

The War That Wasn't

Explaining Relative Peacefulness

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Abstract

Since the end of the Second World War, civil war has been the most frequent and deadly form of armed conflict. This has resulted in an abundance of explanations of the occurrence of civil war. Nevertheless, a complete explanation of any phenomenon must be able to explain the absence as well as the occurrence of said phenomenon. The time has come to turn to the non-events, the dogs that do not bark; the countries where we should expect to see civil war, but where no civil war occurred. One such country is Tanzania. Within Tanzania's post-independence history, the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar, and the 1990-2010 period stand out as particularly conflict-prone. Therefore, the research question is: Why was there no civil war in Zanzibar in the period 1990 – 2010?

To answer this question, I combine various theories of the causes of civil war into a comprehensive and systematic theoretical framework, which incorporates both structural and process-based theories of civil war onset. The resulting theoretical framework holds that governments and their domestic opposition produce their own civil wars, but not at their own accord; they produce them under certain structural conditions, given and transmitted from the past. This theoretical framework is developed in the theory chapter and operationalized in the methods chapter.

I apply this theoretical framework to Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period, and argue that Zanzibar avoided civil war in this period for three reasons. First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented because of a belief held by the opposition that the next election would lead to substantial political change. Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating a civil war. And third, the leadership of the opposition has acted in a risk-averse manner at key moments. In total, the empirical case study explains the puzzle of Zanzibar's relative peacefulness and illustrates the advantages of theory synthesis and methodological pluralism in the analysis of civil war risk in specific cases.

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Abbreviations

ACT - Alliance for Change and Democracy

ASP – Afro-Shirazi Party

CCM – Chama Cha Mapinduzi

CUF – Civic United Front

TANU – Tanganyika African National Union

ZEC – Zanzibari Electoral Committee

ZNP – Zanzibar Nationalist Party

ZPPP – Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, civil war has been the most common and deadly form of armed conflict. Naturally, this has led to a surge in research concerning the causes of such wars. Large-N statistical studies have identified several conditions that increase the risk of civil war onset, game theorists have developed formal models to explain how rational actors end up warring, and historians have uncovered the turn of events leading to specific civil wars. The product of this effort is an abundance of explanations of the occurrence of civil war. However, a complete explanation of any phenomenon must be able to explain the absence as well as the occurrence of that phenomenon. The time has come to turn to the negative cases, the dogs that do not bark, the countries where we should expect to see civil war, but where no civil war occurred.

One such country is Tanzania. Tanzania is a poor, populous, semi-democratic country in a conflict-ridden neighborhood. Both quantitative prediction models, and qualitative area experts identify Tanzania as surprisingly peaceful. The period of 1990-2010 stands out as especially conflict-prone. In this period Tanzania experienced several events that could have acted as triggers for large-scale domestic political violence: the political opening toward multi-party democracy in the early 1990's, the terror attacks against the American embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998 and the brutal repression of the Zanzibari opposition in 2001. Moreover, Sub Saharan Africa experienced numerous civil wars in this period. Geographically, the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar stands out. The islands enjoyed a short-lived independence in 1963 - 1964, and constitute an ethnic homeland for the Zanzibaris, which still harbors sentiments of increased autonomy. Therefore, the research question is: why was there no civil war in Zanzibar in the period 1990 – 2010?

To answer this question, I will combine various theories of the causes of civil war into a comprehensive and systematic theoretical framework. The theoretical framework will incorporate structural conditions, the strategic interaction of actors, and exogenous shocks. In turn, I apply this theoretical framework to the empirical case of Zanzibar 1990-2010. The case study includes a thorough assessment of the case's susceptibility to conflict and a structured analytical narrative of the 1990-2010 period. The narrative is the result of a

theory-driven, critical assessment of the secondary historical literature and 16 in-depth interviews with key actors gathered during five weeks of field research in Zanzibar in February 2019. The resulting case study will explain the puzzle of Zanzibar's relative peacefulness and illustrate the advantages of theory synthesis and methodological pluralism in the analysis of civil war risk in specific cases.

In this introductory chapter, I will do three things. First, I will define the concept of civil war and briefly justify the theoretical framework and research design of this thesis. Second, I will explain in detail how I chose the case, and why one should expect a higher level of political violence in Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. Finally, I will present the outline and structure of the thesis and the argument in brief.

1.2 Defining civil war

To explain the absence of civil war, one must have a clear understanding of what it is. In this thesis, I use the term civil war as a generic term describing severe and sustained armed conflict occurring primarily within the borders of an existing state between its government and at least one organized oppositional group. There are three elements to this definition.

First, the conflict needs to be sufficiently severe and sustained. To constitute a war, a conflict must produce a considerable amount of violent deaths and destruction, and the violence must be sufficiently sustained. A single terror attack or a single massacre is not a war, just as a sustained conflict where nobody dies is not a war. However, just how many casualties must occur for a conflict to be defined as a war? Following the creation of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Wallensteen and Axell, 1993), most of the quantitative literature has distinguished between minor armed conflict (conflicts which have resulted in less than 1000 battle deaths during the conflict) and major armed conflict (conflicts which have resulted in more than 1000 battle deaths). Furthermore, a conflict must produce at least 25 battle deaths a year to qualify as an armed conflict in the dataset. I acknowledge this distinction as something akin to an "industry standard" but regard the cut-off points as in essence arbitrary.

Second, the conflict needs to be primarily intrastate. To constitute a civil war, and not an inter-state war, the fighting must take place primarily within the borders of a state. And third, the government must be a party in the conflict. This distinguishes civil war from communal conflict, in which domestic non-state organizations fight each other.

1.3 Theoretical framework

To explain the absence of civil war in Zanzibar, I utilize a synthesis of existing theories. I provide a detailed description of the synthesis in the theory chapter. To explain why such a synthesis is advantageous I need to briefly describe the current state of research on the causes of civil war. As early as 1978, Harvey Starr observed that the tasks of students of international conflict were becoming both more and less difficult. Starr argued that even though the attention devoted to the study of war had resulted in a vast amount of theoretical knowledge, little effort had been made to structure the growing mass of literature. He observed, “The complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the study of conflict raises the serious problem of how to bring the various speculations, hypotheses, and findings about conflict together in a way useful to the scholar of international conflict” (Starr, 1978, p. 364).

Starr’s (1978) observation rings equally valid for the contemporary field of civil war research. In a review of the contemporary quantitative literature on the antecedents of civil war onset, Young (2016) identifies several theoretical dualisms and distinctions that divide the field. Is it greed or grievances that motivate civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Berdal, 2005)? Are opportunities or motivation more critical when explaining civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Stewart, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013)? Does it make sense to distinguish between old and new civil wars (Kaldor, 1999; Kalyvas, 2001)? Moreover, statistical research has identified a tremendous number of ostensibly robust covariates of civil war, many of them even conflicting. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conducted a thorough sensitivity analysis of these covariates, however, since 2006, new methods and data have led to even more robust correlates (Gleditsch, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Cederman et al., 2013).

On a more foundational level, Young (2016, p. 33) distinguishes between a structural and a process-based approach. In the structural approach, civil war breaks out with a certain probability determined by structural factors. In the process-based approach, civil wars build up through a dynamic interaction of violence. These two theoretical conceptions of the phenomenon lead to a variety of research designs and empirical findings on different levels. Insights from bargaining theory (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2009; Cunningham, 2013) and research on repression and dissent (Davenport, 2007; Young, 2013) have provided further statistical correlates to civil war onset and expanded the theoretical understanding of how

civil war begins. The problem, Young (2016, p. 41-42) argues, is that these insights do not sufficiently build on each other. The result is a fragmented field of research.

Additionally, the ongoing revolution in information technology provides the student of civil war with an amount of empirical data that was unheard of only a decade ago. The sum can overwhelm any aspiring analyst of civil war. The scholarly community have produced enormous amounts of research on the various aspects of the causes of internal conflict. Yet, it is difficult to provide clear advice for what to look for when assessing the risk of civil war in a specific country.

In an ideal world, someone would synthesize what we know about the causes of civil war into an internally consistent, and manageable whole. Young (2016, p. 41) argues that

[...] thinking about civil war does not have to be done using a dualist approach. Is it greed or grievance? Or opportunity and willingness? Or structure versus process? The best answer is probably all of the above. Rather than ignoring the insights of any of these literatures, a synthesis is the best approach.

There are numerous ways to make such a synthesis and no precise method of distinguishing the best way to do it. Young (2016, p. 41-42) calls for a theoretical framework that incorporates the literature, modelling techniques and insights from both the literature on repression and dissent, and the structural theories of opportunity and motivation.

To synthesize everything known about the causes of civil war into a single consistent theory is over-ambitious, and obviously outside the scope of a master's thesis. Nevertheless, most analysis of conflict risk implicitly do this. No area expert would argue "based on the history of this country alone and disregarding any international trends or comparative elements, there is a high risk of conflict". The only honest approach of a practitioner is: "Based on everything I know, this is my best guess". By developing a theoretical framework, I am merely trying to be theoretically explicit about the way I combine theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence to answer the research question. The study of armed conflict needs a framework that utilizes theoretical insights from both structural and process-based approaches, and where inferences are drawn based on the broadest possible empirical foundation. The content of this master's thesis, although inadequate by itself, will hopefully constitute one of many building blocks to such a framework.

1.4 Research design

To understand the causes of civil war, I have chosen to look in detail at a single deviant case. In the methods chapter, I provide a detailed description and justification of the research design. In short, I chose to study a single case because it allowed me to go deeper into the specific causal mechanisms and processes that link structural conditions to the onset of civil war. Thus, a single case study can increase our understanding of *how* civil wars erupt. I have also decided to study a negative case, an instance of non-war. In the study of war and peace, peace is underrepresented. Explanations of a phenomenon should be able to explain the absence as well as the occurrence of said phenomenon. As such, the deviant case represents a chance to strengthen the validity of a theoretical explanation. Additionally, I chose to study a deviant case because it allows me to filter out existing explanations and develop new theoretical insights in a way a positive case would not.

Furthermore, one might argue that case studies are the logical next step in the current state of research on civil war onset. As Gerring (2007, p. 62) argues, “what we need to know, and hence what we ought to study, is to some extent contingent upon what is already known”. In the study of civil war onset, the last three decades have seen a large number of studies utilizing increasingly sophisticated statistical methods, and increasingly developed data sets, to understand the causes of civil war in a cross-case methodological framework. Accordingly, we have a pretty good understanding of what causes civil war, but a limited understanding of how.

Collier et al. (2005, p. 19) argue that the civil war literature generally suffers from a missing link between microlevel theories and macrolevel data, and that “case studies can be used to improve our understanding of how the variables used in the empirical tests influence the probability of civil war”. Moreover, Gates (2002) argues that case studies can contribute to the cross-country literature on civil war onset by “developing theory, addressing measurement issues, analyzing outliers, and maybe most importantly examining the “dogs that did not bark”¹ – cases where statistical analysis predicts war, but there is no war” (Gates, 2002, p. 9).

¹ “The dogs that did not bark” is a reference to Arthur Conan Doyle’s *The Adventure of Silver Blaze*, in which the fact that a dog did not bark constitute a crucial part of the evidence.

1.5 Case selection

To identify a case where statistical analysis predicts war, but where no war occurred, I made quantitative prediction models the point of departure. Specifically, I utilized the prediction models in Hegre et al. (2013) and Hegre et al. (2017). These models make use of structural variables such as conflict history, neighboring effects, socio-economic development, time since independence, and demography; to predict the probability of minor and major internal conflict respectively². I calculated the fraction of years in which a given country had been in conflict and calculated the difference between average predicted conflict, and average observed conflict, for each country according to both models.

As previously mentioned, I am looking for a relatively peaceful country. A relatively peaceful country is a country with a high predicted risk of civil war relative to the country's experienced rate of civil war. To find these countries, I compare the levels of predicted conflict risk to the levels of observed conflict.

Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show scatterplots that plot predicted levels of conflict to observed levels of conflict. As I am interested in the relatively peaceful countries, I have zoomed in on the lower left quadrant of the plot, highlighting the countries which have experienced civil war in less than 20 percent of its history. Note that the Y-axis shows the average probability of either minor or major armed conflict according to the two different models. The X-axis shows the average incident of conflict. A country with a score of 0 will have had no armed

² It is important to note that I made certain changes to the two models that decrease the accuracy of the prediction. I removed all variables measuring time at peace or time since last war, and all fixed and random effects from the models. These variables increase the predictive power of the models, thus the predictions I utilize are less accurate than the original predictions from Hegre et al. (2013) and Hegre et al (2017). However, for the purpose of identifying the most relatively/surprisingly peaceful country it would not make sense to include these variables. There are good reasons for this:

First, fixed and random effects are included in statistical models to control for unobserved variation between units of analysis. Thus, the random effect included in Hegre et al. (2017) essentially controls away the interesting cross-case variation I am looking for. It makes sense to include such effects in a prediction model if the goal is to make accurate predictions and increase model fit. However, as I use the prediction model to identify a case which is not well predicted, the inclusion of a variable which is basically a dummy variable for each country does not make sense. Second, variables measuring time in peace or time since last war are essentially direct measures of a country's peacefulness. My goal is to identify a country that is more peaceful than expected, hence it makes little sense to include a direct measure of peacefulness into the calculation of predicted peacefulness.

conflicts in the period of the dataset. A country with a score of 1, will have had armed conflict in all years covered by the dataset.

Furthermore, note that the observations above the X=Y line represent countries with a higher predicted level of conflict than observed level of conflict. The observations furthest from the line are the most relatively peaceful countries. I have calculated this distance and listed the top ten countries for each model in table 1.3. Five countries are among the most relatively peaceful in both models: China, Tanzania, Vietnam, Malawi and Bangladesh³.

Figure 1.1: Average incidence of conflict against average predicted probability of conflict for countries with fewer than 20 percent of country years in conflict in Hegre et al., 2013.

Figure 1.2: Average incidence of conflict plotted against average predicted probability of conflict for countries with fewer than 20 percent of country years in conflict in Hegre et al., 2017.

Figure 1.1





Figure 1.2



³ The STATA code used to compute these measurements and produce Figure 1.1 and 1.2 is provided in the appendix (7.1)

Table 1.3: Top ten relatively peaceful countries in Hegre et al. 2013 and Hegre et al., 2017

Hegre et al., 2013	Hegre et al., 2017
China	China
Malawi	Tanzania
Tanzania	Vietnam
Brazil	North Korea
Vietnam	Kenya
Zambia	Malawi
Kenya	Mozambique
Egypt	Bangladesh
Mexico	South Korea
Bangladesh	Burkina Faso

Another way to identify countries that do not fit the prediction models is to measure how significant an effect the exclusion of a single country has on the prediction model as a whole. Smidt (2015) did a thorough investigation of the effects of single countries on a forecasting model developed in Hegre et al. (2013). The countries whose removal from the model leads to an increase in overall model accuracy are referred to by Smidt (2015, p. 49) as destructive countries. Smidt (2015, p. 53) identifies 16 destructive countries. Among these are Tanzania and China, which was also identified as surprisingly peaceful above.

As we have seen, Tanzania is identified as relatively peaceful by the statistical evidence. Moreover, qualitative researchers and area experts also identify Tanzania as relatively, or indeed surprisingly, peaceful. Anderson and Rolandsen (2014, p. 543) write that “The Tanzanian experience over these years stands apart from its regional neighbors”. Lupogo (2001, p. 75) observes that “Tanzania has remained peaceful despite the poverty of its tribes”. This notion seems to be widespread in the historiography on East-Africa. Killian (2008, p. 99) argues that “Tanzania is renowned for her long-established civic peace and national unity”. Based on both quantitative and qualitative evidence, I, therefore, choose to focus on Tanzania as a deviant case of civil war onset.

Nonetheless, the full history of post-independence Tanzania is too extensive a topic for a single master's thesis. To limit the scope of this thesis, I decided to focus on Zanzibar and the period of 1990-2010. Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania that enjoyed a short spell of independence from the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964 until the establishment of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1965. Zanzibar is arguably the region of Tanzania that is most susceptible to civil war. If one applies Rustad et al.'s (2011) model of subnational variation in conflict risk on Tanzania, Zanzibar is identified as one of the most at-risk regions.

Moreover, the region has a more violent history of decolonization than mainland Tanzania, is the homeland of an ethnic minority, and has been the stronghold of the Civic United Front (CUF), the most prominent national opposition party, since the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1995. Finally, as Killian (2008, p. 99) observes, "unlike in Tanzania mainland, struggle for the control of the state in Zanzibar has been intense, deadly and zero-sum". This constitutes political unrest that could have escalated to civil war.

I focus on the period 1990-2010 for three reasons. First, the period corresponds to the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania, a development that empirically has been associated with political unrest and even war (Cederman et al., 2010). Second, the period encompasses several events that could have acted as precipitants for civil war: the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, the 2001 massacre of peaceful demonstrators on Zanzibar (Human Rights Watch, 2002), as well as numerous instances of failed peace-negotiation processes in Zanzibar. Finally, the period is neither too distant nor too recent. An earlier period would have substantially limited the access to interview subjects since many who took part in policy decisions in the 1980's are no longer alive. A later period would have intensified the already present problems of studying controversial issues in a semi-authoritarian regime.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

In this chapter, I have done the following. First, I have defined the concept of civil war and briefly justified the theoretical framework and research design of this thesis. Second, I have explained in detail how I chose the case, and why one should expect a higher level of political violence in Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. In the following section, I will present the general structure of the rest of the thesis.

In the second chapter, I develop the theoretical framework. The framework incorporates structural conditions, strategic interaction and exogenous shocks. The structural conditions are comprised of factors that increase the opportunity or motivation of civil war. Together, they constitute a case's susceptibility to civil war. By strategic interaction I mean the rational interaction between actors that determines whether susceptibility to civil war manifests in violent political action. I model this interaction by a slightly altered game adopted from Pierskalla (2010). Structural conditions and strategic interaction constitute an endogenized system. In turn, exogenous shocks, such as the end of the cold war, affect both the structural conditions and the perceptions and strategies of the actors engaged in strategic interaction. I argue that these elements fit together to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its part.

In the third chapter, I elaborate and justify the research design, operationalize the theoretical framework, and discuss ethical and methodological issues. I discuss the research design, including the advantages and disadvantages of the single case study, and the concept of deviance. By assessing a single case in detail, I can trace the causal processes that link structural conditions to the onset of civil war, and map how the dynamics of strategic interaction influence, and are influenced, by these processes. The research design also limits the contributions of this thesis. The results are not valid outside the scope of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. What they can contribute to, however, is theory building and the historiography of Zanzibar. Furthermore, I operationalize the theoretical framework and explain in detail how I measure and observe the various elements of the theoretical framework. Finally, I reflect on some ethical and methodological issues related to qualitative fieldwork and unstructured interviewing.

In the fourth chapter, I conduct a case study. The case study consists of an assessment of Zanzibar's susceptibility to conflict in the 1990-2010 period and a structured analytical

narrative of the period, in order to trace the strategic interaction of actors, and the effect of structural conditions on the risk of civil war. I argue that motivation was for the most part present throughout the period and that the level of opportunity is ambiguous. The structured analytical narrative traces the events of the 1990-2010 period and argues that Zanzibar avoided civil war for three reasons. First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented by the opposition's belief that the next election would lead to substantial political change. Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating a civil war. Finally, the leadership of the CUF, and Seif Sharif Hamad in particular, acted in a risk-averse manner at critical moments. In the fifth and final chapter, I conclude by elaborating on these three reasons and discuss the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of the thesis.

2. Theory

2.1 Introduction

On November 8th, 2018 something happened on Camp Creek Road in Butte County in northern California. The exact turn of events is hidden from us, but some discarded cigarette, unattended campfire, or lost looking glass set off a spark. That spark turned into a firestorm that devastated the town of Paradise a few days later. By November 25th the wildfire had covered an area of 153, 336 acres, caused at least 86 fatalities, several injuries and 16.5 billion worth of material destruction.

What causes such wildfires? Most people would agree that wildfires require both *preconditions* and *precipitants*. The precipitants are the sparks that ignite the fire. Such sparks could emanate from a lightning strike, a carelessly discarded cigarette or intentional arson. This precipitant, or trigger-event, is always a very particular event, even though it might be challenging to identify the actual event after the fact. The precondition is the susceptibility to fire. The amount of natural fuel in the form of dead trees and dry bush, make the forest more or less flammable. Thus, a wildfire is the result of both the dynamic process that led to the spark and the structural conditions that made the forest susceptible to fire. Likewise, the absence of wildfires can be explained either by the lack of sparks or by the lack of structural preconditions.

Civil wars are somewhat akin to wildfires. Structural preconditions, such as poverty, natural resource dependency, and semi-democracy corresponds to a forest full of dead trees. The interaction of actors are the processes that lead to unattended bonfires and discarded cigarettes. The sudden rainfalls and lightning strikes constitute exogenous shocks that can influence both the structural conditions and the interaction of actors. A framework that seeks to explain the onset of civil war needs to consider both the structural conditions, the interaction of the actors, and the exogenous shocks. A peaceful country can thus be the result of an absence of triggering events, or that the country is not susceptible to civil war.

One might argue that this seems like a purely academic distinction. I would argue that the question is important. Whether the forest is full of unattended bonfires, but soaked in the autumn rain, or is dry as the Sahara but utterly free of campfires matters for how a forest attendant should manage the risk of wildfires. Likewise, if a country is peaceful because

specific processes have turned out certain ways, or if it is the structural conditions that make civil war highly unlikely, matters for how the international community should manage the situation. The best policy advice is based on a comprehensive understanding of both the structural conditions and the dynamic interaction of actors.

To gain such a comprehensive understanding, the student of civil war needs a comprehensive theory of the causes of civil war. The current ecosystem of research on the causes of civil war primarily consists of in-depth assessments of singular causal relationships. This is excellent research and knowledge production. Nonetheless, if the goal is to provide a comprehensive analysis of a single case, the knowledge produced is at the same time both overwhelming and of limited utility. Overwhelming, because it would be nearly impossible to read everything ever written on the causes of war. Of limited utility, because the empirical world is too complicated for neat and independent causal relationships.

To accurately assess the risk of civil war in a specific country, the student of civil war must consider a wide range of causal mechanisms, and the interplay between them. This is an over-ambitious proposition. I do not claim that this way of synthesizing existing theory is the only, nor the best, way of doing this. However, any analyst that claims to provide an answer to the question “how likely is a war in country X”, is implicitly synthesizing everything he or she knows about the causes of civil war. I am merely trying to be explicit and systematic in how I utilize existing theory. Consequently, in this chapter, I develop a systematic theoretical framework that takes both structural conditions, strategic interaction and exogenous shocks into consideration. The framework will then be operationalized and applied to the case of Zanzibar in the period 1990-2010.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I assess the empirical patterns and theoretical justification for a set of structural conditions that are identified as determinants of civil war risk. Second, I assess a model explaining how the interaction of actors leads to civil war onset. The model is based on rationalistic game theory and is intended to cover the strategic interaction of actors. One might easily imagine other forms of interaction besides the purely strategic, such as emotional interaction. However, in this thesis, I will limit myself to strategic interaction. Together, structural conditions and strategic interaction constitute an endogenized system. Third, I will briefly assess how exogenous shocks, in turn, can directly affect both the structural conditions and strategic interaction. Finally, I summarize the

chapter with a brief discussion of how these various elements can be combined into a comprehensive analysis of conflict risk in a single case.

2.2 Structural conditions

In 1978, Harvey Starr suggested that *opportunity* and *willingness* were central ordering concepts in the study of war in general. Opportunity referred to the absence of factors prohibiting war, and willingness referred to the fact that two or more actors had to be willing to engage in acts of violence. Over time, the term willingness has merged with the term motivation, and these terms are used interchangeably in the literature. For clarity, I will consistently use the term motivation to refer to actors' willingness and motivation to engage in civil violence, and the term opportunity to refer to the feasibility of rebellion. Applied to civil war, this means that a rebel group challenging the state needs motivation and opportunity. In order to challenge the state, an organization must both want to rebel and be able to rebel. I will conceive of motivation and opportunity together as a particular situation's susceptibility to civil war.

Starr's contemporaries fit nicely within this ordering principle. Some scholars focused on motivation. Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory explain collective violence as the reactions to frustrations originating from unfulfilled expectations. According to Davies' (1962) revolutions occur when the gap between what people want and what they get become intolerable. Moore (1966) explains peasant uprisings as a violent response to wealth inequality. Other scholars focused on opportunity. According to Snyder and Tilly (1972), grievances are too common to explain political violence; instead what explains political violence is resources and organization. Olson (1965) argued that most individuals, no matter how aggrieved, will avoid the risk of armed rebellion and instead free-ride on the risk-taking of others. Thus, the crucial factor enabling collective violence against the state is not the level of grievance, but the factors that help a rebel organization solve the collective action problem.

These foundational works laid the theoretical foundation for the number of quantitative studies on the causes of war onset that emerged in the early 2000's. In Hegre et al. (2001, p. 33) semi-democracies create both motivation and opportunity for rebellion, because "Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness

allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the regime” (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 33).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) explicitly compare broad political grievances to structural factors that render insurgency feasible. They conclude “If, under the right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2000 active guerrillas can make for a long-running, destructive internal war, then the average level of grievance in a group may not matter that much” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 88).

In Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the ordering principles are seen as the focal points of various approaches. “Thus, the political science and economic approaches to rebellion have assumed both different rebel motivation – grievance vs greed – and different explanations – atypical grievances versus atypical opportunities” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p. 564).

They all draw on Starr’s (1978) ordering principles of motivation and opportunity. The foundational theoretical assumption is that civil wars begin when some group is unhappy with the status quo, but only if that group operates in a situation where armed conflict is a feasible strategy to change the status quo. Motivation and opportunity thus constitute the susceptibility to conflict.

It is useful to distinguish analytically, and ideally empirically, between motivation and opportunity. Nevertheless, the goal is not to argue that one is more important than the other. The reason is that situations with opportunity but without motivation are different from situations without opportunity but with motivation. In neither of these situations would we expect to see civil war, but both situations could become susceptible to civil war given the right external shock. However, the shocks which would increase the susceptibility of each situation would be different. This is illustrated in table 2.1. For example, an exogenous positive shock to opportunity, e.g. a state collapse in a neighboring country, would increase the risk of civil war in situation C, but not necessarily have a significant impact in situation B.

Table 2.1 Distinguishing analytically between opportunity and motivation for civil war

	Motivation for Civil War	Non- motivation for Civil War
Opportunity for Civil War	A: Susceptible to Civil War	B: Vulnerable to shock to motivation
Non- opportunity for Civil War	C: Vulnerable to shocks to opportunity	D: Robust Peace

2.2.1 Empirical elements of susceptibility

Susceptibility to civil war is a complex concept. Luckily, there is a vast empirical literature on the empirical covariates of civil war onset. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) review and test the findings from various studies in a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. They use several different datasets and use various definitions of the various variables used by different studies. They run 4.7 million regression models with various model specifications in order to find out which variables were robustly correlated with civil war onset.

Hegre and Sambanis (2006, p. 531) find a robust correlation between civil war and the following phenomena; Large total population, low per capita income, low rates of economic growth, recent political instability, inconsistent democratic institutions, low coercive capability, rough terrain, and war neighborhoods. Additionally, they find that ethnic fractionalization is correlated with low-level armed conflict, but not with full-scale civil war. Ethnic dominance, on the other hand, is correlated with large scale civil wars, but not with low-level conflict. More recent scholarship has identified *horizontal* political and economic inequalities (Stewart, 2008; Cederman et al., 2013), Youth bulges (Urdal, 2006) and natural resource wealth (Ross, 2015) as robust determinants of civil war. In the following pages, I

will go through these variables and briefly assess the various theoretical mechanisms that could explain the empirical patterns.

Large total population

A large population is a natural correlation to conflict, given how the dependent variable is operationalized in most datasets. To be coded as internal armed conflict or civil war, the conflict needs to generate 25, or 1000 battle deaths, respectively. To reach these thresholds is easier in countries with more people. Larger populations also mean larger recruitment pools and more extensive supply of tools, food and other supplies necessary for civil violence, and a higher probability that a sufficient number of potential rebels are discontent and motivated to challenge the state (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009, p. 225). In this way, large populations increase the opportunity and motivation for civil war onset.

Studies also find that population density matters for the risk of civil war. These studies utilize geographical grids instead of countries as units of analysis. Buhaug and Rød (2006) find that territorial conflicts are more likely in sparsely populated regions near the state border. While conflict over state governance is more likely in densely populated regions close to the state capital. Raleigh and Hegre (2009) find that conflict risk increases with local population size, and particularly in larger population concentrations far from the state capital. Theoretically, population concentration increases the risk of conflict by alleviating the coordination problems that potential rebel groups face, and possibly by being more homogenous and autonomous than dispersed populations (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009, p. 226).

Consequently, both a country's total population and the distribution of the population should be taken into consideration when assessing the risk of civil war.

Low per capita income

GDP per capita is robustly correlated to conflict onset (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). The literature has proposed at least two explanations for this relationship. Per capita income is seen either as a measure of the strength of the economy or as a proxy for state weakness.

Collier & Hoeffler (2004, p. 569) argues that a weak economy makes civil war more likely because it decreases foregone income, and thus lowers the opportunity costs for joining a rebel organization. Other proxies for poverty that are correlated with conflict are infant mortality (Esty et al., 1999), and energy consumption per capita (Hegre et al., 2001).

Additionally, a weak economy could also be understood as a situation that generates grievances, and thus motivates potential rebels to change the status quo.

Alternatively, the relationship between low per capita income and civil war risk can be interpreted by seeing GDP per capita as a proxy for state weakness. A weak state increases the risk of civil war because it does not have the necessary military and bureaucratic capability to fight the rebels effectively, and thus increases the viability of armed rebellion (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Hendrix (2011) and Fjelde and de Soysa (2009), find a robust negative relationship between a state's tax capacity and the risk of civil war. According to the authors, the effect of state capacity works both through the opportunistic and the motivational path. A strong state makes rebellion less feasible because of its coercive capability and less tempting because of its capacity to provide social goods.

Consequently, one must assess the effect of both a poor economy and that of a weak state in order to comprehend the relationship between per capita income and civil war onset. One should also keep in mind that this relationship works through both motivational and opportunistic mechanisms.

Low rates of economic growth

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) also find a robust negative relationship between economic growth and civil war onset. The most prominent explanation of this correlation is the effect economic outlook has on alternative costs. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) theorize that the opportunity costs of joining rebel organizations are decreased by lower expected foregone income in the future. Alternatively, in layman's terms, if your future looks bright, you are less likely to incur the risk of joining a rebel organization. If your future looks bleak, the life of a rebel looks better in comparison. Other possible proxies of the economic outlook, such as male enrolment rates in secondary education, is also negatively related to conflict onset (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Consequently, one should assess the economic outlook of a polity when assessing its risk of civil war. However, because the perceived economic outlook is a highly subjective phenomenon, one should preferably assess not only the "objective" measures of economic outlook such as growth and enrolment rates, but also the subjective evaluation of young males, who make up a large proportion of most violent organizations.

Recent political instability

Past conflict is one of the best predictors of future conflict, (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Hibbs (1973, p. 163) was the first to demonstrate that civil wars were dependent on earlier civil wars. Hegre et al. (2001) showed that the effect of earlier conflict is strongest in the immediate aftermath of conflict and that the risk is halved every 16th year. This relationship is sometimes referred to as the conflict trap (Collier et al., 2003). Collier & Hoeffler (2004, p. 569) theorize that this relationship can be explained either by the rising cost of conflict-specific capital or by the slow fading of grievances.

The slowly fading grievances act as motivation for future conflict in terms of revenge for past injustices. Conflict specific capital could be material capital such as military equipment. However, if one expands the concept of conflict-specific capital also to include cultural capital, the concept becomes even more useful. Scott Straus (2015), demonstrates how narratives formed during periods of nation-building frame and shape to what degree violent actions against certain groups are considered politically legitimate. In other words, the narratives of who is “inside” and “outside” the great “us” of the nation prepare and enable a state to use violence as a political tool. Straus (2015) shows how this enables genocide, but the same logic applies to political repression, which could escalate to civil war.

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) also find that recent political instability that does not reach the level of war is correlated with civil war onset. New states and states that are in interregnum or transition have an increased risk of civil war. Cederman et al. (2010) find that both democratization and autocratization increase the risk of civil war. Hegre et al. (2001) argue that such instability constitutes deconsolidation of the political regime which creates instability and uncertainty as social groups readjust to the new status quo. Instability thus opens a window of opportunity where dissatisfied groups are induced to struggle against the state. As protesters and challengers gradually readjust and finds ways to obtain what they want within the new regime, the initial uncertainty and unrest will diminish (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 34).

Consequently, to assess conflict risk, both long-term conflict history and short-term political instability must be taken into consideration.

Inconsistent democratic institutions

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) confirm that semi-democracy increases the risk of civil war onset. (Hegre et al. (2001, p. 33) theorize that semi democracies are not democratic enough to remove the motivation for rebellion, and not autocratic enough to remove the opportunity for rebellion. Semi-democracy thus increases the risk of civil war through two independent causal mechanisms. First, repression creates grievances that motivate groups and individuals to take violent action. Second, political openness allows and enables groups to organize and act against the regime (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 33). Thus, both harsh repression and complete openness are obstacles to civil war onset.

Additionally, rapid change in the level of democracy matter for the susceptibility to civil war (Hegre et al. 2001). However, this constitutes a form of political instability, and the mechanisms are not theorized to be distinct from the effects of other forms of political instability. In conclusion, one should take both the level, and the change of the level, of democracy into consideration when assessing conflict risk.

Low coercive capability

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find that military capability, measured by military manpower, and the share of the population in the military forces, are negatively correlated to civil war onset. These measures are interpreted as proxies for the state's coercive capability. As mentioned above, low coercive capability increases the risk of civil war onset because it increases the feasibility of rebellion. A state with high coercive capability is more likely to deter rebellion in the first place and to quench it at an early stage. This mechanism is a central part of the opportunity element of susceptibility. The theoretically most relevant concept in this regard is the relative capabilities of the state and the rebels. However, potential rebel strength is tough to assess, especially before organizing.

Rough terrain

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find that rough terrain is robustly correlated with the onset of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) theorize that rough terrain enables rebels to hide and avoid state security forces. Therefore, rough terrain is a variable that is likely to increase the capabilities of a rebel organization relative to the state, regardless of the unifying identity of the rebel group. In a more recent study, Hendrix (2011) argues that rough terrain both

increases the feasibility of rebels - as Fearon & Laitin (2003) hypothesize - *and* decrease state capacity because it lowers the tax capacity of the state.

War prone neighborhoods

Civil wars are clustered in time and space (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Some of this is because the *determinants* of civil war onset are clustered in time and space. However, empirical research suggests that some of this neighborhood effect is due to contagion (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). Contagion refers to the spread of civil war through various mechanisms.

Erika Forsberg (2016) has reviewed the literature and proposes five mechanisms for civil war contagion. First, Civil wars produce refugee flows, which tend to increase the susceptibility to civil war on the host countries because they “facilitate the transnational spread of arms, combatants and ideologies” (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, p. 335). Second, civil wars tend to increase the availability of arms, which lowers the cost of rebellion for the challenger (Forsberg, 2016, p. 79). Third, civil wars tend to lead to a reduction in trade and investment in neighboring countries (Murdoch and Sandler, 2004), which lowers the opportunity costs of rebellion. Fifth, civil war might provide lessons and inspiration for opposition groups in neighboring countries. This could occur either through strategic learning and emulation (Bakke, 2013) or because successful rebellion in a neighboring state might increase the perceived probability of success. Finally, the literature suggests that all of these mechanisms are strengthened by long and porous borders (Forsberg, 2016, p. 79), and by the presence of transnational ethnic groups (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008).

In summary, to analyze the risk of civil war in a specific case, one cannot merely look at the number of conflicts in neighboring states but rather assess the specific mechanisms by which other conflicts may or may not affect the specific polity of analysis.

Ethnic composition

Ethnic and religious identities are an essential element of a majority of modern civil wars. In recent decades, as much as 64% of all civil wars were fought along ethnic lines (Denny and Walter, 2014, p. 199). Denny and Walter (2014) argue that three mechanisms makes rebel groups more likely to organize around ethnic or religious identity groups. Ethnic and religious identity groups are “more apt to be aggrieved, better able to mobilize and more

likely to face difficult bargaining situations” (Denny and Walter, 2014, p. 200). It might, therefore, be natural to believe that ethnic and religious heterogeneity increases the susceptibility to civil war. However, the empirical literature suggests a somewhat different relationship. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find that ethnic fractionalization is highly correlated to low-level conflict, but not correlated with civil wars that reach the threshold of 1000 battle deaths. Ethnic dominance – when the largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90 % of the population – is correlated with major civil war, but not with smaller civil conflict. What explains this discrepancy remain unresolved.

In summary, identity and the composition of identity groups are essential elements to take into consideration when assessing susceptibility to conflict. One should distinguish between fractionalization and dominance, as these configurations of ethnic composition seem to increase different kinds of civil violence.

Horizontal inequalities

Horizontal inequalities are “systematic economic and political inequalities between ethnic, religious or regional groups” (Østby, 2013, p. 207). Horizontal inequalities are theorized by Cederman et al. (2013) to lead to conflict through grievances. Horizontal inequalities imply intergroup comparison, which might lead to evaluations of injustice, which again might lead to inter-group grievances through framing and blaming of other groups. Grievances lead to conflict initiation as the groups become mobilized to change the perceived unjust status quo. The intergroup grievances and in-group solidarity might again be reinforced by state repression, setting off a self-reinforcing process (Cederman et al., 2013, p. 35-51). The most important kinds of horizontal inequalities are economic inequalities and political inequalities.

The notion of economic inequalities, conceived of by Gurr (1970) as relative deprivation, was for a long time seen as the key to understanding the causes of civil war. In the early 00’s, several studies, including Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), found no effect of economic inequality and refuted Gurr’s (1970) original thesis. However, new and more sophisticated statistical, empirical evidence comes to a different conclusion. Cederman et al. (2013, p. 205) show that “Once properly conceptualized and operationalized, horizontal inequality can be shown to have a strong impact on the outbreak and duration of civil war”. The critical difference between Cederman et al. (2013) and earlier empirical tests of inequality is the notion of horizontal inequalities.

Additionally, and related to the previous section on ethnic composition, ethnic groups are more likely to challenge the state if they are subject to political exclusion or discrimination, and if there exist relatively large transnational ethnic kin groups in neighboring countries (Cederman et al., 2013). Transnational ethnic kin groups have a curvilinear effect on the risk of civil war. Small ethnic kin groups do not increase the risk of civil war because they would make little difference to the relative capabilities of the actors. Large ethnic kin groups, on the other hand, could potentially change the outcome of any potential war. Hence, large ethnic kin groups make the government actor cautious. These two mechanisms create a curvilinear effect (Cederman et al., 2013, p. 127).

Consequently, horizontal economic inequalities in the form of systematic economic differences between - and systematic political discrimination of - different identity groups, must be taken into consideration when assessing conflict risk. In particular, large, politically excluded groups with medium sized ethnic kin groups abroad increase the susceptibility to civil war. However, it is important to remember that these theoretical expectations are based on certain assumptions about the nature of ethnicity. In situations where ethnic identity is more fluid, the effect of identity might be harder to assess.

Youth bulges

Youth bulges are often associated with susceptibility to conflict. Urdal (2006) finds robust evidence that youth bulges, defined as the proportion of the adult population aged 15-24, increase the risk of armed conflict, terrorism and rioting. Additionally, Nordås and Davenport (2013) find that governments facing youth bulges are more repressive than other states.

There are at least two mechanisms that can explain these relationships. First, youth bulges could be perceived as an abundant supply of potential recruits with low opportunity costs (Urdal, 2006, p. 607). Young males are the best recruits as they seem to have a general propensity for violence. Young males are the main protagonists of criminal- (Neapolitan, 1997, p. 92; Neumayer, 2003, p. 621) as well as political violence (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000, p. 253). Second, youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional crowding, that is situations where the demand for employment is higher than the supply, creating a large group of educated but unemployed youth. Several scholars have argued that high unemployment among educated youth is destabilizing and potentially violent (Choucri, 1974,

p. 73; Winckler, 2002, p. 635; Lia, 2005, p. 145-146). Consequently, the effect of youth bulges should be taken into consideration when assessing conflict risk.

Natural resource wealth

In a recent review article, Michael Ross (2015, p. 250) conclude that most published studies find a positive relationship between natural resource wealth and civil war onset. Oil, alluvial diamonds (Ross, 2006), other alluvial gemstones (Fearon, 2004), other nonfuel minerals (Collier et al., 2009) and narcotics (Angrist and Kugler, 2008) have all been statistically associated with civil war onset. Natural resources do increase susceptibility to conflict, but this relationship is conditional.

First, the effect of natural resources on civil war onset seems to be nonlinear. The risk of conflict increases from low to medium levels of natural resource wealth and decreases at high levels. A probable explanation is that regimes with have high levels of natural resource wealth create strong states capable of repressing domestic challengers (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Second, it seems that the location of resources matter. For instance, off-shore oil is not at all correlated with civil war onset, while on-shore oil wealth is highly correlated (Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2012). On-shore oil resources are much more vulnerable to be claimed by separatist or attacked by rebels. Third, if the on-shore oil is found in poor regions (Østby et al., 2009), populated with marginal groups (Hunziker and Cederman, 2017) and/ or when political entrepreneurs use oil to mobilize resistance against the central government, oil is even more likely to cause civil war. This shows how natural resource wealth is interrelated with other structural conditions such as the political and economic horizontal inequalities mentioned above.

In conclusion

As should be evident from the discussion above, susceptibility to civil war is a complex concept. The list of variables discussed above is not exhaustive or final. Nor, are the theoretical explanations given for each correlation necessarily the correct or the only possible causal mechanisms. However, based on a comprehensive review of the literature, it is fair to say that the set of phenomena discussed to an adequate degree covers the concept of susceptibility to civil war.

In theory, structural susceptibility should be quantifiable on an aggregate level. However, this is not the goal in this thesis. Rather, I make use of the knowledge gathered in the numerous quantitative studies referred to above, in order to explain a single deviant case. To achieve that goal, an aggregated measure of susceptibility to civil war would be counterproductive, as it would muddle the analytical pond, and make the individual contribution of certain phenomena less clear. Instead, I have reviewed the literature in order to provide a list of phenomena that I will account for and take into consideration in the empirical case study of Zanzibar 1990-2010.

The relationships between structural conditions and civil war onset discussed in this section constitute a country's susceptibility to civil war. A country can be more or less susceptible to civil war. The more fine-grained our understanding of the susceptibility, the better situated we are to mitigate and manage risk. However, a theoretical framework that only considers the structural conditions is somewhat inadequate if the goal is to provide a comprehensive analysis of a single case. As Young (2016, p. 39) points out, wars do not merely occur with a certain probability; they evolve through a process of interaction between actors. The next section turns to these processes.

2.2 Strategic Interaction

No matter how dry the forest floor is, it does not self-immolate. Likewise, a particular polity might be extremely susceptible to civil war, but without the actions and interaction of actors, no civil war will erupt. This entails a different conception of conflict risk from the structural approach presented above. Instead of understanding civil wars as events with a certain probability given the structural conditions, civil wars are understood as interactive processes highly dependent on the perceptions, and strategies of the actors (Young, 2016, p. 39). Thus, to understand the causes of civil war, we must understand this strategic interaction.

To model this strategic interaction, I utilize a slightly altered version of Pierskalla's (2010) extensive game of repression and dissent with incomplete information. In the game, there are two players: the government and the opposition. The government can be of two types; strong or weak. A government is strong if it would win an open conflict with the opposition.


The game starts with a random draw for the type of government. The government is strong with a probability of P and weak with a probability of $1-P$. Initially, neither the

government nor the opposition knows the government's type. The game allows the players to update their perception of P in each round. After the government's type is decided, the opposition decides to protest, with the cost of c_p , or not to protest. If the opposition chooses not to protest it receives a payoff of 0 representing the status quo, while the government receives the benefits of staying in power (B_g).

If the opposition chooses to protest, the government decides whether to repress, with the cost of c_r for the government and a utility loss of $-r$ for the opposition or accommodate the opposition. If the government accommodates the opposition, it receives a payoff of $-p$, while the opposition receives a payoff of $p > c_p$. Accommodation represents offering and implementing a credible policy compromise and ends the game.

In Perskalla's (2010) original game, only strong governments repress. This means that the government will know the government's type when reacting to government repression. In this slightly altered version, I allow weak governments to bluff and fake strength by repressing the opposition. This reintroduces uncertainty to the game, so that the opposition's perception of both government strength, and the government's perceived propensity to bluff matter for the opposition's decision.

Figure 2.2: Extensive form game of strategic interaction, adapted from Pierskalla (2010)



If the government chooses to repress, the opposition must choose either to escalate, with the cost of c_{esc} , or acquiesce. If the opposition acquiesces, they give in to government repression. The government then receives the benefit of governing, and incur the costs of repression, while the opposition incurs the costs of both protesting, and being repressed.

If the opposition chooses to escalate after repression, civil war ensues, and the government incurs the cost of war (c_w). It is assumed that the government wins open conflict if the government is of the strong type, or if the opposition escalates after the government has accommodated the opposition. The winner of the war receives the benefits of governing, whether that is the government (B_g) or the opposition (B_o). Figure 2.2 shows the full game and the payoff structure.

The game leads to four distinct and rationally possible scenarios, or equilibrium solutions: *successful deterrence*, in which the government can successfully deter protest by convincing the opposition that the government is too strong; *successful repression*, in which the government repression convinces the opposition that the government is indeed strong; *policy compromise*, in which government and opposition reach a negotiated settlement that both actors prefer over war; and escalation to civil war, in which disagreement over relative power prevents the players from reaching a settlement.

Except for the last scenario, the outcomes are the same regardless of government type. For escalation to civil war, however, it is assumed that a strong government will win and that a weak government will lose. Additionally, note that opposition escalation after government accommodation will always be irrational. After government accommodation, the opposition will always be better off by acquiescing and accepting the policy compromise. Therefore, we can disregard this scenario.

Which of these outcomes that will materialize is dependent on the perceptions, risk propensity, and expectations of the players. Specifically, the outcomes are dependent on the actors' perception of relative power (P), the actors' propensity to bluff, the actors' expectations of the other actor's perception of relative power (P), and the actors' expectations of the other actor's propensity to bluff.

If the opposition believes the government is strong and expects the government to believe so too, it will choose not to protest. This leads to the outcome of *successful deterrence*. If the opposition believes the government is weak, or expects the government to

perceive itself as weak, it will choose to protest. Note that the choice to protest given a belief that the government is strong, but an expectation that the government believes itself to be weak, is a bluff. If the government believes itself to be weak and expects the opposition to believe so too, it will accommodate.

Regardless of belief, the opposition will then acquiesce, leading to the outcome of *policy compromise*. However, if the government believes itself to be strong, or expect the opposition to perceive the government as strong after repression, it will repress. If the opposition still believes the government to be weak, it will escalate, leading to the outcome *escalation to civil war*. Note that this is only rational for the opposition if the perceived benefits of winning outweigh the cost of war ($B_o > c_{esc}$). Finally, if the opposition after repression believes the government to be strong, it will acquiesce, which will result in the outcome of *successful repression*.

With the help of this formal model of protest, repression and escalation, we can see how the perceptions, expectations and risk propensity of the actors affect the risk of civil war. The opposition's perceptions, risk propensity and expectations are crucial for the decision to protest. The government perception, risk propensity and expectations are equally crucial for the government's decision of how to react to protest. Finally, the updated perceptions of the opposition determine how the opposition reacts to repression. Thus, to best predict how specific actors will react in certain situations we need to assess their perceptions and expectations.

2.3 Exogenous shocks

The structural conditions and strategic interaction discussed above are closely interlinked. Structural conditions influence the strategic interaction of actors. Rough terrain, state capacity and natural resources alter the perceived power balance of government and opposition and the benefits of staying in power. In turn, the interaction of the actors can alter the structural conditions. Policy compromise can change the political institutions and alleviate future grievances while escalating violence can produce refugee flows that change the demographics of a country. In this way, structural conditions and strategic interaction constitute an endogenized system. This system can be subject to exogenous shocks that directly affect both the structural conditions and strategic interaction.

An exogenous shock is an event outside of the endogenized system of structural conditions and strategic interaction that directly affect the risk of civil war. Shocks can, over a short period, increase or decrease the susceptibility to civil war, alter the payoff structures of the strategic interaction, change the reference points of psychological states, or change the international context. For simplicity and clarity, one can distinguish between shocks to the economy, the polity and the community.

Shocks to the economy could be global financial crises or sudden changes in crucial commodity prices. Shocks to the polity could be a radical change in the international political context, such as the end of the Cold War, sudden regime changes or international intervention. Shocks to the community could be natural disasters, religious revival or a sudden influx of refugees. However, the most critical aspect of an exogenous shock is not its type or origin, but in what way it alters the endogenized system of structural conditions and dynamic interaction.

There are several empirical examples of the effects of exogenous shocks on the risk of civil war. Dube and Vargas (2013) show how global commodity prices affect the violence in regions of Colombia producing oil and coffee respectively. Hegre et al. (2001) find that civil war onset is more likely in the immediate aftermath of a regime change. They argue that deconsolidation of the political regime creates instability and uncertainty as social groups readjust to the new status quo, and thus open a window of opportunity where dissatisfied groups are induced to struggle against the state.

Similarly, Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) similarly find that irregular transitions of power increase the risk of civil war onset. They argue that these transitions signal windows of opportunity and state weakness. Nel and Righarts (2008) find that natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis and floods significantly increase the risk of civil war in both the short and medium term. Finally, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) argue that the end of the Cold War significantly changed the nature of civil war in the developing world, because the state and rebel actors suddenly were deprived of a significant source of financial support that increased their military capabilities.

2.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have developed a theoretical framework that incorporates structural conditions, strategic interaction, and exogenous shocks. The result is a synthesis of various theoretical elements from various theoretical approaches. I argue that these elements fit together to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its part. The structural conditions constitute the baseline risk of a polity, and frames and shape the interaction of actors through its influence on payoff structures and perceived power-relations. Just as the structure shapes the interaction of the actors, the interacting actors alter the structural conditions. This interplay constitutes an endogenized system. In turn, exogenous shocks directly affect both the structural conditions and the strategic interaction of actors.

Given this theoretical framework, how should one proceed to analyze the risk of civil war in a specific polity? How can the theory be applied to an empirical case? I suggest an analysis in two phases. First, the analyst needs to account for the structural conditions. This entails a thorough assessment of the polity's susceptibility to civil war. The analysis should take all the elements of susceptibility identified in part 2.2.1 under consideration and systematically assess their independent and combined effect. Ideally, the analyst should distinguish between opportunity and motivation, and be specific in terms of what disqualifies rebellion as a viable strategy, and which aspects of the status quo that might motivate a group to violently challenge the state.

It is possible to assess susceptibility systematically both quantitatively and qualitatively. The advantages of a quantitative measure of susceptibility are increased rigorousness, comparability, and transparency. Since quantification forces the analyst to quantify conflict risk, it is easier to evaluate the quality of the analysis. However, quantification risks losing some of the nuances that a qualitative assessment brings to the table. Qualitative assessment of grievances, identity, economic outlook and horizontal inequalities can register local configurations and peculiarities that comparative quantitative data overlooks. In the analysis of a single case, I argue that a balance between quantitative and qualitative tools is the best method to provide a systematic assessment of a polity's susceptibility to civil war. In the next chapter, I will give a more detailed description of this process.

Second, the analyst needs to account for the strategic interaction of the actors and the exogenous shocks. This entails a thorough account of the political and military turn of events that may or may not escalate to civil war. The analyst should seek to identify situations of strategic choice and look for evidence of perception and expectation. Public statements and behavior often tell the analyst a lot about the actors' perceptions, expectations and risk propensity. Ideally, the analyst should talk to leaders and influential members of organizations to best predict their future behavior.

Several formats can adequately map strategic interactions and exogenous shocks. I favor a structured analytical narrative. This entails a systematic, theory-driven, chronological narrative which analyses the turn of events and traces the causal mechanisms at work. With a focus on mechanisms, and the inclusion of both structural conditions and strategic interaction, this approach constitutes a form of process tracing in order to identify causal patterns. Moreover, the approach captures the chronological nature of interaction, it has the potential to read well, and enables the analyst to incorporate the distinctive elements of the local context.

3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The last chapter developed a theoretical framework to study the risk of civil war in a specific case. In this chapter, I will detail how this framework will be applied on the specific empirical case of Zanzibar 1990-2010.

The chapter is divided in three sections. First, I present the overall research design, which consists of a single deviant case study. I reflect on the advantages and limitations of case studies, and especially on what a single case can and cannot tell us. Second, I explain in detail how I proceed to gather, analyze and interpret empirical data of various kinds in order to write the analytical case study of this thesis. This entails both a discussion of the logical foundation of the qualitative case study, as well as a full operationalization. Finally, I discuss ethical issues and possible threats to internal validity that emerges from this research design and methodological choices.

3.2 Research design

This thesis is a single deviant case study on the causes of civil war. Specifically, a case study of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. Based on established quantitative prediction models, and assessments from area experts, Zanzibar is more peaceful than what one might expect. Central to this idea is the concept of the counterfactual, the state of things that might have been given another turn of events. The case study thus entails a synthetic comparison: a comparison between the observed case of Zanzibar in 1990-2010, and the counterfactual Zanzibar of the same period.

To implement such a comparison, the empirical analysis tries to accomplish two things. First, I map Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war in the period of analysis. Then I will trace the turn of events, to see how the structural conditions interact with exogenous shocks and strategic interaction to produce the outcome it does. These two elements will provide an empirically supported and theoretically sound explanation for why Zanzibar did not experience more civil violence in the 1990-2010 period. In the following section, I will do two things. First, I will discuss the advantages and limitations of a single case study. Second, I will give a brief discussion of the concept of deviance.

3.2.1 Advantages and limitations of a single case study

A case study is an intensive study of a single unit, for the purpose of understanding a larger class of events (Gerring, 2007, p. 37). This thesis is an intensive study of Zanzibar, for the purpose of understanding the causes of civil war. Zanzibar is a negative case, as it is an instance of non-civil war.

Case studies have a long tradition in the social sciences. Yet, it has at times been criticized for methodological limitations. Gerring (2007, p. 6) summarize this criticism,

A work that focuses its attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon is apt to be described as a mere case study, and is often identified with loosely framed and nongeneralizable theories, biased case selection, informal and undisciplined research designs, weak empirical leverage (too many variables and too few cases), subjective conclusions, non-replicability, and causal determinism.

These issues must be addressed.

My solution to these issues is to be as systematic and transparent as possible. First, the theory synthesis is structured and formal. It should be clear which observations that would strengthen, and which observations that would weaken, the proposed theoretical relationships. Second, the case selection is systematic and rigorous, as should be evident from the introduction. Third, I attempt to be as disciplined and formal as possible when it comes to the research design. However, I do acknowledge that this research design is not suitable for theory testing. Fourth, weak leverage is a result of too many variables and too few observations. It should be evident that a single case does not consist of a single observation. Finally, I do acknowledge the severe issues of non-replicability and non-generalizability. One can not generalize any causal effect or empirical pattern based on evidence from a single case.

Despite these issues, the case study format has some clear advantages for the research goal. Among these are the focus on specific causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, the benefit to theory generation rather than theory testing, and the increased ease of handling equifinality (Gerring, 2007, p. 37-63).

A single case study enables me to look into the causal mechanisms that lead to civil war. If the question is whether, or to what degree, certain variables affect the risk of civil war, then a cross-case study is a better approach. However, if the question is how various variables increase the risk of civil war and how these variables influence the interaction of

actors, then a single case study is a better tool (Gerring, 2007, p. 43-48). As Collier et al. argue in the introduction to an edited volume of case studies on civil war onsets:

[...] the case study project has value-added because it teaches us about the process that leads to war, rather than focusing only on underlying “structural” characteristics of countries that experience civil war (or not). Process matters if different policy interventions can be designed to reduce the risk of war at various stages of conflict (Collier et al., 2005, p. 19).

According to Gerring (2007, p. 39), the case study also enjoys “a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature”. Where the cross-case study is a much better option if one wants to test a theory, the case study excels at generating theory. As this thesis seeks to synthesize various theories on civil war onset, a case study seems like the proper tool to help generate and illustrate this synthesis.

Furthermore, one might argue that the case study is a suitable format for handling equifinality. Equifinality describes a system where several causal paths or turn of events can lead to the same end state or outcome. When done well, case studies render complex causal relationships visible and enable us to “parse out the independent causal effects of each factor” (Gerring, 2007, p. 61). Several competing explanations might very well explain the same correlation. The case study method makes it easier to distinguish between competing causal mechanisms.

3.2.2 A brief discussion of deviance

Deviant cases are “cases that are known to deviate from established generalizations”, and the purpose is to “reveal why the cases are deviant” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 692). The case of Zanzibar is deviant in the sense that one should expect at least one civil war in Zanzibar since 1964 given a set of established theories and models of civil war. As explained in chapter 1, I use the quantitative prediction models of Hegre et al. (2013) and Hegre et al. (2017) as the point of departure. These prediction models are not fully-fledged theories, but rather models of empirical patterns. Thus, I do not make detailed pre-analytical assumptions about what causes civil war. Instead, I identify a country that is quite similar to the countries that often experience civil war. This means that I cannot claim to disprove or even improve a single theory. What I can do is to explain the single case, and suggest theoretical, methodological and empirical additions and alterations to the current literature on the causes of civil war.

Zanzibar 1990-2010 is a deviant case because it is more peaceful than one would expect. The purpose of the case study is hence to explain why it is so peaceful. The goal, however, is not an idiosyncratic explanation of what happened. The single deviant case study is theoretically interesting because it sheds light on the weaknesses of specialized theoretical and methodological approaches and illustrates the advantages of a comprehensive, yet systematic approach, to the analysis of civil war risk.

The goal is not to improve the statistical prediction models. New, and more disaggregated, data show greater potential than additional variables in that regard. Nor do I argue that these statistical prediction models are deficient or flawed. In fact, they predict remarkably well⁴. Instead, I take these statistical models as a starting point, and add various theories of civil war onset and qualitative data, to provide a more comprehensive account of how civil wars occur. The final product of this theory-synthesis exercise will therefore not be a statistical prediction model, but rather a framework for how quantitative and qualitative tools, and structural and process-based theories, can be combined in order to provide good explanations and predictions of the onset of civil war in specific cases.

3.3 Within-case methods

The within-case methods describe how I will go about to measure and assess the theoretical concepts developed in the theory chapter. This entails operationalizations of the various elements of susceptibility to conflict, examples of how certain types of strategic interaction may look like, and a discussion of various sources.

3.2.1 Observing susceptibility

A number of the structural conditions identified in the theory chapter are quite easily to operationalize. Measures of the total population, population density and youth bulges are obtainable by official statistics, both from the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics and World Population Review. Likewise, per capita income and economic growth rates are available from UN Data. Similarly, the best option regarding ethnic composition and horizontal inequalities is to rely on the secondary literature on identity in Zanzibar. These variables are

⁴ The area under the receiver operator curve (AOC) measures “the probability that the simulation predicts a randomly chosen positive observed instance as more probable than a randomly chosen negative one”. This measure is 0,944 for Hegre et al. (2013, p. 16) and 0,888 for Hegre et al. (2017, p. 252) respectively. This is equivalent of accuracy scores of approximately 80-85 percent, and are similar to the superpredictors identified by Tetlock (2017, p. xxvi), and far better than the vast majority of pundits and policy experts (Tetlock, 2017).

not strictly speaking measured or assessed by me, but rather interpreted and discussed in the context of susceptibility to civil war. The rest of the concepts, however, demand further discussion.

Recent political instability is often operationalized as either former civil war, or as changes in democracy indexes. Because this is a case study of a single case, I can operate with a more substantial definition of political instability. Thus, I define political instability as periods of turmoil, political change, and potential violence. These periods are identified by looking at the historical record of Zanzibar and discussed in terms of the proposed causal mechanisms; The rising cost of conflict-specific capital, and the slowly fading of grievances.

Inconsistent political institutions are generally operationalized as regimes that find themselves within a specific range of democracy indexes. I do refer to both V-Dem and Polity IV to substantiate the claim that Tanzania and Zanzibar are semi-democracies, however, because this is a single case study, I can assess the substantial part of the concept as well. Thus, I look for examples of repression and lack of political rights, as well as examples of political openness. This enables me to disentangle the two mechanisms that link semi-democracy to conflict risk; on the one side the increased motivation that follows from political repression, and on the other side, the increased opportunity that follows from political openness.

Coercive capability is one of the concepts that have the least satisfying standard operationalization. Measures such as military manpower and the share of the population in the military measure some aspect of coercive capability but does not fully cover the concept. Coercive capability is hard to measure directly. I have chosen to primarily look at examples of coercion as manifestations of coercive capability. Furthermore, in the interviews, I have looked for references to perceived coercive capabilities, as coercive capabilities are hypothesized to deter violent rebellion.

For measurements of rough terrain, the civil war literature mostly utilizes the data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). They operationalize rough terrain as the proportion of the country that is mountainous and rely on coding by a geographer in addition to measurements of the difference between the highest and lowest point (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 81). Since this is a single case study, I am once more able to look at the substantial elements of the concept. Rough terrain is supposed to affect civil war susceptibility by increasing rebel

capacity to operate, either through hidden bases or hidden mobility and by decreasing government reach, through inaccessibility. I assess the physical geography of Zanzibar to see whether geography provide these features. Additionally, I look for the existence of other forms of clandestine activity, such as smuggling and organized crime, which would be dependent on similar geographical features.

War prone neighborhoods are usually defined in the literature as a certain amount of neighboring countries in the state of conflict. However, the literature also identifies some mechanisms along which the contagion effect function. Hence, I look for evidence of those mechanisms. Are there refugee flows? Are arms available? Are trade and investment reduced? Are there naturally comparable situations for oppositional organizations to draw inspiration from? These questions are most easily answered through a qualitative assessment of the secondary literature.

Natural resource wealth is measured in many ways in the literature. I primarily look for significant deposits of oil and mineral resources that are currently being extracted, and significant narcotics production. Moreover, as the effect of resource wealth is conditional, I look specifically for the presence or absence of those conditions. Besides, I look for manifestations of natural resource wealth-induced grievances in the narratives of my informants. Do they mention the recent oil discovery in the ocean outside Zanzibar? Do they frame this as something that legitimately belongs to Zanzibar? Or to the whole of Tanzania?

3.2.2 Observing interaction

The structural conditions operationalized above, frame and shape the strategic interaction of actors. To observe and assess this interaction, I utilize a form of qualitative process tracing. I understand process tracing as defined by Bennett and Checkel (2015, p. 7) as the theory-driven “analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case”. In this thesis, this takes the form of a structured analytical narrative of the 1990-2010 period. The analysis simultaneously describes and explains the turn of events by tracing the theorized causal mechanisms described in the theory chapter.

As such, process tracing shows apparent similarities to the historical method. Bennet and Checkel (2015, p. 8) argue that any historical narrative draws on theories to explain the turn of events. However, where the historian might be hesitant to reference these theories explicitly in order to not “clog the narrative” (Roberts, 1996, p. 66-67, 87-88), process

tracing instead deliberately “clog” the narrative by making the theories and proposed causal mechanisms explicit. This enables the reader to critically assess the researcher’s explanation and enable other researchers to test the conclusions rigorously. As such, process tracing is a thoroughly transparent method.

In this theoretical framework, the critical theoretical concept to trace is the strategic interaction modelled in figure 2.2. To map this strategic interaction, it is crucial to understand the perceptions and strategic thinking of the actors — especially their justifications of crucial strategic decisions. As is evident from the theory chapter, three decisions are crucial to this model of strategic interaction — first, the opposition’s decision to protest or not. Second, the government’s decision to reply to protests with repression or accommodation. Third, the opposition’s decision to escalate or acquiesce government repression. I try to uncover the reasoning and strategic considerations behind all these decisions.

To do so, I will first identify these decisions in the history of Zanzibar 1990-2010. Then I will assess the actors’ perceptions, decisions and their justification for the decision. For example, if the opposition states that protest would only lead to repression, this is evidence of successful deterrence. Similarly, if the government chose not to repress because it is afraid of the consequences, this is a sign that the government perceives itself as weak. Finally, if the opposition initially chooses to protest because it believes that will force the government to give in to their demands, but are faced with repression and decides to acquiesce, that is an example of reevaluation of the probability that the government is strong. I look for evidence of these perceptions, strategic justification and attitudes.

To create this narrative, I make use of two categories of sources. First, I critically engage the secondary historical literature of contemporary Zanzibari politics and history. The sources include books, academic articles and news sources. Second, I conduct several unstructured interviews with Zanzibari elites. These people were actors in, and observers of, these interactive processes. By using several different sources, I am also able to triangulate evidence to provide more accurate interpretations of events. By comparing self-perceived reasons given by the actors themselves, and interpreted reasons given by local and international observers, I can form my interpretation based on the most comprehensive basis possible. In the following section, I further discuss the sources.

3.2.3 Sources

In the empirical assessment of the case, I make use of a variety of sources. For the quantifiable elements of susceptibility, I make use of numerous national and international sources of statistics. From the World Bank to the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics. Where statistics are not available, or the concepts of susceptibility not clearly operationalized, I make use of various secondary sources in the form of scholarly articles. For the not so obviously quantifiable elements of susceptibility, such as state capacity or widespread grievances, I make use of scholarly articles and interviews with local experts, actors and observations from the field research. For the analytical narrative and the assessment of the strategic interaction of the actors, I make use of scholarly work such as books and articles on Zanzibar, as well as 15 unstructured interviews with politicians, businesspeople, religious leaders and other actors in Zanzibar.

The interviews were carried out in Stone Town on Unguja Island during February 2019. Before going to Zanzibar, I had identified approximately 30 individuals, primarily politicians, but also scholars, journalists, and businesspeople, as well as people with certain roles or positions, such as a religious leader, youth party leadership and so forth. I identified these individuals with the help of researchers in Norway that work on Zanzibar, as well as a Zanzibari research assistant based in Oslo. I gave this list to my research assistant in Stone Town, Unguja, who contacted people, helped me navigate the Tanzanian bureaucracy and organized the interviews. The final sample⁵ consists of three current and former members of Zanzibar's House of Representatives, three lawyers, one prominent historian, four opposition politicians, one former government minister, two NGO leaders, one imam, one prominent journalist, two businesspeople, and one group of self-employed youth.

Most of the interviews were carried out in public places such as hotels and restaurants. Four of the interviews were carried out in private offices. The various public locations included various resort hotels mostly frequented by tourists, and sparsely visited restaurants. The decision of which hotel to use was made by my research assistant together with the informants. The interviews varied in length from 15 minutes to 2,5 hours, but the majority of the interviews lasted approximately one hour. The informants were chosen

⁵ A full, yet anonymized, list of interviewees is available in the appendix (7.2).

because of their contribution to, or central position of observation of, critical processes in modern Zanzibari political history.

Consequently, they were not asked the same questions. the focus was primarily on their perception of the political situation at various points in time. I did not confront them, nor correct them when they made what I, based on the secondary literature, considered inaccurate statements.

The interviews do not constitute anything resembling a representative sample. That was never the purpose. Based on the interviews alone I cannot claim that the majority of the Zanzibari population believes this or that. What I can claim is that key actors within the Zanzibari political elite held certain perceptions at specific points in time.

My interviews might be a potential source of bias. My reliance on research assistants both in Oslo and Zanzibar and their networks make some informants more accessible than others. For example, there is a clear bias towards the opposition's perspective. To talk to the government, or government-affiliated individuals turned out to be very difficult. This was primarily because I never received a formal research permit from Zanzibari authorities.

Consequently, my research assistant and I decided to be very careful with approaching government politicians, as this might put my research assistant in trouble. At a later stage, we learned that certain individuals were more accessible if I contacted them directly on their private phone than if my research assistant did. This way, and through a recommendation from a prominent opposition politician, I got an interview with a former government minister during my last day in Zanzibar.

3.4 Other methodological and ethical issues

Finally, there are some other methodological and ethical issues I want to address. I will discuss ethical issues such as the trade-off between transparency and safety for my informants, and various threats to internal validity including confirmation bias and issues with unstructured interviews. Additionally, I will reflect on the issue of positionality.

3.4.1 Ethical issues

Ethics are central to the scientific process. To study the risk of political violence in a vulnerable and semi-authoritarian setting carries distinct ethical dilemmas. In this section, I will reflect on and acknowledge these dilemmas, and explain how I have balanced the

sometimes-incompatible considerations. First, I will discuss the tradeoff between the privacy and security of my informants to the ideal of transparency and replicability. Second, I will briefly reflect on the issue of positionality.

The safety of one's informants is one of the most essential ethical obligations of a researcher. Simultaneously, transparency and replicability are essential aspects of the scientific process. Where these two considerations are not compatible, one should always prioritize the safety of one's informants. However, it is not always easy to decide exactly where this line goes. I have decided to apply a conservative approach. In the notification to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, I reported that I would anonymize all informants. Upon being given this information, most of the informants stated that this was unnecessary and that I could quote them openly. I have still chosen to anonymize all informants, partly because the political situation in Zanzibar is complex and hard to predict.

Zanzibar is not currently a dangerous place for the informants, even though some of them had served time in prison for their political activism. Nonetheless, during the field research, there was an active court case over the legitimate leadership of the main opposition party. After my return to Oslo, the candidate considered by most observers as the government's candidate won the court case. As a result, nearly every CUF politician in Zanzibar left the party and joined another coalition of political parties, called the ACT (Alliance for Change and Democracy) Wazalendo. This, in combination with the upcoming 2020 election and the expected increase in political tensions associated with elections in Zanzibar, has reinforced my decision to keep the informants anonymized, and the full transcriptions of the interviews private.

I acknowledge the transparency issues related to this decision. Replicability is an integral part of the social sciences. Ideally, I would like to make transcripts of the interviews available to scholars through an archive. Since the full interviews⁶ will not be accessible to the reader, I will try to achieve what Büthe and Jacobs (2015, p. 57) have coined "replication-in-thought". That is, "the provision of sufficient information to allow readers to trace the reasoning and analytic steps leading from observation to conclusions". This is what

⁶ Even though the full transcripts are not available to the reader, I have made selected quotes from the interviews (7.3) available in the appendix. The quotes selected constitute the direct quotes which I have drawn most heavily on during the analysis.

King et al. (1994, p. 13) refer to as leaving up the “scaffolding” of the argument. Hence, I plan to make the arguments, and the empirical basis of the evidence in favor or against that argument, as transparent as possible. This will enable the reader to assess how the choices and starting assumptions might shape the conclusions.

Another important ethical issue is the issue of positionality. Positionality is the effect of the researcher’s identity and persona on the research. My status as a white, male, presumably well-resourced scholar from a European research institution might affect the informants, and their willingness to speak to me. This enables me to access informants that a local MA-student might struggle to access. Indeed, the leadership of political parties and former members of parliament in Norway would probably not be as forthcoming to me as my informants have been.

3.4.2 Threats to internal validity

Internal validity refers to the extent to which the findings are valid for the case I study. I contend that the research design has a high level of internal validity. The In-depth study of a specific case, using both quantitative and qualitative tools, should ensure high internal validity. However, there are at least three threats to internal validity in the research design and methodological approach. First, there is the issue of confirmation bias. Any scholar might simply find what one is looking for. Second, there are pitfalls and promises regarding the method of unstructured interviews. Third, and related to the method of interviewing, positionality is not just an ethical issue, but might also bias the findings in a particular direction. In this section, I will discuss and acknowledge these threats, and describe how I have tried to alleviate these them.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek confirmation of theories and hypotheses the researcher holds. All forms of research are vulnerable to this bias. However, the less systematic and methodologically rigorous the research, the greater the risk of confirmation bias. In this thesis, there are at least two elements to be aware of. First, there is probably an inherent bias towards finding that the theoretical synthesis developed prior to the empirical analysis is a useful tool. I do not think it is possible to alleviate this bias entirely. The best anyone can do, is to be as transparent and systematic as possible. Second, during the field research initial hypothesis emerges, becomes strengthened and eventually weakens. During the five weeks of field research, I held various opinions on what was the most important

explanation of why Zanzibar has had no civil war. An excerpt from my field notes from February 5th illustrate this.

When it comes to the thesis, I am beginning to doubt, or at least nuance, my former opinion that Malim Seif almost alone is responsible for the peace. The professor, and others as well, speak convincingly about how it is simply not possible to mount an armed rebellion.

Thus, the opinion I held at various times might have subconsciously influenced what I focused on during the interviews and what follow-up questions I asked. I cannot completely alleviate this issue. However, I believe it helps to be conscious of it.

The unstructured interview has definite advantages and apparent limitations. The benefits consist of increased flexibility. As I am primarily concerned about the perceptions of my informants, the unstructured interviews allowed me to go where the interview took me. The informants told me their version of the events and their version of the political situation in Zanzibar. On the other hand, the fact that I did not ask the same questions to all the informants limits my ability to compare or draw any generalizable conclusion about the opinions of Zanzibaris or even a certain echelon of the Zanzibari elite. The empirical output is limited to the views of individuals.

Finally, positionality also carries a risk to internal validity. My position as a male, white, European researcher might bias what the informants tell me. They might see me as a medium to tell a story to a Western audience. An audience that I know that at least some of the informants would like to see play a more significant role in the politics of Zanzibar and Tanzania. This may very well have shaped and formed not only the way they presented their opinions to me, but also which views they offered, and which they kept to themselves. It is difficult to assess how significant an impact this has had on the interviews. When possible, I try to triangulate the impression from the interviews with other sources.

3.5 Summary

This chapter has accounted for the method, research design and methodological and ethical issues of this thesis. First, I discussed the research design, including the advantages and disadvantages of the single case study, and the reason for studying a deviant case. By considering what prevented war from breaking out, we can better understand which mechanisms and processes that lead to war, and which that does not. However, it is essential to keep in mind the limitations and scope conditions of such a study. The results are not

empirically generalizable outside the scope of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. What they can contribute to, however, is theory building and the historiography of Zanzibar. By better understanding how war did not erupt in Zanzibar, we can enhance our understanding of cases where civil war both erupted and did not erupt. Furthermore, theoretical ideas and hypotheses generated through this case study can potentially create more general theories, which can again be tested empirically.

Second, I described in detail the within-case methods. The method consists of an assessment of the structural conditions that constitute susceptibility to conflict, and a qualitative assessment of the turn of events, including the strategic interaction by which conflicts evolve. The first part entails a straight forward consideration of the values of certain variables. The second part entails a form of process tracing, where I seek to provide a theory-driven narrative of the political developments of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. Finally, I reflected upon some ethical issues and various threats to internal validity.

4. Case study

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will use the theoretical framework outlined in the theory chapter to the risk of civil war in Zanzibar between 1990 and 2010. Despite the high predicted level of risk, Zanzibar did not experience civil war in this timeframe. This chapter will seek to explain why Zanzibar avoided civil war and illustrate how the theoretical framework outlined above can contribute to the analysis of a specific case.

The chapter will be structured in the following way. First, I will set the stage by a very brief introduction to Tanzanian post-independence history and highlight the most critical conflict lines and political cleavages evident in Zanzibar. Second, I will give an account of Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war, focusing on the 1990-2010 period. Third, I will provide a structured analytical narrative of the relevant political developments in the period 1990-2010. This narrative will be structured by the elections, as these represent flashpoints of political violence and protest. I will map changes in structural conditions, exogenous shocks and the interaction of actors and explain why that interaction did not lead to an escalation of violence at certain key moments.

4.2 Historical background

Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania. The archipelago consists of two main islands, Unguja and Pemba. Unguja is the larger island and contains the capital of Stone Town and about 60 percent of the population. The main island is also a centre for tourism and trade. Pemba is slightly smaller, less developed in terms of infrastructure and public services, but home to the majority of the clove production, which is central to the Zanzibari economy (Matheson, 2012, p. 595-596).

An Arab sultan with Omani heritage ruled Zanzibar from the 17th century, until the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964. The Omanis introduced clove plantations and Islam to the islands, and intensified the slave trade, making Zanzibar the hub of the East African slave trade. The Influence of the Arab world is still highly visible in the cultural and political life of Zanzibar today. During the late 19th century, the gradual abolition of slavery coincided with a gradual commercial takeover by Indian traders, and many Indians settled on the

islands. In 1890 the sultan of Zanzibar signed a deal with the United Kingdom, which formalized the increasing British political dominance, and made Zanzibar a British protectorate (Lofchie, 1963, p. 190).

In Zanzibar, ethnicity is a very flexible, yet also very politicized, concept. The indigenous population of Zanzibar, which consists of the Hadimu, the Tumbatu and the Pemba - known collectively as the Shirazi - have intermarried and intermingled with Arabs, Indians and Africans for an extended period. Intermarriage was particularly common between Shirazi and Arabs on Pemba island, and between the Hadimu and Africans on Unguja (Sheriff, 2001, p. 307). Glassman (2000) reviews how the Zanzibari intelligentsia shaped these ethnic and racial identities during colonial times. As a result, “[...] the so-called ethnic boundaries were extremely porous and spongy, allowing constant assimilation and re-identification of people as historical conditions demanded” (Sheriff, 2001, p. 307). Sheriff (2001, p. 307) shows how the size of different ethnic groups in Zanzibar changes much faster than what would be possible without widespread re-identification. Given that much of the secondary literature on the decolonization and revolution in Zanzibar is understood through ethnic lenses, it is vital to keep in mind the high degree of fluidity of ethnicity in Zanzibar.

The period 1957-1964 initiated the post-colonial period in Zanzibar and laid the foundations for the current political conflicts. The period saw the formation of three political parties, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP). Somewhat simplified, the parties represented the Arab elite, the urban and rural poor of Unguja, and the population of Pemba, respectively. ASP cultivated a close relationship with Julius Nyerere’s Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanganyika. Even though ASP gained the majority of votes in both the 1961 and 1963 general elections, British gerrymandering ensured that the coalition between ZNP and ZPPP won the elections. Thus, in December 1963, the ZNP-ZPPP-coalition led Zanzibar to independence from the British as a constitutional monarchy (Anglin, 2000, p. 41; Killian, 2008; Rawlence, 2005).

However, the sultan and his elected parliament would not rule Zanzibar for long. In January 1964, the government banned the newly established Umma Party and charged its leaders with treason. Additionally, they initiated a “Zanzibarization” of the police and security forces, removing all officers with mainland descent from their posts. By members of

the opposition, this was seen as the beginning of an “Arabization” of Zanzibar. Consequently, on the night of January 11th, 1964, the Zanzibari revolution erupted. The revolution was spurred by ideological as well as ethnic components. Ideologically, the ASP and Umma Party sought to introduce a revolutionary Marxist regime. Ethnically, the revolution was framed as the overthrow of an Arab elite by the suppressed African masses. The revolution resulted in several thousands of casualties, of whom mostly civilian Arabs killed by roaming bands in the aftermath of the actual coup (Hunter, 2010).

The revolution instated Abeid Amani Karume, the chairman of the ASP, as Zanzibar’s new president. However, Karume would not remain the president of a sovereign state for long. In April 1964, Karume and Nyerere unified Zanzibar and Tanganyika to establish the United Republic of Tanzania. Shortly after, all political parties except Nyerere’s TANU and Karume’s ASP were banned. In 1972, Karume was assassinated by unknown assailants. The event led to the purge of former Umma Party members from the Revolutionary Council. A few years after, TANU and ASP merged to become Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM), the party of the revolution. Tanzania had become a consolidated one-party state.

By the early 1980’s, President Nyerere’s economic policies and the global economic recession had weakened the CCM regime (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001). Simultaneously, a wave of democracy swept over sub-Saharan Africa. External pressure, in the form of international donors, and internal pressure, in the form of newly created civil society groups, and factions within the ruling party itself, pushed for political reforms in Tanzania and Zanzibar. Within CCM Zanzibar, a new generation of politicians emerged. They called for and begun to implement political and economic reforms. Among these were Seif Sharif Hamad, also known as Malim Seif, who served as chief minister under two different presidents from 1984 to 1988. Due to power struggles between factions within the CCM, Hamad was dismissed and spent two years in prison from 1989 to 1991 (Anglin, 2000, p. 42). Hamad would later become the dominant figure of the political opposition in Zanzibar.

This brief historical background sets the stage for this thesis’ period of analysis. A democratization process dominated the early 1990’s. This process culminated with the formation of the Civic United Front (CUF) in 1992 and the first multiparty elections since the revolution in 1995. In the following decade, the CUF and the CCM vied for power. The

period contained three fraudulent elections, several negotiation processes, and episodic political violence. The conflict peaked with the massacre of peaceful demonstrators on Pemba island in 2001. By the end of the period, a reconciliation process emerged seemingly out of nowhere and resulted in a referendum and a government of national unity in 2010.

4.3 Susceptibility

In this section, I will dive into the structural conditions of the 1990-2010 period. I will assess all the empirical elements of susceptibility identified in the theory chapter and consider how these elements increase or decrease Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war. To structure this assessment, I will distinguish analytically between motivation and opportunity. First, I will account for the structural conditions that increase and decrease motivation. Then, I will account for the conditions that increase and decrease opportunity.

4.3.1 Factors increasing motivation

Let us begin with the structural conditions that increase motivation for rebellion. Five issues were consistently brought up by my informants, and by the historical literature on Zanzibar. These issues, or grievances, motivate opposition to the current regime, and could potentially motivate armed violence.

The first issue is the status of the union. Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have constituted a united republic since 1964, but this political arrangement is increasingly seen as inadequate for many Zanzibaris. Even though one could easily argue that Zanzibar and Zanzibaris are indeed overrepresented in Tanzanian politics (Anglin, 2000, p. 41), there is a perception among many people in Zanzibar that the union government represents the interests of the mainland and not the interests of Zanzibar. In the words of a leader in the youth wing of the main opposition party, "Tanganyika is wearing the coat of Tanzania" (Interview 11). Another grassroots activist claimed that domination had always been the intention of Tanganyika, "Nyerere always intended Zanzibar to become a region in Tanzania. The mainland government today continues this policy" (Interview 6). Among the youth I spoke to, this was a common understanding.

However, these attitudes are not only held among the political youth but are common also among the bureaucratic and academic elite of the isles. For example, a former high-ranking government official told me,

Now, mainland is taking away from Zanzibar even the basic things. It does not seem necessary. It is not supporting Zanzibar or making Zanzibar viable. That is to the dismay of everyone in Zanzibar, even those in the ruling party. The problem in the mainland is that they take the union as a given. As a political truth. As a way to control Zanzibar (Interview 8).

Furthermore, a local historian characterized Zanzibar's position in the union as a colony of Tanganyika. As a Christian and African colonization of the Islamic Zanzibar (Interview 4).

Consequently, secessionist sentiments presently exist in Zanzibar, and existed throughout the whole period of analysis. These sentiments increased after 2008, when Zanzibari nationalism re-emerged as a potent political force (Moss and Tronvoll, 2015). The rise of the UAMSHO movement represents this change. UAMSHO is a Muslim mobilization NGO, that promotes secession and Zanzibari nationalism. The organization is heavily repressed, and all its leadership was imprisoned in 2012 (Hutton, 2015). Secessionist sentiments exist in the wider population as well. A local businessman and grassroots activist told me flat out "Zanzibar wants to be independent" (Interview 6). A local historian put it more diplomatically, when he suggested "That is something for Zanzibar to consider, that maybe there is no solution, except to break out of the union. Because here we have nothing to say" (Interview 4).

Among the established opposition however, to break the union is not an alternative. In his biography, written with the help of Thomas Burgess (2009, p. 271), Seif Sharif Hamad makes this clear. CUF believes that the union should persist, but that it needs substantial reform. They call for a three-government structure, with separate governments for Zanzibar and mainland Tanganyika, and a common union government on the federal level. The current system, where the union government is also responsible for non-union matters on the mainland, is dismissed as confusing and infused by mainland domination.

In summary, the issue of the union represents an important grievance, which could motivate civil war. Self-determination based on ethnic nationalism is a common motivation for civil wars (Smith, 2000). This grievance is also clearly linked to issues of ethnic and religious identity and Zanzibar's distinct history from that of Tanganyika. Moreover, this grievance seems to be increasing during the period of analysis. In fact, secessionist sentiments and Zanzibari nationalism grew even stronger in the period after 2010 (Minde et al., 2018, p. 171-174; Moss and Tronvoll, 2015). Several informants agreed that the main

political cleavage in Zanzibar used to be CCM against CUF, but since 2009, Zanzibar's strife with the mainland has now overtaken this position.

The second issue is the perceived economic mismanagement by the current government. In a global perspective, both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar qualify as among the poorest countries in the period of analysis. Mainland Tanzania's per capita income increased from 277 USD in 1990 to 694 USD in 2010. In Zanzibar, per capita income increased from 201 USD to 587 USD in the same period (UN Data, 2019). The economy is growing, but Tanzania and Zanzibar are still among the poorest places in the world. Many people blame the mainland government for Zanzibar's economic woes (Interview 8). One informant told me that without the mainland, Zanzibar would be the Dubai of East-Africa (Interview 11).

The economy, poverty and lack of jobs were mentioned by several of the informants as a source of discontent. According to the leader of a local youth organization, Zanzibari youth have two big concerns, the failure of the democratic process and the failure of the economy (Interview 9). A group interview with five local self-employed men in their late 20's reinforced this interpretation. "It is really hard. Some people have 10.000 Shilling (4.35 USD) for food per day, some have 5000, some have 2000. If you do not have a job, it is really hard" (Interview 14). Additionally, there was a clear perception that their grievances were not being heard by the government. "If we go to Shangani Street and say "Hey! We want healthcare! We want education!" Then security will put us in jail. In jail forever" (interview 14).

These economic grievances are reinforced by perceived political patronage. One former opposition politician told me how his brother had lost his job supposedly solely because he was the brother of the former politician:

Once you are associated with the opposition here you cannot get employment, you are denied any favors or rights from the government. So, the youth here are highly frustrated by this kind of life. This young brother of mine was working for a telecommunication company as an electrician. The telecommunication company decided to outsource the handling of engineering issues. Unfortunately, the company they hired to do this is Dr. Shein's [the current president of Zanzibar] brother's company. And after he took over the company's engineering department... Well, they know he is my brother, so they fired him (Interviewee 3).

Grievances and stories like this are common among the people I talked to who was somehow affiliated with the opposition.

In summary, Zanzibar is characterized by poverty and lack of public services. This does create grievances, especially among youth, that could motivate violent action. These grievances are reinforced by perceptions of political patronage, a youth bulge and the blaming of “others”, namely the mainland government. In this way, economic conditions have provided fertile ground and increased motivation for civil war in Zanzibar.

The third issue is the perceived political and economic discrimination of certain groups. Pembans feel discriminated by Ungujans, and Zanzibaris feel discriminated by the mainland government (Brown, 2010, p. 627). These perceptions and hostile attitudes originate in perceived horizontal inequalities of wealth and power. As evident from the section about the union issue, many Zanzibaris see the union as the mainland’s political dominance over Zanzibar. There might be some truth to that, but it is also the case that Zanzibaris are overrepresented in the union government (Anglin, 2000, p. 41), and not much worse off than their mainland countrymen (World Bank, 2015; World Bank, 2017).


When it comes to Pembans and Ungujans, the perceived injustice is grounded in reality. Pemba is clearly a less developed island than Unguja, with widespread poverty and poorly developed infrastructure (Brown, 2010, p. 627; World Bank, 2015). The opposition believes that this is because of deliberate government policy. Seif Sharif Hamad, the leader of CUF and himself a Pemban argues that Pemba is less developed than Unguja, and that this is the result of a deliberate CCM policy to punish the Pembans for their support of ZPPP in the 60’s (Burgess, 2009, p. 280). This claim is supported by independent researchers such as Andrea Brown (2010, p. 627). Moreover, that Pembans are being discriminated is a stable claim in Zanzibari Human Rights reports (Rawlence, 2005, p. 517).

These horizontal inequalities, whether real or perceived, increase the susceptibility to civil war by framing the conflict as “us” vs “them”. Pembans blame Ungujans, and Zanzibaris blame mainlanders for their perceived lack of economic and political power (Brown, 2010, p. 630). These grievances lead to conflict when the identity groups become mobilized to change the perceived unjust status quo. This perceived injustice is reinforced by state repression, such as the massacre on Pemba in 2001, carried out by state security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

The fourth issue is the issue of political rights, electoral fraud and violent repression of peaceful political action. As evident in data from Varieties of Democracy (Figure 4.1),

Zanzibar is not fully authoritarian, yet clearly not democratic. This creates political grievances. The most frequently mentioned grievance is the lack of free and fair elections. Everyone I talked to, even a former government minister was of the perception that the government had stolen some or all of the elections since 1995 from the opposition. Commenting on the 2010 election results, the former CCM minister said that “Hamad accepted the results even though it was obvious. We knew what we were doing” (Interview 13). Another politician I talked to, who was a former member of the Zanzibari Electoral Committee (ZEC), described obvious interference from the security forces during the counting of the 2010 election results (Interview 3). That widespread electoral fraud occurred during the counting of most of Zanzibar’s elections is also the general perception among international election observers (Matheson, 2012, p. 602).

Figure 4.1 Electoral Democracy Index, Tanzania and Zanzibar, 1988-2011



Source: Varieties of Democracy (2019)

Election fraud, and the repression associated with the election, produces grievances. A leader in the youth wing of the opposition party exclaimed, “The opposition is treated like we are not even citizens!” (Interview 11). A lawyer described the emotional reaction when he and his friends were told that CCM had won the 1995 election:

People were angry. Everyone was angry. People had expectations that something would change. Everyone was down. I remember that day when they declared the

result, oh everyone was put down. It was as if we were afraid that something would happen. Maybe clashes! Because there were isolated events. Some people were beaten and attacked. Everyone was terrified. And angry. Some people in the media had even said that CUF had won! (Interview 1).

The mixture of fear and anger that is evident in this quote is a good illustration of the effect of semi-democracy on the susceptibility to civil war. The same repression that creates anger, grievances and motivation, also creates fear. This fear directly limits the opportunity for organizing and building a movement.

Finally, there is the more foundational issue of the legacy of the 1964 revolution. The revolution was violent and produced grievances that live on to this day. A former government official I talked to put it bluntly,

You can go through the lists of confiscated land and ask where are these people now? And they are still here. They were Zanzibari, and they still are. Well, you took their land, their houses, and sometimes even their wives, and these people are still here, of course they have their sentiments. If they get an alternative forum to express their opinion, they will not support you! (Interview 8).

As such, these grievances still influence contemporary politics, and represent one of the most important issues of political identity in Zanzibar.

For example, these grievances constitute an important part of CUF's political platform. Hamad argues that although the revolution must be accepted as an historical fact, it did not achieve its objectives. Moreover, Hamad argues that "the revolution, you can say, went astray, to the extent of devouring its own sons" (Burgess, 2009, p. 272). Hamad is clearly critical of the legacy of the revolution, but also cautious to avoid calling the revolution a mistake in print. Since the revolution is still highly popular among a large proportion of the population, and any strongly worded statement would surely reinforce CCM's claim that CUF just wants to bring back the sultan.

4.3.2 Factors decreasing motivation

Two important factors limit the motivation to challenge the state.

First, there is a widespread fear of the consequences of severe government repression. This is partly an effect of Zanzibar's conflict history. Zanzibar's government is a revolutionary government. The years from the revolution until the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1995 was characterized by severe repression of any form of political opposition (Matheson, 2012, p. 594-597). Thus, violence and repression are infused into the political discourse, and act as a poorly veiled threat. This fear is reinforced by violent

repression prior, during and immediately after all the elections from 1995 to 2005. This fear is well represented in the following quote from one of the informants, who argued that “If CUF provoke with violence, then mainland will kill everyone!” (Interview 6). This fear of repression seems to be decreasing the motivation for rebellion in Zanzibar.

Second, at least among the local elites, there is a clear perception that violence would be ruinous. The Zanzibari economy is dependent on trade and tourism. Both of these sectors would be devastated by large scale political violence. Since most local elites are dependent on these sectors of the economy for their material well-being, violence is not seen as a legitimate strategy. This opinion is well illustrated by the following statement from a local businessman and opposition activist: “We do not want another revolution. It would destroy our island, and the tourists would stay away. It would be terrible for our economy” (Interview 6).

To summarize, motivation seems to be present in Zanzibar in the period of analysis. Dismay over the institutional arrangements of the union, economic mismanagement and discrimination, and political repression and lack of political rights seem to be targeted towards the same antagonists, namely the CCM government in Zanzibar and on the mainland. The grievances created by the 1964 revolution and its legacy are more complex, primarily because they are not so universal. For instance, the current opposition includes strong supporters of the revolution as well as critics. In the 2015 election campaign CUF even coopted CCMs revolution forever slogan and flew ASP flags at their rallies (Minde et al., 2018, p. 172). To some extent, these grievances are held at bay by the fear of the consequences of large-scale violence. A clear majority of the informants was genuinely afraid of an increase in political violence.

4.3.3 Factors increasing opportunity

Motivation alone is not enough; potential rebels needs to be able to rebel. I identify six structural conditions that increased the opportunity to rebel in Zanzibar in the period of analysis.

First, the demographic conditions increased opportunity in two ways. Zanzibar was, and still is, densely populated. The average population density of Tanzania is 51 persons per square kilometer. The various regions of Zanzibar range from 135 persons per square kilometer in rural Unguja, to 2581 persons per square kilometer in the urban west region of


Unguja. The city of Dar es Salaam is the only region in Tanzania more densely populated than Zanzibar. Densely populated areas are theorized to increase opportunity by providing a concentrated and homogenous recruitment pool for potential rebel organizations.

Moreover, as was established earlier, Tanzania, and probably Zanzibar as well, experienced a continuous youth bulge in the period of analysis. Since 1990, approximately 35 percent of the adult population has been aged between 15 and 24 years (World Population Review). This is because Tanzania experienced rapid population growth in this period. As a result, there is a large cohort of youth experiencing what Urdal (2006) calls institutional crowding. The demand for employment and education among youth is simply much larger than the supply. This results in a large group of young males with low opportunity costs for joining rebel groups - a situation that tends to increase the opportunity to civil war.

Second, the growth rate of Zanzibar's economy varied widely during the period of analysis. As we can see from Figure 4.2, Zanzibar experienced three periods of slow economic growth (90-94, 97-04, and 08-10), and two periods of strong economic growth (94-97⁷ and 04-08) in the 1990-2010 period. The same general pattern can be observed in mainland Tanzania. Growth rates are theorized to influence conflict risk through the alternative costs constituted by the economic outlook. When unemployment is high, and the economic future looks bleak, violent organizations will look more attractive.

⁷ To the best of my knowledge, no through assessment has been conducted of Zanzibar's spike in GDP per capita in 1997. A set of laws deregulating foreign investment and the establishment of free economic zones could be responsible. However, this is far from certain. Even if this single spike is a measurement error, the general trend remains the same.

Figure 4.2: GDP per Capita Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania 1990-2010



Source: UN Data (2019)

Several informants indicated that the mechanism linking youth bulges and slow economic growth to recruitment to clandestine activity is at work in Zanzibar. The informants describe increased recruitment to clandestine and violent activity. This development is linked to unemployment and lack of economic opportunities, but it is also linked to the lack of political rights. The informants connect the lack of political rights to the lack of economic opportunity, because the lack of political rights is seen as the reason for the economic mismanagement of the regime. In this way, political grievances, economic grievances, and low opportunity costs for joining clandestine organizations are intimately connected.

This interconnectedness can be illustrated by the following quotes. A former opposition politician said,

You have people increasingly going into drugs, you have young people increasingly doing nothing. Because even going to college is an issue if you are opposition. You need the CCM card to be employed, get a government job, etc. And we have a small number of people who are bringing themselves into terrorism. Because they think that is how they can change things. Because now they have tried democratically five times. They think: “we must be militant!”. This is a very big problem now. Because in Zanzibar, not in every family but in every village, you can name one or two radical Islamists (Interview 3).

Similarly, an opposition youth party leader told me that “many young people feel that democracy has failed them. Young Zanzibaris leave for Somalia and Kenya to join al-Shabab. [...] I know these youths myself!” (Interview 11). Finally, a young lawyer vented his fears and frustrations:

“Now, there is no freedom of press, no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly. It is chaos. So, what will happen? People will resort to other means? And do not take for granted that you know “people cannot do that”. It might happen. It may, because when you have a lot of people that are angry and unemployed, and they do not have jobs, what else can they do? If someone comes here with money. Revolt. Do this, do that. They will do it. It is risky. It is a very vulnerable situation (Interview 1). Following the logic of decreasing alternative costs, lack of economic growth indicates that the risk of conflict in Zanzibar was slightly higher in 1990-94, 97-04 and 2008-10.

Third, the conflict history of Zanzibar increases the opportunity for conflict through the imagery and narratives of violence generated by the legacy of the 1964 revolution. *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, which is the name of the governing party, means “Party of the revolution”. Their slogan is *Mapinduzi Daima*, which means “Revolution forever”. For CCM, the authority of the state, the legitimacy of the regime and the whole political system is based on the legacy of the revolution (Nassor and Jose, 2014, p. 254). For CCM, the stakes are simply too high for the outcome to be decided by unpredictable elections (Bakari and Makulilo, 2012, p. 198).

One former CCM minister I talked to confirmed that this narrative was present within the governing party. “When the political playing field was opened in 1992, people stuck with their political affiliations from before the revolution. At least that was our view in CCM. So, it was no trust. Anyone who questioned the revolution was seen as a puppet for the imperialists” (Interview 13). This rhetoric was also pursued in public. During the 2005 campaign, Karume threatened the opposition, saying that the weapons used during the 1964 revolution were still available and, if necessary, would be cleaned up and used (Burgess, 2009, p. 301). As briefly mentioned in the theory chapter, such narratives help enable government repression by increasing the legitimacy of violent action (Straus, 2015).

Certain elements of the opposition make use of the same language. A senior member of the youth wing of the CUF told me that, “People could go: let’s have a revolution! Let’s have a genocide!” (Interview 11). The legacy of the revolution thus seemingly legitimizes violent strategies, both for the government and the opposition.

Fourth, certain aspects of Zanzibar's geography and geopolitical location increase the opportunity to rebel. Zanzibar's geography does not qualify as rough terrain. However, the vast ocean and the long coastline dotted with caves and smaller islands might still provide shelter and hiding spots for clandestine activity. The occurrence of widespread and well-established clove smuggling (Sheriff, 2001, p. 315) demonstrates the possibility of such clandestine activity. These established smuggling routes also provide access to clandestine transnational networks that could be utilized to smuggle arms as well as cloves.

The political establishment is well aware of this possibility and seems to regard it as a possible threat. One opposition politician noted that "One of the threatening options in Zanzibar is to turn to terrorism. Unfortunately, we are not [on the] mainland, we are an island. We are blessed with thousands of miles of open sea. For security reasons that is very, very dangerous" (Interview 3). A local historian similarly argued that, "Somalia is close, and the connection was established in 2001 [by way of refugees from the Pemba massacre]. I think that is why they are even more afraid today, in Zanzibar, because they feel that al-Shabab could come from Kenya to Pemba" (Interview 4). In this way, the combination of a long coastline with many caves and small islands, and political instability and civil war in the neighborhood increases the susceptibility to civil war.

Fifth, the democratization of Tanzania the 1990's constitutes a change in the level of democracy that theoretically should have increased susceptibility to civil war for a period. Rapid change in the level of democracy is theorized to represent a window of opportunity where the regime is deconsolidated. Hence, one should expect increased susceptibility to civil war in the late 1990's and to a slightly smaller degree in the early 2000's. This period was characterized by electoral violence in Zanzibar. Luckily this violence did not escalate, a process which will be covered in greater detail during the structured analytical narrative.

Sixth, and as mentioned above, Zanzibar is not a fully authoritarian state (Figure 4.1). Opposition parties are allowed, the press is not completely censored, and to a certain extent allowed to organize. This constitutes a certain amount of political openness, which allows oppositional organizations to emerge. Even though the informants were afraid of government repression, they were not afraid enough to refrain from organizing, demonstrating or talking to foreign researchers. The very fact that I was able to conduct these interviews, demonstrate a certain political openness. An openness that could also be used to organize armed rebellion.

Finally, one should note that oil was recently discovered in the Indian ocean close to Zanzibar. These oil-deposits are located off-shore and are currently not being extracted, which should limit its risk-inducing effect (Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2012). However, if political entrepreneurs begin to use oil-related grievances to mobilize, this could develop into a factor that increases the susceptibility to civil war in Zanzibar.

4.3.4 Factors decreasing opportunity

Despite the number of factors increasing opportunity, there are also good reasons to believe that rebellion would not be a feasible strategy in Zanzibar during the period of analysis. I identify five such reasons.

First, Zanzibar is a small archipelago with a small population. In 1988, Tanzania had a population of 23 million, of which approximately 700 thousand lived in Zanzibar. In 2012 there were 45 million people in Tanzania, of which 1,3 million lived in Zanzibar (Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). In the whole period of analysis, Zanzibar has constituted a rather small part of Tanzania. This decreases opportunity on two levels. First, a small population means a smaller pool of recruitment for potential rebel organizations. This recruitment pool is further diminished by the fact that Zanzibar is currently a highly diverse society, both ethnically and politically. However, one should note that ethnicity is highly fluid in Zanzibar (Moss and Tronvoll, 2015; Kilian, 2008; Sheriff, 2001), and that the recruitment pool could become homogenous given the right exogenous shock. And second, the much larger population in mainland Tanzania skews the power relations significantly in the direction of the mainland government.

Furthermore, even though Zanzibar is located far away from the capital city of Dodoma, which, according to Raleigh and Hegre (2009) should increase risk substantially, presumably because government security forces are less effective far from the capital, Zanzibar is very close to Dar es Salaam, which is the biggest city in Tanzania. This closeness probably decreases conflict risk somewhat as it increases the capabilities and reach of government security forces.

Second, in the two periods of strong economic growth (94-97 and 04-08) the alternative costs of potential rebel recruits were high. The bright economic outlook of these two periods would to some extent incentivize possible rebels to pursue other more lucrative alternatives.

Third, the Zanzibari government, with consistent support from the Tanzanian government, have demonstrated willingness and ability to deploy heavy repressive action. This is evident in the brutal crackdown of the demonstrations in 2001, the imprisonment of 18 CUF leaders in 1997, and numerous instances of police violence (Brown, 1998, p. 91; Anglin, 2000, p. 46). In terms of structural conditions, this repression is a manifestation of both the state's coercive capability and inconsistent political institutions. The coercive capabilities of the state are what makes this repression possible, while the willingness of the government to implement such actions signify a lack of democratic institutions.

The opposition is keenly aware of the restricting effect of government repression. A substantial part of the opposition believes that armed opposition would be impossible in the current situation. One opposition supporter said that, "The government is very brutal. The government is willing to suppress any serious opposition". In response to my question for why the more radical opposition did not organize he answered that "They do not organize because the situation does not allow for that. If you organize you have your leaders calling for demonstration, the next day the leaders will be arrested" (Interview 2). A former senior government bureaucrat said that "The government can do what they want because they have teargas, and firearms" (Interview 8). The leader of a local Human rights NGO drily noted: "On the one side there is the people, and on the other side there are people with firearms. So, you see how it is" (Interview 7).

Fourth, both Unguja and Pemba, the two islands that constitute Zanzibar, are flat and with limited forest cover. The highest point of Unguja is 120m above sea level, and the highest point of Pemba is 95m above sea level. The main island of Unguja is well frequented by roads, while the less developed island of Pemba is less available. The terrain can thus hardly be characterized as rough, and the natural geography provide few safe havens for rebels.

This was also emphasized by some of the informants. One former opposition member of parliament told me that "We are not a people of violence. And if we were to fight, where would we go? We are an island!" (interview 10). A local businessman and grassroots activist were even more specific: "Armed rebellion is completely out of the question. [...] there is nowhere to hide. Zanzibar is flat, we have no jungle, no bush" (Interview 6). A local historian reflected on the possibility of armed rebellion in the following way: "We are so

small, and the terrain in Zanzibar... The highest point in Zanzibar is 100m, no forests to speak of. Nowhere to hide” (Interview 4). However, the effect of geography is ambiguous, after a moment of silence the historian added, “well, we have long coastline of course”.

Fifth, even though Tanzania has a conflict prone neighborhood, Zanzibar is not located close to the majority of these conflicts. The conflicts in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda clearly has transnational effects. However, the refugees from these conflicts arrive in the western part of Tanzania, not Zanzibar. Zanzibar is, so to speak, on the “wrong side” of Tanzania for these conflicts to increase its likelihood of civil war.

4.4 Structured analytical narrative

In this section, I will provide a structured analytical narrative of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period, focusing on the set of processes that could have led to an escalation to civil war.

4.4.1 Before 1995 - Democratization

By the beginning of the 1990’s, a set of exogenous shocks had forced the Tanzanian regime to move in the direction of a multi-party democracy. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the wave of democracy that swept over sub-Saharan Africa, had discredited much of the ideology which the legitimacy of Tanzania’s “one-party democracy” rested upon. Moreover, the combination of falling clove prices, the failed economic policies of Nyerere’s African socialism, and the structural adjustment programs required by the International Monetary Fund, had put Tanzania in a terrible economic situation (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001). Consequently, the pressure towards the CCM regime increased, from the international community, societal forces, and even from within the ruling party itself (Brown, 1998, p. 86).

On the surface, Tanzania’s democratization appeared smooth and well thought out (Brown, 1998, p. 86). Nyerere was one of the few African state leaders of the post-independence era that stepped down of his own accord. Additionally, the introduction of multi-party elections was publicly rooted in popular opinion by the Nyalili commission, which conducted a comprehensive review of the public attitude towards multi-partyism. Furthermore, new political parties were given plenty of time to register and organize prior to the first election in 1995. And finally, the constitution was amended to guarantee freedom of

the press, of association, of thought and of religion (Brown, 1998, p. 87). It seemed that democracy was being introduced by a willing elite to a grateful public.

Yet, for Zanzibar this picture was slightly different. First, the popular support of multi-party democracy was much stronger in Zanzibar. The Nyalili commission reported that 40 percent of Zanzibaris were in favor, compared to only 20 percent in the mainland (Burgess, 2009, p. 265). And second, the government attitude towards multi-party democracy was much more restrained. Only days after the CCM National Congress allowed the formation of political parties in February 1992, Zanzibar's president, Salmin Amour, made it very clear that, if it were not for the union, the islands would never accept multi-party democracy (Burgess, 2009, p. 265). According to Nassor and Jose (2014, p. 242), the Zanzibari branch of CCM saw multi-party democracy as threatening the legacy of the Zanzibari revolution, and thus the party's very reason for existence.

The attitude of the mainland branch of CCM was more ambiguous. According to Hamad himself, Nyerere had told him "I know you are a serious young man, and I am sure the country will benefit if you have a good party" (Burgess, 2009, p. 266). However, another one of the founding members of CUF recalled that Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the current president had said that Hamad's party was the group that should be feared the most of all the emerging parties (Interview 12). In sum, the introduction of multi-party democracy brought political incompatibilities to the fore. In particular the issue of the union and the legacy of the 1964 revolution.

The party that was to become the main opposition party throughout the period of analysis, CUF, was established in May 1992, by former chief minister Seif Sharif Hamad (Brown, 2010, p. 625). The party represented a broad coalition of societal groups, consisting of "urban intellectuals and business interests, and the vast majority of rural peasantry on the second island of Pemba, with some limited rural support on the main island of Unguja" (Cameron, 2002, p. 314). CUF campaigned on a platform of economic reform, restructuring of the union, a closer political relationship to the Arab world, privatization of the clove industry, multicultural Zanzibari nationalism and universal human rights. The governing party, on the other hand, saw CUF as a reincarnation of the pre-revolution ZNP and accused them of wanting to reinstate the sultan and give back the property that was distributed during the revolution (Mukangara, 2000, p. 43-49). Moreover, CCM accused the opposition of being

both radical Islamist terrorist (Burgess, 2009, p. 274), and imperialist puppets (Interview 13). There was instant mistrust between the two political parties.

The stage of Zanzibar in the early 1990's was set for conflict. The low economic growth and rapid institutional change increased the susceptibility to civil war substantially. Additionally, global exogenous shocks such as the fall of clove prices and the collapse of the Soviet Union wakened the government's coercive and bureaucratic capabilities. Yet, Zanzibar did not experience an onset of civil war on the early 1990's.

The explanation is probably a lack of motivation. Most opposition supporters and politicians had a genuine belief that things were changing for the better. When Hamad returned from jail in 1991, he personally reached out to president Amour. Hamad saw no reason for them to quarrel, as they knew each other well and had worked closely together in government in the 1980's (Burgess, 2009, p. 267). Hamad clearly thought he could work with president Amour, and as such saw no reason to initiate violent conflict.

The relationship between the former colleagues eventually soured, and in 1993 Hamad even alleged that Amour had organized an assassination attempt on his life (Burgess, 2009, p. 268). Still, CUF and Hamad saw no need for violent struggle, as they expected to win the 1995 election. With hindsight, Hamad reflects: "We were confident, perhaps overconfident, that we would win the election" (Burgess, 2009, p. 281). This optimism seems to have been shared by a large proportion of the opposition party and its supporters. Several informants, who were in their early 20's in 1995, described the anticipation and excitement leading up to the election, and the deep disappointment when they realized CCM had won. Clearly, it makes little sense to incur the costs of armed rebellion if you believe that you will win the election and seize power through peaceful means.

Hamad's belief that he could work with CCM, and when proven wrong, that he would at least win the election and seize power through peaceful means, prevented war. In this thesis' theoretical framework, this constitutes a lack of motivation. However, the belief that elections would lead to political change was soon to be challenged by the realities of Zanzibari politics.

4.4.2 The 1995 election

The campaign leading up to the 1995 election was "marred not just by violence, but by political repression, electoral fraud and limits on the media, working to the advantage of

CCM” (Brown, 2010, p. 625). Rugalabamu (2000, p. 115) argues that both CCM and CUF used violent language and conducted campaigns that primarily focused on discrediting the opposing political party. Furthermore, a local CUF activist was shot and killed by the police in Pemba (Interview 12, Interview 2), the opposition was banned from holding rallies in certain regions of northern Unguja (Rugalabamu, 2000, p. 114), and Hamad himself claimed that CUF faced arbitrary arrests, police beatings, and a general unwillingness to grant permits to hold public rallies (Burgess, 2009, p. 267). International observers characterized the campaign as carried out in “an atmosphere of intimidation” (Anglin, 2000, p. 43).

In the immediate aftermath of the election, things looked promising for the opposition. A television station based in Dar es Salaam announced that CUF had won the election (Rugalabamu, 2000, p. 121), and agents of CUF were allegedly told that they had won by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC). However, when the official results were announced by ZEC four days after the election, Amour was narrowly re-elected with 50.2 % of the votes (Anglin, 2000, p. 43). Even though the election itself was considered free and fair by most observers, the counting of the votes was clearly fraudulent (Brown, 1998, p. 91; Anglin, 2000, p. 43-45; Cameron, 2002, p. 314).

The reaction was an uproar. Hamad made a statement where he announced that CUF did not acknowledge the election results, nor Amour’s presidency (Burgess 283). CUF decided to boycott the newly formed legislature, and the international community froze all aid to the Zanzibari government (Cameron, 2002, p. 314; Brown, 1998, p. 91). Additionally, several civil servants were fired on the suspicion that they were CUF supporters (Brown, 1998, p. 91), and there were reports of burned houses and widespread violence as part of CCM celebration (Burgess, 2009, p. 284). Hamad himself describes the level of disappointment and frustration in almost mythological terms. “Many people were shocked and disappointed. There were women who miscarried; one man in Wete shouted out and then lost his voice and has never regained it since. Some people just dropped dead” (Burgess, 2009, p. 282).

Despite high levels of anger and frustration, Hamad and CUF did not escalate the conflict by calling for demonstrations or other forms of political protests. This seems like a highly risk-averse decision. To explain this, I turn to the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2). Within this framework, the 1995 election and its aftermath seem to be a case of

successful deterrence. Because the opposition perceived the government as capable and willing to violently repress any protest, they chose not to protest. A senior CUF politician explains that “we did not call for demonstrations [in 1995] because we feared that, things being the way they were, that could lead to escalation of violence” (Interview 12). Hence, the perception of government strength successfully deterred protest.

With hindsight, Hamad seems to believe that he should have handled the immediate aftermath of the 1995 election differently. In his biography, he reflects on his reaction to the stolen election in 1995:

I did not anticipate it, assuming I was dealing with honest and civilized people. For four days, I did not capture the moment, to sensitize CUF followers to demand that the results be announced. I simply waited, thinking these people were gentlemen, but they proved to be the worst crooks. [...] ever since, I have been convinced that we did not capture the moment during those four days, and for that error, I carry the responsibility (Burgess, 2009, p. 284).

Hamad’s decision to not call for demonstrations was crucial and can be explained by a combination of the opposition’s perception of relative power, and Hamad’s risk-averse behavior.

4.4.3 1995-2000 - Muafaka 1

Instead of turning to the streets, CUF turned to the international community and asked for international mediation. In August 1996, the negotiation process known as Muafaka 1 was initiated by the Commonwealth. Both CCM and CUF agreed to engage in negotiation. A former CUF politician told me that “CUF wanted to take part in Muafaka 1 because we believed CCM to be willing to correct their mistakes. We thought that Muafaka would give us a free and fair next election” (Interview 10). She claims that CUF entered the process with a genuine belief in change and reconciliation. CCM also spoke publicly about reconciliation and stability (Anglin, 2000, p. 50). However, according to Anglin (2000, p. 51), both parties’ primary concern throughout the negotiation appeared to be to avoid the stigma of blame if the negotiations failed.

Parallel to the negotiation process, there was an increase in government repression and violent outbursts. In 1997, eighteen CUF politicians were arrested and charged with treason (Brown, 1998, p. 91; Anglin, 2000, p. 46). The same year CUF established the Blue Guards, a group with the responsibility of “protecting party leaders and property and of maintaining security at public rallies” (Burgess, 2009, p. 285). Furthermore, there were

credible reports of sustained human rights violations that targeted CUF supporters and Pembans generally (Anglin, 2000, p. 45). Anglin (2000, p. 45) even claims that during 1996, “waves of non-violent ethnic cleansing removed much of the Pemban population from Unguja”. Seemingly unrelated, the American embassy in Dar es Salaam was attacked by al-Qaeda in 1998. However, several of the attackers were allegedly Zanzibaris (Bretons and Mshigeni, 2004, p. 60), and the event speaks to the general tension and violence of the period.

Finally, in June 1999, CCM and CUF signed an agreement. The deal was a result of significant international pressure on both CUF and CCM. The agreement did include articles on electoral laws, reform of the ZEC, credible voter’s register, and equal access to the media and judiciary reform (Cameron, 2001, p. 282). Legally speaking however, the agreement was not very strong, and was worded in extremely vague terms. In the following months, it became evident that nothing was done to implement the deal. Arrest warrants were even issued, charging Hamad with treason (Anglin, 2000, p. 60). A clear majority of international observers argue that the failure of the Muafaka 1 was due to ill will and lack of commitment, in particular from the incumbent (Cameron, 2002; Rawlence, 2005; Matheson, 2012; Roop et al., 2018; Nassor and Jose, 2014).

The period after the first multi-party election of 1995 was characterized by increased tension, more severe repression, rampant corruption and nepotism (Nassor and Jose, 2014, p. 254; Cameron, 2001, p. 282). In terms of opportunity and motivation, most factors remained stable, predicting a continuing high risk of civil war. Zanzibar was still in transition (Cameron, 2002), and as such still within a window of opportunity created by the deconsolidation of the political institutions. CCM continued to use the legacy of the revolution as a legitimization of violent repression. Furthermore, the main reason why Zanzibar was peaceful before 1995, namely the belief that the opposition would be able to seize power through peaceful means, was considerably weakened. The belief in elections as a path to political power was weakened by the fraudulent election of 1995, and the belief in a negotiated solution was weakened by the experience of Muafaka 1.

Nonetheless, Zanzibar remained relatively peaceful, no civil war erupted. I argue that the main reason is that none of the parties wanted to be seen as responsible for the collapse of negotiations. The Zanzibari branches of CCM and CUF are dependent on exogenous

audiences. The Union government in Dodoma, and international donors had the potential to intervene in the conflict and alter the power relations between the parties significantly. CCM Zanzibar was dependent on support from CCM on the mainland to stay in power. CUF was dependent on international support and mediation efforts to pressure the regime to hold free and fair elections. This significantly increases the costs of breaking the negotiations, especially for CUF, which was a young party without much of an international reputation. Thus, the ongoing negotiations created an incentive to wait, and contributed to decrease the level of motivation for civil war.

Anglin (2000, p. 46-56) describes how the negotiation process followed a repetitive pattern where the Commonwealth envoy would suggest a draft agreement, CUF would be positive to the agreement, and CCM would reject the deal. The commonwealth envoy would suggest a deal even more favorable to the CCM, and the process would repeat. CCM was stalling. A clear majority of scholars who have assessed this negotiation process conclude that the failure of the Muafaka 1 was due to ill will and lack of commitment, in particular from the incumbent (Cameron, 2002; Rawlence, 2005; Matheson, 2012; Roop et al., 2018; Nassor and Jose, 2014).

One should expect CUF to see through CCM's stalling, break the negotiations, and call for demonstrations. Instead, Hamad spent significant amounts of political capital in order to keep CUF supportive of Muafaka 1 during the CCM stalling in 1998 (Anglin, 2000, p. 57). Even more surprising, Hamad continued to preach patience, tolerance and respect for Amours' presidency to his followers even after the Muafaka had collapsed (Anglin, 2000, p. 60). Clearly, for Hamad, the international and domestic reputation was of utmost importance. However, this was not a unanimous party decision in CUF. At several occasions, Hamad had to publicly contradict and dilute statements from his party comrades (Burgess, 2009, p. 286). Once again, Hamad' chose the risk-averse way forward.

Finally, strong economic growth decreased Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war in this period. According to data from UN Data (2019), Zanzibar experienced rapid economic growth from 1994-1998. As made clear in the theory chapter, strong economic growth has a preventive effect on civil war, because it increases the alternative costs of joining violent organizations. This helps to explain how Hamad was able to keep the youth activists of CUF from resorting to violent actions after the 1995 election.

4.4.4 The 2000 election

With the failure of Muafaka 1 fresh in mind and tensions rising, Zanzibar entered into the campaign for the 2000 election. CCM, and their presidential candidate Amani Abeid Karume, son of former president Abeid Amani Karume, portrayed CUF as a violent party of Arabs that wanted to return to pre-revolutionary conditions, while CUF portrayed the CCM as corrupt and repressive (Cameron, 2002, p. 315-320; Burgess, 2009, p. 290-294). In April, Hamad himself and twelve other CUF politicians were detained and held for a short period (Burgess, 2009, p. 291), and at a rally in Kilimahewa, six CUF supporters were shot by the police (Cameron, 2001, p. 284). The issues were to a large extent the same as in 1995, but what stood out, according to Cameron (2002, p. 315), “was a determination by both sides not to give in to the other”. When election day arrived, “both sides predicted victory” (Cameron, 2002, p. 322).

The 2000 election was described as a shamble by international observers. The ZEC failed to deliver ballot paper to 16 constituencies in the Urban West region, considered a CUF stronghold. Later that day, the ZEC ordered the counting in all 50 constituencies closed, and the police proceeded to forcibly confiscate all ballot boxes, for safekeeping. The ZEC concurrently ordered a rerun of the election in the 16 constituencies of the Urban West. CCM blamed the opposition for sabotaging the election, while CUF alleged that the whole thing was orchestrated by CCM and demanded that the ZEC be disbanded, an interim government established, and a full rerun of all 50 constituencies (Cameron, 2002, p. 324; Nassor and Jose, 2014, p. 254).

In the week before the rerun of the 16 constituencies, violence intensified. There were reports of police beating up youth and women in Zanzibar Town, and many women and children left Zanzibar Town for Dar es Salaam and Pemba. Furthermore, a series of minor bomb blasts, which injured one CCM cadre in Pemba, heightened the tensions. The rerun of the election, which the whole opposition boycotted, resulted in 67 percent of the vote going to CCM, and 33 percent of the vote to CUF. CUF refused to acknowledge the result and recommended its elected members of parliament to boycott the legislature both in Zanzibar and in the union government (Cameron, 2002, p. 325).

The post-election political climate was flammable. Many CUF activist and officials were arrested, CUF supporters in Pemba genuinely feared ethnic cleansing, and CCM

supporters worried that CUF were preparing themselves for armed struggle. In an attempt to calm the opposition, Karume released the 18 CUF leaders detained for treason in 1997 (Cameron, 2001, p. 235-237). Mutual mistrust, and CCM's vilification of CUF supporters and Pembans created a dangerous narrative. According to Cameron (2002, p. 326) this narrative had as its logical outcome the possibility of pogroms against Pembans on the mainland and ethnic attacks in Zanzibar by CCM *wanamaskan* (squads) and security forces. In this situation, CUF called for nationwide peaceful demonstrations.

In the morning of January 27th, 2001, an imam was shot dead by the police outside his mosque in Unguja, Zanzibar. In Zanzibar Town, security forces prevented demonstrations by beating up and arresting vast amounts of civilians (Burgess, 2009, p. 295). In Dar es Salaam, CUF supporters marched in the streets peacefully. However, on Pemba the events took a dark turn. The police were unable to disperse the large crowds that gathered, a Human Rights Watch report describes the following events in detail:

When the demonstrators stood their ground, remaining peaceful, the police and army let loose a barrage of teargas, beatings, and shootings, sometimes firing without warning and often pursuing people fleeing the scene. Some of the shooting was done from above by snipers or from a helicopter that circled the gatherings, further terrifying citizens running for cover. As the crowds dispersed, authorities assaulted some of the wounded, and prevented those injured from receiving medical care. With police and intelligence officers controlling hospitals, some of the injured who sought help there were also denied access to medical care (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 3). Human Rights Watch concludes that at least 35 people were killed, more than six hundred were injured, and over 2000 refugees fled to Kenya (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 5). In his biography, Hamad recalls: "It was as if a foreign army had invaded the island of Pemba. It was hard to believe that Tanzanian men in uniform could be so inhuman and cruel" (Burgess, 2009, p. 295). Hamad's shock and disbelief were shared by international as well as domestic actors. The international community, Tanzanian media, other political parties, civil society organizations and religious organizations all strongly condemned the violence (Burgess, 2009, p. 295; Cameron, 2002, p. 329). as early as February 2001, Hamad met with CCM representatives and they quickly prepared a joint statement encouraging peace and reconciliation.

In order to explain why the aftermath of the 2000 elections turned out to be this violent, and why violence did not escalate further, let us once again consider the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2). In this framework, the situation in 2001 seems like a case of

successful repression. The opposition chose to initiate protests after the 2000 election results. The government chose to meet these protests with harsh repression, and the opposition chose to acquiesce and engage the regime in negotiation instead of escalating the conflict. Hence, we need to explain these three choices.

The first choice, namely to initiate nationwide protests in January 2001, was controversial within CUF. A senior CUF politician described the internal discussion to me:

There was a difference in opinion within CUF at this time. [...] You had those of our leaders who were detained on treason charges, there were 18 of them. And most of them were top leaders of CUF. They were released by Karume to calm us down. But this group contained the militants of CUF. [...] And after having spent almost three years in prison, they came out really angry. They were the ones calling for demonstrations. Other people, like Malim Seif, myself and a few others we were saying: if we hold demonstrations there will be a strong reaction from the state and people will lose their life, and nothing will happen! Because the only way demonstrations will result in something fruitful is when you have massive demonstrations and finally the security forces joining hands with the citizens. And those of us who were against demonstrations said that that will never happen in Zanzibar. Because, first of all, the security forces are not Zanzibaris. They do not have any connection with the citizens. They are from the mainland (Interview 12). According to Hamad (Burgess, 2009, p. 294-295) and his allies within CUF (Interview 12), the party leadership decided not to hold demonstrations, but instead to travel abroad to gather international support.

This is another example of Hamad's risk averseness. Just as Hamad was unwilling to incur the risk of large-scale protest in 1995, he was unwilling to risk demonstrations in 2000. However, when Hamad had left Zanzibar, the militants within CUF gave in to grassroots demands and decided to hold major peaceful union-wide demonstrations. A former CUF politician summarized the turn of events in the following way: "They organized rallies. The government said no. They said we will do it. And they did. And lots of people were killed. Malim Seif was not ready for that. If he had been here it would not have happened" (Interview 3).

The Second choice is the regime's decision on how to react to the protests. The government decided to prevent these demonstrations at all costs. The secondary literature does not dwell on this decision, and apparently does not find it very surprising. CCM blamed the deaths on poor training and bad luck (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 4). However, this narrative is countered by reports of government officials instructing police officers to "use all

force necessary to break up the demonstrations” (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 10). According to former police officers who were fired after the attack, a police commissioner allegedly told his men to “Kill, bring back bodies, then we will know that you have done your job” (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 11). Furthermore, immediately after the attack, President Mkapa publicly praised the security forces for a job well done (Human Rights Watch, 2002, p. 4). Unfortunately, it is difficult to further assess the government’s decision to repress, as the government denies that a conscious choice was made and refused to speak to me on that issue.

This brings us to the third choice, namely CUF’s decision to acquiesce. Hamad met with representatives from CCM as early as February 2001, and they quickly prepared a joint statement calling for peace and reconciliation. This decision was both surprising, and crucial for the peace of Zanzibar. Hamad himself declared that election fraud in 2000 would mean civil war (Economist, 1999). Furthermore, there were strong forces within CUF that were frustrated with the lack of political change and wanted to resort to more decisive tactics (Interview 12). The government, on the other hand, had not seemed particularly keen on negotiations the past ten years. Still, Hamad and CCM reached a negotiated settlement. There are at least three potential explanations for this outcome.

First, Brown (2010) argues that the change in leadership within CCM Zanzibar, from Salmin Amour to Amani Karume, was important. After the experience of Muafaka 1, it would be nearly impossible for CUF to enter into negotiation with a regime led by president Amour. In contrast to Amour, Karume welcomed external mediation, and quickly, and without public fanfare, heavily increased government spending on health and education in Pemba (Brown, 2010, p. 626). Hamad himself acknowledged the importance of change in CCM, but argued that it was Mkapa, not Karume who was the force for reconciliation (Burgess, 2009, p. 299). However, Karume and Mkapa had been in power since the election and was as such also responsible for the choice to react violently to the nation-wide demonstrations. As previously mentioned, Mkapa even congratulated the security forces with a job well done (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Thus, this explanation is slightly weak.

Second, Nassor and Jose (2014, p. 254) provide a slightly different explanation. They argue that the shocking nature of the violence “prompted both major political parties, the CM

and the CUF, to pursue another agreement that would secure a lasting solution”. This resonates well with what a former CCM government minister told me:

2001 was shocking. Men were raped. Women were raped. Children were raped. Husbands were raped in front of their wives. Wives were raped in front of their husbands. It was gruesome! To an extent we were shocked into cooperating for the sake of Zanzibar (Interview 13).

The opposition experienced how costly protest and repression could be. The government on the other hand, experienced unanimous condemnation from the international community and domestic actors in Tanzania. This likely changed the regime’s perceived cost of further repression. Thus, instead of creating a window of opportunity for conflict, the massacre seemingly shocked the actors into cooperation.

Third, several of the informants argued that Hamad, almost alone, was the reason why violence did not escalate in 2001. Hamad made the decision to engage CCM in negotiations without running his decision by the formal decision-making structures of CUF (Burgess, 2009, p. 296; Interview 12). Moreover, the joint statement from Hamad and CCM representatives was not well received by people in Zanzibar. Considerable number of activists wanted to continue the demonstrations and some even called for reprisals against CCM supporters. A former CUF politician witnessed Hamad trying to sell his ideas to an angry crowd:

It was the only time where I saw that Malim Seif, when he would give a speech, knew that no one supported his view. So, he had to explain. “You see, it is easy when you are far away to say that we must do this and this. But go to Pemba, people are afraid even to go out of their houses! We must try to find a solution, because we cannot fight!” And the people said okay (Interview 4).

Hamad claims that he did this because of his genuine belief in dialogue (Burgess, 2009, p. 297). In his biography he claims: “That is my philosophy, really, not to treat the other side as monsters. If you avoid dialogue, you allow conflicts to exacerbate, and then eventually people kill each other” (Burgess, 2009, p. 298). One informant offer a slightly different explanation: “I think it is because he was afraid” (Interview 2). Regardless of reason, Hamad’s averseness to risk definitively shaped the turn of events.

Conclusively, violence erupted as the opposition underestimated the government’s capacity and willingness to violently repress demonstrations. However, the violence did not escalate to civil war as the opposition chose to acquiesce and not escalate. In terms of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2), this entails a change in the opposition’s perception

of relative capacity. In the game, this happens because repression signals strength. In this case however, if we believe Hamad and his allies' narrative, the opposition's perception is different because the two decisions were made by two different groups of people. The militants of CUF chose to organize demonstrations, while the choice to acquiesce was made by Hamad and his allies.

4.4.5 2001-2005 - Muafaka 2

The joint announcement made by Hamad and CCM in the aftermath of the 2001 attack, evolved into a new negotiation process, known as Muafaka 2. This process quickly resulted in a written agreement that was signed October 10th, 2001. The agreement included mostly technical and electoral matters, including reform of the ZEC, a permanent voter register, and the establishment of the Office of the Public Prosecutor (Roop et al., 2018, p. 249). The content of Muafaka 2 was not very different from Muafaka 1, but this time it included a detailed implementation programme with time limits for each element and included amendments to the constitution (Cameron, 2002, p. 329). The way the CCM approached this document was also very different, as this agreement was signed in the State House with much fanfare and publicity (Burgess, 2009, p. 297).

Hamad himself describes the result of the Muafaka 2 as initially very good for the CUF. They were allowed to hold rallies again, and their international reputation improved considerably (Burgess, 2009, p. 298). However, as the 2005 election approached, it became clear that the agreement would not be fully implemented⁸. True to the formula, both parties blamed each other (Brown, 2010, p. 626; Rawlence, 2005, p. 518). Despite important reform of the ZEC and the establishment of a permanent voter register, the state apparatus remained inherently politicised, and the political climate of mutual distrust remained (Matheson, 2012, p. 600; Nassor and Jose, 2014, p. 254). By 2004, the two parties once again found themselves in a situation of increasing tension.

The reasons why this period did not see an escalation to civil war can be summarized in three points. First, the massacre of 2001 had a clear deterring effect on political opposition.

⁸ There is some disagreement in the literature concerning to what extent Muafaka 2 was implemented. Mpangala (2005:69-70) argue that 80% of muafaka 2 was implemented by 2004, and that 90% were implemented before the 2005 election. Brown (2010), Rawlence (2005), Nassor and Jose (2014) and Matheson (2012) argue that the implementation was at best patchy.

Several of the informants expressed fear or hopelessness when talking about government repression in general, and the 2001 massacre in particular. One lawyer told me that, “If you organize you have your leaders calling for demonstration, the next day the leaders will be arrested. Remember in 2001! When they organized, what happened? They were killed!” (Interview 2).

On the other hand, government repression also creates anger. This was especially evident among youth. A group of self-employed youth told me that, “Of course we are angry! You come to Zanzibar and everyone is *Hakuna matata* [no problem] and pole pole [slowly slowly]. Big smile! But on the inside, we are furious!” (Interview 14). A leader in CUF’s youth wing put it in daunting terms: “I am scared of a genocide in Zanzibar. It is just like Rwanda, where the peaceful situation was taken for granted, and suddenly the majority have had enough with the power of the minority and BOOM!” (Interview 11). Conclusively, the deterring effect of past repression on future political protest is significant but cannot alone explain the absence of civil war.

Second, it seems the opposition had a clear perception that violent struggle was not possible. This is clearly related to the deterring effect of repression. Both of these effects are caused by the government’s show of force. However, the mechanisms are slightly different. In this instance, the mechanism is not fear of the consequences, but rather an altered perception of the costs of armed rebellion and the plausibility of victory.

In terms of the “objective” measurements, the opportunity of civil war does not appear particularly weakened or strengthened after 2001. Most structural factors remained stable between 2001 and 2005. Two developments are noteworthy, namely the slow economic growth and political crisis of the early 2000’s, (Rawlence, 2005, p. 517) and President Karume’s deliberate actions to alleviate some of the horizontal inequalities between Pemba and Unguja (Brown, 2010, p. 626). However, these do cancel each other out to some degree. Thus, what prevents more violence in the 2001-2005 period seems to be perceived lack of opportunity in the established opposition. Illustratively, when I asked whether the people *can’t* fight back, or if they *won’t* fight back, the director of a local Human Rights NGO told me that “maybe if they had weapons in 2001, they would have gone. But most people are scared” (Interview 8).

Finally, the opposition in general, and Hamad in particular, seemed to genuinely believe that things were different this time. As already mentioned, Hamad considered the Muafaka 2 a positive development for CUF. Furthermore, the reforms in the ZEC, and the ongoing reform of the permanent voter register, provided genuine belief that the 2005 election might be free and fair. This hope seemingly limited the motivation for civil war.

4.4.6 The 2005 election

The 2005 election campaign was characterized by even harsher rhetoric than the two former elections. CCM accused CUF of planning to seize power with force (Rawlence, 2005, p. 519). Union President Mkapu said that “CCM would never allow anti-revolutionary elements to rule the islands” (Burgess, 2009, p. 302), and “told supporters to strike first if they were provoked by the opposition” (Rawlence, 2005, p. 519). Karume allegedly went further and stated in a campaign speech that “the weapons used in the revolution in 1964 were still available and, if necessary, would be cleaned up and used” (Burgess, 2009, p. 301). CUF on their side made it very clear that they would not accept another stolen election (Rawlence, 2005, p. 523).

Furthermore, the campaign experienced widespread violence and political repression. Hamad was initially prevented from registering to vote by an overzealous local election official. In Pemba, one opposition supporter was shot by the police, and a leader of a local government militia was found dead (Rawlence, 2005, p. 519). On Unguja, there were reports of government militias “setting fire to homes, chasing people into the bush, separating parents from their children, and systematically beating up and raping CUF supporters” (Rawlence, 2005, p. 520). CCM agents raided CUF offices, bombs went off in CCM meeting places, the number of mainland security forces increased rapidly, and there were reports of rampant discrimination of Pembans (Rawlence, p. 520).

In terms of transparency, the 2005 election represented a major improvement from the 1995 and 2000 elections, but still had some issues (Mjåtvedt, 2006, p. 1). Officially, CCM won with 53 percent of the vote, but the opposition still disputed the results, and claimed victory with 50.38 percent of the vote (Brown, 2010, p. 627; Nassor and Jose, 2014, p. 254). Immediately after the results were announced, violence erupted between police and protesters (Brown, 2010, p. 627). The CUF headquarters in Mtendeni in Zanzibar Town, where large crowds of CUF supporters had gathered, was surrounded by security forces, tear

gassed, and cordoned off for three days. Conditions soon became critical for children and the elderly (Mjåtvedt, 2006, p. 18). After three days, the impasse was broken when the UN delegation to Zanzibar confronted the security forces, and the regime ordered the police to lift the siege (Burgess, 2009, p. 305).

Prior to the election, Hamad and CUF had promised “Ukraine style” demonstrations, and People’s Power if the election was stolen once again (Mjåtvedt, 2006, p. 17; Rawlence, 2005, p. 523). During the siege of CUF headquarters, frustrated CUF supporters called for action, but Seif Sharif Hamad and the CUF leadership refused. Hamad argued that it would be foolhardy to send unarmed youth to confront army and police. They made the decision not to go ahead with people’s power to avoid a blood bath (Burgess, 2009, p. 304).

In 2007, negotiations between CCM and CUF started once more. This time, newly elected Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete, who had promised to find a lasting solution to the political troubles on the islands, was the initiator. The process, called Muafaka 3, or alternatively the Bagamoyo-process, involved high ranking party officials having face to face negotiations. The process resulted in an agreement but collapsed in March 2008, due to disagreements about implementation and mutual distrust between the parties. A senior CUF politician admitted that factions within CUF were calling for demonstrations at this point. On why these factions were not heard he answered “well, I think, especially after what happened in 2001, demonstrations will always be met with heavy handedness and violence from the other side. And it can result in the loss of life and property. So that was it” (Interview 12)

In terms of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2) both of these instances are cases of successful deterrence. Prior to the election, CUF had announced that they would protest if the election was stolen, and as activists and supporters gathered, the regime decided not to let the demonstrations take place. The siege of Mtendeni was political repression, but primarily it was a threat and a signal. CUF leadership received the signal and decided not to go ahead with large protests. This was a very unpopular decision among the rank and file CUF supporters. However, as we can read from Hamad’s justification of his decision, he was convinced that protest would not lead to anything, except the violent repression of him and his supporters. In this way, the regime successfully deterred protests by signaling strength. In 2007, the threat of violence had been internalized, and effectively deterred protests.

In both of these instances, CUF's decision was strongly influenced by Hamad's risk averseness. In 2005, for the second time, Hamad did not call for large scale demonstrations after he had explicitly said that he would. In 2007, CUF leadership seemed to internalize Hamad's risk averse attitude. A lawyer and CUF supporter noted: "So, people have been very patient. They were angry after the 2005 election, but they remained calm. Because Malim Seif. He has power! [...] Whatever he says, people will follow!" (Interviewee 1). The leader of an unaffiliated youth NGO observed that, "He [Hamad] is the only one who tells them [CUF youth] to calm down, and he is the only one who would be able to get them to calm down. He has helped very much to maintain the peace" (Interview 9). Another lawyer reflected: "He [Hamad] is the one who holds the peace of this country in his hands. [...] The day he says "okay, the election has been rigged, you must go and defend your vote", that day we no longer have peace" (Interview 2). Finally, A CUF grassroots activist proclaimed: "Without Malim Seif, we Zanzibaris would kill each other. He is a true leader" (Interview 6). As such, Hamad's risk averseness, and CUF's willingness to follow Hamad's decision in this regard, is arguably one of the key causes why Zanzibar remained peaceful in the period of analysis.

4.4.7 2008-2010 - Maridhiano

In terms of susceptibility, the 2005-2010 period was mostly similar to the preceding periods. Nevertheless, two developments are worth mentioning. First, strong economic growth in the 2005-2008 period increased the legitimacy of president Karume (Brown, 2010, p. 627) and increased the alternative cost for potential rebels. However, from 2008, the economy, driven by a significant decline in tourism due to the global financial crisis, slowed down (Brown, 2010, p. 627). Interestingly, the period of economic growth corresponds to the two instances of successful deterrence mentioned above. The decline in economic activity increases the opportunity for, and thus the susceptibility of, civil war after 2008.

Second, there are indicators that president Karume continued the measures initiated after the 2001 massacre to alleviate the horizontal inequalities between Pemba and Unguja. Karume increased public spending on health and education, and also initiated a project that would link Pemba to the national electricity grid (Brown, 2010, p. 627-628). Given that there is a long-standing view in Zanzibar that CCM is punishing Pembans for their political opposition (Brown, 2010, p. 630), Karume's actions to some extent weakens this narrative.

Karume thus initiated projects to decrease the horizontal inequalities in Zanzibar, a move that theoretically should decrease both motivation and opportunity for civil war. Karume's initiatives to decrease horizontal inequalities may have alleviated any increased susceptibility due to slow economic growth after 2007.

In the fall of 2009, Zanzibar once again experienced numerous small-scale attacks on CCM and CUF supporters (Moss and Tronvoll, 2015), and it seemed that Zanzibar would enter into another violent election. However, the tension was not as high as before. Political developments on the mainland had led to an increase in Zanzibari nationalism that united rather than divided the Zanzibari branches of CUF and CCM. Especially two issues strengthened Zanzibari nationalism. The first was prime minister Pinda's statement that "Zanzibar si nchi", that Zanzibar was not a country. The statement infuriated Zanzibaris across the political divide. Furthermore, in 2009, the Zanzibari house of representatives voted unanimously to remove the issue of oil and natural gas from the Union articles (Moss and Tronvoll, 2015, p. 96; Interview 12). A senior CUF politician described the ambiguity of the moment: "On the one hand we finally had common ground as Zanzibaris, Zanzibar's status in the Union and the oil and gas issue. But on the other hand, was the increasing violence and calamities during the registration of voters" (Interview 12).

During this crucial moment in Zanzibari history, senior CUF politician and close political ally of Seif Sharif Hamad, Ismail Jussa, decided to approach Karume personally, without speaking to anyone within CUF (Matheson, 2012, p. 601; Interview 12). They met August 5th, 2009, and again five weeks later. The result of these backchannel negotiations was the formation of the Mojo-committee, which met on November 5th the same year. Despite pushback from hardliners within both parties, the Maridhiano process resulted in CUF acknowledging Karume as president and the introduction of a private bill in parliament, a constitutional amendment, and a referendum to introduce a government of national unity after the 2010 election (Matheson, 2012, p. 601).

The 2010 election was officially won by CCM by a small margin. It is widely considered that this election was fraudulent, but that CUF accepted the result in the spirit of reconciliation (Matheson, 2012, p. 602). This was also supported by the informants. A CUF politician and member of the ZEC told me in detail how he, on Seif Sharif Hamad's indirect order, left the room during the final counting of the votes (Interview 3). As a result, a

government of national unity, with the CCM candidate as president and Seif Sharif Hamad as one of two vice presidents, was established after the 2010 election.

How was reconciliation and power-sharing possible in the Zanzibari context? Nassor and Jose (2014) emphasize how aid agencies and international donors put pressure on president Kikwete, which in turn put pressure on CCM Zanzibar. Bakari and Makulilo (2012, p. 199) focus on the fact that Muafaka 1, 2 and 3 was “carried out within the existing institutional arrangements of the party structures”, while Maridhiano was more of an informal process. The senior CUF politician I talked to, who had played a central role in all four negotiation processes, emphasized that Maridhiano was a Zanzibari process (Interview 12). Muafaka 1 was initiated by the Commonwealth, and Muafaka 2 and 3 was Tanzanian, not Zanzibari processes. Moreover, a former CCM minister emphasized the individual courage and statesmanship of Hamad and Karume:

The Maridhiano succeeded where the Muafakas failed because it took everything one step further. It was a Zanzibari process from the start to finish. Karume and Hamad had great courage. Why in 2009 and not before? [...] Karume and Hamad created a tsunami of goodwill. It was like a drug! We genuinely thought that the darkness was behind us (Interview 13).

Roop et al. (2018, p. 252) however, focus on the strategic considerations that made both CUF and CCM positive to a solution to the impasse in 2009. For CUF, a government of national unity represented the best chance of political power, and they reasoned there would be a greater chance that CCM would let CUF win if they were guaranteed at least some political power. Karume on the other hand, wanted to leave a positive political legacy, and wanted to avoid retroactive investigations into transactions and accumulation of wealth by him and his family. CCM in Tanzania wanted to solve the issue to avoid further international embarrassment (Roop et al., 2018, p. 252). Furthermore, the Maridhiano process constitute a situation where the moderates within both CUF and CCM came together despite internal pushback in both parties.

Unfortunately, the government of national unity collapsed before the 2015 election. The 2015 election, although mostly peaceful, resulted in a full nullification and a rerun which were boycotted by the whole opposition. Consequently, the current Zanzibari government is no longer a government of national unity, and tensions are once again rising in Zanzibar (Roop et al., 2018). In March 2019, only weeks after I returned from the field research in

Zanzibar, CUF was split in two. Although clearly outside the scope of this thesis, the current developments show that Zanzibari politics are still unstable and vulnerable.

4.5 Discussion

This chapter assessed Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war in the 1990-2010 period and provided a structured analytical narrative of the period in order to explain the absence of civil war. In the following section I will, discuss how structural conditions and strategic interaction come together to explain the patterned events of the 1990-2010 period, and how the pre-1995, and post-2007 events can also be interpreted in terms of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2).

In the preceding narrative, a pattern of interaction is observed. Protest was successfully deterred after the 1995 election; protests occurred, but were successfully repressed, after the 2000 election; and protests were once more successfully deterred after the 2005 election. I have argued that a lack of sufficient motivation likely helped prevent civil war before 1995 and after 2007. However, the pre-1995 and post-2007 events can also be interpreted in terms of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2), as policy compromise. Recall that the actors' perception of relative power is the key to explain their strategic behavior in the game.

By the beginning of the 1990's, the Tanzanian regime was in a weak position. Due to a combination of falling clove prices, the failed economic policies of Nyerere's African socialism and the structural adjustment programs required by the International Monetary Fund, Tanzania's economy was struggling (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001; Burgess, 2009). Additionally, the fall of the Soviet Union and the wave of democracy that swept over sub-Saharan Africa discredited much of the ideology on which the legitimacy of Tanzania's "one-party democracy" rested. Consequently, the CCM regime felt increased pressure from the international community, societal forces, and even from within the party itself (Brown, 1998, p. 86).

Hence, there is good reason to believe that both the government and the opposition perceived that the government was relatively weak. One founding member of CUF argues that Zanzibar was the place in the republic where the demand for multi-party democracy was highest. The Nyalili Commission reported that 40 percent of Zanzibaris wanted multi-party

democracy. The senior CUF politician explained that “for the regime this was shocking! Because despite all their machinations and fear-mongering, the people could still come out in such huge number to campaign for a multi-party system” (Interview 12). The shocking result of the Nyalili commission in combination with the economic issues of the regime in the early 1990’s and the end of the cold war, likely created the perception of a weak regime.

In the framework of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2), this perceived weakness sparked societal pressure in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, which constitute protest. One example is the widespread reactions to the dismissal of Hamad as chief minister in 1989 (Burgess, 2009, p. 258). One lawyer remembered these reactions well: “He [Hamad] was fired from the party, and the reception he received, especially in Pemba, was an indication that people wanted changes. [...] people followed him from the airport to the Malindi grounds. More than three kilometers!” (Interview 1).

Following the game of strategic interaction, the government could have chosen to repress these acts of protest. Although the regime did imprison Hamad for two years, they also established the Nyalili commission to assess the demand for democracy in the population, and eventually introduced multi-party elections. These democratic reforms appeased both the internal opposition and external actors and can thus be interpreted as an act of policy compromise. These reforms were rational for the Tanzanian regime because it considered itself relatively weak.

Likewise, in 2009, the global financial crisis, low clove prices (Brown, 2010, p. 627) and a continuous loss of popular support (Brown, 2010, p. 625; Interview 8) could have led the CCM regime in Zanzibar to believe that it was in a position of relative weakness. The past three elections had been violent, and there was no reason why the 2010 election would not be violent as well. In this situation, both CUF and CCM wanted to reach some sort of solution without the costs incurred by protest and repression. In the framework of the game of strategic interaction, this is a rational action for CCM, because international pressure and CUF’s increased popularity increased the potential costs of repression.

If we interpret the democratization of the early 1990’s and the Maridhiano-process of 2009 as policy compromise, we are left with the following pattern: policy compromise in the early 90’s, successful deterrence in the late 1990’s, successful repression in 2001, successful

deterrence in the mid-2000's, and finally, policy compromise in 2009. Structural conditions in general, and economic growth in particular, can go some way in explaining this pattern.

In theory, slow economic growth influences relative power by making recruitment easier. If recruitment becomes easier, the opposition will perceive itself as stronger, relative to the government. This perception of relative power influences the opposition's strategic decisions. Consider the first decision node in the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2). The choice to protest or to not protest is primarily dependent on whether the opposition perceive themselves as stronger than the government. As described above Zanzibar experienced periods of strong economic growth in 1994-1997, and 2004-2008, and periods of slow economic growth in 1990-1994, 1997-2004, and 2008-2010. Hence, we should expect the opposition to be relatively strong in periods of slow economic growth, and the government to be relatively strong in periods of strong economic growth.

In 1991, 2001 and 2009 the opposition in Zanzibar put pressure on the government. In 1991 and 2009, the government chose to accommodate, and the result was multi-party democracy in 1992 and a government of national unity in 2010. In 2001, the government reacted with repression, ushering in the massacre of 2001. In periods of slow economic growth, the opposition saw itself as strong and chose to put increased pressure on the government. In one instance the government chose to repress, while in two other instances the government accommodated the opposition and substantial policy compromise was the result. Conversely, the instances of successful deterrence occurred during periods of strong economic growth, in the late 1990's and mid 2000's respectively, where both the opposition and the government perceived the government as relatively strong.

In this application of the game of strategic interaction (Figure 2.2) on the events of the period of analysis, it becomes clear how structural conditions and the strategic interaction of actors are interlinked. The structural conditions, like economic growth, frame the strategic choice, and influence the pay-off structure of the game. Thus, structural conditions do not cause civil war onset in itself, but the conditions frame and influence the interactive turn of events that lead to escalation or de-escalation of violent political action. This is the reason why it is crucial to take both structural conditions and strategic interaction into consideration when analyzing the causes of, or risk of, civil war onsets.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

To better understand the causes of civil war, this thesis set out to discover the reasons why Zanzibar did not experience civil war in the 1990-2010 period. To explain the absence of specific civil wars are difficult, partly because counter-factual events are inherently tricky to study, and partly because the scholarly community have not established a comprehensive theoretical explanation of the causes of civil war. Therefore, this master's thesis has developed a theoretical framework by synthesizing several existing theories on the causes of civil war. This theory synthesis is primarily based on the quantitative literature on civil war onset, and Pierskalla's (2010) extensive game of repression and dissent with incomplete information. This choice was partly inspired by Young's (2016, p. 41-42) recommendation to incorporate modelling techniques and insight from the literature on repression and dissent, as well as the structural theories of opportunity and motivation.

The critical theoretical assumption and argument is that civil wars do not just break out with a certain probability given structural conditions, nor are they the unique result of idiosyncratic processes. Instead, civil wars are produced by an endogenized system of structural conditions and strategic interaction of more or less rational actors. In turn, this system is affected by exogenous shocks that influence both the conditions and the interaction of actors. In other words, governments and domestic opposition make their own civil wars, but not at their own accord. Instead, they make them under certain structural conditions, given and transmitted from the past. This theoretical framework is developed in the theory chapter and operationalized in the methods chapter.

The case study chapter assessed the structural conditions and the strategic interaction of actors of Zanzibar in the 1990-2010 period. First, I provided a historical background which sets the stage for the period of analysis. Then, I assessed the susceptibility to civil war in the period of analysis by subsequently evaluating factors that increase and decrease motivation and opportunity, respectively. I conclude that motivation was, for the most part, present throughout the period and that the level of opportunity is ambiguous. Thereafter, I provided a structured analytical narrative of the 1990-2010 period. The narrative is structured by the elections of 1995, 2000 and 2001, and provides a detailed analysis of the strategic

interactions related to these political events. The narrative also assesses the variation in susceptibility to civil war in the periods before and after the elections. Finally, I provided a discussion of the empirical analysis, where I reflected on the theoretical and empirical interplay of structural conditions and strategic interaction.

In conclusion, I argue that Zanzibar avoided large scale violence in this period for three reasons. First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented due to a belief held by the opposition that the next election would lead to substantial political change. Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating a civil war. This perceived lack of opportunity is evident, both in opposition leadership and supporters, and seems especially important during the strategic interaction immediately after the elections. Third, the leadership of CUF, and Seif Sharif Hamad in particular, have acted in a risk-averse manner at critical moments. This is especially evident in Hamad and CUF's repeated decisions not to call for massive demonstrations after they had threatened to do so. In this chapter, I will elaborate on these three reasons and discuss the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this thesis.

5.2 Findings

In the previous chapter, I discussed Zanzibar's susceptibility to civil war throughout the 1990-2010 period and provided a structured analytical narrative of the period. I draw on evidence from both sections to argue that there were three primary reasons why Zanzibar avoided large scale violence in the 1990-2010 period.

First, in years preceding elections, escalation to civil war was prevented because of a belief that the next election would lead to substantial political change. This phenomenon is linked to the motivational part of susceptibility. For an organization to openly challenge the state, the electoral path must be closed, or at least it must be perceived to be closed. Because of incremental reforms, and pressure from international and domestic third parties, the Zanzibari opposition has entered into each election with the clear perception that "this time will be different". When the opposition, or at least the opposition leadership, genuinely believes that elections represent a plausible way to power, it does not make much sense to

initiate armed rebellion. Especially not when there was already reason to believe that armed conflict would be very costly, in terms of disruption to the tourist and trade economy. In the period of analysis, this perception was present prior to each election. The 1995 election was the first multi-party election since the revolution, and Hamad was confident that the opposition would win (Burgess, 2009, p. 281). The lesson the opposition draw from the 1995 election was that it must not “give in”. Consequently, CUF predicted victory and believed that if they just staged protests, they would be given power (Cameron, 2002, p. 322). Moreover, Hamad’s statement to the Economist (1999), that there would be civil war if CCM stole the 2000 election, shows that civil war before the election was not a legitimate alternative. Before the 2005 election, CUF similarly claimed that they would stage “Ukraine style” protests if the election were rigged (Rawlence, 2005, p. 523), thereby reiterating their trust in elections as a path to political change. Furthermore, the perception that “this time might be different”, was strengthened by the partially implemented Muafaka 2 agreement. Finally, in 2010, the government had already agreed to power-sharing arrangements even before the elections and thus removed any popularly justifiable reason to rebel. Upon my inquiry into why the opposition did not arm itself, a local historian with close ties to the opposition argued that “No, arming would be suicidal. [...] Here, there is still a potential of constitutional change.” (Interview 4). Thus, through stalling and incremental political reform, the motivation to rebel was limited in each period immediately preceding elections.

Second, regardless of the level of objective opportunity, lack of perceived opportunity has prevented the opposition from initiating civil war. Whether or not armed rebellion would have been feasible in Zanzibar is ambiguous. Indeed, the terrain of the isles, and the much greater size and power of the mainland, severely limit feasibility. However, the long coastline full of caves and the considerable following the opposition enjoys on the mainland would make most observers hesitate to call rebellion impossible. If anything, the presence of widespread clove smuggling seems to imply that clandestine activity is feasible. However, just as a lack of objective opportunity prevents the outbreak of civil war, so does lack of subjective opportunity. If the leadership of an organization does not believe armed rebellion to be feasible, that organization is not likely to initiate armed rebellion.

Several informants with key positions in the CUF leadership, or insight into those networks, have argued that Hamad and his close advisors do not believe armed rebellion to be a feasible

strategy. When asked about whether some people in CUF's leadership approved of violent measures, a local historian answered: "I think, maybe some people in the leadership would be for violent action. However, I think a lot of them would probably go along with the analysis of Malim Seif, that armed struggle would not work" (Interview 4). This sentiment was shared by several opposition supporters (Interview 2; Interview 6). The perception that the government is too strong for rebellion to be feasible seems to be widespread, both among CUF politicians and CUF supporters.

Third, and partially connected to the second reason, the leadership of CUF have acted in a particularly risk-averse manner at crucial moments. This is especially evident in Hamad's decision not to call for widespread demonstrations after any of the elections, despite explicitly calling for such protests during the campaigns. When protests were called for after the 2000 election, Hamad and his closest advisors were abroad, and as such were outmaneuvered by a more militant faction. The following massacre of 2001 seemingly proved Hamad's point, and the opposition has acted risk averse ever since. One former CUF politician confided in me that some people within CUF want to take more risks.

There are under table movements against Malim Seif. Supposedly because of his politeness and his peaceful way to solve this problem. People do not believe in that anymore. They want to take action. He is not ready for that. So, people are saying he is too old, he is unfit. Simply because he does not want to do a riot. They are looking for someone who is more hot [sick], who are more militant than Malim Seif (Interview 3).

That someone wants to remove Hamad because he is not militant enough, supports the claim that Hamad's risk averseness has contributed to the relative peacefulness of Zanzibar.

5.3 Contributions and further research

In this section, I discuss the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions this thesis makes to the literature on the causes of civil war.

The quantitative literature on the causes of civil war has identified several structural conditions that are robust determinants of civil war onset. By utilizing these variables in a statistical prediction model, one can reasonably accurately predict the onset of civil war (Hegre et al., 2017; Hegre et al., 2017). This is a significant achievement. However, to understand civil wars exclusively as events that occur with a certain probability given certain structural conditions is somehow not satisfactory. In the same way, the argument that an

abundance of dry leaves caused a forest fire might be statistically accurate, but it is not a satisfactory answer to the question of how the forest fire started. As Young (2016) and Kissane (2016) points out, civil wars do not just break out; they evolve through processes of interaction between actors.

In this thesis, I build on the empirical determinants identified by the quantitative literature and put them within a processual framework, namely Pierskalla's (2010) game of strategic interaction. This framework allows me to consider both structural and processual mechanisms within a single framework. The outcome is not only a theoretical explanation of five instances where civil war did not break out despite structural conditions but also an explanation of the pattern of these events. The synthesis of structure and process makes it possible to go beyond discussions of whether motivation or opportunity is most important or which proxies are the most robust determinants. Both motivation and opportunity are crucial for the risk of civil war. Furthermore, a theoretical framework that incorporates structural conditions and strategic interaction provide the necessary tools to show how.

Despite its strength, it should be evident that this theoretical framework has significant limitations. The formal rigidity of a game ignores the fact that decisions are not as clear-cut in the empirical world as they are in the realm of theory. To be specific, the distinctions between protest and not protest, and between repression and accommodation, do not seem to be as mutually excluding in reality as they are in theory. For example, the reintroduction of multi-party democracy coincided with the imprisonment of then chief minister Hamad, which was the leading oppositional political figure in Zanzibar. Similarly, the 2001 massacre on Pemba coincided with the release of several political prisoners and increased public spending in opposition heartland. However, all models are simplifications of reality, and the application does show the potential of combining large-N statistical studies with game theoretic models and assessing the resulting theoretical expectations with fine-grained qualitative methods.

Methodologically, this thesis combines descriptive statistics and qualitative methods to comment on a mostly quantitative literature. The structural conditions identified by the established quantitative literature are operationalized in quantifiable ways, and as such, it is natural to use quantitative tools to gauge the extent to which these conditions are present in the Zanzibari case. However, and perhaps more interestingly, I utilize a form of qualitative

process tracing to demonstrate how those structural conditions frame and shape the strategic interaction of the actors. For example, the geography and power relations of the Zanzibari context shape the actors' perceptions of the feasibility of armed rebellion. In turn, these perceptions form the cognitive basis from which actors make strategic decisions. Likewise, conflict history and horizontal inequalities frame the discourse on current political issues, and in no small degree define the present actors. In this way, the case study put on display the causal mechanisms linking structural conditions, through processes of strategic interaction, to the onset, or non-onset, of civil war.

Furthermore, this is a deviant case study. To adequately explain the onset of civil war, a theory must also be able to explain the absence of civil war. The explanation of a deviant case can either confirm or refute the original theory, but it can also strengthen the original theory by providing incremental change and qualifications. By explaining a case that is not well explained - neither by the purely quantitative- nor by the purely qualitative literature - this case study illustrates the advantages of using a theoretically comprehensive- and multi-methodological approach to assess conflict risk in specific cases.

However, the validity of this explanation rests on a set of counter-factual claims. To reiterate, I argue that Zanzibar avoided civil war in the 1990 – 2010 period for three reasons: lack of motivation prior to elections, a perceived lack of opportunity in the post-election environment, and a risk-averse leadership, especially within the opposition leadership. As such, it must also be true that if it were not for the periodical lack of motivation, the perceived lack of opportunity, and the risk-averseness of the opposition leadership, then Zanzibar would have experienced civil war in the period of analysis. These counter-factual claims can never be scientifically tested. However, neither of these explanations are necessarily limited to Zanzibar. To the contrary, they generate hypotheses that to various degrees can, and should, be tested in future research

The first hypothesis is that civil war onsets should be less likely in periods immediately preceding elections because the upcoming election should considerably reduce motivation for opposition leaders. This hypothesis is conditional on three assumptions: that the opposition is allowed to participate in the election, that the elections happen regularly - so that the opposition knows that an election is imminent - and that the election is expected to be relatively free and fair - so that an election victory could actually provide the good which the

opposition seek to gain. This hypothesis should be relatively straightforward to test, given the adequate data-set.

The second hypothesis is that perceived lack of opportunity, or what one might call subjective opportunity, is as effective a preventer of civil war onsets as actual lack of opportunity, or what one might call objective opportunity. Consequently, in a situation where armed rebellion is not feasible, but where some organization believes that it is, one might see short-lived and violent uprisings. Conversely, situations where rebellion is feasible, but where no oppositional organization perceives it to be, should stay relatively peaceful. Although it seems plausible, this hypothesis is hard to test in a cross-country setting. To do so, one would have to develop an adequate proxy for perceived opportunity, distinct from objective opportunity. This is challenging. However, in a world where information and public perception has become a battlefield of inter- and intrastate conflict (Khaldarova, 2016), the potential importance of perceived opportunity should not be underestimated.

The third hypothesis is that the more risk averse the dominant leader of the opposition is, the less likely is the onset of civil war. This is also hard to test in a cross-country setting. There are considerable obstacles relating to identifying the dominant opposition leaders and measuring their risk-averseness. However, systematic quantitative evidence exists that shows that specific characteristics make individual state leaders less likely to experience interstate war (Horowitz et al., 2015). Horowitz, Stam and Ellis (2015) theorize that the reason why leaders with specific characteristics are less likely to experience interstate war is their risk-averseness. There is no apparent reason why these mechanisms should not also be present in domestic conflict settings.

In conclusion, the research design and methodological framework developed in this thesis allow me to build on empirical and theoretical relationships established by the quantitative literature. A qualitative approach that utilizes insights from quantitative research enables the analyst to comprehensively analyze a single case, with all its idiosyncrasies and contextual peculiarities, without disregarding the empirical patterns identified by the large-n literature. Furthermore, I argue that the empirical findings of this case study, namely the effect of pre-planned elections on motivation, the importance of perceived opportunity, and the importance of the risk-propensity of opposition leaders could be of relevance when analyzing the conflict risk in other specific cases.

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7. Appendix

7.1 STATA code for case selection

```
1 ****Work done on hegreetal13 repdata****
2
3 *****Labels*****
4 label variable lc1 "lagged incidence of minor conflict"
5 label variable lc2 "lagged incidence of major conflict"
6 label variable ltsc0 "logged number of years at peace up to t-2"
7 label variable ltsc1 "logged number of years in minor conflict up to t-2"
8 label variable ltsc2 "logged number of years in major conflict up to t-2"
9 label variable loi "more than one third of export from oil and gas"
10 label variable loic1 "Interaction lagged minor conflict*oil"
11 label variable loic2 "Interaction lagged major conflict*oil"
12 label variable lois0 "interaction time at peace*oil"
13 label variable let "one ethnic group comprises majority of pop"
14 label variable letc1 "interaction ethnic dominance*lagged minor conflict"
15 label variable letc2 "interaction ethnic dominance*lagged major conflict"
16 label variable lets0 "interaction ethnic dominance* time at peace"
17 label variable lli "infant mortality rate"
18 label variable limc1 "interaction IMR*lagged minor conflict"
19 label variable limc2 "interaction IMR*lagged major conflict"
20 label variable lims0 "interaction IMR*time at peace"
21 label variable lyo "Youth bulge: percentage of adult population 15-24"
22 label variable lyoc1 "interaction youth*lagged minor conflict"
23 label variable lyoc2 "interaction youth*lagged major conflict"
24 label variable lyos0 "interaction youth*time at peace"
25 label variable llpo "log transformed total population"
26 label variable lpoc1 "interaction population*lagged minor conflict"
27 label variable lpoc2 "interaction population*lagged major conflict"
28 label variable lpos0 "interaction population*time at peace"
29 label variable led "Male secondary education"
30 label variable ledc1 "interaction education*lagged minor conflict"
31 label variable ledc2 "interaction education*lagged major conflict"
32 label variable leds0 "interaction education*time at peace"
33 label variable llin "Average infant mortality rate in neighborhood"
34 label variable ledn "average male secondary education in neighborhood"
35 label variable lyon "average youthbulge in neighborhood"
36 label variable lnc1 "conflict in neighbourhood or not"
37 label variable lnc1c1 "interaction neighborhood conflict*lagged minor conflict"
38 label variable lnc1c2 "interaction neighborhood conflict*lagged major conflict"
39 label variable lnc1ts0 "interaction neighborhood conflict*time at peace"
40 label variable r4 "region = Middle East"
41 label variable r6 "region = West Africa"
42 label variable r7 "region = Southern africa"
43
44
45 *****predicted probabilities*****
46
47 tsset gwno year
48
49 /*Model m23*/
50
51 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
52 ///
53 llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
54 if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(103/112 115/156 99/100)
55 predict pm23_0 pm23_1 pm23_2
56
57 /*Model m43*/
58
59 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
60 llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
61 if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(107/110 115/120 145/156 99/100)
62 predict pm43 0 pm43 1 pm43 2
63
64 /*Model m45*/
65
66 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
67 llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
68 if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(107/110 119/120 145/156 99/100)
69 predict pm45_0 pm45_1 pm45_2
70
71 /*Model m48*/
72
73 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
74 llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
75 if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons( 99/100)
```

```

75 predict pm48_0 pm48_1 pm48_2
76
77 /*Model m66*/
78
79 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
80     llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
81     if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(121/156 99/100)
82 predict pm66_0 pm66_1 pm66_2
83
84 /*Model m67*/
85
86 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
87     llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
88     if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(121/126 180 99/100)
89 predict pm67_0 pm67_1 pm67_2
90
91 /*Model m96*/
92
93 mlogit conflict c1 c2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
94     llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
95     if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(121/156 157 159 118 99/100)
96 predict pm96_0 pm96_1 pm96_2
97
98 /*Model m97*/
99
100 mlogit conflict c1 c2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
101     llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
102     if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(107/110 119/120 145/156 121 111
103     131 136 138 116 190 201 214/216 99/100)
104 predict pm97_0 pm97_1 pm97_2
105
106 /*Model m98*/
107
108 mlogit conflict lc1 lc2 loi loic1 loic2 let letc1 letc2 lli limc1 limc2 lyo lyoc1 lyoc2 ///
109     llpo lpoc1 lpoc2 led ledc1 ledc2 llin ledn lyon lnc1 lnc1c1 lnc1c2 r4 r6 r7 ///
110     if year >= 1970 & year <= 2009,baseoutcome(0) cons(121/156 157 159 118 99/100)
111 predict pm98_0 pm98_1 pm98_2
112
113 gen avgp0 = (pm23_0 + pm43_0 + pm45_0 + pm48_0 + pm66_0 + pm67_0 + pm96_0 + pm97_0 +
114 pm98_0) / 9
115 gen avgp1 = (pm23_1 + pm43_1 + pm45_1 + pm48_1 + pm66_1 + pm67_1 + pm96_1 + pm97_1 +
116 pm98_1) / 9
117 gen avgp2 = (pm23_2 + pm43_2 + pm45_2 + pm48_2 + pm66_2 + pm67_2 + pm96_2 + pm97_2 +
118 pm98_2) / 9
119
120 drop if year > 2013
121 by gwno: egen totalconflict = total(conflict)
122
123 *** identify interesting cases***
124
125 gen risk = avgp1 + avgp2
126 sort gwno year
127 by gwno: egen totalrisk = total(risk)
128 gen totaldivergence = totalrisk - totalconflict
129 sort totaldivergence
130 list gwno statename totaldivergence totalrisk totalconflict if year == 2000
131
132 scatter totalrisk totalconflict
133
134 *****Work done on hegreetal17 repdata*****
135
136
137 ***full model***
138 mlogit conflict c1t c2t ltsc1 ltsc2 ltsc0 llpop llpop_c1 llpop_c2 llpop_ltsc0 ///
139     llGDPcap_nonedo llGDPcap_c1_nonedo llGDPcap_c2_nonedo llGDPcap_ltsc0_nonedo ///
140     ltimeindep nc ncc1 ncts0 ltsnc random_1 random_2 if year >= 1950 & year <= 2014
141
142 *** model without random effects**
143 mlogit conflict c1t c2t ltsc1 ltsc2 ltsc0 llpop llpop_c1 llpop_c2 llpop_ltsc0 ///
144     llGDPcap_nonedo llGDPcap_c1_nonedo llGDPcap_c2_nonedo llGDPcap_ltsc0_nonedo ///
145     ltimeindep nc ncc1 ncts0 ltsnc if year >= 1950 & year <= 2014

```

```

146 ***model without random effects or time in peace variables
147 mlogit conflict c1t c2t ltsc1 ltsc2 llpop llpop c1 llpop c2 ///
148     llGDPcap nonedo llGDPcap c1 nonedo llGDPcap c2 nonedo ///
149     ltimeindep nc ncc1 ltsnc if year >= 1950 & year <= 2014
150
151
152 *****Predicted probabilities*****
153 predict p0 p1 p2
154
155 gen moveavep1 = (F5.p1 + F4.p1 + F3.p1 + F2.p1 + F1.p1 + p1 + L1.p1 + L2.p1 + L3.p1 + L4.
156     p1 + L5.p1)/ 11
157 gen moveavep2 = (F5.p2 + F4.p2 + F3.p2 + F2.p2 + F1.p2 + p2 + L1.p2 + L2.p2 + L3.p2 + L4.
158     p2 + L5.p2)/ 11
159 gen eithermoveave = moveavep1 + moveavep2
160 gen moveaveconflict = (F5.conflict + F4.conflict + F3.conflict + F2.conflict + F1.conflict
161     + conflict + l1.conflict + L2.conflict + L3.conflict + L4.conflict + L5.conflict) /11
162 gen divergence = eithermoveave - moveaveconflict
163
164
165 sort gwno year
166 by gwno: egen totalconflict = total(conflict)
167
168 drop if year > 2017
169 *sort divergence
170 *list countryname year divergence totalconflict if divergence < 2 & totalconflict < 1
171
172 gen risk = p1 + p2
173 sort gwno year
174 by gwno: egen totalrisk = total(risk)
175 gen totaldivergence = totalrisk - totalconflict
176 sort totaldivergence
177 list gwno countryname totaldivergence totalrisk totalconflict if year == 2000
178 plot totalrisk totalconflict if year == 2000
179 scatter totalrisk totalconflict
180 scatter totalrisk totalconflict, mlabel(gwno)
181
182
183 *****average conflict vs average risk*****
184 drop if year > 2017
185 by gwno: egen avgrisk1 = mean(p1)
186 by gwno: egen avgrisk2 = mean(p2)
187
188
189 gen conflict1 = 0
190 replace conflict1 = 1 if conflict == 1
191 tab conflict conflict1
192
193 gen conflict2 = 0
194 replace conflict2 = 1 if conflict == 2
195 tab conflict conflict2
196
197 by gwno: egen avgc1 = mean (conflict1)
198 by gwno: egen avgc2 = mean (conflict2)
199
200 scatter avgrisk1 avgc1 if year ==2000
201 scatter avgrisk2 avgc2 if year ==2000
202
203 twoway (scatter avgrisk1 avgc1 if gwno != 510, msymbol(Oh) mcolor(`f0')) ///
204     (scatter avgrisk1 avgc1 if gwno== 510, msymbol(Oh) mcolor(`f1')) ///
205     (function y=x, range(0 1)), legend(off)
206
207 twoway (scatter avgrisk2 avgc2 if gwno != 510, msymbol(Oh) mcolor(`f0')) ///
208     (scatter avgrisk2 avgc2 if gwno== 510, msymbol(Oh) mcolor(`f1')) ///
209     (function y=x, range(0 1)), legend(off)
210
211
212 gen div_avg_r_c_1 = avgrisk1 - avgc1
213 gen div_avg_r_c_2 = avgrisk2 - avgc2
214
215 *drop div_avg_r_c_1
216 *drop div_avg_r_c_2
217
218 sort div_avg_r_c_1
219 list countryname div_avg_r_c_1 avgrisk1 avgc1 if year == 2000
220
221 sort div_avg_r_c_2
222 list countryname div_avg_r_c_2 avgrisk2 avgc2 if year == 2000

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7.2 Anonymized list of interviews

ID	ROLE	TAPED	FULLY TRANSCRIBED	DAY	LOCATION	GENDER
1	Lawyer, Office of public prosecution	yes	yes	1.Feb	Public	M
2	Lawyer, Private firm	yes	yes	2.Feb	Private	M
3	Politician CUF, former ZEC, businessman	yes	yes	3.Feb	Public	M
4	Academic, Historian	yes	yes	4. Feb	Public	M
5	Journalist	no	no	5. Feb	Private	F
6	Businessman, CUF supporter	no	no	6. Feb	Public	M
7	NGO director	yes	yes	7.Feb	Private	F
8	Lawyer, former Senior government official	yes	yes	8.Feb	Private	M
9	Youth development activist	yes	yes	13. Feb	Public	M
10	Former Member of House of Representatives, CUF	yes	no	20. Feb	Private	F
11	CUF youth party leadership	no	no	22. Feb	Public	M
12	Senior CUF politician	yes	no	24. Feb	Public	M
13	Former Member of House of Representatives and Minister CCM	no	no	27. Feb	Public	M
14	Group of Self-Employed Youth	no	no	31. Jan	Public	M
15	Imam, Senior position in Government-supported religious council	no	no	21.Feb	Public	M

7.3 Selected quotes from informants

Interview 1

- “Yes, I voted. Oh, it was my first time. It was an experience. I was terrified, because you know if you go to the electoral ballot... the tension there. So, it was terrifying.”
- “Yeah. People were angry. Everyone was angry. People had expectations that something will change. Everyone was down. I remember that day when they declared the result, ooh everyone was put down. It was as if we were afraid that something would happen. Maybe clashes. Because there were isolated events. Some people were beaten and attacked. Everyone was terrified. And angry. And they thought, because they had very high expectations for the changes that would take place, but no changes happened. And some people in the media had even said that CUF had won. So the people with the expectations had got hope. “ooh things are finally changing!”. Suddenly everything was changed, everyone was put down. Everyone was desperate.”
- **“Question:** So why... because, all that violence happened. And then it stopped. Why do you think it stopped? Why did it not continue? What stopped people from continuing the violence?

Answer: First of all, I think, I do not remember that much, but I remember they used a lot of force. People did not intend to use force, to demonstrate by all means, to use force or whatever, they wanted to demonstrate peacefully. To show the world how development, and human rights, and democratic rights were violated. They wanted to demonstrate that, and the government used a lot of force. Very coercive force.”

- “I think Muafaka 2 was about implementing Muafaka 1. Because it was not implemented. Because of the clashes, and I think the outcome of that was... what else? It is just to implement that agreement. It was time for Muafaka to be implemented.

Q: Did it work? Was it implemented?

A: yeah, it was implemented, because some laws were changed. Electoral laws. Some offices were established. So, some parts were implemented”

- “So, people have been very patient. They were angry after 2005 election, but they remained calm. Because Malim Seif. He has power! That guy has power to make people become... Whatever he says, people will follow.”
- “You now Uamsho. Those sentiments. They think that democracy is going to fail. People will never support the ruling party here in Zanzibar. And the opposition is killed. Now, there is no freedom of press, no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly. It is chaos. So, what will happen. People will resort to other means? And do not take for granted that you know “people cannot do that”. It might happen. It may, because when you have a lot of people that are angry and unemployed. They do not have jobs, what else can they do? If someone comes here with money. Revolt. Do this, do that. They will do it. It is risky. It is very vulnerable situation.”
- “You know, people listen to their leaders here.”

Interview 2

- “They did not organize because the situation does not allow that. If you organize you have your leaders calling for demonstration, the next day the leaders will be arrested. Remember in 2001! When they organized, what happened? They were killed!”
- “The results were in the hands of the Zanzibari electoral commission. The parties knew the results. The CCM then made a statement: “we are not going to recognise the result that will be published soon”.

Q: The CCM said that, the general secretary?

A: yes. Not only said it, it was a press release and a press conference. The document is still public. The next day the commission declared the CCM the winner, and they said okay now we accept the result.”

- “Peacefully, with sporadic instances. But it was peaceful, still. There were some insinuations of violence. But CUF made statements to condemn those incidents. But of course, even though it was not CUF as an organization, it was CUF supporters.”
- “People were arrested, beaten up, some was even killed. I remember one case which I handled in 1994. Or early 1995. In Pemba. After the CUF was registered they opened up branches. IN one area, there was ordered not to proceed. But the people said “no this is our right! Tomorrow we are raising our flag”. The police went there, and they shot people. One person was killed and to other were grievously harmed. Grievously! There were so many instances like that. People were beaten so bad that they would later die.”
- “In 2001 we had killings in January. Amani Karume was the president. He was sworn in in October. Only three months later we had killings. Those killings trace their origins to the introduction of multi-party democracy. People were denied their victory. People have grievances. It erupted in 2001. We have peace now, but you need to work with indications. Is this an indication that we are moved toward sustainable peace? No!”
- “It is a peace out of fear. I do not know if you can term that as peace. It is not peace. You have peace out of freedom! But if you are silent out of fear is different from you being silent out of satisfaction but both are silent! This one is silent because he is satisfied, but if he is no longer satisfied he can speak up! This one is silent out of fear.”
- “Q: So, are people angry?

A: Yes, of course they are angry. But what can they do?

Q: So, you think they cannot do anything because the government is so strong?

A: So strong... The government is very brutal. The government is willing to suppress any serious opposition. From 2015 up to now, we do not have violence we have calm.

But anyone who knows the political situation in Zanzibar will tell you that this is a time bomb in the making.”

- “In Zanzibar we have naturally the situation where people are very respectful to their leaders. They have a voice. If you go to the mosque, people are very loyal to their imam. If you go to the church people are very loyal to their priests. That is the Zanzibar culture. If you go to the political parties, people are very loyal to their leaders.”

- “G: So, who has kept the peace, Seif Sharif Hamad?

A: Of course. He is the one who holds the peace of this country in his hands. He is telling his supporters to calm down, this will be resolved. Now the people is sceptical, how is this going to be resolved? But okay, he is our leader, we need to listen to him. And he keeps them from disrupting the peace. At his risk. He is risking his political career. But those who are in power do not appreciate that. They do not realize that the peace we are enjoying today is because of this old man. The day he says “okay, the election has been rigged, you must go and defend your vote”, that day we no longer have peace.

Q: Why do you think he is not doing that? What is his motivation?

A: I think, there is no motivation. I think there is fear. If he allows that... You know under the rerun of the election, the whole country, Zanzibar, was under military occupation by the mainland. So that is one reason why CUF boycotted the rerun election. Because of peace. They were very aware, especially the old man, that the country was under military occupation. If I allow them to go to vote, they will go to defend their victory. They are not going there for their victory to be stolen. The CCM did not nullify the election just to declare Malin Seif had won the rerun? So, under that situation what choices do you have?”

Interview 3⁹

- “You have people increasingly going into drugs, you have young people increasingly doing nothing. Because even going to college is an issue if you are opposition. You need the CCM card to be employed, get a government job, etc. And we have a small number of people who are bringing themselves into terrorism. Because they think that is how they can change things. Because now they have tried democratically five times. They think: “we must be militant!”. This is a very big problem now. Because in Zanzibar, not in every family but in every village, you can name one or two radical Islamists.”

- “One of the threatening options in Zanzibar is to turn to terrorism. Unfortunately, we are not [on the] mainland, we are an island. We are blessed with thousands of miles of open sea. For security reasons that is very, very dangerous.”

- “They organized rallies. The government said no. They said we will do it. And they did. And lots of people were killed. Malim Seif was not ready for that. If he had been here it would not have happened.”

- “There are under table movements against Malim Seif. Supposedly because of his politeness and his peaceful way to solve this problem. People do not believe in that anymore. They want to take action. He is not ready for that. So, people are saying he is too old, he is unfit. Simply because he does not want to do a riot. They are looking for someone who is more hot [sick], who are more militant than Malim Seif.”

Interview 4

- “If we were on our own, with no interference from without there would have been change. Because when you have over 50% of the people, and even within the family of the ruling politicians the youngsters are sympathetic to CUF. So, without mainland support they would not have survived in power.”

⁹ The informant was concerned about his identity being revealed. Therefore, I have only included the quotes that are also used in the main text.

- “That is something for Zanzibar to consider, that maybe there is no solution, except to break out of the union. Because here we have nothing to say.

Q: But, would that be possible you think?

A: We are so small, and the terrain in Zanzibar... The highest point in Zanzibar is 100m, no forests to peak of.

Q: Nowhere to hide?

A: Nowhere to hide. Well, we have long coastline of course.”

- “It would not be possible! In terms of armed resistance, it would be very difficult.”
- “Somalia is close, and the connection was established in 2001. I think that is why they are even more afraid today, in Zanzibar, because they feel that al-Shabab could come from Kenya to Pemba. They do not need to, because al-Shabab have already come, on the mainland, from Kenya.”
- “Yes, Tanzania as a whole [is at risk]. But especially Zanzibar. Because, if they cancel CUF... Here it would be a lot of turmoil and anger. Maybe on the mainland as well.”
- “Then there was this reconciliation process. The first compromise. Muafaka. It just went on and on and never really got anywhere, because they did not want it to get anywhere. So, I think, regarding your main question, we have a weak position as a colony of Tanganyika. Whatever we do here, I am convinced, every election since 95 the opposition have been winning. When the European diplomats came to see me, they asked me, and it is significant how they put it, will the leader of CUF *be allowed* to win.

Q: It is a very telling question.

A: yes, and he was not allowed. When he won, they cancelled the election.”

- “I do not think they were CUF leaders. I think they would have obeyed their party and come back. These were ordinary people. They could not trust any guarantees. Many of them, even from Zanzibar, were pretending to be Somalis to be admitted in Britain and Europe. They thought: this is perfect, we arrived here and just across the border is Somalia. And then we will say we are Somali. I found recently, some are still there. They got married.”
- “In 2001, Malim Seif saw how ruthlessly they were treated, he agreed to talk, Muafaka. The people in Pemba and here in Unguja were very angry “how can you talk to the people who kill us”. It was the only time where I saw that Malim Seif, when he would give a speech, knew that no one supported his view. So, he had to explain. “see, it is easy when you are far away to say that we must do this and this. But go to Pemba, people are afraid even to go out of their houses! We must try to find a solution, because we cannot fight!” And the people said okay.”
- “Some of the young people are militant, and they do not want to hear anything else. So, for that reason he will come out and say “look you cannot do this. I have not told you that I have failed to find a solution, when I do fail, I will come and tell you”. And people are taking him on his word. There is no break away or rebellion. The few politicians in Zanzibar who broke away to support the Lipumba faction of CUF, they have no support in Zanzibar.”
- “Q: The 2020 election will be very important...
A: Yes, but probably, what I am saying today, I would probably also say in 2014. But what happens when they steal the election again?”
- “Q: It seems to be that there has been no war in Zanzibar in this period because Zanzibar alone is too weak to challenge the government, and Malim Seif believes that strongly. Because, if CUF had been led by other politicians, they could have chosen other strategies.
A: Yes, that is defiantly the case. I think, maybe some people in the leadership, but I think a lot of them would probably go along with the analysis of Malim Seif that

armed struggle would not work. But what I am scared of is that there will be a time when drastic efforts have to be taken, and I personally believe that in the last two months, this has begun to happen.”

- “Q: But not arming themselves?

A: No, arming would be suicidal. Especially if they do it in this stage. Once they arm themselves it would be a completely different story. I think where this has happened, the result have really not been particularly positive. Here, there is still a potential of constitutional change.”

- “I think that a lot of people fear that he will not order them to go to the street. And he will not order that. It has happened twice. In 2001, and in 2005, when people took to the streets after election, and people were killed.”

- “Q: So, is that because CCM knows that if they try to arrest Malim Seif there will be chaos?

A: Yes. Because of his status. Former vice president of Zanzibar. The political situation would heat up. To arrest him would be risky. So, the police, apparently one of his meeting interrupted the second vice president’s activities for the celebration of the revolution, so the police went rather polite to talk to Malim Seif to tell him that his meeting conflicted with the meeting of the second vice president. And Malim Seif replies “I have my job and he have his, let me do mine and him do his”. So, not really apologizing. And this would not have happened before. They would just go and beat up the opposition. But now they cannot. So, it seems resistance, fighting back, it is coming now. In the last two months this feeling has emerged. Soon it will be a meeting in Zanzibar town. Something is happening. Still mostly resistance in terms of elections, not other kind of resistance, but still. Organizing demonstrations. If there is a free election, it will be a walk over.”

Interview 5

Only used for background.

Interview 6

- “We do not want another revolution. It would destroy our island, and the tourists would stay away. It would be terrible for our economy”
- “Nyerere always intended Zanzibar to become a region in Tanzania. The mainland government today continues this policy. People on the mainland does not even want to hear about anything Zanzibari”
- “Armed rebellion is completely out of the question. It is impossible. For two reasons. First, there is nowhere to hide. Zanzibar is flat, we have no jungle, no bush. Second, the mainland is so strong. They are both able and willing to use coercive force to keep Zanzibar part of Tanzania. If CUF provoke with violence, then mainland will kill everyone!”
- “Actually, the risk of civil war is greater on the mainland. Chadema is growing strong, they have mountains and bush., and they do not have a leader like Malim Seif. Since 2015, under Magafuli, people disappear. Journalists are abducted, opposition politicians are shot, and dead people float on the beaches”
- “People do listen to their leaders, but not out of blind loyalty. The difference between listening to your parents and listening to your leaders is that you can chose not to listen to your leaders”
- “People listen to and respect Malim Seif because he is uncorrupted, because he does not even own a house, because we see how much he works”
- “Without Malim Seif, we Zanzibaris would kill each other. He is a true leader”

Interview 7

Mostly used for background.

- “On the one side there is the people, and on the other side there are people with firearms. So, you see how it is.”

Interview 8

- “If you want to discuss Zanzibari politics you cannot start in the 1990’s. If you start in 1990 you will have a story, but the story will not be within its proper context. Perhaps you do not need to begin in the very old history, but what has happened since the 1990’s are a reflection of things that happened well before 1990, and in some instances even before 1964.”
- “Now, mainland is taking away from Zanzibar even the basic things. It does not seem necessary. It is not supporting Zanzibar or making Zanzibar viable. That is to the dismay of everyone in Zanzibar, even those in the ruling party. Now, if they could realize, the problem in the mainland is that they take the union as a given. As a political truth. As a way to control Zanzibar.”
- “Those who belonged to CCM then, they would say “we are the people involved in the revolution, and the opposition are the people who were overthrown during the revolution”. That was the picture they attempted to create. That the politics of the 90’s was only copy of politics in the 60’s.
- “Q: Who wanted to create that picture.

A: The ruling party and their supporters. Because they were in their comfort zone. You can go through the lists of confiscated land and ask where are these people now? And they are still here. They were Zanzibari, and still is. Well, you took their land, their houses, and sometimes even their wives, and these people are still here, of course they have their sentiments. If they get an alternative forum to express their opinion they will not support you! Naturally. He will only support you as long as he has no alternative. Therefore, when it was opened for multy-party democracy the fair showed itself. The ruling party was afraid that the people who they had aggrieved had a chance to come into power. That is why they made the slogan “if you vote for the opposition they will bring back the sultan”. That was their slogan.”

- “Q: Do you think they can’t attack back, or the won’t attack back?

- A: maybe if they had weapons in 2001, they would have gone. But most people are scared. The government can do what they want because they have teargas, and firearms.”
- “What happened was that it was people who was opposing the GNU. Right from the beginning. They were also opposing even dr. Shein. Dr. Shein was seen as the choice of Amani (Karume), but he did need the support of all those who real powers within CCM. These people they are tempted to dislodge his candidacy.”
 - “After the election they told Shein that in order to kill this grouping within the CCM Zanzibar you must appoint Balozi as the second Vice President. To bring them back in. Unity within the party. But these people, right from the beginning where opposed to the GNU. When they got an opportunity through the constitutional review, they used that opportunity.”
 - “That is why I believe they will never give up power. Because they know that the moment they give up power, they are doomed. Because they spent 20 years of multi-party politics without creating legitimacy”
 - “You cannot sustain ruling people by force, you cannot rule people who want freedom forever. I do not know how it will happen. But it will reach a point, either through changes in the mainland or Zanzibar, but a least it is proven and tested that this cannot continue. Now you can see that the support of the opposition was about 50% in 1995, now it is about 80%. It will reach a point when it is 90% and that is a critical point. Beyond that, anything could happen.”
 - “Zanzibar vs the mainland is the main conflict. I do not know how to explain. They know what they are doing. I do not know whether they are focused and know how they want to handle it, where they want to drive it. It is like sporadic. Not homogeneous. Not planned. It is like one will behave like this and the other like that. You know, CCM mainland is what makes CCM Zanzibar lose popularity.

Q: But it is also their power that keeps them in government.

A: Yes, that is the paradox. You cannot keep these people by force for ever. It is not sustainable.”

Interview 9

- “We have a youth bulge in Zanzibar today. Most of these young people are unemployed, we know that the youth unemployment rate is between 17.1 -21.7 %, it is a high percentage of unemployment.”

- “In 2015 young people went to the election hoping that the aftermath would provide them prosperity. Therefore, a lot of young people went out to vote in 2015. They expressed their willingness to trust the democratic process. Voting will create the changes they are looking for. But the electoral process failed. The nullification was a massive blow to the young people who supported and trusted the democratic process. So, the concern is that the democratic process failed them. They believe that democracy failed them, because it did not bring the change that they were looking for.”

- “Q: Are young people frustrated?

A: very much.

Q: frustrated enough to resort to violent means?

A: very much. I call it a time bomb, god forbid. Because these two concern, economic malfunction and lack of economic prosperity combined with the failure of the political process create a larger frustration. A cloud of frustration. Young people might not even have the capability to imagine alternatives. So when young people are frustrated to that level, and they do not have any sort of resilience to this frustration it is very easy for them to resort to violence.”

- “Q: Is he the only one who tell them to be peaceful, or is he the only one who are able to get them to be peaceful?

A: Both. He is the only one who tells them to calm down, and he is the only one who would be able to get them to calm down. He has helped very much to maintain the

peace. The level of charisma he owns is the anecdote of all these political crises after every election. He is the only one they will sit down and listen to.

Q: is his legitimacy running out? In 2020 if CCM still steals the election?

A: No, I do not think so.

Q: So, what will he do?

A: he is charismatic enough to speak to the young people, to speak to zanzibaris, and they can hear. I believe that he knows what he is doing. I believe that whatever he is doing there is not any malicious intentions. And I believe that many young people believe the same. When a leader know what he is doing, and people believe he knows what he is doing, the leader do not lose legitimacy. It wil never fade.”

Interview 10

- **“Q:** Was there any disagreement within CUF about the strategy of non-violence?

A: No, I do not think so. Not in my time. Now I do not know. Only people from the outside who wanted to sabotage CUF want to use violence. CUF has always been strongly committed to non-violent struggle. We are not a people of violence. And if we were to fight, where would we go? We are an island! We do not have any weapons! It was emphasized from the beginning: If someone beats you, remain calm.”

- **“In 1995, when Amour realized he would lose the election, he lifted the passport restrictions of travel between Zanzibar and the mainland. The the CCM brought many people from the mainland to vote here”**

- **“I was appointed [...] to the 14-member inter-party comitee June 9th, 1999. As part of Muafaka 1. Relations were good for two weeks. After that it was terrible”**

- **“CUF wanted to take part in Muafaka 1 because we believed CCM to be willing to correct their mistakes. We thought that Muafaka would give us a free and fair next election”**

- “Muafaka 1 and the Inter party Comitee failed because CCM did not enter in good faith. It was only talk. Not from the heart”
- “We won the 2010 election with an even bigger margin than in 2005. But in the spirit of Mardihiano, Hamad accepted the official results. He did so bitterly. In a speech he said that the winner of this election is not Dr. Shein or Malim Seif, not CCM or CUF, but the Zanzibari people. For me, I was happy with my part in the process. I thought we could open a new chapter in the political history of Zanzibar. I expected the CCM to act in good faith. Unfortunately, that did not happen, and it broke my heart. I learned then that humans are not good. And I realized why Allah made hellfire: To punish the evil men. They truly deserve hellfire!”

Interview 11

- “Many young people feel that democracy has failed them. Young Zanzibaris leave for Somalia and Kenya to join al-Shabab. They believe they will come back with a solution to the CCM dominance. I know these youths myself. They used to be CUF, but now they tell us “you are just like CCM”. There is defiantly underground movement. Zanzibar is like a bomb, ready to explode. The people want to see change! Waiting is very hard”
- “The opposition is treated like we are not even citizens!”
- “Tanganyika is wearing the coat of Tanzania”
- “The History of Zanzibar is full of contradictions and controversy. Elections have always been difficult situations. It is like really warm water just before it is boiling. You can see some vapor, but no bubbles. But if you put in your hand. You will be hurt. Something very bad could happen here in Zanzibar. We have a lot of underground movement. It is like a bomb ready to explode”
- “I am scared of a genocide in Zanzibar. It is just like Rwanda, where the peaceful situation was taken for granted, and suddenly the majority have had enough with the power of the minority and BOOM. People could go: “lets have a revolution! Lets have a genocide!”

- “If we must die we will die. We will die. We will die to defend our victory. It is the only way to defend our victory”
- “I do not think young people will listen to Malim Seif in 2020. In 2015 he said that the international community are listening. But nothing happened. Maybe they will do something. Maybe they will start with him? Malim remember the public animosity he faced after Maridhiano process and 2010 election”
- “The reason we stayed peaceful is because we expected the international community to step in. We have won all the elections since 1995, but we have no proof. We need to show evidence. In 2015 we were told to wait, that the international community would listen. Now, people are giving up on the international community. Because they have failed us to many times. The situation here is comparable to Venezuela! The international community only comes to the rescue if there is oil. They only support democracy if it is in their interest. The young people are sick of this. But Malim sais wait”

Interview 12

- “And I remember even before that, at that time the president was Al Hassan Mwinyi and he is on record as having said that that while we have got different groupings that are aiming to transform themselves into political parties, but the group that we should fear most in the one from Zanzibar because unlike those of the Mainland these people have got a cause and people who have a cause are the political movement to be feared more than anybody else. And I think that had like in a way informed the way the regime has like looked upon CUF throughout”
- “I think the international observers were very well organized in 1995 more than in any other election”
- “The CCM never anticipated that there would be losing big time in the first election to a party that was only three years old. Competing the party that has been there for the past 30 years, a 31 years old party. And therefore, I think they were also in a State of Shock when they lost the island of Pemba. Because at that time it was 21 seats on Pemba and 29 seats in Unguja. So, they lost the whole of Pemba and in Unguja they

lost several. So, they decided to try to temper with the figures during the counting. In certain areas they were calling for recounting as a means to try to stuff extra ballots during the recount.”

- “We had our own internal processes. As a democratic party we made all the decisions through the party’s decision making bodies. So, for example at that time in our structure, we still had a Central Committee that met and then also we had a National governing Council, and finally also for example we set with all the elected members to agree together and we saw that time, that this could be a pressure for like Rectify that situation. Of course. Yes, it did the exact location but didn't make the regime to submit to the demands that were made. Finally, it prompted the Commonwealth to intervene, because it was unusual for the Commonwealth Parliament, who is a member of the Commonwealth government Association for the whole side of opposition not to participate in the Parliamentary proceedings almost a year. So, finally, in August 1996, the then Commonwealth Secretary general Chief Emeka came to Zanzibar in what was said to be a holyday, but I think it was planned. That was the beginning of a process to reach out to the two sides. He came with an proposal for how to break the impasse. It started the long and exhausting process of shuttle negotiations from august 1996 until June 1999, when the ninth of June the first Muafaka was signed.”
- “Actually we did not call for demonstrations because we feared the thing being the way they were, that could lead to escalation of violence.”
- “Muafaka 1 failed for several reasons. One, because in order for any negotiation to succeed you need all the parties to actually be committed to the process. CCM was never committed. They agreed to negotiate only because of pressure from the commonwealth. They agreed only to have an image outside that they believe in peaceful negotiation. But they was never committed to solve the crisis. They argued publicly that there was no Crisis! Second, CCM like many liberation parties in Africa, they have this feeling that the west had a hidden agenda to remove them from power. Therefore, because this initiative came from outside, from the commonwealth, it was

seen as a conspiracy by the west to remove them from power. Therefore they approached the muafaka 1 with much suspicion”

- “There was never a common purpose between CUF and CCM that would lead the agreement to be implemented”
- “the agreement was weak because it had no mechanism for supervision of the implementation. Only the IPC, the interparty committee. The Commonwealth secretary general claimed he would be a moral guranteur, but after he got the credit from brokering the agreement, he was not seen much in Zanzibar after that. Nor would the chief negotiator, Moses Anafu”

Interview 13

- “When the political playing field was opened in 92, people stuck with their political affiliations from before the revolution. AT least that was our view in CCM. So, it was no trust. Anyone who questioned the revolution was seen as a puppet for the imperialists. Even though the cold war was over. This was, I think, deliberately used to maintain power”
- “2001 was shocking. Men were raped. Women were raped. Children were raped. Husbands were raped I front of their wives. Wives were raped in front of their husbands. It was gruesome! To an extent we were shocked into cooperating for the sake of Zanzibar”
- “The Muafakas failed because they were mainly a ploy to buy time for the ruling party. There was some within CCM who genuinely wanted change and reconciliation. But those voices of progress were silenced... “
- “The maridhiano succeeded where the Muafakas failed because it took everything one step further. It was a Zanzibari process from the start to finish. Karume and Hamad had great courage. Why in 2009 and not before? I can only speak for CCM. There was many of us who strongly wanted to avoid bloodshed. 2001 was shocking. Men were raped. Women were raped. Children were raped. Husbands were raped I front of their wives. Wives were raped in front of their husbands. It was gruesome!

To an extent we were shocked into cooperating for the sake of Zanzibar. Karume and Hamad created a tsunami of goodwill. It was like a drug! We genuinely thought that the darkness was behind us. But powerful forces on the mainland felt threatened by this and some ugly faces here in Zanzibar had only hidden, not disappeared”

- “Hamad accepted the results even though it was obvious. We knew what we were doing...”
- “I am worried about 2020. We have a history of violent elections. 64, 82, 95, 2000, 01, and 05. The only peaceful elections were 2010 and 2015. In 2010 because of Maridhinao. Hamad accepted the results even though it was obvious. We knew what we were doing... 2020 is like a bottle of soda that has been shaken, it only takes a small crack for it to explode”

Interview 14

- “If we go to Shangani Strett and say “hey! We want education! We want healthcare!” then security will put me in jail. In jail forever”
- “We are angry. You come to Zanzibar and everyone is hakuna matata, pole pole. Big Smile! But on the inside we are furious”
- “Out of ten people, maybe 5 is CCM, maybe 3.”
- “All my friends are CUF. We do not get anything. If you vote CCM, it is because they give you something.”
- “The government have the money. They have the guns. It is dangerous. They kill people! Like 2001.”
- “It is really hard. Some people have 10000 for food per day. Some have 5000, some have 2000. If you do not have a work it is really hard.”
- “Seif Sharif Hamad. He is really good. Everyone around here like him”
- “At least, we have no corruption here”

Interview 15

Only used for background