

Party-union ties: 60 years of decline?

*A comparative study of personnel ties between trade unions
and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany,
1957-2017*

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Abstract

For some time now it has been argued that the traditionally strong ties between social democratic parties and trade unions are weakening. There is, however, limited research on the unorganized, individual part of the relationship. The aim of this study is to fill some of this knowledge gap. The thesis is a comparative case study of the development in personnel ties in Norway and Germany from 1957-2017. The parliamentary representatives that hold or have held positions in a trade union during four parliamentary periods have been mapped. The primary data source is literary biographies. The data utilized is a combination of already existing data and completely new data collected specifically for this study. The analysis of the data shows that there has been and still are personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany. These ties have declined since the 1950s, but the pace of this decline has been different in the two countries. The ties in Germany have declined gradually (strong-medium-weak), while the ties in Norway started off as medium strong, following an upsurge to strong ties in 1997, before a drastic decrease in 2013. It is also evident that the personnel ties are declining in accordance with other kinds of ties. However, there is variation between different ties that call for further investigation.

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All mistakes and inaccuracies remain my own.

Anne Høyer

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1 Introduction

A common view in scholarly literature is that the relationship between parties and interest groups shapes the nature of democratic governance (Thomas 2001:1). Research on the party-interest group relationship is thus key to understanding power relations in democratic countries. For some time now, scholars have argued that the ties between interest groups and parties have become weaker (Padgett and Paterson 1991; Allern and Bale 2012; Kirchheimer 1966). The traditionally strong ties between social democratic parties and trade unions are among the ties that are weakening (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). However, the trend is not uniform, and empirical studies show variation across countries. This variation is most evident in more organized forms of contact tying the party and unions together. For instance, it is widely known that many social democratic parties and unions meet regularly in joint committees such as the German *Gewerkschaftsrat* or the Norwegian Cooperation Committee. These are organized arenas where the politicians and unionists exchange information and discuss relevant issues. There are also party-union contact that is not based on such organized settings or formal rules. For instance, politicians who have overlapping official positions in both trade union and party. These are most likely influential ties, however, there is less knowledge about such unorganized ties. These ties are also part of the relationship that is key to understanding democratic governance, and as such, it is important to untangle these networks of people sitting with two hats at the same time.

First of all, considering that there is little knowledge and data about the unorganized ties, it is essential to start the mapping the actual existence of these ties. Second, it is necessary to uncover if the weakening found in more organized ties is evident in all kinds of ties, also unorganized ties. Third, it is time to explore how these ties are developing compared to other more organized ties. The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the relationship between social democratic parties and trade unions by examining the unorganized side of the relationship. Systematic research and comparison of these ties could help to better understand and explain the development of the party-union relationship as a whole. Moreover, comparison of how the ties differ in strength and character across countries and over time can possibly provide new answers and perspectives. Thus, the general research question in this thesis is: *To what extent are there personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany, and how have these ties developed over time?*

1.2 Background

At the beginning of the twentieth century, close relationships between parties and interest groups became widespread (Duverger 1990). Some of the best examples were found in Europe, where the social democratic parties and unions had established strong ties to unions (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). These relationships surfaced with the expansion of democratic rights. Moreover, the social democratic parties and trade unions were part of the labour movement that emerged as a reaction to an elite driven political sphere, where cadre parties dominated. Following the expansion of political rights, the public engaged and gathered based on common interests and social background. Duverger (1990) argues that this led to the development of mass-parties and for the social democratic parties this led to the establishment of strong ties to the unions. However, during the second half of the 20th century, the ties were claimed to have weakened, due to changes in the economy and electorate. Social democratic parties were forced to look for new members and supporters through ‘catch all-strategies’ (Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995). Exclusive ties with unions became less useful because ‘target voters’ did not necessarily belong to the unions anymore. Due to the general decline of common political interests the parties and unions adapted by loosening mutual ties. In 1995, Katz and Mair presented a new party hypothesis that supports the theory of detachment between parties and interest groups. They claim that parties are becoming brokers between civil society and the state, rather than agents of civil society (1995:14). Moreover, parties are becoming part of the state apparatus itself, organized in cartels. These new parties share a mutual interest for organizational survival, which changes the general competition between parties, as well as the relevance and role of interest groups.

Several scholars agree about a weakening of ties and observe empirically that there is a trend of decline in the ties between most parties and interest groups (Thomas 2001; Allern and Bale 2012; Allern 2010; Padgett and Paterson 1991). However, the trend is not uniform and it is by no means clear how strong the decline actually is. For instance, in the early 1990s Padgett and Paterson (1991:220–221) stressed that the pace of change in party-union relationships seemed to differ across country borders. Sundberg (2001:11) concluded that the ties in the Nordic region had deteriorated at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thomas (2001) nuanced this finding by discovering a decline in the party-union ties in democracies that have

had strong left-wing governing parties (e.g. Britain and Sweden). Allern and Bale (2012:105–106) conclude that the overall picture is one of decline, but that there are still unanswered questions about how parties and interest groups are linked. Existing research seems to focus on the organized ties and whether these ties have become weaker. There is, in contrast, limited empirical research about the unorganized ties (Allern 2010:52). The separation between the social democratic parties and the unions is not necessarily as evident at the individual level. By widening the scope and comparing two countries that have traditionally strong, but somewhat different party-union ties, I seek to shed light on the individual level and study ties that are less organized.

1.2 Research question, design and data

This thesis is a comparative case study where a part of the unorganized party-union ties (personnel ties) is examined and compared over time in Norway and Germany. The unit of analysis is limited to the party side and the parliamentary groups from the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, Ap) and the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). One of the reasons for studying the parliamentary groups is that prior research about personnel ties, materialized as the MPs (Members of Parliament) trade union background, is limited. An in-depth study of the parliamentary groups is thus interesting because these groups are not an organizational entity per se, but elected individuals meeting in parliament for four years. It is indisputable that these individuals have power and influence, and often other, additional positions in the party organisation. Another reason is the lack of available data. It has been difficult to access information about the party organisation as a whole, especially in Germany. To get similar data (biographies) from the same time periods in Norway and Germany, the parliamentary groups were the most feasible entity to study and compare. Thus, I will not be studying the LO-organisation or other kinds of ties such as financial support or ideological affinity. Nor will I direct much attention towards explaining factors. This is to limit the scope of the thesis and make leeway for discussions of the findings at the end. Still, the comparison of two cases will certainly illuminate some of the factors shaping the relationship and thus I will discuss this briefly in the final chapters.

The starting point of this thesis is the ‘common truth’ about the weakening of party-union ties in the 1960s. Since there is limited research on the development of the unorganized individual side of this relation I am questioning how the personnel ties have developed. The overarching research question entails a study of to what extent there are personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany over time. Based on this mapping I seek to examine if a decline is evident over time, if the ties have developed differently in the two countries and lastly to compare the personnel ties with other kinds of ties. This can be summarized in three integral research questions:

1. *Have the personnel ties in Norway and Germany declined since 1957?*
2. *Have the personnel ties developed differently in the two countries?*
3. *Is the development of the personnel ties coherent with the development of more organized ties?*

To answer these questions, I will map the parliamentary representatives that hold or have held positions in a trade union or a trade union confederation during four parliamentary periods. The focus is on the traditional Ap and SPD allies; German Confederation of Trade Unions, DGB, and its unions, and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, LO, and its unions. I am not aiming to map the profile of the different MPs, but rather count how many of the representatives who have a trade union background. The Norwegian data is from NSD (Norwegian Social Science data service)¹, but coded by me. I have collected the German data by systematically reading through CVs and biographies of the parliamentary representatives. The main source in both countries is biographies. To make the data as comparable as possible, I have coded the data by following the same coding principals in both cases. I will use a framework developed by Allern (2010) to evaluate the strength of the ties and compare the strength over time and between the two countries. I will also compare the findings in this thesis with the development in more organizational ties. The thesis will thus contain three comparative stages. The first stage is a comparison of the developments of the personnel ties over time within each country. The second stage is a comparison of the development of the personnel ties between the two countries. The last stage is part of the discussion chapter and will include a comparison of trends in different kinds of ties over time. This will be based on

¹ (Some of) the data used in this publication are based on Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) Politician Archive 1945 dd. The material is available by Stortinget and facilitated by NSD. Neither Stortinget nor NSD are responsible for the analysis of data or interpretations presented here.

secondary literature that I will review in chapter three. The last stage is meant to place the personnel ties in the broader party-union development and see if and how the findings are coherent with the general party-union trends. Moreover, by comparing the different ties in the two countries it is possible to attain more insight to the relation between different ties.

The reason for choosing Norway and Germany is first of all that both countries have had strong party-union ties that have declined since the 1960s (Allern 2010; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007; Padgett and Paterson 1991; Kirchheimer 1966). Both cases are therefore interesting when studying the decline of unorganized ties over time. Secondly, the ties have differed in strength and type. In Norway, organized ties such as recommended collective affiliation (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:614) have been more apparent than perhaps other kinds of ties. Still, less organized ties such as personnel ties have also existed, but there is limited empirical knowledge about the variation and strength of these ties (Allern 2010:52). In Germany the unorganized ties on the individual level have been perceived as dominant, but, as in Norway, there is limited knowledge about strength and variation over time (Allern 2010; Allern and Bale 2012; Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009). Overall, there is limited empirical information about exactly how the ties have developed and how strong they actually are in both countries. This prompts several questions about the pace, extent and degree of decline in the unorganized ties, as well as questions about the development of these ties compared to other kinds of ties. I will argue that the mapping and comparison of unorganized ties in Norway and Germany unravels a party-union landscape there is little knowledge about.

1.3 Rationale for conducting this study

The main reason for conducting this study is that there is a lack of information on personnel party-union ties. To fully understand the existence, strength and development of the party-union ties, the individual level must be included. Moreover, research on these ties is important because parties and unions have been, and still are, essential parts of the democratization process in most European countries. Studying the personnel party-union ties might provide new insight about how parties and trade unions involve and represent civil society in democratic processes. The potential of this specific thesis is that it will, by mapping and comparing personnel ties, extract and systematize essential knowledge about

the social democratic parties' connection to trade unions. This could provide a better understanding of the actual existence of party-union elite networks. It may possibly uncover whether a trade union background is weighed in as nomination criteria to parliament. Thus, the thesis is a contribution to the party literature about party-interest group ties, as well as a contribution to the literature about democratic processes such as recruitment to parliament.

1.4 Thesis outline

The thesis is divided into six chapters following this introduction chapter. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature and theory about the development of party-union ties. The overview is meant to give an understanding of the relationship, and give basis for some expectations that will be derived in the next chapter. The third chapter will comprise overviews of the two cases studied, in light of the literature presented in chapter 2. Moreover, I will describe the historical development of the party-union relationship in Norway and Germany and review the secondary literature documenting existent ties in the two countries. Based on the theories from chapter 2 and the historic and empirical review in chapter 3, I will outline some expectations. Chapter 4 includes the research design. The method and data will be presented, as well as the analytical framework used to assess the strength of the ties. In the fifth chapter the data will be presented, analysed and compared. The personnel ties will be analysed within each country over time, and the developments will be compared between the two countries. The expectations presented in chapter 4 will be discussed in light of the findings. In the sixth chapter developments of the personnel ties will be compared with other ties in each country. This is to examine if the different ties are developing consistently, and further, to get better insight into the relation between different ties. This comparative design also provides leeway for some reflections about what factors may explain the extent and the development of this relationship. In chapter seven the findings will be summarized and discussed further. This final chapter will also include an outlook to future research.

2 General literature review

In this section I will present an overview of the main theories and empirical studies about the development and trends of the party-union ties. The starting point of this review is the introduction of social democracy and Duverger's *mass party model* (1990; 1959). With the expansion of political rights the new mass party developed during the 20th century. Since the 1960s, several scholars have challenged Duverger's mass party hypothesis and developed new models describing and explaining change and decline. The first section of this chapter will be based on scholarly works within the party-literature, mainly focusing on the contributions from Duverger, Kirchheimer (1966) and Katz and Mair (1995). In the second section of the chapter I will briefly present different conceptualisations and further review the empirical research examining the scholar's theories. Because it is the social democratic party's parliamentary groups that are studied, this section will also include an overview of the recruitment literature of MPs.

Based on the theories and general empirical review in this chapter it is possible to draw some expectations about the development of the party-union ties. However, these expectations will not be presented until the end of chapter 3 (section 3.4). The reason is that it is essential to narrow the scope and expectations to the two cases that will be studied. Thus, the expectations will be based on general theories and trends presented in this chapter, and on the historic and empirical review of the actual ties in Norway and Germany presented in chapter three. Before turning to the broader literature I will distinguish and define the organizations and social democratic parties studied in this thesis.

2.1 Parties and interest groups

The development of parties is closely linked to the emergence of parliamentary government and universal suffrage (Scarow 2006:6). The advance of parties are often seen in connection with the growing need for organization against strong governments, and the seeking of votes in mass electorates (Allern and Bale 2012:8). From the nineteenth century, parties were shaped based on their role in democracy; representing civil society, ensuring responsible governance and implementing policy change. This made many refer to parties as

“gatekeepers” to political power (ibid). Since parties and interest groups are seen as the intermediaries in democracies, the differences between them are not always easy to grasp. They both aggregate individual interests and preferences into collective demands, they seek to influence public policy, and, in one way or the other, they exclude entities such as completely unorganized groups (Allern and Bale 2012:9–10). What makes a party unique is the combination of interests and that they are oriented toward elections (Pomper 1992:145). This can be seen as the feature that separates parties from other groups. When giving a party-definition Pomper (1992:145) refers to Epstein, who includes this electoral element: “Any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given label”.

In contrast, interest groups are organizations of individuals or sub-groups that are usually also formally organized, but only attempts to influence public policy from the outside (Thomas 2001:7–8). Interest groups cover wide-ranging distinctive group categories and their attempts on influencing related public policy are led by people who do not seek office (Allern and Bale 2012:10). Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the difference between parties and interest groups are somewhat blurry. It is both dependent on what kind of interest group it is and what its function is compared to the party. A clear-cut distinction between the two is demanding, especially between the social democratic parties and trade unions that traditionally have had very close ties. I will make this distinction a bit clearer by taking a closer look at the founding and development of social democratic parties. This is necessary to study the strength of the relationship and examine why the two have been tied together.

2.1.1 Social democratic parties

Social democratic parties arose as a response to the European industrialisation and the increasing numbers of industrial workers. These workers where in a way the ‘denizens’ of capitalism and shared a common experience of powerlessness and exploitation (Padgett and Paterson 1991:3). As a response to this shared sentiment they gathered in new parties; “...social democrats formed mass membership parties, disciplined and hierarchical, almost military in organisation” (Padgett and Paterson 1991:3–4). They reflected a new class solidarity that made way for the founding of socialist ideas in the political realm. Across Europe, many parties where established and inspired by Marxist ideas and the German SPD

is often seen as the cradle of ‘Marxian’ social democracy (Padgett and Paterson 1991:4–5). These parties were characterised by their appeal to a similar electorate (mostly working class), combining internal democracy, leader autonomy and a cohesive mass membership (Duverger 1990; Padgett and Paterson 1991). The parties’ biggest strength was their ability to mobilize the working class. The development of social democracy was different across Europe and mostly dependent on the growth of industrial capitalism and the associated working class (ibid). The merge between socialism and labour that took place in most northern European countries did not occur in countries such as Italy. The northern European parties had a more clear sense of their purpose and became geared to convert their mass-membership to electoral majorities. The trade unions were an important ally in securing an electoral majority, in addition to securing the worker’s rights.

2.1.2 Trade unions

According to Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013:2) quoting Webb and Webb, trade unions are continuous associations of wage-earners aiming on maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment. Trade unions’ function is to comprise mutual insurance, meaning providing financial benefits when members face hardship, collective bargaining, and legal enactment, referring to pressure for favorable government action (ibid). Moreover, trade unions are mainly known as associations of workers from a particular trade, industry, company or institution seeking to ensure that earnings and conditions are governed by rules applied consistently across their membership base (Allern and Bale 2014:3). Some unions are also professional associations and have political and social aims, beyond for example the bargaining of wages (ibid). In this thesis the focus is on union confederations that have traditionally been allies with the social democratic parties in Norway and Germany: The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen, LO) and the Confederation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), respectively. In Norway, LO is the main confederation gathering 24 different unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge 2015). In Germany, most labour unions are represented by the DGP. During the 1990s it was claimed that they represented 85 per cent of the 10 million unionized workers (Gellner and Robertson 2001:105).

Because the unit of analysis in this thesis is the party I have kept this section short. Additional necessary information about the unions will be included in the case description and method chapter. In the next section the attention will be directed towards the actual relationship studied and the theories about the development of the party-union ties.

2.2 Introducing the mass party

At the beginning of the 1950s, Duverger (1990:42) argued that political parties had changed from *cadre parties* to *mass parties*. Until political rights were expanded, the parties were based on closed off structures for the few and fortunate, gathered in so-called cadres. Duverger stressed that the party-change from cadre to mass parties was a gradual process and that voting rights did not lead to mass parties right away (Duverger 1990:43–44). The socialist mass parties played a central role in this process. The parties emerged outside national assemblies and were often based on trade union movements (Duverger 1972:24–27,17,75). Thus, when the workers got democratic rights, both trade unions and new socialist parties thrived. The transformation was apparent in the party structure and among the public. People were more involved and a “...distinctive feature of the mass parties was their relationship with organizations in civil society” (Allern 2010:35). Prime examples of such relations were found in the northern European social democracies where close relations between the social democratic parties and the labour movement were a known characteristic. The parties and unions were part of the same labour movement, and seen as divided into two wings: One wing operated in the economic sphere (trade unions) and one operated in the political sphere (social democratic parties) (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:607). The relationship between the two wings was based on a division of labour where the parties pursued the politics of state while the unions conducted the politics of civil society (Upchurch et al. 2009:2; Allern et al. 2007:607). In most European countries the two wings were closely connected from the founding and the relationship grew stronger through collective membership and financing.

Duvergers hypothesis about the mass party is closely connected to the developments in Germany and the SPD. The scholar uses SPD and the financial ties with the union, as an example supporting his argument about the rise of a new mass party (Duverger 1990:44). Around the outbreak of the First World War the SPD had more than one million members

and an annual budget of nearly two million marks. In order to put up independent working-class candidates at elections it was necessary to become independent of capitalist financing and this was only possible with collective financing, through for example union membership (Duverger 1990:44–45). Thus, the mass parties leaned on a broader, paying public, not the wealthy elite. Financing was a significant factor in the development towards a mass party and this financial linking between the party and union has continued for decades. Still, this will not be studied in this thesis, but is meant to illustrate how extensive the ties were and still are. In this thesis the focus will be on contact between the two organisations.

Duverger was among the first scholars who studied the party-union relationship in Europe comparatively and empirically. Following Duverger, several scholars have also centred their studies in Europe, for instance Kitschelt (1994). The scholar groups European countries together based on the character and strength of the party-interest group ties (1994:225). He distinguishes between: Britain and Austria, Sweden and Germany, and France, Spain and Italy. He argued that Sweden and Germany represented an intermediate pattern, while in predominantly Catholic countries such as Italy and France, trade unions was less strongly linked with political parties (Padgett and Paterson 1991:184). In the Scandinavian countries the trade union movements were strong, with little fragmentation. “In practice, the weight of the unions in Scandinavia, financially and in terms of membership, apparently approximated that of the British unions.” (Allern 2010:36). The German ties were not formally established in the party structure, but rather based on personnel overlaps and transfers (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009; Padgett and Paterson 1991). These ties are described as very close. Thus, Ap and SPD were founded in the cradle of social democracy and were both characterized as typical mass parties with close ties to the unions during the 1950s (Lees 2005:14–149; Allern and Heidar 2001:109).

2.3 New catch-all strategies challenge the relationship

During the second half of the twentieth century a weakening of party-union ties was seen in most European countries (Kirchheimer 1966:192–194; Katz and Mair 1995:13–15; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2010:2–3). The decline was considered to be a result of deteriorating cleavages and changes in the economy and in the electorate. Societies were getting more pluralist and this affected the party-union membership base and the party-union ties. After the

Second World War, industrialized economies shifted and became increasingly based on the service sector. This entailed a more extensive and pluralist middle class and a reduction of the more traditional manual working class. The changes resulted in trade union density and the traditional blue-collar unions organized less of the workforce than they used to (Howell 2001:16–18; Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009). This overall fragmentation made the unions less attractive for social democratic parties and vice versa.

During this period the parties changed. Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all party thesis (1966) is based on the parties' new strategies during this period. The changes were, according to Kitschelt (1994:8–39), especially challenging for the social democratic parties. It required a reform of the parties' strategies and relations with unions. The working class they emerged from had changed, new competition surfaced and voters moved on. In other words, exclusive ties with unions became less useful because 'target voters' did not necessarily belong to the unions anymore. Consequently, the social democratic parties started to look for new members and supporters through 'catch all-strategies' (Kirchheimer 1966:184–194; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:610). The unions, however, no longer wanted to put all their cards in one basket - on one party. This reflects the cost-benefit considerations on both sides that affect the relationship. Howell (2001) argues that close party-union ties rest on two bargains: one political and one economic. "Social democratic parties and labour movements must broadly represent the same groups of people, and they must have something concrete to offer each other..." (Howell 2001:32). Thus, due to the general decline of common political and economic interests during the 1960s, the parties and unions adapted by loosening mutual ties.

2.4 Ties replaced by cartels?

Katz and Mair (1995) take the catch-all theory one step further when describing the detachment in the party-union relationship. The two scholars consider the mass party and catch-all models as different stages in a continuing process of party development where interests are changing and old relationships are replaced by new ones (Katz and Mair 1995:6–8). The two scholars' claim that parties are becoming a part of the state apparatus to secure their survival in a pluralist and changing environment (Katz and Mair 1995:12–15). Based on empirical studies in established West European countries they describe a new party that is not dependent on interest groups such as trade unions. The parties share a mutual interest for

organizational survival that change and restrains the competition between them. State financing and ideological convergence are factors that bind parties together and make the trade unions more superficial. The two scholars also underline that parties are becoming partnerships of professionals, not associations of, or for, the citizens - of or for the working class. This development is perceived as causing the leadership in particular, and parties in general, to form elites that control and run state-affairs. This setting is ideal for the formation of cartels “in which all parties share in resources and in which all survive” (Katz and Mair 1995:16). This implies that the party-union ties are not as beneficial as they used to be. The parties do not need the unions – they need each other and the state.

The party models presented are examples of broad theories comprising many aspects of the party-development. Kirchheimer and Katz and Mair worked partly inductive when developing their theories. The cartel party theory is based on empirical studies in Western European countries, but still known as a theory that generates hypotheses about the cartel party. Kirchheimer never presented systematic data across countries, even though he described a general declining trend across Europe (Allern and Bale 2012:14). Thus, there is no clear-cut line between theory and empirical findings in this field of research. A common challenge that researchers are facing when studying the party-union ties is thus to place themselves and their study in the landscape between empirical work and theory. It is also rather difficult to determine exactly how and what to study, based on these theories. Before turning to empirical studies on the party-union ties it is necessary to outline the terms and concepts used within this field of research.

2.5 A common understanding?

What a party-interest group relationship actually constitutes depends on how the scholar perceives and further defines the relationship. There are few established definitions and measures of ties, which has, to some extent, limited the common ground when studying the relationships. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish different concepts. The following section is meant to enhance a better understanding of the party union landscape and identify the focus of this thesis. Allern and Bale’s (2012:13) table of different studies and conceptualizations is a suitable starting point.

Table 1: Conceptualization

Examples	Contact	Material	Ideology	Strategical	Power balance
Ties/ Relations	Collective membership, liaison committee, ad-hoc meetings, leadership overlap	Financial donations, transfer of label, shared resource pools	Degrees of ideological affinity	Competitions, co-option, cooperation, etc.	Independence, group dependence, party dependence
Studies	Duverger (1954) Kirchheimer (1966) von Beyme (1985) Thomas (2001) Poguntke (2002) Sunberg (2003) Allern et al (2007) Allern (2010) Rasmussen and Lindeboom (2013)	Kvavik (1976) Wilson (1990) Yishai (2001) Sundberg (2003)	Thomas (2001) Yishai (2001) Poguntke (2006)	Thomas (2001) Schwartz (2005) Verge (2012)	Duverger (1968) Kitschelt (1994) Mavrogordatos (2009)

Source: (Allern and Bale 2012:13).

*Some studies, such as Sundberg (2003) and Thomas (2001), combine the different understandings.

In table 1, there are several terms and concepts referring to the party-union ties. It is necessary to sort out these different ties because the actual conceptualization is a crucial step when investigating party-union ties empirically. It is necessary to know exactly what is studied to determine which theoretical aspects are relevant.

When it comes to conceptualization, most studies are steered by the research question. It often depends on what part of the relationship the scholar wants to study. It could also be determined by what the scholar assess as important or dominant, or it might boil down to the simple fact that different scholars have different understandings of the term relation. Kitschelt (1994:225) claim that trade union control of leadership appointments is key when describing the social democratic parties' ties to trade unions. Others focus on financial transfers, collective membership or ideological dimensions (Allern and Bale 2012:11). How to assess the strength or existence of actual party-union ties is just as debatable as the actual development of the ties. In other words, there are many ways to go about when studying

party-union ties. This variation is also seen in the different terms used about the relationship. For instance, the literature about parties and interest groups show that there are many labels on the party-union relationship. ‘Interlinked’, ‘links’, ‘connected’ and so forth are examples of the variety of terms used (Allern, 2010:55). In this thesis the term *tie* is used about the party-union relation. Tie refers to how the party and unions are linked together and will be used consistently throughout the thesis.

Most of the ties that will be described in the following section are within the *contact* category. This is mainly because research on party-union ties is within this category. The focus of this thesis is also within the contact category - on the unorganized, individual part of the party-union relation. Moreover, in this thesis the *party-union ties are seen as those means by which the social democratic parties and trade unions may communicate* (Allern 2010:57). Such means range from corporate membership, joint committees to elite contact, transfers and overlaps. Further conceptualizations of the ties studied in this thesis will be included in chapter 3. In the next section I will present a wide range of different ties studied. The main focus will be on the general empirical findings.

2.5.1 An overall decline?

A central part of the transformation of European Social Democracy in the period since the end of the 1970s has been a change in the relationship between Left parties and organized labour. The relationship between what were once considered the political and industrial wings of the same movement has, almost without exception, weakened and soured (Howell 2001:7).

Several scholars confirm this notion and observe that there is a general trend of decline between most parties and interest groups (Thomas 2001; Allern and Bale 2012). The British Labour party, famous for its close union-relations, is by many perceived as a prime example of this overall decline in Europe (Allern and Bale 2012:14). During the 1990s Padget and Paterson (1991:220–222) stressed that the pace of change in party-union relationships seemed to differ across country borders. Thomas (2001) nuanced this finding; he discovered a decline in the party-union ties in democracies that have had strong left-wing governing parties (ex. Britain and Sweden). Yet, he finds no general trend of such decline with traditionally closely tied interest groups. Streeck and Hassel (Streeck and Hassel 2003:343–344) claim that party-union ties in Western Europe have been remarkably stable in a long-term perspective.

Sundberg (2001:11) also find that ties between parties and unions have ‘slacked’ in the Nordic region. While, Allern, Aylott and Christensen (2007) find that decline is evident in Scandinavia, but that the trend has not been uniform. Compared to Denmark the ties are now stronger in Sweden and Norway. Moreover, the scholars find that “the weaker the ties were from the beginning, the more easily they have unraveled in response to environmental changes” (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:630).

The different contributions draw a picture of a general decline in the party-union ties. However, the trend is not as uniform as the party literature prescribes. Howell argue that the ties have weakened but not yet dissolved (Howell 2001:33). And, according to multiple studies the decline seems to vary in strength and pace across countries (Allern and Bale 2012; Thomas 2001). This underlines the need for more research, especially about more unexplored territory such as unorganized ties at the individual level. In this study, I will contribute to the debate by studying the personnel ties between the unions and the social democratic party’s parliamentary groups. I will map the actual existence of these ties and further compare the findings with other kinds of ties in each country. Even though there is an evident decline in the party-union ties there are country differences and little knowledge about the relation between different ties. An in-depth examination and comparison of similarities and differences in the ties, across the two countries, could tell us more about the ties and strength in general, and shed new light on what accounts for variation over time. But first, it is relevant to include some of the recruitment literature about members of Parliament (MPs).

2.5.2 Recruitment from trade union ranks

Organized parties and trade unions have a crucial role in representation, and a large part of parliamentary representatives have been, and possibly still are, drawn from within their ranks (Best and Cotta 2000:453). Recruitment and change in recruitment patterns is thus of high relevance when studying party-union ties on the individual level. Best and Cotta distinguish two processes of change in recruitment patterns: the process of democratization and the process of professionalization (2000:523–524). The recruitment of trade unionists or blue-collar workers was to a great extent connected to the democratization process. Following the introduction of democratic rights and the mass party, organized parties and trade unions gained a crucial role in representation (Best and Cotta 2000:453). However, as the

professionalization of members of Parliament (MPs) has increased, the share of representatives with trade union background may have changed. Trade union experience may have become part of the professionalized background, or been deleted as a selection criteria.

Professionalization can be interpreted in two ways (Best and Cotta 2000:334): one aspect is the increased workloads for politicians, which leads to full-time positions and politics becoming career paths, while the second aspect is the growing number of parliamentary representatives from the professional-intellectual strata. The increasing professionalization has changed the profile of politicians and the question is how this has affected the recruitment of union officials. Best and Cotta (2000:329) state that the Labour party have had a tendency to recruit parliamentarians with a background either in trade unions or as party officials. According to the scholars, this is connected partly to the organisational structure and partly to the professionalization. Thus, union elites may be seen as part of the professionalization trend. From the 1970s there was a turnaround in most European countries including Germany “...the overall increase in recruitment of party functionaries, experience in party or trade union jobs (our so-called party functionaries) has lost its influence as a factor of importance...” (Cotta and Best 2007:152). They refer to von Beyme (Beyme 1993:121) and note that despite that a considerable percentage among the prominent politicians in the 1970s had trade union roots, the impact of these organisations on political recruitment was of minor importance (Cotta and Best 2007:157).

Informal societal norms within the party are factors that influence the recruitment of MPs. Since the 1960s these criteria have changed and there are new expectations and requirements to the candidate lists in regards to for instance gender balance, education and minority representation (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014:2). Findings from Norway and Germany show that the development in the societal background of the parliamentary candidates has been somewhat similar. Women and ‘professional’ politicians are increasingly represented, as well as people with higher education (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014:18; Best and Cotta 2000:187–190). The lists over informal norms as selection criteria seem to have expanded over the years and thus union background may have more competition from other criteria. To stay within the scope of the thesis I will not specify all internal nomination criteria and recruitment norms in Ap and SPD. However, the empirical studies about such criteria and recruitment show that there is few, if none, studies focusing solemnly on trade union

background as selection criteria. Hence, the share of MPs who holds or has held an official trade union position is unknown. This thesis will hopefully fill some of this knowledge gap.

2.6 Summary

The party-union relationship has taken many forms and developed differently across countries, but the existence of the relationship is seldom debated. In accordance with the introduction of universal suffrage and the industrial revolution the old cadre parties were introduced to competition. As described by Duverger, mass parties surfaced and were founded on a strong membership base in social groups. The new parties were mostly socialist or social democratic parties, often with close relations to industrial workers organized in trade unions. The two organisations shared interests, which strengthened the ties and affiliation between the parties and unions. Still, the mass party is seen as part of one phase in a continuing process. The next stage entailed a more pluralistic society with fluctuating voters, which led to weaker party-union ties. Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis portrays new strategies to handle this change. The struggle for votes compromised the party-union ties. Katz and Mair take this argument one step further and assert that the state has become a significant actor that both parties and unions seek directly. This induces change and an overall decline in the party-union relationship.

Summarized, the party literature reviewed creates a picture of a dwindling party-union relationship, which also finds empirical support. Based on the party theories presented and general empirical review, it seems as if the general decline is becoming a common truth. However, the trend is not uniform and varies in strength and across countries. If the decline includes parliamentary representatives with union background is rather undetermined and there seems to be few studies where trade union background aggregated as personnel party-union ties is studied. The mapping in this thesis will hopefully contribute with new knowledge on the party-union decline by focusing on Norway and Germany. To examine if there is an actual decline in personnel ties it is thus necessary to include the party-union development in Norway and Germany, and further review the literature about the actual existence of ties in the two countries.

3 Norway and Germany

In this chapter the historic development of the party-union relationship in Norway and Germany will be presented. There will also be an empirical review of the literature about the existent ties in the two countries. The objective is to review the development in light of the declining trends described in the previous chapter, and accordingly, situate the two cases and the different ties. In chapter 6 I will compare the findings from the mapping with the historic development and existent ties reviewed in this chapter.

This chapter can be divided into three sections. The first section will include the major historic developments in each country. The second section will include further conceptualisation of the different ties studied and compared, and a more specific literature review of the different ties existent in the two countries. In the third section I will outline what precisely will be studied and further derive some expectations that will structure and guide the mapping and comparison in this thesis. These expectations will be based on the theoretical and empirical reviews from chapter 2, and the following chapter, including the historic development and empirical reviews of the different ties in Norway and Germany.

3.1 Ap and LO: twins from the start

In Norway, the party-union relationship formally surfaced in 1887 when the Norwegian Labour party (Ap) was founded by trade unionists in Arendal (Bull 1985:368–171). The founding of Ap was based on the fight for labour rights and the first years after the formation the party was the link between different local trade unions. Moreover, at the beginning the labour party and trade union was one organizational entity (Allern and Heidar 2001:106–107). The national trade union, LO, was established in 1899 (Bull 1985:461). One main discussion was how LO should be affiliated with Ap. Eventually, it was decided that they would continue a partnership with mutual representation at each other's governing bodies (Allern and Heidar 2001:107). This marked the start of a continuous debate about the relationship between these two organizations that has shaped the relationship ever since.

According to Maurseth (1987:47), endorsed collective membership was one of the cornerstones in the party-union relationship. Other organisational agreements also tied the two together, for instance common meetings and joint committees. The personnel overlaps were also usual among the elites, were leaders had official positions in both camps (Allern and Heidar 2001:107). During the 1920s LO and Ap was described as Siamese twins, tied together on almost all levels (Maurseth 1987:47). Despite being remarkably close there were internal disputes in the labour movement and the Labour party was divided twice during the 1920s (1921 and 1923), when the social democratic party and the communist party were founded (ibid). This did not last for long. In 1927 the three parties gathered again and the Cooperation Committee and the mutual representation with LO was again established (Allern and Heidar 2001:108). During the 1930s-1940s Ap aimed for governmental power and the party turned towards a broader working class. Whilst LOs main task was to support Ap's minority government, especially the party's economic policy during the financial crisis (Pryser 1988). After the Second World War the collective membership number was still high and relationship continued to be close (Allern and Heidar 2001:108). The party-union relationship was part of a social democratic peak during the 1950s and about 15 per cent of the members of the party's executive committee (including deputy members) were part of the LO Secretariat (Allern and Heidar 2001:123). The leadership in LO accepted the government's long-term aim of stability in the labour market and the policy of limited wage growth. The Cooperation Committee was essential to coordinate these policy positions so that they had a public united front. The 1940-50s can be characterized as a prime time for the labour party with over 40 per cent of the vote and governmental power (Allern and Heidar 2001; Bergh 1987).

The labour-wind shifted at the beginning of the 1960s and ideological differences within Ap surfaced (Nyhamar 1990). This led to a short radical wave during the 1960s and 1970s. First, when the socialist party (SF) separated and later when the Labour party (Ap) where in Government and intervned in central negotiations about wage settlements (Bergh 1987; Sundberg 2001). SF was founded six months before the 1961-election and the new party gained mandates in constituencies where Ap lost ground (Bergh 1987:328–230). After this period the settlements were left to the labour market and Ap started the revising of party principles (ibid). During this period, LO was also developing a new action program (handlingsprogram) called “program 69”, which caused ideological debates in all camps of the labour movement (Nyhamar 1990:64–69). The program was the first of its kind and was

meant to strengthen the party-union relationship. It outlined the division of labour between the party and union, where LO was responsible for tariff and income related issues, while Ap was responsible for more general political issues (Nyhamar 1990:70–71).

At the beginning of the 1970s the main political tension in Norway was about EU-membership (Nyhamar 1990). There were many internal discussions within the labour movement before both Ap and LO officially announced their support for membership. This led to the breakout of a resistance group within Ap called AIK (Nyhamar 1990:168–191). In 1972 the Norwegian majority voted no in a EU-referendum and in 1973 the Communist party, SF and the remaining fraction of AIK established a common election-list that eventually led to the new socialist party SV (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) (ibid). Despite the 1973 election disaster, Ap gained governmental power and kept it in the 1977-election. However, in 1981 the so-called Right wing wave caused a set-back for the labour movement and internal discussions about freedom and the balance between state and market arose (Nyhamar 1990:384–392, 505–510). Ap was becoming more open and started to engage in cooperation with other interest groups (Allern 2010:131). This period marked a decline in the party-union relationship, which intensified during the 1997 election. Ap's election result did not pass the 36,9 minimum threshold set by party leader Jagland and thus Ap left the governmental offices (Løset 2009). After the election the labour movement was shaken and internal debates about the party-union relationship arose. It was once again decided upon support for a close party-union relationship. At the 2002 party congress the party-union relationship was on the agenda, and the conclusion was not to weaken the existing ties but to continue the close relationship (Allern 2010:131). Prior to this the LO congress had come to the same conclusion; continue close relations with Ap.

3.2 SPD and DGB: fairly strong on the individual level

Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) was formally founded in 1875 as a fusion of a Marxist and reformist group (ADV and SAP) (Berman 1998:73). The party was founded prior to the DGB (founded in 1949), and there have not been any formal affiliation or financial agreement between the party and the union (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009; Dribbush and Birke 2012:3). Moreover, compared to the Scandinavian unions the West Germany unions guarded their autonomy (Padgett and Paterson 1991:180–181). Still, the ties

between the two organizations have been strong on the individual level through personnel overlaps and transfers (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:4). As in Norway, there was fractioning within the SPD during the 1920s. For instance, in 1917, those opposed to the war broke off from the party and formed a new party called the Independent Social Democratic party of Germany (USDP) (Berman 1998:132–133). During the post-war period the labour movement was far from united and according to Upchurch and colleagues (2009) the “events of 1919 and beyond conditioned ideological position of German social democracy and its associated model of trade unionism” (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:57). During this period the concept of economic democracy became enshrined in principles of co-determination (as an adjunct of liberal political democracy). These principles are described as part of the German model for social democratic trade unionism (ibid). For instance, co-determination gave workers the right to participate in management of the companies they worked for. Workers Councils were established and several agreements and laws secured union involvement. However, the war buried the principles, and the reestablishment of co-determination was no automatic process after the war (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:56–58). When Germany was divided after the Second World War the workers from the East were separated from the rest and this reduced a significant share of the manual working class as well as the parliamentary representatives with union background. This is referred to as one factor that led the German SPD to employ catch- all strategies to appeal to the ‘middle ground’ electorate (Howell 2001:22).

During the post-war period there were intense discussions in West Germany about the re-establishing of unions. In 1949 a compromise was made, the agreement entailed that there would be a confederation, Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB, and that there was to be 16 independent industrial unions. Hans Böckler, SPD member of the Reichstag (1928-33) and district secretary of an SPD union organization (Upchurch et al. 2009:60-63) was elected as the first Chairman of DGB. Despite discussions, a deal about co-determination was made and a form of restricted co-determination was applied in the coal and steel industries. SPD supported the principles of co-determination and imposed several amendments to this *Mitbestimmung*. For instance, in 1972 the SPD- Government allowed more organized contact between the union and Works Council and enhanced the power of the Councils themselves (Upchurch et al. 2009:62-63). These acts and amendments was part of the so-called *Modell Deutschland*, which ensured peaceful cooperation with unions through legislation, stabilized collective bargaining, and the Work Councils. The latter constrained

unions' influence at the workplace and kept the West German workers satisfied - as long as the Modell managed to deliver rising real incomes (Upchurch et al. 2009:53). This was also conditioned by a strong and thriving German economy, which was the case in Germany for several years.

Still, some economic difficulties ceased Germany during the 1960s and as a result a phase of 'Concerted Action' between the Government, employers and unions was introduced. This was to reduce wage growth as a counter inflationary measure (Upchurch et al. 2009:64-65). During this period SPD was thrown into a crisis of identity and was led to new strategies to gather votes; seeking votes beyond the traditional workers. When the Bad Godesberg programme of the SPD was presented in 1959, a redefined social democracy was put forward. Despite these new efforts, other movements challenged SPDs hegemony on the left and "the SPD no longer had a monopoly ideological hold over workers and their expectations" (Upchurch et al. 2009:65). In 1980 the West German Green party was founded and despite the SPD-strategy to win back the 'Greens' the Green party continued to be a factor that left the SPD faced with programmatic and strategic dilemmas during the 1980s. In the following decade (1990s) the Model Deutschland came to a halt and this sparked the underlying clash between capital and workers' interests. Upchurch describes this as the root to the development of a current crisis of German social democratic trade unionism (ibid). During this period the right and left wings within the party went head to head. The left wing of the SPD claimed that the welfare state was curtailed through reform programs such as the Agenda 2010, which was endorsed by right-wing social democrats in 2003. This led to "...the process of alienation between the party (represented by the leadership) and its core clientele (including trade unions)..." (Faas 2010:895). It resulted in the foundation of a new party, WASG (Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit - Die Wahlalternative) (Patton 2013:221-222). Although the WASG strove to establish itself nationwide, it was much stronger in western Germany and in June 2005, the mostly eastern party, PDS, and WASG struck a deal and the Left Party (Die Linke) was established. The labour movement was yet again split based on ideological differences and challenged from the left (Silvia and Vale 1992).

3.3 Organized and unorganized forms of contact

In chapter 2 (2.5) the party-union ties were placed within the category of contact and defined as those means by which the social democratic parties and trade unions may communicate (Allern 2010:57). Since contact is a broad term it is necessary to organize the different ties that may open up for contact. Allern (2010:59) distinguish between the following three categories of links opening up for contact between parties and unions.

1. Overlapping organizational structures (e.g. links formalised in party/union rules)
2. Inter-organizational ties (e.g. joint committees)
3. **Unorganized ties for contact (informal contact or personnel overlaps/transfers)**

When using these categories the main challenge is to capture all relevant information - all kinds of ties and contact. Since the party-union ties often are referred to in terms of formal or informal degrees of contact, there is most likely a broader field of information that might be missed by using these categories. However, the difference between what is formal and what is informal is not always sufficient and miss important qualities (Allern and Bale 2014:10). Using such broad terms might threaten the accuracy in the conceptualization, and further cause confusion in regards to what is actually studied and what the results really disclose. Thus, the categories outlined are meant to systematize actual contact in terms of organizational degree. The categories are a way of narrowing the scope and defining - as accurate as possible - the small part of the party-union relationship that will be studied in this thesis. The organizational categories can be seen as degrees of institutionalisation. In other words: "...the degree to which a structured and often highly formalized system or set of arenas in which interaction takes place exist" (Allern and Bale 2014:10). Still, degree of institutionalisation does not solemnly reflect degree of closeness or strength. Significant ties can also materialize outside well-organized settings.

Within each category there are different kinds of ties. The two categories comprising more organized ties (1,2) and include known official links such as joint committees, and less visible arrangements such as tacit (not written but de facto official) agreements about mutual representation in national decision-making bodies. These ties are also examples of ties that

are documented and that have been studied. Scholars know less about the unorganized ties of contact that is studied in this thesis.

There are two kinds of unorganized ties for contact at the individual level: unorganized meetings that are not reported but happen regularly, and personnel overlaps and transfers (Allern, 2010:59). The overlaps and transfers can be based on informal norms that are difficult to trace, but very much existent. Many overlaps and transitions may indicate that informal norms exist and that they are examples of strong party-union ties. Moreover, these ties are within the contact-category, but are not examples of direct contact between representatives. The ties refer to technical aspects such as organized or unorganized features, not substantial value in terms of political significance or influence (Allern and Bale 2014). The strength of the ties will be assessed based on actual frequency. The framework that will be used to evaluate the strength of the ties will be outlined in chapter 4. However, before the method and data will be presented it is necessary to review the empirical documentation that does exist about different ties within the three categories. In the next section I will elaborate further on the development of the relationship, focusing on the actual ties linking the party and union together.

3.4 Documented ties in Norway and Germany

In this section the secondary literature about existing ties will be presented. This is meant to give a clear understanding of the actual extent of other kinds of ties in the two countries and further be basis for the expectations outlined in the last section of this chapter. In chapter 6, the ties from the following review will be compared with the personnel ties mapped in the thesis.

3.4.1 Ap-LO ties

Despite continuous discussions in both LO and Ap, the party-union ties has been and still are, based on a broad range of ties (Allern 2010). Until 1920 Ap was linked to LO at the national level by guaranteeing leaders formal access to the party's executive bodies. The party-union relationship was thus of a strong, organized character (Allern 2010:132–133). However, since the party split during the 1920s there has been no strong tie between the party and union of an

equal character. The party-union ties in the Scandinavian countries have been described as remarkably close, yet, in the early 1970s a decline was also evident in the region (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). In Norway the first sign of decline was seen in 1969, when the rule (paragraph 14) that said that all party members ‘should’ join a LO union was relaxed (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:614). The basis for collective affiliation was thus weakened and many branches ended their affiliation to the party. In 1989 only twenty-four per cent of the party members were collectively affiliated with LO. The requirement that all party members should be members of an LO union, was suggested deleted by the internal party committee in 2000 (Allern 2010:140). However, the proposal was rejected and today the recommendation still stands; the 2013 party statutes (paragraph 13, article 5) note that if party members have access, they should register as a member of LO (Arbeiderpartiet 2013).

One of the most recent studies from Norway conclude that the party-union relationship is still fairly close (Allern 2010). In the early 2000s the relationship is even characterized by strong inter-organisational ties on the national level (Allern 2010:146). For instance, the standing joint committee (Cooperation Committee) between LO and the Ap still regularly bring together the top leaders of both organizations to discuss political and organizational issues (Allern 2010; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:615). The forum hosts discussions on a broad range of political and organizational issues concerning the two organizations. Joint conventions have also been held regularly, and from time to time there have been established temporary sub-committees. Ap even has special written agreements with some of the unions organized under LO. In addition, LO and its individual unions are always invited to Ap’s party congress and conference (Allern 2010:135). It is tradition for the LO chair to formally address the biannual party congress in plenum and the LO-leader usually chairs the internal election committee in Ap and joint conventions are held regularly². When Labour is in Government the joint Committee invites ministers and state secretaries to report on political issues and discuss the union leaders views on relevant issues (Allern 2010:134). The party leader and the secretary also attend the meetings of LO’s general council (without formal right to speak) (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2010:7). Even though the Ap manifesto is not on the Cooperation Committee’s agenda (formally autonomous) at least one LO representative is by common practice a member of Ap’s manifesto Committee (Allern

² This practice was Suspended in 2007, but this was most likely due to special circumstances around the resignation of the Chair (Valla) because of her conflict with an LO employee (Allern 2010:36).

2010:136). Thus, there are plenty of common practices and rules at the organizational level that continue to tie Ap and LO together.

There have not been any formal rules of reciprocal representation between Ap and LO since the 1920s (Allern and Heidar 2001:122). Still, in 2000 39 per cent of the Ap congress delegates were former or current officials in LO or other LO unions (Heidar and Saglie 2003:279). The trade union movement has given Ap many activists and leaders during the years. According to Allern (2010:140) informal rules still dictate that LO and its unions should be represented in the party's executive committee. A survey conducted in 2003/2004 maps the Ap elite's overlaps and transfers outside parliament (Allern 2010:139). It shows that more than 20 per cent of the party's top elite holds or have held positions in LO. More precisely, when the survey was conducted 14 per cent of Ap's elite were currently officials in LO or LO unions locally or nationally. 19 per cent had been LO union officials before they were elected to the party's national executive. When taking into account elite members who were, or had been union staff, the total share of elite members with current (2003/2004) or former trade union positions was almost 40 per cent (Allern, 2010:140).

The actual contact between Ap and LO outside formal committees and forums has also been examined. More than 70 per cent of the respondents had contact with LO and LO unions monthly or more (Allern, 2010:142). Almost 30 per cent had contact on a weekly basis. In addition, the study uncovers that Ap's executive members and national political advisors also had contact with union representatives independently of official meetings. Thus, the Norwegian Ap seems to continue close ties with LO outside organized settings. Still, in 2007 the elite level of the party-union relationship was strained (Allern 2010:282). This was partly due to LO-chair Gerd Liv Valla's public critique of the Government coalition's (Ap included) policy on several issues, and partly due to internal disputes in LO that ended in Valla's resignation. This illustrates the fluctuation in the relationship. The overall picture is one of decline, however, empirical studies of different ties have also shown that the ties are still very much present, especially through informal rules and contact. There is little knowledge about how the party-union ties have developed since Valla resigned. There is thus a need for further inquiries on the actual strength and variation over time in unorganized ties.

3.4.2 SPD-DGB ties

There are few studies mapping the actual party-union ties in Germany. Allern and Bale (forthcoming) are in the process of mapping the existent ties and thus this chapter will review some of the preliminary findings from their studies. The two scholars find that there are some enduring links at the organisational level connecting DGP to SPD's central organisations³. These links are tacit agreements about one-sided/mutual representation in national decision-making bodies and regular meetings between party and confederation. Moreover, the German DGB is reported to have ex officio representation in the SPD's national council and actual formal rights to send delegates to the party congress (Allern and Bale forthcoming). They also discover that there are agreements about temporary joint committees in policy issues. Jacobey and Behrens (2014) support these findings and argue that the party-union ties remains intact in Germany. For instance, despite disputes over major labour market and pension reforms by the SPD government in the early 2000s, the unions and SPD avoided a clear break: they sustained joint committees, such as the *Gewerkschaftsrat*.

More unorganized ties on the individual level has been seen as the most evident ties in Germany (Padgett and Paterson 1991; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013; Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009). Almost three fourths of the SPD Bundestag representatives were members of the DGB at the beginning of the twentieth century (Gellner and Robertson 2001:112). There has been an overlap between union membership and the party electorate for a long time (Padgett and Paterson 1991:181–182). Such personnel links are also evident on the parliamentarians and minister level. For instance, in 1924 about 50 per cent of the German Socialist MPs had previously been appointed in leading positions in the party's administration or in related organisations, such as trade unions (Cotta and Best 2007:145). Another example is from 2012 when the SPD made Guntram Schneider, the long-time state-level president of the DGB union confederation, its Labour Minister. In addition, in 2013 the SPD nominated Klaus Wiese­hügel, president of the construction workers union (IG BAU), as Labour Minister in its shadow cabinet and “In doing so, the SPD is renewing an old tradition whereby this position is to be occupied by a representative of its major ally, the unions” (Jacobey and Behrens 2014:2).

³ The scholars have asked both confederation and party about the existence of every kind of ties and created a data set of dichotomous links (Allern and Bale Forthcoming 13). The data is also supplied by information from the party statutes and from key informants.

During the 1970s the DGB became a more authoritative institution, respected by most political actors and organisations. Still, the member unions continued to exercise autonomy in for instance wage bargaining. Padgett and Paterson (1991:181) describe DGB as a supra-partisan union, independent of the SPD. This entailed that the union did not support the party financially nor did they campaign openly for the party. This stems mostly from the need to accommodate the non-socialist elements within the union (ibid). However, according to Jacobey and Behrens at the end of the 1990s the DGB also campaigned for the SPD (2014:6) which is a newer practice from the union. Despite this formal distance the DGB and the SPD have maintained close informal alignment and “Trade union leaders have occupied positions in the party elite and have not been slow to involve themselves fully in internal party life” (Padgett and Paterson 1991:181). A significant amount of union members has also been representatives in Parliament and when SPD have been in Government there have mostly been trade union presences as well. Still, there seems to be little prior research on the actual personnel ties. Moreover, there are no comprehensive data sets existing (to my knowledge). Since the unorganized ties are claimed to be what ultimately ties the party and unions together in Germany, it is surprising that there is so little empirical evidence available. This underlines the need for the mapping of personnel ties, which is the objective in this thesis.

3.5 Moving forward: Expectations and outline of study

Because there are few empirical studies about personnel party-union ties, information and guidance on the way to proceed is scarce. This makes the study somewhat pioneering, but also challenging to fully outline from start to finish. However, based on the two previous chapters it is possible to define some expectations that will guide the mapping and analysis. This study is thus of a deductive character and in the next section I will outline what I expect to find.

The historical overview has showed that the party-union ties in Germany and Norway have been strong. During the first half of the twentieth century they continued to be strong and materialized through for instance joint committees or more personnel ties. In accordance with the mass party theory (Duverger 1990) the relationship was strong and extensive in both

countries during the 1950s. The first expectation is thus that *the ties in both countries were strong in 1957*.

After the Second World War most Norwegian social democrats came to terms with liberal capitalism, and as such, ideology was marginalized (Allern 2010:127). Still, there was a radical wave during the 1960s and 1970s with the outbreak of SF and later when the Labour party where in Government and intervened in central negotiations about wage settlements (Bergh 1987; Sundberg 2001). During the 1970s and 80s Ap started the revising of party principles (ibid). Following this revising a debate about freedom and the balance between state and market arose. Such ideological debates were also evident in the German party-union development. According to Padgett and Paterson, a new generation of ideologically motivated middle class activists entered SPD between 1969 and 1972 and criticised the SPDs lack of ideological purpose (1991:52). Questions about SPDs character and ideology took centre stage - in accordance with the new politics of postmaterialism. These questions continued into the 2000s and resulted in the outbreak of Die Linke. The internal debates are reflected in the decline of overlapping membership, in both Norway and Germany. Deduced from the catch-all theory, the historic development and the empirical evidence about a decline in other ties, the main expectation is that *the personnel ties have declined since 1957*.

The empirical studies also confirm that there has been and still are party-union ties present in Norway and Germany. However, the character and strength of these ties differ in the two countries. Norway has had a broad range of ties, with especially strong organized ties such as recommended collective affiliation and joint committees. In Germany the unorganized ties have been most apparent according to several scholars. The last expectation is thus, that *the personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than the Norwegian ties*.

The three main expectations in this thesis are:

E1: *The personnel ties in Germany and Norway were strong during the first period (1957-1961)*.

E2: *The personnel ties have declined between 1957 and the current period (2013-2017)*.

E3: *The personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than the personnel ties in Norway*

The expectations are illustrated in figure 1.




Figure 1. Expected extent and development of personnel ties in Norway and Germany from 1957 to 2017

In addition to these expectations the research questions defined in chapter 1 will guide the mapping and further discussions. There are thus some additional distinctions that must be made before turning to the research design and analyses.

First of all, I will distinguish between national and lower levels when mapping the ties. This is because the nomination and recruitment to parliament are affected by geographical considerations in both countries. In Norway, this was even evident through legislation that was meant for stimulating broad geographical representation (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014). In Germany the two-tier canal into parliament is also meant as a guarantee for a geographical representation (Lees 2005). The geographical considerations are important because they are a democratic thermometer regarding the distance between the governed and those who govern. This aspect leads to an important divide between the two cases studied: Germany is a federal state, while Norway is a unitary state. There are over 80 million people in Germany, while there are 5 million in Norway. The distance between the people and the rulers seems to be shorter in Norway. The system also implies that the state level is more

significant in Germany than in Norway. In the analysis I will thus divide between national level and lower levels. The main focus is the national level. However, since Germany is a federal state, the divide is necessary and might give interesting insight to level differences.

The second distinction is between overlaps and transfers. There are several reason for studying both personnel overlaps and transfers. First, as a consequence of the professionalization of politics most official positions are full-time positions. It is becoming increasingly difficult to juggle a full-time parliamentary seat with other official positions (Allern 2010:60). It is thus likely that transfers occur as often, or even more often than, actual overlaps. Second, there seems to be more considerations in regards to wearing two “hats” at the same time. This implies the problem of mixing roles and avoiding conflict of interest (Yishai 1991:31). Finally, in this study - with limited prior data - it is better to have a broader approach when mapping the field to capture as much information as possible. I perceive overlaps and transfers as the most feasible differentiation based on the data accessible.

Finally, the last research question about the cohesion of different ties will be the main focus of chapter 6. The comparison will be based on the secondary literature presented in this chapter. Allern and Bale (2014:11) underlines that it is no requirement for the existence of a relationship that all three classes of ties are present. Thus, the various classes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Still, the three classes of ties should be seen as part of a bigger picture. The decline of one type of organized tie may affect, explain or shed light on the development of an unorganized tie. For instance, the rate of party-union personnel overlaps and transfers may be conditioned by the strength of inter-organizational ties. Compared to Norway, the party-union ties in Germany have been less organized and based on personal contact rather than collective affiliation (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:53). The fact that different ties are present, but vary in character and strength in the two countries, makes a comparison of the different ties interesting. Moreover, by conducting a mapping and comparison of personnel ties with other ties, I will attempt to bring something new to the scientific debate. This might lead to a better understanding of the relation between different ties. Thus, in this thesis three aspects of the party-union ties are examined and compared: variation in personnel ties over time; variation in the development of personnel ties between Norway and Germany; and a comparison of the personnel ties and other more organized ties.

4 Research Design

In this chapter I will present the data and the method applied in this study. First, I will review the comparative case study. This will include a description of the two cases, as well as the generalization potential and aims of the study. Second, I will present the time periods included in the analyses and give a short description of the election systems and nomination procedures in each country. This is because recruitment to parliament is indirectly studied and thus these aspects should be considered when interpreting the results. Third, the method and data will be described. In this section I will also present the operationalization of personnel ties and the framework used to assess the strength of the ties. Further, the process of collecting data and coding will be described. Finally, the challenges and comparison potential will be discussed.

4.1 Comparative case study with an exploratory element

This thesis is a comparative case study where personnel party-union ties in Norway and Germany are examined and compared. Moreover, the study is a comparative case study of variation over time, mapping parliamentary representatives who hold or have held an official position in a trade union. According to Gerring (2007:19) a case study may be understood as the intensive study of a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. This study is an example of the latter, and in accordance with the start of the party-union decline, it spans from 1957 till the current parliamentary period (2013-2017). Levy (2008:5) emphasizes that case studies can play different roles at different stages in research programs. They can test, refine and sharpen existing hypothesis or generate new ones. This study coincides with this notion; the study is deductive, yet with an exploratory element. I will not test hypotheses directly, but rather refine or sharpen the notion of the party-union decline, and hopefully generate new hypotheses about the party-union ties. The research questions and the expectations outlined previously (introduction chapter and chapter 3) will structure the collection of empirical evidence. The overarching aim is to map the personnel ties in Norway and Germany and further, to discuss the findings relative to the expectations outlined. Moreover, since the purpose of a case study should be “at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007:19) I seek to shed light on the

common understanding of a general decline in the party-union relationship by comparing the two cases and by comparing the findings with other kinds of ties. Since most case studies have limited generalisation potential the hope is that the mapping will contribute with important data, which could lead to studies where broader generalisation is possible.

The case selection is important in this respect. If relevant and comparable cases are selected, they can facilitate new knowledge and fill information gaps on party-union ties. As there are few studies on personnel ties, a balance between depth and breadth regarding design and case selection is necessary, or as Tarrow (2010:246) puts it: “the move from single-case comparison to paired comparison offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added”. This assertion summarizes some of the rationale for comparing the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. Except from the obvious notion that two cases tell us more than one, two cases can potentially bring something new to the debate and still keep some of the depth needed when exploring new ground.

The dependent variable in this thesis is the personnel party-union ties, operationalized as MPs who hold or have held an official position in a union. Since this is a mapping of variation on the dependent variable, independent variables are not directly studied in this thesis. Still, the comparative design will hopefully uncover some possible variables that can be used in future studies to explain variation. Thus, when analyzing the data I will focus on both what is coherent and what differs between the two countries. As implied in the theory and literature chapters, both Germany and Norway have traditionally close party-union ties that have seen a decline in recent years. Thus, in this study the case selection is close to a crucial case design (Gerring 2007:89). If party-union ties are declining and have been declining across Europe, Norway and Germany should be examples of such trends in personnel ties as well. Still, as underlined in chapter two and three, several studies show that the party-union decline is not uniform across Europe and that the actual empirical evidence about the unorganized individual side is limited. The comparison of these two cases can thus enlighten us about the factors that determine where the ties can make it or not make it.

Moreover, there are several reasons why Norway is an appropriate country for this comparative study. First of all, Norway is one of the countries where there has been an evident decline in the party-union ties, starting in 1969. Allern (2010) underlines the decline

in Norway, but also shows that the trend is not as clear-cut as presumed. Other Scandinavian studies point in the same direction – there is a lack of consistency (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). To gain better insight to this lack of consistency and what it entails, the study of Norway can be fruitful. Second, Norway’s geographical location and features makes it a comparable case within Europe. Moreover, the Norwegian case represents the Scandinavian region. Norway is also comparable with other European countries where party-union ties have been traditionally close, for example Germany. Norway is one of the few countries where there exist systematic empirical studies covering a wide range of ties⁴. Such prior knowledge makes comparison over time and within the case feasible. The possibility of comparing results may strengthen the validity of the findings. Third, there are fewer practical challenges. Because I am a Norwegian student it is easier to access, collect and understand the data. This reduces the workload and makes it possible to include another case without stretching the scope of the thesis. The comparative approach with the Norwegian Ap-LO ties as one case will hopefully give a better overview of the variation over time, as well as an in-depth look at personnel ties.

I have also chosen to study the personnel ties between SPD and DGB in Germany. First of all, the general party-union ties have been fairly strong in Germany as well and thus this enables insight to how different degrees of formalization might affect the strength of the relationship over time. Second, since Kirchheimer (1966) more or less based his catch-all thesis on the German case, the decline of ties in Germany is interesting in itself. Third, the personnel ties are claimed to be the strongest form of ties in Germany (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009), while other kinds of ties are presumably not as present. Fourth, the empirical evidence on personnel ties is surprisingly scarce and this makes the case both challenging and important to study. Finally, the fact that the German case is similar to the Norwegian - traditionally strong party-union ties and the following decline - also makes it an interesting case for comparison. A comparative case study of the cases from Norway and Germany will provide new data, and clarify the actual existence of personnel ties in the two countries. The comparison might also give insight to the relation between different ties. In turn, this may be significant for the literature on party-union ties. To get one step closer to the aims set out in this thesis it is necessary to outline the actual process of collecting and preparing data for

⁴ Sundberg 2001 and Allern 2010.

analysis. The next section reviews the time periods chosen, and summarizes the choices I have made regarding method and data.

4.2 Time periods, cabinets and nomination

I have chosen four parliamentary periods in Norway and Germany. The periods are selected with a semi-fixed frequency of four and five years. The periods in Germany are: 1957-61, 1976-1980, 1994-1998 and the current period that started in 2013-2017. The periods in Norway are: 1957-61, 1977- 1981, 1997-2001 and 2013-2017. Even though there are standard four-year parliamentary periods in both countries, the second and third periods differ in Germany. This is due to political and historic events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall. Two months after the Wall fell (1990) a new election was held. This was not the only early election in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s, however, this election marks a change in the total number of seats in the Bundestag (Berntzen 2013:226–229). The periods prior to the fall only includes parliamentary representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany (Western part). This also marks a shift in membership numbers in both SPD and DGB, which is important to keep in mind when analyzing the data.

To adapt to such changes I have adjusted the frequency of the selected periods in Germany. The main incentive is to have four periods from each country and have similar starting and ending periods. This will keep the selection biases similar across cases. The choice of the first period was made in accordance with the prescribed decline in the catch-all thesis. Since the weakening of ties is assumed to have started in the 1960s, the timespan of this study starts in 1957. The period is the last parliamentary period during the 1950s in both countries.

Another notion is that the current parliamentary period is not over yet. Thus, all representatives including all alternate representatives⁵ who have met in parliament will probably be a bit higher in both countries at the end of the term. Still, since the term is similar across countries I regard the data as comparable. I also see it as unlikely that the representatives entering parliament later systematically differ from the current parliament

⁵ Meaning stand-ins; representatives that are not directly elected for parliament, whom replace other representatives when they are not able to meet.

group. I argue that four periods are sufficient in terms of restricting the amount of time spent on data collection and preparation.

4.2.1 Governmental periods and nomination regulations

Since it is parliamentary periods that are studied, the parliamentary groups are results of elections and candidate selections. Thus, the results and features of the electoral systems in each country should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. Federal (Bundestag) and national (Storting) elections are held every fourth year in Germany and Norway. During the periods studied in this thesis SPD was a cabinet party in the second (1976-1980) and the fourth period (2013-) (Lees 2005:202–203). Ap was able to enter the governmental offices during the first (1957-1961), second (1977-1981) and fourth period (2013-) studied (Nyhamar 1990; Bergh 1987; Narud et al. 2014). As noted previously, Ap was the largest party also in the 1997 election but due to Jagland's 36,9 per cent threshold (which was not met) a centre minority Government was established. However, in 2001 the centrist Government had to go due to a lost confidence vote and Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) became Prime Minister. Compared, Ap have been more represented in government than SPD, however, both parties have had influential roles in their countries' political development. The fact that both parties are candidates for government is undeniably a factor that can have some kind of influence on the pool of representatives. Moreover, this underlines why it is important to study the parliamentary groups; these are groups close to the party leadership but they are also close to the political power centre. They are thus influential actors in democratic processes.

The electoral systems and nomination procedures in the two countries are also of relevance because the study of party-union ties on the elite parliamentary level is indisputably connected to recruitment and nomination of candidates. The regulations and laws that condition the nomination and recruitment processes have been kept more or less stable during the periods under study. In Norway, there are direct elections and proportional representation and the parties provide candidate lists. These procedures are "closed" in the sense that only a handful of party members participate in the process (Hanne Marthe Narud 2008:553). It can be argued that in Norway the voters more or less vote for parties, not specific candidates. The Norwegian election law determine how mandates are divided between the counties. However,

it does not regulate special quotas for women or other groups. This is decided within the party. Ap have a women's quota that is meant to secure gender balance (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014:5). Germany has a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional representation, there are thus two roads to the parliamentary stage. According to Roberts (1988:98), federal party statutes only provide broad guidelines for selection procedures. Thus, the Länder party organization provide more detailed rules. The parties do not tend to have strict eligibility requirements. The exception is gender quotas. Since 1987 the German SPD took up quota nominations for women (Best and Cotta 2000:177). There is thus no noteworthy difference in formal regulations that might affect the nomination of candidates or favour candidates with trade union background. However, the first-past-the-post system is known for favouring men (Best and Cotta 2000:147). This might be a factor in Germany. Still, it is not an independent variable that is possible to control for in this study, it is rather a factor to be aware of.

4.3 Method and data

The data utilized in this thesis is a combination of already existing data and completely new data collected. Accordingly there are multiple choices and procedures that will be reviewed in this section. The data in both countries are mainly based on biographical documents. However, since the data from each country have been gathered differently, I will outline each process separately. At the end of the chapter I will discuss the comparability of the data, as well as give an assessment of the main challenges that follows the design, method and data.

4.3.1 Sources

In order to trace the parliament representatives' positions in DGB and LO unions, it has been necessary to access each representative's biographies and CVs. In the Norwegian case, the information was obtained from a complete data set (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). In the German case I have used biography handbooks: *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–2002*, as well as the German Bundestags archives (Deutscher Bundestag 2015; Deutscher Bundestag 2007). To increase the reliability, the information about the newest German representatives is also checked and supplemented by information from the politicians own web pages. The data comprises all SPD and Ap

parliamentarians from the four selected parliamentary periods, including politicians sitting longer or shorter terms (alternates). Staff, meaning those who have full-time official positions, are also included.

The main source for the German data (Vierhaus and Herbst 2002) comprises biographies of Bundestag members between 1949 and 1994. The handbook includes three volumes and was published in 2002 by K.G Saur. The editors are two German historians: Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst. The biographies cover political activity in industry and business, in school and religious services and in associations and political parties. There is some uncertainty related to the consistency of the mapping of DGP connections as well as the main behind the biographies. The biographies appear to be based on documents from different archives such as the FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), but the information provided varies a great deal, mostly in terms of sources documented. I have made several efforts to get in touch with the authors, but unfortunately, this has been unsuccessful. Still, because occupation, organisation activity and associations appear to be documented consistently, I regard it as likely that DGB official positions are mentioned. And, since it is two historians affiliated to rather well-known universities in Germany that have collected the data, and because the renowned K.G Saur published the biographies, I regard the documentation to be sufficiently reliable. Still, the reliability and consistency in the mapping may be weaker than with the Norwegian data that appear as more systematically mapped and updated over a longer period of time.

The main data sources in Norway is the NSD Archive of Politicians from 1945 up until today and the data set Norwegian Parliamentarians (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). These archives are collections of biographical information about members of parliament. Professor Trond Nordby undertook the first major contribution to the archive in 1985. The so-called Biografiverket formed the basis of the old NSD biography archive for the period after 1945. The collection was also based on previously written biographies by Olaf Chr. Torp, which gives an overview of new parliaments. Moreover, to register key positions and organisational activity, various publications about institutions and organizations were used. In addition, oral and written inquiries towards the biography authors and representatives were used (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). The biographies were updated in 2001 by a survey and most of the information was standardized. The 2001 questionnaire was sent to all those who had been in Parliament or government after 1985 and to representatives who had been in Parliament or in government before 1985 and who were still alive in 1985. 88 per cent

responded to the survey, and the questions were mostly answered with accurate and detailed information. The parliamentary politician data set is mainly based on data from the Politician archives and supplemented by data from Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, SSB). The data set is used to extract parliamentary politicians from Ap in the relevant periods. Since the Norwegian Data Service has collected the data over several years, and since it has been supplemented and improved over a longer period of time, I regard the data as reliable. In the following sections I will review the operationalization of the variable and the framework that will be used to assess the strength of the ties.

4.3.2 Operationalizations

In this thesis the personnel overlaps and transfers between SPD and DGB, and between Ap and LO, are studied. Specifically, personnel ties is operationalized as members of parliament (MPs) who hold or have held an official position in a LO or DGB union. The MP alternates are included, as far as possible, in the data set. This might enable a distinction between the list candidates on top of the lists and the alternates further down. It also increases the N, which strengthens the validity of the findings. All kinds of staff are not systematically included in the data. However, MPs with full-time positions such as manager or advisor are included⁶. Personal overlaps refer to SPD or Ap MPs who have official position in a DGB or LO union while in parliament. Transfers refer to SPD or Ap politicians with a seat in parliament who have had an official position in DGB, LO or affiliated unions, prior to their election to parliament. Official positions include positions on both the lower and national union levels. In the Norwegian NSD-data, the type of positions is not categorized because there are many variations in the positions. Thus, the definition is somewhat dependent on interpretation. However, I will argue that the criteria applied in both data sets can be summarized as: official positions meaning a position where the representative has a central role and tasks that go beyond mere membership or volunteer activity. Because there are few studies and limited data, the approach and definition is somewhat flexible and exploratory. Official positions ranges from president, board members, executive, managers, honorary member and Chair or Head of different committees and boards. This flexible approach allows me to extract as much information as possible. I argue that in an initial mapping, such as this one, is this the best approach. Later on there will be a review of the search words that were

⁶ This differ from the studies of Heidar and Allern in Sundberg (2001), where all staff is included.

used when analysing the documents. This will give a more precise description of which top positions that were mapped in each country.

As noted in section 3.5 in the previous chapter I will make a distinction between overlaps and transfers. Overlaps capture the representatives who have an official union position while holding a parliamentary seat. Transfers include all representatives who hold or have held an official union position prior or during their parliamentary term. The distinction between transfer and overlap is only possible if the years (start and end) of the positions are disclosed. This has not been straightforward, and it will be discussed further in the chapter, section 4.6.1.

Other variables relevant for this study are the other unorganized kinds of ties defined in the previous chapter; overlapping organisational structures, inter-organisational ties for contact and other unorganized links for contact. However, these will not be included in the main analysis but rather discussed and compared to the findings, in chapter 6. The focus will be on main trends found in secondary literature. To make any kind of comparisons it is necessary to define strong and weak ties. In the next section, I will present the framework for evaluating how strong or weak the ties are.

4.3.3 Framework: strong, medium or weak ties

To assess the strength of the ties mapped, the number of MPs who hold or have held an official position in a union will be counted. The frequencies of such transfers or overlaps determine the strength of the tie. I will use the framework from Allern (2010:73) to differentiate between three categories of strength. The three categories are as follows:

- Weak: less than 10 per cent
- Medium: 10-20 per cent
- Strong: more than 20 per cent.

This constitutes the main framework for analyzing the strength of the personnel ties. It is by no means expected that it will describe the strength of the ties perfectly, nor that the categories give the best estimates of the strength of the ties. However, these categories have been used by other scholars and have given sufficient estimates (Allern 2010). A direct

comparison between strong personnel ties and more organized ties, for instance frequency of meetings or seminars, will not be part of this thesis. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, thus general trends will be compared between different ties.

The strength of the personnel ties mapped will be compared over time, and between Norway and Germany. The latter comparison may be associated with some equivalence challenges. The percentage thresholds that have been used in Norway may not be as suitable for Germany, a much bigger country known for extensive unorganized ties on the individual level. It is also important to note that these categories should be seen in accordance with other such ties, to other interest groups. If a 20 per cent overlap is common between the parliamentary bodies and all kinds of organizations in Germany, one might define strong ties as over 30 per cent. However, since this is a somewhat exploratory mapping I consider the framework to be a suitable starting point that can be discussed further in accordance with the findings in each country. These discussions will hopefully give ground for improvements of the framework, but for now this underlines the importance of conducting this study.

4.3.4 Data collection

Germany

The collection of the German data has been somewhat challenging. After months of research and outreach I was not able to access or find any systematized data or complete data sets containing CVs or biographies. However, I found the biographical handbooks and the biographies online (Vierhaus and Herbst 2002; Deutscher Bundestag 2015; Deutscher Bundestag 2007), which has made it possible to make a new data set especially for this analysis. The fact that no such data exist emphasizes the need for empirical evidence. I will now go through the data collecting process before I discuss the challenges that surfaced during this process.

First, it was necessary to comprise a list over the parliamentarians from the selected periods. In the Bundestag archives, I was able to collect a list over all parliamentarians in the Bundestag from 1949-1994 (Deutschen Bundestag 1998). I had to extract the names of SPD-parliamentarians from the relevant periods and enlist them in an excel sheet. To strengthen the reliability, I went through the lists three times. The names from the two most recent

periods was available online at Bundestag's own archive pages⁷. The lists also include representatives who did not sit full periods – alternates. However, I was not able to distinguish these systematically. Next, I was able to find the biographical handbooks at the Freie University Library in Berlin and scan all the relevant SPD-biographies before bringing them back to Norway. The scanned material was double-checked with the lists prior to departure.

The next step in the process was to obtain the relevant information from the biographies. To find this information I converted the scanned pictures to simple text in Google Docs and did optical character recognition. I did word search on a selected number of relevant words and abbreviations. Unfortunately, the Google Docs program reading the scanned documents could not interpret all the text. About 50 per cent of the scanned documents had to be read and searched manually. I used the same search words and read through the documents manually to highlight the search words and relevant information⁸. I also had my work double-checked by a fellow student. The search words selected represent the words that are mainly used when referring to trade unions in the German language, the umbrella word being *Gewerkschaft*. The reason for using search words is that it would be too time consuming to read through over 800 biographies, page-by-page. Since the biographies are in German the translation process has also been time consuming. By using specific search words I only needed to translate and code the search word-hits. However, this method might cause some of the representatives, who belong to small trade unions, with names not included in the search words, to be missing. Still, since the same search words are used on all biographies the possible errors will be more or less systematic during all periods.

The advantage of using search words is that it eases replication. This again strengthens reliability. It is also less time consuming, and a more systematic approach than reading randomly through all 800 biographies. The search words are a filtering-process that makes it easier to focus on the representatives who have a connection with the trade union. Based on the hits of the word search, I read through all the relevant biographies and translated the relevant parts from German to English. Since my German level is between A2- B1 the translation has been checked and revised by a German fellow student. Based on these

⁷ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007; Deutscher Bundestag 2015)

⁸ The search words and explanations can be found in the code manual

translations, I gave every representative a unique ID-number and coded the relevant information. I will describe this process in more detail later in the chapter.

Norway

The Norwegian data has already been gathered and systemized in two separate NSD data sets (NSD, Politikerarkivet 1945-d.d 2013). The data about parliamentary representatives (Stortingspolitikere) is used to extract the Ap- politicians from the four periods selected. These data are combined through the personal id with the Politician archives (Politikerarkivet), which includes information about the parliamentarians' official positions and affiliation with organisations. The data covers information about positions in roughly 1000 organizations. To include most representatives with background from LO or other LO-unions I have selected Norwegian search words that cover the different unions under LO or LO itself. This is done mostly to capture as much relevant data as possible and to make the process more or less similar with the German data collecting process. The search words used are *Landsorganisasjonen*, LO which is the name and abbreviation for the main trade union organisation that is studied in this thesis. Since there are many Norwegian words referring to unions, I have also searched for all 24 unions listed under LO⁹. Because several of the unions have changed name or merged during the last decades I have also used the search words *fagforening*, which means trade union and *forbund*, which means federation, to cover all kinds of LO-affiliation. I have not included unions that are not part of LO. This is due to the scope of the thesis. Other distinctions are level; national, lower levels or international level; position and start and end year of position. The Norwegian data distinguishes between the elected representatives and the alternate representatives. Thus, I will do two analyses, one including only the directly elected, and one including all representatives in the data set from NSD. The latter is thus comparable with the German data and includes alternate representatives. If the two analyses with different N show similar trends this will strengthen the reliability of the findings.

⁹ Many of the unions have merged and thus the old names of the unions are included in the data set rather than the new name. After some research on the unions web pages I have included the names of the unions before they merged. This is however only the unions that had no word hit on the main union name. List of all unions can be found in the appendix.

4.3.5 Coding and final data sets

Based on the word search all relevant representatives have been extracted, documented and coded. In sum, I found 413 representatives with some sort of trade union association among 862 parliamentarians in Germany. In Norway there were 340 Ap-representatives during these periods, 68 had a trade union connection. The representatives' connection in both countries has been coded similarly¹⁰. I have also coded transfer and overlaps as two different variables (see code manual).

In the Norwegian data, level is already included from the NSD data sets. I have, as far as possible, coded the union-level in the German data as well. State, district and local levels are all included in the lower level category, while national level and international level are coded separately¹¹. This coding is used by NSD on the Norwegian data and thus I have coded it similar in the German data. The threshold in the German data is thus between federal and state level. Information is lost between the state and lower levels in Germany. However, because the information about actual level is somewhat scarce and the differentiation would require a lot of geographical research, I have chosen to keep it similar to the Norwegian data. Moreover, in this thesis I - first and foremost - seek to study the national level. Differentiation is thus necessary¹². Because of the lack of accurate information, especially in the German data, I have chosen to not code full-time positions, but there are undeniably several official positions that are full-time.

4.3.6 Challenges

There have been several challenges when collecting and coding data. In the next section I will give a brief report of the main encounters. First of all, the information recorded in the German biographies is inconsistent. Some biographies are very extensive and detailed while others include only occupation and main parliamentary activity. I have done Internet searches on the representatives who have very short bios, to check if there is any mentioning of trade union connection. It seems as if official positions in trade unions are reported consistently in

¹⁰ See code manual for detailed coding

¹¹ Coded similar to the Norwegian data. For more information see code manual

¹² Youth groups are not included as a separate value, because it is part of the organisation as a whole and thus coded regularly.

the data. The process of coding the relevant SPD representatives was somewhat challenging because some of the reported activity falls into a blurry category “more than membership” which is difficult to entangle. Overall, the parliamentarians working for a union or as a union official seems to be referred to as *Gewerkschaftsfunktionär* in the biographies from the two first election periods (1,2), and as *Gewerkschaftsekkretär* in the biographies from the two last periods (3,4). The consistent use of these titles strengthens reliability of the data and have made the coding less dependent on subjective assessments.

The distinction between transfer and overlap is only feasible if the start and end years for the positions are disclosed. This information is unfortunately inconsistently disclosed in the data especially in the German data. Thus, a revision of the initial plan has been necessary. As noted, I have tried to code transfer and overlap as different variables. I have decided to place all people that hold or have held positions in the trade unions in the transfer category. It is difficult to know if the representative went directly from a high position in the DGB to the parliament, thus transfer is interpreted as hold or have held an official position at one point in time prior or during their parliamentary period. Overlaps are more narrowly coded. Only representatives with a documented official position in a union while being MPs are coded as 1. Thus, there are many uncertain values (coded as 9) and the results should thus be interpreted with caution. In the Norwegian data there is more accurate information about start and end years for the official position. I have included a transfer variable that is stricter. It differentiates between those who went directly from an official union position to parliament, and those who have years in-between the union and parliamentary positions¹³.

This revision and coding have resulted in two complete data sets where transfer is the main variable. The variable documents whether a representative hold or have held a high trade union position. In addition there are variables giving information about the level and kind of connection. Throughout this data collection and coding process I have tried to double-check everything, either with help from fellow students and helpers, or myself. This has strengthened the reliability.

¹³ A direct transfer entails no years in-between, for example official position in LO in 1956 and elected for parliament in 1957.

4.3.7 Comparison

The German data is processed and checked fewer times than the Norwegian NSD-data. The German data is also scarcer and seems less consistent than the Norwegian data, which makes a direct comparison challenging. Still, I argue that the data is comparable first, because the first-hand data in each country is based on biographical material, and, second, because the time periods, unit of analysis (parliamentary group) and search words are very similar. I have coded the data based on standardized coding principles. Thus, the coding is less reliant on subjective assessments. Accordingly, I expect the selection bias to be fairly similar across cases. The biggest worry is the possible underreporting in the German data. This calls for a cautious eye when interpreting the results. Thus, I will focus on more general trends rather than absolute numbers or percentages close to the strength thresholds, as described in section 4.3.3.

Caution must also be taken due to the differences in N. It is possible to execute two analyses with different N in the Norwegian data; one including the directly elected (actual mandates) and one including all representatives (including alternates). The results from the latter will be compared with the German data because these data has only one N, including all alternate representatives. Still, these numbers may not be as reliable as expected either. For instance, in the second parliamentary period there were 214 SPD representatives elected directly to the Bundestag. In the data set based on the DGB-lists there are only 215 representatives, which indicate that only one alternate representative met over the four-year period. This seems very unlikely and thus the total N is probably higher. After checking the lists several times, I could not extract additional names and thus there seems to be a reliability problem with the total N in the German data, at least from the first two periods where lists over all parliamentarians were used. However, I will argue that it is not likely that the representatives not included in the lists differ systematically from the representatives studied. One last remark regarding the country differences are that union-levels in Norway and Germany is quite different, at least at the lower levels. As noted earlier, the levels in Germany are of a grander scale. The state level should probably not be seen as equivalent to regional levels in Norway. However, in the coding it is not differentiated between state, district or local levels, only between national level and everything lower. Still, I regard the national level in the two countries as close to equivalent, and thus I have chosen to separate this level with lower levels.

4.4 Summary

This study is a comparative case study where the unit of analysis is the parliamentary groups of the Norwegian Ap and German SPD. To answer the research questions I have collected and coded data from four parliamentary periods in each country, starting in 1957 and ending with the current period, 2013-2017. Based on the final data sets I seek to map the frequency and level of overlaps and transfers, and examine these findings in accordance with the set of expectations defined in chapter three. The data is mainly based on biographies and have been coded with as similar procedures as possible. The main disadvantage is that the collecting process of these data has been somewhat different. This might imply that there are some issues related to reliability and equivalence. The challenge is that the consistency in the data from Germany is unknown. However, the data that actually exists has given enough information to create a data set that comprise information about parliamentary representatives and their connection to trade unions. The key information and processes presented in this chapter is summarized in table 2 below.

Table 2. Overview of variables, data, search words and time periods.

Country	Variables	Data	Search words	Time periods
Norway	Personnel ties:	Parliamentarian	Landsorganisasjonen i	1957-1961
	MPs who hold	biographies, NSD data set:	Norge, LO,	1977-1981
	or have held an	Politikerarkivet	fagforening, forbund,	1997-2001
	official position in a LO-union or LO	Stortingpolitikere	24 unions under LO*	2013-2017
Germany	Personnel ties:	Parliamentarian	Gewerkschaft,	1957-1961
	MPs who hold	biographies.	Deutsche	1976-1980
	or have held an	Biographisches Handbuch	Gewerkschaftsbundes,	1994-1998
	official position in a DGB-union or DGB	der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages 1949–2002, 1949–2002. German Bundestags Archives	DGB, Industriegewerkschaft IG,	2013- 2017

* Name of all 24 unions is included in the appendix

5 Empirical analyses

The development of personnel ties will be mapped in two stages. First, I will present the development of personnel ties in each country. Second, I will compare the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. Each section is divided by country, type of tie (transfer or overlaps) and level. As noted, transfer is used in a broad sense; the representative had an official position in a union at one point in time prior or during their parliamentary term. Based on the percentages, I will assess the strength of the ties from each period in accordance with the framework presented in chapter four. Over 20 per cent is considered to be strong ties, between 10 and 20 per cent is medium strong, and less than 10 per cent is regarded as weak. Finally, I will compare the personnel ties between the two countries and discuss the findings in light of the expectations outlined in chapter three.

5.1 Personnel ties over time: Germany

In the next section I will present the percentage and absolute numbers of parliamentary representatives who hold or have held an official position in DGB or a DGB union.




Figure 2. Share of the SPD parliamentary group that hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union or DGB.

As seen in figure 2, the data set from the first parliamentary period (1957-1961) contains 187 representatives from SPD. Among these, 27 per cent (50) of the social democratic parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union prior or during their parliamentary period. According to the framework of strength this constitutes a strong personnel tie. During the second parliamentary period from 1976-1980, the data set includes 215 representatives. Among these 18 per cent (39) hold or have held an official position in DGB or a DGB-union. In accordance with the framework, this falls into the category between 10 and 20 per cent, meaning that the personnel ties were of medium strength. In the third period there are 262 representatives, 12 per cent (31) of these hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union. Hence, the period can be categorized as showing medium strength ties between SPD and DGB. During the fourth and current period (2013-2017) there are 198 SPD- representatives, among these 8 per cent (16) hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union. In accordance with the framework, this is a weak personnel tie. The percentages presented are mostly close to the thresholds and thus caution must be taken when interpreting these results.

As noted, the documentation of overlaps of official positions is inconsistent in the German data. Hence, the numbers should be interpreted with caution¹⁴. Still, the numbers collected may help outline how the personnel ties are materialized. In the first period there are 5.4 per cent (10) who hold an official position in a DGB-union during their parliamentary period. The second period marks a decline, and only 1.9 per cent (4) holds an official position in a DGB-union during their parliamentary period. During the third period this number declines even more to 0.8 per cent (2). And during the last period there are no overlaps. These numbers show that there are more transfers than overlaps among the German representatives. The findings also support the claim of an overall decline, however the explanation might just as well be that it is a result of incomplete documentation.

¹⁴ Not documented/missing: see appendix.




Figure 3. Development in share of representatives from the national union level and lower levels in DGB or a DGB-union.

* *International and missing level excluded, see appendix*

The documentation of union level is more consistent in the German data. Figure 3 shows that during the first period, 56 per cent (28) of the representatives hold or have held official positions at a lower union level, while 24 per cent (12) of the representatives were associated with positions at the national level¹⁵. Only one representative came from a position at the international level. During the second period, from 1976-1980, 64 per cent (25) of the representatives' official positions were at a lower level, while 28 per cent (11) were at the national level, none had an international affiliation. In the third period, from 1994-1998, 65 per cent (20) of the representatives were associated with an official position at a lower union level, while 26 per cent (8) were connected to the national level, and only one transferred from an international branch. During the last and current period, starting in 2013, 75 per cent (12) of the representatives hold or have held an official union position at a lower union level, while 19 per cent (3) were associated to the national level. There were none connected to the international level. The main tendency is that there is a greater amount of representatives coming from a lower level (state, district, local) than the national level (federal), in Germany.

¹⁵ Missing: see appendix.

5.1.1 Gradual weakening of personnel ties

The overall share of representatives who hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union are declining. At the end of the 1950s the representatives with an official position connection amounted for 27 per cent of the parliamentary group. In accordance with the framework this constitutes a strong tie. In other words, the party-union contact in terms of transfers was frequent. However, during the mid-1970s a decline is apparent. With a 9 per cent decrease to 18 per cent, the relationship turned into medium strong. The period during the 1990s demonstrated a continuation of the downward trend, but kept relations at a medium level. In the current parliamentary period the ties have become weak, but they are still existent. When 8 per cent of the parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in a DGB-union, it is not a weakening in terms of a complete divorce, but rather a separation. The representatives are mostly connected to the lower union level, which is not unexpected since Germany is a federal state, where the state levels are of great importance. In sum, the findings from Germany support the expectation about strong personnel ties during the 1950s, as well as the expectation about a decline in these ties from the 1950s till today. The next question is thus how this trend is compared to similar ties in Norway.

5.2 Personnel ties over time: Norway

In the Norwegian data there is more accurate information about which year each representative hold or have held an official position in a LO or a LO-union. It is also possible to distinguish between the elected representatives and the alternate representatives, who are “stand-ins” for longer or shorter periods. Thus, there is one number for the directly elected and one number for all representatives who met in parliament during the period. In the following review of the results, I will first present the data, including the alternates (similar to the German data and presentation), then I will review the results of the parliamentary group without alternates. This is also illustrated in two separate figures (4,5). Finally, overlaps, direct transfer and level will be presented.




Figure 4. Share of Ap parliamentary group (including alternates) who hold or have held an official position in LO-union

**No missing or international level*

In the first period, from 1957-1961, the data set including alternate representatives contains 127 representatives. Among these 16 per cent (20) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. This is a medium strong tie in accordance with the framework. During the second period the data set contains 134 representatives, 13 per cent (17) of these representatives hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. The ties have declined, but are still within the medium category. In the third parliamentary period from 1997-2001, there are 118 representatives including alternates, among these 20 per cent (24) hold or have held an official position in a LO-union. It marks a significant upsurge from 13 to 20 per cent. The fourth and current period starting in 2013 there are 167 representatives including the alternates and only 1.2 per cent (2) representatives who hold or have held an official position in a LO-union. This marks a striking decline from 20 per cent to 1.2 per cent and can be categorized as a weak tie.




Figure 5. Share of Ap parliamentary group (excluding alternates) who hold or have held an official position in LO-union

By separating the alternate representatives from the representatives directly elected to parliament it is possible to differentiate between those on top of the party's candidate lists and those further down. This makes an interesting distinction that can reveal more about the variation among the representatives and further about the overall trends. As figure 5 show, there are 78 Ap members elected directly to parliament among these 21 per cent (16) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. In accordance with the framework this is a strong tie, and thus during the first period the two groups differ in terms of strength of the tie. During the second parliamentary period there were 76 Ap representatives elected directly to parliament, among these 16 per cent (12) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. Thus, the percentages are still somewhat different from the group including alternate representatives, but both ties are categorized as medium and both ties show decline. In the third period there are 65 Ap-representatives elected directly to parliament and among these 31 per cent (20) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. This is an evident increase, coherent with the increase in the group including alternates. Thus, the trend continues to be similar, in terms of direction, over time. During the current parliamentary period 55 representatives were elected directly to parliament, among these 4 per cent (2) hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. This is also in line with the significant decline evident in the ties where alternate representatives are included.

The next step is to examine how many of the representatives had overlapping positions or transferred directly from a union position. During the first period there were 6.3 per cent (8) in the group including the alternate representatives who had an overlapping LO-position while in parliament. There were 6.4 per cent (5) overlaps among the representatives who were elected directly to parliament. During the second period there were 2.2 per cent (3) in the group including the alternate representatives who had an overlapping LO-position, 1.3 per cent (1) of these overlaps were among the representatives elected directly for parliament. The third period had only 1.5 per cent (1) representatives who overlapped and this representative was elected directly for parliament. During the last period there were no overlaps.

There are few direct transfers and thus I will only summarize these results in absolute numbers. During the first parliamentary period there was only 1 representative who went directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliament. However, this person was an alternate and thus there is possibly no direct transfer after all because there is no information about when the alternate were actually in parliament. During the third period there were three direct transfers and two of them were representatives directly elected. They went directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliamentary seat. The third period have two representatives that went directly from an official position in LO or a LO-union to a parliamentary seat. Finally, one of the representatives during the current period went directly from an official position in a LO-union to the parliamentary seat. In sum, there are very few overlaps and direct transfers, and in accordance with the German findings most ties are regular transfers where the representatives have had an official union position at one point in time prior to gaining their parliamentary seat.




Figure 7. Development in share of representatives from the national union level and lower levels in LO or a LO-union from 1957-2017.

As seen in figure 7, during the first parliamentary period (1957-1960) there are 25 per cent (5) of the representatives who hold or have held an official position at a lower union level and 75 per cent (15) of the representatives who hold or have held a high position at the national union level. Among all the representatives from the second period (1977-1981) there are 47 per cent (8) of the representatives associated to a lower union level and 53 per cent (9) of the representatives with an official position at the national union-level. The third period (1997-2001) include 42 per cent (10) of the representatives who hold or have held an official position at a lower union level and 58 per cent (14) of the representatives connected to the national union level. During the current period (2013) both (100 per cent) representatives have held a position at the national union level. There are no representatives associated to international levels.

5.2.1 Decline, but not linear

Since 1957, there is an evident decline in the share of representatives who hold or have held an official position in LO or a LO-union. However, the trend is not as consistent as in Germany. The ties were fairly strong during the first period when 16 per cent of all parliamentary representatives were tied to Lo or a LO-union through current or previous

official positions. When separating the alternate representatives, the percentage increases to around 20. This indicates strong ties. In the second period there is an apparent decline in the share of representatives with such connections and in accordance to the framework the tie is of medium strength. This is by no means an extreme decline in terms of percentages, but the share in both groups is declining. During the third period the ties are stronger than ever. 20 per cent of the group including alternate representatives hold or have held an official union position. Strikingly, 31 per cent of the group elected directly to parliament has such trade union connections. This marks the strongest tie mapped (31 per cent), while the next parliamentary period studied marks the weakest tie, with only 1.2 percent and 4 per cent of the representatives who hold or have held an official union position. This is a dramatic decline with many possible explanations. It might be due to special events, or rather be part of a trend towards a complete separation. Still, the finding should be seen in relation to the third period. The drop may be dramatic because the tie during the third period was exceptionally strong. Thus, it might be explained by special circumstances during the third period. Moreover, the third period might be an outlier deviating from the declining trend. Either way, the variation between the two latter periods calls for further discussions in chapter six.

Another interesting finding is the difference between the groups including alternate representatives and the groups with only directly elected MPs. The first period marks a difference, in the strength of the ties. If the alternates are included the tie is of medium strength (16 per cent). When removing the alternates, the tie can be characterized as strong (20 per cent). Still, 20 per cent is on the threshold between the two categories and thus this might not be as significant divide. However, the difference is also evident during the third period; the share of parliamentary candidates elected directly to the Storting with LO-background is 31 per cent, while the share including alternates is 20 per cent. The tie is thus stronger when the alternates are removed. This is an evident trend during the other periods as well. The higher the position on the party list, the higher the share of representatives with trade union background. In other words, the more top list candidates the more trade union background. Or, with a trade union background it is more likely that the candidates are placed high on the candidate lists. This implies that trade union background may be an important selection criterion when the party is putting together the nomination lists.

The findings from Norway are somewhat challenging to interpret considering the expectation of a decline. The personnel ties studied have weakened since the 1957, however, the weakening might have started much later than the 1950s. The most significant decline happened after 2001 and the third period. Thus, the ties have changed since the 1950s, but the change is not linear. For instance, if the last period had been 1997-2001, the development would imply realignment rather than separation. Still, the overall trend show a decline.

Regarding the union level of the connection, the trend is generally stable in Norway. The amount of representatives that hold or have held a high position at the national union-level is mostly higher than the lower union levels. In terms of overlaps the Norwegian data show a decline. Yet, there are very few representatives with overlapping positions and this implies that there are generally more transfers than overlaps. Direct transfers are extremely seldom and thus difficult to interpret further.

5.3 Comparison of ties in Norway and Germany

In this section I will compare the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. The comparison will be based on developments over time. The comparison will be structured in accordance with the expectations outlined in chapter three.

5.3.1 Decline in different paces




Figure 8. Development in personnel ties in Norway and Germany from 1957-2017

The personnel ties studied in Germany were strong during the first parliamentary period. 27 per cent of the representatives in parliament had an official position in a DGB-union prior or during their parliamentary term. Thus, the ties can be characterized as strong. Compared, the personnel ties in Norway were medium strong during the first period, with 16 per cent of the parliamentary group having a trade union association. This partly supports the first expectation (E1) that the personnel ties were strong during the first period. However, the ties were stronger in Germany than in Norway, which supports the third expectation (E3) about the German ties being stronger. The next question is if this continued throughout all four periods.

Figure 8 show that the development from the 1950s till the 1970s is quite similar in the two countries. The percentage of the parliamentary groups that hold or have held an official union position declined to 18 per cent in Germany and 13 per cent in Norway. There is thus a 5 per cent difference between the two countries during this period. Still, there is a 9 per cent decrease in Germany, which is three times as big as the 3 per cent decline in Norway. So far, the development is in accordance with the second expectation of a decline. However, during the third period the Ap-LO personnel ties had an upsurge. 20 per cent of the Ap parliamentary group had an official position in LO prior or during their parliamentary term. Even though this is on the strong-medium threshold, the equivalent share is 31 per cent in the directly elected parliamentary group and thus it might suggest that the general tie could be described as strong. The upsurge found in Norway contradicts the expectation of a decline, it rather implies the start of realignment. Compared, the tie in Germany continues downward, at steady pace. During the same period, the SPD-DGB tie is within the medium category of strength with 12 per cent. This is 8 per cent less than the unorganized tie mapped in Norway, and marks a divide between the two countries. Thus, during the third period the tie is stronger in Norway than in Germany. This contradicts the third expectation that the personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than the ties in Norway.

The last period marks another shift. Almost a complete divorce is evident between Ap and LO. Only 1.2 per cent of the parliamentary group hold or have held an official position in a LO-union. During the equivalent period in Germany, the ties have also declined and become weak. Still, it is only a 4 per cent decline, from 12 to 8 per cent. The shift found in Norway provides new empirical support to the expectation that the personnel party-union ties are stronger in Germany than in Norway. Still, this is not consistent throughout all four periods.

Yet, the overall decline from 1957 till the current period indicates that the development is somewhat similar in both countries and there is an evident decline over time in both countries, which supports the second expectation (E2) of a decline over time.

The most interesting finding across countries is the upsurge in the Ap-LO ties during the third period. This indicates a non-linear variation in Norway. Moreover, since 1957 the personnel ties have declined more gradually in Germany than in Norway. The ties in Germany are thus more consistent, but not consistently stronger in all periods - as expected. Nonetheless, from 1957 to 2013 the Ap-LO unorganized relationship has taken the toughest hit, with currently only 1.2 per cent of the parliamentary group that have or had an official union position.

Thus, this prevails a declining trend in Norway – reflected in the decreasing percentages and thresholds in the framework. However, the lack of consistency in this downward trend urges further discussions and comparisons.

5.3.2 Comparison of levels in Norway and Germany




Figure 9. Share of representatives from the national union level and lower union levels in Norway and Germany from 1957-2017.

As seen in the figure 7, there are also obvious country differences regarding the union level, in which the parliamentary representatives are associated¹⁶. Summarized, there are 63.5 per cent (40) of the representatives in Norway who are associated with the national union level and 36.5 per cent (23) are connected to lower union levels. In Germany, 25 per cent (34) of the representatives are associated with the national union level and 62.5 per cent (85) are linked to lower union levels¹⁷. In Norway most representatives hold or have held an official position at the national union level, while in Germany, most of the parliamentarians have connections to lower union levels. Since it is not possible to extract the state level representatives systematically in the German data these results and the comparison should be interpreted with caution.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter I have presented the empirical mapping of Ap and SPD parliamentary representatives' who hold or have held an official position in a trade union. The data have been analyzed in two different stages and the personnel ties have been assessed in accordance with the framework from Allern (2010). In the first analysis the percentage of the representatives with a union background was presented and the analysis showed the existence of personnel ties, measured as transfers and overlaps. These ties are evident over time in both countries. The strength of the ties has declined in both countries and was strongest during the 1950s in Germany. The current period marks an all time low in both countries, with respectively 8 and 1.2 per cent. Thus, there are several similarities in the development of the ties in Norway and Germany. Still, the most significant finding is that among the strongest personnel ties mapped are the ties between Ap and LO during the third period (1997-2001). This deviates from a gradual decline and from the expectation of the strongest ties during the 1950s. The period might be an outlier that deviates from a declining trend because of special events or circumstances. Either way, this is an interesting finding that will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The second analysis is a comparison of the trends in Germany and Norway. In sum, there is an evident decline in both countries, with a more linear decline in Germany than in Norway.

¹⁶ I have excluded all representatives who are associated with the international union level and those who have no level documented from the figure.

¹⁷ 12.5 per cent (17) missing.

Moreover, the main difference between the countries is the pace of the decline. Still, in accordance with the expectation, the general development in the two countries prevail that the ties in Norway are consistently weaker than the ties in Germany (except the third period in Norway). Another interesting finding is that the level of the union association is mostly on the lower union-level in Germany, while the majority in Norway is associated to the national union level.

At the end of chapter three I outlined some expectations to guide and structure the empirical mapping and analysis. In the last section of both analyses the expectations have been discussed in accordance with the results of the mapping. The first expectation - that the ties were strongest during the 1950s – find support in Germany but not in Norway. The second expectation - about an overall decline - finds support in both countries, but in Norway the declining trend is not linear. The third expectation - that the personnel ties in Germany are consistently stronger than similar ties in Norway - finds some support. The ties in Germany are stronger during the 1950s and continue to be until the end of the 1990s when the Norwegian ties have an upsurge. However, during the current period the ties in Germany are stronger than the ties in Norway. This shows that the decline in Germany is more linear than in Norway, but that the overall decline in Norway is more severe with almost a complete separation in the last and current period. In total, the share of representatives with a trade union background over four periods is almost 12 per cent in Norway and 16 per cent in Germany (see appendix). The countries are fairly similar, but the internal dynamics within the two countries and between different ties, will be interesting to discuss further. Thus, the next chapter include a comparison of the findings of the analyses in this chapter, summarized in table 3, and the development of other ties in each country.

Table 3. Comparison of extent and strength of personnel ties in Norway and Germany

	Norway		Germany	
P1: 1957-1961	16%	Medium	27%	Strong
P2: 1976/77-1980/81	13%	Medium	18%	Medium
P3: 1994/97- 98/2001	20%	Strong	12%	Medium
P4: 2013-2017	1.2%	Weak	8%	Weak

6 Comparison and discussion

This thesis includes three stages of comparison. The previous chapter comprised the two first stages, comparing the development of personnel ties within each country and between the two countries. Moreover, the analyses covered the research questions concerning the extent of the ties and whether the strength of the ties has declined. This chapter is the last stage of comparison, and in the next chapter I examine if the personnel ties *have developed differently in the two countries and if the development of the personnel ties is coherent with the development of more organized ties*. The main part of the chapter is thus a comparison between the general trends in all kinds of ties and the development of the personnel ties mapped. The last section will include a discussion of the main similarities and differences between the countries, aiming to give a better understanding of the party-union relations in Norway and Germany. The last section will also include a brief discussion of possible implications and explanations of the findings.

6.1 Comparison within case

In the following section the findings concerning the personnel ties from the analyses will be compared with other types of ties in each country. I will analyze the ties by period and see if there is any coherence or incoherence in the development. This comparison will be based on the secondary literature review, historic developments and other documented ties presented in chapter 2 and 3, as well as the results of the mapping from the previous chapter. In closing, I will discuss the findings in accordance with the research question. As emphasized in chapter 4, it is the SPD and Ap's parliamentary groups that are mapped. Thus, the party is the unit of analysis aggregated as MPs. This is an important distinction to be aware of, especially when comparing with other unorganized ties.

6.1.1 Ap-LO ties compared

During the 1950s a broad set of ties linked Ap and LO together. The connections ranged from inter-organizational ties such as joint committees to more ad hoc meetings. This close relation is also evident in the personnel ties mapped in this thesis. 16 per cent of Ap's

parliamentary representatives had a LO-union association during the first parliamentary period (1957-1961) studied. The second period (1977-1981) shows a declining trend to 13 per cent. Still, the ties remain within the category medium strong ties during this second period. The decline is coherent with the weakening found in the strongest kind of organized ties between Ap and LO; collective affiliation. Known as the most organized ties in Norway during this period, these ties had a downward turn starting in 1969 when the rule of collective affiliation was relaxed (Allern 2010:140). This led many branches to end their affiliation to the party, and this separation process continued for two decades. This decline, however, is not as evident in the personnel ties, which had an upsurge in 1997 as 20 per cent of the parliamentary group had an official position in a LO-union prior to or during their parliamentary term. In a way this finding contradicts the historic development of decline in the more organized part of the relationship. As noted in chapter 3, during the 1980s the so-called right-wing wave caused a set-back for the labour movement and internal ideological discussions arose (Nyhamar 1990:384–392, 505–510). During this period Ap started to cooperate more with other interest groups (Allern 2010:131). The party-union decline reached a critical juncture after the 1997 parliamentary election, when Ap's election result did not surpass the 36,9 per cent minimum threshold set by Jagland. After this election flop, internal debates about the party-union relationship arose, and it was decided at the 2002 party congress to continue the close party-union relationship (Allern 2010:131).

The upsurge in the personnel ties found in the 1997-2001 parliamentary period studied might imply that the parliamentarians elected in 1997 who had a union background, influenced the decision to continue the close ties. It appears as if there were two different views within Ap during this period; one camp supporting close party-union ties and one camp endorsing separation. Prior to the 1997-election the separation-camp had the upper hand, while the pro-camp was strengthened after the election. This was especially evident in 2000, when the recommendation to abolish the party statute stating that all party members should be members of an LO union was rejected. This rejection could be a consequence of the strong trade union elite within the parliamentary group. The 1997 upsurge might strengthen the argument that parliamentary groups and representatives have increasing influence. The rejection can be seen as coherent with the upsurge found in the personnel ties. In other words, many Ap-elites had strong personal ties to LO during this period and this might explain the rejection of the deletion of the rule. However, this is a somewhat causal argument explaining the development in inter-organizational ties, yet, the high number of union parliamentarians

is not directly explained. This underlines that this third period might be an outlier caused by specific events that call for further investigations.

Other studies examining several parts of the party organization also find strong personnel ties at the beginning of the 2000s. A survey conducted in 2003/2004 also maps the Ap elite's overlaps with and transfers from LO (Allern 2010:139). The results show that more than 20 per cent of the party's top elite holds or have held positions in LO. There are very few of Ap's parliamentary representatives that had overlapping official positions in LO's main organs while in parliament, this is coherent with the few overlaps found in this study. When Allern (Allern 2010:140) conducted the survey 14 per cent of Ap's elite were currently officials in LO or LO unions locally or nationally. When taking into account elite members who were, or had been union staff, the total share of elite members with current (2003/2004) or former trade union positions was almost 40 per cent (ibid). A study from 2001 (Allern and Heidar 2001:125) of the trade union background of Aps parliamentary group, also show that the strongest set of ties is at the end of the 1990s. Thus, strong ties during the third period find support in other similar studies.

Allern (2010:140-145) also finds that there were fairly strong inter-organisational ties during the 2000s. This is coherent with the upsurge found in the third period in this study, but not as evident in the last period studied (2013-2017). Accordingly, the next question is if the dramatic decline found in 2013 can be traced in any other kinds of ties. The suspension of the practice that the LO-leader chaired the internal election committee in Ap in 2007 might be an indication of a decline. Moreover, the suspension could be the first step towards the untangling of personnel ties evident in this mapping, but it might also be due to special circumstances surrounding the resignation of the leader, Valla. However, as noted in chapter 3, Valla also chose to publicly criticize the party's policies when Ap was in government and this might have put a strain on the ties and started a separation on the individual level.

The difference between the two latter periods studied may also be related to the fact that it is the parliamentary group that is studied, and not the entire party organization. As seen in other studies of personnel ties focusing on other parts of the party, the ties were found to be extremely strong. For instance, in 2000, 39 per cent of the Ap congress delegates were former or current officials in LO or other LO unions (Heidar and Saglie 2002:279). This might imply that the ties between the parliamentary group and LO is weaker than personnel ties between

other Ap-politicians and LO. One thought is that the politicians who are part of the parliamentary groups are very public figures, part of the professionalization referred to in chapter 3. This professionalization might also indicate that the parliamentary representatives are under the public eye consistently and that having two hats at the same time is more problematic for them. In addition, part of the professionalization is that these representatives have worked their way up from the party “grassroots” and may thus not have the LO-ties through previous work experience. In sum, the personnel tie mapped in the current parliamentary period is almost non-existent and the cause is possibly the professionalization of politics, which is more evident among the parliamentary representatives than other party officials. Another factor is that the few MPs with LO-associations might have great influence. The two persons in the Ap parliamentary group who have held official union positions is Dag Terje Andersen and Marit Nybakk. Both are renowned Ap-politicians as well as LO-officials. For instance, Andersen has also held several ministerial posts and is thus an example of a representative close to the executive power – with influence. Nybakk was leader/chair of LO Oslo from 1992-1997, while holding a parliamentary seat¹⁸. How much LO bias these two have carried into their parliamentary and ministerial seat is difficult to determine. Still, it is indisputable that there is some sort of influence and thus the conclusion that there is a complete divorce should be taken cautiously. There could be strong ties in terms of elite networking and influence still present in Norway.

The overall picture of the party-union ties in Norway is intricate. The decline has been evident in all kinds of ties over time, however, secondary literature show that the inter-organizational ties are still rather strong. It seems as if the personnel ties are the ties in Norway that support the catch-all and cartel party theories of a party-union separation. Compared to the strong ties found in 1997, the decline in personnel ties is striking and not coherent with the consolidation of inter-organisational ties found in other empirical studies (Allern 2010:146). However, the finding is somewhat coherent with other findings about personnel ties (Allern and Heidar 2001:125). The development in the more organizational ties during the beginning of 2000s can be seen in light of the high share of the representatives with a union background. It emphasizes how the union background may carry weight and influence. In Germany, the same declining trend was expected and evident. However, because of the limited mapping and research on these ties in Germany, the finding of a

¹⁸ (Stortinget 2008).

general decline is interesting, because it implies that the trends over time in Norway and Germany are similar, regardless of historic events or size.

6.1.2 SPD-DGB ties compared

There are few empirical studies done on party-union ties in Germany, which limits the possibility for comparison between different ties. However, the preliminary findings from Allern and Bale (forthcoming) provide interesting newer knowledge about the ties in Germany. In addition, the theoretical literature on the party models outlined in chapter 2 are, to a great extent, based on the developments in Germany. Both Duverger (1990) and Kirchheimer (1966) worked partly inductively when developing their theories, and thus, this literature will also be used to supplement the comparison.

The party-union ties in Germany have been less formalized and based on personal rather than collective affiliation according to most of the literature about the German ties (Upchurch, Taylor, and Mathers 2009:53). The unions in West Germany guarded their autonomy and as follows the formal affiliation has never been very apparent. Scholars, such as Duverger, described the SPD as a typical mass party, which entails that the overall party-union ties are expected to be strong during the 1950s. This aspect of the theory finds support in the personnel ties mapped in this study. Moreover, the first parliamentary period studied in this thesis stands out as the period with the strongest ties compared to all other periods in Germany.

Otto Kirchheimer also based his catch-all theory on empirical studies from Germany (Padgett 2002:53–54) and thus the introduction of catch all strategies imply an evident separation between the SPD and DGB during the 1960s-1970s. This is partly confirmed by the literature reviewed in chapter 3; the DGB became a more authoritative institution during the 1970s as this was part of the DGB leadership's strategy, and thus more organized ties were rare during this period. This is also evident in the unorganized ties mapped in this study. The period from 1976-1980 show a decline from very strong to medium strong ties, and this downward trend continues through the 1990s until today. However, the more organized ties nuance the picture of a decline according to Jacobey and Behrens (2014). Despite disputes over the SPD government's labour market and pension reforms in the early 2000s, unions and the social

democrats sustained joint committees, such as the party's *Gewerkschaftsrat*. In addition, Allern and Bale (forthcoming) find that SPD and DGB have tacit agreements about regular meetings. Together with the *Gewerkschaftsrat* this seems to be current inter-organizational ties that have sustained over the years. The few inter-organizational ties existing imply that the overall decline is not as linear as the theory predicts in Germany. This might be due to the fact that the "dominant" ties in Germany have been unorganized, and thus the decline is more apparent in these ties; a change from weak organizational ties to weaker organizational ties is less striking than the a leap from very strong personnel ties to weak personnel ties - which is the case in Germany. The expectation of a decline finds support in the mapping done in this study. The question is if there exists any evidence supporting this trend in other unorganized ties.

Compared with other unorganized ties in Germany, the findings from this mapping show a more apparent decline than previous literature about connections on the individual level. For instance, Jacobey and Behrens (2014) claim that a significant amount of union members have been representatives in Parliament, and when SPD have been in government there has been, for the most part, union presence. This implies unorganized personnel overlaps on a lower level – the membership level. During the end of the 1990s the DGB also campaigned for the SPD (Jacobey and Behrens 2014:6), which was a new practice from the union. The two authors also argue that ties on the elite level has been apparent and that several DGB high-ranking officials were elected to the party's executive board and nominated for minister posts during the 1990s and 2000s. For instance, in 2011 SPD elected high-ranking union official Armin Schild to the party's executive board. And, in 2013 SPD elected Klaus Wiesehegel, president of the construction workers union (IG BAU), as Labour Minister in its shadow cabinet. "In doing so, the SPD is renewing an old tradition whereby this position is to be occupied by a representative of its major ally, the unions" (Jacobey and Behrens 2014:2). However, there is a lack of actual systematic mapping and knowledge about the strength of these personnel ties among ministers. The conclusion that these ties are strong is probably partly due to how the personnel ties are measured. This might be the reason for the overall conclusion that the personnel ties in Germany are the strongest of all ties; they are strong in terms of influence. Elaborated, the ties are perceived as very strong because there are influential people (ministers etc.) who are tying the party and union together. These people have common political interests, which they also are able to implement. Thus, the ties are seen as strong because the people that constitute these ties are important political actors. This

could also be the case in this thesis, as the 8 per cent who have a union association in the parliamentary group may be extremely influential and thus be part of a strong tie. However, to determine this is outside the scope of this thesis but could be interesting for future research using the same data.

The mapping in this thesis shows that there is a gradual decline in personnel ties over time. The few inter-organizational ties that have been present continue to exist, for instance the Joint Committee, *Gewerkschaftsrat*. The preliminary findings from Allern and Bale suggest that the claim that unorganized ties are the strongest ties in Germany is debatable. Seemingly, there is not an evident decline in the inter-organizational ties, but more a stable development on a rather low level. This suggests that different kinds of party-union ties in Germany are present, but not strong. This also implies that the assumed difference in ties between Norway and Germany is not as evident as presumed.

6.1.3 Coherent developments?

The Norwegian case seems to have similar trends in all types of ties. Even the upsurge at the end of the 1990s is, to some extent, found in the development of both organized ties and other unorganized ties. Still, the dramatic detachment that is evident in the current period is not coherent with the suggested consolidation of close inter-organizational relations with the unions (Allern 2010:146). In Germany there is a stable decline in the personnel ties, but this decline is not as evident in more organized ties (Jacoby and Behrens 2014:2–3). However, these ties have never been very extensive and this might explain that the decline is not as apparent. Because the German organized ties have been moderate, the decline in personnel ties can have led the different types of ties to the same level; existent, but weak. To get one step further, with the knowledge already at hand, it is relevant to ask the question of whether the organized ties have stayed fairly strong or existent in the two countries to compensate for the decline in personnel ties.

There is little evidence from the mapping that supports the notion about compensation in one or the other way. The current period shows a significant decline in both countries, and whether the decline is caused by development in other ties is difficult to determine. In Germany, it seems as if all ties continue to exist, but on a rather weak level. In the Norwegian

case it might be that the organized ties have realigned to compensate for the decline in personnel ties. As described in the historic review, prior to the 2001 election internal forces in Ap were opening up for cooperation with other interest groups and sought to weaken relations with LO. However, after the election, LO was yet again seen as a beneficial partner and realignment was evident in inter-organizational ties (Allern 2010). The realignment of other ties might have caused the personnel ties to be superficial, leading to a decline in the personnel ties, but not in the overall relationship. If this is the case, the ties seems to be mutually contingent, underlining that further and more detailed comparisons of different kinds of ties is essential to see the full party-union picture.

6.2 Possible explanations

This thesis is first and foremost a mapping of the actual ties and developments in each country. However, the comparative design also provides insight to the differences and similarities between the two countries. Moreover, it helps clarify possible implications of the findings and further provide clues to what might explain the development of party-union ties and the relation between the different ties.

A common understanding among many scholars is that there are two main channels of influence in most democracies today: the numerical (electoral) channel and the corporate channel (Rokkan 1987). Both channels are essential democratic mechanisms, and both channels are intertwined to the party-union relationship. For instance, the party-union relation has been seen as a rational cost-benefit relationship where unions supply parties with votes, while the parties provides political influence and members (Allern 2010; Allern et al. 2007). Broadly, the social democratic parties and unions may be seen as guarantors for each other's access to these channels, at least during the 1950s. The evident decline in the personnel ties may thus indicate that the parties and unions do not need each other anymore. In other words, the party-union relationships relevance in democratic processes - in power relations - has declined.

The empirical analysis uncovered that the personnel ties have been and still are present in both Norway and Germany. The ties were strong and medium strong during the 1950s, and then started to decline during the 1970s. The pace of this decline, however, is different. The

German decline is more consistent, or gradual, than the decline in Norway. It appears as if the ties in Norway have been more contingent on historic events such as the 1997 election and internal party debates, than the ties in Germany. For instance, the SPD-DGB ties have declined gradually, despite events such as the reunification. The autonomy of the unions was especially evident during the 1970s, and this can possibly explain why the relationship appears somewhat unaffected by historic events. Or, rather it explains why the decline started during the 1970s. Compared to other types of ties in Germany, the personnel ties mapped are declining more severely. According to the recent article by Jacobey and Behrens (2014), organized ties in Germany are few but stable. Thus, the catch-all thesis might be more evident in the personnel ties than other ties in Germany. Moreover, the comparison in chapter 6 also shows that the inter-organizational ties are not as scarce as many presume. Thus, Norway and Germany might not be as different as assumed: there are both organizational and unorganized ties present in both countries.

The variation in the pace of the decline in Norway and Germany implies that a broad range of factors influences the development and strength of the personnel ties. One suggestion is that the effect of different factors might be determined by how the party and unions have been tied together from the beginning. This is for instance evident in Allern, Christiansen and Aylott's (2007) study from Scandinavia referred to in chapter 2. The scholars find that the weaker the party-union ties were from the beginning, the more easily they unravel in response to environmental changes. They also find that the amount of resources each side can derive from the relationship influences the intensity of the tie (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007:629). Thus, historical and structural factors might be influential factors that should be explored. Moreover, it might be interesting to investigate further if the personnel ties in Germany were stronger than the Norwegian ties from the very beginning and if it might explain why the decline in Norway is more severe. Union density and class voting are also factors that might explain the development in the two countries. However, this will not be elaborated further in this thesis, but is meant to give a glimpse into a broader literature, including institutional perspectives, that can be used to uncover factors determining the party-union development. The comparisons and data provided in this study can contribute to future systematic comparisons where such factors and perspectives can be included. Thus, I will argue that this study is one step further in the direction of generating new hypotheses about the nature of the party-union relationship.

7 Concluding remarks

In the introduction chapter I argued that to fully understand the existence, strength and development of the party-union ties, the individual level must be studied. The limited empirical data and knowledge about this level has been part of the rationale for conducting this study. The overarching aim has been to contribute with new empirical knowledge to the discussion about the uniformity of the party-union decline, by mapping personnel ties. Thus, this thesis has provided and systematized data about the personnel ties connecting the social democratic parties and unions together in Germany and Norway. Moreover, I have mapped the frequency of the parliamentary representatives that hold or have held an official trade union position during four parliamentary periods, starting in 1957 and ending with the current period (2013-2017). Further, I have analyzed and compared the data over time and between countries. Based on the party model literature and secondary empirical literature about the ties, I defined some expectations that guided the empirical analyses. Lastly, I compared the findings with other kinds of ties and discussed how the findings are part of the overall trends in the party-union relationship. In the next section I will answer the research questions in light of the findings from the mapping and review the expectations and results.

7.1 Main findings

The overarching research question in this thesis is: *To what extent are there personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany, and how have these ties developed over time?* The study has shown that there have been and still are personnel ties between the trade unions and social democratic parties in Norway and Germany. These ties were most evident during the 1950s, when they were strong in Germany and medium strong in Norway. Thus, the first expectation (E1) from chapter 3, that the ties would be strong during the first period, finds support.

During the 1970s the ties were medium strong in both countries while at the end of the 1990s the Norwegian ties became strong while the German ties declined within the medium strong category. The extent of the ties today is rather limited in both countries, and the current ties can be described as weak. Moreover, the ties are almost non-existent in Norway. Thus, the

second research question and the second expectation (E2) about a decline, finds support in this study; there has been a decline in both countries since 1957. The pace of this decline has been different in the two countries. The ties in Germany has had a gradual decline (strong-medium-weak), while the ties in Norway started off as medium strong during the first two parliamentary periods, following an upsurge to strong ties in 1997, before the drastic decrease in 2013. Thus, the research question about the developments compared is that the personnel ties have developed partly different in the two countries; an overall decline is evident, but the pace is different. The third expectation (E3) is thus also confirmed because the overall development shows that the German ties are consistently stronger than the Norwegian ties (except in the third period).

It is evident that the personnel ties are declining in accordance with other ties. The Norwegian case has similar trends in all types of ties. Even the upsurge at the end of the 1990s is, to some extent, found in the development of both organized ties and other unorganized ties. Still, the recent developments in the personnel ties differ. While the inter-organized ties have been consolidated, the personnel ties have almost vanished. In Germany there is a stable decline in the personnel ties, but this decline is perhaps not as evident in more organized ties. However, these ties have never been extensive and this might explain that the decline is not as apparent. Thus, the answer to the last research question about the coherence of different kinds of ties is that there is some coherence, but that this should be researched further - extending the scope to the whole party-organization and including all parliamentary periods.

7.1.1 Trade union background as a selection criteria

In chapter 2, I presented a short overview of the recruitment literature. The rationale was that these procedures and the recruitment patterns influence the composition of the parliamentary groups. The mapping in this thesis shows that the number of parliamentary representatives who have had an official trade union position when entering parliament is decreasing. Almost none have an official position while in parliament (overlaps). As indicated previously, this might be explained by the professionalization of politics and the complications with wearing two hats at the same time. In addition, a parliamentary seat is a fulltime position, seldom compatible with other official positions. Another aspect is that parliamentary representatives

increasingly are coming from the party ranks and are political “broilers” (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014; Best and Cotta 2000; Narud and Valen 2008). It might also be explained by the increase of other selection criteria such as geographical concerns and education or gender - the competition has advanced and the criteria list has been extended (Allern, Karlsen, and Narud 2014). Does the mapping indicate that trade union background is not an important selection criterion anymore?

Compared, the share of the parliamentary group that has an official union position background is consistently a bit higher in Germany than in Norway (except in the third period). Also, the majority of the unionists in the Norwegian parliamentary group are associated with the national level, while in Germany the majority are associated to the lower union levels. This partly supports the logical assumption that the differences in system and size might cause level differences between the two countries. For instance, the findings in this thesis show that during the current period there are only three representatives connected to the national union level in Germany, compared to 12 who are connected to a lower union level. In Norway the two parliamentary representatives with a union background are both connected to the national level. The associations might be described as more elitist in Norway than in Germany, at least regarding level. In terms of numbers, SPD seems to have broader network of union representatives in parliament than Ap. Still, Ap has representatives closer to the central organization. Can these clusters of people with a union background be called elite networks?

It is not necessarily given that a person who is a union official is the spokesperson of the union in every political setting. Still, people who go from union to party, or who have one foot in each camp, bring some kind of “union-baggage”. If many parliamentary representatives have the same background it is undeniably a channel, or a kind of network. The question is if this is a noteworthy or influential network. The mapping in Norway shows that there is a difference between the group elected directly to parliament (the candidates on top of the lists) and the group including the alternates. The frequency of candidates with union background increases when the alternate representatives are singled out. This suggests that a substantial share of the party’s top list candidates hold or have held official positions in a trade union. In terms of closeness to power and decisions, a reasonable assumption is that the higher up on the lists, the more influential or “important” the candidates are. Thus, the top list candidates with a union background are most likely influential in both organizations

(union and party), and might be part of some sort of party-union elite network. For instance, the mapping and comparison over time show that the ties studied have declined over the years. Still, during the third period, the ties in Norway were strong and most likely influential - considering the events and realignment of inter-organizational ties at the beginning of the 2000s (Allern 2010). In Germany these networks are broader in terms of more people. Yet, how elitist or high rank these representatives are, is difficult to determine. The fact that there is little empirical data on the personnel ties, and that these ties have been described as the strongest ties of all ties in Germany, might indicate that the ties in Germany have been perceived as strong because the representatives are influential. Thus, it is also a question of how the ties are measured and assessed.

7.2 Contribution and generalization potential

In the introduction of this study I contended that the relationship between parties and interest groups shapes the nature of democratic governance (Thomas 2001), and that research on these relationships is essential to better understand power relations in democratic countries. The question is how this study has contributed in this respect. As highlighted in the above section, this thesis has provided new data that can be used for further studies and comparisons. It might also lead to better insight about how the personnel ties open up for contact between the social democratic parties and trade unions. Since it is the parliamentary groups that have been studied the findings may also shed light on who is recruited to parliament and what union partiality they bring to the table. Moreover, it is possible to get better insight to additional and unofficial channels of influence in democratic countries.

When conducting this study the aim was to shed light on the common understanding of a general decline in the party-union relationship by comparing the two cases. Since most case studies have limited generalisation potential the hope is that this mapping can contribute with important data that might lead to studies where broader generalisation is possible. Since both cases confirm the assumption of a decline this increases the generalisation potential and imply that such decline might be evident in other Northern European countries with traditionally strong party-union ties. Still, the variation in the developments also implies that further research is necessary.

If there are networks of politicians coming from unions, who interchange the same official positions, these are undeniably party-union networks with access to political decisions. The fact that these networks and their influence are more or less unknown to the general public, underlines why it is important to study and map personnel ties. Does the decline in personnel ties found in this thesis indicate that the trade unions – representing thousands of workers – have lost its influence or place in the democratic processes? Or, does it imply that the democratic processes have changed and become so democratic that personnel party-union ties are not perceived as acceptable anymore? The union-bias these representatives bring to the table might be seen as too biased and thus be constrained. Or, personnel ties might be stronger in other, less public parts of the party organization that do not have to answer to the public and press at all times. Perhaps the party and union strategy is to continue with strong ties, but the recruitment process to parliament does not facilitate representatives with a union background. These are all questions that should be examined in future studies.

7.3 Challenges and future research

In this thesis the main challenge has been to find and gather data. It has been time consuming and especially challenging to collect, translate and code the German data. Since the data from the two countries have been collected slightly different there are some issues related to reliability and equivalence. For instance, the consistency in the data from Germany is unknown and thus it is a chance for some underreporting in the final data set. However, the data that actually exists has provided enough information to create a data set comprising parliamentary representatives' trade union background - which is what I aimed to study. Thus, despite the difficulties throughout the process I have managed to contribute with completely new data. The fact that there is no data on personnel ties, which is claimed to be the strongest ties in Germany, is puzzling, but underlines the relevance of this thesis and mapping. The comparison with the Norwegian data, which is a bit more advanced, have been useful both in terms of comparison of trends, but also to uncover how the German data can be improved and serve future research about the party-union ties. This leads to the last section in this thesis, is it possible to generate any new hypotheses from this study? What should future research focus on?

The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the relationship between social democratic parties and trade unions. I have questioned the uniformity of the party-union decline and found that there is an evident decline in the personnel ties in Norway and Germany. However, the trends differ in the two countries. In Germany there is a gradual decline, while the trend is not as linear in Norway. Thus, future research should focus on improving the data sets and differentiate between levels and positions of the representatives. Newer studies should also include the whole party organization and add years or parliamentary terms. This will hopefully strengthen the results and give better insight to the variation that is evident in Norway. The main hypothesis that can be generated from this study is that there is a decline in personnel party-union ties as well. This study is thus a refinement of the already existing hypotheses derived from the catch-all thesis and cartel-thesis. Moreover, the fact that this decline is evident in both Norway and Germany calls for further studies of personnel ties in other European countries. I will also argue that this study generates several questions about the representatives and about possible elite networks that frequent the parliamentary buildings. Who are these representatives and is the trade union background influential? Is there really a decline in terms of power and influence? What determines the strength of the relationship? Is it the representative's power or the total share of representatives that constitute a strong tie? Moreover, what factors can explain the variance in the trends? These are essential questions that underline the importance of party-union ties in democratic processes, but also the importance of this study and future research.

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Appendix

Data sets available by request: anne.hoyer@outlook.com

Code manual

- The data is collected from two different sources in Germany and NSD in Norway.
- To extract the representatives with high positions I have used word search both in word and manually. The program reading the scanned documents could not interpret all the text, about 50 per cent of the scanned documents have been read and searched manually. I used the same search words and read through the documents to highlight the search words. The search words are as follows:
 - Gewerkschaft, Deutsche gewerkschaftsbund, DGB, Industriegewerkschaft, IG.
 - The main search word is gewerkschaft, with few exceptions the word cover all kinds of unions, thus it saves time because a lot of the unions have changed name and been merged during the last 50 years. Ex: ÖTV, ver.di etc.
- Hits, associated organisations included: GEW/IG: Die Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW)/ The German Education Union (GEW), BAU: Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt/industrial affiliate of the DGB BCE:The IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE)/industrial affiliate of the DGB, BE: IG Bergbau un Energie/ later IG BCE, ÖTV: Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV). Now ver.di: ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft "United Services Union. Union was formed when the German Salaried Employees' Union (DAG) merged with four unions of the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) (DPG, HBV, ÖTV, IG Medien, IG Metall: Industrial Union of Metalworkers, part of DGB, IG Medien: IG Medien, druck und papier, now part of ver.di
- Norwegian search: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO, fagforening, forbund, 24 unions under LO. Many of the unions have merged and thus the old names of the unions is included in the data set. After some research on the unions web pages I have included the names of the unions before they merged. This is however only the unions that had no word hit on the main union name.
- List of LO- organisations with word hits, code in NSD data set included:
 - 6117 Landsorganisasjonen i Norge
 - 6588 Tele- og Dataforbundet

- 6044 Norsk Elektriker- og Kraftstasjonsforbund
 - 6465 Fellesforbundet
 - 6375 Norsk Barnevernpedagogforbund
 - 6306 Norsk Vernepleierforbund
 - 6253 Norsk Sosionomforbund
 - 6006 Norsk Forbund for Arbeidsledere og Tekniske Funksjonærer
 - 6075 Handel og Kontor (HK)
 - 6396 Norsk Olje- og Petrokjemisk Fagforbund
 - 6103 Norsk Kjemisk Industriarbeiderforbund
 - 6227 Norsk Treindustriarbeiderforbund
 - 6139 Norsk Musikerforbund
 - 6506 Norges Offisersforbund (NOF)
 - 6008 Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund (NAF)
 - 6123 Norsk Lokomotivmannsforbund (N.L.F.)
 - 6158 Norsk Postforbund
 - 6159 Den Norske Postorganisasjon
 - 6178 Norsk Sjømannsforbund (NSF)
 - 6220 Norsk Tjenestemannslag (NTL)
 - 6226 Norsk Transportarbeiderforbund (NTF)
 - 6141 Norsk Nærings- og Nytelsesmiddelarbeiderforbund (NNN)
 - 6237 Skolenes landsforbund (SL)
- The representatives have been given ascending ID numbers and all numbers are unique.
 - Transfers –direct transfers are difficult to establish because there is restricted information about year start-end.
 - Based on the web search all hits are extracted, documented and coded, including members (none-high positions).

Coding Norway and Germany:

- The criteria applied in both data sets: official positions meaning a position where the representative has a central role and tasks that go beyond mere membership or volunteer activity. The approach and definition is somewhat flexible and exploratory

and official positions ranges from president, board members, executive, managers, honorary member and Chair or Head of different committees and boards.

- The hits have been coded: None: 0, Member: 1, High position: 2, unclear 9.
- I have also coded position, transfer 1 and 2, overlap as three variables. The coding of all variables are as follows:
 - Transfer is the main variable in the data and includes all people that hold or have held an official position in the trade union, regardless of time and year. It is coded as 1 transfer, 2 no transfer, 9 uncertain.
 - Overlaps and position as main occupation are coded similar: 0 No position as main occupation/No overlap, 1 have worked fulltime in union/ overlap, 9 uncertain. Overlaps are understood in a narrow sense compared to transfer; only the rep. that have documented that they have actually had an official position in DGB or LO simultaneously as they were in parliament (year, from to end). The rest are coded 9 unclear.
 - Transfer 2: Direct transfer, subsequent years. Only Norwegian data. Coded similar as transfer 1.
- Coding of level: local, district and regional is lower level category 1, National level is 3, international level is 4, uncertain is 9 – members and none hits is part of this category. Most rep. have been representatives locally, but if they have had a national position they are coded as 3. Youth groups are not included as a value, because it is part of the organisation as a whole and thus coded regularly. If it is not apparent that it is national or lower level it is coded as 9 -uncertain. If there are several positions documented but only one is connected to a region or national level, it is coded in accordance with the level that is specified.
- When year is not specified it is coded as 0
- There is also an uncertain category (9), where all members and none hits are included.

Results:

Germany:

	Transfer		Overlaps		N	National level		Lower Level		Missing + int. level	N
	%	N	%	N		%	N	%	N		
Period 1	27%	50	5.4%	10	187	24%	12	56%	28	9+1	50
Period 2	18%	39	1.9%	4	215	28%	11	64%	25	3	39
Period 3	12%	31	0.8%	2	261	26%	8	65%	20	2+1	31
Period 4	8%	16	0	0	198	19%	3	75%	12	1	16

Norway:

Including alternate representatives:

	Transfer		Overlaps		N	National level		Lower Level		Missing + int. level	N
	%	N	%	N		%	N	%	N		
Period 1	16%	20	6.3%	8	127	75%	15	25%	5	0	20
Period 2	13%	17	2.2%	3	134	53%	9	47%	8	0	17
Period 3	20%	24	1.5%	1	118	58%	14	42%	10	0	24
Period 4	1.2%	2	0	0	167	100%	2	0	0	0	2

Excluding alternates representatives

	Transfer		Overlaps		N
	%	N	%	N	
Period 1	21%	16	6.4%	5	78
Period 2	16%	12	1.3%	1	76
Period 3	31%	20	1.5%	1	65
Period 4	4%	2	0	0	55