The rocky path to a new Swiss peace policy

The development of Swiss civil peace promotion after the end
of the Cold War

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates how Switzerland became an international peace promoter in the period between 1990 and 2011. The analysis focuses on the motives of the Swiss government and the adopted measures aiming to establish Switzerland as a relevant actor in the field of civil peace promotion. Furthermore, it highlights the internal and external factors that influenced this development. By means of governmental documents, interviews with diplomats and mediators as well as news articles, this thesis describes the difficult process of repositioning Switzerland in the increasingly crowded field of civil peace promotion during that period. Bogged down by discussions on neutrality and its own position in Europe, lengthy direct democratic processes and a rather risk-averse foreign policy, Switzerland struggled to establish itself in this field in the early stage. It was not until the turn of the millennium that we can talk of an institutionalized Swiss peace policy. The new, more professionalized approach was characterized by a strong focus on the provision of expertise, the reinforced engagement as a mediator and an increased cooperation with a wide range of actors. Alongside this development, Switzerland started to contribute more actively and visibly to peace processes. This thesis traces the redefinition of Swiss peace policy and shows how a politically small state has succeeded to establish itself as a relevant actor in the field of civil peace promotion.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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1. Introduction

"We ask you for reasonable financial means in order to pursue our foreign policy in the field of peace promotion [...] which is a new form of diplomatic action. We wanted to give priority to this type of activity. It is a field in which Switzerland is good, it is a field in which Switzerland has skills, where it can make its voice heard. Making its voice heard also means having political weight, it also means being able to say what we think and protect our interests."[1]

Micheline Calmy-Rey, former Foreign Minister, parliamentarian debate September 2003

This appeal by former Foreign Minister, Micheline Calmy-Rey, illustrates the self-perception of Switzerland as an international peace promoter as well as the national interests linked to this form of foreign policy. It raises the question why Switzerland decided to give this specific niche in foreign policy priority and how the country became a relevant player in civil peace promotion after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

In the period between 1993 and 2003, we can observe a steady decrease in the number of armed conflicts and a growing importance of multilateral solutions to the highly complex new conflicts.[2] These changes have led to an increase in actors involved in peace processes and to a greater inclusion of a wide range of third parties.[3] The same can be observed in the work of

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[1] All quotes in this thesis have been translated by the author. The longer quotes have been added to the respective footnotes in the original version. Original text: "Nous vous demandons des moyens raisonnables pour pouvoir mener notre politique étrangère dans le domaine de promotion de la paix et des mesures civiles de la promotion de la paix, qui sont une nouvelle forme de l'action diplomatique. Nous avons voulu effectivement donner une priorité à ce type d'activité. C'est un domaine où la Suisse est bonne, c'est un domaine où la Suisse a des compétences, où elle peut faire entendre sa voix. Faire entendre sa voix, c'est aussi avoir un poids politique, c'est aussi pouvoir dire ce que l'on pense et défendre nos intérêts." Micheline Calmy-Rey on the occasion of the parliamentarian debate on the framework credit in September 2003. See: Coucil of States Switzerland. "Ständerat. Herbstsession 2003. Zehnte Sitzung. 30.09.03. Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung. Rahmenkredit", 2003.

[2] Since 2003, the number of conflicts has increased again unsteadily, but constantly. However, the number of conflicts is still much lower than at the end of the Cold War. See: Scott Gates, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård et al., "Trends in armed conflict, 1946–2014," Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo (2016).

[3] Simon Mason and Matthias Siegfried, "Mediation & Facilitation in Today's Peace Processes: Centrality of Commitment, Coordination and Context," (2007), p.3.

international organisations. The structures of such organisations, that predominantly give equal rights to all member states, created new room for manoeuvre which could be used to its fullest extent after the end of the east-west antagonism. In this context, particularly small states[4] were able to strategically position themselves in the field of good services and use the new scope of action to improve their position in the international community and access new political arenas. Furthermore, it enabled them to generate political capital and represent their interests on the international platform more actively.[5]

Switzerland, an often-mentioned example for such a state, had to radically adapt its foreign policy to the new developments. The end of the Cold War introduced a period of change which forced Switzerland to re-evaluate its self-perception and positioning in the international arena. Particularly in the field of good services,[6] an essential sector of Swiss foreign policy, the country was obliged to rethink its traditional approach and participate more actively on a bilateral and multilateral level in order to ensure its relevance.

In this paper, I will explore how and why Switzerland became an international peace promoter. Moreover, I will analyse the internal and external factors that influenced the emergence of Swiss peace promotion in the period between 1990 and 2011.

1.1. The end of the Cold War and its implications

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar world order introduced major changes to the international system. As mentioned, particularly in the field of civil peacebuilding, the transition created room for new actors and practices. With the number of conflicts reaching an all-time high in 1991 and 1992, the international community was challenged to find new approaches to peacefully end these disputes.[7] Moreover, due to the slow

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[4] In this paper, I will use the term "small state" for European countries such as Switzerland and the Nordic countries referring to their lack of hard power in the field of peace promotion.

[5] Andreas Wenger, "Zivile Friedensförderung der Schweiz: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungspotential" (CSS, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2011), p.28.

[6] In this paper, I will use a broad definition of the term "good offices" or "good services" as suggested by Trachsler (2004). This concept implies the following activities undertaken by a state or international organisation: Mediation and facilitation, arbitration activity, protecting power mandates, international legislation and international mandates.

[7] Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 5 (2006), p.619.

withdrawal of the United States and the Soviet Union from the battlefields abroad, many conflicts transitioned to more complex, asymmetric and regionalized conflicts.[8]

These circumstances led to major changes in the demand and supply of good services. First, peace promotion in general gained in importance. After the end of the Cold War, states discovered peace promotion as a useful foreign policy tool to represent their interests and improve their reputation. Therefore, many states started to increasingly invest in this field.[9] Thereby, mediation resumed a prominent role as a promising instrument for conflict resolution. The increased importance of mediation can, amongst other factors, be explained by the rising complexity of regional conflicts. In recent years, mediation has been used in more than half of all international conflicts and according to Mason and Siegfried, it has proven to be five times more effective for conflict resolution than non-mediated processes. This development cannot only be put down to improved international support for civil peacebuilding, but also to a new, more inclusive and comprehensive approach to mediation adapted to the new forms and characteristics of conflicts.[10] Another field that became increasingly important over the years was the development of international law within the framework of intergovernmental organisations. Switzerland, for example, started to advocate for the prohibition of anti-personal mines and illegal small arms.[11] In particular, politically small states started to use their new scope of action to contribute more actively to the further development of international standards.

As a result of these changes in the field of good services, some small European states, such as Switzerland, Finland, Sweden and Norway, have successfully entered, respectively repositioned and consolidated themselves in the field of peace promotion. We can witness these changes particularly in the field of international mediation. Thanks to their financial and

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[8] SA Mason and D Sguaitamatti, "Mapping mediators: A comparison of third parties and implications for Switzerland," *Zurich: ETH/Center for Security Studies* (2011), p.5; Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, "Talking peace:International mediation in armed conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014), p.341.

[9] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document by the Financial and Economic Service, 10.11.1997: "Geschätzte Ausgaben (Budget 1998) ausgewählter Länder für die Beziehung zum Ausland".

[10] Mason and Siegfried, "Mediation & Facilitation in Today's Peace Processes: Centrality of Commitment, Coordination and Context," (2007), p.2.

[11] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4763; Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", (2000), p.271.

political long-term commitment to peace processes, their small size and their experience in the humanitarian field, they succeeded to establish themselves as highly valued mediators and facilitators. In the past, small states had often been seen as weak and irrelevant in international relations because of their size and lack of hard power.[12] However, recent studies have increasingly focused on the growing influence of "weak" mediators. In this "niche-diplomacy" some states managed to gain influence on the international arena despite their limited hard power and resources.[13] By means of good services, those states can not only stress their humanitarian commitment and improve their reputation, but also pursue an interest driven foreign policy.[14] In mediation processes, they present themselves as impartial third parties without the burden of a colonial past. Furthermore, they are characterized by a consistent foreign policy, considerable financial resources and consensus oriented domestic policies. Especially in view of the increasing complexity of conflicts and peace processes, these features as well as the willingness to make long-term commitments have been crucial assets.[15]

Switzerland has been active in the humanitarian field for many decades and has had, based on its neutrality and multilingualism, a distinctive position in the international arena, particularly during the early 20th century.[16] During that time, Switzerland held a large number of protecting power mandates and was an important site for international conferences.[17] However, it was only rarely and rather unsuccessfully engaged as mediator.[18] With the rise of multilateralism after the Second World War and finally with the end of the Cold War, Switzerland had to reinterpret its foreign policy and conception of neutrality. With the *Report on Foreign Policy 1993*, the government promoted an active strategy to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, including preventive diplomacy, mediation efforts and democratization projects. Furthermore,

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[12] Kristian Stokke, "Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy," *International Studies* 49, no. 3-4 (2012), p.211.

[13] Jozef Bátora, "Public diplomacy in small and medium-sized states: Norway and Canada" (Netherlands Institute of International Relations' Clingendael', 2005), p.1.

[14] Wenger, "Zivile Friedensförderung der Schweiz: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungspotential", (CSS, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2011), p.28.

[15] John Stephen Moolakkattu, "Peace facilitation by small states: Norway in Sri Lanka," *Cooperation and conflict* 40, no. 4 (2005), p.387.

[16] David Lanz and Simon Mason, "Switzerland's experiences in peace mediation," (2012), p.73.

[17] The protecting power mandates of Switzerland are a part of its good offices and consists of the safeguarding of foreign interests. Switzerland, for instance, represents the interests of the US in Iran and vice-versa. See: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, "Protecting power mandates", https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html, 29.10.2018.

[18] Thomas Fischer, "From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland's Contribution to International Conflict Resolution", in *Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002* (Springer, (2003)), p.83.

the Federal Council[19] broadened its interpretation of the policy of neutrality and emphasized the need to contribute more actively to collective security.[20] These decisions set in motion a broader process of re-orientation and the elaboration of a new Swiss peace policy approach.

1.2. Formulation of problem and limitations

Switzerland is a particularly interesting case because of its long-time experience in the humanitarian field and its unique position in Europe throughout the 20th century. Due to its already existing engagement in peace policy, the fundamental shifts that came along with the end of the Cold War marked a crucial moment in the strategic design of Swiss foreign policy. While most of the traditional forms of good offices, such as protecting power mandates, lost their relevance, new forms of peace promotion gained in importance. In this context, the question arises as to why Switzerland was eager to establish itself as a relevant actor in the field of civil peace promotion and how it became an international peace promoter after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

In this thesis, I will be focusing on the field of civil peace promotion and only occasionally mention the area of Swiss military peace promotion. The reason for this is the diverging development and lack of cooperation between these two fields. While military peace promotion was much contested in the public discourse in Switzerland and experienced an early setback in 1994, civil peace promotion gained in relevance very quickly. Seen as the continuation of the "Swiss humanitarian tradition", civil peace promotion enjoyed much more public support.

I will use a broad definition of civil peace promotion which is largely based on the responsibilities of the Human Security Division of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The division focuses on the concept of "freedom from fear" which includes according to Greminger (2008) "protecting the individual from armed violence, human rights violations and arbitrary political action and thus keeping violence and the threat of violence away from everyday life".[21] The thematic areas of the Human Security Division are the following: "Peace Policy", "Human Rights Policy", "Humanitarian Policy", "Foreign Policy on Migration" and

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[19] The Federal Council is the highest executive authority and consists of seven ministers that each lead a department. The composition of the council is based on various factors such as the political party landscape of Switzerland, its languages and regions. See: Federal Council of Switzerland, "The Federal Council.The portal of the Swiss government", https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start.html, 31.10.2018.

[20] Lanz and Mason, "Switzerland's experiences in peace mediation," (2012), p.74.

[21] Thomas Greminger, "Swiss Civilian Peace Promotion: Assessing Policy and Practice," *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik* no. 83 (2011), p.4.

"the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding".[22] This thesis will mainly focus on the field of Peace Policy, Humanitarian Policy and the work of the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding. This focus includes inter alia the Swiss mediation efforts and the further development of international standards. However, besides these areas, the concept used also covers other forms of good services such as the protecting power mandates of Switzerland. This broad definition of civil peace promotion takes into account the perspective of the Swiss government and allows the reader to better understand the broader changes in Swiss peace policy.

The perspective of the government as the key institution will be at the centre of the analysis. This limitation is based on the understanding of foreign policy as a domain that is predominantly reserved to the government and allows only limited interference by other domestic actors. Despite smaller interferences by the public and other stakeholders, Swiss peace policy has largely been shaped by the government and more specifically, by the Foreign Ministry. However, due to the direct democratic instruments and principles of Switzerland and the importance of public backing in small states, I will sporadically draw on news articles and in so doing, provide a brief insight into the public perception of the subject matter and its influence on the development of Swiss peace policy.

To analyse the establishment of Swiss peace policy, I will focus on the period between 1990 and 2011. In the context of the global and far-reaching shift that took place around 1990, the Federal Council of Switzerland published the *Report on Security Policy 1990* which illustrated the new security situation of Switzerland and serves as the starting point for this thesis.[23] I decided to end my analysis with the end of Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey's term of office in 2011. In my view, Calmy-Rey's proactive and political approach added a new dimension to Swiss peace policy. This can be observed by means of the Swiss mediation efforts in the conflict between Russia and Georgia (2011). At this point, Swiss peace policy had become much more proactive, interest-driven and visible. In light of this, the development of Swiss peace policy during these two decades looks particularly challenging and worth investigating.

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[22] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, "Human Security Division", https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/fdfa/organisation-fdfa/directorates-divisions/directorate-political-affairs/hsd.html, 30.10.2018.

[23] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz", 1990.

1.3. Theoretical Framework

Along with the growing importance of peace promotion in world politics, we can also observe an increase in research in this field. The large body of literature on peace promotion is very diverse and addresses a wide range of issues. However, most of these studies share a common theoretical basis that also lies at the core of this thesis. The antagonism between realist and idealist arguments shape the motives and decision-making processes of states. In this thesis, this charged relationship becomes evident throughout the period under study. While idealist motives such as the emphasis on the Swiss humanitarian tradition were frequently mentioned as a driving force behind the Swiss commitment in civil peace promotion, arguments referring to the national interests gained in importance particularly after the turn of the millennium. The awareness of this tension is crucial in order to understand the government's decision-making processes and the public discourse on Swiss peace policy.

Another important theoretical component of this thesis is the concept of public diplomacy, which describes the production and systematic use of soft power. According to Nye (2008), "soft power rests primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values and foreign policy".[24] While the image and reputation of a country has always played an essential role in modern history, credibility has gained in importance due to the growing amount of information available. In this context, states have started to use public diplomacy to increase the country's credibility, visibility and reputation. In contrast to the traditional form of diplomacy, public diplomacy aims at the world public as opposed to a small circle of state actors.[25] Both Nye (2008) and Leonard (2002) highlight that particularly small states, such as Norway, were able to use public diplomacy to gain in relevance in multilateral forums and strengthen their profile despite their proportionally small size.[26] In this context, we can see that peace policy does not only contribute to the promotion of peace, but does also have an impact on the position of a country in the international arena and enhances a collective identity.[27] In this thesis, the use of

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[24] Joseph S Nye Jr, "Public diplomacy and soft power," *The annals of the American academy of political and social science* 616, no. 1 (2008), p.96.

[25] Ibid., p.99f.

[26] Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing, "Public diplomacy" (Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), p.171+53; Nye Jr, "Public diplomacy and soft power," The annals of the American academy of political and social science 616, no. 1 (2008), p.104; Bátora, "Public diplomacy in small and medium-sized states: Norway and Canada", (Netherlands Institute of International Relations' Clingendael', 2005).

[27] Ada Nissen. "The Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace Diplomacy Since 1989",(PhD thesis. Oslo, NO: Department of Archeology, Conservation and History, University of Oslo, 2015), p.20.

peace policy as a tool to improve the country's reputation and increase its visibility can be seen as one form of public diplomacy.

In the last century, there have been a wide range of studies on small states' politics. However, the discipline remains in a marginal position within the field of International Relations. Neumann and Gstöhl (2004) provide a good overview of this field of research.[28] In this very broad area, this thesis can be located in the rather young discipline studying the peculiarities of small states' peacebuilding efforts. While there are only a few studies that depict the overall situation of small states in the field of peace promotion, a majority focuses primarily on case studies of specific countries. There is, for example, a significant number of studies about the Norwegian new humanitarian foreign policy and its efforts in the field of mediation. These works mainly focus on specific efforts such as the *Oslo Accord* in 1993, the Sudanese peace agreements and the peace talks in Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, authors such as Waage (2005), Kelleher (2006), Stokke (2012) and Nissen (2015) give us valuable insights not only into the Norwegian approach to peace promotion but also into the general strengths and weaknesses of small states.[29]

There is also extensive literature on the Swiss peacebuilding efforts and especially in recent years, this has become a popular field of research. Institutes such as the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) and Swisspeace have played a decisive role in promoting these studies. There are many studies that focus on the interrelation between neutrality and Swiss foreign policy, such as the research work of Rhinow (2007), Trachsler (2011) and Gabriel (1996, 2002).[30] However, there are also more specific studies on Swiss peace promotion. In this field, the studies of Fischer (2003), Graf and Lanz (2013), Goetschel (2011) and Wenger (2011) stand

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[28] Iver B Neumann, "Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?: small states in international relations," (2004).

[29] Ann Kelleher and James Larry Taulbee, "Bridging the gap: Building peace Norwegian style," *Peace & Change* 31, no. 4 (2006); Hilde Henriksen Waage, "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 4 (2005); Nissen. "The Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace Diplomacy Since 1989",(PhD thesis. Oslo, NO: Department of Archeology, Conservation and History, University of Oslo, 2015); Stokke, "Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy," International Studies 49, no. 3-4 (2012).

[30] René Rhinow, "Neutralität als Deckmantel für eine aktive oder restriktive Aussenpolitik? Anmerkungen zu einer Phantomdiskussion", in *Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen*, ed. Georg Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)); Daniel Trachsler, "Von Petitpierre bis Calmy-Rey: Wiederkehrende Debatten um die Schweizer Aussenpolitik," (2011); Jürg Martin Gabriel, "Die Überwindung der Schweizer Neutralität," (1996); Jürg Martin Gabriel, "The price of political uniqueness: Swiss foreign policy in a changing world" (2002).

out.[31] These analyses of the Swiss peace policy have been a valuable starting point for my thesis. On the one hand, they asked similar questions and in so doing, confirmed certain points of my findings. On the other hand, particularly Fischer (2003) and Geotschel (2011) focus on a very broad period of time which encouraged me to complement their work with a more in-depth analysis. Besides, as most of these studies have been written from a political science perspective, I sought the opportunity to describe the development of Swiss peace promotion from a more historical point of view putting the source work at the centre of this thesis. Moreover, I added further perspectives to the analysis by using interviews and news articles highlighting the domestic factors that influenced the development of Swiss peace promotion as well as the more personal views of key actors in the administration.

Besides these broader studies on the overall Swiss peace promotion, there are also a few case studies analysing the Swiss contribution in specific peace talks such as the research done by Mason (2007)[32] on the Swiss mediation efforts in Sudan and the work of Baechler and Frieden (2006)[33] on the Nepalese peace talks. These case studies give us insights into the approach and proceedings of the Swiss government. As the access to sources regarding specific cases is still very limited, these studies provided me with valuable information on the implementation of the Swiss peace policies at that time.

1.4. Method and sources

In my thesis, I decided to use a diplomatic history approach focusing on the efforts of the Swiss state in the field of civil peace promotion. Thereby, I based my analysis mainly on three types of sources: Official documents of the Swiss government, news articles and interviews.

First, I used governmental documents to depict the repositioning of Swiss peace policy from the point of view of the government. These sources include internal documents of the Foreign

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[31] Fischer, "From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland's Contribution to International Conflict Resolution", in Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002 (Springer, (2003)); Andreas Graf and David Lanz, "Conclusions: Switzerland as a paradigmatic case of small-state peace policy?," *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (2013); Laurent Goetschel, "The politics of peace: from ideology to pragmatism?: proceedings of the swisspeace 20th anniversary conference", vol. 3 (LIT Verlag Münster, 2011); Wenger, "Zivile Friedensförderung der Schweiz: Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungspotential", (CSS, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2011).

[32] Mason Simon, "Learning from the Swiss Mediation and Facilitation Experiences in Sudan," *Mediation Support Project (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich & swisspeace),* (2007).

[33] Günther Baechler and Jörg Frieden, "Népal. La coopération au développement et la transformation du conflit," Annuaire suisse de politique de développement, no. 25-2 (2006).

Ministry and Federal Council as well as publicly accessible reports, political proposals and debates. They give us insights into the strategy, decision-making processes and implementation of the policies within the government. Due to the term of protection of 30 years on most of the documents stored at the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern, the access to these sources is limited. My access request for specific documents was partially accepted, which allowed me to analyse a few internal documents. These sources have been extremely valuable for my thesis. However, it has to be noted that I could only take a look at a small part of this large body of documents. In this light, it would be interesting to re-evaluate my findings as soon as the protection period has expired.

Second, I used news articles to describe the public opinion and discourse on specific events and political decisions. As Switzerland is a rather small country and a semi-direct democracy, the public debate and backing of political decisions play a decisive role. This can, for example, be observed by means of looking at the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations* which was rejected in a public vote in 1994. This rejection had a major impact on the development of Swiss military peace promotion. Furthermore, in contrast to existing studies on Swiss peace promotion, I was eager to add a new perspective to the analysis and put special emphasis on the internal factors that influenced Swiss foreign policy.

Third, I conducted semi-structured interviews with experts and practitioners of the Swiss Foreign Ministry. Overall, I conducted six interviews with people who were mediators, diplomats or high-ranked officials in the Foreign Ministry during the period under study. Because of the sensitive nature of the topic and by request of the interviewees, their personal information and the information given by them have been anonymised. What can be said is that the interviewees were active in different fields of Swiss civil peace promotion and held different positions in the Foreign Ministry over time. With one exception, all interview partners have been mediators in an international conflict. Furthermore, three interviewees were chairmen of a department or division within the Swiss government.

The use of oral history allowed me to take a closer look at the implementation of the changes in Swiss foreign policy and showed the personal perspectives of practitioners who were directly involved in the transition. Furthermore, this approach brought information and perceptions to the forefront that have not been written down yet. This notion is especially interesting in the field of peace promotion as important parts of conflict resolution processes take place in

informal settings. Moreover, due to the period of protection on official documents, research in contemporary and diplomatic history often faces a lack of sources. In this context, oral history allows to partly close this knowledge gap. These interviews have been conducted with the awareness that these sources have to be critically analysed as they mirror the personal experiences and points of view of the interviewees and should not be generalized.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters give the reader insights into the Swiss neutrality policy and a short overview of the development of its peace policy over the last century. Chapter 4 to 7 is a chronological analysis of the development of Swiss peace policy starting with the *Report on Security Policy* published by the Swiss government in 1990 and ending with the term of office of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey in 2011. These chapters outline the motives of the Swiss government to redefine and reinforce its peace policy over that period. Furthermore, the reader gets insights into the measures that were taken by the Swiss government to achieve its goals as well as the factors that influenced this process. With the exception of chapter 4, the main analytical part of this thesis follows, in chronological order, the terms of office of the Swiss foreign ministers. My findings have shown that, even though their role hasn't been the decisive factor in the development of Swiss peace policy, each of them had a personal impact on the process and provided new momentum.

2. The lines of tradition in Swiss civil peace promotion

The current Swiss political system and culture are strongly marked by deep-rooted concepts and narratives that evolved and developed over the course of its history. These concepts have not only shaped the Swiss foreign policy over time, but also played into the formation of the Swiss self-perception as a "special case" [34] and an "island of peace"[35] within Europe. One of these concepts is neutrality, which can be seen, next to federalism and direct democracy, as a major pillar of the Swiss conception of statehood and identity.[36] Neutrality still enjoys remarkably strong support from the Swiss citizens. However, as a result of the changing global environment, its significance and benefit for the Swiss foreign policy is frequently questioned by the scientific community and political elite.[37] Nevertheless, neutrality is predominantly seen as the foundation of the Swiss humanitarian tradition and more specifically the country's efforts in the field of good offices.[38] Therefore, the grasp of this concept and its impact on the country's foreign policy is key to understanding the development of Swiss peace policy.

2.1. The roots of Swiss neutrality

The origin of Swiss neutrality is commonly dated back to the battle of Marignano in 1515, where the defeat of the Confederation marked the end of its policy of expansion. Henceforth, the members of the Confederation refrained from any further attempts to expand their borders and decided not to interfere with matters and conflicts of other powers, focusing from then on

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[34] "Sonderfall Schweiz" (transl. "special case Switzerland") is a general term that points out the unique nature of Swiss history, cultural and territorial features as well as the Swiss political system. Nowadays, the concept is very contested as it has often been politicized and become an essential tool for today's identity politics. Nevertheless, it has remained a key concept in culture and politics. See: Paul Widmer, "Neutralität - eine Aussenpolitik mit Zukunft", in *Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?*, ed. Georg Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)).

[35] "Friedensinsel" (transl. "island of peace") is a commonly used term in Switzerland that refers to the fact that the country, in contrast to the rest of Europe, hasn't been involved in an armed conflict since its foundation in 1848.

[36] Widmer, "Neutralität - eine Aussenpolitik mit Zukunft", in Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 68; Jadwiga Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung" (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 234.

[37] Rhinow, "Neutralität als Deckmantel für eine aktive oder restriktive Aussenpolitik? Anmerkungen zu einer Phantomdiskussion", in Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 20f.

[38] Laurent Goetschel, "Neutralität: Handicap oder Branding der Schweizer Aussenpolitik", in *Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?*, ed. Georg Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 84f.

solely on the defense of their territory. This approach was a way to ensure its independence while being surrounded by great powers.[39] However, the significance of the battle of Marignano with regard to the introduction of Swiss neutrality is highly controversial, as the event has been politicized throughout history. In this context, scholars have claimed in recent years that the importance of the battle of Marignano has been greatly exaggerated by historians of the 19th and 20th century. Whatever the truth, it can be observed that, over the centuries, the Confederation in some instances made decisions that underlined its aspiration to be perceived as a neutral entity.[40]

The modern form of Swiss neutrality was initiated by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 where the permanent neutrality of Switzerland was written-down in the Vienna Declaration and the Treaty of Paris. Despite its neutrality, the Confederation was allowed to maintain its own military force for the purpose of self-defence, which led to a new notion called "armed neutrality".[41] While the terms of the Congress of Vienna were mainly determined by the great powers, the content of that notion has constantly been adjusted and reinterpreted by the Swiss politicians and citizens over the last 200 years.[42]

2.2. Law of neutrality and policy of neutrality

The concept of neutrality can be subdivided into three components: the law of neutrality, the policy of neutrality and its functions. The law of neutrality was codified and part of international law since the Hague Convention in 1907. The law of neutrality prohibits neutral states, among others, to participate in conflicts between other states and to support any party in conflict with troops, weapons or financial resources. However, as the form of conflicts and the global circumstances have fundamentally changed over time, the law of neutrality has largely lost its significance. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Switzerland and other permanently neutral states do not pursue a policy of neutrality.

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[39] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 234f.

[40] Paul Widmer, "Von Marignano zum Wiener Kongress," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 236, no. 128 (2015).

[41] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 235f.

[42] Advisory Board for Strategic Issues. "Der Bericht der Studienkommission für Strategische Fragen: (Bericht Brunner)", 1998.

The policy of neutrality is the sum of all measures taken by neutral states in order to ensure their credibility as neutral countries and is constantly redefined and adapted to the new political conditions.[43] In the case of Switzerland, we can observe many changes of practice throughout the 20th century. An example is the accession to the EU which had been considered incompatible with Swiss neutrality by the government until 1992, the year in which Switzerland decided to apply for membership.[44] This decision was the result of changing circumstances, public discussions and a strategic reorientation made by the government and does not refer directly to the international law of neutrality. It is rather a trade-off of national interests and the principles of neutrality.

In the case of Switzerland, the policy of neutrality basically pursues five targets: Securing the country, ensuring the balance of power within Europe, safeguarding internal integration in a multicultural and multilingual country, assuring economic wealth and finally, promoting services to third parties. The significance of these functions has developed in different ways. While the defence of the country by means of neutrality has mostly lost its importance because of growing economic interdependency and the stable political environment in Europe, neutrality still plays a certain role when it comes to the country's economic interests.[45]

The promotion of services to third parties, the so-called solidarity dimension of neutrality, can be seen as an important basis for the Swiss efforts in the field of good services. It adds an extra dimension to the security and military key tasks of neutrality and includes all measures that are taken to enhance peace as well as contribute to conflict resolution.[46] The idea behind this is that Switzerland, as a neutral country, has a high credibility and no geopolitical agenda. With this in mind, neutral countries seem especially suited to act as third parties in conflicts, to serve as hosts for talks and conferences as well as to take on protecting power mandates. In this respect, Switzerland has been an important player in the development of international arbitration and a popular protecting power throughout the 20th century.[47] However, studies have also shown that

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[43] René Schwok, "Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges" (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014), p. 31-33.

[44] Ibid., p. 37.

[45] Ibid., p. 41-57.

[46] Goetschel, "Neutralität: Handicap oder Branding der Schweizer Aussenpolitik", in Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 84f.

[47] Schwok, "Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges", (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014), p. 48-54.

the impact of neutrality in the field of mediation is negligible as other factors seem much more decisive.[48]

In general, the significance of neutrality for Swiss foreign policy and more specifically for good services has been the object of many contested public discussions particularly in the early 1990s. Even though it is difficult to measure the actual impact of neutrality on the demand and success of good services, there is no doubt that over the last decades, the neutral status of Switzerland has strongly influenced its political culture, foreign policy and commitment to peace promotion.

2.3. The challenges of Swiss humanitarian tradition

The solidarity dimension of neutrality can be seen as the basis of the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. In order to avoid the often-made association of neutrality with the lack of solidarity, passivity and isolation of a country, Switzerland discovered the humanitarian engagement as an effective way to increase its international visibility, represent its interests and enhance its reputation as a neutral country.[49] The humanitarian tradition has become a key concept of Swiss foreign policy and a cultural identification feature, with which Swiss people are identified and identify themselves.[50]

The historical emergence of the Swiss humanitarian tradition is – much like the concept of neutrality – controversial and has often been politicized. Some scholars argue that the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland already started many decades before the foundation of the federal state in 1848. They point out that because of the country's location in the heart of Europe, Switzerland has often been a harbour for refugees of conflicts in surrounding countries, such as in 1685 for the Huguenots fleeing from religious persecution in France.[51] The more recent history of the Swiss humanitarian engagement, however, started with the founding of the Red Cross by Henry Dunant in 1863, which brought the Swiss engagement into the international

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[48] Lionel Marquis and Gerald Schneider, "Wer kommt als Vermittler zum Zuge? Überschätzte und unterschätzte Anforderungsfaktoren für Mediationstätigkeiten," *Swiss Political Science Review* 2, no. 3 (1996).

[49] Goetschel, "Neutralität: Handicap oder Branding der Schweizer Aussenpolitik", in Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 84f.

[50] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 196.

[51] Ibid., p. 194.

arena and reinforced the importance of Geneva as an international meeting point.[52] Furthermore, the role of Switzerland as depositary of the Geneva Convention highlighted the Swiss aspiration to support humanitarian initiatives.[53] Besides those long-term commitments, Switzerland has upheld its humanitarian tradition on several occasions by providing protection for persecuted people such as the Tibetan refugees after the Chinese occupation of Tibet or the refugees of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956.[54]

However, it is important to critically evaluate this aspect knowing that the Swiss humanitarian tradition has often been idealized and considered an unbroken tradition. Switzerland has not always honoured its humanitarian tradition. In this respect, the Swiss political decision to close its borders and hinder mostly Jewish refugees from entering the country during World War II is often mentioned as an example of how Switzerland acted against its humanitarian tradition.[55] Clearly, the Swiss humanitarian tradition cannot be seen as an undisputed success story. It has been overshadowed by many failures and missteps. However, the concept of a Swiss humanitarian tradition has clearly influenced the Swiss foreign policy, the country's reputation as well as its self-perception and has become a part of Switzerland's national identity. Nowadays, this narrative is the basis for Swiss engagement in humanitarian aid, development cooperation and the field of good services.[56]

2.4. Rethinking neutrality

Besides the solidarity dimension which gained in importance during the Cold War, it was still the security dimension that remained the dominant aspect of Swiss neutrality in the bipolar world system. This traditional approach was based on the conviction that Switzerland as neutral country should distance itself from any international conflict.[57] However, after World War II this interpretation of neutrality became increasingly disputed in the international community as Switzerland's neutral position towards the Third Reich was met with incomprehension. In stark

[52] Daniel-Erasmus Khan, "Das Rote Kreuz: Geschichte einer humanitären Weltbewegung", vol. 2757 (2013).

[53] Schwok, "Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges", (Zurich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014), p. 50.

[54] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 196.

[55] Antoine Fleury, "La neutralité Suisse: à l'épreuve de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 194 (1999), p. 31.

[56] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 196f.

[57] Thomas Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 3.

contrast, the Swiss themselves assessed neutrality positively as they had been spared from the cruelty of war.[58]

In this context, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs Max Petitpierre (1945-1961) promoted a more active interpretation of neutrality, arguing that the international community would only respect the status of Switzerland if they saw concrete benefits. Therefore, he introduced the term "neutrality and solidarity" which emphasized that neutrality should not be equated with passivity and indifference. On the contrary, in his view, Switzerland, as a permanently neutral state, was particularly suited to mediate between the blocks and take on mandates as a protecting power. For Petitpierre, neutrality was not a static principle, but a flexible tool of Swiss foreign policy. In this light, Switzerland continued carrying out its mandates as a protecting power and tried to position itself as an ideal host for international peace conferences.

Furthermore, new, more controversial mandates were carried out such as the participation of Switzerland in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in the aftermath of the Korean War.[59] These engagements were highly contested internally as it was feared that Switzerland would lose its credibility as a neutral country when acting under the mandate of the UN.[60] This fear, combined with some unsuccessful commitments, led once again to a more passive foreign policy focusing solely on mandates of a "technical" nature and with little scope for political controversies.[61] The public discussions about the interpretation of Swiss neutrality were resumed in the late 1980s when the changing circumstances in world politics and warfare caused the codified law of neutrality to lose its importance. In 1986, the vote on the accession of Switzerland to the UN further nourished the debate.[62]

With the end of the Cold War, Switzerland was forced to reinterpret the concept of neutrality and adapt it to the new political reality. In 1993, the administration published the *Report on*

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[58] Trachsler, "Von Petitpierre bis Calmy-Rey: Wiederkehrende Debatten um die Schweizer Aussenpolitik," (2011), p. 110.

[59] Ibid., p. 113.

[60] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 3.

[61] Ibid., p. 24+31.

[62] Rhinow, "Neutralität als Deckmantel für eine aktive oder restriktive Aussenpolitik? Anmerkungen zu einer Phantomdiskussion", in Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 19.

Neutrality 1993 and a *Report on Foreign Policy 1993*, which defined a new orientation regarding Swiss neutrality and in so doing, created new scope for action.[63] The former report introduced the term "security through cooperation" which pointed out the necessity to adapt to the new threats to security and foster cooperation with the new international and especially European organisations. In this context, Swiss neutrality was supposed to be a "flexible instrument to defend its own interests".[64] The traditional approach to neutrality wasn't completely abandoned, however. Particularly with regard to a possible NATO membership, Switzerland today still uses the law of neutrality to justify its incompatibility.

However, these reports adapted the Swiss foreign policy to the fact that the classical understanding of neutrality had lost most of its importance. This landmark reorientation opened the door for a more active foreign policy and engagement in den field of good offices. Neutrality has slowly transformed from a security policy into a foreign policy topic. The question of the compatibility of Swiss foreign policy with the concept of neutrality has lost in importance. Meanwhile, the question of how neutrality can be used as a tool in favour of its foreign policy has shifted to the centre of the discussion.[65] The accession to the UN in 2002 was a further decisive step towards a more open-minded and active foreign policy. Shortly after, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Micheline Calmy-Rey, introduced the term "active neutrality" which revived the notion of "neutrality and solidarity" and put emphasis on the Swiss humanitarian commitment.[66] Even though this focus has been criticized particularly by the conservative parties, it has also enjoyed a great acceptance among the population.[67] This can be attributed to, amongst others, the positive perception of the Swiss engagement in peace promotion and humanitarian crises.

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[63] "Bericht zur Neutralität. Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993; "Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993.

[64] "Bericht zur Neutralität. Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993, p. 3+15.

[65] Goetschel, "Neutralität: Handicap oder Branding der Schweizer Aussenpolitik", in Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen?, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 88.

[66] Madej, "Kulturelle Schlüsselbegriffe der Schweiz im öffentlichen Diskurs: eine kultursemantische Untersuchung", (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 239.

[67] Rhinow, "Neutralität als Deckmantel für eine aktive oder restriktive Aussenpolitik? Anmerkungen zu einer Phantomdiskussion", in Die Schweizer Neutralität. Beibehalten, umgestalten oder doch abschaffen, ed. Kreis (Zurich: Werdverlag, (2007)), p. 21.

The importance of neutrality for the Swiss engagement in civil peace promotion is controversial. The conversations with the interviewees have shown that neutrality is often overestimated in the field. While in some cases the reputation as a neutral country and the high credibility of Switzerland in the international arena can indeed be a small comparative advantage, the interviewees pointed out that impartiality is much more important. Nevertheless, neutrality has been playing a major role in the repositioning of Switzerland in the field of good offices. It has shaped the strategic reorientation of Swiss foreign policy and has given the necessary domestic legitimacy, which is a crucial factor in a semi-direct democracy such as Switzerland.

3. Swiss civil peace promotion in the 20ᵗʰ century

Switzerland has been engaged in civil peace promotion throughout the 20ᵗʰ century. However, its approach has been changing significantly over time. The Swiss efforts in the field of international arbitration, as a protecting power and as a host for international organisations have been a cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy over the years. In contrast to these more established forms of peace promotion, mediation played for a long time only a minor role in Swiss foreign policy. In the period between the foundation of the Swiss state in 1848 and the end of the Cold War, there are only few examples of Swiss mediation efforts. However, since the end of the Cold War, mediation has become a much more prominent instrument of Swiss politics.

3.1. Traditional forms of Swiss civil peace promotion

In its early years, Switzerland was a great advocate and promoter of international arbitration. The country often hosted and provided judges for ad-hoc courts such as in the case of the Alabama Claims in 1872 and the territorial disputes between Congo and Portugal in 1890.[68] With the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 and the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the importance of Swiss bilateral efforts decreased significantly. However, Switzerland managed to uphold its commitment in a predominantly multilateral framework thanks to mandates in connection with agreements such as the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the Treaty of Locarno in 1925.[69] But, by the end of World War II, judicial solutions to international disputes had lost much of their former importance and a new focus was put on political solutions. As a result, the appreciation of the international community for the major efforts made by Switzerland to set up the European court of Arbitration of the OSCE in Geneva has been very limited.[70]

Switzerland's global reputation in the field of good offices is strongly marked by its work as a protecting power. Under such mandates, Switzerland acted as an intermediary between states that broke off diplomatic relations. An example for such a mandate is the Swiss representation of the US interests in Cuba after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 or of the Iranian interests in

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[68] Graf and Lanz, "Conclusions: Switzerland as a paradigmatic case of small-state peace policy?," Swiss Political Science Review 19, no. 3 (2013), p. 414; Raymond Probst, "Good offices in the light of Swiss international practice and experience" (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 55.

[69] Jon A Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt" (2000), p. 108.

[70] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 13.

the US and vice versa as a consequence of the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1980.[71] The protecting power mandates can be seen as the most constant and significant form of Swiss peacebuilding.

This kind of Swiss peace engagement started with the Franco-German War in 1870 and reached its first peak during World War I with Switzerland holding 36 protecting power mandates. After a decrease in the interwar period, the number of mandates increased again massively during World War II, reaching an all-time high of 35 interests with over 200 single mandates.[72] The importance of Switzerland as a protecting power, particularly during the World Wars, can be attributed to its broad diplomatic network, its lack of ambitions in world politics as well as its neutrality, expertise and experience in this field.[73] Furthermore, these protecting power mandates, which were strictly bilateral and of technical nature, matched well Swiss foreign policy, standing out for its absolute discretion.[74]

During the Cold War, the number of mandates decreased significantly, but Switzerland was frequently asked to act as a protecting power in the course of international crises as shown in the example above. Thereby, the work as a protecting power did not only help to improve the Swiss reputation and strengthen its position in the international community, but also served as a basis for Swiss mediation efforts. Due to its good relationships with Iran and Israel, for example, Switzerland provided important groundwork to solve the Lebanon Hostage Crisis which took place between 1982 and 1992. Upon request of the United States, Switzerland used its broad network in the region to mediate between the parties involved with the goal of freeing the remaining hostages. In the end, however, because of Switzerland's lack of hard power or its refusal to make use of it, the decisive engagement of the UN was necessary to end the crisis.[75] Nevertheless, this case shows the importance of the protecting power mandates for the Swiss engagement in civil peace promotion and its position in the international arena. In recent years, the number of Swiss mandates has dropped to seven in 2018, due to the end of the west-east-antagonism and the increasing number of intra-state wars which resulted in a decline in the importance of traditional diplomatic instruments.[76]

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[71] Ibid., p. 5-7.

[72] Ibid., p. 5.

[73] Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 101.

[74] Gabriel, "The price of political uniqueness: Swiss foreign policy in a changing world", (2002), p. 15.

[75] Interviewee 2, interview by Laurence Herzog, 07.02.2018.

[76] Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 100.

Another crucial form of good offices has been the hosting of international conferences and international organisations. With the establishment of the League of Nations in Geneva after the end of World War I, Switzerland acquired a good reputation as a host country. Thereafter, Switzerland hosted a variety of conferences and meetings such as the earlier mentioned Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the Treaty of Locarno in 1925. Switzerland, as a politically stable and permanently neutral country with excellent infrastructure, was seen as an ideal location for international meetings. Particularly the city of Geneva gained further importance with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. Many UN bodies and international organisations settled in Geneva and made the city a hotspot and meeting point for international stakeholders.[77] The hosting of conferences such as the *International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* in the summer of 1955 and *the Geneva Summit of 1985* consolidated Switzerland as a reliable partner.[78] Since then, these engagements have become an important pillar of Swiss domestic and foreign policy.[79] However, the competition in this field has become much fiercer as other countries have discovered the benefits of hosting international organisations and conferences and have developed the necessary capabilities. In this light, Switzerland has been aiming at a more comprehensive approach, including a more proactive role in mediation and facilitation, in order to strengthen, amongst others, its importance as a host country.[80]

International mandates issued by intergovernmental organisations such as the UN or the OSCE became an increasingly important pillar of the Swiss peace policy at that time. As a full-member of the League of Nations, Switzerland had the opportunity to carry out a few international mandates in the interwar period and in so doing, gained first experiences in this field.[81] With the establishment of the UN, international mandates have become an essential element of global peacebuilding efforts. Even though Switzerland wasn't member of the UN until 2002, it occasionally took part in international mandates by transporting troops and goods as well as providing experts and experienced diplomats for specific missions.[82] After World War II, Switzerland was eager to demonstrate the advantages of neutrality which was under attack from

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[77] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 9f.

[78] Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 102.

[79] Ibid., p. 102f.

[80] Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018.

[81] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 21.

[82] Ibid., p. 23-25.

abroad. On that note, Switzerland accepted to be part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) as mentioned earlier. However, this mission turned out to be problematic as, in this context, Switzerland was seen as a Western power. Therefore, this role had a negative impact on Switzerland's credibility and reputation as a neutral country. Based on this experience, Switzerland became reluctant to get involved in international missions that weren't strictly of a technical nature. The subsequent Swiss involvement within the framework of the UN was limited to civil and financial support which was not considered a threat to Swiss neutrality.[83] These circumstances changed in 1986 when Switzerland held a national referendum on joining the UN. Even though the Swiss citizens voted clearly against the accession to the UN, the government intensified its cooperation with international organisations and pushed its policy of peace promotion increasingly onto the multilateral level.[84] With the loss of importance of traditional means of arbitration and other forms of good offices, this change of direction was critical.

3.2.   Mediation – A new pillar of Swiss peace policy

In contrast to the above-mentioned fields of activity, mediation hasn't been a traditional element of Swiss foreign policy. Over the course of the 20th century, Switzerland had only been involved in a few mediation efforts with limited success.[85] However, some experts, such as Raymond Probst, argue that due to the highly heterogeneous nature of Switzerland, the country has gained a lot of experience at the national level with regards to mediating between opposed religious, cultural and political groups.[86] Even though these circumstances might have resulted in a better understanding of the importance of peaceful settlement, it can hardly be called a tradition, especially considering the peculiarities of international mediation and the rarity of Swiss engagement at the international level.

The Swiss engagements in mediation that are known to the public are limited in number. During World War I, Switzerland offered its services to the major powers on several occasions, but without any considerable success. Even after the end of the war, its focus stayed on the

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[83] Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 110f; Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 21f.

[84] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 26.

[85] Gabriel, "The price of political uniqueness: Swiss foreign policy in a changing world", (2002), p. 14.

[86] Probst, "Good offices in the light of Swiss international practice and experience", (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 17.

settlement of disputes by arbitration.[87] The situation didn't change during World War II where Switzerland was very cautious not to get directly involved in the conflict. Furthermore, the few attempts that were made by the Swiss government failed due to the refusal of the allies to enter into talks with Germany at any time. However, towards the end of World War II, individual Swiss personalities were able to facilitate agreements on regional capitulations, such as the German capitulation in Northern Italy. [88]

With the establishment of the UN after the war, it was commonly assumed that in the future, the peaceful settlement of disputes would be increasingly addressed and tackled by the newly created intergovernmental organisations. However, with the emerging east-west gap the weaknesses and limitations of the UN came to light and Switzerland perceived these new tensions as an opportunity to highlight the benefits of a permanently neutral state with a discreet foreign policy. Based on the earlier mentioned concept of "neutrality and solidarity", Switzerland tried to get involved more actively as a facilitator and mediator in conflicts.

This strategy suffered early setbacks, amongst others, due to the disappointing results of the above-mentioned contribution in the aftermath of the Korean War and the unsuccessful efforts in the Suez Crisis. Particularly the failed Swiss attempt to initiate talks during the Suez Crisis in 1956 underlined the difficulties of a small state to get involved in Cold War politics. Despite the favourable position as a protecting power, Switzerland demonstrated a serious lack of information and made some fundamental mistakes in communication which resulted in harsh criticism by France. This failed attempt also sparked criticism on the national level and led to a more cautious and passive Swiss foreign policy.[89] As a result, Switzerland was reluctant to accept new mandates, for instance during the Berlin Crisis or the Cuban Missile Crisis.

A case that stands out is the French-Algerian negotiations which led to the Evian Accords and finally, the independence of Algeria in July 1962. Thanks to the close personal relationship between Swiss ambassador Olivier Long and French Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe, Switzerland was seen as a suitable facilitator by all parties. The peace process started with a meeting in Lucerne and was continued in Evian and Lugrin on the French side of Lake Geneva.

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[87] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 14.

[88] Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 103f.

[89] Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 14; Fanzun and Lehmann, "Die Schweiz und die Welt", (2000), p. 105.

Switzerland hosted the Algerian delegation, served as a channel of communication and successfully brought the parties back to the table in February 1962 after the talks risked breaking down.[90] This engagement can be seen as one of the few successful efforts of Switzerland in the field of mediation up to the end of the Cold War.

To sum up, mediation has played only a minor role in Swiss history and can be seen rather as a by-product of the overall Swiss involvement in civil peace promotion. Based on its engagement as a protecting power and host of international organisations, Switzerland was able to build up a large diplomatic network which put the country in a favourable position to contribute selectively as a facilitator and mediator to the peaceful settlement of disputes such as the Iran Hostage Crisis or the Algerian-French Negotiations. However, with the major changes happening in peace promotion towards the end of the Cold War, Switzerland changed its approach and started to devote greater attention to the expanding field of mediation.

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[90] Olivier Long, "Le dossier secret des Accords d'Evian: une mission suisse pour la paix en Algérie" (24 heures, 1988); Fischer, "Switzerland's good offices: a changing concept, 1945-2002," (2002), p. 16f; Probst, "Good offices in the light of Swiss international practice and experience", (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 41.

4. Re-evaluation and repositioning of Swiss peace policy

For Switzerland, the early 1990s were a period of re-evaluation and repositioning. The major shifts in world politics forced most states to rethink their foreign policy. Particularly in the fast-growing field of conflict resolution, new scope of action was created with the end of the Cold War which offered small states new options to shape world politics and represent their national interests more actively in the international community. In this context, Switzerland struggled to keep up with the fast pace of change. Bogged down in discussions about neutrality and its special role in Europe, Switzerland only slowly adapted to the new environment. Furthermore, against the backdrop of the unsuccessful referendum on UN membership in 1986, the government's room for manoeuvre was limited as the Swiss citizens had clearly expressed their reluctance for a stronger involvement in international organisations. Therefore, the engagement in peace promotion and more specifically in international mediation was only slowly adjusted and remained on a rather low level in comparison to other small European states, such as the Scandinavian countries. Notwithstanding, a new focus was put on a more active international profile and a closer collaboration with the international community as Switzerland feared to become isolated due to its absence in most of the important institutions.

All in all, the period between 1990 and 1992 was characterized by a soul-searching process, a stronger emphasis on active participation in the international community as well as the continuation and intensification of already existing efforts. In 1993, the dynamics in the field of peace promotion changed significantly as the Federal Council published the *Report on Neutrality* and the *Report on Foreign Policy* which informed the public about the repositioning of Switzerland in the changing international context and the new alignment of its foreign policy. These reports and the *Report on Security Policy* published in 1990 set new processes in motion and laid the groundwork for a more proactive form of peace promotion.

4.1. Situation analysis and the setting of new priorities

The *Report on Security Policy* published in 1990 by the Federal Council gives us valuable insights into the assessment of the transition period by the Swiss government and its new set of priorities. It illustrates the difficulty it faced to determine a clear orientation and define concrete long-term foreign policy measures in an environment of rapid change. While the authors of the report stuck with a rather traditional view on security policy, they highlighted the necessity for

a "higher flexibility" of the Swiss security system in order to be able to adapt to the crucial changes in global politics.[91]

Despite the rather general nature of the report, two major trends can be identified: The strong focus on European politics and the enhancement of Swiss peace promotion. By declaring peace promotion as the first element of the military's security policy strategy, Switzerland sent out a clear message which went beyond the strict security policy domain. The report stated that the traditional good offices would be strengthened and enlarged. Furthermore, the country aimed to intensify its support for the international peacekeeping missions and efforts, not only by material means, but also through the deployment of blue helmet soldiers.[92] In spite of these clear statements, the report didn't come up with new elements but focused predominantly on the continuation and reinforcement of already existing efforts. Many of the engagements in peace promotion outlined in the report had already been initiated before the publication of the document, such as the support for the UN mission in Namibia, which had been deployed in 1989.[93] In this sense, the report can also be seen as an account of the status quo and, as expressed by Prof. Dr. Curt Gasteyger, it was a message to its "own population and the international community signalling that they could further count on an active Swiss approach in security and peace policy".[94]

During the autumn session of 1991, the United Federal Assembly accepted the *Report on Security Policy* despite some minor criticism. Various members expressed concerns about the lack of vision and concrete propositions. However, it is interesting to note that the reinforcement of the Swiss commitment to peace promotion was not mentioned in the debate of the National Council what suggests that at that stage, the increased engagement wasn't politically controversial.[95] On the contrary, the motions and postulates submitted by members of the Council of States in the 1991 autumn session show that the legislator supported the

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[91] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz", 1990, p.849.

[92] Ibid., p.875f.

[93] Kaspar Villiger, "Sicherheitspolitik und Armee. Friede in Freiheit und Menschenwürde," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 262 (1989).

[94] Prof. Dr. Curt Gasteyger, "Ansätze zu einer Sicherheitspolitik. Überlegungen zum Bericht des Bundesrates," ibid., no. 245 (1990).

[95] Monika Rosenberg, "Der Sicherheitsbericht des Bundesrates vom Nationalrat gutgeheissen. Beginn der Beratung des Datenschutzgesetzes," ibid., no. 128 (1991).

intensification of the Swiss efforts in military and civil peace promotion.[96] In this regard, the *Report on Security Policy* reflects the general consensus of the politicians and administration that the new political environment required new efforts and increased collaboration, especially in peace promotion. However, it also shows that the Swiss government was still very reluctant to get involved in international matters and that the approach was lacking a strategic differentiation between military and non-military measures.[97] A clear positioning and strategy were still missing.

4.2. Active peace promotion with a traditional toolbox

The above outlined position describes the general Swiss efforts in peace promotion in the period between 1990 and 1992. The focus during that transition period was on the efforts to intensify the Swiss engagement on the international level. This increased commitment was to a large extent driven by the fear of "international isolation". With the end of the east-west antagonism, international organisations, most prominently the UN, gained importance and led the Swiss government to realize that its non-membership in significant international institutions put Switzerland in a weak position. This fear of international marginalization has been a key narrative and feature of Swiss foreign policy, but gained even more in relevance with the end of the bipolar world system. On that note, in its annual report of 1990, the Federal Council pointed out that "the possibilities of a smaller political system to carry out national actions are increasingly limited".[98] In this context, the Federal Council concluded that contributions to multilateral missions needed to be brought to the fore. This analysis was also supported by the United Federal Assembly which is reflected by approved requests, such as the postulate of the National Councillor Jean Spielmann "For an active peace policy", demanding a greater involvement in international peace and disarmament processes as well as the various requests of a wide range of parties advocating for a new vote on UN membership.[99]

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[96] Neue Zürcher Zeitung, "Sicherheitsdebatte im Ständerat. Rüstungsprogramm 1991 einmütig gebilligt," ibid., no. 222; United Federal Assembly. "Übersicht über die Verhandlungen der Bundesversammlung. Herbstsession 1991 (20. Tagung der 43. Legislatur)", 1991.

[97] Gasteyger, "Ansätze zu einer Sicherheitspolitik. Überlegungen zum Bericht des Bundesrates," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 245 (1990).

[98] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.6.

[99] Federal Chancellary of Switzerland. "Overview of the discussion of the United Federal Assembly. Special Session February 1990. Spring Session 1990", 1990, p.125; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Motions and Postulates of the legislative councils 1992", 1992, p.12f.

Despite the rejection of the accession to the UN in 1986, Switzerland reinforced its efforts within the UN in the early 1990s in order to minimize the negative impact of the vote on Swiss foreign policy. With the increased emphasis on peace promotion as stated in the *Report on Security Policy 1990*, the budget for the administrative costs for support to the UN increased by more than 30 percent between 1991 and 1992.[100] Switzerland supported UN peacekeeping missions with medical units, election observers, officers and financial means. The Federal Council also decided to support the international sanctions against the Iraqi regime and drafted a new law in 1992 that would allow the military to send blue helmets.[101] Moreover, the importance of Geneva as a centre for international organisations and the location of many UN bodies played a crucial role in counteracting the increased international isolation of Switzerland. The efforts undertaken by the Swiss government within the UN were considerable, but not comparable to the ones of other European states. Nevertheless, Switzerland got a few opportunities to participate more actively in the UN bodies, amongst others thanks to the appointment of the Swiss diplomats Edouard Brunner and Johannes J. Manz as special envoys in the Middle East and West Sahara.[102]

Another and even more important international platform for Switzerland at that time was the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which in 1995 changed its name to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[103] As a result of the tensions in the region of the former Soviet Union and the civil war in Yugoslavia starting in 1991, which led to significant migration, Switzerland had to reinforce its engagement in Europe. Due to its non-participation in the main European institutions, the promotion of peace and stability within Europe in cooperation with the OSCE and its member states became one of the main foci of Swiss foreign policy.[104] In this context, Switzerland played an active role in fostering a system

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[100] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 8. April zur Staatrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1991", 1992; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 31. März zur Staatrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1992", 1993.

[101] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991", 1991, p.6; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.56.

[102] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991," 126, no. 2 (1991), p.26.

[103] *The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCE) will be called throughout this thesis by its later name *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (OSCE).

[104] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.8; Federal Council of Switzerland.

of peaceful settlement and in establishing a model for peacekeeping missions within the OSCE.[105] Furthermore, it offered its good offices to the conflict parties in Yugoslavia and as of 1992, it became the host of the conference on Yugoslavia.[106] This strong focus on European politics characterized the Swiss foreign policy in the early and mid-1990s and, with the exception of a few international mediation efforts, most of the Swiss resources in peace promotion were used in the European context. On that note, the Federal Council wrote in his annual report 1991: "These developments [the non-membership in the UN and the European integration] lead inevitably to a certain concentration of Swiss foreign policy activities on Europe".[107]

As illustrated above, the active participation in international organisations became a major priority of Swiss foreign policy. It was considered as an efficient way to counteract the increased international isolation and enhance Swiss peace promotion while pursuing a low-risk foreign policy. In the period between 1990 and 1992 only a few bilateral mediation attempts were made. They were mostly connected to already existing engagements or protecting power mandates. Thus, Switzerland facilitated between Iraq and the United States a few days before the outbreak of the First Gulf War.[108] As protecting power of the United States in Iran, Switzerland also contributed substantially to the ending of the Lebanon Hostage Crisis in 1992. Furthermore, the Swiss government supported the negotiation on the constitution in South Africa, after having already been active in the country in the late 1980s when making an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to free Nelson Mandela.[109]

"Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991", 1991, p.9; Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1992," 127 (1992), p.12.

[105] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.63; Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1992," 127 (1992), p.12.

[106] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1992," 127 (1992), p.50.

[107] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991," 126, no. 2 (1991), p.7-9.

[108] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.50; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991", 1991, p.33.

[109] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991", 1991, p.33; Federal Council of Switzerland,

These engagements show that Switzerland was eager to be more active in the field of mediation also on a bilateral level and to make use of the new scope of action. However, it can be noted that there wasn't yet a systematic approach and that the efforts were very much dependent on the Swiss network which was based on the traditional forms of good offices such as the protecting power mandates. Furthermore, the focus of the Swiss peace promotion in the early 1990s was, as shown above, predominantly on participation in international organisations and the stabilization of the European landscape. That might also have been a reason why Switzerland was lacking a clear strategy and concrete measures to foster on bilateral initiatives in facilitation and mediation. Moreover, in contrast to the multilateral engagements in civil peace promotion, the bilateral approach challenged the risk-averse and neutral Swiss foreign policy. A first discussion on the reinterpretation of neutrality policy and the reorientation of Swiss foreign policy was only initiated in 1993 with the *Report on Neutrality* and the *Report on Foreign Policy*. Until then, some fundamental issues stayed officially unanswered.[110]

In the early 1990s, the Swiss budget for peace promotion was very limited despite the clear commitment in the *Report on Security Policy 1990* and the general support of the new vision by the United Federal Council. This might be due to the fact that in the beginning of the decade, the Swiss economy plunged into recession and the internal priorities were set elsewhere.[111] Moreover, in an interview, a former representative of Switzerland pointed out that for some time the country didn't realize that the field of peace promotion had transformed itself into a "market place".[112] With this notion, the interviewee referred to the increasingly crowded field of civil peace promotion and the emergence of competition between mediators as described and analysed in the paper of Lanz and Gasser (2011).[113] His statement might indicate that

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"Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991," 126, no. 2 (1991), p.19; Fischer, "From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland's Contribution to International Conflict Resolution", in Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002 (Springer); Richard Rosenthal, "Mission Improbable: A piece of the South African Story" (David Philip Publishers, 1998).

[110] "Bericht zur Neutralität. Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993; "Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993.

[111] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1993 vom 16. Februar 1994", 1994, p.5.

[112] Interviewee 3, interview by Laurence Herzog, 22.02.2018.

[113] David Lanz and Rachel Gasser, "A crowded field: competition and coordination in international peace mediation," (2013).

Switzerland was not aware of the level of experience, degree of professionalization and level of investment needed to establish itself successfully in this profoundly changing field.

On an institutional level, not much was done to enhance Swiss peace promotion in the period between 1990 and 1992. In the early 1990s, Switzerland was primarily focusing on the new security situation and the related reforms of the military sector which were, for the first time, outlined in the *Army Guideline 95* in 1992.[114] In this context, the focal point of public interest was the newly-drafted *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations*, also published in 1992.[115] However, the law was never implemented as a referendum was called and the population thereupon rejected it in 1994.[116] Meanwhile, in the field of civil peace promotion only few institutional changes were made. In the annual report of 1992, the Federal Council highlights that "considering the limited financial and personal resources, the reinforcement of foreign policy instruments has to be inevitably searched for through the optimisation of already existing means".[117] With this in mind, the government set up a new division within the Political Affairs Directorate of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The new Political Affairs Division III. covered the areas of peace, security and disarmament policy as well as the engagement in the OSCE and the role as protecting power.[118] This step allowed the administration to exploit synergies between these fields. Moreover, in February 1990, the Foreign Ministry established a new division called Service for Questions of Peace which was meant to manage the Swiss peace policy outside the international organisations.[119] Besides the lack of financial resources and in spite of structural improvements, there was also an insufficient legal basis for an extensive Swiss commitment to civil peace promotion. It was only at the turn of the millennium that Switzerland started to adapt its legal framework.

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[114] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee in den neunziger Jahren (Armeeleitbild 95)", 1992.

[115] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 24. August betreffend das Bundesgesetz über schweizerische Truppen für friedenserhaltende Operationen", 1992.

[116] Eric Hoesli, "L'échec des casques bleus prive le Conseil fédéral de sa crédibilité internationale," *Le Nouveau Quotidien*, no. 782 (1994); Hugo Bütler, "Ein Nachwort zum 12. Juni," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 140 (1994).

[117] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1992," 127 (1992), p.5.

[118] Federal Chancellary of Switzerland. "Eidgenössischer Staatskalender 1989/90", 1989, p.71; Federal Chancellary of Switzerland. "Eidgenössischer Staatskalender 1991/92", 1991, p.71.

[119] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1990", 1990, p.52.

4.3. Report on Neutrality and Report on Foreign Policy – New room for manoeuvre

The transition period ended in December 1993 with the publication of two important foreign policy reports.[120] The *Report on Neutrality* and the *Report on Foreign Policy* laid the groundwork for a new orientation of Swiss foreign policy. Even though the documents were formulated rather broadly, they provided important clarifications and defined a common ground. On that note, the Swiss daily newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung qualified the reports as "a consensus document" and "a happy medium".[121]

Most importantly, the *Report on Foreign Policy* made a clear shift of emphasis and defined "the protection and enhancement of security and peace" as the first goal of foreign policy.[122] With this decision, the Federal Council determined peace promotion, conflict prevention and collective security as a high priority of Swiss foreign policy. Furthermore, the report focused largely on the importance of Swiss participation in international institutions, such as the OSCE, UN and EU. The authors made it clear that "security and peace can and should be largely provided through broad-based cooperation between states".[123] Therefore, they concluded that Switzerland should strive to join international institutions such as the UN and the EU. According to the report, the constraints that come along with the non-membership of Switzerland in important international organisations hinder efficient representation of national interests in the international community.[124]

Bilateral efforts of Switzerland in the field of peace promotion were not mentioned in the report which might suggest that Switzerland, as a small country, had to place greater priority on efforts on a multilateral level, as indicated in the annual report of 1991.[125] The omission might also point to the fact that Switzerland had no clear vision on the possibilities and its own capabilities to act as a peace facilitator and therefore, a clear strategy in that area was missing. The report

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[120] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1993 vom 16. Februar 1994", 1994, p.4.

[121] Max Frenkel, "Neuorientierung der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Handlungsspielraum - und Handlungsbedarf," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 283 (1993).

[122] "Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993, p.3.

[123] Ibid., p.17.

[124] Ibid., p.16.

[125] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht über die Geschäftsführung des Bundesrates, des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen Versicherungsgerichts im Jahre 1991", 1991, p.32f.

also highlighted that, in a world in which foreign policy tasks had become more complex and intertwined, the setting of priorities and the optimisation of existing tools were essential as financial and personal resources were limited.[126] In general, the *Report on Foreign Policy* was received positively by the public, media and political parties. The added dimension of peace promotion wasn't much debated, in contrast to the outlined strategy of the Swiss integration into Europe which was much more controversial in the early 90s. A former representative of Switzerland stated in an interview that the *Report on Foreign Policy* didn't introduce new aspects, but should rather be seen as an account of the status quo.[127] This assessment was also shared by the daily newspaper Bund, which noted that the Federal Council did not dare to write more than an analysis.[128]

Although the Swiss status of neutrality had lost much of its importance with the end of the Cold War, the relevance of the *Report on Neutrality* should not be underestimated. Neutrality as a reliable protector of Swiss sovereignty and a responsibility towards Europe has been an essential narrative of Swiss politics and is strongly anchored in the self-image of Swiss citizens as illustrated in chapter 2. In this context, the *Report on Neutrality* pointed out that neutrality policy had always been a flexible instrument that needed to be adjusted to the present circumstances. It is a tool to represent national interests.[129] In underlining this, the Federal Council strengthened its legitimacy for a more proactive foreign policy. The authors of the report showed that on the one hand, neutrality favours the Swiss good offices, but on the other hand, it can also hinder Switzerland from accepting politically sensitive mediation tasks.[130] With this in mind, the report highlighted that "neutrality should not be perceived as a position of sitting still and standing apart".[131] The Swiss foreign policy should rather be an active one, that protects Swiss national interests through international solidarity. Hence, the traditional formula "security through neutrality and independence" was complemented with the new statement "security through cooperation".[132] This new formula and the simple observation that

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[126] "Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993, p.37.

[127] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

[128] Fröhlich Walter, "Dans la presse alémanique. Rapport sur la politique étrangère: le message a bien passé," *Journal de Genève*, no. 284 (1993).

[129] "Bericht zur Neutralität. Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993", 1993, p.3+6.

[130] Ibid., p.9.

[131] Ibid., p.12.

[132] Ibid., p.15+27.

neutrality can stand for an active foreign policy constituted an important step towards a more engaged peace policy. A former ambassador stated in an interview that the *Report on Neutrality* ultimately clarified the Swiss position after a period of insecurity and defined the new scope of action for state officials and especially diplomats who represented the Swiss interests abroad.[133]

Even though the interviewees assessed the importance of the two reports differently, the documents present, without doubt, a leap forward in Swiss peace policy. They provide the strategic direction for the following years and lay the groundwork for a more active peace policy. In the subsequent years, the Swiss Foreign Ministry moved to a much more proactive role in the field of peace promotion under the leadership of Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti.

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[133] Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018; Fischer, "From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland's Contribution to International Conflict Resolution", in Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002 (Springer).

5. Flavio Cotti – A new approach to Swiss peace policy [1993-1999]

In 1993, Flavio Cotti, former Minister of Home Affairs and member of the Christian Democratic People's Party, became head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. He introduced major changes in the ministry by defining new priorities in accordance with the repositioning of Switzerland's foreign policy. He was eager to reposition Switzerland in the international arena. The period between 1993 and 1999 was marked by the Swiss OSCE chairmanship and the new commitment within the NATO programme *Partnership for Peace* (PfP). In this context, Switzerland broke new ground and explored its capabilities. A high-ranked official described this period as a roller-coaster with many ups and downs.[134] Undoubtedly, these years served as a catalyst for the Swiss commitment to peace promotion in general, as it generated internal support as well as recognition abroad.

5.1. Institutional changes at the start of Cotti's term of office

Shortly after his appointment as Foreign Minister, Flavio Cotti introduced major reforms to restructure the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs much to the chagrin of many diplomats.[135] Amongst others, he streamlined the organisation by reducing the number of directorates from 5 to 3 and, in so doing, concentrated the decision-making power in the hands of a few people closely connected to him.[136] Thereby, Jakob Kellenberger, later president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who in the media was often referred to as the "alter ego" of Cotti, played a crucial role as State Secretary.[137] In this process, the Directorate for International Organisations was integrated into the Political Directorate which became a new division focusing not only on the collaboration with international institutions, but also on handling security and peace-related topics. This step allowed the directorate to use the synergies between the divisions and their respective fields of activity. According to a former ambassador, Cotti also planned to establish a separate task force which was meant to focus solely on Swiss efforts in peace promotion. However, to the satisfaction of many diplomats, this idea was not implemented. The interviewee explained that the concept of a task force would not have taken

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[134] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

[135] Jean-Marie Crevoisier, "Flavio Cotti, le machiavel," *Journal de Genève*, no. 289 (1995).

[136] Federal Chancellary of Switzerland. "Eidgenössischer Staatskalender 1996", 1996, p.91.

[137] Max Frenkel, "Nachricht vom Hofe des Grosskhans," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 182 (1997), p.11; Jean-Marie Crevoisier, "Falvio Cotti renforce son pouvoir et provoque la grogne des diplomates," *Journal de Genève*, no. 256 (1994), p.15.

into account the paramount importance of the diplomats abroad and their wide network as a source of information and know-how.[138]

This concentration of power and Cotti's philosophy of leadership, described by a close staff member in a news article as "control of the movement", raised some controversy. At the same time, his understanding of the necessity to adapt to the new circumstances by bringing about the end of the traditional form of neutrality policy and good services as well as to pursue a more proactive foreign policy by putting greater focus on peace promotion, earned him recognition.[139] A former representative of Switzerland, who closely worked with Cotti in those days, noted that even though he was lacking a clear diplomatic understanding and was predominantly interested in short-term and media-effective results, Cotti's determination to reposition Switzerland in the international arena and his support of key players in the administration were crucial for the Swiss efforts at that time.[140]

5.2. An early setback for military peace promotion

In the beginning of Cotti's term of office, military peace promotion, in the area of competence of the *Federal Military Department (FMD)*, experienced an early setback. In June 1994, the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations*, which was based on the *Security Policy Report 1990*, was rejected in a popular vote by 57.2 percent of the population, thus prohibiting the arming of Swiss peace support forces abroad.[141] The opponents of the new federal law argued that the arming and increase in troops would lead to exorbitant costs and undermine the clear rejection of the Swiss population to join the UN in 1986.[142] Moreover, they questioned the compatibility of the law with the Swiss status of neutrality and the general effectiveness of blue helmet missions. The VOX survey, which analysed the voting behaviour during the campaign, showed that the main reason for the rejection of the law was the fear of high costs and not so much the concern about neutrality. Apart from that, many people

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[138] Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018.

[139] Raul Lautenschütz, "Es schwankt sein Bild im Urteil der Chronisten. Zum Rücktritt von Bundesrat Flavio Cotti," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 10 (1999).

[140] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

[141] Boris Wernli, Pascal Sciarini, and José Barranco, "Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 12. Juni 1994", (VOX - Analysen eidgenössischer Urnengänge, 1994).

[142] Günther Unser, "Das Nein des Schweizervolkes zum Blauhelmgesetz", *Bulletin 1994 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, p.5f.

prioritized the support of humanitarian efforts, such as the financial support of the International Committee of the Red Cross.[143]

This meant that military peace promotion lost its importance or at least stagnated whereas civil peacebuilding efforts increased under the leadership of Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti.[144] In 1994 and 1995, we observe a considerable reduction of the budget for peacekeeping troops and only a slow recovery thereafter.[145] Hence, the Swiss efforts in military peacekeeping missions remained, in comparison with other European states, on a low level over the following years and are still of lesser importance today.[146]

After the rejection of this new federal law, many Swiss journalists and politicians were afraid of the further international isolation of Switzerland, which had already become a prominent topic after the earlier rejection of the UN membership in 1986 and the membership to the EEA in 1992.[147] As a response to this fear and to minimize the ramifications of the vote, the Federal Council did not interpret the result as a directional decision. It reinforced its efforts in civil peace promotion and, within the reduced budget, continued to participate in UN and OSCE missions with non-armed personnel.[148]

Despite the attempts of the Federal Council to develop both areas of peace promotion simultaneously, only the civil approach gained momentum, amongst other factors, due to the clear rejection of the federal law.[149] The growing importance of civil peace promotion initiated

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[143] Wernli, Sciarini, and Barranco, "Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmung vom 12. Juni 1994", p.2f.

[144] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Political Division III., 12.02.1997: "Demokratie- und friedensfördernde Massnahmen des EDA. Zivile friedensfördernde Massnahmen der Schweiz nach der Abstimmung über die UNO Blauhelme".

[145] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 29. März zur Staatrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1999", 2000, p.234f.

[146] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 21.04.2004: "Zivile und militärische Friedensförderung: Beiträge der Schweiz an friedensunterstützende Operationen der internationalen Gemeinschaft – Überlegungen in mittel- und langfristiger Perspektive"; Andrea Baumann and Marco Wyss, "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Switzerland", in *Providing for Peacekeeping* (2016).

[147] Bütler, "Ein Nachwort zum 12. Juni," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 140 (1994).

[148] Anton Keller. "Interpellation Keller Anton. Friedensförderung ohne Blauhelme", 1995, p.3.

[149] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Political Division III., 12.02.1997: "Demokratie- und friedensfördernde Massnahmen des EDA. Zivile friedensfördernde Massnahmen der Schweiz nach der Abstimmung über die UNO Blauhelme"; Keller. "Interpellation Keller Anton. Friedensförderung ohne Blauhelme", 1995.

a general shift towards a more political and diplomatic peace policy. While in the early 1990s the earlier mentioned *Security Policy Report 1990*, the *Report on Neutrality 1993* and the army reform *Armee 95* mostly emphasized a traditional military approach to national security, the increasing significance of civil peace promotion and the shift of power to the Foreign Ministry brought a more humanitarian and political perspective to the fore.

This shift was also reinforced by the overall political and public support of civil peace promotion. In contrast to its military counterpart, civil peace promotion could be seen as a continuation of the "Swiss humanitarian tradition". With this in mind, popular initiatives were launched – such as the initiative *Less military expenditure and more peace policy*, which was invalidated by the parliament in 1995, or the initiative *Solidarity creates security: For a civil peace service* formulated in 1997 – which both illustrate, despite their invalidation and rejection, a high interest in civil peace promotion.[150] This general interest in the political dimension of peace promotion can also be observed in the parliamentary debates of the time. Motions and interpellations such as the debate on *Support for battle zones* and *Peace promotion without blue helmets* in 1994 were met with much approval.[151]

5.3. The rapprochement to the OSCE

In this favourable atmosphere for civil peace promotion, Switzerland decided to take up the challenge to serve as Chairman of the OSCE in 1996. Despite a slow economic growth and financial pressure at the time, this decision was assessed positively by the press and predominantly seen as an opportunity to contribute more actively to European integration and to be visible on the international stage.[152]

According to an interviewee, Flavio Cotti was instrumental in the decision-making process leading to the acceptance of the chairmanship: "If he hadn't wanted the OSCE chairmanship, we wouldn't have done it".[153] However, it was not only the wish of the Foreign Minister that

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[150] Gruppe für eine Schweiz ohne Armee (GSoA), "JA zum Verbot der Kriegsmaterialausfuhr," (1997), https://www.gsoa.ch/press_release/ja-zum-verbot-der-kriegsmaterialausfuhr/; Federal Chancellary of Switzerland, "Eidgenössische Volksinitiative 'für weniger Militärausgaben und mehr Friedenspolitik'," (2018), https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis225.html.

[151] Keller. "Interpellation Keller Anton. Friedensförderung ohne Blauhelme", 1995; Jacques-Simon Eggly. "Hilfe an Krisengebiete", 1994.

[152] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1995", 1995.

[153] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

led to this engagement. Just as important was the fact that Switzerland was eager to counteract its increased European isolation as well as its lack of engagement on the multilateral level. In the mid-1990s, Swiss foreign policy was strongly concerned with the European integration. After the rejection of the EEA membership in 1992, Switzerland became even more isolated in Europe. In this context, the OSCE, one of the few European institutions that Switzerland was a member of, turned out to be an ideal platform to participate more actively in European politics and improve Switzerland's standing on the continent.[154] Furthermore, with the focus of the institution on peace promotion, Switzerland had a great opportunity to demonstrate its regained ambitions in this field.[155] Over the years, the OSCE region had become the main focus of Swiss peace policy and the chairmanship a perfect starting point to further intensify its commitment.[156]

Declared by the journalist Raul Lautenschütz as "one of the greatest international challenges for Swiss post-war diplomacy", the OSCE chairmanship was not only a huge challenge for the Swiss Foreign Ministry, but also a good opportunity to explore its own capabilities in the field of peace promotion.[157] The importance of this exceptional commitment and the huge dimension of this task for a small country like Switzerland can be observed through the very substantial budget increase between 1993 and 1996. The budget for the OSCE increased more than sixfold during that period of time.[158]

The first focal point of the Swiss OSCE presidency was the implementation of the *Dayton Agreement* in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, at the time, was the largest OSCE operation that had

[154] Wenger Andreas and Breitenmoser Christoph, "Die OSZE-Präsidentschaft 1996: Eine Herausforderung für die schweizerische Aussenpolitik," *Bulletin 1995 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* (1995).

[155] Raul Lautenschütz, "OSZE-Präsidium - Chancen und Risiken," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 275 (1995).

[156] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 4.12.1995: "Actions de la Suisse dans le domaine de la pomotion civile de la paix pour la période 1996-1999; Anhang: Konzept friedensfördernde Massnahmen"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234-02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 16.01.1998: "Jahresbericht 1997 der Sektion für Friedensfragen".

[157] Lautenschütz, "OSZE-Präsidium - Chancen und Risiken," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 275 (1995).

[158] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 31. März zur Staatrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1992", 1993, p.422; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 5. April zur Staatrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1994", 1995, p.421; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 3. April zur Staatsrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1995", 1996, p.421b; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 26. März zur Staatsrechnung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft für das Jahr 1996", 1997, p.421b.

ever been carried out.[159] By sending more than 170 experts, non-armed military personnel ("yellow caps") and building up the Swiss Headquarter Support Unit which coordinated the international efforts, Switzerland played an instrumental role in the organisation and implementation of the national elections in September 1996.[160] Besides the OSCE efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the discussion about a new security model for Europe in the twenty-first century as well as the peace negotiations for the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya were at the core of the Swiss chairmanship.[161] While the tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina were clearly defined by the agreement, the situation in the Caucasus was much more complex. Additionally, Switzerland was only poorly informed and had little experience in the region, which made the tasks even more challenging.[162] At the same time, the lack of experience also meant that Switzerland had no special interests in the region and was therefore able to present itself as an honest broker, particularly in respect to Russia.[163]

By and large, the Swiss presidency was positively assessed by the international community and the Swiss public.[164] The chairmanship gave a clear sign to other countries that Switzerland was prepared to contribute to the European peace order and committed to get more engaged on a multilateral level. Flavio Cotti pointed out that the OSCE presidency was the first step to a more open and internationally connected Switzerland. That year showed that the country had the capacities and capabilities to assume a more active role in the international arena without violating the principles of neutrality.[165] In 1996, Switzerland also joined the Partnership for

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[159] Andreas Doepfner, "Cotti über Schweizer Akzente in der OSZE. Gensellschaft der Bürger - Sicherheit für das 21. Jahrhundert," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 286 (1995); Andreas and Christoph, "Die OSZE-Präsidentschaft 1996: Eine Herausforderung für die schweizerische Aussenpolitik," Bulletin 1995 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (1995), p.1; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Geschäftsbericht 1996: Bericht des Bundesrates über Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung", 1996, p.8; Willy Boder, "Le Conseil fédéral souhaite envoyer des bérets bleus en Bosnie," *Le Nouveau Quotidien*, no. 1152 (1995).

[160] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Geschäftsbericht 1996: Bericht des Bundesrates über Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung", 1996, p.8; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung", 1996, p.18f.

[161] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung", 1996, p.19.

[162] Elisabeth Levy, "Les «boys» de Flavio Cotti achèvent à Lisbonne une année éreintante," *Le Nouveau Quotidien*, no. 1411 (1996); Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung", 1996, p.19.

[163] Sylvain Astier, "Moscou et Berne: une étonnante complicité," *Journal de Genève et Gazette de Lausanne*, no. 248 (1996).

[164] Madeleine Kunin, "Amerikanisches Lob für Schweizer Aussenpolitik. Verstärktes Engagement für Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 8 (1997); Beat Ammann, "Erste Bilanz Cottis zum OSZE-Vorsitz," ibid., no. 274 (1996).

[165] Ammann, "Erste Bilanz Cottis zum OSZE-Vorsitz," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 274 (1996).

Peace led by NATO, thus confirming its willingness to intensify its multilateral engagement in the field of peace promotion.

5.4. Increased visibility and damaged reputation

The OSCE chairmanship and the participation in the Partnership for Peace corresponded to the newly set foci of the Foreign Ministry for the years 1996-1999. The Federal Council planned to invest more resources "in personnel deployment and the concrete implementation of projects" in order to increase the general visibility of the Swiss peacebuilding efforts. In the period between 1995 and 1998, Switzerland more than doubled its resources in this field.[166] In this regard, 1996 was a successful year, as Switzerland was able to gain more visibility on the international stage. However, while the efforts and achievements of Switzerland during the OSCE chairmanship received broad support in the Swiss public, Cotti's emphasis on the visibility and media-effectiveness of efforts was much more controversial. In this context, journalist Max Frenkel wrote: "In fact, the difference between the domestic PR-activities of the department illustrating great foreign interests and the international marginalisation of the Foreign Minister couldn't be greater".[167] This statement indicates that, despite the unique access to the European arena Switzerland had in 1996, Cotti's media-effective public appearances could not conceal the fact that the country's role in the international community remained limited, reflecting Switzerland's overall political influence.

The OSCE chairmanship and its high presence in international media provided the government with a much-needed opportunity to improve the country's image and reputation, which started to be tarnished in 1996 when the so-called *Holocaust Affair* caused a lot of bad publicity for the country. Triggered by an inquiry of the US Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the initiators of the *Holocaust Affair* criticized that the role of Switzerland during the Second World War hadn't been properly investigated by the Swiss government, particularly in respect to the looted gold and valuables stored in Swiss banks by Nazi Germany. The global outcry led to numerous requests for payments of reparation and let Switzerland appear in a negative light.[168] In this context, the OSCE presidency was a good platform to show Switzerland in a better light as well

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[166] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung", 1996, p.35f; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Geschäftsbericht 1996: Bericht des Bundesrates über Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung", 1996, p.11.

[167] Frenkel, "Nachricht vom Hofe des Grosskhans," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 182 (1997).

[168] Jeannie Wurz, "Looking back at the Holocaust assets controversy", *Swissinfo*, 03.09.2013; Rob Wells, "Swiss banks officials accused of collaborating with Nazis", *Chicago Sun Times*, 17.10.1996.

as to highlight its solidarity and its efforts in peace promotion.[169] According to two interviewees, the affair also showed to the Swiss population that, contrary to their beliefs, Switzerland did not only have friends around the world, but that the government had to actively promote a favourable image of the country. With this goal in view, an active Swiss peace policy was seen as an effective tool to improve Switzerland's reputation in the world.[170]

5.5. First steps towards a more professionalized approach

On an internal level, the chairmanship of the OSCE was a unique opportunity for the Directorate of Political Affairs and for a wide range of actors in the Foreign Ministry to gain valuable experience in a multilateral context. Due to the limited human resources of the Swiss Foreign Ministry and the unprecedented dimension of the engagement, the chairmanship meant that not only the highly experienced key players, but many more actors within the administration had the opportunity to prove themselves and gain experience in this field. These circumstances were crucial for the further development of the Swiss efforts in peace promotion and a broader and more systematic approach to its peace policy. With the fostering of new experts and specialists, Switzerland reduced its degree of dependency on key players.

The period around 1996 can also be seen as the beginning of the government's growing efforts to professionalize its approach to civil peace promotion. This included the increased investment in research and the close cooperation with non-governmental organisations as well as other actors of civil society. Even though it took the government several more years to systematically and comprehensively professionalize their approach to peace promotion, we can observe first steps towards that goal.

First of all, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs started to invest increasingly in peace research. In 1995, the Swiss government launched the *Geneva Centre for Security Policy* which included 20 member states by the end of 2002 and provided a valuable platform to exchange experiences and carry out research.[171] In the same period of time, Switzerland also established the International Relations and Security Network in collaboration with the Swiss Federal

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[169] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document of the Political Division III., 02.10.1997: "Zusatzdokument zum Voranschlag 1998".

[170] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrates über seine Geschäftsführung", 1996, p.3; Interviewee 6, interview by Laurence Herzog, 13.04.2018.

[171] Federal Department of Defence Civil Protection and Sport. "Botschaft vom 9. Dezember über einen Rahmenkredit für zivile friedensfördernde Massnahmen im Rahmen des VBS", 2002.

Institute of Technology, which was seen as "an official contribution to the Partnership of Peace".[172] Moreover, those investments were supplemented by an annual financial contribution of the research institute Swisspeace.[173] The institute focused on conflict prevention and conflict transformation and was therefore a valuable source of information for Swiss diplomats and mediators. According to the Federal Councillors Cotti and Metzler, the institute "filled a gap of national interests" as "peace and conflict research has never been officially established" in Switzerland.[174] The financial and personal support of these institutions by the administration was a significant step to develop a distinct Swiss approach to peace promotion, but also to establish Switzerland as a centre for peacebuilding.

Besides the support and collaboration with research institutes, the Directorate of Political Affairs was also eager to cooperate more systematically and intensively with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.[175] The department was promoting this cooperation with the goal of exploiting the synergies between their areas of activity more efficiently. In comparison to other small European states, the cooperation between civil peace promotion and development cooperation hadn't been given much attention throughout the first half of the 1990s. Looking at government documents, it becomes apparent that the cooperation in conflict zones between the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Directorate of Political Affairs had been rather sporadic. This changed after the turn of the millennium when, parallel to the institutionalization and juridification of the Swiss peace policy, a more conflict-sensitive approach was adopted by the Agency for Development and Cooperation. Up until that point, the exchange of information at specific meetings and the cooperation in isolated cases, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, had been the norm.[176] During the time of Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti,

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[172] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Mail by Martin Dahinden regarding the International Relations and Security Network, 23.12.1999.

[173] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#520*, Az. 234.02-2, Letter of state secretary Jakob Kellenberger regarding the Swiss Peace Foundation, 17.03.1998.

[174] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#520*, Az. 234.02-2, Document by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of the Home Affairs, 25.02.1997: "Beitrag des Bundes an die Schweizerische Friedensstiftung (SFS), gestützt auf Artikel 16 Absatz 3 Buchstabe c des Bundesgesetzes vom 7. Oktober 1983 über die Forschung für die Jahre 1997 – 1999".

[175] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234-02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 16.01.1998: "Jahresbericht 1997 der Sektion für Friedensfragen".

[176] Interviewee 5, interview by Laurence Herzog, 27.02.2018; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to Ambassador Armin Ritz by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 8.10.1998; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to state secretary Franz von Däniken, 17.09.1999: "Koordinationssitzung PD/DEZA vom 17.9.1999".

a systemized collaboration and automated exchange of information was still missing. Having said that, these first steps to bring about closer cooperation between the different directorates as well as the increased support of research institutions were vital for a more comprehensive Swiss peace policy.

5.6. Setting of geographical, thematic and methodological priorities

The years between 1996 and 1999 can be described as a transition period. For one thing, government documents show a growing awareness of the increasing competition in peace promotion and its value as a tool to represent Swiss interests on the international stage.[177] These observations highlighted the necessity to systemize and professionalize the Swiss efforts in peace promotion. Secondly, we can observe that the Swiss peace engagement in non-European countries gained in relevance.

While Swiss politics in the early and mid-1990s was marked by the European integration and the new European peace order, we can observe a slight shift towards a more global peace policy in the second half of the decade. In 1995, Switzerland invested 52 percent of its resources in the OSCE region, which was more than half of its annual budget for peacekeeping missions. Three years later, this figure had fallen to 43 percent. Even though Europe stayed the priority geographical area, particularly countries in sub-Saharan Africa gained in importance.[178] One of the reasons behind this gradual shift was the increased commitment of Switzerland on a bilateral level. Even though the main focus of its peace policy was still on the participation in international organisations and operations, Switzerland was eager to create its own distinctive profile and to provide good services increasingly bilaterally.[179] Furthermore, with the slow

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[177] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti by Armin Ritz regarding bilateral peace promotion, 9.12.1997; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti by Jakob Kellenberger, 15.01.1997: "Gute Dienste: Grundsätze und Organisation".

[178] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 4.12.1995: "Actions de la Suisse dans le domaine de la pomotion civile de la paix pour la période 1996-1999; Anhang: Konzept friedensfördernde Massnahmen"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234-02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 16.01.1998: "Jahresbericht 1997 der Sektion für Friedensfragen"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 9.02.1999: "Jahresbericht 1998 der Sektion für Friedensfragen".

[179] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234-02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 16.01.1998: "Jahresbericht 1997 der Sektion für Friedensfragen".

easing of the conflicts in Europe and the stabilisation of the continent, Switzerland was able to focus on a more global strategy without ignoring national security interests.

With the aim of systemizing its approach, using its comparative advantages and increasing its chances of success, the Political Directorate increasingly strived to set geographical as well as thematic priorities for its efforts in civil peace promotion. In this context, Switzerland intensified its efforts in areas in connection with demining, small arms, civil police and election monitoring.[180] By focusing on specific topics, Switzerland aimed to build up expertise and raise its own unique profile. With the same goal in view, the Political Directorate also planned to set the focus of its commitment in peace promotion on six to seven priority countries.[181] While in the *Frame Concept on the Engagement of Switzerland in the Field of Civil Peace Promotion 1996-1999* the geographical priorities were still defined very broadly and included more than half of the world, this targeted approach was meant to make sure that Switzerland was able to represent its interests in the best possible way and to create long-term impact.[182] In this discussion, sub-Saharan African countries such as Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Burundi were given special attention.[183] The setting of priorities confirmed the already existing Swiss efforts in Burundi and Sudan, which are briefly described in the chapter below.

Despite the clear goal of enhancing and professionalizing its peace policy, the Swiss budget for peacekeeping missions stayed comparably low. While Switzerland only spent around seven Swiss Francs per person on peace promotion in 1996, countries such as Norway and Finland invested 8 and 5 times more than Switzerland. These numbers are particularly surprising in view of the increasing awareness of the competition in the field.[184] In this light, the limited budget of the Swiss Foreign Ministry can be seen as one factor that hampered a faster development of an effective and comprehensive Swiss peace policy. Up to this point, the new

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[180] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Division for Peace Questions (Sektion für Friedensfragen), 9.02.1999: "Jahresbericht 1998 der Sektion für Friedensfragen".

[181] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti by Armin Ritz regarding bilateral peace promotion, 9.12.1997.

[182] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 4.12.1995: "Actions de la Suisse dans le domaine de la pomotion civile de la paix pour la période 1996-1999; Anhang: Konzept friedensfördernde Massnahmen".

[183] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#516*, Az. 234.02-0, Note to Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti by Armin Ritz regarding bilateral peace promotion, 9.12.1997.

[184] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2008/2#517*, Az. 234.02-1, Document by the Financial and Economic Service, 10.11.1997: "Geschätzte Ausgaben (Budget 1998) ausgewählter Länder für die Beziehung zum Ausland"; Armin Ritz, "Friedenspolitik vor neuen Herausforderungen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 83 (1997).

focus of Swiss foreign policy on conflict prevention and peace promotion stayed nothing more than a mere lip service with regards to the distribution of resources.

5.7. Long-term commitments in Africa

The intensified efforts in Africa did not only show a geographical shift towards a more global reach, but were also a sign of a stronger focus and a more active role in the field of international mediation. Moreover, particularly the Swiss efforts in the Sudanese and Burundian civil war were the result of a new approach which put stronger emphasis on long-term commitments, a more proactive participation in peace processes and most importantly, the building of alliances with other states and organisations. This strategy was part of a larger development in Swiss foreign policy at the end of the decade, laid out in the *Report of the National Study Commission for Strategic Questions* of 1998. The report stated that a more active role in foreign and security policy is necessary to represent Swiss interests. Furthermore, it followed the guiding principle of "security through cooperation" which pushed Switzerland to create alliances and encouraged cooperation with other states and organisations on a multilateral level. As Switzerland is a rather small state, alliances were seen as a vital instrument to contribute more effectively to global peace building efforts.[185]

This new approach is reflected in the cases of Sudan and Burundi. The Swiss engagement in Sudan goes back to the early 1990s, when Swiss ambassador Josef Bucher, at the time stationed in Libya, was asked to facilitate between the Sudanese government and the South Sudan People Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A). This long-term commitment allowed Switzerland to gather know-how and identify the key issues of the conflict. In so doing, Switzerland was able to build up a trustworthy cooperation with the parties in conflict and other stakeholders. Furthermore, it enabled Switzerland to forge alliances with other third parties that were engaged in Sudan such as the members of the Troika, Great Britain, Norway and the United States. Particularly the collaboration with the United States was a key success factor, as they were instrumental in the initiation of the talks and an important partner to successfully facilitate the *Nuba Mountain Cease Fire Agreement* in 2002.[186]

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[185] E. Brunner and J. Ackermann. "Bericht der Studienkommission für Strategische Fragen", 1998; Directorate of Political Affairs, "Gewalt vorbeugen, Frieden mitgestalten, Demokratie stärken" (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001), p.7.

[186] Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018; Simon Mason, "Learning from the Swiss Mediation and Facilitation Experiences in Sudan," *Mediation Support Project, Center for Security Studies* (2007).

The cooperation with other states and organisations was equally crucial for the efforts in Burundi. By supporting the parties in conflict with expertise, promoting the inclusion of a wider range of local actors and assisting the two facilitators of the peace process, Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, Switzerland was able to make major contributions to the *Arusha Accords* signed in August 2000.[187] Switzerland evolved from a global firefighter offering support in imminent crises to a more long-term liaison and helping hand. This trend towards a more proactive, long-term and collaborative approach at the end of the millennium paved the way for a more systematic approach to peace building.[188]

Even though it might be inadequate to call the Swiss OSCE chairmanship a turning-point, the year 1996 was certainly a milestone in Swiss foreign policy and a catalyst for Swiss peace policy. It not only strengthened the Swiss position in the international community, but also increased the public support for civil peace promotion within the country. Based on this public and political support, long-term commitments and a more proactive approach became possible. While the Swiss peace policy under the lead of Flavio Cotti broke new ground and helped discover the Swiss capabilities and specific strengths, the following years under Foreign Minister Joseph Deiss were characterized by the conceptualization and juridification of Swiss peace policy.

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[187] Directorate of Political Affairs, "Gewalt vorbeugen, Frieden mitgestalten, Demokratie stärken", (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001), p.10; Mason and Sguaitamatti, "Mapping mediators: A comparison of third parties and implications for Switzerland," Zurich: ETH/Center for Security Studies (2011), p.23.

[188] Fischer, "From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland's Contribution to International Conflict Resolution", in Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002 (Springer, (2003)), p.89; Directorate of Political Affairs, "Gewalt vorbeugen, Frieden mitgestalten, Demokratie stärken", (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001), p.7.

6. Joseph Deiss – consolidation and new confidence [1999-2003]

Joseph Deiss succeeded Flavio Cotti as Foreign Minister on March 11th 1999. His term as head of the Foreign Ministry from 1999 to 2003 was marked by the juridification as well as the institutionalisation of Swiss civil peace promotion. Furthermore, Switzerland could claim its first major successes as facilitator after the end of the Cold War. After turbulent and eventful years under the lead of Flavio Cotti, the turn of the millennium was marked by a consolidation and professionalization of Swiss peace policy. On one hand, we can notice major efforts by the Swiss government to develop a distinct and unique profile as peace promoter. On the other hand, we can observe a greater adaption of its peace policy to a more mainstream approach to civil peace promotion. With Joseph Deiss as Foreign Minister, a targeted and systematic approach was pursued, which succeeded in restoring calm in the department.

The juridification and institutionalization of the Swiss peace policy was, at that point, a logical step towards a more professional and effective engagement. This became urgent as other small states started to get engaged in peace promotion, which ultimately led to a more crowded field.[189] Hence, a more systematic approach was necessary to ensure Switzerland's relevance in the field of peace promotion. The smooth and successful implementation of the below-mentioned reforms as well as the consistent approach can, amongst others, be put down to the competence and spirit of compromise of the new Foreign Minister. Like his predecessor, Deiss was part of the Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland which occupies the political centre. However, his predecessor, Flavio Cotti, was a more controversial personality known for his grand gestures, personable manner and choleric temper. In contrast to his predecessor, Joseph Deiss was described by newspaper and colleagues as a much more reliable supporter, as a team player and a silent achiever. The former professor of economics was also broadly respected by diplomats and co-workers for his genuine interest in foreign policy and his high level of knowledge about the important dossiers. His critics, on the other hand, demanded a more determined and glamourous Foreign Minister. Referring to him as "nice Deiss", they

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[189] Lanz and Gasser, "A crowded field: competition and coordination in international peace mediation," (2013); Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

criticized his lack of rough edges. In order words, Joseph Deiss can be seen as the embodiment of the new, systematic and targeted approach in the field of civil peace promotion.[190]

6.1. New assessment of Swiss civil peace promotion at the turn of the millennium

At the turn of the millennium, a wide range of reports were commissioned by the Swiss government in order to assess the security and foreign policy of the previous years and define the new orientation for the future. In this context, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport published two significant reports on the assessment and future development of its peace policy, namely the *Report on Security Policy 2000* and the *Report on Foreign Policy 2000*.[191]

One of the main goals stated in the *Report on Foreign Policy 2000* was the "protection and promotion of security and peace". That objective had already been mentioned in the *Report on Foreign Policy 1993* as one of five pillars of Swiss foreign policy.[192] However, this component had increasingly gained in importance because the security situation of the country had changed significantly. Whereas in 1990, the scenario of another violent confrontation within Central Europe was classified as possible, the situation in 2000 was assessed differently. The military defence lost in importance during the 1990s, while solidary engagement and peace promotion became a priority.[193] Therefore, it is not surprising that peace promotion was given a prominent place in both reports. The question was no longer whether peace promotion should play a role in Swiss foreign policy, but rather how it could be used to have the biggest possible impact and serve Swiss interests in the best possible way.

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[190] Raul Lautenschütz, "Joseph Deiss - der diskrete Brückenbauer", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 1999; Hanspeter Bundi, "Was nun, Herr Deiss?", *Weltwoche* 2002; Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018; Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018.

[191] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt"; Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000)", (1999).

[192] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.268.

[193] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000)", p.36; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz", 1990, p.870f.

As in the *Report of the National Study Commission for Strategic Questions* published in 1998, the leitmotif of the *Report on Security Policy 2000* was "security through cooperation", taking into account the global scale of new threats and the necessity for the country to cooperate in order to represent its own interests on the international stage.[194] This new focus on cooperation was especially evident in the field of civil peace promotion and came to be an essential guideline for Swiss peace policy at the start of the new millennium. Thereby, not only cooperation with international organisations, but also bilateral collaboration with like-minded states and civil actors was promoted.[195]

Moreover, the OSCE chairmanship, Switzerland's engagement in international organisations and its new role in various peace processes, such as in the earlier-mentioned case of Sudan, showed the potential of a politically small country to play a central role on the global stage.[196] With this aspiration in view, the Federal Council stated clear directions in the *Report on Foreign Policy 2000*. It addressed the need for more long-term and systematic Swiss peace engagements, more specifically mediation efforts, taking into account the increased complexity of conflicts. On that note, the authors of the report wrote: "Nowhere is this [the necessity for long-term commitments] as evident as in peace policy. A state that wants to prevent the outbreak of a latent conflict or mediate in a conflict situation needs patience, adequate resources and almost always the close cooperation with other states."[197] Furthermore, the Federal Council announced to pursue a more proactive approach in order to increase the positive impact of its peace policy. This meant that Switzerland moved away from its traditional form of good offices, which was predominantly based on requests from parties in conflict, towards a new, proactive form of peace promotion as described in the following extract from the report: "While, for decades, Switzerland's good offices were characterized by their passive attitude, waiting for a

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[194] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.297; Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000)", p.35.

[195] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000)", p.4.

[196] Coucil of States Switzerland. "Ständerat. Herbstsession 2003. Zehnte Sitzung. 30.09.03. Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung. Rahmenkredit", 2003, p.4; National Council Switzerland. "Wintersession 2003. Neunte Sitzung. 16.12.03. Bundesbeschluss über einen Rahmenkredit für Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung", 2003, p.14.

[197] Original text: „Nirgends kommt dies so deutlich zum Ausdruck wie in der Friedenspolitik. Wer dem Ausbruch latenter Konflikte vorbeugen oder wer in konfliktuellen Situationen vermitteln will, bedarf eines langen Atems, bedarf angemessener Mittel und fast immer der engen Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Staaten." See: Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.325.

request to be submitted by a third party before becoming active, a policy of an active peace engagement was brought to the fore."[198]

The report stated clearly that a new approach to Swiss peace policy implied close cooperation with other states and organisations, long-term commitments and a proactive strategy. This approach wasn't new in the international community and had been adopted for many years by European small states with similar ambitions. However, for Switzerland these new guidelines constituted a crucial, emancipatory step towards a contemporary Swiss peace policy.

6.2. Juridification and institutionalization of Swiss peace policy

The beginning of the millennium was also a period of consolidation. After eventful years under the leadership of Flavio Cotti, in which Switzerland explored its capabilities as an active peace promoter, the Foreign Ministry endeavoured to build up a legal and institutional foundation for future engagements.

A first step in this direction was taken in 1999 by creating a constitutional basis for Swiss peace policy on the occasion of the total revision of the Federal Constitution. First of all, the duty to strengthen "independence and peace in solidarity" was newly included in the preamble of the Constitution. Furthermore, art. 2 of the Constitution obliged Switzerland to fight for a "peaceful and fair international order". And most importantly, under the new art. 54 para. 2, the general objectives and principles of the Swiss foreign policy were clearly defined. Thereby, the "respect for human rights and the promotion of democracy" as well as the "peaceful coexistence of people" were stated as two of the main objectives of Swiss foreign policy. Even though these additions did not introduce new aspects, the new articles were, according to an interviewee, extremely important as they provided a legal basis for Swiss peace promotion and confirmed the new political openness.[199]

Moreover, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Joseph Deiss, the government drafted the *Federal Law regarding the Measures for Civil Peace Promotion and the Strengthening of Human Rights* and the *Framework Credit regarding Measures for Civil Conflict*

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[198] Original text: "Bedeutete die Politik der Guten Dienste während Jahrzehnten eine Haltung des Zuwartens, bis von Seiten Dritter die Bitte um ein Aktivwerden an die Schweiz herangetragen wurde, so hat sie seit längerer Zeit einer Politik des aktiven Engagements für den Frieden Platz gemacht." See: ibid., p.325+33.
[199] Interviewee 1, interview by Laurence Herzog, 26.01.2018.

Transformation and the Promotion of Human Rights in 2002.[200] Even though the implementation of these laws took place during the term of his successor, Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, they can be seen as an important component of Deiss' strategy of juridification of the Swiss peace policy. The new federal law explicitly stated the main goals and measures of Swiss civil peace promotion and clarified open questions on the financing and the responsibilities within the government. The law created a legal basis for the Swiss civil peace engagement on the statutory level. However, it did not grant any new power to the Foreign Ministry and was, therefore, not very controversial among the parliamentarians.[201]

In contrast, the framework credit was much debated during the autumn and winter sessions of 2003 in the National Council and Council of States. Thereby, the credit amount was the central debating point. In the context of the difficult economic environment and the introduction of a national debt brake in the same year, the parliamentarians were reluctant to approve an increase in costs, even though Switzerland's national budget in the field of peace promotion was much lower than the one of comparable European countries.[202] However, after long debates, the national interests and reputation that were at stake seemed to have outweighed the financial concerns. The framework credit over four years was finally set at 240 million Swiss Francs. The annual amount started at 47.5 million Swiss Francs and was raised each year by 5 million Swiss Francs.[203] The four-year credit provided a tool for financial planning and control and in so doing, allowed the Foreign Ministry to adopt a long-term and more comprehensive approach. With the new, or rather intensified mediation efforts in non-European countries such as Sudan, Colombia and Burundi, the need for additional investment in long-term projects became more pressing. Moreover, the increased complexity of the matters and the rising demand for

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[200] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 23. Oktober über einen Rahmenkredit für Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung", 2002; *Bundesgesetz vom 13. April 2004 über Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte*, SR 193.9.

[201] Coucil of States Switzerland. "Ständerat. Herbstsession 2003. Zehnte Sitzung. 30.09.03. Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung. Rahmenkredit", 2003.; Daniel Saameli, "Weniger Geld für Friedensarbeit", *Der Bund* 2003.

[202] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2000*, Az. 234.0-5, Introductory debate in the Council of States, speech of Federal Councillor Micheline Calmy-Rey, 26.09.2003: "Intervention d'entrée en matière. 02.077 n Promotion civile de la paix et renforcement des droits de l'homme. Loi; 02.076 n Gestion civile des conflits et promotion des droits de l'homme. Crédit-cadre".

[203] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 23. Oktober über einen Rahmenkredit für Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung", 2002, p.8047.

international support required a higher degree of political and operational control as well as coordination between the departments. [204]

It is interesting to note that the narrative of a historically rooted peace policy, which stood at the core of the Swiss foreign policy, was a dominant argument in the debate. Surprisingly, the opponents of the credit focused mainly on the financial arguments and prevented a more general discussion on the principles of Swiss foreign policy. Hence, the approval of the framework credit did not only result in an increase in budget and capabilities, but it can also be seen as a clear sign that Swiss politicians were prepared to invest in the field of peace policy and to establish Switzerland as an international peace promoter. Even though the budget stayed comparably low, a majority of representatives agreed that Switzerland needed to pursue a more professionalized and systematic approach. Furthermore, with this decision, civil peace promotion continued to move into the foreground.[205]

6.3. Stronger conceptualization of the Swiss approach

Besides the juridification of Swiss peace policy, some progress was made in the continued conceptualization of a Swiss approach in the period between 1999 and 2003. Firstly, the above-mentioned framework credit and federal law, that had to be approved by the parliament, forced the Foreign Ministry to be more transparent about the foci and approaches of its peace policy.[206] More transparency was also guaranteed by the annual reporting obligation.[207] Furthermore, the government defined concrete topical and methodological areas of focus.[208] Even though the

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[204] Ibid., p.8002f.

[205] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#1999*, Az. 234.0-0, Document of the Human Security Division, 25.04.2005: "Ämterkonsultation. Bericht 2004 über Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung"; Coucil of States Switzerland. "Ständerat. Herbstsession 2003. Zehnte Sitzung. 30.09.03. Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung. Rahmenkredit", 2003.

[206] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 23. Oktober über einen Rahmenkredit für Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung", 2002, p.8004-21 + p.22-33.

[207] Coucil of States Switzerland. "Ständerat. Herbstsession 2003. Zehnte Sitzung. 30.09.03. Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung. Rahmenkredit", 2003.

[208] The new focus points were defined as follows: Fields of action: "Good offices and mediation; programs in civil conflict transformation; Swiss Expert Pool for Civil Peacebuilding (SEF); topical, diplomatic initiatives; partnerships (UN, OSCE, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue etc.)". Thematic priorities: "Constitutional issues, decentralization and power sharing; Media and violent conflict; Human security; Human rights in violent conflicts and humanitarian international law". See: Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 23. Oktober über einen Rahmenkredit für Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung", 2002.

foci weren't completely new, the elaboration of the strategy was an important step to concretize the Swiss model and make it known to the public.

In the same period of time, Switzerland also commissioned larger papers that sought to present and further develop a distinct Swiss approach. Switzerland published the *Research Concept on Security and Peace Policy (2004-2007)* as well as the *Report of the Federal Council on the Financing of institutes in Peace Promotion* in January 2003. In addition, in spring 2003, the government released the book *Peace promotion and conflict transformation in Switzerland: a stock-taking*, listing all Swiss actors that had been active in the field of peace promotion and conflict transformation.[209]

In response to the request of many parliamentarians, the Federal Council also commissioned a global concept for the Swiss efforts in peace promotion in October 2002. This concept, also called *Leitbild Frieden*, was meant to set out the key idea of Swiss peace policy, the main activities of Switzerland in this domain and the division of tasks in the department. Even though various actors regarded this document to be a vital step to ensure a systematic and consistent approach to Swiss peace policy in the future, the work on this concept was postponed and only resumed at the end of 2005.[210]

Consequently, at the end of Deiss' term in office, a general concept on Swiss peace promotion was still missing. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned partial analysis initiated mainly two different developments. On the one hand, it allowed Switzerland to develop a more concrete concept of Swiss peace promotion and on the other hand, Swiss peace policy was adapted to the international norms and steered towards a more mainstream approach to civil peace promotion.

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[209] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council, 11.11.2003: "Bericht des Bundesrates über Forschungs- und Ausbildungskapzitäten in der Schweiz in den Bereichen der zivilen Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung. In Erfüllung des Postulates N°99.3505 Haering vom 6. Oktober 1999".

[210] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2004*, Az. 234.0-9, Document of the Peace Core Group (Kerngruppe Frieden), 14.11.2005: "Kerngruppe Frieden (KGF) – Sitzung vom 14.11.2005 Protokoll"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2001*, Az. 234.0-5, Note to Federal Councillor Micheline Calmy-Rey written by the Human Security Division, 10.01.2005: "Bericht des Bundesrates über die Förderung des Friedens in der Aussenpolitik (Leitbild Frieden)".

6.4.   In search of new tools to professionalize its approach

In the process of consolidation, the Foreign Ministry was looking for new tools to institutionalize and professionalize the engagement in civil peace promotion within its limited budget. Two of those initiatives were the creation of the Swiss Expert Pool for Civil Peacebuilding and of a new position of Ambassador for Conflict Management. Both tools were implemented at the turn of the millennium, however, with varying degrees of success.

On December 4th 2000, the government introduced the Swiss Expert Pool for Civil Peacebuilding, which combined different subgroups into one pool of experts. The group was made up of specialists with a variety of professions and skills, including experts in the fields of: "democratisation and good governance, rule of law, mediation and facilitation, support of independent media, promotion of human rights, protection of minorities, gender issues, administration and observation of elections, customs and police reform."[211] The pool was launched with the goal of facilitating "the quick and flexible participation of experts in peace support operations" and to ensure better training and preparation for its members.[212] To this day, the pool has proven itself to be a valuable tool for the implementation of the Swiss peace policy. The deployment of experts to assist in conflict situations has become a core competency of Swiss civil peace promotion. In this perspective, the introduction of the expert pool was, without doubt, a valuable instrument to further professionalize Swiss peace policy.

In the same time period, the Foreign Ministry also created the position of Ambassador for Conflict Management. The task of the new ambassador was "to establish contact with parties in conflict, promote dialogue between them and support consensus-based solutions."[213] The creation of this new position within the Human Security Division aimed to strengthen the overall activities in the field of civil peace promotion.[214] However, according to an interviewee,

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[211] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 21.04.2004: "Zivile und militärische Friedensförderung: Beiträge der Schweiz an friedensunterstützende Operationen der internationalen Gemeinschaft – Überlegungen in mittel- und langfristiger Perspektive".

[212] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrats über seine Geschäftsführung und die Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung im Jahre 2000 vom 8./28. Februar 2001", 2001, p.3+22f; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Geschäftsbericht 2000: Bericht des Bundesrats über Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung", 2000, p.20.

[213] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Bericht des Bundesrats über seine Geschäftsführung und die Schwerpunkte der Verwaltungsführung im Jahre 2000 vom 8./28. Februar 2001", 2001, p.23.

[214] Christoph Brunner, "Personalreserve für zivile Friedensförderung. Einrichtung eines schweizerischen Expertenpools", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 2000.

this new position did not generate much added value.[215] The new ambassador for conflict management, Josef Bucher, continued his engagement as mediator in the peace processes in Sudan and Eastern Africa, however, his considerable contribution to these negotiations cannot be attributed to his new position as special ambassador. The initiative allowed the Foreign Ministry to react faster to changing circumstances, but at the same time, the capabilities of a single person were too limited to strengthen Swiss peace policy at large.[216] The creation of the new position did raise attention and somewhat strengthened civil peace promotion in the general public. However, it did not have a major impact on the development of the Swiss peace policy overall.

These two initiatives showed the eagerness of the Foreign Ministry to push and develop further the efforts in the field of civil peace promotion by increasing the efficiency and coordination within the department. In view of the low budget, the department mostly used structural shifts to increase its capabilities, strengthen its core competences and enhance flexibility.

6.5. The new key role of partnerships

In the years after the turn of the millennium, a major focus was set on the creation of partnerships and the extension of the Swiss foreign policy network. In 2002, Switzerland became member of the UN, which led to a reinforced involvement in international bodies. Furthermore, Switzerland put a stronger emphasis on the collaboration with like-minded states, scientific institutions and hesitantly also with non-governmental organisations. This development reflected the increased focus of the Swiss government on professionalization, interest-driven politics and the maximization of its impact as elaborated below. The implementation of these objectives was only possible with a stronger integration of Switzerland into the international system and an increased development and exchange of know-how.

As already mentioned, the Swiss people voted in favour of the initiative *For the Accession of Switzerland to the United Nations (UN)* and consequently, Switzerland became member of the UN in 2002. In contrast to the earlier vote in 1986, the starting position and atmosphere were more favourable. Particularly the decreasing significance of the Swiss policy of neutrality and the growing importance of international networking and cooperation were major factors that

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[215] Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018.

[216] Brunner, "Personalreserve für zivile Friedensförderung. Einrichtung eines schweizerischen Expertenpools", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2000.

influenced the outcome of the vote. The Swiss membership in the UN was a main goal of the legislation at the time, but it was a group of party members, interest groups and citizens who launched this people's initiative, giving further legitimacy and support to the concern.[217] For many people the membership was a logical step in the development of Swiss foreign policy, despite the rather low approval rate of 54.6 percent.[218] This result was interpreted by the winners as the end of the isolationist policy of the conservative parties and the turning away of the narrative which considered Switzerland a "special case".[219]

In this spirit, Daniele Ganser wrote in the daily newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung: "the accession to the UN was nothing else than the political adjustment to a factually already existing state."[220] As Switzerland was already part of various UN bodies, had ratified numerous UN resolutions and was actively contributing to UN missions, the changes that came along with the new membership were quite limited. Nevertheless, Switzerland was hoping to play a bigger part in the development of international law and the creation of international framework conditions. Furthermore, the UN membership was also a vital step for Geneva to assert its position as a global hub for international organisations and the headquarters of important UN bodies. Last but not least, the greater scope for action within the UN enabled Switzerland to extend its network and more particularly, to establish new partnerships with like-minded states.[221]

While the cooperation within international organisations had already been an important strategy in the 1990s, the collaboration with like-minded states on a bilateral level became a central focus around the year 2000. In the *Report on Foreign Policy 2000* the "intensification of cooperation with like-minded states in the field of human security" was stated as a main objective.[222] In this context, the cooperation within the group of states called Human Security

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[217] Swissinfo, "Volksinitiative für UNO-Beitritt der Schweiz eingereicht", *Swissinfo* 2000.

[218] Federal Chancellery of Switzerland, "Volksabstimmung vom 03.03.2002", https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20020303/index.html, 21.08.2018; Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018; Council of States Switzerland. "Sommersession 2001. Zwölfte Sitzung. 21.06.01. Für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Uno. Volksinitiative", 2001.

[219] Anne Ponger, "Erleichterung nach dem Ja zum Uno-Beitritt. "Kampf für selbstbestimmte Schweiz geht weiter"", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2002.

[220] Daniele Ganser, "Die Schweiz zwischen Igelmythos und Uno", ibid.

[221] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.315.

[222] Ibid., p.269.

Network or the collaboration with like-minded states, such as Canada and Austria resulting in the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, were some of the first successful efforts.[223] Also in the field of mediation, Switzerland increasingly endeavoured to be part of "groups of friends", such as the group of states in the Colombian peace process which was set up in 2003.[224] This approach enabled Switzerland to specialize its peace policy and increase its impact in major conflicts despite its limited financial, personal and political resources. With the increasing complexity of conflicts and the length of peace processes, the cooperation with other countries had become, particularly for smaller states, an essential tool.[225]

Last but not least, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs aimed to intensify its partnerships with research institutes. While other countries had started to invest in peace research after the end of the Second World War, Switzerland was a latecomer and had to make up leeway in order to establish itself as an international peace promoter. In 2003, more than 25 organisations in Switzerland carried out research in the field of peace promotion despite the lack of financial support and infrastructure.[226] Nevertheless, the Federal Council noted in 2003 that there was still "a lack of organisations that did research in the field of civil peace promotion and conflict transformation on a high scientific level".[227] Some new initiatives were launched in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as the founding of the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 1999 and the establishment of KOFF - the Swiss Platform for Peacebuilding which was launched in 2001 to promote the exchange between non-governmental organisations, research institutes and the government.[228] Furthermore, already existing institutes, such as the

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[223] Ibid., p.271+333.

[224] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#1999*, Az. 234.0-0, Document of the Human Security Division, 25.04.2005: "Ämterkonsultation. Bericht 2004 über Massnahmen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung und Menschenrechtsförderung".

[225] Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018; Interviewee 1, 26.01.2018; Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018.

[226] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council, 11.11.2003: "Bericht des Bundesrates über Forschungs- und Ausbildungskapzitäten in der Schweiz in den Bereichen der zivilen Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung. In Erfüllung des Postulates N°99.3505 Haering vom 6. Oktober 1999"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2000*, Az. 234.0-5, Document of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1.12.2002: "Forschungskonzept Sicherheits- und Friedenspolitik 2004-2007. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ressortforschung des Bundes".

[227] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council, 11.11.2003: "Bericht des Bundesrates über Forschungs- und Ausbildungskapzitäten in der Schweiz in den Bereichen der zivilen Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung. In Erfüllung des Postulates N°99.3505 Haering vom 6. Oktober 1999".

[228] KOFF - The Swiss Platform for Peacebuilding, "Our mission", http://koff.swisspeace.ch/what-is-koff/our-mission/, 31.10.2018; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council, 11.11.2003: "Bericht des Bundesrates über Forschungs- und Ausbildungskapzitäten in der

Geneva Centres, were given more attention with the goal of spurring on the professionalization of Swiss peace policy and the cooperation with international actors.[229] However, the small scientific output throughout the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s, amongst others due to the lack of clear financial commitment by the government and of cooperation between research institutes, can be seen as one of the reasons why Switzerland was lagging behind.[230] The insufficient academic backing allowed only slow progress in the professionalization and specialisation of the Swiss peace policy.

To sum up, the partnership with international organisations, like-minded states, research institutes and to a minor extent also with non-governmental organisations brought Switzerland a substantial step forward towards a more professionalized and comprehensive Swiss peace policy. While particularly financial reasons hampered a faster progress, these new efforts were instrumental to close the gap of knowledge and capabilities between Switzerland and other small states that had been active in civil peace promotion for longer.

6.6. Communication – Efforts to increase visibility

In the early 2000s, not only did the institutional, legal and financial background change, but so did the government's information policy on Swiss peace promotion. In the *Report on Foreign Policy 2000*, the Federal Council set the goal to communicate more actively about its humanitarian tradition internally and externally in order to improve its image and the domestic support it received.[231]

Schweiz in den Bereichen der zivilen Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung. In Erfüllung des Postulates N°99.3505 Haering vom 6. Oktober 1999".

[229] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2001*, Az. 234.0-5, Document of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 22.04.04: "Presseunterlagen für die Pressekonferenz für Bundesrätin Calmy-Rey vom 22.04.2004. Engagement der Schweiz im Bereich der zivilen Friedensförderung"; Federal Department of Defence Civil Protection and Sport. "Botschaft vom 9. Dezember über einen Rahmenkredit für zivile friedensfördernde Massnahmen im Rahmen des VBS", 2002, p.262; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, "Gründung eines Kompetenzzentrums Friedensförderung, KOFF. Pressemitteilung", news release, 02.03.2001, https://www.admin.ch/cp/d/3a9f7965_1@fwsrvg.bfi.admin.ch.html.

[230] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council, 11.11.2003: "Bericht des Bundesrates über Forschungs- und Ausbildungskapzitäten in der Schweiz in den Bereichen der zivilen Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung. In Erfüllung des Postulates N°99.3505 Haering vom 6. Oktober 1999"; Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2000*, Az. 234.0-5, Document of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1.12.2002: "Forschungskonzept Sicherheits- und Friedenspolitik 2004-2007. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ressortforschung des Bundes"; Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018.

[231] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.322+295.

The government launched a new organisation called Presence Switzerland whose goal was to spread a favourable image of Switzerland abroad. One of the "Swiss values" promoted in the campaigns was the "humanitarian tradition of Switzerland". After the *Holocaust Affair* in 1996, Switzerland was well aware of the importance of a country's reputation and the necessity to actively campaign to improve its image. Thereby, the increasingly important peace policy was seen as a valuable instrument to promote Switzerland in a positive light.[232] Moreover, the new information concept might also be put down to the fact that Switzerland built up an increased self-confidence and self-perception as an international peace promoter. Combined with the growing awareness of the market-like nature of the field, communication was brought to the centre of attention. In this context, Joseph Deiss said at a meeting in 2002: "We have a market value. We want to attract attention".[233]

Besides the new promotion of the Swiss humanitarian tradition abroad, Switzerland was also endeavouring to improve the citizens' perception of the global political responsibilities of the country and in so doing, to get a better legitimation for a gradual opening of the country and a more proactive peace policy.[234] In this context, the Swiss government published the booklet "Prevent violence, shape peace, strengthen democracy" in 2001 which introduced Swiss peace policy to a broader public.[235] This publication was an attempt to give the Swiss population a better understanding of the Swiss peace efforts abroad, the interests involved and the impact the country has on world politics. One could say that at the time, the understanding of the subject matter was particularly important in light of the forthcoming vote on the accession to the UN in 2002, but also generally speaking, in a system of a semi-direct democracy such as Switzerland. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the Swiss government was eager to actively communicate the first major international successes at that time, such as the *Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement* in 2002 and the *Geneva Initiative* in 2003. These media-effective successes were vital to get stronger public support.

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[232] Ibid., p.322.

[233] Bundi, "Was nun, Herr Deiss?", Weltwoche 2002.

[234] Federal Council of Switzerland, "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000. Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenswahrung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt", p.295.

[235] Directorate of Political Affairs, "Gewalt vorbeugen, Frieden mitgestalten, Demokratie stärken", (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

6.7. First major successes as facilitator

During the term of office of Joseph Deiss, Switzerland achieved its first successes as an international peace promoter and, more specifically, as a facilitator. Step by step, international mediation became a centre piece of Swiss peace policy. Switzerland contributed, amongst others, to the *Arusha Agreement* signed in 2000, the *Nuba Mountain Cease Fire Agreement* in 2002 and the *Geneva Initiative* in 2003. These temporary achievements were of considerable value for Switzerland as they created legitimacy for the stronger focus and increased financial investment in civil peace promotion.[236] Moreover, Switzerland could now act with credibility as an international peace promoter on a global stage and reposition itself more prominently in the increasingly contested field of peace promotion. Comparing the three cases, one can observe an increasingly self-confident and proactive stance of Switzerland over time. Not only did the Swiss efforts get broader and more determined, but also the media coverage got more extensive.

While the Swiss efforts in Burundi were mainly limited to the provision of expertise and the general support of the main facilitators and stakeholders, the engagement in Sudan went a step further. As mentioned in chapter 5, in 2002, Switzerland facilitated in cooperation with the United States a territorially limited Sudanese cease fire agreement on Mount Bürgenstock in Switzerland, namely the *Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement*. The agreement is considered by many professionals as a model for the Sudanese *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* signed in 2005, which then paved the way for the independence of South Sudan in 2011.[237] These Swiss efforts were new ground and a significant step in Swiss peace policy due to the length of the engagement and the prominent position of Switzerland as one of the main facilitators. The Swiss engagement in Sudan was not only politically a decisive step forward, but it also attracted much more media attention and debate than the Swiss achievements in Burundi.

The *Geneva Initiative*, launched in 2003, can be seen as a further step towards a more proactive and self-confident peace policy. The attempt to provide new impulses for a stable peace in the Middle East was initiated by actors of civil society on both sides of the conflict and facilitated by the Swiss government. The initiative was extremely controversial, particularly as it wasn't approved by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, it initiated new

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[236] Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018.

[237] ETH - International relations and security network, "Swiss peacebuilding efforts in Sudan," (2008), p.1.

talks and set a special focus on the public opinion and actors of civil society.[238] Hence, the initiative reached extensive media attention, especially in Switzerland, where the country's major role in the initiative was extensively reported on. Compared to the reserved Swiss presence in the beginning of the 1990s, the *Geneva Initiative* demonstrated the new self-image and strengthened self-confidence of the country. It can be seen as the transition towards a more proactive approach under Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, who took office in 2003. She introduced the term "active neutrality" and stood for an even more proactive, media-efficient and result-oriented approach.

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[238] Jürg Bischoff, "Die "Genfer Initiative" - Vorschlag für einen Frieden im Nahen Osten", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2003.

7. Micheline Calmy-Rey – Swiss peace promotion becomes an established pillar of Swiss foreign policy [2003-2011]

As of 2003, we can speak of an institutionalized Swiss peace policy. The development of the new federal law and the framework credit which were implemented in December 2003 paved the way for a systematic approach. In the early 2000s, civil peace promotion was broadly accepted by the general public as an essential element of Swiss foreign policy. Thanks to the framework credit and a growing professionalization of the Swiss approach, a greater continuity was provided and, particularly in the field of conflict transformation and multilateral processes, notable successes were achieved. Nevertheless, these years were also marked by many controversies around the geographic priorities as well as the methods and approaches of the Foreign Ministry. Thereby, the personal style and more proactive foreign policy of the new Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, member of the Social Democratic Party, were often at the centre of the discussion.

7.1. Towards a sharpened profile

The framework credit 2004-2007 provided the Foreign Ministry with a budget of 220 million Swiss Francs and for the following four-year period, 20 million Swiss Francs were added to the budget. Due to the fixed annual budget, Switzerland was able to make long-term commitments, build up professional expertise and adapt to changing circumstances. In 2009, a majority of the annual amount was spent on activities in the field of conflict transformation and on the engagement of the Swiss Expert Pool of Civil Peace Promotion while diplomatic initiatives and strategic partnerships only accounted for 14 and 16 percent of the overall budget.[239] Instead of focusing on a clear field of expertise, Switzerland decided to be present and active in different areas at the same time. Over the years, this approach proved to have the necessary political and public backing.[240] However, this development was not without controversy. An interviewee expressed his surprise that a rather small country, such as Switzerland, decided to pursue such a "mainstream strategy". In his view, Switzerland would have been more successful with a more specialized approach, putting a focus on specific niches.[241]

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[239] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2009", 2009, p.6416; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4783f.

[240] Interviewee 3, 22.02.2018; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4751.

[241] Interviewee 6, 13.04.2018.

Since the mid-2000s, "Switzerland appears predominantly as a political actor" in the field of civil peace promotion. This means that Switzerland focused largely on diplomatic activities opposed to civic ones.[242] The development into an increasingly political actor in the field of civil peace promotion can, amongst others, be explained by the simultaneous development towards an increased engagement as a facilitator and mediator.[243] Mediation became a main pillar of Swiss foreign policy, which is also reflected in the increased success rates in this domain as mentioned in the previous chapter. Furthermore, Switzerland named the "development and implementation of norms", the "positive impact on peace" and "visibility" as main evaluation criteria of its engagement. Particularly criterion one and three seem to favour a political approach.[244]

During the terms of Joseph Deiss and Micheline Calmy-Rey, the conceptualization of a Swiss peace policy was at the centre of the ministry's efforts. Thereby, clear thematic and geographical priorities were determined. The thematic priorities of Switzerland were set on the topics "promotion of dialogue, decentralisation and federalism, dealing with the past, mainstreaming of human rights in peace processes, prohibition of anti-personnel mines and illegal small arms as well as the handling of armed non-governmental groups".[245] While the first five themes were particularly important for the Swiss efforts in the field of mediation, the prohibition of illegal small arms and anti-personnel mines were the core concerns of Switzerland in multilateral processes. In cooperation with like-minded states, several initiatives were launched over the years in international organisations such as the *2005 International Tracing Instrument* regulating the use of small weapons, which was created in cooperation with France.[246]

The geographical priorities of Swiss peace policy were much more contested than the thematic ones. As described in the previous chapters, in the 1990s, the main geographical focus of Swiss

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[242] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4809.

[243] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2009", 2009, p.6417.

[244] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4815.

[245] Ibid., p.4763.

[246] Weapons Law Encyclopedia, "2005 International Tracing Instrument", http://www.weaponslaw.org/instruments/2005-international-tracing-instrument, 31.10.2018.

peace policy was Europe. However, around the turn of the millennium, the Swiss government gradually adopted a more globally oriented approach. In this context, questions on where to invest gained in importance and national interests as well as the legitimation of the Swiss efforts were challenged.[247] Based on a study conducted in 2005, the Foreign Ministry reduced its focal countries and regions from 13 in 2004 to only 7 in 2007. In 2009, the priority countries and regions were the following: Middle East, Southeast Europe, Sudan, the Great Lakes Region in Africa, West and Central Africa, Colombia and Nepal. In the same year, the largest part of the budget, with 3.9 Mio. and 3.5 Mio. Swiss Francs, were invested in the Middle East and Southeast Europe.[248]

7.2. Controversies

During the term of office of Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, controversies and debates on the Swiss peace policy became more frequent. At the centre of discussion were the national interests and geographical foci of Swiss peace policy, as well as the interpretation and importance of neutrality. At that point, not the significance of Swiss peace promotion was questioned, but rather the approach and goals of Switzerland in that field.

In the early 2000s, neutrality lost much of its importance in Swiss politics, although surveys showed that 89 percent of the Swiss population were still in favour of keeping neutrality as a major principle.[249] Aware of this often-neglected discrepancy, Calmy-Rey launched a new debate on the interpretation of neutrality policy during her first term as Foreign Minister. Particularly in connection with Switzerland's approach to peace promotion, the role of neutrality caused a lot of discussion. Starting in summer 2008, Calmy-Rey promoted the term "active neutrality" and underlined its meaning and significance through her proactive peace policy and outspokenness regarding international matters. This media-effective and proactive approach fuelled the debate and sparked criticism by a wide range of people.[250] Even though some of the criticism can be explained by party politics and, more specifically, the provocative campaigns of the conservative Swiss People's Party, several decisions made by the Foreign

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[247] Geschäftsführungskommission Ständerat. "Motion. Thematische und geografische Konzentration", 2006.

[248] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.1144.

[249] Christoph Breitenmoser, "Neutralität - Kein Synonym für Gleichgültigkeit. Bundesrätin Calmy-Rey zur aktiven Aussenpolitik", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2005.

[250] Simon Gemperli, "Zwischen Engagement und Abwehrkampf. Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik in der «Ära» Calmy-Rey", ibid. 2011.

Minister were criticised across party lines. Her plan to apply as candidate for the UN Security Council, for example, was seen by many people as a violation of the principle of neutrality.[251] Furthermore, her very proactive approach in conflict transformation, which was often described as a "trial and error foreign policy", stood in stark contrast to the rather unobtrusive Swiss peace policy of the previous decades.[252]

However, parliamentarian initiatives to restrict Swiss peace policy, such as the withdrawal from the Partnership for Peace and the United Nations, didn't receive much support.[253] Despite the persistent criticism of her foreign policy approach, Calmy-Rey held on to her broad concept of neutrality and her proactive strategy. One could say that she succeeded to leave the traditional neutrality policy behind and give Swiss peace policy more scope for manoeuvre.[254]

Besides the lengthy discussions on neutrality, the aspects of national interests and geographical priorities of civil peace promotion were also extensively debated. While the participation in multilateral processes wasn't very controversial, the Swiss efforts on the bilateral level were given much more attention. The increased engagement on other continents begged the question of where to engage. Traditional security policy argumentation lost its importance and norm-driven and national interests took on significance. Apart from that, the increased uncertainties can also be explained by the broadness of the Swiss peace policy and the continuing lack of an overall strategy, criticised on numerous occasions.[255] Despite the fact that the *Report on Foreign Policy 2010* clearly listed the national interests of Switzerland in different regions and that thematic as well as geographic priorities were set in the mid-2000s, material interests did not seem to be a key rationale in the selection processes.[256] The Swiss mediation efforts in Nepal and Colombia, for example, could hardly be justified by economic or political

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[251] Monika Rosenberg, "Plädoyer für eine noch aktivere Aussenpolitik. Calmy-Rey liebäugelt mit Sitz im Uno-Sicherheitsrat", ibid. 2006; Monika Rosenberg, "Parteiengezänk um die Neutralitätspolitik. Debatte in der Aussenpolitischen Kommission des Nationalrats", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2006.

[252] Christoph Breitenmoser, "Calmy-Reys experimentelle Aussenpolitik", ibid. 2003.

[253] Roland Rino Büchel. "Motion. Nein zur Mitgliedschaft der Schweiz im Uno-Sicherheitsrat", 2010; Hans Fehr. "Motion. Vorlage betreffend Austritt aus der Uno", 2003. Simon Gemperli, "SVP fordert Rückkehr zur passiven Neutralität. Vage Drohungen mit einer Volksinitiative", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17.01.2007.

[254] Simon Gemperli, "Primadonna inter Pares", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2010.

[255] Security Commission of the Swiss Council of States. "Postulat. Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung", 2003; Gemperli, "Primadonna inter Pares", Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2010; Security Commission of the Swiss Council of States. "Postulat. Gesamtstrategie für Friedensförderung und Abrüstung ", 2009; Walter Müller. "Motion. Klare strategische Ausrichtung der Aussenpolitik", 2010.

[256] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.6376+78+82.

interests.[257] In this context, there were voices that criticized the Foreign Minister's "uncoordinated activism" and focus on moral obligations. The critics, who consisted of politicians but also diplomats, feared that normative considerations were given priority at the expense of national interests. Furthermore, the "trial and error strategy" of Calmy-Rey offering good services to a wide range of parties reinforced criticism and created uncertainties about the existence of a clear strategy.[258]

7.3. Lack of cooperation within and between departments

The period between 2003 and 2011 was not only marked by many public controversies, but also by internal debates on how to cooperate and use synergies between departments and divisions. Thereby, two relationships were at the centre of attention: First, the cooperation between military peace promotion, led by the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), and civil peace promotion operated by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and secondly, the cooperation between the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Directorate of Political Affairs. In comparison to other similar European states and international peace promoters, Switzerland was struggling with the adoption of a comprehensive approach including military and civil peace promotion as well as development cooperation. Considering the increasing complexity of conflicts and the immense challenges post-conflict societies were facing, the close cooperation between these fields of activities became crucial.

The difficulties of Switzerland to adopt a comprehensive approach to its peace policy can partly be explained by the lack of an overall strategy. As mentioned in chapter 6, Switzerland made its first attempts to develop a global concept, also called *Leitbild Frieden*, in 2002 and 2005 to counteract the strong compartmentalization of Swiss peace policy. However, despite parliamentary requests in 2003 and 2009 as well as the clear need to adapt its approach to catch up with its international competitors, an overall strategy to Swiss peace policy was still missing at the end of the term of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey.[259]

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[257] Simon Gemperli, "Die Aktivierung der Diplomatie begann lange vor Calmy-Rey. Gedenkfeier für Edouard Brunner zeigt viel Kontinuität zur heutigen Aussenpolitik auf", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2008.

[258] Christoph Breitenmoser, "Calmy-Reys experimentelle Aussenpolitik", ibid. 2003.

[259] Security Commission of the Swiss Council of States. "Postulat. Friedensförderung und Konfliktbearbeitung", 2003; Security Commission of the Swiss Council of States. "Postulat. Gesamtstrategie für Friedensförderung und Abrüstung ", 2009.

In Switzerland, the cooperation between military and civil peace promotion developed only slowly over the years. While in many countries military and civil peace promotion developed simultaneously and complemented each other, the relationship between these two fields evolved very differently in Switzerland. As elaborated in chapter 5, military peace promotion suffered an early setback in 1994 with the rejection of the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations.* In the following years, the significance of civil peace promotion grew comparably fast and military peace promotion faded into the background given the limited budget and lack of public support.[260] Despite individual initiatives to start a debate on a common strategy, military peace promotion didn't receive the necessary political and public support. The lack of support can, amongst other factors, be attributed to the Swiss status as an "armed neutrality" which only allows the use of military actions to defend its own territory or secure internal security.[261] These circumstances combined with the lack of an overall strategy can be seen as a reason for Switzerland lagging behind in interdepartmental cooperation.

Nonetheless, in the mid-2000s, the Federal Council was eager to enhance the cooperation between the departments. On the one hand, we can observe an increased amount of declarations of intent by the Federal Council to promote common measures and mechanism as outlined in the *Report on Foreign Policy 2010.*[262] On the other hand, the Federal Council established common coordinating bodies ensuring a better cooperation between the departments. The Core Group Peace led by the Human Security Division, for example, coordinated all activities of Switzerland in the field of peace promotion. Other coordinating bodies were thematically or geographically organised, such as the Coordinating Committee for humanitarian Demining (KAM) or the coordinating body in Sudan organising the various Swiss engagements in the country.[263] However, despite the increased efforts, the coordination mechanisms were implemented only sporadically and with varying degrees of success. This can be seen by the example of the Geneva Centres. These research institutes had been financed by both

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[260] Swiss Federal Archives, E2006A#2011/253#2005*, Az. 234.02-0, Document of the Federal Council of Switzerland, 21.04.2004: "Zivile und militärische Friedensförderung: Beiträge der Schweiz an friedensunterstützende Operationen der internationalen Gemeinschaft – Überlegungen in mittel- und langfristiger Perspektive".

[261] Swissinfo, "Armed neutrality", https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/armed-neutrality/29289102, 19.10.2018.

[262] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.6316; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4751.

[263] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4754.

departments for many years, the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. However, as of 2010, the Foreign Ministry took over the funding strengthening the foreign policy perspective within these institutions. This minor example shows that the cooperation between the departments wasn't mainstreamed throughout the whole field of Swiss peace policy, but instead just promoted in specific cases.[264]

Besides the relationship between military and civil peace promotion, the necessity for increased cooperation between the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Directorate of Political Affairs (FDFA) became an important subject of internal debate. While the close cooperation between civil peace promotion and development cooperation constituted the basis for success for many politically small states, Switzerland implemented and systemized this cooperation at a very late stage. One reason for this might be the traditional rivalry between the FDFA and the SDC. While the latter had much more financial resources at hand, the FDFA enjoyed a greater political prestige.[265]

The cooperation between the two divisions stayed at a low level for many years and only gained momentum during the early 2000s. The first efforts, however, remained incomplete and lacked consistency. The Swiss efforts in Sudan can be regarded as a good example of initiatives taken by the administration to coordinate and use synergies, but at the same time demonstrating a lack of a consistent overall strategy as highlighted in the study of Mason and Lanz (2009).[266] An important step towards a "whole-government approach" was taken with the establishment of the Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division (COPRET), introducing a more conflict sensitive approach to the SDC. A first success of this newly launched division and as a result a stronger overall focus based on a comprehensive approach, were the Swiss mediation efforts in Nepal. After a joint visit of Günther Bächler, head of COPRET, and Thomas Greminger, head of the Human Security Division, in 2003, they developed the Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM) which ensured a joint approach of their activities in Nepal.[267] In the

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[264] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.1151.

[265] Breitenmoser, "Calmy-Reys experimentelle Aussenpolitik", Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2003; Interviewee 2, 07.02.2018.

[266] Simon Mason and David Lanz, "Mehrwert oder Leerlauf? Der Whole of Government-Ansatz der Schweiz im Sudan", in *Bulletin 2009 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and Daniel Trachsler, Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich, (2009)), p.77f.

[267] Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), "Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management CSPM. Integrating conflict sensitivit and prevention of violence into SDC programmes. ", (2006).

mentioned case, the FDFA could benefit from the broad knowledge and long-standing experience of the SDC in the country. The success of the mediation efforts in Nepal, which contributed to the end of the civil war in 2006, confirmed the necessity to reinforce the cooperation between the divisions and served as a model for further engagements.[268]

7.4. Mediation – centre piece of Swiss peace policy

Another major development during the period of 2003-2011 was the increased importance of mediation as instrument of Swiss peace policy. Particularly after the turn of the millennium, we can observe an increase in and growing success of Swiss engagements as a facilitator. Despite the fact that most of these successes were of temporary nature, the engagements allowed Switzerland to reposition itself visibly as an international peace promoter and to become a serious partner in peace processes. Furthermore, looking at the Swiss engagements during that period, the previously mentioned shift away from Europe towards a growing presence in Asia and Africa becomes evident.

To this day, a majority of Swiss activities in this field can be categorized as facilitative mediation or mediation support which includes the provision of experts and know-how as well as of venues for negotiations. This form of mediation can be distinguished from terms such as directive mediation or high-powered diplomacy, two forms of third party involvement that are characterized by a stronger influence on the process.[269] Facilitative mediation tends to be less visible by the public, but at the same time, also less politically and financially risky as it is often a part of larger operations. The activities are well suited to the Swiss tradition of providing a neutral and save venue for talks as well as to its new focus on building up expertise and know-how in the field of peacebuilding.

Hence, over the years, mediation support became a main pillar of Swiss peace policy. Switzerland, for instance, provided peacebuilding advisors in the peace processes in Darfur, Uganda and Aceh.[270] In these three cases, Switzerland aimed to provide the necessary know-how to initiate talks and to bridge the differences in knowledge which are especially striking in

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[268] Interviewee 5, 27.02.2018.

[269] Jonas Baumann and Govinda Clayton, "Mediation in violent conflict," *CSS Analyses in Security Policy* 211 (2017), p.3.

[270] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.1147; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4761+68.

civil wars where asymmetrical balance of power is a common feature. Another example of mediation support was the Cyprus negotiation led by the UN on Mount Bürgenstock in Switzerland in 2004, as well as the organisation of talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Geneva in March and October 2006.[271] While the provision of experts didn't create much visibility in public, the hosting of peace talks captured much more attention. This process and content-oriented approach allowed Switzerland to enhance its engagement without lengthy preparation and improve its position on the international stage despite its comparably low budget.

Besides the many engagements in mediation support, Switzerland was also increasingly committed in long-term engagements resuming a more active role as a mediator during peace processes. As mentioned above, the *Nuba Mountains Agreement* in 2002 and the *Geneva Initiative* in 2003 were the first long-term and publicly visible achievements of Switzerland as an active mediator. The two regions, Sudan and the Middle East, stayed important fields in the Swiss mediation efforts even after the signing of the two accords. In 2005, the Bureau of the Coordinator of the Peace Talks in the Middle East and the Ambassador for Special Projects regarding Human Security, who was responsible for the Swiss contributions during the peace talks in Sudan, were integrated into the Human Security Division. This measure highlighted the key position of these two conflicts within the Swiss mediation efforts and the pivotal role of the Human Security Division.[272]

One year later in 2006, the Ambassador for Special Projects, coordinating the mediation efforts in Colombia, was also attached to the Human Security Division. This step emphasized another long-term priority of the Swiss mediation efforts, namely the civil war in Colombia. Switzerland had been present as a facilitator in Colombia since the year 2000. In cooperation with other states, it tried to facilitate talks between the rebel groups, the government and paramilitary units in the period between 2000 and 2008. Furthermore, it provided expertise on "Dealing with the Past and Justice in Transition Processes".[273] In 2008, Switzerland spent

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[271] Thomas Greminger, "Die Entwicklung der zivilen Friedensförderung der Schweiz seit 2006," *Zivile Friedensforderung der Schweiz: Bestandesaufnahme und Entwicklungspotenzial*. *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 83 (2011), p.45; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2009", 2009, p.6419; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4761.

[272] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Botschaft vom 15. Juni über die Weiterführung von Massnahmen zur zivilen Friedensförderung und Stärkung der Menschenrechte", 2007, p.4814.

[273] Ibid., p.4801; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2009", 2009, p.6424.

around 2.4 Mio. Swiss Francs on its engagement in Colombia – an amount which is comparable to its investment in Sudan, however, well below the financial commitment in the Middle East and Southeast Europe at that time.[274]

Besides these examples, there are two cases of Swiss mediation which stood out due to their visibility and international significance: The mediation efforts in the conflict between Armenia and Turkey, ending in 2009, and the dispute between Georgia and Russia about the WTO membership of the latter, ending in 2011.[275] In both cases Switzerland was asked by the parties involved to act as a mediator in the talks.[276] Both Swiss efforts were regarded by experts with much scepticism as the disputes had a multilateral dimension and were part of larger, long-lasting conflicts. These circumstances meant that the Swiss engagements were particularly visible and politically risky. Moreover, critics feared that Switzerland hurled itself into something without the necessary preparation and knowledge. The proactive approach of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey was interpreted as a gamble with too high stakes.[277]

However, the international dimension of the conflicts and the high visibility also opened up opportunities for Switzerland to more actively represent its interests in the respective regions and in the international community. In both peace talks, the cooperation with the US played an essential role. In light of the dispute between Switzerland and the US on the exchange of bank data in summer 2008, the cultivation of a good relationship and the improvement of its public reputation that came along with the Swiss efforts as a mediator, were crucial.[278] Moreover, Switzerland also pursued economic interests, such as the building of a natural gas pipeline through Turkey that would have facilitated the successful implementation of a contract between the Swiss energy group EGL AG and the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) in 2008. These examples demonstrate very well the interest-driven elements in Swiss peace policy.[279]

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[274] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2009", 2009, p.6421.

[275] Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010, p.1055+59.

[276] Richard Bauer, "«Schweizer Korridor» statt fixer Zollstellen. Calmy-Rey plaudert aus dem Nähkästchen", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2011.

[277] Ibid.; Simon Gemperli, "Machtwort Hillary Clintons am Zürichberg. Die in der Schweiz zelebrierte Einigung zwischen der Türkei und Armenien ist noch fragil", ibid. 2009.

[278] Hansueli Schöchli, "Wie die USA die Schweiz sehen. Referat des Schweizer Botschafters", ibid. 2010, p.1226f; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2010", 2010.

[279] Gemperli, "Zwischen Engagement und Abwehrkampf. Die Schweizer Aussenpolitik in der «Ära» Calmy-Rey", Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2011; Simon Gemperli, "Gute Dienste schliessen strategische Interessen nicht aus.

Both mediation efforts can be seen as a success for Switzerland even though the protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in Zurich in 2009 have never been ratified nor implemented by the national parliaments. Thanks to the peace talks, Switzerland was able to present itself in front of an international public as a peace promotor and to broaden its network in the spheres of influence of Russia and Turkey. Furthermore, these cases are a good example for the successful combination of facilitation, provision of expertise and traditional good services. In the dispute between Russia and Georgia, the role of Switzerland as a protecting power, representing the others' respective interests, was a decisive reason for them to ask Switzerland to facilitate the talks.[280] Furthermore, in the conflict between Turkey and Armenia, Switzerland's expertise in dealing with the past was seen as a great advantage.[281] These two cases illustrate perfectly the new Swiss approach that was characterized by a new self-confidence, a more active role as a facilitator with a key focus on the provision of expertise but without breaking with the more traditional Swiss form of good services.

Die Schweiz hat auch nach der Zeremonie in Zürich ein Auge auf den Südkaukasus", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 2009.

[280] Richard Bauer, "«Schweizer Korridor» statt fixer Zollstellen. Calmy-Rey plaudert aus dem Nähkästchen", ibid. 2011; Federal Council of Switzerland. "Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2011", 2012, p.3026.

[281] Greminger, "Die Entwicklung der zivilen Friedensförderung der Schweiz seit 2006," Zivile Friedensforderung der Schweiz: Bestandesaufnahme und Entwicklungspotenzial. Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik, no. 83 (2011).

8. Conclusion

The end of the Cold War brought about many changes in world politics. As described in this master thesis, a major shift can be observed in the field of peace promotion which over time adapted to the new world order and new forms of conflict. In this context, the traditional form of good services that was instrumental for Swiss foreign policy in the 20th century lost in importance. While in the early 1990s many countries, such as Norway, invested heavily in the establishment of their peace policy, Swiss peace promotion developed only slowly. Bogged down by discussions on neutrality and its position in Europe, lengthy direct democratic processes, a lack of financial means and a rather risk-averse foreign policy, Switzerland was struggling to redefine its role in this field early on. Nevertheless, at the turn of the millennium, Switzerland succeeded to professionalize its approach to civil peace promotion and to gradually establish itself as an international peace promoter. As of 2002, we can speak of an institutionalized Swiss peace policy which was characterized, amongst others, by geographical and topical prioritizations, a new legal basis and a close collaboration with other states, international organisations, research institutes and civil actors.

Despite the good starting point of Switzerland as a country with an already existing "tradition" of humanitarian engagement and good services, Switzerland missed the opportunity to take a leading role in the changing field of peace promotion just after the Cold War. In that context, three main features of Swiss politics had a considerable impact on the initially slow development of Swiss peace promotion and on the overall establishment of Swiss peace policy in the period under study.

First, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the changing circumstances in Europe were at the centre of attention of Swiss politics in the early 1990s. The debate on the role of Switzerland in Europe and its relationship with European countries dominated the political discourse. This can be seen, for example, in the fierce political campaign on the Swiss accession to the EEA in 1992. Even though peace policy was seen as a useful political instrument to represent Swiss security interests, particularly in Eastern Europe, it played only a secondary role in foreign policy at that time. In the early 2000s, the focus of Swiss peace policy shifted away from Southeast Europe and became more globally oriented. As a reaction to the increasingly stable political situation in Southeast Europe, engagements in Africa, Asia and South America became more prominent.

These changes came along with a shift in motives: Swiss peace policy slowly moved from a predominantly security driven to a more foreign policy oriented instrument.

Second, the discussion on Swiss neutrality, which gained new momentum with the end of the east-west antagonism, hindered a more proactive approach to peace promotion in the early 1990s. Even though the policy of neutrality had lost much of its importance for Swiss foreign policy and more specifically, Swiss peace promotion, a majority of the Swiss population perceived it as a binding principle. Therefore, neutrality stayed an important argument in public discussions and political campaigns. During the vote on the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations* in 1994 and the vote on the accession to the UN in 2002, neutrality was a popular reason to disapprove the further integration of Switzerland in the international community. Furthermore, for a long time, neutrality was an argument against a more proactive and offensive approach in peace promotion. As of 2003, Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey broke with this tradition by reinterpreting Swiss neutrality and pursuing national interests more proactively, in spite of strong resistance.

Last but not least, the Swiss political system, which includes strong direct democratic elements and is based on the principle of consensus, shaped the development of Swiss peace policy profoundly. The semi-direct democratic system of Switzerland includes many lengthy approval processes and is highly dependent on public support. Additionally, the need of consensus decisions and the major significance of political and public backing, prevented a rapid adaptation to the new environment and the adoption of a riskier and more proactive approach. These circumstances can be witnessed, amongst others, by the extremely long process that resulted in Switzerland's membership in the UN and the setback of military peace promotion by the negative vote on the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations* in 1994. Moreover, the controversies triggered by the proactive policy of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey showed that fast changes and a more visible and proactive approach, that stood in contrast to the Swiss tradition of good services, had a hard time in Swiss politics and society.

As illustrated in chapter 4, the publication of the *Report on Foreign Policy 1993* and the *Report on Neutrality 1993* opened up new room for manoeuvre in Swiss foreign policy. It highlighted the need for greater cooperation with states and international organisations. Furthermore, it stated the intention to increase the Swiss engagement in peace promotion and to introduce a wider interpretation of Swiss neutrality policy. The communication of this new credo was a

necessary step to be able to reinforce Swiss engagement in the changed field of peace promotion.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Switzerland was eager to establish itself as an international peace promoter mainly because of two reasons: the fear of international marginalization and the cultivation of its historical heritage. First, Switzerland was internationally isolated as the country was not a part of the major international organisations, such as the UN and NATO. In addition, Switzerland was also struggling with the political and economic integration in Europe as non-member of the EU. These circumstances resulted in an increasing fear of international marginalization which was reinforced by the negative outcome of the vote on the accession to the EEA in 1992 and the rejection of the *Federal Law on Swiss Troops for Peacekeeping Operations* in 1994. In this difficult context, civil peace promotion was seen by the government, particularly in the 1990s, as a useful tool to overcome the risk of isolation. Secondly, the humanitarian engagement and good services of Switzerland had been key elements of Swiss foreign policy during the two World Wars as well as during the Cold War. These engagements played into the narrative of a neutral and peace-loving country and became an integral part of Swiss identity. With the aim of keeping up this narrative, the Swiss government was eager to remain engaged in peace promotion and cultivate this image despite the radical changes in the field of peace promotion.

The return to the narrative of Switzerland as a traditional peace promoter was particularly pushed by Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti and his team during the OSCE Chairmanship in 1996. The engagement as chairman generated much attention and allowed Switzerland not only to show its capabilities as a mediating power and its will to contribute to the European order in conflicts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to revive its tradition and to establish itself as a new international peace promoter. It was an essential step to overcome the fear of international marginalisation and to build up a network for further cooperation in Europe. With the successful engagement during the OSCE chairmanship, the accession to the UN in 2002 as well as other efforts in the international community, such as the Swiss engagement for the prohibition of illegal small arms and anti-personnel mines, the fear of marginalisation began to disperse in the public eye. Even though this fear can be seen as an omnipresent topic in Swiss foreign policy in general, it became less important around the turn of the millennium.

At the same time, new ambitions came to the fore. With the *Holocaust Affair* in 1996, it became clear that an internationally visible peace policy could be instrumental to positively influence the Swiss reputation abroad. The bank crisis in 2008 represented another example where Swiss peace policy was appreciated as a useful instrument to improve the tarnished image. The Swiss government succeeded to reinterpret its "humanitarian tradition" and to integrate the new Swiss peace policy in the narrative of Switzerland as a "peace nation". In the early 2000s, new campaigns and institutions, such as Presence Switzerland, were initiated with the goal of improving Switzerland's reputation and increasing the visibility of Swiss peace policy. These measures point out that the Swiss government was well aware of the effectiveness of this form of public diplomacy and started to use it more systematically as a political tool.

Moreover, at the turn of the millennium, we can observe that Swiss peace policy wasn't seen by the government as a mere counter measure to isolationism and a tarnished reputation anymore, but also as an instrument to represent its national interests and more specifically, to improve the position of Switzerland in the international arena and to contribute to the development of international law. Over the years, Switzerland increasingly adopted a political and more proactive approach to civil peace promotion while the technical and risk-averse approach, which had characterized the Swiss good services in the 20th century, became less important. This reorientation came along with the increased engagement as an international mediator. Especially during the term of office of Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey, the Swiss government started to mediate in more controversial and internationally visible peace processes such as the *Geneva Initiative* in 2003 and the peace agreement between Russia and Georgia signed in 2011.

With the goal of improving its position in the international community and pursue its own interests, Switzerland started to professionalize its peace policy. In this master thesis, different measures of professionalization have been identified. In the early 2000s, Switzerland created a legal and financial framework for its civil peace policy. The *Federal Law regarding the Measures for Civil Peace Promotion and the Strengthening of Human Rights* and the *Framework Credit regarding Measures for Civil Conflict Transformation and the Promotion of Human Rights* introduced in 2002 ensured a more sustainable strategy in Swiss peace policy. These circumstances paved the way for long-term commitments, such as in the Sudanese and Colombian peace processes. Besides, the Foreign Ministry adapted its internal structure to meet the new challenges in the field of civil peace promotion more effectively. With this end in view,

the Foreign Ministry, for example, established the Swiss Expert Pool for Civil Peacebuilding (SEF) in 2002, which has been playing a major role in establishing Switzerland as a respected provider of expertise. Thereby, the Foreign Ministry focused on topics, such as decentralization and constitutional issues that have been a core competency of Switzerland for many years. Another measure that has been crucial in the development of Swiss peace policy and pursuing national interests in a more effective way, was the stronger focus on the conceptualization of a distinct Swiss approach to civil peace promotion. With this end in view, the Directorate of Political Affairs set thematic and geographical priorities which also allowed the Foreign Ministry to use its financial means more efficiently to improve its network and to build up expertise in the target regions and thematic fields.

Besides these internal measures that led to a more professionalized approach, cooperation and alliances with a wide range of actors were essential for the development of Swiss peace promotion. The cooperation with many different stakeholders also ensured a more comprehensive approach which had been a weakness of Swiss peace promotion in the 1990s and early 2000s. First, the Foreign Ministry intensified its cooperation with research institutes, such as Swisspeace and the Geneva Centres, resulting in the achievement of a higher level of expertise, as mentioned in the paragraph above. Secondly, in the early 2000s, Switzerland was also eager to intensify its collaboration with other like-minded states, such as France and Canada. As a politically small state, the cooperation with other countries was crucial to maximize its impact and to be able to contribute to larger international peacekeeping operations. Particularly in view of the increasing complexity of conflicts, the cooperation with other states had become vital. These alliances were not only crucial for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, but also for developing new proposals on how to shape international law within international organisations. Switzerland, for instance, initiated the *2005 International Tracing Instrument* in cooperation with France. Third, as part of an increasingly comprehensive peace policy, Switzerland also started to work more closely with civil actors, such as NGOs and local stakeholders, as well as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. A good example to illustrate the improved cooperation are the Swiss peacebuilding efforts in Nepal in 2006. Thanks to the close collaboration between the Directorate of Political Affairs, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and several Swiss NGOs, Switzerland was able to make a significant contribution to the success of the peace process.

The end of the Cold War brought about a fissure in the Swiss engagement which forced Switzerland to reassess and reposition its efforts. This thesis is an attempt to depict this development, marked by a rather rocky start, and to highlight the various factors that shaped the distinctive Swiss approach to civil peace promotion. It can also be seen as an example of how a politically small European state has succeeded to position itself as a relevant actor in the profoundly changed field of civil peace promotion after the Cold War. The thesis can be used as a basis for comparative studies as well as to further analyse the development of Swiss peace policy. As from 2020, the term of protection for government documents at the Swiss Federal Archives will gradually expire and allow researchers to access all relevant documents and gain more in-depth knowledge on the internal decision-making processes. This would clearly be a good opportunity to deepen and complement this historical analysis.

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