

AGENCIFICATION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE IN ZAMBIA:

*A case study of Technical Education
Vocational Entrepreneurship Training
Authority (TEVETA)*

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ABSTRACT

Agencification is one of the characteristics of the wave of New Public Management (NPM) which has become prominent in the last few decades. Public management literature raises questions concerning the rationale behind agencification and how this public management reform is being implemented in Sub Sahara African countries where the NPM ideology is foreign. This study explored how the development of Technical Education Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) can be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVETA sector in Zambia. The study focused on four main issues namely: (i) establishment of TEVETA (ii) organisation and governance of TEVETA (iii) funding of TEVETA and (iv) internal and external change drivers. To undertake this study, a qualitative research strategy was employed and the study used document review and semi structured interview guides as means of data collection.

The study argues that TEVETA is a product of the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) reforms of the 1990s which swept across the country and was supported by Brentwood institutions namely the World Bank and IMF. Following the liberalisation of the economy, TEVETA was established to meet the needs of the local environment and the parastatal companies. It was established through the act of parliament, with a mandate to regulate, co-ordinate and monitor Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training. TEVETA is governed by a board of directors who serve tenures of three years and are appointed by the Minister of Education, Science Vocational Training and Early Education (MESVTEE) in accordance to the TEVET act. The Government of Republic of Zambia (GRZ) is the main source of funding at TEVETA and the current level of public funding to TEVETA is inconsistent and insufficient and has not grown to match up with the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country. The study argues that TEVETA operates with low levels of autonomisation with insufficient resources. Based on these study findings, the study recommends that if TEVETA is granted the levels of autonomisation and resources it requires fully, then it can gratify its mandate completely.

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DEDICATION

To my wonderful mother Mrs. Chunda Chama Lillian and my late father Mr. Chunda Alick Kaluba, I dedicate this thesis to you. Thank you for your tireless efforts and commitment in ensuring that I have the best in life. Mum, your continuous support is the reason why I work hard. Dad, May your soul rest in peace, I know the completion of my thesis would have made you proud.

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ABBREVIATIONS

DTEVT - Department for Technical Education and Vocational Training

GETFund- Ghana Education Trust Fund

GRZ - Government of the Republic of Zambia

IMF - International Monetary Fund

MESVTEE - Ministry of Education, Science Vocational Training and Early Education

NPM - New Public Management

PSCAP - Public Sector Capacity Building Program

PSRP - Public Service Reform Programme

TEVET - Technical Education, Vocational Entrepreneurship Training

TEVETA - Technical Education Vocational Entrepreneurship Training Authority

TEVT - Technical Education and Vocational Training

TVET - Technical and Vocational Education and Training

VET - Vocational Education and Training

Public management in Africa has experienced many reforms in the previous decades. These reforms have brought about changes in the structures and governance of the public service sector including African higher education. Many scholars in developed countries such as Christensen and Lægveid (2005) and Pollitt (2009) have written much about this subject in their own specific national contexts, but the opposite is true for developing countries specifically Sub-Sahara African countries, in the sense that there are hardly any studies on public management dynamics in Africa. Therefore, this study is intended to contribute to the better understanding of public management in Africa focusing on one case, that is, the use of agencification in the Zambian public management setting. The study specifically focuses on four issues: (i) establishment of TEVETA (ii) organisation and governance of TEVETA (iii) funding of TEVETA, and (iv) internal and external change drivers.

This introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 provides a background to the study, section 1.2 presents the establishment of TEVETA. Section 1.3 provides the motivation for the study, section 1.4 presents the problem statement. This is followed by section 1.5 significance of the study. Section 1.6 provides the limitations of the study. Finally, section 1.7 outlines the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Background to the study

One of the strategies governments have over the years introduced in the delivery of public services, is the establishment of semi - autonomous agencies or public entities which render public functions on behalf of ministries. This process is called agencification. Agencification allows for the separation of policy making and implementation functions or responsibilities, in the sense that it enables government ministries to focus on developing policies and providing strategic direction while agencies are tasked with the implementation of such policies and the direct provision of the services (Public Service Commission, 2012). In Zambia, the ministry responsible for education had the task of quality assurance for the

Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) sector and currently this task is the responsibility of the agency¹.

In the Ministry of Education, Science Vocational Training and Early Education (MESVTEE) an agency called Technical Education Vocational Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) was established in 1998 with its office situated in Lusaka. The main aim of TEVETA which is the main thrust for this present study is to foster and enhance better management of higher education institutions in the TEVET sector as a quality assurance agency (TEVETA, 2010).

The establishment of such an agency is a result of the implementation of the ideas and practices with New Public Management (NPM), but many of the ideas associated with Western-style management are more generally maybe inappropriate for use in other social and cultural settings. The implementation of these foreign management practices has been going on for some decades, harking back in some ways to colonial masters (Peters, 2001). This argument ignites more interest on this study conducted in a developing country as compared to the developed world where such NPM ideologies have originated from. Hence this study examines how the development of TEVETA can be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia. The study examines the rationale behind the establishment of TEVETA, the organisation and governance of TEVETA, the trend of funding of TEVETA since its establishment and the change drivers.

1.2 Establishment of TEVETA

The major focus of TEVETA is on the TEVT (Technical Education Vocational Training) institutions in the country. TEVT institutions in Zambia are considered part of the higher education system. In the Zambian context, higher education is defined as post secondary² education. Before the establishment of TEVETA, the MESVTEE was responsible for quality assurance in the education sector including the TEVET sector.

¹ As illustrated in the institutional matrix of political governance by Braun (2008).

² Post secondary education is education pursued after the 12th grade whose criteria for entry is a grade 12 school certificate.

The establishment of TEVETA can be traced back to the time of independence. Mukuni (2014) reveals that at independence³ Zambia was one of the prosperous nations in the Southern part of Africa. This author further indicates that the copper mines were the greatest employers of skilled labour, which at independence consisted predominantly of expatriate personnel. Shortly after independence, a number of expatriates left the country, thereby creating a great demand for local human resources. As a result of the growing demand for skilled labour, the government developed a vibrant demand driven skills developing system through the TEVT Policy of 1969 and TEVT Act of 1970.

By the early 1990s, however, Zambia's economy had become one of the least developed in the world due to the drastic fall in copper prices in the 1970s. Industry experienced severe foreign exchange restrictions which constrained the supply of inputs to production. The poor performance of the economy led to shrinkage of the formal labour market and an expansion of the informal sector, which by 1995 was estimated at about 70 percent of the labour force (Mukuni, 2014).

Literature on the TEVET reforms in Zambia indicates that this state of affairs had an impact on the TEVT sector in two major ways. The first one is that public funding to the sector declined, resulting in a drastic fall in training standards as a consequence of insufficient inputs to training. Secondly, the majority of skills training graduates could not find employment in the formal sector, which had by 1995 shrunk to about 30 % of the labour force.

It is against this background it became necessary for the TEVT policy of 1969 to be reviewed. Therefore, Zambia embarked on a Vocational Education and Training (VET) reform process in 1994 with a view to aligning skills development to the nation's socio-economic skills needs. It was this policy review process that resulted in the TEVET from TEVT initially obtainable under the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT). So, the reviewed policy embraced entrepreneurship in addition to Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and led to the formulation of the TEVET policy of 1996 enacted by parliament by Act No.13 of 1998 and amended by Act no. 11 of 2005 (FNDP 2006 - 2010).

³ Zambia became independent on the 24th October, 1964.

The GRZ has been implementing reforms in the TEVET sector since 1994, through the MESVTEE. The primary instrument driving the reform process has been the government's vision and intent statements articulated in the TEVET policy of 1996. Under this policy, the government working with other stakeholders in skills development, sought to create a national system for TEVET provision, which would satisfy the labour market, socio-economic concerns and resource based opportunities in the economy. More specifically, the new TEVET system aims at balancing the supply of skilled labour at all levels with the demands of the economy; acting as a vehicle for improved productivity and income generation; as well as being an instrument for the minimization of inequalities among the people (TEVETA, 2006). In the light of the above, a number of achievements have been scored and notable among these is the establishment of TEVETA which replaced the Department for Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT).

1.3 Motivation of the study

The motivation for this study is that some of the generic management ideas that have become popular in the industrialised countries have also been introduced into the administrative system of less developed and transitional countries (Peters, 1996). The successful implementation of such reforms using generic management techniques and creating quasi-public organisations for providing public services (Robinson and White, 1998) depends on the existence of the required managerial talent and the existence of private and quasi – public organisations that are capable of meeting the challenges implied in these reforms. This is the context in which agencies have been established for the provision of the public services from the government ministries.

Therefore, this study was inspired by these trends of international reforms in the provision of public services around the world leading to the establishment of agencies in both developed and developing countries. Pollitt et al. (2001) state that there is little doubt that the world is facing a 'regulatory explosion' and an epidemic of 'agency fever', with quasi - autonomous regulatory agencies becoming accepted as 'best practice' all over the world and as a policy fashion of our time. As the wave of such international reforms sweeps the globe from north to south, in Zambia however, there is no study conducted on agencification processes in the public management system of the country.

1.4 Problem statement

There is a varied array of higher education institutions in Zambia, including universities, colleges and TEVT, designed to meet the special needs of various sectors of the national economy for qualified personnel (GRZ, 1996). Considering the nature of Zambian higher education and the agencification of quality assurance, the research problem is formulated as follows:

How can the development of TEVETA be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia?

In order to answer this overall research problem the following specific research questions were raised:

- What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA?
- How is TEVETA organised and governed?
- How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its establishment?
- What are the main internal and external change drivers of TEVETA?

1.5 Significance of the study

Agencification is in fashion. It is undoubtedly not a new phenomenon (Wettenhall, 2005), but its role in public management can be argued to have intensified in recent years. Therefore, it is hoped that this study will provide insights into the understanding of the agencification of quality assurance in Zambia. It is also hoped that the study will grant motivation to interested parties in Zambian higher education to engage in a constructive discussion around this subject. Further, it is expected that the study shall serve as a basis for future research into the agencification of quality assurance in Zambia and also for developing an improved system of quality assurance.

Furthermore, this study may unlock another perspective regarding this subject for both researchers and policy makers, and also act as a basis of supplementary sources of information to the literature concerning this subject in developing countries specifically Sub-Saharan African countries.

1.6 Limitations of the study

The study has the following limitations. This study was conducted at TEVETA, an agency which operates at national level. Therefore, in this regard it could have been prudent if the perceptions of the TEVET institutions who are the major stakeholders were captured in the study. Furthermore, due to inadequate resources and limited time available, the researcher could have conducted more interviews with the intent of gathering more information regarding the subject. With the mentioned restrictions, the study was only conducted at a single agency and at MESVTEE with a minimal sample. Nonetheless, this study has provided information which can be deemed useful concerning this subject and can also act as a basis for further research.

1.7 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter one (current chapter) includes:

Introduction, background to the study, establishment of TEVETA, motivation of the study, problem statement, significance of the study, limitation of the study and structure of the thesis.

Chapter two gives basic information about Zambia.

In the third chapter, the literature review and the analytical framework of the study are presented.

In the fourth chapter the research methodology employed in this study is discussed.

Chapter five gives a presentation, analysis and interpretation of the findings.

Finally, the last chapter provides the conclusions, based on the study's findings.

CHAPTER TWO: BASIC INFORMATION ON ZAMBIA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter of the study presents basic information on Zambia's political context and governance. Section 2.2 presents the background of the political system. State structure and administrative system is presented in section 2.3 and section 2.4 presents the public sector reforms. MESVTEE and TEVET institutions are presented in section 2.5 and conclusion is presented in section 2.6.

2.2 Background: The political system

Pre-independence Zambia was governed between 1891 and 1923 by the British South African (BSA) Company. From 1924 to 1963, it was governed by the British Colonial Government. During this colonial period, as a colonial territory, Zambia was known as Northern Rhodesia. Since the attainment of independence in 1964, the country has experienced three Republics, starting with multi - party politics that allowed the existence of the opposition political parties until 1972 when the one - party system came into existence. However, although it was a one party system, the citizens still participated in the elections to elect their leaders at both parliamentary and local government level (Kelly, 1999).

In 1990, the third republic came into play and Zambia reverted to pluralism adopting a multi - party democratic system which the country is enjoying up to date.

2.3 State structure and administrative system

Zambia, a unitary state and constitutional democracy has three levels of government and these are the central government, provincial administration and local administration. Zambia has 10 provinces and each of the 10 provincial administration headquarters is headed by a deputy minister (appointed and answerable to the president) assisted by a permanent secretary who is

head of the secretariat and coordinates government activities in the province. Furthermore, in each province there are provincial heads of department who act as the link between the district and central line ministries. These are answerable to their sector ministries on technical matters while administratively they are supervised by the provincial permanent secretary on day to day activities (<http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/countryprofile/Zambia.pdf>).

The President is directly elected through national presidential and parliamentary elections which are held every five years and s/he heads both the state and government. According to the national constitution, the sitting President can only serve for two terms and is also empowered by the constitution to nominate 10 Members of Parliament (MPs). The president forms a cabinet by appointing 20 ministers⁴ from the MPs and not more than five from the nominated MPs. The central government is the core of the Zambian public management structure which is organised around various ministries and provides directions for the entire public sector and coordinates all activities with the involvement of the lower levels. In this regard, the minister occupies the top political authority office whose main task is to manage an integrated administrative system and also serves other ministerial functions simultaneously.

2.4 Public sector reforms

In order to improve the provision of public services in the country, the GRZ embarked on the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). Ayeni (2001) pointed out that in 1993, the government officially launched the PSRP designed to transform the public service into a leaner, efficient, cost effective, responsive and affordable organisation capable of delivering quality services and providing an enabling environment for private sector and individual participation in national development.

The objective of the PSRP according to Ayeni (2001) included:

⁴ The following are the Ministries: 1. Justice 2. Defence 3. Finance 4. Home affairs 5. Health 6. Sports and Youth 7. Commerce, trade and industry 8. Mines, energy and water development 9. In formation and broadcasting 10. MESVTEE 11. Lands, environment and natural resources 12. Local government and housing 13. Tourism and arts 14. Labour and social security 15. Gender and child development 16. Community development, mother and child health 17. Chiefs and traditional affairs 18. Transport, communication, works and supply 19. Foreign affairs 20. Agriculture and livestock development (This was the available information at the time of research however, some ministries were split on the 18th September, 2015).

- To improve government capacity, to analyse and implement national policies and perform its function.
- To effectively manage expenditure to meet fiscal stabilisation objectives; and
- To make the public service more efficient and responsive to the needs of the populace.

In view of the above, Olowu (2002) pointed out that the PSRP had three components which was restructuring of public services, management and human resources improvement, and decentralisation and strengthening of local government.

The component of restructuring of ministries and provinces aimed to stream-line and rationalise the structures and operations of government ministries, departments, agencies and provinces to attain leaner and less costly, but more efficient public services (Ayeni, 2001). Furthermore, he pointed out that management and human resources improvement aimed to develop critical skills to enable senior civil servants to more effectively manage public services. In addition, to put in place an effective personnel evaluation instrument and management information system to enable the government effectively compile and manage data needed for personnel decision making, and to improve the remuneration and conditions of services.

The component of decentralisation according to Ayeni (2001) aimed at making local government in particular and district government in general, more efficient, cost effective and responsive to the needs of local communities in the delivery of services, and to ensure that local government is adequately financed.

It is in light of such programmes that the public sector has experienced changes in various dimensions including the education sector and organisation structures for the purpose of improving the delivering of the public services. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) indicate that the public sector reforms involve the deliberate change to the structures and process of public sector organisations with the objective of getting them to run better.

In view of the above reforms in the public sector in the country, according to the study which was conducted in 2004, Zambia had about 40 agencies. From these agencies, 4 were created under Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) spun off from their parent department namely, the National Institute of Public Administration, the civil servant training institute, the Zambia Wild Authority which manages parks and the Zambia Training Institute.

Agencies are established by the act of parliament, and work under way to adapt an overarching legal framework governing the operations of the agencies. However, this has been abandoned following the suspension of the reform program. Currently, government policy is to reduce progressively the subvention to these agencies to zero, forcing them to stand on their own feet (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004). From Levy and Kpundeh's argument, it can be pointed out that the government has boosted agencies in the country to have their own budgetary lines and function within their mandate through the act of parliament hence making them to stand on their own.

2.5 MESVTEE and TEVET institutions

The MESVTEE⁵ whose headquarters is located in Lusaka is the main government body responsible for all levels of education in Zambia. The current education system is decentralized with hierarchical decision-making procedures that run from the national headquarters to provincial, district and institutional levels. The ministry has two permanent secretaries, one is in charge of higher education in the country and the other one is responsible for general education. Both secretaries are answerable to the minister. The Ministry consists of five directorates – planning and information; standards and curriculum development; human resources and administration; teacher education and specialised education; and distance learning. TEVETA falls under the Department of Vocational Education and Training (DVET) which is in charge of formulating and providing policy guidelines to training institutions; promoting TVET; increasing stakeholder participation in the provision of TVET; and quality assessment of TVET programmes. The staff at MESVTEE are employed on permanent basis as civil servants based on their qualifications (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2010).

In Zambia, the TEVET institutions can be either public or private. Public TVET is managed by a number of different Ministries depending upon the particular ministry's function. The former Ministry of Education operated schools of continuing education which offered skill training and academic courses. This ministry has since merged with the former Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training to form the MESVTEE. Under the MESVTEE,

⁵ This was the available information at the time of research. Following the splitting of some ministries on 18th September, 2015 MESVTEE is now divided into two Ministries namely the Ministry of general education & Ministry of higher education (<http://lusakavoices.com/2015/09/18/president-edgar-lungus-parliament-speech-in-full/>).

there are 23 TEVET institutions. The other TEVET institutions fall under the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Child Development, Agriculture, Tourism, and Community Development, and Social Welfare adding up to 25.5 percent of public TEVET institutions. There were 286 registered TEVET institutions in 2009 as revealed in the records. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services is in charge of running rural training centres that offer short-courses in skills development. The Ministry of Sports, Youth and Child Development runs Skill Training Centres that offer informal skill training. Private TVET is provided by church organisations and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and these are demand-driven and mainly located in urban areas. All TVET institutions need to be registered with TEVETA (Corporate Strategy, 2010-2012).

TEVET institutions under the MESVTEE are run by management boards the members of which are appointed by the Minister by statutory instrument. These boards help government in running administrative affairs of the institutions, approve budgets and hire staff. Whereas management boards would have the power to appoint the Principal, Vice Principal and other staff, the existing staff in training institutions may opt to be employees of the management boards or choose to be public officers seconded to the boards (Mukuni, 2014).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has given a brief account of the political system in the country, state structure and administrative system, public sector reforms, and MESVTEE and TEVET institutions. In terms of governance, Zambia is a democratic country with a multi party political system and the president is the head of both the government and the state. The president is constitutionally allowed to serve only for two terms and a term has duration of five years. There are three levels of government in the country which are the central government, provincial administration and local administration. The cabinet is made by the president appointing 20 ministers from parliament and the central government is organised around these ministries. The public sector in Zambia has faced many reforms and these reforms have not spared the MESVTEE and trickled down to the TEVET sector. It is through these reforms the country has seen changes in the governance structures and the birth of various agencies operating under specific ministries at arm's length. Each agency is established by an act of parliament which stipulates, among other things, its functions, powers and composition of the

staff. The next chapter presents the literature review and the analytical framework of the study.

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the literature reviewed guided by the overall research problem: How can the development of TEVETA be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia? However, most of the literature accessed concerning agencification is from the developed countries as there is hardly any research work going on concerning this subject in the developing countries.

In this light, public management globally has experienced some radical reforms in the past two or more decades (Aucoin, 1990; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), in the sense that public management has witnessed a shift in the balance between bureaucratic autonomy and bureaucratic integration, marked by ‘agencification’ (Thynne, 2003: 323). ‘Agencification’ has signified a transfer of government activities to agency - type organisations which serve specialized needs outside ministerial departments. In the framework of the NPM trend, governments across continents have established agencies at arm’s length from ministerial departments in order to take care of certain regulatory and administrative tasks (Pollitt et al. 2004; Verhoest et al. 2004).

Taking the above considerations as a starting-point, in this chapter, literature on agencification will be reviewed which will be done under the following headings: the ideology of agencification and characteristics, why agencification, steering of agencies, few examples of cases of agencification in developed and developing countries, NPM and internationalisation of agencies, and the analytical framework.

3.2 The ideology of agencification and characteristics

Historically, ministerial portfolios have been arranged either as ‘integrated ministries’, meaning that a ministerial portfolio constitutes a unitary organisation, or as a vertically specialised structure, meaning that a portfolio is split into a ministerial, or cabinet-level,

department on the one hand and one or more separate agencies on the other. Over time, agencies seem to have been moved out of and into ministerial departments, often in a cyclical manner (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 2008; Verhoest et al. 2007). It is against this background Pollitt et al. (2001) noted that currently public sector management is experiencing what is called a global agency fever.

The rise of executive agencies or agencification worldwide in the 1980s and 1990s can be traced from the strains noted by governments such as work overload to the Civil Service and ministries, over bloated civil service, insufficient attention given to the service delivery, the pressure to restrain spending and make services to citizens more responsive and accountable, the rising citizens expectations with respect to the quality of public services, and a lack of clear lines of responsibilities and accountability (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2007; Pollitt et al. 2001). In addition, the quest for better service delivery in the public service in the new international regulatory orthodoxy as hypothesized⁶ by Pollitt et al. (2004) is enhanced by the emergence of a universal reform model, which is based on the assumption that the creation of autonomous agencies will improve regulatory performance and efficiency without having negative sides – effects on other values, such as political control and democracy. However, Devas et al. (2001) suggest that agencification is part of the neoliberal reform ideology that seeks to reduce the size and scope of government in public service delivery.

In view of the above arguments, executive agencies are seen as a mechanism to improve service delivery in both developed and developing countries. In the words of Bresser Pereira (1999), agencies represent the creation of quangos, other quasi - public organisations, and organisations that bridge the state-society boundary as a means of providing public services in (presumably) a more efficient and effective manner.

Executive agencies have a number of characteristics which describes them in differentiation from other organisations. Pollitt et al. (2004) call these characteristics a tripod of doctrines. According to these authors, tripod of doctrines refers to a new form of public organisation that is characterised by disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualisation. Pollitt et al. (2004: 36 - 39) defines the core elements of this tripod as follows: Disaggregation as a process whereby an organisation is formally separated from its parent body and clearly delimited as a

⁶ According to Christensen and Læg Reid (2007) the statement is a hypothesis and not evidence - based fact and therefore needs to be examined through empirical studies.

separate entity. Autonomisation is defined as a process through which bodies are granted freedom to make their own choices about internal arrangements. Contractualisation is described as the idea of putting relationships within the public sector, whether between purchasers and providers, or Ministries and chief executives, on some sort of contractual or quasi – contractual basis, usually linked to performance. These characteristics are comparable to the ones identified by Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) which are organisational form, autonomy and control, specialization, coordination, and performance and results.

Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) describe these characteristics as follows; - Organisational form refers to the different names assigned to agencies, such as hybrids and quangos. Autonomy refers to the level of decision making competency (discretion) of an organisation, while control deals with the constraints which can be imposed on these organisations by their parent ministry so as to influence decisions about their day to day operations. Specialization is described as the creation of new public sector organisations, with limited objectives and specific tasks, out of traditional core-administrations and coordination refers to the purposeful alignment of tasks and efforts of units in order to achieve a defined goal. Finally, they define performance in terms of effectiveness, equity, user-satisfaction, and quality.

3.3 Why agencification?

Literature on public management has highlighted various rationales for agencification. In the views of Trondal and Egeberg (2013) agencification has been accounted for by (i) organisational, (ii) functional, (iii) contingency, and (iv) institutional (myth) approaches.

According to an organisational or institutional approach agencies come as a result of power struggles and compromises conditioned by pre-existing organisational structures. Organisational change is framed by the heritage of structures and new agencies are thus likely to be embedded within existing organisational architectures (Radin, 2012: 17). To contribute to this discussion, Christensen and Lægreid (2006) add that the creation of agencies can also be seen as a trend in public policy and as a fashionable idea within the realms of public management.

In the functionalist view, agencification is a response to collective action problems. The principal-agent model is often the analytical expression of this functional logic, together with the notion of transaction costs (Tallberg, 2003: 25). Further, Tallberg points out that the

benefits of agencies lie in the reduction of political transaction costs, by providing solutions to collective-action problems that prevent efficient political exchange.

In the contingency approach, contingent events may help to explain institutional change and the timing of organisational birth (March and Olsen, 1989). In the same line of thought, Trondal and Egeberg (2013) mention that the decisions to create agencies have been motivated by needs to respond to particular circumstances of the moment, and in some cases to crisis.

To address the question of why the agency form has become popular over the past decades, the economic approach⁷ points out that agencies are more efficient than other organisational forms in the central government (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2007). In the same vein - agencification has been identified to have several aims and some of those aims are increased efficiency, strengthened and clarified responsibility and accountability lines, a more encouraged and professional administration, and a more service oriented administration placed closer to citizens (OECD, 2005: 108 - 111).

Pollitt et al. (2004) and other scholars have identified a number of reasons for creating agencies (see table 1).

The itemized reasons for creation of agencies presented in table 1 (Pollitt et al., 2004) have several features which can be noticed. For instance, Pollitt et al. (2004) indicate that these reasons may be inspired by a wide variety of diverse motives. In addition, these authors point out that the itemized list contains tensions and even incoherencies within themselves such as potential tension between the motive of liberating managers to manage and the motive of increasing political steering ability.

⁷ The economic approach group includes the rational choice and principal - agent models (Dunleavy, 1991; Molander, Nilsson, & Schick, 2002; James, 2003).

Table 1. Reasons for the creation of agencies

Scholars	Reasons
Pollitt et al. (2004)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To lessen political interference in order to allow managers to manage. 2. To lessen political interference in order to allow regulatory or quasi-judicial decisions to be taken in an impartial way. 3. To strengthen political oversight by creating separate organisations that can be given clear targets. 4. To put public services closer to their users so as to increase user-responsiveness. 5. To enhance expertise by allowing specialization (i.e moving away from large, generalist bureaucracies). 6. To enhance flexibility by moving out of the ‘iron cage’ of central civil service rules. 7. To pay off political allies. 8. To distance senior bureaucrats from boring, routine operational work and to leave them with high status policy and strategy work. 9. To distance senior bureaucrats from boring, routine operational work and to leave them with high status policy and strategy work.
Powell & DiMaggio (2004)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. To gain legitimacy by imitating an organisational fashion, which is seen to be associated with modernization.
Talbot & Caulfield (2002)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. To create islands of income generation which can be ‘milked’ for various purposes. 12. To create ‘islands of excellence’ in otherwise failing or ‘backward’ public administrations

Source: Pollitt et al. (2004)

Furthermore, in an attempt to elaborate the reasons for the creation of agencies, Pollitt et al. (2004) indicate that there are more obvious tensions between some of the motives listed. For example, finding jobs for political allies and lessening political interference or enhancing expertise.

The other aspect which can be observed is that a single agency can hold various motives regarding its creation. For instance, Pollitt et al. (2004) point out that a single agency reform may quite conceivably be fuelled by four or more of these motives simultaneously, and may appear to hold advantages for a number of different groups such as the politicians, senior civil servants and professional experts. It is for this reason these authors concluded that a particular reform may therefore be embarked upon for ambiguous and or contradictory purposes.

3.4 Steering of agencies

The question of how agencies can be steered best has attracted a lot of ‘grey literature’, but somewhat less academic attention. Considerable attention has been given to the kind of performance reporting that should be required of agencies – typically recommendations for good practice (Pollitt et al, 2004). However, academic work which has been done by various scholars indicates considerable variety, agency by agency. For instance, Hogwood et al. (2000) found that some agencies with politically sensitive tasks were bombarded with questions from the legislature, and closely monitored by their ‘nervous parent ministry’, while other agencies were virtually ignored by politicians. A study by Gains (1999) indicated considerable contrasts in the relationships between various agencies and their ministries, depending on a variety of factors, including the degree of monopoly, the degree of financial independence, and the previous history of relationships inside the parent ministry.

At the same time, there are quite a number of studies which found that ministries are either too strong or interfering, or too weak or passive. For instance, in Latvia, the study conducted by Pollitt found that ministries lack the capacity to control their agencies (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). However, elsewhere Pollitt et al. (2004) note that the balance seems to have swung too far in the opposite direction. For instance, Aucoin (1996) argues strongly that in Canada the first generation of Special Operating Agencies lacked sufficient autonomy. In Tanzania the theoretical autonomy of agencies is frequently crippled by cashflow shortages and the tight grip kept by the President and his Secretary General (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002).

In another study, Van Thiel (2001) found some evidence for ‘reversal of control’ (autonomized bodies becoming stronger than their ministries) especially in the Netherlands where ZBOs (*Zelfstandige BestuursOrganen*)⁸ had a monopoly in their activity and where they had been created by redefining an organisation that was already outside a ministry, rather than being ‘hived off’ from a ministry. However, in some cases, as argued by Kickert (2001), ‘a number of the new quasi-autonomous executive agencies have found that, as a result of their new status, ministerial control of their policy direction is stronger than before’. Both arguments by Van Thiel and Kickert display a mixed picture, where in some cases ministries seem weak and in others they seem the opposite. It is in this light Pollitt et al. (2004)

⁸ Dutch term or phrase meaning independent Governance bodies.

concluded that the situation in which the ministry is either weak or strong in relationship to its agencies seems to depend partly on a number of task specific factors, such as the degree of competition, the degree of self-financing, the degree of political sensitivity of the task, and so on.

In terms of the relationship between the agency and the ministry, Braun notes that the agency does not exist in isolation but it is interconnected with the other institutional levels⁹ which can be observed in the institutional matrix of political governance (Braun, 2008: 232). Braun further points out that a reform of ministries may have implications for representation of policy sectors on the level of cabinet, and it will have effects on the governance and organisations of agencies because each institutional level is associated with its own major activities.

3.5 Few examples of cases of agencification in developed and developing countries

Executive agencies are key institutions in most developed countries (Christensen et al., 2008), but also in developing countries which have not been spared by the wave of NPM.

Pollitt et al. (2004) reveal how the tripod model of agencification has been applied in developed countries. In a study conducted in the Netherlands, these authors note that Dutch agencies are structurally disaggregated. They have their own titles and chief executives, their own organisation charts, buildings and logos. The degree of autonomization – of delegated authority and discretion – is real but not huge and it has been most marked in the financial sphere. With respect to personnel policy freedoms, agencies have not proceeded much faster than general civil service reforms, and could not be described as possessing much greater autonomy than their parent ministries. In terms of the autonomy of the Dutch agencies, Pollitt et al. (2004) concluded that the overall autonomy of Dutch agencies could be said to be somewhat less than most UK Next Steps agencies¹⁰, and much less than Swedish agencies.

To sum up their study in the Netherlands by putting into consideration the tripod model, Pollitt et al. (2004) found that Dutch agencies appear to have three “half legs”. They are

⁹ The other institutional levels are Government and cabinet, Ministry and the knowledge space.

¹⁰ UK Next Step agencies are agencies in the UK which are part of the government departments but have their own managerial and budgetary line and perform part of the UK government functions.

structurally disaggregated, but this disaggregation has no legal or constitutional reinforcement. They have additional operational autonomy, but mainly on the narrow – if important – front of accounting and fiscal freedoms. They have all the paraphernalia of performance indicators and agreements, but there is at least a suspicion that hitherto these have been more for decoration than for active steering by parent ministries.

In another study in Sweden, Pollitt et al. (2004) concluded that the agency reform in Sweden is likely to continue to rely upon informal relationships between agency and Ministry staff. Pollitt et al. further explain that any contractual relationship between agency and Ministry is supported by ongoing exchanges about what can be expected from agencies, and agency expertise and in this way, agencies continue to maintain substantial independence from their (small) ministerial counterparts.

Agencification in Sub-Saharan African countries is in many respects similar to experiences in Western Europe (Caulfield, 2006). This can be attributed to both the colonial heritage of most developing countries and the important role of international donor organisations. Differences in the strategies between Francophone and Anglophone countries can almost directly be related to former colonial powers in these countries. For instance, the agency model in Tanzania is largely copied from the Next Steps Agencies model in the United Kingdom (Sulle, 2008).

Agencies in Tanzania display hybrid characteristic features of the tripod model in terms of their autonomy and control. They have elements of the traditional model, that is, they are heavily controlled ex ante in several aspects and they are structurally placed outside their parent Ministries (Sulle, 2010). Sulle's observation was also shared by Caulfield (2006) who indicated that agencies have been physically separated from their parent ministries. This was not only observed by Sulle and Caulfield but also by Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) who conducted a study at Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund) in Ghana. GETFund is physically separated from the parent ministry and government has a hand in its operations.

3.6 NPM and internationalization of agencies

As highlighted earlier, the creation of agencies can be related to the dominance of NPM in public management. The ideologies of NPM and associated reforms have spread across borders and these reforms have even been spread to countries where they might not have been expected to be readily accepted (Peters, 2001). For instance, Kickert (1994) points out that the

ideas of creating agencies and decentralizing government have been adopted in Netherlands, which has had a highly centralized government for quite some time. Indeed, literature of public management has revealed that agency fever is spreading around the world and agencies are in fashion, for example, the implementation of the agencification programme in Canada started around 1993 (Prince, 2000). As the wave sweeps Asia, the implementation of such ideologies, for example, in Japan can be traced in 1998 through the creation of Independent Administrative Corporations (Yamamoto, 2000).

This fever has also not spared Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, Ghana was the first country and among the first few countries in the developing world to embark upon ‘agencification’ in the civil service around the 1980s (Ofosu-Adarkwa, 2000). Another example concerns Tanzania, where the executive agency programme was officially adopted in 1997 for the purpose of improving the management of public services (Rugumyamheto, 2004). It should be noted that for Sub-Saharan African countries, agencification programmes were mainly sponsored and diffused by international donor organisations and consulting firms like the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which also facilitated both technical and financial support (Larbi, 1998). As McCourt (2008) notes, between 1986 and 1996 the World Bank supported public sector reform programmes in no fewer than 68 developing countries, the driving ideology being that of creating a smaller and more effective public sector.

NPM can be said to have its own benefits but on the other hand Peters (2001) laments that NPM has had numerous failings in the developed world and almost certainly even more in developing countries where it is being used more and more as an ideological frame for public management reforms. It is in this view, Peters (2001) further suggests that governments in developing and transitional regimes need to build up their administrative capacities before they should consider means of reform and dismantling the rather formalistic systems.

Having reviewed the relevant literature on agencification, next the analytical framework of this study is presented.

3.7 Analytical Framework

3.7.1 Introduction

This section presents the study's analytical framework as developed from the relevant literature reviewed. Section 3.7.2 presents the concept of agency, and section 3.7.3 presents the concept of autonomy. Section 3.8 describes the analytical framework for the study.

3.7.2 The Concept of Agency

Agencies are described differently internationally. For example, Roness et al. (2008) reveal some of such descriptions as: non-departmental public bodies, hybrids, quangos, fringe bodies, non-majoritarian institutions, quasi autonomous public organisations, and distributed public governance. The highlighted descriptions clearly mark that there is no universal definition of the concept of agency. In attempting to define the concept, Verhoest et al. (2010) note that how an agency is defined and what it does varies considerably across nations and in different political systems. It is for this reason that Pollitt (2009) admits that since national systems of public law are different, it is illusive to get a universally accepted definition of the concept of agency.

Pollitt and associates' give a narrow definition of an agency as a structurally disaggregated body, formally separated from the ministry, which carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, it is staffed by public servants, financed mainly by the state budget, and is subject to public legal procedures. Agencies have some autonomy from their respective ministry in policy decision-making and over personnel, finance, and managerial matters, but they are not totally independent, because political executives normally have ultimate political responsibility for their activities (Pollitt et al. 2004, Pollitt and Talbot 2004). Contributing to the discussion of what an agency is, Smullen (2004) points out that what an agency is and what it does vary considerably across national and organisational cultures, legal systems, and political systems. However, Christensen and Lægreid (2004) lament that commercial corporations are excluded in the agency concept. Therefore, this study adapts the widely used definition in literature of the concept of agency as elaborated by Pollitt and associates which sheds the elements of an agency as separated from the mother ministry at arm's length, operating at the national level, championed by public servants (not necessarily civil servants),

subject to public or administrative law procedures, and mainly depending on state funding. This definition outlines the characteristics of an agency and highlights in brief the relation to the ministry.

To sum up, an agency according to Pollitt et al. (2004) is an organisation which (i) has its status defined principally or exclusively in public law (though the nature of that law may vary greatly between different national systems), (ii) is functionally disaggregated from the core of its ministry or department of state, (iii) has some degree of autonomy in terms of its operations from the core ministry, (iv) is nevertheless linked to the ministry/department of state in ways which are close enough to permit ministers/secretaries of state to alter the budgets and main operational goals of the organisation, (v) is therefore not statutorily fully independent of its ministry/department of state and, (vi) is not a commercial corporation.

3.7.3 The Concept of Autonomy

Autonomy is a widely, frequently, and diversely used concept in public sector organisation (Christensen 2001, Verhoest et al. 2004, Verschuere 2007). Roness et al. (2008) describe autonomy as discretion, or the extent to which the agency can make decisions on itself about matters it finds important. Autonomy as decision making power can be grouped into two kinds, based on two different scopes of discretion. When agencies have some decision-making competencies delegated from superior bodies concerning the choice and use of inputs they have some degree of managerial autonomy. This includes autonomy with regard to human resource management (for instance salary, promotion and evaluation of personnel) and financial management (for instance taking loans, setting tariffs and shifting budgets between years). The scope of autonomous decision-making capacity may also vary because of the structuring of the primary production processes of the agency and the policies themselves. The second kind of autonomy is policy autonomy which includes the extent to which the agencies can choose the policy instruments. However, in terms of agencies and autonomy, Pollitt et al. (2004) point out that in general agencies have some autonomy from the ministry but are not fully independent, because the ministry has power to alter the budgets and the main goals of the agency. In an attempt to relate autonomy to agencies, Sulle (2010) notes that autonomy is a rational concept which should be seen in relation to control from superior bodies.

The study adapts the widely used definition of the concept of autonomy from Roness et al. (2008) as they put it, the degree to which the agency can make its own important decisions concerning matters at hand and room to manoeuvre regarding its activities which includes both managerial and policy autonomy.

3.8 Specifying the analytical framework for this study

This section of the study focuses on how the main ideas in the literature review can be operationalised. Therefore, analytical framework is discussed in detail below.

3.8.1 The analytical point of departure

The analytical framework for this study is derived from the tripod model of agencification. The ‘practitioners’ or ‘the tripod model’ represents a standard or an ideal agency model as prescribed by the NPM doctrines (Pollitt et al., 2004). In other public management literature, the tripod model is also known as tripod of doctrines. The model has three key features namely; structural disaggregation, autonomisation, and contractualisation (Pollitt et al., 2004). It is in this light that Pollitt et al. (2004) qualify it by pointing out that if an organisation has neither of these, then it cannot be classified as an agency, whatever it may be called in its local context. Therefore, these three key features from the tripod model are operationalised as follows in this framework.

3.8.1.1 Structural disaggregation

This feature reflects emphasizes a removal of a task from the ‘core centre’ to a functionally separate unit that is placed at arm’s length from the centre (Pollitt et al., 2004). Fedele et al. (2007) view this as a new institutional distance between agencies and their parent ministry. In other literature, disaggregation is said to be separateness coupled with a differentiated governance structure which allows specialization of functions and a better focus on client needs (OECD, 2002). Therefore, structural disaggregation in this analytical framework refers to the way the agency was set up as a formal independent body from the parent ministry with

its own legal status which outlines its functions and mandate, and as a separate organisation with its own name.

3.8.1.2 Autonomisation

Pollitt et al. (2004) explain disaggregation in depth by making it distinct from a similar term 'independence'. In the view of these authors, the term 'independence' can be, like the other ill-treated term 'autonomy', misleading if used inappropriately. Therefore, autonomisation in this analytical framework refers to the relationship between the parent ministry and the agency but within the governance structure. This involves the three main actors namely; the political leadership and administrative leadership of the ministry, the board of the agency, and the management of the agency. In this regard, autonomy then would mean that the agency in practically is independent of the balance of power between the board and the management of the agency and that the agency is autonomised in taking the main decisions with respect to its affairs such as personnel, organisation and use of funding.

3.8.1.3 Contractualisation

The third feature is the idea of performance contracting. 'Performance' here means any system of setting targets for, and reporting on (not necessarily publicly) the activities of an agency (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). Contractualisation in the NPM sense involves replacing input-based control with result-based control (Verhoest, 2005). In this regard, the issue of control is the main aspect under contractualisation.

The concept of control can be defined as mechanisms used by the government to intentionally influence the actions of the agencies so that government objectives are achieved (Verschuere, 2007). Viewed from a result-based approach, Sulle (2010) points out that the concept of control entails a number of administrative procedures. Thompson (1993) distinguishes between ex ante control and ex post control mechanisms. The ex ante control focuses on inputs and procedures, whilst ex post control is concerned with performance results. Verhoest (2005) adds that ex ante control involves regulations and rules that force agencies to seek prior approval before they take action. This may also include the extent to which the oversight authority can overrule or nullify a decision already taken by the agency.

According to Verhoest et al. (2004) result based control can be considered as a management process that consists of interrelated subsystems such as a planning system (setting goals for agencies), a monitoring system (measuring agency performance results) and an evaluation system (where sanctions and rewards are applied). Therefore, in light of the above, contractualisation in this analytical framework refers to the control mechanism regarding the setting of performance objectives of the agency and identify the role of agency and the parent ministry regarding performance objectives.

3.8.1.4 The three assumptions

This study uses the following three assumptions derived from on the study as an analytical point of departure.

Assumption 1: Structural disaggregation

The structural disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent ministry is formal with the main purpose of meeting the local demands of the TEVET sector in the country as a means of enhancing service provision. This is in light of Sulle's (2010) observation that structural disaggregation entails that agencies have their separate mandate as described in the framework document, have their own public identity and own recognizable separate functions and management.

Assumption 2: Autonomisation

TEVETA has a low degree of autonomisation as compared to agencies in developed countries. Molander et al. (2002) exemplify that in other countries, like the Scandinavian welfare states, public ownership and nationalization were for a long time more popular policy tools than regulation and there has been also a long tradition of strong autonomous agencies which are responsible for policy implementation and service delivery.

Assumption 3: Contractualism

The performance goals of TEVETA are set by the parent ministry as a means of control. Christensen and Læg Reid (2007) explain that the creation of agencies was expected to result in agencies being controlled by results which means that control on inputs is supposed to be replaced by result-based control, with parent ministries setting performance goals for agencies.

3.8.1.5 Indicators for analysis

In this section the indicators derived from the analytical framework are presented. These indicators are grouped in the three key features of agencification as outlined below.

Table 2. Indicators

Structural disaggregation

- Agency establishment as identifiable, separate organisation with its own name.
- Functions of TEVETA and continuity of the mandate.

Autonomisation

- Internal governance structure and the level of freedom concerning internal decision making.
- Funding consistency and source of funding for TEVETA.

Contractualism

- Performance objectives setting.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the literature reviewed concerning agencification and the analytical framework for the study. Structural disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualism are the

three characteristics of agencification which forms the tripod model of agencification. These characteristics are found in every agency no matter the social and cultural setting and what the agency is called. Structural disaggregation is described as a process whereby a body is separated from the parent ministry and has its own legal status, organisation structure and set of functions. Autonomisation focuses on the degree of freedom which an agency has concerning the managerial and policy aspects while contractualism focuses on the performance of the agency and the control mechanism by the government. It is from this tripod model of agencification, the analytical framework for this study has been derived. The next chapter presents the research methodology of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the study design and research methodology that was used to guide the process of data collection and analysis. The study applied qualitative method as the research strategy due to the nature of research problem and research questions which acts as major determinants of the research strategy. In order to have in-depth understanding of the research problem and taking into consideration the time factor and available resources, the study adapted a case study research design and three in-depth interviews were conducted. Interviews were used as instruments of data collection in the sense that this method of data collection allows participants to express their opinions and experiences unreservedly. Furthermore, purposive sampling was used to select participants for the study in order to involve respondents with relevant information in relation to the research problem and research questions.

In light of the above, section 4.2 presents the research strategy. Section 4.3 presents the research design. In section 4.4 the sampling method and the sample size are presented. Data collection instruments are presented in section 4.5 and section 4.6 presents data analysis while issues related to the quality of the study are presented in section 4.7. Section 4.8 presents the ethic issues and the conclusion is presented in section 4.9.

4.2 Research strategy

A research strategy is a general orientation of conducting social research and the two clusters of research strategy are qualitative and quantitative (Bryman, 2008). For the purpose of this study the qualitative method has been chosen to investigate the agencification of quality

assurance in Zambia. Bryman (2012) describes qualitative research as a strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.

Qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research (Creswell, 2014). Patton (1980) points out that in quantitative research, the emphasis is more on answering the why question leading to establishing the cause and effects, measuring and quantifying phenomena and generalisations of findings while in qualitative research the emphasis is more on answering the what and how questions, meaning and understanding of phenomena and situating the findings in a particular context. In an attempt to differentiate the quantitative and qualitative researcher, Bryman (2008) contributes that quantitative researchers are often preoccupied with applying measurement to procedures of social life, whilst the qualitative researcher is often preoccupied with the usage of words in the presentation of analyses of society.

The decision for preference of the research strategy to apply in any study depends on the type of the required data. It is in this light that the preferred strategy acts as a guide on how data will be collected and analysed and how the findings will be presented. Therefore, the rationale for adopting the qualitative research strategy in this study is to get in-depth understanding of agencification of quality assurance in Zambia. The method enables one to draw on unquantifiable but rich, that is, comprehensive and in-depth data that help to deeply understand the phenomena (Anderson, 1998).

4.3 Research design

A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012). To address the research questions of this study, the study adopted the case study design. As Stake (1995) observes, case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. In this regard it can be pointed out that this approach will enable the researcher to be familiar and understand the problem in realistic terms. Different scholars in research have described case study method in various ways. Yin (2009: 4) stresses that "... case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events such-as Individual life cycles, small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, school performance"

Yin (2003) reveals that there are various case study designs namely: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Yin describes the three as follows; Exploratory case studies may be applied in situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes whilst descriptive a case study aims at describing and observing everything related to the phenomenon of interest without influencing it in any way. Explanatory case studies are driven by the need to answer the ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions in an area of interest for the purpose of explaining the presumed causal links in real - life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. Therefore, this study adopted the explanatory case study design to address the ‘how’ question as indicated in the problem statement and to further help the researcher link the development of TEVETA and agencification.

4.4 Sampling method and sample size

The study used purposive sampling which is categorised under non probability sampling of the participants. The goal of purposive sampling according to Bryman (2012) is to sample cases or participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed. Therefore, the researcher does not seek to sample the respondents on a random basis. The reason of using this type of sampling as noted by Manning (2000) is to enable the person doing a study experience a multitude of points of view on an issue being studied.

The study involved three (3) key participants purposely selected from TEVETA and MESVTEE. The composition of the participants is that two officers were from TEVETA and one officer from the MESVTEE. The participants were purposively selected because they were known to have knowledge deemed relevant for the study.

4.5 Data collection instruments

In this study semi – structured interviews and document review were the means of data collection. The research interview is a prominent data – collection strategy in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Bryman, 2012). An interview as defined by Silverman (2004) is an interaction between the researcher and the respondents in which both participants create and construct the narrative versions of the social reality.

The researcher conducted face - to - face interviews with two participants and one telephone phone interview which was as a result of limited time to organise for the face to face interview. These interviews were unstructured and generally based on open ended questions which allowed the participants to express their opinions and experiences freely. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 2) stress that a research interview is based on conversations of daily life and is a professional conversation where knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between the interviewer and the interviewee ... an interchange of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual respect.

Creswell (2014: 190) expounds that during the process of research, the researcher may collect qualitative documents. The term document in the social sciences is defined differently by various scholars. A sociologist, for example, (Altheide, 1996: 2), described a document as any symbolic representation that can be recorded or retrieved for analysis. The researcher reviewed document literature such as TEVETA reports, pamphlets, strategic reports and TEVETA news from TEVETA to supplement the information which was gathered in the interviews.

4.6 Data analysis

Bryman (2012) notes that the process of coding is a crucial stage in the process of data analysis. The data analysis activity consisted of transcribing and coding relevant responses which addressed the research questions. In qualitative research, Bryman (2012) points out that coding is the process whereby data are broken down into components parts, which are given names. The researcher transcribed and coded the participants' responses and extracted relevant information which was directly addressing the research questions and taking into consideration the importance of the findings to the research problem. The three participants of the study are protected in line with the ethical issues of research in accordance with Bryman (2012) by naming the officer from the MESVTEE as officer from Ministry and two officers from TEVETA as 1st officer from TEVETA and 2nd officer from TEVETA.

4.7 Validity and Reliability

The most prominent criteria for judging quality of social research are reliability, replication and validity (Bryman, 2012). Bryman (2012: 715 - 717) describes them as follows; Reliability is concerned with the question of whether a measure of a concept is stable whilst replication which is mostly valued in quantitative research and is concerned with the degree to which the results of the study can be reproduced. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from one piece of research. Kleven (2007) affirms Bryman's definition of validity as an approximate truth of inference.

Apart from the above criteria, Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that alternative terms and ways of assessing qualitative research are required. For example, they propose trustworthiness as a criterion of how good a qualitative study is. Each aspect of trustworthiness has a parallel with the quantitative research criteria. (i) Credibility, which parallels internal validity - that is, how believable are the findings? (ii) Transferability, which parallels external validity – that is, do the findings apply to other contexts? (iii) Dependability, which parallels reliability – that is, are the findings likely to apply at other times? (iv) Confirmability, which parallels objectivity - that is, has the investigator allowed his or her values to intrude to a high degree?

Therefore, to ensure trustworthiness in this study, the researcher carefully designed the data collection instruments and used purposive sampling to select the relevant appropriate respondents for the study. In addition, appropriate relevant documents were carefully chosen for the study. Bryman (2012: 717) describes triangulation as the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings maybe cross checked. To enhance validity, the data which was collected through interviews was complemented by documents which were analyzed.

4.8 Ethical issues

Ethical issues arise at a variety of stages in social research. Ethical issues cannot be ignored, as they relate directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the disciplines that are involved (Bryman, 2012). Literature in research reveals that ethical principles in social research revolve around certain issues that are broken down by Diener and Crandall (1978)

into four main areas, namely: whether there is harm to participants, lack of informed consent, and invasion of privacy, and whether deception is involved.

In order to uphold the ethical principles in this study, the identity and positions of the participants have been kept confidential. Bryman (2012: 136) explains that the issue of harm of participants in the ethical codes advocates care over maintaining the confidentiality of records meaning that identities and records of individuals should be maintained as confidential.

In addition, the researcher wrote to TEVETA requesting to conduct a study from there and used a letter from the University of Oslo's Department of Education for introductory purposes. This is in accordance with the issue of lack of informed consent. In the view of Bryman (2012: 138), this principle means that prospective research participants should be given as much information as might be needed to make informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate in the study.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research design and methodology for the study. The research methodology discussed in this chapter was selected and applied in this study based on its relevance to address the research problem and research questions. The study applied a qualitative research approach and a case study research design. In addition, purposive sampling was employed to select participants for the study and interviews were the means of data collection.

CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and interprets the findings of the study obtained through document analysis and interviews in view of the analytical framework and identified indicators of the study presented in the third chapter. The research questions which were introduced in chapter one are as follows:

1. *What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA?*
2. *How is TEVETA organised and governed?*
3. *How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its establishment?*
4. *What are the main internal and external change drivers of TEVETA?*

5.2 Research findings and interpretations

5.2.1 Structural disaggregation

5.2.1.1 Agency establishment as identifiable, separate organisation with its own name

A process of reconsidering the policy and institutional framework for the TEVET subsector got underway in 1994. The TEVET Policy (1996) stated that the TEVET system needed to be highly responsive to employment patterns of the economy hence the enactment of the TEVET Act of 1998 by the government which led to the creation of entrepreneurship and informal sector training and the creation of TEVETA. The TEVET Act of 1998 was reviewed and TEVET Act No. 11 of 2005 was enacted. TEVETA holds the main function, including that of accreditations body of both public and private higher education institutions regarding to the

curricula and standard of the programmes. In addition, the agency works hand in hand with the institutions for the purpose of safeguarding acceptable levels of academic and professional standards in the TEVET sector in Zambia.

When the TEVET reforms were instituted, TEVET institutions were placed under management boards as a result one of the reforms after the dissolution of the DTEVT. The dissolution of DTEVT sees the birth of TEVETA. The 1st officer from TEVETA had this to say as the reason for the establishment of TEVETA:

“One of the main reasons for establishing TEVETA was the change in the environment especially from the centralized provision of Technical Education Vocational Training to one which is liberalised attracting other players apart from government then hopefully that was hoped that the training system will cater for everybody.”

TEVETA was established as a separate entity from the ministry following the liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990's. At this time it was no longer the preserve of government institutions to provide Technical and Vocational Training which was then tailored to meet the needs of the parastatal companies. Therefore, with the increased private sector participation in the economy that came with diverse skills requirements, it became necessary to create a structure and organisation for TEVET in Zambia, which would provide the necessary flexibility and relevance in training to meet Zambia's emerging labour market demands. Hence a national training authority was established identifiable in the name of TEVETA separate at arm's length from the MESVTEE. The 1st officer from TEVETA confirmed this as follows:

“... having now unpacked the policy statement which was allowing for anybody to provide TEVET, both public and as well as private sector players. Then it was agreed that in line with other economic liberalisation policies then the training sector also needed to be liberalised so that apart from Government, the private sector can also come in hence the creation of a separate authority to oversee the sector.”

In 2000, DTEVT was dissolved and was replaced by TEVETA. With the dissolution of DTVET, the 23 institutions which it managed were placed under management boards. The Department of Vocational Education and Training (DVET) in the Ministry of Science,

Technology and Vocational Training was created to formulate, monitor and evaluate the TEVET Policy. The department also promotes TEVET and assesses the impact of TEVET programmes. The department has two units namely Entrepreneurship and Skills units (Konayuma, 2008). Another function of the department is to increase stakeholder participation in the provision of TEVET. Before the TVET reforms that started in the 1990s, TVET provision was mostly done by public institutions. Currently TVET provision is also done by private institutions, faith based organisations, trusts and community based institutions. The officer from the ministry had this to say concerning the purpose of government establishing TEVETA as a separate entity:

“As a co-side government institution and as you may wish to know the government established TEVETA with an expectation of supervising, regulating and also conducting examinations in the all TEVET sector in the country. When we talk of TEVETA, TEVETA does not own institutions, it’s just a regulator. It regulates the TEVET sector both public and private”.

5.2.1.2 Functions and continuity of the Mandate of TEVETA

The Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Act (No.13 of 1998), and amended by Act No. 11 of 2005 provides that TEVETA shall: (i) facilitate the development of technical capacity in institutions established or registered under this Act; (ii) develop national curricula in consultation with stakeholders; (iii) set minimum standards and qualifications for any occupation, skill, technology or trade in accordance with trends in industry; (iv) provide guidelines for the development of institutional curricula; (v) accredit local and foreign examinations to be taken by persons attending courses at an institution established or registered under this Act; and (vi) charge and collect fees in respect of examinations, assessments and other services provided by the Authority.

TEVETA has many functions including to: (a) advise the Minister on TEVET in Zambia; (b) regulate and advise Management Boards; (c) development and review of national curricula; (d) regulate and conduct examinations related to TEVET (e) trades testing (f) registration and

inspection of both public and private TEVET institutions. In addition to these functions, Nkanza (2003) states that the mandate for TEVETA is to regulate, coordinate and monitor TEVT in consultation with the industry, lawyers', employers, employees and other stakeholders. The officer from the ministry puts the mandate as follows:

“Its original mandate is to help supervise, to help regulate and examine programs that are of TEVET nature, those are its initial mandate to help regulate, supervise and to help manage. So it's about supervision and it's about regulation, for example TEVETA registers all TEVET institutions in the country, in respect whether they are government or private”.

In light of the above functions and mandate, TEVETA was given an additional function in 2005 of managing the TEVET Fund for the purpose of sustaining training. Mukuni (2014) indicates that as one of the key outputs of the TEVET Development Programme, the TEVET Fund was established through the TEVET (amendment) Act (number 11 of 2005), which provided for the Fund to be managed by TEVETA. According to the Act, the Fund consists of:

- a) Such monies as may be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of the TEVET Fund;
- b) Such monies as may be paid to the Fund by way of loans, grants or donations;
- c) Such percentage of the registration, examination, assessment and other fees payable to TEVETA as the Minister may determine in consultation with the Authority;
- d) Subject to the approval of the Minister responsible for finance, such monies as may be paid to the Fund from any levy which may be imposed and collected for purposes of TEVET.

5.2.1.3 Discussion of the findings on structural disaggregation

In light of the above, it is therefore true to argue that the establishment of TEVETA is not a different case from other Sub-Saharan African countries which have experienced the wave of NPM driven by the similar ideology behind agencification. In the public management literature, agencification in developing countries has been pointed out to be sponsored by international donor organisations, such as the World Bank and IMF. For instance, Rugumyambeto (2004) indicates that Tanzania, a neighbouring country to Zambia, adopted

the agency programme in the 1997 with the sole purpose of improving the management of public services provisions, a development which was mainly supported by the major donors like the IMF and World Bank. Zambia is not an exception in this; the findings of this study have revealed that the establishment of TEVETA is a result of a similar ideology behind agencification and the support of the Brentwood institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. The officer from the Ministry confirms this as follows:

“The main objective of government establishing TEVETA is first of all the product of the TEVET reforms of the 1990s which was the consequence of multi-lateral pressure from the Brentwood institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and other multi-lateral institutions”.

On the other hand, the establishment of TEVETA can be said to be in line with Pollitt et al.’s (2004) argument that one of the reasons of creating agencies is to put public services closer to their users. Pollitt et al.’s observation agrees with the revelation of the findings that the government ceased to be the sole provider of TEVET due to reasons such as high demand of TEVET in the country hence there was increase in stakeholders’ participation following the liberalisation of the economy. This also can be linked to Christensen and Læg Reid (2007) who point out that the rise of agencies can be traced from the strains noted by governments, such as work overload to the civil service and ministries resulting in insufficient attention to service delivery. In this regard, this can be associated to the issue of effectiveness and efficiency which has been revealed by public management literature as one of the reasons for agency creation.

However, another line of thought concerning the establishment of such an agency can be associated to be in line with the views of the contingency approach (March and Olsen, 1989). It is under the contingency approach that Trondal and Egeberg (2013) point out that the decision of agency creation is triggered by the particular circumstances of the moment. However, elaborating the detailed assessment regarding the contingency approach is beyond this study due to that the contingency approach has not been captured in the analytical framework for the study. Nevertheless, it can be safe in this regard to point out that government was responding to the need of national labour market demand of diverse skills and improve the provision of public services by assisting technical training providers both private and public in the country. The findings indicate that the establishment of such an institution proves valid the elements of agencification as elaborated by Pollitt and Talbot (2004) of which TEVETA is an identifiable separate organisation, with its own mandate and

name since it was established with a clear statutory document through the act of parliament which led to its establishment.

Agencies are established with various specific purposes and the mandate of TEVETA is evident of such. This is in agreement with the report by the Public Service Commission (2012) that agencies are established with various expectations, such as the improvement of the performance of government, whether through their policy advice, regulatory role, or service delivery, depending on why they were established in the first place. The 1st officer from TEVETA confirmed this as follows:

“The original mandate for TEVETA has not changed since the time of its establishment. By law, the original mandate for TEVETA is to regulate, coordinate and monitor TEVT in consultation with the industry, lawyers’, employers, employees and other stakeholders. This has been the general function of TEVETA from the time it was established”.

This response by the interviewee marks a good point of concern regarding the mandate and raises the question whether TEVETA fulfils its mandate effectively. This is especially relevant from the perspective of the revelation of the study that the TEVET sector has expanded whilst the interviewee indicate that the mandate is still the same since TEVETA was established although an additional function to manage the TEVET Fund has been added to its initial functions. However, giving a detailed analysis in this regard is beyond this study in part due to that the study focused on the rationale for setting up TEVETA. Again, the major stakeholders, the TEVET institutions were not captured, as part of the sample of the study.

5.3 Autonomisation

5.3.1 Internal governance structure and the level of freedom concerning internal decision making

Governance is about the frameworks in which organisations manage themselves and about the processes and structures used to achieve the intended outcomes – in other words it is about how organisations operate (Maassen, 2003). TEVETA is governed by a board appointed by the Minister responsible for Vocational Education and Training in accordance with Section 6 (1) of the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (Amendment) Act

No. 11 of 2005. The initial act of 1998 provided for 21 board members and it was the biggest board since the establishment of TEVETA. In 2005, the act was revised and the number of the board members dropped from 21 to 11. The major reason for the reduction in the number of board members was that it was too big and one of the discussions was that it was costly. The board members normally serve a term of 3 years.

The first board of 21 members was appointed in July 1999 and this board served up to around 2006 while the 11 members that started – in 2006 served up to around 2011. Recently the number of the board members has been reduced to 10 following the merging of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science Technology and Vocational Training¹¹, hence only one permanent secretary has the mandate to sit on the board representing government. Previously, both permanent secretaries of the two ministries had the mandate to sit on the board.

The board consists of representation from various stakeholders namely: a representative of a federation of trade unions; a representative of the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry; one representative from a University established under the University Act; a representative from a federation of employers' organisations; a representative of the Zambia Chamber for Small and Medium Business Associations; a representative of a research and development institution established under the Science and Technology Act; a representative of a religious organisation involved in providing Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training; a representative of the Ministry responsible for TEVET; a representative of the Ministry responsible for labour; a representative of the Ministry responsible for education; and one other extra board member. The members elect a Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson from among themselves. In terms of organisation, the board has three committees regarding to its activities and these are: Finance and administration committee, TEVET fund committee and Technical committee (TEVETA, 2010).

TEVETA is organised in four divisions and these divisions are headed by directors who report to the office of the Director General and the Director General is also an automatic member

¹¹ The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science Technology and Vocational Training were merged in 2012 to form MESVTEE (<https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/28/president-sata-effects-cabinet/>).

(secretary) of the board. The four divisions are as follows: (i) The Training Standards Division which holds the responsibility for registration and accreditation; (ii) The Development Division which is responsible for curricula and training system development and currently this division is also responsible for TEVET research and innovation responsibility; (iii) the Assessment and Qualifications Division which is responsible for the assessment and certification of the examinations ran by TEVETA; and (iv) the Finance and Administration Division which holds the regulatory functions. The 1st officer from TEVETA confirmed the following as the regulatory function:

“... (a) They anchor the information education and communication function and that is the first line of regulation with the purpose to make people aware that a training institution cannot be run without registration. (b) They also anchor the training fund from the TEVET fund - under the revised law in 2005, TEVETA was given an additional function to be manager of the TEVET fund”.

The TEVET fund plays an important role in helping the GRZ to develop a high quality, sustainable, demand - driven, and equitable TEVET system. The fund establishes a financing platform that purchases training services from the public and private providers on a competitive basis, supports training of workers by enterprises, and finances infrastructure, equipment, and capacity building to upgrade training institutions. In the availability of resources from the government or partners, TEVETA manages those in line with the agreement made with the government to provide specific training outcomes. Basically, that fund is used by TEVETA to purchase training services from registered training providers in line with the funding priorities (TEVETA, 2006).

TEVETA has about forty members of staff and these are employed based on their qualifications. The staffs at TEVETA are employed on renewable contracts and the responsibility of employing is one of the tasks of the board. MESVTEE as a parent ministry oversees the operations of TEVETA by putting the board in place and this defines the TEVETA ministry relationship. The officer from the ministry had this to say regarding TEVETA ministry relationship:

“The relationship between the ministry and TEVETA is that TEVETA is the subset of this ministry, it reports to this ministry and to the permanent secretary of this ministry.”

5.3.2 Funding consistency and sources of funding for TEVETA

The TEVET system in Zambia is financed through a variety of sources: (i) Government provide funding to public TVET institutions through the relevant ministries. Funds are used to subsidise training fees and for operational costs of TVET institutions. (ii) Charities and donors ensure funding for community-based and faith-based TVET providers. Those organisations subsidise TVET training for socio-economically disadvantaged learners. (iii) Training fees are a significant source of funding for both public and private TVET providers. However, fees charged by private institutions are not regulated while public TVET institutions need to seek approval for training fees from the corresponding ministries. (iv) Industry provides funding for enterprise-based training allowing students to train directly at the workplace. (v) Established under the TVET (Amendment) Act. No. 11 of 2005, the TEVET Fund serves as a source of funding for public and private providers. The Government provides funds for the TEVET Fund which is consequently awarded to pre-determined training programmes at public training institutions (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2010). The following interview response by the 1st officer from TEVETA confirms this:

“The main source of funding at TEVETA is the government through the Ministry of Finance which gives the sealing. The government also decides on how TEVETA should fund its activities. This funding is supplemented with regulatory fees, occasional donor funding with their projects although currently this has become erratic in the TEVET sector”.

TEVET’s strategic paper (2007) revealed that government budgetary allocations for financing TEVET was increasingly inadequate, and even if additional funds were made available, government alone could not meet the costs of financing TEVET. The TEVET sector in the country is expanding yearly. In 2002, there were 231 TVET institutions registered, in 2004 there were 314, and in 2006 there were 351 (Mukuni, 2014). TEVETA, on the other hand supplements government funding through the services it offers and this includes those associated with conducting examinations, the registration of training institutions, and the accreditation of examiners, assessors and trainers. The budget of TEVETA has also received support from cooperating partners towards specific programmes and objectives. Management

at TEVETA through the appropriate and technical channels are in constant process of lobbying to the government for increase in funding to the agency.

In order to redeem this funding challenge, TEVETA is planning to increase access to TEVET so that there can be an increase in the number of learners in the TEVET sector. This will be done by coming up with a training system which will promote different path - ways to have many learners into the system. The rationale behind this intent is that there can be an increase in the regulatory fees and this will also give an opportunity to more people to attain training. The expectation with this initiative is that extra funds will be generated by what learners pay and perhaps government can also take note and grant more support to such efforts. This is what the 2nd officer from TEVETA had to say concerning the level of funding at TEVETA:

“The current level of funding for TEVETA is insufficient for TEVETA to be able to achieve its goals and many instances we have not been able to implement some of our planned activities due to lack of financing”.

5.3.3 Discussion of the findings on autonomisation

The revelation of the study is that TEVETA has its own separate system of governance from MESVTEE. From the findings, it has been noted that the board of TEVETA is an instrument of the government whose influence trickles down to the management of TEVETA although it is structural separated from the parent ministry with its own internal structure and system of governance. This can be referred to as ‘conditional autonomy’ where the agency needs approval from the parent ministry through the board of the agency in order to undertake activities as compared to real autonomy where this approval would not be necessary. This is in the light of the decisions concerning the managerial issues, budgetary issues and members of staff which are in the hands of the board, is the members of which are appointed by and acts on behalf of the government. This low level of managerial autonomy at TEVETA cannot be compared to the degree of autonomy which agencies in developed countries, such as in Sweden and the UK, experience as pointed out by Pollitt et al. (2004). However, the conditional autonomy at TEVETA is similar to what is happening in other developing countries such as in Tanzania as revealed by Sulle (2010) who has noted that agencies in Tanzania have quite low both managerial and operational autonomy. Again, this is also what

is happening in Ghana as revealed by Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) who concluded that the GETFund has insufficient autonomy and the board is an instrument of the government. Giving that examining the detailed rationale behind the conditional autonomy at TEVETA is beyond this study which implies that such examination requires another study. However, it can be associated to Christensen and Læg Reid's (2005) observation that this may be seen as a blame avoidance strategy for politicians by shifting responsibility for policy failure to bureaucrats and experts.

The way in which TEVETA is governed is not very different from what is happening in other developing countries where agencies have their own governing boards, even though the composition of these boards can be different from one country to another, and this can also be noted at the GETFund (Kwasi-Agyeman, 2015). TEVETA is being governed by the board which is the employer of the staff and it is appointed by the Minister. Furthermore, the permanent secretary of the parent ministry is also a member of the TEVETA board, which explains the mechanism used by government to intentionally influence the actions of the agency as Verschuere (2007) puts it. Therefore, it can be safe to argue that the staff at TEVETA is employed by the Ministry indirectly through the board which functions on behalf of the government. It is in this line of thought that it can be interpreted that the Ministry has indirect influence in the operations of TEVETA through the board as it is the one which appoints it in place and it has its own space on the same board. The following response from the 2nd officer from TEVETA is an excellent illustration of what has been discussed above:

“The Ministry has an influence on the decisions at TEVETA in the sense that the governing board of TEVETA is appointed by the Ministry and supports its operational cost, especially in the area of assessments”.

This also is in line with the findings of Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) that the government in Ghana interferes with the work of GETFund by appointing the agency's senior members. This is also in some respects in line with the work of Molander et al. (2002) who revealed that, as an outcome of the problems, Swedish politicians turned to other means of dealing with the power of agencies. Therefore, the above explanation indicates the link between TEVETA and the Ministry proving Braun's (2008) observation that an agency does not exist in isolation but it is interconnected with other institutional levels, and agencies are the implementers of the

decisions made at the Ministerial level. However, this places TEVETA at a difficult position in terms of its operations. This can be confirmed by the following response of the officer from the Ministry:

“We as government own public TEVET institutions but TEVETA which operates under this ministry supervises both public and private institutions ... and this is where the trick part comes in because TEVETA will find it very difficult to go and close a public TEVET institution when it does not meet the stipulated required standards. If it means closing a public institution, then TEVETA is closing the government but the issue is that most of the government institutions would have met the minimum standards, because government is large.”

In light of the above, financial autonomy is another aspect under autonomisation which can be argued to be quite low at TEVETA. This can be noted in the insufficient funding to TEVETA which cannot even match the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country. In addition, it can be noted in the findings that TEVETA has limited authority to make decisions concerning funds, as this is the responsibility of the government through the Ministry of Finance. The findings indicate that the government is not only the main funder but also holds the responsibility of approving the budget of TEVETA. This situation is contrary to Verhoest et al. (2004) who point out that agencies are free to make their own decisions including on financial aspects. The low level of financial autonomy at TEVETA is a similar case to what is happening at GETFund as revealed by Kwasi-Agyemen (2015) who pointed out that GETFund has insufficient financial autonomy.

The insufficient and inconsistent funding to meet the current TEVET national demands can be noted in the budgetary allocation by the government. For instance, an investigation in the national budget of 2015 at TEVETA indicated that the education sector as a whole in the country was allocated 20.20 % of the total national budget and out of that only 0.20 % was allocated to the TEVET sector. The latter represents a very minimal amount given especially that the TEVET sector is expanding yearly. This can be confirmed by the following excellent response from the 2nd officer at TEVETA:

“The annual funding to TEVET has been stable but insufficient over the years. Similarly, the grant to TEVETA has been insufficient and sometimes not consistent. As a result, we have not implemented our budgets as planned”.

Therefore, it can be safe to argue that the level of funding of TEVETA has not grown proportional to meeting the demands of the sector. This affects the operations of TEVETA in terms of achieving all the set goals due to insufficient funding. Again, it can be argued that TEVETA does not fulfil its mandate fully nation wide due to the inability of implementing the budget as a result of inadequate funds as indicated by the interviewees’ response.

Therefore, the revelation of this study is not only similar to what is happening in Ghana at the GETFund, but this is also what is happening in other Sub-Saharan African countries such as Tanzania as revealed by Sulle (2010) who points out that agencies in Tanzania have quite low financial autonomy and operate in situations of insufficient resources.

5.4 Contractualisation

5.4.1 Performance objective setting and reporting

The management of TEVETA has been charged with the responsibility to develop operational policies, procedures and guidelines, but once developed these have to be approved by the TEVETA board before they can be used in practice. However, practices that need to be escalated to regulations are presented to the Minister who may issue them in the form of a Statutory Instrument for enforcement.

In terms of operation, each division at TEVETA has the responsibility to set its own strategic objectives and works towards the achievement of such objectives with the use of set indicators for each objective. For instance, the overall objective according to the current TEVETA Strategic plan (2014 - 2016) is *“to promote access to TEVET and facilitate significant growth in annual enrolments and graduation rates by December 2015, while ensuring World class quality, equity and system efficiency and effectiveness”*. The overall Strategic Plan objective is then executed within the legislative context and prevailing divisional structures of TEVETA and each division sets objectives towards the achievement of this general one.

In terms of performance reporting, the specialists in each division report to managers and these managers report to the division directors. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of these division directors to report to the Director General of TEVETA about the performance in the divisions. TEVETA holds the responsibility of drawing its own work plan and the budget which is subjected for approval to the board. Once the approval is done by the board, then it is submitted to the government who later consolidates and submits it to parliament. When the approval is done by parliament, the board of TEVETA then ensures that management acts and does the implementation process.

5.4.2 Discussion of the findings on contractualisation

The revelation of the study is that TEVETA holds the responsibility of setting performance objectives. However, the Ministry which is at the higher level as illustrated by Braun (2008: 232) in the institutional matrix of political governance, is involved in day to day decision making about the implementation of the activities and grants approval to the formulated performance objectives or strategic plans, the fees and the budget by TEVETA. This is a type of control known as ex ante control as identified by Verhoest (2005) where the agency seeks approval pre undertaking any action. This is not only happening at TEVETA, Sulle (2012) observed in Tanzania that most of the agencies have dominated the process of setting their own performance goals, however, the centre has continued to retain power over various aspects of human resources management, rendering agencies less autonomous over operational matters. In this regard, the revelation of this study indicates a different situation compared to Christensen and Lægreid's (2007) observation that the parent ministries set performance goals for agencies for the purpose of control. The following is an excellent response by the 2nd officer from TEVETA confirming what has been discussed above:

“ ... based on the policy objectives as issued by Government, TEVETA develops a strategic plan in which it sets performance targets and government approves TEVETA's strategic and annual work plans and budgets”.

This action by the government is also similar to what is happening in Ghana. The study by Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) revealed that the government uses the legal framework to control the GETFund when it comes to monitoring.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the findings of the study have been presented and analyzed. This has been done by the use of the analytical framework and identified indicators of the study. The study reveals that the establishment of TEVETA is associated to the TEVET reforms of the 1990s and was structural disaggregated from the parent ministry following the liberalisation of the economy to meet the local needs. Its original mandate has not changed since its establishment which is to help supervise, regulate and manage the TEVET sector in the country. However, it was given an additional function of managing the TEVET Fund in 2005. Further, the study has revealed that the level of autonomisation at TEVET is low in the sense that the board at TEVETA is not as independent as it should be but it is an instrument of the government, and the parent ministry holds the responsibility of approving the activities before the agency undertakes the implementation process. Again, the level of funding to TEVETA is inconsistent and insufficient to the extent where the budget is sometimes not implemented fully and the government is the major source of funding. In regards to contractualism, TEVETA holds the responsibility of setting the performance objectives, however, these require approval from the board. The next chapter presents the conclusions of the findings.

6.1 Introduction

The current agencification process is connected to NPM and it is an international trend which is in fashion. The ideology of NPM and associated reforms has spread across the globe and this study focused on the public management dynamics in Africa, more specifically, in the Zambian context. This study has contributed to the literature concerning this subject from the African perspective where this subject has not much been studied as much when compared to developed countries. It is in this vein that the findings of this study have made reference also to agencification in Tanzania and Ghana to contribute to the understanding of agencification in the Sub-Saharan African perspective as compared to the agencification in the developed countries.

6.2 Conclusion

6.2.1 Research question 1

What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA?

The public management literature raises an argument that agencies were established for various reasons and the current importance of agencification in public management practices around the world can be related to NPM. The empirical data in the fifth chapter has revealed many issues concerning the establishment of TEVETA. TEVETA is a product of the TEVET reforms of the 1990s which swept across the nation and the region. This was supported by Brentwood's institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. Further, the results have shown that the commercial pressure in the country to change the vocational training system in terms of skills development led to the establishment of TEVETA. An important rationale in this was the intention to change the role of the government from being the central providers of TEVT to the one which liberalised the sector and hence attracted various new providers. Following the liberalisation of the economy, TEVETA was established as a separate entity to meet the needs of the local environment and the parastatal companies hence government shifting the responsibility by setting up a separate entity. It is evident that TEVETA was formally established under the TEVET act no. 13 of 1998 and amended by act no. 11 of 2005. Its

mandate is to regulate, coordinate and monitor the TEVET sector in consultation with the stakeholders in the country. This was its original mandate upon its establishment and still forms the core of the mandate for the agency.

Therefore, in light of the above findings regarding the establishment of TEVETA, it can be concluded that the assumption number one presented in the third chapter on structural disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent Ministry is corroborated. The assumption states that the structural disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent ministry is formal with the main purpose of meeting the local demands of the TEVET sector in the country as a means of enhancing service provision. Although this is the main conclusion concerning the establishment of TEVETA, it cannot be denied that other factors also contributed to the establishment of TEVETA. From the findings and the discussion, this study argues that the setting up of TEVETA is not a different case from what has happened in most other Sub-Saharan African countries and TEVETA displays most of the elements of agencification.

6.2.2 Research question 2

How is TEVETA organised and governed?

It is evident from the study that TEVETA is governed by its board of directors whose members currently add up to ten and they serve tenure of three years. The board members are appointed by the Minister of MESVTEE in accordance to the TEVET act. This board is composed of various stakeholders and it is organised in three committees namely the Finance and administration committee, TEVET fund committee, and the Technical committee. The study has also shown that TEVETA is hierarchical structured and organised in four divisions. These divisions are finance and administration division, development division, assessment and qualification division, and training standards divisions. Each of these divisions has its own specific functions and is headed by a division director.

The analysis of the governance and organisation of TEVETA leads to the conclusion that TEVETA has limited space to manoeuvre concerning its activities hence signalling low degree of managerial autonomy. The Ministry has granted TEVETA the space to draw the work plan and the budget. However, these are subjected to the approval of the Ministry hence referring to it as ‘conditional autonomy’. Therefore, the study, results and the discussion of the study suggests that the Ministry is an instrument of the government which has influence on TEVETA through the board it puts in place by means of ex ante control. In light of the

above, the study has concluded that assumption number two on autonomisation is corroborated. The assumption states that TEVETA has a low degree of autonomisation as compared to agencies in developed countries such as the Nordic countries and the UK. However, assumption number three on contractualism can be restated to read TEVETA sets its own performance goals, however, approval is in the hands of the parent Ministry (MESVTEE).

6.2.3 Research question 3

How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its establishment?

The results of the study indicate that the government is the main source of funding at TEVETA. The government through the Ministry of Finance decides at which level TEVETA should be funded. Wherever possible, TEVETA supplements the government funding with donor funding. TEVETA also gets resources from the services it offers, namely regulatory fees, examinations, regulation of training institutions, and accreditation of examiners, assessors and trainers. Furthermore, the study has shown that the current level of public funding is inconsistent and insufficient regarding the TEVET sector to the extent where planned activities sometimes are not implemented by TEVETA. Again, the results of the study have revealed that funding has not grown to match the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country which has continuously been expanding. In order to address the problem of insufficient funding at TEVETA, the study has revealed that TEVETA intends to get as many learners as possible in the sector by promoting different path ways with the intent of having more funds through learners' payments. This is in line with the TEVETA strategic plan (2014 - 2016) which aims at promoting access to TEVET and facilitate increase in annual enrolments and graduate rates. Again, this is also related to the mandate in that if need arises to create more path ways in the TEVET sector, TEVETA holds the responsibility of regulating, coordinating and monitoring TEVT in the country in consultation with the stakeholders.

Based on the findings and discussions of the study, it is concluded that funding of TEVETA has not developed in relation to the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country and TEVETA operates in a situation of insufficient resources.

6.2.4 Research question 4

What are the main internal and external change drivers of TEVETA?

The main conclusion with respect to this research question is that there is no substantial change that has taken place regarding the mandate of TEVETA. The findings of the study indicate that the mandate of helping supervising, coordinating, regulating and managing the TEVET sector in the country is still the same since the establishment of TEVETA. However, in 2005, TEVETA was given an additional function of managing the TEVET Fund for the purpose of sustaining training in the TEVET sector in the country. It is important to emphasize here that the detailed changes that have taken place at TEVETA are beyond this study and may require another study. This study only took into consideration finding out any changes concerning the mandate of TEVETA from the time of its establishment.

6.3 Reflections on the main conclusions

The main conclusions of the study concern (i) the rationale for setting up TEVETA, (ii) how it is governed and organised, (iii) how funding has developed since its establishment, and (iv) the main internal and external change drivers. Agencification is a reality in Sub-Saharan Africa, even though the underlying NPM ideology has its genesis in the developed countries. Public management literature has revealed that NPM and associated administrative reforms have spread around continents. However, compared to the situation in developed countries the implementation of such reforms can be argued to be different in Sub-Saharan African countries, even though some of the components are similar.

The results of the study indicate that one of the main differences between agencification in Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries is that the board of the agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa are instruments of the government and are not as independent as they could be expected to be. For instance, the results of this study tend to be similar to the results of a study which was conducted at GETFund in Ghana by Kwasi-Agyemen (2015). Both studies focused on a single agency (TEVETA and GETFund) in the higher education sector under the Ministry of Education in a single particular country (Zambia and Ghana). The findings in both studies reveal that the parent ministries have influence in if not control of the operations of the agencies. The findings reveal that both agencies experience a low degree of autonomisation

and operate in environments with insufficient resources. In light of these findings of the study, the implication is therefore that the policy makers and the government should be aware of the functions and importance of TEVETA in higher education in the TEVET sector in the country hence giving it the level of autonomisation and resources it requires to achieve its goals and mandate. Again, the findings of this study mark the difference of the implementation of NPM reforms and agencification in the Sub-Saharan African countries. In this regard, it is safe to indicate that agencification in Sub-Sahara African countries with reference made to Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia displays a hybrid characteristic of the key features of the tripod model of agencification.

The analytical framework used in this study can be improved by encompassing the contingency approach. This will add more information and provides an enhanced foundation for interpreting the establishment of TEVETA and institutional change that has taken place since its establishment. This is so in the sense that the contingency approach explains institutional change and timing of establishing organisations (March and Olsen, 1989).

This study has unfolded few possibilities for further scholarly research. As indicated in chapter one, this study focused on the question how the development of TEVETA can be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia? This study was limited in its scope hence in order to advance more knowledge of agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia, it can be essential to focus on this topic with the inclusion of the TEVET institutions in the study. Again, future studies regarding this subject could focus on finding practical ways for improving agencification in Sub-Saharan African countries by taking into consideration the lesson of successful agencification processes in developed countries such as the Nordic countries and the UK, and apply it in their local social and cultural setting to address local needs and realities.

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APPENDICES

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE MINISTRY

Aim / Topic	Question / Guide	Timing
Introduction	Thank you for taking part in this interview. It will last between 40 minutes and an hour. Hope you will find this interview interesting and interactive. Please respond honestly and openly to the questions of which the responses will be taken anonymous and for academic purposes only.	
Rationale	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What were the main reasons for establishing TEVETA? 2. Why was TEVETA established as a separate entity from the Ministry? 3. What was its original mandate? 4. How does the Ministry of the Education ensure that TEVETA achieves its goals? 	10 mins
Organisation & Governance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. How is the current relationship between the Ministry of Education and TEVETA? In your view, how has this relationship developed since the establishment of TEVETA? 6. What role does TEVETA play in the current relationship between the Ministry of Education and the TEVET institutions? 7. Who is the role of the Ministry of Education in the organisation and governance of TEVETA? 8. Who is responsible for recruiting and appointing staff at TEVETA? 9. How much influence does the Ministry of Education on TEVETA's way of operation? To what extent can the Ministry control the decisions made by TEVETA concerning quality assessment? 10. How would you describe the room to manoeuvre TEVETA has in developing and implementing its procedures, activities and practices in the area of quality assessment? 	20 mins
Funding	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. How and by whom is the level of funding determined that TEVETA receives receive annually? 12. How does the Ministry fund TEVETA? 13. In your opinion, does TEVETA receive the level of funding its needs to achieve its goals? 14. How has annual level of funding TEVETA received since its 	10 mins

	establishment developed over the years? Stable – increase - decrease?	
Conclusion	<p>We have come to the end of the discussion, but is there anything you have thought important of to be mentioned while we have been discussing that you wish to add.</p> <p>Thank you once again.</p>	5 mins

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TEVETA

Aim / Topic	Question / Guide	Timing
Introduction	Thank you for taking part in this interview. It will last between 40 minutes and an hour. Hope you will find this interview interesting and interactive. Please respond honestly and openly to the questions of which the responses will be taken anonymous and for academic purposes only.	
Rationale	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What were the main arguments for establishing TEVETA? 2. Why was TEVETA established as a separate entity from the Ministry of Education? 3. What was its original mandate at the time of its establishment? Is the current mandate the same as the original one? 4. In your opinion, has the rationale underlying TEVETA changed over the years? 	10 mins
Organisation & Governance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. How is TEVETA organised? 6. How is TEVETA governed? 7. Who is responsible for recruiting and appointing staff at TEVETA? 8. What is the role of the Ministry of Education in determining the organisation and governance of TEVETA? 9. How much influence does the Ministry of Education on TEVETA's way of operations? To what extent can the Ministry control the decisions made by TEVETA concerning quality assessment? 10. To what extent is TEVETA able to make its own decisions concerning its programmes and activities? 11. How does TEVETA relate to the Ministry of Education? 12. In your opinion, does TEVETA have the capacity to develop and implement its own programmes and or activities? 13. How does TEVETA relate to the colleges in the TEVET sector? 	20 mins
Funding	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. What are the main sources of funding for TEVETA? 15. Who decides how TEVETA should fund its activities? 16. How has been the trend of funding to TEVETA since its establishment (stable, increasing or decreasing)? 17. What is TEVETA doing to increase its funding capacity? 18. In your opinion, is the current level of funding for TEVETA sufficient for TEVETA to be able to achieve its goals? 	10 mins
Change Drivers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 19. How would you describe the main changes TEVETA has undergone since its establishment? 20. What are the main internal drivers for the change? 21. What are the main external drivers for the change? 22. In your opinion do you feel that TEVETA has developed positively since its establishment? 	15 mins

Conclusion	We have come to the end of the discussion, but is there anything you have thought important of to be mentioned while we have been discussing that you wish to add. Thank you once again.	5 mins
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To whom it may concern

Date: 07.01.2015
Your ref.:
Our ref.: kristi.barcus@ped.uio.no

ASSISTANCE IN THE CONDUCTION OF FIELD WORK


This is to confirm that **Michael Besa Chunda**, is a second year student in the Master of Philosophy in Higher Education programme at the Department of Education at the University of Oslo, Norway. He began the programme in August 2013 and is expected to complete the programme in 2015.

In the second year our students are required to write a Master thesis of 50 to 80 pages. This researched based thesis includes field-work that may incorporate interviews with educational practitioners and decision-makers, class-room observation and documentary analysis. The type of data gathered should of course be discussed with the relevant authorities. It is our hope that the work produced by the student will not only benefit him in his academic career but also be of use in the future.

Michael Besa Chunda will be conducting his research in Lusaka, Zambia from January 12th until February 20th 2015. We kindly ask you to give him all possible assistance during his field-work.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions regarding this master programme or this student.

Best regards,



Kristi Barcus
Senior Executive Officer
Department of Education
University of Oslo
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Olav M Troviks Vei 56 H0204
0864, Oslo
NORWAY.

19th January, 2015.

The Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education,
P.O Box 50464, *Luşaka*,
Zambia.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT THE MINISTRY.

My name is Chunda Michael Besa, a second year student in the Master of Philosophy in Higher Education at the University of Oslo in Norway.

I hereby seek permission to conduct research for my Master thesis at *Ministry Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education*. My research topic is, — Agencification of quality assurance in Zambia: A case study of TEVETA . I seek to interview two Officers at the Ministry in the department that deals directly with TEVETA.

Find attached my introductory letter from the University of Oslo.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours faithfully,

CHUNDA MICHAEL BESA.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Chunda Michael Besa', written in a cursive style.

Olav M Troviks Vei 56 H0204
0864, Oslo
NORWAY.

19th January, 2015.

The Director General
TEVETA
Plot 4751 Birdcage Walk, Longacres.
Private Bag RW16X, Lusaka,
Zambia.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AT TEVETA.

My name is Chunda Michael Besa, a second year student in the Master of Philosophy in Higher Education at the University of Oslo in Norway.


I hereby seek permission to conduct research for my Master thesis at Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority. My research topic is, — Agencification of quality assurance in Zambia: A case study of TEVETA . I seek to interview two officers who can be deemed knowledgeable about the indicated topic.

Find attached my introductory letter from the University of Oslo.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours faithfully,

CHUNDA MICHAEL BESA.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Chunda Michael Besa', written in a cursive style.