Developments in democratic quality and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Master thesis

Peace and Conflict studies

Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History

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Abstract

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was in a state of war from 1992 to 1995, after declaring independence from Yugoslavia. In 1995, the painstakingly negotiated General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) ended the violence. GFAP included a new constitution, with strong consociational elements. Inherent in the consociational, or power-sharing school of thought, is a conception of what elements are required to ensure a stable and functional democracy. Moreover, consociational theory suggests a development where ethnic division lines decrease in importance over time, thus ensuring enhanced stability over time. The trajectory proffered by consociational theory provides a model against which I posit data with regards to democratic quality and reconciliation. The analysis draws upon original data within the field of Law and Elections alongside a range of secondary sources. The thesis utilises nuanced tools of analysis, intended to address more directly society as it is experienced for the citizen rather than a structural, top-down analysis. The conclusion makes an assessment of democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pertaining to the chosen variables. As a project, it demonstrates one way of analysing a power-sharing, post-conflict society, using theory that aims to be responsive to citizen´s experiences. The conclusions regarding reconciliation and democratic quality in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitute reason for serious concern, and on most variables there seems to be little developments towards the positive. Such concern has been voiced before, but often without being paired with concrete data, or with data pertaining only to a narrow area of society. The ambition of this study is to provide nuanced assessments of a conceptually wide-ranging set of variables, based on concrete evidence, on realms that seem could prove important and fruitful to measure in other post-conflict societies as well.

Foreword

Like most research projects, this one started out as something very different than what became the end result. I owe many people great thanks in helping me get rid of the unnecessary, the immeasurable, the unscientific and the normative that can ruin a project like this.

First and foremost, my supervisor Kåre Vollan has been a great resource. Vollan´s list of contacts, and his knowledge about a number of areas in BiH society were invaluable assets in the process. I owe him thanks for anything from interviewees saying yes to meet, to inside information about the political elite in the country, to teaching me skills that will be extremely valuable in future projects. I am especially grateful for the role he played in collecting and transforming election results into a dataset that made sense. This was in itself a six-month long project, and I could not have done it without him.

Inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a long list of people who each contributed. First and foremost, I need to thank E. Druzic (first name is omitted at request). She translated an endless amount of laws for the chapter about laws, answered an endless amount of questions about things I urgently needed to know while writing. She provided information without which the data chapters would have been significantly leaner, and she helped me to understand important puzzles I encountered when analysing data. Also, a big thank you to Ahmed Rifatbegovic, who answered emails patiently and found the time to talk to me in his busy schedules while I was on field work. Without him, I would not have been able to interview the party leaders while in Parliament. I would not, as a matter of fact, have gotten into Parliament at all, since the sessions are closed for people without the right credentials. Mr. Rifatbegovic, however, managed to get me in. Thank you to Amra Mehmedic, Srdjan Dzdarevic, Halisa Skopljak, Selim Beslagic, Amir Kulaglic and Aleksandra Krstovic for taking the time to talk to me and answer question.

The Central Election Commission in Sarajevo deserves special mentioning. This goes specifically for mr. Ermin Kos, who is handling data material for the CEC. Without his devoted work, I would not have been able to write the chapter on elections at all. Where data was lacking, he exhausted his resources to dig up something of use. Twice, while I was in Sarajevo, he agreed to meet with me, as well as answering an abhorrent amount of emails. Thank you!

Steinar Bryn of the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer: Thank you for taking the time to answer questions and “sanity checking” my ideas and thoughts along the way. This thank-you is, in reality, bigger, and includes the whole of the Nansen Academy and what they have taught me about post-conflict work during my time as a student here. Learning about the dialogue work that the Nansen Dialogue Network does in former Yugoslavia, I felt that the human aspect of post-conflict work was made clear. Without the Nansen Academy, I would have not been able to recognize these mechanisms when in the field.

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Kristin Toverud Klaveness
16.05.2014

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1 INTRODUCTION

Bosnia and Herzegovina, or BiH[1], is a much-studied post-conflict society. It can be used as a case of many things: of constitution making after war, of successes and errors of international intervention, of mechanisms of ethnic conflict, of religious underpinnings of war, of nationalist myth-mongering, or of the upsurge of intra-state conflict after the end of the Cold War. In short, if BiH fascinates you, there is a broad array of angles you could write from. Most of them will, however, have to do with war. In particular, with the last war that was fought here. Ask a person what their first association is when you say "Bosnia and Herzegovina". The answer will likely be: War. By that, they most probably mean the war following BiH´s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia.

The war lasting from 1992-1995 is slowly becoming distant, or at least not so recent past. The peace agreement signed 18 years ago ended the use of violence, and lay foundations for the daily functioning of the BiH as a state. But Bosnia and Herzegovina is in trouble. The unrest in February 2014 can be seen as a sign of unease and discontent with the political system. Ethnically based tensions continue to be discernable. In BiH, it seems possible to question the degree reconciliation between the three main groups, as well as what characterizes the working of the central government. The research question of this project is posed as follows:

What developments can be discerned Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding democratic quality and reconciliation?

1.1 Theoretical concepts informed by consociational visions

Democracy and reconciliation are, I will argue, virtues that consociationalism as a school of thought supposes will stem from its set of tools. Consociationalism, or power sharing, is a realm of theory with roots in the late 1960´s. Scholars within the tradition have highly divided societies as their universe, and the aim of the theory is to reduce tension between groups over time. The idea is that removing competitive features as much as possible can

[1] The abbreviation will be used more than the full name throughout the thesis.

alleviate anxieties and hostilities in fragmented societies. This should be done, it is argued, by creating tools of power sharing, so that different groups feel confident that they are represented in decision-making processes (Lijphart 1969). The founding father of this school is often considered to be Arend Lijphart. He believed in the possibility of having deeply divided societies that still were functioning democracies. Such a society should have four features: 1) a power-sharing government, or a so-called grand coalition, with representatives from all groups, 2) minority veto on important issues, 3) proportionality in civil service and in the electoral system, and 4) ethnic autonomy (Lijphart 1977).

Power sharing theories constitute an evolving tradition. A much-seen exercise is to make use of empirical evidence to develop the tradition, as well as explore differences between consociationalism and competing traditions (Sisk 1996; Wolff and Yakinthou 2012; McGarry and O`Leary 2004). Several scholars have considered Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton as a case of consociationalist democracy (Kasapovic 2005; Belloni 2004). Others have coined it as a democracy that has elements from several traditions (Caspersen 2004; Bose 2002). One has described BiH as a case of "excessive consociationalism" (Weller 2010:302), due to the many veto rules and the high degree of power sharing present in all levels. The description is accompanied by claims that this holds explanatory power for why BiH is a struggling as a state in general. I agree with the characterisation of BiH as a power-sharing democracy. Hence, visions in power-sharing theories are relevant when assessing data findings. This will be justified in Chapter 2.

1.2 Overview

This project is a theory-guided case study (Levy 2008:4). It compares data to a theoretical framework derived from power-sharing theory. Having travelled to Sarajevo three times in the course of the past 8 months, I have collected data on four variables: laws, elections, schools and minority returns. The methods used are mixed. Reports, statistics from various organisations as well as interviews are, in short, the methods that have been used. I have conducted longitudinal measurements on the law, election and minority returns variables, to measure development. For schools, the focus is less on development and more on the status quo. This is mainly due to the lack of any aggregate data. My main source for this variable is interviews. The interviewees all showed a preference for addressing the last four-five years. As assessment of development during the last 18 years with regards to schools thus seems unfeasible.

The recent months of unrest will serve as a reference point in the analyses, in the sense that they should make sense in the conclusion that is given. A causal analysis for the unrest will not be provided – this is a separate project entirely, requiring a theoretical framework with theories on social movements. Thus, the February 2014 unrest should merely be viewed as useful auxiliary evidence. Note also that visions inherent in consociational theory mainly create a framework. No meticulous matching exercise is in line.

1.3 Structure

The remainder of this introduction will contain history about relations between the groups in BiH, as well as an introduction to the last war in BiH between 1992 and 1995. After this, there will be a presentation of technical aspects in the GFAP, and how this relates to concepts of consociationalism. After some paragraphs about the February 2014 unrest, I then define central terms and concepts in the thesis. This is followed by a list of words and abbreviations. A paragraph about my personal point of departure rounds off the chapter.

Chapter 2 is where the theoretical framework will be presented. Necessary ingredients are introduction to consociationalism, as well as a discussion about whether or not the Dayton Accords can be regarded as a case of consociational democracy. After this, I will draw on theoretical contributions to provide a framework for assessing democratic quality, as well as reconciliation.

Chapter 3 situates the thesis in a methodological universe. Ingredients will be case study as a genre, the specific type of case study design I have chosen, as well as the question of what universe my conclusions pertain to. Central methodological concepts will be discussed in relation to the project. Moving on, I justify the choice of variables. The paragraphs about how data was gathered and analysed will, in addition to more direct references, provide insight into how the thesis is situated in relation to methodological concepts.

Chapter 4 through 7 are devoted to empiry. Each independent variable gets a chapter of its own, with preliminary analyses provided for each one.

Chapter 8 is devoted to discussion, structured by the initial research question and theoretical framework.

Conclusions are presented in Chapter 9.

1.4 Brief history of groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been characterized by the coexistence and conflict of three groups: The predominantly Roman-Catholic Croats, the predominantly Russion-Orthodox Serbs, and the predominantly Muslim Bosniacs (from now on: Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs). The groups have had different preferred or given names through history, and alliances as well as transitions in power structures have influenced definitions and self-definitions. These separate identities have roots back to the 11th century, when a unitary Christian faith separated into Eastern and Western forms of Christianity. Identities gradually became the source of division lines. For example, these can be discerned in the history of (the area now known as) BiH under Ottoman Empire (1463-1878) reign. Through historical processes, religious differences slowly morphed into cultural categories. The different political formations that ruled over (the area now known as) BiH from the mid 1400s to the end of the 20th century had a large impact on this process. The Muslims had their political and religious allegiance with the Ottoman Empire, Catholics with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (1878-1918), and Serbs with Yugoslavia (1918-1992). Other monarchical and/or medieval formations, either present or past, that each group could look to were also influential. The area that now constitutes Bosnia and Herzegovina had once been an independent medieval state, but only for a short while, and its borders were different than they are today (Hronesova 2012:31). To generalize the above, one group often supported the state formation that ruled, whereas the two others were adversaries of the rule. Divisions were recognized and institutionalized in different ways through times of foreign rule. Examples are the millet system under the Ottomans, the system of political confessionalism based on principles of parity and proportionality under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the “national key” quota system in communist Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1996:148-149). Building on the above, the cultural categories of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs will be denoted as ethnic groups in this thesis. A more elaborate discussion of the term ”ethnic” can be found below, but for now, ethnicity can be viewed as a social phenomenon, with a framework of us/them-thinking (Calhoun 1994:2). I should also mention that the territory that is now BiH has been (and is) also inhabited by non-Slavic groups such as Roma, Romanians, Albanians, as well as Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews (Malcolm 1996:113). However, because the Constitution given by GFAP treats Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs as constituent people, and because it was these groups that formed the basis for the three main warring factions during the 1992-1995 war, this paragraph is only about them and their coexistence with each other.

World War I and the subsequent creation of an all-South-Slavic state fostered the first serious clashes between Serbian and Croatian identities. Between the World Wars, there was substantial tension between all three groups. With World War II, cleavages deepened as people chose sides and mass atrocities were committed (Hronesova 2012). This war in Bosnia and Herzegovina saw ethnic cleansing, the establishment of concentration camps, and targeting of civilians based on ethno-confessional and political affiliation. According to Hronesova, the "Hobbesian nature of World War II substantially lacerated the delicate fabric of ethno-confessional relations in Yugoslavia" (2012:35). The landscape of who sided with whom is difficult to summarize, because of its complexity. As Malcolm points out, there were plenty of Muslims in some Ustase factions. Cetniks were, most of the time, against the Germans, but in some areas joined ranks with them. In fact, you could at times find all three identities represented in a single armed group (1996:ch.13). Most people had nothing to do with armed factions. Still, stereotypes have it that all Croats were Ustasa, and that all Serbs were Cetniks. Muslims had fought on all sides – Ustasa, German, Cetnik and Partisan, so it was harder to frame a stereotype pertaining to them. The partisans were the only warring faction that was never allied with the Germans, and they came out of the war in control of state power, forming Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1996:190-192). However, a sign of just how deeply seated enemy pictures from the Second World War were, is how they during the 90`s resurfaced as, absurd, but forceful, material for creating fear and mobilizing the population (Malcolm 1996:206, 214, 216, 217).

During the period of socialist Yugoslavia, religion and all religious traditions as part of public life were banned. National identities instead fell into a three-tiered system of nations (narodni), nationalities (narodnosti or nacionalnosti) and other ethnic groups and minorities (manjine). In the beginning of Yugoslavias existence, only Serbs and Croats made it to be defined as narodni. Although they marked a distinct category in society, Muslims were not regarded as a nation in BiH until 1971. Before this, the Bosnian Muslims either went for the category of "undefined", or they chose whatever category seemed suitable at the moment (Hronesova 2012:36-39). The idea of the "Yugoslav person" was important during the era from 1945-1990, with an atheist education systems and a public worship of the Partisans, who were presented as symbols of unity and Yugoslav consensus and coexistence. Considerable effort was put into creating a common language: Serbo-Croatian. Former Partisans held almost all positions of power. Nationalism – at least Serbian or Croatian nationalism - was unacceptable (Mønnesland 2006:219-228). In schools, pupils learnt both Latin and Cyrillic scripts, and textbooks were printed in both. The content in the curriculum

was more or less the same throughout BiH (Low-Beer 2001). Tone Bringa, among others, claims that the school system in Yugoslavia was an important instrument with which to roll the population into central ideas about the Yugoslav state, perhaps even "the most powerful agent of Yugoslav state communism" (Bringa 1995:75). Although there were tensions in the Yugoslav society, especially between centralists and decentralists, it seems safe to say that for the majority of citizens, the time from 1945 to the late 1980´s was marked by low levels of tension between groups. However, considerable collective memory, especially from the two World Wars, constituted a dormant, but forceful reservoir of myths and ideological back up. This became highly visible during the late 1980´s and early 1990´s.

What conclusions can we draw from this history of complex coexistence? There has been scholarly work claiming that there was a consociational type of coexistence during Yugoslavia (Goldman 1985; Vasovic 1992) – this addresses one of the state/imperial periods referred to above. However, using consociational concepts to analyse an authoritarian state seems a puzzling project, considering that a basic premise in the power-sharing model is democracy (Lijphart 1969). Croatian professor Mirjana Kasapovic argues that the three groups in the (area now known as) BiH has a history of consociational mechanisms in its political coexistence dating back to the 15th century, although this should not be confused with a "genuinely enduring, coherent and conscious tradition of consociational democracy" (Kasapovic 2005:7-8). The history of all places, peoples and events, consists of a wild number of facts that can be arranged every which way, to play its part in an array of narratives – a phenomenon well known to historians. I will not conclude this paragraph with a claim that BiH has some deep consociational tradition in its history. However, it seems reasonable to say that history, as it has played out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a common denominator of coexistence between groups that have been very different in religious, and increasingly also cultural, terms.

1.5 The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The emergence of the post-Yugoslav state of Bosnia and Herzegovina came about through a violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disintegrated gradually following Tito´s death in 1980. Power vacuum, economic decline and the fall of the Soviet Union were all factors pushing the development forward. When Croatia and Slovenia got their independence, the leaders of BiH felt they didn´t have a choice but to declare independence as well. The alternative would be to remain in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia. But when the president of

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, declared independence 20. December 1991, a majority of Bosnian Serbs reacted with hostility, as they feared oppression (Nystuen 2005:36). Moreover, Serbs both within and outside BiH saw a possibility for achieving a "greater Serbia" by pursuing an aggressive policy in BiH. Bosnian Croats had similar visions (Nystuen 2005:36-37). Both fear and greed can thus be traced as motivational factors on the Serb and Croat sides. Most sources about sentiments in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to 1992 speak of nationalism on the rise[2], although whether nationalism was cause or effect, and which of this was true for which groups, is a complicated discussion.

A referendum regarding independence was held in 1992, where 99.7% of those who voted, voted for independence[3] BiH was recognized shortly thereafter by the EC as an independent state (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153). A war ensued, largely about territory, fuelled by sentiments, personnel and motivation from both inside and outside BiH´s borders. It is hard to coin the war in broad terms. Bosniacs tend to see it as a war with clear aggressors (SFRY and the Republic of Croatia), whereas Serbs tend to see it as an inter-ethnic civil war where all parties participated equally. The Croats are often more ambivalent (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:169). However, there can be no doubt that nationalism, ethnicity and religion were used as political capital, creating fear and leading to a state of "collective paranoia" between the three main groups (Woodward 1995:228). The proclamation of a Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, where territory reserved for one group only was the constituting principle, were nationalist projects pushed forwards by Serb and Croat leaders both within and without the republic of BiH (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153; Nystuen 2005:37). Serbs had ensured control over the Jugoslav National Army (JNA). Thus, they were the strongest military power of the three warring factions, and were able to conquer substantial amounts of territory in the beginning of the war (Ramet 2006:ch. 14-ch. 15).

During the war, the educational system quickly fell victim to the war. Already from 1992, the schools (the ones that were open – many had to close) were divided according to military positions and frontlines. This meant that whoever held an area militarily, also controlled which curricula were being used in schools, and created a situation where the education system was de facto divided in three (Torsti 2009:67). The international

[2] See definition of nationalism, under 1.6 Terms and definitions.
[3] The Serbs largely boycotted the referendum.

community tried to broker a peace agreement at several points in the time between 1992 and 1995, without succeeding. In the time it took before a peace plan to be accepted, more than one hundred thousand civilians lost their lives, and millions were displaced. BiH´s economic foundations were left in ruins as heavy fighting caused the destruction of massive amounts of buildings, roads, factories and infrastructure (Nystuen 2005:37). More specifically, around 105 000 people, out of a pre-war population of 4,4 million, lost their lives. 1 370 000 were displaced, and 1 200 000 became refugees (UNDP 1998). The war also brought with it an end to a centuries-long diversity (Hronesova 2012:40).

1.6 The Dayton Agreement and its theoretical underpinnings

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (often referred to as the Dayton Accords or the Dayton Agreement, but here we shall suffice with the abbreviation GFAP) put an end to the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina[4]. The agreement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in November, and came into force when it was signed on 15th of December 1995 in Paris (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:153-154). Earlier proposals and drafts for peace plans had been quite similar to the proposal that were presented to the parties in Dayton. The most well known of these are perhaps the Vance Owens Peace Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. These went quite far in condoning the new "ethnic landscape" of BiH, in that it distributed territories according to which ethnic group was dominant where (Nystuen 2005:52). This landscape was, of course, a consequence of the war, as it has been altered by fear and war crimes. When crafting a peace proposal in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the reality of these alterations had to be dealt with. Earlier peace efforts had been condemned, morally, largely because they had condoned the changed demographic picture. In 1995 it seemed that accepting the new pattern of ethnic divisions was preferable to continued war. Moreover, specific ethnicities were granted certain political rights. This was also a compromise that was needed to get the peace agreement signed (Nystuen 2005:3-4).

[4] The Washington Agreement that ended the Croat/Muslim war in March 1994 was a step towards peace, ending one of the territorial conflicts. It did, however, not include all parties in the conflict, and so fighting continued. The Washington Agreement created the Federation between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, one of the two entities recognized by the final peace agreement (Nystuen 2005:53).

The negotiating parties at Dayton, Ohio were President Alija Izetbegovic as representative of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Franjo Tudjman as representative of the Republic of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, as representative of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs were thus represented by Milosevic, from Belgrade. These three leaders, as well as a number of representatives for the international community, signed the General Framework Agreement (GFA) (Nystuen 2005:13, 57). In addition to the GFA, there were 11 Annexes that covered terms and conditions. The entire agreement is called the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Signatories to the Annexes were representatives from groups that were considered Bosnian parties to the conflict: The Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. A joint signature, given by a single representative of the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not seem possible, due to lack of legitimacy of such a person with all groups (Nystuen 2005:13).
The following are the Annexes of the peace agreements:

1A: Annex on the military implementation of the peace agreement
1B: Annex on regional stabilisation and disarmament.
3: Annex on election.
4. Annex containing Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5: Annex on arbitration.
6: Annex on human rights implementation mechanisms.
7: Annex on refugees and displaced persons.
8: Annex on a commission to preserve national monuments.
9: Annex on public corporations.
10: Annex on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.
11: Annex on an international police task force
(GFAP 1995)

According to the GFAP, BiH should not be a unitary state. It was to consist of two Entities, the Federation of BH and Republika Srpska. There would be a common Presidency, Parliament, cabinet of ministers and a Constitutional Court. Parliament, in accordance with GFAP, contains two houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples (Nystuen 2005:67).

The GFAP was brokered and written in a desperate situation, with time constantly running out. There was strong international pressure, and a domestic situation that did not allow for much idealism. Gro Nystuen claims that the GFAP did not have a vision, and surely not one that tried mimicking any scholarly model. The focus when the agreement was formed

was on stopping the bloodshed. Not much more. Many visions and principles had to be sacrificed in order to obtain an agreement, and the result was a framework in violation with international human rights – even though the agreement in itself claimed to adhere to existing treaties on this realm (Nystuen 2014; Nystuen 2005). For example, the requirement of ethnic affiliation for elections for House of Peoples as well as the Presidency, are clearly discriminatory. This has not gone unnoticed, however, as the 2009 verdict from the European Court of Human Rights states. The case is known as Sejdic-Finci, and was brought up by two individuals who demanded that the state of BiH changed the Constitution to allow all individuals in both entities to run for elections in these two government bodies (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:159). As we shall she in the Law-chapter, there have been two chances for ending this discrimination through proposed Constitutional changes. Both have failed.

Back to the GFAP, other reports and books have reiterated or added to the analyses of unfortunate features of the design and implementation of the GFAP (Human Rights Centre, University of Sarajevo 2012; Bieber 2006; Chandler 2000). However, despite all flaws, the peace agreement had to adhere to one particular ideal: Balance of power between the three constituent peoples, Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs. To not spell out this balance in great details would mean to lose one of the signatories as negotiating partner. The result of negotiations on this particular matter was that BiH were to become a federal state, and the new Constitution would provide the three groups with guarantees of influence and protection through various measures. The central power was – and still is - weak, and there are extensive residual powers resting with the entities and even lower levels of governance.

Responsibilities of the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to GFAP, Annex 4, art. III, (1):

- Foreign policy
- Foreign trade policy
- Monetary Policy as provided in Article VII
- Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation
- International and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol
- Establishment and operation of common ant international communications facilities
- Regulation of inter-Entity transportation
- Air traffic control

The components of the GFAP that make BiH quality as a power-sharing system, is, I would argue, a result of the need to ensure the balance of power between the three warring factions. First, there is a tripartite, rotating-chair presidency and equal representation of the three peoples in the upper chamber of the state parliament (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:154). This is a feature of proportional representation. All elections except those for House of Peoples and the Presidency are proportional. There is a possibility for each parliamentary group to use what is called entity voting (a double majority) and evoke the vital national interest-clause in the GFAP, to stop a law from going through the Parliamentary procedure (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:154, 165, 166). This is an example of minority veto. The entities have their own parliaments, with abilities to pass laws and execute them. All residual powers, meaning anything that is not on the list of state responsibilities, are to be handled by the entities (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:162-163). This is an element of territorial self-governance, or autonomy. The only feature that might be missing is the grand coalition. However, grand coalition might be understood as rules for decision-making as much as rules for representation. As such, the national House of Peoples can, with its de-facto demand for consensus, be claimed to be a feature of grand coalition. The presidency, with its demand for one representative from each group, can also be deemed to be a feature of grand coalition. All references to consociational elements are based on Lijphart (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977).

A more elaborate discussion about BiH as a case of a power-sharing democracy is found in Chapter 2.

GFAP´s entry into force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not subject to any domestic legal procedure such as a referendum or a parliamentary vote. The international community couldn´t take that chance, given the risk that a referendum could stop the entry into force. The presence of international community in the brokering of the peace agreement was substantial. The US government, as well as the Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia were part of the process. The Contact Group consisted of the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU/EC (Nystuen 2005:12). The GFAP is a wide-ranging legal instrument, involving both *transitional* (for example demilitarization and return of refugees and displaced persons) as well as *permanent* features (for example the constitution and the human rights annex) (Nystuen 2005:66).

1.7 The February 2014 unrest

Jumping cruelly fast ahead, the last element that needs explaining is February 2014. Violent protests and riots in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in early February in Tuzla, following the closure and sale of factories that had employed most of the local population. The unrest quickly spread to around 30 other cities in BiH. Hundreds of people have been reported injured in the most violent incidents since the 1992-1995 war. Police have used tear gas, rubber bullets and water to disperse protesters (BBC 2014).

The crowds mainly targeted government buildings. For example, protesters surrounded the Bosnian presidency in Sarajevo. Cantonal governmental buildings in Zenica, Bihac, Tuzla and Mostar were torched. Protesters expressed anger over the extensive degree of corruption and inefficiency in government of all levels. Unemployment is also a major issue. There is a general sentiment in BiH that politicians become obstructive and inefficient as soon as they get to power. Demands for resignation from office were voiced in many of the affected cities. Not long after the first protests, the whole cantonal government of Tuzla and Zenica resigned, as did Mario Sulenta, Interior Minister in Mostar (Balkan Insight 2014). The prime minister of Sarajevo canton and the cantonal government of Bihac have also resigned (per 25.03.2014). Most of the unrest has taken place in cities of the Federation. Some protests did occur in Banja Luka, but these were peaceful and lasted for only one day (Pasic 2014).

In ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, these protests have been surprisingly all encompassing when it comes to ethnic make-up of the marching masses. None the less, correspondents observe how media and public debate is used by elites to try and blame "the other" (Pasic 2014; Sarajlic 2014). For example, Bosniac political elites claim that the protests were orchestrated by the Serbs to destabilize the country so the RS can secede, Serb and Croat elites claimed that the upheavals were initiated by Bosniacs to destroy the federal organization of the country and make it more unitary (Sarajlic 2014). However, no trustworthy sources can be found for claiming that motivation behind the upheavals was in any way ethnic. The contention was, in all likeliness, an example of the population rising to address issues that are affecting them all. The demographic profile of the protesters was diverse. War veterans, pensioners, citizen´s associations, labour movements and youth have all participated (Pasic 2014). Former High Representative Wolfgang Petrisch argues that public discourse has now abandoned the ethnic-driven "policy of fear" through these protests. He is glad to note a movement in favour of the bread-and-butter issues of today (Petrisch 2014).

1.8 Terms and definitions

I use contentious vocabulary in this thesis, due to the mere fact that the vernacular in this field is loaded with such terms. Gary Goertz states: "There is no real difference between defining a word and providing an analyses of a concept" (Goertz 2006:3). This seems to be saying that how you define a word, tells a great deal of how you perceive not only what you are defining, but also the realm around it. Definitions are important and contextual, and I shall treat them as such.

Ethnicity: Ethnicity has become an umbrella concept in scholarly as well as non-scholarly vocabularies. It often denotes most any form of group consciousness, from race to language, colour and religion. A quite basic definition is that is the fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition (Oxford Dictionaries 2010). Furthermore, ethnicity can be viewed as a social phenomenon, with a framework of us/them-thinking (Calhoun 1994:2). Fredrik Barth sees ethnicity as something fluid, flexible, changeable and deeply social. It malleability means that both boundaries around and content within the ethnic categories can be renegotiated and (re)produced (Barth 1969). A final contribution accentuates that in contrast to social stratification, which divides or unifies people along horizontal axes on the basis of socioeconomic factors, ethnic identities creates

division and unification along vertical axes. Thus, ethnic groups should, in theory, draw members from all strata of the population. Moreover, ethnic group identity has a strong psychological or emotional component that serve to identify and divide (Peoples and Garrick 2011:389). To sum up, the understanding of ethnicity in this project is influenced by social anthropology, and is mainly based on people´s perception of themselves and others. In BiH such a definition of ethnicity makes sense, and if using the above as a framework, you would find that Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs are clearly demarcated ethnic groups, with us/them-divides and a consciousness around history and culture that is discernable even in brief conversations. Hronesova argues that those who are a result of mixed marriages suffer from an ongoing crisis of identity, as they have trouble defining who is the "self" and who is the "other" (Hronesova 2012). This suggests that the realms of the three groups are a social reality whether or not you fit into them. The choices made by people of mixed descent with regards to spouse, religious practice, place of residence etc. takes on a value-laden characteristic, positioning the person vis a vis ethnic reference points shared by most citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Democracy: Since the word democracy will be used repeatedly in this thesis, there is a need to establish a basic understanding of the term itself – independent of the theoretical framework constructed around it in Chapter 2, as this will be more controversial and less basic. Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally – either directly or indirectly through representatives (Oxford Dictionaries 2010). Moreover, it is to be regarded as a system of governance characterised by 1) upward control, meaning that sovereignty stems from the lowest levels of authority, 2) political equality, and 3) social norms fostering an environment where breaks on the first two principles are deemed unacceptable (Kimber 1989). Writing about democracy is almost always normative. More democracy is considered better. This project is no exception.

Culture: Ethnic groups are said to have a shared culture. In this project, culture will be understood as the ideas, customs and social behaviour of a particular people or society (Oxford Dictionaries 2010).

Nationalism and nation: As these terms are not particularly central, it is not necessary to create a major discussion around it. However, as "nationalism" is used more than once, it is necessary to provide a definition. Hence, nation must also be defined.

Starting with the former, a fitting definition of nationalism would be that it is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute and actual or potential "nation"" (Smith 2010:9-10).

Oxford dictionaries defines "nation" as "a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory" (Oxford Dictionaries 2010). This definition demands territory. However, in a globalising world, the nation is increasingly understood as an entity that is not spatially defined. Benedict Anderson´s defines nation as an "imagined political community" (Anderson 1991:6-7), capturing the subjective aspects of nation as a perceived entity. I prefer a combination of the two, seeing nation as a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture or language, who also seek spatial unity. Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs in BiH fit this definition. It also allows for the inclusion of diaspora – not vital in this project, but worth mentioning.

1.9 List of abbreviations:

As mentioned, Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiH will be used interchangeably. Moreover, the terms indicator and variable are both referring to the concept of independent variable, as defined by King, Keohane and Verba (1994:77). In addition, power sharing system and consociational system are used intermittently, referring to the same school of thought.

The following abbreviations will be in use:

SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

RS – Republika Sprska, not to be confused with the state of Serbia.

FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

GFAP - General Framework Agreement of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement or the Dayton Accords.

Abbreviations of Political Parties found in Tables:

SDA – Party of Democratic Action – Stranka Demokratske Akcije

SDS - Serb Democratic Party – Srpska Demokratska Stranka

SRS – Serbian Radical Party – Srpska Radikalna Stranka

SDP – Social Democratic Party – Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine

HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Herzegovine

SNSD – Alliance of Independent Social Democrats – Savez Neznavisnih Socijaldemokrata

SBIH – Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina - Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu

PDP Mladen Ivanic – Party of Democratic Progress Mladen Ivanic - Partija Demokratskog Progresa Mladen Ivanic

SNS – Biljana Plavsic – Serbian Progressive Party – Srpska Napredna Stranka

DNS RS – Democratic National Alliance - Demokratski Narodni Savez

HSS – Croat Peasant Party - Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka

NHI – New Croat Initiative Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa

SBB – Union for a Better Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Savez za bolju buducnost BiH

1.10 Personal point of departure

I became interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina through studies at the Norwegian Nansen Academy in 2006/2007. Since then I have been travelling in, studying and reading about the country. I have been especially interested in the topic of divided societies. I don´t speak the language, hence I had to rely on translators to obtain some of the data.

2 THEORY

In this chapter, a conceptual framework will be built onto which to superimpose the data. In relation to the Research Question, there are two concepts that in particular need to be filled with meaningful content. These are democracy and reconciliation – the concepts in the dependent variable (see Chapter 3). Below, I will argue that these two terms are visions inherent in political systems that have a consociational, or power sharing, design (terms will be used interchangeably). First in this chapter, the theory of power sharing will be presented to give background on kind of political category that BiH belongs to as a state, along with an argument for why BiH is, in fact, a consociational democracy. Then, theoretical contributions pertaining to democracy and reconciliation will be presented. These terms are –regardless of how their theoretical origins define them- to be considered as continuums, but with no clear demarcation scale. There is a normative aspect in play, in that *more reconciliation* and *more democracy* are considered to be better.

2.1 Introduction to consociationalism

In the following I shall present basic ideas within consociationalism, as well as recent developments in the tradition. Then, inherent visions about post-conflict situations are presented, as well as the practical arrangements through which these visions are to be realized. Last in this paragraph comes a brief overview of the criticism posed against the tradition.

The over-arching goal of governmental set-ups – and especially so in a post-conflict society – is to create a functioning and stable democracy where law and order prevails. Some, such as John Stuart Mill, have claimed that democracy is "next to impossible" in multi-ethnic societies – and completely impossible in linguistically divided societies (Mill 1958 [1861]:42). It has on the other hand been claimed that democracy is the only system in which diversion within the population can be accommodated without subduing or assimilating any part of it (Wolff 2012:23). The question of how to design such a democracy becomes a pivotal question. Arend Lijphart, by many viewed as the founding father of the consociational school of thought, draws out a democratic design allowing a society can be both fragmented *and* stable. His first contributions, originally published in 1969, analysed Netherlands and Belgium, alongside with Scandinavian countries (Lijphart 2002 [1969]), but later on he moved on to study more severely fragmented societies (Ljiphart 1977). Many democratic constitutions prescribe majoritarian decision making for day-to-day business when the stakes

involved are not to high. In times of crises, extraordinary majorities or consecutive majorities are common (such as when constitutional amendment is on the agenda). In such a situation, a state often resorts to a form of power sharing that ensures broad representation. An example is Sweden, which formed grand coalition governments during the Second World War. The decisions that need to be made in times of crises are deemed so important that majority rule is abandoned, even in consensual and rather homogenous societies. In fragmented societies, says Lijphart, a large number of decisions are viewed in this light (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:30-31). Thus, systems must be designed to alleviate anxieties and hostilities. His – and consociational, in the traditional sense – solution consists of a set of tools to remove competitive features as much as possible, in order to make the different groups feel confident that they are represented in decision-making processes (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:31). A power-sharing arrangement seeks to include potential "spoilers" and their constituencies in formal decision-making procedures, because they need to be convinced that expected payoff for peaceful cooperation is greater than payoff for violent behaviour. A consociational set-up provides a "floor" for each party´s returns, limiting the uncertainty found in democratic societies by limiting the ability of larger social groups to completely quell the influence of small groups (Gates and Strøm 2007:3). It follows from this argument that an awful lot is expected from elites. Elites need to be committed to maintenance of the system and to accommodate divergent interests and demands. This rests on an assumption that elites understand the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:32). Despite these words of caveat against pro accommodation and against fragmentation, it is recommended that transactions between antagonistic subcultures in divided societies be kept to a minimum (Lijphart 2002 [1969]:35). Such a recommendation has often been taken to imply that "good fences make good neighbours". All in all, consociationalism envisions a society where ethnic tensions are lowered over time. The cause-effect mechanism through which this is accomplished is by providing channels of influence and representation, seeking to form incentives for elites to behave cooperatively. A consequence of a "successful" power sharing system in a divided society would, according to a power sharing logic, be that ethnic markers and communal lines cease to be the most salient factor of political life over time. It would also be that decisions are made peacefully and efficiently, both at central and local level.

What practical arrangements should bring about these visions? In his 1969 article (Lijphart 2002 [1969]), there is a recommendation for the government to be formed according to the principle of grand coalition – every group should be represented in the executive power. In 1977, three other features are added (Ljiphart 1977). The treatment of more deeply divided

societies seem to necessitate a more complex theory. The way to accomplish democratic and inter-communal ideals in such societies, are through a set of tools. In its most basic form, these are 1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, 2) cultural autonomy for these groups, 3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and 4) a mutual veto with regard to vital minority and autonomy (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42; Ljiphart 1977:ch. 2). To ground these features a bit more, each paragraph tying a consociational trait to conditions in BiH (see below) will start with relaying this writer´s understanding of the trait.

One of consociationalism´s most adamants critics, Donald Horowitz, claim, much to the contrary of the above visions, that a consociationalistic societal set-up reifies and hardens ethnic identities. He also holds that multi-ethnic coalitions generate inter-ethnic competition, or flanking. Rival cooperation is inherently unstable, and the focus becomes centred upon ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class (Horowitz 1985; 1991; 2003). This would seem to be in contrast with visions of a lowered importance of communal lines and peaceful conditions for decision-making. Lijphart and Horowitz are often purported as eternal adversaries in the theory of how to deal with divided societies. Power-sharing scholars have met the criticism with efforts to refine and modernise some of the theory. For example, a more flexible view of groups is deemed important. In traditional, or "corporate" consociationalism (as represented by Lijphart in the 70´s), it is assumed that group identities are "fixed, and that groups are both internally homogenous and externally bounded" (McGarry 2007:172). In a more recent contribution, McGarry instead embraces a "liberal consociationalism". When put into practice, it "rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group or trans-group identities" (McGarry 2007:172). This would mean that shifts in group-identities or loyalty patterns within the population would be mirrored in institutions, by way of democratic elections. A liberal consociationalism, however, requires considerable foresight in the writing of constitutions and other legally binding texts. According to Wolff, a more liberal concept of group identities could be a way of addressing the "empirically valid" criticism referred to above (Wolff 2012:26). I do not aim for an integrationist/consociationalist discussion. The intention is to show a glimpse of developments in the tradition that have been spurred by critique from outside of it. Summing up, consociationalism can be considered a system of tools and visions that are thought to aid the delivery of functional and stable democracy, as well as the gradual reduction of communal divisions over time.

2.2 Is Bosnia and Herzegovina post 1995 a consociational democracy?

For new data about developments in BiH to be relevant to the discussion of consociational democracy, we need to establish that BiH is, in fact, such a democracy. Only then can new findings be influential. Since most of the arrangements of the GFAP are still in place in the daily governing of Bosnia and Herzegovina, elements of the GFAP is going to be a large part of this discussion.

There is no mention in the Dayton Accords that it considers itself a consociational agreement. Neither is the term power sharing used (GFAP 1995). On the one hand, it might be reasonable to demand theoretical underpinnings such as this one to be explicit, if we are to treat it as a case of that theoretical school. On the other hand, it can be imagined that unvoiced ideas could be underlying a more concrete product without explicit reference. Knowing the basics about the very difficult climate in the 1995 peace negotiations, it is hardly surprising that attention was on hands-on issues rather than theoretical frameworks. It thus seems possible that the GFAP could have been based on consociational thinking without stating it. Sumantra Bose is one of those who claim that GFAP has elements of, among other things, devolution, federalism and consociationalism (2002:202). The same is Weller (2010). This backs up the possibility of regarding the GFAP as a consociational arrangement even though it is not explicitly said to be. Below follows a more stringent discussion of central elements in the BiH Constitutional set-up, structured according to the four characteristics deemed most important in the theoretical model of power sharing. This serves the purpose both of elaborating the four characteristics mentioned earlier, as well as discussing whether or not they fit Bosnia and Herzegovina.

a) Grand coalition

All major linguistic and religious groups should be represented in the executive power, according to Lijphart (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). This would entail a definition of what constitutes a "major group", as well as technical procedures that all could agree on. In a consolidated democracy, governments are often formed that are just large enough to control a majority of parliamentary seats. But in a grand coalition, most or all parties are part of the government, broadening the views of the cabinet to include that of all groups (Ljiphart 1977). According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, governments are not grand coalition governments. There are, however, two features of grand coalition spelled out in the

Constitution: Each group needs to have one representative in the Presidency, and the decision making demands in the House of Peoples demands de facto consensus (GFAP 1995:annex 4, art. 5).

b) Self-governance/autonomy

Lijphart purports "cultural autonomy" for the groups recognized in criterion a) (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). Wolff notes how power-sharing theorists often use autonomy used to speak of both a territorially separate unit within an otherwise unitary state, *and* the right of some group or representatives of a cultural group to make decisions independently from the federal government. The meaning of autonomy is, apparently, used in both abstract and concrete form, although the two are often intertwined. Common for them is the transfer of certain powers from a central government to that of the self-governing entity (Wolff 2012:27-28). At the most aggregate level, the BiH Constitution states that the country is divided into two entities (GFAP 1995:annex IV, art. I (3)). It also states that these are to be separated by an Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (GFAP 1995:annex 2). Such a provision is an example of territorial self-governance (TSG). The Cantons in the Federation is also a feature of TSG. They have their own governments and ministries. The Cantons are hardly mentioned in the Dayton Accords, and have their roots in the peace agreement between Bosniacs and Croats in 1994. Regardless, the decision to allow FBiH to keep the Cantons, with extensive powers, must be regarded as a TSG measurement. Moving on to the abstract level, the entities were allowed to keep their constitutions, although the agreement read that these would be amended "to ensure conformity" with the BiH Constitution over time (GFAP 1995:annex 4, art. XII (2) and III (3) (b)). Moreover, art. III (3) (a) of the Constitution states that all powers not explicitly defined as the central government´s responsibility, should be regarded as entity responsibility. This includes education and military forces (the armed forces were, however, moved under the control of central governmental, following a law passed by Parliament in 2004). In reality, this means that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 14 bodies with legislative powers. It could be argued that this is not abstract at all, because these powers have *geography* as its basis. However, since Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially more homogenous than before the war (Valenta and Strabac 2013:129), this trait can be said to have an ethnic or cultural basis. As such, it is abstract. As an example, 90% of the current population in Republika Srpska is surmised to be Serbs, and many studies indicate that Bosnian cities, towns and municipalities have become mono-ethnic. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the development is irreversible (Valenta and Strabac 2013:129; Ahmetasevic

2006). Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina has autonomy measures, both in a geographical and an abstract sense – although the latter is merely implicit.

c) Proportional representation

Lijphart defines proportional representation as another tool with which to ensure a functional and democracy in a divided society (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). Such a trait must necessarily also operate on the basis of a negotiated definition of which groups that are to be represented, and it seems reasonable to assume that all institutions that in any way can shape decisions in the political system should be affected by such a system. The Constitution defines Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs as Constituent Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP 1995:annex 4, preamble), and provides legal foundation for ethnic representation in both chambers of the central law making body, the Parliamentary Assembly. Whereas groups are not guaranteed what representation they will end up with in the House of Representatives (as it is based on entity and not ethnicity), they *are* guaranteed to have one-third of the representatives in the House of Peoples (GFAP 1995:annex 4, art. IV (1) and (2)). Through an imposed law from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 2002, entity Constitutions were amended to harmonize with the BiH Constitution. This entailed that more institutions than before were required to be proportional, making BiH a triple-sharing system (Bieber 2006 :44). From this, we can conclude that the GFAP have strong features of proportional representation. If anything, the insistence of proportionality seems to have gotten stronger over the years.

d) Mutual veto

Another device in theories about power sharing in divided societies is the possibility of groups to stop decisions that would have a negative effect on important group rights as well as autonomy (Lijphart 2002 [1996]:42). This, as is often heard as an argument for power sharing, will heighten the degree of security that can be obtained by cooperating in a democratic set-up (Ljiphart 1977). A mutual veto should be available for all defined groups for it to be reasonable, as well as having well formulated criteria and procedures for its usage. Otherwise there is a risk of the tool being used for obstruction and sabotage. The groups defined as constitutional people in BiH have such a right to veto decisions. They can do so in two ways. First, the Delegates from the House of Peoples can declare a proposed decision from the Parliamentary Assembly to be destructive for a vital interest for the Croat, Serb or Bosniac people. A majority of the ethnic caucus in the House of Peoples vote needs to support the issuance of such a declaration. Members of the BiH Presidency can also evoke

the Vital National Interest-rule. Croats and Serbs were adamant during negotiations of the GFAP that the ethnic veto should be final, with no deadlock-breaking mechanisms embedded in the Agreement. However, a claim for VNI can be nullified by the Constitutional Court, to which the case is referred. They have authority to decide whether proper procedure has been followed. This does not mean that they can decide on the subject matter – whether a vital national interest is really at stake (Nystuen 2005:75). In practice, however, the Constitutional Court has shown that it actually also takes this into account. The second provision for mutual veto is often referred to as Entity Voting. It is a requirement that goes for both chambers, and it means that a decisions passes if they get the votes from the majority of those present and voting, unless the dissenting votes include two-thirds or more of the delegates elected from either entity, or either caucus in the House of Peoples (Nystuen 2005:76) It can thus be concluded that mutual veto rules are in place at the central level of BiH, as a result of the GFAP.

Concluding, the BiH Constitution as it stands today, has strong elements of consociational thinking. Next, I will construct a theoretical frame containing contributions on two concepts that are central in ontological world of power-sharing democracies: Democracy and reconciliation.

2.3 Establishing main concepts

Power-sharing theory presents a set of tools along. Tools are used to create outcomes. I would argue that two of these outcomes are democracy and reconciliation. However, *what kind* of democracy and reconciliation is not a given.

The chosen framework is centred on the citizen. Structural measures form a sort of minimum criteria. They are deemed necessary, but not very fruitful when attempting to link data to theoretical concepts. The approach chosen is more bottom-up. As indicators in this thesis capture features of daily life such as which school to send your child to and the choice of whether or not to return to where you lived before the war, such a framework makes more sense than a more structural, technical one. Moreover, recent unrest in BiH suggests the importance of grounding theory in how population perceives, rather than in technical criteria for, democracy and reconciliation. The downside of such a framework is that some pivotal elements are vague, in that it leaves to popular perception to define, for example,

cooperation, dialogue and "demands and preferences" vis á vis politicians. However, such a cost seems outweighed by the benefits of this framework.

2.3.1 Democracy

Democracy can be defined as a political system containing 1) universal adult suffrage, 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections, 3) more than one serious political party, and 4) alternative sources of information (Diamond and Morlino 2005:10-11). These are deemed to be structural, minimum criteria. Above, it is argued that consociational thinking envisions stable and functional democracies. To better capture citizen´s experience, this is redefined as *democratic quality*. In latter years, voices have emerged that advocate for looking beyond terse, structural measures of democracy, onto questions pertaining to more substantive qualities than can or cannot be present in a democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005). The point of this is to have a better way of analysing how a democracy is functioning and being perceived by its citizens. This is an idea that makes sense in the project at hand.

The analytical framework divides democratic traits into three analytical categories (procedural dimensions, substantial dimensions and outcomes). Procedural dimensions encompass over-arching, structural features of a democracy: The rule of law, participation, competition and accountability (both horizontally and vertically). Substantial dimensions encompass respect for civil and political freedoms, as well as progressive implementation of greater political, social and economic equality. Outcomes serve as a link between procedural and substantive dimensions by measuring the extent to which public policies correspond to citizen's demands and preferences. The main point if these scholars is that you can´t claim that the quality of democracy is good unless substantial dimensions, measured by outcomes, are fulfilled. The outcomes are to be judged by those who democracy serve, namely the people (Diamond and Morlino 2005). In sum, democratic tools and features alone doesn´t provide the realisations of democratic ideals. It is the content side of it that matters. In this project, the above constitute the framework for assessing democratic quality.

Gates and Strøm´s article on transaction costs and agency loss completes the framework of democracy. Their universe is that of power sharing democracies, and the potential of power sharing is discussed in relation to peace making and democratic ideals. Fruitful for this endeavour is the highlighting of some problematic aspects that pertain to democratic quality. Gates and Strøm hold that a high degree of sensitivity of political outcomes (election results) to the performance of relevant players (procedural performance sensitivity) is good, as in more democratic. Second, they hold that a large share of *ex ante*

uncertainty about feasible political outcomes is good, as in more democratic, because it promotes competition and makes sure the one with the most public support gets the most votes (Gates and Strøm 2007:5). However, there is also a prerequisite that the result should be considered fair *ex post* for a system to be viewed as democratic. No group should receive a payoff that falls below a certain level of acceptability. In divided societies, this is more important than in perhaps any other system. This is where consociationalism has its great strength – it is very fair *ex post*. However, this comes at the expense of uncertainty and procedural performance sensitivity, the authors hold. In other words, in a power-sharing system, some features of democracy are being promoted at the expense of others (Gates and Strøm 2007:5-7). As such, "while power- sharing may help prevent conflict, at least some power-sharing arrangements may at the same time be detrimental to democratic accountability and favour politicians that represent narrow group constituencies" (Gates and Strøm 2007:7). This may lead to group-oriented and rent-seeking behaviour, at the expense of public good provision. Institutional design in power-sharing democracies are often complicated, making it hard for citizens to reveal and police acts that go against the common interest of the people. Many decisions are made behind closed doors, and elites may form cartels based on mutual interests (Gates and Strøm 2007:7). "Elite cartels" is an acknowledged trait of consociational systems (Ljiphart 1977:216). Gates and Strøm point to the hazards of them. The maze of trade-offs and ideals outlined above are captured by the terms ***transaction costs*** and ***agency loss***. I understand these as diagnostic concepts, pointing to (unfortunate) outcomes that are especially prevalent in power sharing democracies. It is these terms that will be important as backdrop for my analysis. Transaction costs refer to a lack of decision-making in the institutions that are assigned with decision-making powers. Agency loss occurs between politicians (agents) and people (the principals), and refers to the difference between what principals want and what agents deliver[5]. The latter, Gates and Strøm claim, shows the cost of including potential "spoilers" (of a peace process) in political life. On the pro-side, these are clear representatives of their groups. They are easy to identify, and are seen as secure providers of private goods by the principals in the short run. In the long run, however, these agents are less likely to work for the common good (Gates and Strøm 2007:8). Summing up. The more transaction costs and agency loss are present in a society, and the less substance (in the form of concrete outcomes, as deemed by the citizen), the poorer the quality of democracy.

[5] As such, it overlaps somewhat to the demand for substance, in the writings of Diamond and Morlino.

2.3.2 Reconciliation

In addition to a framework for assessing democratic quality, there is also a need for a conceptual framework pertaining to reconciliation. The level of animosity between groups in the Republic of BiH was low during its time as a Yugoslav republic, although perceptions about cultural differences were present (Hronesova 2012:37). The return to such a state – awareness of difference, but without animosity – constitutes the most fundamental meaning of the term reconciliation in this thesis. However, for a more elaborate framework, I will draw upon Johan Galtung´s term "positive peace" (Galtung 2012). Galtung constructs an intricate theory of violence and peace, with three forms of "peacelessness" (Direct Violence, Structural Violence and Cultural Violence) and three forms of peace (Direct Peace, Structural Peace and Cultural Peace) (Galtung 2012:12). An important insight to be gained from reading his work is that absence of violence is not the same as peace – at least not if we understand peace as harmonious coexistence where people can live free of exploitation, animosities and suppression. Galtung´s presentation of incremental levels goes in the direction from war towards peace, and describes numerous stages along the way. This creates a much more nuanced conceptual framework than the dichotomy of "war" and "peace". The character of intergroup communication and interaction are vital when identifying different stages. At one extreme end we find warfare as direct violence. At the other, we find "positive nonviolence", meaning cooperation, dialogue, empathy and reconciliation (Galtung 2012:48-49). The gain in including Galtung´s work is to be able to posit developments (i.e. data scores) on a continuum from coexistence without violence, but with conflict, to coexistence with harmony and low levels of conflict. The term reconciliation in this project will be shorthand for positive nonviolence. Why not use "positive nonviolence" in full? One reason is that reconciliation is an established concept for many people in BiH, as it has been part of the post-war discourse for 18 years. Another is that it seems to be a good term for the inter-communal development that is a vision in consociational theory. A third reason is that the prefix "re" suggests a temporal dimension, suiting the longitudinal design of this project. Finally, and most importantly, I wish to suggest that dialogue, empathy and cooperation are in fact necessary ingredients in reconciliation. As such, reconciliation is posited one level above the other three terms, conceptually.

Summing up, we now seem to have established a framework of theory that enables us to posit data in relation to the two most important concepts of the research question: Democratic quality and reconciliation.

3 METHOD

I have collected data on four variables to answer my research question. Whereas I have previously defined the "what" of this thesis, it is now time to turn to the question of "how". How will I reach conclusions? In what follows, I will review methodological concepts, and posit the thesis in relation to these.

Methodological outline

3.1 The thesis in relation to central methodological concepts

I have conducted a case study with one single case. This seems to be the only viable way of answering the research question posed. A puzzle such as this calls for many observations on chosen indicators to obtain ***validity***; that we "measure what we think we are measuring" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:25) and ***reliability***, which refers to the degree to which the findings of a study are independent of accidental circumstances of their production (Miller and Kirk 1986:20). A common imperative in social science research is to increase the number of cases to increase ***validity*** (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This imperative is not adhered to here. Focusing on one case increases the chances of obtaining a high degree of ***internal validity*** (Gerring 2007:43), in that we get the chance to collect numerous observations. Moreover, the Research Question posed demands a high degree ***conceptual validity*** (George and Bennett 2005:19), and with the introduction of other cases for comparison, this could not have been obtained. I would argue that the project at hand has a high degree of conceptual validity, in that in-depth knowledge about Bosnia and Herzegovina has been employed to arrive at the best indicators for answering the research question. Conceptual and internal validity is, as I see it, two sides to the same story. They both emphasize a) the deployment of a deep knowledge of the empirical realities of the case, and b) the possibility to collect more observations without exceeding time and spatial limits.

The chosen research design have allowed for many observations, making it more likely that we end up with a large number of ***observable implications*** (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:29). Gerring strongly encourages the latter in his work about case studies in social science (2007:20-22, 26). Observable implications allow a researcher to posit aggregate scores correctly. This enhances the possibility of conclusions being correct.

Three out of four variables in this project are measured longitudinally, in order to capture developments since the peace in 1995. This has been done with regards to x1 (minority returns) x2 (elections) and x3 (laws) since a reasonable amount of data has been available for all years that are relevant to measure. For variable x4 (schools), measuring individual years is not possible due to lack of data. Interviews and academic contributions will constitute the basis for an assessment of this variable. The data found on all variables will be compared to the established theoretical framework. The caveat of a project like this is that it is too ambitious and wide. Thus, inferences must be strictly limited to the areas where measurements have been made. It is thus not my intention to "diagnose" Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

Observations will not land in a binary universe where they either support or falsify a hypothesis, like observations in a study design inspired by the Deductive-Nomological model (Woodward 2009). Rather, they will serve the role as observable implications in relation to a conceptual framework. In a thesis where theory plays such an important part, "theoretical transparency" - making explicit the theoretical stance from which the interpretation takes place – is important. This is because "the theoretical frame produces particular interpretations and excludes others" (Moisander and Valtonen 2006:27). The way I have adhered to this ideal is through making sure references to the theoretical framework are explicit in the text rather than implicit, wherever this makes sense.

3.2 A case of something else?

Gerring holds that a case study should aim to "shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)" (Gerring 2007:20). Levy has a similar view; a case has come to be regarded as an instance of something else (Levy 2008:2). Is the work at hand in contradiction with these ideals, as it is analysing data only from BiH? This project can be view as an instance of "something else" in several respects. First, it is a demonstration of one way – a citizen centred way- to study a post-conflict democracy. Second, elements of it, like the analysis of post-conflict voting behaviour, could be transferrable to other deeply divided societies, suggesting a way to connect theory and data in such societies. The main focus of this work is to measure an empirical situation in the light of theory, to arrive at conclusions about democracy and reconciliation. As such, it is a part of a wider literature where on-the-ground realities are compared with theoretical models. However, as the above should suggest, the aims have been for high internal validity and a deep, rather than wide, investigational focus.

3.3 Fieldwork

Over the course of this research, I travelled three times to Bosnia and Herzegovina. One was an inspirational trip in June 2013, one was in November 2013, and the third time happened in January 2014. During the stays I met with selected people and interviewed them, as well as visiting official bodies for data collection. My reason for travelling to BiH, when so much of the material actually could, at least in theory, be obtained by email or by phone is twofold. Firstly, I wanted to include in-depth interviews in my research. It became increasingly clear that when studying BiH, you have to go there. Everything from language barriers to the mere fact that complex questions are hard to answer via email made it necessary for all interviews to be conducted while I was actually in the country. Also, as political scientist and anthropological scholar James C. Scott stated in an interview: "You can`t explain human behaviour behind the backs of the people who are being explained." (Glenn 2009:14). This quote is appealing because it hints at a process of reality checking data. You have data pointing a given way, yet there is what I perceive to be a real need to not "explain things behind their backs".

During fieldworks, every bit of knowledge and resource I had was put to good use. My supervisor has worked and lived several years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his knowledge was invaluable. He was able to provide me with useful contacts without which my attempts at conducting a fieldwork might have been rather pathetic. Also, he has written a book about electoral systems in conflict-ridden societies, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011). Secondly, I have worked as a journalist for many years and feel comfortable doing interviews. Thirdly, I have gained knowledge about history and politics in BiH after having been interested in the country for a long time. These three factors put together were vital when I was doing fieldwork.

3.4 Interviews as method

During the duration of the work, I conducted more than ten interviews in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I mapped beforehand which people I wanted to talk to, and wrote a list of questions according to their area of expertise. Open-ended questions were used as much as possible, to allow for the probing for information as well as flexibility for the respondents to structure their responses (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:673). I also took to the habit of asking all respondents their general impressions on the issues of x1 (minority returns) and x4 (schools), as this seemed to be an issue area where it was possible to make an educated guess

without having real expertise in the field. Even though I don´t quote everyone that gave their opinion on x1 and x4, I used it as a way of making sure the people I had selected were not completely out of tune with common perceptions of the field. As it turned out, they were very much in tune, reassuring me that I had found knowledgeable people to interview. I am aware of the caveat to interpret information relayed in interviews wrong because I have a preconceived idea about what they will yield, or because the person I am talking to is similar to myself in beliefs and attitudes (Berry 2002). Moreover, there is a general tendency to blame the international community for problems in BiH, in addition to exaggerate the sad state of affairs. These potential problems were attempted solved by a) increasing the number of sources, and b) double-checking statements with questions such as "So, you don´t think that all the fuss about segregated schools is an exaggeration, then?" and "Could it be that minority returns have happened without it being registered anywhere? Why not?" The point was to make sure I had not misheard or misunderstood initial statements. I made notes while interviewing in a form of shorthand. I chose not to transcribe interviews from audio recordings as I have sufficient experience in my work as a journalist of writing and interviewing at the same time. A significant obstacle in relation to interview was my lack of knowledge of local language. However, most of the subjects spoke English well. Language barriers were only an issue with regards to three interviews. These were with the President of the Helsinki Committee in BiH, Srdjan Dzdarevic, former mayor of Tuzla, Selim Beslagic, as well as the closest advisor to the mayor of Srebrenica, Amir Kulaglic. Regarding the former, I had someone else with me at the interview. We helped each other during the interview, and wrote separate transcripts. Last, we consolidated our transcripts through mutual discussion. Regarding the two latter, I used an interpreter.

The role of information obtained from interviews has varied from non-existent (as in the election variable) to very important (as in the variable about Schools and Minority returns). In relation to Schools, interviews have been *the most important* source for reaching conclusions, as no data allowing for aggregate analysis exists. This is a potential methodological problem. I have attempted to solve it by increasing the number of sources, as well as interviewing people that I would surmise to have differing opinions. The answers have been surprisingly consistent, however, both among representatives from the international community, from the political elite and NGO´s.

Variables

In this section dependent and independent variables are presented and justified.

3.5 Dependent variable

A dependent variable is an outcome, a puzzle, something we are interested in knowing more about, or about the causes behind (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:77). Perceived causes are measured by independent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:21). The scores on these should yield insights about the dependent variable. How do you decide on a puzzle or an outcome to study? To be worthy of scientific endeavour, a research project should set out to explain or find out something that is important in the real world, as well as "increase our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:15). I would argue that my research question matches these criteria. The dependent variable in this project, which is

y1 – democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in BiH

has been addressed in in academic literature before. However, new data will always "make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:15), even if a dependent variable has been a topic for earlier research. The dependent variable here cannot be characterised as "unexplained outcomes" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:77), like in the ideal type of some methods literature. It is rather a premonition or a commonly held belief in many circles, albeit more in the line of "what is wrong with Bosnia and Herzegovina?" than a clear and defined outcome. The research question and the dependent variable came to out of a need to formulate this puzzle in a stringent and scientific manner. Current events will be discussed in light of findings on y1. It is supposed that it has connection to y1, possibly causal. However, it will be presented as auxiliary evidence for conclusions more than a finding in itself.

3.6 Independent variables

An independent variable, or indicator, can be defined as an explanatory or causal factor, with connection to the outcome (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:21). In this context, independent variables will be used to arrive at an assessment of democratic shortcomings and degree of reconciliation. It is vital that the way variables are operationalized measure the dependent variable, and not something else. I have used Gary Goertz´ as a source of reference for

critically evaluating whether the indicator/data level is connected with the "basic level" (Goertz 2006:6). For simplicity, I formalise the indicators as x1, x2, x3 and x4.

x1 – minority returns
x2 - elections
x3 – laws
x4 - schools

3.6.1 Choosing independent variables

Reiterating what is stated above: A case study done right allows for high levels of conceptual validity (George and Bennett 2005:19), due to idiographic knowledge invested in the process. Moreover, the principle of omitted variable bias has been useful (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:168). Omitting the four variables I have chosen would, in my view, increase the chance of invalid conclusions to the Research Question. Moreover, it seemed to be the most ambitious number of variables possible to incorporate, given the time limitations.
For maximizing the chance that we are "measuring what we think we are measuring", or in other words obtaining validity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:25), potential sources of bias will be accounted for in the respective chapters. In terms of replicability (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:25-26; George and Bennett 2005:106), I would a) argue that another researcher looking for data on the four indicators would probably come to much of the same conclusions if seen in the light of the theoretical framework at hand, and that b) sufficient explanation of how the data have been collected and analysed will be provided, so as to ensure methodological transparency (Moisander and Valtonen 2006:27). When this is said, conclusions are inevitably based on reasoning. Reasoning always has an element of subjectivity, although this is not the same as to say that all knowledge about social phenomena is subjective and worthless, as some claim (Hayek 1980). However, this element creates the possibility that another researcher would not end up at similar conclusions. This is, in itself, a source of bias, but not one that can be ameliorated other than by providing transparency on the issue. Below is a short contextualisation of each independent variable.

3.6.2 Minority returns – x1

At the end of the war in 1995 about 1 350 000 were refugees and 1 282 000 were displaced persons within BiH. The pre-war population of BiH was 4 364 575 (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 1996:45-46, 52). People fled because they were forced, or because they were afraid of being targets of violence. The issue of getting people to return to pre-war property was complicated by the fact that many buildings were destroyed. Moreover,

there was a situation of deep mistrust, fear and hatred between the ethnic groups (Hastings 2001:221-222). Despite of this, getting refugees and internally displaced people (IDP´s) to return became a top priority for the international community around 1999-2000, and through laws – imposed and passed in Parliament – and vigorous efforts, people got the right to move back into their pre-war residence. This seemed a success at first, but it quickly turned out that those who were returning were so called "majority returns" – people returning to a place of residence where "their" ethnic group was the majority. Minority returns – people returning to a place of residence where "their" ethnic group was a minority - proved much harder (Hastings 2001). The latest Property Law Implementation Plan statistics show a success rate of more than 93% (UNCHR, OSCE, OHR 2006:4), nation wide. There are local variations to this number, but they are minor. Every case that is counted within these 93% is one where a complaint has been filed, the case has been investigated, a decision made and the case closed. The vast majority of decisions were in favour of the claimant. However, I grew to learn that there is no data on whether or not people *actually* moved into the apartments or houses that they had won access to. This puzzle seemed important to solve. *If* BiH of 2014 is, in reality, ethnically homogenous, where groups live in pockets, this is important when assessing democratic quality. It has potential links to the theory because it affects people´s ability to access alternative sources of information. Diamond and Morlino underline this as a criterion of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005:11). It can be argued that everyday encounters provide input that nuances, pertaining, in particular, to how to interpret history and current day events. This can, just as much as diversity of newspapers or literacy rate be defined as access to alternative sources of information. The most important link between this indicator and the theoretical framework, however, relates to reconciliation (Galtung 2012:ch. 5).

In relation to Goertz´ theories about connection between basic and indicator level (Goertz 2006:6), I used four sources to provide the scores that were needed. These were a) election results, looking at voting for parties with ethnic affiliation, broken down in so called "inside" and "outside" voting[6]. The assumption is that the increase or decrease of votes for Serb/Croat/Bosniac-affiliated parties in areas where these groups are surmised to be in

[6] "Outside" votes is a term used for when the voter cast his/her vote in the municipality they were registered in for the 1991 census, but in which they are no longer living. This can be done from somewhere inside BiH, or from abroad, via mail. The right to do so is stated in the BiH Constitution (GFAP 1995:annex. 4). "Inside" votes is a term used for when the voter casts his/her votes the regular way, in the municipality in which they are currently registered to live in.

minority, could tell us something about the development in number of minority returns, b) the same election results, but now looking at development of how many votes that are cast from outside the municipality – meaning from IDP´s or refugees, in accordance with people´s right to do so (GFAP 1995:annex 3, art. IV), compared to votes cast regularly, from inside the municipality. This is not intended to measure how many *has returned* – this is the job of source a). What it measures is, I would argue, attitudes of those who *have not returned.* A more elaborate discussion of this can be found in the chapter itself. The findings from election results have been paired with c) data from interviews and d) reports and articles written by knowledgeable scholars and issue experts. I consider the measurement validity to be medium to high on this variable. The data material that I have arrived at through election results and interviews should be sufficient. Moreover, claiming that mono ethnic communities would affect access to information, constituting a problem for democratic quality, also seems defendable. However, the conceptual link between degree of minority returns and reconciliation can be criticised as many other factors besides reconciliation could affect a decision on whether to become a minority return or not. Here we are moving beyond the aggregate mode of analysis above, to the realm of human agency. However, that degree of reconciliation constitutes one of the factors that affect the decision of whether or not to become a minority return seems undebateable. Moreover, many of these other factors, for example opportunities for your child to go to school, or the availability of jobs, is tied in with who is ethnic minority and majority at the place in question. Implicitly, then, it is tied in with reconciliation. Thus, including degree of minority returns as a measurement of reconciliation seems defendable.

3.6.3 Elections – x2

The second variable is elections, or, more specifically, development in voter behaviour. Elections are an important way that political principals (voters) can inform political agents (politicians) about their preferences (Strøm and Gates 2007:12). An over arching goal of consociationalism is that ethnic division lines slowly get less and less important, when factions and group are guaranteed influence and participation (Lijphart 2002 [1969]; Ljiphart 1977). If this were true in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we would imagine voter behaviour to become less and less nationalistic through the years. As such, a finding for reconciliation can be noted. Moreover, such a finding would suggest a political system in which all-encompassing issues like national economy, pollution, public health and anti-corruption

could be addressed, creating outcomes of substance, not just of communal interest. In other words: The findings on this variable pertain to both concepts of y1.

The results on this variable have come from analysing results from all elections since 1995. For general elections, the numbers registered are for the national House of Representatives where such data exist, and entity level Parliament where only these results are available. This is the case in 1998. For municipal elections, the numbers registered are for municipal councils. These choices have been made to measure the support for nationalistic parties on the highest level possible in each election. This, it can be argued, increases the chance that the voter is voting for ideology and political programs rather than preferred personalities. In municipal elections, this equals municipal councils. In general elections, this equals House of Representatives BiH. Mayor elections have not been included; neither have elections for the City Council of Mostar. As more than 300 political parties and coalitions have run for elections in the 18 years that have passed since 1995, there was a need for making a selection. The inclusion criteria was getting 50 000 votes or more in at least one election since 1996. For Croat parties, this demand is relaxed to 10 000 parties, alone or in a coalition in which a Croat party was dominant. The reason is that the Croats make up a relatively small part of the BiH population. Coalitions with less than 2000 votes have not been considered in any part of the analysis. A numbers check have been done, ensuring that the votes for the parties included in the analysis comprise *80% or more* of the national total vote for each election.

Whenever separate data for Brcko have been provided from the Central Election Commission, these numbers have not been included in the analysis, as Brcko is, technically, part of both entities. When separate data for Brcko have *not* been provided, I have assumed that the CEC have embedded these votes in the results without explicitly stating so.
For any conclusions about voter behaviour to be meaningful, the degree of nationalism of each selected party must be assessed. To do this, I asked for the help of people who are knowledgeable in the political landscape in the country, but that are situated outside of the game of party politics. Nationalism is, in relation to this indicator, was operationalized as more or less focus on communal issues at the expense of devotion to more over-arching issues that affect all citizens. Each party has been given a score from 0 to 10, where 0 is no communal focus, and 10 is very nationalistic. Based on the scores given, I have made a selection of the group of parties that I deem “hardliners”.

Regarding actually getting election results, this was quite an endeavour. The Central Election Commission (CEC) in Sarajevo worked very hard to provide me with the material

that I needed. Unfortunately, the data is mostly meant for internal use, and so the format of results was highly diverse. Basing analysis on them would be impossible without first standardising their format. Each election was presented in a different way, usually needing a reading guide to be deciphered. My supervisor and I, with guiding from the CEC, ended up doing it the hard way, deciphering codes and manually entering all numbers from all elections since 1995. This ended up taking us six months (!!) The work was completed only weeks before deadline. I consider measurement validity to be high on this indicator. The numbers are manually and carefully worked through, and the link between voter behaviour and number of votes received by each party is obvious enough.

3.6.4 Laws – x3

Drawing from Chapter 2, outcomes, and thus substance, is a way of assessing democratic function (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Moreover, the inability to make decisions ("transaction costs") is one of the most fundamental problems in consociational democracies (Strøm and Gates 2007:8). The third indicator addresses decision-making abilities of the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an operationalization of the framework above. A distinction is made between "new laws" and "changes and amendment-laws". Applying this distinction in the contexts of BiH, they make visible a curious trend that was brought to my attention early on in the project. Local sources claimed that the Parliamentary Assembly passes nothing substantial in the ways of laws; they keep revising and making minor adjustment to already existing legal texts. As such, it is arguable whether they represent decisions at all. The results are presented a table, showing longitudinal development in passing of the two types of laws, as well as the use of veto mechanisms such as Entity Voting and Vital National Interest to obstruct proposed legal texts. I consider measurement validity to be high with regards to this variable. The data have been obtained, translated and processed by the same source throughout the process, decreasing the chance for different sources operating with different definitions. E. Druzic has followed the work of BiH central government from 1995, holding various positions along the way, and so should be considered trustworthy when it comes to coding of results. Moreover, the conceptual link between ability of a democratic system to produce outcomes and the ability of the BiH government to pass new laws seem reasonable.

3.6.5 Schools – x4

The fourth and final variable is schools, or more specifically, degree of segregation in schools. At Dayton, the area of education was not regulated by the DPA, except for being mentioned in Annex 6. Thus, it has been up to the entities to sort the issue of education as they see best.

This variable is not studied longitudinally, although several of the included contributions address developments in the past. An introduction to the school system in BiH has been given, partly in the history of groups and party in the paragraph about war in BiH. Academic sources on the field mainly address segregation pertaining to different curricula being taught to different groups (Torsti 2009; Perry 2013; Perry 2003). As an operationalization of the theoretical concepts of this project, I was not satisfied with this approach, which I see as narrow. The issue of physical separation (separate classrooms, entrances and even going to school in shifts) is, I would claim, as important or even more important than school children being taught according to different textbooks.

I have focused on primary education, that is, age 6-15. This is because at this age, the kids are still under the rule of their parents, most (if not all) of who have lived through the 1992-1995 war. As such, the degree of separation in schools is proposed as an operationalization of the theoretical concept of reconciliation (Galtung 2012:ch. 5).
To some degree, I would also argue that degree of separation in classrooms could allow us to assess the degree of democratic quality, as lack of access to information (Diamond and Morlino 2005:11). For such a conclusion to hold water, "information" must be interpreted quite symbolically. In such a mind-set, information could be kids exposed to more than one narrative about a certain historical event, or to hear different interpretation of current day events. Information could be experiences with "the other side" that shows the heterogeneity of opinions inside this group – contrary to the stereotypes that are allowed to remain intact with lack of interaction. The assumption underlying this type of argument is that good information is nuanced information. I would argue that such a mind-set in relation to information is useful. Thus, in a country with high degree of segregation in schools, this could pose a problem for the quality of democracy.

Mainly, though, data on this variable would seem to shed light on degree of reconciliation. We remember that "positive nonviolence" requires is cooperation, empathy and dialogue between groups (Galtung 2012:ch. 5). As such, degree of segregation, especially the physical kind of segregation, seems a useful and defendable operationalization.

Methodologically, data collection on the area of physical segregation is made difficult by the fact that segregation has largely been ad hoc, local solutions, and as such, there are no aggregate data to be obtained. This, in itself, is noteworthy. Numbers, facts and maps are very important in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jansen, 2005), and it doesn´t seem like too far a stretch to claim that development and distilment of data about schools has not been prioritized by national authorities. The international community also seem to have given up on producing such an overview. An ethnography about young peoples living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hronesova 2012) provides the only academic source I could find for the physical aspect of segregation. Its main topic is the lack of contact between the younger generations of the three groups. It should be stated that the inferences on this variable are the most uncertain in this thesis, due to lack of data. The immediate solution to such a problem is to leave the variable out. But when you know that children are taught separately almost everywhere that the local community consists of more than one ethnic group, this seems a most important variable, as it is well suited to discuss degree of reconciliation, and also, to some degree, democratic quality.

3.6.6 Endogeneity

A final note regarding endogeneity is at hand. Endogeneity is here used in the meaning of a causal loop which confuses the direction of causal relations, when the independent variables are caused, at least in part, by the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:107). I do not see that this poses a large issue in this project, as the dependent variable consist of theoretically constructed concepts. When registering data on x1-x4 to arrive at conclusions for democratic quality and reconciliation, we have, in essence, constructed one end of the equation. A construction is not inclined to cause anything. Thus, it does not seem likely that y1 causes x1-x4. However, it could be that more structural phenomena pertaining to y1, such as constitutional measures, nationalist sentiments among religious protagonists, unindicted war criminals etc., are having an influence on the developments in x1-x4. To draw but one example: If a rumoured war criminal (say, a Croat) continues to hold his/her position as a teacher, this would surely affect the choices of families of whether or not to let their Bosniac children participate in pupil integration programs at the local school. To draw another: if Muslim clergy in an area where there is a Bosniac majority openly endorses a nationalist us/them-rhetoric, drawing on medieval myths and age-old enemy images, this could have a causal effect on whether or not Serbs or Croats choose to return to that image. Both these

examples contain an apparent causal factor that is related to the theoretical concepts of reconciliation, the former also to democratic quality. Could endogeneity be an issue, then, as x1-x4 might be affected by factors that are similar to y1? In this project, there is a need to separate *resembling* factors and factors actually defined as topic of research. Several factors could explain developments in x1-x4, and undoubtedly many of these could be related to theoretical concepts in y1. However, the project at hand is not to explain, causally, these developments. Rather, it is to uncover facts, and place them in a meaningful analytical framework. In such a structure, endogeneity is not a major issue.

4 MINORITY RETURNS – X1

With reference to the theoretical framework posed, minority returns have been chosen as an independent variable to measure.

4.1 Distinctions

To start off, some distinctions must be made. First, there is a difference between the right to return and the act of returning. The right to return might be stated as law (such as the GFAP), and come with incentives (such as a document saying you get your house back, from which you were driven during the war). Still, a person or a family unit needs to actually do it. We cannot surmise that if the right to and the incentives for return existed, the person can be counted as having returned. Moving on to a conceptual distinction: "Returns" refers to the general phenomena of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP´s from now on) coming back to live where they lived before the war. "Return of displaced persons" is ethnically neutral, and a subcategory of returns. "Minority returns" is a subcategory of returns, and refers to a return of a refugee or IDP in which the person or family coming back to live where they lived before the war, constitute an ethnic minority in that place. "Majority returns" is a subcategory of returns, and refers to a return in which the person or family coming back to live where they lived before the war, is part of an ethnic majority in that place. "Real" returns refer to the returns that are not just assumed to have returned since they got papers and rights to do so, but who are actually situated in the house (or at least the vicinity of the house) that they were driven from during the war. As mentioned above, "outside" votes is a term used for when the voter cast his/her vote in the municipality they were registered in for the 1991 census, but in which they are no longer living. Such votes could be cast from somewhere inside BiH, or from abroad, via mail. The right to do so is stated in the BiH Constitution (GFAP 1995:annex. 4). "Inside" votes is a term used for when the voter casts his/her votes the regular way, in the municipality in which they are currently registered to live in.

4.2 Sources

For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on two sources: a) Interviews regarding the number of "real" minority returns, and b) official election data on "inside" and "outside"-voting, presented in seven tables. Specifics regarding the measurements will make most sense when posited next to the tables, so I have chosen to do this. The goal is to assess how many

of those who obtained rights to property in a place that they were driven from, and who would be minority if they went back, actually chose to go back to live here. In other words, the goal is to measure the degree of "real" returns. This will be used to assess the degree of reconciliation, as well as, to some extent, democratic quality. For justification of the link between data and theory: see Chapter 3.

4.3 Backdrop

Before the 1992-1995 war, the demographic pattern of BiH was mixed, with the majority of the population living in heterogeneous communities (Census 1991). This changed during the war. According to a UNCHR estimate, in 1995 only 5 per cent of Croats and Muslims remained in Serb-controlled areas. Similarly, only a small percentage of ethnic Serbs had stayed in the Federation. A specific number is not provided. This source however, concludes that an ethnically mixed country had become almost completely "un-mixed" in just four years (UNHCR 2013:1). The expectation was for this to change, and getting people to return was a goal for the international community. There right to return to pre-war property was, moreover, stated in Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA 1995:Annex 7). Moreover, there was a prevalent normative opinion that returns, and especially minority returns, was desirable, regardless of the fact that some people might have built a life somewhere else. A long process of law making ensued, facilitated by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Laws were passed, ensuring the right of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP´s) to return to their pre-war property. The obstacles proved to be many.

One year after the signing of the GFAP, only about 250 000 of the two million displaced citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had returned. The majority of these were "spontaneous", meaning that they occurred without aid from UNHCR[7]. It soon became clear that most of those who went back did so only if they could go to a place where they would be part of the ethnic majority (UNHCR 2013:4). Minority returns were more difficult. The Helsinki Committee estimate that only 15 000 out of the 475 000 refugees returning between 1995 and 1998 were minority returns (Helsinki International Federation for Human Rights 1999:10). Different areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina had seen fighting between different

[7] Local organizations were, however, instrumental.

militias. Thus, there was no one group that needed resettling. All groups were evictors, and all groups were evictees (Hastings 2001).

There was a standardized process through which claims for property could be filed, but the system was inefficient and suffered from chaos and obstruction. For example, police officers often refused to evict occupants from their own ethnic group. Many politicians openly flouted the laws by living in occupied apartments themselves. Most politicians were elected for two years at a time, and could not be seen as willingly implementing the property regulations. One source addressing the situation in Republika Srpska in 1996 notes that the small Social Liberal Party was, *the only* party in Republika Srpska that advocated return of dispelled Muslims and Croats (International Crisis Group 1996). In early 1999, time estimates for when processing of claims would be finalised with the current pace were bleak in early 1999 – some 22 years for FBiH and 40 years for RS. 1999 however, became a turning point. The international community formed a unified front (consisting of OSCE, UNHCR, OHR and UNMIBH), and in essence did all it took to process claims and implement them. No exceptions were made in the implementations, even in the most sympathetic cases. The endeavour was called the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) (Hastings 2001). The statistics from the Property Law Implementation Plan (see below) might lead us to very positive conclusions about the number of minority returns. However, we need to remember the difference between purported and "real" returns.

4.4 Problematic definitions in official sources

Previous to doing fieldwork, I contacted knowledgeable people within BiH, asking them to send me anything they might have on the issue. Their answers were more or less the same: "There is no data on this". The results from the last Census, held in October 2013, could have been a valuable source. However, these results are not likely to be ready until the end of 2014. One document, dated 2002, claims that between 2000 and 2002, a 36% increase in minority returns took place (OSCE, OHR, UNCHR, UNMiBH, IJC, CoE 2002:4). Both in the document referred to above and in a statistics package that UNCHR released in 2012 (UNHCR 2012), the category of "minority return" is not defined, and the reported number of minority returns is very high. I attempted through several months to contact UNCHR in BiH, to inquire about definitions and methods. Despite using creative methods and exhausting available network, I have not received a single reply. A UNHCR document from 2013 gives us a hint about the operationalization of the concept: A minority return is counted as a person

who returns to an entity where another ethnic group is "in control". I.e. a Serb returning to her previous home in the Federation is a minority return. A Bosniac returning to his home in the Federation, isn´t (UNHCR 2013). I contacted the author to inquire, but received no reply. However, if this is the definition underlying the 2012 number for minority returns, then it is problematic. It is entirely possible to be a minority return when you are a Bosniac returning to some place in the FBiH. It varies from municipality to municipality who is majority. Counting as minority return a Bosniac returning to some place in Republika Srpska, however, is easier to justify. The numbers above thus may be useful, in that the document indicates how many Bosniacs returned to RS for each year. The 2012 Statistics Package, however, claims that as of 2012, roughly half of those who have returned are minority returns (for table, see below) (UNHCR 2012). This figure should be doubted, due to the methodological issues outlined above. The data presented below should also contribute to cast doubt on the findings. Summing up, it seems possible to argue for a discrepancy between "official" (that of PLIP and UNHCR) and "on the ground" estimates for minority returns. The most viable way to assess how many minority returns there *really* were, seems to be through a combination of election results with regards to in/out-voting, as well as through interviews.

Table 1: PROPERTY LAW IMPLEMENTATION PLAN. SOURCE: PLIP STATISTICS PACKAGE 2006

National totals, Implementation Ratio of the Property Law Implementation Plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2006

	Grand total	Private property only
Total number of claims	211 791	114,636
Implementation ratio (cases closed)	93,34%	96,10%
Positive decisions, in numbers	197,815	110,227
Negative decisions, in numbers	12,642	3,485

NOTE: ***The implementation ratio in PLIP is defined as the number of closed cases (in which a decision has been made and the appropriate action taken), divided by the total number of cases, stated in per cent. It is worth noting that the numbers are significantly higher for private property than in the grand total.***

This is due to a large number of "socially owned properties", which was also a part of the process.

4.5 Findings

4.5.1 Election data

Below are tables that show the development of votes cast from outside the municipality. The basis of numbers for general elections is House of Representatives BiH, except for 1998, when there was no available data for this level, and I used results from Entity Parliaments. In municipal elections, the basis of numbers is Municipal Councils. Table 2 show the development in Republika Srpska. Table 3 show the development in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Table 4 show total numbers. 1996 is not included, as data from this year are not available. For 2006, only national totals were available – and this number is not consistent throughout sources. Both totals are stated for transparency.

Table 2: VOTES FROM REFUGEES AND IDP´S IN REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, 1997 - 2012

	Regular votes	Outside votes	Total	% of votes cast from outside
1997, municipal elections	678,881	253,985	932,866	27,0%
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH	547,247	193,818	741,065	26,1%
2000, municipal elections	567,289	116,095	683,384	17,0%
2002, HoR BiH	450,451	61,348	511,799	12,0%
2004, municipal elections	430,498	27,475	457,973	6,0%
2006, HoR BiH			591,733	0%
2008, municipal elections	588,208	23,124	611,332	3,8%
2010, HoR BiH	602,092	5,234	607,326	0,9%
2012, municipal elections	669,763	22,646	692,409	3,3%

Table 3: VOTES FROM REFUGEES AND IDP´S IN FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1997 - 2012				
	Regular votes	Outside votes	Total	% of votes cast from outside
1997, municipal elections	979,638	189,360	1,168,998	16%
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH	776,220	151,347	927,567	16,3%
2000, municipal elections	753,958	87,167	841,125	10,3%
2002, HoR BiH	686,003	31,121	717,124	4,3%
2004, municipal elections	538,257	16,016	554,273	2,8%
2006, HoR BiH			921,864	0%
2008, municipal elections	905,894	13,501	919,395	1,5%
2010, HoR BiH	1,005,334	10,368	1,015,702	1,0%
2012, municipal elections	908,118	13,466	921,584	1,5%

Table 4: VOTES FROM REFUGEES AND IDP´S, NATIONAL TOTALS, 1997 – 2012				
	Regular votes	Outside votes	Total	% of votes cast from outside
1997, municipal elections	1,680,796	456,996	2,137,792	21,3%
1998, NA RS, HoR FBiH	1,323,467	345,165	1,668,632	20,8%
2000, municipal elections	1,321,247	203,262	1,524,509	13,3%
2002, HoR BiH	1,136,454	92,469	1,228,923	7,5%
2004, municipal elections	968,755	43,491	1,012,246	4,3%
2006, HoR BiH	1,470,962	37,789	1,508,751	2,0%
2008, municipal elections	1,541,792	37,890	1,579,682	2,4%
2010, HoR BiH	1,607,426	15,602	1,623,028	0,9%
2012, municipal elections	1,577,881	36,112	1,613,993	2,2%
NOTE:				
In 2006 the sum is not consistent because of different sources.				
Alternative sum:			1,513,597	

Data are gathered from various sources (Central Election Commission 2014; OSCE 1997, 1998, 2000; Wikipedia 2006), and then compiled.

The next batch of tables (Tables 5-9) breaks down support for parties based on inside/outside support. Only municipal elections have been considered, to make the measurement as local as possible. The aim is to look for development of inside votes for parties with affiliation to the group that is surmised to be minority This should give us an indicator of the degree of "real" return. For example: If the amount of votes for Bosniac parties, cast from inside of municipalities in the RS, increase through the post-war period, this means an increase in Bosniac "real" return. It could be argued that by supposing who are minority and majority like this, I am falling in the same trap as the UNCHR with its very broad definitions of who are minority and majority in which entity. However, I would argue that voting behaviour constitutes a better source for assessing trends in "real" returns than a system of counting heads, as it represents someone making a statement, in contrast to being counted, passively, according to who-knows-what-criteria. It may not lead us to absolute numbers that are correct. However, they let us discern trends, and the numbers will be correct, proportionally, to those of the other groups in the entity (assuming that voter turnout is the same for all groups). A summary will be provided (Table 10).

Table 5: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE VOTING						
	RS			**FBiH**		
	In municipality	*Out of municipality*	*Total*	*In municipality*	*Out of municipality*	*Total*
1997 Municipal						
Bosniac						
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH	956	3472	4428	1663	268	1931
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA	1876	4729	6605	5804	780	6584
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)	8545	164637	173182	477435	101035	578470
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak			0			0
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH			0			0
Total Bosniac parties	**11,377**	**172,838**	**184,215**	**484,902**	**102,083**	**586,985**
Serb						
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	0	0	0	0	0	0
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	141707	6957	148664	3868	212	4080
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	250689	11839	262528	4376	239	4615
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	0	0	0	0	0	0
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	109267	4056	113323	304	28	332
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	471	26	497	0	0	0
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Serb Parties	**502134**	**22878**	**525012**	**8548**	**479**	**9027**
Croat						*0*
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	828	19242	20070	213561	48290	261851
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	0	0	0	7513	657	8170
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 merged with NHI	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	0	0	0	0	0	0
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ			0			0
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS			0	55959	3020	58979
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.			0			0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP			0			0
Total Croat parties	**828**	**19242**	**20070**	**277033**	**51967**	**329000**
Multi-ethnic						*0*
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine i	1876	4729	6605	108135	8045	116180
Total multi-ethnic	**1,876**	**4,729**	**6,605**	**108,135**	**8,045**	**116,180**

Table 6: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE VOTING						
	RS			*FBiH*		
	In municipality	*Out of municipality*	*Total*	*In municipality*	*Out of municipality*	*Total*
2000 Municipal						
Bosniac						
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH			0	78793	5096	83889
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA			0	171124	11603	182727
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)	4206	63945	68151	57555	16777	74332
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak			0			0
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH			0			0
Total Bosniac parties	**4,206**	**63,945**	**68,151**	**307,472**	**33,476**	**340,948**
Serb						
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	54648	878	55526	0	0	0
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	0	0	0	0	0	0
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	257298	3621	260919	0	0	0
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	93535	1977	95512	2192	5439	7631
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	60254	1321	61575	604	4402	5006
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	48733	720	49453	0	0	0
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Serb Parties	**514468**	**8517**	**522985**	**2796**	**9841**	**12637**
Croat			*0*			*0*
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	254	5224	5478	106753	11779	118532
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	0	0	0	7590	481	8071
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 merged with NHI	18	1188	1206	2193	289	2482
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	354	7401	7755	13285	2563	15848
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Croat parties	**626**	**13813**	**14439**	**129821**	**15112**	**144933**
Multi-ethnic			*0*			*0*
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine i	4418	22695	27113	231750	20394	252144
Total multi-ethnic	**4,418**	**22,695**	**27,113**	**231,750**	**20,394**	**252,144**

Table 7: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE VOTING						
	RS			*FBiH*		
	In municipality	*Out of municipality*	*Total*	*In municipality*	*Out of municipality*	*Total*
2004 Municipal						
Bosniac						
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH	4515	3323	7838	56203	2163	58366
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA	14176	16866	31042	185414	6805	192219
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)						
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak	5427	109	5536	10282	246	10528
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH						
Total Bosniac parties	**24,118**	**20,298**	**44,416**	**251,899**	**9,214**	**261,113**
Serb						
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	45036	128	45164	1074	115	1189
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	14202	55	14257	0	0	0
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	120362	589	120951	451	24	475
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	124231	577	124808	4946	458	5404
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	24147	110	24257	673	90	763
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	20762	79	20841	46	0	46
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Serb Parties	**348740**	**1538**	**350278**	**7190**	**687**	**7877**
Croat			*0*			
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	200	256	456	56456	1266	57722
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	0	0	0	654	11	665
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 merged with NHI	94	44	138	2548	52	2600
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	858	297	1155	2691	70	2761
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ	0	0	0	17630	201	17831
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS	48	415	463	2820	65	2885
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.			0			0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP			0			0
Total Croat parties	**1200**	**1012**	**2212**	**82799**	**1665**	**84464**
Multi-ethnic			*0*			
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine i	8762	3549	12311	100467	2572	103039
Total multi-ethnic	**8,762**	**3,549**	**12,311**	**100,467**	**2,572**	**103,039**

Table 8: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE VOTING						
	RS			*FBiH*		
	In municipality	*Out of municipality*	*Total*	*In municipality*	*Out of municipality*	*Total*
2008 Municipal						
Bosniac						
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH	562	124	686	77522	1411	78933
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA	1637	419	2056	259534	3674	263208
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)	18736	8645	27381	8669	436	9105
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak	8459	156	8615	45370	311	45681
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH						
Total Bosniac parties	**29,394**	**9,344**	**38,738**	**391,095**	**5,832**	**396,927**
Serb						
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	59390	445	59835	430	35	465
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	18592	118	18710	0	0	0
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	129341	943	130284	352	57	409
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	194232	1514	195746	7582	693	8275
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	26044	219	26263	257	15	272
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	40944	226	41170	634	74	708
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0	0	0	2482	83	2565
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Serb Parties	**468543**	**3465**	**472008**	**11737**	**957**	**12694**
Croat						
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	0	0	0	77209	1064	78273
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	0	0	0	15341	0	15341
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 merged with NHI	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	0	0	0	0	0	0
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	61	41	102	30215	262	30477
Coalitions dominated by HDZ	2281	4878	7159	6655	538	7193
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS			0	5187	27	5214
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.			0	2349	52	2401
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP			0	2845	1	2846
Total Croat parties	**2342**	**4919**	**7261**	**139801**	**1944**	**141745**
Multi-ethnic						
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine i	14497	2788	17285	162823	2009	164832
Total multi-ethnic	**14,497**	**2,788**	**17,285**	**162,823**	**2,009**	**164,832**

Table 9: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR BROKEN DOWN ON INSIDE/OUTSIDE VOTING IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS						
	RS			*FBiH*		
	In municipality	*Out of municipality*	*Total*	*In municipality*	*Out of municipality*	*Total*
2012 Municipal						
Bosniac						
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH	5257	987	6244	51790	742	52532
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA	23503	3113	26616	257286	3056	260342
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)	4445	1738	6183	725	58	783
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak	5067	169	5236	31226	263	31489
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH	6438	826	7264	79016	904	79920
Total Bosniac parties	**44,710**	**6,833**	**51,543**	**420,043**	**5,023**	**425,066**
Serb						
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	59432	700	60132	204	12	216
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	4417	39	4456	0	0	0
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	140204	1377	141581	190	4	194
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	177071	1896	178967	5709	449	6158
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	36678	343	37021	664	58	722
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	61475	405	61880	1419	91	1510
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0	0	0	0	0	0
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	0	0	0	0	0	0
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Serb Parties	**479277**	**4760**	**484037**	**8186**	**614**	**8800**
Croat						
HDZBiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	1841	2352	4193	80339	2145	82484
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	124	68	192	15869	253	16122
HSS Bosne i Herzegovine. From 2007 merged with NHI	11	0	11	631	4	635
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	0	0	0	0	0	0
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	0	0	0	24139	410	24549
Coalitions dominated by HDZ			0			0
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS			0			0
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.			0			0
Coalitions dominated by HDZ1990 or HSP			0			0
Total Croat parties	**1976**	**2420**	**4396**	**120978**	**2812**	**123790**
Multi-ethnic						
008 SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine i	16002	2145	18147	159322	2061	161383
Total multi-ethnic	**16,002**	**2,145**	**18,147**	**159,322**	**2,061**	**161,383**

A summarising table is in order:

Table 10: SUMMARIES OF TABLES 5-9					
Development in minority "inside votes":					
	1997	**2000**	**2004**	**2008**	**2012**
Bosniac "inside votes" in the RS:	11 377	4206	24 118	29 394	44 710
Serb "inside votes" in FBiH	8548	2796	7190	11 737	8186
Croat "inside votes" in the RS	828	626	1200	2342	1976

4.5.2 Interviews

OSCE personnel who agreed to interviews were vital in the process of collecting my own data, as were other members of the international community. The question I asked was "How many of those who got their property back do you think actually went back, if this meant going back to an area where they would be ethnic minority?" Halisa Skopljak[8] emphasizes that when talking about returns in general, there has been substantial success. – For example, for the areas in Sarajevo that was controlled by Serbs during the war, the return rate is close to 100% (Skopljak 2014). However, Skopljak estimates that on a national basis, only around 30% of those that would comprise an ethnic minority, actually went back to live following a positive decision on their claim. The rest traded or sold it. – Ethnicity is still a major issue when people are making choices about where to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is politicised, easy to mobilize around, and my experience since 1995 shows that if anything, ethnicity is more important now than it was in 1995 (Skopljak 2014). She agrees with the general image of Bosnia and Herzegovina being a society where the community where you live is an important source for support and security. – So, I have always admired people who settle somewhere where they will be minority. Being a minority in this country is very

[8] Halisa Skopljak is currently employed as National Legal Officer with OSCE. Between 2000 and 2005, she worked with the issue of returns in OSCE.

difficult, she says (Skopljak 2014). Damir Gnjidic[9] thinks 30% is too optimistic as a national figure, when it comes to minority returns. - I would say that 90% of would-be-minorities that got their property back took that property, and either traded it with someone of the majority population for some other piece of property somewhere else, or sold it. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is very important to live in a supportive community. That way, you know that whatever happens, you will have people around you to lean on. This is a lot of the reason why being an ethnic minority is not an option, he says (Gnjidic 2014). Aleksandra Krstovic[10] has viewed the returnee situation up close for several years, as education is major issue for those pondering whether or not to return to their pre-war place of residence – I would guess that less than 30% of those who would be minorities and got rights to their previous properties, actually went back. The rest sold or traded it, she estimates. Ethnicity was probably the main reason for this. It is very hard to be an ethnic minority where you live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. My guess is that when the results of the 2013 Census come out, they will show an ethnically cleansed reality (Krstovic 2014). Amir Kulaglic[11] notes how in Srebrenica municipality (located in the RS with Serbian majority), the Croat and Bosniac women who live there are afraid to visit Serb doctors. They travel to Tuzla instead, which is located in the Federation (Kulaglic 2014). To sum up: A positive decision on claim for property spurred a decision-making process of what to do for the people involved. The options, broadly speaking, were to move back to live, use it as a weekend- or seasonal house, to trade it with someone else´s property in another area, or to sell it. All the interviewees underlined that ethnicity was a – if not the most – significant factor when making this choice. All of them estimate that a low amount (less than 30%) of would-be-minorities with rights to property actually went back to settle.

4.6 Summary

To address Table 2-4: It could be argued that a decreased number of outside voters from could be because that a large number of people have returned. This would make them regular voters. For the reduction seen from 1997 to 2000, this might be some of the explanation – at least in FBiH, where most of the returns, both of displaced persons and refugees, happened in the four years after 1995. In RS, the years between 1999 and 2003 were those in which most

[9] Damir Gnjidic holds a position as Legal Advisor for Public and Administrative Law in OHR.
[10] Aleksandra Krstovic is currently employed as National Programme Officer in the Education Sector in OSCE.
[11] Amir Kulaglic is the closest advisor to the Mayor of Srebrenica, Camil Durakovic.

refugees and displaced persons returned (UNHCR 2012:3). However, this variable measures a *specific type* of return as an indicator for reconciliation and quality of democracy: The return of those who had incentive for returning in the form of rights to property, but who would comprise a minority if they did. As such, table 2-4 provide only very broad answers.

Tables 5 through 10 suggest that the amount of "real" returns to wherever a person would be minority has increased for all groups. However, the numbers are very small. Consider, for example, the ratio between "inside" votes for Bosniac parties in RS, 2012 (44 710) and the number of "inside" votes for Serb parties in the same year (479 277). Note that the largest number in table 10 was chosen for comparison. This shows that even though many have returned, the ratio is still overwhelmingly skewed. The above suggest a situation in which few would-be-minorities have chosen to return, even though they obtained rights to property.

Seen in the light of table 5-10, the decreased number of outside voters suggests that many of those that have not chosen to return, have no intention of returning. The cessation of voting in absentee represents a process of breaking the bonds to this municipality. The findings on this variable should be compared to the 2013 Census, when the results come out. Ostensibly, it will support the conclusion that the so-called "ethnic cleansing" of the 1992-1995 succeeded in changing the demographic patterns of BiH.

5 ELECTIONS – X2

With reference to the theoretical framework posed, elections have been chosen as an independent variable to measure.

5.1 Method

For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on two sources: a) election results for the past 18 years, provided by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and b) scores on how ethnically radical each party is, from three people who have all observed political life in BiH through many years.

Table 1 contains an assessment of how nationalistic the selected parties are. The informants and scoring system will be introduced in the text below, although the latter has been presented in Chapter 3 as well. Table 2 contains development of voting behaviour. See the same chapter for information about the how I obtained, selected and analysed the election results. Note that the total number of votes for selected parties forms a new 100%, then used as basis for analysis of proportional shares of support. As such, "my" 100% does not equal national 100%. Results are stated in per cent. For results in numbers, see Appendix 1. As stated in Chapter 3, the labelling of parties as "hardliners" is done by looking at the trend of the scores given them from my three informants on this issue. This might not be the same number of parties for all three groups. Parties with no supposed ethnic affiliation, so called multi-ethnic parties, are included in a separate table.

5.2 Backdrop

In contrast to the chapter on Schools – x4 and Minority Returns – x1, I will not spend too long presenting specifics. The first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war were held in September 1996, less than one year after the GFAP was signed. The most influential parties of, at least, the 1996, 1997 and 1998 elections had been formed before or during the war. OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for the 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2000, after which the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina took over.

The majority of election results have been transferred from OSCE to CEC, but there exists a certain degree of overlap. The CEC were unable to provide me with results for all years. However, working with other sources as well, I have been able to fill in at least some holes for the missing years. This pertains to 1996 and 2006.

The first couple of years after the war, elections were held somewhat irregularly, but have since been held at four-year intervals.

5.3 Findings

TABLE 1: PARTY ASSESSMENTS – SCORES

Party name	Srdjan Dizdarevic 1996-2012	E. Druzic 1996 to 2002/ 2002 to 2012	Ahmed Rifatbegovic 1996 to 2002/ 2002 to 2012
SDS	9	9/8	10/7
SNSD	9	5/9	3/9
SRS	10	9/9	8/5
HDZ	10	8/9	8/8
HSP	10	8/7	8/5
SBIH	8	7/7	4/4
SDA	8	8/5	7/6
SDP	5	5/8	0/1
PDP - MLADEN IVANIC		7/6	7/5
SNS - BILJANA PLAVSIC		9/9	7/8
NARODNOJ STRANCI RADOM ZA BOLJITAK		5/5	3/2
DEMOKRATSK NARODNI SAVEZ RS		7/7	5/6
HDZ 1990		8/7	7/4
HSS		6/6	3/4
NHI		5/5	3/3
SBB		NOT FOUNDED/7	NOT FOUNDED/3

NOTE: ***Sources have evaluated at request. One of the sources was unavailable to provide me with the last batch of scores. Two of the sources wished to include a temporal dimension, giving one score for an "early" post-war phase (1996-2002), and one for a "recent" post-war phase (2002-2012). 0 means "caters to no communal group at all", 10 means "caters to a communal group, politics highly influenced by perceived group interests". Sources: E. Druzic is currently working as a Programme Assistant in OSCE BiH. She has previously worked in UNIPTF, EUPM, OHR, as well as holding various positions in OSCE. Srdjan Dizdarevic is President of the Helsinki Committee in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has observed political life in BiH over a number of years, from a viewpoint outside of party politics. Ahmed Rifatbegovic is a Parliamentary Programs Coordinator with OSCE. Part of his job description is to observe the political processes in central as well as entity governments (Dzdarevic 2013; Rifatbegovic 2014; Druzic 2014).***

Table 2 presents findings of developments in voter behaviour.

TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR										
	1996 HoR BiH	1997 Municipal	1998 RS NA and FBiH HoR	2000 Municipal	2002 HoR BiH	2004 Municipal	2006 HoR BiH	2008 Municipal	2010 HoR BiH	2012 Municipal
Bosniac parties										
Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu - SBiH	4.08	0.35	0.00	6.06	12.49	7.65	17.95	6.22	5.81	4.66
Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA	39.56	0.86	0.00	13.21	24.73	25.79	19.50	20.88	14.74	22.23
Coalitions dominated by SDA and SBiH (both of them in each)	0.00	41.89	39.51	10.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.85	0.00	0.47
Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.86	2.70	4.26	3.42	2.81
Savez za Bolju Buducnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBB BiH	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.99	7.00
Total Bosniac Parties	**43.64**	**43.10**	**39.51**	**29.57**	**37.22**	**35.29**	**40.14**	**34.22**	**32.96**	**37.17**
Support for "hardliner" parties (SDA and SBIH+SDA-coalitions)	**39.56**	**42.75**	**39.51**	**23.51**	**24.73**	**25.79**	**19.50**	**23.73**	**14.74**	**22.70**
Serb parties										
Partija Drustvenoc Progresa PDP	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.01	5.20	5.35	2.32	4.71	2.78	4.61
Srpska Radikalna Stranka Republike Srpske SRS	2.71	8.63	6.60	0.00	2.27	1.65	1.29	1.46	0.73	0.35
SDS - Srpska Demoratska Stranka	25.16	15.25	10.90	18.86	15.98	14.03	8.88	10.21	9.59	11.19
SNSD - Milorad Dodik	0.00	0.01	3.66	7.46	11.05	15.04	22.03	16.45	19.22	14.14
Socijalisticka partija republike srpske	0.00	6.25	6.10	4.81	2.03	2.89	0.00	2.07	1.01	2.88
SNS - Biljana Plavsic	0.00	0.03	6.49	3.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Demokratsk Narodni Savez Republike Srpske	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.60	2.41	1.64	3.27	2.06	4.84
Coalitions of SNSD, PDP and SNS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.16
Narodni savez za Slobodan Mir	5.92	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Demokratski patriotski blok republike srpske	1.28	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Serb Parties	**35.07**	**30.17**	**33.74**	**38.72**	**38.13**	**41.37**	**36.17**	**38.37**	**35.40**	**38.18**
Support for "hardliner" Serb parties (SNS - Biljana Plavsic, SDS, and between 2002 and 2012: SNSD.)	**25.16**	**15.28**	**17.38**	**22.44**	**27.03**	**29.07**	**30.91**	**26.65**	**28.81**	**25.33**

TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR										
	1996	1997	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
	HoR BiH	Municipal	RS NA and FBiH HoR	Municipal	HoR BiH	Municipal	HoR BiH	Municipal	HoR BiH	Municipal
Croat parties										
HDZ BiH - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH	14.71	15.62	13.31	8.96	0.00	6.72	0.00	6.43	8.04	6.85
Hrvatska Stranka Prava HSP (BiH Dapic Dr. Jurisic)	0.65	0.45	0.69	0.58	0.00	0.08	2.00	1.20	0.00	1.25
Hrvatska seljacka stranka Bosne i Herzegovine from 2007 HSS - NHI Party cod 1290 till 2000	0.00	0.38	0.23	0.27	0.63	0.32	0.00	0.41	0.33	0.45
Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa (NHI)	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.71	1.55	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
HDZ 1990 - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.31	2.39	0.00	1.91
Coalitions dominated by HDZ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.69	2.06	5.67	1.12	0.00	0.00
Coalitions dominated by NHI or HSS	0.00	3.28	2.58	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.41	0.00	0.00
Coalitions across HDZ and NHI etc.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00
Coalitions dominated by HDZ 1990 or HSP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22	3.52	0.00
Total Croat parties	**15.36**	**19.73**	**16.81**	**11.52**	**12.87**	**10.01**	**11.97**	**12.36**	**11.88**	**10.46**
Support for "hardliner" Croat parties (HDZ and HSP, as well as coalitions dominated by either of these)	**14.71**	**16.07**	**13.99**	**9.55**	**10.69**	**8.86**	**7.66**	**7.85**	**11.55**	**8.10**
Multi-ethnic parties										
SDP - Socialdemokratska Partija Bosne i Herzegovine - Socijaldemokrati	0.00	7.01	9.95	20.19	11.77	13.32	11.71	15.06	19.77	14.19
Coalitions between SDS and HSS, UBSD, MBO, REPUBLIKANCI	5.92	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total multi-ethnic	**5.92**	**7.01**	**9.95**	**20.19**	**11.77**	**13.32**	**11.71**	**15.06**	**19.77**	**14.19**
Total, per cent	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

5.4 Summary

The summary in this chapter must necessarily be somewhat longer than in the others, due to the fact that the findings are mainly to be found in tables.

5.4.1 Bosniac

There is less support for Bosniac "hardliner" parties now than right after the war. In addition, the party assessment indicates that the parties defined as "hardliners", SDA and SBIH, have gotten less nationalistic over the years. Moreover, the percentage of voters that votes for (my selection of) parties catering solely to Bosniacs has nearly halved. As The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) show an increase in their shares of the total votes, this suggests that a number of Bosniacs may have started to vote for SDP instead of any of the parties catering only to their own group. SDP has a reputation for mainly competing for Bosniac votes, although it is multi-ethnic. The above suggest that Bosniac voting behaviour have gotten incrementally less nationalistic in the time that has passed from 1995.

5.4.2 Serb

The support for (my selection of) parties that caters solely to Serbs, have increased in the years since the war. Moreover, although SDS has developed in a less nationalistic direction since 1995, the other Serb parties on the list have either remained the same score or gotten more nationalistic (as in the case of SNSD). The support for Serb "hardliner" parties have remained steady and high at around 25%, although with a drop in 1997 and 1998 elections. These findings suggest that Serb voting behaviour is as nationalistic as it was in 1995, and that this has been a quite stable trend. The exception is the low support for "hardliner" parties in 1997 and 1998.

5.4.3 Croat

The support for (my selection of) parties that caters solely to Croats, have decreased from around 15 to around 10 per cent. The support for "hardliner" parties has also decreased from around 14 to around 8 per cent. The "hardliner" parties have not, according to my sources, undergone a moderation process to any significant degree in the years since 1995. It has to be noted that preliminary results from the 2013 Census show that the share of Croats living in Bosnia and Herzegovina has gone down from 17% in 1991 to 14,6% in 2013 (Avaz 2014). This could explain some of the decrease. However, some Croats might also have started voting for SDP, even though this is generally considered to be a party competing for Bosniac votes. These findings suggest that Croat voting behaviour has become slightly less nationalistic in the course of the years since the war. This conclusion, however, is less certain than the conclusion for Serb parties.

5.4.4 Multi-ethnic

SDP is the only multi-ethnic party of some size in BiH. They were the only multi-ethnic party that got more than 50,000 votes at some point, and thus made it through the selection criteria. For all years, except 1996, the multi-ethnic percentage equals SDP´s percentage. Their support is almost tripled from 1995 to 2012. Some of this can probably be attributed to the fear, trauma as well as the mental and physical destruction that marked the country´s first post-war years. Moreover, its share of the total (of my selected parties) is, in 2012, a mere 14.19%. The share for Croat, Serb and Bosniac parties is 10.46, 38.18 and 37.17%, respectively.

All in all, findings for the various groups are very different. However, it seems possible to draw some overall conclusions: The voting behaviour for Serbs seem to be as nationalistic as right after the war, with "hardliner" parties not moderating themselves considerably. The voting behaviour of Croats seems to be somewhat less nationalistic, but this conclusion is more uncertain. The voting behaviour of Bosniacs seems to be considerably less nationalistic. A substantial amount of Bosniac votes now probably goes to SDP, the only real multi-ethnic alternative in BiH party politics. The fact that there are not more multi-ethnic parties that pass the threshold of 50 000 at any point is also significant. Moreover, the fact that "hardliner" parties still harvest such a large share of the grand national total of votes (remember that my selection of parties includes, for all elections, more than 80% of the votes in BiH), is a find that needs to be discussed in relation to democratic quality and reconciliation.

6 LAWS – x3

With reference to the theoretical framework posed, the ability of the Parliament to pass laws has been chosen as an independent variable to measure.

6.1 Method

For obtaining data on this variable, I have relied on a) official gazettes for laws passed by the Parliament of BiH, and b) list of imposed decisions by OHR, and c) official records of the use of Vital National Interest clause as well as Entity Voting. An external translator was needed to do the sorting of much of this material, as it was presented in local language. Data is registered for a number of categories, each of which can be related to the theoretical concepts of democracy and reconciliation, as defined in the Theory chapter. Below is justification and presentation of the categories. The passing of budgets is not considered.

Table 1 contains the following categories:

a) *New laws passed*. Every law passed in Parliament where the title does *not* start with "changes and amendments" has been included in this category. Many pressing issues need to be addressed in BiH. The number of new laws passed suggests the degree to which the politicians are able to deliver to the voters what they need – and indeed depend on them to do.
a) *Changes and amendment – laws*. Every law passed in Parliament where the title starts with "Changes and amendments" has been included in this category. Such laws suggests the degree to which the political agents "go through the motions" of democratic procedures, without adding any real substance. Surely, some changes and amendments will be important ones. However, if changes and amendment-laws make up the brunt of the laws that are passed, there is reason to question the efficiency of decision-making power – and hence the democratic quality of it.

Table 2 contains the following categories:

a) *How many times OHR have imposed a law each year*. This information suggests the number of issues that the High Representative has deemed passing a law so important that he imposed it. Naturally, it is also a reflection of OHR´s attitude to imposing laws at the time.
b) *How many times Vital National Interest-clause has been evoked*. This gives information on the ease or difficulty to pass decisions at the central level.
c) *How many times Entity Voting has effectively stopped a law*. This gives information on the ease or difficulty to pass decisions at the central level; see reference above.

TABLE 1																		
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
"New" laws passed by PA	0	8	4	10	8	21	25	28	43	20	11	10	13	18	1	0	2	0
"Changes and amendment-laws" passed by PA	0	0	1	1	2	7	9	25	37	26	32	29	25	44	7	10	19	12

TABLE 2																		
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
OHR imposed	0	1	5	2	16	0	20	13	11	7	5	14	2	6	1	0	0	0
Vital national interest evoked	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Entity voting effectively stopping a law	0	0	1	9	0	26	26	26	18	18	19	25	11	34	23	10	0	0

TABLE 1B:



TABLE 2B:



6.2 Summary

Table 1 and 1B show that BiH Parliament is, at the moment, merely passing "Changes- and Amendment"-laws. Few new, substantial issues are addressed. This does not reflect a society where there are no issues that need solving: quite the contrary. It does, however, suggest a reality where substantial issues are deadlocked in a system of vetoes and ethnic flanking. Moreover, it is likely to assume that the longer this trend is present, the less likely it is that people involved in the political play will propose needed laws. There is no imperative to initiate a process that, in all likeliness, will come to nothing.

Table 2 and 2B show that the Vital National Interest (VNI) clause has not been used as much as Entity Voting to obstruct laws. This is, ostensibly, because the Constitutional Court acts as a watchdog of sorts, with its power to nullify VNI-claims. Quite often, they do so, thus unblocking the law making process.[12] Entity Voting can be used without any third party being able to unblock the process. We see that Entity voting is used extensively through several years, and then the number falls. A likely interpretation of this that in the years when

[12] A telling example, about which no articles in English have yet been written, is that the Constitutional Court for the Federation Parliament has been one judge short for nearly three years. In this period, politicians have known that they can obstruct laws by evoking Vital National Interest. Ultimately, the claim will be treated, but for the time being, the law is blocked. The 21st of March 2014, the Federation Parliament managed to appoint the judge that was lacking. Thus, the FBiH now has a functioning Constitutional Court again, and will be able to resume treating VNI claims (Source: E. Druzic 2014).

Entity Voting was used, there was a forward leaning approach to initiating new laws. However, as the number of laws blocked by Entity Voting increased, the motivation to initiate new processes seem to have declined. There is simply no use in proposing laws that one in advance knew would be blocked by Entity Voting. It is understandable that Parliamentary activity, then, revolves around making minor changes to already existing laws. More substantial laws would, chances are, not pass.

Two potentially extremely important Constitutinal Amendments, have failed to passed through the period in question. The so-called April Package from 2006 would have strengthened the state level of the country and removed the discrimination in the electoral system to the presidency. Leaders of the major parties had taken the initiative, but in the end, the demand for consensus – or, in practice, the use of vetoes – stopped it.

The 2009 so-called Butmir process removed the discrimination in the electoral system to the House of People and the Presidency, the members of both houses increased. This initiative also failed, for similar reasons as the April Package (Vollan and Butenschøn 2011:159).

As long as we agree that decision-making can be codified as the passing of laws, the above suggests a development with an incrementally decreasing degree of decision-making abilities in the central government of BiH.

7 SCHOOLS – x4

With reference to the theoretical framework posed, schools have been chosen as an independent variable to measure.

7.1 Method

For measuring this indicator, I have relied on two sources: a) scholarly contributions and b) interviews with people who have knowledge about primary education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interest has been in primary education, meaning children from 6-15 (last year of middle school). In interview guides I attempted to assess longitudinal developments. However, despite the efforts, interviewees primarily addressed the situation during the last couple of years. Thus, a longitudinal research design has not been feasible for this indicator. Official data, had they existed, would have helped build a longitudinal framework, and interviews could thus have taken the role as a more secondary source. However, such data does not exist. The measurements – and conclusions – for this indicator will be thus mainly pertain to 2006 and onwards.

A second methodological challenge pertains to the division between curricula segregation and physical segregation in schools. When doing interviews, such a conceptual division is unrealistic. The people I interviewed most likely treated these two forms of segregation as one. However, I did ask questions directly relating to the physical separation of school children, to make sure this was specifically addressed.

7.2 Backdrop

The GFAP, with its devolution of power, left education to be decided by the local level. In Republika Srpska, education is under entity control. In the Federation, the area of Education formally sorts under the Federal Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, but in reality, it is the cantonal Ministries that decide. Ten cantons are surmised to have Bosniac majority, three to have Croat majority, and two are mixed. The cantons are not required to cooperate with each other regarding contents and organisation of education. In some ways, you could say that in BiH there are not three, but eleven different systems of education: one in Republika Srpska, and one in each canton (Low-Beer 2001:1).

Low-Beer stresses the continuum from the communist experience to the nationalist one in school systems after the war. In history education during communism, nationalisms and different experiences from historical periods were minimised. The same is the case after

1995, as history now is consistently viewed from within a particular national framework. The difference is that this "fragmented memory" goes in different directions – from downplaying separate experiences during Yugoslavia to over-emphasising them (Low-Beer 2001:5).

7.3 The origins and contention around segregation in schools

Returnees, to a large extent, triggered segregation in schools. The tendency of the majority population to dominate local schools when it came to teaching staff, curricula and language, became a serious impediment to returns several places of BiH. Some returnees refused to send their child to a school if they knew she would be taught one-sided ethnic curricula, as well as a different language than the parents wanted (Torsti 2009:70-71). An attempt to solve this was made with the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children in 2002. It allowed for a different curriculum (decided by authorities of "their" ethnic group) to be taught in controversial subjects such as religion, language and history, if the parents wanted this. The Interim Agreement also contained provisions for increased employment of returnee teachers, and for the ethnic make up of the school boards to reflect the ethnic composition in the communities that the schools were catering to. This model laid the ground for separate schooling of ethnic groups, and was adopted with many local variations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Federation. In July 2003, 52 schools in the "mixed" cantons Zenica-Doboj, Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva all started a policy known as "two schools under one roof", based on the framework of the Interim Agreement (Fischer 2006:308-310). On the one hand, it is a well-intentioned attempt to create conditions favourable to returns. On the other, it creates a situation where generations coming of age grow up almost completely separate from "the others". Actors such as the OHR, as well as other international organisations, have criticised the arrangement, demanding real integration in schools. NGO´s working in the field, however, often underline the necessity of gradual and careful change (Fischer 2006:310).

The wish for acquiring membership in the Council of Europe made change necessary, as they demanded an end to segregation and harmonisation of in the education sector a prerequisite for accession. Thus, Parliament adopted the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in 2003. The law includes provisions for harmonisation of curricula and the removal of offensive content in textbooks. Personnel from international organisations, comprising a work group, would judge what was offensive. With regards to implementation,

language became a major issue. Five cantons initially refused to implement the law, and a long process followed. In one of the cantons, OHR chose to use its Bonn Powers to impose the law. As of now, all cantons have accepted the law, albeit some continue to refuse the implementation of certain by-laws, thus postponing full implementation (Fischer 2006:306-308).

7.4 Findings

As mentioned before, there is a tendency in BiH to view the current situation somewhat pessimistically, downplaying, perhaps, whatever progress there is. It is telling that I didn´t hear a word about Brcko when I was having conversations about developments in schools. Brcko district, which has a separate administration, has succeeded in introducing a uniform system of education for all children in its district, following the 2003 law (Ivankovic-Tamamovic 2013). Brcko has accomplished this although it is multi-ethnic and saw heavy fighting during the war, proving that an integrated education system is possible despite ethnic divides.

7.4.1 Segregation in content

The wartime practice of importing curricula from Serbia and Croatia continued until the year 2000, when a law forbade the import of textbooks from another country (Torsti 2009:67). This law was influential, as was the 2003 Framework Law. However, analysis of textbooks and curricula in BiH show more or less the same thing, although naturally the findings are framed differently (for example, some are policy recommendations, some pertain only to history teaching, some to langue). In condensed form, the following trends can be discerned from the contributors I have analysed:

- Offensive material has been removed, as the 2003 law requires. The offensive content of curricula is, however, still present, but are now merely found in subtleties and between-the-line-messages that are hard to discern.
- Us/them-thinking in the textbooks still prevails.
- Directly offensive elements have largely been removed from textbooks, but the classroom continues to be a scene where divergent ethnic narratives are conveyed.
- Historical narratives remain heavily influenced by ethnic affiliation.
- With regards to language, the trend is an even greater emphasis on idiosyncratic elements of (so called) Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian language.
- Solutions on how to run a school in a multi-ethnic community remain a local enterprise, and most solutions are ad hoc. Thus, getting an overview is difficult.

(Perry 2013; Perry 2003; Torsti 2009; Fischer 2006; Low-Beer 2001).

7.4.2 Physical segregation

As writers in the academic field have, by and large, not addressed the physical separation in schools, interviews with knowledgeable people seemed like the most viable way to get data on this. As previously mentioned, respondents most likely had *both* segregation in curricula *and* physical segregation in mind when answering questions. As this could pose a potential validity problem, it needs to be mentioned. However, as the two concepts measured are fairly close to each other, this should not matter too much. Physical separation is defined as the use of separate entrances, separate teaching staff, children attending school in shifts, or simply using different buildings within a campus area. Following insights in Jessie Hronesova´s ethnography about young peoples and identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hronesova 2012), physical segregation seems imperative to address. Hronesova stresses that "rigid ethno-national identities and boundaries in Bosnia are not constituted and maintained through social contact…but rather through a lack of it. It is the lack of communication between groups that keeps ethno-national identities in Bosnia rigid" (Hronesova 2012:93). Hronesova structures her project conceptually (for example, what does it mean for people of the various groups to be a Serb/Croat/Bosniac?) rather than geographically. The conclusion of each chapter all carries a common thread: Enemy images, "frozen scripts" as she calls it, are upheld by lack of social contact between the groups (Hronesova 2012:55-56). This seems easily translatable to the situation in schools where education is organised such that children of different ethnic groups don´t see or talk to each other. The people I interviewed both confirmed that this practice is omnipresent in schools catering to more than one ethnic group, as well as expressing concern over it. – When kids go to school separate from each other, young people end up lacking positive experience with "the other". Their narrative about the other side is only negative. We in the Mission are scared of the implications if, for example, violence should break out. When kids have gone to segregated schools, they won´t have any positive counterweight to balance the imperative to join the violence, says Aleksandra Krstovic[13] (Krstovic 2014). She notes the lack of progress in this area, claiming that the conditions now are more or less the same as they were ten to fifteen years ago. – So, if you have kids in BiH, the place where you live is of great importance because of schools. If you pick a place to live where you are majority, you are fine. If you move to a place where you

[13] Aleksandra Krstovic is a National Programme Officer in the Education Section in the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within the Mission she has also worked with property implementation, elections and human rights, after finishing her two degrees in education and psychology, respectively.

are minority, your kid will be assimilated. If the minority is large enough, there are usually provisions where they can choose to go to a separate school, or get their education in a different shift from the rest. But this means your kid will be segregated. This is more or less the situation all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case of Konjevic Polje[14] is telling. In Konjevic Polje, there are a lot of rules regarding how many kids of a certain group have to be in each class for separate teaching to happen. The parents that have been standing outside the offices of the OHR for weeks now, protesting, are not arguing for integration. They want separate premises for their Bosniac children. This solution would merely bring more of the same: More segregation (Krstovic 2014).

Damir Gnjidic´s job description involves monitoring important areas in BiH society, including schools. He shares many of Krstovic´s views with regards to segregated schools, and underlines the fact that if schools are not segregated, they are mono-ethnic, and, in his view, this is still segregation. – Nothing much has happened on this area in years. The kids are still separated from an early age if there is more than one group in the community. I would actually go as far as to say that segregation in schools, both in terms of what pupils learn and which kids they meet in the course of a day, could pose a security threat. If a spark comes along, these kids will be much more likely to be violent against another group if they don´t have any day-to-day experiences with them (Gnjidic 2013), he says.

Steinar Bryn[15] has many years of hands on experience with segregation in the schools of Bosnia and Herzegovina. – We see many different varieties of segregation. It varies from community to community, but most often we see separate entrances, going to school in shifts, the use of different premises. When we held seminars in BiH in March 2014 and came to the primary school in Stolac, a Bosniac member of the cleaning staff opened the door for us. She had never set foot in the Croat part of the school building (Bryn 2014), he explains. Working to promote reconciliation in schools, the Nansen Dialogue Centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina first and foremost seek to bring students together, physically. For example, NDC might offer to teach integrated classes in areas that the community has expressed a need for increased competency in, such as IT or English. The experience is that the mere act of bringing students from different groups together in the same classroom has an effect of its own, regardless of curricula (Bryn 2014).

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[14] In Konjevic-Polje, Bosniac and Serb children have to share schools.

[15] Steinar Bryn is senior counsellor at Nansen Peace Centre. He has been involved in peace and reconciliation-work in former Yugoslavia through Nansen Dialogue since 1994. One of the most important foci in Bosnia and Herzegovina is segregation in schools.

Selim Beslagic[16] has kept a close eye on developments in the Federation, and doesn´t see much improvement when it comes to segregation in schools. - The time it takes before nationalism looses its hold on Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be lost time for the generations growing up. We are still at zero in terms of the segregation in schools, 18 years after the war (Beslagic 2014).

7.5 Summary

The schools in BiH have undergone a centrally administered change pertaining to curricular content, especially since 2003. Offensive content have been removed or reformulated. However, contentious subjects (history, geography, language and literature in particular) are still taught separately. Moreover, the prevalence of physical separation of children, so that they rarely or not at all meet members of "the other" group during a normal school day, seems still to be omnipresent. My informants expressed concern over this. Further, they noted how there has been a lack of development in this issue area. Segregation in schools is, they claimed, as prevalent now as it were ten to fifteen years ago.

[16] Selim Beslagic was the Mayor of Tuzla between 1990 to 2000.

8 Discussion

What can we make of data, when they are viewed in light of the theoretical framework? This question will be attempted answered below. Direct references for the theoretical elements will be left out of the discussion, for fluency. For references to theory, see Chapter 2.

8.1 Minority returns – x1

The degree to which would-be-minorities have chosen to return to their property after gaining the right to do so, is mainly relevant for assessing degree of reconciliation, as it shows willingness and an ability to live together with someone that one´s own group was at war with 18 years ago. Reiterating the theory chapter, a positive finding for reconciliation is defined by low levels of animosity, as well as the traits cooperation, dialogue and empathy between groups. Moreover, it ties in with the theory in that mono ethnic communities represent a problem to alternative sources of information. Of course, when dealing with terms as vague as this, findings do not land in a binary either/or- universe. Degree of reconciliation is a continuum.

The three findings that must be posited against theory are the following: First, there is the table with results from Municipal elections, showing that "inside votes" of ethnic minorities increase through the years since 1995, at least for Bosniacs and Croats in the RS. Second, there are, for all three groups, a falling number of outside voters through the years since 1995. Third, assessments of the interviewees is that 30% or less of would-be-minorities gaining right to property actually returned. Regarding the first finding, it must be noted that, the total numbers are quite small, suggesting that the latter data do not conflict the conclusion that minority returns have been few. For example, "Inside votes" in the RS for Bosniac parties increase steadily from year to year, from around 11 000 in 1997 to around 44 000 in 2012, however, the number of "inside votes" for Serb parties in the same two years are 502 000 and 479 000.

Looking at all three areas of data, then it seems possible to conclude that most would-be-minority returns that got rights to property chose to not go back, trading or selling it instead. What does this mean? On this particular variable, findings inspire quite pessimistic assessments of the development of reconciliation. However, this variable does not measure degree of reconciliation in situations where different groups are already living together. It measures the outcome of a poignant situation of choice, in which a lot of factors, such as the faces of potential neighbours as well as level of community support, were unknown.

Although I initially surmised minority returns to be not that demanding a criterion for reconciliation, I learned that in fact, it is. As a case-within-a-case, minority returns would be a "Least likely case", sorting under the category "Crucial case" for reconciliation (Gerring 2007:115). As several interviewees have pointed out, BiH is a country where people have a long tradition of relying on one´s community to solve the quarrels of everyday life. The thought of having neighbours from a different group removes – or so it is seen - access to a network of human security. Health care, education and municipality offices are other factors, where it is reported that people feel uncertain. As such, this is seems to be an argument softening the blow of the bleak findings.

It can be also be argued that the significance of a family´s (or person´s) decision not to return is decreasing, in relation to reconciliation, if a numerical value is assigned for each year. The reason is that people become gradually more and more rooted where they live, through employment, education and social networks. Moreover, if you have sold or traded property, the choice has obviously ceased to exist.

Summing up the discussion, reconciliation in terms of lowered degree of animosity between groups is, it can be argued, something that can be answered in the affirmative. There are few reports of violence in inter-ethnic neighbourhoods. However, as Galtung points out, there is substantial difference between non-hostile coexistence and the kind of coexistence marked by empathy, cooperation and dialogue. The overall conclusion regarding minority returns when it comes to this project´s definition of reconciliation is that it hasn´t spanned deeper or wider in the years that have paste, and that current levels of reconciliation seem to be quite low.

8.2 Elections – x2

Voting behaviour in a post-conflict society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina can allow us to make inferences both with regards to reconciliation as well as quality of democracy.
As shown in the election chapter, Bosniacs vote considerably less nationalistic now than they did right after the war, both in terms of numbers and in terms of how nationalistic the "hardliner" Bosniac parties are deemed to be. The Croat voters display a similar trend. However, this finding is less substantial because a) the Croats have decreased in numbers, demographically, and b) the "hardliner" parties, to which most of the support is given, have become only slightly less nationalistic – in contrast to the "hardliner" Bosniac parties. Serb

voters display a trend of voting that is as nationalistic as right after the war. The Serb "hardliner" parties are as nationalistic as ever. The one, large multi-ethnic party, SDP, has increased its support almost threefold, although it is still, in proportion to the others, quite small.

Regarding quality of democracy, it seems possible to argue that if most political seats are filled with representatives from nationalist parties, democratic quality will suffer. Ethnic elites have a tendency to focus on communal interests rather than the common good (see reference in Chapter 3). Thus, there is a risk that political agents (politicians) will not be able to deliver what the political principals (voters) want, because many of the issues that need solving slid through the filter of ethnic interests on the grounds that they are all-encompassing, not communal. The unrest from February 2014 is telling in this respect. Lacking ethnic affiliation, demands could be heard for a serious effort being invested in the common problems of unemployment, economic decline and corruption. These issues are the obstacles that are probably most felt for citizens in their everyday lives. The fact that people took to the streets to address them suggest that they have not been addressed through political channels. This is in line with the argument above. The inadequacy of dealing with these issues points to another problem of democratic quality from the theory chapter: that of transaction costs. A Parliament in which politicians focus on their own ethnic group rather than on steering the country in the right direction, will, logically, have trouble confronting issues and making decisions pertaining all-encompassing issues. This is especially so when there is always the possibility to make use of veto measures. As such, we might end up with a country where democracy is followed in procedures, but where outcomes and substance are lacking.

There is something oxymoronic about this picture. Why would a voter cast her vote for a nationalistic party, when she has seen in the past that they have failed to produce desired outcomes? Why would anyone continue voting nationalistic at all in BiH? When election results come out they way they do, surely the citizens themselves must be to blame for the unsatisfactory outcomes. About this, I would like to make three points. One is that there really only exists one party that claims multi-ethnic affiliation. This is the SDP[17]. Several other multi-ethnic alternatives have tried to get a foothold in elections, but have failed.

[17] Not to state that SDP represents all that is good. SDP was spoken of in very bitter word by many of my informants – the reason being that their party tops had proven to be just as bad as the others when they came to power, merely strengthening the party instead of trying to solve problems. The point here is that the SDP represent the only large party that is outspoken about its multi-ethnic affiliation.

Second, the nationalist way of doing party politics can be viewed as a modus operandi that is hard to escape from due to both structural and psychological components. The GFAP, with its division of power, provides a structural backdrop. The party structure, established around 1990, militarised during the war, based on ethnic affiliation, fits a little too well into this framework. The voters, often living in homogenised communities (see discussions on minority returns above), are presented with a plethora of parties. These seem to differ in how they imagine the solving of society´s issues. However, as data suggest, the majority of voters still make their choice *within* the repertoire of parties that represent one´s group – for example with regards to axis such as centralisation –decentralisation, right wing – left wing etc. Third, it is possible – and indeed likely – that the low amount of outcomes and substance in the central government of BiH has several, more systemic, causes, such as vested elite interests. Other factors set aside; it seems possible to conclude that the longitudinal trend of voter support for "hardliner" parties has a cost for democratic quality, and that the development during the last 18 years must be deemed overall pertaining to this variable. These costs are, above all, spelled out in the chapter about laws.

Regarding reconciliation, we note that "hardliner" party get high and steady levels of support. SDS, SNSD, HDZ and SDA –with the possible exception of the latter – hardly seem like agents of cooperation, dialogue and empathy in BiH – the factors necessary for reconciliation in a society. It can be asked: Which parties then, do? This is a fair point, as political parties without ethnic affiliation – and thus, necessarily, inherent enemy images - seem hard to come by. Harder still, is a party that openly advocates increased contact and cooperation between groups. However, the reduced support for Bosniac and Croat "hardliner" parties is a positive sign of reconciliation, as votes that leave these parties will, most probably, either go multi-ethnic or more moderate. All of the above points to a situation where there is still a long way to go before dialogue, cooperation and empathy between the three groups will bring about a stronger degree of reconciliation. Thus, conclusions with respect to both aspects of y1 suggest little progress.

8.3 Laws – x3

As mentioned in the election chapter, the findings on this variable accentuate and spell out some of the developments found here. This is because the tables allow us to look at different kinds of decisions, as well as the use of obstacles for decisions, to assess outcomes, substance and ability to overcome transaction costs. With regards to reconciliation, the data are not well

suited for a discussion using the theoretical concepts we have available. The political strata – at least on the central level, as is the focus here – is somewhat a world of its own. Attempting to analyse degree of empathy, cooperation and dialogue that can be seen on this variable, to arrive at a conclusion about reconciliation, seems futile. The theoretical concepts of reconciliation are more appropriate for variables pertaining to the realms of society where ordinary citizens partake.

The findings in the law-chapter allow us to register developments in the decision-making abilities of the central government. The tables show that the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of Bosnia and Herzegovina had great trouble making decisions and agreeing on new laws in the first five years after the war had ended. Then the PA began passing a substantial amount of "new laws" in 2001. This continued until roughly 2005. There were many "changes and amendment-laws" during most of these years as well, but at least laws of greater substance were also being passed. After 2001-2005, the number of "new laws" decreased, with the possible exception of 2009, when 18 such laws were passed. From 2009 and onwards, the trend has been for almost no "new laws" to be passed. The passed laws after 2009 were mostly "changes and amendments-laws". If we view the second table in the chapter in light of the first, the picture becomes both clearer and more informative. The veto mechanism of Entity Voting was used extensively between 2001 and 2010. After 2010, there has been almost no use of Entity Voting. The Vital National Interest (VNI), another of the veto mechanisms, has not been as extensively used, but when it was used, it was between 2004 and 2007.

The picture painted by these two tables is one where political agents have, through time, gotten to know the political play and each other quite well. They are aware of the boundaries of what is possible. The fact that scores on *all* categories decrease, seem to suggest a form of political inertia. Relating it to the theoretical framework, the development in the passing of both "new laws" and "changes and amendment-laws" suggest that in the realm of decision-making, BiH displays a poor state of democratic quality, both in the sense of transaction costs and in the sense of democratic outcomes and substance. Paradoxically, the decreased use of Entity Voting and Vital National Interest-clause supports this conclusion. Normally, a decreased use of veto-mechanisms suggests greater agreement, so that decisions can be made and higher democratic quality can be obtained. However, when in addition virtually no new laws are passed, as is the case from 2009-present, the findings tell a different story: One of a system that has resigned and stopped trying. The findings in the law-

chapter support a conclusion that on this area, BiH is suffering from a very low level of democratic quality.

8.4 Schools – x4

The findings on the school variable would lend itself most readily to a discussion within the framework of reconciliation. Some comments about how the findings stand in relation to the democracy-concept will also be provided.

Students in primary education are still children or young adolescents. Their minds are malleable. As well as giving information about the level of reconciliation, this indicator also seems to constitute a background for saying something about reconciliation the future. The kids in primary education now will be tomorrow's grown-ups – with whatever perceptions about other groups they have received from the parental generation.

The fact that Brcko has introduced an integrated education system is a step in a reconciliatory direction. Brcko can serve as a form of role model, proving that it is possible to have integrated schools. This however, demands political will. The fact that the political will for integration seem to be lacking proves that education is still an area imbued with symbolic meaning and strategic importance for ethno-nationalist agents in various levels of society. Little development in the direction of empathy, cooperation and dialogue, and thus reconciliation, can be discerned. I would argue that the most important finding in this project is that physical segregation of school children seems to be the norm in any community where ethnic groups need to share a school. This leads me to a negative conclusion about the degree of reconciliation for this variable. As noted in the chapter itself, there has been progress in relation to curricula. Offensive material has been taken out. Textbooks have been revised to make curricula on contentious issues more uniform. This seems to be steps in the direction of reconciliation. Without it, the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina can never achieve integration. However, the fact that primary schools continue to separate children physically is a finding grave enough to argue that the degree of reconciliation on this variable is quite low. The findings of this variable are not measured longitudinally. However, the interviewees all underlined the lack of progress. The physical separation of children in schools is more or less the same now as ten or even fifteen years ago. Thus, although there are reconciliatory findings in the area of curricula, the degree of reconciliation on this area seem to be low. Not much empathy, dialogue or cooperation can happen between children (or their parents) when there is lack of interaction at all.

With regards to the concept of democracy, it can be noted that separate curricula – which is still present, although less now than before the new laws at the beginning of the 2000´nds – as well as physical separation, impairs equal access to information. Reiterating the above, this is one of the criteria of democratic quality found in the theory chapter. As such, separation of curricula as well as physical segregation of children in BiH schools is a problem for democratic quality as well as for degree of reconciliation.

A word of caveat at the end: The conclusions above are the most uncertain in this thesis. My sources were all given the task of providing me with an overview that was national in scope. My conclusions are based on their assessments, as there are no aggregate data to be found on this area. There are, no doubt, local communities that can be found with physical interaction between kids of different ethnic groups, thanks to valuable work of local as well as international NGO´s, and/or parents groups. Such work would be evidence of real life, real time reconciliatory work. Such work would also not have been captured by the assessments of my interviewees, as they were merely reporting the dominating tendencies. In other words: My conclusions are based on very broad assessments from interviews. In light of the above, the findings on this variable could suffer from validity problems.

9 Conclusion

I have now gathered and analysed data on four variables, in order to assess developments in democratic quality and degree of reconciliation in Bosnia Herzegovina since 1995. Three indicators have been measured longitudinally, the last has been measured with focus on latter years. What conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above?

Carving up the picture conceptually, we could conclude that in the variables most pertaining to everyday life (schools –x3 and minority returns – x1), suggests a picture where the trend since the war has been that not much alternative information comes through in the communities where people live, so that narratives largely remain unchallenged. Moreover, this seems to start early, as (most) children in largely heterogeneous communities are educated separately. These two conclusions suggest a poor development in terms of reconciliation. In addition, it shows a stagnant to negative development for one of the requirements with regards to democratic quality: Access to alternative information.

Regarding the two variables that pertain most to the workings of the central government, the developments show a decreasing trend when it comes to the ability to pass laws. Granted, the period roughly between 2000 and 2006 showed positive development, but since then, the amount of laws of all categories passed have dropped dramatically. This is the most serious finding of all when it comes to democratic quality. On this area, the conclusion is clear an unequivocal; this is a negative trend when it comes to the ability of the central government to deliver democratic quality to its citizens.

With regards to the election variable, a somewhat declining trend for voting nationalistic – with an exception for Serb voters – can be discerned. However, the fact that many of the wartime parties are as nationalistic as ever, and the fact that nationalistic parties *still* gather this large a ratio of the grand national totals, suggests a development with regards to reconciliation which is stagnant at best. Because it is reasonable to expect nationalism to decline after a period where it has flourished, the development, vis a vis this expectation, can also be claimed to be negative, with *lowered* degrees of reconciliation.

Another way to carve up the image is to use the two concepts of y1. Regarding ***reconciliation***, it seems possible to conclude, somewhat metaphorically, that the development has consisted of reluctant tolerance instead of cooperation. Instead of empathy there has formed a tendency to keeps one´s distance, and instead of dialogue there has been a long period of reiterating one´s ethnic discourse loudly, without listening, Regarding ***democratic quality***, the all-encompassing, pressing issues that citizens of BiH need solving have, for

many years, not been addressed. The ability to pass laws, albeit experiencing a positive trend for some time, has gone down drastically. Political elites have, through the 18 years since the war, succeeded with the tactic of playing the ethnic card to reap electoral support. When in power, however, they fail to deliver democracy - other than in the procedural sense - to their voters. In such a light, the February 2014 unrest makes perfect sense. I see it, above all, as an outcry for democratic substance. The urge for such substance evidently formed a basis for action that transcended the division lines pointed to by the above results pertaining to reconciliation. As such, even a thesis as full of distressing material as this, can at least *end* on a happy note.

10 Literature

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Appendix 1

See next page.