Cleavage Politics in the 21st Century

How and why social background affects political preferences

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Summary

Existing scholarship shows that social background – represented by features such as class, religion, or gender – is an important predictor of political preferences, including party preference, across Western democracies. This relationship has recently come to the attention of a broader audience, with the referendum on Brexit and the election of president Trump. Unfortunately, we know much less about *why* social background relates to political preferences, i.e., which mechanisms induce the relationship? The main motivation for this thesis is to contribute to filling this knowledge gap by answering the overarching research question: *How and why does social background affect political preferences?* The four papers that constitute this thesis study the question through the application of the same theoretical framework, namely cleavage theory.

The first paper (chapter 2 in this thesis), which is co-authored with Oddbjørn Knutsen, focuses on a measurement issue that is important for the chapters to follow. The paper takes on the prominent claim that changes in the employment structure in post-industrial societies require a redrawing of the class map, especially to capture new distinctions within the middle class. We find that the traditional EGP class schema predicts modern political preferences equally well as the new schema endorsed by critics of the former schema, suggesting that the worries about the continued relevance of the traditional EGP class schema seem exaggerated. This justifies its use in later chapters.

In papers 2 and 3 (chapters 3 and 4), I empirically analyse the importance of one of the most important propositions in cleavage voting theory, namely the idea that social groups have indirect effects on party preference through political values. I find that political values account for less than half of the variation in both class voting and religious voting, meaning that we need to look for additional explanations in order to satisfactorily understand the phenomenon. I also find that there is a substantial direct effect, due to frozen group-party alignments and group identity. Furthermore, the share of the effect that is direct or indirect varies substantially between parties and party families. The two papers jointly develop a theory of cleavage voting. The crux of the theory is that the effect of social group membership on party preference is indirect through political values to the extent that social groups hold distinct sets of political values, and to the extent that political parties emphasise issues of relevance to those values. This means that party characteristics affect not only the *level* of cleavage voting, but even the very mechanisms behind such voting. While I test – and find

support for – the theory on the two most studied cleavages, namely class and religion, I propose that it may be valid for any kind of cleavage voting.

Finally, the fourth paper (chapter 5), which is co-authored with Rune Stubager, scrutinises another prominent claim, namely that globalisation has transformed, surpassed, or even replaced the old cleavages such as class or education. Our findings suggest that direct measures of exposure to globalisation have limited independent effects on both core political attitudes and party preference. Furthermore, there is no indication that class and education today primarily works through globalisation-related processes, nor that these processes interact with class to create cross-class alliances.

In conclusion, social structural variables still affect party preference, and while the dominant view has been that this is primarily an indirect effect through political values, it seems that direct effects related to group identities and frozen party alignments play a larger role than commonly assumed. While globalisation processes as of yet have not significantly altered the way social structural variables affect political preferences, it seems that political actors themselves are able to affect which mechanisms that are at work.

Acknowledgments

First, I want to thank my two supervisors, Rune Stubager and Carl Henrik Knutsen. They are both world-class political scientists, and I'm very grateful for their scholarly guidance over the last few years. More importantly, they both believed in me and my project, even at times where I had doubts. I can hardly overstate the importance of this moral support. I owe them both a debt of gratitude. Rune welcomed me warmly to Aarhus, and I've learned a lot from our cooperation, which resulted in chapter 5 in this thesis. Carl Henrik convinced me that one angry reviewer is no reason to drop a project, and is thus partly responsible for the fact that chapter 3 was finished, submitted, and finally published in a journal. He has been of much help since long before he became my PhD supervisor. Thank you both for your professional and moral support. I hope there are many more co-authored papers and bar visits to come also in the years ahead! I would also like to thank Oddbjørn Knutsen for thorough comments and discussions during the years in which he was part of the team of supervisors, and for the cooperation that led to, among other things, chapter 2 in this thesis. His books and articles constitute an important building block for this dissertation.

Second, I am grateful to many other people at my department. The Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo is a great place to be a PhD candidate. I have had generous travel funding, much freedom and responsibility both in terms of research and teaching, and support from Anne-Julie Semb and Jostein Askim. I have many great colleagues. Bjørn Høyland has taught me a great deal about methodology, has consistently had higher ambitions for me than I do, and has been helping me to find postdoc opportunities. Anders Ravik Jupskås is a very interesting conversation partner and collaborator (the chapter turned out well!). Staffan Kumlin and Bernt Aardal are both inspiring and I have learnt much from them and their work. Staffan also commented on and discussed the introductory chapter with me, for which I am grateful.

Third, the department has had an exceptional group of PhD candidates while I've been here. Haakon Gjerløw has been a close friend and much cherished discussion partner ever since we studied together at the BA level some ten years ago. He has contributed greatly to this thesis, both by reading and commenting on the whole manuscript (!), and by being ever supportive. We have collaborated on an article outside of our dissertations (now published in Electoral Studies), where Martin G. Søyland also participated. Martin is another friend through several years, despite the disappointment he feels about me failing to learn and use

the statistical software *R*. Furthermore, Atle Haugsgjerd has been a good friend and colleague throughout the four years, always generous and helpful. He has also read through and commented on several parts of this dissertation. I've had the most entertaining lunches with Kjersti Skarstad, found a fellow Oslo patriot in Øyvind Stiansen, and Andreas Kokkvoll Tveit deserves a medal for patiently listening to my neurotic nonsense the last few months of the dissertation writing process. The PhD candidates at the department have been to Vilnius, Prague, Gothenburg and Fredrikstad on annual workshops where both the professional and the social aspects have been great. I am in debt to all of you, not just the ones mentioned here.

I spent the spring of 2016 at the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University. I was deeply impressed with the high academic level, but even more by how friendly everyone was (despite the incessant comments on the Norwegian oil riches or other aspects of Norway of which the Danes are jealous). Besides Rune, whom I've already mentioned, I want to give a special thanks to Mads Thau, a great person and an inspiring colleague. Thanks to Christoph Arndt and Kees van Kersbergen for reading through and commenting on early drafts of, respectively, chapters 3 and 4, and to Robert Klemmensen for good discussions. The political behaviour seminars were also interesting. I had much fun with everyone in the international PhD house, as well as the PhD group at the department – not least Casper Sakstrup, who may very well just be the happiest person alive. Carsten Jensen was a particularly fun person. Det *er* deilig å være norsk i Danmark!

I later spent Trinity Term 2018 at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. I would like to thank Geoffrey Evans for hosting me. As is clear from the bibliography, his work has been of immense importance to this thesis. Staying in Oxford for a term, I learned that Geoff is as interesting a person as he is a scholar. He has also commented on and discussed the introductory chapter of this thesis with me, for which I am grateful. Thanks are also due to my friend and fellow political scientist, John Kenny, for showing me around, teaching me how to play crocket, and for interesting conversations. I had the pleasure of meeting Stefanie Walter, who generously took time out of her busy schedule to discuss chapter 5 with me. The chapter benefited greatly from it.

I have had many fruitful discussions about my own work and others' at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo. I am grateful that I have been allowed to participate in their Politics seminars. The Leuven Winter School on Elections, which I've attended twice, has been an important source of academic as well as social pleasure. Not least, this is where I first

met my good friend James Wilhelm. I am grateful to Ruth Dassonneville and the other organisers, and Romain Lachat, who commented on an early version of chapter 3.

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Peter Egge Langsæther
Blindern, Oslo, Norway
December 2018

Contents

1 Summary and introduction: Cleavage politics in the 21st century

1.1 Introduction

Imagine two Norwegian construction workers. The first, Ronny, works with his father. There aren't many political discussions at work, but everyone knows how they feel about the manager who sits in his office all day and drives home in his fancy car, and the party that represents *people like him* – the bloody conservative party, *Høyre.* Ronny can't see why his boss should earn that much. He's not the one doing the hard work.

Ronny and his colleagues have observed a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants in the last decade. While Ronny's friend was laid off recently, more and more Eastern Europeans are hired in his company. In fact, there are now more Eastern Europeans than there are Norwegians. Some of the signs at the construction site are in Polish now. Ronny resents it. He feels that the job has lower status than it used to.

He avoids political debates on television. He doesn't need to watch them. Both him and his father have always voted for the Labour party. His grandfather used to simply call it *the* party, a habit Ronny picked up on. Labour looks after his interests. The local Labour leaders talk like Ronny and walk like Ronny. They represent *people like him.* What more could you ask for?

The other construction worker, Martin, also votes Labour. However, Martin is from a political family. His brother is a local union representative. They frequently discuss politics. Martin is wary of income inequality and sees redistribution as a good thing, as long as industries don't go bankrupt due to taxation. He is also sceptical of large-scale immigration, primarily because it contributes to social dumping and reduced salaries for workers. He is happy that the Labour party wants to introduce measures to reduce social dumping. While not enthusiastically following the current political debate, Martin gets information on the parties' policy proposals through the union, some of his colleagues, and his brother.

Ronny and Martin both belong to the working class. Like so many other workers across time and space, they lean left in economic questions and right in "cultural" questions, primarily when it comes to immigration (e.g. Lipset 1981, Svallfors 2006, Oesch 2008,

Oskarson and Demker 2013, Knutsen 2018: ch. 3). They may do this for reasons related to their market and work situation – what I will later define as *class*. Similarly, people's political preferences are affected by other elements of their social background, i.e. social structural variables such as religion, urban-rural residence, gender, or employment sector. I return to Ronny and Martin later in this chapter, as their cases illuminate the main theoretical arguments of this dissertation.

It is sometimes easy, in the midst of all the regression analyses and theoretical concepts, to forget how our research speaks to real life. It is important to remember that what we study are people like Ronny and Martin, or you and me, and how our life circumstances have shaped our political views. In turn, and taken together, these views contribute to shaping the political trajectory of democratic nations.

In recent years, social groups have re-entered the primary stage of politics. Donald Trump became President of the United States, the British people voted to leave the EU, and Emmanuel Macron beat Marine Le Pen in the French presidential elections. Class, educational, and regional cleavages attracted much attention in these three cases, both in the media (e.g. Cohn 2016, Mckenzie 2016, Burn-Murdoch et al. 2017) and in academic circles (e.g. Goodwin and Heath 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Evans and Tilley 2017). Furthermore, as is clear to any political observer, the outcomes were of crucial importance to the state of affairs in these countries, in Europe, in the US, and in the world at large. Class politics figure prominently in explanations for the rise of the Radical Right all over Western Europe (see, e.g., the edited volume of Rydgren 2013). The study of cleavages – the political behaviour of organised objectively identifiable groups that share life circumstances – is certainly timely, as indicated by Geoffrey Evans:

> The importance of this work [coming class voting research] is signalled very clearly by Brexit and Trump, both of which saw strong working class involvement in shock outcomes, indicating that class divisions in political preferences and voting are not only resilient, they are capable of destabilizing the establishment order. (Evans 2017: 193).

A whole array of studies have been conducted on the association between social structure and political preferences and how this association varies across countries and across time (see section 1.2.2). In recent years, we have also witnessed a rise of studies accounting for these cross-national and cross-temporal variations looking at the *supply side*, e.g. the characteristics and behaviours of political parties (see section 1.3 for a brief review). However, we know

surprisingly little about *why* social structure affects political preferences in the first place (e.g. Svallfors 2006: 7, Evans 2010: 637-638, Bengtsson et al. 2013: 695). Kiser and Hechter (1991: 5) claim that "[a] complete explanation must specify a mechanism that describes the process by which one variable influences the other, in other words, how it is that X produces Y." However, we lack such complete explanations for the relationship between social structure and political preferences. In fact, once every decade, Evans (2000, 2010, 2017) has emphasised the lack of knowledge on the mechanisms connecting structural factors such as class and religion to political preferences in general and voting in particular. While there are a few studies out there (for a brief review see Evans 2017: 190-192), there has been a substantial gap in the literature for many years. This dissertation aims to contribute to filling that gap, by answering the overarching research question *how and why does social background affect political preferences, in particular party preference?*

The research question hinges on the fundamental premise that social structure still affects political preferences. In section 1.2.2, I therefore first discuss the claim that social cleavages are on the decline and hardly matter anymore. I demonstrate that social background is still a major antecedent of political behaviour in the 21st century. The demonstrated importance justifies the research question of the thesis.

I then answer the research question, first, by drawing on insights from the recent political supply side literature to develop a general theory of how party characteristics affect the very mechanisms connecting social structure to political preferences. This is briefly laid out in section 1.3, and further elaborated on in chapter 3 and 4. I test the theory on the class cleavage (chapter 3) and religious cleavage (chapter 4), because these two are traditionally considered to be most important and are also by far the most studied cleavages (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008: 25, Jansen 2011, Evans and de Graaf 2013). The second part of the answer takes on the rising influence of globalisation and the suggested implications for the mechanisms connecting social structure – notably class and education – to political preferences. This part is discussed briefly in section 1.3.2, and expanded on in chapter 5, which is co-authored with Rune Stubager.

Third, I introduce the data sets employed in all the chapters of the thesis. In addition, section 1.4 discusses conceptual and measurements issues of relevance, such as how I understand class, or how to measure cleavage voting. This discussion points forward to chapter 2, which is co-authored with Oddbjørn Knutsen. The chapter takes a closer look at the claim that the most commonly used class schema – the EGP schema – is outdated and no

longer able to explain political behaviour. The conclusion is that the criticism is exaggerated and that the schema has similar explanatory power to the proposed alternative of the critics. The findings from chapter 2, along with the extensive previous use and cross-validation of the EGP schema, then justifies its use in chapter 3 and 5.

Finally, section 1.5 summarises the dissertation, discusses its implications, and suggests some avenues for future research.

1.2 Analytical framework

1.2.1 Different perspectives on electoral behaviour

De Graaf et al. (1995) distinguish between two grand perspectives on individual political behaviour. First, the "economic" theory of political behaviour (e.g. Downs 1957). According to this perspective, people are rational and self-interested, and voters will choose the parties that maximise their utility. Second, voting can be a social act rather than an instrumental one, and the identity to be expressed can be developed through interaction with others – in other words, through political socialisation. De Graaf et al. (1995) call this perspective the "expressive theory" (see also Heath et al. 1985). The more people interact within a group, the more likely they are to influence each other (Zuckerman et al. 2007: 31), and people tend to interact most with people in the same class or religion due to clustering in families, schools, workplaces, and neighbourhoods (e.g. Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007).

Within these grander perspectives, there is research on how candidate images affect vote choice (see, e.g. Garzia 2017, Evans 2017, Zittel 2017, Klein and Rosar 2017), and how voters choose parties that they either agree with on issues or who they find most competent on valence issues (for an overview, see van der Brug 2017 and Green and Jennings 2017). There is also a large literature on how the economic conditions in a country affects support for the incumbents (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, Lewis-Beck and Costa Lobo 2017), and on how more fundamental values affect voting (for an overview, see Lachat 2017). Ever since the early days of electoral research, there are studies on how social background affects voting.

Clearly, all these different strands of research have contributed immensely to our understanding of electoral behaviour. Fortunately, we are not forced to choose among them – they can be seen as complementary, rather than rivalling, explanations. This is the inherent

logic in the "funnel of causality", established in the pioneering work of Campbell et al. (1960). While much can be said about the temporal sequence of variables and causal arrows between them, the role of party identity, and so on, my main point here is that this model – which is still hugely influential (Arzheimer et al. 2017: 2) – emphasises the interplay and complementary role of different explanations. Fundamental conflicts of interest in society arise from the economic structure, social divisions, and regional alignments. These factors establish the long-term political alignments in society, whereas elements closer to the end of the funnel (such as issue opinions and economic conditions) create short-term fluctuations in vote choice (see also Dalton 2014: 184-186).

A similar logic may be found in the conceptual framework employed in the edited volume of Thomassen (2005), and which is depicted in figure 1. Here, social structural variables affect long-term predispositions such as party identity, value orientations, and ideological orientations, which in turn affect short-term factors such as issue positions, retrospective judgements, and leader evaluations. These factors, in the end, affect party preference. However, figure 1 emphasises how the political-institutional context may affect all of these relationships. This is a point that I will come back to later.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of *the European Voter*.



Source: Thomassen (2005: 8).

The elements in the funnel depicted in figure 1 have thus been found to be important across time and space. However, it is certainly possible to add or emphasise other elements. For instance, in recent years, there has been a rise in studies of the role of genetics (see Bergner and Hatemi 2017 for an overview) and emotions (see Redlawsk and Pierce 2017) in political behaviour.

Hence, all aspects of the funnel (as well as other aspects identified by later scholars) are valid and legitimate objects of study for electoral researchers. Yet there are some good reasons to study social structural variables. First, they are still important predictors of electoral behaviour, a point that will be elaborated on below. Second, social structural variables are not as troubled by endogeneity issues as many of the other factors are. While people sometimes take cues from their parties on political issues (e.g. Lupia 1994, Levendusky 2010), and their evaluations of the state of the economy is affected by their partisanship (e.g. Evans and Anderson 2006), people are much less likely to choose their class, religion or gender based on their party loyalties. This is not only a methodological point. Rather, my claim is that we learn something substantial about politics by studying how fundamental and non-political factors such as a person's job or gender affects their political views and behaviour.

Finally, studies of social background may improve our understanding of other variables further along the funnel of causality (see Evans 2017: 180-181 for a similar argument). As Arzheimer et al. (2017: 3) put it, "it remains a difficult argument to make that, even where the direct causal link of social structure on vote is broken, the more proximate explanations of vote, such as attitudes towards policies and leaders, derive from something other than social context." Simply put, candidate images, issue positions, and evaluations of the economy may all depend on an individual's social background, such as their class or religion. Ronny, the worker from the introduction, is more likely to have a positive view of a working class candidate than an affluent person from the upper middle class (Heath 2015: 177). He is also more likely to be harder hit and react more strongly to economic recession (e.g. Weatherford 1978). Furthermore, there may be interesting interaction effects between social factors and other factors in the funnel. Studying social background is thus important not only to understand party preference itself, but also to understand the inter-relationship between the different factors that affect the vote. In the next section, I discuss a prominent claim to the contrary, namely that social background does not matter all that much for political preferences anymore.

1.2.2 Social structure: Still important in the 21st century

This dissertation aspires to contributing to fill the knowledge gap on how and why social structure affects political behaviour. However, this begs the question: Is there much of an effect to account for in the first place? If social structural variables are not related to political behaviour anymore, then it is hard to justify devoting an entire dissertation to their study.

The modern classics in the field of political behaviour certainly considered social structure to be of great importance. The Columbia school went, perhaps, the furthest, announcing that "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially" (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948: 27). Their empirical analyses demonstrated that socioeconomic class, religious and ethnic groups, and urban-rural residence served as the social carriers of political traditions (Berelson et al. 1954: 73). The Michigan school followed up on this work (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960/1980). Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work on political conflict in Western Europe also echoed this sentiment. The conflicts they describe are similar to those described by the Columbia and Michigan schools in the US, between centre and periphery, state and church, land and industry, and finally, owners and workers. In other words, in the mid-20th century, cleavage politics was alive and kicking in Western democracies and political science.

Then something happened. Social scientists noted that the relationship between social groups and politics was on the decline. For the next four decades, cleavage scholars largely debated whether class and religion had become less important and why (for just a few examples, see Lipset 1981, Heath et al. 1985, Inglehart 1990, Franklin et al. 1992, Dogan 1995, Hout et al. 1995, Nieuwbeerta 1995, Evans 1999). This debate was methodological, substantial, and long – and has been summarised neatly in many recent contributions to the literature (e.g. Knutsen 2006: ch. 1, 2007, Jansen 2011: ch. 1, or Evans 2017). I will thus not repeat that exercise here. In brief, at the turn of the millennium, the general conclusion was that class had declined in importance, while scholars of religious voting did not uniformly find a similar decline (e.g. Knutsen 2004b, Elff 2007, 2009, Olson and Green 2006).

Alongside the alleged decline of cleavages in politics, the *study* of these cleavages also moved from the centre to the periphery of political science (see Evans 2017: 180). This is true for the study of religious voting as well as class, despite the former not obviously being in decline. However, this was – and is – often assumed, as both laymen and political scientists tend to ignore the fact that a change in the relative size of groups does not necessarily imply a decline in the differences between them (see also Elff and Roßteutscher 2017). Even in Norway, the birthplace of Stein Rokkan and a cornerstone of class voting for decades, the last

two National Election Studies no longer devote a chapter to social background (Aardal 2011, Aardal and Bergh 2015).

Contrary to popular opinion, religion still plays a major role in determining people's party preference. Figure 2 displays the relationship between religion and voting in Norway[1], one of the most secularised countries in the world, where less than 10% of the population are actively religious. Yet religion still sharply divides the electorates of many parties. The Communist and Left Socialist parties, *Rødt* and *SV*, are both massively overrepresented among the secular voters (comprising around half of the population), while active Protestants (those who go to church, see section 1.4.2) avoid these parties. Those with no denomination are more than three times as likely to vote *SV* as passive Protestants (comprising around 40% of the population), while they are more than *ten times* more likely to do so than the active Protestants. The Christian Democratic *KrF* is a party for the religious crowd: While almost 40% of all active Protestants in Norway vote for this party, less than two percent of the other groups do so. Even the two largest, catch-all parties – the Conservative *Høyre* and the Social Democratic *Arbeiderpartiet* – are clearly overrepresented among passive Protestants, the latter also being quite dramatically underrepresented among active Protestants.

[1] The data in this section is drawn from the European Values Study 2008-2010, which is the main data source used also elsewhere in this dissertation. The data set is introduced in more detail later in this chapter.

Figure 2. Religion and party preference in Norway.



Note: Different Y axes. Data from the European Values Study 2008.

Norway is one of the most secularised countries in the world. The connection between religion and party preference is much stronger in some other West European countries. Take, for instance, Austria (figure 3). More than half of all the active Catholics vote for the Christian Democratic *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP). On the other hand, less than 20% of the Protestants and Catholics do the same. Among those with no denomination, only 8% support the ÖVP. In other words, there is a massive 46 percentage points difference between the active Catholics and those with no denomination. These are not marginal groups: About a quarter of the Austrian population are active Catholics, while about a fifth of the population belongs to no denomination. The ÖVP is among the most important Austrian parties.

Figure 3. Religion and party preference in Austria.



Note: Different Y axes. Data from the European Values Study 2008.

The ÖVP is, of course, a Christian Democratic party. Yet religious differences roam large for most of the Austrian parties except the minor Radical Right party, the *BZÖ*. The Green party has a clear basis among those with no denomination and the Protestants, while active Catholics shun this party. The same is true for the Radical Right party, the *FPÖ*. Those with no denomination are 20 percentage points – and five times – more likely to vote for the FPÖ than the active Catholics.

This is well known among scholars of religious voting, and the importance of religion is of course not limited to Norway or Austria. Rather, the data reported above illustrate the broader phenomenon: Religion is associated with party choice in countries such as the USA (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997, Olson and Green 2006), Canada (Johnston 1985, Bélanger and Eagles 2006), Australia (Bean 1999), in EU elections (Van der Brug et al. 2009), and across Western Europe (see Broughton and ten Napel 2000, and, more recently, Knutsen and Langsæther 2018). Yet it is "widely assumed" that the role of religion is on the wane (Elff and Rossteutscher 2017: 199).

What about class? The British sociologist Richard Hoggart (1989) observed that "every decade we shiftily declare we have buried class: each decade the coffin stays empty." Class voting has declined in many countries, although often from a very high level. It is probably this combination that has led so many to believe that class is no longer important. Compared to class voting in the 1950s, perhaps not. Compared to most other explanatory variables, it remains an important predictor of vote choice. Simply put: The working class friends of Ronny, the construction worker from the introductory paragraph, are less likely to vote Labour than Ronny's father – but they are still much more likely to do so than the middle class people on the affluent West end of Oslo, Norway's capital.

To take but one example: The chapter on social structure in the latest Danish National Election Study starts off by noting that social background, and class in particular, has declined in importance (Goul Andersen 2017: 41). This is true. Yet the empirical analysis demonstrates staggering class differences in support for many of the parties. Goul Andersen (2017: 56) distinguishes between four classes: Workers, lower service class, higher service class, and the self-employed. The Social Democrats attract a mere 11% of the self-employed, 18% of the higher service class, 25% of the lower service class, and 31% of the workers. In other words, a worker is *twenty percentage points* – or three times – more likely to vote for the largest party in Denmark than the self-employed. This surpasses the effect of several issues or attitudinal variables, despite the latter being "so proximate to party choice that they constitute part of what is to be explained" (Evans 2017: 180). The largest non-socialist party, *Venstre*, has the opposite class basis, only obtaining 16% of the working class vote, but an impressive 30% among the self-employed. The large Radical Right party in Denmark, *Dansk Folkeparti,* is twice as popular – a 15-percentage points difference – among the workers as among the higher service class.

Moving from one Scandinavian country to another, the Swedish National Election study uses a somewhat more detailed class schema than the Danish one. In the 2014 General Election[2], almost half of the workers in Sweden voted for the Social Democratic party, while less than a fifth of the service class and the entrepreneurs did the same. There is a 29 percentage points difference between the industrial workers and the service class and entrepreneurs. Workers were *five times* more likely to vote for the Swedish Radical Right party, *Sverigedemokraterna,* than the higher service class, while the latter was five times more likely than non-industrial workers and *eleven times* more likely than industrial workers to vote

[2] The last election for which we have data; the September 2018 Election data are not available yet.

for the Liberal party, *Liberalerna* (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 80-84). Yet the section on class has the underwhelming subtitle "Is there still a class cleavage?" (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 84).

In the UK, one of the countries where class has dropped substantially as a predictor of party choice, the "New" Labour certainly lost appeal among the working class, to the extent that Labour as late as 2015 no longer could be considered a working class party. In the British Election Study 2015, the party obtained around 20% of the vote in the old middle class, the junior middle class, and the working class, while being closer to 30% in the new middle class (Evans and Tilley 2017: 152).

However, that does not mean that class voting is dead in the UK. While only 20% of the workers vote Conservative, 46% of the old middle class does the same, a 26 percentage points difference. So where have the workers gone? In the absence of a clear working class alternative, many of them have left the voting booth. While only 19% of the old and new middle class stayed home in the 2015 elections, more than a third of all workers did not vote. The decline in class voting notably for Labour, then, has been accompanied by a rise in class non-voting (see Heath 2016, Evans and Tilley 2017: ch. 8). And the main reason that class is not important for party choice in the UK is not because the *classes* are dead. On the contrary, the classes are just as distinct in terms of their economic situation, identity and ideologies as 50 years ago (Evans and Tilley 2017: ch. 2-4). It is the *parties* that have become more similar in terms of policy (e.g. Evans and Tilley 2012), class appeals (Thau 2017), and personnel (Heath 2015, 2016), thus reducing the incentives for classes to vote differently. In other words, class voting may be revived in the UK if the parties change their behaviour. When the classes were allowed to express their interests and values more directly, in the Brexit vote, they did. Evans and Tilley (2017: 202) thus describe the differences in the Brexit referendum by class and education as "enormous": 63 per cent of people in working class jobs voted to leave, while 44% in the new middle class did the same.

In chapter 3 and 5, I employ indexes of the perhaps most central political value orientations in Western Europe, namely economic left-right values and immigration orientations.[3] Issues related to these value orientations are essential in most Western democracies. To illustrate further the fact that class is not dead, I compare the association

[3] The indexes are based on substantial questions about the respondents' views on such issues as income inequality or the state's role in the economy, or views on immigrants (are they a strain on the welfare state, are they a cultural threat, etc.). They were developed and validated by Oddbjørn Knutsen (2018). For more details on how they were constructed, see Knutsen (2018) or chapter 3 and 5 in this dissertation and their appendices.

between class and these value orientations with the association between self-reported left-right placement and the value orientations, using the EVS data. Left-right traditionally had to do solely with the extent of government intervention in the economy (Mair 2007: 206-207, see also Downs 1957). In recent years, this "super-dimension" has also captured differences in New Politics, most notably immigration orientations. Previous research has thus found that both economic ideology and immigration orientations correlate strongly with left-right self-placement (e.g. De Vries et al 2013).

The left panel of figure 4 shows the association between *class* and economic left-right values in the pooled data from all the 18 Western European countries in the European Values Study[4], including country fixed effects. The value index goes from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The right panel of figure 4 shows the association between *left-right self-placement* and economic left-right values, including country fixed effects.

[4] I.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain.

Figure 4. The relationship between class and economic left-right values (left panel) compared to the relationship between left-right self-placement and economic left-right values (right panel).



The left panel shows a familiar pattern (e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2013). The workers and routine non-manual employees are most left-wing. The higher service class and petite bourgeoisie are most right-wing, and the lower service class is somewhere in between. In fact, the difference between the higher service class and petite bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the workers on the other, is equivalent of moving *more than three units* on the 10 point left-right self-placement scale, or approximately 1.5 standard deviations. This is a highly substantial difference.

Figure 5 repeats the exercise, but now for immigration orientations. The index goes from 0 (pro-immigration) to 10 (anti-immigration). Again, the pattern in the left panel is well-established in previous literature (e.g. Oskarson and Demker 2013: 182). The workers are most sceptical of immigration, along with the petite bourgeoisie – unsurprisingly, these groups make up the core electorate of many Radical Right parties (see, e.g., Ivarsflaten 2005, Oesch 2013). The routine non-manual employees are in an intermediate position, while the service classes are clearly most positive to immigration. The difference between the service

classes on the one hand, and the workers and petite bourgeoisie on the other, is equivalent of moving *four units* on the left-right self-placement scale, or approximately two standard deviations.[5] The coffin is empty, indeed.

Figure 5. The relationship between class and immigration orientations (left panel) compared to the relationship between left-right self-placement and immigration orientations (right panel).



Social structural variables such as class and religion are still strongly related to political values and party preference across Western Europe. This dissertation is not on the importance of social structure, but on the mechanisms connecting it to political preferences. However, this section provides a corrective to the widespread belief that social structure no longer matters, and to justify the research question. I have illustrated how trends (decline) and levels

[5] Some scholars believe these differences in immigration orientations to reflect educational rather than class, differences. While I later argue that the concepts are closely related and that it is not easy to separate them, I re-run these models with controls for education. The class pattern remains the same, although the differences are smaller. Controlling for education, the difference between the higher service class and the workers/petite bourgeoisie is roughly equivalent to moving two units on the left-right self-placement scale, or approximately one standard deviation – still a substantial difference.

(still high) are sometimes confused in the literature, using examples from Scandinavian national electoral studies. I would like to emphasise that this is not because I wish to criticise these otherwise excellent book chapters in particular, but simply because they are written in languages I am familiar with.

Having established the continued importance of social structure, I now move on to present the particular theoretical framework that informs my analyses of the structural antecedents of political behaviour, namely cleavage theory.

1.2.3 Cleavage politics.

The seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on *cleavages* has been a dominant framework for electoral researchers' understanding of social background. The two scholars unfortunately never defined the term that would become the basis of several important research agendas. However, more than twenty years later, Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990) came up with a three-part definition. A cleavage must have

> an empirical element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an organizational/behavioral element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage. (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215)

This definition is highly useful, but there is one aspect of it that is potentially problematic: The requirement of self-consciousness. For some cleavages, such as the religious one, this is perhaps not a serious problem. Most Protestants probably identify as Protestant to some degree. But does the routine non-manual employees identify as such? And is that really necessary for class to constitute a cleavage? Not according to Oddbjørn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough, who omit the requirement of self-consciousness.

> First, a cleavage is rooted in a relatively persistent social division which gives rise to 'objectively' identifiable groups within a society – according to class, religion, economic, or cultural interests, or whatever. Secondly, a cleavage engages some set of values common to members of the group; group members know a 'common life' in so far as

> they share the same value orientation. Thirdly a cleavage is institutionalized in some form of organization – most commonly a political party. (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494).

Classes – or age groups, or whatever else – may develop a common identity, but they do not have to. It suffices that they share some common way of life, which makes them politically distinct groups in terms of political values and party preference. Knutsen and Scarbrough's definition thus allows groups to behave similarly politically *either* due to a common identity *or* due to similar life circumstances (or both). For this reason, their definition is the one applied in this dissertation.

Many scholars seem to follow a theory of cleavage voting as a phenomenon that occurs because social background affects people's political values, which subsequently affect their party preference (Oskarson 2016: 254). In other words, class, religion or gender may have indirect effects on party preference through political values (or through policy preferences). As discussed in chapter 4, this causal model underlies so much of the work in the field that it can be considered the dominant theory of cleavage voting. It has its roots in the classic works. The Michigan school, for instance, theorises that social-structural variables affect social-psychological attributes such as political attitudes and partisan identification, which then affect vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960/1980). This is similar to the view expressed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who claimed that social structure affects people's interests and values. As such, Knutsen (2018: 9) states that the causal model in both "Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis and Kitschelt's model (…) can be understood as being focussed on the indirect effect from social structure via value orientations to party choice." The theory is even an integral part of the very definition of a cleavage, as stated above, where a group shares value orientations and organises politically. Recent examples include Evans and de Graaf (2013: 16), who state that "…the class-party choice association is assumed to be explainable via voters' positions on a dimension of 'economic left-right ideology'." They employ a similar model for religious voting, where the link between religion and party choice is assumed to be explainable via voters' positions on a dimension of cultural conservatism (Evans and de Graaf 2013: 18).

This particular version of cleavage voting goes under many names, e.g. the indirect pathway (Duriez et al. 2002: 35) or cleavage voting (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 500). Throughout this dissertation, I follow Tilley (2015) and label this the *indirect effect* of a social structural variable on party choice. Martin, the construction worker from the introduction, yields a good example of an indirect effect of social background on party preference. Since he

is a worker, he dislikes income inequality and votes for Labour, a party in favour of redistribution and against social dumping. This kind of explanation is compatible with both the socio-psychological approach as well as the more rational choice-oriented one discussed above. Martin ends up voting for a party that represents his interests and values. Whether Martin (and people like him) calculates that he gets the highest utility from holding leftist values and voting Labour, or he votes Labour because their policies are in-line with his deep-rooted, politically socialised values, is a question for another thesis to answer.

While this perspective is dominant, cleavage theorists are also aware of another way in which social background affects party preference. Historical ties can exist between social groups and political parties. Some groups are affiliated to certain political parties because of events that happened a long time ago, what we may call frozen party alignments. According to Berelson et al. (1954: 73), American Jews voted Democratic in the 1950s partly because of Roosevelt's interventionist stand against Hitler, while African Americans did so partly because of the New Deal. These party ties may be transmitted between generations through parental socialisation. In this case, the political behaviour is influenced through a sense of belonging to the group, regardless of shared values or attitudes. This could also occur if a person votes out of a sense of belonging because the candidate belongs to his or her group, or because a party makes group appeals that induce a feeling that the party represents the group (see Thau 2017).

Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995: 499) label this structural voting, while Duriez et al. (2002: 35) use the term the direct pathway, e.g. when Catholics in Flandern vote for the Christian Democrats simply because they are considered to be the political representative of that particular social group. Throughout this dissertation, I follow Tilley (2015) and use the term *direct effect* to describe this kind of association between social structural variables and party preference.

Another potential example of a direct effect would be if women vote for women candidates because of their gender (see, e.g., Campbell and Heath 2017). In the Democratic primary elections in Michigan in 2018, the young voter Elanor Carey said to the Norwegian newspaper *Klassekampen* that "I support female candidates and will definitely vote for Gretchen Withmer. But I liked El-Sayeds policies more." (Grasaas-Stavenes 2018, my translation). This is a good example of a direct effect of gender on vote choice. The direct effect can be seen as "the idea that religious or class politics reflects an almost unthinking adherence to organizations representing religious principles or class interests" (Evans and De

Graaf 2013: viii). Direct effects of social structure are thus less compatible with the rational choice approach, while they follow naturally from the expressive theory of voting (although they are not necessarily irrational, as I discuss in section 1.5).

These two versions of cleavage voting (depicted in figure 6) may be considered different *mechanisms* through which social background affects political preferences. Directly, due to frozen party alignments and group identities, or indirectly, through political values.

Figure 6. The standard cleavage voting model.



1.3 Mechanisms: How and why does social structure affect political preferences?

My starting point is the theory of cleavage voting, as laid out above. While scholars are aware of the two possible ways in which social background may affect party preference, existing scholarship has little to say about which mechanism is most important, or rather, under which conditions the different mechanisms are at work.

While there are many studies on the relationship between social structural variables and political values, I am unaware of any study that empirically quantifies the importance of political values as a mechanism connecting social groups and party preference.[6] Hence, in chapter 3, I test whether and to what degree economic left-right values, environmentalism, and immigration orientations account for class voting. These political values are important, as

[6] Considering policy attitudes rather than political values, a study by Weakliem and Heath (1994) tested to which degree attitudes to economic issues mediated class voting. These authors found that in Britain, about a third of class differences in Labour support disappears after controlling for such attitudes.

theorised – they account for a fifth to a third of class voting. Yet systematic class differences remain unexplained. The dominant cleavage model, theorising an indirect effect of social structure, is not sufficient to account for even half of the class voting in Western Europe. However, given the substantial amount of survey measurement error and statistical noise, the fact that 20-35% of class voting is estimated to work through political values is not at all trivial.

What about religion? Most authors in the literature assumes that religion exerts its effect, or at least much of its effect, on party preference because religion affects an individual's political values (for a brief review, see chapter 4). However, very few studies have tested this empirically. The most important exception that I am aware of is Tilley's (2015) excellent study on the mechanisms connecting religion to party preference in the UK. Tilley finds that political values do not account for religious voting, and concludes that in Britain, the effect of religion is direct, not indirect. I extend this test to cover 50 parties in 13 West European countries. In chapter 4, I first estimate the religious differences in party preference for each party, and test to what degree traditional-progressive values account for these differences. For most parties, these values account for between one tenth and one fifth of the religious differences in party support. This is substantial. Yet for religion, as for class, the direct effect seems most important, in line with Tilley's (2015) findings.

While the direct effect is most important for both class and religion, there is plenty of variation. Under what conditions do the mechanisms work? To answer this question and arrive at a general theory of how social groups affect party preference, I draw on insights from recent developments in the *supply side* literature, i.e. studies that focus on how parties affect cleavage voting.

It seems as if something is missing if we model the relationship between social groups, values, and party preference, without taking into account traits of the *parties* themselves. The idea that parties must articulate the interests of classes for class voting to occur is not new. In his review of the field in the 1960s, Sartori (1969) criticised political sociology for ignoring the role of politics and political parties. He stated that political sociology needs "a joint assessment of the extent to which parties are dependent variables reflecting social stratification and cleavages and, vice versa, of the extent to which these cleavages reflect the channelling imprint of a structured party system" (Sartori 1969: 214). He did, however, mention Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) introductory chapter as an exception, where politics emerged as an independent factor. While this idea obtained prominent

adherents throughout the next decades (e.g. Przeworski 1985, Przeworski and Sprague 1986), it seems safe to say that there has been a further revival of Sartori's perspective in recent years. Thus, Thomassen (2005: 265) concludes his edited volume by stating that "electoral behaviour is primarily *political* behaviour that is shaped by the supply side of politics at least as much as by autonomous processes in society". In broad terms, the theoretical approach (often labelled "top-down") imply that "the strength of social divisions in political preferences are argued to derive from the choices offered to voters by politicians and parties" (Evans 2017: 185).

So far, this literature has focused on party polarisation in the domain of economic left-right ideology or redistributive policy choices. The main claim is that the decline in class voting is due to the convergence of mainstream parties in economic ideology or policies. Party polarisation is connected to the strength of party cues, i.e. signal strength (see Levendusky 2010: 114-115). The empirical findings demonstrate that party polarisation does indeed affect the level of class voting (e.g. Oskarson 2005, Jansen 2011, Evans and Tilley 2012a, 2012b, Evans and de Graaf 2013, Spies 2013). One study demonstrates that not only polarisation or position, but also the salience of economic left-right issues, matter for levels of class voting (Rennwald and Evans 2014). The notion that salience is also related to signal strength makes intuitive sense. Parties may hold very different positions and thus be quite polarised on certain issues that are rarely discussed, and there is little reason to expect voters to pick up on these differences. Furthermore, previous research has found that "when parties talk more about an issue, voters see a stronger connection between the party and the issue" (Seeberg et al. 2017: 340).

This emerging literature, then, has proved that the behaviour of parties affects the levels of class voting. The mechanism at work is really one where ideological convergence is considered to reduce the strength of the signal from parties to voters as well as the motivation for choosing parties based on class-derived interests or values (Evans 2017: 185).

While most research has been on class, a few studies have looked at religion as well. As such, Elff (2007, 2009) finds that party polarisation on issues related to morality affects the level of religious voting, while Jansen (2011: ch. 5) finds that the parties' emphasis on moral issues correlates with the level of religious voting in the Netherlands over time. Figure 7 depicts a more generalised version of the arguments and causal diagrams in Evans and de Graaf (2013: 17-18).

Figure 7. How party characteristics affect cleavage voting.



From this (or similar models), the authors within the supply side literature derive the hypothesis that party policy polarisation (or, in a few cases, salience) increases the levels of class (or religious) voting. However, as I argue in chapter 3 and 4, there is reason to believe that party behaviour affects not only the *strength* of class voting and religious voting, but the very mechanisms through which these social groups exert their effects on party preference. If a social group such as a class is to affect party preference through political values, then class must affect the political values, and crucially, these political values must affect party preference (cf. the cleavage model in figure 6). Yet this latter phenomenon will only occur when the party sends clear signals on issues of relevance to the political value orientation (cf. figure 7). Clearly, parties and party families send signals of different strength on different issues.

The crux of this dissertation, then, is the development of a general theory of how and why social structure affects party preference. The effect will be indirect through political values, to the extent that the group holds a distinct set of political values and to the extent that political parties emphasise issues of relevance to those issues. Both of these factors may vary in time and space, affecting the nature of cleavage voting.

Let's go back to Ronny and Martin, the two construction workers from the introduction of this chapter. They were both voting for Labour, albeit for different reasons. Ronny derived from his working class background a sense of *belonging* that made him vote for Labour. They represented *his kind of people*. The effect of class, for him, is direct. He doesn't follow political news. If Labour changed its policies, Ronny would still vote for them

for years, without knowing that they no longer represent his political views. Martin, on the other hand, votes Labour because that is the party he judges to be closest to his political views. Martin derived from his working class background economic leftist values, and it is on the basis of these that he votes Labour. If Labour makes dramatic policy changes in this area, Martin will notice, and he will find another party – or perhaps stop voting altogether, like so many of his comrades (Evans and Tilley 2017: ch. 8).

As discussed, some groups are affiliated to certain political parties because of events that happened a long time ago, what we may call frozen party alignments. British Catholics vote Labour partly because of Labour's support of Irish Home Rule back in the day. Catholics in the UK are strongly overrepresented among Labour's voters. This overrepresentation of Catholics can be seen in the left hand panel of figure 8, which is the actual support for Labour in the UK among different religious groups in the European Values Study. As is clear, Labour is overrepresented among Catholics.

Figure 8. Illustration of direct and indirect effects of religion.



Imagine for a moment a middle-aged Catholic woman named Mary. Her parents were Irish, but she is born and raised in England. She reads the news from time to time and notices the most important political developments of the day. Just like most of the members of her local congregation, she votes Labour. She knows that it is the party for Catholics. This, by the way, is true regardless of their class membership. Catholics are overrepresented among Labour voters even when controlling for class, income, education, private schooling, housing type,

employment status, employment sector, trade union membership, sex, birth cohort, region, and ethnicity (Tilley 2015).

Mary is socially conservative. She is very much against abortion and gay marriage. Yet she votes for the somewhat socially liberal Labour. How is this possible? The reason is simple. When she reads the news, she rarely reads about Labour's position on moral issues. In fact, neither Labour, the Conservatives, nor the Liberal Democrats had a single reference to morality issues in their party manifestos in 2010 (Larsen et al. 2012: 117). Abortion seems "impossible to politicise" (ibid.: 123), assisted reproductive technologies and stem-cell research are "completely ignored or relegated to discussions of scientific expertise" (ibid.: 127) and euthanasia is "close to being non-existent as a political issue here" (ibid.: 132). In other words, Mary can thus follow politics and still not realise that she disagrees with Labour in fundamental questions. Even if she does notice, she will very rarely be reminded of it or forced to respond to it. The religious differences in Labour support are thus less likely to be accounted for by traditional-progressive values. The effect is likely to be direct.

However, let us imagine that Labour in the next campaign makes gay marriage and free abortion their most important issues. The political debates are on these issues. Euthanasia is all over the news. Every day, Mary has to read or hear Labour politicians making statements that are fundamentally opposed to her own values. Like many other Catholics, especially the active ones, she will not vote Labour in this election. At the same time, some atheists and secular voters would be attracted by Labour's focus on these issues. This could create a distribution of support similar to the one in the right panel of figure 8 (which is fictional). These new differences between religious groups are much more likely to be due to the groups' different traditional-progressive values. The effect of religion is now indirect. This illustrates my theoretical point: The behaviour of parties affects the *mechanism* through which social groups are connected to political parties, namely whether the effect is direct or indirect. The causal model in figure 7 needs an arrow also from party characteristics to the direct pathway (the arrow between social groups and party preference). This has potential democratic implications, as laid out in section 1.5.

To sum up this section, there is a need for more knowledge on the mechanisms connecting social groups to party preference. Cleavage theory suggests that the mechanism may be direct, due to frozen party alignments and group identities, or indirect through political values. This dissertation contributes to expanding our knowledge by i) testing the

importance of these mechanisms, and ii) suggesting and testing a theory wherein party behaviour affects the likelihood of seeing either mechanism at work.

1.3.1 Testing the argument on class and religion

As discussed above, political values can only affect party preference if the party sends clear signals on issues of relevance to the political value orientation, and this varies between parties. While Radical Right parties typically send very clear signals on issues related to immigration, for instance, Communist parties are more likely to send clear signals on issues related to economic issues. It follows from the theoretical argument that political values should account for different amounts of class voting for different party families – and this is indeed what I demonstrate in chapter 3.

I study three political value orientations – economic left-right values, environmentalism, and immigration orientations – in twelve countries. As theorised, only economic left-right values account for class voting for party families that send clear signals on economic issues – Communist, Left Socialist, Social Democratic, and Mainstream Right parties. Environmentalism only accounts for class differences in support for Green parties, while immigration orientations account for both Green and Radical Right class voting. This suggests that the theory has merits on the most studied cleavage: Class.

What about the second most studied cleavage, religion? Rather than aggregating to party families, as in chapter 3, I gather data on individual parties from 13 Western European countries in chapter 4. I first estimate the religious differences in party preference for each party, and test to what degree traditional-progressive values account for these differences. As suggested, they vary: While none of the religious differences for the British Conservatives are accounted for by such values, about 60% of the religious differences in support for the Left Socialist *Izquierda Unida* in Spain are accounted for.

I then calculate the *salience* of policy issues related to traditional-progressive values for each party. The more salient a policy issue is for a party, the clearer signals the party sends on their position on that issue. The results suggest that the more salient these issues are for a party, the more of the religious difference in party preference are accounted for by these values. It is at the core the same theoretical proposition that is tested here as in chapter 3: Political values account for religious voting, but only to the degree that parties emphasise policy positions of relevance to the political values in question – this time, *moral* values. The

models contain country fixed effects, thus controlling away all features of the party system, including, crucially, policy polarisation.

One final issue remains, namely that of reverse causality. Supply side theories assume that party behaviour affects voters, e.g. that party polarisation increases the level of class voting. However, it is of course possible that the parties are aware of their class basis, and that this affects the stances that they take. A social democratic party that knows its core voters are workers may, for instance, avoid moving too close to the right on economic issues, so as not to lose the votes of the workers. In contrast, a social democratic party with equal support in the middle and working classes may be more willing to move to the right. In that case, the level of class voting affects the party (de)polarisation, rather than – or in addition to – the other way around.

Parties are likely to know quite a bit about the social background of their voters, given that this information is often openly available through polls and reported in the media. Some parties also run their own polls or collect statistics on their members. The problem of reverse causality is thus a real issue for those claiming that party polarisation affects levels of cleavage voting. However, I would argue that this problem is not as acute in my case as it may first seem. The reason is that while parties are likely to be aware of their social basis, they are arguably less likely to be aware of whether the social groups that vote for them do so directly or indirectly – which is the main question under study in chapter 3 and 4 – or the exact extent to which they do so.

Still, it may be that some parties have indications that some groups are tied to them in particular ways, and this may affect the salience they give certain issues. If a Christian Democratic party knows that they can rely on the Catholics to remain loyal, they may give more salience to economic issues to attract other voters. It is thus not entirely certain that there is no reverse causality at play and that may affect the estimates presented in this thesis. This is unfortunately infeasible to deal with given the cross-sectional nature of the data employed in subsequent chapters. Thus, future studies should estimate the importance of direct and indirect cleavage voting for parties in individual countries over long time-spans and use cross-lag models to address the issue of potential reverse causality.

1.3.2 Globalisation and mechanisms: Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

There has been much political discussion on globalisation and its political consequences (for

one review, see Kayser 2007). Within the field of political behaviour, the highly interesting and much-cited works of Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) argue that economic, cultural, and political globalisation processes have created a distinct set of winners and losers in Western Europe. These constitute *political potentials*, which can be articulated by political organisations under the right circumstances. The argument is that this constitutes a new cleavage, on par with or even replacing traditional cleavages such as class and religion.

The authors clearly identify the theoretical mechanisms inducing the new cleavage, such as individuals' factor endowments, exposure to globalisation, and nationalist versus cosmopolitan identity. However, Kriesi et al. (2008: 61) later state that class and education are the most important features distinguishing between winner and losers of globalisation. While this approach makes sense both because class and education probably are related to the core variables discussed above, and for reasons related to data availability, the empirical strategy has some unfortunate consequences.

Chief among these is that the approach does not easily allow us to distinguish between mechanisms that are actually related to globalisation, and mechanisms related to the old and well-known class and educational cleavages. For instance, the model predicts that "lower" classes and educational groups are more fiscally left-wing, more anti-EU, and more anti-immigration than "higher" classes and educational groups. While Kriesi et al. find support for these predictions, unfortunately, the same predictions follow from traditional class and education models. The results may thus be taken as support for mechanisms related to globalisation, but also for the continued relevance of traditional mechanisms related to class and education.

In chapter 5, then, I aspire to disentangle the effects of globalisation processes from the effects of class and education. I obtain measures of exposure to globalisation from the political economy literature, including offshorability of one's job and whether people work in tradeable sectors or sectors that are sheltered from international trade. Furthermore, I obtain measures on whether people identify strongly with the nation state or whether they hold more cosmopolitan identities.

From Kriesi et al.'s theoretical accounts, I derive two testable implications. First, if class and education are proxies for exposure to globalisation and national versus cosmopolitan identity, then direct measures of these experiences should account for a considerable part of the effect of class and education on political preferences. Second, Kriesi et al. (2008: 6) argue that the increased international competition affects individuals across traditional class

boundaries, resulting in "cross-class coalitions". This implies an interaction effect between individuals' class location and their exposure to globalisation, where class differences diminish or disappear among those such exposed.

In chapter 5, I perform empirical tests of these testable implications for the three political attitudes discussed above, namely economic left-right attitudes, EU fears, and immigration orientations, as well as party choice. The tests are performed on the six original countries in Kriesi et al.'s analyses, as well as the three Scandinavian countries, who due to their small and open economies should be especially affected by globalisation. These tests, however, fail to find support for the theoretical propositions.

Yet, it may be that there *is* indeed a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, but that the interaction effect takes on a different form. Recent developments in trade theory suggests that losers of globalisation are low-ability individuals exposed to international competition, because they are most at risk of losing their jobs and suffering from lower wages. On the other hand, high-ability individuals who are exposed to globalisation receive higher wages and can be seen as globalisation winners. If this is the case, then exposure to globalisation has different effects for members of different classes (see, e.g. Walter and Maduz 2009, Walter 2017). This also implies an interaction effect between class and exposure to globalisation, but one where "lower" classes react negatively when exposed, while "higher" classes react positively. However, the empirical tests do not lend support to this view either.

In fact, the globalisation variables turn out to have a quite limited impact on political attitudes as well as party choice, especially when compared to class and education. Neither do they mediate much of the effects of the two traditional variables. Finally, there is little evidence to support cross-class coalitions or heterogeneous effects of exposure to globalisation by class. Rather, the suggested new globalisation cleavage seems to be a replication of the previously known conflicts over class and education.

This does not suggest that processes underlying globalisation have no bearing on how voters behave in West European countries. On the contrary, it follows from traditional accounts of class and educational effects that such events should be expected to have political repercussions, since they may affect the interests and attitudes of different classes and/or educational groups in different ways, thereby creating the potential for political conflict and mobilisation. My claim is thus not that Kriesi et al., or the political economy literature, are wrong to discuss the impact of globalisation on political preferences. However, I argue that

the underlying conflicts yielding differences in party support for classes and educational groups are not primarily centred on the globalisation-related mechanisms discussed above.

The globalisation-related mechanisms that I test in chapter 5 are identified as important in the influential work of Kriesi and colleagues, which is situated within the study of political behaviour. Exposure to globalisation is measured using key indicators from the political economy literature, such as offshorability and tradeability. Despite all this, there may be other relevant indicators. First, the ones I employ are primarily economic, although I also include identity measures. Other variables measuring aspects of immigration, for instance, could be important. Second, my measures focus on individual grievances. However, it may well be that people react sociotropically to globalisation. Just like citizens seem to care more about the state of the national economy than their personal economy when they decide whether to vote for incumbents (Stegmaier et al. 2017: 587), it is possible that voters care more about the impact of globalisation on society at large than they do about the impact on themselves personally. My analyses would not capture such collective grievances, and thus my conclusions are limited to *individual* exposure to globalisation. Future studies may want to use measures of how entire social groups, as well as local areas and regions, are exposed to globalisation in order to obtain the relevant variation.

In sum, chapter 3, 4, and 5 contribute to both theory building, theory refinement and empirical tests of how and why social background – whether that is class, religion, education, or globalisation exposure – affects political preferences.

1.4 Concepts, Measurements, and Data

In this section, I discuss some of the core concepts applied in this dissertation, as well as the measurements of these concepts. I also introduce the data employed throughout the dissertation.

1.4.1 Class

Several parts of this dissertation employs measures of class in the empirical tests of theoretical arguments (see chapter 2, 3, 5). Thousands of pages have been written on the concept of class, and "[t]he sheer variety of things the concept of 'class' appears to cover can sometimes seem bewildering, if not downright contradictory, to those who want to get a handle on it" (Atkinson 2015: 1). Even Karl Marx never defined class clearly (Atkinson 2015:

19). Given the considerable conceptual confusion related to class, a brief discussion seems warranted.

I understand the concept of class such that classes are groups of individuals that share common market and work situations, called "class locations" by John Scott (1994: 934). This understanding is similar to the concept of "economic classes" employed by Jürgen Kocka (1980: 104), in which "families and individuals who, due to a common economic position, share structural presuppositions of manifest interests – in other words: latent interests…". Class is a matter of shared characteristics deriving from similar conditions of employment, to paraphrase Evans and de Graaf (2013: viii).

This diverges from the Marxist notion of classes as groups that either buy or sell labour and are thus either exploiting other people or themselves being exploited. Neo-Marxist schemas such as those developed by Eric Olin Wright (1979, 1997) are thus not suitable for this dissertation – and are in any case not used anymore (Atkinson 2015: 38).

My conceptual understanding of class furthermore diverges from the requirement of what Weber labelled a *social* class – what Marx and Engels (1848) called a "class-for-itself", which they assumed was inevitable in the long run – in that it does not require any sense of class consciousness or common identity, although these *may* develop. It is simply a description of the market and work situation of an individual. This allows objective class positions to affect politics.

Another alternative is Bourdieu-inspired class schemas (Bordieu 1980, 1984, 1998, see also Savage et al. 2013), which focus not on occupations, but rather on a combination of economic, cultural, and social capital. These models, thus, do not conform well to the conceptual understanding of class described above. While they do use information on income or savings, they also include factors such as the number of social contacts held and engagement with "highbrow culture" (Connelly et al. 2016: 3) that are at best indirectly related to market and work situations.

Neo-Durkheimian micro-class schemas (e.g. Grusky and Sørensen 1998, Grusky 2005) evolved as part of a critique of the so-called "big-class schemas". The central claim is that occupations should not be grouped together, since this fails to represent detailed social structures, but should rather be seen as micro-classes of their own. These schemas may easily contain 100 classes (see e.g. Brooks and Svallfors 2010), creating problems for sound statistical analysis (Connelly et al. 2016: 8). While this approach may allow for interesting

and detailed information on how occupations affect political preferences, theoretically derived class schemas with fewer categories seem more suitable for my purposes.

There are thus primarily two candidates when it comes to the choice of measurement of class that I can use in this dissertation, both of which are common in studies of class and political behaviour. The first is the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema (Erikson et al. 1979, Goldthorpe and Erikson 1992), and the second is the schema of Daniel Oesch (2006a, 2006b). These are the primary focus of chapter 2, so I only briefly introduce them here. The EGP schema differentiates positions based on the work situation (authority and autonomy) as well as market situation (including income, degree of income security, career prospects and source of income) of the individual (see also Atkinson 2015: 50-51). Various aspects of income thus make up the market situations that define classes, and these aspects are, by definition, considered constitutive of class membership. The first distinction is Marxist-inspired and separates individuals based on whether a person is an employer, an employee, or self-employed. Furthermore, the employees are separated based on their relationship with their employer.

Daniel Oesch's schema also contains a hierarchical component based on marketable skills. This dimension is measured by considering income and promotion prospects (Oesch 2006b: 274). Oesch (2006b: 274) claims that "an employment relationship essentially boils down to an exchange of work effort for economic resources", meaning that also for Oesch, income is seen as constitutive of class membership. However, he adds a horizontal division based on the work situation of the individual. He separates between technical, organisational, and interpersonal work logics. The schema is developed in part based on a critique of the EGP schema being outdated. Oesch (2006a, 2006b) claims that changes in the new employment structure in the post-industrial societies require a redrawing of the class map, especially to capture distinctions within the middle class. Herbert Kitschelt (2013) shares this view, arguing that the EGP schema no longer accounts for political preference formation, especially for New Right parties.

Chapter 2 is devoted to studying these claims, as they are fundamental to the choice of class schema. I develop and test hypotheses about the explanatory power of these two class schemas for political preferences in Western Europe. Both schemas yield meaningful predictions for the classes' political preferences, and they have quite similar explanatory power. I want to emphasise that the intention of this chapter is not to criticise Oesch's class schema. His schema is theoretically sophisticated and the arguments in favour of further

distinctions within the middle class are convincing. The main point of chapter 2 is rather that students of political preference formation and party choice in Western Europe may safely use both schemas, contrary to the claims of the EGP schema being outdated.

Furthermore, the EGP schema is still "the only systematically validated measure of class position" (Evans and De Graaf 2013: 13; for validations see e.g. Evans 1992, 1996, Evans and Mills 1998, 1999, 2000) and has been used in many class voting studies for decades. For this reason, I employ the EGP schema in the main analyses in chapter 3, where I study the mechanisms connecting class and party preference, as well as in chapter 5, where I study class and globalisation processes.[7]

Another partly conceptual issue in the question of how to understand class, is whether or not to include controls when analysing class, and which controls to include. Clearly, the EGP schema does not allow for controls of income when estimating the total effect of class on political preferences, as various aspects of income are seen as constitutive of class. In fact, even if one considers income to be a *result* of class membership, and thus more of a mediator, the conclusion is the same: Controlling for income will induce post-treatment bias, unless it is explicitly part of a mediation analysis where the goal is to see how much class voting income accounts for.

Perhaps more controversial is the question of whether or not to control for education (for a brief review, see Achterberg and Houtman 2006: 78). Authors such as Rune Stubager (2006, 2010) argue that education should be considered a cleavage of its own, separate from class, while others argue that education is essentially an indicator of class (e.g. Lipset 1981, Wright 1985). Some studies employ controls for education (e.g. Heath 2015) and some do not (e.g. Knutsen 2006).

It is not at all obvious how to handle the issue. Conceptually speaking, education is at least partly different from class. Class is related to *employment relations*, more specifically the market and work situations that come about through these relations. Education is not in itself a measure of the market or work situation brought about by employment relations, but one key function of education is to prepare people for entering the labour market. Thus, one of two core elements used to sort people into EGP classes is, in fact, the extent to which the occupation requires specific education-based knowledge and skills (see Svallfors 2006: 9-10). Oesch (2006b: 271) also uses educational information to allocate people to different classes.

[7] While not reported here, I have replicated many of the analyses in this dissertation with the Oesch schema, and this has never changed any of the substantial conclusions.

Even the occupational ISCO schema that forms the basis of most class schemas is based on skill levels and formal education (Elias 1997: 6-7). The main separation between skilled and unskilled workers lies in their educational levels (Oesch 2006b: 271-272).

In the words of Will Atkinson, in his discussion of Weberian and neo-Weberian approaches to class analysis:

> Amongst those who do not own property – those who must work for others and who make up the majority of the population – there is differentiation according to levels and types of skill and *educational qualification*. This is because different skills and qualifications are of different scarcity, and therefore value, putting their holders in different positions within the labour market (i.e. they can demand different levels of payment) and granting them different life chances. So unskilled workers (drivers, factory hands, cleaners), skilled tradespeople (plumbers, carpenters, builders) and degree-holding professionals (teachers, lawyers, doctors), for example, all have different market situations; they all therefore have different levels and causes of life chances, have different class situations and could even be considered separate classes. (Atkinson 2015: 43-44; my emphasis).

Thus, skills and educational qualifications are seen as a central mechanism that helps sort people into classes. This creates a natural collinearity between class and education, as alluded to by Daniel Oesch:

> In any case, the temptation to play off class against education is somewhat academic as the two concepts are closely linked: access to several classes such as the socio-cultural and technical professions depend upon the successful completion of higher education: being a medical doctor, a lecturer, or an engineer presupposes the existence of a tertiary degree. In contrast, class positions in routine production or service work make the possession of advanced education unlikely, as it is neither requested nor put to effective use in the job. (Oesch 2013: 44)

The above considerations thus suggest that education does, indeed, shape people's market and work situations. However, it is important to note that education is *more* than class, and this additional content may have key implications for political behaviour. Stubager (2008) separates between direct effects of education and allocation effects. The allocation effects are essentially related to the sorting of people into classes. Yet education does also affect cognitive sophistication, and the years spent obtaining an education does entail a certain

amount of political socialisation. Hence, education contains experiences that are entirely unrelated to the labour market and employment relations. It thus makes perfect sense to model education and class simultaneously when trying to disentangle the mechanisms connecting education to political preferences (e.g. Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013).

Similarly, class is more than education. Class contains occupational experiences, identities, and so on that are unrelated to education. Controlling for education when studying class voting thus entails two risks: First, the natural collinearity makes it hard to reliably estimate the independent effect of the two, especially in country specific analyses with fewer units. Second, class voting controlled for education essentially studies only the effect of class experiences unrelated to skills, while controlling away a core aspect of class membership. For this reason, I do not control for education in the main analyses of class voting in chapter 3.

This strategy does, however, come with two risks of its own, one that is worrisome and one that is not. The first is that I may overestimate the effect of class. The point of chapter 3 is not primarily to say something about the total causal effect of class, so this is not a great concern in this context. However, a more serious concern is that I may overestimate the amount of class voting accounted for by immigration orientations and environmentalism. If these primarily account for class differences that would already have been eliminated by controls for education, this is problematic. I thus re-run some of the models with controls for education. These robustness tests indicate that class voting may be overestimated, but the mediating role of these value orientations remain the same. For a full discussion of this, I refer the reader to chapter 3 and its appendix. Thus, the choice of not controlling for education does not threaten any of the main conclusions in the thesis.

Whenever scholars decide what variables to control for, they should at least avoid controlling for the mechanisms through which class is supposed to have its effects. I have already discussed income, but also other variables such as left-right ideology will suppress the real effect of class, thus introducing *post treatment bias* (see e.g. King 2010).

Wrestling with similar issues, Grabb (1980: 371) noted that "[c]learly, it is not possible in one brief discussion to reconcile the various conceptual problems involved in the study of class". Thus the primary purpose of this section is to provide a justification for some of the choices made in the following chapters (e.g. choice of class schemas and control variables), rather than making any definitive statements on best practice.

1.4.2 Religion

Religion is the second most studied cleavage, after class, and played prominent roles in explanations of electoral behaviour already in the classic works of e.g. Berelson et al. (1954), Campbell et al. (1960) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).

There are, generally speaking, two dimensions of the religious cleavage: The denominational aspect and the religiosity aspect (Jansen 2011, Knutsen 2004b). The first is about political differences between members of different denominations, including those who are not a member of any denomination. The second captures political differences between citizens at different levels of religiosity, usually measured by church attendance. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the impact of religion "was more conditioned by whether individuals belong to a social group than whether they believe in religious dogmas, pray more or less frequently, or deem religion as an important dimension in their lives" (Segatti et al. 2011: 18). Despite some authors arguing for the importance of believing (e.g. Nicolet and Tresch 2009), most scholars seem to agree with Lipset and Rokkan. According to Esmer and Petterson (2007: 491), we can sort most of the literature on religion and political behaviour into denominational and religious studies. Teyssier and Côté (2014) review 244 articles – in English and French – on religion and political behaviour from 1956 to 2012 and find nine different ways of operationalising religion. Almost 80% of the articles used a denominational measure, while around 60% applied church attendance. The next on the list, self-declared importance of religion, is only used by 20%.[8]

Often, the two aspects of the religious cleavage are analysed either separately, or simultaneously in a model so that the effect of one aspect is measured independently of the impact of the other (e.g. Bean 1999, Van der Brug et al. 2009, Elff and Rossteutscher 2011). However, as Berelson et al. (1954: 67) noted already in the 1950s in their study of differences between Catholics and Protestants, "if religious affiliation is operative, it should be even stronger among the deeply religious". It is then a question of an interaction between the two aspects of the religious cleavage.

Thus, rather than choosing one of the two, or controlling for one while taking an interest in the other, my categorisation of religion allows us to study both aspects at once. This has been done also by other scholars, who analyse the two aspects simultaneously by sorting citizens into nominal and devout members (the exact terms used vary; see e.g.

[8] This does not sum to 100% because a single study may look into more than one aspect of the cleavage.

Geissbühler 1999, Best 2011, Lachat 2012, Tilley 2015). I follow in this tradition in chapter 4, where I distinguish between non-members, passive members, and active members of different denominations. This measure captures both aspects of the religious cleavage at once. For each country, I include as many denominations as the survey data from the country allows for. Table 1 shows the measurement employed in chapter 4 for each country.

Table 1. Measuring religion.

Operationalisation	**Religious groups**	**Countries**
#1: Catholic countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics	Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
#2: Protestant countries	No denomination Passive Protestants Active Protestants	Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden
#3: Somewhat mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Protestants	Austria
#4: Mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Passive Protestants Active Protestants	Germany, the UK
#5: Highly mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Passive Protestants Active Protestants Passive Evangelists/non-conformists Active Evangelists/non-conformists	The Netherlands
#6: Orthodox countries	No denomination Passive Orthodox Active Orthodox	Greece

In many countries, the data only allows me to study the differences between those with no denomination, passive members of the dominant denomination, and active members of the same denomination. In Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, I distinguish between those with no denomination, passive Catholics, and active Catholics. In Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, I distinguish between non-members, passive Protestants, and

active Protestants, while in Greece there are non-members, passive Orthodox and active Orthodox.

In Germany and the UK, we can study those with no denomination, passive Catholics and Protestants, and active Catholics and Protestants. In Austria, the same is true except that there are not enough Protestants to separate between passive and active ones. The Netherlands is the most diverse country, allowing us to separate between non-members and passive and active Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelicals. Unfortunately, not a single country had enough Muslim respondents for this group to be included.

What about control variables for religion in the context of studying electoral behaviour? Elff and Rossteutscher (2017) argue that it is necessary to distinguish between religious voting and "quasi-religious" or "spurious" religious voting. An example of this would be Catholics in the UK who vote Labour. Catholics in the UK are not only Catholics, but often also of Irish origins and with working class jobs. In this case, the association between the religious group and the party may be not because of the religion per se, but rather because of its members' ethnicity or class. Given this view of religious voting, it makes sense to control for class, ethnicity, and other factors.

However, caution must be exercised. Controlling for variables that come *after* religion in the causal chain may introduce post-treatment bias. As most people become members of a denomination already at birth or a very young age, this applies to most variables, not least class. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Empirically, Tilley (2015) has shown that even in the UK – where one would expect a large "spurious" component of religious voting for the reasons discussed above – controlling for a whole range of variables related to ethnicity, region, class, and so on does not change the estimates of religious voting by much. My own robustness tests in chapter 4 support this conclusion. When it comes to ethnicity, the issue of spurious religious voting is trickier. In the cases where ethnicity and religion are strongly correlated, detailed knowledge of the specific political conflict is needed to understand whether the cleavage is primarily religious or primarily ethnic. In some cases, it may simply be impossible to disentangle the two. This can be considered an incidence of naturally occurring collinearity, making it impossible to accurately estimate the effect of the two different variables.

1.4.3 Cleavage voting

While the concept of a cleavage was defined already in section 1.2.3, how to *measure* cleavage strength has not been settled yet. While a few scholars have used unconventional measures such as trade union membership and strikes for the class cleavage or church attendance and religiosity for the religious cleavage (e.g. Kriesi 2008), most have examined the strength of a cleavage in relation to party preference.

The conceptual confusion in the field is certainly also present here, and the measures used vary from cleavage to cleavage. For those with only two groups, the measure is usually based on simple percentage differences in party preference between the groups. As such we have studies of the "gender gap" (see Norris 1999), which is mostly measured as the percentage difference between men and women in their support for different parties (e.g. Norris 1999, Giger 2009, Knutsen and Langsæther 2018).

Class voting was originally measured by the now outdated Alford index (Alford 1962). The Alford index is the percentage difference between the manual and non-manual workers in support of left-wing parties. The index has been criticised on at least three grounds. The first is that it is based on absolute rather than relative support. This means that it is sensitive to the sizes of the parties. If a party keeps the exact same relative class basis, but grows in popularity, the Alford index will indicate that the class basis has changed – which it has not. The second problem is that the Alford index requires a dichotomisation of both class and party preference that is not suitable for analysis of modern societies. The lumping together of parties with completely different class bases into a "Left" and "non-Left" category yield wrong conclusions in multiparty systems. Parties within these two categories have remarkably different class bases, especially with the rise of Left Socialist, Green, and Radical Right parties (e.g. Knutsen 2006, Langsæther 2014, Knutsen and Langsæther 2018). Even the mechanisms connecting classes to particular parties vary between party families within the "Left" and "non-Left", as I demonstrate in chapter 3. In conclusion, then, the Alford index should not be used, especially in multiparty systems.

The first criticism led to the use of the Thomsen index (Heath et al.1985, Hout et al. 1993, Nieuwbeerta 1995, see also Knutsen 2007), which is similar to the Alford index, but uses log odds ratios. It is thus a relative measure and as such insensitive to the size of the parties. However, the Thomsen index did not solve the problem of the dichotomisation of both class and party choice and should also be avoided in multiparty systems. The problem is,

of course, to summarise the mean differences when the independent variable is multi-categorical, whether it is class, religion, or any other cleavage with more than two groups.

In the 1990s, Hout et al. (1995) came up with a solution for the class cleavage: The kappa index. This index allows for any number of classes and any number of parties and can be calculated for a party system as a whole as well as for individual parties or party families. It captures *total* class voting, i.e. the entire relationship between class and party preference. The index can in fact be used for any cleavage (for examples, see below), and is as much a measure of cleavage voting as of class voting. In its general formulation, as a *cleavage voting* index for an entire party system, the kappa is defined as:

$$\kappa = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{J}\sum_{s=1}^{S}\frac{(LOR_s^j - LOR^j)^2}{J * S}}$$

where LOR_s^j is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the odds of party *j* and of a reference party for a social group *s* and LOR^j is the average value of the LOR_s^j for party j. In most of the chapters of this dissertation, I calculate the kappa individually for different parties or party families based on binary logistic regression models pitting the specific party or party family against all other parties or party families. In that subset of cases, the kappa for a party (family) *j* is

$$\kappa_j = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S}(\beta_s^j - \overline{\beta_s^J})^2}{S}}$$

where β_s^j is the coefficient from a binary logistic regression for social group *s* and party (family) *j* (with the β coefficient of the social group chosen as the reference category being equal to 0), and $\overline{\beta_s^J}$ is the average regression coefficient across all S social groups (see Lachat 2007: 9).

It is possible to calculate the kappa index based on absolute differences (OLS coefficients or predicted probabilities) or relative differences (binary logistic regression coefficients or log odds ratios), with any number of social groups, and any number of parties. Put simply, the kappa index is the standard deviation of social (e.g. class) differences in party preference. The higher the kappa, the larger the group differences. The index has been used in many cleavage studies both related to class (e.g. Nieuwbeerta 1995, Weakliem and Heath

1999, Knutsen 2006; see also chapter 3 in this dissertation), education (e.g. Stubager 2006; see also chapter 5 in this dissertation), and religion (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997, Jansen 2011, Lachat 2012; see also chapter 4 in this dissertation).

1.4.4 Direct effects

Indirect effects are traditionally defined as the part of the effect of an independent variable X on a dependent variable Y which is mediated by an intermediate variable Z, usually measured by comparing the effect of X on Y before and after controlling for Z. The remaining effect after controlling for Z is considered a direct effect. Added together, the direct and indirect effects make up the total causal effect of X (see e.g. Breen et al. 2013: 165). I apply this core logic in this thesis. Given the causal model proposed above, the kappa value for e.g. class that is obtained without controlling for political values is a rough measure of the total effect. The kappa value obtained after controlling for political values is a rough estimate of the direct effect, and the difference between the two is a rough measure of the indirect effect. For applications of a similar logic using predicted probabilities, see Tilley (2015) or Evans and Tilley (2017).

While it seems relatively uncontroversial to consider the reduction of the kappa value when controlling for political values as a rough indicator of the size of the indirect effect through political values, the interpretation of the kappa value after controls requires more of a leap of faith. Contrary to the indirect effect through political values, we have not really estimated the direct effect of social structure. This would require the rather heroic assumption that the political values cover the whole set of potential mediators. However, the remaining effect of class after controlling for three political value orientations (or religion after controlling for moral values) could of course partly be due to other mediators not identified or included. All findings in the thesis that discuss direct effects should thus be considered with this caveat in mind. This is of course a potential problem for all mediation analyses (for a similar discussion in the context of educational effects on party preference, see Stubager 2008: 338-339).

At a deeper level, however, one may consider a direct effect as nothing else but an as-of-yet unspecified indirect effect whose specification would make for a more extensive causal model. Let me concretise this proposition with an example. Following much research on cleavage voting, I assume that the direct effect has to do with group identity and frozen party alignments. However, we might as well formulate this as an indirect effect: Objective group

membership (e.g. gender) affects group identity (e.g. identifying with women), which affects propensity to vote for a party which is considered to represent the group politically (e.g. New Left parties). If I had access to relevant measures of group identity, I could have tested this as a mediator rather than assume it to constitute the direct effect. Unfortunately, there are no such measures available in the data that I employ.

At its core, science may be considered to be a quest for ever more detailed studies of causal chains. In this thesis, I establish that a substantial portion of the association between social structure and party choice is indirect through certain political values. It seems obvious to follow up by asking why (i.e. through what mechanisms) class affects political values. Is it due to economic interests, early socialisation, or workplace characteristics – or a combination of these three? And why do political values affect party choice? As social scientists, we could continue to search for answers until we reach the level of neuroscience. A potential example is presented by Bergner and Hatemi (2017: 384): "In particular, a voter's electoral behaviour could be influenced by a voter's level of trust, which could be influenced by a voter's genetic expression of ocytocin [a powerful hormone that regulates social interaction, *my comment*], which could be influenced by the environmental stimuli presented to the voter…". We are a long way from such detailed mapping of the mechanisms making up the causal chains of political behaviour; my aim is for this thesis to constitute one small step towards that goal.

1.4.5 Data sets

For the empirical work in this dissertation, I use data on both individuals and parties. For individuals, I need cross-nationally comparable information on their social background, party preference, and political values. For parties, I need information on their policy positions and the salience of those positions.

In all the following chapters, the individual-level data comes from the European Values Study 2008 (EVS 2008). It contains data on the respondents' age, sex, education, occupation, religious denomination, and religiosity levels, as well as their party preference. While this is true for other comparable data sets as well, the EVS is unique in its extensive battery of questions on political attitudes that allow for construction of indexes of attitude constraints called *value orientations* (more on this in chapter 3 and 4). For chapter 5, I have added information on the offshorability of respondents' jobs based on Blinder's (2009) offshorability index. This index simply measures a job's potential to be moved abroad, that is, "whether the service the job provides can theoretically be delivered over long distances with

little or no degradation in quality" (Walter 2017: 64). Furthermore, the analyses in chapter 5 are replicated as closely as possible with data from the two first rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004). This allows me to include another measure of exposure to globalisation, namely whether the sector one works in is exposed to or sheltered from international trade.

For data on the parties, I have utilised the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 and 2010 (Hooghe et al. 2010, Bakker et al. 2015). These data sets contain the policy positions as well as importance of policy areas for a large number of political parties, as judged by experts.

1.5 Summary and implications

This thesis takes as its starting point the need for more research on mechanisms in the cleavage voting literature. Building on recent developments in class structure theory, supply side theory, as well as political economy and trade theory, the thesis aims to further our understanding of how and why social groups have different political preferences.

Chapter 2 assesses the highly interesting theoretical claims of scholars such as Herbert Kitschelt and Daniel Oesch that developments in the class structure over the last decades have rendered the EGP class schema obsolete. While there are certainly good theoretical reasons to believe that this is the case, it turns out that the EGP and Oesch schemas have similar explanatory power across Western Europe. The conclusion is that the EGP schema is still able to account for political preferences in advanced democracies. This justifies its use in chapter 3 and 5.

Chapter 3 and 4 contribute both theoretically and empirically to answering the overarching research question, first, by quantifying the importance of the two mechanisms, and second by hypothesising about and testing under what conditions the two mechanisms work. This has to do with traits of the parties themselves.

Finally, chapter 5 takes on the prominent claim that the old class and education cleavages have been replaced by a cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, and conclude that the claim seems rather like old wine in new bottles. Class and education do not primarily work through globalisation processes, but rather through the mechanisms they are traditionally associated with. Furthermore, direct measures of globalisation exposure have only limited effects on political preferences. There is currently little reason to believe that globalisation has changed the face of cleavage voting, or that it has become more important

than class, education, or religion. However, it may increasingly do so in the future – especially if political actors increasingly frame political issues in terms of globalisation.

In conclusion, social structural variables still affect party preference, and while the dominant view has been that this is primarily an indirect effect through political values, it seems that direct effects presumably related to group identities and frozen party alignments play a larger role than often assumed. While globalisation processes as of yet have not significantly altered the way social structural variables affect political preferences, it seems that political actors themselves are able to affect which mechanisms that are at work.

What are the implications of the findings?

First, the EGP class schema may still safely be used when studying political preferences. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the claims of the schema being outdated are exaggerated. Meaningful predictions of party choice can be derived from it, the explanatory power is similar to the most prominent alternative class schema, and it accounts for important contemporary political attitudes as well, as chapter 5 demonstrates.

Second, and contrary to the dominant assumption, less than half of all class and religious voting work indirectly through political values. This finding should be taken into account by future studies: Theorising on cleavage voting needs further development, and alternative mechanisms should be tested. Furthermore, chapter 3 demonstrates that class voting works not only through economic left-right values, but also through immigration orientations and environmentalism. Future supply side studies should model party behaviour along these dimensions as well, rather than only focusing on the economic dimension.

Chapter 3 and 4 document a larger role than normally assumed for *direct* effects of social group belonging across Western Europe. This lends support to recent findings from the UK for religion (Tilley 2015) and class (Evans and Tilley 2017: 162-163). We need further studies of how exactly these ties come about. How do people come to perceive a party as a representative for their particular social group? In addition to policy appeals, recent research suggests the importance of frozen party alignments and parental socialisation (Tilley 2015), group appeals and rhetorics (Thau 2017) and finally, personnel and candidates (Heath 2015, 2016). Future research could study the relative importance of these phenomena, not least outside of the UK, from where most of the current findings originate. We need to know how stable such perceptions are, when they are formed, and what it takes to change them.

The large direct effect also renders some support to Achen and Bartel's (2016: 215) notion of "the powerful tendency of people to form groups, the ensuing construction of 'us'

and 'them', and the powerful role of emotion rather than reason in directing group activity." While voters certainly seem better equipped than some of their hardest critics have argued (see, e.g., Langsæther et al. 2019), group identities and frozen party alignments seem to play an important part in cleavage voting. As Arzheimer et al. (2017: 3) puts it, "…*homo economicus* is certainly not a reasonable label for modern voters any more than it was for their forebears."

However, this is not to say that self-interested or group-interested behaviour is unable to account for electoral behaviour. First, a substantial portion of the effect is indirect through shared political values, after all. Second, while *social group differences* are to a large extent explained by perceptions of descriptive representation of some sort, it does not follow that this holds for general differences in party choice. After all, class and religion only account for some of the electoral choices people make. There is room for both socialisation and calculation, identity and rationality, in the voting booth.

The theoretical innovation of this dissertation, and the subsequent empirical tests of it, imply that parties may not only affect who votes for them, but also *why* people vote for them – the mechanisms behind cleavage voting. The lesson is that not only cleavage voting levels vary over time and space, but also the mechanisms inducing cleavage voting. The same empirical patterns may have different explanations in different contexts. This point should be taken into account in future studies – theoretical as well as empirical – of mechanisms, and not only in the case of cleavage voting.

Whether group voting is direct or indirect does not only have implications for our theories of political behaviour. There are also potential democratic implications. The seemingly technical distinction between the two mechanisms may have real consequences. Indirect effects of social group membership are democratically sound. From a normative standpoint, if someone derives their political values from their class membership or religious denomination or gender or whatever, and they vote for parties which share those values, this means that their political views are well represented. Class, religion, gender, and other groups can provide *good cues* for voting whenever parties send clear signals on issues of relevance to the groups. Direct effects, on the other hand, may be democratically dubious. When parties do not emphasise issues of relevance, voters may fail to capture or respond to disagreements along these issues, leaving long-standing ties between social groups and political parties more likely to remain intact. Under these conditions, the social group may not provide good cues for voters, who may end up voting for parties with which they do not share fundamental

political values. Evans and de Graaf (2013: viii), as already mentioned, describe direct cleavage voting as "almost unthinking adherence". This is, however, not the only possible interpretation of this phenomenon. A voter may, in fact, have put a great deal of thought into it and still prefer descriptive over substantial representation. Voters might also hold certain political values that should make them susceptible to vote for a certain party that does not have long-standing ties to their group, but then rather prioritise their self-interest and cast their vote for the party that prioritises their group. An example of this would be an upper class voter who is ideologically in favour of equality, but in the end votes for a traditional business party in order to obtain tax cuts. This would be direct cleavage voting, yet can hardly be considered irrational.

Chapter 5 assesses the prominent claims about the impact of globalisation on political preferences, as well as its potentially transformative effects on the roles of class and education. The interpretation of the results would seem to be different from that offered by the globalisation model. The globalisation variables do not account for the effects of class and education and are, in themselves, not sufficient to sustain the claim of a new cleavage. Rather, the purported new, globalisation cleavage seems, at its core, to be a replication of the previously known conflicts over class and education.

Building on the theoretical model of cleavage voting discussed above, part of the question is whether exposure to globalisation today sufficiently structures people's experiences and "ways of life" to work in similar ways as other cleavages. Class, religion, and gender have been around for so long that identities and cultural norms have formed around these structural factors. For instance, more than half of all British respondents readily identify as belonging to a class *unprompted*, and this number has been stable since the 1960s. Furthermore, when prompted, more than 90% self-identify as either working or middle class (Evans and Tilley 2017: 43). Visible cues, such as accents, clothing, and hairstyles, may allow people to identify other people's class, religion, gender or urban-rural background as well. Furthermore, people seem to infer candidates' policy positions from their class (e.g. Carnes and Sadin 2015). All this allows for important effects on political values and party choice. This seems not to be the case (yet) with globalisation. This means that the proposed cleavage between winners and losers lacks an important element. It is not obvious how to identify whether a candidate is a loser or winner of globalisation and thus represent "their kind of people". While churches, trade unions, and other organisations in the past have united classes

and religious groups and helped them structure their political views, there are few long-lasting influential organisations of the sort for globalisation losers (or winners) yet.

When political actors discuss globalisation, it is not obvious that they are appealing to globalisation losers or winners *as such*. For instance, Donald Trump said in a speech in June 2016 that "[g]lobalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very, very wealthy ... but it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache." (Jackson 2016). It seems to me that Trump, in this case, is framing globalisation as a problem for the working class, and making a group appeal to workers. In that case, globalisation is interpreted within the framework of class politics, rather than as a new cleavage.

This does not mean that globalisation processes are unimportant. First, specific globalisation processes have effects on specific policy attitudes. For instance, several studies show that individuals who are disadvantaged by international trade have a higher likelihood of preferring protectionism (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Second, globalisation processes may alter the face of other cleavages. While workers have always been more sceptical of foreigners than 'higher' classes (e.g. Lipset 1959), this scepticism is easier to mobilise in an era of (highly politicised) mass immigration. The arrival of significant Muslim minorities in Western Europe may also affect the religious cleavage. Perhaps denominational cleavages increase in importance again, or maybe this group will join forces with the remaining Christians, reinvigorating the religious-secular conflicts. While the results from chapter 5 indicate that economic globalisation has not yet resulted in cross-class coalitions, this could of course still happen in the future. Following the reasoning in chapter 3 and 4, it is clear that political actors are able to affect this development. How politicians and parties frame the conflicts and issues related to globalisation matters for the way in which these conflicts play out electorally in the coming years.

2 Class voting in Western Europe: Do various class schemas make a difference?[9]

The Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portecarero (EGP) class schema has been dominant in political science and sociology for several decades. However, in recent years, it has sustained severe criticism from prominent scholars. They claim that important developments in the class structure of modern societies have rendered the schema outdated. In particular, it is criticised for overlooking important distinctions within the middle classes. Accordingly, the schema is no longer suitable for explaining or predicting political behaviour in post-industrial societies. Daniel Oesch has suggested a new schema that considers these developments. In this article, we demonstrate that it is equally possible to derive meaningful predictions about political behaviour from both class schemas. Furthermore, the two schemas have similar explanatory power with regards to party choice in 18 West European countries. The criticism thus seems exaggerated and there is no urgent need for scholars to move away from the validated and much used EGP schema.

[9] This chapter is co-authored with Oddbjørn Knutsen. Previous drafts have been presented at the 6th Conference of the European Survey Research Association, 2015, and at the IPSA world congress, Poznan, 2016.

2.1 Introduction: Class in the 21st century

In the last several decades, political scientists and sociologists have debated the salience of social class for political preference formation and voting behaviour. Some have argued that social class has become much less important in this respect, while others have argued for its persistent significance in advanced industrial democracies.[10]

There has been much debate over which class schema should be utilised in studies of class voting and preference formation. The dichotomous class schemas that distinguished between workers and "other classes" – like the Alford index – in early studies of class voting has been replaced by more differentiated and sophisticated schemas. Since around 1980, the dominant class schema used in sociological and voting studies has been the EGP class schema (see Erikson et al. 1979, Goldthorpe 1980, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). This schema is primarily based on a hierarchical class dimension, which will be further discussed below.

In recent years, Daniel Oesch (2006a, 2006b) created a schema that challenges the EGP class schema. Oesch and others have argued that this class schema taps the class structure in advanced (post) industrial societies better than the EGP schema because it incorporates class-structure changes that have taken place in the last few decades. According to Oesch, the class map has to be redrawn in order to integrate the new employment structure, including the changes in the makeup of the middle class. His schema includes horizontal divisions based on different *work logics* in addition to a hierarchical or vertical dimension.

Herbert Kitschelt (2013: 226–227) argued that the EGP class framework does not account for the political preference formation and demand-side explanations of radical right party support. He also claimed that the schema, which is based on the assumption that people form political partisan preferences primarily on the basis of market income and that they vote accordingly, places too strong an emphasis on the political demands for redistributive politics. In order to predict party preference, the EGP model needs to be supplemented by other experiences.

The purpose of the present paper is to compare the two class schemas in relation to party preference. Which of them have the largest explanatory power with regard to party choice? Is the EGP schema outdated and unable to explain party choice in modern Western

[10] See for example the various contributions in Clark and Lipset (2001), where several of the central scholars in the debate are discussing the issue.

democracies, or do both schemas have substantial explanatory power? Does one class schema tap into class differences in party support that are not captured by the other?

Data and party systems

We used data from 18 West European countries from the 2008–2010 European Values Study (EVS 2008). The countries and the way we chose to group them by region are displayed in Table 1. The groupings were based on similarities in party systems and welfare state regimes (for details, see Knutsen 2018: ch. 2).

Table 1. The Grouping of the Countries into Regions.

Nordic countries	Central Western region	The Islands	Southern region
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden	Austria Belgium Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland	Great Britain Ireland	France Greece Italy Portugal Spain

The EVS is ideal because it contains information on the respondents' occupations, which may easily be re-coded into the class schemas, and their party preferences. In the EVS 2008 surveys, the respondents were first asked the traditional question about voting intention. For those who stated that they would not vote, we used their responses to the question of which party appealed to them the most. The party choice variable allowed the inclusion of as large a portion of the samples as possible. We named this variable "party preference". This is not a behavioural variable since it does not tap actual electoral voting behaviour. We argue that vote choice in an actual election is more likely to be affected by a host of factors outside of political preference, such as short-term scandals, campaign differences or strategic voting. Asking respondents what party they prefer outside of campaigns might tap stable political preferences to a larger degree than actual vote choice.

The parties were grouped into the following party families: left socialist, social democratic, green, liberal, Christian democratic, conservative and the radical right.

Communist, agrarian and ethnic-regional parties are so few and/or small that they are excluded from the analyses here.[11]

The hypotheses derived below differentiate between Old Politics and New Politics parties. Old Politics cleavages are based on the central cleavages in industrial society that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) described in their famous work and pitted the Old Left coalition against the Old Right coalition. The Old Left has been associated with the working class and their organisations (social democratic parties and labour unions), while the Old Right has been coupled to business interests, employers, the upper middle class and liberal and conservative parties (Dalton 2014: 143–150).

We consider the social democratic, liberal, conservative and Christian parties as Old Politics parties, mainly anchored in cleavages that emerged in typical industrial societies, primarily the economic left–right dimension at the attitudinal or ideological level and the cleavage in the labour market at the socio-structural level (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The Christian democratic parties are also anchored in Old Politics, although primarily in the religious–secular cleavage, which is not examined here.

The concept of New Politics involves conflicts over new issues and values in advanced industrial societies, such as environmental quality, alternative lifestyles, minority rights and immigration. These conflicts are frequently referred to as conflicts between the New Left and the New Right (Dalton 2014: 143–150).

The green, left socialist and radical right parties are considered to be primarily anchored in New Politics conflict lines related to various environmental, immigration and libertarian versus authoritarian issues and values. The parties grouped into the left socialist party family are quite diverse, and some of them represent borderline cases between Old and New Politics.

Methodology and statistical measures

In this paper, we consider class voting as a bivariate phenomenon. Many studies that use controls come to different conclusions simply because they control for different sets of variables with little reflection on how this compares to former studies. These may often even be intermediating variables, such as left–right ideology, whose inclusion would, in fact, bias the effect of class on party choice downwards (so-called post-treatment bias, see e.g. King

[11] The exact categorisation is available from the authors.

2010).

It is also a matter of what *social class* actually means. Social class is more than occupation: Occupation is, rather, a proxy of the location in the social structure. People in different classes hold different skills and assets, such as their education and income (Kitschelt 2013, Oesch 2013: 44). Controlling for these factors means "controlling away" part of what we see as constitutive of class membership. While this could be useful in some instances and for specific research problems, like if we want to study the isolated effect of education, it would not be useful in a comparison of the class schemas' total explanatory power when it comes to political preferences.

It would be too detailed to present the data for the relationship between all parties within the various party families and each of the two class schemas. Therefore, we rely on the mean support for the various social classes within the four regions of the countries and the "total mean" for all the parties within the various party families across the various regions. When there are large variations between parties within a party family, this is discussed, and, in a few cases, single parties within a given party family are omitted from the calculation of the "total mean". We underscore that our concrete hypotheses do not include regional variations, but we find it fruitful to include the regional variations for descriptive purposes.

The traditional analyses of class voting use a dichotomous party choice variable (socialist/non-socialist parties) and a dichotomous class variable (manual versus non-manual social classes). Newer class voting analyses focus on all the significant parties and several social classes, or total class voting. Research on class voting from the third and fourth "generation" emphasises the difference between absolute and relative class voting and suggests that log-odds ratios are a better measure of (relative) class voting.[12] When the assumption of only two social classes is replaced by more classes, as in the EGP and the Oesch class schemas, the analyses become more complicated. Hout et al. (1995) suggested using the kappa index for analysing relative class voting based on several social classes.[13] The higher the value of the kappa index, the higher the level of class voting. The kappa index has several desirable statistical properties, most notably that it is based on log-odds ratios and, therefore, is not dependent on the marginal distributions of the variables. Kappa values can be calculated for each political party and for each party family based on (regional) means.

[12] For an overview of different "generations" of class voting studies, see Knutsen (2007: 459-461). Examples of fourth generation studies can be found in Evans (1999), Knutsen (2006), and Langsæther (2014).
[13] The kappa index calculates several log-odds ratios between a reference category on the class variable and each of the other classes and uses the standard deviation of these log-odds ratios as a measure of class voting.

In the rest of the paper, we first present the two class schemas in some detail. We then derive a number of hypotheses to test the claims about the EGP schema and to compare its explanatory and predictive power to Oesch's schema.

2.2 The Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portecarero class schema

The EGP class schema was originally developed in connection with social mobility studies (Erikson et al. 1979, Goldthorpe 1980, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), but it has also been used in British election studies (Heath et al. 1985: ch. 2, Heath et al. 1991: ch. 5) and comparative studies of class voting in Western democracies (Nieuwbeerta 1995, Knutsen 2006). It is considered the most influential conceptualisation and operationalisation of social class in European sociology (Evans 1992: 211–212).

The aim of the class schema is to differentiate positions based on the work situation (authority and autonomy) as well as market situations (including income, degree of income security, career prospects and source of income). The basic distinction in the schema is within the category of employees. The distinction between employees involved in a service relationship with their employers, and those whose employment relationships are essentially regulated by a labour contract, underlies the way different employee classes have been delineated. A "service relationship", rather than one formulated in terms of a labour contract, is found where the employees are required to exercise *delegated authority* or *specialised knowledge and expertise* in the interest of their employing organisation. Such employees must be accorded a legitimate area of autonomy and discretion, and their performance will depend on the degree of moral commitment they feel towards the organisation rather than on the efficacy of external sanctions. To a significant extent, the organisation must trust these employees to make decisions and carry them through in ways consistent with the values and goals of that organisation (Goldthorpe 1982, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 42). Based on this fundamental distinction, the class schema is drawn up. There are various versions of the class schema. A detailed 11-class schema, which includes several sub-classes, is the point of departure. Here, we use a six-class version that is used in many other works.

Table 2. The Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema.

Higher-level service class	Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors
Lower-level service class	Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees
Routine non-manual employees	Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, sales personnel, other rank-and-file employees
Petite bourgeoisie	Small proprietors with and without employees, including farmers and small-holders and others self-employed in primary production
Skilled workers	Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers, skilled manual workers
Unskilled workers	Semi- and unskilled manual workers, agricultural workers and other workers in primary production

Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 38–39, Table 2.1).

The higher-level service class has positions that typically involve the exercise of authority within a wide range of discretion and considerable freedom from control by others. The lower-level service class comprises lower-grade professionals (typically called semi-professionals) and lower-grade administrators and officials.

Routine non-manual employees do non-manual work, but they do not belong to the service class. They are functionally associated with (but marginal to) the service class (Goldthorpe 1980: 40). This is a class that may be regarded as intermediate in the sense that it comprises positions with employment relationships that appear to take on mixed forms. The working-class differentiates between skilled and unskilled workers. Supervisors of manual workers (foremen) and lower-grade technicians are grouped among the skilled workers.

The schema does not comprise a single category for employers or large employers. Because there are so few large employers, the EGP classifies these in the higher-level service class, while small employers (fewer than 10 employees) are classified as the petite bourgeoisie, along with those self-employed without employees.

Those self-employed in the primary sector (primarily farmers and fishermen) can be classified in a separate category apart from the other petite bourgeoisie in the study of the relationship between party choice and social class, but here they are grouped together with the other petite bourgeoisie since this is also the case for the Oesch class schema. Descriptive statistics and the distribution of the various EGP classes by country and region may be found in Table 1 in the appendix.

2.3 Daniel Oesch's class schema

Oesch (2006a, 2006b) argued that Erikson and Goldthorpe's class schema largely reflects the occupational system that existed until the mid-1970s in industrial societies and does not incorporate important trends in the employment structure, such as the growth of the service sector, welfare state expansion and rising female participation. Oesch argued that the class map should be redrawn in order to take into consideration important shifts in the employment structure. The new class schema should not focus only on hierarchical or vertical divisions, but also horizontal divisions. The salaried middle class should not be conceptualised as a unitary group, and the manual/non-manual divide should not be used as a class boundary.

Oesch also differentiated between hierarchical or more- or less-advantageous positions in the labour market but then added a horizontal dimension that considered the nature of the employee's work experience, their work roles and their insertion into the division of labour. He differentiated between three different "work logics" (technical work logic, organisational work logic and interpersonal work logic) within the category of employees and one such category of self-employed and employers (independent work logic) (Oesch 2006b: 265–270).

The *technical work logic* is based on work processes determined by technical production parameters. Scientific expertise is required for the higher grades (technical professions) and crafts and manual skills for those with lower grades (production workers). The *organisational work logic* is based on management and the bureaucratic division of labour, and the primary orientation is towards the employing organisation. The higher grades have skills in coordination and control (managers), while the lower grades have clerical skills (office clerks). The *interpersonal work logic* is based on service settings from face-to-face interaction with clients. Work is, to a large degree, outside the lines of command, and orientation towards clients (patients, children, pupils and petitioners) is central. The higher grades have skills in communication (socio-cultural professionals), while the lower grades have social skills (service workers). Finally, the *independent work logic* comprises liberal professionals, employers and the self-employed.

The detailed class schema includes 17 categories based on the four types of work logic and four hierarchical levels (Oesch 2006b: 269: Table 2). However, such a detailed schema is difficult to use in surveys, and Oesch frequently used an eight-category schema by collapsing the hierarchical levels into two (Oesch 2006a: 122, Oesch 2013: 37–39).

These eight classes are shown in Table 3. Below, we use the notions of "professional classes" or "higher-skilled classes" for the technical, managerial and socio-cultural

professions, although these classes also include semi-professions,[14] and the notion "lower-skilled classes" for the production workers, office clerks and service workers.

Table 3. Oesch's eight-class schema with typical occupations within each class.

Independent work logic	**Technical work logic**	**Organisational work logic**	**Interpersonal service work logic**
Large employers and liberal (self-employed) professionals Entrepreneurs Lawyers Dentists	Technical (semi)-professions Engineers Architects IT specialists	(Associate) managers in business and public-sector managers, Managerial professions Administrators Consultants Accountants	Socio-cultural (semi-) professions Doctors and nurses Teachers Social workers
Petit bourgeoisie, Small business owners with fewer than 10 employees and without any employees Shop owners Restaurant owners Farmers	Production workers Mechanics Carpenters Assemblers Farm workers	Office clerks Secretaries Receptionists Mail clerks	Service workers Waiters Auxiliary nurses Home helpers Shop assistants

Source: Oesch (2006b: 269) (Table 2), Oesch (2013: 38) (Table 2.2).

The names for the four higher-level classes used here are: bourgeoisie, technical professions, managers (or managerial professions) and socio-cultural professions.

The grouping of the occupations in the various classes is based on the ISCO-88 and is in accordance with Oesch's own classification (Oesch 2006b: 283, Table A1). Table 2 in the appendix shows the distribution for the eight classes in the various countries according to the survey and averages for the regions and for all countries.

The bourgeoisie class comprises 1–4 percent in the various countries, and the number of cases is so small in many countries that the confidence intervals for support for the party families become very large. Therefore, we decided to omit this class from our detailed

[14] Oesch sometimes use the notion "specialists" for the technical and socio-cultural professions. Here we have decided to use the notion professions consistently. For the managerial professions we also use managers.

analyses of support for the various party families. This class is, however, included in the overall correlation analysis below.

We also considered two alternatives to omitting this class from the detailed analysis, namely to conflate this class with the petite bourgeoisie, since these two classes both belong to the independent logic, or to conflate it with the managers, since these two classes can be expected to have economic right-wing preferences. We decided to omit it from the analysis at this stage in order not to create mixed categories, that is, to be able to present the results for pure categories for the managers and the petite bourgeoisie.

2.4 Main hypotheses about the relative impact of the two class schemas

Oesch, Kitschelt and other proponents of the Oesch schema have argued that it should correlate more strongly with party preference than the EGP class schema because it contains a horizontal dimension in addition to the vertical or hierarchical dimension of the EGP schema. The arguments were related to preference formation and party choice in general and to support for the radical right (and New Left parties) in particular.

However, the EGP schema is more detailed regarding the hierarchical dimension, at least compared to the eight-class version of the Oesch schema. We mentioned that the 17 classes in the Oesch class schema are too detailed to use in survey analyses. It is also not reasonable to have one schema that contains considerably more classes than the other, since more detailed class schemas tend to boost the correlation coefficients. Using the six EGP classes and the eight Oesch classes for our comparison, the dice were actually loaded slightly in favour of the Oesch schema, which divides the electorate into two more groups than EGP does.

We formulated two main hypotheses that represent an intermediate position between those who (still) argue for the appropriateness of the EGP class schema and those who support the Oesch schema. For the Old Politics parties, we expect that the hierarchical dimension of class politics is still important, although it has been weakened since the 1960s. The EGP class schema taps this dimension better than the eight-class Oesch class schema. Therefore, *we expect the EGP schema to outperform the Oesch schema in explaining class*

differences in support of social democratic, liberal and conservative parties. We call this the Old Politics main hypothesis.

The horizontal divisions, which are incorporated into the Oesch schema, are most relevant for New Politics parties. According to Oesch's own research (Oesch 2013), there is a New Politics cleavage between the New Right and the New Left that can be formulated within his class schema. Therefore*, we expect the Oesch schema to outperform the EGP schema in explaining class differences in support of left socialist, green, and radical right parties.* We call this the New Politics main hypothesis.

Correlations and explanatory power

Party choice and social class are both nominal-level variables. Two correlation coefficients were used to tap the correlation between party choice and social class: *Cramer's V*, based on Pearson's chi-squared statistic, and Nagelkerke's pseudo R^2, which taps the explanatory power in logistic and multinomial logistic regression. The pseudo R^2 is a frequently used measure for tapping the explanatory power in such analyses, and it has been shown that the explanatory power is similar to R^2 in regression analyses when such measures can be compared (Knutsen 2014). In order to transform the pseudo R^2 to a correlation coefficient, the square root is reported. This correlation measure is abbreviated SRN below.

Table 4. Comparison of correlations between party choice and social class according to the two class schemas.

	Cramer's V		Squared root of Nagelkerke's R^2 (SNR)	
	EGP classes	Oesch classes	EGP classes	Oesch classes
Nordic				
Denmark	0.179	0.167	0.392	0.434
Finland	0.222	0.207	0.482	0.522
Iceland	0.135	0.173	0.305	0.377
Norway	0.195	0.174	0.410	0.443
Sweden	0.202	0.208	0.442	0.511
Nordic mean	0.187	0.186	0.406	0.457
Central West				
Austria	0.156	0.153	0.358	0.405
Belgium	0.189	0.170	0.410	0.444
Germany	0.117	0.128	0.263	0.341
Luxembourg	0.137	0.172	0.307	0.356
Netherlands	0.168	0.158	0.392	0.434
Switzerland	0.143	0.144	0.344	0.381
Central West mean	0.152	0.154	0.345	0.393
The Islands				
Ireland	0.157	0.184	0.359	0.428
Britain	0.129	0.137	0.290	0.303
The Islands mean	0.143	0.161	0.324	0.366
South				
France	0.155	0.159	0.327	0.422
Greece	0.118	0.125	0.263	0.272
Italy	0.141	0.159	0.329	0.411
Portugal	0.184	0.165	0.374	0.379
Spain	0.123	0.125	0.293	0.342
Mean South	0.144	0.147	0.317	0.365
Mean all countries	0.158	0.162	0.352	0.400

According to Cramer's V, the strength of the correlations is rather similar in most countries. Only four of the 18 correlations differ more than 0.02. The average for all countries is only slightly higher for the Oesch class scheme.

The pattern is somewhat different for the SRN measure. The correlations are higher for Oesch's class voting in all countries, although the differences are modest. Based on the average difference for all the countries, the correlation for the Oesch schema is 0.048 higher

than for the EGP schema, which represents a 14% increase compared to the average correlation for the EGP. Six of the correlations are 0.07–0.10 higher based on the Oesch class schema. We may safely conclude that both class schemas correlate with party choice, the Oesch class schema slightly more so than the EGP schema. The strength of the average regional correlations for SRN also shows that class voting is strongest in the Nordic countries. The ranking of the regions is consistent across the two class schemas, and the same applies, to a large degree, to the ranking of the countries.

2.5 Direction of class voting according to party families: The EGP class schema

Hypotheses

The correlation analysis above indicates that there are fairly strong relationships between party choice and the EGP classes, but these correlations tell us nothing about the direction of the relationship between party choice and social class. If the class schema still has explanatory power, it should be possible to make accurate theoretical predictions about the political preferences of the individual classes. Therefore, in the following sections, we develop hypotheses for both class schemas and empirically evaluate them.

Old Politics Parties

The basic political conflicts in typical industrial societies have been related to redistribution, the size of the welfare state and control over the means of production. The conflict in the labour market was a conflict between the industrial left – Social Democrats and Communists – versus (notably) the liberal parties. The conservative parties have, however, also been transformed from being supportive of the nobility and clergy to supporting capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the upper middle class, and these parties are firmly anchored to the right on the economic left–right dimension.

The social classes have divergent economic interests, which might incline them to vote for different kinds of parties. Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006) discussed this in an attempt to measure the classes' economic security, stability and prospects. Based on our reading of Goldthorpe and McKnight, we suggest that the classes might be ordered from left

to right in economic terms as follows: unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, lower service class, higher service class and, finally, the petite bourgeoisie.

The Christian parties are cross-class parties, but previous findings have shown that they receive the strongest support from the farmers, who belong to the petite bourgeoisie (Knutsen 2006: 65).

Hypothesis 1: The social democratic parties will gain the strongest support from the two working-class categories and then the intermediate class – the routine non-manual workers – and the least support from the service classes and the petite bourgeoisie.

Hypothesis 2: For the a) liberal and b) conservative parties, the support will be strongest among the petite bourgeoisie and the service classes and smallest among the workers, with the routine non-manual employees in an intermediate position.

Hypothesis 3: The Christian parties will receive fairly even support from the various classes but stronger support from the petite bourgeoisie (which includes the farmers).

New Politics Parties

The left socialist and green parties are expected to get stronger support from the service class and less support from workers and employers. These parties appeal to post-materialist or libertarian values and issue positions. According to the theory of New Politics, segments of the service class will have libertarian, green and post-materialist values and consequently vote for green or left-libertarian parties (Inglehart 1984: 32–33; 1997: 248–252). Some of the left socialist parties have an Old Politics origin, and we might expect a less clear New Politics class support compared to the greens.

The radical right parties can be expected to gain the strongest support from workers, followed by the petite bourgeoisie. They appeal to those with authoritarian values and anti-immigration views. They also appeal to some with traditional rightist economic views. The former positions are more frequently found among workers than among other social groups, while the second position appeals to employers and the petite bourgeoisie (Ivarsflaten 2005). We do not differentiate between the different levels within the service and working classes for the New Politics parties in our hypotheses. Unlike the economic interests of relevance to the Old Politics hypotheses, the classes are not as easily ranked in the New Politics dimensions. We expect that:

Hypothesis 4: The a) green and b) left socialist parties will gain the strongest support from the service classes and the least support from the petite bourgeoisie and the workers and c) these patterns will be more pronounced for the greens than for the left socialists.

Hypothesis 5: The radical right will gain the strongest support from the working classes and the petite bourgeoisie and the smallest support from the service classes.

Empirical analysis

The average support for the various relevant party families in the various EGP-classes for the various regions and for all countries is shown in Table 5.

Old Politics Parties

The social democratic parties have the strongest support among the worker groups, followed by the routine non-manuals. On average, they have considerably smaller support among the two service classes and the petite bourgeoisie. The regional means show very much the same pattern. The small differences for the Island countries are caused by small and somewhat deviant class support for the small Irish Labour party. This confirms Hypothesis 1.

Table 5. Mean support for the party families in different social classes based on the EGP class schema.

Soc. Dem.	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	21.1	22.0	28.6	10.3	35.7	33.4	25.1	5	0.52
Islands	12.2	17.7	23.1	13.9	18.9	25.3	18.8	2	0.32
Central West	18.7	19.4	23.8	15.9	29.1	33.3	23.6	6	0.34
South	26.5	33.3	37.2	28.2	37.0	38.5	35.8	5	0.21
Total Mean	20.8	23.8	28.8	17.5	32.0	33.9	26.9	18	0.32
Liberal	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	12.1	9.5	6.1	2.3	3.7	2.1	7.1	3	0.70
Islands	22.4	15.1	12.9	5.1	16.3	11.9	14.9	1	0.52
Central West	19.7	14.4	12.7	20.1	11.3	9.3	14.1	6	0.33
South	20.3	20.1	23.8	23.8	19.3	23.1	22.8	2	0.11
Total Mean	18.1	14.2	12.9	15.0	11.2	10.0	13.9	12	0.22
Conservative	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	34.2	25.4	17.5	27.6	13.1	11.1	22.5	5	0.51
Islands	46.7	37.2	38.1	36.0	38.2	33.1	38.7	2	0.17
Central West									
South	31.0	19.3	18.9	31.5	21.5	19.0	22.1	5	0.30
Total Mean	35.0	24.8	21.5	30.6	20.8	18.0	25.1	12	0.31
Chr. Dem.	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	3.8	4.7	5.8	1.2	1.3	3.1	4.1	3	0.64
Islands	24.1	26.6	25.0	31.9	21.6	13.6	22.7	1	0.33
Central West	26.2	24.0	24.2	34.6	20.2	25.0	24.8	6	0.22
South	13.0	10.7	11.7	8.3	8.5	6.8	9.9	1	0.25
Total Mean	18.7	17.8	18.1	22.8	14.1	16.3	17.6	11	0.18
Green	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	12.3	16.3	15.3	4.9	3.4	11.3	12.9	2	0.65
Islands	5.2	10.2	8.2	5.1	3.4	6.0	6.9	2	0.38
Central West	13.4	17.3	13.9	7.1	8.0	6.4	12.3	6	0.42
South	5.7	7.8	7.1	2.3	5.8	5.8	6.2	2	0.41
Total Mean	10.6	14.4	12.0	5.6	6.1	7.1	10.5	12	0.39
Left Soc.	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	8.6	13.5	15.8	6.9	10.0	13.4	12.2	5	0.32
Islands	3.4	4.6	9.5	4.3	17.6	17.4	10.4	1	0.73
Central West	8.0	8.8	8.6	2.4	9.1	9.9	8.3	3	0.52
South	10.4	11.8	6.8	4.0	7.7	5.4	7.0	5	0.39
Total Mean	8.8	11.2	10.6	4.7	9.5	10.1	9.4	14	0.31
Total mean minus	9.2	11.7	10.7	4.8	8.9	9.5	9.3	13	0.31
Rad. Right	**H.serv.**	**L.serv.**	**R.n.man.**	**P.B.**	**Skilled**	**Unskilled**	**Total**	**Parties**	**Kappa**
Nordic	9.1	9.6	13.2	21.1	25.3	21.0	14.1	3	0.48
Islands									
Central West	6.4	8.3	10.3	12.2	16.2	11.5	9.9	6	0.33
South	2.6	2.6	2.0	4.4	3.8	5.4	3.3	3	0.35
Total Mean	6.1	7.2	9.0	12.5	15.4	12.4	9.3	12	0.36

Based on the average support for all the liberal parties, Hypothesis 2a is supported, although the variations in class support are relatively small.[15] Despite some variations, the pattern within the regions is also supportive of Hypothesis 2a.

As for the conservative parties, support is, on average, largest among the higher-level service class and petite bourgeoisie, followed by the lower-level service class. They are less popular with the other classes, in accordance with our expectations. This supports Hypothesis 2b, although the difference between routine non-manual and skilled workers is small. The pattern is particularly pronounced in the Nordic countries, while the Irish *Fianna Fail* deviates by being popular in all social classes.

Support for the Christian democratic parties is largest among the petite bourgeoisie and very even among the other classes, in accordance with Hypothesis 3. This is mostly due to the farmers' high propensity to vote Christian democratic, especially in the Central Western region. The small Christian parties in the Nordic countries seem to have a stronger class base than in other regions, with the strongest support among the routine non-manual employees and the service classes. There are generally small variations between the various social classes in support for the Christian democrats in the other regions.

New Politics parties

The green parties, on average, gain the strongest support from the service classes, especially the lower level, and the routine non-manual employees than from the other social classes. Hypothesis 4a is generally supported; however, it needs to be specified. Support is larger among the lower-level service class than among the higher level, and support is also large among the routine non-manuals, a class we did not include in our hypotheses. Since this class is an intermediate class, we might have expected that it would be located between the service classes and the workers, but it belongs to the classes where support for the greens is high.

On average, the left socialists are more or less equally popular in the different classes, apart from the much lower support from the petite bourgeoisie.[16] The part of Hypothesis 4b that includes the smaller support among workers is not clearly confirmed, but the part that deals with the petite bourgeoisie is confirmed. On average, these parties have similar support

[15] The party classified as Liberal in Portugal is clearly untypical, and deviates from the pattern. When the analysis is done without this party, the pattern becomes more distinct and the kappa increases.
[16] We have also calculated the means for all Left Socialist parties by excluding the deviant Irish case, but this does not change the main trend for the Left Socialist parties.

in all the classes except the petite bourgeoisie. These averages hide important differences between the parties within the party family. This confirms Hypothesis 4c: Support for the greens is clearly much larger in the service class than in the working class compared with the left socialist parties.

The radical right parties are the most popular in the working-class categories and the petite bourgeoisie and the least popular in the service classes, in accordance with our hypothesis. Support is strongest among skilled workers, not the unskilled workers. This main pattern is impressively similar across the countries, confirming a basic perspective on these parties from the New Politics literature.[17] Thus, Hypothesis 5 receives strong support. The kappa values are highest in the Nordic countries with very pronounced differences between the working-class group and the service classes.

We have found that the EGP class schema taps expectations derived from Old and New Politics theory in a meaningful way. The schema is based on hierarchy and, as Kitschelt (2013) indicated, redistributive politics, but this Old Politics dimension is still significant, as the analyses of the social democratic, liberal and conservative parties have shown. New Politics is sometimes considered as Old Politics turned upside down. The analyses of the green and radical right parties in particular have shown that their electorates have a distinctive and meaningful location in EGP social classes, in accordance with central literature on these parties.

The kappa values are indeed largest for the New Politics and social democratic parties. If we rank the party families according to the kappa based on the average support in the various party families, we get the following result (kappa in parentheses): greens (0.39), radical right (0.36), social democratic and liberals (0.32),[18] left socialists and conservatives (0.31) and, finally, Christian parties (0.18).

2.6 Direction of class voting according to party families: The Oesch class schema

Hypotheses

A major point of the Oesch schema is to capture differences within the large service classes better than the EGP schema. The EGP cannot explain the fact that there are large differences

[17] See, e.g., the excellent edited volume on class and the Radical Right (Rydgren 2013)
[18] 0.32 for the Liberal parties is based on the calculation where the deviate Portuguese case is omitted.

in political attitudes, values and party preferences within the higher-level social strata that are defined as the higher- and lower-level service classes.

The hypotheses we have generated about the differences in class support are based on the two dimensions incorporated into the Oesch class schema: The hierarchical difference is expected to be found between the professional classes (technical, managerial and socio-cultural professions) and those with lower education and skills (production workers, office clerks and service workers).

If the Oesch class schema explains party choice better than the EGP schema, we should expect considerable variation between the lower- and higher-skilled classes in support for a given party family. In the extreme case, support would be highest among some of the higher- and some of the lower-skilled classes. The opposite would occur when support is fairly even among the higher- and lower-skilled social classes, respectively. Then the EGP schema would better capture the impact of class on party choice.

We expect a horizontal difference between the managers and the socio-cultural professions. The managers are expected to be the main employed class that support the economic rightist parties, while the socio-cultural professionals are expected to hold post-materialist values and support New Left parties (Oesch 2006b: 276–280).

Oesch's own research has identified a New Politics conflict between the New Left and New Right, which, in terms of class differences, is between the socio-cultural professions who support the New Left and the production workers who support the radical right (Oesch 2013).

The Old Politics redistribution conflict will first be between the three lower-skilled categories and the higher-skilled or professional classes and in terms of party choice. We expect that this will be reflected in differences in support for the social democratic, liberal and conservative parties.

As for the lower-skilled classes, the industrial workers (production workers) have traditionally been the basis for the left. We expect that this class in particular (and to a larger degree than the two other lower-skilled classes) will support the social democratic parties, although a significant portion might have defected to the radical right (see below).

Hypothesis 6: The social democratic parties will be most popular among a) the lower-skilled classes and b) the production workers in particular.

Hypothesis 7: Among the professional classes, we expect that the managers will be the most rightist, supporting a) the liberal and b) conservative parties, while the socio-cultural professionals will be the least likely to support c) the liberal and d) conservative parties. The

technical professionals are expected to be in an intermediate position between the managers and socio-cultural specialists when it comes to support for the e) liberal and f) conservative parties.

Hypothesis 8: As for the socio-cultural professionals, we follow Oesch and expect that the socio-cultural professionals will be the most likely to support a) greens and b) the socialist left.

Hypothesis 9: The production workers will a) support the radical right to a larger degree than other social classes, while b) the petite bourgeoisie will be second most likely to support the radical right.

Empirical analysis

Old Politics parties

Table 6 shows the support received within each of the Oesch classes for the different party families. The Oesch class schema contains two dimensions, and its patterns are more complicated to describe than the EGP classes. We have, therefore, calculated some differences in percentage points to ease the description.

The social democratic parties are more popular among the lower-level social classes in accordance with Hypothesis 6a. However, support among production and service workers is equally strong. Thus, Hypothesis 6b receives limited support. After these groups are the office clerks. Support is lower and quite similar among the professional classes and smallest among the petite bourgeoisie. The socio-cultural professionals are not more likely to support social democratic parties than the other professional classes. Hence, it is the hierarchical component, rather than the horizontal, that is most relevant for explaining variations in support for social democratic parties.

According to the average figures, there are small variations in the support for the liberal parties. The liberals are most popular among managers and least among production workers.[19] This supports Hypothesis 7a. There are small differences in the average support for the liberals between the socio-cultural professions and the technical professions, so Hypotheses 7c and 7e are not supported. However, we observed some important regional variations.

[19] The highly deviant Portuguese party is excluded from the figures referred to here.

Table 6. Mean support for the party families in different social classes based on the Oesch class schema.

Soc. Dem.	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	26.6	20.8	21.9	11.8	33.2	23.3	34.3	25.1	0.42
Islands	11.2	14.2	23.7	11.9	21.6	20.3	24.1	18.8	0.37
Central West	20.1	18.3	21.0	13.6	31.2	21.3	29.4	23.5	0.33
South	32.3	35.0	33.1	27.5	37.3	39.2	37.7	35.8	0.17
Total Mean	24.3	23.2	24.9	16.8	32.4	26.7	32.5	26.8	0.28
Liberal	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	8.6	10.4	12.5	3.1	2.3	6.4	4.3	7.1	0.63
Islands	11.5	16.3	26.4	5.0	13.2	12.1	12.0	14.9	0.53
Central West	15.7	19.1	11.4	21.0	9.4	14.1	10.9	14.1	0.32
South	25.0	10.0	25.6	24.9	21.5	20.1	21.6	22.9	0.36
Total Mean	15.1	15.2	15.3	15.8	10.0	13.0	11.1	13.9	0.19
Total mean	12.9	16.6	14.0	14.4	7.7	11.7	9.1	12.3	0.28
Conservative	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	26.7	36.8	19.0	26.8	11.4	24.2	13.6	22.5	0.49
Islands	43.5	42.6	27.7	36.2	33.3	41.1	39.5	38.4	0.23
South	16.3	27.7	18.1	31.5	17.9	20.8	19.1	22.0	0.30
Total Mean	25.2	34.0	20.1	30.3	17.8	25.6	20.2	24.9	0.29
Chr. Dem.	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	5.4	3.7	7.2	1.7	1.8	4.2	3.7	4.1	0.52
Islands	21.6	32.9	25.5	33.3	19.0	29.5	16.9	23.4	0.33
Central West	21.3	25.3	27.1	33.8	23.5	25.2	22.8	24.8	0.19
South	13.2	8.0	7.6	9.3	6.6	14.9	11.6	9.8	0.31
Total Mean	16.3	18.5	19.8	22.8	15.6	18.9	16.0	17.7	0.16
Green	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	14.6	6.8	21.4	7.0	6.7	17.6	13.3	12.9	0.52
Islands	9.3	6.3	10.6	5.6	4.9	8.5	6.6	6.9	0.28
Central West	20.8	11.9	20.9	8.6	6.8	14.4	10.1	12.5	0.46
South	12.1	4.3	8.0	1.5	6.3	6.1	5.2	6.2	0.62
Total Mean	16.4	8.8	17.1	6.6	6.4	12.6	9.2	10.6	0.42
Left Socialist	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	7.0	8.3	20.8	8.7	10.9	10.3	13.4	12.3	0.38
Islands	8.1	2.6	3.6	4.4	19.0	6.6	13.1	10.3	0.71
Central West	6.9	9.1	10.2	3.3	9.7	7.2	8.8	8.4	0.38
South	7.9	8.7	13.4	4.5	8.2	8.4	5.5	7.0	0.35
Total Mean	7.4	8.2	14.7	5.7	10.2	8.7	9.6	9.4	0.30
Total mean	7.3	8.6	15.5	5.8	9.6	8.9	9.3	9.4	0.31
Rad. Right	**Technical**	**Managers**	**Soc.**	**P.B.**	**Prod.**	**Off.**	**Serv.work.**	**Total**	**Kappa**
Nordic	12.7	10.2	5.1	20.3	26.9	15.3	14.7	14.0	0.56
Islands									
Central West	6.8	9.1	2.8	12.3	14.0	10.2	13.4	10.0	0.56
South	2.6	2.9	2.1	3.9	3.7	0.6	5.8	3.3	0.68
Total Mean	7.2	7.8	3.2	12.2	14.6	9.1	11.8	9.3	0.50

Among the professional classes, support for the conservative parties is strongest among the managers, then the technical professionals, and lowest among the socio-cultural professionals,

in accordance with Hypotheses 7b, d and f. Support for the conservative parties seems to cut across the division between professional and lower-skilled classes to a larger degree than for the social democratic and liberal parties. According to the average figures, support is largest among managers and petite bourgeoisie, then among office workers and the technical profession, and lowest among socio-cultural professionals, production and service workers.

There are some regional variations, but the main patterns are fairly consistent across regions and countries. The socio-cultural professions are among the classes that are least likely to support the conservatives in all regions. All measures show that conservative class voting is much higher in the Nordic countries than in the other regions.

We did not formulate any hypothesis for the Christian parties in connection to the Oesch class schema. There are – as for the EGP – small class differences, although they are somewhat more popular among the petite bourgeoisie.

New Politics parties

According to the average figures, support for the green parties is largest among the socio-cultural professionals and the technical professions and lowest among production workers and the petite bourgeoisie. Office workers are also more inclined to support the green parties than the service workers and managers. Therefore, Hypothesis 8a is not fully supported; the technical professions support the greens on the same level as the socio-cultural professions according to the data. Only in the Nordic countries are the socio-cultural professions clearly more likely to support the greens.

As for the left socialist parties, the socio-cultural professionals are most likely to support these parties, in accordance with Hypothesis 8b. In contrast to the pattern for the green parties, the left socialists are the second most popular among the production workers. The other professional classes (managers and technical profession) and lower-skill classes (office workers and service workers) are placed in the middle with very similar average support.

As for the radical right parties, support is largest among the production workers, followed by the petite bourgeoisie and the service workers, and smallest among the socio-cultural professionals, placing the other three classes in a middle position. Hypothesis 9a thus receives support, while Hypothesis 9b is only partially confirmed; support for the radical right is at the same level among the service workers as among the petite bourgeoisie. According to

the regional averages, we find similar patterns in the Nordic countries and the Central Western region, while the pattern is somewhat deviant in Southern Europe.

Oesch class voting (kappa) is highest for the radical right (0.50), followed by the greens (0.42) and the left socialists (0.31 when the deviate Irish case is excluded). The kappa values for the Old Politics parties are 0.29 for the conservative parties, 0.28 for the social democratic parties and the liberals (excluding the deviant Portuguese case) and, finally, 0.16 for the Christian democratic parties.

2.7 Testing the main hypotheses

Above, we formulated two main hypotheses about the relative importance of the two class schemas: the Old Politics (OP) and New Politics (NP) hypotheses.

To test these hypotheses, we compared kappa values based on the mean regional and mean total support of each party family for both the EGP and Oesch's class schemas. We then calculated the difference between the two, as portrayed in Table 7. This helped us see to what degree the two schemas are able to capture class differences in party choice. We consider any difference in kappa values larger than or equal to 0.03 as worthy of comment.

Table 7. Regional kappa values from EGP and Oesch.

	Old Politics parties								
	Social Democratic parties			Conservative parties			Liberal parties		
	EGP	Oesch	Diff.	EGP	Oesch	Diff.	EGP	Oesch	Diff.
Nordic	0.52	0.42	0.10	0.51	0.49	0.03	0.70	0.63	0.07
Islands	0.32	0.37	-0.05	0.17	0.23	-0.06	0.52	0.53	-0.01
Central West	0.34	0.33	0.01				0.33	0.32	0.00
South	0.21	0.17	0.04	0.30	0.30	0.00	0.11	0.36	-0.25
Total	0.32	0.28	0.04	0.31	0.30	0.01	0.22	0.19	0.03
Total w/o Portugal							0.32	0.28	0.04
	New Politics parties								
	Left Socialist parties			Green parties			Radical Right parties		
	EGP	Oesch	Diff.	EGP	Oesch	Diff.	EGP	Oesch	Diff.
Nordic	0.32	0.38	-0.06	0.65	0.52	0.13	0.48	0.56	-0.09
Islands	0.73	0.71	0.02	0.38	0.28	0.10			
Central West	0.52	0.38	0.13	0.42	0.46	-0.04	0.33	0.56	-0.23
South	0.39	0.35	0.04	0.41	0.62	-0.22	0.35	0.68	-0.33
Total	0.31	0.30	0.01	0.39	0.42	-0.03	0.36	0.50	-0.14
Total w/o Ireland	0.31	0.31	0.00						

Overall, the EGP schema outperforms Oesch's schema regarding social democratic parties, in support of Hypothesis OP. This is particularly true in the Nordic countries. Oesch's schema, however, fares better than the EGP on the Islands, and there are small differences in the Central Western region.

The differences in the kappa values for the conservative parties are small and should not be emphasised. However, we note that there is a difference in favour of the EGP in the Nordic countries, while the Oesch classes perform better in the Island countries.

The kappa values based on the total mean indicate that the EGP also performs better than Oesch's schema when it comes to demonstrating class differences in liberal party support, again supporting Hypothesis OP. This difference becomes somewhat clearer when the deviant Portuguese case is omitted. When we turn to individual regions, it is actually only for the Nordic region that the EGP does better than Oesch's schema. The differences are negligible for the Islands and the Central Western region.

It is worth mentioning that the EGP, in fact, outperforms Oesch's schema in the Nordic countries for social democratic, liberal and conservative parties. This is highly

interesting, given that these countries have high female labour participation, large welfare states and large service sectors. These three factors are considered the rationale behind Oesch's schema. According to Oesch (2006b: 263), it is the emergence of these three phenomena over the last 30 years that has changed the occupational system, thus necessitating a redrawing of the class map. As such, one would expect Oesch's schema to fare better in the Nordic countries. However, that is not the case.

All in all, Hypothesis OP is moderately supported by the empirical analysis, in particular for the social democratic and liberal parties.

The kappa based on the total mean of the left socialist parties does not show important differences between the two schemas. The EGP fares better in the Central Western region and in the South, while Oesch's schema does better in the Nordic countries. Hypothesis NP is not supported for the left socialists.

When it comes to the green parties, the total mean is slightly in favour of Oesch's schema. This is primarily the case for the parties in the Southern region but also in the Central West. Otherwise, the picture is mixed. The EGP has markedly higher kappa values in the Nordic region and on the Islands. The evidence for Hypothesis NP is mixed but slightly in favour of Oesch when it comes to the green parties.

We turn now to the radical right. This party family is particularly interesting, given Herbert Kitschelt's (2013) comments on the relative merits of the two class schemas in this regard. As part of his more general critique of the EGP schema, Kitschelt (2013: 224) claimed that it "simply will not do to account for (…) demand-side explanation of Radical Right party support". His view on the relationship between occupation and political preference is, as he noted, similar to what Oesch proposed (Kitschelt 2013: 231).

While Kitschelt's general critique on the EGP schema's predictive and explanatory power is not supported by the material in Table 7, the empirical evidence is definitively in favour of his comments when it comes to the radical right. Oesch's schema does better than the EGP in total, and the difference in mean kappa values is much larger than for all the other party families. Oesch's schema performs best in all the regions, and the difference is relatively large in the Central West and in the South. The radical right definitely demonstrates the clearest differences between the two schemas. This strongly supports Hypothesis NP.

To summarise, Oesch's schema performs better in demonstrating class differences in preference for the radical right, as measured by the kappa values, and in explaining radical

right voting, as measured by the explanatory power. However, the differences are not dramatic, and Kitschelt's strong remarks in this regard should be moderated.

All in all, however, the evidence for Hypothesis NP is mixed. It is not supported in the case of the left socialist parties, it receives mixed support for the green parties and it is strongly supported in the case of the radical right parties.

2.8 Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to conduct a test of the EGP and Oesch class schemas in a comparative study of 18 West European countries. Prominent scholars have argued that the EGP schema, which is based on the hierarchical dimension of social class, is outdated and that the Oesch schema will tap the preference formations and party choices in advanced industrial democracies in a much better way. The basic idea in the Oesch class schema is that the hierarchical class concept needs to be supplemented with a horizontal component or dimension which takes into consideration other interests and experiences that people develop in connection with their work.

We generated two main hypotheses about the relative impact of the two class schemas by differentiating between Old Politics and New Politics parties. We argued that there are no convincing arguments for why the horizontal divisions should be important for the Old Politics parties, and although left–right class voting has declined in recent decades, we argued that the hierarchical class concept is still most relevant for the Old Politics parties. These expectations are largely supported in the empirical analysis: The expected variations in support for the social democratic, liberal and conservative parties among the hierarchical dimension in the EGP schema among the employed classes are found for all these party families. The differences between the classes are not very large, and there are regional variations, but the patterns are impressively consistent.

The analyses of the relationship between party choice and the Oesch classes for the Old Politics parties confirmed the hypothesis we had for these parties. The hierarchical dimension is most important, and for the social democratic and liberal parties, there is very little variation along the horizontal dimension, although there are some regional patterns that show such differences. The conservative parties seem to be borderline case. There are both important hierarchical *and* horizontal class differences in conservative party preference. This is reflected in the kappa values, which are very similar for the two class schemas.

We find some of the same "mixed" pattern for the left socialist parties. This party family is diverse, and there are considerable variations between the parties' class bases, which distort the means. According to both class schemas, support is lowest among the petite bourgeoisie. As for the EGP, there are small differences among the other classes, and the same applies to the Oesch schema with the exception of the socio-cultural professions, where support is highest.

The conservative and left socialist parties can then be characterised as party families that are influenced by both Old and New Politics trends, at least in terms of class support. These are also the two families where the kappa values for the two class schemas are similar.

The green parties have a clear EGP class profile, as expected according to New Politics theory. Support is highest among the service classes and the routine non-manuals than among other social classes. The reason why the Oesch schema shows a higher kappa value is that support seems to cut across the hierarchical divisions when the horizontal dimension is included. Support for the greens is much higher among socio-cultural and technical professions than among managers and much higher among office workers than among production workers in particular.

Finally, the radical rightist parties are perhaps the most interesting in this respect. These parties have a clear class profile according to the EGP class schema, with strongest support among the two working-class categories and the petite bourgeoisie and much smaller support among the service classes in particular. The reasons why the Oesch schema performs better for the radical right is that there are considerable variations in support for the radical right among the professional and lower-skilled classes: Support is considerably smaller among the socio-cultural professions than among the other professional classes and larger among production workers than among the other two lower-skilled categories.

The decisively largest difference in kappa values is found for the radical right: The Oesch class schema shows a larger correlation. It should, however, be underscored that the EGP class schema is also highly relevant for the greens and the radical right. The kappas based on the EGP are larger for these party families than for all the Old Politics party families.

In sum, there are several developments discussed in this paper that yield good theoretical reasons to believe that Oesch's schema captures the modern class structure better than the older EGP schema. However, both class schemas yield predictions for the classes' political preferences that are empirically meaningful. Both class schemas correlate with party

preference, and the explanatory power of the two class schemas are quite similar, with one exception: As Kitschelt proposed, Oesch fares better in capturing and explaining class differences in radical right support. However, Kitschelt's and others' warnings that the EGP is not useful in explaining political preferences and party choice anymore are empirically unfounded. The differences between the two schemas are not large, and sometimes the EGP does better than Oesch – in spite of having fewer class categories. Scholars who are using the EGP classes do not need to worry. The schema is still relevant to political preference formation and party choice in modern, post-industrial societies.

3 Class voting and the differential role of political values: Evidence from 12 West-European countries[20]

Influential theories of class voting assume that the phenomenon occurs because classes hold different political values, which in turn affect their party preference. However, we do not know how important this mechanism is. Hence, this article uses high quality survey data from twelve Western European countries to study the association between class and voting. The results suggest that political values – including non-economic values – play a central role in accounting for this association, although substantial class differences persist even when holding political values constant. I furthermore argue that the relevance of this mechanism should vary by party family. Political values should account for class voting to the extent that parties give the voters clear signals on issues of relevance to the value orientations. As such, party behaviour not only affects the *level* of class voting, but the very nature of the link between class and voting. This article contributes first by testing one of the most important theories of the mechanisms behind class voting, and second by demonstrating how the parties' behaviour affects this mechanism.

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3.1 Introduction

Understanding how and why social groups differ in their political preferences and behaviour is of central importance to the understanding of how political systems function. Social scientists have mapped the association between social groups and party preference over time and between countries for a long time, in particular for the class cleavage (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, Knutsen 2006, Nieuwbeerta 1995). The class cleavage has attracted renewed attention lately, both within and outside of academia, with the election of Donald Trump and the *Brexit* vote (Evans 2017: 177). The latter is even described as an expression of the democratic class struggle (Evans and Tilley 2017: 201).

Descriptions and explanations of the variations in the macro phenomenon of class voting, both between countries and over time, have often been based on more or less untested ideas about the mechanisms that operate at the micro level: In other words, exactly why belonging to a specific class affects an individual's propensity to vote in a certain way.

This article makes two important contributions. The first is to test in a comparative and systematic fashion one of the most dominant theories about the mechanism behind class voting, namely that class affects political values, which again affect party preference. To what extent do different political values account for class voting? The test employs nuanced measures of several political values based on many indicators. The second contribution is to connect this to the emerging *supply side* literature, by studying how the intermediate role of political values vary depending on characteristics of the party families. Briefly put, my claim is that political values will only account for class voting to the extent that classes hold different political values, and to the extent that the parties provide clear signals on their stances on issues of relevance to these political values. It follows from this that political values should account for different amounts of class voting for different party families.

In the following, I first describe the most dominant view on class voting. I then employ supply side perspectives to argue that the role of political values will vary between party families. Third, the article identifies relevant political values, before testing the role of these values in twelve countries. The findings are in line with the theoretical expectations. Finally, implications are discussed.

3.2 Class and political values

3.2.1 The theory: Class voting is a question of different political values

The most important accounts of the relationship between social groups and voting assume that this relationship is due to the social groups' different values. The Michigan school, for instance, theorise that social-structural variables affect social-psychological attributes such as political attitudes and partisan identification, which then affect vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960). This is similar to the view expressed in the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who claimed that social structure affects people's interests and values. This account is also dominant in newer research. Evans and de Graaf (2013: 16), for instance, state that "…the class-party choice association is assumed to be explainable via voters' positions on a dimension of 'economic left-right ideology'." Knutsen (2018: 9) claims that the basic causal model in both "Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis and Kitschelt's model (…) can be understood as being focussed on the indirect effect from social structure via value orientations to party choice."

This dominant perspective on the relationship between class and party preference is reflected in the very definition of a cleavage, as stated by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995: 494). First, a cleavage is based on long-lasting social divisions that create objectively identifiable groups within a society – like classes or religious denominations. Second, the members of these groups share a common way of life, giving rise to shared value orientations within the groups. Finally, a cleavage needs to be organisationally institutionalised, for instance in a political party or a church. Class voting, in this view, is based on the fact that classes differ in their political values, which again affects their party preference. While much literature looks at the effect of class on values, there are few empirical tests quantifying the importance of this mechanism relating class and political preferences. Hence the first research question in this article: To what extent do political values account for the association between class and party preference?

3.2.2 The behaviour of parties influence the role of political values

Building on the value model of class voting, the phenomenon requires that classes differ in their political values, but also that these values affect party preference. For this to occur, parties must hold clear positions on issues of relevance to the political values in question. Much research in the emerging supply side literature of cleavage voting argues and demonstrates empirically that the levels of class voting vary with the polarisation and salience of left-right issues in party systems (e.g. Elff 2009, Evans and Tilley 2012, Jansen 2011, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Spies 2013). As Evans and Tilley (2017: 159) put it, "if the parties all offer the same economic policies, why would someone's view on economic policy affect their vote?"

However, not only the strength of class voting, but the very mechanism through which class is associated with party preference, should be affected by party behaviour in much the same way. Class can also have a direct effect on party preference (e.g. Weakliem and Heath 1994: 256), for instance due to group identity, and the degree to which the effect of class is direct or indirect through political values may vary. I argue that political values will account for class voting for a party to the extent that i) classes differ in their political values and ii) parties give clear signals on issues of relevance to the political values in question (see also Evans 2017). Parties give signals about their priorities to the voters in a variety of ways. Among two of the most important are the positions they take relative to the other parties in the party system, and the emphasis they put on these positions. Parties in different party families give signals of different strength on different issues, and this gives rise to the second research question in this article, stated as a hypothesis: *The intermediate role of political values varies between party families.* The next step is to determine which political values that are relevant. Then, I will specify hypotheses for the different political values and different party families.

3.2.3 Which political values?

Values are here defined as "conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable but are evident in moral discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes" (van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995: 46). To translate unobservable values into an empirically useful device, van Deth and Scarbrough (1995: 41-43, 46) consider attitude patterns that are constrained by values, called *value orientations*. Which value orientations do class work through to affect

party preference?

The classic view is that this is a matter of economic left-right values (Evans and de Graaf 2013: viii, see also Evans 2017: 189-190). Among other factors, the classes' different economic interests (e.g. Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006, Brooks and Svallfors 2010), promotional prospects (Evans 1993) and work conditions (Bengtsson et al. 2013) yield differences in their economic left-right values (e.g. Svallfors 2006, for a brief review see Evans and Tilley 2017: 60). As such, this value orientation must clearly be included.

There have been recent debates on the role of economic left-right values versus more cultural values in relation to Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and populism (e.g. Hobolt 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016). A set of non-material or cultural values have also been deemed important for class voting (e.g. Houtman 2003, Svallfors 2006, Achterberg and Houtman 2006, Knutsen 2007, Langsæther 2014, Evans 2017, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Here, I focus on the two cultural value orientations that are directly linked to the rise of the two major, new party families of Western Europe the last few decades, namely the Radical Right and Green parties.

The first is related to immigration. Attitudes to immigration can be considered as basic orientations and have been shown to be "closely related to and reflect basic values and beliefs about different conceptions of national identity, ethnicity and multiculturalism" (Knutsen 2018: 81). Economic competition from immigrants affect workers, in particular unskilled workers, both when it comes to domestic competition from immigrants over jobs, housing, and social services, and due to increased competition internationally from countries with lower labour costs (Betz and Meret 2013: 109-11, Oskarson and Demker 2013: 175, Oesch 2008). The middle class is not negatively affected to the same degree, perhaps not at all, and employers might well benefit from this influx of cheap labour. Not only does the competition over jobs increase due to immigration, but this competition directly and negatively influences the wages of native workers (Bjørnstad 2015). The classes have clear diverging economic interests when it comes to immigration.

Furthermore, the educational differences and occupational experiences of the classes yield differences in levels of tolerance, prevention of scapegoating, and socialisation into specific norms related to avoiding prejudice (Coffé 2013: 138, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013, 126, 131, Oesch 2008). The working class typically have stronger national identities and feel more negatively affected by the cultural threat of immigration (Evans and Tilley 2017: 184). For both cultural and economic reasons, then, scholars find class differences in immigration

orientations (Dancygier and Walter 2015, Knutsen 2018: 94, Oesch 2008, Oskarson and Demker 2013).

The other value orientation is environmentalism, which has been described as "the most manifest expression of the 'New Politics' conflict" (Knutsen 2018: 77). The more privileged classes have solved their basic material needs and are free to focus on less fundamental issues than survival (Inglehart 1997). Second, the middle and upper classes are considered to be more politically and socially active, and environmental concern could be seen as an extension of this general concern with social problems. Furthermore, environmental regulations can pose a direct threat to the jobs of industrial workers. On the other hand, lower social strata are in general more exposed to environmental problems, at least local ones (van Liere and Dunlap 1980). Previous empirical work has shown mixed associations between class and environmental concern (Dietz et al. 1998, Gifford and Nilsson 2014, van Liere and Dunlap 1980). To the extent that the classes differ in their environmentalist values, then, these values will account for class voting for party families that hold clear positions on environmental issues.

Knutsen (2018) develops good conceptual and empirical measures for these three value orientations. In this study, I employ these high-quality multiple-indicator measures of economic left-right values, immigration orientations, and environmentalism. See section 3.4 and the online appendix for more information on the measurement and interrelationship of these value orientations.

3.3 The differential role of political values: Hypotheses

In the analyses, I utilise a modified version of the party family schema of Knutsen (2018), distinguishing between Communist, Left Socialist, Social Democratic, Green, Mainstream Right, and Radical Right parties. For details on this categorisation, see section 3.4 and the online appendix.

As discussed above, the general claim of this article is that political values account for class voting to the extent that the classes differ along the value orientation and to the extent that parties signal their stances on issues of relevance to the value orientation in question. The hypothesis that follows is that the class differences in party family preference will be accounted for by value orientations that are important to the party family. Hence, we need to

establish which value orientations that are most important for each party family, using a combination of pertinent literature and a measure of signal strength in policy areas related to the three value orientations. This measure is an additive index combining information on the position and salience of different issues for the parties within the party families, taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The expert survey covers three policy areas directly related to the economy, namely deregulation, redistribution, and spending versus taxation. It furthermore covers a policy area directly related to the environment and immigration. I estimate the signal strength for each party family within each of these areas to find which value orientation the party sends the clearest signals on (see section 3.4 for more details on the construction of this index).

The Communists and the Left Socialists are the most leftist party families in economic terms (Knutsen 2018: 40-45). They oppose market forces and care about public ownership and a controlled economy (Gallagher et al. 2011: 244-250). Both kinds of parties send out the clearest signals in policy areas related to the economic left-right value orientation. The Communist parties have the strongest signals on redistribution, while the Left Socialist parties send out equally strong signals on redistribution and spending versus taxation.

The centre-left and centre-right parties – the Social Democrats and the Mainstream Right – are in most party systems the dominant parties articulating the traditional industrial economic left-right conflict. The Social Democrats originated as the representatives of workers in the conflict between labour and capital (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and these parties are still the main alternative for left-wing voters in most countries, despite the turn to the centre in the 1990s and the electoral losses in the 2000s (Knutsen 2018: 45). The Mainstream Right, consisting of Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties, "oppose the left over state intervention in the economy" (Oesch and Rennwald 2018: 3) and represent the major alternatives to the appeal of social democracy (Gallagher et al. 2011: 260). Both party families give voters the clearest signal in the policy area of spending versus taxation, which is clearly related to the economic left-right value orientation. Based on all this, we can derive the following hypothesis (H1): *Economic left-right values account for class differences in support for Communist, Left Socialist, Social Democratic, and Mainstream Right parties.*

The Green parties, on the contrary, are not primarily concerned with economic conflicts. They were established in the 1970s and 1980s based on post-materialistic conflicts of values, rather than a materialistic conflict of resources. As the name indicates, they prioritise environmental concern, often at the expense of economic growth or commercial

activity (Gallagher 2011: 250-252, Knutsen 2018: 45). They furthermore hold an unambiguous position on the cultural aspects of globalisation, supporting the cultural opening of European societies (Dolezal 2010: 542). Using Benoit and Laver's (2006) expert survey, Ennser (2012: 162) finds that this party family is by far the most environmentalist and immigration friendly in Western Europe. My own measure of signal strength also indicates that the Green parties send out the strongest signals when it comes to environmentalism, followed by immigration. Based on this, I expect that (H2) *environmentalism and immigration orientations account for class differences in support for Green parties.*

Finally, the Radical Right is also not primarily concerned with economic conflict: "As economics is a secondary issue to the populist radical right, the parties instrumentalise it to pursue their primary ideological agenda, i.e. nativism, authoritarianism, and populism." (Mudde 2007: 145). Oesch and Rennwald (2018: 3) claim that these parties even actively blur their socioeconomic positions. On the other hand, these parties are often unequivocal opponents of mass immigration and multiculturalism. It should come as no surprise that these parties send the clearest signal – by far – in the policy area of immigration. I thus expect that (H3) *immigration orientations account for class differences in support for Radical Right parties.*

3.4 Data and methodology

To test these hypotheses, I utilise the latest version of the European Values Study (EVS) at the time of writing, i.e. from 2008-2010. While many sources contain data on occupation and voting intention, this data set is particularly well suited for analysis of political values, as it contains many cross-nationally comparable, high quality indicators that allow us to construct established value indexes with high content validity. In total, I utilise data on 11,266 respondents from twelve West European countries.

The independent variable is class. There are two major alternative ways to operationalise class: the EGP schema (Erikson et al. 1979, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: ch. 2), and the newer schema created by Daniel Oesch (2006). While the latter is highly interesting, given its emphasis on newer developments within the middle class, I apply a modified six class EGP schema here (appendix A.2.1). It is still "the only systematically validated measure of class position available for use in this sort of large scale comparative project" (Evans and De Graaf 2013: 13). Furthermore, recent findings indicate that the

criticism against the EGP schema has been somewhat exaggerated, and that the two class schemas have similar explanatory power for party choice (Knutsen and Langsæther 2016, Vestin and Oskarson 2017).

The three value orientations constitute the intermediate variables. These are constructed by creating indexes out of a range of substantial questions about attitudes. Knutsen (2018) employed factor analyses to find constrained attitude patterns and I replicate his operationalisation here.

The economic left-right values are measured by asking for the respondent's views on individual versus state responsibility, economic freedom, income inequality versus incentives, private versus public incentives, and views on competition. Immigration orientations are measured by asking how the respondent feels about immigrants. Are they seen as a cultural threat, should they maintain or abandon their customs and traditions, are they a strain on the welfare system or not, and so on. The attitudes the respondent has in these regards are considered to reflect basic values and beliefs about national identity, ethnicity, and multiculturalism (Knutsen 2018: 81). The environmentalist value orientation is measured by asking about views on the relationship between the human species and nature; the consequences of current human economic activity, the willingness to give up income to prevent pollution, etc. These measurements, based on many indicators and thorough content validation, constitute an improvement to studies based on single indicators. In the twelve countries combined, economic left-right values correlate only weakly with environmentalism (*pearson's r = 0.12*) and with immigration orientations (*r = 0.05*). The latter two also correlate very weakly (*r = 0.05*), indicating that these do constitute separate political value orientations. The exact wording of the questions are in the appendix along with descriptive statistics and the correlations between the value orientations in each individual country.

Party preference is operationalised through a question of vote intention in the EVS and categorised into Communist, Left Socialist, Green, Social Democratic, Mainstream Right, and Radical Right parties. The exact categorisation of these parties is available in the appendix along with descriptive statistics. Parties from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland are included.

This is a study of the *association* between class and voting – no background variables are introduced as controls. Comparison between studies is sometimes rendered difficult by the inclusion of a range of different controls without first showing the bivariate relationship,

hindering comparison between studies. Some scholars control for intermediate variables, such as left-right self-placement, which supresses the effect of class (e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2014: chap. 9). Other scholars control for variables that are close to, or might be considered to partly *constitute,* class – such as income or education. On this point, I agree with Oesch (2013: 44), who states that class and education are closely linked. This is because access to several classes depends on successful completion of higher education, while other class positions are very rare among highly educated people.

Furthermore, as mentioned, I have used the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (Bakker et al. 2015) to create a measure of signal strength to supplement the discussion of the party families in section 3.3. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 is closest in time to the data collection at the individual level and, crucially, it covers Switzerland and Norway, unlike the 2006 version. The data set includes measures of parties' position and salience of several relevant policy areas. Of relevance to the economic left-right value orientation are measures of parties' position on improving public services versus reducing taxes, whether they oppose or support deregulation of markets, and their position on redistribution from the rich to the poor. There is furthermore a measure of the parties' position on immigration policy, as well as on whether the parties support environmental protection or economic growth. These two cover areas of relevance to the immigration orientations as well as environmentalism. All of these positional measures are accompanied by a measure of the salience of the policy area for the party.

I have coded the parties in the CHES into the same party families as in the EVS data set. In section 3.3, I describe the signal strength as a combination of the deviance of the party's position from the mean position in the national party system, as well as the salience of these positions. The signal strength measure used is simply an additive index of the deviation of the party's position from the mean position in the national party system and the salience of the policy area for the party.

To measure the role of value orientations as an intermediate variable connecting class and voting, we need a measure of the total impact of class on voting, which may be used with and without control variables. The measure also needs to be able to distinguish between different party groups. The traditional measures such as the Alford or Thomsen Index are not suitable, as they require dichotomisation of the party choice variable. I rely on the *kappa* index developed by Hout et al. (1995), commonly used in studies of cleavage voting (e.g. Jansen 2011, Knutsen 2006, Stubager 2006). This measure is not limited to whether workers

vote for left-wing parties, but captures *total* class voting, the full relationship between a voter's class location and party preference. It is simply the standard deviation of class differences in vote choice.

We can calculate separate kappa values for each voting outcome (Hout *et al.* 1995: 813), allowing us to study how the importance of value orientations as an intermediate variable varies between party families. The gross kappa (based on a bivariate model) can be compared to the net kappa (based on a multivariate model) to establish how much of the total party group specific class voting that is accounted for by the extra variables – i.e., the value orientations.

In this article, the estimated models are a series of binomial logistic regressions with the dependent variable being voting for a particular party family (e.g. the Social Democrats) versus voting for any other party family. The models include country fixed effects. The kappa value is then simply the standard deviation of the six class coefficients. The higher the kappa value, the larger the relative class differences in party preference. The gross relative kappa from the first model, which includes only class and vote choice, will be compared to the net relative kappas from the other models, which include the value orientation as control variables. This is similar to the logic applied in Tilley (2015) and Evans and Tilley (2017: ch. 8), although they compare predicted probabilities rather than kappa values. The three value orientations will be included one by one to see how much total party group specific class voting they account for individually. Then, in a final model, they will all be included simultaneously to see how much they account for together.

It is natural to expect that the processes leading the classes to obtain certain value orientations and to obtain certain party preferences are similar in the different countries, as they are derived primarily from individuals' positions within labour markets and production units. The analyses thus are based on pooled data from all the countries that have a party from the relevant party family. The major advantage of this approach is that we can include several countries that are unfit for country-specific analyses, as some countries do not have certain combinations of classes preferring certain party groups. This yields empty cells, distorting the results from the logistic regressions.

However, while similar, the processes just described are not likely to be *identical* across countries. Magnitude differences across countries could arise due to sociological factors related to the classes, or political factors related to the parties. For instance, the regulation of the labour market or the unionisation rate among workers could affect their left-

right values. And as already discussed, the parties' polarisation and emphasis of different issues are likely to affect the impact of the values on party preference. Of course, the theoretical point of this article applies also within countries: I would expect class differences of parties within a country to be accounted for by value orientations to the extent that the party differs from other parties in the party system and to the extent that they emphasise these differences. Both sociological and political factors affect how and why the mediation may vary by country. While beyond the scope of this study, we need future research to both map and explain cross-country differences in the importance of the value model of class voting.

There are two caveats, both related to the fact that I am using cross-sectional data. First, I cannot ensure that there is no reverse causality. It might be, as Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) suggest, that political values affect the choice of occupation and thus class, rather than the other way around. Second, I cannot ensure that there is any causal relationship at all. Talking about causality is inevitably hard with cross-sectional data, which is why it is the *association* between class and voting I have attempted to disentangle.

The idea of causality – and the direction of the causality – suggested in this article is based on theoretical reasoning that have been common in the literature at least since Campbell *et al.*'s (1960) funnel of causality. For modern works based on the same order of causality, see for instance Bengtsson *et al.* (2013) or Evans and de Graaf (2013). In addition, Brooks and Svallfors (2010: 205) state that their findings suggest "little evidence for the hypothesis of self-selection, in which socialization-induced values dispose individuals to choose jobs (and thus class locations) that are most consonant with their preferences."

3.5 Results

The results are presented in figure 1. The first bar in each panel ("class") shows the *gross* total class voting for each of the party families, when no controls are included. As explained in section 3.4, the kappa is simply the standard deviation of the class coefficients: The higher the value, the larger relative differences between the classes in support for the specific party family. The next bar shows the same measure *after* controlling for economic left-right values (ECLR). The relative change between this bar and the bar in the class model indicates the amount of class voting that economic left-right values account for. The same applies to the next bars, including the final one, which shows net class voting for each of the party families when controlling for all the three value orientations simultaneously.

Figure 1: Party family specific class voting in the different models. Horizontal line at bivariate class voting level from model 1 for ease of comparison.

The total class voting, as measured by the gross kappa value, is highest for the Radical Right, the Greens, and the Socialist left, at around 0.40. The class bases discovered for the party families in the data used here are similar to that found in previous research: The high kappa value for the Radical Right is due to the well-established massive overrepresentation of workers and the petite bourgeoisie (see e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005, Oesch and Rennwald 2018), the mirror image of the Green parties' electorate, in which the service classes are overrepresented (see e.g. Dolezal 2010, Oesch 2013). The Left Socialist party family has a very low appeal among the petite bourgeoisie, contributing to the high kappa value (see e.g. Knutsen 2006). The Mainstream Right obtains a kappa value of 0.32. The higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie are both prone to vote for this party family, while workers avoid it. The Communists and Social Democrats have the opposite class basis (e.g. Knutsen 2006, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). There are thus clear class differences for each party family, but the strength of class voting varies between party families.

The first hypothesis is that economic left-right values account for the class differences in support for Communist, Left Socialist, Social Democratic, and Mainstream Right parties. Indeed, this is the case for all these party families. As figure 1 visualises, economic left-right values account for about a third of the Communist and Mainstream Right class voting, and about a quarter of the Social Democratic and Left Socialist class voting. None of the other value orientations matter much for class differences in support for any of these party families. H1 thus receives strong support.

Environmentalism accounts for approximately one tenth of the overrepresentation of the service class and routine non-manual employees in the Green electorate, and the underrepresentation of the petite bourgeoisie and the worker class. Immigration orientations are even more important, accounting for a fifth of the Green class voting. This is more important primarily because class differences in immigration orientations are much larger than class differences in environmentalism. Economic left-right values do not matter. In total, then, the three value orientations account for almost 30% of Green class voting. H2 receives strong support.

The final hypothesis is that immigration orientations account for class differences in support for Radical Right parties. Indeed, almost *half* of the overrepresentation of workers and the petty bourgeoisie is accounted for by immigration orientations. Economic left-right values and environmentalism, on the other hand, do not account for Radical Right class voting. It is perhaps tempting to read this as support for the 'cultural backlash' thesis, which states that support for populism is largely a reaction to progressive cultural change (see Inglehart and Norris 2016). However, workers have been opposed to immigration for ages, long before the rise of progressive values (e.g. Lipset 1959) and this is to some extent a direct response to losses workers may experience because of immigration (see Evans and Tilley 2017: 183). To underline this point further, I have re-estimated the models for the Radical Right with controls for age, sex, and education (appendix A.5). Approximately half of the Radical Right class voting is accounted for by these three variables. However, and crucially, immigration orientations still account for 46% of the remaining class differences when controlling for education. It is thus not obvious that class differences in support for populism or Trump is only the result of cultural backlash.

The value orientations taken together reduce Social Democratic class voting by one fifth and that of the Radical Right with about one third. The value model account for about a quarter of the class voting for the rest of the party families. There can thus be no doubt about

the importance of political values as a mechanism connecting class and party preference. However, given the prominence of the idea that class voting is a phenomenon that is indirect through political values, it is noteworthy that less than half of all class voting in fact works this way. We are clearly in need of more research to pinpoint – theoretically as well as empirically – the exact mechanisms through which class affects party preference.

The major theoretical claim of this article receives strong support: Political values account for class voting to the extent that the classes differ along the value orientation and to the extent that parties signal their stances on issues of relevance to the value orientation in question. As such, economic left-right values account for class differences in support for party families that care about taxing versus spending, deregulation of the economy, or redistribution. Immigration orientations account for class differences for party families that emphasise issues related to immigration policies, and environmentalist values account for class differences for party families that emphasise issues related to climate change and the environment.

3.6 Conclusion and implications

The first contribution of this article is to empirically test and quantify the importance of one of the most dominant theories of how class is associated with party preference. Value orientations surely seem to constitute one of the major mechanisms, accounting for somewhere between a fifth and a third of class voting in Western European democracies. Yet, there is still much class voting that remains unaccounted for. One possible explanation for this is that there may be other important value orientations not included here. Another is simply that political values do not make up the whole story about class voting. There are other strands of literature emphasising identity (e.g. Butler and Stokes 1974), networks (e.g. Huckfeldt 1984, Andersen and Heath 2003), socialisation into partisanship (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), and perceptions of who the parties represent (Evans and Tilley 2017: ch. 7). This includes not only policy representation, but also personnel, rhetoric, media coverage, and group appeals (Evans and Tilley 2017: 163, Thau 2017; see also Weakliem and Heath 1994). Heath (2015, 2016) has shown that the descriptive representation of classes matters for both levels of class voting as well as class non-voting. Voters seem to infer the priorities of the parties not only from their policy positions and the salience of these, but also from e.g. the class background of the candidates. This means that the impact of values could be affected by

social representation as well as policy offerings. In any case, it is clear that we need both further theorising of the mechanisms, and more empirical work to establish how much of the class voting that is accounted for by mechanisms pertaining to social networks, material interests, early socialisation, and other factors.

The findings point us in the right direction when looking for explanations of the variations in class voting over time and between countries. The variations could be due to changes in the effect of class on the political values identified as relevant here; the effect of these political values on party choice; or both.

The second contribution is to study how this varies between party families. Connecting to the emerging supply side literature, I expected variations according to characteristics of the parties. This was indeed the case. Results differ greatly between the party families, and merging these into a Right and Left category in West European, multiparty systems will yield non-valid results. Crucially, the findings indicate that party behaviour not only influences the strength of class voting, but the role of political values as an intermediate variable between class and party preference.

The recent innovations in supply side explanations may also benefit from taking into account the findings of this article. Parties need to offer programmes that differ in respect to the classes' political values if we are to expect class differences in party choice, and "parties can and do shape class politics by restricting (or accentuating) the responsive voter's choice set along relevant ideological criteria" (Evans and de Graaf 2013: 113). But these political values include more than only those pertaining to the traditional economic left-right values. Class voting seems to be the expression of values not only related to the economy, but also to immigration and environmentalism. Supply side studies might thus benefit from including the latter two in their investigations; for example, the increased relevance of immigration issues in most Western European countries could potentially lead to an increase in class voting.

In fact, this is what we might expect given recent developments. The financial crisis and the refugee crisis became important in European countries after the collection of the data used in this article. If the two crises have led to an increased salience of issues related to economic left-right values and immigration orientations among West-European parties, class voting may have increased and a larger share of the association between class and party preference may be due to these two value orientations. Future research should test these developments when newer, suitable data is available.

Finally, the framework applied here can easily be used to test other mechanisms. One could study the role of *interests* by controlling for income, job security or assets and see how much class voting is accounted for, or one could study early socialisation for instance by controlling for the parents' class or education. The framework also works for other cleavages, such as the religious or urban-rural cleavage. In sum, this framework should help with further disentangling the relationship between social structure and voting, and thus make scholars better equipped to understand modern electoral behaviour.

4 How parties shape the nature of cleavage voting: A comparative study of party-mass linkages and political values in 13 West-European countries[21]

The literature on cleavages identifies two different mechanisms through which group belonging affects party preference: Directly, due to frozen party alignments; and indirectly, when group belonging affects political values, which subsequently affect party preference. Combining perspectives on voter and party behaviour, I generate a theoretical account of the conditions that influence which of these mechanisms that are operative. I argue that the effect is indirect through political values to the extent that parties emphasise policy positions of relevance to the political values in question. Under these conditions, group belonging may provide useful cues for voters. The article proposes that party behaviour affects the very nature of the association between social groups and party preference. Combining data on 50 parties with survey data on more than 11,000 citizens from 13 West European countries, the article provides empirical evidence of this proposition in the case of the religious cleavage.

[21] I would like to thank Rune Stubager, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Oddbjørn Knutsen, Pedro Magalhães, Kees van Kersbergen, and Ruth Dassonneville for thorough comments on previous drafts. I have furthermore received highly useful comments from participants at the Political Behaviour Workshop at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University and the 3rd Leuven-Montréal Winter School on Elections in Leuven, as well as from my colleagues at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo. Any remaining errors are my responsibility.

4.1 Introduction

Extant studies have consistently found that social background factors – such as class, religion, or gender – relate to the political preferences of citizens across Western Europe, and are important predictors of party choice.[22] Yet we know surprisingly little about why this is the case (e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2013: 695, Evans 2010: 637-638). What mechanisms shape the linkages between social groups and political parties?

In this article, I first build on cleavage theory to present two potential mechanisms inducing associations between social structural variables and party preference: A direct effect on party preference due to group identity, and an indirect effect through political values. Building on recent supply side theories of cleavage voting, this article then provides an argument delineating the political conditions under which the two mechanisms are likely to operate. While most of the extant supply side literature has shown that party behaviour influences the *level* of cleavage voting, this article further expands this perspective by arguing that party characteristics affect not only the strength, but also the very nature, of the link between social groups and parties.

I test this theory on the case of the religious cleavage, one of the most studied and important cleavages in Western Europe (see, e.g., Esmer and Petterson 2007). Combining demand and supply side – i.e. voter and party – perspectives on political behaviour, I demonstrate how political parties influence individual-level mechanisms that forge an association between religion and party preference. Finally, I discuss the theoretical implications of the findings and the broader implications for how democracies work.

4.2 Two mechanisms: Why cleavage voting occurs

In the literature on cleavage voting – the study of how objectively identifiable groups who share a common way of life organise politically (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494) – there are essentially two perspectives on why social groups have distinct party preferences. The most common perspective implies an indirect pathway, wherein the social background of an individual affects his or her political values, which subsequently shape their party choice (Duriez et al. 2002: 35). Values are here defined as "conceptions of the desirable which are

[22] For just a few recent examples, see Evans and de Graaf (2013), Evans and Tilley (2017), Jansen (2011), Knutsen (2004a, 2006), Knutsen and Langsæther (2018), Stubager (2006).

not directly observable but are evident in moral discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes" (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 46). To translate unobservable values into an empirically useful device, van Deth and Scarbrough (1995: 41-43, 46) consider attitude patterns that are constrained by the values, called value orientations.

The idea of social groups shaping their members' value orientations and thus their party choice follows traditional accounts of religious voting, such as the cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and the 'funnel of causality' in the Michigan model of electoral behaviour (Campbell et al. 1960, see also Raymond 2011: 127). Knutsen (2018: 9) claims that the basic causal model in both "Inglehart's group polarisation hypothesis and Kitschelt's model (…) can be understood as being focussed on the indirect effect from social structure via value orientations to party choice". Indirect cleavage voting is also in line with standard normative democratic theory, as it implies that voters elect parties with whom they share political values.

While this perspective is the most widespread, there is also a *direct* pathway through which social groups can affect party preference: Citizens may feel like one party represents their social group, independent of the parties' current policies. This can come about through historical ties that develop between social groups and particular political parties due to events that occurred a long time ago, creating frozen party alignments (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, see also Knutsen 2004a: 4-6). Such ties may be effectively transmitted between generations through parental socialisation or because children take political preference cues from their parents. Tilley (2015: 923) describes this as a "relic of past associations between groups and parties". They may also come about because a party makes appeals to the group (see Thau 2017) or has candidates that represent the social group (see Heath 2015). In either case, a sense of belonging to the group influences the group members' political behaviour, regardless of shared political values. One example is Catholics in Flandern who vote for the Christian Democrats simply because they consider them the political representative of that particular social group (Duriez et al. 2002: 36). Evans and de Graaf (2013: viii) describe this as "the idea that religious or class politics reflects an almost unthinking adherence to organizations representing religious principles or class interests". This kind of cleavage voting could have problematic democratic implications; voters may take cues from parents or priests of their denomination in a way that make them vote for parties with whom they do not in fact share political values.

While the extant literature has identified these two theoretical mechanisms, and most scholars assume that the effect is primarily indirect, there are unfortunately very few studies on the relative importance of the two mechanisms (but see Langsæther 2018 and Tilley 2015). We also know next to nothing about the conditions under which each of the mechanisms are likely to dominate the other. Hence, in the next section I introduce recent developments in supply side theory, and build on them to provide a new theory of when the different mechanisms are likely to be of importance.

4.3 The pathways depend on party characteristics

Supply side perspectives on the social bases of politics argue that political institutions, parties, and elites, shape and activate the social divisions in the population (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2018). While present in earlier works (e.g. Sartori 1969), this perspective has recently received renewed scholarly attention (see e.g. the edited volume of Evans and de Graaf 2013). The key notion underpinning such perspectives is that parties need to diverge on issues of relevance to the cleavage (for instance, economic redistribution for class and moral issues for religion) to make it electorally relevant. The mechanism is quite simple, as Evans (2017: 185) explains it for the class cleavage: "Ideological convergence reduces the strength of the signal from parties to voters and the motivation for choosing parties on interest/value grounds derived from class is weakened, and *vice versa*." This notion finds empirical support for the class cleavage (e.g. Evans and Tilley 2012, Spies 2013). The argument is derived from a causal model similar to the one depicted in figure 1 (see also Evans and de Graaf 2013: 17-18).

Figure 1. The generalised causal model of supply side theories.



Evans and de Graaf (2013: 17) argue that the extent of party ideological polarisation should also affect the link between *religion* and party preference. The more party polarisation along relevant issues such as abortion, the larger the association between cultural conservative ideology and party preference at the individual level and thus the higher the level of religious voting in the party system as a whole. If parties do not diverge on moral issues, then these differences between the groups are not activated in the voting booth. In other words, convergence on moral issues should reduce religious voting and polarisation should increase it. Several studies demonstrate empirically that the level of religious voting varies with the polarisation of the parties on questions of traditional morality (Elff 2009, Jansen 2011, Jansen et al. 2012).

The major contribution of the supply side literature has been to demonstrate this relationship between party (system) characteristics, notably party polarisation, and the *strength* of the link between social groups and party preference. However, there are other theoretical propositions that may be derived from the causal model above. I propose that party characteristics may affect also the very *nature* of this link – whether it is direct or indirect.

To see why, consider that the indirect route requires that value orientations account for group differences. This route is operative to the extent that i) there are group differences in party preference to account for, ii) the groups hold different views along the relevant value orientation, and iii) the parties send clear signals on issues related to the value orientation, so that the voters may accurately capture and respond to the parties' policies.

The focus in the literature has mostly been on party polarisation as a measure of signal strength, an aspect emphasised in the cue taking literature: "When elites are polarized, they send voters clear signals about where they stand on the issues of the day" (Levendusky 2010: 114-115). In other words, what we are looking for are *clear signals* on issues *of relevance* to the cleavage. However, not only polarisation, but also salience, improves signal strength. Empirically, the salience of economic left-right issues does, indeed, matter for levels of class voting (Rennwald and Evans 2014). Similarly, for the religious cleavage, the more salient traditional-progressive issues such as abortion or gay marriage are for a party – the more they talk about it in their electoral campaigns and the more they emphasise them in their party manifestos – the clearer are presumably the signals to voters.

In fact, polarisation may not yield clear signals unless an issue is also salient. Parties might disagree strongly on issues they rarely talk about, and thus voters are unable to capture these differences. When the signals are clearer, voters are more likely to capture them accurately and respond to them. In other words, voters who do not share values with the party are more likely to abandon it, while the party may attract voters who share its values. Given that political values are not randomly distributed in the population, but rather depends on group belonging, this leads to an indirect effect from social group characteristics via values on party preference.

In sum, any individual party's behaviour should affect the way the voters relate to that party, e.g. whether religious groups will show different support for a party due to long-standing historical ties or due to shared political values. Social groups provide a better cue for party preference when parties give *clear signals* on issues of relevance to the cleavage in question, through emphasising the issue. This argument, unlike the polarisation argument, does not pertain to the party system, but to individual parties, who may choose to emphasise different policy areas.

4.4 Testing the argument on the religious cleavage

Religion continues to shape political preferences in Western democracies (Broughton and ten Napel 2000, Norris and Inglehart 2011: 201).[23] Despite predictions about the weakening political relevance of religion, empirical work suggests that the religious cleavage has been remarkably persistent over time (e.g. Elff 2007, 2009; Knutsen 2004b) or even possibly of growing importance (Olson and Green 2006). Especially for Christian parties as well as openly secular parties, such as many New Left parties, differences in support between religious groups and non-believers are immense (e.g. Elff and Rossteutscher 2011).

The religious cleavage is a good test case for the argument presented above. First, it is among the most studied and "universally" existing cleavages in Western Europe, thus permitting a test of the theory across West European democracies. Critically, this yields sufficient variation in party behaviour to conduct powerful tests. Second, this cleavage is clearly related to a specific value orientation, often referred to as "moral values". Several studies show that religious people are more socially conservative when it comes to sexual norms, such as homosexuality or pornography (Woodrum 1988), gender and family relations (Hayes 1995, Woodrum 1988), or matters of life and death, such as euthanasia and abortion (Clements 2014, Scheepers and Van der Silk 1998). De Koster and van der Waal (2007) discuss a dimension they label *moral traditionalism*, reflected in issues such as gender equality, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and divorce. Traditional stances on these issues are "deeply inspired by the Christian Bible and by socialization in Christian institutions", and "Christian religiosity seems, in other words, to be "naturally" tied to moral traditionalism." (De Koster and van der Waal 2007: 453).

In line with the idea of value orientations as attitudinal constraints, and following existing work on religion and voting, I develop an index based on substantial questions about individuals' views on homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, and divorce (more on this below). These issues are often considered intimately linked to, and even expressions of, religious values (e.g. Engeli et al. 2012, Lachat 2012: 8; Nicolet and Tresch 2009). Since my index does not contain the exact same items as De Koster and van der Waal's (2007) moral traditionalism index, I refer to this index as the *traditional-progressive* value orientation (see the methodology section for details on index construction).

[23] This has been documented in the USA (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997); Canada (Johnston 1985); Australia (Bean 1999); in EU elections (Van der Brug et al. 2009); and all over Western Europe (Broughton and ten Napel 2000, Knutsen and Langsæther 2018).

To summarise, the general argument proposed is that party characteristics not only affect the strength of the association between social groups and party preference, but also the very nature of this association, i.e. whether it is direct or indirect. In the case of the religious cleavage, this means that the clearer signals a party sends on moral issues, the more important is the indirect effect of religion on party preference through traditional-progressive values. In this article, I focus on the salience of moral issues for individual parties, while controlling for polarisation, which is a party system variable (see below for details on this). From all this, we may derive the following *salience hypothesis:* The more parties emphasise moral issues, the more important will the indirect pathway be. In the following section, I explain how this hypothesis is tested.

4.5 Data and methodology

The research design is in two stages. In the first stage, I use voter level data from the most recent European Values Study at the time of writing (EVS 2008-2010) to establish how important the indirect effect of religion on party preference through religious values is for each political party in 13 West European countries. The EVS is ideal as it contains data on the respondents' religious affiliation, party preference, and a range of substantial questions about issues that can be used to construct a variable that measures the respondents' positions along the traditional-progressive value orientation.

In the second stage, the result from the first stage (i.e. the size of the indirect effect) is used as the dependent variable, while the independent variables are measures of how salient moral-traditional issues are for the party. These measures are taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). In the second stage, then, the units are the political parties in Western Europe.

4.5.1 The first stage: Estimating indirect effects at the voter level

To estimate how much religious voting traditional-progressive values account for, I utilise EVS data on a total of 11,496 respondents from the thirteen countries mentioned in the last section.

The independent variable: Religion

There are, generally speaking, two dimensions of the religious cleavage: The denominational aspect and the religiosity aspect (see e.g. Jansen 2011, Knutsen 2004b). The first is captured by asking the respondent which denomination he or she belongs to, while the latter is usually measured through church attendance. Some studies combine the two aspects to capture both at the same time (e.g. Lachat 2012, Tilley 2015, van der Brug et al. 2009). I follow this approach, in distinguishing between non-affiliated, passive denomination members and active denomination members.[24] The passive denomination members are those who expressed that they belong to a denomination while also responding that they visit church either only on special occasions, once a year or less often. The active denomination members are those who belong to a denomination and go to church at least monthly. The number of denominations vary – see the appendix for a full summary of the operationalisation of religion in each country.

The intermediate variable: Traditional-progressive values

The traditional-progressive value orientation is an additive index. The respondents are asked whether they think abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality can be justified. The responses are combined into a single scale of traditional-progressive values that is constrained to go from 0-10. Respondents with the value 0 on this index are traditionalists who *never* justify abortion, divorce, euthanasia, or homosexuality, while respondents with the value 10 always justify these, and as such are the most progressive. The index has a grand mean in the data of 5.7, although this varies between countries. Austrians are most traditional with a mean of 4.8 and Danes are most progressive with a mean of 7.1.

The dependent variable: Party preference

Party preference is operationalised through a question of vote intention in the EVS.[25] While this is not a behavioural variable, like actual vote choice, this is not necessarily a problem. What I study here is party preference, while actual voting could be affected by many short-term factors such as strategic voting, political scandals, etc. Parties with so few adherents in

[24] While church attendance is almost always used as a measure of the religiosity aspect of the religious cleavage, it has sometimes been used as an indicator of religious values. This would be problematic for my analysis. Church attendance and religious values are of course correlated – more religious people are on average more traditional – and as such it may be used as a *proxy.* However, they are not the same. Clearly, one could go to church often and be relatively liberal, or never go to church and be quite traditional. As discussed, I understand values in terms of attitude constraints, following van Deth and Scarbrough (1995).

[25] Respondents who did not indicate a vote intention were asked about the party that appeals to them the most. This is only relevant for a very small number of units.

the data that no logistic models can be estimated are excluded. For a full list of the parties that are analysed in each country, see the online appendix.

Control variables

All models estimated in stage 1 include controls for age and gender, as these clearly come before or at the same time as religion in the temporal sequence. As such, these will not bias the effects of religion downwards. Most other variables are likely to come after religion in the causal chain and introduce post-treatment bias. Religion is most commonly obtained at an early age and often remains relatively stable over time for a given individual (Voas and Crocket 2005: 15). Many denominations register new members already at birth, and while few people in general change their denomination during their lifetime, peak conversion rates are reached around age 13-16 (Regnerus and Uecker 2006: 217), while changes in religiosity levels reach a height at around age 18 (Regnerus and Uecker 2006: 226). It seems implausible that people obtain their income or education before they obtain their religious outlook. Although there might be reciprocity involved, studies show that college attendance rarely lead to apostasy (e.g. Mayrl and Oeur 2009).

However, concerns have been raised over so-called "spurious" religious voting (see, e.g. Elff and Rossteutscher 2017). Essentially, the assumption is that other social-structural variables, such as urban-rural residence or class, are temporally prior to religion and thus should be controlled for. The most likely case for such spurious religious voting is the UK, where Catholics tend to be poorer, are more likely to be working class, and have an immigrant background (see e.g. Elff and Rossteutscher 2017: 201). However, in his analysis of religious voting in the UK, Tilley (2015) controls for occupational class, household income, education, private schooling, housing type, employment status, sector of work, trade union membership, sex, birth cohort, region, and ethnicity. Even in this most problematic case, controlling for this host of variables does not substantially alter the relationship between religion and party preference much.

To further ensure that this is not a problem in my analyses, I have re-estimated all the models in Germany, a religiously mixed multi-party system with a Christian Democratic party, with controls for social class, education, income, and urban-rural residence (see appendix A.4.2). In Germany, as in the UK, this does not substantially alter the coefficients nor the kappa values. Hence, there is little indication of spurious religious voting in the models presented below.

Estimating the models

Multi-categorical independent variables are still problematic in mediation analysis, as we do not in this case want to calculate the indirect effect separately for each individual coefficient, which only measures one religious group's difference from the reference category.[26] Tilley (2015) instead compares the differences in predicted probabilities for preferring a party between religious groups before and after controlling for the relevant value orientations. Evans and Tilley (2017: chapter 8) apply a similar logic for class. I make use of a somewhat more advanced version of this way of thinking here, following the approach of Langsæther (2018).

To measure the role of value orientations as an intermediate variable connecting religion and voting, we need a measure of the *total* impact of religion on voting, which may be used with and without control variables. The measure also needs to be able to distinguish between different parties. The *kappa* index has these desirable properties. It was developed by Hout et al. (1995) for class voting, but was later applied to religious voting by Manza and Brooks (1997) and has commonly been used in studies of both class, religion, and educational cleavages (e.g. Jansen 2011, Knutsen 2006, Lachat 2012, Stubager 2006). This measure is not limited to whether religious voters vote for religious parties, but captures *total* religious voting, i.e. the full relationship between a voter's religion and party preference. Indeed, it is usually considered as the very definition of class voting or religious voting (see Hout et al. 1995, Manza and Brooks 1997), and I adopt that understanding of it here. Religious voting, or the kappa index, is simply the standard deviation of religious differences in vote choice (Manza and Brooks 1997: 50-51).

The kappa index can be broken down into sub-kappas that apply to any of the separate voting outcomes (Hout et al. 1995: 813), allowing us to study how the importance of value orientations as an intermediate variable varies between parties. In the first set of models, I estimate the following logistic regressions for each political party in each country:

$$\ln\left(\frac{\mathrm{P}_i}{1-\mathrm{P}_i}\right) = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta_1 R_i} + \beta_2 AGE_i + \beta_3 SEX_i + \varepsilon_i$$

[26] Even the KHB method, a very helpful recent advance that allows effect decomposition in logit models, decomposes each difference separately (see Breen et al. 2013).

where P is the probability that a respondent *i* prefers the party in question (versus preferring any other party in the same country), $\mathbf{R_i}$ is a vector of dummy variables indicating what religious group the respondent belongs to, $\boldsymbol{\beta_1}$ is a vector of the coefficients of these dummies, β_2 is the coefficient of the variable age and β_3 is the coefficient of the variable sex.

I can then calculate a "gross" kappa by simply taking the standard deviation of the coefficients in the vector $\boldsymbol{\beta_1}$. The larger the standard deviation, the larger the relative religious differences. In other words, the kappa for each party is defined as:

$$\kappa_{rel^j} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S}(\beta_s^j - \overline{\beta_s^j})^2}{S}}$$

where β_s^j is the coefficient from a binary logistic regression for religious group *s* and voting outcome *j* (with the β coefficient of the social group chosen as the reference category being equal to 0), and $\overline{\beta_s^j}$ is the average regression coefficient across all S religious groups for voting outcome *j* (Lachat 2006: 9). A fuller justification of this modelling strategy, as well as a partial replication using multinomial logistic regression analysis (results are the same), can be found in the appendix A.4.1. Parties that do not have statistically significant differences between the religious groups at all are not used in stage two, as there is no bivariate association to decompose into direct and indirect effects.

After having estimated the "gross" kappa, I then include controls for the traditional-progressive values of the respondent (I add $\beta_4 TPV$ to the regression above) and re-calculate the kappa, now based on the coefficients from the new model including controls. The percentage reduction in the kappa value (i.e. the total religious voting) between model 1 and model 2 indicates how much of the religious voting the value orientation accounts for. While this is not standard mediation analysis, it supplies a rough measure of the share of the association between religion and party preference that is indirect through traditional-progressive values (for similar approaches, see Tilley 2015, Evans and Tilley 2017: chapter 8, and Langsæther 2018). The stage one analyses are conducted in each country individually and are available upon request (see also the appendix).

To sum up in a less precise, but also less technical way: I estimate how important religion is for preference for a party (controlled for age and gender), then re-estimate how important religion is for preference for that same party when controlling for the voters' traditional-progressive values. The percentage reduction in the importance of religion between

the two models is how much religious voting the value orientation accounted for, i.e. the share of the association that is indirect.

4.5.2 Stage Two: The Party Level

In the second stage, party-level data is used to test the policy salience hypothesis discussed in section 2. There are a total of 50 parties from 13 countries that are included in both the CHES and the EVS, and that have religious differences to account for.[27] The EVS data was collected in 2008-2009. I have therefore used the 2006 version of the CHES (Hooghe et al. 2010), which is the closest one that pre-dates the data collection at the individual level. The CHES works well because it contains a measure of the salience of "lifestyle issues", such as opposing or supporting liberal policies related to homosexuality, for each party. This measure corresponds reasonably well with the traditional-progressive value orientation. All Western European countries that are included in the CHES 2006 are included in this study, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The only exception is Italy: In this country, the data for the EVS were collected throughout 2009. Due to changes in the party system from 2006-2009, there is a low correspondence between the parties present in the EVS 2010 and the CHES 2006.[28] To sum up, I use the salience of moral issues for parties in 2006 to account for the link between religion and party preference at the individual level in 2008-2009.

We can use the percentage reduction in the kappa value as a party-level measure of how important the indirect effect of religion on preference for that party is. This becomes the dependent variable in the second set of analyses. To test the *policy salience* hypothesis, I need a measure of the salience of moral issues for the parties. The CHES provides a measure of how salient "lifestyle issues", such as homosexuality, are for each individual party. The experts rate the salience of these issues for each party from 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important), with an observed range of 4 to 8.6 in the data, and a mean of 5.9. I can then estimate the relationship between the saliency of moral issues and the size of the indirect effect.

[27] Eight additional parties could be included if we use less strict criteria. This does not change any conclusions, see appendix A.5.1. An additional 12 parties from Italy, Norway, and Switzerland were also included in the analysis based on different data. The results are also robust to including these data (cf. appendix A.5.2).
[28] However, using slightly different data, I have also been able to include Italy, Norway, and Switzerland in the analysis. Including these three countries does not change the results (see the online appendix).

There may be differences at the country-level, notably party polarisation, that correlate with both the independent and the dependent variables. For this reason, I also estimate the models with country fixed effects, essentially controlling away all differences between party systems. There might also be confounding variables at the party family level, for instance related to the salience of *other* issues. I re-estimate the models with party family fixed effects as well. Finally, I estimate very conservative models with both country and party family fixed effects. Results are always the same.

4.6 Results

Summaries of the stage 1 analyses are available in the appendix. The important take-home point is that the change in the kappa value varies between parties. For instance, *none* of the differences between religious groups in support for the Conservative party in the UK are accounted for by traditional-progressive values. On the other hand, about 60% of the differences between the religious groups in support for the *Izquierda Unida* in Spain are accounted for. These numbers now become the dependent variable in the stage 2 analyses.

4.6.1 Party behaviour affects the mechanism at the voter level

Table 1 shows the results from four models. The first column – the main model – gives clear support to the policy salience hypothesis. The more salient morality policies are for a party, the larger the share of the effect of religion on party preference that goes through traditional-progressive values. When morality policies are one unit more salient for a party, the share of the effect of religion that is indirect increases on average by more than five percentage points. Salience alone explains 13.7% of the variance. The result is significant at the 0.05 level, even with the low statistical power given by only 50 units.

Table 1. OLS analyses. Dependent variable: Size of the indirect effect of religion on party preference (in %). Units: Parties.

	Main Model	Country FE	Party Family FE	Full Model
Salience of moral policies	5.55*	5.77**	7.81**	5.66**
	(1.89)	(1.53)	(2.35)	(1.84)
Country FE		Yes		Yes
Party Family FE			Yes	Yes
Constant	-23.12*	-39.54**	-43.09**	-37.46*
	(9.27)	(10.00)	(13.63)	(12.99)
N	50	50	50	50
R^2	0.137	0.416	0.550	0.785

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. See the appendix for a replication with Efron's HC3 standard errors. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The result from the main model is visualised in figure 2 to give a better impression of the magnitude of the effects. The experts in the CHES did not assign any party to a salience of zero for moral issues. In fact, none of the 50 parties are considered by experts to have any lower value than four. It thus seems fair to consider four a low salience in this context. The figure demonstrates how there is no indirect effect of religion on party preference through traditional-progressive values for parties which do not discuss moral issues much – including the Conservatives in the UK. However, for a party with the highest emphasis on moral issues, the predicted share of the effect that is indirect is more than 25%.[29]

[29] Some parties, notably from the New Right, show a suppression effect. These parties often take on traditional stances in moral issues, yet they are underrepresented among religious voters (for instance because they adhere to Christian Democratic or Conservative parties, see e.g. Arzheimer and Carter 2009) *despite* the fact that these voters on average hold more traditional values than the secular ones. When comparing religious and secular voters at the same levels of traditional-progressiveness, then, the differences between them become larger.

Figure 2: The effect of policy salience on the size of the indirect effect, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions from the main model in table 1.



The effect of policy salience is equally important after controlling for all country level differences (see column 2 in table 1). In fact, it is slightly increased, and now significant at the 0.01 level. This means that *within the countries,* religion has a larger indirect effect on party preference for parties who emphasise moral questions more. Notice that this model effectively controls away all differences between party systems.

There might also be confounding variables at the party family level. For instance, the indirect effect of religion for several Left Socialist parties like the Danish *Socialistisk Folkparti* (SF) or the Spanish *Izquierda Unida* (IU) are even larger than the model predicts based on their levels of salience for moral issues, while some New Right parties have a smaller indirect effect, or even a suppression effect. This could be, for instance, because Left Socialist parties like the IU has had moral questions among its most important issues for decades and actively push them on the agenda (see Bonafont and Roqué 2012). On the contrary, many of the New Right parties are primarily known for their immigration policies,

and their extreme salience on this issue might "crowd out" their visibility in moral issues.[30] I re-estimate the models with party family fixed effects in column 3 in table 1. Just as in the country fixed effects model, this controls for all unmeasured aspects at the *party family* level that might confound the coefficient of the main independent variable. We can see whether, within each party family, the relationship between religion and party preference is more indirect for parties for which moral issues are more salient. As we can see in column 3, the effect is now in fact even stronger than before, at 7.81. Increasing salience from the lowest value observed to the highest increases the indirect effect with an astonishing 35 percentage points. The coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.

Finally, I introduce both country and party family level fixed effects at the same time. Any difference between party families and countries is then controlled away. This is a very conservative test of the argument. Yet, the relationship holds. The coefficient is of similar size as in the main model, and significant at the 0.01 level.

To further underline the fact that this relationship is meaningful, I perform a placebo test. If the argument above is correct, the salience of issues *unrelated* to moral questions should not affect the mechanisms at work between religion and party preference. In table 2, I therefore replicate the main model from table 1 with the three measures in the CHES that cover the salience of *economic* policies.

[30] Future research could look into the effect of *relative* salience.

Table 2. Placebo tests. OLS analyses. Dependent variable: Size of the indirect effect of religion on party preference through traditional-progressive values (in %). Units: Parties.

Salience of…	Placebo test 1	Placebo test 2	Placebo test 3
Public service VS tax reduction	1.69 (2.27)		
Deregulation of markets		0.05 (1.66)	
Redistribution			0.92 (1.08)
Constant	-1.60 (14.13)	9.25 (10.04)	3.73 (5.81)
N	50	50	50
R^2	0.011	0.000	0.006

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The first column shows the effect of the salience of increasing public services versus tax reduction. The second column takes on the salience of deregulation of markets, and the third the salience of redistribution. None of these have statistically significant effects on the size of the indirect effect. In fact, they all have larger standard errors than coefficients. The explained variance is tiny, ranging from 0.0003 to 0.011.

In conclusion, then, there is evidence that the more parties emphasise their views on moral issues, the larger is the role for traditional-progressive values as an intermediate variable that accounts for the association between religion and party preference. This effect does not manifest itself if we look at how much parties emphasise their views on *economic* issues.

4.7 Discussion and conclusion

This article contributes to filling the knowledge gap regarding mechanisms behind cleavage voting. Former studies have suggested two different pathways through which an association may arise between social groups and party preference: A direct effect related to group

identity, as well as an indirect effect related to shared values. Despite the literature theorising a strong indirect effect, recent studies suggest that the direct effect is probably more important.

Building on the cue-taking literature and the supply-side literature, the article provides a general theoretical account of when group belonging affects party preference directly or indirectly. Religion affects party preference indirectly through values only to the degree that parties emphasise their views on issues of relevance to the political values in question. For some parties, moral values cannot account for religious differences in support at all, while for others more than half of all religious differences disappear when controlling for such values. The results suggest that religious voting, at least in Western Europe, is not primarily a question of moral values, but rather "a relic of past associations between groups and parties" (Tilley 2015: 923). Tilley draws the conclusion that this may imply that religion is a stronger and more resilient cleavage than e.g. class, because it is rooted in socialisation processes rather than contemporary politics and party policies. I believe it is true that cleavages built on frozen party alignments are more durable than those built on immediate self-interest or shared values. However, this article suggests that contemporary party politics actually affect to what degree religious voting is a relic of past associations or a question of moral values, as the importance of this indirect effect is related to how parties behave.

However, the conclusion comes with a caveat. The results are based on cross-sectional data, and the multi-categorical nature of the independent variable makes traditional mediation analysis hard to conduct, making the calculation of the indirect effect somewhat imprecise. Future studies should consider survey experiments or other ways to get further leverage on the causal question.

Most of the extant supply-side literature has shown that party behaviour influences the *level* of cleavage voting. This article further expands the horizon of supply side perspectives, demonstrating that not only the strength, but also the very nature, of the link between groups and parties are affected by party characteristics. When it comes to the religious cleavage, the analyses provide clear empirical evidence for my general proposition about how group belonging affects party preference. As noted above, the theory may well hold also for other cleavages. There is preliminary evidence of this in Langsæther (2018), who finds that *class* voting is more likely to be indirect for party families that send clear signals of relevance. However, we need further studies on other cleavages, such as gender or education, to further

substantiate the model. Gender may, for instance, work indirectly through gender equality values to the extent that parties emphasise gender equality policies.

A study on the direct and indirect pathway of religious voting in the UK found that the effect was direct (Tilley 2015). However, this seems not to be because religion generally only works directly, but because religious voting is sometimes direct, and sometimes indirect, and this depends on party characteristics. My analysis also indicates that the indirect pathway is unimportant for the major British parties – as expected, since these parties do not emphasise moral issues (Larsen et al. 2012). The indirect pathway is, on the other hand, important for parties who do emphasise moral issues, such as the Austrian *Grünen* or the Spanish *Izquierda Unida*.

While it is in itself important to further our understanding of the mechanisms connecting social groups to political parties, the two pathways also come with implications for the functioning of democracy. Voters relying on their group belonging for electoral cues will only do so effectively when parties emphasise issues of relevance to the groups. When parties do not provide voters with clear signals, social group cues may make voters more likely to vote for parties with whom they do not share fundamental values, as frozen party alignments survive. Citizens following these cues may end up voting for parties that no longer represent them substantively. Thus, the democratic merits of cleavage voting potentially depend on party characteristics.

5 Old Wine in New Bottles? Reassessing the Effects of Globalisation on Political Preferences[31]

In both public and scholarly debates, globalisation has recently been accredited with a massive impact on the political preferences and electoral behaviour of Western citizens. Some go as far as to declare a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation driven, e.g., by individuals' exposure to international competition and their degree of national as opposed to cosmopolitan identification. Extant tests of this argument have, however, relied on class and education as proxies for these processes. In contrast, this study provides the first direct test of the influence of the globalisation processes on attitudes to economic distribution, the EU and immigration as well as on vote choice across nine West European countries. The results show that variables tapping the core aspects of globalisation have relatively little impact on attitudes and vote choice; are largely unable to account for the effects of class and education; and do not seem to lead to the establishment of new divisions between winners and losers within or across classes. Rather, the winners and losers of globalisation seem to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence in modern Western societies, i.e. those placed higher as opposed to lower in the class and education hierarchies. In this way, the proposed cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation may seem to be rather much like old wine in new bottles.

[31] This chapter is co-authored with Rune Stubager, and an edited version has been accepted for publication in *the European Journal of Political Research,* DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.12332. We would like to thank Hanspeter Kriesi, Stefanie Walter, the anonymous reviewers, and finally the participants at the NOPSA conference in Odense 2017 for thorough comments on previous drafts, as well as Romain Lachat for help classifying parties. Any remaining errors are our responsibility.

5.1 Introduction

Globalisation is in many ways *the* buzzword of the 21st century and is often hailed or blamed for cultural, economic, and political changes all over the world. In the political sphere, globalisation is also considered to have a massive impact on the political preferences and electoral behaviour of Western citizens. Some go as far as to declare a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, on par with or even replacing the old cleavages related to class or religion. Recent electoral events in the West seem to support this picture. Both Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election in 2016 and the *Brexit* vote have been seen in this light just as globalisation played a role in the debate leading up to the 2017 presidential elections in France. Free trade, immigration, and globalisation surely have been high on the agenda in the West recently.

In this paper, we first present the innovative and much-cited argument made by Kriesi *et al.* (2006, 2008, 2012) that there is in the 21st century a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, taking over for important cleavages of the 20th century. Second, we argue that there have been important flaws in former empirical tests of this argument. In particular, it is unclear whether the development is really driven by the purported globalisation processes – or if we are, instead, experiencing a revival and/or strengthening of well-known individual-level processes related to class and education. To ameliorate these flaws we identify and use variables that directly tap the characteristics of the winners and losers as defined by Kriesi *et al*. We bring to bear, thus, measures of exposure to globalisation as well as cosmopolitanism versus national identity. Thereby, we enable a focused test of the argument that it is these defining characteristics that drive voter reactions to globalisation. Additionally, we extend the range of countries analysed from the six covered by Kriesi *et al.* (i.e. Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) to include also the three Scandinavian countries which, with their small and open economies, should be even more affected by globalisation.

Our tests of observable implications of the globalisation argument demonstrate that in Western Europe, variables tapping core aspects of globalisation as defined by Kriesi *et al*. are largely unable to account for the effects of class and education just as they do not seem to lead to the establishment of new divisions between winners and losers within classes. Rather, the winners and losers of globalisation seem – to a very considerable degree – to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence in modern Western societies, i.e. those placed higher as opposed to lower in the class and education

hierarchies. In this way, the proposed cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation may seem to be rather much like old wine in new bottles.

5.2 Globalisation: A new cleavage?

In a series of carefully developed and analytically comprehensive works Kriesi *et al.* (2006, 2008, 2012) argue that there is a new *globalisation cleavage* structuring political conflict in Western Europe. The cleavage was induced by economic, cultural, and political globalisation processes that benefited some segments of society and put others at a disadvantage (Kriesi *et al.* 2006: 922). Specifically, the globalisation model posits three interrelated processes creating groups of winners and losers. Economically, increased competition creates losers among those who work in previously sheltered – private – sectors that now become open to international competition. This group cuts across traditional class distinctions.

Second, Kriesi *et al.* (2008: 5) emphasise that an essential criterion for distinguishing losers and winners is whether someone possesses exit options or not. This is tightly connected to levels of marketable skills (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: 7). Culturally, third, increased immigration of people from ethnically diverse origins into Western Europe creates a threat to cultural mores, perceptions, and traditions of some members of the majority populations. Likewise, increased EU-integration creates a threat to those strongly identified with their nation state – they become losers (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: 6-8).

At all three levels, those who have the opposite configuration can be considered winners. In short, the winners are seen to be

> entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalisation, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: 8).

In addition to their national identity, thus, globalisation losers and winners are, in the parlance of political economy, defined based both on their factor endowments (class and education) as in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson models and their sector (i.e. how open it is to international competition) as in the Ricardo-Viner model (cf. Walter and Maduz 2009). The authors predict that, relative to the winners, losers of globalisation will be more in favour of

redistribution, as this to some extent protects them against the negative economic impact of globalisation. They further predict that losers will be more against the EU (which they consider to be the prime symbol of political globalisation for Europeans) and more against immigration – all relative to winners of globalisation (Kriesi *et al.* 2012: 12-16). Moreover, winners and losers are expected to vote in accordance with their attitudes, i.e. for parties articulating programmes appealing to their preferences. In particular, globalisation losers are expected to vote for populist right parties (Kriesi *et al*. 2008: 18-9).

While the work of Kriesi and his colleagues is theoretically innovative and highly stimulating, on closer inspection the empirical tests turn out to be somewhat problematic. In spite of the relatively clear identification of the theoretical mechanisms, the authors later state that "social class as well as the level of education are the most important features distinguishing between winners and losers of globalisation" (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: 61). Class and education are therefore used as measures of voters' positions in relation to the proposed new cleavage – as *proxies* for the variables discussed above. The argument for this approach is, in short, that people in higher classes or with higher education have "specialized skills which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one's exit options" (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: 7).

In the empirical test, then, position in the globalisation cleavage depends on an individual's factor endowments alone: The losers are people with low education and in "lower" classes, while people with high education and in "higher" social classes are the winners. For the countries included in the analysis, this amounts, essentially, to a test of the Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts that globalisation benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (i.e. those with high skill levels in advanced economies), while hurting those owning scarcer factors (i.e. lower skills; see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006: 470).

Although understandable for both theoretical (class and education are likely related to the core variables) and practical (i.e. data availability) reasons, this analytical approach is unfortunate. It prevents an assessment of the core theoretical elements of the globalisation explanation. First, the empirical strategy does not allow us to distinguish between processes that are actually related to globalisation, and processes that are related to the old and well-known cleavages over class and education. While the class schema Kriesi *et al.* use (a modified version of Daniel Oesch's (2006) class schema) is likely to be somewhat correlated with exposure to international competition, it is far from a direct measure of it. Second, while

both class and education may be correlated with national identity to some degree, they are not direct measures of cosmopolitanism versus national identity (we substantiate these points below). Third, although education and class are correlated with marketable skills, they are again no direct measures. Further, skills is also a core aspect of traditional conceptions of class and education (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Oesch 2006, see also Atkinson 2015, Braun and Müller 1997). Using a class schema to measure skills makes it impossible, therefore, to isolate that part of the effect of class that is unique to the globalisation model from that which is due to what is traditionally seen to be the effects of class and education.

Consequently, the otherwise impressive evidence amassed by Kriesi *et al*. to support their conclusion only seems to provide indirect support for the existence of a globalisation cleavage as something qualitatively different from cleavages over class and education.

Specifically, Kriesi and co-authors find that the unskilled workers are more economically left-wing, more anti-EU and more anti-immigration than socio-cultural specialists; they find the same for those with lower education compared to those with higher (Kriesi *et al.* 2008: ch. 10). While we do not dispute these results – indeed we replicate them below – what we question is their implications with respect to the globalisation cleavage hypothesis. The results would seem to also accord with those of other analyses[32] conducted from more traditional perspectives focused on the influence of class and education rather than globalisation. In such accounts, the central mechanisms generating conflict between the groups are related to, for class, re-distribution of wealth, income, and job security (cf., e.g., Lipset 1991: 208, Evans and de Graaf 2013: viii) and, for education, conflicting values grounded in, among other factors, different socialisation experiences (cf., e.g., Lipset 1981; Stubager 2008, see also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

Second, as noted the empirical strategy essentially reflects a factor-endowments model (see e.g. Stolper and Samuelson 1941, Findlay and Kierzkowski 1983), which predicts a class-based distributional conflict where high-skilled individuals are winners of globalisation, whereas the low-skilled are losers (see Walter 2010: 410). This is in contrast to the theoretical argument, that also includes a (Ricardo-Viner type) sectoral component: Whether one is sheltered from international competition or not (see also Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Hays et al. 2005). In this way, the lack of empirical clarity spills over to the theoretical level in the sense that it becomes unclear who the winners and losers of globalisation *really* are.

[32] For class and left-wing attitudes see Lipset 1981, Svallfors 2006; class and EU-attitudes, see Gabel 1998, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Hix 2005; class, education and immigration-attitudes, see Coffé 2013, Dancygier and Walter 2015, Oesch 2008, Oskarson and Demker 2013, Stubager 2008.

To put it pointedly, the analyses of Kriesi *et al*. seek to demonstrate the relevance of the alleged, new globalisation cleavage against the traditional conflicts over class and education by using standard measures of the latter to represent the former and without taking into account the sectoral element of the purported new mechanism and its conditioning effects. With the extant set of analyses from Kriesi and his co-authors it is, therefore, not clear that the hypothesis regarding a new cleavage is supported: The results could just as easily be interpreted as indicating the continued – maybe even renewed – influence of class and education and the processes associated with them. In essence, thus, while we agree with Kriesi *et al*. that class and education are important predictors of political behaviour in modern Western societies, we question whether this relationship reflects the processes suggested by the authors.

5.3 Testing the globalisation model

To approach a better understanding of the processes at work, in this article, we aspire to subject the model of political behaviour that Kriesi *et al.* develop (henceforth the *globalisation model*) to a more valid test. We do this by testing two observable implications pertaining to the core processes of the globalisation model. First, we focus on the influence of the economic aspect of globalisation: increased international competition. As noted, Kriesi *et al*. see such competition as a key aspect of the globalisation model and suggest that those exposed to it – i.e. the losers of globalisation – will react politically as described above. If class and education are proxies for such experiences, it means that a direct measure hereof should account for a considerable part of the effect of class and education on attitudes and vote choice.

This also applies for individuals' degree of national identity. Those who are strongly attached to their nation state are seen as losers of the globalisation process that dissolves the boundaries between such states. To the extent that class and education are proxies for such identities as is assumed in the modelling of Kriesi *et al*., we should – like for exposure to international competition – find that including a direct identity measure will reduce the effect of class and education on the attitude and party choice variables. Our first hypothesis, then, is that direct measures of exposure to international competition as well as strength of national identity should account for a considerable part of the effect of class and education on attitudes and party preference (H1).

Second, according to Kriesi et al. (2008: 6), the increased international competition affects individuals across traditional class boundaries resulting in "cross-class coalitions". This implies that we should see an interaction between individuals' class location and their exposure to international competition such that class differences diminish or disappear among those negatively affected by globalisation. This is H2.

However, and related to the point regarding the lack of theoretical clarity of the globalisation model, the effects of globalisation may be more nuanced. Thus, based on work in trade theory and combining a sectoral and factoral approach Walter and Maduz (2009; see also Walter 2017) argue that the losers of globalisation are those low-ability individuals who are exposed to international competition, because they are most at risk of losing their job and receiving low wages. Conversely, highly productive individuals who are exposed to international competition receive higher wages and can be characterised as globalisation winners. In between these two extremes, low ability workers in sectors that are sheltered from international competition are better off than their counterparts in the exposed industries, but are worse off than the high-ability employees in the sheltered industries. According to this view, exposure to international competition has different effects for members of different classes.

Evidence of such a heterogeneous effect of globalisation on political behaviour has been found for preferences regarding the welfare state (Walter 2010), income inequality (Walter 2017) and immigration policy (Dancygier and Walter 2015) as well as for party choice (Rommel and Walter 2018). Following this logic, we should, as for H2, expect to find an interaction between individuals' class location and their exposure to international completion. But contrary to H2 we would expect the lower classes to react negatively towards globalisation when exposed to it, while the higher classes react positively when exposed to globalisation. To provide a more encompassing test of the mechanisms associated with globalisation, we test this argument as H3.

We examine these implications with respect to two elements both seen as central to the cleavage model of politics: political attitudes and party preference. Thus, we examine, first, the extent to which the implications are supported with respect to economic left-right, EU-, and immigration attitudes. These are the three kinds of political attitudes that globalisation should be particularly relevant for, according to Kriesi *et al.* (2008: 5-8). Second, we investigate the degree of support for the expectations with respect to party preference, which has been the central way of measuring cleavages for decades.

We should underline that we do not purport to investigate all possible implications of the globalisation model, neither as laid out by Kriesi and colleagues, nor in the political economy literature. But we do look into a set of relevant processes that seem to follow directly from the core argument of Kriesi *et al*. The analyses will, consequently, provide a first indication of the tenability of the globalisation model as compared to more traditional class- and education-based oppositions.

5.4 Data and methodology

To test our hypotheses, we use the latest version of the European Values Study (EVS) at the time of writing, i.e. from 2008-2010. As the only cross-national data set, the EVS contains the variables required to test the various models: 1) Several nuanced measures of economic left-right, EU, and immigration attitudes in addition to party preference, and 2) information necessary for constructing our independent and control variables. In total, we bring to bear evidence based on 8,084 respondents from nine countries.[33]

The countries comprise the six original cases from the studies of Kriesi *et al*. – Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK – as well as the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. This choice is based on two considerations. First, the use of the six original cases permits a replication of the analyses of Kriesi and his co-authors just as it holds constant country specific factors that might otherwise confound the analyses. Second, the inclusion of the three Scandinavian countries extends the test of the arguments to a set of cases for which the mechanisms underlying the globalisation hypothesis should be particularly strong. Given their small, open economies, thus, the Scandinavian countries are highly susceptible to the influence of international competition. They may, therefore, be seen as critical cases for the globalisation hypothesis – i.e. as cases in which globalisation should have particularly strong impact.

5.4.1 The independent variables

We start out with the variables used by Kriesi *et al*.: class and education. The former is measured by a standard six-class version of the traditional EGP occupational class measure (Erikson *et al.* 1979, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: ch. 2). In our model, we operate with the

[33] For reasons discussed below, we furthermore replicate the results using the first two rounds of the European Social Survey, see the appendix.

following classes: unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, petite bourgeoisie, and the lower and higher service class.[34] Second like Kriesi *et al*. (2008: 64), we use a standard education variable with three groups: "lower" (i.e. pre-primary, primary or lower secondary education), "medium" (upper or post-secondary education) and "higher" (first or second stage of tertiary education).

To conduct a more direct test of the globalisation model, we use measures focusing on the processes through which globalisation is argued to affect people's life situation. The first is exposure to globalisation. This is traditionally measured in three different ways in the political economy literature: Whether the sector an individual works in is tradable or non-tradable (e.g. Hays et al. 2005); the degree to which the sector is exposed to foreign direct investment (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2004); and finally, the degree to which an individual's occupation is offshorable. Offshoring – the movement of employment from one country to another – is an aspect of globalisation that has accelerated rapidly over the last decades (Rommel and Walter 2018) and it is the measure that we focus on in the main analyses below.

We do so for two reasons. First, it has been argued forcefully that political preferences are "shaped much more" (Walter 2017: 63) by occupational risks than by sectoral risks, as it is easier for an individual to change his or her sector of employment than to change occupation (Iversen and Soskice 2001, Cusack *et al.* 2006; Rehm 2009). The measure is expected, therefore, to capture the pressure of globalisation felt by individuals much better than sectoral measures. Second, it allows us to use the nuanced measures of the dependent variables in the EVS, which contains occupational data on the respondents, but unfortunately, no data on the industrial sectors in which they are employed.

However, because this is an important point in the theoretical discussion (cf. above) and to make sure that this choice does not affect our results, we have replicated the entire set of analyses as closely as possible, using the first two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). While not all measures used below are available in the ESS, it allows us to include a measure of whether the individual is working in a tradeable or sheltered sector, in addition to the offshorability of their jobs. These analyses of a different data set show the same overall

[34] We have also estimated all models using instead the class schema developed by Oesch (2006); the results (available from the authors upon request) are essentially the same as those reported below. This is in line with recent evidence that the two class schemas have similar explanatory power across time (Vestin and Oskarson 2017) and space (Knutsen and Langsæther 2016).

results as do the EVS data and we have, for this reason and due to space restrictions, placed them in the appendix.[35]

Following recent work in the political economy field (e.g., Dancygier and Walter 2015, Walter 2017, Rommel and Walter 2018) we use Blinder's (2009) offshorability index to assess the extent to which a person's job is offshorable. Clearly, the more easily your job can be offshored, the more exposed you are to international competition. The index is based on ISCO codes of respondents' jobs. It "measures whether the service the job provides can theoretically be delivered over long distances with little or no degradation in quality" (Dancygier and Walter 2015: 137). The index ranges between 0 and 100 where a low value indicates that the job is hard or impossible to move out of the country and a high value indicates that the job is easily offshorable. For example, childcare has a value of zero because it requires close physical contact, while data entry keyers perform activities that are clearly offshorable and are thus assigned a value of 100 (Blinder 2009: 51-52). We transform the index to 0-10 for ease of interpretation (see the appendix for descriptive statistics for all variables).[36]

Second, we measure people's degree of identification with their national community as opposed to a more cosmopolitan identity. To construct this variable, we rely on a question where respondents were asked which geographical group they "first and foremost" belong to, and then which they "secondly" belong to. They could choose between their town/local area, region, country, Europe, and the world. Respondents who place their country first, and their local or regional belonging second, or the other way around, are considered to possess a primarily national identity. Respondents who place Europe or the world first, are cosmopolitans. Respondents who either place their country, local area, or region first, and Europe or the world second, are considered to be in an intermediate position.[37] This measure is used to test the part of the first hypothesis related to national identity versus cosmopolitan orientations. In all models, we control for age, gender, and urban-rural residence.

[35] Likewise, we have replicated the analyses using yet another measure of globalisation exposure from Walter (2017), namely whether the sector is import-competing or export-oriented, based on revealed comparative (dis)advantage. These analyses yield essentially the same results as those presented and are available from the authors on request.

[36] We also run all models with a dichotomous version of this variable. This does not alter any of the substantial conclusions, see the appendix.

[37] As a robustness check, the appendix includes analyses where we instead employ a variable measuring how proud the respondent is to be a citizen of the country. As can be seen, the results are robust to this change.

5.4.2 The dependent variables

Party preference is operationalised through a question of vote intention in the EVS. Like Kriesi *et al.* (2012), we distinguish between seven party families: Communists/Left Socialists, Social Democrats, Greens, Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives, the Populist Right, and other parties (including EU protest parties). We follow Kriesi *et al.*'s (2012: 52-53) categorisation of the various parties for the six original countries, and extend the categorisation to the three Scandinavian countries (see the appendix for a complete overview).

Economic left-right attitudes are measured by asking for the respondent's views on individual versus state responsibility, economic freedom, income inequality versus incentives, private versus public incentives, and competition. Following the work of Knutsen (2018) and Langsæther (2018) responses to these five items are combined into an index of economic left-right attitudes ranging from 0 to 10. Higher values on the index indicate left-wing positions (see the appendix for details on the scale construction).

EU attitudes are measured by respondents' responses to a number of items about fears they might have about the EU membership, like loss of social security, power, jobs, national identity/culture, as well as growth in EU-expenses for their own country. Responses to these items are combined and rescaled to the 0-10 range with higher values indicating more fear of the EU.[38]

Finally, for immigration attitudes we again use an index developed by Knutsen (2018). The index is based on questions related to how the respondent feels about immigration and immigrants. Are they seen as a cultural threat, should they maintain or abandon their customs and traditions, are they a strain on the welfare system or not, etc. The summated scale goes from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more immigration positive attitudes. The multiple indicators used here represent an important improvement on extant research on globalisation and political preferences (e.g., Dancygier and Walter 2015) which has mainly relied on single indicators.

5.4.3 Methodology and models

To assess our research question about the implication of globalisation processes for cleavage development in Western Europe we run four (OLS or multinomial logistic) regression models

[38] These items were not asked in Norway, which is not a member of the EU. For this reason Norway is excluded from analyses of this specific attitude dimension.

for each dependent variable. In the first model, we include class and education in addition to the control variables.[39] The model, thus, can be seen as a base-line model intended to replicate the analyses of Kriesi *et al*.

Our second model contains only the controls and the measures of offshorability and national identity in order to establish the existence of a relationship between the two globalisation variables and the outcomes as a preliminary step before estimating the third model which combines class and education with the two globalisation variables. By comparing results from this model with those from the first model containing only class and education (and the controls) we can, hence, evaluate H1 which suggest that the effects of class and education are reduced when the variables are included in the same model as offshorability and national identity. Finally, in the fourth model we interact the offshorability and class measures to test H2 and H3 about the existence of an interaction effect between class and exposure to international competition.

All models are run on a pooled data set comprising all observations. In addition, all the analyses of political attitudes are run in each of the nine countries individually. In the discussion below, focus will be on the former, although we will also comment on the country-specific results (which are presented in the appendix). In the pooled models we include country fixed effects to account for any country specific variation not captured by our independent variables.

5.5 Results

Before launching into the main analyses, it is worth noting that there is only a weak relationship between the two sets of independent variables in our analysis. Thus, as can be seen in Table A.1.7 in the appendix, there are only small differences with respect to offshoreability between the classes and educational groups. The same applies for cosmopolitanism, although it is moderately related to education. These results substantiate our critique of Kriesi et al.'s use of class and education as proxies for the globalisation processes just as they raise initial doubts about H1. If there is only a weak to moderate relationship between class and education and the globalisation variables, it seems less likely that the latter mediate the effect of the former on our dependent variables. The discussion below, ordered according to the dependent variables, throws light on exactly this.

[39] The tables below only show the coefficients of interests. Full tables are available in the appendix A.7.

5.5.1 Economic left-right attitudes

Table 1 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression analysis of economic left-right attitudes. In Model 1 we see clear differences between both groups of workers and all the other classes, with the largest differences opening up between workers and the higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie – exactly as a traditional class approach would predict. Furthermore, class seems to be a much stronger predictor of left-right attitudes than education – again a result that comports with traditional models.

Model 2 shows that the globalisation variables are also related to economic attitudes. But for both variables we find the opposite result of what the globalisation model predicts: Those exposed to offshorability and with a strong national identity (i.e. the losers of globalisation) and the most fiscally right-wing.

Table 1. Explaining economic left-right attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	-0.78***		-0.74***	-0.74***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Class:Lo.serv.	-0.44***		-0.40***	-0.32***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Class:Rout.nman	-0.19**		-0.17**	-0.14*
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Class:Petite bourg.	-0.99***		-0.94***	-0.93***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.13)
Class:Skilled workers	-0.06		-0.04	-0.10
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Education:Medium	-0.18***		-0.17**	-0.17**
	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Education:Higher	-0.13*		-0.15*	-0.15*
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		0.01	0.07	0.07
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		0.22***	0.25***	0.26***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Offshorability		-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Hi.serv.xOffshorability				-0.01
				(0.02)
Lo.serv.xOffshorability				-0.03
				(0.02)
Rout.nmanxOffshorability				-0.02
				(0.02)
Petite b. x Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.03)
Skilled x Offshorability				0.03
				(0.03)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.052	0.086	0.087

Note: *:$p<0.05$, **:$p<0.01$, ***:$p<0.001$. N=8,084. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

Combining the globalisation variables with class and education in Model 3 permits a test of H1, which argues that the effects of class and education will be substantially reduced – maybe even disappear – when placed alongside variables tapping into the globalisation process. As is evident from the table, the effects of class and education are almost unchanged between

Model 1 and 3. This means that the hypothesis will have to be rejected.[40][41] The same applies to H2 and H3, which are tested in Model 4. All of the individual interaction terms as well as all of them together (F=1.5, p=.19) are insignificant just as the increase in the adjusted R^2 is marginal (0.001). We see no sign, that is, of globalisation-based cross-class alliances forming: Class differences are not smaller among those exposed to globalisation than among those not so exposed (H2). Furthermore, people in higher classes do not become more right-wing when exposed to globalisation, and people in lower classes do not become more left-wing (H3). We should note, however, that when interacting *education*, rather than class, with offshorability there is one statistically significant interaction term: Those with the highest level of education are somewhat more right-wing when exposed to globalisation compared to those not so exposed.[42] This counts against H2 which therefore has to be rejected, but the result provides some support for H3 (cf. Walter 2010, 2017) – a point to which we will return in the conclusion.

We have also tested the hypotheses in each country individually (see the appendix). In eight out of the nine countries, there is no support for H1: The class and education coefficients do not change substantially after introducing controls for the globalisation variables. Only in Denmark a small change is detectable for two classes. There is also no support for H2 or H3 in eight out of the nine countries with only minor effects showing up for a few class categories in France. Furthermore, the variables used to directly tap the globalisation processes fare no better in the Scandinavian countries than in the other six, despite the open economies of the former: While the globalisation variables on average explain 4% of the variance in economic left-right attitudes in the original six countries, they explain on average 5% in the Scandinavian countries.

As far as regards economic left-right attitudes, thus, our tests have not been encouraging for the globalisation perspective. While class and education are related to the attitudes in the expected way, this association does not seem to be driven by the globalisation processes. Rather, the relationship conforms to what traditional models would predict. There

[40] In addition, we use the KHB method (Breen *et al*. 2013) to test the extent of mediation of the class and education effects by the two globalisation variables. Except for one coefficient in one model, these tests were insignificant, hence rejecting the mediation expectation. Thus, and because the one significant coefficient was only affected marginally we conclude that the test showed no noteworthy sign of mediation.
[41] Since we can also note that the effects of the globalisation variables do not change much from Model 2 to Model 3, while the R^2 increases, it would seem that the two sets of variables are reflecting rather separate causal processes in the formation of left-right economic attitudes – a point to which we return below.
[42] The results are available from the authors on request. We find a similar pattern in the analyses of the ESS-data.

is no evidence of cross-class alliances and no evidence of classes reacting differentially to globalisation.

5.5.2 EU attitudes

Turning to the analysis of EU attitudes in Table 2, we see a rather similar picture.[43] Both class and education (the latter more strongly so than in Table 1) are related to EU attitudes in the expected direction – i.e. those with higher levels of education or placed higher up in the class hierarchy are more sympathetic to the EU.

[43] Recall, that Norway is not included in this analysis. Hence, the N in the table is lower than for the other analyses.

Table 2: Explaining EU attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	-0.85***		-0.74***	-0.74***
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Class:Lo.serv.	-0.65***		-0.52***	-0.58***
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Class:Rout.nman	-0.34**		-0.28**	-0.34**
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Class:Petite bourg.	-0.64***		-0.59***	-0.65**
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.20)
Class:Skilled workers	0.10		0.07	0.04
	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Education:Medium	-0.35***		-0.37***	-0.38***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Education:Higher	-1.41***		-1.32***	-1.32***
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		-0.95***	-0.75***	-0.75***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		-1.57***	-1.38***	-1.38***
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Offshorability		-0.05***	-0.02*	-0.05
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Hi.serv.xOffshorability				0.01
				(0.04)
Lo.serv.xOffshorability				0.04
				(0.04)
Rout.nmanxOffshorability				0.04
				(0.04)
Petite b. x Offshorability				0.04
				(0.05)
Skilled x Offshorability				0.03
				(0.04)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.126	0.188	0.188

Note: *: $p<0.05$, **: $p<0.01$, ***: $p<0.001$. N=6,935. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

Unsurprisingly, Model 2 shows that whether individuals identify with their nation or have a more cosmopolitan self-conception is rather strongly related to their EU-attitudes with cosmopolitans more positively disposed. Somewhat more surprisingly, however, those occupied in jobs exposed to international competition are more positive towards EU than those not so exposed. Combining the globalisation variables with class and education in Model 3 only affects the influence of the latter minimally and all coefficients that were significant in Model 1 remain so in Model 3. This again leads to a rejection of H1. Turning to Model 4, finally, we can see that H2 and H3 will also have to be rejected since none of the

interaction terms are significant just as the overall test comes out insignificant (F=0.2, p=.96).[44]

At the country level, the class and education coefficients change only marginally or not at all when controlling for the globalisation variables, thereby contradicting H1. As for H2 and H3, the formal, joint tests of the interaction coefficients all turn out insignificant meaning that we have to reject these hypotheses. Furthermore, the globalisation variables explain on average 9% of the variation in the six original countries, and only 6% in the Scandinavian countries. For EU-attitudes, thus, these variables fare worst where the globalisation model would have expected them to do best.

In sum and as was the case for left-right economic attitudes, the globalisation variables seem unable to account for the effects of class and education on EU attitudes. These effects, in other words, do not appear driven by the processes suggested by Kriesi and co-authors; processes that seem, however, to also have some effect on individuals' EU-attitudes independently of class and education.

5.5.3 Immigration attitudes

As can be seen in Table 3, we generally find the same pattern of results with respect to immigration attitudes. Again, we note from Model 1 the well-known connections between class, education, and immigration attitudes.

As expected by the globalisation model, the estimates from Model 2 show those with a cosmopolitan identity to be the most positive towards immigration, but – contrary to expectations based on the model – that also applies to those most subject to international competition. This effect, however, becomes insignificant in Model 3 when placed alongside class and education. And as was the case for the two other attitudinal variables, the effects of the two latter variables are left mainly unaffected by the inclusion of the globalisation variables. Again, this leads us to reject H1 – the effects of class and education are not accounted for by the globalisation processes. Model 4, finally, indicates that we also have to reject H2 and H3: Neither the individual coefficients nor all of them together (F=0.76, p=.58) are significant. There is thus no sign of cross-class alliances between the losers of globalisation; nor is there any sign that those with lower skills react negatively to exposure while those with higher skills react positively.

[44] There is also no significant interaction between *education* and offshorability. The same applies for immigration attitudes and party choice.

Table 3: Explaining immigration attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	0.44***		0.36***	0.31**
	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Class:Lo.serv.	0.45***		0.36***	0.45***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Class:Rout.nman	0.24**		0.20*	0.21*
	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Class:Petite bourg.	0.01		-0.01	-0.03
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.15)
Class:Skilled workers	-0.21*		-0.18	-0.21
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Education:Medium	0.28***		0.30***	0.30***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Education:Higher	1.09***		1.01***	1.00***
	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		0.79***	0.66***	0.66***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		1.45***	1.32***	1.32***
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Offshorability		0.03***	0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Hi.serv.xOffshorability				0.02
				(0.03)
Lo.serv.xOffshorability				-0.03
				(0.03)
Rout.nmanxOffshorability				-0.00
				(0.03)
Petite b. x Offshorability				0.00
				(0.04)
Skilled x Offshorability				0.01
				(0.04)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.150	0.199	0.199

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. N=8,084. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

The country-specific analyses support this picture. First, we find no support for H1 in six out of nine countries while only smaller changes in the class (the UK) and education coefficients (Austria and France) can be observed after controlling for the globalisation variables in the three remaining countries. H2 and H3 do not receive any support in eight of the countries, neither as judged by individual coefficients nor joint tests. And while the joint test comes out significant in France, the individual coefficients show an incoherent pattern. Finally, and again in contrast to the globalisation perspective, the globalisation variables

account for 13% of the variation in the six original countries, and only 7% on average in the open economies of Scandinavia.

Summing up, therefore, we can conclude that the globalisation model fails to meet the expectations based on the observable implications derived from it also for immigration attitudes. While at least one of the variables used to directly tap its effects is significant and provide additional explanatory power (viz. the change in R^2 from Model 2 to 3), they fail to account for the effects of class and education just as we do not find an interaction between class and exposure to international competition.

5.5.4 Party preference

To estimate the effects of the independent variables on party preference, we rely on multinomial logistic regressions. With one exception, the individual coefficients are of less interest and are, therefore, presented in the appendix. Instead, we focus mainly on the overall significance and effects of the core independent variables presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Overall significance of variables and goodness-of-fit for the multinomial logit models of party preference.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class	175.28***		154.48***	101.70***
Education	116.98***		103.08***	101.86***
National ID		142.95***	117.70***	118.90***
Offshorability		49.78***	23.26***	6.00
Class x Offshorability				37.28
McFadden's R^2	0.126	0.115	0.133	0.135
AIC	19452.507	19653.843	19326.059	19344.385
BIC	20216.990	20257.382	20211.250	20430.756

Note: The table shows the chi square values for the Wald tests. $^{*}p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$.

The short version of the results is that we replicate the pattern from the three previous tables. First, it is clear from Model 1 that both class and education affect party preference. Moving on to Model 2, we can see that the two globalisation variables also have significant effects on party choice. The crucial test of H1 is based on Model 3, where we note that the inclusion of the globalisation variables does not cause the overall effects of education and class to become

insignificant. From the table we cannot see, though, whether the size of the effects of the two latter variables is affected by the inclusion of the globalisation variables. We return to this matter below after observing from Model 4 that H2 and H3 have to be rejected since the interaction between class and offshorability turns out insignificant. Likewise, including the interaction does not improve the pseudo-R2, the AIC, or the BIC. As is the case for the three attitudinal variables, we do not, in other words, find evidence of cross-class, globalisation driven coalitions when it comes to party choice. Neither do we find evidence that people in lower classes react differently from people in higher classes when exposed to globalisation.

Returning to the test of H1 we rely on the value of the so-called absolute kappa to conduct a more direct test of the mediation argument entailed in the hypothesis. The kappa index is broadly defined as the group differences in party preference (see Hout *et al*. 1995) and is commonly applied in studies of cleavage voting (e.g., Brooks *et al*. 2006, Jansen 2011, Langsæther 2017). The general definition of the absolute kappa index is

$$\kappa_{abs} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{J}\sum_{s=1}^{S}(\pi_s^j - \bar{\pi}_s^j)^2}{J * S}}$$

where π_s^j is the (predicted) probability that a member of social group *s* votes for party (family) *j.* As such, the index gives a summary of the total association between a multi-categorical independent variable and a multi-categorical dependent variable. We have used Lachat's (2007) *cindex* program to estimate the absolute kappa index for each categorical variable, as well as simulated 95% confidence intervals. The kappa values for the variables included in Model 1 and 3 appear in Figure 1.

The figure shows a very clear pattern. As can be seen by comparing, respectively, the first and third and the second and fourth bars the effects of class and education on vote choice are left substantially unchanged from Model 1 to Model 3. Thus, as is the case for (at least two of) the three attitudinal variables, the two globalisation variables have significant effects on the vote (see also the fifth and sixth bars), but these effects do not detract from those of class and education. Consequently, we have to reject H1.

Figure 1. Effects of the variables on party preference. Absolute kappa scores.



Note: The two first bars show the absolute kappa value for class and education from Model 1. The next four bars show the kappa values for class, education, cosmopolitanism, and offshorability, calculated based on Model 3. All kappa values are shown with 95% simulated confidence intervals. For offshorability, the calculation is based on a version of the variable with four levels of offshorability.

We should note that the conclusions with respect to party choice in general, also apply to populist right parties in particular.[45] Hence, our rejection of the globalisation processes as explanations for the effects of class and education also apply for the party family identified by Kriesi and co-authors as the primary choice of globalisation losers. All in all, the results for party preference resemble those from the analyses of the attitude dimensions and do not, therefore, provide the expected level of support for the implications of the globalisation hypothesis.[46] The effects of class and education on the vote do not, in other words, seem to reflect the globalisation processes although the latter seem to have some measure of

[45] The hypotheses can be evaluated based on the coefficients presented in the appendix just as a plot similar to Figure 1, but for voting for the populist right (not shown), fails to show a reduction in the effects of class and education.

[46] We have opted not to conduct country level analyses of party choice simply because the individual countries – in contrast to the pooled data set used in the main analyses – do not have enough units to reliably estimate the coefficients and their standard errors given the categorical nature of both the dependent and independent variables (Menard 2002: 78-79, 93).

independent influence.[47]

5.6 Conclusion and discussion

The core claim of the globalisation hypothesis advanced by Kriesi and his co-authors is that a new polarisation of the "winners" and "losers" of globalisation has taken over from older cleavages, not least over class. However, when testing this claim, the authors rely on variables tapping exactly such older cleavages, i.e. class and education. To remedy the lack of clarity with respect to the veracity of the mechanisms underlying the globalisation hypothesis – degree of national (as opposed to cosmopolitan) identity, vulnerability to increased international competition, and the interaction between the latter and an individual's factor endowments – we have investigated three hypotheses about the mechanisms behind the effects of class and education on political attitudes and party preference: First, that exposure to international competition as well as individuals' degree of national versus cosmopolitan identification mediate a substantial part of the effects of class and education (H1). Second, that exposure to international competition cuts across classes leading to cross-class alliances (H2). And finally, as an extension of the model proposed by Kriesi et al., that exposure to globalisation leads to differential political reactions from people in lower and higher classes (H3).

As the analyses above have demonstrated, the implications are not supported for any of the four, strategically selected dependent variables in our analysis: economic left-right, EU, and immigration attitudes as well as party choice. Thus, including the degree of offshorability of individuals' jobs and their degree of national identification does not reduce the effects of class and education by any noteworthy amount. Contrary to the first implication of the globalisation model, hence, the effects of the two former variables are not mediated by the globalisation processes. Likewise, exposure to international competition as measured by offshorability does not seem to lead to the formation of cross-class alliances of globalisation winners and losers with similar attitudes and party choice nor do we see a differential reaction to globalisation across classes and educational groups (except for one point discussed below). The results hold up across data sets and operationalisations, including models comprising individuals' employment sector as in the argument (but not the test) proposed by Kriesi *et al*.

[47] We have furthermore replicated all the analyses as closely as possible with the variables available in the first two rounds of the ESS, and the results corroborate our findings here. This also holds when using other measures of globalisation exposure, such as tradeability of the sector.

Overall, however, although a fair amount of their impact is shared with class and education, we do find evidence for an effect of the globalisation variables beyond that of the two traditional variables. Even if the variables are unable to account for the effects of class and education, this evidence might be an indicator of the existence of a globalisation cleavage separate from and in addition to the traditional cleavages. Four points should, however, be noted in this context.

First, the effect of offshorability is, for all three attitudinal variables, the opposite of what the globalisation model leads one to expect: those most subject to international competition, i.e. those most likely to lose from globalisation, are the most economically right-wing and the most positive towards both the EU and immigration. Furthermore, the variable is, according to Figure 1, the one with the weakest effect on party preference – a finding that also holds for populist right parties. Second, the effect of offshorability is insignificant when controlled for class and education in Model 3 for immigration attitudes.

The cosmopolitanism/national identity variable, third, has significant effects on all four outcome variables. However, on economic attitudes, those who are more strongly identified with their country – and hence losers of globalisation – have the most right-wing attitudes. This contradicts the globalisation model's expectation that globalisation losers should opt for protection in the form of left-wing economic policies. Nevertheless, the strength of this variable for the other three outcomes is interesting, and future research should look into whether the variable is best considered a structural or an attitudinal variable. That people who feel like they belong first and foremost to the world or to Europe are supporters of the European Union is hardly surprising. It raises, fourth, a question as to how much can be gauged about the structural roots of political alignments on the basis of this variable.[48] In sum, therefore, while the two variables directly tapping into the globalisation processes do show effects, these effects are often rather weak and, in many instances, run counter to expectations. We would think it appropriate, therefore, to be cautious about basing claims about a new cleavage on these variables. The same is true if we instead employ another measure of globalisation exposure, namely sectoral exposure to international trade.

We should also point out that we have found no systematic country level variation in the support for our conclusions. The few differences between the results from the pooled data set and analyses in individual countries that do manifest are weak and unsystematic. In

[48] The same applies to our alternative operationalisation of the national/cosmopolitan identification variable, cf. the appendix.

addition, the globalisation variables do not seem to fare better in the three Scandinavian cases in spite of the openness of their economies. We consider this problematic for the globalisation model which (even if imperfectly operationalised) should be expected to have a stronger influence in countries that are highly susceptible to the influences of globalisation. The same could be said in relation to the failure of the hypotheses derived from the globalisation model to hold up with respect to voting for populist right parties – parties that were singled out by Kriesi and co-authors as the primary choice of the losers of globalisation. Also for this critical case, hence, did the model fall short of expectations.

Across all of our models, the two traditional variables, class and education, come out as clearly significant and with fairly strong effects. As would be expected from previous research (cf. above), class is more important for economic left-right attitudes and overall party choice, education for EU and immigration attitudes. In this respect, our results do not deviate from those of Kriesi *et al*. who use class and education as proxies for the globalisation processes. However, when placing both their and our results for these two variables alongside our tests of a set of central implications of the globalisation model, the interpretation of the results would seem to be different from that offered by the globalisation model. The globalisation variables do not account for the effects of class and education and are, in themselves, not sufficient to sustain the claim of a new cleavage (cf. above). Rather, the purported new, globalisation cleavage seems, at its core, to be a replication of the previously known conflicts over class and education.

This is not to say that the processes underlying globalisation, such as increased international competition, EU-integration and migration, have no bearing on how voters behave in West European countries. Far from it, in fact. It follows straightforwardly from extant research on both class and education such as that reviewed above, that events like these should be expected to have political repercussions since they are likely to affect the interests and attitudes of different classes and/or educational groups in different ways, thereby creating the potential for political conflict and mobilisation.

Indeed, the otherwise surprising observation that individuals, particularly those with high levels of education, exposed to offshorability are more rather than less right wing on economic issues may be interpreted as indicating exactly this: that globalisation processes reinvigorate classic conflicts over economic distribution. The result could reflect, thus, that those exposed to globalisation in the form of international competition, the highly educated in particular, gain more from this competition than those not so exposed, i.e. the processes

underlying the classic Stolper-Samuelson (1941) model (cf. also Walter 2010, 2017). Alternatively, the result could reflect that individuals with more rightist economic attitudes self-select into jobs characterised by international competition as a way to pursue the higher gains available in an internationally competitive industry; this would, incidentally, fit our observation (in Table A.1.7) that those with higher levels of education or class position are more exposed to international competition.[49] Of course, these conjectures go beyond our analyses here and should be explored by future research.

In sum, our main point is not that the idea of Kriesi *et al*. that globalisation affects political alignments is wrong – quite the contrary. What we are arguing on the basis of the analyses presented above is that the underlying conflicts are not (at least not primarily) centred around the mechanisms identified by Kriesi and co-authors. Rather, to a considerable degree, the conflicts revolve around the oppositions between classes and educational groups identified by previous work on these factors. We would on the basis of this, first, direct test of the mechanisms of the globalisation model conclude that the proposed globalisation cleavage appears rather more like old wine in new bottles.

[49] For EU and immigration attitudes, the unexpected result that offshorability is associated with more positive attitudes (although the effect is insignificant for immigration attitudes when controlling for education and class) could reflect similar self-selection and/or the effect of exposure to international impulses (cf. the contact theory of intergroup attitudes first presented by Allport 1954).

Appendix to chapter 2

Table 1: EGP classes. Distribution according to countries and regional means.

Nordic	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden		Mean
Hi serv.	18.6	22.4	17.6	19.5	14.4		18.5
Lo serv.	26.6	24.6	29.4	25.6	30.9		27.4
R. nman.	21.6	27.5	16.6	26.0	25.7		23.5
P. bourg.	6.1	6.8	11.7	7.5	5.7		7.5
Skilled w.	10.7	7.5	10.0	8.3	9.6		9.2
Unskilled	16.4	11.2	14.6	13.1	13.8		13.8
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0
N	1388	1054	710	1056	1076		
Central West	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Lux	Netherl.	Switzerl.	Mean
Hi serv.	11.9	14.6	9.3	15.9	21.0	16.3	14.9
Lo serv.	19.5	27.7	18.7	25.8	29.9	28.4	25.0
R. nman.	28.2	15.6	26.8	21.0	22.8	25.0	23.2
P. bourg.	9.5	7.3	4.7	5.6	7.1	4.7	6.5
Skilled w.	13.6	13.6	21.0	11.7	8.0	13.9	13.6
Unskilled	17.3	21.3	19.4	19.9	11.1	11.7	16.8
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1359	1335	1767	1455	1446	1200	
Islands							
	Ireland	Britain					Mean
Hi serv.	9.7	18.9					14.3
Lo serv.	17.4	25.1					21.2
R. nman.	27.9	21.1					24.5
P. bourg.	7.4	7.5					7.5
Skilled w.	14.0	9.5					11.7
Unskilled	23.5	18.0					20.8
Sum	100.0	100.0					100.0
N	821	1437					
South	France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain		Mean
Hi serv.	14.4	10.4	11.1	6.1	6.6		9.7
Lo serv.	25.8	13.8	21.4	15.7	12.2		17.8
R. nman.	21.1	17.2	19.6	25.9	24.1		21.6
P. bourg.	6.0	29.9	17.1	5.8	9.9		13.7
Skilled w.	13.9	10.6	13.1	18.3	15.7		14.3
Unskilled	18.9	18.2	17.8	28.2	31.5		22.9
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0
N	1413	1168	1194	1335	1252		

Table 2: Oesch eight class variable. Distribution according to country and regional means.

Nordic	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden		Mean	"Logics"
Bourg	2.4	1.2	3.6	1.9	3.2		2.5	
P. bourg.	6.6	7.6	13.2	9.2	6.4		8.6	11.1
Tech prof	8.4	11.3	5.3	7.9	9.1		8.4	
Prod. W.	17.9	12.7	13.7	12.4	17.4		14.8	23.2
Managers	17.8	16.5	21.0	16.8	16.8		17.8	
O. clerks	9.6	13.3	5.5	9.4	9.1		9.4	27.1
Soc.c.prof	19.0	19.8	20.2	18.5	17.5		19.0	
Serv.work	18.3	17.6	17.5	24.1	20.6		19.6	38.6
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	
N	1388	1058	714	1056	1079			
Central West	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Lux	Netherl.	Switzerl.	Mean	
Bourg	2.5	1.7	1.4	2.0	3.7	1.6	2.2	
P. bourg.	10.1	8.2	5.1	6.1	8.2	5.2	7.2	9.3
Tech prof	4.1	7.3	5.0	7.2	6.3	9.0	6.5	
Prod. W.	18.7	22.5	29.7	20.6	12.0	16.4	20.0	26.5
Managers	13.7	17.0	10.5	19.0	21.1	17.9	16.5	
O. clerks	19.5	10.7	16.9	13.1	11.7	12.8	14.1	30.7
Soc.c.prof	8.8	15.1	10.1	12.5	15.9	14.9	12.9	
Serv.work	22.6	17.2	21.3	19.5	21.1	22.1	20.6	33.5
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
N	1309	1322	1711	1454	1444	1171		
Islands	Ireland	Britain					Mean	
Bourg	1.1	3.1					2.1	
P. bourg.	7.3	7.8					7.6	9.7
Tech prof	5.6	6.0					5.8	
Prod. W.	23.3	16.7					20.0	25.8
Managers	12.9	20.1					16.5	
O. clerks	10.8	9.1					9.9	26.4
Soc.c.prof	9.1	14.0					11.6	
Serv.work	29.8	23.3					26.6	38.1
Sum	100.0	100.0					100	
N	821	1436						
South	France	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain		Mean	
Bourg	1.1	4.0	3.9	0.3	1.8		2.2	
P. bourg.	6.1	30.4	17.8	6.2	10.1		14.1	16.4
Tech prof	9.6	2.7	4.4	6.7	3.2		5.3	
Prod. W.	21.2	18.4	23.3	31.5	31.2		25.1	30.5
Managers	16.2	8.8	12.3	6.5	5.8		9.9	
O. clerks	10.6	8.9	13.6	11.5	10.8		11.1	21.0
Soc.c.prof	14.3	8.5	11.3	5.6	7.2		9.4	
Serv.work	20.7	18.4	13.4	31.7	30.0		22.8	32.2
Sum	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100	
N	1404	1169	1197	1332	1252			

"Logics" sums of the percentages for the two classes that belong to the same logic in Oesch class schema, see Table 3. The first sum is based in the independent work logic and sums up percentages that belong to the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, and so on.

Appendix to chapter 3

This is the appendix for chapter 3. In section A.1, I present the descriptive statistics for social class, the three value orientations, and party preference. Section A.2 discusses in detail the operationalisation of these variables. Section A.3 includes all the regression tables that are the basis for the main results in the article, which may be found in figure 1 in the chapter. In section A.4, I demonstrate the results of separate analyses for the Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative parties. Section A.5 shows the results of the Radical Right analyses after control for age, gender, and education.

A.1. Descriptive statistics.
A.2. Variable operationalisation.
A.3. The coefficients from the main models and calculation of the kappa value.
A.4. Separate analyses of the three party families in the Mainstream Right.
A.5. Controlling for age, sex, and education for the Radical Right analyses.

A.1 Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics are for all units that are included in the analyses in the paper, i.e. excluding those that have missing values on the party group or social class variable.

Table A.1.1: Social class in percent, by country

	Hi	Lo	Rout	Petite	Skilled	Unskilled	**N**
Austria	13.5	18.9	30.0	9.4	12.2	16.0	813
Belgium	15.2	30.0	16.1	6.6	12.4	19.9	1068
Denmark	20.3	26.5	20.4	6.6	10.4	15.7	1190
Finland	25.8	26.2	22.6	7.9	7.6	10.0	738
France	15.9	28.5	20.2	6.5	11.6	17.3	1059
Germany	12.3	18.6	24.5	5.0	21.8	17.9	1244
Greece	10.4	13.9	15.6	35.6	8.8	15.8	800
Italy	13.5	24.5	17.8	16.2	11.4	16.5	702
Luxembour	15.3	28.1	22.0	5.9	11.0	17.7	745
Netherlands	21.4	30.0	21.6	7.9	7.6	11.5	1267
Norway	20.7	25.7	25.0	7.8	8.7	12.2	942
Switzerland	22.1	31.1	23.1	5.4	9.7	8.6	698
Total	17.2	25.3	21.6	9.5	11.4	15.1	1126

Table A.1.2: Party preference in percent, by country

	Com.	Left Soc.	Green	Soc. Dem.	Mainstream Right	Radical Right	Other parties	N
Austria	1.6	-	14.8	32.5	27.4	21.0	2.7	813
Belgium	-	-	14.4	25.3	41.6	6.1	12.6	1068
Denmark	1.9	20.4	0.0	22.8	15.0	8.7	31.2	1190
Finland	-	5.8	16.1	18.3	29.7	12.5	17.6	738
France	3.9	6.0	10.2	28.7	36.7	3.0	11.5	1059
Germany	-	19.0	10.0	22.9	42.7	3.5	1.9	1244
Greece	7.6	9.1	0.0	33.6	32.0	4.0	13.6	800
Italy	6.3	3.1	2.1	32.9	34.8	2.3	18.5	702
Luxembourg	2.7	2.0	17.2	24.7	45.4	3.5	4.6	745
Netherlands	-	11.1	5.9	16.2	38.8	2.8	25.3	1267
Norway	2.1	7.0	-	29.1	29.5	22.6	9.7	942
Switzerland	2.6	-	14.2	20.9	32.0	22.1	8.3	698
Total	2.1	8.0	8.4	25.2	33.9	8.7	13.7	11266

Table A.1.3: Political values (mean), by country

	Economic left-right	*Environmentalist-growth*	*Immigration orientations*	*N*
Austria	4.54	6.27	3.79	813

Belgium	4.52	6.14	3.93	1068
Denmark	3.77	6.16	4.97	1190
Finland	4.68	6.69	4.85	738
France	4.60	6.60	5.15	1059
Germany	4.48	6.02	3.91	1244
Greece	5.13	7.20	4.16	800
Italy	4.54	6.30	4.87	702
Luxembourg	4.32	6.67	5.16	745
Netherlands	4.29	5.61	4.62	1267
Norway	3.93	5.92	4.45	942
Switzerland	4.04	6.69	4.51	698
Total	4.38	6.29	4.51	11266

Table A.1.4: The class basis of each party group, total

	Com.	Left Soc.	Green	Soc. Dem.	Mainstream Right	Radical Right	Other parties	N
Hi. Serv.	1.29	7.33	8.52	20.29	42.13	6.04	14.40	1937
Lo. Serv.	1.90	8.05	11.91	22.31	34.61	6.29	14.93	2846
Rout.nman.	2.14	9.22	9.76	26.51	30.47	9.22	12.68	2429
Petite	2.53	3.46	3.00	20.41	43.26	9.46	17.88	1068
Skilled	2.73	9.35	6.16	29.46	28.29	13.56	10.44	1283
Unskilled	2.70	8.75	5.28	33.47	26.37	11.16	12.27	1703
Total	2.12	8.00	8.36	25.19	33.86	8.74	13.72	11266

Table A.1.5. Correlations between the value orientations in each country (pearson's r)

	ECLR and environmentalism	ECLR and immigration orientations	Environmentalism and immigration orientations
Austria	0.15	0.15	-0.03
Belgium	0.07	0.02	0.12
Denmark	0.16	0.23	-0.02
Finland	0.12	0.11	0.12
France	0.04	0.19	0.10
Germany	0.05	-0.04	0.07
Greece	0.12	-0.01	0.01
Italy	0.10	0.05	0.14
Luxembourg	0.03	-0.07	-0.01
Netherlands	0.11	0.05	0.00
Norway	0.25	0.29	0.12
Switzerland	0.13	0.11	-0.01

A.2: Variable operationalisation

A.2.1: Social class

The EGP class schema was discussed in section 3.1 in the chapter. The EGP class schema is already pre-coded in the European Values Study 2008 data set. For details on how this was done, please refer to the codebook of the EVS 2008. We then created the variable with six categories by combining some classes based on theoretical and empirical criteria, and in line with previous research. For descriptive statistics, please refer to table A.1.1.

Table A.2.1: The applied class schema.

Types of occupations, EGP	**Classes and terms used in this study**
Class I: Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors	Higher Service Class
Class II: Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small business and industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees	Lower service class
Class IIIa: Higher grade routine non-manual employees (administration and commerce)	Routine non-manual employees
Class IIIb: Lower grade routine non-manual employees (sales and services; other rank-and-file employees)	
Class IVa: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees	Petite bourgeoisie
Class IVb: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees	
Class IVc: Farmers and smallholders; self-employed fishermen	
Class V: Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers	Skilled manual workers
Class VI: Skilled manual workers	

VIIa: Semi- and unskilled workers (not in agriculture)	Unskilled manual workers
VIIb: Agricultural workers	

A.2.2: The value indexes

The value orientations are constructed the exact same way as in Knutsen (2018).

Economic left-right values

The variables were tapped by a question battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located to the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question was formulated as follows: "On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?"

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility: "Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves" versus "The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for".
V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control: "The state should give more freedom to firms" versus "The state should control firms more effectively".
V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives: "Incomes should be made more equal" versus "There should be greater incentives for individual effort".
V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership: "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased" versus "government ownership of business and industry should be increased".
V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful: "Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas" versus "Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people"

Environmental values

The index is based on the questions in Q85 (V295-301).
"I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?"

V295: I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution
V296: We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support
V297: When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences
V298: Human ingenuity will insure that the earth remains fit to live in
V299: The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations
V300: Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature
V301: If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe

All items are then based on four-point Likert item ("Agree strongly", "Agree", "Disagree" and "Disagree strongly". The neutral alternative "Neither agree nor disagree" was not included. The index is an equal-weighted additive index (0-10) where support for environmental values has the highest values.

Immigration orientations

These orientations are tapped by six questions which are asked in a battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located at the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The questions were formulated as follows:

Q78: "Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? (from 1 to 10)"

A (V268): Take jobs: "Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country" versus "immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country"
B (V269): Cultural life undermined: "A country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants" versus "a country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants"
C (V270): Crime problems: "Immigrants make crime problems worse" versus "immigrants do not make crime problems worse"
D (V271): Welfare: "Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system" versus "immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system"
E (V272): Threat to society: "In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society" versus "in the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to

society"
F (V273): Customs and traditions: "For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions" versus "for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions, but adopt the customs of the country"

An equal-weighted additive index was constructed on the basis of these six items. The index has values from 0 to 10, and a high score indicates a non-restrictive view on immigration and a positive view on immigrants.

A.2.3: The party group categorisation

The categorisation of the party groups is based on Oddbjørn Knutsen (2018), where he labelled the parties as either Communist, Left Socialist, Green, Social Democratic, Agrarian, Ethnic/regionalist, Christian Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, Radical Right, or Other. This approach builds upon former works in the field, such as that of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and von Beyme (1985).

In the article, I analyse Communist, Left Socialist, Green, Social Democratic, and Radical Right parties separately. I combine Christian Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative parties into one category named the Mainstream Right, as Oesch and Rennwald (2018) do. The agrarian and ethnic/regionalist parties are combined with "Other" parties. These parties are included in all analyses, but the results are not shown as they are not considered of substantial importance here.

Communist parties

Austria: Austrian Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*)
Denmark: Red-Green Alliance/Unity List (*Enhetslisten*)
France: French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*)
Greece: Communist Party of Greece (*Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*)
Italy: Communist Refoundation Party (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista*) and Communist Workers' Party (*Partido Comunista del Lavoratori*)
Luxembourg: Communist Party (*Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg*)
Norway: Red (*Rødt*)
Switzerland: Labour Party (*Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz)*

Socialist Left parties

Denmark: Socialist People's Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*)
Finland: Left Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto*)
France: Left Wing parties[50]
Germany: Left party (*die Linke*)
Greece: Coalition of the Radical Left (*Syriza*)
Italy: Left and Freedom party
Luxembourg: Left party (*Déi Lénk*)
Netherlands: Socialist party (*Socialistische Partij*)
Norway: Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk venstreparti*)
Sweden: Left Party (*Vänstern*)

Green parties

Austria: Green party (*die Grünen*)
Belgium: Green party (*Groen, Ecolo*)[51]
Finland: Green League (*Vihreä liitto*)
France: Green party (*les Verts)* and other environmental parties
Germany: Greens (*die Grünen*)
Luxembourg: Green P. (*Déi Gréng*)
Netherlands: GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*)
Switzerland: Green party (*Grüne Partei der Schweiz*)

Social Democratic parties

Austria: Austrian Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*)
Belgium: Socialist parties (*SP.A-Spirit[52] and Parti Socialiste*)
Denmark: Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*)
Finland: Social Democratic Party of Finland (*Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue*)
France: Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*)
Germany: German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)
Greece: Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, *Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα*)
Italy: Democratic party (*Partito Democratico*)
Luxembourg: Socialist party (*Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Aarbechterpartei)*
Netherlands: Labour party (*Partij van de Arbeid,* PvdA)
Norway: Labour party (*Arbeiderpartiet*)
Sweden: Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*)
Switzerland: Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz*)

Mainstream Right

[50] Revolutionary Communist League, Workers' Struggle and Workers' Party
[51] For Belgium, there will usually be both a Flemish and a Walloon party within the party families
[52] SP.a-SPIRIT is a Belgian electoral coalition between the Flemish parties Socialist Party Different (SP.a) and Spirit.

Austria: Liberal Forum (*Liberales Forum*, LiF), Austrian People's party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*, ÖVP)
Belgium: Liberal parties (*Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten,* VLD, and *Mouvement Réformateur,* MR) and Christian parties (*Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams*, CD&V, and *Centre démocrate humaniste*, CDH)
Denmark: Radical Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*), Conservative People's party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*)
Finland: Christian Democrats (*Kristillisdemokraatit*), National Coalition party (*Kansallinen Kokoomus*)
France: Democratic Movement (*Mouvement démocrate*) and New Centrist party (*Nouveau Centre*), Union for a Popular Movement (*Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*)
Germany: Free Democratic party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*, FDP), CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and CSU (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*)
Greece: New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία)
Italy: Union of the Centre (*Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro*), People of Freedom (*Il Popolo della Libertà*)
Luxembourg: Democratic party (*Demokratesch Partei*), Social Christian party (*Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei*)
Netherlands: People's party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD), Christian Democratic Appeal (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*)
Norway: Liberal party (*Venstre*), Christian People's party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*), Conservative party (*Høyre*)
Switzerland: Radical party and Liberal party, Christian Democratic Peoples' party (*Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz*), Green Liberal party (*Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz*)

Radical Right

Austria: Freedom party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*)
Belgium: Vlaams Belang and Front National
Denmark: Danish People's party (*Dansk Folkeparti*)
Finland: True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*)
France: Front National and National Republican Movement (*Mouvement National Républicain*)
Germany: Republican party (*Die Republikaner*), National Democratic party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion*)
Greece: Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός)
Italy: Tricolour Flame, Lega Nord
Luxembourg: Alternative Democratic Reform party (*Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei*)
Netherland: Freedom party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*)
Norway: Progress party (*Fremskrittspartiet*)
Switzerland: Swiss People's party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*)

Other parties

Belgium: New Flemish Alliance (*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*, N-VA), Lijst Dedecker
Denmark: Agrarian Liberals (*Venstre*)
Finland: Swedish People's Party (*Svenska folkpartiet*), Centre party (*Suomen Keskusta*)
France: Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and Tradition (*Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions*); Movement for France (*Mouvement pour la France*)
Italy: Italy of Values (*Italia del Valori*)
Netherlands: D66, Christian Union, SGP Reformed party, Party for the Animals (*Partij voor de Dieren*), and Group Verdonk
Norway: Centre party (*Senterpartiet*)

A.3: The coefficients from the main models and calculation of the kappa value

In the following section, all the regression models that were estimated to obtain the results in figure 1 in the chapter are reported. In the end, the exact way the kappa values were calculated is shown.

The following tables contain the regression coefficients from the binomial logistic models. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted for the relevant party group (e.g. the Social Democrats) and 0 if the respondent voted for any other party. The first model only includes class and vote choice. The unskilled workers are the reference category. The second model controls for economic left-right values; the third for environmentalist versus growth values, the fourth for immigration values, and finally, the fifth includes all the three value orientations.

A.3.1: Communists

Table A.3.1: Coefficients (log odds ratios) from the Communist logistic models. Dependent variable: Voting Communist versus voting any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	-0.58*	-0.19	-0.59*	-0.76**	-0.36
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)
Lower service	-0.25	-0.04	-0.29	-0.42*	-0.22
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Routine Non-Manual	-0.11	0.03	-0.13	-0.22	-0.07
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Petite Bourgeoisie	-0.64*	-0.31	-0.63*	-0.66*	-0.35
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Skilled workers	0.16	0.30	0.16	0.16	0.30
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		0.49***			0.46***
		(0.05)			(0.05)
Environm. values			0.21***		0.14**
			(0.05)		(0.05)
Immigration orientations				0.15***	0.09**
				(0.03)	(0.03)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-4.03***	-6.69***	-5.36***	-4.56***	-7.79***
	(0.33)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.58)
N	6948	6948	6948	6948	6948

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.2: Left Socialists

Table A.3.2: Coefficients (log odds ratios) from the logistic Left Socialist models. Dependent variable: Voting Left Socialist versus voting for any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	-0.23	0.14	-0.24	-0.48***	-0.15
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Lower service	0.01	0.17	-0.04	-0.24	-0.11
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Routine Non-Manual	0.09	0.20	0.06	-0.05	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Petite Bourgeoisie	-1.04***	-0.68**	-1.03***	-1.08***	-0.75***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Skilled workers	-0.03	0.10	-0.04	0.02	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		0.47***			0.43***
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Environm. values			0.18***		0.13***
			(0.03)		(0.03)
Immigration orientations				0.25***	0.21***
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-1.27***	-3.38***	-2.40***	-2.45***	-4.97***
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.25)
N	8678	8678	8678	8678	8678

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.3: Green parties

Table A.3.3: Coefficients (log odds ratios) from the Green logistic regression models. Dependent variable: Voting Green versus voting any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	0.59***	0.74***	0.50***	0.38*	0.38*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Lower service	0.97***	1.06***	0.84***	0.81***	0.74***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Routine Non-Manual	0.67***	0.71***	0.58***	0.61***	0.55***
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Petite Bourgeoisie	-0.15	0.00	-0.16	-0.10	-0.05
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Skilled workers	0.14	0.16	0.11	0.20	0.17
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		0.16***			0.10***
		(0.02)			(0.02)
Environm. values			0.34***		0.34***
			(0.03)		(0.03)
Immigration orientations				0.26***	0.25***
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-2.33***	-3.16***	-4.50***	-3.36***	-5.95***
	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.29)
N	8326	8326	8326	8326	8326

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.4: Social Democratic parties

Table A.3.4: Coefficients (log odds ratios) from the Social Democratic logistic regression models. Dependent variable: Voting Social Democratic versus voting any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	-0.64***	-0.43***	-0.64***	-0.75***	-0.53***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Lower service	-0.52***	-0.41***	-0.52***	-0.62***	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Routine Non-Manual	-0.29***	-0.25**	-0.29***	-0.35***	-0.29***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Petite Bourgeoisie	-0.80***	-0.59***	-0.80***	-0.80***	-0.60***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Skilled workers	-0.17	-0.11	-0.17	-0.16	-0.10
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		0.25***			0.24***
		(0.01)			(0.01)
Environm. values			0.00		-0.03*
			(0.02)		(0.02)
Immigration orientations				0.10***	0.08***
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-0.37***	-1.61***	-0.38**	-0.70***	-1.64***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.15)
N	11257	11257	11257	11257	11257

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.5: Mainstream Right

Table A.3.5: The coefficients (log odds ratios) from the Mainstream Right logistic models. Dependent variable: Voting for the Mainstream Right versus voting for any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	0.80***	0.53***	0.84***	0.88***	0.62***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Lower service	0.41***	0.26***	0.47***	0.48***	0.36***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Routine Non-Manual	0.25**	0.20*	0.29***	0.29***	0.26**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Petite Bourgeoisie	0.81***	0.53***	0.82***	0.82***	0.54***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Skilled workers	0.07	-0.00	0.08	0.06	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		-0.34***			-0.33***
		(0.02)			(0.02)
Environm. values			-0.15***		-0.12***
			(0.01)		(0.02)
Immigration orientations				-0.07***	-0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-1.31***	0.31*	-0.43**	-1.08***	1.10***
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.15)
N	11257	11257	11257	11257	11257

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.6: Radical Right

Table A.3.6: The coefficients (log odds ratios) from the Radical Right logistic models. Dependent variable: Voting Radical Right versus voting any other party.

	Model 1 Class	Model 2 ECLR	Model 3 ENV.	Model 4 IMM.	Model 5 FULL
Higher service	-0.94***	-1.12***	-0.93***	-0.44**	-0.60***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Lower service	-0.79***	-0.89***	-0.78***	-0.37**	-0.46***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Routine Non-Manual	-0.44***	-0.47***	-0.43***	-0.16	-0.18
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Petite Bourgeoisie	-0.17	-0.35*	-0.17	-0.19	-0.34*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Skilled workers	0.20	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.19
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Unskilled Workers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Economic values		-0.18***			-0.13***
		(0.02)			(0.03)
Environm. values			-0.05		-0.02
			(0.02)		(0.03)
Immigration orientations				-0.50***	-0.49***
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Country FE	V	V	V	V	V
Constant	-0.96***	-0.08	-0.68***	0.35**	1.12***
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.22)
N	11257	11257	11257	11257	11257

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.3.7: Calculation of the kappa values

Calculating the relative kappa value from the main models

Calculating the relative kappa value for each of the binomial logistic models is done simply by taking the standard deviation of the six class coefficients, i.e:

$$\kappa_{rel} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S}(\beta_s^j - \overline{\beta_s^J})^2}{S}}$$

where β_s^j is the coefficient from a binary logistic regression for social group *s* and voting outcome *j* (with the β coefficient of the social group chosen as the reference category being equal to 0), and $\overline{\beta_s^J}$ is the average regression coefficient across all S social groups (Lachat 2007: 9).

For instance, for the first Radical Right model (with only class and vote choice), the kappa value is equal to the standard deviation of the six class coefficients: SD(-0.94, -0.79, -0.44, -0.17, 0.20, 0.00) = 0.41.

A.4: Separate analyses of the three party families in the Mainstream Right

As discussed in the chapter, I have combined the Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Liberal parties into the Mainstream Right. The justification for this is in the chapter. To demonstrate that this aggregation is not hiding any important differences between the party families, I here present the results for the party families separately. As is clear from the figure, only economic left-right values account for the class voting for all of these three party families, while none of the other value orientations matter. The same is true for the result for the mainstream right as a whole.

Figure A.4: Comparing the results of Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Conservative parties to the results for the combined category (Mainstream Right).



A.5: Controlling for age, sex, and education for the Radical Right analyses

As discussed in the article, I have replicated the Radical Right models with controls for age, sex, and education. Education is here measured by a three-categorical variable based on ISCED-codes in the EVS. The categories are lower education (pre-primary or no education, primary education, and lower secondary education), medium education (upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education), and higher education (first or second stage of tertiary education).

Figure A.5, then, shows the results of this replication. They have to be interpreted in a slightly different way from the original analyses. Model 1 is no longer the bivariate model with only class and voting; it is now class, education, age, gender, and voting. In other words, the kappa value is the standard deviation of the class coefficients *when controlling for* age, gender, and education.

This naturally means that the change in Radical Right class voting now measures how much each value orientation is accounting for of the *class differences that still exist after controlling for age, gender, and education.*

Figure A.5: Replication of Radical Right analyses with controls for age, gender, and education.



The class differences are smaller after controlling for education, age, and gender. This should come as no surprise: Controlling for educational differences between the classes will of course suppress the differences in Radical Right vote choice. There are no substantial changes in the conclusions about the role of the value orientations. In particular, it is highly interesting that immigration orientations – often considered to be heavily influenced by education – still account for an impressive 46% of the class differences in Radical Right voting which are not education-related. Perhaps this is a sign that opposition to immigration may have different sources, cultural and economic, as discussed in the article (see also Nielsen 2007). The cultural opposition to immigration and cultural diversity among workers could be partly due to educational differences, and lead to Radical Right voting. The economic opposition to immigration among workers could be affected by class belonging and economic interests, and also – in a different process – lead to Radical Right voting.

Appendix to chapter 4

This is the appendix for the article *How Parties Shape the Nature of Cleavage Voting: A Comparative Study of Party-Mass Linkages and Political Values in 13 West European Countries*. In section A.1, I present the operationalisation of religion in each country. Section A.2 includes a table with all the parties that have been analysed, sorted by country. Section A.3 is for descriptive statistics. It also includes visualisations of the kappa values for all the 50 parties both before and after control for traditional-progressive values, and the percentage change in these kappa values. Section A.4 justifies the model choice by demonstrating that other models would yield the same results. Finally, section A.5 extends the analysis by including more parties and more countries.

A.1. Operationalisation of religion in each country.

In this section, the exact operationalisations of religion in each country for the stage 1 analyses are listed. In "mixed" countries, I can include both Protestants and Catholics. In other countries, there are almost no Catholics (or Protestants). In these cases, I operate with only three categories: Those with no denomination, passive Catholics (or Protestants), and active Catholics (or Protestants). In the Netherlands, there is a third important group, which allows me to include also passive and active Evangelists/non-conformists. In Greece, I operate with three groups: Those with no denomination, passive Orthodox, and active Orthodox. Unfortunately, respondents belonging to other religions than these are excluded because they are very few in the survey material and would thus create empty cells in most of the analyses.See section 3 in the article for a discussion of the criteria for using the different operationalisations.

Table A.1: Operationalisation of religion in each country

Operationalization	**Religious groups**	**Countries**
#1: Catholic countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics	Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
#2: Protestant countries	No denomination Passive Protestants Active Protestants	Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden
#3: Somewhat mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Protestants	Austria
#4: Mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Passive Protestants Active Protestants	Germany, the UK
#5: Highly mixed countries	No denomination Passive Catholics Active Catholics Passive Protestants Active Protestants Passive Evangelists/non-conformists	The Netherlands

	Active Evangelists/non-conformists	
#6: Orthodox countries	No denomination Passive Orthodox Active Orthodox	Greece

As mentioned, some minor parties were so small that they had empty cells when using the detailed operationalisation of religion scheduled above. In the cases were several cells were empty, the parties were excluded as discussed in the paper. In the cases where only one cell was empty, groups were merged to be able to include the party in the analysis stage 2. This is the case for the following parties:

EL, Denmark: Passive and active Protestants merged.
VAS, Finland: Passive and active Protestants merged.
PCF, France: Passive and active Catholics merged.
ND, Greece: "No denomination" was removed, as it was empty (leaving passive and active Orthodox)
GL, Netherlands: Passive and active Protestants merged.
D66, Netherlands: Passive and active Evangelists merged.

A.2. Parties from the CHES analysed, sorted by country.

Table A.2: Parties analysed, sorted by country.

Country	**Parties included in stage 2 analyses**	**Parties excluded because no stage 1 analysis could be performed, either because party was not included in the EVS or due to several empty cells (minor parties)**	**Parties excluded because there were no significant differences between the religious groups (wald>=.05)**
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) Die Grünen Liberales Forum (LIF) Õsterreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) Sozialdemocratische Partei Österreichs	Liste Dr. Hans-Peter Martin	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)

	(SPÖ)		
Belgium	Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams (CD&V) Centre Démocrate Humaniste (CDH) Parti Socialiste (PS) Socialistische Partij. Anders (SP.A) Vlaams Belang (VB)		Groen! Ecolo Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NVA) Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD) Mouvement Réformateur (MR)
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF) Enhedslisten (EL) Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF) Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) Venstre (V)		Socialdemokratiet (SD) Det Radikale Venstre (RV)
Finland	Kristillisdemokraatit (KD) Suomen Keskusta (KESK) Kansallinen Kokoomus (KOK) Vasemmistoliito (VAS) Vihreät De Gröna (VIHR)		Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue (RKP/SFP) Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen (SDP) Persussuomalaiset (True Finns)
France	Front National (FN) Parti Communiste Français (PCF) Parti Socialiste (PS) Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)	Parti Radical de Gauche (PRG) Mouvement Pour la France (MPF)	Les Verts Union pour la Démocracie Française (UDF)/MoDém
Germany	Die Linkspartei/PDS (Die Linke) Die Grünen Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) Christlich Soziale		Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)

	Union in Bayern (CSU)		
Greece	Nea Dimokratia (ND) Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (PASOK) Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras (SYRIZA)	Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima (DIKKI)	Kommunistiko Komma Elladas (KKE) Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (LAOS)
Ireland	Fianna Fail Sinn Fein	Progressive Democrats	Green Party Labour Fine Gael
Italy (2010, see below)	Partito Democratico (PD) Il Popolo della Libertà (PDL) Sinistra e Libertà (SL) Unione di Centro (UDC)	Alleanza Nazionale (AN) Federazione dei Verdi (Verdi) Movimento per le Autonomie (MpA) Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) Partito dei Comunisti Italian (PCI) Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (RC) Sinistra Democratica (SD) Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP)	Italia dei Valori (IDV) Lega Nord (LN)
Netherlands	Christen-Demokratisch Appel (CDA) Christen Unie (CU) Democraten 66 (D66) Groen Links (GL) Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) Socialistische Partij (SP) Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie (VVD)		Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)

Norway (2010, see below)	Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) Senterpartiet (Sp) Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)		Ventre (V) Høyre (H)
Portugal	Coligação Democràtica Unitàra (CDU) Partido Popular Democràtico (PPD/PSD)		Bloco de Esquerda (BE) Centro Democràtico e Social (CDS/PP) Partido Socialista (PS)
Spain	Izquierda Unida (IU) Partido Popular (PP) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) Coalicion Canaria (CC) Chunta Aragonesista (CHA) Convergència i Uniò (CiU) Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)	
Sweden	Kristdemokraterna (KD) Vänstern (V)	Junilistan (JL)	Centern (C) Folkpartiet liberalerna (FP) Moderaterna (M) Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP) Arbetarpartiet – Socialdemokraterna (SAP)
Switzerland (2010, see below)	CVP/PVC GPS/PES SVP/UDC	PdA/PST-POP EVP/PEV Ticino League EDU/UDF SD/DS	FDP/PLR SPS/PSS GLP/PVL

UK	Conservative Party Labour	Plaid Cymru Scottish National Party (SNP) United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	Green Party Liberal Democratic Party

There are a total of 96 parties (when excluding the Italian parties) in the CHES 2006. Of these, 16 either do not exist in the EVS, or were so small that no stage 1 analysis could be performed due to several empty cells. Removing the minor or non-existent parties leaves us with 80 parties. Of these 80, 30 do not have significant differences between the religious groups (wald test yields p>=.05) and are thus not suitable for analysis at stage 2, confer the first criterion. That leaves us with 50 parties, which are used for the main analyses in the article.

However, if we only require the wald test to be significant at the .25 level (in other words, a *very* liberal inclusion criterium), we get eight additional parties: The Belgian Ecolo and Mouvemement Réformateur, the French UDF and Verts, the Irish Green Party, the British Liberal Democrats, the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda, and the Swedish Moderaterna. Including these in the analyses does not change the results, see section A.5.

Furthermore, if we accept the assumption that the salience of moral issues for the parties did not change drastically between 2006 and 2010, we can use the CHES 2010 data for the Italian parties (this corresponds much better with the parties that are in the EVS 2010, as data was collected in 2009) and for Norway and Switzerland (which were not included in CHES 2006). Analyses including these countries follow in section A.6 (again, no conclusions are altered). For this reason, the countries and parties are also listed in the table above.

A.3 Descriptive statistics.

Table A.3.1. Countries and number of units for stage 1 analyses.

Country	**N**
Austria	781
Belgium	1128
Denmark	1200
Finland	673
France	1017
Germany	1234
Greece	874
Ireland	529
Netherlands	1251
Portugal	553
Spain	676
Sweden	665
UK	915
Total	11,496
For countries where CHES 2010 was used for the parties, see below	
Italy	745
Norway	893
Switzerland	611

Table A.3.2. Descriptive Statistics from Stage 2 Analyses.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Policy position salience	50	5.90	1.19	4	8.56
Size of indirect effect (in %)	50	9.57	17.85	-23.19	58

The country fixed effects were introduced by adding dummy variables for all the 13 countries except Austria (reference category). The party family fixed effects were introduced by adding dummy variables for 10 of the following 11 party families: Communist, Left Socialist, Green,

Social Democratic, Ethnic-Regional, Agrarian, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, New Right, and Other. The categorisation follows Knutsen (2018).

A.4 Stage 1 analyses.

For each party in each country, two analyses were performed, as discussed in section 3.1.5. I first estimate the effect of religion on party preference, controlled for age and gender.

$$(1)\ \ln\left(\frac{\mathrm{P}_i}{1-\mathrm{P}_i}\right) = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta_1 R_i} + \beta_2 AGE_i + \beta_3 SEX_i + \varepsilon_i$$

I then estimate the effect of religion on party preference, controlled for age, gender, *and traditional-progressive values.*

$$(2)\ \ln\left(\frac{\mathrm{P}_i}{1-\mathrm{P}_i}\right) = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta_1 R_i} + \beta_2 AGE_i + \beta_3 SEX_i + \beta_4 TPV + \varepsilon_i$$

This is done for every individual party in every country. There are as such 100 logistic regression analyses performed in "stage 1" just for the 50 political parties that are actually included in the stage 2 analyses. In addition, there are 60 logistic regression analyses performed in stage 1 for the 30 political parties that turned out to have non-significant differences in support from the religious groups. It seems excessive to report these 160 analyses here, but all analyses are available upon request. For reasons of illustration, I include the analyses for one party here, namely the Spanish *Izquierda Unida.* Regression (1) is shown in the left column and regression (2) in the right column.

Table A.4.1. Logistic analyses of Izquierda Unida in Spain, with (1) and without (2) controls for traditional-progressive values.

	(1) IU	(2) IU
No denomination	Ref.	Ref.
Passive Catholic	-0.64*	-0.51
	(0.32)	(0.32)
Active Catholic	-1.23*	-0.32
	(0.59)	(0.64)
Age	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.52	-0.75*
	(0.29)	(0.31)
Traditional- Progressive values		0.39*** (0.08)
Constant	-1.55***	-4.74***
	(0.37)	(0.83)
N	676	676
pseudo R^2	0.039	0.124

As we can clearly see, religious differences are much smaller after controlling for traditional-progressive values. This is why the kappa is reduced by as much as 58% for this party, which is then the value the party received on the dependent variable in the stage 2 analyses.

NB! Note that this figure shows *change,* rather than reduction, of kappa values. The values are therefore of opposite sign to those in the article (so the IU, which has a -58% *change* in this figure, is counted as having a 58% *reduction* in the article). Positive numbers indicate suppression effects.

A.4.1 The calculation of kappa values based on binomial logistic regression models.

I run a series of binomial logistic regressions for each party vs the other parties in the party system, and calculate the kappa based on the coefficients of the religious groups. This yields a reasonable estimate of the religious basis of party support for that individual party. On the

contrary, the coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression would not yield the results that are theoretically interesting in this case, because they would not describe the religious basis of a particular party, but rather of that party *compared to the reference party*.

However, a multinomial logistic regression would yield more relevant information if I use it to predict the probabilities of each religious group voting for each party in each country and take the standard deviation of these to obtain an *absolute kappa* value. The problem with this measure is that it will automatically be biased upward for larger parties. It does not take into account the relative size of parties. To see this problem more clearly, imagine two parties in a country with only two religious groups: Protestants and Catholics. The parties have similar relative religious differences.

Party A has 10% support among Catholics and 20% among Protestants. Party B has 20% support among Catholics and 40% among Protestants. The relative difference is the same, but party B is simply more popular. The absolute kappa here would be 0.05 for party A and 0.10 for party B, indicating that religious voting is twice as strong for the larger party. The relative kappa, on the other hand, would be identical in both cases. The latter gives a much more reasonable estimate of religious voting (and is therefore also more commonly applied in studies of class voting and religious voting).

There is one way to achieve a relative kappa from a multinomial logistic regression:
1) Estimate a multinomial logistic regression
2) Predict the probability for each religious group to vote for each party
3) Transform the probabilities into odds
4) Transform the odds into odds ratios with those with no denomination as the reference group
5) Take the natural logarithm of these values to transform the odds ratios into log odds ratios
6) Calculate the standard deviation of these log odds ratios for each party

This is very time consuming. Yet, to make sure that the choice of running a series of binomial logistic regressions rather than one multinomial logistic regression per country does not affect my results, I have replicated the analyses in model 1 for one country, Germany, using this procedure.

Table A.4.2: Comparing relative kappa values based on binomial logistic regression analyses with kappa values based on multinomial logistic regression analyses. Country: Germany.

Party	Kappa in the article (binomial logistic regression analyses)	Kappa based on multinomial logistic regression analysis
Die Linke	1.38	1.35
Die Grünen	0.30	0.28
SPD	0.59	0.58
FDP	0.19	0.19
CDU/CSU	0.74	0.70

As is clear, the results are substantially the same, despite some very marginal changes. In fact, the kappa values based on binomial logistic regression analyses in this case correlate with the kappa values based on multinomial logistic regression values at pearson's r = 0.999.

Another way to validate the kappa values obtained from binomial logistic regression analyses is by demonstrating that they are in line with previous research. The kappa values for the 50 parties range from a low of 0.23 for the Greek social democratic party. Figure 1 shows the average kappa by country (left panel) and by party family (right panel.

Figure A.4.1: Average kappa for the parties in each country (left panel) and each party family (right panel), *before* controls for traditional-progressive values. Sorted low to high.



The average kappa value is highest in Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland. It is lowest in the UK, Ireland, Greece, and France. This is completely in line with recent findings using several other measures, such as Cramer's V and Nagelkerke's R^2 (Knutsen and Langsæther 2018: 136-138). Furthermore, the kappa is lowest for Conservative, Green, and Social Democratic parties, and highest for Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. To give the readers a sense of the substantial meaning of the kappa values, figure 4.2.2 illustrates the predicted probabilities of voting for the Green League (left panel) and the National Coalition party (right panel) in Finland.

Figure 4.2.2: Predicted probabilities of voting for the Green League and the National Coalition.



The Green League is heavily overrepresented among secular voters, and highly unpopular among the Active Protestants, yielding a quite high kappa value of 0.73. The National Coalition party is somewhat underrepresented among secular voters, but the relative differences between the groups are much smaller, as reflected by the kappa value of 0.31.

Figure 4.4.3 demonstrates the percentage reduction in the kappa values when controlling for traditional-progressive values, or in other words, the size of the indirect effect. The left panel

shows the average reduction in kappa for the parties in each country. Notice, first of all, that in most countries there *is*, on average, an indirect effect. The average indirect effect varies from around 10% in countries such as Austria and Sweden to almost 40% in Spain. In four countries, there is on average no substantial change in the kappa value: Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, and in line with Tilley's (2015) findings, the UK. In fact, there is a tiny increase in the kappa value on average in these countries, which indicates a suppression effect, although the change is so small (1-4%) that it is better interpreted as no substantial change.

Figure 3. Average reduction in kappa (in %) after controlling for traditional-progressive values, by country (left panel) and party family (right panel). Negative values imply increases in kappa.



In the right panel, we can see the average relative reduction in kappa for the parties in each party family. We notice that on average, there is an indirect effect for every party family with the exception of the Social Democrats and the Communist. For the New Right, there is a small average *increase* of the kappa. A closer look at the stage 1 analyses demonstrate that this is because the New Right parties, which often take on traditional stances in moral issues, are underrepresented among religious voters (for instance because they adhere to Christian Democratic or Conservative parties, see e.g. Arzheimer & Carter, 2009) *despite* the fact that

these voters on average hold more traditional values than the secular ones. When comparing religious and secular voters at the same levels of traditional-progressiveness, then, the differences between them become larger.

A.4.2. Confounding: Re-estimating the models in Germany with extra controls.

One might worry that the religious voting identified in the article is 'spurious', as I only control for age and gender. Especially, some scholars prefer to control for class or urban-rural residence as well, to avoid that differences between religious groups are due to other factors. In the article, I argue that we should not control for variables that occur after religion in the causal chain if we want to measure religious voting. Occupational class would be an example of this, as this is something most people obtain after their religious outlook[53]. I also show that when Tilley (2015) controls for a massive number of background variables, it does not affect the results, despite the UK being a particularly likely case for spurious religious voting.

Re-estimating all the models with new controls, calculating new kappa values, and running new stage 2 analyses would be extremely time-costly. Therefore, I select instead one of the thirteen countries and re-run the models here with controls for social class, education, income, and urban-rural residence. Since it has already been shown not to matter in the UK, a two (and a half) party system with no Christian Democratic party, I have chosen to use Germany here as an example of a different system. Germany is a religiously mixed country with a multi-party system and a strong Christian Democratic party.

In table A.7.1, I show first the original model run for each party in Germany (1). I then re-estimate the model with controls for class, education, income, and urban-rural residence. As is clear, the coefficients do not change much. Neither do the kappa values (displayed in the bottom of the table), except from a small reduction in the kappa value of the CDU/CSU. Thus, even if one does not agree about the causal sequence, it is clear that the controls do not massively change anything of importance.

[53] One might argue that class is correlated with parental class, and thus obtained already at birth. In that case, we would also have to control for parents' religion and a host of other factors related to the parents. The conclusion would be that the effect of religion on party preference is mostly spurious due to the religion of the respondent's parents (further inquiries would probably reveal that it is all due to the grandparents' religion, and so on). I am not convinced that this is a fruitful way to think about the effect of group belonging.

Table A.7.1: Re-estimating the logit models of party support from Germany. (1) is the original model for the party in question, as used in the analyses in the article, while (2) is the new model including controls for class, education, income, and urban-rural residence.

Germany	(1) Linke	(2) Linke	(1) Green	(2) Green	(1) SPD	(2) SPD	(1) FDP	(2) FDP	(1) CDU/CSU	(2) CDU/CSU
No denom.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Passive Catholics	-1.74***	-1.74***	-1.01**	-0.84*	0.53*	0.57*	-0.05	-0.28	1.33***	1.26***
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Active Catholics	-4.08***	-4.08***	-0.44	-0.08	-1.01*	-0.96*	-0.28	-0.46	2.22***	2.07***
	(1.02)	(1.02)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Passive Protestants	-1.84***	-1.89***	-0.81*	-0.72*	1.21***	1.21***	-0.25	-0.39	0.68**	0.69**
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Active Protestants	-2.42***	-2.30***	-0.43	-0.27	0.07	0.31	-1.53	-1.64	1.62***	1.45***
	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.94)	(0.97)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Female	-0.21	-0.22	0.73**	0.80**	0.27	0.22	-0.13	-0.07	-0.29	-0.24
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Hi serv.		0.16		0.59		-0.67		0.70		0.01
		(0.46)		(0.59)		(0.44)		(0.65)		(0.40)
Lo serv.		-0.35		0.66		-0.80*		0.92		0.29
		(0.42)		(0.53)		(0.35)		(0.58)		(0.33)
Rout. nman.		-0.08		0.08		-0.27		0.72		0.23
		(0.35)		(0.50)		(0.29)		(0.58)		(0.29)
Petite bourg.		-0.93		0.78		-1.12*		1.50		0.45
		(0.78)		(0.65)		(0.53)		(0.80)		(0.43)
Unskilled workers		-0.03		0.20		-0.44		0.50		0.35
		(0.34)		(0.52)		(0.31)		(0.58)		(0.30)
Skilled workers		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)
Low edu.		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)
Medium edu.		0.43		-0.12		1.09**		-0.09		-0.37
		(0.40)		(0.47)		(0.35)		(0.57)		(0.30)
Higher edu.		0.00		0.54		0.48		-0.26		-0.01
		(0.51)		(0.54)		(0.42)		(0.64)		(0.37)
Income		-0.13		-0.12		-0.16		0.36**		0.15
		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.09)
Town (<20 000)		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)		(.)
City (20-100k)		-0.34		0.51		-0.20		-0.52		0.03
		(0.49)		(0.46)		(0.37)		(0.59)		(0.31)
Large city (100 000+)		0.19		0.55*		0.43*		0.09		-0.64**
		(0.23)		(0.27)		(0.22)		(0.27)		(0.21)
Kappa	1.31	1.30	0.35	0.34	0.76	0.71	0.56	0.56	0.77	0.70

Constant	-1.26***	-1.33**	0.28	-0.04	-1.82***	-2.27***	-1.92***	-3.39***	-2.46***	-2.59***
	(0.37)	(0.51)	(0.43)	(0.70)	(0.36)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.83)	(0.35)	(0.54)
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.5. Stage 2 analyses.

A.5.1. Reducing the strictness of the inclusion criteria.

Only parties with significant differences between the religious groups in the stage 1 analyses (p<.05 in a Wald test of all the coefficients of the religious groups being 0 at the same time) were included in the stage 2 analyses. This is because it seems of limited use to try to decompose a difference between religious groups that does not exist. This will most likely introduce noise in the analysis as I expect the coefficients and thus the kappa values to fluctuate rather randomly when introducing controls in this case. However, to avoid any concern that the choice of p<.05 as inclusion criterion is driving the results, I here replicate the main results from the article with different criteria for inclusion.

In the first row, I simply show the results from the main model in the article. Here, all 50 parties with religious differences at p<.05 are included. In the second row, I only require religious differences in party support to be significant at the .10 level to include the party in stage 2 analyses. This means that I can include also the Swedish *Moderaterna*. This does not change the results.

In the third row, I only require differences to be significant at the .15 level. This allows me to include the Irish Green Party, the British Liberal Democrats, and the French UDF. The effect is somewhat reduced, but all conclusions remain the same: Saliency of moral policies has a substantial and statistically significant effect on the size of the indirect effect.

In the fourth row, I can also include the Belgian *Mouvement Réformateur* and the Portuguese *Bloco de Esquerda*. The results are more or less the same as in row 4. In the final row, including all parties where differences between religious groups are significant at the .25 level (i.e. also the Belgian *Ecolo* and the French Greens), the coefficient is further reduced, although the effect does remain substantial and statistically significant at the .05 level.

In sum, the data behave exactly as one would expect. As we include more and more parties without any real differences between the religious groups – essentially introducing noise – the coefficients decrease (the standard errors remain at a similar level because the increase in N offsets the increase in the error of the model). At some point, the effect should become statistically insignificant, as too much noise is introduced into the model.

Table A.5.1: Replicating the main model with more parties.

	Criterion p<.05	Criterion p<.10	Criterion p<.15	Criterion p<.20	Criterion p<.25
Salience of moral policies	5.55* (1.89)	5.51* (1.89)	4.57* (1.98)	4.53* (1.64)	3.99* (1.67)
Constant	-23.12* (9.27)	-23.02* (9.27)	-16.42 (9.79)	-16.56 (7.91)	-13.78 (8.54)
N	50	51	54	56	58

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.5.2. Including the CHES 2010 data (Italy, Norway, Switzerland).

As discussed in the article, Italy was excluded because of low correspondence between parties in the CHES 2006 and parties in the 2010 EVS. Norway and Switzerland were not analysed because they were not included in the CHES 2006.

To get further leverage on the question in the article, I have merged data from CHES 2010 for these countries and included them in the analyses. This only makes sense given an assumption of stability for the salience of moral questions in the period 2006-2010, an assumption which may or may not be true, which is why I have not included these countries in the main analyses. I add them here, however, for further evidence.

Table A.6.1 replicates the analysis from the article, but including twelve more parties from these three countries. As is clear, the substantial conclusions are just the same when I introduce more data.

Table A.6.1: OLS analyses. Dependent variable: Size of the indirect effect (in %). Units: Parties.

	Main Model	Country FE	Party Family FE	Full Model
Salience of moral policies	5.29**	4.78**	6.49**	3.12+
	(1.34)	(1.32)	(1.70)	(1.65)
Country FE		Yes		Yes
Party Family FE			Yes	Yes
Constant	-21.71**	-33.07**	-35.40**	-22.76+
	(6.50)	(8.62)	(9.98)	(11.79)
N	62	62	62	62
R^2	0.153	0.422	0.484	0.722

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

A.5.3. Using estimates as the dependent variable in the stage 2 analyses.

As described above, the percentage change in the kappa values from stage 1 are used as the dependent variable in stage 2. These are of course estimates rather than the true values, and as such, this amounts to a version of estimated dependent variable (EDV) regression. It is not uncommon for the observations on the dependent variable to be estimates for auxiliary analyses (Lewis and Linzer 2005: 345). If the sampling variance of the observations on the dependent variable varies, this induces heteroscedasticity. This is indeed the case in my stage 2 analyses, as the kappa values are based on coefficients from stage 1 analyses with different standard errors.

Heteroskedasticity leaves the OLS estimates unbiased (Long and Ervin 2000: 217). The coefficients in the stage 2 analyses should thus not be biased, yet they would be inefficiently estimated in an ordinary OLS regression. To remedy this, Lewis and Linzer (2005) recommend either applying OLS with robust standard errors, or, when highly reliable information about the sampling variances of the estimated dependent variable is available, applying one of two FGLS approaches.

Lewis and Linzer (2005: 363) conclude that "Indeed, OLS with robust standard errors is probably the best approach, except when information about the sampling errors in the dependent variable is not only available, but highly reliable."

For this reason, I apply cluster robust standard errors in the models in the article. These also take into account the dependence and heteroscedasticity due to the clustering of parties within party systems (Midtbø 2012: 113). However, Lewis and Linzer (2005) also note that Efron's HC3 standard errors, which are more conservative, may be more reliable in small samples. I therefore replicate the analyses here with these standard errors.

Table A.5.3.1: Replicating the analyses with Efron's HC3 standard errors.

	Main Model	Country FE	Party Family FE	Full Model
Salience of moral policies	5.55*	5.77*	7.81**	5.66*
	(2.46)	(2.82)	(2.05)	(2.24)
Country FE		Yes		Yes
Party Family FE			Yes	Yes
Constant	-23.12	-39.54+	-43.09**	-37.46+
	(14.01)	(19.63)	(11.97)	(18.96)
N	50	50	50	50
R^2	0.137	0.416	0.550	0.785

Efron's HC3 standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

We first note that the estimates are of course unchanged. However, as is clear, the standard errors change and become substantially larger for all models except the party model. Still, the results are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level in all cases. No substantial conclusions are changed.

It is possible to use bootstrapping or simulation to create simulated standard errors and confidence intervals around the kappa intervals. This information could then perhaps be fed into FGLS models for a potential gain in efficiency in the stage 2 analyses. However, the dependent variable in stage 2 is not the kappa values themselves, but the percentage change between the kappa values in model 1 and 2 in stage 1. Lewis and Linzer (2005) only recommend the FGLS approaches when the information about the sampling error in the dependent variable is highly reliable, and I am not aware of any way to calculate this sampling error for a change in kappa values, and certainly no highly reliable way. Finally, even if there was a highly reliable way of obtaining this uncertainty, the gain would simply be a potential increase in the efficiency (not the reliability) of the estimates. The cost, at the other

hand, would be to re-run the large number of regression models, calculate this uncertainty, and introduce it into the model.

Appendix to chapter 5

A.1 Descriptive statistics

A.2. Categorisation of parties into party families

A.3. The construction of the indexes

A.4. Robustness analyses

A.5. The country-specific analyses

A.6. The multinomial logistic regression analysis of party preference

A.7. The full tables including all coefficients

A.1. Descriptive statistics.

Table A.1.1. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables and gender.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Economic left-right attitudes	8,085	4.20	1.62	0	10
EU attitudes	6,936	5.58	2.59	0	10
Immigration attitudes	8,085	4.61	2.16	0	10
Offshorability	8,085	2.45	3.13	0	10
Age	8,085	49.80	16.63	15	108
Urban-rural	8,085	3.54	2.27	0	7
Female	8,085	0.52	0.50	0	1

Table A.1.2. Party preference

Party family	#	%
Comm./Left socialist	633	10.48
Green/New Left	518	8.58
Soc. Dem.	1,486	24.60
Liberal	771	12.76
Christ.Dem./Conservative	1,639	27.14
Populist Right	475	7.86
Other	518	8.58
Total	6,040	100.00

Table A.1.3. National identity versus cosmopolitanism (variable used in main analyses, based on questions of sense of belonging).

National identity	#	**%**
Strong national identity	5,397	66.75
Intermediate	1,528	18.90
Cosmopolitan	1,160	14.35
Total	8,085	100.00

Table A.1.4. National identity versus cosmopolitanism – measured by question of pride over citizenship (used in robustness check, not in main analyses).

National identity	#	%
Strong national identity	3,019	40.68
Medium national identity	3,522	47.45
Weak national identity	881	11.87
Total	7,422	100.00

Table A.1.5. Education.

Education	#	**%**
Low education	1,874	23.18
Medium education	3,648	45.12
Higher education	2,563	31.70
Total	8,085	100.00

Table A.1.6. EGP class.

EGP Class	#	**%**
Higher service class	1,419	17.55
Lower service class	2,199	27.20
Routine non-manual	1,907	23.59
Petite bourgeoisie	524	6.48
Skilled worker	915	11.32
Unskilled worker	1,121	13.87
Total	8,085	100.00

Table A.1.7. The relationship between offshorability, cosmopolitanism and the other independent variables.

Class	**Offshorability (mean value)**	**% strong national id**	**% intermediate**	**% cosmopolitans**
Higher service class	2.9	57.6	26.5	15.9
Lower service class	3.1	61.9	21.6	16.5
Routine non-manual employees	2.2	70.5	15.5	14.0
Petite bourgeoisie	3.2	74.1	15.8	10.1
Skilled workers	1.9	72.9	14.9	12.2
Unskilled workers	1.1	73.2	14.5	12.3
Education				
Higher education	2.7	57.6	24.0	18.4

Medium education	2.5	69.9	16.6	13.5
Lower education	2.1	72.3	16.4	10.3
Cosmopolitanism				
Strong national identity	2.4			
Intermediate	2.5			
Cosmopolitan	2.6			
Sex				
Male	2.6	64.7	20.1	15.1
Female	2.3	68.6	17.7	13.6
Age (pearson's r)	0.02			
Urban-rural residence (pearson's r)	0.05			

The table shows that there are only small differences with respect to offshoreability between the educational groups: On average, those with higher education are at 2.7 on the scale from 0-10, while those with lower education are at 2.1, with medium educated people in the middle at 2.5. In other words, those with higher education tend to have slightly more offshorable jobs. Likewise, there are only moderate differences across classes. The most offshorable occupations are found among the petite bourgeoisie (3.2), the lower service class (3.1) and the higher service class (2.9). The least offshorable occupations are found among the skilled (1.9) and unskilled (1.1) workers with routine non-manual employees occupying a middle position at 2.2.

Class is also only moderately associated with cosmopolitanism. While 16.5% of the lower service class are cosmopolitans, the same is true for only 10.1% of the petite bourgeoisie, with the other classes in between. The relationship is somewhat stronger for education: 18.4% of those with higher education are cosmopolitans, while for those with lower education the share of cosmopolitans is only 10.3%.

A.2. Categorisation of parties into party families.

	Communists / Radical Left	Greens/ New Left	Social Democrats	Liberals	Christian Democrats / Conservatives	Populist Right
Austria	*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*	*Die Grünen/Die Grüne Alternative*	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)*	*Liberales Forum (LIF)*	*Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)*	*Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)*
Denmark	*Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF), Enhedsliste n - De Rødgrønne (EL)*		*Socialdemokratiet i Danmark (S)*	*Det Radikale Venstre (RV)*	*Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti (V), Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF), Kristendemokraterne (KD)*	*Dansk Folkeparti*
France	*Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and Trotskyist parties*	*Les Verts, other environmentalist parties*	*Parti Socialiste (PS)*	*Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)/MoDem*	*Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)*	*Front National (FN)*
Germany	*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS)*	*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)*	*Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)*	*Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU)*	-
Netherlands	*Socialistische Partij (SP)*	*GroenLinks (GL)*	*Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)*	*Democraten '66 (D66); Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)*	*Christen-Demokratisch Appel (CDA)*	*Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)*
Norway	*Rødt (R), Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)*	-	*Arbeiderpartiet (Ap)*	*Venstre (V)*	*Høyre (H), Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF)*	*Fremskrittspartiet (FrP)*
Sweden	*Vänstern (V)*	*Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP)*	*Socialdemokratiske arbetarepartiet (SAP)*	*Folkpartiet Liberalerna (FP)*	*Moderaterna (M), Kristdemokraterna (KD)*	-
Switzerland	*Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (PdA)*	*Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GPS),*	*Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SPS)*	*Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP);*	*Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schewiz (CVP)*	*Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)*

		Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz (GlP)		*Liberale Partei der Schweiz (LPS)*		
UK		*Green Party (GRN)*	*Labour party*	*Liberal Democratic party*	*Conservative party*	

Some parties could not be classified according to any of the six party families, and were classified as "others". These are listed below.

Austria: Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), Liste Dr. Hans-Peter Martin.
Denmark: -
France: Nouveau Centre; Chasse, pêche, nature et traditions; Mouvement pour la France.
Germany: Die Republikaner (REP), Nationaldemocratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), Deutsche Volksunion (DVU)
Netherlands: ChristenUnie (CU), Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP), Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD), Trots op Nederland (TON)
Norway: Senterpartiet (Sp).
Sweden: -
Switzerland: Schweizer Demokraten (SD/DS), Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union (EDU), Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz (EVP), Liga der Tessiner.
UK: Plaid Cymry (PC), Scottish National Party (SNP).

A.3. The construction of the indexes.

A.3.1. Economic left-right attitudes.

The economic left-right value index is based on the work of Oddbjørn Knutsen (2018). The index is based on the following variables in the dataset and the question number in the questionnaire:

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful

The variables were tapped by a question battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located to the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question

was formulated as follows: "On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?"

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility
"Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves" versus "The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for".

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control
"The state should give more freedom to firms" versus "The state should control firms more effectively".

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives
"Incomes should be made more equal" versus "There should be greater incentives for individual effort".

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership
"Private ownership of business and industry should be increased" versus "government ownership of business and industry should be increased".

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful
"Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas" versus "Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people"

Table A.3.1: Cronbach's α for the economic left-right values index in the pooled data and the individual countries.

	Cronbach's α
Pooled	0.6235
Austria	0.5589
France	0.5649
Germany	0.5809
Netherlands	0.6043
Switzerland	0.6333
UK	0.6332
Denmark	0.6999
Norway	0.7207
Sweden	0.7775

A.3.2. EU attitudes.

We constructed the EU orientations index based on Q73: "Some people may have fears about the building of the European Union. I am going to read a number of things which people say they are afraid of. For each tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of." The respondent may then indicate on a scale from 1-10 how much they fear the following five aspects of EU membership, where 1 indicates the respondent being very much afraid and 10 is not afraid at all:

V257: "The loss of social security"
V258: "The loss of national identity and culture"
V259: "Our country paying more and more to the European Union"
V260: "A loss of power in the world for [COUNTRY]"
V261: "The loss of jobs in [COUNTRY]"

To create the index, we first turned the scales and substracted one, so that the value 0 on a question indicates that they are not at all afraid, while the value 9 indicates that they are very much afraid. We then added the responses together for each of the five questions and divided them by five. Finally, we divided the index by 9 and multiplied it with 10 to make it go from 0-10 like the other indexes.

The Cronbach's alpha for the EU index in the pooled data and in each individual country are shown below and indicate very good reliability. As mentioned in the article, the question is not asked in Norway as Norway is not a member of the EU.

Table A.3.2: Cronbach's α for the EU index in the pooled data and the individual countries.

	Cronbach's α
Pooled	0.8681
Austria	0.8636
France	0.8527
Germany	0.8258
Netherlands	0.8308
Switzerland	0.8797
UK	0.8719
Denmark	0.8619
Norway	-
Sweden	0.8929

A.3.3. Immigration attitudes.

The immigration index is based on the work of Oddbjørn Knutsen (2018). These orientations are tapped by six questions which are asked in a battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located at the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The questions were formulated as follows:

Q78: "Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? (from 1 to 10) "

A (V268): Take jobs
"Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country" versus "immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country"

B (V269): Cultural life undermined
"A country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants" versus "a country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants"

C (V270): Crime problems
"Immigrants make crime problems worse" versus "immigrants do not make crime problems worse"

D (V271): Welfare
"Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system" versus "immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system"

E (V272): Threat to society
"In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society" versus "in the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society"

F (V273): Customs and traditions
"For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions" versus "for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions, but adopt the customs of the country"

An equal-weighted additive index was constructed on the basis of these six items. The index has values from 0 to 10, and a high score indicates a non-restrictive view on immigration and a positive view on immigrants.

The Cronbach's α for the immigration index in the pooled data and in the individual countries are listed in table A.3.3.

Table A.3.3: Cronbach's α for the immigration index in the pooled data and the individual countries.

	Cronbach's α
Pooled	0.8281
Austria	0.8371
France	0.8388
Germany	0.7889
Netherlands	0.8203
Switzerland	0.8286
UK	0.8512
Denmark	0.8130
Norway	0.7901
Sweden	0.8895

A.4. Robustness analyses.

A.4.1. Using another measure of national identity vs cosmopolitanism.

One could argue that the variable using sense of belonging is not an ideal measure of national identity. In part, it sets the bar very high for being cosmopolitan. The EVS contains another variable that could also be used to tap sense of national identity, namely a question of "how proud are you to be a [country] citizen?". Those who responded "very proud" are coded as having a strong national identity. Those who responded "quite proud" are considered to have a medium national identity. Those who responded "not very proud" or "not at all proud" are coded as having a weak national identity. Descriptive statistics for this variable is available above.

In table A.4.1, we list the results of the globalisation model from the main analyses in the article's model 2 where we used the old variable related to geographic sense of belonging (A) and compare it to the same analyses using the new "pride" variable (B). Briefly stated, the effects are always in the same direction and of relatively similar strength, although the new

variable is marginally better at predicting economic left-right attitudes, while the old variable is a bit better at predicting EU and immigration attitudes. None of this changes any of the substantial conclusions in the article.

Table A.4.1: Robustness analysis using different measure of national identity.

	(1a) ECLR	(1b) ECLR	(2a) EU	(2b) EU	(3a) Immigration	(3b) Immigration
A: Intermediate	0.01		-0.95***		0.79***	
	(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.06)	
A: Cosmopolitan	0.22***		-1.57***		1.45***	
	(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.07)	
B: Medium nat. id.		0.24***		-0.49***		0.55***
		(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.05)
B: Weak nat. id.		0.56***		-0.97***		1.13***
		(0.07)		(0.11)		(0.09)
Offshorability	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.05***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.40***	0.41***	0.32***	0.43***	0.24***	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	0.03**	0.02*	-0.07***	-0.09***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	4.33***	4.18***	6.32***	6.29***	3.57***	3.42***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Observations	8084	7421	6935	6407	8084	7421
R^2	0.054	0.064	0.127	0.090	0.151	0.125
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.063	0.126	0.088	0.150	0.123

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.4.2. Using a dummy version of the offshorability variable.

In this section, we replicate all the pooled analyses from the article for the four dependent variables. While model 1 is identical to the ones in the article, model 2-4 now include a dichotomous measure of offshorability instead of the continuous one: Either the respondent works in an offshorable occupation, or he/she does not. To sum up, the results are identical to those in the article for EU attitudes and immigration attitudes. For economic left-right attitudes and party choice, there is some evidence in favour of a statistically significant, but substantially irrelevant, interaction effect between class and dichotomous offshorability.

Table A.4.2.1 shows the results for economic left-right attitudes. Model 2 shows, like in the article, a weak association between offshorability and economic left-right attitudes, which is further weakened in the combined model 3. Model 4 adds the interaction effect. As is clear, only one of the interaction terms is statistically significant, indicating that people in the lower service class are slightly more right-wing when they work in offshorable occupations. The effect is weak and the R^2 only increases by 0.002 compared to model 4 (despite introducing a number of new coefficients), indicating that the interaction terms do not add anything of substantial importance to the model.

Table A.4.2.1: Explaining Economic Left-Right Attitudes. OLS. Dummy offshorable variable.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.78***		-0.73***	-0.65***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Lo. serv.	-0.44***		-0.38***	-0.23**
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Rout.nman	-0.19**		-0.16*	-0.11
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Petite b.	-0.99***		-0.92***	-0.88***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.13)
Skilled w.	-0.06		-0.04	-0.10
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Medium edu	-0.18***		-0.17**	-0.17**
	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Higher edu	-0.13*		-0.15**	-0.16**
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Intermediate		0.00	0.06	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Cosmopolitan		0.22***	0.25***	0.26***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Offshoreable (dummy)		-0.29***	-0.18***	0.03
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Hi. serv. # offshoreable				-0.26
				(0.15)
Lo. serv. # offshoreable				-0.38**
				(0.14)
Rout.nman # offshoreable				-0.20

				(0.14)
Petite b. # offshoreable				-0.19
				(0.20)
Skilled w. # offshoreable				0.12
				(0.17)
Female	0.34***	0.39***	0.34***	0.32***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	0.04***	0.03**	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	4.76***	4.35***	4.71***	4.68***
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	8084	8084	8084	8084
R^2	0.084	0.056	0.090	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.055	0.087	0.089

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Moving on to EU attitudes (table A.4.2.2), the results are identical to those in the article. None of the interaction terms are statistically significant, and they also fail a joint test (F=.44, p=.82). The explained variance does not increase at all.

Table A.4.2.2: Explaining EU Attitudes. OLS. Dummy offshorable variable.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.85***		-0.74***	-0.75***
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Lo. serv.	-0.65***		-0.51***	-0.55***
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Rout.nman	-0.34**		-0.28**	-0.36**
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Petite b.	-0.64***		-0.57***	-0.67***
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.20)
Skilled w.	0.10		0.07	0.01
	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Medium edu	-0.35***		-0.37***	-0.38***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Higher edu	-1.41***		-1.33***	-1.33***
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)

Intermediate		-0.95***	-0.75***	-0.75***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Cosmopolitan		-1.58***	-1.38***	-1.38***
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Offshoreable		-0.31***	-0.16*	-0.36
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.19)
Hi. serv. # offshoreable				0.14
				(0.23)
Lo. serv. # offshoreable				0.19
				(0.22)
Rout.nman # offshoreable				0.31
				(0.23)
Petite b. # offshoreable				0.28
				(0.31)
Skilled w. # offshoreable				0.26
				(0.28)
Female	0.39***	0.32***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	6.56***	6.33***	6.97***	7.02***
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Observations	6935	6935	6935	6935
R^2	0.151	0.127	0.191	0.191
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.126	0.188	0.188

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The same is true for immigration attitudes (table A.4.2.3). None of the interaction terms are statistically significant, and they also fail a joint test (F=1.27, p=.27). The R^2 essentially does not increase (it changes by 0.001).

Table A.4.2.3. Explaining Immigration Attitudes. OLS. Dummy offshorable variable.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.44***		0.37***	0.36**
	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Lo. serv.	0.45***		0.37***	0.49***

	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Rout.nman	0.24**		0.21*	0.22*
	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.10)
Petite b.	0.01		-0.00	-0.02
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.15)
Skilled w.	-0.21*		-0.18	-0.20
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Medium edu	0.28***		0.30***	0.30***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Higher edu	1.09***		1.01***	1.00***
	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Intermediate		0.79***	0.66***	0.66***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Cosmopolitan		1.45***	1.32***	1.32***
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Offshoreable		0.15**	0.06	0.16
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.16)
Hi. serv. # Offshoreable				-0.02
				(0.19)
Lo. serv. # Offshoreable				-0.28
				(0.18)
Rout.nman # Offshoreable				-0.07
				(0.19)
Petite b. # Offshoreable				-0.04
				(0.24)
Skilled w. # Offshoreable				0.03
				(0.22)
Female	0.13**	0.24***	0.18***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	0.07***	0.08***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.52***	3.57***	3.15***	3.14***
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Observations	8084	8084	8084	8084
R^2	0.152	0.151	0.201	0.202
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.149	0.199	0.199

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Finally, we replicate the results for party choice in table A.4.2.4. The results in model 2 and 3 mirror those in the article: Offshorability does seem to have a statistically significant, independent effect on party choice. Unlike table 4 in the article, there is also a statistically significant interaction effect (p=.045). However, this seems to be of no substantial importance. The unadjusted McFadden's R^2 increases by only 0.002 compared to the model with no interaction terms, and both the AIC and the BIC indicate that this model has substantially *worse* fit with the data than the model without interaction terms.

Table A.4.2.4. Overall significance of variables and goodness-of-fit for the multinomial logit models of party preference.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class	175.28***		151.52***	95.80***
Education	116.98***		104.14***	103.60***
National ID /Cosmopolitanism		143.06***	117.70***	119.58***
Offshorability (dummy)		60.70***	32.84***	4.48 (p=.61)
Class x Offshorability				44.24* (p=.045)
McFadden's R^2	0.126	0.115	0.134	0.136
AIC	19452.507	19641.496	19315.117	19323.931
BIC	20216.990	20245.036	20200.308	20410.302

Note: The Wald tests show the chi square value for the Wald test, with *p* values in parentheses

A.4.3. Replications with the European Social Survey: Including a sector-based measure of globalisation exposure (tradeable vs sheltered sector).

In the article, and in line with other contributions to the field, we use the *offshorability potential* of an individual's job as a measure of globalisation exposure. This was done both because the extant literature suggests that occupational labour market risks are more important than sector-specific risks, but also because this was the only measure available to us in the *European Values Study.* To make sure that our operationalization of globalisation exposure does not affect our results, we replicate the analyses here using the first two waves of the *European Social Survey*. These waves contain a NACE scheme, and using replication

material from Walter (2017), we were able to construct a variable that measures whether the individual works in a tradeable sector or a sheltered sector. This is another common indicator used in research on globalisation exposure. We used the replication material from Walter (2017) to construct the offshorability index in the ESS as well, although in this replication we use a dummy of whether the person's job is offshorable or not, as in the robustness analyses in section A.4.2.

We replicate the analyses as closely as we can with the same nine countries as in the article. However, there are some differences due to the lack of suitable variables in the European Social Survey (which is why we used the European Values Study in the first place).

First, there is only one single item connected to economic left-right attitudes, namely a question about whether or not the state should reduce income differences. Respondents place themselves on a likert scale from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). We turn the scale so that a high value indicates a leftist orientation, as in the article.
Second, there is only one item regarding the EU, namely a question of whether European integration has already gone too far or should go further. It should be noted that this measure is quite dissimilar from the multiple indicator measure of different EU fears that we apply in the article. Respondents place themselves on a scale from 0 (already gone too far) to 10 (unification should go further).

There are a number of different items concerning immigration. We have chosen the indicators that most closely match the ones we use in the EVS, namely questions about whether immigrants take jobs away or create new jobs; whether they enrich or undermine the country's cultural life; whether crime problems will get better or worse due to immigration; and finally whether it is necessary to stop immigration to reduce tensions in society. We construct an additive equal-weighted index based on these items (Cronbach's alpha 0.7), going from 0 (most skeptical of immigration) to 10 (most positive to immigration).

When it comes to party choice, we are mostly able to code the parties in the same way as in the article, although there are a few parties that do not exist in both data sets. These were relatively straight-forward to code (e.g. the Danish *Progress Party* being a Populist Right party). We are unfortunately unable to include a measure of cosmopolitanism versus national

identity, as no such variable exists in the ESS. There is also no measure of the urban-rural residence of the respondent, so we leave out this control variable. We are, however, able to include age and sex.

We run a similar set of models as in the article. First, we show the relationship between class and education and each of the dependent variables, controlling for age and sex, and including country fixed effects. In the second, we include the two globalisation variables: Offshorability and sector (tradeable versus non-tradeable). In the third, we combine class, education, and the globalisation variables. In the fourth model, we add an interaction term between class and offshorability to the fourth model, replicating the results from the article. Finally, in the fifth model, we add an interaction term between class and *sector* (tradeable vs sheltered) to the fourth model.

Table A.4.3.1 shows the results for redistributive preferences, i.e. our replication of our results for economic left-right attitudes. Models 1-2 mirror our findings in the article: Class and education are associated with redistributive preferences, and offshorability has a weak effect. Sector does not affect redistributive preferences at all in this model, although in the combined model 3, it has a very weak effect (a difference of 0.06 on a scale from 1-5). The fourth model reaffirms our findings from the article: All of the individual interaction terms as well as all of them together (a formal test yields F = 1.6, p = .15) are insignificant, and the increase in adjusted R2 is marginal (0.01). Finally, in the fifth model, only one of the individual interaction terms between sector and class is significant (thus the joint test is also significant: F=2.6, p=.02). There is thus some suggestive evidence of an interaction between sector and class, although we note that the explained variance increases from 16.8% to 16.9% - in other words, this interaction does not seem to be substantially important.

Table A.4.3.1: Explaining Redistributive Preferences

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction: Offshorability	5 Interaction: Tradeable sector
Hi. serv.	-0.37***		-0.35***	-0.37***	-0.39***
	(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Lo. serv.	-0.18***		-0.17***	-0.11**	-0.17***
	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Rout.nman	-0.10***		-0.08*	-0.10**	-0.11**

	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Petite bourg.	-0.11**		-0.11**	-0.11*	-0.15***
	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Skilled workers	0.02		0.03	0.01	-0.05
	(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Medium edu	-0.15***		-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High edu	-0.28***		-0.28***	-0.29***	-0.28***
	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
offshoreable		-0.10***	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)
tradeable sector (Dummy)=1		-0.00	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.13**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Hi. serv. # offshoreable				0.06	
				(0.10)	
Lo. serv. # offshoreable				-0.11	
				(0.08)	
Rout.nman # offshoreable				0.03	
				(0.08)	
Petite bourg. # offshoreable				-0.01	
				(0.09)	
Skilled workers # offshoreable				0.05	
				(0.09)	
Hi. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.13
					(0.09)
Lo. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					-0.04
					(0.07)
Rout.nman # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.13
					(0.07)
Petite bourg. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.13
					(0.08)
Skilled workers #					0.20**

tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					(0.08)
Female	0.17***	0.18***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	3.84***	3.63***	3.84***	3.85***	3.87***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	27692	26764	26764	26764	26764
R^2	0.169	0.140	0.168	0.169	0.169
Adjusted R^2	0.168	0.140	0.167	0.168	0.168

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In table A.4.3.2, we replicate the analyses of EU attitudes, in this case attitudes towards EU integration. While the patterns are slightly less clear than in our article (probably because the dependent variable is only partly correlated to our multi-indicator measure), we find that class and education are associated with EU integration views, and education more so than class. The second model shows that people in offshorable occupations are slightly more positive to EU integration than people in non-offshorable occupations, while the pattern is the opposite for sector: People working in the tradeable sector are somewhat *less* positive to EU integration than those in sheltered sectors. In any case, model 3 demonstrates that this is likely just a spurious relationship caused by class and education, as both coefficients drop markedly and their standard errors become large.

The crucial models are again model 4 and 5. In model 4, we see that none of the individual interaction terms are significant, and a formal test of all of them yields F = .94, p = .46. The same is true of model 5: None of the interaction terms are statistically significant, and a joint test yields F = 1.07, p = .38. In other words, including sectoral exposure to globalisation does not alter our conclusions.

Table A.4.3.2: Explaining EU Integration Views

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction: Offshorability	5 Interaction: Tradeable sector
Hi. serv.	0.42**		0.40**	0.36*	0.38*
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Lo. serv.	0.32*		0.29*	0.27	0.28

	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Rout.nman	0.25*		0.23	0.23	0.18
	(0.11)		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Petite bourg.	0.14		0.17	0.02	0.27
	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Skilled workers	-0.13		-0.09	-0.23	-0.27
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Medium edu	0.16		0.15	0.15	0.14
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
High edu	0.82***		0.83***	0.82***	0.82***
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
offshoreable		0.17*	0.03	-0.30	0.01
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.08)
tradeable sector (Dummy)=1		-0.24**	-0.10	-0.09	-0.16
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)
Hi. serv. # offshoreable				0.33	
				(0.31)	
Lo. serv. # offshoreable				0.30	
				(0.28)	
Rout.nman # offshoreable				0.26	
				(0.27)	
Petite bourg. # offshoreable				0.63	
				(0.33)	
Skilled workers # offshoreable				0.60	
				(0.36)	
Hi. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.08
					(0.29)
Lo. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.06
					(0.27)
Rout.nman # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.22
					(0.24)
Petite bourg. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					-0.29

					(0.28)
Skilled workers # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.41
					(0.31)
Female	-0.33***	-0.34***	-0.33***	-0.34***	-0.34***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01***	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	4.69***	5.15***	4.71***	4.78***	4.74***
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Observations	13169	12811	12811	12811	12811
R^2	0.065	0.041	0.065	0.066	0.066
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.040	0.064	0.064	0.064

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In table A.4.3.3, we replicate the analyses of immigration attitudes. The first model mirrors the findings in the article: Class and education are related to immigration attitudes, although education is much more important. The second model shows that people in offshorable occupations are slightly more positive to immigration, while people in the tradeable sector are more negative. The latter coefficients is halved in the third model when class and education are included, while the effect of offshorability disappears completely.

Model 4 yields the same conclusions as in the article: Not a single interaction term is statistically significant and a joint test yields F = 1.4, p = .24. The same is true for the sectoral model 5: Not one of the interaction terms between sector and class are significant, and a joint test yields F = 1.5, p = .19.

Table A.4.3.3: Explaining immigration orientations

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction: Offshorability	5 Interaction: Tradeable sector
Hi. serv.	0.14		0.13	0.12	0.22
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Lo. serv.	0.33***		0.31**	0.33**	0.34**
	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Rout.nman	0.16*		0.11	0.05	0.09
	(0.08)		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)

Petite bourg.	-0.05 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.12)
Skilled workers	-0.15 (0.11)		-0.14 (0.11)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.14)
Medium edu	0.41*** (0.06)		0.41*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)
High edu	1.11*** (0.07)		1.09*** (0.07)	1.08*** (0.08)	1.08*** (0.07)
offshoreable		0.18*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.20)	0.01 (0.06)
tradeable sector (Dummy)=1		-0.40*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.20 (0.14)
Hi. serv. # offshoreable				0.04 (0.23)	
Lo. serv. # offshoreable				-0.02 (0.22)	
Rout.nman # offshoreable				0.14 (0.22)	
Petite bourg. # offshoreable				0.12 (0.24)	
Skilled workers # offshoreable				-0.39 (0.27)	
Hi. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					-0.29 (0.20)
Lo. serv. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					-0.16 (0.19)
Rout.nman # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.17 (0.19)
Petite bourg. # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.01 (0.19)
Skilled workers # tradeable sector (Dummy)=1					0.11

					(0.23)
Female	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	4.53***	5.33***	4.61***	4.61***	4.61***
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	13088	12569	12569	12569	12569
R^2	0.184	0.106	0.186	0.188	0.187
Adjusted R^2	0.183	0.106	0.185	0.186	0.186

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In summary, then, there is little evidence that globalisation has taken over as the new cleavage. In data from the ESS, just like in our data from the EVS, offshorability has no important independent effect on any of the political attitudes and there is no significant interaction between class and offshorability. Whether one works in a tradeable or sheltered sector has a very weak independent effect on redistributive preferences, no effect on EU integration views, and a weak/moderate effect on immigration attitudes. There is no interaction with class for EU integration attitudes or immigration attitudes, however there is some evidence of a limited and substantially unimportant interaction effect on redistributive preferences.

Finally, we replicate table 4 from the article, predicting party choice (see table A.4.3.4 below). Model 1-3 mirror the results from the article. Class, education, offshorability – and now also tradeability – have statistically significant effects on party choice.

Model 4, contrary to the results in our article, now suggests that there is in fact an interaction effect between class and offshorability. However, *statistical* significance is one question, substantial importance another. Including the interaction term essentially does not increase the pseudo R^2 compared to model 4 with no interaction. The AIC is reduced by 1.66, a change which according to Raftory (1995) indicates weak evidence that this model is to be preferred. However, the BIC (which takes into account that the interaction term introduces a range of new coefficients) increases by more than 200, which is considered very strong evidence that model 3 fits better.

Similarly, model 5 indicates that there is a statistically significant interaction between class and sector when explaining party choice. Yet again the pseudo R^2 only increases by 0.001, and the changes in AIC and BIC are similar to above. In sum, there is evidence that class is interacting with globalisation exposure when predicting party choice, but the substantial importance of this interaction term seems to be very limited. It is certainly too limited to make any broad claims about cross-cutting cleavages or cross-class alliances due to globalisation exposure.

Table A.4.3.4. Overall significance of variables and goodness-of-fit for the multinomial logit models of party preference.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction class-offshorability	5 Interaction class-sector
Class	286.66***		268.25***	173.93***	167.25***
Education	292.74***		292.05***	291.05***	293.79***
Sector (trade)		58.37***	49.06***	53.97***	18.68**
Offshorability		55.76***	22.04**	18.28**	20.00**
Class x Offshorability				60.67**	
Class x sector					59.42**
McFadden's R^2	0.110	0.094	0.112	0.113	0.113
AIC	45206.610	45939.190	45151.235	45149.570	45151.144
BIC	45982.541	46464.084	46018.452	46245.003	46246.576

Note: The Wald tests show the chi square value for the Wald test, with *p* values in parentheses.

A.5. The country-specific analyses

A.5.1. Country specific analyses of economic left-right attitudes

Table A.5.1.1: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Austria

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.59**		-0.56**	-0.49*
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.22)
Lo. serv.	-0.50*		-0.45*	-0.54*
	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.23)
Rout.nman	-0.05		-0.02	-0.04
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.19)
Petite b.	-0.37		-0.29	0.15
	(0.24)		(0.25)	(0.31)
Skilled w.	-0.17		-0.12	-0.13
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.24)
Medium edu	-0.14		-0.13	-0.09
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Higher edu	-0.22		-0.27	-0.25
	(0.23)		(0.23)	(0.23)
Intermediate		-0.10	0.01	0.01
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Cosmopolitan		0.32	0.37*	0.38*
		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Offshorability		-0.03	-0.02	0.08
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.14)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.15
				(0.15)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.07
				(0.15)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.09
				(0.14)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.22
				(0.16)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.09
				(0.15)
Female	0.18	0.28**	0.19	0.19
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)

Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	4.97***	4.55***	4.82***	4.81***
	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Observations	960	960	960	960
R^2	0.037	0.021	0.044	0.050
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.015	0.031	0.032

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.2: Explaining Economic Attitudes in France

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.59**		-0.50*	-0.39
	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.30)
Lo. serv.	-0.24		-0.19	0.18
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.21)
Rout.nman	-0.15		-0.10	0.13
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.20)
Petite b.	-0.93***		-0.84***	-0.74*
	(0.23)		(0.24)	(0.34)
Skilled w.	-0.12		-0.09	-0.17
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.21)
Medium edu	-0.19		-0.20	-0.20
	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.14)
Higher edu	-0.41*		-0.46**	-0.47**
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Intermediate		-0.12	-0.00	0.02
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Cosmopolitan		0.26	0.35*	0.37**
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Offshorability		-0.05***	-0.03*	0.06
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.08
				(0.06)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.15**
				(0.05)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.11*
				(0.05)

Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.08
				(0.08)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.00
				(0.06)
Female	0.17	0.21*	0.17	0.13
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
residence	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.02***	4.58***	5.01***	4.86***
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Observations	1123	1123	1123	1123
R^2	0.042	0.021	0.053	0.065
Adjusted R^2	0.033	0.016	0.042	0.049

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.3: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Germany

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.66*		-0.71*	-0.50
	(0.29)		(0.29)	(0.34)
Lo. serv.	-0.78***		-0.79***	-0.65**
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.24)
Rout.nman	-0.59**		-0.56**	-0.44
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.24)
Petite b.	-0.76*		-0.73*	-1.03*
	(0.35)		(0.34)	(0.47)
Skilled w.	-0.12		-0.09	-0.17
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.24)
Medium edu	-0.21		-0.17	-0.12
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.21)
Higher edu	-0.42		-0.40	-0.35
	(0.25)		(0.25)	(0.25)
Intermediate		0.19	0.25	0.23
		(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Cosmopolitan		0.30	0.37*	0.37*
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Offshorability		-0.02	-0.01	0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.11

				(0.08)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.08 (0.07)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.08 (0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.05 (0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.01 (0.07)
Female	0.30*	0.21	0.29*	0.25
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	5.08***	4.42***	4.92***	4.89***
	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Observations	825	825	825	825
R^2	0.066	0.019	0.076	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.011	0.061	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.4: Explaining Economic Attitudes in the Netherlands

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.46**		-0.46**	-0.49*
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.20)
Lo. serv.	-0.16		-0.16	-0.01
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.20)
Rout.nman	-0.08		-0.07	-0.03
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.19)
Petite b.	-0.98***		-0.99***	-0.98***
	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.28)
Skilled w.	0.27		0.26	0.30
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.21)
Medium edu	-0.03		-0.03	-0.03
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.11)
Higher edu	-0.29*		-0.28*	-0.29*
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.13)
Intermediate		-0.09	-0.02	-0.01
		(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)

Cosmopolitan		-0.21 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.13)
Offshorability		-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.01 (0.04)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.07 (0.04)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.03 (0.05)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.02 (0.06)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.03 (0.06)
Female	0.56*** (0.09)	0.62*** (0.09)	0.55*** (0.09)	0.54*** (0.09)
Age	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	3.97*** (0.22)	3.77*** (0.18)	3.99*** (0.22)	3.93*** (0.23)
Observations	1149	1149	1149	1149
R^2	0.112	0.061	0.114	0.118
Adjusted R^2	0.104	0.056	0.104	0.104

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.5: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Switzerland

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.77*** (0.21)		-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.89*** (0.24)
Lo. serv.	-0.41* (0.18)		-0.44* (0.18)	-0.49* (0.21)
Rout.nman	-0.30 (0.17)		-0.31 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.19)
Petite b.	-0.89** (0.29)		-0.86** (0.29)	-0.35 (0.32)
Skilled w.	0.08 (0.20)		0.07 (0.20)	-0.04 (0.23)

Medium edu	-0.57***		-0.56***	-0.51***
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Higher edu	-0.65***		-0.66***	-0.59**
	(0.19)		(0.19)	(0.19)
Intermediate		0.12	0.20	0.22*
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Cosmopolitan		0.22	0.27	0.30*
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Offshorability		-0.02	-0.01	0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.02
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.00
				(0.06)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.05
				(0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.20*
				(0.10)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.04
				(0.07)
Female	0.27**	0.33***	0.27**	0.27**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Age	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.14***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	4.97***	4.06***	4.86***	4.80***
	(0.25)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Observations	980	980	980	980
R^2	0.121	0.059	0.127	0.136
Adjusted R^2	0.112	0.053	0.115	0.120

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.6: Explaining Economic Attitudes in the UK

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.44		-0.40	-0.73*
	(0.29)		(0.29)	(0.32)
Lo. serv.	-0.27		-0.23	-0.30
	(0.27)		(0.28)	(0.34)

Rout.nman	-0.13		-0.17	-0.24
	(0.25)		(0.26)	(0.28)
Petite b.	-0.70*		-0.72*	-0.68
	(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.46)
Skilled w.	-0.17		-0.25	-0.19
	(0.31)		(0.31)	(0.35)
Medium edu	0.06		0.10	0.12
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Higher edu	0.25		0.15	0.14
	(0.20)		(0.19)	(0.19)
Intermediate		0.35	0.35	0.38
		(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Cosmopolitan		0.66**	0.65**	0.66**
		(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Offshorability		-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.10
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.14
				(0.10)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.10)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.04
				(0.09)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.04
				(0.10)
Female	0.11	0.20	0.15	0.15
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.07	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	3.75***	3.45***	3.63***	3.63***
	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Observations	578	578	578	578
R^2	0.025	0.041	0.054	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.031	0.032	0.034

Table A.5.1.7: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Denmark

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model

Hi. serv.	-0.77***		-0.58**	-0.63**
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.22)
Lo. serv.	0.04		0.23	0.35
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.21)
Rout.nman	0.06		0.19	0.12
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.20)
Petite b.	-1.03***		-0.88***	-0.99**
	(0.24)		(0.25)	(0.38)
Skilled w.	-0.18		-0.14	-0.17
	(0.21)		(0.20)	(0.23)
Medium edu	-0.22		-0.21	-0.24
	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.14)
Higher edu	0.08		0.05	0.02
	(0.15)		(0.14)	(0.14)
Intermediate		-0.11	-0.07	-0.05
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Cosmopolitan		0.13	0.19	0.19
		(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Offshorability		-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.11*
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.06)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.02
				(0.06)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.06)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.09)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.08)
Female	0.36***	0.54***	0.31**	0.29**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age	0.01*	0.01*	0.01**	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.05*	0.06**	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	3.37***	3.22***	3.42***	3.48***
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Observations	993	993	993	993
R^2	0.098	0.074	0.124	0.127
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.068	0.112	0.111

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.8: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Norway

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-1.17***		-1.19***	-0.98***
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.27)
Lo. serv.	-0.79***		-0.80***	-0.82**
	(0.23)		(0.24)	(0.28)
Rout.nman	-0.22		-0.23	-0.19
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.24)
Petite b.	-1.58***		-1.58***	-1.45***
	(0.29)		(0.30)	(0.39)
Skilled w.	-0.44		-0.46	-0.44
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.32)
Medium edu	-0.04		-0.03	-0.05
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Higher edu	0.17		0.16	0.14
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Intermediate		0.04	0.03	0.04
		(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Cosmopolitan		0.36	0.30	0.30
		(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Offshorability		-0.02	0.01	0.09
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.09)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.13
				(0.10)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.06
				(0.10)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.08
				(0.10)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.12
				(0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.07
				(0.11)
Female	0.47***	0.66***	0.48***	0.49***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Urban-rural residence	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Constant	4.20*** (0.26)	3.84*** (0.23)	4.17*** (0.26)	4.10*** (0.27)
Observations	723	723	723	723
R^2	0.122	0.050	0.126	0.130
Adjusted R^2	0.110	0.042	0.110	0.107

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.1.9: Explaining Economic Attitudes in Sweden

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-1.24*** (0.28)		-1.17*** (0.28)	-1.43*** (0.33)
Lo. serv.	-0.90*** (0.25)		-0.84*** (0.25)	-0.92** (0.29)
Rout.nman	-0.33 (0.24)		-0.30 (0.24)	-0.49 (0.26)
Petite b.	-1.88*** (0.32)		-1.86*** (0.32)	-2.16*** (0.36)
Skilled w.	-0.11 (0.30)		-0.11 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.32)
Medium edu	-0.37 (0.20)		-0.36 (0.20)	-0.39 (0.20)
Higher edu	-0.18 (0.22)		-0.19 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.22)
Intermediate		-0.09 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.15)
Cosmopolitan		0.29 (0.24)	0.11 (0.24)	0.11 (0.24)
Offshorability		-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.13* (0.06)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.14 (0.08)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.08 (0.07)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.12 (0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.17

				(0.11)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.17
				(0.11)
Female	0.45***	0.49***	0.44**	0.45**
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural	0.04	-0.00	0.04	0.04
residence	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	4.24***	3.63***	4.25***	4.43***
	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.40)
Observations	753	753	753	753
R^2	0.104	0.032	0.106	0.112
Adjusted R^2	0.092	0.024	0.090	0.090

A.5.2. Country specific analyses of EU attitudes

Table A.5.2.1: Explaining EU Attitudes in Austria

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.64		-0.39	-0.31
	(0.39)		(0.37)	(0.40)
Lo. serv.	-0.53		-0.22	-0.17
	(0.32)		(0.32)	(0.35)
Rout.nman	-0.84**		-0.59	-0.63
	(0.31)		(0.30)	(0.32)
Petite b.	-0.44		-0.23	-0.64
	(0.41)		(0.39)	(0.49)
Skilled w.	-0.17		-0.28	-0.29
	(0.36)		(0.35)	(0.37)
Medium edu	-0.38		-0.48	-0.53
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.27)
Higher edu	-2.26***		-1.96***	-2.03***
	(0.41)		(0.40)	(0.40)
Intermediate		-1.37***	-1.17***	-1.16***
		(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Cosmopolitan		-2.37***	-2.14***	-2.12***
		(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Offshorability		-0.07*	-0.06	-0.25

		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.32)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.13
				(0.33)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.18
				(0.32)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.21
				(0.32)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.30
				(0.34)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.20
				(0.33)
Female	0.71***	0.50**	0.54**	0.55**
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Age	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	-0.07*	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	6.40***	6.47***	7.40***	7.43***
	(0.42)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Observations	924	924	924	924
R^2	0.093	0.132	0.171	0.173
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.126	0.159	0.157

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.2: Explaining EU Attitudes in France

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.89**		-0.86**	-0.64
	(0.29)		(0.30)	(0.38)
Lo. serv.	-0.42		-0.36	-0.67*
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.31)
Rout.nman	-0.67**		-0.65**	-0.80**
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.31)
Petite b.	-0.51		-0.50	-0.44
	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.55)
Skilled w.	0.21		0.21	0.14
	(0.26)		(0.25)	(0.31)
Medium edu	-0.38		-0.34	-0.33
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.21)
Higher edu	-1.88***		-1.69***	-1.66***

	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.27)
Intermediate		-0.95***	-0.60**	-0.63**
		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Cosmopolitan		-1.60***	-1.26***	-1.29***
		(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Offshorability		-0.04	0.00	-0.05
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.03
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.11
				(0.07)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.07
				(0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.02
				(0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.08)
Female	0.46**	0.26	0.43**	0.45**
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Age	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	8.02***	7.13***	8.27***	8.34***
	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.38)
Observations	1103	1103	1103	1103
R^2	0.153	0.086	0.190	0.194
Adjusted R^2	0.145	0.081	0.180	0.181

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.3: Explaining EU Attitudes in Germany

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.98*		-0.74	-0.44
	(0.43)		(0.41)	(0.47)
Lo. serv.	-0.96**		-0.85**	-1.02**
	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.38)
Rout.nman	-0.32		-0.46	-0.61
	(0.31)		(0.32)	(0.35)
Petite b.	-0.78		-0.79	-2.09***

	(0.50)		(0.51)	(0.60)
Skilled w.	0.05		-0.06	-0.14
	(0.32)		(0.32)	(0.36)
Medium edu	-0.21		-0.38	-0.44
	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.29)
Higher edu	-1.02**		-1.18***	-1.21***
	(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.35)
Intermediate		-0.91**	-0.79**	-0.85**
		(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)
Cosmopolitan		-1.62***	-1.51***	-1.58***
		(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Offshorability		-0.03	-0.02	-0.07
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.11
				(0.11)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.09
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.09
				(0.11)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.38*
				(0.16)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.11)
Female	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	-0.09	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	7.45***	7.39***	8.13***	8.31***
	(0.52)	(0.39)	(0.53)	(0.53)
Observations	798	798	798	798
R^2	0.089	0.083	0.147	0.160
Adjusted R^2	0.077	0.076	0.133	0.141

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.4: Explaining EU Attitudes in the Netherlands

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.52		-0.50	-0.61

	(0.28)		(0.27)	(0.32)
Lo. serv.	-0.40		-0.34	-0.33
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.31)
Rout.nman	0.00		0.04	-0.15
	(0.27)		(0.26)	(0.31)
Petite b.	-0.56		-0.57	-0.24
	(0.33)		(0.33)	(0.42)
Skilled w.	0.27		0.14	0.11
	(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.40)
Medium edu	-0.50**		-0.46*	-0.48*
	(0.19)		(0.19)	(0.19)
Higher edu	-1.43***		-1.33***	-1.36***
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Intermediate		-1.03***	-0.84***	-0.85***
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Cosmopolitan		-0.92***	-0.72***	-0.72***
		(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Offshorability		-0.03	-0.01	-0.06
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.07
				(0.09)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.11
				(0.10)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.05
				(0.11)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.11)
Female	0.36**	0.40**	0.30*	0.30*
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.04	-0.00	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	5.50***	4.87***	5.67***	5.73***
	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Observations	1099	1099	1099	1099
R^2	0.141	0.067	0.173	0.176
Adjusted R^2	0.133	0.062	0.163	0.163

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.5: Explaining EU Attitudes in Switzerland

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.77*		-0.58	-0.40
	(0.39)		(0.40)	(0.44)
Lo. serv.	-0.88**		-0.66	-0.31
	(0.34)		(0.35)	(0.38)
Rout.nman	-0.48		-0.39	-0.18
	(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.37)
Petite b.	-0.04		0.03	0.18
	(0.58)		(0.57)	(0.76)
Skilled w.	-0.09		-0.01	0.39
	(0.37)		(0.37)	(0.40)
Medium edu	-0.53*		-0.64*	-0.68**
	(0.27)		(0.26)	(0.26)
Higher edu	-1.22***		-1.22***	-1.27***
	(0.32)		(0.31)	(0.32)
Intermediate		-1.00***	-0.83***	-0.82***
		(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Cosmopolitan		-1.41***	-1.30***	-1.33***
		(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Offshorability		-0.03	-0.01	0.37**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.36*
				(0.15)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.42**
				(0.14)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.35*
				(0.16)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.36
				(0.21)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.45**
				(0.16)
Female	0.22	0.30	0.24	0.22
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Urban-rural residence	-0.12*	-0.13**	-0.10*	-0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	5.98***	5.44***	6.52***	6.32***
	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.45)	(0.47)
Observations	864	864	864	864
R^2	0.071	0.075	0.112	0.119
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.068	0.098	0.100

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.6: Explaining EU Attitudes in the UK

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.49		-0.46	-0.33
	(0.43)		(0.40)	(0.49)
Lo. serv.	-0.75		-0.57	-0.66
	(0.41)		(0.39)	(0.52)
Rout.nman	0.08		0.31	0.38
	(0.42)		(0.41)	(0.49)
Petite b.	0.00		0.11	0.08
	(0.51)		(0.50)	(0.61)
Skilled w.	-0.77		-0.65	-0.40
	(0.53)		(0.48)	(0.58)
Medium edu	0.32		0.29	0.27
	(0.27)		(0.26)	(0.27)
Higher edu	-1.47***		-1.22***	-1.23***
	(0.29)		(0.29)	(0.30)
Intermediate		-0.86*	-0.63*	-0.63*
		(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Cosmopolitan		-2.04***	-1.69***	-1.67***
		(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Offshorability		-0.04	-0.02	0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.06
				(0.13)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.00
				(0.13)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.04
				(0.12)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.01
				(0.18)

Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.15
				(0.15)
Female	0.43	0.37	0.27	0.28
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Age	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.11*	-0.12*
residence	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	7.34***	7.40***	7.76***	7.67***
	(0.56)	(0.45)	(0.53)	(0.58)
Observations	527	527	527	527
R^2	0.152	0.108	0.199	0.202
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.098	0.179	0.174

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.7: Explaining EU Attitudes in Denmark

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-0.94**		-0.72*	-0.82*
	(0.30)		(0.31)	(0.36)
Lo. serv.	-0.30		-0.10	-0.18
	(0.28)		(0.28)	(0.34)
Rout.nman	-0.14		-0.06	-0.10
	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.34)
Petite b.	-1.06**		-0.80*	-0.71
	(0.37)		(0.38)	(0.47)
Skilled w.	0.74*		0.75*	0.66
	(0.35)		(0.35)	(0.40)
Medium edu	-0.31		-0.28	-0.29
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.24)
Higher edu	-1.26***		-1.18***	-1.18***
	(0.25)		(0.25)	(0.25)
Intermediate		-0.82***	-0.60**	-0.61**
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Cosmopolitan		-1.88***	-1.54***	-1.54***
		(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Offshorability		-0.09***	-0.07**	-0.12
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.06
				(0.11)

Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.11)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.04
				(0.12)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.00
				(0.15)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.07
				(0.13)
Female	0.53**	0.39*	0.47**	0.48**
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Age	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	-0.08*	-0.09*	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	5.34***	5.25***	5.63***	5.67***
	(0.42)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.44)
Observations	964	964	964	964
R^2	0.119	0.075	0.151	0.151
Adjusted R^2	0.110	0.070	0.139	0.135

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.2.8: Explaining EU Attitudes in Sweden

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	-1.41**		-1.48***	-2.09***
	(0.44)		(0.44)	(0.54)
Lo. serv.	-0.94*		-1.04**	-1.15**
	(0.38)		(0.38)	(0.44)
Rout.nman	0.15		0.14	0.20
	(0.39)		(0.38)	(0.42)
Petite b.	-1.60**		-1.77**	-1.61**
	(0.55)		(0.54)	(0.61)
Skilled w.	-0.01		0.01	-0.37
	(0.45)		(0.46)	(0.51)
Medium edu	-0.88**		-0.96**	-0.99**
	(0.32)		(0.32)	(0.32)
Higher edu	-1.78***		-1.79***	-1.85***
	(0.35)		(0.34)	(0.35)
Intermediate		-0.54*	-0.47*	-0.47*
		(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Cosmopolitan		-1.31**	-1.53***	-1.51***

		(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Offshorability		-0.04	0.00	-0.10
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.12)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.23
				(0.14)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.10
				(0.13)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.01
				(0.14)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.05
				(0.21)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.23
				(0.18)
Female	0.49*	0.41	0.39	0.39
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Age	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	-0.08	-0.16**	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	7.64***	6.61***	8.00***	8.12***
	(0.56)	(0.45)	(0.56)	(0.59)
Observations	656	656	656	656
R^2	0.160	0.052	0.191	0.202
Adjusted R^2	0.147	0.043	0.175	0.179

A.5.3. Country specific analyses of immigration attitudes

Table A.5.3.1: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Austria

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.18		-0.03	-0.19
	(0.31)		(0.29)	(0.31)
Lo. serv.	0.02		-0.18	-0.11
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.30)
Rout.nman	0.42		0.24	0.22
	(0.25)		(0.24)	(0.25)
Petite b.	-0.20		-0.28	0.10
	(0.31)		(0.30)	(0.41)
Skilled w.	-0.35		-0.23	-0.25
	(0.28)		(0.25)	(0.27)

Medium edu	0.28		0.38	0.41
	(0.22)		(0.21)	(0.22)
Higher edu	1.84***		1.49***	1.56***
	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.32)
Intermediate		1.34***	1.21***	1.21***
		(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Cosmopolitan		2.56***	2.37***	2.35***
		(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Offshorability		0.02	0.02	0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.09)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.08
				(0.12)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.04
				(0.11)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.00
				(0.10)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.12
				(0.13)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.11)
Female	-0.25	-0.00	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.14***	0.10***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	4.04***	3.44***	2.97***	2.97***
	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Observations	960	960	960	960
R^2	0.136	0.230	0.260	0.263
Adjusted R^2	0.127	0.225	0.250	0.249

Table A.5.3.2: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in France

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.79**		0.70**	0.37
	(0.26)		(0.25)	(0.32)
Lo. serv.	0.80***		0.71**	1.08***
	(0.23)		(0.22)	(0.27)
Rout.nman	0.56*		0.53*	0.52

	(0.23)		(0.22)	(0.27)
Petite b.	0.14		0.10	0.79
	(0.29)		(0.29)	(0.57)
Skilled w.	-0.16		-0.16	-0.44
	(0.25)		(0.24)	(0.27)
Medium edu	0.22		0.16	0.15
	(0.19)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Higher edu	0.85***		0.60**	0.58**
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.22)
Intermediate		1.08***	0.91***	0.94***
		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Cosmopolitan		1.71***	1.52***	1.52***
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Offshorability		0.03	0.00	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.08
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.10
				(0.07)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.01
				(0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.15
				(0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.11
				(0.08)
Female	0.01	0.20	0.06	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.08**	0.06**	0.04	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	5.06***	5.31***	4.75***	4.78***
	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Observations	1123	1123	1123	1123
R^2	0.137	0.167	0.208	0.221
Adjusted R^2	0.129	0.162	0.199	0.208

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.3: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Germany

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.62		0.36	0.55
	(0.36)		(0.35)	(0.39)
Lo. serv.	0.40		0.28	0.51
	(0.29)		(0.28)	(0.34)
Rout.nman	-0.20		-0.09	-0.11
	(0.29)		(0.27)	(0.30)
Petite b.	0.53		0.48	0.97
	(0.43)		(0.42)	(0.53)
Skilled w.	-0.74*		-0.66*	-0.61
	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.33)
Medium edu	0.37		0.54*	0.54*
	(0.28)		(0.27)	(0.27)
Higher edu	0.77*		0.93**	0.91**
	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.32)
Intermediate		0.77***	0.66**	0.64**
		(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Cosmopolitan		1.55***	1.42***	1.44***
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Offshorability		0.03	0.02	0.07
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.09
				(0.09)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.10
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.10)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.16
				(0.13)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.05
				(0.10)
Female	0.21	0.23	0.20	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	0.04	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	4.38***	4.04***	3.76***	3.74***

	(0.44)	(0.32)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Observations	825	825	825	825
R^2	0.089	0.101	0.163	0.169
Adjusted R^2	0.078	0.094	0.149	0.150

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.4: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in the Netherlands

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.48*		0.45	0.55
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.28)
Lo. serv.	0.52*		0.46*	0.59*
	(0.23)		(0.23)	(0.27)
Rout.nman	0.33		0.26	0.47
	(0.23)		(0.23)	(0.27)
Petite b.	0.28		0.27	-0.01
	(0.29)		(0.28)	(0.41)
Skilled w.	0.05		0.17	0.20
	(0.28)		(0.28)	(0.32)
Medium edu	0.26		0.21	0.23
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Higher edu	1.08***		0.97***	0.99***
	(0.16)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Intermediate		0.83***	0.69***	0.70***
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Cosmopolitan		1.01***	0.85***	0.84***
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Offshorability		0.03	0.02	0.10
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.08
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.09
				(0.07)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.12
				(0.07)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.09)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.02

				(0.09)
Female	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.09
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.03	0.07*	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	3.89***	4.39***	3.72***	3.62***
	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Observations	1149	1149	1149	1149
R^2	0.113	0.076	0.155	0.160
Adjusted R^2	0.105	0.071	0.145	0.147

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.5: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.39		0.24	0.08
	(0.29)		(0.28)	(0.32)
Lo. serv.	0.46		0.28	0.09
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.26)
Rout.nman	0.12		0.06	0.08
	(0.24)		(0.23)	(0.25)
Petite b.	-0.25		-0.21	-0.20
	(0.34)		(0.33)	(0.38)
Skilled w.	-0.00		-0.08	-0.10
	(0.27)		(0.26)	(0.30)
Medium edu	-0.01		0.06	0.10
	(0.21)		(0.20)	(0.20)
Higher edu	0.63*		0.58*	0.62*
	(0.27)		(0.25)	(0.25)
Intermediate		1.03***	0.90***	0.92***
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Cosmopolitan		1.49***	1.41***	1.44***
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Offshorability		0.01	-0.01	-0.12
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.12)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.14
				(0.13)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.15

				(0.12)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.02
				(0.13)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.08
				(0.15)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.09
				(0.13)
Female	0.02	-0.04	0.00	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.08*	0.07*	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	4.78***	4.47***	4.24***	4.23***
	(0.35)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Observations	980	980	980	980
R^2	0.069	0.124	0.149	0.154
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.119	0.137	0.138

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.6: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in the UK

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.50		0.46	0.22
	(0.33)		(0.33)	(0.42)
Lo. serv.	0.71*		0.54	0.66
	(0.31)		(0.30)	(0.41)
Rout.nman	0.27		0.07	-0.01
	(0.34)		(0.33)	(0.40)
Petite b.	0.51		0.38	0.16
	(0.38)		(0.38)	(0.47)
Skilled w.	-0.26		-0.36	-0.70
	(0.38)		(0.36)	(0.42)
Medium edu	0.20		0.22	0.24
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.24)
Higher edu	1.47***		1.26***	1.25***
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.24)
Intermediate		1.04***	0.80**	0.79**
		(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)

Cosmopolitan		1.66***	1.35***	1.33***
		(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Offshorability		0.05	0.02	-0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.11
				(0.11)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				0.00
				(0.10)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				0.05
				(0.11)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.10
				(0.13)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.19
				(0.13)
Female	-0.04	0.15	0.10	0.07
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.10***	3.24***	2.69***	2.83***
	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.46)
Observations	578	578	578	578
R^2	0.149	0.095	0.195	0.201
Adjusted R^2	0.134	0.086	0.176	0.175

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.7: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Denmark

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.33		0.30	0.40
	(0.22)		(0.23)	(0.27)
Lo. serv.	0.45*		0.43*	0.63*
	(0.20)		(0.21)	(0.25)
Rout.nman	0.21		0.21	0.20
	(0.23)		(0.23)	(0.26)
Petite b.	0.11		0.06	-0.08
	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.38)
Skilled w.	-0.44		-0.43	-0.46
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.28)

Medium edu	0.34*		0.33	0.32
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.17)
Higher edu	0.96***		0.93***	0.92***
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Intermediate		0.24	0.11	0.13
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Cosmopolitan		0.75**	0.54*	0.56*
		(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Offshorability		0.03	0.00	0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.06
				(0.09)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.09
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.09)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.12)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				0.00
				(0.10)
Female	0.19	0.38**	0.20	0.17
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	5.36***	5.73***	5.29***	5.30***
	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Observations	993	993	993	993
R^2	0.130	0.070	0.134	0.138
Adjusted R^2	0.121	0.065	0.123	0.122

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.8: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Norway

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.24		0.11	0.28
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.31)

Lo. serv.	0.15		0.04	0.01
	(0.26)		(0.25)	(0.29)
Rout.nman	0.03		-0.02	-0.01
	(0.26)		(0.25)	(0.28)
Petite b.	-0.70*		-0.73**	-0.86**
	(0.29)		(0.28)	(0.31)
Skilled w.	-0.24		-0.34	-0.27
	(0.33)		(0.33)	(0.44)
Medium edu	0.37*		0.38*	0.38*
	(0.19)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Higher edu	0.88***		0.87***	0.87***
	(0.19)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Intermediate		0.34	0.30	0.29
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Cosmopolitan		0.77***	0.75***	0.75***
		(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Offshorability		0.07***	0.06**	0.09
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				-0.07
				(0.09)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.02
				(0.09)
Petite b. # Offshorability				0.04
				(0.11)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.05
				(0.11)
Female	0.45***	0.60***	0.48***	0.48***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.08**	0.11***	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	3.79***	4.08***	3.69***	3.69***
	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Observations	723	723	723	723
R^2	0.142	0.105	0.170	0.173
Adjusted R^2	0.130	0.098	0.155	0.152

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.5.3.9: Explaining Immigration Attitudes in Sweden

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Hi. serv.	0.64		0.77*	0.58
	(0.39)		(0.39)	(0.47)
Lo. serv.	0.34		0.47	0.48
	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.39)
Rout.nman	0.15		0.23	0.25
	(0.33)		(0.33)	(0.38)
Petite b.	-0.45		-0.31	-0.08
	(0.46)		(0.44)	(0.51)
Skilled w.	0.31		0.32	0.60
	(0.44)		(0.43)	(0.48)
Medium edu	0.68*		0.74**	0.82**
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.28)
Higher edu	1.70***		1.71***	1.78***
	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.31)
Intermediate		0.38	0.26	0.29
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Cosmopolitan		0.86**	0.97**	0.94**
		(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Offshorability		0.00	-0.02	0.00
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # Offshorability				0.03
				(0.10)
Lo. serv. # Offshorability				-0.02
				(0.09)
Rout.nman # Offshorability				-0.02
				(0.09)
Petite b. # Offshorability				-0.12
				(0.16)
Skilled w. # Offshorability				-0.16
				(0.16)
Female	0.62***	0.81***	0.65***	0.63***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Urban-rural residence	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Constant	3.17***	4.09***	2.95***	2.86***
	(0.54)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Observations	753	753	753	753
R^2	0.118	0.044	0.134	0.138
Adjusted R^2	0.106	0.037	0.119	0.117

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.6. The multinomial logistic regression analysis of party preference.

Table A.6.1: Explaining Party Preference. Multinomial logistic regression analyses. Country FE.

	1 Class & education	2 Globalisation model	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Comm__Left_Soc_				
Hi. serv.	0.01		0.04	-0.94***
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.24)
Lo. serv.	0.28		0.31	-0.32
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.22)
Rout.nman	0.20		0.23	-0.20
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.21)
Petite b.	-0.26		-0.23	-1.14**
	(0.32)		(0.32)	(0.43)
Skilled w.	0.01		0.04	-0.13
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.25)
Medium edu	-0.17		-0.16	-0.19
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Higher edu	0.00		-0.03	-0.12
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(0.16)
Intermediate		0.33*	0.31*	0.36**
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Cosmopolitan		0.50***	0.48**	1.05***
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
offshore10		-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.03
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.04
				(0.07)
Rout.nman # offshore10				0.04
				(0.07)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.11

				(0.12)
Skilled w. # offshore10				-0.01
				(0.08)
Female	-0.08	0.01	-0.07	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
age	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
urb8	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Constant	-2.49***	-2.65***	-2.62***	-1.86***
	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Green				
Hi. serv.	0.60*		0.58*	-0.42
	(0.24)		(0.24)	(0.28)
Lo. serv.	0.78***		0.76***	0.17
	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.25)
Rout.nman	0.27		0.27	-0.08
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.26)
Petite b.	0.53		0.53	0.01
	(0.34)		(0.35)	(0.43)
Skilled w.	0.26		0.34	0.14
	(0.26)		(0.26)	(0.30)
Medium edu	-0.02		-0.00	-0.03
	(0.19)		(0.20)	(0.20)
Higher edu	0.71***		0.67***	0.59**
	(0.20)		(0.20)	(0.20)
Intermediate		0.52***	0.39**	0.44**
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Cosmopolitan		0.83***	0.71***	1.28***
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
offshore10		0.01	-0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.04
				(0.08)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.07
				(0.08)
Rout.nman # offshore10				-0.01
				(0.08)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.26*
				(0.13)
Skilled w. # offshore10				0.00

				(0.10)
Female	0.47***	0.49***	0.50***	0.64***
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
age	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
urb8	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.38	-0.25	-0.64	0.08
	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Soc__Dem_				
Hi. serv.	0.00		0.00	-1.05***
	(.)		(.)	(0.18)
Lo. serv.	0.00		0.00	-0.61***
	(.)		(.)	(0.17)
Rout.nman	0.00		0.00	-0.23
	(.)		(.)	(0.17)
Petite b.	0.00		0.00	-1.09***
	(.)		(.)	(0.28)
Skilled w.	0.00		0.00	-0.16
	(.)		(.)	(0.20)
Medium edu	0.00		0.00	-0.01
	(.)		(.)	(0.11)
Higher edu	0.00		0.00	-0.07
	(.)		(.)	(0.12)
Intermediate		0.00	0.00	0.05
		(.)	(.)	(0.10)
Cosmopolitan		0.00	0.00	0.56***
		(.)	(.)	(0.13)
offshore10		0.00	0.00	0.03
		(.)	(.)	(0.05)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.03
				(0.06)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.07
				(0.05)
Rout.nman # offshore10				-0.08
				(0.06)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.08
				(0.07)
Skilled w. # offshore10				-0.02
				(0.06)
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14

	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.09)
age	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.00)
urb8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08***
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.02)
Constant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.69**
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.24)
Liberal				
Hi. serv.	1.41***		1.32***	0.56*
	(0.22)		(0.23)	(0.27)
Lo. serv.	1.25***		1.15***	0.60*
	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.27)
Rout.nman	0.94***		0.87***	0.50
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.28)
Petite b.	1.27***		1.17***	0.38
	(0.28)		(0.29)	(0.37)
Skilled w.	0.46		0.46	0.53
	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.33)
Medium edu	0.28		0.27	0.23
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Higher edu	0.78***		0.76***	0.67***
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Intermediate		0.25*	0.12	0.17
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Cosmopolitan		0.38**	0.24	0.80***
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)
offshore10		0.08***	0.05**	0.12
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.14
				(0.08)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.11
				(0.08)
Rout.nman # offshore10				-0.03
				(0.08)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.18
				(0.10)
Skilled w. # offshore10				-0.15
				(0.10)
Female	-0.25*	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
age	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.01**

	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
urb8	0.00	0.03	-0.00	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-3.09***	-2.12***	-3.20***	-2.57***
	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.40)
CD_Cons_				
Hi. serv.	1.09***		1.05***	0.00
	(0.15)		(0.16)	(.)
Lo. serv.	0.80***		0.75***	0.00
	(0.14)		(0.14)	(.)
Rout.nman	0.37**		0.35*	0.00
	(0.14)		(0.15)	(.)
Petite b.	1.30***		1.25***	0.00
	(0.19)		(0.19)	(.)
Skilled w.	0.20		0.17	0.00
	(0.17)		(0.17)	(.)
Medium edu	0.02		0.01	0.00
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(.)
Higher edu	0.04		0.07	0.00
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(.)
Intermediate		0.03	-0.05	0.00
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(.)
Cosmopolitan		-0.49***	-0.56***	0.00
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(.)
offshore10		0.05***	0.03*	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(.)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				0.00
				(.)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				0.00
				(.)
Rout.nman # offshore10				0.00
				(.)
Petite b. # offshore10				0.00
				(.)
Skilled w. # offshore10				0.00
				(.)
Female	-0.14	-0.20**	-0.15	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(.)
age	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(.)
urb8	-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.08***	0.00

	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(.)
Constant	-0.85***	-0.32	-0.76**	0.00
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(.)
Populist_Right				
Hi. serv.	0.31		0.34	-0.67*
	(0.23)		(0.24)	(0.28)
Lo. serv.	0.00		0.02	-0.57*
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.26)
Rout.nman	-0.07		-0.06	-0.19
	(0.20)		(0.21)	(0.24)
Petite b.	0.74**		0.72**	-0.26
	(0.26)		(0.26)	(0.32)
Skilled w.	0.33		0.31	0.13
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.26)
Medium edu	-0.18		-0.19	-0.19
	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Higher edu	-0.96***		-0.93***	-1.00***
	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.21)
Intermediate		-0.49**	-0.41*	-0.36*
		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Cosmopolitan		-0.90***	-0.83***	-0.26
		(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
offshore10		0.00	0.01	0.08
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.07
				(0.09)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.11
				(0.08)
Rout.nman # offshore10				-0.16
				(0.09)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.15
				(0.10)
Skilled w. # offshore10				-0.04
				(0.09)
Female	-0.45***	-0.56***	-0.47***	-0.34**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
age	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
urb8	-0.08**	-0.10***	-0.08**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.21	0.27	0.39	1.04**

	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Other				
Hi. serv.	0.36		0.38	-0.60*
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.27)
Lo. serv.	0.51**		0.53**	0.01
	(0.19)		(0.20)	(0.24)
Rout.nman	0.18		0.20	-0.01
	(0.19)		(0.19)	(0.23)
Petite b.	1.01***		1.02***	0.22
	(0.25)		(0.26)	(0.32)
Skilled w.	0.27		0.26	0.09
	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.26)
Medium edu	-0.17		-0.17	-0.18
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.15)
Higher edu	-0.44*		-0.42*	-0.49**
	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)
Intermediate		-0.16	-0.16	-0.11
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Cosmopolitan		-0.36*	-0.33	0.23
		(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)
offshore10		0.00	-0.01	0.06
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Hi. serv. # offshore10				-0.07
				(0.07)
Lo. serv. # offshore10				-0.12
				(0.07)
Rout.nman # offshore10				-0.09
				(0.07)
Petite b. # offshore10				-0.19*
				(0.09)
Skilled w. # offshore10				-0.03
				(0.08)
Female	-0.28*	-0.32**	-0.30*	-0.17
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
age	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
urb8	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.42	-0.30	-0.35	0.31
	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Observations	6039	6039	6039	6039
Pseudo R^2	0.126	0.115	0.133	0.135

AIC	19452.51	19653.84	19326.06	19344.38
BIC	20216.99	20257.38	20211.25	20430.76

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A.7. The full tables including all coefficients.

Table 1. Explaining economic left-right attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class: Hi. serv.	-0.78***		-0.74***	-0.74***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Class: Lo. serv.	-0.44***		-0.40***	-0.32***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Class: Rout.nman	-0.19**		-0.17**	-0.14*
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.07)
Class: Petite bourg.	-0.99***		-0.94***	-0.93***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.13)
Class: Skilled workers	-0.06		-0.04	-0.10
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Education: Medium	-0.18***		-0.17**	-0.17**
	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Education: Higher	-0.13*		-0.15*	-0.15*
	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Nat. ID: Intermediate		0.01	0.07	0.07
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Nat. ID: Cosmopolitan		0.22***	0.25***	0.26***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Offshorability		-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Hi. serv. x Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.02)
Lo. serv. x Offshorability				-0.03
				(0.02)
Rout.nman x Offshorability				-0.02
				(0.02)
Petite bourg. x Offshorability				-0.01
				(0.03)
Skilled w. x Offshorability				0.03
				(0.03)
Female	0.34***	0.40***	0.34***	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.04***	0.03**	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	4.76***	4.33***	4.70***	4.70***
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	8084	8084	8084	8084

R^2	0.084	0.054	0.089	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.052	0.086	0.087

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: Explaining EU attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class: Hi. serv.	-0.85***		-0.74***	-0.74***
	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Class: Lo. serv.	-0.65***		-0.52***	-0.58***
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.13)
Class: Rout.nman	-0.34**		-0.28**	-0.34**
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.12)
Class: Petite bourg.	-0.64***		-0.59***	-0.65**
	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.20)
Class: Skilled workers	0.10		0.07	0.04
	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.14)
Education: Medium	-0.35***		-0.37***	-0.38***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.09)
Education: Higher	-1.41***		-1.32***	-1.32***
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Nat. ID: Intermediate		-0.95***	-0.75***	-0.75***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Nat. ID: Cosmopolitan		-1.57***	-1.38***	-1.38***
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Offshorability		-0.05***	-0.02*	-0.05
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Hi. serv. x Offshorability				0.01
				(0.04)
Lo. serv. x Offshorability				0.04
				(0.04)
Rout.nman x Offshorability				0.04
				(0.04)
Petite bourg. x Offshorability				0.04
				(0.05)
Skilled w. x Offshorability				0.03
				(0.04)
Female	0.39***	0.32***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	6.56***	6.32***	6.96***	7.00***
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Observations	6935	6935	6935	6935
R^2	0.151	0.127	0.191	0.191
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.126	0.188	0.188

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Explaining immigration attitudes. OLS.

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class: Hi. serv.	0.44***		0.36***	0.31**
	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.11)
Class: Lo. serv.	0.45***		0.36***	0.45***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.10)
Class: Rout.nman	0.24**		0.20*	0.21*
	(0.09)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Class: Petite bourg.	0.01		-0.01	-0.03
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.15)
Class: Skilled workers	-0.21*		-0.18	-0.21
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.11)
Education: Medium	0.28***		0.30***	0.30***
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Education: Higher	1.09***		1.01***	1.00***
	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Nat. ID: Intermediate		0.79***	0.66***	0.66***
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Nat. ID: Cosmopolitan		1.45***	1.32***	1.32***
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Offshorability		0.03***	0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Hi. serv. x Offshorability				0.02
				(0.03)
Lo. serv. x Offshorability				-0.03
				(0.03)
Rout.nman x Offshorability				-0.00
				(0.03)
Petite bourg. x Offshorability				0.00
				(0.04)
Skilled w. x Offshorability				0.01
				(0.04)
Female	0.13**	0.24***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban-rural residence	0.07***	0.08***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.52***	3.57***	3.15***	3.15***
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Observations	8084	8084	8084	8084
R^2	0.152	0.151	0.201	0.202
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.150	0.199	0.199

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Reference categories: Class: unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

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