UNDERSTANDING THE MAKING OF REDD AND THE KALIMANTAN FOREST AND
CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP (KFCP) IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN
THROUGH DIFFERENT MODES OF ENGAGEMENT

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Understanding the making of REDD and the Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (KFCP) in Central Kalimantan through different modes of engagement

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Abstract

This is primarily an investigation of a large Australian initiated Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Demonstration activity known as Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (KFCP) in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.

This thesis is based on fieldwork among villagers living along the Kapuas River in Central Kalimantan who are participating in KFCP, as well as with NGOs, which are working with the project, and NGOs that are working against the project. Based on my findings from my fieldwork with the aforementioned actors, I argue in this thesis that ground dynamics that are constitutive of the REDD/KFCP process in Central Kalimantan comprise three modes of political engagement, which I name: *peasant*, *political* and *administrative*.

I view the activity with REDD in general in Central Kalimantan and within the KFCP-area in particular in relation to the emerging possibilities that the post-Suharto landscape is offering. I argue that NGO`s such as WALHI and AMAN frame REDD within a "fighting"- ethos (*perjuangan*)- and use REDD/KFCP as a tool to re-politicise issues which under the authoritarian Suharto was not doable.

Acknowledgement

List of Abbreviations

AMAN   Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago

BOS   Borneo Orangutang Survival

BPD   Badan Perwakilan Desa, Village representative council

CIFOR   Center for International Forest Research

REDD   Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

TP   Tim Pengawas   (village) Monitoring Team

TPK   Tim Pengelola Kegiatan (village) Activities Management

YPD   Yahasan Petak Danum, Foundation for Land and Water,

WALHI   The Indonesian Forum for the Environment

Table of Content

Chapter 3: Democratic state-making processes and the art of resistance: Surveillance, collaborations and negotiations within the KFCP-area 46

Chapter 1: Introduction

The consequences of wild forest fires have been tormenting the people of Central Kalimantan[1] in Indonesia for a long time, in particular since the late 1990s and onwards. The uncontrolled fires, in addition to creating hardship for the people of Central Kalimantan, also produce tremendous amount of CO_2 emissions. These emissions contribute to a rising global temperature that facilitates for a more unpredictable future for everyone on the planet. The global initiative Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)[2] seeks to address the importance of conserving more forest as an efficient way of fighting climate change. In the drawing above, from the home of a villager engaged with a REDD Demonstration project in Central Kalimantan, the Australian initiated Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (KFCP), his vision of REDD/KFCP is outlined.

The drawing was made by a friend of the aforementioned villager after he had explained his ideas about REDD/KFCP to him. One day when I visited the villager, he elaborated on the meaning of this drawing to me. I give a shortened summary with my own words here: On the top of the drawing, we see a man dressed in traditional Dayak attire with a sword (*mandau)* and a shield (*telawang*) guarding the acronym: "REDD". The acronym is located at the top of a decapitated tree, reflecting the poor condition of the forest nowadays. To guard REDD in this case means to strive towards making REDD favourable for the villagers. The villager positioned at the top of the tree choses a defensive attitude. The villagers are often careful (*hati-hati),* and sceptical towards new projects because of the marks left on their life by previous projects. Below to the left we see a man wearing a hat that comes with a suitcase where the acronym KFCP is inscribed. The suitcase if offered to another who seems, judging by the handshake, to receive the offer with a certain enthusiasm. In the last drawing below to the right, we see a student. The student is a symbol for what the villager hopes that the KFCP can facilitate for in the longer run; namely the possibility of villagers gaining access to higher education and thus increasing their livelihood options. The drawing encompasses the main foci of this thesis: What kind of attitude the actors meet REDD/KFCP with, and how they

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[1] Central Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Tenggah, Kalteng*) is one of four Indonesian provinces on the island of Borneo, the world`s third largest island. Northern Borneo consist of the Malaysian provinces Sabah and Sarawak in addition to the kingdom Brunei. Kalimantan is the name of the Indonesian part of Borneo.

[2] REDD is now often referred to as REDD+ to indicate that sustainable forestry has been added to the agenda. However, I will use REDD for the sake of simplicity

change during the process, the negotiations taking place, and the variety of dreams (or nightmares) related to REDD/KFCP by various actors.

In this thesis, I ask:

How do different actors understand and engage themselves with REDD in general and KFCP in particular?

And: *How is involvement by actors with KFCP/REDD influencing them?*

Through my fieldwork I have involved myself with villagers participating in one of the largest REDD Demonstration activities so far in Indonesia, KFCP, as well as with NGOs engaged in REDD and KFCP, and some governmental authorities. Based on my findings from my involvement with the aforementioned actors, I argue in this thesis that ground dynamics that are constitutive of the REDD process in Central Kalimantan comprise three modes of political engagement, which I name: *peasant*, *political* and *administrative*.

In REDD/KFCP the issue of who owns the forest and what the forest means to different actors loom large. Investigating this further, I argue, presupposes an investigation of different modes of engagement with the forest. Simply speaking, *peasant mode* sees the forest as livelihood, as a source of income and security. *Peasant mode* is the most common mode applied by villagers, who are often targets of REDD-projects simply because they live near the forest. *Political mode* sees forest through a rights perspective, asking about who owns the forest and according to what criteria. NGOs are engaged with REDD through *political mode*, but as I shall show in this thesis, they are also able to influence villagers in applying this mode, one of the potentially most influential consequences of REDD-projects. *Administrative mode* deals with forest in the abstract. In this mode, the forest is something that needs to be categorized and measured. This is typically the mode applied by state authorities, but also a mode applied by NGOs.

In terms of how involvements by actors in KFCP/REDD are influencing them, I argue that KFCP/REDD have been a source of empowerment and a source of dis-empowerment. Involvement in KFCP has enabled some villagers to gain new confidence by participating in the arenas that has emerged through the KFCP. For other villagers experiences of doubt and feelings of inferiority have been widespread in relation to the KFCP. As for the NGOs, I argue that they have been able to use KFCP/REDD to extend and further politicize their current agendas. This has contributed in making NGOs more visible in the official political landscape.

The REDD process can be analysed as an arena which is both enabling and enabled by three distinct modes of political engagement employed by variously situated actors. My analysis of the different actors' engagement brings to view how modes intersect, conflict and constitute each other.

In outlining the three modes of political engagement, I draw upon concepts and insights developed by James Scott (1976, 1985, and 1998) and Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2011). The modes are heuristic devices, forms of simplification, which make visible aspects of empirical realities. The framework is historically grounded. I emphasize how particular historical circumstances enable modes to arise. In my presentation of the modes, I will demonstrate how the circumstances surrounding them have emerged in Indonesia. I argue that REDD in Indonesia enters in a new, historical moment in the country's history which enables *political mode* to arise and become more widespread. I argue that the involvement of the Norwegian and Australian governments, and their supportive partners in REDD, contribute to this development.

Christian Krohn-Hansen (2001) writes that there are basically three ways anthropologists can engage with history: 1) using factual history as a context to the matters being explored, 2) investigating the actor's own historical horizons and how this horizon impinges on how they perceive the present, and 3) investigating how history is used pragmatically by actors to legitimize contemporary claims (Krohn-Hansen 2001: 133). In this thesis, I will engage with history in all of these three ways. I contextualize the modes of engagement in relation to Indonesian history below. In my chapters I will investigate how actors perceive the past and how these perceptions shape contemporary views on REDD/KFCP. I also touch on the

emerging need to obtain sufficient historical evidence in order to support contemporary land claims.

Analytical Framework: Multiple modes of political engagement

Peasant mode

The inspiration for outlining this mode comes from James Scott's two books- *The moral economy of the peasant* (1986) and *Weapons of the Weak* (1985). In *The moral economy of the peasant* Scott argues that peasant politics are dictated on the most basic need: Survival, the need to reassure one's family that one will keep on surviving. Scott formulates this as "subsistence ethic" (Scott 1976: 2). He argues that this ethic shapes the political and economic choices of the peasant, as the guiding principle is to act in a way that increases the chances for a predictable subsistence (Scott 1976: 4-5). It follows that the peasant's ethos is being careful with approaching authorities, as not to stir commotion because this can be a risk towards sustaining survival. This encourages a submissive attitude, a style of deference, though the peasant has their ways of showing resistance and non-compliance as carefully described in Scott's *Weapons of the weak*, namely through "everyday acts of resistance". It is worth to cite the original at length to get the gist of Scott's argument:

> [..] everyday forms of peasant resistance- the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interests from them. Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance. Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relative powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on. [..] They require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understanding and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any kind of direct, symbolic confrontation with authority. [..]..it is rare for peasants risk an outright confrontation with the authorities over taxes, cropping patterns, developmental policies or onerous new laws; instead they are likely to nibble away at such policies by noncompliance, foot dragging, deception. [..]Everyday forms of resistance makes no headlines. (Scott 1985: xvi-xvii)

8

I will show in succeeding chapters how widespread the characteristics that Scott outlines are for the villagers' interaction with the KFCP. I suggest that the villagers along the Kapuas River have become experts of *peasant mode* during the Suharto era, because they have had to. The outer islands of Indonesia, including Central Kalimantan, were never a prioritized part of the greater developmental scheme of General Suharto`s visons[3] (Dove 2011: 13). As an old villager I befriended in one of the villages along the Kapuas articulated it: "We have always been poor. Life has always been so difficult for us". This has meant that the villages along the Kapuas have lived on the economic margins, a precondition for Scott's "subsistence ethic" to be applicable (Scott 1976: 25).

General Suharto was the ruling authoritarian President in Indonesia for 38 years, until 1998. He arranged for the villagers to be incorporated into a particular stately hierarchy. In particular, the village act of 1979 was part of a state-making process aimed at establishing an authoritarian hierarchy where the village (*desa*) was set as the lowest level of administration (Antløv 2003:195). This formal hierarchical set-up made the village head (*kepala desa*) almighty in relation to the villagers. Since higher authorities elected the village head, it made the village as an autonomous entity non-existing (Antløv 2003: 196). This was part of Suharto's overarching goal: The depoliticising of society (Schmit 1996: 179). In this set-up villagers were not reckoned as citizens, but as subjects to be ruled. In this particular political setting, "weapons of the weak" made good sense to villagers. The emerging, democratic framework that came into existence after the fall of Suharto enabled a different way for engaging with politics. The possibilities for learning and daring to apply *political mode* arose.

Political mode

James Scott's (1985) writing grows out of a classical subaltern perspective with a split between the downtrodden masses (the peasants, the poor) set up against the elite. The split, between what I have termed *peasant mode* and what I will return to as *administrative mode* can be summarized neatly by Scott's own words:" Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt and concerned with systematic de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, often convert and concerned largely with immediate, de facto change" (Scott 1985: 33).

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[3] Among the four Indonesian provinces that constitutes Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan is the most undeveloped and the least populous (Cleary, M and Eaton, P 1992: 234).

Partha Chatterjee, an Indian anthropologist and political scientist who has worked within the subaltern school, 2004: 39-40) writes: "It is to understand these relatively recent forms of entanglement of elite and subaltern politics that I am proposing the notion of political society". By recent forms of entanglement, he refers to how democracy in India has reshaped the relations between those who govern and those who are governed. Chatterjee's perspective is that those who are governed are not seen as individual citizens per se, but as demographic categories by those who govern (Chatterjee 2004: 59). This means that for enabling a possible fruitful relation with those who govern, those who are governed need to present themselves as a political community that can be recognized and thus gain their benefits through that recognition. In REDD this logic is visible through the emergence of the labelling of indigenous people after the fall of Suharto (see: Afiff and Lowe 2007). I return to this. Instead of referring to political society, I refer to *political mode*, by which I mean the practise of organizing and negotiating with state authorities through community labels for the sake of gaining rights/benefits. Chatterjee refers to how his conceptual pair political society/civil society has been criticized, among others, by Nivedita Menon. The latter arguing for transforming them into more action-oriented terms This enables grasping how an actor can potentially adapt his choice of mode based on a contextual evaluation (Chatterjee 2011: 90). This criticism has been inspiring for my own modifications. In short whereas *peasant mode* usually is about avoiding or hiding from state authorities, *political mode* is about how to get the attention of state authorities, how to make a visible relation that can result in a transfer of rights (entitlements)/resources. *Peasant mode* navigates around the art of invisible politics in relation to state authorities, while *political mode* navigates around the art of visibility, making one's community seen.

I argue that the democratization and decentralization after the fall of Suharto enabled new forms of entanglements between elite and subaltern domain in Indonesia[4] thus setting the stage for what Chatterjee (2004) calls "politics of the governed" which I name *political mode*. Michael Dove (2011: 284) noted that the Suharto era was known as "the age of speeches", where communication only went in one direction: "from state to subject or from those who governed to those they governed" (ibid). By enabling subjects to organize and voice their concerns back to state authorities and cooperate with NGOs, the possibility of *political mode*

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[4] Antløv (2005) writes about the period after Suharto: [..] "citizens in Indonesia are in a myriad of ways making their voice heard, fill spaces opened by democratization and decentralization, and are in the process of *building a new relationship with the state"* [emphasis added] (Antløv et al.2005:5).

arises. I argue that a project such as the KFCP in Central Kalimantan offers a particular acute case of recent entanglements. KFCP brings together the classical subaltern subject, the peasant, with the highest authorities such as the forest minister in Indonesian and transnational NGOs in out-of-the-way places. This enables a political transnational experiment within a larger national experiment, namely the post-Suharto framework.

Antløv (2003) has characterized the post-Suharto framework as a "quiet revolution", a change from "the old paradigm of villagers as objects of development to one in which villagers have a right to exercise their democratic authority over public matters" (Antløv 2003: 200). Among the changes that qualify this statement is the establishment of the BPD (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*), which functions as a village parliament. The villagers themselves elect the members. The village is now an autonomous level of government. These changes have facilitated for a new orientation for the village head. The village head is no longer exclusively tied upwards, but is now structurally tied to the BPD and through that, has to respond to the villagers` needs (Antløv 2003: 200). I investigate how these changes enabled villagers to resist and collaborate with the KFCP and NGOs in chapter three.

Following the fall of Suharto NGOs, villagers in Indonesia are attuning themselves to a new reality. As mentioned, the Suharto era was characterized by a depoliticizing ethos.NGOs who engaged themselves primarily through *administrative mode* (see below) during the Suharto era, could now engage themselves otherwise, as well. The fall of Suharto meant that issues, previously taboo[5],could now be addressed. In REDD the issue of forest ownership is at the core. The post-Suharto framework enables discussion of this core issue between state-authorities, "small people" (*orang kecil*) and NGOs, often as intermediators. I discuss this in chapter 4 where I argue that WALHI[6] engage with REDD/KFCP through a "fighting ethos" (*perjuangan*). WALHI is actively using REDD as an arena to re-politicize issues that in the Suharto era would not be doable. WALHI are confronting the ideology that REDD is wrapped up in, neoliberal thinking, with a call for addressing the land issue first so "small people" do not fall prey to business interest mainly concerned about making money through conserving

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[5] Ethnicity, religion, race and inter-groups were the taboo subjects not to be discussed in public. These topics were summarized in the Indonesian language by the acronym SARA (*suku,agama,ras dan golongan*) Lan 2004: 218).

[6] WALHI (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia,* the Indonesian Forum for the Environment) is Indonesia`s biggest environmental organization.

the forest. AMAN[7] is working specifically for the indigenous people. AMAN can through REDD, AMAN can bring the issue of indigenous people to the highest level of government. Through arranging workshops and travelling to villages, AMAN can spread the issue of indigeneity and thus contribute to *political mode* becoming more widespread simultaneously.

Administrative mode

By *administrative mode* I have in mind the first part of Scott's already cited passage: "Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt and concerned with systematic de jure change [..]" (Scott 1985:33). Those who are engaged in governing or activities related to supervision typically apply *administrative mode*. It is a mode, following my understanding of Scott's citation above, concerned with institutionalized politics. In Indonesia today we see how agreement to participate in REDD is firstly approved at the Presidential level and further framed in a formal, institutionalized language. REDD is in the official political hierarchy mainly worked with through the *administrative mode*.

When asking how this work is done in relation to REDD terms coming from Scott (1998) are again very useful, namely "simplification" and "legibility". In his book *Seeing like a State*, James Scott argues that for a state to govern it must first make legible, that is visible according to its own categories, the landscape which it supposedly governs. He writes:" Thus a state cadastral map created to design taxable property holders does not merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its ability to give its categories law" (Scott 1998: 3). In REDD, the question such as what is forest, where it is and who owns it, presupposes categorisations and legible-making. I argue in chapter 4 that state authorities' interest in legible-making also applies for the NGOs.

We see that the importance of legibility works on both sides of the governing spectra. Those that govern are depended upon simplification and legibility, for the sake of governing. Those that are governed strive to present themselves in legible ways that may elicit the necessary attention of government authorities or NGOs, which can bring benefits or entitlements back.

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[7] AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*., Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago) is the national organization of indigenous people in Indonesia. It has more than 1000 local branches.

The fieldwork

I arrived in Indonesia shortly before New Year's Eve in 2011. I celebrated the evening in Central Jakarta near Monas (*Monumen Nasional*), a monument, built to commemorate the struggle for Indonesian independence. My journey from Jakarta went with train, across the lush and green central Javanese landscape to Jogjakarta. In Jogjakarta, nicknamed the cultural capital of Indonesia, I attended a one-month intensive Indonesian (*Bahasa* Indonesia) language course. I stayed in the house of a friendly mother (*ibu*) who accommodated students for the language school. She introduced me to the Indonesian kitchen, a pleasure, indeed. I learnt a lot of the language in school, as well as on the streets where I tried to connect as much as possible with the relaxed (*santai*) people of Jogjakarta. In Jogjakarta, people with small wagons filled with beverages and a variety of food sold cheaply, establish themselves on street corners, often inside neighborhoods (*kampung*), where people gather to talk and enjoy each other's company. These eating/meeting-places, known as *angkringan,* are unique to Jogjakarta, and were my first chance to really talk and listen to the *Bahasa* Indonesia.

The University of Oslo (UiO) cooperates with UGM (*Univeristas Gadjah Mada*) in Jogjakarta. This includes the anthropology department at UiO working with their colleagues at UGM on REDD in Indonesia[8]. In Jogjakarta, I met my two co-students[9] from UGM, whom I went to Central Kalimantan with. We had time to get to know each other and discuss REDD before leaving Jogjakarta. Among the preparations we participated in was a one-day seminar at UGM. Everyone who were heading for fieldwork, whether related to REDD or not, had a chance in this seminar to present their research plan and get feedback from UGM staff and other students.

After the preparations in Jogjakarta, which included: The language course, getting to know my co-students, and generally attuning myself to Indonesia, the three of us travelled with night train to Jakarta. In Jakarta, we visited, talked to and interviewed different actors involved in REDD, like WALHI, HuMa [10]and the Norwegian embassy. The purpose of these

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[8] The anthropological, comparative study of REDD is a project initiated and headed by my supervisor, Signe Howell, at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo

[9] Manggala Ismanto (*Anga*) and Patriona Melodia Vanga (*Fiona*)

[10] HuMa (Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform) is an Indonesian non-profit NGO. HuMa focuses on the issue of law reform in the natural resource sector.

visits was twofold. We were curious to know how the aforementioned actors perceived and worked with REDD. Secondly, we wanted information and perspectives on the situation of REDD in Central Kalimantan at the current moment. This was to clarify possibilities ahead for ourselves. None of us knew at that time where to settle after having familiarized us with the "NGO-scene" in Palangkaraya, the provincial capital of Central Kalimantan.

Map showing where I conducted my fieldwork

In Palangkaraya we joined a workshop organized by WALHI Central Kalimantan (WALHI *Kalteng*), almost immediately after arriving in early February, where a lot of the NGOs involved in REDD in Central Kalimantan were present. We tried to acquaint ourselves with some of these NGOs, WALHI Central Kalimantan in particular. This was because WALHI Central Kalimantan was the most active and engaged NGO in REDD, in addition to AMAN Central Kalimantan (AMAN *Kalteng*), in the province. With the NGOs, we were trying to understand who the individuals working in these organizations were, including their dreams and how they influenced their perception and work with REDD.

In mid-February, the three of us, together with staff from YPD[11], visited the area for the Australian funded KFCP-project. The project is located in the district (*kabupaten)* of Kapuas, in the sub-districts (*kecamatan*) of Mentangai and Timpah, consisting of seven villages along the Kapuas River (*sungai Kapuas*) in the Mega-Rice Area. The three of us made agreements for staying with families in our separate villages.

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[11] YPD (*Yahasan Petak Danum*, Foundation for Land and Water) is a Dayak NGO focusing on indigenous rights and livelihood. It is part of the WALHI-Network in Central Kalimantan.

Map showing the KFCP-area with villages engaged in the project.

The rhythm of the fieldwork became a back-and forth between staying in our separate KFCP-connected villages and meeting in Palangkaraya, the hub of REDD activities in the province. In Palangkaraya, I met my co-students, approximately once a month for a few days, to discuss the situation in our respective villages. This made us more aware of the similarities and differences in the villages we resided in: What challenges were similar, which were not. I had to renew my visa every month, thus I could never stay longer than one month a time in the village. This naturally facilitated for a multi-sited fieldwork with a constant movement between the village and the city. This shifting between places forced me to be more aware of the differences between the life and politics in the village and its counterpart in the city with the NGOs. NGO-workers were travelling to the villages and villagers sometimes travelled

alone or went with NGO-workers to the cities. Following their routes, back and forth, made me more sensitive to where particular perspectives originated from, and how different perspectives shaped each other.

Methodology

The relations you establish and sustain in the field constitute the core of the insights you strive to reflect upon after you are gone. I therefore need to make visible my relations to clear the methodological ground for this thesis.

In the city, within the NGO-scene of Palangkaraya, my roles switched between being a participative activist/friend and a researcher. I participated in the discussions that were going on, giving my views on the ongoing talks, as an activist. By that, I mean that I tried to emulate the core characteristics of an activist: Engagement, passion and love for combative discussions. This was not difficult, as I found their discussions and engagement interesting; it was more a matter of going with the flow. By participating and being together with particular people over time, feelings of friendship can also emerge, and I felt a heartfelt connection with some. This connection was sometimes difficult to sustain due to my constant travelling back and forth between the village and the city. I slept over at WALHI's house many nights. I could come and go there anytime I wished. I always felt welcomed and included within the WALHI-sphere.

The other NGO that I was principally in contact with was AMAN Central Kalimantan, but that was on a more sporadic bases. I would go there now and then, but it was not like "being a part of the organization", as I felt with WALHI.

There was a majority of males between 20-35 years in the NGOs, usually with a University degree. Their background was similar to mine, in age, sex and education. The similarities facilitated for an easy entry into the NGOs, as there was a lot of shared references and worldly outlook. It also presented a challenge: Not assuming too much sameness.

I did not smoke before I came to Indonesia, but I became very attached to Indonesian cigarettes during my time in Central Kalimantan. Smoking is a key to socializing in Indonesia (at least among men), a part of everyday sharing and trust building. I found a particular brand of cigarettes, known as Gudang Garam, which produce clove cigarettes (*kretek*). I completely embraced them. To give out cigarettes is an easy token of gratitude. Both in the village and

with the NGOs, people tended to smoke a lot. As people shared their stories and perspectives with me, I found that generously sharing cigarettes was one way of continuously giving something in return.

In the village, I stayed with the same family from the beginning to the end, which became «my family» in the village. I followed their routines in eating, a morning meal and a meal in the afternoon/evening, usually fish[12], rice, noodles and vegetables, depending upon whether they had been to their garden (*kebun*) lately or not. Two questions occurred constantly around morning time and later in the evening by neighbors to everyone: Have you taken a bath? (*sudah mandi?*), and: Have you eaten? (*sudah makan*?). I got used to these routines fast and I enjoyed them, bathing publicly and eating with my hands sitting in a lotus position on the floor together with the father in the house. Do not be shy (*Jangan malu*), he would say, after I had served myself once. I followed his encouragement.

The father was considered the head of the family (*kepala keluarga*) He was a part of the formal political hierarchy in the village, as well as part of the formal organization that the KFCP established in the village. Through him, I was therefore able to get a close insight into the workings of the formal political meetings in the village, the formal meetings of the KFCP as well as everything going on in-between since I was always around and people kept coming to our house for discussing different topics.

Since KFCP is a high-profile project, researchers and journalists, had visited the villages before, but usually only for very short periods. I heard before I came to the village that some villagers were angry with strangers, e.g. journalists, just asking a tremendous amount of instrumental questions, before quickly evaporating into the river mist. I therefore chose to be careful with the REDD/KFCP-issue, from the beginning, rather focusing on getting to know the villagers themselves and the history of the village. Through participating in everyday activities, such as going to the rubber garden (*kebun*), and rituals, like a village wedding and a Kaharingan funeral, I became more and more absorbed into village life. I tried to talk with everyone, the children, the elders, the young, women and men. I was inspired by Hutchinson`s idea of fieldwork as "perfecting the art of conversation" (Hutchinson 1996:45) and also her

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[12] The most common fish eaten in my family was a small fish called *kakabar.*

emphasis on humor`s potential as a gate opener, in particular in tense situations (Hutchinson 1996: 46).

I tried to explain my research as best as I could. I said I was a master student from Norway studying REDD in Central Kalimantan and the KFCP in particular. I emphasized that I would write a thesis about my experiences when I returned to my country. Since NGO-workers themselves usually have a University background, it was easier to be sure that they fully understood what the research entailed than with some I spoke to in the village.

The individuals mentioned in this thesis are anonymized. The village I resided in is also anonymized. However, real names are used for all the NGOs mentioned.

I want to proceed by contextualizing the global initiative REDD more in itself before continuing with REDD in Indonesia and the KFCP more in particular. I close with a short presentation of Central Kalimantan, the broadest geographical scope of this thesis, before I give the outline of the chapters to follow.

About REDD: A short history

Debates about the possible consequences of climate changes for life on the planet, and human's life in particular, has gained a wider audience in recent years. This goes along with actual life experiences people from all over the world have that climate change is real. The reality that climate change already has contributed to lots of unpredictable outcomes, creating feelings of insecurity and fear for some and new opportunities for others (Crate and Nuttall 2009:9-10). There is a consensus among researchers that a rising global temperature is threatening the possibilities of human existence in many places, and in many ways. The question then arises: What can be done to curb the rising temperature? Since there is a consensus that the rising temperature is due to increased emissions from humans, in particular from coal, gas and oil, the question becomes: How can we reduce our emissions?

REDD is one reply to the question about reduced emissions. Emissions from deforestation and degradation amounts to 20 per cent of all emissions worldwide. According to an influential rapport, the Stern rapport, REDD would be the cheapest way of reducing emissions (Stern Review 2006).The idea behind REDD is simple, making trees more worth alive than not. The realization of this idea emerges from the practice of rich countries paying poorer countries for not cutting down the trees. REDD was seen as attractive because it was

considered a cheap solution or a win-win-solution. Angelsen and McNeill (2012) summarizes the win-win scenario: "combining reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions with poverty reduction and the protection of biodiversity" (Angelsen and McNeill 2012: 31).

REDD gained serious momentum internationally at the Bali COP (Conference of the Parties) in 2007 where several countries promised to support the initiative substantially. Among them were Norway and Australia, both countries highly engaged with REDD in Indonesia today.

REDD and Indonesia

The Indonesian government's approach to the international negotiability of their forest has changed considerably from Rio in 1992 to Indonesia's current engagement with REDD. The Indonesian and Malaysian delegation worked explicitly in Rio 1992 to avoid any international restriction on their right to exploit their forests. The countries' delegations were successful in their efforts (Colombijn 1998: 314).

Indonesia has the third largest tropical forest in the world and is the third largest emitter of CO_2, after China and USA. The current President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), has showed will to change current levels of emission. In 2009, he held a speech at the G20 in Pittsburgh where he ambitiously announced Indonesia's goals to reduce their own emissions by 26 per cent compared to their current business as usual trajectory in 2020. With international support, he announced the goals would be up to 41 percent. A specific invitation for international support was formulated in the speech. SBY said:

> [...]developing countries do need assistance from developed countries and international agencies are needed be they in terms of finance, technology, capacity building and cooperation, as indicated in the Bali Action Plan» (Yudhoyono: 2009)

The declaration by Indonesian President in Pittsburg was pointed out as one of the most important landmarks for Indonesia's involvement with REDD by an evaluation done for the Norwegian Development Agency (NORAD 2010: 44).

In May 2010, Norway signed a bilateral agreement with Indonesia, known as Letter of Intent (LoI).This agreement cannot be underestimated for the shaping of REDD in Indonesia, nor can Norway's involvement with REDD in general. This agreement stipulated that Norway promised to pay Indonesia 1 billion dollars for cutting their emissions on a payment for result basis. Further it supported the establishment of a REDD Task Force which operated directly

under the President. This REDD Task force was to be in charge of creating a REDD National Strategy and holistically working for REDD coordination in Indonesia, facilitating the achievement of the reduction targets (NORAD 2010: xix).

Central Kalimantan became, according to official sources, chosen as the REDD pilot province because of its natural resources and its peat. Part of the LoI subscribed the establishment of a moratorium, which meant a two years suspension of license on primary forests and peat lands

Norway Development Agency (NORAD) has from 2008 through a Civil Society Scheme supported many NGOs in Indonesia and many of them were tuned in to engaging with REDD after the bilateral agreement with Norway was a fact. Among the most influential are AMAN, WALHI and HuMa. They are all partners of the Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN). Several research institutions have also been substantially funded under the Norwegian-Indonesian partnership, among them Center for International Forest Research (CIFOR), which has produced several key publications on REDD (e.g Angelsen 2008; Angelsen 2009; Angelsen 2012)

Australia- Indonesia: KFCP

Indonesia signed an agreement with Australia in July 2008, establishing Indonesia-Australia Forest Partnership (IAFCP). This partnership focuses on capacity building for Indonesia's participation in climate agreements, future carbon markets, technical support to Indonesia in developing a national carbon-accounting system and development of demonstration activities (KFCP 2009:1). The main demonstration activity has been the Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (KFCP).The goal of the KFCP was:

> […] to demonstrate a credible, equitable, and effective approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, including from the degradation of peatlands, that can inform a post-2012 global climate change agreement and enable Indonesia's meaningful participation in future international carbon markets" (KFCP 2009: 2).

KFCP encompasses a number of actors. However, the NGO Borneo Orangutan Survival (BOS) and to a lesser extent CARE will be in focus for this thesis as both operated directly within the KFCP-area (see map above).

Central Kalimantan, the forest and REDD

Central Kalimantan has received considerable international attention after it became the first REDD pilot province in Indonesia. Central Kalimantan is the third largest province of Indonesia. It covers an area of 15.4 million hectares and has a population of 2.4 million people.

Central Kalimantan became an autonomous province in May 1957, authorized by President Sukarno, after an insurrection by armed Dayak forces. Those conducting the insurrection wanted Central Kalimantan to be an own province were Dayaks would be in majority instead of a minority as they were in South Kalimantan (Miles 1976: 121). In addition to Dayaks, Central Kalimantan has a large percentage of Bandjar people and a certain percentage of people originating from Java.

Dayak peoples adhere to a number of faiths, such as local belief systems, where Kaharingan is the most known. However, the majority today have converted to world religions, Christianity in particular (Schiller 2007: 71). Conversion from local beliefs to Christianity became widespread in the era preceding Indonesian independence (Saliliah 1998: viii). Most Dayaks live in the interior, in smaller villages near to the river and often quite far from the cities (Schiller 2007:71).The Dayak Ngaju language (*bahasa Ngaju*) is the lingua franca for Central Kalimantan (Klokke 1998: viii) and was spoken widely in the KFCP-included villages along the Kapuas River.

Central Kalimantan was chosen as the pilot province for several reasons, among them the vast presence of peatlands and the challenges the province has with deforestation and degradation (REDD+ regional strategy: 7). The KFCP-area, in particular, encompasses these features: the presence of peat and the recurrent problem of forest fires.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters. I start with this introduction chapter. Three analytical chapters follow. I will relate all of the analytical chapters to this thesis' core research questions: *How do different actors understand and engage themselves with REDD in general and KFCP in particular?* And: *How is involvement by actors with REDD/KFCP influencing them?* I end this thesis with some concluding thoughts. In the following I outline the analytical chapters.

Chapter 2: State-making processes and the question of security: Trust, unrequited reciprocity and its dehumanizing effects

In this chapter I explore the consequences of erupt, state-making processes that put an out-of-the way-place at the centre of a grand national developmental project, known as the Mega-Rice project. I ask: How do past experiences and present concerns shape villagers` perception of KFCP? I argue that the villagers view their past and its relation to the present through the interpretive grid of peasant mode, based on Scott`s subsistence ethics (1976).

I argue that the feeling of loss due to the dramatically changed life conditions after the Mega-Rice Project increases the distrust towards outsiders` arriving with the outspoken intention of "doing good". I emphasize how the knowledge gap between the villagers and the workers for the implementing NGOs of KFCP, further increases this distrust. Lastly, how the insecurity among the villagers about what KFCP is really about and whether it can increase their economic stability or not, mix with the aforementioned sources of distrust and enhanced vulnerability.

Chapter 3: Democratic state-making processes and the art of resistance: Surveillance, collaborations and negotiations within the KFCP-sphere

In this chapter, I ask: How did different villagers engage themselves with the KFCP through the post-Suharto framework? How did the villagers` involvement with the KFCP influence them?

I concentrate on two cases. First: A tree-planting plantation, the main activity organized by the KFCP, and second: A workshop. I focus on how these two cases contributed to new, emerging political consciousness, namely a move towards speaking out more directly to political authorities and thus moving beyond *peasant mode*. I also emphasize how *peasant mode* was

the backbone for how most villagers engaged with the tree-plantation. The workshop contributed more to facilitation of *political mode* because it specifically asked particular villagers to imagine their surroundings in the abstract by drawing maps and arguing for land claims based on the category of indigenous.

I emphasize how the KFCP contributed to conflict within the village and differentiated experiences among the villagers in terms of enhancing their self-confidence or not.

Chapter 4: NGOs with flexible engagement and a "fighting" (perjuangan) ethos: No rights, No REDD

In this chapter I ask: How are Indonesian NGOs engaging with REDD and the KFCP? How do Indonesian NGOs work with REDD/KFCP, against it, or use it as a vehicle for broadening their existing agendas? I look primarily at WALHI and secondly at AMAN`s engagement in Central Kalimantan. Whereas NGOs in the Suharto era mainly deployed *administrative mode*, I argue that the fall of Suharto has enabled them to increase their capacity to deploy *political mode* and thus increase their flexibility. I argue that this flexibility, the situated deployment of both *administrative mode* and *political mode*, accounts for their role as intermediaries, which I argue is characteristic for these NGOs engagement with REDD.

I argue that WALHI and AMAN interpret REDD/KFCP through what I call a "fighting" (*perjuangan*) ethos, which frames their engagement with REDD/KFCP. Whereas WALHI has chosen a straightforward confrontational approach towards REDD, AMAN has chosen a softer approach, viewing REDD more as a possible opportunity than a threat.

Chapter 2: State-making processes and the question of security: Trust, *unrequited reciprocity* and its dehumanizing effects

"How to get money for tomorrow? That is a constant concern for us. It makes me so worried" (Villager in the KFCP-area).

"If this project can improve our economic situation it is a success. No other project has ever done that" (Villager in the KFCP-area).

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the consequences of an erupt, state-making processes that put an out-of-the way-place at the centre in 1995 of a grand national developmental project, known as the Mega-Rice project. In this chapter I ask: How do past experiences and present concerns shape villagers` perception of KFCP? I argue that the villagers view their past and its relation to the present through the interpretive grid of *peasant mode*, based on Scott's (1976) *subsistence ethics*.

The consequences of the Mega-Rice project established a rupture between the past and the present. I argue that this has contributed to an emerging feeling of loss, which amplifies feelings of insecurity and vulnerability about the future. The feeling of having been ignored in the process of national development, and if included -Only for the sake of exploitation, creates sceptical emotions if not outright hostile emotions towards the outsider. This touches on the issue of *unrequited reciprocity* and its dehumanizing effects. This also includes the arrival of the KFCP. The questions lingering in the air between the villagers were: To what extent can the KFCP be a force of economic security? To what extent can it be a source of further deprivation? The insecurity about the answers to these questions entangled with the overarching existential insecurity of the future, about what to live from, about survival and dreams of prosperity.

I start this chapter by outlining the emergence of my fieldwork site, the village Sei Katja.

The emergence of Sei Katja

The history of Sei Katja began with the settlement of a few Dayak Ngaju families in the early 1920s. According to elderly villagers, the first settlers made simple huts (*pondok*) along the Kapuas River. They sustained themselves mainly through fishing and rubber.

From the beginning, the villagers' living conditions were depended upon what their near surroundings could give them. This premise has not changed much. However, their surroundings and available technology have changed considerably.

Engaging with rubber was important from the beginning. The Dutch introduced rubber during their colonial rule in Kalimantan in the early 1900s. This introduced rubber came originally from South-America (Dove 2011: 105). These connections shows how a seemingly out-of-the-way place like Sei Katja from the beginning has been part of a wider economic web (see: Wolf: 1982). Rubber became the backbone of the economy from early on and remained so until the emergence of large scale logging in the 1970s.

The rubber garden is still a profound source of security for the villagers. Geddes writes: "The rubber garden are in the nature of a bank to be drawn upon when money is needed." (Geddes 1954:95).This observation holds true for the villagers of Sei Katja too. The villager can choose to tap whenever he wishes, but the dry season is most suited. This is because the latex from the trees do not mix too much with water during the dry season, which increases the quality of the output. The villager can choose to sell when he finds the price most agreeable. Rubber connects with the market sphere, but villagers also grow various vegetables for their own respective household. Dove writes that the system known as dual economy is characteristic for tribesmen in Kalimantan. The dual economy is a combination of subsistence economic activities related to the household and market oriented activities, such as the engagement with rubber (Dove 2011: 13-14). In Sei Katja, this duality was visible, as villagers engaged themselves with subsistence activities for their household as well as well economic activities related to the market sphere. The duality provides a certain amount of economic flexibility for the villagers.

In the 1970s, timber emerged as the number one income generating activity for a conservable amount of villages in Central Kalimantan, including Sei Katja. As one elderly villager in Sei Katja who remembered the early logging boom in the 70s put it: "Everyone in every river of Kalimantan as far as they could joined the timber trade." A shift in the global sector from focusing on timber from the Northern hemisphere to the Southern hemisphere made Kalimantan an attractive area of extraction. New laws by Suharto enabled foreign companies to invest and work in Kalimantan (Potter 2005: 377). This shift opened up the possibility for villagers to either work for the foreign companies that entered their area, or sell directly to

them. With foreign companies travelling upriver searching for timber, access to new technology followed, namely the introduction of the chain saw. The chainsaw enabled a single villager to cut down considerably more trees[13] than its replacement, the saw, increasing his earning potential likewise.

The wooden houses in Sei Katja follows the Kapuas river (*sungai Kapuas*) neatly. In-between these houses and another row of wooden houses, lies a newly paved road. Sei Katja begins and ends with a sawmill reflecting the omnipresent importance of timber trade. However, the first sawmill has been closed down, due to new governmental restrictions. The houses in Sei Katja differ in size and the kind of wood used for building them. Ironwood (Bahasa Ngaju: *ulin*) is the most preferred building material, but it is very hard to obtain nowadays.

Sei Katja with its two sub-villages (*dusun*) now have a little less than 1500 inhabitants in total. Of those ¾ are Dayaks and the remaining ones split between Javanese and Bandjarese. A considerable percentage of the current population settled in the late 80s and onwards, in particular in relation to the Mega Rice Project, which I now turn to.

The Mega Rice Project and authoritarian state-making processes

The Mega Rice project was the first big project to arrive in the Kapuas district (*kabupaten*) with the intention of changing its landscape immensely and thus the lives of the villagers residing there. Suharto initiated the project in 1995. After Suharto's fall from power in 1998, the project was set on hold and cancelled the year thereafter.

James Scott (1998) has in the book, *Seeing like a state*, outlined the preconditions for establishment of Mega Projects. Scott's criteria are: 1) administrative ordering of nature and society 2) high modernist ideology 3) authoritarian state 4) and a prostrate civil society (1998:4-5). Suharto`s regime arguably encompassed these criteria (McCarthy 2012: 528) thus enabling mega-project to emerge. The two latter criteria`s changed status in Indonesia are grounds of investigations in the following chapters.

Scott (1998) writes extensively in *Seeing like a state* that big project with seemingly good intentions often have rather different outcomes. Nowhere is this more glaring than with the

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[13] As Boomgaard notes about the chainsaw: "[it] made it possible for a handful of people to cut down large stretches of forest in a short time" (Boomgaard 2005: 220).

Mega Rice project. The Mega Rice Project was about remaking an area used for swidden agriculture into becoming the new rice bowl of Indonesia, thus boosting the national confidence of the country as a rice exporting country. This remaking presupposed a tremendous reengineering of the landscape. Construction workers made thousands of canals. They also began a rapid removal of trees. Deforestation was an explicit mean for reaching a developmental goal.

The time of the Mega Rice Project was also the heyday of transmigration (*transmigrasi*), an official government program intended to move people from the highly crowded island of Java to the outer islands, including Kalimantan. During the Mega Rice Project, 13 000 transmigrant families settled in Kapuas (McCharty 2001: 1). This meant that the landscape, as well as the demographic composition, experienced quick changes.

The Mega Rice Project did not proceed according to its pronounced vision. The effects of the Mega Rice Project still haunt the district of Kapuas. The Mega Rice project enabled the vast, continuous forest fires that create so much damage and hardship for the local people. The fires contribute to tremendous emissions of CO_2 because peat, which is highly rich in carbon, burns. The smoke from the fires blocks the view on the river, making travel dangerous. The river is the only passage of transport for many villages in Central Kalimantan. The smoke can contribute in making out-of-the-way places even more peripheral. The smoke can cause breathing problems for those affected by it. In my opinion, all later projects to arrive in the district of Kapuas, are ways of trying to cope and improve the devastated landscape that the Mega Rice Project left behind. The Mega Rice shattered the landscape and left the people in the area in an increased vulnerable situation

The feeling of loss, nostalgia: Remembering the good times, mourning the present

The changed landscape and the changed life situation for the villagers after the Mega Rice Project were something they still struggled emotionally with at the time of my fieldwork. KFCP was partly about getting the forest back (*hutan kembali*). The present focus on reforestation, through tree planting, created a sharp contrast to the pre-Mega-Rice-era, when the forest was still in a good shape (*hutan masih bagus)*. I am returning to that in the following chapter. The focus on reforestation reminded the villagers about their loss and their vulnerable situation today.

Appell (1999) has written about how sudden socioeconomic changes can lead to a feeling of mourning. His conclusions derive from extensive fieldwork among the Rungus people residing in Sarawak, one of the two Malaysian provinces of Borneo. Appell (1999: 346-347) interpret the feeling of mourning as a psychological reaction against the distressed, confused present. I sense similarities between Appell's conclusions and my own observations.

Kirsch (2006: 189-190) describes how the Yonggom of New Guinea experienced a distinct rupture between the past and the present because of the ravaging destructions of the Ok Tedi Mine project. The project completely changed their landscape and resulted in a feeling of loss, often evoked in sorrowful ways. A similar discontinuity was present in the villages affected by the Mega Rice Project. When I was relaxing with a *kretek* cigarette one evening together with some neighbours, this contrast emerged clearly, when one of the villagers commented:

> I remember how cool and nice our vast forest used to be. How tall the trees were, and how the forest was filled with all kinds of animals. Now it is gone, and there is no cold place left behind our village. It is just getting hotter. What if the Mega Rice Project had never arrived- would our forest still be there?

After these words were uttered, his face looked gloomy as he and his fellow villagers gazed towards where the forest used to be, where forest fires just years ago went rampant. A silence fell between us. Only the smoke left lingering in the clear, evening air.

The contrast with how the trees before were so tall, so tall (*pohon tinggi, tinggi*) and how the forest so small, so small (*hutan kecil, kecil)* was a comparison I often heard. I consider it an everyday remembering of loss. This functions as a reminder of one's heightened sense of vulnerability. In the quote above, there is also a counterfactual question: What if the Mega

Rice Project had never become a reality? The question hints to a search for blame: Who is responsible for our current condition?

Tall trees (*pohon tinggi*) and small forest (*hutan kecil*). Exemplification from the villager`s near surroundings.

Villagers often expressed the big forest, tall trees/little forest, small trees-contrast in emotional ways. The words big (*besar*) and tall (*tinggi*) were exaggerated simultaneously while showing affectionately with their fingers how small the forest had become

The loss of the forest is in a sense double. Firstly, a lot of forest had disappeared due to the Mega-Rice Project and its consequences. This includes facilitating for palm oil expansions

The loss is also real in the sense that working in the forest is no longer the backbone of the village economy. This has happened the last 10-15 years. A villager told me that as late as in 2004 he wanted to start growing bananas as an alternative to logging since the government had already outlawed it. He commented upon the reactions by his villagers to his choice of turning away from logging to another source of income: "I was laughed at when I said I wanted to make an experiment with bananas. Most others still preferred to involve themselves with logging, in spite of the risk of getting caught." Villagers often compared times of working in the forest, how nice it was, with the confusing present. Many villagers with small variations repeated the following statement: "I was working with timber. It was so nice (*enak*). Now it is illegal. We are afraid (*takut*) to do it now. We are confused (*bingung*) now."

These stories of experiences of loss seemed to sharpen the feeling towards even further loss. I now turn to a case where many villagers argued that further loss did occur. Moreover, that limitation on the villagers' way of life emerged.

Experiences with a recent project: The case of Mawas

Mawas, meaning orangutan, is the name of a project that emerged in 2001, two years after the Mega Rice Project ended. The project is mainly located near the sub-village to the village I resided in. The project emerged as a reaction to the devastating consequences for orangutans, in the Kapuas area, after the Mega Rice Project. Many orangutans were burnt to death; others became orphans due to the forest fires. Mawas aimed at securing a sanctuary for orangutans, a safe place where they could prosper again. It is run by a Dutch-financed NGO called Borneo Orangutan Survival (BOS). Mawas engaged villagers to work for the project as assistants, advocated for a new understanding of orangutans to the villagers and created fears of further appropriation of land.

"Don't!" New projects, new restrictions; Being told what not to do

New projects can strive to inculcate and enforce new restrictions and values. Mawas emphasized the value of orangutans and restrictions thereafter while the KFCP emphasized the value of reforestation. Information campaigns issued by the state can also make concrete efforts to establish a particular normative order.

Occasionally when I walked around in the village I would see people with t-shirts related to the Mawas project. One of them had the following saying: "Don't kill orangutans!" When I imagined this slogan with the hypothetical slogan of REDD: "Don't kill trees!" I was struck by their similarities and interrelation. If the forest is kept standing, a prosperous existence of orangutans becomes possible as well.

Researchers connected with Mawas today, spend time in the local school every weekend. They hand out comic books, which they use as a platform for teaching the children about why it is important to care about the orangutans. These comic books are filled with tales of human-orangutan interaction. The information in the comic books aims at stimulating awareness among the children about the life of orangutans, their joys and the dangers that surrounds them. By using technique of humanization, by letting orangutans act and speak like humans, these comic books communicate that orangutans are like us and should be treated accordingly.

A villager reported to me that the government was now running advertisement where they said: "Killing a tree is like killing a person". This drew my attention to the technique of humanization in relation to cutting down trees. The person who informed me about this was himself working with timber, which is another way of saying that he was making a living by cutting down trees. He informed me about his occupation in an overemphasized way: "I am working with timber" (*aku kerja kayu*) and added " Even though the KFCP are saying that there are no people doing this anymore after their arrival, it is not true, it is not true. Look at me! I am working with timber!"

Since one of KFCP's aims is getting the forest back (*hutan kembali)*, one who is engaging in too much logging, could easily be perceived as a saboteur, at least from the project's point of view. The person is in a sense pushed up against the wall. He could either hide, denying what he is doing and therefore, secretly, acknowledging that he is doing something wrong. The alternative is questioning the legitimacy of the stately discourse and justifying his actions through a counter-discourse. How he reacted against the advertisement, shows that he chose the latter approach:

> It is the government who is killing us by not letting us cut down trees. How can we get money to live if we are not allowed to cut down trees? The money the KFCP are paying us is nothing: How can we live from that?

The above quote is a typical case of *peasant mode*- argumentation, following Scott's (1976) *subsistence ethics*, stressing the right to survival, the right to sufficient income as morally overriding restrictions that impinges upon that. It is also a key message to future REDD-related project: If loss of income is not sufficiently compensated, the legitimacy of the restrictions is likely to suffer in the same manner

Participation in projects and the feeling of *unrequited reciprocity*

Within the interpretive grid of *peasant mode* lays the expectation of reciprocity: The helping dimension of creating the needed safety net for each other. When a project enters a village where *peasant mode* dominates, the question from the villagers' point of view is: How does the project contribute in building this safety net? Scott (1976:7) writes: "The test for the peasant is more likely to be `What is left? ` than `How much is taken?`". Several authors have written about a feeling of resentment when the expectations towards the other remain unfulfilled. From Kalimantan, Ann Schiller (2007) discovered feelings of exploitation in a historical perspective, and also general resentment, through her studies of Dayak identity in East Kalimantan. One of her Dayak informants told her: "I hope that anyone who interacts with Dayaks does not just treat us as mechanism to get something (for themselves) anymore.' That includes researchers. I hate it." (Schiller 2007:75). Page West (2006), who investigated a conservation project in New Guinea, noticed the feeling of lack of reciprocity among her informants. West quotes one of them saying: "When people come here and work and then go and get big name for themselves by using what they have learned here, what do we get out of it?"(West 2006: 222).Kirsch (2006), writing from the Yonggom of New Guines, noticed how they perceived the relation with the Ok Tedi Mine as being a reciprocal social relation, which presupposed a continuing reception of gift/benefits. The company, on the other hand, interpreted the relation through a market-lens. This entailed paying the Yonggom once for their land. The payment was not only opening up a relation. It was simultaneously the closing of it. To be able to grasp the emotional burden felt by the one that feels excluded, the one that is not reciprocated, Kirsch coins the term *unrequited reciprocity* (Kirsch 2006: 80). I find this term useful in relation to the interpretive grid of *peasant mode* where reciprocity is at the core. *Unrequited reciprocity* is the denial of the long-term social obligation that the interpretive grid of *peasant mode* presupposes. That is why I sense that so many project relations from the villagers' point of view leaves them feeling left behind, excluded, because their reciprocal expectations remains unfulfilled.

Many villagers participated in the Mawas project, usually as assistants for students doing their fieldwork for their Masters' or Ph.D on topics related to orangutans. The villagers got specific training in how to do this assistant work. Many villagers perceived the ones they worked along as friends. When the international students finished what they came for, they returned to their homeland and did not contact the villagers ever again. Many expressed that in these situations a feeling I here call *unrequited reciprocity* could emerge. The core of the uneasy feeling seems to originate from the villagers' viewpoint of this contact. The villagers were assisting others to continue the others' education and expand the others' possibilities, while not experiencing anything likewise in return. A villager formulated it accordingly:

> I worked as his assistant and taught him everything. He wrote it down and then went away. He said we will keep in touch, but I have not heard from him since. He is probably finished with his degree now, but I am still in the woods, still cutting down trees. I would like to further my education, but there is no money. Now new researchers are moving in because of KFCP, but what do we get in return?

Concerning the KFCP, many villagers complained about the feeling of being treated "only as workforce" *(buruh saja)*. This was clearly insufficient. I saw that the villagers used the same type of shoes while working at the tree plantation. I asked one of the villagers whether they got these shoes from the project or not. He answered in the following way: "No, they do not help us, they do not GIVE, they only make us work and then we get paid for it and that is it." He uttered the complete sentence in Indonesian, except the word "give", pronounced in English. He particularly emphasized the word "give", uttering it much louder than the other words. He simultaneously emphasized his point by acting as if he was giving me something. His expressed indignation about the KFCP declares the disappointment of the unfulfilled expectation. The underlying model in the KFCP seems to be the anonymous transaction. This implies paying the villagers for their concrete efforts and tasks. He seemed to perceive it as an exchange relation (Kirsch 2006). But the KFCP does not *give*, they *pay*. The KFCP treats this as a transactional monetary relationship, which creates the disappointment. Exchange relation is tied to reciprocity explained above.

The crucial point is that many villagers report that that they in their roles as assistants for the KFCP, they are *helping* the KFCP. They therefore expect *reciprocation* subsequently. By just being treated as workforce, the helping dimension is excluded, and a feeling of being pragmatically used can emerge. This creates the feeling of *unrequited reciprocity*. Kirsch (2006: 80) sites that this break in expectations can have a dehumanizing effect. This entails

35

that the one who feels that his exchange expectations remains unfulfilled may want to take revenge to gain justice. I will return to this in the next chapter, but sufficiently to say, this want can either be settled within *peasant mode*, through "weapons of the weak", or be canalized into *political mode*.

The past in the present: The fear of losing land

The remembering of past events constitutes a crucial contextual background shaping how new projects are understood by the villagers. When I visited the sub-village near Mawas, I got an insight in one such event. The event shows how broken promises in the past return in relation to new projects and influence the reception of the seemingly anew.

In the sub-village, I saw a videotape of the opening ceremony of Mawas together with local villagers. During one of the speeches captured in the videotape, a man responsible for the project proclaimed that those who lived nearby would not be restricted in their use of the forest. The villagers had nothing to fear was the message that those in charge wanted to communicate. However, the actual experiences from the villagers told a different story. When the proclamation emerged, on a small television with the sound pitched high, an emotional reaction became audible. "Liar, liar!" a villager, sitting right behind me, shouted out in anger. He elaborated his views later that same evening. This was during a talk with fellow villagers who confirmed his story and shared his frustration. He said:

> We have lived here for so long, we have lived from the forest, but then 10 years ago this project came and gradually we were not welcome in the forest anymore. Our access became more and more restricted. How can this be? We were here first, they just arrived, but now they have the forest.

The outburst "Liar, liar" can be understood as an accusation against the broken promises of the past. Those present were reminded about the gap between what they were promised and what actually happened. This creates distrust against those who arrive later and speak nice (*berbicara manis*) about joyful existence. Since Mawas also had the backing of the Indonesian government, distrust is also directed towards the latter.

The story referred to above and other similar events are an important background to the reception of the KFCP by the villagers. Many villagers were asking; would the KFCP become like Mawas? Would the KFCP-area become a designated conservation zone? These questions derived from the earlier projects' ability to disturb, to create insecurity. These remembered

broken promises now re-appeared in relation to the KFCP. Within the interpretive grid of *peasant mode*, the potential these stories have to create severe insecurity emerges clearly, because the stakes are high. What is at stake is the livelihood of the villagers, their security for survival.

KFCP: The latest project since the Mega Rice Disaster

The governing agenda and dreams of those who have entered the Kapuas area over the years have changed. The Mega Rice Project proceeded with large-scale deforestation and canal construction as prerequisites for making vast rice fields. Mawas has proceeded with creating a conservation area for orangutans. Now the KFCP proceeds with large-scale reforestation, dreams of restoring the landscape and potential incomes through, future carbon markets. I have already emphasized how previous projects have influenced the reception of KFCP among the villagers. Now I want to turn directly to the KFCP.

What is carbon? Rubber and carbon compared

As part of the struggling to understand the KFCP, the question of what carbon actually was, frequently occurred in village discussions. It was a source of insecurity because it was difficult to grasp what it was, and how it could help the villagers in securing a predicable income. One villager had the following to say about carbon:

> Carbon is like telephone credit, when we buy it we cannot see it, but when we call we believe it because it enables us to call. They [KFCP] say that we have carbon that is stored in our land that others want to buy. But only if we get money for it can we believe that it exists.

Here an analogy is made between something the villagers are familiar with, telephone credit, and something new: Carbon, to make it intelligible. To see the effect, is a prerequisite for believing it.

Villagers have a long experience of being integrated within the market economy, especially through their engagement with rubber. They know that the price of rubber fluctuates because of the market, which they have no control over. They only thing they can choose is when to sell the rubber, preferring to sell it when the price is high. Rubber is something villagers have access to in their own garden, something they extract through their own manual labour and process afterwards, making it ready for sale. Rubber is a tangible commodity. Rubber is something they can see, feel, smell and touch.

Carbon does not hold any of these properties. Carbon is more a product of the imagination, something one must struggle to imagine. Carbon is something, as the quote above pointed out, they can believe if they get the money for it. In terms of control and predictability, carbon is much more uncontrollable and unpredictable, since the commodity is invisible and it is unknown whether a functioning carbon market will become a reality. If a carbon market becomes a reality, the villagers are not sure if they will be able to benefit from it. Carbon is out of reach for villagers in several ways: They neither control the market where this invisible commodity can be traded, nor do they know where it is, how to interact with it or know whether they will get any money out of it. In short, for the average villager, there is far more uncertainty and risk involved in relying on carbon as a long term source of revenue compared to more traditional ways of making money. Seen through *peasant mode* the scepticism towards carbon is understandable.

The Livelihood program: Extending the safety net or an uneasy exchange?

Paige West (2006) writes about the complexities of combining development and conservation in one project in her book Conservation is our Government now. West coins the term conservation-as-development. The term describes the overarching ambition of the project West studied where villagers get development in exchange for conservation. The problems arise when there is uncertainty about what conservation entails and what development entails (West 2006: xii). The dilemmas she writes about is also present in the KFCP, in particular with a part of the program called the livelihood program.

KFCP's Livelihood program in Sei Katja focuses on creating and expanding economic possibilities for the villagers. A villager explained the purpose of the program to me in the following way: "To make sure we have rice, to make sure we have an income". Rice is the basic ingredient in all meals. You serve yourself first with rice. To make sure we have rice is another way of saying: To make sure we have a (certain) security. This connects directly with the right to subsist, a core element of *peasant mode*. No money for rice challenges the right to subsist. No money for rice indicates rough times and the threat of hunger.

The villagers could choose to either receive support for developing rubber or for fish in the program. Most villagers chose rubber. "Come and see what I have done", a villager eagerly told me, waving me into his backyard. There he showed me that he had dug out a pool. He had prepared for the fish that he expected to receive at the time when the livelihood program

was up and running (*sudah berjalan*). Extended livelihood options were something villagers were eager to see realized. Several meetings by the villagers arranged by the KFCP investigated options for expanding rubber gardens. Villagers decided where they were interested in expanding, and a technical team belonging to the KFCP checked whether the area preferred was suitable for rubber cultivation or not. The future reputation of KFCP connected with the fate of the livelihood program. One villager put it this way: "If this project is able to improve our economic situation, it is a success. No other project has done that before." Seen through *peasant mode*, this criterion of evaluation is clear.

Many villagers were hopeful of the livelihood program. The tree plantation on the other hand, of which I shall be re-visiting in the next chapter, was often seen as something that could subtract their future security by removing land from their future control. While the livelihood program was associated with development, the plantation could easily be associated with conservation. This is where the insights from West (2006) become useful, namely the relationship between development and conservation. In the KFCP-case, the tree-planting plantation could facilitate for keeping the peat rich carbon in the soil. The carbon storage could convert into monetary value if connected to a functioning carbon market. However, if the villagers were the ones to gain from such a scenario is another question. There was fear among the villagers that they would again be on the losing side, entering an uneasy exchange. This fear derived from previous experiences, as one villager put it: "MAWAS was great for the government because the forest was conserved, but it was very bad for us [the villagers] because we were denied our access to our forest." In the presentation above there was no fair exchange between the wants of MAWAS (conservation) and the villager's wants (development).

Michael Dove (1994) has argued that projects may give villagers something in return for stopping with something else. It is possible to understand the livelihood program accordingly. The KFCP design document stating that that the livelihood program wants to create livelihood options that "[..] do not require the use of fire in peatlands nor depend on illegal logging" (KFCP 2009: 4**)**. The question then remains how good the alternative is.

When the same people return under a new acronym: Why trust them now?

With the KFCP, some of the same people and organizations that villagers had lost confidence in returned. This shaped the question of trust, or lack of it, between the villagers and those now returning under a new acronym. Some of the people who had worked for BOS now

returned, now united with the KFCP. Staff from CARE, who had been active in the area previously, also returned. The continuation of staff, jumping from the one project to the other, creates room for reflection and comparison for the villagers: How can we trust them now? How different will it be this time?

In the preliminary phase of the Mega Rice Project, people working for the government went out to investigate the conditions for implementing the project. One villager I spoke to recalled one of these meetings:

> I met one of these experts and I mentioned to him that I do not believe in this project. The Dayaks have lived here for so long and have not done intensive rice-cultivation because the conditions here will not do. He did not take note of my words, but just told me clearly: This will work, the project will be a success.

This same villager today could proudly say: "What did I tell them? He was wrong, so wrong!" This villager is today very skeptical about every step that the KFCP announces, always looking for information from various sources, so he can independently evaluate what is going. Though he criticizes the KFCP, he is not against it, but is always watchful, eager to know more and to confront those he can about how they want to proceed. It seems obvious that the disgrace he received from the expert, who so proudly and carelessly dismissed his critical comment, has shaped his own critical attitude today.

The Knowledge-gap and the amplification of feelings of inferiority

I have touched upon how previous, unfortunate experiences with earlier projects have created grounds for insecurity and doubt .I have mentioned how the surroundings in themselves have become more unpredictable, namely the returning presence of wild fires that threatens to destroy even the houses the villagers live in. Now I will turn to another source of insecurity that also directly affects the villagers' perception of themselves and the projects. I will dwell on the villagers' inferior education compared with those who arrive to work as implementers of the projects. I turn to the knowledge gap. I investigate how this affects trust and interaction between villagers and between them and those who arrive to participate in the governing of the project.

One CARE worker lived in Sei Katja. He had a lot of contact with other CARE workers in the other KFCP included villages by using a walkie-talkie system. This system was necessary due to the poor cellphone connection with the villages further upriver. He was young, Christian

and born and raised in Palangkaraya. He came to the village to do his part in the management of the KFCP; being engaged in what CARE calls «community engagement», shortened CE. He had a Bachelor degree (*S1*) from the University of Palangkaraya. Those who worked for BOS within the KFCP also usually had a Bachelor's degree *(S1)* from Palangkaraya, and most could communicate in English.

Almost no one in the village had education comparable to those working for CARE or BOS. The village's secondary school was first established in 2006. Many of the villagers had only primary school (*Sekolah Dasar*), some secondary school (*Sekolah Menengah Pertama*) and very few had high school (S*ekolah Menengah Atas)*. This created a substantial gap between those who had and those who did not have higher education. There was a fair of degree correlation between level of education and structural position vis-a-vis the project. Those who had higher education were almost exclusively in a position of governing and those who did not were in a position of being governed.

The villagers reflected upon this gap in various contexts. Through reflecting upon the knowledge-gap and its consequences for self-perception, feelings of distrust or inferiority often emerged, the villagers told me. When I discussed the presence of KFCP with one villager with a high school diploma, he made the following comment:

> You need higher education to get any grasp of what the KFCP actually entails. Few have that in the village and most only think about the tomorrow and not the long term. They can easily be convinced to join such a project if they think they can get benefits out of it. If they only had higher education, they would surely be more critical.

He connected the trouble with all the previous projects with a combination of not being able to speak out, due to the political conditions of the Suharto era, and not knowing or understanding enough. The last part was due to the lack of formal education, the low degree of critical thinking. Since he could not trust that most people knew what they were becoming a part of, he could neither trust that they knew how this was going to turn out, whether in their favor or not. This left him doubtful and unconvinced that joining the KFCP was a good idea.

Villagers would often criticize themselves and blame themselves for not understanding enough about the KFCP. This was a typical statement often made: "We are stupid people. We do not have much schooling. The others are so smart, have so high schooling." After having said this, villagers would often turn to the lack of English as the core evidence for their

disconnectedness. It was a case of knowing or not knowing English, of being connected or not to a larger world. The projects that arrived in the village were certainly from somewhere else, from an English-speaking place. These remarks of inferiority, of «being stupid» (*kita bodo*) were also connected to the phrase «not yet developed» (*belum maju*). The «being stupid» *(kita bodo)* was then related to being undeveloped (*belum maju*) and further the blame was often directed towards themselves, as in "we are lazy" (*kita malas*).

When I was having a quiet smoke with one of the elders in the village he suddenly asked me: "What do stupid people do in your country? Here they just fish or go into the forest to cut down trees or tap rubber." How he put the question and how he himself answered it, surprised me. Later after having heard similar statements, I interpreted it as a feeling of inferiority that emerged in the encounter with the other, the implementers of project or students like myself with a different educational background. Another example that describes this feeling of inferiority vividly was a conversation I had with three men in the village. The issue of not knowing English emerged with a vulnerable tone: "All the other places know English. In Malaysia, they speak English. In Palangkaraya, even in some of the bigger villages some people are gaining a certain touch of English, but not here, we still know so little." The faces of the two men became sad after these words. A silence emerged and I sensed a deep frustration among them. This signaled a feeling of being left out, and a feeling of inferiority, which I argue evoke insecurity about the future.

When I visited the tree-plantation together with a young man who had learnt a few words of English, he told me about the white man who would eventually come and check whether the work they had done was good enough or not. As we walked inside the tree-plantation, he asked me to engage in a role-play. He wanted me to play him, while he would play the white inspector. Since his English was very poor he would make up words that were not English, but that would sound like English. He asked me to reply "Yes, sir," after whatever he had said before. This game seemed to amuse him a lot. It enabled a role-reversal; mocking of the power the English-speaking white persons have in these encounters. Here he was the powerful, white, English-speaking and I was the one who just replied; "Yes, sir". The interesting part, as I saw it, was that the pretended English was treated as if was conventional English. This could be a way of staging how many villagers actually encountered the project, saying yes, or accepting, but without knowing what they are actually accepting. This frame of

not understanding easily amplifies feelings of inferiority, as I also argued in the case about Carbon.

I was often questioned why white people (*orang bule*) so rarely married Dayaks. "I do not know", I would usually answer or more lively I would say: "Because there are not many here". After the answer, the questioner would usually give himself the answer: "Because the Dayaks are too stupid. White people (*orang bule*) do not want to marry stupid (*orang bodoh*) people. We do not have much school and white people like to marry people who have higher education." This typical answer sheds light on the relation between self-worth and education. In the monograph, *Cosmologies in the making,* Fredrik Barth (1995) depicts the ritual knowledge system of the Ok people of Papua New-Guinea where male members obtain knowledge through ritual stages. The differentiation generated through the ritual stages created a naturalized hierarchy in the small society. I suggest that Barth's perspective can be applied to the KFCP, in that a knowledge-hierarchy was present in the village, where the degree of competence in English or higher education differentiated those residing in the village. In Barth's case from Ok, one imagined that those that were above oneself in the initiation hierarchy knew more, had a more comprehensive insight. In Sei Katja, the same was the case for education, that those who had lower education imagined that those who had higher knew so much more.

I remember once I was going to a formal, political meeting with some of those who had political position in the village government. They kept trying to remember what the different letters in the acronym REDD and KFCP stood for, eventually re-capturing the words. They had been explained the meaning by the CARE staff in various village meetings. They kept asking me on the way to the meeting: "So what is REDD really about?" The experience with not knowing what REDD was all about was widespread among villagers. Having been fooled before in previous projects, this uncertainty and lack of knowledge was a source of frustration that could trigger much anger.

Once I met a large group of the staff working for CARE inside the KFCP-sphere, who had gathered in one of the villages for a short time. It was more surprising to hear them ask similar questions like the members of the village government on their way to the aforementioned meeting: "So what is REDD really about?" I was surprised to hear about the uncertainty

among the CARE staff. What made it a surprise was that my prejudice that they knew turned out not to be true. They were also struggling to understand what REDD was all about. However, their uncertainty would often be underemphasized when they interacted with the villagers. They could hide their uncertainty. The staff from CARE would occasionally make remarks about the villagers not understanding enough, or much about REDD. This assumption was not mutual. The villagers usually expressed a different assumption about the CARE staff's knowledge, as I have mentioned before (cf. Howell 2014).

Following a KFCP-Document: Empowerment as dis-empowerment

I want to explore another example that can illustrate the knowledge-gap and how it connects more broadly to the different modes of engagement. I will proceed by investigating a document produced with the intent of making sure that what the World Bank refers to as «safeguards» were being followed. The document was written in heavy bureaucratic jargon. It included information on what the KFCP had done so far, how they had made sure they were proceeding according to sound procedures that would secure no harmful consequences. The document was distributed to the villagers before a meeting, and was to be a foundation for the discussions. This was a meeting arranged by a team of consultants hired by the KFCP to investigate how the villagers interpreted their experiences with the project so far. For a person who was used to reading such documents it could be digested fairly easily, but for someone with little formal schooling, not being used to reading, the document could be quite a challenge, indeed (cf. Howell 2014).

The document was normatively written, according to how things were supposed to be done, according to how the laws of Indonesia states those procedures are to be done. I would therefore consider it a classical administrative document, where *administrative mode* is the modus operandi.

I was present when the document was delivered to a sub-village (*dusun*) of Sei Katja. A speedboat from KFCP with CARE staff entered the sub-village briefly and delivered some samples of this document. I went around observing the reactions of the villagers. One woman in her 30's opened the brown, envelope, revealing the thick document that was printed in two languages: English and Indonesian. Not her own language: Dayak. The woman looked at it, for a while, and then she put it down and said with a frustrated face: "I do not understand (*Aku tidak mengerti*). This is too difficult" (*terlalu susa*). Then I went to see another person

opening another sample of it. His reaction was identical. I suppose that the intention of distributing these documents are noble, a transparent process meant to facilitate for empowerment of villagers. However, when the pre-conditions for understanding the document are lacking, giving out this document could have the opposite effect: Disempowerment. It reminds those who receive it that they belong to another sphere, the dual economy of subsistence and market, not the administrative sphere of higher government.

Concluding remarks: The Future -What to live from: Hopes, fears and expectations

Villagers acknowledged the connection between poverty and lack of opportunities on the one hand and the continuation of logging on the other. It was a dream for many parents to be able to send their children out of the village to continue their schooling. If the children wanted to continue with high school (*Sekolah menengah atas*) they had to leave the village for the sub-district capital of Mentangai. This dream often remained just a dream, because "We are not capable" (*tidak mampu*), the means for paying were not there. If further schooling was not an option the choice often became one of choosing one, or combining fishing, tapping rubber and logging. A reason why villagers were still logging that was evoked was: "Well, we need to have money to survive. We need to have money to sustain our families." Another villager expressed it in quite dark, perhaps prophetic way when he said: "If we remain poor, the forest will eventually disappear."

In this chapter I asked: How do past experiences and present concerns shape villagers` perception of KFCP? I have argued in the cases presented here that villagers view their past and its relation to the present through the interpretive grid of *peasant mode*, based on Scott`s *subsistence ethics* (1976). I have argued that the feeling of loss due to the dramatically changed life conditions after the Mega-Rice Project has increased distrust towards outsiders` arriving with the outspoken intention of "doing good". I have emphasized how the knowledge gap between the villagers and the workers for the implementing NGOs of KFCP, has further increased this distrust. Adding to this the insecurity about the potential for KFCP in making future needs and dreams come true, the stage is set for what I shall explore in the next chapter: Namely, how villagers tried to reduce this insecurity by deploying the other core element of *peasant mode*, "weapons of the weak" (Scott: 1985). In addition, how the influence of NGOs and the actual activities the villagers participated in contributed to an emerging political consciousness beyond *peasant mode*.

Chapter 3: Democratic state-making processes and the art of resistance: Surveillance, collaborations and negotiations within the KFCP-area

During the Mega Rice Project [PLG], we did not dare to question our doubts about the project openly, but now we do. Times have changed.

– Villager in the KFCP area

During previous projects, we knew so little about them. Just some information on the TV and then it was gone. We did not know where to go to find out more and how to influence the projects, how to participate, but this is different with the KFCP. There are many meetings, workshops and so on.

-Villager in the KFCP area

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued for the importance of understanding the villagers' reactions to the KFCP in relation to their changing life conditions and experiences with previous projects within the interpretive grid of *peasant mode*. In this chapter, I ask: How did different villagers engage themselves with the KFCP through the post-Suharto framework? How did the villagers` involvement with the KFCP influence them?

 In this chapter I move from villagers in general to focusing more on particular villagers' concern and changing relations between some of them through their relation with the KFCP-process. I take note of Agrawal's (1999) warning against presenting the village as "one" and thus seek to limit the misrepresentations that can follow if the different interest and perspectives within a village is not given due attention (Agrawal 1999: 633).

I am concerned with how particular villagers engaged themselves with the KFCP through the possibilities that the post-Suharto framework enabled. One of the villagers worked for YPD and through him and his connections, some villagers became acquainted with political mode.

I argue that the engagement by some villagers within a governing team for the KFCP contributed to creating a split within the village between an inner core and many who experienced feelings of exclusion. The YPD-villager and his network, I argue, contributed in amplifying already existing insecurities against the KFCP, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The YPD villager and his connections could also amplify the negative views held by those who experienced KFCP as a threat or who felt left excluded from it.

I concentrate on two cases. First: A tree-planting plantation, the main activity organized by the KFCP, and second: A workshop. I focus on how these two cases contributed to new, emerging political consciousness, namely a move towards speaking out more directly to political authorities and thus moving beyond *peasant mode*. Simultaneously I also emphasize how *peasant mode* was the backbone for how most villagers engaged with the tree-plantation. The workshop contributes more directly to advancement of *political mode* because it specifically asked villagers to define themselves in relation to certain governmental categories, encouraging the villagers to imagine themselves and their surroundings in the abstract. I further argue that the engagement by the villagers with the tree-planting plantation and the workshop should be contextualized within larger democratic state-making processes. That is the apparent shrinking of the gap between those who govern and those who are governed and a more interventionist state, evoking promises of more welfare and security as well as fear of more surveillance.

The changing context of village politics in the post-Suharto era

As mentioned in the introduction chapter to this thesis, Anløv (2003) has referred to the changed political structure for the villages in Indonesia after Suharto as a "small revolution" (Antløv 2003: 200). The new political context in the village has given villagers, both those in the village government, the new parliament, and those outside it, new ways of influencing a project such as the KFCP. I want to investigate how these possibilities are actually manifesting themselves in villagers` engagement with the KFCP.

I can mention one, brief example that the changing political structure has shifted the power-balance in the village, making the village head (*kepala desa)* more responsive to the villagers, and the newly emerged village parliament, in particular. I heard from several villagers how the previous village head had almost signed an agreement with a palm oil company. This, in fact, actually happened in a village nearby. That incident is still a cause for continuous resistance and protest against the village head. However, since members of the newly established village parliament (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*) in Sei Katja reacted early and were able to mobilize their co-villagers sufficiently, the near agreement between the previous village head and the company vanished into nothing.

That a palm oil plantation was nearly established around Sei Katja before the KFCP arrived indicates how the KFCP is surrounded by other, competing projects. The villagers continuously compare these competing contemporary projects. Those villages that live within

the KFCP-area are given opportunities to engage in various arenas where they can bring forward political claims and their own visions, whereas those encompassed within others, such as palm oil, are not.

Recent changes in the village after the fall of Suharto

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, there have been a number of changes taking place in Sei Katja. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a secondary school (*Sekolah menengah pertama*) was built in 2007. Before that, only a primary school was available for the villagers. A health clinic where one midwife works has been built in recent years. Before this building emerged, births in the village were the responsibility of a village specialist on the area (*bidan kampong*) with no formal employment.

In 2010, Sei Katja got pavement stretching from one side of the village to the other. The same year the small bridges in the village were painted blue, as they are in other villages along the Kapuas River, a sign of governmental stamping. A sign reminding the villagers about the national independence of Indonesia has been erected near the schools and the health clinic, the public meeting place of the village. Altogether, these changes, in my opinion, reflect a change towards a more interventionist state. A more interventionist state is a state that is more present in terms of the security and aspirations most villagers seems to want more of, namely school and health, but also in terms of more surveillance. Once example of this is allegedly increasing surveillance on illegal logging, as I return to below

After the fall of Suharto, the availability of consumer goods has also increased. Trading boats (*kapal dagang*) functioning as floating shops enter Sei Katja regularly and harbour for some days before travelling on. Emerging debt-relations between traders and villagers are more frequent, as many villagers cannot pay up front. I noticed the pressure put on parents if say, the neighbouring child got a bike but their daughter had not received one yet. I mention this because many villagers seemed to be in increasing need of money, through increasing commercial temptations, and this shaped expectations towards the KFCP, the wish of gaining sufficient money through it.

Setting up a governance-system from within: New emerging hierarchies

To grasp the differentiated engagement by villagers in the KFCP and the gaps that emerged among them it is important to understand the particular governance-system established by the

KFCP inside the village. The father of the household I lived with participated in this governance-system. This gave me a good opportunity to follow it closely from the inside.

The new village framework after the fall of Suharto enabled a closer connection between the village government and those who are governed. The governance system that the KFCP established extended this tendency, by actively making villagers themselves engaged in the governing of the project. This had not happened before. Neither had the practice of electing their own village head (*kepala desa*), which by chance happened right before KFCP entered. The newly elected village head won with a small margin ahead of his competitors. He had been clear about his positive attitude towards the KFCP before the election, which was not the case with several of his competitors. Hence, the arrival of the KFCP and the lost election for the defeated candidates became entwined.

When villagers compared the KFCP with MAWAS and other previous projects, the biggest difference was the setting up of a governance system that included the villagers themselves. The KFCP established two teams in each village to be in charge of the project activities on a daily basis: Activity Management Team (TPK or *Tim Pengeloalaan Kegiatang*) and Activity Monitoring Team (TP or *Tim Pengawasi*). Each team had between three to five members, recruited among villagers. The team members, elected in village meetings *(musyawarah desa)*, had different roles to fill. TPK was in charge of managing the daily activities of the projects, that is, its operation. They were in charge of planning and informing about the work to be done and in checking whether it had actually been done afterwards. They were also in charge of the payments from the project to those involved. TP was in charge of independently monitoring the activities of the TPK. While it was not allowed for those who were elected TPK to be part of the village government, this was not the case for TP's. Some TP's then had this double-engagement, working for both the village government and as TP, enabling a flexibility in terms of role-management.

NGO-connections: Emerging political mode within the village

One of the villagers living in Sei Katja worked for the NGO named YPD, which was critical to the KFCP. This NGO emerged as a reaction to the Mega Rice Project. Documenting the damage done by this project was the rationale for establishing the NGO. His involvement gave the villagers a steady flow of critical information about the KFCP. The opportunity of a villager joining a NGO is in itself a sign of the post-Suharto era, which indicates how it

enables criticism to prosper and thus the possibilities of visible protests not common within *peasant mode*-engagement.

Surah joined the YPD in 2010, two years after the official announcement of the climate collaboration between Indonesia and Australia. He was also elected into the village parliament (*BPD*). In other words, he personated the new, democratic options for influencing politics. Through his double engagement, he was able to play an entrepreneurial role. He could combine the inside expertise of village politics in his NGO work and his information and expertise through the NGO in the village politics. I met him at a workshop in Palangkaraya, which I will be returning to in the next chapter.

Surah was young, eager to learn and use his newly acquired knowledge. In his house along the river, there were lots of information about the KFCP and REDD which he had acquired through his engagement with the YPD and participation in numerous workshops. Nobody in Sei Katja, except the village head, had access to this amount of information. In addition, Surah had access to a laptop, also uncommon in the village. His mobility stretched from the village to the district capital (*kabupaten*), Kuala Kapuas, where the office of the YPD is located. Sometimes he would travel onwards to Palangkaraya where other NGOs proliferate and key politicians have their offices. Occasionally his travels went all the way to the national capital, Jakarta. Through his travelling, he could continually acquire new knowledge and insights, which he could deploy in the village. He also occasionally, through NGO-funding, travelled with other villagers from Sei Katja as representatives of his community. In Jakarta at WALHI`s office the villagers were presented as representatives of an indigenous community threatened by KFCP and thus became part of the greater fight against KFCP by WALHI. I return to this in the next chapter.

Surah was previously occasionally engaged in illegal logging. When I asked him about it, his answer was, as with others: "I had to do it. How else could I feed my family? We have to live; We need food on the table." This is classical *subsistence ethics*-argumentation (Scott: 1976), part of *peasant mode*, which I elaborated on in the previous chapters. The shift from logging illegally to fighting for the environment and rights for his community through a NGO, can exemplify a personal travel of becoming an environmentalist, as written about by Agrawal (Agrawal 2005:161). According to Surah's own statement, his engagement with resisting the

KFCP started with the feeling of insecurity that many of his co-villagers expressed. Once I visited him in his village home, he gave the following account:

> I wanted to know what the KFCP actually wanted to do here. How could we feel safe after all the misdeeds that had been done to us in the past [previous projects]? So I called up my [NGO] friends and asked them to help out in investigating the actual goals by the KFCP and their actual consequences for those residing here.

Several journalists and NGO-workers came to his house for short periods to investigate and update themselves on the situation in the village. This was an opportunity for him to act as a spokesperson of the village. This role was less appreciated by those in the village that were more positively attuned to the presence of the KFCP, fearing that he would give a too negative impression of how the project was received. The father in my own household, for instance, complained about this: "He is supposed to tell the head of the village before he has visitors. The village head must give his permission. However, he does not bother to do this. The village head finds this annoying." This hints to how the a villager with the backing of a NGO can challenge the village head with his view on how a project, such as the KFCP, is proceeding.

The presence of the NGO-connection through Surah opened the possibility for other villagers to participate along the NGO-line too, through participating in seminars that the NGO arranged or through participating in discussion with various NGO-representatives that came to the village. Several villagers held the NGO-line open, as a source of information, but remained ambivalent to the NGO's perspectives. The NGO-line arguably contributed in increasing the level of conflict as its critical approach to the KFCP influenced a pro/contra split within the village towards the project.

The Tree-planting plantation case: A landscape of hope, doubt and vulnerable expectations

The practical activity by the KFCP that was mostly ongoing while I was in the village was planting of trees in an area damaged by forest fires in recent years and the aftermath related to this activity. This included checking whether villagers had planted the trees that they claimed to have planted and paying out money accordingly. I begin by describing the context of the planting. I continue by investigating some of the consequences the tree-planting plantation had for interaction between villagers and outsiders and the discussions and activism it triggered.

The tree planting started in January 2012 and went on until late May the same year. Before the tree planting began, there had already been a trial site where different trees had been tried out. The results of how many trees survived were contested. Investigations done by YPD in collaboration with cooperating NGOs showed a high rate of mortality while investigations done for the KFCP by Center for International Forest Research (CIFOR) concluded that far less died than what the NGOs claimed.

The location of the tree planting was a heavily burnt down area. This was a result of the forest fires in previous years, after the infamous Mega Rice Project. When entering the area through the canal you could see remains of the once, I imagine, towering trees. These remains looked like burnt sculptures, bleak creatures of what used to be. The canal was constructed as part of the Mega Rice Project. The canals drained the landscape. This drastically increased the threat of forest fires. When the wetness in the surrounding landscape was gone, the protection against forest was also gone. These canals indicate how one project, the Mega-Rice project, literally, flows and connects with its successors.

To get to the area, villagers followed the Kapuas River upwards for a while, before continuing further onward by using the canal. The canal took its name from the corporation that was in charge of constructing it. The villagers referred to the tree planting area as *lokasi.* At the *lokasi*, simple cabins (*pondok*) were set up along the canal. Each cabin belonged to a workgroup (*kelompok*) with one person in charge per group. The head of the group (*ketua*) reported to the TPK's about the progress at the *lokasi* who in return reported to a controlling team from BOS (*Tim Teknis*).The latter reported further to their superiors in the KFCP working in Jakarta. Altogether, this constituted a hierarchy from the huts along the canal to KFCP's office in Jakarta and ultimately the responsible politicians supporting the project in Australia.

The making of administrative spaces: Notes of increasing surveillance in general and at the lokasi in particular

James Scott (2009), in his book The Art of Not being governed, writes about the increasing administration of space worldwide and how "little people" have resisted becoming part of them, often by fleeing (Scott 2009: ix). The establishment of the tree plantation is an example of administered space in the making, with its surveillance. The general surveillance that has increased in recent years reflects a more widespread awareness by government officials to govern these formerly out-of-the-way places. I argue that the resistance villagers show against

stately surveillance in terms of forest officers is not the same as the resistance they show against the surveillance at the lokasi. However, the common factor is that both are challenging villagers' conception of bebas (free, independent) and thus contribute to moral discussions among villagers.

The villagers planted the trees, with a three-meter gap in-between them, along strict lines on the plantation. Each family could plant nine lanes. One lane was 550 meters. When half of the lanes were finished, the first payment would follow, when the remaining was done, the remaining payment would follow. The payments would follow after the verification was done.

The verification followed the hierarchy described above, with a control by TP/TPK together with the Bos-Mawas (*Tim teknis)* first before a Jakarta-team would do the last check. A timeline was set when everyone should be finished. One consequence of organizing it accordingly was that those who were finished early were obliged to wait until everyone else were finished. Subsequently, another consequence was putting pressure on those who started late to speed up.

The villagers criticized this model mainly for two reasons. Firstly, it was often evoked that: "The Dayaks do not like to be controlled. They do not like to have someone above them, telling them what to do." This was related to the importance of being *bebas* (meaning free, being independent). Secondly, villagers often commented: "The Dayaks are used to cash and carry. When a job is done, they get the money right away." As I see it then, by juxtaposing these aforementioned premises with the actual organization of the tree-plantation, reasons for emerging tensions become clear. The *lokasi* was hierarchically organized, where someone was to make sure someone else had done the job, establishing a system of surveillance. Secondly, money did not follow immediately after the job was done. It came first after a tedious verification process was completed. The reactions between villagers on the aforementioned tensions differed, related to whether the villager was part of the governing team (TP/TPK) or not. This difference in the village could in practice be between neighbors who were close family, mixing formal roles in the KFCP project together with kinship ties, creating a subtle mix with potentials for frictions, as I return to below.

There were complaints and fear among villagers about increasing surveillance related to illegal timber trade. Many villagers explained that this increased surveillance emerged because of the KFCP. A story that circulated in the village was a fellow villager who was sent to jail some years ago for doing illegal timber trade. This villager lived in the village today.

He could himself testify to the villagers how bad his time in jail had been. The case was seen as concrete evidence that villagers were now in danger of being caught, if they trespassed the forest official's enforcement of the law.

As those doing illegal timber trade were worried about increased surveillance, the governing team (TPKs) were afraid of being accused of corruption. A TPK had to quit due to charges of corruption, not long after the KFCP entered the village. I heard the story of his resignation told numerous times by different villagers. The story in itself seemed to have a disciplinary effect. The story proved that corruption charges could have real effects. The KFCP set strict rules for corruption. I interpret it as a disciplinary-technique in itself from the project's side that villagers have to embrace these strict rules for corruption.

While I was in the village, there were rumors that forest officers roamed around for a time. Villagers who were involved in logging fled due to this rumor. They became invisible for a while, stayed away from the stately radar, beyond the police's field of intervention. This is reminiscent of Scott's (2009) descriptions of "little people" fleeing, when state-officials enter out-of-the way places to enforce the official laws. Many villagers did not see these interventions as legitimate out of two reasons; first, because the ownership of the forests in question was contested (Guldra et al. 2010:18) and second, because many villagers did not believe in the sincerity of the police. The police was not concerned about the well-being of the forest, but rather concerned about the well-being of their moneybag according to those villagers I spoke to. The forest officers could be bribed. The villagers referred to them as Money Police (*Polisi Uang)*. The villagers compared their own lack of money with the big money that the companies had at their disposal in dealing with official authorities. Many villagers explained to me how this put them in a vulnerable position. They could not bribe and were thus in a continuous state of danger of being caught. The big companies, on the other hand, could bribe and override the law. This comparison evoked feelings of injustice among villagers; it reminded them about their disadvantaged position in relation to the official, national law. Many villagers seemed to agree that more surveillance of illegal logging came because of the presence of the KFCP. This made many villagers skeptical towards the KFCP.

The issue of money payment: distrust and control

Tania Li (2008a: 113) has noted how developmental project carry with them the danger of elite capture. The distrust about possible disappearance of money was directed within the village against those positioned above them in the official hierarchy outside the village and

against those positioned in managing position within the village. This case shows how money distributed in a REDD-project easily can cause grounds for conflict in a village. When the villagers are living on the economic margin and the trust among each other in the village is not present, a case of money distribution can easily lead to rumors of corruption and intense arguments.

When I joined one villager to the *lokasi,* he expressed his concern, if not outright irritation, about where the money in the KFCP was going. According to the villager I joined, the actual income for each tree planted should have been five thousand rupiah, but two thousand rupiah disappeared before the money reached the villagers to others, politicians and bureaucrats.

One household could plant trees in nine lanes. This gave them 2.8 million rupiah (approximately 250 US dollars). The villagers I spoke to did not consider this payment satisfying. In particular, when villagers compared the payment of planting trees with the payment for cutting down trees[14].

The leader of the TPK picked up the money in Kuala Kapuas, which the villagers were going to receive for their work. The villagers gathered seeds in the forest and put these in nurseries outside their homes. The small trees were sold to the KFCP. Then the trees were planted at the *lokasi.* The awaited payment were for both the growing of small trees and the planting of them at the *lokasi.* The money was stored temporally in the leader of the TPK's house. Some villagers expressed a concern that money could disappear before they were distributed rightfully. The father of my household told me a story that exemplified the tense atmosphere: "A villager came to the leader of the TPK's house with a knife and demanded to be paid money for the selling of trees immediately. If not, he would make trouble for him." The villager threatened to kill the leader of the TPK if he did not provide the money, the father in my household told me. The leader of the TPK had responded that he would arrange a meeting at the school the next day. He would explain in detail why not everyone in the village had received their due amount of money yet. He would also answer all questions and try to dissolve any doubt about his own trustworthiness. This positioned the leader of the TPK into a

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[14] Villagers informed me that possible income on one day of logging could reach up until a one. Million rupiah (80 US dollars).

classical cross pressure situation, having to respond to the claims by his peer villager, as well as to commitments to his superiors.

Since the money was in one house in the main village, some villagers in a sub-village (*dusun*) upriver feared that due to them having started later with their tree-planting at the *lokasi*, no money would be left when they were finished. When the money was starting to be paid out, it could disappear fast, they expressed. One of the TPK's in this sub-village therefore advocated for the transferring of the money meant to be paid out for those residing in his sub-village to him. He could then reassure the villagers in his sub-village that he had the money for their work stored in his house. I was relaxing one day with a cigarette (*kretek*) together with a couple of villagers when the TPK's from this sub village sat down next to us. They presented their case informally before they were heading for the leading TPK's house. The TPK from the sub-village said: "All the money cannot be stored here. We must control the money that is for the work we do at the *lokasi*. Our money must be in our sub-village *(dusun)*. It must be like this. The money is for the local society. If it doesn't go like this I'll burn his house down!" The TPK's wish was granted later that evening. The money for those residing in his sub-village was brought to his house where it was supposed to be stored until the job had been done.

I spoke to the leader of the TPK's about the work the sub-village that took control over their share of the money had done at a later stage. He was not pleased and commented with a frustrated tone:" They got the money, but we have not received good enough work yet (*belum*). However, the money is already (*sudah*) distributed now!" He further commented upon the protagonist that challenged him and made him accept his demand: "He is good with words, but less with actual work. He should become a writer. I will not be fooled by his words again."

The examples above show how villagers constantly re-negotiate trust among themselves during the KFCP-process and difficulty of the seemingly technical job of just distributing money

Reducing the insecurity of land ownership at the lokasi

 In the villagers' engagement with the tree plantation the overarching questions were: Who owns this land? Who owns these trees? I show, in this case, how differently situated

villagers deployed both peasant mode and administrative mode in coming to terms with these questions.

The trees that the villagers planted at the *lokasi* came either from villages up stream, which were part of the KFCP-area, or were trees that the villagers had grown themselves, and then sold to the KFCP before planting them for the KFCP. Or this was not entirely clear to the villagers: Were they planting the trees on behalf of the KFCP, being paid for planting them and that was it? Alternatively, were they planting their own trees, meaning they had a right to decide over their future use, later? This insecurity became the source of an experiment for some villagers.

Plating a rubber tree in a new area is simultaneously an act of claim making, according to local custom (Potter and Lee 1998:11).The KFCP did not allow villagers to plant rubber trees because they claimed they were not adaptable with peat soil. KFCP only allowed villagers to plant trees that did not produce (*tidak digunakan*). Some of those who were skeptical about the KFCP in the village interpreted this as an omen. As a sign that KFCP did not want trees that required regular interaction with the villagers in the future, like rubber. There was speculation among villagers that this could be because the KFCP actually wanted the area outside of the villagers` control, perhaps planned as a conservation zone.

One day Suklah, who was part of the village parliament, informed me that he was going to plant pineapple and rubber inside the *lokasi*. Suklah came to the village from Java in the 1980's and married a local Dayak. His attitude to the KFCP was ambivalent and hesitant. He tried to keep himself updated through the channels of information available in the village and workshops and other arrangements he was able to join. This particular day we were smoking *kretek* together on his balcony when he said he had to do something. I asked if I could follow and he did not mind. We went behind his house where he had some small rubber trees and pineapple. He started digging up the rubber trees and told me: "I will bring these to the plantation! This is an experiment."

Suklah was not the only one doing this, as more villagers were joining along, but he was the most outspoken one. This was happening just before the final check was due to happen, meaning that the trees that were not supposed to be there could become officially recognized, without the knowing consent of the last verifiers, the Team from Jakarta. The next day,

walking home from a football match near the school, I met Suklah, just after he had planted the trees that were not supposed to be there. Suklah exclaimed in pride:

I have planted pineapple and rubber now. We did not get them from the KFCP. They came from my own garden. So if the KFCP later say that they own this area, we can show to these trees and say: But these trees did not come from the KFCP because they refused these trees to be planted by us.

I understand Suklah's exclamation as an announcement of his strategy directed at reducing insecurity. Given that the destiny of *lokasi* was considered unknown, despite promises by the KFCP against the contrary, these actions can be seen as an intervention on behalf of the villagers against the passive approach of just wait and see. When it comes to where this experiment originated from, or who masterminded it, I am unsure. However, I know that a meeting was held beforehand at the Surah`s house, the villager engaged with YPD who has been constantly criticizing KFCP. It is therefore an open question to what extent Surah and his NGO has influenced it.

A villager who worked as one of the staff for the head of the village invited me one day to his house. He showed me a copy of a letter he had sent to the KFCP-administration residing in Palangkaraya, regarding the ownership of the trees on the *lokasi.* I asked him why he wrote the letter. He replied that he wanted to be sure, to have a written confirmation. "The KFCP assured me that the trees belonged to the villagers."

It is interesting to note the difference in these strategies, the planting of own plants inside a tree-plantation and writing a formal letter, in relation to the political position of those who executed them. Both have the same goal: Reducing the insecurity of the land ownership question. The planting of pineapple and rubber, an "everyday act of resistance" (Scott 1985), is a direct form of action done by a villager who belongs to the village parliament (*BPD*). He is acting firmly within the boundaries of *peasant mode*. The village parliament represents the villagers against the village government; an institution structured to check the power of the village government. By engaging in an "everyday act of resistance", it is also possible to interpret this as a sign of distrust against the village government.

The two strategies make visible difference between two of the modes of engagement that I have outlined before in this thesis. The villager who wrote the letter was part of the village

government. He deployed an administrative strategy of making sure that the land actually belonged to the village, going by the formal rules. The deployment of *peasant mode* speaks to a contextually understandable logic for the villagers, namely the securing of ownership through planting of rubber trees. The *administrative mode*, on the other hand, follows a generic stately approach, securing a guarantee through formal procedures.

An encounter between big men (orang besar) and little people (orang kecil): The arrival of the white man

I was reminded ever since I came to the village that one day the white man from Australia would come and check the work done by the villagers at the lokasi. This encounter makes visible the fear instilled in the hierarchy of controllers, but also how villagers may resist and counter this hierarchy, denying fear of the "bigger man". It also shows how praise given by a "big man" can uplift the spirit of "little people" and thus how a project deemed a success could contribute in enhancing the self-confidence for those involved. I now turn to the event when the white man actually appeared.

The villagers had been waiting long for the arrival of the white man, an Australian, and his team, to do the last and final check. Most of the planting had allegedly been done by now. Before his arrival, the TP/TPK and the BOS reforestation team were busy going over the plantation to check who had done what. The atmosphere in the village was tense, as some expressed a feeling of being ashamed, embarrassed (*malu*) of not having finished the job yet, while others reacted with anger (*merah*) against the system of checking in itself. One day on my way back to the family I stayed with, I witnessed a villager who grabbed one of the controllers working for BOS and lifted him up angrily threatening to smash his face. He shouted out in a direct, confrontational tone: "I am finished. I have done my job. I want my money now, right now. You do not need to check. I am already finished." The people around, including myself, tried to calm him down and eventually the angry villager put the controller down and left in a rush.

The controllers divided themselves into groups when they came to the *lokasi* and divided the job of checking between each other. Between each tree, along the 550-meter lanes, there was supposed to be three meters. The controllers checked if there was three meter between each tree. Along the beginning of the lanes of trees, signs were set up. The signs told the name of the person who had planted along the line. This made walking through the *lokasi* a reminder of all the people who lived in the village. The signs personalized the landscape. When the

controllers went through the lanes I noticed a certain enthusiasm when they saw that a tree already planted had sufficient water around it. It indicated that the tree`s chances for growing up was fair. The team from BOS used GPS-systems and maps in their checking while the TP/TPK used pen and paper. I interpreted this difference in use of technology as a reflection of the gap between those formally hired by the KFCP with higher education and those from the village who were just working as staff for the KFCP without higher education.

I went with one villager who had been told by the controlling team from BOS that some trees were not yet (*belum*) planted along his lines. He said that the controlling team was afraid of the white man who was coming.

> He can easily get angry. If there is any garbage around the huts, he will be mad. He does not accept it. I do not agree with this. I am not afraid of him .This is our land. This means that it is our right to have garbage around the huts if we wish. Those working for Bos-Mawas do not agree with this. They are so afraid of his anger!

After having uttered these phrases, he continued with reflecting upon the asymmetrical relation between himself and the white man who was soon arriving: "He is big man (*orang besar*) while we are little people (*orang kecil*), so we must work." His first statement indicates that who decides whether garbage is allowed or not, also is the owner of the land. I will return to the distinction between *orang besar* and *orang kecil*, but here it seems a contrast is drawn between who work and those who administer those who work.

After having spent some time with this villager, I spent some nights in the hut where those working for BOS slept. Each morning was quite relaxed, with a slow sequence from bathing to eating, but this morning, when the white man was actually arriving, was different. Those working for BOS got up earlier and they did not make food, but instead started cleaning up right outside and near the hut. All traces of human presence, mostly remains from food, waste, were piled up and set on fire, or thrown away into the vegetation near the canal where it could not be seen. These observations made me think of the words by the villager quoted in the paragraph above. It seemed like those working for BOS were preparing a front stage for the last verifiers where everything looked nice and tidy.

In the hut that the BOS used, right before the white man's arrival, representatives from the controlling team often came by. They expressed a tense and worried attitude: The fears that the Australian would not be pleased. Finally, the Australian and his team arrived, along the canal. The tedious and tense waiting was over. The Australian stepped out of a small boat

(*klotok*) and quickly checked whether there actually was a three-meter gap between the trees before he began communicating with those present. He spoke in English, which few of those present were capable of speaking, making translation through an interpreter necessary. I interpreted this indirect communication as having the effect of making the white person seem even "bigger". The Australian, his team, those from BOS, and the controlling team (TP/TPK) soon started walking inside the *lokasi* to do the final check.

When they came to the end of a lane, the Australian asked why they had not finished the lane all the way to the next canal. The reply by a TPK was that the instructions given were 550 meter. The Australian then said, with a loud and authoritative voice, that they must not walk anymore near the newly planted trees. This would disturb the peat. The Australian's message was: Leave it alone now. The Australian asked his interpreter several times if he had translated this message sufficiently to the TP/TPK. I experienced it as if the white man was more concerned with the technicalities of peat than befriending the villagers. That he was not here to give compliments or joke, but only to check if the job was completed and give necessary instructions about the road ahead. I saw him as a physical manifestation of the hierarchy that I had so long heard about. Now the leaders of the huts (*pondok*) and all their superiors were finally able to meet one of the top men in the project itself, who had travelled from Australia to work in Jakarta and now had come all the way to the huts and the burnt down forest area himself. After the tour was over, the Australian was pleased with what he had seen. He expressed that he thought the villagers had done a good job. Many proud villagers repeated the Australian's praising words later on various occasions. The same evening, for instance, I spoke with a TPK who, said: "Did you hear what he [the Australian) said. He said we did a good job (*BAGUS dia bilang*!) ". After having repeated the Australian`s words a big smile emerged, a smile I interpreted as indicating deep satisfaction over the work done, now deemed a success.

On the picture, we see a villager planting a tree at the lokasi. I think of the picture as a metaphor for the emerging political consciousness in Sei Katja (see below)

Emerging political consciousness

I mentioned in the previous chapter the focus on «getting the forest back» (*hutan kembali*). The KFCP focuses on this with the *lokasi* while the national government focuses on keeping the forest standing through government sponsored media campaigns. Many villagers who had been living of cutting down trees until recently expressed uneasiness in evaluating their past economic practices after the government made it illegal. I suggest that making logging illegal and sponsoring commercials such as: "Cutting a tree is like killing a person", can be considered humiliation-strategies. However, the technique of shaming may also be used by «the little people» against those more powerful which the short story I re-tell below show.

Bajola was part of the newly elected village parliament (BPD) at the time when this story occurred. Bajola came to the village in the 1980's and married a local Dayak woman. The setting for the story was that an Australian delegation came to the village to inform about the KFCP. Before this event, Bajola participated in a workshop in Kuala Kapuas organized by the YPD, which I suspect might have sharpened his tone. Bajola gave the following account to

me about how he spoke back against the Australian delegation:

> We are asked to plant trees, to contribute in the fight against climate change. We had some Australians coming here to inform us about this tree planting and the way ahead. They emphasized the importance this would have in the fight against climate change. I listened patiently to what they had to say, but then it was my time to speak and I asked very directly and confrontational: We do our part by engaging in this tree planting, but you have to do your part as well! You cannot arrange for a tree plantation as a measure to fight climate change here and then simultaneously have coalmines everywhere in Central Kalimantan. This is not consistent at all. It cannot be like this!

Bajola told me that the after he had spoken back the pale faces of the Australian representatives turned completely red. They were furious, but did not speak. Bajola continued: "It was as if they communicated with their faces: How dare he? How dare he?"

One way of understanding this story is that it exemplifies an act of inversion. Normally in the KFCP the villagers are told what to do (plant trees) and there are strong sentiments towards what not do (like cutting down trees). The project has certain disciplinary strings attached to it. In this case, a villager goes against those who are leading the project and challenges them, or seeking to demand certain behavior, evoking the ideal of equality: What we must do, you must do too. By pointing out that incongruity between what the Australians except from the villagers and what they do themselves, Bajola makes visible a gap that may have a shaming effect upon the receiver.

Dove (1988: 33) writes that during the Suharto era governmental speech was known by the Indonesian term meaning extension (*penyuluhan*), indicating that the one who listened was not supposed to speak back. In this particular case, Bajola personifies the post-Suharto framework. He speaks from an institutional position that emerged within it, namely the new village parliament. He speaks with information from a NGO-organized workshop available to question the official top-down version given by the Australian delegation. Bajola' s speech is different from a *peasant mode* approach because it makes visible to particular authorities his own view, but it cannot be considered *political mode* as I have defined it as no claim based on a particular governmental category is deployed. However, the latter deployment did occur in a letter allegedly signed by various custom keepers (*mantir)* in a number of the villages within the KFCP-sphere in June 2011. The letter titled "Stop the Indonesia- – Australia REDD+ Project in the Customary Area of the Dayak People in Central Kalimantan", argued for the immediate stopping of the KFCP for various reasons. The chief reason why the project should be stopped was the lack of recognition of traditional land borders (Lang 2011b)

However, this letter was deemed not to be true the week thereafter. The same people signed another letter that stated that the previous was not true and the blame for the first letter was put on "some irresponsible people" (Lang 2011b). A researcher I spoke to at CIFOR who had done extensive investigations in the KFCP-area claimed that the first letter was more of a NGO-product where the custom keepers (*mantir*) were used to give legitimacy to claims by the NGO on their behalf. I return more specifically to the ideology, approach and work done with and through REDD/KFCP by different NGOs in the next chapter. I do not know what actually happened between the first and the second letter and who actually masterminded the first and the second.

The examples of Bajola speaking back to the Australian and the letters both point to a new political consciousness arising in the village going beyond peasant mode. The post-Suharto framework and the ongoing shaping of relations between villagers, NGOs and governmental authorities through the KFCP enable this new political consciousness.

Experiences with exclusion and the desire for revenge

In the previous chapter, I mentioned the effect of "unrequited reciprocity" as dehumanization and a consequence of this could be the emergence of desires for revenge, often through destruction (Kirsch 2006: 82). In the KFCP, there were emerging inequalities between those involved. This sometimes left those villagers feeling excluded with desires to take revenge. Michael Dove is one anthropologist who has written on the topic of wanting revenge through destruction based on experienced unrighteous exclusion. Dove writes that "If indigenous people are deprived of rights to all but the meanest forest resource [...] they may destroy that which was theirs by right but the enjoyment of which was denied them" (Dove 1994:23).

Dove (1994) makes an analogy to the Pearl, a story by John Steinbeck. It is about a man, who finds a big diamond, but instead of bringing him riches, it brings him misfortune and he ends up by destroying the pearl. As I see it, others have found the surroundings of the villagers valuable for various reasons, from logging, rice, orangutans, to potential carbon emissions reductions related to a carbon market (KFCP), but villagers may understand the value put on their surroundings differently. If they see that what others claim to be valuable is bringing them misfortune, they might end up destroying it. If they see resources considered rightfully theirs being taken away from them, they might end up destroying these resources as well. Amity Doolittle (2005) gives an ethnographic case from Borneo that exemplifies this. She writes of how allegedly local people in the Sabah province of Malaysian Borneo burned down

two-thirds of Kinabulu Park after official announcements about plans to expand the park. Expansion, in the local people's perception, was synonymous with losing more land. Because of the burning, no implementation of the expansion was set forth (Doolittle 2005:3). Thus, the burning in this case makes sense as a way of pre-claiming or re-claiming lost land through destruction.

The TP/TPK-organizational set-up included some villagers, but excluded many more. The experiences of staying outside, of not benefitting from the project, or worse losing out completely, could occasionally relate to the want to getting even through destruction. "If I am not benefitting, why should they" seemed to me to be the rationale for this thinking. A villager said the following when comparing the Mega-rice project with the KFCP:" Many villagers did not benefit from the Mega-rice project. I saw many of them set fire on the forest to take revenge. This can easily happen with the KFCP also, if they are not better at including more villagers than just the TP/TPK." When I visited the location of the MAWAS project, mentioned in the previous chapter, I heard similar talk, regarding the injustices felt and a way of addressing them: "One day I'll burn this MAWAS down!" A villager made this comment during a longer discussion among friends who had lived in the sub-village all their life, long before MAWAS came. The utterance reflected feelings of exclusion from the forest they considered their own. On thinking about the present *lokasi* that the villagers were involved in and whether it belonged to the villagers or not, a villager said with a fierce voice: "If the government later proclaims the tree plantation not ours, if they say that it is government area, if they make it a conservation area, we'll burn it down! Why not? We have nothing to earn from it anyway."

Arson is mentioned by James Scott (1985: xvi) as one of the "weapons of the weak", part of what I have called *peasant mode*. The characteristic of arson, I would emphasize, is the invisibility it usually provides the perpetrator(s). This reminds me of the famous saying by von Clausewitz that: War is just politics by other means. Likewise, arson is politics by other means. This is politics applied by a situated actor that has limited possibilities for being heard on the official political stage, living far away from where official politics occur and having limited means and network to participate with.

The TP/TPK, as mentioned, were staff of the KFCP but not hired formally like the ones from BOS or CARE. This also reflected their wage, which was not comparable with those who were hired formally. The wage gap created envy. Before I left, the TP/TPK wanted to send an appeal to the KFCP demanding to be paid like government officials (*pegawai negri*). If this

appeal was accepted, the ones working for TP/TPK would suddenly earn much more than their fellow villagers do. This indicates how the coming of a project can contribute to increasing the income-gap between villagers. This can become a source of resentment for those left out. For just as there was envy among TP/TPK towards the formally engaged ones from MAWAS and CARE, there were also those, who were not, among either, and one villager expressed how he experienced this gap: "The KFCP only care about the TP/TPK. They only bother to inform them, to take care of them. The rest they do not care for. We are left behind. We are only work force (*buru saja*). We are only spectators." The last quote hints to the differentiating effect that a project such as the KFCP may have inside a village, generating a split or increasing an already existing split inside a village. The villagers` who see their fellow villagers rise above them, may feel even more dis-empowered.

Searching for the Indigenous land, struggling for legibility inside and outside of workshops

Villagers who lived within the KFCP-sphere were frequently invited to workshops. In the workshops political claims were made, new knowledge, new connections and frames of comparisons emerged. In my second case of this chapter, I want to investigate one such workshop as a starting point for analysing the possibilities workshops offered for the villagers and how it influenced them.

The workshop was held in Mentangai Tenggah, the sub district capital (*kecamantan*) of Mentangai, some hours with boat from Sei Katja. It was about clarifying the status of land from the villagers` point of view. Mapping the different claims related to land was the crucial task. The main participants of the workshop were the heads of different religious traditions from each village, known as *Mantir,* and some additional villagers. In every village, there were usually three *Mantir*s, each one representing a religion: Islam, Christianity and Kaharingan. The villagers were taken to the sub district capital in speedboats paid for by the KFCP and accommodated in a hotel for the three days the workshop lasted.

Before actually entering the workshop, I want to make a small detour by outlining a perspective from one of the *Mantirs* who participated and what was at stake for him. This is to further break up the homogenous category "villagers" and show how individual concerns mattered, but often camouflaged under the rubric "community" Agrawal (1999).

"This forest is individually owned, but…"

When I first came to visit this Mantir's house, I vividly remember the anger, fear and skepticism he expressed towards the KFCP. His main concern was that land he considered his own would be appropriated as part of the project's possible further expansion. It was hardly clear for me then, what was really at stake for him and his family, but gradually I came to understand. The mantir and his family had planted rubber trees and many other trees in an area that was close to the lokasi since the 1960s, according to him. Only recently had he been able to achieve a formal certificate for this area. However, even though he had a certificate he was not sure whether he would be able to keep claims from KFCP or other villagers away.

I went with him to this area. As we walked inside this area, he made me aware of all the seedlings on the ground, scattered everywhere. "Imagine how much money this can give me", he said. He was referring to the fact that these seedlings could be sold to the KFCP, as they encouraged villagers to fetch seedlings in the forest, plant them in a nursery, and sell them to the project when they had tall enough for planting. Through this lens, seeing seedling equals seeing money. His comments could give support to claims by environmental organizations that projects such as KFCP contribute in making ideas of commodification of nature more widespread. On the other hand, the comments can also be interpreted as a continuation of an ongoing historical adaption by forest dwellers, searching in the forest for what the outside trader or agent is interested in (Tsing 2005: 184). His comment, in relation to the project, reflects certain pragmatism. The presence of the project enabled him to sell seedlings to it, making it an opportunity. The project could also potentially claim his area, making it a threat.

As we walked further into the forest he exclaimed: "This is *hutan adat*." When I asked what he meant by that he explained it in the following manner: "*Hutan adat- hutan yang peorangan pemilih sendiri.*" ("Traditional forest is forest that is owned individually").Since he was head of tradition (mantir) I figured that he could give his definition more trustworthiness through referring to his position: The claim that traditional forest is forest that is owned individually. In other words, not an open access forest for everyone in the village.

When I returned to the village and referred to his claims, many reacted with hostility like: "Oh, did he tell you that, no, no, no- that is not true! That is not only his forest, many have claims there!" This taught me that claims were often contested. I also understood that beginning the process of formalizing your land or making them legible for the state, required both money and network. This meant that for most people in the village, this was out of reach.

Like one villager said: "Oh, I would love to get papers on my land, but I cannot afford it."
The village head said he only certified his lands after he became head of the village. The
interest of many villagers to get their land formalized can be understood as way of protecting
it from other claimants, state or corporate actors, in particular. It will also increase the bargain
power for compensation if state or corporate actors intervene. By formalizing the land one
makes one's land visible on stately terms or legible as Scott (1998) calls it. This then brings
me right back into the workshop.

The Interactional frame: The setting of the workshop

The workshop was arranged inside a building connected to the administrative headquarter of
the sub-district. The neighboring building was the office of the head of the sub district
(cemat*).*

On the walls inside the building were posters informing about various campaigns that the
head of district (*bupati*) was advocating and elaborations of topics that allegedly mattered
most to him. Rows of chairs were lined up where the *Mantirs* and the additional villagers sat.
On a platform, in the front of the room, a bit off the ground, two tables were set against each
other. Along these tables sat those above *Mantir* in the hierarchical traditional *(adat)* system,
demang, the traditional head of the sub-district, as well as representatives from the district and
provincial level. The one who lead the whole workshop was working for CARE and had been
engaged in this area for a long time through previous projects. He was from Java, and
travelled back and forth between Jakarta and the various project sites he was engaged with.
Behind the platform was the Indonesian flag next to pictures of the Indonesian President, the
head of the province and the head of the district. On the other side was the tree of life a key
symbol in the Dayak mythology, altogether reflecting the interpenetration of national and
ethnic identities.

Mapping: counter-mapping and co-option, becoming legible

The participants from each village, including the sub-villages, were asked to produce a map
from their village, which showed, according to their understanding, the various status of the
land and indicated the condition of the forest in areas around the village. It seemed to me that
the groups were differently prepared for this task. Some groups had already been engaged in
making maps to make visible claims as a defense strategy against KFCP and other claimants. I
had for instance seen one of the maps that were reproduced in the workshop before inside the
home of a *Mantir*. A map that was produced as an exercise in counter-mapping (Peluso 1995)

was here brought into contact with one of the claimants that it was made against. This opens the possibility for legibility making, the (gradual) acceptance of this map. This process can simultaneously be a process of co-option, where the counter-element, its edge so to say, is removed.

When the borders between the different villages were discussed among the villagers, the *Mantirs* and those present at the panel, the organizer would constantly ask for historical evidence. Or more to the point: The need for written, historical material. If it was not produced, it needed to be produced. I saw similarities between the legibility making of people and land. The villagers who did not have an Indonesian Identity card (*KTP: Kartu Tanda Penduk*), a pre-condition for registration in a hotel, needed to get it to be able to enter, to become legible. Likewise, the village borders that were claimed to be like this or that, needed to be written down, in order to be made legible. Within this discussion, there is a hierarchy of recognition: The written and formal count more than the oral and informal. Or rather, the written and formal is what is mainly counted as legible from the state's point of view, while the oral and informal has a different relational basis attached to it.

The need for written documentation was brought to my attention in the evening the second day at the seminar outside the hotel where some villagers discussed the topic. "We really need to get our history written down", one of the villagers said, after they had reflected upon the fact that only one of the villages involved in the KFCP-project had a book. This book then contained the kind of information that was often asked for by the workshop organizer, regarding land ownership, borders between this village and its neighbor. "When will you write this history, or who will write it", I asked curiously. "We shall make partnership with NGO", one of the younger villagers who participated, answered me. Then he said: "They will assist us in this work." Many anthropologists have showed how the past can be used to justify present needs or how the past can be manipulated to fit present concerns (e.g Krohn-Hansen 2001). Considering that many NGO's are well connected with government officials and logic, they are well positioned to take on the assignment of translating the claims of villagers in a way that makes them legible for government officials. This is assignment is reminiscent of an example Chatterjee (2004) mentions of the widespread use of teachers in India in the 1980s working as intermediaries between the villagers and the state bureaucracy, translating the needs of the villagers to the bureaucratic discourse that were alien to them (Chatterjee 2004: 64).

In a conversation I had with the organizer himself about what he thought was the purpose of

this workshop he answered in English: "It is about finding the indigenous land." I then asked what he meant by indigenous. "It is difficult to say", he said. He became silent before continuing: "It is people who live in the village, who have lived there for a long time, this is indigenous people." He then continued by explaining the rationale for this workshop: "They [the villagers] are talking about indigenous land, but we [the KFCP] do not understand. Where is it? Now we give them the opportunity to show us where the original indigenous land is." I found it surprising that he was so open about his own insecurity. The category of indigenous is unclear for many. This makes it open for manipulation or talking about it without knowing what the other have in mind. The KFCP, in my interpretation, encourages the deployment of *political mode* in this workshop. The organizer make it clear that he accepts categories such as indigenous people and indigenous land even though he does not have a clear understanding of it. This means that for the villagers to be successful in deploying *political mode* they must be successful in convincing governmental authorities or transnational NGOs cooperating with them about the validity of these categories. This work is often a collaboration between NGOs and villagers. I will return to the issue of indigenous land and people in the next chapter as I explore how one NGO, AMAN, deals with it and prepares villagers exactly for making convincing arguments based on the category of indigenous.

In the evening, the second day of the workshop the *Mantirs* gathered in the hotel. Their task was to finish the maps that they had started on earlier the same day. I joined the group from Sei Katja in their work. The map for the village was on the floor inside a hotel room. The delegation from my village was on the floor, bending over the map. They were drawing, coloring, writing and discussing to finish the map. I noticed how the *Mantir* whom I joined to see the areas he considered his, was actively securing that these areas were marked as his on the map. He was combining two assignments, working on behalf of "community" (*masyarakat*), but also on behalf of himself, his family (*keluarga*). The others did not protest to his marking then, but I heard later that some of them openly did. I was told that his claims were outrageous, and if he had continue pursuing them, there would be trouble. Since he had just gained the lowest legal guarantee for them, they were not that secure. This example highlights the issue of representativeness. It shows how making a village map can be co-opted and tailored according the particular interests of those involved.

One of the in-laws of the *Mantir* in question once half-jokingly said: "When he is s gone, I will get the papers on the land, and then I can sell it and get mighty rich." The transition from land being owned under communal jurisdiction, based on orally agreements, to being

formalized, enables the possibility of selling the land. The mapping exercise the villagers participated in might be one-step in a process that leads to formalization of land claims. That could mean the privatization of land, as well, as with the *Mantir*, in question. Appel writing from the Rungus of Northern Sabah has noted how the emergent privatization of land damaged village solidarity there and opened up the transformation for land being sold to foreigners (Appell 1999: 341). The KFCP could be triggering similar developments along the villages of the Kapuas river.

Payment for the Workshop(s): Inequality made visible

The *Mantirs* who participated in this workshop were paid per day by the CARE-officer in charge. He would sit behind a brown, wooden table inside the governmental building where the workshop was held when the day was over. Here he received the participants standing in a queue. The *Mantirs* signed with their signature under their name on a participant lists and received a white envelope with money. There was disagreement whether what they received was enough. One of the participants complained to me very loudly when I visited him some days after the workshop was over. He was displeased because he thought he would have earned much more if he had gone to his rubber fields. Further, he said: "The ones who were really making money on this kind of occasions is the person from CARE. He takes the money and we are left with crumbs! It is not fair!"

This workshop was just one out of many that different villagers joined. The villagers always seemed to highlight the structural inequality between the villagers (*orang kecil*) and those in charge of the workshops (*orang besar*).The most obvious way of addressing this inequality was through money, how much they got for their participation compared to others and where they were offered to stay compared to others. When I was sitting in the living room where I stayed in the village and talking with the father in the house this topic emerged. He mentioned a workshop in Kuala Kapuas, the district capital that he had recently been to. He commented on the prices for sleeping in the hotel before he exclaimed with a rather sad and complaining voice: "My family is so poor. We could never afford to stay in a hotel." I do not think it was a coincidence that he evoked the issue of poverty after having talked about the hotel and the hotel-life that he was exposed to in Kuala Kapuas. I suggest that when the material life of the villagers is juxtaposed with the hotel-life they can experience through the workshops, their conception of own poverty becomes enhanced. The villagers are exposed to another life, but

only abruptly. This could lead to new desires that cannot be satisfied due to their low financial capacity.

Another day, as I walked through the village I stumbled across a conversations about different hotels in Palangkaraya where the villagers had been accommodated in relation to KFCP workshops. They compared the various hotels by the price charged per night. Some of those participating in the conversations expressed disappointment that they were never allowed to stay in the most expensive hotels. Those were reserved for the ones working for the KFCP, those having higher education and ultimately tied to «another world», the higher administrative sphere.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I asked: How did different villagers engage themselves with the KFCP through the post-Suharto framework How did the villagers` involvement with the KFCP influence them? I have argued that particular villagers have taken advantage of the possibilities through the post-Suharto framework and gone beyond peasant mode in their engagement with the KFCP. However, the majority of the villager have deployed a "weapons of the weak"-approach in trying to reduce the level of insecurity related to the KFCP. Surah and his engagement in YPD and its affiliated NGO-network, which were critical towards the KFCP, has contributed to an increasing scepticism against the KFCP and the emergence of political mode for some villagers.

The way villagers were either part of a governing team inside the village or not, facilitated for a split inside the village. This particular governing set-up contributed to increasing the self-confidence for those participating within it as well as undermining it for those who, in various ways experienced left behind. Lastly, I note to how the KFCP can be a source of heightened pressure to formalize land claims inside the village. This can open the way for privatization of land in the longer term. In the next chapter I turn more concretely to how NGOs engaged themselves with REDD and the KFCP.

Chapter 4: NGOs with a flexible engagement and a "fighting" ethos: No rights, No REDD

I do not care about the environment. I care about land rights! (-NGO-worker)

Indonesia is just barely waking up after 32 years of nightmare (Anu Lounela: On the emergence of the NGO-movement in 1999)

Introduction

How are Indonesian NGOs engaging with REDD and the KFCP? How do Indonesian NGOs work with REDD/KFCP, against it, or use it as a vehicle for broadening their existing agendas? I will be exploring these questions in this chapter. I will do this by analyzing workshops that I have attended and my experiences of accompanying NGOs through various arenas. I will be using materials that the NGOs themselves have produced and situate their engagement with REDD/KFCP towards a historical background that highlight their concerns.

I will primarily look at WALHI and secondly at AMAN's engagement in Central Kalimantan. I argue that their engagement must be seen as a continuation of how environmental-rights based NGOs in Indonesia have operated previously in relation to apparently technical projects, such as REDD. That is by politicizing them, in this case REDD, by questioning the rationale of the projects and thereby making visible for instance the insecure tenure situations for "small people" in relation to big projects. The major difference is that NGOs can be much more vocal in their criticism after the fall of Suharto. Whereas NGOs in the Suharto era mainly deployed *administrative mode*, I argue that the fall of Suharto has enabled them to increase their capacity to deploy *political mode* and thus increase their flexibility. I argue that this flexibility, the situated deployment of both *administrative mode* and *political mode*, accounts for the role of intermediaries, which is characteristic for some NGOs engagement with REDD.

I argue that WALHI and AMAN interpret REDD/KFCP through what I call a "fighting" (*perjuangan*) ethos, which frames their engagement with REDD/KFCP. Whereas WALHI has chosen a confrontational approach towards REDD, AMAN has chosen a softer approach, viewing REDD more as a possible opportunity than a threat (Lang 2010a). This links up with the possibility that REDD gives for promoting the status of indigenous people, which after all is the concern of AMAN.

Emerging Environmental Movement in Indonesia

To get a grasp of the activism that is highly visible among NGOs in relation to REDD in Indonesia today, a journey back to the emergence and development of the environmental movement is necessary.

The particular environmental movement that exists in Indonesia today mainly emerged as a critic to all the environmental problems that arose in relation to Suharto's policy, or worshipping, of "development". The legitimacy of the Suharto regime rested on success in "development". By spotlighting the "darker sides" of "development", the environmental movement also began gradually to shake the foundation of the regime from the inside (Meyer 1996:169-171).Before the 1980s, there was a split inside the Indonesian social movement. One side focused on the technical, administrative and management side of environmental problems while the other focused on social justice. After the 1980s, the two sides gradually merged and started combining their perspectives (Meyer 1996: 184). WALHI emerged out of this development. It began as ten Jakarta-based environmental, human rights and consumer organizations in 1980 (Meyer 1996: 186). Numerous more organizations joined later the same year. Consumer activist Erna Witoelar spearheaded this emerging, vibrant network. The stated goal was to "promote environmental awareness and action" (Meyer 1996: 186) The WALHI network grew rapidly and numbered over 300 organizations in the beginning of the 1990's.These organizations were spread all over Indonesia. With the growth came also a growing gap between the grassroots organizations with more direct field experience and the secretariat in Jakarta. Grassroots organizations accused the Jakarta secretariat of becoming increasingly bureaucratic, arrogant and out-of-touch with the challenges the grassroots organizations were facing (Meyer 1996: 191). In 1992, WALHI decided to change its organizational structure. From being a loose network, it now became a federation. Regional organizations were given leeway to decide their own prioritizations while the responsibility of WALHI secretariat in Jakarta was limited to more overarching facilitation for communication between national government and foreign donors (Meyer 1996: 192).

Suharto blamed swidden cultivators for the forest fires in Kalimantan in 1997-1998. However, NGOs were able to counter this rhetoric by showing that the actual causes were the government`s own forest conversion policies. The Suharto regime lost credibility. This was an unprecedented victory for the emerging NGOs in Indonesia (Lowe 2006: xvii). Since 1998, the number of NGOs in Indonesia has increased considerably. NGOs are contributing in re-

politicising issues that were previously taboo. The slogan for the Suharto era was "politics no, development yes" (Gordon 1998: 50). After Suharto, politics has certainly returned, and in my understanding this is particularly visible in the ongoing REDD processes in Indonesia.

WALHI: REDD as "pathetic eco business"

WALHI is the biggest environmental organization in Indonesia. As a point of departure in scrutinizing their engagement with REDD I want to examine some excerpts from a brochure they published early in 2009. The brochure entitled: *REDD Wrong Path: Pathetic eco business* (Mann.T and Surya T.M 2009), reveals the confrontational attitude that WALHI has chosen towards REDD. In this brochure, WALHI states why they are worried about the coming of REDD in Indonesia:

> The vast majority of Indonesia's indigenous and forest dependent peoples lack secure land tenure agreements. As REDD will undoubtedly result in the value of forests being increased, there is a major risk that Indonesia's indigenous and forest dependent peoples will find themselves denied access to the forests that form the basis of their culture and livelihoods (Mann.T and Surya T.M 2009: 6).

Here the fundamental point is lack of secure land tenure, and by addressing this crucial issue WALHI is politicizing REDD. According to Meyer (1996) Indonesian environmental organizations are known to: [..]"focus their attention on controversies generated by threats to the livelihoods of marginalized, disempowered communities" (Meyer 1996: 178-179). Meyer also emphasizes the particular meaning the word "environment" has for had for the movement. She writes that it is [..]″ emphatically defined in terms of access and control over resources." The excerpt from the brochure shows that how WALHI problematized REDD is a continuation of this rationale. WALHI further on, in the same brochure, states:

> Addressing land tenure concerns and promoting community based sustainable forest management has been shown to significantly reduce the pressure for deforestation. It is vital that greater recognition of indigenous and forest dependent communities' land tenure and improving forest governance form central components of future REDD negotiations (Mann.T and Surya T.M 2009: 6).

The key word here is recognition. That indigenous and forest depended communities are recognized is, as I see it, the most important focus for rights-oriented NGOs such as WALHI and AMAN in the REDD process. The REDD process is an opportunity for the mentioned NGOs to make visible this issue with unprecedented force. This because the NGOs in matter have access to the Indonesian government as part of the REDD process and due to the

limelight that an international presences brings forth in itself. Through REDD a will to deal with the issue of recognition of indigenous and forest dependent communities by government officials, has emerged (cf. Howell 2014). The question of recognition connects with *political mode* as it is about getting the attention of the state authorities based on certain governmental categories and through them gaining access to rights and so forth.

WALHI workshops in Central Kalimantan

I want to explore two workshops arranged by WALHI in February and March 2012. I take these workshops as a point of departure in describing and analysing ways NGOs are engaged with REDD/KFCP, and how this engagement affects their interpretation and engagement with it. I explore some patterns that I find necessary to highlight and elaborate upon in relation to other events that I experienced with NGOS outside of the workshops.

The location for both workshops was an hour's drive from Palangkaraya. The last bit of the ride required taking off from the main road. After following the non-paved road up some hills, the place became visible. It was a hotel area with facilities for working in air-conditioned seminar rooms. A long white, one story, shiny building was the first I noticed. Around the building were well-cut grass and a pathway to areas for food, accommodation and relaxation. I experienced the place as idyllic with its rural beauty, horses playing beyond the well-cut grass in a quiet forest. The place was off-road, sheltered from the noise and pollution associated with city life, but with the facilities that most cities offer, such as Internet.

The participants slept in an accommodation part known as Eco-village. We were given three meals each day: Breakfast, lunch, and dinner in the evening. Participants usually had smoke and coffee after the meals, followed by long discussions as well as jokes and relaxation (*santai*).

Small World, big visions

There has been a great proliferation of NGOs after the fall of Suharto, but at the same time my experience through investigating the REDD process has been that frequently the same spokespersons are uttering themselves. This relates to the question of representativeness, about the number of NGOs actually represented, how many the NGOs represent and what kind of world they inhabit.

"It's a small NGO world," the head of the workshop said in a conversation with me at the workshop. "Everyone knows everyone, it's all very connected", he continued. He had been a part of the NGO-circuit since the 90s and has seen its proliferation in the making, but seen its limits too. "The NGO-world is small and middle-class based", he concluded. These comments emerged after an early episode in the first workshop that caused some laugher. I found a book that I liked and wondered who the author was. Embarrassingly enough for me, the author was the head of the workshop. When he understood this, he started laughing and told me that I was looking for him. From this, he went on to unpack the NGO-genealogy in Indonesia, from the 80s to the present, emphasizing the limits of the NGO-world.

The participants at the two workshops were mainly between 20-35 years old. Most of the participants had their own laptops. The laptops were often decorated with activist stickers such as: "International People's forum against the IMF and the World Bank!" Notice that the spelling on the sticker is in English, not *Bahasa* Indonesia. English slogans were frequent on the t-shirts worn by the participants, e.g. "Climate Justice now!" My impression was that most participants were quite familiar with English. This relates to their higher education and frequently being exposed to English through their line of work. In chapter 2, I noted how many villagers of Sei Katja looked upon the English as a marker for making connections with the outside world. Whereas for the villagers, not knowing English was a source of dis-empowerment and alienation, it was my impression that the opposite rang true for many NGO-workers.

Most NGO-workers had bachelor degree (*S1*) in political science, law or economy. These are all subjects that fit governing purposes, where experiences and knowledge attained are useful when engaging in work for a NGO. The young university-socialized crowd that was gathered gave substance to the general observation made by the organizer of the workshop: That NGO staff are generally a homogenous gathering of people from a certain layer of the Indonesian society, the middle class (cf. Antløv 2005). The latter observation is also congruent with the class background for those working for the NGOs CARE and BOS inside the KFCP-area, as mentioned in the previous chapters. Through their University educated and middle-class background the NGO-workers in the seminar were particularly fit to deal with REDD on an administrative or monitoring level. Few of the people participating here were themselves directly affected by the politics or projects they studied. The engagement by those in the workshop occurred through *administrative mode*, as in mapping and monitoring what is

actually happening, but also through *political mode*, through investigating how peasants or indigenous people in order to claim and protect their land could deploy categories favourable to that.

NGOs represented at the workshop were WALHI Central Kalimantan (WALHI *Kalteng*), the principal NGO, as the organizer and numerically strongest represented. Further there was representatives from YPD (*Yahasan Petak Danum*, Foundation for Land and Water), Save our Borneo (SoB), HuMa (*Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis*, Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform) and YBB (*Yahasan Betang Borneo*). Several participants had previously worked for AMAN.YPD and YBB were part of the WALHI-Network. Rainforest Foundation Norway funded the workshop. The engagement that emerged in the workshop was thus transnational. It was a collaborative, investigation of REDD in Central Kalimantan. An investigation happening within a small world, the NGO-world, but with big aspirations for what they could achieve.

NGO-research in the making: Simplification for efficient advocacy

NGOs in Indonesia have been active in framing REDD, in particular WALHI. It is therefore of interest to investigate the making of brochures that articulate this framing. The workshops proved an apt opportunity in doing this because its intention was to produce publications, which could highlight different aspects of REDD in Central Kalimantan.

The workshop consisted of different groups of participants that covered different aspects of processes related to REDD in the province. One group was engaged in exploring the topic of the Moratorium. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis it is part of the agreement signed between Norway and Indonesia. The Moratorium aims at reducing deforestation in Central Kalimantan by not allowing for distribution of new forest licenses in particular areas. Another group was dealing with the issue of safeguards in the area of the KFCP project, more concretely, in the two out of seven villages. Safeguards are policies, defined differently by different actors. The World Bank, for instance, have their own safeguards. The intention behind safeguards is to make projects safe. That is, firstly, making sure projects do no harm. Secondly, that the safeguards are making sure those affected or involved in projects understand them. Another group was dealing with provincial laws in Central Kalimantan and their relevance to REDD. Each group had been on investigative journeys prior to the first workshop and went for another investigative journey between the first and the second

workshop. "We do not have data on that", was a recurrent comment by the participants writing texts regardless of topic in the first workshop. The head of the workshop was asking for many details concerning their topics of concern, but often they were missing. The need for more data seemed omnipresent and this sparked the second investigative journey.

The head of the workshop emphasized a formula of indicators and verifiers, or a checklist-approach: Asking whether that point was the case or not. For instance: Did the villagers in the KFCP know about REDD or not? Conclusions to more general questions occasionally seemed to emerge before the necessary data were able to support it. The head of the workshop commented upon this phenomenon. He formulated it accordingly: "Jumping to conclusions. It is typical of NGO-work. The conclusion is the point of departure for advocacy. That is why the conclusion is most important." I find this observation to be sensible, as I will argue for below. The head of the workshop told a story of his early engagement as a NGO-worker and the process of writing for a NGO:

> I had written a long rapport from Ache with an historical approach to the violence, which had recently gone out of control there. I argued that the current problems were a consequence of a number of previously unresolved issues, resurfacing. My boss did not like what I'd written. He found it too long, too complicated. He told me to cut it down: To simplify it and present it smoothly. To make it look nice and readable.

James Scott (1998) has written in *Seeing Like a State* that simplification and legibility-making are two key ways states render their field of intervention meaningful, the re-making of the world into their own categories, which then can be acted on. I find this argument valid for NGOs, which can work as state like entities. This has the implication that *seeing like a state* could be "seeing like a NGO". NGOs also need a field for intervention; this field has to be established. This field's making is related to the processes of simplification and legibility making. In other words, both deploy what I have named *administrative mode* as part of their modus operandi. I find this particular to be the case for advocacy organizations, such as WALHI. Simplification and legibility (making it readable) were identified in the paragraph above as keys for producing successful texts. These premises seem not to have changed. A variety of too many viewpoints seems to be at odds with the over-all purpose of enabling efficient resistance. Too many viewpoints can create doubt whether, for instance, a project is good or not, for those involved. This again, can make mobilization difficult.

Olav Smedal (2010) describes a case from the island of Bangka in Indonesia where there are disagreements about whether to support palm oil or coal mining. Smedal shows that the fraction arguing against palm oil made collaboration with WALHI. Smedal argues that he finds palm oil a better long-term solution than coal mining with its irreversible consequences. Noting how WALHI engages themselves, though, Smedal comments on how they seem unable to find any positive contribution by palm oil plantations whatsoever. He notes how the publications by WALHI seems to leave out any positive testimonies to palm oil, on purpose (Smedal 2010: 91). I suggest that it is due to the logic of advocacy, namely its frequent use of simplification and sharp us/them distinctions. This logic, I suggest, is further amplified through a "fighting" (*perjuangan*) ethos, characteristic for NGOs such as WALHI and AMAN. I return to this below.

I met the Executive director of WALHI in Palangkaraya at the office of WALHI *Kalteng* and was able to talk with him about REDD. What I found peculiar about the conversation was that he, almost immediately, deployed WALHI's slogan: "REDD- WRONG Solution." It can easily turn the conversation into a pro/contra: With us or against us on how we approach REDD. On reflecting on the fact that the slogan emerged immediately, I now suggest it as a sign of the logic of advocacy: Stating the overall message, short and simple, to begin with. The slogan is a typical against-kind of perspective. Since WALHI is the biggest environmental organization in Indonesia, to make advocacy efficient, I suggest, that this kind of unifying and simplified rhetoric is necessary. It is necessary to create a common platform to work on. Further, the existence of an "enemy", in this case REDD, which is simplified, also strengthens the bonds and solidarity within the organization. As in a hypothetical slogan: "We are WALHI, we work *against* REDD".

NGOs- teacher / pupil-relations: learning to vs learning from
Aspinall (2004:80) has noted the practice among idealistic youth from the middle class (elite) to travel to the countryside in order to live with and be teachers for peasants. This was quite widespread among the social movement in Indonesia during the 1960s and onwards. The mission was to live with and teach villagers, enlighten them. An experienced NGO-worker at the workshop put it in the following way, how he remembered his own experience of going to the village:

> I was part of group who went to the countryside. On our first meeting, there were
> so many people. We talked about historical materialism. The week after, only five

people came and we understood we had to change our tactics. We had to learn from them. So we started to learn about rice, how to grow rice and so on.

I then asked him how he reflected upon that encounter today. He answered: "It was not a success. The farmers were not interested in the politics of the rice. Only how to plant rice, not *why* we plant rice, from where and so on".

The distinction the NGO-worker made between growing rice and understanding the politics of rice, strikes a chord with James Scott's (1985) argument that: "Most subordinate classes are, after all, far less interested in changing the larger structures of the state and the law […]" (Scott 1985: xv). Scott continues: "Formal, organized political activity, even if clandestine and revolutionary, is typically the preserve of the middle class and the intelligentsia […]" (Scott 1985: xv). The NGO-worker, when his story took place, was part of a young, inspired group, coming from a formal, University sphere. He went to the village because he wanted to participate in changing the larger economic structures by teaching the peasants about Marxism, as a weapon to change their oppressive, exploitative situation. The farmers, though, were not interested in listening to this talk.

Based on the two workshops it was my impression that NGO-workers viewed REDD as an imminent danger to peasants, as a mechanism that could deprive them of more land. NGO-workers saw it as their task to work against such a scenario. This task can be understood as a moral responsibility, something one as a responsible citizen ought to do. One way of doing this is teaching peasants about REDD the way they conceptualize it, which in this case is mainly as a danger.

The working situation inside NGO offices like those of WALHI and AMAN can take the shape of a teacher/pupil relation. This relation, who is teacher and who is pupil, changes depending upon the topic discussed. A lot of the work among NGO workers themselves is about teaching each other, explaining, discussing, analysing and agreeing upon how to meet the different political challenges. Then one switches between who is one the blackboard, lecturing, acting as a teacher, and who is listening, as a pupil. On the other hand: When the NGO workers leave their offices and encounter villagers with their particular problems, the teaching/pupils does not occur among equals, which prohibit role inversions. NGOs-workers often express that they have a good understanding about the nature of REDD whereas the ones they engage with, such as villagers, do not. This inequality derives from the education

gap, their structurally different positioning in the Indonesian society. The encounter between NGO-worker and villagers can take the shape of teacher/pupil-relation. Many examples could illustrate this gap and the differentiating effects the encounter seem to have: The enhanced confidence for those who express that they understand, and the loss of confidence for those who express that they do not understand, reaffirming or amplifying their confidence or lack of it. "The villagers do not understand. They think carbon trade is about selling the air. They have no idea." The comment came from an NGO-worker who had recently been to a REDD-related village in Central Kalimantan. The latter utterance suggests: "We know", whereas as "they do not know". The solution: "We teach them". What you teach, on the other hand, distinguishes the different NGOs, the rights-based ones from the more conservation-oriented ones. The following quote by an AMAN related NGO-worker, illustrates this:

> When the WWF (World Wildlife Fund) enter a village they teach about deforestation and climate change and REDD. When they leave, the villagers know about this, but nothing about their indigenous rights. If you enter a village after AMAN has been there, though, they will surely know about this.

The difference between what rights-based NGOs and conservation-oriented NGOs teaches and the aim of that teaching, relates to the question of *modes of engagement*. WWF's teaching about climate change can be considered a top-down attempt at transferring knowledge to villagers, which is embedded in a particular governing agenda. This agenda, I suppose, aims at encouraging more climate-friendly ways, from the perspective of the WWF, for villagers to engage with their environment. WWF is then deploying *administrative mode*. When workers from AMAN is teaching villagers about indigenous rights and the category of indigenous people, they are deploying *political mode* and contributing to making it more widespread. This is because AMAN is then teaching something that can be used by the villagers in relation to stately authorities in negotiations about the rights of the forest. Put simply, I would suggest that WWF is more a continuation of stately will and policy, while AMAN is contributing, through *political mode*, at possibly challenging stately authorities through their teaching. I return to this.

In the name of the Environment: legitimizing REDD

In discussing REDD and its possible impacts for local people during the workshops, the most common perspective was that realization of REDD, as in for example concrete REDD projects, was likely to lead to dispossession of land for the peasants. The participants applied a particular phrase to refer to how this was justified: "In the name of the environment". Alternatively: "In the name of conservation." One of the WALHI participants summarized a historical trajectory, which emphasized the different ways used by government or companies to succeed with the same goal: "Grabbing the land from the peasants".

He summarized in the following way:

> One has to learn from history, to see the larger lines. There have been different projects with different strategies for taking the land from the peasants. During the Mega-Rice project, there was a lot of optimism, but the result was that peasants lost their land. The tactics was forced through authoritarian rule. Then the CKK [Central Kalimantan Peatland Project] came to the same area. They had a soft approach towards the peasants and they believed in it, but again they lost land. Then the palm oil companies arrived. They used money to buy the land, as well as threats, using gangsters (*preman*). Now REDD comes along, tempting the peasants with economic benefits, but again the peasants are losing their land.

The WALHI person emphasizes continuity in land grabbing from the peasants. According to this narrative, REDD is just the latest legitimizing for grabbing the land. Suharto legitimized the Mega Rice Project "In the name of Development". With REDD, development is switched with environment. He emphasized that it was still development, for the big people *(Orang besar)*, and not development for little people (*orang kecil*), or Environment for big people (*orang besar*), not environment for small people (*orang kecil*). The WALHI person, mentioned above, had a longer historical comparison in mind, but more often the comparison was made explicitly between palm oil expansion and REDD. The following account given by another WALHI activist is typical of this reasoning:

> With palm oil people are paid some money and the company promises to contribute in building schools and hospital. In REDD people are paid some money *not* to work [with cutting down the tree] and they are promised help with building of schools and hospital.

The NGO participants in these workshops positioned themselves as working on behalf the little people (*orang kecil*). They were not perceived to benefit from palm oil nor REDD. Instead, the participants seemed to assume that the little people were in danger of losing land

leading to their further impoverishment. The participants thus considered fighting (*perjuangan*) back urgent to stop this imagined scenario.

Colliding worldviews: WALHI's "fighting ethos" and conflict perspective vs. REDD's harmonious win-win-perspective[15]

I do not think the importance of "fighting" (*perjugangan*) can be underestimated for understanding how WALHI engages with REDD. In a way, REDD is the perfect project to fight against. If one looks at how WALHI officially presents itself, the importance of fighting can be alluded and the predictable resistance against REDD likewise.

It is stated in the foreword to Friends of the Earth International`s (FOEI)[16] brochure on KFCP:

> We challenge the current model of economic and corporate globalization […].We envision a society.., founded on social, economic, gender and environmental, justice and free from all forms of domination and exploitation, such as neoliberalism, corporate globalism, neo-colonialism and militarism." (Pearse, R and Dehm J. 2011:2)

Considering that REDD is a market-based initiative with possibilities for private companies to prosper through a potential carbon market, the skeptical attitude by WALHI seems predictable. However, a brochure statement is one thing, the actual attitudes to actors does not need to follow accordingly. My experiences with WALHI Kalimantan, though, support that the attitudes of the activists do mirror the aforementioned brochure. I found that the importance of "fighting" (*perjuangan*) was an overarching frame that REDD in general and KFCP, in particular, became embedded within.

"Fighting" (*perjuangan*) was related to the fight for land reform, against the status quo. The current system where peasants, as WALHI Central Kalimantan communicates, are easy victims for larger projects, due to their poor tenure security. During a longer talk I had with a WALHI member at the first WALHI workshop this perspective emerged clearly:

> I ask myself why we are in this bad situation. So many poor people, so few jobs. There are two main reasons. One: We are a semi-colony, by that I mean that USA have so much influence over our economy. This is the Suharto legacy. That we cannot decide for ourselves. Then there is the existing semi-feudalism because we have still not had

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[15] REDD is commonly seen according to Angelsen and Atmadja as: […] "win-win because the potentially large financial transfers and better governance can benefit the poor in developing countries and provide other environmental gains on top of the climate-related benefits." (Angelsen and Atmadja 2008: 15)

[16] WALHI is a member of Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)

any agrarian reform. This means that people do not own the land. There are too many landlords. There is cooperation between the capitalists and the landlords as Lenin has pointed out. The education is so expensive, which means that people cannot learn and it becomes much more difficult for them to understand. If they do not understand, how can they change their situation? To change this situation I think fighting [*perjuangan*] for land reform is what matters the most.

Agrarian reform is the all-encompassing aim, which one's dreams are directed towards. To make it happen, fighting (*perjuangan*) is a precondition. I argue, that "fighting" (*perjuangan*) is seen as a tool, but also is an attitude that shapes how one argues, frames "the enemy-other", in this case REDD. I will show in the cases below how the importance of "fighting" (*perjuangan*) is omnipresent.

On the road, emerging comparisons: Travelling with WALHI

By following actors across various arenas, it is easier to understand the concrete comparisons they draw. After having been present in the workshops described above, often listening to comparisons made about palm oil and REDD, it was enlightening to join WALHI staff on a journey through parts of Central Kalimantan. It enabled me to grasp more clearly the linkages they were making. The trip went by car, first from Palangkaraya in the center of the province, to the old center, Sampit, in the west. The WALHI staff reminded me, along the road, about the emerging palm oil expansions right now, right in front of us. They informed me about the location of palm oil fields, which decided where and when they started doing their business. During the trip crossing the endless row of oil palm fields, WALHI staff questioned the sincerity of the Norwegian government's concern for the rain forest. WALHI staff skepticism emerged from the acknowledgement that in addition to giving money for protecting the rain forest, the Norwegian government simultaneously through the Pension Fund invests in palm oil in Kalimantan. According to the WALHI staff, this created a credibility gap and their advice was obvious: Stop supporting palm oil and regain more trustworthiness in the fight for preserving the rain forest.[17] As we got closer to Sampit, the magnitude of palm plantations was overwhelming. WALHI staff informed me that most of these plantations emerged after the year 2000. This made a comparison clear to them: Palm Oil was visible on the ground, re-making the concrete landscape right how for everyone to

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[17] Rainforest Foundation Norway writes about this gap and its potential harmful effects on Norway`s credibility as a rainforest friendly protector in a rapport poetically named Beauty and the Beast- Norway`s investment in rainforest protection and rainforest destruction (RFN 2012).

see. REDD was mainly visible in abstract discussions with limited people involved about what could become something for someone sometime in the future.

As part of this excursion with WALHI, we visited palm oil workers living inside a palm oil plantation. This episode gave me an insight into how concrete encounter with the living conditions of the oil palm plantation workers shaped the WALHI workers` own confrontational attitudes.

The palm oil workers were mostly migrants from Flores.[18] They were crammed together in a small, overcrowded, wooden house with only the bare necessities inside. Agents from palm oil companies gave them "sweet promises" (*bercicara manis*) about a new life waiting for them in Central Kalimantan. However, these promises had never come true, on the contrary. The palm oil workers expressed feelings of entrapment. They saw few options out of their current dreadful situation .Hence, hopelessness and frustration was growing day by day. They told of the tough conditions in the plantation: The long hours of work under the burning sun and about the snakes that could emerge from the oil palms. They got their payments irregularly, which added stress to their already deprived situation. One worker had tried to organize a complaint against the palm oil company. Mysteriously, he disappeared before the job was finished. The palm oil workers feared he had been killed by gangsters (*preman*) hired by the company. The palm oil workers were asking the NGOs for help in improving their life situation. Together with WALHI on this trip were also workers from Sawit Watch, an NGO specifically focusing on issues and problems related to palm oil conflicts in Indonesia. They took note of their problems and promised to work for highlighting their concerns.

WALHI staff asked me about my understanding of the encounter afterwards. I gave my account which was confirmed as correct. I was more unprepared for the next question: What can we do about it? I did not have any particularly good suggestions. The question seemed to be the most intriguing one for the WALHI staff. This made me reflect upon how the social injustices shape NGO-workers as individuals. Moreover, how the request for help they receive from the deprived demands a quest for reciprocation through actually being able to

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[18] Flores is one of the Lesser Sunda Islands (*Nusa Neggara*- "south-eastern islands") extending east from the Java island of Indonesia.

help, to ameliorate the pain. This quest circles around the aforementioned question: What can we do? This practical attitude, I suggest, has implications for how REDD is framed as well. If REDD as I have argued is framed by WALHI as a threat, the question, I imagine, becomes: What can we do to stop it? Or softer: What can we do to limit the possible damage?

Encounters with palm oil workers as those I met with WALHI, I suggest, color their horizon when thinking about palm oil plantations. Since REDD is often compared with palm oil, making visible how WALHI views palm oil, simultaneously elucidates their view on REDD. The encounter above from the WALHI staff`s point of view tells a story of greedy companies exploiting the land and the people (*rakyat*) for their own profit. WALHI's role, in this perspective, becomes one of fighting (*perjuangan*) for the people against the companies. There are different ways of engaging in this resistance, which the following example will illustrate.

Transmigrant peasants vs. Sinarmas: Multiple modes of engagement

I have argued that WALHI sees REDD through the "palm-oil lens". Further that they see REDD within the larger question of land reform, or lack of it. On my journey with WALHI, I was able to witness one case where these two concerns, palm oil plantation and the resistance against it, was at stake. However, my main point with this case is elucidating the importance of the fighting-ethos (*perjuangan*) which REDD and KFCP becomes encompassed within.

I became acquainted with the case of the farmers in a village nearby Sampit fighting against Sinarmas, one of the largest conglomerates in Indonesia, already during the WALHI workshops described above. The village head arrived with a delegation to the first WALHI workshop to present their case and to ask for assistance. The head of the village explained that the village consisted mostly of farmers from East Java, near Surabaya. They had moved to their present village under the transmigration-era of Suharto, in the late 1980s, beginning of the 1990s. They got land and documentation that this land was theirs. The ownership and use of this land is detrimental for the future of these villagers, as the village itself is far away from anything else. Two years ago, trouble started, as the current head of the district (*bupati*) gave large areas of what the village considered rightfully their land, to Sinarmas. This outraged the villagers who first tried to bring forth their case the legal way. They were not successful. Seen though the subsistence-lens (Scott 1976), the situation for the villagers were dramatic as their

87

land was at stake. Without the land, how we can live, the villagers reminded me. Thus, I suggest, their actions became more overt than what is commonly associated with everyday act of resistance" (*peasant mode*). The villagers were pulling up palm oil trees from the plantations to counterclaim that this was actually their land. For these actions, the village head was sentenced to jail for one year. The village head recently returned to his village, released from jail. There were other villagers involved in uprooting of the trees who still had their cases going. They were in danger of having to spend time in jail, as well. I went with WALHI, first to witness part of this ongoing trial, before heading for the village and taking part in political meetings there. On the way to the trial I asked members of WALHI if they thought the villagers stood a chance in court. "No", they answered, "we have never won a case like this, but it's important to keep the fighting (*perjuangan*) spirit alive." After the trial, I experienced a tense and frightened atmosphere in the village. The verdict for the persecuted from the village was unresolved. Their future control of what they considered their land looked bleak. In the midst of this WALHI sat down with the villager pondering on the crucial question: "What can we do now?" During a long and tense meeting before an even bigger meeting the day thereafter, an agreement emerged: The first step of re-claiming the land would be to plant banana trees inside the palm oil plantation. Simultaneously, WALH would work to influence the Governor of Central Kalimantan to put pressure on the head of the district in question, to return the land to the farmers. The planting of the banana trees occurred some weeks later, by the farmers supported by WALHI and other NGOs, such as Sawit Watch.

One the one hand WALHI engages themselves with the villagers in the court of law where they have special expertise. This amounts to engaging in *administrative mode*, following the officially established institutions and their rules. The enforcement of the laws in Indonesia, as in many other developing countries, is skewed too much in favor of the powerful (Cribb 2011:33). This means that equality before the law is not actually the case. The consequence of this seems to be that to win a case for small people against big companies, is very difficult, if not outright impossible, as WALHI staff expressed it. This opens the way for engaging with politics in other ways.

In this case, WALHI encourages the villagers to carry on with "everyday forms of resistance", typical of *peasant mode*. Through the collaboration with the NGOs, the villagers can amplify

their peasant strategies and thus transform small, symbolic actions into confrontational, headings in the news. The villagers need the assistance of the NGOs in court, on advices on the road ahead and not least creating publicity about their case. It seemed to me that the possibility of actual engagement in fighting alongside the villagers had a very fulfilling effect upon the NGO activists. I believe this may be because the ideal of fighting here comes close to its practice thus enabling the experience as truly meaningful.

WALHI and YPD vs KFCP

WALHI has been heavily critical towards the KFCP since its inception in 2008. That their continuous criticism, or negative reporting, has been undermining KFCP is beyond doubt.

I never heard anything positive said about the KFCP from WALHI staff. This negativity towards the KFCP, I suggest, derives from perceiving the KFCP through an ideological lens. It derives from seeing KFCP as "land grabbing". One activist framed it like this: "How much are they paying the villagers for the work at the tree-plantation (*lokasi*)?" The activist then made a calculation, based upon what the KFCP paid the villagers, to deduce what KFCP had actually paid for the land. Through the ideological lens, the question becomes as asked by WALHI workers: If KFCP is a neo-liberal project designed to contribute to a future carbon market, how can it be any good for the villagers? The idea of connecting land that the villagers did not have ownership over to an unpredictable carbon market left the NGO-workers unconvinced of its potential to do any good for the villagers.

In 2011, Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) published the brochure *In the REDD: Australia's carbon offset project in Central Kalimantan* (Pearse, R and Dehm J. 2011). In this brochure the main criticisms by FOEI against the project is presented. In particular, they criticized how the KFCP has dealt with the question of land tenure and ownership. This is in congruence with how Meyer (1996:172) describes the workings of environmental NGOs, that they pick high profile projects and use them as vehicles for issues of national concern. It is worth citing a passage in the brochure that WALHI highlights. The passage comes from the official Design Document for the KFCP project:

> Clear land tenure laws cannot be made a precondition of project development, because no project would then ever be developed or they would all be developed in the same handful of places. Rather, the projects themselves can be made instruments of change,

where community management rights are first given to local people in a step-wise process to land tenure." (KFCP 2009:19)

The passage's location, a footnote in the Design Document, contrasts with how it is highlighted in FOEI's brochure (Pearse, R and Dehm J. 2011:16). The passage points to the fundamental disagreements between the NGOs working against KFCP, such as WALHI and YPD, and the KFCP itself. NGOs argues for clarifying land tenure issues before starting up a project such as the KFCP. The KFCP design document, as cited in the passage, views land tenure issues as something to be resolved as part of the project process itself. Villagers, as shown in the previous chapter, have been engaged in politicized workshops, as steps to clarify land tenure situations through the KFCP. The destiny of the maps produced in these workshops is unclear, whether they will be able to gain recognition in an official political process, as a step to further clarification of their land tenure situation, or be confined to the workshop. The latter could lead to more frustration, or politicized villagers in unexpected ways. This is in congruence with Li's (2007: 277) remark that workshops often engage those involved, but not in the ways intended by the organizers.

AMAN's engagement with REDD: No Rights, No REDD

> Indigenous people only **seek recognition of their land rights from the government** [emphasis added]**,** not money from the rich nations through REDD, not money from rich nations through REDD" –Abdon Nabdan, Secretary-General AMAN (Simamora 2010)

> But we must be careful with the issue since many of the groups could claim they are indigenous people; I myself have no clear understanding who indigenous people really are." -The Indonesian President`s advisor on climate change, Rachmat Witoelar (Simamora 2010)

AMAN was established in 1999, right after the fall of Suharto. This was not a coincident. During the Suharto era making the case for indigenous people was difficult. This because it would go against the official line [..]"that: Indonesia is a nation that has no indigenous people, or that all Indonesian are equally indigenous" (Li 2008b: 339).When AMAN was founded in 1999 they provocatively exclaimed: If the Indonesian state will not respect us, we will not respect the Indonesian state! (Henley and Davidson 2007:1) In a way, their official approach to REDD:"No rights, No REDD", follows the same formula: If you accept what we want (rights), then REDD becomes a possibility. This is tantamount to turning REDD into a case of negotiation. The quotes above highlight the clear demand by the secretary general of AMAN ,

which urge recognition of indigenous people. The clarity by the leader of AMAN contrasts with the careful, worried attitude of the climate advisor, who highlights an important point: The difficulty of identifying who the indigenous people are, and on what grounds. This became clear to me at my first visit to AMAN in Central Kalimantan too.

I went to the office of AMAN in Central Kalimantan together with my two co-student from UGM one early morning. We asked the staff we encountered there about who the indigenous people were. We were, instead of an answer to our question, told to return later and speak with the head of the organization. Returning later the same day, we did meet the head of the organization. A young AMAN staff-member gave us coffee. At the organization's cup, interestingly enough, there was an inscription: "No Rights, No REDD!" This has been, as mentioned, the slogan for those fighting for the indigenous people in the REDD process so far in Indonesia and elsewhere.The head of the organization guided us into his office and showed us a map. The map gave an overview over the distribution of concession in Central Kalimantan. "Look here, he said. He pointed to all the dots on the map where mining, palm oil and timber were ongoing- and they were everywhere. He questioned the sincerity of a true fight against deforestation. "Where is REDD supposed to happen here", he asked. I asked about where AMAN had gotten the map from and he replied that they had gotten it through unofficial channels. As I understood it, this reflected the difficulty of getting solid information about the various concessions given out in the province. In his office there was a list of all the planned REDD projects in the province written on a whiteboard. The list contained information about location, which company was in charge of the planned projects and the area it covered. Since AMAN Central Kalimantan has representatives in most districts, they are able to supervise how different projects are affecting people in the particular project areas. The head of AMAN Central Kalimantan talked about his own life as an activist, having worked in WALHI Central Kalimantan previously. He emphasized the different conditions for NGO under Suharto where you had to be careful, watch your steps. He said the authorities searched for him for his resistance against the Mega Rice Project in the late 1990s. "I had to hide in the forest", he said. When the topic changed more explicitly to REDD, I sensed a change of behaviour. His body language and speed of talking became more powerful, as in a permanent state of attack. He repeatedly emphasized that indigenous people know how to take care of the forest (cf. Ellen: 1986). He also came back to his main concern, namely that the government is not serious about REDD because it is not serious about the indigenous people,

those who actually live in and around the forest. He also repeated in many ways how confusing REDD was to indigenous people, that they did not understand it. However, when we asked him about who the indigenous people are, he seemed to run away from the question. He did not give a clear answer and it became more similar to "local people". I find the argument made by Afiff and Lowe (2007) highly interesting in making sense of this answer. They argue that the use of *masyarakat adat* (translated as indigenous people) should be seen as a strategic tool for claiming natural resource rights. They argue that "The discourse of *masyarakat adat* was an attempt to legitimize rural communities and defend their rights to land and other natural resources against state and corporate action." (Afiff and Lowe 2007:81). Further, they state that: "[...] rather than a problematic essentialization, the *masyarakat adat* framework should be understood as a flexible political strategy that opened up new possibilities for resisting the state in a relatively safe and effective discursive register"(Afiff and Lowe 2007: 82). As I understand this argument then, asking who the indigenous people are is the wrong question. I see the understanding of Afiff and Lowe as an example of what I have named *political mode*, namely the use of certain categories to negotiate with governmental authorities through in order to gain rights and benefits. By arguing through the *masyarakat adat* (indigenous people) framework "small people" (*orang kecil*) have an opportunity to resist stately and other claims on their land. Seen through this lens the crucial question becomes not Who the indigenous people (really) are, but what the category can potentially do for small people (*orang kecil*).This also resonates with a long discussion I had with one of the members who were present at the founding congress of AMAN in 1999. He clearly stated that: "*Masyarakat adat* was a working concept. It was a tool we could deploy for fighting (*perjuangan*) We were not concerned about what quandaries or troubles the concept could lead to later in actual-real-life situations." I now turn to an event organized by AMAN where the intention was enlightening about the international basis for the category of indigenous people and through this work strengthening the case for indigeneity.

It takes a workshop to become indigenous: AMAN-Training for Trainers

Frank Hirtz (2003) with empirical cases from the Philippines argues: "Being recognized as traditional or indigenous requires the employment of modern means" (Hirtz 2003:887). In the process of becoming indigenous, Hirtz emphasizes the role of national and international law, the presence of NGOs and local institution of government. Hirtz's argument resonated with a workshop I participated in as Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) funded it and UN

Declaration of Indigenous Right was the transnational legal fundament for making the case for indigeneity.

I visited this workshop in March 2012 held by AMAN, titled: "Training for Trainers". AMAN Central Kalimantan had invited AMAN representatives from different districts (*kabupaten*) in Central Kalimantan to educate them about issues concerning indigeneity. Most of the representatives present were men. One of the speakers, from AMAN Central Kalimantan, lectured about the UN Declarations on Indigenous Rights. He wanted to explain what it was about and which relevance it had for those present. The purpose with this lecturing was to strengthen the understanding among those present about the international basis for the term indigenous. When returning back to their respective communities they could then act as teachers to further distribute this knowledge and work towards creating indigenous communities. I heard an example of how AMAN can influence villagers when I travelled to the village of Tumbang Anoi, famous for the first standardization of *adat* law in 1898, at a session organized by the Dutch colonial regime. In this remote village, two elders spent a long time discussing ways of resisting the planned expansion of palm oil. They reflected on the issue in relation to human rights and indigeneity I asked where they had learnt this vocabulary, about human rights and indigeneity.They said that AMAN had been holding seminars in the nearest district capital. They had joined those. One of them noted: "Before we did not know about our rights, but know we know. We are ready to fight (*perjuangan*) for them."

Workshops` such as "Training for Trainers can be influential in making the case of indigeneity more widespread and thus contribute in making *political mode* a more common approach of engagement. I now turn to a different workshop to show the diversity of the kind of engagement that were ongoing simultaneously in Central Kalimantan under the general umbrella of REDD. I turn to the REDD Training Center.

REDD Training Center: Transnational governance in the making

Outside of the REDD Training Center in Palangkaraya a marbled stone plate tells the short, official story of the buildings inception:

> Pilot Province Office, Central Kalimantan.
> UN Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia. Inaugurated 17.November 2011 by H.E Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations Secretary General.
>
> In the Kind Presence of H.E Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubruto, Chair National REDD+ Task Force
>
> And
>
> In the Kind Presence of H.E Agustin Teras Narang, Governor of Central Kalimantan, Republic of Indonesia.

The inauguration of these buildings reflected the will in the Letter of Intent (LoI) and the way the Indonesian government had chosen. Central Kalimantan became the pilot province. Kuntoro became the head on the REDD+ Task Force. The establishment of these buildings reflect the collaboration between two national governments, Indonesia and Norway, between a provincial government in the receiving country, Indonesia and a transnational actor, United Nations (UN), which both Indonesia and Norway belong are represented in.

I joined a seminar about forest governance at the REDD Training Center in June 2012 that was organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The seminar intended to upgrade the status of forest rangers to forest investigators. I talked for a while with the person working for the UN, who was in charge of the seminar. He explained to me that the course normally lasted for 2 months. In this workshop, the participants would learn the curricula for 2 months in 11 days. I talked with the different participants in the breaks. One participant worked for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which has an office close to the REDD Training Center. Another one worked for the Sebangau National park, established in 2004, which hosts a large population of orangutans. The WWF is participating in the management of the park. The impression I got was that most forest rangers had a bachelor's degree(*S1*) and quite a few a master's degree (S2). This seminar was entirely in the spirit of *administrative mode*, viewing REDD as a challenge of governance thus strengthening the capacity for those who could deploy the law, as a "weapon of the strong", against those engaging in illegal logging. The Norwegian government sponsored this seminar.

I take the comparison of the two pictures above as a point of departure in discussing the relationship between the aforementioned workshop above with the forest guards, the workshop by AMAN and WALHI`s engagement with REDD. The map on the picture to the left is from the REDD Training Center while the map to the right hangs inside the office of WALHI Central Kalimantan. The map inside the REDD Training Center is almost entirely green. The greenness refers to height above sea level, but in my interpretation, it also seem to signify the idea promoted by governmental agencies in Central Kalimantan, that Central Kalimantan is still green. This greenness indicates that there is still much forest in Central Kalimantan, in need of (REDD) protection. This, somehow optimistic scenario contrasts vividly to the rather pessimistic outlook communicated by WALHI Central Kalimantan and AMAN Central Kalimantan regarding the prospect for the remaining forest and the people who are living near to it. The WALHI map shows all the different concessions given out in Central Kalimantan. This map is reminiscent of the aforementioned map inside the office of the leader of AMAN Central Kalimantan. It is a map where the conflicting interest who work against REDD are highlighted, e.g. coal and palm oil. Where the map inside the REDD

Training Center, in my interpretation, gives out a harmonious view, the WALHI map- speaks of conflict and the need for a fighting (*perjuangan*)- attitude.

In the workshop with the forest guards, the improved enforcement of the national law dealing with forestry was at stake. This contrast with the AMAN workshop where the circumvention of national law to take into consideration indigenous claims was at stake. In the previous chapter, I showed how villagers in the KFCP-area were afraid of more surveillance of illegal logging due to the presence of the KFCP and how they referred to forest guards as Money Police (*Polisi Uang*). Through the juxtaposition of these workshops and the KFCP-project we see how the umbrella term of REDD in Central Kalimantan is able to gather different agendas, which generate different consequences for those concerned (cf. Tsing 2005).

Concluding remarks

In this chapter I asked: How are Indonesian NGOs engaging with REDD and the KFCP? How do Indonesian NGOs work with REDD/KFCP, against it, or use it as a vehicle for broadening their existing agendas? I concentrated primarily on WALHI and AMAN and have argued in the cases above that they both view REDD/KFCP within a "fighting" (*perjuangan*) ethos. However, while WALHI has had an explicit confrontational attitude towards REDD/KFCP, AMAN has been more openly pragmatic. I have argued that the post-Suharto framework has enabled NGOs to switch from engaging with primarily with *administrative mode* to engage with *political mode* when necessary. It is this flexibility that enables the intermediary role that the aforementioned NGOs have in the REDD process, going to the village and monitoring or advocating for villagers` rights at one point, while in the next moment engaging with governmental authorities on administrative terms

Chapter 5: Some concluding thoughts- Colliding Dreams

> I have a dream that our village will become a model village for the KFCP.
> I have a dream that tourists will come here in the future to see what we have achieved.
> However, I fear the NGOs because they are working against my dream.

The father of the household I stayed with uttered these words to me during a conversation we had about his visions for Sei Katja and the KFCP. This was in May 2012. The *lokasi* had been announced a success by the controlling team coming from Jakarta with the Australian as the leader. The future for the village and its cooperation with the KFCP seemed bright. However, the KFCP-area included seven villages and the KFCP had temporary put one of the other villages on hold (*isterihat*), an omen seen from the hindsight. Severe cooperation problems between the KFCP and villagers and mounting criticism by some villagers against how the project was proceeding was some of the background for this decision. A villager with NGO-connections spearheaded this criticism.

KFCP ended, prematurely in 2013. No official announcement has explained why (Lang 2003d). I do not have the key to explain why the KFCP decided to end prematurely, neither is that my task. However, I do suggest that some of the insights I have tried to convey in this thesis may contribute in elucidating tensions that have influenced emerging difficulties with the KFCP. I also suggest that these insights may be worthy of attention for other REDD-related projects elsewhere.

I have argued in this thesis that ground dynamics that are constitutive of the REDD process in Central Kalimantan comprise three modes of political engagement, which I have named: *peasant*, *political* and *administrative*. I have argued that most peasants of Sei Katja mainly deploy *peasant mode* in their interpretation of the past and the present, that they see KFCP through a *subsistence ethic*-lens and act with *weapons of the weak*. However, I also argue that within the new democratic framework emerging after the fall of Suharto, the possibilities for *political mode* has arisen. In Sei Katja, this has opened the way for NGO-involvement by villagers and new possibilities for engaging in village politics. I have argued that this involvement has had an empowering influence on some villagers, as they have been able to raise their voice and speak out. For some of the villagers engaging within the governing team (TP/TPK) I sensed a certain pride and ownership to the project, which was not present among many others. This created a split, which I argue that NGOs involved in the KFCP-area has been able to amplify. NGOs, such as WALHI and YPD has engaged themselves with a

fighting "ethos", working against the KFCP. They have argued that the KFCP has not taken the land issue seriously and have through sustained advocacy worked to highlight this, in their view, crucial issue. In a discussion in the Australian parliament about the difficulties with KFCP in May 2012, Blair Comley, the Climate change department secretary said: [..] "land tenure issues have been more complex than first thought" (Lang 2012d). I suggest that WALHI Indonesia, who has worked extensively with WALHI Australia, has been quite successful in highlighting this concern and thus become more visible themselves through their engagement against REDD, against KFCP.

I began this thesis with a drawing by a villager where he gave his vision of REDD/KFCP. Moreover, I began this last part with another dream by another villager, the father of my household. I cannot forget all the hope and fear that many villagers expressed towards the KFCP. I suggest that dreams should be of more interest when exploring REDD projects other places. I think that when dreams do not collide, but instead begin to co-shape each other, hope may also have higher chances of fulfilling more of its potential. When a big project, such as the KFCP, enters out-of-the-way places, there is a fundamental asymmetrical relation between "big men" (*orang besar*) and "small people" (*orang kecil*). This distance cannot be dreamt away. However, the different visions of the actor`s involved should be taken more into consideration to enable more fruitful cooperation.

The framework applied in this thesis, multiple modes of political engagement, which grew out of a back-and-forth movement between rethinking my field experiences and reading James Scott and Partha Chatterjee, may fruitfully be expanded upon if set into relation with other theoreticians. I was amazed to see the gap between the visions and dreams projected at places like the REDD Training Center, with power-point presentations that neatly classified the forest in the province and the road ahead for REDD- with the worried attitude shown by villagers in Sei Katja- recognizing that the forest was gone and struggling to make ends meet. This is where an administrative point of view encounters a subsistence point of view. The aforementioned gap urged me to formulate a framework that could capture something of the difference in viewpoints that actors engage in REDD/KFCP with. I suggest that this gap is not unique to Central Kalimantan. Hence, efforts to work historically and comparatively with emergence of multiple modes of political engagement, could provide more detailed insights into positions that actors are engaging in an ever-increasing globalized world with

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