

Ritualistic Remembrance

*Films and TV-series about resistance during World War
Two and the construction of Norwegian identity*

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Ritualistic Remembrance - Films and TV-series about resistance during World War Two and the construction of Norwegian identity

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Abstract

In this thesis, I apply insights from collective memory studies to poststructuralist IR in order to enhance understanding of how popular culture operates in processes of discursive identity construction. More specifically, I rely on Grant David Bollmer's (2011) argument that repetition is key when attempting to keep certain memories from being forgotten. Using this theoretical framework, I analyze the following four films and TV-series on Norwegian resistance during World War Two as rituals of embodied movement: *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water* (1948), *Nine Lives* (1957), *Max Manus* (2008) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015). The analysis demonstrates how these films and TV-series in large part reproduce and naturalize dominant representations of Norwegian identity by keeping certain memories of World War Two in Norway actualized. They represent wartime resistance and Norwegian identity along four main lines. These are: Norway as important for the outcome of the war, Norway as 'not' Germany, Norway as rural in its essence and Norway as cold hardy and beautiful. Interestingly, all four representational themes function to reinforce bedrock assumptions of Norwegian moral superiority, and as such, contribute to the perpetuation of the grand narratives of Norwegian identity. Importantly, arguing that Bollmer's theory on collective memory and rituals of embodied movement should be used as a criterion for the selection of text when analyzing popular culture as discourse, I join the efforts of poststructuralists who advocate moderate methodological advances for the approach.

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1. Introduction

Norway is a nation that thinks very highly of itself. Assumptions of inherent goodness and superiority, moral or otherwise, are pillars of Norwegian identity, and have been for hundreds of years. Although this might be true of any nationalism, Norwegian superiority is arguably of a special brand, both due to its resilience and to its specific content. Going back to the 16th century, even the early indications of Norwegian distinctiveness were relying on the idea that Norway was somehow better than and preferable to other places. These indications primarily had to do with the the moral desirability of an allodial¹ system of free farmers (Neumann 2002b: 93-94), but also with the distinctiveness of Norwegian climate and topography (Christensen 1993: 39-41, Neumann 2001c: 46-47). In the 19th century, after Norway had gained independence from Denmark and wanted to take distance from its former suppressor and the continental values it represented, the emphasis was put on the free Norwegian ‘people’ being the bearers of the nation and on the preeminence of down-to-earth modesty as contrasted to highbrow and arrogant decadence (Neumann 2001c: 66-67, Storsveen 1998: 232). The formation of the peace nation identity around the time of the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 saw the moral element in the assumption of superiority gather further momentum (Leira 2004). Moreover, firm commitment to the UN and the peace nation identity-crescendo of the 1990s added a strong concern for human rights and a unique capacity to negotiate peace to the national narrative (Skånland 2010).

It is the puzzle of what enables the sustainability and resilience of these assumptions, and accordingly the stubborn stability of Norwegian identity, that is the engine of this study. From the poststructuralist point of view that I employ, this is a puzzle because other basic assumptions and narratives of Norwegianness that are no less real or true, are also highly conceivable and *could* indeed have come to dominate the storyline instead. For instance, Norway’s recent participation in the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya could have called the assumption of superiority into question², and the same goes for Norwegian

¹ An allodial system is a system in which a peasant owns land him-/herself, meaning he or she is not part of a feudal structure.

² See Leira, Borchgrevink, Græger,, Melchior, Stamnes, and Øverland,(2007: 14-15) and Græger (2007: 88-90) for discussions on the tension between peace commitment and militarism in Norwegian identity construction.

collaboration with the Nazi regime during World War Two³. These examples are a testament to the fluidity and malleability of knowledge, and to all the stories that are not told and not remembered; to the paths that are not followed and are left unexplored and to the truths that are deemed untruthful. My concern in this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of why one specific path is followed at the cost of others and how come one specific truth is elevated and given status as objective and considered commonsensical.

In order to make such a contribution, I will look to World War Two, and more specifically at how Norwegian resistance⁴ against the Nazi occupation has been represented in order to negotiate memories from the war, and accordingly constitute the collective that is Norway. Furthermore, I will follow the, by now quite extensive⁵, literature suggesting that popular culture can take part in processes of identity construction. Adhering to the poststructuralist philosophical conviction that the social reality is only accessibly through meaning created in text, I argue that there is no ontological difference between popular cultural representations of reality and other types of such representations. Therefore, popular culture can, and should, be studied as discourse and the way in which it hooks up to the wider discursive field should be put under both theoretical and empirical scrutiny.

Aspiring to do just that, and intrigued by the case of Norwegian superiority as it is narrated by representations of resistance against the Nazi occupation, my research question is as follows:

How do films and TV-series about Norwegian resistance during World War Two contribute to the discursive construction of Norwegian identity?

Norwegian resistance during World War Two is suitable for an analysis aspiring to understand the sustainability and resilience of Norwegian identity construction for two main reasons. First, as Susanne Maerz (2010: 5) argues, the time of the occupation has been particularly

³ As I will get back to later, this has been well documented and discussed in the literature. See e.g. Kroglund (2012) and Dahl, Hagtvedt and Hjeltnes. (2009).

⁴ Andenæs, Riste and Skodvin (1996: 64) emphasize how resistance was really the theme of World War Two in Norway. Accordingly, much both scholarly and artistic attention has been directed at this in particular.

⁵ A detailed discussion of the study of popular culture in poststructuralist International Relations will follow in Chapter 2.2.

important for Norwegian collective identity because it is routinely and romantically associated with a strong feeling of commonality. By the same token, it has strong symbolic value as the resistance has widely been considered a popular effort involving almost all Norwegians (ibid.: 6).

Second, the representation of the war in Norway bears a striking resemblance to the representation of Norwegian identity in general, in the sense that it too is featuring an astonishing degree of sustainability and resilience. Ole Kristian Grimnes (2009) argues that in spite of increased knowledge and access to sources that should indicate a turn of the tide, post-war storytelling has been stunningly one-sided. The narrative has to a large extent, he continues, revolved around the black-and-white picture of Norwegians being categorically good or bad, depending on whether their wartime allegiance was with the King or with Der Führer. Even attempts at nuancing the picture, Grimnes (ibid.) holds, have used this major distinction for orientation as the black-and-white picture is set up as the default-mode narrative that any nuancing must relate to and nuance *from*. Along the same line of argument, Odd-Bjørn Fure (1999: 43) makes the case that it is curious and indeed paradoxical that Norwegian historians have failed to join their German and French colleagues in properly addressing the tabus and trauma of the war, considering Norwegian suffering was far milder than that of Germany and France. Synne Corell (2011: 107) similarly discusses the «sustainability of the grand narratives» of the war in Norway. Like the story of Norwegian identity then, the story of World War Two is remarkable in its stamina and ability to fend off discursive contestation. More than that, the two representations have in common the tendency to represent Norway in a favorable way, grounding their storytelling in assumptions of superiority⁶. As such, representations of resistance can be expected to have especially strong naturalizing effects on representations of Norwegian identity more generally.

Analyzing the naturalizing effects of representations of film and TV-series on resistance is important because it fills a gap in the literature. Much has been written on how the trauma of the occupation has been processed in Norway, and many, such as Maerz,

⁶ Importantly, these two representations cannot really be separated, even if it might seem like that the way it is set up here. Representations of the war and resistance are enabled by representations of Norwegian identity, and simultaneously contribute to the production of meaning that enables the continued dominance of certain representations of Norwegian identity. As such, the two representations, as they are identified here, are intertwined and implicated in one another, and thus part of the *same* process of discursive identity construction. More thorough discussions of this will follow in chapter 2 on theory and chapter 3.1. on methodology.

Grimnes and Fure who was mentioned above, have pointed to the dazzling and unlikely stability of post-war storytelling. Moreover, Anne Eriksen (1995: 49, 145) Clemens Maier (2007: 47) have gone one step further as they both argue that a ‘mythologization’ of the war explains this stability. However, an analysis linking the narration of World War Two with representations of Norwegian identity in a wider sense, concerning the underlying assumption of superiority in particular, is missing. Employing an IR⁷ theoretical framework and approaching the matter at hand from a poststructuralist perspective allows me to fill this gap as it helps me access the process of intertextual production of meaning at the micro level and get a detailed look at the construction of Norwegian identity.

Some, like Maerz (2010) and Eriksen (1995), have feebly included popular culture in their studies, while Maier (2007: 47) explicitly mentions it as an important element in the mythologization of the past, but refrains from pursuing it further. Anna Oxaal Kaasen (2013) on the other hand, puts popular culture at the centre of attention as she analyzes the processing of the Norwegian past through debates on the film *Max Manus*. Kaasen’s analysis appears to be standing rather alone in its targeted focus on popular culture, however. As such, my analysis, offering a comprehensive, if not exhaustive, account of how popular cultural representations of resistance have contributed to, and continue to contribute to, the construction of Norwegian identity, will be a welcome and useful addition to the already existing literature.

Theoretical approach and contribution

I will argue that films and TV-series on Norwegian resistance against the German occupation function as a ritual of embodied movement that collectivizes memories. A ritual is understood here as a *collective repeating* of an of embodied movement. This is significant on both methodological and theoretical grounds. First, it provides a criterion for selection of text when analyzing popular culture as discourse, and as such, it joins the efforts to make

⁷ International Relations capitalized or abbreviated in capital letters references the discipline of International Relations, whereas international relations in lower case references the actual relations between states, i.e. the substance that is studied in International Relations (Brown and Ainley 2005: 1).

moderate methodological advances for poststructuralist discourse analysis⁸. Second, it improves theoretical understanding of how different popular cultural representations might work together in the process of naturalizing dominant representations of state identity, and as such it allows for a targeted analysis of a body of popular culture.

In developing this argument, I apply insights from collective memory studies to poststructuralist IR, and more specifically to the study of popular culture as discourse that has become an important part of the approach (Hansen 2016: 2, Rowley and Weldes 2012: 12). Grant David Bollmer (2011) draws on Gilles Deleuze's reading of Henri Bergson's⁹ concepts of time and memory in order to craft a theory of collective memory that takes the ontologically distinct quality of the concept seriously. In doing so, he argues that rituals of embodied movement is what gives memories their distinct collective quality. Accordingly, such rituals have the capacity to constitute the collective, in the sense that they take part in the process of providing it with meaning. Moreover, Bollmer argues that rituals can take on literally any form, and is often acted out in the sphere of the everyday. Watching films is listed as one prominent example. Bollmer's theory then, seems to go well with poststructuralist IR, and appears very useful in the attempt to improve understanding of how popular cultural representations of state identity relate to one another as well as to the wider discursive field.

Maier (2007: 47) argues that the dominant representations of Norwegian resistance against the German occupation is a mythologization of the war that «needs rehearsal, and repetition to be enforced and kept». Moreover, he proceeds to characterize such rehearsal and repetition as rituals, and ascertain the importance of «elements of popular culture» (ibid.). It seems then, that popular cultural representations of resistance can well be analyzed using Bollmer's (2011) theory as applied to IR.¹⁰ The extensive and enduring production of films and TV-series on the resistance suggests that consummating these popular cultural

⁸ As I will get back to in Chapter 2.3 and particularly in 3.1., some scholars, most notably Lene Hansen (2006) but also e.g. Iver B. Neumann (2001b) and Øivind Bratberg (2014), argue that there is no need for poststructuralism to be anti-method, and as such, even poststructuralists should welcome methodological advances for discourse analysis.

⁹ On use of Deleuze and Bergson

¹⁰ It is worth noting that applying collective memory studies to IR is especially apt when analyzing the representation of World War Two in Norway, as much of the literature on the war has in fact engaged with the process of collectively dealing with memories. Grimnes (2009), Maier (2007), Maerz (2010) and Corell (2009; 2010) that are referenced here, are examples.

expressions in particular, can be theorized as a ritual of embodied movement. Accordingly, analyzing these specific texts¹¹ promises to be of special interest and value as the collectivizing and constitutive effects that popular culture as ritual has on memory and state identity can be expected to be of particular strength. To highlight the ritualistic aspect of films and TV-series on resistance, I will analyze two films from the 1940s and 1950s, namely *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water* (1948) and *Nine Lives* (1957), and then one film and one TV-series from the 2000s and 2010s, namely *Max Manus* (2008) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015a-f). As they tell similar stories with generations between them, they aptly demonstrate the resilience and sustainability both of representations of World War Two and of Norwegian identity in general.

Some IR scholars have borrowed insights from collective memory studies. Alexander Wendt's (1999: 154) brief mention is one notable example, and Eric Lagenbacher and Yossi Shain's (2010) edited volume on the topic is another. Both of these employ a constructivist approach, and as such read collective memory as yet another variable that can impact ideas and values (Lagenbacher 2010: 21-22). From the poststructuralist strand of IR, however, Maja Zehfuss (2003) understands collective memory to be a part of processes of discursive meaning production¹². Inspired by her take, and curious of the potential for further theoretical enrichment, I employ Bollmer's theory on collective memory and rituals of embodied movement in order to develop my own explicit way of linking collective memory studies with IR. In doing so, I hope to establish a criterion for the selection of text when studying popular culture as discourse, and to enhance theoretical understanding of how popular culture operates in processes of discursive identity construction.

Structure

The thesis consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, I will lay out my theoretical argument, consisting of five sections. First, I introduce poststructuralism and its place in IR theory. I focus on the philosophy of science that distinguishes it from other approaches, and discuss the way in which it engages with the construction of identity. The notions of performativity

¹¹ Given the poststructuralist ontology, film and TV-series are, just like other discursive representations, textual representations of the social reality, and will accordingly be analyzed and referenced as text.

¹² A more detailed discussion of Zehfuss' article 'Forget September 11' will follow in Chapter 2.4.

and relational Self/Othering will be of particular interest. Second, I turn to the ‘popular culture turn’ in poststructuralist IR, in order to justify my choice to analyze film and TV-series as constitutive of state identity. Here too, questions of philosophy of science will be centre stage, as I demonstrate how the poststructuralist ontology enables meaningful study of popular culture. In the third section, I will consider the methodological challenge of selecting text for an analysis that rests on an ontological conviction that encourages massive, if not unlimited, source material. I will argue that criteria for the selection of text needs to be in place, and foreshadow my unique theoretical contribution by suggesting that IR theorists ought to look to collective memory studies for theoretical enrichment that can help develop such criteria. In section four, I give a brief overview of collective memory studies in order to argue that it *can* be applied to poststructuralist IR. Finally, in section five, I introduce Bollmer (2011) and argue that a criterion for the selection of text when analyzing popular culture as discourse can be when films and TV-series can be theorized as rituals of embodied movement. Moreover, I will argue that such a theorization allows me to analyze the way in which different popular cultural representations work together to naturalize dominant representations in the wider discourse.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodological challenges that one faces when conducting a discourse analysis, and lay out the research design for the analysis that will follow in chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 3.1. on methodology, the concepts of causality, reliability and validity, as well as the issue of qualifying good research in general, is discussed. In Chapter 3.2. I present the first part of the research design, concerning the identification of basic discourses that establishes the foundation on which the analysis of film and TV-series will build. Chapter 3.3. lays out the research design for the actual analysis of film and TV-series as discourse. Here, I discuss *how* to go about detecting meaning in text, the intertextual research model I will be employing, as well as the selection of films and TV-series.

Chapter 4 will identify the basic discourses on Norwegian identity that I expect the films and TV-series on resistance to reproduce or in some other way relate to. I will address the matter chronologically, and as such, start with the construction of Norwegian identity prior to 1814. Then, I will continue with its evolvement through the 19th century, and discuss the development of the peace nation identity towards the end of the 19th century and at the

start of the 20th. Finally, I will consider how the major narrative has been sustained through the 20th century and into the 21st.

In Chapter 5, I will conduct a discourse analysis of *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water*, *Nine Lives*, *Max Manus* and *The Heavy Water War*, in order to answer my research question and determine how these films and TV-series contribute to the construction of Norwegian state identity. Moreover, they will also be analyzed in chronological order, so that the way in which they build on and relate to one another and form a ritual will emerge clearer. Finally, in Chapter 6 I offer some concluding remarks, and assess the strength of my theoretical contribution in light of the analysis that has been conducted.

2. Theory: collective memory in IR and film and TV-series as rituals of embodied movement

Poststructuralist IR can benefit from more targeted criteria for how to select texts to analyze as discourse. Relying on the ontological assumption that we can only access reality through lingual interpretation, poststructuralist IR implies that all types of text is worthy of scholarly attention, and that the empirical scope of an analysis hypothetically knows no bounds. The relatively recent turn by many IR scholars to popular culture, that is also my concern in this thesis, illustrates this well. Although such endeavors have come to be established as a household part of the discipline (Hansen 2016: 2, Rowley and Weldes 2012: 12), they nevertheless showcase poststructuralism's ability to enable untraditional empirical approaches. This ability poses a methodological problem that raises some questions for the discourse analyst to grapple with: should certain types of text be privileged? Is all discourse worth putting under scrutiny? If so, how can we choose? If not, where should we draw the line?

In this chapter I argue that borrowing insights from collective memory studies, primarily Grant David Bollmer's theory of virtual systems of memory (2011), can enhance understanding of how discursive construction functions, and that this enhanced understanding can be utilized to contribute to the development of criteria for the selection of text. At base, I hold that the way in which a collective remembers, impacts the way in which it constitutes itself through discursive representation. More specifically, however, I argue that consumption of popular culture can function as rituals of embodied movement that give memories their distinct collective character. Furthermore, repeatedly invoking memories through such rituals, makes sure they stay actualized and remain a potent force in discursive identity construction. Ritual then, can be a criterion for selection of text in the study of discourse generally and popular culture as discourse specifically. Importantly, by suggesting this criterion I take on the methodological challenge outlined above, and join the efforts of e.g. Hansen (e.g. 2006) and Bratberg (2014) to modestly make discourse analysis more methodologically sound.

More than developing a criterion for the selection of text, however, applying insights from collective memory studies to poststructuralist IR enables engaging with discourse in a new and different way. Specifically, analyzing the way in which different popular cultural

expressions relate to one another and how they operate together as a more or less coherent body of popular culture, stands out as an interesting focus.

In developing this theoretical argument, it is important to start with setting the scene for the exploration of the added value of collective memory studies. As such, the first section of the chapter, *Poststructuralism in IR theory*, will introduce the theoretical and philosophical foundation of the argument and address processes of identity construction in international relations. The second section, *The popular culture turn*, addresses the study of popular culture as discourse. More than setting the stage for the application of insights from collective memory studies to IR, however, these two sections is very important as they lay out basic assumptions permeating the empirical analysis that follows later, and justifies the choice to conduct a discourse analysis of popular cultural representations. In section three, *Methodological concerns: the source material challenge*, I argue that knowing how to select empirical focus when analyzing discourse is demanding, considering the fact that the poststructuralist philosophy of science allows for intriguing study of all statements and practices. Following up this claim, I argue that clearer criteria for selection of text is called for and that one such criterion can be developed by looking beyond the borders of IR, and to collective memory studies. In section 4, *Collective memory and poststructuralist IR*, I introduce the scholarly field that is collective memory studies in order to demonstrate its applicability with IR. Finally, in section 5, I draw on Bollmer (ibid.) to make the argument that analyzing film and TV-series is especially interesting when watching them can function as a ritual of embodied movement, perpetually actualizing memories that constitute the collective.

2.1. Poststructuralism in IR theory

In recent decades the discipline of IR has seen a theoretical expansion as more critical approaches have challenged mainstream theorizing (Burchill and Linklater 2013: 4). As part of this expansion, where the concern for the construction and operation of identity in international relations has been of great importance, poststructuralism has picked up steam. Although often misread and misused, falsely caricatured as a symbol of rationalism and posited as a positivist bogeyman (Jackson 2011: 112-113)¹³ Kenneth Waltz' and his *Theory of International Politics* (2010) did indeed spur debates over the philosophical groundings of the discipline and thus functioned to inspire many a theoretical innovation from whom Robert Keohane (1988) labeled reflectivists (Hansen 2006: 3). Poststructuralism took, and continues to take, part in these debates. Moreover, borrowing from linguistics in arguing that the social world is made up entirely of discursive constructions, poststructuralism distances itself from other reflectivist approaches, such as constructivism, the essence of which is the belief in and reliance on social facts that exist prior to and independently of the discursive construction that consumes poststructuralists (Pouliot 2004: 332).

The concern with discursive construction as opposed to social facts illustrates well the ontological assumptions that often define poststructuralism in IR, popularly summed up by Jaques Derrida's famous quote «there is nothing outside of the text» (1974: 158)¹⁴. In short, this statement can be taken to mean that social reality has meaning only after we give it meaning through language. And because we are unable to interpret social reality independent of language, there will always exist a layer of interpretation between the observer and that which is being observed.¹⁵ Thus, in its concern with language, poststructuralist discourse

¹³ See also Goddard and Nexon (2005) and Wæver (2009) for reflections on how Waltz can, and perhaps, should be read, posing alternatives to the mainstream (mis)uses of his theory.

¹⁴ Reducing Derrida to this dogma, as is often done, is misleading at best and therefore problematic (Gaston 2011: xxi). Derrida himself (1988: 136) even suggests that a poor translation from the French might be to blame for the misreading and seems to try and play down the sensation of his position by clarifying that what he meant was that «there is nothing outside context». However, the quote is routinely used to place Derrida alongside Michel Foucault and others to illustrate the poststructuralist ontology. Devetak (2013: 190) is an example, and now I am also guilty of perpetuating the problem. See Edward Said (1978) for a thorough discussion of Derrida's understanding of textuality, where he also relates it to that of Foucault.

¹⁵ This is not to say that poststructuralism assumes an ontological distinction between the observer and that which is being observed. Being a mind-world monist approach, using Jackson's (2011) terms, poststructurliasm holds that the observer is a part of the reality he or she is trying to grasp and understand.

analysis in IR partakes in a turn to linguistics that has taken place in the social sciences more generally (Devetak 2013: 194, Neumann 2001b: 38; 2002a: 627). More than that, and perhaps implicitly, this process of giving social reality meaning through text is inherently collective, as language is assumed to be a social practice. As such, prescribing meaning to social reality is not a process in which individual actors simply decide what to make of the world. Rather, it is an infinitely complex process of creating collective understanding. It is important to stress however, that this ontological position does not reject the existence of a physical reality. On the contrary it very much believes a physical reality to exist, but rejects the idea that this reality has any meaning prior to our interpretation of it (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). For instance, in the Bosnian war that took place in the first half of the 1990s, shots were fired, bombs were dropped and lives were lost, as the regime of Bosnia Herzegovina fought a brutal war against Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia. We know that this physically and actually happened. However, prescribing meaning to the war is not so straightforward, as it can be represented in a series of different ways. Hansen (2006: 96-97) argues that in the dominant representation in the West, the war was seen as 'Balkan' and accordingly «violent, tribal, hating and backward». Importantly, this specific representation helped construct the war as something inherently un-Western, and therefore as something in which the West had no interest or influence. As such, it was given a meaning it did not have in and of itself; the physical reality was interpreted through language in order to create a specific collective understanding.

The ontological position that is illustrated by this case implies the epistemological assumption that knowledge is something that is produced rather than given, and accordingly as something that can take on different meanings and different forms. As such, there is no true knowledge 'out there' for us to grasp, but rather a set of different knowledges, none of which are more real or true than the others. And so, these different knowledges compete over being perceived as real and true in the discursive economy (Campbell 1998: 6-7, Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 38). Importantly then, this epistemological position encourages reading history as genealogy, where every version of the reality that at any point is considered 'the truth' is dynamically produced through long and hard-fought discursive construction and contestation. Thus, knowledge is always historically situated, and can, in the spirit of Foucault, be traced back genealogically to demonstrate how the discursive constructions of

the past operate actively in the present¹⁶. Here too, the Bosnia-case can be illuminating, as Hansen (2006: 96-97) identifies different discourses to demonstrate how alternative representations challenged the dominant one, and how varying versions of ‘the truth’ operated as a legitimizing force for different policies. Most notably, the genocide-representation wherein a distinction between the ‘Bosnian victim’ and the ‘Serbian aggressor’ replaced the generalist ‘Balkanization’ of the war as a whole, gained traction. This representation was particularly powerful because it threatened to delegitimize the belief that the war was un-Western raised by the dominant ‘Balkan’-representation. By highlighting the genocidal character of the war, this representation constructed it as a struggle between right and wrong in a way that implicated the West and suggested that it too could be a party to the conflict. In the US in particular the struggle between the two representations in the discursive economy was intense, as they «ran as unstable dual tracks» for a period of time before something of a combination between the two, tipped in favor of the ‘Balkan’-representation, was stabilized as dominant¹⁷. Furthermore, Hansen demonstrates well how this contested dominance of the ‘Balkan’-representation is conditioned on earlier representations of the Balkans. Most striking is perhaps the link between the ‘Balkan’-representation of the 1990s and the one developed and established in the years after world war one. In both cases the Balkans were constructed as violent, backward and barbarian, suggesting that there was an abundance of discursive resources available for the 90-edition when reinvigorating the representation. Moreover, alternative representations, challenging the categorically negative image of the Balkans, had emerged as quite strong even before this first ‘Balkan’-representation. For instance, one representation constructed the Balkans as «‘a young client of civilization’, with the capacity for change and for whom the West held a responsibility» (Hansen 2006: 97), creating a discursive tension very similar to the one that

¹⁶ It is important to note, however, that this genealogical tracing of discourses does not entail believe in the existence of some sort of origin, a concept that poststructuralists are very skeptical of. See Foucault (1984: 78).

¹⁷ Hansen’s analysis of the discursive construction of the Bosnia-war is just one of many such analysis. Campbell’s (1998) analysis of the construction of American identity and security during the cold war and Iver Neumann’s (2010) analysis of the of the way in which people from the Eurasian steppes functioned as Europe’s constitutive Other in the Middle Ages, are others that could just as well have been used here to illustrate how the poststructuralist philosophy of science can be applied to IR.

dominated in the 1990s, in which whether or not the Balkans fell within the scope of Western affairs took centre stage.

More than illustrating the poststructuralist ontological and epistemological position as well as conception of history as applied to IR, Hansen's analysis highlights how discourse analysis in IR is typically concerned with the construction of state identity (Devetak 2013: 204-205). We saw that the two dominant representations of the Bosnia-war invited different constructions of Western identity; one as inherently different, and disengaged, from the violent and backward Balkans and one as implicated in the conflict and somewhat responsible for its outcome. Thus, like social constructivists¹⁸, poststructuralists hold the very basic believe that state identity impacts international politics. However, they differ from the constructivist approach in emphasizing how state identity, like any identity, is *performative* and *relational*.

Starting with the idea that identity is performative, Campbell (1998: 9) argues forcefully that identity has «no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality». Here, he draws heavily on Judith Butler (1990) and her understanding of the ontology of gendered identity, where the key realization is that identity is not given in the body but rather discursively constructed through repetitive performance of gender norms. Building on e.g.¹⁹ Campbell's work, Cynthia Weber (1998: 78) applies Butler's (1990) ideas specifically to IR in linking the «notion of performativity to the subject of the sovereign nation-state». In doing so she argues that the state, much like the individual, does not have an identity that is pre-discursively given. On the contrary, nation-states are «subjects in process» (ibid.), or in Campbell's words «always in a process of becoming» (Campbell 1998: 12). Thus, a state's identity is never static or fixed, and it can never really be captured. Moreover, it is precisely this absence of statism and fixity that enables the existence of the state. Once a state stops performing its identity, it will «expose its lack of pre-discursive foundation»,

¹⁸ When using constructivism in this manner, to demonstrate poststructuralisms distinctness, I run the risk of over-simplifying and not doing constructivism justice. Importantly, constructivism is, like poststructuralism, not a theory, but rather a way of viewing the world (see Adler 1997 and Barkin 2005). Yet, as Pouliot (2004) shows us, an essence can be extracted from constructivism. And given that this essence is the assumption of the existence of social facts that «provide constructivists with 'foundations of reality'» (ibid.: 332), it serves well to contrast poststructuralism after all: poststructuralism, as we know, rejects the existence of social facts and even the notion of 'foundations of reality'.

¹⁹ See also's Ashley's (1988) on the performativity of the 'anarchic problematique' and Doty (1996) on 'power as productive'.

Campbell argues (*ibid.*). Naturally then, in order to stabilize identities in a way that make them seem static and fixed, repetition is key. As identity is «always in a process of becoming» it relies on the performative acts that constitute it and provide it with meaning to create some sort of coherence. Just like individuals repetitively perform heterosexuality to establish it as the normal mode of being, states can perform e.g. masculinity and militarism as markers of identity. In arguing that the US' repetitively performed masculinity has taken part in enabling it to dominate the Caribbean countries that are often constructed as feminine, Weber also demonstrates how the idea of identity as performativity can bear consequences for actual politics (Weber 1998: 94-95)²⁰.

Moving on, the notion of identity as relational is also of great importance for the poststructuralist approach to IR. Simply put, this should be taken to mean that a state has a certain identity due to the ways in which it relates to other states or political entities that have other identities, and how it demarcates itself as different from them. Thus, a state is what it is only by virtue of what it is not. Here, Hansen (2006) can be a valuable source of insight. She argues that, in accordance with the poststructuralist philosophy of science and the linguistic turn that it implicates, states construct their identity by using language as a «referential system» (Hansen 2006: 24) to set itself apart from other states and accordingly create and solidify distinctiveness. In doing so, states construct so-called Self/Other-relations, where characterization of other states and of the subject Self in relation to this Other, inform the performative acts of identity constitution elaborated on above. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in this process the state is not a rational actor that deliberately constructs Self/Other-relations in order to constitute its identity in a certain way. Rather, the state, like other subjects, is constituted by discourses that are constructed, upheld and altered by vast and continuous flows of statements and practices at all levels of society (Bratberg 2014: 48, Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 26-27)²¹. As such, state identity is constructed within the frames of the state, but not directly and exclusively *by* the state, and for this reason, and as will be

²⁰ It is important stress, that politics too is discourse, and accordingly the assertion that identity bears consequences for politics does not entail conceptualizing these as variables, where one can have a causal effect on the other. Rather, they are mutually constitutive and feed off one another in a perpetual process of meaning production. More on this on the chapter on methodology (3.1.).

²¹ Leira (2002: 21-22) argues that agency is possible even though all agents operate in a discursive structure. Moreover, he links this specifically with the possibility of discursive change, and holds that an agent can deliberately change a discourse, but must always do so while situated in another discourse. Hansen (2006: 212) similarly argues that evolvment of discourse relies on human agency.

discussed at length in the next section, looking beyond the state itself when analyzing identity construction is indeed called for.

Further nuancing our understanding of the construction of state identity as relational, Ole Wæver (2002: 24) criticizes identity research from the poststructuralist canon for being «depressingly close» to more mainstream approaches. He argues that discursive construction of state identity is, taking the ontological implications of poststructuralism seriously, far more complex than the Self/Other-approach might suggest. Therefore, he emphasizes, it is imperative not to fall in the trap of treating Self/Other-relations as «pure dichotomies» (ibid.). Rather, we should understand them as part of a large web of differentiating relations, where many different Others of varying character should be taken into account.²² Although «the pure contrast of Self/Other has a strong energizing and entrenching capacity» (ibid.), and by extension analytical appeal, it should be approached with a certain skepticism and perhaps analytical tools to look beyond this dichotomy.²³

So, having looked at the way in which poststructuralism understands identity, with a focus on performative and relational qualities, the uniqueness of the approach and its contribution to the field of IR emerges in clearer colors. Whereas Wendt, the seminal figure of mainstream constructivism, claims that corporate identities, e.g. state identities, are «constitutionally exogenous to Otherness» (Wendt 1999: 225), meaning a distinct identity does exist prior to Self/Other-configurations²⁴, the poststructuralist approach rejects any ontological stability of identity, as even the mere existence of identity is completely reliant on relational differentiation actualized through performative repetition. Thus, poststructuralism offers a more dynamic way of analyzing identity and how it relates to international relations than does constructivism and other mainstream approaches (Wæver 2002: 20-22). Moreover,

²² He poses the Nordic countries as an illustration, where Othering also includes distancing from «friends and relatives» (Wæver 2002: 24).

²³ Neumann (1996:162) dubs Wæver's, and others', theorizing of «competing selves» the 'Copenhagen cotiere'.

²⁴ As noted earlier, constructivism is, much like poststructuralism, not a unitary theory, and as such reducing it to Wendt as I have done here, and as is often done, can be misleading. However, according to Wæver (2002: 21-22) Wendt is a nice point of departure, when discussing the contribution of poststructuralism to IR, because he is concerned with identity, and thus serves as a helpful and apprehensible contrast. Moreover, the quote used here serves well to illustrate the essence of constructivism identified by Pouliot (2004), namely social facts.

and as we soon shall see, it opens the door to new and intriguing ways of analyzing international relations.

2.2. The turn to popular culture

Discourse analyses often concentrate on official discourse, i.e. discourse that is articulated by elites and the state, typically politicians (Milliken 1999: 244-245, Weldes 1999: 118). Hansen (2006: 60) offers a rather practical justification for this focus when she argues that official discourse can be a sensible starting point as it helps bridge the gap between discourse analysis and «more conventional forms of foreign policy analysis» in IR. This way, an official-discourse-first approach can help connect discourse analysis to IR and give it disciplinary grounding. More than that, and along the same line of argument, starting with official discourse can be advantageous in the sense that it provides empirical, analytical and methodological clarity; it is a point of departure that, from an IR-perspective, makes intuitive sense, and offers a structured way of conducting the analysis. A more theoretical justification for this focus on elite and state discourse however, advocates the poststructuralist epistemological position that knowledge and power directly imply one another. Leaning heavily on the ideas developed by French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault, one can argue that articulators of official discourse, i.e. politicians and other state representatives that view foreign policy from up close and even act it themselves, have a special authority to discipline knowledge on this field (Hansen 2006: 65-67, Wæver 2002: 42). They are closest to the action and thus assumed to speak the objective truth on international relations. For this reason they are rendered natural objects of inquiry in the default mode of discourse analysis in IR. An abundance of examples of such analysis' can be found in the IR literature. David Campbell's (1998) analysis of American security during the cold war, Jutta Weldes' (1999) analysis of the Cuban missile crisis and how it contributed to the construction of American national interest and Roxanne Doty's (1996) analysis of the North's representation of the South and how this conditioned colonialism can be highlighted as particularly prominent and illustrative examples of this tendency to privilege official discourse over other types of representations.

Despite the incontestable value of this approach, and the many interesting advances it has made both on the theoretical and the empirical front, a quite large body of literature criticizing it from a more radical and culture-sensitive position has emerged, suggesting that popular culture should be taken into account as an important type of discursive representations with serious implications for international relations. It is this turn in the

discourse analysis approach to IR, where scholars search for production of meaning in text beyond official discourse and specifically in popular culture, that is of particular interest for this thesis. It is important to stress however, that this turn is not at all a fringe-movement, but rather a development in the field of IR that indeed has gained significant traction and massive scholarly attention. While Hansen (2016: 2) claims that the turn is «well established» in IR, Christina Rowley and Jutta Weldes (2012: 12) even go as far as suggesting that ‘Popular Culture and World Politics’ might even amount to being a sub-discipline due to its wide acceptance. Thus, in seeking to engage in a debate on popular culture as discursive representations, this thesis is undoubtedly on solid IR ground.

In order to understand what this popular culture turn is all about then, starting with Weldes (1999), can be helpful, as she emphasizes how discourse analysis is part of a turn to culture that has taken place in the social sciences more generally. From this position she argues that in order to take the commitment that the culture-turn entails seriously, discourse analysis should not only analyze elite and state practices, but also «popular sites of discursive practices» (Weldes 1999: 118). According to Weldes, «state policy has a pervasive cultural basis» (ibid.: 119) in that the discursive representations that condition certain state policies are grounded in a common cultural understanding, both at the elite level and in the wider public; put simply, the political elites need to be able to formulate policy that bear meaning and seem sensible to the public. Thus, the cultural artifacts that surround us in our everyday lives shape the way in which we conceive the social world, and must be taken into account when analyzing discourse in IR. Moreover, in constructing this cultural platform, this shared reference-bank that we need in order to apprehend the world that surrounds us, popular culture as one type of cultural artifact, is important. Here, it is worth echoing the point made in the previous section about the state lacking control over the discursive field that concerns it, leaving it unable to deliberately and consciously construct its identity. The way in which popular culture and other cultural artifacts shape collective understanding illustrates this perspective on the agency of the state very well.

Building on the idea that a turn to culture should entail a turn to popular culture, the basic theoretical argument that is driving this specific retargeting, or more precisely this expansion of scope, of discourse analysis in IR, rises from the poststructuralist philosophy of science outlined above: as everything is representations of the social reality rather than the

social reality itself, there is no ontological distinction between fiction and reality. A fictional representation of the social reality is, like a representation in a political speech, nothing more than just that: a representation. As such, the line between fiction and reality is blurred at best, and consequently one should be careful to privilege the one over the other when analyzing discourse in IR. However, even a poststructuralist would admit that there is a difference between the two types of representations, as official discourse can be characterized as first-order representation while fiction can be characterized as second-order representations (Neumann and Nexon 2006: 7). Related to the point made earlier that discourse analysis, along with more mainstream approaches to IR, tend to concentrate on elite and state practices, Neumann and Nexon note that IR-theorists «often neglect second-order representations» because actual foreign policy, the speeches, the debates and the action, are «the stuff of our investigations» (ibid.: 8), while fiction is nothing more than commentary on such events. Rejecting this view, they go on to argue that although there is a difference between the two types of representations, the difference is a question of degree rather than ontologic quality. And so, as noted above, there is no clear reason why one type of representation should be privileged over another in analysis' of discourse in IR; they contribute to the same intertextual²⁵ production of meaning, and therefore both deserve to be put under scientific scrutiny.

As such, poststructuralists studying popular culture as discourse are interested in the *constitutive* effects that such representations can have on social reality. In their volume on *Battlestar Galactica and International Relations*, Kiersey and Neumann (2013: 5) specify in what sense these representations can be constitutive by arguing that «popular culture is interesting to IR theorists insofar as it can function to naturalize and normalize a certain social order» (ibid.). In this sense, popular culture has the capacity to strengthen the position of representations coming from other sources, e.g. official discourse, and thus to contribute to constructing them as more true and 'real'. In another, and indeed similar, volume on *Harry Potter and International Relations*, Neumann and Nexon (2006: 19) offers a perhaps more comprehensible formulation of this theoretical idea, when they argue that «popular culture

²⁵ Intertextuality refers to the conviction that all texts must in some subtle or overt way refer to other texts in order to be meaningful as they are «situated within and against other texts» (Hansen 2006: 55). Julia Kristeva (1980) first explicitly theorized the concept, while James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (1989) properly introduced it to IR.

may be said to «clear the ground» for the reception of political representations» (ibid.). In doing so, they suggest that popular culture can alter the way in which other representations from e.g. official discourse is received and interpreted, and perhaps even contribute to making sure they get a softer landing once articulated²⁶. By the same token, Weldes (1999) explains in her analysis of the Star Trek franchise and its relation to US foreign policy, how popular culture can reproduce dominant representations and thereby participate in making them *commonsensical*. The story that is being told in Star Trek, she argues, reproduces stories of US interventionism and militarism, as well as narratives where hierarchical orderings of race and culture are taken for granted. Thus, because Star Trek is part of peoples everyday lives, it constitutes common cultural understanding and inform basic assumptions that make apprehension and acceptance of a certain foreign policy possible (ibid.: 119). Similarly, Neumann (2006: 157-159) argues that representations of geography in the books and films on Harry Potter normalize representations of the international politics in ‘real life’. Voldemort's Albanian connection and the Durmstrang schools special focus on the Dark Arts are examples of representations that link the East with evil forces, dark intentions and destructive barbarism. These resonate well with representations in official discourse where Western foreign policy often rely on the idea of Russia and the East as its constitutive ‘Other’ (Neumann 1999)²⁷. On a more general note, Neumann and Nexon (2006: 19) and Neumann (2006: 160) emphasizes how the Harry Potter-story normalizes a Manichean worldview, where life is ultimately a struggle between good and evil. This way, the fictional representation can make it easier for «a public to accept» (Neumann and Nexon 2006: 19) a political speech or act where such sentiments function as a legitimizing force. George W. Bush's «You're either with us, or against us»-speech comes to mind as a particularly good example, where normalized assumptions of a manichean world made it possible to forcefully convey a particular message.

²⁶ It is important to note, however, that popular culture can also be ‘invariance-bursting’ and incite discursive change (Kiersey and Neumann 2013: 5). This will be clear from the empirical analysis that follows in Chapter 5, as popular cultural representations of Norwegian resistance during World War Two contest the dominant position in the discourse although they mainly function to reproduce and strengthen it.

²⁷ See Nilssen (2015) for an account of how media contributes to the discursive construction of Norway as Western and therefore different from Russia, and Markussen (2016) for an analysis of how the Norwegian TV-series «Okkupert» naturalizes the same differentiation.

Thus, it seems clear how following the poststructuralist ontological assumption that everything is text, enables meaningful study of popular culture as constitutive of the social reality. By actualizing and thus reproducing other representations that already enjoy a privileged position in the discursive economy, fictional second-order representations can strengthen and normalize these representations, and this way contribute to establishing them as true and commonsensical. However, as will be discussed in the next section, tracing such normalization in an empirical analysis can be complicated from a methodological point of view. Perhaps, and as I will suggest in this thesis, even to such an extent that it can be helpful to seek inspiration outside of IR in order to develop a better and more specific understanding of *how* popular culture functions as a normalizing force in processes of discursive identity construction.

2.3. Methodological considerations: the source material challenge

As discussed earlier, poststructuralist discourse analysis is radical in its approach to IR in the sense that it makes bold ontological and epistemological assumptions. Naturally then, the methodological approach it employs is also goes against the mainstream. This primarily has to do with its resistance to what is traditionally seen as ‘scientific’ terms and concepts, such as causality, reliability and validity. The poststructuralist project is, as we have seen, all about challenging the positivist agenda that has taken hold of IR among other disciplines. And so, distancing the discourse analytical approach from the methodological principles of positivist approaches has been very important, even for poststructuralists not supporting the rather polemic anti-science sentiments most notably furthered by Foucault and Derrida (Hansen 2006: xix)²⁸. I appreciate the reluctance to employ scientific, positivist terms and concepts when analyzing discourse in international relations, but at the same time support efforts to clarify how discourse analysis can best be conducted without sacrificing the philosophical essence of the approach. However, striking this balance is easier said than done.

Whereas questions of reliability, validity and causality, and why discourse analysis is prone to neglecting principles such as these, will be discussed in the section on research design later, this section will address the methodological challenge regarding scope of source material that inevitably comes with the poststructuralist philosophy science. This is because it is this challenge in particular that motivates the theoretical exploration that will follow later in this chapter. As with every other methodological challenge facing discourse analysis, the source material-challenge comes as a consequence of taking seriously the ontological assumption that there is nothing outside of text. Because if there is nothing outside of text, everything can be studied as discursive representations. Hansen’s (2006) methodological approach in her analysis of the Balkan discourse and representations of the Bosnian war illustrates this challenge well, as she offers plentiful suggestions to further readings across a variety of genres that could, and perhaps should, supplement her study. ²⁹Thus, she advocates

²⁸ Der Derian (1989) similarly argues that intertextual theorizing must take a «self-conscious step away from the dominant formalistic and ahistoric trends in international relations theory» and that it is «clearly not a process of scientific verification» (ibid.: 7). However, he shies away from extreme anti-method sentiments by trying to find something of a middle ground, as he vaguely holds that intertextuality should not be «construed as intrinsically anti-scientific» (ibid.).

²⁹ Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (2003) is another good example of a discourse analysis that makes use of a wide array of sources.

a ‘the more the better’-attitude with regards to source material that in addition to laying the foundation for thorough, interesting and indeed creative and innovative empirical research, raises some difficult questions on the issue of how to choose source material (Markussen 2016). Bratberg addresses the same problematique in referencing Neumann’s (2002b) analysis of Norway’s choice to stay out of the EU to demonstrate that the potential scope of source material in a discourse analysis is «approximately unlimited» (Bratberg 2014: 55)³⁰. Moreover, he discusses whether or not there should be criteria for choosing which texts to investigate in order to meet this challenge.

Some from the strictly anti-science branch of poststructuralism might argue that using such criteria compromises the essence of the poststructuralist approach by imposing positivist rigor on textual analysis that is intended to be purely interpretive. However, e.g. Hansen (2006) and Neumann (2001b) illustrate that methodology and poststructuralism *can* go hand in hand, and thus criteria have been suggested. One is given by Ted Hopf (2002), who studies everyday communication as discourse and justifies his choice of source material by arguing that a discourse analysis should capture diversity (Bratberg 2014: 55). Hansen gives another one, echoing the discussion above on how discourse analyses tend to focus on elite and state practices, as she argues that discourse is best studied in central texts, i.e. representations articulated by elites, close to actual foreign policy decision making (Bratberg 2014: 55). Similarly, Wæver (2002) advocates a «‘bias’ towards texts by leading political figures», and argues that in exercising such a bias one is certain not to «miss a dominant position» (ibid.: 42).

Interestingly, and as discussed previously, it is the realization that source material can be justifiably unlimited, free from the science-like, disciplining shackles of criteria, that enables the study of popular culture as discourse. As such, one could make the argument that the pop culture turn is quintessentially poststructuralist, and that for this reason imposing criteria for selection of sources would be contradictory at the very least. Thus, in using such criteria, the pop culture turn would seem to distance itself from its very foundational principles. Yet, here too, criteria have been given.

One example of the suggestion of such criteria can be found in Neumann’s (2001a) analysis of Star Trek and diplomacy. His justification for selecting Star Trek as his specific

³⁰ Translation my own.

object of analysis is twofold. First, he argues that the popularity of the show makes it suitable for discourse analysis; because vast amounts of people watch the show and engage with it through «heavily institutionalised fandom» (ibid.: 608) that produces franchise merchandise and hold conventions among other things, the show can be assumed to partake in constituting the social reality of its viewers. A very similar argument is made by Weldes (1999) in her analysis of Star Trek in its relation to US foreign policy discourse, and is also reiterated in Kiersey and Neumann's (2013) *Battlestar Galactica and International Relations*. Secondly, Neumann (2001a: 608) argues that studying Star Trek as discourse in IR is worthwhile because what happens on the show is directly relatable to 'real world' issues in international relations that the audience can easily familiarize with.

Cynthia Weber offers a different way of qualifying selection of pop culture representations to analyze as discourse. In *Imagining America at War* (2006) she argues that in the aftermath of the September 11-terrorist attacks the US was in a position to redefine its identity in terms of Self/Other-relations by «rethinking who we are» (ibid.: 2), and that film played a particularly important role in this process. Because September 11 was «a liminal moment in US history» (ibid.) where state identity was highly fluctuating, the influence of film as a naturalizing force was unusually strong. In referring to the war on terror, she compellingly argues that «the cinema was as much a battlefield in this war as were the ruins in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. and the cities and countrysides of the soon-to-be bombed Afghanistan and, later, Iraq» (Weber 2006: 1). Thus, Weber gives a criterion for selection that is more specific than Neumann's (2001a), as she emphasizes the importance of immediate context when suggesting that analyzing film as discourse is of special interest in times of liminality, i.e. in times when state identity is particularly fluctuating and thus malleable.

However, Weber's criterion is similar to Neumann's in the sense that neither one seeks to privilege one *type* of representation over another, e.g. official discourse over the media or popular culture. Rather, they both give criteria in order to *specify characteristics* of popular culture representations, being one such *type*, that make them suitable for discourse analysis. As such, they do not seem to contradict the poststructuralist assumptions that enable the study of popular culture as discourse after all. Quite the contrary, they embody these assumptions by virtue of partaking in the popular culture turn, while at the same time

developing the methodology of discourse analysis by improving the understanding of how to approach it empirically. Inspired by Neumann's criteria of popularity and circulation of social energies and Weber's criterion of liminality, and following discourse analysts that support moderate methodological advances for the approach such as Hansen, and Neumann, I will suggest another criterion for the study of popular culture as discourse, namely when watching film and TV-series can be conceptualized as rituals of embodied movement. Thus, the following two sections will argue that poststructuralist IR can borrow insights from collective memory studies, and more specifically apply Grant David Bollmer's (2011) theory on 'virtual systems of memory' to discourse analysis, in order to improve its theoretical understanding of the functions of the discursive economy and use this insight to target its empirical approach.

2.4. Collective memory studies and poststructuralist IR

Before turning to Bollmer (2011), having a look at how collective memory studies might be compatible with poststructuralist IR seems in place. Although it is commonly located in the field of sociology, collective memory studies has recently made advances and gained significant traction across disciplines. As such, it has emerged as a cross-disciplinary discipline of its own (Klein 2000: 127-128, Zerubavel 1995: 3)³¹ that, as will be held here, can be, and should be, linked to IR.

Some poststructuralist IR theorists touch on the concept of memory when theorizing discourse. One example of this, and an excellent illustration of how discourse analysis and collective memory studies might link up, can be found in Maja Zehfuss' (2003) article *Forget September 11*. Here, she compellingly argues that in the aftermath of September 11, memory functioned as a political force in the sense that remembering the terror attacks in a certain way enabled the construction of a particular 'we' versus 'them' that in turn conditioned foreign policy. Therefore, we need to 'Forget September', she holds, in order to see in what sense it was a «distinct event» (Zehfuss in Devetak 2013: 193) and to grasp the complexity of American and Western identity. Thus, in arguing that «the problematic of memory destabilises the possibility of straightforward knowledge» (Zehfuss 2003: 513)³². Zehfuss seems to be suggesting a reading of discourse as memory, where the discursive representations that a collective remembers are those that dominate the discursive economy. As such, collective remembering is conceptualized as a key functioning principle of discursive representation; *the way in which* a collective remembers something conditions how this something can be represented, and in turn how the collective can apprehend the world and constitute itself as part of this world. Thus, collective memories are, along with representations, part of the inevitable layer of interpretation between the observer and that

³¹ Olick and Robbins (1998) supports this point, but argues that it has the appearance of a 'centerless enterprise', that lacks direction and structure.

³² Again, Wendt (1999: 154) and Lagenbacher (2010: 21-22) can be mentioned other examples of IR theorists that deal with collective memory. These are not really relevant here, however, as they employ a constructivist approach to IR, and as such they seem to conceptualize collective memory as a social fact that can impact values and ideas.

which is being observed³³. Naturally then, improved understanding of how collective memory works, might entail improved understanding of how the discursive economy works.

Directing our attention to collective memory studies, this reading of memory as discourse must be placed in what Jeffrey Olick terms the ‘collectivist culture’ in collective memory studies (Olick 1999: 333, 341-343). It differentiates from the ‘individualist culture’ in the sense that it conceptualizes memory as something purely collective rather than an «aggregation of socially framed individual memories» (ibid.: 333). In drawing up this distinction and pointing to the fact that studies of collective memory paradoxically can be individualistic, Olick emphasizes how theorizations and analysis of collective memory «can be deceptive» (ibid.: 342, footnote 13) in that they fail to take seriously the collective quality of collective memory. Accordingly, «a residual individualism is sometimes hidden», and thus the «overall ontology» is rarely collectivist (ibid.).

However, some do attempt to take the collective quality of collective memory seriously, and are quite successful in theorizing and analyzing the concept. Maurice Halbwachs, the French sociologist who coined the term ‘collective memory’ and who is referenced in nearly every text on the subject, can be credited with this feat (Maier 2007: 15-16, Olick 2008: 26). Much like a poststructuralist understands the individual’s perception of the world as something that is conditioned upon construction of meaning through collective discursive representation, Halbwachs (1980: 23) understands individual memory as something that can only exist in collective terms (Maier 2007: 16-17, Olick 1999: 341). Yet, as will be discussed in the next section, an argument can be made that even Halbwachs’ theory is not collectivist in the strict sense of the term (Bollmer 2011: 452-454). His position nonetheless serves well to demonstrate the key feature of the collectivist culture, namely the focus on collective memory as something ontologically distinct³⁴.

As it happens, this position is highly recognizable in IR as well. As we have seen, by virtue of its emphasis on the way meaning is created in text, poststructuralism in IR theory also emphasizes collectivity as an inescapable feature of reality that all constitution of meaning must operate in; the way meaning is constituted in text is a purely collective

³³ It is important to stress that collective memories does not precede discursive representation. It is rather an intrinsic part of the process of meaning production and thus cannot be separated from it.

³⁴ For a discussion of Halbwach’s conception of collective memory in relation to Pierre Nora and Paul Ricoeur, two other seminal figures in the field, see Lavabre (2012).

process, where it is assumed that nothing that is isolated can have meaning at all³⁵. And the same seems to go for the collectivist culture of collective memory that Olick identifies; memory exists only collectively, the same way meaning in text exists only collectively.

This way, it seems clear that certain theorizations of collective memory, namely those residing in the collectivist culture, can be compatible with poststructuralist IR. A testament to their ontological compatibility can be found in the theoretical references that collective memory research employs. Especially Foucault, who comes with strong poststructuralist sentiments, stands out as a figure that is relevant in both disciplines. IR theorists such as Campbell, Hansen, Weber are heavily inspired by his thinking, and so are collective memory scholars such as Berthold Molden (2016) and Anaheed Al-Hardan (2015). Liked Plate and Anneke Smelik (2009) is another good illustration, as they draw on Foucault's concept of 'technology of sex' in their volume on technologies of collective memories in the arts. Moreover, research on collective memory often analyzes state identity and how the people of a nation comes to remember a certain past rather than another (Cui 2012, Hartnack 2012). Thus, the two disciplines are also compatible in that they have a shared empirical interest. This makes the overlap even more evident, and the argument that collective memory theory represents untapped and perhaps even wasted resources for IR even stronger. Motivated by this potential for theoretical enrichment, and by the need for methodological development and empirical targeting in discourse analysis that was discussed in the last section, the thesis will now go on to apply Bollmer's (2011) theory on 'virtual systems of memory' to poststructuralist IR.

³⁵ This is perhaps most evident when considering that all meaning is produced through language. And given that language is by definition collective, the production of meaning must be collective too.

2.5. Collective memory and rituals of embodied movement

Grant David Bollmer (2011) explicitly addresses the specifically collective character of collective memory. Evidently, he can be found in the outskirts of the collectivist camp, as he bluntly criticizes it for not being properly collectivist. Although he gives Halbwachs (1980), Connerton (1989) and others right in claiming that individual memory cannot exist independently of the collective, he argues that such theorizations do not take their commitment to the collective seriously, as they almost exclusively defer to the individual, psychic memory when attempting to understand and analyze the collective. Moreover, these approaches tend to assume the existence of the collective prior to remembering, leaving them unable to account for the *production* of the collective through the functioning of memory (ibid.: 454). Thus, Bollmer holds, the «ontological specificity» of collective memory is often neglected in collective memory studies, as it is rarely theorized as «an entity that remembers differently from psychic individuals» (ibid.: 452). Bollmer's agenda then, is to be the missing link, and provide collective memory studies with a new theorization of collective memory, placing the ontological specificity of the collective at the centre of attention, right where it belongs.

In doing so, Bollmer leans heavily on Henri Bergson's concepts of *virtual* and *actual* memory, and Gilles Deleuze's reading of these. The distinction between the two concepts can be defined as follows: «*history is the virtual presence of all events that have ever happened and memory is the actualization of history in space as embodied movement*»³⁶ (Bollmer 2011: 454). Thus, as argued in the previous section, memory has the capacity to determine what is to be considered true and real. By seizing a particular version of the virtual past, memory «imports the past into the present» (Bergson quoted in Bollmer 2011: 455), actualizes it and makes it 'real' in the here and the now. Bollmer emphasizes however, in specifying the concept of time that grounds his approach, that the virtual and the actual are not really dichotomous. Rather, they should be seen as acting in tandem in the production of the present, a theoretical point captured perfectly by Bergson in his argument that «the whole of the past is contained [...] in each moment of the present» (Grosz quoted in Bollmer 2011: 455). As such, «the past lives in time» (ibid.) and cannot be separated ontologically from the present.

³⁶ Italics in original.

Elaborating on this point, Deleuze's idea of labyrinthine time, building on Bergson's concept of duration, can be helpful. In the virtual state, Deleuze holds, time appears as a labyrinth without a centre, expanding outwards, where all versions of the past, and accordingly potential presents, co-exist. In the actual, however, time appears as a straight line. As such, the process of importing the past into the present, of actualizing the virtual, can also be seen as a process of turning the labyrinth into a straight line. Importantly, Deleuze stresses the fact that the labyrinth and the line are not dichotomies, and thus time never exists as either a complete labyrinth or a complete line (Deleuze 1989: 131, Martin-Jones 2006: 23-24)³⁷. It is, like identity according to Campbell (1998: 12), «always in a process of becoming».

Building on by the idea of a virtual systems of memory, functioning kind of like a bank of memories from which collectives perpetually actualize to constitute the present, Bollmer (2011) goes on to theorize collective memory as something with a specific ontological quality, completely distinct from concepts of individual memory. In doing so, Bollmer argues that actualizing certain versions of the virtual «by the active use of the past to differentiate» from other collectives through acts of *embodied movement* is what produces the collective. This can be taken to mean that only «literal, material formation» where certain versions of the virtual past is employed and given meaning, can produce collective memories that in turn produce the collective and defines it as different from other collectives (ibid.: 458). Bollmer uses the Tea Party movement as an illustration, and argues that by gathering at rallies and actualizing a very specific version of the past, referencing particular historical events and texts in order to construct the collective as something distinct and unique. Thus, the collective can physically enact the truth (ibid.: 457). Although Bollmer does not use the terms himself, both the performative and the relational quality of identity construction as highlighted in poststructuralist theory, permeates his theorization. His emphasis on embodied movement and differentiation captures this very well.

Importantly, Bollmer argues that when such formation is momentary, as it often is, memory returns to the virtual. After all «'forgetting' is far more prevalent» (Bollmer 2011: 459) than remembering. Therefore, he continues, repetition of embodied movement in

³⁷ Interestingly, Shapiro (2009) apply Deleuze to his study of cinema in international relations. He seems to do so with out the collective memory-connection, however, as he concentrates on Deleuze's concept of how cinema functions as a technology for producing signs (ibid.: 5).

ritualistic assemblage is essential in order for a distinct collective capable of actualizing the virtual past to be produced. It is through rituals of actualizing the past that a collective can perform itself as just that, a collective, and as such, rituals are «processes of collective memory» that «cannot be reduced to the persistence of the past in the body of a single human» (ibid.). Thus, they provide the collective memory with ontological specificity; ritualistic material formation invokes memories, i.e. actualizes the virtual, in a way that individuals are incapable of. Moreover, Bollmer stresses that rituals can take on many different forms, and are not restricted to physical assemblage such as a rally or a demonstration. Rituals can also be enacted in the everyday lives of the individuals constituting a collective. Watching a TV-show or cooking are highlighted as examples. Thus, Bollmer distances himself from more structuralist approaches such as Halbwachs', as he applies a more dynamic understanding in arguing that rituals are not part of a stable and given collective structure that shapes the memories of individuals, but rather a force that, by invoking certain memories through embodied movement, contributes to the production of the collective itself (ibid.: 459-460). Drawing on Deleuze's concept of labyrinthine and linear time, David Martin-Jones (2006: 29) makes a similar argument by making the case that films must «perpetually reimpose a single straight line» in order to be able to *reterritorialize* the labyrinth and consolidate national identity. Importantly though, he also stresses how films possess the potential to *detrterritorialize* if such a perpetual reimposing, reminiscent of a ritual, does not take place³⁸.

As such, because TV and film can function as rituals, Bollmer's (2011) theorization can be applied to the popular culture turn in poststructuralist IR. Like other rituals, TV and film take part in the everyday production of the collective cultural understanding that makes apprehension of foreign policy possible. However, the problem of momentary formation and the risk of memories returning to the virtual is highly present in the case of TV and film. Just watching a film for instance, does not necessarily invoke memories that can produce a collective. For this reason, Bollmer stresses the point that «collective memory can only be sustained through the ritualistic use of film, continuously performing the collective». This can take place, he continues, «through discussions about the film, events such as fan

³⁸ This reminds us of Kiersey and Neumann's (2013: 5) argument that popular culture can be invariance-bursting, meaning it has the capacity to incite discursive change.

festivals³⁹ [...] or the airing of as specific film at a specific time every year» (ibid.: 461). On a more general note, however, Bollmer defines ritual as «one specific mechanism for the continuous actualization of history in a specific social formation» (ibid.: 459). Specifying this claim, he draws on Paul Connerton to make the case that ritual is an especially effective such mechanism because it has the capacity to help collectives «whose duration exceeds that of the lifespan of any single individual» to «‘remember’ in common» (Connerton 1989: 38). In order to offer such help, he holds, a ritual cannot be «bound by space or physical co-presence». Moreover, this unboundedness indicates the «sheer complexity, hybridity and contradictory nature of rituals». As such, rituals are very hard to box, and should not be treated as something specific and formalized. Also testament to this point is Bollmer’s (2011: 459) reference to Richard Schechner (2006), who argues that all performances in the everyday «consist of ritualized gestures» and that «Even when we think we’re being spontaneous and original, most of what we do and utter has been done and said before - by us even» (ibid.: 52). This is significant because it highlights the loose and fluid quality of ritual as a mechanism; even mundane and seemingly trivial statements and practices often take part in rituals, and contribute to the perpetual actualization of collective memories.

Bollmer (2011) then, offers up a broad conceptualization of rituals that allows for them, not only to take on different forms such as watching a TV-show or cooking, but to be more dynamic and fluid within those forms. As such, film as ritual is not limited to the examples gives, e.g. watching the same film at the same time every year. Not being bound by space or physical co-presence and ever present in the everyday of the collective it constitutes, ritual seems to be ritual by virtue of repeating the actualization of certain collective memories, and not much else. I argue then, that within Bollmer’s framework, *different* film’s can be part of the *same* ritual, as they tell the same story or forward the same discursive representations. Thus, analyzing film as ritual does not require that one specific film is watched at a specific time every year, as in Bollmer's exemplification. Such a take would entail a more stringent conceptualization of ritual than the one Bollmer adheres to. Rather, relying on Bollmer’s conceptualization while taking his exemplifications for what they are, namely exemplifications, enables approaching film as ritual more openly and more

³⁹ As we remember, Neumann (2001a: 608) uses this very same argument when making the case for analyzing Star Trek for insights on diplomacy. Incidentally, Bollmer also cites Star Trek as an illustration of such ‘institutionalised fandom’.

dynamically. This in turn, I argue, promises more intriguing empirical endeavors, in which film and TV can be analyzed as discourse while theorized as perpetual actualizations of memories that are capable of constituting a collective.

Given this dynamic reading of ritual and the assertion that different films can be part of the same ritual considering they tell similar stories and forward the same representations, films and TV-series on Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation during World War Two, can indeed be analyzed using this framework. Although the selection of films for the analysis will be dealt with in the chapter on research design later, it is worth pausing at here as it illustrates the dynamic reading of ritual well. *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water* (1948), *Nine Lives* (1957), *Max Manus* (2008) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015a-f) are the popular cultural representations that will be analyzed. These three films and one TV-series engage with the same general theme. More than that, the way in which they represent this general theme, particularly as a way of discursively constructing Norwegian identity, is similar in important ways. This way they repeat the actualization of certain collective memories and watching them functions as a ritual. This is most evident in the case *Operation Swallow* and *The Heavy Water War* as they tell the same story, but also true for *Nine Lives* and *Max Manus* as they link themselves intertextually to *Operation Swallow* and *The Heavy Water War* and takes part in the naturalization of Norwegian identity.

It is important to stress, however, that more than giving a criterion for the section of text, the theoretical argument presented here enhances understanding of how discursive representation and identity construction in international relations functions. When forming a ritual of embodied movement, popular cultural representations acquire an ability that they would not have if standing alone, namely that of keeping memories actualized. It is my hope that the empirical analysis that follows will further illuminate the functioning of such representational cooperation, and pay favors to the appliance of collective memory studies to IR.

3. Methodology and research design

In this chapter I will move on from theoretical reflections and explorations to concentrate on *how* the discourse analysis will be conducted. Before getting to the actual research design, however, I will revisit questions of methodology in order to address some of the methodological challenges that face a discourse analysis. This will also allow me to clarify my stance on discourse analytical methodology at large. By engaging in the debate over source material and selection of text, advocating a modest rigorization of discourse analytical methods, the theory chapter did indeed do some solid foreshadowing on this behalf. Nonetheless, a clearer articulation and a more thorough discussion of these issues is called for. More specifically, I will address the (im)possibility of detecting causality, and the prospects of providing reliable and valid results when conducting a discourse analysis. Furthermore, these challenges will be discussed in relation to the study of popular culture as discourse.

Without losing sight of these foundational questions of discourse analytical research, I will proceed by dealing with the more practical side of the challenge at hand, and lay out *how* I will go by conducting the analysis. As such, I will discuss what one should look for when analyzing discourse in general and popular culture as discourse in particular. Moreover, I will qualify my choice of source material, with special reference to the criterion that was developed in the theory chapter. Finally, given that the identification of basic discourses and the development of an analytical lens is also part of the discourse analytical method, this prelude to the analysis of popular culture as discourse, will also be discussed here.

3.1. Methodological considerations

As should be evident by now, the discourse analysis that is to be conducted in this thesis is of poststructuralist leaning. By emphasizing the ontological inseparability of e.g. text and practice, it differs significantly from critical discourse analysis, that is routinely set up as the other main approach (Bratberg 2014: 43-46, Fairclough 1992: 72, Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 104)⁴⁰. Often associated with thinkers such as Foucault⁴¹, Derrida, Kristeva and Butler, poststructuralists have developed a reputation for being inherently anti-scientific and against method. This has much to do with their skepticism of facts and ontological rejection of ‘correct’ knowledge. Tellingly, Derrida deems methodology a Western construct reeking of positivism and accordingly advocates the need for a non-method (Hansen 2006: xix). Foucault (1976: 182) on his part argues that slapping the science-label on some forms of research has harmful disciplining effects. Yet, Hansen (2006: xix) convincingly makes the case that poststructuralism and methodology need not be polar opposites and that rejecting narrow conceptions of science does not entail a defiance of method. And thus, she rallies: «it’s time for poststructuralism to take methodology back» (ibid.). Similarly, Neumann (2001b: 14) argues that although social scientists ought be concerned with the philosophical grounding of their research, they need methods in order to add something to the knowledge that is being produced by philosophers. In this thesis I support Neumann’s position and applaud Hansen rallying call: I am of the conviction too that some degree of methodological rigor can be imposed on discourse analytical methods without sacrificing the philosophical essence and desirability of the approach. For instance, it seems clear that even anti-method figureheads such as Derrida and Foucault did incredibly meticulous and rigorous work that unavoidably, although perhaps implicitly, uses methods relying on «strategies, inclusions and exclusions». Acknowledging the value of methodology then, opens up a space for «debating poststructuralist analyses [...] for a stronger theoretical account of the use of identity in foreign policy» (Hansen 2006: xix). It is in this space that my theoretical argument and empirical analysis operate.

⁴⁰ Both poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis is a lot more varied than this caricature suggests. See Wodak (2004) for an account of the width and complexity of critical discourse analysis and Hansen (2006) for an account of the many facets of poststructuralism.

⁴¹ Interestingly, Norman Fairclough (1992), the critical discourse analyst par excellence, leans heavily on Foucault as well. This illustrates well the difficulty of streamlining and drawing a sharp line between the two approaches.

However, such a defense of poststructuralist methodology must be met with caution, as it is important not to read it as an encouragement to employ positivist terms and concepts in discourse analyses. Although the poststructuralist philosophy of science does not categorically bar methodological advances, it certainly bars a causal epistemology as well as the possibility of strictly valid and reliable conclusions. Importantly, these are not flaws or shortcomings in the discourse analytical research design, but rather necessary results of philosophical convictions.

Firstly then, given the poststructuralist philosophy of science *causality* is impossible. From the ontological position that no pre-discursive, unmediated reality exists follows the conclusion that one cannot single out and measure causes and effects. As all meaning is continuously produced and reproduced through discursive statements and practices, we can never point to and isolate one variable and analyze its impact. Rather, it is the production of meaning itself, and the *conditions for*, rather than the *causes of*, certain outcomes that must concern us. Put in an IR specific context, the classic illustration is identity's inability to cause a certain foreign policy. Because «identities are produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy discourse», no identity can exist «prior to and independently of foreign policy» (Hansen 2006: 26). As such, they co-constitute one another and are «ontologically inseparable» (ibid.: 27). Naturally then, they cannot be listed and analyzed as dependent and independent variable⁴². The study of popular culture as discourse is grounded in this ontological position and thus iterates this point further. As it is assumed to have naturalizing effects on social reality, popular culture is an intriguing object of analysis not because it can cause a certain foreign policy outcome, but because it can contribute to the intertextual production of meaning that makes certain foreign policy outcomes possible.

Moreover, the poststructuralist philosophy of science, encouraging the analysis of meaning in text and looking for constitutive rather than causal effects, necessitates a deeply interpretive approach. Such analytical endeavors are complicated, as they aim at exploring

⁴² Here, the difference between poststructuralism and other interpretive approaches such as constructivism emerges in clear colors. Wendt (1999: 87) e.g. argues that generating hypotheses that can be tested should be a goal even for constitutive theories, and Price and Reus-Smith (1998: 279, 282) hold that «some measure of causality» (Hansen 2006: 10) must be in place in order for a study on identity in international relations to be valuable. Banta (2013) makes the case that discourse analysis can and should detect causality, and thus further illustrates the difference between poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis that was discussed earlier, by suggesting that the latter is best equipped to do such research.

infinitely complex processes, looking for patterns in statements and practices that might reveal what assumptions and accepted truths ground them and make them possible (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999 :31). Naturally then, discourse analyses cannot provide results that are scientifically sound , meaning they are in accordance with strict positivist principles of *validity* and *reliability* (Bratberg 2014: 53-54). For instance, being interpretive to the bone, discourse analysis is a hypothesis-generating rather than hypothesis-testing exercise. In spite of often relying on some sort of open analytical framework then, the discourse analyst does not know exactly and precisely what he or she is looking for; that would severely compromise the interpretive spirit of the approach and signal a departure from the poststructuralist ontology. Accordingly a discourse analysis staying true to its essence cannot operationalize its analytical terms and concepts, and is robbed of the opportunity to beat its chest with claims of *internal validity* (ibid.). Moreover, *external validity* is just as problematic, because interpreting text in order to analyze the production of meaning does not allow for generalization. Much like a historical investigation, discourse analysis is generally case specific and strives to examine particular processes of production of meaning rather than generating general theories (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 14, 21-24). Providing generalizable results would, like operationalization, clash with poststructuralist principles, as it would assume the existence of a generalizable, pre-discursive world. Finally, *reliability*, referring to the possibility of replicating an analysis, is another positivist research ideal that discourse analyses cannot meet. Once again, the interpretivist nature of the approach spoils the fun. As the analysis relies heavily on the thoughts, reflections, and interpreting abilities of the researchers, it cannot be replicated (Bratberg 2014: 54-55). That is to say, two researchers doing an analysis of the same discursive material would most likely not make the same findings.

It is important to note, however, that in this respect, poststructuralism is not only different from rationalist approaches striving to emulate the natural sciences, but from other interpretive approaches as well. Bratberg (ibid.: 18-19, 21, 33) emphasizes how discourse analysis is *more* reliant on interpretive techniques as compared to e.g. a constructivist ideational analysis. This has to do with poststructuralisms ambition to ‘unmask’ the way in

which power and knowledge production operates in society (Adler 1997: 333)⁴³. Given that these are not easily detectable things, deep interpretation is absolute key.

It is imperative to stress yet again that the ‘failure’ of poststructuralist discourse analysis to provide scientifically sound results cannot be blamed on problems regarding research design, and it is not due to a stubborn, perhaps even childish, unwillingness to play by the rules describing how to do science ‘right’. It is, on the other hand, a result of philosophical convictions and of the insistence on taking these convictions seriously (Hansen 2006: 26). More than not being a flaw or a shortcoming, however, a strong case can be made that the reluctance to employ positivist terms and concepts in discourse analysis can in fact be an asset. Where the poststructuralist philosophy of science renders discourse analysis unable to do certain things, like detecting causality, operationalizing the analytical framework and providing generalizable and replicable results, it enables it to do other things. For instance, Hansen (ibid.: 45) suggests that different readings of the same discursive material can offer different and equally interesting takes. After all, two different analyses finding different results do not necessarily find opposing results. Naturally then, readings can be complementary and contribute to the overall understanding of the processes operating in a discursive field. As such, a less stringent methodology can be a good thing, as it allows for more flexibility and appreciates the unique contribution of the individual researcher.

However, the advocacy of a less stringent methodology should not be equated with a spirit of ‘anything goes’. As stressed thoroughly already, Hansen and others argue that «it is possible to establish methodological and theoretical criteria for good discourse analysis» (Hansen 2006: 45) without compromising the poststructuralist philosophy of science. Revisiting the issue of replicability is enlightening in this respect: whereas the discourse analyst cannot give a recipe-like account of his/her research given the interpretive nature of the approach, he/she can undoubtedly lay out the dominant interpretations and ket empirical material, in order to make it easier for other researchers to identify it as adequate, weak or something else (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 133). As «infallable criteria exist only in the land of positivist mythology» (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 172), discourse analysis is

⁴³ Critical theory is different from poststructuralism in that it has explicitly emancipatory ambitions. Endeavors to reveal power structures and how discursive constructions cause oppression can qualify the use of deeply interpretive methods as well, and as such the two approaches can overlap (Adler 1997: 333).

not all that different from other brands of science, as all it can do is to try and *do as good research as possible* within the framework set by the philosophical convictions that functions to delimit and indeed enable it.

3.2. Research design I: identifying basic discourses

In order to *do as good research as possible* I will proceed to lay out my research design. The analysis consists of two parts, or rather a prelude followed by the actual analysis. Both the prelude and the actual analysis are part of the discourse analytical method, and therefore both part of the research design that needs to be accounted for.

When analyzing text as discourse, one should look for *signs* that reveal the meaning behind the text and the truths it takes for granted. Looking for such signs in text, however, is a challenging endeavor that can resemble taking a shot in the dark. Therefore, identifying *basic discourses* in order to develop an analytical framework can be helpful. Basic discourses are ideal-typical discursive representations that serve to highlight «the main points of contestation within a debate» (Hansen 2006: 52). They are the greatest hits or the highlights of the game, singling out the themes and trends around which we can structure a discursive field. As such, basic discourses «provide a lens through which a multitude of different representations and policies can be seen as systematically connected». Moreover, they «identify key points of structuring disagreement within a debate» and are a «good indication of where ‘discursive fault lines’ might be located» (ibid.). Thus, employing basic discourses to build an analytical framework can give the analysis of specific texts direction and structure, and importantly function to clarify its empirical relevance by placing it within larger processes of discursive construction and contestation.

The primary method for identifying basic discourses is to read massive amounts of text, relying on a diverse and wealthy source material in order to make sure the whole picture is captured. As a mapping of the discursive construction of Norwegian identity is not my concern in this thesis, I will have to take a short-cut and use a different method, namely a «structured reading of conceptual history» (ibid.: 53). Neumann (2001c) has, in his analysis of the discursive construction that has enabled Norway to stay out of the EU, written a conceptual history of Norwegian identity construction. As such, basic discourses can be identified by conducting a ‘structured reading’ of his text. My structured reading will not rely entirely on this one text, however. As Neumann’s analysis narrowly focuses on representations that enabled certain statements in the EU-debates, some elaborations and the use of supplementary sources, especially regarding the representation of Norway as a peace nation, is called for. Leira's (2004, 2005, 2013) work on the topic will be used as the main

source of insight. By identifying basic discourses of Norwegian identity then, I will develop an analytical framework, giving the analysis of film and TV-series direction and structure. On a more practical note, I will draw on and reference the basic discourses, the key points and ‘discursive fault lines’, in order to discuss how popular cultural representations of Norwegian resistance during World War Two relates to these.

3.3. Research design II: analyzing popular culture as discourse

Moving on to the reading of specific texts and analyzing them as discourse, the first thing to note is that signs that indicate Self- and Othering, i.e. the relational construction of identity, is of the essence. By engaging in «dual processes of *linking* and *differentiation*»⁴⁴ (Hansen 2006: 42) specific texts invoke signs that contribute to discursive construction both by creating sameness and coherence, and by establishing distance. As such, signs that link construct positive identity, while signs that differentiate construct negative identity.⁴⁵ In our case, a good illustration is how the filmic representation of Norway as inherently good due to the role it played in the defeat of nazism links with the representation of Norway as morally superior due to its peace engagement, and differentiates from the representation Germany as inherently evil.

Although Self-and Othering is at the center of attention when analyzing discourse, it is important to keep in mind that not all Othering is explicit Othering of the kind where clear dichotomies are set up (Hansen 2006: 44, Wæver 2002: 24). For instance, in the films and TV-series analyzed in this thesis, Norway is rarely, if ever, explicitly characterized as good, or Germany as evil. Nor are the two of them schematically juxtaposed in order to ascribe to them opposite qualities. Rather, the juxtaposition is more subtle, and relies on signs that are invoking sentiments of good and evil by relating to basic discourses through processes of linking and differentiation. As such, the heavy emphasis on the importance of Norwegian resistance can be read as linking the specific text to the basic discourse by invoking sentiments of superiority that indeed is a ‘fault line’ in the wider field of discursive construction and contestation. A discourse analysis of specific texts then, should look for signs through the analytical lens provided by the identification of basic discourses. As such, it will be able to scrutinize how the texts in question confirm or contest patterns of linking and differentiation and thus how they contribute to discursive construction through the process of Self- and Othering (Hansen 2006 41-42, Neumann 2001b: 60-62).

I will employ this method when analyzing film TV-series as discourse. In specific this will entail watching the film or TV-series in question with an open mind, only guided by the

⁴⁴ Italics added.

⁴⁵ By emphasizing the difference between linking and differentiation and positive and negative identity construction, Hansen (2006) goes a step further than Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 127-130) who seem to conceptualize Self- and Othering as a process of negative differentiation only.

analytical lens provided by the basic discourses. Upon finding a specific textual expression⁴⁶ that is of interest, that be a particular scene, a quote, a dialogue or even a theme, I will consider whether and how this piece of text relates to other pieces of text from the same film or TV-series, from the other film and TV-series and to the basic discourses. Such a consideration will include identifying signs that are recognizable from the basic discourses, and determining what the meaning of those signs might be. This includes deciding whether the signs link or differentiate, whether they contribute to positive or negative identity construction, if they reproduce a certain storyline or a more general narrative or even foundational assumptions, if they engage intertextually with one or more aspects of the basic discourses, and whether they do so with any particular strength and zeal. This is not an exhaustive list, but it nevertheless provides an overview of *how* I will read the films and TV-series as text. Once again then, it is imperative to stress that I will not go through this procedure by schematically checking and measure every sign that I find against the backdrop that is the basic discourses. Rather, I will use the basic discourses for direction, in order to investigate how the films and TV-series engage with Norwegian identity and contribute to its constitution.

One example that can illustrate the procedure of reading film and TV-series as discourse is Neumann's (2001a) analysis of Star Trek and diplomacy. Starting with his concern for and interest in American diplomacy, he sets out to map representations of this specific phenomenon. Having identified a liberal and a universal representation of American diplomacy, Neumann moves on to his real object of study, namely Star Trek, and the way in which it relates to American diplomacy (ibid.: 609-611). Here, he looks for signs in the popular cultural textual expression that might be relatable to American diplomacy, and thus of interest for the analysis. For instance, Neumann (ibid.: 617-618) pauses at the way in which diplomacy between the great powers in the Star Trek universe functions. Moreover, he identifies two representations of such diplomacy in the series: diplomacy as dissembling and diplomacy as universalizing. Furthermore, he looks to more specific scenes, quotes or cases in order to say more about these representations. One case in point is how he uses a Captain Picard quote to elaborate on the representation of diplomacy as universalizing (ibid.: 618).

⁴⁶ Again: popular culture, like practice, is read as text, i.e.all types of discursive representation in a poststructuralist discourse analysis.

Finally, Neumann (ibid.: 621) argues that his analysis of Star Trek, naturally being far more detailed and dense than my short summary here suggests, has demonstrated that popular culture links itself with and reproduces discursive representations from ‘real life’.

Like Neumann used American diplomacy to orient his analysis of Star Trek, I will use Norwegian identity to orient my analysis of films and TV-series about Norwegian resistance during World War Two. Also like Neumann, I will look for pieces of texts, or more general themes, that seem to relate to the basic discourse I have identified, and analyze the character and quality of this relation. This way, I will be able to account for the textual interplay between popular culture and other discursive representations in the construction of Norwegian identity.

Hansen (2006) identifies four intertextual research models. Model 1 deals with the analysis of official discourse, model 2 adds e.g. media and opposition party politicians to the mix, and model 3B is concerned with marginal representations and their role in altering discursive domination. I will employ model 3A, however, as it focuses on «representations of foreign policy issues as they are articulated within [...] ‘popular’ culture» (ibid.: 62). The possibility and indeed desirability of analyzing popular culture as it relates to foreign policy discourse, and specifically to the construction and operation of state identity, was thoroughly, and I believe adequately, discussed in the theory chapter. As such, a short reminder of the poststructuralist philosophy of science, and its bearings on the reading of popular culture as discourse, will suffice here. The poststructuralist ontology holds that all seeming truths are representations of reality rather than reality itself. For this reason, different types of representations, e.g. official discourse, the media and popular culture, are not ontologically different, and can be studied in the same way, using the same methods (Neumann and Nexon 2006: 7-8). As such, looking for and analyzing signs of linking and differentiation can be done with popular culture, as with e.g. official discourse. A testament to this point is the striking absence of reflections regarding specialized research methods in poststructuralist analyses of popular culture and IR⁴⁷. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that although popular culture can be invariance-bursting, i.e. has the capacity to contradict and alter the dominant

⁴⁷ See e.g. Neumann (2001a), Rowley and Weldes (2012) and Weldes (1999). Following Hansen and others in arguing that methodological rigor is compatible with poststructuralism this observation could be pointed out as a weakness in the approach, and suggested as another area that could benefit from more rigor and a development of methods. Nevertheless, it serves well to illustrate the point that popular culture can and should be analyzed as any other type of discursive text.

dynamics of the discourse, it is primarily its contribution to discursive representation by way of reproduction, reinforcement and naturalization that is of interest in Hansen's model 3A, and also in the analysis to follow here.

As for the selection of popular cultural expressions to analyze as discourse, I have already introduced the criterion of ritual. Thus the films that are analyzed are selected because they tell similar stories at different points in time, giving the act of watching them a ritualistic imprint. The ritualistic quality is most evident in the case of *Operation Swallow* (1948) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015a-f), as they both tell the story of the heavy water sabotage at Vemork. However, as we shall see, *Nine Lives* (1957) and *Max Manus* (2008) also take part in constituting the ritual, both because they link themselves intertextually with each other, and because they represent Norwegian identity in much the same way as *Operation Swallow* and *The Heavy Water War*.

In addition to dividing the films and TV-series thematically by pointing to the similarity between the two representation of the heavy water sabotage, we can divide them by time of release. *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* were released relatively shortly after World War Two and thus had to operate in a discursive field that was very different from the one *Max Manus* and *The Heavy Water War* were inserted in, almost 70 years after the war had ended. Especially when analyzing the role of memory in discursive construction, this distance in time matters. For instance, *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* were released at a time when large parts of the people who watched them actually remembered the war themselves, or at least knew someone who did. In such an environment, one can argue, popular culture must navigate in a less dense discursive terrain, as post war Norwegian identity was in a state of liminality and major narratives had yet to settle and solidify⁴⁸. At the same time, it must be careful not to go on accord with the first hand experiences and lived memories of the audience. Moreover, the collective want and need for the swift establishment of a certain type of narrative can be assumed to influence the reception of popular culture. *Max Manus* and the *Heavy Water War* on the other hand, were released at a time when very few people in the audience remembered the war. Moreover, the major narratives telling the story of the war in Norway and the role of the resistance were well established. As such, these two

⁴⁸ As we remember from Chapter 2.2. Weber (2006) makes this point, but uses the case of the US after September 11.

representations are only to a small extent forced to negotiate actual memories. Their prime function then, is to reproduce dominant representations and re-actualize collective memories, and thus take part in constructing a ritual of storytelling, or to contest these representations and threaten the ritualistic status of filmic expressions depicting Norwegian resistance⁴⁹.

This methodological exercise, including the structured reading of a conceptual history in order to identify basic discourses, illustrates well my position on poststructuralism and methodology. Identifying basic discourses to function as an analytical lens through which specific texts can be read, making for a structured search for signs of linking and differentiation, lives by the ideal of modest methodological advances, that enables fair judgement of the quality of the analysis without sacrificing the philosophical essence of the approach.

⁴⁹ One could object to this dividing by time of release, that the films from 1948 and 1957 are available to the audience that watched *Max Manus* and *The Heavy Water War* in and around 2008 and 2015 as well, and that for this reason the argument that they operate in different discursive terrains does not hold up. This is partly true, as the films from the 1940s and 1950s do inform discursive construction even if watched generations after their release. However, it is safe to assume that *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* were watched by more people and were consumed in more concentrated form in and around 1948 and 1957 than they have been since. This concentrated popularization matters because it highlights the ritualistic aspect of watching film, and because, as Weldes (1999) among others argues, the naturalizing effects of popular culture is stronger when the audience is bigger.

4. On Norwegian state identity: identifying basic discourses

Before getting to the empirical analysis, an attempt at identifying the basic discourses of Norwegian identity in order to put the analysis in context and develop an analytical framework, is in place. As discussed in chapter 3.2. and 3.3. on research design, the basic discourses, i.e. the main representations around which we can structure Norwegian identity, will provide the analysis of film and TV-series on the resistance with direction. Given that it is Norwegian identity, and more specifically the sustainability and resilience of the assumptions of superiority grounding it, that is the empirical target of the analysis, the popular cultural representations will be analyzed with an explicit view to namely Norwegian identity. Naturally then, I need to know what Norwegian identity is, before conducting the analysis. In order to find out, I will conduct a structured reading Neumann's (2001c) conceptual history of Norwegian identity. Given that his conceptual history is narrowly focused on how the discursive evolvement of Norwegian identity enabled certain positions on the prospects of Norway joining the EU, it needs some elaboration. As mentioned, Leira's (2004, 2005, 2013) work on Norwegian peace nation identity will be particularly useful. The chapter consists of four parts, and I address the development of Norwegian identity construction chronologically. Moreover, it is important to note that my structured reading will be just that, *a reading*, meaning I will not simply summarize Neumann's book, but rather offer my own take on it.

4.1. Denmark and Europe as constitutive Others prior to 1814

Already before Norway won semi-independence and had its own constitution in 1814, as it was awarded to Sweden from Denmark as part of the settlement in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the traces of a national identity specific to Norway can be found. As we will see, these traces were the beginnings of a comprehensive construction that resonates well in the present, and as such, it is important to start here, with these traces, in order to get a good view of the characteristics that make Norway different from other states.

From the middle of the 16th century⁵⁰ and up until the landmark year of 1814, Norway was under Danish rule, first in a union where Norway was ruled by a Danish king but nevertheless considered sovereign, and then, from 1660 onwards, in an absolute monarchy, where Norway's status as a partner in the union was revoked and replaced by a condition of subordination. Interestingly, the period as a whole, from 1536 till 1814, is popularly referred to as 'The 400 year long night' (Moseng 2004). As I will get back to later, this is very telling of the way in which the time leading up to Norwegian independence was constructed in the 19th century. However, it is also indicative of how Norway constructed its identity relationally in the formative years, under Danish rule, where Denmark indeed functioned as the Other to Norway's Self. In this Self/Other-configuration Norway was represented as uncivilized, uncultured, and hardy as opposed to Denmark that was represented as civilized, cultured and soft. In large part this distinction was energized by the representation of the free peasant as quintessentially Norwegian. Living in a small village, being of egalitarian orientation and leading a healthy life as a natural born skier, the free peasant was even represented as an embodiment of Norwegian values and identity. Powerful, colonial statesmen, on the other hand, embodied Danish values and identity (Neumann 2001c: 42-43, 46, 53, 55, 57). As such, Denmark was represented not only as the Other to Norway's Self, but also the force that was barring Norway from being true to this Self. This way, subordination and the struggle for freedom and independence can be said to be an integral part of the initial relational construction of Norwegian identity.

⁵⁰ Neumann (2001b) explains how it is hard to determine exactly when Norway established some sort of national unity, and that a strong case can be made that Norway was established as a distinct entity already in the middle ages. However, for his, and our purposes, the time of Danish rule, i.e. from 1536 onwards, is a sensible place to start.

Moreover, the representation of Norway as different from Denmark was part of a wider representation of Norway as different from Europe in general. In this picture, Denmark was European, a continental insider, whereas Norway was a northern outsider. Of particular interest for our context is the way in which demarcating Norwegian identity from Europe as a whole rather than from Denmark alone gave the representation of the free Norwegian peasant an extra dimension. With Europe as a clear constitutive Other, Norway's distinctiveness and unique character appeared much clearer, as the feudal character of Europe was highlighted in order to offer the image of the unfree and repressed peasant as an antithesis against which the image of the free peasant could lean (*ibid.*: 138). This specific relational representation can be assumed to be especially strong because it actualized the very fabric and defining feature of European culture and society, enabling the construction of Norway as qualitatively different from it.

Also part of this Self/Other-configuration with Europe, and importantly Denmark as part of Europe, was climatic and topographical features. The representation of Norway as hardy as mentioned above in large part rose from its unruly climate and rough and beautiful terrain. Although many Norwegians resided in the flatter eastern part of the country, mountains in particular came to be represented as uniquely Norwegian. When merchants from more evenly landscaped countries such as Denmark, England and the Netherlands travelled to Norway's west coast to reach the most important city at the time, Bergen, a dramatic scenery, with the now characteristic mountains and fjords, is what met them. This gave rise to the popular idea of Norway as one big mountain. This in turn played well into the representation of Norwegians as natural born skiers, that, as mentioned earlier, was an important part of the representation of the free peasant that embodied Norwegian values and identity (Christensen 1993: 39-41, Neumann 2001c: 46, 57, 135, 163).

On a more general note, placing the Norway-Denmark relation in the wider Norway-Europe relation gave strength and credibility to the representation of Norway as less cultured and civilized. In the European discourse of the enlightenment, the main dividing line was drawn between the North and the South, where the South was «privileged in terms of a higher level of culture than the North» (Neumann 2001c: 47). In Norway, the strength of this representation was cogently expressed by the practice of sending state officials on Grand Tour-like travels to Europe's big cities, designed to build cultural capital that could be used to

advance development in the state apparatus when brought back home. These travels were part of a cultural ideal wherein education and intellectual sophistication was increasingly seen as valuable and as an indicator of status and what in Norwegian would be called ‘dannelse’. The way in which these concepts functioned as cultural ideals in the Danish-Norwegian union, and accordingly among Norwegian state officials, is illustrated nicely in Ludvig Holberg’s popular satire *Erasmus Montanus*, which tells the story of a rather arrogant young man from rural Denmark studying in Copenhagen in order to gain superiority over his (former) peers from the village (ibid.: 43). Moreover, the story also highlights Copenhagen’s status as a capital of the continent and a centre of civilization, safely placed on the European side of the North/South-nexus. In the next section, we will see how this representation of Norway as different from Denmark with regards to the civilizational divide between the North and the South was reinforced and to some extent transformed through the 19th century.

4.2. Denmark and Europe as constitutive Others after 1814

After Norway won independence from Denmark and was handed over to Sweden, and importantly had its very own constitution, all in 1814, construction of Norwegian national identity accelerated. To a large extent, this development revolved around a specification and reinforcement of the relational Self/Other-configuration where Denmark, again as part of Europe, functioned as Norway's main constitutive Other (Neumann 2001c: 58, 72-73, 79, 87).

It is striking to see how the representation of Norway as different from Denmark gained further traction as soon as Norway was no longer under Danish rule. The early 19th century saw an increased interest in national symbols such as clothing, songs, folklores and language; an interest that was soon politicized, as Nicolai Wergeland, from his «hysterical anti-Danish perspective» (Storsveen 1998: 235)⁵¹, blazingly argued that Norwegian identity and culture had been brutally suppressed and exploited by the Danish monarchy. Not long after, in the 1840s, Nicolai's son Henrik Wergeland described the time of Danish rule as a 'fake soldering', suggesting that Norwegian identity and culture did indeed exist during the time of, and in spite of Danish rule, but then as a latent force waiting for conditions under which it could flourish yet again (Neumann 2001c: 65-67; Storsveen 2004: 370). Thus, the events of 1814 was interpreted as a natural continuation of Norwegian history; a history teleologically headed towards independence, sovereignty and freedom, in which secession from Denmark, the brutal suppressor and effective tranquilizer of Norwegian identity that it was, was a big, but nevertheless inevitable, step (Neumann 2001c: 59, 61, Seip 1963: 43). The popular dubbing of the time of Danish rule as 'The 400 year long night' indicates the same representational tendency. Interestingly, the phrase was first used by Henrik Ibsen in his national epos *Peer Gynt* published in 1867, where it was written as a mockery of the way in which the time of Danish rule was represented earlier in the century by the two Wergeland's, among others (Moseng 2004). Despite Ibsen's humorous intentions and sharp observation that constructing Denmark as the primary enemy might be outdated, the phrase has indeed been used as an expression for Norway's relationship with Denmark, and accordingly it has been an effective rhetorical tool in the relational construction of Norwegian identity (Haugan 1991: 13). By discursively linking the time of Danish rule with nighttime, and consequently

⁵¹ Translation my own.

darkness, sleeping and perhaps even dreaming, Ibsen's phrase almost explicitly reproduces and reinforces Henrik Wergeland's representation of Norway under Denmark, as it activates the image of the slumbering nation forced to patiently await a new dawn where its dreams of freedom and sovereignty can finally be realized. Naturally, this narrative was easier to conceive of after the fact; once the time of Danish rule was history, its unnatural and foreign nature could be articulated with more force and conviction, making the story of Norway's uniqueness as a natural and given political entity, as something that has an indispensable essence, distinct from Denmark in particular, appear more coherent and strong.

However, it is important to note that this narrative did not go unchallenged, as ideas of what it meant to be a Norwegian did not exclusively oppose and reject Danish identity and culture. Ibsen's satirical use of the phrase 'The 400 year long night' can be an indication of this, and thus it does well to point us in the direction of more clear-cut expressions of the same tendency, such as Jørgen Haugan's (1991: 11) assertion that for a long time, one could be Norwegian in two different ways: either as a 'Danish-Norwegian' or as a 'Norwegian-Norwegian'. This illustrates well the essence of the struggle over defining Norwegian identity that took place in the early 19th century, in what Neumann (2001c: 68) terms an «intense battle» between 'the intelligence' and 'the patriots', the 'intelligence' being those who did not really see the difference between Norwegian and Danish culture, and 'the patriots' being those who did. Advocating a strong emphasis on *the people* as the bearers of that which was properly Norwegian, echoing the representation of the free peasant as the embodiment of Norwegian values, the patriot position gained terrain in the discursive economy over the course of the century. At the same time, and in the same relational process of constitution, *the state* was represented as foreign and un-Norwegian, due to its «supranational connections with Danish culture and German culture» (ibid.: 73), most clearly expressed by the language that was used by state officials.

Closely related to this divide between the people and the state was the divide between rural and urban life. Similarly to the people/state-divide, this divide was energized by differentiation from Denmark, and again Denmark as part of Europe and as southern and continental. As such, the small villages, where the free peasant, i.e. the people, resided, mastering the cold climate and the hardy terrain, were represented as properly and truly Norwegian. The big cities on the other hand, were represented as being permeated by

decadence and sophistication, run by state officials and academics, reeking of Danish influence and subtle persistence of cultural control. This way, by linking Danish identity and influence discursively to the Norwegian cities, the villages emerged as a symbol of Norwegian identity, drawing heavily on the initial relational distinction discussed in the previous section having to do with level of civilization and cultural development (Neumann 2001c:72-73, 140).

Moreover, the Danish connection on the state level, as expressed by the image of decadent urban life, enabled a forceful representation of the state as deceitful and disloyal towards the essence of ‘the Norwegian’ and accordingly the hopes and dreams of the people, as it supported staying in the union and seemed to have little interest for eventual Norwegian independence from Sweden (Neumann 2001c: 127-128, 130-131). As such, the representation of Denmark as barring Norway from being true to its self that was dominant prior to 1814 remained strong through the 19th century as well; the demonization of the state apparatus by deeming it Danish and thus genuinely un-Norwegian functioned as a substitute for Danish rule in the discourse that helped create the impression of Norway being in a perpetual state of subordination, still awaiting genuine emancipation.

4.3. Independence from Sweden and Norwegian peace nation identity

In 1905 Norway left the union with Sweden and was for the first time in more than half a millennium a free and independent country. In the period leading up to this defining moment in Norwegian history, i.e. the end of the 19th century, Norwegian national identity was, as we to some extent saw in the last section, strengthened and further delineated. An important part of this, however, was the development of the peace nation identity that came to be a resilient force in the representation of Norwegian identity more generally in the century to come (Neumann 2001c: 93-95, Leira 2013).

Although Norwegian peace discourse was inspired by and developed alongside currents from international liberal peace-thinking, it was relatively late to flourish. When the time came however, it not only flourished but blossomed. From around 1890 onwards prominent figures in Norwegian public and political life such as Halvdan Koht and Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson and later Fridtjof Nansen and Christian Lous Lange spearheaded the development of a representation of Norwegian identity having specifically to do with love for peace (Knutsen, Leira and Neumann 2016: 235). Not unexpectedly, and very interesting seen in light of the people/state-dichotomy discussed in the previous section, Norwegian peace discourse was unique in its emphasis on the people, as it rested on an assumption that the Norwegian people consisted of «natural and born friends of peace» (Leira 2013). Grounding the peace nation identity in the people and the values that they carried was effective because it linked this feature of Norwegian identity to wider representations where the people also were at the centre of attention. Just like the representation of the people as inherently free and of independency as a historical necessity, the representation of the Norwegian people as peaceful was of teleological character. Illustratively, in 1906 Koht, a historian at the time, argued that all the way since a peace agreement was demanded by the people around the year of 1020, the Norwegian people has been peaceful by default (Leira 2004: 168). This way he suggested that the contemporary blossoming of Norwegian peace-thinking was a natural and even inevitable course of events given the quality of the Norwegian people.

Importantly, this representation did not really challenge the hegemony of the representation of Norway as a subordinated nation of free and outdoorsy peasants. Rather, the two representation seem to have coupled up nicely in relation to the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905. Interestingly, both of these representations of Norwegian identity were

activated in the representation of the event, and both came to be seen as defining characteristics of it. By emphasizing the peaceful character of the dissolution, and by arguing that this came as a «result of the peoples fight for independence», the dissolution was cemented as a symbol of both of these traits and was accordingly seen as an expression of Norwegianness per se (Neumann 2001c: 93). This way, the people's wish for sovereignty and independence was represented as a peaceful endeavor, and the people's peaceful aspirations were represented as being propelled by the experiences of subordination and the wish for independence. More specifically, the free peasant embodying Norwegian values and identity was given a new quality, namely the love for peace. Similarly, the peace loving Norwegian wanted peace by virtue of being one of the Norwegian people. As such, the two representations were, to paraphrase Henrik Wergeland in his assertion that Norway and Denmark were united in a 'fake soldering', linked together in what can only be seen as an organic and genuine soldering; a soldering in which each of the components functioned to strengthen the other.

Of course, the representation of Norway as a peace nation was challenged by other representations. Most notably, this challenge came from «religiously grounded pacifists» (Leira 2005: 140), who emphasized the historically warring tendencies of the Norwegian people and thus represented them as naturally war-prone. Furthermore, this representation linked the warring mindset of the Norwegian people to its choice of settling in the cold and brutal mountains of the North, utilizing the very same discursive resource, i.e. topographical and climatic features, that was so important in the early construction of Norwegian identity, and that was, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, animating for the peace nation representation later on. Another alternative representation came from radical nationalists. This representation too activated Norway's warring traditions but called for more extreme measures as it advocated a reinvigorating of these traditions, and a declaration of war on Sweden in the effort to win independence. However, none of these representations prevailed, and the image of Norway as a peace nation swiftly acquired a hegemonic position in the discourse, even to the extent that it was taken completely for granted (ibid.).

An important feature of Norwegian identity that came with the peace nation representation was the idea that Norway was in some way 'better' than other states and thus had a claim to moral authority. Of course, this idea was not completely new, as it was an

important part of the relational constitution of Norwegian identity that had taken place previously, especially with regards to the distinction between the free Norwegian peasant and the unfree European peasant. However, with the coming to power of the peace nation representation, this quality of Norwegian identity increased in strength. Of particular importance was the emphasis on peace efforts as «a task, a calling and a mission» (Leira 2005: 142). By representing the love for peace as something that came with a responsibility, highly recognizable from contemporary debates on interventionism and human rights, it emerged as a generator of a righteous, and perhaps even sanctimonious, feeling of superiority.

This feeling of superiority was illustratively expressed by the first minister of foreign affairs in the independent Norway, Jørgen Løvland, when he, in the year of 1905, compared Norway to the «warring states of Europe» (Knutsen, Leira and Neumann 2016: 129) . Similarly, Halvdan Koht, in 1894, argued that «Norway has no desire to join the concert of Europe» (quoted in Knutsen, Leira and Neumann: 93)⁵². Apart from illustrating how the peace nation representation galvanized a claim to moral authority however, these quotes also highlight how Europe functioned as the primary Other to Norway's Self in the construction of the peace nation identity. The «fundamental discursive link between peace and people» (Leira 2004: 153) represented Norway as different from Europe in the sense that it activated the assumption discussed earlier that Norway was unique in that it belonged to the people as opposed to the state, and by extension, to the rural as opposed to the urban areas of the country. The explicit reference to the states of Europe as war-prone then, added a dimension to this representation, and only served to specify and strengthen Norwegian peace nation identity.

⁵² Translation my own.

4.4. Norwegian identity in the 20th century

The discourse on Norwegian identity after independence was won in 1905 and through the 20th century was to a large extent dominated by the representations that already enjoyed a privileged position in the discursive economy. The representation of Norway as distinct from continental Europe, performing its rural, uncultured identity in a struggle for independence, was by this point established as the essence of Norwegianness and thus a kind of basis on which to build further representations on. Moreover, Leira (2005: 140) argues that Norwegian peace nation identity was close to what Pierre Bourdieu terms *doxa* already early in the century, meaning it had travelled beyond discursive contention to cement its place as a given and objective fact. No wonder then, that the dominance of these representations persisted. As such, the 20th century saw a further reinforcement of these trends, although they did not go completely unchallenged.

One of the representations that challenged the discursive hegemony, gained traction already before World War Two. It came from the labour movement and had to do with an alternative understanding of the term 'people'. Being of communist leanings, the labor movement threatened to break the discursive bond between nation and people by emphasizing the cross border quality of the working class and accordingly the importance of ignoring state loyalties and national differences. However, this attempt at redefining the meaning of 'the people' did not succeed due to an effective discursive shift where communism was recast as nationalism, representing the people as something bigger than the working class. Once again, Halvdan Koht was the front man, as he forcefully argued that communism and nationalism were not necessarily contradictory concepts, and held that recent Norwegian history, unlike continental European, was a reminder that nationalism could indeed be a positive, empowering and even peaceful force. As such, 'the people' remained closely connected to the Norwegian nation (Neumann 2002b: 102-104).

During World War Two and the years leading up to it, a fascist representation of the people emerged and gained traction. Drawing heavily on the representation of Norway as rural in its essence, emphasizing the healthy and sturdy values of Norwegian peasants, the fascist representation smoothly found its place in the discourse (Neumann 2001c: 103-104). The fact that members of the Agrarian Party, including one previous prime minister, transferred to the Nazi Party is a testament to the ease with which the representation gathered

momentum. However, it expanded on the rural representation by adding a racial dimension, and by highlighting the direct connection between the people and the leader of the state. As such, the link between the people and the state avoided bureaucratic institutions and the «Norwegian people were represented as all persons of pure Norwegian blood» (Neumann 2002b: 103). Quisling, the leader of the Nazi Party, was eager to stress the biological link between Norway and Germany, and thoroughly emphasized Norway's role as a natural ally and an indispensable part of «the real Europe»⁵³ and Germany's efforts to win the war (Dahl 1992: 237, Neumann 2001c: 104-105). We observe here, that the fascist representation attracts attention to the similarities and cultural compatibility between Norway and Europe and thus threatens the representation of Europe as the Other to Norway's Self.

Soon after the war, however, when the Labour Party had consolidated power, the measure of a 'good Norwegian' was «someone who had not been either a nazi or a collaborator during the war» (Neumann 2002b: 106). This indicates a swift shut-down of the fascist representation, that on the whole was caused by the representation's heavy reliance on German and therefore un-Norwegian concepts and ideas (Neumann 2001c: 105). Intriguingly, the Labour Party maintained much of the Nazi Party's social policy and kept the state's infrastructure for central planning (ibid.: 108-109). This can be seen as yet another testament to the discursive overlap between the rural representation and the fascist representation, and perhaps also as an indication of the dishonesty of the categorical labeling of any nazi collaborator as a 'bad Norwegian'.

Moving into the post world war-era, the debates over EU⁵⁴ membership in 1972 and 1994⁵⁵ were the main battlefields of Norwegian identity construction. Interestingly, at the heart of both debates was the question of who the Norwegian «we» is and should be. Briefly put, the No-side won on both occasions because it effectively appropriated the discursive resources at hand in order to represent this Norwegian «we» as inherently un-European. Of great importance for this representation was the emphasis on Norway as belonging to the people and thus rural in its essence, naturally incompatible with the heavy bureaucratic

⁵³ England too was considered arian and a part of 'the real Europe'.

⁵⁴ In 1972 the debate was rather about EF, but I will nevertheless refer to both of them as EU-debates.

⁵⁵ I will not discuss the two debates separately. Neumann (2001c: 146) emphasizes how there was great continuity between them as they to a large extent drew on the same historical references and relied on the same discursive divides.

machinery and city-driven, highbrow statesmanship associated with the EU. Related to this, the No-side successfully invoked old representations of the Norwegian allodial peasant as historically unique, in order to construct Norway as superior to Europe. Offering the Norwegian village rather than the state apparatus as a model for Norwegianness more generally, specifically emphasizing the importance of egalitarian principles, served the same purpose (Neumann 2001c: 143, Sørhaug 1984: 65). So did suggesting the strong welfare system and successful regional policy as explanations for Norwegian splendour (Neumann 2001c: 150). Also feeding this construction, however, was the representation of Europe as imperialistic. This even saw the peace nation representation come into play, as Norwegian benevolence expressed through active peace building and a sizable foreign aid budget was contrasted with a representation of the EU as an ambitious player in international power politics. The Yes-side's attempts at challenging this representation by arguing that Norway's passivity and peacefulness would remain strong regardless of EU membership was rather feeble, as it only served to confirm the discursive divide between Norway and Europe. Interestingly, NATO, of which Norway was a member while the EU-debates took place, was represented as a peace project and thus compatible with Norwegianness (Leira 2015: 37). This is puzzling, as NATO is arguably more immersed in power politics than the EU. However, the No-side was not confronted with this conundrum, and the representation of the EU as colonial and war-prone, and therefore different from Norway, prevailed. Finally, the EU was depicted as a potential oppressor of Norwegian independence and sovereignty. In a discursively powerful turn, the No-side likened the Yes-side to the parties that advocated staying in union in 1814 and in 1905, suggesting that joining the EU would entail a return to a state of semi-independence at best (Neumann 2001c: 127-128).

After the Cold War, the peace nation representation once again surged to the fore, and re-established its position as a truly defining element of Norwegian identity. This time, however, as was briefly touched upon in the discussion on the EU-debates, it took the shape of active peace building and humanitarian efforts, interspersed with foreign aid (Leira 2015: 37, Skånland 2010: 36-37). Moreover, Norway's status as a small state was highlighted as a major asset, as it was seen to make Norway particularly suitable for negotiating peace (Leira 2013: 349). Thus, a particularly strong kind of Norwegian exceptionalism emerged, allowing Norway to enter a moral high ground, placing superiority over other states, and a

responsibility to help them and make the world a more peaceful place, at the centre of its national identity. Kjell Magne Bondevik, who served as prime minister in two spells around the millennium, was an important figure in forwarding this representation. Representing the Christian Democratic Party, he added a religious touch to the moral commitment of the state, and underscored the intrinsic and unavoidable, almost God-given, quality of Norwegian peacefulness (Leira 2005: 154). In spite of its stability and zeal, however, the peace nation representation too has been challenged. Some have drawn attention to Norwegian participation in recent wars, and others have argued that the peace efforts are not motivated by a sense of moral obligations but rather a cynical concern for self interest as they improve Norway's standing in international politics. Nevertheless, moral superiority has remained a centerpiece of Norwegian identity. It is important to note, that through the Cold War and into the 21st century, Norway's firm commitment to peace activity and human rights work has been closely associated with eager support for the UN (Leira 2013: 348). Moreover, this development has increasingly entailed an orientation towards the US and an Othering of Russia, who emerged as Norway's main constitutive Other in the 1990s (Neumann and Ulriksen 1995: 97).

4.5. Summary: basic discourses on Norwegian identity

Casting a glance over the development sketched out here, a few basic discourses emerge. These will function as a backdrop for my empirical analysis as I expect the films and TV-series on resistance against the occupation to, in some way or another, relate to them. Looking at the early Norwegian identity construction, differentiation from Denmark, and by extension Europe, appears to have been of particular importance. Before 1814, this entailed contrasting Norwegian freedom and egalitarianism with European feudalism, and the uncultured modesty of rural Norway with the civilized and sophisticated grandeur of continental big city life. Naturally, the distinctiveness of Norwegian climate and topography was also of great importance in the early construction of Norwegian identity. Moving into the 19th century, Denmark and Europe continued to function as Norway's prime constitutive Others, but the focus somewhat shifted as the people/state- and the rural/urban-divided took centre stage. Norway then, was increasingly being considered a property of the Norwegian people, and the Norwegian people were increasingly considered rural in their essence. Towards the end of the 19th century the representation of Norway as a peace nation developed and grew strong. Through the middle of the 20th century it travelled to the background of the discourse, before it made a comeback at the front with increased zeal and vigor after the Cold War had ended. An important aspect of the comeback was the introduction of a strong concern for human rights and a generally more active outlook. Meanwhile, the 20th century saw the representations that dominated the discourse before 1814 and during the 19th century be furthered strengthened and developed. Of particular interest is the distancing from Germany and the evil that nazism was in the immediate aftermath of World War Two and the fierce reinvigoration of the rural/urban- and people/state-divides in relation to the EU debates in 1972 and 1994. Finally, in the time that has passed since the end of World War Two, Norway has oriented towards the West, creating strong links especially with the US.

Strictly speaking then, we can identify the following basic discourses on Norwegian identity: Norway as rural, Norway as belonging to the people, Norway as free, Norway as egalitarian, Norway as hardy and beautiful, Norway as peace-loving, Norway as peace-negotiating, Norway as Western, and Norway as something solid and constant. In the analysis then, I will look at how film and TV-series on Norwegian resistance relate to and engage with

these basic discourses. It is imperative to keep in mind, however, that these can be hard to separate as they often intertwine, overlap and work together. As such, I will not schematically check and tick off the basic discourses as they emerge in the films and TV-series, but rather use them as a backdrop while attempting a more fluid discussion in order to show how popular culture *engages with* the wider discursive field.

5. Analysis: film and TV-series on resistance during World War Two as ritualistic remembrance⁵⁶

In the discourse analysis that follows in this chapter, I will analyze four films and TV-series on Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation during World War Two. In doing so, I will investigate how they relate to the basic discourses on Norwegian identity and presumably reproduce and help naturalize the dominant representations. Moreover, the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2, asserting that different popular cultural expressions can come together and form a ritual by telling similar stories, will be applied to the empirical material. In addition to inspecting the intertextual interplay between one popular cultural expression and the construction of Norwegian identity then, the empirical analysis will look at the way in which a body of popular cultural expressions can contribute to the constitution of the Norwegian collective. As such, the analysis will be of theoretical as well as empirical interest.

The selection of text was qualified in Chapter 3.3. on research design, and as such, it will suffice here to mention again that the films and TV-series will be analyzed in chronological order, starting with *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water* (1948) followed by *Nine Lives* (1957) and continuing with *Max Manus* (2008) followed by *The Heavy Water War* (2015a-f). Given that an important part of the analysis will be to examine to what extent these films and TV-series tell similar stories to form a ritual, there is a certain comparative element involved. Addressing them in this order allows me to see how they relate to and build on each other. As such, the structure of the analysis should help make the ritual aspect of the popular cultural storytelling at hand much clearer.

⁵⁶ All quotes from the Norwegian in Chapter 5 are translated by the undersigned.

5.1. *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water*

Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water was released in 1948⁵⁷ and was one of the first popular cultural representations of World War Two to appear in Norway. It tells the story of the Norwegian resistance movement, in close cooperation with the British, to stop Nazi Germany from using heavy water from Vemork in Norway to develop an atomic bomb. The operation came in waves and had many names, Swallow being one of them. Parts of the story takes place in the UK, as this is where the planning of the operation happened. However, most of the story takes place in the Norwegian mountain plateau Hardangervidda, form where the saboteurs carry out the operation. The story is driven by planning and execution of the operation, culminating in the successful blowing up of the heavy water installations at the factory in Vemork and of the Tinnsjø-ferry set out to transport the heavy water to Germany.

The film clearly engages with key points in the basic discourses, as the focus of the story and the way in which it is told for the most part reproduces representations of Norwegian identity. Four representational themes stand out. First, I will discuss film's representation of Norwegian resistance against the occupation, particularly the Vemork-operation, as critical for the eventual outcome of the war. Second, the representation of Norway as qualitatively different from Germany, and therefore as inherently good, requires attention. Interestingly, this representation causes some discursive friction as well, as Norway is likened to the UK and France in the process of distancing it from Germany. Third, the film emphasizes the churlish quality of patriotism and represents resistance as essentially rural. Here too, things are not all smooth, as the film does not follow the basic discourse in offering a contrasting representation where urban Norway is less patriotic. Finally, I will discuss the representation of Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful, and accordingly, Norwegians as rough and ragged.

The battle for heavy water as deciding for the outcome of the war

Operation Swallow's emphasis on Norway's role in the war at large is eye-catching, as it vigorously and immodestly forwards a representation of Norwegian resistance as critical, perhaps even indispensable, for the eventual defeat of Germany and success of the allies.

⁵⁷ From here on, the film will be referred to as *Operation Swallow*. The year of the reference is 1948 in all cases.

Highlighting the vital importance of stopping the Germans from producing heavy water and transporting it to Germany to build an atomic bomb, the film constructs sabotage operations aiming to do just that, as deciding for the outcome of the war. This representation of Norwegian resistance highlights Norwegian moral superiority and ability to do good in spite of its small size. As such, it links itself intertextually with representations of Norway as a peace nation that came to the fore towards the end of the 19th century (Leira 2005).

From start to finish, the Vemork operation is referenced in grandiose terms. A narrating voice giving comments on much of the film states early on that «The Germans think it [Vemork] can play a deciding role for the outcome of the war». Moreover, he argues that «the most important part of the battle was fought in Norway» and dubs the story of the operation «this famous saga». Later, when planning the Gunnerside Operation, the part of the mission that was aimed at blowing up the factory, from Scotland, a British officer holds that «There is no need to emphasize the importance of the Gunnerside Operation», and praises the Norwegian professor Leif Tronstad for the job that he is doing. Soon after, the same Tronstad motivates the six men in the Gunnerside group before departure to Norway by telling them that «you may not fully realize it today, but what you are doing now is Norwegian history in a 100 years». Reiterating his point, one of the saboteurs states on the eve of the operation that «Remember what Tronstad said: in this war, heavy water is important. The operation must succeed». Similarly, when planning the operation to blow up the ferry set out to transport the heavy water to Germany, Knut Haukelid and Einar Skinnarland, the two saboteurs keeping contact with London from Hardangervidda, receives the following message: «The ferry must be sunk at any price, even if that entails the loss of civilian lives». An important point is made in this regard, when one of the saboteurs argues that a lot more lives will be lost if the Germans successfully transport the heavy water to Germany and use it to build an atomic bomb. Finally, towards the end of the film, when the ferry has been sunk and the operation succeeded, the narrator states that the saboteurs did everything they could all the way until «the day the war was won».

As such, a solid discursive link is created between Norwegian resistance and the war in general. A heavy and explicit emphasis on the causal relationship between the heavy water operations and eventual peace and the defeat of nazism, represents Norway as good and

important. Good because nazism is evil⁵⁸ and therefore, taking part in defeating it logically entails being of good morals. Important because doing good by defeating nazism is dependent on Norway, both in the sense that it was the achievements of the Norwegian resistance movement that ensured success, and in the sense that Norway is strategically important by virtue of containing Vemork. By distancing it from Germany then, Norway is represented as being able to defy its size and use its good morals to make the world a better place.

Also important in the discursive construction of Norway as good and important in *Operation Swallow* is the representation of Norway as a close ally of the British, and as such, as a major player in the war in general. Again then, the praise for Professor Tronstad is worth pausing at. The British officials thoroughly express their gratitude for the work that he does for them in Scotland, planning the operations and training the Norwegian saboteurs. Moreover, while executing the mission from Hardangervidda, the saboteurs, primarily Knut and Einar, keep in touch with London on a daily basis, getting instructions regarding the mission and reporting on the situation on Vemork and the status of the operations. This way, England and London are referenced frequently, in exclusively positive terms. By the same token, the narrator of the story very explicitly highlights the favorability of cooperating with the British in two very telling statements: «The unbendable and indomitable London has become the centre for all that is called resistance in Europe» and «London, where Churchill's courage and firmness is starting to yield fruit». Thus, the film not only represents Norway as important because it is allied with the British, but also as good, and accordingly even more important, because the British are represented as good too. By emphasizing London's core position in European resistance and Churchill's key role in the battle to defeat Germany and its evil ideology, and linking Norway closely to the British, the film thus further strengthens the representation of Norway as important and good.

Interestingly, these representations and the assumptions they make about the quality of Norwegianness is recognizable from the representations dominating the discourse. For instance, the peace nation representation relies heavily on the idea of Norway being important in spite of its small size (Leira 2015: 22), and on the idea of Norway as somehow better than other states by virtue of strong morals and good, well-founded intentions (ibid.:

⁵⁸ More on this in the next section, *Norway as 'not Germany'*.

23-24). Remembering Hansen's theorizing on Self/Othering (2006: 42), this is a clear case of discursive linking, where signs of sameness, in this case 'important', 'good', 'moral', and 'responsible', are invoked and coupled, in order for the specific text to hook up to the basic discourses on Norwegian identity in a certain way.

It is interesting to observe that the film's representation of Norwegian importance and capability to do good is almost dogmatically one-sided. Although the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki created the impression that a failure to stop the Germans from developing the bomb would have had catastrophic consequences, it is not evident that German scientists actually would have succeeded in developing the bomb even if they had access to adequate amounts of heavy water (Poulsen 2006: 134). This goes to show that the importance of the heavy water sabotage for the outcome of the war is not beyond debate, and as such, another story, e.g. representing Norwegian resistance as primarily concerned with the well being of Norwegian citizens, could have been told (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 14). However, it was not. This might be partly due to the film's proximity in time to the war and the immediate need for a favorable narrative placing Norway on the right side of history (Maerz 2010: 46-47, 62-63). Moreover, the discursive terrain that the film had to navigate in was dominated by representations of Norway as superior through the images of the allodial peasant and moral peace nation, and had just seen the fascist representation challenging it being fended off (Neumann 2002b: 103). As such, in its contribution to the establishment of such a favorable narrative, *Operation Swallow*, at least on this point, regarding the importance of the heavy water sabotage, seems to have met little resistance, as it simply followed the discursive currents and helped them flow gently along.

Norway as 'not Germany'

The way in which Norway is represented relationally with Germany as its constitutive Other is also of interest. In the Self/Other-configuration that is established, Germany is represented as inherently evil, constituting Norway as inherently good. However, this representation does not really reproduce and naturalize any specific representation of Norway as different from Germany, considering the fact that Germany has primarily functioned as an Other to Norway's Self by virtue of being part of the decadent and civilized continent associated with Denmark. Thus, the representation of Germany as evil, and of Norway as good, does more to

naturalize assumptions about Norwegianness that inform the dominant representations discussed in the last section, namely the once concerning Norway as a peace nation. Moreover, the representation of Norway as ‘not Germany’ is related to the representation of Norwegian resistance as deciding for the outcome of the war in the sense that it too emphasizes close ties to the UK and even France.

First of all, Germany is represented as evil and mean because the war it wages is represented as brutal and destructive. For instance, when telling the story of April 9th 1940, the day Germany invaded Norway, the film underscores the relentless totality of German victory. For instance, German tanks are pictured driving on small Norwegian roads, seemingly exercising complete and utter domination. Almost immediately after, unpleasant scenes from the invasion of France roll across the screen, linking the two invasions together. Further highlighting the brutality of the German regime in relation to these two invasions, the narrator states of the invasion of France that «the unstoppable storm surge harms a country where everything that grows is mowed down» and that «civilians are fleeing in endless rows». More specific representations of German behavior during the occupation further emphasize Germany’s cruelty. One illustration is when a plane full of British saboteurs crashes on Hardangervidda, and the German officials who find them, grinning and without hesitation, kills all the survivors. Another is when German soldiers in large numbers are out looking for Norwegian saboteurs in the mountains, razing random cabins on their way. Moreover, the representation of Vemork while under German control gives a depressing and scary vibe, as the dark and indeterminable figures patrolling the factory where the destructive drops of doom are produced seem to be mindlessly serving the forces of evil. Norway on the other hand, is, enabled by this representation, represented as inherently good, as it desperately attempts to fight the evil that Germany is. Within this framework the resistance heroes risk their lives in order to make the world a better place, and thus come across as benevolent to the extreme, clearly invoking signs of difference as they mark a stark contrast to everything German.

Germany’s obsession with heavy water reiterates this point, as it underscores The Third Reich’s evil intentions. In the film, German soldiers and officials outright rush to Vemork after the invasion to start the heavy water production as soon as possible. More than that, they soon grow greedy and set out to produce large amounts. The comprehensive

protection scheme in an around the factory and the deployment of 1400 men to search Hardangervidda for saboteurs, are two more testaments to this obsession. Interestingly, this specific aspect of the representation of Germany as evil is also directly contrasted by a representation of Norway as the opposite. Early in the film, Norway's pure and honorable intentions with regards to the production of heavy water is explicitly emphasized: «but it is for peaceful purposes it is produced». This way, Germany's intention to use heavy water to produce an atomic bomb, and thus to achieve its evil ambition of world domination, emerges even clearer. At the same time, representations of Norwegian identity, where the desire to do good is key (Leira 2015: 22-23), is furthered strengthened. More than good and evil then, peaceful and war-mongering are suggested as signs that differentiate the two states, relating the film directly to the basic discourse representing Norway as a peace nation.

As mentioned briefly already, this representation of Germany is also forwarded as *Operation Swallow* highlights Norway's close ties to the UK. By discursively linking Norway to the UK then, the film indirectly distances Norway from Germany by distancing the UK from Germany. In that context, two statements on the UK that were both mentioned in the last section is worth revisiting: «The unbendable and indomitable London has become the centre for all that is called resistance in Europe» and «London, where Churchill's courage and firmness is starting to yield fruits». Both statements clearly demarcate the UK from Germany, using Germany as an Other on which the UK's splendidence can lean. Making this process of Self/Othering even clearer, Hitler is referenced as «this gloomy man» soon after the second of these statements. And so, because of its discursive proximation with the UK, Norway too is constituted as 'not Germany' in this process.

Interestingly, the film also emphasizes Norway's relationship with another ally, namely France. Primarily, this also functions to contribute to the distancing of Norway from Germany, as France too was struggling to contain and later survive nazi expansion. As already discussed, Norway's and France's destiny as victims of Germany's evil ambitions are even aligned and equated early in the film. Moreover, their common stance on the application of heavy water, both stressing its potential for energy production in advocating its peaceful potential, is highlighted. However, this representation can cause some discursive friction, as it conflicts with the 19th century representation of Norway as qualitatively different from feudal and decadent France, being an essential part of continental Europe (Neumann 2001c:

138). The representation of Norway as superior to and better off without the European colonial powers that was prominent in the EU-debates (ibid.: 171) also contradicts this discursive likening. The film then, seems to downplay Norwegian uniqueness and moral superiority, weakening the zeal of the peace nation representation. As such, it was clearly colored by its time as taking distance from Germany, still being considered a pure force of evil and accordingly still under administration, appears to have been the prime concern. And in taking care of this concern, the likening of Norway to France is indeed an effective discursive maneuver, as it builds on the likening to the UK in order to add a layer to the good/evil-divide. Moreover, this appears to be a case of the more complex Othering that Wæver (2002: 24) is concerned with and that Hansen (2006: 44) touches on as well. By invoking signs of linking with the UK and France in order to indirectly differentiate from Germany, *Operation Swallow* places Norway in a web of Self/Other-configurations, where not all Othering is explicit and direct.

Like the representation of Norwegian resistance as important for the outcome of the war, the representation of Germany as evil and therefore Norway as good is a strikingly one-sided affair. The shocking lack of nuance is intriguing because it seems evident, even more so than in the case of the importance of the heavy water sabotage, that a different story could have been told (Kroglund 2012: 12). In the years between 1945 and 1948 Norway prosecuted its traitors. 93 000 Norwegians were accused of treason, and close to 50 000 was convicted (Bryne 2013: 5). In a country of less than 3 million these are quite sizable numbers. Needless to say, in 1948 and around the time of *Operation Swallow's* release, people knew that not all Norwegians were patriots. Furthermore, large parts of the audience can be assumed to have had vivid memories of the war, and it is likely that many had even been nazi sympathizers themselves. By telling the story of the nazi sympathizers and collaborators too, the film could have actualized the memory (Bollmer 2011: 451) of Norwegians as morally flexible and thus challenged the assumptions of Norwegian goodness and superiority that inform the dominant representations in the discourse. However, it chose the highroad and crafted a properly black and white representation that collectivized the memory of World War Two in Norway as a thing of purity; a categorical struggle of good vs. evil.

Rural resistance

Father and son Wergeland argued in the first half of the 19th century that the time of Danish rule had been a dark period of Norwegian history. One in which Norwegian identity had been curtailed, forced to remain in slumber, awaiting dawn and eventual unshackling. By implication then, they advocated the idea of Norwegian values being constant and unwavering, not susceptible to change even in times of repression (Neumann 2001c: 66). Moreover, this ‘sleeping nationalism’ was constructed as something that was more awake in rural areas of the country as compared to urban areas (ibid.: 86, 177). By telling the story of rural resistance then, emphasizing the stubborn steadfastness of Norwegian values, *Operation Swallow* reproduces these representations.

Most strikingly, Norwegianness and patriotism is represented as rural by regular Norwegians from small towns and villages, offering to help and thus subtly taking part in the resistance. Soon after arriving in Norway in order to start reporting on the activities on Vemork, Einar Skinnarland, skis to a cabin where his brother, Torstein, is working at local post for Norsk Hydro⁵⁹. Before he arrives at the cabin, an older man living there says «I’ll say, he should have been pummeled, this Hitler». Moreover, upon arrival, Einar is treated well, and asks his brother if he can help him get a job at Hydro. Torstein, being a patriot too, is happy to serve the resistance, and says he might be able to help. Later on, another saboteur has to make the same trip into the village to fix some radio equipment that they need to communicate with London. He too is helped by the patriotic villagers, and returns safely, and with a functioning radio, to the other saboteurs. Moreover, workers at the factory also exercise resistance, by corrupting or slowing the process from the inside, and by providing information for London. These too, are regular rural Norwegians, obeying their patriotic nature to resist the occupation. Perhaps the strongest representation of rural Norway being patriotic and properly Norwegian, however, comes when three of the saboteurs sneak into the Tinnsjø-ferry that is supposed to transport the heavy water out of Norway. While inside the ferry, after having planted explosives below deck, they are seen and stopped by a man working there. They secretly explain their situation to him, and he, being a good Norwegian, evidently harboring patriotic values too, responds «Oh, so you are that kind of guys, then you have to hide».

⁵⁹ Norsk Hydro is a large Norwegian energy company. It that was in charge of the Vemork Factory.

This way, regular people from remote parts of the country, seemingly acting on instinct, take part in the resistance. As such, resistance is represented as rural in its essence. Moreover, Norwegian values are represented as constant and unwavering: even in times of war, much like during the time of Danish rule when Norwegianness was also under pressure, it lives and breathes, especially in small towns and villages.

This representation is further strengthened by the extensive screening of the operation being executed from cabins on Hardangervidda. Hardangervidda is desolate, remote and properly rural. Cabins epitomize the simplicity of Norwegian small town life. Highlighting this aspect of the Vemork-operation then, creates a discursive link between resistance on the one hand and symbols of Norwegianness on the other. As such, it seems to associate, if not explain, the success of the operation with its quintessentially rural anchoring. For instance, daily radio communication with British allies, and accordingly central planning of the operation, takes place in a small cabin. Moreover, the saboteurs have to make use of uninhabited cabins as they move around Hardangervidda, relying heavily on well-developed mountainous infrastructure. The effect of this representation should not be exaggerated, however. Nevertheless, placing the resistance heroes in explicitly rural surroundings and representing their success as dependent on symbols of Norwegian rurality, does indeed contribute to constructing, or in Neumann and Nexon's (2006: 19) words naturalize, the image of resistance as rural in its essence.

Interestingly though, the representation of rural Norway as patriotic and a hotbed for resistance and latent Norwegianness, does not explicitly lean on the representation of urban Norway as the opposite. No references to foreign decadence and European sophistication permeating the cities are made, and as such the representation of regular, rural Norwegians as patriotic does not necessarily entail the representation of regular, urban Norwegians as less patriotic. However, as stressed in the research design, Othering need not be explicit. By linking to and strengthening one side of the rural/urban-divide that is prevalent in the basic discourse then, *Operation Swallow* can nonetheless contribute to differentiation. This way, it appears to play a dual role in the discourse, playing down difference and threatening to put an 'end to sameness' (Kiersey and Neumann 2013: 5) on the one hand, and indirectly reinforcing difference and naturalizing the dominant position on the other.

Moreover, and as will be clearer when we get to the *Max Manus*-part of the analysis, resistance can be represented as urban too. Considering how the rural representation shuts down alternative narratives, it becomes clear that it comes at a price. Again, stressing the proximity in time between the end of the war and the release of the film, is in place. Because of this proximity, many of those who took part in the ritual of watching the film, were likely to remember resistance as urban. However, as we have seen, the rural representation neatly falls in line with general conceptions of Norwegian identity, as it represents resistance as nothing more than the natural enactment of ordinary, commonplace Norwegianness. As it links with the basic discourse, it is an easy sell that effectively negotiates potential discursive friction and immediate memories by identifying an acceptable and appealing overarching narrative. Moreover, the lack of signs of differentiation between rural and urban in *Operation Swallow* makes sure memories of urban resistance are not directly contradicted, and as such this overarching narrative is given a more open field to play in.

Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful

Reproducing early demarcation of Norwegian identity, *Operation Swallow* thoroughly emphasizes the roughness of Norwegian nature and weather, and by extension the hardiness and clout of Norwegians who know how to navigate and command this roughness. This representation then, is somewhat related to the representation of Norwegianness as rural, in the sense that it puts rural Norway and rural Norwegians on display. However, in this section the attention will be directed specifically towards representations of Norway's climatic and topographic distinctiveness, and how this informs the representation of 'the Norwegian' (Christensen 1993: 39-41, Neumann 2001c: 57).

Big parts of the film takes place on Hardangervidda, and thus extensive screen time is given to the beautiful, yet fierce, Norwegian nature. For instance, when we are introduced to the saboteurs early in the film, they are in the mountains and the narrator stresses that during the war they were «struggling in snow and ice month after month». Moreover, upon their first arrival at Hardangervidda, the weather is awful; heavy winds, icing cold and thick snow meet them. Later, as they move from one cabin to the next, desperately searching for shelter and warmth, we are informed by the narrator that this is «one of the worst winters Norway has seen in a lifetime», and that it was as if «all life has left the earth». However, the Norwegian

weather is indeed whimsical, and as it clears up in the film, all of a sudden the mountains appear majestic and stunningly beautiful. We return to the filming of beautiful scenery on many occasions throughout the film, as our heroes travel through it as part of their operation. Even in the scene that ends the film, Hardangervidda, covered in snow, is again depicted as rough and grand. As such, Norway's distinctiveness with regards to climate and geography is meticulously underscored, and the film creates a clear link to the basic discourse that played an important part Norwegian identity construction even prior to independence in 1814.

Moreover, the representation of Norwegian weather being hardy and rough, gives rise to the specific representation of Norwegians, emphasizing their hardiness and clout, adding to their identity of good morals and rural common sense. Given the operation is executed from Hardangervidda the saboteurs need to maneuver in the cold, the wind and the snow. And as we follow them in their struggles, we watch them do just that. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the representation of the saboteurs, and thus Norwegians, as incredible skiers. On a general note, this representation is forwarded by the fact that the saboteurs use skis as their preferred mode of transportation, living up to the cliché that Norwegians are born with skis on their feet, as they seem just as comfortable skiing as walking. A more specific demonstrations of Norwegian skiing prowess, however, is put forth when one of the saboteurs, Claus Helberg, is chased by a group of German soldiers on skis. «Helberg is an accomplished skier», the narrator reassures us, and consequently only one German soldier, a «middle-European skiing champion and Bavarian alp-hunter» can follow him. In the end, after four full hours, Helberg proves the better skier and emerges victorious. Such skiing prowess is also specifically demonstrated when the saboteurs approach Vemork to carry out the operation there, and when set out to attach explosives to the Tinnsjø-ferry. In both instances, they depend on fast and smooth skiing to successfully execute the mission. More than skiing capabilities, the rough conditions of Hardangervidda provide the saboteurs with the opportunity to exhibit their general hardiness. For instance, our heroes are forced to steal from the reindeers' food chamber and eat lichen and moss. Moreover, they endure extreme cold for long swaths of time, miraculously keeping their humor and good spirits. This way, they further demonstrate their abilities to maneuver in the wild, and appear and stout and weathered through and through, almost unaffected by the cold and the hunger.

Norwegians then, by virtue of their ability to masterfully and effortlessly handle the typical Norwegian weather and terrain, are represented as uniquely hardy and rough. Furthermore, and by the same token, *Operation Swallow* forcefully represents Norway as unique by emphasizing the distinctiveness of its climatic and topographic features. As mentioned, the link to the basic discourse is clear. More than that, however, the link to the other main representations in the film that have been pointed out in this analysis should interest us. Importantly, representing Norwegian resistance as important for the outcome of the war, creating links of differentiation to Germany and emphasizing the patriotic quality of rural Norway, entails neglecting other potential story lines, forcing them to remain labyrinthine as they stay in the realm of virtual memories (Deleuze 1989: 131, Martin-Jones 2006: 23-24). Strikingly, these forgotten narratives, particularly those actualizing memories of Norwegians as nazi sympathizers and collaborators, would have been likely to force fierce discursive contention, and even threaten the credibility of the basic assumptions carrying Norwegian state identity. In the discursive exercise of keeping such representations from surfacing and gathering momentum, *Operation Swallow's* representation of Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful, indeed enabled by the continued domination of the basic discourses and by the anti-war, anti-Germany, anti-nazi collaborator euphoria that was trending in the immediate aftermath of the war, played an important role. The representation of Norway as stunningly beautiful and of Norwegians as sturdy and healthy provides a squeaky clean backdrop for the overarching narrative. In its friction-free and shining white beauty, the snow-covered mountain plateau resembles Norway's inherent goodness and infantile innocence, as it invites speculation of what might lie beneath, hidden away like forgotten narratives forced to silence.

Bollmer (2011: 461) argues that «A film cannot guarantee the actualization of a specific psychic memory; it can only attract collective memory». Standing alone then, *Operation Swallow* hardly has the capacity to properly collectivize memories of World War Two in Norway. Moving on to *Nine Lives* (1957), and particularly *Max Manus* (2008) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015a-f), however, we will see how *Operation Swallow* works with other films and TV-series to constitute a ritual of embodied movement that *has* this capacity. As for now, ascertaining that *Operation Swallow* does indeed actualize memories of Norwegian resistance that for the most part reproduce basic discourses, will suffice. Most

striking is perhaps the pure black and white quality of the representation, enabled by the need for a swift establishment of a representation of the war that fell in line with dominant representations and the general mood of the day, permeated by strong anti-nazi sentiments.

5.2. *Nine Lives*

Nine Lives (Skouen 1957), being one of only four Norwegian films that have been nominated for an Academy Award for Best Foreign Language film, is a Norwegian classic. It tells the story of saboteur and resistance hero Jan Baalsrud. Baalsrud and his team of twelve arrive on the coast of Norway in the northern county of Troms in 1943, with a mission to blow up the airport in Bardufoss. Before being able to execute the mission, however, they are attacked by a German ship, and forced to abandon their ship and run ashore. Everyone but Baalsrud is shot dead by the Germans. Not settling for eleven out of twelve, they chase after Baalsrud forcing him to set out for Sweden where he knows he will be safe from harm. The road to the Swedish border is long and strenuous, and Baalsrud faces many challenges along the way. With the help of patriotic Norwegians in Troms, however, he eventually reaches his destination.

Four representational themes that are forwarded in *Nine Lives* are worth taking note of, and will be discussed in this chapter. First, the film represents Norwegianness as something that is rural in its essence, suggesting that Norwegian identity is stronger outside of the cities. Second, it emphasizes Norway's climatic and topographical distinctiveness, and accordingly constructs the typical Norwegian as hardy and stout. Third, *Nine Lives* in large part fails to contextualize Norwegian resistance and thus represents it as in lack of a greater cause and detached from the war in general. Finally, it represents resistance against the Nazi occupation as a David and Goliath-type story, constructing Norway as an underdog capable of punching above its weight, however without representing German identity with any particularity. Especially the third of these representations, but also the fourth, can be said to have invariance-bursting effects. As such, *Nine Lives* differs from *Operation Swallow* on key points, and challenges the presumed discursive coherence between them. This might suggest that analyzing them as part of the same ritual of embodied movement can be problematic, given that a lack of discursive coherence threatens to force actualized memories back to the realm of the virtual (Bollmer 2011: 461-462).

Rural resistance and sleeping nationalism

Nine Lives strongly represents patriotism and Norwegianness as rural in its essence, and suggests that a sleeping nationalism exists in the towns and villages in remote areas in the

country. As has been discussed at length already, these were forceful sentiments in the construction of Norwegian identity in the 19th century, when Denmark and continental Europe, represented as urban and decadent, functioned as an important constitutive Other. *Nine Lives* then, helps naturalize this Self/Other-configuration, solidifying the position of this specific representation of Norwegian identity in the discourse. Curiously, the representation of rural Norway in *Nine Lives* follows *Operation Swallow* in refraining from offering urbanity as a sign of differentiation.

Most importantly, this representation is forwarded by the many ‘regular’ Norwegians, living in cabins in the mountains, that help Jan Baalsrud on his way to Sweden. As mentioned, Baalsrud is left alone after every single one of his eleven co-saboteurs are shot dead by German soldiers. And so, he has to travel to Sweden by himself, left completely dependent on help from others. Soon after escaping the Germans for the first time, while being shot at as he runs ashore and into the woods, Baalsrud arrives at a cabin where a kind but stout lady welcomes him. She lets him stay for a while to dry his clothes and get some rest. When sending him on his way, she instructs him to «ask for Henrik on the other side of the mountain». Thus, she gives the impression that ‘regular’ Norwegians, living in cabins, farms and houses across the country are willing to help, and this way represents nationalism and patriotism as something that is rural. This representations also, by demonstrating the eagerness to do subtle, under-the-radar resistance work, harbors the idea of Norwegianness as sleeping rather than dead in times of repression. Moreover, in sending Baalsrud to a specific person on the other side of the mountain, the lady in the cabin hints at the existence of a community of patriots operating resistance in this subtle way, suggesting every Norwegian is really a patriot.

After walking for a long time, Baalsrud arrives exhausted at Henrik’s house, stumbling into his barn, instantly falling asleep. While Henrik is contemplating what to do with his guest, German soldiers show up at the door for an inspection. Having heard of the fate of Baalsrud’s ship, Henrik realizes who is visiting, and hurries to hide Baalsrud while acting drunk himself, in order not to cause suspicion. Later, when the Germans have left and Baalsrud has returned to his senses, Henrik, who lives on an island, starts planning a way to get Baalsrud further in the direction of the Swedish border. He suggests taking Baalsrud off the island on his boat, and gives him skis so that he can continue at a faster pace once he gets

ashore. Seeming slightly nervous Baalsrud says to Henrik: «Its a long way to Sweden». Trying to calm Baalsrud, he confidently replies: «You are not the first». As such, Henrik does not merely suggest that any regular rural Norwegian can be patriotic. By telling Baalsrud he has helped others in a smilier manner, his character also demonstrates how such regular Norwegians actually do *important* resistance work, indicating that the sleeping nationalism residing in small and remote towns and villages actually matters and has a part to play in the resistance against the occupation.

After a long and fatiguing journey, Baalsrud arrives at yet another cabin. This one is located in the mountains, and is almost impossible to find. When he enters the cabin, Baalsrud is met by a properly Norwegian looking young lady by the name of Agnes. She lives with Martin, and they have a child together, still only a baby. Like Henrik and the lady in the cabin Baalsrud first stayed at, Agnes and Martin decide to help him without hesitation. To do so then, they hide him in the barn, where they take good care of him, providing him with food and even massaging his legs to help him recover before continuing his journey. The massage notwithstanding, Baalsrud does not recover, and is not able to continue by foot or on skis. After discussing with one of his friends how to best help Baalsrud move along, Martin decides they ought to drag him over the mountain and to Sweden on a sled. First, they drag him to a cabin, where he is left alone to wait for a doctor. Later, seeing as the doctor does not arrive, Baalsrud is forced to amputate nine of his toes due to gangrene. Consequently, Baalsrud must stay in his sled and Martin and his friends are forced to drag Baalsrud even further. As such Martin and Agnes, along with their group of friends, emerge as true heroes of the resistance as well. Being instrumental in helping Baalsrud reach the Swedish border, they do an important job for the resistance movement. Moreover, living in rural Norway Agnes and Martin too construct patriotism as a village phenomenon and they represent the sleeping nationalism as alive and well, and even functional and resolute, among regular Norwegians residing outside of the cities.

Not only rural people living in cabins, however, helped Baaslrud on his way. While he was at Martin and Agnes' cabin, the whole local community was mobilized to help him get on with his journey. This is illustrated well by a local teacher's efforts to mobilize his students and the sami people that live near the town, to help find Baalsrud when he is hiding in a snow cave in the mountains, waiting to be transported further towards the border.

Moreover, the last stretch of the way, Baalsrud is dragged by reindeers, and protected from being shot by German soldiers by a reindeer herd controlled by a sami. This broad communal mobilization gives the impression of a sizable resistance movement, and represents patriotism and Norwegianness as vibrant forces in rural Norway, bubbling under the surface of nazi repression.

As mentioned briefly before, this representation exhibits a striking lack of differentiation from urban Norway. Given the fact that the representation of resistance as rural is enabled by the basic discourse where rural Norway differs radically from urban Norway by not being decadent and European but rather down-to-earth and Norwegian (Neumann 2001c: 86, 137), it is curious that such contrasting does not appear in *Nine Lives*. Like in the case of *Nine Lives*, this can be explained by the relative proximity in the in time between the end of the war and the release of the film. In 1957⁶⁰ many still remembered the war and many remembered resistance as urban as well as rural. Thus, a representation amplifying this juxtaposition simply was not in line with the discursive currents and collective memories at the time. A more open representation then, emphasizing the rural quality of resistance without closing the door on the image of resistance as urban too, promised less discursive friction.

Finally, it is worth noting that there is a hint of assumed moral superiority in this representation as well. By telling a story where rural, and therefore proper, Norwegians are everyday resistance heroes, *Nine Lives* by implication, and relying on the completely uncontroversial assumption that resistance is a good thing, tells a story of Norwegians as inherently and instinctively good. As the regular Norwegian takes part in the resistance movement, the regular Norwegian must be good, the logic seems to go. Importantly though, this is a hint and an implication, rather than a front-line discursive representation, and for this reason its impact in the construction of Norwegian identity should not be exaggerated. However, knowing that Norwegians might as well have been represented as ‘bad’, this case of emphasizing Norwegian goodness is indeed noteworthy.

⁶⁰ There is a significant difference between 1948 and 1957. Regarding this representation, however, this difference appears not to matter as much, as the important thing is whether or not the audience remembers the war. As will be clear later, this difference matters more regarding the representation of Germany and Norway as inherently different, given that anti-Germany sentiments were stronger in the immediate aftermath of the war than almost 15 years after it.

On a more general note, it seems evident that the way in which *Nine Lives* links with the basic discourse is very similar to that of *Operation Swallow*. They both highlight signs like patriotism, nationalism and the will to resist in relation to rurality, and strikingly they both fail to contrast these signs with the representation of urban Norway being less patriotic. As such, we start seeing the contours of a ritual, the way it is conceptualized by Bollmer (2011: 459-462). Yet, it is important to note that *Nine Lives* takes some distance from *Operation Swallow* on this point by being even clearer and more vocal and explicit in its representation of resistance as a rural phenomena and of nationalism as a constant force that is only sleeping during times of repression. As we will see soon, the strength of this representation comes at the expense of the strength of others.

Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful

As in *Operation Swallow*, Norway is represented as cold, hardy and beautiful in *Nine Lives*. This way, it naturalizes early representations of Norwegian identity demarcating it from other countries, especially on the continent. Importantly, such identity construction implies the representation of ‘the Norwegian’ as stout and rough. Huge parts of the film takes place in the high mountains, and both the beauty of Norwegian nature and its brutality is thoroughly highlighted.

The first time we encounter the Norwegian nature in the film, it is purely beautiful. After leaving the first cabin he stays at, Baalsrud walks over the mountains on his way to Henrik and the next safe haven. On the way, he is filmed walking by himself, surrounded by high mountains covered in snow, characteristically diving down into the fjords. The sun is shining, and the Norwegian landscape is represented as utterly stunning, almost breathtakingly so.

When Baalsrud continues after his stay at Henrik’s, the landscape is still overwhelming and beautiful. But now, however, the representation is added a dimension as Baalsrud’s is skiing rather than walking. Skiing being a national symbol that is closely connected to, and even enabled by, the rough and cold weather of the north, the image of Baalsrud conquering the mountains on skis is even more quintessentially Norwegian than him doing it by foot. Moreover, it represents Baalsrud, the typical Norwegian, as someone who knows how to maneuver in the challenging terrain. This representation is furthered

strengthened when Baalsrud, later in the film, easily distances German soldiers, also skiing, that are following him. A nice Self/Other-configuration is constructed here: Norwegians can ski, while foreigners, here represented by Germans, cannot. Moreover, in this configuration lies the implication that Norwegians, as opposed to foreigners, are used to and know how to handle rough and cold conditions. Here we see signs of both linking and differentiation (Hansen 2006: 19-20), as skiing abilities and nature know-how is linked with the unique Norwegian climate and geography, while differentiated from German clumsiness and bewilderment.

On the way from Henrik's and to his next destination, however, enduring and intense exposure to the light of the sun bathed snow, Baalsrud suffers from snow blindness. Being completely unable to see anything in front of him, Baalsrud seems to be faced with an almost impossible task. Luckily then, our hero is a hardy Norwegian who moves in the snow like a fish in the sea; throwing snow balls in front of him to get a sense of the terrain, he maneuvers his way through the deep snow and mountainous landscape and slowly makes his way in the right direction. This way, the film establishes a strong discursive link between Norway and snow, and accordingly between Norwegians and toughness. This link is strengthened later in the film, when Baalsrud, alone in a cabin, isolated by a snow storm, is forced to amputate nine of his toes, again demonstrating admirable resolve, and more than that the practical skills required to survive in the cold. Similarly, after being dragged in a sled from this cabin and to a pick-up spot further up the mountain, Baalsrud survives in a snow cave, that is completely snowbound by the time Agnes and Martin come to save him. And if that was not enough, Baalsrud even has the humor and the nerve to act dead when they first dig him out. When they recognize defeat and sadly establish that he is dead, Baalsrud smiles and says: «Oh no, you don't fool an old fox». Reminiscent of the saboteurs in *Operation Swallow*, freezing and starving and smiling all the same, he gives the impression that living in a snow cave for more than a week, being fully covered in snow for parts of that time, was somewhat mundane and not really a big deal. Again then, the rough and cold conditions of the north are used to represent Norwegians as uniquely hardy and stout. This representation is also strengthened by the skiing skills and ability to maneuver in challenging terrain of the men dragging Baalsrud's sled up the mountain.

Nine Lives then, by extensive showing of Baalsrud, and others, walking, skiing and surviving in the snow, and by showing off stunning Norwegian landscapes of mountains and fjords, takes part in representing Norway as climatically and geographically distinct from other countries. Like in *Operation Swallow* the beautifully snow-covered landscapes function as a metaphor for how the smooth story of Norwegian cleanness and goodness is accentuated at the expense of other stories that paint a more complicated and nuanced, perhaps even grim and unfavorable, picture. However, as will be clear from the two following sections, the representation of Norway as good is limited to the representation of Norway as rural and good by implication, that was discussed above. As such, it is not as overwhelmingly one-sided in *Nine Lives* as it is in *Operation Swallow*. Therefore, the metaphor is only moderately fitting. The representation of Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful in *Nine Lives* then, can be said to matter more on its own merits than by virtue of linking with other representations.

Resistance without a cause

Nine Lives differs significantly from *Operation Swallow*, and as we shall see, from *Max Manus* and *The Heavy Water War* too, by *not* representing Norwegian resistance as important for the war at large. The story is almost exclusively driven by Baalsrud's heroic travails, without laying out why these are of particular significance. As such, the bigger picture is missing and the film only mildly hints at why resistance is an important and worthwhile endeavor. However, these hints, or the lack thereof, demand attention, as the mildness of their character challenges the dominant representation of Norwegian resistance as a deciding factor for the outcome of the war, by playing down, almost neglecting, context.

When Baalsrud and the rest of the group arrive at the Norwegian coast, we learn that they have travelled from Shetland and that they are on a sabotage mission that we can assume is orchestrated by the British. More information than that, however, is not shared with the viewer. For instance, the goal of the mission, to blow up Bardufoss Airport, is not communicated well, and thus, the significance of the operation, the saboteurs' sacrifice, and Baalsrud's survival is belittled. Evidently, a very different representation could easily have been forwarded, as highlighting the purpose of the mission and specifying the importance of saving Baalsrud would have clearly linked Norway to the allies in the discourse in order to place in safely on the right side of history and reinforce the image of Norwegians as

inherently good. However, such contextualization did not take place. Accordingly, Norwegian resistance is represented as haphazard and in lack some greater cause. Sabotage for the sake sabotage, and saving Baalsrud for the sake of saving Baalsrud.

An explanation of the difference between *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* in this respect can be found by asking what changed in the short decade that past between the release of the two films. As discussed in the last chapter, *Operation Swallow* was released at a time when the structure and tensions of European politics had not yet moved on from the fault lines that were dominant during the war. As such, placing Norway in the larger context of the war was important in the discursive exercise of constructing Norway as anti-German, good and ‘on the right side of history’ (Maerz: 46-48, 62-63, Maier 2007: 47-49). In 1957, however, these structures had somewhat softened and new lines of tension were being established. Thus, constructing Norway as good and important did not urgently require a distancing from Germany by contextualizing resistance (ibid.: 63-64).

Besides, this turn away from the world is symptomatic of the development of Norwegian identity in the time following the release of *Nine Lives*. This development specifically had to do with the EU-debates. Although the first referendum took place in 1972, the debates over the prospect of Norwegian membership started already in the early 1960s (Neumann 2001c: 123). As we remember, the No-side succeeded in large part due to its effective emphasis on Norwegian superiority over colonial European states and on the idea that Norway would be better off alone due to this superiority (ibid.: 152-155, 171)⁶¹. By narrowly focusing on Baalsrud’s survival and neglecting the importance of resistance in general, *Nine Lives* appears to be cut from the same cloth as this representation. By reducing the story of Norwegian resistance to the story of Baalsrud and a Bear Gryll’s-like alfa male ego-trip, the film reproduces and further enables representations of Norway as solitarily superior. Like the snow-covered mountain landscapes function as a metaphor for the burying of certain less than favorable narratives, Baalsrud’s solo mission of survival can function as a metaphor for Norway’s quest to preserve its distinctiveness by staying out of the EU.

On this point then, *Nine Lives* is overtly different from *Operation Swallow*, as it ignores context and zooms in on one man’s destiny. Thus, it comes across as a personal

⁶¹ The quote «Be true to yourself and to hell with the world», from Ibsen’s national epos *Peer Gynt* is often used as an expression of such sentiments, and is indeed fitting in Baalsrud’s case as well. Perhaps he could be likened to *Peer Gynt* himself?

drama more than a war drama. By diverting attention from Norwegian importance for the outcome of the war in this way, the film fails to re-actualize and contribute to the collectivization of the memory of Norway as a major player in the war. Yet, as we just saw, by linking with the same basic discourse that the No-side in the EU-debates did, and thus reproducing an image of Norway as superior by virtue of being better than the war-prone and colonial European states in general (Neumann 2001c: 171), *Nine Lives* nonetheless represents Norway as superior. However, this image of superiority lacks the dimension of importance, and thus clashes with the representation forwarded in *Operation Swallow*. On this point then, the two films do not work well together in order to keep memories of Norwegian resistance from returning to the virtual. As such, although Bollmer (2011: 459-462) offers a quite dynamic conceptualization⁶² of rituals, our emerging ritual is forced to take a tumble.

Norway and Germany as David and Goliath

More than generally representing Norway as different from other states emphasizing the very distinct quality of its topography and climate, the uniquely rural quality of its patriotism, and its inward sense of superiority, *Nine Lives* represents Norway with Germany as a constitutive Other. In this film, however, as contrasted to the heavy-water adaptations and *Max Manus*, Germany is not explicitly represented as an evil force constituting Norway as inherently good. Rather, German presence in remote Norwegian towns and villages, and German soldiers' restless efforts to capture Baalsrud seems to narrate Norwegian resistance against the occupation as a David and Goliath-type story, specifically representing Norway as the heroic underdog⁶³. This narration fits well with the representation of Norway as an over-achieving small state, playing into the peace nation representation. As such, it somehow takes part in the naturalization of the representation of Norway as good and important after all, although applying alternative discursive resources to do so.

The instance discussed briefly in the last section, where Baalsrud distances German soldiers while skiing, is a good place to start. On his way to Agnes and Martin's cabin, our

⁶² Bollmer's (2011) conceptualization of rituals is dynamic in the sense that there are no structural frames or stringent criteria that determine exactly what a ritual might be. Drawing specifically on Schechner's (2006: 52) argument that rituals are performed in the everyday, Bollmer argues that they can take on literally any form. See Chapter 2.5.

⁶³ Maier (2007: 47) argues that this specific focus has been prevalent in the national narration of World War Two in Norway.

hero passes through a village patrolled by German soldiers. They see him and a number of them follow Baalsrud in hot pursuit, on skis, trying to shoot him. However, Baalsrud is, as we have seen, a very good skier, and as it happens, a very good shot as well. And so he fends off the Goliath-like figure that is the German soldiers to beat the odds that are stacked against him. Moreover, Baalsrud's escape after his fellow saboteurs are shot when they arrive at the Norwegian coast at the start of the film tells a similar story. Being left completely alone and having abandoned the ship and all military equipment, his chances do not look favorable. He is heavily outnumbered, and only has a handgun for protection. Furthermore, he is shot in the leg as he tries to escape, and is forced to continue barefoot as he drops one of his shoes. Starting his journey to cross through Norway and reach Sweden then, considering the fact that Norway is controlled by German soldiers many of whom are now out looking for Baalsrud, seems an insurmountable task that anyone would be wise to simply give up. But as we know, Baalsrud is not a quitter; he smoothly passes his first obstacle, and thus sets the tone for the rest of the story.

As a matter of fact, this representation is forwarded in one of the final scenes of the film as well, when Baalsrud is transported across the Swedish border by a herd of reindeer. While our hero, crippled from the great escape he is now close to pulling off, is lying helpless on a sled, depending on animals to save him, German soldiers with machine guns try time to kill him one last time. This way, narrow escapes seems to emerge as a recurring theme in the film, as Baalsrud is often very close to being caught or killed. This, along with all the times he is forced to hide from German soldiers in cabins and barns, represents him as a David in his struggle against Goliath, constantly fighting an uphill battle. Moreover, and importantly, even the basic premise of the film - one man's attempt to outfox an entire army - lends credit to this representation too. And, as Baalsrud is a proper Norwegian, due to his dexterity with rough and hardy nature and his strong morals and unwavering patriotism, the representation of him as an underdog entails the representation of Norway as an underdog. And as the underdog prevails, the David and Goliath-association is solidified. As such, Norway is not merely an underdog, but an underdog that is expected to treat its difficult position as a possible advantage, and use it to do good in the world. Again, using Hansen's (2006: 42) terms, both 'underdog' and 'ability overcome disadvantage of being a small state' are signs that link well with the basic discourse regarding Norway as a peace nation.

Although this narrative dominates the film, representations of Germany being different from Norway apart from just being a Goliath-figured enemy chasing our hero, are also forwarded. For instance, when Baalsrud and his fellow saboteurs first arrive in Norway, they visit Hansen, the local shoemaker. On Hansen's floor they find a flyer, promising a bounty for whoever can catch the enemy. When they ask him who the enemy is, he hesitantly answers «The Germans is the enemy», before assuring them that he will not report to the Germans that they had been there. As such, Germany is swiftly established as the enemy of our heroes and an impediment to Norwegian freedom and independence. This representation is further strengthened when Baalsrud and the others' ship is attacked by a German ship, chasing them ashore and cold-bloodedly shooting dead eleven out of twelve saboteurs. The instances of German soldiers visiting and controlling farms and cabins to exercise control can also be mentioned in this regard, as they represent German soldiers as an unwelcome force, intervening in regular peoples' everyday and disrupting the harmony of their way of life. Finally, the scene where Baalsrud distances German soldiers while skiing is worth resurfacing, as it explicitly demonstrates how Germans deliberately hinder the success of a Norwegian hero. However, these representations, at least compared to the *Operation Swallow* where the qualitative difference between Germany and Norway is represented with great precision and zeal, do not go a long way in constituting German identity, and consequently Norwegian identity. This has to do with the generic quality of the German threat. Perhaps apart from the killing of Baalsrud's eleven compatriots, Germany is established as the enemy, but, as we saw in the last section, its status as such is never put in any larger context and images of the war in general or the evil intentions of The Third Reich are never invoked. Thus, *Nine Lives* only feebly reproduces representations of Norway as inherently good, using Germany as a constitutive Other. Moreover, it does not offer an alternative representation on this point, accordingly the absence of specification of the German threat does not cause much friction.

Interestingly, the lack of specificity with which German identity is represented can be seen in context of the failure to contextualize Norwegian resistance, as emphasizing the significance of resistance and of Baalsrud's survival would necessarily have had to entail a specification of the content of German identity; representing resistance as important for the outcome of the war and the defeat of nazism, would require, at least implicitly, an

underscoring of the evil quality of the Nazi regime. However, neither of these representations were forwarded with any strength, and as such, the representation of Norwegian identity in *Nine Lives* is strikingly gravitated towards Norway's climate, geography and rural patriotism.

Yet, the narrative casting Germany in the role of Goliath as discussed above, is not reliant on any representation of Germany as evil, and not really reliant on the Other being Germany at all. Thus, the representation of Norway in relation to Germany still functions as a constitutive force for Norwegian identity, specifically emphasizing Norway's David-like quality and ability to punch above its weight. Importantly, the representation of Norway as a peace nation and a humanitarian super power partly rests on the same narrative. And so, although it chooses a different route than *Operation Swallow* by casting Norway as an underdog rather than emphasizing its importance, *Nine Lives* also, however moderately, contributes to the reproduction and thus naturalization (Neumann and Nexon 2006: 19) of this representation.

It seems then, that the two films do indeed tell similar stories and represent Norwegian identity in a similar manner even though they diverge on important points. The representation of Norway as rural in its essence and of Norwegian climate and geography as distinctly hardy and beautiful are strong in both films, and interestingly in both cases signs of differentiation posing urban Norway as a contrast are lacking. I made the argument that this can be attributed to their relative proximity in time to the war and the need to gently negotiate personal memories of resistance as urban. If that is the case, it is puzzling to observe that such a need was not in play when *Operation Swallow* represented Germany as purely evil and Norway as inherently good in 1948. Considering only three years had passed since the war ended, it is safe to assume that many had vivid and nuancing memories of the war at this point. Following the logic appropriated to the lack of differentiating signs between rural and urban Norway then, an overarching, all-encapsulating narrative should have been crafted in order to negotiate these personal memories. However, as discussed above, in the immediate aftermath of the war the need to be anti-German and deal with the trauma of the war by crafting a narrative that indeed was polemic and by nature conflicted with many personal memories (Maerz 2010: 62-63, Maier 2007: 47). This also accounts for the difference between *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* in their focus on Germany as a constitutive Other

to Norway, and on Norway as important for the outcome of the war. By 1957 the urgent drive to take distance from Germany and side with the allies had somewhat passed, and a turn away from the world, concentrating on Norwegian superiority by distancing from Europe more generally, also in line with basic discourses, was in the cards. Thus, the ritual that these films constitute continues to emerge. The process does not run particularly smoothly, however, as clear cases of invariance-bursting representation cause significant discursive friction. Yet, as we have seen, this friction is mostly a matter of difference in focus and strength, rather than outright discursive clashes and contradictions. Again, given Bollmer's (2011) dynamic conceptualization of rituals such friction does not seem to threaten the assertion that the films in large part tell similar stories and represent Norwegian identity in similar ways. *Nine Lives* then, by virtue of linking with *Operation Swallow*, contributes to constituting the collective that is Norway through ritualistic storytelling.

5.3. *Max Manus*

Max Manus (2008)⁶⁴ tells the story of the Norwegian war hero Max Manus. He takes part in the resistance against the Nazi occupation in Norway's capital, Oslo. The storyline revolves around Max Manus and his friends and fellow saboteurs in Oslo, as they plot how to drive the Germans out of Norway and accordingly help the allies win the war. We enter the story at the start of the war and follow Max and the others all the way to the 7th of June 1945, when the occupation has ended. The plot is driven by the group's everyday resistance and Max' continuous efforts to keep from being captured by the Germans. A sort of climax to the plot comes with the blowing up of the German ship *The Donau*, anchored in the Oslo fjord, looming over the city. Max' relationship with Tikken, evolving throughout the war, and his friendship with the other saboteurs, are also important parts of the story.

The analysis of *Max Manus* identifies four chief trends regarding the way in which the film can be said to actualize memories of and thus help naturalize some of the central features of Norwegian identity. First, I will discuss the way in which *Max Manus* represents Norway as different from Germany and therefore inherently good, and second, the narrative representing Norwegian resistance as critically important for the eventual outcome of the war in general will be scrutinized. In the case of both of these representations, the distance in time between the war and the release of the film, especially given the intervening revisionist literature and thinking on the war in Norway, is of interest. Third, *Max Manus* represents Norway as defined by a 'sleeping nationalism' residing in the rural areas of the country. This representation is also challenged by the notion of city-driven resistance that indeed is prevalent in the film. Finally, I will have a look at the mild representation of Norway as climatically and topographically unique, and discuss the significance of its feeble presence.

Norway as 'not Germany'

Although Germany has not been particularly important as a significant Other in the constitution of Norwegian identity, the way in which *Max Manus* constructs Nazi Germany as a relational opposite to Norway, is of interest. Rather than reproducing representations of Germany in particular, the representation of Nazi Germany in *Max Manus* reproduces representations of states that are different from Norway more generally. Besides, because

⁶⁴ All references to *Max Manus* from here on is to *Max Manus* (2008).

Nazi Germany is represented as the evil to Norway's good, this representation primarily functions to naturalize the representation of Norway as morally superior. As I will come back to later in this section, the ease with which *Max Manus* forges this rather one-sided representation of World War Two in Norway, almost 70 years after the fact and when the revisionist turn in the literature long ago had opened up a space for nuancing the picture (Grimnes 2009, Maerz 2010: 277)⁶⁵, is quite astonishing and highly intriguing from a discourse analytical point of view. Neumann (2001b: 60) e.g. argues that although no discourses are completely sealed off and unpolitical, a discursive hegemonies can arise, where the room for discursive contention and change is very limited.

Already in the opening scenes of the film, the representation of Germany as qualitatively different from Norway is forwarded. The film starts with pictures of newspapers, clearly depicting Germany as a warmongering and evil state. Examples of headlines that are showing are «Yesterday, Austria was incorporated in the German empire» and «Poland now feels directly threatened». Very soon after, also in the beginning of the film, we meet Max for the first time, as he, alongside other Norwegians, volunteers in the war against Russia in Finland. Thus, a discursive divide between Germany and Norway where they are represented as qualitatively different from one another is established from the get-go: Norwegians help the Finns and are good, whereas the Germans take control of Austria and invade Poland and are bad.

This representation is strengthened throughout the film, and can be said to be a recurrent theme, as the encounter between Norwegians and Germans is central to the plot. On a general note this has to do with the way in which the German presence in Oslo, functioning as a impediment to resistance as well as to the good life, is represented. Moreover, Oslo is dark and grim during the war. Gestapo officers are everywhere, making it very hard for Max and his friends, and Norwegians other regular Norwegians, to move around and live there lives in any sort of normal way.

⁶⁵ Interestingly, Maerz (2010: 277) argues that the documentary-series *I Solkorsets Tegn* (1981) incited the first new debate of the revisionist decade that was the 1980. In spite of telling the story of Norwegian nazi collaborators, the series upholds the major narrative by emphasizing how many supported the nazi cause because they did not know about Holocaust in the early phases of the war. Although it is a TV-series, *I Solkorsets Tegn* is not of interest for my analysis as it is not a popular cultural representation. For an analysis of *Solkorsets Tegn*, see Baltzrud (2004). Especially Chapter 5.3. on the Norwegian Holocaust, is of interest in relation to my analysis, as it argues that the public reaction to the series - outcry and fury over the sympathetic depiction of collaborators - was a symptom of the largely one-sided consensus that was permeating the national narrative.

More than the representation of Germany as mean and bad by virtue of their general presence in the streets of the capital, more specific statements is indeed worth pausing at. For instance, when Max and some of his fellow saboteurs are in Scotland training for resistance, Linge himself, the leader of the resistance Company they are part of, tells Max that «It is only a question of time Manus, before we all have to learn German». Soon after, Max states in a discussion with his closest friend Gregers Gram that «We create national unity by blowing up all German materials on Norwegian soil». The first of these statements says something about German intentions and suggests that Germany plans to stay in Norway and continue to exert influence there for a long, long time. As such, it is also a reminder of The Third Reich's evil ambition to achieve world domination. The second also represents Germany as a foreign and evil force, and more than that, one that needs to be challenged. Also, by citing resistance as an instrument for creating national unity, it explicitly establishes a Self/Other-relation between Norway and Germany: the former longing for freedom and harmony, the latter pursuing evil ambitions, wanting to hinder Norway from being free and harmonious.

Moving on from these instances of Norwegians and their allies describing the German threat, the way in which German officials behave in the film, is also of interest. The first thing to notice is the German official's inclination to torture Norwegians, even civilians, in the hunt for Max and other saboteurs. For instance, after the saboteurs successfully blow up ships in the Oslo Fjord, Sigfried gives the order to arrest five random employees working at the shipyard to «make them sing», implying torture will be used in order to catch the saboteurs who were behind the operation. Later on, Kolbein Luring, another one of Max' close friends and fellow saboteurs is released from Grini, the prison. He is battered and bruised and has clearly been mistreated. The use of torture is even more evident later in the film when a seemingly random Norwegian is tied to a chair in Sigfried's office, blood dripping from his face. Moreover, Tallak, yet another one of Max' close friends and fellow saboteurs, is captured and tortured for information. However, the torturing of him is not implied, but rather made perfectly explicit, as we see Sigfried himself, along with one of his colleagues, calmly refusing to release Tallak as he begs for mercy and for the torture to stop. Sigfried's colleague is ice cold, and informs Tallak that «torture is a symphony in several movements, and this is only the first». If the discursive link between Germany and torture is not made clear enough by these scenes, Max himself at one point states that they are

«torturing and killing my friends in order to get to me». Nazi Germany then, is represented as evil in the sense that it lightheartedly tortures its enemies, and even civilians, in order to reach its goals. As such, it serves as a perfect contrast to Norway, resisting the German occupation because it humbly wishes to gain freedom and independence, and because fighting evil, i.e. Nazi Germany, is good in and of itself. Moreover, emphasizing the brutality and inhumane character of the occupation allows Norway to enter a moral high ground and claim superiority over other states. Thus, the representation of Germany, and by extension Norway, in *Max Manus*, links itself intertextually with, and reinforces, representations of Norway as a peace nation and a humanitarian superpower that developed to become a powerful force in the discourse on Norwegian identity through the 20th century (Leira 2015: 37, Skånland 2010).

The representation of the occupation through Sigfried, Max' nemesis and the villain of the story, is also worthy of scrutiny. Being cynical, brutal, violent, and completely devoted to the nazi cause as he chases Max and his friends, Sigfried personifies the occupation. The first time we meet Sigfried is when he, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, orders the arrest and potential torture of five random shipyard employees. Thus, by demonstrating willingness to torture innocent civilians, he is immediately represented as being just as evil and completely devoid of humanitarian concerns as Nazi Germany itself. Moreover, and as we have seen, Sigfried himself takes part in the torture of one of the heroes of the resistance movement. Also of interest is Sigfried's meeting with his new office assistant, a blond and beautiful Norwegian by the name of Solveig. They meet only moments after Sigfried gives the order to torture shipyard workers. He is clearly attracted to her, and in his attempt to charm Solveig when welcoming her to the office, Sigfried, appears sly and manipulative, giving the impression of a seasoned womanizer. This, at least in part, has to do with his sudden change in character and tone: one moment he harshly commands his inferiors to torture civilians, the next he puts on a flirting and convincing smile. Solveig serves as a nice contrast to Sigfried. She is humble, naive and innocent, and seemingly unaware of Sigfried's foul intentions. Later, the contrast between them is made even clearer, when Solveig peeks through the door to Sigfried's office, and catches him violently yelling at one of his colleagues for failing to capture Max when having him surrounded. Solveig is shocked by his behavior, and signalizes disapproval of his brutal ways. At another point she similarly voices

discontent and threatens to quit her job due to Sigfried's actions. By questioning Sigfried then, Solveig, helps constitute him as evil, and accordingly a contrast to everything Norwegian. Moreover, because Sigfried is the face of the occupation in the film, and is depicted as a typical German, representing Sigfried as evil entails representing Nazi Germany as evil. And because Norway is everything that Germany is not, activating these memories of the occupation enables the representation of Norway as inherently good and morally superior.

Although the representation of Norway and Germany as qualitatively different from one another is the dominant representation in the film, it does not go completely unchallenged. For instance, one could argue that Solveig's character nuances the picture in revisionist fashion as her tacit support for and collaboration with the occupation as she works in the office of the administration, and her eventual endorsement of the Nazi project as she enters a relationship with Sigfried, offers a representation where Norwegians are not categorically and one-sidedly, and therefore not inherently, good. Our hero's encounter with a nice, young German soldier on the train, who appear to mirror Max in his wish for nothing more than peace and prosperity, has a similar effect, as it too blurs the line between good and evil and challenges the discursive divide between Norway and Germany that prevails in the rest of the film.

This challenge is almost invisibly weak, however, and thus the representation of Germany as evil and a brutal force impeding the flourishing of Norwegian identity, nonetheless completely dominates the narrative. As touch on briefly above, this one-sidedness is rather astonishing, given the time of the release of the film. In 1948, when *Operation Swallow* was released there was an immediate need to establish a narrative distancing Norway from everything German, and as such all Nazi-sympathizers and collaborators were categorically labeled un-Norwegian and bad. In 2008, however, at the time of *Max Manus*'s release, more than 60 years after the war, the perpetuation of such a narrative does not appear to be urgent in any way. The revisionist turn in the literature on the war that happened in the 1970s and 1980s opened up a space for more nuancing as it directed attention to the Nazi-collaboration taboo (Maerz 2010: 277-281-285, Grimnes 2009), doing the hard labor of challenging the main story line where these taboos were neglected and had been forgotten, pushed back and forced to remain in the state of the virtual. A film being made after this turn could have been expected to make use of this space, and challenged the

notion of unconditional Norwegian superiority. Yet, *Max Manus* reproduces this notion by drawing a sharp, almost impenetrable, line between Norway and Germany as good and evil. However astonishing, this is a testament to the resilience of the assumptions that ground the peace nation representation, and that has been a prominent force in basic discourses defining Norwegian identity for centuries. *Max Manus* was enabled by this resilience, and contributes to strengthening its resolve. Speaking of a discursive hegemony (Neumann 2001b: 60) then, appears to be in order.

As such, it seems clear that *Max Manus* links well with *Operation Swallow* on this point, as both films categorically represent Germany as evil in order to represent Norway as the opposite. *Max Manus* then, re-actualizes the memories of Norwegians being patriotic and good during World War Two that was actualized by *Operation Swallow*. This way, watching the two films appears to take on the shape of a ritual of embodied movement, where they work together to keep certain memories of the war, in this case, Norway as inherently good, from returning to the virtual (Bollmer 2011: 459-462). In invoking signs of differentiation that specify the evil quality of the German Other, however, *Max Manus* diverges from *Nine Lives*, and so, with regards to this particular representation the ritualistic aspect is decidedly clearer when considering *Max Manus* and *Operation Swallow* alone.

Norwegian resistance won the war

Interestingly, *Max Manus* represents Norwegian resistance as imperative for not only the eventual retreat of the occupation, but also the outcome of the war and the success of the allies more generally. By emphasizing Norway's strategic importance in the war and its close cooperation with London, and thus the significance of the resistance in a wider, even historic context, the film reproduces representations of Norway 'punching above its weight'⁶⁶, being an important actor and a force of good in world politics. On this point to then, the link to *Operation Swallow* is much clearer than the one to *Nine Lives*.

After he escapes from capture in the hospital, Max travels directly to Scotland to join Kompani Linge, a resistance group established by the British, consisting of Norwegian

⁶⁶ Although Barack Obama has been mocked for using this phrase to characterize all his small state allies, much like he over-used the cliché 'America has no stronger ally' (Keating 2012), it seems especially apt in Norway's case, given that Norway's identity as a peace nation relies specifically on the idea that small state status can be an advantage (Leira 2015: 35, 37).

volunteers. Here, Max and the others are in close contact with British superiors, and cooperate well with them in the planning of further resistance work upon return to Norway. Moreover, while in Norway prior to his escape to Scotland, Max and the resistance group took orders from London. One of the chief organizers of the movement in Oslo, Jens Christian Hauge, even stressed that no operations should take place without such orders. This explicitly places the resistance in context of the war in general, and highlights its importance for the allied powers. Norway's loyalty to the British and the allies more generally is further highlighted when Max and Gregers are rewarded a medal by the Norwegian king on British soil, honoring their contribution to the resistance. The emphasis on the alliance with the British reminds us of *Operatin Swallow*, where the same link was of great importance in establishing the indispensability of Norwegian resistance. As such, the two films act as a ritual by joining efforts to actualize the same memory (Bollmer 2011: 459).

Having handed Max, Gregers and the others their medals, the king gives a speech, in which one statement in particular stands out in our context. He says: «The effort you all do for Norway, is decisive and historic». As such, he adds another dimension to the representation of Norwegian resistance as important for the allies. More than being important, he seems to suggest, Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation is crucial: something that the allies could not do without. Thus, Norway is elevated from being just an ally to being an indispensable ally. This representation is further strengthened and made even more explicit in a scene where Hitler's death is announced on the radio, while the camera zooms in on a picture of Max and Gregers. Their heroism is linked directly with the success of the allies through an event signaling the end of the war and the elimination of evil. This way, seen in context of the construction of Germany as evil and Norway as good, the resistance work done by Max and other saboteurs is represented as being on the frontline of a decisive battle against this evil, constructing Norwegian resistance, and by extension Norway, as a heroic force of good, linking intertextually with representations of Norway as a peace nation and a humanitarian super power. An interesting side note is that the cultivation as heroes of Max in particular, but also his friends such as Gregers, mildly resembles the representation of Norwegian resistance in *Nine Lives* where one man's quest for glory is at the centre of attention. Thus, the representation of resistance in *Max Manus* runs a dual track as it tells the story of Norwegian superiority both by emphasizing the British link and by

worshipping the heroism of individuals. The latter should not be given too much weight, however, as it in large part is overshadowed by the former.

Taking part in this overshadowing is the emphasis on Norway's importance in military strategic matters. At a fancy christmas dinner with the Nazi administration in Oslo, a couple of officers across the table from Sigfried start talking about the development of the war, and possible routes to victory. Siegfried condescendingly interrupts them to state that «I don't believe in negotiations. Luckily, we will never negotiate over Norway». Moreover, in one scene one of the saboteurs, Roy Nilsen, storms in to the headquarters of the resistance movement and agitatedly exclaims that «the Germans have broken through in the Ardennes». Moving on, he links this major development of the war on the continent to resistance at home, arguing that the saboteurs must do everything they can to keep German troops from leaving Norway. This would increase the chances of the allies to keep Germany at bay in the Ardennes, he argues, continuing by stating that it «might result in them [Germany] winning the war». Furthermore, Roy specifically emphasizes the importance of stopping the ship *Donau*, anchored in the Oslo Fjord, from leaving for Germany.

Both Sigfried's argument that control over Norway is non-negotiable and Roy's plea to keep German troops in Norway, puts the war in Norway in context of the war in general. Moreover, by emphasizing the importance of the outcome of the war in Norway for the war on the continent, they frame the resistance movement in a way that places it on the frontline of the war, invoking 'historic' and 'decisive' as signs of linking that build on the construct of Norwegian identity (Hansen 2006: 19-20). At the core of this representation is a vision of Norway's uniqueness, and an inclination towards narrating Norway as somehow better than other states. These are sentiments that are powerful in the peace nation discourse and the representation of Norway as a humanitarian superpower. Like with the representation on Norway as diametrically different from Germany, this representation clearly aligns *Max Manus* with *Operation Swallow*, while the link to *Nine Lives* appears vague. On this point too then, the ritualistic element in the storytelling that these films engage in appears clearer when considering *Max Manus* and *Operation Swallow* alone.

Resistance and patriotism as both rural and urban

By emphasizing how resistance and patriotism are flourishing among ‘regular’ Norwegians typically from the rural areas of the country, and by likening the occupation to the unions with Denmark and Sweden by representing it as an impediment to such flourishing, *Max Manus* naturalizes representations of Norwegianness as peripheral in its essence. However, given the fact that Max Manus and his fellow saboteurs are city boys and run the resistance from the capital, Norwegianness is represented as urban too. This way, the film confirms the dominant representation, but somewhat challenges it by suggesting an alteration. On this point, *Max Manus* falls neatly in line with both *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives*, so that the watching of the films ensures «the actions that constitute memory» are repeated (Bollmer 2011: 459).

Most strikingly, the representation of Norway as rural is forwarded when Max is in the hospital after having jumped from the window of his flat trying to escape the police officers that tries to have him arrested for publishing illegal propaganda. In the hospital, Max talks to his nurse, Liv. Liv is blond and beautiful and talks in a thick accent. In a tense moment, Max asks her where she is from, and she informs him that she is from Eivindvik in Sogn, a small town in a remote part of the country. Max says that he has never been there, and Liv replies: «very few people have». Soon after, Max asks her with a trembling voice whether or not there are many patriots there, and Liv silently and solemnly nods her head for confirmation. Thus, a discursive link is established between patriotism and the rural parts of the country. By referring to a tiny town as a hotbed of patriotism, the dialogue clearly suggests that nationalism and the will to fight the occupation is alive and well across the country, however repressed and silenced it might be at the current point in time. This representation is furthered strengthened when Liv helps Max escape the hospital. First, when he asks how many guards are outside, she looks over her shoulder, thinks for a minute and then secretly whispers «five, and they have guns». More than that, she informs Max that the doctor can probably help him get out a message. Later she delivers him a message from his friends outside of the hospital and she provides him with a tool to break open the orthopedic cast on his leg. Later, when Max attempts his escape, Liv orders the policeman that is guarding his room to leave so that Max can rest, and suggests that Max should hit her before he jumps through the window in order for it to look like she did not help him. By being

willing to gamble with her own safety, Liv, embodying healthy values of rural farm life and representing the 'regular' Norwegian, emerges as a true resistance hero. More than that, her actions suggest that Norwegianness is a constant that, even in times of repression, inescapably lives and breathes deep in every true Norwegian. Here, in Hansen's (2006) terms, the link to the basic discourse on rural qualities being the quintessence of Norwegian identity is quite clear, as signs like 'patriotic', 'nationalistic' and 'sacrificial' is explicitly attached to rurality.

Another interesting aspect of the scene where Liv helps Max escape from the hospital, is the way in which she functions as a contrast to the police officer in charge of guarding Max' room. Where Liv is mild and kind, the police officer, who was also the one brutally and physically attempting to arrest Max leading him to jump from the window of his flat, is harsh and mean. Where Liv is patriotic and takes part in the resistance by helping Max, he is disloyal and un-Norwegian, directly counteracting the resistance by chasing Max. Moreover, this police officer, and the Norwegian police in general, represent the state apparatus that is closely associated with the capital, whereas Liv represents town life and the 'regular' Norwegian. As such, rural Norway is represented as something that belongs to 'the people' and where true Norwegians reside. Urban Norway on the other hand, is represented as something that belongs to 'the state'. Thus, the film invokes signs of differentiation in order to reproduce the rural/urban-divide that was highlighted so forcefully in the EU-debates, where the no-side effectively actualized collective memories of the unions with Sweden and Denmark to represent rural people as real and true Norwegians (Neumann 2001c: 138-140, 148).

Also reproducing this representation, but in a slightly different way, Max Manus himself explicitly stresses the fact that resistance against the occupation is indeed a countrywide movement. In the opening scenes of the film, setting the tone, he asserts that there are «small groups like us all over the country, people who do not want to acknowledge that the fight is over». Soon after, he goes on to make the claim that «right now, there are millions of Norwegians thinking the same as us». Thus, like when he asks Liv if there are many patriots in her home town, he represents patriotism and Norwegian values as alive and well in every corner of the country. More than linking patriotism to the rural areas of the country however, this representation importantly tells the story of a very strong resistance

movement. With a population of less than 3 million at the time (Statistics Norway), making the bold claim that millions of Norwegians were taking part in the resistance, or at least being sympathetic to it, implies the suggestion that the entire population remained true to their Norwegian identity in spite of the occupation and the heavy influence that came with it. As such, Norwegian identity is once again depicted as resilient and constant, in line the basic discourse and Wergeland's argument that it was only sleeping prior to establishment of the Norwegian state in 1814 (Neumann 2001c: 66).

By representing patriotism and resistance as countrywide phenomena then, the film implicitly suggests, once again, that rural people are patriotic and inherently Norwegian. However, apart from the episode with Liv and the way in which she generally contrasts the behavior of Norwegian police, the film's representation of the rural areas of the country as patriotic and inherently Norwegian does not seem to entail the representation of the urban areas as the opposite. Max and his fellow saboteurs, portrayed as the true heroes of World War Two in Norway, and accordingly proper and good Norwegians, are city boys, and they run the resistance from the heart of the capital. Moreover, Max, the hero of the story, is represented as a quintessential Norwegian by virtue of his good morals, unparalleled bravery and unwavering patriotism. However, he is not a peasant and thus his character breaks with the representation of the ideal Norwegian as a hardy and rural, and the representation of rural areas as more 'Norwegian' than urban areas. The general way in which Oslo is represented during, as contrasted to after, the war also contributes to the construction of urban Norway as patriotic too. During the war, the streets are empty, the weather is grey and the mood is low. Moreover, police and gestapo officers are constantly patrolling the streets, relentlessly smothering any activity that might look like attempts at resistance. This representation is starkly contrasted, and accordingly enabled, by the joyous scenes from liberation day at the very end of the film, where the weather is nice and the streets are filled with happy people, smiling, waving flags and celebrating the end of the occupation. Thus, although Max' encounter with Liv does establish a discursive link between rural Norway and patriotism, urban Norway is not represented as-unpatriotic. Rather, the resistance movement is represented as urban as well as rural. Thus, the film can be invariance-bursting, as the way in which it represents Norwegian patriotism contradicts the sharpness of the rural/urban divide that was constructed with Denmark and Europe as constitutive Others in the 18th and the

19th century. In this representation, Norwegianness was, as we have seen, understood to be more intense and alive in towns as opposed to in cities. In *Max Manus* on the other hand, looking at Max' encounter with Liv and on the general representation of Oslo as the centre and engine of the resistance movement, Norwegianness is understood to be intense and alive not only in towns, but in cities too.

Max Manus then, reproduces the representation of Norwegian identity as something that is constant and thus not a subject to change. Consequently, it was never threatened during the war, but merely lidded, only to gain further strength throughout this time, rather than fading in energy. Moreover, the film naturalizes the representation of rural Norway as inherently Norwegian, but plays down the sharpness of the rural/urban-divide, threatening to challenge its dominant position in the discourse by demonstrating how resistance and patriotism can be urban too. Yet, neither *Operation Swallow* nor *Nine Lives* represents resistance as exclusively rural and thus leaves the door ajar for urbanity to be added. *Max Manus* then, reproduces, but also expands on, the representations they forward, and does indeed contribute to keeping the memory of resistance during the war being rural actualized, in spite of telling a story of resistance in the city.

Norwegian nature as unique

Even in *Max Manus*, a film about city-driven resistance, the uniqueness of Norwegian nature is highlighted. However, the effect of this representation must not be exaggerated as typical Norwegian nature is given little time and attention in the film. Nevertheless, the few scenes where it is given such time and attention is worth pausing at for a minute, as they help clarify how *Max Manus* aligns with *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* in order to take part in the ritualistic actualization of certain memories of Norwegian resistance.

Immediately after Max, along with Roy, successfully attaches explosives to the Donau, he travels to Sweden for shelter. Importantly in this context, Max makes his way through the woods, and in hilly terrain, on skis. Having already been represented as a proper Norwegian, owing to his strong morals and abiding patriotism, Max, by exhibiting skiing prowess, only solidifies his Norwegianness. As discussed previously, one of the reasons why skiing is such a strong marker of identity for Norway is that it highlights Norway's distinctiveness with regards to climate and geography. Before being used for competition,

skis were tools used to tackle rough conditions and cold weather (Christensen 1993: 16-19). As such, displaying Max as a good skier, the film connects him discursively to foundational qualities of Norwegianness.

In the same scene, another highly interesting representation takes place. Taking a pause from his effortless gliding through the woods, Max stops at a hilltop, solemnly absorbing the terrain ahead of him. As he pauses, the sun slowly rises over the mountains before his gaze. On screen we see Max from behind, as he beholds the beautiful scenery. Interestingly, this picture bears a striking resemblance to Theodor Kittelsen's very famous painting *Far, far away Soria Moria Palace shimmered like Gold*, where Norwegian ideal and folklore hero Espen Askeladden gawks hopefully at a city shining bright on the horizon. The painting is part of a series of twelve, illustrating Asbjørnsen and Moe's fairytale *Soria Moria Castle*. Having been widely circulated and used for different purposes and in different settings, the painting can safely be considered iconic and an important part of Norwegian cultural heritage (Tveit 2014). Moreover, the painting symbolizes dreams of success and hopes for a better future. As such, Max can easily be placed in the position of Askeladden; glancing over the stunningly beautiful Norwegian landscape, forests and mountains covered in and silenced by a heavy layer of snow, Max envisions a better future; a future in which the German occupation has been driven from Norway, and the people can once again live freely and without despair.

Also contributing to this construction of Norway as climatically and topographically distinct, and even more explicitly so than the scene resembling the Kittelsen painting, is Gregers' question to Max as they walk to Sweden earlier in the film: «Don't you recognize it, how the nature slowly transforms and becomes more Swedish?». Although he asks the question jokingly, he does indeed suggest with it, a qualitative difference between Norwegian and Swedish nature, so distinct that one can even tell the difference between the respective countries' spruce woods.

This way, *Max Manus* reproduces and moderately reinforces a representation of Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful. By highlighting Max' skiing abilities, depicting him in stunning landscapes in an Askeladden-like posture and reminding us that Norwegian nature is distinguishable from Swedish nature, the film adds to the story of the Norwegian resistance hero a dimension of foundational Norwegianness in the shape of rock hard resolve and

nature-loving hardiness. However, as mentioned, and owing to the fact that it is about city resistance, the film only feebly and in glimpses represents Norway by emphasizing its climatic and topographical uniqueness. These glimpses matter however, as they contribute to placing *Max Manus* alongside *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* so that watching them can function as a ritual of embodied movement, where they cooperate to keep actualized the memory of Norwegian nature as unique. We notice that *Nine Lives* can take part in the ritualistic narration of resistance during World War Two, even though it does not align with the other representations in question on all points. Bollmer's (2011) dynamic conceptualization of rituals seems to allow for such a reading of the way in which popular cultural expressions relate to one another. Given that rituals belong in the realm of the everyday, and are coupled together by way of subtle textual interplay, they cannot function on the mercy of complete narrative overlap and strict measures of coherence.

5.4. *The Heavy Water War*

The Heavy Water War (2015 a-f) is a TV-series in six episodes. It enjoyed great success, attracting more than one million viewers to each of them. In brief, the TV-show, like *Operation Swallow* (1948), tells the story of the Norwegian resistance movement and Norwegian saboteurs in their attempt to stop Nazi Germany from developing heavy water and build an atomic bomb. However, in addition to the Norwegian saboteurs and the administrators of the operation based in Scotland, *The Heavy Water War* (2015 a-f), follows the German scientist Werner Heisenberg in his work to build an atomic bomb and attempt to navigate the muddy moral waters of World War Two Germany.

I will identify and discuss four representations of Norwegian identity that are forwarded by the TV-series in this chapter. First, due to the heavy water production at Vemork, Norway's strategic importance in the war is highlighted, and as such a representation of Norwegian resistance as crucially important for the outcome of the war is forwarded. Second, Norway is represented as qualitatively different from Germany. However, this image is nuanced and at times almost threatened, functioning to challenge the dominant representation in the discourse where Norway is inherently good. Third, the TV-series represents resistance as rural in its essence and peripheral Norway as especially patriotic. This representation also highlights the constant quality of Norwegianness, being alive and well in spite of repression. Finally, Norwegian distinctiveness with regards to climatic and topographical features is thoroughly emphasized, enabling the representation of Norwegians as good skiers and hardy nature men.

Noticeably, these are more or less the same four representational themes that were identified and discussed in the analysis of *Operation Swallow*, and interestingly to a large extent in *Nine Lives* and *Max Manus* too. Although differences will emerge, it is telling that these stories, especially *Operation Swallow* and *The Heavy Water War*, being told almost 70

years apart, represent Norwegian identity in much the same way, resting on the same basic assumptions, highlighting the same qualities⁶⁷.

Norway as deciding for the outcome of the war

By representing the heavy water production, and accordingly Norway, as being of strategic centrality for the Germans in their quest for world domination, *The Heavy Water War* represents the ability to exceed expectations and overachieve as a key feature of Norwegian identity. Moreover, the commitment of the Norwegian resistance movement to use this ability to stop Germany and the spread of evil, represents Norway as inherently good. Interestingly, both of these features have permeated the dominant representations that have forged Norwegian identity through the years, and as of late specifically informing the representation of Norway as a peace nation and a humanitarian superpower (Leira 2004; 2015: 37, Skånland 2010).

To set things off, and establish from the get-go the importance of heavy water and accordingly the strategic importance of Norway, one of the saboteurs asks his boss, Leif Tronstad, «What's so important about this water?». Responding, Tronstad gives him an indignant look as if to say 'you really don't understand anything, do you?' (2015a). Soon after, Werner Heisenberg is introduced. Having recently won the nobel price in physics, he has been recruited by the Nazi regime to lead the work on developing an atomic bomb for Germany. Also iterating the strategic importance of Norway, he expresses just one concern before agreeing to do the job, namely the fact that heavy water is only produced in Norway. As a sign of things to come, his superior, Diebner, reassures him that his concern will not be a problem (ibid.). Moreover, Norsk Hydro, the company running the factory at Vemork and in charge of the development of heavy water, agrees to sell it to the French, implying the deal's enormous strategic impact by jokingly suggesting that payment can be postponed to after the war is won (ibid.). Expressing the same belief, a German official yells at his colleagues, after

⁶⁷ One could of course counter that it is not telling at all, and at least not very interesting, as the film and the TV-show set out to depict the same real life event, and as the TV-show has used the film for inspiration. However, being of the poststructuralist conviction that all the things we call reality are really nothing more than representations, I would counter this counter argument with the assertion that the story of Norwegian resistance in general, and of the heavy water-sabotages in particular, could have been interpreted and told in an unlimited series of different way. From this perspective then, the fact that it is told twice on screen, in more or less in the same way, is highly interesting, as it says something about discursive stability and the stubbornness of memory.

the heavy water is successfully transported to France, out-foxing German attempts to steal it en route (ibid.). Later, during a Christmas dinner in Berlin, Heisenberg gives a speech, discussing the potential power of an atomic bomb. Upon explaining how a bomb the size of a pineapple can lay London in ruins, he receives thundering applause from an ecstatic audience (2015c). Apart from being an indicator of German lunacy, to which I will return in the next section, this scene is telling of the importance Germany ascribes to Norway. Placing heavy water at the heart of its military strategy, Germany needs to control Norway. Finally, an American official, quarreling with Tronstad and the British officials over how to best obstruct the Germans' development of heavy water, wants to send in bomber planes and argues passionately that «They're gonna produce heavy water, they're gonna get the bomb and that's gonna be it. [...] What they did to London is gonna be a walk in the park compared to what they're gonna do if they [...] get a bomb. [...] 500 million people will go. The world will end as we know it.» (2015e). Thus, he provides somewhat of a punchline for the representation of heavy water as important for the outcome of the war, and explicitly and forcefully places Norway at the frontline.

Moreover, references to developments in the war on the continent also takes part in representing Norway as strategically important. For instance, Ellen Henriksen, the wife of Bjørn Henriksen, the director at Vermork, tells her husband that rumor has it «the war is about to turn. The Germans have lost 200 000 men in Stalingrad» (2015e). Later, Bjørn Henriksen is confronted with a similar claim, but this time from the German chief official at Vermork, Major Decker. He talks of strategic retreat, and Germany losing the war. Interestingly, Major Decker's natural response is doubling the order for heavy water from the factory, suggesting that building an atomic bomb might be Germany's last chance of turning the tide (ibid.). This way, the representation of Norway as strategically important is further strengthened.

Crucially, this strong emphasis on the strategic importance of heavy water, pointing to its capability to tip the war in Germany's favor, enables the representation of Norwegian efforts to resist occupation and stop Germany from building a bomb as deciding for the outcome of the war, and by extension, of Norway as a state that is able to punch above its weight in order to do good in the world. Stressing the importance of the saboteurs being Norwegian, pointing to the need for local knowledge and skiing abilities, Tronstad highlights

the allies' reliance on Norway in their bid to win the war (2015b). This reliance is explicitly demonstrated by the extensive use of namely local knowledge and skiing abilities in the actual execution of the operation at Vemork (2015d). The Americans' attempt at bombing the factory with what appears to be hundreds of bomber planes, also plays into this representation, as they fail miserably, only weakly damaging equipment used for the development of heavy water but killing 21 civilians. Tronstad is fuming after the attack, convincingly reiterating his point that local knowledge, and hence the use of Norwegian saboteurs, is key to success (2015e). Moreover, the British are overtly praising Norwegian resistance. After the Tinnsjø-ferry operation is executed and the mission is over and deemed successful, even Churchill himself sends his congratulations, expressing gratitude to the Norwegian saboteurs (2015f). As Churchill is one of the real champions of the war, his congratulatory remarks epitomizes the establishment of a strong and direct link between Norwegian resistance and the allies winning the war.

As such, Norway is indeed represented as deciding for the outcome of the war, both by virtue of being strategically important, and due to its willingness and ability to resist the German occupation at a crucial point in time. This representation decidedly reflects on Norway's ability to punch above its weight, and to capitalize on this ability, in tandem with its good morals, to make the world a better place. Given that the representation of Norway as a peace nation and as humanitarian super power relies on the assumption that Norway possess such abilities then, *The Heavy Water War* constitutes «relations of sameness» (Hansen 2006: 42) to reinforce this representation. As such, it aligns nicely with *Operation Swallow* in particular, where the exact same representation was heavily emphasized. Perhaps, after 70 years and the development of a revisionist literature, one could expect some evolvment and a shift to a more nuanced narrative, e.g. problematizing the seemingly indisputable fact that the sabotage missions at Vemork and the Tinnsjø-ferry were deciding for the outcome of the war. The lack of progression can, as with *Max Manus* and the representation of Germany as categorically evil, be read as a testament to the hegemony-like strength and resilience of the assumptions grounding the representation, and the continued craving for stories of Norwegian splendidness. Although it is indeed a story of Norwegian splendidness, *Nine Lives* is the odd one out with regards to this representation as it fails to contextualize resistance. Nevertheless, again going to Bollmer's (2011) dynamic

conceptualization, a ritual of embodied movement is in sight, as *The Heavy Water War* aligns with *Max Manus* in joining it to re-actualize memories that were invoked by films released generations earlier.

Norway as ‘not Germany’

Norway is indeed represented as qualitatively different from Germany in *The Heavy Water War*. However, the image is far more nuanced and the process of representation is far more complicated than in *Operation Swallow*. While generally representing Germany as evil and Norway as good, constructing a solid Self/Other-configuration on which Norwegian identity can lean, the TV-series also somewhat blurs the line. As a result, the quality of Norwegian identity specifically with regards to morality does not appear clear-cut, and is forced to struggle to find its shape. As such, *The Heavy Water War* seems to cause some friction in the discourse on Norwegian identity by modestly altering its dynamics. Interestingly then, it differs from *Max Manus* by problematizing given truths and nuancing the black and white. Moreover, by way of such problematizing and nuancing, *The Heavy Water War* is threatening to challenge the apparent discursive hegemony (Neumann 2001b: 60, 178) and to push collective memories of resistance and Norwegianness back to a state of virtuality (Bollmer 2011: 459).

For the most striking representation of Germany as radically and qualitatively different from Norway, we must revisit the christmas dinner where Werner Heisenberg gives a speech that rapidly deteriorates into a discussion of how powerful an atomic bomb can be. As we remember from the last section, Heisenberg, explains how a small bomb, even on the size of a pineapple, can rubble a city the size of London. The audience is ecstatic, and their evil intentions veritably sparkle in their eyes. At the same time, our Norwegian heroes celebrate christmas in a cabin on Hardangervidda, staying dignified, thoughtful and quiet, while they enjoy a small home made meal and listen to christmas music over the radio, contrasting grandeur with modesty, will to destroy with wish for peace, evil with good (2015c). Offering a similar contrast, Leif Tronstad is very skeptical when he hears for the first time that Germany requests deliveries of heavy water. Soon after, a German general attending one of Heisenberg’s lectures utters his approval of the work being done to develop an atomic bomb, characterizing it as «very promising» when the gravity of the situation and the vast

consequences it might have dawned on him (2015a). Where Tronstad encourages caution in dealing with heavy water, the German general licks his lip. And so again Norway and Germany are offered as contrasts set apart by the good/evil-divide. Furthermore, this time too we can look to the American official mentioned in the last section for a punchline. As we remember, he made the claim that «500 million people will go. The world will end as we know it». Adding «You realize who these people are? They're not gonna play nice» only strengthens his contribution to the representation of Germany as evil (2015e). By suggesting that they will, if they can, kill 500 million people, he leaves little to the imagination, as clear signs of differentiation are invoked.

The treatment of Heisenberg by the German regime early in the TV-show, plays into this representation as well. Without warning and seemingly on fluke, Heisenberg is retrieved from his house, questioned by a Gestapo officer, and accused of being a homosexual, and of being sympathetic to the Jews. Given that the evidence for these claims are a night spent in a tent with other men and citing e.g. Einstein in his scholarly work, the incident highlights the authoritarian nature of the German regime and its utterly regressive inclinations and attitudes (2015a). More than that, however, the incident displays the complexity of Heisenberg's character, perhaps the main source of discursive friction in the TV-series, with regards to representations of Norwegian identity.

Heisenberg is German, and decidedly not categorically evil, and as such he offers up somewhat of a conundrum, threatening to break with the representation of Norway and Germany as qualitatively different from one another, one being good and the other being evil. What Heisenberg's character seems to do then, is to turn the good/evil-divide, into a good/evil-axis, suggesting that the question of good and evil is one of difference in degree, rather than of categories. Heisenberg travels on the axis and blurs the line, if there even is one. As such, *The Heavy Water War* appears to be more a product of its time than *Max Manus* was, considering how it follows the trend of tackling tabus and speaking about the previously unspeakable.

First of all, Heisenberg comes across as a sympathetic and nice man, immediately making the idea of Germany as categorically evil hard to apprehend. More than that, however, his choice to help the regime build the atomic bomb appears well-founded and understandable. Moments before he is sent to the frontline as punishment for his sexuality

and sympathies for the Jews, he is rescued by a memo from Himmler requesting his services (2015a). Moreover, his wife and child are struggling to get enough food, and depend on his job to get by. This way, framing Heisenberg as evil for the job that he does seems less straight-forward. Complicating matters even further, Heisenberg at several occasions stresses the fact that he wants to work with heavy water in order to build a reactor and create energy. Only when confronted and asked specifically, it seems, does he talk about the bomb. Moreover, he looks scared when first told the Germans can actually acquire heavy water (ibid.), and towards the end of the series, when he realizes he has miscalculated something, he wipes his new finding from the board, leaving no trace of a potentially harmful discovery (2015: f). Thus, positive signs such as ‘upstanding’ and ‘honorable’ are linked with Germany, creating discursive confusion in the process of positive identity construction (Hansen 2006: 42, 44-45) by making it hard to apprehend the whole and get a clear grip of Germany really means.

Not only Heisenberg travels on the good/evil-axis, however. Norwegians too, most notably the corporatists at Norsk Hydro, challenge the representation of Norway as inherently good, leaning on a representation of Germany as inherently evil. Bjørn Henriksen is the director at Vemork, where he happily complies with the wishes and needs of the German administration. He runs the factory with rigor, inciting fear by firing workers at random (2015b). Moreover, on April 9th 1940, the day of the invasion, Henriksen confers with his superior, and they both agree that the king would be wise to abdicate and that they will increase the production of heavy water and negotiate with the Germans (2015a). As such, Henriksen is represented as un-Norwegian, but nevertheless showcasing how even someone inherently good can have evil inclinations. Not only Henriksen and his boss at Norsk Hydro blur the line from the Norwegian side, however. The saboteurs too complicate the question of good and evil, but not by turning soft on nazism. When preparing to sink the Tinnsjø-ferry they have moral qualms as the operation entails killing dozens of civilians (2015f). This way, even the resistance movement is represented as not strictly good, calling into question the categorical approach that dominates the discourse. Norway then, is linked with signs like ‘cynicism’, ‘sanctimony’ and ‘potential evil’. Just like with Germany, these signs cause confusion as they challenge the coherence and sense of direction of the positive construction of Norwegian identity.

In spite of this, the divide prevails, and *The Heavy Water War* too naturalizes the assumption that Norway is inherently good by distancing it from Germany. Although Heisenberg is represented as sympathetic and skeptical of the nazi regime, he remains a servant of the nazi cause that interestingly develops over the course of the series, growing more and more into his role, convincing his skeptical Self that he is doing nothing wrong. At one point he states in conversation with Niels Bohr that «As long as we let the war serve the science, there is no danger» (2015b). Interestingly, Henriksen also develops. From being a lighthearted nazi-collaborator, a sense of moral and obligation seems to grow in him, most clearly manifested in his suggestion to Major Decker that they use the heavy water production for alternative purposes such as ammoniac and fertilizers. As such, the German grows evil and the Norwegian grows good, and in the end even the evil Norwegian is better than the good German. And so, although having somewhat altered the narrative by transforming the good/evil-divide into a good/evil-axis and challenged the dominant representation of Norway as inherently good and morally superior, *The Heavy Water War* in large part creates further coherence in the discourse. As such, repetitive storytelling is still in evidence and the ritual of embodied movement, as theorized by Bollmer (2011), remains.

Norwegianness as a rural constant

By representing resistance and patriotism as forces that are especially strong in the rural areas of the country, *The Heavy Water War* contributes to the solidification of the rural/urban-divide that is dominant in the discourse. More precisely, it represents Norwegians coming from the big cities and that are associated with the state apparatus as being in a way, ‘less Norwegian’ than those coming from towns and villages that are innocently detached from everything that has to do with the state. This way too, Norwegian identity is represented as something constant that is embedded deep in the far corners of the country, only sleeping, much like it was during the time of Danish rule (Neumann 2001c: 66, 143).

First of all, the fact that the mission takes place in the most remote of places, Hardangervidda, and is run from inside cabins, a symbol of provincial simplicity, places Norwegian resistance against the occupation in an explicitly rural context. Using abandoned cabin’s for shelter and masterfully maneuvering the mountains, the saboteurs make use of practical skills and exhibit sober and down-to-earth attitudes that are distant from the

decadence of city life. Getting by with little to squander, the saboteurs demonstrate modesty and stamina, living life like regular rural people. The saboteurs' christmas celebration discussed above is an excellent illustration, as the candlelit room, the shortage of food and the below par quality radio broadcast showcase the genuine prudence of small town life (2015c). Moreover, the German administration at Vemork faces internal resistance as some of the factory workers, presumably locals, tamper with the production process (2015b). Such subtle and cunning efforts to resist the occupation and stop Germany from getting the bomb demonstrates that patriotic sentiments are strong among regular Norwegians. More than that, it ascribes a constant quality to Norwegianness, suggesting repression, such as in times of war, does not curtail it and drain it of energy.

Interestingly, the representation of the saboteurs, and regular rural Norwegians more generally, as patriotic and properly Norwegian, is constituted by the representation of corporate urban Norwegians as treacherous and un-Norwegian. Bjørn Henriksen, the director at Vemork and nazi-collaborator turned patriot, is an intriguing case in this respect as well. Along with his boss at Norsk Hydro, Axel Aubert, Henriksen is the face of the state apparatus in the series. The two of them are corporate to the bone, possess great power and manage large amounts of money. As such, they appear radically different from regular rural Norwegians. Henriksen's way of life while being director at Vemork is telling, as he and his wife live in a huge villa equipped with servants and chefs and containing 20 bedrooms they do not use. The servants and chefs are regular rural people, and their modest lifestyle and everyday struggle to get by, starkly contrasts Henriksen's corporate extravagance. The cleavage between Henriksen and the saboteurs, who are leading a simple life living off the land, has a similar effect. Moreover, Henriksen, and Aubert's, lighthearted and greedy willingness to collaborate with the Germans adds to this distinction the question of Norwegianness (2015a). By linking rural, modest, simple Norway to resistance and patriotism, and urban, corporate extravagant Norway to collaboration and disloyalty, towns and villages are represented as 'more Norwegian' than the cities.

As such, *The Heavy Water War* joins *Operation Swallow*, *Nine Lives* and *Max Manus* in representing rural Norway as purely patriotic and Norwegian identity as constantly present, especially in the periphery. Moreover, it goes one step further than *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* and directly contradicts *Max Manus* by adding a strong emphasis on urban

Norway as un-Norwegian. Representing corporate forces associated with the state apparatus and extravagant and decadent city life as disloyal by default, the series offers up a solid Other on which this representation can lean. Interestingly, being released 70 years after the war, *The Heavy Water War* did not give to negotiate personal memories the same way that *Operation Swallow* and *Nine Lives* did. As such, it could represent urban Norway as un-patriotic without the risk of causing discursive friction, and craft a story that links well with the basic discourse casting Norway as rural in its essence. Although it falls in line with the basic discourse then, it moderately breaks with the three films, and accordingly does not join them in invoking ritualistic remembrance on this particular point. Again, given Bollmer's (2011) conceptualization of rituals, absolute coherence between the representations at hand does not have to be in place in order for the ritual to exist and function well.

Norway as cold, hardy and beautiful

In *The Heavy Water War* the saboteurs are frequently and extensively depicted in rough yet beautiful nature, and as such, the emphasis on the distinctiveness of Norwegian climatic and topographical features is strong. More than emphasizing climatic and topographical distinctiveness, however, this representation highlights the hardy and stout quality of Norwegians. In mastering the rough nature, surviving in the cold and excelling in the wild, the saboteurs, importantly being regular Norwegians, demonstrate grit and stamina. As such, the TV-series links itself intertextually with, and contribute to the naturalization of, early, and indeed enduring, representational demarcations of Norwegian identity (Christensen 1993: 39-41, Neumann 2001c: 46).

As mentioned, the saboteurs are frequently and extensively depicted in typical Norwegian nature. Much of the action takes place on Hardangervidda, and this way, simply by thoroughly demonstrating the roughness and beauty of Norwegian nature, the series forwards a representation of Norway as unique with regards to its climate and topography. More specifically, when Operation Grouse, the first group of saboteurs to be deployed to Norway, arrives from Scotland, the weather is uncompromising. As a result they have to land 80 km from the planned drop spot, and are forced to make their way through heavy snow in order to reach the first cabin (2015b). Soon after, the weather continues to prove uncontrollable and wild, as the plane carrying British special soldiers that are on their way to

Norway to help the saboteurs, is unable to land and eventually crashes in the mountains (ibid.). Moreover, the Grouse group is struggling to keep warm and to find food. Parroting *Operation Swallow* here, *The Heave Water War* too tells the story of how the saboteurs eventually had to eat moss and lichen (2015c). While unwelcoming, however, Hardangervidda appears majestic and stunning. Strong winds sweep light snow across the mountain plateaus, and the sun bursts through the clouds to shine light on our heroes as they conquer grandiose terrains.

Emerging from this image then, is the representation of Norwegians as a very special breed, emphasizing their hardy and weathered nature. By being able to maneuver in the snowbound mountains and surviving in highly demanding conditions, the saboteurs overtly demonstrate Norwegian clout. Enjoying reindeer food for dinner is of course one case in point. However, it is the thorough display of skiing expertise that really stands out when watching the series. First of all, the saboteurs are in dire need of their skiing abilities to execute the mission. Moving through Hardangervidda, and eventually down to Vemork, they exhibit swift technique as they effortlessly cut through the moonlit snow (2015d). Moreover, after the operation, one of the saboteurs, Helberg, is surrounded by German soldiers while hiding in a cabin. Realizing he will be rendered no chances of survival if he stays in the cabin, Helberg puts on his skis and bursts out into the snow. As in *Operation Swallow*, only one German soldier is able to follow the Norwegian hero. In his attempt to distance his follower, Helberg must pull out his best skiing tricks, and even masters a spectacular Telemark landing after a jump. In the end, he proves to be the better, and tougher, skier of the two, as he loses his pursuer after a risky jump from a cliff (2015e).

Helberg's skiing abilities, illustrating the skill set of the saboteurs in general, represent Norwegians as champions of the cold, hard weather of the north. Moreover, accentuating the link between the Norwegian people and the Norwegian nature adds a dimension to the representation of Norway as climatically and topographically distinct, as it further underlines the specifically Norwegian quality of such nature. Clearly linking itself intertextually with early representations of Norwegian identity where climate and topography were the prime demarcators then, *The Heavy Water War* certainly functions as a naturalizing force. More than that, the evident alignment with *Operation Swallow* on this point demonstrates how watching the two adaptations, owing to discursive coherence, can be part of

the same ritual of embodied movement. As they both emphasize the distinctiveness of Norwegian nature, pointing to its hardiness and beauty, even telling the same story and using some of the same anecdotes, *Operation Swallow* and *The Heavy Water War* in a way do the same representational exercise. Moreover, *Nine Lives* represent Norwegian nature in a similar fashion, and *Max Manus* does nothing to contradict it and even mildly forwards it itself. On aggregate, actualized through the ritual of embodied movement that the watching of these films and TV-series constitutes (Bollmer 2011: 461), the representation of Norwegian nature as beautiful, entailing an emphasis on cleanness, clarity and smooth surfaces, functions as a metaphor for the oily ease with which the major narratives on Norwegian identity force others to silence. Although its influence is limited in *The Heavy Water War*, due to the relatively nuanced picture and the unusual welcoming of alternative, challenging representations that it exhibits, this metaphor nevertheless does well to make the general and very important theoretical point that telling some stories entails not telling others, and remembering one version of the past entails forgetting others (Hansen 2006: 18-19).

6. Conclusion

Films and TV-series about Norwegian resistance during World War Two appear to reproduce and naturalize dominant discursive representations of Norwegian identity. More than that, by coming together in forming a ritual of embodied movement, these films and TV-series acquire the capacity to keep certain memories of Norwegian resistance actualized, and thus collectivize assumptions of Norwegian identity.

In the empirical analysis, I analyzed the following four films and TV-series on resistance against the occupation in Norway during World War Two: *Operation Swallow: The Battle for Heavy Water* (1948), *Nine Lives* (1957), *Max Manus* (2008) and *The Heavy Water War* (2015). Although differences are in evidence, they do represent resistance, and by extension Norwegian identity, in much the same way. Four representational themes appear with varying strength and in disparate forms in each of the four films and TV-series. First, resistance is represented as a fight of good vs. evil, contrasting Norwegian benevolence and heroism with German destructiveness and brutality. Second, the films and TV-series emphasize the importance of Norwegian resistance for the outcome of the war at large. Third, the rural essence of resistance and patriotism is highlighted, and finally the films and TV-series thoroughly distinguish Norwegian nature, showcasing both its roughness and its beauty. All of these representations are clearly recognizable from Chapter 4 where the basic discourses on Norwegian identity were identified. As such, it is evident that the films and TV-series analyzed here in large part reproduce parts of the grand narrative on Norwegian identity.

The way in which the representations vary in strength and form is worth pausing at, however. Most strikingly, *Nine Lives* (1957) is different from the rest of the films and TV-series in the sense that it fails to contextualize its representation of resistance, and as such, does *not* emphasize its importance for the outcome of the war. Moreover, and related to this, the way in which it distances Norway from Germany is bleak and lacks specificity. *Max Manus* (2008) on the other hand, differs significantly from the other films and TV-series by telling the story of city-resistance. As a result, it plays down the rural/urban-divide and only feebly shows off the beauty and hardiness of Norwegian nature. Furthermore, *The Heavy Water War* (2015) deviates from the major narrative that is especially strong in *Max Manus* (2008) and *Operation Swallow* (1948), by offering a more nuanced representation of the

difference between Norwegians and Germans. Interestingly, these differences in emphasis and focus threaten the discursive coherence between the films and TV-series, and poses a challenge for the argument that they come together to form a ritual of embodied movement.

However, I argue that the differences between them do not compromise the *relative* sameness and coherence of the popular cultural representations at hand. Moreover, keeping Bollmer's (2011) very dynamic conceptualization of rituals in mind, complete representational overlap does not premise their existence and operation. Thus, films and TV-series can contribute to the formation of the same ritual by overlapping only in part.

Moreover, a case can be made that the instances of divergence are not really of a severity that has the capacity to threaten the overarching discursive coherence of the ritual. Most importantly, *The Heavy Water War's* exploration of the grey areas between good and evil stops short of really turning the table. As we remember from the development of Heisenberg's and Henriksen's characters, in the end even a bad Norwegian is better than a good German. Although it flirts with alternative representations then, *The Heavy Water War* lands steadily on confirming the qualitative difference between Norway and Germany. As such, it follows the films that preceded it, perhaps with the exception of *Nine Lives*, and re-actualizes memories of World War Two in Norway as a struggle to fight the forces of evil. Furthermore, the failure to contextualize resistance in *Nine Lives* and the following representation of Norway as somewhat inward-looking and irrelevant challenges the dominant storyline where Norway is important and a force of good in the world. However, it supports the representation of Norway as unique and 'better off alone' that was so important for the No-side in the EU-debates. As such, *Nine Lives* simply takes a different route in order to actualize memories and naturalize assumptions of Norwegian superiority. *Max Manus* (2008) similarly takes a different route than the other films and TV-series on the question of resistance being rural. By representing urban Norway as patriotic too, it adds a dimension to the representation of resistance, but does not, however, contradict the main storyline and the basic discourse, labeling rural Norway as properly Norwegian. Indeed, it even places a heavy emphasis on the rural representation too, of which the story of his nurse, Liv, is the strongest expression.

On a more general note, I have demonstrated extensively that all four films and TV-series, albeit in different ways and with varying levels of strength, thoroughly emphasize

Norwegian superiority in their representation of resistance. This is perhaps most evident with regards to the representation of Norway as different from Germany and therefore inherently good. However, the element of superiority is present and strong in the other representations as well. For instance, the representation of Norwegian resistance being important for the outcome of the war comes with an assumption that resistance is a good thing. As such, it speaks to Norway's unique willingness and ability to do good and thus underscores the morally superior element of its identity. Moreover, the emphasis on the rural quality of resistance that reproduces the representation of Norway as un-continental and thus free, egalitarian and defined by a down-to-earth modesty, is also clearly premised on the idea that Norway is better than other countries. Finally, the representation of Norway as climatically and topographically distinct reinforces assumptions of superiority, but without a clear moral dimension. The beauty of Norwegian nature makes Norway superior because beauty is a good thing, and the roughness of Norwegian nature makes Norway superior because it produces hardy, rough and modest men and women. Herein lies an implicit moral element though, as the roughness of a Norwegian peasant plays into the narrative of Norwegian resistance, firmly based in sturdy rurality, marking a stark contrast to everything German and being critical for the outcome of the war. Interestingly, this illustrates well how the four main representational themes link well with one another to construct a coherent picture of Norwegian identity, where goodness, importance, modesty, toughness and beauty, all of which are enabled by the assumption of superiority, emerge as the main traits.

The resilience of assumptions of Norwegian moral righteousness has perhaps never been clearer than in the case of World War Two, as the stories that have threatened to challenge the grand narrative have almost categorically not been told and accordingly forgotten. For instance, the well documented persecution of Jews and extensive collaboration with the Nazi administration is largely left at the margins of the story. Accordingly, there is space for other stories to be told, and incidentally, stories of Norwegian resistance heroes, fighting evil and doing good, have filled this space. Popular cultural representations of resistance have naturally been part of this exercise; by routinely reproducing the main storylines they too contribute to the perpetual fortification of one version of the truth at the cost of others. Moreover, they can be seen to work together, as I have found that different films and TV-series connect with each other to form a coherent body of discursive

representations. Watching these films then, can take shape of a ritual of embodied movement that ensures the continued re-actualization of certain memories of the war. As Norwegians remember World War Two as a story of resisting the evil that was the occupation, in part owing to the representations forwarded in films and TV-series, the bedrock assumptions of superiority is easier to apprehend and accept as objectively true. However, it is all-important to stress that this one-sided representation of the war in Norway, through rituals of popular culture or otherwise, is enabled by the same assumptions of superiority that it is reinforcing and naturalizing. As such, the ritual contributes to giving direction to a highly complicated and dynamic process of meaning production, and thus plays an important role in the construction of Norwegian identity.

Theoretical and methodological contribution

These films and TV-series are not only interesting in their own right, but also as elements of a process of collective identity formation. Through ritualized representations of rural heroism and moral superiority they reproduce and naturalize the assumptions that ground Norwegian identity. As such, they aptly demonstrate how different popular cultural expressions that forward similar representations can come together and function as a ritual of embodied movement. Moreover, when functioning as a ritual the films and TV-series acquire the capacity to keep certain memories of the war actualized. Without rituals, Bollmer (2011: 459) asserts, «memory returns to the virtual». For instance, if only *Operation Swallow* (1948) had forwarded the representation of Norway as inherently different from Germany, this particular way of remembering the war in Norway through popular culture would have risked being forced to return to the virtual. However, having e.g. *Max Manus* (2008) reproduce the same representation generations later, re-actualizes this memory and increases the chances of it staying actualized.

Moreover, this perpetual re-actualization through rituals of embodied movement is what gives memories their distinctly *collective* quality (Bollmer 2011). By watching films and TV-series on resistance then, the collective that is Norway remembers the past *together* as a collective because the act of watching is in itself collective. Here, we are at the core of Bollmer's argument, and accordingly of my theoretical contribution too. By applying Bollmer's theoretical insights to poststructuralist IR, appreciating the pure and ontologically

distinct quality of collective memory, my contribution offers enhanced understanding of how discursive representations and identity formation works. Although appreciation of the purely collective is far from lacking in poststructuralist IR, a refocusing of the kind that is done here is useful in the sense that it offers a new way of theorizing the way in which popular culture operates in processes of identity construction. More specifically, it allows us to see that when popular culture functions to naturalize identity there is an explicitly collective element involved, and more importantly, that this collective element is highlighted when films and TV-series come together to form a ritual. As such, my theoretical argument provides a framework for analyzing a body of popular culture, and for assessing how films and TV-series taking part in the same representational exercise, together hook up to the wider discursive field.

An obvious objection to the value of my contribution, would be that more theory is not always a good thing. A case can indeed be made that the analysis I have conducted in this thesis could easily have been conducted in much the same way without the development of a unique theoretical argument; that the analysis is a poststructuralist discourse analysis at heart and that the addition from collective memory studies did not add much. Yet, it is my belief that it did. Although I would agree that the actual analysis could have been conducted in pretty much the same way without the addition of Bollmer's (2011) theory, I do think that it also would have been less rich, both in theoretical reflections and with regards to empirical findings. First, the theoretical reflections on how the different films and TV-series relate to one another as well as the discussions on how their cooperative discursive operation functions in the discourse, were directly enabled by the theorization of popular culture as rituals. Second, these theoretical reflections allowed me to interpret the empirical material and ascribe meaning to it in a way that I would not have otherwise. By the same token, the theorization of film and TV-series as rituals, led me to pay closer and more conscious attention to the interplay between them.

Moreover, and importantly, the argument is of methodological significance as well. In arguing that popular culture can function as rituals, I also argue that studying them as such is worthwhile. Thus, anticipating ritualistic storytelling in popular culture can be a criterion for the selection of text when analyzing e.g. film and TV-series in IR. By suggesting a criterion for the selection of text, I join the efforts of other poststructuralists, such as Hansen (2006:

xix) and Neumann (2001b: 13-14), to «take methodology back» (Hansen 2006: xix), i.e. make methodological advances for poststructuralist discourse analysis without compromising the philosophical essence of the approach. This way, my theoretical argument can be considered one such methodological advancement, and a small contribution to development of poststructuralist IR.

On a more general note, borrowing insights from collective memory studies and applying them to poststructuralist IR, allows us to capture the specifically collective quality of identity construction in new ways. By analyzing films and TV-series as rituals, I have sought to uncover an aspect of discursive representation through popular culture that thus far appears under-theorized in IR. It is my hope that I have demonstrated the merits of my unique contribution, and that further exploration of the potential for theoretical enrichment by looking to collective memory studies will follow. If not repeated, I am afraid, my argument will be forgotten and risks be forced to seek refuge in the realm of the virtual.

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