Lang Policy
DOI 10.1007/s10993-015-9357-z

ORIGINAL PAPER

National language policy theory: exploring Spolsky's model in the case of Iceland

Nathan John Albury

Received: 15 December 2012 / Accepted: 19 January 2015
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

REVISED PROOF

Abstract Language policies are born amidst the complex interplay of social, cultural, religious and political forces. With this in mind, Bernard Spolsky theorises that the language policy of any independent nation is driven, at its core, by four co-occurring conditions—national ideology, English in the globalisation process, a nation's attendant sociolinguistic situation, and the internationally growing interest in the linguistic rights of minorities. He calls for this theory to be tested (Spolsky in Language policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). This paper accepts the invitation by firstly considering the contributions and limitations of Spolsky's theory vis-à-vis other contemporary research approaches and then applies the theory to the case of Iceland. Iceland is a dynamic locus for this purpose, given its remarkable monodialectism, fervent linguistic purism and protectionism, and history of overwhelming homogeneity. The study finds that all Spolsky's factors have in some way driven Icelandic language policy, except in issues of linguistic minority rights. Instead, Icelandic language policy discourse reveals a self-reflexive interest in minority rights whereby Icelandic is discursively positioned as needing protection in the global language ecology. Accordingly, the paper examines how Spolsky's theory may be refined to account for non-rights-based approaches to national language policies.

Keywords Language policy theory · Spolsky · Linguistic rights · Relative minority · Linguistic protectionism

Introduction

Language policy research invites perspectives from across social sciences because a nation's language policy is born from the unique interplay of its political, cultural,

N. J. Albury (✉)
Center for Multilingualism in Society Across the Lifespan, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: n.j.albury@iln.uio.no

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

religious, educational and economic ambitions and realities (Spolsky and Shohamy 2000). An accurately nuanced understanding of any nation's language policy calls, therefore, for contextualised perspectives. However, in considering the genesis of language policy, Spolsky (2004) proposes that motivations behind the language policies of modern independent nation states can be categorised by four fundamental and co-existing factors: national ideology, the role of English as a global language, a nation's sociolinguistic situation, and an increasing interest in the rights of linguistic minorities. Spolsky (2004) himself proposes that 'this theoretical model needs to be tested against actual cases' (p. 133).

Iceland is a tempting case for this purpose, given its extraordinary linguistic history. Specifically, both ancient and modern language matters are pertinent to current language policy in this internationally small but vivacious language community. The Icelandic community itself has remained passionately engaged in the politics and planning of its language since Norwegian settlement between 870 and 930 (Árnason 2003), and ideologies of linguistic purism have been sustained. This has nuanced Iceland's social and political history, because the perceived purity of Icelandic as the proto-Scandinavian language—hand in hand with Iceland's medieval literature—has helped to shape modern Icelandic identities. Today, language policy discourse is still intrinsic to contemporary Iceland, but now it exists against a backdrop of expanding fractures in Iceland's linguistic homogeneity. Spolsky (2004) has previously referred to Iceland, but his discussions illustrated Iceland as a purist polity or a phenomenal example of what was perhaps a truly monolingual nation. Given Spolsky has tagged the language community as exceptional, Iceland has been intensely concerned with linguistic protectionism, and its sociolinguistic landscape has just begun to truly transition to linguistic diversity, Iceland is a challenging case for critically testing Spolsky's theory.

The theory may seem at odds with the current age in language policy scholarship that subscribes to the *language policy onion* with its focus on the many interacting agents, levels and processes of language policy (Ricento and Hornberger 1996). Indeed, Spolsky's theory does not claim to entertain the critical perspectives the onion model can facilitate but instead focuses on language policy at the nation-state level. This paper seeks to position Spolsky's theory in the broader language policy research field and consider its contributions and weaknesses within the case of Iceland.

Spolsky's theory

Spolsky (2009: 1) proposes that language policies at the national level are driven by four common and co-existing forces:

- national (or ethnic) ideology or claims of identity;
- the role of English as a global language;
- a nation's sociolinguistic situation; and
- an increasing interest in linguistic rights within the human and civil rights framework.

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

National ideology and identity refer to the infrastructure of beliefs and principles relevant to a collective psyche that may manifest in language policy. For illustration, Spolsky reflects on northern African nations where post-colonial Arabisation instituted Arabic as an official language on the primacy of the Qur'an in national and cultural identity (Spolsky 2004).

The role of English refers to what Spolsky (2004) calls the 'tidal wave of English that is moving into almost every sociolinguistic repertoire' (p. 220) throughout the global language ecology. As the language of global communication, English has come to index a cosmopolitan social and economic mobility. For example, as a language polity, the Netherlands emphatically prioritises English as a second language (L2) (Ytsma 2000: 228). However, the wave can also create tensions between linguistic internationalisation and local language interests (May 2014), meaning the tidal wave may also be resisted by way of interventions to protect the status or vitality of local languages. For example, discourse in Germany reveals a simmering worry about English and debates ensue about the marginalisation of German (Phillipson 2003: 80).

The sociolinguistic situation refers to 'the number and kinds of languages, the number and kinds of speakers of each, the communicative value of each language both inside and outside the community being studied' (Spolsky 2004: 219). This is not just concerned with the factual sociolinguistic setting, but also with subjective perceptions about the importance of specific languages. However, it is important in language policy research not to accept any sociolinguistic situation *prima facie* because sociolinguistic arrangements may not be 'inevitable or logical, but rather the result of political processes and ideologies of state formation' (Ricento 2006: 15). This is not to undo this component of Spolsky's theory but rather to highlight its interconnectedness with his three other components, as well as the salience of examining language ideologies in language policy, given perceived and real sociolinguistic situations may be manifestations of socio-political arrangements and ideologies.

The final factor, Spolsky (2004) claims, is the increasing global interest in 'linguistic pluralism and an acceptance of the need to recognize the rights of individuals and groups to continue to use their own languages' (p. 220). Spolsky (2005) especially recalls the international awareness of minority issues sparked by the American civil rights movement and twentieth century international human rights instruments that affirm and protect language minorities either explicitly or implicitly. Language is positioned as an element of human rights, urging nations to offer language rights to their minorities in some way, such as provisions for minority language-medium schooling (Spolsky 2004). This is indeed the case, for example, for speakers of Maori in New Zealand (May and Hill 2005) and French Canadians outside Quebec (May 2014). Spolsky's final component therefore sees nations as necessarily interested in developing and implementing permissive language rights for their minorities.

Spolsky's theory in contemporary language policy scholarship

Spolsky's four factors constitute a theory on what informs national language policy. While Spolsky (2004) does not label these essential forces, he claims that 'language

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

120 policy for any independent nation state will reveal the complex interplay of (these)
121 four interdependent but often conflicting factors' (p. 133). The forces may overlap
122 and be interconnected depending on local context and policy realisation, but are
123 nonetheless deemed identifiable as the core motivations.
124 However, in an era in sociolinguistic research that emphasises post-structuralist
125 and localised observations of language, a national language policy theory is not
126 without challenges. Indeed, the field has accepted that language policy is much
127 more than official policy alone because the *real* language policy situation of a
128 community is realised via the multitude of actors, contexts, processes, interpreta-
129 tions, negations and contestations of official policy directives. Accordingly, the
130 ethnography of language policy seeks to replace bureaucracy-oriented research of
131 language policy with bottom-up perspectives that examine community-level
132 engagements with language as a policy phenomenon (Johnson 2013) and illustrate
133 the real-life repercussions of policy. Through ethnography the field can engage
134 policy on the ground in order to 'offer a balance between policy power and
135 interpretive agency' and be 'committed to issues of social justice' (Johnson and
136 Ricento 2013: 15), rather than limiting studies to official discourses. A theory such
137 as Spolsky's does not seem equipped to offer that critical grass-roots perspective.
138 Postmodernism has also extended our focus to observing community-level
139 governance structures that inform how languages are managed (Pennycook 2006).
140 Indeed, Pennycook (2013) argues that communities' ideologies may be so
141 influential that they regulate language in society beyond official policy. This was
142 indeed the case in Zavala's (2014) research of official Quechua policy where policy
143 objectives are at odds with ideologies of Quechua acquisition. This echoes the
144 contributions to Menken and García (2010) edited book that examine the pertinent
145 role of educators as regulators of language beyond the sphere of governments.
146 Theorising on language policy also assumes a universal understanding of what
147 languages in fact are, and how they can de identified and delineated. Pennycook
148 (2002) presents concerns about the notion of *mother tongue,* and the sociolinguistic
149 attributes attached to it, as it informs policy. The superdiverse milieu of many
150 communities worldwide has instead drawn attention to the notion of *languaging*:
151 citizens of linguistically diverse communities may sooner 'employ whatever
152 linguistic features are at their disposal with the intention of achieving their
153 communicative aims' (Jørgensen 2008: 169) than adhere to traditional notions of
154 *mother tongue* that a universal language policy theory might rely on. Furthermore,
155 European conceptualisations of language and language vitality that tend to steer
156 policy are indeed just European. In the case of the native American Hopi
157 community, for example, the benevolent ambitions of linguists to teach the language
158 in the public sphere and create dictionaries in fact breached Hopi protocols because
159 traditional beliefs are that documenting and exposing the language to outsiders
160 would 'fix the sounds and meanings of the Hopi language in an alien, objectified
161 form' (Whiteley 2003: 717).
162 A postmodernist perspective would add that any theory that constitutes a grand
163 narrative should be rejected because it naively seeks to explain language in society
164 universally without regard to local policy contexts. This is reminiscent of
165 Schiffman's view that the real language policy of any given community comprises

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 Dispatch : 20-2-2015 Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 □ LE □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 ☑ CP ☑ DISK

overt *de jure* and covert *de facto* policies, both of which arise from a community's unique *linguistic culture*. Whereas overt policies are created and implemented by authorities, covert policies are the unwritten sociolinguistic patterns that in effect operate like policy. Overt and covert policies, therefore, cannot be theorised universally as they arise from a single community's 'ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, religious strictures, and all other cultural "baggage" that speakers bring to their dealings with language from their culture' (Schiffman 2006: 112). Shohamy (2006) offers similar discussion when she calls for an expanded view of language policy to give weight to the covert mechanisms and ideologies that guide language behaviour. As she argues, it may be the case that 'even the most declared multilingual policies do not always reflect the de facto and real (language policies), as these provide only lip service, declarations and intentions' (Shohamy 2006: 52).

With these challenges in mind, language policy research has commonly avoided grand theorising and has often become localised and domain-centred (Ricento 2006). This is Ricento's preference, because in his view 'there is no overarching theory of (language policy) and planning, in large part because of the complexity of issues which involve language in society' (2006: 10). However, Spolsky's attempt at identifying the four core motivations behind language policy does not claim to be an all-encompassing theory, as it is well-established that language policy is not just made by government authorities but also community groups, schools, and families. It also does not claim to provide the critical interpretive and agency perspectives that multi-layered approaches to language policy explore.

Spolsky's theorising, as already stated, concerns language policies of *independent nation*s as a topic of scholarship in itself. Indeed, I would argue that the growing interest in community-level perspectives of language policy does not erase the need to understand what drives governments to create the language policies they do. Instead, it only strengthens this need, as this can only support and better contextualise any grassroots research that is positioned vis-à-vis national language policy frameworks in order to explore the repercussions of policy. Understanding what drives governments to create certain policies can only help to understand, for example, the origin of the hegemonies and of state-sanctioned language ideologies that communities may ultimately experience and respond to.

Research methodology and theoretical foundation

This study took each of Spolsky's four factors and analysed their relevance to current Icelandic language policy so as to arrive at a conclusion as to whether, and if so, how, these factors have motivated Iceland's language policy. A qualitative approach was taken by reviewing primary and secondary literature about the language and language policy situation in Iceland, including books, book chapters, journal articles, theses and unpublished literature. Particular attention was given to discussions by prominent scholars of Icelandic language policy and Icelandic sociolinguistics generally, including Árnason (2003), Arnbjörnsdóttir (2007, 2010, 2011), Hálfdanarson (2003, 2005), Hilmarsson-Dunn (2003, 2006, 2009, 2010),

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

209 Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson (2009), Kristinsson (2012), Kvaran (2003, 2004,
210 2010), Rögnvaldsson (2008) and Svavarsdóttir (2008), and especially Hilmarsson-
211 Dunn and Kristinsson (2010) with their comprehensive monographs of language in
212 Iceland. The research also drew on primary sources that provided direct insights to,
213 and evidence of Iceland's language policy, including government and government-
214 funded websites (e.g., Alþingi,[1] the Ministry of Science, Education and Culture, the
215 Ministry of the Interior, and the Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies),
216 and news media with stories, editorials and opinions relevant to language policy
217 discourse. Although the research was limited to sources available in English,
218 scholarship in Icelandic sociolinguistics and Icelandic language policy information
219 is commonly available in English.
220 Given the research evaluated the relevance of Spolsky's theory regarding the
221 factors that motivate language policy, it was only fair to his scholarship that the
222 study also applied his conceptualisation of what language policy actually comprises.
223 Presumably, it is with this in mind that Spolsky theorised about the determinants of
224 language policy. He offers a tripartite conceptualisation that has been frequently
225 applied in language policy research, including in respect to Iceland (Hilmarsson-
226 Dunn and Kristinsson 2010; Kristinsson 2012). This frames language policy as
227 comprising three distinct components (Spolsky 2007):

228 • *Language management*, which concerns *how authorities intervene* to regulate
229 language with 'explicit and observable efforts by someone or some group that
230 has or claims to have authority over the participants in the domain to modify
231 their practices and beliefs' (Spolsky 2007: 4). For national language policy, the
232 interest is likely confined to government instruments, such as legislation, policy
233 and official programmes.
234 • *Language beliefs* or ideology, which concern what a community *believes should*
235 *happen* with language. Language ideology is the manifestation of social,
236 political and cultural principles into language beliefs (Woolard and Schieffelin
237 1994: 56) because 'there is a complex but non-arbitrary relationship between
238 beliefs about language and beliefs about other things' (Cameron 2006: 151).
239 • *Language practices,* which concern how language is *actually used* in a language
240 environment. The interest here is in grassroots societal norms that are 'regular
241 and predictable' (Spolsky 2007: 3). This excludes language choices that are not
242 habitual.
243
244 This tripartite language policy definition can accommodate the multitude of
245 disciplinary perspectives that language policy research demands. It invites, for
246 example, postmodernists to examine how national identity and sociolinguistic
247 situations manifest in, and become contested through, language ideologies and
248 practices. It may also accommodate the work of critical theorists examining the
249 political, ideological and practical manifestations of inter-language power struggles
250 and hegemony. Against Spolsky's national language policy theory, the tripartite
251 definition is a framework for considering societal-level governance, beliefs and

1FL01 [1] The Alþingi is the Icelandic parliament and was founded in 930 AD (Alþingi n.d.).

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 Dispatch : 20-2-2015 Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 □ LE □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 ☑ CP ☑ DISK

252 practice. Having positioned and discussed Spolsky's national language policy
253 theory and his definition of what language policy comprises, the paper now presents
254 the findings of a systematic and critical analysis of each determinant in the Icelandic
255 context.

256 The impact of national ideology

257 *Icelandic-ness* traditionally draws on two interrelated sources: Iceland's Golden
258 Age literature in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Helgason 2007) and
259 nationalism against Denmark's colonial rule legitimised by Iceland's literary
260 tradition and archaic language (Hálfdanarson 2003). Iceland's literary Golden Age
261 narrated Scandinavian mythology and recalled Iceland's settlement and ancient
262 kings (Sapir and Zuckermann 2008), with prominent works including the Book of
263 Settlements, the Saga of Icelanders, Sagas of Kings, manuscripts of Skaldic poetry,
264 and Snorri's renowned *Edda* poetry (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). This
265 Golden Age can be fairly tagged as Iceland's *Great Tradition* from Fishman's
266 (1971) perspective because the literature became 'the basis for their national glory'
267 (Sæmundsson 1835 cited in Hálfdanarson 2005: 57), and integral to Icelandic
268 cultural life. Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson (2010) explain that the literature also
269 captured wider Scandinavian attention: the monarchy and intellectuals of Den-
270 mark's reign of Iceland from 1262 revered the literature and decorated Icelandic as
271 the proto-Scandinavian language. The literature even remains an important source
272 of popular culture in Iceland today (Kristinsson 2000 cited in Holmarsdottir 2001).
273 Icelandic nationalism was for the most part founded by the nationalist *Fjölnir*
274 periodicals between 1835 and 1847 (Ottosson 2002). An ideology to preserve the
275 Golden Age language had endured, but Danish had become the language of prestige
276 under Denmark's rule and the threat of Danish contaminating the ancient language
277 was potent. *Fjölnir* radically sought to remove all Danish influences from Icelandic
278 (Friðriksson 2009). Sigurðsson harnessed this groundwork to assert that Danish rule
279 in Iceland was unequivocally unnatural, claiming that languages are markers of
280 nationhood and Iceland's language was clearly unlike Denmark's (Friðriksson
281 2009). This linked Iceland's linguistic interests in no uncertain terms to nationalism.
282 However, nationalism did not simply mean speaking a language other than Danish.
283 Icelandic needed to be 'as close to its medieval form as possible' (Hálfdanarson
284 2005).
285 The importance of language in *Icelandic-ness* understandably led to a purist
286 language ideology to preserve an unbroken link to the Golden Age (Friðriksson
287 2009). In fact, *Icelandic-ness* is considered so contingent on the pure form of
288 Icelandic that the language is referred to as the *egg of life* (Kristmannsson 2004)
289 because 'if the language changes, then the national compact will automatically
290 dissolve' (Hálfdanarson 2005: 56). There are, however, speculations that the link
291 between national ideology and language ideology may be weakening. Younger
292 Icelanders, who generally support Iceland's economic and political international-
293 isation with Europe, are often perceived as less likely to attribute their *Icelandic-*
294 *ness* to language and heritage (Friðriksson 2009).

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

295 Thus, traditional Icelandic national ideology is clearly echoed in today's
296 protectionist language interventions to preserve and promote Icelandic as the
297 archaic Scandinavian language. The Árni Magnússon Institute of Icelandic Studies
298 (AMIIS) increases 'awareness of the Icelandic language and its development and
299 preservation in spoken and written form, and providing advice and instruction on an
300 academic basis regarding linguistic matters' [Ministry of Education, Science and
301 Culture (MESC) 2009: 20]. Importantly, preservation is about 'maintaining
302 linguistic continuity from one generation to another with the aim of preserving
303 the link between modern language and the earliest Icelandic literature' (Friðriksson
304 2009: 102) The AMIIS has often reinstated archaic morphological inflections where
305 change occurred and publishes standards in handbooks (Árnason 2003).[2] An
306 enthusiasm for the Golden Age also seemingly underscores investments to promote
307 Icelandic abroad. Iceland operates the free web-based *Icelandic Online* course in
308 Icelandic language (AMIIS n.d.) and an enhanced tutor-assisted *Icelandic Online*
309 *Plus* version (Icelandic Online 2012). The rationale presumably stems from the
310 value of the Golden Age, rather than demand for Icelandic as a foreign language
311 (FL) (MESC 2001).

312 It is less clear to what extent the ideology to foster an unbroken link to Old Norse
313 has influenced actual language practice. Changes in languages are natural (Fromkin
314 et al. 2009), and Iceland is no exception. Icelandic underwent drastic phonetic and
315 phonological changes between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries (Hilmars-
316 son-Dunn 2003), making modern Icelandic substantially different in sound to Old
317 Norse (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). However, Svavarsdóttir (2008)
318 explains that linguistic purism focussed primarily on the written language, not
319 spoken Icelandic. The few changes that have occurred are morphological
320 (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2003) and mostly associated with the case system (Svavarsdóttir
321 2008).[3] The most discussed change is the so-called *dative sickness*: a tendency for
322 accusative case objects to be used in the dative (Smith 1994: 675), but Friðriksson's
323 (2009) study of broader *case sicknesses* amongst Icelandic children, found that only
324 13.13 % of informants showed any signs of *case sickness*. Ultimately, the structure
325 of Old Norse has persisted (Kvaran 2003) and Icelanders easily rely on modern
326 Icelandic to read Golden Age literature (Kvaran 2004).

327 This poses the question whether the relative stability of Icelandic is indeed
328 attributable to the workings of national ideology. Karlsson (2004) points to the
329 surprising frequency of travel across the island throughout Icelandic history,
330 especially for Alþingi meetings, family estates, intermarriages, to the few schools
331 that existed, and for seasonal work. This maintained the form of Icelandic between
332 communities. Hilmarsson-Dunn (2003) reflects on Milroy's (1992) view that tight
333 social networks, as Iceland was, favour linguistic conservatism. However, Iceland's
334 literary culture and ongoing engagement with the Golden Age throughout the

2FL01 [2] For example, inflections on *ia*-stem nouns, such as *læknir* (doctor), had changed from Old Norse, but
2FL02 language management reinstated the archaic forms. For example, the archaic *lækn-ar* (plural nominative)
2FL03 replaced *lækn-irar*, and the archaic *lækn-is* (single genitive) replaced *lækn-irs* (Árnason 2003).

3FL01 [3] Icelandic has retained the four original cases of Old Norse: the nominative, accusative, dative and
3FL02 genitive, such as what existed in Old English, currently exists in German, but has been lost from Danish,
3FL03 Swedish and Norwegian (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2003: 11).

REVISED PROOF

335 centuries also helped to avoid language change (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2003), meaning
336 language stability is most likely attributable to both Milroy's theory and Iceland's
337 reverence for its *Great Tradition*. It is unclear, however, how much relative weight
338 these factors held. Thus, Milroy's theory became less applicable by the mid-
339 nineteenth century when societal networks began to transition but language stability
340 continued. At that time, Icelandic nationalism, as a new aspect of national ideology,
341 became a driving influence (Friðriksson 2009) because corpus planning, such as
342 *Fjölnir's*, described purist language practices as anti-Danish and markers of
343 *Icelandic-ness*.

344 The impact of English as a global language

345 English is no doubt a motivating force in Icelandic language policy. Iceland's
346 response to English is dichotomised by the tension that May (2014) describes
347 between the cosmopolitan and the local: Icelanders pursue the perceived global
348 benefits of English language proficiency, but seek to counter its influence through
349 protectionist policy in the interests of preserving their local language. Language
350 acquisition planning has increasingly reflected a pragmatic interest in foreign
351 language skills for international success (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010)
352 and interests in English began shifting in the 1940s (Rasmussen 2002) when English
353 became Europe's primary lingua franca (Cogo and Jenkins 2010). The curriculum
354 now prescribes English as the first foreign language (MESC 2012) and by the end of
355 formal schooling, students anticipate an advanced proficiency up to the C1 level on
356 the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFRL) (Jeeves
357 2012). English also enjoys hearty ideological support in schools: MESC research of
358 23 teachers and 788 students found that learners and educators value English highly
359 (Lefever 2006) and Jeeves' (2010) survey of 16 students across Iceland even found
360 that English competence is linked to a youthful Icelandic sense of self in the
361 international arena. It is broadly agreed that Icelanders are, in the main, highly
362 proficient users of English, not in the least, for example, because Icelanders
363 commonly undertake English-medium tertiary education (Arnbjörnsdóttir 2010).
364 The assumption that English is Iceland's preferred language in the international
365 arena is indeed applied in practice (Kvaran 2010). This reflects specifically in the
366 much-discussed trend of English as a global language (see Phillipson and Skutnabb-
367 Kangas 1996) and as Europe's lingua franca (Cogo and Jenkins 2010; Cramer 2007;
368 Kachru 1985). The dominance of English is, to a limited degree, challenged in
369 formal intra-Scandinavian relations. The Nordic Language Declaration aims for
370 Scandinavian dialogue in Scandinavian languages parallel to, but not replaced by,
371 English (NCM 2006). On the basis of the assumed mutual-intelligibility of Danish,
372 Norwegian and Swedish, Icelanders traditionally used Danish in intra-Scandinavian
373 fora (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). However, actual practice is more
374 complicated: the assumed mutual-intelligibility is questioned by L2 speakers, and
375 Scandinavian cooperation has also expanded to include the Baltic states (Hilmars-
376 son-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). Consequently, Scandinavian dialogue often resorts
377 to English (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2006).

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

378 Another primary, but related, focus of Icelandic language policy is the
379 management of anglicisms (Sapir and Zuckermann 2008). The AMIIS, with the
380 help of around 50 voluntary committees (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2009),
381 replaces anglicisms as they arise with native Icelandic neologisms (Holmarsdottir
382 2001; Kvaran 2004). The pervasive ideology that preserving Icelandic also amounts
383 to avoiding loanwords means corpus planning is indeed 'widely supported, both
384 officially and among the general public' (Svavarsdóttir 2008: 455). Graedler (2004)
385 quantified these sentiments when she found that of all Scandinavians, Icelanders are
386 the most exposed to English but also the most sceptical of it, with 63 % agreeing
387 neologisms are necessary. Icelandic's structural complexities help to filter out
388 unacceptable anglicisms because loanwords are only feasible if they can comply
389 with Icelandic phonology and morphology (Kvaran 2004). It is therefore often
390 easier to create neologisms (Árnason 1999 cited in Friðriksson 2009). Also,
391 Icelanders themselves seem generally loyal to corpus planning efforts, as it appears
392 that the frequency of using a given loanword decreases after a neologism is
393 promulgated, such as *tölva* (computer) which may have virtually replaced its
394 preceding anglicism (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2009).

395 The impact of the sociolinguistic situation

396 Iceland's contemporary sociolinguistic situation also informs the nation's language
397 policy in so far that the government acknowledges linguistic diversity, but heralds
398 the primacy of Icelandic and anticipates the linguistic assimilation of migrants.
399 Immigration particularly accelerated in 1996 (Statistics Iceland 2009), and whereas
400 in 1995 Iceland accepted 938 new migrants, 9,318 arrived in 2007 (Statistics Iceland
401 2012). Iceland now hosts around 25,000 immigrants, over 2,500 s-generation
402 immigrants, and almost 14,000 Icelanders with a foreign-born parent. The largest
403 groups are the Polish (9,363) and Lithuanian (1,589) communities (Statistics Iceland
404 2013). The arrival of Polish economic migrants is well-documented (see e.g.
405 Tworek 2010), and both Poland's and Lithuania's recent accession to the European
406 Economic Area (EEA) facilitates easier access to Iceland's labour market (EFTA
407 2012).
408 English is also flooding domestic language domains to the extent that it is often
409 touted as Iceland's L2 (Arnbjörnsdóttir 2007). Businesses often favour bilingual
410 cultures (Jónsdóttir 2011) especially because, as a small economy, corporate
411 expansions are often international (Foreign Affairs 2008). Jónsdóttir's (2011) cross-
412 sector research found that 74.7 % of working Icelanders use English daily,
413 especially for reading documents and writing emails. Like elsewhere in Scandinavia
414 and beyond, English is also bonded to tertiary education and academia (Holmars-
415 dottir 2001). Professors of Icelandic-medium courses are even said to entertain
416 requests to shift to English (Robert 2011) and the shift is exacerbated by Icelanders
417 generally being willing and able to pursue English-medium studies (Arnbjörnsdóttir
418 2010). Media and popular culture, other than Golden Age literature, are
419 predominantly in English and enjoy popularity (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2010). The
420 pervasiveness of English in IT, including the use of English-language programming

REVISED PROOF

despite some investments by the government in Icelandic software, prompts speculation that Icelandic will lose this domain entirely (Hilmarsson-Dunn 2006; Rögnvaldsson 2008). It is also possible that English competes with Icelandic as a lingua franca with immigrants, as Einarsdóttir (2011) found that out of eleven migrants, only four claimed to speak Icelandic, and a common impediment is that Icelanders willingly switch to English with immigrants. Þórarinsdóttir (2011 cited in Berman et al. 2011) identified that 40 % of Poles view their residence in Iceland as temporary, meaning a motivation to acquire Icelandic may be minimal if migrants can rely on English.

Indeed, the recent advent of linguistic diversity means status planning only recently seemed relevant (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2009; Kristinsson 2012). Icelandic was eventually legislated as the official language in 2011 (Act on the Status of the Icelandic Language and Icelandic Sign Language no. 61/2011, Article 1), seemingly in response to perceived threats to its status and to language tradition, as Kristinsson (2012) discusses. This legislation also confirmed the statutory role of the Icelandic Language Committee to advise and report on the status of Icelandic (Article 6). The Act built on the *Íslenska Til Alls* (Icelandic for Everything) policy of 2009 that aims to increase use of Icelandic in public domains (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). Education legislation (The Compulsory School Act no. 91/2008, Article 16 and The Upper Secondary School Act no. 92/2008, Article 35) confirms Icelandic as the medium of instruction in schools (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). Immigration and citizenship laws recognise linguistic diversity only by anticipating linguistic assimilation whereby permanent residence applicants must demonstrate completion of Icelandic language studies (Regulation on Foreigners no. 53/2003, Article 50). Citizenship applicants must pass an Icelandic language examination (Regulations on Icelandic Language Tests for Persons Applying for Icelandic citizenship no. 1129/2008, Article 1) at the A2 level on the CEFRL [European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 2012]. The impact of these immigration and citizenship laws is probably limited because the largest migrant groups are from within the EEA and therefore generally have liberal access to residence and the Icelandic labour market without applying for residence or citizenship (Útlendingastofnun, n.d.). Nonetheless, these hegemonic laws intimate that Icelandic language management is motivated by the mosaic sociolinguistic reality.

How Iceland's new multilingual reality manifests in language ideology has undergone little investigation (Friðriksson 2009), but indications are that ideology is unlikely to celebrate linguistic diversity. Further research might reveal, for example, that Iceland presents with a predominantly monoglot ideology (Silverstein 1996), whereby the speech community is characterised by linguistic diversity but the community will 'pledge allegiance to a single norm' (Blommaert 2008: 11). Despite migrant languages and the role of English, language management described so far indeed ascribes allegiance to Icelandic. If such interventions honestly mirror public beliefs, then a monoglot ideology likely exists. Alternatively, ideology may simply exclude linguistic diversity from participating in a definition of contemporary *Icelandic-ness*, thereby excluding non-speakers from the perceived Icelandic linguistic community. For example, public discourse shows that migrant

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

communities are marginalised and interactions with foreigners are often minimal, or sometimes even hostile, a matter which worries the ECRI (2011). This creates a chasm between Icelanders and *others*. Indeed, the term *Icelander* is reserved for 'those who speak Icelandic and share Iceland's history and culture' (Bragason 2001).

The impact of an internationally growing interest in linguistic minority rights

It would so far seem doubtful that linguistic minority rights have informed Iceland's language policy. The most notable achievement for language rights was the recognition of Icelandic Sign Language (ISL) in 2011 (Act on the Status of the Icelandic Language and Icelandic Sign Language no. 61/2011, Article 13) which affords Icelandic Sign Language (ISL) equal status with Icelandic. Affording ISL status was, however, ideologically innocuous because ISL does not threaten traditional Icelandic purism and homogeneity and instead attends to other human rights concerns.

Instead, Iceland's legal stance on minority languages is hegemonic. The 2011 legislation is silent on languages other than Icelandic and ISL, but constructs a *right* for non-Icelanders to acquire Icelandic (Act on the Status of the Icelandic Language and Icelandic Sign Language no. 61/2011, Article 2). However, even implementation of this can attract the attention of critical theorists: the nature of course materials, tuition costs, availability of classes, and lack of time amongst working migrants create barriers to accessing the right (MESC 2009 cited in Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010). Icelandic L2 classes also allegedly ignore the needs of illiterate/semi-literate learners, especially high-needs Asian learners. Indirect discrimination occurs in the job market where an immigrant does not command 'perfect' Icelandic, and social marginalisation often means immigrants have minimal opportunity to practise speaking Icelandic (Icelandic Human Rights Centre 2011). The language legislation of 2011 codified a right for non-Icelanders to access interpreters in courts of law (Act on the Status of the Icelandic Language and Icelandic Sign Language no. 61/2011, Article 8), but fell short of providing interpreters for mainstream social services. However, a right to a free interpreter does feature in health care, asylum, and deportation legislation (Act on the Rights of Patients no. 74/1997, Article 5 and Regulation on Foreigners no. 53/2003, Articles 57, 88, 89; MSA 2007). In practice, the accessibility of multilingual health care information is criticised (The Icelandic Cancer Society 2005) and medical professionals often use English with immigrants rather than engaging an interpreter (Hilmarsson-Dunn and Kristinsson 2010).

Instead, I argue that the current policy framework actually risks initiating language shift away from migrant languages. Minority language maintenance is constrained by legislation that stipulates Icelandic as the only acceptable medium of instruction in compulsory education. Schools are instead tasked to develop and deliver *reception plans* that ensure immigrant children learn Icelandic (The Compulsory School Act no. 91/2008, Article 16). Where possible, a minority language may be studied as a foreign language instead of a Nordic language (MSA 2007), however Statistics Iceland (2012) has not reported any students recently studying Polish or Lithuanian (the largest minorities). Secondly, as May (2006) would predict, the generally hegemonic bias of the policy framework, and the

REVISED PROOF

510 ongoing marginalisation of migrants, creates pressure to abandon minority
511 languages, especially in formal domains. Further research could investigate
512 whether, and how, immigrants who settle in Iceland experience language shift in
513 the long-term.

514 Spolsky's notion that governments are necessarily interested in attending to and
515 affording positive language rights is, therefore, problematic. It seems, at least in the
516 case of Iceland, that it turns a blind-eye to linguistic hegemony and assumes
517 democratic and inclusive policy making. Indeed, nations with hegemonic cultural
518 political agendas, such as for the purposes of unity, may be less likely to afford
519 linguistic rights to minorities. Spolsky (2004) himself has referred to Oman, Saudi
520 Arabia, Portugal and Turkey as examples of 'monolingual countries with
521 marginalised minorities' (p. 139–142) which seemingly fall into a similar camp
522 as Iceland. Réaume and Pinto's (2012) discussions are especially useful. To their
523 theorising, non-rights-based approaches to managing language diversity especially
524 emerge where diversity is seen as a threat rather than an opportunity (p. 39). In such
525 cases, governments may engage the language rights question but decide to deny
526 language rights on the basis of local socio-political interests than to grant them, and
527 this is indeed evident in Iceland. Therefore, the question under Spolsky's framework
528 of how language rights inform national language policies has assumed a positive
529 interest in linguistic rights which is not a universally default position.

530 However, in the case of Iceland an interest in linguistic rights nonetheless informs
531 language policy, but in a way that is self-reflexive and not as Spolsky envisaged.
532 Rather than attending to domestic minorities, Icelandic policy and discourse
533 frequently position the Icelandic language itself as an international relative minority
534 requiring protection. This paper has already described a recurring theme of
535 encroaching language majorities and other perceived threats motivating Icelandic
536 language management. However, Icelandic was most illustratively framed as a
537 minority when the government mounted a battle against Microsoft which had refused
538 to develop Icelandic-language software. Iceland viewed this as a disastrous imposition
539 of supranational language policy on a minority (Holmarsdottir 2001). Academic
540 literature also tends to frame Icelandic as minoritised: for example, Holmarsdottir
541 (2001) groups Iceland with minorities that 'suffer stigmatisation as a result of the
542 removal of the language from areas of social, economic and political power' (p. 391),
543 and Hilmarsson-Dunn (2006) proposes that 'Icelandic requires continued strong
544 support from the state and a positive attitude from its citizens to prevent it succumbing
545 to market pressures' (p. 309). This, however, is usefully contrasted with Svavarsdót-
546 tir's (2008) pragmatic argument that Icelandic, as the overwhelmingly predominant
547 language of Icelanders with a standardised form and strong literary tradition, is
548 undeniably a majority language. She argues that 'there is no obvious justification for
549 this feeling of an external threat to the language in present times' (p. 455).

550 Conclusion

551 This paper has argued that, at present, only three of Spolsky's four forces drive
552 language policy in Iceland in the way Spolsky envisaged: national ideology, English

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 Dispatch : 20-2-2015 Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 □ LE □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 ☑ CP ☑ DISK

553 as a global language, and the sociolinguistic situation. National ideology, steeped in
554 a reverence for Iceland's Golden Age of literature and linguistically-inspired
555 nationalism, fostered policy and practices of linguistic purism that have sheltered
556 Icelandic from language change. Indeed, Icelandic today is by and large the
557 language of Iceland's ancient forefathers. The rise of English as a global language
558 has created both enthusiasm for language acquisition as well as protectionist
559 language planning measures to counter its influence and safeguard Icelandic.
560 Immigration and the emerging linguistic mosaic have engaged traditional Icelandic
561 apprehensions about linguistic diversity and sparked hegemonic reactions that
562 silence minority languages and confirm the primacy of Icelandic. Accordingly, an
563 interest in the rights of linguistic minorities to develop and use their languages has
564 not yet informed Iceland's current language policy. The hegemony of official policy
565 and absence of minority language rights even risks initiating language shift within
566 immigrant communities. The only interest in linguistic rights seems self-reflexive in
567 that policy and discourse attend to the vulnerability of Icelandic as an international
568 minority struggling in the global language ecology.
569 It therefore seems that Spolsky's theory does not account for non-rights based
570 approaches to national language policy such as Iceland's. Whereas Spolsky
571 envisaged increasingly sympathetic responses to minority groups, the Icelandic
572 situation sooner sees domestic linguistic diversity as a threat. However, rather than
573 removing *an interest in linguistics rights* as the fourth component of Spolsky's
574 theory, I suggest its coverage be expanded: instead of this component seeing nations
575 as necessarily adopting positive stances on minority rights, it could be seen as a
576 political domain which nations are increasingly required to *engage* in some way,
577 whether the results are permissive, silent towards, or restrictive for the minorities
578 concerned. Although Iceland has not advanced linguistic rights for its minorities as
579 Spolsky envisaged, it has nonetheless engaged that question: it chose to advance
580 rights for itself on the international stage, but not for its own sizeable Polish and
581 Lithuanian communities. As such, seeing this final factor as an area of engagement
582 means it can account for various political responses to the notion of linguistic rights,
583 or even apply this interest self-reflexively as Iceland has.
584 The activity of applying Spolsky's theory has also shown it is not positioned to
585 trace the practical journeys and experiences of official language policy through its
586 many layers, agents and process from the bureaucracy down to the individual. Even
587 when using Spolsky's own tripartite language policy definition to include language
588 beliefs and language practices as policy, the theory's focus at the national level
589 means it misses the locally contextualised community-level contestations, appro-
590 priations and negotiations that impact on the actual realisation of policy. However, I
591 hasten to add that while postmodernist, ethnographic and multi-layered approaches
592 to language policy that can conduct such research are important, it is also still very
593 valuable to examine how and why governments arrive at particular language policy
594 solutions. Indeed, this is the genesis of change that can ultimately background and
595 even necessitate community-level research vis-à-vis national policy directives.
596 Rather than seeing Spolsky's theory as too focussed on the macro at the expense of
597 the micro, I see his theory as only better equipping scholarship to contextualise any
598 grassroots language policy situation or discourse that is positioned against or

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993	Dispatch : 20-2-2015	Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357	□ LE	□ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537	☑ CP	☑ DISK

599 informed by state policy. The case of Iceland is proof: the theory has especially
600 helped decipher how and why Icelandic society and its government, armed with
601 national ideology and centuries of linguistic apprehensions arrived at their
602 contemporary state language policies. For this reason, I also suggest that Spolsky's
603 national language policy theory may be more successfully applied to explain
604 national-level *language management,* to the exclusion of *language beliefs* and
605 *language practices* which otherwise constitute his full conceptualisation of
606 language policy but manifest differently in the many layers of the *language policy*
607 *onion*. Ultimately, for the purpose of Iceland as a test case, it is now the task of other
608 researchers from other theoretical traditions to examine the lived experiences of
609 Iceland's official language policies.

610 **Acknowledgments** This work was partly supported by the Research Council of Norway through its
611 Centres of Excellence funding scheme, Project Number 223265.

613 References

614 Affairs, F. (2008). Icelandic business is a global business. *Foreign Affairs, 87*(4), 13.
615 Alþingi. (n.d.). Establishment of the Alþingi. http://www.Alþingi.is/kynningarefni/index_en.html.
616 Accessed 11 Nov 2012.
617 Árnason, K. (2003). Icelandic. In A. Deumert & W. Vandenbusche (Eds.), *Germanic standardizations*
618 (pp. 245–280). Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
619 Arnbjörnsdóttir, B. (2007). English in Iceland: Second language, foreign language, or neither? In B.
620 Arnbjörnsdóttir & H. Ingvarsdóttir (Eds.), *Teaching and learning English in Iceland* (pp. 51–78).
621 Reykjavík: Haskolautgafan.
622 Arnbjörnsdóttir, B. (2010). Coping with English at University: Students beliefs. http://netla.hi.is/
623 menntakvika2010/008.pdf. Accessed 9 Sept 2012.
624 Arnbjörnsdóttir, B. (2011). Exposure to English in Iceland: A quantitative and qualitative study. http://
625 netla.hi.is/menntakvika2011/004.pdf. Accessed 9 Sept 2012.
626 Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies (AMIIS). (n.d.). Courses in Icelandic. http://www.
627 arnastofnun.is/page/a_inter_courses_in_icelandic. Accessed 9 Sept 2012.
628 Berman, R., Lefever, S. & Woźniczka, A.K. (2011). Attitudes towards languages and cultures of young
629 polish adolescents in Iceland. http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/12394/30759/1/robert.pdf. Acces-
630 sed 10 Aug 2012.
631 Blommaert, J. (2008). Language, asylum, and the national order. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/groups/
632 ldc/publications/workingpapers/50.pdf. Accessed 26 July 2012.
633 Bragason, U. (2001). Attitudes to the Icelandic language. http://arnastofnun.is/page/attitudes_ub.
634 Accessed 1 July 2012.
635 Cameron, D. (2006). Ideology and language. *Journal of Political Ideologies, 11*(2), 141–152.
636 Cogo, A., & Jenkins, J. (2010). English as a Lingua Franca in Europe. *European Journal of Language*
637 *Policy, 2*(2), 271–294.
638 Cramer, J. (2007). English in the expanding European Union. Revisiting berns' evaluation of "the
639 twelve". http://ling.uta.edu. Accessed 9 July 2012.
640 EFTA. (2012). EEA agreement. http://www.efta.int/eea/eeaagreement.aspx. Accessed 15 July 2012.
641 Einarsdóttir, K.A. (2011). Young unemployed migrants in Iceland: Opportunities on the labour market
642 and situations after the economic collapse with regard to work, social and financial aspects. http://
643 skemman.is/stream/get/1946/7978/20802/1/MA_ritgerd_lokaeintak_til_prentunar_og_i_skemmu.
644 pdf. Accessed 11 Aug 2012.
645 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). (2011). ECRI report on Iceland. http://
646 www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-bycountry/iceland/ISL-CbC-IV-2012-001-ENG.pdf.
647 Accessed 21 Sept 2012.

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993 | Dispatch : 20-2-2015 | Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357 | □ LE | □ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537 | ☑ CP | ☑ DISK

648 Fishman, J. (1971). National languages and languages of wider communication in the developing nations.
649 In W. H. Whiteley (Ed.), *Language use and social change. Problems of multilingualism with special*
650 *reference to Eastern Africa* (pp. 27–56). London: Oxford University Press.
651 Friðriksson, F. (2009). *Language change vs. stability in conservative language communities: A case study*
652 *of Icelandic*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag.
653 Fromkin, V., Rodman, R., Hyams, N., Collins, P., Amberber, M., & Harvey, M. (2009). *An introduction*
654 *to language*. Australia: Cengage Learning.
655 Graedler, A. (2004). Modern Loanwords in the Nordic Countries. Presentation of a project. *Nordic*
656 *Journal of English Studies, 3*(2), 5–21.
657 Hálfdanarson, G. (2003). Language, ethnicity and nationalism: The case of Iceland. In G. Hálfdanarson
658 (Ed.), *Racial discrimination and ethnicity in European history* (pp. 193–203). Pisa: Edizioni Plus.
659 Hálfdanarson, G. (2005). From linguistic patriotism to cultural nationalism: Language and identity in
660 Iceland. In A. K. Isaacs (Ed.), *Languages and identities in historical perspective* (pp. 55–67). Pisa:
661 Edizioni Plus.
662 Helgason, J. K. (2007). The Mystery of Vínarterta. In search of an Icelandic ethnic identity.
663 *Scandinavian-Canadian Studies, 17*, 36–52.
664 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A. (2003). Icelandic: Linguistic maintenance or change? The role of English. Centre
665 for Language in Education: Occasional Paper no 66. University of Southampton.
666 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A. (2006). Protectionist language policies in the face of the forces of English: The case
667 of Iceland. *Language Policy, 5*, 293–312.
668 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A. (2009). The impact of English on language education policy in Iceland. *European*
669 *Journal of Language Policy, 1*(1), 39–59.
670 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A. (2010). the impact of global English on language policy for the media: The case of
671 Iceland. In M. Georgieva & A. James (Eds.), *Globalization in English studies* (pp. 2–22).
672 Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
673 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A., & Kristinsson, A. (2009). Iceland's language technology: Policy versus practice.
674 *Current Issues in Language Planning, 10*(4), 361–376.
675 Hilmarsson-Dunn, A., & Kristinsson, A. (2010). The language situation in Iceland. *Current Issues in*
676 *Language Planning, 11*(3), 207–276.
677 Holmarsdottir, H. (2001). Icelandic: A lesser-used language in the global community. *International*
678 *Review of Education, 47*(3–4), 379–394.
679 Icelandic Human Rights Centre (IHRC). (2011). Submission to the universal periodic review of Iceland:
680 12th UPR Session October 2011. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session12/IS/JS1-
681 JointSubmission1-eng.pdf. Accessed 18 Sept 2012.
682 Icelandic Online (2012). Icelandic online PLUS. http://icelandiconline.is/info/plus.php. Accessed 18 July
683 2012.
684 Jeeves, A. (2010). English at secondary school: Perceptions of relevance. *Málfríður, 27*(2), 4–9.
685 Jeeves, A. (2012). Learning to write correct English was the most useful thing: Young Icelanders'
686 perceptions of writing in English. Paper presented at the Conference of the Association of Teachers
687 of English in Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland.
688 Johnson, D. (2013). *Language policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
689 Johnson, D., & Ricento, T. (2013). Conceptual and theoretical perspectives in language planning and
690 policy: Situating the ethnography of language policy. *International Journal of the Sociology of*
691 *Language, 219*, 7–21.
692 Jónsdóttir, H. (2011). To what extent do native and non-native speakers believe that their english
693 proficiency meets their daily communication needs within the business environment? *Málfríður,*
694 *27*(2), 20–23.
695 Jørgensen, J. N. (2008). Polylingual languaging around and among children and adolescents.
696 *International Journal of Multilingualism, 5*(3), 161–176.
697 Kachru, B. (1985). Standards, codification and sociolinguistic realism: The English language in the outer
698 circle. In R. Quirk & H. G. Widdowson (Eds.), *English in the world: Teaching and learning the*
699 *language and literature* (pp. 11–30). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
700 Karlsson, S. (2004). *The Icelandic language*. Exeter: Short Run Press.
701 Kristinsson, A. P. (2012). Language management agencies counteracting perceived threats to tradition.
702 *Language Policy, 11*, 343–356.
703 Kristmannsson, G. (2004). Iceland's "Egg of Life" and the modern media. *Meta: Translators' Journal,*
704 *49*(1), 59–66.

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993	Dispatch : 20-2-2015	Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357	□ LE	□ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537	☑ CP	☑ DISK

Kvaran, G. (2003). Icelandic language policy in past, present and future. Paper presented at the European Federation of National Institutions for Language Conference, Stockholm, Sweden.

Kvaran, G. (2004). English influence on the Icelandic lexicon. *Nordic Journal of English Studies, 3*(2), 143–152.

Kvaran, G. (2010). The Icelandic language in business and commerce in Iceland. In G. Stickel (Ed.), *Language use in business and commerce in Europe* (pp. 117–122). Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH.

Lefever, S. (2006). English language teaching in Icelandic compulsory schools. *Málfríður, 22*(2), 9–12.

May, S. (2006). Language policy and minority rights. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy theory and method* (pp. 255–272). Malden: Blackwell.

May, S. (2014). Justifying educational language rights. *Review of Research in Education, 38*, 215–241.

May, S., & Hill, R. (2005). Māori-medium education: Current issues and challenges. *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 8*(5), 377–403.

Menken, K., & García, O. (2010). *Negotiating language policies in schools: Educators as policymakers*. New York: Routledge.

Milroy, J. (1992). *Linguistic variation and change*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MESC). (2001). Icelandic: At once ancient and modern. http://www.iceland.is/media/Utgafa/Icelandic.pdf. Accessed 29 June 2012.

Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MESC). (2009). Culture. http://eng.menntamalaraduneyti.is/media/MRN-PDF-Althjodlegt/culture2008.pdf Accessed 17 Nov 2012.

Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (MESC). (2012). The Icelandic national curriculum guide for compulsory school: General section: 2012. http://brunnur.stjr.is/mrn/Utgafuskra/utgafa.nsf/RSSPage.xsp?documentId=C590D16CBC8439C500257A240030AE7F&action=openDocument. Accessed 17 Nov 2012.

Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). (2007). Government policy on the integration of immigrants. http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/acrobat-enskar_sidur/stefna_integration_of_immigrants.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2012.

Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). (2006). Declaration on a Nordic language policy. http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2007-746/at_download/publicationfile. Accessed 4–8 Dec 2012.

Ottosson, K. (2002). Language cultivation and language planning IV: Iceland. In B. Oskar, K. Braunmüller, E. H. Jahr, A. Karker, H. Naumann, & U. Teleman (Eds.), *The Nordic languages: An international handbook of the history of the north Germanic languages* (pp. 1997–2007). Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyte.

Pennycook, A. (2002). Mother tongues, governmentality, and protectionism. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 154*, 11–28.

Pennycook, A. (2006). Postmodernism in language policy. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy theory and method* (pp. 60–76). Malden: Blackwell.

Pennycook, A. (2013). Language policies, language ideologies and local language practices. In L. Wee, R. Goh, & L. Lim (Eds.), *The politics of English: South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Asia pacific* (pp. 1–18). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Phillipson, R. (2003). *English-only Europe? Challenging language policy*. London: Routledge.

Phillipson, R., & Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1996). English only worldwide or language ecology? *TESOL Quarterly, 30*(3), 429–452.

Rasmussen, P. (2002). Globalisation. *Málfríður, 18*(1), 27–31.

Réaume, D., & Pinto, M. (2012). Philosophy of language policy. In B. Spolsky (Ed.), *The Cambridge handbook of language policy* (pp. 37–58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ricento, T. (2006). Language policy: theory and practice an introduction. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 10–23). Malden: Blackwell.

Robert, Z. (2011). Language of instruction. Iceland review. http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/daily_life/Language_of_Instruction_%28ZR%29_0_383254.news.aspx. Accessed 7 Dec 2012.

Rögnvaldsson, E. (2008). Iceland language technology 10 years later. Collaboration: Interoperability between people in the creation of language resources for less-resourced languages. Paper presented at the SALTMIL workshop, LREC 2008, Marrakech, Morocco. http://notendur.hi.is/eirikur/english.htm. Accessed 11 Aug 2012.

Sapir, Y., & Zuckermann, G. (2008). Icelandic Phonosemantic Matching. In J. Rosenhouse & R. Kowner (Eds.), *Globally speaking: Motives for adopting english vocabulary in other languages* (pp. 19–44). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

REVISED PROOF

Journal : Small-ext 10993	Dispatch : 20-2-2015	Pages : 18
Article No. : 9357	□ LE	□ TYPESET
MS Code : LPOL-537	☑ CP	☑ DISK

762 Schiffman, H. (2006). Language policy and linguistic culture. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to*
763 *language policy theory and method* (pp. 111–125). Malden: Blackwell.
764 Shohamy, E. (2006). *Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches*. Abingdon: Routledge.
765 Smith, H. (1994). "Dative Sickness" in germanic. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 12*(4),
766 675–736.
767 Spolsky, B. (2004). *Language policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
768 Spolsky, B. (2005). Language Policy. In J. Cohen, K. T. McAlister, K. Rolstad, & J. MacSwan (Eds.),
769 *ISB4: Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on bilingualism* (pp. 2152–2164). Somerville,
770 MA: Cascadilla Press.
771 Spolsky, B. (2007). Towards a theory of language policy. *Working Papers in Educational Linguistics,*
772 *22*(1), 1–14.
773 Spolsky, B. (2009). *Language management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
774 Spolsky, B., & Shohamy, E. (2000). Language practice, language ideology and language policy. In R.
775 D. Lambert & E. Shohamy (Eds.), *Language policy and pedagogy essays in honor of A. Ronald*
776 *Watson* (pp. 1–42). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
777 Statistics Iceland (SI). (2009). Immigrants and persons with foreign background 1996–2008. http://www.
778 statice.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?ItemID=9077. Accessed19 Sept 2012.
779 Statistics Iceland (SI). (2012). Key figures. http://www.statice.is/Pages/1390. Accessed 19 Sept 2012.
780 Statistics Iceland (SI). (2013). Population by origin and citizenship. http://www.statice.is/Statistics/
781 Population/Citizenship-and-country-of-birth. Accessed 2 Oct 2014.
782 Svavarsdóttir, A. (2008). Icelandic. In U. Ammon & H. Haarman (Eds.), *Sprachen des Europäischen*
783 *Westens/Western European Languages I* (pp. 441–457). Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag.
784 The Icelandic Cancer Society. (2005). Preventing cancer across cultures. Paper presented at the NCU
785 Conference, Malmö, Sweden.
786 Tworek, K. (2010). Motives of migration and types of migration: The case of polish immigrants in
787 Iceland. http://migracje.civitas.edu.pl/index.php/en/motives-of-migration-and-types-ofmigration–
788 the-case-of-polish-immigrants-in-iceland. Accessed 2 Dec 2012.
789 Útlendingastofnun. (n.d.). Who does not need a residence permit after a certain period. http://www.utl.is/
790 index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100&Itemid=102&lang=en. Accessed 1 Dec
791 2012.
792 Whiteley, P. (2003). Do "language rights" serve indigenous interests? Some Hopi and other queries.
793 *American Anthropologist, 105*(4), 712–722.
794 Woolard, K., & Schieffelin, B. (1994). Language ideology. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 23*, 55–82.
795 Ytsma, J. (2000). Trilingual primary education in Friesland. In J. Cenoz & U. Jessner (Eds.), *English in*
796 *Europe: The acquisition of a third language* (pp. 222–235). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
797 Zavala, V. (2014). An ancestral language to speak with the "other": Closing down ideological spaces of a
798 language policy in the Peruvian Andes. *Language Policy, 13*(1), 1–20.
799

800
801 **Nathan John Albury** is a Ph.D. researcher at the Center for Multilingualism in Society across the
802 Lifespan at the University of Oslo with interests in language policy and planning, language attitudes and
803 ideology, and Scandinavian approaches language management. He holds an M.A. (Linguistics) from the
804 University of New England in Australia.

805

REVISED PROOF

Journal : **Small-ext 10993**	Dispatch : **20-2-2015**	Pages : **18**
Article No. : **9357**	□ LE	□ TYPESET
MS Code : **LPOL-537**	☑ CP	☑ DISK