

A Crisis of Legitimacy?

Examining Young Adults' Experiences with Political Trust



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Abstract

This thesis examines the perceptions that young adults from the traditional middle-class in Brasilia have towards the political system in Brazil.

Brazil has had, for quite some time, disturbances in the political system. Democracy was re-implemented in the 1980's and since then, the political environment has gradually gotten worse, with bigger and bigger corruption scandals, and growing polarization between voters. Former presidents are either impeached or arrested for corruption, and the country entered a political crisis in 2016 following the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff. Succeeding the impeachment, a non-democratically elected president took office, before in October 2018, far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro won the presidential election, becoming, in theory, Brazil's president for the next four years.

With all the situations that occur in Brazil, I wanted to examine the perceptions that young adults from the traditional middle-class in Brasilia have towards the political system in the country. I wish to focus on their experiences with political trust, to see how this has been influenced by the political situation in the country. Moreover, young adult's political ideologies and perceptions are influenced by their daily-life, and the places and people surrounding them. Thus, looking at their experiences with political trust allows this thesis to not only see how these individuals perceive the political system, but also on the factors that influence these perceptions. I have conducted qualitative interviews and used a thematic method of analysis to obtain data in order to focus on the research question "*How do young adults in the traditional middle-class in Brazil experience political trust?*" Moreover, I wish to look at how these experiences provide clarity with regards to other aspects of the political system. Hence, a second research question will be discussed. "*Do the attitudes, experiences and beliefs of young adults show signs of a crisis of legitimacy?*"

Throughout the research I discovered that there are several factors that play a part in determining the experienced that the young adults have with political trust. Two factors that were more common than the rest were a lack of ideology within politics, and corruption. Moreover, the majority showed more distrust towards the figures within the political system than in the system itself. The answers provided by the research participants showed that there is a general lack of trust, and provide a reasonable argument for why there is, in the eyes of the informants, a crisis of legitimacy for the political system in Brazil.

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1.0 - Introduction

Brazil, is, according to Reid (2014, p. 118), the perfect example of a country that is slowly moving forward, but while doing so is taking one step back in the process. He states that for each step and a half that the country progresses, something always happens or fail to happen, making the country move back a step. In today's Brazil, inequality is high (Sposito 2018), after failing economically after the incredible boom in the late 2000s / early 2010's (Sweet 2014). The general view of the traditional middle-class is that they are being mistreated by strategies implemented by the Workers Party, or PT (Partido de los Trabajadores) states Singer (2014). This view is combined with an outcry where they believe that the lower classes are not trying themselves Singer (2014) continually asserts, but rather coasting on welfare benefit programs like the Bolsa Familia Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) add. Moreover, the political climate has gotten to the point where people no longer see ideology in politics, only a contest of power (Carreiro & Renno 2019). Some people no longer vote for people they support, but based on hate (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). Perhaps as a result of the continuing revelations that occur as a result of the ongoing Lava Jato investigation (Senters et.al 2019). The context has become such, that Brazil is now in a situation where the "corruption-free" party, ended up with being the most corrupt (Samuels & Zucco 2019), and its leader, former president Lula da Silva put in jail sentenced for corruption. Where Dilma Rousseff, the president following Lula was impeached in 2016, and the vice-president succeeding Dilma, Michel Temer, was arrested for corruption. In a country where the political and economic elite are running the show (Santos 2019), and people tend to view political parties and figures as "fake" shells with no ideology (Do Vale 2015), what kind of attitudes do the young adults have towards the political system and its figures? How have they experienced the political environment? And how has this influenced them?

1.1 - Research Question(s)

This thesis is not looking to reinvent the wheel, but rather provide additional knowledge about the political turmoil in Brazil. What this thesis does bring, is the experiences, attitudes, explanations, and arguments presented by young adults between the age of 20 and 30, the first generation born in the rejuvenated democracy in Brazil (Corrochano & Nakano 2018), living in a city built for government employees, politicians, and bureaucrats (Waldstein 2014). With data collected through focus group interviews and e-mail interviews with 23 members of

designated group before the first round of elections late October 2018, this thesis wants to examine the attitudes and experiences this group has regarding political trust towards the political system and its actors. Hence, this thesis's main research question becomes:

How do young adults in the traditional middle-class in Brazil experience political trust?

I chose to narrow the focus down to traditional middle-class young adults in Brasilia, the capital of Brazil. This question is concerned with the attitudes that these young adults have towards the political system, actors, and institutions in the country, by looking at how they experience political trust. Moreover, this aspect has created a sub-question, that will in effect, guide the analysis and discussion further.

Do the attitudes, experiences and beliefs of young adults show signs of a crisis of legitimacy?

Consequently, this thesis looks to focus on theoretical concepts trust, representation, and legitimacy, and see how these are connected to the political situation in Brazil, and each other. In what manner? And how is this explained in the context of the groups class and age, the recent political history of Brazil, the social and political polarization, and corruption?

Why focus on this group of people? Brasilia was built as a political power center (Waldstein 2014), where bureaucrats and government employees were supposed to live. A place of power, and a symbol of Brazilian urbanization and modernity (Hubbard 2006), as cities are the center of politics and bureaucracy (Vicino & Fahlberg 2017, p. 1001). Living in the spectrum of political power has, and will continue to shape, the political and social values of young adults. They are influenced by their local place of being, trans-national networks, international relations, and their political ideology is based on the complex nature of these characteristics (Farrugia 2018). These individuals are either newly educated, or still getting a higher education, and are as mentioned, the first generation born into the rejuvenated democracy of Brazil (Corrochano & Nakano 2018). Moreover, young adults are seen as the drivers of change in a society (Wolseth & Babb 2008), and an important group for politics based on the increasing globalization in the world (Farrugia 2018, p. 130). Young adults play a key part in determining where a country's political future is heading (Wolseth & Babb 2008), thus, it becomes interesting to look at their experiences and attitudes in the political context in Brazil.

1.2 - Outline of the Thesis

After the introduction of this thesis, a chapter focusing on the methodology of the research and data collection will follow. In that chapter, I will present the specific qualitative methods used to gather data for this research. Prior to this, I will reflect on the qualitative method in general. Moreover, I will focus on the fieldwork and how I gathered the data from the young adult research participants. Furthermore, as this thesis deals with a sensitive topic (Harrison 2006), I will examine and reflect over potential ethical issues with the thesis. In the end of the chapter, I will describe how I analyzed and coded the data.

In order to answer the research questions at hand, I will present a contextualization of the case at hand, before establishing a theoretical framework containing theories regarding political trust and legitimacy as the two main concepts, as well as additional concepts that are relevant when examining the latter two. I will firstly look at the city of Brasilia, and explain how it is important in understanding how the informants' mindset might have been influenced by living in the capital, and political center of Brazil. Following, I will focus on the recent political history of Brazil, in order to establish a ground structure making it easier to understand what the informants are talking about. Moreover, I will examine the inequality in the country, showing the divide between regions and classes in Brazil, to emphasize how politics is divided not only within itself, but also in terms of classes, and territoriality. Adding to this, I will explain the class structure in Brazil, and look into the traditional middle class, as well as theories regarding young adults and their social and political culture, in order to better understand why this group, have the views towards politics that they do. After this, I will examine the political system in Brazil, explaining how it is designed through the concept presidential coalitionism and other concepts regarding governmental power. I will furthermore describe the political culture in the country. Which arguably ties into political corruption, a concept that will be further illustrated within the political context of Brazil.

Following the contextualization, and the theoretical framework, I will analyze the findings of the fieldwork and the data collection process, before combining the theories and the analysis in a discussion. In that section I will discuss the different reasons for the attitudes and beliefs of the informants, look at how politics is understood, how the different concepts are connected, and why. In that manner, I will discuss whether or not the experiences and attitudes illustrate political distrust and show signals of a legitimacy crisis.

To summarize, this thesis wishes to illustrate how young adults from Brasilia perceive politics in Brazil. Hence pointing at different reasons, ranging from corruption, influence, representation, ideology, system design, and political and national culture. The Brazilian political system is not legitimate in the eyes of the informants, which is backed by literature from Brazil experts and others. A political system poised with corruption, clientelism, and patrimonialism is hindering representation argue some informants, showing that the political system is created for people only thinking of themselves, working for themselves, and not the people. For many respondents, this is the biggest problem in Brazil with regards to politics. The people in charge are “rotten eggs”, in it for the money and the power, and not to make Brazil “the land of the future”. Honest politicians are either limited by their parties, due to not being able to get results, due to the political system’s structure. If you are not getting your hands dirty by greasing the wheels, you are not able to get anything done. Other respondents go as far as claiming that honest people are not politicians, since honest people do not steal.

2.0 - Methodology

In order to gather the empirical data needed to pursue my research question, I spoke to 23 young adults between the ages of 20 and 30 from the traditional middle-class in Brasilia. All the primary empirical data was collected before the presidential election that took place late October 2018. Brazil is currently in both a political and economic crisis (Crandall 2018), two crises that correlate with one another. With this considered, I wanted to see what young adults in Brasilia think of the political system and climate in their country. They are the country’s first generation to live in the new democratic regime (Corrochano & Nakano 2018), in a city that was built during the authoritarian age with the goal of becoming a political power arena (Hall 2014). This group is part of the future of Brazil (Farrugia 2018). What are their experiences and attitudes regarding politics?

In this chapter, I will address the methods used in data collection for this thesis. My primary interest is gaining insight into people’s opinions. This thesis relies therefore on qualitative methods because they provide an understanding as to why people think and perceive things the way that they do (Dunn 2016). Qualitative methods are tools that can be used to collect diversified opinions (Mayoux 2006).

This chapter is structured as follows: Primarily, I will reflect over different qualitative methods. Secondly, the chapter will address the specific methods used for this thesis, these

being fieldwork, sampling and interviews. This thesis deals with how people perceive politics, a topic that Harrison (2006) deem as sensitive, meaning that it addresses information that is not commonly shared, and can put both the interviewer and the interviewee in vulnerable positions respectively. It could also reveal contentious information, information that people have different opinions on; this being politics. Thus, the third part of the chapter will reflect on ethics, codes of quality, power relations and the like. The final part of the chapter will focus on the methodology behind the data analysis and coding in this thesis.

2.1 - Qualitative Method

The qualitative method looks at the questions at hand with a holistic understanding of complex processes. The qualitative method has its pros and cons that vary, according to Mayoux (2006, p. 120-122). The findings of this thesis show deep and not always quantifiable meanings. This is criticized and seen as a con due to the difficulty one has in generalizing the findings. The method does, however, capture the essence of the locality. The small-scale investigation allows the researcher to look more closely at focused samples of potential informants. This grants the researcher access to deeper underlying understandings of themes and topics. Additionally, this might open up both the interviewer and the interviewee to bias, seeing that the informants might say what he or she thinks the interviewer wants to hear (Willis 2006). Furthermore, the data can, during analysis, be over-influenced by the biases that the researcher acquired during the research period. However, on the other hand, this type of method gathers information that captures subjectivity.

The qualitative method also decreases the likelihood of falsification. Mayoux (2006, p. 121) explain further that this is due to the thoroughness of the investigation. Ethically, all methods have their pros and cons, and all researchers need to be careful while walking on the edge of ethics. By focusing more on the qualitative method, the researcher can more easily show empathy and understanding towards the informants, as he or she is talking to this person, rather than just collecting numbers to analyze. The researcher can listen to or read the stories of the informants and try to understand their situation. However, seeing as how the aim of a researcher is usually to avoid interference in the daily lives of the sampling group, especially during development research, more openness and connectedness might open up for more bias from both parties. *“A primary aim of many researchers is to reach below the surface and bring to light issues and ways of thinking that might change how people understand problems*

or evaluate what is important” (Staheli & Mitchell 2005, p. 370). This quote illustrates my approach, as I wish to bring forth people’s understandings about politics and the political system and to make them think about the two (Mayoux 2006).

2.2 - Sampling

Sampling is generally used to gather people from whom to generate data (Sumner & Tribe 2008). Researchers determine their target group, and due to limitations in cost and time, sample only a selection of people within that group (Stratford & Bradshaw 2016). Sampling is a key factor in generating data because it gathers people, and these people provide the researcher with the primary data. Additionally, it assesses the statistical validity of the researcher’s secondary data, or data collected from other sources such as books and articles. I have narrowed down the group of people that I selected, based on age, class, and geographical location (Patton 2002). I have only selected respondents that fit within the constraints that I have chosen. I did not know in advance whether or not the people I would end up interviewing would all have the same opinions or not. I used my contacts to gather informants from different walks of life, but with some things in common, this being living in Brasilia, being between the ages of 20 and 30, and members the traditional middle-class. The type of sampling used in this thesis is purposive / non- probability convenience sampling (Mikkelsen 2005). This type of sampling is, according to Sumner & Tribe (2008, p. 106) “*a sample that is selected because of its availability to the researcher... some units of the population are more likely to be selected than others*”. I was purposively targeting people in due to convenience, safety and comfort (Patton 2002).

My project is not meant to be representative. However, it provides an understanding of the situation and can be utilized or read by others in order to gain a deeper understanding of the views of this particular group of people. Furthermore, I did not reach the point of saturation (Stratford & Bradshaw 2016). It is, however, important to point out that the point of saturation is not as important in this project as it may be in others. This is because my aim is to see what people think of the political system, so there is no maximum number of people that I need to interview. Stratford and Bradshaw (2016, p. 125) state that there are almost no rules within qualitative research regarding the amount of people that is needed within a project, it all depends on the characteristics of the project.

2.3 - My Fieldwork

I had a connection with Brazil before having chosen to write my thesis about politics and young adults in the country. Since my girlfriend is originally from Brasilia, Brazil and her family lives there, it was easy for me to establish myself in the city and get in touch with potential informants, using her as an intermediary and translator. Having an established relationship with the country played a key role in my comfort and readiness to start the fieldwork (Binns 2006, p. 15). I was able to travel to Brazil on a tourist visa because I was only doing fieldwork for two weeks. I carried a document from the University of Oslo stating that I was doing fieldwork for my master thesis. Apentiik & Parpart (2006, p. 39) talk about the advantage(s) of conducting preliminary visits to the focus area, if time allows. I find it important to clarify that I had previously visited Brazil, not knowing that I would end up writing about the people that I had met and the city where I met them. I had a preexisting idea of how things work in Brazil. Some of the informants had preexisting knowledge of me before I stepped into the role of the researcher. They had met me before I decided to write about Brazil and travel to Brazil with the intention of conducting this fieldwork. To those I had not met before, I presented myself as a student from Norway traveling to Brasilia to conduct fieldwork for my master thesis at the University of Oslo. I do not think that I exhibit the same authority as a mature and experienced researcher, which I believe gave me an advantage. I believe that my background as a somewhat peer to the interview subjects enabled me to establish trust.

The preliminary visit provided me with enough background knowledge and an already existing network, making it possible for me to spend less time on fieldwork. Furthermore, I already had an idea of how to behave in Brazil, how the culture works, and how to interact with people. I had shown interest in both the country and the people prior to conducting the fieldwork, establishing rapport that later became of use to my thesis (Dowling 2016). Additionally, I had another middleman who is also from Brasilia, but from a different network. Both of the middlemen I used are friends with the respective people they put me in contact with, meaning there is no clear power difference between them and their contacts. Furthermore, none of the interview participants asked for anything in return but a chance to read my thesis when it is finished. Thus, neither I, the researcher, nor these middlemen, have enticed the respondents to answer my questions.

When conducting fieldwork, I am administrating a data gathering process. This is based on the idea that fieldwork is the process of searching for knowledge that is located in a specific

place, as argued by Sæther (2006). When I travelled to Brazil, I travelled to extract data from “there” to “here”. Binns (2006, p. 19) presents an argument regarding research being conducted in Third World countries, calling it “*parasitic*”. My informants are not amongst the lower classes, which are the groups of people that many claim researchers are acting like parasites towards, almost like a colonial power; as you extract data without leaving anything behind (Binns 2006). I travelled to a specific location to talk about a group situated in a specific place, and a topic that can be defined as being limited in space, location and scale. However, seeing that Brazil is in a grey area when it comes to the Third World definition, it is hard to know how to define it. It was on a high-roll during the pink tide and part of the BRICS, before plummeting economically and politically (Crandall 2018), which is one of the reasons why I am interested in hearing what my research participants have to say about politics.

2.4 - Interviews Methods

The interview is a suitable method in gaining “*factual information*” (Willis 2006, p. 146). I chose to use the interview as my main method of qualitative data collection because it allows for the collection of diverse answers, fills gaps that other methods are not able to fill, and as it shows respect to, and empowers the respondents to provide the researcher with data (Dunn 2016, p. 150). Furthermore, interviews provide the researcher with the complexity of reasoning as to why people have the attitudes and experiences that they have. It is an exchange of information in which the researcher is granted subjective information from the interview subject (Dunn 2016). I have conducted 14 interviews with 23 different people from the designated group of interest. I conducted two different kinds of interviews: the e-mail interview and the focus group interview, or as O’Leary (2010) calls it, a multiple person interview. I have done both semi-structured and structured interviews (Mikkelsen 2005). The multiple person interviews were semi-structured, while the e-mail interviews were structured with previously decided upon questions and format (O’Leary 2010). Both interview methods did however follow the same interview guide, but in the case of the focus group interviews, I was able to prompt and change the outline of the questions following the answers given throughout the interview. The interview questions were rather open-ended and cumulatively formulated in order to grasp the scope of the research questions.

2.4.1 - E-mail interviews.

The e-mail interview is a sub-division of what Dunn (2016) calls Computer Mediated Communication, or CMC for short. The e-mail interview provides the interview subject ample time to answer questions and make sure that the answers are adequate and true (Dunn 2016), as the interview subjects have the opportunity to proofread and redraft their responses in a way that they feel accurately presents their ideology, opinions and experiences. Alternatively, this might cause the interview subject to overthink what he or she assumes the researcher wants them to answer, instead of answering with the first thought that comes to mind. This makes, in sum, the e-mail interview a cost efficient and time efficient method of data collection (Tjora 2010). If the researcher has limited time however, this method might be stressful for both the researcher and the interview subject (Dunn 2016).

The e-mail interview offers the informants a greater sense of convenience and security (Dunn 2016, p. 180) seeing that they can answer the questions in the comfort of their own home. Some of my participants stated that they preferred to respond to an e-mail interview rather than meet face-to-face, so that they could have more time to give thorough answers to questions about a topic that they don't normally think about. Additionally, the e-mail interview is a very accessible way to gather data, Tjora (2010, p. 124) argues. Due to the distance between me and the interview subjects, the e-mail interview provided a chance to gather data without being in Brasilia. I would not have gotten the opportunity to talk to most of my interview subjects if it were not for CMC. Some did not want to speak English, but were willing to write. Others had schedules that, when I conducted the fieldwork, conflicted with mine. Moreover, the answers to the e-mail interview are already transcribed, minimizing the transcription process (Dunn 2016). Tjora (2010) states however that the e-mail interview will not work if the interview subjects are not interested in the topic you are asking about. However, in my case, inadequate and uninterested answers were also telling. I would argue that have been able to interpret how a person thinks about politics in Brazil by reading between the lines of their answers, as a "yes" or "no" question provide relevant insight as well.

The use of e-mail is seen by many as "*impoverished*" (Mawdsley 2006, p. 274), seeing that you cannot see the face of the person you are interviewing. Due to the lack of access to visual cues, some argue that the method is quite limited (Dunn 2016). Contrarily, others argue that these cues are distracting and adhere focus away from the questions at hand (Mawdsley 2006, p. 275). Hypothetically speaking, the use of e-mail reduces the feeling of uncertainty that the

interview subject gets from seeing a researcher take notes. Similarly, the use of e-mail can also reduce that same feeling of uncertainty that the researcher gets if the interview subject seems uninterested. Social tics can make people lose focus if they're not aware of these tics, making the e-mail interview a more focused and structured method that limits the uncertainty that occurs during face-to-face interviews (Mawdsley 2006, p. 275). Moreover, "*the mistakes, abbreviations, and emphases, are, in a sense, the email equivalent of "ums" and "ers" and other natural accompaniments of most conversations*" (Mawdsley 2006, p. 275). However, being it face-to-face interviews or e-mail interviews, interpersonal skills are still important, as comfort and trust amongst the people taking part in the interview is seen as a core function (Willis 2006). Additionally, the e-mail interview allows for the researcher and the interview subject to be freed of bias towards the other person's appearance during the interview. It also decreases the risk of the interview subject's identity being exposed. They can remain anonymous since the researcher does not know what the interview subject looks like.

Another challenge regarding the e-mail interview, is perceiving that that you are not in contact with the individual you are supposed to interview (Dunn 2016). This is, however, quite a conspiratorial frame of mind, because maintaining a false persona, even via CMC is not an easy feat (Mann & Stewart in Dunn 2016, p. 181). Another challenge with written communication is not being able to tell whether or not a person is being sarcastic. Social cues get lost and answers might end up sounding bombastic without that being the intention of the respondent. However, the biggest challenge with the e-mail interview regards anonymity on the Internet Dunn (2016) clarify. The ethics regarding the use of the CMC interviews are still evolving, but are important to keep in mind. E-mails do not immediately disappear when you erase them, and the software can store copies of sent e-mails. Moreover, e-mails can be traced and hacked. Even though I have access to the e-mail addresses, full names and ages of some of my interview subjects, this information will not be presented in this thesis. I use pseudonyms in order to ensure the privacy of my interview subjects. Their sensitive information is kept in a codebook away from the interviews and pseudonyms as recommended by Tjora (2010).

2.4.2 - Focus group interviews.

A focus group is a small group of people discussing one or several topics (Cameron 2016). The focus group has for a long time been seen as a way of gathering information about public

opinions, beliefs and understandings (Lloyd-Evans 2006, p. 154). Furthermore, within a multi-cultural context, the method can give further insight into the group's opinions about different aspects of a topic, as it can help explain underlying feelings and behaviors. O'Leary (2010) argues that the advantage that occurs from this technique is exactly this; that the researcher can, if the interview is done correctly, leave with unexpected data as well as the intended data. O'Leary (2010) further argues that the methods can be conducted semi-structured, unstructured and structured, it all depends on the facilitator or moderator, ergo, the researcher's role in the interview process. It is a way of capturing the thoughts of each individual in the group, as well as seeing how thoughts and experiences react to one another. A focus group, as opposed to a one-on-one interview, encapsulates the social nature of knowledge in a more adequate manner. In my case, the different groups discussed Brazilian politics and political figures, which made participants recollect facts and opinions, created additional knowledge as a result (Goss & Leinbach 1996). It is the dynamic nature of the focus group, in combination with the presence of the moderator that makes the discussion bounce back and forth, that creates this knowledge (Cameron 2016). This is defined as "*the synergistic effect*" (Cameron 2016, p. 204). When this reaction occurs, however, I, as the researcher, must limit the information that they present in order to hinder them from sharing too much (Cameron 2016). Goss & Leinbach (1996) discovered that participants in focus group interviews felt more secure talking about sensitive topics. A potential flaw of this method however is that it could leave some of the members of the group feeling left out if the moderator is unable to keep everyone in the conversation, or if one or two individuals dominate the interview (Cameron 2016). The focus group interview is seen as more of a discussion between individuals than an interview, where the goal of the process is to gather as much data as possible without asking direct questions (O'Leary 2010, p. 196) In this way, one gathers data from several people at the same time, instead of collecting the same data one by one. Having a larger group of people helps to establish a feeling of safety within the group, which helps to generate answers that are perhaps more spontaneous compared to those of an individual interview (Tjora 2010). It is, however, important to remember that there is still an imbalance of power amongst the researcher and the interview subject. Even within a group of people, there is still one person asking the questions and working as a moderator. It is still the researcher that powers up the machine and shuts it down when the data collection process is over (Goss & Leinbach 1996).

Cameron (2016) has concerns regarding the focus group interview, saying that it cannot be applied to the general population due to the group being limited. This concern is not only applicable for the focus group interview, but all qualitative methods alike (Mikkelsen 2005). The counter argument for this concern is that this method is not supposed to be used to provide data that can be applied to the general population, it is not the general population that is interesting (Cameron 2016). The focus group interview “*provides insights into how people construct their world views through interactions with others, and they can provide opportunities for researchers and participants to jointly develop new knowledges and understandings*” (Pratt 2002 in Cameron 2016, p. 208). This method is suitable when trying to understand people-place relationships Cameron (2016) clarify.

In my data collection process, I conducted three focus group interviews: two interviews with three individuals, and one interview with five individuals. Two out of three of the interviews were conducted in a mixture of Portuguese and English. The interview subjects spoke Portuguese when they felt that they were not competent enough to fully explain their opinions in English. The interview questions that I composed prior to the interviews, were the same for all three interviews. However, since the interview was semi-structured, I asked follow-up questions and probed when necessary. The groups were all talkative, so I did not struggle to get them to discuss the topic. After the interviews were completed, the interview subjects told me that they felt more comfortable doing a focus group interview. Some even told me that they were hesitant to do the interview at all, but agreed when they found out that it would be done in a group setting. They felt that the one-on-one interview would be too serious and strict. The focus group interview is a safe and secure setting that allows the participants to broaden the scope of their answers (Cameron 2016). I would, however, argue that this is very much dependent on the topic of conversation and the participants themselves.

During the interviews, it did not seem that people were deliberately withholding information (Cameron 2016). Some did not contribute to answering questions that had already been answered by other members of the group, saying that they were of the same opinion and that they felt that the given answer was sufficient. They might have been withholding their true opinions, but it is hard to tell. I do not think this happened because the interview subjects and I were careful with regards to over-disclosure. I think we were successful, but then again, it is hard to know how much is too much when it comes to politics (Cameron 2016).

I decided to use the focus group interview as a research method due to its time- efficiency. Seeing that I had limited time in Brasilia in February 2018, I used the focus group interview

method in order to gather as much data as possible in this short time period. I needed to gather people and talk to them in a group. In one case, I combined two planned interviews into one. In another case, I planned two group interviews, but was only able to conduct one due to limited time and to the respondents running late. The participants that I was unable to interview, did however, agree to partake in an e-mail interview. My focus group interviews can be characterized as informal (O'Leary 2010). The idea, as O'Leary (2010) clearly states, is to make the interview subjects feel comfortable enough that they end up chatting like in a normal conversation. For that reason, I decided to hold the interviews at a bar, and at the apartment I lived in during my stay. The relaxed location of the interview, as well as the feeling of comfort that one gets in a group interview as opposed to a one-on-one interview, have probably helped to establish rapport and trust between the participants and I, even prior to the questions being asked (Tjora 2010). The participants agreed to the use of an audio recording device during these interviews, so I recorded them using the Voice Memos application on my iPhone. Due to background noise during two of the interviews, headphones were used as a microphone in order to better preserve the voices of the participants. O'Leary (2010) further emphasizes that the informal interview is often clarified as unstructured. This was not the case with my interviews. Some of the answers that I received were in Portuguese, thus making it hard for me to carry out a full conversation, due to my own limitations in the Portuguese language. The conversation amongst the participants in my third focus group interview was unstructured, but my role in the three interviews were always semi-structured (O'Leary 2010).

The focus group creates a lot of interesting data, but can be limiting and problematic when it comes to sensitive topics like politics (Harrison 2006). Lloyd-Evans (2006, p. 157) argue that this sensitivity can become problematic within the focus group, and pleads researchers to be careful in this regard. I would, however, argue that in my case, having different opinions in the focus group created a dynamic that in turn generated suitable and relevant data. That would arguably not have occurred had the group been structured with only people of the same political views. It is however hard to talk about politics in Brazil without people turning on each other assert Samuels & Zucco (2019). I did not notice any direct hatred towards other political parties or politicians from any of the interviewees. Furthermore, those that do not see eye-to-eye politically found some things to agree upon, even though they were mostly in disagreement. I believe, as well as experienced, that the class and age group to which my

interview subjects belong, might be fed up with arguing about political parties, and would prefer a more civilized political discussion.

The participants of the focus group interviews were a mix of people that knew each other and some that had never met before. The fact that some of the group members already knew each other might have contributed to them showing up. In two instances, I used pre-existing groups. Lloyd-Evans (2006, p. 158) argue that this can be an advantage when sampling people for a focus group interview regarding sensitive topics, such as politics. An ethical issue that arises almost excessively in a focus group interview is whether or not the discussion occurs naturally (Lloyd-Evans 2006). Is the discussion free, or is it happening because some of the interview subjects feel pressured to take part in it? In my case, I experienced that my interview subjects spoke freely, and I did not notice that people answered questions that they did not want to answer. Upon introducing myself and my thesis prior to the interview, I was very clear that the participants had the option of not answering a question if they did not want to. Tjora (2010) and Lloyd-Evans (2006) differ from Cameron (2016) when it comes to how the group should be composed. While Cameron argues that the best way to structure a group would be to choose people that do not know each other (Cameron 2016), Tjora (2010) and Lloyd-Evans (2006) state that having a group that know each other, can create a positive effect. In my data collection process, I aimed to construct a homogenous group by selecting a group of interview subjects between the ages of 20 and 30, in the same social class. What I did not want, however, is a politically homogenous group because people of the same opinion are less likely to stimulate discussion. However, this is hard to know before conducting the interview.

2.5 - Ethics

Questions about ethics, according to Sumner & Tribe (2008, p. 37) arise with regards to how a researcher should behave around the participants in the study, the environment the study is taking place in, and the research question(s). One must consider ethics when deciding how to gather data, instead of going the quick and easy route that might be less moral. Ethics is “*a system of moral principles*” (Sumner & Tribe 2008, p. 37). So what type of ethical issues can be addressed with regards to my thesis and the data collection process? What ethical dilemmas did/do I have to be aware of? What role do I have as a researcher?

Seeing that I, inquire about people's views on politics and get to know their names and other personal information, I am responsible for the data I have collected (Dowling 2016). I have information about them that is both private and sensitive (Harrison 2006). Thus, I need to be aware of the ethics concerning this (Sumner & Tribe 2008). I cannot disclose this information without carefully analyzing it and keeping my informants anonymous. Another issue regarding ethics for this thesis is the relationship with the institution. As a student researcher, I am not independent. I am representing my institution, which in this case is the University of Oslo. So, if I break codes of conduct, am unaware of ethical concerns, or act in a manner that is not conducive to the beliefs of my university when gathering data, it will negatively reflect the university (Dowling 2016).

Individuals' private details are not used in this thesis, as their information should not be released or shared in a way that would make it part of the public domain (Dowling 2016). This is one of the reasons, as well as concerns regarding research ethics, why the informants' real names and age have been disguised in my thesis (Sumner & Tribe 2008). Seeing that my informants are all in a narrow group of people, in one specific city, I chose this strategy in order to have more control over the privacy of the respondents (Mikkelsen 2005). Another dilemma worth mentioning is with regards to the anonymity of public figures. These people are always in the spotlight (Dowling 2016) and were talked about by my interview subjects while they were presenting their views and opinions. Thus, it was not possible for me to ensure the privacy of these prominent politicians in Brazil. The same consent form was provided to those that chose to do the e-mail interview as the ones that I have met face-to-face. Some of them have decided to print and sign the document and then send it back to me. I did not acquire information from anyone who did not agree to release information (Dowling 2016).

2.5.1 - Reflexivity.

Being reflexive is being critical of oneself. As a researcher it means stepping out of the research bubble and analyzing the situation: asking what is going on (Bailey et.al 1999). How are people reacting to me, my questions, my appearance? These are questions that a researcher needs to address in order to evaluate whether or not the presence of the researcher has corrupted the data (Dowling 2016). How should a researcher deal with differences in roles during the interviews? Can it have implications on the data? Can your character limit or

increase your accessibility to data? I would argue that in my case, my character was of advantage to me when trying to extract data from my interview subjects. I am in the same age group and place in life as them, which perhaps made them feel more comfortable opening up to me. I introduced myself as a student researcher gathering data for my master's thesis about the political system in Brazil. Seeing how most of my interview subjects are students themselves, or have graduated, they understand what the data will be used for and are familiar with the process of finding people to interview. Furthermore, I am also in the same social class as them, the traditional middle-class. However, I am from Norway doing research on this group in Brazil. I did not present myself as an expert on the topic. I wanted to learn as much as possible and therefore allowed the interview subjects to decide for themselves what they thought I should know. This I believe helped me to establish rapport with the research participants.

A thesis is relevant when the social context in which the research is being shaped within is presented, used and interpreted assert Staheli & Mitchell (2005). In other words, it is the researcher's job to contextualize the research and the data gathered from the research into something relevant to the social context (Staheli & Mitchell 2005). It is a contemplative process, just like the process of gaining knowledge. The researcher needs to be aware of his or her surroundings and know which parts of the data are relevant and why. In my case, my data is relevant because Brazil recently had an important election in October 2018, because the country is divided both politically and socially (Amarall & Meneguello 2017), and due to a political and economic crisis that is perceived to continue (Crandall 2018). And seeing that the political climate in Brazil does not change overnight (Ames 2019), the data that I have collected prior to the 2018 election will arguably be regarded as relevant and valid. My research can also be used in other research, in Brazil and elsewhere, since the theories behind the views and opinions can be transferred to additional research. My research is not exclusively relevant to Brazil or to the specific people that I interviewed; their views might be, but the data collection process, the group of people, and potential problems can all be relevant in other similar cases.

2.5.2 - Reliability, validity and generalizability.

Tjora (2010, p. 175) presents three criteria a researcher will have to follow in order to ensure quality within the use of qualitative methods: reliability, validity and generalizability. They

are all regarded as parts of the ethics of data collection and research. I will look into the different ethical challenges that might have appeared during my research period and the data collection process.

Regarding reliability, the most important thing that the researcher needs to be aware of is his or her role and how this might affect the research (Sumner & Tribe 2008). In order to strengthen the reliability of one's thesis, the researcher needs to be introspective. Being honest and open-minded when looking back on the sampling process further ensures reliability (Stratford & Bradshaw 2016). Therefore, I evaluated the information shared with the informants, and whether or not prior knowledge, or the lack thereof, has played a role in the access to the interview subjects, the sampling, the process of generating and gathering data, the analysis, and the end result (Dowling 2016). With minimal prior knowledge, you might end up with poor questions, which lead to poor answers. On the other hand, too much knowledge can cause bias (Tjora 2010, p. 176). I informed the interview subjects about the context of the thesis, why I was writing it and why I was interested in the topic, in order to ensure that the participants knew of the themes and reasons for the thesis. Because if the informants do not know why you are doing the research and what the research is about, can the data they present to you be considered reliable? This creates a question: what can you do to make sure your research is reliable? Confirming that the interview subjects are aware of your reasoning behind the research plays an integral part in ensuring reliability Mikkelsen (2005) proclaim. Additionally, Tjora (2010, p. 178) asserts that recording the interview makes the project more reliable since it creates the possibility of using direct quotes from the interview. Tjora (2010) continues by saying that by transcribing a quote, you are putting the voice of the interview subject on thesis.

Validity refers to the use of current theories and perspectives that are relevant today in academia (Sumner & Tribe 2008). Not just theories and perspectives on theory and method in general, but theories and perspectives that are case specific. In my case I use case specific theories focusing on Brazilian politics, culture, and society. I needed to consider whether the data and method I used has been or can be used in the same way in another instance, by either me or other researchers. I would argue that it can, based on theories used, as well as my findings, observably, showing somewhat similar results as prior research on comparable topics. Research should be compared with other similar research in the same field. Some argue that this is a demand that makes the research highly conservative and that it limits the knowledge that can be generated from a research project (Tjora 2010). Validity can be seen as

a personal strategy of the researcher. As it is a strategy that the researcher uses to navigate between data and analysis (Bailey et.al 1999, p. 172).

There is no clear way to test the reliability and validity of data that was collected using a qualitative method like an interview, according to Mikkelsen (2005, p. 184). The researcher can only do their best to decide whether or not to trust that the data is valid and reliable. It is up to the researcher to use the data in a fair way and to communicate the data in the best way possible in order to answer the questions and predicaments that the research is supposed to answer (Mikkelsen 2005). Thus, transparency is key. It is important to be open about thought processes and methods used to gather data, as well as the rest of the research process (Bailey et.al 1999). Tjora (2010) argues that this is exactly why research is conservative, to secure high-quality results. I believe that the argument presented above shows why my research is valid, as well as generalizable. Furthermore, validity refers to the transparency of the thesis (Sumner & Tribe 2008). Why did I choose the processes and methods that I did? Again, it boils down to being contemplative about the choices and changes being made: how and why?

Generalizability, according to Tjora (2010), is the right term to use when referring to the process of checking the quality of research. The generalizability of the research is used by many to point out the limitations within qualitative research (Smith 2018). What critics of qualitative research point out is the statistical-probabilistic generalizability, which aims to view the data in numbers in order to make the research more representative. Qualitative research views the details and understandings of people's views towards different topics (Winchester & Rofe 2016), where the data is collected from a specific sample of people (Patton 2002). This type of data is the strength of the research, not the weakness Smith (2018, p. 139) state. Mikkelsen (2005, p. 161) refers to Emile Durkheim and the concept "*social fact*". I view this in the same way as "*factual information*" Willis (2006, p. 146), which is mentioned at the beginning of sub-chapter 2.4. This concept helps to clarify the arguments about the limitation of the generalizability of qualitative studies, and also the data collected from individuals and how people view this as factual and trustworthy data. Durkheim defines a social fact as:

Every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestation. (Durkheim 1964, p. 13 in Mikkelsen 2005, p. 161)

The social facts are “data” collected from the informants, and this data can be used in social sciences. Thus, while gathering data from social settings about topics like Brazilian politics, the views and opinions that the interview subjects provide, my data, is arguably seen as social facts. Smith (2018, p. 139) refers to a quote from Lewis et.al (2014, p. 351) that, arguably, solves the argument of generalizability:

Qualitative research cannot be generalised on a statistical basis – it is not the prevalence of particular views or experiences, not the extent of their location within parts of the sample, about which inferences can be drawn. Nor, of course, is this the objective of qualitative research. Rather, the value of qualitative research is in revealing the breadth and nature of the phenomena under study. (Lewis et.al 2014, p. 351 in Smith 2018, p. 139)

2.5.3 - Codes of quality.

Subjectivity and intersubjectivity are two key terms regarding different methodological and ethical dilemmas that might arise during a data collection process (Dowling 2016).

Subjectivity involves the different personal views and characteristics that the researcher might have. As previously mentioned, I used my character as a student as a way to connect with my interview subjects, thus generating more data. I talked to them about my experiences in Brazil and my previous fieldwork in order to establish rapport. I shared my thoughts on the election, and I was open about my political views when asked. My opinion on the election has not affected my research or my thesis. Both my position and my project changed during the research process. Improved knowledge of the different topics, as well as the result of the election in 2018, has influenced parts of the thesis and the analysis. The importance of quotes, statements, and theories changed throughout the process of research and writing, as well as the importance of perceptions regarding different political figures, such as Jair Bolsonaro.

Similarly, to subjectivity, there is another term, intersubjectivity. It can be defined as interpretations and opinions of the world, which have been confirmed or disconfirmed by personal experiences with people in different contexts (Dowling 2016). How does my language and my actions reflect who I am? And vice versa? Societal norms determine how I carry out my research in different interview contexts (Dowling 2016). I consider these questions by being introspective (Sumner & Tribe 2008). Accuracy of data is always a controversial topic, which often concerns the material and the interview subjects that have contributed to the research (Harrison 2006). I am writing about politics, and politics is always

a divisive and sensitive topic to research. People are subjective. Some of their statements or opinions can be fact checked, but other things are simply subjective, and are true to the individual. This relates to Willis' (2006) factual information. This is people's opinions and understandings, which are interesting to explore and consider how they came to be. There are no correct responses to questions such as the ones that I have presented, and the answers are based on the context and time frame in which they were given. The answers are as Willis (2006, p. 151) put it, "*framed by the research process itself*".

When conducting my fieldwork, I was what is considered an "*outsider*" (Binns 2006, p. 19). I am not from Brazil and am not part of the culture that I am researching. I am a Norwegian student, a friend of a friend, who is collecting data for his master's thesis at the University of Oslo. I did not want to fool people into thinking that I am something that I am not. However, I am in some ways an insider, if you consider things like my age, my class, or my current stage in life (Dowling 2016). Despite this, I still consider myself an outsider because I am in a position where I am unable to put myself in my interview subjects' shoes. This is due to my lack of experience regarding the political and economic crisis in the country (Crandall 2018). Dowling (2016, p. 40) states that "*you are never simply either an insider or an outsider*".

With all the traits and characteristics that I share with my interview subjects, there will always be areas where we differ. One of the main critiques to the concept of an "*outsider*" conducting research is that the researcher tends to write about and interpret a society with little to no local knowledge about said society (Apeniik & Parpart, p. 34). In my case, I have used a lot of secondary data gathered and written about by Brazilian authors and researchers. I also have an interest in continuing to have a connection with Brasilia and Brazil, not only as focus area for future research, but also as a place to visit. Therefore, I aim to be respectful and to make use of the help that I have gotten from local intermediaries, and to not diminish my thesis and the trust that I have established with people in Brasilia.

2.5.4 - Bias.

Bias, according to Ragin & Amoroso (2011, p. 220), is a term that describes how aspects of research can alter the interview subjects, data, or results, leading to a lack of validity or representativity. Regarding bias in research, it is important to debate whether it occurred or not. The most probable bias that might have occurred is unintentional bias introduced by my personal values during the data collection and analysis. It can be argued that I am biased

towards one way of thinking. However, during the data collection process and the analysis, I have refrained from answering any questions about my opinion on the political climate in Brazil and the outcome of the election in order to remain neutral when writing this thesis. However, I have my own political views, which might create researcher bias, but seeing that my thesis is about presenting the views, opinions and values of the specific group in question, I do not see that becoming a problem.

Another thing to consider whether I am a “*data-miner*” or a “*data-analyst*” (White 2002, p. 513 in Sumner & Tribe 2008, p. 118). A data-miner knows what to look for, and keeps digging until they find it, while a data-analyst lets the data tell the story (Sumner & Tribe 2008, p. 118). In my case, I would argue that I am both. I knew how I wanted my respondents to answer, and was thus mining for those answers. However, I did not deliberately form questions in a way that forced my interview subjects to answer in a specific way. I wanted to hear both sides of the story, and so I was mining for that. As a result, I believe to fit into both classifications. I knew where to look and what to look for, becoming a data-miner. But that is just the broad picture. When it comes to pinpointing the data, I need to let the data speak for itself and show me the way, making me a data-analyst. With regards to secondary data, I am arguably more of a data-miner. However, it all depends on the situation, the stage of writing, and what part of the literature I am using. In the beginning of the research process, I analyzed secondary data in order to learn as much as possible. Later in the process, the research started to narrow, and with it, the data exploration. This led me to gradually turn to data-mining. I started looking for data that would support differing sides of the argument, as well as data that would provide an understanding as to why and how the arguments came to be.

2.5.5 - Power.

Power in an interview is important to consider when researching social phenomena (Dowling 2016). Knowledge is power, thus making the interview subject a being of power. This is one way of looking at it, another is that the researcher is the one with the power, since he or she is asking the questions (Goss & Leinbach 1996). The different sides of power are debatable, but the main thing to take away from this is the idea that power has implications on the rapport as well as the data (O’Leary 2010). Dowling (2016, p. 36) asserts that there are three different types of power relationships: the potentially exploitative relationship; the asymmetrical relationship; and the reciprocal relationship. It is difficult to categorize the power relationship

that I have with my interview subjects because each category is fitting in some way. It all depends on perspective, making it hard to rigorously classify the relationship. As Dowling (2016, p. 37) argues, “*power cannot be eliminated from your research, since it exists in all social relations*”. On one side, one can argue that all research is exploitative, seeing that I am “using” people for their knowledge, and on the other, based on the relationship that I have with my interview subjects, the power can be seen as reciprocal (Dowling 2016).

There is also the asymmetrical relationship, which is characterized by significant differences in social positions between the interviewer and the interviewee(s) (Dowling 2016). The question then arises, how significant does a difference have to be in order for it to be considered a significant difference? Where do we draw the line? Seeing that my respondents are the ones in power, with them having the knowledge and data that I wish to obtain, they are, arguably, superior to me (O’Leary 2010). The respondents are not in a position where they can influence many others, but they are in a position where they can influence me. Does that mean that our relationship is asymmetrical? But then again, they are not in a higher position in society. In that regard, our relationship is more reciprocal. However, I am trying to extract information from them in a way that critics can argue is exploitative. I did however not experience the relationship between me and my interview subjects in this way. I experienced more of a reciprocal power relationship, with both sides not showing signs of trying to exploit the other.

2.6 - Data Analysis

I am using thematic analysis as a method of analyzing the data that I have collected. Braun & Clarke (2006, p. 79) state that thematic analysis is a method that identifies, analyzes, and reports patterns of themes that are found in the dataset that are applicable to the research. This method organizes and describes these themes in detail. The analysis is an organic and cyclical process where the collected data and theory work together, and the researcher goes back and forth in a recursive manner to better grasp the complexity of the data (O’Leary 2010, p. 257). So why am I using it? First of all, the method allows me to apply several theoretical and epistemological directions within the analysis, creating a flexible and fluid analysis fitting for a topic like views on politics (Braun & Clarke 2006). Furthermore, I am looking at the respondents’ points of view from the inside (Mikkelsen 2005), trying to fathom how they perceive the political system. In order to do so, I need to have a clear understanding of what to

look for, as well as underlying knowledge about the research. But at the same time, I must remain open to new influences and changes, even after having spent almost two years conducting this research project. With this in mind, the thematic analysis works for me, as it is a flexible method that allows me to alter perceptions, while remaining rooted in the specific subject that I am researching (Braun & Clarke 2006). An example of this is how the relevance of certain answers changed after the results of the presidential election. The election results caused answers regarding Jair Bolsonaro becoming more relevant for my thesis than answers regarding Marina Silva.

Within the thematic analysis methodology, there are two distinct types of analysis to differentiate between, the theoretical and the inductive (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 83). I utilized the method of theoretical analysis, as I have a theoretical framework that I worked on before, during and after both the data collection period and the analytical process. The analysis is thus considered deductive or top-down focused. This is because I knew partly what I was looking for. It is also because I started the analytical process during the data collection period by using interactive methods to gather my data (Sumner & Tribe 2008). There are, however, traces of an inductive analysis as well as a bottom-up analysis. This is shown in how I constantly created and altered codes due to gradually discovering more innovative ways to answer my research questions, which in turn made me question different aspects of the thesis. I in turn improve or remove these aspects from the thesis (Braun & Clarke 2006). Therefore, I am using a mix of deductive and inductive data analysis by working in a cyclical motion. Prior to the analysis, I had knowledge and ideas about where I wanted the analysis to go. However, the data influences me to generate codes and themes that are more fitting than the primary codes and thoughts established during the data collection period (Blaikie 2010). The inductive process is creating theory, while the deductive process is verifying the theory. I use a mix of these processes in order to better capture the themes within the dataset (O’Leary 2010, p. 262).

I use a mix of essentialism/realism and constructivism. This is what Braun & Clarke (2006, p. 81) call “*contextualism*”. It can be further defined as a paradigm that looks at how people give meaning to their experiences, and how these experiences shape meanings, and vice versa. Human beings are not passive socially. They respond and react actively to their environment and use theories regarding themselves and the people and situations that they encounter. This concept refers to constructionism (Blaikie 2010, p. 84), while essentialism/realism refers to the meanings and experiences of an individual in society (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 81). I am

studying the individual's reasoning and motivation behind their opinion, and not only how sociocultural contexts shape opinions. I argue that this research paradigm fits the analysis that I am looking for, as I aim to understand how politics and perceptions influence one another. It is arguably difficult to examine subjective reasoning for views on a country's politics and the political system itself, without mixing different methods in a thematic analysis. There are many different ways to understand social action and society, which make it necessary to use a mix to better capture the reasoning behind these views (Blaikie 2010). Another research paradigm that I use during the analysis is interpretivism. This paradigm considers how people understand and make sense of their social lives, and how social lives are constructed by those within it (Braun & Clarke 2006). I want to understand how people experience political trust in Brazil, and whether or not their subjective meanings show signs of political distrust or a crisis of legitimacy. Thus, I am studying a social phenomenon, politics, and how people, the young adults, understand and act with regards to politics. How has the political situation, class status, living in Brasilia, amongst other things had an effect on how the young adults experience political trust? It is the study of social reality that is constructed by the inhabitants within said reality, and how the inhabitants interpret meanings, events, situations and others within the reality (Blaikie 2010). Seeing that I am being interpretative in my analysis, I am also, according to Braun & Clarke (2006) analyzing at a latent level. This means that I am looking deeper into the answers given to me by the respondents. I am not only looking at the overarching views and answers of my respondents, but I am also reading between the lines, trying to figure out why they explain and perceive different aspects of the Brazilian political system in the way that they do.

I have used a software called NVivo 11, which is a computer-aided qualitative data analysis software, or CAQDAS (Cope 2016). The advantage of using CAQDAS is that it allows me to gather all the data in one place, and move back and forth from interview to interview, comparing them, organizing the data on the computer, managing the data, creating categories and themes within the software, identifying and retrieving codes rapidly, and easily correcting mistakes (Cope 2016). Tjora (2010) states that using CAQDAS eliminates the elements of subjectivity and selectivity, and continues by stating that it is an important tool since it helps to grasp the complexity of the data, giving the researcher an overview (Tjora 2010, p. 167). It also provides insight in a way that makes the researcher notice things that would not have been noticeable had the researcher analyzed manually, creating codes that might not have been spotted without CAQDAS.

The downside to using CAQDAS might be that it can cause the researcher to become obsessed with the data, not being able to put it down. Some scholars argue that the data can be alienating, and that grounded theory can be over-emphasized and become the norm (Cope 2016, Tjora 2010). In my case, there is not a lot of grounded theory in my thesis. This is because I read up on theories and established a logic prior to analyzing the data, as recommended by Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) and Braun & Clarke (2006). I have however, not been working with a grounded theory method. The research questions have not been established on the basis of the data collection and analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006), but rather improved by the process. I argue that working with the literature prior to having analyzed the data has given me a better idea of what to look for during the analysis. It has given me enhanced vision, if you will, providing a flashlight, instead of fumbling through massive amounts of data in the dark (Cope 2016). I know in some way, what to look for. I have insight that allows me to both broaden and narrow the categories of themes (Braun & Clarke 2006).

There are, however, potential negative effects as well as critiques to the thematic analysis, as there are too many methods in qualitative methodology. Seeing that thematic analysis is part of the qualitative method, the same critique applies (Cope 2016). This critique is that qualitative method does not reveal enough information, and cannot be quantifiable and generalized to show the essence of an entire group of people. This is, however, not the reasoning behind this thesis, as I wish to show the understandings of one group of people within a context that can be applied elsewhere. Even though this is within the context of the country of Brazil, and a specified group of people, that does not mean that the theories used in this thesis cannot be used elsewhere. I am thus providing focus from an academic standpoint. I would argue, with the help of Braun & Clarke (2006) that it is not necessary to always point out the number of people that argue for one thing or the other during the presentation of the data, seeing that this is not a quantitative thesis. I am instead looking for the views, explanations, and motivations that individuals in the targeted group have towards the political system. It is their words that are interesting, not the amount of people that agree with them. Furthermore, the importance of the data is not decided by quantifiable measures, it is decided by the relevance that the data has to the research questions and the topic at hand (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 82). Moreover, the thematic analysis can be viewed as quite straightforward, as it goes right into the dataset and pulls out codes and themes. On the contrary, it is critiqued of being flexible and fluid, which is why I chose to use it. The method is not fixed to specific theory and methodology, which allows it to move across the spectra of the two. The method,

being flexible and fluid, allows me to not commit completely to specific theoretical and epistemological aspects of the analysis, and to use the paradigms and methods that fit my research.

2.7 - Coding

The purpose of coding is to categorize the data (Cope 2016, p. 377). This makes it easier to work with the data at a later stage. It also helps to determine which respondent said what. This is the first part of creating a theory, supporting a theory, or building a hypothesis from the data collected in the research period. The way to start coding is, according to Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p. 124), to read and reread the transcripts prior to coding, in order to locate possible themes to establish later in the analysis period. This creates existing themes that are present during the analysis, making it easier to find new themes, and to influence the existing ones. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) stress that the idea is not to have decided the themes beforehand, nor is it to go inside the analytical period blindly. Rather the idea is to have a mix of an inductive and deductive frame of mind in order to fully comprehend and utilize the data that you are going to analyze. In the first phase of coding, I used preconceived codes, collected and connected to the secondary literature, such as “corruption”, and “presidential coalitionalism”, as recommended by Tjora (2010), linking the secondary literature and my data together. After creating the initial codes, I began to categorize the codes. I created “deeper” codes, combining some of the latter, in order to reduce the total number of codes (Braun & Clarke 2006). I have created what Cope (2016, p. 379) calls “*analytic codes*”, that being codes that tend to go deeper within the context that the data is targeting, making it highly similar to analyzing at the latent level (Braun & Clarke 2006). The strength of coding comes from its recursive nature, which is what makes it a valid method of analysis. There will always be new themes or codes to find that might replace or improve existing codes (Cope 2016, p. 379).

I started the analysis by re-visiting the interviews after having put them down for a while in order to get a fresh view of the responses. Next, I read one interview at a time. I then started using the NVivo software and pulled out important yet generic information from the interviews. Upon returning, I used the initial codes that I had organized into different categories to further develop themes to use during the analytical presentation. I organized the data by looking for themes and patterns of themes and by categorizing the answers. The

themes that I found in the dataset are relevant to the research question(s) and the main topic of the thesis. This potentially increases the validity of the thesis claim Braun & Clarke (2006). The differentiation has helped me to categorize main themes, sub-themes and sub sub-themes, according to the relation that they have to each other. To show an example: “Trust in political system”, “Yes” or “No”, “reason yes” and “reason no”. The themes did, however, evolve and heavily influence each other throughout the remainder of the analytical process and during the write-up process. Some themes were removed, some were combined into one, and others were separated into several different themes. I have, in my opinion, pulled out a reasonable number of direct quotes, paraphrases, as well as identifiable and interesting data from the dataset, which will be examined during the analytical part of the thesis and in the discussion. The third round of analysis was more focused on reading between the lines of the respondents’ answers. I started to analyze at a latent level, looing deeper into the reasonings behind their answers. I believe that conducting my analysis process in such a manner has enabled me to apprehend potential researcher fatigue, and gain a better overview of the data that I have collected (Braun & Clarke 2006).

3.0 - Case contextualization

The official Brazil is a democratic and diverse country, having achieved global status for its massive economy, significant gains in poverty reduction, and serving as an effective champion for the less-developed world. In contrast, the real Brazil is divided by race and class, rooted in systematic corruption and patronage, and saddled with substandard education, health care, and infrastructure. (Crandall 2018, p. 137)

The problems that Brazil face are not new, and have been there since the establishment of democracy in the country (Filho & Guzzo 2018). Corruption and lack of political transparency are issues that have followed the PT government all the way from the mensalão scandal (PT provided monthly payments to members of Congress to vote in their favor) in 2005 (Crandall 2018), and is an ingrained part of the political culture in the country (Kingstone & Power 2017). Furthermore, the politics of parties on both the left and the right on the political scale are being questioned and people show political institutions less and less support, leading to a delegitimization of the political system (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Lack of confidence in the political system is common amongst all age groups in Brazil, including

young adults (Silva & Castro 2014). The political, cultural, and social spheres influence people, and when rumbles occur within these spheres, people's core values and ideology is altered (Weller & Bassalo 2018). Young people are influenced by events that happen in the spheres, and these events are key factors for their identity building (Weller & Bassalo 2018, p. 232).

This chapter is divided into five sections, which tied together will serve as a contextualization of the case to work with in the following chapters. First off, I will shortly look at the city of Brasilia, examining its history and characteristics, showing how the city can be used as an explanatory tool in understanding how the political mindset of the informants have been created. Secondly, I will look at the recent political history of Brazil, to better interpret the current political situation in the country. The third section will look at the social context in Brazil, before focusing on the traditional middle class, and then young adults. Section four will examine the Brazilian political system, presidential coalitionalism, and forms of government. The fifth section of this chapter will look at corruption, where I will firstly present the underlying characteristics of corruption and politics before looking at the Brazilian case.

3.1 - The City of Brasilia

Cities create identities, through personal performance and experience in the different spheres of the city, in combination with the representational practices that occur throughout the city, and how the city is viewed by visiting actors (Hubbard 2006, p. 79). So, what is the story of Brasilia? And which characteristics of Brasilia are important to look at, in order to understand how the city creates the identities of the people living there?

Brasilia is, according to Waldstein (2014), a city invented and created by and for politicians and bureaucrats. Fitting, seeing that cities are, according to Vicino & Fahlberg (2017, p. 1001) the center of demands regarding political and social rights. Lucio Costa, the main architect and planner of Brasilia, claims that the city is a bureaucratic symbol and center (El-Dahdah 2005). Costa stated that the city's intention was to be administrative, yet pleasant and meaningful for its inhabitants (El-Dahdah 2005, p. 22). Brasilia as a concept is a city that combines modernity, capital and the state, in one specific location (Hubbard 2006). It was, at the time of being built, seen as the city of the future. It was built to be, the power core of Brazil, both with regards to economic spheres and political spheres (Hubbard 2006).

Brasilia's characteristics makes it interesting to look at its young adults and their political viewpoints. Seeing that they live in the assumed political and bureaucratic center of the country, both literally and figuratively (Waldstein 2014).

Hall & Barret (2012, p. 139) argue that the planners ignored the economic and social problems in Brazil at the time of building the city, and that this further exacerbated these problems (2012, p. 139). Kubitschek, the president that decided to move the capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia had a clear vision about Brasilia having social equality. Nowadays however, this vision is far from reality (Waldstein 2014). Due to a shortage of housing options for the urban population because of a limited area to use, the prices skyrocketed, and there are only people with substantial income that are able to live in the city of Brasilia (El-Dahdah 2005).

Brasilia is a place where political views are constituted, and they matter in the grand scale of political analysis and research. The reason is because of the distinctive ways that culture, politics, economics, and socio-economics tie into each other and create ways of viewing phenomena (Jones et.al 2004). The way different actors experience the day-to-day life in Brasilia, their relation to politics, economics and culture, play a part in constituting the way they view the political environment and system in Brazil (Jones et.al 2004, p. 101). Locality and neighborhood territoriality are key factors playing a part in influencing young people Farrugia (2018) explain. These two factors are arguably what transforms young people into citizens and political subjects. Meaning that the nation-state as a political place has dissolved, making difficult for young people to be influenced solely by the nation-state, explaining why young people's political identification is influenced by a broad range of factors Farrugia (2018) further assert. With this in mind, living in Brasilia can be part of explaining the attitudes young adults have towards the political system.

3.2 - The Recent Political History of Brazil

Brazil has a long political history, too grand to cover in its entirety in this thesis. Thus, the most recent history, from the inauguration of former president Lula da Silva and the PT years, until the 2018 election, will be in the forefront. Brazil has had a troublesome recent political history, and is a young, inexperienced, and not fully developed democracy (Sweet 2014), re-established in 1985 (Avritzer 2017a), who is additionally going through an overwhelming crisis both economically and politically (Saad-Filho 2017).

3.2.1 - The PT years.

During the PT years, which lasted from 2003 to 2016, the economy was booming, people were brought above the poverty line and it was created a new middle-class, citizenship was expanded, Bolsa Familia and other social welfare programs were established playing part in helping the poor and bettering per capita income (Saad-Filho 2017). A higher minimum wage was introduced, millions of low-paying jobs were created, and the oil sector was renewed. Even during the financial crisis in Brazil, the unemployment rate was at a staggeringly low 4%, as well as salaries were still rising, even with an economy that was deteriorating (Saad-Filho 2017). Dilma Rousseff was sworn into office her second time after narrowly winning the 2014 election. But due to her narrow victory, she became politically isolated. The economy faltered due to incompetence from PT and Dilma, Saad-Filho (2017, p. 981) explains. The party never implemented a clear strategy against the neoliberal structure that had been rooted in the country since the 1990s, due to the fear of disrupting the political environment in the country. What they did however was to use the minimal growth to improve standards for the poor. What turned into a problem however was the equality of growth distribution not giving enough funds to other parts of the economy. There was no self-sustaining cycle of growth in place, and the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was fragile due to the limitations of the neoliberal model (Saad-Filho 2017). Brazil started to deindustrialize and wanted to focus on commodity exports, mainly to China, who became their biggest trade partner. Brazil turned into the world's leading exporter of unfinished and unprocessed product, leading them into a path where investment and job creation became difficult. Thus, when the economic growth eventually diminished, the country did not have anything to fall back on, leaving inflation to rise, and the GDP crumbling (Saad-Filho 2017, p. 981).

The PT gained support during the economy boom, and their voter average rose, due to them providing a better livelihood for millions of people. They did however lose millions of votes when the economy in the end wavered, due to not being able to decrease the division of classes. When the biggest corruption scandal that has ever faced any country in the world, the Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash), hit Brazil in 2014 (Senters et.al 2019), Dilma Rousseff struggled even more to uphold public, media and opposition satisfaction (Saad-Filho 2017). Rousseff stated that the scandal would “*forever change the relationship between Brazilian society, the Brazilians state and private companies*” (Senters et.al 2019, p. 29). The Lava Jato investigation showed that construction companies had bribed politically appointed oil

directors in Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, through which the bribes were channeled to members of the PT (Saad-Filho 2017).

Problems started to erupt during Dilma's presidency, as she lacked the know-how and experience to lead a growingly divided country that has a political system that is extremely vulnerable to impacts from the elite Saad-Filho (2017) argue. In the same period, aforementioned, the economy of the country started to collapse. Big spending, slowing growth rates, troubling oil prices, unemployment rise, and a massive debt that led to the closing of big industries like shipbuilding, construction, nuclear, and food processing, led to an income per capita that had not been seen since before Lula took office (Saad-Filho 2017). One could say that Brazil was back where they started, with the curve continuing downwards (Saad-Filho 2017, p. 979). Avelino & Fisch (2019, p. 171) argues that the rise of PT played a part in disrupting the political system in Brazil, creating an arms race between the political parties. They further state that this arms race created an environment where political parties only thought of upping the others, creating a harmful relationship between political parties and the economy, further alienating parties from core voters, increasing political polarization. The polarization in the country was quite clear in the 2014 election, where Dilma Rousseff won with a 3% margin, the narrowest margin in a Presidential election in Brazil ever (Do Vale 2015). The political polarization that took part during the 2014 election were due to a regional divide and territorial dynamics that have roots in the socio-economic landscape in Brazil (Do Vale 2015). In the end Avelino & Fisch (2019) clarify, no party yielded, and the arms race spiraled out of control, becoming, in their eyes, the reason there are increasing amounts of political and economic scandals in Brazil. Samuels & Zucco (2019, p. 270) note that the crisis happened due to the PT's mismanagement during the Dilma years, and can be explained by saying that the PT did was not able to change the Brazilian way of doing politics, but rather that the Brazilian way of doing politics changed PT instead.

3.2.2 - The protests.

2013 and 2014 were grave years both politically and economically for Brazil, two problems coinciding together (Sweet 2014, p. 60). In 2013, people took to the streets to show their displeasure. This was the 2013 protests that started from being a reaction to increasing bus fares, to becoming a nation-wide symbol of political dissatisfaction (Saad-Filho 2013). There was an immense public outcry towards politicians, political institutions, and political parties,

with people showing increasing dissatisfaction towards the political system and the ruling elite (Sweet 2014). Many protesters had slogans and signs stating that they do not see right or left, they don't care about that, they just want Brazil to go forward, and stating that all politicians are corrupt (Saad-Filho 2013). Many believe that without a significant change within the political system, there will not be any growth or public and social improvement, only corruption and bad government that nobody can trust Reid (2014) assert. The protests themes were many and sometimes conflicting, due to the massive breadth of the activists. People were against compulsory voting, against the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, against corruption, but also for gay rights and legalization of drugs, for cheaper city transport, and for return of the military rule (Mexi & Boursier 2017). It was a broad social base of classes taking part, ranging from students, left-winged activists, middle-class protesters and a wide range of workers from different sections of public life (Saad-Filho 2013) The majority protesters were however young workers, students and the traditional middle-class (Mexi & Boursier 2017, Avritzer 2017a).

3.2.3 - The end of PT rule.

In 2016, Dilma Rousseff was impeached by what Saad-Filho (2017, p. 979) calls an “*alliance of privilege*”. Members of the police and judges saw themselves as heroes if they got Dilma impeached, and media moguls saw an opportunity that would gain their own self-interest Saad Filho (2017) further assert. The impeachment was part of the end of a long era of PT rule, that resulted in an economic and political crisis and a highly polarized and divided society (Amaral & Meneguello 2017, p. 36). Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) argue that the impeachment was the start of a new political cycle. A cycle where the left plays a smaller part than before, and that the economic and political crisis present in the country is not easily solved. There is a need for a total overhaul of politics in the country Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) argue. Samuels & Zucco (2019) states that the crisis that came from the impeachment show the dysfunctional nature of the political system and the political parties in the country. They further emphasize that the crisis also pummeled the trust for politicians, parties, and the system in general to the lowest degree of all trust in politics in Latin-America. More than 70 % of Brazilians did not identify with a political party, and only 32 % of Brazilians supported democracy, showing that the crisis further weakened what Samuels & Zucco (2019) believes to be an already highly dysfunctional political system.

The end of the PT rule is characterized with political polarization, corruption scandals, impeachment, imprisonment of Lula, and a growing trend of “*negative partisanship*” (Samuels & Zucco 2018, in Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019, p. 263). In addition, Senters et.al (2019, p. 29) connect through cause and consequence Lava Jato and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, arguing that it opened up for the political turn to the right in the 2018 election. Scandals, and the growing negative partisanship for PT allowed the right-winged parties and its politicians to enter the political scene once again Samuels & Zucco (2019) explains. The right-winged parties in Brazil gradually entered the seats of power in Brazil, with the 2016 impeachment leading to Michel Temer becoming president, before Brazil elected, in October 2018, Jair Bolsonaro (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). Bolsonaro supports the actions, politics and policies of the 1964 – 1985 dictatorship, and believes that Brazil would fare better in a dictatorship rather than a democracy, and he has a radical public security policy based on highly liberal gun laws (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019, p. 264-265).

3.3 - The Brazilian Social Context

Brazil is a heavily unequal and divided country (Sposito 2018), with a glaring spatial inequality between regions and states, and inside cities and communities (World Bank 2017). There are big differences in the capacity for development in the different regions, where the North and Northeast are seemingly the less developed states in Brazil, while the South, Southeast and Central-West are seen as the developed (Almeida et.al 2018). The inequality in Brazil breeds more political inequality Hagopian (2019) argue, as the elite and the traditional middle-class have a political advantage because higher income allows for better education, better health, and better access to adequate infrastructure. This makes them less prone to finance private goods through taxation, which will make them support politicians and political parties that are willing to cut taxes (Hagopian 2019, p. 377). The political climate is highly clientilistic, with both the poorer classes and the richer classes in Brazil focusing their votes on candidates that promise something in return for the vote. It is “*help me, help you*” politics (Hagopian 2019, p. 378-379). The inequality in Brazil has always been there Hagopian (2019) further states, claiming that Brazil was born unequal. Moreover, the inequality in the country creates tensions between classes, ethnicities, work groups, and people with different political ideologies (World Bank 2017).

With regards to the elections, the divide is further exacerbated, as the Southeast is home to 43% of the voters, while the Northeast is home to 27%, with these two regions being the most important for the elections. The electoral politics in Brazil is grounded within the regional difference the country (Do Vale 2015). PT mainly gets votes from the north and north-east, with less-educated and poor voters (Do Vale 2015), while right-winged parties get their votes from the middle and south parts of Brazil, where there are a majority of highly educated citizens and high-income citizens (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018, p. 107). Almeida et.al (2018) claim that the lower classes do not care about politics, but rather, covering their basic needs. This is reflected in voting patterns, as the lower classes generally support politicians they perceive will be able to provide this for them (Reid 2014). Studies show that the educational level plays a big part in explaining the voting behavior of the Brazilian people state Carreiro & Renno (2019, p. 226) by referring to Carreirão (2002). They emphasize that the lower the educational level, the lower is the trust and level of relying on the ideological positions and mindset of the potential candidate. People rather vote based on character traits and the personal reputation of the candidate(s), regarding both who to vote for, and who not to vote for (Carreiro & Renno 2019). In Brazil, there are clear indications showing that the more income you have, the more support you give to democracy (Almeida & Guarnieri 2017). The elite and the traditional middle-class in Brazil are sound supporters of democracy, while the lower classes show less support for democracy (Almeida & Guarnieri 2017, p. 179).

In Brazilian society, there is a deeply ingrained belief that people in the lower tiers of society are not to meddle with the dealings of the elite, saying that “*each monkey has its own branch*” (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 11). The political elite is considered its own social class. Power & Rodrigues-Silvera (2019, p. 251) note that it is highly dominated with people from the political right. Furthermore, the political elite is continually increasing the inequality in the country through policies and actions. Moreover, Polimedo (2017) state that this social class is highly distrusted by the general public. People in both the elite, some sections of the middle-class, and in the lower classes believe that what people on top are doing, are not other people’s business (Power & Taylor 2011). With this belief rampant inside the political culture, it is not hard to think of the reason for why there might be lack of transparency and accountability in the political system in Brazil (Power & Taylor (2011). Another way to view this, is that, seeing that Brazil is a historically unequal country, the elite might regard themselves as superior, and conclude that they are within their right to use the system in order to get the funds or rights that they believe they should have on the basis of their social status

(Power & Taylor 2011). For many, social status is above the law, and people shout, “*Do you know who you are talking to?*” to each other (Crandall 2018, p. 133). Brazilian social life is, according to Baquero & Baquero (2018, p. 538), tied together with clientelism and personalism. In addition, they argue that social life is defined by an incapacity from people to demand accountability and changes in the political system.

3.3.1 - The traditional middle-class.

The traditional middle class is seen as a part of society that are more or less in the same situation with regards to social standing and economic power. These people are often bankers, entrepreneurs, lawyers, doctors etc., people who are not on the top tier of the elite in society (Dillon 2014, p. 144). An important characteristic is the high level of education that resides within the group, as a university degree is seen as a noticeable element of the traditional middle-class (Almeida & Guarnieri 2017). This body of people has furthermore uphold the social standing for at least one generation despite changes in society (Singer 2014). The fraction is a heterogenous group of people mainly with indirect ties to the dynamic core of capitalism in the country. They do not have the economic power of the elite or the manpower of the organized workers, but they are able to implement their impact through the political system itself, the media, judges, NGO, lobbies and unions (Boito et.al 2016, p. 195).

Since the 1980’s, with the start of neoliberalism in Brazil, the traditional middle-class has struggled as it was badly hit by the import-substitution industrialization effects on the country (Boito et.al 2016), and later on, the policies implemented by former president Lula. The increase of the minimum wage, welfare programs funded by taxes, increased access for the lower classes in the labor market and in higher education, had all negative effects for the traditional middle-class; as their buying power was crippled (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018), and their monopoly on “good” jobs were removed, due to increasing numbers of people being able to get a higher education (Boito et.al 2016). The traditional middle-class claims turned into a forgotten class (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018), seeing that the poor got attention, and the rich “always” getting what they want and being, in the eyes of the traditional middle-class, corrupt (Almeida & Guarnieri 2017). So, the PT and the advancements that they provided for the lower classes, are not popular amongst the traditional middle-class, as they felt alienated from the government (Saad-Filho 2017). They claim that the PT governments are direct threats

towards the traditional middle-class' economic position and social standing (Boito et.al 2016, p. 195-196).

The middle class lost economic and social standing in the country (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018), but are still influential when it comes to changing the game, seeing that they have economic and political power, access to the media and social movements, as well as having a widespread political ideological influence that reach a great number of the sub-classes surrounding them (Saad-Filho 2017). Members of the traditional middle-class are moreover highly frustrated because of the believed lack of accountability and political representation, and corruption amongst political parties (Crandall 2018). This led to the traditional-middle class creating stronger ties and interests in center-right political parties (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018); an important political shift, as the majority of people at universities, schools, churches and the media are managed by the traditional middle-class. This correlates with class theories presented by Bourdieu (Korsnes et.al 2014, p. 213), and election statistics from Brazil (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018, p. 107). Bourdieu states that people who are part of the middle-class tend to vote mostly for the political parties or actors that are at the right side of the political scale (Korsnes et.al 2014, p. 213). He does however stress that the middle-class is divided, where artists, teachers, painters etc. those who are generally viewed as those with more cultural capital vote for those on the left side of the political scale. However, those with more interest in economy, and have a higher amount of economic capital, such as stock brokers, real estate agents and directors, tend to vote for the right (Korsnes et.al 2014). In sum though, the majority of people residing in the middle-class, are people who in theory have values and ideologies that match the political right.

The majority of the traditional middle-class blames PT, Lula and Dilma for the perceived deterioration of the Brazilian society assert Saad-Filho & Morais (2018). Clarifying that the lack of rejuvenation of infrastructure, urban infrastructure got gradually worse because of a growing number of people using it. These services were believed to be a privilege granted to the elite and the middle class because of hard work, not due to laziness, which the middle class argue that the lower classes are getting rewarded for, advancing in life because of taxpayer support (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018). Hence, due to the rising income of poor people and rising equality of rights, making it possible for more people to use public transport and services, the majority of the traditional middle-class believe that Brazilian society deteriorates. This has created a hostility towards the lower classes and the political elite from the traditional middle-class Saad-Filho (2013, p. 663) clarify. Moreover, the group believe

that corruption in politics is removing big pieces of government funds. The majority of the traditional middle-class Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) argue, wants the country to have a stable economic growth, but exclusivity for the different classes, granting privileged based on personal merit and hard work, not from conditional cash transfer programs.

3.3.2 - Young adults.

This thesis will use the definition of youth/young adults, presented by Sposito (2018) and Baquero & Baquero (2018), stating that when talking about youth and politics, youth is considered between 15 and 29 (Baquero & Baquero 2018). This is why I have decided to go with the terminology “young adults” between the age of 20 and 30. Theories regarding youth is regardless relevant for the terminology of young adults as well, seeing that when someone is within the category of “youth” they are in the way of becoming an adult (Sposito 2018). The characteristic of youth is the difficulty of defining it, seeing that people are not all at the same place in life at the same age (Sposito 2018). People that are 23 years old might have vastly different situations in life, and the same goes for 28-year-olds. Defining youth as a concept depends on different criteria within economy, social life, cultural standing, such as education, income and workplace, household environments, where people live, family situation, and the level of economic independence (Catani & Gilioli 2008 in Scalon & Costa 2018, p. 101). Adding to this, it is not uncommon in Brazil that young adults live with their parents at the age of 30 (Forte 2014). When one is considered youth, one is postponing the commitments that are related to adulthood Sposito (2018, p. 15) assert. Hence, I would argue that being a young adult, is being someone that are on the verge of becoming an adult, or have recently entered adulthood.

My respondents are part of the first generation born in the new democracy in Brazil (Corrochano & Nakano 2018, p. 630). Bourdieu (1980, p. 114 in Sposito 2018, p. 14) argues that those residing in the traditional middle-class and above in societies like Brazil can be viewed as youth longer than the underprivileged classes. The reason for this is the length of their education. Those in the traditional middle class and above in the class scale have greater access to secondary and higher education, meaning that they are part of the younger part of the population due to being in school, while on the other hand, being seen as adults with regards to age. In essence, one could argue that the longer you study, the longer you keep your youth.

Young adults are an important part of society, due to their role as cultural innovators and drivers for social change (Farrugia 2018). It is through young adults that new technologies, cultural phenomenon and expressions, and terminologies are embraced by society (Wolseth & Babb 2008, p. 4). Corrochano & Nakano (2018, p. 630) claim that youth and young adults are seen as the most sensitive group in a society. They base this claim on the argument that when a country is prosperous, this group benefits from it, and when the country is impoverished, the group is harmed. This makes them important targets in politics, as they are drivers for globalization processes within economics and culture (Farrugia 2018, p. 130). Because they are in a period of their life where political experiences are playing a big part in molding their identity, young adults, should, in theory, be aware and interested in changes in society (Baquero & Baquero 2018).

Place play a big part in constructing young people's political identification Farrugia (2018) argue. People, perceptions and feelings that are part of the place a person conduct his or her day to day life shapes young people's political perceptions (Weller & Bassalo 2018). Living in the political and bureaucratic power core of politics in Brazil will play a part in shaping the ideological and social aspects and factors of these individuals (Sposito 2018). It is the dynamic context in which they reside within that decides their core values and ideologies (Weller & Bassalo 2018). This explains why young adults in Brasilia might have other perceptions than young adults from Bahia or Rio de Janeiro. The spatial-community where young people reside creates a political dimension that are found within a specified territory Sposito (2018) argue. Weller & Bassalo (2018, p. 215) continue, claiming that “... *the political, social, and cultural context, with its breaks and continuities, has an important role in the processes of identity construction that characterize a generation at a given time*”. However, it is important to note that even if people are born within the same social context, the cultural and the political context might be completely different, this can be explained through time periods (Weller & Bassalo 2018). Furthermore, people born at the same time and in the same city might have different lifestyles, household environments, going to different schools, doing different extracurricular activities etc., all of these factors play a part in determining who people become and what they perceive of politics, culture, and social life (Weller & Bassalo 2018). The contexts are dynamic, and people react to different political or cultural situations in a country, and is influenced by these situations. Hence, people can be exposed to the same situations, but react differently.

The ideology of the political elite does not always recollect with the ideology and values of the young people (Farrugia 2018), as young people in Brazil show signs of disgust and distrust towards politicians, political parties and institutions (Silva & Castro 2014).

Corruption and a lack of transparency, representation, and financial accountability make it hard for young adults in Brazil to believe that they are able to have their voices heard and make a change (Mexi & Boursier 2017). Young adults in Brazil are frustrated and confused Saad-Filho (2013, p. 664) argue, and the distrust towards the political institutions distance young adults from politics Filho & Guzzo (2018) further clarify. It seems that young adults do not feel that they are represented by their government (Campello 2019), and this makes it hard for people to voice their requests for change (Baquero & Baquero 2018). There is a crisis of political representation (Campello 2019), and young adults do not see democratic institutions and voting as a way to fix the problems in the country (Mexi & Boursier 2017). Thus, young adults increasingly detach themselves from formal political procedures, with some saying that “*politics is more than voting*” (Box 1824 2014, p. 47 in Mexi & Boursier 2017, p. 12).

Silva & Castro (2014) performed in-depth interviews with young people in Rio de Janeiro to ask about their political engagement. Some of their participants said, “*people don’t like politics*” (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 192), while others do not want to take part in politics because it is boring, bureaucratic and overflowing with corruption (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 192). Politics has moved far away from what is important for the general public, resulting in what politicians say, especially during the election campaign, is not taken seriously. It is seen as empty promises or “problems” far from the actual concerns in society (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 193). Politics is by some considered as exchanges of interests between a limited collective, and benefits only this collective. Others see politics as a way of providing for all, and that politicians should use their power to look after others, they see politics is welfare (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 193). It is hard to understand where a political party’s ideology actually is, some of their informants say. There is no clear divide between left and right in politics, and political parties are starting to become more and more homogenous (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 195). Silva & Castro (2014) are afraid that the lack of political engagement amongst young people might become a threat to democratic institutions and democracy itself, due to an alleged apathy and distrust towards institutionalized politics. This lack of engagement from young people is believed to be some sort of apoliticism because it seems that the young people are moving away from politics due to the questioning of political models, confrontations with the political elite and the regulatory power of institutions (Silva

& Castro 2014, p. 188). Another argument is presented by young adults that participated in a study conducted by Filho & Guzzo (2018) after the protests in 2013. These participants claimed that there is too little knowledge about the political system in the Brazil, and stated that when democracy is the way to rule the country, the voters should know more about the people they elect, and the effect that this person has on the country's political, cultural, social, and economic future.

3.4 - The Brazilian Political System

The Brazilian democracy have, according to Baquero & Baquero (2018, p. 530) struggled to improve its system of representation amongst citizens. They further state that this has been going on for the last three decades, and will also continue in the future. This will, or has already led to, a political culture, that is disillusioned regarding the core democratic values and principles, and has different political practices, which are bad for state legitimacy, such as clientelism, patronage/patrimonialism, and personalism (Baquero & Baquero 2018, p. 530). The Brazilian political system is in theory equal for all, and all can partake in it, but it is the political and the economic elite that controls the muddy waters in the political landscape Santos (2019, p. 152) argue. The political system is constructed in a way where the elite occupy the regions surrounding the muddy waters as well, making it difficult to partake in politics. The system does however remain intact, and the corruption and patronage practices which are deeply ingrained in the political culture is allowed to continue (Power & Taylor 2011). So, what are the characteristics of the Brazilian political system? And which political theories and concepts fit together with these characteristics?

A government's function is to provide its public with basic common goods, as well as being an enforcer of rules and norms that makes the market function (Banerjee & Duflo 2012). The government is moreover responsible for citizens that live in the country, for administrating fair and just law, showing transparency through their actions, and make it so that people who are legally allowed to partake in political processes, are able to (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Thus, the economy and politics in a state are linked to each other, and political views depend on economic persistence (Banerjee & Duflo 2012). An argument from Crandall (2018) states that there is no full functioning democracy without the citizens of a state feeling that they are represented. Citizens should partake in decision-making, and not feel overlooked because of class, race, or religion.

Elections are the legitimate way to obtain power in Brazil, and voting is mandatory from the age of 18 up to 70 (Crandall 2018). There is however a big divide between voters, as political discussions are quite heated, and many are not listening to information that might be negative for their party or favorite politician explain Samuels & Zucco (2019). They add that people filter information provided to them, argue what they believe is right, and those showing opposing thoughts are incorrect (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Political ideologies have little importance (Do Vale 2015), and there is no clear party allegiance amongst voters (Amaral & Meneguello 2017). Besides perhaps partisans for PT (Senters et.al 2019), resulting in candidates and parties focusing on division of people rather than political ideology Do Vale (2015) argue. Abers & von Bulow (2019, p. 112) believes that the political segregation in Brazil can be explained by dividing the political landscape in two: the pro-PT, and the anti-PT. As a result of not feeling represented by the political parties, and constant disappointment from state leaders and other political actors (Campello 2019), many Brazilians now claim to be non-party affiliates (Reid 2014).

The Brazilian state was created before a civil society was established, as opposed to Western states, where a civil society was in place before the state was established, this led to a state accountable for the people, as opposed to current Brazil (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Brazil did not establish a strong and unified collective before implementing state control, rather they put Western ideology on top of a divided, weak, and unstable society, creating the political culture that still persists in the country (Baquero & Baquero 2018). The state took advantage of this divide between people, and arguably still do, based on the continuation of patrimonialism, clientelism, and personalism (Pereira et.al 2016). Moreover, a nation's culture plays a big part in creating political turmoil, or political peace (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Moreover, it is believed that the political culture of a country is the most important indicator or tool for a country's democratic development (Burnell et.al 2011), as it through history affects the possibilities of consolidating the political system (Baquero & Baquero 2018), thus playing a big part in the effectiveness of democratic systems (Moisés 2011). When citizens expect effectiveness from its democratically elected officials, they need not only to depend on the actors themselves, but also on the democratic institutions and the political culture ingrained in the system (Moisés 2011). Hence, if the political culture of the country is too far away from democratic values, problems of democratic development might occur (Burnell et.al 2011). The concept political culture entails the values, ideals, beliefs, and attitudes that lie as

the foundation of a political system. In Brazil, this culture is said to be rotten to its core, Moisés (2011) emphasizes.

3.4.1 - Form of government.

Brazil has a long-standing history with clientelism, patronage, and personalism (Pereira et.al 2016), and is so prone in the political system that it has become part of the political culture (Reid 2014), limiting the political reach of the institutions of the state. They are the rules of the game in Brazilian politics, something all politicians know of, and need to follow, even if they do not want to, it is the only way to get things done (Burnell et.al 2011). Power (2010) argues that Brazil has an institutional design within its democracy that strongly favor the elite and a clientilistic way of governing. Clientelism is a manifestation of power asymmetry, where an actor or institution exchange goods and/or services for political support and votes in an upcoming election (World Bank 2017, p. 62). The way political power is concentrated within the executive branch of government provides the small number of patrons/elites with a huge number of potential clients to exploit (Power 2010, p. 20). Clientelism is a thorn in the side for democratic values, respect for the population, and transparency within a nation-state, due to the effect it has on accountability of actors' actions, and to who's authority to be followed and delegated (World Bank 2017, p. 62).

Patron-client relations or patronage is the organization of political life where the strong, the patrons, use their power over the weak, the clients, in order to keep things, the way they want (Burnell et.al 2011). It functions as quid pro quo politics, where the power inequality between the patron and the client is seen. It is common in Brazil, and is seen as a reciprocal relationship, seeing that both sides are getting something out of it. However just as the scale of power, the gains are unequal (Burnell et.al 2011). The patron-client relations within political organizations and institutions make the autonomy and legitimacy of the state weaker Burnell et.al (2011) further argue. Patronage has been part of Brazil's national culture for decades, and explain why social status is highly regarded (Crandall 2018). "Rouba mas faz" is a common thing in Brazil (Crandall 2018), related to patronage. It means that politicians or parties use the public office to steal, but, while misusing the public office, they deliver on the promises that they have given, so the public does not question the ways it has been done, with some even supporting it. However, there has been a change the recent years, as the

governmental officials are no longer getting results, so people, as well as the justice system, are getting less and less tolerant and demands accountability (Crandall 2018, p. 137).

The patrimonial and clientilistic state enables corruption, and make it part of a country's culture, it generates a socio-economic divide and creates distance between classes (with the political elite is on top (Pereira et.al 2016). Some would argue that the democracy in Brazil is close to authoritarian, with the elite running the show, and the political parties not challenging the underlying clientilistic structure in the democratic environment, because that is just how things are done (Boito et.al 2016, p. 190). Families and friends play a big part in Brazil, and within a highly unequal society, people have clientilistic and patrimonialist strategies in order to best fend for themselves. The culture has, simply put, been transferred to the political space, which might explain why so many Brazilians have not cared about corruption, clientelism, and patrimonialism in government before, as it is part of the Brazilian culture (Taylor 2017). In its essence, the patrimonial state creates "*a dangerous legitimacy gap in the political system*" argue Lamounier (1999 in Pereira et.al 2016, p. 142). The main threat to democracy, is, according to Burnell et.al (2011, p. 262), the mediocrity of the government. Where there is a trend of mediocre performances from the government, where the government does not meet the expectations of the citizens, people are getting more and more fed up, losing faith in the democratic model and the political authority all at the same time.

3.4.2 - Presidential coalitionalism.

The presidential coalitionalism is, according to Sweet (2014, p. 74) a problematic, but stable model of political rule, where the winning party in an election needs to create coalitions with many other parties to create a multiparty regime and have control (Neto 2019). Due to the multi-party system, there is a need for party coalitions in order to pass legislations (Crandall 2018). Thus, the system has opened up for patronage and corruption, as a result of people having to give in order to gain (Avritzer 2017b).

The president in Brazil has great legitimate personal power Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) state, clarifying that the structure of the political system limits it's reach. The system fragments political parties and makes it close to impossible for a president to rule without a coalition with other parties (Reid 2014), that most of the time differ in ideology and political strategy, in order to make something happen. Within these coalitions, the different parties have their own agenda, making it a space of unhealthy rivalry and bickering, with some parties even

threatening with rebellion or political deadlock in order to get what they want (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018). It is believed that the coalitional parties and the president are unequally in need of each other, with the president being in need of support from the coalitional parties. Thus, the president needs to work with clientilistic strategies in order to pass legislations (Power 2010), making the political system fragile (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018). Do Vale (2015) and Crandall (2018) argue otherwise, claiming that the president is able to bypass the power of state government, meaning that the president can stop things put forward by the governmental coalition. The president invites other parties and promise important politicians a ministerial post in order to gain support and majority in Congress, but can stop several legislations if deemed necessary Do Vale (2015) clarify. Nevertheless, Congress in Brazil has started to gain more and more power (Crandall 2018). This was shown when Dilma Rousseff was impeached. In that case, Congress defied the president's power, turning it into a forum that the political opposition can use in order to constrain and undermine the sitting government Kline & Wade (2018, p. 51) assert.

There are drawbacks regarding the coalitional presidentialism function. Power (2010, p. 29) refers to Neto (2008) who presents "*the blanket effect*", referring to the situation when you pull the blanket towards your head, and your feet gradually becomes uncovered. This explains presidential coalitionalism Neto (2008 in Power 2010, p. 29) argue, as in order to gain governability by enhancing presidential power, the democratic quality might erode. Conclusively, in order to cover up, fix, or legislate one aspect, other aspects suffer. This leads to what Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) and Avritzer (2017b) believe to be the biggest drawback of presidential coalitionalism, arguing that it opens up for huge amounts of corruption, and illegal election- and campaign financing. Due to the multiparty system, many parties were created so that individuals could exploit them to get congressional power within the presidential coalition (Reid 2014). Many of these parties do not have any ideological identification (Carreiro & Renno 2019), and are only present to promote the people within the parties, basing their politics on preferential voting or one-candidate incentives (Calvo et.al 2015), and extracting money from public office (Reid 2014). These parties are called "*satellite or patronage parties*" (Boito et.al 2016, p. 198), and they provide support for the bigger parties to secure congressional majority. The bigger parties would never be able to implement their politics without these satellite parties Boito et.al (2016) argue, proclaiming that they exist only to apprehend other parties by blocking votes in Congress. Sweet (2014)

stress that the many differences between the parties in the coalitions are getting starker, creating possible problematic outcomes and “short-cuts” in order to get policies through.

3.5 - Corruption

Corruption and politics are two concepts closely related in Brazil (Crandall 2018), as corruption is part of the way of doing politics Power (2010) proclaims. Corruption is part of the political culture (Amaral & Meneguello 2017), and people are clamoring to the notion that seemingly every politician in the country is corrupt (Taylor 2017), as it is believed that corruption is as mundane as football in the country (Polimedo 2017). This makes it difficult to look at the political system and environment of Brazil, without explaining what political corruption is, and how this affects a state and a government. Corruption is seen as the use of public office for own private gain (Burnell et.al 2011), and is limiting democratic functions in a society, and decreases rather than increases citizen loyalty (Seligson 2002). Moreover, corruption has been a key part within the Brazilian democracy for quite some time, seeing that no government, since democracy was reestablished in 1985, has not been accused of corruption (Taylor 2017), which has made it into a “*troubling constant*” in Brazilian politics (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 1). Besides, it is not just within the political culture that there is corruption, but also in the national culture, it is normal to be corrupt. It has become part of the nation’s identity (Crandall 2018).

Corruption is systematically diminishing democratic values and it gradually removes the faith that citizens have in the democracy (Anderson & Tverdova 2003). Furthermore, corruption can be used to indicate the performance of a democratic political system (Baquero & Baquero 2018), and it reduces the support for the government, no matter how young or how old the democracy is (Power & Taylor 2011). Political corruption is believed to shrink the domain of democracy, thus posing a threat to the legitimacy of a democratic system (Baquero & Baquero 2018), because it deteriorates the core ideals of democratic societies: having equality for all, and having an open decision-making process (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 6-7). When corruption becomes part of the daily political routine in a country, it usually redesigns the political values within said country, which in turn causes political disempowerment amongst citizens, making them believe that they have no voice or influence (Baquero & Baquero 2018, p. 540). Hence, corruption creates political apathy amongst the population, an apathy that will gradually become institutionalized. Corruption leads to lack of trust and lower legitimacy, not only

towards institutions, but also towards individuals (Power & Taylor 2011), and might be considered both a cause and an effect of bad government performance (Seligson 2002, p. 413).

When people are aware of corruption in government, other factors are quick to be judged, thus corruption breeds disgruntlement for other areas of politics Anderson & Tverdova (2003) argue. However, on the other side, if people in a society are aware of corruption, and are indifferent towards it, the democratic values in a society are altered, making people not seeing corruption as a thing that will limit political determinations in the future (Power & Taylor 2011). People who has experienced corruption are according to Seligson (2002) more prone to showing distrust towards a political authority, resulting in lower political legitimacy. People perceive government performance as worse than it really is, on the basis of knowing that the government or people within the government are corrupt (Anderson & Tverdova 2003). Catterberg & Moreno (2005) found that the higher levels of income, the higher levels of political trust, but also, the higher the education, the lower the political trust. The two might work against each other, but what Catterberg & Moreno (2005) explained was that education makes people more critical of political establishments, while income makes people more supportive. Senters et.al (2019, p. 20) have seen through research on public opinion on corruption the last 30 years that Brazilians who are part of the higher-income classes and/or part of the more educated sections of Brazilian society are more prone to declaring corruption as the most important problem in the country. The relationship between income and education when it comes to the concern for corruption within politics in Brazil are significant and positive, and have been so across both surveys and time periods (Senters et.al 2019, p. 20-21). People view corruption as a problem, rather than a problem solver (Senters et.al 2019, p. 24).

In a society where there are high amounts of incidences of corruption, the public are getting more and more used to corruption, making the cost of being corrupt diminish with regards to how the public views the severeness of corruption, thus making corruption not damage the perceptions of politicians as severely as it should (World Bank 2017, p. 68). Citizens in Brazil have acknowledged corruption a problem for policy-making, but many show acceptances of corruption. There are within a great part of the population, a clear lack of understanding of how corruption impacts a democracy in a negative way (Amaral & Meneguello 2017). On another hand, Taylor (2017) argue that the majority of Brazilians say that the politicians and the government are not doing enough to tackle the problems faced because of corruption. It is however important to note that the mensalão and Lava Jato investigations have sparked a

growing trust from the public towards the courts, providing a paved way forwards in order to tackle corruption, as there is now a chance to be sentenced on the basis of corruption (Taylor 2017). Power & Taylor (2011) assert that Brazilians see political parties in their country as the most corrupt institutions in society, and perceive corruption as a factor that have, to a large extent, affected their country politically.

4.0 - Theoretical framework

Political views are created by not only the perceptions of day-to-day life, but also the expectations and behaviors people have (Baquero & Baquero 2018). This harkens back to the arguments presented by Almeida et.al (2018) regarding where people are situated in life. If people's livelihoods are sustainable and adequate, their expectations and perceptions are influenced accordingly, and the same goes for those who struggle financially and socially in life, not having adequate living standards. The expectations people have influence the mentality that they show towards the political arena Baquero & Baquero (2018, p. 536) explains, arguing that this is the reason for why people show support or not towards political figures, systems, or potential policy changes, or that a crisis of trust or legitimacy occurs.

4-1 - Legitimacy

Former president of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso said in 2016 that the country had a crisis of legitimacy because of its broken political system following the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (Crandall 2018). Furthermore, corruption and regime legitimacy are strongly correlated, in a negative manner, meaning that where there are high levels of beliefs that the political figures are corrupt, there are lower levels of regime legitimacy (Power & Taylor 2011), resulting in diminishing levels of legitimacy and trust in state authority following the corruption scandals that have hit Brazil.

State legitimacy derives from state authority (Jones et.al 2004), and the acceptance of citizens to be ruled by this authority (Østerberg 2012). Max Weber argue that authority in a modern society bases itself on the legality of the authority, which are grounded in the rules, laws, and norms that are collectively or unconsciously established in a society (Dillon 2014).

Furthermore, if citizens have a collective support towards the state's political authority, the political authority is considered legitimate (Østerberg 2012). However, if the state's role and

actions are questioned, and signs of distrust creeps forward, there might occur a crisis of legitimacy within the territory. When people debate over whether or not the government is able to fix economic problems, when there is corruption galore within the public office, and when people question the character of people in office, there is a legitimacy crisis Dillon (2014) explains. People do not trust the political entities in power to rule the society anymore, due to the belief that the government is no longer capable of reaching the goals and thus uphold the loyalty required to keep legitimate control over the country or society. Hence, in order to keep political legitimacy, it is impeccable for the state to keep a sound relationship with its citizens (Jones et.al 2004). The contest for legitimacy is never completed or absolute (Painter & Jeffrey 2009, p. 13), it is a continuing battle between those in power, and those who question them (Burnell et.al 2011). When a political figure, party, government or institution advance towards claiming legitimacy, they need the support from the public in order to gain it. They need to secure compliance from citizens, and present frameworks and strategies in order to sustain and balance the expectations that the public has towards them (Painter & Jeffrey 2009, p. 13).

Democratic legitimacy is related to the beliefs that the public have towards democracy and democratic values and procedures make the arguably best way to mold an adequate form of government (Painter & Jeffrey 2009). This argument however is just a way to explain legitimacy for democracy in its theoretical form, not to explain the trust and satisfaction that a public have towards a ruling democratic government. The satisfaction that a citizen has towards a regime depends on said regime's performances, and whether or not these performances are accomplishing what this citizen expects them to (Moisés 2011). The same explanation goes for politicians and political parties as well. Different actors have different upbringings, socio-economic standards, cultural characteristics and livelihoods, which play part in deciding what they perceive with regards to politics. The political identity a person has, decides which expectations they have towards the sitting political authority (Painter & Jeffrey 2009).

4.2 - Political Trust

Political trust is related to people's social capital, political interest, well-being, democratic attitude, and external efficacy (Catterberg & Moreno 2005), and experiences with politics (Moisés 2011), meaning that political trust responds to government performance. Political

distrust is a common variable when looking into the relationship between state and public (Moisés 2011). The more a government or political authority fails to deliver on promises, act corrupt, show low levels of political efficiency, or shows a lack of accountability and transparency, the trust the public has deteriorates gradually for each passing instance (Painter & Jeffrey 2006). Political distrust creates a trend where people are moving out of political participation and are not using elections and their voices when they are questioning the legitimacy of the political institutions. Distrust might lead to cynicism and alienation towards democracy as mode of political ruling in a country, but it does not necessarily mean that people rather wish an authoritarian model of regime rule. Furthermore, those who view corruption as a serious political problem, show dissatisfaction towards democracy as a political model (Moisés 2011, p. 348). People are however, in most cases, more distrusting towards politicians and political parties not “using” democracy the way it is intended, and that are not showing any sign of representativeness or transparency towards the public.

Political trust has a pivotal part in explaining a democratic regime’s stability and legitimacy (Zmerli & Castillo 2015, p. 180). If a government has a low rate of political trust from its population, the government will struggle to implement new policies and undermine the government’s ability to solve the problems they might have created themselves, which again will lead to a lower degree of political trust (Hetherington 1998, p. 791). Trust, stability and legitimacy are, according to Zmerli & Castillo (2015) closely linked with political support and system support. Two concepts explained by David Easton referred to in Layton et.al (2017), Zmerli & Castillo (2015), and Moisés (2011). Easton argue that the government/nation-state/regime is seen as a political system, and the support given to it is based on the orientations of individuals regarding the system and its subsystems. Easton present two different types of regime support (Layton et.al 2017). Specific support is the citizens satisfaction with a government’s political performance, in addition to political leadership, while the diffuse support refers to the attitudes that a citizen has towards the political system in general, the performance of those in control of the system does not matter (Moisés 2011, p. 345). You can trust the democracy and show diffuse support, and you can show specific support to a political party and change your support if you are not satisfied with their performance. The recipients of welfare programs show a greater specific support towards their political system than the nonrecipients Layton et.al (2017, p. 113) reveal. There are however no results showing that there is a difference of diffuse support towards democracy between recipients and nonrecipients of welfare programs. In sum, Layton et.al (2017, p. 114) have

discovered that low-income citizens on welfare programs hold more positive perceptions of the legitimacy of the regime than those who do not receive money from a social welfare program.

Moisés (2011) presents five subcategories of political support: “*support for the political community, for the democratic regime per se, for its performance measured by the satisfaction with the regime, for the democratic institutions in their specific function, and for political actors*” (Moisés 2011, p. 346). The first level refers to the geographical location of the political support, it refers to the way that the citizens of a nation-state subjects to its territorial and political borders, and identities. Despite having the world becoming closer and closer and more and more alike due to globalization, the political and territorial frontiers are what keep the citizens together and creates a collective identity that is the basis for the support of the political community. The second level of political support refers to the democratic regime *per se* and suggests that the citizens prefer democracy to other political regimes. The citizens are supporting the democratic regime as an ideal, and is supporting the values that comes with it: participation, tolerance, liberty, the rule of law etc. For some, this level is explained as the Churchill hypothesis: democracy might be flawed, but it is the best option available. The third level refers to the citizens satisfaction with the democratic regime ruling day-to-day, which is applicable to the satisfaction that the citizens have towards the current democratic rule. The fourth level goes a bit deeper into the support of the democracy, and looks at the democratic institutions like the Parliament, Congress, political parties, the judiciary etc. and is evaluated by how much support the citizens show the political institutions in the country. The fifth and last level refers to the political actors, people in the so-called political class in society, and the support citizens have towards them. The way to evaluate this is to look at how the citizens view these political actors’ political behavior and their government’s performance (Moisés 2011).

Unequal societies have lower social trust than equal societies, which in return leads to more corruption, which leads to more inequality and less trust (Zmerli & Castillo 2015). Income inequality is pivotal for democratic legitimacy, as it furthermore is negatively related to people’s willingness to trust and support both the political authority and the institutions and actors working for the nation-state (Zmerli & Castillo 2015, p. 190). It is the authority of the country that are deemed responsible for the inequality of a country, which leads to people questioning the performance of its leaders, thus creating a lack of legitimacy and political

trust. Hence, if the authority fails to provide equal distribution of goods and services, a lower rate of political trust from the population will occur.

The majority of citizens in Brazil show a deep distrust towards a great number of actors within the political sphere (Moisés 2011, p. 339), they do however trust democracy as a political model (Moisés 2011). Not only do they show distrust towards politicians, but also the Parliament, political parties, executive branches of the state and public services in general (Barbosa et.al 2014). If a population do not feel secure and believe that the government policies are not in place to protect them, people turn to cynicism, political resignation, and hostility (Baquero & Baquero 2018, p. 539). In Brazil, this has happened because people have become “used” to the government not being there for them, which has created a situation where people have become fed up and uncertain about their future, as they do not know what the government are planning on doing, and which policies that will be implemented. There is a mass attitude within the public, where there is a stronger belief in negative partisanship than in partisanship (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). People are coming together over the hatred and disappointment towards parties, politicians and the political system, rather than support and trust (Samuels & Zucco 2019, p. 270). The support and trust for the political parties hit a low point in 2016, and many believe that Brazil still has not recovered, being more focused on negative partisanship rather than actual politics and ideology (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). Negative partisanship combined with the charisma of a candidate are believed to be two of the biggest factors that explains voting behavior in Brazilian election processes (Samuels & Zucco 2019, p. 270-271). With this strong questioning of the legitimacy of the political system in the country, it probably has a negative effect on the quality of the Brazilian democracy Moisés (2011) conclude. Moisés (2011, p. 354) has found, with statistical significance, that individuals with little schooling show more satisfaction towards democracy, and show greater political trust than those with more time in school. Furthermore, people with less schooling, show a higher amount of indifference for which type of political regime it is that rules the country. They do however show a higher amount of support for an authoritarian one than undergraduates. Catterberg & Moreno (2005) argues however that political trust is more common amongst people with democratic values and attitudes, due to their belief in democratic institutions. They believe that the more politically interested an individual is, the higher the political trust.

Barbosa et.al (2014) argue that the low level of political consumerism amongst young adults in Brazil is a reaction of them living too long with their families, and not fending for

themselves, rather than political distrust in society influencing them. Nevertheless, there are low levels of trust towards the political system and its institutions from the young adults in Brazil Barbosa et.al (2014) clarify. Believably, according to Campello (2019), as a result of a lack of representation from political parties and institutions, and the same entities not reaching the public's expectations. Additionally, Silva & Castro (2014, p. 198) argue that *“the loss of credibility of formal politics, that is, of parties, government, and institutions, has distanced not only young people, but adults as well, from political engagement”* (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 198).

4.3 - Ideology and Representation

Political ideology is a *“set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved”* (Erikson & Tedin 2003, p. 64 in Jost et.al 2009, p. 309). Ideologies are the beliefs and values that are shared within classes, based on the perception and interpretation that individuals within the classes have towards social life (Østerberg 2012, Jost et.al 2009). Political ideologies shape how individuals view political situations, and determine how these individuals make sense of these situations (Anderson & Singer 2008). The political ideology that people have influence the evaluation of governments, political figures and parties, establishing criteria based on the values that reflect the class and how people make sense of social reality. Political parties and figures thus establish ideologies that fit certain classes or fractions of classes.

Political representation is linked to the concept of ideology, as the policy platforms that political parties and actors follow is considered political ideology (Epstein 2009, p. 338). People vote based on the ideology that both them and political parties and figures represent Epstein (2009) further explains. If political parties do not show signs of any ideology, people do not know what they stand for. A lack of ideology makes it difficult for individuals to know which values the parties and politicians have with regards to social life and the world around. Hence, a lack of ideology creates a lack of representation.

Representation occurs when there is harmony between the interest of those represented and the actions of the representatives (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010, p. 7). Political actors are seen as the incubators for people's values, beliefs, and interest, their political ideologies. This means that if these political actors lack a political ideology, they are not able to represent the beliefs and values of the voters. Representation thus refers to the commitment that potential

representatives show with regards to represent and fulfill the interests and well-being of the represented (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010). Hence, when political figures do not represent the values and beliefs that individuals stand for, these individuals are not represented by these figures (Dovi 2018). Moreover, the level of political representation determines the legitimacy of the representatives (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010). Subsequently, a lack of representation creates an environment where individuals start to question the legitimacy of the figures and system meant to represent them.

4.4 - Where to go From Here?

I will in the analysis focus further on the young adults' position in life, as well as traits characterizing the traditional middle-class, in order to examine what helps explain the experiences that young adults have with political trust in Brazil. Furthermore, I will examine how the recent political history in Brazil and design of the political system ties together with the attitudes and experiences of the young adults, to better illustrate their statements. Moreover, due to cities playing a part in influencing young adults' political, social, and cultural values (Farrugia 2018), the city of Brasilia becomes a tool useful for explaining the attitudes and experiences of the young adults. Additionally, how the participants view the political parties and the politicians in the country in general, and with regards to their relationship with corruption will be analyzed. Thus, theories of how corruption influence politics, as well as remarks made by additional research, will be used to analyze the attitudes of the young adults.

I will continue to examine political trust and legitimacy, in addition to concepts such as representation, influence, ideology. Hence, how a lack of influence is perceived by the young adults will be examined through looking at possible explanations on why this influence is lacking, including looking at its effects on political trust. Moreover, I will examine different reasons for political distrust and lack of legitimacy, and connect them with the answers provided by my interview subjects. By doing so, I create a layer to be further used in the discussion. Following the analysis, where the experiences and views of the interview subjects will be covered, I will move over towards a discussion. I will discuss whether or not the attitudes of the young adults show signs of political distrust both towards the democracy in Brazil, as well as the political institutions and figures, and the political system as a whole. Additionally, I will examine and discuss how the attitudes and experiences of the young

adults point toward a crisis of legitimacy for the political system in Brazil. As a result, the concepts and theories addressed in chapters 3 and 4 will be, as mentioned above, further examined, in order to cover the discussion.

5.0 - Analysis

I will in this chapter address the data that I have gathered from the research participants. The data will be both paraphrases and quotes that are directly pulled from the interviews, to better illustrate the attitudes and experiences of the participants. Theories and arguments presented from secondary literature earlier in the thesis will be used to provide a deeper understanding of the primary data gathered from the participants, prior to the discussion.

Aforementioned, I have gathered data from 23 young adults from the traditional middle-class in Brasilia through focus group interviews and e-mail interviews. These individuals vary in age, but are all similar through the characterization of young adults. These are people in a period of life where they are either recently entered adulthood, or are on the verge of (Sposito 2018). Defining young adults however depends, as mentioned, on where they are located with regards to cultural standing, education, income, social life, family situation, housing situation, and economic independence (Scalon & Costa 2018, p. 101). These criteria play a part in defining the interview subjects as part of the young adult class, and also play a role in determining their political ideology and attitude towards politics and political entities (Farrugia 2018). All research participants have been given a pseudonym, in order to keep their identity hidden. The list of informants can be found as an appendix to the thesis. The data has been analyzed through the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 11. Moreover, a thematic method of qualitative analysis has been used during the analysis and coding process, in order to fully grasp the underlying reason for the attitudes that the interview subjects have. The thematic analysis provides ways of interpreting the experiences and opinions of the participants, creating data that illustrates how Brazilian politics is perceived by this group of people (Braun & Clarke 2006).

How do the participants of this research perceive the political environment in the country? Which beliefs and opinions do they have towards their elected officials, and the political system? Why do they think like this? What explains the different views that the young adults have? How do they experience political trust, and do the attitudes, experiences and beliefs of young adults in the Brazilian traditional middle-class in Brasilia show signs of a crisis of

legitimacy? And how is this explained in the context of the recent political history of Brazil, the social and political polarization, and the groups class and age?

5.1 - The Brazilian Divide

The Brazilian society is highly divided due to inequality between classes, a divide that according to Hagopian (2019) has always been present. This inequality has created tensions amongst Brazilian citizens, as the divide, according to the World Bank (2017), is between classes, ethnicities, and political ideologies. Moreover, the political elite in the country has become its own branch in the societal class structure (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). A social class that distrusted as a result of the political situation in the country (Polimedo 2017). Power & Taylor (2011) believe that the social context in Brazil has created an environment where it is natural to think that the elite might see themselves as superior to the rest, arguing that they might not need to show accountability and transparency towards the remaining classes, as they are beneath the elite. The traditional middle-class in Brazil is a group of people below the elite, but with a high economic power and social standing. It is a branch of people defined by a high level of education (Dillon 2014). They do however believe that they are forgotten by the rest of society (Saad-Filho & Morais 2018), because of what they believe to be corruption amongst the political elite (Crandall 2018), and laziness amongst the poor (Singer 2014).

This analysis does not intend to go much further into the reasons for the divide(s), but wish to look at how the Brazilian political and social divide is described and can be used to explain the experiences and attitudes that young adults have regarding the political system. Hence, it becomes necessary to look at the traditional middle-class views and experiences, as well as the polarization of Brazilian society and politics, and see how it influences the participants. The analysis will examine how societal differences play a part in shaping the respondents' attitudes towards the political system and conclusively provide a deeper understanding on how it affects their political trust.

The term "bread and circus" politics has been provided by the respondents such as Molly and William, two of the young adults from Brasilia participating in this study. In their eyes the concept explains the relationship between class divide and politics in Brazil. They explain that as long as people are given basic needs, and something beautiful, or entertaining to look at or experience, they are satisfied. The poorer and less educated, ergo, the lower classes, the

respondents argue, are satisfied with “bread and circus”, but those more educated, who know what to expect from a government, are not satisfied with this type of politics, as they know what is absent. Brian advance this belief, while providing commenting the social gap in Brazil. He states that the majority of Brazilians lack an economic understanding when electing politicians, only thinking about social issues and religious ideology. The opinions presented by Molly, William, and Brian show a difference in how people view the political environment in Brazil. They see situations where the lower classes are satisfied with the smaller things, empty promises, and ideological beliefs. Being from a city that observably has little poverty (Waldstein 2014), and a good infrastructure (El-Dahdah 2005), combined with the possible right / center-right mindset that exist in the city (Kingstone & Power 2017), and how family and friends assert the political situation, might be part in explaining why they have these attitudes (Weller & Bassalo 2018). The social gap in Brazil might be seen differently by other groups in Brazil, and it is highly likely that living in Brasilia, together with being from the traditional middle-class have created an attitude towards seeing Brazil in this way. Furthermore, the higher the education, the more are people aware of what to expect from the government (Moisés 2011), the more accountability and transparency is demanded.

The political elite in Brazil is its own thing, argue a number of the informants. The political elite is seen as a group of people becoming rich on politics, and using politics to stay rich argue Danilo. A strategy consisting of keeping poor people poor (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera (2019, p. 251). This makes the country regressive argue the respondents Hans, Lea and Dia. Others claim that the political elite is the one functioning elite in the country, and has social, economic, and political power. Molly claim that these are people who expect to be seen as superiors to the rest of the population, which makes them not having to think about others. She defines them as messy and dishonest people, who do not think that they have to work for others. Moreover, the attitudes of the interview subjects tie in with the statement provided by Power & Taylor (2011), that what the people “up top” are doing, is not other people’s business. The political elite believe this to be true, that politics should not be meddled with by those not in the political elite. There are clear distinctions between classes in Brazil, which is also why people talk about “*each monkey has its own branch*” (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 11). Politics is a concept for the elite, which is why Lea joke about not having the class to talk about politics, when asked how she would describe Brazilian politics.

I am a person with a certain degree of instruction (superior education) and I understand very little of politics. I believe that the opinion of many in Brazil, when it comes to

politics, is based and affected by how their familiars see politics themselves. It's something that goes from "father to son". For instance, my family was more sympathetic with politics when Brazil was ruled by FHC (Fernando Henrique Cardoso), and not by Lula. So, this is something that has affected me. The majority don't really go after studying about the topic in order to shape their own opinion about it. On this way, we end up with a lot of people talking about politics without looking at different strands (sides) and its backgrounds. (Paula)

The statement above describes how people are introduced to politics in Brazil, through families or friends. But, there are limited knowledge, and people base their perceptions on things that they hear, or vote based on who they do not like. Forte's (2014) explanation about Brazilians living with their parents until the age of 30, might explain why Paula see politics like this. Moreover, she explains Forte's remarks herself, as she sees politics like something that goes from family member to family member. People vote for who their family vote for. Additionally, another explanation for her description of politics can be found in the statements provided by Farrugia (2018). Young adults' political ideology is influenced by the people that are close to them (Farrugia 2018). In addition to how they experience their daily life, and situations regarding politics, society and economy create political views (Jones et.al 2004). Hence, it is understandable that Paula has these attitudes towards politics. Her attitude is a result of her experiences and locality (Farrugia 2018). Even with the level of education that she has, she does not understand politics. This, in combination with the political chaos might have created a political fatigue amongst young adults, hypothetically make it easier to "just" follow the family.

There are problems in the political debate in Brazil, as people and politics increasingly become polarized (Avelino & Fisch 2019). This polarization has created a toxic environment regarding political debates some participants assert. The two last sentences in Paula's statement in above emphasize these debates. People do not study politics she says, creating situations where the pre-decided support, most commonly influenced by the family, is the only argument people have regarding politics. Thus, creating situations with extremism on all sides Danilo clarify. He states that the extremism has created an environment where people do not listen to each other. Nobody discusses politics, there is only hate towards politicians and political parties. Moreover, many voters have become moved by hatred to other parties, rather than ideology Carlo clarify, while Danilo believes the divide to be pro-Lula versus anti-Lula, rather than pro-PT and anti-PT (Abers & von Bulow 2019). If you support one party, then you do not listen to what other people have to say Danilo further claim. Samuels & Zucco (2019)

presents a similar argument, as they assert that people filter out what they do not want to hear. It has gotten to a point where political ideology does not matter (Carreiro & Renno 2019). People are losing interest in politics because of reactions like these, in combination with political actors that they do not trust or feel represented by. Noticeably, the research participants experience the political environment presented by Mexi & Boursier (2017) in section 3.4. The lack of representation, ideology, party allegiance, and respect for the opposition has created a landscape where political fatigue has been established Mexi & Boursier (2017) proclaim. Explaining why people like Danilo and Carlo state that there is no room for debates in politics anymore.

5.2 - The Political System, a Mess?

The political system in Brazil is seen as a disillusioned, with practices such as clientelism, patrimonialism and personalism (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Practices that has created an unhealthy political culture in a system, that in theory, is equal for all, but in reality, is controlled by a political elite (Santos 2019). In its core, political ideologies are of little importance, both for politicians and for the public (Carreiro & Renno 2019), seeing that there is no clear party allegiance on either side (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). This has created a political environment where candidates and parties focus on division of people rather than political ideology (Do Vale 2015).

In order to understand the young adult's attitudes regarding political distrust, is it important to see how the participants characterize the political system. I asked the informants how they would describe the political system and environment in the country. During a group interview, Lea, David, Dia, Hans, and Martha reacted with laughter. In another group interview, Miriam, Raquel and Molly all agreed that the system is very complicated, messy, and dishonest. The belief that politics in Brazil is a mess is shown by many respondents when asked to describe politics in the country. Clarinha say that the political system in Brazil is made up by a poorly motivated, ineffective, and uncooperative management that fear that creating initiatives promoting efficiency will result in lawsuits and minor problems for the party or politicians in charge. An attitude most likely to have been established by the experiences that she has had with the political system. Young adults are influenced by the situations around them (Farrugia 2018) so if Clarinha has experienced different politicians trying to make it better for themselves, by limiting others, a negative attitude is likely to be created. Danilo explains that

in Brazil, there is not a high level of politics, creating a situation where people have become accustomed to mediocrity. A big threat to democracy according to Burnell et.al (2011, p. 262). Franco and Francisca characterize the Brazilian political system as an area with too many political parties that has a lack of long-term commitments and ideology.

Moreover, Miriam and Dia thinks that the system does not work for the Brazilian culture, as there are too many differences in the country, with different people with different understandings of societal and political issues. William takes it a step further in his explanation of the divide between people in Brazil.

I myself think the political system in Brazil is not fit for a country that was born in social differences, with racial differences, and how can we have like representatives, how can we represent people, how can one represent some people that they don't know of. You know? How can a white guy really know what is going on to a black person here? (William)

These attitudes and the explanation that has been presented above arguably stem from the experiences that the interview subjects have had with politics and social differences. With the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (Saad-Filho 2017), the Lava Jato investigation and the continuing results from it (Senters 2019), and the big protests in 2013 and 2014 (Reid 2014), the young adults in Brazil have experienced a fair share of political situations that potentially influence their views on political institutions and figures. Moreover, they experience a divided country territorially, politically, culturally and socially (Sposito 2018, Almeida et.al 2018). They do not see the values of certain classes correlating with others, as there are too many cultures within the Brazil, creating a divide between classes and societal fractions. Noticeably, the political system does not represent all, as there are glaring differences between the rulers and those being ruled.

5.2.1 - Presidential coalitionalism and the role of Congress.

Presidential coalitionalism is a model of governmental control when no single party has the majority in the house (Sweet 2014). Thus, in a country where the votes are divided between 35 political parties, such a model is needed, in order to keep political stability. It is a complicated model to look at, and some of the informants did not have any knowledge of the concept. Those informants who understand the concept of presidential coalitionalism believe that presidential coalitionalism is a road to corruption, and something that upholds problems within the political system. Hence, as a result, some participants believe that Congress might

be the biggest problem in the country together with corruption, as these two are linked together through the design of presidential coalitionism (Crandall 2018). Presidential coalitionism has become, in the eyes of some informants, the symbol of what is wrong with the political parties in the country.

In Oribe's mind, presidential coalitionism did work in the past. He believes however that due to the alterations that has happened in politics the last years, it does not anymore. The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff has been pointed out by some informants as a reason for why presidential coalitionism does not work. They believe that the Congress misused their power, creating a situation where the country had a leader (Michel Temer) that was not democratically elected. Hence, the argument presented by Kline & Wade (2018, p. 51) might explain how these interview subjects gained their attitude towards the situation. Congress serves as a place where the political opposition can constrain and undermine, and in the worst case, remove, the sitting government (Kline & Wade 2018). Some participants point out that the presidential coalitionism deteriorates the political power that the president has, due to the president needing the Congress to pass bills. The Congress however do not need the president. Thus, a scenario is created Francisca and Clarinha argue, where the public start to question whether or not the members of Congress has the interest to govern the people. The people in Congress, ergo politicians, consequently become the political elite. As politics is considered by some as exchanges of interest between a limited group of people, to benefit this limited group (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 193).

A number of the participants believe that the model creates an unstable political environment which have, and will continue to alter the political order of the country. They believe that it is the result of political parties only wanting to get into power to extract money from the public budget. Many see presidential coalitionism as a dirty way to gain power, and a reason for the lack of ideological commitment from political parties. The continuing argument towards the political elite being its own distrusted entity continues to be an explanation for why the young adults do not show trust in politicians (Filho & Guzzo 2018). Furthermore, the lack of ideology plays a big part, as it shows that the participants wish that the political figures in the country would "stand" for something, rather than only longing for power. Not knowing what their elected officials base their decisions from, and how they make sense of their social life (Østerberg 2012, Jost et.al 2009) might create a feeling of apathy regarding the political elite, which again, might become distrust, as they do not see values and beliefs in the forefront of decision making, only the hunger for power, no matter the cost.

5.3 - A Crisis Occurs?

When did the political crisis occur? Why? Has it happened? Former president Cardoso argue that the political chaos occurred when Dilma was impeached, and that this led to a crisis of legitimacy in the country (Crandall 2018). Do the answers provided by the participants entail that they agree with the former president? The majority of the research participants believe that there is a political crisis at the moment, while one single minority believe that there was one, but that it surpassed in the vacuum between the impeachment and the 2018 election. During the process of analyzing the responses provided by my interview subjects, I noticed many differing opinions to why the political crisis occurred, and why it is continuing to this day. This section will therefore examine the different factors the respondents argue are the reasons for the political crisis in Brazil.

The majority of the respondents see the political crisis as a result of mismanagement from politicians, a lack of political ideology and representation, lack of transparency, and immense amounts of corruption in politics. Experiencing the situations that has occurred in combination with being more aware of what to expect from the government might be part in explaining why they see the political crisis in this way. The reason for the political crisis in Brazil is Brazil some respondents argue, is that the political system is rotten to the core. The system has, according to Molly, Raquel, and Miriam been rotten since the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese, becoming the reason for the political crisis in the country. They believe that the system makes good people bad, and bad people worse, subsequently leading to the current situation. Florence says that the population becoming more aware of the corruption scandals, resulting in the Brazilian population being more and more unsatisfied with governmental performances in general. Access to more information has in her experience played a part in weakening the legitimacy and trust which the public have towards the political entities in the country. This further emphasize that education is part in explaining the views of the participants (Moisés 2011). Moreover, increased transparency make so that people are aware of what is going on in politics. This has, in Florence's mind, done so that Brazil now has sunk deep into a political crisis. She adds that the real problems that Brazil is facing are education, health, and social differences not being targeted by the politicians.

The political elite has according to Power & Rodrigues-Silvera (2019) been part in increasing the inequality in the country, which can be argued to give only money to themselves, or limit

the benefits for the rest of the population. With the research participants being part of the traditional middle-class and being regarded as people with a high level of education (Almeida & Guarnieri 2017), they are arguably aware of what the government should be focusing on. They are aware of policies and actions that might decline or increase inequality, and are thus creating political attitudes as they are experiencing the actions from the government (Farrugia 2018). Thus, when they experience politicians and the political elite not focusing on areas as education, health, and social differences, political views are shaped accordingly, creating distrust towards said actors. Hence, the politicians are by many interview subjects seen as the real problem in Brazil, and an important contributing factor for the political crisis. Clarinha suggests that politicians have lost their ethical parameters, which the public now is starting to notice. Politics has gotten to the point where the public do not take politicians seriously anymore, as it has been uncovered and experienced several times that the promises politicians express are “empty” and “fake” (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 193). When asked what they think of the politicians in the country, a great number of respondents tie corruption and politicians together. Paula clarify that there are no clean parties in Brazil, only politicians that are involved in a money stealing system.

By taking this opinion of politicians and political parties being the real problem further, it has been observed that some participants point towards PT and former president Dilma Rousseff as the main factor for the political crisis. Carlo say that the uncovering of scandals directed at the last administration shook the political environment in a way that the political environment has become highly polarized, with an increasingly weakened left wing. Paula continues by saying that, in her mind, that the political crisis started with Dilma, and her weakness in office. The experiences that people have had with the PT government most likely created this belief. This was the party that was supposed to alter politics, but instead politics altered the party (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Furthermore, it was during Dilma’s presidential period that the Lava Jato investigation started (Senters et.al 2019), the 2013 and 2014 protests took place (Sweet 2014), and the economy faltered (Saad-Filho 2017). Consequently, it is highly likely that attitudes were influenced by these situations, in addition to living in Brasilia, in the midst of the political chaos. Additionally, living with their traditional middle-class family, who, according to Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) statistically show higher levels of support for the political parties and politicians situated at the right side of the political scale. These factors might have influenced these young adults’ attitudes towards the PT, Dilma, and Lula, and their role in creating the political crisis.

There are however others that believe that the political crisis is correlated with the PT and Dilma, but see it from a different angle. These respondents argue that the 2014 election result and the 2016 impeachment were the reasons, together with the path taken after the impeachment, that Brazil found themselves in a political crisis. Maria believe that the political crisis in the country started in 2014, when the losing parties in the election, together with its supporters, never accepted the result. She experienced a situation where the opposition did what they could to remove PT and get into power. In the end, the design of presidential coalitionalism was Dilma's demise, as the Congress misused their power and influence (Kline & Wade 2018), showing similarities to Maria's statements. Saad-Filho (2017) show inclinations towards this possibly being the reason, as the impeachment showed the polarization between political parties, creating a further environment of distrust, not only between political parties and politicians, but also amongst partisans. At the same time, Maria additionally assert, the Lava Jato investigation started, further adding injury to the political situation. Francisca goes a bit further, as she sees the impeachment as a political coup performed by Michel Temer and the Congress. She sees this situation as the pinnacle of Brazil's political chaos, as it, in her mind, exposed the corrupt political system.

As one might detect, a split between the informants is present. This do however correlate heavily with the rest of Brazil, where people have different perceptions regarding the political crisis, PT, Dilma, and Lula (Boito et.al 2016). This is understandable, as shown earlier in this analysis, and by Abers & von Bulow (2019, p. 112) that explains the political polarization in Brazil through dividing the population in two: pro-PT and anti-PT. Thus, it is common to see both sides in arguments regarding politics. Some believe it is the PT's fault, and others do not, pointing towards other reasons (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Further increasing the negative partisanship (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019), and the hostility between people when talking about politics, as explained by Danilo & Carlo.

5.4 - Corruption, a way to Explain Politics?

Corruption and politics in Brazil are two things that are never far apart (Crandall 2018). Corruption has become something of a daily routine in the country (Amaral & Meneguello 2017), and as show by the Lava Jato investigation (Taylor 2017), it runs deep into politics. How do the participants view corruption and politics? What is their attitude towards it? And do they see corruption as a major part in explaining the political turmoil in Brazil? If so, how

do they connect it? It will be interesting to see what this group has to say against corruption and politicians, seeing that they are “in the middle of it” being from Brasilia, the political and bureaucratic center of Brazil (Waldstein 2014).

When asked in the interview, whether or not people saw corruption as a bad thing for government, all agreed, where most imply that democratic values are under attack when corruption occur. Emphasizing comments presented by Baquero & Baquero (2018) and Power & Taylor (2011) stating that corruption prevents people to get a better life, and it construct a greater level of inequality, in an already unequal country. Corruption is, according to Florence, the disease that is contaminating Brazilian politics. She believes that corruption play a big part in explaining how Brazilian politics have gotten to the point of a crisis. She explains that it prevents people from basic education and health, which opens up for an environment where people vote for the candidate with the most promises to improve these institutions, instead of those with the best and most realistic projects and strategies. The participants believe in democratic values, and have experienced a political climate where corruption has limited democratic values (Anderson & Tverdova 2003), and shocked the core of Brazil with the continuing results of the Lava Jato investigation. Phillip’s statement below provides a summary of how the respondents of this research have connected the effects of political corruption in Brazil.

Not only because it makes it more difficult to achieve the common good, but also because it undermines the confidence of the citizen in the democracy itself. This is what we see in the case of some Brazilians who ask for the return of the military dictatorship, believing that our current situation would improve if we had military in power, since “Brazilians do not know how to vote”. (Phillip)

The political environment is, at this moment in Brazilian political history, completely taken by corruption a majority of the research participants argue. Additionally, clarifying that people in charge of politics are only concerned about their own well-being, thus opening up for corruption by giving advantages to companies of people that are connected to the political elite, as have been mentioned above. Francisca provide a deeper clarity to the issue, as she says that the problem is not only selfish politicians, but the belief that these politicians will no be investigated or punished for their acts. The political system is run in such a way that corruption is the only way to get legislations through Congress (Crandall 2018), as shown by informants talking about presidential coalitionalism. Maria believes that the impeachment of

Dilma showed the bad effects that corruption has on a democracy. In her opinion, Brazil has gotten to the level where nothing happens without corruption being involved. She states that if a project or a policy has been introduced to the public, it has most likely gone through a mechanism where dirty money has been involved. Corruption she argues is harmful for democracy because:

Corrupt politicians will try to work together – mostly because they know dirty things about each other that can be dangerous if the population/police find out about it – to get things done their way. (Maria)

Honest people do not win in Brazilian politics asserts Raquel. A view that can be explained through seeing the experiences that people have had with the Lava Jato investigation. The young adults see politicians taking money, bad people getting in power, and staying in power. The respondents are influenced by the things happening around them (Farrugia 2018), and shaped by their political identity (Painter & Jeffrey 2009). Lea adds that there is a need for politicians to dance with the music, if you do not dance, you cannot do things. Hans additionally asserts that in his experience, corruption in Brazil occurs as a result of the political system. No one can govern without being corrupt, he states. In order to get things done, there is a need for politicians to be corrupt, there is no way around it. As commented earlier, it is possible to understand these views through the situations that occurred in Brazil. This arguably made people uncertain of policies and projects. They have experienced that the common way of Brazil is paying people off, resulting in them expecting it to happen. An argument presented by informants, speaks towards the relationship between the political system and corruption. Would people trust the political system if there was no corruption? It seems highly likely that corruption plays an immense part in the lack of legitimacy and trust in the political system and the politicians (Baquero & Baquero 2018), and furthermore, some are pointing fingers towards corruption as the biggest issue (Taylor 2017). Some respondent believe that politicians are corrupt, some argue it is the parties, and others argue the political system in itself. Resulting in attitudes showing that the relationship between corruption and politics in Brazil is strong.

So, is it the system or the politicians that is the problem? There are differing opinions of this, with some stating that it is the politicians that are the bad eggs, destroying the political system from the inside, using it only to create bigger paychecks for themselves. Raquel, Molly, and Miriam believe that an environment where corruption is accepted has been created, because, in their mind, there is no impunity and no accountability. There are people who argue that bad

politicians created a horrible environment within the political system which corrupts everybody that enters it. Some believe that there are honest people in politics, not many of them, but some.

Politicians are corrupt, but so are Brazilians. Brazil's problem is the base. Here everyone wants to know if there will be some kind of gap that will allow you not to pay a tax, there is always a small way to fix it... The rules aren't clear enough and they aren't followed. When the politicians achieve the power, that same vision comes with them. (Paula)

The statement above give insight in the Brazilian culture, where people are getting used to corruption, because corruption is part of the culture in Brazil (Crandall 2018). Respondents present arguments claiming that the corruption in Brazil is in the roots of not only the political system, but in the national culture as well, tying it to the concept of “jeitinho brasileiro”, doing the most for yourself with as little work as possible (Sweet 2014). Danilo explains that in his experience, corruption in politics is only a reflex of society. He believes that when people in Brazil have the opportunity to be corrupt, they tend to be. He calls it a national symptom, where people are corrupt without thinking about it, in politics however, everything is bigger he concludes.

5.4.1 - Jeitinho brasileiro and rouba mas faz.

Jeitinho has been a commonplace in the national culture for a long time, and controls the political environment (Sweet 2014). This was mentioned by Paula, as she states that people only care about their “cuadra”, which is their closest community in Brasilia (El-Dahdah 2005), and they do not think about the whole of the city or the country. For Danilo, the problem with jeitinho is the idea that something that was once considered a bad act, a corrupt act and way of living has been normalized by not only corrupt elected officials, but also the common man and woman in Brazil. Raquel explains that jeitinho brasileiro is found in every Brazilian, that it is not only politicians that follow this, but also the population. Molly explains that this occurs because the country does not work, so people are forced to do it themselves. This mindset she explains, make people do things the quick and easy way for themselves. Phillip provide an explanation of jeitinho brasileiro that is fitting for how it is part of the national culture of the country.

“Jeitinho brasileiro” is corruption in small things: skip the line, cheat in the exam, sit on seats intended for the elderly. In my opinion, this is the result of a generalized

condescendence that the Brazilians have with corruption. Not only in politics, but in the everyday life. "After all, everyone does it. So, what's the problem?", they say. (Phillip)

This normalization of corruption has led to people using the phrase *rouba mas faz* when talking about political life in Brazil. It is a concept understood as a situation where the politician is corrupt, but at least he/she gets things done. Corruption has, in one way of seeing it become such a problem in Brazil, that people see *rouba mas faz* as a victory with regards to politics and corruption, or so normalized that it is better to vote for those who give something back to the community, Paula and Phillip asserts. *Rouba mas faz* has become, according to David, Martha and Lea, the light in the end of the tunnel, due to the system being so corrupt. People are finding positives in the negative, in order to manage to live and keeping their spirits up. By having experienced accounts of corruption scandals, and in the end, not trusting the political entities, people have become accustomed to negativity, and rather try to see the positive (Catterberg & Moreno 2005). At least something is being provided for. Francisca explains, that she experiences Brazil as a reality where it does not matter if the politician is corrupt, as long as he or she gives something in return, some little thing that guarantees votes in the next election. Frida argues that politicians need to disguise their real attentions in the political sphere, by actually accomplishing something good for society. If this do not occur she states, the politician probably will not be re-elected, as he or she has not provided anything for society. Additionally, the majority of participants believe that when politicians are compared, and when all are corrupt, people vote for the people that they hope provide something for society. These attitudes tie into the bread and circus politics mentioned at the start of sub-chapter 5.1. People see the small things and vote for that person, because they do not know what the other people bring (Reid 2014). This might furthermore be a reaction to the lack of ideology within the political parties and institutions (Carreiro & Renno 2019). Moreover, *rouba mas faz* can be seen as a continuation of corruption in politics, but also as a continuation of a national culture where the politicians are seen as their own social class above everyone else, and stating that what they are doing is not other people's business (Power & Taylor 2011). Perhaps *rouba mas faz* is the way people are able to accept these social and political differences?

5.5 - Lack of Ideology = Lack of Representation?

It has been observed that there are attitudes regarding a lack of representation from political institutions, parties, and politicians down towards the rest of the Brazilian public. Phillip

believes that most of the political elite do not have any representation amongst the Brazilian population, as they are only accountable to the political class itself, their political party, and their campaign founders. His statement shows a situation where there is no harmony between the represented and the representatives, none of the values and beliefs of the other classes are represented by the political elite (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010). Phillip additionally states that the Lava Jato investigation provided the transparency needed to see this, and he believes that politicians are only trying to please those who funded their campaign, and that their only concern is the next election. The politicians are not committed to represent and fulfill the interests and well-being of the people (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010, Dovi 2018). Phillip's statements add to the views of other respondents and researchers, saying that the elite are further increasing the divide between them and the rest of the population (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). However, are there other attitudes, experiences and beliefs regarding a possible lack of representation from politicians towards the rest of the Brazilian population?

I asked the respondents of the research whether or not they felt represented by the politicians in the country, and if they felt that they had a voice and being able to have some kind of political influence. Many feels that they have nothing to say, due to politics being "limited" to one certain group. The majority of the respondents claim that the politicians, the general public's representatives are not looking after the citizens of the country, they are only looking after themselves. Thus, according to Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle (2010) and Epstein (2009) not representing the values and interests of the citizens, creating crisis of representation. These statements provided above further emphasize an understanding of the underlying culture in Brazilian society and politics, where it is believed that politics is only to be dealt with by politicians, others do not have anything to say (Power & Taylor 2011), and correlates with the belief that "*each monkey has its own branch*" (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 11). The divide between the classes in Brazil, and how this has translated to the political environment might play a big part in explaining the explanation of why the attitudes of the interview subjects are as they are. Neymar believes that the general public has to speak out in order for something to happen, as he believes that this has not happened enough. He does however think that when this first happen, the people are not heard. This attitude might be a reaction from experiences with the different protests that has occurred throughout the recent political history (Mexi & Boursier 2017).

There is a clear majority who clarify a lack of representation from the political parties and the politicians, there are however differing opinions regarding the possible reasons for the lack of representation. Some participants see only a couple of politicians that they feel represented by, while others feel represented by some political parties when it comes to social ideology, but not economic policy strategies. The majority of respondents however, do not see any representation whatsoever due to lack of ideology, corruption and other scandals, as shown below through answers on whether or not the interviewees feel represented:

No, there is no such thing in Brazil. The parties in Brazil don't have an agenda, or an ideology, just power interest (Danilo).

I don't feel represented by any of the parties that exist today in the country, because all of them have politicians that are involved in corruption scandals (Florence).

I do not feel totally represented by the political parties in Brazil. That is because in the past all the parties got mixed up and their ideologies got lost in that. Also, when a partie gets in power, they tend not to follow up to the expectation (Francisca).

Political parties do not currently represent me. In my opinion, most parties in Brazil are "fake", convenient instruments without ideology that should not be allowed to exist (Franco).

*I do not feel represented by parties because I do not know to what incentives they are subject. They can act more or less like I would, but they do not really represent me unless they act the way I would **for the same reason** (Oribe).*

I don't feel represented. As I said before, it seems that all politicians are involved in some kind of system (Paula).

So, the institutions, yeah, we have them, if I trust them, not actually. I don't feel represented (William).

Through analyzing these statements that the interviewees have given, in combination with additional data, it has been observed that the main reason to which people are not feeling represented by the political parties and the politicians in Brazil, is due to a lack of ideology within the political entities. This results in making people not knowing what the different parties stand for (Jost et.al 2009). Some political parties and figures, look like they according to Maria, deliberately avoid showing any resemblance of a political ideology. Moreover, the respondents show attitudes claiming that politicians are only in it for themselves. These views

harken back to the explanations regarding the political system in the country, and the politicians and parties that reside within Congress, and the opposition. Experiences with governments not doing their job has led people to lose faith in them, thus not feeling represented anymore. Consequently, people do not know what the different politicians or political parties stand for. The lack of ideology is the reason why political parties and politicians are not seen as representative (Dovi 2018). A lack of ideology makes it difficult for individuals to know which values the parties and politicians have with regards to social life and the world around (Jost et.al 2009). Moreover, not knowing the values and beliefs of the politicians, influence the values of the young adults, creating situations where they do not feel represented (Epstein 2009), because their sets of beliefs are not represented by the country's politicians (Anderson & Singer 2008). Furthermore, continued disappointment with parties not following up on their promises and the expectations that they have put forward for themselves has led to people not seeing work being put in for the public (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Additionally, corruption can be seen as a reason for why people do not feel represented. The corruption scandals have made so that people do not believe that the politicians work for the people. Hence, these attitudes that have been presented above show how Crandall (2018) explain why members of the traditional middle-class is frustrated, as they point towards a lack of representation and corruption as key factors. It further emphasizes the views stating that young adults do not feel represented by their politicians and the political system, making it hard to express their requests for change (Campello 2019).

The political elite run the show in Brazilian politics (Santos 2019), but it is still a democracy. Meaning that in theory, the people of Brazil should be able to influence politics. With this in mind, do the respondents feel that they have influence to change things for, what they deem to be the better in Brazil? I asked the informants on whether or not they feel that they have the power or the influence to alter politics in the country, and there where not many positive answers regarding influencing at the national scale. Clarinha, states that she has the chance to influence her social community, but do not see any chance in influencing her country's political future. The same goes for Maria, who do not believe that she has either a voice or political influence, because she is a woman. Molly states that she does not believe that there is much access for people to influence politics, and is supported by Raquel. The two believe that the politicians are preventing people the opportunity to influence politics. Attitudes that connects with the notion believing that the elite trying to keep in power by preventing people the chance to clean the mud out of the water (Santos 2019). Furthermore, as stated by Santos

(2019), the political elite work for themselves, resulting in limited access to politics for the general population. Experiencing the political system as an institution for a limited number of people with a certain class might further exacerbate these beliefs.

With the interview subjects asserting that they do not feel that they have any influence, any way to be part in determining the country's future, it goes back to the idea that the country's political culture is controlled by a view that politics is for the politicians (Power & Taylor 2011). Thus, continuing a political culture where clientelism and patrimonialism is ingrained (Pereira et.al 2016). Both Franco and Paula believe that it is the political environment that is to blame for the lack of influence. They see the climate where people are not able to properly talk about politics with one another. Further continuing the belief and experience that Danilo and Carlo explained in sub-chapter 5.1, when commenting about the political polarization in Brazil. Franco additionally adds to the clarification by explaining that in the current political situation, "moderate" political opinions like his, are in the minority, with the majority being split on both sides of the spectrum. The political polarization in Brazil, as touched upon earlier, prevents people from having healthy political discussions, creating a harmful environment based on negative partisanship (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019).

To summarize, it is clear that there are different reasons and opinions on why and how the situation of lack of representation, and questionable political influence has occurred. Some do not feel represented by the elected officials, believing that the political elite only has to answer to themselves, not to the remaining classes in society. Additionally, the majority of young people do perhaps not see any reasons to have interest in politics (Silva & Castro 2014), following situations where they see no repercussions for the lack of accountability amongst politicians (Mexi & Boursier 2017), and perceiving politicians as only concerned for the next election and maintaining/gaining political power. Moreover, with young adults being likely to disagree with politics and authority beforehand (Farrugia 2018), lack of influence and representation possibly further emphasize the frustration towards political institutions and actors (Silva & Castro 2014). This clearly has resulted in a lack of trust in politicians, which has been observed throughout the analysis, but which will be looked more into in the following section.

5.6 - Examining Political Trust

I found it important to ask the different participant whether or not they trusted the political system, and the politicians in the country. Based on the answers provided above, it is clear that there are indications to what their answers and explanations to these answers might have been detected throughout the previous sections of this chapter, however, there are several other aspects to observe. Do the respondents give indications for a lack of support for the government? For the political system? Do they trust the political system? With these things in question, this will provide a base layer for a later discussion on whether or not it is possible to, based on the answers, believe that there is a crisis of legitimacy amongst political actor in the country, and if so, how is this shown by the respondents?

As presented by Catterberg & Moreno (2005) and Moisés (2011), political trust is decided by factors like experiences with politics, their political interests, social capital, democratic attitude, their own well-being, and the way regimes, political institutions, or political figures show efficiency externally. Meaning that, if a political actor fails to deliver on promises and expectations, trust deteriorates (Catterberg & Moreno 2005). Additional factors that increase distrust, is corruptness, and a lack of transparency, representation, accountability (Moisés 2011). Moreover, a democratic regime's stability and legitimacy depends on political trust (Zmerli & Castillo 2015, p. 180).

It is believed by some respondents that presidents who are next in line, and other political figures in power are not respecting decisions made by those in control prior to them. Further continuing the arguments provided above about politicians being in politics for their own sake. Oribe adds to the clarification, as he experiences that the political institutions in the country is not trusted by the public. Emphasizing the negative partisanship beliefs in the country. Similarly, the statement below highlights one reason why a number of the participants do not trust the political system in Brazil.

I don't trust, because when politicians see themselves with both money and power on their hands, they don't really think on the people. It's like they forget everything they promised and think only on themselves. (Paula)

The political class do not show many reasons for why people should support them (Mexi & Boursier 2017). David does not trust the Brazilian political system because of the people in charge. In his mind, politicians do not provide legitimacy to other politicians, so why should he? An experience with a lack of fulfillment from the political figures help explain why the

respondents, do not trust the politicians. A great number of participants believe that the majority of politicians are only thinking about themselves, and are only part of politics for their own interest. Danilo is amongst them, and states that it is uncommon to find politicians who work for the country rather than him or herself. Moreover, Miriam explains that in her opinion, all people that work with politics are corrupt and bad people. In her mind, good and honest people do not want to be part of that environment, only dishonest people. Additionally, it seems people do not trust the political system because of the political culture of Brazil. Dia states that for a nation to function, there is a need for connection between religion, society, state, language, ethnicity, culture etc... She does not see this currently in Brazil, which makes it hard for her to trust the political system, as she believes it does not work for the entirety of Brazil. This correlates with how William questions how one can be represented in Brazil, when people are so different that it is impossible to know what other people in society is going through. Observably, it looks like some of the respondents show the same belief that Moisés (2011) proclaims: that the social divide in Brazil prevents political trust. A belief that connects to Zmerli & Castillo's (2015) statement that unequal societies have high levels of political distrust.

Contrarily, there is a minority of participants that trust the political system in Brazil. Amongst them is Florence, who states that she trusts the system, even though it does not reflect the needs and wishes of the majority of Brazilians. In her mind, the system is similar to those in many other countries, and argue that if it had not been for the massive amounts of corruption in the political parties and conducted by politicians, the system would work well. Oribe has a similar thought as Florence, as he sees the system not contributing for everyone. He does however think that it is not gone past the level of not trusting the system, as he says the only question directed towards the political system, is how to make it represent all of Brazil. The final aspect of Florence's explanation is further supported by Ramona, who see the political system as advanced compared to other countries. She believes that the system is in need of some renovation, and are aware of the problems and views of others, but she chose to trust the political system as it is established in the Brazilian constitution. In her mind, it is the politicians that is the problem in the country, and not the system in itself. The politicians follow a paternalistic tradition, and do not follow the will of the people she believes, creating a divide and lack of representation between the people and the political elite. In sum of this, there is Neymar, who argue similarly to Florence and Ramona, and see the institutions at place, and believes that the problem in the country is the representatives, not the system.

Neymar clarify that the tools needed is already present, but it is up to the representatives to use them in the correct manner.

The problem is not the system, rather it is the people within the system. Why do these people see it this way? One way is that it is not the system that do bad things, it is rather the people. The interview subjects experience that it is the people that exploit the system. If these people were removed, then maybe the situation would be different? Another way of seeing it is that they believe in the democratic model that is current in the political system in Brazil. The democratic values are not respected by the elected representatives acting corrupt (Anderson & Tverdova 2003), and allowing corruption, which might be part in explaining the attitudes of these respondents. Additionally, the argument continues the trend of young adults not showing support for the political elite (Silva & Castro 2014).

To conclude, I have detected that a majority of the research participants do not trust parts of the political system in the country. Either it being the political parties and the politicians, or the political system. For some, the reason is the political culture that is found within the roots of the country, which has allowed the situation to become what it is today, others see corruption as the biggest issue, while others generally do not trust Brazilians politicians because they are part of the political system. A system, which, arguably, according to the informants, have a great number of flaws.

5.7 - An Uncertain Future

With the context provided in chapter 3, and the explanations, beliefs and experiences that the group have shared regarding the Brazilian political system, the analysis will examine the attitudes the interview subjects have for the future. Where do the participants see Brazil going in the future? Are they hopeful or do they believe that the worst is yet to come?

As the interview were conducted prior to the election in 2018, the interview subjects were not aware of the final candidates for the presidential election, Fernando Haddad and Jair Bolsonaro. However, with the result being that Jair Bolsonaro elected as president, it is natural to look into what people see Brazil as with him in charge. I did ask the informants to shortly describe prominent political figures in Brazil, with Bolsonaro being one of them, together with Lula da Silva, Michel Temer, Dilma Rousseff, and Marina Silva. At the time of interview, I did not see Fernando Haddad, who finished second in the election after Bolsonaro, to be a clear candidate for presidency, due to the uncertainty of Lula's ability and

availability to run for office due to Lava Jato investigations, resulting in there not being questions about Haddad.

The majority of respondents did not see a future where Bolsonaro would win, arguing that he was too extreme. Many stated that they did not see a good future for Brazil if he won, as they believe that he would only worsen the political, economic, and social problems in the country, rather than fix them. Amongst these is Francisca, who is scared for the country's future generations due to Brazil choosing a conservative president. She believes this will lead to long periods of violence and increased poverty and inequality, setting the country back even further. Miriam, Molly, and Raquel believes Bolsonaro will hurt Brazil, arguing that his homophobic and racist thoughts are not suited for the socially and economically unequal Brazil. They are afraid that Brazil will go backwards, leading to less rights for people than they already have. There are too many different people that in the end, it is impossible for some people to be represented by their president. Molly state that those who think that it cannot become worse than Brazil is currently in, should not talk until Brazil has experienced Bolsonaro. Raquel started to nervously laugh and rapidly asked if she could leave Brazil if Bolsonaro won the election. Hans believes that Bolsonaro in the end will be impeached, because he will have the same problem as Dilma, not being able to control the Congress (Crandall 2018).

Consequently, it does seem, according to the respondents, that Bolsonaro do not look like the right direction for Brazil. However, many of them were not certain or optimistic about the country's future, no matter the result in the 2018 election. Some see Brazil heading down the wrong path, and state that one election would not change that path, regardless of the result. Miriam, Raquel and Molly are afraid that the country will not be in a good place the next years, but have hopes for their children's children. Miriam elaborates saying that they joke about it, the situation to which they are in and are headed, but in reality, in her mind, Brazil do not have any future. William believes that Brazil will continue with the right-winged trend that has hit Brazil, and is nervous that the country will fall into deep populism. Which falls in line with a trend that Phillip is afraid has hit Brazil, and will continue in the coming years. He believes that the lack of representation between the more educated sections of the Brazilian population and the politicians will lead to several years of populist leaders, as the other sections of Brazil will continue down this road, not allowing popular participation and reforms to consolidate the democratic institutions in the country. A view that is most likely something that has been established through Phillips class position and higher education. As

shown by Farrugia (2018) and Bourdieu (in Korsnes et.al 2014) clarifying the more common political ideologies of youth, and the traditional middle-class. William further asserts that the Brazilian social and political culture make people look for a savior, the symbol of Brazil, in their political leaders. This he says is a deeply unsettling thing, as they are given, in his eyes, too much power. He says that Brazil personalize the state, which has generated the polarization observed throughout the analysis.

Carlo do not have good hopes for the future, as he does not have any belief in his fellow Brazilians. In his mind, the majority of Brazilians are not bright, and the increasing lack of interest in politics amongst the population is for him deeply concerning. It is understandable that Carlo is concerned, as more and more people are disinterested in politics (Silva & Castro 2014). Additionally, the experience that Carlo has, further show the polarization in the country. With him stating that he does not see the majority of Brazilians as bright, show that he further exacerbates the divide. It arguably correlates with the general view that Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) and Boito et.al (2016) states the traditional middle-class has: seeing themselves as superior to the lower classes.

Corruption is, as observed a big factor in play in Brazilian politics, and will certainly play a part in the future of the country (Amaral & Meneguello 2017), whether or not this will have a positive or negative effect is questionable. Amongst some of the respondents in this research, it does occur to be a positive train of thought regarding corrupt leaders being held accountable for their actions (Taylor 2017). They are optimistic that the continuation of the Lava Jato investigation will play a part in changing the political environment in Brazil. Ramona believe that the country is undergoing a process to which most corrupt politicians and other corrupt members of society are brought to justice. The imprisonment of Lula might perhaps be the symbol for this, as this was, according to Franco, one of the proudest, but at the same time, saddest moments in Brazil's political history.

Young adults and the youth are the nation's future, and the one's that create new ways of seeing social issues (Wolseth & Babb 2008). These views are present due to young adults still being young (Sposito 2018). They see things differently, and believe that hopefully, the political sphere gets the alteration needed to make Brazil "work" again. Frida explains that the old ways of politics with a lack of transparency and corruption are slowly dying, as the people of Brazil cannot stand it anymore. She further adds that a good way to go for Brazil,

would be to implement laws that prevents the reelection of condemned politicians, ensuring the republican principle of power alteration in the country. Clarinha thinks that perhaps in twenty years, if there occur some politicians that are willing to do good and remove corruption, Brazil will be in a good place. She does however state that it is not only the political system that needs to change, but the entire Brazilian culture.

Some participants argue that Brazil will not change, believing that the system is so deeply ingrained, that not even the full effect of the Lava Jato investigation and its following implications will alter the political system in Brazil. Observably, there is uncertainty regarding the political future for Brazil, and people have different meanings and opinions surrounding this. Some argue that the worst is yet to come, others that the worst has already happened, and some that the worst is now. Maria points to the impeachment of Dilma as an example that in her mind shows that anything can happen in Brazil in the future, and deems it highly difficult to guess where Brazil is headed, but she says that her hopes are very low. Oribe further comments the impeachment saying that if Brazilians do not start trusting their institutions, and the losing party in the elections respects the results, Brazilian politics will have several other situations of mistrust, just like in 2016. If this does not happen he believes, then Brazil's democracy is dead. Brian however does not seem very uncertain about Brazil's future. In his mind, the economy and politics in any country works as a pendulum. He argues that the way Brazil is headed at the moment, following the inauguration of Michel Temer, and now Jair Bolsonaro, two right-winged politicians, is a natural path for the country, as they have had many years with a left-winged government during the PT-era. Additionally, there is Lea, who is also certain about her future, but her hopes are rather bleak compared to Brian's statements regarding the future:

...I think I'm living in a country that can't be better. I can't be better. I, me. I was student last year, and I don't think I have a future. A good future. Now. No. (Lea)

To conclude, the majority of the group is uncertain about the future, not knowing what can happen, or afraid because of the things that they believe might happen. Dwyer (2018, p. 849) points to a study undertaken in 2012, where young adults were asked about what it the worst part of being young in Brazil today, where the majority stated that it is the fear of not being able to take care of oneself alone, and the fear and insecurity about the future. It is, observably, possible to see why this is the case. I have confidence in that trust, a lack of

ideology and representation, in addition to corruption are concepts that explain why the group show this uncertainty about the future. The reason being that these are factors that has, according to my respondents, created the political crisis in Brazil.

6.0 - Discussion

This section of the thesis will examine the experiences young adults have with political trust, as well as discussing whether or not the attitudes and experiences provide a way of understanding a possible legitimacy crisis in Brazil. With factors like political parties and figures showing a lack of political ideologies, the design of the political system, and corruption, I wish to discuss how these factors lead to the believed legitimacy crisis within political Brazil. How can these attitudes and experiences be understood in the context of the social, cultural and political environment in Brazil? How does the young adults' class and attitudes towards other classes play a part in explaining their experiences with political trust?

The respondents in my thesis are, I would argue, based on the definitions of young adults in sub-chapter 3.3.2, individuals that are on the verge of becoming an adult, or have recently entered adulthood. These research participants have lived in Brasilia throughout the political turmoil that has occurred through the years, this has, according to Weller & Bassalo (2018) shaped their political ideology. Hence, living in the political and bureaucratic core of politics in Brazil has played a part in shaping the ideological and social features of these individuals (Farrugia 2018). The spatial-community that young people reside within creates a political dimension that are found within a specified territory Sposito (2018). This might explain why there might occur differences or similarities in answers and views from interviewees, seeing that people might be part of the same social territories and dimensions in Brasilia. I have interviewed individuals who are in a state of being molded politically, culturally, and socially (Baquero & Baquero 2018). These are people who have grown up as the first generation within the new democracy (Corrochano & Nakano 2018), being raised by people who have lived through the former dictatorship and seen the change happen. These factors presented above all play a part in explaining who these people are, in addition to being tools to better examine the experiences and attitudes they have towards politics, trust, and legitimacy.

Political trust responds to people's perceptions of government performance and action (Hetherington 1998). Hence, political institutions and figures need to be trustworthy and transparent (Painter & Jeffrey 2009). This does not occur in Brazil according to my

respondents. They state that there is a lack of ideology within parties, and that they switch from one side to another in order to get in power or stay in power. People, thus, they argue, find it hard to trust the political parties and its leading figures. The young adults see little compliance and acceptance between the political institutions and the general public. This might create an environment where the Brazilian population start to question the political system, the democratic values within, and the political institutions and its actors. Thus, creating a possible crisis of legitimacy, seeing as political legitimacy derives from the authority which a state has, in combination with the acceptance of this authority (Jones et.al 2004). Hence, the level of political trust that a country's population has towards its political leaders and institutions is vital for the stability and legitimacy of the political system.

6.1 - Do Class Tie into Political Trust?

The inequality in Brazil play a part in polarizing politics between classes (Reid 2014). The polarization has created a hostile political environment (Hagopian 2019), and increased distrust towards the political elite (Samuels & Zucco 2019). The traditional middle-class show additional dissatisfaction towards the lower classes in society, as they believe them to be lazy and undeserving of the welfare they are granted claim Boito et.al (2016). They see themselves as a forgotten group in society Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) argue. Do the young adults show similar views?

I observed that the majority of the research participants show low levels of trust towards the political elite, but I have not noticed any hostility towards the lower classes in Brazilian society. However, there are statements from some respondents that undermine the lower classes' knowledge of the political system, their values and priorities. There are statements saying that people in Brazil do not know how to vote, and that the lower classes show the "wrong" motivations when voting, following patrimonial guidelines drawn by the political elite. The ideology of the traditional middle-class is shown through the answers of some of the young adults. There are not indications that they see themselves as a forgotten group in society, but rather that the entirety of society is forgotten by the political elite instead. These attitudes I would argue show the polarization in both politics and society. Having a traditional middle-class background grants access to higher education, and different living standards, which create certain values and ideologies (Korsnes et.al 2014). This explain the perceptions and attitudes the young adults have towards the political system, and the trust they show it.

This research has observed that there is an environment where one either do not want to talk about politics because it turns into a screaming contest, or one become part of it. The polarization in Brazil has created an environment where there is extremism on all sides of the political scale (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). There is, according to my research participants, a political climate where people do not look at the ideological reasoning behind political decisions, or during elections. Negative partisanship has become the norm during election processes, as a result of political parties not representing its population, being accused of corruption, and not fulfilling their campaign promises (Samuels & Zucco 2019). This means that many voters become moved by hatred. This has, as observed through the analysis made so that some do not trust the system, as the results are not based on ideology or beliefs of a better society, but rather a movement of keeping people that are disliked based on merit and character traits. Additionally, when the screaming match becomes too loud, and political parties and figures do not fulfill their expectations or represent the population, young adults, might turn to apoliticism (Silva & Castro 2014, p. 188). Saad-Filho (2013) believe that young adults are frustrated with the current political situation in the country. This has been observed in the analysis, as many of the interview subjects show signs of political fatigue. Can this political fatigue be part in explaining the experiences that these young adults have with political trust? And what about the potential legitimacy crisis? Distrust and a lack of representation, and failure to meet expectations, are factors that are distancing fractions of young adults from politics (Silva & Castro 2014), and create a situation where these young adults do not trust their political system. These low levels of trust that are shown by my informants correlate with research from Samuels & Zucco (2019), who states that the majority of Brazilians do not trust their political system following the political crisis resulting from the impeachment in 2016. The political crisis increased the divide between the political elite and the rest of the population.

When political leaders are not able to keep citizens satisfied, and trust and support from big fractions of the population deteriorates, the political situation becomes heavy and though (Moisés 2011). The scandals that has occurred in Brazil has decreased the trust of the population (Crandall 2018), as seen through the statements provided by my interview subjects. This might not however be the case with all. There is a divide between people with regards to economy, culture and politics. If you are not highly educated, then you have other cultural interests than those who are, and this goes with politics as well (Moisés 2011). If you are poor and do not have an education, then you care about different things than what the

people who are rich and are able to go to the university (Carreiro & Renno 2019).

Additionally, the locality of where a person lives, especially young adults, play a key part in creating the political mindset of the individual (Farrugia 2018). Being raised and living in Brasilia has created and influenced the ideologies and values that these young adults has, and explain how their attitudes are determined by their experiences (Hubbard 2006). Moreover, experiencing political situations while living in Brasilia has influenced the attitudes these individuals have towards the political system in the country. As a result, the attitudes of my interview subjects will perhaps differ from people from other parts of Brazil, and in other sections of society. This is shown through the statement below, provided by Phillip, where he, a member of the traditional middle-class, elaborates on the differences of aspirations and priorities between the lower classes and his class.

The priorities and aspirations of poor people with low levels of education that suffer to ensure the food of the day are not the same as the ones of the major investor in the stock market with a foreign university degree. For obvious reasons, this latent disparity between these two poles of Brazilian society interferes in the political choices of each one of these citizens. (Phillip)

Looking at Phillips statement in the essence of this explanation, I would argue that the life and expectations that people have, decide how they view the political situation in Brazil. As Phillip, and the other interview participants are part of the traditional middle-class, they view the political situation in Brazil, differently than other sections of the societal class structure. These differing political ideologies and values explain why some do not trust the political system. The majority of those residing in the traditional middle-class show support for the right side of politics (Korsnes et.al 2014). This can also be observed through some statements provided by my research participants when talking about the different political figures in Brazil, and pointing at the reason for why Brazil is in its current crisis. Some informants show similar thoughts as what Saad-Filho & Morais (2018) argue is the norm for the traditional middle-class, mainly blaming the PT, Lula, and Dilma for the deterioration of Brazilian society, and allowing the crisis to occur. However, this does not go for all of the young adults, as some blame the political system and the culture within. They believe that the system creates an environment where politicians need to be corrupt in order to make policies go through. There is are differing political beliefs amongst the research participants, but there is an agreement about the political system and the figures within needing to change. Some of the respondents believe that the system is trustworthy, but that is lacks the correct people to

function. However, the system is run by a political elite that is not trusted by any of the young adults, a political elite that prevents influence and representation for other aspects of society. Thus, the political system continuously lacks the correct actors, making it difficult to argue that the system is trustworthy, as stated by several of the majority respondents. Without a significant change in the system, institutions, and its actors, it will, observably, be difficult for the Brazilian political system to be trusted by these young adults.

Some informants show some dissatisfaction towards how people vote, and what they base their votes on. The lower-class sections of Brazilian society prefer to vote on personal characteristics and charisma, and personal reputation of the candidate (Carreiro & Renno 2019). There are indications that this make it difficult for some of the respondents to trust the political system, as the result is not based on political ideologies that show where the country might head. Rather the lack of ideology is used in order to generate more votes, as candidates focus on the feelings of the voters, rather than sensibility. Seeing that some sections of the Brazilian society are satisfied with or unaware of the patronage in the national and political culture, politicians use this in order to gain or keep political power (Pereira et.al 2016). Observably, there seems to be a lack of trust in both the political elite and the system, as they both undermine and use the poorer sections of society by “help me help you” political strategies that mostly benefit the elite. The political culture follows the national culture, as Brazil has always been highly clientilistic (Hagopian 2019), increasing the divide between the classes. This is an issue for some interviewees, as the lack of ideology make them uncertain of what to expect from their elected officials. This in turn make them question the motivations of the politicians, leading them to distrust, and showing signs of decreasing political legitimacy for the regime.

Locality, class status, family and friends, political experiences, social and cultural values, all influence the political ideology and the attitudes that people (Farrugia 2018), especially young adults have, as they are more prone to influence by their surroundings (Farrugia 2018). These factors play a part in determining the level of trust that the young adults show for the political system in the country (Catterberg & Moreno 2005). When young adults experience situations that make them slowly show less trust towards the political elite and the institutions, in combination with experiencing that their family and friends do the same, it is natural to see people showing signs of distrust towards the political system (Moisés 2011). The class that the young adults are situated within thus play a part in determining their experiences with political trust. Seeing that they are influenced by the people around them, they show signs of

leaning towards the same values (Sposito 2018). Moreover, by having a certain lifestyle and education, young adults have certain values that influence their political views (Dillon 2014). Paula's statement in sub-chapter 5.1, saying that she does not really know politics, even with her high level of education show somewhat a different view however. What it does show on the other hand, is voting behavior being decided by what the individuals' family values. This further continues the indications that politics in Brazil is continuously affected by patrimonial or clientilistic thoughts, as well as a growing apathy, where young adults rather than getting invested, follow their families and the people around them. This has, as observed in the analysis, created a situation where some do not trust the political system in the country because of the voting habits of the country's population.

The political elite in Brazil is its own thing, removed from the remaining elite in the country argue a number of the informants. A group of people becoming rich on politics, and using politics to stay rich (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019), and keeping poor people poor, which makes the country regressive argue a fraction of my research participants.

I think most people get involved with politics to take advantage of the money and the power, rather than making our country a good place to live. Most politicians in Brazil are involved in corruption scandals and it seems like the more money they get, the more they want. And they don't care about the Brazilian people, they care about themselves and their families. (Maria)

The statement above underscores the argument about the political elite, covered in the analysis, claiming that the elite only think about themselves. Moreover, it shows that young adults are not following the belief that “*each monkey has its own branch*” (Power & Taylor 2011, p. 11). Young adults' rebel more often than not against the common thought (Farrugia 2018), and are frustrated and increasingly distrusting towards the political elite and the political institutions (Filho & Guzzo 2018). People in Brazil believe that what the elite “up on the top” are doing, are not other people's business (Power & Taylor 2011). I would argue with this belief rampant inside the political culture, it is perhaps not hard to think of the reason for why there might be lack of transparency and accountability in the political system in Brazil. This consequently create a further divide between the public and the elite (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). Several sections of society are not meant to be able to relate to politics, and as long as they have their food on the table and a day-job, they should not worry about the grander scale of things politically. As long as people are kept uneducated, they are happy with the benefits granted (Almeida et.al 2018). Keep the public “dumb” so that they do

not question politics, which leads to the politicians being able to stay in power. This allows the political elite to continue patrimonialism and clientelism, and follow a strategy without ideological beliefs, resulting in, what some participants see as a reason why they are not represented. An example showing this is Jair Bolsonaro calling students who protest against his educational policies as “*useful idiots and imbeciles*” (Boadle & Garcia 2019).

A question thus rises, might this be a factor that will gradually make the rest of the population not trust the elite? As they only see the results from, for example, the Lava Jato investigation? They see top-tier members of society being accused and sentenced for corruption (Sinters et.al 2019). People that should, in theory, work for the public’s best, end up being sentenced to jail, based on actions that they do in order to push themselves even further ahead.

Respondents provide statements underscoring that corruption is part in explaining why politicians are seen as untrustworthy. However, the biggest issue that the young adults, observably, have with the country’s political elite is tied into the number of political parties in the country, as well as the design of presidential coalitionalism. The most reoccurring reason that the young adults in focus in this thesis do not show signs of trust towards the political elite is due to the lack of ideology, consequently not knowing what to expect from their elected officials (Jost et.al 2009). Arguments are presented stating that the political elite do whatever it takes to continue in power, or to gain power. By having these mindsets, the respondents argue that the elite do not show any ideology, which is why some participants state that there is no left or right in politics anymore, every politician is the same, and thinks the same.

6.2 - Do Corruption Tie into Political Trust?

Corruption is part of the political culture in Brazil (Amaral & Meneguello 2017). A stagnant constant the majority of the interview subjects point out. Corruption is politics as usual, and participants agree that it is deteriorating the democratic values in Brazil, playing a key role in creating the political situation which Brazil is currently in. The respondents do however differ in their explanations of whether or not the political system creates corruption, or if it is the politicians that create corruption. The majority point towards all politicians being corrupt, a belief that according to Power & Taylor (2011) and Dillon (2014) indicate that there are low levels of regime legitimacy.

When citizens expect effectiveness from its democratically elected officials, they need to not only depend on the actors themselves, but also the democratic institutions and the political culture ingrained in the system (Moisés 2011). The concept political culture entails the values, ideals, beliefs, and attitudes that lie as the foundation of a political system (Burnell et.al 2011). Hence, if the political culture of the country is too far away from democratic values, problems of democratic development might occur (Burnell et.al 2011). Corruption is harmful for a regime's legitimacy (Baquero & Baquero 2018), and with the amount of scandals that have hit Brazil in the newer political history of the country (Saad-Filho 2017), the understanding of whether or not corruption is playing a part in people's diminishing levels of trust in politics, and thus lowering regime legitimacy is highly believable (Power & Taylor 2011). This more than likely means that corruption is part in explaining the perceived lack of political trust, legitimacy and representation in Brazil.

The political culture, I would argue, can be an explanatory tool for the political situation in Brazil. With a national and political culture providing the elite of the country a mindset where they are "on top" (Power & Taylor 2011), the democratic and political effectiveness works for them, but not the rest of society. Moreover, the participants believe that every almost politician is corrupt, and see corruption as a constant in history, creating concepts like *jeitinho brasileiro* and *rouba mas faz*. It seems like the Brazilian way of life have transferred itself to politics, which can explain the concept *rouba mas faz*. People have become accustomed to politicians being corrupt the research participants clarify. Creating a climate where people are satisfied as long as something is given to the public. The "bread and circus" politics is tied into this belief. A belief that is not observed amongst the young adults that have been part of the research, seeing that different upbringings, socio-economic standards, cultural characteristics and livelihoods decide political perceptions (Painter & Jeffrey 2009).

Observably "bread and circus" politics can be seen as an explanation of how lower classes in Brazil tolerate, or do not see, corruption happening in politics. This creates a patrimonial environment where people support corrupt politicians, because they are given something in return (Crandall 2018). The political culture allows patronage and corruption to flourish, diminishing democratic values. The participants show throughout the analysis disgruntlement towards this culture. They believe, as mentioned, that politician do whatever it takes to get power. This further uphold patronage and corruption in the political culture, increasing the inequality in the country (Power 2010). However, can this explain the experiences that the young adults have with political trust towards the political system in Brazil? The Brazilian

state was created according to Baquero & Baquero (2018) on top of an unstable society, which created the patrimonial and clientilistic culture that now reside within Brazilian society and politics. This explains why some do not trust the political system, as it has observably been feeding on the weaker. The political culture allows for the continuation of corruption and patronage, further polarizing the Brazilian society, and thus Brazilian politics, based on different values and motivations (Farrugia 2018). Experiencing this over several years create distrust, as the young adults has grown up seeing the political elite using an unstable society for their own benefit (Baquero & Baquero 2018).

Corruption is a way to explain how politics work in Brazil respondents argue. But how does it play a part in explaining the attitudes and experiences that the young adults have for political trust? It has been observed throughout the analysis that corruption is a major issue for the majority of the respondents. There are however different arguments regarding where corruption play a part, and which institutions are responsible for the occurrence of the immense amount of political corruption in the country. Nonetheless, corruption is pointed to as a factor to be seen in order to elaborate on the political trust and legitimacy within the group. These views correlate with citizens in Brazil, according to Amaral & Meneguello (2017), who assert that the majority have acknowledged corruption a problem for policy-making. Baquero & Baquero (2018) state that corruption leads to a lack of representation and influence for citizens in a society, due to corruption diminishing democratic values, causing political disempowerment, thus making them believe they have no influence. In the eyes of many interviewees, the political parties are the most corrupt institutions in society. This is a reason for why the young adults are not trusting their government, as they see the government as the people who are corrupt.

There are however differences in perception of corruption and trust in political parties, institutions and the government, as many show acceptances of corruption, and there are, amongst a great part of the population, a clear lack of understanding of how corruption impacts a democracy in a negative way (Amaral & Meneguello 2017). Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that the members of the lower classes in Brazil are not seeing this as a big problem (Senters et.al 2019), and that it is rather those with a higher education that problematize it. This explains why the young adults are opposed to and react to the believed political corruption. Additionally, Senters et.al (2019, p. 20) observed, through research on public opinion on corruption the last 30 years, that Brazilians part of the higher-income classes and/or part of the more educated parts of the Brazilian society are more prone to

declaring corruption as the most important problem in the country. This explains why many of the research participants are stating that this is not a new coincidence. Perhaps it is not always the politicians that are corrupting the system, maybe the system corrupts the politicians? Thus, no matter how the participants perceive the situation and make sense of it, corruption is connected to the political system. For some of the participants, presidential coalitionalism, is a way for corruption to be fostered in the system. As presidential coalitionalism enable several parties to chance to get in power (Sweet 2014), and the design of the model results in parties needing to strike deals with others (Neto 2019), the system creates a climate for corruption both my respondents and Avritzer (2017b) argue.

Corruption has, as abovementioned, been part of the political sphere and in focus regarding politics since the rejuvenation of the democracy in 1985 (Power & Taylor 2011). This has created a situation where the young adults have always been influenced by corruption and remarks about corruption in their daily life. They have never experienced a Brazil without political corruption. Hence, it is believable to see the level of class in society for the young adult interviewees as an explanation for their views on corruption. Moreover, increased perceptions regarding corruption in government, create similar effects to apoliticism (Silva & Castro 2014), and negative partisanship (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Corruption thus becomes a factor that is difficult to overlook, as it observably, create meanings and experiences that shape the attitudes of the young adults in question. Experiencing an environment where corruption is a key aspect of politics, influence the attitudes that young adults have for the political system. Furthermore, corruption leads to a lack of trust and lower legitimacy of both political institutions and actors (Power & Taylor 2011). When learning and believing that corruption is bad for society, and so experience that the majority of the elected officials and political elite are caught up in corruption scandals, influence the attitudes and levels of trust that these young adults have (Seligson 2002). Corruption thus becomes an explanatory factor in understanding how young adults shape their attitudes towards trust in the political institutions.

6.3 - Do Representation, Influence and Support Tie into Political Trust?

The Brazilian democracy has struggled to improve its system of representation amongst citizens (Campello 2019). Baquero & Baquero (2018) claim that this has been going on for the last three decades, and that it will continue also in the future. This will, or has already led

to, a political culture where Brazilian citizens are disillusioned about the core democratic values and principles. When a political party, or politician, or Congress are not representing its citizens, and people are getting more and more impatient with their elected delegates, it might not take a long time before they are showing unhappiness (Moisés 2011). When that happens, political actors might end up in a negative spiral, falling more and more with every negative action performed, no matter the size, digging a deeper and deeper hole that is hard to get out of. What does this mean for the trust and legitimacy? The more a government or political authority fails to deliver on promises, act corrupt, show low levels of political efficiency, or shows a lack of accountability and transparency, the trust that the public has deteriorates gradually for each passing instance, eventually leading to a believed crisis of legitimacy (Zmerli & Castillo 2015).

Some respondents do not see representation for either themselves or others in the elected officials. Political institutions, parties, and figures are all questioned, as there are little signs of trust towards these parts of the political system. People are not heard and do not feel represented by their elected officials (Campello 2019). So, how does lack of representation play a part in explaining the experiences and attitudes that the young adults have towards the political system in the country? As observed in the analysis, the majority of the respondents point towards the lack of ideology as a main reason for the lack of representation. Ideologies represent classes and people as I understand from Østerberg's (2012) explanation of the terminology. Thus, if political parties and figures lack political ideologies, the young adults in question express legitimate arguments towards not being represented by political parties (Epstein 2009). The lack of representation is a result of presidential coalitionalism Power (2010) argue. Parties are created by politicians trying to extract money from public office (Reid 2014). This shows how not trusting the political elite might mean that one does not trust the political system in its entirety, seeing as the system is run by these actors and parties.

A lack of representation lead to political apathy and fatigue (Barbosa et.al 2014). This has led young adults in Brazil to be distanced from political engagement Silva & Castro (2014) proclaim. This has also been observed throughout this thesis, as the young adults focused on show signs of apathy and are uncertain about the political future of the country. Many research participants do not know what the political parties stand for. Trust thus continually affects the legitimacy of the government and also the opposition. Silva & Castro (2014) assert that the lack of ideology has led to only empty promises provided by the politicians during election campaigns. Silva & Castro (2014) additionally show that youth in Rio de Janeiro

additionally express similar attitudes as my research participants, claiming that it is difficult to know where a party's political ideology is. A lack of ideology is seen as a key reason for the believed lack of representation by my interview subjects, and it emphasizes the distrust to the political elite. They have experienced that that political parties do whatever it takes to get in power, resulting in them not representing the people and the beliefs and values that they deem important. But do the participants show signs of meaning that they are the only one's not represented? Are their views concurrent with others in the traditional middle-class, stating that they are a forgotten group in society (Saad-Filho 2017)? The way I deduce the answers given by my research participants, their answers entail the entire Brazilian population. I have not experienced dissatisfaction with the lack of representation based on a traditional middle-class ideology. They argue that there is no ideology whatsoever, thus creating a situation where the politicians and the system do not represent any section of the Brazilian society but themselves. The non-existing representation resulting from the lack of ideology (Epstein 2009), I would argue, lead to a low level of legitimacy for the politicians and the political system in Brazil. The reason being that low levels of representation creates low levels of legitimacy (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle 2010).

Today's young adults in Brazil are the ones in a position to realter Brazilian society and make changes in the political institutions Baquero & Baquero (2018) argue. But what if young adults do not see any way to change politics? What if, as observed in the analysis, young adults feel like they do not reach a level of influence in politics? Perhaps the political culture and the mismanagement in government have created such an apathy and distrust that they do not see any future without significant changes that they perhaps might not deliver? Young adults do not show inclinations towards voting being a way to fix the issues in Brazilian politics Mexi & Boursier (2017) argue. For some, the system does not allow change, and those that do trust the system believe that the issues lie with the figures within the system. No matter, there are factors within the system that make it difficult for the young adults to believe they can alter politics.

Farrugia (2018) and Wolseth & Babb (2008) argue that young adults are the drivers of social change in a society. Thus, they should show interest in politics (Baquero & Baquero 2018), and the changes that occur in society (Farrugia 2018). In Brazil, this is not the case. As seen with the belief that politics should not be meddled with by the lower classes (Power & Taylor 2017), in addition to an increasing political fatigue amongst young adults and the general population (Silva & Castro 2014). Mexi & Boursier (2017) argue that corruption, lack of

transparency and representability make it hard for young adults to believe that they are able to make a change in society. These factors are similar to the statements that are given by my respondents. The young adults experience that they do not have major influence, that their votes do not matter, and that the political elite is far from the rest of the population. This creates a gap between the political elite and them. Creating an environment without political representation, where people become apathic and start to show signs of apoliticism and negative partisanship (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019). A lack of influence and representation has led to a situation where the young adults argue that they do not have the means to make changes in politics. Without being able to influence politics, and not being represented by the elected officials and the political elite, there are stark indications that these factors determine the level of trust the young adults have towards the political system. The interviewees state that they see little chances of influencing politics as well as no representation from their elected officials, leading to, as Barbosa et.al (2014), Mexi & Boursier (2017) and Campello (2019) assert, low levels of political trust amongst young adults.

Support for a government is something that show the level of trust and the legitimacy of said government (Hetherington 1998). The same goes for the democratic model, the model of government in the country. Hence, I will look at Easton's two types of support, specific and diffuse (Layton et.al 2017), and the subsections of support presented by Moisés (2011), and the nature of these in Brazil. During the analysis, it was observed that young adults can show signs of distrust towards the political system, while still be supportive of the Brazilian democracy. It was furthermore observed that some showed support for the system, but not showing support for the actors within. There was no specific support for the ruling government at the moment of data collection, and based on the remarks people gave about Jair Bolsonaro, the likelihood of there being limited specific support directed at him is high. Hence, the majority do not show support to the Brazilian political system at this moment. Diffuse support is a bit trickier than specific support, seeing that people show little support for the political system, but there is support for democracy.

At no point during the interviews, nor during the coding process, did I find people wanting to get rid of democracy. Hence, there are clear indications that the respondents support democracy and the theories within it. The belief in democracy is present, thus, I would argue that there is a notion that it is not the theoretical model of democracy that is the problem in Brazil, but rather the way that this model is being used. This is supported by Moisés (2011)

stating that in most cases, people show distrust towards the politicians and political parties for using democracy incorrectly, and thus not showing any signs of representativity towards the public. This explains why some state that they trust the political system. Brazil has a democracy, meaning that they have the tools for the system to function. Observably, the issue is Congress, the president and other political actors not using the democratic system correctly, leading to neither diffuse nor specific support for these actors. There is democratic legitimacy according to the interview subjects, seeing that they support democracy as a political form of ruling and the beliefs within the model (Painter & Jeffrey 2006). Conclusively, diffuse support is not found for the majority for the political system in general, but diffuse support for the democratic model is found amongst all participants.

The amount of support for the democracy from the young adults are perhaps a reaction from their class status. Almeida & Guarnieri (2017) argue that those in the middle-class and upwards in Brazilian society show a higher level of trust for democracy, than those in the lower sections of social class. Furthermore, Carreiro & Renno (2019) show that people with higher education, a trait that is common in the traditional middle-class, show higher levels of distrust towards political figures than those with little, or no education. This is further argued by Moisés (2011), stating that those with little schooling show stronger support for the government than those with higher levels of schooling. Furthermore, those with lower levels of education additionally show higher indifference for the political system than those with higher education Moisés (2011) present. This further show the polarization between groups of people in Brazil, as the level of education and class status play a big part in determining political ideology (Reid 2014). Moreover, low income-citizens Layton et.al (2017) further argue, hold more positive perceptions of regime legitimacy. Contrarily, there is a high chance for the traditional middle-class to not show support for the government, and also show negative perceptions of regime legitimacy (Layton et.al 2017). Catterberg & Moreno (2005) however maintain that political trust is higher amongst those with democratic values and attitudes, due to their belief in democratic institutions. This argument is arguably debunked by the observations and statements provided throughout this study. In this case, the young adults in focus show high levels of support for democracy and the values within. They do however not show signs of having high levels of political trust for the political system, mainly as a result of lacking influence and representation, in combination with massive corruption scandals.

Aforementioned, the young adults show little support for the political actors, and some state that they are the problem with Brazil. Establishing corruption in the system, thus deteriorating the system from within. However, there are others proclaiming that the main issue is the system in itself, with presidential coalitionalism enabling the corruption of the politicians entering it. The majority of young adults focused on in this thesis show indications of not supporting the Congress, the political actors in the country and the system in general. The collective identity and political community (Moisés 2011, p. 349) do not exist it seems in Brazil, as the country is believed to be, by some respondents, too divided. There are signs of some respondents distrusting other voters, while other respondents explain such a situation. The political culture in the country combined with the values and beliefs of others create an environment where people do not support and trust the political system based on votes from certain people. There are however not all that see it like this, but, there are signs of traditional middle-class young adults being frustrated with both the political environment as well as the political system. It is perhaps difficult to trust a political system where the officials are decided through voting behavior determined by hate for other parties and charisma, rather than actual political strategies and ideology (Samuels & Zucco 2019). Thus, the only of Moisés' (2011) subsections of support that has a positive perception is support for democracy and the values a democracy inhabits.

Consequently, can it be understood that in the eyes of the interview subjects, that there is a general lack of trust towards political institutions and actors, in addition to a crisis of legitimacy for the political system? By looking at the answers provided by the research participants, there are clear indications that they show a lack of trust towards the political elite. Moreover, the majority of them also show distrust towards the political system in general, pointing towards corruption and lack of ideology amongst political actors as the two biggest reasons. Thus, the young adults' experiences with political trust show signs of low levels of trust towards the country's political institutions and figures. Hence, it is possible to argue that the attitudes of these young adults point towards a crisis of legitimacy for the political system in Brazil. By looking back at the statement provided by Zmerli & Castillo (2015, p. 180), arguing that political trust plays a key role in explaining a regime's legitimacy, the answers provided by the interview subjects presents enough factors that point towards this being a possibility. Additionally, the arguments provided by Layton et.al (2017) point towards a similar notion, as they assert that the traditional middle-class have a high chance of showing negative perceptions towards a regime's legitimacy. Moreover, the traditional middle-class

also show a negative perception towards corruption in politics Senters et.al (2019) argue. Furthermore, the lack of representation and influence that young adults perceive increase the distrust that they show towards both the political institutions and the system in general (Baquero & Baquero 2018). Conclusively the factors pointed towards above, and during both the discussion and the analysis show how young adults experience political trust in Brazil, and furthermore explain how the characteristics of political distrust show signs of a believed legitimacy crisis for the political system in Brazil.

7.0 - Concluding remarks

The objective of this thesis has been to examine the attitudes and experiences that young adults in the traditional middle-class in Brasilia have with political trust in Brazil. Additionally, I aimed at examining how the experiences and attitudes these young adults have show signs of a crisis of legitimacy for the political system in Brazil. Through a short fieldwork in Brasilia with focus group interviews, combined with e-mail interviews, qualitative research methods were conducted prior to the presidential election in late October 2018. The qualitative research collected data from 23 individuals from the traditional middle-class in Brasilia between the age of 20 and 30. Following the data collection process, the use of a thematic analysis method allowed the data to be divided into core themes and codes that were used in order to better illustrate the experiences of the interview subjects. The young adults' experiences with political trust was explained in in the context of class and age, the recent political history of Brazil, the social and political polarization, the design of the political system, and attitudes towards political corruption.

Why have I focused on this group of people? These individuals are either newly educated, or getting a higher education, and are the first generation born into the rejuvenated democracy of Brazil. Brasilia is a place of power, the symbol of Brazilian urbanization and modernity, and the center of politics and bureaucracy (Waldstein 2014). Living in the spectrum of political power has, and will continue to shape, the political and social values of these young adults (Farrugia 2018). The experiences that these young adults have with political trust has been determined through the influence of people and perceptions in their daily life (Weller & Bassalo 2008), seeing that place play a key role in constructing the political identification of young adults (Farrugia 2018). They have been influenced by their locality, socio-economic upbringing, national culture, and political views of family and friends (Farrugia 2018).

The group might have different views, different understandings, and see the political crisis differently than others, but in the end, arguably, most of them are pointing towards a lot of the same things. The many situations that has happened throughout the recent political history in Brazil has shaped the attitudes of the young adults. Living in the center of politics while this has happened undoubtedly influenced these attitudes as well. For some corruption is the problem, for others it is the politicians, for the third group it might be the system in itself, and lastly, for some, it is the presidential coalitionism and the political parties. In Brazil, it is never only one factor that make people concerned. For the majority, all four factors referenced above is a problem. This observably creates a sense of distrust amongst the participants.

Corruption is playing a big part in many levels of politics in Brazil (Power & Taylor 2011). It is found in people's day to day life, within local politics, national politics, it is part of the national culture (Amaral & Meneguello 2017). Corruption creates political apathy amongst the population of a country, which increasingly becomes institutionalized. Corruption creates distrust towards the system and the actors within, creating lower legitimacy for them both (Power & Taylor 2011). As detected in the analysis, the differing opinions from the respondents of the research show that people put different meanings and understandings towards politics. Some argue that they do not trust politics because of corruption, others argue that corruption is the reason for why there is a political crisis in Brazil. The politicians are corrupt, the political parties are corrupt, but have they become corrupt through working in politics, or have they made politics corrupt? There are differing opinions about this, and it is a highly debated topic in Brazil, following the increase of negative partisanship, and especially the hate towards the PT (Power & Rodrigues-Silvera 2019).

In addition to corruption, the lack of ideology is pointed out by the interview subjects as a reason for their distrust towards politicians and the political elite, which arguably, as mentioned, turns towards distrust for the political system. The system is controlled by these actors, who muddy the waters, creating preventions for others to participate (Santos 2019). Politics is for the political elite, and those in the lower classes should not meddle with it is a common thought in Brazilian society (Power & Taylor 2011). However, the lack of ideology within politics make it hard for the young adults to both be represented and influence the political sphere. Not knowing what the political parties and politicians stand for, in addition to a lack of transparency from the political system creates an environment where the citizens in Brazil start to question their elected officials. The young adults in focus in this thesis has

looked at this lack of ideology as a main reason for why they do not trust the political elite. They argue that the actors in the political system has only one motivation, and that is private gain. There is no political ideology being used to gain votes, only personal characteristics and preaching hate towards other parties and politicians. The lack of ideology within the political parties has transferred itself to the general public, meaning that people vote on charisma, negative partisanship, hate, and personal characteristic, rather than political strategies and ideology. This in turn create a situation where some of the young adults see little reason to trust the system, voters, and political figures.

Similar to the attitudes shown by my respondents show the majority of Brazilians deep distrust towards actors in the political sphere (Barbosa et.al 2014). Resulting from experiences with the government and the political system not focusing on their citizens, not having a voice in politics, lacking a political ideology, and corruption. Most Brazilians, as well as all my respondents do however show diffuse support for democracy, and show signs of high democratic legitimacy, as they value democracy as a political model, and democratic values and beliefs (Moisés 2011). The majority of the young adults show little trust and support for the political system, while a small minority believe that the issues of the political situation cannot be blamed on the political system, but rather the people within it. This belief is strong amongst all the respondents, as the political elite is not shown any signs of political support or trust. With the political actors not being trusted, this has an influence on the entirety of the political institutions and system, as it leads to the young adults, conclusively showing little trust to them as well. The stability that is needed for a democratic government to be able to fulfill their promises for the population is not in place in Brazil (Baquero & Baquero 2018), creating a polarized environment where people show little support both for each other and for the political actors and institutions in the country (Reid 2014).

It looks like, based on the experiences and attitudes of the young adults that there is a crisis of legitimacy in Brazil, seeing that lack of trust results in a crisis of legitimacy (Zmerli & Castillo 2015). A lack of trust resulting from the political chaos that has taken place the recent political history of the country (Crandall 2018). There is a political crisis in the country (Samuels & Zucco 2019), but how people perceive this crisis differs from individual to individual. Moreover, how this crisis has affected the attitudes that the young adults have towards political trust and the potential crisis of legitimacy additionally differ from individual to individual. The political chaos and the results of the many situations that has occurred has created a deep uncertainty amongst the young adults. The little trust they have in the political

actors and institutions, in combination with the increasing amount of corruption in politics, as well as a believed lack of representation and influence has led them to question the legitimacy of the political system, and the future of Brazil. In the end, being regarded as key drivers for social change, the attitudes and experiences of these young adults might be part in determining Brazil's political, economic, social, and cultural future. A future that undoubtedly will be interesting to follow, as there are indications that the political turmoil in the country will continue in the years to come.

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Appendix 1: List of informants

List of informants

Brian – 23.02.18. Focus group interview.
Carlo – 27.03.18. E-mail interview.
Clarinha – 25.03.2018. E-mail interview.
David – 25.02.18. Focus group interview.
Danilo – 11.04.18. E-mail interview.
Dia – 25.02.18. Focus group interview.
Florence – 26.03.18. E-mail interview.
Francisca – 11.03.18. E-mail interview.
Frida – 02.04.18. E-mail interview.
Franco – 15.10.2018. E-mail interview.
Lea – 25.02.18. Focus group interview.
Hans – 25.02.18. Focus group interview.
Maria – 15.03.2018. E-mail interview.
Martha – 25.02.18. Focus group interview.
Miriam – 15.02.18. Focus group interview.
Molly – 15.02.18. Focus group interview.
Neymar – 23.02.18. Focus group interview.
Oribe – 16.04.18. E-mail interview.
Paula – 27.03.18. E-mail interview.
Phillip – 31.03.18. E-mail interview.
Raquel – 15.02.18. Focus group interview.
Ramona – 04.04.18. E-mail interview.
William – 23.02.18. Focus group interview.

Appendix 2: Interview guide

E-mail interview

It would be of great help if you are able to elaborate / explain your answer for each question.

How would you define Brazilian politics?

How would you describe the current political environment in Brazil?

Do you believe that there is a political crisis in Brazil? Either answer, please elaborate.

Do you trust the national political system? If you are able, please explain your answer.

Follow-up to the last question: Do you trust politicians in Brazil?

In your opinion, is the country governed by people who only have an interest in themselves?

Do you feel politically represented by the political parties in Brazil? And do you feel that you have a voice and that you are able to influence the political future for your country?

How are political parties in Brazil divided? Are there clear left- and right- parties?

What is your opinion on “presidencialismo de coalisaõ”? (Very broadly said: The way parties need to cooperate with each other to gain power).

The media, have for many years, stated that “all politicians are corrupt”. Do you agree or disagree? Please elaborate.

Do you think that corruption is bad for democracy? Or is it just part of politics?

An author that has written about politics in Brazil states that corruption and a lack of transparency and participation is part of Brazilian politics. Calling it “politics as usual”. Is this something you agree on? How so?

“Rouba, mas faz”. Can you explain the meaning of this in politics? Do you support this notion? (the politician steals but get things done). And what about *“jeitinho brasileiro”*, does that affect politics in Brazil? How?

Do people vote on a party on the basis of favors and benefits? Like Bolsa Familia. Can a vote be seen as an obligation because of this?

Can you, shortly describe Bolsonaro, Lula, Temer, Dilma and Marina Silva? How do you characterize these individuals?

What are your hopes for the 2018 election? And Brazil’s future?

Is there anything that you want to add? Any comments about the questions? Something you feel that I have not asked about?

Request for participation in research project

Master thesis about the political landscape in Brazil

Background and Purpose

I am a student currently enrolled at the master program Human Geography at the University of Oslo. In correlation to this enrollment I am conducting a research prior to writing my master thesis about the current political landscape in Brazil. The purpose of this study is to learn about the different perceptions Brazilians, between the age of 20 and 30, who is based in Brasilia have towards politics in the country. I am interested in the perceptions you have towards politics, democracy, the upcoming election, the different political parties, corruption, and prominent political figures.

What does participation in the project imply?

The data collection of this project will be conducted through interviews and observations and following analysis of the data collected from February 2018 until somewhere between June and August 2019, depending on when the project is due.

The questions of this paper concern your views on the political system in Brazil, your thoughts on prominent political figures, your hopes for the political future and the upcoming election etc. This data will be collected through audio recordings (if you give your consent to this), and notes.

What will happen to the information about you?

All personal data will be treated confidentially. The data that I collect will only be accessed by me (the student) and my supervisors. The personal data (regarding you) as well as the recordings will be stored separately to ensure that you remain anonymous in the project. You will not be recognizable in the publication, as I will give you a fake name (which you can decide yourself).

The project is scheduled for completion by 01.08.2019. When the project is completed, I will delete the recordings, and the data that you have given me will be further anonymized, before being archived.

Voluntary participation

It is voluntary to participate in the project, and you can at any time choose to withdraw your consent without stating any reason. If you decide to withdraw, all your personal data will be made anonymous.

If you would like to participate or if you have any questions concerning the project, please

contact Håkon Paulsen Torset (student researcher) at [REDACTED], or
David Jordhus-Lier (supervisor), at

The study has been notified to the Data Protection Official for Research, NSD - Norwegian
Centre for Research Data.

Consent for participation in the study

I have received information about the project and am willing to participate

(Signed by participant, date)