexplored relationship between power-sharing institutions and levels of state repression. If an increasing number of conflicts are ascribed to unresponsive and repressive institutions and some form of power-sharing provisions is recommended as the prominent tool for conflict prevention and resolution, it is necessary to examine power-sharing institutions' inability or ability to mitigate state repression.

Whereas the power-sharing literature in general fails to take into consideration how such provisions affect conditions driving conflict, Gates et al. (2016) provide a theoretical link between the literatures on power-sharing and repression. Drawing on a global dataset they find that among three distinct forms of power-sharing, named inclusive, dispersive and constraining institutions, only the latter is associated with civil peace[1]. Contrary to inclusive and dispersive institutions, which are characterized by the sharing of executive and legislative power in national and sub-national units of government, in constraining institutions power is shared with the judiciary and ordinary citizen (Gates et al. 2016:516). Gates et al. (2016) suggest that the causal mechanisms which explains the pacifying effect of constraining institutions on civil conflict, involve their ability to mitigate state repression[2]. As illustrated in Figure 1.1., Gates et al. (2016) identify an empirical link between constraining power-sharing institutions and civil conflict and theorize that the effect is mediated by state repression[3].

While Gates et al. (2016) provide important insight into the mechanism linking power-sharing, repression and conflict, to my knowledge, no one have empirically tested the power-sharing and repression relationship. Hence, this thesis adds to this debate by testing the

---

[1] See section 1.1.2 for a definition of constraining, inclusive and dispersive power-sharing institutions.

[2] A causal mechanism can be defined as «a process in which a causal variable of interest i.e. a treatment variable influences an outcome. The identification of a causal mechanism requires the specification of an intermediate variable or mediator that lies on the causal pathway between the treatment variable and outcome variables" (Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto 2011:765).

[3] While Gates et al. (2016) suggests that repression is the key causal mechanisms linking power-sharing institutions to civil conflict, it is important to note that this is merely one possible mechanism among several.

relationship that is assumed in the literature but has not been explicitly tested empirically. More specifically, I investigate the effect of constraining, inclusive and dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression between 1976 and 2010, in a global context and in post-conflict states. The aim is to tease out whether power-sharing institutions reduce state repression, and if the answer relies on the specific form of power-sharing and the political context[4]. Based on these aims, the thesis raises the following research question:

"How do different de jure power-sharing institutions affect the de facto occurrence of state repression, across different political contexts?"

Power-sharing institutions

?

State Repression

Gates et al. (2016)

Davenport (2007)

Civil conflict

Figure 1.1: Causal diagram linking power-sharing institutions, state repression and civil conflict, based on Gates et al. (2016).

---

[4] While the literature on power-sharing institutions tends to focus on post-conflict settings, in alignment with Gates et al. (2016), Bormann et al. (2019) and Graham et al. (2017), I expand the empirical scope and analyse their effect also in a global sample.

1.1.1   Relevance and contribution

This thesis contributes to the literature in the following way: Existing literature on power-sharing tends to focus on how such arrangements affect peace settlements, the duration of post-conflict peace, and the prospects of democracy (Binningsbø 2013:53). Nonetheless, most studies of power-sharing fail to take into consideration how such institutions affect the underlying drivers of conflict. As argued by Wolf and Cordell (2011:307) "It is essential to understand the causes of conflict before viable prescriptions for its resolution can be offered". In a similar manner, in order to understand how power-sharing arrangements enhance or reduce the prospects of durable peace, it is crucial to understand how it relates to key drivers, such as state repression (Cederman, Hug and Wucherpfenning 2018). By empirically investigating the relationship between power-sharing institutions and state repression, the thesis aims to fill this current research gap.

This thesis also seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate regarding the effect of formal or *de jure* power-sharing institutions on actual political and legal behaviour. Formal institutions, especially in a post-conflict environment, might not successfully reflect the situation on the ground (Strøm et al. 2015). Scholars have therefore argued that it is not clear whether the implementation of formal power-sharing institutions are effective by themselves (Bormann et al. 2019). Formal rules might directly have an impact on a specific outcome, or they might chiefly work through power-sharing practices (Cederman, Hug and Wucherpfenning 2018). Contributing to this debate, this thesis focuses on *de jure* power-sharing and emphasises how formal institutions can have a direct effect by altering ambition and expectations.

A third contribution relates to the aim of theory-building. A growing body of literature has examined why governments use repression to stay in power and under what conditions such tactics are applied (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; Carey 2010, Davenport and Appel 2004; Davenport 1996, 1999, 2007). While empirical research emphasises how domestic legal institutions affect state repression by raising the cost of such acts, studies often neglect how political institutions can reduce repression by shaping expectations (Dragu and Lupu 2018). Bormann et al. (2018) emphasise that it is necessary to "address what forms of political

accommodation induced different actors to behave peacefully". I offer a theoretical framework of how institutions that effectively set constrains on executive authority, alter expectations and behaviour among political elites and ordinary citizens, and thereby reduce the risk of repression.

Finally, this thesis seeks to give policy-makers a better understanding of which tools and what forms of power allocation most successfully restrain leaders from repressing their citizenry. Outrage over state repression fuels conflict, while state repression tends to rise during and after conflict (Davenport 2007; Zanger 2000; Colaresi and Carey 2008). Alarmingly, conflict trends show that since the mid-1990s most internal armed conflicts have been recurrences, and post-conflict peace has a median duration of seven years (Gates, Nygård and Trappeniers 2016). While elite-based power-sharing provisions are often implemented in peace negotiation processes, they may merely contribute to short-term peace if they do not tackle the use of state repression. The World Bank (2011) urges policy-makers to address repeated cycles of violence by strengthening legitimate state institutions and promote human rights, inclusivity and justice. Yet, research is needed to improve our understanding of how power-sharing provisions work in these contexts, if one opts for long-term stability.

1.1.2   Theoretical argument

Before I elaborate on the specific theoretical argument, it is necessary to briefly present the three conceptual and empirical forms of power-sharing institutions analysed in this thesis. Constraining power-sharing institutions set constrains on the executive authority, and are characterized by freedom of religion, judicial review and military legislative ban. Inclusive power-sharing guarantee oppositional groups a share of power in central decision making, and is characterized by mutual veto, grand cabinet coalitions and mandated military inclusiveness. Finally, dispersive power-sharing institutions are characterized by subnational authority in the form of decentralization (Strøm et al. 2015). According to Gates et al. (2016) the key distinction between the three forms of power-sharing arrangements, is that in constraining

arrangements power is not divided among political elites, but rather among political elites, the judiciary and the general public.

Turning to the theoretical argument, I rely on Gates et al. (2016) as a point of departure. In brief, Gates et al. (2016) argue that in order for power-sharing institutions to be effective in mitigating the risk of conflict onset and recurrence, they have to resolve the commitment problem. Commitment problems arise in contexts of mutual suspicion among the incumbent government and insurgency groups, when neither party can offer credible commitments to peace (Walter 2002). In the wake of civil conflict, rebel groups are vulnerable to further state repression as they are asked to disarm and demobilize (Walter 2004; Gates et al. 2016). In light of this dilemma, Gates et al. (2016) argue that constraining institutions allow the government to credibly commit to peace, by offering ordinary citizens protection from state repression (Gates et al. 2016:514).

While Gates et al. (2016) offer a fruitful theoretical baseline, I add mechanisms to their theory in order to better understand exactly how *de jure* institutions can alleviate commitment problems. I borrow the term *logic of expectations* from Dragu and Lupu (2018) in order to explain how *de jure* institutions can alter practices and behaviour in a manner which alleviates commitment problems and in turn reduces the risk of repression. Dragu and Lupu (2018) argue that the scope and frequency of state repression hinges on a state's repressive capacity, which in turn depends on whether agents of the state obey orders to repress. The crucial point being that legal institutions can alter beliefs about what other agents of the state are willing to do. If agents of the state believe other agents will not obey orders to repress, the likelihood of obeying such orders themselves, are reduced (Dragu and Lupu 2018).

I add to this theory by arguing that the logic of expectations can run in multiple directions, both affecting the behaviour of political elites and ordinary citizens. If power-sharing institutions entail mechanisms which protect ordinary citizens, there are fewer incentives for ordinary citizens to turn to violent mobilization. This in turn can reduce the willingness of agents of the state to turn to repression in order to maintain status quo. Elite-based power-sharing provisions on the other hand, are theorized to be more vulnerable to repressive means.

6

When only a few political elites are secured at the top, agents of the state have bigger incentives to use repression in order to maintain status quo (Gates et al. 2016).[5]

Based on these acknowledgements, I develop and test two hypotheses. First, *Hypothesis 1* holds that constraining power-sharing institutions have a negative effect on state repression independent of political context. As such, I expect to find a negative relationship between constraining institutions and repression both in the global sample consisting of all states and in the sub-sample consisting of post-conflict states. Second, *Hypothesis 2* holds that the pacifying effect of constraining power-sharing institutions is stronger in post-conflict contexts. Hence, while I argue that the theoretical argument is valid in both contexts, I expect to find that the assumed relationship is stronger in post-conflict environments. The reason being that in post-conflict contexts, the commitment problem is more pressing (Walter 2015). I furthermore predict that dispersive or inclusive power-sharing institutions are not negatively associated with repression.

1.1.3 Research design and findings

In order to empirically investigate the relationship between power-sharing institutions and state repression, I opt for a quantitative research design. I utilize an ordinary least squares regression model to address the relationships of interest and furthermore include an interaction term to estimate whether the effect varies across different political contexts. Due to the threat of endogeneity bias the regression analysis is conducted both with concurrent levels of repression and with the independent variables lagged.

Findings from the regression analysis lend support to *Hypothesis 1* and suggest that constraining institutions have a pacifying effect on state repression. As theorized, the argument holds across both political contexts, illustrated by the persistent negative effect of constraining institutions in the global sample and in the sub-sample consisting of post-conflict

---

[5] In Chapter 3. section 3.5. I elaborate on why I regard the theoretical extension as having an added value.

states. The findings moreover suggest that the effectiveness of constraining institutions is not stronger in post-conflict states, hence the thesis finds less support for *Hypothesis 2*. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, dispersive power-sharing seems to have a pacifying effect in the global sample, while not being effective in post-conflict settings. The effect is nonetheless less robust across alternative model specifications. Finally, inclusive power-sharing institutions are not significantly associated with state repression. The findings suggest that scholars and policy makers should shift their attention from the conventional forms of power-sharing institutions to institutions which constrain political power holders, in order to address the issue of repression.

1.1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters and is structured in the following way. In Chapter two I summarize the relevant literature on different forms of power-sharing institutions, conditions affecting state repression and discuss the current research gap. In Chapter three I elaborate on the key theoretical concepts and the theoretical expectations. More specifically I discuss how commitment problems and the logic of expectations contribute to understanding the mechanisms linking various forms of power-sharing institutions to state repression.

In Chapter four I present the research design and methods applied. I discuss several challenges associated with drawing causal conclusions, with a special emphasis on the appearance of spurious relationships and endogeneity bias. Lastly, the chapter discusses the ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) and the logistic regression model (Logit), which are applied as statistical tools in the following empirical chapters[6].

In Chapter five I present the data employed in the analysis, outline key variables, and discuss some shortcoming associated with the data. I merge the Inclusive, Dispersive and Constraints (IDC) dataset by Strøm et al. (2015) with the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset by Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke and Arnon (2017). While the former provides information on power-

---

[6] Results from the OLS-regression model are reported in Chapter 6, while results from the Logit-model are reported as a robustness check in Chapter 7.

sharing institutions, the latter provides information on state repression. In the last section of the chapter, I introduce relevant control variables and briefly comment on the sample.

In Chapter six I present and analyse key findings. The chapter consists of descriptive statistics, correlations and results from regression analysis. I estimate the effect of the multiple forms of power-sharing institutions in a full sample consisting of all states and in a sub-sample consisting of post-conflict states. I furthermore add time-lags, interaction terms and control variables in my empirical model. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the implications of the findings within the broader theoretical framework.

In Chapter seven I conduct several robustness checks and model diagnostics in order to investigate whether the results are affected by model misspecifications and to investigate how robust the findings are.

Finally, in Chapter eight, I summarize the findings, discuss limitations and strengths and propose avenues for further research.

Chapter 2

Literature review

The literature on power-sharing and state repression is both rich and diverse, yet the two strands are commonly not studied in relation to one another. Thus, it is necessary to review both strands and discuss how they interrelate, before turning to the theoretical and empirical chapters. In the first section of this chapter I present an overview of the literature on power-sharing institutions, elaborate on different ways scholars conceptualise forms of sharing power and present the main conclusions drawn from this research. In the second section I review the literature on state repression, with an emphasis on physical integrity rights violations. Finally, in the last section I address the current research gap.

2.1 Power-sharing in the literature

The literature on power-sharing pays tribute to the seminal work of Arendt Lijphart (1969, 1977). Lijphart studied the virtues of consociationalism in western European states, characterized by deep group divisions. Contrary to pluralist theory (e.g., Almond 1956), Lijphart (1977) argued that democratic forms of government were plausible in societies with deep divisions, if elite-cooperation was promoted. More specifically, Lijphart (1977:25) suggested that by promoting grand coalitions, mutual veto, proportional representation systems and segmental autonomy, plural states could overcome challenges associated with deep divisions. Most importantly, grand coalitions including all major religious and linguistic groups were prescribed to contribute to cooperation and consensus (Lijphart 1977, 1985). In his later work, Lijphart moved beyond the geographical scope of Western Europe and included Lebanon and Czechoslovakia in his analysis.

The literature on power-sharing has since then developed within two dominant strands (Strøm et al. 2015). Influenced by Lijphart some scholars have continued to assess the effect of power-sharing on the prospects of democracy (e.g. Norris 2008). Another strand departed from the traditional studies, and instead assessed the effectiveness of power-sharing in the contexts of civil conflict (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 2002; Gates et al. 2016; Cederman et al. 2018; Martin 2013). Within the civil war literature, scholars have addressed power-sharing as peace agreement provisions for inclusion of rebels (Hartzell and Hoodie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009) and power-sharing institutions' ability to reduce the risk of civil conflict onset and recurrence (Gates et al. 2016; Cederman et al. 2018; Bormann et al. 2019). Scholars have furthermore assessed the dilemmas associated with the dual aim of consolidating democracy and ensuring durable peace in post-conflict contexts (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Jarstad 2009). While the existing power-sharing literature does not adequately address how such institutions relate to state repression, it does give important insights into how power-sharing can be conceptualised and the virtues of power-sharing in reducing the risk of violence[7].

2.1.1   Power-sharing: Divergent definitions and findings

Despite the rich scholarly literature on power-sharing institutions, there is no consensus regarding how power-sharing should be defined (Binningsbø 2013). Broadly speaking, power-sharing is understood as the inclusion of fractional groups or parties, in joint central decision-making (Binningsbø 2013:90). The key idea being that by dividing power among elites representing different fractions, one hinders political power holders from abusing their authority at the expense of other groups. Consequently, power-sharing institutions are intended to lead to political cooperation rather than violent confrontation (Strøm et al. 2015). Beyond this common understanding, scholars conceptualise power-sharing differently in terms of their purpose and scope. Moving beyond Lijphart's famous conceptualisation of power-sharing, scholars interested in the effectiveness of power-sharing in relation to civil conflict often include a broader set of spheres in which power can be divided. Walter (2002)

---

[7] For a comprehensive review of the power-sharing literature, see Binningsbø (2013).

for instance, differentiates between power-sharing within political, territorial and economic spheres, while Hartzell and Hoodie (2003, 2007) also include a military dimension. Roeder and Rothchild (2005:30) furthermore differentiate between *mandates* of power-sharing and *opportunities* of power-sharing. The former is characterized by hard guarantees, exemplified by the Lebanese power-sharing formula. The latter reflects soft guarantees, exemplified by power-sharing arrangements in South Africa (Gates and Strøm 2018).

In addition to conceptualising power-sharing differently in horizontal terms (e.g. military, economic, political and territorial), the literature also encompasses different conceptualisations in vertical terms (elite versus masses). Scholars have traditionally studied power-sharing considering elite-cooperation (e.g. Lijphart 1969, 1977). Recent studies have nonetheless emphasised how power-sharing can be divided among political elites and ordinary citizens (Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Gates et al. 2016). Rothchild and Roeder (2005) distinguishes between power-sharing and power-dividing institutions, while Strøm et al. (2015) and Gates et al. (2016) distinguish between constraining, inclusive and dispersive forms of sharing power. In their conception of power-sharing, power-dividing institutions and constraining arrangements are directed both at political elites and ordinary citizens, while other forms of power-sharing are oriented chiefly at political elites.

In part due to the various definitions and measurements of power-sharing, scholars have reached quite divergent conclusions (Binningsbø 2013). Some applaud power-sharing arrangements for being peace enduring (Sisk 1996; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007, Mattes and Savun 2009), while others have found such institutions to be conflict-ridden (Roader and Rothchild 2005). Gates et al. (2016) argue that the support of power-sharing institutions should be more conditional. In line with this reasoning Strøm et al. (2015:167) note that "The power-sharing label captures a multitude of institutional provisions, and it is by no means obvious that they all tend to coexist or reinforce one another". Thus, while a majority seems to agree that power-sharing arrangements have pacifying effects, debate persists regarding what institutions are most effective and under which circumstances (Hartzell and Hoodie 2003, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 2002; Wucherpfenning, 2013).

The conflicting findings also stem from the varied methods and samples applied (Strøm et al. 2015:166). While earlier work chiefly relied on case-studies (e.g. Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977), the emerging work within the civil war literature more commonly applies statistics and large samples (e.g. Graham et al. 2017; Bormann et al. 2019; Cederman et al. 2018). Within the growing body of literature that applies statistics, there is also great variation. Some studies focus on power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict states (e.g. Sisk 1996), while others also address their effectiveness in states not affected by conflict (e.g. Cederman et al. 2018). Furthermore, differences appear among scholars who measure power-sharing by one single institution, and those who differentiate between multiple forms of sharing power (Gates et al. 2016:514).

Lastly, different findings stem from the notion that some studies focus on the effect of *de jure* forms of sharing power (e.g. Graham et al. 2017; Strøm et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016), while other studies include information regarding power-sharing *practices* (Cederman et al. 2015; Bormann et al. 2019, 2014; Roessler and Ohls 2018). The latter is understood as the behaviour of governmental politicians and group representation (Cederman et al. 2018:30). Bormann et al. (2019) and Cederman et al. (2018) find that the effect of formal institutions is chiefly mediated through power-sharing practices and the de facto allocation of political power. Yet, debate persists regarding whether it is valuable to study the effect of formal institutions. Strøm et al. (2015:171) argue that while formal institutions might not accurately "describe politics on the ground", it is fruitful to study the effectiveness of such institutions. Firstly, even when not fully implemented, formal institutions can be effective in the sense that they produce a certain expectation or ambition. Secondly, formal institutions are easier to measure in a reliable way (Strøm et al. 2015).

In sum, the existing scholarly research on power-sharing gives important insights into how power can be divided and how such arrangements affect a variety of outcome variables. Yet, as stressed earlier, scholars tend to neglect how power-sharing affects factors contributing to conflict itself (Cederman et al. 2018). As this thesis seeks to investigate how different power-sharing institutions affect state repression, it is necessary to turn to the literature on human rights violations.

2.2   State repression in the literature

The literature on state repression is fundamentally concerned with why and how governments are drawn to use repression to stay in power, when a variety of other tactics are available (Davenport 2007). As argued by Hill and Jones (2014) this is a crucial question, as it taps into the fundamental role of the state. Bluntly said, the state can either prey upon their citizens and use harsh repression in order to stay in power, or apply its monopoly of violence to promote safety and prosperity (Bates 2008). The following section provides an overview over different forms of state repression, maps out some of the most cited causes of its occurrence, and elaborates on the main theoretical strands within this literature.

2.2.1   State repression: Definitions and findings

It is common to distinguish between two main categories of state repression, namely empowerment rights restrictions and physical integrity rights restrictions (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). The former include but are not restricted to violations such as censorship and restrictions to assembly. The latter encompass violations such as torture, disappearances, political imprisonment and killings (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). Commonly these tactics are used to inflict cost on a target or organization in order to deter specific activity that is seen as a threat to the state (Davenport 2007b). While state repression can be understood in broader terms, for instance by including structural or economic violence, in this thesis I focus on physical integrity rights restrictions. The reason being that physical rights violations are concerned with the personal security and survival of individuals (Davenport 2007b).

The literature on state repression has grown steadily over the past 30 years, with an emphasis on cross-national patterns. Scholars have assessed why and when repression onset occurs (e.g. Carey 2010; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport 1999, 2007), what accounts for the frequency and scope (e.g. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Powell and Staton 2009), and which factors enable one to reduce repression once it is underway

(Davenport and Appel 2014). In the early work on repression, scholars were chiefly interested in the underlying political, social and economic conditions fuelling state repression. The well-cited study of Poe and Tate (1994) found that measures of democracy and GDP per capita were negatively associated with repression, while population size and civil conflict were positively associated with repression. The negative association between democratic regimes and repression is commonly ascribed to the appearance of democratic norms and opportunity for peaceful contestation (Poe and Tate 1994). Yet, more recent studies have nuanced the proposed linear relationship between regime type and repression. Regan and Henderson (2002) suggest that the relationship resembles an inverted u-shape, indicating that countries that are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian are most prone to repression.

While the early work on state repression gave important insight into the underlying drivers, this strand underemphasised agency. As argued by Davenport (2007), by focusing on political-economic conditions, coercion was "viewed as something as a pathology". In other words, the research took it for granted that specific socio-economic conditions compelled leaders to repress. Importantly, another strand in the literature has implemented the role of agency and examined state repression as a response to popular dissent and social movements (e.g. Carey 2010; Gartner and Regan 1996). This strand highlights how state actors weight the cost and benefits of repressing their citizenry (e.g. Gartner and Regan 1996). When faced with popular dissent, state authorities are provided with a "legitimate" mandate to coerce, which reduces the cost of applying such means (Davenport 2007). Studies have demonstrated that various forms of dissent, such as demonstrations, riots, and civil war, increase the risk of state repression (Davenport 2007). Findings nonetheless indicate that the state responds differently according to the specific form of dissent applied (Carey 2010). Carey (2010) for instance, finds that only guerrilla warfare increases the risk of repression, while Regan and Henderson (2002) suggest that there is a relationship between the average magnitude of rebellion and repression.

The literature on state repression has also focused on the effect of various domestic and international legal institutions (Cross 1999; Davenport 1996; Keith, Tate and Poe 2009; Powell and Station 2009). Empirical evidence illustrates that independent courts, constitutional guarantees and common law heritage are negatively associated with state

repression (Powell and Station, 2009; Mitchell, Ring and Spellman 2013). Mitchell, Ring and Spellman (2013) conducted empirical analyses of state-year data from 1976 to 2006 and found that legal systems characterized by strong rule of law, safeguard against repression. Hill and Jones (2014) argue that the studies examining legal institutions constitute a "promising development because a large amount of theoretical work in the comparative politics suggests that there should be a meaningful relationship between legal institutions and repression". Yet, they also highlight that the legal institutions have received far less attention in the literature than political institutions and suggest that this area merits further research (Hill and Jones 2014)[8].

In sum, the literature on state repression spells out a range of factors that predict repression, and under what conditions state actors are most compelled to repress. Some studies give important insights into how domestic institutions affect state repression, yet none have explicitly focused on the role of power-sharing institutions. Furthermore, as will be more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, the literature on state repression tends to neglect how institutions may induce particular behaviour, which in turn increases or decreases the risk of state repression[9].

2.3 The gap to fill: Linking power-sharing, repression, and civil conflict

While scholars have not addressed the direct empirical link between power-sharing institutions and state repression, existing literature give important insights into how these themes are interrelated (Gates et al. 2016; Cederman et al. 2013; Østby 2013). In the following I will briefly shed light on how state repression, civil conflict and power-sharing institutions relate to one another, as this highlights the current research gap.

---

[8] Another strand in the literature focuses on how international human rights treaties affect state repression (e.g. Conrad and Ritter 2013), yet in this thesis I focus on domestic influences.
[9] See Davenport (2007b) for a review of the dominant traditions in the repression literature.

In accounting for potential insurgency, one strand in the civil conflict literature focuses on how grievances based on political and economic inequality between groups can motivate rebels to take up arms (Cederman et al. 2013; Østby 2013; Stewart 2008[10]). Grievances as a motivation for insurgency can stem from inequality between groups, or so-called horizontal inequality. Stewart (2008) defines horizontal inequality as "inequality in economic, social, or political dimensions or culturally defined groups". While political inequality refers to the limited access to political power, economic inequality refers to the unequal distribution of resources.

In accounting for how grievances can translate into violent action and thus motivate vulnerable groups to dissent, Cederman et al. (2013) emphasise the crucial role of how the state responds to mobilization. Grievances do not appear in vacuum but are moderated and thus enhanced or reduced by state institutions (Østby 2013; Stewart 2008). As Stewart (2008) notes, "Whether democratic or not, governments can be accommodative and inclusive, making violent opposition less likely. In contrast, governments can make no attempt to meet peoples' demands and react to violent opposition with harsh repression, which might provoke further violent reaction". Thus, state repression is seen as a key driver of civil conflict onset, as it contributes to generate grievances and frustration among exposed groups (Cederman et al. 2013; Davenport 2007).

Repression can also fuel cyclical patterns of conflict, or "political conflict traps" (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier 2003). One speaks of a conflict trap if the risk of conflict considerably increases after the first conflict onset (Hegre et al. 2011). The political conflict trap holds that weak and repressive institutions foster conflict, while conflict erodes the quality of such institutions further (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier 2003). Regional trends show that conflict recurrences are particularly prominent in the Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa (Walter 2015). These are also the least institutionalized regions of the world (Walter 2015). Empirical findings presented in the World Bank report on the Middle East region (2011), illustrated that the countries that were currently in a state of conflict, or had experienced conflict suffered from severe levels of state repression and human rights

---

[10] See Collier and Hoeffler (2004) for a discussion on whether grievances or greed fuel violent insurgency.

violations. The report furthermore demonstrated that the longer and more severe the conflict, the more repressive the country was likely to be.

Power-sharing institutions are often recommended as the dominant approach for solving and preventing conflict, especially in deeply divided societies (Binningsbø 2013). As Cederman et al. (2013:224) note, "If ethnic exclusion (…) leads to conflict then ethnic inclusion (…) will offer the best prospects for conflict prevention". Power-sharing is thus prescribed to give potential warring parties incentives to restrain from violence, both before and after civil conflict (e.g. Sisk 1994). Yet, it is not given that all forms of power-sharing institutions moderate repression. Power-sharing arrangements may contribute to the desirable goal of elite cooperation, and simultaneously have adverse effects regarding protection from state repression among ordinary citizens. While Gates et al. (2016) theorize that only constraining power-sharing institutions are effective in mitigating the risk of repression, they have not empirically tested this relationship.

In sum, previous research indicate that more attention should be given to whether power-sharing institutions are effective in mitigating repression, and if the effect depends on the specific form of power-sharing and the specific context. In the next chapter I will present theoretical concepts and elaborate on the mechanisms that link various forms of power-sharing institutions and state repression.

Chapter 3

Theoretical argument

In the following chapter I will elaborate on and explain the key theoretical argument of this thesis and outline testable hypotheses. In alignment with Gates et al. (2016) I theorize that constraining power-sharing institutions are most effective in mitigating state repression, as they provide mutual security to oppositional elites and ordinary citizens. The crucial point being that mutual security contributes to resolve the commitment problem among possible insurgency groups and the incumbent government[11]. Resolving the commitment problem is essential as it lowers the risk of dissent and reciprocal acts of repression. I furthermore expand the theoretical argument of Gates et al. (2016) in order to better understand *how* formal institutions can contribute to overcome commitment problems. More specifically, I offer a theory of how *de jure* power-sharing institutions can alter behaviour and practices, via the *logic of expectations* (Dragu and Lupu 2018). Here, the logic holds that constraining institutions induce both political elites and ordinary citizens to behave in a manner which reduces the risk of repression.

3.1   Inclusive, dispersive and constraining power-sharing

Before turning to the theoretical argument, I will more thoroughly present the three distinct forms of power-sharing applied as my theoretical and empirical framework. I conceptualise power-sharing in accordance with Strøm et al. (2015) and Gates et al. (2016), in which power

---

[11] Walter (2015:1245) makes a similar argument as Gates et al. (2016), by arguing that the "more accountable the government is to a wider range of people, the easier it will be to credibly commit to peace". Hence, high quality institutions which provide constrains on the executive authority, are presumed to resolve the commitment problem.

is allocated through constraining, inclusive and dispersive arrangements[12]. Graham et al. (2017:688) explain how one can understand the three distinct forms of power-sharing arrangements, by considering how one thinks about sharing in ordinary life:

> In some contexts, sharing means enjoying or consuming something jointly, as when families share special occasions. In contrast, when family members share an inheritance, sharing means a dispersion of goods to be consumed separately by their respective recipients. Finally, those who ask elites to "share the wealth" or motorists to "share the road" typically wish to prevent a powerful group from excluding others from some good or privileged. Sharing can thus refer to joint and inclusive consumption, dispersion, or constraints on the dominant actor's control of something vulnerable.

In alignment with the provided example, inclusive power-sharing implies that power is held jointly (Gates and Strøm 2019). Inclusive power-sharing institutions allocate power to oppositional elites within national state institutions and provide guarantees for the inclusion of minority groups in executive and legislative branches of government. Such arrangements can also entail mutual veto, grand cabinet coalitions, and mandated military inclusiveness of all major social or political groups (Graham et al. 2017; Gates and Strøm 2019). Examples of inclusive power-sharing can be found in Lebanon and former Yugoslavia, in the form of reserved executive positions and reserved seats in the legislative, or in Burundi in form of mutual veto. Inclusive power-sharing arrangements are most aligned with the conventional conceptualization of power-sharing, as defined by Lijphart (1969, 1977).

Dispersive power-sharing institutions on the other hand divide authority among actors in a well-defined pattern, commonly in the form of territorial decentralisation (Gates et al. 2016:517). Dispersive institutions entail that power is delegated away from central decision making towards regional government (Bormann et al. 2019). Dispersive power-sharing

---

[12] Strøm et al. (2015) first presented the three forms of power-sharing institutions applied in this thesis, yet the same conceptualisation is applied in later studies by Gates et al. (2016), Graham et al. (2017), Cederman et al. (2018), Bormann et al. (2019) and Gates and Strøm (2019).

institutions are characterized by subnational tax authority, subnational education authority and subnational policy authority. Such arrangements can also include institutions which prohibit central decision making at subnational levels of government (Gates and Strøm 2019). As such dispersive institutions empower regional government and hold them accountable vis-à-vis the local electorate. Switzerland provides an example of subnational education authority, while Colombia serves as an example of state elections (Gates et al. 2016).

Lastly, constraining power-sharing arrangements are institutions that limit the power of a party or a central social or political group. The core element of constraining institutions is that power is not divided among oppositional elites, but rather between the elites and the public in general (Gates et al. 2016). Constraining institutions are characterized by freedom of religion, judicial review and military legislative bans. As such, constraining institutions "remove particular issues from the political arena" by enhancing the independency of judicial institutions and by bolstering civil society (Gates and Strøm 2019). This is in turn prescribed to "protect individuals or social groups from encroachments and predication, for example, politicians or the armed forced" (Strøm et al. 2015:173). Taiwan's military legislator ban serves as an example of constraining institutions. Constraining institutions are similar to Roeder and Rothchild's (2005:15) concepts of power-dividing institutions, which are designed to expand individual rights and empower independent judiciaries.[13]

Some readers might be inclined to argue that constraining institutions are in fact not power-sharing institutions, but rather elements integral to democracy (Graham et al. 2017). Yet, in line with Strøm et al. (2015), Graham et al. (2017) and Gates et al. (2015) I find it useful to distinguish between constraining power-sharing institutions and democracy as concepts. This is because democracy may merely entail contestation of power in the form of free and fair elections, while not providing constraints on the executive authority. As argued by Zakaria (1997), there is a sharp distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies. In fact, "Democratically elected regimes (…) routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms" (Zakaria 1997:1). In addition, the definition of constraining institutions does not include all possible constraints on government power, and for instance excludes legislative veto powers (Gates et al. 2016:516). This

---

[13] The indicators that make up the three forms of power-sharing institutions are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

contributes to conceptually distinguishing constraining power-sharing institutions from liberal democracy. The distinction between the three forms of power-sharing and examples of such provisions are illustrated in Table 3.1.

Type of power-sharing	Examples of Institutions	Examples of Polities
Constraining	Judicial review	Ghana (1993-2010)
	Military legislator ban	Taiwan (1975-2010)
	Freedom of religion	Sierra Leone (1979-1991)
Dispersive	Subnational education authority	Switzerland (1975-2010)
	State elections	Colombia (1992-2010)
	Constituency alignment	Russia (1994-2003)
Inclusive	Mutual veto	Burundi (1995-2010)
	Reserved legislative seats	Yugoslavia (1975-1992)
	Reserved executive seats	Lebanon (1975-2010)

Table 3.1. Examples of power-sharing institutions (Gates et al. 2016:517).[14]

3.2 Possible pathways to reduce repression

As the research question indicates, this thesis focuses on specific power-sharing institutions and the effect they may have on state repression. As I analyse three empirical forms of power-sharing, there are initially three possible pathways to reduce repression. I illustrate the potential pathways in Figure 3.1 (route A, B and C), where I distinguish between the dispersion of power among political elites and ordinary citizens (horizontal lines) and furthermore between national and regional government (vertical lines). While all three forms of power-sharing institutions provide political accommodation in some form, a key distinction between inclusive, dispersive and constraining arrangements, is that only the latter include "mass-mechanisms" in the institutional setup. By this I mean that power is not merely divided

---

[14] Note that in Table 3.1. examples of polities with specific institutions are limited to the timeframe between 1975 and 2010, as they correspond to the IDC dataset. The categories are furthermore not mutually exclusive.

among the political elites, but moreover between the government and ordinary citizens. There is also a distinction in terms of whether power is dispersed at the national level of government, or to sub-regional levels. Dispersive power-sharing represent the latter.

Importantly, Figure 3.1 encompasses ideal types and should therefore not be interpreted without some nuances. While the figure demonstrates three distinct trails to reduce repression, they should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Meaning that the different institutional arrangements might work in tandem or in combination with one another[15]. For example, peace agreements that encompass provisions of power-sharing often combine a variety of institutions (e.g. Sisk 1996).

Figure 3.1: Possible pathways to reduce state repression

	ELITE-MECHANISM	MASS-MECHANISM
National government	A. Inclusive power-sharing	B. Constraning power-sharing
Regional government	C. Dispersive power-sharing	

---

[15] As will be discussed in Chapter 6 the IDC dataset does not provide information on constraining institutions at the regional level. Yet, the combination of constraining institutions at regional levels of government, provides a possible fourth route to mitigate state repression.

3.3 Linking power-sharing and state repression

Having introduced the three conceptual forms of power-sharing institutions and three possible pathways to reduce repression, the question which remains is how they relate to one another? In addressing the relationship between power-sharing institutions and civil conflict, Gates et al. (2016) argue that "Constraining power-sharing institutions work by limiting the government's ability to repress, which raises the cost of mobilizing a rebel force and create the conditions for a credible commitment to peace". Meanwhile, "inclusive power-sharing is inherently elite-focused and does not adequately address the commitment problem" (Gates et al. 2016:524). I suggest that the same logic applies for the occurrence of repression, and not merely for civil conflict. I furthermore combine the theoretical concept of commitment problems with Dragu and Lupu's (2018) concept of logic of expectations, in order to better emphasise the power-sharing and repression relationship. Importantly, the added mechanisms should not be regarded as an alternative explanation to Gates et al. (2016), but rather as a supplement.

3.3.1 The logic of expectations

In addressing how human rights abuses can be prevented or reduced, Dragu and Lupu (2018) offer a new theoretical concept, namely the *logic of expectations*. Using a game-theoretical model they demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest. They argue that the potential for abuses is at its height when dissent against the regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such contexts, the scope and severity of state repression depends on a state's repressive capacity. A state's repressive capacity in turn depends on whether agents of the state are willing to obey orders to repress. Political leaders and elites do not conduct repressive acts themselves, but depend on obedience from regular police, the military and intelligence services (Dragu and Lupu 2018:1047).

If dissent has grown sufficiently powerful and a broader base of the population is taking to the

24

streets, a small number of loyal agents are not sufficient to crack down on the opposition. In these scenarios Dragu and Lupu (2018) theorize that the logic of expectations is activated. The logic stipulates that if agents of the state believe other agents of the state will not obey orders to repress, they are less likely to do so themselves. This in turn reduces the likelihood that government leaders will order their subordinates to repress, in the first place (Dragu and Lupu 2018:1047).

According to Dragu and Lupu (2018) the logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism in explaining the occurrence of state repression, alongside the *logic of consequences* and the *logic of appropriateness*. The logic of consequences holds that sanctioning a regime for its repressive behaviour, can contribute to mitigate state repression. The logic of appropriateness stipulates that normative aspects can do so. In accordance with the logics of consequences, legal institutions, such as independent judiciaries and constitutional protections, can "create ex ante barriers to repression or raise its ex post costs by imposing sanction" (Dragu and Lupu 2018:1046). Hence, leaders refrain from repressive behaviour because the cost of doing so is raised. Dragu and Lupu (2018) argue that the pacifying effect of legal institutions can also work through expectations, if and to the extent such institutions change actors' beliefs. Dragu and Lupu (2018:1065) argue that:

> Generally, legal institutions can themselves be important sources of beliefs. Rules can affect incentives, and rules can change preferences, but rules can also coordinate beliefs about what others might do (…) Existing work on the effects of human rights law focuses on how it may reduce repression via the logic of consequences and appropriateness but does not focus on whether and under which conditions it might also change beliefs. Our theory implies that if and to the extent human rights law can affect government agents' beliefs about the extent to which other agents are willing to conduct repression, the law may reduce repression via the logic of expectations (Dragu and Lupu 2018:1065).

The logic of expectations offers a suitable baseline for my theoretical argument, but contrary to Dragu and Lupu (2018) who focuses on political elites, I argue that the logic also should

take into consideration the role of the general population. More specifically I argue that the logic of expectations is not merely activated in horizontal terms, among political elites, but furthermore in vertical terms, between political elites and ordinary citizens[16]. Dragu and Lupu (2018) briefly discuss the possibility that dissent groups might be less inclined to dissent, if they expect that agents of the state will follow orders to repress. I argue that the relationship might work in a reciprocal manner, in the sense that agents of the state might be less inclined to obey orders to repress if the perceived threat of dissent is reduced. In other words, if legal institutions provide security for the general population, the perceived threat of dissent is reduced, making repression a less worthwhile option for state actors. Hence, I propose that the logics of expectations runs in multiple directions, affecting the behaviour of both political elites and ordinary citizens[17]. Figure 3.2 illustrates the reciprocal relationship, and how expectations within both elites and ordinary citizens can alter behaviour and practices which in turn reduce the risk of state repression.

Figure 3.2. The logic of expectations.

---

[16] See Ritter and Conrad (2016) who argue that obligations to protect human rights affect not only state behaviour but also the behaviour of dissidents.
[17] I elaborate on this argument in section 3.2.3.

3.3.2   The commitment problem

The logic of expectations stipulates that legal institutions can be a focal point of ambition and expectation and induce agents of the state and ordinary citizens to alter their behaviour in a pacifying manner. In order to understand why the reciprocal relationship between the general population and the political elite is so crucial in order to mitigate state repression, it is necessary to introduce the notion of *commitment problems*. While the term is most commonly applied in contexts of inter-state war (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006) and civil conflict settlements (Walter 2002; Gates et al. 2016), it is also relevant in addressing the reciprocal relationship between state repression and dissent. Commitment problems characterize a situation where oppositional parties cannot credibly commit to a peaceful order (Walter 2002; Walter 2015). This is because they are unable to do so, or unwilling given the uncertainty of the situation (Powell 2006).

Breaches of trust among potential dissidents and the incumbent government can arise prior to conflict, during conflict and in the wake of conflict (Gates et al. 2016; Strøm and Gates 2019). Yet, commitment problems are especially pressing in the wake of civil wars (Walter 2002). Following the signing of a peace-agreement, making credible commitments to peace and rebuild breaches of trust is difficult (Cederman et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016; Walter 2004). While the governments overall aim is to regain the monopoly of violence within their territory, rebel groups are asked to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate into civil life (Walter 2002). This in turn makes rebel groups vulnerable to further state repression (Gates et al. 2016).

Conflict also affect attitudes towards violence (Cederman et al. 2015; Hegre et al. 2011). As Cederman et al. (2015:356) argue, "armed conflict becomes a part of the repertoire of protest actions that the opposition can resort to". Post-conflict societies are often marked by anger among victims of conflict (Hegre et al. 2011). Thus, to escape this dynamic the state needs to restrain from repression and exclusion and offer credible commitments to peaceful behaviour (Gates and Strøm 2019). Without safeguards against further state repression, leaders of rebel

groups and ordinary citizens may also be reluctant to make credible commitments to peace and engage in violent mobilization (Gates et al. 2016).

3.4 The pacifying effect of constraints on the executive authority

Having introduced a theory of how legal institutions can alter behaviour and practices through the logics of expectations and presented the issue of commitment problems, I will elaborate on how this relates to the three conceptual forms of power-sharing institutions. Considering the logic of expectations, I argue that the constraining institutions are most effective in altering the behaviour of political elites and the general population, in a manner that reduces state repression. I suggest that formal or *de jure* power-sharing institutions can be effective in their own right, and not merely work through power-sharing practices. Bormann et al. (2014:7) note, "If formal rules exist that promise reserved seats in the legislature for minority groups, the expectations of future inclusion may discourage armed rebellion by minority groups in the present". In the same manner, I argue that constraining institutions may create expectations regarding mutual security among the government and potential dissidents, which in turn reduces the risk of repression. In the following I will elaborate on the two key elements of this argument.

First, if and to the extent ordinary citizens believe that political leaders are willing to implement constrains on their executive authority and bolster civil rights, members of vulnerable groups have fewer incentives to dissent (Gates et al. 2016; Walter 2015). As previously described, outrage over injustice can be a powerful motivation for individuals to turn to violent means of opposition and even join insurgency movements (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). If the state is viewed as a protector or provider of the unjust treatment, outrage can more easily translate into violent action (Cederman et al. 2013). With institutions in place that are intended to assure freedom of religion and judicial checks on the executive authority, one might create collective expectations regarding mutual security and trust among potential dissidents and the incumbent government (Walter 2015). Rebel leaders will in turn

find it more difficult to mobilize members of vulnerable groups, as they prefer status quo (Gates et al. 2016; Walter 2015).

Second, if and to the extent that the perceived threat of violent mobilization among ordinary citizens is reduced, agents of the state might be less inclined to obey orders to repress. As Davenport (2007:39) emphasises, in every statistical examination on the subject, dissent is seen to increase repressive behaviour. Protest or dissent is argued to decrease the costs of repression, as actors of the state can frame dissent as a threat to political order (Davenport 2007:40). Moreover, history has demonstrated that peaceful protesters have not always been met with brutal police force (Chenoweth and Stephan 2013). I propose that while constraining institutions can reduce the risk of dissent, it might also alter expectations among political elites. In the same manner that leaders of potential insurgency groups find it more difficult to mobilize recruits, state authorities may find it more difficult to compel agents of the state to obey orders to repress.

I should underline that a range of other factors can also determine whether members of vulnerable groups decide to dissent and if state actors turn to repression. For example, where group identify is weak, it is difficult to mobilize willing recruits, despite the lack of political or legal safeguards (Gurr 2000). In a similar manner, if income levels rise and ordinary citizens benefit from increased living standards, there will be fewer reasons to rebel (Ross 2003; Walter 2004). History has also demonstrated that in highly repressive regimes, social mobilization of any kind is less feasible as the individual cost of dissent is too high (Bellin 2012:135). There are also ample of instances where implementing constrains on the executive authority does not work according to expectations or is not welcomed by political elites (Walter 2015). As Walter (2015:1246) emphasises, "Government elites will have few incentives to build strong institutions if doing so would permanently remove them from power". She points to the example of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who was reluctant to share power with the majority Shia population, after years of repressing them (Walter 2015:1246). Roessler and Ohls (2018), on the other hand argue that self-enforcing power-sharing in weak states only occurs if the incumbent government faces a strong rival. These nuances are important, as it emphasises that the explanatory power of the theoretical argument in part depends on the specific conditions and the actors who are involved.

Yet, despite the various factors that can contribute to explain why and under what conditions members of vulnerable groups dissent and why the state applies means of repression, I stress the importance of legal and political constrains. Formal institutions may alter perceptions and expectations which in turn influence people's decisions and behaviour. Instead of producing a vicious cyclical pattern of violent dissent and state repression, constraining power-sharing institutions may provide expectations regarding mutual security and an environment in which the risk of repression is reduced. This is because the commitment problem is eased. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the pacifying effect of constraining power-sharing institutions on state repression, is expected to work via the logic of expectations which addresses the commitment problem. Based on these acknowledgements I formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Constraining institutions are negatively associated with state repression.*

Figure 3.3. Causal diagram of main theoretical argument

So far, the thesis has focused on the general relationship between power-sharing institutions and state repression. Yet, the objective is not merely to address whether the pacifying effect of power-sharing institutions on state repression depends on the specific form of power-sharing, but furthermore to assess whether the effect varies across two different contexts. More specifically I aim to identify if the effect is greater in post-conflict states. While I argue that the main theoretical argument holds across both contexts, I expect to find a stronger relationship between constraining institutions and repression in post-conflict states.

While the commitment problem can arise prior to conflict, it is more pressing in post-conflict environments (Walter 2002; Walter 2004). As Cederman et al. (2015) notes, "Once an armed conflict erupts (…) it drastically changes the relationship between the group and the incumbent government". Opponents who have recently fought, have less reason to trust one another (Walter 2004). As the government and insurgency groups find themselves in a context of mutual suspicion, the absence of safeguards might spur further dissent and repression. I therefore predict that the effect of constraining institutions is stronger in these contexts (see Figure 3.4.) Based on these acknowledgements, I formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *The negative effect of constraining institutions on state repression is greater in post-conflict states.*

Figure 3.4. Interaction between power-sharing institutions and political contexts.

3.5 The role of inclusive and dispersive power-sharing institutions

I will now briefly discuss why other forms of power-sharing institutions, namely inclusive and dispersive power-sharing, are not proposed to have a negative effect on state repression.

As previously described, inclusive power-sharing entails institutions which divide authority within the executive and legislative branches of government, while dispersive power-sharing divides power in a territorial pattern to sub-government units (Strøm et al. 2015). As such, one seeks to mitigate the risk of violent confrontation among political elites by ensuring their access to political decision-making (Graham et al. 2017). While such institutions might be fruitful in order to reduce the risk of contestation among oppositional elites, in alignment with Gates et al. (2016), I argue that they are not effective in reducing state repression. Considering the logic of expectations, I presume that elite-based institutions do not alter behaviour and practices in a sufficient manner to alleviate the commitment problem. Contrary to constraining power-sharing institutions, inclusive and dispersive power-sharing arrangements may not be as effective in terms of reducing the perceived threat of dissent. This in turn can heighten incentives for the government to restore to repressive means.

First, elite-based power-sharing institutions do not necessarily safeguard against dissent. While some groups are co-opted by the state, other vulnerable groups might be left out of the political game (Gates et al. 2016). Elite based power-sharing institutions do not necessarily gain legitimacy within the broader public (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). This in turn makes it easier to recruit and mobilize members of vulnerable groups (Gates et al. 2016). As Walter (2015:1245) illustratively argues, "Incumbent elites who are answerable to few groups in society and face few institutional restrains make bad negotiation partners". Lebanon's experience with inclusive power-sharing institutions is a stark example in this regard. While the Taif-agreement signed in the wake of the 1995-1990 civil war empowered different confessional groups with parts of executive and legislative power (Rosiny 2015), they did not ensure security and wealth for the general population. Therefore, members of vulnerable groups receding in socio-economic deprived areas such as Tripoli, have more recently become easy targets for militia groups seeking to recruit new members (Gade 2017).

Second, elite-based institutions will not necessarily make agents of the state less likely to obey orders to repress. Elites that are already co-opted will have stronger incentives to maintain status quo. If repression is seen as the only viable alternative to maintain social rest, then fewer will see the benefits of disobeying such orders. Illustratively, Kendall and Taylor (2014) find that dictators that use co-optation are more inclined to violate physical integrity

rights. They argue that this is linked to the notion that co-optation increases the number of potential rivals. More specifically they argue that once co-opted, rivals might "use their position within the system to build their own bases of support" (Kendall and Taylor 2014:332). This in turn generates incentives to increase physical integrity rights violations to mitigate possible threats (Kendall and Taylor 2014). In a similar manner Roeder (2005) argues that elite-based power-sharing institutions are more prone to violent escalation, as they give oppositional elites incentives to make extreme demands. This in turn might spur tension among empowered minority groups and the majority. Illustratively they point to the unintended consequences of power-sharing institutions implemented in wake of the 2003 US invasion in Iraq, in which confrontation between the Sunni and Shia confessional groups followed (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).

3.6   Theory-testing versus theory-building

In this chapter I have spelled out the theoretical argument of the thesis. While the overall aim is to test the theorized assumption provided by Gates et al. (2016), to some degree the thesis also aims at theory-building in the sense that I seek to better address the power-sharing and repression relationship. I argue that the theoretical extension provided in this chapter, has an added value for two reasons.

Firstly, Gates et al. (2016) apply the commitment problem as a theoretical concept to explain the relationship between power-sharing institutions and civil conflict. In this thesis the concept is more narrowly focused on the relationship between power-sharing institutions and state repression. This is an important distinction as it emphasises that commitment problems are also relevant in understanding in the appearance of repression, and not merely seeing repression as source or resolution to the commitment problem. Said differently, addressing the commitment problem is not solely important to reduce the risk of civil conflict, but furthermore in order to reduce the risk of repression.

Secondly, by including the concept of *logic of expectations,* I am able to more thoroughly

address how legal institutions can be a focal point of ambition and expectation, and thus alter behaviour. This is relevant in light of the current scholarly debate regarding the effectiveness of *de jure* power-sharing institutions versus the effectiveness of power-sharing practices[18]. As such, the logic of expectations provides a fruitful theory of how *de jure* institutions can be effective in their own right.

To summarize, in this chapter I argue that constraining power-sharing institutions can alter behaviour and practices, which in turn mitigate commitment problems and reduce repression. While institutions which encompass constraints on the executive authority are suggested to be effective in this regard, institutions which merely empower oppositional elites, are not prescribed to have the same pacifying effect. While I theorize that only constraining institutions are negatively associated with state repression, there are initially at least three possible pathways to reduce repression (as illustrated in Figure 3.4.). In order to investigate whether I find support for the theoretical expectations, I now turn to the empirical chapters.

---

[18] See Bormann et al. (2019), Cederman et al. (2018) and Graham et al. (2017).

Chapter 4

Research design

The following chapter spells out the research design and the statistical tools applied. I start off by briefly addressing why I make use of quantitative methods to answer my research question and why I focus on direct relationships. Next, I turn to the issue of endogeneity biases and confounding due to common cause, and how these issues pose a challenge to determining causal interference. In the last section I turn to the standard ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) and the logistic regression model (Logit). While the former is applied as my main model, I include results from the binary logistic regression model as an alternative model specification, as the dependent variable is neither completely continuous nor binary by nature. Finally, I elaborate on the virtues of the OLS-model versus the Logit-model. Model diagnostics and robustness checks are left for Chapter 7.

4.1   Why a quantitative design?

I have opted for a quantitative design for several reasons. While a core objective of qualitative research is to explain the outcome of individual cases, a quantitative research design is aimed at "estimating the average effect of one or more causes across a population of cases" (Mahoney and Goertz 2006:230). Mahoney and Goertz (2006) argue that qualitative research deals with the question of "causes-of-effects", while quantitative research aim at addressing "effects-of-causes". My research question is aimed at addressing general trends and associations, whereas the specific outcome of particular cases is of less concern. The quantitative approach is therefore regarded as suitable.

Moreover, in alignment with the theoretical argument of Chapter 3, I am not merely interested

in identifying whether there is a dissimilar effect of specific forms of power-sharing institutions on state repression, but also determining if the effect is contingent on the specific context. By including interaction terms in my model, the quantitative approach enables me to identify the distinct effect of various forms of power-sharing within each type of political context and identify if there is a significantly different effect across contexts. As such I am able to test *Hypothesis 2,* in which I prescribe that the effect of constraining institutions on state repression is greater in post-conflict states.

Lastly, even though the main objective of this study is to identify general associations, the quantitative design also enables me to identify whether there are particular cases that to a large extent drives the predicted effect. In other words, I can identify the cases or countries where the relationship of interest is particularly strong. I am also able to identify whether there are deviant cases, in which the assumed relationship does not work as hypothesized. The identification of such cases can contribute to understand under which conditions power-sharing institutions tend to work or not work in the prescribed manner, and thereby offers a fruitful departure for further qualitative studies.

4.2   Why focus on repression as outcome?

As illustrated in Figure 1.1, Chapter 1, my research question was motivated by the theorized assumption of Gates et al. (2016). They found a negative relationship between constraining institutions and civil conflict and theorize that the causal mechanism linking constraining institutions and civil conflict is their ability to mitigate state repression. In order to investigate this potential relationship, one could opt for a causal mediation analysis addressing the relationship between power-sharing institutions, state repression, and civil conflict.

However, due to the scope of the thesis and lack of empirical evidence of how different power-sharing institutions affect state repression across different political contexts, I focus on direct relationships and repression as an outcome. I argue that this is a necessary and fruitful first step in disentangling how these phenomena relate to one another, which will also provide

a foundation for further research. The empirical findings from the regression analysis, reported in Chapter 6, also lend support to this step-by-step approach. This is because not all theoretical assumptions presented by Gates et al. (2016) are supported in empirical terms.

Further, in addition to being a risk factor for civil conflict, repression is an important outcome in its own right. Repression includes torture, killings and human rights violations, and may imply substantial human suffering and economic costs (e.g. Davenport 2007; Carey 2010).

4.3   Causal inference and the issue of endogeneity bias

Before turning to the specific choice of models, I will address the claim of causal inference, and review criteria and challenges that arise when one seeks to achieve casually valid explanations. As my research question indicates, I am interested in establishing whether the implementation of certain forms of power-sharing arrangements decreases the risks of state repression. In alignment with the *Hypothesis 1* of Chapter 3, I predict that constraining institutions have a negative impact on state repression. As such I am making claims about causal interference. Claims of causal relationships differ from purely descriptive finding of correlation (Keele 2015). In the former I would argue that constraining institutions cause less state repression, in the latter I would argue that polities with a high score of constraining institutions also have a low score on state repression (Keele 2015).

While evidence from statistical analyses cannot provide conclusive evidence regarding causality, one can opt for a research design in which the threats are less evident (Backman 2006). Bachman (2006) emphasises three criteria which must be considered when establishing a causal relationship between X and Y. Firstly, there must be an empirical association between the independent and dependent variable. Secondly, there must be an appropriate time order. Thirdly, the relationship between the dependent and independent variable is not spurious. I will elaborate on the latter two criteria as they are most pressing.

Appropriate time order implies that variation in the independent variable must precede variation in the dependent variable. If one cannot determine whether the cause precedes the

effect, the issue of endogeneity biases can become evident (Keele 2015). Endogeneity biases arise when there is a reciprocal relationship between the dependent and independent variable. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the reciprocal relationship between X and Y, in this case between multiple forms of power-sharing institutions and state repression, might work contradictory to the assumed direction. Reversed causation could imply that countries with a low score on state repression might be more inclined to implement constraining power-sharing institutions. Or conversely, that countries with high a high score on state repression, would be less likely to implement constraining institutions.

Figure 4.1. The issue of reversed causation

The issue of endogeneity bias is especially pressing when one analyses the effect of political institutions. As Prezeworski (2004) argues, "institutions are almost always endogenously chosen". This poses a methodological challenge as the impact of political institutions depend on the specific context which they emerge within (Prezeworski 2004:527). Thus, it is necessary to include statistical adjustments in order to mitigate the risk of reversed causation and endogeneity biases. In mitigating the risk of reversed causation one strategy is to take advantage of the temporal sequence of cause and effect (Knudsen 2008:7). In accordance with Graham et al. (2017) I run alternative model specifications with time-lags ranging from two to five years[19]. More specifically I estimate the effect of the independent variables at time t on the dependent variable at time $t + 2, t + 3$ etc.

The decision to include time-lag is also related to my theoretical argument, and the *logic of*

---

[19] In Chapter 6 I report both the estimated effect in a concurrent or cross-sectional analysis and analysis with a two-year time-lag. In Chapter 7 I report further robustness checks with two-five-year time-lags.

expectations. While I theorize that different forms of power-sharing institutions differently alter actor's behaviour and practices, such processes do not work in an instance. Said differently, if a country with no prior history of constraining institutions, decides to implement such provisions, it might demand more than a year to fully see the effect of altered behaviour and practices. Thus, as it takes time to manifest expectations that are widespread among both the political elite and the general public, there is a presumed theoretical time-lag between the implementation of institutions and particular behaviour.

A second major threat to drawing causal conclusions, stems from spuriousness. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the spurious relationship implies that L is the cause of both D and Y, while the effect of Y is independent of D. Evidence from statistical analysis can wrongfully indicate that there is a relationship between D and Y, while the effect is in fact confounding due to a common cause (Keele 2015:318). In my case, this would imply that a country's given score on one of the three forms of power-sharing arrangements and a country's given score on state repression, both depend on a third variable. For instance, economic development might both affect a country's score on constraining power-sharing institutions and levels of state repression. As will be elaborated on in Chapter 5, I include several control variables in order to reduce the risk of spuriousness.

Confounding Due to a Common Cause

Figure 4.2. Spurious relationships: confounding due to a common cause (Keele 2015:318)

4.4 Choice of models: The OLS and the binary logit model

As will be described more at length in Chapter 5, my dependent variable *Repression* is based on the political terror scale (PTS). The scale runs from a low repression score of 1 to a high repression score of 5. Hence, the dependent variable is not completely continuous as it is ordinal rather than numeric. This is a disadvantage for the OLS-regression. Scholars within the human rights literature who use the PTS dataset have opted for different approaches to this issue. While a majority treat the variable as it is, on an ordinal scale, others recode it as a binary variable. Davenport and Appel (2014) for instance distinguishes between cases in which state repression becomes "institutionalized and systematic" and cases with good records of respect for physical integrity rights violations. They utilize a logistic regression model with a binary dependent variable, and thereby estimate the probability that systematic and institutionalized state repression occurs or not.

Whether one decides to maintain the dependent variable *Repression* on a continuous scale or applies a binary dependent variable has implications for the choice of models applied. The OLS-regression model rests on the assumption of a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable. With a binary dependent variable, this assumption is violated. The reason being that with a binary dependent variable, one estimates the probability that the dependent variable will have a score of either 0 or 1. If one uses an OLS-regression one is left with impossible predictions, as probabilities above or below a score of either 0 or 1 in not possible (Long 1997:35).

While both estimating techniques can be applied in the case of my thesis, I opt for a dual approach. More specifically I keep the dependent variable *Repression* on a continuous scale for my main empirical analysis applying OLS-regression, while I also run additional logistic regressions with the binary variable as a robustness check[20]. This approach ensures that information contained in the original 5-category measure are intact in the main empirical analysis, while I am also able to distinguish cases of severe repression from cases of low repression with the logistic regression model. I elaborate and test key assumptions underlying

---

[20] Results from the OLS-model are reported in Chapter 6, while results from the Logit-model are reported in Chapter 7.

the OLS-model in Chapter 7.

Chapter 5

Data

In this chapter I introduce the data, present key variables and discuss shortcomings associated with the two datasets. In the first section I present the Inclusive, Dispersive and Constraints (IDC) dataset by Strøm et al. (2015) and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) by Gibney et al. (2017). I then explain how I measure the key independent variables and the dependent variable, namely various forms of d*e jure* power-sharing arrangements and *de facto* state repression[21]. In the last section, I provide a list of control variables and present the sample, before turning to the empirical analysis in Chapter 6.

5.1   Dataset and unit of analysis

The IDC data were collected as part of the Power Sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict project, initiated by Kaare Strøm, Scott Gates and their colleagues (Strøm et al. 2015, 2017). The purpose being to collect data on various forms of power-sharing institutions in order to assess their effect on democracy and civil peace. The IDC includes a global sample covering 180 countries between 1975-2010. All independent states with a population over 250 000 are included (Strøm et al. 2015). I use replication data from Graham et al. (2017), which is based on the IDC dataset[22].

The IDC dataset includes nineteen indicators of power-sharing institutions, which are clustered in three conceptually and empirically defined forms of power-sharing arrangements. In alignment with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3, these encompass inclusive,

---

[21] As noted, the IDC dataset captures *de jure* power-sharing institutions. An alternative is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), which captures information on power-sharing practices.

[22] I detected an error in the IDC replication data for Strøm et al. (2015). I therefore utilize the replication data from Graham et al. (2017), which encompass the same key variables.

dispersive and construing institutions. The indicators on power-sharing are coded from constitutions, peace treaties and secondary sources (Gates et al. 2016:520). The unit of analysis is country-year, in which power-sharing institutions are coded as of January 1st (Strøm et al. 2015:174).

In order to conduct my analysis, I merged the IDC dataset with the PTS dataset. The PTS measures violations of physical integrity rights carried out by the state or their agents. The PTS covers 210 countries, territories and entities from 1976 to 2017. The data are provided by annual reports on human rights violations, gathered from Amnesty International, the US Department of State, and Human Rights Watch (Gibney et al. 2017). Importantly, the PTS entails information on human rights *practices*.

The unit of analysis of the PTS-data project is technically *report-year* as opposed to *country-year.* The reason being that the data sources gather information on entities and territories that are not defined as a state in the sense of full United Nations membership (Gibney et al. 2017). Contrary to the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI), the PTS furthermore include countries which have not had a functioning government, at least for a certain time period, in their sample (Wood and Gibney, 2010:397). Examples include Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

I apply *country-year* as the unit of analysis, despite the technical use of report-year in the PTS dataset. This is because the two datasets are easy to integrate when applying a country-year unit of analysis. In relation to the scope of time and space, I limit the analysis to country years between 1976-2010. While the PTS entails information until 2017, the IDC data is coded until 2010. The merged dataset which form the basis of my empirical analysis include 5806 observations[23].

---

[23] The merged dataset has a total of 9736 observations. Nonetheless, when limiting the data from year 1976-2010 and only including observations which have a valid score on PTSsum and power-sharing, N= 5132.

5.2 Dependent Variable: State repression

State repression is measured in accordance with political terror in the PTS-dataset (Gibney et al. 2017)[24]. The term "terror" refers to state violations of physical integrity rights, rather than terrorism conducted by non-state actors. In the PTS-dataset political terror is defined as "violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question" (Haschke 2017:1). Two clarifications are necessary, namely what classifies as *violations of physical integrity rights* and *agents of the state.*

Firstly, violations of physical integrity right include acts such as torture, cruel and unusual treatment and punishment, beatings, rape and sexual violence, killings and unlawful use of deadly force, extra-judicial executions, political assassination and murder, political imprisonment, arbitrary arrests and detention, forced disappearances and kidnappings (Gibney et al. 2017). These indicators are in alignment with the definition of physical integrity rights in the literature, where torture and arbitrary arrests are often provided as prime examples (Davenport 2007).

Secondly, "agents of the state" include the police, law enforcement, guards and security personnel, military and paramilitary organizations, executives and members of executive agencies and bureaucracies, members of the criminal justice and penal system, intelligence agents, militias, death squads, political parties and their organizations, mercenaries and private military contractors and foreign personnel supplementing domestic capacity. Notably, the PTS solely measures repression conducted by state actors. As such, while domestic (family) and societal (mob, clan) violence are widespread in a range of countries included in the sample, they are not represented in a country's annual score on the PTS scale (Wood and Gibney 2010).

The PTS-dataset encompasses three distinct indicators for state repression based on the

---

[24] I use the term «measurement» as the dependent variable is already operationalized by Gibney et al. (2017) and the key independent variables are operationalized by Strøm et al. (2015).

definition outlined above. The variables, named *PTS_A*, *PTS_S* and *PTS_H,* entail scores from annual reports from Amnesty International, US Department of State and Human Rights Watch. As illustrated in Table 5.1, The PTS applies a 5-point ordinal scale in order to measure political terror. A score of 1 indicates the minimum level of political terror while a score of 5 indicates the maximum level of political terror (Haschke 2017:4). More specifically, a score of 1 entail that "countries are under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional", while a score of 5 entails extensive and systematic human rights violations. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life (Haschke 2017).

The coders are instructed to consider the scope, intensity and range of state terror described in each yearly report (Haschke 2010:4). Scope refers to the type of repression conduced, intensity refers to the frequency of such acts, and range refers to the number of people targeted. As such, the distinction between a score of 3 and 4 is the severity of such violations, while the distinction between a score of 4 and 5 is related to the scope of such activities. In the former, the level of terror affects primarily those who engage in politics, while in the latter, state terror has been extended to the whole population (Haschke 2010:4).

Table 5.1: Political Terror Scale, Coding Scheme (Haschke 2017:4)

Level	Description
1	Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2	There is limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3	There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
4	Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interests themselves in politics or ideas.
5	The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

In order to conduct my empirical analysis both utilizing the OLS-model and the Logit-model I create two new variables, namely *sumPTS* and *sumPTS2*. First, I construct a new variable that entail the mean score from the annual Amnesty International reports and the annual US Department of State reports. The reason being that I want to capture state repression as one measure rather than two, and to increase the reliability of the measure by combining the two reports[25]. Scores form annual Human Rights Watch reports are not included, as they are provided after 2010.

As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the scores from Amnesty International and US Department of State reports, did diverge to a certain degree between 1976 and 1990. For robustness I therefore ran correlation tests, which indicate that the two separate measures of state repression are highly correlated, $r = 0.80$. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, for 97 % of the cases the scores are either identical or have a maximum difference of 1. This implies that there is high inter-rater agreement or reliability. The continuous mean-score variable has a mean of 2.44 and a standard deviation of 1.12.

Figure 5.1. Mean PTS-scores 1976-2017, for Amnesty International and US Department of State.

---

[25] Reliability refers to "The extent to which results are consistent over time and accurate representation of the total population under study" (Golafshani 2003).

Figure 5.2. Rater agreement for Repression (PTS score), for Amnesty International and US State Department. Pearson's $r = 0.80$ ($p < 0.001$).

Second, I construct a dichotomous dependent variable. In accordance with Davenport and Appel (2014) I apply a threshold of 3 and distinguish between cases where state repression has become institutionalized and systematic and cases with good records of states adherence to human rights practices. Countries that are given a score below 3 on the original scale are given a score of 0, while countries which scored 3 or above on the original scale are granted a score of 1. In my sample 39 % of the observations have a high score on repression.

5.2.1 Shortcomings of the PTS dataset

While the PTS is the most frequently applied indicator of state violations of citizens physical integrity rights (Haschke 2017:1; Wood and Gibney 2010), there are several shortcomings with the data in relation to my research question. The first issue relates to how one measures repression conducted by *state agents*. The PTS captures physical integrity rights violations if they are "perpetuated, sanctioned or ordered by state agents", yet it is often difficult to pin

down the extent of government involvement vis-à-vis e.g. paramilitary groups (Wood and Gibney 2010:371). The coders are instructed to leave out the incidents that are not easily attributed to state actors, yet this might contribute to inaccurate scores (Haschke 2017:3; Wood and Gibney 2010).

The second issue relates to how the PTS does not exclusively measure state repression, as it includes "non-politically motivated violence". While state repression in the literature is defined in terms of political motivated violence, the PTS includes state violence that is aimed at political, personal or monetary gains (Haschke 2017:3). As such, general police brutality, can imply a high score on the PTS scale, despite the lack of political motivation (Haschke 2017:3).

A third issue relates to the notion that the PTS measures *actual* violations of physical integrity rights (Wood and Gibney 2010:370). The implication being that some countries are granted a low score on the political terror scale, even though the government is repressive. Wood and Gibney (2010:370) provide a useful example in this regard. They illustrate that the former Soviet Union received a score of 2 or 3 in the early 1980s, despite the highly repressive characteristics of the state. They argue that in the Soviet Union,

> The USSR had engaged in massive organized violence against its population during earlier periods, coupled with the state's ability to monitor and police its population, meant that the USSR did not need to resort to high levels of explicit violence during that time in order to keep its population repressed.

The example illustrates that a previous history of state repression meant that the government did not have to turn to as repressive means in later years, in order to maintain control over its population. North Korea serves as another example in this regard. These examples demonstrate that while the PTS in most circumstances captures an accurate level of state repression, there are certain scores that do not adequately reflect realities on the ground. Despite the shortcomings of the PTS, it is regarded as the most fruitful available dataset in

order to capture state repression. The global scope, a nuanced scale and the emphasis on repression conducted by state actors, all implicate that the dataset fits my thesis question. Importantly, I do not regard the shortcomings as serious enough to doubt the validity of my study[26].

5.3 Independent variables: Power-sharing institutions

I now turn the main independent variables, namely inclusive, dispersive and constraining power-sharing arrangements. As previously described, the IDC includes 19 indictors of different power-sharing institutions. Using factor analysis Strøm et al. (2015) demonstrate that the 19 indicators cluster empirically around the three latent forms of power-sharing. Their findings show that the indicators associated with constraining arrangements load on the same factor, while indicators associated with inclusive and dispersive forms of power sharing load on a second and third factor (Strøm et al. 2015:171). Strøm et al. (2015:23) created an index for the three types of power-sharing, and weight the indicators according to how they load on the latent variable. I apply the three factor score variables as they are already available in the dataset, yet for the purpose of operationalization, I will map out the different indicators included in the three latent variables.

5.3.1 Inclusive power-sharing

The variable *inclusive* power-sharing consists of *grand coalitions*, *mutual veto* and *reserved seats* in the executive positions for specific minority groups (Strøm et al. 2015:13). *Grand coalitions* capture both a de jure component, which include those authorised by a constitution or a peace treaty, and a de facto grand coalition in e.g. governments of national unity. Representation of minority groups are included in the form of *mutual veto* for minority groups, *reserved executive positions, reserved seats in the legislative body* and *inclusive*

---

[26] Validity refers to the degree that one measures what one attempts to measure (Golafshani 2003).

military. The latter implies that major ethnic, religious or linguistic groups are represented in the military or that the army represents different regions. The *Grand coalition* and *Unity Government* are weakest associated with the latent variable, inclusive power-sharing (Strøm et al. 2015:15) (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Inclusive power-sharing institutions based on Strøm et al. (2015)

Indicators
Mandated Grand Coalition or Unity government
Mutual Veto
Reserved Seats Legislative Positions
Reserved Executive Positions
Inclusive Military

5.3.2 Dispersive power-sharing

Strøm et al. (2015:172) capture dispersive power sharing in three distinct dimensions (see Table 5.3). Firstly, they include the access of power allocated to subnational governments. This is measured by subnational authorities' control over *subnational tax*, *subnational educations systems*, and *subnational police authority*. They also include measures of the accountability of subnational authorities to their citizens, by including a measure of subnational *state elections* and subnational *representation* in the upper house (Strøm et al. 2015:172).

Table 5.3: Dispersive power-sharing institutions based on Strøm et al. (2015).

Indicators
Subnational Education Authority
Subnational Tax Authority
Subnational Police Authority
Constituency Alignment
State Elections

5.3.3 Constraining power-sharing

The variable *constraining power-sharing* reflects whether the constitution or peace treaty assures religious practice, *Religion Protected (de jure)*, and freedom from discrimination based on religious affiliation, *Religion Protected (de facto)* (Strøm et al. 2015:173). Strøm et al. (2015) also code if members of the armed forces are restricted from serving in the legislative, *military legislator ban,* and whether there is an *ethnic party ban.* In addition, the factor variable includes measures of *judicial review, judicial tenure* and *judicial constitution* (see Table 5.4). The indicators reflect the degree of judicial check on the authority of elected officials (Strøm et al. 2015:173).

Table 5.4: Constraining power-sharing institutions based on Strøm et al. (2015)

Indicators
Religion Protected de facto and de jure
Military Legislator Ban
Ethnic Party Ban
Judicial Constitution
Judicial Review
Judicial Tenure

As illustrated in Table 5.5, the three variables encompass different minimum and maximum values and encompasses quite dissimilar distribution of scores. While the constraining and dispersive variables have quite evenly distributed values, the inclusive variable is very skewed. The reason being that quite few states in the full sample have inclusive power-sharing provision, in terms of institutions which guarantee minority representation in government or in the armed forced. The three variables have a similar mean value as all three variables are standardized factor scores. I maintain the three variables on their original scale, as it contributes to maintain as much information as possible.

Table 5.5: Summary statistics: Independent variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Skew.	N
Inclusive	0.03	0.91	-0.20	7.35	5.19	5402
Dispersive	0.04	0.89	-0.77	2.13	1.06	5402
Constraining	-0.02	0.91	-1.49	1.23	-0.31	5402

5.3.4 Shortcomings and strengths of the IDC dataset

As with the PTS-dataset, there are certain aspects of the IDC dataset which are important to highlight as they have implications for my empirical conclusions. First, contrary to the dominant approach in the literature on power-sharing institutions, the IDC data offers a global sample. As noted, all independent states with a population over 250 000 are included. This is a significant shift as most studies which estimate the benefits and drawbacks of power-sharing institutions, merely assess their effect in post-conflict states (Cederman et al. 2018). The global sample is thus an advantage as it enables one to test the effect of power-sharing institutions across different political contexts. Cederman et al. (2018) applaud this shift as it aligns with the more recent focus on addressing the preventive effect of power-sharing institutions as opposed to seeing them merely as a conflict resolution tool.

A second advantage is that the global sample provides more precise statistical results, as the number of observations is a great deal bigger than samples merely consisting of post-conflict states. Scholars applying the IDC dataset argue that the use of a global sample reduced the risk of biases, as power-sharing institutions in post-conflict states are not implemented on a random basis (Strøm et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016; Cederman et al. 2018). This in turn is prescribed to reduce selective problems (Strøm et al. 2015).

There are also a few methodological challenges associated with applying a global sample. Most importantly, one is left with a very heterogeneous sample in which the issue of omitted variable bias becomes more pressing (Keele 2015). With a heterogeneous sample it is more difficult to estimate whether the variance in the dependent variable is in fact affected by the

key independent variable, or other confounding causes. Countries with very dissimilar historical trajectories, levels of economic development and political systems, obtain a similar score on the key independent variables. Illustratively, Norway, Qatar and Tanzania all have a low score on inclusive power-sharing, while Lebanon, Finland and Iran have a high score on inclusive power-sharing.

In sum, despite certain limitations, the IDC dataset is regarded as suitable in answering my research question. While the global scope is a disadvantage in terms of omitted variable bias, it enables me to assess the effect of various forms of power-sharing institutions in a great number of states, across different political contexts.

5.4 Control variables

In the next section I will spell out the control variables applied in the regression analysis. I follow the dominant approach in the human rights literature and include economic development operationalized as *GDP per capita*, logged *population* of the state and *civil war* as control variables (e.g. Davenport and Appel 2014). I also include the variable *year,* as this covariate is correlated with the independent variable *constraining power-sharing* and the dependent variable, *repression*. Finally, I include the variable *post-civil war,* in order to estimate if the effect varies in a full sample and in post-conflict states. In general terms control variables are included to estimate the adjusted effect of the included independent variables, and thereby improve the model's explanatory power (Christophersen 2013). All control variables are available in the replication data from Graham et al. (2017). I will briefly outline how these variables are coded and why I include them in the model.

5.4.1 Civil war and post-civil war

The covariates *civil war* and *post-civil war* are included in the model for two reasons. Firstly,

empirical findings demonstrate that state repression is highly associated with internal armed conflict and that repression tends to persist in the wake of civil war (Davenport 2007). Secondly, I aim to identify whether the effect of constraining power-sharing institutions differs across different political contexts. I include the *post-civil war* covariate in an interaction term with the variable *constraining power-sharing*. I operationalize civil war in accordance with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In order to be coded as a civil war, the government must be a party to the conflict. The UCDP applies a 1000 battle-death threshold in order to identify civil war cases. This distinguished civil war from civil conflict, as the latter encompasses a 25 battle-death threshold[27].

5.4.2 GDP per capita

I furthermore include *GDP per capita* which is a proxy for economic development, as a control variable in the regression model. Within in the human rights literature, scholars have found mixed results regarding the effect of economic indicators (Davenport 2007:88). Nonetheless, as emphasised by Davenport (2007) there are several theoretical justifications for including economic development in the model. Most importantly, state repression is commonly a result of a lack of viable alternatives. Davenport (2007:87) argues that "by this logic, when societies are poor and populations are large, fewer resources are available for influence such as bribery, high wages and welfare payment". Therefore, political authorities are compelled to rely on repression.

5.4.3 Population size

Following the same logic as including GDP per capita, I furthermore include *population size* as a control variable. While the effect of GDP per capita has had mixed results, population size is shown to have a significant negative effect across a range of studies on human rights violations (Poe and Tate 1994). Such demographic factors are regarded as an important influence for state repression. States with a larger population tend to apply more repressive means (Davenport 2007). Both GDP per capita and population size are logged.

---

[27] Note that while I apply a threshold of 1000 battle related deaths per year, I also use both the term "civil conflict" and "civil war" to describe internal armed conflict.

5.4.4 Year

Lastly, I include the covariate *year* in the regression model, which covers the time-period between 1976-2010. As I will explain and elaborate on in Chapter 6, the descriptive statistics demonstrate that the dependent variable, *repression,* and the independent variable *constraining power-sharing,* are positively correlated with the covariate *year.* Said differently, global trends indicate that both constraining institutions and state repression have become more prevalent with time. As both variables correlate with a cofounder, it is necessary to include the covariate in the regression model in order to obtain more correct estimates.

5.5 Sample

I differentiate between a full sample consisting of all states and a sub-sample consisting of post-conflict states. The full sample consists of states with no prior history of civil war, states currently in civil war, and post-conflict states. In accordance with Graham et al. (2017) I apply a fifteen-year threshold in order to define post-conflict states. Hence, the sub-sample include countries that currently are not in war, but which have experienced civil war during the past fifteen years.

Chapter 6

Empirical analysis

In the following chapter I present and discuss the key empirical findings. First, I present descriptive statistics, encompassing the mean level of the various forms of power-sharing arrangements and state repression, across different political contexts and across time. Second, I present the regression results from the ordinary least squares regression model. I distinguish between predictions of concurrent levels of state repression and predictions of repression when the independent variables are lagged. In the last section I discuss the findings considering the broader theoretical framework of the thesis and elaborate on their implications.

6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations

The mean value and confidence intervals of the three forms of power-sharing institutions within three conflict sub-groups are reported in Figure 6.1. While I distinguish between three conflict sub-groups in the presentation of the descriptive statistics, I merely apply a full sample and one sub-sample in the regression analysis. As illustrated, constraining arrangements are most frequent in states without a violent history of internal armed conflict, while less common in states currently in conflict and in post-conflict states. In a dissimilar manner, inclusive power-sharing arrangements are most frequent in post-conflict states and states currently in conflict, and less frequent in states with no prior history of internal armed conflict. This is not surprising, given that inclusive power-sharing institutions are often implemented as a conflict resolution tool in post-conflict states (Strøm et al. 2015). Finally, Figure 6.1. illustrates that dispersive power-sharing arrangements are least common in post-conflict states and most common in states with no history of armed conflict.

Figure 6.1. Mean Values, and 95% confidence intervals, of Powersharing, by sub groups

Turning to the dependent variable, Figure 6.2 illustrates the average level of state repression measured according to the PTS-scale, across the three distinct conflict sub-groups. The mean value of state repression in states without a history of civil conflict is 2.04, implying that there is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, few people are affected, and torture and beatings are rare (Haschke 2017:4). States currently in conflict have a much higher mean score, reaching almost the highest level at 4.04. In accordance with the PTS-scale, such a level entails that the civil and political rights violations have been extended to large parts of the population, and murders, disappearances and torture occur on a frequent basis. In post-conflict states, the level of state repression has decreased to 3.25. A score above 3.0 is nonetheless regarded as high, as there is extensive use of political imprisonment, unlimited detention and political murders and brutality may be common (Haschke 2017:4). The trends illustrated in Figure 6.2 corresponds with previous empirical findings in the human rights literature (Davenport 2007). Given that repression fuels conflict, a score of 3.25 in post-conflict states contributes to understand why sixty percent of conflict-ridden countries experience recurring conflict (Gates et al. 2016b).

Figure 6.2. Mean Repression score for Other (without current or recent civil conflict), Current civil conflict, and Post-conflict countries

Descriptive statistics are also useful in order to detect trends over time. Figure 6.3. and 6.4. illustrate the average yearly value for the three types of power-sharing institutions and state repression. As illustrated constraining power-sharing institutions increase between 1976 and 2010. The trend of dispersive and inclusive arrangements is contrary quite flat[28]. Simultaneously, state repression has had a steady upward trend from 1976-2005, while decreasing slightly from 2005. There is also substantial variation in developments of repression (1976-2010) across countries. For illustration, see Figure 9.1 in appendix B, which shows development trajectories of repression for a selected set of states.

---

[28] Graham et al. (2017) find similar trends.

58

Figure 6.3. Trends of Power-Sharing 1976-2010

Figure 6.4. Trends of Repression 1976-2010

The descriptive statistics have so far demonstrated that the mean value of the three key independent variables and the dependent variable varies across the different political contexts and across time. It also demonstrates that there seems to be a variation in terms of which

specific institutions are implemented and in levels of state repression. On the one hand constraining institutions are frequent in states without a history of violent armed conflict, where levels of repression are low. On the other hand, inclusive institutions are frequent in post-conflict contexts, where levels of repression are high. Given that constraining institutions are negatively related to conflict (Gates et al. 2016), these tendencies are not surprising.

Before I turn to the main regression analysis in the next section, I will briefly discuss how the multiple forms of power-sharing correlate with the dependent variable, state repression. I distinguish between a full sample encompassing all states and a sub-sample encompassing post-conflict states. As illustrated in Table 6.1, constraining institutions correlate $r = -0.20$ (p<.001) with state repression in the full sample and correlate $r = -0.10$ (p<.001) in the sub-sample. A negative correlation implies that countries with higher levels of constraining institutions have on average lower levels of state repression. Dispersive power-sharing correlate $r = -0.13$ (p<.001) in the full sample, while there seems to be no correlation in the sub-sample of post-conflict states. Lastly, inclusive power-sharing institutions correlate rather low with state repression, with $r = 0.016$ (p=0.22) in the full sample and $r = -0.005$ (p=0.87) in the sub-sample.

Table 6.1: Correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable

	All states	Post-Conflict States
Constraining	-0.206 ***	-0.102 **
Dispersive	-0.131 ***	0.008 n.s.
Inclusive	0.017 n.s.	-0.005 n.s.

The descriptive statistics and correlations indicate that constraining and dispersive power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with state repression in the full sample, while only constraining institutions are negatively associated with state repression in the sub-sample. These trends lend support to *Hypothesis 1* but are also surprising given the pacifying effect of dispersive power-sharing in the full sample. In order to estimate the controlled effect

of the main independent variables and include interaction terms, I now turn to the regression analysis.

6.2 Regression analysis: Effect of power-sharing on repression in the full sample and sub-sample

In order to estimate the effect of the three independent variables on state repression, I start off by predicting concurrent repression in a full sample consisting of all states (see Table 6.2) and a sub-sample consisting of post-conflict states (see Table 6.3). The first column of Table 6.2 (Model 1) reports the individual effects of each form of power-sharing institutions. In the second column (Model 2), I include the multiple forms of power-sharing in the same model, and thereby estimate the isolated effect of each form of power-sharing institutions. In the third column (Model 3), I include the key control variables, namely GDP per capita logged, log-transformed population size, civil war, and year. In the fourth column (Model 4) I include an interaction term between constraining institutions and post-civil war, in order to estimate whether the effect of constraining power-sharing institutions is significantly different in other states and in post-conflict states. Table 6.3, which includes results from the sub-sample of post-conflict states, is organized in the same way. In order to take into account dependency in the data, I utilize robust clustered standard errors, clustered on country [2930].

---

[29] I follow the approach recommended by Beck and Katz (1995, 2001) by applying robust SE. Yet, for robustness I run the alternative model specifications with fixed effects, as recommended by Green, Kim, Yoon (2001). See Chapter 7.

[30] Table 6.2 and 6.3 report unstandardized coefficients. Corresponding tables with standardized coefficients are reported in appendix A (See Table 9.1. and 9.2).

Table 6.2 Prediction of Concurrent Repression in the global sample, Linear Model

	All States			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constraining	-0.249 ***	-0.222 **	-0.192 ***	-0.176 ***
	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Dispersive	-0.160	-0.075	-0.149 **	-0.142 *
	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Inclusive	0.021	0.041	0.076 *	0.044
	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Log GDP per capita			-0.302 ***	-0.261 ***
			(0.038)	(0.039)
Log population size			0.253 ***	0.226 ***
			(0.027)	(0.027)
Civil war			1.173 ***	1.225 ***
			(0.109)	(0.105)
Year			0.019 ***	0.017***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Post-Civil war				0.476***
				(0.084)
Constraining x Post-Civil war				0.074
				(0.065)
Constant		2.513***	-36.138 ***	-33.533***
		(0.067)	(5.155)	(5.436)
N		5134	5108	4736
R²		0.046	0.481	0.506

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

313233

---

[31] The power-sharing variables correlate between $r=0$ and $r=0.40$.

Table 6.3 Prediction of Concurrent Repression in the sub-sample, Linear Model

	Post-Conflict States		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constraining	-0.104 ***	-0.144 ***	-0.157***
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Dispersive	0.009	0.097 *	-0.050
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.029)
Inclusive	-0.003	-0.010	0.032
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.044)
Log GDP per capita			-0.129 ***
			(0.034)
Log population size			0.220 ***
			(0.021)
Year			0.015***
			(0.003)
Constant		3.260 ***	-29.649 ***
		(0.025)	(2.716)
N		1011	1006
R^2		0.015	0.149

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Turning to the interpretation of the coefficients, I start with the effect of constraining institutions on state repression in the full sample (see Table 6.2). In all four models there is a significant negative effect of constraining power-sharing institutions on concurrent levels of state repression (p<.001). In other words, lower levels of constraining power-sharing institutions are associated with higher levels of state repression. The size of the coefficient varies across the four models according to the inclusion of different control variables, with a negative coefficient of 0.222 in Model 2 versus a negative coefficient of 0.192 in Model 3. In

---

[32] Model 4 has lower N, due to the inclusion of the co-variate Post-Civil War, which has more NAs.
[33] The low constant is due to the covariate *year*.

terms of interpretations, this implies that the mean value of the dependent variable decreases 0.192 with a one unit-shift in the independent variable, while holding other covariates in the model constant. While the effect of constraining institutions on state repression is not particularly strong, I find support for *Hypothesis 1*, in which I predict that there is a negative relationship between constraining institutions and state repression. The fact that the coefficient is negative in all four models and is significant at the one percent level, strengthens the statistical conclusions.

Turning to the sub-sample of post-conflict states, the negative relationship between constraining power-sharing institutions and state repression persists (see Table 6.3). When holding the other variables constant, the mean value of the dependent variable *Repression* decreases 0.157 with a unit change in the independent variable (see Table 6.3 Model 3). The findings lend support to the theoretical argument of Chapter 3, in which I argue that the prescribed relationship between constraining institutions and state repression holds across different political contexts. Turning to the question of whether the effect of constraining institutions on state repression is significantly stronger in post-conflict states, as stipulated in *Hypothesis 2*, the results indicate that this is not the case. The interaction term included in Model 4 Table 6.2, is positive and non-significant with a coefficient of 0.074. The interaction term indicates that there is not a significant different effect across the two political contexts.

I now turn to the effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression in the full sample (see Table 6.3). Contrary to my theoretical prediction spelled out in Chapter 3, there is in fact a negative and significant effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression in the full sample ($p < 0.05$)[34]. The mean of the dependent variable decreases 0.149 with one-unit shift in the independent variable, when controlling for covariates. Importantly, an alternative model specification illustrates that the results are highly affected by the covariate *population size*. When excluding the log-transformed covariate from Model 3, power-sharing has a positive coefficient of 0.064. Hence, the results seem to be highly sensitive to the covariate, as both the size and direction of the coefficient changes. Simultaneously, the coefficient for the variable constraining power-sharing does not alter in a substantial manner in the alternative model specification, with a negative coefficient of 0.192

---

[34] The coefficient for dispersive power-sharing is $p < 0.01$ in Model 3 and $p < 0.05$ in Model 4.

(p <0.001). A closer look at the data indicates that both China and India entail a high score on dispersive power-sharing and population size, which might explain the initial negative effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions.

Interestingly the effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression changes in the sub-sample. While the coefficient appears to be relatively strong, significant and negative in the full-sample, dispersive power-sharing has no significant effect on state repression in post-conflict states when holding other covariates constant. More specifically, the individual effect of dispersive power sharing on state repression is positive and significant (p<0.05) in Model 2, with a coefficient of 0.097, while it is negative and non-significant with a coefficient of 0.050 in Model 3. These findings indicate that the effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression depends on the specific political context and are sensitive to influential cases. Again, it is necessary to emphasise that the effect reported in Table 6.2 was in large part affected by the covariate population size.

Inclusive power-sharing institutions seem to have a small but significant positive effect on state repression in the full sample. As illustrated in Model 3 of Table 6.2, the mean value of the dependent variable state repression increases 0.076 with a one-unit change in the independent variable, inclusive power-sharing. Meaning that higher levels of inclusive power-sharing institutions are associated with higher levels of state repression in the full sample. In the sub-sample of post-conflict states the coefficient for inclusive power-sharing continues to be positive with a coefficient of 0.032, yet not significant. The effect of inclusive power-sharing on state repression is rather small both in the full sample and in the sub-sample. As such it is difficult to conclude that inclusive power-sharing institutions increase repression in a substantial manner, yet it is evident that these institutions are not fruitful in order to mitigate state repression. The lack of a strong or negative relationship between inclusive power-sharing institutions and state repression persists across the different political contexts, supporting the assumption presented in Chapter 3.

Lastly, all control variables, namely GDP per capita, log-transformed population size, year and civil war, are significantly related to state repression. In fact, excluding year, the covariates are the strongest predictors of state repression across all models. In alignment with

previous empirical findings in the human rights literature, population size logged is positively associated with state repression with a coefficient of 0.253 and significant at the one percent level. As illustrated with the alternative model specification, the regression results are very sensitive to this specific covariate. While the effect of GDP per capita on state repression has received more mixed results in the human rights literature (Davenport 2007), it is evidently negatively associated with state repression, with a negative coefficient of 0.302 in Model 3 Table 6.3. The covariate civil war is also positively associated with state repression, with a covariate of 1.173, while *year* is positively associated with state repression with a coefficient of 0.019 in Model 3.

In sum, results from Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 lend support to *Hypothesis 1*. The effect of constraining institutions continues to be significant and negative independent of the political context, which indicates that the theoretical argument is valid in both contexts. In regard to *Hypothesis 2*, I find no support for the claim that the effect of constraining institutions is stronger in post-conflict states. This indicates that that the effect of constraining institutions on state repression is very similar in the two contexts. The findings also suggest that the relationship between dispersive power-sharing institutions and state repression runs contrary to the assumed relationship in the full sample, yet the findings are highly sensitive to the covariate *population size*. In the sub-sample the effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions is neither significant nor negative, indicating that the pacifying effect does not endure in these contexts. Finally, the regression analysis demonstrate that inclusive power-sharing institutions are not negatively associated with state repression, as predicted in Chapter 3. These tendencies persist independent of the political context, as the coefficient continues to be non-significant and positive in post-conflict states. All additional control variables are highly and statistically related to state repression and are the strongest predictors in my models. I will discuss the implications of these findings more thoroughly in the last section of this chapter, but first I will turn to regression analysis with a two-year time-lag.

6.3 Introducing time-lags

As described in Chapter 4, including time-lags in the regression analysis can be a useful statistical tool in order to mitigate the risk of wrongful causal conclusion. In my main models,

reported in Table 6.2 and 6.3, there is in fact an inherent time-lag in the sense that the three power-sharing institutions are measured 1st of January each year while state repression is measured with a mean score of every year. In the last section I nonetheless run additional analyses to estimate if the effect of power-sharing institutions on state repression differs if I include a two-year time-lag for the independent variables. Thus, Table 6.4 reports predictions with a two-year lag, in the full sample (columns to the left) and in the sub-sample (columns to the right).

Results from Model 1 and 2 (see Table 6.4) in the full sample illustrate that the effect of the multiple forms of power-sharing institutions on state repression are stable with a two-year time-lag. In fact, the effect of constraining institutions, controlled for other covariates, is slightly stronger when including a time-lag. While the coefficient for constraining power-sharing is negative and significant at 0.192 for concurrent repression, the coefficient is negative and significant at 0.198 in the lagged regression model. The increase is not of substantial manner, but it strengthens my causal argument. It also lends support to the assumption that it might take time to see the full effect of *de jure* institutions on state repression, as argued in Chapter 4. Formal institutions do not necessarily affect expectations and behaviour in an instance, but rather takes time to manifest. The effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions on state repression is also stable in the full sample with a negative and significant coefficient of 0.151. Finally, inclusive power-sharing institutions have about the same effect in both analyses.

Turning to the lagged analysis in the sub-sample, constraining power-sharing institutions continues to have a significant negative effect on state repression. Contrary to the analysis of concurrent repression, dispersive power-sharing is also negatively associated with state repression in post-conflict states with a two-year time-lag. The coefficient is nonetheless highly sensitive to the covariate population size. Inclusive power-sharing is not associated with state repression in a significant manner, neither in analyses of concurrent repression nor lagged[35]. In sum, the results seem to be quite robust across time-lags for constraining and inclusive institutions, while being less robust for dispersive power-sharing institutions.

---

[35] See Chapter 7 for alternative model specifications, including 2-5-year time-lags.

Table 6.4 Prediction of repression with a two-year time-lag for independent variables, Linear Model

	All States		Post-Conflict States	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constraining	-0.226 ***	-0.198 ***	-0.123 ***	-0.117 ***
	(0.068)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Dispersive	-0.074	-0.151 **	0.067	-0.111 **
	(0.088)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.042)
Inclusive	0.030	0.066 *	-0.023	-0.030
	(0.078)	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.044)
Log GDP per capita		-0.330 ***		-0.127 ***
		(0.039)		(0.033)
Log population size		0.262 ***		0.253 ***
		(0.027)		(0.033)
Year		0.017***		0.012 ***
		(0.002)		(0.001)
Civil war		1.034 ***		
		(0.105)		
Constant		-32.372 ***	3.211 ***	-24.346 ***
		(4.981)	(0.026)	(3.203)
N	5.285	5.258	1030	1025

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Before addressing the implications of these findings, I will briefly comment upon the fact that all coefficients are rather small, independent of the sample applied and concurrent or lagged repression. Graham et al. (2017) utilize the same IDC dataset in their study where they estimate the effect of the specific forms of power-sharing institutions on democratic survival. The scholars emphasise that as the IDC dataset chiefly consists of *de jure* power-sharing institutions as opposed to power-sharing practices, one can expect to find rather small effects (Graham, et al. 2017:5). They argue that, "To the extent power-sharing rules on the books are not thoroughly enforced, this approach reduced the probability that we will observe strong

effects. If anything, the results should therefore be biased against our expectation" (Graham, et al. 2017:5). While I argue that formal power-sharing institutions can have a direct effect by shaping expectations, the same argument is applicable for this thesis, and in part contributes to explain why the estimated effects are rather small. The small effects also stem from the fact that a range of other factors predict state repression. As illustrated in table 6.2, the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables, increases substantially when the control variables are included in the model.

6.4 Discussion and implications

In this chapter I set out to empirically investigating the following research question: "How do different *de jure* power-sharing institutions affect the de facto occurrence of state repression, across different political contexts?". The statistical results presented in this chapter contribute to our understanding of the empirical link between multiple forms of power-sharing institutions and state repression. The findings suggest that power-sharing institutions can reduce state repression, yet, their mitigating effect is highly dependent on the specific form of power-sharing and in part on the specific political context. In the following, I will elaborate on three key findings and return to the question of which institutional pathway is most viable in reducing state repression.

First, the negative association between constraining power-sharing institutions and state repression, lend support to *Hypothesis 1* and the theorized assumption made by Gates et al. (2016). Independent of conflict group, constraining institutions, which are characterized by independent judiciaries, military legislative bans and freedom of religion, seem to reduce the risk of repression. The findings can be interpreted within the theoretical framework of the logic of expectations. It is plausible that constraining institutions may produce certain expectations among ordinary citizens and agents of the state, in a pacifying manner. Higher levels of constraining power-sharing institutions might provide collective expectations regarding mutual security. Such institutions can signalise that state authorities' value

individual rights and are willing to share power with a broader set of actors and institutions. This is crucial, as perceptions of mutual security may influence people's behaviour. Marginalised groups may restrain from acts of dissent if the fear of being repressed is eased. This may in turn contribute to lower the risk of reciprocal acts of state repression. Beliefs regarding mutual security should contribute to make commitment problems less tenacious.

The findings support previous empirical research in the human rights literature, addressing the effect of various domestic legal institutions (Cross 1999; Davenport 1999; Keith, Tate and Poe 2009; Powell and Station 2009). While a growing body of literature has assessed the virtues of independent courts and constitutional guarantees, most fail to take into consideration how legal institutions can affect the prospects of state repression after civil war. As such, the findings contribute to a more nuanced and contextual understanding of their effectiveness. In broader terms, the findings may imply that cyclical patterns of violence, or political conflict traps, are less probable in societies with constraining power-sharing institutions. While I did not find support for *Hypothesis 2*, the negative effect of constraining institutions continues to be stable independent of context. As such, constraining power-sharing institutions may be fruitful both as a preventive measure before conflict, and as a conflict resolution tool in the wake of conflict.

The second key finding is that dispersive power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with state repression in the full sample consisting of all states, while not being effective in post-conflict states. While these findings run contrary to the theoretical expectations of this thesis and assumptions presented by Gates et al. (2016), previous findings in the power-sharing literature find similar tendencies (e.g. Cederman et al. 2015). In their study of power-sharing institutions on civil conflict onset and recurrence, Cederman et al. (2015) find that decentralization has a significant conflict-preventing effect where there is no prior conflict history. Yet, in post-conflict states, the scholars find that decentralization is not negatively associated with civil conflict recurrence (Cederman et al. 2015). In a similar manner, the results reported here indicate that dispersive power-sharing institutions are merely effective in reducing state repression in a global sample. This raises a puzzle in terms of why they are idiosyncratic to the political context.

In terms of theoretical explanations, the context-dependent effect may indicate that in a climate of mutual suspicion which characterizes post-conflict societies, granting sub-units of government greater autonomy is not sufficient to address commitment problems. While sub-national branches of government are granted access to power, there are not necessarily any guarantees safeguarding ordinary citizens. Considering the logic of expectations, decentralisation may not alter expectations regarding mutual security and thereby influence behaviour in a pacifying manner. It is also possible that only some regional sub-units are granted autonomy in the wake of civil conflict, while others sub-units are not. This in turn might contribute to make it easier to recruit members of potential insurgency groups in sub-units which are left out of the political realm, and thereby raise the risk of repression from the national authorities.

Notably constraining and dispersive power-sharing institutions are quite highly correlated ($r =$ 0.39). This indicates that states that have implemented *de jure* constraining power-sharing institutions are also more likely to have dispersive power-sharing institutions in place. Meanwhile, both arrangements have a unique negative effect on repression in the full sample. Another important nuance is that IDC-data does not provide information regarding constraining institutions at sub-regional levels of government. As such, I am not able to identify whether the pacifying effect of dispersive institutions are affected by the appearance of constraining institutions at the sub regional level.

Turning to the last institutional design assessed here, namely inclusive power-sharing, the findings indicate that such provisions do not hinder state repression. In terms of theoretical explanations, it seems plausible that elite mechanisms characterizing these institutions are not effective in altering behaviour and practices in a peaceful manner. More specifically, while inclusive power-sharing institutions include elites representing minority groups in central decision-making, they do not necessarily provide security for ordinary citizens. Without guarantees for the protection of ordinary citizens, members of vulnerable groups might be more inclined to take to the streets in order to change status quo. Especially in cases where elites representing oppositional groups do not act in the best interest of the people which they are set out to represent (Jarstad 2008). The findings correspond with Martin (2013), who find

that contrary to the prevalent view that elite power-sharing institutions foster stability in post-conflict settings, such institutions can be unstable.

6.4.1 Pathways to reduce repression

Returning to Figure 3.4. presented in Chapter 3, which stipulates three possible pathways to reduce repression, the findings suggest that both route B and C are viable in the global sample. While I predicted that constraining institutions is the favourable design to reduce repression, dispersive power-sharing seems to have a pacifying effect in the full sample. The findings may indicate that as long as power is dispersed away from central decision-making, power-sharing institutions can be effective in reducing state repression in general terms. Either in the form of constraining institutions, where power is shared among the political elite and the ordinary citizens, or in vertical terms between national and sub-national units of government. Yet, in post-conflict societies, only constrains on the executive authority, seem to be a valuable pathway.

Turning to the broader debate regarding the virtues of power-sharing institutions, the findings suggest that power-sharing is not a panacea for state repression. Power-sharing by itself is not sufficient in order to reduce repression and particular types of power-sharing might even have an enhancing effect. Nonetheless, constraining and partly dispersive power-sharing institutions, seem to reduce the risk of repression. These findings correspond to previous research conducted by Roeder and Rothchild (2005). They argue that institutions that effectively set constrains on the executive authority and implement checks and balances, are the best way to reduce violence (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). While their conceptualization of power-dividing institutions is not identical to constraining and dispersive arrangements, the idea of dividing power among a set of actors is quite similar.

Regarding policy recommendations, the findings indicate that policy makers engaged in conflict-prevention and post-conflict settlement work, should promote institutions that provide security for a broader set of actors. Elite-oriented institutions which do not provide

security for ordinary citizens, are not effective in addressing the issue of repression. Yet, in order to enable peace agreements, some form of inclusive or dispersive power-sharing might be necessary (e.g. Sisk 1994; Binningsbø 2013; Bormann et al. 2018). As such, one should opt for a solution where constraining institutions are combined with other forms of power-sharing. This enables one to guarantee elites access to power and simultaneously give the masses credible commitments on behalf of the government. While institutions that safeguard the masses and constrain executive authority are the most viable in order to reduce the risk of repression, elite-oriented institutions might be necessary in order to make elites more willing to give such guarantees.

Chapter 7

Model fit and robustness

Having presented the key empirical findings in Chapter 6, it is necessary to briefly discuss whether the assumptions underlying the OLS-model are sufficiently met and discuss the robustness of the findings. More specifically, I set out to investigate whether the results are affected by model misspecifications and biases. In order to test the OLS-assumptions, I focus on Table 6.2 Model 4, consisting of the full sample of concurrent repression. I furthermore estimate a series of additional models to test the robustness of my findings. I utilize a logistic regression model as an alternative estimating technique and run the analysis with a range of different time-lags. I also run the analysis with fixed effects as an alternative to the use of robust clustered standard errors and run analyses where I exclude influential cases. The chapter demonstrates that key assumptions are met, and that the key results are quite robust across different model specifications.

7.1 Assumptions for the OLS-model

While the OLS-regression model is favoured for its easy interpretation and transparency, it rests on several assumptions in order to give the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) [36]. By "best", one is referring to estimators with lowest variance compared to other estimating techniques (Long 1997:18). Kennedy (2008) offers a list of five key assumptions:

1. The dependent variable can be calculated as a linear function of a set of specific independent variables and an error term.

---

[36] Assumptions were tested before I ran the analysis presented in Chapter 6. I nonetheless chose to present model diagnostics and robustness checks together in Chapter 7.

2. The expected value of the disturbance term is zero.

3. The disturbance terms have the same variance and are not correlated[37].

4. Observations on the independent variable can be considered fixed in finite samples.

5. There are more observations than independent variables, and there are no exact linear relationships between independent variables.

The first assumption relates to whether the regression equation is specified correctly (Kennedy 2008:93). Firstly, the equation can be wrongly specified if the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is in fact not linear, but rather u-shaped. The u-shaped or invert u-shaped form implies that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable differs for low, middle and high scores (Knutsen 2008). In order to test the linearity assumption, I apply a scatter plot which illustrates the distribution of the residuals for each variable included in Model 4, Table 6.2. As the plot demonstrates (see Figure 9.2 in appendix B), the assumption is sufficiently met, as the relationships appear to be linear.[38]

Secondly, the regression equation might not be specified correctly due to omitted variable bias (Kennedy 2008:94). The bias becomes apparent if one or several relevant variables which are left out of the model correlates with an included independent variable (Long 1997:24). More specifically, the omitted variable will be reflected in the error terms, which in turn will correlate with the independent variable which is included. As a result, the regression coefficients will give inconsistent results, as the effect of the independent variable can be over or underestimated (Kennedy 2008). In order to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I included a range of control variables based on theoretical assessments.[39]

The third assumption relates to the error term and the issues of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Kennedy 2008:112). The former appears if the error term does not have constant variance, in which it is homoscedastic. If the assumption is violated, one can

---

[37] Note, «disturbance term refers to real world deviations from the real-world linear relationship, whereas error term refers to the estimated deviation from the estimated linear relationship» (Knutsen 2008:2).

[38] Both GDP per capita and population size are logged, which contributes to make the relationship linear.

[39] Contrary to other studies on repression, I do not include democracy in the model. The reason being that it overlaps with my measure of constraining institutions, and thereby measures some of the same empirical aspects.

underestimate the coefficient's standard error. I apply a QQ-plot and the ncv-test, in order to investigate whether the error terms are homoscedastic. The plot indicates that the error terms are homoscedastic, with some observations appearing outside the stipulated line (see Figure 9.3 in appendix B).

A second issue relates to autocorrelations, which implies that the "disturbance terms are systematically correlated in one way or another" (Knutsen 2008:2). In the case of my analysis, this would imply that a country's score on one of the independent variables in year t is correlated with a score in year t +1. As I apply time-series cross-section data, the issue of autocorrelation is apparent. I follow the recommendation of Beck and Katz (1995) by applying robust clustered standard errors in my main analysis as an antidote to autocorrelation.

While Beck and Katz (1995) argue that robust standard errors are sufficient in order to reduce the risk of autocorrelation, Green et al. (2001) recommend fixed effects. Analysts are especially encouraged to use fixed effects if "non-observed country specific effects strongly drive results" (Knutsen 2008:9). In other words, if results are highly driven by differences between units, in this case between states, fixed effects are recommended in order to take into account dependency in the data. As an additional model specification, I run Model 4, Table 6.2. with fixed effects (results are reported in Table 9.3 in appendix A). The findings demonstrate that while constraining institutions continues to be significant at $p < 0.001$ level, dispersive power-sharing institutions is no longer significant. Interestingly, inclusive power-sharing institutions are positively associated with state repression and are significant at $p < 0.001$ level.

The fourth assumption relates to the former discussion on exogeneity biases. While experimental and quasi experimental designs are the best research designs in order to alleviate this issue (Knutsen 2008), including time-lags as I propose, is another way to deal with the issue. The consistent results across the different models with and without time-lags, to some degree mitigate the risk of wrongful conclusions based on exogeneity bias. Yet, when analysing the effect of institutions on political behaviour, one has to be careful regarding the interpretation of results (Fearon 2011).

76

Finally, the fifth assumption relates to "degree of freedom" problems and the violation of "perfect multicollinearity problem" (Kennedy 2008). The first entails that there are more independent variables, than observations, and is not an issue in the analysis conducted here. The latter entails that there are high correlations among the predictor variables (Kennedy 2008). This in turn makes it is difficult to distinguish between the effect of each of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Knutsen 2008). I test the latter by applying a variance inflation factor (VIF)-test. The test indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue, as the bivariate correlations are low with VIF scores between 1.1 and 1.6. In sum, the statistical tests demonstrate that the underlying assumptions are sufficiently met.

In addition to the key assumptions investigated above, I will briefly comment on the issue of influential cases. As noted in Chapter 3, quantitative methods enable one to identify whether certain observations drive the observed effects in a substantial manner. The analysis conducted in Chapter 6 furthermore illustrated that the effect of dispersive power-sharing institutions where highly dependent on the variable *population size*. In order to investigate whether results in Model 4, Table 6.2. are driven by influential cases, I use an influence plot (see appendix B, Figure 9.4). The influence plot identifies Niger, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tanzania, with high CooksD. I run alternative models where I exclude each case at a time and find that results do not alter in a substantial manner (see Table 9.4 in appendix A). A further investigating of why these cases are influential, are outside the scope of the thesis. Yet, they may by a fruitful point of further study.

7.2 Robustness: Alternative model specifications

Having addressed the underlying assumptions for the OLS-model, it is necessary to discuss and test how robust my findings are. As described in Chapter 4, the dependent variable *Repression* is neither completely continuous nor binary by nature. While I utilize an OLS-model with a continuous dependent variable as my main model, I run an alternative model specification with a dichotomous dependent variable with a cut-off at 3 on the 1-5 PTS-scale.

In order to utilize the binary dependent variable, I use the logistic regression model to estimate effects. Results from the logistic regression model are reported in Table 7.1, Model 1-4. The table is organized in the same manner as Table 6.2.

Results from the logistic regression model indicate that main findings are robust, independent of whether the dependent variable is continuous or binary. As illustrated in Table 7.1, the relationship between constraining and dispersive power-sharing institutions and state repression continues to be negative and significant in the full sample. Importantly, the effect of constraining institutions continues to be significant at $p < 0.001$ level, while dispersive institutions is barely significant at $p < 0.05$ level. Meanwhile, the relationship between inclusive power-sharing institutions and repression continues to be positive and none-significant.[40]

Figure 9.5 (see appendix B), illustrates the estimated odds for *repression* (low/high), according to level of *constraining power-sharing.* The figure shows that countries with a low score on constraining *(*i.e. -2ds) have odds of 1.45 for having high repression, while countries high on constraining (+2sd) have odds of 0.35, yielding more than four times higher odds among the low-constraining compared to high-constraining group. As such, even though coefficients reported in Chapter 6 were rather low, the logistic regression model clearly illustrate that constraining institutions have a substantial effect on the chances of repression.

The persisting results furthermore indicate that the association between the power-sharing institutions and repression, do not alter when one dichotomizes the dependent variable, repression. Davenport and Appel (2014) argue that it is fruitful to distinguish between cases where repression have and have not become institutionalized and systematic, by applying a threshold of 3 on the 1-5 PTS-scale. Findings from the logistic regression nonetheless indicate that the relationships persist independently of how one measures state repression, either on a continuous scale or a by dichotomizing the variable.

---

[40] As the logistic regression model predicts the probability of receiving a high or low score on the dependent variable, the interpretation of the coefficients differs from the OLS-model. Yet, the results indicate similar trends as the OLS-model.

Table 7.1 Prediction of Concurrent Repression, Logit Model

	All States			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constraining	-0.385 ***	-0.366 **	-0.471 ***	-0.453 ***
	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.125)
Dispersive	-0.201	-0.061	-0.351 *	-0.326 *
	(0.139)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.158)
Inclusive	0.037	0.065	0.207 *	0.126
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.088)	(0.093)
GDP (logged)			-0.535 ***	-0.438 ***
			(0.099)	(0.099)
Population (logged)			0.663 ***	0.601 ***
			(0.088)	(0.093)
Civil Conflict			2.901***	2.957***
			(0.408)	(0.407)
Year			0.035 **	0.034 ***
			(0.007)	(0.008)
Post-Civil Conflict				0.919***
				(0.212)
Civil Conflict* Constraning				0.033
				(0.189)
Constant		-0.341 **	-76.994***	-73.790***
		(0.112)	(14.917)	(16.394)
N		5134	5108	4736

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

As a second alternative model specification, I ran additional analysis where I include a variety of time-lags. More specifically, I ran Model 4 in Table 6.2 with time-lags of 2-5 years. Results show in Table 7.2., suggest that the key findings form Chapter 6 are very robust independent of time-lag applied. In fact, the coefficients for constraining, dispersive and inclusive power-sharing institutions are slightly stronger with a five-year time lag than a two-year time-lag. As illustrated in Table 7.2, Model 4, constraining and dispersive power-sharing institutions continue to be significant at p <0.001 level and p < 0.05 level, while the effect of inclusive power-sharing institutions is not significant.

Table 7.2 Prediction of Repression (full sample) with different time-lags.

	All States			
	Model 1 2-year lag	Model 2 3-year lag	Model 3 4-year lag	Model 4 5-year lag
Constraining	-0.191 *** (0.041)	-0.191 *** (0.042)	-0.192 *** (0.043)	0.195*** (0.044)
Dispersive	-0.149 * (0.058)	-0.158 ** (0.058)	-0.166 ** (0.058)	-0.172** (0.058)
Inclusive	0.043 (0.033)	0.045 (0.035)	0.046 (0.036)	0.049 (0.037)
GDP (logged)	-0.281 *** (0.042)	-0.286 *** (0.043)	-0.295 *** (0.044)	-0.301*** (0.045)
Population (logged)	0.242*** 0.027)	0.248 (0.027)	0.258*** (0.028)	0.265*** (0.028)
Civil Conflict	1.068 *** (0.104)	1.022 *** (0.104)	0.960*** (0.103)	0.904*** (0.105)
Year	0.015 *** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.323 *** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
Post-Civil Conflict	0.375 *** (0.086)	0.345*** (0.088)	0.103 *** (0.091)	0.293** (0.092)
Civil Conflict* Constraning	0.107 (0.068)	0.106 (0.070)	0.103 (0.074)	0.093 (0.076)
Constant	-29.729 (5.257)	-27.841*** (5.192)	-25.856 *** (5.206)'	-23.780 *** (5.247)
N	4854	4854	4858	4858

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

---

[41] While both Model 1 in Table 7.2. and Model 2 in Table 6.4 include a two-year time-lag, they differ as the former also includes an interaction term.

7.3 Overall robustness

Having tested the assumptions underlying the OLS-model and presented several alternative model specifications, Chapter 7 demonstrates that constraining power-sharing institutions perform well as a predictor of state repression. The key findings of Chapter 6 seem to be robust as they do not alter when one applies a logistic regression model or alternative time-lags. The robustness tests moreover demonstrate that while dispersive power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with state repression, the relationship is less robust across alternative specifications. Lastly, inclusive power-sharing institutions do not appear to be significantly associated with state repression, with the exception of models including fixed effects. I now turn to the concluding chapter, where I discuss broader limitations and strengths of the theoretical and empirical framework and suggest fruitful avenues for further research.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 Summary

This thesis empirically investigates the relationship between three forms of *de jure* power-sharing institutions and state repression, across two different political contexts. The objective is to examine whether power-sharing institutions constitute a liability, or rather a viable tool, to reduce repression. I differentiate between constraining, inclusive and dispersive power-sharing institutions and analyse their effect on state repression between 1976 and 2010. While constraining institutions are characterized by the sharing of power between the government and ordinary citizens, inclusive and dispersive power-sharing are chiefly oriented at granting oppositional elites access to power in national or sub-national units of government. The findings indicate that while power-sharing institutions can reduce state repression, their effectiveness is conditioned on the specific form of power-sharing and the idiosyncrasies of the political context.

The research question is motivated by two trends in the civil conflict literature. On the one hand, scholars emphasise that state repression is key driver of civil conflict (e.g. Davenport 2007). In contexts of grave human rights abuses conducted by state authorities, grievances may translate into violent mobilization (Østby 2013; Stewart 2008). During conflict, repression tends to rise and often persists at high levels after conflict termination (Zanger 2000). This in turn may produce cyclical patterns of violence (Collier 2003; Walter 2004). On the other hand, academic research indicate that some form of power-sharing is necessary and valuable in order to prevent conflict and sustain peace after conflict (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Binningsbø 2013; Sisk 1996). While scholars have extensively addressed how power-sharing institutions affect the likelihood of civil conflict, little attention has been given to how such institutions affect repression.

While the power-sharing literature in general has not addressed the relationship between power-sharing institutions and repression, Gates et al. (2016) argue that they are theoretically related. More specifically, Gates and colleagues find that among constraining, inclusive and dispersive forms of power-sharing, only the former reduces the risk of conflict. They theorize that the causal mechanisms linking constraining power-sharing institutions and civil conflict, involves state repression. This thesis seeks to contribute to the empirical understanding of this theorized relationship, by empirically assessing how power-sharing and repression relate to one another.

In alignment with the theoretical expectations of Gates et al. (2016) the thesis predicts that constraining power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with repression. The theoretical argument holds that institutions that not simply provide elite-security, but rather constrain executive power, are most effective in reducing the risk of repression. This is because constraining institutions can contribute to overcome commitment problems among insurgency groups and the government. In order to address *how* formal institutions can contribute to overcome commitment problems, the thesis suggests that the logic of expectations is a possible mechanism. Formal institutions can create beliefs and expectations regarding how other persons will act, in a manner that reduces the risk of repression. Power-sharing institutions which chiefly benefit oppositional elites, are theorised to not reduce state repression, as they do not necessarily give ordinary citizens and agents of the state incentives to obtain a peaceful order.

Findings from multiple regression analyses demonstrate that constraining institutions are negatively associated with state repression, both globally and in post-conflict states. Constraining power-sharing institutions perform well as a predictor of state repression, across a range of alternative model specifications. Such institutions provide freedom of religion, judicial review and military legislative bans, and thereby create mutual security for oppositional elites and ordinary citizens. Contrary to the theoretical assumption, dispersive power-sharing, which is characterized by decentralization to sub-region units, is effective in reducing state repression in general terms. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of dispersive power-sharing is highly context dependent and the pacifying effect is less robust. Finally, inclusive

power-sharing, which allocate power to oppositional elites within national bodies of government, might be a liability. The findings indicate that such provisions of power-allocation do not mitigate state repression.

In sum, of the three forms of power-sharing institutions assessed in this thesis, only constraining power-sharing is negatively associated with repression, independent of context. As such, while including oppositional elites in central decision-making or granting sub-regional units of government greater autonomy might provide other valuable outcomes, mitigating repression is not one of them. The findings suggest that setting constraints on the executive authority and providing guarantees of security for a broader range of people, most effectively reduces repression.

8.2 Strengths and limitations

The foremost strength of this thesis is that it contributes to bridge the empirical gap between power-sharing institutions and state repression. Addressing how different forms of power-sharing institutions affect state repression, is important by itself. Millions of persons live under conditions of grave human rights abuses and are consequently deprived basic rights (Carey 2010; Cederman et al. 2013). Yet, beyond the high cost inflicted in personal terms, human rights violations have grave implications for society as a whole (Davenport and Appel 2014; World Bank 2011). One of these consequences, as have been discussed extensively, is the increased risk of civil conflict (Davenport 2007). While scholars have assessed the effect of legal institutions on repression (Cross 1999; Keith, Tate and Poe 2009; Powell and Station 2009), to my knowledge no one has addressed the effect of power-sharing institutions on repression. Hence, this thesis seeks to contribute to the empirical development of this research field.

In a related manner a second strength of this thesis is that is pushes forward the research design applied by Gates et al. (2016) by explicitly testing the power-sharing and repression relationship. While Gates et al. (2016) suggest that repression is the intermediate variable or

mediator between multiple forms of power-sharing institutions and civil conflict, they do not investigate this empirically. Contrary to the prediction, dispersive power-sharing seems to be negatively associated with repression in a global context while not being effective in post-conflict states. While this raises a puzzle in terms of their context-dependent effect, by altering the research design one gets a more nuanced understanding of how the power-sharing and repression relationship appears.

A third strength of this thesis is that it moves beyond Gates et al. (2016) in terms of theoretical explanations, by bringing in the logic of expectations by Dragu and Lupu (2018). While the thesis aims at theory-testing in the sense that it empirically tests the power-sharing and repression relationship it also aims at theory-building. By adding mechanisms to the theory presented by Gates et al. (2016) the thesis has more thoroughly addressed how *de jure* institutions can alter expectations and behaviour, in a manner which alleviates commitment problems and reduces repression. In terms of identifying a causal pathway, the theoretical argument suggests that a possible mediator between *de jure* power-sharing institutions and repression, is the logic of expectations. The theoretical addition thereby shed light on how formal institutions can be effective by themselves, and not merely work through power-sharing practices.

There are also some limitations. Firstly, while the global scope of the datasets applied is an advantage as it provides solid statistical results, it raises the threat of omitted variable bias. As the global sample is very heterogeneous, it is difficult to identify to what degree the variation in the dependent variable is in fact a result of the key independent variables, or other omitted factors. Said differently, when one lumps together states with no prior history of armed conflict with states currently in conflict and post-conflict states, it is difficult to estimate the actual effect of the different forms of power-sharing institutions on state repression. This is also related to the fact that power-sharing institutions are not randomly assigned (Cederman et al. 2018). For instance, inclusive institutions are less probable in states where there are no challenges associated with ethnic or religious cleavages, as such provisions are aimed at including minority groups. While the statistical models in this thesis include a range of control variables in order to mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias, the trade-off between statistical efficiency and biases can be regarded as a weakness (Keele 2015).

A second limitation is related to the general challenges of a quantitative approach. As discussed in Chapter 5, both datasets that are utilized, are associated with certain downsides. As the IDC-dataset chiefly consists of formal or *de jure* power-sharing institutions, one is not assured that these institutions are in fact implemented (Strøm et al. 2015). While I argue that formal institutions can have a direct effect in their own right, I am not able to determine the degree to which the effect is mediated by power-sharing practices. Simultaneously, the PTS-dataset measures acts of repression conducted or ordered by actors of the state. This nonetheless poses a challenge in terms of determining when and to what degree the state is involved. Again, one is left with uncertainty in terms of how well the data reflect realities on the ground.

Finally, in line with previous studies assessing the effect of power sharing institutions[42], the main caveat relates to the issue of endogeneity bias. As has been discussed throughout previous chapters, when addressing the relationship between institutions and political outcomes, one has to keep in mind that institutions are often endogenously chosen (Prezeworski 2004). Needless to say, governments who consistently violate human rights will be less inclined to implement constraining institutions, and the effectiveness of constraining institutions might be affected by the specific context in which they operate. Power-sharing institutions and abuses of human rights are policy choices, and thus clearly related to one another (Fearon 2011). This evidently poses a methodological challenge and affects our ability to draw causal conclusions. In his valuable contribution to the discussion of the scholarly research on political institutions, Prezeworski (2004:540) concludes that:

> I am willing to believe that where history was kind enough to have generated different institutions under the same conditions we will know more and know better. But history may deviously generate institutions endogenously and this would make our task next to impossible. We need to be sceptical about our belief in the power of institutions and we need to be prudent in our actions. Projects of institutional reform must take as their point of departure the actual conditions, not blueprints based on institutions that have been successful elsewhere.

---

[42] E.g. Graham et al. (2017).

As the statement illustrates, the task of determining the exact effect of political institutions on a specific outcome, such as state repression, is difficult. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that the study of such relationships is useless. Incumbent governments change, and violations of human rights should not be regarded as a pathology. If we are to believe that institutional designs cannot alter behaviour or practices, especially in the wake of civil conflict, we are left without tools to change the prospects for conflict ridden states. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to analyse the effect of institutions on specific political outcomes, and meanwhile improve our research design in order to overcome the methodological challenges associated with studying such relationships. On a positive note, the findings presented here suggest that constraining power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with state repression in post-conflict states, also across a range of time-lags. This indicates that one should not regard these institutions as merely viable in favourable political contexts.

8.3 Further research

The thesis started off by visualizing the current research gap in Figure 1.1., Chapter 1. As illustrated, there was a lack of empirical evidence of how power-sharing institutions affect state repression. A fruitful step for further research is to conduct mediation analysis to estimate the relationships between power-sharing institutions, state repression, and conflict. While the findings presented here indicate that constraining power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with state repression, and previous findings show that constraining institutions are associated with civil conflict (Gates et al. 2016), we do not know how much of the effect is mediated through repression.

In a related manner, research is needed to identify whether the effect of power-sharing institutions on state repression changes with interactions, as it might be that the effectiveness of the different institutions relies on specific combinations. The findings indicate that both constraining and dispersive power-sharing institutions are negatively associated with repression in the global sample. Yet, better data are needed to investigate if the pacifying

effect of dispersive power-sharing is in fact conditioned on the appearance of constraining institutions at sub-regional levels of government.

Finally, this thesis has suggested that the logic of expectations can function as a mechanism linking *de jure* power-sharing institutions to state repression. Further research is needed to better understand if and to the extent expectations alter with the implementation of formal institutions. This can contribute to shed light on the specific circumstances in which provisions of *de jure* power-sharing can mitigate state repression.

8.4 Concluding remarks

Building sustainable peace continues to be one of the biggest challenges for international and national actors engaged in peace efforts. As the joint United Nations and World Bank report (2018) emphasises, we are in dire need of better tools to prevent conflict and promote durable peace. Oddly enough, little attention is given to how tools, which are prescribed to mitigate the risk of conflict, affect factors driving conflict. Findings from this thesis suggest that institutions that enhance civil liberties and independent judiciaries to protect them, are effective in reducing the risk of repression. As such, scholars and policy-makers engaged in peace-efforts are encouraged to shift their attention towards institutions that constrain executive power, rather than empower political elites.

Bibliography

Bates, Robert (2008) *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late Century Africa.* Cambridge University Press.

Beck, Nathanial and Jonathan N. Katz (1995) "What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data". *American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 637-647.

Beck, Nathanial and Jonathan N. Katz (2001) "Throwing out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim and Yoon". *International Organization*, 55(2), 847-495.

Bellin, Eva (2012) "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring". *Comparative Politics,* 44(2), 127-149.

Binningsbø, Helga M. (2013) "Power sharing, peace and democracy: Any obvious relationships?". *International Area Studies Review*, 16(1), 89-112.

Bormann, Nils-Christian, Lars-Erik Cederman, Scott Gates, Benjamin A. T. Graham, Simon Hug, Kaare Strøm and Julian Wucherpfenning (2014) "Does Formal or Informal Power-Sharing Produce Peace?". *APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper.*

Bormann, Nils-Christian., Lars-Erik Cederman, Scott Gates, Benjamin A. T. Graham, Simon Hug, Kaare W. Strøm, Julian Wucherpfenning (2019) "Power Sharing: Institutions, Behaviour and Peace". *American journal of Political Science,* 63 (1), 84-100.

Carey, Sabine C. (2010) "The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent". *Political Studies,* 58(1), 167-186.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min (2010) "What makes ethnic groups rebel? New data and new analysis". *World Politics*, 62(1), 87-119.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug (2013) *Inequality, Grievance and Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Julien Wucherpfenning (2018) *Sharing Power, Securing Peace? Ethnic Inclusion and Civil War*. ms., ETH Zurich.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Andreas Schädel and Julian Wucherpfenning (2015)

"Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?". *American Political Science Review*, 109(2), 354-370.

Chenoweth, Erica and Maria J. Stephan (2012) *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.* Colombia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Colombia University Press.

Christophersen, Knut-Andreas (2013) *Introduksjon til statistisk analyse. Regresjonsbaserte metoder og anvendelse.* Gyldendal Akademisk.

Colaresi Michael and Sabine C. Carey (2008) "To Kill or to Protect: Security Forces, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(1), 39-67.

Collier, Paul, Lanni Elliot, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004) "Greed and grievances in civil war". *Oxford Economic Papers,* 56(4), 563-595.

Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis (2002) "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (1), 3-12.

Conrad, Courtenay R. and Emily Hencken Ritter (2013) "Treaties, Tenure and Conflict: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law". *Journal of Politics,* 75(2), 397-409.

Cross, Frank B. (1999) "The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection". *International Review of Law and Economics,* 19(1), 87-98.

Davenport, Christian (1996) "Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are Suppressed". *Journal of Politics,* 58(3), 627-54.

Davenport, Christian (1999) "Human Rights and the Democratic Propositions". *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 43(1), 92-116.

Davenport, Christian (2007) *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace.* Cambridge University Press.

Davenport, Christian (2007b) "State Repression and Political Order". *Annual Review of Political Science,* 10:1-27.

Davenport, Christian and Benjamin Appel (2014) "Stopping State Repression: An Examination of Spells 1976-2004" *APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper.*

Dragu, Tiberiu and Yonatan Lupu (2018) "Collective Action and Constraints of Repression at the Endgame". *Comparative Political Studies, 51(8), 1042-1073.*

Fearon, James (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for war". *International Organization*, 49(3), 374-414.

Frantz, Erika and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (2014) "A Dictators toolkit: Understanding how co-potation affects repression in autocracies". *Journal of Peace Research,* 51(2), 332-346.

Gade, Tine (2017) The Lebanese army after the Syrian crisis: Alienating the Sunni Community? *In Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon. Conflict, Cohesion and Confessionalism in a Divided Society,* Ed. Knudsen, Are John and Tine Gade. Palgrave Macmillan.

Gates, Scott, Benjamin A. T. Graham, Yonatan Lupu, Håvard Strand and Kaare Strøm (2016) "Powersharing, Protection and Peace." *Journal of Politics, 78(2), 512-26.*

Gates, Scott, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård and Esther Trappeniers (2016) Conflict Recurrence, *Conflict Trends*, 2. Oslo: PRIO.

Gates, Scott and Kaare Strøm (2019) Fragile Bargains. ms., University of Oslo.

Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Patrick M. Regan (1996) "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence" *Journal of Peace Research, 33(3), 273-287.*

Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon and Attilio Pisanò (2018) The Political Terror Scale 1976-2017. Date Retrieved from the Political Terror Scale website: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org

Golafshani, Nahid (2003) "Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research". *The Qualitative Report*, 8(4), 587-606.

Goodwin, Jeff (1997) "State-Centred Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition." In *Theorizing Revolutions*, edited by John Foran. London: Routledge.

Graham, Benjamin A. T., Michael K. Miller and Kaare W. Strøm (2017) "Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival". *American Political Science Review,*111(4), 686-704.

Green, Donald P. Soo Yeon H. Kim and David Yoon (2001) "Dirty Pool". *International Organization*, 55(2), 487-495.

Hartzell, Caroline A. and Matthew Hoddie (2003) "Institutionalizing Peace: Power sharing and Post-Civil Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science,* 47(2), 318-32.

Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie (2007) *Crafting Peace: Power-sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Haschke, Peter (2017) The Political Terror Scale (PTS) Codebook. University Of North Carolina, Asheville. Gathered 25.03 from: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.

Hegre, Håvard, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Håvard Strand, Scott Gates and Ranveig D. Flaten (2011) "The Conflict Trap". Prepared for the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Seattle, WA.

Hill, Daniel W. and Zachary M. Jones (2014) "An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression." *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), 661-687.

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2008) "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War". *American Journal of Political Science,* 52(2), 436-455.

Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, Teppei Yamamoto (2011) "Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Data". *American Political Science Review,* 105(4).

Jarstad, Anna K. and Desiree Nilsson (2008) "From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords". *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 25(3):208-23.

Jarstad, Anna K. (2009) "The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace." *Africa Spectrum,* 44(3), 41-62.

Jarstad, Anna K. and Timothy D. Sisk (2008) *From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.* Cambridge University Press.

Keele, Luke (2015) "The Statistics of Causal Inference: A View from Political Methodology". *Political analysis,* 23(3), 313-335.

Keith, Lina Damp, Tate, C. Neal and Poe, Steve C. (2009) "Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse". *Journal of Politics,* 71(2), 644-60.

Kennedy, Peter (2008) *A Guide to Econometrics 6th edition.* Blackwell Publishing.

Knudsen, Carl Henrik (2008) "Beyond OLS: A non-technical guide to econometric methods" Working paper. Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

Lijphart, Arend (1969) *"Consociational Democracy". World Politics,* 21(2), 207-225.

Lijphart, Arend (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend (1985) "Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparation of Federal and Consociational Theories". *The Journal of Federalism*, 15(2), 3-15.

Long, Scott J. (1997) *Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables.* Sage publications.

Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz (2006) "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research". *Political Analysis*, 14(3), 227-249.

Martin, Philip A. (2013) "Coming Together, Power-sharing and the Durability of Negotiated Peace Settlements". *Civil Wars,* 15(3), 323-58.

Mattes, Michaela and Burcu Savun (2009) "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design". *International Studies Quarterly,* 53(3), 737-59.

Miller, Michael, Benjamin Graham and Kaare Strom (2017) "Replication Data for Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic survival" Harvard Dataverse, URL https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KGOUYI

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Jonathan J. Ring and Mary K. Spellman (2013) "Domestic Legal Traditions and States Human Rights Practices". *Journal of Peace Research,* 50(20), 189- 202.

Norris, Pippa (2008) *Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Poe, Steven C. and Tate, C. Neal (1994) "Repression of Personal Integrity Rights in the 1980s: A Global Analysis". *American Political Science Review,* 88(4), 853-72

Powell, Emilia J. and Jeffrey K. Staton (2009) "Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violations". *International Studies Quarterly,* 53(1), 149-74.

Powell, Robert (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem". *International Organization,* 60(1), 169-203.

Prezeworski, Adam (2004) "Institutions Matter?". *Government and Opposition*, 39(4).

Regan, Patrick M. and Errol A. Henderson (2002) "Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?". *Third World Quarterly,* 23(1), 119-36.

Ritter, Emily Hencken and Conrad R. Courtenay (2016) "Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state". *The Review of International Organizations,* 11(4), 449-475.

Roeder, Philip G. (2005) "Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing". In *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil War,* ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 51-82.

Roeder, Philip G. and Donald Rothchild (2005) *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil War.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Roessler, Philip and David Ohls (2018) "Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States". *International Organization*, 72(2), 423-454.

Rosiny, Stephan (2015) "A Quarter Century of Transitory Power Sharing. Lebanon's unfulfilled Taif Agreement of 1989 Revisited". *Civil Wars,* 17(4)485-502.

Stewart, Frances (2008) "Horizontal inequality and Conflict: An introduction and some Hypotheses". *In Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic societies*, edited by Frances Stewart. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan.

Strøm, Kaare, Scott Gates, Benjamin A. T. Graham and Håvard Strand (2015) "Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraints: Powersharing in the Worlds States, 1975-2010" *British Journal of Political Science,* 47 (1), 165-185.

Strøm, Kaare, Scott Gates, Benjamin A. T. Graham and Håvard Strand (2015) "Replication data for: Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraints: Powersharing in the Worlds States, 1975-2010." Harvard Dataverse. URL: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29421

Strøm, Kaare, Scott Gates and Benjamin A. T. Graham "Official Codebook for the Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraints Dataset. Version 1.0." National Science Foundation Grant. Gathered from:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/29421

The World Bank (2011) "Reducing Conflict Risk, fragility and development in the Middle East and North Africa", gathered from:
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MNA/WDR2011-Conflict-MENA.pdf

United Nations and World Bank. 2018. "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict." World Bank, Washington, DC. License: Creative Commons

Walter, Barbara F. (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. (2004) "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War". *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(3), 371-388.

Walter, Barbara F. (2015) "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(7), 1242-1272.

Wood, Reed M. and Mark Gibney (2010) «The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI», *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(2), 367-400.

Wucherpfenning, Julian (2013) "The Strategic Logic of Power-Sharing after Civil War." Paper presented at the Powersharing workshop in Lucerne, Switzerland, May 1-3, 2013.

Zakaria, Fareed (1997) "The rise of illiberal democracy". *Foreign Affairs,* 76(6), 22-43.

Østby, Gudrun (2013) "Inequality and political violence: A review of the literature". *International Area Studies Review,* 16(2), 206-231.

Appendix

A. Additional regression tables

Table 9.1 Prediction of Concurrent Repression, Linear Model, with standardized regression coefficients.

	All States			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constraining	-0.203 ***	-0.181 **	-0.156 ***	-0.143 ***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Dispersive	-0.128	-0.060	-0.118 **	-0.113 *
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.047))
Inclusive	0.017	0.033	0.061 *	0.035
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.02)	(0.025)
Log GDP per capita			-0.318 ***	-0.275 ***
			(0.028)	(0.041)
Log population size			0.318 ***	-0.313 ***
			(0.040)	(0.037)
Year			0.221 ***	0.206 ***
			(0.031)	(0.032)
Civil war			0.310***	0.323 ***
			(0.028)	(0.027)
Post-Civil war				0.171 ***
				(0.039)
Constraning * Post-Civil war				0.027
				(0.024)
Constant		0.091***	0.091 *	0.102 ***
		(0.036))	(0.036)	(0.036)
N		5134	5108	4593

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 9.2 Prediction of Concurrent Repression, Linear Model, with standardized regression coefficients.

	Post-Conflict States		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constraining	-0.102 **	-0.141 ***	-0.154 *
	(0.078)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Dispersive	0.008	0.082 *	-0.042
	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.090)
Inclusive	-0.005	-0.014	0.045
	(0.095)	(0.033)	(0.074)
Log GDP per capita			-0.128
			(0.080)
Log population size			0.329 ***
			(0.079)
Year			0.197 *
			(0.085)
Constant		0.002	- 0.036
		(0.031)	(0.086)
N		1011	1006

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$
Note: Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 9.3 Prediction of Concurrent Repression,
Linear Model with fixed effects

All states	Model 1
Constraining	-0.144 ***
	(0.021)
Dispersive	0.018
	(0.030)
Inclusive	0.072 ***
	(0.024)
Log GDP per capita	-0.235 ***
	(0.040)
Log population size	0.515***
	(0.085)
Year	0.011***
	(0.002)
Civil war	0.974***
	(0.038)
Post-civil war	0.266***
	(0.033)
Post-civil war* constraining institutions	-0.019
	(0.028)
N	4736

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Table 9.4 Prediction of Concurrent Repression, Linear Model, excluding influential cases.

	All States			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constraining	-0.176 ***	-0.178 ***	-0.176 ***	-0.164 ***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Dispersive	-0.142*	-0.144 *	-0.139 *	-0.144*
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Inclusive	0.044 ***	0.042	0.059	0.041
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.031)
Log GDP per capita	-0.261 ***	-0.265 ***	-0.262 ***	-0.271***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Log population size	0.226 ***	0.226 ***	0.225 ***	0.227***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Year	0.017 ***	0.017 ***	0.017 ***	0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Civil war	1.225 ***	1.220 ***	1.217 ***	1.246***
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105	(0.104)
Post-Civil war	0.476 ***	0.486 ***	0.481 ***	0.484 ***
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Constraning * Post-Civil war	0.074	0.076	0.084	0.092
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Constant	-33.533 ***	-33.628 ***	-33.595***	-32.948***
	(5.436)	(5.461)	(5.467)	(5.444)
N	4736	4701	4718	4701

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Note: 1) Based on the identification of influential cases I exclude Nigeria (Model 2), Bosnia (Model 3) and Tanzania (Model 4). Model 1 consists of the full model, not excluding any cases. 2) Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

# B.   Descriptive statistics, OLS-assumptions tests and robustness

Figure 9.1. Development of Repression (1976-2010) for selected countries.

Figure 9.2. Testing linearity assumption.

Figure 9.3. Testing homoscedasticity.



Figure 9.4 Influence plot.

Figure 9.5. Estimated odds for Repression (low/high), according to level of Constraining Power-Sharing. Estimates are based on Logit=-0.351 and Constant=-.334, found in analysis corresponding to model 1, table 7.1, with fully standardized constraining score. For example, countries low on Constraining (i.e. -2sd) have odds of 1.45 for having high Repression, while countries high on Constraining (+2sd) have odds of 0.35, yielding more than four times higher odds among the low-constraining compared to high-constraining cases.