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Migration and the politics of control

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Editorial

New dimensions of an old debate

In the final edition of *British Politics Review* for 2016 we are raising an issue which must be described as both sensitive and controversial - immigration to the UK. While it can hardly be seen as a new bone of contention in British politics, the question of immigration has gained a very prominent position in recent years, and most notably so in connection with the referendum on British membership of the EU in June this year. In this context, the discussion of immigration focused primarily on *work migration* from other EU-countries to the UK. The line of argument was a simple one: With Britain a member of the EU's internal market, there is no effective barrier to immigration, thus disqualifying the government's stated aim of reducing annual net migration to "tens of thousands rather than hundreds of thousands".

Yet, the EU debate certainly addressed anxieties about non-European migration too, notably with reference to the ongoing refugee crisis and the prospect of Turkish membership of the Union. The large number of people fleeing from the civil war in Syria towards a – hopefully – safe haven in Europe is central to the debates about refugees on Europe's threshold; how they should be received and in whose name the decisions about asylum policy should be forged. In the opening article of the Review, Lord Hain reflects upon the Syrian tragedy, and on why it went so wrong.

UKIP has been a key player in carrying immigration to the centre stage that it held in the referendum campaign, in the form of European migration, non-European work migrants and refugees. In her article on UKIP, Cathrine Thorleifsson looks at the role immigration has played in the rise of the party in Doncaster, part of the post-industrial North England that has swung decisively in support of the party, and of Brexit. Henry Allen addresses the central free movement of persons-principle, and how that might fare in the process of dismembering Britain from the EU, while John Todd goes more in depth on the anti-immigration narratives presented during the referendum campaign. Asher Boersma looks at the Channel Tunnel, and the now two-decades-old problem of immigrants desperately trying to make their way to Britain through the tunnel. Finally, Gavin Schaffer reminds us that while immigration to the UK is particularly high on the political agenda just now, it is by no means a new phenomenon, and that attempts to restrict immigration – in combination with attempts to quell domestic racism – was the dominant feature of British immigration policies for most of the post-war period.

Together these articles further address a complex issue that has been, and will continue to be, an important part of British political debate.

Atle L. Wold & Henry Allen (editors)

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Syria – a policy catastrophe

By Lord Hain

Sadly headline grabbing British Government soundbites over Syria have substituted for a proper understanding of the conflict that could end both it and the desperate refugee crisis.

Already this year 3000 desperate refugees have drowned in the Mediterranean trying to get to Europe. A quarter of a million, mostly Africans, are waiting in Libya to make the crossing.

More walls are being erected around Europe's borders than during the Cold War.

Criminal smugglers made a fortune in 2015 from 80 or 100 boats a day crossing the Mediterranean, bringing a million refugees – a third of these children – as part of the biggest movement of people Europe has faced since 1945.

The Syria crisis is apocalyptic – a disaster of biblical proportions, with over four million refugees. There are 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon; over 600,000 in Jordan; 1.5 million to be accepted by Germany; 68,500 who settled in France last year; or 2 million in Turkey, still aspiring to European Union membership.

When the Arab Spring reached Syria in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad reacted with callous butchery, driving his people into carnage and chaos, instead of responding positively to non-violent protests.

But the unfolding horror in Syria has also been the product of a monumental foreign policy misjudgement which reached its nadir in the Prime Minister Cameron's humiliation when trying to bounce Parliament into backing a military strike in 2013.

Britain had begun in 2011 with a demand for Assad's unconditional departure – which didn't work. And was never going to do so. Then we resourced rebel forces – which failed too. Then we got the EU arms embargo lifted and tried to arm the rebels – until cross-party opposition in Parliament blocked that, because nobody



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had a clue whether those arms would end up with Jihadi extremists or not.

And, abhorrent though chemical weapons are, experts estimate they accounted for just 1 per cent of all the terrible casualties in Syria in 2013 when Cameron failed to get MPs approval to bomb Assad's regime.

Of course Russia and Iran have been massively culpable in the unfolding horror. So have the Saudis and Qataris. But Britain, too, is culpable, not least in siding with.

We should have promoted a negotiated solution from the very beginning. Assad was reported to be willing to consider the proposal by the then UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi for a ceasefire for the four-day Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday beginning at the end of October 2012.

But instead of urging their friends in the rebel groups to declare that they would reciprocate if Assad made good on his tentative promise, the Western powers and the Arab arms suppliers continued to demand regime change and resource the opposition. And they have since in other attempts to negotiate.

That was fatal, because this never was some simplistic battle between evil and good, between a barbaric dictator and a repressed people. It's always been a civil war: a quagmire into which Britain (or the US and France) treads at deep peril, involving the now bitter and incendiary fault line in the region of Sunni versus Shia Muslims, Saudi Arabia versus Iran – and, a cold-war hangover, the US versus Russia.

The "good guys versus bad guys" prism through which David Cameron projected the crisis was hardly made credible by the increasing presence of, first Al Qaida then Islamic State, fighters amongst the West's favoured rebels – indeed Al Qaida's Syrian offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra fought in Aleppo all the way to a pile of rubble whilst being tacitly supported by the Saudis and Qataris. Nor did this prism reflect the barbarous murders of innocent Syrian citizens by some rebels, including Kurds.

Moreover, Assad and the ruling Shia-aligned Alawite minority formed a tenth of the population and were never going to give up power if it meant, as they feared and still do, being oppressed by the Sunni majority, with Christians and other minorities similarly nervous about change.

Together those behind Assad amounted to nearly a third of the Syrian people; add in the Kurds and the total reached around 40 per cent. Few of them liked Assad or his Baathist rule. But they feared even more the alternative – becoming victims of genocide, Jihadism or Sharia extremism.

That was the context and still is even if the proportions may have altered through the War. Therefore if western military intervention had somehow toppled Assad without a settlement in place, the country would have descended into even greater chaos.

Russia feared that anarchy because, like the US and UK, it has key strategic military, economic and intelligence interests in the area; Syria provides Russia's only Mediterranean port in a region where the US is well placed militarily.

The West's initial block on Iran and also Assad from attending a peace conference meant it never even got off the ground until the crisis was well entrenched. The demand for Assad to go morphed belatedly into demanding he went after 6 months. Is it any wonder that, holding most of the cards with Russia and Iran steadfast behind him, he proved a reluctant suitor?

This was Western diplomacy of huge incompetence.

Surely we should by now have understood, not least from Britain's long and bitter experience of resolving the Northern Ireland conflict, that setting pre-conditions always prevents attempts at negotiation from even getting off the ground?

A political solution was always the imperative. Britain, France, the United States their Gulf State allies, adopted a disastrous course which has also contrived to put Putin in the saddle.

It may not be too late to open the door for Russia to use its leverage to ensure Assad negotiates seriously. Like it or not, without engagement by Russia and Iran, a Syrian settlement will not happen.

The Guidelines for a Political Transition approved by the

five permanent members of the UN Security Council at the Geneva conference on 30 June 2012 still provide the best road map. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's call on 9 October 2012 for both a ceasefire and an embargo on more arms going to the opposition as well as government forces, should be heeded.

Transitional arrangements that reach the end point of democratisation are crucial. But their pace must be negotiated, not imposed.

For instance several years ago in Yemen (now another disastrous arena for proxy wars and Western double standards over Saudi Arabia's malevolence), a hated President did not actually resign but equally did not stand for re-election.

However unpalatable, Assad and his henchmen may have to be granted immunity in order to get them to sign up: hardly worse than the continuing barbarity and devastation of ancient heritage. All state employees – including the ranks in the armed forces – must be allowed to keep their posts, to avoid a repeat of the chaos caused by America's de-Ba'athification in Iraq.

Britain needs to persuade its friends in the Syrian opposition to go into negotiations with a credible plan for compromise: local ceasefires, access for humanitarian relief, and names of prospective members of a new government of national unity that will also include ministers from the current Syrian government. Together they can initiate a process of constitutional reform for new parliamentary and presidential elections with UN observers.

This will all be incredibly, tortuously difficult. But surely not more difficult than alternative failed options and the humanitarian catastrophe?

Only through mutual concessions by the regime and the opposition, by the US and Russia, by the Saudis and Iran, can the people of Syria, the region, the refugees and indeed the world be saved from the current nightmare perpetuating for years to come.



Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President since 2000 and commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces. Having "driv[en]" his people into carnage and chaos" through his response to the Arab Spring, Assad may yet have to be granted immunity as part of the resolution to horrific civil war, according to Lord Hain. Photo: www.kremlin.ru

The rise of UKIP: rebordering the nation in an age of migration

By Cathrine Thorleifsson



Cathrine Thorleifsson is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Dept of Social Anthropology/Centre for Research on Extremism, University of Oslo. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from LSE (2012). Her chief theoretical interests lie in anthropological approaches to the study of nationalism, migration, borders and xenophobia.

In many European countries, a notable response to globalization has been the heating of exclusionary identity politics and call for the reinforcement of symbolic and territorial borders. Populist parties protesting European and global integration have obtained unprecedented double-digit support in regional and national elections. Nigel Farage led the UK to Brexit, Donald Trump has been elected new president of the United States and the Freedom Party's (FPÖ) Norbert Hofer is set to win the presidency of Austria on 4 December. What explains this populist resurgence?

To find out more about the local set of conditions and circumstances fuelling support for right-wing populist parties, I conducted anthropological fieldwork in Doncaster, a UKIP hotspot. In May 2015, the party got its electoral breakthrough in the general elections on an anti-immigration, anti-EU and pro-coal platform, obtaining 24.1% of the votes, an increase of 20% from the last General Election in 2010. Examining people's concerns and motivations for voting UKIP in traditional Labour heartland, I found that cultural, socio-economic and political dislocation were driving factors for the party's appeal. UKIP has captured a segment of the population's fears and insecurities about the impact of global and European integration on national identity, welfare and security - even civilization as a whole.

A way of life under threat. Doncaster is a white-majority working-class town of 18,000 inhabitants located in South Yorkshire. The town is one of many that went from boom to bust when most of the coalmines shut during Thatcher's neoliberal restructuring programme starting in late 1980s. Over the years, labour in globalizing Doncaster has gone from being predictable, to insecure and vulnerable

to marked fluctuations. At the same time Doncaster has undergone rapid diversification processes, particularly following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union. After English, Polish is the most spoken language. The dissolution of industry, combined with fast demographic change, shape ongoing struggles over meaning, values and identity.

The UKIP supporters I interviewed nostalgically remembered the industrial era as a period of proud belonging. A sense of community centred around places of work. In the post-industrial era, several men and women described how they had lost a sense of cultural identity and community. The part of society recovering from its dependence on heavy industries felt exposed and vulnerable under a new economic reality where they had to compete with cheap labour from elsewhere. Informants framed newcomers as competitors in a precarious labour market, a factor driving anti-immigration sentiment. "The immigrants are stealing our jobs" or "We are unemployed; we can't afford housing while the immigrants get all state benefits" were recurring complaints. Many felt uneasy about their children's

"The UKIP supporters I interviewed nostalgically remembered the industrial era as a period of proud belonging. A sense of community centered around places of work. In the post-industrial era, several men and women described how they had lost a sense of cultural identity and community. The part of society recovering from its dependence on heavy industries felt exposed and vulnerable under a new economic reality where they had to compete with cheap labour from elsewhere."

future, stating that it was "an utter disgrace" to see young people struggling, while new migrants were entering the country.

It was not only the white population of Doncaster that idealized the past and scapegoated migrants. A Sikh man named Aadi, in his mid-fifties, working in a local drug store, expressed longing for the British Empire and supported UKIP's anti-immigration politics. Invoking kinship terminology to justify exclusion

of new migrants, he stated that:

The house is full, and you can only have so many guests. I have worked very hard to get this job. I would wash; I took all kinds of jobs. I have served customers for 24 years. I have worked long, hard hours, seven days a week. I look at the people from Poland and Africa who enter my shop. Some would not have survived one week in India. You need to work and not only claim benefits. The United Kingdom used to be called Great Britain. What is it now? United States of Europe?

To Aadi, an imagined British home and work ethic was threatened by new people coming to the country. He seemed to distance himself from the hardship he himself had endured as a migrant by scaling globally to include an appreciation of historical Asian–British links and the British Raj. In order to deal with his fear of becoming redundant in a precarious labour market, he voted for UKIP, a party in favor of halting migration while nurturing nostalgia for the Empire (Thorleifsson 2016).

St. George to the rescue. Informants who were experiencing less personal economic precarity, highlighted cultural accounts of difference rather than discourses of economic uncertainty in explaining their support for the party. Some informants viewed migrants as threatening outsiders with no respect or knowledge of British values and way of life. Knowing that UKIP supporters are also far more likely than those of other parties to describe themselves as “English” rather than “British”, I asked the local UKIP politician Guy Aston (64) about the difference between the two.

I guess English these days means not being an immigrant. And being proud of that. Our local schools are swamped with people who can't speak English. As a UKIP politician I have to say I'm doing this for Britain, but I am also doing this for England. We need to wrap ourselves in the flag of St. George! We have to fight for what is English. British socialists have long undermined any sense of nationalism. But people want to belong. If we can't have nationalism, what are we then besides some people living in the land? No, we need to be proud of England. We need to stand up to the champagne socialist elite in London and all their political correctness. People are tired of being bullied by the state.

In Aston's populist narrative, a mythical way of British/English life is threatened from the outside, whether from migrants or the cosmopolitan, liberal London elites. UKIP's anti-migration and hard Euro-sceptic stance was an appealing message to my informants who felt neglected by the establishment and threatened by fast demographic change—whether caused by natural minority increase or labour migrants. UKIP tapped into local anxieties and disillusionment, promising a brighter future modelled around proud nationalism.

Resentment and politics of fear. Local UKIP politicians and supporters were disillusioned with the outcome of the 2015 General Election. The election, which secured the party 3.9 million votes, only resulted in one seat in Parliament. The crisis of representation fuelled further rage and alienation from mainstream politics. Local politician Guy Aston from UKIP Don Valley articulated his fury in military terms comparing the struggle for political power to the formation of battalions during war:

Like the British army in 1940. We sharpen up and build our forces. In the beginning you saw an almost naïve enthusiasm, but it's gonna be along war in Donny [Doncaster] for my troops. We're like a season battalion, retreated, but not defeated.

Exploiting resentment and the considerable mistrust in national governance, UKIP hosted its party conference in September 2015 in Doncaster. Moving the stigmatized town momentarily to the foreground of national politics, UKIP promised to challenge Ed Miliband – the Labour candidate for Prime Minister who was seen as “no voice for the working man”.

To massive applause, Nigel Farage entered the conference stage to the tunes of the 1986 single by the Swedish rock band Europe, “The Final Countdown”. The soundtrack had been chosen to reflect the message of the conference entitled “Out of the EU and into the world”. UKIP's answer to the alleged threats posed by migration was to leave the EU and its freedom of labour and movement rules and “take back the control of the borders”.



Doncaster, South Yorkshire, where the author conducted her anthropological fieldwork. A UKIP stronghold, the city is also, incidentally, represented in Parliament by the former Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, lending substance to the Labour/UKIP rivalry over the votes of the working class.

Not surprisingly, the conference focused on migration as the central theme. Several of the conference talks consisted of scaremongering on the issue of the allegedly uncontrolled continuing arrival of non-indigenous people to the UK, stating that migrants were a drain on resources, threat to cultural heritage and national security. UKIP's defence spokesman, Mike Hookem, presented a video showing himself riding along with a truck driver who had allegedly been intimidated by migrants in Calais. In one scene, Hookem climbs the fence to the Eurotunnel to illustrate the need for tighter border security. Focusing on migrants as a threat to safety, Hookem ended his presentation with invoking exclusionary ethno-nationalism. "Now is the time to reject the dictatorial EU project that threatens our heritage, our traditions and our way of life" (UKIP 2015).

Migration was also the key issue of the Leave campaign. A few days before the nation-wide referendum on the UK's EU membership, UKIP leader Farage exploited similar anxiety over security through a controversial Breaking Point anti-migration poster. The poster depicted a que of refugees, and was accompanied by the caption "We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders" (Guardian 2016). The image of the non-European 'threatening migrant' served to reinforce the ethno-nationalist boundaries of Britishness/Englishness as propagated by UKIP, strengthening the image of the party and the Leave campaign as the righteous protectors of the nation-state.

While UKIP supporters in Doncaster primarily expressed concern over the impact of migration on culture and economy, the party leadership translated these grievances into an irrational politics of fear dehumanizing migrants. Xenophobic fear tactics associating migrants with crime were exploited to morally justify their exclusion from national territory.

The inflammatory campaign resonated with British citizens. On Thursday, 23 June 2016, a majority of Britons voted for Brexit, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, with large protest votes not only from the disenfranchised, older, less educated working-class (Goodwin and Heath 2016), but also from affluent



The people's voice. Nigel Farage, leader of UKIP in 2006-09 and 2010-2016, speaking at the party conference in 2009.
Photo: Euro Realist Newsletter (flickr)

southerners. Still, at the Leave celebrations, Farage communicated to the core of his voters, declaring "a new dawn and victory for the ordinary people". A similar message was conveyed by president elect Donald Trump in a tweet the day after the US presidential election: "The forgotten man and women will never be forgotten again."

UKIP post-Brexit. The rise of UKIP under Farage's leadership shows how the party

managed to position itself as the party of the working class, increasingly alienated from the establishment by offering a nationalist solution. Now that the Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May is committed to Brexit and has highlighted the importance of creating opportunities for those who feel left behind, it is far from clear whether UKIP's future leadership will be able to spark the same sense of purpose that gave the party its previous momentum.

A period of UKIP leadership uncertainty – the newly elected leader Diane James quit after just 18 days – creates a window of opportunity for Tories and Labour to reconnect with supporters. However, unless Labour manages to curb their cultural distance from working-class communities, there is still a political vacuum that can be filled by UKIP. The grievances that enabled Farages's strong anti-immigration message – a sense of cultural dislocation, feelings of relative economic deprivation and resistance to progressive value change – are likely to persist. If Labour fails to seize the opportunity post-Brexit represents to reconnect with the more value-conservative, less-educated working-class electorate, surely the populist right will continue to do so.

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Brexit and immigration: the problem of the free movement of persons principle

By Henry Allen

Immigration has been a controversial political topic in the UK for many years. However, it was the 2004 EU enlargement, and particularly the British experience of free movement of people, which has underpinned the increasingly toxic debate around migration in the UK. Crucially, it was *the* issue for many who voted to leave the EU in the referendum.



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Those who voted leave did so for a variety of different reasons that brought together principle and practical grievances. However, while those who voted to leave the EU were by no means a homogenous group, the one issue that did garner broad support from across the Leave spectrum was immigration. This was linked to the general issue of control that the Leave campaign focused on so successfully, especially in respect of borders. However, for many it was also a lightning-rod issue for a range of grievances regarding their prospects and how politicians were (failing to) address them.

This article briefly sketches out how the post-2004 changes, particularly around immigration, had such an effect on the ultimate vote to leave, and how the free of movement people principle will continue to overshadow how the UK eventually exits the EU.

First, the lived experience of many highlighted the explicit concerns towards the effects of immigration in particular areas. The figures for immigration (see fig.1 from the UK Office of National Statistics) show a significant, and continued, increase post-2004. The vote to leave the EU (see fig.2) correlated both with areas that saw the largest increase in immigration and votes

for UKIP in the 2014 European elections (Becker & Fetzer, 2016), highlighting how important an issue this had become for many. The example of Boston in Lincolnshire is illustrative. Here, people talked of the changing face of their town, and how up to 62% of pupils in some schools came from Eastern European backgrounds. For some, it had become too much to bear. The sense of pressure on public services coupled with a depression of wages at the lower end of the income spectrum disadvantaged a section of the population (Becker & Fetzer, 2016), who already felt marginalised by urban and educated elites (Kaufman, 2016) and particularly a political class that was not listening. This resulted in a 75.6% vote to leave in this area. Such examples fed a broader national narrative of immigration being 'out of control' in some newspapers, which in turn was emphasised by UKIP and the Leave campaign.

Secondly, although a large section of the population cared deeply about immigration, obviously not all did. Therefore, the issue of 'control', which the Leave campaign strategically focused on as the core theme linking all the anxieties voters had about the EU, was focused primarily on *control of UK borders* and a general antipathy to the free movement of people principle. Thus, while more explicit concerns around immigration and how it was experienced on the ground were acknowledged, the emphasis was on more on the principle state sovereignty as expressed through border control. This was one way in which the Leave campaign widened their

appeal both across the Conservative spectrum, but also from the low-skilled and less well-educated blue-collar Labour supporters (Goodwin & Heath, 2016).

The statistics in fig. 1 show why it is easy frame immigration as being 'out of control'. Net migration (the number of people emigrating taken away from those immigrating) rose significantly post-1997, continued post the 2004 enlargement up to the present day, with figures increasing year on year.





Fig. 1: Long-Term International Migration, UK, 1970 to 2014 (annual totals).
Source: Office for National Statistics.

To date, 1.8 million people have migrated to the UK from the new (post-2004) EU member states (Vargas-Silva, 2016), generally taking up jobs at the lower end of the income spectrum and in largely lower-skilled areas (Becker & Fetzer, 2016), like the agricultural communities around places like Boston, Lincolnshire.



UKIP vote shares (in percent) across local authority areas in the 2014 European Parliament elections plotted against the Leave shares in the 2016 EU referendum. Source: Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2016).

in power who seemed neither to recognize their difficulties, nor be willing to seriously engage with the issue. This divide is illustrated by research that shows that in 401 out of 632 Parliamentary constituencies the majority of people voted to Leave (Hanretty, 2016), where 479 of 650 (inc. Northern Ireland) MPs declared a vote for

Moreover, those who felt most acutely affected were also often least able to deal with some of the consequences of immigration such as job scarcity, and pressure on wages, local services and housing, etc. The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of austerity in 2010, putting even further pressure on resources. As a consequence, it is easy to see why immigration (and the free of movement of people principle) quickly gained such traction and resulted in UKIP, which had campaigned vigorously on this issue for years, ending up winning the 2014 European elections nationally, the first time a "minor" political party had done so. Furthermore, as Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2016) have shown, support for UKIP in those elections and the subsequent vote to leave the EU are 'tightly linked'.

These developments have occurred under a generally more liberal government approach to immigration over the past 20 years under both Labour and the Conservatives. The general tenet has been that immigration benefits the economy and the UK as a whole. However, the success of UKIP which has focused on peoples' difficulty in dealing with the changes wrought by increased immigration, has forced both main parties to reconsider the issue. Thus, the Conservative election manifestos in both 2010 and in 2015 pledged to reduce net migration levels to the "tens of thousands". However, the numerous debates around proposed caps on immigration prior to the referendum all highlighted the difficulty of enacting such measures due to the free of movement of people principle. The seeming inability to regulate migration in any meaningful way further undermined trust in government and the main political parties, not to mention the EU. Thus, the Leave campaign was able to focus on and exploit fears over the apparent "lack of control". In doing so, they highlighted the divide between those who were directly affected by acute immigration, and those

Remain prior to the referendum (BBC).

On the Remain side, while the majority accept that the UK will leave the EU, many continue to fight hard to ensure the UK remains in the single market – the so-called 'soft Brexit'. Some, including a number of MPs, have called for a second referendum, while the recent High Court ruling preventing the government from triggering Article 50 without parliamentary scrutiny is being interpreted by people on both sides as a way to obstruct a "hard Brexit" and maintain single market membership. The greatest challenge, though, is that this would necessitate the continuation of freedom of movement. A divide is therefore opening up between those who wish to maintain the economic relationship with the EU through the single market, and those for whom control of immigration, and the symbolically important borders, was fundamental to their choice for Brexit.

Freedom of movement will therefore remain central to domestic debates on Brexit and is likely to become a pivot point for the forthcoming negotiations once Article 50 is triggered. Indeed, it could become the determining factor behind public acceptance of the eventual deal.

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How (not) to counter populist anti-immigration narratives: the story of the EU referendum campaign

By John Todd

During the frenetic weeks of the EU referendum campaign, if the "issue of the day" was the economy, then commentators regarded it as a good day for the Remain campaign. However, if the focus was on immigration, then it was widely acknowledged that Leave campaigners were the beneficiaries. Of course, the results demonstrate that the Leave campaign had more good days than Remain. Those campaigning for Brexit managed to "cut through" with their arguments focusing on immigration and "taking back control" in a way that Remain and their arguments on the economic benefits of EU membership failed to match.



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Those campaigning for Brexit successfully linked immigration—and by extension EU membership—to crime, to low wages, to lack of housing and to a creaking NHS. The lack of successful counter-narrative was striking. Of course, the challenge of responding to anti-immigration rhetoric goes beyond the referendum campaign both temporally (it did not suddenly rear its head in the weeks before 23 June 2016) and geographically (countries across Europe are facing similar issues from populist-nationalist political movements, and of course Donald Trump has now reached the White House on a wave of xenophobic America-first rhetoric). This article though will explore why no convincing alternative to this anti-immigration rhetoric was put forward during the EU referendum campaign – and what such a narrative might have looked like.

One common argument as to why the issue is so challenging to address constructively is that the benefits of immigration are accrued regionally and nationally, but the challenges are experienced locally. This analysis posits that whilst migrants are net contributors to the UK exchequer (being on average young, healthy and economically active), these financial benefits are most tangibly felt in a close reading of the government accounts. On the other hand, the challenges of an influx of new people to a local community are directly experienced in that community. Now, if we look at the areas that voted most strongly in favour of leave, these areas have *not* received high numbers of migrants in recent years. London, for example, is a destination for large numbers of migrants but voted clearly in favour of remaining in the EU. That

being said, as Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath have recently observed, areas that experienced relatively high levels of EU migration in recent years were somewhat more likely to vote Leave.

So it appears that the direct experience of migration was only part, and in all likelihood only a small part, of what inhibited "cut through" of a compelling pro-EU, pro-immigration narrative. One crucial inhibiting factor was that David Cameron had the role of ultimately doomed figurehead of the Remain campaign. This meant the campaign carried with it his soft, qualified Euroscepticism and his track record of attempting tough-on-immigration rhetoric whilst in office as Prime Minister. That this rhetoric was accompanied by continued high levels of immigration was, from the perspective of the Remain campaign, the worst of both possible worlds. These attempts to crack down on immigration tacitly acknowledged that, as far as Cameron was concerned, UKIP and the Eurosceptic right of the Conservative Party had a point. This undermined any attempts from the Prime Minister to address credibly the issue of immigration during the referendum campaign. The Labour Party's struggles with finding their own coherent approach to immigration combined with Jeremy Corbyn's lukewarm campaigning did not help the Remain campaign here.

It is also important to acknowledge that the populist, anti-immigration rhetoric employed by the Leave campaign worked. There existed (and exist) deeply felt grievances in communities across the UK. Grievances including lack

"Those campaigning for Brexit successfully linked immigration—and by extension EU membership—to crime, to low wages, to lack of housing and to a creaking NHS. The lack of successful counter-narrative was striking."

of good quality jobs, stagnating wage levels, lack of housing and pressure on the NHS. Those holding these grievances feel with some justification that the main political parties in the UK neither listen to nor deliver for them. The Leave campaign, aided and abetted by much of the print media, successfully harnessed these grievances

and directed them towards outsiders in the form of immigrants and a sovereignty-consuming EU. The Leave mantra of "take back control" (including, they claimed, of immigration) chimed with frustrated voters across England and Wales. It is though in these very grievances that we can uncover the potential for an alternate narrative.

There is the potential for a convincing (and I would say better-founded) narrative that these grievances are the result of a ratchet-effect of two crises: a productivity crisis and a public investment crisis. We could also label them respectively as private and public austerity, with the crises being played out in the context of globalisation and the slow, grinding recovery from the financial crisis. With regard to productivity, the amount of output for each hour worked in the UK is significantly lower when compared to both the rest of the G7 and the UK's European neighbours.

This is in large part down to short-termism and an accompanying lack of investment in training and new technology. An alternative narrative would argue here that improving such investment is both sensible for the long-term health of the UK economy and good for workers, in that such investment creates better paid, more secure jobs (it should be in the interests of business to retain well-trained, productive employees). This focus on productivity is also commensurate with retaining an open economy, in that if the focus shifts from employing the cheapest workers towards employing the best, accusations of social dumping begin to fall away. At the very least it would help shift some of the focus away from blaming migrant workers and place more responsibility on private sector employers that take on low-paid workers on short-term contracts instead of well-trained and productive employees with job security. There were some limited attempts to put forward this view during the campaign, but all too little to have any significant effect.

An alternative narrative would also have had to tackle the lack of investment in housing and public services – another major source of grievance. The Leave campaign did well from plastering a false implication about £350m extra per

week for the NHS on the side of a bus, so it would appear that referendum voters did have concerns about levels of investment in public services. An alternative narrative on immigration would therefore have needed to address this investment, ideally with a well thought through plan on how to ensure the state could become more responsive in areas experiencing high levels of immigration. This would not have been straightforward given how successfully the Conservatives (and, during the days of coalition, the Liberal Democrats) drove home the austerity narrative. In addition, Labour has yet to develop and communicate an alternative that chimes with the electorate. But an alternative vision for an open and flexible labour market must be part of an overarching narrative that addresses the grievances that populism seeks to harness.

It is worth noting that, even if a perfectly formed narrative that sought to address immigration and tackle these twin crises had been convincingly put forward by Remain campaigners, it would still in all likelihood have been too little, too late. As mentioned near the start of this piece, the official Leave campaign was able to stand on the shoulders of xenophobes, including elements of the right-wing press and Nigel Farage (the “Breaking Point” poster being a nadir here). Their constant othering of immigrants and their linking of immigration to EU membership, gave Remain campaigners a mountain to climb in shifting how the issue was addressed.

There is also here an indictment of those who have over time been in favour of EU membership, in that they failed to both create enthusiasm for EU membership and failed to address immigration and its benefits and challenges in a constructive and coherent manner. This is a challenge that becomes ever more acute as the wave of populism

builds in strength on both sides of the Atlantic. Reclaiming an ability to speak with and for “the people”—and indeed reclaiming the power of definition over who “the people” are—is essential for all parties outside the populist-nationalist right. Our democratic institutions are at risk of being hollowed out by these populist movements and finding a convincing counter-narrative to their othering of those not part of who they deem to be “the people” is essential.



London, 7 June 2016. Vote Leave poster setting the stage for the ITV EU Referendum debate. Photograph: David Holt

Schizophrenia under the Straits of Dover

By Asher Boersma

The English Wikipedia entry on the Channel Tunnel is an impressive piece of collaborative writing. Ordinarily the collaborative aspects stay hidden. In the interface of Wikipedia, in the top left corner, just right of the logo there are an "Article" and a "Talk" tab. The former shows us a 12.000 words article, which is at the limit of what Wikipedians consider readable given the average concentration span: between 30 and 40 minutes, which also happens to be about the length of the Channel Tunnel train journey from terminal to terminal (when using the car-train service). Now that the UK has chosen to leave the EU, it is interesting to look at which ties will remain. I want to argue that it is productive to try and think in infrastructures. The Channel Tunnel is a prominent one and its Wikipedia entry is a surprisingly helpful starting point.



Asher Boersma is a PhD researcher on the DFG research training group 'Locating Media', at Siegen University. His research looks at technologically mediated work (ethnographically) and its representations (media archeologically). It focuses on the advent of infrastructure control rooms and how they have developed from manned stations towards more algorithmic autonomy, from the 1950s to today.

The webpage gives a remarkable amount of attention to the two centuries *before* construction of the current tunnel commenced in 1988. The tunnel was imagined - mainly through construction plans but also in a science fiction movie in 1935 - long before it was built. In academic writing (particularly in media archaeology) this awareness is commonplace, but for the public it normally fades as soon as new futures are imagined. When switching to the 'talk page' of the Wikipedia article, one sees that its construction is ongoing and at times is fiercely debated. Although the article tells us the tunnel was constructed between 1988 and 1994, these infrastructures are, like its Wikipedia entry, a work in progress, never finished, always needing care, amending and reconstruction. Infrastructure is not something that is made, solidified, and then used. Rather it is something you have to do, day in, day out. Bowker and Starr (2006) have made it into a verb: to infrastructure.

Why then do we commonly think about infrastructure as finished, permanent, fixed? The classic answer, again by Bowker and Starr, is that aided by standardisation processes infrastructure is hidden, only becoming visible to the public when broken. The Channel Tunnel has been 'broken' plenty of times in various ways, which highlights the various layers of infrastructure that converge there

below the Straits of Dover (in my Dutch primary school I actually learned it was the Straits of Calais).

There have been at least six fires, the most severe in 1996. Trains have broken down, trapping passengers in the tunnel for hours. Protesters - from farmers to ferrymen - have blocked the entrance to the tunnel repeatedly. Financially the tunnel's billions of euros of debt and initially low revenue have made headlines. Above all, and contrary to fears beforehand, the presence of refugees wanting to reach the UK, have highlighted something that should have been invisible, residing in the background.

During the centuries where the Tunnel was just an imagined one, the concerns were primarily military: an army could invade the British mainland by surprise, circumventing its powerful navy. A proposal in 1929 sought to tackle this by providing both countries with a sump to flood the tunnel at will. Now that the tunnel exists, an "invasion" of a different kind is feared, as the Leave campaign and post-Brexit violence has shown.

If there is one way in which European policy has failed over the past decade, highlighting the EU as a broken infrastructure, it has been the failure to collectively and consensually solve the major issues, manifested poignantly in the financial and refugee crises. ("Crisis" could imply an urgency, a boiling point, but given the length of Europe's woes, and the indecisiveness with which they are met, they have become every day, not exceptional.) The lacklustre defence of the European project by its frontmen of the European Commission in the wake of these crises, demonstrate that those who are essentially bureaucrats would rather reside in the background, be what infrastructure is popularly considered to be: permanent, technical, neutral, invisible, and legitimate. Instead problems are made local. In the case of refugees, it is Lesbos' problem, Lampedusa's problem, Calais' problem. When the problem escalates, it becomes the problem of the state. When in the summer of 2015 Merkel said "*wir schaffen das*", accepting scores of refugees, the "we" was German, not European. Merkel bypassed the official EU policy that a refugee has to apply for asylum in the EU country of arrival, when presented by the bypass the refugees had found, the so-called Balkan route. Long before, in 2011 Greece had been officially suspended of this duty of asylum application following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, as it could no longer safeguard the basic human rights of the refugees.

The threat that France would no longer feel compelled to keep refugees in Calais if the UK would leave the EU, as reported during the debates leading up to the referendum, was *first* a local threat made repeatedly by the president of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie region, Xavier Bertrand. He pressured the French government and even wrote to Cameron. Only later the French national economy minister said a Brexit would threaten bilateral agreements. A Cameron spokesperson suggested Kent could be the new Calais.

Ordinarily, on the French side, transport through the Tunnel is hindered when refugees try to hide on trucks and trains, and comes to a standstill when this goes horribly wrong. Then the high tech efficiency of a 35 minute journey, as promised by Eurotunnel the company that manages and operates the tunnel, evaporates. The schizophrenia of the Channel Tunnel is that it is simultaneously a high speed connection and an impenetrable border.

Geographically, the Channel Tunnel shows that Britain is no longer an island, as it has a land border with France in the Tunnel. To prevent people from entering their territory, France and the UK agreed to do immigration checks on opposing sides of the Channel Tunnel. For the Eurostar, the high-speed train that runs between London and Brussels and Paris, checks are done upon entering the train, or at the Lille station, which takes 30 minutes or so. When Tunnel services are blocked, Kent Police turns the M20 into an enormous lorry park, sometimes for days on end, a tactic it has had to resort to ever more frequently. Right now it looks as though over half a century of European efforts to make borders invisible has stalled. The ideal of seamless travel and transport of goods, of which the Channel Tunnel was heralded by the EU as a primary example, has crashed.

Refugees encounter infrastructures built especially for them, against them. Co-funded by the UK, infrastructures of ever higher razor-wire fences and ever more fenced objects (like parking places), heavily armed riot police, and networks of CCTV cameras that are operational around the clock. Even if refugees do make it to the other side, getting out of their hiding places, for instance when trucks are disembarking from the train, can be lethal. Official numbers for those who make it alive to the other side are deliberately not made public. Instead they become visible through the burden on other

infrastructures, such as in 2015 when a Kent council leader said that 600 underage asylum seekers put an “enormous strain” on its social services department.

Not only are crossings, or attempted crossings, potentially deadly for refugees, but also merely approaching the Tunnel terrain can be life threatening. In particular they have to cross highways where there is no pedestrian infrastructure (although they make their own paths, straight through farmland if necessary). Many drivers are afraid to stop in and around the Calais roads, resulting in person-vehicle collisions. In 2015 French train drivers wrote “we are afraid (...) to start, afraid to finish, afraid to drive, afraid to hit, to crush, to electrocute, to reduce to a pulp a wretched, disinherited, ill-fated, damned of the Earth”. So not only for those who we infrastructure against, but also for those dedicated to infrastructuring our mobility live becomes unbearable. We would rather keep infrastructure black boxed: trusting that it works, not knowing how.

Reading the Wikipedia article on the Channel Tunnel much of the ugly details remain hidden. Perhaps it tries to keep away from controversy. As Nathaniel Tkacz has argued, the truth claim of Wikipedia pertains not so much to the knowledge in the articles, but to the idea that there is a neutral point of view. All claims have to be made by other sources.

The Channel Tunnel’s Wikipedia page manages to hide discontent behind a tab, available for everyone, accessed only by a handful. According to alexa.com, a web data company owned by Amazon, Wikipedia is the sixth most visited website in the world. In contrast, the encyclopaedia has, for all its participatory promises, roughly 10.000 very active editors, predominantly white middle-aged men. Likewise, the Channel Tunnel is infrastructured by only a fraction of those who use it, 20 million in 2015. The construction-consumption ratio is an expert-laymen contrast, it is a contrast between those who use an infrastructure for their convenience and those who get their hands dirty. For infrastructures to function as primarily intended, they need to remain black boxed, preferably keeping their moral dilemmas hidden too.

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“The schizophrenia of the Channel Tunnel is that it is simultaneously a high speed connection and an impenetrable border.”

Immigration to Britain: the fabric of the nation

By Gavin Schaffer

In popular history, heritage, and educational material, immigration to Britain is frequently constructed as a twentieth-century phenomenon. Focusing invariably on the arrival from Jamaica of the *Empire Windrush* ship in 1948, popular narratives present post-war migration from Asia and the Caribbean as if, previous to this, Britain was a white and mono-cultural place. This approach, however, silences a much longer and more diverse history of immigration, which has contributed to every aspect of Britain as we know it today.



Gavin Schaffer is a Professor of British History at the University of Birmingham. He specialises in race and immigration history, with a particular interest in racial science, race and the media and the history of racial violence, and is currently working on a history of British multiculturalism.

The foregrounding of the *Windrush* obscures two important features of immigration to Britain; firstly, that the majority of immigrants have been White and, secondly, that Black presence in Britain is not post-war, but rooted in hundreds of years of history. Dealing with the latter point at the outset of his still unrivalled history of Black lives in Britain, Peter Fryer explained, "There were Africans in Britain before the English came here". Fryer was referring to African troops in the invading Roman army, labelling the English as Anglo-Saxons, who, of course, came much later. This argument is politically crucial, since it challenges the construction of Black Britons as outsiders. Yet it also (by labelling the English themselves as migrants) highlights the complex trajectories of migration and identity in Britain.

In the past two centuries the majority of migrants to Britain have been white, and most of them came from Ireland. Particularly as a result of the Irish Famine (1845-50), hundreds of thousands of migrants moved to Britain, significantly altering the makeup of many British communities (by the end of the famine nearly quarter of Liverpool's residents were Irish born). This migration, of course, had long roots and was not unidirectional. Throughout history, but especially over the last two centuries, millions of people moved between Ireland and Britain. In 2001, the BBC reported that a quarter of all Britons claimed to have some Irish roots.

Other white migrants have made similarly substantial contributions to British society. European Jews

(fleeing persecution in Russia and later from Nazi Germany), and migrant workers invited from Europe after the Second World War, shaped the makeup of British multiculturalism. Of course, the contribution made by Black and Asian migrants to Britain was no less substantial, but it is important to emphasise that migration history is not well understood in simple terms of white indigenous communities and black newcomers. In reality, black and white people have moved to and from Britain for hundreds of years, reflecting the impact of colonialism as well as broader trends in international migration in the modern world.


While most migrants have come seeking better lives for themselves and their families, the idea of Britain as a refuge for the persecuted is treasured within the national imagination. Britain, politicians frequently attest, is proud to have provided a home for persecuted minorities: Huguenots, Jews, Belgians during the First World War, Cold War refugees from Communism, and Ugandan Asians (among others). This popular self-image, however, masks a less generous reality. While Britain has indeed provided refuge for some, a persistent concern about the political, social and cultural dangers of allowing refugees into Britain has led to the introduction of significant restrictions.

"In the past two centuries the majority of migrants to Britain have been white, and most of them came from Ireland."

Here, the refugees from Nazism offer a case in point. Britain afforded protection to approximately 80,000 European Jews (including the high-profile *Kindertransport*), yet it refused entry to a far greater number, ostensibly fearing a rise in domestic

anti-Semitism. Similarly, in the post-war period, Britain severely limited entry to refugees, even to those who had a claim to British nationality (such as Kenyan Asians and residents of Hong Kong). Repeatedly, various British governments have asserted the need to limit numbers in order to prevent an increase in British racism. In this mode of thinking, as historians such as Colin Holmes and Tony Kushner have emphasised, the idea of British tolerance has been tested and found wanting (Kushner pointing out that refugees are accepted and valued by Britain mainly in the past tense).

Overall, the policy of Britain towards migrants in the twentieth century has been characterised by restriction. Following the Aliens Act of 1905, numerous pieces of legislation have limited the entry of migrants, in laws that have become increasingly draconian.



HMT Empire Windrush, originally a German passenger liner, acquired by Britain at the end of the Second World War. She is best remembered today for bringing one of the first large groups of post-war West Indian migrants to Britain, arriving at Tilbury with 492 passengers from Jamaica on 22 June 1948. The Windrush generation refers more broadly to British Caribbean immigrants arriving in the post-war years.

Perhaps the most significant of these measures has been the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, creating as it did barriers to entry for people from the British Empire/Commonwealth. Reflecting the nation's imperial demise, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act began to unpick the idea of a global community of Britons – where all subjects of the British monarch were essentially seen as British - prioritising instead a more introspective notion of "belonging" (James Hampshire).

Yet while the 1960s witnessed two restrictive Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, Harold Wilson's government also enacted Britain's first Race Relations legislation in 1965, a measure which indicates that British governmental responses to migration were not solely rooted in a desire for restriction. The Race Relations Act 1965 outlawed discrimination in public places and criminalised the incitement of racial hatred. Although it took further Acts to give this law real teeth (the Race Relations Acts of 1968 and 1976), it is nonetheless significant that the British government saw the importance of protecting its diverse population from racist discrimination and attack. In this context, Shamit Saggar has presented post-war immigration policy as having a "dualism" at its heart, a combination of restriction and measures to prevent racism.

"Anti-immigration and racism does not, however, characterise the national atmosphere... Racism has sat alongside a developing multiculturalism in Britain for hundreds of years."

Events in recent years have gone some way to bring the matter of British racism to a head, ensuring that discussion has never been far from the centre of political life. The handling of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993 led to a public inquiry chaired by William McPherson, which concluded that the Metropolitan Police was institutionally racist. This outcome, alongside the failure to secure convictions for Lawrence's murder (until 2012) highlighted the ongoing challenges facing Britain's Black communities and the continuing potency of racial discrimination at all levels. In the aftermath of 9/11 (and the 7/7 attack in London) an increasing climate of Islamophobia has taken hold, reflecting disquiet in some quarters about immigration and multiculturalism more broadly. Stirred up by a tabloid press, much of which has consistently railed against immigration, Britain seems increasingly inward looking and apprehensive about its ethnic diversity, anxieties which, no-doubt, fed the vote for Brexit.

Anti-immigration and racism does not, however, characterise the national atmosphere. As scholars such as Panikos Panayi have pointed out, racism has sat alongside a developing multiculturalism in Britain for hundreds of years. Day-to-day, millions of Britons live "convivially", as Gilroy put it, in what are very much global, cosmopolitan communities. Ultimately, immigration is woven into the core of Britishness, and will continue to enrich and shape its character, even as racial discrimination and prejudice remain an everyday problem for many Britons.

Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2016

By Amber Rudd MP

Amber Rudd was appointed Home Secretary in Theresa May's incoming government on 13 July 2016. She was Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change from 2015 to 2016. First elected to Parliament in 2010, Ms Rudd represents the constituency of Hastings and Rye.



The Home Secretary's speech to the annual Conference in Birmingham on 4 October was widely reported, providing a framework of policies and ideas for the Home Secretary's brief in the wake of the referendum.

I succeed one of the most successful Home Secretaries of modern times. You may define success as holding the post for longer than any prior Conservative incumbent since World War Two. You may judge it by introducing the Modern Slavery Act ... Which has delivered tough new penalties to put slave masters behind bars. Or, you may judge it by the eventual, hard-won deportation of Abu Qatada – and the message that sent.

Well, Theresa May is now Prime Minister, and I am honoured to be Home Secretary in her Conservative-only Government.

It's no secret that earlier this year I campaigned on behalf of the Remain side in the EU Referendum. I travelled the country setting out my views and reasons. I sparred with the Foreign Secretary live on television ... Now he keeps offering me lifts in his car.

But it comes down to the fact that the British people made their wishes very clear, and I absolutely accept the result. Our country does this very well. We debate. We argue. We can disagree. But as a proud, democratic country we know that the result is binding - and that we must respect the will of the people.

So this is my undertaking to you today ... that as we leave the European Union, my Department will play its part in fighting for, and securing, the best possible outcome for our country.

When Theresa May spoke for the first time as Prime Minister, she outlined her desire to tackle the persistent injustices of poverty ... the persistent inequalities based on race ... and lingering class division. It is why this Government is determined to build a society that works for everyone. It is why with Theresa May as our Prime Minister, we will drive through ambitious social reforms.

Social reforms that will deliver equality of opportunity. Reforms that define the Conservative principle that the things that matter the most are the talent you have. And how hard you are prepared to work.

For me, as Home Secretary, building a society that works for everyone means that we must help those right at the very bottom. (...)

VULNERABILITY

Conference, I want to talk about vulnerable people and how we, as a society, look after them.

I have met victims of domestic violence. I have met victims and survivors of child sexual abuse. And I have met victims of modern slavery. I know that they carry scars you can see and the ones you can't.

I feel very strongly that, as we work to deliver a Britain that works for everyone, it is our duty to help the less fortunate. This means that we have to discuss issues that make us feel uncomfortable.

Domestic abuse is still a huge problem ... It can mean that home isn't a place of safety and comfort.

There is some progress ... the volume of prosecutions and convictions for domestic violence are at their highest ever levels – that means more victims are seeing justice than ever before.

(..)

But many women, and men too, still live in fear of their partners ... Many women and girls still find themselves in circumstances where they don't think they can say no. What should be a very clear line, so often isn't, and there is absolutely no excuse.

We, and the police, have more work to do. It is as much about being clear what behaviours are acceptable, as it is about investigation and prosecution.

(..)

As a country, we have led the global effort in responding to the online threat of child sexual exploitation. Our methods must never stop evolving, if we are to keep fighting it effectively. Where technology is concerned, what worked for us yesterday, will rarely work for us tomorrow. We must protect all those who are vulnerable, and protect them from every kind of abuse.

I am not interested in people using cultural differences as an excuse, telling us that so-called honour based violence is something not to be interfered with.

(..)

But our compassion does not stop at the border. There are vulnerable, unaccompanied children in Calais at risk of people trafficking and abuse. Where those children have a relative in the UK, or it is in their best interests to come to the UK, we are doing all we can to bring them over here.

Conference, We can only stand up and look at ourselves with true self-respect, if we are doing our best for those less fortunate ... For those that have fallen on hard times ... For those who have no one else to stand up for them. We will not leave them to suffer behind closed doors.

EU / IMMIGRATION

Now, the British people sent a clear message in the referendum.

There can be no question that recent levels of immigration motivated a large part of the vote. But concerns about immigration did not just spring up out of nowhere.

Twenty years ago levels of immigration weren't really an issue in British politics. As net migration has risen, that has changed. I've seen why as a Member of Parliament for Hastings and Rye.

Hastings is a seaside town that has experienced relatively high levels of migration over the past two decades. That's led to legitimate concerns around the pressures put on housing, public services and wages. The Prime Minister recognised this, and took action to reduce net migration in the areas she could when she was in my position. And now as Home Secretary it is my responsibility to do the same, and to make sure people's concerns are addressed.

As you know, the Conservative Party was elected on a Manifesto commitment to reduce net migration to sustainable levels. This means tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands. And my commitment to you today is that I'll be working with colleagues across Government to deliver this.

But I am also here to level with you Conference... This will not happen overnight. Leaving the EU is just one part of the strategy. We have to look at all sources of immigration if we mean business.

Now, a lot has improved since 2010. From annual net migration under Labour rocketing almost five-fold. The Conservative-led coalition stopped 875 bogus colleges bringing in overseas students, tackled abuse of student visas, and reformed the family system. And I would like to recognise my predecessor's action in driving these changes through. Since then she has been freed from the shackles of the Coalition.

Without Nick Clegg and Vince Cable there to hold her

back she, passed new Conservative legislation to make sure that immigrants heading to these shores are going to make a positive contribution.

My job is to press on with implementing this legislation. So today, I am announcing that from December, landlords that knowingly rent out property to people who have no right to be here will be committing a criminal offence. They could go to prison.

Furthermore, from December, immigration checks will be a mandatory requirement for those wanting to get a licence to drive a taxi. And from next autumn, banks will have to do regular checks to ensure they are not providing essential banking services to illegal migrants. Money drives behaviour, and cutting off its supply will have an impact.

However, the difference between those arriving and those leaving is still too substantial. I believe immigration has brought many benefits to the nation. It has enhanced our economy, our society and our culture. This is why I want to reduce net migration while continuing to ensure we attract the brightest and the best.

Because it's only by reducing the numbers back down to sustainable levels that we can change the tide of public opinion ... so once again immigration is something we can all welcome.

So, I can announce today, we will shortly be consulting on the next steps needed to control immigration. We

"We still need to do more ... so all British people get the opportunities they need to get on in life. The test should ensure people coming here are filling gaps in the labour market, not taking jobs British people could do."

will be looking across work and study routes. This will include examining whether we should tighten the test companies have to take before recruiting from abroad. British businesses have driven the economic recovery in this country, with employment at record levels.

However we still need to do more ... so all British people get the opportunities they need to get on in life. The test should

ensure people coming here are filling gaps in the labour market, not taking jobs British people could do.

But it's become a tick box exercise, allowing some firms to get away with not training local people. We won't win in the world if we don't do more to upskill our own workforce.

It's not fair on companies doing the right thing. So I want us to look again at whether our immigration system provides the right incentives for businesses to invest in British workers.

We will also look for the first time at whether our student immigration rules should be tailored to the quality of the course and the quality of the educational institution.

I'm proud that we have world-leading centres of academic excellence. It's a testament to our country's proud history and our top universities' ability to evolve. But the current system allows all students, irrespective of their talents and the university's quality, favourable employment prospects when they stop studying.

While an international student is studying here, their family members can do any form of work. And foreign students, even those studying English Language degrees, don't even have to be proficient in speaking English. We need to look at whether this one size fits all approach really is right for the hundreds of different universities, providing thousands of different courses across the country.

And we need to look at whether this generous offer for all universities is really adding value to our economy. I'm passionately committed to making sure our world-leading institutions can attract the brightest and the best. But a student immigration system that treats every student and university as equal only punishes those we should want to help.

So our consultation will ask what more can we do to support our best universities - and those that stick to the rules - to attract the best talent ... while looking at tougher rules for students on lower quality courses.

This isn't about pulling up the drawbridge. It's about making sure students that come here, come to study. We're consulting because we want to work with businesses and universities to get this next stage of our reforms right.

But I also come here today with a warning to those that simply oppose any steps to reduce net migration: this Government will not waver in its commitment to put the interests of the British people first. Reducing net migration back down to sustainable levels will not be easy. But I am committed to delivering it on behalf of the British people.

So work with us, not against us, and we'll better control immigration and protect our economy. Systems evolve. We have to adapt. Our consultation will do that.

While we are still members of the EU, there are things we can get on with immediately. And there are things which the EU is currently considering which we can support, particularly those measures

to tackle crime and terrorism.

Many of them were our ideas in the first place. So we are going to overhaul our legislation to make it easier to deport criminals and those who abuse our laws.

By setting out in legislation what is in the fundamental interests of the UK, we will make it easier to deport EU criminals, aligning their fortunes more closely with those from outside the EU. And going one step further, for the first time, we will deport EU nationals that repeatedly commit so-called minor crimes in this country.

So-called minor crime is still crime - its pain is still felt deeply by victims. Well, those criminals will face being banned from coming back to the country from between 5 and 10 years. That delivers on a very clear manifesto pledge.

And today I can tell you that I will deliver on another one. Conference - you might have heard that Jeremy Corbyn wants the Government to bring back a migration fund Gordon Brown introduced after Labour let immigration spiral out of control. Jeremy Corbyn seems to think it's a substitute for taking action to reduce immigration.

Well if there's one thing we don't need, it's policy advice from the man who almost bankrupted Britain ... and the man that wants to do it all over again. Labour's fund was ineffective and focused funding on migrants rather than the pressures caused by migration. Money was spent on translation services, rather than English lessons. Councils were given money to promote recycling, rather than the support they needed to ease housing pressures.

So instead we will deliver on our manifesto commitment and set up a new £140m Controlling Migration Fund - designed specifically to ease the pressures on public services in areas of high migration.

And at the same time it will implement strategies to reduce illegal immigration. The fund will build on work we have done to support local authorities ... to stop giving housing benefit to people that have no right to be in the country ... to reduce rough sleeping by illegal immigrants ... and to crack down on the rogue landlords who house illegal migrants in the most appalling conditions.

And for those that are here legally, we will provide more English language support. And with it, the obvious benefits of being able to join the way of life in the country they have chosen to call home.

So Conference today I am setting out how we will get immigration under control. In the long term, by reducing the numbers that come from Europe. In the mid-term, by reforming the student and work route of entry. And, in the short term, taking action to help communities affected by high levels of immigration, and stopping people coming here that threaten our security.

As your Home Secretary, my primary concern is protecting our way of life, and delivering the security measures we require to ensure this. In a fast-moving world, we need to move in concert with new technologies and the threats they can pose, adapting our responses rapidly. I want people who seek to damage our way of life to know that we are tireless in supporting the police, and the security and intelligence services that keep us safe. The people who do these jobs work long hours, in challenging conditions, often with little praise or thanks, frequently at risk to themselves... and for all our benefit. This is the definition of public service. A service that we should all be extremely grateful for.

SECURITY

The intelligence briefings I read on a daily basis tell me how dangerous the threat from Daesh really is. Our security services have prevented the kind of awful attacks we are seeing too often on the world stage.

My first statement in Parliament as Home Secretary followed the attack on Nice. A crude and primitive act, where innocent people were murdered by a radicalised individual. Lives ruined. Families broken. France forever scarred.

It could have been any of us at a different time in a different place. The one clear lesson from this is that international co-operation and intelligence sharing must continue, and continue to improve. My counterparts in other countries and I have spoken about this.

We have strong co-operation with our European partners. And we are in agreement that there cannot be any let up in pursuit of those people trying to ruin our way of life – or the freedom that defines our society.

I spoke earlier about evolving threats, and later this year I will be publishing the next phase of our counter-terrorism strategy. If you think of the state of technology only 10 years ago... There were no smartphones. The internet moved at a fraction of today's speed. Its abilities were a small percentage of today's power. And in another ten years, it's hard to imagine how powerful it will be.

We must, therefore, keep changing and updating our approach. And with this in mind, the Investigatory Powers Bill will be crucial. It will ensure that our police, and security and intelligence agencies, have the powers they need to keep us safe in an uncertain world. But

it also provides far greater transparency, overhauls safeguards and adds protections for privacy.

It fundamentally reforms the authorisation of the most sensitive investigatory powers with the introduction of the “double lock” of both Secretary of State and judicial authorisation.

It creates one of the most senior and powerful judicial oversight posts in the country, with the creation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

We are also making huge investment in our police and security services ... both in monetary terms, and with the recruitment of nearly two thousand additional staff at MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.

This is as well as strengthening our vital network of counter-terrorism experts in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa.

(..)

CONCLUSION

At the end of a long challenging day in this post, I sometimes reflect on some of the turbulent times my predecessors faced in office. From the IRA ... the Cold War ... and over the years the numerous other threats from terrorism, espionage and organised crime.

They must in their time have seemed almost insurmountable ... with the gravest of consequences if we had faltered in facing them.

But we adapted then, and we met those challenges head-on. And now we have a strong Conservative-only Government. One that puts the greatest value on protecting our way of life ... And one that will do whatever it takes to defend it from those who seek to destroy it.

In this we are supported by some of the most professional and competent public servants in the world, working hard to keep us safe. We have a Conservative-only Government that is 100% committed to putting Britain's interests first, delivering both the security of our borders, and control of who comes in.

It is this Government that will work tirelessly to protect our society, and some of the most vulnerable in it. We are ready to take on the challenges and tackle any threats we face at home ... So that all people across our country have the certainty of safety and security ... And can get on with their lives in a Britain that truly works for everyone ... In the knowledge that we will keep putting them and Britain's interests first.

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Northern Ireland 10 years after the St. Andrews Agreement of 2006

On 30 September, British Politics Society had the pleasure of inviting its members and friends to an autumn seminar on Northern Ireland, featuring two distinguished speakers: Lord Hain of Neath and Dr. Peter McLoughlin.

Lord Hain, who was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 2005 to 2007, reflected on how the process leading up to the St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 might be relevant to contemporary conflict resolution. Dr. McLoughlin, who is a Lecturer at Queen's University Belfast, offered his thoughts on the State of Northern Ireland today.

The two talks were followed by a lively Q&A session, led by British Politics Society's John Todd. The seminar was opened by BPS leader Atle Wold, and it took place at Georg Sverdrups hus at the University of Oslo.

The St Andrews Agreement was negotiated between the British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland's political parties, addressing the devolution of power to Northern Ireland. It emerged from multi-party talks held in St Andrews in Scotland in October 2006, between the two governments and all the major parties in Northern Ireland. The Agreement resulted in the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the formation of a new Northern Ireland Executive (based on power-sharing between Unionist and Republican parties) and a decision by Sinn Féin to support the Police Service of Northern Ireland, courts and rule of law.



Membership 2017

Membership in BPS is open to individuals and institutions. As a member, you receive subscription to four editions of *British Politics Review*, invitation to all events organised by the society and the right to vote at our annual general meeting.

our membership comes into force as soon as the membership fee, 200 NOK for 2017, has been registered at our account 6094.05.67788.

If you have questions about membership, please do not hesitate to contact us by e-mail at

mail@britishpoliticssociety.no

Forthcoming edition of *British Politics Review*

Although often confused for the UK as a whole, England as a country and nation is also much forgotten. This is at a time when the English voted to leave the European Union (54%), in stark opposition to the Scots (38%). At the same time, there are calls for an England-only Parliament, or vetoes on MPs from the Nations, in order to answer the West Lothian Question (or English Question).

So as well as there being

both tensions between England and Brussels and within the UK between the Nations, there are tensions within England too. The North-South divide remains an important economic and political issue, with politicians talking about the new Northern Powerhouse whilst at the same time London continues to be seen by many as nearly a different country.

The English have felt the ire of the other nations

for centuries, having held the main seat of power and making up the majority of the population of the British Isles, but what issues face the English in a time of significant political change? In our issue on England we want to address some of these issues to better understand England, and the English, today.

The winter edition of *British Politics Review* is due to arrive in February 2017.