Hybridity in the public sector – comparing development features in municipalities in Japan and Norway.

Abstract.

The theme in this article is managerial or administrative changes in municipalities seen from the perceptions of citizens. It's asked what characterize these changes, whether they are showing an inter-related and hybrid pattern, and whether the perceptions are varying depending on individual demographic characteristics or contextual factors related to their communities and the country they are living in. The data used are from surveys in Japan and Norway in 2015-2016. The main results indicate that the change or reform measures are indeed inter-related and hybrid. They don't vary much related to individual characteristics, except for political attitudes, but more so related to the size of their municipalities, year of local residency and local political activities. Japan and Norway have also marked different profiles regarding the main perceptions of the citizens, reflecting major structural and cultural differences

Introduction

The modern era has seen a great deal of turbulence concerning the structure, culture, and activities of public authorities. One general reason for this is that the world has become increasingly complex, with 'wicked' societal problems often spanning levels and sectors (Clark and Stuart 1997). This makes more demands on the political executives tasked with solving those problems, which they often tackle through reforms, making political-administrative systems more complex (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). These demands may be generated externally – by other countries or international organizations – or internally, by national political actors, interest groups, unions, and professional groups.

Changes in the public apparatus may be the result of continuous, incremental changes, but are also increasingly the result of public reforms, even though not all reform efforts result in implementation and effects (Patashnik 2008). One example of the former is the gradually increasing transparency in the public sector; another is the increased participation of various affected groups on different levels. Examples of major reform waves are the systematic reform efforts that started in the early 1980s in Australia and New Zealand and later came to be labeled New Public Management (NPM). This was followed by a counter-wave of reform known as post-NPM that started in the late 1990s in the same countries, like NPM, eventually also spread around the world (Christensen and Lægreid 2007).

There are different ways to look at the changing structures and cultures of the public sector over time, for example related to continuous changes or reforms. One way is to look at developments over different eras, phases or periods in which some development features are dominant (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). This will encompass literatures that, for example, see the emergence of NPM mainly as a substitute for the Old Weberian Public Administration (OPA), or post-NPM as challenging or eventually pushing NPM aside (Richards and Smith 2006). A second way is to follow Thelen's (1999) suggestion of layering, meaning that when new reforms or changes emerge they meld with features from former periods as part of processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. A third way, which is somewhat similar to the second but less complicated to grasp empirically, is to say that the public apparatus is increasingly *hybrid*, which means that it is complex and has elements pointing in different directions, i.e. it shows inconsistency (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The point of departure in this article is the third focus.

There are different ways to study hybridity in the public sector. A vast literature is studying this at the central level, in the civil service, often related to reforms (Pollitt and

Bouckaert 2011). This literature is based either on comparative country studies or on national case studies or on broad surveys. One finds some of the same profiles in studies at the local level, reflecting the fact that the local level often either imitates or implements reforms decided on the central level (Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014) or else sometimes anticipates central government in public sector reform (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; GAO 1993;Yamamoto 1999). These latter studies are often complemented by surveys of citizens or users, instead of politicians and civil servants, because citizens potentially know a lot about what is going on at the local level. The point of departure in this study is a comparison of citizen surveys from Japan and Norway that examined people's perceptions of changes in local politics and administration in a bid to discover whether hybrid patterns are evident.

This comparison of Japan and Norway contributes to public administration research both in terms of the significance of administrative culture and overall governance models, but also with respect to other factors like demography and local contextual elements that may be affect public sector reform and practice. Both nations are classified as reluctant and late adopters of public sector reforms (Olsen 1996, Kokubu et al. 1998), especially NPM, and they have both continued to maintain strong *Rechtsstaat* values. For example, Norway and Japan both institutionally use cash-based accounting and budgeting in local and national financial management, while many OECD countries have adopted accrual-based accounting and some have gone over to an accrual accounting and budgeting system promoted by NPM. By contrast, there are significant differences in demographic and fiscal conditions: Japan is the oldest society in the world (with over-65-year olds accounting for 26.3 % of the population in 2015). At the same time it is in the worst fiscal condition of the developed nations (its fiscal balance was -4.2% and gross government debt was 239.3% of GDP in 2013). In Norway, by contrast, only 16.3% of the population was over 65 in 2013, the fiscal balance was 9.1%, and gross government debt was 32.3% of GDP. Furthermore, the tax burden or government revenue is much higher in Norway than in Japan: in Norway government revenue was 55.4% of GDP in 2013; in Japan, by contrast, it was 33.9%.

The main research questions are the following:

- What is typical for the way citizens perceive changes in their municipalities over time? How and to what degree can one characterize and explain these developments as hybrid, i.e., consisting of diverse and not necessarily consistent elements of change? What are the main features of this hybridity and how are the variables inter-correlated?

What are some of the major similarities and differences between Japanese and Norwegian local government reform in this respect?

- How do citizens perceptions of change vary according to individual demographic and contextual variables? What is the relative importance of these variables compared to country differences?

First, what is meant by hybridity is outlined. Then the major features of a hybrid public sector are described. This is followed by a description of the context of the study – i.e. the local public sector in Japan and Norway. After outlining the data and method, the main results are presented and analyzed.

Potential features of hybridity in the public sector.

To understand hybridity, one has to define complexity as a concept. Complexity may mean many different things and structural complexity is mainly focused, but also discussing cultural complexity (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Starting with structural complexity, organization theory would point out that it has two major components, vertical and horizontal specialization (and in some cases coordination), both of which have intra- and inter-organizational elements (Egeberg 2012; Gulick 1937; Simon 1957). Vertical, intra-organizational specialization tells us how formal authority is distributed among different levels of the hierarchy within an organization, i.e. in the current case the formal governmental apparatus of the municipalities. Weak vertical specialization may thus mean a lot of hierarchical and centralized control by political and administrative leaders, while strong vertical specialization means more dispersed influence patterns and delegation. Vertical inter-organizational specialization focuses on specialization among public organizations on different levels. Strong vertical inter-organizational specialization may for example mean relatively much power to municipal enterprises companies or other subordinate units. Strong external vertical specialization may mean that private providers are involved in service provisions, through competitive tendering.

Horizontal intra-organizational specialization means internal specialization on the same level within public organizations, between for example divisions, teams/groups or other units. Such a specialization could be according to the principles of Gulick (1937), meaning purpose, process, clientele and geography. In municipalities, following the *purpose* principle may mean units for education, health, social affairs, etc., using the *process* principle implies gathering people with the same expertise like economists or lawyers in the same unit, following the

clientele principle could mean focusing on social weak groups and using the *geography* principle having special units for special areas locally. Horizontal inter-organizational specialization focuses on specialization among public organizations on the same hierarchical level, i.e. in this case several municipalities.

Taken together, these vertical and horizontal dimensions indicate how structurally complex a system or organization may be. At one extreme there can be strong vertical and horizontal specialization overall, both intra- and inter-organizational, meaning extensive structural fragmentation; this has been typical for countries that have adopted NPM reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). At the other extreme, where specialization is low on both dimensions, the political-administrative system will be well integrated, like the 'old public administration' in many countries or following post-NPM reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Rather than trying to use these dimensions to measure complexity directly; they are used to describe and analyze in what direction municipal changes are moving. The converse of the complexity and specialization described is of course coordination measures of various kinds along the same dimensions.

Cultural complexity is also important, but more difficult to measure. Public organizations that score high on cultural complexity have a variety of informal cultural norms arising from distinct cultural profiles or sub-cultures that have developed over a long period of time, but have also been influenced by modern reforms, as one sees in the municipalities (Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016). Scoring low on cultural complexity means cultural homogeneity and integration—i.e., members of an institution share the same basic cultural norms and values and there is a common sense of purpose (Kaufman 1960; Krasner 1988; Selznick 1957).

Hybridity in the public sector may mean different things. It can be described as different structural and cultural features coexisting in *inconsistent ways*, i.e. seemingly contradictory elements are evident. Hybridity represents inconsistent considerations, making trade-offs potentially difficult and unstable and creating lasting tensions (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Hybrid organizational features can exist either inside public organizations or between the public and private sectors (Lan and Rainey 1992). Cultural hybridity means different cultural elements coexisting in government. In municipalities structural hybridity may, for example, mean combining hierarchical steering with negotiational elements, network features, market measures, privatization, etc. While cultural hybridity may mean combining professional groups with different educational backgrounds and cultural professional norms and values (for example in the social and health sectors), which was typical for the Norwegian welfare administration

reform that was launched in 2005 (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). Recently, Japanese local governments have introduced a similarly integrated healthcare system in cooperation with medical doctors, nurses, caregivers and the community (Tsutsui 2012).

Which potential elements might hybrid local government encompass and what is the role of citizens in these? Old Public Administration (OPA) could be a point of departure. Basic Weberian features are typical for most political-administrative systems around the world, focusing on hierarchical features, strict formal organizational measures like laws, rules and procedures, an unambiguous distinction between public and private, etc. (March and Olsen 1983). In such a system politicians achieve legitimacy among citizens by being attentive to voters in elections and by having governing and implementation capacity, while bureaucrats follow formal rules and work according to the principle of equal treatment, etc. Despite many reforms that have tried to change some of these features, they are still alive and kicking. What Easton (1965) labels diffuse support is behind such legitimacy.

When New Public Management (NPM) was introduced in Australia and New Zealand, in the early 1980s, subsequently spreading to the rest of the world, many basic ideas were adopted that differed from OPA in many ways (Boston et al. 1996). Under NPM, power was to be mainly decentralized (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The formal structure of government was to become vertically and horizontally much more specialized, to make roles and tasks less ambiguous and purer. Efficiency was the main consideration and other premises were consigned to the background. The state was to be rolled back through diverse market features, competitive tendering and privatization (Self 2000). Citizens began to be viewed mainly as users or consumers (Fountain 2001) who should be given choice and influence. NPM is still used to varying degrees in many countries today, including in Japan and Norway, but it peaked in the trail-blazing Anglo-American countries in the late 1990s (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

Post-NPM began in the late 1990s in the same countries and like NPM spread rather quickly around the world. The main measures were now more centralization and central political and managerial capacity, despecialization through more control of agencies and SOEs, mergers of public organizations to create synergies, etc. Increased coordination both within the public apparatus and with private stake-holders in network-like arrangement also became important (cf. New Public Governance). Culturally, this reform wave focused on collective norms and values and also on ethos and ethics. Post-NPM was seen as a reform wave countering NPM because of three main factors (Christensen and Lægreid 2007): first, NPM was regarded as not having delivered on its promise of efficiency, neither in a macro-economic nor in a micro-economic respect; second, NPM had undermined the influence of executive politicians, and

third the 'fear factor', i.e. the increased insecurity generated by terrorism, pandemics, tsunamis, economic down-turns and environmental threats created a need for greater coordination. In some ways, post-NPM resurrected the role of the citizen again, focusing on collective solutions, but it was also about staying in contact, reaching out, collaborating, etc. (Fountain 2001)

A fourth potential element in the hybrid mix, and one that does not fit neatly into any of the other three is Open and Participatory Government (OPG) (Gant and Turner-Lee 2011). The background to this is that people are better educated than before and that modern technology, including social media, create pressure for more information and more participation. One important aspect of this is increased transparency about what is going on inside the public apparatus and continuous information on changes, policies, budgets or other decisions. Another is networking, as described in the concept known as New Public Governance (Osborne 2010). Instead of using only formal and established organizational structures, the public apparatus can also use looser and more informal networking mechanism both inside the public apparatus and towards the private/civil sector, which potentially allows more intensive participation by citizens in different capacities. Information and participation does not per se guarantee strong influence and can be symbolic, but it will probably increase the legitimacy of leaders and decision-making processes.

In the description and analysis of the data from citizens in municipalities the focus is on whether some of these main models are perceived as coexisting and inter-correlated, whether some are seen as dominant or whether there is a changing hybrid mix of them. It's also analyzed how citizens' perceptions of these hybrid features are dependent on individual background features such as gender, education, age, profession and income, but also on contextual variables such as size of municipality, how long people have lived there, activity in the local community, political views and country.

Context

To understand *Japanese* local government in an Asian context, the first characteristic to consider is that Asian politicians prefer management reform to political reform. This makes NPM reforms more relevant (Koike 2013), partly because their impact is mainly on the administration rather than politics. The second characteristic is the relationship between politicians, civil servants and citizens (political nexus triad) as conceptualized by Moon and Ingraham (1997). Many Asian nations occupy an administration-dominant or administration-

led position in the triad (Cheung 2005). Japan basically fitted this profile for a long time until the 1990s.

Concerning government structure, Japan has a two-tier local government system classified into 47 prefectures and 1719 municipalities. Municipalities consist of cities, towns and villages, all of which are subject to central government legislation. The Constitution clarifies the basic 'principle of local autonomy' in terms of both residents and entities. It provides for the establishment of the legislative assembly as well as the direct public election of assembly members and the heads of local government. It also confers administrative power on local governments as well as the right to exercise autonomous legislative power within the scope of the law. Local government accounts for around 60 percent of government expenditure and 25 percent of GDP overall. Average voter turnout in the 2011 local elections of governors was 52 percent, ranging from as high as 59 percent to as low as 41 percent (MIC 2015). Local government provides basic services for residents such as schools, waste disposal, a fire brigade, health and welfare services, urban planning, infrastructure etc. Approximately two thirds of public services are provided by local government.

However, Japanese local government institutions exhibit a number of special features. One is the influence of total quality management (TQM), which originated from quality control in the United States. In the 1990s, some innovative governors introduced TQM[1] in which the local government is a dual representative system of governor or mayor and assembly, in other words, a presidential and parliamentary system. Therefore NPM in a Japanese local government context has certain elements that reflect the TQM concept (Noutomi and Nakanishi 2007). Local government also introduced NPM instruments such as performance measurement and accrual accounting (Pallot and Yamamoto 2001)

The other special feature is the existence of a social network of civil society organizations (CSO). The combination of high institutionalization and high collaboration in Tokyo is quite distinct from that in other capital cities in Asia (Tsujinaka et al. 2013). CSOs, such as the Neighborhood Association (*chonaikai*), have played an agent role in local government, and in the pre-war period and during the war there was a mutual monitoring organization, which supported local government in its role as an intermediary institution between central government and the local people (Pekkanen 2006). Despite the gradual dwindling of their membership, CSOs are still active. Accordingly, it can be said that local government in Japan

[1] For instance, Shizuoka Prefecture began examining TQM in 1994 and introduced a basic QC tool in 1997.

had an affinity in network or collaborative governance called NPG or OPG before these concepts were discussed in the1990s.

Norway is a unitary parliamentary state, with a multi-party system that often produces minority coalition governments, meaning more central political volatility than Japan. The central government is seen as rather strong relative to lower levels, relatively stronger than in Japan, and steered by sectoral ministries/agencies that extend down to the regional/local level and through county governors (Christensen 2003). However, Norway also has an important tradition of local self-government. All of the approximately 430 local authorities have their own elected democratic bodies with wide competencies.[2] These elected bodies are mostly based on a proportional consensus principle, i.e. parties are represented according to their relative strength in elections, while the parliamentarian principle of 'winner takes all' is only used in a few big cities. The Norwegian welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and universal in the world. Welfare policy is mostly decided at the central level, but adapted to local contexts and implemented by local government (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). Local government represents a major part of the public sector in terms of the number of employees and the volume of financial resources. The relationship between central and local government is a mixture of national control and standardization, political decentralization based on the principle of local autonomy, and administrative decentralization based on the principle of delegated authority.

Norway differs from Japan in a number of other ways too. At the local level, political reforms are much more typical than management reforms (Askim 2007). Local government is dominated more by politicians than bureaucratic actors. Norwegian local government is overall less oriented towards NPM reforms (Knutsson et al. 2017). More people participate in local elections in Norway than in Japan. 64.5 % participated in municipal elections in 2011 and 60 % in 2015. The Norwegian municipalities are overall much smaller than the Japanese, which has implications for the proximity to local government, for local information, for reform resources and for citizens' local political activities. Norway has a wide variety of local associations influencing local politics through a kind of corporate network (Wollebæk and Selle 2008), but these play nothing like the role that CSOs play in Japan. Norway scores much higher than Japan both on inter-personal trust and on trust in government (Christensen and Lægreid 2005).[3]

[2] A post-NPM-inspired merger process is currently going on in the Norwegian municipalities, which will probably bring the number of municipalities down to about 70.

[3] See https://ourworldindata.org/trust and https://www.indy100.com/article/uk-trust-government-edelman-report-data-statistics-survey-2017-7535346

Method and some expectations

Data

As part of a study of local government in Japan and Norway, an internet based survey of 3100 Japanese citizens and 1030 Norwegians was conducted in March 2015 and February 2016 respectively. A survey company was contracted to deliver a sample in both countries that was representative in terms of gender, age, income and education. Respondents included both men and women in the age groups 20+, 30+, 40+, 50+, and 60 and over) with 310 persons for each subgroup in Japan, and 103 in Norway. The Japanese and Norwegian surveys consisted of 27 and 20 items, respectively, including background information on the respondents. Respondents were asked a number of questions regarding their perceptions of values and practices in local government policy and management, using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The questions about the characteristics of management models were adapted from Christensen and Lægreid (2007) and Park and Joaquin (2012).

Methods

Dependent variables.

The point of departure was a general question about change in municipalities: 'Compared with the public services you experienced several years ago, how do you feel the operation of your local government has changed?' There were five values for each sub-question, ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Seven sub-questions have been selected for analysis, each grouped into the four main elements presented above that is expected to be included in hybrid local government:

- Old Public Administration (OPA)

  'The local government now acts more in compliance with laws and regulations' (OPA1).

  'The local government places more emphasis on procedures and peoples' rights' (OPA2).
- New Public Management

  'Public services have been more actively privatized or outsourced to the private sector' (NPM1).

  'In providing public services the local government has placed greater importance on seeing citizens as customers/clients' (NPM2).
- Post-NPM

'The local government now coordinates more with relevant public entities and collaborates with citizens and the private sector' (Post-NPM).

- Open and Participatory Government (OPG)[4]

  'Citizens are kept better informed of the objectives and achievements of the local government' (OPG1).

  'The local government now places more emphasis on transparency, democratic procedures and consultation/dialogue with citizens' (OPG2).

General expectations on hybridity.

Overall, according to the theoretical reasoning about hybridity, one would expect people's perceptions of changes in municipalities not to point only to single reform elements, but to be complex and hybrid, combining reform elements pointing in different directions and thus containing all the four main elements presented. The exact composition of this hybridity may depend on supplementary reasoning. If one believes in path-dependency and resilience one would expect relatively more weight to be given to OPA, while a focus on recent instrumental changes would lead one to expect stronger NPM measures. Similarly, a balanced change scenario would assume more of a balance between NPM, post-NPM and OPG, with lower scores for OPA. In the following some expectations related to how perceptions of the different types of reform measures might vary are connected to independent variables containing either individual features or contextual factors.

Independent variables and expectations.

Ten independent variables are used to describe and analyze variations in perceptions of change in own municipality. The first six – gender, age, education, income, occupation and political attitudes – are mainly individual demographic variables, while the last four – size of municipality, length of residency, activity in municipality, and country – are more contextual variables related to the municipality where the respondent lives.

Gender.

What expectations might one have regarding gender differences in the responses to the different categories of questions? Research seems to show that women care more about following rules

[4] Post-NPM and OPG may seem to overlap somewhat, but OPG and the related questions represent more of the input side of public decision-making, while the questions representing post-NPM are more about the output and implementation side.

than men, probably because they trust that adhering to rules will produce greater fairness (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). One may also extend this reasoning to include transparency and democratic procedures. This may lead us to expect women overall to score higher on the variables related to OPA and OPG.

Age.

Generally speaking, people are likely to become more conservative in their beliefs and behavior as they grow older. One would therefore expect older people generally to see fewer changes around them locally, and if they do see changes these will be connected to old or traditional public policy and management to new or innovative ones. This might lead one to expect a slightly positive correlations between the age variable and perceptions of change on OPA, and mainly negative correlations between age and change, particularly with respect to NPM and OPG.

Education.

People with higher education typically have a better background for understanding local public policy and activities, i.e. they have more complex models of thought. This often leads them to participate more actively in political, administrative and societal processes. Based on this, one would expect higher education to result in a greater focus on OPG.

Income.

People with higher incomes may be more highly educated or they may be self-employed or more generally connected with the private sector. Even though this variable may point in different directions, the main expectation is that a focus on NPM will be coupled with high income.

Occupation.

Although income is to some extent related to occupation, the working environment and culture will affect whether people recognize government activities and management reforms and how they feel about them. Office workers and civil servants are employed in a hierarchical organizational structure. This contrasts with the more autonomous working conditions enjoyed by professionals. Accordingly, professionals or executives are likely to be more sensitive to Post-NPM and OPG, while office workers probably would score higher on changes related to OPA.

Political attitudes.

Traditionally, a Left-Right political continuum would indicate a difference in attitudes towards how public authorities should be run and what aspects of their activities are attended to. One would thus expect people who are more left-leaning to care more about post-NPM measures while those to tend more to the Right would focus more on NPM.

Size of own municipality (Size).

Overall, one would expect people living in small municipalities to score low on the various change variables, because change demands political and administrative resources that are more frequently found in larger societies; moreover, problems resulting in various management changes are also more typical for larger municipalities. Further, rather robust research findings show that people living in smaller municipalities are more active in different ways politically than people in larger municipalities (Houwelingen 2017; Rose 2002), which may lead one to expect people from smaller municipalities to score highest on OPG measures.

Length of residency in a municipality (Residency).

This variable deals both with the period of life when basic attitudes are formed, but also of course with life experience – in this case citizens' experience of municipalities and local services (cf. Christensen and Lægreid 2009). Based primarily on generational differences, one would expect people who have lived in a municipality for a long time to focus mainly on OPA and perhaps on post-NPM, while shorter periods of residency would presumably direct attention more to NPM and OPG.

Activity in municipality.

The degree of activity in a municipality often indicates a high score on social capital (Putnam 2000), which is also connected with some of the demographic variables presented. Overall, one would expect more active people to score higher on the OPG measures.

Country

The last independent variable is the country one. What kind of similarities and differences would one expect between Japan and Norway concerning perceived changes in municipalities? Japan and Norway seem both to be reluctant and selective adopters of modern reforms. However, since Japan is a more traditional society than Norway, with lower participation in

elections and political activities, one would generally expect Norway to score highest on all measures. However, in the development perspective of NPM, Japan has some advantages over Norway in financial management reform, presumably reflecting more globalization features, individualist characteristics, and a greater focus on management reforms in general. The government sector in Japan has adopted accrual-based financial reporting while budgeting has retained a cash basis; in contrast, Norway still maintains cash-based financial reporting and budgeting. This may lead one to expect more emphasis on NPM in Japan. Also community-based organizations like Neighborhood Association in Japan might be more connected to the concept of OPG than corresponding organizations in Norway. Greater centralization overall in Norway may lead to more of a focus on post-NPM than in Japan.

Main results

Changing landscape of municipalities?

Changes in the above seven types of local government management in Japan and Norway are shown in Table 1 using the Likert scale (5 = strongly agree to 1=strongly disagree). All the measures scored around 3, which means 'neither agree nor disagree', indicating that neither country is particularly prone to change. Even though the differences between scores on the measures are small, it is worth noticing that the measures with the highest overall score are those related to OPA and post-NPM, which emphasize law/regulation and coordination respectively. Taken together these give a traditional profile.

As mentioned earlier, previous studies on public management reforms concluded that since the beginning of the twenty-first century new ideas or concepts labelled Post-NPM and NPG have emerged (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). OPA and NPM may have been modified or partly replaced by these principles. Some scholars have asserted that "NPM is dead" (Dunleavy et al. 2006), while other scholars say that NPM, or at least NPM ideas and instruments, are still alive (Vries and Nemec 2013) and are overlaying OPA and post-NPM

Insert table 1 here

(cf. Thelen 1999). The results indicate, however, that all the main reform groups are rather evenly albeit not strongly represented.

For all types of change/reform, Norway scores slightly higher than Japan, which indicates a slightly more marked 'modernizer' profile (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The two

countries' profiles are also slightly different in the sense that Norway scores highest on post-NPM, reflecting the post-NPM features of many of the reforms of recent years, including those affecting the regional and local level. Japan, on the other hand, scores highest on changes characterized by more law and regulations, reflecting a more traditional society and therefore an OPA profile.

The findings show several types of reform measures operating in parallel, but the question is: Are they coupled? Table 2 shows a high correlation between the seven dependent variables, indicating hybridity. The different waves of public sector reform are not independent, but connected in the eyes of citizens. Starting with the traditional OPA measures, they are, as expected, most strongly correlated with one another, with post-NPM measures and with one of the OPG measures, but overall most weakly correlated with NPM measures.

Insert table 2 here

The NPM measures are most strongly correlated with post-NPM measures, which seems to be inconsistent and contradictory, unless one consider the need for post-NPM coordination measures to counter the fragmentation of NPM. It is also interesting to observe that the NPM measures correlate most weakly with the OPG measures on information, transparency and participation, which potentially should fit in rather well with NPM. As expected, post-NPM correlates most strongly with OPA measures, while OPG measures correlate most strongly with the OPA coordination measures on procedures and peoples' rights, which seems to fit together in an understandable way.

Varying perceptions.

The seven types of public management are interrelated. However, each type is assessed differently depending on the respondent's demographic and contextual background as defined by the independent variables. In the multivariable analyses an ordered probit[5] model is used for each type in the case of pooled data for Japan and Norway. The operationalization of variables is described in the appendix. Table 3 shows the results.

[5] Regression analysis using an ordinary least square method was also implemented. The results were basically identical to those of the probit model. See appendix tables #a, A-1 and A-2.

Insert table 3 here

Concerning gender, the expectation of an OPA and OPG profile are not met. Quite the contrary: one finds that female citizens are more likely to perceive changes in NPM1, which means privatization and outsourcing. One explanation could be that women are more reliant on work in the public sector or services from local authorities and are therefore more sensitive towards such changes. The expectations concerning age are not met, since there are no significant correlations with any of the dependent variables. The same is true for education.

The income variable correlates positively with post-NPM and OPG1, meaning that people earning a higher income are more likely to recognize changes in the direction of more coordination and more information from the municipalities, which is different from the expectation of positive correlation with NPM measures. For occupation, the expected differentiated pattern was not found, sine none of the correlations are significant. For the size variable, OPG1 has a significant negative correlation with size (population), as expected, meaning people think information from local authorities is more of a problem over time in large municipalities.

Political attitudes have a positive effect on OPA2, NPM2, Post-NPM, OPG1 and OPG2. This means that conservative or right-leaning people are more likely to perceive change moving into new management styles, but also see changes strengthening the traditional style (OPA2). However, the expectation of a more differentiated set of attitudes between the political Left and Right was not confirmed. The positive impact on NPM2 is, however, consistent with the expectations.

Concerning the contextual variables, the results for size do not confirm the expectation that respondents from small municipalities would score lowest. But people living in smaller communities score higher on OPG1, meaning that they feel better informed about the goals and achievements of the local government than people in larger municipalities. On residency, people who have lived in their municipality for a shorter time consistently perceive more changes related to all management styles than those who have lived there longer, which does not fulfil the expectations concerning NPM and OPG, but instead those related to a differentiated pattern. Social and political involvement in municipality by citizens which are measured in terms of activity 1, having several friends, activity 2, participating in voluntary work, activity 3, voting in elections, and activity 4, participating in neighborhood associations,

generally affect their perceptions of changing management styles. However, by contrast with the expectations, with the exception of activity 2, more socially and politically active participan are likely to recognize the changes in all styles of government other than OPG1 and OPG2.

The country variable is negative and statistically significant on all dependent variables other than OPG1.[6] This indicates that Norwegians are more likely to perceive the changes and strengths of all styles in local government management than Japanese, which is mostly in line with the expectations. If one ask whether the main results hold up when it's differentiate between the two countries, one find some interesting differences (tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix). In Japan women see more of a development locally concerning privatization and outsourcing, which may indicate that they are in a more vulnerable position than in Norway. Concerning age, one finds two different profiles that cancel each other out in the overall result, namely, that older Japanese citizens overall see more changes in management styles, in particular related to OPA2 and OPG, which may reflect a more traditional profile, while older Norwegian citizens overall perceive fewer changes.

Analysis and discussion

The major results do not generally support the expectations related to the demographic variables, while the contextual variables do so to a much greater extent (Table 4). Concerning demographic variables, some interesting cross-country differences occur, which may reflect both social and political differences. The fact that right-leaning people with high incomes in Japan overall score high on perceptions of change on most variables may reflect more social inequality in Japan than in Norway,[7] a more right-leaning political landscape and more political polarization. Lack of a differentiated pattern concerning political attitudes and change in Norway may also indicate that the political differences in Norway overall are smaller. The fact that older Norwegians generally don't see much change in the municipalities may reflect that

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Insert table 4 here

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more often live in smaller municipalities where not much is happening. One indication of this is also that they score relatively lowest on NPM measures which more often are used in cities.

[6] In the case of OPG1, there is a negative correlation with the country variable ($p=0.085<0.1$).
[7] The Gini coefficients of Japan and Norway in 2012 were 0.33 and 0.25 respectively (OECD 2016).

When one turns to contextual variables, size does not have overall the expected effect of lack of perceived change in smaller communities. But, when looking at the qualitative aspects and differentiate between types of changes, one sees that Norwegian respondents score highest on OPA2, OPG1 and OPG2, which relate to peoples' rights, information and transparency. Since Norwegians generally live in smaller communities than the Japanese,[8] it is probably easier for them to perceive such changes.

Length of residence does have an effect on perceived change, but the pattern is not as differentiated as expected. Overall, short residency is correlated with high scores on NPM and OPG, but this is more typical for Norwegian respondents than for Japanese, which may reflect the influence of a new generation of young people in municipalities as the pro-active 68-generation starts to retire.

Partly contrary to the expectations, socially and politically active people in municipalities are more likely to be interested in most changes of style, but as expected score highest on OPG. This is more typical for Japanese respondents than Norwegian, which may be because more Norwegians overall are active in the different types of government administration, making this a less differentiating factor. Respondents in Norway answering "yes" to the question "I have several friends in the neighborhood" and "I voted in the latest local government elections" respectively amount to 68.9 % and 75.9 % compared with 44.6 % and 49.1% in Japan.

As a whole, one can say that the contextual variables are more influential determinants of perceived change in types of public management than the demographic variables. As expected, the country factor leads to a different pattern in citizens' perceptions of change. This means the concepts and ideas of public management are neither considered a linear development from OPA to post-NPM or OPG through NPM nor are they multi-layered. Further, contextual factors have a different impact on each type of public management, although some elements are commonly composed of all types. The change pattern could rather be considered as a complex and hybrid mixture of multiple principles. This is rather typical for modern reform waves when they overlap and are combined (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

Conclusion

Using survey data for Japanese and Norwegian citizens in municipalities, it's compared and analyzed how people perceive recent changes in local management models and practices in

[8] More than half of the municipalities in Norway have fewer than 5000 residents (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernization 2014). In Japan, by contrast, the municipalities with fewer than 5000 citizens amount to 16 percent of the total (MIC 2016).

Japan and Norway. It's also focused on whether OPA and NPM have been replaced or overlaid by emerging models like post-NPM and OPG, or whether, indeed, a hybrid mixture has emerged

The main results show that these four types of public management models are highly inter-related, suggesting that the development features cannot be understood either as dominant reform waves substituting for each other or in terms of a layering theory, because a complex and diverse pattern with elements from different contexts is evident (cf. Thelen 1999). Emerging models, including NPM, do not always counter, replace or substitute previous models and this also applies to post-NPM (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Reform measures showing hybridity often reflect a combination of reform symbols and actual implementation of reform measures (Røvik 2002). The conclusion reached by Kuhlmann and Bouckaert (2016) in their comprehensive comparison of reform trajectories in thirty-two European countries tallies with the results not only for Norway, but also for Japan:

> 'The significance of NPM/post-NPM notwithstanding, European local government has never concentrated solely on reforms of these kinds but has pursued a variety of (partly) conflicting reform trajectories' (Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016: 2).

The perceptions of change measures in this study do not indicate a movement in a particular direction that is consistent with a specific type of management model. Rather, people's perceptions of changing practices depend on their contexts, but generally speaking not on demographic factors (with the exception of political attitudes). Their level of social and political activity in their municipalities determines their perceptions of public management models and practices of all types (Rose 2002). The same is true for size of municipality and length of residency (Houwelingen 2017). As expected, there are also both similarities and rather significant country differences, reflecting structural and cultural differences.

Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014) in their comprehensive comparison of civil service systems and reforms on different levels in Europe point to the fact that NPM reforms dominated in many countries in Europe in the 1990s, but from around 2000 there was a partial U-turn when post-NPM reforms were implemented. This was also the pattern in Norway, creating hybrid structure and cultures (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Japan has more of an unusual pattern of NPM and OPG, and also scores lower on most change measures than Norway. Using the typology of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), which distinguishes between 'marketizers/ minimizers', 'modernizers' and 'maintainers', Norway would be a weak version of a modernizer, while Japan is more of a maintainer, but with elements from the other two types.

This study adds to the knowledge in the field by showing, in a comparative perspective, how the varied balance of hybridity, both concerning structural and cultural hybridity, gives different contexts for local reforms and change in the public apparatus. Theoretically, it's shown that instead of experiencing either one major component of reform dominating, like NPM, or seeing a typical pattern of layering (Thelen 1999), the study gives insight into the world of varied hybridity in the public sector (Christensen & Lægreid 2007).

Analyzing changes in public management systems using surveys of citizens has certain limitations. The perceptions in the survey are a kind of subjective or soft measure. They are also by nature retrospective. On the other hand, citizens score high on proximity to the reform measures. Future research using objective measures through panel surveys will be required to identify the causal relations between public management and demographic and contextual variables in addition to examining how management thoughts, theory and practices have developed. Further comparative approach may also be explored.

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Appendix.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Main Changes and Reform Measures.

Item	Japan	Norway
OPA1	2.964(0.688)	3.065(0.726)
OPA2	2.831(0.721)	3.015(0.780)
NPM1	2.886(0.706)	3.015(0.810)
NPM2	2.834(0.742)	3.102(0.790)
Post-NPM	2.924(0.736)	3.111(0.740)
OPG1	2.963(0.785)	3.052(0.825)
OPG2	2.836(0.709)	2.937(0.864)

Table 2. Correlation Matrix (in case of pooled or combined data)

	OPA1	OPA2	NPM1	NPM2	Post-NPM	OPG1	OPG2
OPA1	1						
OPA2	0.634**	1					
NPM1	0.549**	0.507**	1				
NPM2	0.590**	0.578**	0.602**	1			
Post-NPM	0.710**	0.625**	0.623**	0.624**	1		
OPG1	0.573**	0.681**	0.480**	0.531**	0.578**	1	
OPG2	0.670**	0.677**	0.514**	0.635**	0.665**	0.617**	1

**p<0.01

Table 3. Results of Ordered Probit Analysis (Coefficients and standard errors)

Variable	OPA1	OPA2	NPM1	NPM2	Post-NPM	OPG1	OPG2
Gender	-0.003	0.020	0.096*	0.030	0.051	0.047	-0.019
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Age	0.009	0.009	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.013	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education	-0.010	0.017	0.005	-0.012	0.010	0.008	0.019
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Income	0.026	0.025	0.020	0.014	0.042*	0.039*	0.023
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Occupation	-0.005	0.013	-0.004	0.010	0.006	-0.002	0.000
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Political attitude	0.001	0.020*	0.015	0.028**	0.021*	0.018*	0.021*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Size	-0.022	-0.031	0.003	-0.003	-0.012	-0.049**	-0.037
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Residence	-0.045**	-0.043**	-0.043**	-0.051***	-0.042**	-0.034*	-0.063***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Activity1	-0.088*	-0.128**	-0..070	-0.130***	-0.152***	-0.138***	-0.113**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Activity2	0.002	-0.098	-0.135*	-0.089	-0.077	-0.133**	-0.088
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Activity3	-0.227***	-0.110**	-0.165***	-0.094*	-0.117**	-0.104**	-0.084*
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Activity4	-0.095*	-0.124**	-0.070	-0.112**	-0.115**	-0.187***	-0.099*
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Country	-0.223***	-0.131**	-0.140**	-0.368***	-0.324***	-0.081	-0.113*
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.049)
τ 1 (threshold)	-2.900	-2.631	-2.480	-2.905	-2.866	-2.717	-2.501
	(0.192)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.190)	(0.182)	(0.187)
τ 2	-2.114	-1.738	-1.616	-2.083	-2.080	-1.780	-1.720
	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.180)	(0.185)
τ 3	-0.003	0.031	0.158	-0.237	-0.129	-0.263	0.158
	(0.187)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.178)	(0.183)
τ 4	1.056	1.449	1.323	0.927	1.108	1.231	1.327
	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.189)
-2Log-likelihood	8025.8	8720.0	8923.9	8726.1	8264.6	9452.5	8662.6
χ 2	116.3***	94.5***	89.7***	163.4***	153.9***	126.0***	80.0***
N	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129

Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, Upper numerical values mean coefficients, the parentheses show standard scores.

Table 4. Expectations and Main Results. An Overview.

Independent variable	Expectation	Main result
Gender	Women more focused on OPA and OPG	Not confirmed – women score high on NPM1 in Japan
Age	Older people see fewer changes overall and focus more on OPA	Overall no significant correlations, but confirmed for Norway
Education	Higher education more focus on OPG	Not confirmed – no significant correlations
Income	Higher income focused on NPM	Not confirmed overall, but higher income in Japan yields high score on most changes
Occupation	Differentiated pattern	Not confirmed – no significant correlations
Political attitudes	Left focus on post-NPM, Right on NPM	Partly confirmed, for NPM1, but right-leaning score highest on five of seven dependent variables, which is typical for Japan but not for Norway
Size	Overall, see fewer changes if small. Small more focus on OPG	Confirmed for OPG1 overall, but for Norway on OPA2, OPG1 and OPG2
Residency	Long=OPA and Post-NPM – Short= NPM and OPG	Confirmed for short on NPM and OPG, but short overall scores highest on all variables, which is most typical for Norway
Activities	High more focus on OPG	Confirmed for OPG1 overall, but high on activity scores highest overall, which is typical for Japan
Country	Norway higher overall, meaning perceives most changes, while Japan most focus on NPM	Mostly confirmed

Overview of dependent and independent variables.

Dependent variables:

OPA1, OPA2, NPM1, NPM2, Post-NPM, OPG1, OPG2:1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree

Independent variables:

Gender: 1=Male, 2=Female

Education: 1=junior high or secondary school, 2=high school, 3=vocational college and university, graduate school, 0=others

Income (annual household): Japan 1= less than JPY 3 million, 2=3 to 6 million, 3=6 to 10 million, 4=over 10 million. Norway 1=less than NOK 0.4 million, 2=0.4 to 0.7 million, 3=0.7 to 0.9 million, 4=over 0.9 million.

Political attitudes: 1= left (Japan) or liberal (Norway) to 10=right (Japan) or conservative (Norway)

Size of municipality (population): 1= less than 10,000, 2= 10,000 to 50,000, 3= 50,000 to 500,000, 4=over 500,000, 0=NA

Residence: 1= less than 1 year, 2=1 to 5 years, 3=6 to 9 years, 4=10 to 19 years, 5=more than 20 years.

Activity1-4: 1=Yes, 2=No

Activity 1: I have several friends in the neighborhood that I can talk with.

Activity 2: I am involved in local non-profit organizations, clubs and volunteer activities.

Activity 3: I voted in the most recent local government elections for council members /head of government.

Activity 4: I am a member of the neighborhood association.

Country: 1=Norway, 2=Japan

Age: 1=19 or under, 2=20 to 29, 3=30 to 39, 4=40 to 49, 5=50 to 59, 6=60 or over

Occupation: 1=student or unemployment, 2=self-employed, farmer/fisherman, skilled worker, 3=office worker or public servants, 4=executive/manager, 0=others

Table 3a. Regression Analysis

Variable	OPA1	OPA2	NPM1	NPM2	Post-NPM	OPG1	OPG2
Gender	0.003	0.018	0.066**	0.025	0.037	0.036	-0.004
Education	-0.008	0.011	0.002	-0.008	0.005	0.006	0.011
Income	0.017	0.018	0.015	0.011	0.027*	0.028	0.017
Political attitude	0.003	0.014*	0.012*	0.020**	0.014*	0.013	0.015**
Size	-0.013	-0.021	0.002	-0.001	-0.007	-0.036	-0.024
Residence	-0.028*	-0.029**	-0.031**	-0.034***	-0.026**	-0.025	-0.053***
Activity1	-0.049*	-0.082**	-0.048	-0.084**	-0.090***	-0.095***	-0.071**
Activity2	0.004	-0.054	-0.089	-0.051	-0.043	-0.087**	-0.053
Activity3	-0.130***	-0.071*	-0.109***	-0.058*	-0.070**	-0.073**	-0.050
Activity4	-0.064**	-0.082*	-0.050	-0.075**	-0.074**	-0.136***	-0.071**
Country	-0.142***	-0.085**	-0.098**	-0.246***	-0.205***	-0.060	-0.069*
Age	0.007	0.009	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.011	0.006
Occupation	-0.004	0.008	-0.003	0.008	0.004	-0.002	0.001
Constant	3.627***	3.495***	3.470***	3.705***	3.633***	3.672***	3.446***
Adjusted R2	0.024	0.019	0.018	0.035	0.033	0.026	0.015
F	8.869***	7.153***	6.992***	12.406***	11.741***	9.397***	5.807***
N	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129	4129

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table A-1. Regression Analysis for Japan

Variable	OPA1	OPA2	NPM1	NPM2	Post-NPM	OPG1	OPG2
Gender	-0.003	0.043	0.079**	0.038	0.029	0.046	0.004
Education	-0.002	0.015	0.019	0.011	0.006	0.015	0.012
Income	0.026	0.035*	0.041**	0.021	0.045**	0.044**	0.024
Political attitude	0.018**	0.033***	0.018*	0.034***	0.030***	0.028***	0.036***
Size	-0.001	-0.012	0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.027	-0.008
Residence	-0.017	-0.020	-0.22	-0.25*	-0.021*	-0.015	-0.032**
Activity1	-0.061*	-0.085**	-0.057*	-0.084**	-0.098***	-0.111***	-0.107***
Activity2	-0.021	-0.071	-0.094*	-0.069	-0.081	-0.100*	-0.042
Activity3	-0.131***	-0.078**	-0.130***	-0.63*	-0.072**	-0.095**	-0.077**
Activity4	-0.040	-0.029	-0.002	-0.34	-0.046	-0.087**	-0.011
Age	0.024*	0.040***	0.025*	0.22*	0.026*	0.038**	0.029**
Occupation	-0.005	-0.009	-0.009	0.003	0.000	-0.017	-0.004
Constant	3.138***	2.986***	3.023***	2..963***	3.057***	3.301***	3.001***
Adjusted R2	0.020	0.026	0.022	0.016	0.025	0.036	0.021
F	6.142***	7.864***	6.790***	5.273***	7.559***	10.728***	6.631***
N	3099	3099	3099	3099	3099	3099	3099

Table A-2. Regression Analysis for Norway

Variable	OPA1	OPA2	NPM1	NPM2	Post-NPM	OPG1	OPG2
Gender	0.003	-0.107*	0.032	-0.010	0.032	-0.036	-0.067
Education	-0.019	0.009	-0.040	-0.051*	0.002	-0.010	0.014
Income	0.012	-0.001	-0.023	-0.001	0.008	0.011	0.018
Political attitude	-0.019*	-0.017	0.005	-0.001	-0.008	-0.009	-0.017
Size	-0.029	-0.042*	0.011	0.006	-0.013	-0.047*	-0.048*
Residence	-0.057**	-0.051*	-0.055*	-0.059**	-0.041*	-0.049*	-0.065**
Activity1	-0.063	-0.118*	-0.056	-0.118*	-0.118*	-0.088	0.009
Activity2	0.023	-0.016	-0.082	-0.020	-0.002	-0.067	-0.063
Activity3	-0.144**	-0.078	-0.033	-0.048	-0.069	-0.006	0.009
Activity4	-0.049	-0.083	-0.088	-0.134*	-0.058	-0.134*	-0.167*
Age	-0.037*	-0.061**	-0.041*	-0.028	-0.049**	-0.046*	-0.035
Occupation	-0.003	0.053**	0.009	0.019	0.009	0.037	0.017
Constant	3.889***	4.067***	3.765***	3.979***	3.754***	4.006***	3.897***
Adjusted R2	0.019	0.046	0.014	0.017	0.014	0.026	0.026
F	2.684***	5.144***	2.209**	2.522**	2.199**	3.316***	3.253***
N	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029	1029