

United or divided?

*A case study assessing how the Union for the
Mediterranean has adapted to increased numbers
of migrants and refugees*

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IV

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), in the time period of 2008 to 2017, has adapted to increased levels of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area. It is also of interest to shed light on the UfM member states' motivations in advocating for adaption. By drawing upon official documents and data attained through interviews with officials, the study utilizes a case study approach.

Securitization theory is employed in order to identify attempts at moving the issues of migration and refugees up on the UfM's agenda, and evaluate the impact such attempts have had on the UfM. While the UfM secretariat is treated as the potential securitizing actor, the 43 members are the audience of a potential attempt at securitizing. Both are thus focal points of the analysis. The analysis shows that on the part of the secretariat, there has been no attempt at securitizing refugees and migrants. It is nevertheless found that the secretariat has attempted to move refugees and migrants up on the organization's agenda. By arguing that the two phenomena are regional and therefore require a regional response, the secretariat has been able to gain the acceptance of the member states for extending the organization's mandate with the 2017 UfM roadmap.

While securitization theory accentuates that the audience has to accept a securitizing argument for securitization to occur, little attention is devoted to the motivation of the audience for doing so. Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states are therefore utilized to analyse the motivation of three groups of member states in adopting the roadmap. These three groups are Jordan Turkey and Lebanon; the Northern and Central European UfM members; and the Southern European UfM members of Italy, Spain and Greece. While the two former groups are found to have acted out of self-interested motivations when adopting the roadmap, the latter did so out of collective interest. The combined will of these three groups to extend the organization's refugee- and migrant-related mandate indicates the UfM may be positioned for playing a bigger role in migrant- and refugee-related concerns in the future.

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
Thanks to my friends and fellow PECOS students for encouraging words, and for all the fun we have had outside of the university. Last but not least would I like to thank my parents, Anne and Johannes, for support and encouragement throughout my studies.

Any mistakes or shortcomings are mine alone.

Oslo, December 2017.

Øyvind Steensen.

Map of the Union for the Mediterranean



Explanation of colouring:

Green: EU UfM members, orange: non-EU UfM members, blue: observer states, and yellow: self-suspended members. Source on the UfM member states: Union for the Mediterranean 2016c. Thanks to Melanie Sauter for designing and providing the map.

List of abbreviations

AMC – Arab-Mediterranean Countries

EMP- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENP- European Neighbourhood Policy

EP- European Parliament

EU- European Union

Euromed- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

EuroMeSCo- Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission

FRONTEX-European Border and Coast Guard Agency

NGO- Non Governmental Organization

OECD- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PA-UfM – Parliamentary Assembly- Union for the Mediterranean

SMC – Southern Mediterranean Countries

SOM- Senior Officials Meetings

UfM – Union for the Mediterranean

UNGA- United Nations General Assembly

UN DESA- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US- United States of America

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1 . Introduction

In November 1995, heads of state from all 15 members of the European Union (EU), and from 12 countries located on the EU's southern borders, met at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona. In a process that would result in the Barcelona Declaration, this meeting set the stage for multilateral cooperation through the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Panebianco, 2003b, p 179-180). Viewed as a masterpiece of the post-Cold War era due to its regional response to new security threats, the EMP saw cooperation within the field of migration included in its merits (Bicchi, 2012, p13; Barcelona Declaration, 1995, partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs). However, after being criticized for being Eurocentric in terms of representation and priorities, and with limited progress in achieving the various goals of the organization, the EMP was replaced by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 (Noguès, 2012, p 20-21; Collyer, 2016, p 609).

International relations in the Mediterranean area involve a wide variety of state and non-state actors, forums and intergovernmental organizations. The UfM is nonetheless unique in that it is the regional intergovernmental organization that encompasses all EU members and most non-EU states bordering the Mediterranean (Collyer, 2016, p 611-613).

Although it has inherited the mandate of the EMP, the UfM has operated under quite different circumstances in terms of migratory and refugee influxes than its predecessor. Starting with the 2011 Arab spring and the consequent Syrian civil war, refugees arrived en masse, first in neighbouring countries, then in 2015 in Europe. The flow of migrants in the Mediterranean area has similarly drastically increased, to some extent due to the destabilization of Libya, which has acted as a gateway to Europe (Wolff, 2015, p 165-166,181). As these trends are fairly recent and the UfM as an intergovernmental organization encompasses members from all sides of the Mediterranean, it is natural to ask how the UfM has reacted to the increases in migration and refugee influxes.

1.1 Research question and delimitations of the thesis

This thesis sets out to examine how the UfM deals with the increase of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area. More precisely, it will investigate whether the phenomena of migration and refugees have been given a higher level of prominence in the context of the UfM, and how this might have transformed the organization. To a varying degree, the increase of migrants and refugees, together with their transnational characteristics, has posed an impact on most, if not all UfM members (Wolff, 2015, 165-167). As the organization is composed of 43 members with diverse backgrounds in terms of history, culture, and experiences in dealing with the issues under scrutiny, there is reason to believe that there exist differing perceptions of how the UfM is to engage with migration and refugees.¹ Diverging interests among the members when it comes to the various disagreements and conflicts around the region has certainly been estimated as a weakness, which can potentially hinder cooperation through the UfM (Bicchi, 2012, p 12).² It is thus of interest to investigate the members' motives in acknowledging or renouncing potential proposals for bestowing a higher priority on the issues of migration and refugees. The research question is therefore as follows:

How has the UfM adapted to the increasing levels of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area, and what are the members' motives in advocating for a potential attempt at adaption?

Commended as “the most efficient and multifaceted cooperation forum in the region” in the conclusions of the 2015 Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (Council of the European Union, 2015, p 5), researchers have tended to focus on other aspects of the UfM than that of migration and refugees. In the period antecedent to, and following the establishment of the UfM, the prospects and intention of the organization were a popular topic among publications of all kinds, including academic journals, newspapers, and other media.³ However, the number of publications seems to have dropped in recent years. This thesis will therefore contribute to

¹ As of 2016 the UfM consists of 43 member states. This includes all 28 EU members, as well as Egypt,

² I.e. the Cyprus conflict.

³ See for instance: Gillespie (2011), Gillespie (2008), Balfour (2009), Bicchi (2012), and Benhold (2007b).

the pre-existing literature with an enhanced understanding of the development of cooperation on the issues of migration and refugees in the context of the UfM.

1.1.1 Delimitations

While the scale of migrants and refugee influxes in the Mediterranean area has increased immensely in recent years, the phenomena themselves are not new to the region (Collyer, 2006, p 255; Wolff, 2015, p 165-166). It is therefore analytically wise to limit the time span of this study. The analysis concerns how the UfM has adapted to increasing levels of migration and refugees. With this increase occurring from 2011 and onwards it is imperative to extend the time period under scrutiny to before the increase in order to measure whether an adaption has been a response to the increases in migrants and refugees. While the UfM is a continuation of the EMP, several new features intended to enhance cooperation have been introduced with the UfM (Hunt, 2012, p 176). It thus makes sense to limit the time period under scrutiny to that of the establishment of the UfM in 2008 until 2017. Moreover, the research question is itself based on another delimitation. In analyzing potential adaptations of the UfM, the thesis targets the overall political guidance of the organization. Adaptions in terms of the UfM projects and initiatives are thus excluded.

1.2 Preface to the theoretical framework

The theoretical approach utilized in this thesis derives from the theoretical branch of constructivism. As a relatively new theoretical school within international relations, constructivism has become known for its ability to capture the relationship of agents or actors to structures, and vice versa (Barnett, 2008, p 162). In this regard two aspects within constructivist theory were deemed promising, and were therefore employed in the analysis, namely securitization theory and Alexander Wendt's approach to understanding the interests of states. The theory of securitization, as designed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, encompasses an understanding of how issues might be moved up on the political agenda by constructing them as security-related concerns, which enables the actor to act upon the issue outside of the ordinary procedures (Buzan et al., 1998, p 23-25). It is thus a theory that allows for assessing whether the issues of refugees and migrants have been attributed a higher level of prominence within the UfM, and how this might have transformed the organisation.

While states are frequently treated as the main actor for the securitization of an issue, both politicians and bureaucracies have the ability to do the same (Buzan et al., 1998, p 40). The establishment of an UfM secretariat is, compared to the EMP, an institutional innovation. Even though the role of the secretariat is technical in nature, Nogués (2012, p 26-27) explains that the European Parliament noted in 2010 that the secretariat “has the ability to become an autonomous actor and to provide a real added value to co-operation across the Mediterranean”. In terms of preparing working documents and acting as a liaison among the different institutional structures, the secretariat has a role as a preparatory body. This role implies close contact with other institutional elements, and is therefore thought to open up for the secretariat to have an effect on the organization’s agenda (Office of the Secretary General, no year, p 2). The analysis regarding securitization will consequently be focused on the secretariat as a potential securitizing actor. It is vital to point out here that the securitizing actor’s construction of an issue as a threat needs to be accepted by the audience in order for securitization to occur (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25). While the theory gives little explanation as to who it is that constitutes an audience, in the case of the UfM this is deemed to be the member states. This is because the UfM is a consensus-based organization in which all 43 member states, in the context of the ministerial meetings, approve or reject suggestions to amend its mandate (Paris Summit, 2008, p 11).

Looking to expand the understanding of whether states are self-interested, Wendt put emphasis on the motives for their actions, and their attitude toward other states. Self-interest is a belief concerning how the state is to meet its needs. This encompasses an instrumental attitude toward other states in realizing those needs. Collective interest is in contrast an instance where the state acts because it identifies with the other state or states (Wendt, 1999, p 240). The distinct divide between collective interest and self-interest makes this a feasible approach for investigating the UfM member states’ motivations for accepting or renouncing proposals for adopting the organization due to the increased migration and refugee influxes.

In sum, the utilization of securitization theory allows the thesis to identify potential attempts at moving the phenomena of migration and refugees up on the agenda of the UfM, and assess whether such attempts have had an impact on the organisation. Employing Wendt’s considerations on the interests of states will then facilitate an examination of UfM members

underlying reasoning for rejecting or acknowledging attempts at altering the organization's mandate related to migrants and refugees.

1.3 Preface to the methods

By investigating contemporary events, utilizing interview data, and asking a “how” research question, this research project has employed a single-case study approach (Yin, 2014, p 9, 12). Field interviews with UfM member state diplomats, parliamentarians, and officials with the UfM among their competencies, have been carried out for the sake of triangulation and acquiring a sufficient level of data. Attaining access to data on the perspectives of respondents belonging to different UfM governments has been particularly important, as secondary sources provide limited coverage of their attitude to recent developments in the UfM. It has however proven difficult to gain access to relevant respondents. Substantial efforts have been put into the process of data gathering, resulting in six interviews with a total of seven respondents.

1.4 Further outline of the study

The rest of this study will proceed as follows: Consisting of six chapters in total, this introduction constitutes chapter one of the thesis. Chapter two seeks to establish an understanding of the UfM and the environment it operates in, which will constitute a backdrop for the thesis. Starting off by illuminating the recent increases of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area, the second part of this chapter will form a historical background of relevant developments concerning the UfM and its predecessor.

Chapter three concerns the analytical framework applied in the thesis. Its first sub-chapter defines migrant and refugees; the second subchapter then puts the concept of security under scrutiny before moving on to delineate the framework of securitization theory. The third subchapter explores and explains how the thesis is to utilize Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states.

Presenting the methods and research design of the study, the fourth chapter commences by elucidating the reasons for choosing a single case study approach and the selection of data.

Furthermore, the chapter also presents the research design, concerns related to the methods, as well as an assessment of the reliability, representativeness, and validity of the study.

Chapter five constitute the analysis and sees the collected data analyzed in conformity with the theoretical approach as designed in chapter three. The chapter is split in two main subchapters with the first utilizing securitization theory to assess whether the UfM has adapted. The second subchapter then applies Wendt's considerations of self-interest in order to assess the motivation of the member states in advocating for the adaption. The thesis then goes on to summarize the findings, and concludes in chapter six.

2 Background

The background presented in this chapter is essential to the understanding of both the UfM and the environment it operates in. Recent trends in movement of people across the Mediterranean area will be presented in part 2.1, while the historical, thematic and institutional conditions of the UfM will be elaborated in section 2.2.

2.1 Trends in migrant and refugee influxes

The Mediterranean as a geopolitical region can be defined in many essential respects by the successive migrations which characterize it (Collyer, 2006, p 255).

The Mediterranean area has, as the quote indicates, a long history of movement of people across national borders. The process of decolonisation after World War II, patterns of migration between Europe and the Arab-Mediterranean Countries (AMC)⁴ and the arrival of refugees from several conflicts, have all been a part of this movement of people (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012, p 4-7; Bardak, 2015, p 21-22).

The European Union and its member states have in general been characterized by stability and prosperity since the post-WWII rebuilding (Anastasiou, 2007, p 34). The EU's southern neighbours, in contrast, have on several occasions experienced political instability, economic challenges, and conflicts. The most recent example of political instability and conflict being the 2011 Arab Spring (Cordesman, 2016). It is therefore hardly surprising that many AMC inhabitants have left for Europe. Out of 8 million first generation AMC migrants residing in another country by 2010, 62 percent were located within the EU (Bardak, 2015, p 33). These numbers do not include migrants originating from Turkey, Libya or any of the Balkan states. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that there is a significant level of migration in-between the UfM member states.

The reasons for migrating vary due to both individual and societal concerns. However, Bardak (2015, p 25-26) identifies economic concerns as common motives. Low wages, few

⁴ This categorization derives from Bardak (2015) who utilizes it in order to describe the countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Tunisia, all of them important UfM members.

career opportunities and tight labour markets have made it difficult especially for younger generations in the AMCs to economically maintain themselves without migrating. Both the AMCs and Europe have previously profited off this pattern of migration. For Europe, labour and economic migrants in general constitute a significant portion of the labour market flexibility, as well as 70 percent of the growth in the workforce between 2004 and 2014 (OECD, 2014, p 1). Furthermore, immigrants originating in non-European Mediterranean countries contributed to compensate for the shortage in low-skilled workers several European countries experienced in the 1960s and 1970s (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012, p 5-6). Migrants of non-European Mediterranean origin have in turn remitted parts of their earnings to their relatives, thereby increasing the gross domestic product of their country of origin. Migrant remittances do in fact make up for a substantial share of the Jordanian and Lebanese GDP. Other potential outcomes are the adoption of Western values, and the acquiring of certain skills that might be beneficial if the migrant at some point chooses to return to their country of origin (Bardak, 2015, p 35-36). Though the importance such values and skills have upon return is questionable, Bardak (2015, p 35- 36) points out that migrants returning from Europe often have fewer children, have a higher likelihood of acquiring work, and that a large share attain jobs as employers.⁵ Circular migration have therefore been accentuated by the European Commission (2007, p 4) as a phenomenon that can help in transferring skills to, and alleviate brain drain in migrants country of origin, as well as addressing EU labour marked needs.⁶

Moreover, with a 28 percent youth unemployment in 2013, the AMCs have the highest unemployment rate amongst youth in the world (Bardak, 2015, p 22). Such a high unemployment rate lays the foundation for a potential large-scale movement of people in the Mediterranean area, both among the AMCs themselves, to European and other Western countries, and to the countries in the Persian Gulf. Previous trends have nevertheless demonstrated that the EU members are the most favoured destinations (Bardak, 2015, p 23, 30-34).

⁵ Such skills and values include language skills, technical skills, and ethical awareness.

⁶ Circular migration is a concept that lacks a commonly accepted definition. Nevertheless the European Commission (2007, p 4) defines it as “a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries”.

2.1.1 The 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis

It has already been demonstrated that large-scale movements of people may be problematic. Since the 2011 Arabic Spring, Europe has faced what Wolff (2015, p 165) describes as “unprecedented refugee and migratory fluxes”. This peaked in 2015 when more than one million people commenced the hazardous voyage of crossing the Mediterranean Sea to enter Europe (UNHCR, 2016a, p 7). Arriving in Southern Europe, the sheer number of migrants and refugees presented Greece and Italy with major challenges in receiving them. Ultimately many sought their way to other European countries, Germany and Sweden in particular. As migrants and refugees passed through the Balkans, countries like Croatia and Hungary abruptly experienced tensions on their borders (Bogdan & Fratzke, 2015; Wessberg et al., 2017, p 12). By the end of 2016, and even though they had received support from the EU, Italy still had troubles with receiving, and Greece with accommodating the arriving migrants (Wessberg et al., 2017, p 5, 12). Recent developments have also seen an increase in arrivals in Spain and France (Frontex, 2017, p 4). The resettling of migrants and refugees inside Europe has had far-reaching effects as both the political and economic pressure on European communities has increased, consequently reinforcing anti-immigration and xenophobic parties across the continent (Toaldo, 2015, p 77). However, not all migrants and refugees have succeeded in reaching Europe, and approximately 3,770 people tragically lost their lives crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 alone (UNHCR, 2016a, p 32).

As the numbers of migrants and refugees, the death toll, and the difficulties European countries experienced in handling the phenomenon increased, the situation has been referred to as a “European migrant crisis” (Townsend, 2015, p 1; Bogdan & Fratzke, 2015). Yet the perceptions of a European migration or refugee crisis are highly ambiguous in that they describe the phenomena as purely European. The rising levels of migrants and refugees are in fact affecting most states along the Mediterranean. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, all members of the UfM, have traditionally been countries of origin, but are today facing a reality as host countries for mainly Syrian refugees (Dustmann & Frattini, 2012, p 6; Bardak, 2015, p 24-25).⁷ The number of refugees seeking refuge in these countries has put major pressure on

⁷ Lebanon and Jordan have also been accommodating Palestinian refugees for decades. Citizens of these countries are moreover still migrating to Europe and elsewhere in order to attain jobs. See Bardak 2015.

their capacities in several sectors (UNHCR, 2016a, p 18,21).⁸ According to Rother et al. (2016, p 7-8, 13) this is especially evident in Jordan and Lebanon. In the latter, refugees make up one quarter of the population, which consequently has put the housing and labour market, infrastructure, the budget, and also public services like health care and education, under strain.

Furthermore, Libya, which has a long history as both a host and a transit country, has experienced tremendous political turmoil since the 2011 Arab-Spring. During Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship, preventing migrants from utilizing Libya as a springboard into Europe was used as means to gain European recognition of his rule. However, when he fell, the new Libyan government lacked the institutional ability to handle the migratory pressures, which was further diminished by the fragmentation of the government into two separate governments after the 2014 civil war (Toaldo, 2015, p 75-77). Human traffickers and smugglers have been able to take advantage of the instability caused by these events, as they smuggle human beings to Europe through Libya (Rother et al., 2016, p 14-15). Libya has thus risen as the main country of departure on the central Mediterranean route, where a majority of migrants are of African origin.⁹ In 2016, 181,459 people, with a death toll of 4,500, arrived in Europe after travelling this hazardous route. This signifies an 18 percent increase in detected migrants and refugees compared to 2015. A similar trend has been evident on the western Mediterranean route where 10,000 detections, an increase of 46 percent since 2015, were made in 2016. Migrants utilizing this route were notably, crossing the Mediterranean to reach Spain. At the same time has the number of migrants travelling along the eastern Mediterranean route declined from 885,386 in 2015, to 182, 277 in 2016 (Frontex, 2017, p 18-20). This decrease, is according to the European Border Guard Agency (Frontex, 2017, p 18), partially a repercussion of the 2016 EU-Turkey statement as it has both limited the incentives for migrants to irregularly access Greece and impaired the smuggler networks.

Migrants and refugees seeking to reach a safe haven or a better life therefore offer challenges for most countries along the Mediterranean and Europe. The "crisis" is in other words not only European but also Mediterranean, and involves refugees and migrants originating from both within the UfM member space and outside.

⁸ The UNHCR (2016a, p 16) estimates that Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan combined hosted 4.2 million refugees by the end of 2015.

⁹ Also utilized by Syrian refugees. See Toaldo, 2015, p 80.

2.2 The Union for the Mediterranean

2.2.1 Preceding the UfM: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Meeting in Barcelona at the 1995 Euro Mediterranean Conference, the then 15 EU member states, plus Cyprus, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority, launched the Barcelona Process (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the Barcelona Process represented a turning point toward multilateral cooperation and partnership between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours (Panebianco, 2003b, p 179).

With the overall goal of “turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995), the EMP was developed as a platform for addressing common non-military challenges. These challenges included several “soft” security issues, often rooted in economical and political conditions and with a transnational character, including illegal migration (Panebianco, 2003a, p 3-4).¹⁰ Cooperation was then to be centered on a three-fold partnership derived from the three chapters of the declaration, namely: “Political & security partnership”, “Economic & financial partnership”, and “Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Combined, these chapters constituted what former Italian ambassador in charge of the Barcelona Process, Mr Antonio Badini (2003, p ix), called a global approach “for reinforcing overall stability”. A key assumption for this approach, which therefore needs to be taken into account, is that “...political stability and economic prosperity are

¹⁰ Jandl et al. (2008, p 6) define illegal migration as an “act of migration that is “not legal”, or an act of migration that is carried out against legal provisions of entry and residence”. They further state that the EU utilizes this understanding of illegal migration.

interdependent and require social and cultural development according to a mutually reinforcing logic” (Panebianco, 2003a, p 18).

Hence, the three partnerships for cooperation fulfilled each other, were envisioned to have cross-cutting effects, and opened up for integration between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. However, by 2003 they had had varying degrees of success, something that Philippart (2003, p 12) refers to as related to the EU’s varying “competences, weight and experience” within the three fields. Looking to establish a “common area of peace and stability”, the aim with the first chapter was rather bold (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). The chapter in itself had, according to Philippart (2003,p 12), experienced slow progress by 2003 and had finite concrete accomplishments to show for. However, he also points out that the participation of both the Arab states (including the Palestinian Authority) and Israel as EMP members has been assessed as an achievement of this chapter. Panebianco (2003a, p 13-14) similarly assesses the very fact that the EMP was a forum where 27 very diverse states, despite disagreements and conflicts, were able to come together and discuss as another accomplishment. However, it also proved challenging for the organization as the two ministerial conferences in Malta (1997) and Marseille (2000) were deadlocked due to events related to the Middle East Peace Process (Panebianco, 2003a, p 9).

Economic cooperation was, according to both Ambassador Badini (2003, p ix) and Hunt (2012, p 172), at the forefront of the EMP’s focus. It is therefore no surprise it was within the economic and financial partnership (the second chapter) that the EMP by 2003 had achieved the most. This was especially true when it came to addressing socioeconomic challenges in the region, which among other achievements saw the execution of employment reforms with adequate progress in the partner countries (Philippart, 2003, p 12, 17). Bettering the socioeconomic conditions in the southern Mediterranean states was, according to Derisbourgh (1997, p 9), seen as a fundamental cause for creating the EMP in the first place. Socioeconomic conditions were affiliated with the goals of ensuring “peace and stability”, and confining migration to Europe (Derisbourgh, 1997, p 9).

The third partnership emphasized the need for dialogue and exchange at the “human, scientific and technological level” as important contributors in developing mutual understanding between different cultures across the Mediterranean (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). An important aspect with this partnership is the fact that migration was recognized as

a key aspect in the relationship between the EMP members. The main factors as depicted in the declaration were readmission of illegal migrants and downsizing of migratory pressures (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). However, agreement on this topic was not reached without discussion. Southern Mediterranean countries, which provided a substantial portion of migrants going to Europe, strived to enhance the legal protection of migrants living in Europe. European countries were, on the contrary, opposed to strengthening the legal protection of migrants beyond what already existed in international law, and also sought to limit the impact of illegal migration (Biad, 2003, p 147- 148). Given the unequal positions it is no wonder that Philippart by 2003 (p 12) finds the implementation on relevant measures to be intermediate, with little progress on the one substantial project on border controls and migration management.

Migration proved to be an increasingly important issue for cooperation in the EMP during its lifetime. The 2005 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit resulted in a five-year work plan for the EMP with a chapter dedicated to internal security and the management of migration, explicitly linking migration to development (Council of the European Union, 2005, p 7-8). Addressing the development on the southern shores of the Mediterranean were in fact seen by the EU as a method for relieving the impetus for dissatisfied inhabitants to “join fundamentalist movements and migrate to Europe”(Hunt, 2012, p 171-172). This was taken even further at the 2007 First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, where ministers introduced measures intended to address various aspects of migration. The core essence of this ministerial conclusion was to fight illegal migration, reap the benefits migration has on development by promoting legal migration, and address the root causes of migration (Euromed, 2007, p 1, 3-7).

Illegal migration was here to be opposed through increased cooperation and capacity building in relation to the management of migration influxes. Moreover, by facilitating options for legal migration, ministers sought to reap the benefits migration has in terms of development. These benefits included the transfer of remittances to families as well as competences, in terms of work related experience, which migrants bring back when returning to their country of origin. It was in this sense also emphasized that both the needs of the countries of origin and destination should be taken into account when facilitating legal migration, in order to work against brain drain and at the same time enable the migration of workers with relevant backgrounds for the labour market in the country of destination (Euromed, 2007, p 2-6).

As for the root causes of migration, ministers further emphasized that such causes needed to be addressed, and specified them to concern poverty, unemployment and the development gap (Euromed, 2007, p 5-6). Emerging in the 1980s, the notion of addressing migration through root cause approaches encompasses measures aimed at alleviating driving factors for forced migration and economical migration in the country of origin. The former in terms of devoting efforts to prevent or limit violations of human rights and the eruption of violence, the latter in terms of reducing poverty by employing development policies (Castles & Hear, 2011, p 287 -288). The ministerial meeting on migration put emphasis on poverty, unemployment and the development gap as root causes (Euromed, 2007, p 5-6). The root cause approach unveiled at this meeting was thus designed for tackling economic migration. According to Castles and Hear (2011, p 297), such approaches are grounded in the notion that poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment are what drive the movement of refugees and migrants, addressing these underlying causes is thus thought to “help keep people home”. It should be noted though that one needs resources in order to migrate; putting efforts into increasing the development of poor states has therefore been estimated to cause more migration in the short term before potentially mitigating migration influxes in the long term (Castles & Hear, 2011, p 297- 298).

2.2.2 Building upon the Barcelona Declaration: The Union for the Mediterranean

Officials from both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean had high hopes for the 2005 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit. It was seen as an opportunity to invigorate the EMP, which as a by-product of the deadlock in the 2000 Israeli-Palestinian peace talks had experienced little progress and few attempts at cooperation (EuroMeSCo, 2005, Editorial; Collyer, 2016, p 609). Although a work programme was produced, the summit itself turned out to be problematic. Opposing what was perceived as “pushiness of the EU in promoting” the fourth chapter of the work programme concerning among others migration, heads of state and governments from southern non-EU partners chose to refrain from participating (Bicchi, 2012, p 10).¹¹ Combined with an inability to formulate a common

¹¹ Except for Turkey and the Palestinian Authority.

declaration, it demonstrated that cooperation in the EMP framework was problematic (EuroMeSCo, 2005, Editorial).

Arguing that the EMP had failed to reach its objectives, French president Nicolas Sarkozy as part of his 2007 election campaign called for stronger cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean through a “Mediterranean Union”. Intended to only include the states bordering the Mediterranean, the proposal initially met headwind from especially Germany, but also Italy, Spain and other EU states (Delgado, 2012, p 45-47). Though, according to Benhold (2007a, para 15), Spanish Ambassador Juan Prat in charge of Mediterranean affairs did react positively to the prospect of such a union as an efficient approach for handling “new risks like immigration”. Substantial negotiations then commenced, resulting inter alia in that all EU states were to be included in the union and that it was to build upon the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, renamed Union for the Mediterranean at the Marseille Ministerial Conference of November 2008, was then launched at the Paris Summit in July 2008 (Delgado, 2012, p 46-49). It was here underscored that the UfM was to:

... build on the acquis and reinforce the achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its three chapters of cooperation ... will continue to remain central in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Paris Summit, 2008, p 12).

Hence, the UfM is to a large degree based on the EMP, with uniform underlying motivations, including the issues of migration, development and security (Bicchi, 2012, p 2). This is underlined by the fact that the five-year work programme adopted at the 2005 summit, and all EMP ministerial conclusions, remained valid for the UfM (Paris Summit, 2008, p 12). The conclusions from the 2007 ministerial meeting on migration focusing on fighting illegal migration, promoting legal migration, reaping the benefits migration have on development, and addressing the root causes of migration, are thus still valid. Moreover, the 2009 work programme, as laid down in the 2008 Marseille declaration, emphasized that migration should be “an integral part of the regional partnership”, that in accordance with the 2007 ministerial meeting on migration should be addressed through a “comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach” (Council of the European Union, 2008, p 24). The respondents participating in this study, i.e. my respondents, have indeed accentuated that migration is an

important issue for discussion in the regional and political dialogue of the UfM, and moreover that addressing the root causes of migration is a vital goal for both the dialogues and the UfM projects.

Another similarity with the EMP is the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly- Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM) is the “legitimate parliamentary expression” of the UfM (Paris Summit, 2008, p 14). Formerly known as the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, the PA-UfM was established in 1998 to “provide the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with a parliamentary dimension” (PA-UfM, no year). It is a purely consultative interparliamentary institution, bringing together parliamentary representatives from the UfM member states, and the European Parliament with the purpose of issuing recommendations on the features of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This includes the role of, and the work conducted by the UfM (PA-UfM, no year). It is here important to note that the UfM operates closely with another institutional component, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Bicchi, 2012, p2). Being a EU foreign policy instrument, the ENP consists of bilateral agreements between the EU, and its southern and eastern neighbours. As a multilateral organization with a strong EU presence, the UfM has been referred to as complementing the ENP (Rieker, 2016, p 4).

Although there are several similarities between EMP and UfM, the latter are intended to address three core aspects, which have been evaluated as insufficient with the former, namely “to upgrade the Partnership’s political status, to increase co-ownership among partner states and to raise the Partnership’s visibility” (Hunt, 2012, p 176). The Paris Declaration signalled the importance of biannual heads of state and government summits, the co-presidency and the secretariat as means to address these aspects (Paris Summit, 2008, p 13-15; Hunt, 2012, p 176).

While the UfM co-presidency, made up by one non-EU and one EU co-president, was established as an instrument to increase co-ownership, the summits between the heads of state and government were introduced as a means to upgrade the relations between the EU and its partners.¹² Tasked with the formulation of a two-year work plan as well as a political declaration, these summits were to be held every other year. Foreign ministerial meetings, which had been a central aspect in the EMP, were then to be held once a year. With the task

¹² The co-presidency has as of 2012 been assumed by Jordan and the EU (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016f).

of making preparations for the next heads of state and government summit, and inspecting the development in implementing the conclusions from the previous summit, foreign ministerial meetings were to have a less prominent position than during the EMP (Paris Summit, 2008, p 13-16; Nogués, 2012, p 23- 25).

However, tension between Israel and the Arab states caused by a variety of incidents has had severe complications for UfM ministerial and heads of state and government meetings.

Whereas the initial issue was Israeli objections to the incorporation of the Arab League as an observer with the right to intervene, the Gaza war of 2008-2009 caused the Arab members to refrain from attending meetings until mid 2009. Several sectoral ministerial meetings in 2010 as well as the biennial summit between heads and governments fell victim to similar reasons (Bicchi, 2012, p 10-11).¹³ As of 2015, the latter type of meeting had yet to be implemented, while the frequency of the former has increased and become an important component when it comes to the development of the UfM's political guidance and political mandate (Collyer 2016, p 610; Anonymous 6, 2017). However, due to the crackdown of the biennial summits and at the same time frequent meetings in the Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM), this institution has taken prominence as the main governing body of the organization. Here representatives from all the members meet with the task of supervising and coordinating the work of the secretariat as well as preparing for the various ministerial meetings (Nogués, 2012, p 25; Bartczak & Jongberg, 2017, p 4).

Working toward the objectives of “peace, security and stability”, through projects of regional but also sub-regional type is a key feature in amplifying UfM's visibility to citizens (Paris Summit, 2008, p 11, 14, 17). The UfM project portfolio as of 2016 consisted of 47 projects within six priority areas that all are fixated towards the three objectives of “Human development, Stability, and Integration” (Union for the Mediterranean, 2017a, p 11).¹⁴ It falls within the secretariat's responsibility to identify, follow up, and promote these projects, while the SOM have the final say in approving the secretariats proposals for new projects (Bartczak & Jongberg, 2017, p 4). It is, however, not the secretariats responsibility to implement projects and initiatives, they rather support and shapes project proposals from private, national, or other actors. Once a project is labelled by the secretariat as an UfM project it gain

¹³ See Bicchi 2012 for a further elaboration.

¹⁴ These six priority areas are: business development, social and civil affairs, higher education and research, transport and urban development, water and environment, and energy and climate action.

access to technical and logistical assistance, as well as assistance in terms of acquiring financing, by the secretariat (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016b; Anonymous 6, 2017). The role of the secretariat further encompasses a function of “working in operational liaison with all structures of the process”. This involves, among other things, the preparation of working documents for the SOM. Such documents are also prepared for the other structures of the UfM through the SOM (Office of the Secretary General, no year, p 2). In this regard Nogués (2012, p 27) expresses that the EP as of 2010 estimated the secretariat “has the ability to become an autonomous actor and to provide a real added value to co-operation in the Mediterranean”. This thus signifies that the secretariat has a crucial role that encompasses coordinative responsibilities and close contact with the decision-making bodies of the organization.

3 Analytical framework

This chapter presents the analytical framework employed in this study. It sees the exposition of two theories derived from the theoretical branch of constructivism, namely securitization theory, and Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states. These two theories are essential in order to shed light on how the UfM has adapted toward the increased migration and refugee influxes, and the members' motives for acknowledging or rejecting a potential attempt at adaption. Securitization theory will therefore be accounted for in section 3.2, and the interests of states will be subjected to scrutiny in section 3.3. However, the chapter will start off by defining refugee and migrant. This way the study aims at avoiding intermingling two closely related terms.

3.1 Terminology: migrants and refugees

Recent years have seen a drastic increase in all kinds of migration. Having increased by 71 millions since 2000, the total amount of international migrants reached 244 million people in 2015. Between 2000 and 2015 the number of international migrants increased with 71 million, totalling 244 million people in 2015 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2016, p 1). Furthermore, by 2016, 65.3 million people, among them 23.1 million refugees, had been forcibly displaced from their country of origin (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2016a, p 2- 7). Meanwhile the terms "refugee" and "migrant" have increasingly been applied in an interchangeable manner. They are, however, referring to two groups of people with different status in international law (UNHCR, 2016b).

The 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol lays the foundation for the legal definition of a refugee. Here a refugee is defined as any person who:

...owing to well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being

outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 2010, p 14).

Hence, it can be said that a refugee is a person who is unable to return to their country of origin due to well-founded fears of persecution on the basis of one's political, national or ethnic characteristics. By qualifying as a refugee, in accordance with this protocol, one gets certain rights. These rights are based on the principles of non-refoulement, non-penalization and non-discrimination. The convention also contains certain standards for the treatment of refugees. These standards are minimum standards and are also to be granted without discrimination or prejudice (UNHCR, 2010, p 2-3). Refugees thus have a fairly strong legal protection.

There is, in contrast to a refugee, no clear definition in international law of what constitutes a migrant. However, article 2, paragraph 1 of "The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families" defines a migrant worker as:

...a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 1990, p 262).

This definition entails that a migrant worker is a person who is or has been working, and therefore also living, in a foreign country. It may therefore be said that a migrant is a person who is residing in a country other than that of their origin. Nevertheless, this understanding of what constitutes a migrant would blur the lines between migrants and refugees, as refugees also reside in countries other than their own. This study will therefore assess migrants as people who move to a country other than that of their origin due to reasons other than persecution. Such reasons might be to get away from environmental disasters such as famine, improving their quality of life by education or working, or even family reunification with family members who live abroad. Hence, environmental, socioeconomic and personal conditions could lead people to migrate. It is important to note here that instances like environmental disasters often leave little choice to stay in the migrant's place of origin, thus giving rise to the term forced migration. This term, which lacks basis in international law,

entails the involuntarily movement of people due to causes other than those that apply to refugees (UNHCR, 2016b).

3.2 Security and the theory of securitization

Security is a vital concept within international relations. However, it is highly subjective in that security is a perceived condition. As a subjective concept, different actors will perceive security in different ways, which makes security difficult to define and therefore also difficult to measure (Kjølberg & Jeppesen, 2001, p 18). Security has consequently been described as an underdeveloped (Buzan, 1991, p 3) and contested concept (Gallie in Baldwin, 1997, p 10).

However, despite the lack of a commonly accepted definition, some common ground has been found regarding what security in international relations entails. This common ground perceives security as the absence of threats toward the identity and integrity of both states and communities (Buzan, 1991, p 18-19). Humankind has fought numerous wars throughout history, so there is no surprise that the traditional perception of security is associated with states' military power and the absence of military threat aimed toward a state (Kjølberg & Jeppesen, 2001, p 18). Nevertheless, during the 1980s, when the Cold War was coming to an end, scholars started arguing for widening the understanding of what security entails. A prime assertion was that the traditional view of security failed to include, at the time, recent security-related challenges, usually with non-military characteristics (Buzan et al., 1998, p 2). Challenges, or threats, that scholars sought to incorporate in security studies included “domestic poverty, educational crises, industrial competitiveness, drug trafficking, crime, international migration, environmental hazards, resource shortages, global poverty and so on” (Baldwin, 1995, p 126).

In the 1998 book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde attempt to link elements of the traditionalist approach to that of the wideners. Intended to preserve the concept's analytical value, lessen its complexity and identify distinct kinds of security interaction, this theory operates with a sectoral understanding of security (military, economic, environmental, political and societal) (Buzan et al., 1998, p 4, 7-8). It is further a constructivist approach in that, with a basis in security as a “particular kind of politics”, it puts emphasis on how issues through the use of “speech acts” may be shaped into security

related problems (Buzan et al., 1998, p vii & 26). The term speech act is derived from language theory and here refers to the utterance of words as an act. Labelled securitization, this shaping of issues as security concerns encompasses the social construction of an issue as an existential threat, which can be employed on a variety of issues (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25-26). Securitization thus emphasizes the impact rhetoric and the spoken word has on perceptions of security and the manner of studying it is according to the authors (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25), “ to study discourse and political constellations”. Security and the process of securitization is then defined as:

Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics.

Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p 23).

Politicization does refer here to issues that are included in public discussion and part of governmental, and sometimes also communal, policy and decision-making. It stands in contrast to nonpoliticized issues, which entails that an issue is exempt from public discussion and decision-making. The issue is consequently not handled by the government. The above definition accentuates that securitization, as compared to politicization, is more drastic in that it entails exceeding rules by framing the given issue as something that is to be managed separately from normal political procedure. The emphasis on security as a “move” which entails the “framing” of an issue as “above politics”, thus implies that the term security is not considered as a trait, or a part of a greater vision, but as a rhetorical position used to express an issue as problematic (Buzan et al., 1998, p 23-25). Displaying an issue as a threat thus makes it a security related concern, as Buzan et al. (1998, p 24) express it: “security is thus a self-referential practice”. The next section will for the purpose of clarification expound three key terms of this theory, before moving on to elaborate on the securitization process and its attributes in section 3.2.2.

3.2.1 Referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors

Buzan et al. (1998, p 35-36), emphasize it is important to distinguish between three kinds of units when analyzing securitization. First there is a need to identify the referent object for

security, which is defined as: “Security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collective. The referent object is that to which one can point and say, it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to....” (Buzan et al., 1998, p 36). The referent object thus concerns who or what it is that needs to be protected. It is of interest to mention here that the authors point out that the referent object tends to be a state or nation, and that previous efforts at referring to systemic level units as such objects has failed. Nevertheless, the above definition opens up for a wide range of referent objects, including systemic (Buzan et al., 1998 p 36-37). With UfM members both in the north and south experiencing migration and refugee influxes, it is feasible to inquire whether such referent objects have been created in the context of the UfM (See chapter 2.1.1 of this issue).

It should be further noted that each sector of security has its own dynamics and the characteristics of what it is that needs to be protected differs among the sectors of security (Buzan et al., 1998, p 27). Political security and societal security are here deemed as the two sectors where securitization in the context of the UfM is most likely to occur. This has to do with the referent objects. Principles related to international society and law are among potential referent objects in the political security sector (Buzan et al., 1998, p 141). The term societal concerns “communities with which one identifies”, and the potential referent objects within societal security are consequently communities, or populous groups where a sense of “we” can be framed as threatened (Buzan et al., 1998, p 120, 123).¹⁵ Migration is hence an issue that often figures on societal security agendas (Buzan et al., 1998, p 121). In studying the UfM, potential referent objects for securitization can be international principles related to the treatment of migrants and refugees, the preservation of certain communities in the UfM member space, or the UfM member space as one community.

The securitizing actors are also of vital importance as they are the ones who speak security by stating that a referent object is threatened and needs to be protected. These actors can be individuals, or groups such as “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups” (Buzan et al., 1998, p 40). As a bureaucratic unit, the UfM secretariat operates in close contact with other institutional bodies. It has also, as previously demonstrated and as stated by Nogués (2012, p 27), been deemed by the EP as an actor with the ability to become “an autonomous” actor which can provide “a real added value to co-

¹⁵ Societal security is distinct from social security, which often refers to economic issues at the level of individuals.

operation in the Mediterranean”. This assessment implies that the secretariat, despite its technical role, might take on a central role in shaping the organization. Its close contact with other institutional bodies further indicates that it can have an effect on the agenda of the UfM, thus warranting analysis on the role of the UfM secretariat in shaping UfM policy in relation to migrants and refugees (see chapter 2.2.2 of this issue). The section of the analysis utilizing securitization theory will therefore focus on the UfM secretariat as a potential securitizing actor.

Lastly, Buzan et al. (1998, p 36) refer to a concept they call functional actors. These actors do not speak security, nor are they themselves referred to as the unit that needs to be protected. They are thus neither securitizing actors, nor referent objects. However, they have the power to affect decision making related to security. Côté (2016, p 544) further clarifies that these actors are “key security influencers that do not have the capacity to legitimize new security meanings alone but can affect the dynamics of actor- audience interaction”. In the case of migration and refugees, human right groups like Amnesty International could be an example of a functional actor as it in some cases has the power to affect how people feel about the issue at stake.

3.2.2 The process of securitization

Securitization in its complete form entails the three following components: “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al., 1998, p 26). The rhetorical framing of an issue as an existential threat to a given referent object is a distinct aspect of securitization theory. By doing so the securitization actor expresses that the issue needs to take precedence over other issues on the political agenda, and thus assert the necessary legitimacy to employ emergency measures. Emergency measures, or emergency action, imply that the measures one seeks to employ would be in contrast to “procedures or rules” which the actor normally would have to abide by. Employing these measures is framed as necessary in order to ensure the survival of the referent object in question. Whether an issue is an actual existential threat is irrelevant (Buzan et al., 1998, p 24-26).

Moreover, the emergency measures and rule breaking this entails might encompass rules that the unit in question share with other units. A securitizing move might then cause effects on the relations between them (Buzan et al., 1998, p 26). In the case of the UfM secretariat, the relationships between units might concern how other institutions, NGOs and so forth relate to the organization. Thus, if the UfM secretariat is found to act as a securitization actor, one should expect some sort of reaction, such as critique, from other units.

However, another key aspect in securitization theory is that the audience of the securitizing actor needs to accept the argument presented by this actor. In other words, if such an actor argues that an issue is an existential threat that requires the utilization of emergency measures, the audience has to recognize the presented argument. Securitizing actors thus need to argue their case (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25).

Besides emphasizing that the securitizing act needs to be accepted by a “significant audience” for securitization to occur, Buzan et al. (1998, p 27) provide little guidance with regards to what features a significant audience is composed of. Nevertheless, in his 2008 article on securitization theory, Vuori provides an enhanced understanding of this aspect. The audience is here accounted for as those who “have the ability to provide the securitizing actor with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with the securitization” (Vuori, 2008, p 72). Audiences for securitizing arguments thus vary from case to case, which entails that “specific audiences have to be defined in each empirical analysis” (Vuori, 2008, p 72). By providing the political mandate of the organization through the ministerial meetings, the 43 member states are assessed to be the audience. If the secretariat is found to be a securitizing actor, the member states can provide the secretariat with what they want from an attempt at securitization.

Moreover, if the argument of the securitizing actor falls short of the audience, the actor has failed to legitimize the utilization of emergency measures, and there is no securitization of the issue. Nevertheless, a securitizing move, where the securitizing actor has attempted to acquire the necessary legitimacy for utilizing emergency measures, has been made (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25). This implies that the actor has framed the issue in an attempt at moving the issue from *low politics* toward *high politics*. High politics are here referring to politics “of vital national interests, politics that the actors regard as sensitive to the state and that is to be dealt with by the highest authority of the state” (Dokken, 1997, p 84). In contrast to nonpoliticized

and politicized issues, which as explained in section 3.2 distinguishes between issues that are part of public discussion and decision-making and those that are not, high politics and low politics both concern issues that are part of decision making processes. The latter two rather refer to the emphasis actors put on the issue in question (Dokken, 1997, p 83).

3.3 Alexander Wendt and the interests of states

As with most theoretical schools, constructivism is internally diverse, and there is an internal contest between constructivist scholars.¹⁶ However, the core premise of constructivism, which scholars agree upon, is that the theoretical branch is concerned with “human consciousness and its role in international life” (Barnett, 2008, p 161). One of these scholars is Alexander Wendt. His book “Social Theory of International Politics” is regarded as a firm, but also debated, part of the constructivist perception of how international relations function (Guzzini & Leander, 2006, p xvii). Throughout his works, Wendt has been a sharp critic of the theoretical branch of structural (or neo) realism, and this book is no exception. The book sets primarily out to disclose that anarchy “is what states make of it” as a response to the neorealist assumption that “anarchy forces states into recurrent security competitions” (Copeland, 2006, p 1-2). Doing so Wendt (1999, p 238-239) also attempts to disentangle whether states are “realists”, or as he also puts it if states are self-interested “by *nature*”.

He argues that interchangeable use of self-interest with notions like “an actor did X because X was in its interest” has deprived the concept of self-interest of its explanatory capacities (Wendt, 1999, p 239). This suggests that the concept encompasses “whatever the Self is interested in” (Wendt, 1999, p 239). Moreover, one seldom carries out an act that might cause damage, or might have negative effects for the self. Most or all behaviour is thus determined to “have some perceived benefits for the Self” (Wendt, 1999, p 239). This understanding, that actors do something because they perceive it to be in their interest, does not convey information about the content of the actor. Put differently, it doesn’t explain why this something is in the actor’s interest, which hence implies further lack of explanatory power (Wendt, 1999, p 239).

¹⁶ Scholars of constructivism are like scholars in other theoretical schools emphasizing the importance of difference aspects within international relations. E.g: While the aspect of inter state politics is the main centre of research for some, others weight transnationalism more heavily.

To counter this lack of explanatory power, Wendt (1999, p 239-240) argues that one has to define self-interest as “a *kind* of interest”. Another aspect of importance is that one has to comprehend the Self, which is the actor in question, and furthermore “its relationship to the Other” in order to get a grasp of what self-interest entails (Wendt, 1999, p 240). The kind of interest which self-interest should be defined as is therefore to be understood in relation to a notion of identity. Wendt presents the following definition of self-interest:

Self interest is a belief about how to meet one’s needs – a subjective interest – that is characterized by a purely instrumental attitude towards the Other: the Other is an object to be picked up, used, and/or discarded for reasons having solely to do with an actors individual gratification (Wendt, 1999, p 240).

The kind of interest Wendt associates with self-interest is thus a subjective interest concerned with how one is to fulfil the needs of the self, and which is ingrained through instrumental attributes in the actor’s attitude versus the other actor or actors. The self thus lacks identification with the other actors it interacts with when acting out of self-interest. Moreover, it is important to mention that self-interest is not necessarily implying that the actor in question declines to cooperate with the other actor(s). It is rather concerned with the underlying motivation for choosing to cooperate, and inasmuch this motivation is instrumental, cooperation remains self-interested (Wendt, 1999, p 240).

Forming a contrast to self-interest, Wendt also presents collective interest as a theoretical concept explaining the motivation of actors, defined as: “...if a state helps another because it identifies with it, such that even when its own security is not threatened it still perceives a threat to the Self”(Wendt, 1999, p 240). Collective interest thus sees an emphasis on the identity of actors. Identity is further defined as “...simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation” (Wendt, 1999, p 170). For a state to act out of identity with the other state, it thus has to possess an idea of similarity, or relation with that other state when it acts in a given situation. It is however important to note that while acting out of identification with the other would imply collective interest, “taking into account” the interests of the other, or others, would not. As it is implying that the self foresees the interests of others, taking those interests into account is seen as an approach for “gratifying the self”, and is therefore still an act of self-interest (Wendt, 1999, p 240).

These theoretical considerations are deemed vital in understanding how UfM member states have related to potential proposals for adopting the organization to the increased migratory and refugee influxes. The study can then shed light on the underlying motivations of members for renouncing or accepting such a proposal. An act of collective interest could then be that members that are not immediately affected by these influxes believe that other members that are affected are also similar to themselves, and they therefore support a proposal for enhancing UfM efforts to relieve the affected members. However, either support or refusal to accept such a proposal is seen here as a potential act of self-interest. An instance of the former could be if a given member possesses an instrumental attitude toward other members, and opposes the proposal due to assessing it as inapplicable to realise its own needs. The latter could be the case if a given member, still with an instrumental attitude to the other, supports the proposal, as it could lessen the impact migratory and refugee influxes has for the self.

3.4 Applying the theory

Centered on securitization theory and Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interest of states, the purpose of this chapter has been to account for the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. With the basis in the UfM secretariat as a potential securitizing actor, securitization theory offers a framework for analyzing whether the organization has sought to adapt to the increased influxes of migrants and refugees. Securitization theory will therefore form the basis in which the analytical arguments will be structured, in the first out of two main analysis subchapters.

Formulations implying that migration, or refugees, are framed as an existential threat which thus needs to take precedence over other issues on the organization's agenda will here be assessed as a sign of securitization. Potential referent objects for such threats could be located both in the political and the societal security sector. However, the theoretical requirements for securitization to occur implies that attempts at moving the phenomena of migration and refugees up on the organizations agenda might occur without qualifying as securitization. Politicizing the issues, or framing them as high politics, thus also signals there has been an attempt to move them up on the agenda. However, compared to securitization, this implies

that there is no breaking of rules, arguments for employing emergency measures, or emphasis on refugees and migration as issues that need to take absolute precedence over other issues.

Moreover, the audience for a potential securitization argument by the UfM secretariat is likely to be the UfM member states, and whether such an argument is accepted or not will be assessed in the subchapter utilizing securitization theory. However, while securitization theory demands acceptance of argument by the audience, the theory puts little emphasis on motivations for accepting an argument. Alexander Wendt and his considerations on the interests of states allows for assessing the UfM member states' underlying motives in accepting or rejecting such an argument. The distinct divide between acting out of collective interest and self-interest makes it possible to assess whether a rejection or acceptance of a potential argument was grounded in members' emphasis on such an argument as benefitting merely the self, or also the other members. Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states will therefore be utilized as the theoretical aspects structuring the analysis in subchapter two.

4 Methods and research design

This chapter will account for the methods and research design applied in the study. First is the case study approach, which will be elaborated on and discussed in section 4.1. I will then discuss the sources of data used in the study, the interview research method, and finally validity, reliability and representativeness.

4.1 The case study approach

The case study method is characterized by its ability to produce “rich, detailed and in-depth information” (Berg, 2009, p 318). It has however, been subjected to various critiques (Berg, 2009, p 317). It is therefore important to properly define its attributes. Case study methods are, according to Yin (2014, p 9-14), applicable when the researcher seeks to answer a research question with the form of “why” or “how”, when it concerns a contemporary incident which he or she is unable to control. Apart from employing a “how” research question, this study concerns a contemporary event which is not possible for the researcher to affect. This contemporary event is how the UfM has adapted to the increasing levels of migrants and refugees. It is thus deemed feasible to employ a case study approach.

Defining the case as “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context”, Miles and Huberman explain, as referred to in Baxter and Jack (2008, p 545), that the “case is your unit of analysis”. The case under scrutiny in this study is thus the UfM and how it has adapted to the context of increased migratory and refugee influxes. It is a bounded context in that it concerns the UfM member space, and also because the study investigates a specific time period from 2008 until 2017.

Arendt Lijphart (1971, p 691) distinguishes between six kinds of case studies: atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory infirming, theory confirming and deviant case studies, the fourth and fifth hereafter referred to as theory-testing case studies. In theory-testing case studies, the case is chosen for the sole purpose of testing the theory. In this study it's rather the opposite; the theory is chosen in order to shed light on the case in question. Accordingly, the study does not qualify as a theory-testing case study, but as it utilizes

theoretical propositions it could be said to take on the form of an interpretative case study (Lijphart, 1971, p 691-692). Theory-guided case studies have limited effect when it comes to the testing and development of theory. However, they offer a valuable approach to understanding and explaining the case or cases in question. (Levy, 2008, p 4-5). They are in fact well suited to contributing to what Lijphart (1971, p 692) refers to as “applied science”. The main strength of this design is hence to contribute to the understanding of the case in question, which is the aim of this thesis.

The research design is in other words developed in order to understand the development of UfM policy toward migrants and refugees, and to interpret its characteristics and the internal motivation that underlines this development. The study thus consists of three variables: How the UfM has adapted is the dependent variable, while the increased influxes of migrants and refugees are the independent variable. Motivation for adopting a potential proposal for adaption is additionally introduced as an intervening variable. The analysis will further be divided into two main sub-chapters, the first (5.1) utilizing securitization theory and concerning how the UfM has adapted, and the second (5.2) employing Wendt’s considerations on the interests of states when investigating the member’s motivation for accepting or rejecting attempts at adaption. Yin (2014, p 53-55) accentuate that single case studies might take two different forms: holistic, which has no sub-units of analysis, or an embedded case study which has several sub-units. With an emphasis on the UfM secretariat in subchapter 5.1 and three groups of members in subchapter 5.2, this study sees the inclusion of several sub-units. It therefore qualifies as an embedded single case study.

The three groups of members under scrutiny in section 5.2 are Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; the Southern European UfM members of Spain, Italy and Greece; and the Northern and Central European members.¹⁷ While the UfM secretariat as a sub-unit of analysis in section 5.1 is bounded in the securitization theory, the three sub-units in section 5.2 are not; the rationale behind focusing on Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey rather relates to their experiences in receiving and hosting refugees. Italy, Greece and Spain are similarly chosen due to their position as EU border-states that have been on the frontline in facing the increased migration

¹⁷ As derived from the EU EuroVoc thesaurus (European Union, 2015, p 443) definition of Northern Europe, the Northern European UfM members consist of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. While no clear-cut definition of Central Europe exists, the UfM members of Germany, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary are listed as located in Central Europe by the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbooks list (CIA, 2017).

and refugee influxes into Europe. While some Northern and Central European UfM members, such as Sweden and Germany, have received large numbers of migrants and refugees during the time period under scrutiny, this is not the main cause for including them as a sub-unit. It is rather that, through interviews, it has come to the researcher's attention that these countries have become more prone to cooperate in the context of the UfM.

4.2 Choice of data sources

In analyzing whether the UfM has adapted to the increased migratory and refugee influxes, this study utilizes several methods for data collection. This allows for triangulation of data, which implies that the researcher ensures the accuracy and relevance of the findings by utilizing different sources when measuring the same phenomena (Yin, 2014, p 120-121). The study will make use of primary sources such as interviews with UfM and national officials, UfM reports and minutes from UfM ministerial meetings, as well as official EU documents from the relevant time period.

However, the availability of relevant documents and minutes has proven to be a challenge. This goes especially for UfM ministerial meetings. Minutes from most sectoral ministerial meetings are available on the secretariat's webpage.¹⁸ However, the nature of these meetings implies they focus on certain areas of cooperation, such as energy, or employment and labour. While no sectoral ministerial meeting has been conducted on the topics of migration or refugees, the other sectoral meetings see few references to these two issues. It has moreover proven difficult to locate minutes from one crucial ministerial meeting, namely the informal UfM ministerial conference held in November 2015. This study has sought to compensate for this lack of written primary sources by performing interviews, as well as utilizing the UfM activity report and speeches held by UfM officials as data. The latter is especially relevant in relation to the above-mentioned conference. Yin (2014, p 105) emphasizes that the use of documents and interviews as data sources are complementary, and it is therefore believed that it strengthens the study.

¹⁸ The minutes and declarations are located under each specific priority area. See Union for the Mediterranean 2016e.

Secondary sources such as newspaper articles, research articles and books have also been used. Such sources offer a diversity of interpretations. This is problematic as there are often limited options for assessing and controlling the author's methodology (Hellevik, 2011, p 103). It is consequently important to treat secondary sources with care. The journal *Mediterranean Politics* has been of significant relevance for this study as it covers both challenges and actors relevant for the Mediterranean area. Besides regular research articles published in this journal, the thesis has made use of several chapters in the book *The Union for the Mediterranean* (Bicchi & Gillespie, 2012), which was originally published as a special issue in *Mediterranean Politics*.

4.3 Interview as a research method

Interviews are a valuable approach to collect data for case studies (Yin, 2014, p 110). Berg (2009, p 101) defines an interview as “a conversation with a purpose”, this purpose being to gather relevant information. Qualitative interviews are often categorized into various subtypes. Berg (2009, p 104) divides them into three different groups based on their structure: First, there is the standardized interview where there is a formal structure, and no deviation from the interview guide is allowed. Second, semi-standardized interviews where the interviewer has an interview guide, but the use of it is more flexible. Last is the unstandardized interview, where nothing is pre-planned and the questions are made up as the interview is commenced (Berg, 2009, p 104-105).

In order to attain sufficient information about potential attempts at adapting the UfM, as well as the members' motives for rejecting or accepting such attempts, this study assessed officials with formal ties to the UfM as the most rewarding respondents. However, they were also assessed as challenging respondents in that, with extensive knowledge on the subject at hand, they were likely to know what they wanted to talk about. The interviews performed in this case study have, due to this rationale, followed the semi-standardized formula. The fact that the interviewer has an interview guide allows the researcher to ask pre-prepared questions and thus both compare between the interviews as well as retain a certain level of control over the interview (See Appendix 1 for the Interview guide). However, it requires the questions to be adjusted to the background of the respondent. While most questions in the interview guide have remained unchanged, some have been reworded in order to conform to this demand.

This way one accounts for the fact that one often has varying ways of understanding the subject at hand. Moreover, the approach also allows the respondent to elaborate beyond the question at hand, and the researcher to ask further follow-up questions. This way one can pursue issues brought up by the respondents and retain more data than in the standardized approach (Berg, 2009, 107-109).

Furthermore, Patton's (in Mikkelsen, 2005, p 171) "interview guided approach", has certain similarities to Berg's semi-standardized approach. It entails that topics and issues are prepared in advance while the questions are formulated during the interviews. While the interview guide employed in this study has consisted of pre-formulated questions, their sequencing and formulation has at times been reworked to conform to the respondents' different backgrounds, thus making it worth noting Patton's observations on the limitations of the interview guided approach. By having a flexible sequencing and formulation of the questions, the researcher may obtain varying responses, which would lower the degree of comparativeness across the interviews, thereby making it difficult to compare the results. He also emphasizes that the approach allows for the danger of the researcher unwittingly omitting important issues in the interview. Nevertheless, it is also pointed out that "logical gaps in data" can be foreseen, and thus acted upon in advance (Patton in Mikkelsen, 2005, p 171). This study has, through thorough preparation and planning, sought to attain a clear idea of which issues to include or exclude, thereby attempting to limit the chance of omitting relevant topics in the interviews, and assuring that the gathered data is comparable across the interviews.

Moreover, the analysis of the data has been carried out in accordance with one of four strategies derived from Yin (2014, p 136), namely "relying on theoretical propositions". The strategy entails that the theory should guide the data collection and analysis of the data. Securitization theory and Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states, as outlined in chapter 3, have been utilized by this study. Indicating what information would be relevant for the study these two theories has guided the data collection. Therefore, the interview guide has been formulated in accordance with the theories. The structure of the analysis is designed in conformity with the theories (Yin, 2014, p 136).

4.3.1 Performing interviews

Gaining access to relevant respondents has been a major challenge for this study.

Over the course of two and a half months, considerable efforts went into contacting embassies, national Permanent Representations to the EU, the UfM secretariat, PA-UfM parliamentarians, researchers and more. In the end, five semi-standardized interviews with a total of six respondents were conducted, either during a one-week fieldwork trip to Brussels, or later via Skype and telephone. The length of these interviews varied between twenty minutes, and one hour and twenty minutes. Another additional interview (Anonymous 5, 2017) carried out via email at the request of the respondent, and thus conforms to the standardized interview approach.

The sample of respondents was in the end composed of three diplomats either working with Mediterranean relations or participating in the SOM, one official at a northern European permanent representation to the EU, one PA-UfM parliamentarian, and two officials with ties to the UfM secretariat (See list of interviews, this issue, p 86). There is thus a great degree of variety in the respondents' relationships to the UfM. Rubin and Rubin (2005, p 67) accentuate that the findings achieve higher credibility if the respondents "reflect a variety of perspectives". This variety is thus an aspect that might strengthen the findings.

Another aspect relevant to Rubin and Rubin's considerations on credibility is the fact that the UfM member space is extensive and quite varied. The credibility has therefore been sought strengthened by acquiring respondents that belong to different geographical areas of the organization. Even though a majority of these respondents originate from Southern Europe, there were also interviews with respondents from a Northern European country and from a South Eastern Mediterranean country. Interviewing more respondents from these two categories would of course be preferable. However, given the difficulties of attaining respondents, it has proven especially difficult to acquire further respondents within these categories.

All interviews were carried out in English and the study followed the ethical guidelines of the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD).¹⁹ Among these guidelines is the informed consent, which according to Yin (2014, p 78) encompasses that the respondents are informed of the nature of the study in question and are asked to formally express that they participating on a voluntary basis. With several interviews performed via telephone or skype, information of the study was conveyed by email in advance, with consent mostly requested orally, but also written when performing fieldwork in Brussels.

Yin (2014, p 78) further notes that protection of the respondents' "privacy and confidentiality" is a core responsibility of the researcher. All respondents were therefore asked whether they preferred to remain anonymous, to which six of them replied yes. The seventh who expressed willingness to participate with full name had a central position, and out of concern for exposing this respondent to unwanted attention and critique I have decided to anonymize that person as well. Besides avoiding any reference to names and job titles, this thesis will make no reference to the specific country the respondents represent. This is deemed necessary as several of the respondents represent countries where few officials have the UfM among their competencies. Stating their nationality could thus reveal the identity of these individuals.

4.4 Validity, reliability and representativeness

King et al. (1994, p 25) explain validity as whether we are "measuring what we think we are measuring". This applies to two aspects, the definitional validity and the validity of the data. The first aspect refers to the conformity of the operationalized definitions and the theoretical definitions. The second refers to the relevance of the selected data, which depends on the reliability, definitional validity, and how the data is gathered. This implies that the way the analysis is carried out in this study needs to be consistent with the theoretical definitions at hand, and that the data have to be relevant (Hellevik, 2011, p 51-53). As demonstrated in section 4.2, triangulating the data is important to ensure good validity (Yin, 2014, p 121). The validity of the interviews was ensured by attaining respondents with a relevant background to that of this research project, and by preparing well-formulated questions in line with the

¹⁹ All researchers based in Norway must apply for permission to carry out fieldwork at NSD. For authorization see Appendix 2.

operationalized definitions. As a non-native English speaker, some assistance was acquired in order to ensure that the questions were well formulated and clear; a native English speaker reviewed the interview guide.

It should be noted though that by focusing on the UfM secretariat as a possible securitizing actor in section 5.1, other potential securitizing actors are omitted. This is unfortunately an aspect that affects the validity of the study. Other potential securitizing actors could be individual member states, or other institutional bodies such as the SOM or the Co-Presidencies. This would require access to data that has proven unattainable to this study. While interviews could attain information on such actors, my limited familiarity with member states' languages other than English implies that findings in such interviews would be difficult to triangulate and corroborate with multiple sources of data. The same goes for other institutional bodies, as minutes and speeches from the SOM and other institutional bodies other than the ministerial meetings are largely unattainable for the public. Moreover, Buzan et al. (1998, p 41) notes that concentrating on the "organizational logic of the speech act" is the best way of identifying a securitizing actor, and that it is also easier to identify such actors in the context of the state due to its "explicit rules of who can speak on its behalf". While the UfM is not a state, the joint secretariat is part of the endeavour to increase co-ownership of the organization between the members (Paris Summit, 2008, p 14). It is therefore likely to be an institutional component that takes all parties' interests into consideration, and attempts to speak on their behalf, thus justifying the choice of concentrating on the secretariat.

The reliability of the data concerns how the data is collected. If data is gathered and treated with accuracy, then it has high reliability (Hellevik, 2011, p 183). Reliability is thus concerned with the researchers' ability for attaining accurate data. Complete and correct notes, or transcripts from the interviews are of importance here. Recording the interviews is one way to assure accuracy of such data (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p 71, 110; Yin, 2014, p 110). Four of the seven interviews conducted in this study were recorded with approval of the respondents, and transcribed later the same day. This aspect strengthens the accuracy of the data.

Moreover, reliability also concerns the ability of other researchers to identify the methods and steps taken in order to get to the conclusion, thus making the study possible to replicate.

Maintaining a “chain of evidence”, which requires proper referencing, is thus an important aspect when assuring the reliability of the study (Yin, 2014, p 127). While preserving such a chain of evidence has been attempted wherever possible, the necessary precautions when it comes to anonymizing the respondents will unfortunately affect the ability of other researchers to reproduce the data. Another common issue when it comes to the reliability of interviews is unconsciously asking leading questions or having leading body language (e.g. nodding when the respondents’ answers are in line with the researchers’ anticipations). The potential consequences of such questions and behaviour could be that the answers given by the respondents are biased toward the opinion of the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p 200-202, 276). This potential bias has been addressed as much as possible by asking broad questions, avoiding interrupting the respondents, and having neutral body language.

The representativeness of the study, also referred to as external validity, is another aspect that needs to be mentioned. As explained by Yin (2014, p 48) external validity concerns whether the findings in a study are “generalizable beyond the immediate study”. Due to the specific nature of the case study approach, it has often been criticized for low external validity. This is true for this study, which encompasses a unique organization, not with the aim of producing generalizable knowledge, but rather to gain an in-depth understanding of the UfM. However, the case study offers certain possibilities for generalizing. This concerns its ability to generalize “to theoretical propositions”. This case study may thus illuminate whether the theories in question may be useful when performing future research on other, but still somewhat similar cases (Yin, 2014, p 48, 20-21). The findings of the study are also thought to shed some light on the three groups of UfM member states under scrutiny in chapter 5.2, and how they relate to the issues of migration and refugees on a more general level.

4.5 Summary and further outline

This chapter has presented the research methods and research design applied when gathering the data and performing the analysis. The research design is suitable to explain and understand the case in question. However, it is deliberately constructed to attain in depth knowledge of this specific case as opposed to more generalizable knowledge. The external validity of the findings is therefore low. Internal validity and reliability is in contrast

estimated as good, though with two potential weaknesses, namely concentrating on the UfM secretariat, and anonymizing the respondents.

5 Analysis

Chapter 5 constitutes the analysis and will be divided into two main subchapters. Utilizing securitization theory, chapter 5.1 seeks to investigate how the UfM has adapted (dependent variable) to increasing migration and refugee influxes (independent variable). Chapter 5.2 then employs Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interest of states to assess the motivation of the members in accepting a potential proposal for adaptation (intervening variable).

5.1 Adapting to increased levels of migrants and refugees

This subchapter assesses whether the issues of migration and refugees have been framed as problems related to security in the context of the UfM. Buzan et al. (1998, p 32) accentuates that the analysis should be centered on the process of securitization and actors that are "more or less privileged in articulating security". In compliance with the assessment in section 3.2.1 and based on interviews, speeches held by the Secretary General, and the yearly "UfM activity report", this subchapter will start off by looking into the secretariat as a potential actor for speaking security. Its impact as such an actor will then be assessed in section 5.1.2.

5.1.1 The UfM secretariat: An actor that speaks security?

The current UfM secretary general, who came into office in 2012, is Amb Fathallah Sijilmassi. He is the former Moroccan ambassador to France, and represented Morocco during the initial talks on the establishment of the UfM (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016d; Benhold, 2007b, para 18). Though the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) are a diverse set of countries, being a diplomat representing an SMC, his thoughts at the time were likely to have represented several other SMC governments. Discussing the future prospect should the UfM be established, a 2007 *New York Times* article (Benhold, 2007b, para 17) pointed out that the SMCs were worried that such a union would focus on a "negative agenda". Centered on illegal immigration and the fight against terrorism, this "negative agenda" reflected the difficulties previously experienced with the issue of migration during the downfall of the EMP (See chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of this issue). In this context Amb

Sijilmassi was quoted as saying, “If it's all about security I can't sell this to my country”, and furthermore that “We want a win-win partnership” (Sijilmassi as quoted in Benhold, 2007b, para 18). These extracts signify that Amb Sijilmassi sought for the UfM to be an organization promoting mutual cooperation in order to gain mutual benefits by downgrading the importance of security related issues.

In the end migration, though not refugees, turned out to be a part of the UfM’s mandate (Anonymous 5, 2017). In fact, Bicchi (2012, p 2) accentuates that “Security, migration, energy, development, Arab-Israeli relations” appeared to be the main issues of interest for the countries participating in the UfM. It is therefore surprising that a UfM ministerial meeting on migration has yet to be undertaken. Nevertheless, the notion that a security focus toward migrants should not be the union’s main priority was evidently a priority for Morocco, and likely also other SMCs. Therefore this laid the ground for employing the indirect root cause approach envisioned at the 2007 EMP ministerial meeting on migration. Though not an explicit part of the three main objectives of the UfM activities, the respondents participating in this study have emphasized that the UfM has indeed been employing a root cause approach to mainly address economic migration (Union for the Mediterranean, 2017a, p 11).

In relation to the UfM activities, this approach entails projects and initiatives aimed at business development, employability, education, empowerment of women, and vocational training, but also bigger projects directed at developing and improving infrastructure. By addressing infrastructure one seeks to promote trade, thus creating jobs, fostering integration between the UfM members, and improving living conditions (Anonymous 6, 2017). This approach has taken time to develop and implement, as the initial political climate after the establishment of the UfM affected the willingness of the members to cooperate. That climate also delayed the establishment of the secretariat until 2010, with the process of commissioning the secretariat completed during 2012 (Anonymous 6, 2017; Nogués, 2012, p 26).²⁰

2012 was the year when the secretary general, the current secretary general, took office. That was important because his ideas of operationalization of the works of the secretariat, and of the projects was very important (Anonymous 6, 2017).

²⁰ The secretariat was initially planned to be up and running by the beginning of 2009.

Hence, Amb Sijilmassi has held office as secretary general for the whole period of time that the secretariat has been operational. Furthermore, the extract implies that the secretary general has played an important role in shaping the organization. This corresponds with the secretary general taking a stance against a security based approach in 2007 and the emphasis on a bottom up approach.

However, by 2014 the number of migrants and refugees entering Europe started to increase. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan were at the time already hosting significant numbers of Syrian refugees, while the Libyan Civil War caused refugees and migrants staying there to leave the country. The results of the Syrian and Libyan civil wars in terms of migrants and refugee influxes were thus felt not only in the SMCs but also in Europe (Cogolati et al., 2015, p 11-16). This new situation was recognized by the secretariat as a situation that the UfM had to act upon in a credible way. Yet, as an intergovernmental organization, the UfM relies upon the mandate given by its member states in order to act upon an issue, and as mentioned this mandate was restricted to addressing migration at the time (Anonymous 6, 2017).

But we have some liberty let's say, to push for an agenda and to try to demonstrate to the countries, to the member countries, that we have to address a certain number of issues. Because they are on the table, we cannot ignore them. So that's what we started to do from 2014/2015 (Anonymous 6, 2017).

For the secretariat to "push for an agenda" when the nature of the secretariat is technical, and its mandate is to be given by the member states, signifies there has been sidestepping from normal procedures. Moreover, as the quote states, in the context of the new flows of migrants and refugees that occurred from 2014 it is evident this was a new situation that caused the secretariat to work for a revised agenda. Effectively, this suggests firstly that the secretariat has been an important actor attempting to adapt the UfM to this new reality. Secondly, the secretariat has deemed the issues urgent and sought to move the issues up on the organization's agenda by breaking, or at least bending, the political rules. This therefore indicates that a process of securitization might have occurred.

As a way to reach out and demonstrate their actions to the general public, and thus also the member states themselves, the UfM publishes a yearly activity report in which the secretary

general addresses the audience in a section called “A message from the UfM Secretary General”. In the 2014 edition, this section emphasized that the region was facing challenges.

Growing security and socio-economic challenges make regional dialogue more important now than ever (Union for the Mediterranean, 2015a, p 6).

The wording “more important now than ever” leaves the reader with an impression of acuteness, that regional dialogue has to be improved to counter these challenges. Amb Sijilmassi thus accentuates there are challenges, the urgency of those challenges is increasing, and regional dialogue is an essential means to overcome them. Yet, when referring to “challenges” the secretary general avoids specifying the issues that require regional dialogue to be stepped up. Moreover, while it is natural to assume that he is referring to the Mediterranean region as what is in need of protection, the statement lacks a clear referent object. It is then uncertain whether Amb Sijilmassi refers to migration or refugees at all, and there is no clear reference as to what it is that needs to be protected from these challenges. Although stated in the 2014 edition, the issue was not published before March 2015. At the same time a process of reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was in motion. The Secretary General spoke about this review process in a speech held at the Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Among six dimensions emphasized as important for the region, the first was:

The need for [a] global and balanced approach between security and development. There is no doubt that security related issues rank very high in the priorities in our region: terrorism, radicalism, illegal migration, crisis in Libya and Syria and all the related impacts and consequences need to be addressed urgently, collectively and efficiently (Sijilmassi, 2015a, para 11).

Thus, the secretary general presents illegal migration, alongside the conflicts in Syria and Libya, radicalism, and terrorism, as a crucial and regional issue that needs to be handled in a cooperative manner. It is important to note here that the instability in Libya and the civil war in Syria are major contributing factors to the migration and refugee influxes in the region (Wolff, 2015, p 165-166, 181). The same goes for acts of terrorism, which Schmid (2016, p 3, 28) finds to be an important push factor for forced migration. Moreover, refugees and

migrants are found to be groups that are vulnerable to radicalisation and joining terrorist organizations. Schmid points out that proximity of the refugee camps to conflicts and combatants is an important aspect that increases the likelihood of radicalisation. The same goes for young immigrants residing in diasporas and finding it difficult to integrate in their host country (Schmid, 2016, p 34-39). These four issues are hence closely affiliated with the phenomena of refugees and migrants.

However, by framing them as “security related issues rank very high in the priorities of the region”, Amb Sijilmassi abstains from characterizing them as existential threats, merely confirming they are of high priority. This avoidance of framing the issues as existential threats means the statement can hardly be assessed as an attempt at securitization. Nevertheless, the UfM assesses itself as the only intergovernmental regional forum that covers the whole region (Union for the Mediterranean, 2015a, p 5). When the secretary general refers to a need for the issues “to be addressed urgently, collectively and efficiently”, is it then natural to assess it as an attempt to increase the role of the UfM by handling these issues through the organization.

The potential audience for such an argument would then be the 43 member states, since it is a consensus based organization and they all thus have to accept any change in UfM policy (Paris Summit, 2008, p 11). In that regard, it is vital to point out that the 2015 ENP review, published half a year after Amb Sijilmassi's speech, emphasized the UfM to be a good forum for regional cooperation, and furthermore that:

The Commission and the High Representative work to further invigorate this regional cooperation. For this reason, the EU will give priority, wherever suitable, to the UfM in its regional cooperation efforts (European Commission, 2015a, p 18).

The fact that the EU is expressing willingness to step up cooperation through the UfM indicates that Amb Sijilmassi's argument gained resonance among the northern UfM members. While it indicates an adaption of northern priorities toward strengthening the UfM, it does not explicitly state where these efforts will be made, merely “wherever suitable”.

Nevertheless, November 26, 2015 an informal UfM high-level conference was arranged in Barcelona (Union for the Mediterranean, 2015b).²¹ Though likely to have been planned for some time, the meeting occurred at a crucial point. By late October, and following actions of a similar nature around Europe, a process of constructing border fences had started in Austria and Slovenia (Kruse, 2015). Additionally, a short time before the meeting, Sweden strengthened its border controls. This was significant, as the Scandinavian country normally has had a generous policy regarding migrants and asylum seekers (Crouch, 2015). Moreover, the ENP review had been published only seven days earlier and the Valetta Summit, between the EU and several African countries, had been arranged 11 November. The migrant and refugee influxes were the main topic of the summit (European Commission, 2015a, p 1; Befring, 2015). Thus, the UfM conference was held in a very pressing period of time when the influx of migrants and refugees had reached Europe in major force, and a process of designing new policies was in the making. In a speech at the opening session of the conference, Amb Sijilmassi again underlined the need to handle the issue of illegal migration and refugees collectively.

An increasing magnitude of the regional security challenges – the refugee crisis, the tragedies of illegal migration and the fight against terrorism, with the recent tragic attacks of Paris and Beirut. We saw it again yesterday in Tunisia. But this leads to one main conclusion: A growing need to further increase our regional cooperation. The challenges are all regional therefore requiring a regional response. Yes, we have to recognize that there is a paradox. At a time when there is need to be all mobilized together in the defence of common values, against common aggressions, and despite our collective efforts, our region still has one of the lowest level[s] of integration in the world. This is unacceptable in November 2015 (Sijilmassi, 2015b, p 1-2).

By linking illegal migration and the refugee crisis with security challenges, Amb Sijilmassi implicitly expresses a concern for the impact these issues might have on the region. Referring to what values this large group of countries shares, he further implies they compose a community, or a “we”. Moreover, the Secretary General clearly states there is a need to defend the values of this community. Societal security concerns threats to the identity of communities (Buzan et al., 1998, p 119-120). It may therefore be said that the Secretary

²¹ This conference did not produce an official declaration.

General expresses that the UfM and its members are facing an instance of societal insecurity. The referent object for this insecurity would be the common values of the UfM as a community, as they are emphasized to be in need of protection. However, it is important to note that Buzan et al. (1998, p 123) points out that for a community to qualify as a referent object in the societal sector of security it has to be possible to “create a socially powerful argument that this ‘we’ is threatened”. This requires a high level of devotion and loyalty from the subjects belonging to that community. The “we” that is presented by Amb Sijilmassi is both broad and heterogenic in that it crosses regions, religions, nations, states, and civilisations. These units are accounted as primary referent objects for securitization within the societal sector, and thus in general possess high levels of devotion and loyalty from their subjects (Buzan et al., 1998, p 123). Amb Sijilmassi’s “we” is hence referring to an overarching UfM community that might not possess the same devotion and loyalty from its subjects as other sorts of communities. It is therefore questionable whether Amb Sijilmassi’s framing of “we” complies with the theory’s requirements for referent objects in the societal sector.

Moreover, while failing to present exact consequences if the challenges of illegal migration and refugees went without increased regional cooperation, Amb Sijilmassi also referred to terrorism and the Beirut and Paris terror attacks. A recent study (Schmid, 2016, p 3-4) found that terrorists sometimes utilize refugee camps as bases for conducting attacks. The same study (Schmid, 2016, p 8) also points out that ISIS claims to have sent 4,000 jihadists to Europe.²² In the aftermath of the Beirut attack several people of Syrian origin suspected of having ties to the bombing were detained in a refugee camp (Younes, 2015, para 1-5). In the Paris attack one of the perpetrators were suspected to have posed as a refugee in order to enter Europe (Barnard, 2015, para 16).

This is important, as referring to objects of a threatening nature might ease the process of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, p 33).²³ The secretary general might thus be said to implicitly link terrorism with migrants and refugees, making it possible to assess the latter groups as potential terrorists and a threat to the security. However, that assessment is highly interpretative and also contrasts with the framing of illegal migration as “tragedies”.

²² Though Schmid (2016, p 49) also writes there have been few incidents of terrorists acting as refugees.

²³ Buzan et al. exemplifies objects such as: tanks, polluted waters and hostile sentiment. Given its hostile attributes, this thesis estimates terrorism as a hostile sentiment, thus qualifying as an object.

Assigning illegal migrants this characteristic points out the vulnerability and humanity of the phenomenon instead of framing it as a threat. A similar notion is evident in relation to refugees, as the secretary general stated the following in the 2015 activity report:

The Mediterranean is facing challenges on an unprecedented scale linked to terrorism, extremism, radicalism and xenophobia, the tragedy of the refugee crisis and illegal migration, whereby tens of thousands of people are risking their lives to cross the region. The magnitude of these pressing and serious challenges calls, more than ever, to further consolidate the Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation and an enhanced common regional agenda for the Mediterranean. These regional challenges call for regional solutions (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016a, p 4).

The quote expresses that the secretary general assesses that a complex and wide range of urgent issues constitute challenges for the region. However, it is ambiguous whether the “speech acts” presented in this subchapter qualify as securitization. While it has been demonstrated that illegal migration and the refugee crisis have been linked to regional security, issues have to be presented as an existential threat that needs to be addressed by employing emergency measures for a securitization move to occur (Buzan et al., 1998, p 25, 27). Presenting illegal migration and the refugee crisis as challenges of a “serious” and “pressing” nature, and further that “common values” are at stake, indeed offers a sense of urgency and threat. Yet, when it comes to these two phenomena, the wording of the secretary general is distinctively different from the other issues that are referred to as challenges. Putting emphasis on the human suffering that illegal migration and the refugee crisis represents, by denoting them as “tragedies” and saying “thousands of people are risking their lives”, indicates measures have to be taken, not only from a security perspective, but also a humanitarian perspective. Furthermore, the very fact that the phenomena are presented as challenges in conjuncture with other issues implies there is a holistic focus. Hence, the secretary general avoids arguing that the phenomena of refugees and illegal migration are so important that they have to take precedence over other issues, which contradicts the very logic of existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998, p 24).

Another aspect to take into consideration is Amb Sijilmassi’s emphasis on “regional cooperation”, “common regional agenda”, and that “these regional challenges call for regional solutions”. It is evident that the Secretary General advocates regional cooperation

implicitly through the UfM, as a necessary means to counter the multiple challenges which the region faces, among them illegal migration and refugees. While Amb Sijilmassi promoted intensifying regional cooperation before the refugee and migrant influx into Europe peaked in 2015, his arguments intensified throughout that year. Moreover, the phenomena of illegal migration and refugees have, as demonstrated, increasingly been presented as reasons to step up cooperation. Referring to these two phenomena as such reasons should then be interpreted as attempts at bolstering the leverage of his argument of increasing cooperation. Utilizing this rhetorical strategy, he also underlines the need for prioritizing the issues of illegal migration and refugees on the UfM's agenda. Hence, Amb Sijilmassi has been making efforts to incorporate illegal migration and refugees into high politics in the context of the UfM.

Furthermore, while Amb Sijilmassi refers to both illegal migration and the refugee crisis as phenomena demanding regional cooperation in order to find a solution, the mandate of the UfM has been restricted to migration. Not only may this explain why several respondents referred to other institutions as the main instruments for addressing this issue, but it also suggests that in the context of the UfM it has been a nonpoliticized issue (Anonymous 2, 2017; Anonymous 3, 2017; Anonymous 4, 2017). Presenting the influx of refugees as an issue to be addressed through the UfM, the secretary general may then be said to seek to include it in the debate surrounding the role of the UfM, and furthermore, in its policies and decision-making processes. Besides attempting to move the issue of illegal migrants and refugees into high politics, the rhetoric also conveys an attempt at politicizing the latter.

5.1.2 Acceptance of argument: The 2017 UfM roadmap

A crucial component in Buzan et al.'s theory (1998, p 25) is that for securitization to occur, the argument of the actor has to be accepted by the audience. The audience is those who can supply the securitizing actor with what that actor seeks to bring about (Vuori, 2008, p 72). In this regard one respondent stated the following:

What is most important to us is the ministerial meetings. Because it will be the ministerial meetings that will set the goals and establish the roadmaps on different sectors in terms of development...So these ministerial meetings will give us the

directives, the agenda and the general objectives...for a given sector (Anonymous 6, 2017).

It is thus evident that the member states, through the ministerial meetings, have the ability of realizing or denying a securitizing actor with what it is that actor seeks. This study therefore assesses the 43 member states in the context of the ministerial meetings as a relevant audience. While there is no sign of a securitizing move linked to the issues of migration and refugees, there have certainly been attempts to move these issues up on the organization's agenda. This subchapter will therefore employ this theoretical component to assess whether the attempts at moving these issues up on the organization's political agenda has gained resonance.

I believe that we can be stronger, we need to be stronger in the future. This is why the main conclusion of the ministerial meeting of November 2015 was to decide for the adoption of a roadmap to strengthen the activities of the UfM in the future, and so we have started the discussion for this roadmap, and we intend to adopt it, of course under the leadership of the co-presidencies in the next UfM regional forum, which will be held in November 2016 (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016g, 25:58).

Speaking to the European Parliament (EP) in early 2016, the quote sees Amb Sijilmassi conveying the frequently expressed argument for strengthening regional cooperation through the UfM by putting emphasis on "we need to be stronger in the future". Yet this time the statement clearly voices that change is coming, as he states that the 2015 high-level conference did in fact reach agreement on strengthening regional cooperation and that a dialogue for that purpose was in motion. Referring to illegal migration and the refugee crisis as aspects that require more regional cooperation to resolve, and doing so at a time when they were pressing, seems to have paid off.

In the very same speech the Secretary General also said that a ministerial meeting on cooperation and planning was being planned (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016g, 22:04). Held June 2, 2016 in Jordan, this ministerial meeting gathered ministers of international cooperation and planning from the member states. As the title implies, the ministers met to discuss the prospects of cooperation and integration among the UfM member states. In their declaration the ministers stressed that the region faced serious challenges related to the socioeconomic situation that, combined with climate change, affects living conditions for the

populations and thus also migration fluxes. Emphasizing that all the countries in the region, and thus all UfM members, experience these challenges, the ministers took up Amb Sijilmassi's argument and stated that "addressing common needs and opportunities require a strong regional perspective" (UfM Co-Presidency, 2016, p 2).

This demonstrates two things. First, it signifies an acceptance of the Secretary General's argument on stronger regional cooperation as a necessary means to address the migratory influxes. This is further corroborated by the fact that the meeting was the first of its kind and was carried out after the secretary general had attempted to give migration a higher priority. Second, in compliance with the pre-existing root cause approach, the ministers believe the role of the UfM is to address the underlying causes of migration. However, the declaration makes no references to the phenomenon of refugees and whether the UfM should incorporate this in its mandate. The minister's acceptance of Amb Sijilmassi's urge to cooperate on migration and refugees is thus restricted to migration.

Moreover, in January 2017, foreign ministers from the member states convened at the UfM regional forum. As envisaged by the secretary general in his speech at the EP, this forum saw the adoption of a new roadmap for the UfM meant to strengthen regional cooperation (Union for the Mediterranean, 2017b, para 1). An important aspect with this roadmap regards enhancing political dialogue amongst the members. Concrete measures to achieve this includes, among others, the arranging of annual foreign ministerial meeting, and expanding the agenda of the SOM (UfM- Co Presidency, 2017a, p 4). Annual foreign ministerial meetings were an important part of the UfM envisaged at the 2008 Paris Summit (p13). However, Bicchi (2012, p 11) says that no such meetings were carried out from the end of 2008 through late 2010. The 2016 UfM annual report further indicates that the November 2015 Informal Ministerial Conference, or regional forum, was the only foreign ministerial meeting carried out from 2013 to 2016 (Union for the Mediterranean, 2017a, p 10). To re-introduce foreign ministerial meetings on a permanent basis thus demonstrates a will to strengthen cooperation within this framework, and potentially also strengthen political guidance. Moreover, mandating the SOM to include dialogue on efforts to address root causes of the regional challenges, including migration, might strengthen the organization's will and capacities to discuss and label migration related projects (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 4).

There was also a section in the roadmap on migration and the role of the UfM in that regard. In compliance with the declaration following the ministerial meeting on cooperation and planning, this section accentuated that addressing the root causes of the “refugee and irregular migrant crisis” is crucial when it comes to securing regional stability (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7).²⁴ The ministers further emphasized their recognition of migration as a vital issue for political dialogue within the UfM framework (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7). Even though migration has been accentuated as an important aspect for cooperation at previous occasions, such as the 2008 Marseille conference (Council of the European Union, 2008, p 24), this suggests that the phenomenon has obtained a higher priority on the organization’s agenda.

They [ministers] also agree that, on an operational level, all existing UfM activities, methodology and toolbox of activities will be called to contribute to these efforts.

When appropriate and after approval by the SOM, the UfM will therefore be involved in relevant migration-related initiatives in the region in order to ensure the substantial and tangible contribution of the UfM activities to addressing this challenge (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7).

Enabling the utilization of “all existing UfM activities, methodology and toolbox of activities” implies the organization has fully decided to utilize its capacities to address the root causes of migration and refugees. To guide the UfM migration related work there are four parameters in this roadmap. The first emphasizes that UfM activities are to be enhanced in areas within the UfM member space where the challenge of migration is the most pressing. Furthermore, the third not only stresses that the UfM will concentrate its work to address the underlying causes of migration, but will do so in line with the declaration and the action plan derived from the Valetta Summit. This corroborates the notion of the UfM as dedicated to addressing the root causes of migration, and also offers the secretariat a comprehensive political document to base its actions on.

It is however, logical to assume that addressing underlying causes, such as youth unemployment, demands presence on the ground where these causes are present (Carling & Talleraas, 2016, p 6). As the UfM activities occur in a variety of UfM member states, with an

²⁴ The term irregular migration has recently started to replace the term illegal migration. Avoiding denoting the migrants as illegal or criminal, irregular migration is defined by Jandl et al. (2008, p 7) as: “a form of migration that is ‘not regular’, ‘unlawful’, or not according to the rules”.

extra focus on the Mashrek and Maghreb sub-regions, it makes sense to assess the organization's ability to address root causes of migration as confined to migrants of an internal character (Anonymous 6, 2017).²⁵ It is therefore interesting to note that the roadmap expresses that:

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa...can also be a valuable instrument for relevant UfM activities and countries (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p15).

Established in 2015, this trust fund is an instrument to address the crises in and around Sahel, and the Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa, and The North of Africa, and at the same time contribute to stabilization, improving migration management and the underlying causes of migration (European Commission, 2015b, p 5). Opening up for UfM activities to partake in this initiative thus signifies political support to expand the UfM migration related activities to non-UfM members and areas. There is therefore potential for the UfM to expand the scope of its migration related activities to migrants of an external kind.²⁶ Nevertheless, stating that the trust fund “can also be a valuable instrument” implies this is a suggestion, not a decision. It is hence uncertain whether cooperation with the trust fund will commence at all. Furthermore, it is entirely plausible that UfM activities would be concentrated in North African countries, of which several are UfM members, if cooperation with the trust fund were to be commenced.

At the same time, opening up for involvement in “relevant migration-related activities”, the previous quote from the UfM roadmap gives the UfM some latitude when it comes to expanding its migration approach into new areas and in new designs (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7). The framing gives few specifications as to what these migration relevant activities should entail and are therefore very much open to interpretation by the secretariat in their process of labelling projects, and the SOM when approving activities. It could thus open for UfM involvement in a range of efforts related to migration, including efforts directly affecting the situation of migrants, not only the factors that coerce people to migrate.

Moreover, the second and fourth parameters shed light on a broader assessment of the phenomenon besides tackling its root causes. The second parameter stressed that “new

²⁵ Internal in the sense that the migrants originate from within the UfM member space.

²⁶ In contrast to internal migrants, the term external migrants is used here to describe migrants originating outside the UfM member space.

drivers for mobility” should be examined by the UfM (Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7). Exemplified with mobility arrangements for research and education, this indicates that the UfM actually seeks to promote not hinder the movement of people. This makes sense when one takes into consideration that education-related mobility and the movement of skilled migrants might be factors that increase integration, and furthermore that integration between the two shores is one of the key goals of the organization (Sinatti & Tinajero, 2011, p 25; Paris Summit, 2008, p 12). This assessment was certainly urged by one of the respondents, as it was stated that:

We also contribute for [*sic*] the mobility of workers and students because our objective is not to end migration. Because migration is very important be it south-north, be it south-south, because it promotes economic integration, and when you see what economic integration did in terms of peace, in terms of tolerance, in terms of dialogue in Europe and when you see what NN was saying that of 100 percent of trade in the Euro-Mediterranean region, only 1 percent of it is south-south, then you understand that this is something that we have to tackle. This is, we have to focus on migration issues, south-south, promoting migration, promoting students’ mobility, because it is the only way that we have to guarantee that there will be a strengthened integration of these societies and economies (Anonymous 6, 2017).

Accentuating the effects of integration between European countries on peace and stability, the respondent clearly sees internal migration as a means to promote integration, peace and stability between the UfM member states. Assessing the second parameter in relation to this extract thus clarifies that migration is not only seen as a phenomenon of grievances and challenges, but also an opportunity for the region. In this regard, the fourth parameter emphasizes that the presence of people originating in the SMCs in the EU actually is a factor that “build bridges” between north and south (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 8). It is here also worth noting that one respondent accentuated the following:

Although there is just one paragraph or two in the roadmap [regarding migration, refugees and mobility], and well when you read it you probably don’t think that it makes such a difference. It opens the door for the secretariat to work with other partners in other kinds of projects. So that’s basically what we are doing, we are identifying new paths that can be used for when addressing these questions of

migration and mobility and refugees so these are the three main questions that are mentioned in the roadmap (Anonymous 7, 2017)

It is hence evident that the roadmap enables the UfM to cooperate with other actors on new kinds of projects. Despite few references in the roadmap to refugees, the respondent also put emphasis on refugees as one of three main aspects, thus confirming that the roadmap enables the organization to direct its projects toward the issue of refugees, in addition to questions of migration and mobility. In fact, Karin Dokken (personal conversation, 17 October 2017), a professor at the University of Oslo, explained that once an issue is implemented into an organization's mandate, no matter how vaguely, it is likely to have binding effects into the future. In other words, by referring to refugees, the roadmap breaks a barrier. Once this barrier is broken it is likely to entail an amplified focus on refugees in the future.

As demonstrated by the second UfM ministerial conference on urban development, held 22 May 2017 in Cairo, this has so far been the case with the UfM. Ministers underlined conflict resolution, development cooperation, and addressing root causes as crucial components in addressing migration influxes. Moreover, the ministerial declaration puts emphasis on migration as one out of seven priority areas in relevance to the topic of the meeting. The section concerning migration accentuates that the UfM and its members devote themselves to addressing the need to improve elemental services in cities that accommodate refugees, but also migrants and internally displaced persons (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017c, p 6,8). In that regard it is also interesting to observe that the ministerial meeting on water, held April 27 2017 and thus also in the aftermath of the adoption of the roadmap, devoted attention to migration. Ministers here recognized that water scarcity and quality are important aspects influencing migration influxes, and moreover that inflow of migrant and refugees may in turn affect the availability of water. With the purpose of contributing to addressing migration challenges, the ministers then maintained their support for addressing water issues in the Mediterranean (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017b, p 2-4). When seen in relation to previous sectoral ministerial meetings where references to migrants are few, and references to refugees virtually non-existent, it is hence evident that the issues of migration and refugees have received invigorated attention in the wake of the roadmap.²⁷

²⁷ See each specific priority area in: Union for the Mediterranean 2016e, for the various declarations and minutes.

To sum up, sub chapter 5.1 has found that the UfM secretariat with the Secretary General upfront has attempted to utilize the phenomena of migration and refugees as means to strengthen regional cooperation through the UfM. In that regard, there have been attempts to move the issues up on the organization's agenda, though without qualifying as attempts at securitizing the issues. This process has furthermore seen efforts at politicizing the previous nonpoliticized issue of refugees. The 2017 roadmap, which includes the first comprehensive mandate related to migration since 2007, signifies that cooperation and dialogue on the issue are to be intensified in the context of the UfM. Moreover, the approach toward migration outlined in the roadmap entails that the UfM is to strengthen its focus on underlying causes of migration, promoting mobility between the members, and might also open up for the involvement of the UfM activities into new areas pertinent to migration. With UfM activities previously having been restricted to focus on internal migration, the roadmap also opens up for extending these efforts to external migrants. This demonstrates that the audience has indeed accepted migration as of high priority for the organization. The same goes for refugees, as the roadmap contains the first mandate related to refugees. Although there are few references, as compared to migration, to refugees in the roadmap, it opens up for both enhancing cooperation on the issue as well as for labelling refugee related projects in the future.

5.2 Motivations for approving the roadmap

The adoption of the 2017 roadmap clearly represents compliance by the UfM member states to strengthen and extend the refugee- and migrant-related mandate of the organisation, thus signifying an adaption by the organisation. In line with the research question and by drawing upon Alexander Wendt's thoughts on self-interest and collective interest, this chapter will examine whether members sought this adaption out of mutual interest.

5.2.1 The self and the other: European UfM members and the SMCs

In his book "Social Theory of International Politics" Wendt (1999, p 240) sets a stark contrast between collective interest and self-interest. The former is defined as "...if a state helps another because it identifies with it, such that even when its own security is not

threatened it still perceives a threat to the Self, then it is acting from collective interest”, The latter is defined as:

A belief about how to meet one’s needs—a subjective interest—that is characterized by a purely instrumental attitude towards the Other: the Other is an object to be picked up, used, and/or discarded for reasons having solely to do with an actor’s individual gratification (Wendt, 1999, p 240).

Moreover, Wendt (1999, 240) notes that in order to understand the self-interest of actors one has to understand “the Self, and especially its relationship to the Other”. Though migration as emphasised in the Marseille declaration (Council of the European Union, 2008, p 24) is to “be an integral part of the regional partnership”, decisions or even references to the issue in the various later ministerial declarations (except for the 2017 roadmap) are rare. As mentioned, most SMCs abstained from attending the 2005 EMP summit as a way to demonstrate their discontent with “EU pushiness” to include migration and internal security in the suggested work plan (Bicchi, 2012, p 10). Thus, even before the UfM was established, migration had proven to be a difficult issue for cooperation. Furthermore, when Sarkozy promoted the establishment of a “Mediterranean Union”, the SMCs, according to Benhold (2007b, para 17), worried such a union would encompass a focus on a “negative agenda” concerning illegal migration and terrorism. In fact, Altemir and Hernandez (2014, p 49-50) write that the modified proposal Sarkozy presented in late 2007 “avoided any reference to the controversial issue of migration”, thus signifying acceptance of the SMCs concerns. While migration in the end turned out to be included in the remit of the UfM, these controversies show migration as a strenuous issue for cooperation in the UfM.

Migration, both between EU member states and from outside countries, has been on the EU’s agenda since the establishment of the European Single Market in 1993 (Brochmann, 1997, 14-15). Given this long-term focus on migration, and that the EU has devoted an enhanced level of attention to the issue in the wake of the events in 2014-2015 (Geddes & Abdou, 2017, p 10), it is then viable to assess the EU-UfM member states as prone to promoting cooperation on the subject. Further corroborating this notion is the fact that the 2005 inclusion of migration in the remit of the EMP was promoted by the EU states. The SMCs on the other hand, with their reluctance to include migration in the remit of the EMP at the 2005

summit, as well as the anxiety that a Mediterranean Union would focus on illegal migration, seem to have possessed a more hesitant attitude toward migration (Bicchi, 2012, p 10).

The EU-UfM members and the SMC-UfM members thus seem to have had conflicting opinions on whether migration is an important issue for cooperation through the UfM. Despite disagreeing with each other when it comes to migration, an increase in UfM activities since 2012, including sectoral ministerial meetings, suggests the overall relationship between the members has been improving (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 1, 3). It should nevertheless be noted that these two groups of states, especially the SMCs, are comprised of fairly diverse states and attitudes might thus diverge between countries. Moreover, Wendt (1999, p 240) emphasizes that the belief that constitutes self-interest “is normally issue- and Other-specific”. In other words, general improvement of relationship between the self and others does not alone imply absence of self-interest in decision-making. Individual issues should thus be scrutinized separately and for individual or smaller groups of units. Based on the data obtained in the interviews, the following analysis will therefore focus on three groups of states and their reasons for accepting an extension of the UfM mandate as regarding the 2017 roadmap. These groups are: the Southern European members of Spain, Italy and Greece, the non-European UfM members of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, and the Northern and Central European members. The first two groups are of interest because of their experiences with receiving and hosting migrants and refugees (See chapter 2.1.1 of this issue). The latter is included as it has come to the researcher’s attention that they have become more involved in the UfM.

5.2.2 Taking the other into account: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan

There is a big change concerning the role of the UfM. As I told you the UfM is mentioned in an important part of the new ENP, and second in the UfM roadmap the UfM took a decision to play a role in the migration (Anonymous 1, 2017).

This respondent belongs to the government of one of the three states under scrutiny, and participates in the Senior Officials Meetings (SOM). The respondent evidently sees the 2017

roadmap as vital since the UfM here “took a decision to play a role in the migration”. In that regard the same respondent expressed the following:

When we [in the SOM] talk about the Syrian crisis or the Libyan crisis we are mainly talking about the migration problem. For example when we talk about Syria, the Jordanian senior official, the Lebanese senior official and the Turkish senior official talk mainly about what they need from the EU to face this problem (Anonymous 1, 2017).

By pointing out that “the migration problem” is the main point of discussion when the senior officials talk about the Libya and Syrian crisis, it becomes evident that migration has been an issue of prominence within the SOM for some time. Moreover, emphasising that they use this arena to advance to the EU what “they need” in order to “face this problem”, the quote further indicates that there exists a belief among Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan that assistance from fellow UfM members and the EU is necessary in order to fulfil their needs. The respondent’s reference to the Syrian crisis, which the three countries have heavily invested in as they host large numbers of Syrian refugees (See chapter 2.1.1 of this issue), indicates that “this problem” is referring to refugees. The needs which Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey seek to fulfil are thus likely related to the refugee pressures they have experienced recently. Corroborating this notion, a respondent connected to a European PA-UfM delegation expressed that:

Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey rightly take every occasion on UfM/PA-UfM to ask for more help in supporting refugees’ reception from partner countries and active involvement of the UfM. This is a priority for them at the time being and will be, as long as the situation in that region will not stabilise with the end of the war in Syria and effective peace talks (Anonymous 5, 2017).

Stating that the three countries under scrutiny have been requesting support on “refugees’ reception”, and “active involvement of the UfM”, this quote demonstrates that they indeed possess a need for assistance in order to handle the situation. By emphasising that they “rightly” give voice to this need “at every occasion on UfM/PA-UfM”, it further confirms that Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon have been regularly utilizing the UfM as a forum for expressing concerns related to refugee pressures. Moreover, as it is stated that this is and will

be “a priority for them” as long as the Syrian civil war goes on, it is also likely that it has been a priority for them since the very onset of this war and the consequent refugee influxes into Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Also, all interviews conducted in this study were carried out between one and three months after the roadmap was adopted. This is hardly enough time to operationalize the new mandate and the interviews are therefore thought to give voice to needs as they were before the adoption of the roadmap. It is then feasible to estimate that prior to the adoption of the roadmap, a belief existed amongst Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey that the UfM and its member states should devote further assistance for their countries’ refugee-related needs.

In order for this belief to be in line with the definition of self-interest, the attitude these countries express toward UfM and other UfM members has to be of an instrumental character (Wendt, 1999, p 240). Both quotes outlined above indirectly stress that the devotion Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey have had toward attaining support from partner countries and the UfM itself is a mean to cover their own individual needs. According to Wendt (1999, p 240), the motivation to act is what self-interest is about. For Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, the motivation for adopting the roadmap thus seems to be ingrained in a desire to obtain more devotion to the issue from the UfM, as well as support from the other member states. In other words, one seeks to utilize others in order to gratify the self, which implies an instrumental attitude to the others. In line with the definition of self-interest, this then signifies that Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey adopted the roadmap out of self-interest. However, when asked what further increased migration influxes would mean for the Mediterranean area, the respondent stated the following:

If the migration increases in the Mediterranean, I think we will have more economic and security problems in Europe. It is better to ask for example the Italian senior official on this issue. But personally it is logic [*sic*] that, if we want to say that the illegal migration will not stop in the near future in Italy, Italy will face economic problems and security problems also. We cannot let the migration crisis develop more and more. What’s happening now from Libya and North Africa to Italy is very dangerous, very dangerous, and it is obvious when you look at the camps and the situation of the migrants in the Italian territories (Anonymous 1, 2017).

When remarking that “We cannot let the migration crisis develop more and more”, the extract implies this is something “we” have to handle collectively. This is important as Wendt (1999, p 170) notes that identity concerns “a certain idea of who one is in a given situation”. In the case of the migration influxes the respondent thus implies a belief that the self is part of a community with the others, thus further suggesting identification with the others and commitment to the roadmap out of collective interest.

Nevertheless, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are, as mentioned, primarily affected by refugees, not the phenomenon of migration. Remarking that more migration will lead to “more economic and security problems in Europe” then demonstrates the respondent takes into account needs that are of more immediate importance to others than the self. This is especially true for Italian and Southern European concerns, as the influx of migrants from North Africa and Libya to Italy is described as “very dangerous, very dangerous”. Given the importance of migrant remittances for national GDP in Jordan and Lebanon, this is thought to be limited to external migrants, which there are a lot of in Libya in particular (See chapter 2.1 and 2.1.1 of this issue).

It may then seem like the respondent indicates external migration is something to be solved together despite not being immediately affected by the phenomenon. The roadmap did indeed encompass a significant emphasis on addressing migration, while it saw less attention devoted explicitly to refugees. Hence, by adopting the roadmap Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey also expressed a will to act on an issue of less importance to the self, which could correspond with Wendt’s (1999, p 240) considerations of collective interests: actors act when they identify with the other and the security of the self is not threatened.

In this regard Wendt (1999, p 240) also accentuates there is a distinctive difference between identifying with others, and to take into account the behaviour (and thus also the needs) of the others. While the former would encompass taking action out of collective identity, the latter would still be an instance of self-interest. At the same time as the respondent pointed out that “we” have to handle the migration crisis, the respondent also stated it is better to inquire with senior officials pertaining to European UfM member countries. While this reflects the fact that reception and the hosting of migrants is more an issue in Southern European Countries than Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (See chapter 2.1.1 of this issue), it also signals a reluctance to put emphasis on the subject. Taking into account that refugees seem to be the main priority

for Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, this reluctance suggests the respondent has an idea that migrants and migrant-related issues are, if not dislocated, then only distantly relevant for the self. When seen in relation to Wendt's (1999, p 170) consideration of identity as "ideas about who one is in a given situation", this then suggests that rather than identifying with the European counterparts, the respondent merely takes their needs into account.

In the cases of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey there thus seem to be mixed motives for accepting the roadmap. Actively seeking to attain involvement of the UfM and support from UfM member states in receiving refugees reflects these countries immediate needs and should thus be interpreted as a self-interested motivation. Moreover, while addressing external migration influxes is not in these countries immediate needs, the adoption of the migration-related paragraphs in the roadmap merely signifies they are taking into account the needs of the others. However, it also demonstrates a contrast to the scepticism SMCs in general had toward cooperating on the issue during the EMP and later at the formation of the UfM (See chapter 5.2.1 of this issue).

5.2.3 Southern Europe: Identifying with the other?

Addressing the root causes of migration by creating opportunities for job creation, education and mobility is certainly a shared goal for UfM member states. But the situation some of them face in respect of migration issues goes way beyond the remit of the UfM: ...for Italy and Greece is it the need for help in managing the influx of migrants crossing the sea on dangerous travels, rescue at sea and reception on the land (Anonymous 5, 2017).

Accentuating that Italy and Greece need support in handling these influxes, the respondent confirms that Italy and Greece indeed have a migrant- and refugee-related need they seek to fulfil. As exemplified in the quote, this need encompasses "help in managing the influx of migrants crossing the sea" with an emphasis on "rescue at sea and reception on the land". Greece and Italy's needs thus consist of support in managing migratory influxes on their own land and sea territories. Moreover, the quote clearly assesses UfM as insufficient to fulfil these needs in a credible manner.

While the roadmap opens up the possibility for involvement by the UfM in “relevant migration-related initiatives” within the region (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7), it is further emphasised by the respondent that “it is hard to say if initiatives will be taken to address these serious challenges” (Anonymous 5, 2017). This signifies an uncertainty concerning the relevance of UfM in realizing the needs of Italy and Greece. Among the interviews conducted in this study, two respondents held the position of diplomats belonging to southern European countries. One of them shared the view described above, as it was stated that:

Although for us immigration is part of the UfM agenda, Paris and Marseille Declarations and acquis from Barcelona process, this is not a position which is shared by the majority, especially in the south, who prefers that UfM concentrates its work on concrete projects of economic impact for the populations (Anonymous 4, 2017).

When emphasising that “for us immigration is part of the UfM agenda”, and at the same time referring to the Paris and Marseille declarations where migration was emphasized to be a vital issue for the organisation (Paris Summit, 2008, p 12; Council of the European Union, 2008, p 24), the respondent confirms that Southern European countries see migration as an important issue for cooperation through the organisation. Nonetheless, it is at the same time evident that the respondent perceives other members, “especially in the south”, as less inclined to incorporate the issue in UfM policy discussions. It is not that these members avoid the issue in general, just that they prefer to put emphasis on “projects of economic impact for the populations”, hence addressing root causes. The respondent thus accentuates that while migration was included in the merit of the organisation by these declarations, the organisation’s efforts have been limited to addressing its underlying causes.

Consequently we have not succeeded in calling an UfM ministerial devoted to the issue, which would include Ministers of Interior. Therefore until now the relationship between UpM [UfM] and immigration has been via projects with impact on job creation, or via programs focused on young people. The UfM roadmap recently approved by the F.A. Ministers insists on a positive agenda for young people. Indeed we have an experience in dealing with this issue with our southern neighbours but

practically all what we have done and reached has been on a bilateral basis
(Anonymous 4, 2017).

As a continuation of the previous quote, this extract has the respondent underlining there has yet to be held an UfM ministerial meeting on migration. As such a meeting is likely to put migration higher on the organisation's agenda, the extract further displays that the UfM Southern European members seek more cooperation on the matter. Moreover, while there are differences among the competencies of the interior ministries in the three Southern European countries (Greece, Spain and Italy), all have crucial roles when it comes to shaping national migration policies. In Italy and Spain their roles also includes controlling immigration in terms of security (Kontis et al., 2013, p 11; European Migration Network, 2013, p 10; Callia et al., 2012, p 5 & 22). By stating that such a meeting "would include Ministers of Interior", the respondent implicitly confirms that support in facing the situation on their territories constitutes the intermediate needs of the countries in question. Such a need would certainly lay the ground for a motivation based on an instrumental attitude: to help others, e.g. those of the UfM members hosting external migrants or refugees, since it could act as a measure to relieve pressures on their own territories.

Though such a motivation for adopting the roadmap would be shaped by an instrumental attitude to the others, and thus qualify as self-interest (Wendt 1999, p 240), the respondent merely assesses the roadmap as "insisting on a positive agenda for young people". Indeed, the roadmap puts an emphasis on a positive agenda for youth, centered on a number of factors, such as employability and education (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 9). However, the respondent refrained from mentioning, let alone putting emphasis on, the section in the roadmap devoted especially to migration. This corroborates that Southern European countries put no significant emphasis on the extended migrant- and refugee-related merit of the UfM.

Moreover, even though this section of the roadmap enables the UfM to engage in new forms of migration-related initiatives, and as assessed in section 5.1.2 to cooperate on the issue of refugees, the addressing of root causes is still a primary focus (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7-8). Root cause approaches, as explained in section 2.2.1, are long-term methods for addressing the phenomena of migration and refugees. The UfM root cause approach is, as laid out in the roadmap, likely to concentrate its migration related efforts in countries where migrants originates (See chapter 5.1.2 of this issue). Such countries include the SMCs and

potentially also non-UfM member countries. Given that the immediate needs of Southern European countries in question concern support in their territories and surrounding areas, it is safe to assess this approach as diverging from their immediate needs. This then signifies that the UfM and the measures manifested in the roadmap are unable to realize those needs. When taking into account that self-interest is all about realizing the needs of the self in an instrumental fashion (Wendt, 1999, p 240), this then indicates that the Southern European countries did not adopt the roadmap out of self-interested considerations.

If we assume that the UfM is based on the EMP, migration is not a part of the UfM. It [*sic*] is a single reason for this, namely that migration is handled through other forums, mainly bilaterally through the ENP, but also multilateral through Valetta. UfM is very aware of this problem but is applying its mandate to affect the underlying causes for migration (Anonymous 4, 2017).

Corroborating the notion that Southern European UfM members put little emphasis on the organisation as an arena for realizing their migration-related needs, this quote further suggests where these needs are realised. The ENP and the 2015 Valetta Summit on Migration are depicted here as the platforms for handling migration. While the UfM is the primary focus of this study, it is still worth noting that both the review of the bilateral ENP (European Commission, 2015a, p 3, 13 &15) and the Valetta summit (Valetta Summit, 2015, para 9-10) put emphasis on migrant- and refugee-related issues that are disregarded in the UfM roadmap, such as the return and readmission of migrants, and the fight against human traffickers.²⁸ It might then be the case that the migrant- and refugee-related needs of Greece, Italy and Spain are addressed through these forums. It is important to point out that the other respondent belonging to a Southern European government denoted multilateral forms of cooperation as crucial:

Multilateral cooperation and financial institutions is [*sic*] essential and must be upheld towards [*sic*]. You know what I am talking about right? The new US administration. It is for the EU to insist, if we are to be taken serious [*sic*], to insist that this is the way to go (Anonymous 3, 2017).

²⁸ They also have a significant focus on alleviating the underlying causes of migration.

By referring to “the new US administration” as what multilateral cooperation has to be upheld toward, the respondent clearly refers to the administration of President Donald Trump. The president had expressed contempt toward the EU and other forms of multilateral cooperation in the period leading up to the interview of this respondent (Erlanger, 2017, para 4; Bouchet, 2017, p 6). In contrast to this contempt, and in order “to be taken serious”, the respondent evidently signifies that the EU needs to continue its focus on multilateral cooperation. It is interesting to note here that an in depth analysis, prepared for the European Parliament (EP) and concerning EU-US relations in the wake of the 2016 US election, emphasises that the EU among others should strengthen its role as a foreign and security political actor in the southern neighbourhood (Bouchet, 2017, p 10). This is a way to alleviate potential negative impacts Trump could have on the EU-US relationship. Moreover, while the quote encompasses multilateral cooperation and financial institutions in general, is it important to emphasise that UfM, besides being the topic of the interview, is the only regional arena where states from all around the Mediterranean participate (See chapter 5.1.1 of this issue). It is then viable to assess the quote as implicitly referring to the UfM as one of the multilateral institutions for cooperation that are “essential and must be upheld”.

Furthermore, taking into account Wendt’s (1999, p 170) portrayal of identity as ideas concerning who one is in a given situation, it is also natural to evaluate the emphasis on multilateral cooperation and financial institutions as “the way to go” as an idea of the self as being part of a society, or community, where problems and issues are dealt with by means of cooperation. Southern European UfM members then seem to identify with the other UfM members. Accordingly, when seen in relation to the roadmap, this then indicates that these members adopted the migration- and refugee-related aspects out of collective identity.

To sum up, while self-interested motivations for adopting the migrant- and refugee-related aspects of the roadmap might exist among Southern European UfM members, the respondents have not given voice to such motivations. They have rather expressed that the UfM focus on root causes and on a “positive agenda”, though deemed important, has low priority among these countries. Nevertheless, emphasis on multilateral cooperation as crucial demonstrates that the Southern European UfM members identify with the other members, which thus implies that they seek to solve problems and issues collectively. It is therefore viable to assess their acceptance of the enhanced migration and refugee affiliated remit as out of collective interest.

5.2.4 From indifference to self-interest: Northern and Central Europe

There has been a lot of sceptics e.g. in the Baltics, Germany, Poland. They are very suspicious of pooling money to the Mediterranean because the effective spending is not there. But it is necessary and must be done (Anonymous 3, 2017).

Stated in the context of both the UfM in general and the ENP, this quote signifies scepticism among Northern and Central European UfM members. Concerning the “pooling of money in the Mediterranean”, this scepticism is assessed to entail the funding of projects and initiatives, as this is one of the core function of the UfM, in member countries where the “effective spending” is not present. It has to be stated that the funding of UfM activities, as of early 2017 estimated at EUR 5 billion, is financed through different forms of financial institutions, ranging from international and governmental financial institutions, to private donors (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 17-20; Anonymous 6, 2017). The extract is thus limited to governmental financial institutions, of which the Swedish, French, Spanish and Norwegian governments are party to, according to the UfM secretariat’s website (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016b, Financial Partners).

Nevertheless, this scepticism displayed toward the funding of projects and initiatives indicates an absence of confidence among this group of members as to the viability of the UfM in fulfilling their needs. When seen in relation to Wendt’s (1999, p 240) definition of self-interest, this would signify that the approach of addressing migration through projects and initiatives aimed at the phenomena’s root causes has not been in these actors’ self-interest. One respondent participating in this study had job responsibilities relating to the UfM, and belonged to a Northern European government. This respondent did indeed display little knowledge of the recent developments when it comes to the issues of migration and refugees in the context of the UfM (Anonymous 2, 2017). Thus confirming that the UfM and its root cause approach are of low priority among its Northern and Central European members. This should not come as a surprise, as there is after all a considerable geographical distance between these countries and the SMCs, where most UfM activities are centered.

According to Wendt (1999, p 240), granting support in instances where the self identifies with the other, or when the self is not affected by an issue or phenomena, counts as an instance of collective interest, as opposed to self-interest. However, the scepticism Central and Northern European UfM members have demonstrated toward UfM implies they have not been inclined to help other members through the instruments of the UfM, while not being affected by the phenomena themselves. This, signifies indifference to the needs of the others rather than identifying with them.

I would say that some countries, that did not have the Mediterranean in their priorities, in their foreign policy priorities, have somehow been confronted with the need to address the question of development in the Mediterranean, by what happened in 2014 and especially in 2015. So countries from Central and Northern Europe, traditional European countries are now conscious of the importance of addressing the root causes of migration and terrorism and radicalism and we feel that they are investing more time and more energy in promoting development cooperation through the UfM in the southern rim and eastern rim of the Mediterranean (Anonymous 6, 2017).

Emphasizing that there has been a change in the priorities of Northern and Central European members, this statement confirms the previous paragraph's assessment of Northern and Central European UfM members as indifferent to the root cause approach of the UfM. However, addressing root causes of migration through the UfM has evidently attained higher merit among the members in question, as at the time of the interview they were thought to invest more time and energy "in promoting development cooperation through the UfM". It is also clear the respondent sees the events in 2014 and 2015 as important factors in raising awareness among these members of the "need to address the question of development". The assessment of Central and Northern European members as indifferent is thus only true for the period antecedent to the 2015 migrant and refugee crisis. The impact these events had on Europe in general and those member states in particular, from the shutdown of borders to the overstrained Common European Asylum System, might thus constitute a need that these countries had not had prior to these events, that quickly emerged with a change in circumstances (Aiyar et al., 2016, p 8).

Addressing the phenomena of migration and refugees through the UfM and its approach thus suddenly had merit as a method for realizing this need. This would explain why they accepted Amb Sijilmassi's argument to strengthen the UfM and its prospects of having an impact on these phenomena. The adoption by the EU of a refugee relocation scheme in 2015 demonstrates that several European, especially Central European, EU-UfM members have had a reluctant attitude toward hosting refugees. Intended to relieve refugee pressures on the southern EU members, this deal met significant headwind as Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, and Hungary, all opposed such a deal (Trainor, 2015, para 1-4). Though the deal was adopted, intense negotiations could not sway the attitudes of the three latter countries, in addition to Romania, who still voted against it (Trainor & Kingsley, 2015, para 1-4).

Wendt (1999, p 240) emphasises that "self interest is about motivation, not behaviour". The reluctance to accept the relocation deal demonstrated by these states should be seen as an act of behaviour. However, this behaviour demonstrates they indeed possess an underlying motivation to prevent refugees from entering their societies. Given that refugees retain stronger legal protection than migrants, thus making it more controversial to deny them entry, this motivation is also likely to include the curbing of migration. Moreover, Wendt (1999, p 240) stresses that motivation is a phenomenon that "is notoriously difficult to measure". In this instance the motivation is identified in the context of the EU. However, the EU refugee relocation scheme and the UfM roadmap were enacted within two years after the refugee and migrant crisis reached Europe. This proximity in time between the enactments of the two arrangements, as well as the fact that all EU members are members of the UfM, makes this motivation likely to be applicable to the context of the UfM.

Carling and Talleraas (2016, p 16) explain that root cause approaches, both in terms of economical migration and "conflict-driven displacement", have since the 1990s retained recognition as approaches that can stem these phenomena. Indeed, the prevailing notion of the respondents participating in this study, i.e. my respondents, is that the UfM approach helps in stemming economical migration. The 2017 roadmap has now extended this approach to also applying to the root causes of refugees (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7). The change in behaviour of Northern and Central European UfM members, from indifferent prior to the crisis, to accepting an extended mandate in 2017, thus suggests that their underlying motivation is not to help the SMCs or Southern European countries out of collective interest.

It rather suggests perceived interest in preventing migration, or simply confining migrants and refugees to other member states, motivated by reluctance to hosting refugees and migrants in their own territories. They are thus complying with the definition of self-interest as they indirectly gratify their own needs by supporting others (Wendt, 1999, p 240).

The Northern and Central European UfM members' adoption of the UfM roadmap and its migration- and refugee-related paragraphs hence signify an act of self-interest in accordance with Wendt's definition and emphasis on motivation. It should be noted though that these estimates are highly generalised. Sweden is for instance the only Northern or Central European country listed as a financial partner with the UfM, which implies that Sweden is more prone to channel efforts into the framework of the UfM than other Northern and Central European members (Union for the Mediterranean, 2016b, Financial Partners).

In addition to the Northern and Central European UfM members, subchapter 5.2 has also shown Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey to act out of self-interest when extending the refugee and migrant merit of the UfM. Spain, Italy and Greece on the other hand, due to emphasis on multilateral cooperation as crucial, were found to identify with other members, thus adopting this remit out of collective interest. The two former groups of members have nevertheless demonstrated a change in behaviour when it comes to the UfM and the two phenomena of migration and refugees. The Northern and Central European members have notably gone from indifferent, to adopting the remit and investing more time and energy into the UfM and its root cause approach. In the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, both efforts to acquire support in refugee reception, and the will to take into account the migrant-related needs of Europe demonstrates a shift from the scepticism SMCs in general had to cooperation on migration in the 2000s. It is important to note here that Wendt (1999, p 241-242) emphasises that, while there are indeed pressures on states to be self-interested, the main question is whether states manage to exceed those pressures and "expand the boundaries of the Self to include others", which initially can be done out of a self-interested rationale. The willingness of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey to take European concerns into account and adopt a remit with emphasis on migration, while the needs of the self primarily concern refugees, demonstrates they have exceeded self-interested pressures and at least partially expanded the boundaries of the self toward including others.

6 Conclusion

This study has investigated how the UfM has adapted to the increased levels of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area, and moreover what has caused members to advocate for a potential attempt at transforming the organization. The thesis itself has taken the form of a single case study with field interviews as an important source of data. Securitization theory and Alexander Wendt's considerations on the interests of states has furthermore composed the theoretical framework upon which the analytical arguments have been structured. This concluding chapter of the study sets out to summarize the main findings, illuminate limitations with the study, and finally suggest areas for further research.

6.1 Findings and conclusion

The research question this thesis has aimed at answering, as presented in the introduction chapter, is as follows:

How has the UfM adapted to the increasing levels of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean area, and what are the members' motives in advocating for a potential attempt at adaption?

The UfM secretariat and its Secretary General Amb Sijilmassi are found to have attempted to move the issues of migration and refugees up on the organization's agenda. However, the study finds that by avoiding framing these issues as existential threats, the Secretary General did not attempt to securitize them. Presented from 2014 and onwards, the arguments for moving migration and refugees up on the UfM's agenda mainly emphasize that the regional nature of the two issues demands a regional answer. While migration has been included in the mandate of the UfM since its establishment, the phenomenon of refugees has not. Framing refugees as an issue that should be addressed through the framework of the UfM thus denotes that the secretariat has attempted to politicize the issue.

The 2017 UfM roadmap further signifies that the 43 member states have accepted these arguments. This roadmap also constitutes an adaption of the organization's refugee- and

migrant-related mandate. The ministers have decided to utilize the full capacities of the organization to address the root causes of migration. Besides reaffirming the political will to employ a root cause approach toward migration, the roadmap enables cooperation on the issue of refugees through the UfM. The conclusions from the ministerial meetings on urban development in May 2017 and water in April 2017 demonstrate that refugees have indeed received more attention after the adoption of the roadmap. This indicates that cooperation and possibly the labelling of projects related to refugees are likely to be further invigorated in the future.

Moreover, the roadmap underscores that migration is an important aspect for cooperation in the UfM. Even though migration was emphasized as an important aspect for cooperation both in the 1995 Barcelona declaration and the 2008 Marseille declaration, the roadmap enables the UfM secretariat to utilize new approaches to address migration (Barcelona Declaration 1995; Council of the European Union, 2008, p 24). These new approaches include the involvement of the UfM in “relevant migration related activities”, and the ability to engage in addressing external migration, though it is questionable whether that will occur (UfM Co-Presidency, 2017a, p 7). There are few specifications as to how these approaches are to be designed, thus opening it up for interpretation by secretariat when labelling projects, and the SOM when approving them. The emphasis on mobility as a means to attain higher level of integration does however indicate that it is not the goal for such projects to curb migration. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the roadmap extends the possibilities for engaging with migration signals that the issue has attained higher prominence within the UfM. It is therefore assessed as likely that efforts to address the issue in the context of the UfM will further intensify if migration influxes in the Mediterranean area continue to increase.

The thesis has further unveiled that Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as the Northern and Central European members, adopted the roadmap out of motivations of a self-interested character. This motivation was notably rooted in a need for support in relieving refugee pressures in the former group, and an aversion for hosting migrants and refugees in the latter. They have, notwithstanding, all become more prone to utilize the framework of the UfM as an arena for cooperation on the topics of migration and refugees. In comparison, and tied to the organization’s emphasis on root causes, the UfM and its roadmap are seen by the respondents as insufficient for fulfilling the immediate needs of Italy, Spain and Greece. Instead, the study has shown an emphasis on multilateral cooperative institutions as essential.

In turn this signifies that motivations tied to collective interests laid the ground for their acknowledgment of the roadmap and its refugee- and migrant-related paragraphs.

Despite different motivations for adopting the roadmap, the combined efforts of these three groups of members in extending the mandate of the organization signifies the possibility of a further strengthening of the UfM's role in migration- and refugee-related matters in the future. The UfM has thus adapted in such a way that its mandate now enables the direction of its projects and initiatives to the support of internal migrants, external migrants and refugees, as well as enabling the bolstering of cooperation and dialogue concerning migration and refugees within the framework of the organization.

6.2 Limitations to the study

The secretariat was chosen as the focal point for the analysis concerning securitization due to its central position as a coordinative institutional body, and Nogués' (2012, p 27) statement regarding the EP assessing the secretariat as an institutional unit that had the potential to "become an autonomous actor". In doing so, other potential securitizing actors were omitted. It is indeed a possibility that actors such as other institutional bodies and member states might have strived to revise the refugee- and migrant-related merit in the same period. However, investigating such potential securitization actors would have required access to data unattainable to this study, such as minutes and speeches from the SOM, and national debates regarding the role of the UfM. It has not been possible to locate the latter in an English medium, but it might be possible to obtain for researchers familiar with languages like French and Arabic.

Moreover, case studies are in general studies with limited abilities for generalizing the findings to a larger population besides the case in question (Yin, 2014, p 20-21). This is true for this study, as the aim with conducting it was to contribute to the understanding of the developments in UfM policy regarding migration and refugees, not to produce generalizable knowledge. Additionally, the challenges experienced in the process of data gathering warrant the choice of methods. Obtaining additional interviews would strengthen the findings of this study. However, by performing six interviews, with seven respondents in total, I attempted to account for the various experiences among the member states. This was done by interviewing

respondents belonging to the governments of three important, but different, groups of members. These findings are however confined to these three groups. As a means to strengthen the validity of the thesis, there were efforts made to triangulate the findings to the highest possible degree by employing multiple sources of evidence. It should be noted though that the analysis in chapter 5.2 is primarily based on the conducted interviews, which may lower the level of triangulation. This was nevertheless a necessity, as this section covers very recent developments in UfM and national policy, which so far has limited coverage in secondary literature.

6.3 Revisiting the theory

Although the findings are empirically nongeneralizable, the choice of theory been beneficial to the study. The parameters that make the basis of securitization theory have made it possible to identify a process where there have been attempts to move the issues of migration and refugees up on the UfM's agenda. While no evidence has been found of securitization, the inclusion of high politics as a theoretical concept supplementing politicization has proven advantageous. Politicization has been a helpful theoretical concept for explaining how the secretariat attempted to include the previously non-mandated issue of refugees into the mandate of the UfM. In comparison, high politics has been fruitful in understanding and explaining how the secretariat attempted to move the already-mandated issue of migration even higher up on the organization's agenda without it being securitized. Wendt's considerations on the interests of states have further proven to be a useful tool in assessing what motivates the audience to accept an attempt at moving an issue up on the political agenda. It is assessed as a theory that can complement future research employing securitization theory, in that it opens up for a deeper understanding of the audience than securitization theory alone.

6.4 Suggestions for further research

Increased influxes of migrants and refugees have had serious impacts for many of the UfM member states, and have, as this study demonstrates, been given a higher level of prominence on the agenda of the UfM. Although the impacts are felt locally, I do believe it is important to recognize the transnational nature these issues retain. While this thesis has focused

specifically on the UfM and its political agenda, it is then natural to ask how its stance relates to that of other actors and forums, thus warranting further analysis on the role of UfM policy toward migration and refugees, in relation to forums and actors such as NGOs, the Rabat and Khartoum process, its bilateral sibling ENP, and others. Such analyses could contribute to the existing literature with a holistic understanding of the role of, and interplay between, the UfM and other forums and actors engaging in dialogue and policy formulation concerning migrants and refugees.

Moreover, with rather vague goals and descriptions for the new UfM migration and refugee policies related to its project approach, disparity between the goals and the final implementation of measures might occur. Referred to as implementation gaps by Carling and Talleraas (2016, p 25-26), such gaps might, together with the existence of discourse gaps between the stated objectives and the concrete measures, lower the efficiency of the policies. This study has been set in close proximity in time to the adoption of the roadmap, which implies that implementation has not come far. This justifies further analysis on the implementation of the revised mandate at a later point in time.

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List of interviews

- Anonymous 1. (2017) Interview of diplomat belonging to a SMC, Brussels.
- Anonymous 2. (2017) Interview of official working at a Northern European Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels.
- Anonymous 3. (2017) Telephone Interview of diplomat belonging to a South European Country, Brussels.
- Anonymous 4. (2017) Telephone Interview of diplomat belonging to a South European Country, Oslo.
- Anonymous 5. (2017) Interview by email of PA-UfM parliamentarian belonging to a South European Country, Oslo.
- Anonymous 6. (2017) Skype interview of official tied to the UfM Secretariat, Oslo.
- Anonymous 7. (2017) Skype interview of official tied to the UfM Secretariat, Oslo.

Appendix 1: Interview guide

Interview guide: Union for the Mediterranean and increased levels of migrants and refugees

Step 1: Short introduction of myself and the research project.

My name is Øyvind Steensen. I am a student of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo, where I am currently conducting research for my master thesis.

The interview is conducted in relation to the master thesis. It aims at investigating the Union for the Mediterranean and how it has adapted to the increased levels of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean. I am moreover interested in how the member states relates to a potential adaptation. This will hopefully enable me to assess both how the UfM has adapted, and the members reasoning in advocating for that adaptation.

Also ask for permission to record the interview and give the respondent the option of remaining anonymous.

Step 2: Opening questions

- May I ask for your name?
- What is your position here at ____, and how long have you been here?

Step 3: Main questions

- I will start off with a general question. What are your impressions of the change in UfM policy since 2008?
- What would you say are the most important aspects for cooperating through the UfM for (the respondents country)?
- Migration and refugee influxes have been described as among the most serious challenges that the Mediterranean region faces today. What aspects with these influxes does the UfM assess as especially concerning?
 - Would you say that most UfM members, both in the north and south, share this view?
 - What role do the UfM have in addressing these challenges?
- With regards to the UfM projects,
 - Do you think they are a suitable tool for addressing the underlying causes of migration?
 - Has their importance changed with the increased levels of migration and refugees?
- Would you say that the relationship between the southern members and the northern members has been affected by the increase in migration?
- Looking at the UfM roadmap adopted in January. Do you think the UfM is likely to play a more active role in relation to migrants and refugees in the future? Why? How?
- What do you perceive as potential consequences of further increased levels of migration and refugees?

Step 4: Final remarks

- Do you have any questions for me, or is it anything you like to add?
- Do you know of some
- Thank you for taking your time to answer my questions.

Appendix 2: Project authorization by the NSD



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Vår dato: 19.01.2017

Vår ref: 51554 / 3 / ASF

Deres dato:

Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 12.12.2016. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

<i>51554</i>	<i>Migration and the Union for the Mediterranean</i>
<i>Behandlingsansvarlig</i>	<i>Universitetet i Oslo, ved institusjonens øverste leder</i>
<i>Daglig ansvarlig</i>	<i>Karin Dokken</i>
<i>Student</i>	<i>Øyvind Steensen</i>

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger er meldepliktig i henhold til personopplysningsloven § 31. Behandlingen tilfredsstiller kravene i personopplysningsloven.

Personvernombudets vurdering forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, <http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html>. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, <http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt>.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 23.05.2017, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Kjersti Haugstvedt

Amalie Statland Fantoft

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Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.