Electoral Contestation as a Mitigator of Conflict

Testing the Mechanisms of Electoral Contestation and their Effect on Intrastate Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Summary

This thesis examines more closely the mechanisms that lie behind the causal relationship between electoral contestation and violent intrastate conflict identified by Henrikas Bartusevičius and Svend-Erik Skaaning in their 2018 article "Revisiting Democratic Civil Peace: Electoral Regimes and Civil Conflict". By using a nested-analysis research design the thesis first tests whether the causal patterns identified by Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning's global analysis, also are present within a limited geographical region, Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the logistic regression, the standardized residuals of each observation within Sub-Saharan Africa is calculated in order to identify the samples' deviant and pathway case, namely Madagascar (Deviant) and Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway). The analysis reveals that there are three main mechanisms behind the causal relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict; *Substitution*, *Inclusion* and *Constraints on Repression*. Both Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa) have similar stories of dominating party systems and executive dominance both over time and within the political system being challenged in the 1990s. But where Madagascar was successful in taming this revolt through different means of increasing electoral contestation, Congo (Kinshasa) were unable to stop the tensions within society from developing, eventually leading to a civil war, causing more than 4 million people to lose their lives in the two Congolese Wars around the millennium mark.

By evaluating the mechanisms within Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa), using indicators of each mechanism's outplay, it is revealed that the Congolese regime's executive fumigation of the political system effectively created zero space for any of the mechanisms to play out. This resulted in the effective closing off of any potential development and/or increase of electoral contestation. Combined with the destabilization of Eastern Congo following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, this created a deadly mixture leading to the occurrence of two civil wars. On the contrary, Madagascar was able to create a disruption in the executive domination of Didier Ratsiraka, a disruption that allowed the oppositional powers to develop democratic institutions, as well as a channel of non-violent participation. The country's ethnic and religious diversity in combination with the neo-patrimonial legacy of the African continent allowed marginalized groups of society to be included in the policy processes through seats in the cabinet. This led to the fulfillment of all three mechanisms, an increase in electoral contestation and the effective stop to a potential civil war following the transition, especially with regard to the tensions arising from the hotly contested 2001 elections.

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All flaws within this thesis are, of course, my own

Falk Eidsvold Tøien

Oslo, 23 May 2019

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In December 2007, following a disputed presidential election, social tensions exploded throughout Kenya. Within minutes after the sitting president Mwai Kibaki was re-elected, tribe-based riots broke out across much of the country, exacerbated by the ethnic and linguistic diversity within the regime. Accusations of electoral fraud and a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of votes after the election led to concerns about the final result and by the end of February, the ethnic violence had resulted in over 1500 deaths and displaced an estimated 600 000 persons leading to indictments by the International Criminal Court (Collier & Vicente, 2012, p. 142; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015, p. 23).

Free, fair and open elections are considered the purest institutional embodiment of democracy as it transforms the will of the people into actual political power and policy. It represents the most common and widely accepted institutionalization of political participation. However, this prominent position also brings with it a great potential for violent conflict when the expectations of the electorate is not met, as illustrated by the 2007 elections in Kenya. Elections and its varying degrees of freedom, fairness and openness is one of many different indicators that can be used to differentiate between a plethora of diverse regime-types. From the more basic three-fold differentiation between democratic, non-democratic and hybrid regimes to more complex separations of regimes based on their institutional make-up. The relational patterns that exist between regime-type and intrastate conflict have been subject to a number of studies throughout the years. Researchers have attempted to identify mechanisms and specific aspects of regimes that either make them more or less prone to violent domestic conflict. The common conclusion for most of these analyses has been the presence of a democratic civil peace. The most reliable path to stable domestic peace has been the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime that secures competitive elections, and political and civil rights for its people. This thesis is concerned with aspects that may move a regime closer to this democratic civil peace, thereby reducing their propensity for violent conflict. It focuses on the competitive element within elections as its guiding point for differentiating between regimes, and for its effect on the

propensity for domestic conflict. Since African independence, elections have taken on a new meaning within the political context of the continent. Further research may eventually provide the key to establishing an African-derived formula for constructive political participation (Chazan, 1979). Many studies throughout the years have lacked the explicit focus on the underlying mechanisms behind their empirical findings, and this thesis stands in contrast to this by highlighting some these mechanisms, and their outplay.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

The overarching goal of this thesis is to identify the mechanisms that lie behind the relationship between electoral contestation and violent intrastate conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to obtain this goal, the research question has a purely explanatory goal and is territorially bound in order to reflect its narrow focus on a specific aspect of the relationship between democracy and conflict, and on a specific region of the world. Based on this the research question is the following:

(RQ): What are the mechanisms connecting electoral contestation to violent intrastate conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa?

The decision to look more closely at the mechanisms is done as a way of operationalizing the concept of "electoral contestation", as the concept in itself is difficult to measure precisely. Electing to look at specific mechanisms associated with a country's level of electoral contestation, enables the analysis to point to institutional traits or compositions that either increase or decrease a regime's level of contestation, and thereby directly alter their propensity for violent intrastate conflict.

1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

In order to answer the research question, I will use a nested analysis research design which combines elements from a quantitative and qualitative analysis. By doing this, I am able to not only examine if there exists a causal pattern between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict, but also identify the mechanisms behind this possible causal pattern. This hopefully enables me to generate an analytical payoff that is greater than only using either a qualitative or quantitative analysis. The data that will be used in the quantitative analysis, is the "Lexical Index of Electoral Democracies (LIED)", a dataset comprised of electoral regime types and

onsets of intrastate conflict, as well as numerous control variables. The qualitative analysis will be largely based upon second-hand sources such as articles, books and compendiums. The qualitative analysis is based around two contrasting cases, one case adhering to theoretical expectations (Pathway Case) and one that deviates from these expectations given its values on the dependent and independent variable (Deviant Case).

1.3   STRUCTURE

This thesis is organized as follows: Following this first, introductory chapter, Chapter Two consists of a literature review, presenting the important empirical findings into the relationship between regime-type and intrastate conflict. The chapter shows how this thesis' foundational article by Svend-Erik Skaaning and Henrikas Bartusevisčuis not only represents a continuation of a more recent trend within this research field by focusing on a particular institutional characteristic and its effect on intrastate conflict, but also represents a deviation from the finding that semi-democratic regime are the most conflict-prone.

The first part of Chapter Three is concerned with defining some of the important components of the thesis, as well as presenting the regime-typology being applied throughout the analysis. Following this, I go on to a presentation of the different mechanisms connecting regime-type to intrastate conflict, based on the same three articles that make up Chapter Two.

Chapter Four begins with a presentation of the research design being applied, followed by a thorough walkthrough of the case-selection process. After the data behind the dependent and independent variable is presented, the reliability and validity of the research process is evaluated, and the thesis scope is demarcated both in time and space. The last part of Chapter Four is dedicated to creating a checklist for mechanisms that will be employed throughout the case-focused part of the analysis.

In Chapter Five the logistic regression is conducted and an assessment is presented into Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning's causal patterns and their presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Following this the outplay of the mechanisms identified in Chapter Four is detailed by looking more closely at the case of Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa). Chapter Six, the final chapter is dedicated to concluding remarks.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

In this part of the thesis I will briefly present the most important empirical findings of Henrikas Bartusevisčuis and Svend-Erik Skaaning's analysis into the relationship between democracy and intrastate conflict. Their article represents the foundational theoretical framework upon which this thesis is built. Following this, I will introduce some alternative views on the relationship that differ from the empirical findings of the authors, as well as some criticism that has been directed at the use of the Polity Index. The goal of the chapter is to tell a story of moving away from the use of the Polity Index and instead employing databases that are more specifically focused towards institutional characteristics, like the "Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED)" and the "Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM)" dataset. This change has made it possible to determine if some measures of democratization are proven to be more fruitful in reducing a regime's propensity for intrastate conflict and how these institutional traits relate and affect each other. The literature review will highlight the fact that few studies have focused on the mechanisms underlying the actual empirical findings of their research. This will further contribute to show why a research project like mine, not only fits into a larger trend currently taking place within the scholarly community, but also stands in contrast to much of the democracy-conflict research that has been conducted prior to this thesis.

The relational patterns that exist between regime-type and intrastate conflict have been subject to a number of studies throughout the years. The common ground for most of these analyses has been the presence of a democratic civil peace. The most reliable path to stable domestic peace has been to establish a consolidated democratic regime that assures competitive elections, and that secures political and civil rights for the electorate tasked with electing their leaders. However, in the last few years more studies have focused on the institutional characteristics that are behind this democratic civil peace and elected to go away from the traditional use of the Polity Index as a measure for differentiating between regime-types. This is done in order to determine if some measures of democratization are proven to be more fruitful in reducing a regime's propensity for intrastate conflict and how these institutional traits relate to each other.

In a 2018 article Henrikas Bartusevičuis and Svend-Erik Skaaning looked more closely at how differences in electoral contestation across different regime-types affect their propensity for violent domestic conflict by applying a new dataset to several hypotheses. Their global analysis spanned close to 200 years (1817-2006) and uncovered general causal patterns in the relationship between electoral regimes and their propensity for intrastate conflict.

2.1 ELECTORAL CONTESTATIONS' EFFECT ON VIOLENT INTRASTATE CONFLICT

In a newly published article titled "Revisiting Democratic Civil Peace" in *The Journal of Peace Research,* Henrikas Bartusevičuis and Svend-Erik Skaaning present an institutional-specific view on the relationship between regime-type and intrastate conflict. The institutional feature that they elect to employ is a concept familiarized through Robert Dahl's conception of democracy, namely electoral contestation, the level of competition within elections. By focusing on one particular feature of democracy, one that is not directly correlated with violence, and using this as the backbone for their regime typology, the authors avoid potential problems of measurement error and capture the multifaceted nature of democracy. Both the presence of measurement errors and the inability to capture the complex nature of a democratic regime have been foundational elements in criticism that has been directed at authors that have previously conducted research into the relationship between regime type and domestic conflict (Treier & Jackman, 2008; Vreeland, 2008). Alternative explanations into the relationship and some of this criticism will be presented in section 2.2.

By testing different hypotheses in a global statistical analysis spanning the years 1817-2006 Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning find that polyarchies, regimes characterized by unconstrained electoral competition, have the lowest probability of armed conflict compared to the other electoral regimes. The analysis also reveals that these regimes are only slightly less prone to violent intrastate conflict than minimalist democracies. This points to an overall finding that high levels of electoral contestation positively relates to civil peace (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 637). In addition to this, the analysis also reveals that single- and multiparty autocracies are more peaceful than non-electoral autocracies, pointing to the fact that this relationship is potentially linear. FIGURE 1 shows that a regime's level of democracy relates to the onset of intrastate violent conflict in a negative monotonic way. However, the disruptions in the linear patterns suggest that the regime-type – conflict relationship is more nuanced, and the findings

made by Bartusevičuis and Skaaning in their analysis supports this. The model clearly depicts the fact that non-electoral autocracies have a substantially higher propensity for intrastate conflict than single-party autocracies and multiparty autocracies, and that the difference in the number of parties only slightly alters this propensity. The model also shows that minimalist democracies display a much lower propensity for intrastate conflict and one that does not deviate substantially from the level of conflict within polyarchies.

FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS BASED ON ELECTORAL REGIME TYPE (FULL SAMPLE)

Source: (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 637)

The model is the estimated probabilities (95% CI) of civil war onset as a function of a dummy-coded LIED

2.2 ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE REGIME-CONFLICT LINK

Within the scholarly community there exists a consensus that the regime-type of a state, in some capacity affects both the likelihood and the possible severity of intrastate violent conflict. One of the early and fundamental theoretical frameworks illustrating this point was brought about through Hegre et.al. Their analysis argues that there exists an "inverted-U" relationship between a regime's level of democracy and their probability of domestic armed conflict. Within their 2001 article, they make the argument that semi-democratic-regimes have a higher risk of

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conflict than consistent autocracies or democracies (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). FIGURE 2 illustrates this argument and clearly depicts the inverted U-shaped relationship that exists between a country's´ level of democracy, in this respect ranging from 10 to -10 based on the Polity index, and their relative risk of conflict, ranging from 0-3. Civil war is most likely when the Polity index is equal to 0 and becomes less and less likely as a country moves away from 0 in either direction, toward +10 or -10.

FIGURE 1. Relative Risk of Civil War as a Function of Democracy and Time since Most Recent Regime Change, 1816–1992

FIGURE 2: INVERTED U

> *Source: (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 40)*
>
> *The baseline case is an observation with a democracy level of 0 and a proximity of regime change equal to 0 (15 years since regime change). All risks are plotted relative to this case.*

Empirical research following the analysis conducted by Hegre et.al has tended to support the authors' findings that semi-democratic regimes as the most conflict prone and that the regime-type – conflict relationship can be modeled in the form of an inverted U. Research that followed, estimated that these regimes have approximately 68% greater odds of experiencing civil war outbreak, even after controlling for a lack of consolidation of a certain regime-type (James D. Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 85). There has, however, been some criticism concerning the use of

the Polity Index as a measurement for differentiating between democratic, autocratic and semi-democratic regimes and this criticism will be presented below.

James Vreeland criticizes the use of the Polity Index as a measure of regime-type in studies like the one conducted by Hegre et.al. Vreeland claims that the original finding that semi-democratic regimes are more prone to intrastate conflict is not driven by the relationship between political institutions and civil war, but by the relationship between political violence and civil war, as the coding of the Polity Index's regime characteristics may reflect ongoing civil war or other political violence (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 36; Vreeland, 2008, p. 401). The Polity Index uses different measures in order to classify a regime as either democratic, non-democratic or semi-democratic, and within both the measure of political competition and political participation there are similar problems of tautology, with either direct or indirect references to intrastate violence being explicitly stated within the coding. These clear links to intrastate conflict within the coding of the Polity Index constitute the fundamental criticism from Vreeland.

While Vreeland criticized the use of the Polity Index within analyses that were concerned with the effect of regime type and armed conflict, Treier and Jackman claim that researches have been overly sanguine about the properties of the Polity democracy scale within applied statistical work (Treier & Jackman, 2008, p. 201). The reasoning behind this claim is that there exists considerable error in the latent levels of democracy underlying the Polity scores, a measurement error of sorts. This error creates unwanted statistical noise when applying the index in scientific research, and the authors claim that this measurement error is heteroskedastic, meaning that the countries with the highest or lowest levels of democracy also exhibit the most noise within their measures (Treier & Jackman, 2008, p. 213). In a study like the one conducted by Hegre et.al where the divisions between the different regime types are one of the foundational pillars of their findings, an error when measuring these regimes can drastically change the conclusions drawn. The authors therefore encourage researches to use caution when applying these measures, as there is simply not enough information in the Polity indicators to capture the multifaceted nature of democracy, and thereby do not support elaborate models highlighting the way democracy affects outcomes (Treier & Jackman, 2008, p. 213).

In their 2018 article titled "Which Institutions Matter?", Fjelde, Knutsen and Nygård present a refined look at the relationship that exists between regime type and civil conflict and contributes with another application of an institutional trait-based assessment of the relationship. The authors apply the dataset "Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM)", comprised of 350 indicators of

institutional and non-institutional indicators of democracy. This diversity of indicators enables the authors to consciously avoid using inherently endogenous measures of democracy, such as political killings and election violence, providing a solution for the criticism presented by Vreeland, while still having enough indicators to create a fruitful analysis (Fjelde, Knutsen, & Mokleiv Nygård, 2018, p. 15). The authors chose to focus on the institutional constraints that exist within the political system and differentiates between regime-types based on these constraints' ability to limit the executive power. An autocratic regime is characterized by a lack of, or very limited, constraints on the executive power resulting in the state-apparatus being designed for and in many respects becoming the executive power. In a democratic regime, these constraints uphold the separation of powers by providing checks on the executive while at the same time securing free and fair elections to office. A semi-democratic regime will have institutionalized some of these institutional constraints, but either because of the composition of the constraints or the lack of power inserted in them, they find themselves in a situation where these constraints more halt than limit the executive power (Fjelde et al., 2018). The findings in Fjelde et.al are consistent with the inverted-U shaped relationship between regime type and intrastate conflict found in the analysis of Hegre et.al.. They are also consistent with the overall findings of a democratic civil peace in the same analysis, as well as with Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning's analysis (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638; Hegre et al., 2001, p. 44). Through their analysis the authors also find that autocratic countries like North Korea, Eritrea, China and Belarus, despite of their lack of democratic traits, have a distinctly lower propensity for conflict compared to semi-democratic regimes that inherently have some of these democratic elements embedded in their institutions and society (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 29).

2.3   THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS

Through examining different aspects of the relationship between democracy and violent intrastate conflict, the authors presented above have identified that certain regime types or specific institutional features within these regimes can have a substantial effect on a country's propensity for violent conflict. The findings in Hegre et.al, Fjelde et.al and Bartusevičius and Skaaning all follow the same common understanding of causality, that an independent variable X causes an outcome Y. However, any account of causality needs to specify how this effect is exerted. This thesis contributes to that by moving the analytical focus away from causes and outcomes and over to the causal process that links these causes and outcomes together (Derek

Beach, 2016, p. 15; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 85). It is this shift in analytical attention that in my opinion is this thesis' main contribution to the study into the relationship between democracy and intrastate conflict. Instead of focusing on a more static understanding of causality, this thesis will attempt to identify the mechanisms that are behind the more general causal patterns. This also enables the thesis to have a theoretical contribution to the research field, by outlining the precise mechanisms linking electoral contestation to intrastate conflict. This is done by scaling down to a more narrowly focused analysis on Sub-Saharan Africa with an explanatory goal that is being fulfilled through focusing on specific cases of particular interests within the region. As Bartusevičius and Skaaning write:

> *"Large-N cross-national design allows the identification of patterns consistent with the theorized claims. Identifying the actual mechanisms driving these patterns, however, requires scaling down and alternative analytical approaches." (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638)*

By applying a case-based nested analysis design to a limited geographical region, this analysis contributes not only to strengthening the insight into the relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict, but fills an addressed need within this research field (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638). The thesis represents a continuation within the vein of research that deals with the effect of a single institutional characteristic on intrastate conflict. However, through in-depth case studies, the goal is to advance the work of Bartusevičius and Skaaning and by this infer beyond what the particular observations within their work tells us (King et al., 1994, p. 8). By treating societal developments and political processes as indicators of larger mechanisms taking place within these countries, I wish to obtain a more thorough understanding of electoral contestation and its effect on a regime's propensity for violent intrastate conflict. This goal of the qualitative part of the analysis is two-fold; it aims to test the theoretical basis of the analysis through identifying whether the mechanisms of electoral contestation and its effect on intrastate conflict are present within a pathway case, thereby strengthening the theory. Following this, the analysis aims at uncovering if there are some alternative processes taking place within the deviant case, testing the theory and thereby enabling the thesis to also have a large theory-building potential.

Chapter 3

Theory

In this part of the thesis the attention will be shifted to the underlying mechanism behind the empirical findings presented above. This will be done by defining some of the important concepts that will be used to describe the theory connecting electoral contestation to the onset of intrastate conflict, in detail. Following this I will also present the empirical indicators that will be used in the analysis, and ground these within the theory. At the end of the chapter I will present some alternative mechanisms, which in contrast to Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning conclude that semi-democratic regimes are the most conflict prone. The inclusion of these alternative mechanisms is done in order to highlight the similar processes taking place affecting a regime's propensity for intrastate conflict, while at the same time displaying the differences in focusing on the specific impact of electoral contestation.

3.1   DEFINING THE COMPONENTS OF THE THESIS

Within their analysis Bartusevičius and Skaaning apply the dataset "The Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy" (LIED) which exclusively focuses on the features of electoral regimes. Based on the level of electoral contestation within each regime, the authors create a regime typology that differentiates between five different types; non-electoral autocracies, single-party autocracies, multiparty autocracies, minimalist democracies and polyarchies (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 625).

The definitions applied to the different regime-types will be based on the typology used by Henrikas Bartusevičuis and Svend-Erik Skaaning, and compared with more general, alternative, yet complete understanding of the concepts. This is done in order to highlight the fundamental focus of this paper; electoral contestation and its effect on the propensity and severity of intrastate conflict.

FIGURE 1 is a graphical presentation comparing Bartusevičius and Skaaning´s typology with the more commonly applied three-fold regime typology differentiating between autocratic, semi-democratic and democratic regimes. This three-fold typology is more commonly used to describe the difference between the three regime types.

FIGURE 3: ELECTORAL REGIME TYPOLOGY

3.1.1 Electoral Contestation – Political Competition as a Measure

The concept of "electoral contestation", more commonly referred to as "electoral competition", is a concept that is difficult to measure precisely, given that its presence is dependent on an understanding within the electorate, especially among oppositional forces, that they are genuinely contesting for power through electoral means. The threshold of when this occurs is different across regimes, and because of this, I will use three particular institutional criteria or traits as an operationalization for the concept. Electoral contestation will be considered to be high if all three are fulfilled, intermediate if two of the three criteria is satisfied and low if one or none of the criteria is institutionalized. The three criteria are the following; "Ex-ante uncertainty", entailing that elections are sufficiently free to allow the opposition a chance of winning, "ex-post irreversibility" requiring that the winners take office and "repeatability" which secures that the electoral regime is not interrupted (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 16).

3.1.2 Democratic Regime – An Assured Peace?

As presented in FIGURE 3, Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning differentiate between two different types of democratic regimes, minimalist democracies and polyarchies.

Minimalist Democracy

Minimalist democracies are regimes where multiparty elections take place, and where these elections are competitive in the sense that the final result of the election is not decided beforehand. This regime-type fulfills the minimal standard of democracy applied by "The Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED)" which defines a democratic regime as:

"*(...)[1] a regime where leaders are selected through contested elections held periodically before a broad electorate*" (Skaaning, Gerring, & Bartusevičius, 2015, p. 1495).

Polyarchy

Polyarchies exhibit the same institutional trademarks featured among minimalist democracies, but also include an element of extensive freedom of expression (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018). This regime-type is based on Robert Dahl's ideal type with the same name, but is more similar to the concept of "liberal democracy" presented by Fareed Zakaria and represents one extreme of the scale applied by Bartusevičuis and Skaaning's typology. Zakaria defines the regime-type as one:

> "*(...) that holds free and fair elections, while at the same time establishes certain basic political rights for the electorate*" (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22).

An alternative and more general definition of democracy can also be created by combining the eight institutional guarantees put forward by Robert Dahl to illustrate what he labeled as a "polyarchy" (Dahl, 1971). These institutional features are the presence of "*(...) freedom of organization, freedom of expression, the right to vote, broad eligibility for public office, the right to compete for support and votes, the availability of alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and the dependence of public policies on citizens' preferences*" (Coppedge, Alvarez, & Maldonado, 2008, p. 633). An additional element of consolidation can also be included in order to differentiate between consolidated democratic regimes and those that exhibit democratic traits or elements, but where democracy has still not become "*(...) the only game in town.*" (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14). All of these institutional features are in some capacity related to achieving high levels of electoral contestation. Civil rights like freedom of organization and expression, and the availability of alternative sources are all components of creating an even playing field, something that is of fundamental importance in order to secure

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[1] A "(...)" at the start of a direct citation indicates that the citation is an excerpt from a complete sentence

the rest of the institutional features identified by Dahl as composing a polyarchic regime. Based on these criteria and including the element of democratic consolidation alluded to by Linz and Stepan, an alternative definition of a democratic regime can be:

> "*A consolidated regime that secures civil and political rights and holds regular fair, competitive and inclusive elections.*"

3.1.3 Semi-Democratic Regime – A Conflict-Prone Mixture?

Semi-democratic regimes are often referred to as "hybrid regimes" because of the regime-type's inherent mix of democratic and autocratic institutional characteristics. Bartusevičius and Skaaning recognize that there exist two hybrid electoral regime types, differentiated based on the regimes number of parties.

Single-Party Autocracy

A single-party autocratic regime is a regime that effectively experiences a lack of genuine contestation as the opposition either directly through law or repression, or indirectly exemplified through the use of "uneven playing fields", is prevented from participating in elections (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The regime type is defined as:

> "*(…) an electoral regime characterized by elections taking place, but with only one party running for office.*" (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 632)

Multi-Party Autocracy

A multi-party autocratic regime allows oppositional parties to participate in elections, but electoral contestation is effectively constrained through repression of oppositional forces and/or through clever use of electoral thresholds. The regime type is defined in the following way:

> "*A regime where multiparty election takes place, but where the elections are non-competitive.*" (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 632)

An alternative and more statically based definition of a semi-democratic regime can be obtained by using the Polity Index. Within the index a regime is labeled as semi-democratic if it obtains a score between 5 and -5. In contrast a regime is recognized as democratic if it obtains a score higher than 5, and autocratic if it obtains a score lower than -5 (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers,

2017). This points to the fact that there exists greater diversity among the hybrid regimes than among democratic or autocratic regimes. This trait is also exemplified through a wider and less institutional-specific definition:

> *"A political regime that combines institutional traits from autocratic and democratic regimes"*

3.1.4 Autocratic Regime – A Guarantee for Violent Intrastate Conflict?

Precisely pinpointing which institutional features that compose an autocratic regime is a difficult task. The inherent diversity of non-democratic regimes is not only present in the different forms they take, exemplified through personal, one-party, theocratic, military and monarchical regimes, but also through the different ways the incumbents in these countries obtain power. Some obtain power through semi-competitive elections while others attain incumbency through coups or violent action. However, all autocratic regimes are founded upon one simple premise; the absence of democracy. This lack of democracy is also the basis of Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning´s one type of non-democratic regime.

Non-Electoral Autocracy

The basic assumption behind how Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning define an autocratic regime is that these regimes lack democratic institutions, most notably elections that ensure any type of electoral contestation. This may be due to of a lack of political willingness by the executive power or because of other institutional impediments that stand in the way of an election. This form of electoral autocracy represents the contrasting extreme to the polyarchic electoral democracy in Bartusevičuis and Skaaning's typology and is simply defined in the following way:

> *"(...) a regime where no elections take place* (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 633)

An alternative definition of the concept will also be largely based on the absence of democracy, rather than on the specific presence of autocratic political institutions. This is also what separates this regime type from the "hybrid" semi-democratic regimes defined above. These regimes are characterized by a lack of several freedoms, such as speech and assembly, but also through the deprivation of people's right to elect their own leaders (O'Neil, 2010, p. 142). Based on this, an autocratic regime will be defined in the following way:

"A consolidated political regime characterized by the absence of democratic institutions, and by a lack of political and civil rights for the electorate."

3.1.5 Intrastate Conflict – Domestically Bound, Numerically Based

Within this analysis the concept of "intrastate conflict" will be territorially bound to conflicts that occur within a certain state's territory and be based on the definition of civil war applied by the Correlates of War (COW)-project. The use of COW's Intra-State War Data correlates with the LIED-database applied by Bartusevičuis and Skaaning, and demarcates the analysis within the time-period of 1817-2006. COW defines "civil war" as:

"(..) sustained combat between a state government and non-state actor(s) resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths annually and taking place within the state territory" *(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010b)*

3.2 ELECTORAL CONTESTATION - AN OPERATIONALIZED EXPLANATION OF CONFLICT?

Bartusevičuis and Skaaning argue that constraints on electoral contestation generate incentives for the opposition to resort to violence (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 625). These constraints will be defined as the lack of one or more of the institutional criteria highlighted in the definition, leading to intermediate or low levels of electoral contestation. Their argument is based on four different mechanisms through which electoral contestation may influence the opposition's willingness to resort to violence, more specifically constraints on this competition.

"(…) constrained electoral contestation can (i) motivate the opposition to substitute electoral competition with violence, (ii) legitimize the use of anti-government violence, (iii) ˊself-selectˋ the opposition recruits into violence, and (iv) hinder the incumbent's strength." (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 626)

In the qualitative analysis the focus will not be on these opposition-specific mechanisms, but rather on three underlying institutional mechanisms linking electoral contestation to violent intrastate conflict. In this part of the paper I will outline these three theoretical mechanisms, before presenting an alternative view of the conflict-regime type dyadic, based on Hegre et.al and Fjelde et.al's articles. The three mechanisms of electoral contestation are *Substitution*,

Executive Constraint and *Inclusion*. The specific indicators of each mechanism will be outlined in Chapter Four, when discussing the research design of the qualitative analysis.

3.2.1   Costs and Grievance – Two Schools of Conflict

Within the literature focused on the factors causing intrastate conflict, there has traditionally existed two schools, each with their own model or explanation for why certain groups within society elect to take up arms against the state.

The first school argues that there exists a rational cost-benefit analysis behind the decision to engage in violence as a means to achieve political goals. Resorting to violence has an inherent cost attached to it, one that is greater than non-violence. This cost is not only economic, but also entails more socio-economic costs such as increases in child mortality and decreases in life expectancy and access to clean water (Gates, Hegre, Nygård, & Strand, 2012). Oppositional actors therefore have to take into account these costs when choosing whether or not they elect to resort to violence. When the benefits of resorting to violence exceeds the costs associated with taking up arms, the oppositional actors will choose this option and vice versa.

The second school of thought makes the argument that intrastate conflicts are driven by grievances that marginalized groups have towards the ones in power. The choice to rebel violently against the regime may be explained by grievances caused by high inequality, a lack of political rights and/or ethnic and religious divisions within society (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 563). When these causes of grievances are attached political significance or are institutionalized, oppositional actors may see it fit to rebel violently, particularly if other avenues of political participation are closed off.

The mechanisms within this thesis combine elements from both schools when explaining the onset of intrastate conflict or lack thereof within each case. The specific mechanisms' effect on intrastate conflict is grounded in a combination of both schools' explanations and this will also become clear in the presentation of each mechanism. As the mechanisms are all operationalized measures of electoral contestation, they are also intrinsically linked and affect each other in some capacity. This is important to remember when assessing their outplay within the pathway and deviant case. However, as they speak to different aspects of electoral contestation, they also exhibit individual value of their own, and this is the reasoning behind why they are presented, and their outplay within each case tested independently of the others.

3.2.2 Substitution: An Alternative Route to Political Influence – Substituting Violence with Non-Violence

The mechanisms of *Substitution* highlight the existence of an arena of non-violent participation where electoral contestation can take place within the political system. The mechanisms effect on the potential onset of intrastate conflict derives from its existence as an alternative channel of political participation in contrast to the violent channel. The mechanism also creates a foundation where the effect of the other mechanisms of *Executive Constraint* and *Inclusion* may be enhanced. However, the inclusion of the other mechanisms speaks to the fact that both *Executive Constraints* and *Inclusion* have an individual conflict-mitigating or conflict-enhancing effect. The expected effect of each of these will be presented in more detail in section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

Several researchers have found that electoral events that take place in non-democratic regimes increase the risk of ethnic civil war, recurrence of civil conflict and small-scale civil violence (Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015). The underlying mechanism behind this argument is that the sitting regime, by removing all competition, not only creates tensions within society, but makes resorting to violence an accepted substitute for this lack of participation. In contrast to democratic regimes, autocratic regimes constrain electoral contestation to the point where they effectively legitimize violence, instead of voting, as the political measure of choice for the opposition. In a democratic regime characterized by high levels of electoral contestation, these constraints are not present. Because of this the substitution of political action is therefore deemed unnecessary by the opposition, removing any possibility of it being legitimized as a viable action and removing its potential for "self-selecting" oppositional recruits into violence. By removing constraints on electoral contestation, securing high levels of competition, democratic regimes are able to make the electoral arena the most "profitable" place of political contestation for the opposition, thereby making resorting to violence much less attractive for the opposition. As pointed out by Bartusevičius and Skaaning "*(…) civil peace is more likely to prevail when the opposition has a meaningful chance of gaining power via electoral means.*" (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638). This logic creates the foundation for the first mechanism of electoral contestation that will be analyzed within the qualitative analysis of this thesis: *Substitution*.

When defining the concept of "electoral contestation" there were three institutional characteristics related to elections that together created the foundation for obtaining and sustaining a high level of competition. The presence of "ex-ante uncertainty", "ex-post irreversibility" and "repeatability" together ensures that the elections being held within regimes characterized by high levels of contestation, represent an alternative route of political influence. By allowing periodic electoral competition, oppositional actors are incentivized to await elections and pursue their interest in political excitation nonviolently, exemplified through the use political parties or lobbyism. Conversely, if regimes constrain electoral competition, oppositional actors are disincentivized to wait and to use the nonviolent routes, instead electing to contest power violently between elections. This mechanism creates a relationship between the two routes where "*(…) fighting and voting can be seen as strategic substitutes.*" (Dunning, 2011, p. 329). The mechanism of substituting between different tools in the box of political measures is dependent on the electoral regime in which the opposition operates. It is also tied to the notion of "costs" presented earlier as the cost of violent action is much higher than non-violent action, given the resources and risks associated with armed conflict (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, pp. 628-629). One could make the argument that this aspect is more pronounced in electoral regimes that exist between the two extremes.

Single-Party Autocracy

Minimalist Democracy

FIGURE 4: COMPARING COSTS

    —— = *A solid line indicates the current level of political inclusion*

    --- = *A dotted line represents the potential change in political inclusion*

    0 = Non-Electoral Autocracy. A regime where there is no political inclusion of the opposition

    1 = Polyarchies. A regime where there is full political inclusion of the opposition

    ● = *Current status*

FIGURE 4 illustrates the point that an opposition within a minimalist democratic regime has more to lose than an oppositional movement within a single-party autocracy, as the cost of armed conflict also has the effect of possibly closing the democratic substitutional route. Within the model, political inclusion is operationalized as a measure for electoral contestation.

3.2.3 Executive Constraints: Guarding Against Repression – The Role of Multiparty Institutions in Preventing Executive Closure of the Political System

The *Executive Constraint* mechanism derives its conflict-mitigating or conflict-enhancing potential effect from its preventive nature in ensuring that the executive power is "hands off" in allowing the effect of electoral contestation to play out, thereby ensuring "ex-ante uncertainty". Developing institutions that constrain the executive power, making direct and indirect manipulations of the electoral process difficult, should in theory also lead to more *Inclusion* and make oppositional actors more willing to *Substitute* violent action with non-violent action as the constraints ensure less meddling from the executive within this channel. If this institutional development does not take place, the effect may be reversed by decreasing *Inclusion* and creating less faith in the non-violent channel as a viable option into which to *Substitute* political participation.

Based on previous analyses, like the ones conducted by Hegre et.al and Fjelde et.al, non-democratic regimes are able to obtain low levels of intrastate conflict through repressing oppositional movements and voices to the point where there simply does not exist political room or opportunity for the opposition to challenge the system. These regimes are characterized by low levels of electoral contestation. Using the same logic applied in Fjelde et.al should lead us to believe that a regime where the incumbent has removed all possible competition from the electoral arena, they would obtain low levels of intrastate conflict. However, the analysis conducted by Bartusevičuis and Skaaning reveals that it is those regimes without electoral contestation that are actually those that experience intrastate conflict. Contrary to the argument that autocratic regimes remove the opportunity for oppositional forces to organize and carry out violence through pervasive repression, Fjelde makes the argument that when this repression is coupled with low state capacity, these regimes may not only be unable to prevent violence but actually provoke it. The use of overwhelming coercive force leads to a depleted base of support for the executive and strengthens the cause of deposing the incumbent, leaving the regime's strategy of repression with a great potential for backfiring (Fjelde, 2010, p. 199). Repression also has the potential for increasing the costs and decreasing the anticipated success of non-

violent relative to violent resistance, further heightening the risk of intrastate conflict (Rørbæk, 2016, p. 1). This element of executive repression and dominance constitutes the basis for the second mechanism linking electoral contestation to the onset of intrastate conflict, a mechanism I have elected to refer to as *Executive Constrains*.

A natural by-product of increased electoral contestation is the manifestation and development of more political parties within the political system. This multiparty setting provides a less effective institutional context for the executive power to monitor, co-opt and repress oppositional movements (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 632). This mechanism is due to the fact that increased electoral contestation also requires developing other related institutions to uphold this high level of contestation. Institutions such as an independent judiciary and legislature work as preventive tools that make it difficult for the executive to repress political adversaries or enrich themselves without expecting to be punished, either at the ballot box, through actions of the other state institutions, or directly through violent action. Developing these institutions effectively creates horizontal constraints on the executive power, constraints that not only have a conflict-mitigating effect in itself, but are also crucial for upholding a high level of electoral contestation (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 31). Another dimension to this mechanism is that high levels of electoral contestation accompanied by institutions that ensure compliance with the results within these elections, have a mitigating effect on commitment problems between oppositional movements within post-conflict settings (Brancati & Snyder, 2013, pp. 829-831; Flores & Nooruddin, 2012, pp. 561-562). When elections occur within post-conflict settings, ex-warring parties may be uncertain about each other's willingness to comply with the formal electoral process resulting in neither side credibly committing to the elections as a mean to gain political influence, resulting in a higher risk of conflict recurrence (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 629). A version of this type of a "commitment problem" is also presented as one rationale for resorting to violence by James Fearon (James D Fearon, 1995, p. 381). The indicators behind this mechanism will be the establishment of a multiparty institutional setting and the subsequent consolidation of the institutions that comprise this setting. In line with Bartusevičius and Skaaning's understanding of a stable regime, the consolidation of a multiparty setting will be set to three years, meaning that a conservation of multiple parties and an independent legislature and judiciary beyond this time, will be recognized as a consolidation of this multiparty setting.

3.2.4 Inclusion: Enabling Dahl´s Second Condition – How Increased Contestation Also Leads to Increased Inclusion

The mechanism of *Inclusion* and its potential effect is in many respects a token of the representative aspect of genuine electoral contestation and is closely related to the conflict-mitigating effect of having institutionalized vertical constraints on the executive (Fjelde et al., 2018). Bringing marginalized groups into the political arena further diversifies and broadens the electorate, in itself effectively removing potential grievances. At the same time it instills more faith into the non-violent electoral channel as more people are being represented and heard, making *Substituting* into this channel a viable course of action. The presence of high or low levels of *Inclusion* into the political system also speaks to the success or failure in creating institutions of *Executive Constraint,* as it points to the fact that the executive has either been able or unable to manipulate the electoral process, leaving certain groups out of the political system.

When defining his utopian ideal-type of regimes, the polyarchy, Robert Dahl included the presence of two overarching goals that needed to be met in order to classify a regime as democratic; contestation and inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). A regime's ability to obtain a high level of inclusion into the political system also has an effect on their overall level of electoral contestation and vice versa. Therefore, the third and last mechanism will be directly related to this.

One of the most common and effective ways of restricting electoral contestation is through the limitation of political rights or access, either directly through a lack of extended franchise rights, or more indirectly through the use of "uneven playing fields" as alluded to earlier (Levitsky & Way, 2010). A potential effect resulting from this lack of inclusion into the political system is the accumulation of grievances. This is especially pertinent when regimes restrict franchise rights along religious or ethnic divisions within society, and has the potential for increasing a regime's propensity for armed conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fjelde et al., 2018). Electoral regimes exhibiting high levels of electoral contestation on the other hand, are able to bridge marginalized groups and actors into a legitimate political process. This has a binate effect as extensive franchise rights are one of the key components of both creating and upholding high levels of electoral contestation within a regime, but through inclusion these regimes are also able to restrict potential grievances, thereby removing one potential source of domestic armed conflict. In much of the same fashion as with the mechanisms of *Substitution,* it is difficult to

pinpoint an exact point where a marginalized group feels included into the political system. However, given the history of using national conferences as a tool within the African context, especially during the attempted democratic transitions taking place in the early 1990s, a possible indicator of this mechanism is to identify whether or not institutional changes, like the use of national conferences were able to increase the level of inclusion into the political system, thereby reducing a regimes propensity for experiencing violent conflict (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 172).

When examining the relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict, Bartusevičius and Skaaning reveal that there are two critical thresholds where the risk of intrastate conflict decreases substantially; one between non-electoral and electoral regimes and one between regimes with/without competitive elections (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638). These thresholds are compared to the different regime-types in FIGURE 5.

FIGURE 5: THRESHOLDS IN COMPARISON TO ELECTORAL REGIME TYPOLOGY
Source: (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 637)
The figure is a graphical presentation of the findings of thresholds existing between different regime-types and is based on FIGURE 2 presented earlier in the chapter. Each vertical line represents a significant drop-off in a regime's propensity for violent intrastate conflict.

3.2.5 Two Critical Thresholds

As presented above, the absence of electoral contestation that exists within autocratic regimes creates incentives for the opposition to resort to violence, leading to a high propensity for violent intrastate conflict. The analysis conducted by Bartusevičius and Skaaning reveals that elections and associated institutions, even if non-competitive, reduce such incentives as they offer an alternative political measure to violence, facilitate autocratic divide-and-rule strategies and diminish the acceptance of anti-government violence within the electorate (Bartusevičius

& Skaaning, 2018, p. 638). Semi-democratic regimes are, however, irrespective of their form, intrinsically conflict-prone. Multiparty autocratic regimes are different from single-party autocracies as they allow oppositional parties to participate in elections, but these are usually characterized by a lack of genuine competition. As a precaution for continued incumbency these regimes usually introduce counteracting mechanisms that partly cancel out the positive effects associated with increased political openness (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 638). It is through the restriction of parties found in single-party autocracies and through the counteracting mechanisms found in multiparty autocratic regimes that one can identify the autocratic elements within these hybrid regimes. These inherent autocratic traits constrain electoral contestation and are the root cause behind the finding that semi-democratic regimes are conflict-prone. However, as these regimes also introduce some democratic elements as to loosen these constraints, they are found to be less prone to intrastate conflict than outright autocratic regimes.

3.3 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE MECHANISMS

This part of the thesis reflects upon some alternative explanations and mechanisms behind the negative monotonic relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict, diverting the attention to a wider array of institutional characteristics. These characteristics and their mechanisms have many of the same components that are found when focusing solely on electoral contestation, and will be based on the mechanisms identified in Hegre et.al and Fjelde et.al. However, where these mechanisms differ, thereby constituting alternative explanations to the relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict, there is focus on the effects of more than one institutional characteristic mechanisms. Both alternative explanations focus on regime characteristics which also capture the effect of electoral contestation, while Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning focus solely on this one institutional characteristic. In addition to this, the alternative explanations also end up with different empirical evidence as to which regime-type is the most conflict-prone. These alternative explanations will be presented and structured using the commonly used three-fold typology differentiating between democratic, semi-democratic and autocratic regimes.

In Chapter Two, the findings from Fjelde et.al's article was presented briefly. In the article the authors assess more closely which particular aspects and institutions of democracy that affect a regime's propensity for experiencing intrastate conflict, and also how these different institutional underpinnings for civil peace interact with each other (Fjelde et al., 2018, pp. 30-

31). Their analysis is particularly concerned with how vertical and horizontal constraints on the executive power can affect the propensity for intrastate conflict.

It is the institutions that are designed to make leaders accountable to the population, that create vertical constraints. Among several forms of institutional constraints two are of particular interest when examining the relationship between regime-type and intrastate conflict. Through contested multi-party competition, the executive power faces a non-negligible probability of being removed from office and replaced by new leaders, and through this ensures a-priori uncertainty. Checks against election fraud, freedom of speech and freedom to form parties are all prerequisites that put together, ensures that elections embodies this competitive element (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 8). The other institutional element, the presence of extensive franchise rights, ensures that the broader masses are included among those that are able to garner representation through their vote. If specific groups within the society are not granted these fundamental franchise rights, this can create tensions within society that may eventually lead to intrastate conflict.

Institutions such as an independent judiciary and a powerful legislature, create horizontal constraints that work to mitigate potential transgressions by the executive power. Examples of such transgressions are the jailing or threatening of oppositional forces or a further concentration of policy-making power in the hands of the chief executive (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 11).

Democratic Regimes

Because of the inherent institutional features that compose a democracy, these regimes create few political grievances and are able to accommodate oppositional forces in a non-violent matter. The institutions create opportunities for the political cleavages within society to be manifested through the establishment of political parties. By granting them access to the political arena, the regimes effectively eliminate the need to resort to violence (Aarebrot & Evjen, 2014, p. 305). By creating institutions which secure free and competitive elections, and through establishing basic civil rights such as freedom of speech and organization, democratic regimes remove the motivation behind resorting to violent means. The cost of violent intrastate conflict will by this be raised to a point where employing it is only associated with losses. Both vertical and horizontal constraints on the executive are present within democratic regimes and they work in tandem to reduce the threat of mass-based revolt, as they promote non-violent

channels to keep elites accountable to the broader citizenry (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 629). These constraints are in many respects operationalized indicators of a larger responsibility connected to obtaining power as an executive power, namely accountability. This accountability is institutionalized through governmental bodies that ensures oversight and sets boundaries for the actions that can be performed by the executive power, and are fundamental and integral parts of a democratic regime (Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999, p. 13). Through electoral institutions that mitigate potential credible commitment issues towards the masses, and by having both parliamentary and judicial constraints on leadership behavior, limiting the executive's actions towards non-incumbent elites, democratic regimes are able to ensure sustainable domestic peace (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 31).

Autocratic Regimes

Hegre et.al argues that autocratic regimes display inherent institutional features that allows them to obtain the same low risk of conflict that exists within democratic regimes (Hegre et al., 2001). However, whereas in democratic regimes these institutional features are geared towards creating genuine representation as a means to avoid conflict, in autocratic regimes these institutions are created to repress oppositional challengers, often violently. While democratic regimes remove the motivation to resort to violence, autocratic regimes are able to effectively shut off this channel of participation, removing the opportunity for violence through repression. The result is, however, the same, both democratic and autocratic regimes effectively remove the option of resorting to violence. Autocratic regimes are also able to obtain domestic peace, though one that is less stable than the one found in democracies. This is due to the fact that the executive power faces very limited or no horizontal constrains. It is therefore able to construct a system that caters to the executive power itself, making disposing of the incumbent a non-credible threat and removing any opportunity to revolt against the regime. However, by removing any element of accountability, which the executive has towards the larger masses, this also heightens the divisions within society itself, potentially explaining the lack of sustainability associated with autocratic civil peace in some cases (Fjelde et al., 2018). Through corrupting the electoral process these regimes limit electoral contestation, but is effective in meeting their goals while at the same time securing civil peace (Cox & Weingast, 2018, p. 284).

Semi-Democratic Regimes

Semi-democratic regimes represent a hybrid between the democratic institutions securing representation and the autocratic institutions of repression. These systems are partly open yet

lack effective means of solving conflicts. In these types of political systems, repression is difficult since some organization of opposition groups and some oppositional expression of discontent are allowed, but mechanisms to act on the expressed discontent are incomplete (Hegre, 2014, p. 163). Therefore, the regimes are not able to effectively transform these grievances into political representation and are at the same time not powerful enough to be able to repress them. However, the regimes' attempts to repress oppositional forces lead to more grievances within the society. This induces groups to take action, and the openness, which inherently exists, allows them to organize and engage in activities against the regime (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 33). This leads to a vicious circle where the inherent mixture of democratic and autocratic institutional traits creates a mechanism of accumulating grievance. This viscous circle fills the room that representation and repression is responsible for in democracies and autocracies, and leaves oppositional forces with both the motivation and opportunity to resort to violent action in an attempt to gain power. Semi-democratic regimes either score high on one institutional constraint and low on the other or display a mixture of the two, where none of the constraints are fully developed or under-developed. Independently, these institutional features are not enough on their own. It is, however, the lack of horizontal constraints that have the strongest effect on a regime's propensity for experiencing intrastate conflict. When these institutional features of horizontal constraint are lacking, improvements to the freeness and fairness of elections do not mitigate the risk of intrastate conflict. In many respects these institutions create the base, the horizontal substructure that makes it possible to increase vertical constraints and without them, a regime is unlikely to achieve domestic peace. However, when at least moderately strong horizontal constraints exist, improving electoral competition strongly reduces conflict risk (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 31). The inherent mixture of autocratic and democratic institutions found in semi-democratic regimes leaves these regimes without the tools to either fully represent or fully repress, given oppositional forces both the motivation and the opportunity to resort to violence.

In this chapter I have presented the foundational theoretical framework behind the empirical analysis being conducted in Chapter Five as well as some alternative mechanisms that have some similarities, but differ from my theory in both result and analytical focus. I have also presented the three mechanisms of electoral contestation; *Substitution, Executive Constraint* and *Inclusion* that will be tested within the analysis.

Chapter 4

Method

Chapter Three presented the theoretical mechanisms linking electoral contestation to intrastate conflict, giving us the theoretical foundation necessary to conduct an analysis into their effect in Sub-Saharan Africa. This part of the thesis will present the way this analysis will be conducted. Initially the nested analysis research design as a whole is introduced and its use in comparison with other designs is defended, followed by a walk-through of the case selection process, a process that led to the selection of the pathway case, Congo (Kinshasa) and the deviant case Madagascar. To conclude the research design part of Chapter Four, the method behind the qualitative part of the analysis is highlighted, briefly presenting the process tracing method, the sources used as well as the indicators used to break-down the larger mechanisms presented in 3.2. The second part of the chapter is focused on the two larger datasets behind the analysis as well as on some methodological considerations when it comes to validity and reliability, and it also presents the demarcations of time and space conducted within the analysis. The chapter is concluded with a brief overview of what observations I expect to find, if the theoretical mechanisms presented in Chapter Three are present.

The overall goal of this chapter is to present the way the research question will be answered, and how I methodologically imagine unlocking the theory-strengthening potential achieved by looking at the pathway case and the theory-building potential that exist in finding alternative explanations of the theory, through looking more closely at the most deviant case.

4.1   RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1.1   Nested Analysis

The overall goal of this thesis is binate. This binate goal also requires research being conducted on two different levels as the overall objectives of the two parts are different. The benefit of utilizing a mixed-methods design is that it has the potential of expanding the scope and breadth of the analysis in order to offset some of the weaknesses of using either approach alone (Driscoll, Appiah-Yeboah, Salib, & Rupert, 2007, p. 19). This analysis will be conducted using a sequential mixed-methods design referred to as "nested analysis" which combines the statistical analysis of a quantitative study with the in-depth investigation of one or more cases that are in the quantitative sample (Almalki, 2016, p. 292; Lieberman, 2005, pp. 435-436). The sequential nature of the method implies collecting and analyzing quantitative and then qualitative data in two consecutive phases within one study (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006, p. 3). The goal of the strategy is to improve the quality of conceptualization and measurement of the analysis, while at the same time instill more confidence in the central findings of the study being performed. Within this analysis the sequential nature of the nested analysis design instills this confidence by allowing me to first test whether the findings of Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning's global analysis also are present in a smaller, region-specific, sample of observations thereby removing one potential source of falsification.

In order to defend the use of the approach in comparison with other research designs there are certain prerequisites and conditions that need to be met. The first of which is the availability of a quantitative dataset with a sufficient number of observations and the existence of a baseline theory (Lieberman, 2005, p. 438). The condition of a baseline theory is already covered considering that the thesis utilizes arguments from Bartusevičius and Skaaning's global analysis as its foundation. The second part of the condition regarding the number of observations is also met, given the discussion in chapter 4.3 regarding external validity.

The second condition that should be met when employing a nested-analysis in contention with other research design, is that it upholds one promise; that the use of the nested analysis, specifically through the mutual exchange of information between the quantitative and qualitative parts of the analysis, will generate an analytical payoff that is greater than the sum of its parts (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436). In order to fulfill the ultimate goal of identifying the mechanisms that are behind the findings of Bartusevičius and Skaaning this analysis needed to

include an element of depth. This requirement is simply not met through only using a quantitative analysis. Because of the focus on underlying mechanisms the analysis could have been founded upon a qualitative case-study of specific cases. This meets the requirement of depth. Because there exists a baseline theory, the case-selection process could have been founded upon this. However, through using nested analysis and its sequential process-design you are able to obtain this same level of depth and at the same time remove a potential source of selection bias by grounding the case-selection process as an output of the quantitative analysis. Based on this, my argument is that this condition, the element of depth, is also met as the nested analysis, through its mixing of quantitative and qualitative components, creates a greater analytical payoff than would be obtained if the analysis was conducted using only one of the components.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative part of the nested analysis serves two main purposes; verifying that there exists a relational pattern, and guiding the case-selection process conducted in the qualitative part of the analysis.

In order to isolate the observations from sub-Saharan Africa from the rest of the panel data, a binary variable titled "SSA" was created. The variable was coded "1" if the country was sub-Saharan and "0" if it was not. Following this, a replication of Bartusevičuis and Skaaning's full model using a logistic regression including all control variables, was conducted in STATA restricted to observations from countries within the sub-Saharan region.

Qualitative Analysis

Looking more closely at the specific mechanisms that are behind the relationship between regime-type and intrastate conflict requires a scaling down and more focused approach with fewer observations and more depth. Within the qualitative analysis this is achieved through the use of case studies, more specifically through identifying two specific cases from the quantitative sample that each exhibit traits which are of special interest when answering the research question. The two cases that the analysis will look more closely at, is the deviant case and the pathway case of the sample. Looking at the most deviant case within a sample has large scientific value as it holds the potential for discovering other underlying factors that may alter the outcome of the dependent variable, thereby having a theory-developing potential. The pathway case on the other hand has a large theory-building potential as it conforms to

theoretical expectations and may therefore provide crucial insights into what institutional characteristics are associated with a certain outcome of Y. Prior to 1993, Madagascar (Deviant Case) had never experienced the onset of intrastate war and was characterized as a single-party autocracy, before being termed a minimalist democracy following the democratic transition of the 1990s. Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) on the other hand was characterized as a non-electoral or single-party autocracy all the way up until the attempted democratic transition, and remained an autocratic electoral regime, one that experienced two onsets of violent intrastate war in 1996 and 1998.

All case-selection strategies rest upon a specific case's relationship to a larger population of cases. An added benefit of looking at two cases with varied scores on the explanatory variables is that the analysis can demonstrate the nature of the predicted causal effect associated with the model in contrasting contexts (Gerring, 2017, p. 48; Lieberman, 2005, p. 444). This enables the analysis to point to specific mechanisms, that either through their presence or absence, have a significant effect on a regime's propensity for intrastate conflict. This in turn can a create a foundation for further in-depth studies within other countries and the case-selection applied within the thesis, on that account provides a theory-building contribution to the research field.

The overall causal pattern from Bartusevičius and Skaaning's article is that an increase in electoral competition will lead to a reduction in intrastate conflict. Looking at the case that deviates the most from this expected causal pattern allows for the analysis to illuminate the periphery of the population, potentially enabling me to determine whether the mechanisms are operating in spite of the values on the independent and outcome variable or whether there are conditioning factors that limit or heightens the effect of electoral contestation on domestically bound violent conflict.

Within a logistic regression model like the one applied within this analysis, the relative deviance of one case compared to another is measured by the residual for a given case. By comparing the distance between the predicted value of the case and its actual value, one is able to measure deviance. Given that deviance usually is a matter of degrees, the residuals provide an appropriate method for evaluating relative deviance among a large number of cases (Gerring, 2017, p. 76). Because the dependent variable within the analysis is binary it was theorized that the most deviant case over time exhibited scores on the independent variable, electoral

contestation, that according to the baseline theory would lead to a certain outcome, but instead ended up with the opposite outcome.

The pathway case represents the country whose prediction is most improved by including the element of electoral contestation into the regression model. It therefore stands in contrast to the deviant case as the apparent effect of X on Y conforms to theoretical expectations, and where this effect is at its strongest while keeping the control variables constant (Gerring, 2017, p. 105; Nome, 2008, p. 21). As this analysis is based on a categorial independent variable's effect on a dichotomous dependent variable, the case-selection process required identifying a case that satisfies two criteria. The first of which is that the case did not represent an outlier within the full model, as this would violate the criterion of representativeness (Gerring, 2017, p. 109). By calculating the standardized residuals of each observation using Cook's Distance you are able to graph the influence of each observation in relation to others based on their residuals and, as a rule of thumb, an observation surpassing a Cook's Distance of 1 is considered an outlier (Lane, 2013, p. 483). Based on this it is determined that this condition is met, and that Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway case) does not represent an outlier (FIGURE 6). The second condition, which needed to be fulfilled by the pathway case, was that its score on the outcome variable (Y) was strongly influenced by the theoretical variable of interest (X), taking other factors into consideration (Gerring, 2017, p. 109). This condition is met when applying the procedures necessary to identify the pathway case.

Because the analysis is concerned with demonstrating the nature of intrastate conflict in contrasting contexts, it was necessary to add an additional third condition, not mentioned by Gerring, when selecting the pathway case. This condition is in line with the stipulation of the pathway case adhering to theoretical expectations and was the fact that the case selected, based on its electoral regime, had or had not experienced the onset of domestic civil conflict.

4.1.2 Case Selection

Given that the main objective of this analysis is to look more closely at the effect of a regime's level of electoral contestation has on its propensity for intrastate conflict, the relationship between these two variables guided the case-selection process. In order to identify both cases the same three-step procedure was used. The procedure is originally created in order to identify the pathway case(s) within a sample, but given the focus of the analysis it can also be used in

order to pinpoint the case that deviates the most from the theoretical baseline patterns (Gerring, 2017, p. 110). The process was based on the logistic regression from the quantitative analysis.

Step 1 – Constructing a Minimal Specification

The logistic regression was first re-run without the independent variable of electoral contestation, but with all relevant background factors included, producing one set of standardized residuals.[2] The equation is written in "logit" form since I will use a logistic regression in the quantitative part of the analysis.

$$Log\ odds\ (Conflict\ Onset):\ Log\ \frac{P\ (Onset\ of\ Intrastate\ Conflict)}{1-P\ (Onset\ of\ Intrastate\ Conflict)} = B_0 + B_1 X_i + \varepsilon_1$$

Step 2 – Constructing a Full Specification

Following the first step the logistic regression is re-run with the independent variable electoral contestation included generating another set of standardized residuals.

$$Log\ odds\ (Conflict\ Onset):\ Log\ \frac{P\ (Onset\ of\ Intrastate\ Conflict)}{1-P\ (Onset\ of\ Intrastate\ Conflict)} = B_0 + B_1 X_i + \varepsilon_2$$

Step 3 – Identifying the Pathway Case

In order to identify the two cases, the residuals from the full specification, which includes the variable of interest, is subtracted from the residuals from the limited specification not including the variable for electoral contestation (ε_1 - ε_2).

$$Pathway = |\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2|,\ if\ |\varepsilon_1| > |\varepsilon_2|$$

This generated a new variable with one value attached to each observation which was consequently sorted. If the value of a specific observation was positive, thus indicating that the residuals from the minimal specification was larger than the ones from the full specification, ($\varepsilon_1 > \varepsilon_2$) the observation fulfilled the criteria of a pathway case. The fulfillment of these criteria indicates that this case adheres to the theoretical expectations put forward by the theory on electoral contestation and intrastate conflict.

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[2] $\mathbf{Y}$ = The dependent variable – Civil War Onset. $\mathbf{Z}$ = The relevant background factors. In this instance the control variables applied in the quantitative analysis. ε_1 = The error term for the logistic regression with minimal specification. ε_2 = The error term for the logistic regression with full specification

Based on this three-step procedure Congo (Kinshasa)[3] (Pathway Case) was selected based on the fact that it exhibited numerous observations with a positive residual, indicating a strong effect from the addition of electoral contestation into the model, and on the fact that these observations adhered to the theoretical expectations regarding the effect of electoral regime type on conflict. . Congo (Kinshasa) experienced the onset of intrastate conflict in 1996 and 1998 and was at the same time characterized as a single-party and non-electoral autocracy. As alluded to earlier, in the pathway case the residuals from a case must be smaller in the full specification of the model than in the minimal specification; otherwise, the addition of electoral contestation (X) pulls the case away from the regression line (Gerring, 2017, p. 110). Using this same logic, it is possible to uncover the deviant case by reversing this process and thereby identify Madagascar (Deviant Case) as the most deviant case, as this is the case that by far had the highest number of observations with a low score on the combined variable. Madagascar is characterized as an imperfect democracy but has not experienced the onset of intrastate conflict. This means that Madagascar (Deviant Case) represented the case that deviated the most from the theoretical expectations, indicating its contrasting nature to the pathway case. This case will be analyzed in order to uncover why it is deviant, opening the door to alternative theoretical explanations for why the case does not adhere to theoretical expectations.

4.1.3 How to Observe the Mechanisms – Outlining the Analytical Design of the Qualitative Part of the Analysis

Given the analysis' scientific emphasis, the analytical design will be focused towards analyzing patterns of observations that should, based on the theoretical foundation, either have experienced or not experienced the onset of intrastate conflict. This is primarily done through identifying the presence and outplay of certain theorized mechanisms within the two specific cases. Because of this it is necessary briefly to introduce the most important component within the qualitative analysis, the process-tracing design. The method is employed in order to identify intervening causal processes between an independent variable, exemplified through the operationalized mechanisms of electoral contestation, and the outcome of the dependent variable, onset of intrastate conflict. The most common application of the method within case-focused research is to trace processes that takes place within a case and match them step by step to an empirical process known beforehand. However, it is also possible to theorize a fixed sequence of intervening steps which then is tested using process-tracing, like in this thesis

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[3] The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will throughout this analysis be referred to as Congo (Kinshasa) or Zaire. The references to the name of the country is different as to reflect the change that occurred in 1997.

(Rohlfing, 2013, p. 33). This form of process-tracing falls under the rubric of "pattern matching" as I match the hypothesized mechanisms and their outplay, to the observed sequence taking place in Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) and Madagascar (Deviant Case). This is also the reasoning behind some of the indicators being focused on the presence of a single institutional or historical characteristic being present within the case, because I aim to theorize and empirically test the full sequence. I should also test for the presence of each step in the theorized sequence, otherwise parts of the argument would remain untested (Rohlfing, 2013, p. 33).

Applying a process-tracing design within a case-focused analysis enables us to test a theoretical framework, while at the same time ensuring substantial empirical leverage (Derek Beach & Brun, 2013, p. 1; Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p. 223). The qualitative part of the analysis will use secondary sources focused towards more general trends occurring across the African continent in the period of particular interest (1990-2006), as well as more case-specific articles and electoral compendiums to exemplify the outplay of the mechanisms within Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) and Madagascar (Deviant Case) more closely.

The complex nature of the concept of "electoral contestation" requires a scaling down to more observable indicators of each of the three mechanisms presented in Chapter 3.2. These indicators are diverse and will be the foundational elements of the qualitative analysis and define it structure and be presented as questions to be "answered" using the events and developments within each case. The indicators are presented below in chapter 4.1.4 and summarized in TABLE 1.

Table 1: Empirical Indicators of The Three Mechanisms

ELECTORAL CONTESTATION	
Mechanism	Indicator
Substitution	Did an alternative channel of non-violent political participation present itself?
	Was an organized group willing to employ a non-violent channel?
	Does the country have a history of non-violence?
Executive Constraints	Did a judicial system exist?[4]
	Did a legislative system exist?
	Were the judicial and legislative branches of government independent of and vested genuine power by the executive?
	Does the country have a history of executive dominance?
Inclusion	Were oppositional groups allowed to organize freely and participate in in electoral activities, including the election itself?[5]
	Did there exist some level of media freedom and/or independence from the executive?
	Was an independent[6] national conference held?
	Did this national conference reflect the social and political diversity of the country?

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[4] When assessing the development of judicial and legislative institutions as an indicator of executive constraints, this development will have had to been taking place within the current political regime. For Congo this is the coup in 1965 and for Madagascar this is the Third Republic beginning in 1992.

[5] I define the reach of electoral activities to include actions happening before the election itself, thereby including activities such as political meetings, lobbying and the nomination of candidates.

[6] Independent in the sense that it was not manipulated or directly provoked by the executive.

4.1.4 Evaluating Each Indicator's Theoretical Value within the Qualitative Analysis

Substitution

Did an alternative channel of non-violent political participation present itself?

Included as a measure for whether or not an alternative channel of non-violent participation was either established prior to the attempted democratic transition or occurred as a result of or during the democratic transition. Its importance for the mechanism unfolding derives from its foundational nature, without its presence or development, there is no channel to *Substitute* into.

Was an organized group willing to employ a non-violent channel?

This indicator represents another measure that derives its importance from its foundational nature, as it complements the presence or development of a non-violent channel. However, the measure is also included independently of the prior one, in order to determine the existence of pressure towards democracy, regardless of the presence of a non-violent channel.

Does the country have a history of non-violence?

Determining whether or not the countries have a prior history of non-violence is included as an indicator of the executive and oppositional movements familiarity with employing non-violence as a means to achieve political participation, as well as an indirect measure of the tensions that existed within society prior to the attempted democratic transitions of the 1990s.

Executive Constrain

Did a judicial system develop?

An indicator more closely resembling the pattern-matching aspect of the process-tracing method. In order for the judicial system to be able to *Constrain* the executive, their actual existence is, of course, of vital importance.

Did a legislative system develop?

This indicator serves the same purpose as the prior one. An important difference between the two and the one following, is that these two indicators only measure whether or not a legislative and judicial system is existent, not their independence or power.

Were the judicial and legislative branches of government independent of and vested genuine power by the executive?

This indicator is included as a measure of the actual political power invested in the judicial and legislative system, as well as their independence from the executive power. It differentiates itself from the measures above as it more closely resembles a pure process-tracing, measuring and pinpointing different processes or events that shift the balance of power between the three branches of government. The indictor is more sensitive to the case-specific context as there does not exist an established theoretical point of power, where one can determine that the legislative and judicial branches of government are independent and vested genuine power by the executive, thereby enabling *Executive Constrain*.

Does the country have a history of executive dominance?

This indicator represents a middle-ground between pattern-matching and more traditional tracing of processes as there is no exact way to measure executive dominance. The indicator's theoretical value is that it creates a historical backdrop that is important to understand in order to analyze the existence of *Executive Constraints* within each case.

Inclusion

Were oppositional groups allowed to organize freely and participate in electoral activities, including the election itself?

This indicator is included as a measure of the representative element of *Inclusion*, such as the extension of franchise rights across ethnic, religious, economic and political lines, and a measure of the presence of basic civil and political rights such as freedom of expression and organization. A lack of representativeness can, as alluded to earlier, create potentially conflict-driving grievances within the electorate.

Did there exist some level of media freedom and/or independence from the executive?

This indicator measures the degree to which the public opinion in large part is controlled by the state itself, or if the media can be used as a political tool for expressing political opinions and perform checks on the executive.

Was an independent national conference held?

The indicator falls within the pattern-matching aspect of process-tracing; establishing the existence of a commonly used institutional tool across the African continent in the period leading up to democratic transition, before assessing its conflict-mitigating value of *Inclusion* using the following indicator. The National Conferences and their importance during the attempted democratic transitions in the 1990s, stems from the fact that these conferences in many countries represented the first organized and representative institutions of resistance and struggle towards the executive dominance of post-colonial Africa (Fatton, 1995, pp. 83-84). Their inclusion as an indicator is also due to their relative position in the world as the village-style assemblies they represented were mostly widely used across the African continent.

Did this national conference reflect the social and political diversity of the country?

This indicator is a token to the African tradition of using national conferences as a representative tool in order to increase the *Inclusion* of previously marginalized groups into the political future, following a democratic transition. The relationship between this indicator and the previous is the same as with the first two indicators of *Executive Constraints* and the third indicator; establishment followed by an indicator aimed at measuring its subject matter, which it derives its conflict-mitigating effect from.

4.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In this part of the thesis I will outline some methodological considerations that the method applied within this thesis faces given its use of nested analysis, as well as the focus on identifying a relational pattern between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict.

The sequential nature of the nested-analysis research design, which is one of its biggest strengths as it allows the researcher to 'ground' the case-selection process as an output of the quantitative analysis, also has the largest potential source of limitation for the design. Given the interconnected relation between the two separate parts of the design, there also exists latent potential for consequential errors as the results within the qualitative analysis are dependent on the quantitative analysis being specified correctly. This problem of travelling errors is something that might be easier to avoid through the use of a single-method approach (Lieberman, 2015, p. 253; Rohlfing, 2008, p. 1493). In order to determine any misspecification or error within the quantitative model, errors that may cause this type of consequential error, the next sections will be dedicated to identifying possible sources of this.

Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity is caused by correlation between the independent variables of the regression model and is problematic because it removes much of the explanatory power that these independent variables possess. High multicollinearity makes it difficult to separate the effect of one variable from another, removing the independence of each individual variables' effect on the dependent variable (Midtbø, 2007, p. 114). In order to control for this among the variables used within the quantitative analysis, I created a correlation matrix to measure each variables effect on each other. The matrix is found in TABLE A1.

The results from the correlation matrix reveals that there are two instances of multicollinearity. The first is between the measure for electoral regime type (LIED) and the indicator for the polity score of the regime (Polity 2), derived from subtracting the autocratic value of the regime from its democratic value on the Polity index, providing a single regime score ranging from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy) (Marshall et al., 2017, p. 14). The two indicators display a correlation of 0.7672.

The second instance of multicollinearity occurs between the indicator of 'Population' and the CINC-indicator measuring the annual values for the computed 'Composite Index of National Capability'. The correlation between the two independent variables is at 0.6598 and this is due to the fact that CINC scores are "*(...) based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures.*" (DeRouen Jr et al., 2010, p. 337)

These two instances of multicollinearity may potentially pose a problem of ineffectiveness if they are both included within the same model. Because of this, the quantitative analysis will also be conducted without the inclusion of these variables within certain models. However, as neither instance of multicollinearity surpasses the threshold of 0.8[7], the determining factor of the model ineffectiveness is whether or not the inclusion of the independent variables together changes the overall findings of the quantitative analysis (Schreiber-Gregory, 2017, p. 4). This aspect will be addressed in the analysis in Chapter Five.

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[7] The threshold of multicollinearity as set by Schreiber-Gregory

Endogeneity

Problems of endogeneity arises in situations where the independent variable explains the dependent variable, and the dependent variable simultaneously explains the independent variable. Endogeneity makes drawing causal connections difficult as one is not sure where the effect originates from. Within this thesis a potential problem of endogeneity arises from the fact that prior onset of conflict may affect the overall level of electoral contestation within a country.

Past violence may influence have provided the opposition with familiarity of the violent channel, making them unwilling to *Substitute* their political participation into a non-violent form. Within the same vein the incumbent may elect to increase repression and centralize power within the executive branches of government following a civil war in order to avoid a repeated onset. This decreases the *Executive Constrain* of other branches of government, and increased repression and feelings of alienation may also lead to less *Inclusion* of marginalized groups in the aftermath of a violent intrastate conflict.

However, this effect may also be reversed, thereby strengthening the conflict-mitigating potential of electoral contestation and its mechanisms, as past violence also may induce the opposition to avoid violence at all costs, making them more willing to *Substitute* their political participation into non-violent channels. It may also lead to the executive power being more susceptible to increased *Inclusion* and the establishment of institutions dedicated to exercising *Executive Constrain*, as they wish to avoid the costs associated with a repeated onset of intrastate conflict.

The discussion above highlights the fact that an argument can be made that there exists some level of endogeneity between the independent and dependent variables in focus. However, there is no precise way of establishing this with absolute certainty through statistical means or precisely establish how the two may affect each other.

Omitted Variables

The discussion of endogeneity above suggests that the inclusion of more instrumental variables into the quantitative analysis may shed some light onto the potential issues as they can be used to account for unexpected behavior between the two variables. An example of an instrumental variable that may fulfill this role, is a measure of the 'ethnolinguistic fractionalization' or other

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similar measures indicating the religious, ethnic or linguistic diversity within a country. These types of measures would be able to shed some light on the potential accumulation of grievances, an important source of tension and conflict-potential within many African regimes and more generally post-conflict regimes.

The Analysis in Light of These Considerations

Despite these potential methodological weaknesses, I nevertheless believe that the results of this analysis are robust, given the fact that the goal of the thesis is not as much statistical generalizability as it is theory-development. Instead of estimating a precise causal effect this mixed-method analysis is less ambitious, instead focusing on identifying the presence of a relationship between the independent and dependent variable. This is in line with the idea of using the case-based analysis in order to peer into the box of causality, allowing us to 'see' X and Y interact (Gerring, 2017, pp. 247-248).

This is partly why this thesis does not conclude on the causal effect of whether or not electoral contestation causes the onset of intrastate war. The quantitative analysis is instead primarily used as a conformational tool used to determine whether or not the relational patterns between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict identified by Bartusevičius and Skaaning in their global analysis, is also present within sub-Saharan Africa. The overarching strategy of the analysis is merely focused towards highlighting the fact that the theoretical foundation for this relational pattern is also present and has unfolded empirically in within a specific region of the world, i.e. sub-Saharan Africa.

This more restricted use of the quantitative analysis is a secondary tool that enables the identification of relational patterns, as well as the direction of electoral contestation's effect on intrastate conflict. This in turn, allows this analysis to avoid many of the more confounding analysis-challenging aspects of these methodological considerations.

4.3   DATA

4.3.1   The Dependent Variable – Onset of Intrastate Conflict

Throughout numerous studies the Uppsala Conflict Database has been used to shed light on civil war onset and development throughout the world, but in relation to this analysis it suffers from one fundamental challenge, the fact that its data only goes back to 1946. Using the

Correlates of War database solves this issue and makes it possible to measure the dependent variable along the same time-period as the independent variable. This is also the reason why it was applied by Bartusevičius and Skaaning. As this analysis is focused towards the onset of intrastate conflict, country-years after the onset year were set to 0.Within the time-period the sub-Saharan African region experienced 53 domestically bound conflicts (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010a; Skaaning, Bartusevičius, & Gerring, 2015).

4.3.2 The Independent Variable – Differentiating between Electoral Regimes

The Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED) is an index of electoral democracy that divides regimes into a seven-level ordinal scale based on different dichotomous indicators of regime qualities. The lexical approach to constructing the index is unique in the sense that each level in the ordinal scale is defined by an additional attribute of electoral democracy (Skaaning, Gerring, et al., 2015, p. 1519). The lexical index has six conditions resulting in seven different categories of electoral regimes (Skaaning, Gerring, et al., 2015, pp. 1496-1497).

(L0): No elections

(L1): No-party or one-party elections.

(L2): Multiparty elections for legislature.

(L3): Multiparty elections for legislature and executive.

(L4): Minimally competitive, multiparty elections for legislature and executive.

(L5): Minimally competitive, multiparty elections with full male or female suffrage for legislature and executive.

(L6): Minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage
for legislature and executive.

Due to a combination of few observations of certain regime types and small relevant differences between some of the levels, Bartusevičuis and Skaaning choose to collapse this scale into the five distinctively different regime-types. (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, pp. 632-633). These different regime-types and their characteristics were presented alongside the more commonly three-fold differentiation between democratic, autocratic and semi-democratic regimes in section 2.1.

4.4 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

4.4.1 Can the Results be Replicated? Assessing the Reliability of the Analysis

Reliability ensures that the methods for data-collection, which are being used, are reliable and that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure, creating a sense of replicability (King et al., 1994, pp. 25-26). The most important tool applied in order to ensure reliability is the presence of transparency throughout the analysis and this is achieved in the quantitative part of the analysis by using a dataset that is publicly accessible and entering every action completed into the do-file. It is widely recognized that achieving this transparency and thereby replicability is harder to achieve in small-C studies than in large-C studies[8]. Applying a case-study design, like in the qualitative part of this analysis, presents specific challenges to this goal. These issues are related to three main areas characterized by case study research; the interpretation and broader significance of a specific case, the case-selection methods and analysis, and the continuous interaction between theory and evidence (Gerring, 2017, p. 209). To solve these issues Gerring proposes following a general protocol that ensures that transparency is obtained at every step of the process. Below are the protocols concerned with the type of analysis applied in this thesis (Gerring, 2017, pp. 209-211).

1. <u>Clarifying the theoretical argument</u>

It is important to clarify whether the theoretical argument is descriptive or causal in its nature. Given that the theoretical argument within this analysis is causal, it is important to specify the envisioned change in X and its anticipated effect on Y, as well as any relevant background conditions and the suspected mechanism. This is achieved through the theory-chapter.

2. <u>Case Selection</u>

By clarifying the method applied for case-selection you create a path that another researcher can follow step-by-step. The clarification surrounding the case-selection process is found in chapter 4.1.2.

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[8] Small-C and large-C is used in order to more precisely reflect the wording used in Gerring´s book. The terms refer to qualitative studies with a small number of cases, and quantitative studies with a larger number of cases respectively.

3. Evidence-Gathering

Transparency related to how within-case evidence was gathered is important, as it gives someone the chance to revisit and re-trace the steps you took in order to end up at your conclusions. This transparency is achieved through meticulously referencing my sources throughout the text.

4. Analysis

To allow for replication, it is necessary to clearly state how you analyzed your data. In the quantitative part of the analysis, this is achieved through summarizing your analytical steps or software commands in "do-files". Within the qualitative part of the analysis, this transparency is achieved through presenting the checklist of developments and processes that can be pinpointed as having an effect in creating mechanisms.

5. Sequence

Thoroughly sequencing each step of the research design is one of the most important protocols that needs to be in place in order to achieve reliability. The steps taken above to enhance transparency within each part of the thesis is necessary in order to create replicability. Openness and thoroughness about the build-up of the research design is of crucial importance. This reliability is obtained through chapter 4.4.

Based on the protocols presented by Gerring, I would argue that this thesis exhibits a high level of reliability and transparency, which is a key component in ensuring validity. Potential problems of validity and the answer to these problems is presented below.

4.4.2 Am I Measuring This Right? Achieving Generalizability? - Assessing the Internal and External Validity of the Analysis

Internal Validity

One of the ways the nested-analysis approach brings considerable value to the examination of internal validity is through the use of case studies. While the statistical analysis that is first conducted indicates whether or not there is a relationship between two phenomena, internal validity can provide us with evidence of whether this relationship is causal (Mentzer & Flint, 1997, p. 204). In order to establish whether or not the relationship is causal, and therefore conclude that the analysis has a high level of internal validity, case studies can be of importance. They provide in-depth explanatory information necessary to clarify these relationships, depth

that is not achievable through the sole use of a quantitative analysis. This is another reason in support of the use of a mixed-methods design as you are able to obtain this depth, while at the same time being able to verify or invalidate the presence of a relational pattern. The focus of this thesis creates two potential threats to internal validity.

Societal and Political Developments
Given the fact that the quantitative analysis spans from 1817-2006 this has implications for the level of internal validity. During this time the Sub-Saharan African region has gone through many developments that may affect the quantitative findings of the analysis. However, I would argue that the limited focus of the qualitative analysis removes many of the concerns connected to these developments, as they also have an important role in identifying the mechanisms that are behind the causal patterns.

Case Selection
One of the main threats against achieving internal validity is selection bias. However, abiding to the procedures of the nested analysis, allowing the quantitative results to guide the case-selection process, creates a form of randomness that removes much of this potential bias. Electing to specifically look at the most deviant and the most theoretically promising case, further develops this idea of randomization, displaying the diversity that exist within the sample. Looking at the pathway case provides us with a crucial test of whether or not the mechanisms of electoral contestation are present, while the focus on the most deviant case can tell us why the mechanisms are not present or why we get the result, despite the fact that we do not expect it.

External Validity
There are two ways to assess this analysis' external validity, the first of which representing the greatest and most referenced measure of external validity, generalizability. In total the sub-Saharan sample size represented 1,857 observations out of a population of 10,115. Despite the fact that Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning's analysis exhibits a higher level of external validity, given their global analytical focus, an argument can be made that the sub-Saharan African sample size is large enough that the findings from the restricted logistic regression not only fulfills the goal of providing an adequate solution for answering the research question, but are also representative and generalizable from a scientific perspective and therefore exhibits external validity (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970, p. 608). However, given the focus of this thesis, one

can make the argument that external validity, in the form of generalizability, is neither a goal nor a measure of fulfilment. Given that the main goal of this analysis is to test the mechanisms that are behind the relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict within a limited sample, the value of this papers external validity is first and foremost found in its theory-developing potential rather than its generalizability.

4.5 LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS – PRESENTING THE ANALYSIS DEMARCATIONS OF TIME AND SPACE

4.5.1 Two Generations of Missing Observations – Demarcating Time

Within the quantitative part of the analysis the same time-frame that is being applied within Bartusevičius and Skaaning's article will be applied, given that the focus of this part of the thesis is descriptive in its nature and therefore needs to reflect the same aspects as their analysis. Based on this, the quantitative analysis will employ the same time-frame, 1817-2006.

The qualitative part of the analysis will however, given the regional focus of the analysis, be limited to 1960-2006. The decision rests on two main pillars. The first of which is that the research design applied within the thesis requires that the statistical analysis guides the case-selection process. The majority of observations from sub-Saharan Africa only dates back to 1960. More specifically for this analysis, observations from Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) begin in 1960 and while there exist observations in Madagascar from 1817-1895, they display no variation across the dependent and independent variable. In addition to this, Madagascar (Deviant Case) displays an observational gap between 1895 and 1960 where there are no data (Skaaning, Bartusevičius, et al., 2015). This is explained by the fact that both the deviant case of Madagascar and the pathway case of Congo (Kinshasa)[9] gained their independence in 1960 (Radio France Internationale, 2010). A more general comparison between the observations in the full model and in the limited model, further highlights the discrepancy in observations taking place before 1946 (TABLE A2 and A3).

When attempting to identify the mechanisms that are behind the causal patterns found using the statistical analysis, a further demarcation of time is necessary, one that again is closely linked to the research design being applied as well as to the cases selected. The case-selection strategy

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of the analysis is, as presented earlier, dependent on the cases adherence to theoretical expectations or lack thereof. In the pathway case of Congo (Kinshasa) the two observations that fulfil the conditions presented in 4.3.2 take place in 1996 and 1998.In Madagascar the period between 1993 and 2006, each observation represents a steady increase of deviance[10] while at the same time keeping the dependent and main independent variable constant (TABLE A4). By 1990, sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world where a substantial number of people where still living under authoritarian regimes across a large number of countries. Sub-Saharan African countries were in 1990, with a few exceptions, personal dictatorships, military regimes, one-party systems or some combination of these three, but in the early 90s this began to change as more and more African countries were on the path to democratic transition (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Huntington, 1991, p. 20). Based on this combination of political developments taking place across the sub-Saharan African region and adhering to the conditions of the case-selection strategies employed, the main focus of the qualitative part of the analysis will be elections taking place within the period between 1990-2006. However, many of the efforts towards achieving democracy across African countries within this time-period are strongly influenced by the political and institutional legacies of the continent as a whole, as well as the history of each country. Because of this the overall demarcation of time to the period between 1960-2006 will be upheld (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997).

4.5.2   State Fragility Held Constant - Demarcating Space

The regional focus on sub-Saharan African countries is justified because the region exhibits variation across a number of explanatory variables that have been used to explain conflict onset, and also brings with it a history of conflict. The fact that low state capacity has characterized many sub-Saharan African countries throughout history, creates a unique environment where you are able to hold this effect constant because of the lack of variation, something that would be difficult in other regions of the world where there exists a larger diversity of state fragility across history. An argument could therefore be made that the regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa removes a potential source of confoundment or "third-variable problem" from the analysis. In this respect the thesis also contributes to underscoring Bartusevičius and Skaaning's focus on examining the central attributes of democracy, like electoral contestation, rather than the correlates of it, like state capacity, as this effect is kept constant (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018, p. 626).

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[10] Referring to the fact that the error term for the logistic regression with minimal specification continues to grow

4.6 WHAT WILL I FIND? – OUTLINING THE EMPIRICAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE MECHANISMS

This part of the thesis will be similar to an outlining of hypotheses regarding what observations I expect to uncover if the mechanisms of *Substitution*, *Executive Constraint* and *Inclusion* are present within the cases. It is a given that all the mechanisms are interrelated because they are operationalized indicators of the same concept, but this interrelation is also due to the fact that they all have an effect on the overall level of electoral contestation within a regime. Below I will present the expected outplay of each mechanism within electoral regimes characterized by either high or low levels of electoral contestation. This is done in order to display the individual effect of each mechanism, and also highlight the fact that they are present, despite the level of electoral contestation, and that the environment within they operate is what determines their outplay.

Substitution

High Level of Electoral Contestation

Within electoral regimes characterized by high levels of contestation I expect the mechanism of *Substitution* to have a conflict-mitigating effect as oppositional movements elect to substitute their violence with political participation within non-violent channels. They elect to do so because the high level of contestation ensures that the electoral channel is characterized by 'ex-ante uncertainty', 'ex-post irreversibility' and 'repeatability' and therefore constitutes a less costly, and more effective way of achieving political influence.

Low Level of Electoral Contestation

In regimes characterized by low levels of electoral contestation I expect the mechanism of *Substitution* will lose its conflict-mitigating effect as political actors would not see the non-violent channel as a viable option in comparison to the violent one, and therefore elect to not substitute their political participation into it. Within these circumstances the violent channel may not only be seen as a more effective way of achieving political influence, but also the only way.

Executive Constrain

High Level of Electoral Contestation

I expect the mechanism of *Executive Constraint* to have a conflict-mitigating effect in regimes characterized by high levels of electoral contestation. This expectation is due to the fact that this combination of vertical constraints ensuring genuine contestation, and horizontal constraints through the establishment of judicial and legislative institutions has been proven to have a conflict-mitigating effect (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 31).

Low Level of Electoral Contestation

In regimes characterized by low levels of electoral contestation I expect the mechanism of *Executive Constraint* to have a conflict-mitigating effect, though one that is less pronounced and effective than *Substitution* and *Inclusion.* This is due to the fact that *Executive Constraints* in itself have an effect despite of the level of electoral contestation (Fjelde et al., 2018, p. 31). However, a lack of outplay of these mechanisms due to executive dominance may also lead to the establishment of a 'kleptocratic' regime, adding a potential conflict-aggravating element of greed to the mix (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Inclusion

High Level of Electoral Contestation

Within regimes characterized by high levels of electoral contestation I expect the mechanism of *Inclusion* to derive its conflict-mitigating effect from the fact that a high level of electoral contestation also entails an element of wide representation. This allows marginalized groups to be included into the political system, thereby effectively removing a potential source of grievances.

Low Level of Electoral Contestation

While the mechanism of *Inclusion* within regimes characterized by high levels of electoral contestation had a conflict-mitigating effect because of its ability to restrict grievances, in regimes with low levels of electoral contestation the mechanisms outplayed stands in contrast, instead resulting in a conflict-enhancing effect based on the accumulation of these grievances. I expect that as marginalized groups are either not allowed access to the political arena completely, or are effectively restrained, this will create tensions within the electorate. These

tensions are the reason behind the mechanism's potential conflict-enhancing effect in regimes with low contestation.

Chapter 5

Analysis

5.1 SCALING DOWN - ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

As alluded to earlier this quantitative part of the thesis serves a binate goal. Its first goal is to test whether the relationship between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict identified by Bartusevičius and Skaaning's global analysis also is applicable to a smaller geographical region. The statistical analysis' second and equally important goal is to fulfill its intended role as a part of the nested analysis design, by guiding the case-selection process.

In TABLE 2 Bartusevičius and Skaaning's global model (Model 1) is presented next to the region-specific Sub-Saharan African models (Model 2-5). The goal of this part of the analysis is not to compare the two models relating to their explanatory power or generalizability, but rather to see if the same relational patterns identified in the global analysis are present also within the limited model, first and foremost focused on electoral contestation and its effect on the onset of intrastate conflict.

TABLE 2 clearly displays that the relationship between electoral contestation and civil war onset found in Bartusevičius and Skaaning's global analysis is present also within the limited sub-Saharan African model. The comparison between the two models including all control variables reveals that a change in the electoral regime of a country in a direction that enhances electoral contestation, for example moving from "L0 - Non-Electoral Autocracy" to "L1 - Single-Party Autocracy", has a greater effect in reducing a regime's propensity for violent intrastate conflict within sub-Saharan Africa (OR = -0.60) than on a global level (OR = -0.30). The negative preceding sign of the odds ratio determines that the effect of electoral contestation is preventive, meaning that a one-unit increase in X, enhancing electoral contestation to the point of creating a new electoral regime, is negatively associated with conflict onset. This preventive effect is constant across all the models. This effect is also found to be statistically

significant (p = 0.003) within the full model and is only slightly less significant than the effect in the full model (p = 0.001), a difference in significance that does not alter the overall findings from the model.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Output

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Electoral Regime (LIED)	-0.30***	-0.33**	-0.28	-0.30†	-0.60**
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Population	0.24***	0.38***	0.33*	0.66**	0.63**
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.24)
GDP/cap (ipol)	-0.46***		-0.43	-0.31	-0.20
	(0.11)		(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.35)
GDP growth (ipol)	-1.21		-0.25	-0.18	0.57
	(1.08)		(2.10)	(2.11)	(2.18)
Oil income	-0.03			0.28	0.30
	(0.08)			(0.27)	(0.26)
CINC	-2.53			-305.65	-336.54†
	(2.18)			(190.51)	(183.51)
Polity2	0.02				0.12**
	(0.02)				(0.04)
Instability (3y)	0.14				-0.41
	(0.16)				(0.35)
Constant	-1.45	-6,0	-2.73	-6.01	-5.72
	(0.93)	(1.08)	(2.59)	(3.56)	(3.56)
N	10,115	2,106	1,927	1,860	1,857
chi2	229.36	40.95	39.25	40.32	48.83

*†p < 0.10 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.*

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Running the estimated probabilities (95% CI) of civil war onset as a function of the dummy-coded explanatory variable on the sub-Saharan sample reveals a similar negative monotonic pattern as portrayed in FIGURE 2. As electoral contestation increases, the predicted probability of domestic conflict onset decreases. In conjunction with the findings from the global analysis, the probability is at its highest when LIED = 0 ("Non-Electoral Autocracy") and electoral contestation is at its lowest level and both models display a similar point of probability when X = 0. And while the disruptions within the global sample are more pronounced, both the overall development and the decreases in probability indicate that the same relation patterns identified by Bartusevičius and Skaaning within their global sample also are applicable and found within the sub-Saharan sample.


FIGURE 6: PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS BASED ON ELECTORAL REGIME TYPE (LIMITED SAMPLE)

The model is the estimated probabilities (95% CI) of civil war onset as a function of a dummy-coded LIED within the Sub-Saharan sample and is based on Figure 1.

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TABLE A5 and A6 display the cross-tabulations between civil war onset and different electoral regimes for both the complete and the limited model. Based on the two tables I will look more closely at other aspects beyond the odds ratios displayed in TABLE 2 and compare probabilities between the two models, in order to look more closely at another aspect relating to the research question at hand.

Before assessing the different trends and probabilities that the tables display and how these can help answer the research question, it is important to highlight some of the missing values within the tables concerned with observations from sub-Saharan Africa. A quick comparison between the tables shows that the Sub-Saharan African region only experienced three conflict onsets leading up to the end of World War II, and that this deviates from the number of onsets experienced on a global level (TABLE A2 and A3). Following the end of WWII and up until 1993 all of the sub-Saharan African countries except Liberia and Ethiopia gained their independence and this explains the uptick in observations within this time-period, and the missing observations between 1817-1945. This, as alluded to earlier, is the reason for the more limited scope of the qualitative analysis (Radio France Internationale, 2010).

The fact that the data used within this analysis is limited, in the sense that they are spread out from 1817-2006 makes it possible to look at the overall probability of conflict onset within the two models, and also compare them to the different types of electoral regimes. The first interesting observation is that the probability of conflict onset is the same in both models when you look at the total instances of onset and the total number of observations for the entire time-period.

<u>Complete Model</u>

$$N = 16\ 153$$
$$N^{Onset} = 281$$
$$N^{Peace} = 15\ 781$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{282}{16\ 153} = 0.02$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{15\ 781}{16\ 153} = 0.98$$

<div align="center">

Limited Model

</div>

$$N = 2\ 452$$

$$N^{Onset} = 53$$

$$N^{Peace} = 2\ 399$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{53}{2\ 452} = 0.02$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{2\ 399}{2\ 452} = 0.98$$

The fact that the two models display the same probability of experiencing conflict, but that there are differences in the magnitude of the correlation between civil war onset and electoral contestation, may indicate that other factors such as GDP per capita has a stronger effect globally than in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the finding is an attestment to the fact that sub-Saharan Africa may actually not represent an outlier when it comes to the onset of civil war compared to other regions in the world. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the sub-Saharan region is only responsible for roughly 1/5 of all onset of violent intrastate conflict within the period. Calculating the probabilities for the period 1946-2006 does not alter this picture. While the probabilities of conflict onset remain the same in the full model, the probabilities increase by 0.01 in the limited model.[11]

Comparing the probabilities of civil war onset based on the type of electoral regime also leads to the conclusion that the relation patterns between the full model and the limited model is very similar, with only minor differences in the probability. Overall the results from the limited model are consistent with the disruptions in the statistical patterns within the global analysis, displayed in FIGURE 2. However, while the probabilities of the full model follow these disruptions imitatively, there is a slight increase in the probability of conflict onset within the limited model when moving from a single-party autocracy (L1) to a multiparty autocracy (L2).[12] However, this increase in probability is, as shown earlier, not consistent with the statistical pattern displayed in FIGURE 6.

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[11] The calculations of probability for the time-period can be found in the Appendix

[12] The calculations of probability for each of the different electoral regime types can be found in the Appendix

5.2 CONGO AND MADAGASCAR – HISTORICAL SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

In many areas Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa) are similar to each other. Both cases have followed much of the same historical trajectory of increases and decreases in political contestation since their independence in 1960. Congo (Kinshasa) was a dictatorship, switching between being labelled a single-party autocracy and a non-electoral autocracy, and it also experienced the onset of civil conflict, holding it true to theoretical expectations. Madagascar on the other hand, has been classified as a single-party autocracy all the way up to 1993, but has since been classified as a minimalist democracy. Even if it has some democratic aspects, its overall level of democracy should have led to the onset of intrastate conflict according to the model. This may point to the fact that this deviance is caused by other alternative underlying factors that is yet unknown. Both countries have experienced extended periods of single-party governance. Longtime presidency experienced throughout the 1970s and 80s were being offset by protests towards implementing multi-party politics in the 1990s. The fact that these countries share many of the same developments and patterns in their political history, allows the qualitative case-study of each of them to focus more closely on the large shifts that took place within these countries following the widespread political turbulence that occurred across the African continent in the early years of 1990 (FIGURE 7). The period signified the most far-reaching shifts in African political life since the time of political independence 30 years earlier (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 2). Based on this there are two overarching questions into which the qualitative analysis can provide insight.

For Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) the question remains how these mechanisms of electoral contestation made them unable to stop these protests from turning into a civil war? Answering this question has a large theory-affirming potential as it provides answers with regards to the institutional make-up and mechanisms at play within cases that have low levels of electoral contestation and has experienced the onset of civil war. For Madagascar (Deviant Case) the question is how the regime was able to avoid the onset of civil war altogether? Answering this question is has a large theory-developmental potential as it provides insight into how a regime that based on institutional make-up and history of violence, should experience civil war, but were able to avoid an onset.

Time-Period

FIGURE 7: CONFLICT ONSET IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1960-2006

The figure illustrates the trends in political protest across sub-Saharan Africa in the period between 1960 and 2006.

This case-focused part of the nested analysis will be structured by using the mechanisms presented in chapter 4.5 as the starting point, presenting the specific mechanism of *Substitution, Executive Constraint* and *Inclusion* one at a time, first within Congo (Kinshasa) before assessing the contrasting case of Madagascar and the mechanisms' evolvement there. Before the main part of the qualitative analysis begins, I will briefly present some of the most important aspects within each country's history as this allows the analysis of the two cases to be more geared towards the period of interest, the 1990s, and the mechanisms, while still acknowledging the impact that history has had. Before presenting the historical perspective and assessing how these mechanisms of electoral contestation unfolded in Congo (Kinshasa) and Madagascar during the period of attempted democratic transition, an important point needs to be made. The conflicts in Congo in 1996 and 1998 represented more than internal struggles for a democratic transition, they also represented a larger power struggle between different eastern and southern African countries and was closely linked to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004, p. 8). Because of this it is necessary to also involve some aspects of this power struggle,

as well as more general trends occurring within the region, when assessing the effect of electoral contestation on these conflicts within the country.

5.2.1   30 Years of "Mobutuism" – Highlighting the Important Historical Events in Congo (Kinshasa) Leading Up to The First Congolese War

Following months of unrest and rebellion against the regime on the backbone of five years of civil war, Lieutenant General Joseph-Desire Mobutu, at that time commander in chief of the national army, seized control over the country and declared himself president in November 1965 (Times, 1965). Following the 1965 coup, Mobutu proceeded rapidly to concentrate all governmental powers in the office of the president and by October 1967 he had secured full control of major state institutions and turned the newly independent country into a single-party polity through the abolishment of political pluralism and repression of any form of political dissidence (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, pp. 93-94).

> "*Ironically, for the Zairian people, political independence paved way for internal colonization.*" (Mukum Mbaku & Ihonvbere, 1998, p. 284)

Mobutu's reign as a dictator within a one-party state continued throughout the 1970s and 80s, but during these years oppositional forces began to manifest themselves, most notably through the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress) party (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 146). When the Cold War approached its end point, both internal and external pressures to democratize began to materialize. By 1990 Mobutu was forced to accept the idea of a multi-party system. In April 1990 Mobutu declared his commitment to in-depth political reform through the attempted establishment of the Third Regime. The process was perceived as fundamentally and urgently necessary in light of the failures connected to the political system inaugurated by Mobutu's coup d'etat (Ikambana, 2007, p. 2). However, following the declaration, Mobutu immediately proceeded to undermine it with a combination of brutal crackdowns and calculated evasions as a last attempt to uphold the single-party rule that had characterized Congo/Zaire for over 30 years. The country actually experienced a decline in their overall level of democracy between 1988 and 1994, and up until the start of the First Congolese War in 1996, Mobutu continued to disregard the attempted democratic transition (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 220).

5.2.2 Multipartism And Marxism – Highlighting the Important Historical Events in Madagascar Leading up to the 1992 Election

Madagascar has experienced a wave of instability and political change since the island state's independence in 1960. Throughout the years the country has experienced transitions from military to civilian government, and a move from the single-party rule to the multi-party rule with the holding of the first competitive elections in the early 1990s (Toulou, 2009, p. 187). Like the situation in Congo (Kinshasa) the first regime after independence was followed by the insertion of a president with a military background. Beginning in 1975 Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka introduced a benevolent Marxist dictatorship in Madagascar. The island state had retained a multiparty system for 14 years after independence, longer than any other African country that subsequently abandoned multipartism, and this led to earlier-than-normal outbreaks of protest (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 145). The polices of Ratsiraka involved a nationalization of the economy which almost ruined it. Throughout the 1980s internal pressures began to formulate, demanding the abolishment of the one-party system imposed by the regime. In response, the constitution was amended in December 1989, removing the requirement for political parties to be members of the socialist organization, opening the door for multiparty politics to take form (Toulou, 2009, p. 190).

Following this a number of new parties were formed in 1990, and in June 1990 a general strike was called in support of demands for the resignation of the president and the appointment of a transitional government. As Ratsiraka refused to resign, the opposition group Forces Vives (FV) appointed its own parallel transitional government in mid-July. Responding to an attempted occupation of ministries by the transitional government, Ratsiraka issued a state of emergency. In the following months demonstrations, confrontations, abductions and killings continued until an interim agreement was signed on the 31st of October 1991. It provided for the suspension of the constitution and moved the country from a presidential to a parliamentary type regime, followed by an election in 1992 (Toulou, 2009, p. 190).

5.3 SUSPENDING POLITICAL PROTEST THROUGH CONTESTATION – EVALUATING THE OPERATION OF THE THREE MECHANISMS IN CONGO (KINSHASA) AND ZAIRE

The qualitative part of the thesis will examine each mechanism unfolding within the pathway case of Congo (Kinshasa) followed by Madagascar (Deviant Case). Each question associated with the indicators presented in TABLE 1 (Page 36) and their relevance for the qualitative analysis was presented in chapter 4.1.4, and this constitutes the foundation for the analysis below. Before each mechanism and their unfolding is analyzed, the theoretical expectations of the mechanism will be presented. At the end of each sub-chapter the particular analysis of each mechanism will be briefly concluded before all the indicators are presented again in checklist-form, through TABLE 3 in chapter 5.4.

5.3.1 Evaluating the Effect of a Substituting Mechanism

Given that Congo (Kinshasa) is classified as either a non-electoral democracy or single-party autocracy throughout the period of interest, we would expect the conflict-mitigating effect of the mechanism of *Substitution* to be limited, given that the executive power allowed for few alternative channels for political participation to occur. Given Madagascar's similar history, we would also expect a limited conflict-mitigating effect. However, the fact that the model depicts Madagascar as representing deviance may allude to the fact that the opposition found alternative ways of *Substitution* or other factors made the move to violence too costly.

CONGO (KINSHASA)/ZAIRE

Substitution 1: Did an alternative channel of non-violent political participation present itself?

The case of Zaire/Congo (Kinshasa) exemplifies an overall trend across the African continent of protests breaking out and being more likely to be sustained within single-party regimes that had outlawed the political organization of their opponents (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 147). This point is perhaps even more pronounced when taking into account the close relation between the two Congolese wars, where internal pressure was detrimental in the onset of the first, with the consequences of this war being decisive in the onset of the second one. The combination of a political history characterized by a lack of accountability and the effective clogging and/or removing of non-violent channels of political participation, is the main contributor behind why the mechanism of *Substitution* unfolded and took effect as a mechanism

of 'closure' within Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire. This reversal of the mechanism also led to a reversal of its conflict-mitigating potential, instead resulting in further entrenchment of potential conflict-enhancing political tensions. This lack of accountability can in itself be said to be an indicator or condition for the mechanism of *Substitution* as the oppositional forces within the electorate will only elect to substitute violence with non-violence if the elected leaders are said to be accountable. This lack of accountability manifested itself first and foremost through Mobutu's failure to live up to his promises of transition in 1990, and instead opting for a sticks-and-carrot approach towards the opposition, where promises of multipartism instead resembled "multi-mobutism" with Mobutu providing material incentives for the opposition in order to remain president (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 166). Even though external factors were strong contributors to the onset of civil conflict, an argument can be made that they, in conjunction with Mobutu and Kabila's tactics, also had an equally strong effect in forcing the hand of the opposition, making violence a necessary means to achieve political influence. Based on this I would argue that the overwhelming executive dominance of Mobutu and Kabila never allowed the room for an alternative channel of political participation to manifest itself.

A vital pre-condition for the conflict-mitigating potential of the mechanism of *Substitution* to take effect is the presence of a non-violent channel for political influence, most notably an electoral system characterized by some resemblance of electoral competition. This logic may seem straightforward and non-complex, but was from an institutional standpoint arguably a determining factor in causing the two devastating civil wars in Zaire/Congo (Kinshasa) during the late 1990s and early 2000s. A direct consequence of Mobutu'ss unwillingness to engage in a democratic transition was the continuation of the one-party system that had been operating for over 30 years, a system characterized by a lack of genuine electoral contestation. In the wake of Mobutu's executive demise and the end of the First Congolese War in 1997, Laurent Kabila rose to power proclaiming himself president of the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo. Shortly after taking office Kabila vested himself absolute control over the executive, military and legislature thereby upholding the low level of contestation that been one of the hallmark features of the country for decades.

Substitution 2: Was an organized group willing to employ a non-violent channel?

Even though external factors such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the consequent destabilization of parts of eastern Zaire, and meddling from neighboring African countries can be blamed for increasing the severity of the two Congolese Wars, an underlying internal pressure towards democracy, wanting to create a non-violent channel of participation from the opposition, was also a determining factor causing these wars (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, pp. 95-96). This oppositional push towards a democratic reform points to the fact that an organized oppositional group were willing to employ this non-violent channel, but as alluded to above, one never manifested itself. In many respects the external involvement can be argued to have closed off the last non-violent avenue that the opposition could use, and that the cost of resorting to violence was lowered by the fact that the opposition was no longer alone in their attempts to dethrone Mobutu. The all-encompassing nature and widespread use of repression within both the Mobutu- and Kabila-regimes also ensured that other non-violent avenues of political participation, such as political organization and the use of the media, were closed off. However, a willingness to use a non-violent channel is only one part of this question. In the fight to achieve democratic elections, this factor is just as important, as without an organized group to spearhead the movement it would have been easier for Mobutu to repress it. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) had emerged as a leading opposition force and represented a revival of a party that the most notable opposition leader in Congolese history, Etienne Tshisekedi, had tried to launch in 1982. This previous experience with party organization enabled the party to hibernate, merely freezing the alliances of alignments within it, and remerge as an organized and willing leader of the opposition movement when the transition to democracy was promised (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 146). Based on this I would argue that UDPS represented both an organized and willing employer of a non-violent channel. Had a non-violent channel of political participation been established during the attempted democratic transition, enabling the UDPS to *Substitute* their political participation into non-violent forms, enabling the mechanism's conflict-mitigating effect to unfold, this may have made Congo (Kinshasa) avoid the onset of two civil wars.

Substitution 3: Does the country have a history of non-violence?

Within Congo (Kinshasa) the mechanism of *Substitution* carries with it a historical backdrop that is important to understand in order to interpret its display, or rather lack of display, in the 1990s and into the 2000s. The past decades of political instability leading up to the attempted democratic transition in 1990, further entrenched the practices of rule without accountability. This was the case all the way up to the elections in 2006 (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009). Even though political instability was an important part of Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire's history, much of this revolt had been quelled before it turned violent. Even so, since 1960 there had been six instances of civil war onset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010a) However, half of these onsets (1960, 63 and 64) were tied to the Congo Crisis following the country's independence from Belgium in 1960.The onset of the First and Second Congolese War in 1996 and 98 are the focus of this paper (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2019). We are therefore left with one instance of intrastate conflict onset in 1978 tied to the Battle of Kolwezi. Both the onsets tied to the Congo Crisis and the Battle of Kolwezi represented onsets of civil war that were independent, in the sense that they were not directly tied to Mobutu's regime. Based on this I elect to conclude that Congo (Kinshasa) up until the period of interest (1990-2006) had a history of relative non-violence. This also points to the success of Mobutu in repressing revolts to the point of them not turning violent, an attestment to the findings by Hegre et.al and Fjelde et.al that autocratic regimes also experience civil peace. However, the fact that they eventually experienced the onset of intrastate conflict also points to the delicate and less consolidated nature of this peace in comparison with the democratic civil peace.

MADAGASCAR

Substitution 1: Did an alternative channel of non-violent political participation present itself?

When comparing the history of Madagascar and Zaire/Congo (Kinshasa) one would imagine that many of the same issues of accountability and lack of non-violent channels would also lead to Madagascar experiencing the onset of intrastate conflict during the 1990s. However, in contrast to the lack of an institutional arena for the *Substituting* mechanism's development to take place, as was found in Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire during the 1990s and 2000s, the island state experienced the establishment of a consolidated arena for non-violent participation within this same time-period. This is exemplified by elections taking place in in 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006, attesting to the country's familiarity with electoral

competition and leadership change, change that took place in both 1993, 1996 and 2002. (Toulou, 2009, p. 187). Holding elections this regularly not only represented the presence of an alternative channel, but provided the sense of 'ex-ante uncertainty' that is inherent in competitive elections, and highlighted the "pro-tempore character of democratic governments", that is, their time-bound nature (Toulou, 2009, p. 211). All of this point to the fact that an alternative channel of non-violence was present, and an argument can be made that its time-bound nature also strengthened its place within Malagasy politics.

However, an important point needs to be made; these elections were by no means beyond reproach, and Madagascar has often been cited as an example of the erroneous perception which links competitive elections to regime change, and as a political system that exemplifies the doubtful causal connection that many researcher have tended to assert between the quality of elections and the replacement of incumbents (Toulou, 2009, p. 187). Despite these remarks an argument can be made that this enhances the substituting mechanism's affect within the country as it seems to be at work despite these drawbacks. In most countries across the African continent the movement to multi-party politics was characterized by the relatively quick emergence of a dominant party system. The dominating party(ies) often owed their dominance to non-structural dividing lines within society. This is also the case in Madagascar where linguistic, ethnic, and regional diversity structured around neopatrimonial networks shaped the nature and role of the political parties (Richard R Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 497; Van de Walle, 2001, pp. 30-31; Aarebrot & Evjen, 2014, p. 304). This dominance has often led to executives, most notably presidents, remaining in office. It also explains why so few incumbents have lost free and fair elections following a transition, as the dynamics and advantages of the former single-party system is merely continued within a context of disingenuous multipartism. Madagascar represented a disruption within this pattern through the 1993 election, and was, together with Benin, the only African country where the president suffered electoral defeat following the transition (Van de Walle, 2001, pp. 30-31). This is another example of the strength of the non-violent channel in creating "ex-ante uncertainty", thereby representing an arena into which to *Substitute* political participation.

Substitution 2: Was an organized group willing to employ a non-violent channel?

As alluded to when defining "electoral contestation" the concept is difficult to measure precisely given the fact that much is based on the opposition's perception of genuine competition within elections. Since independence in 1960 the average incumbent has been in office for 4.8 years, despite Didier Ratsiraka´s 24-year rule (1975-1993 and 1996-2002) (Toulou, 2009, p. 187). This speaks to the effectiveness of the electoral system in creating an alternative non-violent path for the opposition to remove incumbents, thereby creating a belief within the electorate that "executive rotation" is possible to obtain through elections, thereby avoiding a costly onset of civil war in order to obtain the same goal.

Another example of an organized group being willing to employ the non-violent channels of political participation is exemplified by the 2001 presidential election. The election was the most contentious in the political history of Madagascar and marked a critical point in Malagasy history. It represented the decline of Didier Ratsiraka´s 27-year-old patronage network, with Marc Ravalomanana, a business man representing the Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM)-party claiming an outright victory over incumbent Ratsiraka (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, p. 215; Toulou, 2009, p. 192). The result of the elections was heavily contested, as Ravalomanana claimed he received an absolute majority of the votes, something that was necessary in order to avoid a second round of balloting. The 1992 Constitution mandated that the High Constitutional Court review disputed electoral results. When the court responded to the 2001 elections, it was with an unabashedly partisan decision in favor of the incumbent Ratsiraka (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, p. 215). In response more than 100,000 people filled the streets daily protesting non-violently, and even when violence began to increase it remained fairly isolated. Through these protests the opposition created a sense of non-violent mass democracy and in effect used the freedoms granted to them by a larger concept of democracy to protest the institutions atrophying under the neopatrimonial rule of Ratsiraka (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, pp. 218-220).

> "*When electoral participation in Madagascar was trumped by social action, the will of the people overcame the ossification of the country´s marginally democratic institutions and gave renewed hope to a citizenry that had all but given up.*" (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, p. 221).

Substitution 3: Does the country have a history of non-violence?

Through a familiarity and willingness to employ non-violent channels of political participation, despite many of them being underdeveloped, the Malagasy opposition not only has showed a willingness to employ non-violent channels of political participation, but also entrusted them in achieving results. Because of this, Madagascar has avoided the onset of civil war since independence in 1960 even in the face of tough challenges to domestic peace, most notably through the 2001 elections and the following aftermath.

Summary of the Mechanisms' Operation

The analysis above displays the differences in the mechanisms' unfolding between Congo (Kinshasa) (Pathway Case) and Madagascar (Deviant Case) within the time-period of interest. It also highlights the fact that Congo (Kinshasa), as expected, fulfills the criteria for being a pathway case, by sticking to theoretical expectations while at the same time identifying a potential crucial point of difference between the two cases; the establishment and manifestation of a non-violent channel for political participation.

Madagascar on the other hand, fulfills the criteria expected to be found in a case that has not experienced the onset of conflict, highlighting the aforementioned point of Madagascar displaying deviance, but one that does not originate from theoretical expectations. The analysis also reveals a potential conflict-mitigating factor similar to the threshold of competition alluded to by Bartusevičius and Skaaning, in that familiarity with the electoral process seems to entice oppositional actors to use the channel of non-violent participation instead of violence.

5.3.3   Evaluating the Mechanism of Executive Constraint

Based on the fact that both Congo (Kinshasa) and Madagascar were classified as autocracies leading up to 1993, and had been classified as such for an extended period of time, I expect the effect of *Executive Constraint* to be limited by the fact that the institutions associated with *Executive Constrain* was underdeveloped or missing for a long period of time. On account of this, their incorporation into the political system would require large political, perhaps even constitutional changes. However, I expect this limited effect will be even more visible in Congo (Kinshasa), given that the autocratic regime continued further into the 1990s and 2000s.

<u>CONGO (KINSHASA)/ZAIRE</u>

Executive Constraints 1: Did a judicial system exist?

The judicial institution in Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire is well-known throughout its history and despite the military coup in 1967, the constitution proposed the establishment of a constitutional court, alongside a Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). However, this court was never established. When the constitution was reviewed in 1974, a system of judicial review more closely resembling the American model, was established and remained until 2006 (Kahombo, 2011, pp. 1-2) In conclusion, a judicial system existed both prior to and during the period of democratic transition.

Executive Constraints 2: Did a legislative system exist?

Following Mobutu's military coup in 1965, the 1967 Constitution established a unitary state, a presidential system and a one-chamber legislature. This system was upheld until the Pretoria Accord of 2002, when a new two-chamber transitional legislative system consisting of a Senate and a National Assembly was established. Based on this, I conclude that a legislative system existed during the attempted democratic transition and was further developed following the end of the two Congolese wars.

Executive Constraints 3: Were the judicial and legislative branches of government independent of and vested genuine power by the executive?

Even though the 1967 constitution established a legislative branch of government, the National Assembly was later renamed the Legislative Council and given substantially reduced powers. At the same time the number of legally authorized political parties were limited. By October 1967, political pluralism was abolished, and Mobutu had succeeded not only in limiting the power of the legislative and judicial branch of government, but also created a monolithic political system where the president was the only entrusted political institution (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, pp. 93-94). The foundational element enabling Mobutu to effectively shut down any attempt towards greater political liberalization, thereby effectively contributing to his own political demise and the First Congolese War, was the single-party system built around "The Popular Movement of the Revolution" (MPR). From 1967 until 1990, MPR was the only legal party allowed within Zaire and membership was compulsory and automatic for all citizens from birth. This allowed the party to uphold its status stipulated in the 1974 constitution where it was stated that "*(...) there exists a single institution, the MPR, personified by its president.*"

(Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, p. 94). Through this Mobutu, in effect, created a system leading up to 1997 where the MPR, and himself by virtue of his presidency of the party, had all the executive, legislative and judicial power within the country, enabling him to monitor, co-opt and repress any oppositional movement attempting to challenge his incumbency. Because the single-party monopoly blocked or restricted the expression of any popular preference, citizens had little choice but to experiment with informal, even extralegal, modes of participation outside of official party or legislative channels (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 145).

In the start of the attempted democratic transition, following years of internal pressure from the opposition, the newly convened Sovereign National Conference (CNS) adopted a constitution aimed at governing a political transition leading to democratic elections in Zaire in 1994. The "Acte Constitutionnel de la Transition de la République du Zaïre" was promulgated on the 9th of April 1994 and established a number of institutions, among these a transitional government lead by Archbishop Laurent Mosengwo. However, the institutions established by the CNS never functioned properly because of Joseph Mobutu's continuous intervention and attempts to monopolize power back into his own hands, and the subsequent reformation of the transitional institutions back into the hands of Mobutu's allies (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, p. 95). Repression can in some cases be viewed as reactionary, in the sense that its often a response by the incumbents to the initiative of opponents, and the actions of Mobutu following the adoption of a transitional government follows this pattern. All across the African continent, presidents long accustomed to a monopoly over public affairs found it difficult to accept what they viewed as challenges to their hegemony. In Zaire the attempted establishment of institutions associated with a multiparty institutional setting was met with increased repression of the opposition (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 166).

Executive Constraints 4: Does the country have a history of executive dominance?

Following the military coup in 1965, Mobutu declared himself president of the Congolese republic and established a three-decade-long brutal and self-centered rule. This same pattern of executive dominance of the political arena continued with the incumbency of Laurent Kabila in 1997. An argument can be made that the long withstanding repression of the oppositional movements in Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire, the familiarization of extralegal channels of political participation, and the cumulative grievance-accumulation taking place throughout these years,

played a part in extending the Second Congolese War two years further after the assassination of Kabila in 2001. By effectively blocking the establishment and consolidation of a multiparty institutional context, removing any independence and genuine power from the legislative and judicial branch, and instead electing to uphold the repression of the opposition, the incumbencies of Mobutu and Kabila compelled the opposition to "exit" the political system and await a possibility to express their grievances, a possibility that materialized with the destabilization of Eastern Zaire and the following civil war.

MADAGASCAR

Executive Constraints 1: Did a judicial system exist?

Through the 1992 Malagasy Constitution the judicial system of the Third Republic was adopted. Article 41 states that "*The structure of the state shall include (…) the judicial power, exercised by the Administrative and Financial Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, Tribunals, and the High Court of Justice.*" (Malagasy Constitution, 1992). In addition to this the Rule of Law is established through article 7. On account of this I conclude that a judicial system existed at the start of the democratic transition.

Executive Constraints 2: Did a legislative system exist?

In the 1992 Malagasy Constitution it is stated, in conjunction with the judicial system, that the legislative system of Madagascar is in place from the day of the adoption of the constitution and is "*(…) formed by the National Assembly and the Senate.*" (Malagasy Constitution, 1992). Based on this, I conclude that the Malagasy legislative system was in place prior to the democratic transition.

Executive Constraints 3: Were the judicial and legislative branches of government independent of and vested genuine power by the executive?

The Third Republic in Madagascar received its first expression of popular support on 19th of August 1992 with the adoption of a new constitution. The constitution provided the country with many of the hallmark institutions associated with the implementation of political liberalization, such as the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branch of government, the creation of a multiparty system and the guarantee of individual human rights and freedom of speech (Toulou, 2009, p. 190). While the judicial branch's independence from the executive and power vested within, was explicitly stated in the

constitution through article 98, the legislative system's power was embodied through their actions in May 1996.

When detailing the mechanism of *Executive Constraints,* the consolidation of the multiparty setting was the decisive indicator of its presence, and I elected to define this consolidation to three years in accordance with Bartusevičius and Skaaning. The consolidation of this multiparty institutional setting and its effect on intrastate conflict in Madagascar is exemplified through the impeachment of then former oppositional leader and at the time president Albert Zafy in May 1996, following allegations of ministerial inability and corruption (Randrianja, 2003, p. 311). Since his election win in 1993, Zafy had attempted to centralize authority in the hands of the president through multiple constitutional shifts. By attempting to divert power away from prime minister Francisque Ravony, who himself was selected by the National Assembly, Zafy wanted to be able to exert power not only over executive matters, but legislative matters as well (Richard R. Marcus, 2004, p. 3). Impeachment of the president was in itself very uncommon in post-colonial Africa in 1996 and the decision to relive Zafy of his duties as president can be seen as an attest to the strength of the multiparty setting, the institutional separation and its manifestation through the constitution (Toulou, 2009, p. 187). The impeachment can also be seen as an indirect by-product of the mechanism of *Substitution* as it provided the opposition an increased belief in the fact that substituting violent protest with political participation at the ballot box, may lead to a shift in incumbency. I would make the argument that the decision of the Malagasy legislative body in 1996 created a sense of late-blooming "ex-ante uncertainty". This process would have been complicated without the development and consolidation of a legislative body effectively creating horizontal constraints on the executive, removing a possible source of grievances and thereby limiting the propensity for increased political tension and possible onset of armed conflict. The impeachment also fulfills the condition of taking part within a consolidated multiparty setting, being four years removed from the amendment of its constitutional basis.

Executive Constraints 4: Does the country have a history of executive dominance?

During Didier Ratsiraka´s first tenure as president from 1975, leading up to the democratic transition in 1993, the new constitution that followed his rise to power made AREMA the only political organization permitted. Without any oppositional movement apart from dissidents,

Ratsiraka created a de facto single-party political system that lasted until the elections in 1993. Based on this I conclude that Madagascar like Congo (Kinshasa), has experienced a history of executive dominance leading up to the democratic transition. However, during Ratsiraka's first tenure as president, the popular vote in favor of his socialist regime declined from nearly 95% in 1975, to 63% in 1989 (Toulou, 2009) This points to the fact that the executive dominance of Ratsiraka was gradually decreasing. An argument can be made that this gradual lessening of dominance has had an important effect in making the move to a multiparty setting more grounded within the electorate, rather than an abrupt change causing large political shifts, indirectly having a conflict-mitigating effect.

Summary of the Mechanisms' Operation

The analysis again shows similarities between the two countries across several indicators of *Executive Constrain* and points to another crucial point of difference; the independence that the legislative and judicial branch of government was awarded. This also alludes to a larger point of continued executive dominance. While Congo (Kinshasa) never was able to break the continued dominance of Mobutu and Kabila x2, thereby not being able to enforce genuine *Executive Constraint*, the 1996 impeachment of Zafy proves that Madagascar was able to break the trend of executive dominance, moving them beyond the mutual statement of judicial and legislative independence stated in both the countries' constitutions. The analysis above, furthermore, highlights Madagascar´s lack of deviance from theoretical observations while at the same time pinpointing a potential unobserved or at least un-measured factor, the gradual decrease of popular support for Ratsiraka, that may be causing the deviance from the quantitative model.

5.3.4   Evaluating the Mechanism of Inclusion

Given Congo (Kinshasa) and Madagascar's historical characterization as autocratic electoral regimes leading up to the point of attempted democratic transition, I expect that the level of contestation will be mirrored by similarly low levels of *Inclusion* into the political system. Based on this I also expect that the effect of the mechanism is conflict-mitigating if the countries have been successful in raising the level of *Inclusion, and* thereby removing potential grievances within the electorate. I believe that this effect will be particularly potent in limiting a country's propensity for intrastate conflict if this increased *Inclusion* also has been able to remove historic limitations on basic political rights based along the lines of religion and

ethnicity that have been created through years of executive dominance, in combination with the neo-patrimonial tradition that has been common across the African continent.

CONGO (KINSHASA)/ZAIRE

Inclusion 1: Were oppositional groups allowed to organize freely and participate in electoral activities, including the election itself?

The announcement of restoration of multiparty competition led to the proliferation of close to 130 political parties in Zaire. While these parties were nominally united in an alliance known as the Union Sacré, they never really came together and were fragmented to the point of being unable to force the convocation of the promised presidential elections (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 199). The main reason behind this was the fact that the opposition was repeatedly outmaneuvered by Mobutu's divisive tactics. Some oppositional leaders were tempted by provisions of public financing and set up their own organizations, others accepted Mobutu's inducements to accept positions in the government, only to find their authority being limited and their decisions being reversed by the military (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 199). The manipulative actions of Mobutu is perhaps best exemplified through the naming of three of the most prominent opposition leaders as prime ministers in succession during the transition; Etienne Tshiesekdi (July 1991), Nguza Karl-I-Bond (November 1991) and Faustin Birindwa (March 1993) (Africa Confidential, 1991).

In many respects Mobutu created an arena for oppositional groups to organize relatively freely. However, this arena was constructed outside of the realm of actual political power and he was therefore able to construct something similar to an "uneven playing field" where the opposition either directly or indirectly were coerced in order to keep them in check (Levitsky & Way, 2010). These deteriorating actions towards political pluralism combined with the prominent position of MPR, made the opposition unable to participate freely in electoral activities. I therefore conclude that these groups were not allowed to organize and participate in electoral activities. On top of this, had they been able to organize and participate freely, there were no elections to participate in, further limiting the inclusion of marginalized groups of society into the political arena.

Inclusion 2: Did there exist some level of media freedom and/or independence from the executive?

When attempting to create a single-party autocratic regime, media freedom is usually the first victim as obtaining its control requires limited costs. In other words, it is easier and less costly to print or broadcast your opinions and control the flow of information, than it is to make people say what you want under threats of distress. Because of the executive dominance of Mobutu in all aspects of political life, the level of independence within the media was low and characterized by "*(...) prolonged, incessant, unchanging, permanent violations of media freedom.*" (Takirambudde, 1995, p. 49). Based on this I conclude that there did not exist any level of media freedom or independence from the executive power.

Inclusion 3: Was an independent national conference held?

Confronted with increasing pressures to democratize, many African leaders recognized the need to create a platform where different oppositional groups and the government could gather and propose solutions for the political and economic challenges facing the regime. These were, challenges that were behind many of the demands to liberalize, facing the incumbents (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 111). The platform of choice within many African countries was the use of a national conference. National conferences were ad hoc assemblies representing a wide range of individual and corporate interests and would often reflect the diversity of ethnic, religious and regional groups within a regime. However, while its democratic potential was high, resembling an updated version of government based on a traditional village assembly, its non-democratic potential was equally high as incumbents would manipulate the platform, using it as an opportunity to front a continuation of the current system (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 112).

The convention in Zaire was riddled with problems from its inception. It was not only postponed five times following Mobutu's promise of its gathering in mid-1990, but a large proportion of the delegates were also individuals whom Mobutu believed to be loyal to him (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 166). During the conference, which would stretch over a period of more than 1,5 years, Mobutu would attempt to influence the outcome by alternatively ignoring the meeting and its deliberations, bribe and threaten the participants and finally have his prime minister suspend it in February 1992. By mid-1993, in the midst of growing chaos

and economic meltdown Zaire had obtained two governments, two legislatures and even two worthless currencies (Africa Confidential, 1993a, 1993b).

However, the reality of the situation was still the same following the advent of the national conference. Zaire was still a political system with approximately absent electoral contestation given its low levels of genuine inclusion into the political system. The fundamental underlying problem was the lack of recognition from Mobutu's opponents at the Conference, as they acted as if they were legislating in a post-revolutionary situation when in fact no revolution had occurred. When Mobutu's manipulative strategies failed, he employed his control over raw force (Weiss, 2000, p. 4). The failure of the National Conference to end Mobutu's rule and win international recognition, strongly influenced the country's political and social situation up until 1996 and is strongly related to the continuation of limited inclusion that followed during the incumbency of Kabila. By removing Mobutu thereby achieving international recognition, Kabila and his Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) felt no need to form an inclusive government with the democratic forces that dominated the National Conference. Kabila and his supporters were confident that they had all that was needed to bring about economic and social reconstruction, and that this could happen without the active participation of all the relevant political and social forces in the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004, p. 5).

Inclusion 4: Did this national conference reflect the social and political diversity of the country?

The conflict-mitigating potential of national conferences, as an indirect measure of increased inclusion, is found in its ability to reflect the diversity of political groups as well as in the incumbent's willingness to participate in the process as a non-manipulative actor. When the national conference of Zaire was convened in August 1991, its composition reflected many of the political groups within the Zairian society as 2.850 individuals nominally representing 159 parties, the public and state institutions were present (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p. 166). However, through Mobutu's consistent manipulation of the process of *Inclusion*, most notably throughout the 18-month national conference, he also effectively removed much of its effect in ensuring increased political participation, thereby also its conflict-mitigating potential.

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MADAGASCAR

Inclusion 1: Were oppositional groups allowed to organize freely and participate in electoral activities, including the election itself?

A display of the potential conflict-mitigating effect of *Inclusion* is represented by the aforementioned 1993 elections. This was the first election following the shift to a parliamentary system of government, in which the prime minister was chosen from the party or parties able to command a majority in the National Assembly (Randrianja, 2003, p. 310). The legislative elections produced a majority that, in theory, was loyal to Albert Zafy, but there was no single predominant majority party within the assembly, something that had been the case under both the First (1960-72) and Second (1975-91) Republics. Rather, the shift in system led to large number of small parties being represented (Randrianja, 2003, p. 311). This fact points to oppositional groups not only being allowed to organize relatively freely, but also participate in electoral activities, following the same rules as the incumbent.

The conflict-mitigating effect of this institutional change to parliamentarism is strengthened when assessing the repercussion of the most notable change that occurred in the Malagasy electoral system during this time of transition, the 1998 constitutional amendments and the following election (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, p. 216). Legislative elections were conducted on the 17th of May of that year under a new electoral law, which favored larger parties. The previous system of proportional representation using party lists was replaced by a mixed system combining 82 single-member constituencies and a form of proportional representation for 34 two-member constituencies (Toulou, 2009, p. 197). The conflict-mitigating effect of the mechanism of *Inclusion* is exemplified by the fact that the first election following this shift to a mixed system, the 2001 presidential elections, was the most hotly contested one in Malagasy history. It was the closest the country has ever been to an onset of domestic armed conflict. An argument can be made that the reversion back to an electoral system favoring larger parties, effectively limiting the political influence of marginalized groups in the Malagasy society, therefore led to an increase in the propensity for intrastate conflict, highlighting the fact that an institutional move to a parliamentary system potentially has a conflict-mitigating effect.

As mentioned earlier when discussing the presence of an alternative route of political participation in Madagascar, the political parties of the country are shaped and structured around neopatrimonial networks displaying the linguistic, ethnic and regional diversity of the island state. Throughout many transitions across the continent, clientelism and rent-seeking has continued to be attractive to poorly integrated political systems often characterized by weak interest aggregation institutions, ethnic divisions and under-performing economies, all attributes that characterized Madagascar in the period of democratic transition (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 32). This has often led to governments attempting to restrict their neo-patrimonial circles to a bare minimum, including only those that are able to grant them continued incumbency and excluding others. In Madagascar, the ethnic diversity of the country led to an increase in the cabinet size from 22 to 34 in the period of July/August 1988 to August/September 1996, as one of only two countries experiencing increases in cabinet size within the same time-period (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 33).

An argument can be made that the neo-patrimonial traditions of the African continent, an often-cited source of political protest, in combination with the ethnic diversity of the country, actually had a potential conflict-mitigating effect in Madagascar, creating the presence of increased *Inclusion* into the political system through an alternative way, a more direct avenue of political participation. As more people, who were owned services, became a part of the government, it led to people electing not to revolt against the incumbent as this would in turn lead to them losing access to political as well as economic power. One the other hand, an argument can be made that this application of the mechanism of *Inclusion* is non-democratic and therefore outside of the scope of this thesis. It does not directly indicate an increase in electoral contestation. However, I would make the argument that it rather represents a reversal of the order, that an increase in inclusion leads to increased contestation and that its conflict-mitigating effect originates from this interaction, representing an extension of franchise rights, jointly creating the presence of vertical constraints (Fjelde et al., 2018). Based on this, I conclude that Malagasy oppositional groups were allowed to both organize freely and participate in elections alongside the incumbent, and that the ethnic diversity of the island in combination with the neo-patrimonial tradition of the continent created an alternative avenue of participation, raising the level of *Inclusion* and thereby electoral contestation further. The unfolding of the mechanism of *Inclusion* within the Malagasy regime resembles somewhat of an extralegal channel of political participation, however one that through its incorporation as a part of a larger African tradition has become imbedded into the political system. Despite the

fact that this non-violent channel at its core is not directly related to an increase in electoral contestation, its unfolding in Madagascar points to the fact that there exist alternative ways of achieving the same conflict-mitigating effect of increased *Inclusion* as an operationalization of electoral contestation through other indirect means.

Inclusion 2: Did there exist some level of media freedom and/or independence from the executive?

Throughout the period of attempted democratic transition, the Malagasy media was recognized as relatively free, in the sense that the executive power by no means controlled the message that was being broadcasted directly. However, even without formal rules of censorship and executive meddling, the government acted as a powerful constraint on free expression through the media, and thus led to the growth of self-censorship (Takirambudde, 1995, p. 27). In much of the same vein as Mobutu in Zaire, however not as constricted, the regime in essence created an arena where the media freedom was relatively high, but the arena in itself was in some respects outside of the political realm. Marc Ravalomanana was the most prominent actor in using this freedom in a way that expanded it into the political realm. As mentioned earlier, Ravalomanana was a businessman. Through this he owned Radio MBS (Malagasy Broadcasting System). He used his familiarity with the platform to make rebroadcasting deals with local stations around the country, and was through this able to use the relative media freedom to ensure his message would get out, despite efforts at the provincial level to limit airtime (Richard R. Marcus & Razafindrakoto, 2003, p. 218). Based on this, I conclude that there existed some media freedom within Madagascar during the transition period, and that the effect of this freedom as an indicator of *Inclusion* was most clearly visible during the lead up to the 2001 election.

Inclusion 3: Was an independent national conference held?

Lacking any significant presence in parliament due to the political regime during Ratsiraka's first term, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets daily in 1991. They launched a general strike led by the opposition coalition, demanding Ratsiraka's resignation and calling for a national conference (Randrianja, 2003, p. 310; Robinson, 1994, p. 592). Following months of demonstrations, confrontations, abductions and killings, an interim agreement was signed on the 31st of October 1991, which provided for the suspension of the constitution and the formation of a transitional government. As mentioned earlier a National Conference sprung out

of this, a conference responsible for the proposed new constitution that was adopted in August 1992, marking the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary type regime (Tshiyoyo & Kadima, 2009, p. 190).

Inclusion 4: Did this national conference reflect the social and political diversity of the country?

Giving a definitive answer to this question is difficult as there is little direct information about the social and political diversity within the National Conference. Due to this I will rely on more abstract indicators. During the referendum that took place in August 1992 the voters were asked to approve a new constitution proposed by the National Conference, moving the country in a more parliamentary direction. The first indicator of the fact that the National Conference reflected the political plurality of the country, was that all the major political parties in the negotiations had approved the new constitution that was up for referendum (Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). Knowing that the political parties of Madagascar are also manifested along the lines of socio-economic diversity, I would argue that also this points to the National Conference's proposal reflecting the social diversity within the country (Richard R Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 496). However, even though the proposal seemed to represent the wishes of a wide range of Malagasy political and socio-economic groups, the ultimate test of its *Inclusionary* effect was the actual referendum results. After they were tallied up the "Yes"-side received 72.7% of the votes, in contrast to the "No"-side which received 27.3% of the votes (EISA, 2010). Based on this I conclude that the National Conference reflected the social and political diversity within the Malagasy electorate.

<u>Summary of the Mechanism's Operation</u>

The analysis of *Inclusion* was perhaps the mechanism that most clearly revealed the impact that a history of executive dominance can have on a country's level of electoral contestation, thereby also affecting their propensity for the onset of intrastate conflict. The sheer dominance of Mobutu severely impacted not only the opposition's ability to organize freely, but also their ability to freely express their political opinions. Even though both countries used national conferences, conferences that reflected much of the civil and socio-economic diversity of each country, in their attempts to kickstart the transition towards democracy, Mobutu's continued manipulation of the process left the increased *Inclusion* without political power and thereby also its conflict-mitigating effect in Congo (Kinshasa). Madagascar's

successful use of the national conference and the following political backing of the constitution that came as a result, points to another un-measured alternative factor that may show why Madagascar was successful in avoiding the onset of intrastate conflict. They were able to create a wide base within the electorate for their democratic transition.

5.4 CHECKING OFF THE INDICATORS – SUMMARIZING THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Table 3: Checklist Based on the Empirical Indicators

ELECTORAL CONTESTATION			
Mechanism	Indicator	Congo (Kinshasa)	Madagascar
Substitution	Did an alternative channel of non-violent political participation present itself?		X
	Was an organized group willing to employ a non-violent channel?	X	X
	Does the country have a history of non-violence?	X	X
Executive Constraints	Did a judicial system develop?	X	X
	Did a legislative system develop?	X	X
	Were the judicial and legislative branches of government independent of and vested genuine power by the executive?		X
	Does the country have a history of executive dominance?	X	X
Inclusion	Were oppositional groups allowed to organize freely and participate in electoral activities, including the election itself?		X
	Did there exist some level of media freedom and/or independence from the executive?		X
	Was an independent national conference held?		X
	Did this national conference reflect the social and political diversity of the country?	X	X

5.4.1 The Pathway Case of Congo – Exemplifying the Mechanisms Conflict-Enhancing Nature

The analysis above clearly shows that Congo (Kinshasa) fulfills the theoretical expectations as their lack of electoral contestation, leaving them to be characterized as either a non-electoral or single-party autocracy, had a direct impact on the onset of the Two Congolese Wars in 1996 and 1998.

Mobutu and later Kabila's complete dominance of the political system left no room for a willing opposition to *Substitute* their political participation into non-violent action. Instead the mechanisms unfolding more closely resembled a mechanism of 'Closure' where channels that were already clogged became completely closed. This complete dominance within the political system also led to a 'Continuation' of an executive manipulation that had been established and maintained for close to 40 years. While the 1967 constitution established additional branches of government, these were never vested genuine power or independence by the executive, leaving them with only symbolic power of *Executive Constrain*. The analysis also shows that Mobutu´s continued manipulation of any attempt towards increased *Inclusion*, led to the accumulation of grievances among the electorate and by creating an oppositional arena for *Inclusion* outside of the realm of actual political power, Mobutu also enabled the regime to take advantage of the destabilization of Eastern Zaire following the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

In conclusion, the analysis above confirms that the relational pattern between electoral contestation and intrastate conflict identified by Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning was present within Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire in the period between 1990-2006, thereby strengthening the theory as it has been proven to be present on a smaller scale, within a limited region. In addition to this, the case of Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire also exemplified the conflict-enhancing unfolding of the mechanisms of *Substitution*, *Executive Constrain* and *Inclusion* within regimes characterized by low levels of electoral contestation. As alluded to earlier, these mechanisms instead ended up being more similar to mechanisms of 'Closure', 'Repression' and 'Alienation'.

5.4.2 The Deviant Case of Madagascar – Exemplifying an Alternative Path of Conflict-Mitigation

The qualitative analysis of the mechanism of *Substitution*, *Executive Constrain* and *Inclusion* and their unfolding within the Malagasy political system, highlights the fact that these mechanisms fulfilled their conflict-mitigating potential, exemplified by the fact that Madagascar did not experience the onset of intrastate conflict.

The fact that the democratic institutions of Madagascar fulfilled their conflict-mitigating potential despite being underdeveloped and on the backdrop of an executive dominance lasting over 20 years prior to the attempted democratic transitions of the 1990s, highlights the theory-building aspects of the deviant case. It points to the fact that Madagascar's deviance in fact does not originate from its inability to fulfill theoretical expectations, but perhaps rather from a form of measurement-originating deviance. In many respects the Malagasy case perfectly embodies the criticism of Treier and Jackman, as it alludes to the fact that it is difficult to create a measurement of democracy that adequately captures the multifaced nature of the regime type (Treier & Jackman, 2008). The measurement error of sorts that Madagascar exemplifies, is the fact that democracy and autocracy, and in particular moves up or down "the ladder of contestation" and the conflict-mitigating effect of these moves varies across countries, and across different regions of the world. In certain regions of the world, particularly in a traditionally democratically starved continent like Africa, the democratic characteristics of semi-democratic electoral regimes, the potentially underdeveloped and imperfect institutions of electoral contestation may obtain their conflict-mitigating effect through their development, rather than the European ideal of these institutions being consolidated parts of the regime.

The Malagasy case also exemplifies the historical predominance of the presidential system of government across the African continent and its potential as both a mitigating, as well as a factor sustaining tensions within society. An argument can be made that the institutional composition of the presidential system, being more focused towards majority, large parties and a single leader may limit the possible conflict-mitigating effect that the unfolding of the mechanisms brings with it. The majority-based electoral system may make the opposition less hopeful for the representative power of the non-violent electoral channel, than they would have the channel been characterized by proportional representation, thereby protecting the smaller parties within the party system. This may lead to a higher threshold of *Substitution* given the view as this non-violent channel as less representative. A natural continuation of this is that

obtaining genuine *Inclusion* is also further complicated as the manifestation, the institutionalized representation through political parties, of the diverse opinions within society is lost in the larger dominating parties of the presidential system (Aarebrot & Evjen, 2014, p. 305). The vesting of political power in a single, directly elected politician also has important implications for *Executive Constrain* as the president is not politically accountable to the legislature, creating an institutional space that many African presidents have used to put them out of reach from the other branches of government (Müller, 2017, p. 139). Despite all of this, the case of Madagascar highlights the fact that this presidential tradition also 'lowers' the bar of political participation as the unobtainability of the presidential office is already instilled within the political system. Because of this the increases in electoral contestation, thereby also enabling the conflict-mitigating effect of *Substitution*, *Executive Constrain* and *Inclusion* may actually be more attainable as less developed and consolidated institutions of democracy are adequate to obtain a representation that, based on the historical predominance of presidentialism, has been unattainable prior to the 1990s.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 MAIN FINDINGS

In itself, the adaption of multi-party electoral systems across the African continent following the democratic transitions of the 1990s, left unchanged many of the defining characteristics of African politics, most notably presidential dominance and low levels of participation. On top of this, the transitions did little to change the enduring weakness of the vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, facing the executives (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 32). However, based on the analysis, there are, in my opinion, two broadly defined underlying regime characteristics or developments that through their effect on a country's level of electoral contestation also affected their propensity for the onset of violent intrastate conflict, despite of this historical legacy. Given the thesis' limited case-based focus and explicit explanatory goal, generalizability was not a goal in itself. However, the findings from Congo (Kinshasa) and Madagascar also point to the presence of other theoretical mechanisms closely related to the relationship between electoral contestation and its effect on intrastate conflict being present. Because of this, a mention of the generalizable nature of each of the two main findings will be presented.

Based on the checklist in TABLE 3, there are especially two factors that seem to have a particularly large effect in separating the two cases from each other. The analysis shows that the gradual transfer of more political power into the hands of the legislative power, moving the political system in a more parliamentary direction, has a conflict-mitigating effect. A natural by-product of this shift would also be a more proportionally based electoral system. This would increase the inclusion of marginalized groups and manifest their position within the political system, while at the same time moving regimes further away from the dominating party system of the past. In the case of Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire all of the political power was in the hands of the executive power, almost resembling a reverse parliamentary system with the legislative assembly only having ceremonial, non-political power.

In Madagascar on the other hand, the short-lived experiment with a parliamentary shift, led to increases in the number of political parties and the manifestation of legislative power through the impeachment of president Albert Zafy. The combined effect that this institutional shift had in raising the level of genuine contestation, while at the same time establishing constraints on the executive power, had a clear conflict-mitigating effect. However, much of this effect is gone in a country like Congo (Kinshasa) when the executive domination of the policy process at all stages makes the seats in the legislature of little use (Alonso & Ruiz-Rufino, 2007, p. 237). The generalizable nature of this finding, in relation to its effect on a regime's propensity for violent domestic conflict, is present. It speaks to a more overall finding that parliamentary democratic regimes are more likely to survive than presidential ones, as well as the fact that it disperses political power more broadly, allowing for a "wider" alternative route into which the opposition to *Substitute* their political participation (Riggs, 1997, p. 257).

The other factor that was abundantly clear when assessing the three mechanisms of electoral contestation and their unfolding within Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa)/Zaire, was the effect that a history of executive dominance has on a regimes overall level of electoral contestation and thereby its propensity for experiencing violent conflict. The historical dominance of Mobutu, and the consequent continuation under Kabila left no space for a democratic transition to occur, thereby closing off any alternative routes of non-violence. This not only put restrictions on the regime's ability to develop and manifest genuine electoral contestation through the establishment of democratic institutions, but also contributed to the accumulation of grievances over a long time-period, resulting in two onsets of civil war occurring within a 7-year period.

In contrast, the democratic transition in Madagascar created a disruption in the executive dominance of Ratsiraka, effectively creating enough space for the development of electoral contestation and democratic institutions. This disruption represented a crossroad in the similar story between Madagascar and Congo (Kinshasa), and was decisive in stopping the political protests from escalating into the onset of civil war. Even though Ratsiraka was re-elected in 1997, the institutions that were developed in the period between his two tenures (1993-1997) withstood his second tenure, resulting in his eventual electoral loss in 2002. Despite of the contrasting outcomes of the two cases, the conflict-enhancing effect of executive dominance over time was present within both countries and is generalizable in conjunction with the argument of accumulating grievances presented by Collier and Hoeffler (Collier & Hoeffler,

2004). However, the determining factor separating the two cases was the external pressures caused by Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the following involvement of other neighboring countries.

In conclusion, the analyses conducted above point to the fact that the causal patterns identified by Bartuseviscuis and Skaaning's global analysis, are also present across the sub-Saharan African region. The quantitative analysis revealed similarities within the statistical pattern, displaying a negative monotonic and potentially linear relationship between electoral regime type and the onset of intrastate conflict within the sub-Saharan African region. The findings of the analyses are also in conjunction with Bartuseviscuis and Skaaning's finding of thresholds. This is best exemplified through the success of Madagascar in avoiding onset of violent conflict. Despite of the shortcomings of their institutions the country still managed to obtain an element of genuine contestation and uphold partisan pluralism, in contrast to the case of Congo (Kinshasa) where neither of these elements were present. As we have seen, Madagascar did not experience this same type of external involvement, nor armed conflict, and assessing the effects within this case therefore did not require the same type of precautions. Regardless of this, the qualitative analysis showed that the selected mechanisms of *Substitution*, *Executive Constrain* and *Inclusion* appear to be transferable across the cases, exhibiting a universal nature. The mechanisms can "travel" across cases and the very same mechanisms are activated despite different external contexts, resulting in different outcomes when it comes to the onset of intrastate armed conflict.

6.2 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

6.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Implications for Future Research

In this final part of the thesis I will look at some of the further theoretical, empirical and methodological implications of this study, using the findings of my research to point to how others can further develop these ideas. Through this analysis I have contributed to the research field by moving the analytical focus away from causes and outcomes, instead focusing on the causal process that link different levels of electoral contestation to the propensity for experiencing the onset of intrastate conflict. This has primarily been done through the dismantling of the concept of "electoral contestation" into three distinct mechanisms, with indicators of each mechanism's unfolding.

My findings from the analysis answer the study's research question and help to achieve its goals, which were to identify the mechanism connecting electoral contestation to violent intrastate conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings have several significant implications for further research, particularly for advancing the research on how specific institutional characteristics affect a regime's propensity for intrastate conflict and how this effect is measured.

Accordingly, the first further implication of this study is that I have provided a template, through the use of the nested analysis and region-specific case research, for how to further examine the findings of Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning. The results from the analysis point to the fact the sub-Saharan African region adheres to the statistical patterns in the larger global analysis regarding the relationship between electoral contestation and conflict onset. However, the same template can also be used within future research in order to test the impact of the operationalized mechanisms of electoral contestation within other regions such as Latin-America, Asia or Europe, thereby providing further testing of the relational pattern, creating an even larger theory-building potential. Testing the theory across different cases and regions also enables the theory to be falsified or "restricted", and it is often from theories that are proven to be wrong, we can learn the most (King et al., 1994, p. 19). In this respect I have not only filled an addressed gap within the literature, but also created a pathway for further research into the development and testing of specific institutional characteristics' unfolding and effect on the propensity for intrastate conflict, as well as the overall relational pattern.

A second equally important implication, which this study represents for future research, is that it through the analysis identifies that a history of executive dominance and the lack of parliamentary institutional development seem to create a roadblock for further development of electoral contestation. In other words, in the imaginary "ladder of contestation" these two factors seem to represent two broken ladder rungs, making move up the ladder difficult. Based on this, my findings open the door for future research into the specific influence of executive dominance or lack of parliamentary development on a regime's propensity for experiencing intrastate conflict.

6.2.2 Methodological Implications for Future Research

An important methodological implication for further research, which this thesis has exemplified, is that there exists a need within the scholarly community of more region-specific measures of democracy. From the pathway case of Congo (Kinshasa) we learned that the theoretical framework presented by Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning, and the operationalized mechanisms of electoral contestation and their effect on intrastate conflict, fit the case well. Despite international and regional factors having an impact on the onset of the First and Second Congolese Wars, the unfolding of the mechanisms and their inability to decrease the country's propensity for violent conflict was clear. On the other hand, the deviant case of Madagascar potentially tells us that researchers conducting analysis into the democratic nature of African countries should obtain more region-specific indicators. The successful use of a representative and independent national conference, the familiarity with an electoral process and the presence of a larger, less institutionalized mass democracy in Madagascar were determining factors in assuring that the island state never experienced mass-based violent revolt against the executive. Even though the Malagasy political institutions were by no means perfect and largely based on the presidential tradition of the African continent, they were still able to obtain the conflict-mitigating effect of *Substitution*, *Executive Constraint* and *Inclusion* that Western countries have been able to obtain through parliamentarism, a more strict separation of power and proportional representation.

This finding strengthens the theory, while at the same time alludes to the fact that moves towards more region-specific indicators of democracy across all continents of the world, will not only reinforce potential findings, but also remove a source of western scientific imperialism within the field of democracy and conflict research. Across much of Europe the development and consolidation of a minimalist democratic electoral regime would represent a form of autocratic backsliding, resulting in the accumulation of grievances which by itself has been proven to have a potentially conflict-enhancing effect. The sub-Saharan African countries historical background stands in contrast to this, and a move like the one that took place in Madagascar, moving from an autocratic single-party regime to a minimalist democracy may indeed be sufficient to obtain the conflict-mitigating effect that has already been established during the European democratic transitions occurring after the end of World War Two.

As alluded to in the discussion of the methodological considerations of the thesis in chapter 4.2, a potential solution for the problem of endogeneity may be the inclusion of more instrumental variables, such as an indicator of ethnolinguistic fractionalization into the analysis. A future project concerned with assessing a specific institutional characteristics' effect on a regimes propensity for experiencing domestic conflict, should include instrumental variables or a structural vector autoregression (VAR) as this may enable them to explain some of the underlying factors that affect the unfolding of conflict-mitigating mechanisms within post-conflict regimes or regions.

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
Appendix

FIGURE A1: COOK'S DISTANCE
Source: (Skaaning, Bartusevičius, et al., 2015)

Table A1: Correlation Matrix

Observations = 1,857

	Civil War Onset	Electoral Regime (LIED)	Population	GDP/cap (Ipol)	GDP growth (ipol)	Oil income	CINC	Polity2	Instability (3y)
Civil War Onset	1.000								
Electoral Regime (LIED)	-0.0745	1.000							
Population	0.0803	-0.0484	1.000						
GDP/cap (ipol)	-0.0743	0.3486	-0.2951	1.000					
GDP growth (ipol)	-0.0072	0.1061	-0.0714	0.1708	1.000				
Oil income	-0.0095	-0.0020	-0.1828	0.4092	0.0773	1.000			
CINC	0.0271	0.1118	0.6598	0.1376	0.0020	-0.0435	1.000		
Polity2	0.0067	0.7672	0.0437	0.2378	0.0645	-0.0957	0.1923	1.000	
Instability (3y)	-0.0071	-0.0076	-0.0814	-0.1434	-0.0511	-0.0676	-0.1351	0.0687	1.000

Table A2: Crosstabulation Between Time-periods and Civil War Onset (Full Model)

Civil War

LIED	1817-80		1881-1945		1946-2006		1817-2006	
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
L0	1,680	27	809	29	1,339	55	3,828	111
L1	315	11	579	15	1,934	30	2,828	56
L2	1,175	25	1,103	19	1,548	40	3,826	84
L3	337	3	957	3	1,739	23	3,033	29
L4			300	0	2,056	2	2,356	2

Source: (Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010a)

The table is a cross-tabulation between LIED and civil war onset through different historical periods in the global analysis conducted by Bartusevisčuis and Skaaning.

Table A3: Crosstabulation Between Time-periods and Civil War Onset (Limited Model)

Civil War

LIED	1817-80		1881-1945		1946-2006		1817-2006	
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
L0	90		74	1	427	25	591	26
L1	3		53	0	740	10	796	10
L2	31		12	0	424	16	467	16
L3	52		78	0	331	1	461	1
L4					84	0	84	0

Source: (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010b; Skaaning, Gerring, et al., 2015)

The table is a cross-tabulation between LIED and civil war onset through different historical periods in sub-Saharan Africa

Table A4: Calculated Residuals for Case-selection and Demarcation of Time

Country	Residual	Year	Civil War Onset	Electoral Regime Type
Madagascar	-.3283231	2006	0	3
Madagascar	-.3192115	2005	0	3
Madagascar	-.3096941	2004	0	3
Madagascar	-.3007202	2003	0	3
Madagascar	-.2913609	2002	0	3
Madagascar	-.2827644	2001	0	3
Madagascar	-.2736769	2000	0	3
Madagascar	-.2643404	1999	0	3
Madagascar	-.2542951	1998	0	3
Madagascar	-.2438283	1997	0	3
Madagascar	-.2317781	1996	0	3
Madagascar	-.2227287	1995	0	3
Madagascar	-.2134683	1994	0	3
Madagascar	-.2033491	1993	0	3
Congo (Kinshasa)	.00411025	1998	1	0
Congo (Kinshasa)	.0030643	1996	1	1

Probability Calculations – 1946-2006

Full Model

$$N = 8616$$
$$N^{Onset} = 150$$
$$N^{Peace} = 8466$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{150}{8616} = 0.02$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{8466}{8616} = 0.98$$

Limited Model

$$N = 2006$$
$$N^{Onset} = 52$$
$$N^{Peace} = 1954$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{52}{2006} = 0.03$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{1954}{2006} = 0.97$$

Probability Calculations based on Electoral Regime Type

Full Model

L0 – Non-Electoral Autocracy

$$N = 3939$$
$$N^{Onset} = 11$$
$$N^{Peace} = 3828$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{11}{3939} = 0.03$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{3282}{3939} = 0.97$$

L1 – Single-Party Autocracy

$$N = 2884$$
$$N^{Onset} = 56$$
$$N^{Peace} = 2828$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{56}{2884} = 0.02$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{2828}{2884} = 0.98$$

L2 – Multiparty Autocracy

$$N = 3910$$

$$N^{Onset} = 84$$

$$N^{Peace} = 3826$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{84}{3910} = 0.02$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{3826}{3910} = 0.98$$

L3 – Minimalist Democracy

$$N = 3062$$

$$N^{Onset} = 29$$

$$N^{Peace} = 3033$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{29}{3062} = 0.001$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{3033}{3062} = 0.99$$

L4 – Polyarchy

$$N = 2358$$

$$N^{Onset} = 2$$

$$N^{Peace} = 2356$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{2}{2358} = 0.0001$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{2356}{2358} = 0.999$$

Limited Model

L0 – Non-Electoral Autocracy

$$N = 617$$
$$N^{Onset} = 26$$
$$N^{Peace} = 591$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{26}{617} = 0.04$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{591}{617} = 0.96$$

L1 – Single-Party Autocracy

$$N = 806$$
$$N^{Onset} = 10$$
$$N^{Peace} = 796$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{10}{806} = 0.01$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{796}{806} = 0.99$$

L2 – Multiparty Autocracy

$$N = 483$$
$$N^{Onset} = 16$$
$$N^{Peace} = 467$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{16}{483} = 0.03$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{467}{483} = 0.97$$

L3 – Minimalist Democracy

$$N = 462$$
$$N^{Onset} = 1$$
$$N^{Peace} = 461$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{1}{462} = 0.002$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{461}{462} = 0.998$$

L4 – Polyarchy

$$N = 84$$
$$N^{Onset} = 0$$
$$N^{Peace} = 84$$

$$P^{Onset} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{0}{84} = 0$$

$$P^{Peace} = \frac{Onset}{Number\ of\ observations} = \frac{84}{84} = 1$$

Table A5: Crosstabulation between LIED and civil war onset (Full Model)

COW civil war onset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010b)	LIED					
	0	1	2	3	4	Total
0	3,828	2,828	3,826	3,033	2,356	15,781
1	111	56	84	29	2	282
Total	3,939	2,884	3,910	3,062	2,358	16,153

Source: (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010a; Skaaning, Bartusevičius, et al., 2015)

The table is a cross-tabulation between Civil War Onset and Electoral democratic regime type (LIED) in Bartusevičius and Skaaning's global analysis.

Table A6: Crosstabulation between LIED and civil war onset (Limited Model)

COW civil war onset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010b)	LIED					
	0	1	2	3	4	Total
0	591	796	467	461	84	2,399
1	26	10	16	1	0	53
Total	617	806	483	462	84	2,452

Source: (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010a; Skaaning, Bartusevičius, et al., 2015)

The table is a cross-tabulation between Civil War Onset and Electoral democratic regime type (LIED) in the limited Sub-Saharan African model.

Do-File from STATA

set more off

*** In order to create a dummy-variable for Sub-Saharan African Countries
gen SSA = 0
replace SSA = 1 if inrange(cow,402,625)

** Because of coding Sudan has been placed outside of the Sub-Saharan regional coding. I therefore need to recode the dummy variable so it does not contain observations from North-Africa
replace SSA = 0 if inrange(cow,600,620)

** In order to label the new dummy variable "Sub-Saharan African Countries" and code it "Not Sub-Saharan" = 0 and "Sub-Saharan" =1
label var SSA "Sub-Saharan African Countries"
label define subsaharan 0 "Not Sub-Saharan" 1 "Sub-Saharan"
label values SSA subsaharan

*** Creating the Main Quantitative Models
sort cow year

** *MODEL 1:*
logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2 l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3

** *MODEL 2*
logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3 if SSA==1

** *MODEL 3*
logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3 if SSA==1

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*** MODEL 4*

logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3 if SSA==1

*** MODEL 5*

logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2 l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3 if SSA==1

*** Create FIGURE 6

sort cow year

logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2 l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3 if SSA==1

margins, atmeans at(l.lied4=(0(1)4)) level(95)

marginsplot, scheme(s1mono) title("Limited Sample") ytitle("") xtitle(LIED) recastci(rarea) ciopts(fcolor(gs13) lcolor(gs13)) recast(line)

*** Create TABLE A4 & A5 - Displaying the cross-tabulation between Civil War Onset and Electoral Democratic Regime Types

*** Table A4*

tab cow_cw_on lied4

*** Table A5*

tab cow_cw_on lied4 if SSA==1

** Remove Noise

Drop if SSA ==0

*** Create TABLE A2. Displaying the cross-tabulation between Civil War Onset and Electoral Democratic Regime Types in different periods

gen period = 0

replace period = 1 if year < 1881

replace period = 2 if year < 1946 & year > 1880

replace period = 3 if year > 1945

label define period 1 "1817-1880" 2 "1881-1945" 3 "1946-2006"

tabulate lied4 cow_cw_on if period == 1

tabulate lied4 cow_cw_on if period == 2

tabulate lied4 cow_cw_on if period == 3

tabulate lied4 cow_cw_on if SSA

** Predict Cook´s Distance and generate a variable for the observation numbers

sort cow year

logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2
l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3

predict cook

gen index = _n

** Create FIGURE 5

graph twoway scatter cook index, mlabel(countryn)

*** Uncovering the "Deviant" and "Pathway" Cases

logit cow_cw_on lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2 l.instability3
peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3

predict stdres1, stdp

logit cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2
l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3

predict stdres2, stdp

** Create new variable in order to uncover the cases with the most difference in
standardized residuals between the two logit models

gen logitres = stdres1-stdres2

sort logitres

*** Test for Multicollinearity

sort cow year

corr cow_cw_on l.lied4 lnpop l.lnigdp_pc l.igdp_pc_g l.oil_income l.cinc_a l.polity2
l.instability3 peaceyrs_cow peaceyrs_cow_2 peaceyrs_cow_3