

Climate Changing Civil Society?

*- Norwegian non-state actors' channels, strategies,
and influence in the UNFCCC negotiations*

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Abstract

There has been a tremendous civil society presence at the UNFCCC negotiations. However, the extent to which they work strategically to influence the negotiations have varied. In this thesis, I consider the following research questions:

- 1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?
- 2) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?
- 3) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?

There is a growing academic literature on NGO influence in the climate negotiations, particularly looking at transnational networks. However, there is limited research on the Norwegian civil society specifically, that sheds light on their efforts to influence the international negotiations. The ambition of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the academic debate from this angle. In order to allow that and increase the applicableness to further research, the analytical framework on NGO influence in environmental negotiations developed by Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell is applied.

In this qualitative case study three different type of Norwegian non-state actors were chosen: a) a membership based activist environmental NGO, the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature; b) an intellectually based advisory environmental NGO, Bellona Foundation and; c) a lobbyist business NGO that represents an important sector in the national economy, Norwegian Shipowners' Association.

Based on informant interviews, document analysis, fieldwork, and former research, I find that these organisations apply a wide repertoire of strategies in order to influence various policy levels with an implication for the UNFCCC negotiations. Although the thesis started with a pessimistic perspective, through the empirical data and analysis, I conclude that there are in fact evidence of influence – at times quite significantly so.

Word count: 39 741

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It has been an exciting path. It started with my personal experience coordinating approximately a hundred delegates at the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. The tens of thousands of delegates from all over the world inside the Bella Centre, with more activists demonstrating outside – it was without doubt an overwhelming experience at times. The impressions from Copenhagen triggered my academic interest for civil society participation, and it has truly been an intriguing journey to dig into the strategies of professional, hardworking, and experienced organisations. It has undoubtedly been an educational path.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Arild Underdal for his wise guidance. I am truly grateful for the support throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis. Furthermore, the thesis would not been complete without the representatives from Naturvernforbundet (NNV), Bellona and Rederiforbundet (NSA), other NGO representatives, the Norwegian negotiators, former Environment Ministers and current Political Adviser, Members of Parliament, and staff from the UNFCCC Secretariat who allowed me their insights. It has been intriguing to learn from you all.

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Acronyms

BINGO	Business and industry non-governmental organisations
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBDR (-RC)	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (and Respective Capabilities)
COP	Conference of Parties
ENGO	Environmental non-governmental organisations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
HoD	Head of Delegation
ICS	International Chamber of Shipping
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
NNV	Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature/Friends of the Earth Norway (Norwegian name: Norges Naturvernforbund)
NSA	Norwegian Shipowners' Association (Norwegian name: Norges Rederiforbund)
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries
RINGO	Research and independent non-governmental organisations
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
TUNGO	Trade unions non-governmental organisations
YOUNGO	Youth non-governmental organisations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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1 Introduction

International security and global economics have traditionally been the core topics in world politics; nevertheless, some scholars argue that the environment has emerged as the third major issue (Porter et.al. 2000 in Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 261). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) organises its Conference of Parties (COPs) in December every year. The member states follow up their commitments from the first and second period of the Kyoto Protocol, and negotiate what should be the next agreement to be adopted in 2015. The climate negotiations between states have received substantial attention from civil society, and until 2009 about half of the hundred thousand delegates to the COPs were civil society representatives (Muñoz Cabré, 2011, p. 10). COP15 in Copenhagen marked the peak with unprecedented numbers of representatives from non-state actors present (approximately 15,000) (Spain, 2009). While the number of NGO delegates remain high, participation since COP15 has been restricted. Furthermore, the notable presence aside, the question remains whether these various civil society actors have the opportunity and the capability to affect the climate negotiations.

This thesis will thus study the channels of influence available for the Norwegian civil society organisations in the UNFCCC negotiations, specifically focusing on the time frame from COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, to COP20 in Lima, Peru. A ‘broad’ definition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will be applied in this regard – including both environmental NGOs and business associations. The reason for this is simple: amongst the Norwegian civil society actors with accreditation to the UNFCCC, there are three Business and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGOs¹), six Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs), and one Trade unions non-governmental organisation (TUNGO), in addition to a few research institutions (RINGOs). This is also the definition of NGOs applied by Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 66): “we use the term “NGOs” to refer to all these types of organisations, as long as they are involved in international environmental negotiations”. Skodvin (2012, p. 3) on the other hand makes a clear distinction between NGOs and “non-state actors” in her analysis – the peculiarity of NGOs being that they are organised, while non-state actors also includes “scientific communities and other forms of

¹ These abbreviations are also the names used for the NGO constituencies in the UNFCCC. The complete list can be found under section 1.5.

knowledge based networks”. As this thesis will study organised actors, it will thus apply both the limited term NGO and the broader term non-state actor interchangeably.

The relevance of the topic to political science is firstly due to the way in which climate change is currently affecting the world, and will most likely do so in the future. Changing biodiversity will influence the livelihood of people, including access to energy and key resources such as water. Furthermore, without appropriate measures, climate change has the potential to trigger resource conflicts, migration due to increasing sea levels and desertification, as well as influence the agricultural sector, to mention some possible consequences. The global level for policy making is key to finding ways to face these challenges, as it is a “borderless” question.

Secondly, civil society organisations have been actively present at the COPs, albeit with varying degrees of access to, and impact on, the decision-making processes. Thus, it is interesting to look into the COPs as a negotiation field and examine which strategies the various non-state actors apply in order to affect the outcome. Moreover, although there is extensive research on NGOs at COPs in general, there is a knowledge gap regarding Norwegian NGOs in particular. The Norwegian governments have generally had a positive and inclusive attitude towards civil society, facilitating arenas to influence government policy. Concurrently, it is an auspicious time to study the topic of civil society influence on the COPs from a Norwegian perspective, as the right wing government that was elected in 2013, removed the observers to the delegation (also called the “extended delegation”) which was introduced by the former centre-left government. This alteration shed light on a formal change in NGO access to the negotiations, which could followingly shed light on changes in NGO influence.

More generally, COP15 to COP20 also marks the period from the last attempt to reach a binding agreement at COP15 up to the negotiations leading up to the next top level meeting in Paris at COP21. Specifically for this study, it is also a significant period to study because changes in the NGO access have been introduced. One of the key alterations is that the number of NGO delegates has been significantly capped.

Last but not least, Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 68) describe findings of NGO influence in international environmental negotiations as “an interesting empirical puzzle”. Treaty making has been the domain of states, as UN members are the only ones with formal decision-making

power. Identifying the traces of influence from Norwegian NGOs and putting the puzzle together is therefore a key ambition of this thesis.

1.1 Research Questions

The research questions of this thesis are thus:

- 4) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?
- 5) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?
- 6) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?

The first research question concerns UNFCCC, and particularly its COPs, as a negotiation playing field for non-state actors, while the second question is related to the actors' choices of strategies in that particular structural framework, and the last is an assessment of their success in influencing the negotiations in the various channels they approach.

There are more than 1,400 organisations and institutions with accreditation to the UNFCCC. Among these, there are sixteen registered in Norway. This thesis will focus on the following business and environmental organisations: Bellona Foundation (*Miljøstiftelsen Bellona*), NNV – Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (*Naturvernforbundet*)², and NSA – Norwegian Shipowners' Association (*Rederiforbundet*). These non-state actors are of particular interest, as they have worked for climate policies from dissimilar thematic angles, channels, and strategies. Acknowledging the types of NGOs is key to understanding these differences.

Environmental NGOs can be distinguished by the type of approach they have. Lars H. Gulbrandsen and Steinar Andresen (2004, p. 56) differentiate between “activist” and “advisory” organisations. The first is a classic membership based organisation that achieves its legitimacy through popular support, while the latter is more expertise based and aims to provide legal, technical and scientific policy advice to the decision makers. Thus, to highlight the different types of green NGOs, NNV and Bellona have been chosen to represent these

² This organisation uses the names “Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature” and “Friends of the Earth Norway” interchangeably. I have chosen to use the Norwegian abbreviation NNV (Norges Naturvernforbund) that my interview objects used besides the full Norwegian name.

categories respectively. Furthermore, they also differ in terms of whom they try to influence. Bellona has worked towards the EU on a greater scale than NNV, which instead focuses on the Norwegian government.

Regarding NSA, shipping continues to be an important business sector in Norway. Furthermore, the industry makes Norway one of the fifteen largest shipping states internationally (Department for Transport, 2015). Globally, the maritime transport covers “around 80 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent of global trade by value” (UNCTAD, 2014b). The sector alone makes up between 2-3 per cent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Furthermore, shipping is tightly connected with the fossil industry as tanker trade (crude oil, petroleum products and gas) accounts for 29.8 per cent of the seaborne trade globally (UNCTAD, 2014a, p. 4). In Norway, 80 per cent of the ships built and/or equipped in the country’s shipyards are connected to the offshore oil and gas industry (Norges Rederiforbund, 2010a). As it is a highly globalised sector, one-sided national regulations may distort the competition, and global regulations (if any) concerning emissions are therefore preferred by NAS and others. NSA is thus an interesting business organisation case from a Norwegian as well as an international climate perspective.

The actors’ success will be studied using the term NGO influence. There is to a large extent a divide in the academic literature between research looking into BINGO and ENGO influence in climate negotiation. There are some notable exceptions such as Depledge (2005) and Vormedal (2008). This study is hence also a contribution in the efforts to bridge the gap. It must be specified that looking at the NGOs’ abilities to meet their goals, means that the actors themselves define the targets. This implies that the thesis is not limited to studying influence on the negotiation text but also other types of activities such as showcasing aimed at the involvement of target groups or success in indirect channels such as changing the Norwegian government’s position.

1.2 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

There is extensive research on civil society and the UN climate negotiations. However, the research on the Norwegian civil society in the international climate regime specifically is more limited, and thus provides a research opportunity. There are several studies looking into transnational ENGOs’ and BINGOs’ activities and influence in climate regimes. Michele

Merrill Betsill and Elisabeth Corell are two of the most prominent scholars in the field of NGO influence in international climate negotiations. In a study on ENGOs' influence in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Betsill (2008, p. 65) makes note of the need for further research on "how institutional rules, the nature of the issue, and the selection of particular strategies mediate between NGO activity and influence in international treaty negotiations". To study this link is a key ambition for this thesis by looking at the channels, strategies, and influence of various types of NGOs.

In international relations, including in regime theory, state-centric ideas have dominated. This is why it is interesting to consider *how* and *when* non-state actors may influence, as it may nuance this picture. In canvassing the channels available, the arenas defined by Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) will be a starting point: 1) international negotiations and processes; 2) domestic climate policy and ratification; 3) target groups' climate policy and behaviour and; 4) public opinion. This will be adjusted for the purpose of answering the research question.

Like states, nongovernmental organisations have access to various resources that can enable them to influence international environmental negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2008, pp. 22-26). To approach the second research question, the thesis will first look into the types of resources possessed by each NGO. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2004; 2005)³ carry out a systematic research on "green" NGOs' strategies and influence. Their conceptualisation of *activist* and *advisory* NGOs, and *insider* and *outsider strategy* will be the theoretical basis in analysing the non-state actors' strategies. In order to incorporate the BINGO perspective, Irja Vormedal's (2008) concept of grey and green BINGOs in the climate regime will be integrated to form the theoretical framework on the topic of NGO strategies.

Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 71) points out that "examining the effects of NGOs on international environmental negotiations is not the norm". They argue that many scholars have rather studied activities, access and resources but not influence itself. In order to approach the third research question, a definition of influence will be developed in the next chapter, before applying and adjusting Betsill and Corell's theoretical framework for NGO influence for the purpose of this thesis.

³ The research from 2005 will mostly be applied, and content will be drawn from the 2004 article to supplement the prior when the latter provides more in-depth analysis, and contributes to shed light on a topic.

1.3 Research Design

This research will be a case study of a selection of Norwegian NGOs at COP15-COP20 (2009-2014). In case study research, the focus is on “finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 31). What is the process leading towards a certain outcome?

The research question will be addressed both from a structural as well as an agency perspective. Firstly, the thesis will explore the structural level – the UNFCCC climate negotiations, with a particular interest in the channels available for civil society influence. Secondly, the actors’ choices of strategies will be discussed in light of the structural ‘playing field’ they are in. It is essential to both study the actors the NGOs decide to lobby (political parties/parliamentarians, Norwegian and other governments, EU etc.), in addition to the tools they apply (pressure through media, participation through the delegation, alliances etc.). In regards to the strategy, it is also necessary to evaluate the topics within the climate negotiations the various civil society organisations decide to focus on, and how ambitious their goals are. Have they chosen to focus on progressive approaches necessary to limit the temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius (or less) or policies that are more plausible to become adopted by the politicians – given that this is a contradiction. Thirdly, the perspective on agency is then drawn back to the structural level by studying whether the NGOs have impacted this level.

Data

Interviews with key actors from the aforementioned NGOs (Bellona, NNV, and NSA), government officials, and bureaucrats were conducted. Furthermore, publicly available documents from the NGOs, UNFCCC, and the ministries, and media monitoring reports served as sources of information for the document analysis. Furthermore, documents were also requested directly from the NGOs and the Norwegian government such as the position papers acquired from the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2014; Miljøverndepartementet, 2010, 2011, 2013a). *Klimaspillet* (The Climate Game) by Bård Lahn from NNV, who was the only NGO delegate on the Norwegian delegation (not the extended delegation) for several years, will be an additional source of

insight. Moreover, existing academic research will supplement the first-hand information collected.

1.4 Outline

The following chapter two will present previous research and the theoretical framework. Subsequently, chapter three will discuss the methods applied in this thesis. What are the benefits and challenges of the selected approaches, and how can these challenges be tackled? The following three chapters will approach each research question successively. The fourth chapter will thus study the channels available for the NGOs to influence the climate negotiations. Chapter five will look into the resources each organisation has, which channels they target, and the strategies they apply. The sixth chapter will based on these findings look into key strategic goals of each organisation, in order to consider whether they have had influence on these selected topics. As the research questions will be addressed directly in the concluding section of the three aforementioned chapters, the seventh and final chapter will thus shortly summarise the findings and highlight the explanatory value and analytical implications, before concluding and encouraging further research.

2 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

“[I]t is critical to deepen our concerns for the pervasive role of the non-state actors as players in the process of regime creation, implementation and operation of regimes. [...] No issue area constitute a better laboratory in which to study these developments than international environmental affairs.” – Oran R. Young & Konrad von Moltke (1994, pp. 361-362).

There is limited in depth research on Norwegian actors’ strategies and influence towards the UNFCCC negotiations. This thesis’ mission is thus to explore how three selected actors can contribute to the existing theories on NGO channels, strategies, and influence in international climate negotiations. Through such an analysis, the study aims to engage in the ongoing academic debate by matching the research on non-state influence towards the UNFCCC negotiations with a concrete case study. This chapter will present and discuss the existing academic literature and theories relevant for each research questions before concluding with theoretic approaches.

In order to set the theoretical framework for the research questions, theoretical background on non-state actors’ place in international relations and literature review will be presented before going more specifically into the arenas of influence available to NGOs. The second section will thus explore the concrete theories relevant to the first research question: the channels of influence. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) highlight four such arenas that will serve as the basis which will be adjusted for the purpose of this thesis.

The following section will approach the second element of the research questions: strategies applied. The framework of “activist”/“advisory” ENGO types by Andresen & Gulbrandsen (2004; 2005) will be presented, and adapted to encompass BINGOs as well by supplementing it with the theoretical framework on “green”/“grey” BINGOs developed by Vormedal (2008). This synthesis will serve as the theoretical framework for analysing the strategies. Finally, the last research question on the success of the NGOs’ in reaching their goals will be addressed. To study this question, the term NGO influence is firstly defined, before moving on to present the analytical tool developed by Betsill and Corell (2008) that will be adjusted in order to suit this thesis’ aim.

2.1 Theoretical Background and Literature Review

Liberal internationalists challenged the realist idea of state-centric international relations, including theories about international cooperation. On the other hand, states can also dominate *within* that international cooperation. The growing engagement from civil society on the international arena, therefore presents an interesting aspect of the debate in international relations. Analysts started to see “the increasing presence of NGOs at the international arena as indication of a more fundamental change in the basic features of the international system itself and as a change to the state-centred paradigm of international relations theory” (Risse 2002 in Skodvin, 2012, p. 2)⁴.

The growing international political scene represents an arena of influence in itself with its own dynamics; nevertheless, with only a few exceptions⁵ states remain the actors with formal power (such as voting rights). State-centric perspectives have thus been dominant in understanding global environmental politics in international relations (Paterson, 1996; Saurin, 1996). Risse (1995, p. 13), however, suggests that it is not necessarily a contradiction to recognise that states are significant actors while also acknowledging transnational actors’ influence in state interests and relations. Peter Willetts, an authoritative scholar in the field of civil society in international relations, examined non-state influence and found that NGOs did in fact challenge the state-centric view, and that states no longer were *gatekeepers* who controlled the interactions in their environment but rather communicated, negotiated, and cooperated with NGOs (Willetts, 1982, 1993, 1996).

The literature on NGOs’ in international regimes is to a great extent influenced by social movement theories (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005), constructivist theories (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 1995, 2000), and organisational theory on networks (Powell, 1990). Peter Newell is one of the scholars that challenge the state-centric perspective specifically in terms of the climate regime. Newell (2000, p. 161) builds his research on the transnationalist projects of the neoliberal Keohane & Nye’s (1972) and further development by the constructivist Willetts. He argues that non-state actors (ENGOs, researchers, industry groups, and media) have formed and developed the international climate regime. As we shall see in

⁴ Formerly Risse-Kappen.

⁵ For example Skodvin (2012) point out that non-state actors, particularly researchers, have increased their formal power in international environmental negotiations.

the following sections, Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell are also key scholars who systematically explored how to analyse NGO influence in international environmental negotiations.

The case studies in this thesis are three primarily domestic NGOs, nonetheless, the presented literature will be relevant and valuable in understanding how these organisations navigate in the international climate negotiations. Furthermore, the starting point of this thesis is the NGOs and not a topic. Thus, it has a different starting point than much of the research presented here, and adjustments to the theoretical framework must be carried out respectively. Let us now look into the theoretical perspectives and literature more specifically linked to the three research questions regarding *channels*, *strategies*, and *influence* in the climate negotiations.

2.2 Channels: Intergovernmental State-centric?

In this landscape, Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) identify four channels that they assume that NGOs, depending on the type, will attempt to impact the climate regime through: 1) international negotiations and processes; 2) domestic climate policy and ratification; 3) target groups' climate policy and behaviour and; 4) public opinion. These points are rather self-explanatory, except the third that Andresen and Gulbrandsen exemplifies with companies and BINGOs. Adding to that, scientists and other opinion-makers (such as think tanks) will be included in that category. A problem with Andresen and Gulbrandsen's framework for the arenas that NGOs address is that it does not encompass the regional level nor foreign governments. Foreign government delegations *at the negotiations* itself are of course covered by their first point, but some NGOs do operate in foreign countries as well as in the regional arena (such as in Brussels to impact EU policies). These arenas will be incorporated in the second category for the purpose of this thesis, making it: 2') national and regional policy and ratification.

Yamin and Depledge (2004) list up the following NGO activities available in the international negotiation channel: a) lobbying government delegates; b) circulating information and position papers; c) working with the media; d) hosting side events; e) making interventions during debates and; f) monitoring developments in the negotiations. It must also be noted that NGOs use various coalitions (in addition to direct contact) in order to lobby the governments

(activity ‘a’ in Yamin & Depledge 2004). Instead of trying to approach delegates directly at the COPs, competing for attention with the tremendous amount of other delegates present and a tight schedule, NGOs may choose to navigate and canalise their efforts through alliances and networks (such as Climate Action Network or International Chamber of Shipping) and/or the recognised UNFCCC constituencies.

In many cases, it will be natural for NGOs to work with their own country’s delegation in international negotiations. However, if this channel is blocked Keck and Sikkink (1998) explain that another channel can be created. They call it the *boomerang pattern*. The boomerang effect occurs when the NGOs bypass their domestic government to ally themselves with foreign states, in order to influence an intergovernmental organisation and/or their own government (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Having access to these channels however will not in itself suffice in making an impact. A “significant conceptual confusion exists in the global governance literature” between access and participation (Uhre, Tallberg, Duit, & Beyers, 2013, p. 15). Hence, there is a need to first look into the ways of participating – the *strategies*, before moving on to understanding how *influence* occurs.

2.3 Strategy: Activists, Advisors or Lobbyists

In order to understand the strategies available, one must firstly map the terrain and then evaluate the type of organisation and followingly the tools available. The former section gave the analytical foundation for studying the setting that the non-state actors navigate in, and this section will therefore first look into the types of NGOs before elaborating on the theories on the strategies that can be expected from the environmental and business NGOs.

NGO Types

Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) differentiate between “activist” vs. “advisory” *types* of environmental organisations. While activist organisations “obtain funding and legitimacy through membership and popular support”, the advisory organisations obtain these “through their ability to give policy recommendations and provide decision makers with legal, technical or scientific advice”. Somewhat similar to this distinction but with other terms, NGOs (more generally) can also be distinguished by how radical their stance is on climate

change. Jackson and Sørensen (2010, pp. 261-263) point to the “modernist” versus “ecoradical” approach to the issue of environment. Briefly explained, the modernist view is that improvement in science will be sufficient to protect the environment while the ecoradicals’ opinion is that human activities are challenging the planet’s capacity and ecosystem, and therefore, technology is not sufficient and drastic changes in modern lifestyles are required in order to face these problems. This can affect how close the NGOs’ approach is to what is acceptable for some governments, and thus the potential of their impact. This distinction between ecoradical and modernist ENGOs, is complementary, rather than incompatible, to Gulbrandsen and Andresen’s model, due to the similarities between the ecoradicals/activist NGOs and modernist/advisory NGOs.

NGO Strategies

While states can exercise various tactics of influence, such as those Holsti (1995) points to: a) persuasion; b) offering rewards; c) granting rewards; d) threatening with punishment; e) inflict non-violent punishment and; f) use of force, these cannot be directly applied to NGOs in UN negotiations. Firstly, there are formal restrictions for those who attend the UNFCCC negotiations, thus, *using force* would simply get the NGO delegate(s) expelled from that meeting or even permanently. As such, it is an option but not a relevant one. Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 74) argue that a) *persuasion* is the only way for non-state actors to influence government representatives. Based on this argument, they apply David Knoke’s definition to their study on NGOs’ influence in international environmental negotiations and define NGO influence as “when they intentionally transmit information to negotiators that alters both the negotiation process and outcome from what would have occurred otherwise” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 66, 74). The key element of their definition is *information* that creates influence. It must also be noted that not only the *outcome* (eg. final negotiation text) is considered, but also the negotiation *process* (eg. the agenda).

However, d) *punishment* as enlisted in Holsti’s definition of state influence can also be applied to NGOs; for example, NGOs can punish governments through ‘shaming’ in the media and/or through actions in order to affect the public opinion – and ultimately create pressure that could change a state’s position. Conversely, *rewards* (b and c) can also be given to some extent. Although states usually have more financial resources, non-state actors can offer other types of resources as a reward. For example, they can promise to use their

exclusive network (ie. CAN) in order to promote/speak positively about a country’s position. The non-state actors can also offer “faming” by embracing a country’s policy or even carry out so called “greenwashing” (deceptive green marketing). In the updated theoretical framework, Betsill and Corell (2008, pp. 23-24) now recognise the other tactics as well for NGOs. More specifically Princen and Finger (1994, p. 37) for example argue that NGOs’ leverage can be linked to “expertise, grass-roots support, a transnational base or network, the ability to rectify information imbalances, and, above all, public legitimacy”.

According to Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172) “relationship between [green] NGO types and resources, levels targeted and strategies” can be summarised as below:

	Activist NGO	Advisory NGO
Critical resources	Membership base	Intellectual base
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy Target groups Public opinion	International negotiations Domestic policy (Target groups)
Strategy	Dual strategy: insider and outsider	Insider only

Table 2.1 “Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies” (Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 172).

The critical resource is the source of leverage that can contribute to influence. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, pp. 171-172) list up the following resources: 1) intellectual base which is issue-specific knowledge and the ability to give expert advise; 2) membership base is simply the NGOs’ number of members; 3) political base is the NGO’s access to decision makers and lastly; 4) financial base is financial resources that can be channelled into “campaigns, lobbying, participation at conferences, commissioning of expert reports etc.”. This list is not exhaustive, but its purpose is to “show that the types of leverage an NGO can apply will contribute to defining the organisation’s *opportunity set*” (Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 172).

Insider strategy focuses on knowledge construction, research-based reports, policy solutions, and expert advice (Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004, p. 56). In this strategy, NGOs work closely with the negotiators and decision makers. *Outsider strategy*, on the other hand, applies

tactics aiming at influencing the public opinion in order “to induce states to be more flexible in international negotiations, to push governments to comply with international commitments and to give polluters and environmentally harmful corporations negative public exposure”. This is carried out through pressuring governments and negotiators, and target groups through various means such as “campaigning, letters of protest, rallying, direct actions, boycotts, and even civil disobedience”. According to Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005), activist NGOs combine the two strategies while advisory NGOs mainly apply the insider strategy.

How does the BINGOs fit into this picture? Irja Vormedal (2008) studies the influence of business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) in promoting carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) within the UNFCCC negotiations. She develops an analytical framework that encompasses both the formal and informal channels, and argues that the BINGOs influenced regulatory design, particularly based on their corporate technological power. In an effort to bridge the divide between the business lobby and NGO influence literature, she bases her analytical framework for BINGOs on methodology that originates from the analysis of ENGO influence at environmental negotiations (Vormedal, 2008). Her analytical approach is also compatible with the theory on influence by Betsill and Correll that will be presented later, as Vormedal also bases her framework on their model.

Vormedal (2008) first distinguishes the types of BINGOs from “grey” to “green” BINGOs, according to how they view climate change mitigation, the strategies and mandate they apply, and their tactics, as illustrated in table 2.2 below:

BINGO Continuum	“Gray”		↔	“Green”
	1	2	3	4
Views on climate change mitigation	Reactionary, anti-emissions control	Accept frameworks for climate mitigation and GHG regulation	Acknowledge/ endorse need for climate mitigation and GHG regulation	View climate change as a business opportunity
Mandates and strategies	Obstruct efforts to negotiate binding regulations	Promote the interests of member companies in the regime, in particular with respect to regulatory/policy instruments and mitigation options	Promote business-friendly regulations, including market mechanisms and specific mitigation technologies; Promote level playing fields	Promote stringent, mandatory GHG regulation and financing of clean-tech development
Tactics	Financial inducement and lobbying	Information-based lobbying	Information-based lobbying & discursive tactics	Information-based lobbying
Examples	GCC, AIGH, ACC	WCI, IPIECA, WNA, ←-ICC	IETA, WBCSD→	BCSE

Table 2.2. “Gray-Green Continuum of BINGOs in the Climate Regime” (Vormedal, 2008, p. 41).

As can be seen in table 2.2, she has four categories that indicate how pro-climate a BINGO is, and which implications she expects for the mandates, strategies and tactics chosen. Vormedal applies Alpin and Hegarty’s notion of information-based political strategies to define information-based lobbying as something that “may involve providing governments with expert advice, technical reports and position papers, and assisting decision-makers directly with policy formulation and the writing of legal texts”, and later adds networking with key decision-makers, and discursive tactics (Vormedal, 2008, p. 43).

Based on table 2.1, the following table 2.3 illustrates an adaption of the table by Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172) to encompass the business actor by supplementing the theory from Vormedal (2008) as presented in table 2.2:

	Activist ENNGO	Advisory ENNGO	Lobbyist BINGO
Critical resources	Membership base	Intellectual base	Financial base
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy Target groups Public opinion	International negotiations Domestic policy (Target groups)	International negotiations Domestic policy
Strategy	Dual strategy: insider and outsider	Insider only	Insider only

Table 2.3. Analytical Framework for the NGOs’ Strategies.

This study will use this as an analytical framework in order to understand the strategies of the selected NGOs. Looking at the critical resources, NNV falls under the activist ENGO category, while Bellona is more an advisory ENGO, and NSA a green or grey BINGO. NSA’s position on the green/grey continuum will be assessed through the empirical findings. The policy arena and the theories on strategies based on the types of NGO have been presented, so let us now move on to explore how NGO influence can be understood.

2.4 Theory on Non-state Actors’ Influence

Paradoxically, the term “influence” has not been properly defined in many studies focusing on NGO influence in international negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68). One issue is that it will be difficult to compare across cases, while another is that it causes the risk of over-determination – the research only focuses on successes and not the failures. Furthermore, as a related matter to lack of definition in the academic literature, Andresen and Gulbrandsen

(2005) point out that some scholars confuse NGO “access” with “influence”. Similarly, NGO “activity” and “resources” have also been presented as evidence of influence.

Let us look into some examples. Many NGOs have *access* to the negotiations but their primary goal is not necessarily lobbying for their policies into the negotiation texts but rather to gain knowledge about the UNFCCC process and communicate that to their target audience. Access for some NGOs is simply access to knowledge – not necessarily the wish to influence. Hence, access to the UNFCCC and activities at COPs can be indications of *how* attempts to influence may happen, but are not alone evidence on *whether* NGOs have an intention to influence or succeed in affecting the negotiations.

In “Activists Beyond Borders” Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 25-26) point out that it is necessary to study goal attainment at several different levels. However, this will not be sufficient to prove isolated influence by single actors. Although there are overlaps between an actor’s policy and the outcome, the influence could originate from other sources. Thus, correlation must not be confused with causation.

NGO influence can be mapped out by “building a logical chain of evidence linking NGO transmission of information, actors’ use/non-use of that information, and the effects/non-effects of that information” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 71-72). They argue that this chain of evidence can be established by looking at the NGO’s *access*, *activities and resources*, and *goal attainment*. Adding to this, *response* by the negotiators and politicians should be added as a perspective to their model. This is because, in general, behaviour by an NGO in one context may affect the receiver’s perception of the same NGO’s message in a later instance of lobbying. Additionally, although the information is not transmitted immediately due to restrictions that the negotiators/politicians/bureaucrats face, the idea may be brought back to light at a later stage. Hence, though the focus is on 2009-2014, broader perspectives must be considered when relevant. The logical chain of evidence can be summarised as presented in the illustration 2.1 below.




Illustration 2.1. Chain of evidence on NGO influence

This line of thought is also reflected in and supports the research questions: which channels of influence are there (access), which strategies are applied (activities and resources), and do the NGOs succeed in reaching their goals (response and goal attainment)? However, access alone does not give the whole picture on the environment in which the NGOs operate. Hence, in studying the channels, it is essential to also understand how an actor stands among other potential influencers.

In *NGO Diplomacy – the Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations*, Betsill and Corell (2008, p. 24) argue that the definition of NGO influence in environmental negotiations occurs “when one actor intentionally communicates to another so as to alter the latter’s behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise”. Betsill and Corell (2008) notes that communication encompasses a variety of methods (from technical information to threats etc.). This updated definition therefore accommodates criticism from amongst others Skodvin (2012) towards their 2001 article. Vormedal (2008, p. 44) on the other hand, criticise Betsill and Corell’s definition as it “fails to define the type of behaviour being caused”.⁶ She points to Dahl’s relational concept of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203). The argument is that it is contingent that the change in behaviour reflects the intentions by the sender of the message. Hence, taking Vormedal’s criticism into

⁶ Vormedal addresses Betsill and Corell’s article from 2001 but the criticism is also valid for the updated definition in the book from 2008.

consideration, NGO influence can be defined as: *when A intentionally communicates to B so as to alter B's behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise and bringing about A's intended effects.*

Betsill and Corell (2008, pp. 34-35) develop their analytical framework and a system to assess NGO influence as illustrated in the table 2.4 below:

	Influence indicators	Evidence		NGO influence? (yes/no)
		Behaviour of other actors...	...as caused by NGO communication	
Influence on negotiation process	Issue framing	How was the issue understood prior to the start of the negotiations? Was there a shift in how the issue was understood once the negotiations were underway?	What did NGOs do to bring about this understanding?	
	Agenda setting	How did the issue first come to the attention of the international community? What specific items were placed on or taken off the negotiation agenda? What were the terms of debate for specific agenda items?	What did NGOs do to shape the agenda?	
	Positions of key actors	What was the initial position of key actors? Did key actors change their position during the negotiations?	What did NGOs do to shape position of key actors?	
Influence on negotiation outcome	Final agreement/procedural issues	Does the agreement create new institutions to facilitate NGO participation in future decision-making processes? Does the agreement acknowledge the role of NGOs in implementation?	What did NGOs do to promote these procedural changes?	
	Final agreement/substantive issues	Does the agreement reflect the NGO position about what should be done on the issue?	What did the NGOs do to promote these substantive issues?	

Table 2.4. "Indicators of NGO influence" (Betsill & Corell, 2008, pp. 34-35)

As this thesis' research questions has a broader scope than the UNFCCC as an arena (as it will also study indirect channels to the international negotiations), this table will purely serve as a foundation to assist the analysis of influence. Together with the definition on NGO influence, it will guide the analysis of influence based on the collected data.

3 Method

This chapter will firstly present the case selection suited to answer the research questions, followed by challenges and benefits of the choices. Secondly, the description and discussion of methods will be presented before considering threats to validity and reliability and how that can be counteracted.

3.1 Case Selection

The potential sample was first narrowed to the organisations with a consultative status to the UNFCCC, then following some initial research, three organisations were selected on the basis that they apparently used different strategies and channels of influence. George and Bennett (2005, p. 83) stress that the selection must match the research objective. The following section will thus shortly present how the cases were narrowed down and finally selected, by discussing their relevance and feasibility to answer the research questions.

3.1.1 Consultative Status to the UNFCCC

Firstly, media sources and impressions from previous participation at COP15 were used in order to gather a general picture of the Norwegian non-state participation. However, neither media exposure nor visibility at a COP are not necessarily the most effective strategy and/or accessible for all organisations. Therefore, the list of accredited Norwegian organisations to the UNFCCC appeared as a natural starting point of case selection.

As this thesis does not solely focus on the UNFCCC negotiation as an arena of influence, it can be argued that limiting case selection to organisations with consultative status would exclude non-state actors that also engage in the topic through other channels. Some Norwegian environmental NGOs, such as Zero and Future in Our Hands (Framtiden i våre hender), work domestically to influence Norwegian climate policy but not in the UNFCCC negotiations.

The consultative status, however, can be considered as a sign of active interest to the UNFCCC negotiations, and not simply Norway's climate policy. Many actors participate in the domestic climate debate; nevertheless, there is arguably less discussion more concretely on the Norwegian delegation's strategies or international targets and how those should be met.

Furthermore, the application procedure for the UNFCCC is somewhat comprehensive; the applicant is among other things required to present documentation on relevant activities to indicate the organisations' competence on UNFCCC related topics, and the applicant must apply more than a year prior to a COP (UNFCCC, 2015). In other words, organisations must decide whether it is a priority worth the efforts. Other channels, such as own national governments and the media are supplementary in the context of this thesis – they are means by which organisations try to influence what happens with the Norwegian delegation's position as well as the overall outcome of the international negotiations. The most relevant actors in this regard are thus those that have decided that UNFCCC is a platform they choose to use.

Another perspective potentially neglected in this case selection is that certain non-state actors will partake in the UNFCCC negotiations through another organisation's accreditation. Nature and Youth (Natur og ungdom), youth parties⁷ and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) do not have direct accreditation, but still participate through other NGO delegations or through international umbrella organisations. To eliminate these in the selection was a conscious choice in order to limit the scope of the research. It would not be feasible for the purpose of this thesis to get in touch with the over 1,500 organisations with consultative status to UNFCCC to seek out Norwegian delegates. Some NGO delegates are even included in national delegations from countries other than their own. Thus, selecting cases from the organisations directly accredited and registered in Norway is a purposeful starting point for case selection. Lastly, the Norwegian Council for Children and Youth (LNU) does not have accreditation, but has a youth delegate on the Norwegian delegation to the UNFCCC (LNU, 2015a, 2015b; Rotevatn, 2015). As I am currently involved with LNU as the UNFCCC youth delegate for 2015, this could potentially affect the academic distance needed, and LNU was thus eliminated as a case.

3.1.2 The Different NGO Types

Three organisations were selected on the basis that they use different strategies and channels of influence. As presented in the former theoretical chapter, Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) distinguish between member based and intellectually focused environmental

⁷ In Norway, the youth parties are mostly organisations independent from their mother parties rather than integral youth wings of political parties.

organisations. In order to reflect this perspective, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (NNV) and Bellona Foundation were respectively obvious choices among the Norwegian ENGOs with accreditation. Furthermore, NNV is an interesting case as it has a unique channel of influence through a delegate on the official Norwegian delegation (and not just the extended delegation). In order to highlight a different perspective and dynamics that could illustrate another approach than ENGOs, Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA) was selected. Shipping is a key industry in Norway and is as such an interesting case to explore. Moreover, as this particular business sector is highly exposed to international competition and is a topic under discussion in the UNFCCC since it is responsible for 2-3 per cent of global CO₂ emissions, NSA has an interest in influencing potential international or country specific regulations.

As presented in the introduction, there are other constituencies such as research NGOs (RINGOs), trade union NGOs (TUNGOs), and youth NGOs (YOUNGOs) as well. However, ENGOs, researchers and BINGOs are “considered to be among the most long-standing and active observer constituencies participating in the climate regime” (Depledge 2005 in Vormedal, 2008, p. 37). As this thesis studies organised interests, RINGOs were excluded. Moreover, increasing the number of organisations to study would affect the time available to study each individual case, and as the purpose of this study is to supplement the existing research that mainly looks into the non-state influence on the global level, it is more suitable to allow in depth qualitative research by limiting the number.

Beyond the question on the number of interviews practically feasible, an important aspect of these particular research questions was an aim to gain an in-depth understanding of all the topics that each organisation worked on in the climate negotiations. UNFCCC is often described as a highly technical negotiation process with a complex structure of alliances. Adding to that, proper understanding of for example mitigation targets, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), deforestation and forest degradation, the shipping industry, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), etc. (that are some illustrations of the topics NNV, NSA and Bellona work on) was essential in order to be able to carry out the interviews effectively. Therefore, an understanding of the intricate negotiation process and all the topics connected to each organisation's strategy was also taken into consideration when deciding on the number of organisations to study.

Accessibility was another reason for the actors chosen. Of the business NGOs (BINGOs), I had a contact within NSA who could introduce me to those working on climate issues. Other BINGOs would require efforts that would not necessarily bear fruits. In addition to representing a key industry, the choice of NSA was therefore also of a pragmatic nature taking into consideration the feasibility for this thesis.

3.1.3 Time Frame

The period that this thesis will study is mainly from 2009 (COP15 in Copenhagen) to 2014 (COP20 in Lima). COP15 was a decisive moment as it was supposed to lead to a new international agreement that would replace the Kyoto Protocol, and failed to do so. More specifically for the purpose of the thesis' research questions, it was the peak year in non-state participation with approximately 15,000 non-state delegates (Spain, 2009). Since then, the number of delegates from observer organisations has been highly restricted. However, due to the nature of the topics studied in this thesis the period is indicative. As previously mentioned, influence happens over varying amount of time. Therefore, activities from other periods will also be considered when relevant to the primary time frame.

3.2 Description of Method

This thesis is a case study in which data is collected through field study, informant interviews and document analysis. Additionally, relevant existing research will supplement the first-hand data. This method will allow for a holistic image of the channels of influence available, the strategies applied and the influence of NNV, NSA, and Bellona.

The various sources and the different methods of data collection (particularly whether the researcher has an active or passive relation to the data) affect the results that surface. While documents are static, interviews and fieldwork require a more active researcher role. Keeping this in mind, it is important to have a clear understanding of how to benefit from the complementary nature of the data. These sources were therefore approached in the following manner: 1) the first phase starts as the more "passive" document analysis in addition to studying former research which establish a firm foundation for; 2) the field study that allows first hand active information-gathering that further strengthens the background knowledge that helps prepare; 3) the informant interviews in which further active data is collected and

former impressions adjusted and finally; 4) the last phase returns to the document analysis, former research, and follow-up communication whenever necessary. Let us now look into each data type.

3.2.1 Document Analysis

Organisations' position papers, strategy documents, and annual reports are some of the key documents essential to mapping out and understanding the strategies and positions of each organisation. Official government documents, such as white papers, Norwegian submissions to the UNFCCC, and speeches by the Prime Minister and Environment Ministers, will be studied in order to look into the policies of the government. The Norwegian delegation has a detailed position paper for the COPs and inter-sessional meetings. Not all of these were published, and were hence acquired directly from the Ministry for Climate and Environment. Official UN documents such as treaties and conventions will also be studied.

Media sources and newsletters by organisations will be subjects for analysis, in order to understand the organisations as well as the decision makers. Carrying out targeted searches in the media database Atekst owned by Retriever (a leading media monitor supplier in the Nordic countries that covers almost two hundred news sources) will allow thorough examinations. This will be a source of information on concrete statements by the three NGOs and the decision makers, as well as a way to gain an overview of the media activity by these organisations during the UNFCCC negotiations. Additionally, bulletins that cover the daily activities in the negotiations such as ECO and Earth Negotiations Bulletin are useful sources that allows specific insight into the detailed negotiation process.

3.2.2 Field Study

Although this thesis researches climate conferences back to COP15 in 2009, it was still essential for the development of this research with a field study at COP20 in Lima, Peru. I have previously participated at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 through an international NGO delegation from the International Federation of the Liberal Youth (IFLRY). This was a source of inspiration for the research questions, and a source of several assumptions prior to my research. The field study at COP20, however, was an indispensable part of this research, particularly due to the fact that it countered many of my a priori assumptions in regards to Norwegian non-state participation.

Although I participated in COP15, I had almost no direct interaction with Norwegians outside my own delegation. Thus, the subjects were not exposed to my previous role that could potentially affect their impression of my role as a researcher. On the other hand, it was an important background experience both to navigate efficiently at a complex event and to interpret the situation. After the end of the field work and the interviews I have asked some of the subjects who I met during the field study whether they were aware of my former background, and those who I asked had not noticed.

A moderate type of participant observation was chosen in order to balance the insider and outsider perspective. In practice, this meant participating in formal and informal settings; nevertheless, staying somewhat passive in conversations in the sense that I would rather ask questions than give my own opinions in discussions, and in meetings I would simply stay in the background.

A principal purpose of the field work was of course to accumulate an impression of the work of the Norwegian organisations through observations and talks, but it also became an indispensable part of the study in that such comprehensive participation over two weeks allowed for access to unique information that could not have been achieved solely from interviews. Through the field study experience, I was able to highlight nuances in the interview setting later, as I had established concrete ideas about what I should ask beyond the standard questions. In addition to contributing to the formulation of pointed questions, the fieldwork was also useful in helping the subjects to refresh their memories if their memory halted.

3.2.3 Informant Interviews

Gerring (2009, p. 45) points out that case study research can “offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting” in studying decisional behaviour. Furthermore, Dennis Chong argues that the advantage of in-depth interviews in this regard, is that the researcher can more fully record how subjects arrive at their opinions (Chong 1993 in Gerring, 2009, p. 45).

The informant interviews were qualitative and in-depth, carried out in a semi-structured manner. The interview guide thus covers a series of questions, however without a strict order and also including questions with open-ended answers. The prepared questions will allow

certain standardisation to the acquisition of information while also allowing the informants to speak freely – opening for added perspectives to what is covered in the interview guide. In the interview setting, an active researcher role was selected. *Active* in this context does not imply overriding or asking leading questions to the subject. Rather, while being an attentive listener, it is about taking the initiative when suited in order to test the researcher’s own assumptions or the basis of the subject’s observations, descriptions, and assessments (Andersen, 2006, p. 280). During the interview with the Norwegian Head of Delegation (2013-) Aslak Brun stated that he had not noticed much of NSA’s influence directly, however, later in the interview he was well aware of the shipowners’ interests in the negotiations (Brun, 2015). That interview moment is an illustration on how an active researcher role and a semi-structured interview format were useful to explore the origins of Brun’s source of knowledge which he had not initially reflected on, in order to examine whether it could be understood as indirect political influence from NSA.

The informants were chosen through the “position method” – meaning that they have a certain power, influence, and knowledge due to a formal position, instead of the “reputation method” that seeks out influencers through their reputation (Engelstad, 2010, pp. 174-175). Engelstad points out that although the latter could contribute to uncovering actors who affect decision-making indirectly, it could also contribute to unnecessarily clouding the results. The institutions to be studied in this thesis have divisions of labour that allow an effective selection of relevant subjects; hence, the position method appeared most appropriate.

The informants chosen in NNV, NSA and Bellona were thus presidents and other key employees/representatives working specifically on the UNFCCC negotiations. To highlight the authorities’ recipient perspective, former and current Heads of Delegations and Environment Ministers (in one case the Minister’s Political Adviser), the President of the Parliamentary Committee on Energy and Environment, and negotiators/bureaucrats working on topics related to the three NGOs strategic goals, were chosen as subjects. Additionally, the UNFCCC NGO Liaison Officer was an important source who could supplement the knowledge gained from official documents. Other key informants were a representative from The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM) who has coordinated civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation and authorities. Additionally, third party perspectives were obtained through interviews and talks with Norwegian researchers who have followed the negotiations.

3.3 Discussion of Method

Case study was selected as the approach for this thesis. Robert K. Yin argues that case study research is “the preferred method, compared to the others, in situations when (1) the main research questions are ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions; (2) a researcher has little or no control over behavioural events; and (3) the focus of study is a contemporary (as opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon.” (Yin, 2014, p. 2). Case study thus appears as a suited method to answer the research questions. Mitchell (2004, p. 122), on the other hand, is critical to this method stating that “[t]he findings of carefully designed case studies often fit the case studied well but cannot be convincingly extended to many, and sometimes to any, other cases”. As presented in the previous chapter, a substantial amount of research has been developed particularly on transnational NGOs and networks, however less so on Norwegian NGOs work directed at the UNFCCC. The in-depth understanding provided by a case study, is hence valuable in this phase in a research field. Furthermore, by applying the analytical framework by Betsill and Corell (2008) as presented in the previous chapter, it allows the researcher to highlight the uniqueness of each case while also being able to draw more generalised conclusions, and letting others apply the findings in this study in a comparative analysis.

The research questions ask for the channels available for the civil society, strategies applied, and the evaluation of the outcome of their tactics. Thus, it is essential to find key informants who have proper insight into these topics within their organisation/institution, and are able to share knowledge in a comprehensive manner. Accordingly, informant interviews appear as a suitable choice of method. However, there are several potential pitfalls in carrying out an interview – particularly with the elite. Firstly, informants in general are often inclined to create a positive portrayal of their self-image, and speak from their own point of view (Goffman, 1992). Consequently, the civil society representatives may present a favourable picture of their own accomplishments. Also, the civil servants and the politicians may as well opt for such a positive description of the non-state actors’ influence in decision-making, if they are motivated to present themselves as having an open approach towards civil society. Secondly, elites will have a stronger ability to control the interview situation, and potentially neglect the interviewer’s perception (Engelstad, 2010, p. 185). They are also more accustomed to presenting an official statement.

Several counter strategies were set in place in order to withstand these difficulties. One sided and potentially too positive (or negative) portrayals of civil society's accomplishments, will be avoided by matching the information gathered from one interview with statements from other informants (including third parties) and document analysis, in order to verify/modify/contradict claims. Regarding the elite's influence over the interview situation, this must be countered by doing comprehensive background research and also being aware of the interview subject's power. Given the value of informants' insights, and with these counter measures in place, the informant interviews were a productive way to answer the research questions.

3.4 Threats to Validity and Reliability

A key threat to the validity and reliability in this research is that due to the informants being very resourceful, there is a higher risk that the subjects may attempt to steer the direction of the interview. Svein S. Andersen (2006, p. 279) argues that a conscious and active research role can increase the analytical control, and thus improve the validity and reliability. If for example, there are topics that are more sensitive, the informants may try to avoid it. In the case of NSA, there is an internal disagreement within the shipping industry, particularly between shipbrokers and shipowners, regarding the speed of the ship, which has implications for climate friendliness/energy efficiency and delivery efficiency. Thus, it was important to accumulate sufficient knowledge of the industry and carefully ask the question in order to highlight a topic with implications for their strategic thinking (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). This is one of many examples in which an active research role contributed to tackle the threat to validity and reliability in an interview setting.

Particularly for the interviews that dealt with negotiations a few years back, memory of the informants could contribute to a reduced reliability and validity (Andersen, 2006, pp. 292-293). Andersen points to psychological research that shows unique memories, particularly on complex subjects, are more difficult to reconstruct correctly compared to situations characterised by routines. This issue did in fact occur in some of the interviews; however, this threat was tackled through the previously mentioned verification procedure.

Informants are naturally inclined to present themselves in a preferable light. It does not necessarily occur consciously; nevertheless, people have a tendency to highlight their own

efforts over others’ as those are easier to oversee (Plous 1993 in Andersen, 2006, p. 293). Therefore, it was essential to compare the informant’s perspectives with other sources, and whenever possible explore those topics during the actual interview. The credibility is about putting statements and thoughts of the informants in a coherent context (Ochs & Capps 2002 in Andersen, 2006, p. 294).

In assessing influence, there is naturally the question of perception. Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 178) points out “discrepancy between *ego* and *alter* perceptions about NGO influence”. For example, the Norwegian Head of Delegation from 1995-2007, Harald Dovland, expresses that on the topic of compliance NGOs have had limited impact on the design, while Andresen and Guldbransen notes that there is nonetheless, unclear direction of causation due to the close interaction between NGOs and delegates. This must be tackled by building the analysis on a robust set of indicators from various sources. Furthermore, the triangulation method called the EAR instrument can contribute to increased validity (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, pp. 416-419). The instrument can be summarised as in the table 3.1 below:

Ego-perception (E)	Views of key players with regard to their own influence (or its lack) on key topics in complex decision-making
Alter-perception (A)	Views of the other key players with regard to the influence (or its lack) of “ego” on key topics in complex decision-making
Researcher’s analysis (R)	Validity check of ego- and alter-perceptions by the researcher on the basis of the indicators “goal-achievement,” “intervention,” and “anticipation”

Table 3.1. “Three Dimensions of the EAR Instrument” (Source: Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 417)

Being conscious of these challenges, these were approached by researching a variety of sources and data types in order to verify the information received and build a robust research. Let us now move to the three chapters that will directly address the three research questions.

4 Canvassing the Channels

This chapter will first explain the framework of civil society participation in the UNFCCC process, thereby assessing the first part of the research question. What are the direct channels through the UN system, and what are the indirect channels through, for example, national governments, regional organisations such as the EU, and other alliances? This will be highlighted through the findings in the interviews, official document sources, and existing academic literature.

This section is structured in such a way to reflect each of the *arenas* of influence as laid out by Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) and as presented in the theoretical framework. First, the channels in the international negotiations and processes will be considered, before studying the domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification arenas. Thirdly, the target groups – as a channel of influence, is looked into. Finally, the public opinion is considered. The main emphasis will be on the first topic on the international negotiations itself. Empirical data will be presented for each of the aforementioned sections before moving directly into the analysis of that specific arena.

4.1 International Negotiations and Processes: UNFCCC

‘If you want to go quickly, go alone - if you want to go far, go together. Maybe we were slow, but will make it together.’ – Dan Reifsnyder, Co-Chair, ADP, UNFCCC (2015).

UN processes can be very deliberate, as illustrated in the quote from the Co-Chair of the inter-sessional negotiations in Geneva in February 2015⁸. The UNFCCC negotiations are a so-called “party-driven process”, indicating that the participating state parties must be included throughout the process and have a sense of ownership of the outcome. Thus, in the UNFCCC, consensus is sought rather than quick decision-making through majority voting. It is understandable that it requires comprehensive effort to reach consensus among almost two hundred states with diverging interests. In this context, the NGOs can give a push to the negotiations by asserting pressure in an attempt to create a momentum to move the negotiations forward. The NGOs can also use the party-driven process to their advantage as it

⁸ The quotes and paraphrases from the Geneva meeting in 2015 used here, and later, are taken from my own notes from that meeting which I attended in a different capacity than as a master student.

increases the relevance of greater number of states. Followingly, more delegations can be lobbied and/or made alliances with. Let us now look into the *access* – both formal and informal to the international climate negotiations.

4.1.1 Data

Access to the UNFCCC negotiations

Formal and informal access and limitations

In article 71 in the UN Charter from 1945, NGOs are granted a “consultative arrangement”. This implies that various UN bodies have a system for giving NGOs a consultative status that ensures some degree of access to the policy-making processes – if not otherwise required by the member states. As a consequence, the NGOs are granted a “secondary role” to the states (Skodvin, 2012). The UNFCCC has its own accreditation system in addition to the UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) consultative status that grants access to several UN bodies, including UNFCCC. The Article 7, paragraph 6, in the Convention on Climate Change states that:

“Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 12).

Similarly, on Contact Groups (negotiating groups that report to the plenary meetings):

“The Conference of the Parties [...] Decides that the presiding officers of Convention bodies may invite representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to attend as observers any open-ended contact group established under the Convention process, unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session of the Convention body setting up that contact group object, and on the understanding that the presiding officers of such contact groups may determine at any time during their proceedings that they should be closed to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations” (UNFCCC, 1998b, p. 66).

These decisions are two of the key decisions that cement NGO access to the UNFCCC negotiations. Additionally, Rule 6-8 in the draft Rules of Procedure from COP2 (that is

applied albeit being a draft)⁹ reflects the aforementioned decisions and adds to the formal structure for NGO participation at UNFCCC negotiations (UNFCCC, 1996, p. 4). Furthermore, regarding Rule 30 that states that COPs are public while its subsidiary bodies normally have private meetings, it is specified in an interpretation that accredited observers are also permitted to attend “private meetings” (UNFCCC, 1996, p. 9). Consequently, media are the only actors at the negotiations excluded from these meetings.

In order to achieve consultative/observer status, an NGO can go through the ECOSOC consultative status as mentioned previously. Applying directly to UNFCCC requires an organisation to submit information on their relevance to topics in the UNFCCC, and formal documentations (such as tax-exempt status and proof that they are non-profit) (UNFCCC, 2015). The Secretariat screens the applications and compiles a list that is considered by the COP Bureau which then submits it to the COP (or an inter-sessional meeting for provisional admission) (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 435).

While some Norwegian non-state actors apply directly through this system to achieve this consultative status, others access the negotiations through other national or international accredited organisations or directly through the national delegation. There are also examples internationally of organisations that have been invited to be advisors for or directly part of, national delegations from countries affected by climate change but with limited negotiation resources of their own (Newell 2000 & Oberthür 2002 in Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 173).

As a reaction to the tremendous NGO presence at COP15, the numbers have since been limited. NGOs that had over a hundred delegates to COP15 were sometimes reduced to a delegation of less than ten representatives. The UNFCCC’s NGO Liaison Megumi Endo (2014) explained that the number of delegates are decided on the basis of the size of the organisation and a merit system based on previous participation – active use of the delegates allocated were rewarded. Furthermore, negative behaviour, particularly non-authorised actions were penalised, with expulsion as the most severe consequence.

⁹ The Convention (in Article 7.3) decided that the Parties would adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the subsidiary bodies, however, as Parties are unable to agree on the voting rule (Rule 42), the rules of procedure remain a draft.

The number of participants represents an opportunity for alliances as well as competition for attention from decision-makers and journalists.

The NGOs in the UNFCCC negotiations are categorised in the constituencies as listed below:

1. Business and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGO);
2. Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO);
3. Farmers non-governmental organisations (Farmers)¹⁰;
4. Indigenous peoples organisations (IPO);
5. Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA);
6. Research and independent non-governmental organisations (RINGO);
7. Trade unions non-governmental organisations (TUNGO);
8. Women and gender non-governmental organisations (Women and Gender);
9. Youth non-governmental organisations (YOUNGO).

These groups are identified as stakeholders in Agenda 21, the comprehensive plan of action for the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. This status allows “plenary interventions, time permitting, are made per constituency, and their focal points interact with the secretariat as channels of communication with large groups of constituents” (UNFCCC, 2013a, p. 1). For some NGOs, this is thus an important channel to voice their opinions.

According to a UN official Betsill interviewed, access to the negotiation area was limited as a consequence of an action by a BINGO from the oil industry that sent notes to OPEC countries in an attempt to orchestrate the debate (Betsill in Betsill & Corell, 2008, p. 48). Furthermore, Yamin and Depledge (2004, p. 436) explain that a code of conduct for NGO participation was “prompted by a small number of disruptive incidents involving individuals admitted as environmental NGOs”. The UNFCCC Secretariat made the code of conduct for NGO participation with the consultancy of the NGO constituencies. The guidelines are on access,

¹⁰ Farmers are recognised as a constituency on a provisional basis at the time of the COP19 (UNFCCC, 2013a, p. 2)

etiquette and safety, participation, and the distribution of information materials (UNFCCC, 2003). Particularly the latter is of relevance for NGOs opportunities, as it regulates the limits to document distribution and unauthorised demonstrations. The consequence of any infringement of these guidelines is formulated diplomatically as it “would normally be resolved following consultations between the secretariat and the responsible organisations and individuals” (UNFCCC, 2003); however, the uttermost consequence is exclusion of the individual and/or organisation.

In regards to access to international negotiations, the informal talks in which actual decisions are taken must certainly be addressed. In addition to informal talks facilitated officially during a meeting, there are also “‘informal informals’ – too informal for NGOs to participate, but indeed where the decisions were made” (Enge and Malkenes 1993 in Raustiala, 1997, p. 733). These are normally not available to the NGOs, and only indirect channels through participating states may allow of influence.

A climate happening

While the negotiations naturally are at the centre of any COP, it has also become a meeting place for the “international climate community”. The non-state actors “engage in networking, holding meetings among peers, finding quick and effective solutions, debating new ideas and approaches and presenting novel research findings” (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012, p. 34). In other words, the UN climate negotiations have become “mega-conferences” (Gaventa 2010 in Neeff, 2013, p. 154). It has become a hub where impact occurs – beyond influencing decision makers in the negotiations directly, as we shall see under the channel described under 4.3 on target groups.

Side events and showcasing are a prominent part of this climate ‘happening’. There are numerous parallel side events throughout the day for two weeks mostly hosted by NGOs but sometimes also state parties. Schroeder and Lovell (2012) found that 60-75 % of the side events did directly relate to the negotiation items. Furthermore, non-state actors also use the UNFCCC arena as an opportunity to present problems and solutions through exhibitions and excursions. The fact that significant personalities in the international ‘climate community’ are gathered in one place allows for relatively cost-efficient usage of this channel. Additionally, the location of the COP may contribute to opportunities for excursions. At COP20 in Peru for example, the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF) brought a targeted audience into the

Amazon to meet with indigenous people affected by oil spills, while Bellona benefited from the Doha location at COP18 in order to bring selected guests to the opening of the Sahara Forest Project facility that produced vegetables in the desert (Goldenberg, 2014).

Adding to these, actions and demonstrations are organised both inside and outside the negotiation venue, as global attention is directed at the UNFCCC. There are formal procedures through the Secretariat in order to carry out demonstrations, and failing to meet these requirements may lead to consequences for the individual(s) as well as the accredited organisation.

Norwegian delegation

The Norwegian delegation to the UNFCCC includes representatives from various ministries (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 2012, 2013b, 2014b). A bureaucrat from the Ministry of Climate and Environment¹¹ leads the delegation, except when the Climate and Environment Minister arrives at the end of each COP. In the period of this research from 2009-2014 the Head of Delegation (HoD) has had his/her background from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹², though they would work from the Ministry of Climate and Environment during their period as HoD. This is a notable fact, as there are internal disagreements in the governments between the ministries and the fields of interests each of them represent. These disparities are not available for the public, but were noticeable during the field study mainly in informal talks with various delegates, and is an internal dynamic in the Norwegian delegation confirmed by several of the interview subjects. These altering lines of conflict within the government are relevant particularly for NGO representatives on the delegation as well as for non-state actors that lobby various ministries. In order to influence the Norwegian position, it is beneficial to have various ministries' support, as will be presented in the next section 4.2 on the non-state actors' strategies.

Access to the international policy-making through national delegations is also a key channel of potential influence for non-state actors. On the Norwegian delegation there has been an ENGO representative, and from 2014 a youth representative. The former is elected on behalf of the members of the Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM) – a

¹¹ Previously the Ministry of Environment (Miljøverndepartementet). The name changed 1st January 2014.

¹² Except Audun Rosland who stepped in as the Acting Head of the Delegation after Aud Lise Norheim left only ten days before COP16 (Blindheim & Ruud, 2010). Rosland worked for the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT – Statens forurensningstilsyn) at the time.

network of fifty environment and development organisations while the latter is selected from the Norwegian Youth Council (LNU) covering about hundred organisations. Bård Lahn and Ola Elvevold have filled the ForUM position consecutively on behalf of NNV and the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF). This is to be distinguished from the *extended delegation* that will be explained in the next paragraph. While not being negotiators, these NGO representatives are integrated into the Norwegian delegation to a greater extent formally and informally, and have access to meetings that are closed to other non-state actors.

Extended delegation

The Minister of Development and Environment Erik Solheim introduced the so-called *extended delegation* in 2009 (E. Solheim, 2015). Non-state actors were invited to be observers on the delegation while not having complete access as negotiators. This implied that these NGO delegates on the Norwegian delegation would have meetings regularly with selected Norwegian negotiators, but normally be excluded from the internal meetings and daily work during the negotiations. The observers are formally under the Norwegian Head of Delegation's (HoD) authority, and are not allowed to make public statements on behalf of Norway (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013b). The badge indicating that they are on a national delegation would allow representatives on the extended delegation to access negotiation areas closed to those on NGO delegations or journalists. However, the instructions from the Ministry of Environment explicitly stipulate that, as a general rule, the NGOs representatives shall only attend plenaries and Contact Groups (subsidiary meetings that report to the plenary) and not the smaller meetings in which most of the actual negotiation take place (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013b). In the meetings they are allowed to attend, they are moreover required to sit separately from the Norwegian negotiators, and they are also excluded from the Norwegian delegation's office at the negotiations (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013b).

A formal limitation was introduced at COP17 in 2011, still under Solheim's term, in which the NGO representatives on the extended delegation were visibly marked as "Party Overflow" on the conference badge – indicating a secondary positioning in the state delegations. Consequently, the UNFCCC Secretariat could ask for and the country delegations could demand this group's limited access to the negotiations. The extended delegation was finally abolished from COP20 about a year after a new right wing government had replaced Solheim's Centre-left government. Some negotiators pointed at negative media coverage from

Norwegian media on the size of the delegation as part of the reason for this decision. Furthermore, the Political Adviser at the Ministry of Climate and Environment in the new government, Jens Frølich Holte (2015), explained that it was due the overall number of delegates at COP20 being tremendously cut compared to previous COPs, and that regular meetings with the Norwegian civil society would ensure sufficient interaction.

Meetings between the Norwegian civil society and the state delegation

Despite the removal of the extended delegation, regular meetings between the Norwegian civil society and the Norwegian negotiators (often the HoD) endured. There is normally one such meeting prior to a COP and the inter-sessional meeting in June, followed by meetings throughout the negotiations. A Norwegian umbrella organisation, Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM) facilitated the contact between the Norwegian delegation and the NGOs. The meetings observed during the fieldwork can be characterised as having a positive and open atmosphere most of the time, with updates from the Norwegian delegation and questions and inputs from the non-state representatives. However, towards the critical end phase of COP20, with heightened stress-level and patience running thin amongst the state delegations, the negotiators' receptiveness appeared to decline. The patience for 'progressive appeals' instead of concrete inputs on the negotiations seems to be lowered among the negotiators. On the other hand, whenever a new draft text was put on the table during COP20, it had been considered internally in the delegation for a limited time prior to meeting the civil society organisations; in this context, the negotiators often seemed keen to hear the opinions of the civil society representatives.

That leads to a more general finding. Many of the negotiators appeared interested in inputs as long as it was constructive, relevant, and filling a policy vacuum. This was further confirmed through interviews and through talks with negotiators during the fieldwork. In addition to the aforementioned civil society meetings, this was similarly so in the context of direct lobby meetings, the distribution of policy papers, and seminars organised (both at the negotiations and in other contexts).

Alliances

In UNFCCC, there are two ENGO networks: Climate Action Network (CAN) and International and Climate Justice Now! (CJN). Two principal distinctions between these

organisations are that CJN is to a greater extent confrontational rather than collaborative from a tactical perspective, and CJN focuses more on North-South climate justice (Lahn, 2013, pp. 93-98). Both organisations have daily coordinating meetings, and the ENGO office at the negotiation venue is divided in such a way that CAN and CJN use it half a day each. Additionally, CAN has an executive branch that meets every morning, and working groups on various topics related to the negotiations. CAN is very strict about who is allowed into their meetings (in contradiction to other constituencies such as RINGO and YOUNGO), and has a formal procedure and requirements, even for researchers, to access their meetings. CAN coordinates lobby efforts among its network members, carry out actions/stunts, and distribute ECO – a daily bulletin during COPs and inter-sessional meetings that gives updates on the negotiations and also on CAN's consideration. The main CAN action is the Fossil of the Day ceremony in which countries are 'shamed' for hindering progress in the negotiations. 'Faming' also occurs (though rarely) through the Ray of the Day which highlights remarkable efforts by countries to move the negotiations forward.

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is the contact point for the BINGO constituency in the UNFCCC, and coordinates the formal BINGO inputs (UNFCCC, 2013a). The BINGO group is very diverse with delegates representing everything from the fossil industry to green businesses. The most relevant network for NSA is hence the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS). However, ICS only sent a few representatives to the UNFCCC negotiations.

NGO alliances are often based on thematic interests as has been illustrated above. Nonetheless, for Norwegian NGOs (except the BINGOs), the daily Norwegian civil society meetings are also an important place to gain knowledge, disseminate information and encourage action. Arvid Solheim, Senior Advisor at the Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment (ForUM), facilitates these meetings. ForUM is a Norwegian umbrella organisation comprised of more than fifty ENGOs, human rights NGOs, and development related NGOs that promote global justice, solidarity, and sustainability (ForUM for Utvikling og Miljø, 2014). Arvid Solheim explained that non-ForUM members are also invited to these daily meetings (A. Solheim, 2015).

Secretariat

There has been increasing focus in the academic literature on the UN Secretariat's power. Although *neutrality* is a key for the UNFCCC Secretariat to carry out its job, particularly in a

party driven negotiation like the climate negotiations, the Secretariat can for example influence the direction of the negotiations through its administrative role. This means that the Secretariat's formal role contributes to challenge the state-centric perspective and draw a multifaceted picture. Biermann (2010, p. 285) argues that the complexity of the climate negotiations (both the system and the issue itself), informing governments about actions and commitments by other actors, reporting on the overall problem assessment, and providing compromise solutions are ways in which the intergovernmental bureaucracies can influence the climate negotiations. However, only "to the extent that these bureaucracies manage to maintain the trust [from the states] upon which their formal and informal influence relies" (Biermann, 2010, p. 285). Within these limits, the UNFCCC Secretariat can thus be a channel for NGOs as well in their effort to affect the outcomes of the UNFCCC processes.

Other Intergovernmental Organisations

The most relevant intergovernmental organisations are the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the EU. The latter will, however, as it is a party in the COP, be dealt with later under domestic/foreign/regional channels. In Article 2.2 in the Kyoto Protocol, the states agreed that the developed countries, so-called Annex I parties, "shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively." (UNFCCC, 1998a). IMO has 170 of the UN member states, and the exceptions are mostly landlocked countries. IMO report for the international maritime sector to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2014a). In influencing the marine climate agenda, IMO is thus a key actor, particularly for NSA.

An important distinction to note between IMO and UNFCCC principles, is that while IMO's founding document emphasises non-discrimination as stated in Article 1 of the IMO Convention, the climate regime is built on the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) as enshrined in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 (UNGA, 1992; United Nations Maritime Conference, 1948). This implies an equal or differentiated contribution from countries to meet the climate change. Another notable difference is that, since IMO has closer ties to the industry, the approach to emissions is quite dissimilar to the UNFCCC. Framing climate change in terms of market

mechanisms and energy efficiency (as is done in IMO) is an approach that is more acceptable for the shipping industry itself since it does not necessarily contradict with profit making (Norges Rederiforbund, 2012, p. 8; Oftedal, 2015).

4.1.2 Analysis

At the inter-sessional negotiations in Geneva in February 2015, the Russian Head of Delegation Oleg Shamanov stated in the plenary discussions that ‘Mr. Co-Chair, we are not going to turn into pumpkins at 6 PM’. He was making an analogy to the Cinderella fairy tale, implying that negotiations may continue even after closing the official meeting. In the UNFCCC process, there is a variety of significant arenas in addition to the plenary discussions.

Access to the UNFCCC negotiations

Formal and informal access and limitations

Some scholars interpret the observer status simply as evidence of lack of influence. Compared to those who have party status in the UNFCCC, those with observer status are limited in the way that they lack formal rights such as voting, taking the floor (with the exception of designated interventions allowed by the parties), access to some negotiation rooms etc. However, access does not equal influence – both in the sense that evidence of access is not proof of influence, and in the way that limited access does not equal no influence. It is a question of *whether* the available channels are applied efficiently.

Although the formal structure is in place to access the UNFCCC negotiations, participation will still depend on an organisation’s resources. Financially, it is expensive to attend meetings around the world for a few weeks at the time. If an NGO wishes to organise a side event or rent an office at the COP venue, there are additional costs related to that. Consequently, though the formal structure is present to enforce NGO participation, other structural issues hinder equal participation due to the way this channel is arranged. Accordingly, the NGOs from the richer part of the world are more heavily involved than their counterparts in developing countries.

Another issue of access despite the formal structure established in the UNFCCC is the *informal informals*. Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 70) argue that increasing use of inaccessible

meeting arenas requires the NGOs to alter their strategies towards an indirect one. One channel into these closed arenas is through country delegations (or others invited) that attend these meetings. Another is pressure from the outside. Both of these indirect channels, however, also depend on the knowledge that such closed discussions are taking place. At COP15 for example, towards the end of the negotiations, the information screen that normally announces where various meetings are taking place, simply showed “No meetings scheduled” (Lahn, 2013). Significant parts of the final discussions leading to the Copenhagen Accord actually occurred when US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton barged into a meeting of the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) that they were not invited to (Landler & Cooper, 2010). Needless to say, it was not a meeting NGOs would have had access to. Although informal meetings are often key to finding consensus and common solutions allowed by the more discreet setting, increasing use of closed meetings are a great obstacle to NGO access.

A climate happening

The fact that important stakeholders are gathered in one place naturally allows for valuable and time efficient networking and exchange of ideas. As an illustration, Bellona has been the most active organiser of side events at COPs amongst the three selected NGOs. NNV on the other hand, would normally co-host at least one such event, nevertheless, Elvevold (2015) argued it was not always an efficient tool to affect the negotiators as they would not always have the time to set aside to attend these. While some Norwegian negotiators actually mentioned side events as an important learning ground, this does not seem to be the case for the majority of Norwegian negotiators. Schroeder and Lovell (2012) note that “their current format and purpose as being events ‘on the side’ does not offer a sufficient framework for coordination between the work of [non-state actors and UNFCCC] process”. This is hence, primarily a channel to reach (non-negotiator) stakeholders. Showcasing and excursions on the other hand, may reach decision makers (and indirectly negotiators), especially if it garners media attention.

Norwegian delegation

During the fieldwork, many Norwegian negotiators expressed a rather negative attitude towards NGOs. There are several potential explanations for this. The criticism was mainly about NGOs’ lack of understanding of decision-making processes (when to lobby for what),

unrealistic demands, and too uncritically supporting developing countries. On the last point, it seemed to be a sense of unfairness in that Norwegian efforts were not recognised enough while developing countries, on the other hand, were not scrutinized adequately. A few went as far as saying that the Norwegian delegations' interaction with the civil society was not about NGO influence but rather an information channel for the Norwegian delegation. Another perspective is that the ministries have different cultures for interaction with civil society actors. This is interesting in light of the formal interviews that were carried out. When asked concretely about the three NGOs in this study, the impressions were mostly more positive or neutral. This will be discussed further under each organisation in the next chapters on strategies and influence.

The ENGO representative (NNV in this case) on the Norwegian delegation certainly has a higher degree of access to the negotiators through formal and informal contact. The representative therefore has information that is not available to other non-state actors. Simultaneously, they are also more limited in their role in regards to public behaviour, and professional secrecy.

Extended delegation

The explanations for the changes vary, and there is probably a combined reasoning for implementing, adjusting, and finally abolishing the extended Norwegian delegation. An official stance (to the extent that one can call it that, as there is no official documentation on the removal of the extended delegation) is that the UNFCCC Secretariat asked the states to limit their delegation size. On the other hand, some Norwegian NGO representatives at COP20 argued in a meeting with Norwegian parliamentarians that this was not reflected in other countries' delegations.

Trust is essential in understanding this matter. The detailed instructions that were presented, indicates that the Norwegian authorities experienced a need to remain in a certain degree of control over those carrying the conference badge, signifying that they represent Norway. There is certainly a risk in letting people who are not part of the government seemingly "represent" Norway. Interestingly, some of the NGOs (including Bellona) have paralleled experience in cases where they have allowed representatives outside their organisation to benefit from their accreditation and join their delegation.

Another aspect is that the ministries have varying traditions and levels of interaction with civil society. On a related topic, the Minister of Environment (2012-2013) Bård Vegar Solhjell (2015) pointed out that this had affected the discussion around whether to continue to have a civil society representative on the delegation after Bård Lahn from NNV ended his term. According to him, it was ultimately decided politically by his government to continue to have an NGO representative as a member of the delegation (Solhjell, 2015).

A scholar familiar with the negotiations and the Norwegian civil society plainly described the extended delegation as politicians ‘channelling noise into one space’. Instead of meeting more than ten Norwegian organisations separately, a coordinated arena allows for concentrated and time efficient interaction. This applies to both the extended delegation as well as the civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation.

On whether the extended delegation was an effective channel from the non-state perspective, there was an intriguing difference in opinion. While NSA highlighted this as a central reason for not attending the COPs after it was dissolved, representatives from NNV and Bellona point to the fact that it allows you access to certain closed meetings while it may also limit your activity – as has been highlighted through the Norwegian delegation’s instructions (Elvevold, 2015; Lahn, 2015; Søyland, 2015). Particularly after being marked as “Party overflow”, the risk of exclusion from certain meetings increased, and hence, the point in remaining on the extended delegation was even more limited according to the NNV President Lars Haltbrekken (2015). NSA appears to value this channel higher due to their insider lobby strategy as will be presented in the next chapter.

Meetings between the Norwegian civil society and the state delegation

As the negotiators are professional bureaucrats, and present at the negotiations to put their uttermost effort in promoting and protecting Norway’s interests, they may be more critical to lack of timeliness among NGO representatives. Although the political leadership have the same mandate, they also have a stronger interest in keeping good relations to the non-state actors. That may be a reason for why they appeared more receptive to (from a Norwegian government’s point of view) “unrealistic” demands. On the other hand, the negotiators keenness to hear non-state actors’ opinions following new drafts of the negotiation text can indicate a policy window. Alternatively, they are just assessing the reactions of the civil

society organisations to evaluate the terrain, and see if there is a need for adjustment – not necessarily on the content but on how they present the Norwegian stances.

The Environment Minister from 2012-2013, Bård Vegar Solhjell (2015), explained that not all of the Norwegian positions and evaluations are shared at the meetings with the civil society, but that they still go in-depth at these meetings. The ForUM Senior Advisor also emphasises the fact that media are aware of these meetings but not present (A. Solheim, 2015). Accordingly, these meetings are based on trust, as well as mutual interests and openness as a democratic value. The latter is underlined by many of the informants – even some of those negotiators who are critical to the NGOs' involvement.

Nevertheless, this channel is strongly limited by what is already discussed and adopted in the government or parliament. Solhjell (2015) argues that NGOs will not have decisive influence on Norwegian position during the negotiations – rather they can affect which positions are emphasised, and if new topics are introduced during the negotiations, they may influence when presenting their considerations of the new element.

Alliances

The restricted access to the CAN daily meetings can imply that their meetings are of a more strategic nature and hence more secretive. The CAN daily meeting that I observed at COP20 was dominated by a few persons who shaped the agenda. This is an impression that NNV representative Elvevold (2015) also shared, and he added that many are there mostly to gather information and that a lot of the important decisions were in actuality taken in the morning meetings in the CAN Executive Committee. The CAN bulletin ECO is widely read by state and non-state actors at COPs and inter-sessional meetings, and is therefore a potentially effective channel to reach out. The Fossil of the Day, not surprisingly, receives a mixed response. Some negotiators frown at this as 'noise'. On the other hand, it is efficient in reaching the media – as it is highly camera-friendly (in an otherwise 'monotone' negotiation scenery).

Regarding ICS, there are several reasons for it being an efficient channel for NSA. Vormedal (2008, p. 38) lists up UNFCCC Secretariat's wish to coordinate, the business' attempt to increase legitimacy, cost sharing, knowledge pooling, effective communication with policy makers, and access to policy arenas they would not single-handedly have had access to, as

reasons for the business and industry to organise itself. Similar arguments can be applied to the other constituencies as well.

The daily Norwegian NGO meetings were an essential arena for knowledge sharing, and for coordinating the questions and inputs to the civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation. In this regard, the ForUM Senior Adviser Arvid Solheim's role is key. He is an important source of knowledge, as he is one of the most experienced Norwegian NGO representatives, asserting procedural knowledge particularly to new civil society representatives. By carrying out practical facilitation as well as the coordination of the questions and inputs to the negotiators and politicians, he bridged the Norwegian delegation's meeting with the civil society in an efficient manner.

Secretariat

To the extent that the Secretariat can affect the negotiations, this is a relevant channel. The Secretariat functions as a bridge between the state parties and NGOs in several matters, and also has a power through their screening of NGOs in the application process and allocation of number of delegates. Hence, the Secretariat represents another potential channel of influence. However, for ENGOs and BINGOs, they remain rather dependent on the states' formal power in impacting the actual negotiation outcomes in the UNFCCC. The Secretariat is thus, a supplementary channel.

Other Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)

It is also interesting how NSA has decided not to put efforts into the COPs in the recent years. Their argument was based partly on how they assessed the access to the decision-making and negotiations, and also due to most shipping discussions now being carried out in the IMO where they have decided to insert a greater effort to influence (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). A key element to consider regarding the issue de-linkage¹³ of shipping from UNFCCC, leaving it mostly to the IMO, is that the business sector itself has a greater potential for influence – with both the positive and negative consequences that may have for the climate. On the positive side, the negotiations may become more efficient as the technological competence on

¹³ Issue de-linkage is a term used in international negotiation theory when topics are subtracted from the agenda for example when it is controversial, prevent an agreement, and/or to simplify a negotiation process (Sebenius, 1983, pp. 288-289).

shipping is higher in a specialised forum such as the IMO, allowing greater knowledge on the set of alternative solutions available. On the negative side, in terms of climate change, business interests regarding profit (if it conflicts with climate friendly solutions) may succeed over climate interests. Additionally, various IGOs are based on different founding principles that may affect the nature of the climate debate. As previously presented, the UNFCCC is based on the idea of differentiation (the CBDR-RC principle) while IMO follows the principle of non-discrimination. In the context of the maritime sector that is vulnerable to flagging out of ships, applying climate regime principles to shipping can have severe consequences for some countries and distort competition significantly. The maritime sector in developed countries therefore has an interest in keeping their sector out of the UNFCCC framework.

The whole UNFCCC framework is not necessarily perceived as the most efficient arena to use in order to achieve a desired outcome. This is reflected not only in the fact that the NSA deprioritises the COPs, but also how Bellona President Hauge (2015) said he prioritised working with EU's 2030 goals over attending COP20. This COP was also deprioritised by NNV's Haltbrekken (2015) who explained it was decided based on costs as well as low expectations to the significance of this meeting. Let us now move on to study the separate, though complementary, domestic, foreign, and regional arenas as indirect channels to the UNFCCC negotiations.

4.2 Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy

As explained in chapter two, Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) speak of the domestic channels. The adapted version in this thesis, however, also includes foreign governments and the regional arenas in this section, as those channels are relevant for NGOs.

4.2.1 Data

Norwegian decision-making processes

As briefly mentioned in the analysis of the Norwegian delegation as a channel, negotiators and politicians alike, stressed the domestic decision-making. There are several channels to influence the Norwegian position – communication with ministers, bureaucrats, and

parliamentarians, and also lobbying the parties (for example in their internal policy formulation processes such as adoption of party programs).

The government has their official channels, such as hearings and inputs to the state budget. Additionally, both the bureaucrats as well as the politicians in the various ministries have meetings with stakeholders. Furthermore, the negotiators who are mostly bureaucrats in their daily lives attend seminars organised by NGOs that represent another type of channel.

Similarly, Members of Parliament (MPs) are relevant in the Norwegian political arena, as Norway has mostly had minority governments in the last decades. For the period that this thesis studies (2009-2014), however, this channel was somewhat limited as there was a majority government from 2005 to 2013. Nevertheless, in a consensus democracy such as Norway, there were still opportunities to make an impact, especially if the MPs settled for a broad political compromise with most/all parties (often the case if there was a wish for longstanding policies that would survive elections).

Related to this, the processes in the political parties can be essential as well. Many of the parties in Norway have had inclusive processes when developing/updating their manifestos, inviting NGOs to submit their inputs. In between those processes, NGOs have access to political parties locally and nationally, and can give their inputs through statements, lobby meetings seminars, and so on.

Lobbying regional institutions and foreign governments

In addition to the domestic and international level, the regional level (mainly the EU) can be a relevant channel for influencing climate policy globally. EU is a key actor in the UNFCCC and their position will subsequently have an impact on the outcome of the international climate negotiations. As Norway is not a member of the EU, but rather associated to it through the European Economic Area (EEA), Norwegian NGOs have arguably used the European level to a lesser degree than what their European counterparts have. Nevertheless, of the three cases in this thesis, both NSA and Bellona are directly represented in Brussels with their own offices.

Both relating to the regional level but also independent of this aspect, contact with foreign governments can be a channel of influence. Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004, pp. 59, 72) studied NGO influence in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and found that NGOs

relied heavily on alliance with key state actors. On the European level, alliances can be made with member states sympathetic to the non-state actor's view, in order to affect EU policies relevant to the UNFCCC negotiations. In the UNFCCC meetings itself, there have been various alliances between non-state actors and state delegations. Many ENGOs share views with developing countries while the fossil industry has often sought out more likeminded in actors in oil rich countries and Western countries that fear the costs of climate policies (Lahn, 2013; Skodvin, 2012, pp. 11-14).

4.2.2 Analysis

Norwegian decision-making processes

The domestic context is essential, particularly due to its accessibility – from a geographical, costs, and relational perspective. There are both formal and informal channels available for NGOs. Politicians and bureaucrats seem particularly open to receiving input in the policy formulation stage.

The party manifestos, on the other hand, were according to the interview subjects not the main platform in which the specifics of Norway's positions in the UNFCCC were handled. Policy on this topic was instead formulated in the parliament or government. On the other hand, the relevance of the political party level appears to be to promote general Norwegian and global targets, and climate solutions.

In addition to the political proximity to the decision makers, the domestic channel may be advantageous for many domestic oriented NGOs due to the leverage they possess. ENGOs may have a public legitimacy and ability to mobilise pressure, which is usually not equally applicable in the international context. From a BINGO perspective, the possibility of influence may be higher in a domestic rather than international context due to the political standing a BINGO can have when it represents a key sector in the domestic economy (Newell, 2000).

Lobbying regional institutions and foreign governments

Although UNFCCC is a party driven process in which all states supposedly partake as equals, parts of the negotiations are sometimes solved amongst a few key states (such as at COP15 in

Copenhagen). Single countries, including Norway, can thus be excluded from some closed negotiation arenas. In this context, foreign delegations and the EU have, for example, been a relevant institution for non-state actors from Norway in their effort to affect the outcome of the negotiations.

Furthermore, these channels can be highly relevant in building alliances with likeminded actors with the purpose of affecting the Norwegian government, or simply in order to build a stronger alliance in favour of a policy. This leads to the *boomerang effect*. Keck and Sikkink (1998) conceptualised this term to illustrate when NGOs bypass their domestic governments and target other state parties (and regional actors such as the EU) to affect the international negotiation and/or their own government. This can be an effective channel to build fruitful alliances.

4.3 Target groups' climate policy and behaviour

Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) who looked at ENGO influence in the development of the compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol highlighted affected parties such as the companies or a certain sector in this arena. In this thesis, affected companies are certainly relevant target groups. Additionally scientists are also important for some to engage in order to establish support for policies and/or technological solutions.

4.3.1 Data

Seeking support from target groups, such as businesses that are affected by a certain policy, may strengthen the NGOs success. In promoting clean energy, businesses that work with clean energy themselves – or have the potential to expand to that field – are relevant allies. Furthermore, in promoting cleaner technologies for existing businesses, the industry's support is very valuable, as can be seen in the case of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

Tora Skodvin (2012, pp. 8-9) highlights the legitimacy scientific knowledge can give to climate policies for decision makers to use or misuse. Keeping this in mind, scientific legitimisation of policies can also be applied by non-state actors in order to support their position on a topic. This does not imply that a scientific result is “ordered”. Rather, it is about directing more research into a certain field, or increasing the attention toward a certain existing research field.

4.3.2 Analysis

Involving scientists and stakeholders such as businesses and industries, is an effective way to push for a certain policy in a desired direction, particularly as it will make it easier for politicians to support that option over others when there is a broader alliance. Moreover, involving business can contribute to the concrete application of a technology or other types of solutions. Additionally, inserting private funds will also ease potential financial demands directed at decision makers. Pulling business from a grey to a greener position (to apply Vormedal's (2008) terminology) through collaborations – enabling them to take those steps, may furthermore contribute to making business actors more constructive or at least pacifying active opposition. Increasing environmental awareness among consumers in various parts of the world, and businesses' fear for the consequences of climate change and/or its regulatory implications, have contributed to increase the incentives for businesses to move into a greener direction. Hence, cooperating with non-state actors that can assist them with solutions as well as green profiling can be a 'win-win situation' for businesses and the climate.

Seeking alliances with researchers can also be a useful channel of influence for NGOs. Negotiations on climate change is a technically complex, and the UNFCCC uniquely has the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to set the academic basis of the debate. IPCC aggregates scientific knowledge from various researchers to find an academic consensus. Despite IPCC's academic authority, elements in the findings may be debatable (as in any scientific report), and even politicised. This was for example illustrated when India criticised emission reduction numbers from IPCC as 'unscientific' at the inter-sessional negotiations in Bonn in 2009. This happened as the IPCC had suggested 25-40 per cent emission reduction in developed countries by 2020 compared to 1990 levels – which indirectly implies what remains of the carbon budget for the developing countries (Lahn, 2013, pp. 82-93).

IPCC, however, does in general have significant support from states. Hence targeting IPCC (or other) researchers to consider certain technologies, solutions, or principles can be a way to affect the premises for the climate debate. Although not from an NGO, the scientific report ordered by the Norwegian Socialist Left Party that considers what part of Norway's targets should be based on historic responsibilities and current capabilities, is an illustration of how research can colour the climate debate (Kallbekken, Gloppen, Jansen, Nøstbakken, & Sørensen, 2014). Hence, engaging scientists in topics (for example by ordering reports), or exposing scientists with information and ideas, are channels that non-state actors can apply.

4.4 Public opinion

Public opinion is the last arena in Andresen & Gulbrandsen's scheme. They point out that this is the most diffuse target. According to them, this is mainly a channel for the activist NGO type, in order to achieve influence as well to attract new members (Andresen & Gulbrandsen, 2005, p. 171). Additionally, activists NGOs also depend on keeping members, and addressing the public is also a way to signify to their existing members about their efforts.

4.4.1 Data

Media is the channel with widest outreach to the public. Depending on how important that particular COP (and sometimes inter-sessional meetings) appear, a number of Norwegian journalists attend the UNFCCC negotiations. As the negotiations are rather intricate and technical, it gives an opportunity for the NGOs to form the journalists' perception both through formal and informal interaction. Press conferences are held daily by state as well as NGO delegations, and journalists interview NGO representatives to cover their assessment of the ongoing negotiations. Moreover, the NGOs distribute press releases, as well as carrying out informal knowledge sharing. Some Norwegian NGOs also have such interaction with the international media. In the cases where these are used as a channel, it appears as it is mainly to affect the Norwegian position through distorting the government's reputation internationally. The HoD Aslak Brun (2015) expresses that the media in fact is an effective channel that particularly those close to the political leadership take note of and discuss how to follow up.

In Norway, as well as in many other countries, people are gathering information from a variety of sources, and increasingly so from social media. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, blogging etc. are thus relevant for many NGOs in reaching the greater public with their opinions and policies. Own communication by NGOs such as newsletters and websites/blogs are also part of an effort to affect the public opinion.

Mobilising demonstrations and other types of actions are also a channel to reach the public opinion directly and indirectly. Directly if citizens are actually mobilised to partake, and indirectly if it is communicated through traditional and social media. It must be noted that actions and demonstrations are limited by the UNFCCC regulations as explained under 4.1 on international negotiations.

4.4.2 Analysis

Although Andresen & Gulbrandsen (2005) indicate that this channel is mainly targeted by activist NGOs, establishing and maintaining a public standing can equally be important for advisory NGOs that depend on external funding. The BINGOs can also have a strong interest being visible, as it can improve their image and relevance.

In regards to the media, this channel appears to target the politicians to a greater extent than negotiators, as they are part of the public debate. Keeping close ties to journalists is an effective channel to link journalists with information that an NGO is interested in making publicly known. Among the Norwegian journalists present at COP20, they differed in the extent to which they interacted with the Norwegian non-state actors.

On the topic of social media as a channel, the reach depended quite heavily on which type of social media as well as how effective it is applied. Twitter has limited number of users compared to giants such as Facebook, however, if used correctly it can have an effect – largely due to the fact that the many of the active users in Norway are opinion-makers such as journalists, NGO representatives, and politicians. Similarly, environmental blogs itself have limited outreach compared to the top ranked Norwegian blogs. Nonetheless, they can have an effect if it reaches the relevant actors who spread the ideas further. NGOs' newsletters and websites/blogs do vary greatly in their reach. Hence, it is most effectively applied in combination with other channels. Rather than reaching the greater public, these tools may have an indirect effect similar to that of social media, if they reach journalists and other opinion shapers.

4.5 Concluding remarks: Considering Channels

The research question approached in this chapter was:

- 1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?

The chapter started by studying NGOs' formal and informal access, and restrictions, to the UNFCCC negotiations. The principles of NGO access is enshrined in the Convention. Nevertheless, restrictions have been gradually introduced to the channels. The NGOs also find ways to circumvent these limitations. This will be highlighted further in the next chapter on

strategies. Particularly, the COPs have become “climate happenings” that allow networking, exchange of ideas, and to a limited extent policy dissemination to decision makers. The domestic delegation is still a significant channel for many NGOs. Inclusion on the delegation appears to be a relevant channel for lobbying, but less so for activism. At the same time, the civil society meetings with the Norwegian delegation appear to serve the key purpose of the extended delegation. Internationally, networks such as CAN, ICS, and ForUM contribute to knowledge sharing, policy dissemination, as well as lobby coordination, and can benefit NGOs in collectively achieving what would be impossible singlehandedly. The Secretariat can be a beneficial channel, particularly on procedural matters, within their limits of neutrality. IGOs (or IMO in this case) are certainly arenas to be targeted when relevant topics are dealt with there.

For many NGOs the domestic political processes remain the key channel to target – through the government, the bureaucracy, parliamentarians, and/or political parties. Moreover, when the domestic channel fails, NGOs have a *boomerang* channel in addressing foreign and regional (EU) decision makers. Target groups were also highlighted as a potential channel, particularly businesses and scientists. Finally, public opinion through media and mobilisation can serve a pressure and/or agenda setting purpose.

Despite lack of certain formal rights and restrictions imposed by the state parties and the UNFCCC Secretariat, the NGOs nevertheless, have a varied set of channels available. It is important to note that NGOs develop new channels when one is blocked. This and other perspectives of NGO strategies will now be discussed.

5 Different NGO Types and Their Diverse Strategies

During the debate towards the end of COP20, Singapore's Minister for the Environment and Water Resources Dr Vivian Balakrishnan warned "We should be very careful in making changes to the current text. Only minor surgery is needed. Let me give another analogy, which I am sure many men can identify with. If you are submitting yourself for circumcision, be very careful that it doesn't become an amputation!" (Balakrishnan, 2014). Dr. Balakrishnan's statement could simply be a warning to other parties interested in amending the text but is also an illustrating metaphor about the 'art of balance' in the climate negotiations – how difficult it is to steady the diverging interests. This leads to the question of progressiveness versus constructiveness amongst the NGOs. This has been a source of conflict among particularly the ENGOs (Duwe, 2001; Lahn, 2013, pp. 93-98; Parks & Roberts, 2010). The basic question is whether to apply an *insider* or *outsider strategy*.

This chapter will study more specifically the non-state actors' strategies within the framework as presented in the previous chapter; followingly, this chapter addresses the second part of the research question. The chapter will study each NGO separately, by first looking into their critical resources (intellectual/membership/political/financial), then address the arenas (international/domestic/target groups/public opinion), and the strategies (insider/outsider) they apply. Hence, the structure reflects the analytical framework for strategy, based on Andresen & Gulbrandsen (2005) and Vormedal (2008), presented in chapter two. Lastly, these findings will be summarised and compared to the theoretical framework on NGO strategy.

5.1 NNV – The “Necktie Activists”?

A Norwegian magazine “Bistandsaktuelt” described some of the NGO lobbyists, amongst others the NNV representative on the Norwegian delegation Ola Elvevold, as the “necktie activists” (Håskoll-Haugen, 2014). The journalist pointed to the contrasts between the activist, often perceived as being loud, carrying out protests, and wearing everything else than a suit, and the ENGO representatives at the climate negotiations in suits, with a degree in higher education, lobbying in the corridors, and even giving positive statements about politicians

(Håskoll-Haugen, 2014). Have these ENGO activists simply become lobbyists? Let us now briefly look into NNV's critical resources before addressing the arenas and strategies applied.

5.1.1 Critical Resource

Membership base: NNV is the largest ENGO in terms of number of members with approximately 20,000 members (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 15; 2015a). This is much lower compared to their Danish and Swedish counterparts, and according to NNV President Lars brekken can be explained with a higher number of ENGOs in Norway competing for the attention (Martiniussen, 2011).

Intellectual base: More than a dozen employees with relevant work experience and/or higher education (mostly at least a master degree) who work on various thematic areas (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2015b). They have one designated employee, co-sponsored with the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (RFN), to work on REDD+ and UNFCCC.

Financial base: The most significant part of NNV's income originates directly from the government. Until 2014, they were the largest receiver of basic financial support for Norwegian ENGOs from the Ministry of Climate and Environment (only surpassed by Norwegian Association of Hunters and Anglers in 2014), and received from 2009-2014 between NOK 6,793,000 - 7,496,000 (approx. USD 900,000 - 1 million) (Prop. 1 S: 2014-2015, 2014, p. 46). Project based funding come in addition to this – such as the support for the NNV representative on the delegation, which is funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Their total income was approximately NOK 40-50 million in the period, and roughly NOK 25-30 million of these were public funds (approx. USD 5-6.5 million and USD 3-4 million) (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, 2011b, 2012)¹⁴.

Political base: NNV has had close relations to the Ministry of Environment, particularly during the centre-left government's rule. The State Secretary¹⁵ under Solheim was former President of NNV and a friend to the current NNV President Lars Haltbrekken (Ertesvåg & Tjersland, 2012). Additionally, Haltbrekken is married to the person who was the Secretary General of the Socialist Left Party at the time the party was in government. These personal

¹⁴ In the 2012-2013 Annual Reports, the accounts were not included, and the 2014 report was yet to be published.

¹⁵ Norwegian ministries have a political leadership consisting of the minister, followed in rank by the State Secretary (sometimes translated the Deputy Minister), and the Political Advisor.

relations have contributed positively to their access and influence, including on REDD+, according to a person who knows NNV well. They are also well connected to politicians in the Norwegian parliament.

Critical resource: Globally, even compared to the neighbouring countries, NNV's member base is not significant. However, relative to the other Norwegian NGOs, particularly the ENGOs, it is NNV's member base that stand out compared to the other resources. They certainly have a substantial amount of financial, political, and even intellectual base; nevertheless, in the context of many competing ENGOs in Norway, the members are NNV's stronghold, giving the organisation an essential legitimacy.

5.1.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies

In NNV's International Strategy for 2011-2020 they highlight how it is a priority for them to have coherence between their international projects, international and domestic lobbying, and that it should all be rooted in the organisational work in Norway (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 9). On the international climate negotiations more specifically, the strategic document states that NNV should strive to influence topics with relevance to NNV, Norway, and NNV's international partners (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24).

1) International negotiations and processes

According to NNV's President Lars Haltbrekken (2015), they increased their strategic efforts to influence the UNFCCC negotiations, following their joint proposal with the Rainforest Foundation Norway's (RFN) on deforestation which was adopted by the Norwegian government. That was the background for the co-sponsored representative that NNV and RFN acquired through ForUM's position on the Norwegian delegation. On a more general basis, NNV has had a decreasing number of participants at the COPs starting with five at COP15 and down to only one at COP19 and COP20 (Elvevold & Lahn, 2015)¹⁶.

¹⁶ Lists of participants for each organisations were developed by searching for representatives on various delegations in the final participants list published by UNFCCC (as seen in 8.0 Bibliography). These lists were then sent to informants in each organisations, in order to clear out delegates who were on their delegation but from other organisations (this is practiced by several accredited NGOs).

Insider strategies

NNV's statements in the media were sometimes criticised by negotiators for not being constructive but when asked about the NNV representative's role on the Norwegian delegation, the impression was either neutral (due to lack of interaction) or positive as being a constructive partner. The NNV representative on the Norwegian delegation from 2011-2014 Ola Elvevold (2015) explained that while Norwegian ENGOs carried out the 'walk out', he stayed in the negotiation. These illustrate the dual approach by NNV – while the President is in the media criticising harshly, the representative on the other hand remains in a lobbyist role. The representative on the delegation serves as an important source of information to his/her organisation (and the Norwegian civil society more generally). Hence, this explain why some negotiators commented that while NNV's statements in the media were often critical, it was still to the point and well informed.

In addition to receiving useful information, the NNV representative also lobby the negotiators through meetings, policy papers, and informal interaction. The disagreements between the ministries are also a window of opportunity for an NGO delegate. In the interview with Bård Lahn (2015), he explained how NNV could benefit from this by building alliances with various ministries on the delegation depending on the topic.

In the international strategy, NNV points out that they will contribute to ensure international accept for propositions from the Norwegian government through their networks, if the proposal is coherent with NNV's policies (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 22). This is a leverage that is also highlighted from the HoD Aslak Brun (2015). This strategy is hence an effective way to promote climate policies while also improving NNV's relation with the Norwegian government and its negotiators.

Regarding the notion by Raustiala (1997, p. 733) of *informal informals* – the arenas too informal for NGOs to participate but where decisions are made, there was clear evidence of this at the UNFCCC negotiations as well. Elvevold (2015) pointed out that there were many dinners and other bilateral and multilateral meetings that were mentioned during the Norwegian delegation's morning meetings in which the NGO representatives on the delegation were not welcome. Interestingly however, informal meetings are of course not only a tool used by governments. NNV and other NGOs organise informal workshops and (dinner) meetings during both COPs and inter-sessionals. The relatively relaxed atmosphere at the

inter-sessional negotiations in Bonn (compared to COPs), were occasions that NNV applied this strategy (Elvevold, 2015).

The NNV representative from 2008-2011 Bård Lahn (2013, pp. 81-82) explains in his book about the UNFCCC negotiations that one of the first things he did was to get heavily involved with the Climate Action Network (CAN) and the Friends of the Earth network (FoE), in addition to general networking specific to NNV's focus areas. FoE is a network of 75 ENGOs while CAN is a broader network but with a more limited scope and the most important in terms of UNFCCC activities. Lahn highlights the CAN meetings as a place to exchange information, coordinate lobbying, and media stunts Lahn (2013, pp. 81-82). In addition to the daily meetings, CAN also has strategy meetings before and after UNFCCC negotiations, and extensive information sharing through the email list called "CAN Talk". Lahn (2013, p. 97) explains that NNV is caught in the middle of the international ENGO network differences between CAN and Climate Justice Now! (CJN); while NNV is more sympathetic to CJN's view that climate change is a matter of distribution of resources globally, and they differ from many large US based ENGOs in CAN as they are a grass-root movement, they are, however, more in line with CAN regarding a more reformist and consensus seeking tactical strategy.

NNV among others recognises the *boomerang effect* that they can gain through coordinating lobby efforts in networks such as CAN in order to influence Norwegian positions indirectly in the negotiations (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, pp. 23-24). They furthermore highlight that they will contribute to such boomerang strategies for their partners as well.

Outsider strategies

Being present increases the relevance for the Norwegian media at COPs to interview representatives from Norwegian NGOs. Moreover, the media monitor reports generally indicate high exposure for NNV around the COPs. At COP15 high mitigation targets, more political will in the negotiations, and finance were the key aspects of NNV's demand as highlighted by Bård Lahn (2013, p. 129) in his account of the negotiations. Interestingly, while NNV was publicly pushing for a binding deal, Lahn (2013, p. 129) explains that he was very pessimistic about this, highlighting that the Norwegian Head of Delegation Hanne Bjurstrøm already stated at the Bangkok inter-sessional in September/October 2009 that "there will not be a treaty in Copenhagen". Having that insight, they still chose to promote a legally binding treaty. This supports Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 75)'s argument that

“environmental NGOs are notorious for promoting extreme positions as a strategy for pushing state decision-makers in new directions or for distracting their attention”.

At some COPs NNV carried out daily press conferences, which is a channel with strong potential for agenda setting, as the journalists present are eager to obtain information and angles for their stories. In addition to bringing non-confidential insights from the Norwegian delegation and their networks on the status and expectations to the negotiations, NNV is also able to convey their perspectives on that information, which contributes to their agenda setting (Haltbrekken, 2015; Lahn, 2013, p. 142). Another tool for awareness raising and influence that NNV applied during COP15 was a daily newsletter with 1,500 recipients with updates on the negotiations (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 14).

In addition to media, NNV has taken part in activism inside and outside the venue. At COP15 a president of a local branch were among the 100,000 demonstrators outside the venue, and NNV’s national president joined the ‘walk out’ from COP19 in Warsaw when about 500 NGO representatives left the venue as a protest to the unfruitful discussions (Roux, Sæveraas, & NTB, 2009; Sylte, 2013).

2) Domestic/regional/foreign climate policy and ratification

Insider strategies

Furthermore, NNV was described from former/current HoDs and government officials as an organisation well acquainted with the political processes, and thus submitting their contributions at the right point of time. Policy papers are handed in, debates and seminars are organised, and bilateral meetings are held in order to influence the decision makers’ knowledge and stances. Their annual report and comprehensive set of position papers on among others hearing, also exhibit an insider approach.

The way NNV worked on the Norwegian greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target for 2020 is an example of how they applied these various channels strategically. On the government level for example, they, together with other environmental NGOs, lobbied and put pressure on the government negotiations leading to the Declaration of Soria Moria 2009 in which the minimum 40 per cent GHG emissions cut was adopted (though with some disclaimers). Lahn (2013, p. 123) argues that the aim was not only the Norwegian contributions itself but also in an attempt to make Norway to show leadership, so that other developed countries could put

forward increased ambitions as well. It was as such an endeavour to create a positive negotiation atmosphere at the Bangkok meeting only two months prior to the Copenhagen negotiations.

A prime example of an insider strategy is on NNV's work on REDD+. REDD+ stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (summarised as "plus"). NNV President Lars Haltbrekken and NRF President Lars Løvold sent a joint letter (sometimes called the 'Lars & Lars letter') to the Norwegian government and the parliament; the result was that Norway committed itself to finance NOK 3 billion (USD 410 million) annually to REDD+ projects. From the letter was sent to Prime Minister Stoltenberg's announcement, it merely took two months, and is arguably the quickest decision of this magnitude taken in modern Norwegian political history (Reed, 2015). Haltbrekken (2015) explained that they consciously targeted a way of thinking that they assumed both the Environment Minister Solheim as well as Prime Minister Stoltenberg would support. Stoltenberg is an economist, which has coloured his political stances, and in the letter, which is only two pages long, NNV and NRF argue with cost efficiency, amongst others referring to the prominent report by Nicholas Stern "The Economics of Climate Change: the Stern Review" in promoting REDD+ (Løvold & Haltbrekken, 2007). The Review argues that "curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way to reduce emissions; large-scale international pilot programmes to explore the best ways to do this could get underway very quickly" (Stern, 2006, p. ix). A cost efficient climate policy that moreover can put Norway in the spotlight of the UNFCCC negotiation were two key aspects that made investing in REDD+ an attractive policy.

In addition to targeting the governmental level both through the letter and lobbying, NNV and NRF also addressed the opposition in the Norwegian Parliament, particularly ensuring support from the Conservatives which is a key opposition party (Haltbrekken, 2015). While Solheim's Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) and the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) in the opposition are considered as pro-environment parties, the most important resistance to such a large scale climate policy could appear from Stoltenberg's Labour Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*)

and/or the Conservative Party (*Høyre*)¹⁷. NNV thus consciously targeted these with cost efficiency as a central argument. By building this foundation, they furthermore secured that the REDD+ initiative gained a broader political support, and would become a long-term Norwegian climate policy that would stand firm through changes in governments.

Next to REDD+, the way in which NNV lobbied for a cross party climate agreement (*Klimaforliket*) is a significant illustration on an insider strategy. NNV lobbied the parliamentary parties, in order to secure a long-standing and ambitious climate agreement for Norway. In recent Norwegian politics, such broad compromises have been reached on topics that acquire thorough and stable frameworks such as on pension and tax reforms. The agreement was finally signed in 2008 with the support of the government and all opposition parties except the Progress party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) (Innst. S. nr. 145: 2007-2008, 2008; *Klimaforliket*, 2008). REDD+ was also cemented further, through this agreement (*Klimaforliket*, 2008, pp. 3-4).

Former Minister of Environment Bård Vegar Solhjell (2015) explained that in his experience from the Socialist Left Party, ENGOS such as NNV take influencing the adoption of political party programmes very seriously, and that they submit both targets as well as solutions in that policy formulation process. NNV uses seminars as an insider strategy in approaching politicians. The Political Adviser in the Ministry of Climate and Environment Jens Frølich Holte (2015) expressed that he found a seminar that NNV contributed to in the Conservative Party called the “Conservative Nature Conservation” (as in NNV’s name Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature) was a very clever lobby strategy to influence the agenda in his party. NNV also invites negotiators to seminars in Norway, both for educational purpose as well to let their stances known. A negotiator expressed that this was a very fruitful strategy, as it was in a more relaxed atmosphere where it is easier to have a more open dialogue (Norwegian Negotiator, 2015).

While Bellona and NSA work directly on the European level, NNV leaves that to its European networks CAN Europe and FoE Europe (Elvevold, 2015; Haltbrekken, 2015). Similarly, they use CAN as a channel to interact with foreign delegations rather than lobbying

¹⁷ The Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) was the largest opposition party but due to their history of “climate scepticism”, (internally they diverge from that approach to pragmatic political figures who are more willing to look at climate technologies etc.), it has not been an important target for NNV.

these governments directly. This reflects the natural labour of division that happens in networks that consists of many domestic oriented NGOs.

Outsider strategies

Visibility in media is not only a tool to communicate with existing and potential members but also a channel to put pressure on decision makers. According to NNV's 2009 annual report, the media coverage was over 10,000, making them the most cited ENGO; for the following years, only the 2013 report indicates a concrete number which had dropped to roughly 8,000 – still a high rate (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 10; 2014, pp. 22-23). In the 2013 report the numbers are divided into thematic areas, and climate has a small peak in June and the main peak from September to December (in both these periods climate surpasses other topics) (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2014, p. 23). This may indicate that their media exposure on climate is closely linked to the inter-sessional meeting in Bonn in June and the run up to the COP at the end of the year. Nevertheless, NNV's annual reports also highlight several domestic climate issues on the domestic political agenda, which lead to visibility. More generally, NNV has been a critical voice in the media, using this channel to pressure decision makers as a supplement to the abovementioned insider strategies.

3) Target groups' climate policy and behaviour

Looking at NNV's annual reports, strategies, and interview subjects' answers, target groups do not appear to be a prioritised area for NNV in influencing the international climate regime.

4) Public opinion¹⁸

Outsider strategies

NNV's communication strategy states that its main objective is to contribute to increased number of members, increased involvement, and gain support for NNV's policies (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2013, p. 3). Their international strategy also highlights that NNV aims at increasing the Norwegian public's understanding of the climate issue through communication measures (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24). Consequently, it supports the notion by

¹⁸ On public opinion, the insider strategy is not applicable.

Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 171) that activists ENGOs that has membership as a key resource, will perceive the public opinion as an important channel to be targeted.

NGOs may seek high levels of activities envisaging influence through visibility, however, if the message is implausible, it will not be received as a relevant message for the negotiators and simply ignored. On the other hand, during the fieldwork, some of those who participated in actions within the negotiation arena with a message that seemed overly ambitious compared to the ‘realistic’ outcomes from COP20 argued that actions were sometimes indirectly aimed at negotiators and politicians through media and the public. Thus, it was rather to create public pressure through the public opinion by carrying out ‘camera friendly’ actions.

At the domestic level, NNV President Lars Haltbrekken (2015) pointed out the activities in the local branches are limited with mainly the Bergen branch organising an annual streaming event of the COPs. With the high expectations to COP15 on the other hand, several debates were organised across the country and a demonstration were held in Oslo and Kristiansand according to their annual report (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2010, p. 14). Additionally, local NNV representatives and activists were also present in Copenhagen, partaking in activities and demonstrations outside the negotiations. These events amongst other aim at increasing the public pressure towards politicians and negotiators.

5.1.3 Summary: the Activist ENGO?

NNV’s levels targeted and strategies applied can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.1:

Strategies	Levels targeted					
	<i>UNFCCC</i>	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>Foreign</i>	<i>Regional</i>	<i>Target group</i>	<i>Public opinion</i>
<i>Insider strategies</i>						
Lobby decision makers	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	n/a
Lobby the bureaucracy ¹⁹	No	Yes	No	No	No	n/a
Lobby through alliances	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	n/a
Formal intervention/submissions	Moderate	Yes	No	Yes	No	n/a
Scientists/other opinion-makers	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	n/a

¹⁹ The negotiators are in this table included as the bureaucrats of domestic/foreign/regional IGOs, while bureaucracy at the UNFCCC level is considered as the UNFCCC Secretariat.

<i>Outsider Strategy</i>						
Mobilising activists	Moderate	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Media	Moderate	Yes	Moderate	No	No	Yes
<i>Mixed Strategy</i>						
Showcasing	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Seminars	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Table 5.1. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of NNV

With this in mind, NNV does fit into the activist type of ENGO that Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s (2005) developed, which can be summarised as shown in table 5.4 below:

	Activist ENNGO
Critical resources	Membership base
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy Target groups Public opinion
Strategy	Dual strategy: insider and outsider

Table 5.4 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Advisory ENGOs.

NNV’s critical resource is the membership base, and they have a dual strategy. However, target groups as an arena is not utilised as the other three channels. Consequently, though with some discrepancy, Andresen & Gulbrandsen’s (2005) activist ENGO type does have a high explanatory value for NNV.

5.2 Bellona – Technological Solutions over “Comma Fucking”

A significant distinction from many classical ENGOs, is that Bellona does not care for “comma fucking” as their president Frederic Hauge (2015) bluntly called working on the negotiation text. At the COPs, they rather focus on showcasing technological solutions.

Bellona was founded in 1986 by the current president Frederic Hauge and Rune Haaland who both left NNV’s youth organisation Nature and Youth. It is an environmental foundation with activist roots that originally focused on ‘environmental crimes’, and has since changed the

course to concentrate on environmental solutions – through direct cooperation with businesses and decision makers (Bellona & Sæther, 2006). Following this line of thought, they therefore focus on existing technological solutions as a policy window for decision makers or business opportunity for the private sector. Consequently, the key topics and projects that Bellona has promoted from 2009 to 2014 are Carbon Capture and Storage and renewable energy projects/products (such as the Sahara Forest Project and electric cars) (Bellona, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).

5.2.1 Critical Resource²⁰

Membership base: Bellona is one of the ENGOs in Norway with a limited membership base. It follows a general trend in the Norwegian civil society that has occurred in the last decades. The number of members are less defining characteristic, and smart strategic figures and opinion shapers are more significant for an organisation's power (NOU 2003:19, 2003, pp. 21-22). Bellona only has approximately 2,500 passive members (Sandberg, 2013).

Intellectual base: The Oslo headquarter, and the offices in Brussels, Murmansk, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, have altogether roughly fifty employees. Most of these are listed as experts – with a variety of background from marine biologists, engineers, social scientists, and physicist, and Bellona has in the last decade focused on developing an intellectual stronghold (Bellona, 2015a; Bellona & Sæther, 2006; Smith, 2007).

Financial base: Bellona's income has had a turbulent period. It was at its highest in 2010 with NOK 56,7 million and its lowest in 2012 with NOK 39,5 million (USD 7,5 million and 5,2 million respectively) (Bellona, 2012, 2013, 2014; Miljøstiftelsen Bellona, 2011; Ree & Helgesen, 2011). Until 2012 the Ministry of Environment did not give base support to environmental foundations and Bellona therefore did not receive funds from directed to civil society in the years prior to this change (Prop. 1 S: 2011-2012, 2011, p. 35). Since then Bellona has been allocated NOK 1.3-1.8 million (USD 172,000-238,000) annually (Prop. 1 S: 2012-2013, 2012; Prop. 1 S: 2013-2014, 2013; Prop. 1 S: 2014-2015, 2014). The majority of their income thus come from private sources, particularly companies. These private funds are

²⁰ This section studies the Bellona Foundation exclusively and does not cover the Sahara Forest Project Company, Sahara Forest Project Foundation or Bellona Holding AS that are initiated by the Foundation but are separate legal entities (Brønnøysundregistrene, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d).

a combination of general donations, project based sponsorship, and advertisement fees on their webpages and publications.

Political base: what distinguishes Bellona from most other Norwegian ENGO is its own network to decision makers internationally. Bellona is well connected with decision makers and bureaucrats from Norway as well as from other countries, particularly within EU but also beyond (Hauge, 2015; Helseth, 2015).

Critical resource: Hauge (2015) points at some key strategic factors for their success. He highlights leverage as the main field – processing complex scientific knowledge in a systematic way and transmit that to decision makers in an understandable manner. The position they have internationally in the field of environment is built over the years, particularly starting with the efforts against atomic waste in Russia that among others engaged European and US authorities (Hauge, 2015). This case also accelerated their work internationally, and triggered a broad and valuable network with decision makers, UNFCCC Secretariat, scientists, NGOs, and businesses. They do have notable influx of private capital; however, both the political and financial base rely on the intellectual base. Hence, the latter is Bellona's critical resource.

5.2.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies

Bellona does not have a formulated strategy for each COP nor the UNFCCC process more generally. According to a former Senior Advisor Svend Søyland (2015) who was one of Bellona's key actors at COPs along with the President Frederic Hauge, they had a more generic approach to the work they did at the COPs. Bellona has focused on technological solutions that politicians and business can apply, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has principally been their field of expertise in the recent years (Hauge, 2015; Helseth, 2015; Søyland, 2015). Additionally, they have worked on Sahara Desert Project – a project that enables food production in the desert with seawater and solar power, and other technological solutions that need help to start up while representing potential policies to assist decision makers to face both environmental and economic concerns (Hauge, 2015).

1) International negotiations and processes

Bellona's participation was at a peak at COP15 in Copenhagen. At this conference they had 153 delegates who attended the event on their delegation, but only 43 were actually working for Bellona (Søyland & Helseth, 2015; UNFCCC, 2009b, pp. 116-118). The remaining delegates are partners and others without accreditation that Bellona accommodated. The following COPs saw a significant decrease: six each at COP16 and COP17, eleven at COP18 (increase mainly due to the Sahara Forest Project), three at COP19, and only one at COP20 (Søyland, 2015; Søyland & Helseth, 2015).

Insider strategies

Being a relevant ENGO for decision makers and business for Bellona means opening policy windows and business opportunities (Hauge, 2015). Distribution of knowledge and direct dialogue is therefore a preferred insider strategy that Bellona applies.

Distribution of materials (policy papers, pamphlets etc.) has been important for Bellona. One aspect is the need for explanation – as they do promote (relatively new) technological solutions. Another aspect is connected to their focus on concrete tools that can assist countries and companies to face climate change targets. Thus, their magazine “101 Solutions to Climate Change” is a key example highlighted by several interview subjects – both from Bellona as well from other actors. In the magazine 101 concrete examples are presented, and it was distributed at COPs (Bellona, 2009a).

Bellona's network is a key factor that Hauge (2015) highlights. Two and a half year before COP15, he booked a table at a renowned restaurant in Copenhagen for the whole duration of the negotiations (two weeks), in order to accommodate lobby dinners with significant actors. Bellona hosted such informal dinners almost every evening. This illustrates their conscious approach to attract high profile figures from a COP. Furthermore, while some organisations are characterised by a high turnover, Hauge (2015) emphasises continuity as an essential element for Bellona in keeping valuable networks. The COP15 was a network boost for Bellona, and the following years were spent on preserving these, and developing new contacts (Bellona, 2011, pp. 34-35). In their 2013 annual report, Bellona claim they know the leaders and key personnel in all the major NGOs, the important Heads of Delegations, top executives from the industry, former heads of state, leaders of several UN organisations and politicians in the EU and the US (Bellona, 2014, p. 24).

At COP15 Bellona booked a delegation room among state delegations (in addition to their exhibition pavilion). This, according to Hauge (2015) allowed them to stay after all other NGO representatives were denied access at the end of the negotiations, and furthermore, they let the Norwegian delegation use their rooms towards the end of the negotiations, thereby improving the relationship. Such designated rooms are also useful in carrying out lobby meetings at COPs. It must be noted that it is not common for NGOs to have delegation rooms, partly due to the costs related to renting a room. Not even all state delegations have rooms at COPs. This illustrates the resources Bellona put in this particular COP. While even booking of rooms is a strategic matter to Bellona, it has also contributed to negative sentiment among some negotiators. Partly due to a certain degree of distance, that negotiators wish to have when working but also due to a particular incident at COP16 in Cancun in which Bellona used the delegation's secured Wi-Fi connection (that pose a certain security risk for the internal government communication). It might appear as a small issue but it actually still colour some negotiators' opinion about the organisation.

Bellona does not partake in the officially recognised ENGO constituency in the UNFCCC (through neither CAN nor CJN), and according to Hauge (2015) there are four main reasons. Firstly, Bellona's main field of interest is not the negotiation text as mentioned previously in contradiction to CAN. Secondly, the foundation focuses on pragmatic solutions rather than politically not feasible demands as Hauge puts it. Thirdly, Bellona is also more positive to business – even willing to work with the fossil industry, and lastly and related to the former point, Bellona is fond of CCS dissentient to many ENGOs in the UNFCCC negotiations. Bellona is a member of other alliances such as the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC), nevertheless, these do not lobby the UNFCCC platform (Helseth, 2015). Global Climate Network (GCN) is on the other hand a coalition in which Bellona cooperated with think tanks to promote policies that contribute to tackle climate change (Bellona, 2011, pp. 33-34).

Outsider and mixed strategies

Two tactics that may appear as outsider strategies but that certainly have aspects of insider strategy as well are seminars/side events and showcasing. Showcasing is an important strategy for Bellona to promote the technology that is explored to a limited degree by business and governments. As COPs are annual 'climate happenings', showcasing at these arenas is a tremendous opportunity. Showcasing carries elements from both outsider and insider

strategies. While it can be seen as media friendly stunts, this tactic can also be a way to trigger stakeholders' interest and improve Bellona's branding through the visibility that showcasing can bring about.

The Sahara Forest Project's "moment of fame" was during COP18 in Doha, Qatar. Selected delegates from the negotiations were brought to the Sahara Forest Project Pilot Facility to see, learn and taste produce made in the desert with seawater and solar energy, in order to illustrate the technological possibility and also the interest to allocate funds to invest further. 120 guests visited the pilot facility including ministers, business representatives, and researchers, and it received global media coverage²¹ (Bellona, 2012, p. 28). The project has since been expanded to Jordan, and according to Hauge (2015) actors from other countries have also expressed their interest. Hauge (2015) claims he had a key impact in Doha becoming the host of COP18 – in order to give Qatar a concrete deadline in their pilot facility cooperation. When asked, he did not however respond to who/which channel that allowed him this influence. Thus, although it could be an interesting example of procedural lobby, without other sources, this remains as an unverified claim from one part.

Side events can also be perceived as a mixed strategy. On one hand, it is an insider strategy if the goal is to create an arena for dialogue with stakeholders. On the other hand, it is also a potential arena to assert pressure. As illustrated by the number of delegates Bellona sent, COP15 in Copenhagen was a peak not just in participation, but also in the number of side events they organised. They had over sixty side events/seminars/workshops in Copenhagen, then around twenty the two following years, and fewer at COP18 in Doha when they focused on the Sahara Forest Project (Bellona, 2010; UNFCCC, 2014c).

A clear outsider strategy on the other hand, is Bellona's usage of its international network of journalists to criticise the Norwegian government. Norwegian governments do care about the country's international reputation, and Hauge (2015) tells that the 'phone started ringing' after he was quoted in the Washington Post²² calling Norway a 'selfish country of petroholics'.

²¹ Such as BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera, CCTV (China Central Television), in addition to Norwegian and Qatari media.

²² The quote appear to have been to the TIME Magazine when Frederic Hauge was featured as one of the global 'heroes of the environment'. He told the Magazine "We're a nice little selfish country of petroholics" (Smith, 2007).

2) Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification

Insider strategies

One particular element that makes Bellona stand out among the three organisations studied in this thesis in regards to strategy is how easily their employees call government representatives and parliamentarians to let them know Bellona's reaction on various statements. While many Norwegian NGOs keep to formalised meetings, hearings, and seminars, getting in touch in such a direct way differs from most other actors according to decision makers who have been interviewed. This was also confirmed by the Bellona representatives. This somewhat "unconventional" and informal communication secures that Bellona's positions are communicated continuously beyond the formal channels. Additionally, they apply the regular tactics such submitting policy documents and concrete budgetary inputs, meeting with decision makers and bureaucrats/negotiators. Distribution of information materials, including reports are an integrated part of this strategy.

On the regional level, Bellona has the most significant presence in Brussels among the Norwegian ENGOs. With its own office in Brussels since 1994, and formal cooperation with the EU, it has built a certain standing in the European political scene related to climate and energy. Their lobby on foreign governments is tightly interrelated to the EU lobby work according to the Director at Bellona's Brussels office Jonas Helseth (2015). Helseth (2015) explains that the main target is the European Commission, and then the EU Presidency, as they are the most central actors in developing EU's position in UNFCCC. Additionally the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are used as a supplementary channel as, although they have limited impact on EU's positions in the climate negotiations, they are beneficial as an indirect channel to their national parliaments (Helseth 2015).

In order to influence the EU level, Bellona has decided to work with some key member states such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany. Part of the narrative Bellona builds around CCS in the European context, is that in order to include carbon intensive countries such as Poland on the path to a low-carbon economy, CCS is a 'ticket in' for those countries, which in turn may contribute to an agreement (Helseth 2015). Hauge (2015) stated that he received an email from the British Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change thanking him for Bellona's effort to get Poland on board in the EU 2030 agreement.

For several years, Bellona had an office in Washington DC that was applied to lobby the US and Canadian governments. Even after the office was shut down, they have continued cooperation at the bureaucratic level, particularly with the US Department of Energy, on among others technological development and knowledge sharing (Helseth 2015). Previously, while Bellona had their own staff in Washington D.C., they also lobbied politicians.

Beyond those countries and regional inter-governmental organisations that are considered as key actors in the international climate regime, Bellona also works with governments on concrete projects. In the Sahara Forest Project they work directly with the governments of Qatar and Jordan. According to Hauge (2015) they have ongoing dialogue with additional national as well as local governments. These project-based relations add to Bellona's effort to build an international network.

Outsider strategies

Again, seminars can be interpreted as mixed insider and outsider strategies. It is an essential strategy in order to transmit knowledge, lobby policies, network, and have a dialogue with decision makers, and opinion makers such as journalists.

Though Bellona's identity appears to be mostly an advisory type of ENGO today, the activist roots are still apparent especially in the domestic context. Particularly the Bellona President is known for straightforward comments – positive as well as negative. Bellona actively uses the media as a channel to reach decision makers domestically, as well on the regional level, and towards foreign governments. More details on the use of media will be explained in the section 4) public opinion, however, this section can highlight some examples that illustrate the way Bellona uses media to communicate to decision makers. In 2009, prior to COP15, they carried out a stunt where they presented Bellona's 'alternative white paper'. The table was turned, and politicians, including the Minister of Environment Erik Solheim, and government institutions were invited to a hearing. While being a stunt that was media friendly, the focus on constructiveness remained, and the hundred page long "white paper" did contain a comprehensive plan on how Norway should tackle climate change (Bellona, 2009b). This is an example of how Bellona combines communicability, constructiveness, relevance to politicians, and sometimes a touch of activism in their strategy.

3) Target groups' climate policy and behaviour

Bellona (2015c) explains that since pollution does not know borders, there is basically no limit to who they could work with but they do point out that they will remain as an independent 'watchdog'.

Mixed strategies

From its establishment in 1986 and into the 1990s Bellona used activist methods such as chaining themselves to places to protest against companies' environmental violations. This approach has since been significantly toned down in the last decade (Bellona & Sæther, 2011). While Bellona cooperates with business today, they have nevertheless, not been shy to criticise companies publicly.

Bellona is the ENGO in Norway with the longest tradition for working closely with the business sector, and started its first business programme in 1998 (Bellona & Sæther, 2011, p. 35). The organisation's approach is to attract businesses by assisting them with competence on existing climate technology that can be implemented by each company. In addition to the direct contact with each business, Bellona has also forums in which businesses gather for knowledge sharing, as well as to cooperate on policy formulation (Bellona, 2015b). This close relation allows Bellona to affect Norwegian, and foreign, companies', approaches on climate change, which in turn also may affect the political level. To apply the notion of green/grey BINGOs as conceptualised by Vormedal (2008), though the starting point may differ for each business, Bellona will pull the business actors to the greener end of the continuum.

Bellona's strategy on cooperating closely with business (even from the fossil industry) raises challenges between that collaboration and keeping the organisation's environmental legitimacy. Bellona has been accused of 'greenwashing' (deceptive green marketing of) companies in exchange for funding, but has countered these allegations systematically for example in a series of articles and opinion pieces published in an online news site NA24 (Simenstad, 2006; Stenerud, Sveinbjørnsson, & Selvik, 2006; Sæther, 2006a, 2006b). A tactic that Bellona applies is to report environment crimes to the police, and the Norwegian oil company Statoil that has previously sponsored Bellona has not been an exception while they were still a sponsoring partner. While cooperating on CCS, Statoil has also been criticised by Bellona on their wish to drill for oil in the Arctic, and their tar sand project in Canada. According to Bellona Managing Director Nils Bøhmer and Statoil Communication Director

Jannik Lindbæk Jr., they did not renew their agreement in 2008 due to disagreements and that they did not consider the partnership as fruitful any longer (Bøhmer, 2011; Ree & Helgesen, 2011). Director of Bellona Europe, Jonas Helseth (2015), describes that it is in fact not always easy for companies to accept public criticism from Bellona directed at them or their sector. For example Shell is a Bellona partner in promoting CCS, and when Bellona criticised Shell for their interest in drilling oil in the Arctic, it was difficult to accept for the company. However, Helseth (2015) explains that most businesses in the end see their interest in letting Bellona follow its ideology and keep their green legitimacy. These relationships demonstrate the difficult balance of partnerships that Bellona faces in cooperating with businesses and remaining as an ENGO with legitimacy.

Furthermore, Helseth (2015) points out that it is vital for Bellona to retain flexibility. He says that they will cooperate with business when that appears fruitful, however, that they also partner with other ENGOs, for example when industrial actors were sceptic about the EU Emissions Trade System (ETS) (Helseth, 2015). Bellona also draws on expertise from scientists when working with business, as well as in promoting technological solutions to decision makers. These target groups are complementary while business appears to be their main target group.

The Climate Conference in 2008 and 2009 (CC8 and CC9) that Bellona organised in collaboration with the Norwegian power company Hafslund (among others a producer of hydropower and district heating) and Club de Madrid (“the world’s largest forum of former democratic Presidents and Prime Ministers”) (Club de Madrid, 2015; Hafslund, 2015). This was a conference with high-level guests from business, politics, and academia including members of Club de Madrid (such as Norwegian Gro Harlem Brundtland and Costa Rican José María Figueres) (Bellona, 2008, 2009c). The latter has also helped Bellona in establishing relations with his sister Christina Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC (Hauge, 2015). Other notable guests were the economist Nicholas Stern and UN Special Envoys on Climate Change Ricardo Lagos. This conference series is both an illustration of the international status Bellona has established and a way in which they further develop their network and branding.

4) Public opinion

Outsider strategies

Bellona's media coverage is quite extensive, and according to their annual report, they were the ENGO with the most media coverage in Norway in 2011 (Bellona, 2012). The other annual reports state that they have about 5,000 – 6,000 coverages annually (Bellona, 2011, p. 22; 2012, p. 23; 2013, p. 18; 2014, p. 21). The media monitor searches through Retriever on the concrete COPs confirms a similar picture of high levels of exposure. Søyland (2015) explained that one of the measures taken was publishing articles on the Bellona website formulated so that journalists could easily apply it. Furthermore, in 2013 Bellona put an extra effort to boost the social media outreach.

From the advisory ENGO perspective, one could expect decision makers and businesses as their main targets. Additionally, Bellona is not member based, therefore, they do not have the same incentives as a member based organisation in reaching the greater public. However, they do define all three groups as their target (Bellona, 2011, p. 22). More specifically, in the 2009 annual report Bellona mentions the public as a target in relation to COP15, and draws the attention to their cooperation with Copenhagen Municipality on “Hopenhagen” – an exhibition and event area in the city centre (Bellona, 2010, pp. 11-12). Though not part of their main activity, Bellona also visits schools and have information stands across Norway to inform and involve the grass root in climate and environment issues (Bellona, 2014, p. 23). It appears that they therefore in addition to the pragmatic media outreach directed at decision makers and businesses, have an ideology driven effort to reach the public opinion as well.

5.2.3 Summary: the Advisory ENGO?

Bellona's levels targeted and strategies applied in the period 2009-2014 based on the data collected can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.3 below:

Strategies	Levels targeted					
	<i>UNFCCC</i>	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>Foreign</i>	<i>Regional</i>	<i>Target group</i>	<i>Public opinion</i>
<i>Insider strategies</i>						
Lobby decision makers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a	n/a
Lobby the bureaucracy	Moderate	Yes	Moderate	Yes	n/a	n/a
Lobby through alliances	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a	n/a

Formal intervention/submissions	No	Moderate	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Scientists/other opinion-makers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a
<i>Outsider Strategy</i>						
Mobilising activists	No	No	No	No	No	No
Media	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Mixed Strategy</i>						
Showcasing	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Seminars	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 5.3. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of Bellona

Comparing the above table 5.3 with Andresen and Gulbrandsen's (2005) advisory ENGO type as presented in table 5.4, Bellona divert from these characteristics:

	Advisory ENNGO
Critical resources	Intellectual base
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy (Target groups)
Strategy	Insider only

Table 5.4 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Advisory ENGOs

It appears that historical (activist roots) and ideological reasons contribute to the fact that Bellona targets the public although a member base does not play a significant part of neither their budget nor the functioning of the organisation. Furthermore, they approach target groups to a greater extent than for example NNV. Approaching target groups, especially businesses, are actually a fundamental element of their strategy. Consequently, Bellona does not fit into the advisory ENGO type.

5.3 NSA's strategy: the Discreet Business Lobbyist

As a business association which is dominated by ships operating on fossil fuels, and also being involved in the Norwegian oil industry, there are paradoxes when promoting a 'green profile'. Although the representatives from NSA argued that they want Norwegian shipping to be leading in green technology globally and ambitious ideas are presented in their environment strategy, there are still some hinders that should be highlighted. This is not as a

normative discussion or judgement (which is not the aim of this thesis) but rather an imperative interest to be aware of in analysing their strategy.

Firstly, there is an internal disagreement within the sector (primarily between shipowners and shipbrokers) regarding the speed of the delivery that has a consequence for the level of emissions. The ship owners often have an interest in not exceeding a certain level of speed for the vessel, as higher speed requires more fuel which is of course costly. Additionally, they have an interest in maximising the potential of the route by stopping at several ports on the way from A to B. Shipbrokers on the other hand will often be interested in quick deliveries, which are more cost efficient from their perspective. This is particularly the case for so-called “hot markets” with high levels of competition (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).

Secondly, it must be noted that around 80 per cent of ships built and/or equipped in Norwegian shipyards are connected to the offshore oil and gas industry, and followingly, NSA argues in favour of increased activity in the oil sector and the opening of new offshore oil fields (Norges Rederiforbund, 2010a).

Finally, profit can both be an enabling and hindering factor in adopting green solutions in a business sector. Vormedal (2008, p. 62) note, however, that within the diversity of BINGOs, it is “evident that business activities and mandates have moved towards the green(er) end of the spectrum, reflecting a more general shift in corporate strategies from opposition towards more accommodative and constructive approaches to climate change mitigation”. This also appears to be the goal of NSA. While they are aware that ambitions among their members vary, they as a business umbrella association would like to encourage green innovation and best practice sharing among their members, and furthermore lobby for regulations that allow the marine sector a smooth green shift (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The Specialist Director in the Ministry of Climate and Environment that works with shipping (including IMO), Sveinung Oftedal (2015), noted that NSA do have a more climate friendly “positive voice” within the ICS.

Taking these aspects into consideration, NSA is mixed in regards to their environmental ambitions. As presented in the theoretical chapter, Vormedal (2008) develops a scale from one (the most “grey” anti-emission control BINGOs) to four (the greenest most climate proactive BINGOs). NSA can be said to be a “middle green” BINGO (the third category on the continuum). This implies that their view is to “acknowledge/endorse need for climate

mitigation and GHG regulation”, the strategy and mandate are to “promote business-friendly regulations [and] level playing fields”, and it carries out “information-based lobbying and discursive tactics” (Vormedal, 2008, p. 41). Consequently, it fits into the more general development in Europe and North America since the turn of the century, in which corporate strategies have turned more to accommodation and cooperation rather than opposition (Vormedal, 2008, p. 40).

5.3.1 Critical Resource

Membership base: NSA is an umbrella organisation that consists of around hundred and fifty Norwegian shipping companies, roughly covering 1,400 ships (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014c). However, as its membership is based on business and not individual membership, they do not fit into the classic sense of a membership base. In this analysis, as Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005) describe this resource as a matter of among others gaining new members, this does not apply directly to NSA. The explanation is that NSA does not have a competing association and shipowners recognise the benefits of being organised in the Norwegian society.

Intellectual base: NSA has an extensive intellectual base through their employees and member businesses. From 2009-2014 NSA has had 40-50 full-time equivalents (FTEs) (Norges Rederiforbund, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014d, 2015). Of these most of the employees are lawyers and advisors, however, only two work directly with environmental concerns (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014a; Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).

Financial base: The operating revenue is not published in every annual report. As an illustration, it was NOK 123 million (USD 16,5 million) in 2014 (Norges Rederiforbund, 2015, p. 16). A significant share of this are membership fees from the shipowners.

Political base: As they represent an important sector with longstanding traditions in Norway they have access to politicians as well as bureaucrats. The Norwegian shipping industry’s international presence, has historically allowed for close ties between NSA and particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, there are traces of revolving door politics, with movement of personnel between bureaucracy/politics and NSA.

Critical resource: The membership base is in a certain manner an important resource, however, for the UNFCCC negotiations the relevance of this factor is limited. The intellectual base is restricted due to the low number of employees working concretely with climate. In the context of the climate negotiations, their financial and political base are the most significant resources and the latter is the resource that particularly stand out.

5.3.2 Targeted Arena and Applied Strategies

Unlike the other two organisations in this thesis, NSA rarely applies any outside strategy. Politicians as well as the NSA representatives pointed out that NSA is not a publicly vocal type of organisation. Being a BINGO, activism is not a strategy they apply either. The first three sections on arenas will thus, present the insider strategies the organisation applies. NSA's media coverages on climate issues are very limited but will be briefly presented under the forth arena on public opinion.

1) International negotiations and processes

Insider strategies

NSA has been less active at the actual UNFCCC negotiations compared to NNV and Bellona. Following the removal of the extended delegation, and despite their direct accreditation, NSA has deprioritised the COPs as they considered the negotiations itself to be a less effective arena of influence (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). For NSA, the bureaucratic level appears to have been a more vital channel to communicate their positions to the Norwegian authorities on climate matters relating to shipping. As a representative of a key industry in Norway, NSA naturally has meetings directly on the government level, nevertheless, in this particular field of subject the bureaucratic channel has been important (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).

Another imperative aspect for deprioritising COPs is that the detailed shipping related climate issues are negotiated in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Thus, the IMO negotiations have a higher strategic priority than the UNFCCC. Furthermore, Sletner stress the fact that NSA is on the Norwegian delegation to IMO (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). IMO presents reports to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) under the UNFCCC. The fact that the shipping industry in general only has a limited number of delegates – the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) for example has only sent one to

four delegates per COP, may indicate a similar interpretation of the relevance of the UNFCCC to the shipping industry (UNFCCC, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2013b, 2014b).

While they were still on the extended delegation, the NSA representative to COP15 Gløersen called himself the “backbench consultant” (Hovland, 2009). This illustrates NSA’s approach fittingly. They are discreet in their lobbying but ensure that their members’ interests are properly communicated. Vormedal (2008, p. 43) described information-based lobbying as lobbying that “may involve providing governments with expert advice, technical reports and position papers, and assisting decision-makers directly with policy formulation and the writing of legal texts”. NSA has most certainly submitted most of these elements but less so on concrete policy formulation and writing of legal text in the context of the negotiations. They have made their stance known on the need for a global regulatory framework (rather than domestic), and related to that, the need to avoid the distortion of competition. Furthermore, they also actively lobby within ICS (which will be discussed further in the next chapter). At COP18 for example, the NSA Director for Security, Environment and Innovation Hanna Lee Behrens pushed for a common proposal for emission reduction from the shipping industry (Andersson, 2011).

Mixed strategy

On showcasing, Sletner brought up the example of the ship Viking Lady at COP15 in Copenhagen (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The fuel cell and combustion engines on board are powered by LNG (liquefied natural gas) which “significantly [reduce] harmful emissions compared with the traditional marine oils that commercial ships generally operate on” (Viking Lady, 2015). The ship is a collaboration between NSA member Eidesvik Offshore, DNV-GL, and Wärtsilä in the project they call the FellowSHIP (DNV-GL, 2015). This is also the only example of showcasing in relation to a COP, so this strategy is seldom applied directly in the UNFCCC arena by NSA.

2) Domestic/foreign/regional climate policy and ratification

Insider strategies

Although NSA has not attended many COPs, they have made it clear to the Norwegian political authorities what their stances are on the negotiation text and given them inputs prior

to COPs (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Sletner points out that it is a matter of prioritising the most effective channel for NSA. While some are more vocal in arenas such as the COP itself or on the extended Norwegian delegation, this is not the favoured tactic for NSA (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Sletner says that they would rather have direct meetings with the political leadership in Norway, and submit thorough policy papers prior to COPs (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Former Minister of Environment (2012-13) Bård Vegar Solhjell confirms this approach. According to Solhjell (2015), NSA is not the organisation to scream the loudest but they will make their opinion known through direct meetings. The Political Advisor to the Climate and Environment Minister (2013-), Jens Frølich Holte (2015), also notes that NSA sends their political inputs – whether it is a policy or budget matter, effectively at the right point of time in the domestic political process.

Sletner expressed that the EU was certainly an important channel to them when targeting the UNFCCC negotiations (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). In addition to being Head of Section on Environment in NSA, he is also the Chairman of a working group on energy efficiency in the European Community Shipowners' Associations' (ECSA). NSA actively promotes their stances in this arena through the ECSA and directly from its office in Brussels.

While keeping an eye on the greater picture regarding climate change, similar to Bellona, NSA prefers to be more “hands on” and develop concrete projects that allow a greener shipping industry. For example, NSA has a voluntary reporting system for its members on CO₂ emissions as becoming aware is the first step toward reductions, according to Sletner and Vaagland (2015). Furthermore, NSA and its members engage in projects on development of green shipping technology.

3) Target groups' climate policy and behaviour

Insider strategies

For NSA, the main target group appears to be shipping business, particularly their own members. As previously presented, their member base is very diverse, with climate regulations being a larger threat to some member corporations than others. NSA has thus carried out internal efforts to encourage their members to agree on climate targets in the environment and climate strategy “Blue Sea – Green Future”. A key tactic has been to present

climate-friendly measures in terms of energy efficiency, and to facilitate knowledge-sharing. This arena will be more elaborately addressed in the next chapter.

4) Public opinion

Outsider strategies

Public opinion is of limited importance for NSA compared to the other channels. Publicly, NSA portrays itself as a business association that takes Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) seriously, including on climate change. Looking through the media coverage during COPs (which is not substantial), their expression is ‘sober’ in that they are clear on their opinions and stances but they do not directly criticise others through the media. They argue in a factual manner, and proactively suggest benefits for actors that could potentially oppose their stances (e.g., leverage for developing countries that desire differentiated regulations). It appears as though public opinion is of a lesser importance (as long as there is no negative PR). Hence, this channel does not seem to be prioritised.

5.3.3 Summary: the Lobbyist BINGO?

Strategies	Levels targeted					
	<i>UNFCCC</i>	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>Foreign</i>	<i>Regional</i>	<i>Target group</i>	<i>Public opinion</i>
<i>Insider strategies</i>						
Lobby decision makers	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Lobby the bureaucracy	No	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Lobby through alliances	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	n/a	n/a
Formal intervention/submissions	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	n/a
Scientists/other opinion-makers	No	Moderate	No	Moderate	No	n/a
<i>Outsider Strategy</i>						
Mobilising activists	No	No	No	No	No	No
Media	Moderate	Moderate	No	No	No	Moderate
<i>Mixed Strategy</i>						
Showcasing	Moderate	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Seminars	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No

Table 5.5. Strategies and levels targeted – the case of NSA

NSA’s levels targeted and strategies applied can be summarised as illustrated in table 5.5. Their interpretation of the effects of participating in an extended delegation also appears as a key reason for the decreased interest. As highlighted before, there are still shipping related topics in the UNFCCC – such as suggestions on international bunker fuel taxation. Nonetheless, particularly two strategic considerations appear to be relevant. Firstly, relevance of platform: decisions that may have a negative impact on their sector may not give the impression of being realistic to reach within the UNFCCC framework (in contrast to IMO). Secondly, the relevance of their presence: NSA may consider their interests covered by Norway through prior lobbying and non-state actors such as the International Council on Shipping (ICS), which represents the shipowners’ interests. This also confirms the observation by Vormedal (2008, p. 38) that the transnational organisations targeting the regional/international level are more active in the climate negotiations than nationally-based BINGOs.

In chapter two, the approach for a lobbyist BINGO was presented as the following:

	Lobbyist BINGO
Critical resources	Financial base
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy
Strategy	Insider only

Table 5.6 Relationship between NGO type and resources, levels targeted and strategies – Lobbyist BINGOs

NSA mostly fits into the description above. However, they do not prioritise the international negotiations in the UNFCCC any longer. On the other hand, they are active in IMO negotiations. What is lacking in the overview above compared to NSA’s practice, is that they target their own industry – both among their members and through their umbrella organisations. Additionally, the political base appeared to be more significant – both when studying their resources as well as after studying the strategies applied.

5.4 Activist, Advisory, and Lobbyist NGOs? Concluding Remarks on Strategies

Looking back at the Singaporean Minister Dr. Balakrishnan’s quote with a metaphor from surgery that illustrated how sensitive it is to keep the balance in order to reach agreements in the UNFCCC negotiations, it is intriguing to study the various approaches applied by NGOs.

This section will summarise and address the second research question: What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?

This chapter presented and analysed NNV, Bellona, and NSA's strategies by looking at their critical resources, arenas targeted, before considering whether they applied an insider/outsider or dual strategy. At first sight, NNV and Bellona appear as typical activist and advisory ENGOs, and it could be expected from the theoretical framework that NNV would have a dual and Bellona an insider approach.

HoD Aslak Brun (2015) commented that while NNV is the organisation that make use of all the formal channels available, often arranging meetings to set an agenda, before criticising and pressuring through media, Bellona on the other hand is less visible in the 'formal channels' but in turn is very outspoken in the media. This experience thus differ from what could be expected from Andresen and Gulbrandsen concept of activist and advisory ENGO. In sharp contrast to what Brun noted, another person from the Norwegian delegation expressed that you can draw an axe from "noise" to technical expertise, and you would find NNV closest to "noise" and NSA at the other end while Bellona was somewhere in between. However, the same person also notes that in the UNFCCC negotiations NNV behaves much more like an expert and that other Norwegian NGOs represent the "noise".

This leads to the finding that both NNV and Bellona had a division of labour to a certain degree in having the President act as an "activist type" (though they also did lobby), and others from their organisation ensured purely lobbyist functions. NSA on the other hand, is mostly comfortable with its insider strategies, and fit well into the lobbyist BINGO type. Interestingly, as an umbrella association that covers a variety of shipping company, NSA furthermore highlighted internal lobbying.

Specialised knowledge is a key resource relevant to NGOs strategies. As climate negotiations are highly complex and technical, "decision-makers often turn to NGOs for help in understanding the nature of the problems and the implications of various policy alternatives under consideration (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 74). This was also confirmed in the field research. The negotiators would evaluate, together with bureaucrats in Oslo, new propositions and draft texts on their own. Nevertheless, they were very open to suggestions and inputs particularly on such occasions when new texts were on the table. The information submitted

by NGOs in those situations are not the single source for the decision makers but still represent an essential policy windows in which influence may happen.

Although many negotiators emphasised constructive inputs as the most effective, putting pressure is nevertheless not to be underestimated. From a bureaucratic point of view, the outsider strategy of creating public pressure may appear less relevant. Nevertheless, this strategy is rather a communication directed at politicians who do partake in the public debate. Hence, though the negotiators/bureaucrats may not be very receptive for this strategy, it may, on the other hand be effective in influencing the politicians.

The parliamentary channel is also relevant for both the insider and outsider strategy. According to the President of the Parliamentary Committee on Environment and Energy, Ola Elvestuen (2014), he is of the impression that the ENGOs are more heavily involved in lobbying the parliament than the private sector. It should be noted that the Liberal Party (Venstre) is considered to be one of the environmentally friendly parties in Norway, and that he may have a selective depiction given the grey lobby may have prioritised the larger and less environmentally friendly parties. NNV and Bellona have in fact actively used the parliament both when disagreeing with the government as well as in order to cement their policies broadly. For NSA on the topic of climate, other arenas have been sufficient to secure their stances; hence, the need to lobby the opposition may have been lower.

In addition to the concrete policy formulation, showcasing and ‘leading by example’ have been strategies that are more indirect but that may enhance the international climate negotiations by pushing/pulling industries in a greener direction – which in turn will make it easier for decision makers to take climate friendly choices. Both Bellona and NSA focus heavily on this strategy, though the former more publicly than the latter.

Strategy naturally depends on their goals. NSA reaches its goals mainly through discreet lobbying. Their goals are on a concrete detailed (often regulatory) level on climate issues. Thus, engaging the public is not a primary tactic. Media also appears as a complementary method. In regards to publicity, Bellona is at the other end of the spectrum, as their goal is to promote technological solutions, visibility is a key, and is reflected in their choice of strategies as well. They focus on showcasing, networking, and projects. The UNFCCC for Bellona is thus a supplementary channel. NNV is the organisation among these three that

focuses the most on the UNFCCC negotiation process itself. This is closely linked to their REDD+ involvement, and general domestic climate ambitions for Norway.

6 Influence:

Putting the Empirical Puzzle Together

The chief negotiator for G77 and China in the Accra negotiations, Bernarditas Castro-Muller from the Philippines, compared the fruitless negotiations with the dance cha-cha-cha: Moving a few steps to the right, then forward, a few to the left, and then a hop backwards where you are ultimately back to square one. ‘Moving without going anywhere’ (Bals, Treber, & Harmeling, 2008). In these intricate and cumbersome negotiations, what are the contributions of the NGOs? Do they push the negotiations in a positive direction and present solutions, or simply dance along the climate cha-cha-cha?

In the existing academic literature, there seems to be a broad agreement that non-state actors do have influence on international policy-making. While this research often focuses on transnational actors, can the same statement apply to Norwegian NGOs? There has certainly been a clear increase in the number of participating organisations, but what is their actual impact?

So far, we have considered the channels available, and the strategies applied by three selected NGOs. Now the last research question will be targeted: do NNV, Bellona, and NSA have influence? The non-state actors’ impact will be assessed through among others their own evaluations in the interviews, the receivers’ impressions, fieldwork observations, and document analysis. As highlighted in the introduction, finding NGO influence in international environmental negotiations can be described as putting together “an interesting empirical puzzle” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68). This chapter will thus gather the empirical puzzle pieces together to trace the influence of NNV, Bellona, and NSA.

For each organisation their main strategic goals will be presented before looking into competing and converging interests in various arenas for those goals, which may affect the potential influence that the NGOs may achieve. Lastly, as presented in the theoretical chapter, this section will assess the influence based on the definition of NGO influence, and guided by the analytical framework developed by Betsill and Corell (2008). The framework emphasised issue framing, agenda setting, and positions of key actors regarding the process outcome, in addition to procedural and substantive issues in regards to the negotiation outcome (or outcome on targeted position in this case). NGO influence was defined as: *when A*

intentionally communicates to B so as to alter B's behaviour from what would have occurred otherwise and bringing about A's intended effects. The summary for each NGO will gather the evidences in order to assess whether NNV, Bellona, and NSA were successful in reaching their strategic goals and influence the climate regime.

6.1 NNV's Impact

6.1.1 Strategic Goals

In NNV's international strategy it is emphasised that their goals internationally reflect their national priorities: nature conservation and hindering climate change (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 9). Two themes appear to be their key areas. As presented in the former chapter, REDD+ has been a central topic for NNV in the climate negotiation. Secondly, another primary concern for NNV is an agreement in the UNFCCC that consider the historic responsibilities, and interrelated to that are ambitious targets for GHG cuts in Norway.

6.1.2 Competing and Converging Interests

In a report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, pp. 148-150) to the Norwegian Parliament in 2009 (prior to COP15), the MFA highlights a new climate regime, a global emissions ceiling, cost effective mechanisms, CCS, and limiting deforestation and forest degradation as key issues for Norway in the UNFCCC. How did the Norwegian government end at this conclusion?

REDD+ – “the Rainforest Billions”

“Through effective measures against deforestation we can achieve large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions - quickly and at low cost. The technology is well known and has been available for thousands of years. Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree.”
– Prime Minister of Norway, 2005-2013, Jens Stoltenberg (2007).

The “Lars & Lars letter” – the letters sent to the Norwegian government and parliament by NNV President Lars Haltbrekken and the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation (NRF) Lars Løvold – which encouraged Norway to contribute with NOK 6 billion (USD 820 million) annually to REDD+ (Løvold & Haltbrekken, 2007). This is a prominent example of effective

influence. The result was announced in the Stoltenberg speech two months later with half the amount of what NNV and NRF asked for, nevertheless, a significant amount that put Norway in a central position in the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+.

As explained in the former chapter, NNV's strategy was to address the government and the opposition in the Parliament with a policy that had an appeal to several political parties. By further cementing it in the parliamentary climate agreement (*Klimaforliket*) they ensured the long-term survival of the Norwegian support for REDD+. Cost efficiency and giving Norway a favourable impression and position in the UNFCCC were leading arguments that contributed to secure the REDD+ support in Norway. Additionally, it circumvented the more contentious issue of making cuts in GHG emissions in Norway at a higher cost. It had thus an appealing framing.

Several of the informants also point to Minister of Environment (later Minister of Environment and International Development) Erik Solheim who took personal interest in securing the NNV/NRF initiative. Hermansen and Kasa (2014, pp. 10-12) argues in a working paper that the fact that Solheim established a new section under the Ministry of Environment – the Climate and Forest Secretariat (KOS), affected the way the initiative was implemented “by bypassing bureaucratic establishments” cautiousness.

It must be noted that the extensive amount was drawn from the aid budget, which raised some criticism in Norway. However, it did not suffice to hinder the continuation of the Norwegian REDD+ efforts. Partly, this can be due to the legitimacy that NNV and NRF gave the initiative. This also happened in the context of a growing aid budget and state budget in general. The aid budget was doubled between 2004 and 2013 to become NOK 30 billion (USD 4 billion) (Utenriksdepartementet, 2012). Furthermore, there has been a political consensus to target 1 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) for aid in Norway, and by drawing from the aid budget, it hence served both this political purpose while containing the potential opposition from the fiscally conservative Ministry of Finance.

In addition to the policy influence that NNV together with NRF accomplished, they also achieved a procedural victory as they gained a position in the Norwegian delegation through ForUM. This, combined with funds from Norad that actually originates from the “rainforest billions” (*regnskogsmilliardene*) as it is popularly called in Norway, gave NNV and NRF a shared full-time employee that followed up REDD+ and the international climate negotiations

more generally. The negotiators and politicians impression on the extent to which this position contributed to NNV influence through the international channel varies. While one Norwegian negotiator who had worked with NNV called this civil society position on the delegation simply as a communication channel for the government to the civil society and the greater public, another expressed that the NNV representative on the delegation was a beneficial sparring partner to brainstorm and develop the REDD+ policy further (Norwegian Negotiator, 2015). This varying perception may indicate a moderate influence through this position. On the other hand, this position does allow NNV a comprehensive insight (compared to NGOs without such access to a state delegation) to create relevant and targeted policies that can be applied through other channels.

In the period from 2006-2014 Norwegian pledges surpassed those of the next five largest donors to REDD+ combined (Norman & Nakhooda, 2014, p. 14). The initiative also survived the government shift in 2013 in which the coalition government of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party came in power. Looking back to the definition of NGO influence, NNV certainly moved the Norwegian decision makers to a favourable position in their view. The Norwegian REDD+ finance is thus a prominent example of non-state influence towards the UNFCCC through the domestic channel. This has furthermore been followed up by more small-scale policy entrepreneurship in the following years with moderate influence.

Norwegian Contribution to an Ambitious and Just Climate Agreement in the UNFCCC

In their international strategy NNV stresses that the UN should remain as the platform to address climate change globally (Norges Naturvernforbund, 2011a, p. 24). They were for example sceptical in leaving emissions from the international shipping industry to IMO (Andersson, 2011). While working through various channels internationally, particularly through their networks, the domestic channel remains the main arena for NNV.

In the previous chapter, it was highlighted how NNV strategically targeted the government on the 2020 GHG targets – and rather successfully so. In the most recent debate on Norwegian mitigation targets for 2030, however, NNV demanded that Norway should reduce its emissions by 80 per cent compared to 1990 levels. This is a very radical stance – even compared to other ENGOs (Sagmoen, 2015). As a contrast, in the report that the Ministry of Environment ordered from the Norwegian Environment Agency, which constitutes an

important foundation for the policy formulation, the most ambitious scenario described showed 43 per cent reduction by 2030 with the same base year (Miljødirektoratet, 2014, p. 11). Interestingly this ambitious target is a consequence of being a democratically built member based organisation. The target was adopted in the NNV national board following a proposal by their youth organisation Nature and Youth. Paradoxically, Nature and Youth itself reduced its own ambitions to 60 per cent a few months later at their Congress following a debate that among others referred to the Environment Agency report. Accordingly, NNV ended up with the most far-reaching stance in this matter among the Norwegian ENGOs – a target that was perceived neither as politically feasible nor realistic. The Norwegian Parliament in the end adopted 40 per cent reductions by 2030 compared to the 1990 levels within the EU framework. On this concrete matter, NNV appears to have outmanoeuvred itself.

On the other hand, NNV did show political craftsmanship when they proposed a broad climate settlement in the Parliament. As previously mentioned, all political parties in the Norwegian Parliament except the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) reached a compromise through a climate agreement (*Klimaforliket*). The agreeing parties settled on an updated version in 2012 (Innst. 390 S: 2011-2012, 2012). The Climate and Environment Minister Tine Sundtoft's (2013-) Political Adviser Jens Frølich Holte explains that this agreement is respected and that it set the framework to a great extent on other climate policies (Holte, 2015). Whether NNV managed to push for increased ambitions is harder to prove. The targets adopted were not as ambitious as the targets aspired by NNV. However, they had a strong procedural impact as Norway has a climate policy, which is cemented strongly, notwithstanding changes in government.

NNV has voiced in favour of global climate justice, and that Norway in this context should contribute significantly, taking historical responsibilities and current capabilities into consideration. HoD Aslak Brun (2015) and the Political Adviser Holte (2015) exemplify NGO influence with the fact that several NGOs had criticised that the term *justice*²³ was not included under a section on international climate in the Revised National Budget²⁴ (RNB),

²³ In Norwegian the terms “justice”, “equity”, and “fairness”, are not distinguished as clearly as in English – particularly in the way it is in the climate debate. The word *rettferdighet* simply covers the aforementioned.

²⁴ Not to be confused with the State Budget of Norway. The National Budget of Norway describes the state of the economy and the Government's view on economic policies. As a matter of fact, the RNB actually mentions “just distribution” but not in terms of the classic climate justice (Meld. St. 2: 2013-2014, p. 100).

and that the Norwegian government had since started to refer to a “*fair* and ambitious agreement”. In the context of climate change negotiations, *climate justice* has been a contentious term, as it touches on the topic of burden sharing and the question of ‘who pays for what’. Norwegian authorities consciously use *fairness* instead of *justice* in English due to the connotations in the climate discourse. Additionally, neither Brun nor Holte had any additional explanation when asked whether adding the word *fairness* had any implication beyond language. Followingly, calling this usage of the term for influence appears as mere symbolism that give organisations “credit” without truly changing anything significantly.

However, according to Holte (2015) climate justice is a matter that the Norwegian civil society has moved politicians the most from their original stance on the topic of climate change. He exemplifies with how he believes the parliamentary climate agreement (*Klimaforliket*) would most likely have looked differently without the NGO pressure on climate justice, and more concretely how Norway should ‘take responsibility’ by cutting domestically as well as internationally (which is the more cost efficient alternative) (Holte, 2015).

NNV has been active through alliances, particularly CAN, in the material available for this thesis, however, there has not been found clear traces of a *boomerang effect* in which they have bypassed the domestic level and influenced another state (most likely in cooperation with CAN) to affect the international negotiations and/or the Norwegian delegation. This is not to say that it has not happened but rather that the evidence is not clear. There is sufficient research indicating that CAN and other transnational networks have had influence on the UNFCCC negotiations, and NNV contributing to this could accumulate to influence together with others’ contributions. Nonetheless, *activity* does not equal *influence*. Proving a *boomerang effect* would therefore require interviewing, or by other means gather sufficient information, from state delegates from other countries, and then study if that in turn has changed the Norwegian position in the desired the direction.

So has NNV had influence on the matter of improving Norwegian contributions to a just and ambitious climate agreement in the UNFCCC? As we have seen, only minor steps have been taken with only limited symbolic effect regarding climate justice, indicating low to moderate influence on issue framing. Ambitious demands can contribute to pressuring decision makers but in this case, NNV seems to have outmanoeuvred themselves from that discussion and not had significant impact on the positions of key actors. However, they have certainly moved the

political parties through the cross-party climate agreement initiative, as it ensured a firm framework for the Norwegian climate policy. Followingly, this is a clear sign of agenda setting.

6.1.3 Summary: Effective Use of the Dual Strategy?

Former HoD (2007-2009) Hanne Bjurstrøm (2015) expressed that if political influence is only measured by whether NNV reached the target of having the countries sign a binding treaty, then they have not had influence. However, she points out, NNV has influenced on other topics such as REDD+. Moreover, although not all issues can be dealt with on the spot during a negotiation, the inputs can nevertheless be brought to the domestic political decision-making at a later stage, and back into the negotiations as the Norwegian position (Bjurstrøm, 2015).

NNV appears to balance the outsider and insider strategy on the topic of climate change. Sceptical comments directed at NNV mostly originated from people who had not worked with the organisation directly, and had built their impression through NNV's outsider strategy in the media and through demonstrations. Those who had experienced their insider strategy on the other hand, considered NNV as a professional actor and distinguished the activist and lobbyist side of NNV, furthermore pointing out several successes in reaching their strategic goals.

Looking at the REDD+ strategy of influence versus their promotion of 80 per cent GHG emission cuts in Norway by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels) illustrate an interesting paradox for an ENGO such as NNV. While the policy entrepreneurship of REDD+ and the parliamentary climate agreement bear traces of thorough analytical considerations on how to frame and promote a topic in order for the initiatives to win support, the mitigation target on the other hand appears unrealistic to many of the same parties that supported the aforementioned initiatives. NNV therefore appears to have substantial competence in influencing, while sometimes being coloured by its ambitious member base driven by ideology rather than pragmatism. This on the other hand is typical for many activist ENGOs, and can be a way to create pressure but the line between that and outmanoeuvring themselves is a difficult line to walk.

6.2 Bellona's Impact

6.2.1 Strategic Goals

As we have seen in the previous chapter on strategy, in all the arenas Bellona is active on, transmitting knowledge on technological opportunities is vital part of their strategy. Promoting CCS in Norway, abroad, and building recognition for the technology in the UNFCCC has been of primary importance. Furthermore, the Sahara Forest Project (SFP) is another flagship of theirs.

6.2.2 Competing and Converging Interests

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) – Controversy, Crash-landing, and Success

The report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, pp. 148-150) to the Norwegian Parliament in 2009 (prior to COP15), as mentioned in the former section on NNV, presents CCS as one of the key issues for Norway in the climate negotiations. The Norwegian position papers from COP15 and COP16 list CCS as one of the four prioritised negotiation topics; moreover, inclusion of CCS in the UNFCCC's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is supported as a Norwegian position from COP15 to COP17 (when it was finally formalised) (Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, 2010, 2011).

According to Bellona's director from the Brussels office, they played a key role together with country parties such as Norway, United Kingdom, and USA, in promoting CCS to become a part of CDM which was reached in Durban at COP17 (Helseth, 2015). Although Bellona does not usually focus on the negotiation text, it was important for this matter as it would give the technology a recognition by the UN, which was considered as valuable in Bellona's efforts to promote CCS more generally.

Tracing a clear causation on CCS in decision maker's policy positions, or in the negotiations more generally, to Bellona is however tricky. HoD Brun (2015) suggested that it was rather parts of the fossil industry itself in his impression that pushed for CCS. In the study by Vormedal (2008) she finds that BINGOs have influenced the UNFCCC negotiations in making CCS a part of CDM. On the other hand, some of that knowledge on CCS in general and interest for this technology may have originated in Bellona's cooperation with these

businesses in Norway and abroad. One thing that can be said with greater certainty is that Bellona has shaped the domestic debate on CCS. While most other ENGOs in Norway have not been that positive towards CCS, Bellona's support has allowed businesses and politicians the legitimacy that an ENGO approval can give to a technology. In comparison, the debate on CCS has been more negative in some other European countries such as in Germany.

Gas plants, as well as CCS, have been contentious political topics in Norway, and the former has even contributed to dissolving a government (which is rare in the modern Norwegian political context). Thorbjørn Jagland was the first Prime Minister to put CCS on the governmental agenda. Tjernshaugen (2011, p. 233) who studied the growth of political support for CCS in Norway principally gives Bellona the credit for playing a "key role as policy entrepreneur, and started promoting CCS as a potential compromise solution during the years 1995–1996", and furthermore points out that Jagland explicitly thanked Bellona's initiative.

The centre-left government (2005-2013) started a full-scale CCS plant at Mongstad in Western Norway with the estimated cost of NOK 25 billion (USD 3.4 billion), and the then Prime Minister Stoltenberg described the project as Norway's "moon landing". A few days after the election in which the Stoltenberg government lost its election, however, they announced that after investing NOK 7.4 billion (USD 1 billion) on research, the full-scale project was not perceived as feasible and followingly scrapped (Haugan, Husby, & Eisenträger, 2013; Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 2015, p. 38). Frederic Hauge condemned the termination and execution of the project, calling it the 'ugliest political crash landing' he has seen (Haugan et al., 2013).

According to the Office of the Auditor General of Norway, the business interest to apply CCS may have diminished due to the high costs in the Mongstad project (Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 2015, p. 3). In comparison, the full-scale CCS facility at Boundary Dam coal plant in Canada cost less than the aforementioned investments prior to the ending of the project (Bertelsen, 2014). This could followingly affect the political parties' perception of CCS. The governing parties do, however, confirm that they will still adhere to the commitments made in the Sundvollen Declaration of the Solberg government (2013-) which states that they wish to support the development of a cost efficient CCS technology, and at least one facility with CCS (Innst. 161 S: 2013-2014, 2015, p. 25).

Initially, the decision to develop a full-scale CCS plant at Mongstad had been a significant victory for Bellona. They were one of the most prominent actors arguing in favour of the technology and that Norway should become a leading country in CCS. Bellona also cooperated on CCS with two of the industrial companies involved in the project, Statoil and Norwegian Shell. While most other Norwegian ENGOs have been sceptic to CCS, Bellona has been the primary ENGO voice in the media, hence giving the technology a ‘green legitimacy’ in the Norwegian public.

Bellona’s insistent push for this technology, particularly through lobbying of politicians and business executives, also appear to have been fruitful. Bellona has thus addressed the Norwegian politics on CCS through all four arenas: international, domestic/foreign/regional, target groups, and public opinion. Looking at the aforementioned pieces of evidence and putting the empirical puzzle together, it appears that on the topic of CCS, Bellona seem to have had influenced through issue framing, agenda setting, and moving the Norwegian position in UNFCCC (through political changes), business interest, and public opinion (in Norway, and partly in Europe) into a favourable direction in their view.

Sahara Forest Project (SFP) – “Seeing is Believing”

Bellona’s most apparent success on SFP, is the pilot facility in Qatar and the agreement with Jordan. In a video interview the Jordanian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Dr. Malek Kabariti points out that “seeing is believing; first you have to convince the people that this technology will work in our region” (Sahara Forest Project, 2013). This is essentially, what Bellona aimed at when they invited a group of selected guests from COP18 in Doha to an excursion to the pilot facility, and feeding the delegates cucumbers produced in the middle of the Qatari desert.

As mentioned in chapter four on channels, Hauge claims to have affected the decision of locating COP18 in Doha. According to Hauge (2015) the Qatari authorities had been slow in the beginning of the process, and that he “took some phone calls” to make Doha the location of a COP, so that it would be the deadline for Qatari government to finish the facility by then. Hauge (2015) would not name whom he spoke to, therefore, it has not been possible to verify to what extent Bellona has affected this decision.

The Qatar Pilot Plant was developed as a joint project by SFP in cooperation with two fertiliser companies, the Norwegian based Yara and the Qatari Qafco (Sahara Forest Project, 2015). The CEO of Qafco had commented at the opening that “it is a pilot facility. We see that it works but we have yet to see its profitability” (Alstadheim, 2012). The Sahara Forest Project Launch Station in Jordan on the other hand was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment with NOK 11.5 million (USD 1.9 million), with additional funding originating from the Grieg Foundation and other philanthropic sources (Sahara Forest Project, 2014). Its main purpose is to conduct feasibility studies. According to Hauge (2015) there are also other interested parties in various countries.

As mentioned in the former chapter on strategy, SFP received extensive attention from international media at the opening of the facility in Qatar in conjunction with the COP in Doha. The SFP signing ceremony with Qatari and Norwegian Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers earlier that year led to “several hundred articles” according to Bellona’s annual report (Bellona, 2013, p. 18).

In other words, Bellona has been successful in mobilising both private and public capital in support for the SFP concept. Moreover, they accomplished to reach the public in many countries through the media, and possibly target groups to expand the project further. They have thus accomplished agenda setting, moderate issue framing, and moved the positions of key actors. Whether they will succeed in reaching their long-term target to have the SFP concept commercially implemented beyond pilot plants and feasibility studies remains.

6.2.3 Summary: Showcasing for Success?

Analysing Bellona’s influence has been tricky at times. The issue surrounds contradicting information on their activity as well as influence. According to Sveinung Oftedal (2015) – a bureaucrat who works with environment issues related to shipping (which is also a topic that Bellona lobbies on), Bellona as well as other NGOs have a tendency to take larger credits than their real influence deserve. This comment leads to the point about the difficulties in analysing the data. As discussed in the third chapter on methods, there is a risk in both NGO representatives as well as politicians speaking too highly, or exaggerating the NGOs influence. The impression is that Bellona sometimes exaggerates its importance and accomplishments both in media as well as in documents such as their annual reports. As with statements from other actors, this was tackled by searching for information that would

verify/modify/contradict the claims. Critical statements, such as from Oftedal and several others during the field work, may also simply be an indication that they did not represent a (successful) channel for Bellona. Although they represent a relevant channel, Bellona (or other NGOs for that matter) may simply have targeted other channels. In other words, these types of statements alone are not evidence of influence, or lack of thereof.

Are these technological innovative projects truly realistic in the eyes of the decision makers and business owners? Moreover, can the application of the technology, or mentioning of it in position papers and/or negotiation text, be attributed to Bellona's lobbyism? The decision makers interviewed did recognise CCS as a key issue for Bellona for example but did express that the fossil industry's wish was more essential in including this technology in the official position of Norway. Norway's economy is largely dominated by the fossil industry, namely oil and gas. On the other hand, it can also be that Bellona's lobbyism towards the business sector has influenced the position of these industries. On this point, it is thus problematic to conclude on the direction of causation. Previous research on CCS in Norway, however, do credit Bellona significantly for both transmitting expertise, lobbying politicians/target groups, and creating public support (or at least soothed opposition).

Although *activity* does not equal *influence*, it is fair to say that the extensive amount of side events, workshops, and lobby meetings they have carried out, is at least an indication of knowledge transmission. In the chapter that addressed channels, the attention was drawn to the fact that several negotiators emphasised that contributing with solutions in a policy vacuum was a strategy from non-state actors that was highly appreciated. Bellona has in the recent years consciously targeted this channel. Hauge (2015) is critical to what he calls symbolic demands from ENGOS that only create political pitfalls, and they rather focus on building technological and lobby expertise. Despite Hauge's critical comments in the media, the Political Adviser in the Ministry of Climate and Environment explained that in his impression climate authorities seek expertise from Bellona (Holte, 2015).

The ideas Bellona promote are based on existing technologies, sometimes gathered in a new concept such as SFP. Although many find Bellona's showcasing intriguing, some decision makers and negotiators hesitate, as many of the projects are very costly. This is for example reflected in the "hearing response" from the Environment Minister Solheim to Bellona's white paper stunt in 2009 as highlighted in the former chapter. Solheim expresses gratitude for an ambitious white paper with interesting solutions, however, he also notes that evaluation

of costs had not been properly taken into consideration, and doing so would strengthen Bellona as a discussion partner in developing climate policies (Bellona, 2009b, pp. 132-133). For the realisation of Bellona's ideas, support and collaboration with the business sector therefore seems to be a key in moving projects from concept to execution.

6.3 NSA's Impact

6.3.1 Strategic Goals

As noted under the former chapter on strategy, NSA can be considered to be a "middle green" business actor in Vormedal's (2008) terminology. In their environmental strategy "Blue Seas – Green Future", they consider climate change as "one of the greatest challenges we face", that they have "responsibility to help ensure sustainable growth and reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 17). A key target highlighted both in the strategy and in the interview with Sletner and Vaagland (2015) from NSA's Environment Section, is that NSA wish an international agreement on emission reductions from international shipping. Additionally, both sources also emphasise engaging target groups in the development of green technology for shipping as an important issue that NSA prioritise.

6.3.2 Competing and Converging Interests

International Regulations for Emission Reduction – "the absence of stick"

Sletner and Vaagland (2015) express that proper Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) system is one of the types of regulations that the industry needs. As an illustration they exemplified with EU's MRV system, and how just the act of measuring emissions is an action that raises awareness, and in the next step turn into emission reduction. Sletner pointed out that after all, it is simple human psychology, nobody wants to be the worst, and Vaagland added that it is like "carrot and stick – just that the carrot in this case is the absence of stick". These comments illustrate NSA's approach to climate related regulations and shipping – promoting incentives that will indirectly be disincentives to pollute.

There are three key steps in NSA's tactics and impacts in promoting a regulatory framework that cut GHG emissions from shipping: 1) convincing NSA members; 2) convincing colleagues internationally and; 3) lobbying the Norwegian government & EU.

Convincing NSA members

Firstly, the member base of NSA is diverse from large-scale shipowners, with tremendous capacity to adapt and even carry out their own technological development, to smaller companies with old polluting ships. This and other factors such as the diverging interests regarding the speed of the ship and fuel consumption as shed light on in the former chapter have previously made the topic of climate change contentious within NSA. Therefore, the first step was actually an internal shift.

An important and effective strategy appear to have been – as is done in IMO – framing GHG cuts as energy efficiency. This is a key in understanding NSA's (and other relatively progressive shipping actors') approach to climate change. Vaagland summarised it simply; CO₂ is the most important GHG and the easiest to deal with, since CO₂ in shipping equals fuel, and fuel equals costs, if you reduce emissions, you have also reduced costs (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).

Furthermore, Norwegian ships are technological advanced in a global context, and there was hence the argument that Norwegian shipping could attack the issue head-on, and aim at becoming a leading actor in green technology for ships. This would then allow them an advantage *when* GHG regulations would be implemented (NSA has had a basic assumption that this will take place, only depending on when and in which arena).

Followingly, NSA has been able to adopt, relative to similar BINGOs, a somewhat ambitious climate and environment strategy, and become a positive voice within the international shipping sector. That leads to the next step.

Convincing colleagues

The second step was to target their international colleagues, particularly in ICS. Sletner and Vaagland (2015) expressed that not all ICS members are equally ambitious on the topic of climate change, and that they work to influence within this international network as well. The

Norwegian IMO negotiator Oftedal (2015) also noted NSA's positive contribution from a climate perspective within ICS.

NSA take upon this role because they have an interest in it, and they are also open about it. Sletner for example says NSA promotes transparency because it benefits their members (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). Instead of only having domestic (or regional) regulations in place, pushing for common international regulations will benefit the NSA members as it will avoid competition distortion. It is, however, difficult to trace concrete influence from NSA, which has changed the course of ICS. What can be said in this regard is thus only NSA's role and *activity* in the international context.

Lobbying the Norwegian government & EU

In the interview with HoD Brun (2015) he noted repeatedly that he had not heard directly from NSA since he was appointed in 2013. Nevertheless, he had a clear understanding of what NSA's strategic interests were in the negotiations. When asked where the source of his knowledge was, after pausing and reflecting, Brun answered that it was from other bureaucrats. Although a HoD is not directly lobbied, this illustrates how other channels can be fruitful to penetrate a policy field to affect the Norwegian position in the UNFCCC negotiations.

In the previously mentioned report from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009, pp. 148-150), it states that "as long as the UNFCCC system does not cover emissions from international transport, it is particularly important for Norway to work actively towards cuts in these emissions within IMO and ICAO" (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 149). This report was published prior to COP15, and in the position paper to this COP, emissions from international shipping is furthermore listed as one of the four prioritised areas in the negotiations for Norway (Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, p. 6). Soon after COP20 in Lima, the Ministry of Climate and Environment presented a white paper about mitigation commitments for 2030. In this document, the government expresses the continued view that it shall work with climate and environmental regulations for the maritime industry through IMO (Meld. St. 13: 2014-2015, 2015, p. 25).

The Norwegian position on international shipping in UNFCCC and NSA's views appear coherent. For the first of these COPs, the papers mention sending a clear signal to IMO, while

confirming that the detailed discussions should be taken in IMO (Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, p. 16; 2010, p. 17). From COP17 it turns to a statement about not hindering IMO's efforts on emission reduction (Miljøverndepartementet, 2011, pp. 21-22). Behind these policies is the conflict between developing countries that wish the inclusion of the CBDR principle (differentiation) and the richer countries that seek a level playing field for the industry. As explained in chapter four, the former reflects a UNFCCC principle while the latter is what can be found in the IMO Convention. Hence, NSA as well as the Norwegian government have preferred issue de-linkage from UNFCCC. In the Norwegian COP19 position paper, it describes that the UNFCCC negotiations on shipping has greatly faltered due to this disagreement of principle. As a leverage for the developing countries Norwegian position papers, as well as NSA's former representative in the extended delegation Terje Gløersen, suggested that climate financing that originates from international shipping should be aimed at developing countries (Hovland, 2009; Miljøverndepartementet, 2009, p. 16; 2010, p. 17).

The Norwegian COP19 position paper also notes that there has been no substantial decisions in the UNFCCC body SBSTA that discusses shipping, and reporting from IMO is the only expectation they have (Miljøverndepartementet, 2013a, p. 35). This trend appears to have continued, and at COP20 it was simply stated "not prioritised" (Miljøverndepartementet, 2014, p. 17). Hence it confirms NSA's deprioritising of the UNFCCC – both due to their views already been mostly covered by the Norwegian positions and as a consequence of lack of any relevant decision-making.

Does this coherence originate in NSA's influence? A bureaucrat that NSA highlighted in their lobby effort was Specialist Director in the Ministry of Climate and Environment Sveinung Oftedal who has been a key actor at the IMO meetings and also been a negotiator in UNFCCC. Interestingly, Oftedal (2015) expressed that the NSA had little influence on the Norwegian IMO delegation specifically nor on his policy field more generally (in the sense of steering the directions in environmental policies). According to him, these policies are established on the basis of a wide range of views and interests, and not only one; he furthermore added that relevant knowledge derived from other sources, for example, technical expertise was exerted from a Norwegian company called DNV-GL that works amongst others on certifying ships (Oftedal, 2015). On the other hand, Sletner also mentioned that NSA

regularly met Ministers. The political leadership did in fact express that NSA got their message through to them (Holte, 2015; E. Solheim, 2015; Solhjell, 2015).

Vaagland noted that changing the industry's attitude takes time but that for NSA it has been important to promote emission reduction in the shipping industry. It appears as if they have been successful in this internally among their members, as NSA has been able to both adopt moderately ambitious environment strategy, and promote this stance. These are both signs of issue framing, agenda setting, and changes in the positions of key actors. There is also evidence pointing to that they have been active in promoting this view internationally among their European and international colleagues. However, evidence of influence was harder to pin point (similar to NNV and CAN). This would require studying these networks more extensively. Thirdly, there was significant coherence between Norwegian and NSA policies. As an important sector with long standing traditions in Norway, and well connected into the political leaders in Norway, they have certainly been able to communicate their positions to the decision makers. On the question, relating to the definition of influence in this thesis, whether the receivers of the communication would have acted differently in the absence of the lobby efforts, Norwegian authorities would likely have taken consequences for the business sector into consideration to some extent. However, partly due to their discreet lobby strategy, it is difficult to concretely point at evidence on whether Norwegian authorities would have acted differently.

Green Solutions for Shipping

The other main approach of NSA is (similar to Bellona) the "hands on approach" that would aggregate to a more ambitious target in the UNFCCC, as Sletner put it (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). As explained above, the shipping angle to climate change in NSA (as well as IMO and indirectly to the UNFCCC) is energy efficiency. Hence, the development of green technology partly surrounds this topic.

NSA has worked with best practice sharing among its members on both operational as well as technological energy efficiency matters. Furthermore, they also support green technology transfer, which is a topic in UNFCCC as well. When asked about the cost perspective to technology transfer (after all NSA's members are profit driven), Sletner explained that the members would perhaps not share the newest valuable innovation but that joint ventures and

other types of collaborations did enable shipping companies to contribute on this matter (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015).

According to Sletner, the first significant step was convincing NSA members as explained in the former section, then, he explained, the second step on the matter of technology was the Working Group of Five (WG5) (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). WG5 is an energy efficiency project with five of its members: Torvald Klaveness, Wilh Wilhelmsen, Höegh Autoliners, BW Gas, and Grieg Star (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 20). First, they studied how they could actually measure energy efficiency, as there was no adequate measuring method. Then, they applied the technologies on five ships that the companies put in the project's disposal to study the effects. The results were first shared internally in the group, then in NSA, before making it public through NSA's Fram Project (Sletner & Vaagland, 2015). The Fram Project built on the WG5 initiative, and as a part of the project a cooperation was established between NSA, World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), DNV-GL (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 20). The cooperation's purposes is to "establish a common system for collecting, verifying, storing and reporting greenhouse gas emissions data from the Norwegian fleet", and to "establish a forum for goal-oriented work on energy efficiency at individual shipping company level and in partnership between the companies" (Norges Rederiforbund, 2014b, p. 20). Through this NSA aspire to cut emissions from Norwegian vessels as well as showcasing internationally how a climate friendly system for shipping can be established.

The Jordanian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Dr. Kabariti's expression: "seeing is believing" can also be applied to this case. Furthermore, to take the essence of what Sletner and Vaagland explained, 'knowing leads to changing'. Researching measuring methods and potential solutions are important in regards to the climate negotiations, as it can contribute to a greener business voice, and followingly a policy change among states. However, the concrete effects exerted on the UNFCCC negotiations are hard, if not impossible, to measure. These efforts by NSA, its members, and partners, are still an important contribution to escalate climate negotiations in a positive direction, as it among others contribute to issue framing.

6.3.3 Summary: the Subtle Sway and Sailing Solutions?

As a sector that can be targeted by decisions in the UNFCCC, NSA's lobby angle is naturally different from NNV or Bellona. The main aspect is to lobby any agreement that may affect

the shipping industry in a desired direction. The shipping industry domestically as well as internationally is diverse, and NSA appears to have been a climate friendly driving force among its members and within ICS. The domestic result is, however, more visible on actually moving key actors' behaviour.

In NSA's case, their policies are mostly coherent with the Norwegian governments' stances. However, the information on whether they have caused a change in the receiver's behaviour varies, as we have seen, and their discrete lobby strategy also made it more difficult to evaluate the influence. Bureaucrats tended to have an impression of limited impact from NSA, which diverged from what the politicians stated in their interviews.

The green technology projects also certainly contribute to concretisation that is needed both in regards to an MRV systems for shipping as well as to commercialise green shipping technology further. These developments can potentially be an enhancing force in the climate negotiations as well, as it gives negotiators as well as business concrete alternatives to the fossil approach. Concrete influence beyond the participating parties in these projects, however, have been hard to trace.

6.4 Evaluating the Impact – Concluding remarks on Influence

This chapter has approached the third research question regarding to the extent to which the NGOs succeeded in reaching their strategic goals by looking at two strategic areas for each organisation. The analysis was guided by the definition of NGO influence and Betsill and Corell's framework for NGO influence in climate negotiations.

The nature of issues and the comprehensiveness differs extensively between the organisations in this study. As has been illustrated both the REDD+ initiative and CCS requires more immediate resources – human and financial, from authorities in the implementation, while NSA's demands have in the case of the UNFCCC negotiations been more of a regulatory nature. NSA's technological projects do also require such resources but as a BINGO, these resources have been available within their sector.

On a general note, it is intriguing the extent to which the impressions of influence diverged. An essential part of the explanation can be mirrored in the aforementioned knowledge and

analysis of the political process. As it has been highlighted, it also appears as a matter of who in the end is the key actor that changed the position – although one receiver of a message declines, another may accept.

If the answers from, particularly many negotiators whom I met during the fieldwork, are to be emphasised, Norwegian NGOs are simply there as a channel for the Norwegian delegation to communicate with the outside world (media, the Norwegian public, transnational NGOs and their members). Many also claimed the NGOs do not have influence on the Norwegian delegation. Limited examples of influence such as those presented by HoD Aslak Brun and Political Adviser Holte do not point much of an impact either. HoD Brun (2015) listed up examples in which the Norwegian government in various ways rephrased their existing policies (without changing the content), by adding or subtracting certain terms such as “fairness”. On the latter, he explained that they recognised that the Norwegian public care about climate justice, while inserting a different meaning to it than what appears in the concrete suggestions on climate justice in the UNFCCC negotiations, (Brun, 2015).

Nevertheless, NGOs do seem to have had impact on what Norway works on in UNFCCC. One of the most prioritised topics on the Norwegian delegation (also financially) is REDD+. This seems to have originated largely from NNV and the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation’s common lobby effort to put it on the Norwegian government’s climate agenda. Furthermore, the pieces of the empirical puzzle also indicate that Bellona has influenced Norwegian CCS position. NSA on the other hand, has applied an inward looking approach that they seem rather successful in, while it is difficult to prove the direction of causation regarding the coherence between NSA and the Norwegian authorities’ policies in the climate negotiations.

Not surprisingly, political feasibility appears to be a key. This does not only imply moving the lobby target from position A to B but also in some cases moving the target from A to B by demanding the target to move to C. This can be done through a push as well as a pull (for example by creating a policy window) or a combination of these. The cases in which the three non-state actors influence are characterised by thorough knowledge of the process (what happens *when* and *where*, *who* the key actors are, and *whom* to lobby with) and analysis of the target and how to move the target from the current position.

7 Conclusion: NGO Professionalism

The UNFCCC negotiations are sometimes compared to a travelling circus. An extravagant show that travels the world with activists in polar bear costumes and colourful political figures with provocative speeches and ‘camera friendly’ activities. Some of the negotiators are even characterised as entertaining, particularly with their rich metaphors. In this “travelling circus” with thousands of delegates competing for attention, which channels are available and applied? Which strategies do Norwegian NGOs apply? In the end, does it matter – do NGOs have influence? The starting point of the thesis was rather pessimistic. Based on the data collected and analysis conducted, however, it increasingly became apparent that NGOs are in fact capable of influencing.

7.1 Summing Up the Study

The study’s research questions were:

- 1) Which channels of influence are available for the Norwegian non-state actors into the UNFCCC negotiations from 2009-2014?
- 2) What type of strategies do these NGOs apply?
- 3) To what extent do they succeed in reaching their strategic goals?

The second chapter started by getting an overview through a literature review, before discussing how NGO influence is an interesting angle in international relations as it may challenge the state-centric perspective that has dominated regime theory. After placing the thesis in the current academic debate, the chapter explored relevant theories for each research question. The first and second research questions were guided by Andresen and Gulbrandsen’s conceptualisation of the four arenas that NGOs target: 1) international; 2) domestic; 3) target groups and; 4) public opinion, in addition to their activist/advisory ENGO types and the insider/outsider strategies. Decision-making in foreign countries and on the regional level was included in the second category together with the domestic political channel. In order to integrate the BINGO perspective, Vormedal’s (2008) notion of green/grey BINGO lobbying was inserted, and a theoretical framework to analyse the strategies of the three selected NGOs. Theory regarding the third research question on

influence was approached by firstly developing a definition that would be fruitful in the analysis of this thesis. The definition by Betsill and Corell (2008) was the starting point, and supplemented. The definition together with Betsill and Corell's framework for analysing NGO influence served as a guide in analysing NGO influence.

Cases were then carefully chosen, and the third chapter firstly presented and discussed the selection, before describing the various methods applied (field study, informant interviews, and document analysis), and how they complement each other in the research process. Furthermore, these methods were discussed, and counterstrategies to for the methods' weaknesses were then put forward. The three chosen cases were NNV (a member based ENGO), Bellona (an advisory ENGO), and NSA (a lobbyist BINGO).

The following three chapters systematically addressed the three research questions guided by the theoretical framework. The fourth chapter mapped and analysed the channels available for Norwegian NGOs in approaching the UNFCCC negotiations from various angles. The aforementioned levels from Andresen and Gulbrandsen guided the data collection and analysis. The following chapter also applied an adjusted version of their theory to study the types of strategies and arenas targeted for each NGO. The former chapter then approached the third research question to analyse the extent to which each NGO reached their strategic goals and more generally, to what extent they influenced the climate negotiations.

7.2 Main Findings

Based on the data and analysis on the channels available, the strategies applied, and the influence of the selected NGOs, what are the main findings? Furthermore, what can be said across the three cases?

The fourth chapter found formal and informal access, and restrictions. It was particularly interesting to explore the counter strategies applied whenever one channel was restricted or closed. Limiting access to the negotiation areas moved the lobbying outside; 'closed doors' at the NGOs' domestic delegation, led NGO delegates to apply the *boomerang effect* (often through alliances); increasing use of *informal informals* made NGOs use the indirect channels through state parties or simply adopt the tactic themselves – such as Bellona's daily lobby dinners during COP15. While some NGOs carried out direct lobbying through meetings with delegations, coordination through alliances, and policy dissemination through policy papers,

other NGOs was primarily present for the ‘climate happening’. As the COPs attract world leaders and key figures in the international climate community, these arenas are also applied as a channel to network, exchange ideas, and explore possibilities for partnerships, through numerous side events, showcasing, etc.

The third arena is somewhat interlinked with this aspect of the COPs being a climate conference as well. Both through this arena but also by approaching directly, target groups can in fact be a channel for NGOs. Skodvin (2012) for example highlighted scientists’ influence, even possessing some degree of formal power. Engaging business actors to support a position or neutralising opposition can be efficient channel to indirectly target the climate negotiations. This arena was particularly utilised by NSA and Bellona. In NSA’s case, it pacified potential internal opposition while in Bellona’s case, it is both a source of finance – particularly to realise concrete projects, but also in order to build an alliance to lobby from several angles, as illustrated in the case of CCS.

NNV on the other hand appeared to target the domestic and international channel with a dual strategy through lobbying, supplemented with media and to some extent activism. Additionally, public opinion was also targeted with the latter two tactics. Though Bellona does not have the same member based incentive to be vocal in the media, they certainly utilised this channel. They seemed motivated by branding, attracting potential partners, and perhaps with a hint of the organisation’s activist roots. NSA is not as vocal compared to the other two. They favour a subtle lobby strategy meeting bureaucrats and politicians directly. Furthermore, when they did in fact appear in the media, they did not voice criticism directly through this channel. NSA rather kept a clear but constructive approach.

The domestic channels are highly valued by particularly nationally oriented NGOs, as the geographical proximity both allows easier networking and lower costs. However, foreign and regional decision-making arenas are applied both in bypassing the organisation’s domestic governments but also in order to build broader alliances, and/or due to the specific country/regional institution’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations.

The strategic approach in NNV’s REDD+ initiative for Norway, and the parliamentary climate agreement are prominent examples of carefully planned agenda settings – which also moved key actors. They achieved both procedural and substantive success in these two

initiatives. The influence has on the other hand been much more limited in regards to climate justice in terms of changing key actor’s behaviour in a desired direction.

What makes Bellona stand out from the other Norwegian NGOs, is its carefully developed international network – which they make well use of. Though they are often criticised by decision makers of promoting expensive projects with unknown feasibility, their persistent push and pull, seem to allow them success as seen with CCS in Norway (before the “crash-landing”) and SFP – which mobilised public and private funding.

Though it is not equally evident how much NSA has influenced the Norwegian position on shipping, due to the conflicting information, and lack of third party information (as they to a great extent carry out discreet insider strategies); however, they do appear to have pulled the shipping industry domestically, and perhaps also internationally, in a greener direction.

Professionalism is a key in all cases. Knowledge as a resource encompasses not only technical knowledge of climate change but also knowledge of the political process (procedural and cultural) domestically and internationally. Though they vary greatly in their approach, the three non-state actors that this thesis has studied can all be characterised as professional in their strategic work to influence decision makers’ positions.

7.3 Explanatory Value and Analytical implications

The explanatory value of the theoretical frameworks chosen in this thesis will be discussed, and suggestions on how these should be adjusted. An adaption of the table by Andresen and Gulbrandsen (2005, p. 172), with BINGO theory from Vormedal (2008) integrated to it was presented in chapter two:

	Activist ENNGO	Advisory ENNGO	Lobbyist BINGO
Critical resources	Membership base	Intellectual base	Economic position
Arenas targeted	International negotiations Domestic policy Target groups Public opinion	International negotiations Domestic policy (Target groups)	International negotiations Domestic policy
Strategy	Dual strategy: insider and outsider	Insider only	Insider only

Table 7.1. Analytical Framework for the NGOs’ Strategies.

At first sight, NNV, Bellona, and NSA do seem to fit well into the categories of activist ENGO, advisory ENGO, and lobbyist BINGO respectively. However, as it has been highlighted in the previous chapters, all three non-state actors in this research appears to apply quite a mix of strategies and targeting different levels. They therefore do not seem fully fit into the framework developed in chapter two based on Andresen and Gulbrandsen's "relationship between [green] NGO types and resources, levels targeted and strategies" as illustrated in table 7.1. NNV did not appear to focus on target groups. Furthermore, Bellona on the other hand did approach the public opinion and target groups while to a varying degree the international level.

On critical resources, in order to integrate BINGOs better, the BINGO's place in the national economy may be more relevant than the financial resources available for an organisation – as this is what often give BINGOs public legitimacy. It is also intriguing to see how Bellona mobilised resources. Many NGO studies consider resources more or less as a static or at least stable value. Bellona has, nevertheless, mobilised public as well as private funds, and built a comprehensive international network in a relatively short amount of time. Though most organisations do in fact have a rather stable set of resources, this case challenges this idea.

Moreover, showcasing, side-events, and seminars are difficult to clearly place into the insider and outsider strategies. One approach to handle this, is to study the intentions of NGO actors in order to determine whether the event has an insider or outsider strategy intention. However, in the cases highlighted in this thesis, the intentions also were sometimes easy to categorise but at other times, it was clearly mixed.

Another complication was related to the NGOs' media coverage. Again, the intentions may be difficult to determine, moreover, the target of the message can be mixed. If a non-state actor presents a green technology in the media for example, it could be aimed at creating accept for the technology so that it would be included in the UNFCCC (as in the case of CCS in CDM); it could be directed at the politicians and/or business as a target group to mobilise funding or; it might just be for branding purpose – or a combination of these.

Despite these challenges (that may be accommodated by various means), as it has been illustrated in the thesis, Andresen and Gulbrandsen's framework was very useful in analysing the selected NGOs.

7.4 Proposals for Further Research and Concluding Remarks

Similar to the exercise in this thesis that asserted the lobbyist BINGO into Gulbrandsen and Andresen's conceptualisation of ENGO types and the respective arenas targeted and strategies applied, it could be interesting to examine how other NGO (RINGOs, TUNGOS, YOUNGOS etc.) could be included in a common framework. Another research angle is to look further into whether there is a *boomerang effect* from the three organisations in this thesis. On a general note, detailed and comparative analysis on non-state actors' influence in various UN negotiations would be interesting in order to highlight the difference in impact depending on the negotiation field, stakes, and level of non-state participation. Lastly, the analytical framework by Betsill and Corell (2008) was consciously applied in order to allow other researchers to carry out comparative studies for example with other Norwegian NGOs, other countries' NGOs and so on. There is an intriguing variety of NGOs that can be studied which may highlight the captivating and complex UNFCCC negotiations further.

The research started with a somewhat pessimistic perspective on whether non-state actors had influence in midst of the somewhat disordered UNFCCC negotiations. Can influence truly occur in a situation that is chaotic at the first sight? After looking into existing research and adding my own empirical data and analysis of three Norwegian non-state actors, the potential and actual influence became much more apparent. While there are organisations with various motives for partaking in the UNFCCC process, if non-state actors are willing and capable, there are channels that can be utilised in order to make an impact. Let me in the end borrow Wendt's "power is what states make of it", and rephrase that to 'channels are what NGOs make of it'.

8 Bibliography

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9 Appendix

9.1 Request and Informed Consent

This request (in either Norwegian or English) was sent by email to the interview subjects beforehand, and then distributed at the beginning of the interview.

Request for participation in the research project:

«*Climate Changing Civil Society?*»

Background and purpose

The study wants to examine Norwegian civil society's channels of influence, the choice of strategy, and assessment of impact to the negotiations in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This is a Master's thesis study at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo (UiO). You are requested to participate because you hold a key position - with knowledge of the relevant processes and/or outcomes.

What does the participation in this study imply?

Participation involves interview and any written supplementary questions (mainly via E-mail, unless otherwise agreed). The student will also attend COP20 (with UiO accreditation) and meetings between civil society and the Norwegian government. The observations will not involve the collection of personal data, unless otherwise agreed. The questions will deal with Norwegian civil society participation and influence in the UN climate negotiations. Data will be recorded with notes and audio recordings, unless otherwise agreed.

What happens to your information?

All personal information will be treated confidentially. Only the student and supervisor, Professor Arild Underdal will have access to personal data, unless otherwise agreed upon. Persons wishing anonymity will be assured this.

The project is planned to be completed on 25th May 2015. After the completion, the data material will be anonymized by delinking the name lists, e-mail addresses and other direct or indirect personal identifying information, unless otherwise agreed. Audio or video recordings (which can identify individuals) in connection with the project will be deleted or censored to make the data anonymous. Being anonymous implies that it will not be possible to link individuals to the information in the study.

Voluntary participation

It is voluntary to participate in the study, and you can at any time withdraw your consent without giving any reason. If you withdraw, all your information will be anonymised.

If you have questions about the study, please contact the master student Naomi Ichihara Røkkum (email: naomi.rokkum@gmail.com or phone: +47 470 19 560) or her supervisor Professor Arild Underdal (email: arild.underdal@stv.uio.no or phone: +47 22855241).

The study is reported to the Privacy Ombudsman for Research, Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).

Consent for participation in the study

I have received information about the study and am willing to participate

(Signed by the project participant, date)

I agree to participate in the interview

I agree that personal information (eg. name and title) may be published

9.2 Interview Guide

Master thesis study: «Climate Changing Civil Society? » by Naomi Ichihara Røkkum, UiO

Type of interview: Semi structured interviews with key informants

Phase 1: Setting the framework

1. Information (5 min)

Welcome

Short presentation of student and the study

Topic of the interview (background, aim)

Ask if anything is unclear

2. Formalities (5 min)

Make audio record. Explain why and deletion after the end of the project.

Written consent from the participant.

Do you have any questions? Is anything unclear?

Start audio record.

Phase 2: Experiences

3. Opening questions: (5 min)

Ask the informant to introduce herself/himself by name and relevant background (role, position)

4. Transition questions: (5 min)

What experiences have you had with the UN climate negotiations?

Follow-up questions

Phase 3: Focusing

5. Key questions: (30 min)

How can Norwegian civil society influence the UN climate negotiations?

Follow-up questions:

- Other indirect channels via the public and/or local/national/regional (ie. EU, AU, ASEAN) authorities?

Which strategies do the civil society actors apply?

Check list:

- Which channels of influence?
- Which topics?
- What is your perception of Bellona/Naturvernforbundet/Rederiforbundets' strategy?

In your opinion, did the civil society actors succeed in reaching their goals? Please exemplify.

Check list:

- Which channels of influence?
- Which topics?
- What is your perception of Bellona/Naturvernforbundet/Rederiforbundets' strategic success?
- Ensure that both successes and failures are covered

Follow-up questions

Phase 4: Recap

6. Summary (ca. 10 min)

Follow-up questions

Summarize findings

Have I understood you correctly?

Is there anything you would like to add?

Thank you for the interview. Please get in touch if you have any questions.