

Chocolate war - Capitalist peace?

Investment in cocoa, reconciliation and capitalist post-conflict development in Côte d'Ivoire

Eva-Maria Niedermeier



Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of Political Sciences

Faculty of Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Spring 2015

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Printed by: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

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ABSTRACT

There is an increasing unity about the importance of economic conditions of individuals and the natural resources of nation states in conflict studies. One section of the literature highlighting the economic nature of peace is the so-called capitalist peace theory, arguing for the importance of trade, globalisation and market values in peace-building efforts. Advocates of the involvement of private business in post-conflict economies also claim that investors and private business can play a role in preventing a relapse into conflict. This thesis will critically examine such claims by questioning whether or not investment in the cocoa value chain has a positive impact on reconciliation in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire. By focusing on the development after the country's 2011 crisis, the thesis will analyse the four capitalist peace assumptions, namely the transformative power of capitalist markets, their conditional effect with democracy, the protection of contracts and the signalling towards investors, and see whether investment activities in the cocoa sector have had a positive impact on reconciliation. In addition to the abovementioned will this thesis examine the involvement of private chocolate businesses and NGO networks and their impact on job creation, the improvement of livelihoods and the re-integration of former combatants.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost thanks to my supervisor Morten Bøås, who has been patient, constructive and engaged in the work of this thesis.

There would be no thesis without all the informants and experts in Abidjan and Fromager that took their time answering my questions. Thanks to Madam Bouabre and Monsieur Kaleu for their support in the field. Thanks to Adia Ouattara for her intelligent input, her hard work and her lead through Western Côte d'Ivoire. Further thank you to Lisa, Thomas and Leon for opening doors, helping me out and making this fieldwork highly enjoyable: "C'est doux-dee"!

Getting out of the reading room and into the real world is important. Therefore I would like to thank UNIFOR, the DAAD and the Department for Political Sciences for supporting my efforts to go out and get the data. I am further very grateful to ILPI for the interest and support for my project.

Being able to study, travel and use my time on whatever I want to is a privilege. Without the support of my parents, Michael and Christina, and my sister this would not have been possible. Your ambition, intelligence and sense of justice have formed my choices and will do so in the future.

The process of writing is essentially very lonely and frustrating. Being in the companionship of the Kick-Ass-PECOS-People has been such a great experience.

Last but not least I want to thank Eirik. Your friendship, kindness and love graciously glance over my many weaknesses. I am grateful for having you in my life.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADDR - Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réintégration
ADM - Archer Daniels Midland (agricultural processor)
ARCC - Autorité de Régulation du Café et du Cacao
ANADER - Agence Nationale d'Appui au Développement Rural
ArcGIS - Geographical Information system from Esri
BCC - Bourse du Café et Cacao
BMZ - Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
CAISTAB - Caisse de stabilisation
CAR - Central African Republic
CCC - Conseil Café Cacao
CEO - Chief Executive Officer
CFA - Central African Franc (1 € = 656 CFA)
CNRA - Centre National de Recherche Agronomique
CPI - Corruption Perception Index
CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EU - European Union
FDI - Front Populaire Ivoirien (Party of Laurent Gbagbo)
FGCCC- Fonds de Développement et de Promotion des Activités des Producteurs de
Café et de Cacao
FN - Force Nouvelle
FRC - Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle du Café et Cacao
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GIZ - Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
ICG - International Crisis Group
IDH - Sustainable Trade Initiative
IMF - International Monetary Fund
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUCI - Opération des Nations Unis en Côte d'Ivoire
PAPC - Projet d'Assistance Post-Conflict
PDCI - Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (Party of Félix Houphouët-Boigny)
RDR - Rassemblement des Républicains (Party of Alassane Ouattara)
SCAD - Social Conflict Analysis Database
STATA - Statistical Data Program
UCDP-GED - Uppsala Conflict Data Program - Georeferenced Event Data
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
US - United States
US\$ - US Dollar (1€ = 1.13 US\$)
WCF - World Cocoa Foundation

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The economic conditions of individuals and the natural resources of nation states have been widely analysed in conflict studies and contributed to a vast body of literature examining the role of diamonds, cocoa, timber, oil and other resources as causes of war (see Collier 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Ross 2004; Basedau & Lay 2009; Jensen 2004; Yang 2009). While most claim that there are economic agendas behind wars, an emerging part of the literature further argues that economic liberalisation might reduce the likelihood of war. Supporters of this so-called capitalist peace theory (see Gartzke & Hewitt 2013; Mousseau 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch 2013) argue for the importance of trade, globalisation and market values in peace-building efforts. And advocates of the economic post-conflict management (Iff et al. 2012; Prandi et al. 2013; Bray 2010) argue that investors and private business can play an important role in preventing a relapse into conflict.

In this thesis I will critically examine these claims by questioning whether investment in the cocoa value chain has a positive impact on reconciliation in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire.¹ Focusing on the development after the country's 2011 election crisis, I will analyse the four capitalist peace assumptions, namely the transformative power of capitalist markets, their conditional effect with democracy, the protection of contracts and the signalling towards investors, and see whether investment activities in the cocoa sector have had a positive impact on reconciliation. In addition to this, I will question to what extent the involvement of private chocolate businesses and NGO networks have actually had an impact on the creation of jobs, the improvement of livelihoods and the re-integration of former combatants.

The topic is not only interesting due to the upcoming presidential elections in 2015,² but can add another case study for the critical evaluation of the capitalist peace literature as well as offering additional explanations from the economic peace-building theory.

¹ Positive impact would mean in this context that the investment activity contributes to peace-building and could therefore (in part) prevent a relapse into conflict.

² The presidential election scheduled for October 2015 is the first one after the heavily contested presidential election in 2011, which eventually led to the collapse of the Gbagbo regime.

In order to explain my research question, I will first assess some central aspects and empirical evidence on economic development in post-conflict countries before reviewing the Ivorian conflict history. Thereafter I will present my theoretical and methodological framework.

1.1 Post-conflict development – Why think about it?

How are investment and global capital connected to reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire? De Soysa et al. (2012) argue that “all too often (...) post-conflict peace-building efforts are designed to remove societal grievances, rather than to promote markets by removing the risks of investing” (ibid., p.6). In other words, they claim that there is too little focus on (private) investment in actual post-conflict reconciliation. The importance of investment in rebuilding a country is reviewed by Ramsbotham et al (2011), who emphasise the significance of economic development during post-conflict reconstruction. Some argue that this is necessary in order to prevent “spoilers of peace” in the shape of ex-combatants or other actors profiting more from war than peace (see Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.216; Kingma 1997).³ Understanding economic motivations in conflict helps in shaping a vision for the future and creates possibilities for the population to see their share of the peace dividend, as highlighted by Wennmann (2011). The integration of former combatants into civil life offers job opportunities and revenues and is a crucial contribution to normalization (World Bank 2011; Bøås & Hatløy 2008; Subedi 2014; Batmanglich & Enria 2014; Gilligan et al. 2013).⁴

The rebuilding of the agriculture sector is seen as an essential factor for this economic reconstruction (see Hårsmar 2010; Binns & Maconachie 2005; Alinovi et al. 2007; Ismail 2008). Gleditsch et al (1999) stress that “the rehabilitation of agriculture is a central condition for development, reducing poverty, preventing environmental

³ The literature further suggests that the creation of livelihood and jobs are crucial if conflict resolution should succeed; due to the fact that “dire poverty, on-going ethnic, political or religious rivalry, the proliferation of arms, weak government structure and ravaged infrastructure pose tremendous threats that can easily lead a country back into war” (Maponga & Fombi 2012, p.47).

⁴ “The phase 2 need is, first, to absorb enough of those previously employed in disbanded militia as will reduce disaffection to containable levels and, second, more generally, for there to be a sense that, however difficult and indeed miserable material conditions may be now, there is sufficient evidence of likely future improvement - particularly in employment prospects” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220).

destruction, and for reducing violence” (1999, p.15). Grossmann et al (2009) underline the importance of small-scale farming as a stabilising aspect due to its income-generating and employment possibilities (ibid., p.61). In their assessment of an agricultural training for at-risk youth in Liberia, Blattman and Annan (2011) discover high engagement and interest in agriculture amongst former child soldiers. While the program did not prevent ex-combatants from totally engaging in illicit activities the participants did manage to improve their livelihoods considerably.

Another aspect of economic post-conflict development is the influx of investment in infrastructure and local entrepreneurship (Krech 2009; Bray 2010). Investment and innovation in value chains offer high returns for foreign firms, as Ouma and Withfield (2012) claim, whilst being considered vital for broad development and tension-reduction in fragile contexts. Tobias and Boudreaux (2009) illustrate how the increased innovation in the Rwandan coffee sector intensified the contact between the different ethnic groups and therefore amplified reconciliation. The positive effect on social cohesion between ethnic groups and ex-combatants is often reviewed as an incentive to invest in value chains (Grossmann et al. 2009, p.55 ff).

So far it seems as if investment in an agricultural cash crop such as cocoa has been a neglected aspect in the capitalist peace and post-conflict literature, even though it might be essential for employment and livelihood generation (see Larsen et al. 2009; APP 2014; APP 2012). I would like to contribute to closing this gap in the literature with a review of the relatively recent case of Côte d’Ivoire. My thesis could therefore add to the understanding of the capitalist peace in the context of cash crop investment and its impact on post-conflict reconciliation.

1.2 Background: Côte d’Ivoire

The case of Côte d’Ivoire is a particularly interesting one, considering the role cocoa and its revenues have played historically in financing the country (Losch 2003). Côte d’Ivoire proceeded quite peacefully into independence in 1960 after being a French colony for 80 years. The first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, installed a one-party rule; his Parti Democratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) guaranteed political stability and economic growth in a system based on the boom in agricultural products like cocoa,

coffee and cotton (McGovern 2011, p.15 ff.). These cash crops not only secured miraculous economic growth, but also contributed to job creation and increased living standards for a large part of the population.⁵ It was a system that was built on the expansion of farmland as well as the migration of labour towards the south. It was also a system built on customary relationships such as the *tutorat*, in which first-comers (autochthones) concede long-term land rights to migrants (see Chauveau 2006; Richards & Chauveau 2007).⁶ Though partly corrupt, the system arguably had “trickle-down” effects and improved standards in education and health (see McGovern 2011, p.15 ff. Ayangafac 2009). Boigny used his charisma and the country’s economic muscles over three decades to keep the Ivorian elite, the military and the majority of people content. A consequence of this was that he managed to navigate the deep cleavages between the North and the South successfully for many years (Ogwang 2011). Up until an economic crisis caught up with the country in the late 1980s, which instigated pro-democracy movements that put pressure on Boigny’s one-man rule and eventually forced him to defend his position in the first multi-party elections in 1990. Despite being re-elected, Boigny’s death three years later, left a power vacuum, concluding the years of stability and giving way to chaos and uncertainty.

Following Boigny’s death, Henri Konan Bédié, a Southerner and President of the National Assembly, succeeded against the Northerner and Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara in the bid for presidency and was elected in 1995. Bédié further introduced the concept of “Ivoirité” that differentiated between “real” Ivorians and “foreigners” from the northern regions as well as migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. This differentiation built on already existing cleavages (Ogwang 2011), but had now been appropriated by the political elite in order to not only exclude “Northerners” from Ivorian citizenship and deprive non-Ivorians of land rights but also kept Northern elitists like Ouattara out of the decision-making processes and gave the people

⁵ Côte d’Ivoire was and still is the largest cocoa exporter worldwide and cocoa represents “on average 35% of the total value of Ivorian exports, worth around CFA 750 bn per year (\$US 1.4bn). Out of a total population of 16 million inhabitants, 3 to 4 million people work in the cocoa sector” (Global Witness 2007, p.5).

⁶ Chauveau and Collin define it as „an agrarian institutional device for regulating relationships between first-comers and late-comers. It fits into a moral economy principle that considers that any individual or group has a right of access to the means of subsistence for himself and his family“ (Chauveau & Colin 2010, p.87).

someone to blame for the economic downturn (Langer 2004; Akindès 2004). These xenophobic politics led, however, to political crisis and a coup d'état under General Robert Guéï in 1999. This is generally considered as the starting point of the period of civil war (Peace Direct 2015).

Laurent Gbagbo, the southern frontmen of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FDI) entered the competition against Guéï and declared himself president in 2000.⁷ Bloody clashes and rebellion occurred shortly after, but Gbagbo was able to gain control over the country. During his presidency he was able to successfully put his Bété followers into essential positions, especially in the cocoa sector (McGovern 2011). Another coup d'état attempt by exiled soldiers however increased instability and created an insurgency in 2002. As the situation escalated, it eventually caused the employment of French military support, and required French-brokered peace talks (e.g. Linas-Marcoussis, Accra III, Pretoria agreements) in addition to the establishment of a buffer zone between the North and South, the “zone de confiance”. Regardless of all the peace agreements in place, the situation deteriorated and the destruction, fighting and killing of combatants and civilians continued until the Ouagadougou agreement in 2007.

In the aftermath of the Ouagadougou talks, presidential elections were postponed several times, but were eventually held in 2010. Ouattara, finally being declared an eligible candidate, went into the race as candidate for the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR). The election ended in a run-off between Gbagbo and Ouattara in November 2010 in which Ouattara was eventually declared the winner with 54.1% of the votes over Gbagbo's 45.9%. Gbagbo, however, was unwilling to surrender power and created an impasse between his troops and Ouattara's FN fighters. Only through the support of the UN and the French military was Ouattara finally able to claim his presidency after his forces succeeded in storming Gbagbo's residence in April 2011. The new government eventually supported the International Criminal Court with the indictment and transfer of Gbagbo to The Hague (see Bah 2012; Bøås & Dunn 2013).

⁷ A rather suspicious Supreme Court ruling ruled both Ouattara and Bédié out from participating in the election, declaring them non-eligible.

There are a number of explanations for the Ivorian conflict, which I will come back to in Chapter 3. Some argue that ethnic-induced grievances and the autochthony debates formed the background for the conflict (Bøås & Dunn 2013; Lund 2011; Chauveau & Richards 2008; Chauveau 2006; Bax 2003). Others take a neo-Malthusian approach arguing that land and resource scarcity created the dispute (see Kahl 2006b; Furlong et al. 2006; Le Billion 2001). Others explain the insurgency with theories of greed and rent-seeking (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Ryan 2011; Woods 2003; Alongi 2011; Global Witness 2007). McGovern (2011) argues against an “either/or” causal explanation (*ibid.*, p.174), because the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is such a multi-layered case that cannot be explained with a single reason. It is important to understand this complex conflict background in order to see possible implications for the post-conflict management approach and the analytical framework.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

In order to explain and analyse the peace-building situation in Côte d’Ivoire, I use different aspects of both the capitalist peace literature as well as the liberal peace-building approach, which I will briefly lay out here and continue to discuss in Chapter 2.

Moving along the path of Kant and others, Russett and Oneal (2001) re-formulated the liberal peace theory for modern inter-state conflict, by claiming that liberalisation of trade, international organisations and democracy has a pacifying effect. Empirical evidence is diverse but establishes the liberal peace idea as one of the few laws in conflict studies. Polackek et al (1999) find for example that free trade with large states decreases the likelihood of inter-state conflict. While Mousseau (2000) argues that market prosperity supports the development of democratic norms and the evolution of democratic institutions, Hegre (2005) sees strong support for the international peace theory both internationally as well as domestically.

Gartzke (2007) distinguishes between the political and economical liberal peace theories, the former one being the so-called “democratic peace” and the latter one titled as the “capitalist peace” theory. Because the capitalist peace is a rather new branch of theory, the literature does not yet offer a coherent set of assumptions.

Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) however argue that four mechanisms can explain the pacifying effect of capitalism: its transformation of human behaviour, its power combined with democratic rule, its ability to protect contracts and property rights and its power to signal towards investors (ibid., p.1 ff). I will return to these four arguments in the theory chapter. According to the supporters of this theory, studies find not only proof that international conflict likelihood is lessened by trade and globalization, but also argue that economic freedom and openness towards globalised markets decreases the risk for civil wars (see De Soysa & Fjelde 2010, p.288; Mousseau 2012; Bussmann et al. 2005).

“Capitalist peace” is an interesting theory because it gives a voice to economists in peace-making, which seem to be increasingly important. But while economic motivations and explanations are the name of the game for many, capitalist peace theory also faces serious critique. Some argue that warlords already participate in the globalised markets and that trading with them increases the revenues available for insurgency (Willett 2005). Others assess that the theory’s assumption of a Western hegemonic state with a highly codified legal systems is invalid for the African context. The “modern state” has been taken over by big men and clientelistic networks, which devaluates the Western-based paradigm of the capitalist peace (Taylor 2007). Others claim that the capitalist peace serves as an explanation in order to capture high-return and untouched markets of the developing countries, but does not increase reconciliation (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2007; Moore 2000).

I believe that these critical remarks about capitalist peace make it even more interesting to see how and to what extent the Ivorian case can be explained by the theory. While I recognise that the theory might have some limitations, I do think that it makes sense to include three parameters from the post-conflict management literature. By enquiring whether private capital is able to positively influence job creation, livelihood improvement and integration of ex-combatants, one might be able to reflect more broadly on the influence of investment in post-conflict countries (see Iff et al. 2012; Bray 2010).

In the following thesis I will analyse the capitalist peace critically by using the case of post-2011 Côte d’Ivoire. I employ a slightly eclectic framework, using both

capitalist peace as well as literature on private and non-governmental actors in peace-building. By acknowledging some of the “messiness of particular real-world situations” (Sil & Katzenstein 2010a, p.142), which cannot be explained by one theory alone, I want to include a broader political-economic framework for the Ivorian case. The framework I use is therefore two-fold: Firstly I want to critically review the capitalist peace theory for the case of investment in Côte d’Ivoire. Since it is a cross-sectional and causal theory, I assume that it will not be able to explain all the possible mechanisms of how investment might have a pacifying effect. Secondly, I draw in post-conflict management literature to look into some of the possible additions to the capitalist peace framework. I use this two-fold approach to effectively discuss the roles (non-) governmental and private capital might play in the post-conflict economy.




Figure 1 Theoretical framework

I will first question some aspects of the capitalist peace theory on the national level: Does investment lead to a change in behaviour? Do capitalist markets only have a pacifying effect under the conditions of democracy and high human development? Is the capitalist framework able to explain property rights protection and is there an increase in accountability and transparency?

Thereafter I will review three aspects in which private companies, the international community and non-governmental actors might have an impact at the local level, namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of livelihood.

1.4 Operationalisation and methodological considerations

In the following section I will define the main variables of my theoretical framework as well as reviewing the methods that I use in order to evaluate my research question.

My main variables are defined thus:

- When referring to **Investment**, I mean projects that are funded by chocolate manufacturers/exporters in cooperation with donors, organisations and the government. It is difficult to differentiate single actors in cocoa investment due to the network structure (Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015).⁸
- In the first analysis chapter I will analyse the assumptions of the capitalist peace in the following ways: Firstly, by **transformative power** of the capitalist peace theory, which claims that the involvement in globalised markets change values towards focusing more on exchange, individual choice, free will, compromise etc. (see Mousseau 2000, p.479). A second **conditional effect of capitalist peace** should be apparent in combination with democratic political framework and high levels of human development. Thirdly whether **property and contract rights** should be more strictly protected in the capitalist framework. A fourth aspect is the number of **accountability and transparency** measures that are apparent in the cocoa sector. The capitalist peace argument would imply that these increase.
- I will also review the **re-integration** of combatants, seeking to identify whether former fighters have been employed on cocoa plantations. **Job creation** measures general possibilities of employment in the cocoa sector, while **improvement of livelihoods** considers if the perceptions of cocoa farmers' livelihood have become better or worse.

⁸ They refer to business and NGO networks' involvement that are "based on the idea of market-based collective action serving public interests as well as private interests" (Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015, p.356).

- **Reconciliation** will be taken up both in terms of social as well as economic cohesion. The former being understood as “restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.246). The latter concludes that former enemies have equally positive perceptions of their economic opportunities (see Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein 2015). I will further reflect on the de-escalation model by Ramsbotham et al (2011).

In addition to the two-fold theoretical structure, I use multiple analytical tools in order to evaluate the capitalist peace theory and the peace-building literature, on which I want to briefly reflect because it might have some implications for the understanding of the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. I first assess my research question in a larger capitalist peace framework, using statistics, news reports, expert interviews and other national data. Thereafter I review the social realities on a smaller scale by using regional statistics and reports as well as focus group interviews.

In order to get access to data and conduct the expert and focus group interviews, I went on a five-week fieldwork trip from January to February 2015 both in Abidjan and Gagnoa. I also collected the material that I used to geo-reference the investment projects during this period. Based on this fieldwork information and online data, I mapped investment sites in Côte d’Ivoire in ArcGIS in order to see possible overlaps between conflict and the investment locations.⁹ The attached overview (see Annex 3) shows the different projects, which are private, governmental and non-governmental and count 140 locations. One major caveat for the geo-referencing is the lack of support from cocoa exporters, organisations and chocolate manufacturers in the data collection and while I will return to this issue in Chapter 4, it is important to underline that this challenge have also had some methodological implications: Throughout my fieldwork and in my 11 expert interviews my aim was to get information on the actual investment locations referred to by these experts. In addition, I followed up and contacted 35 of the 110 World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) members as well as seven NGOs involved in investment projects in Côte d’Ivoire. I received very few responses,

⁹ ArcGIS from Esri is a geographical information system (GIS) that uses maps and GIS-formatted datasets; it can be used as a tool for the creation of individualised maps.

however, and almost no concrete locations. This lack of access to information is a serious shortcoming of the geo-referencing mapping and might indicate a bias in the results.

Based on the data I obtained, I cross-referenced the project locations with two different conflict datasets in order to see some correlations. The first source of data was the social conflict analysis database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) that accounts for small-scale incidents such as riots, protests and strikes in the period of 1990-2013. These are geo-referenced and can therefore be mapped in ArcGIS as well. The second source is the Uppsala geo-referenced event dataset (UCDP-GED) (Sundberg et al. 2010) and locates sites of organized violence, armed conflict, non-state violence or one-sided violence, between 1989 and 2010. Although the data set does not include the five months of the crisis in 2011, it outlines the biggest conflict sites until the end of the presidential election between Gbagbo and Ouattara. Through the two databases I have a general overview of the most conflict-affected areas in relation to those that are most targeted by investment.

Another data source I used was the Afrobarometer survey (Penar & Mukana 2013) from Côte d'Ivoire in 2013. The survey of 1200 households offers a broad overview of questions on economic, social and political opinions in the country. I used the dataset in STATA to both re-run the national results for interesting issues, comparing questions along the different regions to see if there are any major geographical trends. I further created a sub-sample for the Fromager region, which counted only 40 households. As shown in the attached do-file, I used simple tabulation commands and only cross-tabulated relevant questions on reconciliation with geographical region and perceptions of the economic situation. Both the national and regional samples could be criticised for not being representative. Afrobarometer is however the only available source for public opinion and is used in combination with other sources.

One of the other main sources I use for the analysis are “qualitative or in-depth interviews” (Bryman 2008, p.438) that I conducted with experts in the field of cocoa and reconciliation as well as cocoa farmer focus groups. It is not only the most time- and cost-effective method of data collection, but it also offers a more specific focus on

the research question, while giving opportunities for reconstruction of events as a greater breadth of issues covered (Bryman 2008, p.467 ff). I selected my interview partners for the expert interviews based on their importance in the sector, which of course is relative and may be biased. I wanted to get a broad overview of industrial,




Figure 2 Sector overview by Hatløy et al (2012)

governmental and foreign organisational experts. Based on the recent sector study by Hatløy et al (2012), I got a first overview of the involved organisations. Figure 2 shows the different levels of actors involved in the sector and I wanted to cover at least some of the main program owners, such as TechnoServe, the WCF or the German Development Agency (GIZ), parts of the industry and implementers, such as the Agricultural Research Centre (CNRA) or the Agency for Rural Support (ANADER) named in the study. Based on that study, I contacted possible experts to arrange interviews. After I entered the social network of expats in Abidjan, I was able to contact even more experts and was referred to more key players. I conducted 11 formal expert interviews in total, but also received some nuanced feedback through informal conversations and my field experience in general. Conducting the expert interviews, I used a semi-structured interview guide that I adjusted depending on the expert's organisation and special fields of cocoa engagement and reconciliation. The sampled experts are by no means exhaustive, but I still felt that after talking to some of the different experts that I heard many of the same themes, and therefore achieved something of a "theoretical saturation" (Bryman 2008, p.459 ff) which enabled me to answer my research question.

I also conducted five focus group discussions in cocoa co-operatives in Fromager. This region was heavily affected by the civil war but was also targeted by

investment projects, as can be seen in the geo-referencing of both investment and violence in Chapter 4. In order to look more closely into the local perceptions of communities, I conducted three focus group discussions in co-operatives that received investment and two in cooperatives that did not.¹⁰ I was assuming that the co-operatives might have different perspectives on reconciliation depending on whether they received the training programme or not. I was further able to talk to some other co-operative members in Wanéwa and Bayota (see Annex 1). The groups were equally large and contained mainly male cocoa planters, between 35 and 50 years. I was able to talk to members of a female co-operative, which helped in getting a broader range of characteristics. However Wanéwa is one of the few places in Fromager that has a female co-operative and it was therefore not possible to have an equivalent interview session with women that did not receive investment.¹¹

In order to choose my focus groups I contacted ANADER, one of the implementers of projects from WCF, the GIZ, TechnoServe and private partners. The private sector was, as I previously indicated, not too keen on cooperation considering their project locations. But in order to have the oversight of an implementing partner, I needed an institution with a wide reach and overview, which the local ANADER agents had. The two local staff members in Gagnoa checked their lists of co-operatives in the region and helped me to contact them. This kind of selection process is not a fully randomized one and therefore there might be a bias towards certain co-operatives with whom the ANADER-agents had an interest in working, or already had good working relations. Another possible bias might stem from expectations of participants in investment communities towards me coming there as an ANADER agent by proxy. During the interviews I was made aware that the cooperatives we eventually ended up with might have been ethnically segregated, with the treatment category largely

¹⁰ Some might argue that this is methodologically related to a quasi-experimental approach as described by Posner (2004). This should increase both validity and reliability of the community results.

¹¹ My informants in Gagnoa (and in Abidjan) mentioned that the female cocoa farmers and plantation owners are mainly concentrated in the area around Abengourou, where they are considered as “husband-killers” in order to get their spouse’s cocoa plantation.

containing autochthones and the non-treatment category over representing allochthones from non-Bété communities, an aspect that I will return to later on.¹²

My interpreter moderated all five focus group interviews and we had a number of meetings before we travelled to Gagnoa so she was aware of my research project and reviewed the questions that I developed. Due to her (cultural) understanding and social awareness, she suggested some changes in the wording and framing of the different topics in order to get people to answer as freely as possible. When conducting the sessions, that we recorded and later transcribed together, she followed the interview guide, sometimes switching questions, translating simultaneously and adding questions she or I had in order to understand the group's responses. The general outline of topics and questions however remained the same throughout the interviews.¹³ This outline (see Annex 1) contains three sets of questions: The first section included easy-to-access topics of work possibilities and alternative jobs in the community. Thereafter it moved towards asking about issues of yield increase and income in order to assess how the situation evolved in terms of livelihood. The last (and definitely the most sensitive) section reviewed the perceived inclusion of ex-combatants and thoughts on the state of reconciliation.

I already mentioned a number of possible biases, that I want to draw attention to. First and foremost, I already mentioned a possible bias in the geo-referenced investment overview due to the difficulties in getting access to data. The information that I eventually mapped is limited and likely over-represents investment with a social infrastructure focus. My data contains relative little information on projects aimed at productivity levels, which is a considerable caveat.

Another possible selection bias lies in the choice of experts and co-operatives for the interviews. Especially with regards to the focus group interviews my results

¹² The informants referred to their ethnic affiliation/ group with the French term of "communauté", which translates only poorly into "community".

¹³ All interviews contained a proper formal and local presentation of both of us, as well as my research project, to the participants. Our main contacts in most of the co-operatives were the chairmen or leaders of the co-operative, which as is custom dictates "translated" us; meaning that he/ she introduced us first, then we introduced ourselves again. When we were finished and gave thanks, the contact person repeated the content. This aspect may be critical, since it could establish a potential bias, as well as representing a possibility for us to gain great credibility amongst the respondents. In addition, we communicated the rules for the group sessions, ensuring anonymity as well as valuing all input.

might be biased by the choice of investment project, ethnic composition and non-randomness. Further biases might relate to my gender, the gender of my interpreter, our young age, her ethnic affiliation as well as my skin colour. I got the impression that most of the participants were relatively open towards us. They did not seem threatened by us and opened up because as they said to us, they appreciated having their opinions heard.

A possible source of bias might further arise from the capitalist peace theory logic in itself. A number of researchers (see Schneider 2014; DiGiuseppe et al. 2012; De Soysa & Vadlammanati 2013) mention that the proposed relationship between involvement in global capital markets and peace suffers from endogeneity. This means that there might be a reversed causality between investment and reconciliation or that the results are driven by factors that are not included. I tried to mitigate some of these possible biases by methodologically triangulating the results and discussing problems of the theoretical endogeneity underway.

By using a multitude of data sources, both quantitatively and qualitatively and by critically discussing possible biases I can argue that my data material is quite sound and can effectively be used to draw some preliminary conclusions (see Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; Lieberman 2005; Feilzer 2009). However, it is important to outline what this thesis cannot offer. I am not attempting to evaluate programme results or assessing national reconciliation programme efforts. I do not offer a sector study with all actors involved in cocoa farming, since there are so many that it would be impossible to reach out to all of them in a master-level thesis. The network-characteristic of the cocoa investment also makes it difficult to aggregate individual actors' effects on the reconciliation process. What this thesis can offer is a case study based on qualitative and quantitative methods; that tries to evaluate some aspects of the very broad capitalist peace literature and liberal peace-building agenda in the context of Côte d'Ivoire. It can be useful as an example that critically assesses the strengths and weaknesses in the capitalist approach and points to some aspects that I deem important to include in order to evaluate business involvement in fragile contexts.

1.5 Thesis structure

Following this introduction, my next chapter will go into more detail on the theoretical framework that I use. By first explaining the eclectic approach to theories fronted by Sil and Katzenstein (2010b), I will argue that using two frameworks might be useful to answer a real life research question. Thereafter I will outline liberal peace theory and capitalist peace and discuss critics of those theories. I will then refer to some post-conflict management views which argue that investment might be able to create jobs, reintegrate combatants and improved livelihood. This chapter will conclude by reviewing the term “reconciliation” and presenting my conceptual framework.

In the third chapter, I will present more of the background and go into more detail on the history and reasons for the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire as well as accounting for the country’s system of landownership. To conclude, I will briefly review the cocoa value chain in general before referring to the country-specific features of the Ivorian cocoa industry.

My nation-level analysis in Chapter 4 begins with a short introduction to the main investment actors in Côte d’Ivoire and the results from investment and conflict mapping. I thereafter discuss the state of reconciliation in general before reviewing the four main assumptions of the capitalist peace theory.

Chapter 5 will deal with the micro-level and the individual perspective. Here I will use both qualitative and quantitative measures to establish an overview over the case region Fromager before putting the results of the four focus group discussions up for comparison.

The conclusion follows in Chapter 6 which divided into three parts. The first part compares the macro and micro-level evidence and the second reviews the most important points of my theory, the case country and need for further research. The third part makes on recommendations.

Chapter 2. Theory

As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis has a two-fold theoretical approach due to the complexity of the conflict (see O'Bannon 2012) as well as the focus of the theories. I will therefore first give a brief overview of the eclectic manner in which I use theories. Subsequently I will outline arguments and assumptions of the capitalist peace theory before reviewing literature on non-governmental and private actors in post-conflict management in more detail.

2.1 Making theories useful -Analytic eclecticism

Though most of the theory I use might be summarised under the larger heading of the liberal peace, I am not dealing with the whole theory. Instead I review one of its sub-theories critically and as I assume gaps in explaining the case of Côte d'Ivoire, I include parts of the peace-building literature. I argue that political science is no longer adequate in explaining what is its object (Shapiro 2005, p.2) but is instead limited by adhering to one theoretical paradigm. Studying the actual results of political science often reveals that global black and white theories are no longer able to explain the “messiness of the real world”. These challenges are however no reason to ignore theoretical assumptions completely because “theory is unavoidable” (Nye & Welch 2011 p.ix). My main point is that in order to acknowledge the complexity of reality without downsizing it to one specific theory, one needs to use broader and different theoretical frameworks.

Sil and Katzenstein (2010b; 2010a) are amongst those who argue to use paradigms in a more pragmatic manner, the so-called analytical eclecticism. “Analytical eclecticism is about making intellectually and practically useful connections among clusters of analyses that are substantively related but normally formulated in separate paradigms” (ibid., p.2). Without getting into an epistemological debate about the sense and nonsense of assumptions in social sciences, I will briefly present their take using theories in the real world. Sil and Katzenstein see the need to integrate observations and causal stories from different paradigms and theoretical narratives in order to explain problems meaningfully (ibid. 2010b, p.3). Their main argument here is to use so-called “points of convergence” (ibid., p.34) from the

different theories and combine paradigms in that way.¹⁴ For example, the invasion of the Bush government in Iraq can be explained by combining assumptions from the realist and the liberal paradigm by using arguments close to paradigms' convergence points.¹⁵

Claiming that most paradigms are too quick to simplify reality, their approach “seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate (...) narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems” (ibid., p.10).¹⁶ They acknowledge challenges to their approach; for example the problem of theory-comparison across cases as well as problems occurring from two paradigms with incompatible perspectives, like the school of capitalist peace and the more policy-oriented peace-building literature. They argue however that eclecticism still makes sense since one rarely refers to one theoretical paradigm as a whole anyway (ibid., p.18 ff).

I use here a reduced eclectic framework in order to review the complex yet substantive problem of investment in fragile contexts. Firstly, I evaluate assumptions of capitalist peace theory by referring to the Ivorian case. Assuming that these assumptions are problematic in explaining all relevant aspects of the post-conflict situation in Côte d'Ivoire, I refer to elements of post-conflict management literature in the second part of my analysis. I use such an eclectic approach due to capitalist peace theory being a more static and macro-oriented theory, while the post-conflict literature focuses on the individual perspective.¹⁷

¹⁴ They argue that “eclectic scholarship is designed to highlight the substantive intersections and practical relevance of theories originally constructed within separate paradigms” (Sil & Katzenstein 2010b, p.35).

¹⁵ Realist assumptions might be found in the extensive and aggressive defence character of the invasion, while liberalist arguments can be seen in the missionary neo-conservative attitude of “exporting” democracy around the world.

¹⁶ “An eclectic approach also assumes the existence of complex interactions among the distribution of material capabilities (typically emphasized in realism), the gains pursued by self-interested individuals and collective actors (typically emphasized by liberals), and the role of ideas, norms, and identities in framing actors' understanding of the world and of their role within it (privileged by constructivists)”(Sil & Katzenstein 2010b, p.37).

¹⁷ One can hardly argue that the way in which a single community is entrenched in the globalised markets is decisive in that communities' social cohesion. One could however argue that the way in which a certain investment-friendliness breaks down to local indicators like jobs and livelihood standards has a real impact on the social peace.

2.2 Capitalist Peace theory

The idea of liberal peace has a long tradition and is established as one of the few “laws of nature” in the discipline (see Mazower 2012; Nye & Welch 2011; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Most recently the liberal peace has explained as the “tripod of peace” by Russett and Oneal (2001). They argue that increased international trade, global organisations and cooperation as well as democracy are the three crucial ingredients for peace. A large number of empirical studies have followed, testing the theory for different periods and country samples (see Oneal et al. 1996; Spiro 1994; Doyle 2005; Oneal & Russett 1999).

This thesis is not concerned with the grand liberal peace, but rather in its economic component outlined by Gartzke and Hewitt (2013). They argue that liberalism contains two schools, “one emphasizing representative government and international deliberative bodies and the other advocating global markets and economic development” (ibid., p.11), namely the economic and the political liberal tradition. Though they underline that economic liberalism received less attention, Weede (1992) has already argued for a connection between free-trading markets, development and peace. He is therefore considered to be one of the capitalist peace’s founding fathers (Schneider & Gleditsch 2013; Mousseau 2010; Weede 2005).¹⁸

2.2.1 Three shades of the capitalist peace

Traditionally, capitalist peace researchers focus on trade relations and their pacifying impact (see Mousseau 2010; Schneider & Gleditsch 2013). Hegre (2005) outlines for example that the trade of manufactured goods creates interdependencies which in turn reduce the likelihood of interstate dispute. He argues that business interests influence the foreign policy of a country on such a scale, regardless of the political system, that it makes it less reasonable to fight (ibid., p.31). Polackek, Robst and Chang (1999) claim that smaller states can reduce the chances of conflict by trading with larger

¹⁸ Some of the older articles reviewed here are labelled as ‘economic liberalism’. I however argue that Gartzke and Hewitt’s (2013) open up to the assumption that all of the economic liberal peace literature can be summarized under the term of ‘capitalist peace’ theory, since all of them review the impact of trade, globalisation and free-markets upon peace.

states (ibid., p.15). Rosencrance (2010) argues that industrialisation and the change in production mode had a pacifying effect.

A second aspect of the capitalist peace is the focus on economic freedom and openness. De Soysa (2012) claims that “those who invest money wish to avoid war because violence would disrupt profits” (ibid., p.4). Greed literature further assumes that rebellion is costly and needs to be waged against peace-time economics. Therefore some argue that increased economic freedom offers larger profits from peace and makes war less reasonable.¹⁹ De Soysa (2012) measures economic freedom via the Fraser Institute indicator which includes two aspects: the freedom of business from state interference and the support of private business by impartial institutions (ibid., p.10). He finds not only that economic freedom has a pacifying effect, it is also more important than political liberalisation and democratisation. De Soysa and Vadlammanti (2013) take up the positive relationship between free markets, economic reforms and human rights violations.²⁰ Their main argument is that free markets “help disperse economic resources, allowing those with economic power to offset the influence of those with political power” (ibid., p.165). Mousseau (2010; 2000) argues for the importance of market norms in capitalist peace. Norms such as individual choice, free will, negotiation and compliance are values that are said to have a positive effect on the establishment of democratic norms and peace (2000, p.474).

A third aspect of the capitalist peace comes involves the pacifying effect of globalisation. Gartzke and Hewitt (2013) argue that this is due to three reasons: First, because modern modes of production raise the costs of coercion, making it cheaper to trade than to steal. Second, that critical aspects in the international system are no longer debated due to a homogenisation amongst trading partners. Third, that leaders of globalized countries bluff less often about war and have more credibility (ibid., p.12). While globalisation in itself is recognized to decrease conflict likelihood (Flaten

¹⁹ “In other words, economic freedom matters: more open markets dampen the fear and mistrust associated with ethnic nepotism. This suggests in turn that the primary concern of ethnic groups might be economic, rather than political well-being”(De Soysa 2012, p.4).

²⁰ “Economic reforms are usually wide-ranging changes to the existing regulatory, institutional and structural make up of the economy, and are aimed at increasing economic efficiency by promoting the privatization of markets, free competition and the strengthening of property rights” (De Soysa & Vadlammanti 2013, p.165).

& De Soysa 2012; Bussmann & Schneider 2007; Bennett 2014a), globalisation shocks do have a conflict-increasing effect, as Nieman (2011) points out.

The above-mentioned arguments largely look at international disputes. As the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is a civil war, can I then use it to evaluate capitalist peace theory? I argue that I can, since there is a growing body of literature on the existence of domestic capitalist peace as well (see De Soysa 2012; Mousseau 2012; Hegre 2005; DiGiuseppe et al. 2012).²¹ De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) find that economic freedom and free markets result in more prosperity and social cooperation and therefore decrease civil war (ibid., p.289). Magee and Massoud (2011) find that a rise in trade openness leads to a decrease in civil war likelihood. Bussmann et al (2005) find a long-term pacifying effect of trade opening. However they argue that in the short-term, trade opening might fuel internal conflicts. Similarly Nieman (2011) claims that globalisation at large lessens the civil war likelihood, while shocks of globalisation can increase the likelihood of civil war. This last explanation might describe the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1980s and 1990s where a decrease in crop prices and an intensified liberalisation acted as (external) globalisation shocks.

2.2.2 Capitalist assumptions

The range of the capitalist peace literature makes it difficult to pin down its main assumptions (see Schneider 2014, p.176). But in order to have a framework for evaluation I use Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) who offer an overview over four main arguments explaining the capitalist peace (ibid., p.3 f.). Firstly, they claim that capitalism alters human behaviour and transforms belligerents into traders, consumers and businessmen. This is supported by those arguing that market norms aid the creation of democratic values and therefore capitalism has a pacifying effect (see De Soysa 2012; Mousseau 2000; De Soysa & Vadlammanati 2013).

²¹ “Several contemporary studies report a positive relationship between economic freedom, properly functioning markets, and civil peace, and describe a number of different channels through which good market institutions, such as respect for property rights, can temper social conflict (...)” (De Soysa 2012, p.4).

The second argument reflects on capitalism being conflict-reducing under certain conditions, namely democratically governed and highly developed states.²² This second argument is rather ambiguous since many of the proponents argue that markets alone can do the trick. Others claim that this explanation is prone to endogeneity, arguing that involvement in global markets are responsible, while in fact other aspects drive the results.

Thirdly, they argue that capitalist economies are more active in protecting contract and property rights. This makes capitalist countries less likely to get into conflicts over property and therefore has a pacifying influence. Mousseau (2010) argues that capitalist economies consist of many market-linked actors and that due to their power, governments enforce contracts rigorously both internally and externally. This in turn causes peace (ibid., pp.188-190).

The fourth argument is that capitalist economies are able to signal their resolve more effectively than closed economies. This point is underlined by others (Hegre 2005; De Soysa 2012; DiGiuseppe et al. 2012; Gartzke & Hewitt 2013) who claim that states involved in the global market experience an increase in accountability and credibility because they need to signal to international investors and creditors. For my own evaluation of the capitalist peace theory, I will look in a more nuanced manner into these four assumptions in Chapter 4.

2.2.3 Looking at the capitalist peace from a critical angle

As mentioned previously, there are a number of critics towards these capitalist peace assumptions. One critique has been that the global players have utilized capitalist peace arguments in order to enter “untouched” markets of fragile states. This has been supported by MacGinty and Richmond (2007) who argue that capitalist peace essentially camouflages Western business interests (ibid., p.493). Though capital liberalism is effective in creating quantifiable post-conflict results, such as number of rebuilt houses, is it less “effective in managing the affective dimensions of peace –

²² “In his [Schumpeter’s] view, the power of the capitalist peace conviction within a country depends on the distribution of power between protectionists and the adherents of the market economy who both are able to voice their wishes within a democratic setting. Another conditionality argument maintains that the pacifying influence of trade grows with the level of development” (Schneider & Gleditsch 2013, p.3).

reconciliation, trust, and inter-communal respect” (ibid., p.497). Moore (2000) argues along similar lines:

“If humanitarian agencies want a piece of the decreasing aid pie, perhaps it is understandable that they are deigning to dine with the devil that brews up such investment friendly concoctions” (ibid., p.16).

Moore argues that African wars have been historically waged by global capital without empathy or understanding of the local context (ibid., p.21).

Others criticise capitalist peace for its assumptions about the state. Taylor (2007) implies that the theory constructs its argument based on the idea of a hegemonic state and is therefore ill-fitted for African context.²³ He concludes:

(Economic liberalism) “in Africa is likely to be hidebound – if not sabotaged – by Africa’s well-established governance modalities, such as personal rule, clientelism and the unwillingness to engage with nongovernmental organisations or expend resources on broad-based development projects” (ibid., p.564).

Willett (2005) similarly claims that capitalist peace ignores African states that have been taken over by warlords and local elites (ibid., p.575). One interesting aspect here is that global capital already invested heavily and trades with neo-patrimonial African leaders.²⁴ Willett therefore argues that capitalism has a negative impact:

“In this manner, international capital rewards reinforces the indigenous structures of violence enhancing militarised solutions to resource disputes that often inadvertently undermine international resolution to conflict.” (ibid., p.576).

In short, the capitalist peace theory might lack the global generalisability because it assumes a Western state model that is not found universal.²⁵

²³ “The non-hegemonic nature of much of Africa’s ruling elites means that the relative autonomy of the state, which allows reforms, makes autocracy redundant and creates the soil in which liberal democracy might be nurtured, is not present” (Taylor 2007, p.560).

²⁴ “In their struggle for control over strategic assets, warlords have often secured support from multinational companies that have a vested interest in maintaining access to profitable natural resources” (Willett 2005, p.571).

²⁵ “Africa urgently needs inward investment, but investments by multinationals have done little to enrich African people; on the contrary, all the evidence suggests that it has impoverished them. The

A third source of critique against the general nature of capitalist peace lays in the Ugandan case study by Shaw and Mbabazi (2007). They state that economic liberals cynically allow for a dual economic development, creating vast inequalities throughout the country. This so-called “war with peace”, contains one part of the country that is peaceful and integrated into global markets, while the other part remains at war. They argue that such a “peace” is neither liberal nor sustainable but rather uneven and therefore unstable (ibid., p.569). They claim that the case of the “two Ugandas” shows that “African capitalism” is very different from the Western concept, which poses questions on the generalisability of the capitalist peace argument.²⁶ Looking at these critiques, I think it is useful to evaluate the assumptions of the capitalist peace agenda with a critical look at the case of Côte d’Ivoire.

2.3 Reconciliation in capitalist economies

Capitalist peace theory has a very macro-analytical perspective on the cause of peace. There are some aspects that this perspective might not be able to cover, but in order to evaluate whether investment can have a positive effect, I think it is important to draw on literature from post-conflict management. Combining the investment focus with peace-building literature is sensible, as De Soysa (2012) already hints towards implications of the capitalist peace for peace-building.²⁷ Besada et al (2009) also argue for the significance of investment in the peace-building in the Côte d’Ivoire (ibid., p.1).

Ramsbotham et al (2011) review the five main theories of conflict resolution and argue that pluralist and cosmopolitan theories are the “heartland of conflict resolution” (ibid., p.396 ff). The former argues that the world community exists and

history of corporate involvement in Africa is a history of forced labour, evictions, murder, wars, the under-costing of resources, tax evasion and collusion with dictators” (Willett 2005, p.582).

²⁶ “A signal lesson of Uganda’s ‘war with peace’ status is the ability of the liberal peace to tolerate war and dislocation in areas adjacent to showcase examples of ‘success’. (...) While democratisation and economic liberalisation are encouraged in the south, considerable deviance from this path is tolerated in the north. This suggests a cool-headed calculation on behalf of promoters of the liberal peace, namely bilateral donors and international financial institutions – and, by proxy, the Ugandan government. Northern Ugandan ‘deviance’ maybe deemed acceptable because the area is considered to be strategically marginal”(Shaw & Mbabazi 2007, p.578).

²⁷ “Thus, the peace-building initiatives (...) might have to focus intently on how to build economic and political institutions that support economic competition and ensure low barriers to entry for legitimate businesses” (De Soysa 2012, p.6).

has a responsibility to intervene in order to develop a “human governance”, while the latter is more critical towards intervention and the overriding of sovereignty in order to protect local culture and economies. The realists, on the other hand, see both other theories as utopian and argue that intrastate wars, due to their greed-basis, can be more successfully solved via military action. Most articles that argue for private companies’ involvement in peace-building as part of a larger framework of peace are somewhat rooted in pluralist theory. Some aspects of greed and profit-gains are however part of the rational agenda of conflict resolution. In other words, the field of private and non-governmental involvement in peace-building is not so predefined by the large paradigms as the literature on causes of conflict. It is however slightly more policy-related and in parts more normative.

The idea that private companies and other non-state actors might impact the peace-building and reconciliation is not entirely new. Especially in the stabilisation phase, where Côte d’Ivoire is today, economic reconstruction should be the main policy priority (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.211). There are a number of authors arguing that the economic perspective has been neglected in the peace-building approach (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Johnson 2009; Grossmann et al. 2009). This economic understanding, which includes non-state and private actors, is important in order to evaluate possible peace dividends and long-term stability. Especially when looking at West African peace-building (Hutchful & Aning 2004; Johnson 2009) is it important to look at the involvement of resources and the private sector in order to adequately address post-conflict challenges.

There are also authors suggesting that private actors might gain some credit from consumers if they engage in conflicts, for example as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR). Bennett (2014b) argues that industries that are directly connected to consumers, for example clothing and shoe production, rely on their reputation. This makes it more important for them to review their involvement in post-conflict or fragile contexts. Some (Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015) argue for the increasing need for private companies to present “do-good-stories” to claim their legitimacy (Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015, p.37), which leads them to increasingly engage in networks with NGOs. Others however imply that the ones most

directly involved in are small and medium enterprises, since “many multinational companies are afraid of the reputational risks of working in conflict-affected countries” (Grossmann et al. 2009, p.119). Iff (2012) supports this by highlighting that some private actors do not want to lose their neutrality in the countries in which they operate, as peace-building is perceived as too political.

There are three main areas outlined in the literature which non-governmental partners and private might impact: job-creation, re-integration of combatants and improved livelihoods. I will briefly relay how these three parameters might help in explaining the effect of investment in the fragile context.

2.3.1 Creating jobs in fragile contexts

One of the main tasks of the economic reconstruction is therefore the creation of employment prospects and jobs (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220). Besada (2009) argues: “Communities cannot prosper unless private investment restores markets and generates employment opportunities” (ibid., p.7). The promotion of a business environment and support to value chains can also be crucial in order to “build trust and foster cooperation for a common goal” (ibid., p.10). Employment across different ethnic groups and both sides of a conflict can help not only in creating revenues but also to reconcile former enemies in forward-looking activities. The study on entrepreneurship in Rwanda’s coffee sector (Tobias & Boudreaux 2009) provides an interesting case. It reviews “to what extent (...) commercial enterprises in the post-conflict Rwandan coffee sector contribute to conflict resolution”(ibid., p.2). The study is based on Allport’s intergroup contact theory, which says that more contact between different ethnic groups has a positive impact on reconciliation. They also include the arguments of the capitalist peace literature, which says substantial gains from peace-time trade is more important than gains from war.²⁸ Measuring a number of intergroup contact features, such as frequency, affect and quality, they find “high degrees of ethnic distance reduction and highly frequent social and work-released contact” (ibid.,

²⁸ “(...) liberalisation of the Rwandan coffee sector triggers psychological processes among coffee workers affected by this institutional change that lead to more positive attitudes towards members of the other ethnic community in Rwanda” (Tobias & Boudreaux 2009, p.4).

p.15). This means that working together in one value chain had a positive effect on the post-conflict relations between different conflict groups in Rwanda.

One sector that is essential here is small-scale agriculture both due to food security and providing income and employment for returning refugees and soldiers. Richards and Chauveau (2007) argue along similar lines, saying that agriculture is able to supply employment for a large number of young people (*ibid.*, p.7). However, they caution that this depends on how land institutions are able to integrate them. They claim improvements in agriculture such as skill training and land reforms may be effective in employing youth (*ibid.*, p.11). Looking at job creation for young men in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Batmanglich and Enria (2014) link to some topics that are interesting for this argument. This study reviews private investment in mining and agriculture and how it impacts perceptions of employment and livelihood. They find that there is no relationship between investment and job creation in their case countries. That is partly due to the fact that the private sector was not involved in the planning, programming and implementation of post-conflict job creation.

I believe that the issue of job creation, or at least the idea of job creation, should be an important aspect in the post-conflict agenda. Investment by private and non-governmental partners might have a pacifying effect, both due to the increased contact between different groups as well as the increased livelihood through jobs.

2.3.2 Re-integration of combatants

One of the most important tasks in post-conflict states is the integration of former fighters into the economics of peace (Kingma 1997). In order to create a civil economy, a country's economy should be able to "absorb enough of those previously employed in disbanded militia as will reduce disaffection to containable levels" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.220). Some (Alusala 2011; Grossmann et al. 2009) argue that long-term stability is only achieved if skills are developed that diminish the incentives for combatants to re-engage in looting or armed blackmail as an easy and profitable alternative for young fighters (Alusala 2011, p.108). Investment can play an important role in this by supporting vocational training (Besada et al. 2009, p.2), as in the case with cocoa investment in Côte d'Ivoire.

International Alert (2012) finds that “early engagement with businesses and close coordination amongst stakeholders is essential for the positive reception of ex-combatants into the labour market” (ibid., p.5). The report claims that re-integration of combatants not only transforms the individual, but also offers extended benefits for peers and the community around the combatants. Similar to the contact-hypothesis by Allport (see Tobias & Boudreaux 2009), community bonds might be strengthened when ex-combatants are re-integrated into a common work (International Alert 2012, p.5). Re-integration into the civil labour market should create a kind of “social belonging” both for the communities as well as the combatants (Alusala 2011, p.12). Bøås and Hatløy (2008) find that those that joined the rebel troops in Liberia were not over-proportionally poor but instead “ordinary people who joined armed groups based on various ideas concerning protection and opportunity” (ibid., p.14). This should be another argument that re-integration into civil economies might decrease the chance of a resurgence of conflict.

Lamb (2012) reflects on the mixed results from re-integration into agriculture in South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He argues that some participants found subsistence agriculture unappealing (CAR) or difficult to enter because they did not have land rights (CAR & DRC). However, integration into farming in South Sudan was considered a great success because most of the former fighters received skill training or had some prior experience.

2.3.3 Improving economic livelihood

One of the most important aspects in post-conflict countries is the question of so-called “peace dividends” (Junne & Verkoren 2009). Arguing that armed violence is “not simply a breakdown of a particular system but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection” (Wennmann 2011, p.11), peace economies need to offer improved livelihoods to combatants and non-combatants. Looking into income sharing arrangements, Wennmann (2011) underlines that it is crucial to craft “an economic vision for a future that ex-combatants and the conflict-affected populations can start believing” (ibid., p.75). Johnson (2009) explains that it

is necessary to promote economic growth that lessens ethnic and regional inequalities in order to increase stability.

Some state that it is vital to include development agencies and business as partners in order to make these peace dividends tangible. Global companies are locally involved, and therefore Wennmann (2011) thinks that “private sector can contribute to stability, livelihoods, and economic recovery from the bottom-up and directly affects the people’s experience of war-to-peace-transitions” (ibid., p.97).²⁹ Grossmann et al (2009) argue along the same lines, claiming that business people and bankers are the ones that can create such an inclusive growth and “mitigate the socioeconomic exclusion of those who have little or no access to resources, jobs and other opportunities” (ibid., p.17).

However, many outline that even though private investment can provide important incentives, companies do not feel that they have the responsibility, the information or the political mandate to get involved in conflict resolution (see Wennmann 2011, p.101; Iff et al. 2012).³⁰ Bray (2010) is slightly more critical to foreign direct investment in fragile states, arguing that the impact assessment often is lacking, that wealth-generating activities are often lagging behind, while investors might be ‘used’ by local patronage figures involved in the conflict as well as being linked to very specific political interests that increases the conflict likelihood (ibid., p.9).

Agriculture is an important factor here as well, as Sikuka (2014) points out.³¹ De Soysa et al (1999) argue that rebuilding agriculture is a “central condition for development, reducing poverty, preventing environmental destruction, and for

²⁹ “These [different forms of support for peace processes, EMN] include building bridges between different communities and between the state and society, engaging directly in talks with belligerents, providing good offices and information, acting as pro-peace constituencies, paying for peace processes, assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, strengthening entrepreneurship, building trust, fostering accountability, and limiting access to conflict financing” (Wennmann 2011, p.98).

³⁰ “Many chief executive officers (CEOs) consider that they have no stake in conflict resolution because they believe armed conflict is something ‘political’ or something for governments to sort out” (ibid., p.101).

³¹ “Based on these statistics, it is therefore logical to assume that any improvements in the agricultural sector would significantly contribute towards the realisation of many other developmental priorities for Africa, such as poverty eradication, industrial expansion and increased interregional trade” (Sikuka 2014, p.39).

reducing violence. Poor conditions for agriculture hold grave implications for (...) sustainable peace.” (ibid., p.15). Some (see Berdal & Keen 1997; Collier et al. 2011) claim the existence of a “vicious circle of poverty”: Conflict destroys the agriculture sector, making it difficult for farmers to survive, which in turn leads to more conflict because farmers get higher revenues from engaging in war.³² Therefore they argue that agriculture is necessary for peace,³³ for example by investing in cash cropping (see Chauveau & Richards 2008; Schneider & Gugerty 2011). Others see the need for a large-scale “agrarian revolution” in West Africa, due to increased population growth and demand for diversified food and agricultural production (see Bossard 2012, p.5; Kahl 2006a; Kahl 2006b). An important factor in this change in production modes is the investment of the private sector and the change in investment policies by governments.³⁴ Other possibilities for agricultural “livelihood recovery” are skills development, provision of agricultural input or livestock, micro-credit agricultural extension services (ibid., p.70). In order to see if investment, such as skills development in cocoa, has an effect on the perceived post-conflict livelihood, I will review the differences in perceptions between the communities that received training and those that have not.

2.4 What is reconciliation?

One final aspect is the conceptualisation of reconciliation in order to know what this analysis is looking at. Ramsbotham et al (2011) define reconciliation as “restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences” (ibid., p.246) which is quite difficult to measure. More practical are the four dimensions of reconciliation that they disclose. Firstly, the acceptance of the status quo, where violence ends and people try to get acquainted with the situation. This is followed by the reconciling accounts, where each side compares their stories of the war and suffering. The third stage is entitled ‘bridging diversity’ and emphasises mutual

³² “Indeed, only five out of 63 states who exhibit a low dependence on agriculture have suffered armed conflict after the Cold War” (De Soysa et al. 1999, p.17).

³³ “Without cultivating development—a process highly dependent on favourable conditions for agricultural production and rural livelihood—there can be no sustainable peace” (De Soysa et al. 1999, p.23).

³⁴ “Promoting entrepreneurship and agricultural investment ought to be a ‘regional great cause’” (Bossard 2012, p.6).

change and the bridging of opposite views. The final stage, which happens not on a societal but instead on a personal scale is the reconciliation of former enemies (ibid., p.247). In order to evaluate steps taking in reconciliation, Ramsbotham et al present aspects of the de-escalation ladder, which are connected to the four meanings of reconciliation. The first acceptance stage is particularly difficult in conflicts without a decisive victory or defeat.³⁵ In the second stage, violent enemies are “re-humanised” again by comparing each other’s sides of the conflict. Thirdly come structural political and economic rearrangements that seek to bridge differences between the former foes. During the last stage of reconciliation enemies have not only come to terms with each others differences but even appreciate them.

Ramsbotham et al (2011) also refer to alternative paths to reconciliation, by for example using truth commissions, war trials, reparations, ritual healing and ‘indigenous’ peace initiatives as well as retaliation. Amongst those is also the “official amnesia”, where societies collectively forget the past violence.³⁶ There are a number of articles arguing for some of these alternative processes in Côte d’Ivoire, for example by employing a truth and reconciliation commission (Owusu-Sekyere 2009). O’Bannan (2012) indicates that Côte d’Ivoire offers a number of examples of such ancient or “inherited hatred”.

2.5 Theoretical framework

So what do these theoretical discussions lead to? They serve first and foremost as a background for the theoretical framework. First of all, I want to critically review the capitalist peace theory concerning investment in Côte d’Ivoire. Since it is a cross-sectional and causal theory, I assume that it will not be able to explain all the possible mechanisms of how investment might have a pacifying effect. Secondly, I draw on post-conflict management literature to look into some of possible additions to the

³⁵ “If it is hard to forgive a defeated enemy, and harder to forgive a finally victorious enemy, it is harder still to forgive an enemy who is still seen to be an immediate and potent threat” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011, p.259).

³⁶ „So perhaps there are some things best forgotten, such as ‘ancient hatreds’ (...) but others we want to remember, such as the memory of the victims and reasons why violence is best prevented (...)” (ibid., p.252).

capitalist peace framework. I use this two-fold approach to effectively discuss the role (non-) governmental and private capital might play in the post-conflict economy.

Therefore I will first question some aspects of the capitalist peace theory on the national level: Does investment lead to a change in behaviour? Do capitalist markets only have a pacifying effect under the conditions of democracy and high human development? Is the capitalist framework able to explain property rights protection and is there an increase in accountability and transparency?




Figure 3 Theoretical framework

Thereafter I will review three aspects in which private companies, the international community and non-governmental actors might have an impact on the local level, namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of livelihood.

Chapter 3. Background

In order to get a better understanding of what the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire is all about and what role cocoa historically has played in the country I want to briefly account for some background information.

3.1 Côte d'Ivoire – diversity, cocoa wars and land

The war in Côte d'Ivoire is often portrayed as a typical West-African conflict with ethnic vengeance, rooted in greed over resources and nested in patrimonial networks. But in contrast to neighbouring Liberia or Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire is very different from the so-called “failed states” of the region,³⁷ although it has been branded as such (see Global Witness 2007, p.14; O'Bannon 2012; Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). Indeed the unravelling of the “economic powerhouse of the African continent” in the nineties came somewhat unexpectedly (O'Bannon 2012, p.5): “There was a deep sense of shock in Abidjan. This was the first time this had happened in nearly forty years of independent rule” (Ryan 2011, p.33). Côte d'Ivoire is somewhat special when it comes to post-colonial development, as Chirot (2006) explains. He argues that the close ties to France and Boigny's choice to enter market capitalism, created a national welfare system and economy that was quite special. He outlines that of the 4,5 million citizens in the early 1970s, “about 50,000 were metropolitan Frenchmen and another 100,000 were French-passport holders—including a substantial ethnic Lebanese business class” (ibid., p.65). The country simply was one of the most progressive and prosperous in the region.

³⁷ Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) are amongst those quick to declare the Côte d'Ivoire as a failed state at the same level as Somalia: “Extractive institutions that expropriate and impoverish the people and block economic development are quite common in Africa, Asia, and South America. (...) The pattern of extractive institutions collapsing into civil war and state failure has happened elsewhere in Africa” (2012, p.376). The ICG report from the 2004 does for example remark: “At first sight Côte d'Ivoire does not appear to fall into the same category as Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is clearly not a ‘failed state’ they became: the roads are still in good condition, the country is still shipping more cocoa than any other, and Abidjan's Plateau neighbourhood is home to many skyscrapers” (ICG 2004, p.4). Others also note the sophisticated style of wealth-extraction in comparison to Liberia or Sierra Leone (Skogseth 2006, p.23; McGovern 2011, p.165).

3.1.1 Ethnicity and economics

So how did the country end up in a decade of conflict? Looking into the country's ethnic and economic background may provide some answers. Côte d'Ivoire counts about 60 ethnic groups. However none of them dominate or represent an "ethno-linguistic centre of gravity" (Groves 2006, p.1), which means that no ethnicity has an "automatic" right to rule due its majority. The OECD and others divide the Ivorian ethnicities according to the four main ethno-linguistic groups: Mandé, Voltaïque, Krou and Kwa (see Figure 4).




Figure 4 Ethno-linguistic map of Côte d'Ivoire from OECD

In the south the Kwa, consist of the **Baoulé** and Ebriy Lagoon groups, while the Kru are mostly **Bété** people. Further North the Mandé contain **Malinké**, Bambara, **Dioula**, while Voltaïque people are **Senoufou**, Djimini and Tagouana.³⁸ Both the absence of an ethno-linguistic "centre of gravity" and the strong division into major groupings are seen as impediments for national unity (Groves 2006, p.1 f).

³⁸ The bolded groups are those that are most important for the historical overview as well as the micro-level analysis.

Regardless of the tricky ethnic composition in Côte d'Ivoire, the country did not disintegrate after independence. Some say it is because Boigny, a Baoulé himself, was able to include different ethnicities in his government. Although others (see Langer 2004) rightly argue that only Baoulés entered the main power circle, non-Baoulés were still represented at high levels in politics. They were for example integrated in the PDCI-structure and had full political rights (see Skogseth 2006). Others claim that Boigny bought Northern elites off in order to keep the country calm (Chirot 2006, p.68; Ayangafac 2009, p.35). However, he was the one who encouraged migration towards the South, installing liberal rules for landownership.

Divisions between the North and South existed already under Boigny and were due to geographies, ethnicity and religion. The country is further divided by inequalities between the people and elites (Langer 2004). This might be especially important for the internal divisions in the cocoa-producing Western part of the country where a number of ethnic groups lived and worked together (Owusu-Sekyere 2009). It can be argued that Boigny's liberal land and migration policies were designed "to ameliorate the profound economic inequalities between the north and the south by allowing migrants from the north to settle quickly" (Meehan 2011, p.1).³⁹ This however created three distinct groups in the south: the autochthones, Bété, Dan and Guére, who are considered as the "first settlers", then the allochthones of Baoulé, Senoufou and Dioula who migrated inside the Côte d'Ivoire. There are also the "foreigners", the so-called allogenes, who are from Burkina Faso and Mali (O'Bannon 2012, p.8).

After four decades of ethnically-balanced politics, did the country's economic downturn result in an politicisation of identity (see Meehan 2011). While parties were already religiously and regionally defined, the invention of "Ivoryité" enabled political parties to present themselves also according to ethnicity. Bédié excluded other ethnicities rather strictly, which led to the so-called "Baoulisation" of politics (Langer 2004, p.26). After the military coup of General Guéï, a "de-Baoulisation" and "de-Akanisation" occurred, which meant that these ethnic groups were discriminated

³⁹ Other factors also argue in that direction with increased public investment in the 1970s (Langer 2004, p.12 f).

against. Gbagbo in turn tried to promote his Bété/Kru followers into powerful positions.

My main point is that governments after Boigny increasingly politicised ethnic identity. Boigny kept the country together by including and balancing different ethnicities. McGovern (2011) even attributes the entire Ivorian identity to him.⁴⁰ He argues that the Ivorians still have so much trust in Boigny that discrediting his politics would eventually mean denouncing the nation's identity as a whole (ibid., p.155).



Picture 1 Boigny as a preacher for peace in Abidjan-Cocody

The impact of the economic crisis is a second important aspect. Many argue that the start of the economic recession coincides with the considerable decline in prices for cocoa and coffee (Skogseth 2006). Others are arguing that the rise in oil price, the rising dollar and large interests rates contributed to the economic downturn (Akindès 2004, p.17). Being largely built on revenues from agricultural crops, the government was unable to provide essential services without heavily indebting the country. A decline in jobs in the government and less investment in health and education caused unemployment and the deterioration in living conditions (Akindès 2004). Especially critical here was large-scale youth unemployment, which formed the recruitment base for Gbagbo's and other militia groups such as the traditional *dozo*-hunters (Skogseth 2006, p.20; Hellweg 2011; Banégas 2012).

The World Bank and IMF insisted on structural adjustment reforms and liberalisation first and foremost in the cocoa sector. But one of the important

⁴⁰ "Ivorians have an acute sense of the ways in which Houphouët-Boigny, for better or worse, held the country together through sheer force of will and personal political skill" (McGovern 2011, p.154).

consequences of the economic downturn were the “exacerbated tensions between indigenous and immigrants on the one hand and between migrants from the North and locals in the affluent South.” (Langer 2004, p.13). This was one of the main reasons why ethnicity was utilised in the political game and why the ethnic card has been increasingly been played in order to win votes and re-shape identity.⁴¹

3.1.2 Land ownership, greed and scarcity

Theories explaining the conflict rely heavily on features of ethnicity and the economy. The autochthony argument (see Bøås & Dunn 2013; Lund 2011; Chauveau & Richards 2008) focuses on the importance of belonging to a certain area or land. This kind of belonging reasons the access to long-term revenues of that land.⁴² As outlined above, Boigny promoted the migration of allochthones and allogenes to the booming south to meet the demand for workforce in cocoa. The land rights system of the *tutorat* encouraged this migration. Chauveau (2006) outlines the *tutorat* as a system common in rural societies and as an tool to regulate the relationship between the first-comers, the autochthones, and the “new-comers”. Being based on the moral code that everyone should be able to provide means of subsistence to his family, the *tutorat* grants access to “free” land and hence incorporates foreigners into the community. Especially for cocoa and coffee, the use of the *tutorat* meant the long-term transfer of land rights. It should however not be mistaken for “renting, sharecropping and other short or middle-term transfers of land use rights” (Chauveau & Colin 2010, p.87).⁴³ The system was further supported by a decree by Boigny from 1967 “which stated that ‘the land belongs to he who cultivates it’”(Global Witness 2007, p.13) as he wanted to push

⁴¹ Chirot (2006). argues along the lines of Horowitz on outlining the consequences for election: “Under such circumstances, as Donald Horowitz points out, elections in ethnically divided societies become substitute censuses, giving those in power every incentive to distort results lest they risk falling into the minority as a result of demographic changes. Rather than creating harmony and stability, elections then become an invitation to fraud and open conflict“ (Chirot 2006, p.69).

⁴² “Autochthony implies that one is entitled to belong because of ancestral rights to land. Simply put, the claim is ,this is ours because we were here first”“ (Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.102).

⁴³ “The autochthone-migrant relationships that were established were similar to the ‘stranger-father’-relationships in Liberia and the forest region of Guinea (...). In Côte d’Ivoire this structure is known as the *tutorat* institution. This institution establishes a bond of patronage between the autochthon and the migrant, to whom land rights are extended on the basis of the principles of a moral economy: any individual has a right to the amount of land necessary to ensure his and his family’s subsistence“ (Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.114).

agriculture as a main economic force. Disputes over land rights and properties eventually arose in the wake of the economic crisis of the '80s/ '90s and the increasing scarcity of land (see McGovern 2011; Bøås & Huser 2006).

A political solution to these problems was offered in the concept of “Ivoirité” and the land reform of 1998, which supports the property rights of “the first settlers”, the so-called “sons of the soil” (Bøås & Dunn 2013, p.102). Suddenly, these autochthones had a stronger legal claim over land than the allogenes and allochthones. A further decrease in civil and social rights for northern migrants ignited conflict. Deep-felt grievances on both sides started to emerge and to be politicised as Bax (2003) depicts. Due to the close connection of political programme, migration and land rights issues is often said that the autochthony question is “the heart of the Ivorian crisis” (McGovern 2011, p.7), granting civil and social rights to one group but not the other. Some (Chauveau & Richards 2008; Richards 2011) claim however that the autochthony argument is just an epiphenomenon; that ethnicity and belonging are used to mask the struggle over scarce land.

Another main explanation of the conflict is the argument of greed for agricultural resources. Some claim that resources, mainly cocoa, are most important and that the Ivorian conflict boils down to a dispute between patrimonial networks trying to gain control over revenues (see Ryan 2011; Woods 2003; Alongi 2011; Global Witness 2007). Proponents of this explanation argue that the cocoa exports played a similar role in financing the war as “conflict timber” did in Liberia or “conflict diamonds” in Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2007). By uncovering the revenue system of the cocoa trade and its political importance for Boigny, Gbagbo and Ouattara, authors like Woods (2003; 1999) analyse the cocoa rent-seeking strategies of political elites. An important aspect of the rent-seeking argument is the relative scarcity and competition for land for cocoa. This touches upon the Neo-Malthusian argument, claiming that conflict is more likely when people compete over scarce resources (see Hendrix & Glaser 2007; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012; Trombetta 2012; Furlong et al. 2006; Le Billion 2001).

I believe that both the autochthony and rent-seeking argument can explain some aspects of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. Knowing possible causes further helps in

understanding the post-conflict challenges that this thesis deals with. I find it useful to refer to a multi-level and multi-causal explanation for the Ivorian case (see McGovern 2011; Bellier 2011; Bøås & Dunn 2013; O'Bannon 2012). McGovern (2011) for example argues that the conflict rhetoric of xenophobia has long-term and short-term purposes. Immediately, hatred against foreigners can cover the looting of economic gains. In the longer term, xenophobia helps to disqualify political opponents and gain economic power (ibid., p.165). O'Bannon (2012) argues similarly that the conflict deals with three separate yet connected levels. On the local level, the conflict is rooted in land disputes that existed earlier, but have intensified and escalated over the course of the 1990s. Nationally a number of factors, like the death of Boigny and the economic downturn, exaggerated the struggle over the neo-patrimonial state. Regionally, the conflict is connected to political and ethnic relationships with Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali and Ghana.⁴⁴ The complexity of the case and the interaction between those levels and time-perspectives create difficulties for post-conflict management.

3.2 How to make chocolate – the Cocoa-Value Chain

The cocoa value chain includes a number of actors. The analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 will refer to some of these and some other technicalities of the cocoa value chain, which I will therefore briefly present here.

The chocolate production is essentially dependent on the tricky *theobroma* tree, with origins in Central America. The tree counts around 15 different sub-species and has very specific needs for optimal growth; it needs a humid, hot climate and thrives in 15-20 degrees latitude from the equator. The *theobroma* grows in tropical and lush vegetation with shade and annual average temperatures of 25 degrees, in an altitude below 500 meters above sea level (Bøås & Huser 2006; World Cocoa Foundation 2014). The plant is very vulnerable to changes in these optimal conditions and prone to

⁴⁴ “Local violence between indigenous and ‘foreigners’ erupts over land tenure disputes, which fuels the flames of the national-level discourse of autochthony and xenophobia. For their part, national-level politicians seem keen to instrumentalise local disputes to help wage their own battles and in doing so help create a hostile climate in which more local conflict is likely. As a result, local violence, even that driven by local concerns, often reflects the national cleavage, or the master conflict narrative” (O'Bannon 2012, p.4).

diseases and insects. It measures five to eight meters when fully developed and produces pods containing the cocoa seeds only for a limited time during its 25 to 30 years-long life span. After planting the seedlings, farmers have to wait seven years before the crop reaches its potential, thereafter the tree's production increases for 13 years before rapidly declining (see Bøås & Huser 2006).

Investment and innovation in fertilizers, new hybrids and improved techniques can have a large impact in the productivity of the plant. Ruf (2007) looks for example at three possible options for improved productivity: the expansion of production area, a “green revolution” with hybrid adoption and heavy use of fertilizer, and a “double green revolution” including seed technologies, mixed-crop planting and organic fertilizers. He finds that both expansion and hybrid adoption/ fertilizers have negative consequences. Instead he argues that a yield increase is most likely with the “double green revolution” option including diversification. This might be important also in regards to effects and challenges by climate change (Ruf et al. 2015).

68% of worldwide cocoa supply is produced in Africa, mainly in the West (Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire) and the Centre (DRC). Asia produces 17% and the Americas 15%. Côte d'Ivoire is and has long been the largest producer of cocoa, generating about 33% of the world's supply. During the last couple of years there has been an increase both in quality as well as demand for cocoa.

Cocoa is a cash crop largely produced on family-farms and by smallholders. They are called “plantations” even though they are considerably smaller than tea or coffee plantations. Farmers have to care for the tree the whole year round due to its sensitivity to pests and changes in its environment. It needs to be underlined that cocoa farming demands not only a lot of hard labour but also a lot of knowledge. This mixture of labour and skill is one of the special aspects and represents some of the difficulties in recruiting new farmers. From five years onwards the tree can be harvested twice a year (World Cocoa Foundation 2014),⁴⁵ though some areas and sorts can produce all year around. The ripe yellow pods are pulled from the trees, collected and cracked open to remove the cocoa beans that are covered with a white and bitter

⁴⁵ The main harvest season in Côte d'Ivoire is from September to December and then a smaller one from April to June (Bøås & Huser 2006, p.16). Fluctuations in weather patterns can affect these harvesting times (World Cocoa Foundation 2014, p.4).

pulp. Depending on the plant and quality, a pod contains 20-50 single cocoa beans. Thereafter the beans are collected in one place and covered with mats or banana leaves. This starts the fermentation process of the white pulp, which takes three to seven days; here the cocoa develops its aromatic taste. The fermentation is therefore a critical step in order to produce good quality cocoa. After fermenting, the beans are laid out in the sun to dry. After they pack the beans in plastic or jute bags, farmers deliver their cocoa to local buying agents (known as “pisteurs” in Côte d’Ivoire) or co-operatives.⁴⁶ From there the local buyer sells the beans to an exporting company for further marketing. After quality controls, the cocoa might be dried some more before being exported to the processing location, which includes grinding the cocoa, pressing of the cocoa mass and chocolate making. These last stages of processing, outside the production country add a considerable economic value to the product. About 40% of the processing sites are located in Europe, especially the Netherlands (World Cocoa Foundation 2014). This marks a division of labour and value, with the most labour-intensive part (planting, harvesting, fermenting and drying) being executed in the producing countries, while the exporting and processing that adds most value is completed in more developed countries.

3.3 Côte de Cocoa

Côte d’Ivoire is the largest supplier of cocoa worldwide, exporting between 30-40% of the global cocoa (Hatløy et al. 2012; VOICE Network 2015; World Cocoa Foundation 2014). Produced on over 600,000 farms, cocoa employs “more than four million of the country’s 22 million inhabitants” (Hatløy et al. 2012, p.8). The average farm counts 3 hectares and produces 450 kg of cocoa per hectare. Only 17% of the cocoa produced is also



Figure 5 The cocoa value chain

⁴⁶ The “farmgate”/ producer price established by the PDCI and CAISTAB was a major planning instrument for farmers and secured that each cocoa planter knew how much he could get for his cocoa (McGovern 2011, p.159).

processed in Côte d'Ivoire (Global Witness 2007, p.17). The rest of it is directly exported via San Pedro and Abidjan ports.⁴⁷ The numbers on the share of cocoa for the GDP vary, but are estimated to be 6.99% for 2009 (Abbott 2013, p.256) and about 1.35 million tonnes per year.

As mentioned previously, cocoa is a major political and economic factor for the country (Global Witness 2007; Woods 2003; Jadot 2013). But in order to understand the circumstances of cocoa investment and the role the crop has played, I want to briefly review some parts of the cocoa history. Already the French colonialists had thought about planting *theobroma*, but cocoa farming only took off after independence. Ryan (2011) argues that Boigny was not interested in industrialisation but prioritized agricultural growth instead: "If Côte d'Ivoire is to prosper, the Ivorian president said, farmers should grow coffee and cocoa" (ibid., p.26). The export of cocoa beans became the motor of Ivorian economic development from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Produced in small plantations, farmers were organised in cooperatives and farmers' organisations, and the state-owned Caisse de Stabilisation (CAISTAB) was a stabilisation fund for cocoa-planters setting the cocoa price.⁴⁸ There are debates over the form of this first cocoa revenue system. Some argue that it symbolised the interests of a so-called "planter bourgeoisie", a Baoulé-dominated, ethnically-determined elite that gathered most revenues from cocoa. Others claim that it was a smallholder-friendly system; while again others debate that so-called "gros planteurs", the large-scale producers of 20 tonnes or more, were the biggest winners (McGovern 2011, p.143). McGovern concludes that urban political elites were those most profiting from Boigny's system by using CAISTAB as a "financial black box". These semi-illicit and neo-patrimonial revenue networks were so non-transparent that both the IMF and

⁴⁷ "53 Four large multinational companies – the American companies ADM and Cargill, the French company CEMOI and the Swiss company Barry Callebaut – as well as the Ivorian company Pronibex have invested in cocoa-processing capacity in Côte d'Ivoire, as a result of government policies to encourage exports of semi-finished products" (Global Witness 2007, p.17).

⁴⁸ "Since 1964, government officials simply skimmed a certain amount off the top of all cocoa sales, placing money into the cocoa-coffee stabilisation fund set up as part of the marketing system or 'filière', in order to ensure stable prices for producers even in years when the international price dipped" (McGovern 2011, p.138).

World Bank argued for liberalising cocoa in the 1990s.⁴⁹ With the economic crisis and the decrease of cocoa prices, the government declared the “cocoa war” in 1987. Counting on their power as largest supplier, Boigny held back cocoa to artificially increase the price. After two years of self-declared export stop, without the desired effect, the ban was lifted and left the sector weakened (McGovern 2011, p.145). The continued decline in cocoa prices further worsened the situation further. In an economy which rested heavily on the shoulders of the cocoa planters, this had devastating results.

It was not only farmers and those directly involved in the cocoa sector that faced serious difficulties. In the booming days of cocoa, the secondary and tertiary sectors in the cities grew and attracted work migrants (Chirot 2006). With the decline in the economic motor, these sectors also had to lay off workers, and particularly young men had to return to their home towns. Especially for the younger work migrants the crisis created deep frustrations and “(...) the feeling that their future had been sold out from under them” (McGovern 2011, p.141). These young men returned to the plantations of their families in the West and found their claims contested by migrants who had worked their way up, adding more frustrations.

The liberalization-reform of the cocoa system was finalised in 1999 with the dismantling of CAISTAB, which in essence led to “leaving the private sector to handle marketing and producer prices” (Agritrade 2012, p.2). Many argue that the reform was unsuccessful in increasing sector transparency, but instead intensified illicit activities to be “more elaborate, better hidden, yet sometimes even greater in scale and scope” (McGovern 2011, p.158).

Gbagbo, an outsider of the cocoa system and his Bété followers, tried to access the cocoa revenues as well (see Ryan 2011, p.69). But instead of one organisation remaining responsible, Gbagbo dispersed responsibilities into four new organisations.⁵⁰ These new agencies demanded a nine-fold of fees and taxes from farmers without adding any benefits (McGovern 2011, p.161). This leads researchers

⁴⁹ However one can also find that the illicit cocoa network had a certain ‘trickle-down’ effect, increasing health care, school system and other social measures (McGovern 2011, p.140).

⁵⁰ The Autorité de Régulation du Café et du Cacao (ARCC), the Bourse du Café et Cacao (BCC), the Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle du Café et Cacao (FRC) and the Fonds de Développement et de Promotion des Activités des Producteurs de Café et de Cacao (FGCCC).

to claim that the reform had a devastating effect on cocoa farmers' livelihoods. Gbagbo's government took "away from the cocoa farmers in order to enrich individuals close to the [him] and the FPI" (ibid., p.163). In other words, the relatively stabilising neo-patrimonial system of Boigny was over time replaced by the complex illicit network of Gbagbo.

Cocoa production declined somewhat in the years of instability, but exports were still going out. Cocoa was looted and exported because "everybody can make their margin, the government can get its revenue (...) It was in no one's interest for the beans to stay on the farm" (Ryan 2011, pp.36/37). A report by Global Witness suggests that cocoa financed both sides of the conflict with a minimum of US\$20.3 million (Global Witness 2007, p.5). Others argue that it was about US\$118 million (Boka-Mene & Whyche-Shaw 2009). After the crisis of 2010-11, Ouattara reformed the cocoa system almost immediately. His government removed all former structures and integrated all organisations into the Conseil du Café Cacao (CCC), which serves as one of the points of departure in Chapter 4 and 5.

Ruf compares large-scale cocoa producers and points towards the peak in Côte d'Ivoire's production in the 1970s, which has been gradually declining thereafter (Ruf 2007, p.2).⁵¹ The decline in cocoa productivity is not a sole Ivorian issue, but some argue that Ghana's production organisation has saved farmers from some of the more negative influences (Bøås & Huser 2006). Privatisation and taxation burdens especially had an impact on the decline in cocoa quality in Côte d'Ivoire (FSG 2009). Additionally cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire is more of a mono-crop and demands higher input costs in comparison to Ghana (VOICE Network 2015).⁵²

The cocoa sector in Côte d'Ivoire is therefore without a doubt the heart and the blood of the Ivorian economy (Bøås & Huser 2006, p.21). It is a crop that guaranteed enormous growth, as well as being used in financing the country's violent conflict. It is a sector that has been subject to a number of reforms, but the results of these are

⁵¹ "Unfortunately, since 2003/04, a dramatic taxation on cocoa has reversed the trend, discouraging farmers. Average yields are stagnating or even declining again in many regions of Côte d'Ivoire" (Ruf 2007, p.2).

⁵² The Cocoa Barometer argues that 90% of the cocoa farmers in Côte d'Ivoire only crop cocoa, compared to 78% in Ghana. Input costs per ha are calculated at US\$ 513 (Côte d'Ivoire) against US\$ 360 (Ghana) (VOICE Network 2015, p.26).

somewhat lagging behind. Ruf (2007) argues that that is related to the life-cycle of the plant (ibid., p.3). A lot of observers claim that the system in itself is deeply corrupt and opaque (Global Witness 2007). Hatløy et al (2012) argue further that the sector is facing a large number of problems in the future. Main social constraints are: child labour, lack of access to infrastructure, ageing of famers and cocoa trees. The sector also faces a number of economic constraints, for example the lack of access to finance and agricultural inputs and problems in cooperative organisation. Environmental problems, like land degradation and pests, as well as political problems add to these issues.

Chapter 4. National-scale analysis

Starting my analysis on the national level, I will first evaluate the capitalist peace theory (see Schneider & Gleditsch 2013; De Soysa & Fjelde 2010). I will do so by looking more closely into the country's investment activity after 2011. Thereafter, I will review some general trends of the reconciliation process before discussing investment-activities according to capitalist peace assumptions.

4.1 Cocoa investment in Côte d'Ivoire

In order to assess the investment activities, it is essential to have an overview of main investors, types of investment and project objectives. By looking at statistics and reports, I can argue that general and cocoa investment increased after the 2011-crisis before I introduce the mapping of main investment data.

4.1.1 What does investment look like?

To start with, it is worth noticing that financing in the cocoa sector in Côte d'Ivoire differs greatly from investing in other agricultural commodities like rubber or palm




Figure 6 Most important actors in the cocoa sector

oil.⁵³ Cocoa is, as mentioned in the background chapter, a crop that is farmed by families on a small-scale which effects the scale of private and governmental investment. The number of actors involved in cocoa investment, however, is vast (see Global Witness 2007; Hatløy et al. 2012). I depicted the most important entities for this thesis in Figure 6. The figure includes main cocoa exporters, like Barry Callebaut or Cemoi in red,⁵⁴ most of whom have their own cocoa sustainability programmes. In orange are the programme owners, like the German Development Agency (GIZ). The sub-governmental bodies, like the Conseil Café Cacao (CCC) are in green and other important players in yellow. All these actors cooperate in programmes as part of business-NGO networks (see Blitzer et al. 2012; Bitzer & Glasbergen 2015) investing together. Take the World Cocoa Foundation's (WCF) 'Cocoa Livelihood programme' for example. It is financially supported by: four cocoa processors (ADM, Blommer etc.), three manufacturers (Mars, Hershey etc.), ten supply chain managers (Olam, Petra etc.), the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH). The implementation is managed by the WCF but executed by five agencies (GIZ, TechnoServe etc.). This complicates things not only in terms of data collection but these complex investor-networks cause difficulties when trying to aggregate the impact from single actors.⁵⁵

Investment activities can be described as three types. Firstly, projects trying to increase the amount and quality of cocoa, which try to counter the decreased cocoa productivity that started in the 1980s (see Chapter 3) and consist of teaching agricultural practices or the distribution of fertilizers. This may impact farmers' livelihoods, but aims mainly at increased export yields. A second investment type aims at improving farmers' livelihoods by teaching planters good business practices or educating co-operatives in management skills. Third and last are investments with a

⁵³ These crops are more often connected with larger scale and industrial plantations, although they are sometimes and in countries such as Liberia planted on family farms as well.

⁵⁴ This overview gives an estimation of their market share (George 2014).

⁵⁵ Since the cocoa sector is a rather sensitive sector and due to the request of some interviewed experts, I make the data as anonymous as possible. However there is a list of actors I talked to attached in Annex 1.

corporate responsibility approach,⁵⁶ which usually contain social infrastructure projects such as school buildings, health centres and water points.⁵⁷ The data I gathered consists of all types of investments. For the selection of the focus groups in Chapter 5 I picked one of the programmes from the second category of farmer business schooling.

When reviewing these sorts of projects, it is worth noticing that most of them do not have a specific conflict-reducing objective. Initiatives like farmer business schooling try to include younger farmers (at least 50 per cent of the participants should be under 30 years) and female planters. However they are not selecting recruits that are ex-combatants or targeting more conflict-affected communities. One of the projects that does have a conflict-sensitive approach is the newly established CCC-programme ‘Jeunes agriculteurs’, the young farmers’ initiative (see Akinocho 2014). It combines cocoa investment and increased farmer livelihood with specific focus to youth “strongly impacted by the war”. According to the official objectives, the project intends to promote youth employment, diversify revenue sources and increase yields.⁵⁸ My interview partner at the CCC was more specific on the target group for the initiative and added that they want to aid in the reconciliation process and make ex-combatants “forget all kinds of ideas of war”.⁵⁹ One newspaper article on the campaign kick-off in Bougouanou further mentions that parts of the recruits have been recommended from the national agency for DDR, the Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réintégration (ADDR) (Yéboué 2015). Another more specific reconciliation project is the World Bank’s Project for Post-Conflict Assistance (PAPC) programme, which supports, amongst others, youth at risk re-integrating into civil life. The project tries to initiate income-generating activities both for individuals and communities some located in agriculture and cocoa (Gov CDI 2013a). While one

⁵⁶ Many of the firms discuss the so-called “three Ps”: People, Planet and Profit/ Productivity, which combines a CSR approach on farmer livelihood, ecological sustainability and increased economic return.

⁵⁷ Often these programmes are partially financed through surpluses of certified cocoa sold.

⁵⁸ “The Director General of the Conseil Café-Cacao Massandjé Touré, revealed that the project was initiated in 2014 and is part of the vision of President Ouattara and his government to solve the problem of youth employment. She said that this project aims at the promotion and integration of youth, diversification of sources of income across different cultures, improving the processing of products locally” (Yéboué 2015).

⁵⁹ “Its important to stop the young from coming up with any kind of ideas about war”.

implementing expert argued that the conflict represents an important cross-cutting issue in designing projects, there seems to be no overarching reconciliation approach for cocoa investment. The main objective is the increase of productivity.⁶⁰ The capitalist peace assumptions however do not outline that the intentions of an investment project plays any major role for the theory to be valid. Hence I gather that even if most investment programmes do not aim at improving reconciliation, any investment as part of the (re-) integration into the capitalist system should, by default have a pacifying effect.

4.1.2 Investment increase after Gbagbo left the stage

As previously indicated, Côte d’Ivoire was one of Africa’s great economic miracles and suffered immensely under the economic downturn, the corrupt practices of the Gbagbo government (ICG 2011a, p.3) and the electoral crisis. This economic decline pre-2011 is apparent both in reports and statistics of the country, as the six months of unrest in 2010-11 alone led to a decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 6.3% (ICG 2011a, p.13). Most international companies and personnel, especially from the biggest business ally, France, left the country in fear of violence (BBC 2010b; BBC 2010c). This sharp decline in investment is also noticeable in the long-term inflow of investment, remittances and aid (see Figure 7). Aid Data (Aid Data 2014) reveals here that the civil war period from 2001-2 is marked by shifting money inflow. Especially after the peak in 2009 and around the crisis 2010/11, there is a drop in investment.




Figure 7 Inflow of aid, remittances and investment in Côte d'Ivoire (Aid Data)

⁶⁰ “Everyone is talking about doubling yields, but for that to happen labour is needed, then we need to make sure that schools are in place to avoid child labour.”/ “Everyone wants to increase yields to increase livelihood”.

Regarding cocoa, experts argue that the “tensions starved Ivory Coast of investment and sapped the confidence of cocoa growers” (BBC 2010a). Farmers were less likely to re-invest in cocoa and did not plant new seedlings. Regarding the lifecycle of the tree such lack in re-investment has negative long-term consequences. Until the EU and the US imposed sanctions on cocoa (BBC 2011b; BBC 2011e; BBC 2011f; BBC 2010b), exports proceeded normal (BBC 2011d). After the sanctions were in place, most cocoa was either stored at the harbours or smuggled to Ghana or Burkina Faso, where it was re-packed, re-labelled and sold off. One BBC report argues that about 500,000 tones of cocoa were temporarily held back due to the crisis (BBC 2011f).⁶¹ Estimations of the amount of smuggled cocoa are less certain but should be considerable (see Mark 2011). All in all one can notice an “absence of investment and policy incentives and the deterioration of infrastructure” (Agritrade 2012, p.2) and the temporary cut-off from the global cocoa market.⁶²

Ouattara’s government did start to prioritise economic recovery early (BBC 2011j). Increased GDP, better infrastructure, economic reforms and raised investments were main objectives right from May 2011 onwards (see BBC 2011o; Boisvert 2014; Kobo 2014; Maritz 2014). This National Development Plan highlights the importance of attracting private investment (Gov CDI 2012b, p.8), especially in the renewal of cocoa farms and support of intensive plantations (Gov CDI 2012b, p.31). The National Investment Plan in Agriculture (Gov CDI 2012a) bears the same logic and outlines three main areas for intervention, in which the state should cooperate with research institutions and chocolate exporters to establish private-public partnerships.

Macro-economic reviews show an overall GDP-growth of 8.6% in 2012, including cocoa exports that increased by 1.1% (Yembiline et al. 2014). This considerable increase in GDP re-installs Côte d’Ivoire as one of the top-growing


⁶¹ As early as January 2011, reports mention the difficulty of cocoa exporters in dealing with Gbagbo’s government as problematic: “They [the major cocoa exporters] will be worried about losing their licences if Mr Ouattara does ever come to power, he [director of export firm] says. And global companies could be concerned about their international reputations if they are seen to be dealing with an administration seen as illegitimate by the world community, he says” (BBC 2011d). “While most big cocoa traders, including US food giant Cargill, have actively said they will respect the ban, others, such as Nestle, have not, says Ms Tasfay. , Tariffs and port taxes will likely be increased [...] raising operating costs for companies that are still trading in Côte d’Ivoire” (Anderson 2011).

⁶²Sanctions in themselves mark the end of free trade as Mousseau and others argue (Mousseau 2010; Hegre 2005; Polachek et al. 1999).

economies on the continent (Hedley et al. 2014).⁶³ But more important for this thesis is the increase in investment. According to Yembiline et al, the country could refer to a 39.9% growth in investment (Yembiline et al. 2014, p.52). Alby (2014) and others voice expectations of massive inflow of private and public investment in Côte d’Ivoire. It is somewhat tricky to only rely on such statistics, since they are very difficult to access for the cocoa sector and because they might exclude so-called “shadow economies”, namely the informal sector and agriculture. This might bias the results (see Jerven 2011). However most investment reviews further confirm the country’s attractiveness to investors; the US Department of State (Grauer 2015) deems Côte d’Ivoire as “fertile soil for US investments” as well as “one of the best bets in Africa for business growth and opportunities” (ibid. 2015, p.1 f). Reforms and the adoption of a new investment

code in 2012 might have further attracted foreign direct investment, as Monnier (2014) points out. Some smaller signs further signal that Côte d’Ivoire is “back in business”: for example the first African visit of the French president was to Côte d’Ivoire (BBC 2014b), large investors conferences (Gov CDI 2013b) and media reports about the rise in international investors (BBC 2014c).

It is especially cocoa that seems to attract investors again. Being one of the main targets for Ouattara’s FN troops San Pedro was captured early on (BBC 2011n; BBC 2011i; BBC 2011d) in order to gain control over the cocoa revenues (BBC 2011c). The renewed investor interest is also noticeable in increased exporters’



Source: IMF
Figure 8 Investment ratio (Yembiline et al 2014)

⁶³ Regional GDP comparisons are somewhat unreliable as Jerven (2011) underlines due to the differing methods of calculating the national figures. The quoted numbers here come from IMF and AfDB estimates as well as national authorities.

activities as my interview partners argue.⁶⁴ One of the first larger investment projects was revealed in November 2011, when Cargill announced investment of US\$3 million in improving and renewing cocoa plantations (ICG 2011b, p.7). Nestlé invested CFA 10 billion, in 2012 and 2013 (Monnier 2014). CEMOI announced plans to build a factory for chocolate production (Africa Report 2015). Many others followed, also because the CCC installed a platform for private-public partnerships in cocoa.

4.2 Mapping investment and conflict in the Côte d’Ivoire

Aside from the national investment outlook, I wanted to locate the investment in cocoa value chains in order to cross-check the relation to investment patterns and conflict

hotspots. As outlined in the background chapters, cocoa only grows under very specific conditions. These are limited to the southern regions in Côte d’Ivoire, namely: (Dix-Huit)




Montagnes, Moyen Cavally, Haut-Sassandra, Bas-Sassandra, Sud Bandama, Fromager, Marahoue, Lacs, N’zi Comoe, Moyen Comoe, Agneby, Sud Comoe (see Figure 9). It was, as previously mentioned, very difficult to get access to data on the locations of the investments. One of the few overviews on project sites I received from an informant depicted project sites of the CCC, but was too broad to be informative. Due to the lack of a proper

Figure 9 Map of cocoa-producing regions in Côte d’Ivoire

⁶⁴ “There have been substantial investments in agro-industry and the extractive and food industries. The principal countries of origin of investment were Singapore, France, Lebanon and the UK. [...] Agriculture, mining, and hydrocarbons sectors represent important investment opportunities” (Gov UK 2014). Other signs of increased investment lie in the return of the African Development Bank to Abidjan in 2014 and the 22 of 75 agricultural projects started during the International Forum of Investment in Côte d’Ivoire.

cocoa-investment map, I gathered as much data myself and geo-referenced the locations as described in chapter 1 (see Figure 10).



This overview indicates the locations of 140 project sites, which have been installed after 2011, and includes private, governmental and donor agencies (see Annex 3).

Figure 10 Investment mapping

The colour code signals the main focus of the investment project: green stands for projects to increase cocoa quality/ quantity, blue describes projects focusing on education (building of schools and education programmes), black points to infrastructure (building of health stations, water points etc.) and yellow marks youth projects. Overall it seems as if investments are largely focused on building schools as well as increasing cocoa yields through quality insurance programmes. Infrastructure projects are less apparent and restricted to the Daloa-San Pedro route. This is not surprising since this route is the main access way to the harbour. Youth projects are also less apparent. From the information that is accessible it seems as if investment projects have a strong focus on building schools and infrastructure. From informants I heard however that there are a lot more projects that deal with the increase of cocoa quality and quantity, but these project sites are much harder to get data on. This might be due to exporters being reluctant to hand out “their secret” of how to grow the best cocoa.

If one follows the general logic of the capitalist peace, one might look for an overlap between investment locations and conflict locations. In order to get an overview over the most conflict affected areas I first cross-checked the smaller scale events, such as riots, strikes and protests documented in the Social Conflict




Figure 11 Investment and Conflict mapping with SCAD data

Event Dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012) with the investment locations. For Côte d'Ivoire, the dataset contains 316 entries sorted by level of escalation, approximate location and possible number of deaths (see Figure 11). SCAD indicates that the spots with the largest escalations were in Abidjan and west of Bouake, in Vallee du Bandama. The deadliest events, measured via number of people killed per event, however are more dispersed. These




Figure 12 Investment and Conflict mapping with GED data

are illustrated through orange circles corresponding to the number of deaths reported. Apart from Abidjan and the locations close to Bouake, the data further reveals high mortality rates in the coastal areas in Sud Bandama and Lagunes, as well as further north close to Duekoue.

My second source was the GED geo-referenced conflict dataset (see Figure 12). The conflict spots are again highlighted in orange, with circles proportional to the amount of people killed. The distribution of conflict locations here is a bit different than the SCAD data reveals. Apart from clashes in Abidjan that were smaller in their intensity level, the main conflict sites are along the Liberian border and along the “zone de confiance” around Guiglo, north of Daloa and around Bouake.

When reviewing the locations of investment projects in relation to the conflict spots, one can see that investment does not seem to focus on former conflict hotspots. This is regardless of the level of violence. Both lower level (SCAD) and higher level (GED) event data (Sundberg et al. 2010) reveals that post-2011 investment in cocoa is not directed to conflict-affected areas. This could be interpreted as a “shying away” from conflict provinces, similar to the findings from Shaw and Mbabazi (2007) on the dual development of Uganda. One can argue along the same lines and claim that different parts of Côte d’Ivoire are targeted according to their status on the market - increasing investment in areas with lower conflict history and main infrastructural importance, such as the Daloa-San Pedro road, versus a general ignorance of main areas of conflict, namely along the Liberian border. The only area where there is a stronger overlap between the investment projects and conflict intensity is the area south of Duekoue, where investment in school buildings is located. However since these projects are part of a more “charitable” or CSR approach, one might still hold on to the dual-development explanation, since social infrastructure might not be a symbol for integration into the global market. Considering possible changes of the investment activities over the time in relation to conflict locations, only the Nestle Cocoa Plan is relevant.⁶⁵ In the course of the programme, there is a move away from Sud Bandama and Moyen Cavally, going towards the north into Marahoue, Dix-Huit-Montagnes and

⁶⁵ This is due to the fact that this is the only data that is in time-series cross-sectional format, which allows us to make assumptions over time and space.

Savanes. This might indicate an increased spread of social revenues towards the former buffer zone in order to increase the peace dividends beyond the cocoa-belt.

4.3 Reconciliation vs. reconstruction?

There is not much large-scale data available to investigate the state of reconciliation. One of the few sources is the Afrobarometer (Penar & Mukana 2013) survey, which interviewed 1200 households in 2013 on a range of issues. I re-ran the national results by region and saw some interesting trends. A majority of 60% thought that instead of general amnesty, perpetrators should be taken to court first. This opinion was largely the same throughout the country, but received some more support in southern regions like Lagunes and Lacs. This might allude to a lack of reconciliation, because most respondents argue that gaining justice is more important than overall reconciliation. That being said, it is very difficult to draw conclusions based on these Afrobarometer questions, both because they take no account of what issues like amnesty and forgiveness really entail, as well as the questions on the reconciliation process, which seem rather indecisive to begin with.

Because the survey data alone is not sufficient, I chronologically reviewed expert and news reports in a second step. In its March 2011 edition, the International Conflict Group (ICG) (2011c) is very negative when describing the general uncertainty prior to the capture of Gbagbo. They expect the “disintegration of society and rapid decline of all its institutions” in the following years. This rather pessimistic evaluation was not shared by all observers (Cook 2011b; Cook 2011a). Cook (2011a) argues for good chances of a swift recovery after economic activity and basic security are back on track (*ibid.*, p.11). In a footnote, ICG indicates that the South-West and far West were the main hotspots of unrest, beatings, destruction of goods and killings during the crisis (ICG 2011c, p.13).⁶⁶ The report argues further that national security is endangered due to the cocoa sanctions because they were damaging the economy further (ICG 2011c, p.6; BBC 2011l). The capturing of Gbagbo (BBC 2011k; BBC

⁶⁶ They mention reports from Dignago (Fromager), Garango (Marahoué), Niboua (Haut Sassandra), Korhogo (Savanes), Daoukro (N’zi Comoé); Vongoué (18 Montagnes) as well as “In the extreme west, the country’s most unstable region, clashes have taken on an extra dimension as communities have fought each other, notably in Duékoué, where at least 14 people have been killed” (ICG 2011c, p.14).

2011h) did nothing to stop human rights abuses or lessen the cross-border attacks (HRW 2011; BBC 2011i; BBC 2011m).

The August 2011 assessment from ICG focuses much more on long-term reconciliation (ICG 2011a, p.3) and mentions the problem of winner's justice and an increase in "ethnic imbalance" in positions of power (ICG 2011a, p.10). This is an aspect re-iterated in a number of reports (HRW 2011), especially in reference to the arrests of former ministers and allies of Gbagbo (BBC 2011g; BBC 2011k). The ICG already points out that Dix-Huit Montagnes and Moyen Cavally are the regions most critical in need of reconciliation measures. ICG further mentions the need to create reconciliation by economic means, by injecting international funds and loans into labour-intensive activities in order to "quickly occupy the poorly educated sectors of the male population, diverting them from using weapons and crime" (ICG 2011a, p.19; Zounmenou 2011).⁶⁷

The last ICG report for 2011 depicts a slight improvement in the reconciliations status (ICG 2011b),⁶⁸ arguing that the new government made "significant improvement in governance and more efficient management of economy and public funds" (ICG 2011b, p.6). However ICG outlines an economic focus on urban areas and not in the regions most affected by the crisis, namely Moyen Cavally and Bas-Sassandra. This argument supports the impression from the investment-conflict geo-referencing, that economic activities have not targeted the most conflict-affected areas. The report further mentions that despite the return of international and national investment, important underlying political, regional and ethnic tensions are still present.⁶⁹

The main messages from 2011 reverberate in the 2012 ICG report (ICG 2012). The biggest task for national stability is reconciliation, which still remains neglected.

⁶⁷ "It is crucial for a country to have a coherent post-conflict economic management strategy that identifies the challenges affecting the vital economic and financial systems in Côte d'Ivoire – including the cocoa, coffee and oil sectors, which have been crippled by corruption and mismanagement" (Zounmenou 2011, p.37).

⁶⁸ "In six months, the present administration has done what the previous government was not able to do in a decade" (ICG 2011b, p.6).

⁶⁹ "However, these promising economic signs, which will hopefully result in the creation of jobs for the young people whose careers have been sacrificed during the last two decades, are not enough to guarantee lasting stability" (ibid., p.7).

The ICG cautions that the slow progress on reintegration of former combatants might endanger the transition into a civil economy (ICG 2012, p.3).⁷⁰ ICG underlines that the agency for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (ADDR) needs to be more realistic in their assessments and timelines (ICG 2012, p.10). Furthermore, the report mentions that the government does see reconciliation as one of its top priorities (ICG 2012, p.21). Further problems with the integration of Gbagbo's troops into the national army are apparent (HRW 2012, p.9), which arguably led to an increase in insecurity and frequent attacks in the West. Report on cross-border raids from Liberia (BBC 2012a) and Ghana (BBC 2012b) as well as frequent violence in Abidjan (BBC 2012d; BBC 2012c) raised concerns. The mistrust of the opposition continued due to the delivery of Gbagbo to the ICC (BBC 2012e) as human rights abuses and impunity continue (HRW 2012; ICG 2012, p.16 f).⁷¹

From 2013 onwards, concerns over the government's attention on economic reconstruction were more pronounced, arguing for more focus on reconciliatory policies (Ford 2013; Boutellis 2013; HRW 2013a).⁷² In light of exhumations of mass graves and disproportionate numbers of court cases against Gbagbo supporters, issues of impunity received more attention (BBC 2013b; HRW 2013b).⁷³

The last ICG report from 2014 is focused on the Western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes. It reiterates the message of former ICG assessments of grave shortcomings in reconciliation efforts. This is due to the economic focus on

⁷⁰ "According to the former president of the National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, 97,000 armed men are awaiting demobilisation. They are divided into three groups: the first is composed of 32,000 ex-FN soldiers who, at one time or another, were in the rebel forces; the second is composed of 36,000 auxiliaries recruited by the FN during the post electoral crisis; and the third is composed of 38,000 members of militias and self-defence groups created under the former regime" (ICG 2012, p.9).

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, for example, reports from a detention camp for the military in Abidjan quoting one detainee: "How does the government expect reconciliation when the FRCI steal from us, treat us all as militiamen, [and] do daily mass arrests? I have nothing left now, all my money was taken or [used to pay for my release]. If someone asks me tomorrow to pick up a gun and fight the FRCI, I don't know what I will say. When people have been stripped of everything, when all we are left with is hatred ... we're a long way from reconciliation" (HRW 2012, p.60).

⁷² "The reconstruction is relatively easy compared to reconciliation", said Guigale. 'You build a bridge, the question is whether all parties and all segments of society want to cross that bridge'" (Ford 2013).

⁷³ "Two and a half years after the post-electoral crisis, the national cohesion remains the priority of the leaders in Côte d'Ivoire. 'The social dimension of the cocoa sector is so important that decisions are more responsive to political and economic concerns,' confirms an operator" (Africa Up Close 2013).

the centres while the most critical regions are in need of serious investment.⁷⁴ Looking more closely at the three important factors that destabilise these two Western regions, the report mentions the importance of agriculture and criticises the legal uncertainties of land rights.⁷⁵ The report argues that the national situation has improved since 2013 (ICG 2014, p.21) with reconciliation still being challenged by impunity (BBC 2014a; Ozoukou 2014; Kobo 2014; Kouamé Remi 2015) and lacks efforts in re-integration (BBC 2014d).

One employee of the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) that I talked to, mentioned the fundamental lack of reconciliation in the country. While there are great improvements in the urban infrastructure he said, people in the North were getting frustrated because they expected more from Ouattara.⁷⁶ He stressed that the current perception of a “winner’s justice” is toxic to the peace-project.

The review of these reports on reconciliation offers a few interesting aspects. First and foremost is there a noticeable contradiction between the human rights advocates who criticise the mono-focused efforts of the government on economy, while at the same time arguing that the most conflict-affected areas still need investment. As I alluded to before, I perceive similarities with the Ugandan case by Shaw and Mbabazi (2007), arguing for a cynical idea of the capitalist peace. The fact that the West continues to be an unstable region, while security in the economic centres is re-instated, is an especially interesting point. The overall canon is that economic recovery is overestimated and that serious reconciliation should be the primary focus of the government. There is a high degree of criticism when it comes to efforts on reintegration of combatants as well. This echoes the critical remarks of MacGinty and Richmond (2007), who argue that capitalist peace theory is good at achieving countable results but is not as good at reconciling.

⁷⁴ “There has not been much public investment in infrastructure. There are two general hospitals in Guiglo and Duékoué, few tarmacked roads, only one court, recently refurbished, recurring problems with access to drinking water, etc. Private investment in infrastructure has been equally low” (ICG 2014, p.14).

⁷⁵ The law of 1998 established that “foreigners” are not supposed to own land, but this legislation is seldom executed. The existence of traditional land usage systems further complicates the issue (ICG 2014, p.9).

⁷⁶ This ONUCI officer argued that Ouattara is mainly increasing infrastructure in Abidjan due to the large amounts of voters he could win there.

4.4 Sweet capitalist peace?

In order to go even deeper and to evaluate the four main assumptions of the capitalist peace theory, I will review the expert interviews.

4.4.1 Transformation of behaviour

The first assumption mentioned by Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) is “based on a hedonistic understanding of human nature and argues that capitalism alters human behaviour and transforms belligerent individuals (...) into peace-loving consumers, traders and business people” (2013, p.3). According to Mousseau (2000) and cultural materialism:

“individuals in developed market economies tend to share the social and political values of exchange-based cooperation, individual choice and free will, negotiation and compromise, universal equity among individuals, and universal trust in the sanctity of contract, then individuals in developed market economies tend to share democratic values” (ibid., p.479).

These market/capitalist values should accordingly impact the individual norms and contribute to a lessening of violence.

During my research and fieldwork it was rather difficult to find evidence for this argument. There are some indications that the values of free markets have been strengthened. The Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (BTI) (2014) for example, outlines that the government has been successful in combating illicit activities and smuggling, which thrived during the civil war. And “despite sluggish progress, donors have invested considerable efforts in creating a more welcoming environment for small and medium-size enterprises” (ibid., p.13). This could be an indicator that the increased inflow of international capital is able to reverse some illicit activities and increase a formal business culture in Côte d’Ivoire. However when looking at indicators like the Frazer Institute Economic Freedom Indicator used by De Soysa (2012), Côte d’Ivoire ranges in the mid-field with a 6.0 of 10.0 (Frazer Institute 2012).⁷⁷ The index has remained at the same level during the last decade, which might indicate that individuals have the same market norms as they had before 2011.

⁷⁷ The Indicator ranges from 0 to 10, representing “total economic freedom”.

During my fieldwork I was often confronted with the idea of “moving on” and getting “back on track” to the pre-war status. In Blokosso, one of the Gbagbo-areas in Abidjan, our landlord expressed his views concerning the presidential elections later this year and his hopes that Ouattara would win again, due to the progress he made: “He is not from my party at all, but the president does things right”. This entails for example the construction of a third bridge in Abidjan, increases in public wages and the construction of a new highway to the North. Not unlike other post-conflict countries, people in Côte d’Ivoire seem to be (superficially) reconciled with their destiny and positive about the economic improvements. From my fieldwork I got the impression that this kind of “moving on” mentality connects with the business culture that has been present since independence. However it did not seem as if this mentality and wish for peace was something entirely new that emerged after the country was re-established on the global market, since some Ivorians had plenty of time being traders and consumers since independence, but did, as highlighted in the background chapter, instead decide to involve themselves in the conflict.

Most Ivorians I talked to do not even speak of the period between 2000-2011 as a civil war or conflict but rather refer to it as “the political-military crisis”.⁷⁸ I often got the impression that people viewed it as a hiccup of an otherwise functioning economy, which should be overcome instead being dwelled upon. One of the cocoa programming experts mentioned: “One should simply move on”.⁷⁹ He thought it was important to integrate ex-combatants swiftly in agriculture and other sectors, but that they should not be continuously singled out. For now, he said, the justice sector should do whatever it needs to do, but society at large does not profit from these kinds of differentiations.⁸⁰ When I asked the implementing expert whether he thought that investment projects such as farmer business education contributed to reconciliation, he agreed and underlined that these projects increase the welfare of the farmers, which

⁷⁸ The government's national development agency argues that “serious political instability” lasted from 1999 until May 2011 (Gov CDI 2012b, p.3).

⁷⁹ French: “on peut avancer”.

⁸⁰ This was further supported by the CCC-expert I talked to, who stressed that the young farmers initiative targets young demographics at risk and not specifically ex-combatants “The programs contribute to the integration of young people at risk in the communities”.

helps in keeping the peace.⁸¹ From my point of view this “moving on” attitude might however indicate that certain business values existed before the conflict. Combatants just need to get back into the business world in order to properly exercise these values, but have not changed them. I think, however, that they do to some extent support Mousseau’s (2010; 2012) argument on market-linked actors. He claims that a large number of market actors constitute the electorate and hence influence the government to prioritize economic policies instead of security.

The issue of re-integration is especially interesting in the context of that first argument of transformed behaviour. One security expert I consulted was very sceptical of the demobilisation project and argued that “the nasty guys are not on the list of the ADDR” underlining that those most involved in the conflict are scattered in the forests, hiding out in Liberia and Ghana and waiting for their signal to return. He argued that people, especially in the West and around Gagnoa, have no interest in handing over their guns or returning to civil life. Another security expert pointed out that the reintegration of the remaining fighters is especially tricky:

“They cannot read, they cannot count. This last phase of reintegration touches a population that is simply not qualified to fill in any position in the administration and other sectors”.

So, even though some ex-combatants who were not integrated into the business culture and the market before the war might want to re-establish themselves in the civil economy and “transform” into a peace-loving consumer or trader, they might not have the necessary abilities and capacities for such a transformation. This again questions whether markets alone have that kind of transformative power.

This kind of lack of abilities is especially apparent in the case in the cocoa sector. Although an expert acknowledged that the government and private investors have intentions to integrate young combatants into cocoa farming, most experts I asked about the possibilities of that were very reserved. They argued that most former combatants were not used to hard work and would rather live from war revenues. One

⁸¹ The national development plan and the government sees economic development and growth as the way to “strengthen social cohesion through job creation, particularly for the youth, address the return of refugees and internally displaced people” (Gov CDI 2012b, p.10). However they perceive the social cohesion, national reconciliation and the normalization of political life as “fundamental determinants for the consolidation of a climate of sustainable peace” (ibid., p.10).

implementing expert further claimed that these younger men were a lost generation, but that “they have been lost long before the war”. Another point mentioned was the fact that cocoa requires a lot of prior knowledge, which makes it a trade that is rather “inherited” than “taught”: “I do not think they [ex-combatants] could be overnight cocoa farmers [since] cocoa is more of a legacy”. It is difficult to enter cocoa farming without any ties or family connection in cocoa and indeed for most of the World Bank/PAPC reintegration projects in agriculture, ex-combatants have some family background in farming. In my view this is very significant regarding the argument of transforming behaviour; this kind of reasoning ignores abilities and social circumstances that enable transition. Some actors in the market in Côte d’Ivoire might be able to “get back on track” and return to the same economic activities as they did before the war. But former fighters without the essential knowledge are not easily converted just because they are part of the larger market-system. This in turn might reflect that the transformational capitalist peace argument is quite difficult to see in the real world. Additionally, this ignorance around ability and circumstance indicates a lack of understanding of the realities of an individual combatant at large.

4.4.2 Conditional effect


Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) mention a more critical assumption that regards capital markets and the “peacefulness of unregulated markets in certain configurations” (ibid., p.3). They state for example that the existence of democratic governance or reasonably high levels of human development need to be in place in order for capitalism to have a pacifying effect. I find that this argument is the most difficult one to evaluate, since it touches upon the issues of endogeneity mentioned in the method part. If both the level of development and democratic structures are necessary in order to ensure the capitalist peace, it is extremely difficult to review as an individual factor.

One might argue that parts of the reform of the cocoa sector is one of such configurations that makes the capitalist peace work in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa. As outlined in the background chapter, one of the first measures was to reconstruct a major cocoa organisation, the CCC, to set the prices and regulate the market. The

reform is heavily supported by the CCC field-agents who travel around co-operatives and announce the seasonal price. One private company expert remarked that the CCC is “surprisingly” active and not limited to acting as centralised administration. This is not only to spread the real price amongst farmers but also to control illicit cocoa trade by patrolling the border to Ghana. Two professions further argued that regulations in the cocoa market make it now much more competitive and open for new actors. One claimed that the CCC implements cocoa limits for each exporter, which in turn opens up more competition amongst the established firms and allows smaller chocolate producers to enter the market. This might indicate that the democratic state has established the CCC-structure, which is able to create the circumstances in which the capitalist peace works, namely to distribute the cocoa wealth towards farmers, instead of increasing inequalities.

However, one major contrast the argument of global capitalisation is that a large part of the cocoa reform is the installation of state-controlled marketing and pricing (BTI 2014, p.21).⁸² The pre-seasonal fixing of prices (for example CFA 1847 per kg in January to March) makes it easier for farmers to understand what their cocoa is worth. The system also secures a minimal price for cocoa, which was put at CFA 850 per kilogram for the 2015-16 season.

This should make it impossible for the middlemen or *pisteurs*, to buy cocoa below the minimal price of EUR 1.30.

PRIX DE DEBLOCAGE CACAO		
Session N°2 du 02/03/2015		
	Janv-Mars 2015 :	1 847 FCFA/KG
	Avril-Juin 2015 :	1 839 FCFA/KG
	Juil-Sept 2015 :	1 807 FCFA/KG
	Oct-Dec 2015 :	1 779 FCFA/KG
	Janv-Mars 2016 :	1 748 FCFA/KG
		Prix Minimum Garanti Producteur 850 FCfa

Picture 2 Fixed cocoa price for 2014/15

The setting of the price is remarked as one of the positive aspects of the cocoa reform of 2011, firstly because it increased the income of farmers and secondly because it increased transparency in the whole value chain. As one expert put it: “The farmers are happier now, because they know when they are being cheated”. Another implementing expert mentioned how much cocoa farmers suffered during the last decade due to the liberalised price. He argued that the low price was

⁸² “The Ouattara government is considered to be a staunch defender of a liberal economy, but its actions thus far have been quite mainstream and have strengthened state intervention” (BTI 2014, p.21).

why so many farmers had to cut corners and employ children (see also Alongi 2011; Bøås & Huser 2006). The WCF expert exemplified this claim with the story of a small cocoa community he began to visit in 2013:

“When I came there first, very few people were driving around in cars or motor bikes. Now, in the same community, I see a lot of motorbikes, people are mobile and have more money to buy things”.⁸³

I would argue that the stable price has had a large effect on whether people perceive that they can live from the cocoa trade or not. I think it is however noteworthy that these kinds of state-interventionist policies are not part of the capitalists’ assumptions but instead go back to a strongly state-controlled economy. As outlined earlier it is difficult to assess the second argument, since it does not provide a proper causal chain of explanation. This might be a further indication that the capitalist peace model is strongly rooted in a traditional Western capitalist framework.

4.4.3 Property rights protection

Schneider and Gleditsch (2013) claim that capitalist economies are more effective and uphold contract and property rights especially, which in turn should make these countries more peaceful. This is the aspect that is most difficult to pin down for the Ivorian example because it assumes a highly codified system for land rights and contracts that is applicable for all regions of the country. For Côte d’Ivoire however, the customary land systems like the *tutorat* and land titles attributed under Boigny, Bédie and Gbagbo (BTI 2014, p.15) represent a Pandora’s box of disputes. One grinding expert noticed that when on certification visits, he often experiences that the farmer he finds on the field claiming to own the plantation is not the same as the one registered, or that the real owner does not have a clue about the plantation.

Two implementing experts further mentioned that the discussion with local communities and evaluation of impacts of an investment project was important before the start in order not to “accidentally increase tensions”. The experts argued that in the

⁸³ It is however interesting that some of the steps that have been taken in the Ouattara government, might actually have their roots in the policy action taken from Gbagbo. As Guesnet et al (2009) point out were problems with cocoa pricing and quality were already noticed in 2008, which led to some efforts to make the sector more transparent. However the report also notices that the improvements made thus far did not show a lot.

majority of the cocoa belt, land rights and title disputes have not been solved after the crisis and remain still “a major problem for investment in the cocoa sector”. Such disputes are often connected with ethnic struggles, as one other expert reports. He recalls an incident from 2014 in the Sassandra area, where a co-operative of mostly “foreigners” (namely Mossi/ Burkinabe) wanted to use their surplus from cocoa trading to build a health centre.⁸⁴ He remembers that the co-operative tried to buy land for this project over months, but were denied every time. “It is fascinating how problematic it was. People did not want the investment of the Dioula co-operative even if it was for everyone to use”. The cooperative was able eventually able to acquire land a couple of kilometres outside the community, but it was apparently more important to block the project from the “foreigners” than to build something that everybody could use. He agrees: “in this incident, our programme has no effect on reuniting anyone”.⁸⁵ In my view this third argument is a major aspect in evaluating the capitalist peace for Côte d’Ivoire, since it again illustrates that the causal reasoning of the capitalist peace is largely build on the Western state model as critically mentioned by Willett (2005) and Taylor (2007). This third argument might work in some countries, but automatically disqualifies economies like Côte d’Ivoire, which have been globally integrated, but lack such a highly codified property framework.

4.4.4 Signalling accountability

The last argument (Schneider & Gleditsch 2013) claims “that capitalist economies are better able to signal their resolve than closed economies”. In my understanding, this should contribute to more accountability and credibility because capitalist economies need to signal that they are well-functioning in order to attract international investors and creditors.

A first aspect that this argument might help to explain is why the government not only seeks to re-capture their traditional French investors (BBC 2014c) but aims at

⁸⁴ A lot of the private companies social infrastructure projects are supported by the cooperatives they work with, their earned surpluses and then some contribution from the cocoa exporter/ manufacturers in question.

⁸⁵ One expert said, that agriculture (and cocoa) has great potential reuniting the country due to its effects on a number of levels, but since there is not a lot of land and cocoa is the main dominating crop, it gets difficult.

a broader investor audience. This is indicated in the High Level Prosperity Partnership with the UK, which started in 2013 to increase economic cooperation in key areas. This increased investor audience could explain why the UK government sees “notable advancements in trade freedom and fiscal freedom”(Gov UK 2014).⁸⁶ Other indicators like the World Bank’s Distance to Frontiers score further shows steady improvements when it comes to the ease of doing business. One can see Côte d’Ivoire performing better and decrease the costs for exports (World Bank 2015). Some reviews credit the international donors and organisations (namely the World Bank, EU, IMF) for those improvements, arguing that they demanded reforms to ensure a “more transparent and competitive economic environment” (Grauer 2015, p.9). This would partly be explained by the signalling argument. As mentioned in the investment overview, the government puts in some serious efforts in order to convince international capital to (re-) invest in Côte d’Ivoire.

Another issue that might be explained by this assumption is the combating of corruption in Côte d’Ivoire. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in Figure 13 shows a slight increase of the index, which reflects that less corruption is perceived since 2011 (Transparency International 2014).




Figure 13 Corruption Perception Index for Côte d’Ivoire

From 1998 onwards, the country’s CPI decreased gradually to 1.9 at its lowest during the pre-crisis years. Côte d’Ivoire hit rock-bottom in terms of corruption perception in

⁸⁶ Though these have been said to being somewhat reduced due to decrease in rule of law (measuring property rights) and freedom from corruption.

2005 when it was almost last out of the whole ranking.⁸⁷ Being officially proclaimed as a top priority of the government,⁸⁸ anti-corruption efforts lack actions against “former rebel leaders who accumulated wealth during the military occupation of the north” (BTI 2014, p.20). Throughout the years critics have argued that “clientelistic tendencies in the economy”, especially in cocoa, need to be tackled (ibid., p.24). The government has improved certain practices, making the use of resources more efficient as well as improving access on available information about resource revenues for the budgetary process (BTI 2014, p.20; Grauer 2015, p.10). Reports further underline that the guaranteed price has “proved its capacity to better distribute the wealth of the network” (Africa Up Close 2013). Furthermore, the government created a showcase in court with the so-called “cocoa barons” that embezzled revenues on a large scale and led to the sentencing of 15 former top officials of cocoa (BBC 2013a). All these indications could be explained by the fourth assumption of the capitalist peace that cocoa is becoming less corrupt and more transparent in order to attract investors, which might mitigate some violence.

A third important aspect that might be covered by this argument is the issue of corporate responsibility.⁸⁹ There is an increasing effort from the business-NGO networks to expand transparency and accountability rooted in the scandals surrounding child labour in the cocoa plantations.⁹⁰ One expert said that the companies are more active in improving farmers’ livelihoods and that there is a growing interest in “the living conditions of the farmers”. This is an understanding of the value chain which apparently did not exist earlier. He underlined that exporters had been reluctant to invest in social infrastructure such as schools projects, but that this has now changed.

⁸⁷ The Corruption Perception Index ranges from 0 ‘very corrupt’ to 10 (since 2012: 100) ‘very clean’; in 2005 Côte d’Ivoire scored as 152nd country out of 158.

⁸⁸ “A national plan for good governance and fight against corruption was set up in 2013 and is supervised by the High Authority for Good Governance – which is effective since September 2014 and the National Secretariat for governance and capacity building” (Gov UK 2014).

⁸⁹ “Companies are not required under Ivorian law to disclose information regarding to corporate social responsibility, although many companies, especially in the cocoa sector, do publicize work they have done in these areas on their websites” (Grauer 2015, p.13). “‘There is a moral obligation’, said Gilbert Kone Kafana, minister for labour and social affairs. ‘The chocolate companies have a duty to engage with us. We need to build roads, schools, hospitals and social centres; anything that would allow Ivory Coast to progress’ (Hawksley 2011).

⁹⁰ The issue of child labour has been a very sensitive topic in most of the expert and focus group interviews. There further a lot of media and governmental attention on the topic.

The CCC expert argued along similar lines, saying that she witnessed a slight change in motives. There has been a lot of “bad press” for chocolate enterprises and manufacturers due to the “the media commercialising of child labour”, she said. This negative attention has raised firms’ awareness of social considerations in their value chain, sustainability and transparency. It might be due to this newly found understanding of social responsibility that manufacturers are becoming increasingly aware and document sustainability projects on their websites.⁹¹ One might however argue that this does not equal with widespread transparency in locations where companies are involved in cocoa projects. I would indeed argue that this kind of argumentation only works for “softer” issues that are highly emotional, such as child labour.

Even though there are major improvements in the area of accountability, I could still notice the general opaqueness surrounding cocoa revenue that has been mentioned before 2011 (see Global Witness 2007; ICG 2004; Losch 2003; Kuklinski & Adhuze 2013). This makes it difficult to follow the fourth argument in its generalist nature. One expert for a cocoa-programming organisation put it fittingly: “Asking questions about cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire is like asking questions about oil in Dubai”. This was a problem that I experienced throughout my fieldwork, especially in regard to data collection for the investment mapping. Almost all private partners, foreign and governmental organisations active in cocoa are reluctant to hand out any information on projects, especially their locations. A couple of projects are visible online and in the field, but most of the investment sites are hidden. When asking experts directly on the locations of their projects, most were evasive, rather general or said right out that those locations were part of the companies’ or organisations’ classified information. One example that illustrates these non-transparent practices is the presentation by the WCF on their ‘Echoes’ programme line. The WCF, the major actor in private-NGO cooperation, entertains some projects on their own, some with private partners as previously outlined. I would expect a large number of projects in the world’s largest cocoa export nation. On their webpage however, the WCF only indicates the locations

⁹¹ Though again there is mostly little specific information, very little is being reflected on the actual content or location of the project.

of 22 projects, 13 of which are essentially in the same community. This seems odd, especially in comparison to the WCF activities in neighbouring Ghana, where 404 national sites are located. However the presentation of the WCF project is also in



Picture 3 WCF project in Zibouyaokro

contrast to the organisation’s own statements. According to their own website, WCF Echoes “currently supports 38 communities in the regions of Haut Sassandra, Moyen Comoé, Agnéby, Moyen Cavally Region, and Sud Bandama of Côte d’Ivoire (...)” (World Cocoa Foundation 2015). Again this does not add up with openly available project sites. It was by coincidence, that I came by one of these few indicated project locations (see Picture 3) which was a rare occasion where I saw open advertisement for cocoa investment. This just underlines the aforementioned point; it is hard to track down investment projects and their locations in the field. Indeed the difficulty of getting access to data on such as large scale seems to support, as previously mentioned, considerations of clientelistic networks seeking to keep information concealed. In my view this difficulty in accessing all information necessary for analysis, might be another argument against the capitalist peace’s assumptions. As mentioned earlier, many exporters like to keep their investment activities rather non-transparent because they would otherwise risk losing large revenues, which in the end seem like another indication against the capitalist peace logic.

A second aspect I found is the persistence of corruption in the sector. Some of the reports on the cocoa sector post-2011 are very critical of the fact that there has been no independent audit on cocoa and oil (BTI 2014). As well as underlining that though the sentencing of the so-called “cocoa-barons” in itself is a good sign, it is however argued that this arrest did not result from a systemic anti-corruption approach (ibid. p.20). It is further worth mentioning that the process against these illicit

networks already started during the government of Gbagbo, after he ordered the “investigation into allegations of widespread corruption in the coffee and cocoa sector” (BBC 2013a) in 2008. One expert claimed that the CCC expects large bribes for the awarding of export licences to the exporter and that transparency is limited. He further highlighted the importance of cocoa as the government’s main revenue resource,⁹² and could therefore not see any incentive for the state or the private companies to really increase transparency. When asked about the unexpected speed of the cocoa reform, another expert answered that Ouattara “had to get hold of the main cash point, the cocoa, quickly”.

This continued corruption is apparently also noticeable in the newly unified CCC. One of the programme experts mentioned that the branding of the cocoa marketing entity does not really matter. He argued that the marketing system of cocoa is very complicated, which gives the cocoa administrators the power of being highly specialised and nearly irreplaceable. Therefore he guessed that only the name had altered, while the administration was more or less unchanged. One other implementation expert mentioned that the revenue-extraction happened through a number of small organisations before the reform. Today, the government and industry only interacts with one organisation, the CCC, which indicated in his eyes a kind of “pseudo-transparency” in the sector. Not even that is done rigorously, as the CCC headquarters in Abidjan nicely illustrate (see Picture 4). Still being called the ‘Maison de CAISTAB’ (the CAISTAB house), with floor plans indicate the multitude of Gbagbo’s cocoa institution while the “new” CCC staff steer the cocoa sector from there. One might argue that an administration that cannot be bothered to change the name on their floor plans might essentially remain the unchanged, also on the inside. This persistence of old corrupt structures might be something that Taylor (2007) would call the sabotage of the capitalist peace by African patterns of clientelism.

⁹² He was arguing that 58% of the cocoa revenues are collected by the state, while some reports only talk of 22% of the country’s GDP (AFP 2015).



Picture 4 The CCC headquarters or “Maison de CAISTAB”?

4.5 Conclusion: “On peut avance!”

In this chapter I reviewed assumptions of the capitalist peace theory for the case of Côte d’Ivoire. By first outlining the sector and the low starting base after the crisis in 2011, I established the insight that investment increased (see Aid Data 2014; Yembiline et al. 2014; Alby 2014; Monnier 2014) and looked into evidence from investment-conflict mapping, reports and survey results as well as my interview material.

I want to discuss several main issues for the Ivorian case. First is the reiterated claim of an increasing tension between economic reconstruction and reconciliation. As the thriving business nation that Côte d’Ivoire essentially is, and surely was before the civil war, one could argue that economic measures and growth for the country are (for now) what it takes in order to satisfy the nation. As Ivorians from both side of the country admit, they want to move on (“on peut avance”), as they are mainly tired of being used by the politicians. It could be further argued that reconciliation still is an issue “too fresh” and sensitive, especially when it comes to integrating more people into the competitive landscape of cocoa land disputes. However, I think it is worth noticing that the majority of international observers want a post-conflict economy like

Côte d'Ivoire to immediately switch tracks. Knowing that reconciliation takes time, I would argue that an economic jump-start might not be such a bad idea.

Secondly, I observe strong neutrality from the cocoa exporters towards reconciliation and re-integration. That is almost a bit surprising, since one of the main underlying problems is the remaining issue of land rights. As mentioned previously, the type of land rights system influences the production of cocoa to such a high degree that such neutrality seems rather strange.

Regarding the capitalist peace assumptions, I want to outline some issues. Firstly, I think that the assumption of the transformative power of capitalist liberalism on individuals is quite odd concerning the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Cocoa trade has long been part of the capitalist market. However, people decided to take up weapons, and at least partially neglect their cocoa fields. I think this questions the power the market has over an individual, and further questions how much can the market change abilities and socio-economic conditions for combatants.

A second aspect I think is interesting is the aspect of state intervention and which issues the government chooses to address. The capitalist peace argues for example that property rights are more respected in capitalist systems. This is quite strikingly not the case in Côte d'Ivoire, although one may argue that the complicated mixture of customary land laws, ethnic affiliations and old regulations make it impossible to declare land rights sensible, let alone enforce them. However, it shows that this assumption might not have validity for all capitalist economies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The state in the Ivorian case is however involved in the setting of the prices for cocoa, which is overall a positive aspect. Again this is in contrast to the capitalist peace assumptions.



Picture 5 The UN convoy: One of the few reminders of war in Abidjan

Thirdly, the assumption on transparency and accountability attracting investors does not seem to be adequate. Up to a certain degree, accountability might be something that investors are interested in, first and foremost regarding corruption. However, I would argue that private businesses are not interested in accountability on all fronts because it would most likely increase the prices for products, due to better labour standards, fair competition, etc. I would further argue that unless investors are forced to change, like in the example of child labour, the costs of transparency are too high. In my view, this case is at least in part explained by the capitalist peace assumptions. However, the theory lacks an individual perspective on issues of ability and a more locally applicable understanding of land rights and African capitalism. As mentioned above, does it not explain adequately why a person who could earn money through war would be transformed by participating in the global market. In my view the explanation needs to consider how these people can be reintegrated and how the existing cocoa farmers might remain peaceful by having improved livelihoods and possibilities for work.

Chapter 5. Regional analysis

As outlined previously the capitalist peace theory attempts to explain cases from a macro-level. In order to evaluate the research question further I from a more individual perspective I will review the impact of investment on three parameters (increased job creation, improved livelihoods and integration of ex-combatants), which are based on the peace-building literature.

5.1 Fromager – the region of Cocoa and Gbagbo

As outlined in Chapter 1, I chose Fromager in the heart of the so-called cocoa belt as a case region, because of its conflict history and its investment activity (see 1.4). There is very little regional data that can help to evaluate the impact of investment on job creation, improved livelihood and re-integration of ex-combatants and their impact on reconciliation. Some reports and data can however offer a first insight into the region. Fromager is considered




Figure 14 Investment and conflict locations in Fromager

the “homeland” of the Bété. The region was a strong support base for Gbagbo in the 2011 elections, where he gathered 67.10% of the vote (CEI 2011). Looking into the regional investment data that I collected, it reveals that the area has been targeted by some projects. As can be seen in Figure 14 there are a number of investment locations north of Gagnoa, highlighted in blue, green and yellow. These are mostly focused on constructing schools and projects to increase cocoa quality and quantity. Fromager also counts a

number of incidents of political violence according to SCAD (orange).⁹³ In fact, there are quite a number of overlaps here between capital investment and conflict events. Most of these incidents date back to 2004 and include gang killings after land disputes or farmer clashes.⁹⁴ I further indicated the locations where I conducted my focus group interviews, marked with green pins, in Gagnoa; Bayota, north of Gagnoa; Wanéwa, south of Gagnoa and Galebre west of Gagnoa. Two of these communities (Bayota and Galebre) did not receive any investment, while two others (Wanéwa and Gagnoa) did receive investment that was implemented by ANADER.⁹⁵ There were no registered SCAD conflict events in the focus group communities.

5.1.1 Reports from Fromager

As mentioned earlier, Fromager is one of the regions in the West that is quite often in the spotlight due to instability and insecurity. Frequent cross-border attacks from Liberia on small villages (BBC 2012a) and land disputes continue to cause tension in Fromager. Violence is often connected with activities of the traditional *dozos*, the former protectors of Northern immigrants, who scare people to return to the region (BBC 2011a). Former reports of a harmonious mix of ethnicities (James 2009) are reversed and Western Côte d'Ivoire is now known for “some of the country’s most brutal violence over the past decade” (Ford 2013). A further problem is that “executioners and the victims’ families must today live in the same town and cross each other’s paths” (ICG 2014, p.19), which keeps tensions between former combatants high.

The National Assembly’s ten-year extension of the land reform of 2013 that allows “immigrants” to own land did nothing to decrease the tensions (Grauer 2015), since these rights directly contradict those granted through the 1998-land law, which excludes “Northerners” from ownership. Pritchard (2013) outlines for example that

⁹³ There are no events in Fromager in the GED data set.

⁹⁴ “A gang kills villagers over land dispute” (Oragahio), “Burkinabe and Ivorian farmer clash, killing six” (Gagnoa).

⁹⁵ This specific programme concentrates public and private actors and organizes farmer business schooling focusing on investments, cocoa quality and financial management (Matthess 2014). However the following analysis does not seek to evaluate results of the concrete programme, but rather uses the exemplified communities in order to look into the perceptions of impact on a general scale.

69% of the respondents for his study in Guémon and Cavally had first-hand experience of land disputes. Contested land rights were due to ecological change, contested occupation (re-taking of land) or contested sales (unclear or contested ownership). Mitchell (2015; 2013) interviewed 70 cocoa farmers in western Côte d'Ivoire and underlines that land conflicts are likely to flare up again. He argues further that cooperation with communities is necessary in order to successfully solve land disputes. Hounghbedji et al (2013) notice a considerable increase in extreme poverty of household heads, the level of which is set as US\$1.25 per day. This is especially the case for Western regions and Fromager. The baseline study by Kuklinski et al (2013) offers more insight into Western cocoa communities, for example the town of Diegonéfla in Fromager. In one of the few small-scale cocoa studies, Kuklinski et al describe how the liberalised pricing system raised mistrust amongst the actors in the cocoa value chain (ibid., p.34). They mention that one of their main concerns is the progression from subsistence into a more stable economic situation. Their main hindrances in overcoming subsistence remain high costs of input like fertilizers, low pricing of cocoa and high costs for pest control. In this baseline study, Kuklinski et al find that 69% of the farmers perceive their economic situation as stagnant, but are surprisingly optimistic about increasing their livelihood.

What is apparent from the material so far is that Western Côte d'Ivoire continues to be instable due to activity of traditional militias, cross-border attacks and land disputes. The region remains a hotspot for land disputes, but has been targeted with a small amount of investment. Furthermore one can see a decline in economic conditions and livelihood throughout the last decade for cocoa farmers in the West and particularly in Fromager. Cocoa farmers in Fromager seem to not have been satisfied with the cocoa pricing system in order for them to advance beyond subsistence and they review the current status as stagnant. This relates to the findings from the national analysis that found the liberalised price system to be highly negative for the cocoa farmers.

5.1.2 Regional Afrobarometer data

The Afrobarometer survey (Penar & Mukana 2013) is one of the few other sources available for investigation.⁹⁶ I did look into some of the regional data, on economic realities, perceived top priorities for the government, and government performance as well as reconciliation, for the Fromager sample. The majority of respondents (78%) were Krou (Bété) and some Baoulé, Akye, Anye (15%). More or less all (73%) participated in the 2010/11 elections. The questions on living conditions reveal that most respondents in Fromager could satisfy their basic needs during the last year. Most of them, for example “never” suffer from: immediate hunger (48%), lack of water (55%) or lack of cooking fuel (65%). However, a large number said they “often” (38%) or “always” (17.5%) lacked medicine or medical care. An even larger amount of recipients argued they “often” (27.5%) or “always” (50%) lacked money during the last twelve months.

Asking what they perceived as the top priority issue for the government, the answers were quite diverse. The top three first responses were: economic management (15%), job creation (12.5%) and peace and reconciliation (12.5%). Problems that were referred to as second priority were: living expenses (22.5%), crime and security (12.5%) and peace and reconciliation (12.5%). Third priority was health (20%) and water (17.5%). From these priorities, one can see that economic issues receive the most importance from the respondents. Although it is difficult to make an adequate comparison on livelihood indicators from before the war, respondents seemed to cover basic livelihood. However some aspects, such as money and healthcare, created discontent amongst the respondents. This was also apparent in their policy choices, which indicated that job creation and improvement of livelihood are important topics for respondents in Fromager. It is, however, interesting to see how economic measures are again perceived as very important. In a region that suffered under insecurity for a decade, one might expect crime, security and peace to be more urgent policy issues.

⁹⁶ Of the 1200 participants in the first Afrobarometer survey in Côte d’Ivoire collected in 2013, 40 participants were questioned in Fromager. This is not a very large sample and therefore not representative but might help to highlight some issues from the region.

The economic focus of the respondents again reiterates the findings from Chapter 4 that there is a sense of “moving on” mentality in the country.

Afrobarometer further surveyed the perceptions of the current government’s work, which was rather negative, especially considering efforts of economic management where 78% of the Fromager respondents attested bad results. Two issues, improvement of living conditions for poor people and job creation, were perceived even worse, with 97.5% (!) responding that the government was making insufficient efforts. This might be due to the high number of Bété respondents. Less dramatically reviewed were policies on anti-corruption: “only” 56% attested “bad” or “very bad” influence, while 17.5% argued that the government was taking adequate action. The issue of resolution of conflict was equally negative reviewed, with only 32% saying that the government’s efforts were positive against 60% negative. Afrobarometer further surveyed opinions about the state of economy and asked about the general direction they think the country is taking. The Fromager sub-sample was equally negative here: About 50% answered that Côte d’Ivoire’s economic situation was “very much worse” or “worse” than a year before. Most of them seemed however undecided if the conditions of living had improved or not (32.5% more negative vs. 20% more positive). When asked if the country is moving in a good or bad direction, 73% were rather pessimistic.

These rather negative reactions of the Fromager might not be surprising due to the region’s close connection to Gbagbo. As outlined in Chapter 3, the South, especially Fromager, thrived during Gbagbo’s rule because he granted privileges to the autochthone cocoa farmers. Whether or not these privileges are still granted, the Bété might mostly perceive that they are less fortunate now. These responses might further indicate that Fromager is still occupied with accepting the status quo, which is the first step in de-escalation mentioned by Ramsbotham et al (2011). Whatever the reasons, the overall perception from Fromager respondents of some economic factors and conflict resolution is rather negative.

The third and last issue-block from the survey that is interesting in this context is on the state of security and post-conflict. A majority (55%) of the Fromager respondents never felt insecure in their neighbourhood or suffered from crime in their

own home (70%). In the reconciliation section, Afrobarometer largely surveyed support for statements reflecting forgiveness and amnesty versus justice and prosecution.⁹⁷ The survey asks for example if respondents backed the statement that “the reconciliation requires the liberation of all political prisoners” (Penar & Mukana 2013), which a majority of 63% supported. Some survey items put up two contrasting statements, one being more focused on “justice no matter what” and being on “amnesty and forgiveness”. In Fromager respondents were relatively undecided: with amnesty (40%) being trumped by amnesty after trial (52.5%). In another question, people supported the statement that perpetrators should be forgiven after they have repented (75%) rather than judging people according to their crimes (30%). It was also interesting to cross-tabulate the responses from those who perceived the general economic condition of country as bad with the responses on reconciliation. The respondents that answered rather pessimistically on the direction the country was taking, were slightly in favour of an amnesty law and equal treatment of all parties in the justice-seeking process. When however being faced with having to pick an either general amnesty or amnesty after conviction however, the pessimistic respondents answered less forgivingly.

It would be too eager to deduce that a perception of decreased economic opportunities leads to less willingness to forgive, since it is such a small sample. Lacking better data however, it is worth noticing that there are a number of respondents frustrated with their economic situation who are not convinced of the need to forgive and forget at all costs.

5.2 Focus Groups – Listen to the farmers

In order to dig a bit deeper and see what local perceptions of communities indicated, I conducted five focus group interviews in Fromager: three in co-operatives that received investment and two in co-operatives that did not. As outlined in the introduction, I had assistance from ANADER, which implements the investment project from GIZ and private partners in Fromager.

⁹⁷ Each Afrobarometer survey has a country specific section. For Côte d’Ivoire that was occupied with reconciliation and the influence of China. In specific were the reconciliation questions: Q79AA_CDI, Q79AB_CDI, Q79AC_CDI, Q79B_CDI and Q79C_CDI.

5.2.1 More money to share, too little to spend – non-intervention group

No money - no workers

In the focus group without an investment project, all participants were plantation owners. So when we asked about job creation, the respondents were not the ones potentially demanding work, but rather being the ones possibly offering employment. They largely agreed that it got more difficult to offer jobs after 2011, although most of them indicated that they needed support because of the large workload. Some argued that the revenues, even after cocoa prices increased, were not sufficient to employ additional workers.⁹⁸ Others pointed out, that it was difficult to get men to work for them, due to strict regulations. In order to cope with the immense amount of labour, the participants mentioned that they, as a co-operative, as well as the community, supported each other during harvesting season. Most farmers were solely dependent on cocoa and did not have alternative jobs, though some cultivated rice and corn for their own consumption. In one group some farmers had intensified cropping hevéa and more recently palmnuts, while others “returned” to cocoa planting after coffee proved to be less valuable. Even early on in this first section on employment possibilities, the respondents voiced issues of land ownership.

In Fromager I was confronted with two kinds of land rights and co-cropping systems (see Chauveau 2006; Chauveau 2000; Bøås & Dunn 2013; McGovern 2011): Firstly, the *metéage* - a system in which revenues from a piece of land are divided by three, with the workers receiving one third, while the owner gets the rest. The second system, the *adokatâ* (freely translated into “work it and take it”) has “unused” land as its subject matter. This land is trusted to the care of a worker who plants cocoa seedlings and cares for the tree over at least five years. When the tree starts to produce cocoa pods and revenues start coming, the worker and owner share the reward fifty-fifty. Members of one group mentioned that the worker receives one part of the land afterwards. Both the *metéage* and the *adokatâ* system are open to (mis-) interpretation. One aspect that was mentioned was that the two different systems were bound by

⁹⁸ Workers on the cocoa farms are usually called “main-d’œuvre”/ helpers. When talking about hiring people, the focus groups in the treatment section often talk about hiring people from Burkina Faso/ the “foreigners”. They described them like this: “our brothers that came and have been settled here with us, that have their fields” or “the people”.

ethnicity: *metéage* being mostly used by Baoulé, while *adokatâ* is a system used by the Bété, who owned land but did not cultivate it. Most of the respondents mentioned that the autochthones (Bété/ Baoulé) do not like to work, which reasons why they like to employ others over a longer time.⁹⁹ One younger respondent mentioned that he participated in *adokatâ* because he was not able to buy land. Therefore he invested both labour and resources over a long time to work on someone else's land in order to own two hectares afterwards. He was one of the few involved in one of the two systems, but said that the *adokatâ* arrangement did not create any tensions. However some participants claimed that there were cases where landowners did not adhere to the contract, taking revenues from the workers.

I experienced during the discussions that the participants did not always agree on the conditions of the systems amongst them, which might cause future tensions. However, even though the respondents did see a decrease in job possibilities after 2011, they seemed quite content with their work situation.

Improved price and more to get by

Responses on the second block of questions on yields and livelihood were quite diverse. The participants supported the expert's assessment about the positive effects of the reform: All respondents agreed that higher prices, more transparency and better planning opportunities had a positive impact on their lives. They said that they expected a continued price rise, which I would argue means a hopeful outlook on the economic future. One man argued for example that the next seasonal price will be set shortly before the elections, so will therefore be higher in order to create some goodwill amongst the farmers. Only one farmer mentioned that he received better revenues under the liberalised system. This seems to indicate a similar result as in the national analysis; farmers suffered immensely during the liberalised system, but are increasingly more positive about their opportunities in the new civil economy.

However most farmers cautioned that regardless of the increased cocoa price, their main problem remains ageing trees and decreased capacities. In order to proliferate their profits they either have to re-plant or use fertilisers. Both options

⁹⁹ "It is being said that the autochthones (those that own the land) do, in general, not like to work".

demand heavy re-investment of their scarce revenues.¹⁰⁰ One co-operative board member discussed the issue of bean quality, and pointed out that the stabilised price helps farmers to plan their harvest since there was no longer a need to “rush” into selling at a high price. He said that this satisfies many planters and makes them appreciate the reform. It is worth underlining here that most respondents perceive overall improvements to their livelihoods. Although they might be small, one could argue that the farmers perceive that they might share their part of the “peace



picture 6 One cooperative in Fromager

dividend” (Junne & Verkoren 2009) after the years of liberalised prices. However the state efforts seem to not be fully successful in order to create a stable growth for the farmers, since they seem to have problems replanting in large quantities.

Reintegrating into what?

In the last block of questions I asked about the re-integration of former fighters and social cohesion between different communities. When it comes to re-integration of combatants, most co-operative members said that they had not experienced former fighters returning and trying to integrate in civil life close by. One of them told that he once received six ex-combatants asking for work at his farm. Each of them obtained a piece of land, most likely as part of a *metéage*, and he had no troubles with them. In the other group a couple of participants told about some guards and watchmen that were *dozos* during the crisis. They returned to the village and their jobs and have integrated into civil life.

All respondents argued that they saw no problems between different ethnic communities. I was surprised by the swift response on that issue but when we asked a bit more, some farmers acknowledged that there were occasional conflicts, or

¹⁰⁰ One farmer put it like this: “It is getting better, but that is not sufficient”.

“divergences”. For example, one planter agreed to help another but did not show up, or co-operatives collected the cocoa from the farmers but delayed paying them.

Participants argued however that issues are settled pretty quickly with the help of delegates from each community, who discuss problems first amongst themselves and then inform the chief or local administration in cases where they cannot settle the dispute.

I asked some questions about the participants’ expectations concerning this year’s election and possible violence. This was a surprisingly sensitive topic, as respondents had underlined that politics do not belong in the co-operative. I thought this was an interesting indicator how delicate issues of political expression are in Côte d’Ivoire. This might be another indicator that country is still struggling with the first step of reconciliation, trying to accept the status quo but not yet being able to face and acknowledge major difficulties. Both groups argued that they did not expect the elections to pose a threat for them or the social cohesion with other communities, unless the children of the old owners provoked fights with the new land owners.¹⁰¹ I found this open and brief evaluation surprising, because the participants were much blunter about the underlying tensions with the autochthones than I expected. They briefly reflected on the post-election violence from 2011, acknowledging that there had been a problem in the village. They quoted an incident in which “passion won over reason” and it was difficult to control the emotions. They were however very reluctant to go into detail, and preferred that we did not ask further questions regarding that incident. This might be reflected by Ramsbotham et al (2011) who describe Rigby’s framework in terms of trauma-settlement. They argue that post-conflict societies vary between the poles of vengeance and amnesia (what they call “forgive-and-forget”), with the later being “one way of ‘moving on’ for societies” (ibid., p.250). I am not sure if this description of forgiveness is the proper one for what the focus groups discussed. The general amnesia might however be a way of avoiding the heavy task of forgiveness, and instead concerns the more secure immediate future. Pugel and others (Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007) indicate that it is difficult to assess successful re-integration, social cohesion and reconciliation.

¹⁰¹ “In general it the children that drive a wedge between the communities”.

To get a better and more nuanced understanding of how close the relations between the different communities really are, I therefore asked the participants if they would want to live with or marry their daughter off into another ethnic community (see Bøås & Hatløy 2008; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007). The participants reflected that already a month after the crisis, political associations were not noticeable and outsiders were integrated into society. They said that they themselves felt very welcomed by the autochthones.¹⁰² Asking the other group about the degree of closeness with different communities, they answered that there is a lot of solidarity, for example inviting each other to weddings and funerals. They further outlined that they are not only living together, but also working across community-borders in the settlements (“on se melange”/ “we mix”). However, one participant indicated that there are some communities not too eager to work.¹⁰³ Especially amongst the young men, there were a number of “good-for-nothing” people who were smoking and stealing and therefore not suitable for work.¹⁰⁴

No investment – no reconciliation?

In summary, it seems like the revenues from cocoa are not sufficient to employ the much-needed workforce and that the partially-contested land management systems are practiced in order to get access to land. The new pricing system increased farmers’ income and quality of cocoa, but the ageing of trees remains a key problem. The focus groups without the investment project recollected some instances of integration of combatants and did not encounter many problems. However some conflict trends continue to simmer under the surface of cross-community living. One aspect that I found noteworthy in these focus groups was the issue highlighted by Wennmann (2011, p.75). He argued that it is important to create a civil economic vision that people can start believing in. From the group sessions, I saw this was more apparent in the context of the focus groups without investment. This might be the case because these groups largely consisted of “foreigners”, who might perceive themselves to be in a much better position after Ouattara took office. These focus group respondents

¹⁰² “It is us that has been received here”.

¹⁰³ “there are communities that do not like to work too much”.

¹⁰⁴ I was asking whether these guys were former combatants, which the participants neglected to answer.

largely referred the government as the main actor, creating the inclusive growth that Grossmann et al (2009) discuss. Besada and others (Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Besada et al. 2009; Grossmann et al. 2009) refer to the essential role that private investment can play in restoring markets and generating employment (Besada et al. 2009, p.7). In the communities that were not taking part in the ANADER project, there seems to be a lack in private investment that could have this kind of positive impact. There are problems in employing migrant workers, which are not solved by employment for local workers but instead by using each other's help in the co-operative. The non-investment groups did not give any account of intergroup contact and re-integration into the cocoa value chain as suggested by Tobias and Boudreaux (2009). Instead there seem to be indications that the respondents want to “move on” and at least forget, though maybe not forgive, the past atrocities.

5.2.2 Coming back to land of your parents – the investment group

When looking at the results of the focus groups that received an intervention, there are a couple of similarities but also larger differences in regards to reconciliation and investment.

No money and no work

I heard very similar opinions regarding employment, with participants saying that there are fewer opportunities to employ workers than before 2011. Although most farmers mentioned that they had more than enough to do on their plantations, they argued that prior to 2011 they had more money available to hire people and that it was easier to employ relatives to come down South to help.¹⁰⁵ One man said that people had to be careful when employing others, since some of them are only working in order to get a piece of land for themselves instead of taking care of the owner's plantation. According to him, that was the reason why he prefers to work with other co-operative members or with short-term employees for specific tasks.¹⁰⁶ Another man mentioned that he stopped *météage* because of the negative experiences he had

¹⁰⁵ They said that the government has suspended the import of workers from Burkina Faso (“the state demands of us to not bring any people”) that it was “forbidden” now. After that a lot of Burkinabe apparently travelled back or worked on their own plantations.

¹⁰⁶ “Because they come to look for something for them (...), so it is difficult”. This has been a trend from before the crisis as well, the man underlined.

working with “foreigners”.¹⁰⁷ This in my opinion indicates that the land rights system and the issues of land ownership still have the potential to create tensions. Even with a training programme and investment projects in the communities, there seems to be a lack of trust, yet no contact and increased intergroup understanding as described by Tobias and Boudreaux (2009). Most of the groups’ participants recollected rather negative experiences with foreign workers and preferred to support each other, i.e., inside their community, instead of employing other or entering into land-management systems. Since most farmers keep to their own fields and plant cocoa, there seems to be an increasing abstraction from the working life and realities from the other communities. Where the *tutorat* historically offered an almost family-like relation, the communities from the focus group that have received investment largely keep to themselves.



Picture 7 Another cooperative in Fromager

“Poverty of hell”

The second block of questions was occupied with the issues of farmers’ livelihoods and increased yields; and here I got much more negative feedback than in the other discussion groups. One man was said: “Before the crisis we had poverty in times of emergency, but today we have poverty of hell”. In that specific community, the respondents mentioned that the price they received during the liberalised system was better than the current stable price. They explained that while they received CFA 800-1000 per kg before 2011, they only get CFA 700-808 today. This is rather odd, since

¹⁰⁷ “I did, but for a while, I stopped. (...) Because often when they are given a plantation: it's not what I want; he has no time; he said that we are all Africans (...) one just can not work”.

they quoted a price that was below the officially set price at the time. I gather again that these communities might actually have a problem in being paid the right price. However, it might again be an indicator that respondents' perceptions on livelihood and economics are highly influenced by the outcome of the conflict, i.e., them being on the "losing side".¹⁰⁸ This might further be an indication that Bété cocoa farmers do not see the "peace dividends" (Junne & Verkoren 2009) from the new economy. This might be an argument against the findings from Johnson (2009), who claims that promotion of economic growth lessens ethnic and regional inequalities (ibid., p.54). Since this literature is very policy-based, it is hard to argue against them, but it seems obvious that either by perception or by real neglect, the "losing side" of the conflict might not be as integrated in the new economic vision of peace as is necessary (Wennmann 2011).

The respondents were further very dissatisfied with the selling system, where they handed over their cocoa on credit and needed to wait for weeks, sometimes months, before receiving their revenues. This was a problem that was also apparent in the other focus groups. Like the other participants, they argued that they did not have the extra revenues to spend in reinvestments - that instead used it to pay for medicine, school fees and other larger expenses. Only one group out of the investment-receiving section mentioned that the price has increased and that they see (slight) positive changes in the way the cocoa is being sold. One man criticised for example the liberal pricing system being only good in theory,¹⁰⁹ but did not positively impact the quality of the cocoa. He said that the exporters were the winners of the liberalised price system, while today's system assists the farmers to profit.¹¹⁰

Regarding the yields of the cocoa farmers, the picture is more or less the same as in the other focus group. Most planters have old trees with a declining production. They know by experience and after various training programmes that they need to replant, use fertilisers, pesticides and certain techniques. But this is too expensive for most of them. An interesting point was mentioned on several occasions in one of the

¹⁰⁸ Before the pubs were full with young men after harvesting season, now they are empty: "we became poor, it is nothing; we are not happy, we are not at ease".

¹⁰⁹ "Before there was liberalisation. The liberalisation was coming, in the theory it was good, but the practice was not good".

¹¹⁰ The exporter, the so-called *acheteur*, could buy a kg for CFA 500 and could sell at CFA 800/1000.

discussion groups, that there were told (by the exporters and others) that they should not use a certain herbicide due to its toxic content. This was mentioned as a negative aspect in two groups, since these toxic products apparently increased production considerably. This was amongst the few times that the discussers actually mentioned the influence of the cocoa exporters and NGO-business networks.

These negative perceptions amongst farmers might have negative implications for the sustainability of the peace (see De Soysa et al. 1999; Chauveau & Richards 2008; Schneider & Gugerty 2011), if they feel left out of the peace-building process and the civil economy over a long time.

Does investment have an impact?

An essential point with the division in focus groups was to see if the intervention of ANADER had a noticeable impact on the lives of the farmers.¹¹¹ Therefore I asked in the three communities that had received such training if they perceived any changes. There the results were not as easy to conclude. Most participants mentioned that they learned more about the importance of producing quality cocoa and farming theory as well as how to plan their revenues and finances, which should raise their surplus a bit. But a large number of participants saw no real improvements in living conditions, since they still lack the money to actually implement all these changes. One of the participants but it nicely in saying: “if someone comes and just talks about helping you, without putting anything on the table, then I wouldn’t call that help”. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis is not a programme evaluation and the results of the farmer business schooling in the three communities are highly contextual, however, it might be still worth discussing some aspects of the investment impact. From the focus group’s feedback one of the main problems in order to increase livelihood is the lack of capital. This might be similar to the results from Batmanglich and Enria’s (2014) study. They did not conclude with a real outcome from (foreign) investment in creating jobs in fragile contexts. Two aspects from their study might be found in the context of the cocoa value chain in Côte d’Ivoire. Firstly, Batmanglich and Enria (2014) perceive that programming in Liberia and Sierra Leone had an

¹¹¹ The cooperatives that participated in the groups had not only been in farmer business schooling but further received input from *champs d’école* etc.

unrealistic and infeasible framing of the problem in terms of the capacities of the post-conflict economy. There might be a similar knowledge gap for programming with livelihood projects in Fromager, where short-term and long-term possibilities differ. In addition, Batmanglich and Enria (2014) argue a lack of innovation and creativity when working in fragile contexts. They argue that high-risk countries demand smart solutions and linking up projects is something that can be possibly found in the case of cocoa investment. Only teaching good practices without offering adequate capital for cocoa farmers to make essential changes might be an example of lack of link-up that could potentially improve livelihoods.

One aspect that appeared to me whilst conducting the focus group interviews was the very limited presence of the multinational businesses on the local level, which could be a source of potential livelihood improvement and jobs (see Wennmann 2011, p.101; Iff et al. 2012; Grossmann et al. 2009, p.70). It seemed that the NGOs and the governmental partners were very much engaged on the ground but that the exporters and manufacturers were less involved. I found this rather puzzling, since the cocoa supply mainly relies on the change in production patterns and considerable increase in yields in order for the export figures to remain stable. This might be an indication of some of the outputs from Bray (2010) who claims that wealth-generating activities often lag behind when investment is done in fragile contexts.

Re-integration and the community

The latter questions surveyed the state of re-integration and social cohesion, which was the aspect that differed most from the other focus groups. Two groups reflected rather negatively on the state of social cohesions without having experience with former combatants. The last group argued for a balanced understanding of the conflict, claiming that both sides of the conflict employed Ivorians and migrants. That group mentioned that most of the internally displaced people that were in Gagnoa had essentially returned to their homes. Some of the younger ex-combatants that came home to Gagnoa apparently received some land from their parents, and are therefore fully integrated in the villages.¹¹² This might be an indicator that most of the people have returned to their communities and re-enter their former work, similarly to other

¹¹² “Children who were on the front that came back to the land of their parents were given land”.

conflicts (see also Bøås & Hatløy 2008). Foreigners however had no chance of receiving land because this is most likely to be inherited.¹¹³ This is an interesting point that bears some resemblance to the results of re-integration in agriculture that Lamb (2012) refers to. The cases of the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo especially show that combatants were unable to access to land in order to re-integrate into civil life.

In that discussion group there were two planters with very different experiences concerning the re-integration of combatants into cocoa farming. One man explained an episode with a returning ex-combatant who asked to work for him. He agreed, because he thought of preventing him from getting frustrated and turning to violence.¹¹⁴ Another man's story was much more negative, saying that the young guys that had worked for him before the conflict returned and brought other ex-fighters. Because they had guns when they came, they were able to take the law into their own hands and took his (and others') plantations by force.¹¹⁵ He tried to contact the chief of the community, but claimed that in those conflicts even the chiefs were powerless. These two stories do in my view reflect much of the underlying tension with ex-combatants in the cocoa sector in Côte d'Ivoire. Some combatants, like the ones in the first anecdote, might manage to re-integrate into the economics of peace (Kingma 1997). But the main issue here is that most of the land is already taken, and the civil cocoa economy cannot really offer the absorption into non-violent revenues. As the second episode indicates, some ex-combatants still have the means and the incentive to engage in looting as a profitable alternative (see Alusala 2011, p.108). In order to really create long-term stability and livelihood in the cocoa sector, it seems necessary to find solutions to the land rights issue.

Tensions persist

Another interesting aspect came up when we asked about the expectations for the upcoming election. Most of the respondents argued that the politicians are not really interested in the cocoa farmers' reality and cannot relate to them. This was repeated by

¹¹³ "But foreigners, here at home, we do not sell forests to, we no longer sell land, the land can not be sold because there is so little left".

¹¹⁴ "It's better than leaving him to be a robber or thief".

¹¹⁵ "Today they ripped these fields from our parents".

others who said “the election is not going to change anything because politics are politics” and that the politicians “are not eating with us”. It seems that after a decade of conflict, people do not trust politicians to be truly interested in their living conditions. I think this could be interpreted as a positive sign, since it might dissolve some of the connections between local level conflicts and national patrimonial disputes that O’ Bannon (2012) and others refer to. O’ Bannon argues that “national-level politicians seem keen to utilize local disputes to help wage their own battles and in doing so help create a hostile climate in which more local conflict is likely” (ibid., p.4). This increased cynicism against national politicians might open up spaces for reconciliation, since local disputes might no longer be driven from the national level as before.

I further discussed the issue of social cohesion asking how the communities are living together (see Pugel 2009; Pugel 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007). One group for example mentioned that they had been sensitised on how to live together and talked about discrimination in the training.¹¹⁶ However, some participants underlined that they always lived harmoniously with other communities, even before the programme and that there is no discrimination against certain communities.¹¹⁷ Stories were told like from one man who talked about his neighbour being a Malinkè and that they shared their work and communal life; going to the cooperative meetings, transporting their cocoa and working together in the cooperative, which contributes to the peaceful living together. A couple of other participants added that there were dispute settlement mechanisms in place in case of conflict between different communities, but that there were some problems in accepting these settlements from all sides.¹¹⁸

Like in the non-investment group most participants repeated swiftly that they live peacefully together, but after a while respondents also shared other views. One older farmer was less optimistic, and frightened of the upcoming election. He argued that there were still weapons all around and that people were responsible for bad actions. Another older man remembered the time before the crisis, how his father

¹¹⁶ “The certification and trainings they taught us how to live together”.

¹¹⁷ “There is no complex of inferiority or superiority; we live in hospitality and solidarity”.

¹¹⁸ “We eat together, we do everything together”.

employed workers from Burkina Faso and how they were living in “perfect harmony”. “But one day things were reversed”. He argued that they know the price of the cocoa now, but that it does not help them. This might be another indication that perceptions of economic livelihood are highly dependent on whether one is on the “winning” or “losing” side of a conflict.¹¹⁹ Some respondents also reflected on newly emerging conflicts relating to the *tutorat* system, which they said did not exist before 2011. They argued that after the elections “and with the current president” is it “them” that make the law. The discussers argued that autochthones are no longer heard or respected.¹²⁰ Now, one of the participants reasoned, the “foreigners command us around”. I was rather surprised by the openness of the cocoa farmers, who described their frustrations very openly. Here we find again the perception of being “on the losing side” of history, which makes the acceptance of the “status quo” according to Ramsbotham et al (2011) more difficult. In one of the groups the respondents argued that it was necessary for a group or NGO to come in and talk to the foreigners about how to behave, and that they should respect the autochthones more.

I think this reflects two aspects in the context of the post-conflict development approach: firstly it shows that external help might be accepted in order to increase understanding, possibly through cocoa investment projects. It also shows that there is a need for the Bété who “lost” in the conflict, to still be fully recognisable members of their communities. Alusala (2011) calls this the need to create “social belonging” (ibid., p.12) in communities, to (re-) create in order to secure longer lasting stability. What is interesting in the context of the respondents’ views on social cohesion and reconciliation is that there was not so much close coordination amongst stakeholders and the cocoa business as some reports indicate to be necessary (see International Alert 2012, p.5). There are various points of possible contacts for different communities, but it seems that the investment in the farmer business schooling did not really take up these contact points.

¹¹⁹ In that same community there was one Burkinabe that had been in the village for a long time. He quoted a proverb saying that “the one who welcomes a stranger and calls it a harmonious home can not be contradicted by his guest”. This might have been an indication that he had a different view but that custom did not allow for him to complain.

¹²⁰ “It was after the crisis we had these problems”; “your workers they not even respect you”; “They [the foreigners], they say it is them who are in power”.

Investment but not at peace

All in all, the responses of the investment focus group did offer some more indications for the underlying tensions of the land issues and that the crisis did not really help anyone to gain on the local level as it might have done on the national level. It showed some similarities to the case study by Batmanglich and Enria (2014); investment does not seem to have an essential impact on the stability and reconciliation. Most investment is not able to create peace dividends and a sense of social belonging across different ethnic groups.

5.3 Conclusion: “The crisis has not helped anyone!”

This chapter offers a number of interesting issues: First and foremost, it seems from the preliminary overview of the main results from all groups (see Table 1), that the investment has not yet made an impact on the main parameters in the cocoa communities. It is the stabilisation of the cocoa price and the ethnic belonging of the farmers that seem to however affect their views on their livelihood options more.

Investment	No investment	Investment
Creation of jobs		-very complex/ forbidden process of hiring since 2011
Increase in revenue and yields		-price increased & price decreased -severe decrease in livelihood since 2011
Integration of ex-combatants	-some ex-combatants came and got a piece of land (no problems) -returning <i>dozos</i> fully integrated	-need to sell cocoa on credit -young ex-combatants returning get piece of land from their parents -others have no right (sometimes they take that right by force) -employing ex-combatants in order to keep the calm
Reconciliation	-politics/ elections a sensible topic (some incidents) -feeling welcome in the community -living together well -some communities are not eager to work	-politicians were not really interested/ they have been used -had some incidents -‘foreigners’ are making their own rules -no respect for the autochthones

Table 1 Main differences between focus groups

It is also interesting that people in the cocoa communities are living very close to each other and take part in other communities’ daily and special rituals. However there was a large continued grievance in all the groups. From the “migrant” side, they feared that autochthones’ children could stir up trouble. From the autochthones’ side, they point

towards the lack of respect and instances of being “robbed” of their own land. These tensions can become real, although they seemed to somewhat simmer under the surface and were only discussed after some time.

Another noteworthy point here is the aspect that the “victor’s justice” that has been portrayed on the national scale seems to have a trickle-down effect on the regional scale. Anecdotes for example of the local chief being told-off by the “young migrants” because he is a Bété (investment group) or the ex-combatants taking the law into their own hands and taking a piece of land. Perceptions of the winning and losing sides that affect the perspectives of their livelihood are of course highly subjective, but these are narratives that could potentially threaten the social cohesion. If the stabilised cocoa price were to decrease, one might see these underlying grievances re-surface, since those communities that perceived the prices to be lower than before 2011 did have a more pessimistic outlook on the state of social cohesion.

A third issue that I think is noteworthy is that the possibilities for re-integration into the cocoa sector are rather limited. In most focus group discussions, respondents argued that there is no land left for cocoa plantations. Those that have been active in cocoa before the war and returned might be able to “steal” some land. But there seems to be no institutional approach to try to include former combatants into cocoa farming.

A fourth and last point that is also connected is the general negative perception of livelihood. That might be an aspect that is even more apparent further north or further west, but is a different kind of perception than the largely positive outlook from people I talked to in Abidjan. This might be a further indication of how a lack in investment in infrastructure in certain areas impacts perceptions of the future.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This thesis has tried to critically assess some aspects of the capitalist peace and the large capitalist development agenda by reviewing Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa value chain. It has reviewed the research question of whether investment in the cocoa value chain is able to have an impact on the state of reconciliation. I find a number of surprising answers to that research question that I will review and put into a larger context.

6.1 The Macro and the Micro-Level and what they have in common

On the macro level we see the debate of reconciliation versus economic recovery. Most national experts and informants underlined the need to move on. Reforms and programmes to revitalise the cocoa business are seen as good steps taken by the current government, private sectors and donors to ensure stability in the country. The experts however, did not think that integration of former combatants into the cocoa sector was possible. On the micro-level, people still encountered difficulties in the aftermath of the conflict and the liberalised price system. The reform of the cocoa sector, not so much the investment, offers better yields and improved livelihoods, while job creation and re-integration of combatants remains difficult. Issues of ethnic belonging and perceptions of being on the “losing” or “winning” side of the conflict seem to be more important than the investment projects. This indicates that the “winner's justice” that is criticised on the national level seems to have a local counterpart.

Regarding the evaluation of the capitalist peace theory, I posed some general questions in the start of this thesis, which I would now like to answer. Firstly, the issue of whether investment can change individual behaviour, which in turn causes peace. That might be the case on a superficial level. However, as the case of Côte d'Ivoire shows, this assumption neglects the aspects of individual abilities as well as social circumstance, as has been seen in the issue of re-integration into cocoa farming.

Secondly, I analysed the question whether investment and development/democracy create a framework that has a conditional pacifying effect. The answer is again “to a certain extent”, since both development and democracy should increase the chances that people are content with their political system, and less

likely to relapse into conflict. As outlined in Chapter 4, this question is however very hard to answer, because the individual effects are hard to disaggregate.

Thereafter I asked whether the integration into a capitalist market has pacifying effect due to better protection of contracts and property. Here, capitalist peace is highly biased from the Western model, which makes it difficult to find the same assumptions elsewhere. As the Ivorian case shows there is no necessary link between participating in the capitalist market and being able to protect property.

The last question concerning capitalist peace was whether global investment could increase accountability and transparency, which in turn could be perceived as pacifying. Again, to a certain extent the investors can influence the accountability standards in a country. Under the scrutiny of global investors, certain ground rules of transparency in the value chain have to be met. However it is still possible, if not at times wanted, that a large amount of information is not accessible in order to keep lucrative win-win deals between government bodies and businesses alive.

Thereafter, I reviewed the three aspects in which private companies, the international community and non-governmental actors might have an impact on the local level, namely job creation, re-integration of combatants and improvement of livelihood. Most of them seemed not be drastically impacted by the private-NGO networks, but were rather affected by the state-led intervention of a cocoa reform.

6.2 What does that mean?

"Economic development itself is certainly no guarantee against violence. But a lack of development can be a guarantee for resumption of violence." (Junne & Verkoren 2009, p.2). This statement on economic post-conflict management sums up the two aspects that I deem important in understanding the Ivorian case. Firstly, based on the data from this thesis, I see the need for a combination of economic factors that most Ivorians appreciate with a more conflict-sensitive approach in investment projects. Concentrating on economic growth alone might not be enough to win peace in the country for the long-term. A second aspect that is interesting from the Ivorian case is the relatively positive impacts from the state. It seems that the new government has

been very effective in getting things done and moving forward. However it also seems necessary to solve some of the root-causes to re-build a country's stability.

It is important for me at this point to re-iterate the limitations of this thesis. The large actor-network in the cocoa sector makes it difficult to research and collect data. The special combination of private sector, governmental, non-governmental and donor involvement makes it difficult to segregate single actors' impacts and inputs. Capitalist peace and capitalist peace-building provide a new and interesting theory to review. However, it is such a broad framework that has its limits on the definitional distinctiveness. This opens it up however for discussing some broader ideas of the capitalist peace agenda. As outlined in the introduction, I do not seek to evaluate a specific investment programme, re-integration efforts or the economics of the whole cocoa value chain. These are all aspects that I think would be interesting to research further for the Ivorian case.

This thesis also offers a number of implications for the capitalist peace agenda. Though there are serious limitations to the generalisability of the Ivorian case, it can serve as a starting point for case-evaluations for the theory. It is first and foremost an indication that the assumptions of the capitalist and economic liberal agenda are too general and too focused on the Western state model. This might strengthen the claim that capitalist peace does not work as easily on a single case as it does on a global cross-section. Furthermore, as the research on the micro-level shows, the integration of some peace-building literature might help to explain some of the more individual aspects of the involvement of global companies.

Most importantly, this thesis might show that it is difficult to use only one kind of large-scale theory on individual cases such as Côte d'Ivoire. The difficulties connected to the collection of data, the somewhat ambiguous assumptions as well as the individual case-characteristics might instead be arguments in favour of an eclectic approach described by Sil and Katzenstein (2010b; 2010a). Capitalist peace theory as well as peace-building literature might be helpful in uncovering different aspects of global companies' and business networks' activities in fragile countries. This in itself is a great real world challenge, which is important to meet with adequate theoretical tools. All in all, I do however believe that this thesis could be a note-worthy case study

of the broad capitalist peace and peace-building framework in the cocoa-sector of Côte d'Ivoire. It could be useful as an example that critically assesses the strengths and weaknesses in the capitalist approach, and points to some aspects in which the cocoa value chain may be important for the stability of the country. However there is a need for research concerning the assumptions of capitalist peace for the African capitalism. Further research in the field of private business involvement in fragile contexts is necessary to track other possible channels, and cases where global companies influence the stability of a post-conflict economy.

6.3 What should be done about it?

Even with the limitations that I am aware of, based on my research and fieldwork, I would argue for a number of important aspects and policy recommendations that need attention.

First and foremost, I got the strong impression that firms, NGOs and governmental organisations in the cocoa industry need to act more conscious about their role in the long-term economic peace-building situation. As outlined above, these institutions have a large potential to impact farmers and communities in cocoa-producing areas that have been deeply affected by the conflict. In my opinion, they have a responsibility to be more active to reduce tensions and impact long-term reconciliation.

Secondly, I think that the CSR approach that many chocolate producers and value chain actors have developed should be broadened beyond issues of child labour and increased productivity. It would be helpful to get more actively involved in issues of transparent revenue streams such as “publish what you pay” and “publish what you get” in other resources.

Thirdly, people are eager to “move on” and seem quite satisfied with the government’s approach and focus on economic growth. I think however that the current government should use the economic progress that the country has experienced and settle some business in order to create sustainable growth. For example, they could use the growing goodwill for a land reform or a more balanced justice system, as well

as a larger economic diversification. If such issues are not reflected upon, spoilers of peace that destabilise the country remain likely.

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ANNEX 1

Expert Interviews

Organisation	Other information
GIZ-PROFIAB & PPP	Conseiller - Partenariats Public-Privé
GIZ-GISCO	Local Representative
North-American Grinder	Cocoa Sustainability Expert
World Cocoa Foundation	Country Representative
Conseil Cafe Cacao	Cacao Expert
African Development Bank Group	Chief Irrigation Engineer
African Development Bank Group	Country Representative for CI
GIZ-SSAB	Technical Consultant
GIZ-PROCACAO	Project Leader
TechnoServe	Deputy Country Director
World Bank	Project Leader-Conflict and Social Development Unit

Table 2 Expert Interviews

Focus Group Interviews

Treatment/ Non-Treatment	Location	Participant Features	Number of participants	Ethnic composition
Treatment	Wanéwa	Females (25-50)	10-12	Mostly Bété
Treatment	Wanéwa	Males (40-75)	6	Mostly Bété, one Burkinabe
ADD.	Wanéwa	Females (30-50)	14	Mostly Bété
Non-Treatment	Galebre	Males (35-60)	11-12	Mossi/ Moré, Senoufou
Non-Treatment	Bayota	Males (40-65)	10-11	Mossi/ Moré, Senoufou
ADD.	Bayota	Male	1	
Treatment	Gagnoa	Males (40-65)	8	

Table 3 Focus Group Interviews

Outline Focus Group Interviews

WELCOME

Thanks for agreeing to be part of the focus group. We appreciate your willingness to participate.

INTRODUCTIONS

Moderator/ Interpreter and EMN

PURPOSE OF FOCUS GROUPS

The reason we are having these focus groups is to collect data for the research of EMNs Master thesis on the cocoa sector and its role in the reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire. We need your input on this and want you to share your honest and open thoughts with us.

GROUND RULES

1. WE WANT YOU TO DO THE TALKING.

We would like everyone to participate.

I may call on you if I haven't heard from you in a while.

2. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS

Every person's experiences and opinions are important. Speak up whether you agree or disagree.

We want to hear a wide range of opinions.

3. WHAT IS SAID IN THIS ROOM STAYS HERE

We want folks to feel comfortable sharing when sensitive issues come up.

4. WE WILL BE TAPE RECORDING THE GROUP

We want to capture everything you have to say.

We don't identify anyone by name in our report. You will remain anonymous.

Questions:

1) When you compare the situation to the one before 2011: Are there more or less jobs available in cocoa?

2) What about other sectors: Are they alternative jobs?

3) When you compare the situation to one before 2011: How did the cocoa price and your revenues change?

3B) (for 'treatment group') Do you think that the investment/ intervention of ANADER did change something about that?

4) When you compare the situation to one before 2011: How are your cocoa yields? Did the productivity change?

5) How do you expect the future to be in terms of jobs and yields?

6) Later this year Côte d'Ivoire is going to have presidential elections: What do you think about that?

7) When you look back to the 2010/11: Do you think that your community is living together more or less harmonious?

8) Do you think the elections this year are going to have an impact on the social harmony in your community?

9) When you think about members of other communities or supporters of other parties: Do you want to work together/ live in the same compound/ share family with them?

ANNEX 2

Stata do-file Afrobarometer

//Afrobarometer MA Thesis

//MACRO Analysis

set more off

tab Q79B_CDI REGION

/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus coupables.

Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1,

3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2,

5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant*/

tab Q79C_CDI REGION

/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs crimes.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après s'être repenties.

Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s'être repenties pour leurs crimes

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1,

3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2,

5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant */

tab Q79AB_CDI REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,

3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q79AC_CDI REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,

3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q84 REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q84

Question: A quelle ethnie ou groupe culturel appartenez-vous?

Variable Label: Votre ethnie ou groupe culturel

Values: 1260-1264, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1

Value Labels: 1260=Akan, 1261=Krou, 1262=Mandé du Nord, 1263=Mandé du Sud, 1264=Gur (Voltaïque) 9990="Ivoirien seulement," ou "Ne s'identifie pas en ces termes", 9995=Autre, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant

Source: SAB

Note: Si le Répondant ne s'identifie pas à un groupe ethnique, c'est-à-dire s'il REFUSE de répondre (9998), NE SAIT PAS (9999) ou répond " Ivoirien seulement (9990)", alors encerclez 7= Non applicable à Q85A et Q85B et allez à Q85C. */

tab Q85A REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q85A

Question: A quelle fréquence est ce que les _____ [groupe ethnique du Répondant] sont traités injustement par le Gouvernement?

Variable Label: Fréquence des mauvais traitements infligés à votre ethnie par le gouvernement

Values: 0-3, 7, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Quelques fois, 2=Souvent, 3=Toujours, 7=Non applicable, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant

Source: SAB

Note: Si le Répondant ne s'est identifié à aucun groupe à Q84 – c'est-à-dire, s'il a REFUSE de répondre (9998), NE SAIT PAS (9999) ou affirmait « Ivoirien uniquement » (9990)- alors encerclez 7= Non applicable pour les questions Q85A et Q85B et continuer à Q85C. */

tab Q89B REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q89B

Question: De quel parti s'agit-il?

Variable Label: Quel parti?

Values: 1260-1268, 9995, 9997-9999, -1

Value Labels: 1260=Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), 1261=Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), 1262=Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), 1263=Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire (UDPCI), 1264=Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY), 1265=Mouvement des Forces d'Avenir d'Innocent (MFA), 1266=Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), 1267=Parti des sociaux démocrates (USD), 1268=Union Pour la Côte d'Ivoire (UPCI), 9995=Autre, 9997= Non applicable, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q6A REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q6A

Question: Concernant le futur, prévoyez-vous que les situations seront meilleures ou pires. La situation économique du pays dans douze mois?

Variable Label: Situation économiques du pays dans les 12 prochains mois

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures, 5=Noem meilleures, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q7 REGION

/* Question Nombre: Q7

Question: En général, que pensez-vous de la direction dans laquelle évolue le pays? Diriez-vous que le pays va dans la mauvaise ou la bonne direction?

Variable Label: En général la direction actuelle du pays est-elle bonne/mauvaise

Values: 1, 2, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Dans la mauvaise direction, 2=Dans la bonne direction, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

//MICRO Analysis

```

keep if REGION==1264
/* only keeping those observations that are from Fromager
1160 observations are deleted -> 40 observations kept */

save "/Users/kruenkernchen/epleblomst/uni oslo-master/05. MA Thesis/3. Data &
Projects/Data/Afrobarometer/Afrobarometer CDI_Fromager.dta"

tab Q5A
/*Question Nombre: Q5A
Question: Par rapport à la même époque l'année dernière (C'est-à-dire il y a 12 mois),
comment évaluez-vous. Les conditions économiques actuelles de ce pays?
Variable Label: Q5a. Conditions économiques actuelles du pays comparées à 12 derniers mois
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures, 5=Noem meilleures,
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q5B
/* Question Nombre: Q5B
Question: Par rapport à la même époque l'année dernière (C'est-à-dire il y a 12 mois),
comment évaluez-vous. Vos propres conditions de vie actuelles?
Variable Label: Vos propres conditions de vie comparées à celles des 12 derniers mois
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 1=Bien pires, 2=Pires, 3=Identiques, 4=Meilleures, 5=Noem meilleures,
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q7
/* Question Nombre: Q7
Question: En général, que pensez-vous de la direction dans laquelle évolue le pays?
Diriez-vous que le pays va dans la mauvaise ou la bonne direction?
Variable Label: En général la direction actuelle du pays est-elle bonne/mauvaise
Values: 1, 2, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 1=Dans la mauvaise direction, 2=Dans la bonne direction,
9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q8A
/* Question Nombre: Q8A
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.
Nourriture insuffisante pour manger à sa faim?
Variable Label: Insuffisance de nourriture
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q8B
/* Question Nombre: Q8B
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.
Manque d'eau potable pour les besoins domestiques?
Variable Label: Manque d'eau potable
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois,
4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q8C
/* Question Nombre: Q8C
Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous
(ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.
Manque de médicaments ou de soins médicaux?
Variable Label: Q8c. Manque de médicament ou de soins médicaux

```

Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois, 4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q8D

/* Question Nombre: Q8D

Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous (ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.

Manque de combustible pour la cuisson des repas?

Variable Label: Manque de combustible pour la cuisson des repas

Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois, 4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q8E

/* Question Nombre: Q8E

Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous (ou un membre de votre famille) avez-dû faire face aux situations suivantes.

Manque d'argent?

Variable Label: Manque d'argent

Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois, 4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q9A

/* Question Nombre: Q9A

Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous (ou un membre de votre famille). Ne vous êtes pas sentis en sécurité dans le quartier?

Variable Label: Ne pas se sentir en sécurité dans son quartier

Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois, 4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q9B

/* Question Nombre: Q9B

Question: Au cours des 12 derniers mois, combien de fois est-ce que vous (ou un membre de votre famille). Avez- vous craint de subir un crime dans votre propre maison?

Variable Label: La crainte de subir un crime dans sa maison

Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Jamais, 1=Juste 1 ou 2 fois, 2=Quelques fois, 3=Plusieurs fois, 4=Toujours, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q27

/* Question Nombre: Q27

Question: Concernant les dernières élections présidentielles de 2010, laquelle des affirmations suivantes est vraie pour vous?

Variable Label: Concernant les élections présidentielles 2010

Values: 0-9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Vous étiez trop jeune pour voter,

1=Vous n'avez pas été inscrit,

2=Vous avez voté,

3=Vous avez décidé de ne pas voter,

4=Vous n'avez pas trouvé le bureau de vote,

5=Vous avez été empêché de voter,

6=Vous n'avez pas eu le temps de voter,

7=Vous n'avez pas voté car vous ne pouviez pas trouver votre nom dans le registre des électeurs,

8=Vous n'avez pas voté pour d'autres raisons, 9=Ne sait pas/ne se souvient pas,

998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q28

/* Question Nombre: Q28

Question: Dans l'ensemble, à quel point est-ce que les dernières élections présidentielles de 2010 étaient libres et équitables?

Variable Label: Liberté et équitabilité des élections de 2010

Values: 1-4, 8, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels:

4=Entièrement libres et équitables,

3= Libres et équitables, mais avec des petits problèmes,

2=Libres et équitables, mais avec des problèmes majeurs,

1=Ni libres ni équitables, 8=Je ne comprends pas la question,

9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q63PT1

/* Question Nombre: Q63PT1

Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s'attaquer?

Variable Label: Problèmes les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-
1ère réponse

Values: 0-33, 1260-1262, 9995, 9998-9999, -1

Value Labels:

0=Rien à dire/Pas de réponse, 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus,

3=Chômage, 4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits,

7=Agriculture, 8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier,

11=Transports, 12=Communication, 13=Infrastructures routières, 14=Education,

15=Logement/Habitat, 16=Electricité, 17=Eau,

18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile, 19=Autres services,

20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité,

24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique,

26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions ethniques,

27=Discrimination/Inégalité, 28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme,

29=Démocratie/Droit politique, 30=Guerre (internationale),

31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole,

33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse,

1261=La paix et la réconciliation, 1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques,

9995=Autre à préciser, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q63PT2

/* Question Nombre: Q63PT2

Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s'attaquer?

Variable Label: Problèmes les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-
2ème réponse

Values: 0-33, 1260-1262, 9995, 9998-9999, -1

Value Labels:

0=Rien à dire/Pas de réponse, 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus,

3=Chômage, 4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits,

7=Agriculture, 8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier,

11=Transports, 12=Communication, 13=Infrastructures routières, 14=Education,

15=Logement/Habitat, 16=Electricité, 17=Eau,

18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile, 19=Autres services,

20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité,

24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique,

26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions ethniques,

27=Discrimination/Inégalité, 28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme,

29=Démocratie/Droit politique, 30=Guerre (internationale),

31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole,

33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse,

1261=La paix et la réconciliation, 1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques,

9995=Autre à préciser, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q63PT3

/* Question Nombre: Q63PT3

Question: A votre avis, quels sont les problèmes les plus importants auxquels le pays fait face et auxquels le Gouvernement devrait s'attaquer?

Variable Label: Problème les plus importants à traiter par le gouvernement-3ème réponse

Values: 1-33, 1260-1262, 9995-9996, 9998-9999, -1

Value Labels: 1=Gestion économique, 2=Salaires et revenus, 3=Chômage, 4=Pauvreté/Exclusion sociale, 5=Impôts et taxes, 6=Prêts/Crédits, 7=Agriculture, 8=Insécurité alimentaire/Famine, 9=Secheresse, 10=Terre/Foncier, 11=Transports, 12=Communication, 13=Infrastructures routières, 14=Education, 15=Logement/Habitat, 16=Electricité, 17=Eau, 18=Orphélins/Enfants de la rue/Enfants sans domicile, 19=Autres services, 20=Santé, 21=SIDA, 22=Maladies/Epidemies, 23=Crime et insécurité, 24=Corruption, 25=Violence politique, 26=Instabilité politique/Divisions politiques/Tensions ethniques, 27=Discrimination/Inégalité, 28=L'approche genre/Droit de la femme, 29=Démocratie/Droit politique, 30=Gerre (internationale), 31=Guerre civile, 32=Commercialisation agricole, 33=La création de marchés, 1260=Vivant coûteuse, 1261=La paix et la réconciliation, 1262=Libération des prisonniers politiques, 9995=Autre à préciser, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q65A

/* Question Nombre: Q65A

Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: Gestion de l'économie? Variable Label: Q65a.

Gestion de l'économie: manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise

Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien, 9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q65B

/* Question Nombre: Q65B

Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: Amélioration des conditions de vie des pauvre ?

Variable Label: Améliorer les conditions de vie des pauvres: manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise

Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien, 9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q65C

/* Question Nombre: Q65C

Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: Création d'emplois? Variable Label:

Création d'emplois: manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise

Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien, 9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q65K

/* Question Nombre: Q65K

Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: Lutte contre la corruption au sein du gouvernement?

Variable Label: Lutte contre la corruption au sein du gouvernement:
manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1
Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,
9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,
-1=Manquant */

tab Q65L

/* Question Nombre: Q65L

Question: Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont le Gouvernement actuel répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: Résolution des conflits inter- communautaires violents?

Variable Label: Résolution des conflits inter-communautaires violents:

manière de réponse par le gouvernement_bonne ou mauvaise

Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,

9= Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant */

tab Q66E

/* Question Nombre: Q66E

Question: Qu'en est-il de vos autorités locales? Je ne dis pas le Gouvernement central.

Je veux dire votre Conseil municipal ou communal. Qualifier la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont votre Conseil municipal ou communal répond aux préoccupations suivantes, ou n'avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

Gestion de l'utilisation des terres?

Variable Label: Gestion des utilisations des terres par le Conseil municipal:

manière_bonne ou mauvaise Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Très mal, 2=Plutôt mal, 3=Plutôt bien, 4=Très bien,

9=Ne sais pas/N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant */

tab Q79AA_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AA-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord,

2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas,

-1=Manquant*/

tab Q79AB_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,

3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q79AC_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en

avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes?
Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes
Values: 0-4, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q79B_CDI

/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus coupables.

Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1, 3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2, 5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant*/

tab Q79C_CDI

/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs crimes.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après s'être repenties.

Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s'être repenties pour leurs crimes

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1, 3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2, 5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q84

/* Question Nombre: Q84

Question: A quelle ethnie ou groupe culturel appartenez-vous?

Variable Label: Votre ethnie ou groupe culturel

Values: 1260-1264, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1

Value Labels: 1260=Akan, 1261=Krou, 1262=Mandé du Nord, 1263=Mandé du Sud, 1264=Gur (Voltaïque) 9990="Ivoirien seulement," ou "Ne s'identifie pas en ces termes", 9995=Autre, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q89B

/* Question Nombre: Q89B

Question: De quel parti s'agit-il?

Variable Label: Quel parti?

Values: 1260-1268, 9995, 9997-9999, -1

Value Labels: 1260=Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), 1261=Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), 1262=Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), 1263=Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire (UDPCI), 1264=Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY), 1265=Mouvement des Forces d'Avenir d'Innocent (MFA), 1266=Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), 1267=Parti des sociaux démocrates (USD), 1268=Union Pour la Côte d'Ivoire (UPCI), 9995=Autre, 9997= Non applicable, 9998=A refusé de répondre, 9999=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q95A

/* Question Nombre: Q95A

Question: Pourriez-vous me dire si vous avez les éléments suivants à l'intérieur de votre maison, à l'intérieur de votre concession ou hors de votre concession:

Une source principale d'eau pour le ménage?

Variable Label: Existence d'une source d'eau pour le ménage

Values: 1-3, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=A l'intérieur de la maison, 2=A l'intérieur de la concession, 3=Hors de la concession, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q95B

/* Question Nombre: Q95B

Question: Pourriez-vous me dire si vous avez les éléments suivants à l'intérieur de votre maison, à l'intérieur de votre concession ou hors de votre concession:

Toilettes ou latrines?

Variable Label: Existence de toilettes ou latrines

Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 0=Rien, pas de latrines disponibles, 1=A l'intérieur de la maison,

2=A l'intérieur de la concession, 3=Hors de la concession, 9=Ne sait pas,

998=A refusé de répondre, -1=Manquant */

tab Q5A Q79AA_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AA-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord,

2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord, 3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas,

-1=Manquant*/

tab Q5A Q79AB_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AB-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer:

La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par le vote d'une loi d'amnistie

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,

3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q5A Q79AC_CDI

/* Question Nombre: Q79AC-CDI

Question: Depuis quelques années en Côte d'Ivoire a lieu le processus de réconciliation nationale. Êtes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les propositions suivantes ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes?

Variable Label: La réconciliation passe par une justice équitable pour toutes les parties prenantes

Values: 0-4, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=Tout à fait en désaccord, 1=En désaccord, 2=Ni en accord ni en désaccord,

3=D'accord, 4= Tout à fait d'accord, 9=Ne sait pas, -1=Manquant */

tab Q5A Q79B_CDI

/*Question Nombre: Q79B-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent bénéficier d'une amnistie générale afin de favoriser la stabilité du pays.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent répondre d'abord devant la justice avant qu'une amnistie éventuelle ne leur soit accordée s'ils sont reconnus coupables.

Variable Label: Une amnistie générale au répondre d'abord devant la justice

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1,

3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2,

5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant*/

tab Q5A Q79C_CDI

/*Question Nombre: Q79C-CDI

Question: Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion.

Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

Affirmation 1: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être jugées pour leurs crimes.

Affirmation 2: Les personnes soupçonnées de crimes doivent être pardonnées après s'être repenties.

Variable Label: Jugées au pardonnées après s'être repenties pour leurs crimes

Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1

Value Labels: 1=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1, 2=D'accord avec Affirmation 1,

3=D'accord avec Affirmation 2, 4=Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2,

5=En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et 2, 9=Ne sait pas, 998=A refusé de répondre,

-1=Manquant *

ANNEX 3

Location	Departement/ Region	Programme Name	Programme Owner	Kind of Investment	Source	Additional Information
Téhiri	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Téhiri	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Joachimkro	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	QQC	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Joachimkro	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Joachimkro	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Joachimkro	Fromager	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Goboué	Sud-Bandama	ECHOS	WCF	QQC	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Gbahiri	Sud-Bandama	ECHOS	WCF	QQC	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Dueniville	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Hamdoulaye	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Sioville	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	QQC	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Yaokro	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Yaokro	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Bleufor	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	QQC	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Kranzadougou	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Kranzadougou	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Educational	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	
Fouédougou	Moyenecavally	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/	

	avally							
Kéfiadougou	Moyenec	ECHOS	WCF	Youth	http://worldcocoafoundation.org/category/program-region/africa/			
Yaffoattie/ Akoupé	avally Agneby	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	QOC	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/89			
Moussadou gou/ Zikisso	Sud- Bandama	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	Infrast ucture	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/56			
Akoupé	Agneby	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	Educati on	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/91			
Goh	Bas	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	Infrastr ucture	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/59			
Gligbéadjì	Bas Sassandra	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	QOC	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/39			
Pacobo	Lagunes	Cocoa Horizon	Barry Callebaut	QOC	http://www.barry-callebaut.com/en/9266			
San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Quality Partner Programme	Barry Callebaut	QOC	http://www.qualitypartnerprogram.com/en/40			
Soubre	Bas Sassandra	Vision for change	Mars/ ICRAF/ CNRA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122015			
Soubre	Bas Sassandra	Vision for change	Mars/ ICRAF/ CNRA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122015			
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122013			
Agnibiekro	Moyen Comoe	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122013			
Tanda	Zanzan	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122013			
Bondoukou	Zanzan	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122013			
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QOC	http://www.hatloy.com/en/102011-122013			

Daoukro	N'zi Comoe	Fight against the swollen shot	FIRCA/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Inform and sensiblize farmers 12.2011-12.2013/ Transfer of technology 12.2011-12.2013
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Agnibilekro	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Tanda	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Bondoukou	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Daoukro	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ 2011-2012
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Agnibilekro	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Tanda	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Bondoukou	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Daoukro	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	Cargill/KDD/ANA DER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Shade trees nurseries, training on certified cocoa 2011-2012
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ

Agnibilekro	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	2011-2012 Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Tanda	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Bondoukou	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Daoukro	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	COCAF-Ivoire/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Agnibilekro	Moyen Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Tanda	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Bondoukou	Zanzan	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Daoukro	N'zi Comoe	Project certified sustainable cocoa production	SACO/ANADER	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperative members in techniques of sustainable cocoa and UTZ
Abengourou	Moyen	CLP Livelihoods Programme	WCF & 16	QQC	Hatloy et al 2012	Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014

	Comoe							
Diwo	Sud-Bandama	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
Dalola	Haut Sassandra	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
Issia	Haut Sassandra	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
Soubre	Bas Sassandra	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
Duékoué	Moyenc avally	CLP Livelhoods Programme	WCF & 16 members	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Improving farmer livelihood 2009-2014	
Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	QQC	Harløy et al 2012		Training of cooperatives in certification 2009-2012	
Kazérébéy/ Lakota	Sud-Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Adama- Kouamékro/ Lakota	Sud-Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Adama- Kouamékro/ Lakota	Sud-Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Bocanda/ Dalola	Sud-Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Téhiri/ Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Zibougao/ o/ Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	
Mahounou/ Dalola	Haut Sassandra	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestlecoc oaplan.com/school-projects/		School Project 2012	

Kéfiadougou u/Duekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2012
Fouédougou / Duekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2012
Bleufor/ Duekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2012
Kranzadougou/ Duekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2012
Sioville/ Duekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2012
Yobroueko/ Divo	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Gragbadago litié/Lakota	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Gnakpalaliti e/Lakota	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Joachimkro/ Gagnoa	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Gbahiri/ Lakota	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Goboue/ Lakota	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Koffikro-	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER,	Educati	http://www.nestleecooaplan.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013

Jerusalem/ Gagnoa				ICI & Solidaridad	on	oaplan.com/school-projects/	
Allakro/ Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Kouametro/ Gagnoa	Bas Sassandra	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Paulkro/ Gagnoa	Bas Sassandra	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Yaokro/ Dukoué	Moyenc avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Handoulay e/Dukoué	Moyenc avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2013
Guitry/ Tiégba	Sud- Bandama	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project ongoing
Zongodoug ou/Sinfra	Marahoué	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project ongoing
Yaokro/ Sinfra	Marahoué	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project ongoing
Djiboffla/ Sinfra	Marahoué	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project ongoing
Koulouan/ Bangolo	Dix-Huit Montagne	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project ongoing
Yaokouasik ro/Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educational	on	http://www.nestleecoc.com/school-projects/	School Project 2014

Amanikro/ Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	<a href="http://www.nestlecoo
oaplan.com/school-
projects/">http://www.nestlecoo oaplan.com/school- projects/	School Project 2014
Jb kro/ Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	<a href="http://www.nestlecoo
oaplan.com/school-
projects/">http://www.nestlecoo oaplan.com/school- projects/	School Project 2014
Petit Korhogo	Savanes	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	<a href="http://www.nestlecoo
oaplan.com/school-
projects/">http://www.nestlecoo oaplan.com/school- projects/	School Project 2014
Gbapleu/ Dyekoue	Dix-Huit Montagne s	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	<a href="http://www.nestlecoo
oaplan.com/school-
projects/">http://www.nestlecoo oaplan.com/school- projects/	School Project 2014
Telably/ Dyekoue	Moyenec avally	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Solidaridad	Educati on	<a href="http://www.nestlecoo
oaplan.com/school-
projects/">http://www.nestlecoo oaplan.com/school- projects/	School Project 2014
Gagnoa	Fromager	Nestle Cocoa Plan	Nestle, ANADER, ICI & Outspan	Educati on	Hatloy et al 2012	Training of cooperatives in certification 2009-2012
Bida/ San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012
Brouko/ San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012
Gniti- Caillou/ San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012
Payé/ San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012
Boigny kro/ San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012
Belleville/ Daloa	Haut Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastr ucture	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010- 2012

Bali/ Daloa	Haut Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastructure	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010-2012
Yokroéa/ Daloa	Haut Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastructure	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010-2012
Bouassakou a Mékro/ Daloa	Haut Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastructure	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010-2012
Kouassikro- Bédiala/ Daloa	Haut Sassandra	Improving lives of 10 cocoa communities in San Pedro and Daloa	Cargill, Cake, ANADER	Infrastructure	Hatloy et al 2012	Supporting basic social services 2010-2012
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	Certification cooperation	Blommer, ANADER, Outspan and OLAM	QQC	Hatloy et al 2013	Teaching good farming practices 2010-2014/15
Akoupé	Agneby	Certification cooperation	Blommer, ANADER, Outspan and OLAM	QQC	Hatloy et al 2014	Teaching good farming practices 2010-2014/16
Yakasse Attobrou	Agneby	Certification cooperation	Blommer, ANADER, Outspan and OLAM	QQC	Hatloy et al 2015	Teaching good farming practices 2010-2014/17
Aboisso	Sud Comoe	Certification cooperation	Blommer, ANADER, Outspan and OLAM	QQC	Hatloy et al 2016	Teaching good farming practices 2010-2014/18
Daloa	Haut Sassandra	SSAB	GIZ	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager	
Zuénoula	Marahoue	SSAB	GIZ	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager	
Bouaflé	Marahoue	SSAB	GIZ	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager	
Vavoua	Marahoue	SSAB	GIZ	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager	

Oumè	Fromager	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Man	Dix-Huit Montagne	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Duékoué	Moyenc avally	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Guiglo	Moyenc avally	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Bangolo	Dix-Huit Montagne	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Abengourou	Moyen Comoe	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Agnibilekro	Moyen Comoe	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Bongouanou	N'zi Comoe	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Divo	Sud- Bandama	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Soubre	Bas Sassandra	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Sassandra	Bas Sassandra	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Gagnoa	Fromager	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
San Pedro	Bas Sassandra	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Soubre	Bas Sassandra	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Tiassalé	Lagunes	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Adzopé	Agneby	SSAB	GIZ	on	Educational	List by SSAB Programme Manager

Aboisso	Sud Comoé	SSAB	GIZ	Educati on	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Yakasse Attobrou	Agneby	SSAB	GIZ	Educati on	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Yamoussou kro	Lacs	SSAB	GIZ	Educati on	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Bouaké	Vallee du Bandama	SSAB	GIZ	Educati on	List by SSAB Programme Manager
Toumodi	Lacs	SSAB	GIZ	Educati on	List by SSAB Programme Manager