Finding Bureaucracy

Are managers in public administrations more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises?

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Abstract

This thesis will use survey data from Norwegian managers to answer the following research question:

Are managers in public administrations more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises?

I will argue that the classical bureaucracy, as described by Max Weber, can be understood as defined by structure and values. One often disparages the structural elements of bureaucracy and forgets about the bureaucratic values. The mean scores from AFF's 2011 leadership survey will be used to learn if managers in public administrations and private enterprises differ in reported attitudes toward bureaucratic structure and values.

The following analysis and discussion will debate and present explanations for the results, and suggest that there are both similarities and important distinctions between managers in public administrations and private enterprises.

My main findings are that managers in public administrations are not more bureaucratic than managers of private enterprises in their attitudes to structure. They do however show more bureaucratic-values, such as bureaucratic ethos and public values.

I will discuss these results with the appropriate theory; similar attitudes toward structure will be explained with a higher degree of professionalism in public administrations, multi-divisional hierarchies, complex goals, homogenous organizational forms, demand for delivery, fear of consequences and differing expectations. Differences in value will be explained by the nature of public service, and a higher degree of professionalism in public administrations. Higher "post-bureaucratic"-values, such as employee-involvement and communication with their stakeholders, will be used to indicate that even though public

administrations show more bureaucratic values, they are not necessarily more rigid and unable to adapt. At the end I will discuss how contemporary public managers should be understood as more complex actors than those of the classic machine-bureaucracy, and the implications this has for our understanding of public administrations.

Preface

Takk til Palma for at du gjør alle dager bedre, spesielt lange skrivedager! Takk til gode venner for støtten, takk til veiledere Torben Hviid Nielsen og Haldor Byrkjeflot for tilbakemeldinger, og takk til Rune Rønning og AFF for tilgang på datasettet.

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1 Introduction

The bureaucratic organizational form is one of the most extensively debated of our time. From the news we see political opposition blame inefficiency on it, before promptly expanding it when they find themselves in power. Bureaucracies have to a degree become antonymous to efficiency, and are talked about as an organizational form obstructing progress and hindering service delivery. The Norwegian government has even made it one of their goals do debureaucratize Norwegian public sector (St.meld. nr 1. 2014-2015, 2014). By defining bureaucracy narrowly as delimiting structures, we fail to appreciate the bureaucratic values aiding a rational tool capable of acting faster and more accurately than any other organizational form (Weber, 1991). This thesis will discuss the duality of bureaucratic values and structure, and explore how they are reflected in attitudes of managers in public administrations and private enterprises.

It has been argued that public administrations have not been given the same extensive attention as other areas of leadership-studies (Vandenabeele et al, 2014). This thesis will contribute to the field by using empirical data to explore if managers in public administrations can be considered more or less bureaucratic than their private equivalents. By comparing the prevalence of "bureaucratic-attitudes" among managers in public administration and private enterprises I seek to increase our understanding of public managers. This will provide a more accurate picture of the men leading these supposedly "bureaucratic" organizations.

This thesis can be seen as building on the work of Robert K. Merton (1960) and Victor Thompson (1961). They were primarily concerned with the negative effects formal bureaucratic structures had on officials. By taking a fresh look at managers, inspired by new readings of Max Weber, I seek to take their theories a step further. New interpretations of Weber suggest that bureaucracies contain both structure and values, with values as the defining quality (Kallinikos, 2004;

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Bartels, 2009), contrary to earlier readings which mainly saw bureaucracy as structural elements (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963). By utilizing data from AFF's 2011 leadership study on Norwegian managers I will compare managers in public administration and private enterprises to learn if one or the other can be seen as inherently more "bureaucratic". By testing if there is a difference between sectors we can learn whether managers in public administrations should be considered more, or less, bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises, and whether one or the other is more prone to "bureaucratization" (Thompson, 1961).

First, I will review literature on bureaucracy and note two different understandings of the organizational form. The main point of this chapter is to demonstrate that bureaucracies can be understood as both structures and values. The term "value" is defined as including both formal and informal ways of conducting business. With "values" I will primarily focus on public values and the bureaucratic ethos of loyalty to formal rules, as well as "post-bureaucratic"-values of communication and employee-involvement (Weber, 1991; Kernaghan, 2000).

I will argue, by using theory and empirical data from Norwegian managers that public managers are not more positive toward structural elements of bureaucracies, but they are more bureaucratic in their attitudes to values. Similar attitudes toward structure will be explained with a higher degree of professionalism in public administrations, multi-divisional hierarchies, complex goals, homogenous organizational forms, demand for delivery, fear of consequences and differing expectations. Differences in value will be explained by the nature of public service and a higher degree of professionalism in public administrations. Higher "post-bureaucratic"-values, such as employee-involvement and communication with their stakeholders, will be used to indicate that even though public administrations show more bureaucratic values, they are not necessarily more rigid and unable to adapt. At the end I will discuss how contemporary public managers should be understood as more complex actors

than those of the classic machine-bureaucracy, and what implications this has for our understanding of public administrations.

My research question is:

Are managers in public administrations more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises?

1.1 Definitions

"Bureaucracy" has different meanings to different people. I will not look at bureaucracy narrowly as relating only to the performing of public tasks, but as an organizational form prevalent in both public and private sector (Weber, 1991). Other theories and research on the field will be utilized to understand and explain the results.

Usage of the term "manager" instead of "leader" when describing Norwegian managers has been carefully thought through. There is a whole industry concerned with the differences between "managers" and "leaders", and the implications of this. A popular notion is that "management" is dead (Cloke and Goldsmith, 2002), and that they are replaced by visionary leaders (Bennis, 1989). Both terms means a person leading a group or organization (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015), but the connotations of the words in the literature suggests that leaders are seen as visionary, while managers are mainly concerned with administration (Bennis, 1989). My contribution with this thesis is not to define the qualities of leadership, or comment on the qualities of "managers" or "leaders". I have chosen to consequently use the term manager about all the respondents, which includes top and middle-level managers in a formal management-position. I do not want this thesis to be bogged down in a debate about "managers" and "leaders". My choice brings no connotations, I simply must chose a word to use, and my chosen word is manager.

2   Bureaucracies are Structure and Value

This section will discuss different understandings of the term "bureaucracy". Max Weber's (1991) writings on bureaucracy will be used to present two understandings of bureaucracy: An account mainly concerned with structural elements, and a more contemporary understanding seeing bureaucratic values as the defining quality of bureaucracy. Additional scholarly contributions will be used to illustrate the two interpretations. This discussion will demonstrate that the understandings of Weber's contributions are constantly evolving; scholars read and re-read, and find new areas to emphasize. By discussing a dual understanding of bureaucratic elements I seek to create a foundation for my empirical assessment of Norwegian managers. Deliberating these different understandings of bureaucracy helps place my contribution into a historic context: I wish to learn if managers in public administrations or private enterprises are more bureaucratic, both in the structural and value-understanding of the term. By looking at and including both these aspects I aim to comprehensively capture the term "bureaucratic" in my discussion and empirical-analysis.

Max Weber's writings on the bureaucratic ideal types have inspired and guided those who came after him. It represents a natural starting point for any discussion about bureaucracy. Solidly in the rational school of thought, Weber (1991) saw bureaucratic organizations as technically superior to other forms of organization; it is faster and cheaper in its strictest form than any other form of administration. Hierarchy and defined structure are as an asset for bureaucratic organizations, making them coordinated and precise while minimizing unnecessary use of resources.

Weber (1991) presents six characteristics of bureaucracy, and five traits of the position of officialdom. Weber's bureaucracy can be seen as part structure and

part value. The six characteristics can be understood as structural ideal types facilitating a rational organization with a focus on hierarchy, formalization, rules, structuring and regular activities. The five traits of the position can be seen as values facilitated by the structure. Value is taken to mean what we fill the structure with. Examples of bureaucratic values include the bureaucratic ethos, separation of role and person and rational-legal authority (Weber, 1991).

The structural elements of the ideal types enable officials to occupy a formalized role; separating the function of the organizational role and the private life of the official. The official is "not considered the personal servant of a ruler" (Weber, 1991: 199). The five traits the official should fill in the organization can be understood at what the structure is trying to achieve, the ends created by the structural means, and a critical component of bureaucracy.

2.1 Bureaucratic Rationality

Weber describes a "discipline of officialdom" with a set of attitudes for "precise obedience within his habitual activity" (Weber, 1991: 229). This indicates that an important trait for the bureaucratic-official is to be precise and obedient, following instructions precisely. This system based on the rationality of instructions illustrates how the instrument of bureaucracy can be used for good or bad; the bureaucracy is dependent on good instructions to do good work, just like a hammer is dependent on a steady hand not to hurt the thumb. This is not to say that this is the best system for society, but is the best system for getting things done, and it is prevalent because it is the most rational way of organizing. Instead of an organization being ruled by a dominant master, it is ruled by rationality, and the bureaucratic organization is the best vehicle for delivering this rationality (Weber, 1991).

A possible downside of this rationality-driven world is the creation of an "iron cage"; trapping man in a mundane, routinized environment. The dominance of rationality, driven by capitalism in all facets of life, could create an environment

weighing man down more than it lifts him up (Parsons and Gidden, 1930). The "iron-cage" should be seen as a description of a possible worst-case scenario of a capitalist-driven rationality, and should not be seen as a general negative trait of bureaucracy. Additionally it has been suggested that the translation into "iron cage" is erroneous and portrays a rigidity and dimness to the matter not intended by Weber (Baehr, 2001). While the term "iron cage" might be too negative, it is important as it suggests that organizations driven by rationality could have harmful effects on the people working in them.

2.2 Bureaucracy as Structure

Stanley Udy (1959) and Richard Hall (1963) saw the structural elements of the ideal types as useful for studying organizations. They understood bureaucratic organizations as defined by their structural elements. Ideal types were used to create organizational traits for testing the degree of bureaucracy in an organization (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963). By comparing organizational traits of any formal organization (hierarchical authority structure, specialized administrative staff and differential rewards according to office), to traits only occurring in "rational-legal bureaucracies" (limited objectives, emphasis on performance, segmented participation and compensatory rewards). Udy (1959) set out to test organization's degree of bureaucracy by measuring structural elements. When looking at the occurrence of these different traits in 150 different organizations, he found that the three "bureaucratic"-traits and the four "rational-legal"-traits had positive associations with each other, but no association between the groups. This suggests that Weber's theories on the rational and hierarchical coming together is not an accurate description for how organizations actually look (Udy, 1959). It also showed that the structural elements of bureaucracy are rather flexible in their appearances across organizations; it is hard to find a pattern proving "bureaucracy", all structural elements plays a role to varying degrees.

Richard Hall (1963), like Udy, set out to test the degree of bureaucracy in organizations with indicators based on the bureaucratic structural elements

(Hall, 1963). His results also showed that structural traits are found to a varying degree, and without being highly correlated with each other. There is no apparent correlation between the different traits, indicating that organizations come in every shape and form (Hall, 1963). This confirms the flexibility of the bureaucratic structure found by Udy; organizations are found in different shapes and forms along the continuum. Empirical data seems to support that bureaucratic structure is not a dichotomy, but an organizational form of different traits on a continuous scale.

An exception to this is that organizations defined as autonomous, are observed as less bureaucratic (Hall 1968). This can be due to the fact that authority in these organizations are decentralized to the professionals as there is no strong hierarchical "external or administrative jurisdiction" (Hall, 1968), and unsurprisingly they were found to score low on the dimension "hierarchy of authority", and "rules" as well as "impersonality", possibly due to the small amount of clients and face-to-face meeting used to define autonomous organizations in the survey (Hall, 1968). One can discuss whether organizations like these are hierarchical at all, and if they should even be called bureaucratic. They do not appear to answer to a monocratic entity, nor have a separation of role and person; authority is anchored in the individual's knowledge rather than formal-rationality. There is also an issue of size being a potential underlying variable, as the autonomous-organizations are likely to be smaller (Hall, 1968). Hall's (1968) research seems to largely replicate Udy (1959) and Hall's (1963) earlier findings, with the exception that organizations which may not be bureaucratic at all are less bureaucratic.

This relative flexibility of structural traits is further confirmed empirically in what is called the "multidimensional bureaucratic structure space" (Reimann, 1973: 462). Bernard Reimann (1973) and John Child (1972) developed questionnaires to uncover bureaucratic traits based on structural objectives such as number of defined roles, organizational charts, and more. Their findings are consistent with that of Hall and Udy; there is no universal description fitting

organizations regarding bureaucratic traits; all show some traits, but the traits they show differ. The structural understanding of bureaucracy, while prominent, has a hard time finding empirical data accurately describing "the one" bureaucratic organization (Child, 1972; Reimann, 1973; Hall, 1963; Udy, 1959).

It is suggested that the structural flexibility is due to "technical nature of the task being performed", and the fact that rational-legality "tend to be mutually inconsistent in the same formal organizations" (Udy, 1959: 794). Organizations are not simple or either-or in regards to structure and rational-legality. Empirically testing the structural elements of the bureaucratic ideal types reveals that organizations are not necessarily logically coherent in regards to the ideal types, but vary based on factors in their environment (Udy, 1959). This structural understanding of the ideal typical rational bureaucracy sees organization as unstable social systems, adapting to the tasks they are performing (Udy, 1959). This fits the contingency theory-approach to organizations where the chosen way to organize is seen as depending on internal and external factors (Child, 1984)

Structural contingency theory has been a staple of organizational research for a long time. Projects such as those performed by Udy (1959), Hall (1963), Reimann (1973) and so forth have all tried to explain the structural elements of bureaucracy with internal and external demands. A broad look at the empirical data published between 1960 and 1999 supports that there is not one constant form for bureaucratic structure, but there is a clear occurrence of bureaucratic control (Walton, 2005). This indicates that the structure of organizations might differ, but the bureaucratic control remains consistent; while the structure is relatively flexible there seems to be some sort of constant value carried out by these organizations. The value of bureaucratic authority seems to exist independently of the structure, signifying that there is a constant rational-legal value present within bureaucracies. This value appears to some degree separate from the structure. The elements of structure and formalization are relatively flexible in organizations as a whole; somethings work somewhere, other thing

work somewhere else and there is no clear dichotomy to it, but a continuous scale. The ways in which organizations organize differ, but the reason they organize stay the same: to facilitate control. The only constant seems to be the ways, and not the means, of the bureaucratic organization (Walton, 2005). There is no consistency to what kind of structural elements make these organizations bureaucratic or not.

2.3 Bureaucratic Values

The value-approach to bureaucracy represents an opposing understanding to the structural-understanding of bureaucracies. Instead of seeing structural elements as the defining quality of organizations, they are seen as facilitating bureaucratic values. These values are the defining quality of bureaucracies (Kallinikos, 2004; Bartels, 2009). Structure in this perspective becomes a means to achieve bureaucratic values. Values, such as the bureaucratic ethos, is seen as important and crucial to bureaucracies because they discourage a slave-master relationship, making it possible for an official to serve the hierarchy while keeping his personal interests independent from the job: "structure is a fundamental vehicle by which organizations achieve bounded rationality" (Thompson, 1967: 54; Weber, 1991; Bartels, 2009). The structural elements facilitate bounded rationality in the organization, making it possible to make decisions with a limited number of choices.

Koen Bartels (2009) argues that one should not see the ideal types as normative, structural, limits for organizations, but rather as ways for individuals to keep their freedom within a hierarchy. Limited freedom is an important value of bureaucracy; it allows the official to make judgements without making accommodations to peripheral needs. Structure is not seen as limiting to the officials; it allows them to make decisions separated from external factors. It facilitates freedom in the hierarchy through a bureaucratic ethos. The structural ideal types "increase the chance of particular kinds of behavior" (Bartels, 2009: 459). They create systems that increase the chance of bureaucratic substantive

and formal rationality, uniting the ways officials follow instructions with a reason for doing so. The bureaucratic ethos includes both an adherence to formal rules and "explicit substantive decision-making" (Bartels, 2009: 461). The ideal types help the individual deal with "the dilemma of obedience and autonomy in bureaucratic organizations" (Bartels, 2009: 462).

The structural ideal types describe how it is possible for the official to balance following formal rules, with the demands of making a judgement: "Substantive rationality signifies behaving according to a set of values after making a judgment about the possible effects of actions for multiple values" (Bartels, 2009: 463), and "Bureaucrats operate at the nexus of acting according to explicit judgments about the consequences of governmental actions for society" (Bartels, 2009: 467). Values of substantive and formal rationality are united and facilitated by way of structure. By limiting the considerations an official must make, and protecting his individual freedom with boundaries, it limits external pressures, protecting citizens from unjust actions (Bartels, 2009). The lack of obedience to a person, facilitated by the structure, makes bureaucratic systems better able to handle complex administrative tasks than traditional systems. The members are able to question their superiors and be independent as their roles define their relationship rather than their personality (Scott 1981).

This view sees values, not structure, as the essence of bureaucracies (Kallinikos, 2004; Du Gay, 2008; Bartels, 2009). The value-approach to bureaucracy represents an alternative to the structural. The structures are seen as merely facilitating the real defining quality of bureaucracy; values. This is supported in Weber's own writings, where we find a passage arguing for the relativity of the structural ideal types (pure types):

> one of course from the beginning has to keep his eye on the fluidity and the overlapping transitions of all these organizational principles. Their 'pure' types, after all, are to be considered merely as border cases which are especially valuable and indispensable for analysis. Historical realities,

which almost always appear in mixed forms, have moved and still move between such pure types.

(Weber, 1991: 244)

The bureaucratic structure is understood as a framework that facilitates bureaucratic values (Bartels, 2009; Weber, 1991). Structure is a result of rationalization, and must be rooted in rationality to be considered bureaucratic: "The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational character" (Weber, 1991: 244). Structure changes with the environment, while the values of separation of person and role, authority from rational-legal objective as well as bureaucratic ethos are stable rational-values kept in the bureaucracy regardless of its structural form. This is possible as the structure only facilitates the values, and does not create them; the bureaucratic values spring from rationality, not structure, making structure a tool and not a reason for the bureaucratic values.

This is not to say the managers cannot "value" structure or see structure as a value in and of itself, but it is proposed that structural elements of Weber's bureaucratic ideal types are not an inherent value of bureaucracy, but rather a description of how values like separation, rationality and the bureaucratic ethos can be realized in the organization.

Critical to understanding this reading of bureaucracy is to understand that the structural ideal types have a rational purpose, and that purpose is to facilitate the bureaucratic values. That does not mean that the structural elements of the ideal types are the only way for organizations to achieve these values, they are merely a suggestion (Höpfl, 2006).

2.4 The Universality of Bureaucracies

By acknowledging the different perspectives on the term "bureaucracy" we can better understand it and what it entails. Weber (1991) saw the bureaucratic organizational form as one fitting all kinds of large organizations, not only public administrations. The development of the bureaucratic structure is credited to the capitalist market. Its need for speed and precision drives development and creates the need for businesses and public organizations built on bureaucratic ideals. Bureaucracies are the "optimum possibility" (Weber, 1991: 215) for objectively placing tasks at the hands of those with the most expertise, and for creating a system where "purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements" are eliminated from official business (Weber, 1991: 216). The bureaucratic organizational form limits what is taken into considerations; it limits the "noise" and makes it possible for a person in a complex world to function in a role. It creates boundaries between the person and the role, creating objective experts out of people, making decision-makers independent of elements besides their expertise. This could create a more perfect rationality in a complex world where no such thing is thought to exist. Weber sees the fully established bureaucracy as a superior instrument for carrying "community action into rationally ordered societal action" (Weber, 1991: 228). It is the optimal tool for implementing and carrying out decision-making (Weber, 1991).

A continuation of this was that Weber saw the development of the bureaucratic organizational form as happening to both the public and private sector: "Business-management throughout rests on increasing precision, steadiness, and, above all, the speed of operations" (1991: 215). And while he acknowledges that the "bureaucratic apparatus may, and actually does, produce definite obstacles to the discharge of business in a manner suitable for the single case" (1991: 215), he sticks to arguing that the bureaucratic form is optimal for achieving the speed and precision needed in organizations of the time (Weber, 1991). Bureaucracy was not seen by Weber (1991) as an organizational form

exclusively for public administration, but something all kinds of organizations would benefit from.

2.5 Summary

This chapter has discussed two schools of thoughts regarding the defining qualities of bureaucracy: Structure and values. The structural approach has not been able to empirically confirm structure as the defining quality. A pure contingency-understanding of structure is further challenged by scholars arguing that organizations are not internally consistent or able to be explained by one model, they have multiple internal objectives and forms (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981; Olsen, 2006). The relative flexibility of the structural ideal types does not have to be a weakness of the bureaucratic model: "The relativity of the ideal types is not unexpected as Weber's ideal types are not expected to be universal or observed in every organization, but they are a nice starting point when looking for bureaucracies" (Blau, 1963: 310).

This does suggest that the structural elements of organizations are relative, and a competing school of thought argues that the structural view of the bureaucratic organization alone is not enough to understand them. The value-approach to bureaucracy represents an alternative understanding founded on the notion that the structure only facilitates the values, and these values are the defining quality of organizations. This can be supported empirically by studies showing that the structure in organizations varies to a large degree, but some bureaucratic values, like control, stays intact (Walton, 2005)

Based on responses from managers, it is possible to test to what degree managers in public administrations have more positive attitudes toward the bureaucratic structure, or value, than their private counterparts. If managers in Norwegian public administrations are more bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises, they are expected to show more positive attitudes to bureaucratic structure or values. By measuring both the structure-approach, and the concept

of values we can fully comprehend if there is a difference among managers in public administrations and private enterprises. The research done on the structural approach by Stanley Udy and his peers suggest that the structural elements of bureaucracy are not systematic different among the managers, and this hypotheses will be tested on Norwegian managers.

3 Method

Attitudes of Norwegian managers will be tested by using secondary statistical data from the 2011-edition of the leadership study by The Administrative Research Institute (AFF) at the Norwegian School of Economics. The use of secondary data is a challenge, and using it besides it intended primary use might in some cases warrant a lengthy discussion. The AFF study's primary use is to map managers' attitudes to their leadership role and work situation (Dalen and Ansteensen, 2011). Utilizing this study to examine attitude-differences between managers in public administrations and private enterprises is within the scope of the primary use, making a lengthy discussion unwarranted.

It is important to emphasize that this survey measures attitudes of managers, not the objective reality of the organizations. I will present the managers' subjective understanding of their organization. It has been proposed that a measurement of attitudes contains more than just the cognitive-dimension, it can also reveal an "evaluative dimensions", influencing the future behavior of the respondent and appear to be of relative permanence (Reid, 2006). Attitude-studies can to that extent be a very useful way of understanding a manager's behavior and actions.

There are many proposed pitfalls of attitude-studies and use of indexes to measure attitudes. I am confident that rigorous testing of internal consistency and unidimensionality ensures that the indexes are as good as attitude indexes can get (Reid, 2006). They will provide results with significant information about the attitudes of Norwegian managers. From an attitude-survey it is possible to compare the attitudes of managers, but not say something absolute about the attitudes themselves as they appear in the vacuum of the survey (Reid, 2006). Because of this I will only use the attitude-scales for comparisons between sectors, and not use the measurement for an absolute measurement of leadership attitudes in Norway. In a perfect world I would follow the survey-data with a suggested independent observation such as interviews or case-studies (Reid,

2006). Unfortunately, this thesis is constrained in terms of time and scope, but additional research concerning bureaucratic attitudes among managers in private and public sector could further enlighten the subject with independent observations. While surveys with scales could be criticized for trying to capture complex issues with a small amount of questions (Reid, 2006), they are an efficient and cost-effective way of collecting large amounts of data. These observations can inform the debate and probe further research into the field.

3.1 The Survey

The 2011 AFF-leadership study is a comprehensive mail-in survey of a varied selection of Norwegian top and middle-management. A response rate of 71% yielded 2910 respondents. This survey is concerned with managers in a formal leadership position. Middle-managers, representing the biggest cohort in the survey, were randomly selected from the organizations. Top managers are managers running the local divisions, not necessarily the CEO of the group or head of the national organization. Respondents where weighted to counter systematic bias created by probability of selection. The size and scope of the study should produce representative results (Dalen and Ansteensen, 2011).

3.2 Separating Private/Public Organizations

With private and public sector becoming increasingly intertwined, it can be difficult to clearly separate them from each other (Peters, 2003). Information on industry and organizational sector from survey will make this separation attainable for my purposes. Information on self-reported industry and sector makes it possible to separate those identifying themselves as working in state/municipal administration/units from those working in private enterprises and other organizational forms. A further distinction is made to isolate those working in publically owned enterprises. Based on a combination of self-reported data and organizational-registers the respondents will be separated into four groups: "Private Enterprise", "Public Administration", "Public Enterprise" and

"Others". From this I will look at how managers in "Private Enterprise" compare to managers in "Public Administration". This way of grouping the managers makes it possible to isolate and study public administration without results being impacted by public enterprises. There is still the possibility for differences across the spectrum of public administration. This selection presents a look at how managers in public administration as an entity compares to managers in private enterprises as an entity. The groups are recoded from 11 industry-variables in the following way:

- Organizational Sector:
  - 1: Private Enterprise:
    - Wholly private corporation
    - Foundation
    - Other private business
    - Co-operation
  - 2: Public Administration
    - State Administration/Unit
    - Municipal Administration/Unit
  - 3: Public enterprise
    - State owned governmental company with limited responsibility
    - Fully state-owned corporation
    - Fully municipal-owned corporation
  - 4: Other
    - Corporations co-owned by public and private
    - Union/NGO
    - Other

Some exceptions were made to increase the validity of the categories. By cross-referencing reported sector with industry I was better able to separate between the different categories and place respondents in the right one. The variables are recoded so managers belonging to private sector registered as corporations will be coded to "Private Enterprise" regardless of what they rapport. Public enterprises at the state and municipal level are coded to "Public Enterprise" regardless of what they rapport. Companies are coded to "Private Enterprise" or "Public Enterprise" dependent on sector, never "Public Administration". Managers in foundations registered as foundations are coded to "Others" while other foundational forms are coded to "Private Enterprise". The final distribution after these adjustments looked like this:

<div align="center">Public/Private</div>

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Private Ent.	1545	53,1	53,1	53,1
	Public Adm.	476	16,4	16,4	69,5
	Public Ent.	509	17,5	17,5	86,9
	Other	380	13,1	13,1	100,0
	Total	2910	100,0	100,0	

3.2.1 Large Organizations

By further separating the categories to only include managers from "large" organizations, those with more than 100 members, the effect of size will be negated while keeping a high number of respondents:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Private Ent. 100+	403	13,8	37,1	37,1
	Public Adm. 100+	404	13,9	37,2	74,2
	Public Ent. 100+	280	9,6	25,8	100,0
	Total	1087	37,4	100,0	
Missing	System	1823	62,6		
Total		2910	100,0		

Only including "large" organizations gives a large and similar distribution of respondents. It also limits size-differences as a possible explanation for the differences between public and private organizations. It has been argued that larger organizations are more bureaucratic and are harder to change (Adams, 1985). With that in mind it makes sense to look at large organizations as they are likely to be most extreme, giving a good base for comparison between sectors, keeping size out of it as much as possible.

In the population as a whole it is reported that organizations of this size are fairly uncommon with a majority of the organizations in public administration and private enterprises reported to be between 1-19 employees (SSB, 2015). These numbers are not reflected in the selection of this survey, as only 5% of the respondents from the public sector work in organizations with less than 20 members, 85% report to work in organizations with more than 100 employees. Private enterprises are skewed in the same direction but to a lesser degree; 29% report to work in organizations with less than 20 employees, 26% report to work in organizations bigger than 100 employees. This is higher than in the population (SSB, 2015). The ratio between large and small organizations seems to be skewed among the respondents compared to the population as a whole, possibly due to selection bias, or that there have been used different methods for collecting data on the size of organizations between SSB and AFF.

Including all private and public organizations in the data-material could make the data less representative for the population as a whole, weakening the value of the data found. By only including responses from managers in organizations with more than 100 employees I can say something meaningful about the subsection "large Norwegian organizations". This is better than presenting something not meaningful about all Norwegian organizations. As the respondents attitudes do not change drastically with size, I will keep my representative selection of "large" organizations and leave the question of small/large organizations to future projects.

3.2.2 Gender and Educational Differences

Public administrations recruit women and people with higher education to a higher degree than private enterprises (Jacobsen 2013; Strand, 2007), which is also reflected in this study:

		Large			
		Private Ent. 100+	Public Adm. 100+	Public Ent. 100+	Total
Man/Woman?	Man	317	212	189	718
	Woman	86	192	91	369
Total		403	404	280	1087

Gender and educational differences might work as an underlying or mediating variable for the independent variable "organizational sector". Nonetheless I will treat sector as the predictor variable on the account that these differences are real and observable in these organizations. I will not focus especially on the reasons for the differences, but rather acknowledge their existence and possible effect, while looking at what these differences mean for the observed attitudes of managers. Differences between the sectors can be explained by gender, education or a myriad of other variables, but they exist nonetheless and contribute to the differences we might see between managers in public and private organizations. When relevant, I will perform correlation-analysis pointing to the comparative effects of sector, gender and education. Observable differences are the main-focus of this thesis, but explanatory underlying factors will be briefly discussed.

3.3 Representative and Significant Results

Results Are judged on the recommended alpha-level of 0.05, and a margin of error at 5% (Bartlett and Kotrlik, 2001; Dalen and Ansteensen, 2011). There were 2846 organizations with more than 100 employees in Norway in 2011 (SSB, 2015). Determining the exact number of managers in these organizations is challenging, but I am confident that N approximating 400 is high enough to give us a representative look at the experience of managers in Norwegian organizations. This is supported by theories on survey size for organizational studies: With the alpha-level, margin of error and the standard deviation observed in the sample of all respondents the sample size present is more than adequate to be called representative (Bartlett and Kotrlik, 2001).

Throughout the thesis I will use the much tried and tested independent-samples t-test to compare the means of the responses from managers in public administration and private enterprises. These groups are not believed to correlate and should be considered independent, and thus independently tested (Zimmerman, 1997). This test is chosen because it is robust against type 1 which errors, which is an erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis, provided that sample sizes are equal, fairly large (20-30+) and two-tail tested (Sawilowsky and Blair, 1992). By looking at managers from "large" organizations I keep the sample size equal, large, and minimize the risk for type 1 error. All results will be two-tail tested to ensure significant results. It will be noted with an * when significance-tests shows that the means of the respondents answers are not significantly different enough to safely reject the null-hypothesis.

3.4 Potential Survey-Technical Sources of Error

The attitude-statements used to create indexes are parts of a larger battery, and represents a small portion the totality of statements the respondents are asked about. This kind of design increases the chance for "respondent fatigue" where the quality of responses might drop, and lead to the respondents engaging in "straight-line-responding" where an overwhelming amount of statements could lead the respondents to repeating answers, or don't fully comprehend the issue at hand before answering. This could result in him or her copying previous answers in a straight-line, compromising the accuracy of the results (Ben-Nun, 2008).

Another risk with a five-point Likert-scale like the ones used here is a central-tendency bias. The respondents could potentially center their answers toward the central alternatives, vary of taking a stand. This bias might lead to answers in the middle of the selection and skew the results toward looking more similar than they actually are. Another possible source of error is as social desirability bias, where the respondents answer what is expected of them and thus can skew the responses toward the conservative and "acceptable" alternative.

The selection of respondents is another possible source of error. More than one top-manager and as many as every third manager from middle management could potentially participate from each chapter or organization. This could systematic skew the data if some organizations are overrepresented.

These are known issues for companies performing these surveys and they are minimized here by breaking up statements into parts, and encouraging brakes for the respondent. But still it is worth noting and acknowledging that the technical aspects of the survey is a possible source of error and could lead to more "conservative"-attitudes than the population actually have.

3.5 Suggestions for Improvements to the Survey

Before presenting my findings I will comment on some improvements I would have made to the survey to increase our understanding of attitudes toward bureaucracy among leaders:

1. I would have included statements concerning to what degree the manager's experience that structural elements contribute to inefficiency in their organizations. This would make it possible to gauge whether there is a difference between sectors to the degree structural elements are limiting managers in their work.
2. Inefficiency is a recurring challenge for bureaucracies. To better understand it I would have included statements concerning the source of inefficiency. This would have made it possible to say something about the source of inefficiency and compare sectors; additionally we could more accurately find if the experienced inefficiency stems from issues related to bureaucracy.
3. It is possible that some managers in the survey are from the same chapter. The inability to cap participation from each chapter/organization represents a weakness of this study. Provided my own survey I would cap the number of respondents from a singular organization to limit the

possibility of systematically skewing the data with respondents from one organization.

4. A five-point scale risks that the responses become too centralized. In a quest to get nuanced answers we end up with no answers at all, as the respondents are not forced to take a stand. To counter the central-tendency bias a six-point scale could be used to force the respondents to take a stand. Alternatively one could present two options in the form of examples of managers, and ask the respondents to identify with one of them. By creating opposite categories one could get a clearer picture of the managers' preferences. While creating accurate and balanced examples takes skillful crafting and meticulous work, it would pay off as it could emphasize differences to a greater degree than the nuanced five-point scale. This means that we could not compare the strength of the differences between them, but it would be a good tool for comparing attitudes between two groups isolated and give us an indication of any differences between them.

4 Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic Structure Among Norwegian Managers

If public administrations are more rigid and rule-based than their private counterparts, we would expect to see differences in managers' attitudes to structure. If they are similar, as suggested by previous research, we would expect them to be alike in their attitudes toward structure. Based on survey-data I will test if there is an observable difference between managers' attitudes to structural elements. From this we can learn if managers in public administrations are more bureaucratic in a structural sense than managers in private enterprises. This will not provide a complete picture of the organizations' structure, but will indicate to what degree managers in these organizations experience and impose the structural elements of the bureaucratic ideal type in their work. Based on the presented research on the relative flexibility of bureaucratic structure I would expect small difference between managers across sectors. The following hypotheses will be tested:

> **H0:** *There are no differences between managers in public administration and private enterprises in their attitudes toward bureaucratic structural elements.*
> **H1:** *Managers in public administration value bureaucratic structural elements higher than their private counterparts.*
> **H2:** *Managers in private organizations value bureaucratic structural elements higher than their public counterparts.*

4.1 Measuring Attitudes Toward Structure

To test these hypotheses I will use indexes made from survey statements measuring degree of uncertainty avoidance, centralization of power/autonomy, formalization of work, and structuralizing of subordinate's tasks. These indexes are chosen to represent the structural elements of bureaucracy because they to a substantial degree correspond with Weber's ideal types. These indexes are put

together by AFF's leadership survey and are intended to be used as indexes measuring these elements (AFF, 2012).

A test for Cronbach Alpha values has been performed to measure the internal consistency of these indexes. All indexes have a Cronbach Alpha value of at least 0.70, making them satisfactory for comparing groups (Bland and Altman, 1997). To test for unidimensionality I conducted a factor analysis showing that these four indexes are mainly influenced by a single underlying construct, responsible for at least 43% of the variation, and double that of the second most influencing factor suggesting unidimensionality (Grau, 2007; Reckase, 1979). The indexes show a satisfactory internal consistency and a degree of unidimensionality to the extent that they can be used as an index for measuring these attitudes. Throughout the thesis I will utilize indexes like these and note when they are used. Unless commented they all show at least a satisfactory degree of internal consistency (>0.70), and unidimensionality. The questions making up the indexes are part of a larger battery of questions, and from this I have selected four indexes representing the bureaucratic structural traits. Some indexes from the battery were rejected either because they lack high internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha <0.7), or unidimensionality. Others were rejected as they did not fit the criteria of measuring a Weberian (1991) structural ideal type. All statements were answered on scales from 1 ("completely disagree") to 5 ("completely agree"), value 6 ("don't know") is set as missing (Appendix A).

Uncertainty Avoidance

"Uncertainty avoidance" measures to what degree managers show attitudes of rule adherence. This concerns the importance of rules and following rules in the organization and is inspired by Hofstede's (1983) theories on uncertainty avoidance. While this category is not explicitly designed for testing bureaucratic attitudes, its concern with avoiding uncertainty through rules/instructions goes to the heart of Weber's structural ideal type of a "bureaucratic authority"; grounded in a principle of "fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are

generally ordered by rules" (1991: 196).

Question: Respond to these statements about values concerning your work:

- *It is important that work demands and expectations are detailed and explicit so the employee knows what to do.*
- *Rules are important because they express to the employee what the operation expects of them.*
- *Routines are important because they ease the employees' work.*
- *Detailed instructions are important for the employees.*
- *I expect the employees to accurately follow instructions and procedures.*

Centralization/Autonomy

"Centralization/Autonomy" measures to what degree managers experience power as centralized in their organizations. This goes to Weber's ideal type concerning a monocratic head of the organization, and a hierarch based "supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones" (1991: 197). The higher authority is clearly defined and regulated, without the higher office necessarily being able to take over.

Question: Respond to these statements concerning decisions, rules and routines in your business:

- *Not much happens in this operation without a manager's consent.*
- *People are not encouraged to make their own decisions.*
- *Even minor stuff must be referred to a manager higher up in the operation.*
- *Associates must confer with the manager before doing anything.*
- *All decisions by associates must have the manager's approval.*

Formalization

"Formalization" touches on some of the same areas as "rule adherence", but is more focused on the existence and importance of formalization of rules and them being written down. This is another important aspect of Weber's ideal types seeing administration as based upon written documents. Instructions should follow "general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned" (Weber, 1991: 198).

Question: Respond to these statements concerning decisions, rules and routines in your business:

- *This operation has a great amount of written rules and guidelines.*
- *A rules and procedures-manual exists and is easily accessible in the operation.*
- *There is a complete job description for most jobs in the operation.*
- *The operation has a written overview over the work-achievement for nearly every associate.*
- *There is a formal introduction program for new associates.*

Structuralizing

"Structuralizing" asks to what degree managers shape the work of their employees. Weber argued that commands should be given in a "stable way and is strictly delimited by rules" (1991: 196). This index to a degree overlaps with both rule-adherence and centralization of power, but is nonetheless included as it measures an aspect of bureaucratic structure, managerial structuring of tasks, that the others fail to fully capture.

Question: Some statements about your relationship to the group you lead:

- *I encourage the use of standardized procedures.*
- *I decide what gets done, and how it gets done.*
- *I delegate specific tasks to the group members.*
- *I plan when the task should be finished.*
- *I keep defined standards for performance.*
- *I expect the members of the group to follow current rules and regulations.*

When working with interconnected items such as structural ideal types creating indexes not overlapping to some degree is close to impossible. That said, I am confident that these four indexes accomplish to capture the most important bureaucratic structural elements. The most obvious structural characteristics left out are the elements concerning expert-training and officials working to their full capacity (Weber, 1991). Degree of professionalization will be touched upon later, and I am confident that the chosen four indexes make it possible to measure to what degree managers in public and private organizations have different attitudes toward the structural elements of bureaucracy. Each of these scales are suitable for measuring attitudes, as they are put together by questions on a

comparable scale, measuring a meaningful attitude, and have a total with a high internal consistency and unidimensionality (Reid, 2006).

4.2 Attitudes of Norwegian Managers

	Large	N	Mean
Uncertainty Avoidance	Private Ent. 100+	400	4,04
	Public Adm. 100+	401	3,72
Centralization/Autonomy*	Private Ent. 100+	400	1,96
	Public Adm. 100+	396	1,95
Formalization	Private Ent. 100+	398	3,60
	Public Adm. 100+	394	3,23
Structuralizing*	Private Ent. 100+	380	3,52
	Public Adm. 100+	387	3,45

No statistically significant difference between the two.

These responses mean that we can reject both the null hypothesis and the first alternative hypothesis. There is no statistically significant difference between attitudes of managers toward structuralizing and centralization/autonomy. Managers in private enterprises tend to value formalization and uncertainty avoidance to a higher degree than managers in public administrations. This supports the second alternative hypothesis saying that "*Managers in private organizations value structural elements of organizations higher than their public counterparts".* The differences are small (0.32, 0.37), but trend in the same direction. This confirms that structure seems to be relatively flexible both among organizations and manager's attitudes, and if there is a difference it appears that managers in public administrations show less positive attitudes toward bureaucratic structure than managers in private enterprises.

The attitudes of private and public managers appear to be largely similar, but trend toward more positive attitudes toward structure among managers in the private sector. This is in line with previous research in the field of organizational studies showing that structure seems to be relative between, and internally, in organizations (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963; Pugh et al, 1968; Walton 2005). While this similarity is not surprising considering previous research on organizations, it is surprising considering the public debate and the classic theorists on bureaucratic personality which seems to think that public administration is inherently more "bureaucratized" (Merton, 1960; Thompson, 1961).

Contrary to what is proposed by Merton (1960) and Thompson (1961) it does not seem that managers in public administrations are more accepting or supportive of bureaucratic structure. Their attitudes show that they are similar to managers in private enterprises, and in some instances even less positive toward these structural elements. This suggests that the perceived lack of efficiency does not seem to be created by attitudes managers in public administration have toward structure. If public administrations are synonymous with rigidity and control, why are their managers equally or less focused on the structural elements? The discrepancy between what scholars and society believes about public organizations, and what empirical data shows is telling for how we view bureaucratic organization with a priori knowledge (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). Before explaining these findings with theories from the organizational research field, I will look at what possible underlying factors to sector can tell us about the differences between sectors.

4.3 Correlations of Possible Underlying Factors

This result is not likely to stem from gender-differences as they appear be very small or non-significant.

	Are you man or woman?	N	Mean
Uncertainty Avoidance	Men	1980	3,98
	Women	909	4,05
Centralization/Autonomy*	Men	1978	1,97
	Women	908	1,91
Formalization*	Men	1972	3,28
	Women	901	3,29
Structuralizing*	Men	1923	3,51
	Women	864	3,52

*No statistically significant difference between the two

By analyzing the structural elements and possible underlying factors such as age, gender, organizational size and level of education we can learn if there is a correlation between them. The Spearman Correlation Coefficients indicates the degree of association between the variables on a scale from negative (-1) to positive (1) (Kraemer, 2005). This can indicate if a high value on one variable is correlated with a high or low value on another variable. This indicates to what degree the variables are associated with each other or not. Association is interesting because it shows what underlying factors are associating with what answers. While these correlations do not prove causality it can point out where the association is stronger and weaker, providing a possibility for comparison.

When we look at the Spearman Correlation Coefficients between gender we see a very weak or no significant association (-0.1 to 0.1) between gender and attitudes toward structural elements of bureaucracy, suggesting that gender is not associated with structural attitudes. Organizational size has a weak association with uncertainty avoidance (-0.15) and formalism (0.22), very weak or not significantly for the other indexes (-0.1-0.1). This indicates that in larger organizations, the manager show less positive attitudes to uncertainty avoidance, and more to formalism. There is a stronger association between education and

structural traits than size, gender and sector. Education correlates moderately negative (-0.41) with uncertainty avoidance and stronger than any other factor with structuralizing (-0.17). There is a very weak or no association with the other two structural elements and education (-0.1-0.1). This suggests that the more educated a manager, the less positively he is towards uncertainty avoidance and structuralizing. This association is stronger for education than for the other possible underlying variables (size, gender). The exception is formalism, which correlates strongest with size (0.22), suggesting that managers in large organizations are more influenced by their size than education, gender, and sector in their attitudes. The larger an organization, the stronger a manager reports positive attitudes toward formalism.

These correlations, with the exception of education on uncertainty avoidance, are weak and do not indicate that any of these possible underlying factors have a strong correlation with structural elements. However, they do suggest that education is an underlying factor that could explain some of the differences between the sectors in attitudes toward structural elements of organization; higher education means less positive attitudes toward structure. We will come back to this when discussing public administrations as professional organizations. This effect is stronger for education than gender. This indicates that there are some underlying differences between the sectors explaining some, but not all, of the variation between them. The following chapter will use appropriate theories to provide explanations for the results, and reasons why public managers show equal or more negative attitudes toward structural elements.

5 Possible Explanations for Attitudes Toward Structure

5.1 Selective Structure

The attitudes of Norwegian managers confirm previous research on the topic. Formalization is generally found to be similar between public and private sectors in most instances, weakening the myth of formalization and structural focus running amok in the public sector. An explanation for this, supported by US-data, is that public managers are rather autonomous and experience less formalization in the areas where they are in control, but wield less control over areas with more extensive external control and oversight, such as purchases and personnel. The differences between the sectors are suggested to be due to matters outside the agency's hands, and not a weakness of the organizational form itself, public managers appear to receive the red-tape more than they create it (Rainey and Bozeman, 2000).

Public managers are not more supportive of bureaucratic structure than managers in the private sector. A possible explanation, based on Rainey and Bozeman's (2000) theories, is that degree of formalization and amount of "red tape" are equal between the sectors. It could even be higher in the private sector, possibly due to a general lower feeling of oversight and external control in the public sector. Unfortunately there is no data on the explicit level of oversight and control in this survey. But when we look at a general question of how often public managers feel that political decisions make it difficult to work efficiently, we see that managers in public administration score substantially higher than managers in private enterprises:

Political decisions limiting efficency

Private Ent.

Public Adm.

■ Political decisions limiting efficency

1   2   3   4   5

This indicates that while managers in public administrations are less focused on structural elements, they feel more limited by political decision making than their private counterparts. This result is not surprising considering that the political decision-makers should be considered the owners of public administrations and should be instructing them (Hoggett, 2006). Unfortunately, there is no data on how private enterprise owners influence the efficiency of their organizations.

Peter Blau saw large organizations, including government agencies, as "multilevel hierarchies" with each level so far removed from top management, and consequently autonomous in their actions, that they "make operations relatively self-regulating and independent of direct intervention by management" (1968: 453). By seeing public administrations as "multilevel hierarchies", we can understand how their managers might report one thing for dealing with their own employees on their "own level", and something else for their experience with their management-level. Individual managers at each level of the hierarchy might not experience their level to be rigid and stringent, as they are a fairly independent of the central management, but this does not necessarily mean that the hierarchy as a whole equals the individual parts. Managers seem to

experience less structural elements at their own level, but face more troubles with inefficiency when having to confront higher levels, or the totality of the hierarchy. This could mean that the individual levels of the hierarchy experiences less structuralism, but as each level of hierarchy is added together the totality of structuralism could increase, making it possible that the whole organization is more formalized in the public sector, while each manager reports equal or less levels of formalization at their level.

Lack of oversight of certain areas of public administration could contribute to formalization (Rainey and Bozeman, 2000). I can neither confirm nor deny this with the data available. It is however clear that managers in public administrations report less attitudes of formalization, rule adherence and centralization, but they experience more limitations from the political level and report to experience more formal rules in the day-to-day operation (4.0>3.8). These conflicting reports suggest that while the public managers themselves report not to prefer, or impose, structural elements to a higher degree, they deal with these issues to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises. This is supported empirically by research showing that public organizations are under more rule-based control (Boyne, 2002). Managers in public administrations seem to be under more control, but prefer less structure indicating that they are not more bureaucratic in their attitudes. The comparatively negative attitudes toward structural elements among public managers can be explained by them having a greater a degree of freedom inside their own level of the hierarchy compared to private enterprises. While they receive more directions from above, they do not seem to be more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure, possibly because they have greater freedom in this area (Blau, 1968)

5.2 Complex Goals and Attitudes Toward Structure

Attitudes of Norwegian managers confirm previous research suggesting that managers in public administration are not the rule-craving bureaucrats they are made out to be (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). They explained this with a

connection between goal ambiguity, "red tape", and rule formalization (Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman, 1995). Public sector has been perceived as having more complex goals and tasks, hey are tasked with achieving a wide variety of goals while taking into account a whole society's worth of interests (Hoggett, 2006). From the survey we can learn about goal complexity by measuring how often Norwegian managers experience unclear feedback on their work, and troubles seeing tasks to completion. While this is not a complete measurement of complexity, it points to whether there is a difference between managers in private and public organizations to the degree that they experience success as hard to measure and completion of tasks as hard to achieve.

When asked about to what degree they receive clear feedback about their work, and to what degree they are able to see their work through by finishing started tasks, there is a difference in disfavor of the public managers:

	Large	N	Mean
Feedback	Private Ent. 100+	401	3,97
	Public Adm. 100+	401	3,67
Completion of tasks	Private Ent. 100+	399	4,05
	Public Adm. 100+	404	3,77

Managers in public administrations report to experience less clear feedback about their work, and are to a lesser degree able to complete their tasks. This is not unequivocal proof of complexity, but suggests that managers in public administration have a harder time identifying a job well done and completing tasks. This could be caused by a higher degree of complexity of tasks and unclear goals, a prevalent feature of a public sector dealing with a multitude of goals and tasks that are difficult to measure and complete (Strand, 2007).

By looking at Spearman's correlation between the structural elements and reported feedback we can learn how they correlate with each other. There is a correlation between feedback and structuralizing (0.23) and completion of tasks and structuralizing (0.19). Feedback (0.23) and completion of tasks (0.22) also correlated with uncertainty avoidance stronger than with structure and formalization. This suggests that managers who experience clear feedback and completion of tasks are more positive to structure. They favor clear rules and regulations for their employees' work. This indicates an association between goal complexity and structure. While these correlations cannot prove causality, it appears that clarity of goals end expectations could be a driving force behind the prevalence of structural attitudes.

A possible reason for this is that clearer goals and feedback motivates the managers in private enterprises to impose stricter rules. It can be easier to structuralize and follow rules and regulations for work that is easy, or even possible to complete. This dates back to Arthur Stinchcombe's (1959) research regarding craft and professional administrations. He found that instability decreases bureaucratization as it is difficult to create and impose rules for unclear situations.

Standardizing that which cannot be standardized seems to be a challenge for Norwegian managers. Public managers report using less performance measures, and less utility from performance goals, suggesting that private managers have more measurement and utility of formalized goals. It is not clear if this is a result of complexity of tasks, easier targets to measure or other factors. It is however clear that public managers are measured on goals to a lesser degree, and have less utility of the performance goals presented to them. This can be seen together with the difficult of getting feedback and completing tasks as an indication of complex goals in public administrations. This complexity is as possible a reason for stronger negative attitudes toward structure, and could explain some of the attitudes of public managers.

5.3 The Fallacy of Alienation

There is a proposed connection between a feeling of alienation, and the perceived need for rules (Foster, 1990). Alienation (powerlessness) has previously been fund to be more prevalent in private organization than in public organizations, and correlates with a preference of formalization, suggesting that the preference for rules are based in the personality of the official and not the structure of the organization (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998). Higher demands and focus on delivering according to demands might create a more rigid, rule-based system in the private sector compared to public administration.

In the survey of Norwegian managers we see that managers in private enterprises report a higher degree of facing sanctions if unable to deliver results as expected (2.34 v 1.90), but there is none (<0.10) or weak (<0.20) correlation between fearing sanctions and the structural elements. This suggests that fear of sanctions are less of a factor for structuralizing and rule adherence than clear feedback and completion of tasks to Norwegian managers as shown above. Unclear goals seems to be a more likely explanation for why public managers show less positive attitudes toward the structural elements of bureaucracy than ascribing it to a feeling of alienation among managers in private enterprises. These differences between US and Norwegian managers could be contributed to cultural-differences in the work-place, or other factors making the impact of alienation less powerful here.

5.4 Expectations

Expectations of structure could play a factor when managers are asked about their attitudes. Differing expectations could mean that the attitudes portray a difference that is not objectively observable, but only exists as a subjective construct. There is not necessarily a relationship between perception and measurable objectives. Studies have shown that people let their threshold of "red-tape" influence their perception of it regardless of the objective amount as people can only compare their situation to what they know (Rainey and Bozeman 2000).

A possible explanation for the differences between managers in public and private organizations could be that the managers in public administration are evaluating the structure based on their experiences with surroundings they are familiar with. Managers in governmental offices are likely to have a career in the organization, and know what rules and structures they can change and what is not up for discussion, which may then influence their perceptions and values. Their experience with the existing systems could lead to more negative attitudes toward structural elements as they take them for granted, and perhaps see them as a natural resource, or unavoidable obstacle to their managerial business. On the contrary, it is possible that managers in private enterprises expect less rules and "red-tape" and therefore feel that the structure in place are more prevalent that it really is. Unfortunately, when we measure attitudes, and not objects, we cannot know whether these differences are observable or not. Research suggests that there is no correlation between the perceived level of red-tape in an organization and the actual level of formalization (Pandey, 1995). This weakness of survey-data and the effect of expectations could explain the attitudes observed, but it does not limit the validity of the experienced level of structure and formalism reported by the manager; managers in public administrations report less experience of structural formality than managers in private enterprises.

5.5 Do Professionals Need Less Structure?

Another possible explanation for the difference in attitudes between public and private managers could be that the managers in public administration are professionals to a higher degree, and that they do not value the structure as much as they value the work; they are primarily educated professionals, and then public employees. This explanation is supported by the previously shown correlation between education and attitudes to bureaucratic structure.

Structural traits of bureaucracy can be used as management tools to impose bureaucratic control; giving managers the authority needed to lead a rational organization (Reimann, 1973). The tension between the need for the managers to

lead a rational organization, and the need for the professional to act in the manner of his profession might collide. Despite these tensions, it is suggested that organizations are able to be efficient despite these internal differences because of "accommodative mechanisms" (Udy, 1959). These mechanisms can be understood as ways rational systems let professionals be professionals while staying contained in a system, ensuring that hierarchies are not antagonistic to professionals. Professionals can be efficient in hierarchies because they recognize that some decisions must be made by others, and because the support provided by a hierarchy might aid their work (Hall, 1967). Hierarchical organizations show more bureaucratic traits than autonomous organizations, but they are not inherently less professional. The "bureaucratic structure", with its normative systems, might not limit the professional's "self-regulatory activity" (Hall, 1967: 462), as "the occupational base of an organization or an organizational segment may influence the structure and norms of the organization" (Hall, 1967: 475), and "It might be hypothesized that the more developed the normative system of the occupations in an organization, the less the need for a highly bureaucratized organizational system" (Hall, 1967: 475). Bureaucratization appears to be merely one piece of the puzzle, and far from the only factor limiting or promoting professionalization in the organizational setting; professionals are able to thrive in bureaucracies.

The AFF-survey confirms that managers with no university education report substantially stronger positive attitudes toward structural elements than those with a University-degree:

	Educational level	N	Mean
Formalization	Up until University	823	3,40
	4+ Years of University	933	3,20
Centralization/Autonomy	Up until University	828	2,01
	4+ Years of University	936	1,87
Uncertainty Avoidance	Up until University	833	4,39
	4+ Years of University	938	3,68
Structuralizing	Up until University	793	3,67
	4+ Years of University	909	3,41

The number of managers in large organization without a university-degree makes it dubious to compare only managers in large organizations, but the general trend is that the more educated a manager is, the more negative he is toward structural elements like formalization, centralization, rule-adherence and structuralizing. This portrayal of the public manager as a professional, with a strong union-presence, has merit as an important contingency for leadership in the public sector (Strand, 2007). It can be observed empirically in the leadership data, where managers in public organizations report to listen to unions in their day-to-day work to a significantly higher degree than managers in private enterprises (3.7>3.4). This suggests that managers in public administrations can be considered as university-trained "professionals" to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises.

5.5.1 Understanding Autonomy in Bureaucratic Organizations

Elizabeth Morrissey and Keith F. Gillespie (1975) look at the difference between "professional" and "bureaucratic"-organizations, listing multiple dichotomies before setting on this as the major difference between them:

Hierarchical authority permeates bureaucracies, and executives typically demand from their subordinates compliance to organizational rules and procedures. By contrast, professional authority emanates from superior

expertise which requires individual autonomy in decision-making and task operations.

(Morrissey and Gillespie, 1975: 320)

The focus on hierarchical versus individual autonomy is interesting. Seeing that managers in public administration are equally or more negative to structural elements than managers in private enterprises, it is curious to see if this is also mirrored in the level of autonomy they experience. Theorizing that one of the reasons for this structural leniency is the degree of professionalism, we should expect than managers in public administrations do not experience less autonomy in their work.

From the AFF-leadership survey, we can study how managers in public and private organizations experience their levels of autonomy. An index (Appendix B) of statements regarding their degree of autonomy makes it possible to test the following hypotheses regarding manager's autonomy in private and public organizations:

> **H0:** "*There are no differences in the experienced autonomy-levels of managers in public administration and private enterprises*".
> **H1:** "*Managers in public administration experience a lower degree of autonomy than managers in private enterprises*".
> **H2:** "*Managers in private enterprises experience a lower degree of autonomy than managers in public administration* ".

The results show than we can reject the null-hypothesis and accept the first alternative hypothesis. Managers in public administrations report a lower level of autonomy in their work than managers in private enterprises:

	Large	N	Mean
Autonomy	Private Ent. 100+	401	3,60
	Public Adm. 100+	404	3,09

This suggests that while they report more negative attitudes to structure, they also report lower level of autonomy. While managers in public administrations are less worried about the structural aspects of their own and subordinates' work, they report to have less autonomy in their own work.

A possible explanation for this could be that managers in public administrations have freedom in the way they solve their problems, but the problems they are set to solve are less autonomous as a result of them being under political control and part of a bigger overlying structure. This organizational duality is described as a way for professionals to operate in a hierarchical system (Francis and Stone, 1956). While public managers appear less worried about structural elements, they also report less autonomy to form their own work; possibly due to control and instructions from the political level. It has been suggested by multiple theorists that this duality is a source of strength for the public administration. The freedom created by the structure and formalizations ensures the official freedom to decide, while limiting arbitrary decision-making (Goodsell, 2014; Hoggett, 2006). Public administrations are political tools (Strand, 2007); managers are set to carry out decisions, and while they are less able to formulate what those decisions are compared to their private counterparts, they appear more willing to involve their subordinates in how these tasks should be carried out.

Managers in public administrations show traits of a professional working in a hierarchical system (Francis and Stone, 1956). The public managers appear to fit better into a category of professional bureaucrats than an administrating, classical, bureaucrat (Strand, 2007). With this understanding, it is erroneous to suggest that public administrations are bureaucratic organizations to a higher

degree than private enterprises. The freedom to choose goals appears more limited, but this does not seem to indicate more structural rigidity among the managers. Rigidity of goals and less autonomy allows the public organizations to operate with the stability necessary for carrying out public service, while staying flexible enough to perform the job to the expectations and resources available to the manager (Strand, 2007; Clegg et al, 2011).

Degree of professionalism and education is a possible explanation for structural attitudes. Managers in public administration are more educated, appears to be more "professionals", and this can partly explain their attitudes to bureaucratic structure.

5.6 Organizations are Becoming More Alike

Organizational homogeneity could explain the relative similarity between managers in public administration and private enterprises. The trend of organizations generally becoming more alike is proposed as a result of changing rationale for structural elements (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Weber (1991) argued that structure was based in rationality, changing due to competition and performance needs. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1983) argue that contemporary organizations change due to reasons in their organizational field, and as a result become more alike, though not necessarily more efficient. The reasons for changing are anchored in the organizational fields, where organizations become increasingly alike as they depend more on each other and actors in the field. As a result, there is a path-dependency to organizational form; the ones who are chosen and successful will be imitated. This has been observed in organizations as they become increasingly similar when they interact with each other (Marsden, 1999).

If organizations are becoming more alike due to organizational fields it can explain the relative equality in attitudes to structure between managers in private and public organizations. As fields become more and more interdependent

and affect each other across sectors (Strand, 2007), it becomes increasingly likely that the structural attitudes of private and public organizations become similar, making it less of a surprise that managers in public administration appears to be structurally less bureaucratic than private enterprises.

Another aspect of this is that an increasing prevalence of "soft-control", and project-work might contribute to less formal-control through structures overall (Raelin, 2010). The increased popularity of these informal ways of coordination might lead to a uniformity of organizational types. If project-work is becoming as common in the public sector as in the private, it stands to reason that the levels of formal structural attitudes would become similar between the sectors. This movement toward more similar organizational forms is predicted by Weber (1991) as a possible development for bureaucracy. As previously discussed, he saw the speed and accuracy of the organizational form in a world demanding these qualities as a reason for its continuing prevalence. The fact that we now 100 years later can spot these trends among managers might indicate that Weber's theories on this issue where correct; the utility and flexibility of the bureaucratic organizational form has made it a staple of organizations in all sectors, and this can be observed among its managers.

6   Implications of Structural Attitudes

The previous chapter presented that managers in Norwegian public administration are equal or less positive in their attitudes to structural elements than managers in private enterprises. This was explained by looking at previous research and theories concerning public sector and structure. This section will discuss the implications of my findings:

6.1 Public Administrations do not Bureaucratize Managers

Robert K. Merton claimed that the "bureaucratic structure exerts a constant pressure upon the official to be 'methodical, prudent, and disciplined'" (1960: 562), and that pressure from the social structure can lead to the official becoming overly rigid and overly concerned with rules and structure. Victor Thompson (1961) proposed that managers in classical bureaucracies who are removed from their specialization and facing unclear demands become insecure, creating "bureaupathology", a breeding ground for control-oriented behavior. While Thompson ascribes these problems to the individual, they are believed to be systematic as the classical bureaucracy promotes them (Bozeman and Rainey, 1998).

The attitudes toward structural elements suggest that there is no more "bureaucratizing" of the public manager than the private. To further hammer home this point we can look at an index of questions measuring "power distance" (Appendix C) defined in the following way:

> In organizations, the level of Power Distance is related to the degree of centralization of authority and the degree of autocratic leadership. This relationship shows that centralization and autocratic leadership are rooted in the "mental programming" of the members of a society.
> (Hofstede, 1983: 81)

Power-distance in this survey measures to what degree the manager supports centralization of power and autocratic leadership. This distance is proposed to be represented in both formal and informal hierarchies inside the organization (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). I did not include this as an element in my discussion on structural elements of bureaucracy as the power distance is more a suggested adverse effect of bureaucracy than a defined ideal type of it (Merton, 1960; Weber, 1991). Another reason for not including it in the main analysis is that it has a lower internal consistency than the threshold (Cronbach Alpha=0.67). This level is not critically low, and factor-analysis shows that it is unidimensional.

The attitudes of Norwegian managers show that managers in private enterprises show attitudes of power distance to a higher degree than managers in public administrations (1.88>1.68), further suggesting that the control-oriented bureaucrats described by Merton (1960) are more prevalent in the private sector than in public administration.

The attitudes of Norwegian managers suggest that there is less "bureaupathology" among managers in public administrations compared to private enterprises; public managers prefer and experience less rules and structure. This indicates that public administrations have less rule-focused officials than private organizations, and should dispel the myth of the public administration as craving rules and control as an inherent value in and of itself. There is no empirical data suggesting that Norwegian managers in public administration are more structurally bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises. If the bureaucratic structure exerts a kind of pressure it does not seem to influence the managers at all, contrary it may seem that managers in public administrations receive more instructions and procedures from above, but that they prefer to not pass this on to their associates.

6.2 Public Administrations are Less Bureaucratic Than Believed

A staple of organizational culture-theory is that culture can be learned in an organization. It has been suggested by several scholars that work environment influences personal values. This is done through organizational learning in an "organization socialization"- process where the individual learns the normative behaviors, attitudes, and values expected of him as a new member of the organization or group (Weiss, 1978; Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). Specifically to bureaucracy, it has been suggested that professionals learn to adapt certain bureaucratic values (Hall, 1967). It has been posited that old values are unlearned so that members of organizations can learn new values in the new organization through a process of events (Schein, 2003).

If we presume that "organizational socialization" happens in organizations, either through imitation of models or other means, one would expect members of a bureaucratic organization to show stronger bureaucratic attitudes than members of non-bureaucratic organizations (Weiss, 1978). Taking "organizational socialization" into account it can be argued that managers' equal, or stronger negative attitudes to structural elements of bureaucracy, suggest that there is no basis for saying that they are members of more bureaucratic organizations in a structural sense.

7 Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic Values Among Norwegian Managers

"The goal of formal rational behavior is to maximize predictability and minimize personal preferences" (Bartels 2009: 460).

The value-perspective of bureaucratic theory could elaborate on the attitudes to structure as it proposes that differences in the structural ideal types are ill-equipped for telling us whether these organizations are bureaucratic at all, and that we must consider other elements to understand bureaucracy (Bartels, 2009). Data from Norwegian managers, as well as previous research (Udy, 1959; Hall, 1963; Walton, 2005) suggests that structurally there is no empirical reason for painting public administrations as more bureaucratic. And the value-approach would say that this is because there are no structural differences between them, and the important difference lays in the values they keep. This could mean that managers in public administrations are less positive to bureaucratic structure than managers in private organizations, or that structure in general is a poor indicator of bureaucracy: "neither the issue of centralization-distribution of authority nor that of standardization can be made the yardstick for deciding the limits of the bureaucratic form" (Kallinikos, 2004: 18).

By claiming that the structural ideal types do not indicate degree of bureaucracy, we need to look deeper to detect what does. An alternative approach is to look beyond structure, and to the values filling the structure as the defining quality of bureaucracy; network-organizations might differ from classical bureaucratic-organizations in their structure, but that does not make them less bureaucratic, just different (Kallinikos, 2003). Kallinikos bases this on the fact that the centralization of an organization is not as crucial for the bureaucratic form as the "legal-rational type authority, separation of office duties and personal life, meritocracy and universalism" (2003: 9). Looking

different from the classical bureaucracy does not necessarily make them different. Adaption to the environment does not make them less bureaucratic as long as they carry with them bureaucratic values.

Koen Bartels argues that most of the criticism toward bureaucracies is based on what he calls "new conventional wisdoms" (2009: 447), which uses Weber's ideal types to focus on structural problems of underperformance such as rigidity and infectivity. He rejects the notion of rigidity due to structure and formality as a new wave of misunderstandings of Weber's theories, not unlike the criticism of ideal types (Bartels, 2009). Based on limited readings and misunderstandings of Weber, they equate formal rationality with rules and control. It is taken for granted that a bureaucratic structure creates inefficiency in its workers by the way of formal rationality (Bartels, 2009; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997).

Data from Norwegian managers, as well as earlier studies, fails to detect a clear difference between public and private organizations with regards to bureaucratic structure. If we cannot find that public administrations are structurally more bureaucratic, is it possible to find differences in the values they fill their structures with? To test this, I will focus on the experience of the managers and see if there is a value-based bureaucratic ethos separating managers in public and private organizations. I will also look if there appears to be a significant difference in the degree of "public values" shown by managers in their daily work. To measure f public managers truly are less willing to adapt and less "modern" I will measure "post-bureaucratic"-values. This will not be, or even try to be, a comprehensive list of bureaucratic values, but an effort to describe a dichotomy between managers in public and private organizations. By looking beyond structural attitudes of Norwegian public and private managers we can identify if they are different regarding bureaucratic values.

7.1 Bureaucratic Ethos and Formal/Substantive Rationality

An important aspect of bureaucratic values is the bureaucratic ethos; following orders and separating their own convictions for those of the position. This allows the bureaucrat to separate himself from his position, and makes it possible to keep his freedom as he enters the role of public servant. By uniting the formal and substantive rationality he is able to function in the role, formally separated from the person. To illustrate it with Weber's own words, a bureaucrat:

> takes pride in preserving his impartiality, overcoming his own inclinations and opinions, so as to execute in a conscientious and meaningful way what is required of him by the general definition of his duties or by some particular instruction, even—and particularly—when they do not coincide with his own political views.
> (Weber, 1994a: 160)

While doing this the bureaucrat is not limited from individual decision-making, but he is supposed to follows orders even if they are against his convictions (Weber, 1994a; Weber, 1994b). This is done by uniting the substantive and formal rationality through the bureaucratic ethos (Bartels, 2009). Paul Du Gay argues that the bureaucratic ethos makes it possible to separate person and role and facilitates an "impartial and efficient administration" (2008: 339). A central bureaucratic value is the ability to follow orders from above no matter the personal "inclinations and opinions" (Weber, 1994a: 160)

To what extent do Norwegian manager's attitudes reflect the bureaucratic ethos? Are there differences between public administrations and public enterprises in this regard? The AFF leadership study is able to tell us to what degree managers must carry out decisions going against their professional competence, and to what degree they must make decisions going against their own ethics and values.

These two questions make it possible to test hypotheses about the bureaucratic ethos of public and private managers:

H0: *"There is no difference in how often managers in private enterprises and public administration reports going against their own convictions".*
H1: *"Managers in public administration reports going against their own convictions more often than managers in private enterprises".*

	Large	N	Mean
Going against professional competence	Private Ent. 100+	397	2,36
	Public Adm. 100+	399	2,72
Going against personal ethic and values	Private Ent. 100+	395	1,76
	Public Adm. 100+	401	1,89

The respondents indicate that I can safely reject the null-hypothesis: there is a difference between the two sectors to the degree managers report going against their own convictions. We can accept the first alternative hypothesis saying that managers in public administrations indicate that they to a higher degree experience having to go against their personal convictions in their work life. This suggests that the bureaucratic ethos, as Weber envisioned it, exists to a higher degree in Norwegian public administration than in private enterprises. The reasons for this could be many, and worthwhile looking into for future projects. Possible explanations include that this is expected of managers in public sector to a higher degree, or that the interference they report from above them in the hierarchy and political level binds them to carry out decisions they do not agree with, but have to comply with. While I cannot prove Du Gay's (2008) theories on the importance of the bureaucratic ethos, I can say that managers in public administration report to more often behaving in accordance to these values than managers in private enterprises.

These results are not unique as it has been argued that the appearance of a bureaucratic ethos separates public and private sector (Du Gay 2000; Olsen 2006):

> Bureaucracy has a role as the institutional custodian of democratic-constitutive principles and procedural rationality, even if in competition with other institutions embedding competing criteria of success Bureaucracy also has a role as a tool for legislators and representative democracy and is positively related to substantive outcomes that are valued in contemporary democracies, by some more than others.
> (Olsen, 2006: 18)

The public service side of public administration makes it absolutely necessary with a bureaucratic ethos separating the individual from the role. It preserves the officials' freedom, and secures the public from unjust actions (Bartels, 2009). These values are the elements that make an organization able to serve without becoming a maligned force (Clegg et al, 2011).

By understanding the bureaucratic ethos as one module of the "modular man" (Gellner, 1996) we can explain how the official can separate his private self from the ethical demands and duties of the office. This allows a separation of person and role in the organization. An official should care for those he is serving, but only in the capacity of his role as a public official and within the regulations (Du Gay, 2008). The bureaucratic ethos is conservative. It has to be to protect itself from special interests and short-term personal gains at the cost of long-term public effectiveness (Du Gay, 2008). When the bureaucrat is no longer performing according to his role, but person, thus breaking the bureaucratic ethos, he stops being an efficient tool and can no longer be considered a bureaucrat, but a rogue official.

Weber has already argued for the official as not simply a machine, but someone who makes his own decisions within the rules (Weber, 1994a: 160). A case worker

making subjective determination according to instructions is still a bureaucrat, but a case worker making up his own instructions and demands for helping a client is rogue, and not performing his duties according to the bureaucratic ethos. He no longer separates between his person and his role. A stronger bureaucratic ethos for managers in public administrations is a strength and necessity as they ensure that the manager is anchoring his business in the rational instructions given to him.

7.2 Public Interests Versus Organizational Interests

Research done on US public officials in the 1950s found that officials stray away from written instructions when they feel they have skills permitting it, are short on time, or because of demands for productivity and cultural factors (Francis and Stone, 1956). From this they gather that "conflicting or competing forces are operating within and among the employees" (Francis and Stone, 1956: 129). Employees felt they had the competence to break the norms when they needed to, suggesting that public administration showed traits of a professional organization. Bureaucracies see the individual as subordinate to the system, but the professional organization sees the system subordinate to the professional, so these two traditions are able to coexist in varying degrees within the same system because they are "not types of organization, but principles of organization" (Francis and Stone, 1956, 157). Hospitals are used as an example of a hierarchical structure, with doctors and nurses who are seen as professionals in their field; "while the professional is supposed to treat each client as unique, and therefore the relation is individual, his obligation remains to the code of rules which determines the relation" (Francis and Stone, 1956: 164). The professional can function in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and the limiting of autonomy is necessary and useful for the organization as has been discussed earlier.

Knowing this, can we observe a difference among managers in private and public organizations regarding the degree of which they take into account "public values"? By looking at how they balance the needs of the public with the needs of

their organization, we can see if managers in public administrations are more like professional organizations with a goal of service, or rational actors worried about their organizational goals. A survey-question concerning to what degree the managers seek to balance organizational interests with public interests would give us an indication of how they view the importance of organizational goals compared to public values:

	Large	N	Mean
Balancing organizational interests with public interests.	Private Ent. 100+	387	3,41
	Public Adm. 100+	360	3,99

It appears that managers in public administrations to a higher degree seek to balance organizational interests with public interests, suggesting that we can understand them as professional organizations trying to balance organizational, rational goals with a broader value of public interest to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises. The tension between acting as a professional, and following rules is apparent in that public managers both goes against professional competence, and seems to take into account a broader perspective (public-values) in their daily work than private managers. This result is not surprising considering that public enterprises are orientated toward public service as they are supposed to serve the public (Clegg, et al, 2011). While not surprising, it is interesting to view data showing that leaders in public administrations appear to balance public values with organizational values to a higher degree than private managers, while at the same time behaving like professional actors to some degree. This supports the public manager as a duality of both bureaucratic and professional values, uniting in the manager as a professional bureaucrat (Strand, 2007).

7.3 A Note on the Relationship Between Bureaucratic Structure and Values

By looking at how attitudes to structural elements associate with values, we can learn about the relationship between bureaucratic structure and values. Spearman's rank correlation suggests that sector (0.18) associates stronger with going against professional competence than size (0.11), education (0.06) and gender (0.04). This sector association is matched by the association between attitudes toward centralism/autonomy (0.20), but no other structural attitudes. This indicates that these bureaucratic values correlate positively with a high score on sector (public administration) and positive attitudes toward centralism, but not the other structural elements.

These are all weak association numbers, but they do suggest that sector has a stronger effect than size, education and gender combined when it comes to managers' bureaucratic values. It also shows that the structural elements of centralism correlate with values, suggesting that there is a connection between attitudes to centralism and bureaucratic values. I found no correlations for going against ethical-values (-0.1 to 0.1) besides centralism (0.18), again suggesting that the structural aspect of centralism could be a contingency-factor for a bureaucratic ethos to a similar degree as working in public administration.

When looking at Spearman's rank correlations between the structural elements and public values we find that structuralizing (0.12) and formalization (0.13) correlates weakly; the other structural attitudes very weak or not at all (-0.1 to 0.1). The correlation between structuralizing and formalization is weaker than that of sector (0.23), suggesting that structure is not the only, or necessarily the strongest, carrier of bureaucratic values.

Managers who fear sanctions for not performing their work are more likely to complete tasks going against personal convictions. This is partly supported by the correlation between fear of sanctions and going against professional

convictions (0.15), as well at ethical convictions (0.16). This suggests that prevalence of the bureaucratic ethos can be explained to some degree by fear of sanctions. The bureaucratic ethos is more prevalent among managers in public administration, and the reasons for it appear to be more complex than attitudes to structural elements of bureaucracy.

8 "New" Bureaucratic Values?

Weber's ideal types have been described as incomplete, a check-list, not a theory. As a result it is possible that the hegemonic-power of the classic ideal types have led to other ideal types being ignored (Höpfl, 2006). The vagueness and incompleteness of Weber's ideal types makes it well worth thinking about, and testing, for ideal types not encapsulated by Weber's. If we are not dealing with a pre or post-bureaucracy as the ideas always were incomplete, and a theory more than a check-list, it is time to add some contemporary theories to the existing corpus of work. Instead of treating Weber as gospel we might be better served treating him as a starting and not an end-point. There is a risk that the existing ideal types are so universal and based on age-old qualities of hierarchies that is not fully modern, post-modern, nor able to separate hierarchical organizations.

The structural ideal types are in many ways descriptions of what makes organizations work well, and they are largely based on hierarchical-traits that have always worked (Höpfl, 2006). Empirical data suggests that these structural ideal types are not as telling as one would like. This might lead to a conclusion that everything is structural bureaucratic according to the ideal types, and that the only true difference between the old and the new lay not in the structural ideal types but the bureaucratic values of separation of role and person, monocratic-nature, and its anchoring in rationality. The structural ideal types can therefore largely be seen as general for every hierarchy more than an ideal type of bureaucratic organizations. It has been suggested that separation between individual and organization is the "cornerstone of bureaucracy" (Kallinikos, 2004: 19) and further research into possible values might enlighten research on bureaucratic organizations further.

Weber's characteristic must be understood as examples of a most distinctive possibility, not as an accurate description of what a bureaucratic organization should look like. Peter Blau argues against the utility empirical testing of Weber's ideal type when he claims empirical testing while take away its purity,

while updating it with empirical data will "become a meaningless construct" (1963: 311). The testing and updating of these ideal types might weaken the ideal type itself, but if that comes with a greater, more precise way, of describing rational-legal organizations it seems like a small price to pay. The classic ideal types will not vanish, Weber's words will always be there, and we can look back and see what is still accurate and what is not.

As an effort to broaden the understandings of public administrations I will look at attitudes of employee-involvement and communication with stakeholders to learn if these values are more or less prevalent in the public sector. These two components are chosen because they are believed to be a staple of a "post-bureaucratic"-movement, and have been suggested as a wave of new-public service values (Kernaghan, 2000). I do not set out to test the legitimacy of "post-bureaucracy", but rather test a few of these proposed values to see if any of them are more prevalent among managers in public administrations. The results will indicate whether public managers are more or less "up-to date" in their organizational attitudes. If we make the presumption that these values are "modern", not necessarily in their origin, but in their popularity, they can indicate to what degree public managers are adaptable and staying current.

8.1 Involvement of Employees

Leadership attitudes to cooperation and input from subordinates could indicate whether managers in public administration, differ from managers in private enterprises regarding how much the members of an organization are able to influence organizational matters. This can be and indicator of to what degree public administrations should be understood as more or less like "machine-bureaucracies" compared to private enterprises. If public administrations to a higher degree are classic bureaucratic organizations we would expect to see their managers indicate that "Positions are specified, roles are defined, and role relationships are prescribed independent of the personal attributes of participants" (Scott, 1981: 62). I propose that by seeing if there is a difference

between how managers in private administrations and public enterprises incorporate suggestions and input from their subordinates it is possible to identify if we should understand their organizations as more machine-bureaucratic or professional. If public administrations are truly more machine-bureaucratic and set in their "old" ways, one would expect lower scores on involvement. The level of involvement from employees and subsequently the degree of professionalism can be seen by how managers respond to indexes pertaining to questions about the degree their subordinates contribute with new ideas/solutions, and to what degree there is an environment of cooperation, dialog in organizational activities. Four Indexes measuring the attitudes of leaders, and their relationship to their employees (Appendix D) are presented here together with two statements regarding level of involvement:

	Large	N	Mean
Subordinate Innovation	Private Ent. 100+	392	3,78
	Public Adm. 100+	401	3,96
Subordinate: Co-operative conflict style*	Private Ent. 100+	393	3,41
	Public Adm. 100+	399	3,48
Manager: Compromising conflict style*	Private Ent. 100+	393	3,35
	Public Adm. 100+	394	3,44
Subordinate: Compromising conflict style *	Private Ent. 100+	392	3,17
	Public Adm. 100+	397	3,20
I make decisions together with my employees	Private Ent. 100+	399	4,11
	Public Adm. 100+	401	4,27
I allow my employees to perform tasks their way	Private Ent. 100+	398	4,09
	Public Adm. 100+	400	4,21

*No statistically significant difference between the two.

Managers in public administrations report involving their employees in organizational affairs to a higher degree. This trend was also identified in a Swedish study on the involvement of public versus private employees (Tengblad,

2006). From the results, it is apparent that public administrations and private enterprises are at least equally involving their employees in organizational activities. The responses from the managers suggest that public administrations should not be considered as more machine-bureaucratic than private enterprises, and they seem to portray "modern post-bureaucratic"-values to the same degree.

8.2 Communicating with Stakeholders

Public managers report to spend most of their time on being spokesmen for their organizations, whereas private managers do not. When asked to consider their daily work, managers in public administrations report taking into consideration the reputation of their operation in the media (4.1>3.8), as well as their personal reputation in their industry (3.8>3.7) to a small, but significantly higher degree than managers in large private enterprises. There is no significant difference in how they consider input from customers/users and owners, but managers in public organizations report to take into consideration input from their partners to a small, but significantly higher degree (3.9>3.8). Managers in public administration report to spend an equal amount or more time on communicating and orientation towards their stakeholders compared to managers in private enterprises. Managers in public administration seem willing and able to listen, suggesting that we should see them as actors in an organization more complex and open than the classical bureaucracy.

This small look into the "post-bureaucratic"-values discerns that leaders in public administrations seem to reflect similar or even more values fitting the notion "post-bureaucratic". This thesis' scope does not include testing "post-bureaucracy" as an organizational form, but by looking at managers in public and private organizations it is apparent that public administration in this small sample appears to be just as much following the trends of organizational forms as private enterprises. This suggest that these leaders are able to adapt, and the classical argument of public administration as less able, or willing, to adapt than private enterprises seems to be unfit for describing the attitudes of public managers.

9 Implications of Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic Values

The previous section has shown that managers in public administrations appear to have a stronger bureaucratic ethos, they balance public values with organizational goals, and display more "post-bureaucratic"-values such as communicating with their surroundings and involvement of employees. The following section will discuss the implications of these results.

9.1 Managers in Public Administrations Have More Bureaucratic Values

Defining bureaucracies as structure, we find no reason for claiming that managers in public administrations are more bureaucratic. If we view bureaucracy as values, there seems to be a stronger bureaucratic ethos and concern with balancing organizational and public interests among managers in public administration. This suggests that the "public administration"-view on leadership, claiming a profound difference between public and private managers seems to be correct regarding values (Byrkjeflot, 2008). Structurally, these differences appear to be based on contingencies and not sector. However, when we look at the values portrayed in the sector and how managers spend their time, we sense that public managers show a stronger degree of a bureaucratic ethos and balancing public and organizational interests. This is to be expected as public managers perform public tasks.

The prevalence of "post-bureaucratic" values among managers of public administration suggests that the notion of public leaders as unwilling to adapt is false. This is not to say that "post-bureaucracy" is truly new, but it shows that public managers seem to adapt and reflect values that are seen as contemporary and "modern" to the same, or even a higher, degree than private managers.

The bureaucratic ethos is stronger among public managers, suggesting that following orders going against professional competence happens more frequently in public administrations. The causality behind these bureaucratic values are impossible to determine with my data, but Spearman's rank correlation suggests that sector (0.18) associates strongest with going against professional competence and balancing interests (0.23). There is a stronger association between sector and bureaucratic values than gender, organizational size, length of education and age. For some reason it appears that public sector managers report bureaucratic values to a higher degree than managers in private enterprises. This is likely due to a combination of underlying factors, but it cannot be explained by gender, size, education and age alone. This suggests that there must be something else, perhaps the educational-type beyond level, or systematic recruitment of managers who portray and support these bureaucratic values. The notion of managers recruiting people with a shared background, gender and education is called "homosociality", and could explain to a certain degree how these values are transferred and carried in the organizations (Kanter, 2007).

Managers in public administrations seek to balance their own interests with those of the public to a higher degree than private managers. This supports the theory that public administration can be seen more as professional actors than purely rational actors seeking their own organizational survival. This is of course complicated by the fact that the rational directive of public administration is to prioritize public needs. Nonetheless, it suggests that managers in public administrations can be considered more bureaucratic in the values they portray.

9.2 Why Bureaucratic Values Matter

While the bureaucratic values make public managers more "bureaucratic", their adaption of "modern" organizational values such as post-bureaucratic communication and involvement seem to emphasize that bureaucratic should not be equated with old-fashioned or unadaptable. By seeing the bureaucratic values

as necessary for performing public service, the term "bureaucratic" can escape the connotations of being inefficient and unable to adapt.

The value of bureaucratic ethos is important as it makes the official able to function as the political instrument he is supposed to be (Du Gay, 2008). By combining the official's knowledge with a direction from the political level, it is possible to create efficient carriers of policy. The fact that officials show values like the bureaucratic ethos demonstrates that they make decisions independent of his or her personal attitudes or beliefs/values. This is a strength for public administrations as it allows them to be efficient tools for the political level.

Bureaucratic values exist to a larger degree among managers in public administrations, and they seem to be apparent in the sector at the least partly independent of bureaucratic formal structure. They could be carried by organizational culture or informal hierarchy, or by other mechanisms. I have argued that attitudes toward structure are not stronger among managers in public administrations compared to private enterprises. This suggests that structure is not as big a reason for the perceived inefficiency of public administration as its critic suggest.

Bureaucracy is seen as a prerequisite for good government (Friedrich, 1950), Weber himself saw bureaucracy as a natural partner to mass democracy, as they both represent a historic break with a culture of feudal, patrimonial and plutocratic privileges for administrators (1991). The value-aspect of bureaucracy is crucial for good public administration, as it brings with it crucial moral elements (Hunter, 1994; Du Gay, 2008). If public administrations do not carry these values, we run a risk of having a rogue bureaucracy with self-interests ruling over public interests. Critics of bureaucracy prefer to focus on the structural aspects of bureaucracy as inefficient, thereby fully ignoring the important inherent values embedded in the bureaucracy. While this thesis argues that the formal structure is not more important for the day-to-day operation of the public manager, and as a continuation not necessarily limiting

efficiency in the public sector, I do not propose that structure and formal rules are unimportant. It has been argued that simple structural elements like taking notes are important for upholding bureaucratic values (Byrkjeflot and Du Gay, 2012). Guy B. Peters (2003) argues that the end of structure is not necessarily an end to public values. Industrial countries are seen as able to weaken the bureaucratic structures without weakening bureaucratic values, as these values are already permeated in the organization and they will not disappear with the formalized structure. I am not arguing for a decoupling of structure or values as much as showing that attitudes of structure and values do not appear to correlate strongly. Thus, the structural ideal types might not fully explain the bureaucratic values found in managers of contemporary public administrations, nor define its contribution to public administration.

Managers in public administrations appear to be less structurally bureaucratic and more value-bureaucratic than managers in private enterprises. This suggests that the values are not carried solely by structure. As a result, public administrations could be able to adapt to the environment more than we give them credit for, and while modernization reforms might change the way they look, they will not necessarily affect the important values they carry with them.

9.3 Possible Carriers of Bureaucratic Values

As we have seen, evidence indicates that bureaucratic values are loosely coupled with attitudes to structure, which other mechanisms in the organizations could be carrying these values?

A possible explanation posited by scholars is that organizational culture carries these bureaucratic values (Parker and Bradley, 2000). The flexibility of structure suggests that culture, rather than leadership attitudes toward a bureaucratic structure, is the more likely explanation for the continuance of these bureaucratic values.

An alternative carrier of bureaucratic values in a diminishing structural environment is informal hierarchies. Hierarchical elements appear to be an underlying constant quality of organizations. When there is a decline of formal hierarchy, it is suggested that informal hierarchy takes over to keep the total amount of hierarchy constant (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). Formal hierarchy is grounded in what I have described as bureaucratic structural elements, while informal hierarchy is rooted in social relationships over time. Thus, even classical bureaucratic organizations have some room for informal hierarchies. These informal hierarchies flow from the formal hierarchy, but are from social relationships internally in each unit of the bureaucratic organization rather than from the top (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). The replacement of formal hierarchies with informal ones could explain how bureaucratic values can be carried on in organizations even as bureaucratic structure weakens.

The dynamic of structure and social actors is a recurring theme in sociology. The relationship between structure and autonomy is complicated as structure implies less autonomy for social actors. It also implies stability as the structure appears to be given. To be able to understand values as decoupled from structure we need to understand how social actors can influence structures and move away from seeing structure as limiting (Sewell Jr, 1992). Building on Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, William H. Sewell suggests that structure is flexible and can be changed:

> ...the same resourceful agency that sustains the reproduction of structures also makes possible their transformation-by means of transpositions of schemas and remobilizations of resources that make the new structures recognizable as transformations of the old.
> (Sewell Jr, 1992: 27)

The same resources that the structure is facilitating can be reapplied to changing the structure based the actions of social actors (officials). It is a reciprocal relationship where the social actors utilize structure to change structure. By

seeing the structure as possible to influence, we can further understand how the values carried by the culture and social actors can influence the structure of an organization. This type of relationship between structure and values is critical for the notion that values are not created by the structure, but by social actors, and then carried out by the structure as a means to an end.

When asked about to what degree the managers take into account unwritten rules for actions in day-to-day operations, there was no significant difference between managers in public administrations and private enterprises. When looking at Spearman's rank correlations, there is a correlation between following informal rules and balancing public interests (0.23), but not for bureaucratic ethos. While this far from proves that informal systems carry values, this connection is worth exploring further to better understand the creation and sustainment of bureaucratic values.

Alfred Chandler (1962) suggested that organizations adapt their structure to their strategy, and reinforced this with a case-study where change in management led to change in strategy, which again led to structural changes. While his theory almost deterministically suggests that change in strategy will lead to a change in structure, it illustrates how values could potentially influence structure. By understanding the relationship between structure and values as operating in the same manner as that of strategy and structure, I propose that values are not necessarily a result of formal structure; structure might be a byproduct of values. I do not propose that bureaucratic values fully determine the structure of the organization, or that bureaucratic values necessarily are part of a strategy, but the flexibility of the structure suggests that bureaucratic values do not depend fully on bureaucratic structure. A possible image of the relationship between structure and values is that "structure follows strategy as the left foot follows the right" (Mintzberg, 1990: 183). Bureaucratic structure and values coexists, but they do not necessarily determine each other.

10 Implications for Our Understanding of Public Administration

So far I have reviewed and presented what these findings mean for our understanding of managers in public administrations and private enterprises. This part will briefly discuss the implications of my findings for our understanding of how public administrations operate as a sector.

10.1 Beyond machine-bureaucracy

It appears that the rational description of organizations does not fully explain the competing internal processes reported by managers of public administrations. Based on the responses from the managers, it would be more accurate to say that public administrations, like private enterprises, function as a hybrid of different systems. This section will suggest that based on my findings public administrations should not be seen as wholly rational "machine bureaucracies" (Mintzberg, 1980) any more than their private counterparts.

Richard Scott suggests that it is not enough to understand organizations as singularly rational, and that we need to understand that "the rational and natural system perspectives are at variance because each focuses on a different end of a single continuum representing the range of organizational forms" (Scott, 1981: 125). By seeing public administrations only as rational organizations, we fail to understand and appreciate a far more complex organizational form, one which is able to adapt and listen to its constituency, and yet serve the political level in a flexible and loyal way. By seeing them as purely rational, we fail to see the beauty in which they adapt to complex and changing demands, while serving the people they are established to help.

Bureaucratic organizations come in many configurations. Henry Mintzberg (1980) presents five different organizational forms, where three of them are seen as bureaucratic: machine-bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy and

divisionalized forms, in addition to the more loosely shaped adhocracy and a simple organizational form. Machine-bureaucracies are the "classical bureaucracy", with a centralization of power and standardization of work. They operate in stable, simple environments with a clear hierarchy. Professional bureaucracies coordinate by standardization of skills that allows decentralization, and are found in complex environments. Divisionalized forms are coordinated by standardization of output and are in charge of operating specific areas with autonomy. These organizational forms can be combined into hybrid forms (Mintzberg, 1980).

The attitudes of the managers show that the categorization of "public administration" is not sufficient to give a clear picture of the type of organizational form we can observe; the reality is more complex than organizational charts. Public managers appear to be less positive to structural elements and value involving their employees in decision-making, they orientate towards the market as adhocracies, but at the same time they experience vertical control like machine-bureaucracies, all while operating in complex environments.

"Diagnosing" public sector with one organizational form based on managers' attitudes seems impossible, but based on the responses of the managers it is evident that public administration is complex in its diversity, and that the managers appear to behave as such. Based on managers' responses there appears to be not one, but many contingencies influencing public sector – they appear to be under pressure from a wide variety of competing values. This discussion will not concern itself with the impossible task of fitting managers into one organizational form based on managers' attitudes, but it is important to acknowledge and emphasize that there is not one bureaucratic organizational form fitting all public administration. This notion is supported by the fact that managers report values and prioritizations fitting a wide variety of Mintzberg's forms (1980), and competing set of values (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981).

A consequence of this is that criticizing public administration for being "bureaucratic" is next to meaningless as there is no one bureaucratic form to criticize, but a wide selection. A substantial amount of criticism towards "bureaucracies" is based on the notion that they are inefficient and rigid, traits one would equate with the structural understanding of bureaucracies. By showing that these elements are not more prevalent among managers in public administration, it is demonstrated that seeing their managers as more bureaucratic than those in private enterprises in a structural sense is erroneous. Public Administrations must be understood as a hybrid-form of bureaucracy, more similar than different to private enterprises in structure.

The perceived inefficiencies of the public administration should not be blamed on a process of "bureaucratization" of the public sector, but possibly on the values they are set to defend; the importance of a thorough, just and politically anchored decision-making (Clegg et al, 2011). These values are critical for the performance of public administration; without them they are not servicing the public as they are designated to do (Clegg et al, 2011). These values are central, but understanding public administrations as solely bureaucratic based on their bureaucratic values is a mistake (Olsen, 2006), they operate on multiple levels and in much more complex environments than that, and this is reflected in their managers.

The core of the open system approach to organizations is that they are not only rational, formalized and goal-specific organizations; they are to a larger degree open to informal systems and goals and adapting to the environment (Scott, 1981), and are seen as social groups adapting to their surroundings. The equal importance of owners and higher importance of media in their day-to-day work shown by managers in public organizations indicate that orientating towards the field, justifying their existence, is equally important for managers in public organizations as for private enterprises. This suggests that managers in public administrations are concerned with flexibility and readiness. While it is unclear if they are concerned with growth and acquisitions, it can be suggested that in an

effort to secure funding they feel the need for being flexible and communicating with their stakeholders.

By understanding public administrations as open systems filled with the values of rationality, facilitated by a bureaucratic ethos and supported by structure and formalization, we can better understand how they can adapt structurally but keep their bureaucratic values. Just as the cogs in the bureaucracy keep going with new people in the same roles, the bureaucratic values stay intact as the organizational structure changes. As bureaucratic organizations adapt, they are called "post-bureaucratic" by some, but are they not just adapting to their environment? If we understand bureaucracies as open systems we understand that post-bureaucracy is nothing but adapting bureaucracies.

Seeing public administrations as more than purely rational, we can fully appreciate the complex environment they are navigating. Complexity of goals and outputs is a constant challenge for managers in public administration, and it only stands to reason that this complexity in goals would manifest itself in the managers facing a set of competing values in their day-to-day operation. They are part managers of rational systems, internal process, human relations and open systems, all while trying to balance the needs of their organizations with public needs, and following orders from the political level they experience as creating inefficiencies. Additional research into managers in public administrations should further expand on this by looking at how managers are torn between competing values, and how it affects their ability to simultaneously be managers of employees and carrying out political decisions.

11 Conclusion

This thesis has addressed whether managers in public administration are more bureaucratic in their attitudes toward structure and values than managers in private enterprises. By using empirical data from AFF's leadership study 2011, I am able to say that managers in public administrations are not more bureaucratic in their attitudes to structure, but show stronger bureaucratic values, than managers in private enterprises.

I have argued that "bureaucratic" can be understood as both a question of structure and values. I present that managers in public administration show equal, or more negative, attitudes toward structural elements of organizing their work compared to managers in private enterprises. These differences are discussed and explained by factors such as complex goals, multidivisional hierarchies, expectations, demand for delivery and fear of consequences, as well as a higher degree of professionalism in public administration.

Two major implications of this are that managers of public administration do not appear to be more "bureaucratized" than managers of private enterprises, and that public administrations should not be considered structurally more bureaucratic than private enterprises. If we presuppose that members are trained and socialized in their organization, we would expect that bureaucratic organizations would have produce manages with stronger bureaucratic attitudes.

Further, I discuss the value-perspective of bureaucracy and how bureaucratic traits can be found in values portrayed by organizations. Defining bureaucratic ethos and public values as bureaucratic values, I find that managers in public administrations show more attitudes of bureaucratic values than managers of private enterprises. This suggests that while managers of public administrations are not structurally more bureaucratic, they appear to be more bureaucratic in terms of the values they portray. Managers of public administrations also show

more "post-bureaucratic"-values, suggesting they are as adaptable and "modern" as leaders in private enterprises.

The implications of this are that while managers are more bureaucratic in their values, they are not less adaptable. One should not confuse performing a public service through the bureaucratic ethos with rigidity. The bureaucratic values are an asset for managers in public administrations; they make them able to perform their role free from inappropriate influences.

It is suggested that the bureaucratic structure does not necessarily play a critical part in facilitating these values. A possible explanation of this is that the organizational culture in public administrations carries these values, or that informal hierarchies carrying these values exist to a higher degree in public administrations than in private enterprises.

A further implication of the structural flexibility is that public administrations should not be seen as just rational organizations. This is illustrated by their interactions with their stakeholders and involvement of employees in organizational matters. According to the managers, it appears that public administrations are just as, or more willing, to let employees be involved in organizational activities, to orientate toward their stakeholders in day-to-day business, and follow informal rules as managers of private enterprises. This suggests that understanding public administrations as singularly rational organizations is a mistake. Managers in public administrations report equal or more traits correlating to managers of more complex organizational models in their willingness to orientate toward their stakeholders, involve employees, and follow informal rules than their private enterprise counterparts.

A possible source of error in my conclusion is that the attitudes of the managers might not be a perfect representation of the objective reality of the organization's situation. To avoid this, I have as far as possible connected my findings with other research and empirical data, to show that these attitudes are part of a

trend and not a unique observation in this thesis. Another possible source of error is the selection of managers from organizations of more than 100 employees. While the results are representative for large private enterprises and public administrations, it is possible they are not representative for all organizations.

Further research in this field of study should include independent observations on these issues. A case-study in decision-making could identify if, and where, the perceived inefficiency of public administration manifests itself. This thesis has concerned itself more with the prevalence of the bureaucratic attitudes and values among managers, than their connection to efficiency. By furthering our knowledge of the concept "inefficiency", we will better understand whether the bureaucratic organizational form is creating it with its rigidity, if it is fixable, or if it is the cost of doing business with bureaucratic values. Formalization has for example been viewed as both a coercive and enabling force for organizations (Adler and Borys, 1996); this relationship should be further investigated. Another aspect worth looking into is the carriers of bureaucratic values. This thesis suggests that structural elements might not be as crucial for the existence of bureaucratic values as believed. The informal side of organizations may play an important part of carrying values. Further research into the relationship between structure and values should look past managers' attitudes to provide a deeper understanding of how these values are carried in public administrations.

By understanding that public administrations are more similar to private enterprises than we might instinctively think, we can judge them more accurately and have an informed debate about their role and outputs, based on research and not preconceived notions about their performance. In order to improve something, we need to understand it. I hope to have contributed to the debate by showing that managers in public administrations might be more bureaucratic, but not in the structural sense of rigidity as many would like to believe. Managers in public administrations are more bureaucratic in their attitudes to values, and this should not be considered a bad thing.

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Appendix

Appendix A:

Uncertainty Avoidance: #12 Item 1-5.
Centralization/Autonomy: #22: Item 1-5.
Formalization: #22: Item 6-10.
Structuralizing: #67: Item 1-6.

12	Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine verdier i jobbsammenheng. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.						
	ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE	1=Helt uenig	2	3	4	5=Helt enig	Kan ikke svare
•	Det er viktig at jobbkrav og jobbforventninger er detaljerte og klare slik at ansatte alltid vet hva de skal gjøre	1	2	3	4	5	6
•	Regler er viktige fordi de viser ansatte hva virksomheten forventer av dem						
•	Rutiner er nyttige fordi de letter arbeidet til de ansatte						
•	Detaljerte instruksjoner er viktige for de ansatte						
•	Jeg forventer at ansatte følger instruksjoner og prosedyrer nøyaktig						
•	Velferden til arbeidsgruppen er viktigere enn individuell belønning						
•	Arbeidsgruppens suksess er viktigere enn individuell suksess						
•	Det er viktig å bli akseptert som medlem av arbeidsgruppen						

22 **Nedenfor følger noen påstander om beslutninger, regler og rutiner i virksomheten. Vennligst ta stilling til hver av påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.**

ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE

	1=Helt enig	2 Kan ikke svare	3 uenig	4	5=Helt enig
• Lite skjer i denne virksomheten uten at en leder har godkjent det	1	2	3	4	5
• Personer oppmuntres ikke til å ta egne beslutninger					
• Selv små saker må henvises til ledere høyere opp i virksomheten					
• Medarbeidere må spørre sjefen før de gjør noe som helst					
• Virksomheten har et stort antall skrevne regler og retningslinjer					
• En ¨regel og prosedyre¨ manual finnes og er lett tilgjengelig i virksomheten					
• Der finnes en komplett stillingsbeskrivelse for de fleste jobber i virksomheten					
• Virksomheten har en skriftlig oversikt over nesten alle medarbeideres prestasjoner i					

67 **Så noen påstander om ditt forhold til arbeidsgruppen du leder. Angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor uenig og 5=helt enig.**
Dersom du har din egen ledergruppe, ønsker vi at du skal svare relatert til denne gruppen.

ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE

	1=Helt enig	2 Kan ikke svare	3 uenig	4	5=Helt enig
• Jeg oppmuntrer til bruk av standardiserte prosedyrer	1	2	3	4	5
• Jeg bestemmer hva som skal gjøres, og hvordan det blir gjort					
• Jeg tildeler gruppens medlemmer bestemte oppgaver					
• Jeg planlegger når arbeidet skal være ferdig . . .					
• Jeg opprettholder definerte standarder for ytelse					

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Appendix B:

Autonomy: #51: Item 1-3.

51	Nedenfor følger en del påstander om kjennetegn som kan tenkes å beskrive din lederjobb. Med utgangspunkt i <u>DIN</u> lederjobb/ arbeidssituasjon ønsker vi at du skal ta stilling til hver av påstandene. Vennligst angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.						
	ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE	1=Helt uenig	2	3	4	5=Helt enig	Kan ikke svare
•	I min jobb kan en selv velge oppgavene som skal gjøres	1	2	3	4	5	6
•	I min jobb kan måten jeg utfører oppgavene på velges uavhengig av andre						
•	I min jobb har en selv stor frihet til å tenke og handle uavhengig av andre						
•	Min jobb inneholder mange varierte arbeidsoppgaver						
•	Min jobb preges lite av gjentakelser i arbeidsoppgavene						

Appendix C:

Power Distance: #12: Item 12-17.

12	Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine verdier i jobbsammenheng. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av påstandene ved å angi dine svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.						
	ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE	1=Helt uenig	2	3	4	5=Helt enig	Kan ikke svare
	• Det er viktig at jobbkrav og jobbforventninger er detaljerte og klare slik at ansatte alltid vet hva de skal gjøre	1	2	3	4	5	6
	• Regler er viktige fordi de viser ansatte hva virksomheten forventer av dem						
	• Rutiner er nyttige fordi de letter arbeidet til de ansatte						
	• Detaljerte instruksjoner er viktige for de ansatte						
	• Jeg forventer at ansatte følger instruksjoner og prosedyrer nøyaktig						
	• Velferden til arbeidsgruppen er viktigere enn individuell belønning						
	• Arbeidsgruppens suksess er viktigere enn individuell suksess						
	• Det er viktig å bli akseptert som medlem av arbeidsgruppen						
	ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE	1=Helt uenig	2	3	4	5=Helt enig	Kan ikke svare
	• Ansatte burde bare forfølge individuelle mål etter at gruppens velferd er tatt hensyn til						
	• Ledere bør oppmuntre til lojalitet til gruppen selv om oppnåelse av individuelle mål blir vanskeligere						
	• Individuelle medarbeidere forventes å gi opp egne mål for å fremme gruppens suksess						
	• Ledere bør ta de fleste avgjørelser uten å rådføre seg med underordnede						
	• Ledere må ofte bruke autoritet og makt overfor underordnede						
	• Ledere bør sjelden be om underordnedes synspunkter						
	• Ledere bør unngå å ha kontakt med underordnede utenfor jobben						
	• Ansatte bør ikke være uenige i ledelsens beslutninger						

- **Ledere bør ikke delegere viktige oppgaver til ansatte** . . . .

- **Møter blir som oftest effektive når en mann leder dem** . . . .

- **Det er viktigere for menn enn for kvinner å ha en yrkeskarriere** . . . .

- **For å løse organisatoriske problemer kreves det vanligvis en handlekraftig tilnærming som er typisk for menn** . . . .

- **Menn løser som regel problemer gjennom logisk analyse, mens kvinner ofte bruker intuisjon** . . . .

- **Menn er å foretrekke fremfor kvinner i ledelsesposisjoner på høyt nivå** . . . .

Appendix D:

Subordinate Innovation: #45: Item 1-5.

Subordinate: Co-operative conflict style: #64: Item 1-2.

Manager: Compromising conflict style: #63: Item 7-8.

Subordinate: Compromising conflict style : #64: Item 7-8.

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45 | **Nedenfor følger endel påstander om dine underordnede. Vi ber om at du tar stilling til hver av påstandene ved å angi ditt svar på en skala fra 1-5, hvor 1=helt uenig og 5=helt enig.**

ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE

	1=Helt uenig	2	3	4	5=Helt enig	Kan ikke svare

Mine underordnede...

	1	2	3	4	5	6
• fremmer ideer overfor andre						
• viser kreativitet på jobben når anledningen byr seg						
• utvikler gode planer for gjennomføring av nye ideer						
• har ofte nye og innovative ideer						
• foreslår nye måter jobbene kan utføres på						

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64 | **De samme strategiene for konflikthåndtering kan også følges av andre i virksomheten. Hvor ofte oppfatter du at _dine underordnede_ følger følgende strategier?**

ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE

	1=Aldri	2	3	4	5=Hele tiden	Kan ikke svare

	1	2	3	4	5	6
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, foreslår de at dere jobber sammen for å finne løsninger?						
• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, forsøker de å ta hensyn til begge parters anliggende for å finne en felles løsning?						
• I situasjoner hvor dine underordnede er uenig med deg, insisterer de på at deres standpunkt aksepteres?						
• I situasjoner hvor dine underordnede er uenig med deg, holder de fast ved sine egne synspunkter?						
• Unngår dine underordnede diskusjoner med deg når konfrontrasjoner er sannsynlig?						

• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg,
holder de sine synspunkter for seg selv? . . . .

• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, foreslår de kompromisser for å nå en løsning på middelveien? . . . .
. . . .

• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, inngår de et kompromiss for å nå en akseptabel løsning? . . . .
. . . .

• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, tilpasser de seg dine ønsker? . . . .

• Når dine underordnede er uenig med deg, gir de etter for dine forslag? . . . .

63	Nedenfor har vi listet opp en rekke strategier man kan følge for å håndtere konfliktsituasjoner. Hvor ofte følger <u>du som leder</u> følgende strategier?						
	ETT SVAR I HVER LINJE	1=Aldri	2	3	4	5=Hele tiden	Kan ikke svare
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, foreslår du at dere jobber sammen for å finne løsninger?	1	2	3	4	5	6
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, forsøker du å ta hensyn til begge parters anliggende for å finne en felles løsning?						
	• I situasjoner hvor du er uenig med dine underordnede, insisterer du på at ditt standpunkt aksepteres?						
	• I situasjoner hvor du er uenig med dine underordnede, holder du fast ved dine egne synspunkter?						
	• Unngår du diskusjoner med dine underordende når konfrontrasjoner er sannsynlig?						
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, holder du dine synspunkter for deg selv?						
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, foreslår du kompromisser for å nå en løsning på middelveien?						
	• Når du er uenig med underordnede, inngår du et kompromiss for å nå en akseptabel løsning? . . .						
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, tilpasser du deg deres ønsker?						
	• Når du er uenig med dine underordnede, gir du etter for deres forslag?						

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