

Sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeepers

A quantitative analysis of variation of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa

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Abstract

What explains variation of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa across a large number of missions and over time? To what extent does a specific pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers exist in UN missions in Africa? And how does such a pattern of SEA in UN missions in Africa differ from a pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers on the global level? Because there are only a few quantitative studies that analyze variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers over time and a large number of UN peacekeeping operations, this thesis aims at contributing to the literature by extending and updating the SEAP dataset by Nordås and Rustad from 2013 with additional mission-year observations until 2016, focusing exclusively on peacekeeping operations in Africa. The first objective is to replicate Nordås and Rustad's research with the updated dataset until 2016, in order to examine whether the two authors findings are strengthened or refuted by an analysis on the African level. Secondly new explanatory variables are added to the updated dataset and their hypotheses tested with a quantitative analysis using the updated dataset, focusing on UN missions in Africa. After retesting all seven hypotheses by Nordås and Rustad with the updated dataset on UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, I first claim that in peacekeeping operations with a higher number of female peacekeepers, reports of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are less likely to occur. Second, based on cultural diversity in peacekeeping missions I assume that in missions with a high number of troop contributing countries per year, the likelihood of reports of sexual exploitation and abuse is higher.

Using Nordås and Rustad's SEAP dataset, including all UN, AU and ECOWAS peacekeeping missions until 2010, as a basis for the empirical analysis of this thesis, I update the dataset with mission-year observations for all peacekeeping operations on the African continent until 2016. Testing the hypotheses with the updated dataset, focusing on Africa, I find amongst others that the hypothesis regarding female peacekeepers cannot be accepted, since the output of the regression models shows rather a positive effect. Furthermore contrary to the findings and assumptions of Nordås and Rustad I find some support for a higher likelihood of SEA if there has been a conflict that reached the threshold of 1,000 battle related deaths. In contributing my small part to the literature, I hope that a better understanding of the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers will result in more appropriate measures to work towards the elimination of this phenomenon.

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The responsibility of any inaccuracies is mine alone.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SEAP	Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers
SV	Sexual violence
SVAC	Sexual violence in armed conflict
TCC	Troop contributing countries
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UN DKPO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNEF 1	United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

1 Introduction

1.1 Peacekeepers as perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse

Some of the earliest reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers emerged in 1992 in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), when mostly young children in a local hospital were victims of SEA by UN peacekeepers (Wills 2009, 27). Since then the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers has risen to an epidemic problem, according to Beardsley and Karim (2016, 100). It is estimated that in Cambodia, where the earliest allegations of SEA arose, around 25,000 children were fathered by peacekeepers, compared to around 6,600 children fathered by soldiers in the UN observer mission in Liberia (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 175). Since then, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have continued to come up to a total of 107 allegations in 2007, 60 in 2012 and 103 in 2016 (United Nations 2017l). Peacekeepers in today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are deployed to protect civilians, assist the parties to a conflict in the disarmament, help in the facilitation of a political process, give support in the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and help in the restoration of the rule of law (United Nations 2017h).

The problem of sexual violence in armed conflict is already by itself horrible, however if the perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse are peacekeepers, in effect deployed to restore and maintain the security and peace in a host country, the problematic gets another dimension. Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers diminish the credibility in UN peacekeeping missions and fuels that criminal trafficking groups transport women and children into mission areas where peacekeepers are stationed (Kent 2005, 87). In the eyes of the host countries and the local population, the trust in the UN and peacekeepers is lost and thereby the peacekeeping mission's ability to fulfill its mandate is undercut (Stern 2015, 8). How is a local community supposed to continue to believe and trust peacekeepers with their mandate to protect civilians and promote human rights and stability, if they sexually exploit and abuse their daughters?

Although the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse has hurt and continues to damage the image and credibility of the UN a lot, there is another side to the effects of SEA, which concerns the consequences for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Victims of SEA by peacekeepers are often already in a vulnerable situation due to the post-conflict environment they live in, characterized by collapsed economies, weak or nonexistent justice systems, inefficient law enforcement, lack of livelihood opportunities, poverty and in some countries increased inter-personal and sexual violence (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 10; Stern 2015, 8). Because the local population in a post-conflict situation potentially does not have alternative jobs or income to still their basic needs, women and children are offering sex to peacekeepers, in exchange for some money, food or a job (Action for the Rights of Children (ARC) 2009, 14).

Furthermore victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers have to deal with the physical and psychological pain, which ranges from chronic pain, infections, infertility, HIV, abortions, broken bones, mutilations and amputations, just to name a few (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 15). Consequently the health issues from sexual exploitation and abuse have socio-economical consequences for the victims, in the sense that they might be excluded from their family and communities, they lose their jobs, are socially excluded, are rejected from their husbands, may have a lot of difficulties to marry in the first place and might be left with a “peacekeeping baby” without any support from the father (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 15; Notar 2006, 414).

1.2 Research question and hypotheses

Inspired by Nordås and Rustad’s research paper from 2013, which presents the first quantitative analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse across a large number of missions and over time, the focus for this thesis lies on the continuation of Nordås and Rustad’s research on the variation of SEA by peacekeepers across multiple missions and over time. The objective of looking at variation of SEA in peacekeeping operations is based on the research interest to get a better understanding of where, when and why SEA happens. Subsequently, having more knowledge about SEA and where, when and why it happens will allow taking appropriate and more effective policy measures to eliminate this phenomenon. Hence the main research question is: *What explains variation of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa across a large number of missions and over time?*

Furthermore, because this thesis' analysis focuses exclusively on UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, a subsequent question is whether there exists an pattern of SEA in UN missions on the African continent, and if yes, if the pattern of SEA in Africa is any different from findings of variation of sexual exploitation and abuse on the global level by Nordås and Rustad.

In order to answer the research question of this thesis a number of hypotheses related to mission and host factors are being tested in the course of this thesis. First, by replication Nordås and Rustad's research from 2013 on the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers across a large number of missions and over time, their seven hypotheses will be retested using an updated version of the SEAP dataset. The seven hypothesis that are being tested in regards to their implications on reports of sexual exploitation and abuse are:

“H1: Peace operations which mention women in the mandates are less likely to be associated with reports of SEA by peacekeepers, all else equal” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 520).

“H2: There will be more SEA in missions when the troops come from countries that do not protect the rights of women to be spared from unwanted sexual advances” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 521).

“H3: The larger the missions in terms of troop size, the higher the likelihood of reports of SEA” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 521).

“H4: SEA is more likely the lower the economic development of the host country” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 522).

“H5: SEA is more likely when the host country does not legally protect the rights of women to be spared from unwanted sexual advances” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

“H6: SEA is more likely if there was extensive sexual violence during the preceding armed conflict” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

“H7: The more intense the ongoing violent conflict, the less reports of SEA” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

Additionally to retesting the above-mentioned hypotheses, this thesis includes three new hypotheses, which have not yet been tested with an updated version of the sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers dataset. The objective is to contribute to the literature and research on sexual exploitation and abuse by including new variables to the dataset and testing them. Based on numerous authors, politicians and human rights organizations, calling for a higher number of female peacekeepers since this is assumed to reduce cases of SEA, this thesis tests for hypothesis eight, stating that:

H8: In peacekeeping missions with a higher number of female peacekeepers, reports of SEA peacekeepers are less likely.

Hypothesis nine is tests for a mission factor, which is the presence of specific troop contributing countries and their effect on reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Because the statistics from the UN on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers only provide information on the nationality of perpetrators from 2015 onwards, testing for an effect from all troop contributing countries separately on reports of SEA allows to explore whether certain national troop contingents that are often present when a lot of allegations of SEA appear. Adding a dummy variable for every troop contributing country and testing for an effect on allegations of SEA has to be considered more in an explorative manner and with the goal of generating a more specific hypothesis. Hence, this thesis hypothesizes that:

H9: The presence of certain troop contributing countries makes the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse more likely.

Related and based on the above-mentioned factors of all separate troop contributing countries, one last factor is tested for in this thesis. Troop contingents do not have a unified code of conduct, however every national troop contingent has its own and therefore peacekeepers might be confronted with new code of conduct once they are deployed to a host country. Based on the assumption that a higher cultural diversity in UN peacekeeping results

in potentially more difficulties in the monitoring a large group of troop contingents from various countries, this thesis hypothesizes that:

H10: The higher the number of countries contributing troops to a mission in a year, the higher the likelihood of SEA by peacekeepers.

The theoretical arguments supporting the inclusion of these variables into the dataset are presented in more detail in chapter 3.

1.3 Research design and scope of analysis

To test the above-mentioned hypotheses this thesis uses the Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers (SEAP) dataset by Nordås and Rustad as a base for the quantitative analysis of variation of SEA by peacekeepers across space and in time. The SEAP dataset contains cross-sectional time series data, with mission-year observations as the unit of analysis that includes all peacekeeping operations from the UN, ECOWAS and AU from 1991 to 2010. The first aim of this thesis is to extend and updated the SEAP dataset with mission-year observations until 2016. Due to the limited time in the process of writing a master thesis, the scope of analysis is limited to UN peacekeeping missions only in Africa. An intensified media attention and thus information on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions in Africa in the early stages of this thesis and a personal interest in this continent led to the decision to focus on peacekeeping missions in Africa only. Based on the large amount of articles on sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions on the African continent, it seemed like the availability of data on SEA would be augmented as well.

In order to answer the research and subsequent questions of this thesis, the above-mentioned hypothesis will be tested with the updated dataset, including mission-year observations for UN missions in Africa until 2016. By that this thesis might eventually identify a specific pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions in Africa. The second objective is to replicate the research by Nordås and Rustad with the updated dataset on peacekeeping missions in Africa and compare the findings to the ones on the global level. The aim is to examine whether the findings on variation of SEA on the African level strengthen or even refute the findings from Nordås and Rustad on the global level.

1.4 Structure

The structure of this thesis falls into 5 sections. Chapter 2 presents background information and definitions regarding the two main concepts of this thesis: sexual exploitation and UN peacekeeping operations. In the first part of chapter 2, the three most common types of peace operations by the UN are presented and defined, followed by a discussion on the categories and definition of UN peacekeeping personnel and a brief history on UN peacekeeping operations. The second part of chapter 2 focuses on the definition of sexual exploitation and abuse, followed by a short historical review on the evolution of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in past UN peacekeeping missions until now. Part three of chapter 2 presents a literature review on the past research that has been done regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. In chapter 3 the theoretical framework and hypotheses of this thesis are elaborate, including all seven hypotheses related to mission and host factors, theory on the influence of female peacekeepers and theoretical arguments to include troop contributing countries as a factor to this thesis' research. Chapter 4 develops the research design and methodology of this thesis, which is a quantitative analysis of variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. In chapter 5, I present the empirical analysis using logistic regression models, the interpretations and compare findings of variation of SEA by peacekeepers on the African and on the global level. Finally, in chapter 6 I conclude on the findings of this thesis, weaknesses of the research design and suggestions for future research.

2 Background

Before diving into the subject of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel, it is important to familiarize with the concept of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers and understand the goals, personnel structures and history of UN peacekeeping operations. Background information for the two main concepts of this thesis, sexual exploitation and abuse and UN peacekeeping operations, will be given in this chapter, including definitions of the two concepts, a historical background of peacekeeping operations and the evolution of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel.

2.1 United Nations peace operations

The United Nations uses a multitude of activities in order to comply with its first purpose, stated in Article 1 of the Charter as follows: “To maintain international peace and security, [...]” (United Nations 1945, 3). Among such activities are conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the main focus in this thesis (United Nations 2017h). Chapter 2.1.1 provides a definition for the main concepts of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping, which are also often confused amongst each other.

2.1.1 Definitions

Peacebuilding

Based on the United Nations Peacekeeping website, peacebuilding is a long-term process that aims to “[...] reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.” (United Nations 2017h). Furthermore peacebuilding missions include a large range of goals, related to local security, economic development, rule of law, governance, and restoration, reconciliation and transformation (Diehl and Druckman 2015, 104). According to Heathcote and Otto peacebuilding assist countries in the implementation of negotiated peace settlements and assume a commitment over a long period of time in order to “[...] assist with the establishment of legal institutions, monitor elections, train local police and military personnel and build democratic governmental structures and capacities [...]” (Heathcote and Otto 2014, 6).

Peacemaking

Peacemaking can be defined as the intermediate activity that is taken while a conflict is still in place. On the United Nations Peacekeeping website, peacemaking is defined as including “[...] measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.” (United Nations 2017h).

Peacekeeping

The main focus of this thesis, in the context of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peace missions lies on peacekeeping operations. Heathcote and Otto define peacekeeping operations as an important element of collective security, which deploys troop contingents from member states to countries in a post-conflict environment to establish the fundamental basis for sustainable and long-term peace (2014, 10). Peacekeeping operations often incorporate activities of peacemaking and peacebuilding in their role on the post-conflict ground of a host country, even though they are mainly deployed to assist during the implementation of peace agreements or ceasefires (United Nations 2017h).

In contrast to the above-mentioned activities of the UN to maintain international peace and security, peacekeeping operations are founded on the basis of three general principles. First, peacekeeping operations are only deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict, which subsequently requires the commitment of the main parties of a conflict to a political process (United Nations 2017k). Second, peacekeeping operations shall be impartial in the way they cooperate with the main parties and maintain good relations with the parties, which means not to accept violations of international norms or any principles from the UN and prevent any sort of activity that might challenge the impartiality of the peacekeeping operation (United Nations 2017k). Third and final, peacekeeping operations are not authorized to use force, unless there are using it for self-defense and defence of the mandate (United Nations 2017k).

Concerning the legal basis of UN peacekeeping operations, the Security Council has the primary competence to establish and mandate a peacekeeping force due to its obligation to fulfill its main objective of international peace and security (White 2015, 46). In exceptional cases when the Security Council is deadlocked or inactive, the General Assembly has secondary competences to mandate peacekeeping forces (White 2015, 46). Summing up, both political organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly, are qualified to establish

and authorize peacekeeping forces (White 2015, 46). Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council decides upon a mandate with specific task for the mission, which constitutes the basis for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation (United Nations 2017g). Mandated tasks for peacekeeping operations deployed in a host country might involve the prevention of a conflict outbreak or spill-over of a conflict across borders, the stabilization of conflict situations after a ceasefire, assistance during the implementation of peace agreements and taking on a leading role for states or territories during a transition to stable governments, with the basis of economic development, democratic principles and good governance (United Nations 2017g).

Although all three types of activities executed by the United Nations to maintain peace and security worldwide are define with distinguishable characteristics, their boundaries have become very blurry and all activities are mutually reinforcing each other (United Nations 2017h). The scope of peace operations has become very large and has resulted in a lot of peace operations that incorporate overlapping types of activities (United Nations 2017h, 2008, 8).

2.1.2 Categories of UN peacekeeping personnel

Politicians and academic authors have approached the categorization of UN personnel of peacekeeping operations very differently. It is therefore crucial for this thesis to address the different definitions for peacekeeping personnel and refer to the categorization of peacekeeping personnel that is relevant to this thesis.

Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Husseini, permanent representative of Jordan in 2004, was asked by Kofi Annan to write a comprehensive report on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, after large amounts of allegations became public in 2004 (Stern 2015, 5). The release of the so called Zeid report in March 2005, represented a large step towards the acknowledgement of the existence of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and presented multiple recommendations to eradicate SEA by UN peacekeepers (Stern 2015, 5). Regarding categories of peacekeeping personnel, the Zeid report states that there can be up to five categories of personnel included into a peacekeeping mission of the UN (United Nations Secretary-General Report 2005, 4). These five categories of UN personnel each have their own separate set of rules and are classified into: United Nations staff, United Nations civilian

police and military observers, Members of national contingents, United Nations Volunteers and individual contractors (United Nations Secretary-General Report 2005, 4). Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Husseini, currently in the position as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, notes in the comprehensive report from 2005 that the large number of categories of UN personnel in peacekeeping missions and the fact that each category is regulated by a different set of rules makes the course of action problematic when dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (United Nations Secretary-General Report 2005, 4; OHCHR 2017).

Authors like Kent categorize UN personnel into military members of national contingents, military observers, civilian police, UN volunteers, consultants and individual contractors (2005, 88). Alternatively Notar speaks of four categories that UN peacekeeping forces can consist of, including U.N. staff, volunteers, independent contractors and members of national armies (2006, 421). As chapter 2.1.3 will address too, UN peacekeeping missions are always a very unique response to the circumstances of a country, which is a reason why it is impossible to find a universally accepted definition of peacekeeping operations (Wills 2009, 3). This might be, why a lot of authors, writing on the subject of UN peacekeeping operations, do not provide a definition of UN peacekeeping operations, as I have observed while reading through the literature.

Important to note is that the United Nations does not have its own army or police contingent and therefore relies on member states to contribute police and military personnel for the deployment of peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2017b). In contrast to academics, the UN focuses in the definition of peacekeeping personnel either on the distinction between uniformed personnel or on the distinction between military, police and civilian personnel. Both ways of categorizing peacekeeping personnel go hand in hand and can be found on the UN web pages. The first definition of peacekeeping personnel by the UN is general and categorizes the peacekeeping personnel into uniformed personnel (including troops, military observers and police), civilian personnel and UN volunteers (United Nations 2017i). The second definition presented on the Conduct in UN Field Missions website describes the subcategories of the uniformed personnel, military, police and civilian, in more detail with the different types of peacekeeping actors. According to this source, “[M]ilitary includes members of military contingents, military staff officers, military liaison officers and military observers. *Police* includes members of formed police units, United Nations police officers,

and other government-provided personnel, such as justice and corrections personnel. *Civilian* includes international and national staff members, United Nations Volunteers, consultants and contractors.” (United Nations 2016).

Because official data on peacekeeping personnel from the United Nations is used in this thesis, it makes sense to apply and follow the official categorization of peacekeeping personnel from the United Nations. The distinction between uniformed and not uniformed personnel is important and discussed in more detail in chapter 4 presenting the operationalization of all variables, including the mission size variable.

2.1.3 History of United Nations peacekeeping operations

The first peacekeeping mission, called United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was deployed in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of military observers to Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria in the Middle East (United Nations 2017d; Williams and Bellamy 2015, 31). After the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli War, UNTSO was established to assist the parties to the conflict in sustaining the ceasefire in Palestine and the General Armistice Agreements (Theobald 2015, 121–23). Because the parties to the conflict have until now not agreed on the final settlement of all questions amongst them, UNTSO has not come to an end yet and is still deployed to this day (Theobald 2015, 123).

According to authors such as Wills and Adebajo, the first ever recognized UN peacekeeping operation was the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF 1), deployed in 1956 because of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and the Suez crisis (Wills 2009, 5; Adebajo 2011, 8; Diehl 2015, 144). As Diehl explains it, the UNEF 1 can be seen as the first real peacekeeping operation due to the fact that it was the first complete peacekeeping mission, involving also armed personnel and not only unarmed military observers as in the case of UNTSO (Diehl 2015, 144). As mentioned before, due to the reason that there exists no official definition of peacekeeping operations, different perspectives and opinions result in contradictory literature.

Since the first peacekeeping operation, there have been 69 field missions (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Public Information 2014). In 1960, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was deployed and

formed the first large-scale peacekeeping mission with almost 20,000 military personnel at its peak. Later on between 1960 and 1970, on the one hand short-term missions were created in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), West New Guinea (UNSF) and Yemen (UNYOM) and on the other hand long-term peacekeeping missions were deployed in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Middle East (UNFICYP, UNEF 2, UNDOF, UNIFIL) (United Nations 2017f).

After the end of the Cold War, new challenges arose for peacekeeping missions, including new types of conflict, such as intra-State war or civil wars, which conclusively obliged the UN peacekeepers to execute a much larger range of tasks in the host country (United Nations 2017e). Between the end of the Cold War in 1990 and 2010, Africa innovated “multidimensional” peacekeeping in Namibia, where the UN received the mandate for tasks to monitor human rights, train police forces, disarmament, demobilization and strengthening state institutions (Adebajo 2011, 10). MINUSMA in Mali and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic are both United Nations multidimensional integrated stabilization missions from the UN (United Nations, n.d.).

As a consequence of the fact that peacekeeping as a tool of international security and peace is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter and every peacekeeping operations is an imitable response to a particular situation in the host country, the practice and doctrine has and continues to change (Wills 2009, 3). In the future we will most definitely see peacekeeping operations by the UN operate new practices, in response to new challenges to the international security and peace.

2.2 Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers

The second concept relevant for this thesis is the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers of UN missions, which also deserves a short introduction. The aim of this section is to first clarify what is being understood under the terminology of sexual exploitation and abuse and then secondly to take a quick look at the emergence of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping missions.

2.2.1 Definition: Sexual exploitation and abuse

Wills offers examples of acts of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, including visits to brothels, sex in exchange for money or food, sexual slavery of women and children, the fathering of

children by local women, rape of adults, trafficking of women and girls, filming children for pornographic purposes, sex with children and rape of children (2009, 275). According to Kent acts of sexual abuse can range “[...] from a violent rape to coercive sex in exchange for money, goods or services” (2005, 86).

The UN defines sexual exploitation as “[A]ny abuse or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. This includes acts such as transactional sex, solicitation of transactional sex, and exploitative relationships.” (United Nations 2016). In addition, sexual abuse is defined by the United Nations as an “[A]ctual or threatening physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. All sexual activity with a minor (a person under the age of 18) is considered as sexual abuse.” (United Nations 2016).

Nordås and Rustad use the UN definition of sexual exploitation and abuse for the SEAP dataset and research article from 2013. Because their research paper and most importantly their SEAP dataset serves as a basis for the analysis of the extended dataset in this thesis, it only makes sense that this thesis follows the UN definition as well. Thereby the consistent definition of sexual exploitation and abuse is guaranteed and no extra confusion is created.

As mentioned in the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” from 2003, the UN prohibits forces of UN operations to perpetrate acts of sexual exploitation and abuse and are obliged to care for women and children (UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin 2003, 1). Furthermore, recognizing that certain human rights norms are applicable to peacekeeping missions, the UN has defined sexual exploitation and abuse as a violation of such international human rights norms (Notar 2006, 423). Notar argues that peacekeepers who sexually exploit and abuse women and children are preventing them from their right to life and security as described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2006, 424).

2.2.2 Evolution of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations

Even though the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers has received public attention since the beginning of the 21st century, the phenomenon is not new. Some of the earliest reports of sexual violence, rape and other forms of violence have been registered 1992 in the UN mission in Somalia and in the United Nations led mission in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993 (Kent 2005, 87; Nordås and Rustad 2013, 512). Other early allegations of peacekeepers sexually exploiting and abusing women and children emerged in the Balkans and Timor-Leste in the 1990s and later in West Africa in 2002 (Stern 2015, 8).

The phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers obtained global media attention, after the British non-governmental organization Save the children together with the UNHCR released a report in 2002 on “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone” (Kent 2005, 87). The report brought to light, that young girls were forced by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers to have sex with them, compensated by food, money or shelter (Kent 2005, 87). Attention regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers grew after the UN Secretary-General at that time, Kofi Annan, issued a bulletin in 2003 on special measures to protect the local population from sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, which illustrated that the UN pursued a policy of zero-tolerance, prohibiting sexual activity with children, exchange of food or goods for money and any sort sexual relationship between peacekeepers and the local population (Stern 2015, 8; UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin 2003, 2).

Those reports of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers arose over a period of time where the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000, which called upon all parties to a conflict and member states to take measures to protect women and girls from sexual violence and abuse and to end impunity of perpetrators (United Nations Security Council 2000, 3). Another important report by the UN released in 2005, called “A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations” marked an important step in the recognition that sexual exploitation and abuse is a large-scale problem and led to the adoption of resolution A/RES/59/300 introducing a reform package to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (Stern 2015, 5; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 171). Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid

Al-Hussein, appointed special advisor to the Secretary-General on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel in 2004, wrote the report and raised concerns regarding the United Nations ability and efforts to address and investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers (Kent 2005, 86).

Both reports from 2003 and 2005 marked a turning point in the realization of the seriousness and dimensions of the problem of SEA by peacekeepers and in the extended efforts channeled to remove this sort of acts by peacekeepers, damaging the image of the UN. In response to the increased media attention on allegations of sexual abuse in various peacekeeping missions, including MONUC, led the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to investigate those allegations, based on the request from the United Nations Division of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and MONUC (Notar 2006, 417). In total the OIOS investigated 72 allegations, most of them related to sex with minors, and release the report in early 2005 with recommendations on how to counter sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel (Notar 2006, 418).

Since these first reports and reactions of the UN regarding the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse in the beginning of the 21st century, more reports of allegations of SEA in UN peacekeeping missions have appeared. In all currently deployed UN peacekeeping missions on the African continent there have been reports of allegations of peacekeeping personnel sexually abusing and exploiting the local population. According to Stern a general declining trend in reports of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is observable since the above-mentioned reports were issued by the UN (Stern 2015, 5). The statistics on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in all UN peacekeeping missions over time by the UN present a slightly different image. Indicating a total of 127 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in 2007, the number of allegations reported by year decreases to 52 allegations of SEA in 2014, before increasing again to 69 allegations in 2015 and 103 allegations in 2016 (United Nations 2017). An examination of UN data only from all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa shows an identical evolution of the total number of allegations of SEA. Decreasing from a peak of 102 allegations of SEA in 2007 to 36 allegations in 2014, the total number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse increased again in 2015 to 58 and 91 allegations in 2016 (United Nations 2017).

If the statistical data by the UN can be trusted and represents the trend on the ground, one might assume that the initiatives and reforms from the UN have had a positive impact on the reduction of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. However, it is important not to put too much trust in this statistical data, since there is a large problem of underreporting of sexual violence and a lot of allegations of SEA go unreported (Stern 2015, 5). Underreporting of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and even aid workers is a serious problem and was one of the key findings of fieldwork by the NGO Save the Children in preparation for a big report, released in 2008, on sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers (Save the Children 2008, 12).

Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers have diminished and continue to harm the credibility in UN peacekeeping mission and fuel that criminal trafficking groups transport women and children into mission areas where peacekeepers are stationed (Kent 2005, 87). Today the UN continues to fight. Since the problem of SEA by peacekeepers is still omnipresent today and the UN continues to fight against its occurrence, research is crucial to get a better understanding of where the problem comes from and thereby help institutions such as the UN to adopt the right measures to effectively prevent peacekeepers from sexually exploiting and abusing during their time deployed within a UN peacekeeping mission.

2.3 Literature review

This section provides an overview of the existing literature on sexual exploitation and abuse in the context of UN peacekeeping operations and illustrates the necessity of further quantitative research to investigate variations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers over a large number of peacekeeping missions and arrange data in a systematic way.

Starting a literature review on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers necessitates a quick introduction into studies of sexual violence in general and sexual violence in armed conflict. The reason for this is that the field of research on sexual violence in armed conflicts is far more extensively researched and studied than sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. Literature on sexual violence in armed conflict can serve as in the establishment of a theoretical framework in a research on sexual exploitation and abuse by

peacekeeping personnel. There are numerous books and studies on sexual violence in armed conflict, for example by authors such as Cohen who studied sexual violence during armed conflict and has shown that sexual violence by state armies is just as likely as by non-state rebel groups in an armed conflict (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 516).

In a report from 2007 Bastick, Grimm and Kunz demonstrate the scope and dimension of sexual violence in armed conflict by documenting the occurrence of sexual violence during wartime in 51 countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia Europe and the Middle East (2007, 9). Furthermore motives of sexual violence during armed conflicts can vary from advancing military objectives, to humiliate families, communities and the enemy, to gain control over the victim and to incite terror in a population (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 14–15). From the feminist literature, Brownmiller demonstrates in 1975 rape for men, as the basic weapon of force against women and a test to a man's superior strength and triumph of his manhood (1997, 14). Rape is seen as a process of intimidation by men to maintain women in a state of fear and in wartimes, through the power of weapons, receive a license to rape in the name of victory and to prove their superiority (Brownmiller 1997, 15, 33).

Due to the fact that the research field of sexual violence in an armed conflict is very broad and would require its own literature chapter to do its justice, this thesis won't go into more detail in matters of sexual violence in armed conflicts. The main focus of this thesis is sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations and therefore this thesis' literature review emphasizes primarily on previous research on SEA by peacekeepers.

In their research paper, Nordås and Rustad summarize the literature on peacekeeping operations as primarily focusing on studies of the success of peacekeeping missions to maintain peace and stability (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 511–12). Furthermore the literature on peacekeeping is ruled by mostly policy reports and single case studies without any comparative studies examining the relationship between factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of SEA by peacekeepers over a large number of cases and over time (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 512, 515). Shotton for example studies the response to SEA of the DPKO before and after 2004 and concludes that the media, “think-tanks” and the civil society play a crucial role in maintaining the pressure on the UN and member states to adopt a comprehensive strategy focusing on prevention, early detection, quality investigations and to end impunity (2006, 107).

Although there are a lot of authors focused on policy changes and the effectiveness of strategies from the UN to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, some have focused on risk factors that might explain the occurrence of sexual violence by peacekeeping personnel. Gustafsson and Harrington, amongst others, suppose that the unequal power distribution between peacekeeping soldiers and the local population is one of the main reasons for the sexual violence that is happening in peace operations of the UN (Neudorfer 2015, 30). Focusing on the post-conflict environment, Kent concludes that “[T]he absence of mainstream economic opportunities for women and girls, compounded by unequal power dynamics, pervasive gender inequality and the likelihood of previous exposure to violence and/or rape all [...]” lead to women and girls offer their sexual favors in exchange for material things, such as food amongst others (Kent 2005, 91).

In her normative discourse of a case study of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nathalie Gilliard examines to what extent feminist theory can be useful in explaining the phenomenon of sexual violence by peacekeepers. More specifically, she concludes that feminist theory illustrates well how conceptualizations of gender and unequal power structures can cause sexual exploitation and abuse and also construct the response of international actors (Gilliard 2012). According to this author sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeper has to be looked at as part of an overarching culture of sexual violence in the Congo (Gilliard 2012). Nathalie Gilliard concludes that one explanation for acts of sexual violence by peacekeepers against local women in the DRC can be traced back to conceptualizations of gender and an unequal gender power dynamic, with women having limited rights, fewer work possibilities and other socio-economical drawbacks (2012, 27–33).

The 2007 report on sexual violence in armed conflicts from the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces reflects suggestions of the current research, that more women in peacekeeping operations have a positive influence on the mostly male dominated UN missions, by reducing cases of sexual violence against local women and children (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 174). Complementary, Whitworth conducted a study in 2004 on why UN peacekeepers conducted crimes against the local population, especially in Cambodia and Somalia and found that the military culture is encouraging peacekeepers to aggressive sexual behavior in order to symbolize their heterosexual masculinity (Neudorfer

2015, 30). Whitworth claims that the inherent militarized masculinity of the military makes soldiers aggressive, which leads to the subject of the gender composition of peacekeeping operations (Neudorfer 2015, 30).

How has the literature on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers expanded its scope since Nordås and Rustad's research paper was published in 2013? Non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Save the Children or the Code Blue Campaign, by Aids free world, have had an important role since the emergence of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Human Rights Watch released a report called "The power these men have over us" in the fall of 2014 demonstrating the situation in Somalia, after doing research regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in AMISOM (Human Rights Watch 2014). Likewise, Amnesty international has released several articles and also conducted numerous interviews with victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, as for example describing incidents of SEA in MINUSCA in 2015 (Amnesty International 2015). Finally the Code Blue Campaign was created in 2015 in order to end impunity for peacekeepers who perpetrate sexual exploitation and abuse during their time deployed in the peacekeeping missions, to call for the establishment of an external and independent investigation and engage supporters from all over the world in order to press the UN, troop contributing countries and member states to present mechanism to restore their accountability (Code Blue 2017). Overall NGOs have contributed a lot to the knowledge on SEA by peacekeepers and still continue to contribute to the literature, by getting facts and details of incidents out to the public and spread attention to the problem.

Neudorfer published an article in 2014 focusing on the causes for the decline in SEA by peacekeepers from 2006 to 2007, using mixed methods. Focusing on the introduction of the Conduct and Discipline Units (CDU)¹ the author finds that there is a negative and significant effect from the conduct and discipline unit on the number of allegations of SEA (Neudorfer 2014, 623). Neudorfer continued to focus her research on the effect of the introduction of the Conduct and Discipline Units (CDO) in her 2015 published book, described just bellow.

¹ The Conduct and Discipline Unit was established in 2007 and provides directions on conduct and discipline issues, such as eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions, formulates policies, develops training and awareness raising activities and supervises the dealing with allegations of SEA (United Nations 2017o).

In a study published in 2015 Neudorfer analyzed risk and prevention factors of SEA with the goal to identify appropriate measures to reduce the risk of future SEA in peace missions using criminology theory (2015, 149). First, Neudorfer finds that, similar to Nordås and Rustad's variable concerning the level of sexual violence in a previous conflict, in areas where there is a high level of sexual violence, more SEA will be committed (Neudorfer 2015, 152). Second, in her large-N analysis she observes that there exists a positive effect between areas with a large share in internally displaced people and SEA by peacekeepers (Neudorfer 2015, 150–55). Third, she identifies a positive and insignificant causal relationship between the occurrence of SEA by peacekeepers and areas in which peacekeepers and locals mix with limited supervision (Neudorfer 2015, 150). Fourth, her findings show that the introduction of a Conduct and Discipline Unit significantly reduced the number of SEA cases by peacekeepers in all of the peacekeeping missions (Neudorfer 2015, 150–55). Fifth, in a case study of MONUC/MONUSCO Neudorfer finds that when there is no training session with an SEA part, more SEA by peacekeepers will be committed, however the negative effect between training measures and the number of SEA is statistically insignificant (Neudorfer 2015, 150–55). And finally, the hypothesis of whether SEA is committed more likely in missions where the local population has received empowerment campaigns regarding SEA, amongst others with gender advisors, was supported by the large-N analysis and a case study of UNMIL (Neudorfer 2015, 151–56). To identify risk and prevention factors Neudorfer turns to theories of criminology and transfers them from crime explanations to peacekeeping operations, in order to establish testable hypothesis (Neudorfer 2015, 37). Neudorfer suggests for further research to expand the theoretical framework to individual criminology theories (2015, 150–55).

The highly relevance of the gender distribution in peacekeeping operations has been addressed by multiple authors. Just recently Karim and Beardsley wrote an article on the role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries where they conclude that higher proportions of female peacekeepers and personnel from countries with a better gender equality are affiliated with fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by military contingent in UN peacekeeping missions (Karim and Beardsley 2016, 100). On the same topic of the influence of female peacekeepers on reducing the possibility of SEA, Simić argues that although evidence shows that women in peacekeeping missions are able and do change the behavior of male peacekeepers, women are not the fix to the problem and the UN

and troop contributing countries need to act at the roots of the problem, by introducing laws to end impunity of perpetrating peacekeepers instead of just treating female peacekeepers as the saviors of SEA in peacekeeping operations and the UN's integrity and accountability (Simić 2010, 188, 196–97).

Since this thesis includes a variable for the gender ratio for every mission-year observation to the updated dataset of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, chapter 3 will go into more detail on gender theory and the impact that female peacekeepers and more gender balanced UN missions have on the number of allegations of SEA.

Stern wrote a report in 2015 on the impact of the Zeid report on the reduction of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions. She points out the fact that peacekeepers are deployed into war-ravaged settings with a vulnerable local population, which results in a fundamental power difference between the peacekeepers and the local population and is sometimes exploited by peacekeepers in various forms of sexual exploitation and abuse (Stern 2015, 8). Overall Stern concludes that the UN has in the ten years since the Zeid report done a lot of progress, including SEA training for all peacekeepers, increased community outreach, standardized procedures, implemented the UN Victim Assistance Strategy and reinforced the independence of UN investigators (Stern 2015, 20).

Finally the focus lies on Nordås and Rustad's research paper from 2013, which serves as a basis for the analysis of this thesis. Because most of today's studies on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers are covering only limited cases over time and space, the identification of general patterns is understudied and there is a need for systematic analysis of SEA (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 513–15). Around the time when Nordås and Rustad published their research paper there were only very few quantitative studies that looked at variation of SEA over time and across multiple cases of UN peacekeeping missions (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 515–16).

Nordås and Rustad identified the lack of quantitative research on the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeper across a large number of UN peacekeeping missions and over time, and thus constructed a new dataset, covering all missions active in the years 1999-2010 (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 511). With their new SEAP dataset of SEA

in peacekeeping operations, Nordås and Rustad conducted the first statistical study that explores variations in reported allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers across all peacekeeping mission and over time (2013, 511).

The two authors goal was to identify contexts in which SEA is more likely, through statistical analysis, using their arranged sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (SEAP) dataset (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 512). In organizing their theoretical framework, Nordås and Rustad categorize explanatory factors in mission and host factors. Nordås and Rustad find from their statistical study that sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers was more frequently reported in less intensive conflicts with lower levels of battle-related deaths, in larger operations, in more recent peacekeeping missions, in less developed countries hosting the mission and in operations where the previous conflict involved high levels of sexual violence (2013, 511–30). Furthermore they conclude that when women are mentioned in the mission mandate this is associated with a higher likelihood that there will be reports of sexual exploitation and abuse. And finally the existence of laws protecting women against spousal rape in the country hosting the mission does not effectively help prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, in contrast to suggestions of previous literature (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 511–30).

On the basis of the above-mentioned literature review and Nordås and Rustad’s approach to research variation of SEA by peacekeepers, the objective of this thesis is to take up Nordås and Rustad’s research and extend it by adding mission-year observations for all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa until 2016. Furthermore the aim is also to include additional explanatory variables with statistical data from the UN in order to investigate potential factors that might explain why reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel vary across missions and over time. Supportively, in an article from 2016 Grady examines the impact that the annual statistics from the UN about allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers have on the implementation of legal reforms and finds that these statistics have attracted little academic assessment (Grady 2016, 931).

3 Theoretical framework

Having identified the omnipresent problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, this section presents the theoretical framework to frame this thesis research and provide a theoretical base to address this thesis's research question: *What explains the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in peacekeeping missions in Africa and to what extent does a pattern of SEA on the African continent differ from a pattern of SEA on the global level?*

Due to the limited amount of data availability and time this thesis does not focus on explanations of sexual exploitation and abuse on the individual level. Research regarding the motivation of peacekeepers, driven by psychological, social or physical factors, to engage in sexual acts with the local population are not considered in this thesis, since such research would require conducting fieldwork, by interviewing victims and perpetrators, in order to get a better understanding of the situation of peacekeepers that are deployed in a UN mission and their motivations behind such acts of sexual violence. Because this topic is very sensitive and intimate for people to talk about, linked with a difficult if not impossible chance to get access to victims and perpetrators, this form of research will be postponed to a future research on motivational factors of peacekeepers to become perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse.

This thesis focus lies on SEA in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and seeks to investigate factors that might be able to explain the variation of SEA in Africa, compared to patterns of SEA on the global level. The first aim of this thesis was to expand and update the SEAP dataset by Nordås and Rustad from 2013 with mission-year observations for all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa until 2016. Using the SEAP dataset as a foundation for an extended research on the variation of SEA by peacekeepers in UN missions in Africa, this thesis constructs a replication of Nordås and Rustad's research. The objective is to investigate whether the additional mission-year observations for UN missions on the African continent are strengthening the findings from Nordås and Rustad on the global level or by refuting them, presenting an own pattern of SEA for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

The theoretical framework of this thesis limits the scope of this thesis to a few explanatory factors related to the structure and composition of UN peacekeeping mission, including factors concerning troops contributing countries, and some factors related to the host

country². Besides replicating Nordås and Rustad’s research and retesting their hypotheses, this thesis aims at contributing to the literature by adding a few new explanatory variables that have not been tested yet using the updated SEAP dataset. This chapter is structured into three sections. First, all seven hypotheses by Nordås and Rustad are elaborated and supported by theory. Second, I’ll elaborate on the theoretical basis to include female peacekeepers as a relevant explanatory variable to the extended SEAP dataset with mission-year observations of UN missions in Africa until 2016. Third, theoretical background is presented to justify the inclusion of troop contributing countries to the updated SEAP dataset.

3.1 Mission and host factors

In the theoretical framework of their research paper from 2013, Nordås and Rustad make the distinction between mission factors and host factors possibly influencing the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers across peacekeeping missions and over time. Mission factors concern properties of a peacekeeping mission like its size, duration, spousal rape laws in troop contributing countries or composition of a mission. Host factors include characteristics of the country where the peacekeeping mission is deployed to, such as its GDP per capita, the existence of a law prohibiting spousal rape, sexual violence in previous conflicts and the level of the ongoing conflict. The first three hypotheses belong to the category of mission factors, followed by four hypotheses of the host factor category.

First, Nordås and Rustad assume that in missions where women are mentioned in the mission mandate, peacekeepers will focus more on protecting women and not commit acts of sexual violence towards them (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 520). Thus they hypothesize that:

“H1: Peace operations which mention women in the mandates are less likely to be associated with reports of SEA by peacekeepers, all else equal” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 520).

Second, turning to the literature of gender studies and psychological literature Nordås and Rustad expect that male peacekeepers are less likely to sexually exploit and abuse if they come from a troop contributing country where women’s rights are respected and integrated into legal and cultural norms (2013, 520–21). This comes from the different ideals of

² The term host country is used to describe the country hosting the UN peacekeeping mission.

masculinity and gender relations that peacekeepers bring with them, additional to their attitudes, ideologies and social backgrounds (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 520–21; Agathangelou and Ling 2003, 142). According to Higate and Henry male peacekeepers, although sharing some aspects of masculinity, differ in terms of their religious, military, ethnic and social class backgrounds, which influences their behavior, promotion and construction of masculinity (Higate and Henry 2004, 484–85). Based on the above-mentioned theoretical foundation Nordås and Rustad established the following hypothesis:

“H2: There will be more SEA in missions when the troops come from countries that do not protect the rights of women to be spared from unwanted sexual advances” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 521).

Third, based on the principal-agent model, stating that agents or soldiers behave more according to their own personal preferences if their leaders or principals do not have the capability to monitor, Nordås and Rustad assumed that peacekeeping troop commanders would have more problems to supervise a large number of soldiers than soldiers in a smaller mission (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 521). Therefore they assumed that:

“H3: The larger the missions in terms of troop size, the higher the likelihood of reports of SEA” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 521).

Fourth and turning to the first hypothesis in the category of host factors, Nordås and Rustad argue that conditions in the country where the peacekeeping mission is deployed can increase the vulnerability of the local population to be sexually exploited and abuse (2013, 522). Action for the Rights of Children (ARC) argues that issues of poverty are often at the root of cases of exploitation (2009, 40). This goes in line with the argumentation of a lot of authors that the local population’s vulnerability to being sexually exploited and abused is linked to poverty, gender discrimination and social injustice amongst others (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 175; Patel and Tripodi 2007, 588). Being in a situation of starvation and desperation, it is well known that women and girls agree to have sex with peacekeepers in exchange for food, money or jobs (Notar 2006, 417). Notar talks about “survival sex” in this case (2006, 417). Based on these theoretical arguments, Nordås and Rustad hypothesized that:

“H4: SEA is more likely the lower the economic development of the host country” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 522).

Another factor that might increase the likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and which is closely related to poverty in the host country is the unemployment rate of women in the host countries of UN missions. Women and girls amongst others are vulnerable to the harassment of militia groups which continue to persist in a post-conflict environment and make it insecure for parts of the population to cultivate their fields (Notar 2006, 417). Hence women might not have other alternatives besides prostituting themselves in order to secure their basic needs to survive (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 170–71). Consequently one could assume that the likelihood to observe cases of SEA by peacekeepers, including “survival sex”, is higher in host countries where the female unemployment rate is higher. Because of lack of time this factor is not yet included into the SEAP dataset, however data on female unemployment rate is available on the World Bank Website³ and it might be possible to compare the effect of female unemployment rate on the occurrence of SEA by peacekeepers.

Fifth, sexual violence is still often viewed as a domestic problem and the product of local culture (Wills 2009, 275). However, according to Bastick et al. “[C]ourts often lack the infrastructure, capacity and expertise to prosecute crimes of sexual violence.” (2007, 163). Thus Nordås and Rustad argue that women might be more vulnerable to SEA in countries where impunity of gender-based violence is common and no effective legal protection from sexual exploitation and abuse exists (2013, 522–23). Subsequent, Nordås and Rustad established following hypothesis:

“H5: SEA is more likely when the host country does not legally protect the rights of women to be spared from unwanted sexual advances” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

Sixth, a high level of sexual violence in a preceding conflict might lead eventually to a lot of local women offering themselves for transactional sex in exchange for food, protection, money or other benefits according to Nordås and Rustad (2013, 523). In a post conflict environment after an armed conflict with a high level of sexual violence, women might be

³ Data is available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS>

traumatized and feel that them being sexually exploited and abused is normal. As Wills states, sexual violence in armed conflicts has increased in terms of its scale and brutality in the last couple of years and the effects of sexual violence persist even long after the end of a peace process (2009, 273). Furthermore women that have been sexually exploited and abused in a previous conflict, and survived, might be infected with HIV, are unable to work and support their children, are often rejected from their community and might suffer from inhibiting health problems due to the sexual abuse or exploitation they had to live through (Wills 2009, 273). Based on these arguments, women might find themselves in a vicious circle of no other possibility than to give in to sex to satisfy their basic needs. Their vulnerable situation might be exploited more easily by peacekeepers, which led Nordås and Rustad to hypothesize that:

“H6: SEA is more likely if there was extensive sexual violence during the preceding armed conflict” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

Sevenths, the last host factor considers the general security situation as a factor that might influence the prevalence of sexual exploitation and abuse. Nordås and Rustad assume that peacekeepers that are deployed to countries with an ongoing armed conflict, might be limited in their mobility and have less contact with the local population (2013, 523). Correspondingly opportunities to sexually exploit and abuse women might be reduced (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523), hence:

“H7: The more intense the ongoing violent conflict, the less reports of SEA” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 523).

3.2 Female peacekeepers

To contribute my part to the research literature on variation and patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, this thesis aimed at addition a variable for female peacekeepers to the updated SEAP dataset on UN missions in Africa until 2016. This section describes the theory that backs up the decision to investigate the effect of female peacekeepers on reports of SEA.

When Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad constructed the SEAP dataset for their research paper in 2013, there was not enough data to include this variable into the dataset and execute a comparison across cases (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 522). However, in the meantime with additional mission-year observations until 2016, more data is available to attempt a cross-case comparison including the `gender_ratio` variable. Furthermore there is more literature on the topic of female peacekeepers and how the increased number and role of women in peacekeeping operations can benefit the elimination of SEA.

Already in March 2005 Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein recommended in his comprehensive report that the UN should increase the percentage of female peacekeeping personnel. His argument was that victims, often female, might be more likely to turn to a female peacekeeper to report any incidents of sexual exploitation because they might have more confidence when talking to another woman (United Nations Secretary-General Report 2005, 18–19). Consequently that will potentially increase the reporting of incidents of SEA, which is according to Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein a first step in the elimination of this phenomenon (2005, 18–19), by reducing the problem of underreporting of SEA.

Not only has this idea evolved in international organizations like the UN, however also politicians and celebrities such as Angelina Jolie are urging the UN to include more women in peacekeeping missions. They are hoping that gender balanced missions will increase the effectiveness of the missions and restore the credibility of peacekeeping troops (Griffin 2016). In a chapter of “Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations” Kent cites a study from the UN Division for the Advancement of Women in 1995, which found that cases of sexual violence decrease with an increased number of women present in peacekeeping missions (Kent 2007, 56). She further cites the UN DPKO who argues in favor of the presence of women in missions, because their presence facilitates access and support for local women to report their cases of abuse and at the same time increases the responsibility and reflectiveness of male peacekeepers (Kent 2007, 56). It is imaginable that local women may feel more comfortable to confess any sexual abuse or exploitation by UN soldiers towards another woman than a man. Also Notar recommends that more women be employed at all levels of the UN and peacekeeping missions, from peacekeepers to senior level throughout (2006, 428).

Heathcote and Otto compare female peacekeepers to a task force to reduce and eliminate cases of sexual exploitation and abuse over a large scale (2014, 188). Feminist scholars and the media have assumed that women are less likely to sexually exploit or abuse someone and are thus better and more sensitive in their contact to local women (Heathcote and Otto 2014, 189). In contrast to that, there are more and more authors critically analyzing the assigned role of female peacekeepers to only prevent sexual exploitation and abuse and consider the current strategies of including more women in peacekeeping missions to rely on gender stereotypes (Heathcote and Otto 2014, 190). Authors such as Heathcote and Otto argue that the simple deployment of more women as a “quick fix” of SEA will not change the gender hierarchies and the macho culture in the military and police components of peacekeeping operations and thus will not solve the problem of SEA just by their presence (2014, 188, 195). Despite some critical reflection on the role of female peacekeepers, the majority agrees with the assumption that female peacekeepers help to reduce SEA, even though this does not solve the problem. Hence, this thesis hypothesizes that:

H8: In peacekeeping missions with a higher number of female peacekeepers, reports of SEA peacekeepers are less likely.

3.3 Troop contributing countries (TCC)

Finally this thesis adds sort of two types of new variables related to troop contributing countries. First, for every troop contributing country that has ever contributed soldiers to a peacekeeping mission, a dummy variable is created and added to the updated SEAP dataset until 2016, focusing on UN missions in Africa. Because the nationality of UN perpetrators of sexual abuse and exploitation is only recently, starting from 2015, publicly accessible on the Conduct in UN Field Missions web page⁴, there is until now insufficient data available to include the nationality of perpetrators to the dataset. However, an alternative way to approximate the question of where perpetrators of SEA come from is by including all troop contributing countries for every mission and observe whether there is a correlation between reports of SEA and certain TCCs. The approach of this factor is more of an explorative and hypothesis-generating nature and seeks to examine if there is any correlation between reports of sexual exploitation and abuse and certain troop contributing countries.

⁴ Available at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-subjects>.

Peacekeeping soldiers from various troop-contributing countries do not only have different cultural background, but also inconsistent and diverse training doctrines they bring along to the mission they are deployed to (Nsia-Pepira 2014, 175). As Bastick et al. state the motivation for sexual violence can be rooted in more specific cultural beliefs and a complex web of cultural preconceptions (2007, 15). Furthermore, “[T]he motives of individuals who perpetrate sexual violence during conflict reflect their understandings, and socially constructed collective understandings, in particular as regards gender roles.” (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 15). Therefore this paper establishes the following hypothesis in order to approximate the question of the nationality of perpetrators:

H9: The presence of certain troop contributing countries makes the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse more likely.

Second, related to the previous hypothesis on the influence of certain troop contributing countries on reports of SEA, this paper assumes that it might be harder to monitor missions with multicultural soldiers that come from very different troop contributing countries, due to their different cultural backgrounds and beliefs. As Odoi argues peacekeepers have to be aware of their own cultural and historical context and must be able to adapt to a multicultural setting, with peacekeepers from different national contingents and the host communities (2005, 4). Furthermore this paper assumes that the collaboration among soldiers in a multicultural environment is more difficult, than if there were fewer soldiers from various troop-contributing countries involved. As Heathcote and Otto explain, the UN military contingent personnel deployed in a peacekeeping operation stands under various degrees of control from the troop contributing country and the UN (2014, 75). Creating a working environment with a high national diversity of peacekeepers could possibly lead to more cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, if soldiers incite each other to commit acts of sexual violence towards the local population. Hence this paper hypothesizes that:

H10: The higher the number of countries contributing troops to a mission in a year, the higher the likelihood of SEA by peacekeepers.

Regarding the explanation of the variation of SEA by peacekeepers there are a lot more theories existing that would be interesting to pursue in a quantitative analysis. The lack of time for this thesis does not allow going into more detail of other explanatory factors.

However this concluding paragraph states a few additional factors, which are not further discussed in this paper, which could be added to an extended comparative analysis of SEA by peacekeepers in a successive paper.

As Kent argues, it is important that clear behavioral standards are established by the senior management, which is regrettably not often the case (2005, 90). One could hypothesis that female force commanders put the emphasis more on women's rights and the status of women than maybe male force commanders would. Male peacekeepers might have fewer incentives to sexually exploit and abuse women and children, if they are under the force command of a woman, because the female force commander might insist strongly on the protection of women. This explanatory factor is not relevant for this thesis, since there has been only one female force commander in the history of peacekeeping missions so far. Kristin Lund from Norway was assigned military force commander in August 2014 in the mission in Cyprus (United Nations News Service Section 2014). Kristin Lund's case in Cyprus is the only case so far and thus including a variable regarding the gender of the force commander is not relevant for this paper's focus on UN missions in Africa. Once the UN deployed more women as force commanders in peacekeeping missions, the inclusion of this factor could be reconsidered.

The effect of the number of refugee camps and the number of internally displaced people are two additional explanatory factors that could be tested in the context of a comparative quantitative study. It is well known that wartime related sexual violence also occurs in refugee camps and camps for internally displaced people. Women that are internally displaced or refugees are especially vulnerable to being sexually exploited and abused by peacekeepers, armed groups or fellow refugees, amongst others due to an increased level of frustration in a domestic relationship (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 28). Furthermore women constitute the greatest number of refugees and are thus often vulnerable to sexual violence, discrimination and exploitation (Murphy 2006, 534). In a subsequent paper one could hypothesize that the higher the number of refugee camps and internally displaced people in the host country is, the higher the likelihood of SEA by peacekeepers.

4 Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology, the dataset that is used to test the hypothesis, its unit of analysis, the operationalization of all variables included into the dataset and data sources. Using Nordås and Rustad's SEAP dataset from 2013 as a basis for this thesis's quantitative analysis, this paper has two analytical aims. The first objective of the analysis is to conduct a replication of the two authors analysis using the extended and updated dataset that focuses exclusively on UN peacekeeping operations on the African continent. All of their hypotheses will be retested with the updated dataset and compared to the original findings, analyzed on a global level. The aim is to investigate whether the Nordås and Rustad's findings found on the global level, studying all UN missions worldwide, are similarly recognizable on the continental level. In the case of this thesis the focus lies on the African continent. The second objective is to contribute a part to the literature on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers by adding additional variables, that weren't included in Nordås and Rustad's research design. Additional variables that are tested in the successive analysis concern the gender composition of UN peacekeeping operations, the total number of troop contributing countries and indications on all TCCs for every mission-year. Furthermore a variable describing the total number of allegations per mission-year observation and one describing the status of allegations were added to the dataset. The purpose is to get a more detailed view on the dimension of the phenomenon of SEA by peacekeepers.

Collecting all the data for the added variables and recoding most of Nordås and Rustad's explanatory variables, due to some discrepancies allowed me to understand the data much better and also see drawbacks linked to such a research design. In chapter 5.3 drawbacks, limitations and problems related to a quantitative research design on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers will be discussed in more detail.

4.1 Updated SEAP Dataset and unit of analysis

Nordås and Rustad's Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeper (SEAP) dataset from 2013 includes cross sectional time series data for all UN, ECOWAS and AU peacekeeping operations. The unit of analysis of the dataset is mission-year observations, which means that for every year since the mission's creation there is an observation included into the dataset up until its closure. Nordås and Rustad incorporated all UN, ECOWAS and African Union

peacekeeping missions worldwide into their dataset with mission-year observations until 2010. With their research the two authors objective was to understand variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers by investigating all UN peacekeeping operations that have ever existed worldwide.

The first, and one of the main goals of this master thesis is to expand and update the SEAP dataset, presented in a research paper by Nordås and Rustad from 2013. Because the original SEAP dataset incorporates mission-year observations only until 2010, it was an opportunity to extend the dataset with additional mission-year observations until 2016. Adding more mission-years observations increases the number of observations and thereby the reliability of the research design. However, because extending and updating the whole SEAP dataset with mission-year observations until 2016 would have taken up too much time, the sample for this thesis's quantitative analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is concentrated on peacekeeping operations from the United Nations and the African Union in Africa. Furthermore for the quantitative analysis in this thesis I transferred all UN and AU peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa from the original universal dataset to a new separate dataset.

The decision to focus on the African continent and thereby all UN and AU peace missions in African countries is based amongst others on the availability of sources and a personal interest for Africa. In the early stages of the development of this master thesis, reports of allegations of SEA in African missions were very present on the Internet and with that data and information on those allegations, which is a crucial factor when aiming at expanding a dataset with additional mission-year observations. Furthermore, from the 16 currently deployed peacekeeping operations of the UN worldwide, nine of them are based on the African continent (United Nations 2017a). With the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) there is an additional peacekeeping mission by the African Union deployed in an African country. Table 1 shows all 10 peacekeeping missions on the African continent, either operated by the United Nations or the African Union. Missions like MINURSO, UNAMID, AMISOM (AU), UNMIL, MONUSCO and UNOCI are rather old missions, that were established before 2010 and which are currently still deployed. For those missions, that were included only until 2010 into the dataset, additional mission-year observations were added in order to update the dataset with mission-year observations until 2016. The remaining UN missions that are currently deployed are: UNISFA, UNMISS, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

Table 1: UN and AU peacekeeping operations currently deployed in Africa

Mission	Mission Name	Location	Start Date	End Date
AMISOM (AU)	African Union Mission in Somalia	Somalia	January 2007	Present
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Africa	Western Sahara	April 1991	Present
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	Central African Republic	April 2014	Present
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	Mali	April 2013	Present
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	July 2010	Present
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Darfur, Sudan	July 2007	Present
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	Abyei Area, Sudan	June 2011	Present
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	Liberia	September 2003	Present
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	South Sudan	July 2011	Present
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	Present

These missions were created and deployed after 2010 and were therefore no longer incorporated into the original dataset. As before new mission-year observations were added to the dataset for these recently created peacekeeping operations.

I want to remark that I am fully aware of the problematic side of the decision to exclusively focus this thesis's quantitative analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers only on UN and AU missions in Africa. There are a several misconceptions related to sexual violence during wartime, which are straight on and very clearly presented and discussed by Cohen, Hoover and Wood in a special report on wartime sexual violence (2013). According to Cohen, Hoover and Wood wartime rape is often misconceived to occur in every armed conflict, to occur only in ethnic wars, to be perpetrated mainly by rebel groups instead of state militaries, to be committed only by men or to always be perpetrated by combatants only (2013, 2–6). For all those misconceptions, the three authors have found evidence in recent research and reports of human rights organization to disprove such misconceptions. For example in the case of the first misconception, that wartime rape is omnipresent in every armed conflict, scholars have recently found that the occurrence of sexual violence during an armed conflict varies a lot, on the basis of the location, the timing and the armed groups involved (Cohen, Hoover-Green, and Wood 2013, 2–3).

However the most relevant misconception for this thesis, is that sexual violence during armed conflicts is an African problem (Cohen, Hoover-Green, and Wood 2013, 3). In opposition to repeated calls of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to be the rape capital of the world, reports on war-related rape have not been limited to one particular geographical region (Cohen, Hoover-Green, and Wood 2013, 3). Rather, a study looking at the period from 1980 to 2009 showed that “[...] eastern European civil wars were more likely than sub-Saharan African conflicts to feature reports of massive levels of rape” (Cohen, Hoover-Green, and Wood 2013, 3). Cohen, Hoover and Wood, based on global patterns and reports of the State Department that show that sexual violence in war-affected countries is common in the majority of countries experiencing an armed conflict, have refuted the misconception of sexual violence being an African problem (2013, 3). As mentioned above, my decision to focus on peacekeeping missions on the African continent does not intend in any way to present sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers as an African problem. This decision is primarily based on personal interests and the availability of information at the time of finding a research question. The purpose of this thesis is in no way to proof that sexual

exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers is an African problem. Rather the purpose is to expand the SEAP dataset, compare findings applying to the global level with findings of the quantitative analysis, including only missions in Africa and potentially identify a special pattern for SEA in UN missions on the African continent.

Concerning the nature of the sources to gather data on SEA by peacekeepers, both primary and secondary sources have been used. Former include statistical data by the Conduct in UN Field Missions web page of UN (United Nations 2017) and the World Bank, UN reports on the subject of SEA by peacekeepers and very importantly the research article from 2013 by Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad, whose dataset serves as basis for the quantitative analysis of this thesis. Secondary sources involved amongst others newspaper articles, academic articles on previous research on SEA by peacekeepers, reports by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Aids-free World. More details on the exact sources of data for each variable included in the updated dataset are provided in the following chapter 5.2.

4.2 Operationalization of variables

Using Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad's SEAP dataset from 2013, as a basis for this thesis' analysis required a careful acquirement of their coding decisions for the various variables. Examining coding decisions and making own decisions allows having a better understanding of the data and the variables. Furthermore I have learned to appreciate and respect the large amount of work a researcher has in the process of collecting and entering quantitative data into a dataset. This section elaborates coding decisions for all the variables and indicates the exact sources from which data was taken from. A codebook describing the added variables to the dataset and a background document clarifying the coding and data entry decisions were established parallel to the start of the data collection. Both documents can be found in the annex of this paper.

Important to note is that some of the indicators, coding decisions or data sources in the new updated dataset, focusing on UN missions in Africa, are not exactly the same as in the original dataset by Nordås and Rustad. The reason therefore is, that either the data sources where not available anymore or the original coding decisions were not very clearly stated in the associated background documents. It was not always very clear how and why a variable for a mission-year observation was coded a certain way. This is why few slightly alternative

coding decisions were applied, based on personal research and consideration. It occurred that my data collection and use of the data sources did not accord with the measurements and coding decisions in the original dataset. I will go into more detail concerning some of the discrepancies of measured values with variables in question in chapter 5.2.2. Because I ended up with other values after measuring a certain variable for a mission-year observation, the decision was reached to recode the dependent variable (*sea*) and all explanatory variables (*Inhostgdp*, *milszeavg*, *ConflitSV*, *ConflLevel*, *d_womres*, *spousalrape_host*, *spousalrapelaw_tcc*). Instead of overwriting the variables in the original dataset with the recoded values, I created identical explanatory variables and marked them with *_2* in the variable name.

Due to the recoding of the dependent and all independent variables, data was not only collected and for the additional mission-year observations from 2011 to 2016, however I checked all data entries for the whole dataset with 156 mission-year observations. Doing in that way allowed to first check the data entry of all variables for 156 mission-year observations and update the dataset. Data before 2010 of the depending variable *sea_2* was adopted from the original dataset, because checking all the data entry decisions would have taken up a lot of time. However, there is no rule without an exception. In some cases of mission-year observations also coding decisions before 2010 were checked and potentially adapted in the new variable. For the same reason I adopted the data entry by Nordås and Rustad for the *spousalrapelaw_tcc_2* variable.

4.2.1 Dependent variable: Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel

Nordås and Rustad (2013) use this variable as their dependent variable. Due to additional mission-year observations a new identical variable *sea_2* was created, indicating a (0) when there was no information or reports of any allegations of SEA by peacekeeping personnel and (1) if there were reports of allegations of SEA. The data for this variable was in a first step collected from the statistics of the Conduct in UN Field Missions (United Nations 2017). In case data for a particular mission-year observation was missing on this web page, online research was conducted to find additional information in newspaper articles and reports on websites of NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or the Code Blue

campaign⁵. Thereby it was eventually possible to find data for not all, however some missing observations.

The discrepancy between the originally coded variable *sea* and the duplicate *sea_2* in the extended dataset is due to updated data sources in the time that has passed since the data collection process for the original dataset from Nordås and Rustad. For example for the mission-year observation of UNAMID in 2010, Nordås and Rustad coded this variable as (1), indicating that there were reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. However, after exploring the data statistics on SEA on the Conduct in UN Field Missions website, there are no indications of allegations of SEA anymore. Overall there are only two mission-year observations before 2010 that were recoded differently.

4.2.2 Independent variable:

Sexual violence in armed conflicts

In order to test hypothesis six as mentioned in Chapter 4, Nordås and Rustad (2013) included the *ConflictSV* variable into their dataset and use “a measure of the highest reported prevalence in the previous conflict in the host country, from Cohen (2010)” (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 525). Cohen created this measure for her dissertation in 2010 on sexual violence during civil war. However her data does not exceed 2010, which is why I had to do some research to find alternative data sources. I found the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, which includes reports of sexual violence in armed conflicts perpetrated by armed actors, including government/state forces, pro-government militias and rebel/insurgent groups (Cohen and Nordås 2017b). It was established by Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås and is currently in the process of being updated to include 2010-2015 (Cohen and Nordås 2017a). According to Cohen the updated dataset with observations until 2015 will not be ready to be published by May 2017, but only later this year (2016). Due to the lack of updated data it is not possible to complete the dataset with additional data on sexual violence in a previous armed conflicts for the mission-year observations from 2010 until 2016. Hence all the added mission-year observations from 2010 until 2016 are missing data on this variable.

⁵ The Code Blue campaign is a worldwide campaign seeking to end impunity of UN peacekeepers who sexually exploit and abuse women and children during their mission.

Conflict level

This variable describes the security situation in the host countries and data to describe the variable is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset⁶. Nordås and Rustad established the variable *ConflLevel* in order to test hypothesis seven as aforementioned in Chapter 4 and coded the variable for their research paper in 2013 as follows: (0) if there was no active conflict, (1) if there was a minor conflict (at least 25 battle-death-related deaths per year, but less than 1000 during the course of the conflict) and (2) if there was an actual war with more than 1000 battle deaths in a year (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619; Nordås and Rustad 2013, 525). The coding decisions of previous versions, that were used in the SEAP dataset by Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad can be found in Gleditsch et al.'s article "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A new Dataset", where the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is introduced (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

In the meantime since 2013 a new version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset was released in 2016. The newest version 4 was compiled and updated by Lotta Themnér from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), in cooperation with colleagues of her at UCDP and PRIO that established earlier versions. In the fourth version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the intensity level of a conflict is coded differently, namely in only two categories instead of three. As a result of the accessibility of this newest version, this paper adapts the new coding of the conflict intensity level into the extended dataset and created a separate duplicate of the *ConflLevel* variable. Based on version 4-2016 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset the variable *ConflLevel_2* is coded as (0) when there was no armed conflict, as (1) if there was a minor conflict between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths per year and as (2) if there was a war with at least 1000 battle related deaths in a year (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 2017, 8).

In version 4 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset some countries experienced not only one conflict but several in a year on their territory. Additionally there are a few cases in the dataset, where a country had more than one conflict on its territory, however with different intensity levels. Some examples are Sudan, where in 2011 there were two different conflicts,

⁶ Data is available at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>.

measured as (1) and a (2), or the Democratic Republic of the Congo which experienced two conflicts in 2013 coded as (1) in the region of Katanga and one coded as (2) in another region. Due to the fact that only one measure is possible to include for a mission-year observation, a decision had to be taken on how to code the conflict level for those particular countries. For consistency reasons and because it was difficult to find out the exact locations where those particular UN missions operate, I decided to always code those mission-year observations using the higher conflict intensity level measure from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

Temporal dimension of a conflict

Associated to the *ConflLevel_2* variable measuring the intensity level of a conflict, this thesis adds a second variable, named *CumInt_2*, in order that the temporal dimension of the conflict intensity is included and not neglected. The reason for this is that in version 4-2016 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, only two categories remain to measure the conflict level. With the two new categories described above, the temporal dimension of a conflict, which was included in the third category of the original measures, is omitted. Therefore the researchers, working on changing the coding categories in version 4 of the UCDP/PRIO dataset, coded the former intermediate category, representing a temporal dimension of a conflict, by a separate dummy variable named *CumInt*.

I have added the *CumInt* variable as *CumInt_2* to the updated and extended dataset, including only peacekeeping missions in Africa. The *CumInt_2* variable codes a conflict as (0) “ [...] as long as it has not over time resulted in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 2017, 9). A conflict is coded as (1) as soon as it has reached the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 2017, 9).

Based on the above-mentioned possibility of multiple conflicts in a year on a country's territory, the same observations occurred in regards to this variable. For some host countries of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa with multiple armed conflicts on their territory, one conflict might have reached the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths and others didn't. For example in the case of MINUSMA, where three different conflicts took place in 2015, not all

of those conflicts reached the threshold of 1000 battle-related death.⁷ In order to be consistent, I followed the same reasoning as for the conflict intensity level coding. I decided to once again adopt the higher value of the temporal dimension value from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, in case there was more than one conflict in a host country in a year.

Mention of women in mission mandates

In order to test hypothesis one, whether missions that refer to women in their mandate are less likely to have reports of SEA by peacekeepers, Nordås and Rustad use a dummy variable called *d_womres*. The variable measures whether women are mentioned in the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions searching by the terms “women” or “woman” and is coded as (0) if the terms “women” or “woman” do not appear in the mission mandate and (1) if one of those two terms is included into the mandate. On the basis of some differences between coding decisions of the original SEAP dataset and my own research, this paper has created an identical variable *d_womres_2*. Through adding the identical variable it was possible to adjusted variable values, which I would have coded differently based on own research and after reading through all relevant mission mandates concerning UN missions in Africa.

The discrepancy between the original coding decisions and my adjustments concern mainly all mission-year observations from UNMIL, MINURCAT and one mission-year observation of MONUSCO from 2010. In the case of UNMIL, the original dataset by Nordås and Rustad codes all mission-year observations as (0), indicating that women are not mentioned in the mandate. In contrast, reading through the mission mandate from 2003 shows that women are part of the mission’s mandate. In MONUSCO’s case, Women’s Protection Advisors are mentioned in the mandate and probably therefore coded as (1) in the original dataset. However, based on personal considerations that the terms women should be linked to local women in the host country and not concern women of a Western NGO, I decided to code the this variable for 2010 and all following observations as (0).

Important to mention is that mission mandates are updated from time to time, depending on the situation on the ground, which is why the most recent mandate for every mission-year

⁷ Detailed information on the coding decisions of all variables for every mission-year observation can be found in the three background documents from the coding process. Access to the background documents can be provided upon request: celinefuerer@gmx.ch

observation was used in order to identifying if women are mentioned in the mandate or not. Finally, mission mandates and information whether women are mentioned in it or not can be found on the official peacekeeping mission websites (United Nations 2017a).

Mission size

In order to test their third hypothesis on the influence of the mission size on allegations of SEA by peacekeepers Nordås and Rustad created a measure (log) of the monthly average mission size in terms of uniformed military and police personnel for the *milsizavg* variable. Because their way of coding and sources of the data was not clearly stated and identifiable, I did my own research and searched for data, which resulted in different mission size measures compared to theirs. Because of the divergent measures I decided to recode this variable again for all mission-year observations and included the measures in a separate variable named *ln_milsizavg_2*. Based on their coding decisions, I used the natural logarithm of the average monthly troop size, including only uniformed personnel, for every mission-year observation. Uniformed personnel of a UN peacekeeping operation include military troops, military observers and police (United Nations 2017i).

Data on the number of UN personnel in peacekeeping missions is available on the UN Peacekeeping web page under “Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive” for missions from 2004 until today (United Nations 2017j). Data on the size of a mission, deployed before 2004, is accessible under “Troop and police contributors archive (1990 – 2016)” on the United Nations Peacekeeping web page (United Nations 2017n). In the files “Country contributions detailed by mission” and “Country contributions detailed by post” information on the monthly average number of uniformed personnel was the most accessible for missions before 2004.

In regards to the definition of uniformed personnel, it is important to state that in the older documents with information on troop and police contributions, the terminology of uniformed personnel is not the exact same as in the more recent fact sheets. For example in the files “Missions detailed by country” observers are referred to as experts on mission and police personnel as individual police, civilian police or formed police unit.

Finally, important to mention is also that for certain mission-year observations there are conflicting numbers on the actual mission size among the different official UN documents.

Either the number of military and police personnel of a mission in a particular year is not correctly summarized in the official UN document, as for example in the case of UNOMSIL in 1998, or the total number of uniformed personnel for a mission-year differs among the different files concerning the troop and police contributions. Thus, the reliability of the UN sources has to be questioned and looked at with a certain criticism and caution. However, at the moment there are not many (if any) other sources available, where centralized and official information on the number of uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping missions is accessible to the public. In the case of the *ln_milsizeavg_2* variable, the process of rechecking the data source and recode all 156 mission-year observations was even more crucial, because it allowed to observe the publicly available data and identify shortcomings from the UN data. Additionally it allowed getting a better understanding of the evolution of mission sizes over the years of their deployment. Overall, the disparity between the *milsizeavg* and *ln_milsizeavg_2* variables depends on the mission-year observation, the appearance of above-mentioned discrepancies and whether I was able to find data that was missing before. In general the difference is rather small.

Economic development in the host country

Nordås and Rustad created a measure for the *lnhostgdp* variable to account for the economic development of a host country and test hypothesis four. For their research paper the two authors measured the economic development of the host country with the logarithm of the host country's GDP (current \$), available from indicators on the World Bank web page. Because some time had passed since Nordås and Rustad's research paper was published, the data was updated since then and it was not clearly recognizable how the GDP measure for the host countries was calculated, I decided to recode this variable too and generate a new identical variable called *lnhostgdp_2*. Instead of using the GDP (current \$) indicator from the World Bank, I calculated the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita (current \$) to include a measure of the economic development of a host country into the updated dataset.

Covering the period from 1960 to 2015, the dataset with information on a country's GDP per capita (current \$) is available on the web page of the World Bank and was last updated on the 14th of October 2016 (World Bank 2017). Therefore all data on the economic development of a host country in 2016 is missing for all mission-year observations from that year. The deviation between the two variables is quite noticeable, particularly because another indicator for the economic growth and development was chosen for the updated dataset. Once testing

hypothesis four with the updated dataset, it will be possible to see whether the effect of the economic development in the host country on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers has changed.

Law prohibiting spousal rape in the host country

Nordås and Rustad created a dummy variable *spousalrape_host* in order to test hypothesis five. If there is a law in the host country that recognizes and prohibits spousal rape, the variable is coded as (1), if not it is coded as (0) (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 525). The terms “spousal rape” and “marital rape” were treated as equivalent, which was not explicitly stated in Nordås and Rustad’s research paper from 2013. Data on the human rights situation of host countries, including spousal rape, is available in the Human Rights Reports on the U.S. Department of State website (U.S. Department of State 2017).

In order to get a better understanding of the variable and check certain coding decisions from the original SEAP dataset by Nordås and Rustad, an duplicate variable, *spousalrape_host_2*, was established and coded in the exact same way. The process of recoding allowed grasping the variable much better and coding certain mission-year observations based on personal research. Relating to the margin between the two variables *spousalrape_host* and *spousalrape_host_2*, only the coding for the ECOMIL mission-year observation in 1999 and all mission-year observations of MONUA are different. In case of ECOMIL, the original dataset indicated that Guinea-Bissau had a law prohibiting spousal rape and was coded as (1), although my research did not account for such a law. Therefore I changed the coding to (0). Identically, I changed the coding of all MONUA observations to (0) for the *spousalrape_host_2* variable, since my research did not discover any reference to a law prohibiting spousal rape in Angola from 1997 to 1999.

Comparing both dummy variables shows for the new variable *spousalrape_host_2* that none of the host countries of UN and AU missions have a law protecting women from rape in their marriage. The next chapter, focused on the empirical analysis of the updated dataset including only peacekeeping missions in Africa, will go into this matter and analyze how the effect of a spousal rape law in the host country has potentially changed due to the changed coding.

Law prohibiting spousal rape in the main troop contributing country

Hypothesis two concerns a mission factor in the form of a law prohibiting and recognizing spousal rape in the main troop contributing country, which is assumed to reduce the likelihood of reports of SEA by peacekeepers. In the same way as the above-mentioned variable, describing whether a law exists in the host country that prohibiting spousal rape or not, Nordås and Rustad coded this dummy variable *spousalrapelaw_tcc* as (0) if the main troop contributing countries does not have a law that prohibits spousal rape and as (1) if there is a law that prohibits and recognizes spousal rape. In the same way as for the *spousalrape_host_2* variable, “marital rape” and “spousal rape” are used as equivalent terms.

Before researching whether the main TCC has a law against spousal rape, an intermediate step in the coding process had to be taken for this variable. The intermediate step concerned the identification of the country that contributed the most troops to the mission in a particular year. In order to do that, data was gathered from the United Nations Peacekeeping Web page (United Nations 2017n) and calculated from the accessible “Missions detailed by country” files. Once the main troop contributing country with the largest contingent was identified, information on the human rights situation of that country was collected from the Human Rights Reports on the U.S Department of State website (U.S. Department of State 2017).

Due to the intermediate step, which is quite time-consuming at times when there are multiple big troop contributing countries, I decided to not check and recode all 156 mission-year observations. Instead just data on the *spousalrapelaw_tcc* variable are added for all additional mission-year observations from 2010 to 2016.

Even though the dataset might have certain mission-years coded as (1) for the *spousalrapelaw_tcc* variable, just because there is a law does not mean that those laws are respected and perpetrators are convicted in courts in post-conflict environments. There might be a law recognizing rape as illegal and prohibiting it, however, as witnessed in some human rights report the law is not always executed accordingly. Especially in a post-conflict situation it might be difficult to bring cases in front of a court or to prove acts of sexual exploitation and abuse, because as Kent remarks in her publication, host countries in which peacekeepers are deployed with their mission normally do not have a functioning legal system (2005, 88).

For example in the case of UNMIL in 2014, Nigeria contributed the largest troop contingent. Although the Human Rights Report about Nigeria in 2014 indicates that there was a law that prohibited spousal rape, the reports further states that cases of spousal rape were difficult to prove in court and that no prosecutions were reported during 2014 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017). As Kent argues, as long as the rule of law is not re-established and people are not assisted and supported by institutions, the population remains vulnerable (2005, 91). As in the above-mentioned example a mission-year observation might be indicating that there is a law prohibiting spousal rape, even though the reality on the ground looks very different, especially in a post-conflict environment.

Control variables

Nordås and Rustad included a dummy variable, *post2005*, for all missions after 2005 to control for the increased attention on the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Furthermore a control variable was added to account for the number of years a peacekeeping mission has been active. SEA practices and mechanisms to report incidents of SEA might take some time to evolve, which is why Nordås and Rustad assume that the longer a peacekeeping mission is active, the higher the likelihood of reports of sexual exploitation and abuse.

4.2.3 New added explanatory variables

Female peacekeepers

To test hypothesis eight with the extended SEAP dataset focusing on UN missions in Africa, I established a variable, called *gender_ratio*, to measure the gender ratio of all mission-year observations in the military and police component. Focusing on uniformed personnel, including the military and police component, is related to the coding decisions of the *milszeavg_2* variable, which also focuses only on military and police personnel. The gender ratio is calculated by dividing the total number of male peacekeepers by the total number of female peacekeepers in a mission-year observation. The value received is interpreted as the factor of how many times there are more male peacekeepers than female peacekeepers in a mission-year. For example in the case of UNISFA in 2016, there were 14.1 times more male peacekeepers than female.

Data on monthly gender statistics of military and police personnel in peacekeeping operations was collected from the United Nations Peacekeeping web page (United Nations 2017c). This source contains data on the gender composition of missions from the year 2006 up until today. However between 2006 and February 2009 data on the gender composition of peacekeeping missions is only available for the military component of the mission. Any information on the police component of the mission and its gender composition is missing. Starting from February 2009, data describing the total number of female and male peacekeepers is available for the military as well as the police component of a mission. Due to the fact that the gender statistics on the UN Peacekeeping website only include data from 2006, data for all mission-year observations before 2006 are missing.

Scope of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers

Although not linked to a separate hypothesis, this variable, named *numberallegSEA* was added to the updated dataset in order to get a more detailed abstract of the scope of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers during their time deployed with a mission in a host country. The data comes from the Conduct in UN Field Missions' statistics on the total number of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers per year in a mission (United Nations 2016). Since there is no other data source for information on the number of allegations of SEA available at the moment, the UN source shall be critically evaluated in matters of its reliability. The UN has an interest to keep the numbers of allegations of SEA by its peacekeepers at a minimum level, in order to be able to preserve its credibility of being an institution working towards the maintenance of international peace and security as it is stated in Article 1 of Chapter 1 in the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945).

Furthermore the variable indicating the total number of allegations of SEA by peacekeeping personnel is at risk to correlate with the *sea_2* variable, due to the way it is coded. Mission-year observations that were coded as (0) for the *sea_2* variable, because no data regarding reports of SEA by peacekeepers was found, have been coded as (0) for the *numberallegSEA* variable. The consideration behind is that if there haven't been any reports of SEA in the first place, then we also won't find any total numbers of allegations of SEA per year of a mission. Descriptive analysis will be used to analyze the *numberallegsea* variable in the context of the updated SEAP dataset, focusing on UN missions on the African continent.

Status of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers

On the Conduct in UN Field Missions website an electronic system with information on the number of allegations, the category of personnel of the perpetrator and in which mission reports of allegations appeared was established in 2007 (United Nations 2017). Taking advantage of more accessible data on the status of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers, since 2010 on the above-mentioned web page, I created a dummy variable called *substallegSEA*. The variable is coded as (1) if at least one allegation of a mission-year observation has been substantiated (1) and (0) if all allegations of SEA were unsubstantiated or are still pending. Mission-year observations that were coded as (0) for the *sea_2* variable were coded (0) as well for the *substallegSEA* variable. Again data comes from statistics on SEA on the Conduct in UN Field Missions website, where the status of allegations is notified as substantiated, unsubstantiated, pending or other (United Nations 2016). A substantiated allegation refers to an allegation that has been proven through an investigation, whereas unsubstantiated either means that the allegations has been disproven by an investigation or that there is not sufficient evidence to prove the allegation (United Nations 2017m). This variable is hoped for some indication on the amount of substantiated allegations in comparison to the total number of allegations of SEA for every mission-year observation.

Troop contributing countries

Firstly, to test hypothesis nine, I added dummy variables for all troop contributing countries that have ever contributed a troop contingent to any UN mission on the African continent. In more of an explorative manner the goal is to test whether the presence of troop contingents from certain countries correlates with reports of SEA by peacekeepers. Is there a correlation between certain troop contributing countries and reports of allegations of SEA? A *country_tcc* variable is coded as (1) for a mission-year observation if the respective country has contributed troops to the mission at any moment during the particular year. Complementary the *country_tcc* variables are coded as (0) if the country in question has not contributed troops to the mission in that year. Data was gathered from the Troop contributing archive on the United Nations Peacekeeping website and can be found in the data files “Missions detailed by country” (United Nations 2017n).

Secondly, in order to test hypothesis ten and as a second step I added the variable *sumoftcc* to the updated dataset as a measure of the total number of troop contributing countries per mission-year. Among all 156 mission-year observations the number of troop contributing

countries of a mission-year varies from 1, for example in the case of UNOMSIL in 1998 and 1999, to 52 in the case of UNMISS in 2015. The aim is to test hypothesis ten whether UN peacekeeping missions with a high number of troop contributing countries have a higher likelihood of reports of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers.

Important to notice is that a potential correlation between a troop contributing country and the *sea_2* variable has to be interpreted with a lot of caution, since just the presence of troops from a certain country do not directly point out that that peacekeepers from that country are also the perpetrators of SEA. As stated on the Conduct in UN Field Missions web page, information on the nationality of uniformed personnel that have been alleged of SEA is provided from 2015 onwards (United Nations 2017). However adding data of troop contributing countries, in terms of which peacekeeping operations they contribute their troop contingents to, potentially allows touching upon the question of the nationality of the perpetrators, which as mentioned above is not publicly accessible for mission-year observations before 2015.

4.3 Methodological drawbacks

Conducting a quantitative research on the topic of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions in the above-described methodology, does not exclude certain drawbacks. First, there are only very few or no primary sources available concerning cases of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers. Either there is only one source for data available, which has to be trusted in its reliability, or there are only secondary sources that describe allegations of SEA in UN peacekeeping missions. The lack of complementary sources and the dispersion of the little information that is available, does not allow for this cross case analysis to respect the principle of triangulation of sources and results in a cautious consideration of the collected data.

Furthermore the lack of finding data on the location of the incident, if it happened in an urban or rural area, in a refugee camp or in the private home of the victim and so forth is very difficult to detect. Articles for example by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International that mention such details are very dispersed on the Internet. Information on the victim (woman, man or child), the type of sexual exploitation and abuse (rape, abuse, exploitation or involving a minor) and the nationality of the accused peacekeeper are very

hard to identify. Only recently, with the electronic system by the UN is centralized information on the above-mentioned categories accessible.

Another problem of doing research on variation of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers is the large problem of underreporting, from the victim's side as well as the peacekeeper's side. Schaefer cites a leaked report from an UN-commissioned expert group that argues that there is a large amount of underreporting of SEA (Schaefer 2016, 16–17). Dr. Thelma Awori, Dr. Catherine Lutz and General Paban J. Thapa from the expert mission report that was, leaked state in their report that the underreporting, from the side of the peacekeepers, was due to a number of reasons, including the fear of reporting inside the UN, a culture of silence within military and police, a sense of futility about reporting, the rarity of remedial outcomes and problems of record keeping (2013, 14). As the Secretary-General has acknowledged in a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council from 2013, underreporting of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers may be due to “[...] the stigma associated with rape, shame and fear of reprisal, denial that rape occurs, intimidation by many Government officials and the inability to access some conflict-affected areas” (Secretary-General 2013, 16). According to Kent, one of the reasons that victims of SEA are silent about the sexual abuse and exploitation they have faced is that they are ashamed or fear to be intimidated (2005, 90).

Conclusively this thesis has to be taken into account with the awareness that the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel is quite certainly bigger than it is reported today and shown in the few data statistics on SEA. We are not seeing the full scope of the phenomenon of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, amongst others because victims are silent about their abuse and the information is so diffused over the Internet, that it takes a lot of time to collect the data, which in the worst case even contradicts with other sources. The updated dataset and its missing observations have to be taken into account in the context of the limited time and resources that a Master thesis offers. Therefore any coding decisions are based on the limited data research that was conducted, compared to long-term studies on such complex issues.

A final drawback of this thesis is the primary focus on women and children as victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Although this thesis is fully aware of the existence of female perpetrators and male victims of sexual violence, the focus on women

and children is mostly because there is very rarely any information on the gender of the victim of sexual exploitation and abuse, and if so, they are mostly female. Also, so far the Conduct in UN Field Missions web page does not address the gender of the victims in their centralized data system. The electronic system by the UN for tracking down allegations of SEA only indicates if the victim was a child, an adult or unknown. Gilliard emphasizes the lack of research on the victimization of men by female peacekeepers, which she assumes to exist, however gone underreported (2012, 33).

5 Empirical Analysis

Nordås and Rustad researched a general pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers on the global level, including all UN peacekeeping operations deployed all over the world. Their aim was to understand the variation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers among all UN missions. This thesis' focus lies exclusively on UN missions in Africa and thus captures another level of analysis, namely the African level. The aim is to research the variation of SEA and to what extent is it possible to identify a pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions in Africa. Therefore mission-year observations from UN missions only in Africa have been extracted from the SEAP dataset by Nordås and Rustad and updated until 2016.

This chapter is structured in three parts. In the first part, the original dataset from Nordås and Rustad with mission-year observations until 2010 is adapted to include only UN missions in Africa and then various logistic regressions are run with it.⁸ The aim is to replicate Table 2 with the five models from Nordås and Rustad's research paper from 2013 using the adapted dataset including only African missions until 2016. Additionally the objective is to compare these results on an African level to Nordås and Rustad's results for all UN missions globally. Running a logistic regression with data on only UN missions in Africa from the original dataset will provide a foundation for further comparison to results on the global and findings on the continental level with additional mission-year observations until 2016. As mentioned above the aim is to examine whether Ragnhild Nordas and Siri Rustad's findings on the global level from Table 2 of their research paper go in line with results of analyzing only UN missions in Africa. *What explains variation of SEA in peacekeeping missions in Africa and to what extent is it possible to identify a special pattern of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions in Africa or does the pattern repeat itself on the global as well on the continental level?*

The second part focuses on the updated and extended SEAP dataset with mission-year observations until 2016 and focusing exclusively on UN mission in Africa. In this part various regression models are run, using the recoded variables (*sea_2*, *d_womres_2*,

⁸ The adapted dataset, including only UN mission in Africa until 2010 was established based on the original SEAP dataset by Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad and available as: Nordas_Rustad_2013_African_missions_edit CF.dta

spousalrapelaw_tcc, *ln_milsizeavg_2*, *lnhostgdp_2*, *spousalrape_host_2*, *conflictsv*, *confllevel_2*, *cumint_2*) instead of the original variables. The new added variables (*gender_ratio*, *sumoftcc*, *numberallegSEA*, *substallegsea* and all *country_tcc* variables) are incorporated in the analysis of the third part in this chapter and therefore left aside for now. Again the findings will on the one hand be compared to Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad's results on the global level and on the other hand to the findings on the African level, analyzed in the first part of this chapter. *If at all, how do the additionally added mission-year observations for UN missions in Africa in the updated dataset influence the results in the regression models in comparison to the findings on the African level with data only until 2010? Does a different pattern of SEA by peacekeepers exist on the African level, compared to the findings of a global analysis in Table 2 of Nordås and Rustad's research paper from 2013?*

The third and final part, using the updated dataset with mission-year observations for UN missions only in Africa until 2016, focuses on testing the new hypotheses on the presence of female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping missions and troop contributing countries. I have established and presented three hypotheses, which will be tested for in this chapter using the updated dataset, focusing on UN missions in Africa. I will run logistic regression models with the new variables (*gender_ratio*, *sumoftcc* and all *country_tcc* variables) that were added to the updated and extended dataset, covering UN missions in Africa until 2016. The empirical analysis of this third part will be to some degree more of an explorative nature, due to the fact that these variables have, until now, not been analyzed in the context of a quantitative study including the SEAP dataset. Also in this third part, I will conduct descriptive analysis for the more detailed variables on the number of allegations (*numberallegSEA*) and the status of the allegations (*substallegsea*). The reason for this is that both variables are omitted from the regression model because they predict the data perfectly, which is due to the coding decisions described in chapter 4.

All ten hypotheses will be tested with multivariate regression models, using reports of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers as the dependent variable. For the analysis of the new hypotheses the extended cross sectional time series data including only UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, will be used and findings will be analyzed and compared to the findings on the global level. Thereby this thesis aims at contributing to the literature by conducting comparative panel data analysis and filling out the gap of few

quantitative analyses to investigate variation and general patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel on the African and the global level.

Table 2 Nordås and Rustad Multivariate Logistic Regression: SEA in Peace Operations, 1999-2010

	(1) Mission	(2) Mission	(3) Host	(4) Host	(5) All
Years 2005-2010	2.139 ^{***} (0.645)	1.622 [*] (0.725)	2.170 ^{**} (0.660)	2.668 ^{***} (0.759)	1.322 (1.121)
No. of years mission has been active	-0.123 ^{***} (0.0316)	0.101 (0.0570)	-0.0818 [*] (0.0356)	0.0132 (0.0607)	0.342 ^{**} (0.109)
Women mentioned in mandate, dummy	1.206 ^{**} (0.430)	0.623 (0.682)			1.751 (1.141)
Main TCC has law against spousal rape	-0.0870 (0.489)	0.597 (0.567)			-0.345 (0.743)
Size of mission (uniformed personnel), log		1.204 ^{***} (0.189)			1.854 ^{***} (0.482)
log of GDP per capita, host			-0.745 ^{***} (0.225)	-0.863 ^{**} (0.310)	0.830 (0.719)
Law recognizing spousal rape, host country			0.955 (0.562)	1.903 [*] (0.751)	0.678 (1.124)
High-level sexual violence in preceding war (Cohen 2010)				1.789 [*] (0.729)	1.910 ^{**} (0.593)
Conflict severity (UCDP/PRIO)				-0.677 [*] (0.308)	0.938 (0.671)
Constant	-1.130 [*] (0.467)	-10.80 ^{***} (1.930)	3.404 ^{**} (1.241)	2.106 (2.198)	-23.69 ^{**} (8.447)
Observations	315	161	278	157	124

Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Nordas_Rustad_2013_replication.dta⁹

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2 is a replication of Nordås and Rustad's research of SEA by peacekeepers in all ECOWAS, AU and UN peace operations worldwide and serves as a basis to compare

⁹ Replication data from Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad is accessible on the Dataverse website, at:

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/22326>

subsequent findings on variation of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions in Africa to.

5.1 SEAP dataset: African level (-2010) vs. global level (-2010)

Because the dependent variable *sea* or *sea_2* is a binary (dummy) variable, logistic regression analysis is used to quantitatively analyze the hypotheses with the dataset. After extracting exclusively all African mission-year observations from the original dataset this thesis ran different logistic regression models (see Table 3), identical to the ones in Table 2 mentioned above. Because a mission-year observation from UNTSO was coded by mistake as being on the African continent, I have extracted all UN and AU peacekeeping missions to a new data file¹⁰, in order to be able to adjust for this mistake and code the continent variable of this mission-year observations as “Middle East”.

Model 1 and 2 are focusing exclusively on mission factors. Similar to Nordås and Rustad’s findings on the global level, Model 1 in Table 3, focusing only on peacekeeping mission in Africa, shows that the relation between women mentioned in mission mandates and sexual exploitation and abuse is positive and thus reverse to the assumption in hypothesis 1. Missions where women are mentioned in the mandate are more likely to get reports of SEA than missions that do not mention women in their mandate. However the effect is much weaker and not statistically significant when comparing it to the findings with all UN missions deployed worldwide. The variable concerning spousal rape laws in the main TCC has a negative coefficient and goes in the direction of the hypothesis, however the effect is also not statistically significant.

Reconstructing Model 2, including the military size, triggers the effect of women mentioned in mission mandates and spousal rape laws in the main troop contributing country as statistically insignificant. Worth mentioning in the established Model 2, is the significant effect of the variable describing the military size of a UN mission in terms of uniformed personnel, which supports hypothesis three. As assumed in hypothesis three the larger a mission in terms of troops (military and police), the higher the likelihood of allegations of

¹⁰ All replication documents, including this dataset and the do-file can be accessed upon request via email at: celinefuerer@gmx.ch

sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Comparing the coefficient of the military size variable for only African missions (1.608), with the one for all UN missions (1.204) shows that the former has a stronger positive effect. Both findings for the effect of the mission size in Table 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The reason for this could be that the most and some of the largest UN peacekeeping operations are on the African continent, compared to the rest of the deployed peacekeeping missions worldwide. Therefore this factor might particularly stand out in the analysis of mission factors in peacekeeping operations on the African continent.

Model 3 focuses on host factors and includes the host country's GDP per capita and a dummy variable for the existence of a spousal rape law in the host country of the peacekeeping mission. In 2013, testing the relationship between SEA and spousal rape laws in the host country on the global level resulted in an unexpected slightly positive but statistically insignificant relationship (see Table 2). Host countries with laws prohibiting spousal rape were more likely to observe reports of allegations of SEA. Replicating Model 3 with data only on UN missions in Africa results in the omission of the variable concerning spousal rape law in the host country from the model. This is because it perfectly predicts the outcome of the dependent variable. In part two, once we test all hypotheses with the updated SEAP dataset, focusing on peacekeeping operations in Africa and including mission-year observations until 2016, the direction of this relationship might change again. The reason for this is, that I have completely recoded the variable regarding the existence of a law against spousal rape in the host country, after doing my own research. The changed coding decisions and modified dataset might result in the disappearance of the variable's perfect predictability of the outcome, once we test again with the updated dataset.

In contrast, the relationship between the economic development of the host country and reports of SEA is as anticipated in a negative direction. The higher a host country is economically developed, the less likely there are reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Furthermore Model 3 shows that the variable on economic development is statistically significant at the 0.1% level and the negative direction is much stronger than in the Model including all UN peacekeeping missions worldwide (see Table 2). A reason for this might be that the economic development in African countries is rather low compared to the remaining countries where UN peacekeeping operations were or are deployed. The effect of a more developed country might therefore be higher on the African level than on the

global level, where the economic development of the host countries might be more balanced and broader.

Table 3 Nordas and Rustad: SEA in Peace Operations in Africa, 1999-2010

	(1) Mission	(2) Mission	(3) Host	(4) Host	(5) All
Years 2005-2010	2.096* (1.037)	1.865 (1.155)	2.419* (1.010)	1.155 (1.099)	1.171 (1.577)
No. of years mission has been active	-0.0376 (0.0673)	0.0757 (0.0640)	0.0292 (0.0634)	0.153 (0.109)	0.152 (0.127)
Women mentioned in mandate, dummy	0.334 (0.523)	-0.210 (0.711)			-0.0635 (0.660)
Main TCC has law against spousal rape	-1.272 (0.728)	1.310 (1.205)			2.844 (1.630)
Size of mission (uniformed personnel), log		1.608*** (0.349)			1.943** (0.707)
log of GDP per capita, host			-1.150** (0.363)	-0.0684 (0.848)	0.878 (1.048)
Law recognizing spousal rape, host country			0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
High-level sexual violence in preceding war (Cohen 2010)				4.814 (2.538)	2.881 (4.165)
Conflict severity (UCDP/PRIO)				-0.795 (0.431)	0.720 (1.114)
Constant	-0.577 (0.621)	-13.98*** (3.629)	5.198** (1.756)	-4.195 (6.620)	-24.49** (7.702)
Observations	86	81	86	78	68

Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Nordas_Rustad 2013_Missions in Africa_edit_CF.dta

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

By adding the variables for the conflict level and a high level of sexual violence in armed conflicts, Model 4 contains now all host factors. The statistical significance of the economic development in the host country is not maintained and so the effect is lost. This is contrary to the findings in Table 2, where the statistical significance of the economic development of the

host country is maintained at the 1% level. Model 4 of Table 3 shows that the variable on the intensity level of a conflict, in terms of battle related deaths, stands as expected in a negative relationship to allegations of SEA by peacekeepers. However this finding is not statistically significant. The variable describing a high level of sexual violence in the previous conflict is in the expected positive direction, however not statistically significant. Equally as above, the variable on spousal rape laws in host countries is omitted from the Model due to its composition in the dataset, which forecasts perfect predictability.

Comparing the findings of Model 4 in Table 3 to the ones of Model 4 in Table 2 shows that on the global level, the findings regarding the economic development, the spousal rape law in the host country, the intensity level of a conflict and a high level of sexual violence in the previous conflict are all statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The loss of half of the number of observations, from 157 to 87, between analyzing all UN missions and focusing only on UN missions in Africa might be the reason that the findings are not statistically significant. In general, all findings in Table 2 have to be interpreted with some caution due to the low number of observations.

Finally, incorporating all host and mission factors in Model 5 in Table 3 affects the total number of observations negatively, which drops to 68. Similar to the findings in Model 5 of Table 2, using the dataset with mission-year observations for all UN peace operations globally, the monthly average military size of an UN mission is the strongest predictor of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers in Model 5 of Table 3. The reason for that is that its findings are statistically significant at the 1% level and the effect is in the expected positive direction, supporting hypothesis three. However, in Model 5 of Table 3, all other independent variables are either omitted like the spousal rape law in the host country or statistically not significant.

5.1.1 Summary of findings

Comparing all findings from Table 2 that incorporates findings on the global level with the results from Table 3, representing findings on the African level shows that on the global and on the African level the mission size is the strongest predictor. Larger peacekeeping missions are associated with a higher probability of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel. Furthermore, as well as on the global level, there is some support

that allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers are less likely, the higher the GDP per capita is in the host country of the mission. However, this relationship is not consistently statistically significant and also changes the direction of its effect.

In conclusion, an overall scarcity of statistically significant findings is noticeable in the five above discussed models of Table 3, which tested the hypotheses with the original dataset, however including only UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. A reason for the scarcity of statistically significant findings could to some extent be related to the small number of observations in these models. While Model 1 of Table 3 included 86 observations, this number dropped to 68 observations in Model 5. Amongst others the next part examines how the added mission-year observations until 2016 for UN missions in Africa are influencing the statistical significance of the findings, through the gain in the number of mission-year observations.

5.2 Updated SEAP dataset: African level (-2016) vs. African level (-2010) and universal level (-2010)

By comparing findings of regression models, using the updated SEAP dataset with mission-year observations for peacekeeping operations in Africa until 2016, with the outputs of Table 3, using only data on UN mission in Africa until 2010, the goal is to investigate how additional mission-year observations affect the findings after retesting the hypotheses. The output of all five logistic regression models, using the updated dataset with mission-year observations for UN missions in Africa until 2016, can be checked up in Table 4.

Furthermore, this section examines again whether the findings on the continental level strengthen Nordås and Rustad's global findings or if they eventually even refute their findings from 2013 and present a different pattern for UN missions in Africa. In contrast to the previous section, the replication of Nordås and Rustad's research in this chapter was conducted with the updated dataset and additional mission-year observations until 2016, which has increased the number of observations. As mentioned before the objective is to see whether the increased number of observations has an impact on the statistical significance of the findings in Table 4.

All subsequent models presented in Table 4 are created with the recoded variables from the updated and extended SEAP dataset, including only UN missions on the African continent and with mission-year observations until 2016. As mentioned in chapter 4, most of the explanatory variables from the original dataset by Nordås and Rustad were recoded and added to the updated dataset of UN missions in Africa. This is because my own research for data revealed some discrepancies between the data I found and the coding decisions of Nordås and Rustad. Additionally, due to the fact that more mission-year observations for the mission-years 2011-2016 were added, the decision was to recode all variables. Hence creating identical duplicate variables allowed to consider coding changes without changing the original dataset by Nordås and Rustad. The recoded variables are: *sea_2*, *d_womres_2*, *spousalrapelaw_tcc*, *ln_milsizeavg_2*, *lnhostgdp_2*, *spousalrape_host_2*, *conflictsv*, *confllevel_2*, *cumint_2*.

First, Model 1 of Table 2 from Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad's research paper is replicated, using all recoded variables from the updated SEAP dataset. Compared to the replicated Model 1 of Table 2, including only UN missions in Africa until 2010, now with additional mission-year observations, the number of observations has almost doubled and stands at 154 as shown in Table 4. In contrast to the expected negative effect of hypothesis one, the findings show a positive effect of women mentioned in mission mandates. In addition the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, model 1 indicates that if women are mentioned in mission mandates the likelihood of reports of SEA is increased. This positive effect of women mentioned in mission mandates on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, is in line with the findings of Model 1 in Table 2 of Nordås and Rustad's research paper, focusing on all UN missions worldwide. The two authors argued in 2013 that the positive correlation between women mentioned in mission mandates and SEA by peacekeeping personnel might come, amongst other things, from an already high level of sexual abuse of women in host countries (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 527). The findings for spousal rape laws in the main troop contributing country are in the expected negative direction and not statistically significant, which is in line with the findings in Model 1 of Table 2.

In Model 2 the military size variable is added whereby the statistical significance of women mentioned in mission mandates disappears. Again we don't find an effect of spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country, which is identical to the results of Model 1 in Nordås

and Rustad's research paper. The size of a mission in terms of uniformed military and police personnel is a strong predictor of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers and statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore the findings indicate the expected effect of a positive direction and support hypothesis three. The larger a mission in regards to military and police personnel, the higher the probability of reports of SEA by peacekeepers. One of the reasons for this could be, that it might be more difficult to monitor peacekeepers in a large UN missions than if a mission contains only roughly 200 military and police personnel as for example in the case of MINURSO in 2015.

Comparing these findings to the ones in Model 2 of Table 3 in the previous chapter 5.1 reveals, that the number of observations is naturally higher in the Model using the updated and extended dataset with additional mission-year observations until 2016. Additionally the positive effect of the mission size became slightly weaker using the updated dataset with observations on UN missions in Africa until 2016.

So far, comparing the findings on the African level of Model 1 and 2 in Table 4 to the findings on the global level by Nordås and Rustad shows that the findings on the two levels go in the same directions. If there exists something approximating a global and African pattern of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers, the African pattern is accordant to the global pattern. Findings for the tested hypotheses on women mentioned in mandates and the mission size in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa indicate an identical positive and statistically significant effect on the global and the African level, displayed in Model 1 and 2 of Table 2 and 4.

Whereas Model 1 and 2 focus exclusively on mission factors, Model 3 and 4, which will be analyzed consecutively, focus only on host factors. The economic development of the host country and a dummy variable for spousal rape laws in the host country are included into Model 3. As expected in hypothesis four, Model 3 shows a negative effect of the economic development in the host country. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The more a host country is developed the less likely we observe reports of SEA by peacekeepers. Concerning spousal rape laws in the host country as a predictor of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN missions, STATA omits the dummy variable due to collinearity and leaves no information in the regression output table. In comparison to the third regression model on UN missions on the African continent with the original dataset (Table 3), the

findings are very similar. The coefficient of the economic development variable in Table 4 is only slightly less negative, when comparing it to the coefficient of economic development in Table 3, which includes mission-year observations for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa until 2010.

Table 4 Peace operations in Africa, 1999-2016

	(1) Mission	(2) Mission	(3) Host	(4) Host	(5) All
Years 2005-2010	1.672 (0.934)	1.513* (0.703)	3.433** (1.067)	1.354 (1.242)	1.989 (1.799)
No. of years mission has been active	-0.0273 (0.0356)	0.0521 (0.0460)	-0.0264 (0.0460)	0.150 (0.0856)	0.105 (0.112)
Women mentioned in mandate, dummy (recoded)	1.575* (0.715)	-0.240 (0.563)			-0.0618 (0.700)
Main TCC has law against spousal rape (recoded)	-0.507 (0.491)	-0.185 (0.858)			3.562* (1.507)
Size of mission (uniformed personnel), ln (recoded)		1.037** (0.357)			2.016** (0.642)
ln of GDP per capita, host (recoded)			-1.082** (0.359)	-0.695 (0.601)	-1.362 (1.232)
law recognizing spousal rape, host country (recoded)			0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
High-level sexual violence in preceding war (Cohen 2010) (recoded)				3.125** (1.034)	-2.618 (2.339)
Conflict severity UCDP/PRIO (recoded)				-1.985 (1.036)	-3.480*** (0.862)
Cumulative intensity of a conflict				1.984 (1.455)	5.752*** (1.341)
Constant	-1.318 (0.928)	-8.929** (3.295)	5.205** (1.712)	0.552 (3.942)	-8.654 (7.538)
Observations	154	136	136	84	78

Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Peace operations in Africa_2017_Céline Fürer.dta

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Adding a variable for the intensity of the conflict and for a high level of sexual violence in the previous conflict to a fourth regression model results in the disappearance of the statistical significance of economic development as a predictor of SEA. Although the variable describing spousal rape laws in the host countries is omitted again for the same reasons as mentioned above, Model 4 shows that a high level of sexual violence in the previous armed conflict is the strongest predictor in Model 4. This variable is in the expected positive direction of hypothesis six and statistically significant at the 1%. In countries where sexual violence was widespread in the previous conflict cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers are more likely to occur in such missions. Hypothesis seven would be supported by the results for the conflict level predictor, which is in the expected negative direction, however the findings are not statistically significant.

Model 4 further includes the temporal dimension of armed conflicts, which is an additional component of the intensity of the conflict. Findings show that the effect of the cumulative intensity level of the conflict has a positive effect on reports of SEA and is statistically not significant. Thereby the two variables describing the intensity level of a conflict, *confllevel_2* and *cumint_2*, are predicting reports of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the complete opposite direction from each other. Bastick et al. to some extent support the positive effect of a previously intense armed conflict on reports of SEA, by stating that “[...] a number of countries emerging from armed conflict report a very high and/or increasing incidence of criminal and family violence, including sexual and other forms of violence against women.” (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 15).

Comparing Model 3 and 4 with the identical models from analyzing African missions in the older dataset (Table 3) reveals that Model 3 had similar findings in regard to the economic development variable, which was in both cases in a negative direction and significant. In Model 4 (Table 4) the additional mission year observations in the new dataset have resulted in statistically significant findings at the 1% level in regards to a high level of sexual violence in armed conflicts. Finally, when comparing the global pattern of SEA by peacekeepers (Table 2) with the pattern of SEA on the African continent (Table 4), it is observable that in the African context, the economic development has a stronger negative effect, although not significant. The omission of the spousal rape law in the host country variable is omitted due to the fact that some changes in the coding decisions were adapted into the updated dataset.

Lastly this section looks at the results of Model 5 in Table 4, where all variables, host and mission factors, are included. With all variables included in this Model, the statistical significance of women in mission mandates disappeared. Model 5 reveals statistically significant findings for four explanatory variables. The strong positive direction of the effect of spousal rape laws in the main TCC is in the opposite direction as expected in hypothesis two and the findings are statistically significant at the 5% level. Contrary to hypothesis two, the findings of Model 5 suggest that the probability of allegations of SEA is higher if the main troop contributing country has a law prohibiting spousal rape. Peacekeepers from troop contributing countries, where a law prohibiting spousal rape exists, might be more likely to commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse with local women and children, exactly because these acts are prohibited in their home countries and they might feel that they are far away from home, in a post-conflict environment where other or no legal obligations exist concerning sexual exploitation and abuse.

Model 5 does neither identify a significant effect of the economic development, which is in the expected negative direction, nor of a high level of sexual violence in the preceding conflict that the UN mission is deployed to, which is in contrast to hypothesis six in a negative direction. Two strong predictors of SEA seem to be the two components of the intensity level of the previous conflict variable, namely the temporal part of the conflict intensity variable, *cumint_2*, and the intensity level in terms of battle-related deaths, *confllevel_2*. Latter is in the expected negative direction and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The more violent a previous conflict was or still is, the less likely it is to observe allegations of SEA by peacekeepers. The reduced likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in UN missions that were deployed in a post conflict environment with a high number of battle related deaths during the conflict, is according to Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad related to the few interactions with the local population due to safety reasons (2013, 528).

The effect for the cumulative intensity level of a conflict (Model 5 in Table 4) is equally significant at the 0.1% level, however has again a positive effect on allegations of SEA. These findings assume that the likelihood of allegations of SEA is higher in countries that have experienced a conflict, which exceeded the threshold of 1000 battle related deaths. These results are in line with Kent's argumentation that when the violence level in a conflict rises, acts of sexual violence against women and children become omnipresent (2005, 87).

Conclusively these findings show more support for the theoretical arguments of authors such as Kent or Bastick et al. and thereby contradict and refute to some extent hypothesis seven by Nordås and Rustad.

Explanations for a higher likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse after an intensive conflict might emerge from the social situation of living in a post-conflict environment. Living in a post-conflict situation and potentially having experienced sexual violence during the conflict, has made the local population even more vulnerable and therefore women might offer themselves as prostitutes in the sense of “survival sex” to provide for their basic needs. Their last resort to consider “survival sex” in order to survive, could be reinforced by the fact that during an intense armed conflict, women might not be able to work on their fields because of rival rebel or governmental troops fighting on their land.

Concerning the control variables Table 4 shows less support for the two control variables. In Model 2 and 3 some support is shown for the control variable regarding missions after 2005. The effect of the control variable concerning missions after 2005 in Model 3 of Table 4 is in a positive direction and statistically significant at the 1% level. This shows that it is more likely to observe reports of SEA in missions after 2005. Concerning the control variable for years that the mission is active, all effects in all Models of Table 4 are not statistically significant and the direction of the effect is inconsistent.

5.2.1 Summary of findings

In conclusion, comparing the results of Table 3 with Table four, shows that the additional mission-year observations improved the number of observations and the statistically significant findings. The results from testing the hypothesis with the updated dataset, including mission-year observations until 2016 for UN missions in Africa, are very similar, but more informative and complex, compared to the findings on African level with the original dataset. On the African level the mention of women in mission mandates, the mission size, the economic development of a host country and a high level of sexual violence in a previous conflict show significant findings, when using the updated dataset. These findings that show a certain pattern of SEA in Africa are in line with the findings of a pattern of SEA on the global level. On both levels, the likelihood or reports of SEA by peacekeepers is higher when

women are mentioned in the mission mandate, the larger the mission is, the less developed a host country is and the higher the level of sexual violence was in a previous conflict.

In the case of the effect of a spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country and the temporal dimension of a conflict level, the findings on the African and on the global level differ to some extent. In this thesis's analysis of the effect of a spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country, using the updated dataset on UN missions in Africa until 2016, Table 4 shows some a positive effect on allegations of SEA. This result is in the opposite direction than what hypothesis assumes. There might be some approval to potentially refute hypothesis two, however the effect of a spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country is inconsistent in the various models of Table 4 and thus should be interpreted with caution.

Finally, although one part of the effect of the conflict level on allegations of SEA is in a negative direction, the temporal dimension is in a positive direction and statistically significant. The models in Table 4 show some support for a positive effect of an intensive armed conflict on the number of allegations, which has been argued by various authors before. Based on these findings and the theoretical arguments by certain authors, hypothesis 7 should be rejected in the context of reports of SEA in UN peacekeeping missions on the African level.

5.3 Updated SEAP dataset: New explanatory variable

Additionally to replicating Nordås and Rustad's research paper of 2013 with an updated dataset until 2016, including only UN missions in Africa, this thesis aims at contributing a small part to the literature on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Therefore a few new variables were added to the updated SEAP dataset, namely the gender ratio of UN peacekeeping operations, the total number of allegations of SEA per mission in a year, the status of allegations of SEA from a mission-year, a variable for the total number of TCC in a mission-year observation and dummy variables for all countries that have ever contributed troops to a mission between 1991 and 2016.

The first subsection will test the hypothesis, whether more female peacekeepers in UN missions reduce the likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, through

logistic regression models. The second subchapter focuses on the analysis of the variables regarding the total number of allegations of SEA in a mission year and the status of those allegations. And finally in the third subchapter this thesis tests hypothesis nine and ten. Hypothesis nine states that the contribution of troop contingent by certain countries is associated with a higher likelihood of reports of SEA, while hypothesis ten assumes that the higher the total number of countries contributing troops to a mission in a year, the more likely there are reports of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers. Conclusively, as mentioned before, this third section of the empirical analysis is more of an explorative nature, since none of the just mentioned variables have ever been analyzed in combination with the updated SEAP dataset.

5.3.1 Female peacekeepers

In order to test the assumption of hypothesis eight that more female peacekeepers reduced the likelihood of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, various regression models are established and analyzed. The Models are established, focusing exclusively on mission factors. In the first Model I included only the variables concerning women mentioned in mission mandates and the gender ratio. Because the gender ratio variable is coded in terms of the x-times there are more men than women in a peacekeeping mission, regression outputs need to be interpreted carefully. The gender ratio variable is in the first Model in a negative direction and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level, although the negative effect is very small. Model 1 suggests that if the gender ratio increases (more men in peacekeeping operations), the likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers decreases very slightly. This effect is in the opposite direction than expected in the hypothesis eight.

Looking at Model 2 and 3, the same negative effect of the gender ratio in a peacekeeping mission on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is observable. All three models suggest that when the gender ratio increases, namely that the amount of male peacekeepers in relation to female peacekeepers increases, then reports of SEA by peacekeepers are less likely. As mentioned before in this thesis there are a lot of authors and especially politicians that assume that more female peacekeepers will reduce the likelihood of SEA in peacekeeping missions. What could explain the findings for gender ratio as presented and shown in Table 5?

Table 5 Peacekeeping operations in Africa, 1999-2016: Female peacekeepers

	(1) Mission	(2) Mission	(3) Mission
Years 2005-2010	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
No. of years mission has been active	-0.0980* (0.0421)	-0.0961* (0.0448)	-0.0664 (0.0810)
Women mentioned in mandate, dummy (recoded)	1.013 (1.007)	0.914 (1.028)	0.670 (0.916)
Gender ratio in mission	-0.00000119*** (0.000000218)	-0.00000123*** (0.000000288)	-0.00000112*** (0.000000289)
Main TCC has law against spousal rape		-0.668 (0.477)	-0.570 (0.686)
Size of mission (uniformed personnel), ln (recoded)			0.192 (0.483)
Constant	1.683* (0.737)	1.872* (0.829)	0.146 (4.381)
Observations	88	88	88

Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Peace operations in Africa_2017_Céline Furer.dta

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

First, it is important to remember that the number of observations is not very high for the three different regression models of Table 5, which means that the findings have to be interpreted with caution. Second, the negative effect of the gender ratio on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is very small and almost at zero. Correlating the dependent variable of allegations of SEA with the gender ratio reveals as well a slightly negative correlation coefficient of -0.2198 between the two variables. Third, female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping missions are still a big rarity. According to the UN peacekeeping website, women represented 3% of all military personnel and 10% of all police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions in 2014 (United Nations 2017p). The UN encourages the deployment of female peacekeepers, however the responsibility and decision lies with Members States (United Nations 2017p).

Conclusively women represent today only a very small part of the peacekeeping personnel, which is why there might be almost no effect regarding the gender ratio variable. And finally, it is important to point out that there are a lot of missing variables for the gender ratio variable, mostly for all mission-year observations before 2006.

5.3.2 Number and status of allegations of SEA

The goal of the empirical analysis, including the total number of allegation of SEA and the status of the systematized allegations of SEA, using the updated dataset with mission-year observations for UN missions in Africa until 2016, is to get a more detailed and complex perspective of the scope of the phenomenon of SEA by peacekeepers. Since the data regarding the total number and the status of the allegations of SEA is available on the UN webpage, for mission-year observations from 2006 and later, it should be used and integrated in datasets. This will give a much more detailed look at the problem of SEA and potentially allow to concretize in which missions there are a lot of allegations of SEA and in which missions there are only sporadic allegations of SEA. An important remark here is that I am completely aware of my reliability on the accuracy of the data from the UN and my dependency on this one source. As mentioned before as well, the following total numbers of allegations of SEA per mission-year are most certainly not the effective numbers of allegations of SEA. There is a big problem of underreporting, which means that the data available represents not the whole phenomenon of SEA, however it is an approximation to the problem.

Including more specific information on the status allegations of SEA in a mission-year will hopefully help identify whether there is a real problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers or if there are only a lot of allegations with no substantiated cases. Also, are there certain regions, UN missions, where there are more substantiated cases than other? This section will try to investigate those objectives.

Because both variables regarding the total number and the status of allegations of SEA perfectly predict the dependent variable regarding allegations of SEA by peacekeepers, there is no possibility to run logistic regressions with these two variables. Therefore I will use descriptive analysis in order to analyze these variables with the updated dataset, including mission-year observations for UN missions in Africa until 2016.

Tabulating the total number of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers by missions reveals that 66 mission-year observations did not have any reports of SEA and 68 mission-year observations had reports of SEA. If the status of the allegations is tabulated by year, the table shows that substantiated cases have only been identified from 2010 onwards. This has certainly to do with the availability of data and the increased attention to the problem of SEA. Along the UN peacekeeping missions with substantiated SEA cases in the most mission-year observations are MONUSCO with seven mission-year observations with substantiated allegations of SEA, UNOCI with six and MINUSMA with three.

Furthermore, out of the 155 mission-year observations, 44 observations are missing and 29 observations reveal substantiated allegations of SEA, which represents around 19% of all missions.

Figure 1 Number of allegations (Mean) per peacekeeping missions




Figure 1 shows the mean of the total number of allegations for every mission and indicates that the most allegations of SEA over the years have come from ONUB, MONUC,

MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Interestingly we observe that all three host countries of UN peacekeeping missions (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic) are more or less in the same region in Africa. Using a case study research design, it might be interesting to pursue more research on allegations of SEA in these three countries, in order to find out what they have in common and what separates them from the other host countries that do not have that many allegations of SEA.

5.3.3 Troop contributing countries

Since data on the nationality of perpetrators of SEA from UN peacekeeping missions is only made publicly available on the UN webpage from 2015 onwards, there is a lack of data on the nationality of perpetrators of SEA. In order to test hypothesis nine I have integrated dummy variables for all countries that have at least once contributed troops to a peacekeeping mission in Africa. The objective is to find out whether troop contingents from certain countries are correlated with a higher likelihood for reports of SEA by peacekeepers. Furthermore hypothesis ten, which states that the likelihood of reports of SEA in missions with a large number of troop contributing countries is higher than in missions with fewer TCC, will be tested.

Running a preliminary bivariate regression model with the dependent variable of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers and the total number of troop contributing countries per mission-year (*sumoftcc*) reveals a positive coefficient for the total number of troop contributing countries per mission-year, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding would support my hypothesis ten, by which the likelihood of reports of SEA by peacekeepers is higher if the number of troop contributing countries of a mission-year is larger. This could be related to the fact that peacekeepers potentially spur each other on incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Additionally various logistic regression models are run, using the update dataset until 2016, in order to detect the effect of the total number of troop contributing countries on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the context of other predictors of allegations of SEA. Table 6 shows the different logistic regression models, while focusing on the effect of the *sumoftcc* variable. Due to the fact that an established correlation matrix revealed a quite strong correlation of 0.7734 between the total number of TCC in mission-

years and the mission size, I excluded the mission size from the regression models. Since the two variables are correlated it makes sense that in larger missions, with more troop contributing countries there will be more allegations of SEA and the peacekeepers will eventually be more difficult to monitor in such a big missions.

Table 6 Logistic regression models focusing on the Sum of TCC

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model
Years 2005-2010	1.488 (0.954)	1.470 (0.960)	2.830* (1.221)	0.448 (1.145)	0.453 (1.343)
No. of years mission has been active	0.0144 (0.0345)	0.0165 (0.0352)	0.0188 (0.0440)	0.169 (0.0938)	0.176 (0.102)
Women mentioned in mandate, dummy (recoded)	0.337 (0.632)	0.303 (0.644)			0.164 (0.645)
Sum of TCC	0.0827* (0.0356)	0.0806* (0.0358)	0.0578* (0.0283)	0.0702 (0.0496)	0.0662 (0.0465)
Main TCC has law against spousal rape		-0.378 (0.544)			1.621 (1.053)
Ln of GDP per capita, host (recoded)			-0.960* (0.392)		
ConflLevel_2				-3.136*** (0.946)	-3.401** (1.210)
Cumulative intensity of a conflict				3.601** (1.153)	3.734** (1.320)
High-level sexual violence in preceding war (Cohen 2010) (recoded)				2.913* (1.473)	4.504* (2.292)
Constant	-2.487** (0.963)	-2.344* (1.050)	3.505 (2.212)	-4.640*** (1.254)	-6.275** (2.250)
Observations	149	149	130	85	85

Standard errors in parentheses

Source: Peace operations in Africa_2017_Céline Fürer.dta

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Analyzing the five logistic regression models and focusing on the effects of the sum of troop contributing countries on the likelihood of allegations of SEA reveals a positive effect. The

Finally, the aim is to explore whether the troop contribution of one or multiple countries correlates with a higher likelihood of allegations of SEA by peacekeepers. First, running bivariate regressions for all troop contributing country dummy variables shows that certain country dummy variables are omitted from the logistic regression model, because they predict the outcome perfectly. It is very difficult to make any assumptions on certain countries, because overall the effects of troop contributing countries varies a lot from being omitted, to a negative and positive effect.

Looking at the main troop contributing countries from 2008, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria (Simić 2010, 193), reveals that all four countries show a positive but insignificant effect on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, except for Bangladesh. However, it is difficult to find data on the nationality of perpetrators and therefore conclusions and assumptions on a linkage between certain troop contributing countries and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse need to be done very carefully. In future research it might be better to have certain types of troop contributing countries, like European countries, countries from the western hemisphere and so on and retest the models with such predictors of types of TCC.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Main findings

In conclusion, this thesis has analyzed and shown that the additional mission-year observations for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have improved the number of observations and increased the appearance of statistically significant findings in Table 4. The larger number of observations in the models of Table 4 have allowed to test all hypotheses with more information and resulted in more complex findings. Using the updated dataset with mission-year observations until 2016 for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, Table 4 shows that reports of SEA are more likely in missions that mention women in the mandate, that are large in size of personnel, that are deployed to host countries that are not very developed and that had a high level of sexual violence in the previous conflict. These findings show a certain pattern of SEA in Africa, which is in line with the findings of variation of SEA on the global level. Regarding these four factors, a certain pattern on the African level follows the pattern of variation on the global level. Conclusively the results on the global and African level support hypothesis three, four and six and contradict hypothesis one, which shows a positive effect of women mentioned in mandates on reports of SEA.

The findings for spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country and for the temporal dimension of a conflict level (*cumint_2*) differ among the African level and the global level. On the African level there is some support for a positive and statistically significant effect of a spousal rape law in the main troops contributing country, which is in the opposite direction than what was assumed in hypothesis two. On the other side, on the global level the effect changes inconsistently from positive to negative and is not significant. Therefore there might be some approval to potentially refute hypothesis two, in favor of its opposition, however the effect of a spousal rape law in the main troop contributing country is as well inconsistent in the various models of Table 4 and thus should be interpreted with caution.

Finally, although one part of the effect of the conflict level on allegations of SEA is in a negative direction, the temporal dimension is in a positive direction and statistically significant. The models in Table 4 show some support for a positive effect of an intensive armed conflict that reached the threshold of 1,000 battle related deaths on the number of allegations, which has been argued by various authors before. Based on these findings and

the theoretical arguments by certain authors, hypothesis 7 should be rejected in the context of reports of SEA in UN peacekeeping missions on the African level.

In regards to testing hypothesis eight, the findings of Table 5 indicate a negative effect of the gender ratio variables, which is in the opposite direction than expected. The findings show a negative and statistically significant effect, which thereby assumes that if the number of male peacekeepers in relation to female peacekeepers is higher, then, the likelihood of reports of SEA decreases. As mentioned before in chapter 5, the negative effect is very weak but statistically significant in all models at the 0.1% level. In conclusion I would definitely keep this variable in the dataset and hopefully test it again with a bigger dataset, in order to find more robust findings concerning its effect.

In regards to the total number of allegations in mission years, the most allegations of SEA over time have emerged from ONUB, MONUC, MONUSCO and MINUSCA. The three host countries, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic) are all situated in almost the same region of Africa. In a future research it might be interesting to take a closer look at these host countries with a lot of allegations of SEA, using most similar and most different system designs.

Findings in the previous chapter have shown that around 19% of all mission-year observations reveal substantiated cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Among the missions with the most substantiated cases are UNOCI, MONUSCO and MINUSMA. In order to get a better insight into these specific host countries and their characteristics it might be useful to conduct a case study in future research.

Finally, Table 6 indicates some support for hypothesis ten and shows significant findings of an expected positive effect of the number of troop contributing countries on allegations of SEA. The findings assume that the higher the number of troop contributing countries is for a mission, the higher the likelihood of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

6.2 Weaknesses

First and a major weakness of the research design of this thesis is the low number of observations of the updated dataset. Focusing only on UN peacekeeping missions in Africa

meant to compromise in the number of observations and therefore in the amount of information to test the hypothesis. Second, even though there is new data available on the Internet for certain factors, there are still a lot of missing observations in the updated SEAP dataset. This is because some datasets, for example regarding sexual violence in armed conflicts, have not been updated until 2015 or later. Overall, especially with the new data statistics on the Conduct in UN Field Missions webpage, data accessibility gets easier, although the data needs to be interpreted with caution. Since a lot of the data, for example the total number of allegations of SEA per mission-year and the status of allegations, comes from only one source, the UN, the reliability of the data needs to be looked at critically, which is a third weakness of this thesis. Because the UN has an interest to maintain its image and keep the number of allegations of SEA by its peacekeeper at the lowest number as possible and there is no comparable data available, this data needs to be interpreted cautiously. Overall the subject of sexual exploitation and abuse is a very intimate and sensitive topic, which suffers from the problem of underreporting and therefore necessitates a respectful and insightful research approach.

6.3 Further research

Based on the presented findings above, future research could aim at extending the whole SEAP dataset with mission-year observations until 2016 and for all UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. Additionally, extending the whole SEAP dataset with mission-year observations will increase the scope of analysis and allow for a comparison of factors influencing reports of SEA over a larger number of mission-years and over time. Adding more data through additional mission-year observations increases the overall external validity of the SEAP dataset and creates more robust findings, since the hypotheses can be tested with more information. Finally, it might be very beneficial to combine the quantitative analysis of SEA with socio-economical and cultural factors with qualitative analysis on the individual level, focusing on the individual's motivations and reasons behind incidents of SEA. Although it might be very difficult to interview peacekeepers that sexually exploited and abused women during their time deployed in the mission, it might become easier through court hearings, to get information on the perpetrator's motives to perpetrate sexual exploitation and abuse in the local population of a host country.

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