

The Norwegian Coast Guard Model

*Strengthening Norwegian Seapower or
unfortunate militarization of Norwegian
jurisdiction?*

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IV

Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of the Norwegian coast guard model. The study is based on theory of Seapower by Geoffrey Till and empirical data mainly from official Norwegian documents.

The analysis of the Norwegian coast guard model is based on three dimensions of the model: the naval power dimension, the good order at sea dimension, and the cost-benefit dimension. The thesis is divided into three main parts. The focus of the first part, consisting of chapter one and two, is to define what a coast guard is. Furthermore, the theoretical foundation of this thesis and the rationale behind coast guard models in general, and the Norwegian coast guard model in particular, is found in this part. The second part is an account of the events that led up to the establishment of the Norwegian Coast Guard and the main developments that have occurred since. The last part of the thesis, consisting of chapter four and five, analyses the Norwegian coast guard model, its challenges and possibilities.

This study has found that the Norwegian coast guard model is a flexible model that enables the Coast Guard and Navy to alleviate each other if needed. On the other hand the study indicates that the military aspect of the model could in some cases complicate the coast guard in its duty to exercise police authority. Lastly it is the finding of this thesis that the model is probably highly cost-beneficial in the Norwegian setting. These are features that may be generalizable to other coastal states of similar size as Norway.

Acknowledgements

The work on my thesis is drawing to a close. In naval terms it has been a long voyage in unchartered waters. The journey has been swift at times, but there have also been periods with little or no wind in my sails. That I now have the shore in sight is only made possible due to certain individuals and institutions to which I am eternally grateful.

I would therefore like to thank the Norwegian Naval Staff for the scholarship I have received during my work on this thesis. This has enabled me to devote my full attention to the work on my thesis, a luxury few master's students enjoy. A special thanks goes to my former employer, the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), who let me keep my office until I finished my thesis even though I resigned my job. My friends and colleagues at IFS also deserve special thanks for their support and professional input during my time here. During the two years I have been affiliated with IFS, you have made me feel respected and valued as if I was a permanent employee, not just a master's student passing through. Among these I'm particularly indebted to Roald Gjelsten for his invaluable insight into the workings of the Norwegian Navy, and to my supervisor Paal Sigurd Hilde. His knowledge and feedback kept me afloat and on course on many an occasion. Thanks also to my office neighbour Magnus Håkenstad for his hints and tips. It is true that the soundtrack for *Orions belte* is the only viable option when you are researching naval issues.

Thanks to friends and family who I have seen far too seldom this autumn. A special thanks to Elisabeth for proofreading and valuable comments at the end.

A very special thanks goes to my wife Ingvild. Her unyielding support and love inspired me to keep going when things were difficult. It is truly unfair that I'm going to reward you for this by moving home to my parents for the next four months.

Bård Holmen Solvik
Oslo, December 2014

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

CHENS	Chiefs of the European Navies
Com.	Commissioned
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
Disp.	The displacement of a ship, meaning its weight, measured in metric tons
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
KNM	Kongelig Norske Marine (Royal Norwegian Navy). Ship prefix used on Norwegian naval units. The prefix HNoMS is used in English and stands for His Norwegian Majesty's Ship
KV	Kongelig vaktjeneste (Royal Guard Duty). Ship prefix used on Coast Guard units.
MSO	Maritime security operation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOK	Norwegian Kroner (the Norwegian currency)
RECSYR	Removal of Chemical Agents from Syria
RHIB	Rigid-hulled inflatable boat
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise. Naval exercise hosted and administered by the United States Navy's Pacific Fleet
SAR	Search and rescue
SHV	Sjøheimevernet (Naval Home Guard). Prefix used on Naval Home Guard units
SUSV	Small unit support vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USSR	Union of Soviet Social Republics

1.1 The Norwegian Coast Guard: one of a kind?

Throughout history, the fortunes of Norway have been dependent on the sea. Seamanship and superior ships gave the Vikings their power. Fishing ensured the survival of a poor nation. And although a small and insignificant country in most respects, Norway has been a giant in commercial shipping for a long time. More recently, the sea has blessed Norway with large deposits of oil and gas, ensuring the wealth of the nation for the foreseeable future.

Until recently nations have had little interest in claiming exclusivity over sea areas as the open sea was considered to be free for all and far too vast for any nation to control. Fishing was for the most part conducted close to shore and the deep seas were mostly a means of transportation and trade. This changed with the advent of industrial fishing and the discovery of vast oil and gas fields beneath the surface. From the 1960s, European nations fought (mostly legal) battles over the exclusive rights of vast sea areas jurisdiction under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Recently Norway concluded its last battle over a sea territory with Russia. After almost four decades of negotiations foreign ministers Jonas Gahr Støre and Sergej Lavrov signed a bilateral treaty in 2010 that ended the nations contest over disputed areas in the Barents Sea. This entails that the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is approximately 2, 35 million square kilometres, more than six times the size of mainland Norway. By all accounts Norway has indeed emerged as one of the nations that gained the most from the delimitation lines that have been drawn in the North Sea.

The enormous new areas that came under Norwegian jurisdiction starting in the 1960s, created a need for protection; militarily and economically. A committee led by Thorvald Stoltenberg was given the task of advising the government on how to face the new opportunities and challenges that followed from the United Nations Convention in the Law of the Sea. The committee advised the establishment of a Norwegian coast guard that was to be a part of the Norwegian Naval Forces.¹ This

¹ See appendix III for information on the choices made regarding translations.

option was viewed as the most cost efficient since the Naval Forces already had most of the infrastructure needed in place. They also had skilled personnel and systems in place for requisition of equipment and vessels. The committee's advice was heeded and in 1977 The Norwegian Coast Guard was established (Gjelsten et. al. 2010:461).

While the need to protect and preserve the new areas that came under Norwegian jurisdiction was recognized by most, the establishment of a military coast guard was not without controversy. Some argued that a coast guard was needed, but that this should be a civilian organization as some of its duties were to be of a law enforcing nature. Others, mainly in the Navy, feared that a coast guard, within the military or a civilian one, would threaten funding for the Navy. They argued that the Navy should be allocated the resources necessary to take on duties that would otherwise be the responsibility of a coast guard.

Almost forty years later, the Coast Guard is an established and respected branch of the Norwegian Naval Forces. By all accounts it seems to have fulfilled its duties well having had few incidents that have reflected badly on it. The Coast Guard is generally perceived favourably, by both domestic and foreign fishermen, and by the Norwegian public as well. Still, the objections raised in the 1970s still hold merit. There are other ways to protect and preserve Norwegian maritime jurisdiction. In fact, most coastal nations do this in ways that differ substantially from the Norwegian model.

1.2 Operationalization and research question

The main objective of this thesis is to identify the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of the Norwegian coast guard model. I should at this point stress that it is the Norwegian coast guard model, not the Norwegian Coast Guard that is the phenomenon under study in this thesis. Naturally the one follow the other to some degree, but it is possible that the Norwegian Coast Guard has at times chosen courses of action that proved disadvantageous, but that this was not necessarily a result of the Norwegian coast guard model. An analogy can be drawn to electoral systems. A first

past the post system and a system of proportional representation will impose constraints on the type of political system in a country, but it does not decide what kind of policy that country pursues. The focus of this thesis will be on the systemic constraints and possibilities of the Norwegian coast guard model as opposed to other coast guard models, not on opportunities lost or exploited by the Norwegian Coast Guard. My main research question is therefore:

What are the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of the Norwegian coast guard model?

In addition, the exploration of contesting coast guard models is aimed at finding out if these are viable options for Norway. My sub-question is therefore:

What trade-offs would other coast guard models entail for Norway?

To do this, I have chosen to focus on three crucial dimensions: the naval power dimension, the good order at sea dimension, and the cost-benefit dimension. A study of any one of these dimensions could easily justify a master's thesis in and of itself, but it would fail to give an accurate description of the Norwegian coast guard model as a whole. The drawback is of course that not every aspect of these dimensions can be thoroughly studied. Within the scope of this thesis, I will have to settle with looking at some of the main aspects of these dimensions and draw my inferences from this somewhat broad picture. I make this sacrifice in order to be able to draw broader inferences that can say something useful about the Norwegian coast guard model as a whole, not just on an isolated part of the model. These dimensions are of course not drawn out of thin air. It is along aspects of these dimensions that the debate on how to secure Norwegian interests in the North Sea ran prior to the establishment of the Norwegian Coast Guard. It is also along these dimensions that the debate continues to run today.² These dimensions should also prove useful when contrasting the Norwegian coast guard model with other coast guard models, thus highlighting their similarities and differences.

² To claim that there is a public debate over the organization of the Norwegian Coast Guard would be an exaggeration. This have, however, from time to time been debated within the Coast Guard and the Navy.

The thesis is structured in a manner that best answers the research questions. In chapter two I will present the theoretical foundation and analytical framework that will be applied in this thesis. Geoffrey Tills work on Seapower will be prevalent in this regard. Additionally, the foundation and operationalization of the cost-benefit dimension will be explained further in this section. The chapter will also include a study of coast guard models in general and the Norwegian coast guard model in particular. In this chapter I will identify what constitutes a coast guard model and seek to identify the different models in use. Is the Norwegian coast guard model identifiable as one of many coast guard models, or does it differ from known models in substantial ways? The models, as they are presented in chapter two, will form the basis of my analysis in chapter four.

Chapter three will be a background chapter that will give an account on how the Norwegian Coast Guard came into being, its development and its current status. This will form the empirical basis for the subsequent analysis of the Norwegian coast guard model. In addition the chapter will show how the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) had a deep impact on the creation of the Norwegian Coast Guard, a trait shared with most other modern coast guards.

In chapter four I will analyse how the Norwegian coast guard model has affected the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Navy. I will do this by analysing the three dimensions that are crucial to how a coast guard model work. The naval power dimension is focused on how the Norwegian coast guard model affects the Norwegian Naval Forces. Within this framework I will take a closer look at the concept of the dual navy that was established in the 1990s. The good order at sea dimension is focused on the issues that might arise when a military organization is given policing authority and other civilian responsibilities. I will also look into how Norway's regional and international coast guard cooperation has been affected by the fact that the Norwegian Coast Guard is part of the Armed Forces. The cost-benefit dimension is focused on the areas where the Coast Guard supposedly benefits from the Navy's resources such as in the education and recruitment of personnel, acquisition of vessels and equipment, and response, surveillance and command and control infrastructure. I

will also see if the establishment and development of the Norwegian Coast Guard has led to cutbacks in the funding for the Norwegian Navy as some feared it would.

Chapter five will conclude the thesis. In this chapter I will sum up the findings of the thesis and make a short assessment of the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of the Norwegian coast guard model. Are these minor issues, or could they have serious ramifications for the future of the Norwegian Coast Guard? Would it be beneficial for Norway and Norwegian interests to explore a different coast guard model?

1.3 Previous research

While extensive research has been conducted on issues concerning naval war fighting at sea, there is little research on coast guards in general, let alone on how coast guard models might affect a nation's maritime and naval capabilities. Not strange perhaps, as the coast guards as we know them today, with the range of tasks and responsibilities that is placed on most of them, is something that has mostly come about as a result of the UNCLOS agreements. One can also presume that researchers are more drawn to the hard security questions of navies, rather than the softer questions that are the domain of the coast guard. There are fortunately some exceptions to this. The British naval strategist and historian Geoffrey Till's book *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (2009; 2013) is perhaps not an exception per se, as 11 out of 13 chapters are concerning issues related to war fighting at sea. But in chapter 12 on maintaining good order at sea, there is a section on the balance between navies and coast guards. Here Till identifies four ideal types of coast guard models. I will return to the work done by Till in later sections of this thesis.

Retired Royal Norwegian Navy Captain Roald Gjelsten writes extensively on the establishment and development of the Norwegian Coast Guard in *Sjøforsvaret i krig og fred* (Gjelsten et. al. 2010). Similarly a master's thesis by Willy Knudsen (2008) shed light on the decision making processes that led to the establishment of the

Norwegian Coast Guard in 1977, and its development up until the implementation of the Law of the Coast Guard in 1999 (passed in 1997). Both Gjelsten and Knudsen bring valuable insight to the reasoning behind the Norwegian coast guard model. Commodore Jacob Børresen has also written on the relationship between the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Navy in several publications, most thoroughly in his book *Kystmakt* (1993).

Colin S. Gray (2001) has written an article that compares the duties and services between the US Coast Guard and the US Navy. Gray made some interesting inferences in this article, arguing that a coast guard and a navy are driven by the beats of different drummers, meaning that the first is preoccupied with policing tasks and the latter with war fighting. The enormity of the US Navy and Coast Guard however, give these findings little value in terms of generalization. Writing in the context of the Asia Pacific, Sam Bateman (2003) has published a report that has found that coast guards are emerging as important national institutions in the region with the potential to make a major contribution to regional order and security.

There has of yet however, not been a study of the Norwegian coast guard model, or for that matter, a study that compares different coast guard models to a given case.

1.4 Central Concepts

As this thesis is centred on the Norwegian coast guard model, it is essential with a definition, or at least a further understanding of what a coast guard is. Canadian Vice-Admiral Jean-Yves Forcier claims that there are generally speaking two types of coast guards

...One that focuses on a multi-role of Marine Safety, Search and Rescue, and Marine Environmental Stewardship; and one which, in addition, incorporates Homeland Security functions to its mandate and capabilities, often with a marine constabulary dimension.

Jean-Yves Forcier (2011:6)

This is fairly correct if one only considers coast guards that call themselves coast guards. However, there is much to support the argument that there are more coast guards out there than meets the eye, seeing as many nations use their navy to perform coast guard duties. I argue therefore that it is not the name that makes an organization a coast guard, but the tasks it performs. An example of this is the Danish Coast Guard. Officially there is no such thing. Instead tasks normally associated with coast guards fall under the responsibility of the Danish Navy's 1st squadron. So what, then, is a coast guard? As earlier stated, the Norwegian Coast Guard came about through the need to protect and preserve the vast new sea areas that came under Norwegian jurisdiction through UNCLOS. Protection; through enforcing sovereignty, economic exclusivity and providing maritime aid, and preservation; by controlling fish quotas and having measurements in place for reducing the risk of maritime environmental disasters are at the core of coast guard tasks. These tasks are some of what come under what the Chiefs of the European Navies (CHENS) call maritime security operations, or MSOs. An MSO is defined by CHENS as

...those measures performed by the appropriate civilian or military authorities and multinational agencies to counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain, so that they may be acted upon in order to enforce law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interest.

CHENS (2007)

A working definition of a coast guard is therefore *the national authority that counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain, so that they may be acted upon in order to enforce law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interest.*

Assertion of Sovereignty, Norwegian sovereign rights and exercise of authority are concepts that will be referred to quite a few times in this thesis as these are issues that

most coast guards deal with regularly. My definition of these concepts stem from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence' strategic concept for the Armed Forces:

Assertion of sovereignty is to defend, with military force if necessary, Norwegian fundamental rights as a state against other states that directly or indirectly challenges Norwegian sovereignty on Norwegian territory, or Norwegian sovereign rights in areas subject to Norwegian jurisdiction outside of Norwegian territory.

Norwegian sovereign rights are Norwegian rights based on international law and international agreements, for instance UNCLOS.

Exercise of authority is the enforcement of laws and regulations in accordance with Norwegian or international law in areas subject to Norwegian sovereignty or Norwegian sovereign rights against private persons or other entities subjected to the rules of Norwegian or international law.

Forsvarsdepartementet (2009): Author's translation

1.4 Research design

As this thesis is centred on a single phenomenon, the Norwegian coast guard model, the choice of considering this as a qualitative case study is more or less given. The main emphasis of the case study is in what way the Norwegian coast guard model limits or enables the Norwegian Coast Guard and Navy in performing its duties. This makes for a fairly complex study with a potential for many variables. Ideally, a case study, though an intensive study of a single case, should shed light on a larger class of cases (Gerring 2007: 20).

The empirical foundation of my thesis will be based on the study of official documents, such as Norwegian governmental studies (NOU's), Norwegian laws and defence briefs. I have chosen not to conduct interviews of coast guard personnel. Such interviews would probably yield much inference on the current state of the Norwegian

Coast Guard along a broad spectre of areas. While obviously interesting, these insights would have had limited value for the purpose of this thesis as it is centred on the Norwegian coast guard model, not the Norwegian Coast Guard.

The question of reliability and validity is something one should keep in mind when one is assessing the level of ambition of a thesis. I'm confident that a researcher that uses the same sources and materials as I have in this thesis could reach similar conclusions as mine. My confidence on this is founded on the fact that this thesis is based on theory and written sources such as journal and magazine articles, official documents, laws and public reports. Most of these sources have been written either by scholars or public committees, that is, persons with a vested interest in objectivity. This should, according to Adcock and Collier (2001: 531), give this thesis a high degree of reliability. To be fair, some of the sources used in this thesis have been written by persons with a clear agenda, but these sources have mostly been used to highlight debates over certain issues relating to this thesis.

Concerning validity, Adcock and Collier (ibid: 530) stress that "*The thoughtful consideration of concepts is important in order to link them to the aim of the study.*" The central concept of this thesis, the coast guard, has been carefully considered and defined based on literature available. The coast guard models, including the Norwegian coast guard model, are based on this definition of what constitutes a coast guard. It is difficult to ascertain the external validity of this thesis. Gerring (2007: 217) states that "*the key element of external validity rests... upon the representativeness of the sample.*" This thesis has the ambition making inferences that can be generalizable outside of the Norwegian context, as my focus is on the potential constraints and possibilities the Norwegian coast guard model offers in general, not only for the Norwegian Coast Guard.

2 Theory and Analytical Framework

2.1 Theoretical foundation

There are many who have written on the subject of Seapower; from the seminal studies of Mahan and Corbett, to more recent contributors such as Geoffrey Till and the Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorsjkov (1977). Closer to my own waters, Norwegian commodore Jacob Børresen has written on the unique way that small coastal states such as Norway, derives their Seapower, or coastal power from a “*combination of geographical situation, the characteristics of the coast, the continental shelf, and the exclusive economic zone which is the main source of the wealth of the nation and its economic influence, its mobility and ability for rapid deployment*” (Børresen 2004a). Still, Geoffrey Till is considered *the* authority on the subject, and his theory on Seapower encompasses the whole spectrum of Seapower, from the high intensity tasks of war fighting, to the low intensity tasks associated with good order at sea.

Till has written extensively on Seapower in *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (2009; 2013).³ In this book, Till lay much emphasis on underlying requirements for a nation to achieve or raise its Seapower, such as the importance of maritime awareness, having a maritime and naval policy, and integrated maritime governance. Seapower is here elevated to the combined maritime input and output of a given nation where inputs are *navies, coast guards, the marine or civil-maritime industries broadly defined and, where relevant, the contribution of land and air forces* and output is *the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea* (Till 2013: 24). For Norway this rings especially true. While many Norwegians fought gallantly as soldiers or airmen during World War II, the nation’s by far most crucial contribution to the allied war effort was that of the commercial fleet.

³ The book was first published in 2004, but I have used the 2nd and 3rd editions published in 2009 and 2013 respectively.

Nevertheless, this thesis is concentrated on the Norwegian coast guard model and the advantages and disadvantages this has for the ability of the Norwegian Navy and the Norwegian Coast Guard to utilize their Seapower. In this regard, much of the underlying requirements of Seapower as explained in Till's more recent works are secondary to the more direct approach to Seapower found in his book from 1994. The theoretical foundation of this thesis rests therefore also on Geoffrey Till's theory of Seapower as described in *Seapower: Theory and Practice* (1994).

Seapower

Table 1 show Tills model of Seapower containing three dimensions that are the constituents of his theory on Seapower: war fighting, naval diplomacy and good order at sea.

War Fighting	Against Relatively Major Opposition
	Against Relatively Minor Opposition
Naval Diplomacy	Coercive
	Alliance Building
	International Maritime Assistance
Good Order At Sea	




Table 1: Geoffrey Till's model of Seapower (1994)

War fighting, or ideally to stop this from occurring, is the *raison d'être* for any nation to have a navy. Till differentiate war fighting into two sections. The first section is against relatively major opposition. During the Cold War, Norwegian naval strategy was aimed at a scenario where a fairly weak Norwegian Navy would be facing the

might of the Soviet North Fleet. The gist of the Norwegian strategy was therefore not to win an impossible fight, but to harass the enemy and hopefully deny it command of the sea until help from allies could arrive (Børresen 1993: 309). The second section, war fighting against relatively minor opposition, has been the likely scenario for western powers since the end of the Cold War. However, the complete command of the sea by the United States and NATO in conflicts where they have participated has basically resulted in the absence of naval war fighting. Till concludes that the main difference between these two types of war fighting is essentially those of scale as new technology has not resulted in a shift in relative power from the strong to the weak (Till: 1994: 190).

Till describes three sections of naval diplomacy: coercive, alliance building, and international maritime assistance. Maritime coercion can be used to deter or deny an adversary the ability to use their resources in ways that are considered detrimental (Ibid: 191). A classic example of maritime coercion is that of a maritime blockade. Israel has for several years imposed, at times forcefully, a maritime blockade on Gaza. Israel justifies this blockade by claiming it is a necessary measure to prevent weapon shipments reaching Hamas. Alliance building aims at establishing and maintaining beneficial relationships with allies, and encouraging co-operative approaches to common problems. Politicians often use navies in this regard by sending them to participate in naval exercises, or visit friendly ports (Ibid: 191). The last section of naval diplomacy, international maritime assistance, is a category used to collectively describe naval efforts in peacekeeping operations, monitoring of ceasefires or embargoes, mine-clearance operations, looking after merchant shipping and assisting in disaster relief after natural disasters, to mention the most prominent ones (Ibid: 193). The Norwegian Navy has in recent years participated in operations to secure shipping lines in the Gulf of Aden. This has served several purposes for Norway. For one it has helped secure shipping lines used by the still large Norwegian commercial shipping companies.⁴ Secondly, Till argues that joint naval operations has the

⁴ Though the industry to a substantial extent has moved their business to nations with little or no corporate tax such as Luxembourg, a tiny nation with no coastal line and a non-existing navy to protect shipping companies (Egeland 2011).

advantage of sharing risks and responsibilities. They also contribute to confidence building within an alliance and perhaps to a more positive perception from a stronger member of the alliance⁵ (Ibid: 192).

I have chosen to make a minor alteration to Geoffrey Till’s Seapower model. The new model now differentiates between the naval related aspects of Seapower and good order at sea. The two dimensions war fighting and naval diplomacy have in this model been sorted under a single dimension which I have called naval power. The reason for this is twofold: 1), this reduces the amount of Seapower dimensions into two, the mainly military dimension of naval power and the mainly civilian dimension of good order at sea, and 2), it eases the work on the coast guard models as these fall along an axis that separate civilian and military duties for navies and coast guards.

Naval Power	War Fighting	Against Relatively Major Opposition Against Relatively Minor Opposition
	Naval Diplomacy	Coercive Alliance Building International Maritime Assistance
Good Order At Sea		




Table 2: Modified model of Seapower

The last dimension of what constitutes Seapower is the good order at sea dimension. This dimension deals with the maintenance of order, law and security on the seas (Ibid: 194). The dimension has broadly speaking two sections, international good order

⁵ Till seem to sort joint naval operations strictly under naval diplomacy, but I argue that this occurs under all the categories of naval diplomacy. Embargoes, for example, have been enforced jointly by several countries. So have humanitarian relief efforts involving navies and naval assistance to suppress a regional war, as in the case of the wars in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia during the 1990s

at sea and national good order at sea. The first one is concerned with tackling problems relating to securing international shipping lines from the scourge of modern day piracy, to setting up international and regional regimes based on UNCLOS that will make the sea safer and more secure for all (Till 2013: 309). For domestic purposes, good order at sea means having a sustainable maritime policy by for example imposing sustainable taxing on fishing. It also means securing the coastline by having a readiness capability to aid ships in distress or prevent environmental catastrophes. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP 2014) states that *“Good order at sea ensures the safety and security of shipping and permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their marine resources in an ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law.”* In order to achieve good order at sea, one must be able to enforce this policy (Till 2013: 311). Internationally this poses a whole series of problems as there is no international naval police force in place to implement good order at sea. At best coalitions, like Operation Atalanta that combat piracy off the Gulf of Aden, are from time to time formed to combat the most eminent and grievous threats to international good order at sea. Nationally, nations have either set their navy to enforce good order at sea, or they have established a coast guard to do so.

Cost-Benefit

In addition to the theory of Seapower, the analysis of the Norwegian coast guard model will be based on an assessment of the cost-benefit of this model, compared to other coast guard models. This assessment is not founded in theory, but it will consider potential economic ramifications of the different coast guard models. For instance, maintaining a navy and/or a coast guard is very expensive for a nation. Intuitively one would think that maintaining just a navy and let this do low intensity coast guard tasks in addition to its naval tasks would be cheaper than operating both a coast guard and a navy. The fact that a modern navy is vastly more expensive than a coast guard of similar size complicates this assumption. Many would also argue that tasking a navy with coast guard duties is a burden on 1) the vessels, that would then need to be

outfitted with encumbering equipment of little war fighting value, and 2) for navy personnel, who would in addition to being trained in naval war fighting, would need to know how to operate an oil boom and the legal width of fish nets. This might then reduce the quality of both the naval power dimension and the good order at sea dimension of such a country compared to a country that operates their coast guard and navy separately. On the other hand, a civilian coast guard with no military affiliation may not be the cheapest option as such a coast guard would find it difficult to make use of military equipment and services. A third dimension, the cost-benefit dimension will therefore be used in addition to the naval power and good order at sea dimension to analyse the different coast guard models.

2.2 Analytical framework

Having defined the foundation for the three dimensions that will be used to analyse the Norwegian coast guard model, I now turn to the analytical framework of this thesis. The aim of this section is to create an analytical framework that best utilizes these dimensions to analyse the Norwegian coast guard. I have chosen to use coast guard models as my most prominent analytical tool in this regard. This is perhaps not surprising given the name of this thesis. “*A model is a simplification of, and approximation to, some aspect of the world*” (King et.al. 1994: 49). Models range between the restrictive and the unrestrictive. Restrictive models are clearer, more parsimonious, and more abstract, but they are also less realistic. Unrestrictive models are more realistic, but they are also less clear and harder to estimate with precision (Ibid: 50). In my analytical framework, I have chosen to make use of two models, one restrictive, and one unrestrictive. The restrictive model will introduce the ideal coast guard models that will be used to highlight the potential benefits and drawbacks to Norwegian Seapower had Norway opted for a different kind of coast guard model. As the most prominent phenomenon under study in this thesis is the Norwegian coast guard model, I have chosen to exempt this from the set of restrictive ideal coast guard

models, and a utilize a unrestrictive, more detailed model in order get a more realistic picture of the Norwegian coast guard model.

Coast guard models

In the introduction, I argued that there are more coast guards out there than meets the eye. Many nations have found that having both a coast guard and a navy is either redundant, too expensive, or both. That does not mean that these countries do not perform coast guard duties. To include all the de facto coast guards, I found that a definition of what a coast guard is was necessary. I defined a coast guard as *the national authority that counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain, so that they may be acted upon in order to enforce law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interest.* Clearly, this definition of a coast guard vastly raises the number of existing coast guards in the world, the majority of which are officially national navies.

Geoffrey Till operates with four ideal types of coast guards, the US model, the British model, naval coast guards, and navies as coast guards. In short the US model is a model where the coast guard is a civilian organization completely separated from the navy. In the British model the coast guard duties are performed by a large number of agencies that are loosely knit together. The naval coast guard is a coast guard model where the navy runs the coast guard but differentiates it from the rest of the naval service. In the last model, coast guard duties fall under the responsibility of the navy (Till 2009: 314-317).

For the purposes of this thesis I have chosen to make some alterations to the coast guard-navy spectrum that Geoffrey Till makes use of. The most significant alteration is that I have chosen to exempt the British model altogether as it is only used by some members of the former British Commonwealth – and then in vastly different and seemingly incomparable versions. I have also chosen to alter the US model into a civilian coast guard model. The coast guard-navy spectrum I am left with thus consists of three ideal type coast guard models: the civilian coast guard model, the naval coast

guard model, and the navies as coast guards model. In the civilian coast guard model, the coast guard is a civilian organization with little or no affiliation to the navy. They are responsible for enforcing the law and safeguarding the seas. Sweden is an example of a nation that operates a coast guard after this model. The naval coast guard model is a coast guard model where the navy runs the coast guard but differentiates it from the rest of the naval service. The coast guard is a military organization with military personnel and certain military responsibilities in addition to enforcing the law and safeguarding the seas. The navy on the other hand, does not have any civilian responsibilities. The Norwegian coast guard model is, as we shall soon see, is a version of this ideal model. In the navies as coast guards model, coast guard duties fall under the responsibility of the navy. In this model the coast guard is present in function, but not in form. We see in this model that the navy is single-handedly given the responsibility of defending national security and sovereignty, as well as enforcing the law and safeguarding the seas.




Figure 1: Coast guard models

The Norwegian Coast Guard model

The Norwegian Coast Guard has always been, and still is, a part of the Norwegian Naval Forces (Sjøforsvaret).⁶ Despite this the Coast Guard is separated from the three other branches of the organization, the Navy (Kysteskadren), the Naval Schools (Sjøforsvarets skoler), and the Naval Bases in one major way: it is not part of the Norwegian Naval Forces' budget. Instead, the Coast Guard is a separated post on the defence budget.




Figure 2: The Norwegian Naval Forces

The Norwegian Coast Guard consists of two branches with different areas of operations and responsibility. The Littoral Coast Guard (Indre kystvakt) has its area of operations in Norway's territorial waters, including the innermost corners of the fjords. The purpose of the Littoral Coast Guard is to function as an executive or auxiliary branch of agencies with responsibilities in the territorial waters, but who themselves lack seafaring vessels. These include the police and customs, the Norwegian Mapping Authority (Kartverket), and the Directorate of Fisheries to mention a few. The Offshore Coast Guard's (Ytre kystvakt) area operation is in the Norwegian EEZ, including the fishery zone around Jan Mayen and the fishery protection zone around Svalbard.

⁶ See appendix III for more on my choices regarding translations from Norwegian to English.

The Norwegian Law of the Coast Guard specifies what duties the Norwegian Coast Guard is charged with. Its main task is fishery supervision and resource control. In addition it is charged with supervision of customs laws, environmental laws and other laws that might apply to the marine environment. The Coast Guard is also charged with participating in search and rescue operations, supervise maritime research, act to secure the seas, and assist the police and other state agencies if requested.

In order to lawfully execute certain tasks, the Law of the Coast Guard bestows Coast Guard personnel with limited police authority. This authority enables Coast Guard personnel to lawfully investigate a number of breaches of Norwegian law related to fishing and the marine environment. They are also allowed to conduct searches of suspected vessels and their crew and seize any illegal contraband. Finally, Coast Guard personnel have the authority to order vessels to a Norwegian harbour. Paragraph five of the Law of the Coast Guard states that the Norwegian Coast Guard is part of the Norwegian Armed Forces. It also states that although the Coast Guard in peacetime should focus on conducting its duties in accordance with The Law of the Coast Guard, it should exercise its wartime duties. In peacetime the Coast Guards main naval, or military, duty is the assertion of Norwegian.

Based on the organizational structure and the duties of the Norwegian Coast Guard, it can safely be labelled a naval coast guard.




Figure 3: The Norwegian coast guard model

Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of the Norwegian coast guard model. In this model I have taken a closer look at the naval coast guard as depicted in figure 1. I have also added the information task and their frequency and intensity from the modified version of Tills Seapower model as shown in table 2. The model shows that the Coast Guard is responsible for the high frequency, low intensity tasks of maintaining good order at sea. In addition, it shows that there is a burden sharing between the Coast Guard and the Navy for the less demanding naval power tasks of asserting sovereignty, and to some degree, naval diplomacy. The high intensity naval power task of war fighting is solely the responsibility of the Navy. I should specify that the Norwegian Coast Guard does have war-time obligations. It will be absorbed into the Norwegian Navy if war breaks out in Norway, and the Coast Guard does participate in war-time scenario exercises with the Navy from time to time. However, their role as potential fighting platforms was abandoned in the early 1990s (SST/ORG 1994).

3 The establishment and development of the Norwegian Coast Guard

3.1 UNCLOS and the great sea grab

During the 50s and 60s there was much interest in Norway to extend the area where Norwegian fishermen enjoyed a monopoly on fishing.⁷ There was, however, a political consensus that this should only be achieved through international agreements, not as a unilateral decision by Norway. Unfortunately, the two first conferences on the Law of the Sea held by UN in 1958 and 1960, failed to reach a 2/3 majority (by one vote) on a treaty that stated that nations could claim territorial waters of up to 12 nautical miles. Arguing that most of the international community had voted in favour of the treaty, Norway announced that it would establish an exclusive fishing zone of 12 nautical miles by April 1st 1961, less than six months after the conclusion of the conference (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998: 84-85). Norway refrained from expanding its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. The reason for this had to do with the Svalbard-treaty which regulates Russian and Norwegian co-existence on Svalbard. If Norway's territorial waters were to be extended from 4 to 12 nautical miles, then the principle of equal treatment would have to apply. This would force Norway to allow Russians to operate in the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard Tamnes 1997: 279). It was only in 2004 that Norway changed its stance on this matter and extended its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles off mainland Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen (BarentsWatch).

The oil field Ekofisk was discovered in 1969. This was the first economically viable discovery of oil in the North Sea. Ekofisk is located on the border of the Norwegian continental shelf, just a couple of miles east of the British continental shelf. The demarcation lines of the Norwegian continental shelf against Denmark and Great Britain had been established in 1965 (NOU 1975:50: 142) which probably prevented

⁷ In essence Norway's EEZ.

any contestation over the rights of the oil field. Soon new discoveries would follow which would herald an unprecedented age of economic prosperity for Norway. To this day, Ekofisk remains the single largest discovery of oil deposits in Norwegian history.

In the same period the advent of modern fishing, and especially industrial size trawlers, became a concern. These trawlers did much damage to the coastal fishing industry within the 12 nautical mile zone. In addition it became clear during the 60s and 70s that the fish stocks in the western fields were being depleted at an alarming pace. This put further pressure on the fish stocks in the Norwegian and Barents Sea as trawlers from nations that had depleted their own fish stocks



Figure 4: Areas under Norwegian jurisdiction after the great sea grab of the 1970s and 1980s.

now flocked to the still bountiful areas off the coast of Norway. In the period from 1972 till 1974 West-Germany, Spain and Portugal increased their collected catch of fish off the coast of Norway from a little over 2000 to approximately 160 000 tons (Tamnes 1997: 281). Soon demands rose for a further expansion of the exclusive fishing zone; first to 50 nautical miles as Iceland had done, then to establish a 200 nautical mile EEZ (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998: 90). Still, the Norwegian Government was sceptical of unilaterally extend its EEZ as Iceland had done. There were several reasons to this, but perhaps the most important one was that they feared this would undermine the international treaties that were expected to materialize out of the UN conferences. As a small state, Norway found it essential that international law was

adhered and respected (Tamnes 1997: 282). The need for a speedy and beneficial resolution to the Law of the Sea conferences was thus seen as paramount for the Norwegian state. In 1974 a new department was established with the single objective of seeing this through. During the 12 sessions between 1973 and 1982, it became clear in the mid-seventies that there was a rising acceptance for the establishment of 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) by coastal states (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998: 123). Norway therefore felt confident enough to establish a 200 mile EEZ off its mainland in January 1977. This was followed by a fishery protection zone around Svalbard in June 1977, and an exclusive fishing zone around Jan Mayen in 1980.⁸ In total this amounted to approximately 2 million square kilometres of sea that came under Norwegian jurisdiction, more than five times the size of mainland Norway. The Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes calls this “the great sea grab” (Tamnes 1997: 279-280). After 30 years of negotiations Norway and Russia agreed on a delimitation line in the Barents Sea in 2010. This agreement settled Norway’s last border dispute surrounding its home waters. The end result was to establish a delimitation line half way between the sectorial line sought by Russia and the medial line sought by Norway. The sea grab initiated in the 1960s was thus finalized.



Figure 5: The delimitation line between Norway and Russia.

3.2 The Stoltenberg committee

In the early 1970s it became clear that The Naval Fishery Supervision, which had functioned as a sort of coast guard since 1907 was wholly inadequate to fulfil its duties

⁸ For more detailed information on Norwegian maritime boundaries, see appendix II.

in the future should its current form and size remain unchanged. Not only was the area of operations about to increase dramatically, the discovery of oil and the changes within the fishing industry entailed an increase in both the amount and complexity of tasks that needed to be performed (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998: 92-93), The Ministry of Defence therefore ordered a study on the consequences this entailed for the Norwegian state. State secretary in the Ministry of Defence Thorvald Stoltenberg was chosen to lead the committee. It was given a broad mandate as shown below:

- 1. Consider the need for state services outside of our coast in connection with fishery and petroleum activities in terms of supervision, inspection and control (including control of scientific research), search & rescue, security installations, combating of pollution at sea and any other services.*
- 2. Provide an overview of how these services are covered today and the plans that are available [for future coverage].*
- 3. Provide an overall assessment of, and suggestions for how the responsibilities and organizational structure should be formed in order to solve these tasks, in addition to the Armed Forces place within this structure, as well as an overview of the budgetary implications*

(NOU 1975:50: 7) Author's translation.

A year later the committee presented their recommendations. The report was thorough, considering all the aspects as stated under section 1 and 2 of the mandate. Based on the mandate given, the committee gave five premises upon which their recommendation would be based: 1) the need for a rapid establishment of the services required, 2) clearly defined area of responsibility, 3) maximal utilization of already existing personnel, 4) maximal utilization of already existing equipment, bases and other facilities, and 5) coordination of fishery inspection and surveillance of the continental shelf. They concluded that the establishment of a coast guard would be best course of action in order to meet the requirements of the mandate (NOU 1975:50: 128). Hoping to learn from the mistakes and successes of others, the committee studied the practice of coast guard duties in nine other countries. They found that the diversity on how

different countries managed their coast guard tasks varied greatly. They also found that none of the nations studied had managed to place these tasks under a single coherent organization (Ibid: 150).

Given the lack of consensus among other nations on how to operate a coast guard, the committee argued that the establishment and management of a coast guard should adhere to established Norwegian organizational culture. This culture was based on a notion of Norway as a small nation that should refrain from duplicating already existing infrastructure, but rather seek out practical solutions. The committee concluded that in practice this meant that The Norwegian Naval Forces was the only viable option for the placement of the coast guard. The organizational structure of the Coast Guard would then be based on a modified version of The Naval Fishery Supervision, eliminating the need to establish a new organization from scratch. The Naval Forces also had many of the resources needed to operate a coast guard already available, such as skilled personnel, systems for education and logistics, and maintenance and supply facilities. The committee noted that these resources would need to be duplicated if the new coast guard was to be established as a civilian organization. In addition, as a part of the military, the Coast Guard would be able to make use of the Air Forces aircraft and Army's vehicles if needed. Given that the Naval Fishery Supervision, which previously had performed many of the civil tasks that the new coast guard would perform, was a military organization, the committee considered the aspect of a military coast guard to be unproblematic from a security policy point of view (Ibid: 129).

Based on an assumption that the Norwegian EEZ would be extended to 200 nautical miles, the committee recommended that 10 new vessels of roughly 2000 dead weight tons with ice-breaking capabilities be commissioned. In addition to helicopter decks and hangars, these vessels should be stocked with high tech equipment to combat oil spills, fight fires on platforms and have decompression chambers. The committee also recommended the purchase of six naval helicopters and additional two Orion surveillance planes in order to expand the new vessels' potential area of operations. Almost as a side note the committee also suggested the establishment of a small unit

consisting of soldiers from the Army and the Navy. These should be given the task to counter potential hijackings and other terrorist activities on future Norwegian oil platforms (NOU 1975:50: 129-137). With this, what is known today as The Norwegian Special Forces came into being.

The Stoltenberg committee's report was well received by most affected parties (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 461). Few questioned that the vast new areas that were soon to fall under Norwegian jurisdiction required substantial investments. The Naval Staff by and large supported the recommendations made by the committee, but among some of



Figure 6: Committee leader Thorvald Stoltenberg portrayed as cuckoo chick by cartoonist Finn Graff (Arbeiderbladet 1975)

the senior officers there was great concern that the Coast Guard would lay siege to large sections of the defence budget to the detriment of the Navy. The fear was that an independent, visible and popular coast guard inevitably would swell in size due to popular demand. This would lay siege to both funds and personnel that were at the time allocated to the Navy.⁹ This “rebellion” was led by Commander Lilleheim. Through a series of newspaper interviews and articles in the Naval Journal Commander Lilleheim argued that coast guard duties should be an integrated

part of the Navy's general tasks. The resources needed for building specialized coast guard vessels with very limited military capabilities, should rather be spent on two modern frigates and repurposing of existing crafts in addition to three smaller vessels for supervision purposes (Aftenposten 1976; Bergens Tidende 1976; Lilleheim 1977).

A small minority within the political establishment argued for a civilian coast guard. This stance was based on a principal aversion against giving the military forces

⁹ Some members of the Navy brass regarded a coast guard as a cuckoo chick that would grow strong at the expense of its sibling (the Navy). This was acutely captured in a drawing by Finn Graff as shown in figure 6.

coercive power over its own citizens. This aversion largely stemmed from the labour movements political struggle prior to their seizure of power in 1936 (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 460).

In the end the Parliament voted to establish a coast guard almost in complete accordance with the recommendations from the Stoltenberg committee. The exception naturally being that much of the investments the recommended by committee was severely cut. For instance, the number of modern coast guard vessels ordered was first reduced to seven, and then finally to three. The vessels civilian capabilities were also sacrificed at the expense of military capabilities. For instance, the vessels were not given ice-breaking capabilities and decompression chambers, but were instead installed with anti-submarine measurements, depth charges and an advanced command, control and communication equipment. The idea was that the vessels could be transformed into escort vessels or light frigates for the Navy in case of crisis or war (Børresen et.al 2004: 268).

3.3 The restructuring of the Norwegian Coast Guard: the dual navy, The Littoral Coast Guard and The Law of the Coast Guard

The end of the cold war heralded change for the armed forces in Western Europe. Gone was the adversary on which their existence was based. The result was that many Western European nations cut their defence budgets. In Norway this peace-dividend also made its impact. Proposed defence budget increases of up to 7 percent in the mid-1980s, turned into severe reductions after 1991 (Diesen 2011: 17). This had far reaching repercussions for the Armed Forces, not in the least for the Navy and the Coast Guard. Throughout the 1990s the Naval Forces restructured their organization, closed bases and even dissolved the coastal artillery.¹⁰ This was a painful time for the Naval Forces as a whole, but the position and capabilities of the Coast Guard was strengthened (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 489). In a sense, the fear of Commander Lilleheim; that the Coast Guard would inevitably grow at the expense of the Navy, came to pass.

¹⁰ The coastal artillery was in effect dissolved around the millennium, but formally it existed until 2007.

As part of the restructuring of the Naval Forces, there was a growing recognition of the futility of the old mobilization defence structure,¹¹ where the Coast Guards vessels was meant to provide substantial assistance to the Navy in times of crisis and war. This realisation was to a large extent driven by cost-benefit calculations. The days when lightly armed ships could provide any real military value was gone. At the same time the price of military equipment, and the cost of keeping them operational in terms of personnel and maintenance, was prohibitive.¹² The Naval Staff therefore concluded that a stricter separation of tasks between the Navy and the Coast Guard was needed. In the *dual navy* the Coast Guard was given an increased responsibility for maintaining sovereignty, surveillance and control of Norway's sea areas during peacetime in addition to its regular coast guard tasks. This enabled the Navy to focus primarily on honing its war fighting capabilities through national and international exercises and engage in naval diplomacy (SST/ORG 1994). The concept of the dual navy closely resembles the modified model of Seapower shown in table 2. The Coast Guard, as the workhorse of the Naval Forces, was now to a large extent solely responsible for the high frequency, low intensity task of maintaining good order at sea within Norwegian waters.

The Coast Guard proved its use and soon became a popular and much requested organization both out at sea and along the shore, though the services needed often differed depending on where they were needed. It was therefore decided that the Coast Guard should be split into an offshore and a littoral branch. The Littoral Coast Guard (Indre kystvakt) was established on January 1 1996. Its area of responsibility is the territorial waters of Norway. The purpose of the Littoral Coast Guard is to function as an executive or auxiliary branch of agencies with responsibilities in the territorial waters, but whom themselves lack seafaring vessels. These include as the police and customs, Kartverket (national map service), and the Directorate of Fisheries to mention a few.

¹¹ For an analysis of the Norwegian mobilization defence, see Håkenstad (2010).

¹² See Diesen (2011) for an analysis of the issue of critical mass, and its consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

A small but vocal opposition in Parliament led by the Socialist Party (SV) had opposed the establishment of the Norwegian Coast Guard as a military organization, arguing that the military should not be given coercive powers against civilians even at sea. They also contested the Stoltenberg Committee's view that a military coast guard would not pose a liability to national security in the High North. Though the committee's recommendation was approved by the Parliament without much trouble, the issue of the Coast Guards judicial authority would soon return. Already in 1982 it was proposed that the law regulating the Coast Guard had to be revised in order to officially give the Coast Guard police authority. The law was passed in 1984, but the Justice Department argued that further specification of the relationship between the Coast Guard and the police and prosecuting authority was needed, and that this should be regulated by law. The Justice Department felt however, that this law should be made after the Coast Guard had been operational for some time so that experiences and lessons learned could affect the outcome. In connection with the establishment of the Littoral Coast Guard, the Department of Defence was charged with formulating a draft of a specific law that would regulate the Coast Guard in 1994. The Department of Defence formed an interdepartmental committee to perform this task. Their draft was generally well received and the Law of the Coast Guard passed Parliament in 1997 (Knudsen 2008: 36-40). Paragraph 8 through 18 of the Law of the Coast Guard (LOV-1997-06-13-42) lists the tasks that the Norwegian Parliament has charged the Norwegian Coast Guard of performing. Their main objective is exercising sovereignty. In addition they are charged with jurisdictional tasks such as fishery, environmental and toll supervision and civil security tasks such as participate in search and rescue operations. The Coast Guard Law had little practical impact for the Coast Guard as it generally described the tasks that had been *modus operandi* for the Coast Guard for several years. It did however put into law that the authority of the Coast Guard is a supplement to the authority of the legal agencies, not a substitute. It also formally recognized the legality of Coast Guard officers to exercise police authority (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 464).

In January 2013, the Coast Guard headquarters, along with the Chief of the Coast Guard and the entire Coast Guard staff, was relocated to Sortland in northern Norway. This ended the organizational duality that had split the Coast Guard into a northern and southern branch. The southern branch had been based out of Haakonsværn in Bergen and the northern branch out of Sortland, while the Chief of the Coast Guard was stationed in Oslo. This was the last move in a series of restructuring programs within the Navy and the Coast Guard that started with the end of the cold war in the beginning of the 1990s. In addition to the headquarters at Sortland, the vessels of the Coast Guard that operate below the 65th parallel, uses the Navy's headquarters at Haakonsværn outside of Bergen as their home base.

4 Analysing the Norwegian coast guard model

4.1 The three dimensions

In the following chapter I will apply the Norwegian coast guard model as explained in chapter two across three dimensions that are affected by the model. The three dimensions I will explore are the naval power dimension, the good order at sea dimension, and the cost-benefit dimension. As previously mentioned, I have chosen these dimensions because they are crucial for how the Norwegian coast guard model, and probably most coast guard models, works. If we go back to figure 1 which showed the three different coast guard models, we see that what differentiates the coast guard models is where the coast guards and navies are placed along a civilian-military axis, where the civilian aspect deals with maintaining good order at sea, and the military aspect deals with issues related to naval power. Based on an analysis of these three dimensions, I should be able to accumulate sufficient inferences to be able to answer my research question: What are the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of the Norwegian coast guard model? Similarly, the analysis should also shed light on the possible benefits and drawbacks of competing coast guard models.

Even though the analysis will be on the systemic level of the Norwegian coast guard model, I will seek to illustrate this with references to how the Norwegian Coast Guard has been affected, or has dealt with issues within the confines of the model.

Conversely, I will use examples from Sweden and Denmark to illustrate the constraints involved with the civilian coast guard model and navies as coast guards model respectively. Sweden and Denmark are chosen as case examples because they face similar conditions as Norway in terms of geography, culture, population, and economy, but differ in choice of coast guard model. Some aspects differ of course. Denmark's EEZ is for instance just slightly larger than Norway's while Sweden on the other hand has a much smaller area of jurisdiction enclosed in the Baltic Sea. Still, the

different choice in coast guard model among such similar nations makes for an interesting observation. Norway chose to opt for their particular coast guard model based in part on Norwegian organizational culture. While surely different in many respects, the shared history of Norway, Denmark and Sweden has made these nations fairly similar with regards to organizational culture. It is therefore somewhat of a conundrum that they have opted for vastly different coast guard models.

4.2 The naval power dimension

The dual navy

The Norwegian coast guard model as depicted in figure 3 also gives an accurate description of the concept of the dual navy. In the model we see how the Norwegian Coast Guard is responsible not only for maritime tasks that aim at maintaining good order at sea, but also to a large extent alleviate the Navy from the responsibility of asserting sovereignty.

The main purpose of the Norwegian naval Forces is to contribute to the Armed Forces' war preventive measures and crisis management through its ability to contain a foreign military aggression, secure arrival of and cooperation with allied forces, and restore territorial integrity. The Norwegian Navy is designed to be able to establish sea control and sea denial in peace, crisis and war. The Navy is also an important contributor to operations abroad, and contributes regular participation in NATO's standing naval forces (Prp. 73 S (2011-2012)).

In order to fulfil its purpose, the Navy must ensure that its force generation, i.e. its ability to produce combat ready forces, is adequate. Force production is in essence two distinct activities. One the one hand it is the development, procurement, and maintenance of vessels and equipment in accordance with the mandate given by Parliament. On the other hand it is concerned with the ability of the Navy to use and operate its vessels and equipment. In here lies its ability to recruit, train and in general make good use of its human resources (Børresen 1993: 320).

In the area of force production the Norwegian coast guard model potentially may have a major impact. By being able to exclusively focus on force production, the Norwegian Navy should have a comparative advantage over similar sized navies that are forced to equip their vessels and train their crews to handle coast guard duties as well.

Especially for countries that follow the navies as coast guards model this could be rather cumbersome. Warships have always been highly specialized vessels where the main goal is to produce the most lethal floating weapons system possible within allocated funds. Equipment such as booms for containing oil spill, towing capabilities and excess tank capacity are expensive, space consuming and add none, or even negative war fighting capabilities to a vessel.

The Norwegian Navy has a long tradition for prioritizing honing their war fighting capabilities through national and especially international exercises. In the Cold War era this was more or less done on autopilot as the North Atlantic was considered to be a strategically vital area for NATO. The Norwegian Navy therefore routinely exercised with other NATO countries, including the US Navy, in naval exercises off the coast of northern Norway. Doubtlessly, these exercises contributed to the effectiveness of the Norwegian Navy. In the post-Cold War period, such exercises have been fewer and further between, though still an occasional occurrence. Perhaps in an effort to ensure that the Norwegian Navy gets to train with the best, they secured a spot on for the frigate *KNM Fridtjof Nansen* in the 2014 RIMPAC exercise held by the US Navy off the coast of Hawaii in the summer of 2014. (Forsvarsdepartementet 2014b).

The military duties of the Norwegian Coast Guard are not necessarily limited to assertion of sovereignty and Norwegian sovereign rights. For eleven months in 1990 and 1991 *KV Andenes* participated in *Operation Faraway* in the Persian Gulf. Along with the Danish corvette *Olfert Fischer*, *KV Andenes* was part of a task force whose mission was to secure the international shipping lines running through the Persian Gulf. The task force was part of the UN sanctioned *Operation Desert Storm* that was charged with ousting Iraq's occupation force in Kuwait.

Norway has recently contributed to several other international maritime security operations (MSOs). In 2009 Norway contributed to the EU led *Operation Atalanta* combating pirates off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean. Norway contributed in the almost identical *Operation Ocean Shield* in 2013. Lastly Norway participated in escorting chemical weapons from the Syrian port of Latakia to be destroyed. In all of these operations, Norway decided to send one of their new Nansen class frigates. However, there is little reason to believe that the Coast Guard would not have been a suitable candidate for the missions. Especially the MSOs off the coast of Somalia had more in common with coast guard duties than naval ones, considering that the adversaries were pirates, not an enemy state. *KV Andenes*, already equipped to handle the high temperatures in the Middle East after its adventure in the 1990s could probably have performed this mission at a considerable less cost than *KNM Fridtjof Nansen*. Especially if one consider that *KNM Fridtjof Nansen* had to be upgraded for this purpose. In addition a crane had to be installed for on and off-loading of the Special Forces' RHIB (rigid-hulled inflatable boat). Indeed *KV Andenes* replaced *KNM Helge Ingstad* in April 2014 as an escort vessel for the UN operation responsible for the removal of chemical weapons from Syria (Bentzrød 2014).

That the Norwegian Coast Guard as a separate military organization can perform certain national or international low intensity tasks, and in this way alleviate the Navy if needed, shows the flexibility of the Norwegian coast guard model. It is doubtful that this would have been possible had Norway opted for a civilian coast guard model as these kinds of MSOs are generally strictly military operations. In addition, a civilian coast guard would not be used to military cooperation, nor would it be familiar with NATO naval doctrine. The importance of this for efficient participation has been made evident, as studies show that the Norwegian Navy often find it easier to cooperate with other allied navies than with the other branches of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Bergstrøm 2009: 18).

§ 8 of the Law of the Coast Guard states that the Coast Guard shall assert Norwegian sovereignty and Norwegian sovereign rights (LOV-1997-06-13-42). As mentioned in chapter three, like most other coastal nations, Norway has claimed sovereignty over

their territorial waters. Norway's territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles off its mainland coast. Norway has also claimed similar areas of sovereignty off the coast of the Svalbard archipelago, Bjørnøya, and Jan Mayen. In addition Norway has claimed a 200 nautical mile EEZ off its mainland coast and a fishery protection zone off Svalbard, and a fishery zone off Jan Mayen of equal size.¹³ The Norwegian EEZ and the zones off Svalbard and Jan Mayen are international waters. Norway has thus not the right to claim sovereignty over these waters as it has within their territorial waters, but it still has certain sovereign rights.¹⁴

Assertion of sovereignty against other states is a military task. If a foreign power is challenging Norwegian sovereignty on Norwegian territory, or Norwegian sovereign rights in areas subject to Norwegian jurisdiction, this would constitute a violation of Norwegian sovereignty according to international law and merit a military response. A serious example of violation of Norwegian sovereignty would be military incursion into Norwegian territorial waters not in accordance with UNCLOS' section on the right of innocent passage. An example of challenging Norwegian sovereign rights would be if a foreign military vessel was trying to prevent inspection of a trawler operating in an area under Norwegian jurisdiction. In theory, the Norwegian Coast Guard should be able to forcefully defend against such challenges, but it is likely that at least the first example would require the full attention of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Proponents of a military coast guard would however argue that these coast guards represent a low level military presence that projects a serious willingness to defend sovereignty and sovereign rights that civilian coast guards are unable to do (Gjelsten 2011b).

A fleet in being?

There are potential consequences to handing over the responsibility of asserting sovereignty to an organization with very limited war fighting capabilities, even if it is

¹³ See appendix III for further details on Norwegian maritime boundaries and specifications regarding Norwegian EEZ, the fishery protection zone off Svalbard, and the fishery zone off Jan Mayen.

¹⁴ For definition of *assertion of sovereignty* and *exercise of authority*, see chapter 1.2 Central Concepts.

a military organization. The main purpose of asserting sovereignty by patrolling one's sea territory is to remove potential doubt from foreign nations of one's ability and will to uphold its rights and duties of this territory in accordance with international law (Børresen 2004a: 21). For a small coastal state there are several ways of achieving this. States that have a coast guard organized under either the civilian coast guard model or the navies as coast guards model leave this responsibility to the navy. These navies must then perform this objective in addition to training its war fighting capabilities and engaging in naval diplomacy. These tasks are not always mutually exclusive as most navies endeavour to combine naval exercises and patrol duties. However, efficient patrolling of a large sea territory necessarily involves a certain dispersion of the vessels available, resulting in less efficient exercises. A navy's projection of will to defend its sea territory by patrolling it regularly can thus paradoxically affect their ability to do so negatively by weakening their potential war fighting capabilities as a result of inferior training.

A common way to alleviate this problem is to rely on a naval doctrine that rests on the theory of maintaining a *fleet in being*. According to this theory, if a navy can adequately project its will and ability to defend its sea territory from time to time, it does not need to continuously be physically present in order to have the wanted effect on foreign nations. Most naval theorists and naval officers would support the effect of a fleet in being is real, but a healthy discussion of how much patrolling and how much exercising is necessary in order to achieve this effect is relatively common.

The Norwegian Navy has traditionally argued that it should be more present in Norwegian waters, especially in the high north arguing that if Norway does not sufficiently project its intent to safeguard its own claims in this region, then this may invite other nations to consider advances that run counter to Norwegian interests (Børresen 2004b: 270). Though seldom voiced, this argument implies that the Navy believes 1) that a coast guard presence is not a credible show of national interest to safeguard the area, or 2) that if the Navy is not used for this highly visible task, it will be viewed as less crucial for Norwegian interest among the public and the politicians, further increasing the danger of funding cuts. When former Chief of the Navy, Rear

Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth voiced his concern of the limited presence of the Navy in the high north, former Chief of Defence, General Sverre Diesen, answered that a credible naval presence in the High North would lay siege to an unacceptable amount of the Navy's resources. Conventional military forces should thus only be used in extreme situations, according to General Diesen. Incidentally, General Diesen did not consider the presence of the Norwegian Coast Guard to qualify as military presence, but still argued that a naval doctrine that would have the Navy function as an emergency response agency to security situations in the high north would be a better use of the resources available (Norges Forsvar 2007). How an agency that will have to travel 1200 km (distance from Haakonsværn to Tromsø) in order to reach the area in question could be characterized as adequate is a mystery to many of General Diesen's opponents within the Armed Forces. In a response to General Diesen, Navy Captain Roald Gjelsten argued that the Coast Guard does have a function as a day to day military presence in Norwegian waters, but that this should be augmented with naval presence on a regular basis. This would serve several purposes according to Commodore Gjelsten. It would prevent the arrival of naval vessels to be perceived as an undue escalation of conflict by an opponent as this could not be said to be an unusual occurrence. It would probably raise the bar for a foreign nation's willingness to test Norwegian resolve in this issue. Commodore Gjelsten argues that the highly mobile *Skjold* class corvette would be suitable for such tasks as this is heavily enough armed to potentially win a tactical engagement against a quantitative superior opponent, affecting the opponent's cost and risk analysis (Gjelsten, 2011a).

The great concern with a naval doctrine that more or less solely rests on the theory of a fleet in being is that if a situation arises that requires a naval response, this will undoubtedly be viewed as an escalation of the situation by the counterpart. In these circumstances the outfall is often considered to be more uncertain. Nations that utilizes the navies as coast guards model are of course exempt from this concern. In order for them to perform their coast guard duties adequately, they will have to be present in their national waters just as coast guards that are organized under the two other models. They have thus a continued naval presence and do not have to rely on a fleet

in being strategy to be a sufficient deterrent for foreign nations. A nation that utilizes a civilian coast guard model will either have to rely on a fleet in being strategy or prioritize a dispersed sailing pattern for their navy in order to show their presence with the potential consequences this may have for other naval tasks. The most advent proponents of the Norwegian coast guard model will argue that by leaving the day to day task of asserting sovereignty to the Coast Guard, Norway is in the comfortable position of not having to choose, either by relying solely on coast guard presence, or preferably by supplementing this with the occasional naval presence (Gjelsten & Melien 2007).

4.3 The Good Order at Sea dimension

The *raison d'être* of the Norwegian Coast Guard is off course not to alleviate the Navy of the tedious task of asserting sovereignty in Norwegian waters. Rather the Coast Guard's main objective is of a civilian character. In chapter two I concluded that the understanding of good order at sea in a nation state perspective differs from that of the international perspective. In this sense good order at sea was defined as

...a regime that ensures the safety and security of the sea under the state's jurisdiction and permits the state to pursue its maritime interests and develop its marine resources in an ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law.

Most coastal nations have either a navy or a coast guard that is responsible for maintaining good order at sea within the areas that fall under its jurisdiction. This is not to say that any given navy or coast guard is necessarily given the sole responsibility of maintaining good order at sea. For instance, the Norwegian Coastal Administration is the agency responsible for monitoring ship traffic along the Norwegian coast and to maintain preparedness to be able to rescue ships in distress or contain and recover oil spills. In such cases the Norwegian Coast Guard act on behalf of the Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket 2011). The Norwegian Coast

Guard regularly performs assignments for 12 different state agencies, organizations and departments. In addition to these 12 clients, the Coast Guard also regularly perform assignments for several other clients (Sjef Kystvakten 2014). These clients are fairly diverse in size and mandate, ranging from research institutes to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (Hovedredningsentralen), but most of them are in some way related to maintaining good order at sea.

Equipped for maintaining good order at sea?

In order for a nation to secure good order at sea, it needs to be able to fulfil a great number of tasks. Nations that follow the civilian coast guard model do not have to preoccupy themselves with military issues. These nations should thus intuitively be better suited to maintain good order at sea, all else being equal. In previous chapters I have shown how the coast guard vessels of the *Nordkapp* class featured several military capabilities that were both expensive and space consuming in order for them to have an auxiliary function for the Navy. Obviously, had these resources been spent more exclusively for coast guard purposes, the *Nordkapp* class would have had either more of the coast guard capabilities that the Stoltenberg study envisaged, or additional ship(s) would have been commissioned. Due in part to development in military technology, the Norwegian Naval Forces found in the 1990s that commissioning semi-military vessels like the *Nordkapp* class for the Coast Guard was no longer cost-effective as such vessels had no real war fighting capabilities in modern warfare (SST/ORG 1994). If we look at the capabilities of the vessels of the Norwegian Coast Guard today,¹⁵ we see that the vessels are designed to perform good order at sea tasks such as towing and oil recovery, rather than for military purposes.

In order to make their Navy more versatile, Denmark developed the StanFlex system in the 1980s and 1990s. The StanFlex system is a module based system where certain components are built in containers that can easily be loaded and offloaded into slots on the Danish Navy's vessels. These components range from high end military weapons

¹⁵ See appendix I for more details on the capabilities of the Norwegian Coast Guard's vessels.

systems to environmental equipment used for oil recovery (Thorsteinson 2013). This reduced the number of ships needed in the Danish Navy to perform its tasks as a single vessel now could perform a wider range of tasks depending on the types of modules it was carrying. A complicating factor with this module system is that a change from a weapon module to an environmental module completely changes the skills needed by the crew in order to operate these modules professionally. There are several ways to solve this. Each vessel could have a larger than normal crew that would change depending on the load out, but this would be rather expensive. The crew could be trained in using different types of modules. A gunner could also be an oil recovery specialist. Lastly, one could opt to mostly use a fixed set of modules and train the crew accordingly, but this would defeat the purpose of the system. It has also been argued that the alterations in ship design needed to be able to operate such vastly different modules has renders module based vessels to be jacks of all trades, master of none (Gjelsten & Melien 2007). Some Danish studies have shown that especially environmental preparedness is suffering under this system due to an institutional difficulty to give these issues priority. They have argued that there is either a need for a separate organization to safeguard the environment, or that a civilian Danish Coast Guard should be established similar to the Swedish Coast Guard (Østhagen 2014).

Nations that follow the civilian coast guard model are less encumbered in this regard. Having no military affiliation, civilian coast guards are free to equip their vessels without having to make military considerations. The Swedish coast guard, for example, has a strong emphasis on environmental preparedness, and has outfitted their vessels accordingly (Kustbevakningen 2014b). A potential drawback for the Swedish Coast Guard is that their vessels are without any armament. Having the ability to use a deck gun could be of great help in several instances. The Norwegian Coast Guard has very rarely fired their deck gun, but the threat in and of itself has often led those who have opposed the authority of the Norwegian Coast Guard to re-evaluate their initial stance. The drawback for the Swedish Coast Guard is of course that this is not a possibility for them. It should be stressed that some civilian coast guards have deck guns, such as Japan Coast Guard and the US Coast Guard. Although the US Coast

Guard model is by some researchers defined more as a naval coast guard model than a civilian one (Gary 2001; Bateman 2003), and Japan Coast Guard may be civilian due to constitutional constraints on the Japanese Military budget¹⁶, there is nothing within the civilian coast guard model that prevents nations that follow this model from arming their coast guard vessels.

There seem to be nothing intrinsically that prevents nations that follow the naval coast guard model from investing in vessels and equipment that are more or less solely designed to be of use for good order at sea assignments. The case of Denmark shows that this may not be as easy for nations that have a navies as coast guards model. Certainly, Denmark could just invest in specialised vessels for its coast guard, and to some extent they have (Royal Danish Navy 2014). However, in the navies as coast guards model, the coast guard and the navy is a single military organisation, where the two are indistinguishable from each other. The case of Denmark shows that when a military organization must decide between prioritizing good order at sea and naval power considerations, it will probably put most emphasis on the latter.

Jurisdiction

Most western democracies have very strict laws dictating what the military can and cannot do. Typically the military is banned by law to use force against its own citizens in peacetime except in extreme situations, such as if martial law is declared. In Norway such limitations are even stipulated in the constitution. In the incidents where the Norwegian Armed Forces has assisted the police in keeping law and order, this has been highly controversial. Especially *the battle of Menstad*, where the Army and the Navy assisted the police in suppressing an uprising among dockworkers in Skien, led the Labour party to distrust the Armed Forces when it later came to power in 1936 (Dyndal 2010). Similarly, when the Army and the Navy assisted the police during the Alta protests in 1981 with communication equipment and small unit support vehicles

¹⁶ See Hughes (2004) for a debate of whether or not Japan still consider themselves constrained by this.

(SUSV) that were repainted in civilian colours, it caused some controversy (Kosmo 1997).

The potentially problematic issues with giving the Coast Guard, as a military organization, coercive powers over the civilian population was something that concerned many of the decision makers responsible for creating the Coast Guard. Most however, agreed with the Stoltenberg committee who argued that given the fact that the Coast Guard replaced the Naval Fishery Supervision, this did not entail a further militarization of the Norwegian State (NOU 1975:50). In order to ensure this, there was a consensus that the authority of the Coast Guard should be defined by law. Based on the experiences made by the Coast Guard since its inception, Parliament passed a law that clearly defined the objectives and powers of the Coast Guard in 1997 (Knudsen 2008). As stipulated by the Law of the Coast Guard, the main civilian objective of the Coast Guard is to supervise the seas under Norwegian jurisdiction to ensure that they are safe and that Norwegian law is upheld. Supervision of fishery, customs and the environment is mentioned in explicit paragraphs in the law. In order to do so, the Coast Guard is authorized to carry out inspections if they suspect transgression of Norwegian law. The Coast Guard is also charged with assisting the police and other state agencies, such as the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, upon their request. The Law of the Coast Guard grants the Coast Guard limited police authority that enables it to perform its designated objectives within the confines of the Norwegian constitution. § 34 of the law stipulates that whenever the Coast Guard is conducting an investigation or is applying coercive force (against civilians), it is doing so in its capacity as an instrument of the Norwegian prosecuting authority (LOV-1997-06-13-42).

Norwegian fishermen seem to accept the authority of the Coast Guard and appreciate its presence (Jansen & Bleichfeldt 1998:230). Based on reports from the Norwegian Coast Guard, the cooperation with Norwegian police and other state agencies also seem to work well in most instances (Sjef Kystvakten 2014). There is little to sustain a claim that there exists a popular demand for the Coast Guard to become a civilian organization among fishermen. This may be because the military has a long tradition

with supervising and aiding fishermen in Norway given that the Naval Fishery Supervision has existed since 1907. Also, the Norwegian Coast Guard, probably like many other coast guards, actively participates in seminars and other arenas with the fishing industry and other maritime industries in an effort to build trust and confidence among the actors in the industry (Næringsliv i Møre og Romsdal 2014).

It is possible that having a military affiliation may be beneficial in the Norwegian Coast Guard's dealings with foreign fishermen. It was speculated that coast guard vessels in grey paint and coast guard inspectors in military uniform would elicit greater authority and therefore more compliance from foreign fishermen than a civilian coast guard would do when the Norwegian Coast Guard was established. Fairly seldom has foreign fishing vessels refused to comply when they have been given orders from the Norwegian Coast Guard. The reason for this could of course have something to do with an intrinsic respect for military vessels, but it could just as easily be a respect for the deck gun on said vessel, or respect for an official vessel per se. Still, the Norwegian Coast Guard has on several occasions stopped foreign vessels, by force if necessary, if they have shown behaviour of non-compliance (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998: 185-189).

On the other hand, the Coast Guard has on at least one occasion been accused of preferential treatment towards Russian vessels compared to Norwegian vessels or vessels from the EU. In a case where two Spanish vessels were seized and brought to port by the Coast Guard in 2004, the councillor of the plaintiffs wanted to know why a Russian vessel charged with a similar offense was released with only a warning. The reply from the Coast Guard was that they had been instructed to do so by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Inderberg 2007: 93-94). From a security policy point of view there may be several good reasons for showing a Russian vessel more leniency than Spanish ones, but it is a clear violation of the fundamental principle of equality before the law. It is doubtful that a civilian coast guard firmly placed under the Ministry of Justice would have considered weighing principles of law against security policy considerations, or issues relating to the broader picture that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs applies when making decisions. As agents exclusively representing

Norwegian law enforcement, Norwegian Coast Guard personnel would be much more restricted in their exercise of police authority. It is hard for example, to imagine Norwegian police officers considering the nationality of a suspect before making an arrest, even if they are aware that this may cause tension between Norway and the suspect's country.

Crisis management

As part of the judicial and/or military branch of a nation, a coast guard may be called upon to resolve a wide range of crises. Particularly nations such as Norway, with vital interests in maritime industries such as offshore drilling and fishing, have an interest in safeguarding themselves against maritime threats. Especially oil installations are considered to be vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks (NOU 2000: 24). Over the years the Norwegian Coast Guard has had to deal with noncomplying foreign fishing vessels, radical environmentalists and even a Soviet Submarine (Jansen & Blichfeldt 1998). Though some of these situations may have been stressful, none of them escalated to anything that would warrant the term crisis except perhaps two incidents that occurred only a few days apart in 2005. On the 15th of October 2005 the Russian trawler *Elektron* was boarded by the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel *KV Tromsø* in the fishery protection zone off Svalbard. Initially the crew cooperated with the Coast Guard, but on the morning of the 16th the captain told the inspectors on board that he had been instructed by his superiors to resist seizure and headed for the Russian EEZ with the two Norwegian inspectors on board. *KV Tromsø* initiated a hot pursuit of *Elektron*. Several options to forcibly stop *Elektron* were discussed, but all of them involved what was considered an unacceptable risk to human life. The incident was resolved on the 20th of October after *Elektron* had entered Russian territorial waters and met with a warship of the Russian North Fleet. The Norwegian inspectors were then escorted back to *KV Tromsø* and a meeting between the Russian border control authorities and the Norwegian Coast Guard on the alleged fishery transgressions of *Elektron* was held. Less than two days after the *Elektron* incident was resolved, *KV Nordkapp* ordered the Russian trawler *Kapitan Gorbachev* and the factory trawler

Dmitrey Pokramovich to head for Longyearbyen on the grounds of not having filed for permission to transferring of fish from *Kapitan Gorbachev* to *Dmitrey Pokramovich*. Initially the captains of the Russian vessels refused to comply with the orders from the Coast Guard, and it was feared that a repetition of the *Elektron* affair was in the making. The situation was resolved however, when the owners of the vessels agreed to pledge a sufficient amount as a bank guarantee pending trial (Forsvarsdepartementet 2007). At the time of the incidents, only the *Elektron* affair was made public. In both incidents it was deemed necessary to request the assistance of the Armed Forces, which deployed Special Forces in case these were needed to resolve the situations. In the *Elektron* affair, the Special Forces were deemed to be the only viable option for conducting a forced boarding. The media attention this incident attracted in Norway may also have been a contributing factor for deploying such a sharp unit in order to halt the escape of *Elektron*. The decision to deploy Special Forces in the Bjørnøya incident must be attributed to the short timespan since the *Elektron* affair and the fear of a repetition that situation among the decision makers (Engebretsen-Skaret 2012).

The aftermath of these affairs showed that there existed several views on how the law of the Coast Guard should be interpreted. According to some Coast Guard personnel, their interpretation of the law was that while at sea it was them, the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who called the shots and that the prosecuting authorities took over once a seized ship arrived at the docks (Inderberg 2007: 67-68). The Director of public prosecution (*Riksadvokaten*) was alarmed by this and felt the need to remind the Coast Guard and the ministries of §34 of the Law of the Coast Guard that stipulates that whenever the Coast Guard is conducting an investigation or is applying coercive force (against civilians), it is doing so in its capacity as an instrument of the Norwegian prosecuting authority. The Director claimed that a culture of constraint had made the prosecuting authorities too cautious in instructing the Coast Guard on how to handle situations that might occur while performing duties subject to §34, including appropriate use of coercive powers. This had led the Coast Guard to primarily seek to resolve these issues within their own (military) system. The Director feared that this may have resulted in decisions made

while performing civilian investigations may have been based on a security policy considerations, which of course is a clear violation of the principle of an independent prosecution (Inderberg 2007: 91-92).

A study group was appointed to look into how tasks and authority was allocated between the Coast Guard, the Police and the prosecuting authority. They concluded that if Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights are being challenged, then appropriate measures can be taken regardless of whether or not this happens while the Coast Guard is acting as an instrument of the prosecuting authorities. Furthermore, they concluded that it would be impossible to draw a clear line between the exercise of authority and asserting sovereignty and sovereign rights that would cover all potential eventualities. They also found that the Norwegian coast guard model, where the coast guard is an integrated part of the Armed Forces, creates flexibility as it empowers the Coast Guard to attend to several state interests simultaneously, and that it may have a preventive effect by raising the bar for other powers that may wish to challenge Norwegian sovereign rights. While seemingly content with the organizational structure and the general state of the Norwegian Coast Guard, the study group saw the need to further develop notification procedures for situations that lies in the borderland between the exercising of authority and the assertion of sovereignty and sovereign rights as these situations will potentially involve a wide range of government agencies (Forsvarsdepartementet 2007: 31-32).

The Elektron and Bjørnøya affairs revealed some potentially troubling issues with how the Norwegian Coast Guard differentiate between its role as a military organization charged with asserting Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights on the one hand, and as an instrument of the prosecuting authority on the other. Both cases indicate that the Coast Guard considers itself to a larger extent as military organization rather than as an instrument of the prosecuting authorities. While the fact that the prosecuting authorities showed reluctance to instruct the Coast Guard in their performance of their duties of course contributed to this view within the Coast Guard, it is also probable that it was to a large extent shaped as a result of the Norwegian coast guard model. Not only is the Norwegian Coast Guard part of the Armed Forces, most of the personnel,

and all of the personnel with decision making powers, are military with training from the Naval Schools. As such their code of conduct differs from that of civilian authorities. This is not to say that Coast Guard personnel are unprofessional, but rather that their education stems from the military which may have a different approach to situations than civilian authorities. Recently the Coast Guard has endeavoured, in cooperation with the prosecuting authorities, to resolve more cases of fishery crime where the suspected culprit is a foreign vessel at sea. Previously the Coast Guard used to order suspected vessels to Norwegian ports where the prosecuting authorities then take over (Sjef Kystvakten 2014). This indicates the prosecuting authority is now involved at an earlier stage when the Coast Guard is acting on their behalf, and more thoroughly than what seemed to be the case prior to the Elektron and Bjørnøya incidents.

Regional and international cooperation

The Norwegian Coast Guard cooperates with many regional and international actors through forums such as the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum (NACGF), the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and the Nordic Coast Guard Forum (*Nordisk kystvaktssamarbeid*). In addition they have formal bilateral cooperation with Russia, the Nordic countries and the United States among others (Sjef Kystvakten 2014). These forums and extensive bilateral cooperation is important for promoting maritime confidence and security building measures and for maintaining the regime of good order at sea that exist in the North Atlantic and the High North. It is probable that the Norwegian coast guard model has limited impact on how the cooperation with these forums and countries is conducted. In all of the forums the Norwegian Coast Guard participates, there are member states that follow all of the different coast guard models mentioned in chapter two, so one can safely assume that the forums are not adversely affected by the case of Norway. As for the Coast Guards bilateral cooperation, most of these countries are NATO allies or have close connection to Norway through other international organizations. Cooperation between Norway and these countries is thus

so extensive that I find it improbable that the Norwegian coast guard model has any significant effect on these relations.

A notable exception to this is the case of Russia. Relations with the Soviet Union were a substantial part of the discussion of how the Norwegian Coast Guard was to be organized in the 1970s. As I have already mentioned, some argued that a Coast Guard organized under the Armed Forces would prove provocative for the USSR and that this posed a potential security threat to Norway. While the Stoltenberg committee dismissed these concerns on the basis that coast guards operated by navies was a common occurrence, the choice to establish the Norwegian Coast Guard as a separate organization within the Naval Forces may have been done to appease the Soviet Union. To further differentiate the Coast Guard from the rest of the Naval Forces, its vessels and helicopters were distinguished from the other naval units by the word KYSTVAKT, meaning coast guard in Norwegian, painted in large black capital letters on its exterior (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 467). In some way this follows the Norwegian security policy of deterrence and appeasement that has characterized its relation to the Soviet Union and Russia since the beginning of the cold war. As membership of NATO was meant as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, the naval affiliation of the Coast Guard is thought to raise the bar for Soviet interference against the Coast Guard. Conversely Norway appeased the Soviet Union with its base policy, which banned NATO countries from establishing bases or having combat units permanently stationed in Norway. The limited military capabilities of the Coast Guard and the clear marking of its vessels and helicopters could similarly appease the Soviet Union by showing that the main purpose of the Coast Guard was of a civilian character.¹⁷

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and incursions into eastern Ukraine, the relations between Russia and Norway has become strained. Along with the EU and other western nations, Norway has placed economic sanctions on Russia, which has replied with similar sanctions in return. Norway has also suspended all scheduled military activity with Russia for the year 2014. However, the Ministry of Defence assures that

¹⁷ On the Norwegian policy of deterrence and appeasement, see for example Skogrand, Kjetil (2004).

collaboration will continue in Coast Guard, Border Guard and search-and-rescue activities as well as the workings of the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Contact between the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the Northern Fleet will continue as well. This is to ensure the safety of all parties in northern marine areas and to maintain stability and predictability in our immediate region (Forsvarsdepartementet 2014a).

Russia is, by their own accounts, the Norwegian Coast Guard's most important international partner related to fishery and resource control (Sjef Kystvakten 2014). This indicates that even though the Norwegian Coast Guard is a part of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Norwegian coast guard model enables the Norwegian Government to differentiate it from the rest of the Armed Forces when needed. Russia has also seemingly accepted this differentiation and the cooperation between Russia and Norway in this area have proceeded as it would under normal circumstances. It should be specified that Russia has signalled that it would prefer a reversion to status quo vis-à-vis the West and therefore has a clear interest in not arguing on this point. In addition, Russia probably shares the same interest as Norway in keeping general good order at sea in the High North. Still, Russia has in some areas retaliated with sanctions of their own, for example on the import of Norwegian salmon. Having a civilian or naval coast guard model where coast guard vessels are clearly distinguishable from naval vessels in times of tension is particularly beneficial since all military action is more sensitive in these situations (Bateman 2003). For a naval coast guard this presupposes that the opponent shares this distinction. It is uncertain that Russia does this, as it has been known to refer to Norwegian Coast Guard vessels as naval vessels (which they technically of course are). While one may on this basis argue that a civilian coast guard is the least provocative option in these situation, followed by a naval coast guard, and then a navy, one could with the same logic then claim that the introduction of warships would be viewed as a more provocative escalation of the situation in the first example.

As the situation with Russia is today, an incident of a similar kind as the Elektron and Bjørnøya affairs could very well lead to an uncertain spiral of events. If the Coast

Guard should find itself in a similar situation as during the Elektron incident, it would therefore probably do well to keep the situation at the lowest possible military level and resolve the situation within its capacity as an instrument of the Norwegian prosecuting authorities.

4.4 The cost-benefit dimension

As has already been established in chapter three, one of the main reasons for why the Norwegian Coast Guard from its inception was designed to be a military organization, was that it was believed that this would be the most cost-effective solution. In this section I will look at certain aspects of where the Norwegian coast guard model is thought to be cost-effective and see if this assumption holds any merit.

A cuckoo chick?

As mentioned in chapter three, certain elements feared the creation of a Norwegian Coast Guard for funding reasons. A popular coast guard would develop into a cuckoo chick that would grow larger and larger at the Navy's expense, potentially eradicating it (kicking it out of its nest), or at least severely cripple its funding over time. Figure 7 and 8 depicts the development in funding for the Norwegian Coast Guard and the rest of the Naval Forces in the last fifteen years.¹⁸ Figure 7 show that the Coast Guard saw a doubling of its funding in nominal terms from 500 million NOK in 2000, to 1 billion in 2010, a level that has since been kept stable. The Naval Forces on the other hand, was subject to severe budget cuts between 2000 and 2007, before a large increase from then until 2014. If we view the numbers in percentage of the total allowance to the Norwegian Naval Forces, as shown in figure 7, this reveals that the Coast Guard has increased its share of the annual budget from roughly 15 till 23 percent. Conversely the rest of the Naval Forces has seen its share decreased from 85 till 77 percent.

¹⁸ These numbers are based on numbers found in Prop. 1 S for the years (2000-2001) till (2014-2015).

Funding for the Coast Guard and the Naval Forces




Figure 7: Funding for the Coast Guard and the rest of the Naval Forces. Numbers are in million NOK.

Share of total naval budget allocated to the Coast Guard and the Naval Forces




Figure 8: Share of total naval budget allocated to the Coast Guard and the rest of the Naval Forces.

These numbers could probably be interpreted in many ways. One could argue that the actual amount of funding has increased for both the Naval Forces and the Coast Guard since 2000 and disclaim the cuckoo chick theory on this basis alone. The graph depicting the yearly funding in percentage does, however, tell a somewhat different story. If this trend was to repeat itself, the Coast Guard would eventually receive more funding than the Navy (as part of the Naval Forces) in the long term. Like with most numbers it is essential to put them into context with the actual events that transpired in this period in order to make more sense of them. Firstly, the fluctuation in the funding for the Naval Forces during the 2000s can to a large extent be explained by the decommissioning of a large part of the Navy's vessels, 31 to be exact. In the same period the Navy commissioned six *Skjold* class corvettes and five *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates (Gjelsten et.al. 2010: 533-534). As these new vessels have gradually become operational, the funding has increased well above the level it was on in 2000.

Furthermore, it is likely that the vast increase in funding for the Coast Guard that occurred in the 2000s is not going to repeat itself any time soon. The reason is that this increase in funding is closely related to Norway's recent emphasis on the High North as an area of top priority for economic development and research. This required substantial investments in coast guard capabilities such as towing, firefighting and oil spill preventing measures. Within the Norwegian coast guard model, the Coast Guard was the natural organization to be given these responsibilities and capabilities. This increase in funding resulted in several new coast guard vessels in the period, including all the littoral coast guard vessels, *KV Harstad*, the *Barentshav* class vessels, and the flagship of the Norwegian Coast Guard, the icebreaker *KV Svalbard*.¹⁹ I want to stress that the numbers for the time period show a trend that occurred during the 2000s. It is this trend that I find likely not to occur a second time unless Norway suddenly discovers a new sea-based area that would merit the same kind of attention that the High North attracted in this period. There is still a possibility that the Coast Guard could still grow at the expense of the Navy in the future, but there is little in these

¹⁹ See the appendix for further details on the capabilities of the Norwegian Coast Guard vessels.

numbers to sustain that claim seeing as the level of funding of the Coast Guard has stabilized in the last five years.

Of course, had Norway had a navies as coast guards model, the allocations for securing the High North would probably have benefitted the Navy, though there is no certainty that the end result would have been to the Navy's liking. For example, one could easily imagine that both the Navy's frigate and corvette programmes would have been affected as these were planned and executed in the same period as the modernization of the Coast Guard occurred. Given that the *Skjold* programme was highly controversial both within and outside the Armed Forces (Gjelsten 2007), it is doubtful that the Navy would have received funding to commission as many vessels as the Coast Guard and Navy have been able to do as separate organizations during the 2000s. Rather there are two other scenarios that would have been more likely; 1) fewer specialized vessels of the sort that operate in the Navy and the Coast Guard today would have been the result, or 2) Norway would have opted for less specialized vessels that could perform both coast guard and navy duties. Had Norway had a civilian coast guard model, there would probably not have been a vast difference in the investments during the 2000s other than that the new coast guard vessels would have had similar or even more inferior military capabilities than the ones operating today.

Still, with the scheduled decommissioning of all of the Nordkapp-class vessels around 2020, the Coast Guard will require new vessels. It is still uncertain what the capabilities of these new vessels will be, but considering the vast area the Nordkapp-class vessels are covering today, it is unimaginable that they will not be having hangars and helicopter decks suited for the new NH-90 helicopters. The investments needed for these new vessels, and the costs related to operating them, could mean a new increase in the Coast Guard budget. The political capital invested in the High North initiative by successive governments indicate that it will be politically difficult to commission replacements for the Nordkapp-class vessels that are not considered to be on par with the proclaimed importance of the area. The fact of the matter is that a coast guard is charged with performing highly visible and popular tasks that can measurably be done better with more funding. A navy, on the other hand, is charged

with tasks that have no practical day to day immediate use for the population, seemingly just sailing around in expensive vessels. It could very well be that this will also in the future benefit an increase in Norwegian funding for the Coast Guard at the detriment of the Navy. It is therefore hard, from a naval power point of view, to argue that the civilian and naval coast guard models do not pose a latent economic threat for the navies operating under these models. “Luckily” for the Norwegian Navy, the resent aggressive behaviour from Russia has seemingly actualized their reason of existence along with the rest of the Armed Forces.

Synergy effects of the Norwegian coast guard model

Generally speaking, the military is not known for being the most economically sensible of organizations. Certainly the Norwegian Armed Forces has at least until recently had a reputation for being a bloated and somewhat inefficient organization with limited budgetary control. This was crowned in 2005 when the Armed Forces reported a deficit of roughly one billion NOK for the year 2004 (NRK 2005). It is thought that commissioning of vessels and recruitment of personnel is both more expensive and time consuming for a coast guard operating within the military, than it is for a civilian organization of similar size and scope (Østhagen 2014). With regard to the commissioning of vessels, I have already touched upon this previously in this thesis. While the commissioning of the Nordkapp-class showed that this assumption may hold some merit, procurements done by the Coast Guard since then has showed that this is not necessarily longer the case. Currently all of the Coast Guard vessels are, or have been, on lease from civilian shipping companies with the exception of the Nordkapp-class vessels and *KV Svalbard*. This means that they have been built without the military specifications that made the Nordkapp-class vessels so prohibitively expensive. Their specifications and capabilities also indicate that these vessels have been built solely with the interests of the Coast Guard in mind. This is in line with the concept of the dual navy as previously mentioned.

As we have seen in this thesis, the Norwegian Coast Guard is tasked with performing a wide range of duties from assisting the Armed Forces, policing Norwegian waters, to be part of the Norwegian environmental preparedness and SAR programmes. This requires highly skilled personnel that would probably be expensive to train regardless of whatever coast guard model was in use in Norway. Of course many countries have opted to burden their coast guard with fewer tasks. The Canadian civilian Coast Guard for example has no law enforcement authority. They must therefore escort members of the Royal Mounted Police if they are to enforce Canadian law in Canadian waters (Østhagen 2014). The Swedish Coast Guard, which is also civilian, has its own education programme that graduates approximately 20 cadets each year from an eighteen month or two year programme. The education is mainly focused on the various policing assignments of the Swedish Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen 2014). The men and women serving in the Norwegian Coast Guard receive most of their education from the Naval Schools along with other naval cadets. After being assigned to the Coast Guard, officers receive additional education specifically for Coast Guard personnel that deals with issues of law, assertion of sovereignty and fishery inspection (Kystvakten 2011).

Within the areas of commissioning of vessels and education of personnel, the Norwegian Coast Guard make use of already existing elements within the Armed Forces that would otherwise have to be established. It is hard to ascertain the amount of resources the Armed Forces uses specifically for commissioning Coast Guard vessels and educating Coast Guard personnel, but it is probable that a duplication of these institutions to cater for a relative small organization such as the Norwegian Coast Guard would be more expensive. I should stress that this is probably more so the case for small coast guards. For larger coast guards there is probably not that much money saved, perhaps even money lost by joining forces with naval academies. Examples of this would be Japan Coast Guard and the US Coast Guard. Japan Coast Guard has approximately 12 000 employees. The US Coast Guard has about 50 000 permanent employees, in addition to roughly 40 000 reservists and auxiliary volunteers (USCG

2014).²⁰ The Norwegian Coast Guard on the other hand, has 370 permanent employees in addition to the conscripts.

Recently Norway has experienced that there is a large gap in the quality of the education provided by the different universities and colleges in Norway where the smaller institutions are all at the bottom ties of the spectrum. This has in large part been attributed to the limited level of academic environment that small institutions can sustain. The limited amount of academic staff and student mass results in deficit of academic discourse and a vulnerability in the academic quality in these institutions compared to larger ones (Kunnskapsdepartementet 2014). While organizations that have as many employees as Japanese and American Coast Guards, have no trouble in running large institutions for educating their personnel, this is not the case for small coastal states.

The Norwegian coast guard model probably save the Norwegian tax payers vast amount of money in the areas of infrastructure, surveillance and command and control. The Norwegian Coast Guard only operates a single base, their headquarters at Sortland, themselves. This base, apart from housing the staff that keeps the Coast Guard running, resupplies and maintains the Coast Guard vessels that operate in the High North. The Coast Guard vessels that mainly operate in the southern waters of Norway are dependent on the use of the Navy's base Haakonsværn near Bergen.

The cooperation between the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Armed Forces is extensive. The Norwegian coast guard model enables the Coast Guard to request assistance from the Armed Forces if this is deemed necessary. This expands the means available to resolve crises, such as the previously mentioned Elektron affair, but in most cases the assistance provided to the Coast Guard from the Armed Forces is of a more mundane character. The Coast Guard make extensive use of the Air Forces' helicopters and aircraft for surveillance purposes. While the Coast Guard has to pay

²⁰ While officially a civilian coast guard, some scholars argue that the US has a naval coast guard model similar to Norway. The main reason for this is that even though it is organized under the US Department of Homeland Security, it will be sorted under the Navy in case of crisis or war. In addition the USGC has a militarized organizational structure (Bateman: 2003). Further evidence to this claim could be that the web page address of the USCG is USCG.mil, not USCG.com.

the Air Force for these services, which totalled for 7% of last year Coast Guard budget (Sjef Kystvakten 2014), it is not burdened with costs related to maintenance, storage and crew.

The Coast Guard also makes use of the Armed Forces' command and control system. This system is operational 24/7, 365 days a year. This system is manned by a highly skilled and trained crew, operating advanced communication and electronic equipment that has been requisitioned over time and requires continuous updating. The information and assessment of the current situation at sea that this command centre produces, is readily available to the Coast Guard as a military organization (Gjelsten & Melien 2007: 15). In contrast to the use of the Air Forces' helicopters, the Coast Guard does not pay the Armed Forces for the services they receive from the military command structure. The grade and type of information a command centre of this kind produces is not easily duplicated by a civilian replica as much of the information gathered is by equipment not available to civilian organizations. A civilian replica would still need to invest substantially in advanced and costly equipment, and hire a large staff in order to operate around the clock. It is quite clear that in this regard the Norwegian Coast Guard saves a substantial amount of money by not having to duplicate this feature. This is evident in its account for 2013 that showed that 90% of the Coast Guards expenses were directly related to operative activities (Sjef Kystvakten 2014).

5 Concluding Remarks

The Norwegian Coast Guard was established based on a model that was supposed to ensure a competent management of good order at sea in the vast areas that fell under Norwegian jurisdiction during the great sea grabs of the 1970s and 1980s. The model was also supposed to be cost-beneficial for the relative small coastal state of Norway by ensuring that superfluous duplications of already existing infrastructure were avoided.

In this concluding chapter I will summarize the main findings of this thesis. The inferences drawn will be used to answer the research questions:

1) What are the most prominent advantages and disadvantages of the Norwegian coast guard model?

2) What trade-offs would other coast guard models entail for Norway?

Furthermore it will entail a short discussion on the potential wider implications of these findings and some thoughts on future research projects within the subject.

5.1 Main Findings

The objective of this thesis is to analyse the Norwegian coast guard model. Based on the comprehensive theory of Seapower by Geoffrey Till, I created a model depicting three different ideal types of coast guards: the civilian coast guard, the naval coast guard and the navies as coast guards. Identifying the Norwegian coast guard model as a version of the naval coast guard model, I developed this model to contain a more accurate description of the Norwegian coast guard model. This model was then subjected to an analysis based on three dimensions. Two of these dimensions, the naval power dimension and the good order at sea dimension, are the two dimensions that form the basis of Geoffrey Till's theory of Seapower. The last dimension, the cost-benefit dimension, was included on the basis that the analysis needed to account for a coast guard model existing in a universe where the phenomenon being studied is a

small organization with limited resources. Based on this premise, this thesis has made several findings within each of the dimensions. I will first present these findings separately, before I draw a conclusion based on all the inferences drawn.

The Norwegian coast guard model has been shown to be a flexible model within the naval power dimension. By being an integrated part of the Norwegian Naval Forces, the Coast Guard has on several occasions been able to alleviate or assist the Navy in performing its tasks if the Navy's resources have been stretched too thin. This was last evident during operation RECSYR when *KV Andenes* took over the operation from the Navy frigate *KNM Helge Ingstad*, as this had to return to Norwegian waters when another frigate, *KNM Fridtjof Nansen*, left to participate in the RIMPAC exercise. By taking most of the responsibility for the low intensity, high frequency tasks of asserting sovereignty and sovereign rights in sea areas under Norwegian jurisdiction, the Coast Guard has also enabled the Navy to focus more of its attention on training for war fighting and engaging in naval diplomacy. These are areas where the civilian coast guard model would struggle to be as efficient. It is unlikely that a civilian organization would be able to seamlessly (or at all) replace a military vessel in the middle of a military operation. Some proponents of the naval coast guard model also argue that the low level military presence, such as that a grey painted coast guard vessel represent, is beneficial for security policy reasons, but this has been harder to ascertain.

While initially burdened with military equipment of limited use, recent additions to the Norwegian Coast Guard Fleet has shown that there is nothing intrinsic with the Norwegian coast guard model that stops the Coast Guard from investing in vessels that are specialised for the various good order at sea tasks that is its primary reason of existence. The Danish case could imply that the same cannot be said of the navies as coast guards model.

The Norwegian Coast Guard is reported to be on relatively good terms with both national and foreign fishers. However, findings indicate that the Norwegian Coast Guard has in some cases valued bilateral relations above the principle of equality

before the law. The Elektron and Bjørnøya affair also showed that the Norwegian Coast Guard perceived itself to be torn between the differing opinions of representatives of the Ministry of Justice on the one hand and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs on the other on how to handle such incidents. It is not unlikely that as a military organization, the Norwegian Coast Guard may be inclined to put most weight on the latter. Conversely, it is probable that a civilian coast guard firmly placed under the auspices of the Ministry of justice, would not be subjected to these kinds of conflict, for better or worse.

The Norwegian Coast Guard maintains extensive cooperation with other coast guards and in several forums. Given the lack of consensus of coast guard models in the world, it is unlikely that the Norwegian coast guard model makes much of a difference in this regard. A notable exception is in Norway's dealings with Russia. The recent tension with Russia has resulted in the freezing of all military collaboration with Russia. The Coast Guard has been exempted from this freeze and are able to continue their work as normal. This distinction may not have been as easy to make had Norway followed a navies as coast guards model.

My analysis has showed that even though the Coast Guard saw its budget almost double in the 2000s, it is not necessarily so that the Norwegian coast guard model has resulted in moving funding from the Navy to the Coast Guard. The spike in funding for the Coast Guard could rather be attributed to the heightened interest in the High North among the Norwegian Governments in the period. Still, there is no denying that the Norwegian Coast Guard has recently seen its share of the total naval budget increase compared to the Navy. New commissions in the near future and the discrepancy in the nature of tasks between a coast guard and a navy could indicate that civilian and naval coast guard models are more prone to allocate a larger part of their naval budget to cater for coast guard tasks, than is the case in a navies as coast guards model.

In terms of reducing costs, the Norwegian coast guard model, with the extensive cooperation between the Coast Guard and the Armed Forces, is in all likelihood a

formidable success. Several institutions such as schools, bases and command and control centres that the Coast Guard make use of, are operated by the Armed Forces. The extra cost for the Armed Forces in order to cater for the needs of the Coast Guard probably dwarves in comparison to the cost involved with having to duplicate these in order to run a civilian coast guard.

It is the finding of this thesis that the flexibility of the Norwegian coast guard model is an advantage in terms of naval power compared to a civilian coast guard model, though a navies as coast guards model could potentially yield similar results. There are potential pitfalls concerning exercise of authority that the Norwegian coast guard model, by having a military affiliation, seem to be more prone to than a civilian coast guard model. Whether the recent extension of cooperation between the Coast Guard and the prosecuting authority will mitigate these tendencies remain to be seen. The Norwegian Coast Guard has the capability to more forcefully enforce its country's jurisdiction than its Swedish counterpart has. However, the civilian coast guard model does not prevent armament of vessels, so this has not been classified as an advantage of the more militarized models over the civilian coast guard model. The sometimes strained relationship Norway has with Russia makes it likely that it is an advantage that Norway does not have a navies as coast guards model. It is more difficult to ascertain whether or not a civilian coast guard model would be even more beneficial in this regard than the Norwegian coast guard model. The cost-benefit dimension probably has a deep impact on the Norwegian coast guard model. It is probable that there are huge savings involved with making use of already existing institutions and equipment in the Armed Forces rather than duplicating these for an organization with such limited size as the Norwegian Coast Guard.

5.2 Wider Implications

The aggregated findings of this thesis confirm that the Norwegian coast guard model is well adapted to be a strengthening factor of Norwegian Seapower. Correctly utilized the, the model enables the Norwegian Navy and the Norwegian Coast Guard to play

on each other's strengths and mitigate each other's weaknesses. Militarization of Norwegian jurisdiction and siphoning of the Navy's funding by the Coast Guard are the model's two largest threats to Norwegian Seapower. While this is potentially an inherent threat of the model, the thesis has shown that these drawbacks can be prevented from occurring within the constraints of the model. It seems probable that Norway would be better served with avoiding the threats of the Norwegian coast guard model than contemplating transforming it along the lines of the civilian coast guard model or the navies as coast guards model. Børresen (2004b. 274) argues that *coastal navies should... be tailor made to fit the local environment*. It is the finding of this thesis that the Norwegian coast guard model is a coast guard model that to a substantial degree does just that.

5.3 Thoughts on Future Research

As this thesis is based on a single case study of the Norwegian coast guard model and how this model affects Norwegian Seapower. This limits the generalisations that can be made based on the inferences drawn in this thesis. Børresen's words that coastal navies should be tailor made to fit the local environment is a clear indication that studies of coast guard models in coastal states should be performed in a qualitative manner lest inferences be drawn on faulty grounds. This is perhaps true, but in my limited study of the Danish and Swedish coast guard, I found that the challenges they face are not that different from that of Norway's. Further comparative studies of coast guard models applied in coastal states would therefore probably yield interesting results.

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Appendix I

Norwegian Coast Guard Vessels









	Class	Com.	Disp.	length	Knots	Crew	Armament	
	Nordkapp class							
	KV Senja, W 320	1981	3 200	105 m	21	50		
	KV Nordkapp, W 321	1981	3 200	105 m	21	50	57 mm Bofors	
	KV Andenes, W 322	1982	3 200	105 m	21	50		
	KV Svalbard, W 303	2002	6 375	104 m	18	50	57 mm Bofors	
Offshore Coast Guard	KV Ålesund, W 312	1996	1 375	63 m	18	20-25	40 mm Bofors 12,7 mm machine gun	
	KV Harstad, W 318	2005	3 132	83 m	18	27	40 mm Bofors 12,7 mm machine gun	
	Barentshav class							
	KV Barentshav, W 340	2008	4 000	94 m	20	40	40 mm Bofors 12,7 mm machine gun	
KV Sortland, W 341	2009	4 000	94 m	20	40			
	KV Bergen, W 342	2009	4 000	94 m	20	40		
Littoral Coast Guard	Nornen class							
	KV Nornen, W 330	2006	761	47 m	16	13		
	KV Farm, W 331	2006	761	47 m	16	13		
	KV Heimdal, W 332	2006	761	47 m	16	13	12,7 mm machine gun	
	KV Njord, W 333	2007	761	47 m	16	13		
	KV Tor, W 334	2007	761	47 m	16	13		
Reine class								
	KV Magnus Lagabøte, W 335	2011/2013	791	50 m	16	32	12,7 mm machine gun	

Figure 9 Norwegian Coast Guard Vessels

Vessels in the Offshore Coast Guard

The *Nordkapp class* vessels were commissioned soon after the establishment of the Norwegian Coast Guard in 1977. These vessels have been refitted and modernized on several occasions and have seen action in in as incomparable conditions as the Antarctic and the Persian Gulf. As earlier stated, when considering their coast guard purpose, the Nordkapp

class has been burdened with military specifications such as advance weapons system and secondary propulsion systems. These requirements have a substantial impact on their maintenance budget.

KV Ålesund is, apart from the Nordkapp class vessels, the oldest ship in the Coast Guard. Its area of operation is usually in the Norwegian EEZ below the 65th parallel. It was built in 1996 and has since been on lease from Fosnavåg Shipping. The Ministry of Defence is planning to replace *KV Ålesund* when its current leasing contract expires in 2016. The new vessel will have equipped with more military capabilities and be able to carry the new NH-90 helicopters (Stige, 2013). This indicates that the new vessel will be state owned.

KV Svalbard, commissioned in 2002, is the Navy's largest vessel in terms of tonnage and is specially designed for operations in Arctic waters. With ice-strengthened hull, powerful diesel electric propulsion machinery, and de-frosting system, the vessel is built to be able to pierce a meter of solid ice, or four meters of cracked ice. Apart from the three Nordkapp class vessels, *KV Svalbard* is the only helicopter carrying vessel in the Coast Guard. *KV Svalbard* normally operates in the waters around Svalbard performing tasks such as assertion of sovereignty, resource control, search and rescue, oil spill recovery, diving assistance and towing

KV Harstad is a vessel with several capabilities that the Coast Guard had not been in possession of prior to its commission in 2005. The vessel is well equipped for oil spill recovery with mounted booms as well as tanks that can hold up to 1,000 tons of recovered oil. *KV Harstad* was designed to strengthen Norway's sea readiness capabilities, and can singlehandedly carry out towing, firefighting and oil recovery. In addition *KV Harstad* is equipped to carry the NATO submarine rescue system and can act as a platform for the Navy's underwater vehicle. Substantial tank capacity makes *KV Harstad* a durable vessel that is able to operate for long periods without being resupplied. The Coast Guard originally leased *KV Harstad* from Søviknes verft, but the Ministry of Defence decided to purchase the vessel in 2009.

The Barentshav class vessels are three vessels that have been leased from Remøy Management since their commissioning in 2008 and 2009. They have a very good environmental profile, as they are equipped with machinery that can utilize natural gas. In many respects, the Barents Sea class vessels are evolved versions of *KV Harstad*, having similar firefighting, towing and oil recovery capabilities. *KV Sortland* is also equipped with

the same submarine rescue system as KV Harstad.

Vessels in the Littoral Coast Guard

The Nornen class vessels were built specifically for coast guard duties in littoral waters. The vessels were built by Remøy Shipping and originally leased from Remøy Management after their completion in 2006 and 2007. However, the Ministry of Defence decided to purchase the vessels in 2011 for a total of 477, 5 million NOK. The Ministry expected to save a total of 111 million NOK by the end of the ships 30 year lifespan. The vessels are equipped with both fixed and mobile booms in addition to drainage equipment to combat oil spills. The vessels have the capacity to store 150 cubic meters of oil. The Nornen class is also rigged for towing other vessels. The Nornen class is in addition equipped with small high speed patrol boats. These boats have a large operational radius and are very well suited for search and rescue and other emergency operations.

KV Magnus Lagabøte, is a Reine class ship that was transferred from the Naval Home Guard (Sjøheimevernet) in 2013. The Reine class a slightly modified version of the Nornen class that were built for the Naval Home Guard to function as multi-purpose vessels. They therefore have the ability to load/offload and store multi-purpose vehicles and containers on its aft deck. Unlike the Nornen class vessels, KV Magnus Lagabøte is still on lease from Remøy Management. Only two versions of the Reine class ships were built. KV Magnus Lagabøtes sister ship, the SHV Olav Trygvason, was transferred to the Navy's logistics branch.

Source: The Norwegian Armed Forces webpage

<http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/utstyrsfakta/sjo/Sider/sjo.aspx>

Appendix II

Norwegian Maritime Boundaries




Figure 10 Norwegian Maritime Boundaries

Norway's 200-mile zones

In 1976 Norway established an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from its baselines. Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Norway has sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone for the purpose of exploring, exploiting and managing both the living and non-living natural resources.

In 1977, in accordance with the Act of 17 December 1976 relating to the Economic Zone of Norway, a fisheries protection zone was established around Svalbard. The Fisheries Protection Zone is a 200-nautical-mile zone around the Svalbard archipelago. The regulatory

measures for fisheries in the zone are non-discriminatory and take into account previous fishing patterns in the area. The objective of establishing fisheries protection zone was primarily to achieve control and restriction of fishing in the area in order to conserve resources and avoid unregulated fishing.

In 1980 Norway established a fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, also under the Act relating to the Economic Zone of Norway. The fisheries zone extends 200 nautical miles from the baselines apart from where it meets the zones of Iceland and Denmark (Greenland). Jan Mayen is not a full economic zone, but a zone which is limited to fishery purposes. In contrast to the coast along the Norwegian mainland, there has not been established a particular fishery zone around Jan Mayen. The regulations for foreigners fishing in the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, is basically equivalent to the regulations regarding the Norwegian EEZ.

Svalbard and Jan Mayen

Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard was recognised under the Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920. The Svalbard Treaty entered into force on 14 August 1925, and from the same day Svalbard became part of the Kingdom of Norway, in accordance with the Act of 17 July 1925 relating to Svalbard. Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard is undisputed and generally recognised. Under the Svalbard Treaty, Norway undertook certain specific obligations under international law related to the archipelago, including ensuring equal treatment of all nationals and companies of parties to the treaty as regards certain activities within the geographical scope of the treaty.

In the Svalbard Treaty, Svalbard is defined as the islands situated between specified geographical coordinates. Some of the provisions also apply to the territorial waters, which now extend to the 12-nautical-mile limit. Norway annexed Jan Mayen in 1929 and the Act of 27 February 1930 relating to Jan Mayen gave the island status as part of the Kingdom of Norway. Norwegian sovereignty over Jan Mayen is undisputed.

Sources: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Fisheries and Industry.

<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/reports-to-the-storting/2011-2012/meld-st-7-20112012-2/5.html?id=697752>

<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nfd/selected-topics/catches-quotas-and-concessions/rydde-internasjonalt/fiskevernsonen-ved-svalbard-og-fiskeriso.html?id=445285>

Appendix III

On Translations

As this thesis is centered on the Norwegian Coast Guard, I have found that in some cases translations from Norwegian to English can yield confusing results. Below is therefore a list of the translations of agencies and organizations that are mentioned in this thesis along with a short explanation.

Chief of Defence	<i>Forsvarssjefen</i> . Highest ranking military officer of the Norwegian Armed Forces, second only to the King of Norway.
Coastal Administration	<i>Kystverket</i> . Government agency responsible for monitoring traffic along the Norwegian coast.
Directorate of Fisheries	<i>Fiskeridirektoratet</i> . Government agency with responsibility for fisheries and aquaculture management.
Dual Navy	<i>Det todelte Sjøforsvar</i> . A concept developed by the Norwegian Naval Staff in the 1990s that in large part defines the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard.
The Law of the Coast Guard	<i>Kystvaktloven</i> .
Littoral Coast Guard	<i>Indre kystvakt</i> . The Littoral Coast Guard is a branch of the Norwegian Coast Guard that mainly operates within the territorial waters of mainland Norway
Offshore Coast Guard	<i>Ytre kystvakt</i> . The Offshore Coast Guard is a branch of the Coast Guard that mainly operates in the Norwegian EEZ, the fishery protection zone around Svalbard, and the fishery zone around Jan Mayen.
Mapping Authority	<i>Kartverket</i> . The Norwegian Mapping Authority Hydrographic Service is responsible for preparing and updating nautical charts, and covers all marine and coastal waters in Norway and around Svalbard, as well as polar waters.
The Norwegian Naval Forces	<i>Sjøforsvaret</i> . The Norwegian Naval Forces currently consists of four branches: the Navy, the Coast Guard, The Naval Schools, and the naval bases. The official

English translation of Sjøforsvaret is The Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN), but this translation makes it difficult to differentiate between the Navy branch of the RNoN, and the Royal Norwegian Navy as a whole.

The Navy

Kysteskadren (popularly known as Marinen in Norway). The Navy is responsible for the manning, training and maintenance of the Norwegian naval units and their associated operational support units. The Navy officially calls themselves the Norwegian fleet to differentiate themselves from the RNoN, but this would translation would make the thesis less coherent as this is a distinction in little use among other navies.

Naval bases

Sjøforsvarets orlogsstasjoner. The Navy has two naval bases which function as operational and logistical hubs. The main naval base is Haakonsværn Orlogsstasjon located 15 km (10 miles) outside the center of Bergen on Norway's southwest coast. Haakonsværn is a “full pitstop” facility containing all necessary resources to support the RNoN in its day-to-day operations. The other naval base is Ramsund naval base in Northern Norway. This facility has a more limited capability, but still serves as an important logistical facility in the high North.

The Naval Schools

Sjøforsvarets skoler. **The Naval Schools** are responsible for the recruitment and education of naval personnel of all categories. Main units are the Naval Academy, the naval recruit depot at HNoMS Harald Haarfagre and the main naval training centre, HNoMS Tordenskjold.

The Naval Staff

Sjøforsvarsstaben.