

Euroscepticism in the EU15

*An individual-level analysis of Instrumental and Policy-specific
Euroscepticism*

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Abstract

European Integration has been pushed forward in the last 20 years, even in the face of falling public support for the Union as a whole. The falling support has recently manifested itself in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, where a large number of the MEPS were elected on the basis of anti-EU campaigning. In my thesis I attempt to reach a better understanding of the reasons behind opposition to the EU, or Euroscepticism. Much of the research on support for, or opposition to, European Integration has focused on general membership support. I build my work on this, but instead of looking into such support alone, I try to find out to what extent the factors which determine membership support also explain support for European-level decision-making within various policy-areas. Even amongst supporters of their respective country's EU membership there can be found large variation in which kinds of policy they feel the EU and the National governments should be in charge of. To answer my research question I use data from the Eurobarometer 71.3 which was conducted in 2009, just after the previous European Parliament elections. The analyses rely on the theoretical framework of David Easton, distinguishing between diffuse and specific support. In order to be able to compare the degree to which the various factors explain the different dimensions of Euroscepticism I use Ordinary Least Squares regression, allowing for causal analysis and comparisons of the explained variance between models. Furthermore, I organise the different factors which have been used to explain general membership support into utilitarian explanations, cultural explanations and political, or institutional, explanations, before I test these on approaches both on general membership support - in this thesis named Instrumental Euroscepticism - and policy-specific support. The latter is further divided into two dimensions: Political Euroscepticism; tapping into attitudes concerning policy-areas in which European integration has already come quite far, and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism; tapping into attitudes towards policy-areas which have been kept more or less under national jurisdiction. My analyses show that utilitarian explanations, which are crucial in determining general membership support, are somewhat less relevant when it comes to the two policy-specific dimensions, whereas the cultural explanations are central to all three dimensions of Euroscepticism. Lastly, the political approach is found to be more relevant for Instrumental and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism than for Political Euroscepticism.

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1 Introduction

Support for political authorities is a fundamental aspect of democratic government. Whether it be directed towards the institutions of political decision-making or the actors within these institutions, such support maintains is vital for the legitimacy of political representation. Max Weber's 'legal-rational' type of political legitimacy isn't based on personal loyalty towards the incumbents or power-holders, as with traditional legitimacy, but on "general acceptance of the procedures by which these orders and laws are produced" (Birch, 2007, p. 96). In western democracies support for national institutions and democratic values has remained fairly stable, although the former has decreased somewhat and the latter has increased slightly (Dalton, 2008). At the same time, these national institutions have also remained fairly unchanged. The same cannot be said for the institutions and jurisdiction of the European Union. In the early days of European integration the agreements and treaties made in Brussels didn't affect the average citizen much, and political elites were free to dabble with further integration - leaning on the so-called 'permissive consensus'. As a result, scholars theorising on the future of European integration focused mostly on elite behaviour. The intergovernmentalist theories of Stanley Hoffman (Hoffmann, 1966) hypothesised that national governments would resist further integration, whereas the early neo-functionalist theories of Ernst Haas (Haas, 1958) assumed that integration in some areas would lead to integration in others - the 'spill-over' effect. History has shown both theories to be partly right and wrong. National governments have to a large extent resisted the effects of 'spill-over' within the social and political sphere. Still, there is little doubt that economic integration has led to increasing EU governance and cooperation in ever new areas. The Union has kept on deepening and widening, and with the exception of the rejection of the EU constitution, largely without public discontent. With the final outcome of the recent financial crisis yet to be seen, and with the prospect of structural changes in the EU looming large, the legitimacy of the EU framework is paramount. Whether the structural weaknesses of the eurozone are to be overcome by deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); by reducing the number of eurozone members; or even yet dismantling the eurozone as a whole, public opinion on such matters should be taken into consideration. In this thesis, I study different indicators of EU legitimacy, differentiating between one measure of diffuse support; general membership support, and two measures of policy-specific support; tapping into attitudes towards the deepening of the European Union and the areas in which support for more EU-level decision-making either wanted or unwanted by the European public. In doing so, I emphasise the importance of focusing on particular policy areas, and whether or not European citizens

support further integration within these.

1.1 The backdrop: The democratic "deficit" and the debate on EU legitimacy

The main backdrop and the motivation for my thesis is the much debated democratic deficit of the European Union. The idea of a democratic deficit gained much ground after the growth of EU powers following the Single European Act and the subsequent Maastricht Treaty. The resulting changes caused scholars to call for a strengthening of the European Parliament and the European party system, both organisationally and financially (Norris, 1997). Since the 90s, the powers of the European Parliament has increased with each new EU treaty, moving from 'consent' to 'co-decision', most significantly with the introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure. The growth of European party groups has also show that the European political arena is growing more relevant.

Even so, the standards to which you hold the European Union remain the crux of the debate. Should EU democracy be judged by national democratic standards or by the standards of international institutions? The EU is by far the most democratic international institution around, but when compared to national governments it lags behind. Andrew Moravcsik argues that the EU is not a 'superstate' and is not in danger of becoming one. He accuses the strongest supporters of the 'democratic deficit'-argument of overlooking the multi-level nature of the EU, and that through accountability mechanisms at different levels, the EU actually holds up to the standards of most modern democracies (Moravcsik, 2002). If European elections were the only accountability mechanism in place, there would be a deficit, but through the nationally elected governments represented in the Council, the level of accountability is still satisfactory. The democratic deficit is really only an issue if or when the EU turns into a true federation. Similarly, Giandomenico Majone poses the question of "whether it is realistic and methodologically correct to assess the legitimacy of present institutions and policy-making processes with reference to norms that are largely irrelevant today and may not become relevant in the future." (Majone, 1998, p. 27).

Follesdal and Hix, on the other hand, disagree. In their view, the EU is democratic only to the extent to which the institutions and policies of the EU are responsive to the preferences of the European public (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 556). They find this responsiveness to be below par at the European level, especially when looking at European party competition. Still, what Follesdal and Hix call for is not a 'fundamental reform', but that the political elites "open the door to more politicization of the EU agenda" (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 557). With that in

mind, the role of public opinion, and particularly European, rather than national public opinion will have to play a larger role. There have already been taken steps towards such a politicization. Peter Mair and Jacques Thomassen have argued that after the strengthening of the EP "parties and MEPs within Parliament do seem to serve an effective representative role" (Mair & Thomassen, 2010, p. 33). With this year's (2014) EP elections there were also attempts at politicization of the election of President of the European Commission, although this largely failed. Still, there is little doubt that the EP has gone through vast changes, and has grown more powerful and effective. Judged by its effectiveness, it actually does better than any national parliament in Europe, with about 25 percent of the changes to legislation proposed by the European Parliament being successful (Hix, 2012).

1.2 Public opinion and European Integration

Whether you hold the EU to national or international standards the fall in EU support since the early 1990s still represents a challenge for EU decision-makers. For long periods of time the link between public opinion and the European integration process was neglected, and European elites did not pay much attention to the opinions of the European public. The EU was an elite-driven project, and as mentioned, the ordinary citizen did not know or care much about European integration. This was reflected in European integration theory. As mentioned briefly, both the (neo)functionalist hypothesis of Ernst Haas (Haas, 1958) and the intergovernmentalist one of Stanley Hoffman (Hoffmann, 1966) clearly emphasised elite behaviour, or 'political actors', although the latter was a little more open to public opinion. In the words of Richard Sinnott: "It is clear that the exclusive emphasis on élites and the dismissal of public opinion associated with early neo-functional theory does not reflect the real thrust of integration theory as it developed from the early formulations through various revisions to recent efforts at revival" (Sinnott, 1995, p. 31).

The role of European public opinion has changed, however, and will continue to do so. When revising his theory Haas gave more weight to the influence of public opinion (Haas, 1971), although elite behaviour was still decisive. Already in the the seventies, Ronald Inglehart predicted the increasing importance of public opinion in political decision-making. Looking at developments in French decision making, where Pompidou had opened for greater responsiveness to 'societal preferences', Inglehart argued that European publics were becoming more politically aware, and that this would force political decision making to reflect their opinions to a larger extent, and that this would increase support for "supranational integration" (Inglehart, 1970b, p. 795). Nevertheless, even in later times, public opinion has

remained in the background of European integration theory. In the early 90s, Andrew Moravcsik explained European integration by emphasising economic interdependence and intergovernmental bargains, largely viewing the EU as an instrument by which national government sought to extend their jurisdiction and overcome national opposition - giving little consideration to public opinion (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993).

Inglehart was correct in predicting a greater responsiveness to the preferences of European publics, illustrated by the increasingly important role of the European Parliament. This year's (2014) EP elections saw parties campaigning on anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiments garnering a huge amount of support, and such parties finished top in the UK, Denmark and France. Eurosceptic and right-wing parties in Holland, Austria, Hungary, Finland, Sweden and Greece also did well. Whilst it remains in the balance whether or not these groups can cooperate to any meaningful degree, their sheer size is enough to frighten other MEPs - a fear which was expressed well ahead of the elections. French President Francois Hollande warned last year that these groups could lead to "regression and paralysis", and then Italian PM Enrico Letta expressed fears of a "nightmarish legislature" (Mahony, 2013). Some even fear that the rise of Eurosceptic parties might lead to a gridlock in the European Parliament, à la the débâcle in the US congress in the autumnal months of 2013 (Mueller, 2013).

To sum up, public support for European integration is crucial if the union hopes to get passed the recent crisis in any meaningful way, in stead of merely postponing the consequences of a lack of legitimacy. European integration is no longer an elite project, or at least not to the same degree as earlier, and public opinion is both driving, and being driven by party politics and mass media, through a dual process (Steenbergen, Edwards, & de Vries, 2007).

1.3 Research question

Since the days of Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monet, and even earlier yet, there has been disagreement about which form European integration should take (Dinan, 2006). Today, this disagreement is as pertinent as ever. Support for European integration is not as simple as being for or against the project as a whole, or the membership of ones country. Two people may both be adamant supporters of their country's EU membership, and yet radically disagree on which and how many policy areas the EU should be in charge of. This is the federalist-intergovernmentalist divide. In my view, research which focuses on only membership support overlooks a central dimension of EU support. In my thesis I will try to incorporate this dimension, and compare it to support for EU membership, in order to see the extent to which

the determinants of the latter also explain the former. I will have a closer look at the factors effecting Euroscepticism, not only regarding support for EU membership within the respective members states, but also when it comes to the transfer of decision-making powers from the national to the European level within various policy areas. Using Eurobarometer data I construct three different measures, or dimensions, of Euroscepticism - one general and two policy-specific. The first dimension - Instrumental Euroscepticism - has already been in use for some time, and taps into general membership support and perceptions of benefit connected to this membership. This corresponds with David Easton's concept of diffuse support. The policy-specific dimension is divided into two sub-dimensions: Socio-Economic Euroscepticism; containing socio-economic policies, such as unemployment, economic growth and social rights, and Political Euroscepticism; a collection of general policies, including major health issues, gender equality, fighting crime and terrorism, promoting peace, research cooperation, energy security and environmental protection. These policy-specific measures can be placed under Easton's concept of specific support. In analysing the effect of social structure and different value-based and attitudinal factors I attempt to map the differences and/or similarities in determinants between the different dimensions. Moreover, looking into support for EU decision-making in socio-economic policies - an area usually associated with national governments - is particularly interesting in this period of economic hardships in Europe.

My research question can be stated as such:

"What are the differences between different dimensions of Euroscepticism in their socio-structural, value-based and attitudinal foundations?"

I would like to have a closer look at the degree to which the most usual determinants for Euroscepticism explains the variation in the different dimensions - looking into theories based on utilitarian, cultural and political factors. I will therefore apply the same model - i.e. using the same determinants and structuring the analysis in the same way - to each dimension of Euroscepticism, firstly for the EU15 as a whole, and subsequently for each of the 15 EU member states in question. As I will explain further in the following two chapters I organize the different determinants within the theoretical approach to which they belong, distinguishing between utilitarian factors, cultural factors and political/institutional factors.

1.4 A quantitative approach

In order to answer my research question I have chosen a quantitative approach to the subject. Doing this allows me to build on the substantial work already done within the field of Euroscepticism and, through the use of the same model in each of the 15 countries, I will be able to compare the characteristics of the different types of Euroscepticism within each country. Through the use of least-squares regression I will also be able to look further into the causal mechanisms through which this scepticism is shaped, from socio-structural background through values and attitudes. Furthermore, I will apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, as this allows for causal analysis, and comparison of changes in explained variance between models.

1.5 Outline

I will start by briefly looking into the existing literature on the subject in chapter two. Here I will explain the multitude of definitions and operationalisations which have dominated the literature for the past couple of decades. Thereafter I will describe the main theories and explanations of Euroscepticism, starting with the most dominant one, utilitarianism, before I present the cultural and political explanations. In chapter 3 I will outline the theoretical framework on which I will base my analyses, presenting my hypotheses and causal model. This is followed by a review of the data and research methods I will utilise in my analyses, in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will present the analyses of the three different types of Euroscepticism as well as the discussion of findings. Finally, I will reflect on the study as a whole in chapter 6, considering methodological and conceptual weaknesses as well as reflecting on possibilities for further studies.

2 Existing Literature

In this chapter I will account for the relevant literature on support for European integration, and try to link it to my thesis. Firstly, I will explain and define the concept of Euroscepticism, before outlining the dominant approaches to explaining it, on which I will base my later analyses.

2.1 The concept of Euroscepticism

Attitudes to European Integration comes in many shapes and forms. It can be directed at various different objects, and can thus be measured in different ways. In the field of public support for the EU, the various conceptualisations of the subject are almost as many as the studies devoted to it. Scholars have looked at support for specific EU institutions, EU leadership, EU performance, attitudes towards the widening and deepening of the Union, and support for EU membership, among other things. In the bulk of the work on public support for European Integration the focus has been on the latter. Furthermore, there are different ways of framing these studies, the main choice being whether one chooses to study opposition to European integration, or support for it. Whereas these might be two sides of the same coin, the choice of approach tells us something about the general situation in European public opinion at the time of the study. In much of the early literature the focus was on support for European integration, or the European Community. This was, after all, natural in a period where the general evaluations of EU memberships were positive' (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1998; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998b; Inglehart, 1970a). Around the 1990s, however, the share of positive evaluations of European integration took a nosedive(see Figure 2.1) - in what has been called a shift from 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) - and the literature in turn shifted its focus. Slowly but surely, researchers started to study the lack of support for European integration, or even Euroscepticism (Hix, 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Ray, 2007; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, 2008b; Taggart, 1998). The latter label has been rejected as too negative by some opponents of European integration, such as former Czech President Václav Klaus, who has argued that it's not a question of scepticism, but of realism. Also, it can be argued that the term Eurosceptic is quite minimalistic, as it is possible to identify multiple groups of both supporters of, and opponents to, the EU. Kopecky and Mudde, f.ex, propose a typology which differentiates between Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 303). Jan Rovny, as well, argues for a richer understanding of Euroscepticism, suggesting a distinction between ideological motivations for Euroscepticism

and strategic motivations (Rovny, 2004). Nevertheless, the term Eurosceptic has stuck and has become widely used by the media as well as scholars as a general term for opposition to the European Union.




Figure 2.1: EU Membership Support

The specific, or scientific, meaning of the term Euroscepticism is not self-evident. To be sure, it signifies some sort of disapproval of or scepticism towards European integration. Beyond that, however, the particular meaning of the concept varies greatly between different studies. One well-established definition of Euroscepticism comes from the work of Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. In their studies of Euroscepticism in the party systems of Europe they distinguish between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism. In their own words: "*Hard Euroscepticism* implies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 10), and more specifically, opposition to one's country's EU membership. *Soft Euroscepticism*, on the other hand, is when there is "not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory"

(Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a, p. 8). Thus, Szczerbiak and Taggart split the concept into one general, or hard, dimension, and one specific, or soft, dimension.

Studies of general support for the European Union have usually been based on questions asking the respondent whether or not the EU membership of the respondents country is a good or a bad thing¹. General support for European integration as a project has also received some attention, asking whether European Unification has 'gone too far', or 'not far enough'. 'Soft' aspects of Euroscepticism, on the other hand, did not receive much attention before Single European Act and the the Maastricht Treaty. Since then, discussions on the scope of European government have become ever more salient, as the Union has moved from a trade union to a monetary and increasingly political union. Moreover, public rejections of EU treaties have shown that the European public can disagree with single EU policies, whilst they are still positive to European integration in general. Eichenberg and Dalton argue that much of the drop in public support after the Maastricht Treaty was due to opposition to integration within particular policy areas (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). They acknowledge the increasing importance of public preferences of integration within particular policy areas, as the European public readily gives away national decision-making powers within some policy areas but not others. According to Dalton and Eichenberg, European integration is more likely within fields where the 'permissive consensus' still remains' (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1998). They hypothesised that "public support for policy integration should be greater for those issues that are difficult to solve at the national level or which have clear potential benefits from international coordination" (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1998, p. 254), in accordance with the hypothesis of Stanley Hoffman, who argued that there would be more public support for integration within 'low politics issues', such as tariffs, compared to 'high politics issues', such as national security, economy and sovereignty (Hoffmann, 1966). Similarly, De Winter and Swyngedouw find that the "Policy domains that are already perceived as most Europeanized are those for which citizens demand further Europeanization" (De Winter & Swyngedouw, 1999, p. 67).

Recognizing the (over)emphasis on membership support as the basis of most research on Euroscepticism, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) argue for a division of the concept into one instrumental dimension and one political one. *Instrumental Euroscepticism* encompasses general membership support as well as a utilitarian element, asking whether or not the respondent's country benefits from membership. The coupling of these was established early on, among others by Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer, who argued that the both items tap

¹ Like the question asked in the Figure 2.1

into utilitarian as well as affective support and are thus hard to separate (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 9). *Political Euroscepticism*, on the other hand, is not general or utilitarian in nature, but policy-specific; instead of focusing on membership as a whole, it captures attitudes directed towards various policy areas, and whether or not the respondent is willing to cede power from the national level to the European level in these respective areas. Lubbers and Scheepers divide this second dimension into sub-categories, or policy-domains, such as international policies or sociocultural policies, and show that these can be gathered in a cumulative measure, tapping into general attitudes towards national and supranational governance. This political dimension is related to, but still conceptually different from, the instrumental dimension of Euroscepticism (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 230). It is therefore worth studying in its own right, and not just as an explanatory factor for membership support, something which they have continued to do in a series of other studies (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, 2007, 2010; Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2012). They even argue that this dimension might be more important than the instrumental one when dealing with the challenges of EU legitimacy (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 239). Lauren McLaren, as well, have studied attitudes towards supranational decision-making, although without differentiating between policy areas (McLaren, 2007).

The aforementioned are not the only scholars arguing that a one-dimensional approach to the study of EU attitudes is unsatisfactory, and that a deeper, and multidimensional understanding of EU support is more advantageous. Krouwel and Abts argue that EU attitudes can have many different targets, and can be "directed against the very idea of European integration; the actual integration process of enlargement and/or deepening; the perceived impact of particular developments within this process; the EU and its officials, performance, output and policies; and, last but not least, politics in general" (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, pp. 255–256). Similarly, in their empirical analyses of European attitudes, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) find five distinct dimensions. They base their work on the Eastonian distinction between diffuse support and specific support (Easton, 1975), as well as the distinction between utilitarian and affective support (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). Using factor analysis they find five separate dimensions: 1) Negative affection, 2) (European) Identity, 3) EU Performance; attitudes concerning democracy, transparency and political trust; 4) Utilitarianism/idealism; attitudes concerning peace and environmental issues as well as membership evaluations, and 5) EU strengthening; feelings towards the widening and deepening of the union (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011, pp. 248–249). On a somewhat similar note, Bernard Weßels (2007) find three distinct levels of Euroscepticism: attitudes concerning 1)

Generalized Membership support, 2) EU responsiveness, and 3) EU effectiveness. He argues that there are different groups of Eurosceptics, where some "concur with one or more of the three elements of Euroscepticism, but are attached to Europe at the same time and those who feel discontent and are not attached to Europe." (Weßels, 2007, pp. 295–296). If we compare all these we find that Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2001) '*Hard Euroscepticism*', (Weßels' (2007) '*Generalized Membership support*', and even Boomgaarden et al.'s (2011) '*Utilitarianism/idealism*' are similar, and that they all considering membership support as only one of several important dimensions of EU support. How many dimensions it is meaningful to split them into, however, is more unclear. As Beaudonnet and Mauro argue, it might be that "individual attitudes towards Europe are structured and multi-dimensional but that the distinctions made by individuals in their perceptions of Europe are less fine-grained than is theorized in the literature" (Beaudonnet & Mauro, 2012, p. 19). Therefore - for the sake of parsimony - I have chosen to focus on the main division between general membership support and policy-specific attitudes. I will, however, look into sub-dimensions of policy-specific attitudes.

2.2 Explaining Euroscepticism

In this section I will account for the dominant approaches to explaining Euroscepticism. I have chosen to organise these into three categories: utilitarian explanations, cultural explanations and political, or institutional, explanations. The different explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters.

2.2.1 Economic/Utilitarian explanations

For most of the EC/EU era, the utilitarian explanation of EU Support has been the dominant one. This approach emphasises the importance of economic factors, and is based on the assumption that individuals are rational actors. Consequently, support for European integration - or the lack of it - is regarded as a result of utilitarian calculations, or cost-benefit analyses. Such calculations can happen on an individual basis; 'Does some one like me gain from European integration?', or on a national basis; "Does my country gain from European integration?". Moreover, it is assumed that such evaluations happen, whether the individual is asked the question or not. Thus, if we differentiate between the national, macro-economic level, and the individual, micro-economic level, as well as between subjective and objective measures, the utilitarian approach can be tapped into in four different ways: 1) *Objectively at the macro-level*; through the use of macro-economic indicators, 2) *Subjectively at the macro-*

level; using subjective evaluations of the national economic situation or outlook, 3) *Objectively, or indirectly, at the individual level*; through proxies such as demographic and social characteristics, or more directly by 4) *subjective evaluations of the individuals economic situation or outlook*.

The connection between 1) *macroeconomic indicators* and public support for European integration was established early on. Inglehart and Rabier found significant effects of both industrial production rates and inflation on EC support (Inglehart & Rabier, 1978). Similarly, when studying Eurobarometer surveys from between 1973 and 1998, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found a strong link between indicators such as inflation, unemployment rates, GDP, and the balance between payments to and from the EC/EU budget on the one side, and support for the European Community (EC) on the other. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) as well explain variation in EU support - both across time and countries - using nationally economic conditions such as GDP growth, unemployment and inflation. From this they argue that continued support for the EU is largely contingent on national economic and political circumstances (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996), while also recognizing the importance of other factors, such as length of EU membership² and national politics. Gabel and Palmer corroborate the effect of Intra-EU (Gabel & Palmer, 1995), stressing the importance of benefits directly linked to the EU, such as individual benefits from European integration or whether or not the country is a net beneficiary from the EU budget. In the words of Anderson and Reichert: "individuals living in countries that benefit more from EU membership display higher levels of support for their country's participation in the EU" (Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 231). Similarly, Mahler, Taylor and Wozniak argue that benefits directly linked to EU membership are the most important, and not economic factors per se (Mahler, Taylor, & Wozniak, 2000). Besides self-reported personal income having a strong positive correlation with EU support, they found that EU benefits such as net budgetary impact from EU membership and intra-EU trade that had the greatest effects.

The close relationship between macro-economics and EU support, however, has not remained unchanged. Eichenberg and Dalton predicted that EC support should increase with intra-EU trade after the implementation of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, and that the Maastricht Treaty could strengthen the relationship between citizens opinions, as well as their economic evaluations, and the policies of the EC/EU (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, p. 529). More than a decade later, however, they found that their predictions had turned out to be false. As a result they revised many of their earlier arguments. Instead of continuing on in the same path, they

2 As do Inglehart & Rabier (1978)

found that the impact of economic influences are weaker than earlier thought, and especially when it came to inflation and trade concentration. Most importantly they argue that the fall in public support for the EU that began in the 1990's was a reaction to the integration in specific policy areas, most importantly the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007).

In stead of using objective macro-economic indicators, one might then try to look into national economic factors more directly. In order to do so, 2) *subjective evaluations of the economy* have been used. These are somewhat independent of socio-economic characteristics. Gabel and Palmer found that positive evaluation of the national economy over the last 12 months increases EU support (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 15). Similarly, Hooghe and Marks have explained Euroscepticism using, among other factors, a measure tapping into expectations (worse, same, better) of the national economic situation and the employment situation in the country (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p. 419). Even Eichenberg and Dalton found that the effect of economic factors also holds true for citizens evaluations of the EC's economic effectiveness, and their political evaluations of this (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993). In other words, when the economic outlook is good, measured both in real terms, and indirectly through citizens evaluations, support for the European Community is stronger. This approach to has been relatively less popular than the other three utilitarian ones, but considering the declining importance of macro-economic indicators they might represent a useful way of tapping into the effect of the national and European economic situations on EU Support.

With the declining importance of macro-economics scholars have also turned to 3) *individual-level proxies*. Socio-structural characteristics are known to heavily influence individual attitudes and economic evaluations. Furthermore, characteristics such as education and professional skills are important in determining competitiveness in the job market. In an increasingly integrated and European labour market, people with particular professional skills and higher education are assumed to have better chances of competing for jobs. Instead of being a threat, European integration represents a door of opportunity (Duch & Taylor, 1997; Hix, 2008). In contrast, workers without particular skills or education will have to compete with workers from around Europe without any new work opportunities opening up. Consequently, the utilitarian explanation of Euroscepticism predicts that higher educated people, as well as trained or skilled workers, are more positive to European integration than people with less education and unskilled manual workers (Gabel, 1998a; Hooghe, Huo, & Marks, 2007). In the words of Simon Hix: "citizens who perceive that they gain new economic opportunities from market integration in Europe tend to support the EU, while

citizens who perceive that market integration threatens their economic interests tend to oppose the EU (Hix, 2008, p. 64).

Yet another way of studying the effect of utilitarian factors at the individual level is through the use of 4) *subjective evaluations of personal economy or benefit*. One example of this is the use of self-perceptions of being a winner or a loser. Steffen Mau illustrates that "subjective self-assessment of whether the EU is personally worthwhile may not coincide with one's objective location" and that "winner/loser self-characterization explained by occupational status is not very great." (Mau, 2005, p. 306). In stead, he uses a separate measures of whether or not people feel they benefit from European integration, and show that this is an important determinant of EU support. Similarly, De Vries and Kersbergen have shown that feelings of economic anxiety reduces support for the EU (de Vries & van Kersbergen, 2007) and Hooghe and Marks found that positive expectations of personal financial and job situation strengthens it (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Such direct measures of individual evaluations might prove even more fruitful than macro-economic indicators, as not all people possess the knowledge to relate the rate of inflation or GDP latter to their own personal economic situation.

2.2.2 Cultural explanations

Whilst the utilitarian explanations are usually held as the most important ones, a second group of theories, which are centred on cultural factors, have been shown to be important as well. In addition to aspects of national culture, such as language, national identity and ethnicity, the concept of culture contains such factors as attitudes, values and belief systems. The dominant cultural approaches to explaining Euroscepticism have focused on either aspects of national identity, immigration, or political values. 1) *Exclusive National Identity* has been the dominant factor within the cultural explanations. It is, however, closely related to other cultural explanations, such as those emphasising 2) *Negative attitudes to immigration*, or anti-immigration values. These are also often linked to 3) *perceived threats from the EU to national culture*. Lastly, 4) *Value orientations*, beyond anti-immigration values, have been found to influence EU attitudes, as they influence most political attitudes.

In some instances cultural factors have been shown to be even more important than the utilitarian ones in explaining Euroscepticism. One of the cultural factors which has received the most attention is 1) *feelings of national identity*. Looking at three different conceptualisations of national identity, Sean Carey found that "stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower levels of support for the EU" (Carey, 2002, p. 387). Hooghe and Marks

have also argued that communal identity is more important than economic calculations in shaping EU attitudes, and that these identities "may reach well beyond race or immigration" (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 437). De Vreese and Tobiasen found that National identity even translates into voting behaviour in European elections (de Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007). The argument is that people who feel a strong connection to their country are afraid of the cultural changes that EU membership might entail. The relationship is not so straight forward, however, National and European identity does not have to be mutually exclusive. People can have a strong sense of belonging to both their nation and to Europe (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 260). According to Lauren McLaren it is "exclusive national identity" which turns Europeans against European integration (McLaren, 2007, p. 233). Thus, it is important to emphasise that it is not a strong national identity as such which leads to Euroscepticism, but an exclusive national identity, i.e. one in which individuals identifies themselves solely with the nation (see the typology in table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Typologies of National and European identity

		National identity			
		To a great extent	Somewhat	Not really	Not at all
European identity	Not at all	Exclusive National identity		Neither nor	
	Not really	Exclusive National identity		Neither nor	
	Somewhat	Multiple identities		Exclusive European identity	
	To a great extent	Multiple identities		Exclusive European identity	

2) *Negative attitudes to immigration, or anti-immigration values*, is a second cultural factor used when trying to explain Euroscepticism. It is, however, difficult to decide to what extent this is a cultural phenomenon, or just part of utilitarian calculations. Vries and van Kersbergen argue that the interest- and identity based explanations are closely related: "the more citizens perceive integration to threaten their (economic and social–psychological) security and well-being, the less likely they will support the EU" (de Vries & van Kersbergen, 2007, p. 307). Thus, unskilled and low-educated people are perceived to be more directly affected by immigration, since they are often the ones who compete with the immigrants in the labour and housing market. Lubbers and Scheepers (2007), on the other hand, argue that the effect of immigration attitudes is connected to a fear of losing national culture and not just economic considerations (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, p. 664). This is partly corroborated by de Vreese and Boomgaarden who find that attitudes towards immigration is an important predictor of Euroscepticism, and that this holds true even when controlling for economic evaluations (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005, p. 72).

There is also the question of discerning the relationship between identity and immigration attitudes. Luedtke (2005) shows that the people who identify more with their country than with Europe are the least willing to cede control over immigration to the European level, and he shows this factor to be "stronger than support for European integration, opinions about immigrants themselves, and other variables such as economic calculation, political ideology, age and gender" (Luedtke, 2005, p. 83). The link between immigration attitudes and national identity is also illustrated by Andrea Schlenker-Fischer's finding that liberal attitudes to immigration and cultural diversity are linked with identification with Europe and multiple identities (national and European, see table 2.1) (Fuchs, 2011; Schlenker-Fisher, 2011). People who have a sense of belonging to both Europe and their country are less negative towards immigration.

A third factor which is closely related to the first two is the the perception of European integration as a 3) *threat to national culture*. The central aspect of this factor is that explanations linked to national identity and fear of immigration are not about personal interest, but fear of losing national culture. When studying the referendum concerning the EU constitution in the Netherlands, Marcel Lubbers found that explanations based on political considerations or national identity explained the no-vote better than utilitarian ones. Furthermore, of these, the strongest predictor was a "perceived threat from the EU to Dutch culture" (Lubbers, 2008, p. 59). This perceived threat was strongly linked to ethnic minorities and immigration. Nevertheless, he maintains that concerns about a loss of national identity are fairly independent of economic considerations. Similarly, Lauren McLaren finds that for some people, integration poses a threat to national identity by reducing nationalistic sentiment, which in turn leads to a loss of 'national identity and culture' (McLaren, 2004). It is worth mentioning that most people who hold these fears are still in favour of their country's EU membership.

The vast changes brought about in Europe during the after-war period saw a generational gap in 4) value orientations arise. Ronald Inglehart wrote of a 'Silent Revolution', in which Materialist values were pitted against Post-materialist values in a conflict between generations. According to him, people who gave greater weight to political values such as democracy and free speech than to values concerned with physical and economic security were more likely to support European integration (Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Inglehart, 1971). In a more recent study, Marianne Skinner has emphasised the importance of post-materialist values in explaining Norwegian and Icelandic Euroscepticism (Skinner, 2012, 2013). Beyond the materialist vs. post materialist dimension, political values have not received too much

attention, although there are exceptions. In a study of the 1994 EU referendum in Norway, Jo Saglie took a closer look at the "value conflict between social democracy and economic neo-liberalism" (Saglie, 2000, p. 230). He found that the pro-EU side in Norway tried to sell the EU to the voters as a project based on social democratic values, whereas the 'no to the EU' movement emphasised the neo-liberal vision of the EU. Although Norway is not part of this analysis, the example shows the importance of national political context when it comes to political values.

2.2.3 Political explanations

A third group of explanations has earned its place in the literature, although to a lesser extent than the two preceding ones. These explanations focus on political or institutional aspects when trying to explain Euroscepticism. Theories within this approach explain Euroscepticism as a result of 1) *Support for, or trust in, the national government or national institutions*, 2) *Cueing by political parties or elites/opinion leader*, 3) *Political Awareness*, 4) *Dissatisfaction with the democratic standards of the European Union*, or as a result of 5) *Game theoretic calculations*, based not on economic considerations, but on the relative standing between national governments and the EU on particular political issues.

One of the most important political explanation of Euroscepticism argues that support for the EU is based on 1) *trust in, or support for, national government, political parties or institutions*. Christopher J. Anderson argued that "system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support membership in the European Union" (Anderson, 1998, p. 569). He explained this by arguing that citizens who are not well informed use *proxies* in deciding their attitudes to the EU, and that support for the national government thus translates into support for the EU." Armingeon and Ceka (2013) corroborate this argument, finding that the most important predictor of the loss of support since 2007 is the level of trust in the national government (Armingeon & Ceka, 2013). In their view, citizens are better able to evaluate the policies and the performance of national governments, as opposed to the EU. To back this up, they point to the fact that the effect is weaker for citizens with better EU knowledge. The importance of this factor is further demonstrated by the finding of Boomgarden et al.(2011) who conclude that, aside from immigration attitudes, government approval was the only factor influencing all of the five EU attitude dimensions distinguished in their previously mentioned study (Boomgarden et al., 2011, p. 259). It is also worth noting that such attitudes translates into voting behaviour. In a study of Anti-integrationist voting in the Danish 2004 EP elections, Claes de Vreese and Mette Tobiasen point to dissatisfaction

with the incumbent government as a crucial factor (de Vreese & Tobiasen, 2007, p. 104). Nevertheless, they emphasise that EP voting behaviour is not just a proxy for other things, and that many people vote according to attitudes towards the EU, feelings of identity, as well as political ideology and trust.

While support has been used frequently as an indicator of such explanations, trust has been central as well. Hartevelde, Meer and Vries (2013) find that citizens' *trust in the EU* is to a great extent influenced by *trust in national institutions* and that this is fairly independent of their feelings of national identity and knowledge about the EU (Hartevelde, van der Meer, & Vries, 2013, p. 561). Their argument is that trust in the EU is not based on the logic of rationality but on the logic of extrapolation. In other words, citizens' trust in the EU is a reflection of their trust in national institutions. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), on the other hand, complicates this picture. Whilst he too finds a link between feelings towards national institutions and the EU, he argues that the higher citizens' opinions of EU institutions are, and the lower their opinion of their national institutions are, the more positive they are to European integration. He illustrates this by showing that EU support is high in countries that have high levels of corruption and underdeveloped welfare states (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). According to him, people in these countries see the supranational EU as a way out from, or an alternative to, the corrupt or inadequate national institutions.

National political parties may also influence support for the EU through 2) *Partisanship and political cueing*. Taggart and Szczerbiak have championed the importance of domestic politics, as political parties are "key gatekeepers in the process of political representation" (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a, p. 2). As a result, the political basis of EU attitudes has been studied mainly through political parties. Inglehart, Rabier and Reif found that people who supported parties on the left side of the political scale had lower levels of support for European integration than those who supported parties on the right side (Inglehart, Rabier, & Reif, 1991). Similarly, later studies of Euroscepticism in the party systems of Europe have found clear connections between parties' positioning on EU matters and positioning on both the economic Left/right scale and the GAL/TAN scale³ (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002), indicating a close relationship between political values and attitudes and Euroscepticism. Furthermore, Marks and Wilson show that cleavage theory can explain a substantial amount of variation in the positioning of national political parties on European integration. Parties have more in common with parties from the same party family than with parties from the

³ The GAL(Green, Alternative, Libertarian)/TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) scale is also known as the 'New Politics' dimension.

same country, suggesting a party political basis for attitudes on European integration (Marks & Wilson, 2000, pp. 458–459). Kopecky and Mudde also argues that "ideology is the crucial factor in explaining the positions that political parties adopt on issues surrounding the current process of European integration" (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 321). This link between political ideology and party standings on EU matters can be seen in practice, as well, with the strengthening of European party groups, particularly after the Lisbon Treaty, although it should be mentioned that there exists a certain divide between elites and public opinion in attitudes to European integration (Hooghe, 2003; Marks, 2006). However, since partisanship is largely influenced by the same factors as EU attitudes, it is primarily interesting as an explanatory variable when partisanship influences these attitudes directly - for example through political cueing. Gabel and Scheve finds that intra-party dissent on EU matters increases variance in EU support amongst the party's supporters as well (Gabel & Scheve, 2007b). The effect of elite cueing, however, varies with the level of political awareness (Gabel & Scheve, 2007a), as people with higher political awareness are less susceptible to these cues. Also, it is important to keep in mind that such cueing happens both from the top down and from the bottom up - party supporters take cues from party elites, but party elites are also responsive to the grass roots and adjust their opinions accordingly (Steenbergen et al., 2007).

As mentioned, the effect of political cueing varies with levels of 3) Political Awareness, or knowledge, and this has also been used as an explanatory factor in its on right. Ronald Inglehart coined the term cognitive mobilisation when trying to explain EU(then EC) support. Cognitive mobilisation theory states that people who are cognitively mobilised, i.e. who have a high level of political awareness and highly developed communication skills are more likely to identify with the European Community (Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Inglehart, 1970a). The argument is that these skills allow them to understand the project better, and that much of the resistance against European integration is based on a lack of knowledge.

Yet another group of studies have focused on 4) *democratic standards and political representation* in order to explain EU support. Robert Rohrschneider argues that a majority of west-Europeans do not feel adequately represented in the EU, and that this leads to lower EU support. Moreover, he argues that this effect is independent from the economic perceptions of the citizens, and that the effect is stronger in nations with well-functioning national institutions. In other words, the quality of these institutions conditions the effect of the perception of a democratic deficit (Rohrschneider, 2002). One might argue that since the European parliament has been strengthened since then this argument is less pertinent today,

but problems of representation continue to exist. When studying media, political websites and blogs in connection with the 2009 EP elections Wilde, Trenz and Michailidou found that contestation of EU legitimacy focused primarily on the institutional set-up of the EU, and not the project of European integration in itself (de Wilde, Trenz, & Michailidou, 2010). It is also illustrative that the new name of Gert Wilders' European party group is *Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy*. Thus, it might be argued that the fall in public support for the EU is a result of particular policies of the EU, which were implemented without real legitimacy. As mentioned, Eichenberg and Dalton argued that the fall in support in the 1990s was a reaction to the Economic and Monetary Union (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), which was driven forward by political and business elites, rather than public opinion. As a result, the way in which citizens evaluate EU policies has changed, they argue. With the EU becoming prominent on the policy arena, policy evaluation become more important in shaping EU attitudes, something which has clear implications for the study of EU support.

The last political explanation can be considered a 5) *rational choice explanation*. Simon Hix has tried to explain Euroscepticism as a product of a game theoretic calculation on the part of the citizen. As an example, he compares Great Britain and France. Traditionally, the right side of politics in Great Britain has been sceptical towards the EU whereas in France, this has been the role of the political left⁴. The EU, however, is normally perceived as being a project based on the values of political centre. Using the labour market as an example, EU membership thus meant less regulation in France, but more regulation in GB. Hix argues that Euroscepticism is not only a result of economic cost-benefit calculations, but on political calculation. Citizens who "feel that EU policies (such as social and environmental regulations) are closer to their personal political views than their current national policies", will see EU membership as a way of influencing their national policies, and therefore be more open to European integration (Hix, 2008, p. 64). Thus, support for European integration and opposition is a result of the same calculation, the difference being the starting point of the calculus. Both are merely a way of influencing national politics. Opposition to the EU is therefore not necessarily opposition to the system in itself, or the institutional make-up of it. People who feel that increasing the EU's decision-making abilities, or becoming a EU member, will move the national politics in their direction will be positive to European integration and vice versa (Hix, 2007).

⁴ As well the extreme right, it should be mentioned

2.2.4 Summary

In short, there are a wide selection of factors which can explain Euroscepticism, and whereas some of these are conflictual, most of them can be combined to reach a greater understanding of the concept. The utilitarian factors mentioned in the previous section can easily be complemented by cultural factors such as national identity and anti-immigration values, as well as political or institutional factors. Some of these factors I haven't been able to include in my study, either due to the lack of data or due to conceptual similarity to other factors. Of the ones I have been able to incorporate, education, social class and economic evaluations are representatives of the utilitarian approach, whereas anti-immigration values and exclusive national identity represent the cultural approach. Lastly, trust in political institutions will represent the political/institutional approach. Furthermore, I will include several factors which have not been mentioned in the review of the existing literature, such as type of community and Libertarian and Market Liberal values. Even though they have received little previous attention I will argue that they should be included nonetheless, the reasons for which I will explain in the following chapter.

3 Theoretical Framework

The following chapter gives an overview of the theoretical framework on which I will base my analyses, presenting my causal model, describing my hypotheses and their theoretical foundations and my general focus.

3.1 Political Support and the European Union

In order to specify what is meant by political support I rely on the work of David Easton. In his reassessment of political support as a concept he distinguished between specific and diffuse support (Easton, 1975). Discontent with political parties, office-holders or politicians is not the same as discontent with the regime or community. *Specific support* is connected to specific outputs and the performance of political authorities, and is thus dependent on citizens being aware of these authorities in a general sense, as well as believing that the actions of these authorities have an impact on their daily life. Theoretically, it can be viewed as a result of weighing the authorities performances against expressed demands. Such evaluations may also be made on the basis of perceived general performance, or general social conditions, rather than specific activities. It is still regarded as specific support, however, as it is connected to the performance of the authorities in question. Thus, even if citizens are unlikely to develop the political awareness needed for actively weighing their demands up to political outputs, Easton argues that specific support can be theoretically distinguished from diffuse support. In the words of Edward Muller: "The most useful conception of specific support is not that its distinctive characteristic is demand-satisfaction, but simply that it involves members' evaluations of the performance of political authorities" (Muller, 1970, p. 1152).

In contrast, *diffuse support* is based on evaluation of what the object of support is, not what it does. This support is less influenced by the specific performance or outputs made by the object. Whilst it can change and experience short-time fluctuations (Easton, 1975, p. 444), it is thought to be fairly stable in the long run. Nevertheless, whilst diffuse support is largely based on socialisation, it is also experience-based, and if dissatisfaction with performance or output endures for long periods it will naturally influence the level of diffuse support as well. When studying political authorities, usual indicators of diffuse support are trust or confidence in these, whereas for a community it might be in the form of group identification.

In order to illustrate how I define the different types of support in this thesis I have borrowed a table from André Krouwel and Koen Abts, in which they divide EU support into support for

the European Union (specific support) and support for European integration (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, p. 257).

Table 3.1: Specific and diffuse EU support

	<i>Targets</i>	<i>Sub-targets</i>	<i>Criteria of evaluation</i>	
<i>European Union (Specific support)</i>	Authorities (actors)	Morals Actions	Integrity of actors Competence of actors	
	Regime (institutions)	Institutions Performance Practice of European integration	Responsiveness - Equity Output - Outcomes Widening - deepening	
	<i>European Integration (diffuse support)</i>	Community	Liberal-democratic society	European democracy
			European integration European project	National sovereignty EU membership legitimacy

As shown in table 3.1, support directed towards the regime is categorised as specific support, deviating somewhat from the framework of David Easton, where regime- and community support is regarded as diffuse support. Others as well have used this distinction between diffuse support, or general feelings towards Europe, and specific support, which concerns more particular policies, office-holders (Norris, 1997, p. 278), or the "general practice of European integration" (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). Both specific and diffuse support can be directed at either the regime or its authorities, however. As mentioned, diffuse support for political authorities is often viewed in the form of trust. A second manifestation of it is a "belief in the legitimacy of political objects" (Easton, 1975, p. 447). This second component of diffuse support implies a sort of moral commitment to the object, based on the perception that the object conforms to the citizen's own moral principles.

Whereas David Easton argues that diffuse and specific support can be theoretically distinguished, there have been some doubts concerning whether or not this can be replicated empirically. In an attempt to do this, Beaudonnet and Di Mauro found that the distinction between diffuse and specific EU support holds at both the national and the European level (Beaudonnet & Mauro, 2012). Using Mokken Analysis they categorised opinions on the EU itself, trust in the EU, and views on membership as diffuse support, whilst evaluations of the EU's performance on specific policy domains is categorised as specific support (Beaudonnet & Mauro, 2012, p. 11). In my study, I use a similar approach. I will look into one measure of diffuse support, and two measures of a more specific nature. Instrumental Euroscepticism can be placed under diffuse, community-based support, and more specifically under EU membership legitimacy, whereas Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism can be placed under Specific regime-based support, tapping into attitudes towards the deepening of European integration in table 3.1. Thus, I do not study citizens' evaluations of EU outputs,

but the willingness of EU citizens to cede power over policy areas from the national to the European level.

3.2 Factors not covered in the existing literature

Whereas I include neither self-placement on the political left-right scale, nor political affiliation in my study, I will include two political values which haven't received much attention so far: Market Liberal values and Libertarian values. These tap into fundamental views concerning the role of the market and the state. As the EU is a project based on market liberalisation it is safe to assume that values concerning such liberalisation should be related to support for the EU, and the link between the social democratic/neo-liberal dimension and Euroscepticism has already been established (Saglie, 2000).

The link between Libertarian values and EU support, however, remains less explored. Whilst normally considered a classical liberal theorist, Herbert Spencer is also viewed as one of the early libertarian thinkers. In his view, governments should only be in place to protect the rights and property of citizens, nothing else. Justice is the natural task of government, not controlling economic or social matters (Mack, 2011). It should be noted that the term libertarian can mean many different things. Whereas the original term was used mostly with regards to left-wing anarchists, it has been used to describe fiscally conservative right-wingers in the US. What all libertarians have in common, however, is a general scepticism towards government and authority. Thus, the use of the term libertarianism in this thesis refers only to general negative attitudes concerning the involvement of the state and authority. I am not trying to tap into the normal economic left-right dimension, as such values can be found in either end of this scale. When put in a European context, libertarian values are thus assumed to have a positive effect on Euroscepticism.

3.3 Causal model

As I explained in the introduction to this chapter I will combine the three groups of explanations in order reach a fuller understanding of Euroscepticism. There are, of course, even more aspects which could be included, but in order to maintain a certain level of parsimony I have chosen to limit my variables to these main ones. I have, for example, left out macro-economic indicators, as these are not the focus of this thesis. In a quite similar study to this one - i.e. using the Eurobarometer survey and looking into many of the same factors - Lauren McLaren even argued that "the effects of individual-level variables are not altered by adding such variables" (McLaren, 2007, p. 234). The relationship between the

variables I have chosen to include is mapped out in figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Causal Model

Social structural characteristics, such as age, gender, education and social class are known to be crucial to political behaviour and attitudes, and attitudes to European integration are no different in this. Within these social characteristics, the ascribed, or semi-ascribed variables (in the case of Type of community), are assumed to be antecedent to all the other variables. They are thought to have a direct effect on Eurocepticism as well as an indirect effect through the achieved status variables of education and social class, the value orientations and the political attitudes. The achieved status variables are assumed to have both a direct effect and an indirect effect, through value orientations and political attitudes. The value orientations, which in this study consist of Libertarian values, Market Liberal Values and Anti-immigration Values are thought to be antecedent to specific political attitudes such as Exclusive National Identity, Trust in political institutions and Economic Evaluations. Finally, although I am looking into different dimensions of Eurocepticism, I have used the general concept of Eurocepticism in this figure, as I expect the factors included to influence all dimensions of Eurocepticism, although not necessarily in the same way.

3.4 Hypotheses

I make the assumptions that the three approaches to explaining Euroscepticism can be combined in explaining the factors at play in shaping EU attitudes. As Phillippe Schmitter put it: "Understanding and explanation in this field of inquiry are, as in other fields such as political development, best served not by the dominance of a single "accepted" grand model or paradigm but by the simultaneous presence of antithetic and conflictive ones" (Schmitter, 1970, p. 868). In order to look into the differences between the different types of Euroscepticism I will make use of hypotheses which draw on the major theoretical approaches to Euroscepticism. My analysis is structured after my causal model, and thus I present the hypotheses linked with each model, starting with the ascribed variables, followed by the achieved status variables, the value orientations and, finally, the attitudinal variables.

3.4.1 Ascribed variables

The relationship between age and Euroscepticism is somewhat ambiguous. Some have argued that younger people are more positive towards European integration as they are thought to have a more "cosmopolitan outlook" (Carey, 2002, pp. 396–397; Inglehart & Rabier, 1978). The effect of age on Euroscepticism, however, has been found to be fickle at best, and findings which suggest that younger people in the 70s had a more cosmopolitan outlook than their parent generation stand in danger of being outdated. I therefore do not expect to find a strong relationship between age and Euroscepticism. Also, I do not attempt to link age to any of the major approaches to explaining Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, I hypothesise that younger people are more positive towards European integration

H1) Age has a positive effect on Euroscepticism

Moreover, a modest gender gap in EU attitudes has been found in previous research. Women tend to be more Eurosceptic than men. This might be due to women being more inclined than men to admit to knowing little about the EU, linking it to cognitive mobilization theory. Also, although a lack of EU knowledge predicts Euroscepticism among both genders, Nelsen and Guth argue that women are more prone to let this lack of knowledge shape their attitudes (Nelsen & Guth, 2000). Another explanation for this is that men tend to be in occupations where they are better able to gain from European integration, thus making it a consequence of utilitarian calculations. Anderson & Reichert, however, find that both age and gender are not consistent determinants of EU support. (Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 241). Thus, as with age, I do not expect gender to be an important determinant of Euroscepticism. Furthermore,

since I do not control for cognitive mobilization in this study, I will not use gender as an indicator of the utilitarian approach.

H2) Women are more Eurosceptic than men

The relationship between type of community and Euroscepticism is a fairly difficult one to hypothesise about. I do not expect to find a uniform relationship between type of community - i.e. the size of the community of the respondent - and the different dimensions of Euroscepticism across Europe. Previous referendums and European elections, as well as domestic politics, have shown that whereas people living in rural areas tend to be Eurosceptic in the Nordic countries, they tend to be Europhile in the Southern European countries, where they have received a good amount of structural funds. Similarly, in countries which have received considerable amounts of funds from the Common Agricultural Policy, such as France and the Netherlands, farmers also tend to be positively inclined to European integration. Regional politics may also come into play. Marks and Wilson argue that "Political parties representing territorially dispersed peripheral minorities are likely to oppose all efforts to centralize authority, whether it is in the central state or at the European level" (Marks & Wilson, 2000, p. 438) whereas "Territorially concentrated peripheral minorities take a different view because European integration can facilitate decentralization of authority" (Marks & Wilson, 2000, p. 438). As with the other ascribed variables, type of community is more of a control variable than an explanatory variable, and I do not attempt to link it to any of the theoretical approaches.

H3) People living in large towns are less Eurosceptic than people living in small towns or villages

3.4.2 Achieved Statuses variables

Based on the utilitarian approach to Euroscepticism, higher educated people are less likely than lower educated people to be harmed by increased labour market competition. On the contrary, in many cases this might lead to new job opportunities for them (Hix, 2008). This could also be explained using cognitive mobilization theory, since people who are higher educated also tend to read more about, and discuss politics (Inglehart, 1970a, p. 69), and are thus more exposed to information about the EU (McLaren, 2007), but since I could not find a satisfactory way of studying this theory using this data set, I have chosen to consider education as an indicator of the utilitarian approach.

H4) Education has a negative effect on Euroscepticism

Social Class is similarly categorised as a utilitarian variable in this study, based on the same logic as with Education. Labour migration in the EU is most widespread within manual labour professions. As a consequence, these groups have the most to fear from the opening up of national labour markets - especially so, since I study the 'old' member states. I therefore expect these vulnerable classes to be more Eurosceptic. For Mid- and Higher-level non-manual workers, as well as employers, however, European integration is generally thought to lead to new job opportunities in other countries, and citizens from these classes are thus more positive to the EU (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Hix, 2008; McLaren, 2004). Also, since the Common Agricultural Policy provides and protects farmers with subsidies and tariffs, farmers are generally expected to be positive to European integration (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 7).

*H5) Unskilled manual workers and Skilled manual workers workers are more Eurosceptic than non-manual workers, employers and the self-employed***3.4.3 Value orientations**

When it comes to the relationship between Euroscepticism and Libertarian values I expect the latter to have a positive effect on the former. As Libertarians are generally against excessive government activity, and in favour of participatory democratic processes, they may discard the EU as "faceless administrative technocracy" (Brinegar, Jolly, & Kitschelt, 2004, p. 72).

H6) Libertarian attitudes have a positive effect on Euroscepticism

As for Market Liberal values, these are assumed to have a negative effect of Euroscepticism, since the EU can be viewed as a project based on market liberalisation. This effect is expected to vary quite a bit between countries, however, as the level of market liberalisation in each country is likely to condition its effect on Euroscepticism.

H7) Market liberal attitudes have a negative effect on Euroscepticism

Lastly, negative attitudes towards immigration and immigrants has been found to be one of the strongest determinants of Euroscepticism (de Vries & van Kersbergen, 2007; Garry & Tilley, 2009; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). I therefore expect people with negative attitudes to immigration to be negative to European integration as well, and I expect this effect to be valid even when controlling for exclusive national identity and economic considerations.

H8) Negative attitudes to immigration have a positive effect on Euroscepticism

3.4.4 Attitudinal variables

Since feelings of belonging to the nation and to Europe are compatible for most people, it makes sense to single out exclusive feelings of national identity. Thus, people who feel a close connection to their country, and little or no connection to Europe are expected to be more Eurosceptic: "it is those who conceptualize their identities exclusively in terms of national identity who are likely to be most hostile to the European integration project" (McLaren, 2007, p. 237). I therefore expect people with an exclusive national identity to be negative to European integration.

H9) Exclusive national identity has a positive effect on Euroscepticism

The connection between trust and regime support is a well-established one in the field of comparative politics, and the field of Euroscepticism is no different. Trust in national institutions have been found to greatly influence trust in the EU (Harteveld et al., 2013), and I therefore I expect trust in political institutions to have a negative effect on Euroscepticism.

H10) Trust in political institutions has a negative effect on Euroscepticism

Lastly, I expect positive evaluations of the country's economic situation and labour market to have a negative effect on Euroscepticism. Economic indicators have been shown to be a powerful determinant of EU support. Whereas I do not use any objective macro-economic indicators, it has been argued that subjective economic evaluations is an even better measure of economic performance than objective indicators, as "voters in some sense anticipate economic outcomes" (Duch & Taylor, 1997, p. 77). Also, since not all people are capable of understanding the relationship between such indicators and their own personal economy, I believe subjective economic evaluations to be an adequate substitute for such measures.

H11) Positive Economic evaluations have a negative effect on Euroscepticism

3.5 Hypotheses and theoretical approach

To sum up, table 3.2 presents the hypotheses structured under each group of theoretical explanations. As shown, Economic Evaluation joins the well-established indicators Education and Social Class under Utilitarian Explanations. Similarly, Libertarian and Market Liberal values join the more known anti-immigrant values and Exclusive National identity under

cultural explanations. In contrast, Trust in Political Institutions is the sole representative of the Political explanation of Euroscepticism. This relative scarcity should be held in mind during the analyses. Also, one might argue that this variable could have been placed under cultural explanations, but I follow others in differing between specific political attitudes and more general values and attitudes, especially since this variable also can be loosely linked to the state of democracy in the respective countries.

Table 3.2: Variables and hypotheses categorised according to theoretical explanations

Utilitarian explanations	Cultural Explanations	Political Explanations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education - Social Class - Economic Evaluation Hypotheses: - H4, H5, H11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Market Liberal values - Libertarian values - Anti-immigration values - Exclusive National Identity Hypotheses: - H6, H7, H8, H9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trust in Political Institutions Hypotheses: - H10

4 Data and research design

In this chapter I will present the data material which I use in my analyses, and give a thorough description of the variables included in these. I will also describe methodological and technical challenges related to my choice of subject and research design.

4.1 Data set

In this cross-sectional study of Euroscepticism I have chosen to use the third version of the Eurobarometer 71.3, released in 2012, as it is the newest survey I could find containing all the factors needed to complete my study. It is named: "Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections" and was conducted between June 12th and July 6th 2009 by TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels, and was requested and coordinated by the European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communication⁵.

Table 4.1: Country samples

Country	Frequency
<i>Austria</i>	1015
<i>Belgium</i>	983
<i>Denmark</i>	1012
<i>Finland</i>	1012
<i>France</i>	1038
<i>Germany</i>	1521
<i>Greece</i>	1000
<i>Ireland</i>	1006
<i>Italy</i>	1036
<i>Luxembourg</i>	530
<i>Netherlands</i>	1000
<i>Portugal</i>	1010
<i>Spain</i>	1002
<i>Sweden</i>	1068
<i>United Kingdom</i>	1352
<i>Total</i>	15585

The data set covers the population of the respective EU member states, resident in each of the Member States and aged 15 years and over. In each country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size and to population density. It contains the standard Eurobarometer measures, as well as questions on a range of particular areas. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in people's homes and in the appropriate national language.

⁵ European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 71.3 (Jun-Jul 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4973 Data file Version 3.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.11135](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11135)

I have removed the newer member states from the data set, so that I am left with the EU15 group of countries, or the 'old member states'⁶, and 15585 units of observation, the distribution of which can be seen in table 4.1. This has been done to limit the number of countries, both out of practical considerations in terms of space - as I will look into specific effects in each country in the second part of my analysis - and also to ensure a certain level of homogeneity between the countries.

4.2 Dependent variables

The first order of business was to see which dimensions of Euroscepticism I could discern. I started out with a factor analysis of 17 items tapping into attitudes towards the EU. Out of these items 13 were policy-specific(v258-v270), asking whether the respondent wanted more or less decision-making at the European level in certain policy areas. The remaining items were of a more general nature; one asking the respondent about whether or not his or her country's EU membership was a good thing(v205), another asking whether or not the respondent's country had benefited or not from EU membership(v206), yet another asking whether the respondents view of the EU was positive or negative(v221), and lastly, one asking whether or not the respondent trusts the European Union(v219). The factor analysis extracted three factors, one with the four general items, and two policy-specific factors. In the following sections I will look at the different factors.

4.2.1 Instrumental Euroscepticism

Table 4.2: Frequencies, Instrumental Euroscepticism

Indicators	Values	Frequencies (%)	Missing/DK
EU Membership - Good/Bad (v205)	0 = Membership is a good thing	8528 (55%)	545 (3,5%)
	1 = Neither good nor bad	4013 (25,7%)	
	2 = Membership is a bad thing	2436 (15,6%)	
EU Membership - Country Benefit (v206)	0 = Benefited	9211 (59,10%)	1652 (10,60%)
	1 = Not benefited	4722 (30,30%)	

The four general indicators which had been distinguished from the policy-specific ones had strong correlations, and adequate skewness and kurtosis. When measuring Instrumental Euroscepticism, however, I have chosen to leave out EU trust and EU Image. This is partly due to the the inclusion of Trust in Political Institutions as one of the independent variables. Including Trust in the EU in the dependent variable would be problematic, as the two have a strong correlation of ,518. Moreover, I have chosen to continue the conceptualisation used by most of the literature so far. It is hard to truly catch a concept with only one measure of it, and

⁶ Countries who were members before the 2004 enlargement

although the two indicators shown in table 4.2 are not completely identical, they are so closely related that it is more useful to include them in a joint measure of diffuse, or general, and utilitarian support. The measure I ended up with includes only 'Membership Good/Bad'(v205) and 'Country Benefit'(v206). As put by Gabel and Palmer: "based on the belief that while there may be different types of public support, the Eurobarometer questions are too vague and broadly worded to be precise measures of these distinct components" (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, p. 9). They argue that responses to both of these questions are correlated both affective and utilitarian support. In both instances I have coded 'Don't Know' (DK) responses into a neutral category, in order to limit the loss of information, in line with previous practices. In a study using comparable items, Lauren McLaren argues that individual who answer "don't know" "are neither Eurosceptic nor necessarily favorable toward integration and thus should be placed somewhere between the two extreme responses" (McLaren, 2007, p. 239). Of these two items I created an equally weighted index where 0 signifies positive attitudes to EU membership and 10 signifies Euroscepticism⁷. It cannot be said to be a true ratio variable, but it will be treated as such in the analyses. Moreover, the distribution is somewhat skewed to the left, as most respondents are positive to their country's EU-membership, with 48,1% at 0. The two indicators have a strong correlation of ,674 and an acceptable Cronbach's Alpha of ,782. A factor analysis of the two extracts one factor with an eigenvalue of 1,654 and an explained variance of 82,7%.

4.2.2 Policy-specific Euroscepticism

In order to tap into policy-specific support for the EU I use the answers to items v258-270, "*For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level?*". the different policy areas can be seen in table 4.3. As shown in the table, support is quite strong in areas where international cooperation is crucial. With European integration theory in mind, this is well explained by both the functionalism of Ernst Haas (Haas, 1958), or the liberal intergovernmentalism of Stanley Hoffman (Hoffmann, 1966) and Andrew Moravcsik (Moravcsik, 1991). The former would predict that "public support for policy integration should be greater for those issues that are difficult to solve at the national level or which have clear potential benefits from international coordination" (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1998, p. 254), based on the logic of interdependency, whereas the latter hypothesised that within 'high-politics' issues, such as matters of national security and identity, integration would be harder achieve (Dalton & Eichenberg, 1998, p. 254). In other

⁷ For a fuller description of the operationalisation, see appendix A

words, support for integration would be greater in 'low politics' areas.

Table 4.3: Frequencies, Policy-specific Euroscepticism

VARIABLE/INDICATOR	VALUES	FREQUENCIES (%)	MISSING/DK
<i>Political Euroscepticism</i>			
<i>Fighting Organised Crime</i>	0 = More decision making	12302 (78,9%)	601 (3,9%)
	1 = No change needed	486 (3,1%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	2196 (14,1%)	
<i>Fighting Terrorism</i>	0 = More decision making	12669 (81,3%)	550 (3,5%)
	1 = No change needed	573 (3,7%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	1793 (11,5%)	
<i>Ensuring Food Safety</i>	0 = More decision making	10451 (67,1%)	663 (4,3%)
	1 = No change needed	927 (5,9%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	3544 (22,7%)	
<i>Protecting the Environment</i>	0 = More decision making	11823 (75,9%)	550 (3,5%)
	1 = No change needed	644 (4,1%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	2568 (16,5%)	
<i>Managing Major Health Issues</i>	0 = More decision making	11021 (70,7%)	615 (3,9%)
	1 = No change needed	847 (5,4%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	3102 (19,9%)	
<i>Equal Treatment of Men and Women</i>	0 = More decision making	11263 (72,3%)	607 (3,9%)
	1 = No change needed	1080 (6,9%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	2635 (16,9%)	
<i>Supporting Agriculture</i>	0 = More decision making	9145 (58,7%)	909 (5,8%)
	1 = No change needed	898 (5,8)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	4633 (29,7%)	
<i>Promoting Peace and Democracy in the World</i>	0 = More decision making	12446 (79,9%)	652 (4,2%)
	1 = No change needed	707 (4,5%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	1780 (11,4%)	
<i>Cooperation in the field of Research and Innovation</i>	0 = More decision making	12051 (77,3%)	838 (5,4%)
	1 = No change needed	728 (4,7%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	1968 (12,6%)	
<i>Securing Energy Supply</i>	0 = More decision making	11731 (75,3%)	785 (5%)
	1 = No change needed	708 (4,5%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	2361 (15,1%)	
<i>Socio-Economic Euroscepticism</i>			
<i>Fighting Unemployment</i>	0 = More decision making	9029 (57,9%)	737 (4,7%)
	1 = No change needed	780 (5,0%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	5039 (32,3%)	
<i>Protecting Social Rights</i>	0 = More decision making	9417 (60,4%)	743 (4,8%)
	1 = No change needed	844 (5,4%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	4581 (29,4%)	
<i>Ensuring Economic Growth</i>	0 = More decision making	10493 (67,3%)	826 (5,3%)
	1 = No change needed	691 (4,4%)	
	2 = Less Decision Making	3575 (22,9%)	

The findings are pretty much in line with the hypotheses mentioned in the previous section. 'Energy supply', 'environmental protection', 'research and innovation', 'fighting terrorism', 'fighting organized crime' and 'promoting peace and democracy in the world' - all policy areas where the potential benefits from international coordination are substantial - all have support for more European-level decision-making of more than 75%. In contrast, areas which are more strongly connected to national governments, such as the socio-economic policies of 'fighting unemployment', 'protecting social rights', and 'ensuring economic growth', receive much lower levels of support. Another interesting finding is that few respondents feel that no

change is needed, whatever the field.

Policy-specific, or Political, Euroscepticism has been previously been operationalised as the number of policy areas in which the respondent is against European-level decision-making (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, 2007), or as an equally weighted index where the lowest score represents willingness to give more policy-making power to the EU and the highest score the opposite (McLaren, 2007). Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) show that Instrumental and Political Euroscepticism can be distinguished in all the ‘old member states’, and that these are positively but modestly correlated. Moreover, they demonstrate that Political Euroscepticism is cumulative, as Euroscepticism in one policy area is related to Euroscepticism in others (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 238).

Table 4.4: Policy-specific Euroscepticism (Sum of policy areas)

<i>Number of policy areas</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent</i>
0	6759	43,4	43,4
1	1849	11,9	55,2
2	1452	9,3	64,5
3	1251	8,0	72,6
4	987	6,3	78,9
5	762	4,9	83,8
6	495	3,2	87,0
7	413	2,6	89,6
8	318	2,0	91,7
9	244	1,6	93,2
10	150	1,0	94,2
11	119	,8	95,0
12	117	,8	95,7
13	669	4,3	100,0
<i>Total</i>	15585	100,0	

Table 4.4 shows the number of policy areas in which the respondents want less European decision-making. The most striking number is that 6759, or 43,4%, of the respondents are positive or indifferent to European-level decision-making within all 13 policy areas, as opposed to the 669, or 4,3%, which are against European-level decision-making in all policy areas. This shows that extreme Political, or policy-specific, Euroscepticism is not very widespread, and more than half of the respondents are positive or indifferent to European-level decision-making in all but one policy area.

Furthermore, coded as such, the variation between countries is quite large, with the United Kingdom averaging almost 5 policy areas, while countries like Portugal, Belgium and Luxembourg are closer to 1 (figure 4.1). As this measure neither distinguishes between policy areas, nor does it make use of all the values of the original survey item, I have chosen the other approach to policy-specific Euroscepticism.




Figure 4.1: Country means, Sum of Policy Areas

I will look at the different clusters of policy areas as sub-dimensions of Policy-specific Euroscepticism, rather than sum them all up in one measure. Furthermore, I have coded the variables as equally weighted indexes, preserving the difference between wanting more EU decision-making and feeling that no change is needed. This means that 0 represents 'more decision-making', 1 represents 'no change' or 'DK', and 2 means 'less decision-making'. Next, I considered the suitability of the indicator set. There are some issues with the skewness and kurtosis, as these vary between negative and positive numbers. With the exception of Fighting Terrorism, however they are all within the general criteria of ± 2.0 (Ferguson & Cox, 1993, p. 87). Since the demand for normality is less crucial in large N studies I chose to move ahead with further analyses. The group of 13 policy areas has a strong internal reliability with a Cronbach's Alpha of ,908, and correlations ranging between ,299 (Research/innovation*Unemployment) and ,680 (Organised Crime*Terrorism). Using Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with Varimax rotation I found that the indicator set performs well on Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling (KMO), with a score of ,940, far above the minimum requirement of ,5 (Ferguson & Cox, 1993, p. 88), and a statistically significant Bartlett's test of Sphericity, signalling that the variances are fairly equal among the different

indicators. From these 13 indicators two factors were extracted, with eigenvalues of 6,319 (48,604% explained variance) and 1,163 (8,945% explained variance). If adhering to the criteria of extracting factors until 60% of the variation is explained (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 1998, pp. 103–104) another factor could have been extracted, but for fear of overfactoring I chose not to.

Table 4.5: Factor Matrix, Political Euroscepticism

	Factor		Rotated Factor	
	1	2	1	2
<i>Fighting Unemployment</i>	,602	,461	,189	,734
<i>Protecting Social Rights</i>	,630	,411	,242	,712
<i>Ensuring Economic Growth</i>	,668	,234	,382	,596
<i>Fighting Organised Crime</i>	,700	-,158	,649	,308
<i>Fighting Terrorism</i>	,695	-,266	,711	,219
<i>Ensuring Food Safety</i>	,676	,072	,487	,474
<i>Protecting the Environment</i>	,698	-,073	,594	,374
<i>Managing Major Health Issues</i>	,688	,008	,537	,431
<i>Equal Treatment of Men and Women</i>	,698	-,054	,582	,388
<i>Supporting Agriculture</i>	,557	,133	,356	,449
<i>Promoting Peace and Democracy in the World</i>	,707	-,223	,694	,260
<i>Cooperation in the field of Research and Innovation</i>	,667	-,257	,684	,209
<i>Securing Energy Supply</i>	,695	-,155	,642	,307

Note: Using Varimax rotation

Table 4.5 shows the factor loadings. Loadings greater than .30 (or -.30) are generally thought to meet a minimal level, .40 is more important and above .50 is practically significant. A .30 loading accounts for about 10% of the factor explained variance, whilst .50 accounts for about 25%. (above .70 means around 50%) (Hair et al., 1998, p. 111). With this in mind, all thirteen indicators load strongly on the first factor extracted. The rotated factor matrix, however, gives a different picture. Here, the three socio-economic indicators have significantly stronger loadings on the second factor. Furthermore, 'Supporting agriculture' and 'Ensuring Food Safety' have very similar loadings on both factor 1 and 2, and I have therefore left them out of the further analyses. I am thus left with 8 indicators for factor one, and three indicators for factor two.

The group of indicators loading strongly on factor 1 I have named *Political Euroscepticism*, lacking a better term, even though this risks confusion with the cumulative measure used by Lubbers and Scheepers (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005). All these indicators have at least one thing in common: In contrast to the remaining three indicators, they all concern policies which do not immediately affect the everyday life of citizens, and they are areas with a slightly international character, in which European cooperation has already come quite far. The second factor I named *Socio-Economic Euroscepticism*. These policy areas are more national in nature, and represent areas in which European cooperation is not as wide-ranging as those

of Political Euroscepticism. Based on these factor analyses I created equally weighted indexes, ranging from 0-10 where high scores indicate scepticism to European-level decision-making⁸. Another approach could have been to compute factor scores. Such indexes are computed based on the factor loadings of all variables on one factor, but the problem with such an approach is that it is harder to replicate across studies (Hair et al., 1998, p. 119).

4.3 Independent variables

In order to explain variation in the different dimensions of Euroscepticism I will rely on a range of variables, drawing on different theoretical approaches. As in the previous chapter, I have chosen to structure these in terms of which step in the causal model they belong, thus presenting the *ascribed variables* first, followed by the *achieved status variables*, the *value orientations* and the *attitudinal variables*.

4.3.1 Ascribed variables

I will look at the socio-structural characteristics as the underlying variables, which are thought to influence all the other variables. *Age* is coded as the actual age of respondent, whereas *Gender* is coded as a dummy variable, with male as 1. Finally, to look into geographical factors, I use *Type of Community*, asking what kind of community the respondent lives in, ranging from 'Rural area or village', via 'Small or middle-sized town', to 'Large town'. I have created two dummy variables, and use 'Large town' as a reference group.

4.3.2 Achieved status variables

To tap into *Education* I have chosen to use a question asking at what age the respondent left school. 'Up to 14 years' is coded as 1, using one-year intervals up until '22 years and older', which is coded as 9. Respondents which answered 'Still studying' was coded into the category corresponding to the actual age of the respondent', and 'no full time education' was coded into the first category. With respect to *social class*, I have coded the occupation question (v669) into the Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema, with 7 categories (1: Employers, 2: Self-employed/employers in the primary sector, 3: Higher-level non-manual workers, 4: medium-level non-manual workers, 5: lower-level non-manual workers, 6: Skilled manual workers, 7: Unskilled manual workers). Respondents who answered that they are retired, unemployed or student were coded into the category corresponding to their last occupation. These categories are then coded into dummy variables, with 'Never had any paid work' as the reference

⁸ For more information see Appendix A

category⁹.

4.3.3 Value orientations

The first of the value orientations is *Market Liberal values*. To tap into general values concerning market liberalism I use the the answer to item v374 'Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity' (coded 0=Totally disagree, 1=Tend to disagree, 2=Tend to agree, 3=Totally agree) as a surrogate variable. This item has a positive correlation of ,179 with Left-right self-placement, lending it some credibility as a measure of market liberalism, as market liberal attitudes are generally thought to be more connected to the political right than the left. using a single item to tap into this value is somewhat limited, but this is due to the limitations of the data set.

As for *Libertarian values*, this is not to be confused with the value orientation often dubbed authoritarianism/libertarianism (although they are related). Libertarianism as a political philosophy, is more associated with a belief in the individuals right to freedom, accompanied by a scepticism towards government - both on the economic arena, and other arenas - distinguishing it from the authoritarianism/libertarianism-dimension, which mainly focuses on non-economic issues. This is illustrated by the moderate negative correlation between Libertarian values and Trust in political institutions(-,258). To tap into such attitudes I have used the answer to the item v371 'The state intervenes too much in our lives' (0=Totally disagree, 1=Tend to disagree, 2=Tend to agree, 3=Totally agree). This item has a very weak, but significant correlation of ,074 with Market liberalism, and ,030 with left-right self-placement.

Finally, *Anti-Immigration values* is measured on the basis of six statements where the answers range from 'tend to agree', via 'it depends', to 'tend to disagree'. The indicators are substantially similar, in that they constitute statements about immigration of either a negative or positive nature(for more information see Appendix A and B). The inter-item correlations range from ,127 to ,475, and the indicator set has a satisfactory Cronbach's Alpha of ,727. A Principal Axis Factoring (PFA) gives the indicator set a KMO of ,773, with a significant Bartlett's test of Sphericity. Based on the K1 criterion two factors are extracted. All six indicators have strong initial loadings on the first factor extracted, which has an eigenvalue of 2,571 and an explained variance of 42,854%. The rotated factor matrix, however, show that the two negatively worded statements could make out a distinct factor, which I assume is a result of response sets. Nevertheless, they also load strongly on the first factor, and since they

⁹ For more information see Appendix A and B

are substantially similar to the others I include them in the index together with the other indicators. Out of these I created equally weighted index ranging from 0-10, constructed so that a low score means a positive view on immigrants and immigration and high score means a negative view. Respondents with missing values on less than three of the six indicators are given the mean score on these. The rest are recorded as missing, amounting to 2,6%.

4.3.4 Attitudinal variables

The first of the attitudinal variables is *Exclusive National Identity*. The relationship between European identity and measures of support for the EU is complicated. Beaudonnet and Mauro (2012) argue that European identity theoretically can be viewed as a part of diffuse support for European integration. Empirically, however, they manage to show that European identity can be distinguished from diffuse support. In my case, however, I use European identity only as an indicator, in order to identify those individuals who identify solely with their country, and not Europe. Similarly, Boomgarden et al (2011) regard European Identity as a different dimension than general membership support. The question of whether there is a European identity or not is a central one to the legitimacy debate. Using Eurobarometer data, Fuchs and Schneider show that between 1995 and 2007 the degree of attachment to Europe grew steadily, even while support for the EU decreased (Fuchs & Schneider, 2011, p. 76). Moreover, they develop a typology of identities, ranging from multiple identities - respondents who feel an attachment to both Europe and their country - through exclusive national or European identity, to no identity at all. To tap into attitudes related to identity and culture I have used two items measuring the respondents sense of belonging to their country and to Europe, respectively, ranging from 'Not at all' to 'To a great extent' on a four point scale. Schlenker-Fisher show that for the majority of the population in the old member states of the EU feelings of National and European identity go hand in hand (Schlenker-Fisher, 2011). In order to tap into exclusive national identity I created a dummy variable where the two highest scores on national belonging and the two lowest scores on European belonging are coded as 1.

To study the effect of *Trust in Political Institutions* on Euroscepticism I have chosen to combine three items asking whether or not the respondent tends to trust 'The national legal system' (v215), 'Political Parties' (v216) and 'The national parliament'(v218). I agree with another recent study in arguing that a more holistic approach to political trust is more appropriate than focusing on separate political institutions (Harteveld et al., 2013, p. 561). Moreover, Freedom House has shown that confidence in parliament and scores for

democracy correlate, strengthening the validity of the measure as an indicator of general attitudes to the state of democracy (Newton, 2007), which is central since I use this variable as an indicator for the political/institutional approach to Euroscepticism. The use of a single yes or no answer is, however, a weakness - a scale would have been a better measure. The three items were originally coded as dummies. From these I created an additive index from 0 (no trust) to 3. 7,5% of the respondents had one missing value on one of these three indicators. On this single item these respondents were given the mean score, while respondents with missing on more than one were left out, leaving a missing score of 3,1%.

The final attitudinal variable is *Economic evaluations*. Objective economic measures, such as macro-economic indicators have been shown to have a strong relationship with EU support. However, one might argue that the respondents perception of the national economy is even more crucial for political attitudes than objective macro-economic indicators. In order to measure such subjective perceptions of I have created an additive index based on answers to two items asking how the respondent would rate the situation in the national economy (v105) and national employment (v110) on a four-point scale from 'Very good' to 'Very bad'. The created index ranges from positive evaluations at 0 to negative evaluations at 10 with 'Don't know' responses coded in the middle as 5.

4.3.5 National Context

Finally, in the first part of the analysis - where I will study the effects in the EU15 as a whole - I will control for the large differences found between countries within the different dimensions of Euroscepticism. Such differences could be the result of idiosyncratic national characteristics such as party system, political culture or other phenomena not picked up by the other variables in the study. Omitting controls for such country-level fixed effects would bias the parameter estimates, and would give unreliable results. I have therefore chosen to include dummy variables for each country. In doing this, I build on the choices of various other studies of support for European integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel & Scheve, 2007a; Gabel, 1998b; Hakhverdian, van Elsas, van der Brug, & Kuhn, 2013; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Maier, Adam, & Maier, 2012; McLaren, 2002, 2007). These dummies will make up the first model in the analysis, and are thus included before the ascribed model consisting of age, gender and type of community. Technically, the inclusion of such controls removes the cross-country variation, and the effects found in the regression are thus only from within-country variation. I will not interpret the coefficients from the country dummies as they are not part of my research focus, and therefore they will not be

presented together with the rest of the analyses found in the next chapter.

4.4 Method of analysis

In order to answer my research question I have chosen to rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. This allows for causal analysis, and comparisons of the amount of variance explained by each model - both between countries and between the dimensions of Euroscepticism. There are some challenges with choosing this method of analysis with my data, as I will explain in due course, but I feel the advantages of using linear regression weigh up for these. I will also employ a couple of measures to strengthen the validity of my findings.

The basic linear-regression model can be equated as such:

$$y_i = B_0 + B_1 x_i + e_i$$

where y_i is the dependent variable - in this case, either of the three dimensions of Euroscepticism - B_j are unknown parameters, x_{ji} are regressors and, e_i is the unobservable error (Fox, 1991, p. 6; Skog, 2010, p. 215).

4.4.1 Assumptions and preconditions

Before applying linear regression certain assumptions should be verified. First of all, linear regression assumes a linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. Secondly, the residual must have a normal distribution over all of the observations. Even though this assumption can be quite arbitrary, "the central-limit theorem assures that under very broad conditions inference based on the least-squares estimators is approximately valid in all but small samples" (Fox, 1991, p. 40). Also, the independent variables and the residual must not be correlated (Skog, 2010, p. 253). If they are, this means that some important variable has been left out of the model, which may affect both the independent variable and the residual, leading to a spurious correlation. With regards to my analysis, these assumptions are largely confirmed. There are some deviations, however.

First of all, the residual variation for the data set as a whole does show signs of modest heteroscedasticity, which breaks with a third assumption - homogeneity of variance. Homogeneity of variance means that the standard deviation of the residual is independent of the x-value, and is thus spread fairly equally around the regression line. This does not affect the estimates in themselves, but it will affect the standard errors. When this is not the case, however, WLS-estimators are more efficient than OLS-estimators (Fox, 1991, p. 52). With a

large number of observations some heteroscedasticity, making the statistical margins of error small, a certain amount of heteroscedasticity doesn't need to be a problem (Skog, 2010, p. 247). I have thus chosen to stay with OLS estimators, but I compute Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors, based on a macro created by Andrew Hayes and Li Kai (Hayes & Cai, 2007).

Secondly, the residuals are not completely normally distributed, especially for Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism. Again, however, with such a large number of observations, this is not crucial, as it only affects the statistical significance of the parameters, and not the parameters themselves (Skog, 2010, p. 250).

A third precondition which is violated is that of independent observations. Variance at the country level accounts for 7,7%, 7,2% and 9,5%¹⁰, which implies that the observations are nested within countries. The consequence is that the intercepts and slopes vary between countries and that normal OLS-residuals will be correlated. With such a big number of respondents per country even a small intraclass correlation may lead to misleading results. However, since I only have 15 level 2 units, which means multi-level regression would be problematic, I find it useful to use ordinary linear regression. It is generally thought that one should have at least 30 groups with at least 30 individuals in each group (Hox, 2010, p. 235), and even with such a number standard errors for the fixed parameters are "slightly biased downward" (Hox, 2010, p. 233). Furthermore, there has been some critique of the widespread use of Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) in stead of traditional OLS if these are not designed so as to reflect the research question. Concerned about the general understanding and interpretation of HLM, Newman, Newman and Salzman argue that is is only superior to OLS when failing to incorporate person vectors in the regular linear models, and they demonstrate that "when models were written to reflect the question of interest (...) the results of OLS and HLM were virtually identical" (Newman et al., 2010, p. 7). As mentioned, I incorporate such vectors (the country dummies). Another option could have been to aggregate the data at the country level, but this would mean that I lose all variation between individuals, which would mean a large information loss (Bickel, 2007, p. 111). Moreover, when doing this, you end up using too many degrees of freedom when testing the statistical significance (Van de Vijver, 2003, p. 233). The significance of the aggregated variables would be based on the number of respondents, and not countries, and thus increasing the probability of errors of type 1 (Bickel, 2007, p. 110). This also leaves the danger of committing the fallacy of the wrong level, more

¹⁰ *Instrumental Euroscepticism*: $ICC=1,080/(1,080+12,962)=0,077$; *Political Euroscepticism*: $ICC=0,535/(0,535+6,862)=0,072$; *Socioeconomic Euroscepticism*: $ICC=1,3/(1,3+12,436)=0,095$

specifically, Ecological fallacy - interpreting aggregated data at the individual level (Hox, 2010, p. 3).

Finally, neither of my dependent variables have normal distributions. In spite of this I have chosen not to transform them, as such transformations would change the hypotheses being tested. and complicate the interpretation of my findings. Furthermore, such transformations have by some been considered to be not worth the effort (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972, p. 241), especially when using such large samples. Ottar Hellevik has argued that "with a reasonably large sample, random sampling error may often be rejected off hand as a possible cause of a tendency, as long as we are not interested in very weak effects." (Hellevik, 2007, p. 62). In his words: "the linear test is so robust that even sample sizes unusually small for survey research and very skewed distributions on the dependent variable do not create problems" (Hellevik, 2007, p. 64). Since I am looking to do causal analyses, I prefer a linear approach to a logistic one, but similarly to other studies (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; McLaren, 2004) I have chosen to back up the findings from OLS with ordinal logistic regression, which is the more appropriate method of analysis. Furthermore, the central-limit theorem assures us that in large samples the estimate will come from a normal distribution independent of the shape of the sample or the population (Field, 2013, pp. 171–172).

5 Empirical analysis

In this chapter I will present the findings of the analyses of Instrumental, Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism. I will study the 15 member states as a whole, attempting to find what causes Euroscepticism in the EU15, and more importantly, which similarities and differences can be found between the respective dimensions. In my opinion, understanding what causes policy-specific Euroscepticism is critical if the EU is to overcome the problems of legitimacy any time soon.

After studying the EU15 as a singular unit, I will test my hypotheses in each country separately. This allows me to map the differences between the different dimensions in each country, as well as look at which determinants are the strongest and the most consistent across the EU15. Finally I will sum up the findings and discuss them more closely in the final section of this chapter.

5.1 Studying the EU15 as a whole

In the following three sub-sections I present the findings for Instrumental Euroscepticism, Political Euroscepticism and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism when studying the EU15 as a whole. The multivariate analysis is structured so as to fit the causal model in figure 3.1. However, since there is a substantial amount of variation between the different countries, I have included country dummies in order to control for country specific fixed effects. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the omission of such controls could bias the parameter estimates. Including them allows me to look at the effect of my independent variables independent of country differences. It is important to note that this keeps cross-country variation in check, so that the effects estimated are based solely on within-country variance.

Model 1 is made up solely by these country dummies, but since it is not relevant for my research question, I have chosen not to present it with the other models¹¹. Model two enters the ascribed variables of age and gender, as well as the semi-ascribed geographical component, Type of Community. These variables are thought to be antecedent to all of the other variables in the model. The third model adds the achieved status variables of education and social class. The ascribed and achieved status variables are in turn thought to influence a person's value orientations. Model 4 therefore includes the variables Libertarian values, Market Liberal values and Anti-immigration values. Lastly, model 5 adds the attitudinal variables of Exclusive National Identity, Trust in Political Institutions and Economic

¹¹ Model 1 for the three different dimensions of Euroscepticism can be found in Appendix C

Evaluations, as these are thought to lie the closest to the dependent variable.

5.1.1 Instrumental Euroscepticism

I start out by looking at Instrumental Euroscepticism. The mean score for the EU15 is 3,25, with a standard deviation of 3,77. As seen in figure 5.1 there are large differences between the countries in Instrumental Euroscepticism. The distribution is fairly trimodal, with the UK leading the group with a mean of 5,45, followed by Austria at 4,40. In the other end we find Ireland and Luxembourg, both with means of 1,83, with the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain also scoring fairly low. In the middle we find a mixed group of countries. It is hard to discern any clear pattern from this table. As the measure ranges from positive attitudes towards EU membership at 0 and negative attitudes at 10, it is interesting to note that only the United Kingdom has an average in the sceptic end of the scale. Although membership approval is lower than its highpoint before the Maastricht treaty, talks of mass Euroscepticism seem unfounded.




Figure 5.1: Country means, Instrumental Euroscepticism

I start out by looking at country differences. As the intraclass correlations already have

suggested, variation between the different countries explains a lot of the variance in the dependent variable, and model 1 shows that the amount of variance explained by country differences is 7,4%.

Table 5.1 shows us that the inclusion of the ascribed variables in model 2 explains an additional 1,3% of the variance. Hypothesis H1, predicting that younger people are more positive to European integration is confirmed, as the total causal effect of age is positive and significant. Furthermore, the effect of age goes largely via the achieved status variables, as the beta coefficient is halved in Model 3. It is also worth mentioning that the direct effect of age is significant. H2, predicting that women are more Eurosceptic than men, also holds for Instrumental Euroscepticism, lending the first bit of support to the utilitarian theory of Euroscepticism. As for the effect of type of community, it can be confirmed that people in small towns, villages and rural areas are more Instrumentally Eurosceptic than people living in large towns.

The achieved status variables in the third model explain a further 3,7% of the variance. Education has a strong negative effect on Euroscepticism, and H4 is confirmed. Similarly, the hypothesised inclination for Euroscepticism among manual workers is confirmed. Compared to the reference category ('Never had any paid work') Unskilled manual workers is the most Eurosceptic social class, followed by Skilled manual workers, confirming H5.

Model 4 further improves the model by 8,1%. All three hypotheses connected to value orientations (H6, H7 and H8) are confirmed, and negative attitudes towards immigration and immigrants seems to be the strongest determinant of the three. The model also shows that much of the effect of the achieved status variables work indirectly through the value orientations.

The inclusion of the attitudinal variables in model 5 explains another 8,9%, leaving us at 29,4% explained variance. All three hypotheses (H9, H10, H11) are confirmed for this model as well, with particularly strong effects for Trust in Political Institutions and Exclusive national identity. It is also worth mentioning that all three value orientations have a substantial amount of indirect effect, with their beta coefficients clearly weakened by the inclusion of the political attitudes, suggesting they work largely through these. Still, Anti-immigration values also have a strong direct effect and it is the third strongest determinant in the model 5, emphasising its importance.

Table 5.1: OLS regression with Instrumental Euroscepticism as dependent variable. N: 14193.

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B
<u>Ascribed var.</u>									
Age	,100**	,081	,017**	,040	,008**	,044	,009**	,045	,009**
Gender	-,066**	-,064	-,482**	-,057	-,434**	-,052	-,393**	-,031	-,235**
Type of Com.									
- Rural/village	,004	,043	,335**	,023	,179*	,011	,085	,012	,092
- Small/mid town	,027**	,054	,422**	,038	,297**	,031	,242**	,027	,211**
<u>Achieved var.</u>									
Education	-,199**			-,143	-,185**	-,094	-,122**	-,060	-,077**
<u>Social Class</u>									
- Employers	-,018*			,028	,351*	,018	,232	,007	,086
- Self-Employed	-,003			-,003	-,061	-,007	-,164	-,012	-,272
- Hi-lev. non man.	-,080**			-,028	-,461**	-,023	-,387*	-,028	-,458**
- M-lev. non man.	-,079**			-,002	-,025	,000	-,004	-,011	-,123
- Lo-lev. non man.	,018*			,072	,581**	,058	,470**	,033	,266**
- Skilled manual	,067**			,092	,894**	,065	,638**	,039	,379**
- Unskilled man.	,095**			,090	1,125**	,065	,809**	,035	,430**
<u>Value Orientations</u>									
Libertarian	,166**					,127	,550**	,062	,267**
Market liberal	-,101**					-,108	-,498**	-,068	-,315**
Anti-immigrant	,284**					,226	,283**	,146	,183**
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>									
Excl. Nat. Identity	,308**							,179	1,653**
Trust in pol. inst.	-,333**							-,234	-,752**
Econ. Evaluation	,204**							,085	,249**
Adjusted R ²			,087		,124		,205		,294
Increase in Adj. R ²			,013		,037		,081		,089

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Notes: Model 1 (Adjusted R²=,074) includes only the controls for Country fixed effects

Using Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors

To sum up, all hypotheses are confirmed, lending credibility to all three explanations of Euroscepticism. However, when including only the ascribed and achieved variables the model is not a good fit, when considering that subtracting the variance explained by cross-country variation leaves only 5% of the variance explained by these sets of variables. This varies quite strongly between the different countries, however - something I will look into in the comparative analysis. The value orientations and the political attitudes, on the other hand, appear to be the most important characteristics in determining Instrumental Euroscepticism. When comparing the direct effects we see that Trust in Political Institutions is the strongest determinant in the full model, followed by Exclusive national identity and anti-immigration values. It would seem that the political and cultural explanations of Euroscepticism are the most important in explaining Instrumental Euroscepticism, although it should be mentioned that the testing of the utilitarian theory is somewhat limited as I am not looking at macro-economic indicators such as inflation and GDP. Nevertheless, the respondents subjective evaluations of the economic conditions should reflect this to a certain extent, and my findings

suggest that the utilitarian explanation might not be as important as it was in the early days of European integration.

5.1.2 Political Euroscepticism

All hypotheses were confirmed for Instrumental Euroscepticism. The question remains whether the determinants of membership support can be used to explain support for European-level decision-making within various policy areas. As explained in the previous chapter, Political Euroscepticism is made up of policy-areas with a slightly international character (fighting crime, fighting terrorism, protecting the environment, managing major health issues, gender equality, promoting peace and democracy, research and innovation cooperation and energy security), and these are areas in which cooperation between the member-states has already come quite far. Support for European decision-making within these fields is thus fairly high.




Figure 5.2: Country means, Political Euroscepticism

The mean score of Political Euroscepticism in the EU15 is 1,85 with a standard deviation of 2,71, suggesting a general willingness to hand over decision-making power to the EU level

within these policy areas. As seen in Figure 5.2, no country has a mean score in the Eurosceptic end of the scale, the closest is the UK at 3,54.

The ranking of the countries by their Political Euroscepticism mean gives a somewhat similar picture to that of Instrumental Euroscepticism. The UK and Austria once again find themselves situated at the top, and Luxembourg is at the bottom. Ireland, however, jumps from the lower end of the scale in the previous figure to the higher end in this one. At first glance, it would seem that the Irish are happier than the average European to be members, but a little less willing to have their policy-making done in Brussels. Still, the mean score is quite low, and I would not read too much into this relative shift. With respect to the country differences, these explain 7,2% of the variance in Political Euroscepticism¹², which is quite similar to Instrumental Euroscepticism, where it explains 7,4%. This is fairly substantial, and provides further motivation for the comparative analysis later in the chapter.

Table 5.2 shows the results from the OLS regression using the same model as before, but with Political Euroscepticism substituting Instrumental Euroscepticism as the dependent variable. As in the previous analysis I have left model 1 out of the table, in order to save space, since it is not relevant to my research question.

The first impression is that the model explains considerably less of the variance in Political Euroscepticism than for Instrumental Euroscepticism. The full model explains only 14% of the variance, compared to 29,4% in the previous analysis. This discrepancy can to a large extent be explained by the small amount of variance explained by the ascribed and achieved models. Model 2 has an adjusted R^2 of ,075, which means an improvement of 0,3% when compared to model 1. The predicted positive effect of age, and negative effect of gender are significant, but with an N of 14193, statistically significant relationships are unsurprising. The very weak effects, however, do not allow me to truly confirm hypothesis H1 and H2, although it could be argued that H1 is confirmed, as the direct effect of age is still significant and about as strong as the effect of Libertarian attitudes in model 5. There are no significant differences in type of community, and H3 cannot be confirmed.

Furthermore, entering the achieved status variables improves the model by a mere 0,6%. H4 is confirmed, as the total causal effect of education on Political Euroscepticism is negative and significant. It is not however, very strong, and the direct effect education is insignificant. H5 is not confirmed, as it cannot be clearly stated that that manual workers are more Politically Eurosceptic than the other social classes. While we're looking at social classes, however, it is

¹² As with Instrumental Euroscepticism, model 1 can be found in Appendix C

worth noting that people who have never had any paid work are seemingly the least willing to hand over decision-making powers to the EU within the respective policy areas of Political Euroscepticism.

As with Instrumental Euroscepticism, the value orientations and political attitudes represent the most important contributions to the total explanatory power of the model, as the inclusion of the former improves the model by 3,2% and the latter by a further 2,7%. Compared to 8,1% and 8,9%, respectively, in the analysis of Instrumental Euroscepticism, it becomes apparent that the same factors which determine Instrumental Euroscepticism do not automatically determine Political Euroscepticism. Nonetheless, hypotheses H6, H7 and H8 are confirmed, with anti-immigration values seemingly the strongest determinant of the value orientations. H9 and H10 are also confirmed, but H11 is not, as the effect of negative economic evaluations are not significantly different from 0.

Table 5.2: OLS regression with Political Euroscepticism as dependent variable. N: 14193.

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B
<u>Ascribed variables</u>									
Age	,047**	,048	,007**	,035	,005**	,039	,006**	,034	,005**
Gender	-,022**	-,016	-,088*	-,009	-,050	-,004	-,023	,003	,017
<u>Type of community¹³</u>									
- Rural area/village	,000	,020	,111	,007	,042	,001	,006	,000	-,002
- Small/mid town	-,024**	,004	,021	-,004	-,024	-,007	-,041	-,010	-,055
<u>Achieved variables</u>									
Education	-,125**			-,067	-,062**	-,038	-,035**	-,020	-,018
<u>Social Class¹⁴</u>									
- Employers	-,015			-,034	-,314**	-,039	-,353**	-,038	-,351**
- Self-Employed	,042**			,000	-,006	-,003	-,057	-,007	-,111
- Hi-lev. non man.	-,034**			-,041	-,490**	-,038	-,450**	-,035	-,419**
- Md-lev. non man.	-,045**			-,041	-,337**	-,040	-,329**	-,039	-,318**
- Lo-lev. non man.	-,018*			-,039	-,229**	-,047	-,275**	-,051	-,296**
- Skilled manual	,016*			-,030	-,210*	-,045	-,317**	-,052	-,363**
- Unskilled man.	,050**			-,008	-,075	-,024	-,216*	-,032	-,283**
<u>Value Orientations</u>									
Libertarian	,084**					,057	,177**	,035	,110**
Market liberal	-,073**					-,087	-,288**	-,072	-,237**
Anti-immigrant	,200**					,155	,139**	,118	,106**
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>									
Excl. Nat. Identity	,252**							,162	1,073**
Trust in pol. inst.	-,148**							-,068	-,157**
Econ. Evaluation	,103**							-,020	-,042
Adjusted R ²			,075		,081		,113		,140
Increase in Adj. R ²			,003		,006		,032		,027

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Notes: Model 1 (Adjusted R²=,072) includes only the controls for Country fixed effects .

Using Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors

13 'Large town' as reference category

14 'Never had any paid work' as reference category

In the full model, Exclusive national identity is the strongest determinant, followed by anti-immigration values. Trust in Political institutions does not seem as relevant in explaining Political Euroscepticism as with Instrumental Euroscepticism. With this in mind, as well as the relatively modest contributions of the achieved statues variables, I would argue that the cultural explanation is the most important to Political Euroscepticism. Again, it should be noted that including macro-economic indicators, as well as a couple of additional measures within the political explanation, might change the picture slightly.

5.1.3 Socio-Economic Euroscepticism

Using the same logic as before, it is not unlikely that the explanatory power of the model, and the individual effects of the various determinants, will vary between willingness to cede national decision-making power over the fairly international policy areas of Political Euroscepticism and the more national policy areas within Socio-Economic Euroscepticism(Fighting Unemployment, Ensuring Economic Growth, Protecting Social Rights).




Figure 5.3: Country means, Socio-Economic Euroscepticism

The EU15 average is 2,39, which is slightly little higher than that of Political Euroscepticism, and the standard deviation of 3,73 suggests larger differences between the countries. Still, the mean suggests a general level of support for EU decision-making, also within these policy areas. If we look at figure 5.3 we find that the United Kingdom has the highest mean score for the third time, and as with Instrumental Euroscepticism it finds itself alone in the Eurosceptic end of the scale. Moreover, it is followed by a cluster consisting of the three Nordic countries as well as Austria. In the other end we find a cluster with the founding members of Belgium and Luxembourg coupled with the two Iberian countries. Also, similar to the two other dimensions, we find a fairly ambiguous group of countries in the middle.

Table 5.3 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis using Socio-Economic Euroscepticism as the dependent variable. Model 1, which again is not presented¹⁵, explains 9,2% of the variance in Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, thus a bit more than for the two other dimensions. Including the ascribed model improves the model by 0,6%. H1 and H2 are confirmed, although as in the preceding analysis the effect of gender is quite weak. Age, on the other hand, has a comparatively strong effect, and even has a significant direct effect. When it comes to type of community, people living in rural areas or villages are significantly more Socio-Economic Eurosceptic than people living in large towns, but there is no significant difference between people living in middle-sized and large towns, and H3 cannot be completely confirmed.

The achieved status variables only improves the model by further 0,1%. Education has a negative total causal effect on Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, confirming H4, but the effect is weak. One might argue that from a substantive criterion none of the hypotheses connected to model 2 or 3 are confirmed, as amount of variance explained by these models is microscopic.

Model 4 increases the explained variance by 2,7%, with both H6, H7 and H8 confirmed. As with the two other dimensions, anti-immigrant is the strongest determinant among the value orientations. It is also interesting to see that the effect of age is largely independent of values, as the beta coefficient of age changes little from model 3 and onwards.

Lastly, the inclusion of model 5 explains a further 3%. H9 and H10 are confirmed, but the effect of Economic Evaluation is insignificant. Exclusive national identity is the strongest determinant in the full model, followed by Trust in Political Institutions and Anti-immigration values, although anti-immigration values has a stronger total causal effect. Apart from these,

¹⁵ But can be found in Appendix C

the remaining determinants have fairly weak effects. These findings are similar to the ones for Political Euroscepticism in that there can be found little support for the hypotheses connected to the ascribed and achieved variables, suggesting that the utilitarian explanation of Euroscepticism is not very relevant to the policy-specific dimensions of Euroscepticism. Trust in political institutions, on the other hand, seems to be more relevant when tapping into attitudes towards socio-economic policies than the more internationally oriented policies of Political Euroscepticism.

Table 5.3: OLS regression with Socio-Economic Euroscepticism as dependent variable. N: 14193.

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B
<u>Ascribed variables</u>									
Age	,102**	,073	,015**	,062	,013**	,064	,013**	,062	,013**
Gender	-,019*	-,019	-,143*	-,018	-,136*	-,015	-,110	-,006	-,042
<u>Type of community¹⁶</u>									
- Rural area/village	-,005	,024	,188*	,016	,124	,009	,071	,008	,063
- Small/mid town	-,008	,017	,130	,012	,093	,008	,063	,006	,045
<u>Achieved variables</u>									
<u>Education</u>									
<u>Social Class¹⁷</u>									
- Employers	,002			,004	,045	-,002	-,020	-,004	-,048
- Self-Employed	,030**			,017	,390	,014	,330	,011	,256
- Hi-lev. non man.	,003			-,015	-,250	-,013	-,206	-,011	-,186
- Md-lev. non man.	,018*			,001	,006	,002	,019	,001	,008
- Lo-lev. non man.	,003			-,001	-,005	-,008	-,067	-,016	-,125
- Skilled manual	-,012			,001	,009	-,014	-,136	-,024	-,229
- Unskilled man.	,019*			,008	,097	-,007	-,083	-,018	-,215
<u>Value Orientations</u>									
Libertarian	,080**					,069	,296**	,041	,174**
Market liberal	-,031**					-,068	-,308**	-,049	-,224**
Anti-immigrant	,129**					,140	,174**	,099	,123**
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>									
Excl. Nat. Identity	,211**							,152	1,389**
Trust in pol. inst.	-,108**							-,102	-,323**
Econ. Evaluation	,026**							-,011	-,030
Adjusted R ²			,098		,099		,126		,156
Increase in Adj. R ²			,006		,001		,027		,030

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Notes: Model 1 (Adjusted R²=,092) includes only the controls for Country fixed effects .

Using Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors

5.1.4 Similarities and differences

If we compare the findings with the different explanations of Euroscepticism in table 3.2, there are clear differences between the dimensions. Both the economic/utilitarian, cultural and

¹⁶ 'Large town' as reference category

¹⁷ 'Never had any paid work' as reference category

political explanations seem to be fairly important in explaining Instrumental Euroscepticism. The utilitarian explanation, in this analysis represented both through proxies such as education and social as well as the more direct measure of economic evaluations, seems to be less important when looking at the policy-specific dimensions, however. There is little evidence for arguing that there is any substantial socio-structural basis for policy-specific Euroscepticism. Even though H1, H2, and H4 are confirmed for Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism the amount of variance explained by these factors is negligible at best. Table 5.4 shows the cumulative explained variance of the 5 models for each dimension. The differences between model 1 and model 3 are small when looking at the policy-specific dimensions. Thus, if we use substantial importance, and not statistical significance, as the criterion for confirming the hypotheses, they might remain unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the weak effect might be a result of large country differences, and even opposite effect in different countries, which is something I will look into in the next section. It is also interesting to find that people who never had any paid work seem to score the highest on Political Euroscepticism. As mentioned, however, the amount of variance explained by this is close to none, and this should not be read too much in to.

Table 5.4: Cumulative explained variance in the EU15

<i>Explained Variance</i>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Instrumental Euroscepticism</i>	7,40%	8,70%	12,40%	20,50%	29,40%
<i>Political Euroscepticism</i>	7,20%	7,50%	8,10%	11,30%	14,00%
<i>Socio-Econ. Euroscepticism</i>	9,20%	9,80%	9,90%	12,60%	15,60%

Another interesting finding is that economic evaluations are not particularly relevant when explaining, or determining, Policy-specific Euroscepticism. Looking at Easton's conception of diffuse and specific support, such evaluations should play a central role, as specific support is based upon evaluations of output. Admittedly, the variable picks up the situation in the national economy, and not the European, but in today's Europe the two are so closely knitted together that such evaluations at least indirectly also should cover the EU. I was especially anticipating a clear relationship between economic evaluations and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, as the national economy and employment situation should affect the willingness to hand over policy-making decision to the EU within these areas. This is something I will keep a close eye on in the national level analysis, to check if opposing effects in different countries might have cancelled each other out at the European level.

When it comes to the value-based and attitudinal foundations of Euroscepticism, there are clear grounds for arguing that the same set of values and attitudes which cause membership

disapproval also cause unwillingness to transfer decision-making power, although to a lesser extent. Libertarian, Market Liberal and Anti-immigration values are relevant for all three dimensions, and the effect is similar, although their relative importance differs. Of these, Anti-immigration values is clearly the most important, and as shown in table 5.5 it is the second most important determinant for each of the dimensions. Exclusive national identity and Trust in Political Institutions also play a part in all three dimensions .

Table 5.5 Most important determinants at the EU15 level

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Instrumental Euroscepticism</i>	Trust in Political Institutions	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive national identity	Education	Libertarian Values	Market Liberal Values
<i>Political Euroscepticism</i>	Exclusive national identity)	Anti-immigration values	Market Liberal Values	Trust in Political Institutions	Education	Libertarian Values
<i>Socio-Economic Euroscepticism</i>	Exclusive national identity)	Anti-immigration values	Trust in Political Institutions	Age	Libertarian Values	Market Liberal Values

Note: According to the total causal effects found in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3

To sum up, whereas all three explanations are important for Instrumental Euroscepticism, the utilitarian one it seems less relevant for the policy-specific dimensions. For these, the cultural explanations are the most important. Noteworthy, Trust in Political Institutions is also more important when looking at Socio-Economic Euroscepticism than Political Euroscepticism, on which it has a weak effect. Following the logic of Sanchez-Cuenca (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000), it might be that a lack of trust in national political institutions motivates some people to leave the decision-making in the hands of the EU, rather than their national government, thus weakening the effect of this variable.

Lastly, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, I have chosen to cross-validate my findings by comparing the findings of the OLS regression with the more appropriate Ordered Logistic Regression¹⁸. The logistic analyses corroborate the findings from the OLS. First of all, the same hypotheses are confirmed, with the single exception of H11 for Political Euroscepticism. This is rejected the logistic regression, but is insignificant when using robust standard errors in the OLS regression¹⁹. Secondly, I structured the logistic analysis in the same way as the linear analysis, in order to compare the Adjusted R² from the linear regression with the corresponding Pseudo R²(Nagelkerke) from the the logistic. Table 5.6 shows that the increases in explained variance associated with the respective models correspond well between the two, adding credibility to the findings from the OLS regression.

18 The full analyses of the latter can be found in Appendix C
 19 It should be noted that when using the regular standard errors, in stead of computing Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors, H11 is rejected also in the OLS analysis

Table 5.6: Increases in Explained Variance, OLS vs. Ordered Logistic regression

Increases in Explained Variance		Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Instrumental	Adj.R ²	,013	,037	,081	,089
	Pseudo R ²	,014	,044	,086	,088
Political	Adj.R ²	,003	,006	,032	,027
	Pseudo R ²	,001	,005	,032	,025
Socio-Economic	Adj.R ²	,006	,001	,027	,030
	Pseudo R ²	,005	,002	,026	,028

Note: Adjusted R² taken from OLS regression of the EU15, Pseudo R²(Nagelkerke) is taken from Ordered Logistic Regression of the EU15

5.2 Comparative analysis of the EU15

The analyses so far has shown that country differences explain 7,4%, 7,2% and 9,2% of the variance in Instrumental, Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, respectively. In order to not leave substantial amounts of variance unaccounted for I will have a closer look at the differences between countries. The effect of the various variables in this study might be dependent on idiosyncratic country contexts, and it is not unthinkable that a strong positive effect in one country can be cancelled out by a strong negative effect in another. Also, it is possible that effects that were too weak to be significant when looking at the whole collection of countries might be strong and significant within individual countries. Such aspects should not be overlooked.

The analyses of the individual countries are structured in the same way the three previous analyses, the only difference being the absence of country dummies. This means that model 1 in these comparative analyses corresponds with model 2 in the analyses of the EU15 as a whole, model 2 with model 3, and so forth. In order to check how well my theoretical framework explains the different dimensions of Euroscepticism across country borders, I will test my hypotheses and compare the models in each country. For each dependent variable I will present two tables, one containing the total causal effects of the various independent variables in each country, and another showing the increases in explained variance associated with each model. In the tables the standardised regression coefficients are presented, with the exception of the nominal variables 'Type of community' and 'Social Class', where the unstandardised coefficients are presented.

5.2.1 Instrumental Euroscepticism

As there is no room for presenting the full analysis for each country, Table 5.8 presents only the total causal effects found in the OLS regression of Instrumental Euroscepticism in each of the 15 countries. The adjusted R² in the full model varies from ,128 in Luxembourg to ,402 in

Austria (which coincidentally happen to find themselves in opposite ends in the ranking of country means in figure 5.1). It is hard to tell whether there is any pattern to be found, I can find no clear geographical clusters. The Nordic countries all have adjusted R^2 of more than , 200, and the southern European states of Italy, Portugal and Spain are also similar to each other in this fashion (Greece, on the other hand, differs from these), but the within-country effects are different between the countries.

In the majority of countries, neither H1, H2 nor H3 are confirmed. This supports the finding of Anderson and Reichert that age and gender are not consistent determinants of EU support (Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 241). The least supported of these, H3, is only confirmed in Finland, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Thus in most countries, people living in rural areas or small towns are not more Instrumentally Eurosceptic than people living in large towns. The significant effect in the analysis of the EU15 might be a result of the strong effects found in countries such as Finland and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in many countries the ascribed model accounts for more of the variance in the dependent variable than it does for the EU15 as a whole. As presented in table 5.7, it explains 6,5% in both Finland and the UK, compared to 1,3% for the 15 member states together. Very low levels of explained variance in Austria, Greece, Italy, Luxemboug and Portugal, however, contribute to a low R^2 at the EU15-level.

I find more support for the hypotheses linked to the achieved status variables. H4 is confirmed in most countries, as education generally has a strong negative effect on Instrumental Euroscepticism, and especially so in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. In more than half of the countries, however, H5 cannot be confirmed, and it is even rejected in Luxembourg, where Employers and Lower-level non-manual workers seem to be more Instrumentally Eurosceptic than manual workers. The improvements in explained variance vary quite a bit, from 8,4% in Ireland to 1,1% in Spain. Table 5.7 shows that the latter is clearly the exception, it should be noted. Nevertheless, it is hard to see any clear pattern in which group of countries the achieved variables play a big part in determining Instrumental Euroscepticism.

As for the value orientations, H6 is confirmed in fourteen out of fifteen countries. The negative effect of Market Liberal values varies greatly, from very strong effects in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, to weak and insignificant ones in France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemboug, the Netherlands and the UK. H8 is confirmed in all countries, and the effect of Anti-immigration values is among the strongest of the three value

orientations in each country, save Greece, Portugal and Sweden, where it is overcome by Market Liberalism. In general, the explained variance is improved quite substantially by including the value orientations. This is certainly true in Austria, the UK and the Netherlands, but not so much in countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Denmark.

Table 5.7: Increases in Explained variance at the national level, Instrumental Euroscepticism

<i>Increases in Explained variance</i>				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Austria</i>	0,4%	8,2%	21,3%	10,3%
<i>Belgium</i>	3,1%	3,9%	6,1%	4,6%
<i>Denmark</i>	2,3%	5,1%	4,9%	8,5%
<i>Finland</i>	6,5%	5,7%	8,8%	9,3%
<i>France</i>	3,3%	4,6%	7,1%	17,5%
<i>Germany</i>	1,8%	5,3%	8,9%	12,5%
<i>Greece</i>	0,7%	2,1%	10,6%	20,0%
<i>Ireland</i>	1,4%	8,4%	3,6%	4,3%
<i>Italy</i>	0,0%	2,8%	13,1%	6,0%
<i>Luxembourg</i>	0,6%	2,0%	5,3%	4,9%
<i>Netherlands</i>	1,3%	3,8%	12,9%	6,5%
<i>Portugal</i>	0,7%	5,0%	4,9%	8,8%
<i>Spain</i>	2,0%	1,1%	6,6%	10,7%
<i>Sweden</i>	3,6%	4,9%	8,0%	9,1%
<i>United Kingdom</i>	6,5%	4,5%	13,1%	7,3%

Note: From OLS regression of Instrumental Euroscepticism in each of the EU15 countries

Finally, H9 and H10 are also confirmed in all countries, and the effects of Exclusive National identity and Trust in political institutions are generally among the strongest in every country. H11, on the other hand, is confirmed in eight out of fifteen, but rejected in Italy. It seems that for Italians negative evaluations of the national economy are linked with positive evaluations of EU membership.

In short, the findings corroborate many of the findings from the EU15-analysis. Most of the hypotheses associated with the value orientations and the political attitudes are confirmed in most countries, and the last two models account for most of the explained variance. Lastly, the ascribed variables and the achieved status variables are fairly inconsistent determinants, but there is still support for the hypotheses associated with these in a number of countries.

Table 5.8: Comparative OLS regression with Instrumental Eurocepticism as dependent variable

	AUS	BE	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NE	POR	SPA	SWE	UK
Age	,056	,170**	,060*	,139**	,092**	,049	,045	-,008	,044	-,039	,035	,076*	,081*	,057	,238**
Gender	-,032	-,063	-,152**	-,063	-,149**	-,024	-,071*	-,093**	-,036	-,004	-,128**	-,067	-,023	-,113**	-,008
Rural	-,197	-,472	-,030	1,716**	,729	,879**	-,485	-,354	-,201	-,464	,047	-,327	,900**	1,448**	,648*
Sm.twn	,477	-,164	-,172	1,729**	,213	1,144**	,004	,450	,145	,293	,084	-,256	,118	,756*	,786**
Adj. R ²	,004	,031	,023	,065	,033	,018	,007	,014	,000	,006	,013	,007	,020	,036	,065
Educ	-,041	-,152**	-,137**	-,172**	-,110**	-,145**	-,077	-,249**	-,165**	-,107	-,192**	-,164**	-,118**	-,105**	-,200**
Empl	1,021	,950	-,447	1,100	-,502	1,030*	,967*	,231	,383	2,074*	,567	-,436	,374	-,156	,666
Self-em	1,570	,830	-,676	1,763	-,899	,269	1,341**	,378	,118	2,441	,734	-,310	-1,500*	-,025	-2,452
Hi-non	-,112	,681	-1,380	,601	-1,066	-,105	-1,285*	-,349	-,045	1,629	,093	-,676	-,562	-,079	-,107
Md-non	1,320*	-,056	-,890	,329	-,145	,632	,950	-,141	-,497	,670	,297	,066	,172	,519	,243
Lo-non	2,077**	,349	,155	1,578	,751	,888*	,736	,446	-,267	1,431**	,486	,555	,005	1,379*	,464
Sk.man	3,421**	,857*	-,194	1,803	1,305**	1,770**	1,530**	,504	,137	1,011*	,840	-,088	-,251	2,187**	,743
Unsk.m	3,891**	1,488**	,504	2,035	,877	1,453**	1,473*	1,204**	,292	1,251*	1,114	1,337*	,295	1,873*	0,45
Adj. R ²	,086	,070	,074	,112	,079	,071	,028	,098	,028	,026	,051	,057	,031	,085	,110
Libert	,176**	,087**	,064	,142**	,123**	,139**	,172**	,105**	,115**	,114*	,165**	,097**	,093**	,075*	,169**
Mar.lib	-,108**	-,154**	-,145**	-,085**	-,035	-,064*	-,202**	-,041	-,229**	-,040	,013	-,183**	-,157**	-,220**	,009
Immigr	,384**	,176**	,181**	,248**	,253**	,233**	,182**	,157**	,249**	,210**	,300**	,107**	,202**	,205**	,318**
Adj. R ²	,299	,131	,123	,200	,150	,160	,134	,134	,159	,079	,180	,106	,097	,165	,241
Ex.NI	,120**	,091**	,157**	,118**	,309**	,165**	,290**	,160**	,120**	,167**	,130**	,165**	,223**	,177**	,154**
Pol.trst	-,313**	-,163**	-,244**	-,274**	-,160**	-,286**	-,270**	-,152**	-,227**	-,159**	-,250**	-,191**	-,230**	-,231**	-,164**
Ec.eval	,034	,113**	,051	,085**	,153**	,113**	,117**	-,009	-,102**	-,063	,043	,104**	,015	,099**	,123**
Adj. R ²	,402	,177	,208	,293	,325	,285	,334	,177	,219	,128	,245	,194	,204	,256	,314

Note : Standardized regression coefficients (asterisks from unstandardized coefficients), except for the categorical variables of 'Type of Community' and 'Social Class' where the unstandardized coefficients are presented

Using Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors

5.2.2 Political Euroscepticism

As with Instrumental Euroscepticism there are large differences between the countries in the amount of explained variance. With only 3% explained variance in Belgium (see table 5.10), it seems rather irrelevant, and none of the hypotheses are confirmed in this country. With a country mean 1,094 (as shown in Figure 5.2) this is not surprising, as the population is largely positive to European-level decision-making within these policy areas. In countries such as the UK and Austria, however, the model seems to fit the data in a much better way.

Table 5.10 presents the total causal effects found in the individual country analysis of Political Euroscepticism. As in the analysis of the EU15 as a whole, there is little support for the hypotheses which are linked to the ascribed variables. H1 is only confirmed in five countries, and it is rejected in four others. H2 and H3 are confirmed in only two countries and even rejected in one each. It seems willingness to transfer decision-making power within the policy areas included in Political Euroscepticism is largely independent of age, gender and type of community of the respondent. The only country in which this model explains a substantial amount of variance is in the UK where age has a very strong effect. Older people in the United Kingdom are significantly less willing to cede power to Brussels. Furthermore, it seems that this very strong effect in the UK to a large extent explains the significant effect of age found in the EU15-analysis. In Portugal, people living in rural areas or villages are substantially more Politically Eurosceptic than people living in small or large towns, something which contributes to model 1 explaining 3,5%. In other words, substantially better than the 0,3% explained by the corresponding model in the EU15-analysis.

Turning to model 2, the increases in explained variance are generally low, or even non-existent. The largest increase, at 2,9%, is found in Austria, which happens to be the only country where H5 is confirmed. In all other countries, social class seems largely irrelevant in explaining Political Euroscepticism. Furthermore, in Italy, skilled manual workers are significantly less Eurosceptic than the other social classes, which clearly breaks with the hypothesised effect. As for H4, there can be found significant negative effects of Education in 6 out of 15 countries, and the effects are fairly strong in Italy and the UK.

In most countries, Model 3 improves the model quite a bit. An exception is Belgium, where neither H6, H7 nor H8 is confirmed, and no improvement can be found. In contrast, the improvement in Austria is a full 10%, and the model also does comparably well in the UK with a 7,7% improvement. Libertarian values do not seem to be a consistent determinant, as

H6 is only confirmed in 5 countries, and it is even rejected in Spain. H7 and H8 are largely confirmed, suggesting that Market Liberal values and anti-immigration values are fairly consistent determinants of Political Euroscepticism.

Table 5.9: Increases in Explained variance at the national level, Political Euroscepticism

<i>Increases in Explained variance</i>				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Austria</i>	0,2%	2,9%	0,1%	3,0%
<i>Belgium</i>	2,1%	0,5%	0,0%	0,4%
<i>Denmark</i>	1,3%	1,0%	3,6%	3,3%
<i>Finland</i>	1,6%	0,4%	3,4%	1,8%
<i>France</i>	0,2%	2,1%	5,2%	3,5%
<i>Germany</i>	0,2%	1,1%	3,6%	4,4%
<i>Greece</i>	2,3%	1,7%	3,5%	7,6%
<i>Ireland</i>	0,3%	0,9%	6,4%	0,6%
<i>Italy</i>	0,7%	1,7%	4,3%	5,6%
<i>Luxembourg</i>	1,1%	0,0%	1,1%	2,8%
<i>Netherlands</i>	2,2%	0,0%	1,6%	0,6%
<i>Portugal</i>	3,5%	1,3%	0,7%	5,0%
<i>Spain</i>	0,0%	0,0%	3,4%	1,1%
<i>Sweden</i>	1,4%	0,0%	6,2%	1,6%
<i>United Kingdom</i>	4,9%	2,0%	7,7%	3,8%

Note: From OLS regression of Political Euroscepticism in each of the EU15 countries

The final model does not represent as big of an improvement as it does with Instrumental Euroscepticism. It makes the biggest difference in the southern countries of Greece, Italy and Portugal, which is an interesting coincidence, although the lack of correspondence between these countries in the preceding models prevents me from reading too much into this geographical trend. Regarding the consistency of the different hypotheses, Exclusive national identity is a strong determinant in most countries, and H9 is confirmed in all countries but Belgium and Ireland. H10 also finds support in nine countries, but H11 is only confirmed in Greece, and is rejected in Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. In these countries negative evaluations of the national economic and unemployment situation is associated with a willingness to transfer decision-making power to the EU, something did not expect.

To sum up, there is little evidence that the ascribed and achieved status variables are important when determining Political Euroscepticism, lending little credibility to the utilitarian explanation of Euroscepticism. The hypotheses associated with the value orientations and the political attitudes, however, find a great deal of support and the findings are quite similar to those of Instrumental Euroscepticism, with the exception that Trust in Political Institutions seem relatively less important, and Economic Evaluations have a somewhat surprising relationship with the dependent variable.

Table 5.10: Comparative OLS regression with Political Euroscepticism as dependent variable

	AUS	BE	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NE	POR	SPA	SWE	UK
Age	,054	-,079*	,063	,083*	,037	,066*	,092**	,022	-,004	-,097	-,147**	,077*	,036	-,126**	,228**
Gender	,030	,020	-,114**	,011	-,045	-,013	-,061	-,074*	-,011	,095*	,001	,030	-,014	,012	-,025
Rural	,286	-,529*	-,162	,783**	-,356	,140	-,250	-,119	,935**	,052	-,159	,620**	,085	-,105	-,014
Sm.twn	,236	-,718**	-,017	,488*	-,502	,075	1,073**	-,266	,751**	-,018	-0,33	-,289	-,085	-,162	,064
Adj. R ²	,002	,021	,013	,016	,002	,002	,023	,003	,007	,011	,022	,035	-,002	,014	,049
Educ	-,003	-,065	-,109*	-,027	-,074	-,087**	-,112*	-,067	-,143**	,002	-,028	-,129**	-,031	,009	-,113**
Empl	,312	-,111	,708	,670	-,696	,115	-,505	-,415	-,213	-,365	-,107	-,652	-,126	,103	-1,181
Self-em	1,243	,060	1,091	1,562	-,670	,601	,040	,426	1,205	-1,303**	,030	-,916	-,395	,422	-2,530
Hi-non	-,210	,932	,304	,105	-1,179**	-,294	-,964	-,234	1,085	-,150	,041	1,358	-,693	,089	-1,815*
Md-non	,937*	-,435	,385	,009	-,616	-,087	-,901	,170	,508	-,499	-,139	-,005	,145	-,153	-1,304
Lo-non	,701*	-,005	,575	,225	-,691*	,037	-,623	-,061	-,172	-,444	-,121	-,007	-,132	,313	-,697
Sk.man	1,572**	,082	,233	,179	-,187	-,007	-,272	,302	-1,100**	-,268	-,582	-,657*	-,355	,209	-,987
Unsk.m	1,835**	-,218	,506	,036	,043	,443	,066	,694	-,201	-,638*	-,057	-,289	-,239	,356	-1,238*
Adj. R ²	,031	,026	,023	,020	,023	,013	,040	,012	,024	,011	,020	,048	-,006	,014	,069
Libert	,168**	,055	,078*	-,004	,008	,103**	,039	,130**	,024	,030	,091**	-,001	-,090*	,029	,130**
Mar.lib	-,117**	-,030	-,094**	-,015	-,108**	-,083**	-,139**	-,102**	-,176**	-,103*	-,043	-,098**	-,134**	-,161**	,039
Immigr	,211**	-,007	,165**	,203**	,224**	,119**	,131**	,195**	,106**	,087	,088*	,018	,115**	,216**	,242**
Adj. R ²	,131	,026	,059	,054	,075	,049	,075	,076	,067	,022	,036	,055	,028	,076	,146
Ex.NI	,133**	,057	,164**	,145**	,170**	,192**	,198**	,060	,184**	,182**	,094*	,123**	,080*	,110*	,187**
Pol.trst	-,138**	-,007	-,075	-,040	-,079*	-,107**	-,101**	-,052	-,087*	-,031	-,027	-,089*	-,084**	-,089*	-,050
Ec.eval	-,047	-,070*	,043	-,025	,011	-,025	,130**	-,080*	-,205**	-,039	-,010	-,217**	-,032	,004	,051
Adj. R ²	,161	,030	,092	,072	,110	,093	,151	,082	,123	,050	,042	,105	,039	,092	,184

Note : Standardized regression coefficients (asterisks from unstandardized coefficients), except for the categorical variables of 'Type of Community' and 'Social Class' where the unstandardized coefficients are presented

Using Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors

5.2.3 Socio-Economic Euroscepticism

When turning to Socio-Economic Euroscepticism it becomes obvious that the results are clearly more similar to the ones of Political Euroscepticism than those of Instrumental Euroscepticism. Explained variance in the full model ranges between an acceptable, but unimpressive, 18,4% in the UK and a less than modest 3% in Belgium. Only in three countries does the full model explain more than 15% of the variance, and in nine out of the fifteen countries it explains less than 10%.

Model 1 does not seem to explain a whole lot in most countries. The UK is an exception, where the strong effect of age contributes to an explained variance of 4,9%, which is similar to the findings in the analysis of Political Euroscepticism. Age is also confirmed as a significant determinant in six additional countries. As for gender, women are significantly more Socio-Economic Eurosceptic than men only in Denmark, France and Ireland. Even less support is found for H3, which is only confirmed in Denmark, and rejected in Belgium. In Germany and Italy people living in small towns are significantly less willing to cede socio-economic power to the EU than people living in large towns, but the difference between large towners and people living in rural areas is not significant. In other words, the ascribed variables are very inconsistent determinants of Socio-Economic Euroscepticism.

Compared to Political Euroscepticism, I find even less support for the hypotheses connected to the achieved variables. H4 is only confirmed in four countries, whereas H5 is confirmed in none. Moreover, the largest improvement between model 1 and 2 is found in Denmark, with 2,2%. As we saw in the EU15-analysis of Socio-Economic Euroscepticism the model improved by 0,1% when going from the ascribed model to the achieved model. The lack of any further explanatory power in Spain and the Netherlands - as indicated by actual reductions in the adjusted R^2 - might explain this.

As for the value orientations, Libertarian values is a significant determinant in 7 out of 15 countries, and the effect is fairly strong in Austria and the UK. H7 does a little better, and is confirmed in 9 countries. Market Liberal values has a particularly strong effect in Italy, Ireland, Spain and Sweden and it is among the top two determinants in all of these except Italy (see table 5.13). Anti-immigration values is an even more consistent determinant, and H8 is confirmed in all but the three least Socio-Economic Eurosceptic countries - Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal. In most countries model 3 brings meaningful improvements of the model, except for the three countries just mentioned. It explains the most on the British isles,

with a 7,6% improvement in the UK and 7,1% in Ireland.

Table 5.11: Increases in Explained variance at the national level, Socio-Economic Euroscepticism

<i>Increases in Explained Variance</i>				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Austria</i>	2,0%	0,8%	6,4%	5,2%
<i>Belgium</i>	1,1%	0,0%	0,4%	0,5%
<i>Denmark</i>	2,9%	2,2%	2,3%	2,3%
<i>Finland</i>	1,5%	1,1%	4,1%	1,9%
<i>France</i>	1,0%	0,3%	3,2%	2,8%
<i>Germany</i>	1,4%	0,0%	2,7%	5,6%
<i>Greece</i>	2,7%	1,0%	2,3%	0,0%
<i>Ireland</i>	1,7%	0,3%	7,1%	1,8%
<i>Italy</i>	0,4%	0,3%	5,3%	4,8%
<i>Luxembourg</i>	0,0%	1,6%	0,6%	0,3%
<i>Netherlands</i>	0,0%	0,0%	4,7%	1,8%
<i>Portugal</i>	2,7%	1,2%	1,1%	4,4%
<i>Spain</i>	0,2%	0,0%	2,3%	1,9%
<i>Sweden</i>	1,1%	0,4%	5,2%	1,2%
<i>United Kingdom</i>	6,5%	0,4%	7,6%	3,9%

Note: From OLS regression of Socio-Economic Euroscepticism in each of the EU15 countries

As in the analysis of Political Euroscepticism, Model 4 adds the most in the southern European countries of Greece, Italy and Portugal. Furthermore, it adds the least in the founding members of Belgium and Luxembourg. The cultural explanation of Euroscepticism finds strong support as H9 is confirmed in all countries but Luxembourg. Trust in Political Institutions also has the hypothesised negative effect in eleven out of fifteen countries. Lastly, there is little support for H11. It is only confirmed in Greece, and rejected in Ireland, Italy and Portugal. Again, it seems that in these three countries, negative evaluations of the national economy induces support for EU decision-making. It is not a crucial determinant in Ireland, but it is quite strong in Italy and in Portugal.

As might be expected beforehand, it seems the two policy-specific dimensions are closely related. Most of the findings are similar, and the two first models represent a bad fit with the data in both instances. The varying effect of Economic Evaluations is also replicated in the this analysis. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two dimensions within individual countries, and Trust in Political Institutions seems to play a larger part in determining Socio-Economic Euroscepticism than Political Euroscepticism.

Table 5.12: Comparative OLS regression with Socio-Economic Euroscepticism as dependent variable

	AUS	BE	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NE	POR	SPA	SWE	UK
Age	,130**	-,049	,105**	,121**	-,030	,106**	,085**	,071*	,009	,020	,010	,066	-,013	,008	,257**
Gender	,010	,015	-,098**	-,023	-,105**	,049	-,056	-,093**	-,019	,014	,009	,016	-,030	-,035	,007
Rural	-,461	-,844**	,742*	,508	,440	,358	-,172	-,311	,528	,482	-,208	,942**	-,393	,735**	,303
Sm.twn	,271	-,654*	,761**	,114	,049	,492*	1,715**	-,767*	,794**	,525	-,183	,090	-,635*	-,178	,078
Adj. R ²	,020	,011	,029	,015	,010	,014	,027	,017	,004	-,005	-,003	,027	,002	,011	,065
Educ	-,003	-,072	-,127**	,011	-,033	-,041	-,094	-,040	-,119**	-,024	-,039	-,110*	,009	,056	-,078*
Empl	,168	,209	,490	1,720*	,621	,683	-,276	,494	,226	,870	,057	-,893*	,018	1,224*	-,112
Self-em	,050	-1,058**	2,270*	3,832**	,480	1,644	,326	,491	,720	3,65	,015	-1,249	,279	1,651*	-1,996
Hi-non	-1,126	,362	,780	1,307	-,515	,985	-1,541	,177	1,000	,395	-,015	1,586	-,532	,373	-,146
Md-non	,270	-,253	1,544*	,852	,113	,612	-,131	,787	,137	,550	-,006	-,111	,221	1,009	,105
Lo-non	-,105	,263	1,648*	1,793*	,186	,409	-,597	,132	-,058	-,460	-,005	-,036	-,123	1,225*	-,038
Sk.man	1,065	,224	1,691*	1,281	,695	,498	-,299	,385	-,432	-,576	,003	-,737	-,230	1,419*	-,858
Unsk.m	,736	,257	1,575*	1,169	,707	1,001*	,196	1,162*	-,183	-,037	-,011	-,342	-,079	,479	-,790
Adj. R ²	,028	,011	,051	,026	,013	,014	,037	,020	,007	,011	-,006	,039	-,004	,015	,069
Libert	,155**	,079*	,003	,058	,050	,113**	,027	,128**	,049	,085	,118**	-,024	-,075*	,049	,179**
Mar.lib	-,088**	,018	-,041	-,040	-,082*	-,058*	-,092**	-,131**	-,152**	-,009	-,025	-,110**	-,113**	-,197**	,044
Immigr	,158**	,011	,165**	,201**	,175**	,087**	,130**	,197**	,164**	,072	,177**	,016	,100**	,149**	,195**
Adj. R ²	,092	,015	,074	,067	,045	,041	,060	,091	,060	,017	,041	,050	,019	,067	,145
Ex.NI	,164**	,091*	,137**	,131**	,162**	,146**	,185**	,103**	,172**	,094	,148**	,078*	,084*	,098**	,191**
Pol.trst	-,181**	-,010	-,086*	-,086*	-,040	-,205**	-,153**	-,090*	-,142**	-,019	,002	-,120**	-,112**	-,080*	-,078*
Ec.eval	-,004	-,019	,001	-,026	,032	-,025	,123**	-,093*	-,134**	-,019	-,018	-,218**	,013	-,001	,017
Adj. R ²	,144	,020	,097	,086	,073	,097	,146	,109	,108	,020	,059	,094	,038	,079	,184

Note : Standardized regression coefficients (asterisks from unstandardized coefficients), except for the categorical variables of 'Type of Community' and 'Social Class' where the unstandardized coefficients are presented

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5.3 Main findings

In this section I will discuss the findings from the analysis of the EU15 as a whole, as well as the comparative analysis. I start out by looking at the relative importance and consistency of the different determinants, before I discuss the findings with regards to the three theoretical perspectives accounted for in the second chapter.

5.3.1 Most important determinants

Table 5.13 presents the two strongest determinants for each dimension in each country. With respect to *Instrumental Euroscepticism*, Trust in Political Institutions is the single most dominant determinant in the model. It is the strongest determinant in six out of fifteen countries, the second most important in another three, and H10 is confirmed in all countries. It is also the strongest determinant in the analysis of the EU15 as a whole. Also, Anti-immigration values is among the top two determinants in ten countries and is the second strongest determinant in the EU15. The closely related Exclusive national identity is amongst the two strongest determinants in five countries, and is the third strongest determinant in the EU15-analysis. It is also interesting to find that Education is the strongest determinant of Instrumental Euroscepticism in Ireland, and age is the second strongest in Belgium and the UK. Even though the socio-structural determinants aren't consistent across the EU15, they still play a central role in selected countries.

For *Political Euroscepticism*, a similar dominance can be found. Anti-immigration values is the strongest determinant in seven countries, and the second strongest in two more, whereas Exclusive national identity is among the top two strongest determinant in eight countries. These two are also the most important determinants in the EU15-analysis. The very strong negative effect of negative economic evaluations in Italy is somewhat of a mystery. In fact, it is the strongest determinant in this country, trumping Exclusive National Identity. This is especially mystifying when compared to Greece, where Economic Evaluations is the second strongest determinant of Political Euroscepticism, but with the opposite effect of that in Italy. Compared to the first dimension, Trust in Political Institutions is relatively less important, and it is only among the top two determinants in Austria and Germany. This corresponds well with the findings from the EU15-analysis.

When it comes to *Socio-Economic Euroscepticism*, Exclusive National identity is one of the two most important determinants in nine countries, and it is the strongest determinant in the EU15 as a whole. Moreover, in contrast to the findings from the analyses of Political

Euroscepticism, Trust in Political Institutions is among the top two determinants in five countries and the third strongest in the EU15. One anomaly is the lack of significant relationships in the analysis of Luxembourg, but as seen in figure 5.3, Socio-Economic Euroscepticism is very low in Luxembourg, something which might explain this.

Table 5.13: Most important determinants at the national and European level

Country	Instrumental Euroscepticism		Political Euroscepticism		Socio-Economic Euro-scepticism	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
<i>Austria</i>	Anti-immigration values	Trust in political institutions	Anti-immigration values	Libertarian	Trust in political institutions	Exclusive National Identity
<i>Belgium</i>	Anti-immigration values	Age	Age	Economic Evaluation	Exclusive National Identity	Libertarian Values
<i>Denmark</i>	Trust in political institutions	Anti-immigration values	Anti-immigration attitudes	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity
<i>Finland</i>	Trust in political institutions	Anti-immigration values	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity
<i>France</i>	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity
<i>Germany</i>	Trust in political institutions	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Trust in political institutions	Exclusive National Identity
<i>Greece</i>	Exclusive National Identity	Trust in political institutions	Exclusive National Identity	Market Liberal values	Exclusive National Identity	Trust in political institutions
<i>Ireland</i>	Education	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Libertarian values	Anti-immigration values	Market liberal values
<i>Italy</i>	Anti-immigration values	Market Liberal values	Economic evaluation	Exclusive National Identity	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values
<i>Luxembourg</i>	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Exclusive National Identity	Market Liberal values	(no significant determinants)	(no significant determinants)
<i>Netherlands</i>	Anti-immigration values	Trust in Political Institutions	Age	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity
<i>Portugal</i>	Trust in political institutions	Market Liberal values	Economic evaluation	Education	Economic evaluation	Trust in Political Institutions
<i>Spain</i>	Trust in political institutions	Exclusive National Identity	Market liberal values	Anti-immigration values	Market Liberal values	Trust in political institutions
<i>Sweden</i>	Trust in political institutions	Market Liberal values	Anti-immigration values	Market liberal values	Market liberal values	Anti-immigration values
<i>United Kingdom</i>	Anti-immigration values	Age	Anti-immigration values	Age	Age	Anti-immigration values
<i>EU15</i>	Trust in Political Institutions	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values	Exclusive National Identity	Anti-immigration values

Note: According to total causal effects found in table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.12

In order to evaluate the consistency of the various determinants I have chosen to use a criterion of at least 50% consistency (i.e. the hypothesis associated with the respective variable is confirmed in more than half of the countries). If we look at *Instrumental Euroscepticism*, education is the only truly consistent determinant among the ascribed and achieved variables. All of the value orientations and political attitudes, however, are fairly consistent determinants. The hypothesised effects of Anti-immigration values, Exclusive National Identity and Trust in Political Institutions are found in all countries, and Libertarian values in all but Denmark. Market Liberal values and Economic evaluations are slightly less consistent.

Among the ascribed and achieved variables in the analysis of *Political Euroscepticism*, age is the only determinant with a consistently significant relationship with the dependent variable, although the direction of the effect varies from country to country, and H1 is confirmed in only five countries and rejected in four. Turning to the last two models, all value orientations and political attitudes, except Libertarian values and Economic evaluations are consistent predictors. No single determinant is found to be significant in every country, however, but Exclusive national identity is the closest, with thirteen out of fifteen.

Lastly, the comparative analyses of *Socio-Economic Euroscepticism* shows us that none of the ascribed or achieved variables are consistent determinants of this dimension. As with Political Euroscepticism, all value orientations and political attitudes except for Libertarian values and Economic Evaluations are consistent, and once again Exclusive National Identity is the most consistent determinant with strong significant effects in all countries save Luxembourg.

To sum up, the low importance of social structure found in the EU15-analysis of the two policy-specific dimensions is corroborated in the comparative analysis. Moreover, when looking at the comparative analysis it is quite difficult to discern any clear patterns or groupings of countries. Even though we might expect clear similarities between countries in the same geographical area or linguistic/cultural tradition I can find no such clusters of countries, at least not consistently.

5.3.2 Conclusions

The EU15 analysis told us that whereas all three theoretical perspectives combined in explaining Instrumental Euroscepticism, the *utilitarian explanation* was comparatively less relevant for the policy-specific dimensions. The comparative analysis confirms this to a large extent. Social structure is an important part of explaining Instrumental Euroscepticism, but the

same cannot be said for the policy-specific dimensions. Similarly, the effect of economic evaluations is ambiguous at best with respect to the latter. It does play a part in determining Instrumental Euroscepticism, but the individual country analyses shows that the strength of the effect varies greatly. When it comes to the policy-specific dimensions, economic evaluations it is the strongest predictor of both of these in Portugal, but with the opposite effect of the hypothesised one. It also has a negative effect on both Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism in Ireland and Italy. Financial aid in form of the regional funds might have contributed to moving public opinion in the EU's favour. All three of these countries have received vast amounts of funds through this mechanism, and it might be that the citizens see the EU as a way out. Following this logic, the worse the national economic situation is, the more willing citizens of these countries are to transfer decision-making power to the EU. If this logic is robust, however, this should also hold true for Greece, but surprisingly, this is not the case. It might be that some other idiosyncratic phenomenon inhibits such a logic in this country. The Euro crisis had only just started when this survey was administered and the so-called 'troika' bailouts were still not a reality, but Greece was already hit hard by the financial crisis. Whether some Greek citizens blamed the EU for the economic situation or not is outside of my analysis, but it might have had an impact.

The *cultural explanation*, on the other hand, is found to be crucial in explaining both Instrumental, Political, and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism. Anti-immigration values and Exclusive national identity are the two most important determinants in the EU15 analysis of both Political and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, and for Instrumental Euroscepticism they are number two and three. The comparative analyses show that they are also the two most consistent determinants of all three dimensions, with H8 and H9 being confirmed in almost all countries for each dependent variable. Market liberal and Libertarian values are relatively less important, but still play an important part in select countries. As seen in table 5.5, Market Liberal values is the thirds strongest determinant of Political Euroscepticism when analysing the EU15 as a whole, but only the sixth strongest in the analyses of the two other dimensions, whilst Libertarian values is the fifth strongest determinant of Instrumental and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism, and the sixth strongest determinant of Political Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, as suggested in table 5.13, Market Liberal values play an important part in determining Instrumental Euroscepticism in Italy, Portugal and Sweden, as well as Political Euroscepticism in Greece, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden, and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism in Ireland, Spain and Sweden. Also, Libertarian values seem to be central to Political Euroscepticism in Austria and Ireland, and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism in

Belgium. It is also the third most important determinant in Germany for both policy-specific dimensions. All this would suggest that Libertarian values might be more important in western Europe than southern Europe and the Nordic countries.

Finally, the findings clearly suggest that the *Political explanation* is more relevant in explaining Instrumental and Socio-Economic Euroscepticism than Political Euroscepticism, although in some countries it clearly influences the latter as well; as is the case in Austria and Germany, where it is the third strongest determinant. At the EU15-level, Trust in Political Institutions is the strongest determinant of Instrumental Euroscepticism, the fourth strongest of Political Euroscepticism and the third strongest determinant of Socio-Economic Euroscepticism. As mentioned in the previous section, the effect it is largely strong and consistent, as H10 is confirmed in all countries for Instrumental Euroscepticism, in nine out of fifteen for Political Euroscepticism and eleven for Socio-Economic Euroscepticism. As I have emphasised in earlier parts of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that the political explanation is somewhat under-represented, in comparison to the utilitarian and cultural ones. Even though they are related, perceptions of national and EU democratic standards are not the same as Trust in Political Institutions, as such trust can be boosted or damaged by other factors as well, and it might be that the inclusion of such measures would have given even greater credibility to the political explanation of Euroscepticism.

6 Concluding Remarks

I will use this final chapter to reflect upon this thesis as a whole, both with respect to weaknesses, as well as ways to build on it. Lastly, I will conclude with a couple of remarks about the future of European integration.

6.1 Weaknesses of the study

I start by looking at the conceptual or theoretical weaknesses of this study, before turning to the more methodological ones. First of all, there is a theoretical, or rather conceptual, challenge in defining and separating specific and diffuse support in practice. It is possible to argue, for example, that the two policy-specific dimensions could be placed under diffuse support, together with Instrumental Euroscepticism, as these are not direct evaluations of the performance of the EU in the respective policy-areas. In stead, they are quite general attitudes towards decision-making within these. Nevertheless, in regarding them as specific support I follow the practice of others. Also, whether they are regarded as specific or diffuse support does not make any difference for the empirical findings. It does, however, matter when it comes to their theoretical interpretation.

There has also been some confusion in the literature regarding the theoretical basis of certain variables. Age, education and social class has been used as proxies for very different things, ranging from cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970a); leaning on the cultural approach to explaining Euroscepticism, to human capital (Gabel, 1998b) and individual competitiveness (McLaren, 2004); grounded in the utilitarian approach. It is fair to assume that characteristics such as political awareness communication skills make up some of the explanatory power of these variables, and this should be kept in mind, since these factors are not controlled for in this study.

Concerning the more methodological challenges, the first one is the scarcity of the Eurobarometer when it comes to the coding of variables. The use of dichotomous variables and lack of breadth is a problem, and variables such as Trust in Political Institutions, Libertarian values and Market Liberal values could have been measured in a better way with a richer data set. I have not managed, however, to find such a data set which is as new as this one. Also, panel and/or longitudinal data would have allowed for more bold statements of causality than this cross-sectional study does.

In the social sciences there is always the challenge of possible omitted factors. I believe much

of the country specific effects are made up by political cueing/elite-mass linkages (Steenbergen et al., 2007) (Gabel & Scheve, 2007a, 2007b), as well as media and public debate/discourse (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009), but was not able to look into this in this study. These country specific effects are controlled for through the use of country dummies, but the study would be much the richer if I would have been able to incorporate these into the analysis. As a result, the political/institutional explanation group is under-represented, compared to the utilitarian and the cultural approaches.

6.2 Possible areas of further focus

More attention should be directed towards national contexts and the mechanisms of political cueing, whether it be top-down or bottom-up. Previous research has shown party cueing to be strongly dependent on national context. When national elites are divided on European integration, for example, citizens tend to evaluate EU in a more negative manner (Stoeckel, 2012, p. 41). Maier et al, however, find strong cueing effects even when controlling for country contexts (Maier et al., 2012). Furthermore, political cueing seems to have the strongest effect with extremist parties, compared to mainstream ones (Steenbergen et al., 2007), a fact which was clearly illustrated in this year's EP elections. When studying this, the effects of campaigning should be included, in a similar way to what Hobolt and Brouard (Hobolt & Brouard, 2010) as well as Maier et al (Maier et al., 2012) has done. The role of political discourse should also be included. Trenz and de Wilde emphasise the role of the media and the public sphere in both formation and strengthening of Euroscepticism. The framing of the EU in public debates is crucial to how the public view the union (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009). In order to study these factors alongside the well-established individual-level determinants, however, a thoroughly planned survey should to be made, one which I neither have had the time or resources for.

6.3 The future of European Integration

What lies in the immediate future of European integration is fairly hard to predict. The solutions to the challenges the EU is facing are neither apparent nor will they be easily implemented. Something which is more certain, however, is an ever increasing sensitivity to European public opinion. I believe that studying the policy-specific dimensions of Euroscepticism is more important than studying general membership support when faced with the current situation. Residents of the EU member states are generally in favour of

membership, and although this support is dropping, there is little talk of exiting the EU²⁰. European decision-makers would benefit more from listening to their citizens views on the form further European integration should take, and be less worried about the level of general EU support. The continuous ceding of power from the national to the European level, has not been grounded in public support, something which has lead the EU to its current situation, but this does not have to continue. In the words of Hans-Jörg Trenz and Pieter de Wilde: "Euroscepticism is not something to be solved or to be overcome by better or more rational ways of communicating with the public. It is something that will remain prominent for as long as the European Union seeks to consolidate its future." (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009, p. 14). As long as EU elites try to steer the EU in a direction in which their European citizens disagrees with Euroscepticism will persist. In the words of the newly elected president of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker: "*We must go back to teach Europeans to love Europe*"²¹. Whereas Juncker is seen by some as a federalist, I believe that the only way to teach Europeans to love Europe is through a greater responsiveness to the preferences of ordinary European citizens. Last year, then Italian PM Enrico Letta stated that European citizens do not feel represented by Europe (Davies, 2013), something which I believe is the core of the matter. Although the election of Juncker is seen as a defeat by many eurosceptics, there are signs that federalism is not the only way forward. EU council president Herman Van Rompuy recently suggested that Brussels might be best served trying to avoid interference in areas where national governments fare well on their own (Pop, 2014), and that neither federalism nor the opposite was likely solutions to the challenges the EU are facing. Then again, it may not be the scope of EU which is underlying problem, but the failure to deliver - i.e. the effectiveness - a problem which might be solved by an even stronger EU. Still, I would argue that focusing more on the tasks which the EU is well equipped to handle, and within which it has legitimacy, and thus leaving the other tasks to be handled by national governments, might lead to just that - a stronger EU.

20 Except, of course, in the UK, although a recent poll by YouGov for The Sun (June 2014) suggests most Brits want to remain in the EU

21 From an interview with El Pais, 06.02.2004

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Appendix A: Operationalisation of variables

Instrumental Euroscepticism	An equal-weight index from 0-10, made up of two items measuring attitudes to EU membership. "Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?" (v205) (3 categories: 1=Good, 2=Bad, and 3=neither good nor bad) and "Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" (v206) (2 categories: Benefited, not benefited).
Socio-Economic Euroscepticism	An equal-weight index from 0-10, made up of three items (v258-v260). More or less decision-making at a European level within the areas of 'Fighting unemployment', 'Protecting social rights', and 'Ensuring Economic Growth'. (Three categories: 1) More decision making, 2) No change needed, and 3) Less decision making.)
Political Euroscepticism	An equal-weight index from 0-10 of eight items (v261, v262, v264-v266 and v268-270). More or less decision-making at a European level within the areas of 'Fighting Organised crime', 'Fighting Terrorism', 'Ensuring Food Safety', 'Protecting the Environment', 'Managing Major Health Issues', 'Equal Treatment of Men and Women', 'Supporting Agriculture', 'Promoting Peace and Democracy in the World', 'Cooperation in the field of 'Research and Innovation', and 'Securing Energy Supply'. (Three categories: 1) More decision making, 2) No change needed, and 3) Less decision making.)
Age	The actual age of the respondent (v666)
Gender	Dummy (v665): male=1, female=0
Urban-Rural	Based on a question asking what type of community the respondent lives in (v671). Three values: 1) rural area or village, 2) small/middle town, and 3) large town, coded into dummies with as large town as reference category.

Education	Age when respondent left school (v663), coded into nine categories, from 14 years and under (1) to 22 years and over (9). No education coded to 1 and still studying coded to the category corresponding with their present age.
Social Class	The occupation variable (v669) is coded to fit the Erikson-Goldthorpe Class Schema. Dummy variables for 1) Employers, 2) Self-employed/employers in the primary sector, 3) Higher-level non-manual workers, 4) medium-level non-manual workers, 5) lower-level non-manual workers, 6) Skilled manual workers, 7) Unskilled manual workers. 8) Never did any paid work is used as reference category.
Libertarian	A surrogate variable using the answer to item v371 'The state intervenes too much in our lives'. (A scale from 0=Totally disagree, 1=Tend to disagree, 2=Tend to agree, 3=Totally agree). DK is coded to a neutral category at 1,5.
Market Liberalism	A surrogate variable using the answer to item v374 'Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity'. (A scale from 0=Totally disagree, 1=Tend to disagree, 2=Tend to agree, 3=Totally agree). DK is coded to a neutral category at 1,5.
Anti-immigrant	Equal-weight index from 0-10 where low scores mean a positive view on immigrants and immigration and high scores means a negative view. Based on 6 items measuring attitudes towards immigration: " <i>People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (OUR COUNTRY)</i> "(v503), " <i>We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy</i> "(v508), " <i>The arrival of immigrants in Europe can be effective in solving the problem of Europe's ageing population</i> "(v509), " <i>Immigrants can play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of the world</i> "(v510), " <i>The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity the world</i> "(v505), and " <i>The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY)</i> "(v506). All items were originally coded 1=Tend to agree, 2=Tend to disagree, 3=It depends.
Exclusive National identity	A variable created from combining the answers of questions tapping into the respondents sense of belonging to Europe and their Nation respectively, which were coded 0=Not at all, 1=Not really, 2=Somewhat and 3=To a great extent. Those who had responded 0

or 1 on the European question and 2 or 3 on the National question were coded 1. All others were coded as 0 and DK as missing.

**Trust in
political
institutions**

Additive index from 0-3, where 3 represents trust in political institutions. Created on the basis of 3 items (dummy variables) asking whether or not the respondent tends to trusts 'The national legal system' (v215), 'Political Parties' (v216) and 'The national parliament'(v218).

**Economic
evaluation**

Additive index based on answers to two items asking how the respondent would rate the situation in the national economy (v105) and national employment (v110) on a four-point scale from 'Very good' to 'Very bad'. The created index ranges from positive evaluations at 0 to negative evaluations at 6.

Appendix B: Independent variables; indicators and frequencies

VARIABLE/INDICATOR	VALUES	FREQUENCIES (%)	MISSING
<i>Ascribed variables</i>			
AGE: D11 Age	Actual age of respondent	15502 (100%)	0 (0%)
GENDER: D10 Gender	1 = Male	7185 (46,30%)	0 (0%)
	2 = Female	8317 (53,7%)	
TYPE OF COMMUNITY: D25 Rural-Urban (Would you say you live in a...?)	1 = Rural area or village	5770 (37,2%)	28 (0,2%)
	2 = Small or middle-sized town	5490 (35,4%)	
	3 = Large town	4214 (27,2%)	
<i>Achieved Status variables</i>			
EDUCATION: D8 Education (Age of respondent when left school)	1 = Up to 14 years	2593 (16,6%)	268 (1,7%)
	2 = 15 years	1267 (8,1%)	
	3 = 16 years	1795 (11,5%)	
	4 = 17 years	1163 (7,5%)	
	5 = 18 years	2135 (13,7%)	
	6 = 19 years	1142 (7,3%)	
	7 = 20 years	850 (5,5%)	
	8 = 21 years	786 (5%)	
	9 = 22 years and older	3586 (23 %)	
SOCIAL CLASS: D15a+b Occupation	1 = Employers	1475 (9,5%)	26 (0,2%)
	2 = Self-employed/employers in the primary sector	435 (2,8%)	
	3 = Higher-level non-manual worker	832 (5,3%)	
	4 = Medium-level non-manual worker	1890 (12,1%)	
	5 = Lower-level non-manual worker	4921 (31,6%)	
	6 = Skilled manual workers	2825 (18,1%)	
	7 = Unskilled manual workers	1682 (10,8%)	
	8 = Never did any paid work	1499 (9,6%)	
<i>Value orientations</i>			
LIBERTARIAN VALUES: QC1a The State intervenes too much in our lives	0 = Totally disagree	993 (6,4%)	513 (3,30%)
	1 = Tend to disagree	4566 (29,3%)	
	2 = Tend to agree	5860 (37,6%)	
	3 = Totally agree	3653 (23,4%)	
MARKET LIBERAL VALUES: QC1a Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity	0 = Totally disagree	939 (6,0%)	1396 (9%)
	1 = Tend to disagree	3301 (21,2%)	
	2 = Tend to agree	6686 (42,9%)	
	3 = Totally agree	3263 (20,9%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Ethnic enrich cultural life	0 = Tend to agree	8464 (54,3%)	451 (2,9%)
	1 = It depends	1899 (12,2%)	
	2 = Tend to disagree	4771 (30,6%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Immigrants needed for economy	0 = Tend to agree	8432 (54,1%)	490 (3,1%)
	1 = It depends	1527 (9,8%)	
	2 = Tend to disagree	5136 (33,0%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Immigrants solving ageing problem	0 = Tend to agree	5916 (38,0%)	1257 (8,1%)
	1 = It depends	1589 (10,2%)	
	2 = Tend to disagree	6823 (43,8%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Immigrants role in understanding	0 = Tend to agree	8350 (53,6%)	942 (6%)
	1 = It depends	1666 (10,7%)	
	2 = Tend to disagree	4627 (29,7%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Ethnic cause insecurity	0 = Tend to disagree	5335 (34,2%)	393 (2,5%)
	1 = It depends	2048 (13,1%)	
	2 = Tend to agree	7809 (50,1%)	
ANTI-IMMIGRATION VALUES: QH1 Ethnic increase unemployment	0 = Tend to disagree	5891 (37,8%)	453 (2,9%)
	1 = It depends	1476 (9,5%)	
	2 = Tend to agree	7765 (49,8%)	
<i>Attitudinal variables</i>			
EXCLUSIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY: QE4 Sense of belonging: Nationality	1 = To a great extent	12371 (79,4%)	75 (0,5%)
	2 = Somewhat	2357 (15,1%)	
	3 = Not really	521 (3,3%)	

	4 = Not at all	261 (1,7%)	
<i>EXCLUSIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY: QE4 Sense of belonging: European</i>	1 = To a great extent	5149 (33,0%)	152 (1%)
	2 = Somewhat	6640 (42,6%)	
	3 = Not really	2540 (16,3%)	
	4 = Not at all	1104 (7,1%)	
<i>TRUST IN POLITICAL INSITUTIONS: QA9 Trust in institutions: Justice</i>	1 = Tend to trust	8749 (56,1%)	633 (4,1%)
	0 = Tend not to trust	6203 (39,8%)	
<i>TRUST IN POLITICAL INSITUTIONS: QA9 Trust in institutions: Political Parties</i>	1 = Tend to trust	4212 (27,0%)	716 (4,6%)
	0 = Tend not to trust	10657 (68,4)	
<i>TRUST IN POLITICAL INSITUTIONS: QA9 Trust in institutions: National Parliament</i>	1 = Tend to trust	6720 (43,1)	953 (6,1%)
	0 = Tend not to trust	7912 (50,8%)	
<i>ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS: QA2A Situation: National Economy</i>	0 = Very good	272 (1,7%)	168 (1,1%)
	1 = Rather good	3998 (25,7%)	
	2 = Rather bad	7674 (49,2%)	
	3 = Very bad	3473 (22,3%)	
<i>ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS: QA2A Situation: Employment Country</i>	0 = Very good	158 (1,0%)	182 (1,2%)
	1 = Rather good	2735 (17,5%)	
	2=Rather bad	8095 (51,9%)	
	3=Very bad	4415 (28,3%)	

Appendix C: Additional analyses

Country Specific Effects in the OLS analyses of the EU15

Model 1 of the OLS regression of Instrumental Euroscepticism on page 50

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 1	
		Beta	B
<u>Country fixed effects</u>			
<i>Austria</i>	,078**	-,076	-1,163**
<i>Belgium</i>	-,047**	-,190	-2,898**
<i>Denmark</i>	-,075**	-,224	-3,395**
<i>Finland</i>	,027**	-,120	-1,813**
<i>France</i>	,036**	-,117	-1,768**
<i>Germany</i>	-,001	-,177	-2,216**
<i>Greece</i>	,016*	-,135	-1,998**
<i>Ireland</i>	-,103**	-,237	-3,798**
<i>Italy</i>	,038**	-,114	-1,769**
<i>Luxembourg</i>	-,073**	-,173	-3,781**
<i>Netherlands</i>	-,085**	-,230	-3,475**
<i>Portugal</i>	-,009	-,156	-2,468**
<i>Spain</i>	-,073**	-,221	-3,325**
<i>Sweden</i>	,045**	-,116	-1,713**
<i>United Kingdom²²</i>	,178**		
Adjusted R ²			,074

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Model 1 of the OLS regression of Political Euroscepticism on page 53

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 1	
		Beta	B
<u>Country fixed effects</u>			
<i>Austria</i>	,086**	-,074	-,810**
<i>Belgium</i>	-,078**	-,225	-2,468**
<i>Denmark</i>	-,027**	-,183	-1,993**
<i>Finland</i>	-,005	-,155	-1,685**
<i>France</i>	-,050**	-,203	-2,214**
<i>Germany</i>	-,070**	-,250	-2,249**
<i>Greece</i>	,051**	-,103	-1,100**
<i>Ireland</i>	,084**	-,078	-,899**
<i>Italy</i>	,033**	-,117	-1,300**
<i>Luxembourg</i>	-,061**	-,164	-2,562**
<i>Netherlands</i>	-,062**	-,213	-2,311**
<i>Portugal</i>	-,031**	-,188	-2,130**
<i>Spain</i>	-,033**	-,186	-2,009**
<i>Sweden</i>	-,050**	-,205	-2,174**
<i>United Kingdom</i>	,184**		
Adjusted R ²			,072

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

22 The UK has been chosen as reference category in all three analyses

Model 1 of the OLS regression of Socio-Euroscepticism on page 56

Independent variables	Pearsons R	Model 1	
		Beta	B
<u>Country fixed effects</u>			
<i>Austria</i>	,051**	-,113	-1,705**
<i>Belgium</i>	-,115**	-,265	-3,997**
<i>Denmark</i>	,077**	-,091	-1,363**
<i>Finland</i>	,053**	-,109	-1,631**
<i>France</i>	-,037**	-,195	-2,920**
<i>Germany</i>	,001	-,194	-2,396**
<i>Greece</i>	-,012	-,175	-2,555**
<i>Ireland</i>	,005	-,150	-2,367**
<i>Italy</i>	-,042**	-,195	-2,974**
<i>Luxembourg</i>	-,074**	-,181	-3,898**
<i>Netherlands</i>	-,021**	-,182	-2,720**
<i>Portugal</i>	-,114**	-,266	-4,148**
<i>Spain</i>	-,093**	-,252	-3,740**
<i>Sweden</i>	,082**	-,088	-1,282**
<i>United Kingdom</i>	,190**		
Adjusted R ²			,092

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Note: Model 1 of the OLS regression of Socio-Euroscepticism on page []

Ordered Logistic regression of Instrumental Eurocepticism (EU15)

Independent Var.	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE
<u>Ascribed var.</u>										
<i>Age</i>			,009**	,001	,004**	,001	,005**	,001	,006**	,001
<i>Gender</i>			-,277**	,032	-,256**	,034	-,247**	,035	-,163**	,035
<i>Type of Comm.</i>										
- <i>Rural/village</i>			,180**	,041	,095*	,043	,059	,043	,070	,044
- <i>Small/mid town</i>			,234**	,042	,165**	,043	,155**	,044	,158**	,044
<u>Achieved var.</u>										
<i>Education</i>					-,102**	,007	-,072**	,007	-,049**	,007
<i>Social Class</i>										
- <i>Employers</i>					,165*	,078	,120	,080	,036	,082
- <i>Self-Employed</i>					-,086	,118	-,140	,119	-,218	,122
- <i>Hi-lev. non man.</i>					-,379**	,101	-,351**	,103	-,389**	,104
- <i>M-lev. non man.</i>					-,056	,079	-,049	,081	-,125	,082
- <i>Lo-lev. non man.</i>					,299**	,064	,258**	,065	,156*	,067
- <i>Skilled manual</i>					,473**	,069	,360**	,070	,230**	,072
- <i>Unskilled man.</i>					,574**	,075	,434**	,076	,247**	,078
<u>Value Orientations</u>										
<i>Libertarian</i>							,320**	,020	,166**	,020
<i>Market liberal</i>							-,299**	,021	-,222**	,021
<i>Anti-immigrant</i>							,171**	,006	,123**	,006
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>										
<i>Excl. Nat. Identity</i>									,883**	,042
<i>Trust in pol. inst.</i>									-,475**	,017
<i>Econ. Evaluation</i>									,151**	,016
<u>Model summary</u>										
N		14193		14193		14193		14193		14193
X ²		1122,56		1332,59		1979,88		3364,83		4945,02
Cox and Snell)		,076		,090		,130		,211		,294
Nagelkerke		,081		,095		,139		,225		,313
McFadden		,028		,034		,050		,085		,125

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Estimation: Ordered logistic regression. The coefficients for the country specific effects are not presented.

Ordered Logistic regression of Political Euroscepticism (EU15)

Independent Var.	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE
<u>Ascribed variables</u>										
<i>Age</i>			,002*	,001	,001	,001	,002	,001	,001	,001
<i>Gender</i>			,006	,031	,035	,033	,059	,033	,083*	,034
<i>Type of comm.</i>										
- <i>Rural/village</i>			,059	,040	,016	,041	,001	,041	-,011	,042
- <i>Small/mid town</i>			-,024	,041	-,053	,041	-,061	,042	-,073	,042
<u>Achieved var.</u>										
<i>Education</i>					-,030**	,007	-,012	,007	,000	,007
<i>Social Class</i>										
- <i>Employers</i>					-,279**	,075	-,306**	,076	-,309**	,076
- <i>Self-Employed</i>					-,007	,111	-,050	,112	-,093	,112
- <i>Hi-lev. non man.</i>					-,345**	,092	-,324**	,093	-,310**	,093
- <i>M-lev. non man.</i>					-,304**	,075	-,305**	,075	-,302**	,075
- <i>Lo-lev. non man.</i>					-,217**	,061	-,256**	,061	-,277**	,062
- <i>Skilled manual</i>					-,213**	,067	-,290**	,067	-,336**	,067
- <i>Unskilled man.</i>					-,076	,073	-,182*	,073	-,228**	,074
<u>Value orientations</u>										
<i>Libertarian</i>							,072**	,019	,030	,019
<i>Market liberal</i>							-,234**	,020	-,202**	,020
<i>Anti-immigrant</i>							,102**	,006	,081**	,006
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>										
<i>Excl. Nat. Identity</i>									,756**	,041
<i>Trust in pol. inst.</i>									-,103**	,016
<i>Econ. Evaluation</i>									-,043**	,015
<u>Model summary</u>										
N		14193		14193		14193		14193		14193
X ²		873,72		884,13		964,73		1443,75		1836,9
Cox and Snell		,060		,060		,066		,097		,121
Nagelkerke		,061		,062		,067		,099		,124
McFadden		,016		,017		,018		,027		,035

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Estimation: Ordered logistic regression. The coefficients for the country specific effects are not presented.

Ordered Logistic regression of Socio-Economic Euroscepticism (EU15)

Independent Var.	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE	Exp(b)	SE
<u>Ascribed variables</u>										
<i>Age</i>			,007**	,001	,006**	,001	,007**	,001	,006**	,001
<i>Gender</i>			-,068*	,032	-,061	,033	-,050	,033	-,015	,034
<i>Type of comm.</i>										
- <i>Rural/village</i>			,070	,041	,036	,041	,018	,042	,011	,042
- <i>Small/mid town</i>			,047	,041	,028	,042	,011	,042	,005	0,04
<u>Achieved var.</u>										
<i>Education</i>					-,020**	,007	-,003	,007	,011	,007
<i>Social Class</i>										
- <i>Employers</i>					-,067	,077	-,086	,077	-,094	,078
- <i>Self-Employed</i>					,167	,113	,141	,113	,117	,114
- <i>Hi-lev. non man.</i>					-,204*	,093	-,173	,093	-,159	,093
- <i>M-lev. non man.</i>					-,057	,076	-,043	,076	-,042	,076
- <i>Lo-lev. non man.</i>					-,079	,063	-,105	,063	-,130*	,064
- <i>Skilled manual</i>					-,067	,068	-,138*	,069	-,187**	,070
- <i>Unskilled man.</i>					-,003	,075	-,089	,075	-,141	,076
<u>Value orientations</u>										
<i>Libertarian</i>							,135**	,019	,076**	,019
<i>Market liberal</i>							-,169**	,020	-,130**	,020
<i>Anti-immigrant</i>							,091**	,006	,067**	,006
<u>Attitudinal var.</u>										
<i>Excl. Nat. Identity</i>									,740**	,041
<i>Trust in pol. inst.</i>									-,166**	,016
<i>Econ. Evaluation</i>									-,027	,015
<u>Model summary</u>										
N	14193		14193		14193		14193		14193	
X ²	1410,16		1485,47		1515,36		1907,29		2356,74	
Pseudo R ² (Cox and Snell)	,095		,099		,101		,126		0,15	
Pseudo R ² (Nagelkerke)	,099		,104		,106		,132		,160	
Pseudo R ² (McFadden)	,032		,034		,035		,044		,054	

** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Estimation: Ordered logistic regression. The coefficients for the country specific effects are not presented.