

# Knowledge of the Soul in Plato's *Phaedrus*

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## **Abstract**

In this thesis, I consider the account of soul's nature required by the art of rhetoric as proposed in Plato's *Phaedrus*. In doing so, I sketch out what picture of soul appears to be necessary, and certain question we should ask about this. In the middle two chapters, I go on to consider Socrates' extended speech in praise of love – his Palinode – and the various claims it makes about the soul and its nature. I argue that within this speech, we find an interesting account of soul's nature, which provides answers the questions raised in the first chapter, and in turn raises further ones. In the final chapter, I consider certain methodological objections, and assess to what extent these undermine my argument.

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## Introduction

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato argues that for rhetoric to be an art, it requires a grasp of the nature of soul, as outlined at 271a4-b4. Yet prior to any consideration of rhetoric and its requirements, Plato has Socrates deliver his Palinode in favour of love, over the course of which the soul receives an extended treatment that broaches its nature, immortality, structure, self-motion, and species. In light of the later claim that rhetoric requires a grasp of the nature of soul, and the often-questioned unity of the dialogue, it seems compelling to ask whether we are intended to detect parallels between these two treatments of soul. Over the course of this thesis, I explore this question with the aim of showing that the palinode's treatment of soul offers a number of answers to questions raised about what grasp of soul is required of rhetoric.

To do so, I begin by analysing the passage at 271a4-b4 in order to clarify what account of the nature of soul is most plausibly required by a rhetorician. To briefly summarise, I conclude that from the context and scholarly consensus we have good reason to think that rhetoric needs a grasp of the various kinds of soul there are and their respective powers of acting and being acted upon. On this view, rhetoric is an art that requires one adapt one's speeches to the specific kind of soul one addresses in order to maximise one's chance of persuading that soul to believe a certain thing or act in a certain way. But while this much appears to be the case, there are at least three questions which it seems prudent to raise about this account of soul's nature; having raised these, I outline the reasons why, on the face of it, it appears plausible that the palinode should provide answers.

Having established a presumption in favour of considering the material in the palinode, in Chapter II, I turn to this speech and its treatment of soul in order to set out the various claims it makes about soul. The chapter divides into three sections, each of which focuses upon a specific element of that treatment. The first considers the argument made at the outset for the immortality of soul, identifying its key premises and attending to the question of which soul its conclusions apply to; the second considers the described structure of soul, and illustrates how this description builds upon claims made over the course of the immortality argument; the third considers the law of necessity, how there come to be various kinds of human soul, and what differentiates between these kinds. Over these three sections, I also outline how each appears to provide something relevant to an understanding of soul's nature.

In the third chapter, I return to the subject of rhetoric and the account of the nature of soul it requires. Having re-iterated this, I turn to outline what the palinode gives us to understand regarding the nature of soul, and defend the observations of the preceding chapter. With this done, I turn to the issue of what relevance the palinode's claims about soul's nature have in the context of rhetoric. Specifically, I illustrate how it provides answers to the three questions raised in the first chapter of the thesis. With this done, I offer some final considerations regarding points over which my interpretation is either lacking or not definitive, and indicate areas in which I think further scholarship could do well explore.

In my fourth and final chapter, I outline three potential objections regarding the validity of the commitments in the palinode. For each, I conclude that they do not constitute sufficient reason to jeopardise the position I have argued for over the course of this paper. With this complete, I offer a brief conclusion summarising the results of the investigation as a whole.



# 1. Rhetoric and the Nature of Soul

In this chapter, I consider what understanding of the nature of soul is ostensibly necessary for the practice of artful rhetoric, as outlined at 271a4-b4. To do so, I begin (1.1) by clarifying the explanation of the method one must follow in order to grasp the nature of anything (270d2-7), which forms the methodological basis for Socrates' claims at 271ab. Having done so, I go on to discuss what sort of account of soul is required by rhetoric, and conclude that, as an art of moving the soul with speech, it requires an account of soul's various kinds. With this general picture sketched out, I conclude the chapter by raising three questions we should pose about this account and *prima facie* reasons why we should expect the treatment of soul in the palinode to provide answers to these (1.2).

## 1.1 Rhetoric and the Nature of Soul

At 271a4-b4, Socrates explains how a genuine practitioner of artful rhetoric will convey his understanding of the nature of soul. For the sake of clarity, I shall quote the passage in full.<sup>1</sup>

SOCRATES: Clearly, therefore, Thrasymachus and anyone else who teaches the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is: whether it is one and homogenous by nature or takes many forms, like the shape of bodies, since, as we said, that's what it is to demonstrate the nature of something.

PHAEDRUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Second, he will explain how, in virtue of its nature, it acts and is acted upon by certain things.

PHAEDRUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Third, he will classify the kinds of speech and of soul there are, as well as the various ways in which they are affected, and explain what causes each. He will then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it. And he will give instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced. (271a4-b4)

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<sup>1</sup> All translations I provide are not my own but those of Nehamas & Woodruff 1997.

This explanation is not offered in isolation: prior to this, Socrates has argued that rhetoric – as an art [τέχνη] – requires knowledge of the nature of soul (269e4-270b7), and explained the method one must follow to grasp the nature of anything (270d2-7). This explanation, which I will subsequently refer to as the “procedural explanation”, is an important point of reference: it clarifies the steps one must take to grasp the nature of anything and the passage at 271a4-b4 transparently applies this step-by-step procedure to soul. It will therefore be useful to begin with an outline of the procedural explanation.

Briefly, it claims that to determine the nature of anything [περὶ ὅτουοῦν φύσεως] requires two steps.<sup>2</sup> First, one must determine whether something is simple [ἀπλοῦν] or complex [πολυειδές].<sup>3</sup> This step, henceforth N1, is the same step Socrates claims a rhetorician<sup>4</sup> will begin his explanation of soul with (271a4-7). The antithesis he sets up there – that a rhetorician will describe the soul and show whether it is by nature one and homogenous [ὅμοιον] or takes many forms [πολυειδές] – clearly mirrors this earlier distinction between simplicity and complexity.

With an answer to N1, there is a second step, N2. If something has been found to be by nature simple, one will then need investigate its power [τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ] by considering what natural power of acting [ποιεῖν] it has on what things, and what natural disposition it possesses for being acted upon [παθεῖν] by certain things. However, if the entity is not simple – if it has many forms [ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχη]<sup>5</sup> – then one must enumerate these and subject each to an investigation of their powers of acting and being acted upon. This same step is

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<sup>2</sup> The order of the steps is sequential: the first comes first because the second is contingent upon its results. Cf. Griswold 1986: 191-193, and Yunis 2011: 208-14.

<sup>3</sup> While there is an ambiguity regarding the sense of this distinction, I take up this point below.

<sup>4</sup> When I refer to “rhetoricians” or “rhetors”, I mean Socrates’ *artful* rhetorician unless stipulated otherwise.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. if complex or multiform [πολυειδές].

applied at 271a9, when Socrates stipulates that the rhetorician will explain how, in virtue of soul's nature [πέφυκεν], it acts [ποιεῖν] and is acted upon [παθεῖν].<sup>6</sup>

While this is admittedly also a dense passage, my reason for introducing it here is that it introduces the methodological procedure and technical terminology in play at 271a4-b4. I should also note that at several points (271c8-272b3; 273d2-274a4; 277b4-c5) Socrates repeats what understanding of soul the rhetorician will need possess and convey. These passages will likewise be important points of reference where clarification is required. With this qualified, I will proceed to my analysis of the account of soul the rhetorician will convey.

As we have just seen, to convey an understanding of the nature of soul, the rhetorician – in accordance with the procedural explanation – will first describe the soul with “absolute precision” [πάση ἀκριβείᾳ] and make clear what its nature is. There are two alternatives: by nature, anything is either simple [ἀπλοῦν] or complex [πολυειδές]. Hence, in describing the soul, the rhetorician will first clarify whether it is (a) one and homogenous,<sup>7</sup> or (b) takes many forms, like the shape of bodies, and by doing so make clear what the nature of soul is.

On a first reading, Socrates appears here to suggest that the rhetorician will begin by describing the soul's internal structure. On this view, the two possibilities are (a1) that soul is simple, one, and homogenous, insofar as it does not admit of partition, or (b1) that soul is multiform, just as the shape of bodies are [κατὰ σώματος μορφήν], insofar as it admits of having multiple functional parts. While this requires us to take εἶδέ – as used in πολυειδές – to refer to “parts”, this is not an exceptional demand for several reasons.

First, within his palinode Socrates describes the soul's ἰδέα – visible shape – and makes it clear that it has multiple parts – a charioteer, and two distinct horses. It thus seems natural to read a4-7 as requiring the rhetorician to provide a description of soul in the same sense, describing its structure albeit now with a level of precision that was previously held to be

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<sup>6</sup> N1 thus requires one determine whether something is by nature [πέφυκεν] simple or complex, while N2 requires one determine the power of something by nature [πέφυκεν] – those of the thing itself, if simple, or its “forms” if complex.

<sup>7</sup> Here homogenous [ὅμοιον] is equivalent to simple [ἀπλοῦν].

beyond human capabilities.<sup>8</sup> This description, as with that in the palinode, would serve to explain the soul's shape [ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν] (cf. 271a5), and clarify that it has multiple functional parts. Second, the reference to bodily shape here invites comparison with how Socrates suggested (266a) that the human body can be divided into pairs of parts – ears, eyes, hands, and so on. This again implies the rhetorician will here address the soul's internal structure. Third, in *Republic IV*, we see Socrates address the issue of soul's parts in not dissimilar language: at 436b8-c1, he refers to what the parts do and suffer [ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν] – indicative bearing in mind that upon completion of this step, one must go on to consider what the many εἶδη of soul do [ποιεῖν] and how they are acted upon [παθεῖν] – and asks whether soul is one or many [ἤν ἄλλὰ πλείω].<sup>9</sup> Finally, that the soul does or does not have parts seems unquestionably relevant for any understanding of what the soul, by nature, is.

Owing the sequential order of N1 and N2, reading the first step in this sense has implications when we consider the next step. Following the determination of soul's simplicity or complexity, the rhetorician will go on to explain how, in virtue of its nature, the soul acts [ποιεῖν] and is acted upon [παθεῖν]. Taking the first step, N1, to be a determination of soul's parts, in the second step, N2, one would consequently expect the rhetorician to explain, for each of soul's parts, what each does and how each is acted upon.<sup>10</sup> By doing so, he will allow us to understand how the soul, *qua* entity with various parts, acts and is acted upon.<sup>11</sup>

So far nothing seems to stand in the way of such a reading. However, upon reaching the third step of the rhetorician's education – a step which intuitively reads as an application of the results of the first two steps – we are presented with a complication.

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<sup>8</sup> Reading it in this manner, Griswold states that “Socrates seems here to be promising us that divine narrative about the soul that he claimed in his palinode to be beyond the reach of mankind” (192); Cf. also Ferrari 1987: 76 for a similar assessment.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. ἔν καὶ ὁμοιον (271a6) and ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχη (270d5).

<sup>10</sup> I say respectively owing to the stipulation that each εἶδη will be subjected to the same kind of investigation. Were they thought to share powers, this specification would be frivolous; hence it seems plausible to conclude each part is thought to possess its own natural set of powers. Cf. Jouanna 1977, and Lloyd 1991 for in depth treatment of this issue.

<sup>11</sup> The view that comes out is therefore not dissimilar to that sketched by Griswold *op. cit.*: 191 in reference to 270d, submitting that it *a priori* determines that “entities... are the sum of eidetically distinguishable parts acting upon and being acted upon by each other”.

In the third step, the rhetorician will ostensibly ‘classify the kinds [γένη] of speech and of soul, as well as the various ways in which the kinds of soul are affected, and explain what causes each. He will then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it. And he will give instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced’ (271b1-4). At this stage, Socrates ceases to employ the term εἶδη, and refers instead to the γένη of speeches and souls. This complicates matters: while εἶδη is an ambiguous term, which can mean both parts or types<sup>12</sup>, and has until now appeared to mean “parts”, it appears for several reasons that here γένη should be read as meaning “kinds”.<sup>13</sup>

The first reason concerns the reference to the γένη of speech. Socrates here claims that a rhetorician – one who has mastered rhetoric as art – will need determine the γένη of speech and match these to the γένη of soul. This cannot obviously mean “parts” of speech insofar as Socrates’ later explanation (272a) indicates that by the γένη – used interchangeably with εἶδη – of speech, he has in mind things like speaking concisely, appealing to pity, or exaggeration – that is, kinds of speech. Translating γένη as kinds or types of speech, consistency demands we take Socrates at 271b to likewise mean kinds of soul.

The second point concerns the picture of artful rhetoric that emerges upon taking γένη at 271b1 as referring to kinds of soul. At 261a6, Socrates claimed that rhetoric was an art of moving soul with speech [ῥητορικὴ ἄν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων]. The key term here – ψυχαγωγία, soul-moving – refers, among other things, to the rhetorical power of speech to move a soul one way or another: speech can move the soul to certain beliefs – accounting for the persuasive element in rhetoric – and to act in certain ways.<sup>14</sup> With this, Socrates anticipates the later insistence that rhetoric requires a grasp of soul’s nature: it is soul that speech acts upon and is capable of moving both to action and belief. From 271d onward,

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<sup>12</sup> *LSJ s.v. II*

<sup>13</sup> On this point, there is large consensus among scholars: Hackforth 1952: 147 renders γένη as “types”, as do Asmis 1986: 169, Griswold *ibid*: 192, and Ferrari 1987: 76; Nehamas & Woodruff, as quoted, render it as “kinds” in juxtaposition with the usage of “forms” for εἶδη, as do de Vries 1969: 237, Rowe 1986: 115, and Yunis *ibid*: 212-14.

<sup>14</sup> While this adequately summarises the basic sense of ψυχαγωγία, this is hardly a full treatment of the matter; for a fuller treatment of this subject, see Asmis *ibid*: 153-172 and Yunis *ibid*: 12-13, 183, and 215.

Socrates develops this point by explaining why a rhetorician will need grasp the nature of soul in the manner outlined. To paraphrase, his explanation runs as follows: since the nature of speech is to move soul [ψυχαγωγία], one must know the forms of soul [εἰδέναι ψυχῆ ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει] because – it having so and so and so many forms – so too are there so and so many characters a rhetorician must learn to recognise. One must then learn the forms [εἶδη] of speech – likewise so and so many and of such-and-such a sort – because people of a certain character – viz. who have a certain form [εἶδη] of soul – are most persuaded – moved to a certain belief or action – by a certain form [εἶδη] of speech.

As Hackforth rightly observes, were we to render εἶδη in this passage consistently as “parts”, we would need take Socrates to think that, there being so and so many parts of soul, so too are there so and so many characters which the rhetorician must learn to recognise and adapt his speeches to. However, it being clear that there are only three parts of soul, and it being implied that the number of characters and speeches the rhetorician must familiarise him or herself with is greater than three, it seems implausible that Socrates here should be using εἶδη to mean parts.<sup>15</sup>

Conversely, if we take γένη and εἶδη as being used interchangeably, and take Socrates to be referring, with these terms, to the kinds of soul and of speech, the implied magnitude of what Socrates proposes at 271b1-4 and 271d1-272b3 becomes clear. On this picture, the art of rhetoric, *qua* art that moves the soul with speech, requires knowledge of the soul’s various kinds because these each correspond to a certain character, each of which in turn is moved by a certain kind of speech. One must therefore also learn the various kinds of speech there are, and match each kind of speech to the kind of soul and character that will find it to be compelling. In practical terms, the art rhetoric is therefore one that requires one adapt one’s speeches to the kind of soul one is addressing and, by using the most persuasive kind of speech, move the particular kind of soul to act in a certain manner or believe a certain thing. It is such a view of rhetoric that plausibly elicits Phaedrus declaration that it is ‘evidently a rather major undertaking’ to acquire this art (272b4).

There being contextual and scholarly support for the view that εἶδη and γένη should both be rendered as “kinds” in these later passages, it seems a revision is required of the initial reading of what account of the nature of soul the rhetorician will convey. As we have seen,

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<sup>15</sup> Implied by Phaedrus’ comment at 272b4.

the first step (N1) the artful rhetorician will take is to explain whether soul is by nature simple [ἀπλοῦν] or complex [πολυειδές]. Where before we took this to imply that a rhetorician will convey an understanding of soul's parts, on the revised view, this step reads as requiring a rhetorician to grasp whether (a2) the soul is simple, one, and homogenous in the sense that it is by nature one single kind of thing, or (b2) the soul is multiform in the sense that there are many forms, types, or kinds of soul.<sup>16</sup> While this may not appear to sit quite as well with the reference at 271a6 to the shape of bodies, this is not an insurmountable obstacle: as Yunis (2011: 213) plausibly notes, one can take bodies to come in a variety of shapes, and so be multiform in this second sense as well as the first.

Given the contingency of the second step (N2) upon the answer to the first, this has implications for the second matter the rhetorician will attend to. On our revised view, if the soul is simple and has only one kind, then at the second stage of his teaching, the rhetorician will go on to subject soul to an investigation of how it acts and is acted upon. If, however, by nature [πέφυκεν], the soul has many kinds – as is suggested it does in the passage that immediately follows – then in the second stage of his teaching, the rhetorician will explain the powers [δύναμιν] of each kind by accounting for how each respectively acts [ποιεῖν] and is acted upon [παθεῖν].<sup>17</sup>

With such a reading, it becomes more apparent how, at the third step, the rhetorician will classify the kinds of speech and soul there are, and what kinds of speech are convincing to what kinds of soul. Having in his first step clarified that the soul has many kinds, and in the second step, enumerated these and explained how each kind respectively acts and is acted upon [παθεῖν], he will have presumably already made clear that speech acts upon souls, and is capable of either being persuasive or un-persuasive. Step three therefore appears to read, as

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. 238a3: here πολυειδές is used in reference to *hubris*, and intuitively reads as stipulating that there are many kinds of *hubris*.

<sup>17</sup> While there is less detailed treatment of this particular issue, the view I sketch concurs strongly with that outlined by Yunis *op. cit.*: 212-215, and finds no disagreement in Griswold *op. cit.*: 192, Ferrari *op. cit.*: 76, and Hackforth *op. cit.*: 151. It may also be noted that this use here of the term “nature” [φύσις] to mean the essential and unique character of a thing has its roots as far back as Thales as an inquirer into the true nature of reality; cf. Aristotle, *Met.* I.3 983b6–18

Ferrari observes, as an extension of the second stage of the rhetors education, albeit now applied to speeches.<sup>18</sup>

With this, we appear to have an adequate outline of what account of soul is required by rhetoric: what rhetoric requires, in order to be practiced as an art, is a grasp of various kinds of soul, each of which differs in terms of its proclivity to be persuaded by a certain kind of speech, and on the basis of which a rhetorician will be able to adapt his speeches in order to maximise his chance of moving the soul to act in a certain way. But while I take there to be a great deal of plausibility to this revised view, and largely agree with scholars that this seems to be the account of soul here meant, there are some pertinent questions this late passage in the text raises. In the following, I will sketch these out, and establish a presumption in favour of turning to the palinode to look for answers to these.

## 1.2 Lingering Issues

The first and most pertinent point concerns the kinds of soul with which a rhetorician must acquaint himself. While it seems clear enough that Socrates takes a rhetorician to require knowledge of the kinds of soul, at no point in the remainder of the dialogue are we given a sense of what kinds of soul Socrates, and much less Plato, has in mind. What we receive in terms of an explanation is the assurance that there are a determinate number of different kinds of soul, each of which corresponds to a certain character (271d, 273d). While at 277bc, Socrates does refer to souls as being either complex or simple, this does not exactly constitute a complete explanation of the many kinds of soul there are thought to be.

As a connected problem, we are here given to understand that rhetoric, as an art, requires knowledge not only of the kinds of soul, but their natural power [*δύναμιν*]; how they, by nature, act and are acted upon. While the general point here appears clear enough – in order to grasp the nature of soul, or the natures of its kinds, one must understand how it is that the soul, or its kinds, act and are acted upon – we are given a somewhat truncated treatment of this particular notion and its importance to rhetoric. Though it is suggested that, by nature, certain kinds of soul will have a proclivity to be persuaded – acted upon – by a certain kind of speech, once again there are ambiguities here: what kinds of speech does Socrates plausibly have in mind?

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<sup>18</sup> Ferrari *op. cit.*: 76.



On this point, there are several plausible possibilities. From 266e-268a, Socrates outlines what he terms the “fine points of the art” and gives an extensive summary of the variety of rhetorical techniques a rhetorician is thought to require knowledge of. At 272a, as noted above, he refers to “Speaking Concisely” and “Appealing to pity and Exaggeration”. Both of these appear to be kinds of speech. There is, in addition, a third possibility quite easily overlooked: on Socrates view, the rhetorician must grasp not only the nature of soul but the truth about the subject one intends to speak about. As he outlines at 263b, rhetoric’s power is greatest when one is speaking on a subject – for instance what is just or good – upon which each of us ‘differ with one another and even with ourselves’. Here, he goes on to claim that a rhetor must make a systematic division and grasp the particular character of his subject and whether it is one in which people are easily deceived or not. It seems that this distinction between classes of subject should also be relevant to the kinds of speech: presumably a rhetorician would do well, when attempting to convince a particular soul that something is good or bad, to recognise that this is subject upon which some will be easily deceived and others will not. This, of course, is highly speculative: without a sense of what kinds of soul and what proclivities for kinds of speech a rhetorician will be familiar with, it is somewhat baseless.

The next issue concerns the specification that a rhetor must grasp each kind of soul’s power of acting – what it, by nature, does. Despite this specification, at the third stage of the rhetor’s education no reference is made to this aspect of the rhetor’s education. On the one hand, one may side with Hackforth in thinking that Plato here is more interested in the soul’s passive interaction with speech and only mentions the active power to avoid giving the impression that soul is purely passive. However, this view is not wholly compelling: that Plato felt it worthy of mention in the context of rhetoric could equally well suggest that it *is* necessary for the rhetorician to grasp what the soul, by nature, does. The issue, however, is murky, for nowhere in the later dialogue are we given any definite sense of what it is that, by nature, soul does.

The last issue concerns the detectable ambiguity of the term εἶδη. While I side with scholarly consensus in thinking that what is most plausibly required for rhetoric is a determination of the various kinds of soul there are, it nevertheless seems striking that, on an initial reading, it is easy to think, for the various reasons outlined above, that a rhetorician requires knowledge

of whether or not soul is complex in the sense that it has multiple parts.<sup>19</sup> There is no doubt issues from the fact that, in the palinode, we see soul described in such a way that emphasises its composition as a tri-partite entity. Because of this, it seems worth questioning the ambiguity of Socrates' explanation prior to 271b1. If we are, as Yunis and Hackforth contend, not intended to read εἶδη as referring to soul's parts, then why, one may defensibly ask, would Plato not strive to make this more clear?<sup>20</sup> It seems not implausible, for instance, to think that rhetoric requires a grasp of soul as πολυειδής in both senses – as an entity both with multiple parts and kinds. Furthermore, it seems *prima facie* plausible that knowledge of soul's parts would be relevant when discriminating between kinds of soul.<sup>21</sup>

There are, in sum, several questions it seems worthwhile posing about the account of the nature of soul required by Socrates' artful rhetorician. These concern (i) the grasp of the soul's kinds he must possess; (ii) the stipulation that a rhetorician must grasp the power either of soul or its kinds; and (iii) the ambiguity over whether or not the rhetorician requires knowledge of the various parts of the soul.

This last issue is one in which I am particularly interested. The ambiguity over the term εἶδη stems in no small part from the description of soul provided within the palinode, a speech in which Socrates begins with an extended treatment of the soul. In light of his later specification that an artful rhetorician requires a grasp of the nature of soul, it seems not ungrounded to wonder whether we are intended to draw parallels between the claims made within the palinode and this later passage.<sup>22</sup> On the face of it, a number of compelling reasons sit in favour of posing this question.

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<sup>19</sup> Interestingly, both Ferrari and Griswold initially appear to take this view in relation to the passage at 270d, yet subsequently go on to speak of the types of soul in relation to the passage at 271ab.

<sup>20</sup> Both Yunis and Hackforth expressly warn against reading the term εἶδη in this sense, a fact that testifies in favour of its ambiguity.

<sup>21</sup> The former speculation is lent support by *Republic* 9.581c, where Socrates differentiates three psychological types based upon what part of the soul dominates. Also cf. Rowe *op. cit.*: 206 who concedes there is merit to posing such a question.

<sup>22</sup> All the more so given the often cited central problem of the *Phaedrus*: since antiquity, scholars have been divided upon the unity of this dialogue, in light of it appearing to fall

First, as noted above, at no stage in the latter half of the dialogue are we given a sense of the kinds of soul Plato has in mind. Conversely, within the palinode, we are offered at least two ways of dividing the soul up into kinds at 248d2-e3 and 252c4-253c2. In light of the later silence upon the different kinds, the burden of explanation appears to fall squarely upon the palinode's account of the different kinds of human soul: are these kinds of soul the same kinds with which a rhetorician is expected to be familiar? Second, the ambiguity over whether or not a rhetorician will need to grasp the soul's composition and parts appears a compelling reason to turn to the palinode and inspect the description provided of soul, and whether it seems relevant in a rhetorical context. Third, rhetoric ostensibly requires a grasp of what the soul, or its kinds, by nature do [ποιεῖν] and have done to them [παθεῖν]. In the palinode, Socrates provides a speech concerning the passion of love [τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος] (265b). In light of this treatment of an experience [πάθος] soul is capable of, there seems room to wonder whether this is intended to be relevant to the later reference to the soul's propensity to experience or be acted upon [παθεῖν] by speech. Fourth, as Hackforth notes but dismisses as irrelevant, in this speech soul is said to move itself and the body, and this claim seems to be one concerning what the soul does.<sup>23</sup> While I can understand why he takes this stance – the self-movement of soul being bound up in a cosmological account of soul as the source of the universe's eternal motion – it hints at a possible connection between the two parts of the dialogue seldom explored in great detail.

These considerations notwithstanding, there is a final and quite compelling reason to expect a certain level of consistency between the claims made about the soul in Socrates' palinode and the account of soul required by rhetoric. As we have already seen, at 269e4, Socrates introduces the second requirement of artful rhetoric: all arts require a grasp of nature [φύσεως], with medicine grasping the nature of body and rhetoric the nature of soul (270e). At 245c, after having announced the scope of his speech and prior to his argument for the immortality of soul, Socrates says the following: 'now we must first understand the truth about the nature of soul [ψυχῆς φύσεως] divine and human [θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης] by examining what it does [ἔργα] and what is done to it [πάθη]'. Here, Socrates quite emphatically promises to provide an explanation of the nature of soul divine and human,

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neatly into two halves, with the first treating love and the second treating rhetoric. Cf. Asmis *op. cit.*: 153 for a brief overview of this issue.

<sup>23</sup> Hackforth *op. cit.*: 151.

complete with a treatment of what it does [ἔργα] and what is done to it [πάθη]. This reference to what soul, divine and human, does and has done to it quite transparently mirrors the later requirement that a rhetorician must grasp the soul's natural power, or those of its kinds.<sup>24</sup> With this, it seems compelling to consider the relevance, to the art of rhetoric, of the palinode's treatment of soul.

### **Concluding Remarks**

To summarise our position so far, it seems there are at least three questions worth asking about rhetoric. The first is what kinds of soul Plato believes the rhetorician must be familiar with; the second is what we are intended to understand by the stipulation that the rhetorician will grasp the soul's natural power or those of kinds – specifically, what power of acting does Plato have in mind, and what, if anything is the significance of this in the context of rhetoric; the third is whether the rhetor will need be familiar with the soul as a tri-partite entity, or whether it will suffice to simply grasp the various kinds of soul. Because there appears to be a number of reasons for thinking that the palinode should provide some answers to these questions, in the following two chapters I will turn to the treatment of soul in this speech and how this treatment is relevant in the context of rhetoric. This will take two stages. In the first (Chapter 2), I consider the palinode's treatment of soul – the argument for its immortality, the description of its structure, and the listed kinds of embodied human soul – over the course of which I will show how this treatment ties back to the issues raised here. In the second (Chapter 3), I return to these issues, and outline how the palinode's treatment of soul provides answers that are relevant and informative to our understanding of the rhetorician's grasp of the nature of soul.

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<sup>24</sup> Though it may be objected that there is dissimilarity between the term ἔργα and the later used ποιεῖν, the usage of the term πάθη at both stages makes the objection somewhat implausible.

## **2. The Treatment of Soul in Socrates' Palinode**

Having noted several respects in which we are lacking clarity about the rhetorical understanding of soul's nature, and highlighted the various reasons why the palinode appears to promise a treatment of soul that answers our questions, in this chapter I turn to consider the treatment of soul in the palinode. My principal aim here is to clarify the speech's commitments about soul, on the basis of which I will be able to return to the issue of the nature of soul and the understanding thereof required by rhetoric. In this chapter, I divide my analysis into three sections. In the first, I consider the argument for the immortality of soul [245c5 – 246a1] and analyse it in some detail. Following this, I conclude with a discussion of what kind of soul the argument's premises and conclusion apply to and highlight how it appears to provide an explanation of what, by nature, the soul does.

In the second, I consider the subsequently provided description of the soul as a charioteer and a team of winged horses. On this point, I outline how it functions as a description of the internal composition of soul, and illustrate how the description builds upon the major premise of the immortality argument that the soul is a self-mover. Following this, I indicate what this appears to suggest about the soul's self-motion and what, by nature, soul does.

In the third, I consider the speech's contention that there are nine kinds of embodied human soul, and assess in what respects these kinds most obviously differ from one another. With this done, I go on to illustrate how this can be seen as accounting not only for the kinds of human soul which there are, but also how they quite plausibly differ both in respect of what they each do and what each is acted upon by. On the basis of this, I will have covered sufficient ground to merit returning to the account of the nature of soul required by rhetoric.

### **2.1. The Argument for the Immortality of Soul [245c5 – 246a1]**

Socrates' argument for the soul's immortality is deceptively complex, and as such I will devote some pages to its analysis. To begin, however, it will be useful to quote the argument in full.<sup>25</sup> In anticipation of the forthcoming analysis, I have broken it up into its key subsections.

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<sup>25</sup> The translation I use is that of Nehamas & Woodruff 1997; my only modifications are that I have substituted their "every soul" for "all soul" and their usage of "principle" for "definition"; I justify both below.

All soul [ψυχή πᾶσα] is immortal. That is because whatever is always in motion [ἀεικίνητον] is immortal, while what moves, and is moved by, something else stops living when it stops moving. So it is only what moves itself that never desists from motion, since it does not leave off being itself. (c5-7)

In fact, this self-mover is also the source and spring of motion [ἀρχὴ κινήσεως] in everything else that moves; and a source has no beginning [ἀγένητον]. That is because anything that has a beginning comes from some source, but there is no source for this, since a source that got its start from something else would no longer be the source. (c7-d2)

And since it cannot have a beginning, then necessarily it cannot be destroyed [ἀδιάφθορος]. That is because if a source were destroyed it could never get started again from anything else and nothing else could get started from it – that is, if everything gets started from a source. This then is why a self-mover is a source of motion. And *that* is incapable of being destroyed or starting up; otherwise, all heaven and everything else that has been started up would collapse, come to a stop, and never have cause to start moving again. (d2-e2)

But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very essence and definition of a soul [ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον], for every bodily object that is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul, that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so – that whatever moves itself is essentially a soul – then it follows necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death. (e2-246a1)

Despite its length, the argument effectively has only two premises. These are:

**P1.** Whatever is a self-mover is immortal, and;

**P2.** Soul is a self-mover,

from which it follows that soul is immortal, a conclusion Socrates states at the outset and reiterates at the close. Each of these premises, however, depend upon one or more arguments, with **P1** being established by two arguments (the first at c5-7, the second at c7-e2) and **P2**

being established by a single argument located at 245e2-246a1.<sup>26</sup> With this clarified, I will now turn to the arguments for **P1**.

### 2.1.1. The Arguments for **P1**

The first of the two arguments runs from c5-7, and is comprised of the following premises.

A1. Whatever is always in motion [ἀεκίνητον] is immortal;

A2. A self-mover never ceases moving,

the apparent conclusion of which is **P1** – that whatever self-moves is immortal.

But while **P1** is what Socrates needs to conclude, the issue here is that this particular argument does not warrant such a conclusion. The issue arises from A1's assessment that what is ἀεκίνητον – always in motion – is immortal: for this premise to be true, "always in motion" must mean "moving forever". To use A1 in an argument for **P1**, it must be shown that a self-mover is "always in motion" in this sense. A2 appears to be the attempt to do just this: it claims that a self-mover – "what moves itself" in contrast to "what is moved by something else" – never desists from motion; this seems close enough to the claim that a self-mover is always in motion to think that A1 and A2 are an attempt to establish **P1**. However, the difficulty creeps in with the sense in which A2 establishes that a self-mover is "always in motion".

A2 establishes that what moves itself never desists from motion inasmuch as "it does not leave off being itself". This is to say that it establishes only that motion 'is an essential property of a self-moving thing' (Bett 1986: 5). The reason for this is that a self-mover is the source of its own motion. It, unlike a non-self-mover, cannot cease to move from abandonment by its source of motion, because it itself is the source, and it cannot abandon its own being. What this establishes is that so long as a self-mover is, it is in motion; what it does not establish, as it must in order for **P1** to follow, is that a self-mover cannot cease to be. For this reason, A1 and A2 fail to establish **P1**.

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<sup>26</sup> My summary of the argument agrees with those of both Bett 1986: 3, and Blyth 1997: 196-7; however, in claiming that there are two arguments for **P1**, I side with Bett and against Blyth. I do so primarily for the sake of concision, and because their disagreement in fact has little impact upon the general shape of the argument made for **P1**.

So much for this argument; despite it being plausibly fallacious, Socrates can be seen as making a second, stronger, argument for **P1** from c7 to e3. This can be reconstructed as follows:

B1. A self-mover is the source of all motion [ἀρχὴ κινήσεως];

B2. The source of all motion is both ungenerated [ἀγένητον] and imperishable [ἀδιάφθορος].

This leads us to conclude that a self-mover is ungenerated and imperishable, which in turn amounts to **P1**.

B1 is not apparently argued for, but simply stated in the sentence spanning c7-8. Following this, Socrates proceeds to argue for B2. B2 is established by two sub-arguments, the first of which proves that the source of all motion has no beginning and is ungenerated (c7-d2), and the second of which proves that it cannot thereby be destroyed (d2-e2).

While not directly argued for, B1 can be defended: the antecedents to this claim are located in the distinction drawn at 245c5-8 between self-movers – entities which are their own source of motion – and non-self-movers – entities whose motion originates in something distinct from themselves. Being distinct from their source of motion, non-self-movers move *accidentally* – only so long as they are not abandoned by their source of motion (c5-7).<sup>27</sup> As we have seen, self-movers cannot suffer the same fate: their motion is *essential* because they cannot be abandoned by their source of motion – themselves. So long as they are, they are therefore in motion.

On the basis of this distinction, it becomes more clear why a self-mover *must* be the source of all motion: a self-mover must be the source of all motion because a non-self-mover cannot be. This is implicit in the meaning of the term ἀρχὴ – an original source of all motion. The original source cannot be a non-self-mover, for were this the case, there would need be something in virtue of which it was in motion; this would contradict the basic assumption that it itself be the source of all motion. Hence, by simple elimination, the source of motion must

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<sup>27</sup> While this point may seem alien to us, I will treat it in the argument for P2; for now, it should simply be observed that, implicitly, this view corresponds the view that bodies are moved – given life – by soul (e3-5).



therefore be a self-mover.<sup>28</sup> While Socrates does not make this explicit, we will see the same thought in the argument he makes for B2.

As noted, the argument for B2 is quite extensive and comes in two parts. I will deal with each in turn. First comes the claim that the source of all motion [ἀρχὴ κινήσεως] has no beginning [is ungenerated – ἀγένητον]. It runs as follows: everything which comes about [γίγνεσθαι] does so from [as the result of – ἐξ] – a source [ἀρχή]; a source cannot be generated by anything else, because – were this the case – it would not be a source (d2-3).<sup>29</sup> Hence, we are invited to conclude that a source must be ungenerated – the conclusion stated at the beginning of the argument.

An important point requires making before we proceed: where Socrates previously identified a self-mover as the source all motion [κίνησις], he now refers to the source of all generation [γίγνεσθαι].<sup>30</sup> The internal logic of his argument demands that these be the same entity – the source of motion must also be the source of generation. What validates this apparent change of tack is the relation in Greek between motion [κίνησις] and becoming or coming about [γένεσις]. As Blyth notes ‘κίνησις does not refer only to locomotion but all forms of change’ (Blyth: 203). Furthermore, as Bett points out, in *Laws* 10.894b11, we find an explicit reference to similarly broad notion of κίνησις that includes both becoming [γένεσις] and destruction [φθορά]. It is thus not peculiar that Plato here makes a shift from motion to becoming: if becoming is a species of motion, then the source of becoming must also be the source of motion.

Returning to the argument, its key premise is that everything comes about from or because of a source. More generally, however, it is this: all generation – coming into being – is generation *from* something – the ἀρχή - and not nothing. This implicitly rules out the possibility of creation *ex nihilo*. On the basis of this premise, we can see why Socrates claims that the source of all generation must itself be ungenerated. It must be ungenerated, because,

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<sup>28</sup> Assuming, of course, these are the only alternatives; but nowhere else are we given to understand that there are, so the inference is presumably a valid one.

<sup>29</sup> The text here is disputed, with some opting for the mss ἐξ ἀρχῆς and some opting for Buttman’s conjecture that ἐξ is a corruption of ἔτι. For an alternative rendering ‘it would not be from an ἀρχή that everything which comes into being comes into being’.

<sup>30</sup> The use γίγνεσθαι is interchangeable with γένεσις.

were it generated, then – all generation being *from something* and not nothing – we would be forced to conclude that a source came about *from* something, which existed prior to it. This, however, would contradict the meaning of ἀρχή – an original source all genesis – for it would require one to posit the existence of an entity, ungenerated by the source, to explain how the source came to be. Because this no doubt would lead to an infinite regress of explaining the generation of one entity in terms of another *ad infinitum*, the elegant solution presented here is the flat denial that the source was generated at all.<sup>31</sup> As noted above, this same strategy is plausibly at work with Socrates' identification that a self-mover must be the source, albeit now in the context of γένεσις and not κίνησις.

This completes the first step of this sub-argument. Next comes the proof that a source also necessarily cannot be destroyed [ἀδιάφθορος] (d2-e2). It runs as follows: were a source destroyed, nothing else would be able to bring it back and nothing else could come into being (d4-6). This could not happen owing to the following hypothetical: having already established, via B1, that a self-mover is the ungenerated source motion, were it – a self-mover *qua* source of motion – destroyed, all heaven and everything started up [πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε] would collapse, cease to move and never have any cause to start up again (d8-e2).

On the face of it, this may not a particularly compelling argument. It appears to rest entirely upon the illustration of what would follow from the destruction of the source. Having proven that a source must be ungenerated, it follows necessarily that its destruction would be completely final: not only would it not be able to return into being – on the strength of the argument that it is ungenerated – but its destruction would bring to an end all possibility of motion and generation. Because the source is responsible for motion and genesis of the whole universe, following its destruction the universe would cease to move and collapse into nothing. Given that the argument is premised upon this, it seems necessary to ask why this hypothetical situation is ruled out.

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<sup>31</sup> We may at this stage ask whether it necessarily follows that a source *must* be ungenerated – could it not be self-generated? In short, no; a source must be distinct from what it generates, because it must exist prior to what it brings into being. Self-generation is thus impossible because it would require the simultaneous existence and non-existence of the source, which is impossible. For a more extensive treatment along similar lines, cf. Blyth 1997: 200-201.

There are two plausible explanations. The first is Hackforth's, accepted by Bett, which claims that this simply 'was a possibility never contemplated by any Greek thinker' (Hackforth 1952: 67). A second, along similar lines, is simply this: the possibility Plato here sketches – the cessation of the existence and motion of not only our universe, but all *possible* universes – is so fundamentally inconceivable that it is held to be impossible. For an analogous scenario in more modern terms, the scenario Plato here sets up as an impossibility is presumably akin to the possibility that all motion and change, down to a sub-atomic level, could halt and never again begin. Because this is unfathomable, it is taken to be impossible, and so concluded that the source of all motion and becoming must be incapable of destruction. Being incapable of destruction, a self-mover is of course immortal, and this proves **P1**.

This concludes the argument from c8-e2. To sum up briefly, we can now see how it establishes **P1** – that whatever self-moves is immortal. Because a non-self-mover cannot be the source of all motion and genesis, by exclusion Socrates concludes that the source of all motion must be a self-mover – something which is itself its own source of motion. By a not dissimilar principle, it follows that the source of motion must be completely ungenerated. Because it is ungenerated, its destruction would bring to an end all possible motion; this being impossible, it follows that, as the source of all motion, a self-mover must be ungenerated and imperishable – viz. immortal. We can now turn to the comparatively shorter argument for **P2** – that a soul must be a self-mover – located at 245e3-246a1.

### 2.1.2. The Argument for P2 and the Immortality of Soul

The argument begins by stating its intended conclusion: it will incur no shame to declare that self-motion is the essence and definition of soul [ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον].<sup>32</sup> This is

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<sup>32</sup> While I take liberties with the translation of this claim, I take it to be defensible. The term λόγον has a variety of possible translations, namely definition (Hackforth 1952; Rowe 1986; Griswold 1986), account (Yunis 2011), or principle (Nehamas and Woodruff 1997). My preference for the first of these is based largely upon the treatment of soul in *Laws X*: at 895d, in the context of a discussion about soul and its essence *qua* self-motion, it is claimed that the definition [λόγον] of a thing must grasp its essence; hence, self-motion is both the essence and definition of soul. Furthermore, it also seems defensible insofar as self-motion is taken to be a property unique to soul: as completely unique to soul, it serves as the defining feature of soul, and hence defines what it is to be soul.

implied to follow simply from the claim that “every body moved from outside lacks a soul [ἄψυχον] and... every body whose motion comes from within is ensouled [ἔμψυχον], this being the nature of soul [φύσεως ψυχῆς]”. On a first reading, this again does not appear a particularly compelling argument – it relies upon an apparently unwarranted leap from the fact that soul moves the body – the key premise – to the conclusion that soul’s essence and definition is self-motion, **P2**.

The argument, however, is not as weak as it may seem: by establishing that bodies are capable of independent motion only in virtue of the presence of soul – all bodies whose motion comes from without lack a soul – Socrates connects the argument back to the distinction established at 245c5-7 between non-self-movers – entities whose motion is contingent upon the presence of an entity distinct from themselves – and self-movers – entities who are their own source of motion. By establishing that bodies only move in virtue of the presence of soul, Socrates establishes that bodies must be non-self-movers whose motion and life is contingent upon the presence of soul. This is eminently plausible: what is the soul, after all, if not the principle of life? But even accepting this, we are not forced to infer that soul must be a self-mover: nothing yet bars the inference that the soul, as with the body, is a non-self-mover. For this proof, we must consider the second argument for **P1**, with its claim that a self-mover must be the source of all motion.

Over the course of this argument, Socrates has implicitly been treating the entire universe as a non-self-moving entity, whose motion is contingent upon the existence of an ungenerated, imperishable, self-moving source of motion. In establishing that bodies are non-self-movers whose motion is contingent upon the presence of soul, Socrates places himself in the position to identify soul as that which is responsible for the motion of the cosmos. Because the universe is comprised of a collection of orderly moving celestial bodies – the stars and planets – and the argument establishes that the motion of the universe must result from the existence of a self-moving source of motion, with the statement that the motion of bodies is contingent upon the presence of soul, Socrates invites us to conclude (i) that soul is that which is responsible for the motion of the universe; and (ii), that it must, therefore, be a self-mover, **P2**.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Though this places a lot of weight upon the assessment that the motion of the universe is the result soul acting celestial bodies, this is hardly a controversial statement – in Greece it

With this conclusion reached, Socrates' proof is almost complete. All that is required is the recognition that, *qua* self-moving source of all cosmic and bodily motion, it must follow, on the strength of Socrates' argument, that soul must be ungenerated and imperishable. Being ungenerated and imperishable, it is of course necessarily true that soul must be immortal, and this is exactly what Socrates iterates in the final sentence of his argument.

In sum, the argument for the soul's immortality depends primarily upon the major premise that whatever is a self-moving entity – an entity which is its own source of motion – is immortal. This is established by an extended argument for the conclusion that a self-mover must be the source of all motion and genesis in the universe, and that, as the source, it must therefore be without a beginning – ungenerated – and incapable of destruction. Having established this, Socrates' proof of the soul's immortality hinges upon our recognition that the soul is the source of all cosmic motion. Having conceded this point, it follows that the soul must be a self-moving entity, and, being incapable of birth or death, immortal.

At this stage, there are two further points that need addressing. The first concerns the scope of this argument. So far, I have treated this argument simply as one about *soul*. However, as is frequently noted throughout scholarship, it is ambiguous what kind of soul Plato here has in mind, and this ambiguity stems from the phrasing of its intended conclusion, all soul is immortal [ψυχὴ πάντα ἀθάνατος].<sup>34</sup>

### 2.1.3. Translating ψυχὴ πάντα

The phrase ψυχὴ πάντα can be seen as having at least three readings. The first is that it should be translated “all soul” and understood as referring to the world soul of the *Timaeus* – a single, unitary soul that accounts for all cosmic motion.<sup>35</sup> In support of this view, it should be observed that it certainly fits grammatically, for the argument always refers to soul in the singular and without the article.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, it also fits with the logic demanded by the

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was widely held that the motion of the universe was the work of the gods, themselves souls; this same thought will become apparent when Socrates turns to consider the soul's structure and life.

<sup>34</sup> The debate over this question goes back to antiquity as we can see from Hermias' commentary upon the text; de Vries 1969: 121

<sup>35</sup> *Timaeus* 34b1-37c5.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. 245c5, e2, e5, and 246a1.

argument: the argument requires that there be only one source of motion and genesis in the universe, and by reading world soul into the argument, we would have an explanation as to why Socrates takes this source to be soul as a singular – by soul it, refers literally to a single soul.

However, in spite of these considerations, I side with scholars in dismissing this reading of ψυχῆ παῖσα.<sup>37</sup> The most common, yet no less compelling, justification for this dismissal is simply that, within the entirety of the dialogue, we find not one unambiguous reference to something like a world soul.<sup>38</sup> Rather, as Bett notes, the rest of the speech appears to stress the differences between various kinds of souls, which makes it *prima facie* implausible that, within this argument, Socrates should be taking all the kinds of soul to be part of a single world soul or trying to demonstrate *its* immortality. And while it is true that a concept of world-soul would fit with the syntax and demands of the argument we have been attending to, there is another reading I will outline below which both meets this condition and sits better in respect of the commitments made in the remainder of the speech.

This takes us to a second reading: on this view, it should be translated and understood as “every soul”. In its favour is the simple fact that the palinode goes on to emphasise the existence of multiple kinds of soul, and it appears intuitive that the argument should be read as attempting to prove the immortality of every one of these.<sup>39</sup> This is true in particular of human souls, for Socrates goes on to prove that love is a good by contending that, after choosing to pursue a life of philosophy three times in a row, the human soul will re-grow its wings and its return to that state in which it can nourish itself upon the true beings. For such a proof to be consistent with this argument, we must read it as being an attempt to establish that the human soul is immortal. In addition to this, the argument depends upon the premise that soul is responsible for the motion of the body; this most obviously sits in favour of reading the argument as applying to the individual souls which, following their failure to see the truth,

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<sup>37</sup> Those who explicitly reject this reading include Griswold *ibid*: 84; Bett *ibid*: 12; and Blyth *ibid*: 186.

<sup>38</sup> While it is possible to see it as being referred to at 246b6-7 and 247c1-2, it is more plausible to see these as referring to soul in the distributive sense; Griswold *ibid*: 84.

<sup>39</sup> Such a stance is suggested by Hackforth who likewise notes that it seems reasonable to believe ‘that Plato regarded any demonstration of the immortality of ‘soul’ in general as applicable to individual souls’; Hackforth: 64

shed their wings, and take on a body which seems to move itself ‘owing to the power of this soul’ (246c).

However, as noted above, there is an issue with this view in respect of the argument Socrates has just made: for the argument to work, it requires there be only one self-moving source of motion. This, in turn, is identified as *soul*, in the singular. Hence, while taking a distributive view and translating ψυχή πᾶσα as every soul fits with the rest of the speech more than “world soul” does, all the same, it does not sit well with the grammar and requirements of Socrates’ proof: it would apparently require us to think of each individual soul as being *the* source of motion. This is an unattractive view, for it would no longer be clear why, as the argument suggests, the destruction of a single soul would bring all motion to a halt.

Neither of the above alternatives being wholly satisfactory, I will therefore consider a third rendering of ψυχή πᾶσα. On my view, we would do best to translate it as “all soul” and understand it as using soul as a mass term.<sup>40</sup> By this I mean to say that I read the argument as using “soul” in just the same sense that one could use the concept of “mind”, in the singular, in discussions pertaining to what is true of “mind”. Just as such a discussion would treat all minds as a singular *kind* of entity, I take the argument to treat soul as a single *kind* of entity and in such a way that its conclusions are intended to apply to every soul detailed in the remainder of the speech. By reading soul in this manner – taking soul to be used as the genus of which kinds of soul, such as human and divine, are species – the usage of the singular is therefore respected and preserved, but in such a way that the conclusions of the argument may also be taken to apply equally to the various kinds of soul Socrates goes on to treat in his speech.<sup>41</sup> This appears satisfactory not only as it seems clear that the argument should apply to the individual human souls, but also because it is self-evident that the gods, as souls, are immortal.

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<sup>40</sup> In this respect I side with Griswold: 82; Bett: 14; Yunis 2011: 136; and Blyth *op. cit.*: 186.

<sup>41</sup> In a certain key respect, my position differs little from that of Richard Bett: while he argues for a similar view, he does so on the basis that soul is being treated as a single kind of stuff, akin to “electricity” or “water”; while I am not particularly fond of this analogy, I side with his core assessment that the argument is plausibly intended to apply the different soul’s detailed throughout the palinode.

It may defensibly be asked at this stage whether such a solution fits with the argument's contention that soul, as a singular, is the source of all motion. For on this view, I appear not far off suggesting that every soul is the source of motion, a stance which I have already claimed to be problematic. However, this is not exactly what I am suggesting: by taking soul to be used as a mass term, I suggest that we see soul itself, as a single kind of entity, as being that single thing is responsible for all motion. While part and parcel of this position is the view that every soul should be a self-mover and so responsible for motion of some kind – for example, certain souls being responsible for the motion of human bodies with others being responsible for that of cosmic bodies – by reading soul as a mass term, soul is nevertheless conceived as that single entity which, alone, is the source of all motion. Following the destruction of such an entity, it therefore would follow that all motion would cease. For these reasons, on my view, *ψυχῆ πᾶσα* should therefore be understood as using soul in this last sense, as a 'mass term' as it allows us to take Plato to be attempting to establish general truths about all individual souls while fitting with the grammar and logical coherence of the argument.

### **Concluding remarks**

To briefly summarise, upon analysis of the immortality argument, it is so far clear that Socrates makes several commitments about soul. These are (i) that it is a self-mover – an entity which is its own source of motion; (ii) that, as a self-mover, it is the source of all motion – soul is responsible not only for the life and motion of bodies, but also for that the entire universe; and (iii) that, as a self-moving source of all motion, soul must be immortal. On the strength of the remainder of the speech, I have argued that Socrates here is best understood as using soul as a mass term, such that what is true of soul – that it is an immortal, self-moving entity responsible for bodily motion – is true for souls of every kind, in particular the human soul.

This brings me to the final point I wish to make, and one that concerns how the argument stands with respect to the passage immediately preceding it. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, at 245c, prior to the argument we have just been studying, Socrates claims that we must understand the nature of soul, divine and human, by examining what it does [*ἔργα*]. In this passage, just as in the argument, soul is referred to only in the singular. What Socrates thus most obviously promises is an explanation of the nature of soul, whether divine or human



– in short, the nature common to both kinds of soul.<sup>42</sup> Part of this explanation concerns what it – soul divine and human – does.

In the argument, as we have seen, Socrates makes a quite remarkable claim about soul, namely that its essence and definition [οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον] is self-motion. Furthermore, soul is said not only to move itself, but also the body ‘this being the nature of soul [φύσεως ψυχῆς]’ (245e6). These two claims appear striking in light the promise to explain what soul, divine and human, does: both effectively appear insinuate that, by nature, what soul itself does is self-move, for on the basis of this it follows that soul, by nature, is also the source of motion for every body. Hence, with the claim that soul’s essence and definition is self-motion, we appear to have something akin to an explanation of the soul’s active power. There are, however, still questions. First, it may be pointed out that this is contingent upon a specific reading of the scope of Socrates’ claim at 245c – does it, pertinently, unambiguously promise an explanation of what both kinds of soul *commonly* do, and not rather what divine and human souls *respectively* do? Second, we may ask what we are to make of the claim that the soul moves itself, for it is not exactly clear what Plato means by this. In order to respond to these questions, we must turn to consider the *ιδέα* of soul, divine and human.

## 2.2. The *ιδέα* of Soul

As we have seen in the previous section, Socrates sought to establish that soul was immortal on the basis that, as a self-mover, it is the source of all motion. Having contended that this argument uses soul as a mass term and its conclusion are intended to apply to each and every soul, at this stage I will develop this position by considering the description of the soul. This will be relevant to our investigation in three respects: first, it will indicate with less ambiguity that Socrates takes soul, both divine and human, to be a self-moving entity. Second, it will allow us to clarify the sense in which the soul moves itself and, by extension, the body; by doing so, it will allow us to grasp the soul’s natural power of acting. Third, it will indicate why an understanding of the nature of human soul quite decidedly requires a grasp of its tripartite structure.

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<sup>42</sup> At this venture, I ask that this reading be accepted for the time being; in the following section it will be shored up, and in the third chapter I defend my taking this stance at greater length.

Immediately after arguing for the immortality of soul, Socrates turns to explain the form [ιδέα] of soul (246a1-b5). He begins by qualifying that he will not describe what the soul actually is [οἷον ἔστι] – this would require a very long account, ‘altogether a task for a god in every way’ – but rather what it is like [ἔοικεν]. This may appear to pose a problem: if it is, as he claims “a task for a god” to say what the soul actually is, we may ask what this means for the possibility of a mere human to grasp this, as a rhetorician is later said to be required to. I will return to this issue after having treated the description Socrates offers.

Following this qualification, soul is likened to ‘the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer’. This image serves as general description of the composition of all souls the palinode will go on to treat: each of these is composed of horses and a charioteer. Less generally however, ‘the gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good and come from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture’.<sup>43</sup> While “everyone else” [τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] is certainly an ambiguous statement<sup>44</sup>, it undoubtedly includes the human soul – Socrates further explains that ‘our charioteer is in charge of a pair of horses’ one of which is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort as the divine souls’ horses and the other of which ‘is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline’.<sup>45</sup> There are two things I find to be striking about this description: the first concerns its foregrounding of the soul’s essentially self-motive nature.

The decision to represent every soul<sup>46</sup> in this manner appears far from coincidental: as we have seen, in the immortality argument Plato claimed that soul’s essence and definition

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<sup>43</sup> The reference here to the gods is taken up explicitly from 246e3ff, where we learn that there are twelve gods, including Zeus, Hestia – both named in the passage in question – Apollo, Ares, and Hera – named at 252c-253b. Each of these is implied to be charioteer in charge of their uniform team of good horses (Hackforth 1952: 73)

<sup>44</sup> Cf. de Vries 1969: 127

<sup>45</sup> The most obvious difference, on this account, between divine souls and those of everyone else concerns the horses; while the gods only possess good horses, everyone else possesses a pair of mismatched and opposite horses. While there is a discussion about whether the divine soul’s possess more than a pair of horses, I will not get into it here; for treatment, see Hackforth *ibid*: 69, n.3 and de Vries 1969: 126.

<sup>46</sup> I take this point to require no further argument – as noted already, the twelve gods and the various human soul are all conceived as having their respective charioteer and horses.

[οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον] is self-motion. Here, Plato appears to reinforce this key premise by representing the soul in such a way that makes it clear that soul is defined by its self-motion. Every soul, insofar as it possesses a team of horses<sup>47</sup> and is steered by a charioteer, is, in essence, depicted as a vehicle of motion. This sits in favour of two of my previous contentions. The first is that the immortality argument's conclusions apply to soul collectively: here, we see that soul, whether divine or human, is quite emphatically described as being an entity that self-moves, as we would expect were to take the immortality argument's conclusions as applying to soul as a single kind of entity. The second concerns the connections between Socrates' promise to explain what soul divine or human does, the claim that soul's essence and definition is self-movement, and the *ἰδέα* of soul. Following Verdenius, 'the *ἰδέα* is the form in which the nature (*φύσις*) of soul manifests itself'.<sup>48</sup> Taking self-movement to be the nature of soul – what soul essentially and by nature does – this is quite plausible: the *ἰδέα* describes soul divine and human, and illustrates that their essential and defining trait is their self-motion. As I will go on to show, Plato has good reason to do this: in the argument we have just looked at, it was argued that the soul not only moves itself, but is the cause of all motion – that of the celestial bodies and the human bodies. What the description of soul allows Plato to illustrate is this particular conception of soul as the entity responsible for all bodily motion.

In virtue of possessing winged horses, soul is said to take care of all that is soulless, patrol all of heaven, and have the entire universe as its dominion (246c). From 246e3-247a5, this point is developed. Here Socrates explains how the eleven<sup>49</sup> divine souls each lead a section in the divine procession of souls that traverses the universe. Each of the blessed gods, we are told, is capable of taking up the many aisles of heaven and attending to their own work (247b). While we learn little about what this consists in, Zeus is said to take care of everything and put all

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<sup>47</sup> While later Socrates will claim that these horses may or may not possess wings, for the current point this is not relevant.

<sup>48</sup> Verdenius 1955: 277. Also cf. Griswold 1986: 92-93; who also observes the relation between the *οὐσία* and *ἰδέα* of soul.

<sup>49</sup> Though there are twelve gods, the twelfth, Hestia, is remains at home, as befits her status as Goddess of the hearth; the rest – the other eleven are each charged with leading their own section in the divine procession of souls. The number twelve corresponds to the twelve Olympian gods that were canonical. Cf. Long, 1987.

things in order (246e3-5). On the basis of this, it seems fair to intimate that each of the gods is responsible for a certain aspect of the life of the cosmos.<sup>50</sup>

This description of the soul's cosmic function appears conspicuously reminiscent of the argument Socrates has just made: where before he argued that soul, *qua* self-mover, must be the source of all motion in the universe, he now describes how the gods, *qua* winged self-moving souls, patrol all heaven, take care of all that lacks soul, and attend to their work, with Zeus in charge of maintaining order. The symbolism of this description appears quite clear: taking celestial bodies, such as the planets, to be that which is lacking soul, the motions of the eleven divine souls about the universe serve to illustrate the collective role of the gods as those beings which maintain and move the cosmos.

This is hardly a controversial assessment: as Hackforth points out, it has been frequently assumed that, from the relation of Hestia – who remains at the home of the gods – to the rest of the eleven, the divine souls here described imply that Plato is here representing ‘some astronomical scheme or planetary system’ (*op. cit.*: 73). Proponents of such a view have suggested that Hestia represents either the earth at the centre of the universe or the central fire of Pythagorean cosmology. Without taking a stance upon which reading is the more plausible, what is important here is that it is not unprecedented here to see the movement of the divine souls about the cosmos as representing of the revolutions of the divine heavenly bodies.<sup>51</sup> In this respect, the description of the divine souls further confirms the suspicion that the argument's premises apply to the souls described in the remainder of the speech.

The same is true when we turn to consider the situation of the embodied human soul. Here, we see how the soul, *qua* self-mover, is responsible the motion of bodies. As with divine

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<sup>50</sup> On this point Rowe astutely observes a connection with *Republic IV*, insofar as the gods each adhere to their allotted role in the heavens, with Zeus – taking charge of ordering all things – corresponding to the role assigned to the philosopher king; Rowe 1986: 179. This point is strengthened by the claim at 252e that followers of Zeus will have a proclivity for philosophy and the guidance of others.

<sup>51</sup> For further support, cf. Hackforth's comment (73 n. 3) that διέξοδοι (247a4) is more commonly associated with the orbits of the stars than the motions of the divine souls; Blyth 1997: 186-192, who illustrates the parallels between the motions of the gods and the cosmic role assigned to world-soul in *Timaeus*, Rowe 1986: 178; and Yunis: 2011: 139.

souls, the human soul self-moves insofar as it is comprised of horses – the soul’s motive elements – and a charioteer – the part which commands and directs the two horses of the human soul. As already noted, unlike divine souls, human souls possess a pair of mismatched horses, the first of which is good, with the other its opposite. The differences are spelt out in more detail at 253d. Here the good, white horse is described as possessing only fair features, and is said to be a ‘lover of honour with modesty and self-control’ who needs only verbal commands for direction. Conversely, the bad, black horse is described as an unsightly beast, and said to be a ‘companion to wild boasts and indecency’ who – being deaf – ignores the charioteer’s commands and requires whipping and goading for its direction.

With this description of the human soul’s two distinct and opposite motive principles, Socrates goes on to illustrate the human soul’s conflicted response to the sight of the beloved (253e onwards). While the soul’s good horse remains in control and restrains itself, the bad horse is said to ignore its yokemate’s restraint and the protests of the charioteer, leap violently forward, and do its best to move the soul towards the boy and engage him in sex. Upon being so convinced, the two other parts of the soul are reluctantly led forward until the charioteer sees the boy’s face and is struck by a recollection of it’s prior vision of Beauty and, next to it, Self-control or Temperance [σωφροσύνη]. At this point, the charioteer reins in his two horses, and while the good horse falls back voluntarily, the bad horse does so unwillingly and with great ire.

Here, and again at 256a, we see Plato quite masterfully using the image of the self-moving soul to depict several things at once. For though he is here describing the motions of the soul, the language of locomotion also quite naturally refers to the body in which the soul dwells: it is the body of the lover that is literally in bed with his beloved at 256a, which approaches and recoils from the beloved, and which engages, or refrains from engaging, in sex. As with the motions of the divine soul, Plato here uses the motions of the human soul’s two horses to depict how the soul moves the body. This is, again, what we would expect: in the argument for the soul’s immortality, Socrates claimed that soul, as a self-mover, is that in virtue of which bodies are capable of motion, this being the nature of soul. Here, Socrates illustrates how, *qua* self-moving entity composed a charioteer in a charge of an unruly team of horses, the human soul is responsible for the body’s locomotion and actions<sup>52</sup>. On the basis of this, it

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<sup>52</sup> While perhaps this may ask us to read actions as being examples of motions, this should not be an unprecedented step; as we have seen previously, motion is used in a broad sense which

seems quite plausible to infer that the palinode's does provide an explanation of what soul, divine and human, by nature does: the soul moves itself and, by extension, the body.<sup>53</sup>

Perhaps what I am proposing is not a particularly controversial thesis: that soul is responsible for the actions of human subjects is, after all, not exactly contentious. As a psychological being, the soul clearly plays an important role in explaining why humans act in certain ways. Furthermore, as early as 237d6-7, Socrates claimed that each of us is 'ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead'. The first is said to be 'the inborn desire for pleasures' [ἐπιθυμία] and the second 'acquired judgement [δόξα] that pursues what is best [ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου]'. It hence seems not implausible that what soul naturally does should be to move the body. This takes me to the second striking feature of the description of soul.

As scholars largely concur, in describing the human soul as a union of charioteer and two mismatched horses, Socrates is unmistakably reworking the tripartite account of the soul from *Republic IV* and *IX* to fit with literary requirements of the palinode.<sup>54</sup> To briefly summarise the parallels, the charioteer is taken to represent the soul's rational or reasoning part [λογιστικόν], while the good and bad horses represent the spirited part [θυμός] and appetitive part [ἐπιθυμία] respectively.

This comparison is far from unsubstantiated: at 247c5, Socrates identifies the soul's captain [ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη], the charioteer, as mind [νόος] and reason [διάνοια].<sup>55</sup> Second, the charioteer alone is said to be capable of seeing the true beings – the forms detailed at 247d – and acquiring knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] and opinion [δόξα]; third, it is made clear at several instances in the latter half of the speech that the charioteer is responsible for epistemic

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includes coming into being. If all forms of change are subsumed under this term (Bett *op. cit.*: 9), then it seems likely that the actions of a body are included within the stipulation that soul moves the body.

<sup>53</sup> While I will take this conclusion to be granted on the strength of our analysis so far, I will return to and defend it in the following chapter.

<sup>54</sup> Scholars who draw this comparison include and are not limited to Thompson 1868; Hackforth 1952; de Vries 1969; Griswold 1986; Ferrari 1987; and Yunis 2011.

<sup>55</sup> Griswold points out an ambiguity on this point concerning the relation between "mind" and "reason" (107). On my view the difference is not particularly crucial: the charioteer clearly represents the part of capable of cognition and knowledge.

“capacities” such as memory [μνήμη], forgetfulness [λήθης], and recollection [ἀνάμνησις]<sup>56</sup>; and fourth, its role as the driver or captain of soul is telling given Plato’s views about soul’s ideal governance by knowledge in *Republic*.<sup>57</sup>

There is similarly good evidence in favour of taking the horses to represent the spirited part [θυμός] and appetitive part [ἐπιθυμία]. First, at 237d, Socrates explicitly refers to desire [ἐπιθυμία] as one of the two ruling principles that we follow. This talk anticipates the role assigned to the dark horse: not only is it one of the soul’s two motive principles, but its description as an unsightly beast, companion to indecency, who is deaf to the protests of reason and pursues sexual pleasure at every venture (253e) make it quite clear that it is the appetitive part of soul described in *Republic IV* and *IX*.<sup>58</sup>

While Socrates never identifies the good horse explicitly as the spirited part [θυμός], several things make this clear. First, its description at 253d as a lover of honour with modesty and self-control [τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς] recalls the similar description of the spirited part at *Republic* 9.581b as a lover of honour [φιλότιμον].<sup>59</sup> Second, it is said to be obedient to the charioteer’s commands – the commands issued by mind or reason; this parallels the description of the θυμός as the natural ally of the soul’s rational part at *Republic* 4.441a. In connection with this, the good horse, under the charioteer’s command, is depicted as being that part of soul which allows one to refrain from pursuing pleasure, and so being governed completely by the whims of one’s appetitive part. It thus seems substantiated to think that it should represent the third, spirited, part of soul [θυμός].

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<sup>56</sup> For memory cf. 249c4, 250a4, 253a2, 254b4. For forgetfulness cf. 248c5, 250a3. For recollection, cf. 249c1, 250a1, 254b4.

<sup>57</sup> Perhaps also comparable to the metaphor of the city as a ship, ideally steered by the philosopher kings; *Republic* 6.488e-489d.

<sup>58</sup> I follow Hackforth in thinking that this calls for no extensive treatment; in *Republic IX*, the appetitive part requires sensual satisfaction, just as the bad horse here does; *op. cit.*: 107. It should be noted that the description of this horse’s aesthetic qualities have moral connotations: the opposite horses are opposed not only in look but insofar as they help and hinder their charioteer; Yunis 2011: 159

<sup>59</sup> *Republic* 9.581b.

On the basis of these parallels, it should be no surprise why, at 237d, Socrates claims that each of us is ruled by two principles. As the structure of the human soul makes clear, every soul possesses two motive elements – the two horses. The first, the bad horse represents the appetitive part of soul – the soul’s inborn desire for pleasures, and one of the principles which our actions are governed by. This can be seen at 253e onwards: the appetitive part of soul drags the soul toward the beloved in an effort to solicit sex from him. The second, the good horse, represents the spirited and honour loving part of the soul. Here, an apparent asymmetry with Socrates’ remarks at 237d creeps in. While there, he claimed that our second ruling principle was “acquired judgement [δόξα] the pursues what is best”, this seems problematic: on the tri-partite picture of soul, it is no doubt the charioteer – the mind of soul – that is responsible for judgement and the good horse that is responsible for moves the soul to act with honour and self-control. This has led to some scholars rejecting the thought, I am proposing here, that Socrates’ remarks in his first speech are consistent with the tri-partite description of soul in his second.<sup>60</sup>

To my mind, however, it seems not irrelevant that, on the picture we are provided, the good horse is said to be thoroughly obedient to the charioteer and guided by verbal commands alone. Furthermore, nowhere within the speech do we see a disagreement between the charioteer and his good horse: at 254bc, when the charioteer recalls his prior vision of self-control, he reins in his horses and the good horse falls back completely voluntarily. In the description which follows, we rather see the soul torn between the pull of the bad horse – the appetite – and the resistance of the good horse and the charioteer. In short, on the picture we are presented, as Hackforth I think rightly points out, ‘the desire of the good horse cannot be discriminated from that of the charioteer’ (Hackforth *op. cit.* 107). Both the charioteer and the good horse appear to share the same fundamental goals, namely to act in accordance with honour and pursue virtue.<sup>61</sup> For this reason, it seems not improbable to me that the comments Socrates makes in his first speech are consistent with the described structure of soul: the charioteer, as mind, is the part of soul responsible for judging what is best (cf. its recollection of self-control) and this judgement is capable of moving the soul insofar as it is obeyed by

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<sup>60</sup> Eg. Hackforth 1952: 41; and de Vries 1969: 85.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. 256ab. The analysis here of each part of soul having its own desire conforms to the analysis of *Rep* 9.580-581, in which the distinction between each part is what it desires (Hackforth: 107).



soul's spirited part.<sup>62</sup> In sum, I therefore take the soul to effectively be moved by two principles, these being the bad horse, as soul's desire for pleasure, and the charioteer directed good horse, as the desire or drive to do what is seen as just and good by the soul's reasoning part.

This takes us back to the point which precipitated this comparison. In the first half of this section, I observed how the image of soul as a charioteer and horses conveyed the notion that soul's essence is self-motion: every soul is depicted as a vehicle of motion. In addition to this, I attempted to show how, on the basis of the soul's described motion, soul accounts for and explains the motion of bodies. In the case of the human soul, the motions of its two horses illustrate how the soul can move one to pursue either sex or a more abstemious and "honourable" course. On the basis of the parallels between the description of soul and the tripartite conception of the *Republic*, this seems unsurprising: *qua* psychological entity, the soul is a motivational entity that brings about action within a subject in light of its appetitive and honour loving parts. The question now is what this appears to suggest about the soul's self-motion.

On my view, it invites the following inference. Because the soul's essential self-motion in the immortality argument is the basis for the claim that the soul is the source of motion in a body, and that here, the description of the soul's movements – those of its two horse – serve the same purpose, insofar as they show how the soul is the source a body's motion and actions, then, on the basis of the fact the soul's motions symbolise the soul's desires for pleasure and for what is good, it thus seems not unfounded to infer that the soul's motion – its essential self-motion – refers to its motivations *qua* its desire for pleasure [ἐπιθυμία] and its desire to

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<sup>62</sup> It is also worth stressing that in this respect I concur with Rowe, who notes that the bipartition of soul's ruling principles appears to reflect the position of *Republic* IV onwards that desire is a motivating force in itself, which must be subjugated by the other two parts of soul in order for the soul to avoid acting with vice and excess. It should be borne in mind that elsewhere in the Platonic corpus we find testimony in favour of the view that judgement [δόξα] aims at what is best and is not an impotent state: in *Protagoras* 358cd, Socrates claims that beliefs, like knowledge, lead to action; in *Theaetetus* 200e, Theaetetus claims that true judgement leads to things which are admirable and good and this seems most clearly to recycle the view in *Meno* that knowledge and true opinion both lead to what is good [97e-98a].

do what is rationally seen as being good [θυμός in tandem with νόος]. This appears invited not only by the choice to depict the soul's appetitive and spirited parts as those parts which move the soul and allow to act, but also by the description, at 237d, of the soul's ruling principles – its two driving motivations – in locomotive terms.

Taking this view, it becomes more clear in what sense at least the human soul said to be capable of motion: the soul is capable of moving in what we today would call a figurative sense.<sup>63</sup> It's motions – a desire for pleasure and a desire for what is good – are in essence “motivational”.<sup>64</sup> If this is not wrong, then I submit we can see why Plato insists, in the argument for its immortality, that soul's essence and definition is self-motion: if the soul's desire for pleasure and its desire to act honourably and well – it's motivations – are conceived by Plato as motions [κίνησις], then of course it follows that the soul's essence and defining characteristic is that it moves itself and, through doing so, is the source of motion for the body.

This is not a wholly unsubstantiated position. For one, there is the linguistic element in its favour: we today still speak of psychological phenomena in similar language – we speak of “being moved” or “being driven” to act in a certain way, and so on. It seems not implausible that here Plato is illustrating, in locomotive terms, what we would think of in psychological terms. Second, the language used throughout not only the palinode but the whole dialogue is similarly suggestive: at the outset, Socrates talks of “being led” by Phaedrus, he “steers” the discussion in a direction of his desire, and “leads” Phaedrus away from his admiration of Lysias. Most strongly of all, however, is that at *Laws* 10.897ab, the Athenian claims that the motions of the soul include opinion [δόξα] true and false, wish [βούλεσθαι], and fear [φοβουμένην]. While he does not mention either desire or spiritedness, the parallel roles of wish and fear as a psychological motivations make it quite defensible to infer that here Plato

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<sup>63</sup> I specify that this reading largely pertains to the human soul, on the basis that it somewhat less clear how much we are to make of the presence of horses in divine souls: are these also motivational in the sense that “spirit” is or are they rather the divine equivalent to human motives? I suspend strong judgement upon this, but will note that comparison between *Laws X* and *Timaeus* suggests that even divine soul's possess the power to wish [βούλεσθαι].

<sup>64</sup> I do not believe this itself is a wholly novel suggestion; among others, a similar stance is suggested by Griswold *op. cit.*: 124, and assumed by Blyth *op. cit.*: 189ff.

conceives of the soul's two ruling, motivational principles – which also include judgement [δόξα] – as being kinds of motion, and hence explicating what soul does when it moves.

This view can perhaps be further extended to cover the motions of divine souls: divine souls each possess a team of winged good horses, in light of which they are illustrated as roaming the cosmos and accounting for the orderly motion of the planets. If we take these to correspond to the divine equivalent of θυμός, and their charioteer to represent divine mind [νόος], the picture that emerges is of the cosmos moved by the minds and wishes of the gods. This is not far a cry from the picture which emerges in *Timaeus*, in which mind plays a central role in the regular motion of the cosmos.<sup>65</sup>

To wrap up this discussion, it is worth outlining how this reading builds upon the claim first noted in the previous chapter. There, I contended that, in claiming that soul's essence and definition was self-motion, Socrates quite plausibly made good upon his promise, at 245c, to explain what soul divine and human, by nature, does: soul by nature self-moves, from which it follows that the soul moves the body, 'this being the nature of soul [φύσεως ψυχῆς]' (245e6). On the basis of our treatment of soul's ἰδέα, this thesis appears to hold water: not only is soul, divine and human, described in such a way that makes it clear that both kinds of soul are essentially self-motive entities, but in virtue of their motions, these souls are the source of motion for the cosmic and earthly human bodies respectively.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, upon close inspection of this claim in tandem with the description of soul's ἰδέα, I take it to be at least not far from the truth that soul is said to be a self-mover because Plato plausibly conceives of desire and the rationally informed drive to act well as being themselves kinds of motion. This appears plausibly to me insofar as it makes clear why soul, *qua* self-mover, is taken to be the source of the motion of bodies: soul's motions, being essentially motivational, account for the actions of a human subject. On this view, there is a rather striking upshot to the discussion. In order to depict what soul does by nature – self-move and in doing so bring about action – Socrates must refer its tripartite structure, insofar as this

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<sup>65</sup> Cf. Blyth 1997 for elucidation of the parallels. However, on this point refrain from committing too strongly to a particular view regarding the divine soul's self-motion, for my interest in this thesis is that of the human soul in particular.

<sup>66</sup> Thus it is not unsubstantiated to think that, at 245c, Socrates should be using soul as a mass term: what soul, as a singular kind of entity, does – its ἔργα – is self-move.

serves to clarify how the motions of a soul can bring about action. Looking forward, it seems warranted to think, therefore, that to explain the essential nature of soul, a rhetorician will necessarily be required to describe its tri-partite structure. I will return to this in the next chapter.

### **A Final Consideration and Concluding Remarks**

Before we turn to the final section of this chapter there is a final issue I need return to. Prior to his description of soul, Socrates claimed that he will not describe what the soul actually is [οἷον ἐστὶ], but what it is like [ἔοικεν]. The issue here is that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, a rhetorician must be able describe the soul with perfect accuracy [πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ]; in claiming here that such a thing is a task befitting a god, it seems prudent to ask what to make of this declaration.

While on the face of it, this may appear problematic, there are several reasons for not thinking that Socrates takes the task to be beyond the ambitions of a human being. For one, in the later passage, Socrates seems to have little doubt that such a thing is possible: a rhetorician is required to be able to describe the soul with perfect accuracy, and this suggests that it is not impossible.<sup>67</sup> Second, within the palinode itself, to say “what soul actually is” is said to require a very long treatment [διηγῆσεως]; comparatively, to say what it is like is said to take less time, and Socrates goes on to do this. Quite aside from taking this to imply the impossibility of describing the soul with perfect accuracy, a more compelling explanation for this statement recommends itself. Socrates’ express aim, within this speech, is to present a fitting and respectful palinode praising the madness of love he previously censured, and is implicitly to win over Phaedrus’ complete admiration of his rhetorical superiority to Lysias. For these reasons, it seems plausible that Socrates has other reasons for not providing a complete and full treatment of the soul’s composition: what he provides is fitting insofar as it adequately conveys the benefits bestowed by love, and does so in suitably colourful and simple manner that will not fail to impress, rather than fatigue, the young Phaedrus.

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<sup>67</sup> Unless, of course, Plato is taken to believe that it truly *is* impossible, and is therefore attempting to prove that rhetoric cannot be an art; this, however, seems wrongheaded – Plato’s view of rhetoric in this later dialogue, and others such as *Statesman* and *Laws* – has quite noticeably developed since the earlier critique of rhetoric in *Gorgias*. Cf. Yunis 2005: 101-106 for a compelling case to this effect.

As a second point, it is also noteworthy that, in spite of the fact that we here receive only a description of soul in contrast to the account provided in *Republic*, this is not a strong reason to doubt its philosophical credentials. Prior to accounting for the tri-partite structure of soul, Socrates makes a very similar disclaimer to the one made here of the image: at *Republic* 4.435d, Socrates says that a precise description of soul could only be reached by a longer and fuller road; this is foregone in order to provide a briefer account which nevertheless measures up to the standards of the previous inquiries. Given the similarities between these two disclaimers, it seems warranted to see both of them as conveying a similarly respectable treatment of the soul's structure.

This is, of course, not to claim that the image used will be sufficient for the purposes of rhetoric. Rhetoric requires a description of soul with perfect accuracy, and here, as in *Republic* we do not get this. Nevertheless, given the parallels between the description here and the tri-partite account offered in *Republic*, it seems plausible to believe that Plato, at the time of writing this dialogue, thought that the tri-partite picture of soul was at least close enough to the truth that it could be said to describe what the soul is like. Hence, while the rhetorician is expected to have precise grasp of the soul's composition, it also seems plausible enough that his general grasp will not depart fundamentally over the tri-partition of soul and its two motivational principles.

This rounds out the second section of this chapter. To briefly summarise, our results so far are promising. In the previous section, soul's self-motion was identified as an important aspect of what the soul is; in this section, we have not only confirmed that this is the case, but have managed to draw an important connection between Socrates' depiction of the human soul's tri-partite structure, its motivational role, and its self-motion: the self-motion of the human soul corresponds to the motions of its two horses. Because the two horses represent the appetitive [ἐπιθυμία] and spirited part [θυμός] of soul, I surmised that soul's motions are simply its psychological motivations, and this will prove something of a step forward when we return to rhetoric. Beforehand, however, there is a third and final section to this chapter.

### **2.3. The Kinds of Soul**

As outlined in the first chapter, the artful rhetorician requires more than simply a grasp of the soul's composition and what it does: a critical requirement is that they grasp the soul's various kinds. In the case that soul has various kinds, the rhetor is also required to grasp the respective powers [δύναμιν] of each – how each, by nature, acts [ποιεῖν] and is acted upon

[παθεῖν]. As far as we have seen so far, the palinode plausibly provides us with an explanation of what the human soul by nature does – its ἔργα – insofar as soul’s essence is self-motion and the human soul’s essential self-motion means its capacity to desire and pursue pleasures and what is judged to be good. At this stage, however, we have no sense of the kinds of human soul, or how they plausibly differ in terms of their powers. In this section, I turn to this subject. At 248de, Socrates provides a list of nine kinds of embodied human soul; within this section, I consider the formulation of this list with the aim of accounting for what distinguishes between the nine kinds of human soul. To briefly anticipate the results, I submit that the nine kinds each differ in terms of their self-motion – what they are naturally disposed to pursue – and in terms of their disposition to be acted upon by their pre-natal vision of the forms.<sup>68</sup>

Prior to considering the kinds of human soul, it is important to begin by outlining what causes the human soul to lose its wings and how it becomes one of the nine kinds of embodied soul listed at 248d-e. While this will require some time, it will prove worthwhile insofar as it is of relevance to subsequently provided list of the nine different kinds of embodied human souls.

At 246c, Socrates first notes soul’s potential to lose its wings, fall to earth, and take on a body. This precipitates an explanation of what causes the shedding of a soul’s wings. He explains that, while they are nourished and grow best in the presence of beauty [καλόν], wisdom [σοφόν], and goodness [ἀγαθόν], they shrivel and wither away in the presence of evil and vice [κακός] (246d5-e3). From 247a6-248c, we see the application of this explanation. Here Socrates details how the divine procession of souls, led by the gods, ascends to the heavenly vault [ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα] in order to feast.<sup>69</sup> Once at the hyperuranian realm, the soul’s charioteer – mind [νόος] – is said to be capable of seeing the beings that are what

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<sup>68</sup> While it may be noted that there is a second sense in which human souls are differentiated depending upon which of the eleven gods they followed prior to embodiment, in this section I will not provide a detailed examination of these kinds. I return to this issue and defend this omission at the close of this section.

<sup>69</sup> Heaven is depicted here as the interior space of a sphere. At its uppermost point is located the “vault”, “arch” or “rib” [ἀψίδα] (247b1) that supports the heavenly sphere from the inside; cf. Yunis 2011: 140, and de Vries *op. cit.*: 133. Outside of this sphere is the place beyond heaven or the hyperuranian realm [ὑπερουράνιον τόπον] where the eternal forms are located (247c2).

they truly are [οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα], the objects of true knowledge – transparently, the forms.<sup>70</sup> Among the forms in this place are those of Justice [δικαιοσύνη], Self-control [σωφροσύνη], Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], and – as attested from 250b onwards – Beauty [καλόν]. Through the mind’s sight of these forms, it acquires knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], which is said to be the nourishment and appropriate food for the soul’s reason [διάνοια]. Not only this, but the hyperuranian realm – as ‘the plain where truth stands’ [τὸ ἀληθείας πεδίον] – is said to contain that which nourishes the soul’s wings (248c1-2). This is hardly surprising: having already stipulated that these are nourished by goodness, wisdom, and beauty, Socrates has prepared us for his subsequent declaration that by the soul’s contemplation of true beauty and acquisition of true knowledge, it sustains its plumage.<sup>71</sup>

This is something of striking claim: at 245c, Socrates promised to explain the nature of soul, divine and human, by considering not only what it – soul, whether divine or human – does but also what is done to it, its experiences [πάθη]. At this stage, as I have argued in the previous two sections, we have seen what soul does – self-move – but as of yet have received no word about the soul’s πάθη. Here, however, Socrates takes up the issue of soul’s nourishment, and explains that ‘the mind of any soul concerned to take in what is appropriate to it’ is nourished by its sight of the forms, as are the soul’s wings. Not only is this a claim about what acts upon soul – the soul is nourished, and hence acted upon, by the forms – but the soul’s interaction with the forms is couched in language which foregrounds the soul’s experience of them – they are said to be without colour or shape, visible to intelligence, and said to be wonderful to

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<sup>70</sup> While they are never explicitly referred to as such, from their visibility to mind, their brilliance as described at 250b-e, and their status as the “true nature of things” (247c5-6), it is defensible to infer Plato is here taking them to be the forms. Also cf. the location and brightness of the form of the Good in Rep.6.508; Hackforth *op. cit.*: 80-81.

<sup>71</sup> It is somewhat ambiguous what nourishes the wings of soul: while Socrates speaks of the forms themselves or their images as nourishing the wings (248c1, 251b), Yunis suggests that they are nourished by virtue and destroyed by vice (*ibid.*: 140). Given the relation in Plato between knowledge, virtue, ignorance, and vice, the lack of specificity on this point is forgivable: the wings are nourished by the sight of truth because truth provides knowledge of the Just, which in turn is necessary for acting Justly and so with virtue.

behold (247cd).<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, the forms play an important role in the life of both divine and human soul: by nourishing the wings, as we will see shortly, the soul's sight of the forms takes on great significance insofar as it allows souls to preserve their winged state.

However, I understand here that there may be some reservations about this suggestion. For one, it seems more intuitive to think that the *πάθη* referred to at 245c should be the soul's experience of love, and not the forms. Second, if the soul requires wings in order to see the forms, then it seems unlikely that they should constitute the *πάθη* of the embodied human soul. To attend to both these questions, we must press on.

As just noted, soul's ascent to the hyperuranian is significant: if a soul is able to successfully make this ascent and see the forms, its mind and wings will remain nourished and it will continue its winged roaming about the cosmos. This standard is set by the divine souls: owing to their uniformly composed team of good, winged horses, the gods' chariots are well balanced and under control, and they do not struggle to make the journey up the steep slope (247b2). Once they reach the top, they move outward, take their stand on the high ridge of heaven, and are carried around by the circular motion of heaven while they gaze upon the resplendent forms situated outside of the heavenly sphere. Having completed the full circuit, seen all the forms, and satiated themselves completely, they can then return back to the heavens realm with their wings nourished. (247b5-e5).<sup>73</sup>

The same is not the case for the human souls. Being saddled with a bad horse and a good one, their souls are mismatched. The bad horse is said to weigh down [*βρίθει*] the human soul, and if the charioteer has failed to train it well, it jeopardises the whole journey.<sup>74</sup> But, with much toil, the human soul is also able to reach the place beyond heaven: any soul which follows a god most closely and makes itself most like a god, insofar as it controls its bad horse, will

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<sup>72</sup> Later on Socrates will go on to describe the forms in a similarly colourful manner, highlighting their dazzling qualities and the bliss experienced upon the sight of them. See Lebeck 1972: 271-3 for further treatment.

<sup>73</sup> The circular, revolving motion in which the soul's are said to be carried recalls *Timaeus* 37bc on the revolutions of the circles of same and different; Blyth 1997: 187.

<sup>74</sup> The reference to the bad horse "weighing down" the human soul is perhaps apt: it represents the appetitive part of the soul, and this is said to require "enslaving" if the embodied soul is to pursue a life of philosophy (256ac).



manage to raise the head of its charioteer outside heaven, and will be carried around the circuit like the gods. While still distracted by his team of horses, the charioteer will nevertheless catch a view of the forms and nourish its mind and wings. Comparatively, other souls rise and fall haphazardly, being dragged down by their bad horses and raised by their good, causing them to see some things and miss others. As for the rest, caught in the stampede of souls all eager to see the truth, they are maimed by the incompetence of their charioteers and fail to see any of reality. These soul's leave uninitiated, and go on to depend not upon knowledge but opinion [δόξα].<sup>75</sup>

This takes us to the law of destiny [θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας] that governs the life of every soul.<sup>76</sup> The law states that every soul which was a companion to a god – which made itself “most like a god” – and caught sight of anything true will remain unharmed until it retakes the circuit once more. If it is able to do this at every venture – every time it ascends to the high ridge of heaven – it will eternally remain safe.<sup>77</sup> However, souls which failed to see the truth are said to take on a burden of forgetfulness and vice [λήθης τε καὶ κακίας], be weighed down, shed their wings, fall to earth, and take on a body.<sup>78</sup> While before Socrates claimed such souls go away dependent upon opinion, he now claims that they are blighted by forgetfulness and vice. While Ferrari (1987: 133) observes that it is unclear what the relation is between these states, it seems plausible, for reasons we will see momentarily, to connect forgetfulness to the soul's prior visions of truth.<sup>79</sup> Through the incarnate soul's forgetfulness

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<sup>75</sup> As Hackforth notes, the reference here to the “food of semblance” recalls the divided line in *Rep. VI*; Hackforth *op. cit.*: 82.

<sup>76</sup> The reference here is to Adrastea, the god from whom none can run away – necessity. This signals that what we will learn at this stage follows by necessity, and so can be said to be governed by a lawful principle.

<sup>77</sup> This is understandable: because the sight of the forms sustains the plumage of the soul, a soul that always sees the forms – such as the well balanced divine souls – will always preserve its wings.

<sup>78</sup> 246c.

<sup>79</sup> By “prior visions” I refer to the visions of the truth the soul saw in its preceding ascent – as is made clear, the soul must make successive journeys to the forms to acquire knowledge and nourish its wings. It is only when it fails to see the forms that it becomes embodied.

of these, it depends upon its own opinions about what is just and temperate and consequently becomes capable of vice.

This finally takes us to the kinds of embodied human soul, listed at 248d2-e3. Upon a soul's first incarnation, it will take on the body of a human rather than that of a beast.<sup>80</sup> Upon doing so, it can manifest itself as one nine possible kinds of incarnate human soul. These are, following Nehamas and Woodruff:

1. That of the philosopher, the lover of beauty, one cultivated in the arts, and prone to erotic love;
2. That of the lawful king or warlike commander;
3. That of the statesman, a manager of a household, or a financier;
4. That of the trainer or a doctor;
5. That of the prophet or priest of the mysteries;
6. That of the poet or some other representational artist;
7. That of the manual labourer or farmer;
8. That of the sophist or demagogue; and
9. That of the tyrant.

As scholarship quite unanimously concurs, the list naturally reads as an order of merit. Appropriately ranked first on the hierarchy is the philosopher: following *Republic* 9.587e1 this soul lives 'seven hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly than a tyrant', the kind of soul aptly placed ninth on the hierarchy. The relative positions of these two members of society thereby invites a reading of the list on which the first member is the best and most blessed kind of soul – one with a natural proclivity for virtue – the last is the least blessed – one with a natural proclivity for vice – and the intermediary members assigned positions in respect of the varying merit or virtue of their lives.<sup>81</sup> Putting such a reading to one side for the

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<sup>80</sup> Why this should be so is suggested at 249bc: all human souls, in order to understand speech, must have previously seen the true beings. What this implies is that prior to the failure to see the true beings – which serves to explain the soul's loss of wings and consequential embodiment – all human souls have seen the true beings. As such they will, upon their first failure to see the truth, become embodied human souls. Cf. Hackforth: 82, n.2

<sup>81</sup> For more extended treatments of this list along these lines, see Hackforth: 82-83; and Yunis: 144-145

moment, in what follows I would like to consider how Socrates frames the differences between the respective members. While this will not lead to a reading which departs substantially from the above sketched, it will be useful insofar as it will clarify *why* each member is so assigned. This in turn will give us a sense of the differences between the kinds of soul that will become important in the next chapter.

This list, as with the soul's fall to earth, is governed by the law of necessity; it is far from arbitrary which soul one will become after the failure to see the forms. On the contrary, Socrates states that 'a soul that has seen the *most*' of the forms will go on to become the first kind of soul: a lover of wisdom, beauty, follower of the muses, and one prone to erotic love (248d2). From this, we can infer that what distinguishes between the kinds of soul is the amount seen prior to their embodiment – the tyrant saw the least, the philosopher the most, and every soul an amount correlating with the position relative to these two.<sup>82</sup> However, what is somewhat easily overlooked is how the aspects of the first kind of soul – in particular lover of beauty and one prone to erotic love – directly correlate with the amount the soul saw prior to its embodiment: at two instances later in the speech, Socrates again uses "the amount a soul saw of the truth" as the criteria by which to discriminate between kinds of embodied soul and which of these are capable of erotic love.

The first is at 250a. Immediately preceding this, Socrates announces that he will turn to the point of his discussion – the madness of love his palinode is designed to praise. This madness is said to be that which someone shows upon their sight of earthly beauty and corresponding recollection [ἀνάμνησις] of true Beauty.<sup>83</sup> At 250a, he explains that not every soul is prone to this recollection and the experience he will go on to describe – those who only had a brief glimpse at reality and those who forgot their pre-natal visions are incapable of this. Conversely only soul's whose memory is good enough will, upon the sight of an image of the form of beauty, recall their pre-natal vision of Beauty. The second comes shortly after: at

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<sup>82</sup> Hence, de Vries: the farmers owe their place on the list to 'their ability to inform their work' with what they have seen prior to their embodiment (*op. cit.*: 144).

<sup>83</sup> The doctrine of recollection [ἀνάμνησις] goes back to *Meno* (81c-85d) and *Phaedo* (72e-77a). In this dialogue, it introduced at 249c1-2, and goes on, as here, to play an important role in accounting for the experience of love. I will avoid providing a treatment of recollection and the importance of this doctrine in this particular dialogue: in my view, it is introduced most obviously to stress the epistemic gap between the philosophical soul and the tyrannical.

251a, Socrates explains that “one who has seen much in heaven” will, upon the sight of earthly beauty, be overcome by the feverish experience of love. Because the stream of beauty stimulates the re-growth of the soul’s wings, upon parting from the beautiful boy, the whole soul is said to throb as its wings attempt to sprout. This experience drives that soul into a frenzy, whereby the soul is compelled to pursue the beloved wherever he may in order to sustain the re-growth of its plumage. This is, as Socrates says, the experience we call love.

In light of these comments, there appears to be a connection between the amount a soul saw prior to embodiment, its memory of the true beings, and its propensity for the experience Socrates goes on to describe. While souls which only got a brief glimpse at reality or forgot their sight of beauty are incapable of this, a soul which saw much and has not forgotten its sight – soul’s whose memory of this is good enough – are prone to this experience. This is consistent with Socrates explanation of the list of souls: soul’s of the first kind are philosophers, lovers of beauty, and prone to erotic love, and are unique insofar as they saw the most prior to embodiment.<sup>84</sup> It seems quite clear now that this is no accident: the amount these souls saw directly correlates with the designation “lover of beauty” and “one prone to erotic love”.<sup>85</sup>

About this, however, there may be some discomfort: as we have already seen, according to the law of necessity the condition for the soul’s embodiment is that it fails to see any of reality, and takes on a burden of forgetfulness. How, then, are we supposed to make sense of the discrimination between kinds of soul based upon the amount of truth seen? And what are we to make of the apparent connection between the amount seen, and a soul’s memory or lack thereof? I will consider these questions in turn.

While the answer to the first requires some speculation, a plausible solution appears to offer itself in light of Socrates comments at 248d, 249bc, and 249e. As noted above, at 248d

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<sup>84</sup> At 249c, he goes on to identify the soul of the philosopher – the first kind of soul, one prone to erotic love, and that which saw the most – as that soul uniquely kept in close proximity, by memory [μνήμη], to the forms. In virtue of this soul’s memory, it is presumably able to recollect its former vision of Beauty upon the sight of an earthly image of this.

<sup>85</sup> It also bears noting that the palinode goes on to defend love on the grounds that it is capable of leading a soul to pursue a life of philosophy (256ab). Thus, the amount seen of the forms presumably also correlates with the designation “philosopher”.

Socrates explains that upon its first incarnation – upon its first failure to see the truth – the soul will become that of a human. At 249bc, he explains that a soul which never saw the truth cannot become a human, because humans ‘must understand speech in terms of general forms’; this is re-iterated again at 249e. Because incarnation into human form takes place upon the soul’s first<sup>86</sup> failure to see reality – the forms as the true nature of things – it seems clear that Socrates’ references to the necessity of the human soul’s having seen the truth refer to the visions it had over the journeys prior to that which caused the soul to become incarnate. For this reason, it seems warranted to think that the discriminating principle – the amount a soul saw prior to its embodiment – must refer to the amount a soul saw of the forms not on its final – unsuccessful – ascent, but on these previous ascents to the hyperuranian realm.

Conceding this, it is still unclear what the relation is between the proportion of the truth seen and a soul’s position upon the list. Could, for instance, a soul that saw two-thirds of the forms, but consistently failed to see that of justice go on to become a philosopher, the most just and virtuous soul? And why should the sheer amount seen have any influence upon a soul’s memory? Taking amount to be meant in a proportional sense – having seen a certain amount of the forms – it seems difficult to answer this. However, because of the connection between memory and the amount seen – the first kind of soul is said to have both seen the most and possess the strongest memory of the forms – I suspect that the amount seen refers to the amount a soul saw *cumulatively* over its repeated visitations to the garden of truth. On this view, it is more clear why a soul which saw the most should possess, of all the embodied souls, the strongest memory of its prior vision of the forms: its memory is the result of its history of exposure to the forms.

In drawing this connection, it becomes a great deal clearer why only a select few souls – those of the first kind – are said to be lovers of beauty and prone to the experience of love described in the palinode. Having seen the most of the forms prior to their embodiment, upon its incarnation into human form, this kind of soul possesses the strongest memory of its sight, and is by consequence most prone to the recollection of the true beings. Because erotic love is directly connected – at 249d – to the recollection of true beauty, only souls of the first order will, in virtue of the strength of their memory and their corresponding propensity for recollection, be prone to erotic love. Conversely, souls said to have seen comparatively less of the truth – culminating with the tyrannical soul implied to have seen the least of all – each possess

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<sup>86</sup> Cf. the law of Adrastea, and n. 80 above.

respectively weaker memories of their pre-natal visions, and so are correspondingly more burdened by forgetfulness [λήθης], and less capable of the recollection [ἀνάμνησις] of their former visions. On this reading, the principle which governs the list is largely an epistemological one: as one proceeds down the list, each soul is gradually more gripped by forgetfulness, and so at a further remove from recollection of the true beings and knowledge and more dependent upon opinion [δόξα].

With this, I am now in a position to return to the list itself and consider how Socrates' remarks sit with respect to reading it as an "order of merit". As outlined, it seems quite natural, in light of *Republic IX*, to take the list to order its members based upon the respective blessedness of their lives: the philosopher is most virtuous and so most blessed, while the tyrant is least virtuous and least blessed, with the respective member all occupying position corresponding to their virtue and corresponding worth. Having seen that what distinguishes the members is the amount each has seen and remembers of the forms – and by implication their respective capacities for recollection – we can now develop a treatment of the list that builds upon this reading.

The first kind of soul, that of the philosopher, is the kind of soul with the strongest memory of its pre-natal vision of reality. Among the forms a soul is capable of seeing there are those of Justice [δικαιοσύνη], Self-control [σωφροσύνη], and Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]. Through its memory of these forms, it seems clear – taking Beauty as an example – that the first kind of soul is most prone to the recollection of true Justice, Self-control, and Knowledge. This much appears to be confirmed by Socrates' remark that a soul is not only capable of recollecting its vision of Beauty but also that of Self-control (254b). Through its propensity to recognise and recollect what is Just and Temperate, the soul of the first kind is presumably most liable, of all the souls, to reacquire and act in accordance with its prenatal knowledge of Justice and Self-control. Once again, this speculation appears well founded in light of 254b: upon the soul's recollection of self-control, the charioteer – mind – reins in its two horses. With the aid of the obedient horse, the spirited part of the soul and a lover of self-control, this allows the soul to refrain from simply engaging the beloved in sexual intercourse. With this reading, there is a

direct correlation between the soul's epistemic state – its proximity to truth – and its propensity to act in accordance with virtue.<sup>87</sup>

While Socrates never takes up the situation the other eight kinds of soul find themselves in, there are comments that make speculation possible. At 248b, he specifies that all souls who leave the place at the rim of heaven without sight of the forms go away “uninitiated”, dependent upon opinion [δόξα], and – shortly after – burdened by forgetfulness and vice [λήθης τε καὶ κακίας]. Having seen that the first kind of soul is least firmly gripped by forgetfulness, and most prone to re-acquire knowledge and act virtuously, it seems warranted to infer that each successive member of the list will be gradually more burdened by forgetfulness, dependent upon their own opinions about what is Just or Temperate, and hence less prone to act virtuously. While the higher members – the lawful king, warlike general, statesman, and household – are presumably still prone to recognise what is truly Just,<sup>88</sup> the eighth and ninth member of the list – the sophist, demagogue, and tyrant – are the kinds of soul furthest removed from the truly good: being gripped by forgetfulness and thoroughly dependent upon their own opinions about what is just, good and self-controlled, they are most liable to act with no modicum of self-control, and so most likely to lead a life blighted by vice [κακίας].

This much appears suggested by a comment at 250e: here, Socrates claims that souls warped by vice – most obviously a reference to the eighth and ninth members of the list – will, upon seeing a beautiful boy, not recall their former visions but instead surrender to pleasure and rush forward to pursue not only sex, but “unnatural pleasures” *without a trace of fear or shame*. What is interesting is how this contrasts with the response of the first kind of soul: upon looking in the eyes the beloved, the good horse of this soul is said to remain in control

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<sup>87</sup> Similarly, at 256a it is claimed that this soul is capable of enslaving the part that brought trouble into the soul – the bad horse, appetite, responsible for vicious and hedonistic conduct – and set free the part that gives it virtue – presumably mind, responsible for judging what is good and temperate, and directing the good horse to pursue these.

<sup>88</sup> This would explain their positions on the list: the lawful king and warlike general come second on the basis that both lead similarly just lives and convey important practical benefits upon a city (Yunis *op. cit.*: 144), and this reflects the view in Statesman that a constitutional monarchy is the ‘least unsatisfactory substitute in default of an ideally wise ruler’ (Hackforth *op. cit.*: 83). The same is true albeit on a lesser scale for the statesman and household manager.

of itself by its sense of shame [254a], and, while the bad horse is said to rush forward with no sense of shame [254e], upon the charioteer's recollection of his vision of Temperance, the soul is brought back under control. The stipulation that souls warped by forgetfulness and vice act with no sense of shame is thus quite interesting in this respect – what it appears to suggest is that such souls are not only an epistemologically unique, insofar as they are the furthest removed from knowledge of what is truly Temperate and Just, but that this deficiency extends to their spirited and honour loving part. Unlike that of the first kind of soul, the spirited part of a soul warped by vice does not appear to resist the urges of its yokemate. The description of these souls – as lacking this sense – appears rather to suggest their disposition to be ruled by their shameless appetitive side.<sup>89</sup>

This of course connects neatly back to our previous analysis of the soul's structure and self-motion. As I argued in the previous section, the soul's self-motion corresponds to the motions of soul's motivational parts – its two horses *qua* desire for pleasure and the spirited drive to act in accordance with what reason judges to be best. This list appears to build upon that reading: souls higher on the list, being more prone to recognise what is truly Just and Self-controlled, are plausibly more disposed to correctly judge what is Just or Self-controlled and act in accordance with this. And, while their appetitive parts may still drive them to pursue pleasures, if the example of the first kind of soul is anything to go by (254b), presumably these souls will be able to resist these urges in light of their relatively strong memories of the truth. Conversely, souls of the latter kinds – those of the eighth and ninth variety – being more given over to their opinions about what is Just and Self-controlled, appear less able to resist the urges of their appetitive parts. Perhaps the best explanation for this is that, being furthest from the truth, these souls are more prone to conflate hedonistic pleasures with their ideas about what is just or good, as is suggested by *Protagoras* 351bff. While somewhat speculative, this is not implausible with the scant information we have to go on.

With this, I can now explain how the list appears to provide us with rough outline of how we can discriminate between the kinds of soul in terms of their respective self-motions. While certain souls are naturally disposed, by dint of their proximity to truth, to desire and pursue what is truly good, others are naturally disposed to desire and pursue what merely appears good – pleasures. Hence, upon consideration of this list, and the palinode's promise to explain

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<sup>89</sup> This is consistent with the view in *Republic IX* that the tyrannical soul is most given over to desire and so most prone to act with excess and vice; cf. 586ab.



what soul does, it seems we not only have a strata of kinds of soul, as is required by rhetoric, but we also have an apparent way to assign to each soul a respective power of acting. The different kinds of soul differ in no small way in terms of the ends they naturally move to pursue, some pursuing what is just and others what is less so.<sup>90</sup>

The same, I submit, can be argued for the respective *πάθη* of these souls. Above, I suggested that the forms serve to explain what it is the soul is acted upon by. At this stage, I can return to this point. While there were initially two apparent obstacles to this view, it is now more clear why they do not constitute a strong reason to deny that the forms *are* the *πάθη* of soul. The first obstacle was that soul's *πάθη* is more plausibly its experience of love. However, as noted above, the soul's capacity to experience the love described by the palinode is contingent upon the soul's capacity to recognise earthly beauty as an image of the form of Beauty itself. Hence, the soul's capacity to see the forms has a kind of natural priority. This also overcomes the second obstacle: because the forms possess earthly images, they are visible and capable of nourishing not only to winged souls but also embodied souls. It is their nourishment, in turn, which grounds Socrates' contention that the soul of the philosopher will most quickly renew its wings. However, I will defend this thesis more extensively in the following chapter, and so will not labour the point here.

At this stage, I would instead like to indicate how this assessment also provides us with a way to discriminate between the respective powers for being acted upon [*παθεῖν*] of the kinds. On the view I am arguing for, the soul's natural *πάθη* is the forms, the true nature of reality. On this view, we can discriminate between the kinds of soul in terms each kind's propensity to be acted upon by these forms: souls of the first kind are the most prone to recognise and receive nourishment by these forms, those of the second kind are the second most prone, and so on. When we reach the ninth kind of soul, we find a soul which is practically incapable of recognising what is true and recalling its vision of truth. Far from signalling an issue for this thesis, this inability is a *conspicuous* one: being incapable of recollecting true Beauty and what is truly Just, the souls lower down on the list are incapable of knowledge and instead thoroughly depend upon their own, mistaken opinions about what is either Just or Self-

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<sup>90</sup> While I am aware that I have neglected to treat in any detail the middle constituents of this list – the fourth to seventh kinds – in my view the analysis above can plausibly be seen as extending to them. For a more in depth treatment of these members, see Yunis *ibid*: 144-5; and Hackforth *ibid*: 83-4.

controlled. As such, they are confined to pursuing what merely appears to be good, namely pleasure.

### **The Character Types and Concluding Remarks**

Before I conclude this section there is, however, a final point in need of consideration. As noted in the introduction, this is not the only way Socrates divides the soul up into kinds. At 252c, he claims that different kinds of soul exist depending upon which god one followed in the divine procession. Soul's that followed in the section Zeus are said to be like Zeus, while those who followed Hera like Hera, and so on for Apollo, Ares, and the rest of the eleven.<sup>91</sup> In the introduction, I noted that I will not here pursue an investigation of these kinds of soul, and this choice requires some justification.

Three things factor into my decision to omit treatment of this other typology. The first is simply that I do not think there is a great deal of evidence within the speech pertaining to what distinguishes between the gods and their human followers – hereafter, the eleven character types, each of which emulates a particular god. While Socrates explains at 252d1 that human souls strive to emulate the god it followed in the procession and spends its embodied life ‘honouring the god in whose chorus he danced’ and emulating that god ‘in every way he can’, we are given little information about what differentiates between each gods and so each of the character types. In sum, they are implied to have their own respective qualities, customs, and practices (24253a1-b1), and it is attested that Zeus is responsible for ‘looking after everything and putting all things in order’ (246e5). While we are told that the other eleven each attend to their own work in the cosmos (247a), we are not given any clues about what this might be. Much the same holds true for the characters: souls that followed Zeus are said to become like him insofar as they have a talent for philosophy and the guidance of others’ (252e4), and bear the burden of love with a dignity that contrasts with the violent temperamental natures of souls which followed Ares (252c). Followers of Hera are implied, conversely, to have a kingly a character – insofar as they pursue souls who followed Hera and pursue souls with a kingly nature – but this of the rest we are told nothing.

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<sup>91</sup> It is not clear whether there are followers of Hestia – she remains at home and it is left unspecified whether she joins the gods in their ascent to feast. But because she is not part of the divine procession, it seems implied that there no kinds of soul will become like her.

The second regards my own uncertainty about the details of the list and how Plato conceived the relation between it and the list I focused upon here. On a first reading, the stipulation that followers of Zeus possess a talent for philosophy, and those of Hera look for a kingly character, suggests that the list of character types should parallel the kinds of embodied soul: first comes the philosopher, second comes the lawful king. Moreover, Plato himself appears to suggest as much over the course of treating the madness of love experienced by the soul, which culminates in the adoption of a life of philosophy (cf. in particular 250b). However this cannot be quite right: for one, it would require us to think that tyrants and sophists both owed their excessive and vicious practices to a particular god, rather than to their own forgetfulness of the forms. For another, there are said to be eleven gods in the divine procession, yet only nine kinds of embodied soul. In light of these obscurities, and the scant information we are provided I find it difficult to see one could formulate an account of these character types and their respective powers, and much less argue that such a thing is required by rhetoric.

The third is not a textual but rather a pragmatic decision. So far, I have analysed the immortality argument, the structure of soul, and the nine kinds of embodied soul; on the basis of this, I have managed to provide an outline of how these kinds can be seen as differing both in terms of what they do – their self-motions – and in terms of their propensity to be acted upon by truth. Having achieved this much, my interest at this stage is to turn to what relevance these results have in the context of rhetoric. Because, for the reasons outlined above, I do not think that speculation about the eleven characters will add much to our analysis, I have opted to avoid spending too much time considering them. As I return to this omission in the final section of the next chapter, I take this to be a sufficient justification for the time being.

To summarise the upshot of this section, we have considered the nine kinds of embodied soul. Upon consideration, it seems adequately well founded to conclude that the list is formulated in accordance with the amount a soul has seen and remembers of the forms. On this view, the natural reading of the list as an order of merit of course follows: having seen the most of the forms, the soul of the philosopher possesses the strongest memory its sight of Beauty, Self-control, and Justice, and is correspondingly the most disposed, of all the souls, to recollect its former sight of these forms, act Justly, and lead a blessed life. As we pass down the list, each soul is gradually less prone to recall its former vision, and leads a life of justice that corresponds to this propensity. This culminates with the tyrannical soul, which is at the mercy

of its own opinions about what is just and self-controlled, and appears moved largely by its desire for pleasure. In turn, this reading of the list allows us to intimate that each of the various members possess their own respective powers of acting and being acted upon: the soul of the philosopher is most prone to be acted upon by the forms and so most disposed to pursue what is truly good and act justly and with self-control; conversely, that of the tyrant is the least prone to be acted upon by truth, and correspondingly pursues pleasures with no ounce of shame or self-control.

### **Concluding Remarks**

This concludes my analysis of the palinode. In this brief section, I will summarise the ground we have covered and the results this has obtained.

In the first section (2.1), I considered the argument made for the immortality of soul, and contended that it seeks to establish the immortality of soul *en masse* – by using soul in the singular, Socrates does not refer to a single world-soul, but rather soul as single kind of entity. On this view, the argument sought to establish that soul *of every kind* is immortal, a view lent credence by the fact that the argument quite intuitive reads as the attempt to establish the immortality of the human soul. In addition, I ventured that within this argument, we see Socrates make good upon his promise, immediately prior, to explain what soul, divine and human, by nature does: in this argument, its integral premise was that soul's essence and definition was self-motion.

This assessment became further substantiated when we turned to consider the description of soul's structure. Owing the fact that this description fore-grounded the soul's motive capacity, I argued that it was not unsubstantiated to conclude that what soul, both divine and human, does is self-move. Furthermore, because the motion of the soul owed to its possession of horses, and – in the human soul at least – because these horses represent soul's motivational components – its desire for pleasures and its desire to pursue what is rationally judged to be good – I contended that the soul's self-motion plausibly refers to its motivational nature. Taking its motions to be motivations, it becomes clear why the self-moving human soul is the source of the actions – motions – of the body in which the soul dwells: through the soul's desire to do what is judged to be good and its desire for pleasures, the soul accounts for all actions.

In the final section, I considered what causes the soul to shed its wings and become one of the nine kinds of embodied human soul – through its failure to see the forms, soul becomes embodied, and the kind of soul it becomes directly correlates with the amount it has seen and remembers of the forms. On this view, while the kinds of soul differ principally in terms of their respective memories, this in turn can be seen as implying a difference between their respective powers of acting and being acted upon by the forms: soul's higher on the list, having a stronger memory than the rest, are more disposed to being acted upon and recollect Beauty and recollect Self-control. As such, they are correspondingly more prone to pursuing what is truly good, acting with self-control, and less prone to being swayed by their desire for pleasures. Conversely, soul's lower down on the list are less prone to be acted upon by Beauty and recollect this knowledge: correspondingly, they are at the mercy of their opinions about what is just and good, and more disposed to be moved by their desires for pleasure.

With this summary out the way, we can now proceed to the third chapter of this thesis, in which I will return to the subject of rhetoric, the account of the nature of soul it requires, and the account of soul's nature I have here claimed is presented within the palinode.

### 3. Returning to Rhetoric

Having seen that the palinode is committed to several theses regarding the soul, in this chapter I will iterate how these serve to provide us with an account of the nature of soul that plausibly has relevance for rhetoric. In order to do this, I begin by reiterating what understanding of soul is required by rhetoric, before considering the palinode's promise to provide and understanding of the nature [φύσις] of soul (3.1). What is promised, on my view, is an explanation of what soul, *qua soul*, does and is acted upon by. The next step, therefore, is to present and defend my reading of what it is that the soul by nature does and is acted upon by (3.2). This makes up the first half the content of the chapter. In the second half, I consider the importance to rhetoric of the claim that soul is a self-mover and that it is acted upon by the forms (3.3); here, I illustrate why, in particular, the soul's self-motion has relevance in the context of rhetoric, and how answers two of the questions raised in the first chapter. Concerning the soul's propensity to be acted upon by the forms, I forego a complete treatment of the relevance this has to rhetoric, and instead outline reasons why it appears likely to have relevance and why I do not treat the issue as fully I would like to. Following this, I consider the nine kinds of soul, their respective powers, and argue that this has relevance to rhetoric (3.4). With this, I answer the third of the questions raised in the first chapter, and so complete what I set out to do. In the final section (3.5), I consider the areas in which I take my analysis to be lacking and where I believe future scholarship would do well to explore.

#### 3.1. Rhetoric and the Palinode on the Nature of Soul

As clarified in the first chapter, at 270d, prior to his outline of how the rhetorician will explain the nature of soul, Socrates explains what is required to grasp the nature of anything. While I have already analysed this passage, it will be useful here to quote it in full and briefly reiterate how its key claims pertain to rhetoric.

The explanation runs as follows:

‘First, we must consider whether the object regarding which we intend to become experts and capable of transmitting our expertise is simple [ἀπλοῦν] or complex [πολυειδές]. Then, if it is simple, we must investigate its power [δύναμιν]: what things does it have what natural power of acting [ποιεῖν] upon? By what things does it have what natural disposition [παθεῖν] to be acted upon? If, on the other hand, it takes many forms [πλείω εἶδη], we must enumerate them

all and, as we did in the simple case, investigate how each is naturally able to act upon what and how it has a natural disposition to be acted upon by what.’ (270d2-7)

At 271a5-b6, this method is applied to the soul in order to explain the understanding of soul’s nature required by rhetoric. As these passages both illustrate, a rhetorical understanding of the soul’s nature requires two stages of investigation. In the first stage, N1, one must determine whether soul is simple or complex. As noted in the first chapter, upon inspection of the context and scholarly consensus it seems most plausible to read this as requiring the rhetorician to determine the kinds of soul, in spite of the ambiguity of the term employed [εἶδη].

Following this determination, we come to the second stage, N2: the investigation into soul’s powers [δύναμιν] or those of its kinds. Importantly, this step is contingent upon the results of the first: if soul is simple – has only one kind – then one will need investigate what natural power of acting it has over what things, and what it is naturally disposed to be acted upon by, and in what way. However, if soul has many kinds, this same investigation will need be undertaken for every one of them. On the basis of this, the rhetorician will go on to match the kinds of soul to the kind of speech each soul will find most persuasive. Having done this, the rhetorician will be in a position whereby he can practice the art of rhetoric vis-à-vis the art of moving, with speech, any particular soul [ψυχᾶς] to certain beliefs or to act in a certain way.

In my first chapter, I posed several questions about this account. To briefly return to them, they were the following: (i) what kinds of soul is the rhetorician here expected to have familiarity with?; (ii) of what importance is it that the rhetorician must grasp what soul, by nature, does, or, if it has many kinds, what they do?; and (iii) given the initial ambiguity of the term εἶδη – which can be translated equally as kinds or parts – is it defensible to think that the rhetorician must possess knowledge of the soul’s parts? In this chapter, I will try to provide answers to these question on the strength of the account of soul’s nature within the palinode. In order to do so, I will begin by briefly returning to the palinode’s claim that it will explain the nature of soul [ψυχῆς φύσεως] and defending the assessments made in the previous chapter.

Prior to arguing for the immortality of soul, Socrates states the following: ‘now we must first understand the truth about the nature of soul [ψυχῆς φύσεως] divine and human [θείας τε καὶ

ἀνθρωπίνης] by examining what it does [ἔργα] and what is done to it [πάθη]’ (245c2-3). Here, there are two quite obvious points of contact with the later required account, namely that Socrates promises an explanation of what it – soul divine and human – does [ἔργα] and what is done to it [πάθη]. This quite unmistakably corresponds with the requirement that a rhetorician determine the soul’s powers: what it does [ποιεῖν] what it is acted upon by [παθεῖν]. On the basis of this promise, I suggested that what we are here promised is an explanation of the soul’s natural powers – what soul, whether divine or human, does and has done to it by nature. Because this is not the only way of reading this passage – it may, for instance, seem more consistent with the passage at 270d to expect an explanation of the respective powers of divine soul and human soul, I will begin by defending my stance that what we are promised is an explanation of the natural power common to both of these kinds.

The first point in favour of my view is a grammatical one. Though Socrates does make reference to two kinds of soul, what he promises is an investigation into the nature of soul divine and human [ψυχῆς φύσεως περὶ θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης], whereby soul is used in the singular, and with no corresponding article. Were we here being promised two investigations – one into the nature of divine soul and one into the nature of human soul – we would expect him to use soul in the plural, and correspondingly promise an investigation of their respective ἔργα and πάθη. As it stands, however, what we appear promised is rather a single investigation. This seems to suggest that the scope of the investigation will simply be soul, whether divine or human – in other words, an investigation into the nature common to both kinds.

The second point concerns how the palinode progresses. In the argument which immediately follows, Socrates uses the term soul [ψυχῆς] in much the same manner as he does here – in the singular and with no corresponding article. It therefore seems plausible to expect that in the passage immediately preceding it, we ought, as we did with that argument, take Socrates to be using soul as a mass term: to refer to soul collectively – soul of each and every kind. Having seen that, in the argument for soul’s immortality, the term was used in such a way as to allow Socrates to establish certain facts true of soul itself – hence, true of every kind of soul – such that soul is immortal, it seems not implausible that here, Socrates is using the term in a similar sense to suggest that both kinds of soul share certain natural powers, namely those characteristic of soul itself.



The third is somewhat hypothetical but nevertheless still stands. It seems not implausible to think that Plato should here be proposing an investigation into the nature of soul, whether divine or human, because, at 270d, he at least outlines the possibility that, if soul is by nature simple – a single kind of entity – then one will need investigate its powers of acting and being acted upon. Here, I propose that we are promised just this: an explanation of the nature of soul *qua* simple entity, which possesses its own distinctive nature. This does not appear to be an unreasonable assessment for several reasons. First, at 270d, it seems clear that the different kinds of soul are each thought to possess their own respective natural powers – their own distinctive natures. It seems no great leap to think that the same thought can be applied to the soul itself, and how it possesses its own distinctive nature.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, as we have already seen, the palinode makes it quite clear that both divine and human soul's possess a number of similarities – namely that both are immortal self-movers nourished by truth – and this too sits in favour of taking Socrates here to be promising an investigation of the nature common to both kinds. I will now turn to these similarities.

### **3.2. The ἔργα and πάθη of Soul According to the Palinode**

The first and most significant claim made in the palinode is that soul's essence and definition [ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον] is self-motion. (245e2-3) This is immediately striking for a number of reasons. By nominating self-motion as both soul's essence and definition, Socrates appears to suggest that what it is to be a soul is to be an entity essentially capable of self-motion, this being the definition [λόγον] of soul. As such, it follows that every soul, in virtue of being a soul, should be a self-mover. This inference appears adequately well supported when we turn to consider Socrates' description of what soul is like. This description, which illustrates the ἰδέα of soul both divine and human, makes it quite clear that soul is an entity whose essence and definition is self-motion: the soul is likened to the union of a charioteer and a team of winged horses, and this quite vividly captures the essential self-moving power of soul.<sup>93</sup>

In the previous chapter, I identified self-motion as constituting an explanation of what, by nature, the soul does – its ἔργα. This inference appears plausible for a number of reasons.

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<sup>92</sup> Cf. Cratylus 386d7-e3; here Socrates claims that each thing has an essence [οὐσίαν] of its own by nature [πέφυκεν].

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Griswold *op. cit.*: 93-94

Primarily, it appears quite emphatically to state what it is that soul – whether divine or human – does: soul self-moves, and not accidentally, but essentially. Given that self-motion is an essential property of soul, it seems reasonable enough to think that it should be related to the nature of soul, divine and human. Second, at 245c Socrates claims we must grasp the ἔργα of soul. This term is a cognate of the Greek term ἔργον, one more frequently associated with Aristotle than Plato. Its translations, like most Ancient philosophical terms, are various, though “work” and “function” are preferred in translations of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>94</sup> Here, Aristotle seeks to isolate the ἔργον of a human being and by attempting to isolate the kind of living particular to the human being. This is because he must grasp what is special or unique about the human, the kind of living that sets humans apart from all other living organisms and so can properly be called *their* work or function.<sup>95</sup> Returning to Phaedrus, it seems not implausible that Plato should be using the term in a not dissimilar fashion, to indicate that we must grasp what it is that soul, alone and by nature does *qua* work or function. This certainly seems suggested upon learning that soul’s essence is self-motion: what soul does, in essence, is self-move. As the argument for the soul’s immortality makes clear, it is necessary that soul alone possesses this power.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, within the argument Socrates claims that, *qua* self-mover, soul is the source of all motion, and is that in virtue of which bodies move, this being ‘the nature of soul’ [φύσεως ψυχῆς] (245e6). As my analysis of the soul’s structure confirms, the soul’s self-motion *is* that in virtue of which it is capable of moving bodies: because the soul’s motions include its desire for pleasure and its desire for what it judges to be good, the human soul’s motions correspond to motivations, and it is plausibly in this sense that soul’s motion is the source of the motion in bodies. Because Socrates claims that soul moves the body *because* this is the nature of soul, it seems warranted to infer that, because its self-motion is that which allows soul to move the body, soul’s self-movement should be what it, by nature, does; from this, it would necessarily follow that, by nature, soul also moves the body.

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<sup>94</sup> E.g. Reeve 2014.

<sup>95</sup> NE. 1.1098aff

<sup>96</sup> Necessary because the argument is premised upon the view that there is only one single source of motion, and this is can only be self-mover; because soul is that self-mover, it follows that soul alone is both the source of motion and a self-mover.

Finally, the identification of self-motion as soul's natural power of acting is further supported if we follow Verdenius (1955: 227) and Griswold (1986: 92) in thinking – rightly, in my view – that there is a strong connection between the *ιδέα* of soul and its nature. The *ιδέα* not only illustrates the soul's essential self-moving nature, but also serves to explain in what sense the soul is capable of motion, namely that its motions correspond to “motives”. While I think there are further reasons for taking this stance, I will not delve deeper here into this issue.<sup>97</sup> I will now turn to the second important parallel between human and divine souls, and how this appears to constitute the palinode's explanation of the *πάθη* of soul, divine and human.

From 247b-e, Socrates describes how souls collectively ascend to the high ridge of heaven in order to see and nourish themselves upon the forms. Among the forms visible to the soul are those of Justice [δικαιοσύνη], Self-Control [σωφροσύνη], Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη], and Beauty [καλόν]. Through the soul's sight of these by its charioteer, mind [νόος], it is nourished in two key respects: first, knowledge acquired through the soul's contemplation of the forms – the subject of all true knowledge – is said to be the proper nourishment of the reason [διάνοια] of any soul. Second, the sight of the forms nourishes and sustains the soul's plumage, and so allows the gods to continue to roam about the universe. Conversely, by the human soul's failure to see the forms, it sheds its wings and takes upon an earthly body. In the previous chapter, I suggested that, owing to the veridical nature of the soul's interaction with the forms and the claim that they nourish soul divine and human, it seems warranted to assume that the *πάθη* of soul is the forms.

This appears to me not without some justification. The first point is related to the meaning of the term *πάθη*: this term admits of various possible translations, and while I have so far taken it to mean “what acts upon soul” in the manner in which speech is said to, it can also mean ‘experience’ or ‘suffering’ [πάθος]. As noted already, the soul's interaction with the forms is conspicuously an experiential one: the soul sees the forms with mind [νόος], is said to “feed” upon their vision of the truth, and feel wonderful upon the sight of this (247d).<sup>98</sup> Later, we see the forms themselves, as well as their earthly images, described as radiant [φέγγος] and blissful to behold (250b). Second, there is the fact that the forms are said to be visible to mind [νόος] alone. Insofar as we are nowhere given to understand that mind is anything aside from

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<sup>97</sup> These will become more clear upon turning to the issue of where in the palinode we ought look to find information concerning soul's *πάθη* and *ἔργα*.

<sup>98</sup> For a more detailed treatment of the aesthetic qualities of the forms cf. Lebeck 1972: 272.

a part of soul, this would suggest that the forms are visible to soul, and soul alone. If the ἔργα soul as self-motion is anything to go by, we would expect, under the heading of soul's πάθη, to learn about what soul essentially – soul alone and by nature – is capable of being acted upon by or experiencing. The forms appear to serve just this purpose, insofar as they are visible only to souls, and are visible to souls in virtue of the fact that a soul's composition, which includes mind, allows them to grasp the true nature of reality. Third, the forms are visible not only to disincarnate human souls, but also embodied human souls. For these reasons, it seems possible to maintain that the forms should constitute the palinode's explanation what it is that acts upon soul, divine and human.

At this stage, however, it seems worth returning to the objection raised in the previous chapter. In the second half of the palinode, Socrates turns to the madness of love and describes the soul's experience of this in quite vivid and, once again, experiential terms. Later, he will go on to refer to this as the passion of love [τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος]. Is it not, therefore, more plausible that we should think that this constitutes the palinode's explanation of the soul's πάθη?

While this is an understandable view to take, I do not think it can be the right way to read the palinode. On my view, at least two things do not sit in its favour. The first is that, at 245c, Socrates specifies that he will explain the nature of soul, *divine* and human, by conveying a grasp of what it is that soul, both divine and human, are acted upon by. The issue with taking the soul's experience of love to be the experience we must understand, in order to understand the nature of soul divine and human, is simply that this experience is one which only a select few human souls are capable of. Likewise, nowhere is it suggested that the gods are capable of this same kind of madness.<sup>99</sup> As such it cannot exactly be called a πάθη of soul both divine and human.

The second issue concerns the structure of the speech. Its stated aim is to prove that love is a madness given by the gods 'to ensure our greatest good fortune' (245b8). In order to prove this, Socrates turns to the nature of soul, stating that we *must first* [πρῶτον] understand the truth about the nature of soul. This remark is programmatic: it establishes what Socrates will do to prove that love indeed ensures "our greatest good fortune", namely explain the nature of

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<sup>99</sup> Cf. Griswold *ibid.* 97. The gods are already perfect, and so have no need for the human benefits ascribed the madness of love.

soul, divine and human. The significance of this is that it clarifies the structure of Socrates' speech: while it ultimately seeks to prove that love is the cause of our greatest good, it will first establish the nature of soul divine and human, on the basis of which the final proof will rest. Jumping ahead, Socrates signals his speech's turn to the subject of love at 249d. What this appears to suggest, in tandem with his promise at 245c, is that prior to this point he has restricted himself to treating the nature of soul divine and human. It is within this section of the speech that we learn about the soul's capacity to experience truth; it is in the section which follows that we learn about the soul's experience of love. In terms of its position in the speech, the soul's experience of truth appears the stronger candidate for the *πάθη* of soul both divine and human.<sup>100</sup>

Furthermore, from Socrates remarks at 245c, it seems implied that the understanding of the nature of soul will play an explanatory role. We must first understand the nature of soul because, by grasping what it is that soul does and has done to it, we will better be able to accept the proof that love ensures our greatest good fortune. If we take the forms to be the essential *πάθη* of soul, then Socrates' explanation does just this: it is because the soul is by nature capable of seeing the forms *that* Socrates can go on to describe the embodied soul's sight of an earthly image of beauty, its recollection of its pre-natal experience of this, and the profound experience of a soul's wings being nourished this precipitates. In short, the soul's disposition to see the truth has an order of priority to it: because the soul can experience beauty, the soul is made capable of the experience of love described so vividly within the speech.

As a final justification in favour this position, it should be noted how it serves to explain the soul's epistemic nature. By representing the forms as visible to mind, what Plato here illustrates is the soul's epistemic capacity: the soul, as an entity, is one capable of grasping the truly Just and the truly Beautiful. In short, it serves to illustrate that soul is an entity capable of knowledge and understanding the true nature of things. By extension, it also serves as the basis for the claim that the soul is capable of deficient epistemic states. Through the failure to

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<sup>100</sup> The same argument likewise favours reading self-motion as the soul's natural *ἔργα*, given that Socrates explains that the soul is a self-mover immediately following his promise to explain the nature of soul. I am not the first to think that this argument should be relevant to this promise – Bett (*op. cit.*) also sees it as making a claim about the nature of soul, but take immortality to be the nature of soul.

see the forms, the soul goes on to depend not upon knowledge but opinions (248b) about what is just and what is beautiful. This, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is an important part of the discrimination between kinds of soul.

In sum, I take it adequately supported to draw the following two conclusions about the palinode's explanation of the nature of soul. First, what soul by nature does is move itself. Because, at the least, the human soul's self-movement corresponds to the motions of its appetitive and spirited part, it seems defensible to infer that its movements are motivational – they serve to explain how it is the soul's self-movement is the cause of human action. Second, what soul, by nature, is acted upon by are the forms. Not only are these visible to the mind of any soul, including that of an embodied soul, but they are also said to act upon soul by nourishing both its mind and its plumage. Furthermore, as the subject of all true knowledge, they play an important role in accounting for the soul's epistemic capacity.

At this stage, therefore, I take it that a change of tack is now warranted: having argued that the palinode does indeed provide us with an explanation of the human soul's ἔργα and πάθη, the relevant question now is whether this explanation is one that will be useful in the context of rhetoric. This question has two aspects to it: the first is whether a grasp of the human soul's power [δύναμιν] of self-motion and power of being acted upon by the forms will be useful for the rhetorician, and I will take up this question in the next section. Having attended to it, I will then turn to the issue of the kinds of soul and their respective powers of acting and being acted upon that a rhetorician said to require knowledge of. At this stage, I will attempt to show both that we can, on the basis of the results so far, piece together a rough picture of the nine kinds of soul and their differing powers, and that these differences will be important for the rhetorician.

### **3.3. Rhetoric and Soul's ἔργα and πάθη**

In this section, I will proceed in two stages. In the first, I will consider what I take to be the palinode's explanation of soul's ἔργα, and consider the rhetorical importance of this. In the second, I will do the same for what I take to be the palinode's explanation of soul's πάθη.

On the view I have argued for, soul's natural ἔργα – what it does by nature – is self-move. Not only is this said to be soul's essence and definition [ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον] but as we have seen from the description of soul's structure – it's ιδέα – every soul is depicted in such a way that makes it clear that self-motion constitutes an essential part of what it is to be a soul.

Furthermore, on the basis of our analysis of the tri-partite structure of the human soul, I have argued that the human soul's self-motion means – presumably among other things – its motivational capacities. The human soul, *qua* tri-partite entity, is one moved by two desires, namely a desire for pleasures – the appetitive part of soul [ἐπιθυμία], represented by the dark horse – and its desire, wish, or drive to act in accordance with its judgement of what is good – the spirited part [θυμός] of soul in tandem with the soul's mind [νόος] or reasoning part [διάνοια], represented by the white horse which naturally obeys the charioteers commands.

Of what import is this for rhetoric? In order to present my view, allow me for the moment to return to how Socrates defines this art. As noted above and considered in the first chapter, at 261a6 Socrates appears to provide a definition of rhetoric, calling it an art of moving soul with speech [ῥητορικὴ ἄν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων]. Later on, he will go on to say that it is the power of speech [λόγου δύναμις] to move soul [ψυχαγωγία] (271d). By this, Socrates refers to rhetoric's capacity both to move a soul to certain beliefs and to move the soul to act in certain ways.

There are two things about this which strongly suggest that soul's self-motion, read as motivational, is centrally important to rhetoric. The first is circumstantial. Rhetoric is here defined as a soul-moving art; alone, this would perhaps be easy to overlook, but in tandem with the claim that the soul is a self-mover – an entity to which motion is an essential property<sup>101</sup> – it seems an unlikely coincidence that Socrates should choose this way to define rhetoric.<sup>102</sup> What it rather suggests is that the motion of soul, an issue of central importance in the *palinode* and its treatment of love as a soul-moving force, is relevant in the latter half of the dialogue.<sup>103</sup> In addition, he claims that it the power [δύναμις] of speech to move soul, and this choice also seems no coincidence having only just specified (270d and 271ab) that the rhetorician will grasp the soul's natural power [δύναμιν] of being acted upon by speech. In claiming that speech natural power is to move soul, it seems once again that the motion of soul is implied to be of relevance.

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<sup>101</sup> Cf. the immortality argument.

<sup>102</sup> One of course may object that he does not use the term κίνησις to describe rhetoric, but the connections between ψυχαγωγία and motion are close enough to permit this comparison.

<sup>103</sup> This is not widely noted in discussions of ψυχαγωγία: while Yunis 2011: 183 does well to note the possible connection here, it goes unmentioned by Hackforth, Griswold, Rowe, Asmis, or Ferrari.

The second is that rhetoric is said to be an art of moving the soul to certain beliefs and to act in certain ways. The reference to moving a soul to act in certain ways in particular indicates a quite tangible connection between rhetoric's aim and the soul's self-motion. On the view I have argued for, the from the description of soul, it appears plausible that the soul's motion is, in part, figurative and refers to its desires *qua* motivations. Through these motions – desires – the soul accounts for action: it acts either because something is taken to be just or good, or because something appears pleasurable. Because rhetoric is defined as being an art of moving to act in a certain way, it seems eminently plausible, on the view I have been arguing for, that this art should require a grasp of soul's self-motion: in grasping this, the rhetorician effectively grasps the two principles which move the soul to act. By grasping this, the rhetorician will have grasped what he must do if he is to move a certain soul to act in a certain way.

The first thing he may do is appeal to the reasoning part of soul, and endeavour to make a certain course of action appear just or good. By bringing about this judgement, the soul's desire to do what appears to be good will then move it to take the course of action proposed by the rhetorician. This is perhaps not a novel suggestion: in the early portion of the dialogue's treatment of rhetoric, the topic under discussion is the power of rhetoric to convince people that certain things are just or unjust, and the disastrous consequences this can lead to (cf. 260ad).<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, it connects the power of rhetoric to move a soul to certain beliefs, as treated from 260d-262c – with its power to move a soul to act in certain ways, and this is a connection which seems eminently plausible in light of the thesis, not uncommon in Plato, that belief is not an impotent state.<sup>105</sup>

The second thing a rhetorician may do is appeal to a soul's appetitive part and represent a particular thing as leading to pleasure of some kind. In doing so, the soul's natural desire to pursue what appears pleasurable will move it to take the course of action proposed by the rhetorician, and the rhetorician will once again have succeeded in moving the soul with his speeches. This analysis appears to be at least not far from the truth: at 270b6, Socrates explains in what manner the rhetorician's knowledge of the nature of soul will prove beneficial to him. Here, he claims that the rhetorician requires knowledge of the soul on the basis of which he will be able to impart to the soul the wishes and virtues [βούλη καὶ ἀρετὴν]

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<sup>104</sup> Also cf. the treatment of rhetoric and *Gorgias* 454b.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. e.g. *Protagoras* 358cd



he desires. Here, he expressly uses the term “wish” [βούλομαι], and in doing so implies that it is in this manner – by appealing the soul’s motivational components – that a rhetorician will proceed to move a soul to act in a certain way. Furthermore, in his compelling 2005 paper, Yunis argues that the persuasion of Socrates’ proposed art of rhetoric pertains not only rational persuasion – a concerted appeal to the soul’s rational nature – but extends to ‘the creation of desire in an auditor’s soul’ (115). On his reading, the palinode evidences this particular strategy in its sensual and evocative description of love.

For these reasons, it appears quite plausible that the self-motion of soul should be of relevance to rhetoric. Because the self-motion of the human soul plausibly corresponds to its desire for pleasures and desire for what it judges to be good – its two motivational drives – and rhetoric is required to be able to move the soul to act in certain ways, knowledge of the soul’s self-motion seems eminently connected to the aims of rhetoric. On the strength of this, I submit that the palinode thereby provides an answer to one of the questions raised at the outset of this thesis.

In the first chapter, I noted that Socrates was conspicuously silent upon the topic of what soul, by nature, does, and that it was not clear whether, if at all, rhetoric has any need to grasp soul’s natural power of acting. At this stage, having outlined the explanation offered by the palinode of what soul does – the soul self-moves, and its motions correspond to its motivations – it seems clear not only that we have an explanation of what soul, by nature, does, but also a sense of the relevance this has in the context of rhetoric. The rhetorician would presumably do well to grasp the soul’s self-motion because, by doing so, he will grasp the principles that move a soul to act in a certain way, and he will be able to exploit this knowledge in service of moving a soul to take up a certain course of action. I therefore conclude that Hackforth (151) is entirely wrong to dismiss the soul’s self-motion as irrelevant in the context of rhetoric; as I have endeavoured to show, upon a careful reading of the self-motion claim, and the accompanying description provided of soul, self-motion appears to have clear relevance to the later proposed art of rhetoric, and the rhetorician would do well to grasp this essential aspect of soul’s nature.

If this is not wrong, then it, in turn, gives us an answer to a second of the questions I raised. Owing to the ambiguity of the term εἶδη and the plausibility of the thought that a rhetorician should also require knowledge of the soul’s tri-partite structure, I asked what to make of this: is knowledge of the soul’s structure relevant in the context of rhetoric? At this stage, it seems

defensible to conclude, on the strength of the analysis thus far, that it is. Because an understanding of the human soul's self-motion requires an understanding of its tri-partite structure – each part, after all, plays an integral role in the motion of soul and how it brings about action – and because an understanding of this – the soul's self-motion *qua* motivation – seems important for the rhetorician to grasp, it necessarily also follows that a rhetorician will require a grasp of the soul's tri-partite structure.

Perhaps this is not entirely a surprise. As Rowe democratically notes, the ambiguity between the two senses of the term πολυειδής is one best responded to by thinking the distinction between parts and kinds will 'in the end go closely together' (206). Nevertheless, there is certainly a trend within scholarship (cf. Hackforth 1952 & Yunis 2011) to insist that one sense of the term – many-kinded – is here relevant. While this does not preclude the suspicion that the soul's tri-partite structure is relevant in context of rhetoric, neither does it encourage the thought. Moreover, while Rowe notes that the issue of soul's parts and kinds go closely together – and on this point I certainly concur as we will see below – I know of no scholar who has advanced the position I am arguing for viz. that knowledge of the soul's parts goes closely together with knowledge of its natural power of acting, its self-motion. So, while it is perhaps not a novel suggestion that knowledge of soul's parts will be relevant to rhetoric, what is novel about my position here is that there are reasons *why* it is relevant hitherto unexplored in scholarship.

With this, I will now turn to what I take to be the explanation of soul's πάθη in the palinode. As I have argued, the soul, by nature, is acted upon and able to experience the forms. On this view, however, we appear to face a difficulty: what, if at all, is the relevance of the forms and the soul's ability to recognise images of these, to the down to earth and altogether quite serious discussion of rhetoric in the second half of the dialogue? Furthermore, it seems clear enough that we have an explanation – wholly relevant to the subject of rhetoric – of what the human soul is acted upon by: the soul is acted upon by speech. What, then, is the need to speculate about the relevance of soul's πάθη according to the palinode? I begin by tackling this particular question, before returning to the first.

On the strength of the argument thus far, it seems plausible that the palinode's claim that soul is a self-mover is not irrelevant to rhetoric. Rather, it appears the rhetorician would do well to grasp soul's natural power of moving itself. Because this – what I take to be the palinode's explanation of what soul does [ἔργα] or its power of acting [ποιεῖν] – appears relevant in the

context of rhetoric, *prima facie* it should seem interesting and far from irrelevant that the palinode promises to explain the soul's πάθη. This hypothetical notwithstanding, it seems that for several reasons, the soul's disposition to be acted upon by the forms is more relevant to the subject of rhetoric than it may at first appear to be.

For one, at 249b4-c3, Socrates claims that a soul which never saw the truth cannot take human shape for a human 'must understand speech in terms of general form, proceeding to bring together many perceptions into a reasoned unity' (Nehamas and Woodruff 1997). Here, Socrates signals a strong connection between the soul capacity to understand – be acted upon by – speech and its disposition to be acted upon by the forms. The connection between these two subjects is further strengthened by the argument Socrates will go on to make from 259e-266d: here, he argues at great length for the thesis that rhetorical persuasion requires a grasp of the truth, and not merely of what is probable. In light of the fact that in the palinode Socrates indicates that soul's have a "pathological" relation to the truth, and that he goes on to argue that what the rhetorician will grasp as the πάθη of the human soul – speech – also has a relation to truth, it seems probable to me that there should be a strong connection between these two commitments.

Furthermore, among the subjects which a rhetorician is expected grasp the truth of are those in which our opinions are frequently at odds with one another, for instance in questions pertaining to what is just [δικαίου] or good [ἀγαθοῦ] (263a7). As Socrates has only previously attempted to demonstrate, it is knowledge of what is truly Just that is of central significance to the rhetorical art: at 260a he begun by outlining why knowledge of what is truly good is an important requirement for rhetoric, and – only slightly later (261c) – the discussion turns to the capacity of rhetoric to make a chosen thing appear either just or unjust.<sup>106</sup> As a parallel to this, it seems no coincidence that among the forms a soul saw in the garden of truth was that of Justice [δικαιοσύνη].

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<sup>106</sup> In this assessment, I follow Hackforth *op. cit.*: 129. While the discussion principally concerns arguing for opposite cases and resemblances and differences, it seems implicit that Socrates here has the question of what is just and unjust in mind. Also cf. *Gorgias* 454b4-5, at which point Gorgias admits that rhetoric seeks to instil persuasion about what is just and unjust [δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα].

On slightly different note, the palinode contends that the proper nourishment the mind of any soul is truth and knowledge acquired by their vision of Justice, Self-Control, Knowledge, and Beauty, and that embodied souls go on to depend upon what they take to be nourishment: their own opinions about these matters. This seems hardly an irrelevant claim in the context rhetoric. Rather, it appears to provide something akin to end or purpose – a *τέλος* – for the rhetorical art: if the soul is indeed nourished by knowledge of what is truly Just, then the art of rhetoric, as an art of moving a soul to certain beliefs about what is just or unjust by means of speaking, should aim to move a soul closer to knowledge about what is just or unjust rather than deceive a soul about such matters. This assessment is not without some support of its own: at 273e, Socrates claims that the effort required to acquire the art of rhetoric will be a laborious one, which a man make only in order to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods – in short, he will speak the truth, for it is truth that has been said to nourish the gods.

Finally, within the palinode, the central focus in the subject of love. The love Socrates is here concerned with is that which a soul exhibits when it sees an image of beauty and is reminded of true Beauty, which it saw prior to embodiment. Upon the sight of this, the soul is stirred into a frenzy and driven to pursue the Beauty of the beloved wherever he may be. In this manner, the love described is a truly a soul-moving force, and one which is intimately connected to the soul's capacity to experience true Beauty. Because rhetoric is also a soul-moving force, and has a relation of its own to the truth, *prima facie* it seems defensible to suspect that there should be a degree of unity between the palinode's description of a soul stricken by love, and the soul-moving power Socrates goes on to ascribe to rhetoric and speech, insofar as both concern the human soul's relationship with truth.<sup>107</sup>

From these points of contact I surmise that a grasp of the soul's propensity to be acted upon by the forms is far from divorced from the subject of rhetoric. A rhetorician, presumably, will do well to know that the soul is acted upon by the truth concerning what is Just, Beautiful and Self-controlled, because this capacity parallels to the soul's ability to be acted upon and moved by speeches about what is Just, Beautiful, or Self-controlled.

However, at this stage I must make a concession: while these points of contact indicate a connection between the soul's capacity to be acted upon by the forms and by speech, in the

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<sup>107</sup> Cf. Lebeck *op. cit.*: 268; “These two forces, Eros and Logos, are complements of one another: both lead the soul to ultimate harm or good”.

present thesis I cannot explore this connection in greater detail than I have done here. In my view, such a treatment calls for an extensive investigation into the relation between the palinode's treatment of the forms – *qua* what a soul must have seen in order to understand speech by bringing together [συνιέναι] many perceptions into a single form [εἶδος] by means of reason, Socrates' striking claim that the art of rhetoric requires a grasp of the truth in order to persuade a soul to hold a certain view, and the later claim that rhetoric requires proficiency in the dialectical processes of collection [συναγωγή] and division [διαίρεσις]. To summarise briefly, it appears there should be a connection owing to the role dialectic plays in rhetoric – it allows the rhetor to grasp the truth – the process of collection [συναγωγή] and the claim that speech requires the bringing together [συνιέναι] many perceptions, and the relationship this has to the forms.<sup>108</sup> Because of the magnitude of this undertaking, I cannot here explore it greater detail than I have done already.

I will return to this omission in the final section of this chapter. For now, I should like to briefly summarise the upshots of what I have done in this section. So far, I have treated what I take to be the palinode's explanation of soul's powers – its natural power of moving itself and being acted upon by the forms – and considered what significance this has in terms of rhetoric. While I am unable to completely defend the assessment that the soul's disposition to be acted upon by the forms is relevant to rhetoric, I believe I have provided sufficient justification for thinking that it should be: the forms act upon soul by nourishing it and providing it with knowledge about what is truly Just, and speeches can do likewise. Moreover, there appears to be a connection signalled between these two subjects, insofar as rhetoric requires a grasp about what is truly Just. Concerning self-motion, however, it seems more clear on my analysis why this should be important to rhetoric: by grasping the soul's self-motion, what a rhetorician will grasp is the soul's motivational nature – that it pursues pleasure and what is taken to be good or just. By grasping this, the rhetorician will have an understanding of what of he must do if he is to move a soul to act in a certain way, namely convince the soul that something is good, or represent it as leading to pleasure. On the strength of this view, it follows that a rhetorician will also require knowledge of soul's parts, for its motions – *qua* motivations – are intimately related to its tri-partite composition.

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<sup>108</sup> Connections between these areas are noted by Yunis 2011: 146, but also left underexplored.

### 3.4. The nine kinds of soul, their ἔργα and πάθη, and Rhetoric

While we have answers to two of the questions raised in the first chapter, there is of course a final and important question to consider. As I reiterated at the beginning of this chapter, rhetoric is conceived as an art which requires knowledge of the various kinds of soul, and their respective powers of acting and being acted upon. On the basis of this, a rhetorician will be required to match kinds of speeches to kinds of soul based upon what the particular kind of soul will find persuasive.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the palinode indeed provides us with a list of nine kinds of embodied human soul, on which the souls differ in terms of their proximity to truth: the first kind of soul, having seen the most, possesses the best memory of its vision of the forms, is consequently the most prone to recollect its former knowledge, and so is most disposed to lead a life of self-control and justice. The second soul, being the second most prone, leads a life second in the justice to the first, and so on. Concerning the latter kinds of soul – soul's of the sophist, demagogue, and tyrant – these kinds are at the second furthest and furthest remove from truth respectively. As such, they are the least disposed to recollect their former visions, most dependent upon their own opinions of what is just or self-controlled, and so disposed to act without self-control – they pursue pleasure without shame or reservation – and unjustly – they are said to be burdened by vice.

As I argued in the previous chapter, the differences between these souls can be seen as corresponding to differences at the level of their ἔργα and πάθη. Taking the philosophical kind of soul as our paradigm, souls higher on the list are presumably unique in terms of their self-motion. As argued, the soul of the philosopher is moved only in part by its desire for pleasures – the bad horse, the appetitive part of the soul [ἐπιθυμία], moves to solicit sex from its beloved. However, this is far from the dominant drive in this soul: in virtue of its proximity to the truth by memory, the soul is capable of recognising and recollecting what is truly Beautiful, Just and Self-controlled. Through doing so, the soul's reason [διάνοια] can – in virtue of its natural alliance with the spirited part [θυμός] of soul – move the soul to pursue the beloved in a manner which exhibits self-control and leads to virtue, rather than the depravity and excess desired by the appetitive part of soul. For this reason, this soul can be seen as being unique both in terms of what it does – what ends it desires and moves to pursue – and in terms of what it is acted upon by – the forms, *qua* the true nature of Justice, Beauty, and Self-control.

A similar assessment appears to hold true for the latter kinds of soul. These kinds, souls that have become defiled (250e), which only got a brief glimpse at reality and forgot the truth they once beheld (250a), are conspicuously less prone to be acted upon by Beauty and, implicitly, Self-control: while still capable of seeing an image of Beauty, they are incapable of recognising it as an image of Beauty itself and recalling their pre-natal experience. As such, they do not experience the transformative wonder experienced by the first kind of soul whose memory is still strong, and instead are said to “surrender to pleasure”, and pursue sex with no trace of fear or shame. This suggests both that these kinds of soul are unique in terms of what they are acted upon by – they conspicuously fail to be acted upon by the true nature of either Self-control or Beauty – and what they do – their self-motion appears largely to be governed by their appetitive part or their mistaken opinions about what is good.<sup>109</sup>

While, on this view, it appears plausible that the kinds of soul can be distinguished at the level of their powers, the question is whether a grasp of the kinds of soul listed, and their respective powers, is relevant for rhetoric, *qua* the art of moving the soul to certain beliefs and to act in certain ways. Does it, for instance, give us a sense of how the rhetorician will match kinds of speech to kinds of soul based upon what the kinds of soul will find persuasive? In what follows, I will speculate about how it plausibly does. In order to do this in a concise fashion, I will limit myself to a treatment of the first kind of soul and what speeches will move it, and repeat this for last kind of soul.

As we noted, what is most obviously unique about the first kind of soul is that, according to the palinode, it has seen the most of the forms and as such is most disposed to be acted upon and moved by its sight of truth. It appears that this has a quite clear relevance to rhetoric. As noted above, the rhetorician is expected to know the truth of any matter he will discuss, and one of – if not the most – important matters a rhetorician will compose speeches on are those which pertain to what is just and unjust. Because what most obviously identifies the first kind of soul is its proximity to the truth about what is Just – among other things – it seems intuitive to think that, upon confronting a soul of the first kind, the rhetorician will stand the best chance of moving that soul if he appeals to its reasoning part and speaks truthfully and honestly about what is just or unjust. Because this soul is most disposed to recognise truth when presented with it, this presentation will presumably convince it to adopt the course of

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<sup>109</sup> As suggested previously, they presumably believe pleasures to be the good, in line with the suggestion of *Republic IX* and *Protagoras*.

action proposed by the rhetorician. In virtue of this soul's epistemologically privileged status, it will presumably not – or at least not easily – be swayed to pursue unjust ends, and so the rhetorician will either avoid attempting to mislead this soul, or will need work with great alacrity to convince to pursue such ends.

Alternatively, to take a view slightly more grounded in the palinode's treatment, the rhetorician may opt to formulate his speeches in a manner which is truly beautiful. Because this soul is said to be a lover of beauty, this will presumably elicit a congenial and soul moving response. This is not only suggested by the palinode's treatment of the first kind of soul's ecstatic response to the sight an image of beauty, but also by the palinode as a whole. As is widely recognised throughout scholarship, the palinode is one of Plato's most intricate, poetically composed, and stirring pieces of work.<sup>110</sup> Within this speech, Socrates' explicit purpose is to recant his first speech and prove that love is the source of our greatest good (245bc). Implicitly, however, it is impassioned defence of the superiority of the life of philosophy and an attempt to prompt Phaedrus to devote himself to such a life.<sup>111</sup> If such a view is not grossly mistaken, then it seems that the palinode's poetic formulation testifies in favour of the thesis that a rhetor will, upon finding a soul naturally disposed to true beauty, supply that soul with speeches of an appropriate degree of beauty. By doing so, the rhetorician will presumably manage to evoke and arouse a desire in this particular soul, and so once again maximise his chances of moving the soul in the manner he desires.

What of the appetitive part of this kind of soul? Will the rhetorician make much headway if he attempts to convince this particular kind of soul that a certain thing will lead to pleasure? It is somewhat difficult to answer this: in the palinode, it certainly seems clear that even in the first kind of soul, its appetitive part and desire for pleasure is still a motivating force, capable of prompting the soul to act in a certain way. In this regard, it seems that a rhetor could, hypothetically, apply speeches to this part. However, it is also testified in the palinode that the appetitive part of this soul is by no means the dominant drive: while it moves the soul toward the beloved, the soul's spirited and reasoning parts resist the impulses of desire and are said to

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<sup>110</sup> Cf. Hackforth *op cit*: 72; Rowe *op cit*: 7-8; Lebeck *op. cit*: 267-8, Cooper: 1997: 507; Yunis 2011: 128.

<sup>111</sup> Yunis 2011: 126-130.



be capable of enslaving the appetitive part (256b).<sup>112</sup> For this reason, it seems unlikely to me that the rhetorician will have great success if he attempts to move this soul by representing a course of action as leading to pleasure.

In sum, therefore, on my view the rhetorician stands to benefit from his knowledge of the first kind of soul and its particular propensity to be acted and moved upon by truth and unmoved by pleasure: on the basis of this understanding, he will know that, if he is to move the soul to act in a certain way, what he must do is appeal to the dominant part of this soul – its rational side and drive to act in accordance with what it judges to be best – and attempt either to convince it that a certain, unjust, course of action is just, or administer truthful discourses to it, presenting what is truly just as what is just, and in a suitably Beautiful manner.

What of the last kind of soul? As I have argued, the last kind of soul's most obvious trait is its remove from the true nature of reality and ignorance of what is truly Just or Self-controlled. Once again, this appears to have clear relevance when we come to rhetoric. While the rhetorician must know the truth about these subjects, he is not expected to always speak the truth but is required to say what will be expedient in service of persuading a particular soul on a particular issue.<sup>113</sup> This, of course, adverts to the morally dubious nature of Plato's proposed art of rhetoric: while it is frequently touted as a 'philosophical rhetoric'<sup>114</sup> it is of course a key feature of it that it is not only able to lead a soul to truth but also deceive and mislead one (cf. 261e-262c). Nevertheless, as we have seen, there is support for the view that rhetoric should be used for the good of a soul: truth and Justice are said in to nourish a soul, and Socrates claims that the rhetorician will speak to please the gods (273e).

Here, with the kind of soul not disposed to being moved by truthful speeches, I suggest we have an example of what kind of soul will prompt the rhetorician to speak deceptively. Assuming, for the moment, that the aim of rhetoric is to lead a soul to act well and justly, this is of course made a difficult goal to achieve given that not all souls are naturally disposed to

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<sup>112</sup> The tension between these two parts presumably reflects the possibility of *akrasia* in *Republic* 4.435c-441b. Cf. Morris 2006: *Akrasia in the "Protagoras" and the "Republic" for treatment.*

<sup>113</sup> Yunis 2005: 104.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Asmis 1986: 154.

be convinced by truthful speeches about what is just or good.<sup>115</sup> For this reason, it seems plausible to me that the rhetor, when confronted by a soul not disposed to be moved by a truthful speech, will be forced to use his skill in deception and make what is truly just and good appear just and good to that particular soul. On this view, the rhetor's knowledge of the natural kinds of soul can be plausibly be connected to the discussion about rhetoric's power of deception from 261e-262c. In recognising that not every kind of soul is moved by truthful speeches, the rhetor will presumably also grasp of what kinds of speech will be persuasive to particular kinds of soul: those more attuned to what is just will be persuaded by truthful speech, while those less attuned will be persuaded by deceptive speech.<sup>116</sup> On this view, the rhetor will need supply the latter kinds of soul with speeches that are comparable in form to the Noble Lie of *Republic* 3.414e-15c, or the preambles of *Laws*. However, this is of course speculative and entirely contingent upon an unexplored relation between the soul's disposition to be affected by speech and truth. As such I cannot put too much weight upon this point.

A second feature noted about the last kind of soul was that it appears to differ in terms of its self-motion *qua* motivations. In this kind of soul, the dominant drive appears to be its desire for pleasures (cf. 250e-51a). This too is plausibly relevant in the context of rhetoric. As I have argued above, the soul's desire for pleasures may be appealed to by a rhetorician insofar as they are capable of representing a certain course of action as leading to pleasure. While this particular strategy may not prove greatly effective with souls of the first kind, when confronted by souls whose dominant drive is their desire for pleasure, it seems this strategy will be a great deal more likely to succeed. By doing this, the rhetorician will maximise his odds of moving this particular kind of soul to act in a certain manner.

With this, I take there to be sufficient evidence to return to the third and final question we raised in the first chapter of this investigation. There, I asked what kinds of soul Plato has in mind. While it was taken to be clear that these kinds differ in terms of their power of acting, and the kinds of speeches they will be persuaded – acted upon – by, it was unclear what kinds of speeches Plato there had in mind, and much less what kinds of soul. At this stage, I have

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<sup>115</sup> Griswold *op. cit.*: 103 and 168-173.

<sup>116</sup> I recognise that here I am using “deceptive speeches” in a somewhat free manner to refer to how a rhetor will garb truthful ideas in more palpable forms. However, this appears not uncalled for by the discussion following 261e.

endeavoured to show that the palinode appears to provide at least something like an answer to these questions.

First, it claims that there are nine kinds of embodied soul. Having subjected these to an investigation, it was found that each can plausibly be seen as possessing their own respective powers of acting – they differ in terms of the motions they exhibit *qua* the actions of their parts – and being acted upon – not all are equally disposed to being acted upon by truth. Second, in the present section, I have speculated about how this reading provides us with a sense of what speeches the kinds of soul are disposed to be persuaded or moved by: souls in closer proximity to truth will be persuaded or moved by truthful and truly beautiful speeches when the subject concerns matters of justice; conversely, souls further removed from truth will not be persuaded by truthful speeches, and to these souls the rhetorician must either apply speeches which depict what is truly just in more compelling terms, or must appeal to their natural proclivity for pleasure. By doing this, the rhetorician will be able to practice the art of systematically or scientifically moving a soul to act in certain ways, by administering specific kinds of speeches to specific kinds of soul.

### **3.5. Final Thoughts and Concluding Remarks**

At this stage, I should like to begin by making a concession about and defence of my position. I concede that what I have done in the previous section is perhaps quite speculative – it relies, to some degree, upon commitments about the rhetorician’s grasp of truth, and a notion of “kinds of speeches” that perhaps plays fast and loose with an intuitive sense of what constitutes a kind of speech – I have not, for instance, referred to the various “kinds of speeches” described between 266d-268a. However, while I make these concession about I have omitted to do, I would like to stress the upshot of what I *have* done. In the present and preceding sections, I have attempted to connect a number of threads between claims made throughout the palinode, and further connect these to the demand that rhetoric requires a grasp of soul’s nature. On the view I have sketched, rhetoric requires a grasp of soul’s natural power of acting – its self-motion – for on the basis of this one is able to begin to assign each of the nine kinds of embodied soul their own natural power of acting. In addition, by taking the forms to be the  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$  of soul, we are able to assign each of the kinds their own natural power of being acted upon. Not only does this make clear how the kinds naturally differ, but it

strongly suggests that knowledge of soul's structure is integral to this understanding.<sup>117</sup> On the strength of this, it seems we can, with the claims made in the palinode, begin to see what kinds of soul Plato may have in mind when he insists that rhetoric requires a grasp of soul's kinds, why knowledge of their respective powers of acting – their specific motivations – is relevant, and why knowledge of the tri-partite structure of soul is important. With this, I submit that the palinode provides at the very least something like an answer to each of our three questions. While there may be obscurities and ambiguities with those answers, I take this to be a promising sign for subsequent investigations. In what follows, I will sketch out the areas in which I think there is there is room for further consideration.

The first point worth adverting to concerns the different kinds of souls' propensities to be acted upon by truth, and the stipulation that the rhetorician requires a grasp of the truth. While I have not, in this thesis, explored this topic in great detail, I believe that there are points of contact between the palinode's treatment of the forms and the later discussion of truth that make an exploration into this subject – the relation between these two areas – not only warranted but one that promises to be fruitful. In brief, it seems likely there should be room to compare the two areas on the basis that (a) the forms are the subject of truth, which is related to rhetoric; (b) the forms are said to be that which a soul must have seen if it is to understand speech; (c) included within the forms is that of Justice, a subject the rhetorician is intended to know the truth about; and (d) that dialectic – the method with which the rhetorician will acquire his knowledge of truth – involves collecting [συναγωγή] things scattered about everywhere, which appears not unrelated to the claim that speech consists in bringing together [συνιέναι] many perceptions.

This connects somewhat to the second point: the soul is said to be a self-mover, and capable of moving itself to the point at which a contemplation of the truth is possible. In this thesis, I have treated the soul's self-motion as a motivational claim: soul's motions correspond to its motives. However, there are numerous suggestions in the dialogue that this is not the only sense in which soul is capable of moving – not only is it depicted as moving to see the truth, but Socrates later clearly considers rhetoric able to move the soul to hold certain beliefs, able to lead a soul from one belief to another in virtue of similarities (262b), and speaks of people “wandering in different directions” when they differ in their beliefs (263b). There is,

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<sup>117</sup> In this respect I therefore concur with Rowe's assumption that knowledge of the soul's parts and kinds will the end go hand in hand (*op cit*: 206)

therefore, a cognitive side to the soul's motion, which I do not think I have done full justice to, and which could be explored in greater detail. On this subject, it is also worth noting that there further avenues in which to explore soul's motion in relation to other dialogues: in *Timaeus* (37bc) the soul's best state is described as the perfect rotation of its circles of same and different, while in the palinode the soul's contemplation of the forms also uses the image of a revolution. It may be profitable to consider whether this – the soul's regular motion and vision of truth – should be important in the context of rhetoric.

The next point concerns the kinds of soul there are. On the view I have argued for, the nine kinds of soul are those which a rhetorician must grasp the natures of. It seems worth noting that, on this list, we find kinds of soul treated at greater length in other Platonic dialogues, for instance *Statesman* and *Sophist*. It may, perhaps, be interesting to consider the treatment of these kinds in light of the thesis that knowledge of their natures is relevant for rhetoric.

Another key area to explore concerns what kinds of soul Plato has in mind: as noted in the previous chapter, Socrates provides us with a second set of divisions between kinds of soul based upon what god one followed prior to embodiment. While I have sketched reasons for refraining from considering these kinds of soul and their differences, I am not unsympathetic to the suggestion that this second list of souls – the eleven character types – constitutes an alternative way in which the rhetorician will divide soul into kinds. On this view, I imagine we would get a somewhat different, but nevertheless interesting, picture of the kinds of soul a rhetorician need grasp in order to speak with art. With this, in turn, it seems there is room to explore less rigid interpretation of what constitutes the respective *πάθη* of souls – souls which followed Zeus are said to be more mild and congenial than those which followed Ares, and this perhaps points to a different reading of what constitutes soul's *πάθη*. In all these areas, I take there to be possible and interesting ground which future scholarship may do well to cover.

This brings the current chapter to a close. To briefly summarise, it seems eminently possible to use the treatment of soul within the palinode to shed light upon the account of soul required by rhetoric. First, within the palinode, it is claimed that soul moves itself. As I have suggested, the motions soul is capable of are desires – motions *qua* motivations. Read in this way, the soul's self-motion has clear relevance in the context of rhetoric: by grasping soul's motivations for acting, the rhetorician will grasp what he must do if he is to move a soul to act in a certain manner. Second, within the palinode, we see the soul's tri-partite composition

described in such a way that suggests that knowledge of it is important to a grasp of the soul's self-motion. Because the self-motion of soul seems important to rhetoric, so too therefore is knowledge of soul's structure.

The same conclusions appear further reinforced when we consider the kinds of human soul listed in the palinode. On the view presented within this chapter, to account for the differences between these kinds requires a grasp both of soul's tri-partite composition and its self-motion. On the basis of this, we can supply something approaching an account of kinds of soul each of which possesses a certain power of acting – that is, a unique kind of self-motion – and one which appears to be of some relevance to the later formulated art of rhetoric. Furthermore, it also seems likely that the palinode provides us with a sense of what soul is acted upon by – the forms – which promises to also prove relevant in the discussion of rhetoric.

It is my hope that this makes something of a contribution to the often cited problem of the lack of unity in the *Phaedrus* – on the view argued for here, the palinode contains various commitments about soul that are plausibly relevant to the discussion of the second half of the dialogue. Of course, this somewhat depends upon our concession that the palinode is valid textual source, and it is to this issue I will now turn.

## 4. The Validity of the Content of the Palinode

Thus far, I have been analysing the extent to which the palinode's commitments about the soul are relevant to the later formulated art of rhetoric, and, in doing so, have been treating the speech as though it is a valid source which represents Plato's philosophical commitments. In spite of the relevance I take it to have, however, there is still an issue that remains unaddressed, namely what validity we have for using the palinode in this manner. In this final chapter, I will address this issue by outlining several objections to my usage of the speech and considering the weight of each. My principal source in this respect are claims made across the dialogue that appear to call into question the status of the palinode's content.

As a concise summary, there are three issues I will address.

- i. That the palinode, as a rhetorical composition, is either misleading or does not convey genuine commitments regarding the soul;
- ii. That its mythical contents require interpretation, and Socrates apparently censures such practices; and
- iii. That the only serious matter in it was its treatment of love, insofar as this exemplified the rhetorical application of the two dialectical procedures.

It is possible to argue that each of these call into question whether the palinode is an adequate philosophical resource. In the following three sections, I will outline each of these objections and show why each is far from damning for my thesis.

### 4.1 The Rhetorical Nature of the Palinode

In order for us to see the palinode as representative of Plato's views about the nature of soul and rhetoric, it is necessary to take its commitments about the soul to be *sincere* philosophical commitments. By this, I mean that we must have reason to believe they convey at least something like what Plato took to be the truth about the soul's nature. For this thesis to be at all plausible, it seems important that we take Socrates as intending them in this same sense – as commitments made in service of an end such as educating Phaedrus. So far, I have assumed something like this to be the case. However, such an assumption is not obviously warranted, especially in light of comments made in the second half of the dialogue. In this section, I consider how these comments challenge the foregoing assumption, and assess their significance.

After delivering his speech, Socrates steers the discussion toward a consideration of the rhetorical art, its goal, and the conditions that must be met in order to fulfil that goal. It begins by loosely defining rhetoric as an art of soul-moving through speech [ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων]. As already noted, this definition picks out rhetoric's capacity to persuade – move – a listener's soul to believe something or act in a certain way. To emphasise this point, Socrates considers the practice of disputation or speaking on opposite sides (ἀντιλέγουσιν), contending that this amounts to the ability 'to make the same thing appear to the same people just and sometimes, when [the rhetor] prefers, unjust' (261c8-d1).<sup>118</sup> This practice – being able to equally well make something appear desirable and undesirable – is the benchmark of what rhetoric must be able to do if it is, as Socrates says it is, capable of leading the soul to believe anything.

Having established the capacity for ἀντιλέγουσιν as one essential to rhetoric, Socrates next turns to what one requires in order to do this. On his view, if one is to be capable of arguing for both sides, one requires the capacity to deceive ones audience.<sup>119</sup> Following this, he goes on to argue that only if one knows the truth about the subject at hand will one possess this capacity. His justification for this, briefly, is that deception – as being able to make some X appear either just or unjust – requires knowledge of that X, framed in terms of what it truly is. In order to make some X appear as something it is not – X' – Socrates contends one must know both what it truly is, and what it differs very little from. In order to deceive somebody, a rhetorician will proceed in small steps, making the X in question appear first as something similar to it, then as something similar to that, and so on until it appears to be the opposite of what it is – X'.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> This capacity is most obviously of use in lawcourts, but Socrates here takes it to be applicable in much wider contexts than simply this, as his reference to Zeno (261d) makes clear; Rowe 1986: 196. Also cf. Kerferd 1981: 62ff. for more extensive treatment of this issue.

<sup>119</sup> Because ἀντιλέγουσιν is set up as the ability to make some claim appear true at one time and false at another, it necessarily involves a degree of deception.

<sup>120</sup> Knowledge of what some X truly is intimately bound up with what it is similar to owing to the fact that Socrates will go on to argue that a rhetorician will acquire his knowledge of the truth through the method of collection and division. See below in 4.3.



While this is a condensed summary of the argument, the important point here is what follows it. At 262c4, Socrates proposes a consideration of the speeches delivered in the first half of the dialogue in order to identify within them examples of “the artful and the artless”. Within two of the speeches, Socrates claims that, by chance, there was an example of “the way in which someone who knows the truth can toy with his audience and mislead them” (262d).<sup>121</sup> We are thusly presented with an important admission: having identified his speeches as examples of rhetoric’s capacity for to argue with equal plausibility for what is true or false, Socrates appears to call into question my assumption that the palinode’s aim was educative. In combination with his later, at best lukewarm, assessments of the palinode – namely that it was not implausible and was a playful composition (265b1-d1) – it seems defensible to ask whether the primary goal of this speech is not simply to toy with Phaedrus by leading him to believe the opposite of what he previously believed.

At this stage, it may be objected that this does not rule out the possibility that Socrates presents the truth about love within the palinode; just because it lead Phaedrus to take an opposite view of the matter, this does not imply that the conclusion it argued for was false. On a conventional view,<sup>122</sup> the matter is quite clear: Socrates’ first speech serves as an example of rhetoric’s ability to deceive as it encourages Phaedrus to hold false beliefs about love, while the palinode serves as an example of rhetoric’s more praiseworthy ability to lead its audience from ignorance to truth. However, even if such a view were held, it seems that at best it primarily supports the thesis that the conclusion of the palinode – that love is something good – is true. This does not, importantly, imply that the premises – the claims Socrates makes to secure Phaedrus’ conviction about his conclusion – should also be true. For if Yunis is correct, as I think he is, when he claims that Plato’s artful rhetorician will say only what is

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<sup>121</sup> While Socrates never explicitly states which two speeches he is referring to, it seems most likely that he means his own compositions. This is because Lysias’ composition is subsequently and consistently taken as an example of artless rhetoric and because Socrates attributes the deception of the speeches to the local gods who inspired his speeches. Thus, Hackforth and de Vries *op. cit.* cannot be right in thinking that Socrates here refers to his two speeches as one; cf. Rowe *ibid.*: 197 for discussion.

<sup>122</sup> A view quite unanimously shared among scholars who comment upon the issue cf. Rowe *ibid.*; Yunis 2011: 190; for a particularly compelling case see Asmis 1986.

“rhetorically expedient” in service of persuading,<sup>123</sup> then it seems worth questioning whether we are entitled to the assumption that Socrates’ commitments regarding the soul are sincere.

In sum, there is therefore a potential issue to address surrounding the palinode’s rhetorical character: being a work of artful rhetoric, a point it seems worth conceding given Socrates’ statements at 262d,<sup>124</sup> and this having been set up as being the ability to lead a soul from one belief to its opposite, the sincerity of the palinode’s commitments are by no means guaranteed. The later remarks, both about rhetoric and the palinode, instead invite us to examine what justification we have for thinking that its commitments about the soul are sincere and not merely ones made in service of the conclusion Socrates intends to persuade Phaedrus of.

To begin, I will consider some points about the conclusion the speech argues for. The stated goal of the speech is to prove that love is a god given madness which ensures our greatest good fortune (245bc). In respect of the issue raised above, the potential worry to be assuaged is that this is not a sincerely held view – at worst it is something Socrates does not believe, and – in leading Phaedrus to accept it – is simply exercising his rhetorical ability to deceive his listener. While this is in theory possible, there are some points that do not clearly sit in its favour.

Prior to this speech, there have been two previous speeches on love – Lysias’ and Socrates’ – both of which reach the conclusion that it is something to be censured. If we take the palinode’s conclusion to be false, then by inference we must see the first two speeches as arguing for a true one; consequently, the dialogue reads as Socrates’ attempt to lead Phaedrus from a true opinion to a false one. Conversely, were we to take the first two speeches as sharing a false conclusion, the dialogue would then read as Socrates’ attempt to lead Phaedrus from a false opinion – that love is a shameful thing – to a true one – that it is one of the greatest things. In light of the general bent of a Platonic dialogue – viz. that Socrates doggedly pursues the truth – the first reading seems straightforwardly mistaken.

Furthermore, as Ms. Asmis takes pains to show, one of the more cohesive elements of the dialogue is that it charts four stages of *ψυχαιγωγία*, each of which is distinct from the previous one. The first is Lysianic, false rhetoric; the second is Socrates’ artful, yet still deceptive

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<sup>123</sup> Yunis 2005: 104.

<sup>124</sup> Also cf. 263d4

rhetoric; the third is the palinode, which reveals something of the truth, albeit still vaguely; and the fourth is the dialectical examination where the truth is finally reached.<sup>125</sup> Not only is this a compelling thesis about the unity of the *Phaedrus*, but it is also one supported by Socrates' comments at 273d2-274a4, where he expresses his conviction that an artful rhetor will speak to gratify the gods – will speak to educate rather than deceive. Given this conviction, the aforementioned reading of the dialogue, and the general outline of Plato's dialogues, it therefore seems hard to entertain the notion that the palinode's conclusion is meant to be misleading. It seems more likely to me that what Socrates has in mind at 262d is only the first of his two speeches: while this demonstrated rhetoric's powers of deception, this deception is soon righted by the palinode and the subsequent dialogue.

While this arguably establishes nothing concrete regarding the speech's commitments about the soul, it in fact gives room for optimism. This is due to how the speech argues for its conclusion that love is something beneficial. The benefit conveyed by love is cast in terms of a benefit to soul – it is shown to be good insofar as it allows a soul to nourish itself upon true beauty, and stimulates the re-growth of its lost plumage. While in the best case it can lead to the shared pursuit of wisdom, a life of bliss, understanding, modesty, and self-control (256a5-b5), even in the worse case, the wings of the souls of lovers will be bursting to sprout, and so the benefit is said to be no less considerable (256d4). The significance of these wings, in turn, is that they allow a soul to return to the condition for which sight of the true beings is possible – in other words, they allow it to acquire and nourish itself upon true knowledge, which is taken to be of critical importance to both divine and human souls (247d1-3).

Given that Socrates' intention here is to persuade Phaedrus of the conclusion that love is good, he requires Phaedrus to accept that love leads to things which are themselves good. Were Phaedrus not to accept these as goods, the speech would be a complete failure. Having argued that it seems more coherent to see the palinode's conclusion as being sincere, I can now turn to the commitments about soul this conclusion is premised upon. On my view, it seems difficult to believe – for several reasons – that these commitments are made merely in service of persuading Phaedrus to hold a certain view of love. For one, if this were Socrates' only aim, it would be surprising, to say the least, to see him making the case that he does – why, one would defensibly ask, would Socrates not rather appeal to some other positive, and certainly less contentious, benefits of love? In light of the merit the palinode's conclusion

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<sup>125</sup> Asmis *ibid*: 157ff.

places upon the pursuit of truth, knowledge, and a life of virtue above pleasure, it seems more plausible that Socrates' goal goes above and beyond merely persuading Phaedrus.<sup>126</sup> This, in turn, would fit with Socrates' later assessment that the speech contained a measure of truth, his stipulation, prior to the immortality argument, that his proof of love's benefit will convince the wise but not the clever, and the later expressed conviction that the artful rhetor will not merely gratify his fellow men.

Second, in spite of being a rhetorical composition, the commitments about soul made in the palinode are remarkably similar to ones made within other dialogues. Briefly, these are (a) that soul's definition is self-motion;<sup>127</sup> (b) that soul has a tri-partite structure;<sup>128</sup> (c) that soul is immortal;<sup>129</sup> (d) that soul has various kinds;<sup>130</sup> (e) that knowledge is better than opinion<sup>131</sup>; (f) that human souls can come by knowledge by recollection<sup>132</sup>; and (g) that love is a good inasmuch as it leads a soul to knowledge.<sup>133</sup> With such parallels, it seems an unlikely objection that the speech's commitments about the soul are of dubitable sincerity.

This settles the issue raised by the first objection. On my view, while it is important to consider the possibility that the palinode, as a work of rhetoric, is not intended to be philosophically sincere, upon reflection it appears that this is unlikely. In light of the inconsistency created by doubting the sincerity of its conclusion, and the relation between that conclusion and the theses about soul, ones also found in other dialogues, it seems defensible, on balance, to take the palinode as being a speech whose goal is to educate Phaedrus by providing him with a conception of how love can be of true benefit.

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<sup>126</sup> Cf. Yunis 2011: 128 for treatment of the extent to which the values heralded by the palinode depart from the conventional values of a young Athenian.

<sup>127</sup> *Laws* 10.896a

<sup>128</sup> *Republic IV* and *IX*.

<sup>129</sup> *Phaedo* 64c1ff., *Republic* 10.610b1ff.

<sup>130</sup> *Republic IV-IX*.

<sup>131</sup> An axiom in Plato but see *Meno* and *Theaetetus* for particular treatment.

<sup>132</sup> *Meno* and *Phaedo*.

<sup>133</sup> *Symposium* 201d1-212c.

## 4.2 The Mythical Contents of the Palinode

The second issue facing my interpretation of the palinode concerns its status as a myth. While there are a number of issues this undoubtedly raises, in this section I will treat only one, namely the validity of an allegorical reading, such as my own, of the speech's mythical contents.

Socrates twice designates the palinode a myth [ $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ]: first at 253c7 and again 265c1. While not being totally comprised of mythic elements – the argument at the beginning, for one, appears decidedly non-mythical – this is unsurprising: it contains a number of elements that are mythical, insofar as they do not invite a literal but rather allegorical reading.<sup>134</sup> This is most true of the description of what the soul is like and the journeys it is said to make. Owing to these mythic elements, the following question seems worth posing: what justification does the dialogue provide for interpreting these mythic elements of the palinode? For while I have, for the sake of my thesis, been treating these features of the speech as requiring and inviting interpretation, it is nevertheless unclear that such a reading is invited by *all* of Socrates' comments concerning myth. In the following, I will sketch out how one statement of his is apparently problematic for my thesis.

We first encounter myth in the dialogue in the shape of the myth of Boreas and his abduction of Oreithuia (229c-230a). Upon Phaedrus asking whether he believes it to be true, Socrates first explains how he could reject it, weaving a clever story about how it was actually the North wind, personified by Boreas, which blew her away; having illustrated this possibility, he goes on to claim that such clever or ingenious interpretations of myth are an unenviable task in his eyes, and one for which he has no time. He claims to lack any such time because, as he says, 'I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that' (229e4-230a1).<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Griswold 1986: 139.

<sup>135</sup> Nehamas & Woodruff 1997.

This seems to make clear Socrates' general attitude to rationalist interpretations of myth – for him, they are a waste of time insofar as they distract from his pursuit of self-knowledge.<sup>136</sup> This may appear somewhat problematic: over the course of this paper, I have been treating the palinode's mythic contents not at face value but as requiring some degree of rationalisation and interpretation. Given Socrates' denouncement here of this practice, it seems worth entertaining at least some ambivalence regarding the assumption I have been working under, and examining what justification there is for attempting to interpret the mythic elements of the palinode.

One may wonder why Socrates' comments here should apply to his palinode. There are two justifications for this, to my mind. The first is the fact that the palinode, just like the myth of Boreas, is designated a myth [μῦθος]. The second is that when Socrates delivers his palinode, he appears to make reference back to his previous remarks by stating that his speech 'will convince the wise but not the clever [δεινοῖ]' (245c1-2). Because the palinode will not appeal to the clever – those who seek to provide interpretations of myths, earlier described as being "over-clever" [λίαν δεινοῦ] – it seems worth asking whether we are not being warned away from offering, like them, a rationalist interpretation of its mythic contents.

To counter this objection, it may seem a promising strategy to appeal to the myth of Thoth. Upon reciting the story of Thoth's creation of the written alphabet, and the Theban king's criticism of it, Socrates is accused by Phaedrus of making up stories. In response, he reprimands Phaedrus and implores him to focus less upon where the story comes from and instead consider 'whether what [the Theban king] says is right or wrong' (275c). Given this remark, it appears promising to think that, like the myth of Thoth, the palinode is also truth apt. However, an appeal to this story and Socrates' remarks about it, is not straightforwardly relevant to a discussion of the palinode's mythic elements: despite possessing various mythic features, it should be noted that neither Socrates nor Phaedrus ever refer to it as a μῦθος. When it is referred to, at 275b, it is designated a λόγος. Being a λόγος and not a μῦθος, it cannot precisely be of aid when considering the question of palinode's attested mythic status.

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<sup>136</sup> While he describes people who undertake such interpretations as the wise [οἱ σοφοί], this usage is, as the context suggests, ironic, and more plausibly refers to the sophists and intellectuals who had become prominent in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century; Ferrari 1987: 234-5.

Nevertheless, there is one way in which it is relevant to our assessment of the palinode. As with the story of Thoth, the palinode's status as a μῦθος is not entirely a clear-cut matter; while the term is frequently contrasted with λόγος – taken to designate a factual account or reasoned argument – within the *Phaedrus* this contrast is not rigidly adhered to: Socrates also designates it a λόγος (252b2, 265b8, c6, d7, e3, 264e7, and 266a3).<sup>137</sup> In addition, just as with the myth of Thoth, there are a host of insinuations and explicit declarations that it speaks the truth (244a1-b1, 245c3, 247c4-6, and 265b7). The combination of these stress a likeness between it and the account of Thoth, one which suggests that we *are* invited to see it as being truth apt.

But this seems to add an additional layer of difficulty to the examination of the textual support for taking the palinode to be a valid philosophical source: being a λόγος, it is implied to convey the truth or a measure thereof, yet being a μῦθος, we seem to have reason for denying that it warrants interpretation. For the sake of avoiding a discussion of which the palinode really is – one that seems misguided given the attestations that it is both – I will therefore instead tackle the issue of its being a myth head on.<sup>138</sup> As I will argue, there is justification for thinking that, even though it is said to be a μῦθος, we are not precluded from providing an interpretation of it.

There are two crucial dissimilarities worth noting between the μῦθος of Boreas and the palinode as a μῦθος. The first is fairly trivial: unlike the myth of Boreas, the palinode is Socrates' own construction. This is to say that he composes the speech in part to persuade Phaedrus and in part as a recantation of his former speech; the myth of Boreas, conversely, is brought up by Phaedrus. This fact is easy to ignore, but I suspect it is what grounds the basic assumption that an interpretation of the palinode, unlike that of the myth of Boreas, is warranted: it is presumably seen as requiring interpretation *because* it is Socrates who composes the speech – the supposition being that it, unlike the Boreas myth, conveys something like Socrates' own convictions.

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<sup>137</sup> I am indebted to Griswold in particular for his cataloguing of these references to the palinode as a λόγος; Griswold 1986: 139.

<sup>138</sup> Here I side with Griswold in thinking that the contrast is simply not one adhered to with any degree of consistency.

The second concerns who Socrates claims will and will not be convinced by his second speech. Those who will not are the clever [δεινοῖ] rationalisers of myths (245c1-2). These people are then contrasted with another class: the wise [σοφοί].<sup>139</sup> What are we to make of this contrast? *Prima facie*, it recalls the contrast drawn between the rationalisers of myths – whom Socrates denigrates – and Socrates himself, as one who seeks to attain self-knowledge. This goal is precisely why he claims to have no time for rationalisation – insofar as it is not conducive to this aim, it is a waste of his time. However, this opens the door to the following possibility: were an interpretation conducive to such an aim, it would not be a waste of time but rather a permissible and a wholly relevant activity.<sup>140</sup> Hence, where before I suggested that Socrates’ comments appear to warn against all interpretation of the palinode’s mythical contents, it now seems plausible that this cannot be the right way to read this: what Socrates has no time for are those “clever interpretations”, which do nothing to further his goal of self-knowledge. Far from ruling out the possibility of interpreting or rationalising the mythic contents of the palinode, this comment appears to allow interpretation of the palinode conducive to the goal of self-knowledge.

Is such an interpretation possible? Rather than attempting to prove that it is, at this stage I will defer respectfully to Griswold who treats the issue of self-knowledge in the *Phaedrus* at far greater length than I can do here. As he compellingly argues, by self-knowledge, what Socrates seeks is knowledge of himself *qua* soul.<sup>141</sup> Because the palinode is a work of Socrates’ own, and presents us with a great deal of material regarding the nature of soul, Griswold therefore concludes that we are meant to interpret that myth nonliterally ‘in a way that assists self-knowledge rather than, say, in ways confined to the study of the historical traditions of myth-making or the antecedents of any particular myth’ (141).<sup>142</sup> On the strength of the case he makes within his study of the *Phaedrus*, I take it to be adequately supported to

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<sup>139</sup> While before this term was used ironically, it is now being used in a positive sense; Rowe *op. cit.*: 173.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Verdenius’ assessment that ‘allegorical interpretation should always be directed by self-examination; Verdenius *op. cit.*: 268.

<sup>141</sup> Griswold *op. cit.*: 2ff.

<sup>142</sup> For the fuller treatment of the palinode as a vessel conveying important truths about soul, see Griswold *ibid.*: 74-146.



think that we have licence to interpret the palinode’s mythical claims about the soul in the manner I have done.

### 4.3 Dialectic and the Palinode

The third and final issue I will consider concerns Socrates’ affirmation of his speech’s value from 265c7-266b1. Here, Socrates claims that, while his speech was mostly a playful composition, a part of it was delivered with the guidance of fortune – not playfully but seriously. By this he is referring to two kinds of things, the processes of collection [συναγωγή] and division [διάρεσις], which he goes on to explain from 265d3-266b1. In order to see how this constitutes an objection to my thesis, I will need to briefly summarise and comment upon his explanation of the two processes.<sup>143</sup>

Concerning collection, Socrates claims it consists in ‘seeing together things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each thing we can make clear the subject of any instruction we wish to give’ (d3-5).<sup>144</sup> To illustrate this point, he cites how his speech formulated a definition of love, which – whether or not it was correct – at least ‘allowed the speech to proceed clearly and consistently with itself’ (d3-6). As scholars largely concur<sup>145</sup>, this importance of this step concerns definition. The two speeches exemplified collection insofar as they took diverse phenomena, including love, gluttony, intoxication, and poetic inspiration – “things that are scattered about everywhere” – and “collected them into one kind” by stipulating that each is a kind or species of madness. By defining love as a kind of madness, his two speeches acquired clarity and consistency.

Concerning division, he claims it consists in the ability ‘cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do’ (265e1-3). To illustrate this point, he cites how his two speeches put *all* mental derangements into a common kind, and proceeded to cut love up into a “left-handed” love, which the first speech denounced, and a “right-handed” love that shares its name with the first, but which is

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<sup>143</sup> Though I concede that a great deal more can be said about the details of these two processes and the dialectical method they constitute, it is not purpose here to discuss this. For a recent and fairly comprehensive treatment of dialectic in *Phaedrus*, see Hayase 2016 .

<sup>144</sup> The translations I use here are not my own but are those of Nehamas & Woodruff 1997.

<sup>145</sup> Following Hayase *ibid*: 116, scholars who adhere to this general summary include and are not limited to Cornford 1935, Hackforth 1952, Rowe 1986, Griswold 1986, and Yunis 2011.

very different from the first, being a good kind of madness. Broadly speaking, this process requires one to carve or divide a given thing up into various sub-kinds. This is ostensibly what Socrates does between his two speeches: while both treat madness as a single thing – mental derangement – each treats a certain sub-division of it, with the first treating harmful kinds of madness, such as human love, gluttony, and intoxication, and the second treating beneficial its kinds of madness, such as divine love, poetic inspiration, prophecy, and mystic madness. The significance of this step here is that it allowed Socrates to treat love first as something harmful and then again as something beneficial without explicitly contradicting himself: while both kinds of love were kinds of madness, the first was an example of harmful madness quite unlike the second.

This brings me back to the objection this all raises. For my thesis to be plausible, it requires us to think that Socrates considers the account of soul he provides in the palinode a serious one. This, however, seems called into question by his remarks at 265d. As noted, the only aspect of the speech ostensibly delivered seriously was its treatment of love, insofar as it served to demonstrate an application of collection and division. Because what this conspicuously appears to omit is any suggestion that the speech’s treatment of soul was also delivered “with the guidance of fortune”, Socrates’ remarks at this stage do not appear to sit well with the thesis I am arguing for, namely the treatment of soul in the speech is relevant for rhetoric.

While this objection is well made, it is not quite as problematic as it may at first seem to be. Though Socrates only cites the palinode’s treatment of love, his express reason for doing so is that it exemplified an application of the dialectical procedures of collection and division, this being the basis for his claim that this part of the speech was delivered with the guidance of fortune. With this, however, it appears to me there is room to infer that the palinode’s treatment of soul was likewise so delivered. This is because it seems quite plausible that its treatment of soul also provides an example of an application of collection and division.

As we have seen in chapter 2, Socrates’ initial concern in the speech is to establish the immortality of every kind of soul and he attempts to do so by arguing that self-motion constitutes the essence and definition of soul [*ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον*]. In the argument’s treatment of soul in the singular, and its stipulation that soul’s definition is self-motion, it seems not implausible that here we find another example, not mentioned by Socrates at 265d, of an application of collection. As the later explanation of the process clarifies, collection consists in seeing together – collecting – diverse kinds of thing under a single definition. Just

as the diverse kinds of madness were all identified as kinds of *madness*, so too are all souls collected and defined by self-motion – self-motion is that essential property common to every soul treated within the speech.

Along with this, it seems not unclear that the treatment of soul also reflects an application of division. Just as the speech divided madness into kinds and sub-kinds, so too does it divide soul into two broad classes – divine and human soul – and apply further divisions to each – divine soul is divided into the twelve Olympians, while human souls are divided into twelve characters, each corresponding to a certain god. We then see two further divisions made: first, we get the broad division between un-embodied and embodied human souls; second, the division of embodied souls into nine distinct kinds.<sup>146</sup>

Given this plethora of divisions made, and that in the immortality argument all these kinds of soul are collected under the heading of self-motion, it seems quite clear that Socrates' speech contains far more examples of dialectic than his remarks at 265d suggest. For this reason, I do not believe these remarks pose as substantial an issue to my thesis as they may appear to: while they only advert to the palinode's treatment of love, it is quite clear that this is because the treatment provides an example of the dialectical processes. Insofar as the speech's treatment of soul also provides examples of these processes, they too, it can be concluded, were delivered not playfully but with the guidance of fortune.

But perhaps this raises more questions than it answers: why, at 265d, would Socrates not refer to his speech's treatment of soul if, as I am suggesting, it also provided an example of the dialectical treatment of a subject? And of what significance is it that the treatment of soul was dialectical? I will deal with these two questions in turn.

To answer the first question, it is worth considering why dialectic is introduced into the discussion when it is. Socrates prefaces his turn to dialectic with the following question: how was the speech able to proceed from censure to praise? By this, he refers to how he was first able to argue that love was something bad, before arguing for the opposite case: in short, he refers to the capacity of rhetoric for ἀντιλέγουσιν, and asks what made it possible for him to

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<sup>146</sup> The view that the palinode's treatment of soul is dialectical in nature is not one widely considered by scholarship. Among secondary literature, only Yunis 2011: 212-13 suggests that the typology of souls in the palinode arises from dialectical division, but he makes no mention of the aspect of collection.

do this.<sup>147</sup> His introduction of dialectic most clearly serves to explain what is required for the rhetorician to argue for opposite positions. By grasping dialectic, as a method of collection and division, a rhetor will possess a method which allows him to practice rhetoric as an art of moving the soul first to believe one thing and then its opposite. It does so because it allows them, as Socrates does with love, to approach any subject in such a way that one will be able to make it appear either desirable or undesirable.<sup>148</sup> This much is suggested by Socrates' comments when he summarises the results of the discussion at 277b4-c5: here, he claims that one must know the truth concerning everything one speaks about, learn how to define each thing, and, having defined it, also how to divide it into kinds. It is therefore unsurprising that Socrates should here choose to illustrate how his speeches applied dialectic to the subject of love: by doing this, Socrates was able to argue first that it was bad and then that it was something excellent and praiseworthy. This somewhat answers the first question: he does not refer to the treatment of soul, because that is not what he here wishes to convey about dialectic and its use for rhetoric.

Nevertheless, there is still the fact that the soul appears to be treated dialectically. What is the import of this? To answer this second question, it bears worth considering Socrates' further comments at 277b4-c5. Here, having outlined how dialectic must be applied to any subject a rhetorician treats, Socrates goes on to say that one must understand the nature of soul *along the same lines*. Because the lines he has in mind are those of dialectic – collection and division – he here suggests that the processes of collection and division will also be useful insofar as they will allow a rhetorician to grasp the nature of soul. Perhaps this is no great surprise: at 270d, when Socrates outlines what is required to grasp the nature of anything, he makes it quite clear that division plays an important role, insofar as one needs to discern whether the entity in question is simple or has many kinds, and if the latter, how each possesses their own unique set of powers.<sup>149</sup> Moreover, at 266d, having outlined the processes of dialectic,

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<sup>147</sup> There is here the suggestion that Socrates' two speeches were only one speech; but this is retracted shortly after at 265e.

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Yunis 2011: 196-7 for a more in depth treatment of the importance of dialectic to rhetoric.

<sup>149</sup> Later, he will also go on to say that a dialectician will choose a proper soul within which to plant a discourse (276e), once again emphasising the importance of dialectic to the rhetor's knowledge of soul.

Socrates insinuates that nothing valuable and grasped by art is independent of these processes. Because dialectic is implied at these later stages to be important for the rhetorician's understanding of the nature of soul, it thus seems quite significant that the palinode's treatment of soul appears to be dialectical in character. What it suggests is that there a further reason for thinking there should be a degree of consistency between the account and typology of souls provided by the palinode, and the account later said to be required by rhetoric.

Is this to say that the account of soul provided in the palinode is the very one which Socrates takes to be required by rhetoric? This thesis is perhaps too strong: for one, in the palinode, there are two axes of divisions made between kinds of soul – the soul is divided into kinds both along the lines of how much truth it saw prior to embodiment and which god it followed in the divine procession. Were the palinode intended to convey what divisions are required by rhetoric, then it seems unclear why Socrates would provide us with the two ways of carving up the soul into kinds with no sense of which is the right way to do so. Moreover, rhetoric requires a degree of specificity Socrates manifestly fails to provide within the speech; not a great deal of time is given over to how each of the soul's kinds – especially the different characters corresponding to a certain god – are unique.

However, it does seem possible to think that the definition supplied of soul, and the distinctions drawn between its kinds, should indicate to the sorts of collections and divisions that a rhetorician will make in relation to the soul. What I mean is that it seems more plausible that the collections and divisions applied to the soul in the palinode should, while lacking in crucial details, provide us with an outline of the dialectical account of soul ostensibly required (277bc) by rhetoric. Concerning the ambiguity of the two axes of division, it seems possible that Plato is here indicating two ways in which soul can be divided each of which can be relevant to rhetoric in their own way.

This takes me to the close of this issue. To briefly summarise, while Socrates only claims that the speech's treatment of love was delivered seriously – with the guidance of fortune – upon inspection of this claim, it seems there is room to think that the speech's treatment of soul was also delivered seriously, insofar as both treatments provide examples of the application of collection and division and both these applications are plausibly relevant in the context of rhetoric. Because a rhetorician is required to grasp dialectic to understand the nature of soul, it seems defensible to think that, the account of soul provided by the palinode being dialectical

in character, the palinode's treatment of soul should also be seen as being serious and relevant to our understanding of what account of soul is needed by rhetoric.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Having considered these three objections to my usage of the palinode, and found that none of them constitute a sufficiently strong objection to my thesis, I think it is safe to conclude that the palinode is a valid philosophical source, in spite of its rhetorical nature, its reliance upon mythic elements, and Socrates' lukewarm appraisal of what part of it was delivered seriously. In particular, however, I take the final objection to point to a further reason for thinking that the palinode's treatment of soul should be relevant to rhetoric: because the rhetorician is claimed, at 277bc, to require dialectic in order to grasp the nature of soul, and because the palinode's treatment of soul is plausibly dialectical in character – inasmuch as it applies both collection and division to the soul – it seems that the treatment of soul in this speech should be in some way relevant in the context of rhetoric.

## Conclusion

With this, I submit that my thesis is at an end. In this study of the *Phaedrus*' treatment of soul, we have made some headway. Having begun by treating the account of soul's nature required by rhetoric, I contended that there were several questions the account left unanswered, namely what kinds of soul must an artful speaker be familiar with, would they require knowledge of soul's tri-partite composition, and of what relevance is the reference to soul's "natural power of acting". On the basis of the investigation of the palinode's treatment of the nature of soul, I was able to propose answers to each of these questions. By the soul's natural power of acting, Plato plausibly has in mind the soul's essential self-motion. By this, in turn, I have argued we can see it as being intimately related to the soul's tri-partite structure. The soul's composition is relevant insofar as it seems plausible that the human soul's desire for pleasures and its desire for judged to be good – its motivations – constitute its motions; this much at least appears suggested by the palinode's description of soul.

Because the soul's self-motion correlates with its motivational role in bringing about action, I went on to argue that knowledge of this aspect of soul was quite likely to be some relevance to rhetoric, inasmuch as rhetoric is required to be able to move a particular to act in a certain way, and knowledge of soul's ruling motivations will be conducive to that goal. With this, I was also able to argue that knowledge of soul's tri-partite structure was required by rhetoric, it being so tightly connected to an understanding of the self-motion of soul.

Furthermore, within the palinode I identified the list of the nine kinds of human soul as being of possible significance to the later proposed art of rhetoric. Not only have I attempted to show how it is possible to assign to each of these kinds a respective power of acting – a unique self-motive nature – and power of being acted upon – a unique disposition to be acted upon or not by the forms – but I have also attempted to shed some light upon how this appears to be of relevance in the context of rhetoric – a speaker will, upon meeting a certain kind of soul, be able to grasp what speeches will move it and what speeches will fail to do so.

Finally, on the basis of the consideration of the validity of the palinode as a source, I argued that it is justified to treat it as a sincere source of philosophical commitments. Specifically, I contended that neither its reliance upon myth nor its rhetorical character present a substantial challenge to the assumption that it is intended to be a serious piece of philosophical prose. In addition, Socrates later remarks about the role of dialectic within the palinode appear to point

to the conclusion that its treatment of soul serves as an example of an application of dialectic, and this is not a view that appears widely noted among scholars. I take this to also be a positive contribution of my paper.

In sum and on my view, this all points toward the conclusion that there is a great deal more unity to the *Phaedrus* than at first meets the eye. Upon close inspection of its two treatments of the soul, it is possible to detect not only those parallels I have iterated above, but further places in which it seems not unlikely that we should find more continuity. Of particular interest to me is the speech's treatment of the forms – the subjects of truth and what I have contended are the beings which soul alone is capable of being acted upon by – and the later discussion of truth in the context of rhetoric. While I have been unable to explore the relationship between these subjects in the detail I should like, I am confident that further investigation into this topic should prove greatly interesting.



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