Trust between sworn enemies?

A study of mine clearance's role in the Colombian peace negotiations

Thea Katrin Mjelstad

Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Abstract

Since the Cold War, peace negotiations have become the most common way to end wars, but far from an easy one. The parties to the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary armed forces of Colombia (FARC) finally reached a peace agreement in 2016 after more than 50 years of fighting. Understanding how sworn enemies manage to sit down at the negotiation table and agree on an outcome is important in international conflict resolution. For parties who have spent their whole life hating each other, it requires a certain level of trust to finally find common ground and seek the end of the war. This study focuses on an aspect of how negotiations can reach an agreement. The thesis analyses the role of trust needed between parties, and look at the impact of specific measures to build trust, so called confidence building measures (CBMs).

The findings presented in this thesis have been placed in a context of existing literature on the subject. This research indicates that confidence building measure can function as an important tool to build trust at the local level where the project is conducted and between the participants. Moreover, such projects create a common space in the peace talks that can help the conversations move forward and can reduce mistrust between parties. Lastly, such confidence building measures could be a tool not only to build trust between the fighting parties but also function as an outreach to the public – if this opportunity is used. However, I argue that in the case of Colombia, this opportunity was a success at the local level, functioned as a tool at the negotiation table, but were not present at all in the general public.

I use empirical data collected from a confidence building project conducted between the FARC and the Colombian government during the last round of peace talks in the year of 2015 and 2016. Two important theory-derived explanatory factors are examined to analyse the role of trust: confidence building measures and conciliatory signalling. To provide input to the analysis participants form the FARC, the BIDES, Norwegian People's Aid, local community and other NGOs have been interviewed.

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Errors in this thesis are mine only.

Thea Katrin Mjelstad

6 June 2018

Contents

List of Figures

List of abbreviations

BIDES – the Humanitarian Demining Brigade

CBM – Confidence Building Measures

CCCM - The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines

DESCONTAMINA - Directorate for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines in

Colombia

ELN – National Liberation Army

FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

NPA – Norwegian People's Aid

UNMAS – United Nation Mine Action Service

# Pilot Project locations, Colombia

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📍 Vistahermosa
📍 Santa Helena
📍 El Orejón

Figure 1: Location of the pilot projects and location of my field visit

1 Introduction

There are numerous theories about peace negotiations; why parties decide to negotiate, when they choose to do so and what makes them succeed - or fail. War has devastating consequences, always harming the civil population. Peace negotiations are therefore usually seen as the best solution, but far from the easiest. This study focuses on an aspect of how peace negotiations can succeed and the role of trust in this. After years and decades of fighting, how do you manage to sit down for peaceful negotiations, take down your armour and trust that your enemy have good intentions? How do you reach a peaceful agreement with your sworn enemy for decades?

This thesis examines the value and necessity of trust in peace negotiations. Historically conflicts end because the fighting parties defeat their opponent through military forces, or because violence levels drop and the conflict simply fades out and end (Ramsbotham, Miall, Woodhouse 2011:172). However, ending a war through the means of negotiation has increased substantially, and after the end of the Cold War this has been the most common way to end a war (Fixdal 2016:10). Today, international politics are characterized by extensive cooperation between states and an increased number of international institutions, laws, organizations, networks and international actors. These institutions are linking states in structures of shared norms and expectations that challenges the nation state autonomy and make it hard to maintain a sharp distinction between international and domestic politics (Lake, 1996:30). Emphasis on institutions, shared interest and identities are increasingly becoming a part of international politics and therefore also changing our understanding of conflict resolutions and negotiations. This thesis examines a field of social science that explores the actions taking place on micro level, understanding how trust and personal relations can function as tools to find peaceful solutions to war.

But to end a violent civil war that has lasted for more than 50 years through dialog and negotiation is not an easy task. Efforts to resolve a conflict is often confronted with a rather basic, but crucial, dilemma: parties cannot enter into a peace process without a certain degree of mutual trust, but they can neither build trust without entering into such peace negotiations (Kelman 2005). Scholars have argued over how parties can communicate and create this necessity of trust between them. Several scholars have emphasised the need of confidence building measures to build trust. Nevertheless, there is no shared definition of how trust can be

built, and it is an ongoing debate between scholars to figure out the best way parties can create this trust *and* communicate it to one another.

The point of departure of this thesis is understanding how confidence building measures (CBMs) can create trust between negotiating parties and be a tool in peace negotiations. Whereas the theoretical assumptions stipulate a positive relationship between trust and peace negotiations, several scholars point to a need of concrete tools to help achieve this trust (Kelman 2005; Höglund, Svensson 2006). The specific case of my thesis is the protracted conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC. By using the case of trust building exercise in the peace negotiations in Colombia, the following analysis will try to identify the different functions of CMBs and which conditions needs to be present for such exercise to work. This will hopefully contribute to an understanding of the potential of trust building in peace talks, as well as understanding its limitations and difficulties.

The primary objective of my thesis is therefore to empirically examine the role of trust in peace negotiations and to understand the role it plays in such a context, with Colombia as case study. The secondary objective of my thesis is to look at this through concrete actions of confidence building measures, more specifically through a concrete project of mine clearance. Examining this could help pinpoint the conditions that need to be present for such projects to have a positive effect on building trust, particularly in negotiations. For theory-building purpose, I explore how different sorts of political risks, communicative signalling, cooperation and confidence building measures through lenses of trust can be included in the communicative process to transform sworn enemies into partners in peacemaking. I do this by analysing trust building measures that were taken during the negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC.

1.1   Research question

Literature on peace negotiations often focuses on what makes fighting parties agree to join the negotiation table at a macro level, and the intentions and strategy of different actors. In this thesis, the focus is rather at the micro level of peace negotiations, where I want to develop further knowledge of trust building. Theory on the field suggest a rising focus on concrete exercises that can build trust between fighting parties, but it appears to be challenged by a lack

of understanding of which conditions need to be present for such exercises to succeed. Hence, the research question of this thesis is the following:

How, and under what conditions, can mine clearance contribute to trust building in peace negotiations?

1.2   What is peace negotiation in protracted conflicts?

The Colombian civil war falls under the definition of a protracted conflict. A protracted conflict is a war facing hostile relationship over a period of usually twenty years or more, often with periodic recourse to war or large-scale violence, and characterized by several conflict management efforts (Bercovitch, Kadayifci 2002:115). Making peace in this type of environment is particularly challenging because of involvement of several armed actors, use of contrabands such as cocaine, large territory, rough terrain and external involvement (Fearon 2004, Buhaug and Gates 2002). The Colombian conflict truly exemplifies a protracted conflict and negotiating for peace under such conditions is particularly difficult, but indeed needed when the fighting parties have conflicting interest. Iklé (1964:3) says that

"*Negotiations is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present*".

He argues that actors may want to end war due to the human suffering it causes and the economic losses (Iklé 2005:20). Negotiations are therefore a necessary mean for parties to settle their differences peacefully and find a solution that does not involve military force and violence. In a civil war, the need to find a political solution is more crucial than in an international conflict. When the war is over, the parties can not withdraw back to their own territory and be physically separated, and without a political solution the war might easily rearise (Fixdal 2016:14). A civil war can also be hard to win by military means especially if ethnicities or national groups are up against each other. Modern civil war can be almost impossible to win due to weak rebellious groups that can keep the war going because of their access to income from natural resources or the use of means of terror (Fixdal 2016:14; Buhaug, Gates 2002). Another reason why negotiations and peaceful solutions to war have become more common is the rise of democracies. Studies find that there is a correlation between democracies

and peace, and democracies tend to a higher degree than non-democracies to choose peaceful solutions for conflict management.

Colombia, which falls in to the category of several of these observations, with a civil war that has been going on forever with no military victory in the horizon, has chosen to negotiate and manage to agree on a peace agreement. While the outcome of the negotiations in itself is not the main focus of my thesis, it is necessary to have some concepts about peace negotiations, outcomes and the development of this tradition in the recent years (Fixdal 2016). With these difficulties solving a protracted conflict it is even more fascinating and interesting to analyse aspects of the Colombian peace negotiations.

In this thesis, the focus is on the actual negotiation phase in itself which marks the time period from 2012-2016 when peace talks took place in Havana, Cuba, not including pre-negotiating phase (Colombia Reports, 2016). The main negotiators were the Colombian Government led by President Santos on one side, and the FARC on the other. Norway and Cuba functioned as guarantor countries present at the negotiation table, while Venezuela and Chile had the role as accompanying countries.

1.3 Background to the Colombian war

The civil war between the Colombian Government and the FARC has been one of the longest lasting civil wars in modern time. The bloody conflict – too complicated and long to give it a justified overview here - has been fought between rural leftist rebel groups such as the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN), paramilitaries, drug cartels and other criminal groups and the Colombian government. The civil population have been victims trapped in the middle. FARC has been ideologically driven and wants a reformation of the state. The FARC and the government have attempted negotiations in the past but these peaceful attempts to resolve the conflict have failed (Walch 2016:85). In the 1980s the conflict escalated with the rise of drug trafficking leading to the rise of more leftist rebel groups that became active in the fighting. Drug trafficking revenue was financing weapons across Colombia, and the formation of right-wing self-defence forces started turning up to protect private interests from the increasingly powerful guerrillas (Alsema, Colombia Reports).

The FARC and ELN claim to be fighting for the poor in Colombia, to protect them from government violence and to provide social justice through communism. The paramilitary groups on their side claim to be reacting to the perceived threats by the guerrilla movements, while the Colombian government says they were fighting for order and stability, and to seek to protect the rights and interests of its citizens.

The roots of the conflict go all the way back to colonial history with a number of civil conflicts. However, the history of the most recent civil war and what is being studied in this thesis, dates back to 1948. On April 9th 1948 the liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was murdered. This led to a ten-year long period of intense violence called "La Violencia" - the Violence with a capital V - between the Conservative and Liberal Party. Their battlefield mostly took place in the countryside. The period ended in 1958 with the creation of the National Front, an agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Party that divided power between them and had shifts on having the presidency for the coming years (Pécaut 2008:19).

After La Violencia, several communist-inspired guerrilla groups were born in the Colombian countryside in the 1960s, among them FARC. Many of them, FARC being the largest one, were established by Colombian farmers with the agrarian reform as their primarily concern. The inequality in the rural zones of the country is the root cause of a lot of the conflict the country has faced and is still facing today. The roots of inequality dates back to colonial history and has persisted in Colombia for centuries, making Colombia one of the most unequal societies in the world when it comes to distribution of wealth, land and income (Isacson, Poe 2009:3).

But the communist-inspired guerrilla are not the only armed groups in Colombia. Right-wing self-defence groups are highly represented in the country, after they experienced a rapid expansion in the 1990s. Many of these self-defence groups - paramilitaries - formed an alliance in 1997 under the name the United Self-Defence Force of Colombia (AUC). The paramilitaries have been considered the most violent actor in the conflict.

For the Colombian Government, the war has had a devastating effect on the economic, social and political development of the country, with the most devastating consequence being the dreadful numbers of more than 220,000 people dead between 1956 and 2013, where a total of 177,307 were civilians. In addition, more than six million people have been forced to flee their

homes, creating the world's second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Up until today, a total of more than 8 million Colombians are victims of the war, 16.9% of the population (Portafolio, 2017; GMH, 2016). Inequality has been and still is high in Colombia, on issues like income distribution, level of land concentration and ownership. NGO Oxfam says that 80% of land in the country is in the hands of just 14% of owners. This concentration has increased over the last 50+ years. When it comes to income, Colombia is ranked number eight on the list of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of family income. Surveys show that more than 70% of the Colombian population believes that policies should be implemented by the government to reduce this inequality of income (Gillin, Colombia Reports, 2015).

The issue of land inequality has therefore been an important part of the peace agreement. The negotiations starting in 2012 has not been the only attempt of peace talks. FARC and the Colombian government have been involved in three serious attempts of official peace negotiations since the conflict escalated in the late 1970s. The first attempt took place in 1984 under President Belisario Betancur. He initiated negotiations with the FARC and tried to encourage them to become a legitimate political movement. They did, and formed the political party *La Unión Patrótica* (UP), and agreed on a ceasefire. Unfortunately, this did not last for long. The solution was heavily repressed by right-wing paramilitary groups that, in protest, killed more than 3000 UP members with total impunity. This led FARC to resume the armed struggle, as they saw it as the only viable strategy to change the nature of the Colombian state (Walch 2016:86).

President Andrés Pastrana initiated peace talks with the FARC in 1998. This time, granting a demilitarized zone as a basis for the negotiations. Despite some accords being signed, the negotiations collapsed in 2002. In August 2002 Alvaro Uribe took office as Colombia's new president. Uribe held a tough line against the FARC and did not see negotiations as a possible way out of the conflict. Uribe pushed the FARC deeper inside the jungle, but this high military use against the FARC came with a human cost; millions of Colombians were displaced from their homes, and thousands were killed (Alsema, 2016). It was not until todays president was elected, Juan Manuel Santos, that new peace negotiations officially started in August 2012.

The peace talks starting in 2012 stood out compared to previous rounds. The last round of negotiations led to a signed peace accord in December 2016. The peace accord is organized

16

around six main issues: 1) integrated agricultural development policy, 2) political participation, 3) solution to the problem of illicit drugs, 4) victims and transitional justice, 5) end of conflict and 6) implementation, verification and ratification (Walch 2016:87), supposedly covering both the causes and the effects of the conflict that never exclusively involved the FARC and the government. The inclusion of the rural reform and political participation can be seen as an attempt to solve the causes of the conflict, whereas the point regarding victims deals with the consequences of the Colombian war (Alsema, Colombia Reports).

The FARC and the Government found partial agreement on four points on the agenda early on in the peace talks. This was a breakthrough compared to earlier attempts of negotiations. The parties agreed on a crucial point about how to punish human rights abuse during the conflict. This particular issue had caused many difficulties in the negotiation. An agreement on this point gave more promising prospects of reaching a signed peace agreement. The first common agreement was given in Havana September 2015, where the Colombian President Santos and rebel leader Rodrigo Londoño also known as Timoleon Jimenez or Timochenko, declared their commitment to finalize the peace deal within six months (Walch 2016:87).

The 2nd October 2016, the Colombian people went to the ballots and gave their "yes" or "no" to the peace accord between the FARC and the government. The agreement was voted down by 50.2% of the voters. Soon after, President Santos conducted a wide-ranging national dialogue to secure peace in Colombia and to get broad support for a new agreement. In the new peace accord, the parties to the agreement have addressed a range of proposed amendments and suggestions that were raised in the national dialogue (MFA Norway, 2016). The agreement was signed between President Santos and rebel leader Timochenko in December 2016, finding agreement on all six points, following the principle of "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" (Nylander, Sandberg, Tvedt 2018).

1.4 The birth of the pilot project

The successful negotiation was the fourth try in a long history of attempts to end the Colombian civil war - either by military means or by peaceful talks. Even though a peace agreement has been reached, the Colombian war has left the country in social and economic devastation. One of the largest problems caused by the civil war has been the contamination of antipersonnel landmines. Colombia is one of the countries in the world most contaminated by landmines, and

it still has some of the highest numbers of accidents per year. This contamination of the country is the result of the decades of conflict with non-state armed groups which has led to a massive displacement of people now counting as high as 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

It is believed that landmines are dispersed throughout 40 % of the national territory of Colombia, affecting 31 out of 32 departments in the country, affecting one of every two municipalities (Norwegian People's Aid, n.d.). Between 1982 and 2013, the Landmine Monitor recorded 10,626 casualties due to landmines, including 2157 deaths and 8469 injuries. Civilians accounted for 37 % of the total casualties, and of these a total of 26 % were children. The highest number of victims was recorded in 2006 with 1,232 victims. Compared with the numbers ten years later from 2016, this number has dropped to 89 victims, a reduction of 93%. During 2017 this number dropped again, with only 50 victims throughout the year (Descontamina, 2018).

Considering the terrible impact of mines in Colombia, as illustrated by the data above, it is evident that mine clearance is particularly important for the country. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been advising The Mine Action Authority (Descontamina) in Colombia. UNMAS's aims for 2016 were three folded and include: 1) to increase the capacity of the authorities to manage, coordinate, and regulate the mine action sector, 2) to develop the sector to support peace and development initiatives, and 3) to support the peace process (Mine Action Review, 2017). In 2016, Colombia reported clearance of 287,661m² across six departments as shown in Figure 1.

Province	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
Antioquia	161,641	121	4
Bolivar	16,671	20	7
Caldas	35,349	18	0
Meta	20,874	19	1
Santander	53,059	32	1
Tolima	67	0	1
Totals	**287,661**	**210**	**14**

AP = Anti-personnel

Figure 2 Mine clearance in 2016[1]

[1] Mine Action Review, 2017

During the course of the peace process, the FARC and the Colombian government agreed on a number of confidence building measures (CBMs). In March 2015, the two parties announced that they had reached an agreement on demining as one initiative of CBMs. In a joint statement the government and the FARC signed the "Agreement on Land clean-up and decontamination from the presence of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMs), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs) or Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs) in general" and selected a number of pilot zones with the highest level of this threat. In August the agreement was signed with the European Union for support to the pilot project, and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) was given the responsibility of overseeing non-technical survey and clearance of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (Mine Action Review, 2017).

When NPA formally initiated the mine action programme in April 2015, it was part of their participation in the peace talks between the government and the FARC that concerned demining. In the implementation process of this agreement on demining, the first step was to conduct non-technical survey of suspected contamination in the departments of Meta and Antioquia. The role of NPA was to lead and supervise the mine clearance projects as a trust-building exercise between the Government of Colombia, represented by the Military Humanitarian Demining Brigade (BIDES), and the FARC (Mine Action Review, 2017).

NPA coordinated a team consisting of representatives of the Colombian Government and the FARC. The pilot project was being deployed in El Orejón, Briceño, in the department of Antioquia and the second one in Santa Helena, Mesetas, in the department of Meta. The efforts done by this project was accompanied by the ICRC and by Norway and Cuba as guarantor countries to the peace talks. On December 21st 2016 NPA, together with Descontamina, BIDES, the FARC and the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed through with the technical handover of the cleared areas in the Vereda El Orejón, Briceño, after clearing 19,849 square meters and destroying 46 anti-personnel mines through the pilot project (Noriega, 2017).

Today, the departments of Meta and Antioquia have mine clearance projects through NPA – two of the departments with the highest numbers of victims of landmines. The program of NPA has 180 employees, 10 mine-detecting dogs and five mechanical assets. Their program supports the BIDES with their mine detection dogs and also the establishment of Humanicemos - FARC's own demining organisation. NPA also supports Descontamina on information

management and collaborates with Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in the field. They conduct common surveys so that the NRC can provide educational support in areas that NPA has declared cleared and released back to the local community (Norwegian People's Aid, n.d.).

In 2017, NPA has continued supporting the implementation of the peace agreement and was the first organization to reach an agreement with the FARC on the inclusion of local guides into their survey teams on demining. The information provided to NPA from the former FARC combatants was invaluable, and has reduced the m² per explosive item found to approx. 400 m² (in the areas in question) vs. the national average at 1500 m². The project was not only successful in making NPA operations more efficient, effective and safe, but was also the first step in incorporating former FARC combatants into humanitarian demining, making it part of the reincorporation process (Norwegian People's Aid, n.d.).

In this thesis, I will use the theoretical approach to analyse if the pilot project contributed to create trust between the parties, and to analyse which conditions that needed to be present for the pilot project to function as such a trust building tool between the FARC and the Colombian Government. Here, I have analysed the pilot project conducted in El Orejón and Santa Helena in 2015/2016.

1.5   Structure of the thesis

I have structured my thesis as follows. In Chapter 2 I introduce the theoretical literature about peace negotiations in protracted conflicts and the role of trust in this, and I introduce my analytical framework. Here, I also present how I understand negotiations and actors' decision to negotiate, and I elaborate on the role of trust in international relations, particularly in negotiations. In Chapter 3 I discuss my methods and research design.

In Chapter 4-6 I present my empirical findings and analyse the explanatory factors of how and under which conditions the mine clearance exercise – the pilot project - has been a trust building tool in the Colombian peace negotiations. I will present my findings from the pilot project from both El Orejón and Santa Helena in 2015 and 2016, to look at the effect it has had on three different levels; local level, negotiation level and community level. I want to study what effect the pilot project has had on different levels, and my focus will be on how it has functioned as a confidence building measure, and if, to what degree, it has created trust within

each level towards the peace process and between the parties. To be able to understand this in a larger framing, I present important factors, lessons learnt and way forward in chapter 7, and implications of this study for other peace negotiations.

2 Theory and analytical tool

This chapter reviews theories and theoretical approaches about trust in peace negotiation and the role of confidence building measure. My thesis focuses less on the macro approach about power and negotiations, but more on micro level to look at efforts taking place on ground and how these might affect the negotiation table and the outcome of the negotiations themselves. This section starts with some main aspects of peace negotiation onset, and the role of trust building and confidence building measures in peace talks and how identity fits into this. Second, I will outline the analytical framework being used to empirically examine my case. Here, I specify how I understand actors' decision to negotiate from a perspective of trust and the role of trust in ongoing negotiations, before I look into the different factors that can help build this trust - or reduce mistrust.

2.1   Negotiations in protracted conflicts

Trying to negotiate peace after 50 years of war is difficult. In a protracted conflict it is even harder. Wars that have lasted over a long period of time might have lost the sight of the objective of the war itself or the purpose has changed, and the parties might end up fighting each other just out of revenge, not necessarily to win (Iklé 2005:8). Another important element in the civil war between the FARC and the Colombian government, is that this type of conflict with guerrilla warfare tend to be of lower intensity, and therefore also of less urgency than other issues. This can result in a government that has fewer incentives to solve the conflict. The Colombian conflict is also characterized by "peripheral insurgencies" which makes the conflict harder to end because the guerrilla groups can hide in a geographically difficult terrain without the interference of the state (Fearon 2004:277).

War also creates fear and mistrust between the parties, which can make it difficult to agree to join the negotiation table even if the parties want to. A party might fear that negotiations can weaken its political position and that the opposite party will interpret signals for negotiations as a sign of weakness; another setback can be linked to security reasons – as peace negotiations often put disarmament as a precondition for substantial negotiations, and the parties might fear the opposite party will take advantage of this vulnerability (Fixdal 2016:34).

Others again have focused on the cost of war and negotiation, were high cost seem to make parties seek a negotiated outcome, or seek negotiations only for a short-term benefit so to be able to pursuit the war at a later time after being able to restore their arsenals and military strength (Fixdal 2016:35). Others might want to end a war due to the immense human suffering and economic losses a war can cost (Iklé 2005:20; Walter 2013). Maybe the most important reason why fighting groups oppose negotiations is the belief that they can achieve their goals by continue fighting (Fixdal 2016:34). Reasons to join negotiations might be to get international recognition and acceptance, especially for guerrilla groups and other rebellious groups where legitimacy in itself is a goal.

There have been many different approaches from scholars to explain why and how armed actors then decide to pursue peace negotiations and seek an end to such a protracted conflict. These theories have mainly been dominated by scholars such as Zartman and his ripeness theory, with focus on the time aspect of when parties decide to finally negotiate an end to the war. Zartman focuses on mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) when both party find themselves in a rather negative situation with no possibility to gain a victory. This leads to seeking a way out (WO) which is when both parties sense that negotiation can be a possibility, or the only possibility to get out of the hurting stalemate (Zartman 2000:230). Pruitt adds another dimension to this theory arguing that instead of mutual ripeness it is rather individual readiness of each actor that is of importance when actors decide to negotiate. This readiness theory focus on both side's motivation to achieve de-escalation and optimism about finding an agreement that is mutually acceptable by both sides. Both motivation and optimism can therefore increase the readiness to negotiate (Pruitt 2005:9).

The reasoning behind the MHS is the concept of cost-benefit analysis based on the assumption that when parties to a conflict find themselves on a pain-producing path, they try to look for an alternative that is more advantageous (Zartman 2000:229). The FARC and the Colombian Government, having tried different options, tactics and several rounds of peace talks before, the alternative to negotiate must have come across as the most preferable at this time. The lack of economic funding and a war that hinders economic and social development to a point where none of the parties are benefiting from the war any longer, led the parties to look for a more advantageous alternative. This reasoning is consistent with public choice notions of rationality and negotiation. This approach assume that a party will pick the alternative it prefers and that

the decision to change is induced by means of increasing pain associated with the present course (Zartman 2000:229).

The rational actor model is often criticised for simplifying reality and not considering the many different factors that can influence a state or a non-state actor's politics. Decision makers often lack relevant information about the other party, and emotions and wishful thinking can therefore influence the decision making process. Also, the notion about one unit is problematic, as both a group or a state often is complex and combined of many decision makers who often disagree among themselves (Fixdal 2016:32-33).

The debate about peace negotiations has not only been surrounding the issue of why, when and how parties are ready to negotiate or not, but scholars have also to a larger degree focused on peaceful initiatives, mutual trust between parties and the role of third party mediation. Constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, both a social construction of knowledge and construction of social reality (Adler 2013:3), where the focus should be on norms and ideas in international relations (Müller 2004). Constructivism adds value by explaining why people converge around specific norms, identities and cause-effect understandings (Adler 2013:13). Fisher and Uri argues that the basic problem in a negotiation lies not the conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's interests, needs, desires, concern and fears. Looking towards the parties' interest instead of their positions make it possible to develop a solution. Behind the opposed positions between the parties lie shared and compatible interest, as well as conflicting ones (Fisher, Uri 2011:42).

Researchers within psychology and communication have devoted extensive attention to the role of persuasion and argumentation (Thompson 2005, in Odell 2013:8). When discussing international politics, the way parties interact and communicate with each other is of importance. The way we communicate can change the perception of the other. This approach to negotiations relate more to practice and discourse, and the role of institutions. These instruments should be developed and influence peace talks. Jönsson (1990) came with a pioneering attempt of communication theory in international negotiations. Jönsson studies how international negotiators attach meanings to ambiguous signals, and language is the first step in such signalling. Describing a political group as "freedom fighters" or "terrorist" send different signals that hearers attach different meanings to. Listeners' reactions are also coloured by their initial stereotypes (Odell 2013:8). Words shapes identities. These processes are a

change of concepts, not a change of the FARC and the army in itself, but the way they are referred to and talked about. Changing the communication and approach changes the patterns of behaviour. Communicative actions aim at producing consensus between the parties with the presumption that both parties enter the communication with a readiness to submit to the better argument (Muller 2006:397).

This thesis views negotiations from the more constructivist perspective and the sociological factors of negotiations, analysing the interactions that happens at the individual and interpersonal level and communication, rather than focusing on the role of power and military. There seems to be a gap between theory about these micro-processes I study and theory from macro conditions (Odell 2013:18). My level of analysis takes place at the micro-level, analysing the negotiations on the ground. However, my aim for the thesis is to draw upon these empirical findings to contribute to theory of trust in negotiations, and I must be aware of this risk of level fallacy between the level of theory and data used in this thesis.

2.2 Peace negotiations and trust building

There has been an increased interest in trust and social relations in the studies of peace and conflict. Recent study of social capital theory in peace studies suggest a growing interest in exploring the roles of trust in conflict resolution (Cox 2008:3), and lack of trust has been widely used to explain failure of peace negotiations (Höglund, Svensson 2006). What role does trust play in conflict resolution and peace negotiations? What exactly is meant by trust, and equally as relevant, why is trust important?

William Ross and Jessica LaCroix point out the importance of trust between negotiating parties, arguing how a minimal level of trust would appear to be necessary for any negotiated transaction to occur (Ross, LaCroix 1996:314). Trust, however, is not an easy concept to define, and scholars vary in both their approach and definition of this perspective. Ross and LaCroix mention three different orientations, from a state perspective, to refer to trust: 1) cooperative motivational orientation (MO), 2) patterns of predictable behaviour and 3) a problem-solving orientation. They also mention three different definitions of trust in general: 1) trust as a "confident reliance on the integrity, honesty, or justice of another; faith", 2) "a confidence in the reliability of persons or things without careful investigation" and 3) "confident expectation; belief, hope" (Landay, 1966 in Ross, LaCroix 1996:314). By adapting

definitions offered by several scholars such as Deutsch (1973), Barnet and Hansen (1994), Wise and Kuhnert (1996) and Zand (1972), Ross and LaCroix give the following definition of trust:

"One can define trust in a bargaining situation as one party's willingness to risk increasing his or her vulnerability to another (or others) whose behaviour is beyond one's control; thus, the party is confident that the other will not exploit the party's vulnerabilities. Further, the party's short-term losses that follow if the other does violate the party's trust usually exceed the short-term benefits of mutually upholding the trust" (Ross, LaCroix 1966:315).

Other scholars view trust as a constant process where one anticipates the reliability of the other party's action based on reputation of the party, evaluation of current circumstances of actions, assumptions about the other party's action and lastly the belief in your opponent's honesty and morality (Khodyakov 2007:126). All these different way of looking at trust and its definitions are interesting because they raise some important questions and awareness for my study; what exactly is trust and how can we measure it? Whether trust is a process, reliability in another person or simply a belief or hope, it is important to discuss these different concept to understand the scope of this approach.

Next to the question of "what is trust", comes the question of "why is trust important?" Trust is worthy of consideration because if a party is vulnerable towards another party or is considering an option that makes it vulnerable, trust can release this tension by taking away the party's worries about being exploited. If this trust does not exist, the party must protect itself from the other party or avoid decision options that puts the party in such a situation of vulnerability. The issue of trust is whether we believe that the other party will act in our best interest or not (Ross, LaCroix 1966:315).

To simplify party's decision to negotiate or continue negotiating based on trust solely is a poor explanation, at least not comprehensive enough. Parties in negotiations will often perceive this from a cost-benefit perspective, looking at the advantages and disadvantages of continuing negotiations. The parties evaluate political, diplomatic and military cost up against potential benefits (Fixdal 2016:39). However, it is possible to see negotiations as something more than strictly as cost-benefit, because this approach does not include aspects outside the rational approach, such as emotions and personalities. Whether negotiations succeed or not are also

26

effected by many different factors such as who is included in the peace process, who participate at the negotiation table, the political climate in the country, and whether a compromise agreement is available or not (Walter 2013:5). Here, trust can play a crucial role.

2.2.1 Identities in peace negotiations

There is no doubt that interest play an important role in negotiations. However, various theoretical perspectives share an assumption that conflicts are not merely about resources or the interests of the parties, and therefore approaches of methods for conflict resolution can neither have this limited focus. Conflict always contains issues concerning identity, separating one party from the other (LeFebvre 2013). Identity therefore represents an important phase of negotiations, where these identities needs to shift from what separates the two parties, to what brings them together. In a war the parties have identities as enemies. Building trust is about changing that identity so that they in a less degree see each other as opposite, and rather as actors with a common goal.

Since the early 1960s there has been various scholars around the world who have been experimenting with and developed a new approach to international conflict resolutions, where identity issues are addressed, compared to the traditional interest-based approach. Conflicts are about both resources, interest *and* identities. There has been a development within theories of conflict resolution taking into account the role of identities. It is not identities that suddenly have played a role in conflict and conflict resolution, but it is rather the theoretical approach to this issue that has changed. Fisher (1996) describe these models with focus on identity as interactive conflict resolution (ICR), which

 "facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality" (Fisher, 1996:8 in Rothman, Olson 2001).

This approach is designed to address protracted social conflicts with the involvement of different identity groups. The focus of interest-based bargaining is to move the parties from a frame characterized by mutually exclusive positions to a collaborative frame of shared interests (Rothman, Olson 2001). Focusing on shared interest can help the parties reach an agreement.

However, this type of interest framing can sometimes appear to be successful only as an illusion; the cooperation is just for show. If identity issues are the root of a conflict, these unaddressed issues are likely to cause the conflict to re-emerge at a later time (Rothman, Olson 2001). An identity-based conflict are often dealing with identities of the fighting parties, and these identities contain some primary elements that are not negotiable. The focus in the approach has shifted from focus solely on interest to also include unfulfilled identities needs. In these cases, it can be hard to find shared context between the two parties, but when each party recognizes the legitimacy of the other party progress can finally be made.

Theory of identity based approach to conflict resolution is interesting through focus on trust building in peace negotiations. Building trust between the parties will to a certain degree very much rely on recognizing the underlying needs and values of each party, to try to understand and build trust between them by focusing on shared interests and searching for the factors that brings them together, rather than the identity that separates them. Confidence building measures, which I will discuss later, also facilitates these face-to-face activities such as communication as Fisher mentions, which promotes problem solving. The aim of moving the parties to a collaborative frame of shared interest overlaps with theories of how parties can build trust between them. It is about changing the identity from sworn enemies to actors working for a common goal. The identity as a FARC soldier or an army soldier is equally as much connected to identities as enemies – as opponents to one another. Addressing identity issue in connection with trust seeks to understand how trust building exercises can change this perspective of an identity as "enemy", to an identity of "partners" working towards a shared goal.

2.2.2 Who are the FARC?

When discussing identities, there is a need to understand who are the FARC. The FARC was founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the Communist Party, with a clear Marxist-Leninist ideology. FARC was mainly founded by small farmers and land workers who had grouped to fight against the increasing inequality in Colombia. The Security forces estimate that there were between 6000 and 7000 active FARC soldiers, with another 8,500 civilians who made up the FARC's supportive network. In 2002, the number was even higher when FARC was estimated to have around 20,000 active fighters. FARC has often been accused by human rights group for forcibly recruiting poor farmers and children, while FARC on their side says that

everyone who joined them did so voluntarily. In May 2016, according to their own figures, there were 21 children under the age of 15 in their ranks. Most of their fighters come from poor, rural communities, and include people from both sexes and all ages (BBC, 2016b).

Mayer provides a framework for analysing identity issues, and for categorizing identity based needs into four groupings: the need for meaning, community, intimate connectivity and autonomy (Mayer 2000, in LeFebvre 2013). The first need for meaning arises when a conflict, as the Colombian one, has lasted for so long that it has become part of the people's identity. Many FARC soldiers have spent their entire life in the guerrilla, and know no other reality. It can therefore be hard for people to resolve the conflict because somehow resolution means taking away a part of themselves. The second concerns a need to feel connected with a group that can provide a social home for people to feel safe and appreciated. This group affiliation can arise from various cultural sources like religion, ethnicity, professions but also an overall way of life. Thirdly, is the need for intimacy which can be fulfilled by a sense of connectivity with family and friends, while the forth one is the need to feel independence and freedom, often characterised as ethnic or cultural groups forming autonomous political entities (LeFebvre 2013). My informants from FARC often referred to the guerrilla as family, and many FARC members feared an uncertain future away from the mountains, their way of living and away from the organization after the war (Moloney, 2016).

Understanding these identities in the Colombian war can be of importance when trying to understand how the parties can reach a peace agreement.

2.2.3 Third party as a condition for trust

What is of interest in this thesis is to understand and analyse under which conditions such CBMs work. What conditions needs to be present for CBMs to have an effect? In Kelman's study of confidence building workshops in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman highlights the importance of the third party to serve as a repository of trust, who can bridge the gap of mutual distrust that divides the parties and that enables them to enter into a process of direct communication. In the beginning of such a process the enemies might not be able to trust each other, but they can have trust in the situation in which the interaction occurs. If they can place trust in the third party they can feel that the situation is safe, even with the mistrust in the other party still present. They can feel that their interest will be protected, that their confidentiality

will be respected and that no personal attacks will take place, they will not be exploited, and their participation will not be used against them (Kelman 2005:645).

A third party can therefore serve as a condition that needs to be present for parties to even enter into CBMs. If the mine clearance program is such a situation that both parties can have trust in, despite not trusting each other, and NPA is an actor that both party have confidence in, again despite the lack of trust in each other, one factor of how the pilot project can be a successful CBM can therefore be due to the condition that a third party is present, such as NPA has been in this case.

Since the relationship between the two fighting parties are characterized by a high level of mistrust, as seen in the Colombian conflict, previous research has highlighted the importance of "guarantors" for easing the dilemmas that mistrust has created. "*Guarantors are third parties who are willing and able to credibly enforce cooperative behaviour between the former foes*" (Höglund, Svensson 2006:383). These type of interactions - like the pilot project - are not risk-free given the depth of the mutual distrust among the parties, and meeting like this can arouse anxiety. The third party has the role of bridging the gap of this mutual distrust and enable them to enter into a process of direct communication (Kelman 2005:645).

Third party participation will therefore be an important factor when analysing my empirical findings, as to whether trust has been built or not. Without the presence of Norway as a mediator in the negotiations, and NPA as the important middle linkage for the pilot project, the mine clearance project might have looked quite different – if it would have taken place at all.

With this in mind, it can be assumed that third parties can be an important tool to create this cooperative behaviour between the government and the FARC. By this definition, I assume that the presence of NPA is a necessary condition that needs to be present to reduce the mistrust by being able to enforce cooperative behaviour between the FARC and the government through the pilot project. It is not a trust building tool in itself, but third party presence serve as a necessary condition for creating an environment where trust can be built.

2.3 Building trust among enemies

Kelman presents an approach to the gradual building of trust among enemies. He argues that even when enemies have an interest in making peace they are afraid to extend trust to each other to avoid jeopardizing their own existence. Therefore, efforts to resolve a conflict are confronted with a basic dilemma: parties cannot enter into a peace process without a certain degree of mutual trust, but they can neither build trust without entering into such peace negotiations. Kelman explores the ways that interactive problem solving – a form of unofficial diplomacy, can play to solve this dilemma.

Kelman ask central and important question in saying "*In a context of profound mutual distrust, how can a process of conflict resolution begin, both at the micro-level (of our workshops) and at the macro-level?*" (Kelman 2005:643). He argues he has found several concepts that are helpful in dealing with two closely intertwined issues concerning this work, related to its dual purpose of change and transfer from a difficult situation. He analyse how CBMs can help build trust between the groups so that the participants can interact productively, and adds another important aspect; how these CBMs and similar micro processes can contribute to trust building in the macro-system (Kelman 2005:644).

Several other scholars have explored these micro-processes in negotiations. Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson have studied how to reduce mistrust, with a case study of the peace negotiations in Sri Lanka. They argue that the lack of trust has been widely used as an explanation for the failure of peace negotiations. This is particularly true for situations characterized by high levels of vulnerability, like an internal armed conflict like the one between the FARC and the Colombian Government, where the warring parties have strong reasons to be distrustful of the other parties' intention. Still, there is little knowledge of how mistrust can be reduced between parties involved in peace negotiations (Höglund, Svensson 2006:367).

Trust is important in peace negotiations because negotiating the end of a violent conflict with the enemy is a risky endeavour. Trust is said to "presuppose a situation of risk" (Luhmann 1998:97 in Höglund, Svensson 2006:370). Negotiations are a risk because as a group, the other party can exploit concessions made in the peace negotiation process. Because of this, it is important to reduce mistrust in order to begin meaningful negotiations.

2.3.1 Confidence Building Measures

"*CBMs are not intended to deal with the root causes of conflicts, but advocates argue that these measures are the first step in turning hostile relationships into more accommodating ones. It is often said that "if CBMs won't work, nothing else will*"" (Marie-France Desjardins (1996), in Mason, Siegfried 2013:58).

CBMs can be a valuable tool to build trust between parties. Simon J. A. Mason and Matthias Siegfried define CBMs as "*a series of actions that are negotiated, agreed and implemented by the conflict parties in order to build confidence, without specifically focusing on the root causes of the conflict*" (Mason, Siegfried 2013:58). I will try to fit this understanding of CBMs into the issue of mine clearance in peace processes.

The use of CBMs can be "*an effective tool for preparing and deepening peace negotiations and mediation*" (Mason, Siegfried 2013:57). At the same time CBMs is often overestimated and it is therefore necessary to have a careful consideration of their limitations. Also, CBMs are often commonly misunderstood as only relevant in the military field, which can be seen as a narrow view that stems from the historical role that CBMs played in the Cold War (Mason, Siegfried: 2013). Mason and Siegfried argue that actors involved in violent conflict often do not even talk, but still a minimal degree of confidence in each other and in the negotiation process is indispensable for actors in a conflict if they are to negotiate a mutually acceptable outcome. Therefore, they argue, mediators assisting negotiations will seek to build confidence in all their efforts and throughout the entire mediation process. In the case of the Colombian war, it has been Cuba and Norway that have functioned as facilitators in the peace processes, and NPA as facilitators of the pilot project. Once again, I argue that this serve the function as a condition for trust.

"*CBMs can improve relationships, humanize the other, signal positive intentions and commitment, and avoid escalation. Through CBMs, mediators try to "humanize the conflict parties and to break down the image of an impeccable villain, usually incarnate beyond redemption (…) the idea is to help build a working trust by addressing easier issues, which will then allow parties to address the root causes of a conflict through substantive negotiations*" (Mason, Siegfried 2013:57).

With this clarification, Mason and Siegfried argue that CBMs are not an end in themselves, but rather a useful step in the ladder to negotiating and implementing peace agreements that addresses the key strategic concerns of the fighting parties (Mason, Siegfried 2013:58). CBMs can be seen as part of a larger set of communications between the fighting parties in a peace negotiation process (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371).

With this definition of CBMs in mind, I assume the pilot project can create trust, improve the relation between the parties, signal positive intentions and avoid escalation. It is a step for turning hostile relationships into something better, and to change the harming view that the parties have of each other, that often stands in the way of seeing beyond labels and understand that both parties wish for the same - an end to the conflict. I will use my empirical findings to see how the pilot project could have been used to change the view of the other party, find common ground and create better conditions for negotiations. Furthermore, with this definition I assume the pilot project can escalate the conflict and create more tension and negativity between the parties if it is not to be successful.

2.3.2 Conciliatory signalling

For CBMs to be successful, you must be able to tell when trust is been given. How do you recognize signs of trust from the other party? How do you know when your enemy is showing willingness to trust? Höglund and Svensson look into why some confidence-building strategies are more successful than others, and explore how a party can send conciliatory signals to the other party that will increase trust by the party exposing itself to three different kinds of political risks. They examine what they call "communicative signalling process" between the parties, a set of conciliatory signalling. The findings of Höglund and Svensson contribute to understand what kind of strategies can be used to build enough confidence between the fighting parties to elicit cooperative behaviour and enable to start serious peace negotiations. They look at how different form of political risk can be taken in the communicative process to transform foes into partners in peacemaking (Höglund, Svensson 2006:368).

After a long period of violence it is not realistic to assume a high level of trust, and confidence building is mainly about reducing the level of mistrust. While cooperation does not require trust, the reduction of mistrust is highly important in these situations because it facilitates

problem solving (Höglund, Svensson 2006:370). For a confidence-building strategy to be successful, a party must be able to show that the party is trustworthy in its claimed willingness to pursue peace negotiations. But after a long and brutal conflict, the characterization of the relationship between the parties are more likely to be dominated by mistrust, fear, hatred and other negative attitudes. In this case, in a bargaining situation, the parties have more incentives to cheat and mislead for tactical reasons. The key question then becomes how the parties, in a credible way, can convey their willingness for peace negotiations, despite this evident presence of cognitive barriers that hinder communication as well as strategic incentives to misrepresent intentions (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371).

Several scholars have suggested a strategy labelled "sticking one's neck out", where parties can increase their credibility by taking measures that impose a substantial cost onto themselves (Mitchell 2000:177, in Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). *"The trustworthy actor must do something that the untrustworthy actor would hesitate to do"* (Kydd 2000a:399 in Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). The cost here will make it possible to distinguish between those parties who are genuinely interested in peace negotiations and those who are negotiating for tactical reasons. In rational choice literature, communication like this is referred to as "costly signalling" - in contrast to "cheap talk" - which may be used to persuade the other party of its their credibility. By taking costly conciliatory initiative like this, the party's intentions can therefore be credibly communicated (Höglund, Svensson 2006).

"Parties may strategically use potential costs, vulnerabilities, and risk inherent in peace processes as a way of increasing the credibility of the conciliatory communication" (Höglund, Svensson 2006:371). Jeffrey Rubin argue for three different types of such potential costs involved in a de-escalation process (Rubin, Pruitt, Kim 1994); image loss, position loss and information loss. Höglund and Svensson have elaborated further on these three cost and use three slightly different measurement of trust in their analysis of the Sri Lankan peace process: image costs, security costs and information costs (Höglund, Svensson 2006:372).

Image cost covers the risk of parties losing their image and prestige, and particularly important are measures where the party may be portrayed as weak. The importance of image and status should not be undermined in a negotiation process (Höglund, Svensson 2006). One form of such an image cost can be by recognizing the other party to the conflict. Granting this type of recognition is costly because rebels fight for recognition and legitimacy (Guelke 2003, Zartman

1995, in Höglund, Svensson 2006), and when recognition has been offered once, it is hard to take back. Also, a leader risk being perceived as a traitor when cooperating with the enemy.

Where Rubin argues for position loss - cost related to losing the bargaining position in the negotiations – Höglund and Svensson rather use the concept of security cost. The parties risk incurring security costs when they reduce or give up some of their means to security, like giving up power and positions on ground or open up access to territory (Höglund, Svensson 2006:376). Taking such security risk can be an important form for conciliatory signal, that makes it more likely that mistrust will be reduced and cooperation can be initiated between the parties.

Thirdly, information cost covers the cost related to loss of information regarding strength, commitment, resources and any other type of crucial information in the context of conflict (Höglund, Svensson 2006:372). Höglund and Svensson argue how third-party monitoring and the organizational design of the negotiations are two measures that can increase transparency and reveal important information. Taking these actions of information risk can arguably send conciliatory signalling to the other party and reduce mistrust.

If a party is willing to take these conciliatory actions, the party runs the risk of suffering these types of losses. Most bargainers will only take such conciliatory actions if they trust the other party (Ross, LaCroix 1996:331), however, such actions serve as an important first step to signal trust. Conciliatory signalling is therefore important to show a party's willingness and readiness for negotiations.

In their research comparing two rounds of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka, Höglund and Svensson found that the second round of negotiations were more successful in initiating substantial negotiations as the conflicting parties showed readiness to counter internal criticism, to expose themselves to increased media attention, and to recognize the other party as an equal. I argue that this conciliatory signalling has also been used in the case of the peace negotiations in Colombia with the use of the pilot project.

I assume that these conciliatory signalling has been important for reducing mistrust between the Colombian government and the FARC, especially through position loss and information loss through the pilot project. When it comes to image loss, I assume that the readiness from

the parties to expose themselves to increased media attention will play an important role not only as a tool to reduce mistrust between the parties, but to portrait the trust building initiative to the Colombian population in general and to show the readiness and commitment from both parties to reach an agreement in the peace negotiations. Losing such an opportunity may fail to address this identity-based approach to a conflict that stretches beyond the negotiation table itself and out to the population in general. Therefore, talking about reduction of mistrust and building of trust between parties should also include the general public. In my analysis, I want to look at the factor of conciliatory signalling between the parties but also at their attitude towards the public; I assume that image loss towards the general public can increase the populations trust in the negotiations.

3 Research Design and Methodology

In this chapter, I will account for the methodological choices that I have made during my thesis, what sources I have used and how they have contributed to answering my research question. I will also account for the consequences that these choices have had on reliability and validity, as well as some of the challenges that I have faced during my research. To be able to answer my research question I have made use of both secondary literature and consultancy reports, as well as my own data collection during my fieldwork in Colombia.

3.1 Case study

A case study is a spatially delimited phenomenon which is observed at a single point in time or over a period of time, trying to explain the phenomenon (Gerring 2007). In a case study each case may provide a single observation or multiple (within-case) observations. Gerring stresses that "*a case may be created out of any phenomenon so long as it has identifiable boundaries and comprises the primary object of an inference*" (Gerring 2007:19). To be able to answer my research question, I have performed a qualitative case study of a mine clearance project in Colombia where I conducted interviews in El Orejón, Antioquia, Vistahermosa, Meta and in Bogotá, Colombia over a time period of five weeks.

Case studies have the potential to achieve high internal validity, meaning that the answers found have a high chance of being true (George, Bennett 2005:20). When looking into factors and variables as trust building I have chosen to perform a case study due to the difficulty measuring this variable. In addition, it gave me the possibility to consider contextual factors and provided me with an opportunity to identify and measure the indicators that best represents the theoretical concept of trust building. For this thesis, an in-depth study enables me to gain insight at a micro level on how the different actors perceive these matters, and has given me the possibility to analyse them in relation to external reports.

Doing a case study like this will give me the opportunity to check facts, consult multiple sources and analyse a specific case, which can lead me to gain more knowledge of the mechanisms in this field (Gerring:2007:60). Furthermore, it provided me with the possibility to go deeper into the matter (George, Bennett 2005:20), as I have been able to interview the participants of the pilot project, talk with local community and analyse the relationship between

different actors. This would probably have been impossible to get an insight in without the opportunity to visit the mine clearance field and talk with the actors myself.

3.1.1 External and internal validity

Performing a case study could face some challenges, especially in terms of external validity. This means the extent to which the case can be representative to a broader case, such as the population as a whole. The use of case study is therefore able to make general assumptions only to well-defined types of cases, but in return provides a high degree of explanatory richness (George, Bennett 2005:31). A case study will bring the researcher closer to a real-life situation and thereby also give a greater insight into the different nuances in the matter being studied (Flyvbjerg 2001:72). What a case study lack in external validity, it makes up for regarding internal validity: With a thorough investigation of just one or a few cases, case studies can both uncover or refine theory about certain causal mechanisms or phenomenon (George, Bennett 2005:31).

In a case study it is easier to ensure that the indicators that are chosen are the best to measure the theoretical concepts in a given context, since case studies rely on detailed descriptions of the case studied (Bollen 1989:184). In the case study of trust building exercise in the Colombian peace negotiation, such a case will be valuable as a tool in examining the relationship between trust, trust building exercises, and peace talks. Due to natural differences from one case of confidence building measures to another, it is important to be cautious in regard to the study's external validity. However, I argue that external validity on such a tangible and concrete measure would not necessarily be as challenging, due to the fact that the same project could be conducted in other peace negotiations.

3.2 Fieldwork

I found fieldwork to be the preferable choice as my research concerns the establishment of trust through a concrete project that took place during the peace negotiations where I had the possibility to go to Colombia and interview the participants of this project. As Kappler argues, "*In the research of conflict, peace and development, fieldwork has become an indispensable element of data gathering*" (Kappler 2013:125).

I conducted a fieldwork in Colombia over a period of five weeks in February and March 2018. During my fieldwork, I carried out interviews at three locations in Colombia; Bogotá, and NPA's mine clearance program in El Orejón and in Vistahermosa. The pilot project was not conducted in Vistahermosa, but in Santa Helena. However, due to security issues the mine clearance program in Santa Helena is put on hold, and I therefore visited Vistahermosa instead. Here, I was able to interview several of NPA staff and local community who originally participated in the pilot project in Santa Helena. In addition, I had a unique opportunity to interview FARC soldiers because the government recently approved an agreement between NPA and the FARC to allow so-called "explosive experts" in the FARC to be part of and cooperate with NPA on mine clearance projects. This made it possible for me to talk with FARC's explosive experts in El Orejón who had participated in the pilot project in El Orejón a year earlier.

Being able to stay at NPA's campsite in El Orejón and Vistahermosa and spend time with the informants on a daily basis, gave me the possibility to have several informal conversations with both NPA employees, local community and FARC soldiers related to my research question, which otherwise would have been difficult to obtain. We would eat breakfast, lunch and dinner together, peel sugar pees together, play or watch football, and even attend a party and a soccer tournament in the local community. These conversations and interactions gave me an important insight into the life "in camp" and gave me an insight to how it might have been during the pilot project, as we were living in the exact same camp where the pilot project were conducted.

Beside from this important insight, these informal conversations and interactions invited me to see how the NPA employees, the FARC soldiers and the local community interacted with each other, missing only the BIDES who are no longer there since the pilot project has ended. Collecting data through observations and informal conversations might challenge the reliability of the study, concerning the chance of another researcher to get the same results might be threatened (LeCompte, Goetz 1982:35).

3.2.1 Meta data

A methodological challenge relevant for this research project was how to conduct interviews in situations of war and violence, and to what extent a researcher can trust narratives that are generated in politically sensitive contexts. My interview guide mostly consisted of questions

about the pilot project, but several of my informants are direct victims of the war, which they stated in the interviews. Asking questions related to the peace negotiations and the fighting parties could trigger certain feelings or underlying issues that Fujii defines as meta-data – the spoken and unspoken expressions about people's interior feelings and thoughts (Fujii 2010:231-232). These are not always articulated in their stories or answers to interview questions, and can include rumours, silences, and invented stories.

Meta-data can be just as valuable as the interviews themselves, because they give indications about how the social and political landscape is shaping what people might say to me during the interview. Forgetting about meta-data, a researcher might risk misinterpreting ambiguities, overlook important details and thereby draw incorrect conclusions (Fujii 2010:232). Doing research in a post-conflict society like Colombia, and studying a project that has direct connection with the warfare and the peace negotiations, could trigger this type of meta-data that Fujii is highlighting.

3.2.2 Practical challenges in a "post-conflict" country

Even though Colombia has reached a peace agreement with the FARC, the security dimensions of doing a fieldwork in an area either in conflict or in post-conflict time, has to be taken seriously. Some security precautions to be taken were to ensure a good contact in the country if anything should happen, timing and relying on local knowledge (Binns 2006:15). NPA functioned as my main contact point, and my visits to the field were carefully organized, planned and followed-up by my main contact person in NPA, especially due to the security risks still highly present in the country. To have this insurance and help from people with local knowledge and long experience within the field were of great help to me during my fieldwork.

However, the fieldwork did not pass without some practical challenges. I met my first challenge already a week after I landed in Bogotá. My planned trip to El Orejón, Briceño in Antioquia, an eight hour drive from Medellin, was supposed to start on a Sunday so I would get a full week in the field. Unfortunately, four days before my planned departure, the ELN announced a national "travel ban warning" lasting for three days starting on the day of my departure. As NPA takes no risk and the peace talks with the ELN had stopped only three weeks prior to this due to an ELN attack killing several police officers, I had to postpone my visit to the field until the risk had passed. This shortened my stay in El Orejón with about three days, but these kind

of security situations is exactly what Binns' points out, and relying on local knowledge in this case was my only option.

Several other situations occurred during my stay in Colombia, everything from physical access to the place I was visiting, to small encounters with different people. Getting to El Orejón was a whole day's ride; first flying to Medellin before an eight hour drive up the mountains, where the last five hours took place on an unpaved, difficult to access, bumpy and dusty road. In this area, due to security constrictions, we had to drive in a NPA car the last five-hour drive from Yarumal to El Orejón, Briceño and always travel during daylight. In the area of Briceño you still have the representation of the ELN, FARC dissidents and risk of violence over land restitution and coca cultivation due to criminal groups. The same risk are present in Meta with the addition of FIAC (Fuerzas Irregulares Armadas de Colombia) – a neo-guerrilla organization and Los Puntilleros – a small paramilitary group (Norwegian People's Aid, 2018).

I had to go through a security brief by NPA before I could visit the mine clearance field, and I had a local contact point at both fields I visited. NPA have defined the most significant risk in terms of likelihood and impact of NPA, varying from traffic accident and natural disasters, to violent criminal assault, deliberate attack by guerrilla and kidnapping. There was a constant follow-up by NPA during my fieldtrip, and without them I would not have been able to visit the fields or conduct most of my interviews. They functioned as main focal point during my fieldwork.

Getting to Vistahermosa was "only" a six hours drive from Bogotá, which compared to El Orejón felt like nothing. When interviewing Colonel Benitez from BIDES I had to take a five hour drive from Bogotá, just to do a 1,5 hour interview before heading back to Bogotá the same day, a ten hours' drive in total.

3.3   Interview as Research Method

The methodological strategy I used in my case study consisted of collecting information through qualitative interviews during a fieldwork. Interviews can be an important source of information that otherwise would not have been available, for example through relying solely on observations or other available sources (Bryman 2004:340). I conducted 22 interviews with 23 different representatives from the FARC, UNMAS, NPA, The BIDES, The Colombian

Campaign to ban landmines (CCCM), Descontamina and local community from El Orejón and Santa Helena.

Ragin (1994) points out several goals for social research that will have an influence on the choice of methodological strategies. One of these goals that have impacted the construction of this project, is giving voice to the interviewees. The lived experience of the participants of the pilot project is of particular interest to me in this study. Therefore, giving voice to the participants of the pilot project and the local community has affected my analysis. I focus on stories from the participants by using their view as a source of information and giving their stories the majority of the space in my analysis. However, the findings are supported by secondary literature and data, such as news articles and a variety of reports from different NGOs, think tanks and state institutions. Here, I must point out that my lack of language skills have prevented me from accessing considerably amount of secondary literature on this issue, as many articles and reports are written in Spanish.

3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

There are several important aspects to have in mind when conducting interviews during fieldwork. For this thesis, I have chosen a semi-structured interview style (Bryman 2004:320), meaning the interviews were conducted around a list of broad questions that I had prepared beforehand. It was important to have flexibility to ask follow-up questions as the answers varied a lot. A semi-structured interview can ensure that I cover the areas I find important, but also provide the interviewees with the opportunity to bring up their own ideas and thoughts (Willis 2006:145). As I was interviewing different people with a completely different connection to the pilot project, this flexibility was also important to be able to ask relevant question depending on whom I was interviewing.

By using interviews as a method, I get the advantage of making it possible to reconstruct previous events and get access to that information. However, such reconstruction has limits regarding information and reliability. It is limited by the informants' memory where people have a tendency to *interpret* events retrospectively, rather than relate them objectively. Still, I find these accounts of previous events useful in my thesis as they reflect the respondents' perspective on the pilot project, but having in mind how they might be shaped and coloured by the present knowledge about the events (Bryman 2004:340).

3.3.2 Selection and collection

In qualitative study the practical access to respondents may have a big influence on what ends up being the final selection of respondents (Bryman 2004:334). This can be an issue being a foreign researcher doing research through fieldwork over just a short period of time, and it can therefore be an important tool to establish some contacts in the area. For my thesis, I used contacts as door-openers to get in contact with relevant informants (Weiner:1964), as I do not speak Spanish and neither had any contacts in Colombia beforehand. Hence, NPA became my main contact point and door-opener when setting up interviews with different actors.

Who you use as a door-opener is of particular importance in Colombia – a country who during the war has learned to be wary of everyone. Who the informants are contacted on behalf of could therefore have a lot to say when it comes to how much they open up, their attitude towards it and if they at all want to meet. The use of certain door-openers may affect the findings both concerning who I got to interview but also the setting of the interviews. A different door-opener could have provided me with other interviewees. Another potential result would be to conduct the same interviewees but get different findings due to the door-opener's effect on the informant. In order to avoid such situations, I would be very careful in having my interpreter explain that I was an independent researcher.

The setting of the interviews can also influence the material gathered (Willis 2006:148, Fuji 2010). Willis argue that "*you need to think very carefully about how the location may affect the material gathered, the dynamics of the interview and also the way in which you present yourself to your potential interviewees*" (Willis 2006:148). I had limited opportunity to control where the interviews took place. However, while conducting interviews in the field I let my informants choose were to sit and talk, which ended up with the interviews being conducted in a tent, under a tree, at camp site or at the elementary school in the village. This was to try to secure as private conversations as possible. Conducting interviews in a location the interviewee is comfortable with may give you a chance to get insight into an important location and see the dynamics, but it can also lead to distractions.

Two of my interviewees commented on this effect of the location. Angela from FARC, whom I interviewed in El Orejón, said that if the interview was held somewhere else she would not

have shared the same joy, enthusiasm and energy about the subject, as El Orejón represents "*every day, every night, every planning, every life, every challenge, and awakes a bunch of feelings and emotions*" about the pilot project. Also a Fernando from Descontamina who participated in the pilot in El Orejón, but who was interviewed in Bogotá, commented on how he probably would have responded differently or come up with more stories to tell if the interview had happened out in the field.

3.3.3 Translator – a blessing or a curse?

A major challenge during my fieldwork was language, as I do not speak Spanish. I therefore needed a translator, which potentially can lead to some concerns. As Janet Bujra says, "*The problem with dependence on local translators is that one may be restricted and trapped within their perspective on their own society*" (Bujra 2006:174). Having a translator might be negative in the sense that the information has to go through another person before reaching me, but there are also positive aspects of using a translator. Letting the informants speak in their own language may give them the freedom to communicate more naturally and express themselves in a way that makes it easier for them to share information. It can also be helpful to have someone from the local community joining the interviews, as the presence of a foreign researcher might feel strange and intimidating for some.

This is something Axel Borchgrevink points out when arguing how interpreters who are knowledgeable about the local conditions can serve as a fact check against false information (Borchgrevink 2003:110). My translator definitely served this function. After the interviews we would sit down and go through the notes, especially certain points where I for example had doubted the honesty of an answer or if a person was making a joke or not. Having a translator who knows the local context and culture was of particular help to me when interviewing the local community. Relying on a translator might provide more access to information, that otherwise would not have been accessible. However, Borchgrevink (2016:109) points out how this "interpreter effect" can work both ways:

"*Just as informants may react to one interpreter by closing up and denying information, another interpreter may serve as a gate-opener for the researcher by serving as warrant of good intentions.*"

During the visit to El Orejón, I notice how my translator functioned as this gate-opener. In the beginning it was difficult to get in contact with the FARC soldiers, whom I was told did not want to talk to me, and I sensed some form of rejection when trying to approach them. However, having my translator with me – a young, positive, outgoing Colombian woman – helped loosen up the situation and resulted in getting the interview. We interacted with them in daily activities like preparing vegetables for dinner, and talked about everything from marriage to life in Norway. Here, I think my translator played a crucial role in creating a relaxed and comfortable situation I would not have been able to provide myself even if speaking the language.

Borchgrevink argues how interpreters can serve as key informants if they are from the locality being studied, and can become an invaluable source of information and discussion partner. Still, communication is to a certain degree hampered when it needs to go through an extra link; it takes longer time, you might lose the direct contact with you interviewee and body language and meta-communication might be lost on the way. The translation in itself also involves interpretation and explanation of cultural context, which can add an additional filter through which the information is screened (Borchgrenvink 2003:110). However, in several of the interviews I did in English with native Spanish speakers, conducting the interviews in Spanish with a translator might have been a better option, as their English fell short on certain issues to be able to explain themselves properly, which might have led to some misunderstandings.

I used a local translator who has a good knowledge of both the mine clearance projects and the peace process, but with no attachment to any "party" that could interrupt her role as an interpreter. I used four different translator for my 22 interviews, where three of the translators were used on only four interviews, while I had the same translator for the rest. Working with different translators can be an advantage and may facilitate access to different spheres, depending on their sex, social status or differences alongside other fundamental dimensions (Borchgrenvink 2003:112). In my case, I experienced more challenges with having to use other translators, such as them not having the vocabulary for this particular field as well as lacking enough experience as a translator. For two interviews I unfortunately had to use an interpreter from NPA, which is challenging due to the role of NPA in the pilot project. This could affect the answers I was given.

3.4 Operationalization of theoretical concepts: How to know trust when you see it?

There is a clear need of operationalization of the relevant theoretical concepts in this thesis. Operationalization is about making the theoretical concepts measurable, and move the theory from systematized concepts to indicators (Adcock, Collier 2001:530). Operationalization helps define a concept so that it can be measured, empirically and quantitatively, and is important for the reliability and validity of this thesis. To secure validity of a study there is a need of coherence between the indicators that are chosen and the theoretical concepts that the researcher wants to measure (George, Bennett 2005:19). For this study, the role of trust in peace negotiations will be the systematized concept, while the indicators are the different functions to build this trust.

It is challenging to use a fluid concept like "trust". That is why it is in need of operationalization in this thesis. The difficulty is to be able to answer "*How do I know trust when I see it?*". In my analytical framework, I will judge my interviewees and their answer from my definition of trust. Together with secondary literature about the peace negotiations in Colombia and the data collected through my fieldwork, the provided data will be used to examine these indicators of trust.

I define trust in this paper in accordance with William E. Ross and Jessica LaCroix in their article "multiple meanings of trust in negotiation theory and research: a literature review and a integrative model" where they have tried to bring together the different definitions of trust and get an overview. One research orientation treats "cooperation" and "competition" as behavioural operationalization of psychological trust and distrust, where one interpretation of this perspective is "*if a negotiator makes a cooperative move, by definition, the negotiator trusts the other party*" (Ross, LaCroix 1996:322). Another approach to measuring trust is by analysing trust as caused by predictability. The suggestion is that a pattern of repeated, predictable behaviour is necessary to establish trust, hence the focus is on establishing trust and not simply on operationalizing the concept. Butler (1991) supports the idea that trust may follow from predictable behaviour, and identifies ten conditions of trust; consistency, availability, competence, discreetness, fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise fulfilment, and receptivity (Ross, LaCroix 1996:325).

Lastly, a third perspective defines trust as caused by a problem-solving perspective. This approach relates trust to factors that enhance an integrative bargaining orientation on the part of the negotiators, which may include suffering a mutual fate if failure occurs or a mutual awareness that both sides have a problem-solving perspective (Ross, LaCroix 1996:327). With these different approaches in mind, I have focused on certain criteria for actions and way of speaking that can indicate trust in the other party. These includes;

1. Voluntary, interactive actions outside forced/mandatory work tasks

2. Referring to the other party by terms of friends, Colombian, good person, and positive attributions about the other party such as funny, nice, kind, good etc., and not by labels

3. Telling stories of positive interactions with one another, using terms as "we", not "them/us"

4. Cooperation and "problem-solving" activities or references

5. Talking about family, friends, life, not limited to life in camp

However, as important as realizing when trust appears, is to know the absence of it. Knowing when trust have not been built can give important information about which conditions need to be present for trust to appear. Therefore, I have developed a set of criteria for actions implying that trust has *not* been built. These includes;

1. Talking negative, hateful or indifferent about the other party, participants or the pilot project

2. Focusing on the negative aspects of the pilot, what went wrong and showing regret

3. Separating between "them" and us", using negative terms as enemies, terrorist, killers etc.

4. Not willing to cooperate or give the opposite party a chance

5. Assuming the worst of the other party: misleading, lying, bad intentions, feeling scared

While these measurements are best at analysing trust at the interpersonal level between people on ground, I have chosen to use a different measurement for the negotiation level and community level. I find conciliatory signalling to be best for analysing trust between parties at the negotiation table and to the community. The reason for this evaluation is due to the lack of enough interviewees at the negotiation table to be able to tell if trust has been built at the interpersonal level. It is therefore more relevant and fruitful for me to analyse if trust has been built between the parties and also between the negotiations and the Colombian public. To do so, I need to analysis other signs of trust then the measurement used on the interpersonal level.

For the negotiation level and community level I therefore use conciliatory signalling as signs of trust. Conciliatory signalling can be costly for the parties because it includes giving up certain goods to show good will and to show that you are serious about the negotiations. Such signalling can help reduce mistrust between the parties. As mentioned in my theory chapter, this signalling can come in the form of information cost, security cost or image cost. I assume both the FARC and the Colombian government has been willing to give such conciliatory signalling and expose themselves to such cost on several occasions.

Information cost occurs when parties are willing to give or reveal important information to show the other party that they are serious. This type of information can be through organization of the negotiations, like communication, transparency and decision-making, or through third-party monitoring. Security cost concerns the risk attached with giving up power and position on ground and open up access to territories, which increases a party's vulnerability and chance of being exploited by the other opponent, but therefore at the same time can reduce mistrust between them if a party is willing to do these efforts. Lastly, image cost can be costly through internal criticism and willingness to expose themselves nationally and internationally to show the other party their efforts towards peace. The following three types of conciliatory signalling has been operationalized with the definitions by Höglund and Svensson, and further developed with my hypothesis of how to find these signs:

Information cost – revealing information about strength, commitment and resources – is based upon 1) third party monitoring and 2) organizational design of the negotiations. Here, signs of third party monitoring will be analysing the role of NPA as a condition for trust, while organisational design will be the communication between the pilot and Havana.

Image cost – the risk of losing image and prestige – is based on 1) Recognition, 2) Media Exposure and 3) Internal Criticism. Recognition is based on the two parties recognition of each other by analysing how the parties talk and refer to one another, and how the agreement between them was formed and conducted. Media Exposure will be analysed based on media outreach to the public: if there existed a strategy and a goal concerning media exposure, and to what degree the parties were committed to this. Internal Criticism is analysed by looking at how the pilot project was portrayed and discussed within FARC, the government and BIDES.

Security cost – reduce or give up some of their means to security – will be based on 1) Open up access to territory and 2) Give up power and position on ground. This is measured by looking at the selection of the two sites for the pilot project, the security protocols for the pilot project and disarmament.

3.5 Summary

Timing, preparation, informants, translator and meta-data are all relevant factors that are both important and challenging when it comes to the methodology in this research project. I have tried to take measures to mitigate the different challenges and to secure validity of the findings. Lastly, I have tried to operationalize trust and provide some clear indicators that I have used to identify trust *and* distrust when conducting my interviews and throughout my thesis.

For the next chapters, I have chosen to divide my empirical findings into three distinctions: local level, negotiation level and community level. This way, I can analyse where and to what degree the pilot project had an effect. Based on my operationalization of trust and distrust, I will look at how conciliatory signalling can build trust, and analyse if the pilot project has been such a tool for confidence building measure (CBM) to achieve this. Furthermore, I analyse which conditions needs to be facilitated for mine clearance to function as a trust building exercise.

4 Analysis: project level

"We were saving each other's lives by clearing the mines together"

(FARC soldier).

The project level concerns the pilot projects in El Orejón and Santa Helena. I have chosen to separate between those who have experienced trust – the *participants* of the pilot project - and those who play the role of explaining and facilitating the establishment of trust, the *facilitators*. In this study, NPA have the role as facilitators, while all other actors, the FARC, the BIDES, Descontamina and the local community, has the role as participants. In addition to these main categories, I have conducted interviews with actors who were not part of the pilot project, such as UNMAS and CCCM. These interviews are used as contributions to understand the pilot project from an outside perception.

4.1 Signs of trust

4.1.1 Voluntary interactions, positive labelling and cooperation

Some of the signs of trust, such as "cooperation", "voluntary interactions" and "no labelling" was evident throughout my interviews with the participants of the pilot project. These signs of trust, however, might not have been as evident the first few weeks of the pilot project, but was something that developed over time. Vanessa Finson, head of NPA in Colombia, highlights the importance of co-existence in this trust building exercise. She explains how they made everyone wear common uniforms - despite the fact that no one wanted to in the beginning - and they even made a pilot project logo which Vanessa points out sounds silly but is something she thinks brought the people together. An informant from Descontamina also mentions this factor of creating common uniforms, and removing labels. Continuing, Vanessa talks about how they "forced" everyone to live together in the same camp. At the beginning, both the BIDES and the FARC wanted to live separately in their own houses, but NPA disagreed with this. It was important for the parties to live together, to eat together, make plans together and have social interactions with one another. These acts removes the labels of "FARC" and "army" and creates a space for the parties to see beyond their usual distinction.

During my fieldwork in El Orejón I stayed at the same camp site of NPA where the parties lived for almost two years during the pilot project. I was told that the way of life in the camp

was pretty much the same as during the pilot project. The area is not big, with just one large table in the middle where they all share their breakfast, lunch and dinner. There are only two bathrooms, five rooms with bunk beds and tents on the backside of the main camp house where the deminers are staying. I understand how most of my informants mentioned the importance of "co-existing" several times. There is no way to "hide"; if you live in the camp you live together.

The life in the camp of Santa Helena was just as close as the one in El Orejón. Two men were living in a room of 3m x 3m, 12 people living in the same house. There were no connection with the outside world which many of my informants claims "forced" people to talk to each other. The living condition and the way the project was conducted made the parties create an environment beside the work situation. This was combined with playing football, playing cards, watching movies, talking about the past and sharing stories – all signs of voluntary, interactive actions that took place beside the mandatory work. Mario from NPA explains how there was tension the first month, but after that people started to get closer and "share everything". He claims this process created a confidence that still is present today.

"I felt that for them (in Havana) the pilot project was the first hope (...) the first way they showed the country that peace was possible. It was the first time in the history of Colombia that the two actors of the conflict could sleep in the same house. Not only sleep in the same house, but living together, doing things together, trust each other" (Mario, NPA).

"The way you see the camp now is almost how it was during the pilot; we eat together, clean up, keep it tidy. It's basically the same co-living and coexistence. During the pilot, we had barbeque every Saturday organized by the NPA (..)We got together as one family at the end" (FARC informant).

Most of my informants who participated in the actual pilot on the ground highlights these daily interactions between the different actors. They were sharing meals together, living in the same camp, in the same bunk beds, and sharing stories from the war. Talks, storytelling and playing football seem to be daily interactions in the camp, and clear signs of voluntary interactions and focus on talking about issues not only limited to the life in camp. They also had daily update in the evening about their work, the progress made and the plan ahead.

Highlighting stories of positive interactions between the parties was a common finding in my interviews. Both local community, NPA staff, informants from Descontamina, FARC and the BIDES representative, told stories of positive interactions that took place during the pilot project. Such stories were often about events that took place during the war, positive stories from the pilot project and personal interactions they had with one another. A BIDES soldier and a FARC soldier who participated in the pilot project were sharing stories and talking about the war and how they, at one point, came really close in battle. When talking further, it turns out that they had both grown up in the same village, attended the same elementary school, had the same teacher and at some point, even dated the same girl. They became really good friends during the pilot, a friendship that my informants emphasise is still strong.

Regarding stories of positive interactions, I was told the following story by a FARC soldier. He and the other participants of the pilot project were barbecuing together one night. A "huge army man", one of the captains, walked through the door and was offered a beer by the FARC soldier. He turned to him and said *"are you "his name"? Is it really you?"* Then he took out a photo of his pocket and showed the face of the FARC soldier, telling him he had been looking for him for the past two years. At one point, the army soldier even had him in his target through the gun lens for ten minutes, but he could not shoot because a woman was in his way. An NPA informant says they were drinking, talking and even crying until the early hours of the next morning. The FARC soldier also had an encounter with another sergeant who previously was chasing him. He explained how he felt scared in the beginning of the project, as there were about 40 army soldiers and only three of them (the FARC soldier), but this changed over time and in the end they became friends. *"He is like a brother to me"*. Even when he was drunk he (the army soldier) never insulted him or treated him differently, the FARC soldier explained.

Angela (FARC) also met a soldier who had been chasing her in battle before. She explains how they established a really strong friendship during the pilot project, a friendship that still exist. When I met Angela she was walking around the camp in El Orejón with enthusiasm, a sort of authority and she was laughing and making jokes with everyone. I did not even notice at once, but she was constantly followed by around eleven-armed security men. She was one of the FARC delegates at the negotiation table in Havana at the beginning. *"Every person who was working here (in the pilot project) just forgot about the conflict"*. She defines the pilot project as a project to rescue the human being that was inside each person, without labels and stuff. Angela refers to the participants of the project as "us/we", she does not use labels and she, as

many of my informants, focus on the positive experiences from the pilot project. Talking about the participants as "friends" and "humanize" the other party is definitions that was mentioned several times during interviews with different participants, even by some informants from the NPA.

Another positive sign of trust that was clearly emphasized by my informants were the role of coexistence. Several informants explained how the daily interactions made them realize that the conflict had been fought between the same people. Marcela (FARC), a former war prisoner, highlighted this by saying "*The people from the FARC are poor and humble people, but during the pilot you saw that the soldiers were exactly the same*". They have the same social and economic conditions, and they noticed that the conflict was being fought between themselves; the poorest of the society. Marcela emphasized how the interaction of living together, the FARC and the army forces, created a reconciliation process. Drawing from this, the coexistence seem to have created a space for the parties to see beyond labels and to explore what connects them, rather than what separates them.

In the pilot project, the participants were distracted from the conflict and neither of them were holding arms. Several informants emphasized how the pilot project was important in creating space were they had the opportunity to talk, listen to each other and to understand reasons of why they were fighting, a space they never had access to before. Soldiers and guerrilla who previously had met in confrontation and in a battle, were not facing each other in another scenario, building something together instead of destroying something (Marcela, FARC) . "*The war was too intense right before we started all this. Probably neither of us (the FARC or the army) would have existed had this experience never happened*" (Marcela, FARC).

Over time, the pilot project seem to reflect many positive signs of trust. However, the project faced some challenges in the beginning. The FARC informant, who joined FARC when he was only 11 years old and who has spent the last 25 years with the guerrilla up in the mountains, said the project was tough in the beginning, being the first time the FARC and the army were together without fighting. Before joining the project he had been shot in combat. When the pilot project started there was not even a mutual ceasefire in place. The FARC soldier explained how they felt that an time the project could break down. But after a while when they started to get closer by talking he realized that the army are also just people, and they got to know them.

What he liked the most about the project was building trust and prove that they could work together, and to see that they could accomplish that mission together.

Yeison from NPA is sure the coexistence made them become friends. He describes the pilot project as a facilitator, and stresses how they constantly had to help each other. In the beginning it was not easy between the parties, but NPA arranged soccer matches where they mixed the teams; NPA, FARC, BIDES and Descontamina on the same team. They also invited the local community to join. After this Yeison saw a development, how one military helped a guerrilla soldier passing some phone numbers over to a new phone, cutting each other's hair. It was not without problems making all these different actors working and living together, and sometimes confusion did occur. He thinks NPA functioned as the "father of the house" with the role of keeping a good environment. For him, it was not a demining project, but a coexistence project to make the different personalities, the different way of thinking, become friends (Yeison, NPA).

It is clear that CBMs is an important tool to improve relationships between parties, humanize the other side and signal positive intentions and commitment. Also, it can avoid escalation (Mason, Siegfried 2013:57). Several mention how the coexistence, the football matches, card games and storytelling made them connect with the other side, see them from a new perspective and for many of them, become friends. On several occasions, the pilot project has been the one concrete and tangible exercise that the parties gathered around when they were on the brick of escalation of the conflict. This becomes clear for example in the case were the FARC broke their ceasefire and the government retaliated. Further on, mediators, in this case NPA, can use CBMs to try to humanize the conflicting parties to break down the image of an impeccable villain. The goal is not to make them like each other or address these root causes of the conflict, but rather to build a working trust by addressing easier issues (Mason, Siegfried 2013:57). Clearing of landmines seems to be an issue that both parties find important to address, as they both have the interest of the civil community in mind. Here, the coexistence and working together seem to have had this effect on humanizing the other party, forcing them to see the person behind the label and get to know each other.

54

4.1.2 Facilitator becomes participant

When interviewing NPA staff who participated at the pilot, I expected to get answers more related to their role as facilitators of the project and how they felt that trust had been built between the parties. However, several NPA informants answered the question as if they themselves were part of this trust building exercise. The answers came from the perspective of a participant, from the point of view of a "Colombian" rather than as a facilitator – a neutral party who were supervising the project. Several of the NPA staff come from the cities and admit that they had certain perceptions about both the army and the guerrilla before starting the pilot project. Mario says that in school and in the media they teach you that the conflict consist of the army that is part of the state and are the "good and intelligent guys", while the guerrilla is portrayed as the "violent and bad ones". But meeting them in the pilot project Mario got a different perception.

"When I met these guys (FARC soldiers) I realized, ok come on, who are the bad ones here? Yes of course in the war you can see that both parties are sometimes good and sometimes bad, but at that point I realized; come on, you can find the goodness between both parties (...) I know these guys made a lot of mistakes. They told me, and maybe they don't repent about it. But if you don't know (about that) you can find good things. Maybe they never had my opportunities to be a good man?"

Yeison describes the project as the best experience of his life, because he was seeing enemies for 50 years being friends, meeting at the same table and eating dinner together. Another informant from NPA explained how the pilot project was an important experience as a Colombian, because the project made it possible to "humanize" the FARC; understand them and respect them in a certain way, even though it is difficult to understand what has been done (Informant, NPA).

"To be honest, I think they were more than colleagues, I think they were friends. It was incredible to see a sergeant from the army and a commander from the guerrilla talking at the same table, speaking about the war, how they were 20 minutes away from each other in battle almost killing each other, and now talking. Understanding that everyone are from the same villages, they have the same families, the same feelings, just their way of thinking is different" (Yeison, NPA).

For Mario it has been amazing to be part of the Colombian history, as he calls it. Closing the pilot project was difficult for him. He kept the communication with the guerrilla through Facebook. He hopes that one day he can tell his grandchildren that he was part of the peace agreement. When looking at the photos he took from the pilot he is mind blown of what he himself has participated in.

"This guy (a FARC soldier) was one of the most dangerous guys in the country and he was talking to me! And now he is I don't know, a politician, a good man, but in that moment he was one of the most wanted in Colombia. He was talking to me, and he was part of the project, believing that the peace was possible" (Mario, NPA).

Even though Mario was a *facilitator*, he and many of the other informants from NPA tells these stories showing the blurry lines between a *facilitator* and a *participator,* at least the for the Colombian NPA staff. Also Juan Camilo (NPA) explains the project from the point of view as a Colombian;

"It was the first gesture of peace, you know. The first time all parties were working together after 50 years (...) I am good friends with these guys from FARC, actually I thought (playing) guitar to one of them. And his story, he is just another victim, I mean there is no side.(...) All my life I lived in the city and that was my way of live, my way of thinking; they are just bunch of criminals, let's kill them all and problem solved. A lot of people think like that. But after you get in contact with the real deal, what's happening, it is another world you know".

I found that the NPA staff mentions many indicators of trust, showing trust being built between them and the participants. This strengthens the argument that such confidence building measures can be an important tool to create trust to the population in general, not only between the fighting parties. Seeing how the local community and the Colombian NPA staff was positively affected by the project, gives positive indications that such trust building exercises can establish trust between all parties involved.

4.2 Signs of distrust

4.2.1 Negative labelling and separation

Kelman talks about successive approximations, and how each party needs some reassurance from the other in order to build trust, and that this process must happen over time. The coexistence and the daily interactions between the representatives from the government and the FARC might have been a success over time, but in the beginning, this reassurance might have been hard for the participants to see. There were a lot of obvious mistrust in the early days of the project, and several of my informants mention a rather hard time during the first weeks filled with tension. For this time period, the pilot project was characterized by several signs of distrust: negative labelling of the other party, fear of the other party's intention and the possibilities of being deceived. There was also a lack in cooperation between the BIDES and the FARC on the conduction of the mine clearance work. When an army soldier stepped on a landmine and died just a couple of weeks into the project, the distrust between the parties became evident: the army did not trust the information from FARC and the FARC were not trusting the army's intensions.

A FARC soldier claim that the accident could have been avoided if they (the army) had listen to them (the FARC). The death of the soldier was a very bad experience for the FARC soldiers, as they already felt they had created a relationship between them. They had seen that the soldiers were from poor families, just doing their jobs. Several claimed mistrust was the tragic reason for the death. Juan Camilo (NPA) said the accident put everyone in shock. They lived together, they got to know each other and the soldier had already become a friend. It was very tough when he died, especially for the FARC soldiers (Juan Camilo, NPA).

While most of my informants explained the accident as the result of the mistrust between the parties in the early days of the pilot, Colonel Benitez from BIDES, however, put the whole blame on the FARC soldiers. He claims it was lack of information from their side that resulted in the death of the soldier. However, Colonel Benitez, emphasised how the death of the soldier was part of changing the mistrust between the BIDES and the FARC. After the death, he himself went to FARC, asking them how the mines were built. The army and the FARC sat down together and the FARC soldiers showed the army how to build the mines, what they were made of and how to lay them, so that they could avoid any other accidents.

While the FARC soldiers appear to have found trust in the other party and been able to see them as "humans", I found that Colonel Benitez had a rather different perception of the pilot project. He described the FARC from a rather negative perspective, where he assumed they have bad intentions. Colonel Benitez was commander for the battalion number 60 of the humanitarian demining, and was overseeing the operations in El Orejón from the army's side. He kept referring to the FARC as "terrorist" and "killers" and focused on the negative aspect of the guerrilla.

Still, Colonel Benitez seem to have mixed feelings and perception of the project. He was the only interviewee coming from the BIDES. He has been fighting the FARC his whole grown-up life, and his identity is very much connected to that of a soldier, and he views FARC as the enemy. Suddenly, they were supposed to work together. Colonel Benitez constantly talks about "them" and "terrorist", indicators of distrust, but at the same time he talks positively about the pilot project. The pilot project was the first sign of de-escalation and the first time the government and the FARC actually came together to work on a project for the benefit of the nation. "T*he reason why the project was born is simple*", he said, "*it was because the country didn't want any more victims*". Here he talks about "country", as the FARC and the BIDES could agree on no more victims, and that this common goal could make them work together. Through the pilot project, the parties were able to see beyond their identities as "enemies" and focus on a common goal; the benefit of the Colombian people. However, Colonel Benitez seem to be able to focus on this common goal – a sign of trust – at the same time as he holds on to the definition of FARC as the "enemy" – a sign of distrust.

In the beginning it was very hard for Benitez and for the army. The perception and image that he, his soldiers and the entire army had was that these people (the FARC) were terrorist and criminals. The first thing he had to do was to convince himself that he was doing it for a higher purpose for the peace of the nation, for a better life for everyone. A FARC soldier mentioned the same need to convince his own people to believe in the project. His fellow FARC combatants were scared in the beginning, but one day the FARC soldier came riding on the back of a motorcycle with a sergeant from the army to go to the nearest village to share a beer, and it gave them trust. It seem to be a lack of information and support within the BIDES and the FARC regarding the pilot project, but also lack in the general public. The army received a lot of criticism from the civil population, calling them disloyal and traitors because they were

"helping" the FARC and simply for being part of a peace process that many people did not have faith in.

For Benitez, it was difficult after spending his whole life in the army, to suddenly trust and cooperate with his lifelong enemy. He thinks the FARC saw the project as an opportunity to take advantage of. He felt that FARC at all times had a double intention. First, it was about FARC showing a human side, "humanize" themselves, making themselves look less criminal. For Benitez, the mistrust towards the guerrilla has not really changed with the pilot project. More than a year after the peace agreement Colonel Benitez describes how they still find hidden weapons and hidden money. He even thinks that the FARC dissidents are left there by FARC themselves as a method of control, so if the political party fails, they still have their military structure to rely on. He argues that the FARC has created a massive propaganda organism, creating an image of themselves as Robin Hood of Colombia. He says the only thing the FARC has learned through these years of conflict is blackmailing and murder.

Colonel Benitez showed signs of distrust, focusing on the negative aspects of the project, assuming the FARC has other intentions and not trusting their actions. At the same time, Benitez thinks that the main purpose of the pilot project was to use decontamination exercise as a way of reconciliation, to truly show the country and themselves that two enemies who have been fighting for so long actually can work together for a common goal. But for him, he says there is still too many open and fresh wounds to forget. Still, he cannot deny that they worked together, and that they actually succeeded.

He stressed that he did not want to give the impression that he hates the FARC, emphasising how living together for so long obviously created friendship between them. He felt that the project was a good thing, but claimed that one short project was not enough to "fix" more than 50 years of war. Therefore, Benitez has no problem with sharing both positive and negative stories from the pilot. He laughed when telling a story from Havana when he was sitting and talking to Romaña about memories from the war. They have met in combat before, almost killing each other. One time Benitez battalion was breathing down Romaña's neck. "*I almost got you, I was in your footstep*" Benitez had told Romaña over a peaceful dialog.

Benitez is now retired. He says a lot of it has to do with the pilot project. He received a lot of threats and criticism for participating in the project, not only from the public, but also within

the army. Benitez comes from a field that has had the FARC as enemy number one for more than 50 years. It seemed to have been difficult for Benitez to be one of the few from the BIDES who participated and supported the pilot, especially when having the role as Colonel. He felt that he could no longer be part of an institution that reprimanded him for a job that they themselves had asked him to do. Benitez showed a tweet with a photo from the pilot project, with the NPA, Descontamina, Benitez himself and two from the guerrilla. Under the photo it said "where is your honour, Coronel?". He was labelled a traitor. He felt it was difficult to embark in this project, because he had to change the way he was thinking, and when he did he was punished for it.

Almost all informants argue that the pilot project created trust between the parties at the local level. Only Colonel Benitez from BIDES argued differently. These findings are based on my informants using words and expressions as "friends", "human", "humanize", "us/we", and positive descriptions of the other participants, as I have specified in my methodological chapter are indications of trust. Most of them also exclusively focus on the positive aspects of the pilot project such as the coexisting, seeing the parties working together, social interactions and the positive outcome. Colonel Benitez, however, uses expressions as "terrorist", "enemies", "the FARC", "them", and focused on a large degree on the negative aspects of the pilot project; the death of the soldier and the FARC's hidden agenda: clear signs of distrust. However, Colonel Benitez seem to be torn in his opinion about the project.

Furthermore, NPA staff seem to have difficulties separating clearly between their role as facilitator and participants of the project. This is an indicator that participation and information about such confidence building project can increase peoples trust in ongoing peace talks.

4.3   Conditions for trust

For CBMs to be successful, certain conditions need to be present. Through my findings it became evident that at the local level, third party presence was a fundamental condition for the CBM to be successful. Meeting with the other party is not necessarily risk-free even though it happens within confidential frames. Considering the depth of the mutual distrust among the parties, the idea of meeting the other side may arouse anxiety. The participants may worry that the discussions might be acrimonious, that they will be subjects of verbal abuse by the other party, that the confidence might be betrayed and that their participation will be exploited and

cause them personal or collective damage (Kelman 2005:645). Having NPA in the field therefore took away this risk between the party. I therefore argue that third party present is a necessary condition for trust to be built at the local level.

A FARC soldier believes NPA played crucial role in the pilot project. They were the main link between the two parties and functioned as mediators. He says it was a clear decision-making process where all of them agreed on everything and on every step. A representative from CCCM highlights the important of third party participation. In this process in general, and in Colombia particularly, tension is high so a third party is important to be a guarantor of the process and make the link between the actors. The third party actor brings the advantage of being much more objective and impartial in this kind of activity.

A representative from Descontamina stressed the importance of a third neutral actor and compare the role of Norway at the negotiation table with the role of NPA in the pilot project; "*It makes the environment of the conversation more respectful, because you have like a referee at the table, so it allows to build that respectful environment. And in the pilot project NPA plays that role*". She said it was critical to have them there because they had the possibility to hear both the guerrilla and the government's claims.

The role of NPA as third party and facilitator of the project has been crucial in establishing the trust between the FARC, BIDES and Descontamina, and comes a necessary condition for trust. Having a neutral third party present at all time released the tension and increased the trust in the project due to the fact that both parties had trust in the role of NPA.

When trust was not established, as in the case of Colonel Benitez, it seemed to be a lack of internal support and understanding of the project within the organization that made it particularly hard for Benitez to fully join the project. If this is the case, a necessary condition to establish trust on the individual level seems to be inclusion and information within the organization/party that can lead to more openness and support. When Colonel Benitez was facing that much internal criticism, it became difficult to fully support the project, as doing that would imply going against his own "people".

5 Analysis: Negotiations level

"The pilot project of humanitarian demining was the very first joined activity between FARC and the government in field in Colombia. It was a political project to understand if there really was will from the government side to accomplish the agreement"

(Informant, Descontamina).

In chapter 6, the effect the pilot project had on the ongoing peace negotiations is under analysis. In his study of confidence building measures and tools for building peace, Kelman argues how confidence building efforts in a micro process can contribute to trust building in a macro-system (Kelman 2005:644).

The Pilot Project officially begun in July 2015. The month before, June 2015, was the most violent month since the peace process began, with 43% more FARC offensive actions than the guerrilla's monthly average since the peace talks began. The chief government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, came with assessment of the negotiations' current state in May 2015. "*The peace process is at its worst moment since we began talks. I want to tell the FARC in all seriousness, this could end. Someday, it's probable that they won't find us around the table in Havana*", continuing saying that the FARC process would end soon, either through an accord or through a break in the talks (Colombia Peace, 2015).

An article in *Semana* magazine from 20th June 2015, columnist María Jimena Duzán, describe the negotiations as tense. "*The days are gone in which one side would greet the other in a natural sort of way in the halls of Havana's Hotel Palco (…) what is perceived today is a tension, which slows the momentum and which weighs on them when they happen to make eye contact and greet each other with gritted teeth*" (Colombia Peace, 2015). In other words, tension was high at the negotiation table.

Foreign Minister in Norway at that time, Børge Brende, called the pilot project an important trust building act that happened at a crucial time in the peace process. Before the pilot project started the peace talks were threatened by a recent escalation of the conflict (MFA Norway, 2015). The pilot project helped deescalate the situation.

5.1 Signs of trust

5.1.1 Conciliatory signalling – a mutual agreement

To able to increase trust the parties need to send signal to the other party that they are willing to place themselves in a position of increasing its own losses as a result of its failure to fulfil commitments by subsequent deeds (Mitchel 2000:177). The decision to take on the pilot project was decided at the negotiation table in Havana, with the goal of increasing the trust between the FARC and the government. The parties developed a Communiqué #52 and a roadmap, a memorandum of understanding. All parties had to sign the agreement which clarified the different role of the different actors. In March 2015, the Communiqué #52 was agreed between the two parties. This was the main document between the FARC and the national government, establishing the agreement of the project, what would be the agreement between them and where they selected NPA to be the coordinator of the project. In the Join Communiqué #52, it stated that:

"*Within the framework of de-escalation, seeking to move forward in building trust and in order to contribute to create security conditions for the inhabitants of risk zone due to the presence of land mines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war, and in order to provide non-repetition guarantees to the communities, the Government and the FARC-EP have agreed to ask the Norwegian People's aid (NPA) organization to lead and coordinate the implementation of a land clean-up and decontamination project from APMs, IEDs, UXOs and ERWs*".

The Communiqué included agreements concerning site selection, information gathering, procedure of clean-up and decontamination, dialogue with the communities, verification processes, and statement about the formal delivery to the national and local authorities and communities. The agreement also state that the National Government and the FARC will establish a roadmap for the implementation of this measure, including the forms and specificities of their participation in the project. It also state that the dialogue table will establish a mechanism to report the progress and compliance with the implementation of this de-escalation measure, which it highlights is a mutual commitment (communiqué #52). The signing of such an agreement, without a mutual ceasefire and in the middle of ongoing peace negotiations, was a clear conciliatory signal that the two parties were willing to take on risk to show their commitment to the peace talks.

The pilot project was initiated as a confidence building exercise, supported by the two guarantor countries of the negotiations, Norway and Cuba, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Confidence building measures (CMBs) can improve relationships, humanize the other party, signal positive intentions and by this avoid escalation of the conflict. This required the two parties to risk several losses to indicate their willingness and commitment to the other party by conciliatory signalling through image cost, information cost and security cost.

"I think it (pilot project) actually helped a lot. Having both army and national government representatives you know sleeping, eating, playing and working together with the FARC members ended up showing that this war that has been in Colombia for the past 50 years is just nonsense. They saw that they were very similar, they come from sort of like poor societies with a lack of basic needs and the only choice they had in their lives were whether to join FARC or to join the army (...) at the end they saw that they are basically the same, just different colour or different uniforms" (Esteban, NPA).

The international Crisis Group listed several ways the pilot project could help strengthen the Havana talks. They argue how the pilot project would help build trust between the parties, highlighting how the demining is a joint commitment where government officials and FARC members – unarmed and without uniforms – will work together to identify priority zones, verify progress and jointly hand over cleared areas. The International Crisis Group argues that confidence in the process and faith that the other side is doing everything it can to end the conflict are critical for the success of an eventual bilateral ceasefire and for FARC to "leave behind" its weapons (International Crisis Group, 2015).

5.1.2 Image cost – recognition

The peace negotiations in Havana had already been going on for several years, meaning that a certain degree of recognition of the other party as a legitimate actor probably had taken place. But there is an important image cost that arises from the risk this kind of concession can bring: a party could appear weak – both to the opposing side and to members of their own consistency. The government's willingness to recognize the FARC as an equal partner in the negotiation

process is illustrated by the ways that the pilot project was planned and put together, and how the two parties had equal saying and not at least role, in the conduction of the pilot.

In Havana, the pilot helped to show a way forward for the process. There was an important period of over a year where the negotiations were "blocked" because there were no step forwards. That is when the pilot was born. Fernando (Descontamina) highlighted how the pilot project was important to get the negotiations going again after this period of stalemate. The birth of the pilot project happened at a crucial time when there was a stop in the peace negotiations and it seems like a concrete, tangible exercise as the pilot project helped get the negotiations back on its feet. But this did not happen without both parties signalling their commitment.

The role the pilot project had within the negotiation was to create another alternative to the war, making it "lighter", Marcela argued. *"It was like putting more oxygen to the tension"*. Focusing on the pilot project meant to shift the focus from the difficulties at the negotiation table to the victims of the war – the common interest of both the FARC and the government. Focusing on a common interest took away the tension from the other negotiating factors (Marcela, FARC), and required both actors to recognize their responsibility towards the civil population regarding landmines. Engaging in the pilot project meant recognizing the issue of landmines as a common responsibility, recognizing each other as partners in the project and facing internal criticism for engaging with the other party.

There was a clear need for concrete action and commitment to peace from both side, and for the FARC and the government to show this willingness for peace to the country and Colombians. As a gesture of peace, they decided to design the project of demining (Fernando, Descontamina). After four years of negotiations, the landmine issue became a tool for both parties to build a bridge between them and to start doing something pragmatic that produced very concrete results, and that was used to build some trust between them (Pablo, UNMAS). Agreeing on the pilot project as a CBM was a commitment from both parties to recognize the other as a serious partner in the peace agreement, and to show willingness to keep the negotiations going.

It was clear from the beginning that the project was about building trust between the parties and showing the world, in particular the opponents in Bogota, that this could work. The hope

was that the trust that was being built between the parties working together in the field on something so specific and tangible as demining, would trickle down to the negotiation table in Havana. Also, the hope was to send a signal to the people of Bogota and Medellin, as well as in Cali and the other bigger cities of Colombia, that there were actual positive work being done in Havana (Vanessa, NPA).

The mine clearance project in itself is also a confirmation and recognition of two things. First, that Colombia has a severe issue with landmines and that someone is responsible for laying them, mostly the FARC, and that their weapon of choice is a weapon that is forbidden by international humanitarian law (Pablo, UNMAS). Second, that someone, mostly the government, has failed in protecting the people from this danger (Fernando, Descontamina). A FARC soldier stressed how they (the FARC) used the mines to protect themselves in war, but they realized that there were also a lot of civilian victims. Anyone can pick up a mine, he says; a child, an elderly, or an animal can step on it. He said they had to use them for protection, but it was important to remove them for the community. This recognition of planting the mines goes hand in hand with one of the Descontamina representatives admitting the government's failure in protecting their citizens in certain parts of the country (Fernando, Descontamina).

5.1.3 Security cost – opening up areas

Living together, the FARC and the BIDES, after more than 50 years of war, meant giving up some of their means to security. They had to lay down their arms at a time when there did not exist any ceasefire between the two parties. When parties reduce or give up some of these means of security, they risk incurring security cost (Höglund, Svensson 2006). These risks are incurred when parties give up power and positions on the ground and when they open up access to territory, as has happened here. The pilot project set the parties on a clear path towards deescalating of the conflict and reach an bilateral ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2015).

It is clear that the pilot project was very tough in the beginning, due to the lack of a ceasefire and the tension arising from enemies working together for the first time. As no ceasefire were in place, there were security issues concerning the pilot project. Both the government and the FARC had to tell their troops to stay still, because they were still in conflict and peace was not signed. The pilot project took place in a so called "red zone", but as an informant told me, NPA were in a way protected by the negotiations itself. For the government and the FARC however,

they had to trust that the security protocols were followed. An informant from NPA constantly referred to it as a "act of balance", were the communiqué #52, the roadmap, the constant float of information, the organization of the project were all key components to maintain a balance. My informant says that a lot of trust was gained from this work.

In March the parties agreed to cooperate on the pilot project, but already on the 14th of April FARC violated its own ceasefire and attacked the Colombian army in Cauca. This resulted in 11 dead and 20 wounded Colombian soldiers. The government retaliated. The Bogotá think-tank CERAC which tracks conflict events, reported a total of 86 offensive actions involving the FARC in the month after the group revoked its unilateral ceasefire (Colombia Peace, 2015). Many of my informants stressed that they were scared that this would mean the end of the negotiations. A FARC soldier emphasised this when explaining "*We felt that any time it (the project) could break down, the whole situation was so fragile in the beginning*". Also Vanessa (NPA) points this out: "*People were crying, but the President called and said no, the project shall continue. I think this shows why it is so useful to have something very concrete to work in peace negotiations*". The pilot project might have created a necessary space where the parties could focus on the goal of the peace negotiations and not on the events that could jeopardize the whole process.

Another explanation is that the demining project created a highly localised informal truce in areas where both the government and the FARC had strategic interest. These areas were off-limits for humanitarian deminers up until the pilot project started. The International Crisis Group argue in their analysis that such prospect should help avert the twin spectres of first, an eroding FARC truce, and second, the political backlash this act could trigger (International Crisis Group 2015).

El Orejón, a FARC controlled area, was opened up for the pilot project to conduct the mine clearance project. Not only does it include a security risk for FARC to open up their controlled areas for the army, but also for the army and the government to enter an area where they have not been present for more than 30 years. Driving into a FARC controlled, landmine contaminated area, the government voluntarily took security risk and increased their vulnerability and chances of being exploited by the opponent (Höglund, Svensson 2006).

Another aspect of taking security risk was the choosing of the two places where the pilot project took place; each party choosing one location. The choice was of strategical interest of both parties. El Orejón, chosen by the government, lies high up in the mountain, close to a hydroelectric power plant in the nearby valley. As El Orejón has been controlled by the FARC, establishing the presence of the government could eventually lower the violence and avoid potential future attacks on the power plant (NPA Informant). Santa Helena on the other hand was chosen by the FARC. Santa Helena has been a strategically important area for the FARC, as it is located in an area where you have access to paths taking you north, south, east or west. This area has also been heavily bombarded by the government, and conducting the pilot project in this area would mean for the government to stop their bombings and potentially giving the FARC in the area the potential to move freely without any accidents in the future (NPA Informant).

By letting each party chose their own spot for the demining, it definitely made the two parties give up some means of security – FARC giving the government access to El Orejón and the government making Santa Helena a "free zone", stopping the bombardments in the area. However, the parties choice of location seem to have come of a focus on military strategy and influence rather than choosing the areas most affected by landmines.

Looking at security cost as a measurement of trust, it can be defined by having played a role on two distinct fields in the peace negotiation. The first one concerns the areas where the pilot projects were conducted, with the selection of areas, opening them up for the other party and entering them together without a bilateral ceasefire in place. The other aspect of security cost comes from the direct work itself: clearance of landmines. The work was divided so that it was the BIDES who were responsible for the actual mine clearance, while the FARC were the ones providing them with the information about where the mines were. This work in itself is highly related to cost connected with security, as one wrong step, as unfortunately happened during the pilot, can end in death.

5.1.4 Information cost – communication and third party monitoring

The FARC and the Colombian government risk incurring information cost when they reveal information about their strength, commitment and resources. Incurring information cost means when a party contract costs connected with the information they share. When revealing

information about for example their strength, they could give the opposing party greater bargaining leverage (Höglund, Svensson 2006). Two ways of revealing this information cost, according to Höglund and Svensson is by third party monitoring and the organizational design of the negotiations, measuring the increased transparency and reveal important information.

When talking about increased transparency, structure and communication becomes important. The pilot project, both in El Orejon and in Santa Helena had divided the structure of the project in to three clearly defined groups; reference group, steering group and field group. Field group represented the group on the ground and consisted of a representative from all the participating parties: the FARC, Descontamina, BIDES and NPA. The steering group took place in Bogotá and had the same set up, except for the fact that the FARC representative was in Havana. This meant that the steering group had to go to Havana for a week once a month to be able to gather everyone. The last group was the reference group with representatives from the negotiation table; the FARC, the government and NPA.

The communication between the pilot and Havana was constantly floating. Daily, they made information sheets that were passed on to the negotiation table. All my informants who directly participated in the pilot project explained the three different groups and the communication between them. Every day they were reporting all the activities from the field, the technical operations, the relationship with the community and the situation in the camp, to the other groups. Therefore, every day, NPA in Havana were aware of what was happening in the field and every party was constantly updated on the development and progress of the project.

Yeison from NPA is sure that the pilot project improved the trust between the parties in Havana. He says when FARC showed where the landmines were, it was a good action to improve the government's confidence in the FARC. He argues a lot of this was due to the constant information float between the pilot project and Havana. This shows how the structure of the negotiation itself can be a tool in building trust. Mario from NPA also highlights how the pilot project was the first time the parties in Havana saw that the idea of working together was possible and that even with their differences they could work for a different future for the country. The pilot project was an act that made the parties focus on their shared goal for the community – their common identity and goal – instead of their differences. For the pilot project to impact the negotiation table in Havana, these daily updates and constant flow of information seem to have been essential.

Another way Höglund and Svensson argue parties can give information cost, is by third-party monitoring. NPA participated in the planning of the pilot project from day one. Vanessa was invited to go to Havana to develop, negotiate and coordinate the pilot project. She spent from January to May 2015 developing the project in the negotiations. They did not have an office in Havana. Cuba's limitation with internet and phone reception made it even harder. They were working out of bars and pubs in the beginning, writing down the plan for the pilot project on a napkin. There was an interest of both parties to have a neutral third party monitoring the pilot project, and for FARC especially it was of importance that it was NPA, as they were perceived as such a neutral third party. However, I once again argue that the presence of a third party is not a sign of trust in itself, but rather a condition that needs to be present for trust to be built. This was evident at the local level, and seem to also have be relevant for the negotiation table.

Including the aspect of a third-party monitoring and constant flow of information that increased transparency all the way up to the negotiation table, exposed the parties to significant risk of incurring information cost (Höglund, Svensson 2006).

5.2   Signs of distrust

It is difficult to argue to what extent the pilot project created trust between the parties in Havana. Without doubt, the project succeeded as a confidence building exercise on ground, and I would also argue to a certain extent in Havana. However, even though it is possible to claim that the pilot project was a good confidence building exercise that helped the negotiations, it is difficult to argue if it made the parties trust each other – or if it simply was a tool to get the negotiations going and to have trust in the process itself.

There are mixed conceptions among my informants concerning how the pilot project might have changed the way the FARC and the government perceive each other in Havana. Some argue the pilot project only served as a tool to get the negotiations going again, while others claim it definitely changed the relationship between the parties by both parties showing their commitment to the peace process.

Another way the parties can reduce mistrust by appearing weak through image cost, is internal criticism. The Colombian Government risked internal criticism by recognizing FARC as an equal partner in the peace talks, and also by signing an agreement with them about the pilot

project. Same can be argued about the FARC risking internal criticism by agreeing on the pilot project when only a one-sided ceasefire excised. However, FARC could have been better at exposing themselves for this internal criticism by to a greater degree broadcast the pilot project to all its members to show concrete measures were being done. It might be difficult in a hierarchy organization like the FARC to communicate the project to the whole organization.

Marcela said when they tell ex-combatants about the mine clearance program they are shocked, saying "*really? We didn't kill each other planting them (landmines), no we have to kill each other making the clearance?*" indicating that not all FARC soldiers were aware of the pilot project happening. At least 1000 guerrillas are estimated to have abandoned the peace process. The dissident groups don't have the national command structure, but operate as small guerrilla armies that try to maintain control over abandoned territories. Three former mid-level commanders of the FARC are the ones who have formed considerable groups. One of the most recent FARC dissidents groups are present in the north of Antioquia, allegedly led by "Cabuyo", with between 45-130 fighters who are mainly active in the municipalities of Ituango and Briceño – nearest town to El Orejón (Alsema, Colombia Reports, 2018).

Another sign of distrust has been the lack from the parties to expose themselves to media exposure. There were not enough consideration made towards the Colombian reality and what took place in the country. By sitting in Havana, far away from the daily life in Colombia, peace talks took place too far away and lost contact with the general public. The result of this is a peace agreement that is not rooted in the population. The parties should have exposed themselves to higher level of image cost by communicating the pilot project through media.

It is possible that some people believe there is more distrust than trust created at the negotiation table. The findings in this thesis, however, indicates that the pilot project has been a tool to increase the trust between the parties at the negotiation table in Havana, through increased willingness to show to the other party their commitment. This has taken place through conciliatory signalling such as the parties opening up areas, recognizing the other party by signing a mutual agreement for the pilot project, having an equal say in the agreement and organizing the pilot project to such a degree that both parties are equally represented. This conciliatory signalling has also been present through information cost where the flow of communication has been carried through three levels securing the inclusion of all parties.

5.3 Conditions for trust

There are several conditions that need to be present for a CBM to function in peace negotiations. At the negotiation level it is evident that shared interest in the CBM is a necessary condition for the CBM to be successful. Both parties must have an interest in the subject, be equally as committed to the project and both parties need to be able to contribute in the actual conduction of the CBM. This is evident in the case of mine clearance in Colombia. First of all, it concerns a shared interest of both parties as it addresses an aspect of the conflict that harms the civilian population. This common ground make them see this as a project they were able to do together. Secondly, both parties were able to contribute to the implementation of the pilot project, as the FARC provided the information and the BIDES did the actual demining.

As seen on the local level, third party presence was a necessary condition at the negotiation table for the pilot project to be able to build trust. Especially for the FARC, the presence of the NPA was necessary for them to enter a written agreement with the government in the middle of negotiations. During the pilot project, NPA coordinated the teams consisting of representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC. Parallel to this, Norway sat as guarantor country at the negotiation table in Havana. Having a third party monitoring, reporting and disseminating information about the activities of the parties on the ground, helped ensure that the pilot project was transparent. and helped reduce mistrust between the parties, as well as initiating cooperative sequences. Hence, the role of a third party is a needed condition in creating trust.

6 Analysis: Community level

"The harsh truth is that Colombians don't believe in the peace process"
(Humberto de la Calle, chief government negotiator[2]).

"The pilot project was the first way they showed the country that peace was possible"
(Mario, NPA).

In this chapter, I would like to explore to what extent the pilot project reached out to the general public in Colombia. Colombia is a country deeply divided between different socioeconomic groups, class differences and perspectives, not least different experiences with the Colombian conflict and therefore also different perceptions of the peace agreement.

The landmark peace agreement with FARC was for many, both nationally and internationally, shockingly turned down by the Colombian people on the 2nd of October 2016, when 50.2% voted against it. The peace agreement had been signed a week earlier by President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño after four years of peace negotiations.

Both the "yes" campaign and the "no" campaign – led by former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, did their work ahead of the voting to affect the outcome. Polls conducted ahead suggested a win for the "yes" campaign but, whit what turned out to be a surprising result, the no side won with 50.2% of the voters, compared to 49.8% voting in favour of the agreement. 13 million ballots were handed in, which means a turnout with fewer than 38% of Colombians casting their votes. The Colombian society is characterized by huge class differences, social inequality and different ways of life. This was clearly reflected in the outcome of the referendum with clear geographically differences. Colombia was divided regionally where people in and near the capital and the big cities had the largest groups of people voting against the agreement, and people in the outlying provinces voting in favour (BBC, 2016a).

In the department of Choco and the town of Bojaya, two of the places hardest hit by the conflict, 80% and 96% of the residents voted "yes". In Bogotá, the outcome was 56% in favour of the

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[2] Colombia Peace, 2015.

agreement. In Antioquia, the home state of the former President Alvaro Uribe, 62% rejected the peace agreement. Among the "no" voters, there are a lot of discontent with all the benefits that they feel the FARC rebels would get. One of the points in the agreement includes creating a special court to try crimes committed during the more than 50 yearlong conflict. Those who would confess to their crimes would be given more lenient sentences and could avoid serving time in conventional prisons, which for many Colombians were not acceptable (BBC, 2016a).

Figure 3: How Colombia's provinces voted [3]

6.1 Signs of trust

In this chapter, I have divided the Colombian population into two categories: those who were directly exposed to the pilot project, and those who were not. The local community in El Orejón and Santa Helena, the two communities where the pilot project was conducted, represents the part of the population that was directly affected by the pilot project.

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[3] BBC News. 2016a, National Civil Registry.

6.1.1 Local community

The voice of the local community is interesting in this analysis, because they are the closest eyewitness to the project, and also the ones who are directly affected by it. During my fieldwork to El Orejón and to Vistahermosa – the minefield closest to Santa Helena - I talked with representatives from the local community in both villages. They were the ones who suddenly became the witness of two enemies working together. Their perspective is interesting in understanding the effect of the pilot project.

The issue of trust is not a new concept in Colombia, and several articles recognize the importance of trust in the country. An article from the Bogotá Post focus on trust as establishing and reconstructing relations with the "other", and highlights the particular importance of this in a deeply fractured society such as the Colombian reality, "*where people assume, almost by default, that this "other" may hurt, rob or deceive you in some way*", arguing that overcoming this obstacle will be essential for achieving the main objective of any peace process: reconciliation (The Bogotá Post:2017).

The International Crisis Group argue how such a project could address the deep-seated scepticism of communities in conflict regions. Local community might not fully trust either side and fear that the peace process only will transform the violence or make it worse (International Crisis Group, 2015). Many of my informants highlighted this point of how it's difficult to say who's the enemy and who's "the good guy". One informant stressed that when the bombs fell, it made no difference if they came from the FARC or the army, it was still as damaging.

Another aspect the International Crisis Group emphasise is how the demining act itself can send a positive signal to the communities. Instead of calling landmines a military necessity in an irregular war, by demining they are beginning to repair the damage landmines have inflicted. This is both an ethical imperative as well as a necessity if the guerrilla wants to transform themselves into a legitimate political movement, the research argues. The landmine removal can also be used to prove the government and the military's commitment not only to eliminating guerrillas, but to tackling the intricate day-to-day problems that communities in conflict zones are faced with (International Crisis Group, 2015). In the case of Colombia, landmines are in particular such a problem that needs to be addressed.

Yeison worked as a community liaison in El Orejón. His job was to have meetings with the community at least weekly, and socialize and explain the project and to include the community. In the beginning he felt he was entering a hazardous area, but when he met the people and started to talk he got a better understanding of things, of the people. Yeison comes from the city, and it was a totally new environment for him to see how it was the FARC who controlled the area, talked with the community and set the rules. He realized that this community did not have any real contact with the government, and for them in this area the real government was the FARC. As the International Crisis Group highlights, the pilot project brought the government to the area, and along with that came development in form of building schools and roads.

But conducting the pilot project in small villages were not without problems. El Orejón for example is a small village of only 80 inhabitants. During the pilot project that number raised to 130 with the BIDES, the NPA, the FARC and Descontamina setting up their camp site. In the beginning the local community did not take it that well. Suddenly, foreigners were brought in to a small village that never got visit from the outside (NPA informant). El Orejón had not seen any government representatives for more than 30 years, one informant told me. The 45-year-old farmer, who has lived his whole life in El Orejón, explained a life in fear with the constant threat of mines in the area, which he unfortunately had to experience the consequences of several times. Three of his sons are victims of landmines, being maimed when stepping on the hidden threats surrounding the village. The farmer explains how it affected their everyday life; they could not let their children go out playing, collecting wood for the fireplace became really hard and dangerous, the mountains became off limit and they had to concentrate their life around the centre of the small village of El Orejón.

Several informants from the local community stressed a feeling of fear in the beginning of the pilot. The farmer said the first time he saw the FARC and the government working together in the village he was struck by a feeling of joy mixed with anxiety. A woman from Santa Helena explains the same fear in the beginning, and how she never thought it would be possible to see them together. But as time passed by they saw that the relationship was good and that the two parties were living together without any problems. As time passed by, she saw the violence going down, she did not hear gunshots or bombs at night anymore, and the danger of mines

went away. Beside the demining, she highlighted how the project managed to build peace between the parties and for the local community.

The farmer explained how he - as a victim of the threat of landmines - could not step aside of what was happening between these two actors. He had the need to get in, join them in this project and give his forgiveness. "*If they can get closer, I have to forgive*", the farmer said. Even though forgiveness not necessarily is a sign of trust, the willingness of the farmer to support the process when seeing the parties working together can be interpreted as the farmer having trust in the parties commitment to peace.

In Santa Helena they had the chance to learn from the mistakes made in El Orejón. An important part of this included going to the area long before the project started to create a good environment with the local community, create trust, explain the project and build the first relation. It was a different area than the one in El Orejón. This area has been totally controlled by the FARC and, in a sense, the government and NPA felt like visitors. What they thought would be a rather tough start in a guerrilla controlled area, turned out to work rather smoothly after a couple of months (Mario, NPA).

Diego, a teacher from Santa Helena, has been working all his life in a place that has been directly victim of the conflict. He explained how he felt like a neutral part of the conflict; he would see the illegal group on one side and the army on the other, with them in the middle as victims. Diego felt hope when the pilot project came to the small village of Santa Helena. Bringing the two parties to Santa Helena would bring good things to the community and for the peace (Diego). This initiative would minimize the impact that the conflict had at the community because it would bring a stop to the war in that area. Diego, as the others, highlighted the importance for the community and themselves to see the two groups finally working together. Seeing the interaction between the FARC and the army helped build trust in the peace process because he saw how they talked with each other and gave an effort in mitigating the conflict itself, (Diego). Diego explained the community as "shocked and amazed" when they got to see FARC members and army soldier having dinner together or playing soccer in the beginning of the project.

Viviana, a 30-year-old woman, mother of two and grandmother of two, is a victim of the war. Her father was killed and they were forced to flee. After 18 years in Bogotá she came back to

the village of El Orejón seven years ago. She said it was unbelievable to see the FARC and the government working together. She explained a feeling of fear and panic when the pilot begun, saying she was ready to run at any point if they had to, in case the situation would turn the village into a warzone. But with time she realized the project was working. She saw them getting closer and closer every day, and she said the project gave them an opportunity to get to know the other, beyond labels, to see that your former enemy is also a person. She says after the project was installed, they feel more "free", in what used to be a FARC controlled area. Viviana says the pilot project has given them the trust and possibility to walk around with your children without any fear that at any point you are going to be blown up.

"*It was unbelievable to see them together*", stated Luceny, an internal refugee from Santa Helena. She had to flee because of the conflict. She represented a human right organization in Santa Helena and was included in the pilot project when representing local community through her organization. "*When you face this much injustice and violations of human rights, it is unbelievable that something might change, but seeing them together for the first time it gave me some hope for the peace process*" (Luceny, Santa Helena).

For most of my local community informants, it was scary in the beginning, but with time, they saw that the project was working and it made them realize that peace was possible, saying it increased their trust in the peace negotiation. Building trust in the local community was key to be able to conduct the pilot project. "*If you do not involve the local community in this process, you're going to have a hard time*", Esteban (NPA) explained, saying they will be either your best friend or your worst nightmare. Establishing a good community liaison was therefore crucial for the pilot even to be possible. The local community in both El Orejón and Santa Helena became the first audience to see the direct efforts of the peace negotiations, and the first judges to say if it worked or not. Even though they mention some challenges in the beginning and throughout the project, they all emphasized how the project gave them increased trust in the peace process. Seeing the parties working together, playing football and having diner were something most of my informants never thought would be possible. Involving the local community in the decision making of the pilot project and keeping them updated on what was happening, has been important outreach to the local community were both parties risk image cost by exposing themselves.

6.1.2 Opening doors for reconciliation and reincorporation

When The final peace agreement includes humanitarian disarmament in five different places. In the peace agreement, humanitarian demining is mentioned under the section about illegal drug problems, under the section about victim agreement, under the section about the ceasefire, about activities in the indigenous territories and last but not least, as a reincorporation project. One concrete thing that was born through the pilot project was the creation of Humanicemos. Humanicemos is the FARC's own humanitarian demining organization and is one of the few tangible, concrete and functional actions that has been implemented from the peace agreement, especially when it comes to reincorporation projects.

Marcela, head of Humanicemos, FARC's own humanitarian demining organization, tells how the organization is a direct result of the pilot project. She says that the relationship with the military now after the pilot is much easier, because now the militaries know them and knows how they work, thanks to the pilot project. That has opened up an opportunity for the organization to work with them and do mine clearance. Still, she points out how this fraternity and friendship with the guerrilla comes mostly from the soldiers, were she says it is much more "easy to be emphatic with the other one", rather than with the top levels of the military forces. They have a harder time assimilating or accepting, and the soldier would feel intimidated by this sometimes. It is a high prize for a military to openly support the guerrilla, Marcela says.

Humanicemos is a reintegration opportunity for ex-combatants. The process reduces the risk of being more in battle, and it is an opportunity to have social, economic and labour reincorporation to the civil society and an opportunity to explain how these processes work, to show that it is a safe project and that they are not going to be killed afterwards (Marcela). Deminers in Humanicemos were in the middle of their training when I did my fieldwork, training to become qualified mine clearance employees of Humanicemos. Marcela said it is very nice to see young people who have lost faith in the peace process itself finding in Humanicemos the opportunity to get re-associated to having work, having economic opportunities and getting this training. She says that now, she understands the pilot project as a seed that was meant to grow and transform lives. It is a life project for these people.

One of the FARC soldiers who participated during the pilot with giving information about where the landmines were, wants to join the training program and go work with Humanicemos.

A representative from Descontamina stresses how glad she is for the creation of this organization. She claims the pilot project was a success precisely because of this. It allows the guerrilla to find a way to reincorporate to the society at the same time as they are doing a humanitarian activity, and an activity where they are the key because of the information they carry. With this information, Colombia has the possibility to reach the goal of becoming free of mine contamination (Informant, Descontamina).

6.2 Signs of distrust

6.2.1 Image cost – Media Exposure

Desconfíe – to have distrust in people – is almost a widespread law in Colombia, Kristina Johansen argue. People do not trust each other, and she describes walking through Bogotá as walking in "the landscape of fear" (Johansen:2013:35). To not have trust has almost become part of the Colombian identity. Many Colombians have lived their whole life with war, learned to trust no one, with danger lurking on each street corner. It does not come easily for Colombians to "trust": not in people, and neither in processes. However, for a peace process to have support, negotiators have to become more trusted by the public. To be able to gain trust from the public the parties have to show evidence of how their words match deed and fulfilment of good faith (Carlin, McCoy, Subotic 2016:23).

Trust in Colombia is a difficult concept, both as trust towards public institutions, but also trust as a social connotation regarding feelings we have towards individuals rather than political entities in the public sphere. In Colombia, both definitions of trust are broken. An article in the Bogota Post argues how these confidence building measures that was implemented during the peace process, needs to continue to not lose momentum for the implementation of the peace agreement. They refer to the pilot program as "*holding public and sincere acts of apology in affected communities*". If this is how the pilot project is seen, as a sincere act of apology that shows both parties' commitment to peace, it could be argued that having this great effect on local community could also be transferred to the national level (Hoelker, 2017). This requires the parties to risk image cost.

This exposure can be costly for the parties, having to expose their intention to the general public. Höglund and Svensson argue how such image cost can be portrayed through media exposure. Extensive international media attention can create a risk of image loss, and media

attention can therefore be a way of showing seriousness of the negotiation, and in this case the project. Exposing themselves to such media exposure could be a way for the FARC and the government to show how they are bringing their words into action.

According to most of my informers this media exposure did not take place. Angela from FARC highlighted an important lack of information in the media about what was going on. She argued the peace negotiations were negatively discussed in the media, portrait as if they were only spending money for international supporters, not coming to any agreement. She believed this was due to a lack of information, a lack of "pedagogic" about the peace process and a lack of visualization to the public.

Vanessa in NPA also pointed out the lack of information shared with the public. This lack of media exposure seem to have had a negative effect when it comes to reducing distrust between the population and the negotiations. Every single media request or notice that they could have shared to the public, had to go through Havana and be agreed upon by their communication teams (Vanessa). NPA had signed confidentiality and were not allowed to communicate about the project, neither to the public nor the humanitarian demining sector.

"*We could have done the PR about the project at a much better, higher and more frequent level if it wasn't so political* (…) *I think we could have showcased to the Colombian public in a much better way what the parties were actually doing, how they were collaborating and how they were all invested in the peace agreement* (…) *We should have focused more on communicating what was being done, the willingness, interviewing both the FARC and the BIDES, showing all the pictures of them playing football together, cutting each other's hair (Vanessa, NPA).*

The FARC and the government did agree on a media strategy on how to communicate the pilot project to the public. This mainly included announcing the start and the end of the pilot project and providing some updates during the process. However, not even this seem to have been done to such a degree that it actually had an effect on the public. The way the pilot project was communicated through media regarding frequency of the updates and what was being portrayed, seem to have been lacking a proper strategy of what needed to be communicated and the purpose of this communication. Communication the pilot project to the public could

have been an opportunity for the parties to show concrete actions taking place during the negotiations, increasing the public's support in the process.

"We missed a tremendous PR opportunity. When you talk about building trust, it is not just between the parties in the project, right, it is also trust in the community. And I think we missed that opportunity" (Vanessa NPA).

"The project could have been an important socialization or sort of marketing tool for the peace process", (Esteban, NPA). Esteban was not saying it necessarily would have changed the results of the referendum, but it could have showed the positive projects that were implemented throughout the peace process.

There seemed to be mixed conceptions about how much information had been shared with the Colombian people. A FARC soldier believed that the whole country was watching out for what was happening, because enemies for more than 50 years were suddenly working together. It showed the community it was possible and that they could work together no matter what. The FARC soldier had a clear vision of the effect he thought the project would have had on the greater public, as Colonel Benitez had. Colonel Benitez also highlights how the perception of this being communicated with the public was part of the whole project. It was a sense of propaganda, to show the world and to show Colombia itself that the peace process was actually happening and that it was having an affect (Benitez). But this is not necessarily what was communicated.

It is evident that the media strategy was not a success. Mario from NPA describes the communication as the worst strategy ever. Esteban also feels that Colombia did not receive enough information about what happened in Havana, or the pilot project. It is a feeling of a missed opportunity to showcase for the country a concrete, good action that came out of the negotiations (Esteban, NPA). Humberto de la Calle, chief government negotiator, acknowledged in an interview with the newspaper El Universal, that public opinion was a challenge, stating that "*the harsh truth is that Colombians don't believe in the peace process*". In a bimonthly Gallup poll from June 2015, it was a clear drop in Colombian's belief in the peace process. Only 33% of those polled said they believed the current talks would result in a peace accord to end the armed conflict. For the first time since 2003, more respondents favoured "no dialogue and try to defeat them militarily" over "insist on dialogues until a peace

accord is reached", to the question "the best option to solve the guerrilla problem in Colombia" (Colombia Peace, 2015).

The pilot project was very poorly communicated, especially the implementation of the project. While waiting for the negotiating table in Havana to decide what was going to be communicated out to the public, journalist and others gathered information by themselves from people, from the FARC, from local authorities and from NGOs, and started to produce information that was not authorized by the government. Pablo from UNMAS said this created parallel dialogs to the public; the government saying everything was perfect and that trust was being built, and the other channels communicating discontent among the communities for not being consulted, and of course, the accident that happened in the beginning of the pilot. It gave an opportunity for people who were against the process to produce negative information about what was going on. Still, Pablo cannot seem to make up his mind, and continues arguing that the pilot project was a success story because it managed to stop the escalation of the conflict and to put mine action on the top of the mind of the general public. They finally found something to gather around in times of disbelief, and even the accident, which was something to regret, touched the people in the cities. "*This was a hero who died trying to bring peace to Colombia*", Pablo says.

Marcela has split opinion about the lack of communication. Some people were of course against the project, and the strict term of security of information might help to avoid sabotage. The chance of having a leak in the information might have been a threat to the general process, and she thinks that that might have been one of the reasons of why they decided to keep it confidential. But she says it is a pity, because it is a very nice and pretty case they are fighting for now, but it is not visible for people, and she thinks it is a pity that it cannot be better communicated.

Vanessa from NPA points out how the fact that communication had to go through Havana was also a trust building exercise. Not only did the government and the FARC have to work together clearing mines, planning the survey and clearance and deploying teams, they also had to work together making a security protocol, agreeing what was important, and they had to agree on whether "is this something we can communicate to the public, and how should we say it?" These different elements where they had to collaborate builds trust in itself, Vanessa says, but because they had to go through Havana it slowed down the process and they had to turn down

almost every journalist request. She regrets that they did not push harder for NPA to do some of the communication to showcase for the Colombian public what the parties were actually doing, how they were collaborating and how they were all invested in the peace agreement.

By not portraying the pilot project more in the public media, might have been a missed opportunity of media exposure that could have helped reduced the mistrust even more by exposing the two parties to the risk of image cost. Not using the potential of the media to broadcast the pilot project in a greater way, has been a missed opportunity for the pilot project and the negotiating parties to build trust among the general public in the peace negotiations itself. In a society as divided and tense as the Colombian, in a time of intense peace negotiations, several of my informants feel that one of the biggest mistakes from the project was this lack of communication to the public. Several has expressed their feeling that if more people knew about what was actually taking place during the peace negotiation, the outcome of the referendum might have been different.

6.2.2 Undermining the role of the public

By exposing themselves to increased media attention, the conflicting parties could have showed readiness to counter internal criticism and risk image loss (Höglund and Svensson 2006:376). It could have been a possibility for both parties to show their serious commitment to the peace negotiation and to show their efforts in reaching an agreement. According to my informants, this chance was not properly taken advantage of, and it seemed to have been a missed opportunity to reach out to the public with a tangible, concrete evidence that the peace negotiations were going forward.

Image loss – the risk of parties losing their image and prestige – can also be a tool to measure to what degree the parties have been willing to reduce mistrust between them. The pilot project required the Colombian government to recognize the FARC as an equal partner in the negotiations. This act exposed the Colombian government for internal criticism, as well as giving the FARC an important recognition. However, the most important form of image cost in the case of Colombia is the cost related to media exposure, a cost neither of the party seemed willing to take. I argue that such an expose would have been the most crucial when it comes to gaining the Colombian people's support to the agreement – a much needed support of the peace agreement is to be successful. In an analysis of the pilot project conducted by the International

Crisis Group (2015) the report says "*With it (the demining agreement) the Havana negotiations have finally arrived in Colombia*".

President Santos said in a speech to the Colombian people addressing the topic of the peace process with the FARC, that "*Because we have been speaking amid war, but the Colombian people increasingly have trouble understanding how in Havana the conversations speak of peace while in Colombia the attacks and the deaths are ongoing. The deaths, destruction and pain that this absurd confrontation leave behind every day need to be stopped now*" (Presidencia, 2015).

However, it does not seem to have been enough for the Colombian people to hear another promise of progress in Havana, while the Colombians themselves were still caught in the crossfire. The point Santos make about the Colombian people's difficulties to understand the ongoing conversations in Havana, turned out to be true. A lot of criticism towards the agreement, which several of my informants also touch upon, is that people had a feeling that it was all talk and no action, just people wasting money in Havana. This might be exactly why a concrete, tangible and visible project such as the pilot project would have been a useful tool to communicate to the public. Instead, the President came with new promises about renewed agreements of steps forwards in the peace talks.

"*the Colombian people need deeds of peace to recover their trust in the process. And that is what happened today in Havana: a decision has been made, which gives us a new ray of hope to reach a final agreement*" (Presidencia, 2015).

There were established a communication protocol for the project, but as most of my informants have highlighted, this was poorly used and were a missed opportunity to communicate the pilot project to the general public. Several informants stressed how pictures and reports of how army soldiers and FARC soldiers were laughing, eating, playing football and living together would have sent an important signal to Colombians, especially to Colombians in the big cities of Bogotá, Medellin, Cali and Cartagena.

A research team from Georgia State University (GSU) used a two-wave experimental survey, conducted in 2014 and 2015, to test whether and how trust in Colombia's negotiating elites affected support for the peace process. They also checked whether levels of support for lenient

treatment of FARC members could be affected by contextualizing ex-combatants' experiences within narratives that capture the main negotiating points. Their key findings include that public support for the peace process was predicated on trust in all the negotiating elites, and that increased public trust in any party to the negotiations increased public support for the peace process. This implied that the two parties needed to build trust in all players in the peace talks to gain public buy-in to the peace process (Carlin, McCoy, Subotic 2016).

"As the negotiators become more trusted by the public, support for the peace process grows (...) Moving trust in the positive direction requires Colombians to find Santos and the FARC more trustworthy, an assessment that requires word to match deed and the fulfilment of good faith. Therefore we expect any actions that increase the public's confidence that the actors will carry out their agreements will be most likely to contribute to greater trust, and actions that imply a lack of sincerity or willingness will hurt trust. Demonstrated progress on the recent agreement to jointly demine conflict areas could be one example of building trust; conversely, the breakdown of the ceasefire may be expected to erode trust"
(Carlin, McCoy, Subotic 2016:23).

However, this trust from the public seem to have been lacking in the case of Colombia. Image loss through media exposure indicates a possibility to increase trust to the general public by portraying the pilot project and the positive initiatives with mine clearance. It becomes clear when seeing the massive effect it has had on local community regarding trust in the peace process versus the effect on the general public where trust in the peace talks seems absent.

6.3   Conditions for trust

One of the principles for the negotiations, that the "incidents on the ground shall not interfere with the talks" (Nylander, Sandberg, Tvedt 2018) seems to have had the opposite function as well, where you could almost argue that the talks in Havana shall not interfere with the life on ground. The missing communication of the pilot project to the public, seem to have prevented the pilot project from being able to function as a trust building tool between the negotiating parties and the Colombian people. Therefore, I argue that comprehensive inclusion of all parties involved is necessary condition for mine clearance to build trust to the general public. This lack of inclusion of the general public seem to be the reason why the local community who were exposed to direct contact with the pilot project, perceive it as a

successful trust building exercise, while the general public that neither saw, heard or experienced the pilot project, did not.

In addition to inclusion, another condition requires that mine clearance serve as a relevant topic that the parties see useful and that concrete, tangible results comes out from it. For the local community in Santa Helena and El Orejón, the humanitarian disarmament was a concrete action that would change their social, economic and cultural possibilities in the area. For Colombians in the cities where landmines are not an issue, it might be difficult to see the direct benefits of such a project, and therefore also not realizing the commitment of the parties. However, if the general public had been included in a more comprehensive way, even if the mine clearance did not directly concern them, it could have increased the trust by showing the relevance for the country as a whole.

There is also a need for visible improvements for people in a conflict torn community. Trust must be re-established, safety guaranteed and institutions strengthened. Mine clearance can be crucial in such a normalization process and help people return to their homes, release farmland for cultivation, and give children safe passage to school (Brende, 2016). The condition for this is that mine clearance produce such concrete results that the parties can benefit from.

7 Conclusion

"Creating trust and understanding between former enemies is a supremely difficult challenge. It is, however, an essential one to address in the process of building a lasting peace"

Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Emeritus

This chapter will sum up the main findings of this study, and explain what implications this has for the current theoretical framework. I will consider the theory used in this analysis and how my findings can contribute to theory-developing on this subject. Further, I will give an update on the ongoing situation in Colombia and recent research about the situation in the country, before I suggest further research that can be added to understand the issue of trust in ongoing negotiations and peace work. Finally, some concluding remarks regarding the implications of this study.

As I stated in the beginning of this study, theoretical assumptions suggest a positive relationship between confidence building measures and the focus on trust in peace negotiations that can result in successful negotiation outcomes. The need for trust in negotiations seem to be widely accepted, but a lack of empirical research is missing to show this theory in practice. In particular, there is a need to look at measures of how trust can be built, as well as understanding the necessary conditions required for this to happen.

With this in mind, the research question for this study has been as following: *"How, and under what conditions, can mine clearance contribute to trust building in peace negotiations?"*

To be able to answer this question, a confidence building exercise conducted through the Colombian peace talks in 2015 and 2016 has been mapped and analysed based on my own empirical data and existing literature, using different approaches to measure trust. It has further been investigated based on academic literature of trust, negotiations, and third party.

7.1   Main findings

Much can be said about the historic peace agreement signed between the Colombian Government and the FARC in 2016. This study has focused on a concrete confidence building exercise that took place during these historic negotiations. The pilot project appears to have been a successful exercise of trust building conducted throughout the peace talks that helped bring the negotiations back on its feet. My findings, presented in this thesis, indicate that the pilot project has had a positive effect when it came to build trust between the two parties at the negotiation table - but most visible and prominent between the parties in the field.

Furthermore, it shows a clear evidence of a missed opportunity to use this exercise to build trust and confidence to a third, even more important actor – the general public. The lack of inclusion and communication with the public, according to my findings, indicates a missed opportunity to also include the Colombian people in this exercise of trust.

The findings discussed in this chapter indicate that the pilot project conducted in El Orejón and in Santa Helena during the peace negotiations in Colombia, is perceived from most parties as a success-story of confidence and trust building, but not without lessons learned. In the first section I presented the pilot project on the most intense and local level: the actual minefield. My findings show a high level of mistrust in the beginning, that through co-existence, third party representation, incurring security risk and information cost, turned into a close bond between the different actors who participated in the project. I found that the way the project was conducted, from wearing different uniforms to the work itself, created a bond between the actors that eventually turned into trust.

The clearest effect of the pilot project can be found at the local level. Here, I have used inter-personal measurement of trust building to analyse if trust has been built. I operationalized the concept of trust and distrust into clear measures such as way of communicating and speaking about the other party, cooperation, types of interactions and way of describing the pilot project. These measurements were then applied when analysing trust building at local level. I found all interviewees except one to give clear indications that trust was built, by positively referring to the other party, highlighting positive experiences and interactions and talking about the project and its effects.

When looking for these act that "humanize" the other party, I found several at the local level. Playing football, cutting each other's hair, helping each other in crisis, daily interactions and sharing stories with each other are all concrete actions taken place between the party that helps remove labels and see the other party as a "human being", a "Colombian" rather than FARC or army.

Also for the negotiation table in Havana, I found through this study that CBM have a positive effect. Through security risk, losing face and information cost, the two parties developed and conducted the pilot project with the intention of reducing mistrust among each other at the negotiation table. The pilot project has been subject of several mistrusts reducing activities from both parties. This include incurring security risk and information cost, to allowing third party monitoring and organising the pilot project so it had a direct and constant connection to the negotiation table. The birth of the pilot project took place at a crucial time during the peace talks, were negotiations had stopped and there was a need to get the conversations going again. A tangible, concrete action such as the pilot project create an important room to reopen negotiations. It allows the parties to focus on something outside the negotiation room, but still highly relevant for the actual peace talks.

Lastly, I found that the project failed in providing the necessary information to the general public, proving to be unable of creating trust among Colombians in the peace process itself. While several of my informants mentioned this as an important part of the pilot project and a goal of the project itself, it does not seem to actually have been implemented. This supports the indication that the lack of media exposure can create a lack of trust from the general public. As a confidence building exercise between the parties, the pilot project can be said to have been rather successful, both at a local level and at the negotiation table. It has generated trust between all the different actors, giving more confidence to the peace negotiations itself, and reducing tension at a time where not even a ceasefire existed. However, failing on communicating this project to the general population seems to have been a missed opportunity to show a positive side of the peace negotiation to the public, that possibly could have had the effect of bringing both hope and increased trust to the process. It is impossible to say, but maybe it also would have had an effect on the outcome of the referendum.

In addition to the specific findings connected to each level, I found the pilot project to be important as a tool of reconciliation – making enemies sit face to face with each other after 50

years of fighting, initiating peaceful interactions. My informants who participated in the pilot project mention this "humanizing" of the other party, and how the pilot project has been an important happening to create reconciliation. This reconciliation seem to have taken place both between the FARC and the army representatives, but also between the Colombian NPA informants and the other participants of the pilot. While the NPA staff was supposed to facilitate the pilot project, I found through my interviews that it seem to have been equally as much a trust building exercise for them. This supports my argument that showing such confidence building measures to the general public could have helped increase the trust between the Colombian people and the peace agreement. Of course, no one would be as close on the pilot project as the NPA staff, but the results indicate a positive indicator between the pilot project and increase trust from Colombians in the peace talks – through my interviews with Colombian NPA staff and local community.

As well as analysing the measurement of trust, I have mentioned the conditions required for trust to be built through mine clearance. These varies between levels, but in conclusion the presence of third party is evidently an important condition for mine clearance to contribute with trust building in peace negotiations. In addition to this, comprehensive inclusion of actors, relevant topic, internal support and concrete results are conditions that need to be present for mine clearance to function at its best as a contribution to trust building in peace negotiations.

As this is a single case study it is not possible to conclude that the inclusion of such confidence building measures as the pilot project will increase trust and confidence between conflicting parties in another peace negotiation. However, it may provide valuable insight into the research of conflict resolution, trust building, identity and peace negotiations. In the following, I will discuss the consequences of my research and my findings and recommend further research activities based on this.

7.2   The significance of this research

There appears to be a lack of research on concrete, tangible activities in form of CBMs that can take place between fighting parties in a peace process. The role of trust in conflict resolution has been debated and discussed by many scholars, but it seems to be hard to find one common understanding of this fluid concept, and we are therefore left with many different approaches of how trust can be build. However, most scholars agree that trust is essential in negotiations,

but how this trust is developed, what it is based on and how to approach it seems to lack empirical research.

This study has focused on how mine clearance can be such a tool for confidence building and trust building in peace negotiations. The work of mine clearance is an act of trust itself. Working in a mine contaminated area requires that you can trust your colleagues. The specific role of mine clearance as a CBM is also visible in two concrete ways: first of all, it addresses a concrete issue of the conflict itself, and gives the parties an opportunity to address an issue related to the war they are negotiating the end of. This gives the parties an opportunity to focus on their common interest, which in this case is the Colombian population. Both the FARC and the Government claim to be working for the benefit of the people, and the mine clearance program gave both parties the possibility to shift the focus towards the victims of landmines instead of each other, seeing their common goal rather than the differences that separate them.

Second, the mine clearance work give the community the possibility to see concrete, tangible results of the peace process – not just talks taking place in another country. Seeing how their local community gets transformed from a warzone to an area that finally can be opened up for agriculture, development and social gatherings, give the local community a reason to trust the ongoing negotiations, and see that concrete results are coming out of the peace talks. This second outcome would also count for the general public if the parties would have succeeded in communicating the pilot project to Colombians everywhere, not just where the pilot projects were conducted.

Several of my informants expressed how their perception of the pilot project at the local level had a positive impact on their belief in the peace negotiation at the central level. This indicates that there is a connection between the confidence building measures taking place on the local level and what happens at the central level. This is where a better media outreach and communication to the public could have had the same effect on the general public. Such a conclusion depends on further research, but it serves as an indication that confidence building measures can serve a function not only between the negotiating party, but towards the society the peace is negotiated for. This, however, requires more attention, both by researchers and stakeholders involved in conflict resolution.

7.3 Choice of theory

This study has had a constructivist approach to the theoretical debate of peace negotiations and parties' decision to negotiate and how such negotiations are conducted. This thesis has demonstrated how theory of trust, communication and identity in relation to ongoing peace negotiations can be used to evaluate concrete confidence building measures within a given frame of peace talks. I used the theory of conciliatory signalling and the role of third party as my analytical framework. These concepts were further operationalized to be able to measure to how confidence building measure, such as the pilot project, can help build trust between parties in negotiations.

Different approaches to trust and measurement of trust could have been taken. However, In my empirical analysis I have used the measurement from Höglund and Svensson and their study of reducing mistrust in the peace negotiation in Sri Lanka. I have found their three measurement of conciliatory signalling – image cost, security cost and information cost – to be rather useful in the analysis of the reduction of mistrust and building of confidence between the parties in the case of Colombia. In addition, I built on the study of Kelman and his concept of Confidence building measure (CBM) from his research on the long lasting "conflict"/occupation between Israel and Palestine. Here, he look at how certain tools for building trust can be useful in such conflict with sworn enemies. Lastly, I analyse the role of third party in help securing trust between the parties as a condition for trust. These measurements have been used to analyse if mine clearance can be a useful tool as confidence building measure in peace negotiations.

7.4 Further research and lessons learned

More than a trust building exercise, the pilot project can be said to have played a role of reconciliation. This is clearly evident from my research on the ground, where all of my informants have mentioned in different forms and varieties how the pilot project has removed labels, humanized the other party or seen the Colombian behind the titles. This interaction between enemies, seeing the human and not the villain, is important for a country to be able to move away from war and towards a new future together, where all actors need to live side by side.

There is no short cut to try to heal wounds and brining a society back together after a long-lasting violent conflict, but to be able to build long and lasting peace, these issues needs to be

addressed. While democratic processes and structures are in themselves the most effective means for peaceful prevention and management of conflict, especially in post-conflict contexts, it is important to address the legacy of the past, develop working relationships in the present and to build a shared vison of the future (UN, Handbook Series 2003). Reconciliation is an over-arching process including the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing, and is at its core to find a way to live alongside former enemies, to be able to coexist and develop a degree of cooperation that is necessary to share a society with them (UN).

Looking further ahead, mine action can plan a role in the aftermath of a peace agreement. Mine clearance plays an important role when it comes to secure further development for a country. Therefore, in the case of Colombia, where landmines have played such a vital role in the displacements of civilians and the brutality of this war, it is a crucial part of the peace building process.

"*Mine action must be part of peacebuilding and reconstruction and development programmes, if it is to be sustainable. It is, therefore, necessary that participation by the afflicted community, and their capacity enhancement, is guaranteed in all measures which concern their interest*". (The Bad Honnef Framework, n.d.).

When looking at existing literature on the field, the findings of this thesis indicate that more research should be done on concrete actions that can release tension, reduce mistrust and create an identity concerning common ground in peace negotiations. There are also important findings to be done when analysing the micro-levels of negotiations that could be connected to the larger macro-level approaches to negotiations and conflict resolution.

7.5   Concluding Remarks

Much can be learned from studying confidence building measures and trust in the challenging task of peace negotiations and reaching an agreement. This thesis indicates that the successful building of trust through the pilot project also required the aspects of identity, creating common ground and communication as elements in trust building. The Colombian peace agreement is today in its implementation phase, where it is facing several challenges ahead. When this thesis is handed in, Colombia is in the middle of electing a new President. The future of both the

peace agreement with the FARC and future agreements with other groups may be at risk depending on the outcome of this election.

But that is not Colombia's only concern. Facing a divided society such as the Colombian reality the failure to implement the peace agreement and successfully build trust with the public might have devastating effects. Colombia faces many challenges ahead, but if the pilot project is an indication of how things can be if the efforts are put into it, it does not look all that dark.

In the concrete case of Colombia, the pilot project could potentially play the role as a "best practice" example of the implementation of the peace agreement in addition to function as a tool during the negotiations. Many promises are still not in place regarding the implementation of the agreement, and both the Colombian people and the FARC – who has given up their arms – are becoming impatient. The continued effects of the pilot project, such as the creation of Humanicemos and the training of FARC deminers, serves as an important example of how reintegration programs could be conducted.

In a larger scale, however difficult it might be to draw conclusions from a micro-level case-study in Colombia to a higher level, this study shows the possibilities such concrete confidence-building measures have on ongoing peace negotiations, but also which effects it can have for the aftermaths of a peace agreement.

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Appendix

Interview Guide

Background of the interviewee:

1. What is your connection to the Pilot Project and what was your role?
2. What did you do during the project?

Design/organizing

3. How was the pilot project planned?
4. Who participated in the design and organizing of the project?
5. Were you satisfied with this?
6. Was the different interest represented?
7. What do you think about the Pilot Project?

Implementation and results

8. Were there any challenges with the project? In case, what challenges?
9. What was the goal of the project and do you think this was achieved?
10. What contact did you have with the negotiation table in Havana?
11. What do you think was the role of NPA?
12. How was the pilot project communicated with the country?
13. What do you think came out of the pilot project?

Reflection depending on participant:

14. When did you first hear about the pilot project and what did you think about it?
15. What did you think when you first saw the parties working together?
16. How was life in the camp?
17. How was the interaction between the pilot project and local community?
18. What did you think when the pilot project ended?
19. Has the pilot project changed the way you view the two parties? In case, how?

Request for participation in a research project:

"The role of humanitarian disarmament in peace negotiations
– a case study of Colombia"

Background and goal

The project is for my master thesis in Peace and Conflict studies at the University of Oslo (UiO). The study researches the role of humanitarian disarmament, in particular clearance of landmines, on peace negotiations. To look further into this, I want to do a case study of Colombia and the peace negotiations. During these negotiations, a Pilot Project *of on Land clean up and decontamination from the presence of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMs), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs) or Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs) in general* took place between FARC-EP and the Government facilitated by Norwegian People's aid. My goal of this project is to try and understand the role that this project to clear APM, IED,UXO and ERW has had on the peace negotiations. To test the theories, I need to do data collection in Colombia. From the end 2. February to 7. March 2018, I will be going to Colombia for a four weeks' fieldwork to gather information on the pilot projects. I am contacting you as a relevant actor on this issue from advice from Norwegian People's Aid.

What does participation in this study include?

For my thesis I want to do interviews with relevant actors as yourself, and I will be going to Briceño, El Orejon, Antioquia, for observations. I would like to do 30 minutes' interviews, and possible extent further if necessary. The questions in this study will be about the Pilot Project that Norwegian People's Aid has facilitated. I will be asking questions about the clearance work of APM, IED, UXO and ERW, the peace negotiations that took place in Colombia last year, knowledge of the Pilot Project and your thoughts on these initiatives. I will be recording the interviews with audio recordings, and I will be taking notes during the interview. I will be using an interpreter for the interviews in Spanish.

What will happen with the information about you?

All information about you will be treated confidentially. It will only be me who will have access to the personal information. If necessary, my supervisor will also have access. I will save the personal information on an external hard drive behind password protected programs,

and I will use a "connection key" to protect the information. This means that I will be coding the data I get so that the answers are saved at one place and the personal information at another: this way the data is separated and not possible to track.

If possible, I would like to identify you in the publication by name. If this is not preferred, it will be anonymized and not possible to recognize you.

I agree to be identified in the publication by name	**Yes**	**No**

The fieldwork is set to be done on the 7th of March, and the thesis will be submitted on the 23th of May 2018. The personal information and audio recordings will be destroyed after this, on the 1th of June 2018.

Volunteer participation

It is volunteer to participate in this study, and you can at any time retreat from it without giving any explanation. If you do, all the information about you will be anonymizes.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact:

Thea katrin Mjelstad, +47 988 85 319, thea.katrin@gmail.com

My supervisor: Benedicte Bull, +4722858902, Benedicte.bull@sum.uio.no

This study has been reported to the Data Protection Official at NSD - Norwegian center for research data - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS.

Consent to participation in study

I have received information about the study and want to participate

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(Signed by project participant, date)

102

List of Informants

Name	Organization	Date of Interview	Place of interview
Angela	FARC	16 February 2018	El Orejón
Diego	Local community, Santa Helena	20 February 2018	Vistahermosa
Esteban	NPA	12 February 2018	Bogotá
Fernando Navarro	Descontamina	27 February 2018	Bogotá
Hernan	Local community, El Orejón	15 February 2018	El Orejón
Informant	CCCM	5 February 2018	Bogotá
Informant	Descontamina	17 February 2018	El Orejón
Informant	Descontamina	6 March 2018	Bogotá
Informant	FARC	17 February 2018	El Orejón
Informant	NPA	5 February 2018	Bogotá
Juan Camilo	NPA, MDD	15 February 2018	El Orejón
Leonardo	Descontamina	6 March 2018	Bogotá
Luceny	Local community, Santa Helena	15 February 2018	El Orejón
Marcela	FARC, Humanicemos	12 February 2018	Bogotá
Mario	NPA,	19 February 2018	Vistahermosa
Patricia	Local community, Santa Helena	20 February 2018	Vistahermosa
Pablo Parra and Lina Castillo	UNMAS	6 February 2018	Bogotá
Sara	NPA	8 February 2018	Bogotá
Vanessa Finson	Country Director, NPA Colombia	5 February 2018	Bogotá
Viviana	Local community, El Orejón	15 February 2018	El Orejón
Willington Benitez	Coronel, Batallion 60 BIDES	27 February 2018	Girardot
Yeison	NPA	15 February 2018	El Orejón